By Example: The Impact of Recent Argentine Naval Activities on Southern Cone Naval Strategies

Margaret Daly Hayes, Ph.D.

Center for Naval Analyses
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Summary

The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy and Operations, asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to evaluate Argentine naval strategy, its political and economic sustainability, its impact on other key nations in South America, and the implications for U.S. naval relations with countries of the Southern Cone. Thus, we examined in-depth the political-military environment in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—the three naval powers of the Southern Cone. The study considers the impact of civilian leadership on the Southern Cone armed forces, and navies in particular. It documents the themes of defense policies evolving within the region, examines broad political support for the armed forces in general, and gives special attention to navy roles and missions. The study also recommends approaches for the U.S. Navy in developing a long-term strategy toward the Southern Cone and Latin America.

Study approach

Defense policies and maritime strategies in the Southern Cone countries of Latin America are evolving. This study reflects the insights and interpretations of a senior regional political-military expert and is informed by a series of meetings with senior defense officials, the commanders in chief and staff of individual Southern Cone navies, Senators and Congressmen responsible for defense issues, and senior academics leading the defense-policy debate in the region. The study builds on efforts undertaken in connection with CNA Research Memorandum 94-63, Future Naval Cooperation with Latin America: Final Report prepared for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

1. The term “Southern Cone” generally refers to Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Brazil, a continental power, is often included because of its shared interests.
Key findings

Argentina’s defense policy of close engagement with the United States and its maritime strategy of active participation in out-of-area peacekeeping operations is being observed with considerable interest by its neighbors, Chile and Brazil, the only other South American countries currently able to undertake sustained out-of-area activities. Senior navy officials in both countries recognize that Argentina is gaining unique and irreplaceable experience operating with elements of far more sophisticated fleets. They also recognize that the Argentine navy has performed well and has won the admiration of U.S. naval officers and the officers of other navies. While not necessarily agreeing with Argentina’s aggressive association with the United States or with UN peacekeeping operations, other navies would like to have similar experience and exposure.

On the political front, Argentina has served as a positive example of a successful transition from military to civilian government and of a relatively smooth assertion of civilian oversight and authority over the armed forces. The Argentine transition has been studied closely, particularly by civilian defense experts in both Chile and Brazil. The process of subordination of the armed services to a civilian-led defense ministry has just begun in Chile, but the directions and outlines are clear. Scholars and military officers in Brazil also have studied the transition in Argentina and Chile, but the process there lags far behind because the country has lacked a strong national political leadership.

The defense policies being developed by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are based on the premise of no territorial ambitions, the need to reduce the risk of conflict in the region and beyond, and the need to promote national interests by exercising positive presence in regions of interest. In contrast to both countries’ previously introspective policies, the current postures are outward-looking policies that argue for cooperation and engagement in the world on a scale appropriate to national interests and capabilities. The region’s maritime strategies parallel evolving defense policy and focus on defense of homeland; defense of maritime resources in and beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); and global-order responsibilities. Brazil and Argentina
define their interests in the South Atlantic, whereas Chile regards the South Pacific as its area of maritime interest. Restoration of civilian government in the region permits the military to focus on professional activities. More frequent bilateral and international interactions will be viewed as opportunities to enhance professional skills.

Conclusions and recommendations

It is in the United States’ interest to encourage Southern Cone navies to develop their capabilities to participate in multinational efforts and to operate effectively in a mixed coalition context. The Southern Cone navies already have the capability to assume useful roles in the relatively peaceful context of the South Atlantic and South Pacific.

The congruence of defense and maritime policy thinking in the Southern Cone region suggests that Southern Cone navies gradually will follow Argentina’s example, engaging selectively in out-of-area multinational efforts and seeking opportunities to work with the United States. Brazil and Chile will choose the venues for their cooperation selectively. They will seek to maintain distance and independence from the United States while welcoming closer professional relations. Some foreign ministries, particularly Brazil’s, may remain cool to closer engagement.

The benefits that Argentina has derived from its engagement with the United States are not lost on its neighbors, but they also ask, “What has Argentina gotten for its efforts?” They note that the United States still will not transfer technology to Argentina, and the United Kingdom appears to exercise a veto on U.S. transfers to Argentina. At the same time, Argentina’s neighbors are not aware of the variety of bilateral activities in which the United States and Argentina engage: bilateral strategic war games, Ghost IASW operations, and efforts to bridge the communications interoperability gap, for example.

Willingness to engage with the United States in naval operations notwithstanding, the Southern Cone navies remain small and operate under serious budget constraints. A long-term goal of U.S. Navy policy toward the region should be to encourage intra-regional cooperation and
coordination so that, in the future, elements of the three fleets might deploy together. The United States can encourage and influence these positive trends among Southern Cone navies by looking for opportunities to gradually expand bilateral operational and intellectual engagement with counterparts.

A key requirement for building the relationship is a long-term, realistic vision of objectives in the region. The following recommendations address issues of broad navy policy for the region and themes of specific interest to Southern Cone navies.

- Develop guidance for naval activities in the region.
- Review regional strategies with the commanders in chief in the region.
- Designate a Flag-rank policy coordinator for the region.
- Address C3 interoperability issues on a priority basis.
- Develop a long-term program for equipment transfers to the region.
- Exercise with navies of the region during routine deployments and by expanding invitations to fleet exercises.
- Expand exchanges with the region.
  - Expand shiprider exchanges to the extent possible.
  - Review, revise, and enhance Personnel Exchange Program and other reciprocal political-military exchanges.
- Engage Southern Cone navies in dialogue on organizational, administrative, and doctrinal issues.
- Use Flag visits to promote dialogue.
- Use wargaming to explore strategic engagements in the region.
- Engage Brazil in Africa.
- Promote combined regional operations.
- Explore training opportunities in South America.
Introduction

Since the summer of 1990, Argentina has maintained a special relationship with the United States and the U.S. Navy. Argentine ships participated in Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991, conducting intercept operations outside the mouth of the Persian Gulf. U.S. carrier air wings have conducted four rounds of Gringo-Gaucho exercises with Argentina since 1990. In December 1998, Sea Control Wing One conducted Operation Ghost I ASW exercises with Argentine naval aviation, an ASW destroyer, and its TR 1700 submarine. Argentina participated in FLEETEX 2–94 off the coast of Norfolk with a submarine and a destroyer, and maintains a ship in the ongoing Haitian embargo operation. These interactions add up to an unprecedented relationship between the two countries and the two navies. They are unique in that no other South American navies have opted to work so closely with the United States. Historically, Argentina and the United States have not had a close diplomatic relationship. The recent naval interactions have been mutually beneficial to that relationship. The United States has enjoyed the support of a developing world democracy in the Gulf and in Haiti, and has gained important experience and information from the ongoing exercise series. Argentina, for its part, has rejoined the community of developed, democratic states, and its navy has demonstrated its recovery from the ravages of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict.

But Argentina is a small country (population 30 million) with a small, though very professional, navy, and it spends little on defense. The nearly "automatic" alignment with the United States is unprecedented in Argentine or Latin American history. Will Argentina's commitment to international engagement and operations with

2. Gringo-Gaucho exercises have been held in conjunction with U.S. aircraft carrier interfleet transfers. USS Constellation's 1998 transit around Cape Horn was the last scheduled carrier passage through South Atlantic/Pacific waters until 2000.
the United States continue under other governments, or is it the project of a single president? Can the Argentine navy sustain the kind of costly out-of-area operations and exercises that it has been undertaking with the United States? How do other Latin American naval powers, particularly Brazil and Chile, view the U.S.-Argentine relationship?

To better understand the Southern Cone navies' interest in and commitment to closer working relations with the United States or out-of-area multinational activities, CNA assessed Argentina's strategic vision, comparing and contrasting it with the strategic visions, maritime strategies, and naval roles and missions of its Southern Cone neighbors. CNA also evaluated the likely evolution of strategies over the remainder of the decade, and assessed the depth of political and economic support for enhanced naval missions, particularly in conjunction with the United States.³

This report documents CNA's assessments and is based on both an evaluation of the ongoing debate in the Southern Cone countries about future defense and military policy, and a series of meetings and interviews with senior political, foreign affairs, navy, and academic personnel in each country. In August 1993 and June 1994, we interviewed the commander in chief of each navy and various senior navy staff. We also met with Defense Ministers and representatives of the Defense Ministry and/or the Joint Staffs in each country. In addition, we consulted senior Foreign Ministry representatives, the chairmen and staff of relevant legislative committees in each country, and key academics involved in the defense-policy debate.

An unprecedented commitment: Argentina in the Gulf

In the summer of 1990, the United States began to prepare for imminent hostilities in the Persian Gulf. The President sought to build a multinational force that would convincingly demonstrate to Saddam

Hussein that the entire world opposed his policy of forceful takeover of Kuwait. It was particularly important that representatives of non-NATO countries participate in the multinational coalition, so that neither the maritime blockade nor future armed activities could be perceived as the United States or NATO acting against poor developing countries.

To build the multinational naval interdiction force that would impose UN sanctions on Iraq, OPNAV sent quiet inquiries to naval and other attachés at various embassies in Washington, alerting them informally of a possible invitation to participate in a Gulf maritime coalition. By chance, the Foreign Minister of Argentina was visiting Washington in late August 1990. En route to National Airport to return to Buenos Aires, Argentina’s naval attaché (now commander in chief) mentioned the possibility of an invitation regarding Argentina’s participating in a Gulf coalition force. The Minister, who had doubts about the undertaking, phoned President Carlos Menem from the airport and received a resounding “yes” response to the proposal that Argentina sign up for Desert Shield participation if Kuwait should so request.

The Argentine Navy sent a total of four ships to the Gulf. The destroyer ARA Almirante Brown and the frigate ARA Spiro arrived on station on October 27, 1990. They were replaced in March 1991 by the frigate ARA Rosales and the support ship ARA Cabo San Blas. The ships conducted intercept operations and carrier escort outside the Gulf. Although the Argentine ships did not participate in combat operations, they were very active in intercept operations (above average for coalition participants). At the same time, they were confronted with a variety of problems associated with communications and logistic support to a navy that had not operated out-of-area since the Cuban Missile Crisis, and whose equipment was supplied by a mix of U.S., British, Italian, and German companies. The British lifted their ban on supplies of spare parts to Argentina for the duration of Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Argentina’s response to the Desert Shield invitation was unprecedented. Not only have Latin Americans generally adopted a “noninterventionist” approach to other countries’ conflicts, but Argentina
had never had close military relations with the United States, as Brazil, for example, had during and after World War II. Moreover, the United States had provided critical support to the British during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict.

Brazil and Chile also received informal invitations to send ships to the Gulf, but neither responded affirmatively. Chile was in the process of a delicate transition to civilian government following 16 years of military rule, and Brazil felt constrained because, among other reasons, a large number of Brazilian citizens were still in Iraq.

The legacy of Gulf cooperation

Since the Gulf War, at Argentina’s continuing initiative, the United States has conducted a number of singular navy-to-navy interactions with the Argentines. Strategic talks are no longer held with other Latin American nations, but continue with Argentina. Since 1990, the United States and Argentina have conducted an annual, bilateral strategic war game that emphasizes responses to out-of-area scenarios. In 1993, U.S. antisubmarine warfare (ASW) air units conducted Exercise Ghost I off the coast of Mar del Plata with Argentine ASW aircraft, a destroyer, and a submarine. Argentina sent a surface ship and submarine to FLEETEX–2 1994 (the first time it has sent ships to a U.S. FLEETEX). Argentina maintains a frigate as part of the UN/OAS-sponsored Haitian embargo, and Argentine army units form part of the multinational peacekeeping force in Bosnia.

This close working relationship with the United States and the U.S. Navy reflects a conscious decision by Argentine President Carlos Menem to restore Argentina to the community of Northern Hemisphere developed nations, and by Foreign Minister Guido di Tella to ally Argentina so closely to the United States as to resemble “carnal relations.”

4. OPNAV interest in bilateral engagement with South American countries had its origin in the 1980s’ Maritime Strategy and waned in the 1990s.

5. As expressed in an interview with the Argentine press in August 1993.
Defense Minister Oscar Camilion to reestablish respect for the Argentine armed forces and to rebuild confidence in the Argentine navy, especially among the British.  

In spite of a shift to more pro-U.S. orientation in foreign affairs in the 1980s, no other nation in Latin America has dared to pursue such a blatantly U.S.-oriented foreign policy. However, most Latin American countries, for the first time since the era of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s pre-World War II Good Neighbor Policy, are openly eager to work with the United States, particularly in expanding commercial relations.

Argentina’s example is not lost upon its neighbors. In retrospect, important elements of both Brazilian and Chilean navies, particularly the latter, would have liked to have had the experience of working with other nations in a major maritime exercise. At the same time, some segments of the Brazilian and Chilean defense-policy community continue to adhere to Latin America’s historical posture of self-determination and non-intervention, and believe that it is inappropriate to commit assets to respond to out-of-area conflicts. Those who support some out-of-area activities would limit their commitment to peacekeeping operations and worry that the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is not always clear or predictable. Some (a very few) believe that Argentina has “gone too far ....” “given up a bit of her sovereignty” in allying herself so closely with the United States. But all recognize that the Argentine services are gaining experience and training that is unprecedented and irreplaceable.

These issues are being debated in the midst of a profound reorganization of civil-military relations and restructuring of the region’s armed forces under pressures of budget restrictions and shifting national-policy priorities. Civilian authorities are seeking to establish oversight and policy control of their armed forces as part of strengthening civilian government and democratic institutions. Economic restructuring has reduced the various governments’ ability to support

bloated bureaucracies, and has required cuts in payrolls and greater administrative efficiencies to sustain activities. Military salaries are at all-time lows, placing severe pressure on service morale, recruitment, and retention. At the national level, defense policy is focused on "preventive security" or "cooperative security," including explicit cooperation with neighbors. No country entertains the likelihood of military conflict with a neighbor today. These trends are placing continuing pressure on the South American military forces' ability to sustain current operations and readiness.

The U.S. Navy's investment in relations with Argentina is significant—and arguably should be more so and more focused if Argentina is to be a continuing ally in multinational operations around the world. However, further investment should be made only if there is a reasonable chance that Argentina will continue its commitment to cooperation with the United States, and if it is able to maintain and improve its operational capabilities. Moreover, continuing investments in U.S.-Argentine relations should avoid, if possible, jeopardizing fragile relations with Brazil and Chile, South America's other significant naval powers. Ideally, Brazil and/or Chile also can be persuaded to work with the United States and with Argentina in some future combined South American task group. What investment would be needed to accomplish this?

The answers to these policy issues depend on the direction of ongoing national debates on defense policy and the roles of the armed forces in civilian-led democratic governments in the Southern Cone countries. Furthermore, they depend on continued economic performance that will permit adequate resources to be allocated to the armed forces so that they can pursue modernization, improve maintenance, and expand operational training.

This paper explores the answers to these issues. It is divided into six sections. The first section describes the evolution of defense-policy thinking under civilian governments in the region. The next section examines the structure of naval forces in the region and levels of national investment in their armed forces. The following three sections look at how the different navies of Argentina, Chile, and Brazil
define their roles and missions and how these roles and missions may evolve over the coming years. Finally, the report offers conclusions about the directions of defense policies in the region and the implications for U.S. Navy policy-makers.
Defense policies in the Southern Cone

South Americans are uncomfortable talking about defense policy. Historically, they have adopted defensive postures in relation to their neighbors, arming themselves to counter overland invasions. They remind the United States that "you are undergoing a crisis of redefinition of your national-security strategy. The Cold War ended for you, not for us. We were not part of the Cold War; our outlook was different, and our threats have not changed."

The South Americans are correct in part. They did not prepare for war against the Soviet Union, though they did justify their naval expansion, and their continuing naval relations with the United States (in UNITAS, for example) in terms of their role in the protection of South Atlantic or Southeast Pacific sea lines of communication (SLOCs). They were, however, fully engaged in the Cold War's ideological campaign, waging war against communism and leftist subversion for three decades. Thus, their Cold War battles were internal (though their armed forces were structured and trained to fight a conventional enemy). The end of the Cold War brought about the demise of the radical left in most countries. With the return to democracy, many former leftists are now members of parliament. The political roles that the armed forces played from the mid 1960s to the late 1980s are no longer acceptable. The Latin American armed forces are redefining their missions in terms of professional military activities within the context of national debates on defense policy.

The debate on defense policies in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil is driven by the need for civilian leaders to establish authority over the armed forces and to provide a framework within which a national

8. Defense of SLOCs was the role assigned to South American navies under the Rio Treaty and, more recently, in the 1980s' Maritime Strategy.
consensus on the size, force structure, and roles and missions of the various services can be established. Moreover, it provides the interface between foreign policy and defense policy at a time when countries are actively seeking integration with their neighbors, within a commercial framework that is in stark contrast to the generally isolationist and protectionist policies of the past.

The defense-policy debate departs from a firm consensus regarding the continued need for a national armed force in each country. On this point, there is no debate: countries want modern, efficient, professional forces. However, the dispositions, roles and missions, and threats against which the armed forces are to prepare are uncertain.

From the civilian perspective, the national debate also is driven by the need to establish civilian authority over the military. It is an area in which civilians have had little experience. Historically, most Latin American armed forces managed their own budgets without civilian scrutiny, made their own decisions regarding acquisitions, and developed their own strategic visions (often not coordinated at the national level). Although budgets were not extravagant, there were few constraints on military spending. Armies, in particular, had access to unlimited numbers of conscripts.\textsuperscript{9}

The new emphasis on professionalism in the South American armed forces is bringing about only a "refinement" of military strategies that have not changed dramatically. The return to the barracks following years of military governments has resulted in a diminution or abandonment of internal "national-security" concerns and a return to emphasis on defense questions. South America was marginal in the Cold War, so the end of the Cold War has made little difference in the armed forces' underlying mission definition. Budget constraints are making a greater difference in how the militaries implement traditional missions.

\textsuperscript{9} Conscription was adopted as a mechanism to instill in the nation's youth the idea of the nation and of patriotism, as well as to teach basic skills and sanitary habits to rural youth. This remains an important service role in Brazil and Chile.
The principal military role remains defense of the nation, usually defined in terms of deterring possible aggression. Aggression, in turn, is no longer viewed as likely to come from regional neighbors. Both civilian and military authorities in the Southern Cone region insist "we have no enemies." Nevertheless, all take precautionary and "dissuasive" postures in approaching the issue of defense of sovereign territory. They recognize that defense and deterrence will take place at national borders, not by seeking to resolve threats to national interests far from home, as the United States does.

Internal security problems stem from social inequalities, emergence of radical groups such as Peru's Sendero Luminoso, or the spillover of such groups onto national territory, and cross-border migrations. In the maritime environment, violations of the EEZs, or infractions of international regulations governing fisheries, Law of the Sea (LOS), or the environment are seen as the more likely threats.

National-security strategies, or so-called defense policies, are being defined in each country. Argentina has advanced the most in this process and serves in many ways as a model. Chile is behind Argentina, but is working with a timetable geared to 1997, when a major generational transition within the armed forces will take place. Brazil has only begun to debate defense policy and the process has been hampered by uncertainties regarding the outcome of October 1994 presidential elections.

It is important to note that the discussion of defense policy and the refining of military strategies is part and parcel of the transition to full

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10. Latin Americans use "defense policy" to refer to what we would normally call "national-security strategy" because of the unfortunate experience with national-security strategies developed in the 1960s and 1970s and associated with military government. Under the umbrella of national-security strategy, the concept of security was defined too often as a military issue, and the military too often used force to resolve the accumulating political, social, and economic problems of the nation. As will be seen, defense policy is based on political, economic, and military considerations, with the military responsible for acting in only one of these arenas. Latin Americans tend to use the term "military policy" to refer to what we would normally understand as defense policy (roles and missions of the armed forces).
civilian authority over defense decision-making. The discussion of
defense policy has advanced most in the country that has had the
greatest success in defining and institutionalizing civilian authority
over military matters—Argentina. Both civilian and military authori-
ties have used the academic environment to raise issues of impor-
tance, to build consensus on defense and military policy issues, and to
establish a venue in which politicians, academics, and senior military
officers can explore ideas, establish channels of communication, and
develop a common vocabulary on security issues. The importance of
the academic venue and of academic debate for building consensus
cannot be overemphasized.
The shape of Southern Cone navies

Compared to many other countries, Latin American countries have relatively small armed forces and spend little on them. Table 1 shows data on the size of the armed forces relative to population and on defense spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Data are included for the United States, Canada, and Australia to provide a basis for comparison. The first column of the table shows that no Southern Cone country maintains even 1 percent of its population under arms. In the second column, it can be seen that Brazil spends less than 1 percent of its GDP on defense, whereas Chile and Argentina are currently spending 2.5\textsuperscript{11} and 3.2 percent, respectively. These relative shares of GDP have declined for both Argentina and Chile since the mid-1980s, but have remained relatively constant for Brazil. Finally, the third column shows that, on a per capita basis, the Latin American countries spend little at all on defense. The per capita defense dollar figures are comparable to Portugal or Turkey, and are lower than any other NATO country’s expenditure.

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\textsuperscript{a.} Source: \textit{The Military Balance, 1993.}

11. Published figures for Argentina include spending on internal security forces and the \textit{Prefectura Naval} (Coast Guard), a separate force reporting to the Interior Ministry; so, even these figures are higher than actual spending on the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Latin American armed forces have been concerned with defense of their own territory, subversion, and counterinsurgency efforts. Because of this introspective focus, armies predominate in the defense equation. Table 2 shows the structure of the armed forces of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile for the years 1980 to 1985 and 1991 (the latest years for which data are available). The table describes the dramatic downsizing that has taken place in the Argentine armed forces since the Falklands/Malvinas War (from 130,000 to 45,000), as well as the relative sizes of different services within the armed forces. It also shows that the army is the dominant force in each country and the air force is equal in size to the navy in Brazil, but smaller by half in both Argentina and Chile.

Table 2. Structure of Southern Cone armed forces (figures in parentheses are conscript numbers)\textsuperscript{a,b}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>130,000 (90,000)</td>
<td>45,000 (25,000)</td>
<td>40,000 (13,400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>19,500 (10,000)</td>
<td>13,000 (3,000)</td>
<td>8,900 (1,200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>36,000 (18,000)</td>
<td>20,000 (2,000)</td>
<td>20,500 (3,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval air</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brazil</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>182,750 (110,000)</td>
<td>197,000\textsuperscript{c} (143,000)</td>
<td>219,000 (126,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>42,800</td>
<td>50,700</td>
<td>59,400 (5,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>47,000 (3,000)</td>
<td>48,000 (2,200)</td>
<td>58,400 (2,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval air</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>53,000 (30,000)</td>
<td>57,000 (30,000)</td>
<td>54,000 (27,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14,000 (1,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>24,000 (1,600)</td>
<td>25,500 (2,000)</td>
<td>25,000 (3,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval air</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{b} Obligatory service is 6–14 months in Argentina, 1 year in Brazil, and 2 years in Chile.

\textsuperscript{c} To increase to 296,000 (\textit{The Military Balance}, 1985–1986).
The structure of the armed forces and the relative priority among services are important because of the history of military decision-making on national-security issues. The dominant service tends to determine the overall defense outlook. Because of the army's involvement in politics, and its concern with border defense and internal security, the army-dominated national-security outlooks of all three countries have tended to be introspective.

The structure of forces is important for a second reason. Because each service has been responsible for its own budget and no overarching defense ministry has been in place to allocate resources according to need, budgets have tended to be set according to the manpower size of the service, not their hardware requirements. Any budget increments have been spread proportionally across services. This process is changing in Argentina, and will likely change in Chile over the next several years as a defense military is put in place, but is yet unchanged in Brazil.

Table 3 shows the force structure of Southern Cone navies. They are small navies, but the assessment of most U.S. Navy operators who have worked with them is that they are professional, well-trained, and good ship operators. They are relatively modern. Chile engaged in a major acquisition program in the 1980s and will continue adding to its fleet until early in the next decade. Brazil made acquisitions in the 1970s and developed an indigenous shipbuilding infrastructure to which it remains committed. Argentina lost ships during the Falklands/Malvinas War and is still hard-pressed to replace those losses. While Argentina is the process of privatizing its defense industries (and many may close), both Brazil and Chile will continue to support their national defense-industry infrastructure.

12. Various USCOMSOLANTs who have worked with the Southern Cone navies in the annual UNITAS deployment have referred to the Southern Cone navies as "near-NATO navies" in their seamanship.
Table 3. Force structure of Southern Cone navies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light carrier</td>
<td>(1)b</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14 + 4c</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious ships</td>
<td>1 + 1 Newport C1</td>
<td>3 + 1 Newport C1</td>
<td>3 + 2 Newport C1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>42 + 13 armed helos</td>
<td>29 armed helos</td>
<td>14 + 16 armed helos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol and coastal</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24 + 6 river patrol</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antarctic</td>
<td>1 icebreaker</td>
<td>6 survey/oceanography</td>
<td>1 patrol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


b. Argentina’s carrier is in the drydock, and commentators disagree whether it will ever be reactivated. The navy continues to plan for a carrier. The Defense Minister argues that it is “a desirable platform for Argentine presence in the South Atlantic.” No funds for reactivation are in the current budget plan.

c. Brazil originally planned to acquire six U.S. Knox-class frigates. Because of high reactivation costs, Brazil reduced its program to four ships and ultimately declined the U.S. offer, opting instead for the more modern U.K. Broadsword.

d. The Brazilian air force’s Maritime Command consists of 11 S-2E and 21 EMB MR/SAR aircraft.

e. Each navy has a large number of other coastal patrol and utility craft. Those listed here are combatants.

It is important to recognize that the Southern Cone fleets, though small, are relatively modern and reflect a conscious effort to upgrade hardware and to eliminate older equipment that can no longer be maintained. Modernization, incorporation of technology, and efficiency are key themes in each navy’s plans. Each navy is postured for conventional open-ocean activities. Chile and Argentina, more than Brazil, have developed capabilities intended to confound their principal rivals—Peru, Bolivia, or Argentina for Chile, and Chile or Brazil for Argentina. Brazil was watchful of Argentina, but built her navy in the

context of two roles in the South Atlantic—defense of SLOCs and ASW patrol as part of an allied force in the event of global war. Argentina maintains the only sizeable naval air capability and began, as of last year, to hold annual exercises with Brazil’s carrier. Each navy today wishes to preserve its open-ocean capabilities and to assume certain additional responsibilities.

14. By the mid 1970s, Brazil was increasingly skeptical that the United States would ever concede a meaningful responsibility to it, even in the event of global war, and it began to de-emphasize roles with a global coalition, preferring to develop indigenous capabilities tailored to its own unique interests and circumstances. See the excellent discussion of this phenomenon in Fernando Bustamante, “La proyección estratégica de Brasil: visión de sus problemas de defensa presente y futura,” in VA Rigoberto Cruz Johnson and Augusto Varas Fernandez, Percepciones de amenaza y políticas de defensa en América Latina (Santiago, Chile: FLACSO/CEEA, 1993).
Argentine defense policy and maritime strategy

Argentina's national defense policy is an extension of its foreign-policy commitment to rejoin the developed world, i.e., the United States and Europe. This has been a specific commitment of President Carlos Menem and his current Foreign Minister, Guido di Tella, and is strongly supported within the Foreign Ministry. Good relations with the United States are a priority, as is advancing regional relations. Relations with Brazil are excellent and those with Chile almost as good.

National policy

Argentina's leaders continue to maintain that the Falklands/Malvinas Islands belong to Argentina, but they have forsworn use of force to recover the islands, no matter how long it may take. The South Atlantic is a key area of interest because of its economic wealth (fisheries and the possibility of petroleum and gas). Argentina is committed to peacekeeping missions as a means to assert its responsible role in international affairs and presently has peacekeepers in nine different countries.

Believing that the Organization of American States (OAS) is not playing an adequate role in regional security, and that the Rio Treaty is no longer a meaningful vehicle for hemispheric collective security, Argentina has initiated a movement within the OAS to foster a regime of "cooperative security" (based on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) model) and has sought to promote this idea with its neighbors, so far without great success. On a bilateral basis, Argentina has pursued rapprochement with both Brazil

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15. Diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom have been restored, though the U.K. continues to deny Argentina military equipment or replacement parts.
and Chile, working at the diplomatic level and service by service; has promoted and signed every multinational nonproliferation accord; and is seeking to establish confidence-building measures with her neighbors.

Argentina’s commitment to overseas operations is justified on several grounds. It is a clear manifestation of the country’s insertion into the developed world (under President Menem, Argentina withdrew from the Group of Non-Aligned Nations); it provides Argentina with opportunities to work with NATO countries, particularly the British. For the military, overseas engagements provide opportunities to recoup prestige lost as a consequence of the Malvinas War and failed policies of military government. Moreover, these engagements provide opportunities for funding and training that would not otherwise be available.

Within this overall vision, Argentina is committed to a small, modern, efficient armed force, whose main role is defense of sovereign territory. By law, the armed forces now are proscribed from acting in internal affairs unless called on to do so by the president. President Menem recently instructed the Defense Ministry to “quickly eliminate the compulsory recruitment service and implement an entirely professional Armed Forces.”

Argentine navy strategy

The Argentine navy defines Argentina as a maritime country without, as yet, a maritime consciousness. One of the navy’s stated goals is to raise the consciousness of the country’s maritime interests. In this vein, the navy stresses Argentina’s 4,000-km coastline; its extended continental shelf, with rich fishing grounds; its vast, untapped mineral wealth; its growing international commercial traffic; and its geographic location as a gateway to Antarctica via the city of Ushuaia on the Beagle Channel. The geographic extent of Argentina’s maritime interests are shown in figure 1.

Figure 1. Maritime interests of Southern Cone navies: Argentina

Key:
- **Exclusive economic zone**
- **Claim in Antarctica**
- **Area of maritime interest**
- **Continental Shelf**
Within the context of national-defense policy, the navy defines for itself a number of specific missions.\textsuperscript{17}

- **Regional deterrence.** This is defensive in nature, but credible so as to be effective, and is based on stability achieved by developing mutual trust among neighbors.

- **Protection of sea resources.** In the EEZ and on the continental shelf, which is particularly extensive in the Argentine case (see figure 1), competition is increasing among international fishing fleets, many using predatory practices, and some entering into the Argentine EEZ. Effective sea control is to be exercised by “effective presence and maritime surveillance.”

- **Preserving world order.** This is to be achieved by participating in peacekeeping operations. Navy roles in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) include amphibious operations, search and rescue operations (SAR) and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), humanitarian operations, and maritime blockade. Peacekeeping requires interoperability.

- **Control of South Atlantic sea lanes.** The navy recognizes that shipping in the South Atlantic and around Cape Horn is vastly diminished today compared with years when the Suez Canal closure required ships to use the Horn route to Asia, but nevertheless thousands of ships pass annually through South Atlantic waters. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay (Mercosur countries) maintain a Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) organization, CAMAS; and Argentina accepts International Maritime Organization responsibility for organizing SAR missions in the South Atlantic. These responsibilities also impose a need to establish working relations with other coastal nations of the Americas and Africa.

- **Recovery of Malvinas.** “Recovery of the Malvinas, South Georgias, and South Sandwich Islands” represents a strategic priority in Argentine foreign policy.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{17} The following list is derived from Argentine Navy, General Staff of the Navy, *Naval Strategic Policy*, August 1993.

\textsuperscript{18} President Carlos Menem, address to the Nation, May 1, 1993.
• **Antarctica.** Argentina claims sovereign rights in Antarctica, but is committed to upholding the 1992 treaty. The navy maintains monitoring facilities on the Antarctic continent and provides support to these stations.

• **Environmental concerns.** The navy is committed to patrol and enforce international conventions regarding environment in its jurisdictional waters and to conduct salvage and disaster operations.

• **Counternarcotics operations.** The navy recognizes that narcotics consumption has increased in Argentina and that the country is a route of transshipment and money laundering. The navy's Maritime Control of Shipping conventions helps detect traffickers, and the navy provides logistic support to law-enforcement authorities.

• **Domestic community activities.** The navy conducts, as needed, disaster relief, evacuations and medical assistance, as well as oceanographic and hydrographic support operations.

Port authority and Coast Guard operations in Argentina are conducted by a separate entity, the *Prefectura Naval*, and there are ongoing jurisdictional conflicts with the *Prefectura* over naval responsibilities in the EEZ.

**Sustainability of defense policy and maritime strategy**

Because Argentina today has the smallest force and the lowest budget of the three major South American countries, there is some concern about its ability to sustain the ambitious international commitment it has made for its armed forces, particularly for the navy. For the moment, such concerns can be allayed by the strong commitment on the part of the present government—with tacit support of other parties—to the internationalist agenda. Nevertheless, budget measures will continue to limit both maintenance and modernization.

**Political support**

Argentina's major political parties support the concept of a lean, modern, efficient armed force with carefully defined professional
military missions. Generally speaking, defense leaders in the legislature support the armed forces' participation in multinational activities—because of the professional exposure—though the opposition Radical Party is less supportive than the government party (Peronists). Public opinion polls have registered gradual increases in approval of the armed forces during the Menem government. The public strongly supports the elimination of conscription.

Argentina has made significant progress in building a defense ministry and a joint staff that work together effectively to redefine professional military missions. The Defense Ministry recognizes that service budgets are painfully low and has argued for increases. There is broad, though still evolving, consensus within Congress, the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries, and in the services as to the directions that military policy should take. As President Menem will likely win a second four-year term in office in the 1995 elections, he will have five more years to lay the foundations of this policy.

The policy will rest on two bases: multinational participation out-of-area and cooperative security within Latin America. Argentina's relations with both Chile and Brazil are excellent and should only improve.

Argentina would like to see the United States working with both of its neighbors on nearly the same terms as it works with its government. "This would help us in the region," said one senior diplomat. "We're seen as too close to the United States." Argentina and Chile have now resolved 22 of 24 outstanding border disputes, and Argentina has taken several initiatives with Chile to conduct combined exercises. Relations between the two countries' armies and air forces are good, and the navies maintain both informal and senior-level contacts. The two navies conduct an annual bilateral training exercise in the Beagle channel region. Argentina is committed to improved relations with Chile, and discussions with authorities in both countries make it clear that initiatives will continue.

19. Of the remaining two issues, one awaits ratification by the Argentine Congress (Chile has ratified) and one is under arbitration.
Constraints

In the foreseeable future, the principal constraints on Argentina’s continuing its policy of association with the United States are economic. Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo has gambled high stakes on his ability to halt inflation by pegging the national currency to the U.S. dollar. The country has a significant trade deficit (especially with Brazil), and substantial inflows of cash to partake of privatizations have not created new jobs. Should the current economic stability falter dramatically, the armed forces certainly would bear a burden of budget cuts.

Even under optimistic economic scenarios, the armed forces are not likely to see significant increases in overall budgets. The services will have to realize savings by becoming more efficient. A multi-year planning cycle may permit some greater attention to operations and maintenance of equipment, both of which are clearly needed. OPTEMPO has dropped to only 30 to 40 days at sea per year. Argentina’s multiple foreign suppliers make it expensive to maintain adequate spares for her equipment. Replacement parts for British equipment sometimes are not available. The Argentines would like to make future procurements with the United States, if possible, but recognize that they are committed to their European equipment for some time.

The current navy officer corps is well-educated and professional. Hands-on training is often curtailed because of budgetary constraints on OPTEMPO. Peacekeeping missions are viewed as one way to train.

Morale among junior officers is mixed because of continuing low salaries and few opportunities at sea. The navy is concerned that recruitment will be seriously affected in the future. Higher pay associated with an all-volunteer military may help some with recruitment.

20. Overall Argentine readiness has been severely challenged in the past two years, both because the country is allocating scarce resources to ships operating out-of-area, and also because operational days at sea have been reduced to well below the acceptable level. A Congressional Deputy observed that the air force has suffered casualties because pilots were not able to maintain adequate flight time. These considerations support the military’s request for more operational resources.
Chilean defense policy and maritime strategy

Like Argentina, Chile historically had an "isolationist" foreign policy and an introspective defense policy. Sensitive to global opinions, Chile turned further inward during the period of military government from 1973 to 1989. Threats historically came from geographic neighbors (Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia), and from internal factors.

Partly because of its isolation from the "West" during the military government, and partly because of the growing economic activity in the region, Chile began to discover its Pacific-Rim neighbors in the late 1970s and 1980s. Today, one-third of Chile's foreign trade takes place with Pacific-Rim economic powers, and Japan is its largest single trading partner, followed by the United States and Europe. This economic link to the world forms the basis of Chile's current national-defense-policy thinking.

As in Argentina, the debate over defense policy in Chile is taking place as part of the civilian government's effort to assert authority over the historically autonomous armed forces. Relations between civilian-defense authorities and the armed forces were cold during the Aylwin government (1989–1994), but warmed immediately under the current government of Eduardo Frei and his defense minister, Edmundo Perez Yoma. The latter has initiated a process of dialogue among party leaders, military officers, and academic specialists to define the broad and specific outlines of defense and military policies that will evolve over the course of his administration.

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21. General Augusto Pinochet, who declined to deal with Aylwin's Defense Minister, called personally on Perez Yoma before he took office and has worked closely, and publicly, with him since.
National policy

The new policy\textsuperscript{22} is to be based on the premises that Chile seeks to promote peace, quality of life, the common welfare, and democracy "with governability"; that Chile's commitments will be related to its economic interests; that Chile will emphasize conflict resolution in its foreign policy, and that it will support a well-equipped, well-trained armed force that will collaborate with the forces of Chile's neighbors and will participate in peacekeeping operations.

Further defined, the policy will assert the following:

- Chile has no territorial ambitions.

- There must be transparency in the allocation of national resources (i.e., the armed forces' expenditures must be made public).

- The armed forces' budgets must respond to public direction (i.e., the 1990 law ensuring a stable percentage of the budget to the armed forces, and the 1958 law allocating 10 percent of copper-export receipts to the armed forces will be revised (probably after 1997).

- Chile will seek to reduce risks in the region through a preventive diplomacy that seeks to avoid armed conflict and to manage crises. Chile will seek to expand opportunities for cooperation, believing especially that the Southern Cone neighbors need to "march together." Chile will promote confidence-building measures that facilitate this. Beyond the region, Chile will join all conventions limiting weapons of mass destruction and will seek opportunities for mutual controls with its neighbors; Chile will join international humanitarian treaties.

\textsuperscript{22} The following is based on interviews with the Defense Staff and Chilean defense experts (Santiago, June 1994) and a presentation on Chile's defense policy by academic coordinator, Guillermo Holzman (Buenos Aires, June 1994).
• Chile will study UN/OAS peacekeeping case by case, evaluating its participation according to a defined set of criteria that will include: non-participation in wars; an assessment of the “character” of the country to be supported; the missions Chile might be asked to perform; the political objectives of the missions; the length of time of the commitment; the kind of professional training that the armed forces will receive to participate; and the interoperability required.

• Military roles and military careers will be modified to encourage greater cross-training of officers within civilian institutions, and to encourage alternative civilian careers for officers who retire short of maximum service.

Chilean navy strategy

Official navy thinking lags behind these defense-policy guidelines, but the broad outline of the navy’s strategic vision has been presented to the Chilean public since 1990 under the rubric of Admiral Jorge Martinez-Busch’s concept of Mar Presencial (presence in the sea). Mar Presencial is an explicit effort to establish a maritime consciousness in a country that, like Argentina, in spite of more than 4,000 km of coastal front, has not historically had a sea-going mentality.

Martinez-Busch describes Chile’s Mar Presencial as a geographic area encompassing the territorial sea, the EEZ and the ocean waters included in a region defined by Chile’s northern border, Easter Island, and Chile’s claims in Antarctica (see figure 2). Mar Presencial takes on importance, in Martinez-Busch’s argument, because of the economic activity that flows through the region—commerce, fishing, potential mining of the deep-sea bed, and possible territorial conflicts over the island states of the region.

23. Stressing the issue of interoperability, a senior office noted specifically that Chile will not participate in peacekeeping missions in which it cannot place a meaningful role alongside the major powers (Interview, June 1994).

24. Martinez-Busch’s ideas are presented formally in Admiral Jorge Martinez-Busch, Océanopolitica: Una alternativa para el desarrollo. (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1993).
Figure 2. Maritime interests of Southern Cone navies: Chile
Mar Presencial is consistent with Chile’s recent experience. The country’s development policy is based on trade, with 97.7 percent of imports and 93.7 percent of exports by volume, and 67 percent of exports and 91.9 percent of imports by value moving in maritime transport. Coastal cabotage has increased dramatically in the past several years. Fisheries’ activities also have increased by 250 percent (craft greater than 50 Dead Weight Tons (DWT)) and by 530 percent (craft less than 50 DWT) in a period of ten years.²⁵

Chile’s obligations as a responsible power require it to establish its presence in this region of interest. The concept precedes and may have been a model for Argentina’s definition of its resource interests off the continental shelf. In a similar vein, Canada recently proposed legislation that would apply Canadian conservation rules to adjacent international waters.²⁶

Specific navy roles in the area of Chilean interests cover three fronts:²⁷

- **Diplomatic or naval presence.** Presence can be asserted formally with Chilean ships visiting at ports or visits of the training ship, *Esmeralda*; through personal contacts established throughout the region, which can facilitate crisis management; and through the show or exercise of dissuasive power.

- **Defense of territory.** The navy is responsible for protecting the Chilean coast through exercise of sea control, and through military power projection.

- **Socioeconomic responsibilities.** The navy has an important role in developing maritime activities per se, including


²⁷. This discussion is taken from Arancibia, op. cit.
maritime safety; oversight and control of maritime regions; and undertaking a variety of maritime activities such as cartographic and hydrographic responsibilities, marine radio management, maritime SAR, and salvage. The navy exercises maritime traffic control under the auspices of the American Maritime Traffic Control Organization.

Whereas the Argentines minimized the consideration of threats to national interests other than economic predators, Chile continues to count possible terrorist threats (supported by Cuba) to the country. The posture is aided by the fact that the Marxist-supported Manuel Rodriguez Revolutionary Front (FRMR) operated with increasing frequency in the last months of the military government and continues to exist organizationally.

Chile regards the Panama Canal as an issue of concern. On the one hand, most of Chile’s petroleum imports pass through the canal, and costs would increase sharply if the Canal were closed. Senior navy officers express pessimism about Panama’s ability to manage the canal in the post-2000 time frame. \(^{28}\) Chile would have increased responsibilities for vigilance over the Straits of Magellan and Drake Passage should the canal be closed and maritime transport have to seek the southern route.

In the past, Chile imagined that superpower confrontations in the Pacific could embroil Chile\(^ {29}\) and it continues to imagine that regional conflicts over island states in the South Pacific could require Chilean engagement. More contemporary threats, however, include concern over Asian migrations to the Americas, a prospect that Chilean officers believe could become serious should hostilities break out with North Korea.

Chilean authorities acknowledge that drug trafficking takes place through Chilean ports and overland, partly because the route is not as well-policing as are more-northern routes. Patrolling and inspecting shipping and ports are becoming “more serious, more

\(^{28}\) Interviews, August 1993.

\(^{29}\) A senior officer commented that Chileans did not appreciate how the American War in the Pacific had saved the country from involvement in World War II. Interviews, August 1993.
important," and the Maritime Transport Directorate and the Merchant Marine—both under navy supervision—have responsibilities for these activities under the law.

Consistent with Mar Presencial, the Chilean navy has a growing interest in policing fisheries' activities in the Pacific and in monitoring environmental issues, including pollution and hazardous-waste disposal in the area.

Finally, Chile maintains a claim to a section of the Antarctic continent that overlaps claims of other countries. These overlapping claims could spark conflict if not managed carefully. Chile is a signatory to the Treaty of Antarctica.

Chile's navy has adopted a strategy of deterrence to confront these various threats or tensions and argues that the exercise of deterrent power requires a force that is credible in terms of capacity and the will to use it. Monitoring the various maritime responsibilities requires a fleet that can operate on the high seas and sustain itself logistically over a large area.

**Sustainability of defense policy and maritime strategy**

Chile's new defense policy and maritime strategy, though still evolving, bear a strong resemblance to those devised by Argentina. They are based on a careful calculation of Chile's interests in the world, its dependence on a peaceful international scenario to expand its markets, and the need to build regional economic strength and institutional stability by linking first the Chilean and Argentinian economies, then the economies of Brazil and other countries in South America.³⁰ Both the Chilean and Argentinian governments are committed to bilateral economic integration and to bringing Chile into Mercosur, the emerging Southern Cone Common Market of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Chile gives priority first

³⁰. This integrationist view prevails throughout South America today. At the recent Inter-American Summit (September 1994), the region's leaders agreed to link their economies in a South American free-trade zone by the end of the century.
to national, then to regional commitments, finally to international partners such as the United States.

Chile’s policy is being vetted on a broad, nonpartisan basis via academic forums. A formal White Paper is expected by the end of the year. Selected aspects of the policy will be phased in over the course of the Frei administration’s five-year term of office. The current government will oversee the 1997 transition of the armed-forces leadership from the commanders in chief designated for eight-year terms of office by the Pinochet government to commanders probably selected by a civilian leadership. The administration will also rewrite authorities for funding the armed forces. Thus, it will have a powerful tool for shaping future military roles and missions.

Chile’s future defense policy will support the idea, in principle, of participation in out-of-area operations, but Chile will be selective in its accepting missions, measuring each request against a detailed checklist. Although the present army and navy commanders in chief do not endorse out-of-area operations, and the navy declines to operate with its neighbors in UNITAS and resists hosting shipriders from other countries,31 significant other elements within the navy would welcome opportunities for engagement with other navies.

**Political support**

It is not yet possible to test support for a more outward-looking defense policy or for expanded maritime missions. The widespread evaluation that the defense program is receiving in political circles and in the academic community argues in favor of nonpartisan support across the full political spectrum. Chile’s armed forces are not a discredited entity within Chilean society. Elements to the left in Chile’s tri-polar political spectrum would favor cutting additional resources from the military and would probably resist multinational engagement with the United States or in UN peacekeeping operations.

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31. This posture stems from reactions during the Beagle Channel dispute (1978) when Argentina and Chile nearly went to war with each other. Peru was perceived to take Argentina’s side.
Constraints

The Chilean navy is often judged by U.S. Navy officers who have worked with it as one of the best in South America in terms of readiness and seamanship. The current officer corps is professional and well-educated. However, senior officials express concern that salaries are not sufficient to attract and retain the best personnel. The navy has been well supported and has an acquisitions program that extends into the next century, but budgets have already shrunk in real terms and long-term resources will shrink further. In addition, projected revenues are already committed. The navy will have to realize savings by becoming more efficient if it is to generate more resources for operations. Under the national-defense policy, Chile would retain its own defense industries to ensure replacement and repairs to its equipment. The navy would continue to operate the national shipbuilding and repair facility (ASMAR).

The Chilean services are very proud. Having once been declared pariahs, they will not likely undertake activities in which they cannot participate as equals. Access to adequate technology and real interoperability are regarded as essential if Chilean units are to participate efficiently and successfully with other major forces. “We won’t go if it’s just a token role,” was the observation of one senior officer.

U.S.–Chilean navy relations

U.S. Navy relations with Chile’s navy are good. The two navies maintained contacts throughout Chile’s isolation during the Pinochet government. At the same time, Chilean officers suspect that the United States is not a reliable partner, and they are reticent to make any commitment to the United States as a consequence. Chile also maintains excellent relations with the British and German armed forces, with which it interacts in the context of equipment acquisitions.

Chile’s current navy leadership is interested in developing operational exchanges with the United States, especially in the Pacific area. To this end, they have recently sent a submarine to operate with U.S. units at Keyport, Washington. They would like to learn from the United States, but are not yet committed to operating with the U.S.
Navy. Chilean officers stressed the desirability of training together as the best way to build the relationship and develop interoperability.\textsuperscript{32}

In this vein, the Chilean navy has proved to be an excellent partner, whether in the UNITAS context or in other ad hoc exercises. The Chilean environment offers a true laboratory for ... \textit{From the Sea} operations. U.S. Navy units are challenged when they engage the Chileans.\textsuperscript{33}

Future Chilean naval leaders are more likely to be interested in engagement with the United States and other navies on a bilateral basis and in multinational contexts. They will be less affected by Chile’s 1973–1989 isolation. At the same time, their activities will be constrained by limited budgetary resources. In addition to at-sea training opportunities, the academic venue provides opportunities for sharing views on a variety of operational and doctrinal issues on which the United States would like to develop multinational consensus.

\textsuperscript{32} Interviews, Chilean Navy Staff, June 1994.

\textsuperscript{33} See CRM 94–63, op. cit.: 6.
Brazilian defense policy and maritime strategy

In contrast to Chile's and Argentina's modest and introspective national-security perspectives, Brazil has traditionally espoused a manifest-destiny national-security policy (its pursuit of grandeza or greatness), and though the policy is not expansionist, it clearly envisions Brazil as the dominant power in South America and, indeed, in the South Atlantic region. Brazil's armed forces were historically postured against Argentina, the only country able to credibly threaten Brazilian population centers. However, in reality, Brazil has long counted on its overwhelmingly greater economic power to protect it from physical threats from the region, and today it sees only opportunity, not threat, in its relations with other Latin American countries.

National policy

Brazil has not revised its national-security policy significantly since the early 1960s, when the Superior War College promoted a developmentalist national-security doctrine. The policy emphasized the armed-forces' role in the development and modernization of the Brazilian people, economy, and institutions. In the maritime area, the policy described Brazilian hegemonic pretensions over the South Atlantic region. With borders on every South American nation except Ecuador and Chile, Brazil has sought to manage its regional relations in a way that does not alarm, but nevertheless ensures protection of Brazilian interests.  

Initially Brazil's maritime interests were defined as protecting SLOCs in the South Atlantic, a role that Brazil played in both world wars. Beginning in the early 1970s, Brazil identified Africa as a priority interest area and it has renewed that interest in the post-Cold War environment.

34. Brazil's intentions aside, most of Brazil's neighbors regard it as overbearing with hegemonic intentions, "the Colossus of South America."
The United States has sought close relations with Brazil since the early 1900s. President Theodore Roosevelt sent the Great White Fleet to Rio to court Brazil, and Brazil accorded the fleet an extravagant and prolonged reception as part of its own efforts to establish its independence from British influence.\textsuperscript{35} During World War II, the U.S. Fourth Fleet operated out of Brazil and Brazil placed its navy under U.S. Navy operational command.\textsuperscript{36} Brazil sent an army division to the Italian campaign, U.S. planes flew out of Brazilian bases, and Brazilian ships patrolled the South Atlantic on behalf of the allies. No other South American country made such a strong commitment to the allied cause. Relations developed during the war lasted through the late 1970s.

In contrast to the earlier period, relations with Brazil and its military establishment have been rocky since 1977 when, following publication of the first Congressionally mandated human rights report, Brazil broke off the U.S.–Brazil military accord. Contributing to Brazil’s ire was a profoundly negative U.S. reaction to the country’s signing of a nuclear-technology-sharing accord with the Federal Republic of Germany. U.S. objections to Brazil’s indigenous arms industry and its pursuit of sales in unpredictable markets such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq (which Brazil courted because of its dependence on imported petroleum), also irritated the Brazilian military. More recently, environmentalist interest in the Amazon region has raised an ages-old red flag of extra-hemispheric designs on Amazon wealth.\textsuperscript{37} U.S. relations


\textsuperscript{36} See Patrick H. Roth, Captain, USN (Ret.), \textit{The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps in Latin America: 1775–1994, A Chronology} (manuscript).

\textsuperscript{37} Brazil’s fears are not totally unfounded. From time to time serious people have debated “internationalizing” the Amazon region. In the early part of the century, Brazil’s rubber boom was cut short when foreigners “stole” indigenous rubber plants and exported them to Malaysia. More recently, officers in all services have given unwarranted credence to the writings of Lyndon LaRouche as circulated in Spanish: \textit{El complot para aniquilar a las Fuerzas Armadas y a las naciones de Iberoamérica} (The Plot to Eliminate the Armed Forces and Nations of South America), Washington, DC: \textit{Executive Intelligence Review}, 1993.
with the Brazilian military today are highly dependent on personalities at the heads of different services. Internal interest in developing professional skills appears to be a key factor in renewed good will on the part of the Brazilians.

Like Argentina and Chile, Brazilian strategic thinkers acknowledge that the country is passing from an era of "confrontation and relative stability" to one of nonexistent confrontation with a high degree of instability (sic).\(^8\) Although Brazilian officials do not see a likely military confrontation with its neighbors, they do see the possibility that "tensions" from the neighbors (e.g., drug trafficking, contraband, migration, poaching, and cholera) can be communicated through the vast, rich, and unoccupied interior of the country.

The army has taken the lead in defining Brazil's new "internal security" vision, which emphasizes maintaining military presence in frontier zones to manage national affairs and to prevent contagion of tensions from other areas. The army vision is perceived by the navy and air force to relegate those services to being mere transport platforms and these aspects of the policy are strongly resisted by both services.\(^9\)

The introspective strategic vision promoted by the army is complemented by a nationalist Third World policy orientation promoted by the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty). The highly professional ministry is an influential and independent voice within the Brazilian hierarchy and it often prevails in internal debates about policy. The ministry resists relationships that in any way appear to subordinate Brazil to the United States or any other power. Itamaraty is the architect of Brazil's Africa policy and advocates a regional, i.e., South Atlantic, focus for Brazil's foreign policy. The ministry has long promoted a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic region and is upset and suspicious that the United States has consistently rejected

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\(^8\) As stated in the Brazilian Navy's Command Brief presentation, June 1994.

\(^9\) Given its size, the army has dominated the national-security debate in Brazil. The struggle for meaningful naval missions within the army's introspective strategy has contributed to navy resistance to recommendations for "joint" coordination and operations.
entertaining the concept. The Foreign Ministry also holds to a
strict constructionist approach to UN peacekeeping opportunities.
Brazil will only participate in situations of "prior peace."41

One observer expressed the view that the Foreign Ministry "feels it is
possible to organize a joint action ... by Third World states with the
aim of creating a new type of international relationship based on dif-
f erent values and principles than those of the super powers. This dip-
lomatic standpoint ... had led to the proposition of 'demilitarization'
of the South Atlantic." This position in turn has diminished the gov-
ernment's interest in a Brazilian military presence in the South Atlan-
tic, and has weakened Brazilian naval forces."42

Today, Brazil is behind both Argentina and Chile in discussing
"national-defense" issues and in asserting civilian control over the
armed forces. This is explained in part by the continuing political
chaos at the country's national level and the failure, to date, of strong
political leadership to emerge. In addition, authorities agree that the
Brazilian population has little notion of the concept of "defense" as a
national concern. Defense is "the military's business."43

Nevertheless, military issues received attention in the recent presi-
dential campaign. Trade unionist Luis Inacio Lula da Silva's Workers'
Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)) platform44 stated that military
spending should be increased to 2 percent of GDP by the end of the
decade, with spending targeted at restructuring the forces, and
upgrading equipment and personnel. The platform also proposed

40. The ministry interprets the U.S. position as an effort to ensure U.S.
dominance of the region and as mistrust of Brazil (Interviews, June
1994).


42. VA J.C. Gonçalves Caminha (Ret.), "The South Atlantic: A Brazilian

43. See Fernando Bustamante, "La proyeccion estrategica de Brasil:
visiones de los problemas de su defensa presente y futura," in Cruz
Johnson and Varas, op. cit.: 168.

44. See FBIS-LAT-94-027 (9 February 1994), "PT's Government Plan
Revealed," from Folha de São Paulo (3 February 1994).
creating a Ministry of Defense, professionalizing the armed forces, and eliminating conscription, as well as maintaining key military projects such as the AMX aircraft (an air force project), and the navy’s nuclear-submarine program. No other parties took such explicit positions on defense or military issues, but because the PT platform is the only clear statement of military policy before the public, it will have some influence on the direction of future debate on policy.

Other efforts to strengthen civilian control over defense questions include providing the Congress with professional staff who are defense experts, and preliminary discussions about long-term defense issues under the leadership of the Strategic Studies Institute of the Office of the Presidency, and other academic institutions.

Brazilian navy strategy

Like Argentina and Chile, the Brazilian navy views Brazil as an ocean power, with a population that does not have a maritime calling. One of the navy’s challenges is to raise awareness of the importance of the sea to the country’s national power. Ninety-five percent of Brazil’s commerce moves by sea, with 60 percent of imports coming from the Middle East (petroleum), and an equal amount of exports going to the North Atlantic countries (United States and Europe). Brazil’s two main sources of domestic petroleum lie on the continental shelf, and major fisheries grounds are found off of the Amazon River mouth, the state of Bahia, and the southern coast of the country.

The Brazilian navy defines its mission as one of defending national territory, including:

"... advising in the development and use of maritime power and preparing for and applying naval power to contribute to the attainment of national objectives."

45. The following mission statements are taken from the navy’s Command Brief presented June 16, 1994, at Brasilia. Translations from the Portuguese are the author’s.
In fulfilling this mission, the navy has at least supervisory authority over the merchant marine; safety of navigation; maritime law enforcement; the navigable riverine network; and the North and South Atlantic Ocean areas that Brazil faces as far south as Antarctica (see figure 3).

The navy’s specific missions include:

- Defending national territory by demonstrating deterrent force and the ability to use force if necessary. The navy argues that its projected nuclear-submarine force will enhance its deterrence mission.

- Supporting international political initiatives in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry. Brazil is presently helping to stand up a Namibian navy and envisages working closely with other nations in Africa (see figure 3).

- Maintaining sovereignty over maritime areas of interest by patrolling and establishing presence in the territorial sea, EEZ, and on the continental platform.

- Exercising maritime control over SLOCs of interest to Brazil or its allies in accordance with international commitments.

- Conducting maritime SAR in areas of its responsibility.

- Exercising maritime control of shipping and police activities associated with Law of the Sea responsibilities.

- Exercising control over maritime areas of importance to national security by denying the enemy use of maritime areas.

- Maintaining the ability to project naval power over land.

- Operating in coordination with other (national) armed forces.

- Contributing to the maintenance and control of the Amazon and Paraguay-Paraná Basin waterways.
Figure 3. Maritime interests of Southern Cone navies: Brazil

Key:
- Areas of interest in Africa
- Exclusive economic zone
- Zone of interest in Antarctica
- Range of maritime interests
— The Amazon River is navigable by ocean-going vessels to Manaus. Brazil has more than 12,000 miles of navigable rivers in its two principal river basins, and two of its six naval districts are riverine. Expansion of navigation on the Paraguay-Paraná waterway will bring increased responsibilities. The navy also provides medical assistance to rural and indigenous populations along the upper Amazon waterway.

- Maintaining national institutions as dictated by the Constitution.

- Supporting national social, economic, cultural, scientific, and technological developments. The navy includes its support for nuclear research and for the national shipbuilding industry under this rubric.

Despite its emphasis on riverine activities, the navy devotes relatively little effort to Amazon or Paraná/Paraguay activities. Some six ships and 2 to 3 percent of personnel are allocated to the riverine effort. The Manaus Naval District will soon be headed by a Rear Admiral to match the Army’s one-star commander of the Calha Norte (Northern Amazon) program. In the past, the army and the navy have contested control and decision-making authority over the riverine patrol force, and the contest of parallel commands reflects this. Despite the rivalry, navy presence in the riverine network is minimal.

**Sustainability of defense policies**

It is not possible to talk of sustaining one or another defense policy in Brazil until issues of political leadership are resolved. This may or may not occur following Brazil’s fall 1994 presidential elections. Brazilian observers believe that a Workers’ Party government would have the most explicit and perhaps most progressive military policy, emphasizing the modernization and professionalization of the armed forces.\(^{46}\) Nevertheless, managing inflation and containing government spending will be the next administration’s main preoccupation.

\(^{46}\) In part because of its need to assure the armed forces of its intentions, but also because as a minority party of untraditional origins.
The armed forces are not likely to see significant increases in budget support until Brazil's fiscal house is in order.

Brazil's long-standing policy of building bridges to regional neighbors will continue. Brazil will not follow Argentina or Chile. It will continue to pursue its relatively independent foreign policy oriented toward South America and Africa. Economic and commercial policy differences as well as simple rivalry with the United States will impede very close U.S.–Brazilian relationship.

**Political support**

Brazil's military is not a discredited institution. Indeed, public opinion polls rank the armed forces among the top three most respected institutions in the country—in part in contrast to the incompetence and corruption of civilian government institutions, but also because the armed forces have resisted further engagement in Brazilian politics. The armed forces will continue to play an important role in national life with the army dominating.

Brazil's navy is actively pursuing opportunities to interact with neighbors in the South Atlantic region. It holds exercises with all of its Southern Cone neighbors and is building bridges to Africa.

**Constraints**

The principal constraint on Brazil's armed services is the lack of national leadership to establish priorities. The army's introspective view of national-defense issues will serve as a modest constraint on the Brazilian navy's efforts to define a South Atlantic mission. Similarly, Itamaraty will probably resist greater navy engagement with the United States. Strong national leadership could overcome foreign-ministry resistance, but other issues may dominate presidential decision-making.

Brazil is reluctant to discuss the impact of lower pay and reduced opportunities on recruitment and retention, but officers noted that with a "lower class of people" (i.e., less academically prepared) entering the service, the navy has to dedicate more resources to bringing them up to acceptably high navy standards. At the same time, the
navy has maintained its high standard of training and "this is why Brazil's old ships continue to run smoothly."

Budget resources do impose constraints on readiness. Brazilian officers admit that low budgets have forced them to cut back "on land-based activities." This has included cuts in programs that directly benefit troops. In some cases, budget limitations have also constrained acquisitions. Brazil declined a U.S. offer of six Knox-class frigates because of the high reactivation costs.

**U.S.–Brazilian navy relations**

U.S. Navy relations with Brazil have been cool over the past several years, but recently they have shown signs of improvement. Brazil welcomes the fact that the U.S. Navy has begun to examine its relationships in South America. Personal relationships with key Brazilian leaders provide the building blocks for improved relations. Areas of interface that do not impinge on foreign-policy decisions can provide useful venues for expanding contacts within the Brazilian navy. Brazil is very pleased with the U.S. Atlantic Fleet shiprider program, in which Brazilian junior officers embark on U.S. ships for six months. The navy has indicated interest in exploring methods of strategic planning. Academic exchanges, emphasizing instructors, also might serve as a bridge to Brazil's military academies. Brazil's marines are interested in greater interaction with the U.S. Marine Corps.
Conclusions and implications for the United States

Argentina has taken the lead in the transformation from an introspective defense policy and naval strategy to one of engagement with the developed world’s navies. Chile is not far behind. The defense policy likely to be promulgated by the Frei government resembles Argentina’s in many ways because the two countries are beginning to see their interests in similar terms. Moreover, Argentina and Chile increasingly see each other as close allies—a convenient relationship that gives them weight on the continent relative to Brazil. Both the Menem and Frei governments are committed to strengthening cooperation between the two countries. The Frei government will be in office for six years, and with the likelihood that in 1995 Carlos Menem will be re-elected for a second four-year term in Argentina, the new outlook will have ample time to take root. Brazil is further behind, as political circumstances in Brazil have not permitted difficult issues to be addressed.

Defense policies

The Southern Cone countries of Latin America are experiencing a profound and dramatic transformation in their political and economic structure, the relations of their military institutions to the state and society, and in their sense of integration with the world community. Economic restructuring, market opening, the return to elected civilian government, and the end of superpower rivalry and ideological conflict have all contributed to the transformation process and influence the directions in which it is evolving.

South America’s military institutions are not discredited services. Civilian leaders in all three countries will assert increasing control over the armed forces: first, by placing the services under a civilian minister (already the case in Argentina and Chile); second, by
controlling military budgets (already the case in Argentina); and third, by determining national goals and military roles and missions in support of those goals.

Because national well-being depends on economic growth and trade, national policy is increasingly outward oriented. Regional integration is occurring at a faster pace than was ever imagined. Political coordination is accompanying economic integration. Cooperation between once-rival armed forces is a reality, at varying stages of implementation for Peru and Chile, Chile and Argentina, and Argentina and Brazil. No country presently contemplates conflict with its neighbors. Instead, countries are formalizing cooperative measures, institutionalizing cooperative security\(^{47}\) and confidence-building measures, and engaging in inter-service exchanges. Foreign and Defense ministries are taking the lead in defining the new policy direction.

The old warfare contingency plans still exist (no text has yet been written for the new relationship), but military planners are fully engaged in the restructuring of the armed forces to emphasize professional military roles and training, organizational and administrative efficiency, and incorporation of advance technology to facilitate efficiency.

The emerging strategic scenario emphasizes peace, regional cooperation, and attention to opportunities for ensuring political and economic stability that enhances economic growth and development opportunities.

Under this new strategic scenario, the armed forces must refine and redefine their own roles and missions. Armies, no longer needed to fight a land war against an aggressive neighbor, will become smaller and may well have fewer conscripts. (Argentina will have eliminated conscription by 1995; Brazil may phase out or dramatically reduce

conscription under a new government, and Chile may address the compulsory military service question in conjunction with revisions to the organic law of the armed forces in 1997.) Naval missions will be enhanced, particularly by the growing sense of responsibility for national maritime economic wealth. Professional military roles will be emphasized, and an effort made to distinguish between defense, internal security, military, and policy roles.

As a consequence of the assessment of roles and missions, each country will discover the tension between the minimal size of force necessary to perform routine duties, and the force and capabilities required to cope with crises and to be able to operate with peers, out-of-area, or on the high seas. As the United States found in the Bottom-Up Review process, the anticipated routine post-Cold War security tasks may not justify a large, standing army, a large fighter air force, or a blue-water fleet, but capabilities must be maintained to meet the demands of possible, though less probable, major conflicts or crises. South American countries will probably follow Argentina's example and increasingly opt for engagements with the U.S. Navy and other NATO-class fleets, often out-of-area, in order to maintain a competitive professional edge and to justify their blue-water missions.

Brazil remains a question mark in this equation, not so much because Brazilian thinking differs dramatically, but because continued lack of national-level leadership in Brazil could result in failure to address new policy opportunities.

Maritime strategies

In the maritime arena, the Argentine navy has defined its priorities in the following terms:

- Defense of homeland
- Defense of maritime resources in and beyond the EEZ
- Global-order responsibilities.

Chile's maritime strategy includes these same priorities and Chile's navy also emphasizes enhanced coastal defense and port responsibilities that fall to the Prefectura Naval (Coast Guard) in Argentina.
Brazil also is paying increasing attention to a variety of naval operations other than war and refocusing its South Atlantic role.

Out-of-area engagements other than war operations offer opportunities to exercise the fleet in non-threatening ways and to demonstrate national "presence" in areas of interest. Because such activities are often conducted with other navies, they provide exposure to peers and an opportunity to "see how others do it." This, in turn, enhances professional engagement.

Although South American navies have traditionally guarded the homeland or patrolled contiguous waters, the decline of perceived threats at home, coupled with an acknowledgment of broader responsibilities for global order, can be expected to lead South American navies to emphasize engagement with each other and with the United States and other advanced nations as a means of enhancing their professional skills and expanding opportunities for training.

In sum, Argentina has set an example for international engagement in peacekeeping operations and bilateral engagement with the United States. Chile is clearly studying a similar posture, if not yet committed to pursue it. Brazil is intrigued, but is still constrained by political and other considerations from following suit. However, one senior Brazilian officer suggested the direction that Brazil might take when he observed, "I think you will see us in more multinational activities in the future."48

Implications for the United States

The Southern Cone navies’ redefinition of roles and missions does not necessarily imply close working relations with the United States. The benefits that Argentina has derived from its out-of-area commitments are not lost on its neighbors; but they also see costs. A senior Brazilian officer observed that "Argentina’s close relationship with the United States is not for us. She has given up a bit of her

48. Interview, Brasilia, June 1994. Legislation needed to permit Brazil to finance sending units abroad on short notice has been submitted to Congress.
sovereignty ....” In Chile an officer admonished, “we’re not going to hire out like mercenaries.” Many observers ask, “What has Argentina gotten from the United States in return for its cooperation?” The answer, they believe, is “not much.”

Skepticism is driven by the belief that Argentina has not been given access to advanced technology and that the United Kingdom continues to exercise an effective veto over U.S. transfers to that country. 49 Beyond that, Argentina’s neighbors are not aware of the variety of incidental interactions that have taken place—unique wargaming exercises; special exercises such the Ghost I ASW operations, and others are not well known. The neighbors see what Argentina is doing with the United States out-of-area, but they do not seem to be aware of what the United States is doing with Argentina on a bilateral basis.

Neither Chile nor Brazil is likely to be as enthusiastic in its relations with the United States as Argentina has been. Neither feels the same obligations to “rejoin” the Western community that Argentina does. Segments of the Chilean navy resent the treatment their country received from the United States during Chile’s military government. Brazil will insist on maintaining its independence of an entangling alliance with the United States.

At the same time, professional sailors are interested in pursuing their profession, learning the state of its art, and interacting with the best role models. Political and economic considerations aside, the navies would all welcome an opportunity to interact more frequently.

49. These conditions changed during 1994.
Recommendations

A variety of channels are open to engage South American navies in ways that do not appear to “push” them toward a slavish copying of the Argentine relationship. Many of these channels were explored in CNA’s study *Future Naval Cooperation with Latin America: Final Report*.

Key requirements for building the relationship are a policy agenda with realistic objectives and a policy coordinator with status and interest to implement the agenda. Categories of broad navy action are reviewed below.

- **Develop guidance for naval activities in the region.** Many opportunities for useful interactions with Latin American navies have been lost because of the absence of an overall navy vision of its objectives in the region. A regional guidance would provide a long-term framework within which to plan engagement with the region so that mutual interests can be accommodated. Guidance would focus dispersed U.S. Navy component attention on the need to exploit opportunities in the region and would provide rationale for doing so. Guidance can facilitate coordination of the activities of the navy staff, fleet commanders, and Navy International Programs Office, as well as with other service and unified-command activities.

- **Review regional strategies with the commanders in chief in the region.** South Americans are used to the United States deciding policy “on its own.” A CNO-led initiative to identify mutual interests and requirements would be unprecedented and welcome. It would also provide the framework for a review of mechanisms for interaction and for enhancing cooperation in the region. Issues that should be reviewed include:

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50. See CRM 94-63, op. cit.: 87–103.
— Coordination of blue-, green-, and brown-water initiatives

— Long-term goals for UNITAS

— Command, control, and communications issues

— Prospects for engagements out-of-area

— Riverine training and operations

— Maritime control of shipping

— Combined operations within the region

— Training opportunities in the region, including deployments for training (DFTs)

— Other issues.

It is important that discussions be addressed at the senior level so that an appropriately senior peer can respond, and they can be followed up. Personal relations are important in the region, much as they are in Japan, and the policy coordinator needs to be visible and personally engaged.

- **Designate a Flag-rank policy coordinator for the region.** CNA's research found that there was no overall coordination of efforts in the region and that operational responsibility tended to be concentrated in too few staff hands, often at too junior a level to have an impact. Coordination of programs and policy requires integrating operations, training, security assistance and political-military activities within the U.S. Navy, as well as representing U.S. Navy interests to Latin American counterparts. The message was heard repeatedly: "You need a Flag to manage this."

- **Address C3 interoperability issues on a priority basis.** Interoperability is the region's number one concern. The South Americans' willingness and ability to participate in out-of-area activities depend on the assurance that they can play meaningful (not "token") roles, and that they can work with their developed-country counterparts. A regional communications system should be pursued before each navy develops its own
independent system. This issue should be discussed at the commander-in-chief level.

- **Develop a long-term plan for equipment transfers to the region.** Latin American navies have indicated their interest in procuring ships and weapons from the United States. They would prefer to negotiate “hot” transfers, both to reduce costs and to facilitate training with U.S. crews. Their ability to operate with the USN in the future may depend on the capability and compatibility of their equipment inventories. Nevertheless, the high costs of reactivating dated U.S. equipment has discouraged them and sent them shopping in other countries. In some cases, Latin American navies have not been able to take advantage of offers made on short notice. In other cases, equipment has been offered that is inappropriate to the size and budget of the respective service. The United States not only loses the revenue from the transfer, but also the opportunity to work with Latin American crews for extended periods of time. A long-term plan that matches the region’s future needs with the potential availability of United States equipment would permit both U.S. and Latin American navies to maximize the utility of equipment transfers. Such long-term planning requires senior navy attention.

- **Exercise with navies of the region.** Ships operating in the Caribbean and its environs should seek opportunities to exercise with navies of northern South America. Third Fleet ships, as well as Atlantic Fleet assets, should be encouraged to engage with navies of Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela when they are operating close to the area.

  — Southern Cone navies (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) should be invited routinely, perhaps on a rotating basis, to participate in Atlantic area FLEETEXs and in PAC area exercises when feasible and appropriate.

  — As NS Guantanamo is phased out, the navy should ensure that access to CONUS or Puerto Rico-based refresher training opportunities continues for northern-tier navies.
• Expand exchanges with the region.
  — Shiprider exchanges should be pursued to the maximum extent possible. These “deckplate-level” contacts are the best way to bridge the generation gap and to establish commonality of procedures. Working-level contacts “in the fleet” are highly valued. Chile would like to work in the Pacific area, Brazil and Argentina in the Atlantic area.
  — Explore revising the policy of “reciprocal” exchanges to enhance the value of exchanges to the respective services. PEP and other academic exchanges are in need of extensive review and revision. The Latin American navies send their best personnel, whereas U.S. officers “fight like hell” to avoid overseas assignments. The complex demands of peacetime forward presence, military diplomacy, and multinational coalition-building require political-military and operational skills, and the navy must find ways to put value on both. Assignments to the region should be carefully monitored to ensure maximum utility to the host navy, and follow-on assignments for U.S. personnel should be identified to make the exchanges more attractive.

• Engage Southern Cone navies in dialogue on organizational, administrative, and doctrinal issues. Southern Cone navies are interested in knowing how we think. Most navies are seeking better ways to educate their officer corps. Brazil indicated an interest in learning how the United States does strategic planning. The academic venue offers excellent opportunities to develop personal relations and to influence the direction of thinking among the navies. Flag officers and distinguished specialists should make a point of addressing war colleges.

• Use wargaming to explore strategic engagements in the region. With the exception of the Argentines, with whom the United States has conducted of series of strategic war games, South Americans tend to use wargaming in their naval academies to teach tactics. They should be engaged in gaming at higher levels that will help them explore operations other than war, crisis management, coalition interoperability, rules of engagement, and similar issues. U.S. visitors should explain how the
United States uses these scenarios and what it is doing with other countries on these issues.51

• **Engage Brazil in Africa.** Both Brazilian foreign policy and the Brazilian navy’s naval strategy emphasize Brazil’s Africa connection. The Brazilian navy is engaged in standing up a Namibian navy, and Brazil is looking for other opportunities to engage in the continent. In the past, Brazil deferred a response to invitations to participate in the West Africa Training Cruise. The invitations should be reiterated.

• **Promote combined regional operations.** Latin American fleets have unique capabilities. They are small and will remain small. Their ability to expand in the near term, even under optimistic scenarios, is limited. Because of these constraints on the Latin Americans’ ability to contribute to the outcome of a crisis, a goal of engagement with the region should be to build on their own increased coordination and develop a combined Southern Cone capability that would permit elements of the three fleets to deploy together.

• **Explore training opportunities in South America.** The major operating areas of South America’s Southern Cone are distant and U.S. Navy ships rarely deploy to the region outside of the annual UNITAS deployment. Much more can be done with South American navies, and they would prefer more frequent interactions rather than an expansion of UNITAS. The South American region is a prime laboratory for developing ... *From the Sea* doctrine and for training against challenging “opponents” in a ... *From the Sea* environment. CNA’s report to CINCLANT-FLT noted that U.S. units benefitted whenever they engaged with the Latin Americans and that more opportunities for beneficial engagement could be obtained at little additional cost if greater attention were given to planning such interaction over a medium-term time frame.

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51. Southern Cone navy staff all indicated real interest in the subject matter of recent U.S.–Argentine strategic war games. For example, Brazil would be interested in non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).
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