## East Asia

### Southeast Asia

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25 OCTOBER 1990

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Ghafar Urges Muslims To Modernize
91SE00064 Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN
in Malay 16 Sep 90 p 2

[Text] Kuala Lumpur—Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba reminded the Islamic community that religion, development, and modernization are closely related and cannot be separated.

"Muslims in this country must therefore improve their self-confidence and abilities so that they can make maximum contribution to the creation of an advanced society.

"Members of the Islamic community must realize that lack of knowledge and skills will weaken them and make them always dependent on other people for protection," he said yesterday as he inaugurated a seminar entitled "Religion, Politics, and the Islamic State."

The 2-day seminar at the National Administration Institute is sponsored by the International Islamic University.

Ghafar said the most obvious example of the failure of the Islamic community to participate in world progress is the placement of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia because of the Gulf crisis.

"The weakness of the Islamic community in technology and modern weaponry made it necessary for Saudi Arabia to seek the protection of Western countries despite its being surrounded by nations of the same religion," he said.

He noted that narrow thinking which rejects progress as contrary to faith will continue to make the Islamic community backwards in every sector.

He said some in the Islamic community make such a narrow interpretation of the faith that they create a viewpoint that the world, wealth, and progress are only for non-Muslims.

The deputy prime minister said the Islamic community must realize that non-Muslims themselves do not need faith to convince them that they must improve themselves for the sake of their families and national development.

"If most Muslims keep their narrow way of thinking, what will become of them? Will a small group of Muslims working hard to advance themselves give help to those who only daydream about the afterlife?" he asked.

He said that if this situation continues, the Islamic community will remain dependent forever on other people to help when it suffers difficulties and disasters.

Ghafar advised the Islamic community not to be influenced by such narrow thinking, because Islam encourages self-improvement to avoid poverty.

Speaking to reporters after the meeting, the deputy prime minister said there is nothing wrong with students at all levels following national and international political developments as long as their only objective is learning.

"This does not mean, however, that they should plunge actively into politics, for they are not experienced in life yet and such activity could hurt their studies," he said.

Importance of Sabah, Sarawak to National Front
91SE0006C Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 19 Sep 90 p 7

[Text] A senior leader in Kuala Lumpur says jokingly that if after the next general election the Peninsula's seats in Parliament are divided 50:50 between the National Front (BN) and the opposition alliance, the BN in Sarawak and Sabah will determine the majority.

Although the idea of a 50:50 split is hard to accept, considering that the government's popularity under the leadership of Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad is on the increase, the number of seats to be contributed by Sarawak and Sabah has profound significance.

Their 47 of the 180 seats to be contested in the election are expected to be quite important in determining the future majority in Parliament.

The BN now holds 34 of the 44 seats of these two states. The remaining 10 districts are controlled by opposition members and independents. Three new seats in Sarawak are to be contested for the first time in the next election.

Sabah has 20 seats, while Sarawak has 27. Sarawak added three seats when the Election Commission redrew district boundaries. In the 1986 election, 24 parliamentary seats were contested in Sarawak and 20 in Sabah.

The question now arises as to whether the Sarawak BN is able to increase the number of seats it holds and whether it can ensure that its present seats will not fall into the hands of the opposition.

This question is certain to arise among Federal BN leaders, who hope that Sarawak and Sabah will contribute one-fourth of all BN seats in Parliament.

The visit Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, as BN chairman, is to make to Sabah and Sarawak after his upcoming visit to South Korea indicates the serious attention he is giving to the two states and is certain to improve the BN's image among the people there.

The focus will clearly will be on Sarawak Chief Minister Tan Sri Haji Abdul Taib Mahmud and his counterpart in Sabah, Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan, to see whether BN will be successful in their states.

It is rather difficult to predict victories for BN candidates in the two states because of the unique politics that
exist there, particularly in Sabah. In each election, the BN faces other BN candidates as well as opposition parties.

The emergence of independent candidates in certain election districts occasionally raises the question of who is behind them. Stabbing one another in the back in the political arena has become a tradition.

A debate has now arisen between the Sabah United Party (PBS) and USNO [United Sabah National Organization] over the use of the BN symbol in the next parliamentary election. Both are component parties of the BN, but at the state level USNO is the opposition.

USNO’s status is the same as that of the Sarawak Dayak Party (PBDS), which opposes the government of the State National Front (better known as “BN3”). The State National Front is made up of the United Traditional Bumiputra Party (PBB), the Sarawak National Party (SNAP), and the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP).

USNO wants to use the BN symbol in the next parliamentary election, whereas PBS proposes that both use their own symbols.

USNO President Tun Datu Haji Mustapha Datu Harun says that USNO remains loyal to the BN and, as its “close friend,” is prepared to accept any BN leadership decision about the election.

Emerge

On the other hand, Deputy PBS President Datuk Bernard Dompok, who is also deputy chief minister, criticized USNO for appealing to “loyalty” as an excuse for using the BN symbol in the next election.

On his visit to Pahang yesterday, however, Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir said he had not received an official PBS request for use of their own symbol.

By using separate symbols, PBS and USNO are “free” to debate each other, or, more accurately, to conduct “open opposition” for all 20 parliamentary seats. Their concept is, “The strongest will get the most seats.”

On the other hand, if they use the BN symbol, they cannot debate each other. In other words, they are compelled to defer to each other. If this happens, it will be no surprise if many independents, who are not truly independent, emerge to challenge the official BN candidates.

That is what happened in the 1986 election, when the independent candidate in Marudu district, Jeoji Supiring, defeated the USNO nominee. Jeoji is now officially a member of PBS.

That situation also occurred in Sarawak in the same election, when two independent candidates, Dr. Nicholas Munong (Rajang) and Andrew Luwak (Serian), defeated the respective BN candidates from SUPP.

A year later, both were accepted as members of PBDS. Last year, however, Luwak announced his resignation from PBDS to be a permanently independent member of Parliament.

In fact, many other independent candidates believed to be backed by certain parties ran for office but failed.

In actuality, however, victorious independent candidates are not recognized as BN representatives in Parliament but sit with the opposition despite their being accepted as members of BN component parties. Moreover, the BN has the right to put its own official candidates in the races for seats held by the independents.

This means they will again run as independents in the next election if they want to keep their seats.

In the 1986 election, the PBS was allocated 14 seats and USNO 6 seats. PBS lost four seats to DAP [Democratic Action Party] in the Gaya, Tanjung Aru, Tawau, and Sandakan districts, while USNO lost only the Marudu seat.

Honesty

In Sarawak, PBB was given eight seats; SNAP, five; SUPP, seven; and PBDS, four. PBB, SNAP, and PBDS won all the seats they were allocated.

SUPP lost three seats, one to DAP in the Bandar Kuching district and two to independents in Serian and Rajang.

One of the two PBB seats is now held by an opposition party member from the Sarawak Malaysian People’s Association (PERMAS), Haji Bujang Ulis; whereas the Bintulu seat belonging to SNAP is held by independent Ting Ling Kiew.

Ting and former Deputy Minister of Education Haji Bujang Ulis were dismissed from their respective parties in 1987 for involvement in the “Ming Court” attempt to topple Chief Minister Tan Sri Haji Abdul Taib Mahmud.

Whether the seat allocations for BN component parties in Sarawak and Sabah will remain as they were in the 1986 election is up to the Federal BN Supreme Council. The same is true for the distribution of the three new seats in Sarawak.

In view of the current political configuration, there is no easy way now for the opposition to “steal” Parliament seats from the BN in Sarawak and Sabah.

Still, the matter of an absolute victory for the BN is dependent on whether there is honesty, cooperation, and family spirit within the BN itself. Only DAP appears even a little able to threaten the BN, particularly in the urban districts of Sarawak and Sabah.

As for Sarawak, Tan Sri Taib himself recently predicted that the BN will win at least 20 of the 27 seats, but political observers believe the BN may win more than that.
The Sabah BN is also predicting that they may win at least 14 of the 20 seats there.

This means that the BN in Sarawak and Sabah will be able to contribute the strength of roughly 34 seats to Parliament, but the final decision will be up to the people in those two states.

Former UMNO Leader Names Men Qualified for Prime Minister Post
91SE0006B Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA in Malay 15 Sep 90 p 2

[Text] Langkawi, 14 Sep—Three leaders with credibility to be prime minister are Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba, Minister of Education Anwar Ibrahim, and former Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Musa Hitam, according to former UMNO [United Malays National Organization] Secretary-General Datuk Haji Mustafa Jabar.

He said these three leaders have individual and outstanding styles that will enable them to lead the country in the future.

Speaking to reporters here yesterday following a meeting held for official announcement of the New Pioneer Project Estate Worker Organization, he said that “Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir should continue in office, however, for we still need him.”

He said the Malaysian people should be proud of Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir’s leadership because of his efforts to make the world acquainted with Malaysia.

Greedy

“Where is there a courageous prime minister like Dr. Mahathir? We can see for ourselves the many things he has done since becoming prime minister,” he said.

When asked which of the three men he mentioned is most qualified to be prime minister after Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir, he said, “We leave that to God.”

Datuk Haji Mustafa added that a leader will become prime minister when the time has come and that if he is too greedy something undesirable will happen.

As an example, he noted that the UMNO split which occurred two years ago was caused by the failure of a greed-motivated leader’s effort to become prime minister.

He advised young leaders to avoid such an attitude.

He also rejected the accusation made by some people that the present young leaders in UMNO are in too big a hurry to “get ahead.”

Commentator Assesses Sabah Political Situation
91SE0005B Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN in Malay 18 Sep 90 p 9

[Article by Afandi Ismail: “PBS, USNO Alliance Essential to National Front Victory”]

[Text] Although the date of the next election is still a question mark, election fever is already inflaming the opposition’s “dreams.” The opposition parties are daily more convinced that they can topple the National Front (BN) government, especially on the Peninsula.

While the opposition is laying its plans, the BN government under the leadership of Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad is also making preparations for retaining the reins of government for the sake of the people.

In the August 1986 election, UMNO [United Malays National Organization] contested 84 parliamentary seats; MCA [Malaysian Chinese Association], 32 seats; MIC [Malaysian Indian Congress], 6; Gerakan, 9; PBS [Sabah United Party], 14; Sabah People’s United Party, 7; Sarawak National Party, 5; United Traditional Bumiputra Party, 8; USNO [United Sabah National Organization], 6; Sarawak Dayak Party, 4; and HAMIM [Muslim Front of Malaysia], 2.

Sabah, which just had its state election on 16 and 17 July, is not excluded from election fever.

Although only 20 parliamentary seats are at stake in Sabah, political observers think the election will be livelier than in the past.

This is because the two BN components in Sabah—PBS and USNO—had their strength tested in the recent state election and because political contention in Sabah never wanes. This is particularly true when the “election season,” which makes the state an arena for deciding the “champion,” puts the destiny of the state’s people at stake.

This being the case, the people of Sabah will probably again witness a civil war between the two BN components.

This is likely, for the PBS is insistent that it will run under its own symbol for all 20 of the seats. USNO, which originally proposed that the two BN components use their own symbols, ultimately decided to use the BN symbol.

Last month, PBS Secretary-General Datuk Joseph Kurup said that his party will proceed with its plan to run in all 20 parliamentary districts in Sabah and that it is up to USNO if it wants to use the BN symbol, since that is USNO’s right.

Datuk Joseph Kurup, who is also state finance minister, said the decision to use its own symbol had the approval of the Sabah BN Committee.
He said PBS submitted the committee meeting's decision in an official letter to Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba, who is also secretary-general of the Federal BN, for further consideration.

"This does not mean, however, that PBS violates the BN concept, for the situation guarantees that the BN will win all 20 of the seats being contested in Sabah, for we are BN components," he said.

He charged that USNO, although a BN component in Sabah, has not given a clear picture of PBS to the Federal BN during the last 5 years.

USNO always paints a bad picture of PBS in order to "poison" the thinking of federal leaders and to make them think that PBS is anti-Federation.

The proposal that parties use their own symbols in the next parliamentary election in Sabah was made early this year by the USNO president, Tun Datu Haji Mustapha Datu Harun.

USNO reconsidered its proposal when so requested by a recent BN meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

USNO Secretary-General Askalani Abdul Rahim then said that USNO would use the BN symbol in the next parliamentary election and that the decision to do so was made by the USNO Supreme Council after BN leaders asked the council to reconsider its earlier decision to use its own symbol.

He said that USNO initially had wanted to use its own symbol but reconsidered its decision at the request of a recent BN meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

"As a BN component, USNO complied with the request," he said.

Tun Mustapha also said that USNO remains loyal to BN and that because USNO views the BN as its "close friend" USNO will accept any decision that BN leaders make about the next parliamentary election.

"USNO politics are clean, unlike those of the PBS, which likes to 'exploit' conditions and forgets its comrades in a twinkling of the eye," he said.

Tun Mustapha said there was no ulterior motive behind USNO's plan to withdraw its original proposal to use its own symbol in the next election.

"USNO clearly still gives its loyalty to the BN for the sake of the Malaysian people, particularly those in this state," he said.

In connection with this matter, the prime minister as chairman of the Federal BN said the BN Supreme Council will discuss the issue of political party symbols in Sabah and Sarawak if an official request is made.

Speaking to reporters following a closed meeting with Pahang BN leaders on 6 September, the prime minister also said that the ratio the BN used for distributing Peninsula seats in the 1986 election will be retained in the next election.

Although Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir did not mention distribution of parliamentary seats in Sabah, the PBS should nevertheless rethink its intention to run under its own symbol for all 20 parliamentary seats.

The PBS should also be patient about its request for use of its own symbol since the matter depends on the decision of the BN Supreme Council.

We do not want the history of the 1982 election to repeat itself if the BN Supreme Council does not immediately decide on the PBS request. In the 1986 election, five USNO candidates who ran on the BN ticket were defeated at the hands of independent candidates said to have the backing of BERJAYA [Sabah People's Party], which was a BN component at that time.

BN lost the parliamentary seats at Marudu, Kota Belud, Labuk Sugut, Hilir Padas, and Silam.

Political observers also feel that the PBS request to run in all 20 parliamentary districts clearly shows its arrogance over having won 36 of the 48 seats in the Sabah election in July.

PBS actually should not be arrogant or confident that because of its earlier success it can make a clean sweep of the 20 parliamentary seats it is contesting in Sabah.

On the contrary, the PBS must remember that, although the Sabah election in July again fell its way for the third successive time, not all the people of Sabah supported it.

In fact, the two BN components in Sabah must take into consideration the political maturity the people of Sabah demonstrated in their clear decision in the last state election. They emphatically rejected parties with merely a record of opposition but no support for the state's prosperity and progress.

It was clear from their decision that Sabah voters selected PBS and USNO only because of the stability of these two BN components.

The people also rejected the slim record of the DAP [Democratic Action Party] because that opposition party's record did not draw their attention or directly affect them. The same was true of the other opposition parties and the independent candidates.

A day after the Sabah State Legislature was dissolved on 26 May, Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir said, "The BN cannot lose, because PBS and USNO are both BN components." His statement apparently served as guidance for the 496,353 Sabah voters who chose the two BN component parties in the state election.

Thus, they gave another mandate to PBS in order to ensure continuity in the development that PBS had
carefully planned and chose USNO, which is clearly more stable, to be a monitor and counterbalance in the Sabah State Legislature.

Both PBS and USNO need to reflect on the outcome of the state election lest they again confuse the people through the two parties' own strong political ambitions.

On the other hand, the maturity that the people showed in their state election should be appreciated, for at the same time they were indicating that they want to see better relationships between the BN components for the sake of creating close ties between the administrations in Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu.

Gas Reserves Enough for 100 Years
91SE0005A Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN in Malay 19 Sep 90 p 7

[Text] Malaysia has about 52 trillion cubic feet of proved natural gas reserves, which if used at the current rate will last for the next 100 years.

Deputy Prime Minister Ghafer Baba said he is confident that more natural gas reserves can be found through the exploration activities that are conducted from time to time.

He said the country's oil and natural gas industry developed rapidly after the government introduced laws to protect the rights of national and foreign investors.

He said the government was compelled to provide such protection because the oil and gas industry presents great risk to investors.

Oil and gas industry operations recorded encouraging growth after the government approved the Petroleum Industry Act in 1974, he said yesterday at Bangi while speaking at the inauguration of a 2-day symposium entitled "The Malaysian Gas Industry, 1990."

Ghafer said the government also drafted a national energy policy in 1979 for the purpose of establishing basic national energy development that would move toward the diversification of energy sources and reduce dependency on oil.

As a consequence, energy supply rose from 9,469 metric tons of oil equivalent (TOE) in 1980 to 16,301 TOE in 1988.

He said also that the country's dependence on oil has declined from 87 percent to 63 percent and that energy derived from gas rose from 8.5 percent to 27.8 percent.

The government hopes that national energy supplies will continue to meet demand and can be sold at suitable prices, because these aspects of energy encourage industrial and investment growth.

Ghafer said that because of natural gas supplies Malaysia is now more confident about entering the heavy industry sector, which it is doing through joint ventures with business partners from the advanced countries. Initially, there were people who disagree with the government's decision to plunge into the heavy industry sector.
POLITICAL

SAIGON GIAI PHONG Holds Discussion on Improving State Management
912E0008A Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 1 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Hai Nam: "Improving State Management, Many Questions Need Answering"; first paragraph is SAIGON GIAI PHONG introduction]

[Text] Editor's Note: On the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the August Revolution and National Day on 22 August 1990, the editorial department of SAIGON GIAI PHONG held a discussion on the problem of raising the effectiveness of state management at the present time. Taking part in this discussion were Nghi Doan, Chairman of the Fifth Precinct People's Committee; Vo Van Thon, Chairman of the Third Precinct People's Committee; Nguyen Minh Dung, Chairman of the Cu Chi District People's Committee; Nguyen Huu Tam, Vice Chairman of the Municipal Administrative Organization Committee; Trinh Minh Tam, Chief of the Economics-Planning-Budget Committee of the Tan Binh Ward People's Council; and two research specialists of the Municipal People's Committee (some individuals, unable to attend due to work, sent statements to the editorial department). They confirmed the achievements of our state during the past 45 years, clearly stating that consolidation of the revolutionary administration is a current problem while at the same time acknowledging that the problem of renovating and raising the ability of state management is an extremely great and urgent issue.

These opinions led the discussion by representatives of the SAIGON GIAI PHONG editorial department. While precincts and wards are studying renovation of the precinct-level mechanism, and while many problems are arising at that level, the question of how to improve the quality and effectiveness of state management was posed to those attending the discussion. A SAIGON GIAI PHONG reporter recorded the following opinions emerging from this discussion: [end editor's note]

Subprecinct Level Should Only Be One of Administrative Management

As the individual responsible for leading implementation of the subprecinct administrative management improvement proposal in the Fifth Precinct, Nghi Doan concentrated his opinions on this proposal. He asserted that throughout the past 15 years, the subprecinct-level administrative system has been consolidated and strengthened, increasing progress has been made in implementing the state management function, and the management ability of subprecinct cadres has been improved. However, in shifting the economy from a state subsidized to a multi-element market economy, the subprecinct-level itself has revealed many limitations. Management decentralization to the subprecinct has been too pronounced and difficult to understand due to the limited standards, professional ability, and training in state management of subprecinct cadres with concentration on economic work but lax administrative management at the local level. With city permission, the Fifth Precinct People's Committee submitted a proposal for improving subprecinct-level administrative management and, at the beginning of August, began to conduct pilot projects in Subprecincts 2 and 14. The objective of improving the subprecinct-level mechanism is to separate administrative management from business management and consequently, according to Nghi Doan, must designate that the subprecinct be engaged only in an administrative management mission and not in production and business management. Thus, the subprecinct should not be an echelon with a plan or budget but should only participate in formulating precinct's plan and budget estimates.

According to the Fifth Precinct proposal, all management of taxes, public health, education, and production and business units was assigned to precinct-level sectors. Implementation, according to those attending the discussion, will demand that sectors elevate and improve management effectiveness while avoiding creation of a void in local government leading to lax management in all fields.

It may be said that there are recently steadily more opinions sympathetic to establishment of the subprecinct level as one of administrative management. Nevertheless, the Fifth Precinct proposal only posed the problem of improving the sub-precinct mechanism and simplifying the subprecinct-level apparatus within the current mechanism. Many opinions have posed the issue that the civil election mechanism no longer be maintained in the subprecinct and be changed to a nomination mechanism. This is an issue outside the purview of the city.

In his final view, Nghe Doan made two requests for possibly improving the subprecinct mechanism: to train a rank of subprecinct cadres with renovation ability and concentration on serving the people; and to unceasingly perfect the state management mechanism in conjunction with a legal system meeting the demands of the situation.

Trinh Minh Tam emphasized the need for a regular school of administration and for truly training skilled administrative management cadres. Many others stated the need for training a rank of "professional civil servants" for the revolutionary government. Nguyen Huu Tam did not specifically analyze management improvement at any level of government but posed the basic requirements that in promoting state management improvement, unity and synchronized change in basic views are needed with a clear understanding that improvement of state management is an extremely urgent and essential requirement, from the city to the sector and the basic level.
State Management According to the Law

Noting the achievements of the state during the past 15 years and simultaneously recalling the urgent requirement for improving state management, Vo Van Thon praised the position of the Party Central Committee, city, and many sections and sectors that are presently submitting proposals for improving state management, a position becoming a unified and general policy throughout the country. First of all, he stated that the use by Party Central Committee documents of the district as the basic model in state organization and management is inconsistent because precincts and districts have many different characteristics. Moreover, the trend toward urbanization in our country is steadily developing. Even the previous inconsistent subprecinct model was largely from adoption of the village model. According to Vo Van Thon, to improve state management, it is first of all necessary to improve the wage system, considering it the key to renovating state management, because cadre, workers, and civil servants cannot diligently serve without wages sufficient to sustain themselves at the minimum level. This is not a new problem. The difficulties are acquiring a foundation and conditions for readjusting the wage system. Vo Van Thon stated that the true standard of living of cadres, workers, and civil servants during the past 15 years have expressed the shortcomings of the state apparatus in managing, regulating, and distributing the national income. In fact, this is not entirely a simple matter, especially regarding a market mechanism and economy of many elements, and as the Third Precinct chairman observed, of all areas of management, state management is the most difficult. It is not only a problem of training able professional state management cadres but of state management in accordance with the law, as viewed by Vo Van Thon and Nguyen Huu Tam. Vo Van Thon said, “We usually use the terms of boldness and daring to think and to act. I believe that in state management, it is only possible to dare to think, not to act, and to follow the laws, directives, and stipulations of above.” It is also a matter of discipline. In the same vein, Nguyen Minh Dung suggested the need for swiftly perfecting the entire legal system, especially administrative law, with unified guidance for the compliance of all levels of the state system. Vo Van Thon stated an additional requirement that our country must have a Constitutional Court aimed at detecting and halting every violation of the Constitution, while simultaneously making constitutional revisions consistent with the actual situation of the country.

Vo Van Thon said the Third Precinct is formulating a proposal for improving state management. According to him, an understanding that a four-level state with every level absolute is erroneous. The state at all levels is a unified body of which the central government is the commanding brain and the subordinate levels first of all the functional parts. He asserted that the mechanism of the party leading, the people controlling, and the state managing is correct, but with the idea of the state at all echelons being a unified body, party leadership at all echelons must be more active. At the present time, government leaders must also carry out party work and conversely, lower level party committee echelons place too much concentration on government leadership, leading to a situation in which government cadres cannot reserve all their time for the state management mission and party cadres cannot give full concern to the task of building party organization. In his view, this is also a reason for the poor state management situation. He referred to party members appointed to lower level government leadership positions who therefore can no longer carry out their party responsibilities, and suggested that the party lead the government through party and youth group organizations to make party leadership more effective and firm.

Nguyen Minh Dung agreed with the opinions of those from inner city precincts, suggesting that all district levels concentrate only on implementing a state administrative management function and shift to management by sector. In this way, the administrative organization and staff would be minimized and government cadres would have conditions for greater professionalism and improvement of their administrative management abilities.

A Basic Problem: Separating State Management From Production and Business Management

From the opinions, suggestions, and proposals above, the problem is raised on whether the government at the precinct and subprecinct levels should be elected or appointed. What should be the degree of professionalism of government cadres? Why should the party train its cadre members into skilled state cadres and its party members into skilled economists? Many views are that elected agencies be maintained only at the municipal and central government levels while implementing an appointment mechanism at the precinct and subprecinct levels. This is a great problem, requiring time for the National Assembly and Party Central Committee to study, but Trinh Minh Tam and Vo Van Thon both observed that the present mechanism finds it difficult in expressing that the precinct and subprecinct people’s council is the authoritative agency (for example, budgets and expenditures are decided by the finance sector). Regardless, it must be emphasized that the law of people’s councils and people’s committees at all levels is still in force. From the above opinions on the subprecinct and precinct-level mechanism, according to Nguyen Huu Tam, the need exists for separating state management from production and business management. However, this is not exclusive to the precinct and subprecinct levels but applies also to municipal levels and to sectors. Also according to Nguyen Huu Tam, this is not a simple problem and is not similarly understood by everyone. His view is that an organizational model must be separated from the general concept. In the city, there is also a course of simplifying services and sectors until they are only assistance units surrounding the municipal people’s committee. Some opinions express the “fear” that production and business units will be “forsaken” without a manager. Many do not agree with this view. These units
operate in accordance with state laws and stipulations and are responsible before the law.

With some final opinions answering the question about how improvement of state management would benefit the people, Nguyen Huu Tam evaluated that improvement of administrative management would naturally be accompanied by improved administrative procedures, save time and trouble for the people, and allow citizens to clearly recognize the government of the people and for the people. Only from this will they cherish, serve, and protect the government. To avoid public aggravation and to protect the law, Nguyen Huu Tam suggested there be methods for inspecting implementation of legal decisions, and a strict system of mandatory compliance with the law.

Also according to Nguyen Huu Tam, the tasks of streamlining organizations and improving administrative procedures in the city are being conducted today slowly at a time demanding great urgency. To overcome this situation, there is a demand for greater concern by municipal leaders. Some problems are dependent upon the National Assembly, the Constitution and various laws but there are also matters lying within the authority of the city that can be achieved immediately. Besides that, many maintain there are tasks that can be immediately achieved by precinct and subprecinct levels themselves in accordance with guidance of the Council of Ministers or Municipal People's Committee, demanding that precinct and subprecinct echelons themselves fully recognize their responsibilities in assisting to improve state management.

Cleanup, Reorganization of the Party in HCM City Discussed

912E0002A Hanot NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by Le Huyen Thong: "Party Reorganization in a Large City—Cleanup in the Party To Go Hand in Hand With Improvement of Party Members' Capabilities and Intellectual Power—Confusion in Many Basic Party Chapters About Leadership Substance and Method"]

[Text] The Ho Chi Minh City party organization has profound traditions of revolutionary struggle and is a party organization that has gone through the harsh challenges of history. Its traditions have been further accentuated by 15 years of peaceful construction full of difficulties and complex situations. Its party members have also been tempered, have matured, and have been undergoing the laws of sift the good from the bad.

This autumn we returned to the city that bears the Uncle's name on the occasion of the Executive Committee of the Municipal Party Organization convening a conference to discuss "one more step toward consolidating the party organization." The first question to be resolved was how to correctly evaluate the quality of its members and to consider it the first step toward achieving a cleanup inside the party.

What is the real situation?

As of 5 July 1990, the Ho Chi Minh City party organization had 75,979 party members, or 1.93 percent of the population, including 8.35 percent being youth union members and nearly 11 percent production workers. In the past 10 years, the municipality got 40,617 new party members, or nearly 54 percent of the current total party membership. From 1984 to 1988, the increase was the largest: from 4,500 to 5,500 new members per year. In the last two years, the growth of party membership came to a stop. Meanwhile, the average party membership seniority in the municipal party organization was 41 years. The educational background in the party showed 44 percent of members having graduated from general middle schools and nearly 20 percent from colleges. Some .7 percent (542 persons) of party members had Ph.D. and M.A. degrees.

Opening the campaign for party consolidation, the Municipal CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] Committee praised and stressed the examples of a large number of party members of many generations who showed solid political abilities, adhered to revolutionary moral values, calmly distinguished between right and wrong, and resolutely contributed their efforts to the renovating task. It considered them the precious assets that the party organization would need to protect and to continue improving so as to serve as the hard core for raising the quality of leadership in the party and expanding the political forces of the municipality.

It would be a great omission if we failed to mention a component of the municipality's party membership consisting of older members who, in spite of their age and poor health, still set good examples for the young generation. They are more than 13,000 party members who have retired as cadres and now account for 57 percent of the total number of party members in subwards and villages. In a number of other party bases, they account for 76 percent. The number of party members who are retired cadres in Ho Chi Minh City nearly equals the total number of party members in a southern province. Many of them remain unshaken in the face of any challenge, have strong confidence and intellectual power, and often show profound concern for the common undertaking. The Municipal CPV Committee fully appreciated the contributions of the retired cadres who had done some work showing their affection and loyalty. Naturally, not all retired cadres had such fine qualities. What we would consider worrisome was the fact that in the face of difficulties, some party members became politically confused, weakened in terms of the will to fight, decadent and deviant, with a few, including party members—retired cadres, having even worked as lackeys for the enemy.

The recent developments in Eastern Europe and the realities in our country have further clarified our party's sound political ability and correct line on renovation, and this fact has gradually awakened a number of people,
including active and retired party members, who vaguely turned to the multiparty tendency.

With the attitude of fully admitting the truth, the Municipal CPV Committee had this observation: "Because of slackened management, a part of the party membership being cadres in positions of authority, particularly in production and business, has shown a degrading way of living, become corrupt, taken bribes, wasted public funds, gone after pleasure and debauchery, and shown disrespect for organization and discipline."

The municipality's party organization had to reconsider the qualifications of about 20 percent of its members. In the weak party chapters, this percentage was higher. Among these party members, many were dealt with by various forms of disciplinary action.

**How is a cleanup in the party correctly conducted?**

The department store party organization was one of the five basic units in the municipality being chosen to achieve on a trial basis consolidation of the party. The outstanding problem here was the profound disagreement between the party committee, first of all its secretary, and the department store director because they had different opinions on the direction the business venture should follow. Many party members did not believe that the party organization could be consolidated. Cadres and nonparty-member store employees were afraid that they could lose their jobs if the department store conducted joint business with foreign countries.

The party committee of the department store recently held an enlarged meeting. The director of the Commercial Service attended the meeting. He raised a number of urgent problems but did not affirm the business direction set for the department store (which has nearly 400 employees). Realities indicated that if the party organization's political task were not correctly defined, it would be difficult to distinguish between right and wrong in the leadership of the party committee and the management as performed by the director. The evaluation of the quality of party members also would begin from there.

Pham Van Hung, head of the Organization Section of the Municipal CPV Committee, discussed with us about the real situation of some party bases like the party organization of this store and emphasized the lesson that had been learned here, i.e., to reorganize the party should first of all be closely linked with the unit's political task. In this municipality, there still were quite a few basic party organizations that had not yet correctly defined their political task. This real situation, along with the fact that the party committee failed to adhere to the need for making steps toward consolidating the party, would easily reduce the effectiveness of the efforts to achieve a cleanup in the party base. Why did this situation exist?

We had an exchange of views with Vo Tran Chi and Nguyen Vo Danh, secretary and deputy secretary, respectively, of the Municipal CPV Committee, on the measures necessary for consolidating party organizations. The question that was raised here was how would the cleanup in the party be carried out to be in the right direction. To carry it out in the correct manner would really not be that simple.

The Municipal CPV Committee advocated making an important step toward a cleanup in the party as an urgent need that should be seriously satisfied in the present situation. First of all, to resolutely struggle, criticize, and take disciplinary action, including expelling from the party those people who would no longer qualify as members. Those people who had committed mistakes but not to the extent that their names should be deleted from the lists of party members would be given a time to correct their shortcomings; if they did not show any progress within this period, they would be expelled from the party.

Those party members who were leading and managing cadres, had shown political vacillation, and had spoken, written, and done things that were against the party's views, in spite of the fact that their action might not be serious enough to warrant expulsion from the party, would definitely lose the chance of being placed in positions of total authority. Those party members who had been proved with full evidences as having made serious mistakes, in spite of the fact that they might have denied them, would still be subjected to strict disciplinary action.

All of the 26 party committee secretaries in party bases and organ groups who had been asked to express their opinions believed that it would not be easy to use strict discipline to handle party members. However, it would be even harder to raise the capabilities and quality of party members and, through them, to strengthen the relationships between the party and the people. This was both a need and an objective to attain at any cost. In 1989, the municipal party organization took disciplinary action against 660 cases, including 217 members, or .3 percent of the total membership, being expelled from the party. Those results obviously did not fully reflect the weakness of the party organization. Even in the party bases where many members had been subjected to disciplinary action, their party organization has so far remained weak because the consolidation of party chapters did not materialize.

In an actual survey, members of the Standing Committee of the Municipal CPV Committee believed that if we only emphasized handling disciplinary cases in a one-way manner and at the same time failed to attach importance to raising the intellectual capacity of party organizations, correctly defining their political task, and strengthening the party—people relationships, it would be difficult to ensure that a cleanup in the party would be carried out in the right direction. The reason was that to reorganize the party, even in the initial stage, would be aimed at maintaining political stability on the basis of exploiting in the best manner possible the positive effects of the ideological measures and organization of cadres in
the direction of democracy and renovation. This would require the party committee echelons to attach greater importance to the development of party members, particularly to the training and recruiting for admission to the party of outstanding workers and of those intellectuals who have been trained by realities.

How long would this situation last?

The strength of the municipal party organization originated from the quality of basic party chapters. The municipality had 1,390 party bases in 18 precincts and districts, and 955 other bases in its services and major sectors, as well as in the central sectors located in the municipality. It did not adopt the organizational system of party committees based on the people-administration-party structure as the provinces did. In September 1982, the CPV Central Committee Secretariat let the municipal party organization establish on a trial basis the system of party organizations above the basic level among sectors and groups in the municipality and the central echelons subordinate to the Municipal CPV Committee.

After eight years of carrying out this organizational system based on basic groups, although there still were some restrictions, the municipal party organization generally obtained good results from it and achieved better management and leadership over the consolidation and construction of basic party organizations than when the latter had been subordinate to the precinct and district party organizations. However, because this organizational system has not yet been recognized and included in the CPV statutes, there has been a mentality of doing things just temporarily in regard to assuming leadership over achieving it.

In an investigation conducted in the precincts and districts, 21 percent of the party bases were found to be strong, 66 percent good, and the rest poor. Generally speaking, the organization of party bases remained a weak link, particularly in the production and business sector and in a number of organs, professional units, and rural villages. In these bases, as far as party members were concerned, many of them had good educational and specialized background, but they all underestimated the mass-propagating task. Many problems arose, with the more noteworthy ones resulting from the fact that many basic party organizations, mostly the basic party committees in units in the production and business sector, had failed to correctly fulfill their leadership functions. Ever since the state subsidies were abolished and the right of self-support in production and business was granted to the basic level, the party's leadership role at this level has been nearly "nullified." In a number of units where there had been negative acts, the basic party organizations even tried to defend such wrongful acts on the part of directors because they were bound by the "interests mechanism." As Vo Tran Chi, secretary of the Municipal CPV Committee, put it, "a number of party chapters 'have earnings' by siding with directors."

In the case of party bases assuming total leadership, such as those in subwards and villages, there was no clear definition of the functions and tasks to be divided between party committee echelons and the administration. That situation was also a factor that would hamper the fighting power of cadres and party members. And so how long would this situation last?

At a recent meeting convened by the CPV Central Committee Secretariat as a work session jointly held with the locality, the Standing Committee of Ho Chi Minh City Municipal CPV Committee requested that the Central Committee study and issue at an early date the necessary documents to provide guidelines regarding the leadership that the party would apply to different levels and different forms of basic organization. The central resolution has clearly stated that one of the tasks of this leadership would be "to outline major lines, positions, and policies." To what limits would this task be carried out at different levels and in different basic organizations? How would we introduce cadres to the elected organs so as to ensure both democratic elections and party leadership? It would be necessary to define early and more positively the functions, tasks, and powers of party organizations in accordance with different forms of basic organizations, particularly in the production and business sector, including the nonstate-operated sector and the jointly-operated businesses involving foreign countries.

There should be a uniform solution.

In all three work sessions held with us, Nguyen Vinh Nghip, chairman of the Municipal People's Committee, emphasized that there should be a uniform solution regarding making one step toward the consolidation of party organizations. In his opinion, the experience of a number of subwards and villages clearly indicated that to consolidate the party without at the same time perfecting the state machinery and mass organizations would not create the right conditions for the basic party organizations to fully play their leadership role. There were many reasons behind the weak aspects of the current socioeconomic situation. Of these reasons the outstanding one was the inexperience and weakness of the state management of the economy. The municipality did not have the state management experience in the multicomponent goods-producing economy. Many party bases also were confused about both the substance and method of leadership in accordance with the new mechanism. Many units performed economic renovation without at the same time affirming and applying the new mechanism in the socioeconomic management based on the law. A number of people in powerful positions took advantage of the loopholes in the mechanism to practice corruption in all of its forms. The consequences were that they both "lost" cadres and caused anger in society. This would require that consolidating the party go hand in hand with strengthening leadership over the renovating efforts and raising the effectiveness of state economic management. Achieving a cleanup in the party should go hand in hand
with a cleanup in the state machinery at all levels, first of all the fight against bureaucracy and corruption.

The municipality is concentrating its efforts upon providing training, both elementary and advanced, to secretaries of party chapters and cadres in charge of party affairs in organs and enterprises.

**Provincial Party Committees Conduct Party Consolidation**

912E0007A Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese
31 Aug 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Le Huyen Thong: "Provincial Party Committees Gain Experience in Experimental Party Consolidation; Partially Achieve Purification of Ranks; Uphold Party Member Vanguard Role and Responsibility; Many Party Chapters Admit New Members; Some Locations Have Not Urgently Resolved Major Negativisms; Expressions of Rightism, Mutual Protection, and Evasion Still Exist"]

[Text] Implementing Resolution 8 of the Party Central Committee, the party organizations of provinces, cities, special zones and the armed forces throughout the nation have initiated phases of party consolidation, have partially purified their ranks and have raised the combat strength of the cadre and party member ranks.

After meeting with northern provincial and municipal party committees to gain experience from units engaged in this experimental work, the Secretariat continued by meeting with the secretaries of southern provincial and municipal party committees to discuss methods of achieving partial purification of their ranks and to achieve strong and stable party consolidation aimed at successfully preparing for basic level congresses at the beginning of December 1990 with progress toward the Party Seventh Congress. The provincial party committees of Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ha Son Binh, Nghe Tinh, Quang Ninh, Ha Nam Ninh, Ha Bac, Haiphong, etc. have conducted a preliminary summary of some experiences on work and point selection, applying guidelines and policies for disciplinary action, core cadre training, etc. Many party organizations such as those in Thai Binh, Ho Chi Minh City, Ha Son Binh, and Nghe Tinh have known how to use party members who are retired cadres and knowledgeable in party construction for participation in this work.

Each party organization has individual characteristics. Consequently, each local area has different major problems and key positions. Ha Bac has conducted party consolidation in coordination with a struggle against corruption and achievement of internal purification in close connection with purification of the state apparatus and mass organizations. The Dong Nai Province Party Committee gave concern to internal party problems in many locations with a prolonged loss of solidarity, in conjunction with efforts to resist negativism from within the party to local government agencies and economic units. The Quang Ninh Province Party Committee concentrated efforts in initial supervision of enterprises, business corporations, a number of units in the internal affairs blocks of the border region, and basic units with major problems of greatest concern to party members and the masses. The party organization of Ben Tre Province has given attention to initially resolving serious incidents and issues creating discontent among the people; and party members in leadership posts who are committing violations are being publicly criticized. The provinces of Lam Dong, An Giang, Long An, Hau Giang, Thanh Hoa, Thuan Hai and Ha Nam Ninh, and Ho Chi Minh City have surveyed a number of basic party units comprising many different forms to correctly evaluate the true quality of the ranks, considering that an opening step in this phase of party consolidation. A number of agencies of the Party Central Committee such as the Nguyen Ai Quoc Academy, Organization Department, Department of Ideology and Culture, Central Control Department, and Administrative Office have studied experience gained in supervising experimental points in Hai Hung to learn of problems in party construction during the new situation. Many provinces have examined party member quality along a course divided into three types: party members with full qualifications, those with qualification violations, and those insufficiently qualified to be a party member.

Through nearly a hundred basic units engaged in this experimental task, there has generally been partial purification of the party member ranks, expelling from the party those individuals with insufficient party member qualifications by appropriate measures and bringing disciplinary action against those violating party member qualifications. Of those fully qualified to be party members (accounting for 60 to 75 percent), from 18 to 35 percent have been praised as party members truly developing a vanguard role, with a leadership effect, and with the confidence of the masses. The spirit of self-criticism and criticism in party chapters has progressed and disciplinary actions against party members have become more strict. Mass participation and contribution of opinions, especially in the rural area, have generally been straightforward and sincere. Many party members have upheld a spirit of responsibility and a determination to correct shortcomings.

The results above are not uniform. Worthy of note is that the need for raising the combat strength of party organization and through that, strengthening the flesh and blood relationship between the party and the masses, has not received the proper level of emphasis compared with the need for purifying the ranks. Basic units engaged in this experimental work, especially party chapters of economic groups, still have many expressions of rightism, evasion, and mutual protection. The use of opinions from the masses to criticize party members in business corporations and production enterprises has encountered a great many difficulties because many people still worry about subtle reprimands or losing their jobs. A number of localities such as Hanoi City, the
provinces of Dong Nai, Kien Giang, etc., a number of basic units in the ministries of Commerce, Finance and Forestry, the tourism, banking and credit sectors, grain reserves branch, etc., have not yet concentrated efforts on urgently resolving major negativisms of concern to public opinion. These units have not closely coordinated the internal party struggle with discovery by the people or with the inspections, audits and investigations of internal affairs agencies to clarify the disciplinary violations of individual party members, especially those holding leadership positions. Many retired cadres in the provinces of Kien Giang, An Giang, Cao Bang, Lang Son, Tay Ninh, etc., have suggested to the party organizations there that rank purification and party consolidation be closely connected with the struggle against corruption and the spread of illegally imported goods into the local area.

Through the preliminary summarization of experimental work points, many localities such as the provincial party committees of Ha Son Binh and Thai Binh have gained experience in the use of opinions contributed by the masses on party composition. The contribution of opinions by the people can be in many forms such as: direct statements in conferences, reflections made to work teams or higher level party committees, letters deposited in ballot boxes, etc. Of importance is that party committee echelons and unit leaders strictly review and clarify the right or wrong, and afterwards report results to the people or to cadres and personnel outside the party. Determined correction of the shortcomings of party chapters and party members committing violations is the most effective ideological work for strengthening the relationship between the party and the masses.

Consolidation of Party Organization in Hau Giang Discussed

912E0005A Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by Le Huyen Thong: “Hau Giang Party Organization: Initial Experience in Consolidating Party Base Organization; Party Member Disciplinary Actions Increase; ‘Door Not Shut’ to Party Consolidation; Still No Party Members in 136 Hamlets”]

[Text] How is the Hau Giang party organization consolidating party base organization and purifying its ranks? During the past several years, Hau Giang has been one of the southern provinces giving concern to consolidation of party organization and has gained some initial experience in this task. Actual surveys indicate that the Provincial Party Committee has emphasized proper evaluation of party base organization and correct analysis of party member quality as decisive opening steps in this stage of party rehabilitation.

Equality and Fairness Are Important

Generally speaking, for more than the past three years, more prosecution of cadre and party member violators has occurred than during previous years. During 1989, of the 997 party members who were disciplined, 676 were expelled from the party. During the first six months of 1990, districts, towns, and cities expelled 467 of a total of 636 disciplined party members (73 percent); including 12 cadres who were prosecuted before legal agencies. What can be seen through these phases of purifying the ranks? To Buu Giang, Vice Chairman of the Provincial Party Committee, stated that most of the more than 3,000 cadres and party members of the province disciplined since 1987 were primary level cadres. This deserves some thought. Naturally, these actions were very necessary. However, we believe the degree of serious errors and the resulting consequences are greater among the leadership and management cadres from the district level up. It is easy to see that a number of production and business corporations and enterprises have declared bankruptcy, sold all their assets and, even using state funds for compensation, have still been unable to repay all their debts. Meanwhile however, most of the cadres and party members who are directory board members, chief accountants, warehouse custodians and treasurers of these units have quickly become rich. This situation has caused social discontent. What problems have occurred in this situation that party base organization has not yet clarified? Perhaps a number of cadres and party members in authority have taken advantage of mechanism weaknesses to engage in corruption under every form but have not yet been severely prosecuted.

Concurring with this opinion, many retired cadres in Can Tho City have stated one experience: that the foremost issue is not whether disciplinary actions against party members are many or few, but more importantly that they be accurate, equal and fair. A situation of “light on top and heavy on the bottom” still occurs in local areas with many different causes. Consequently, fairness of party discipline and equality before the law are indispensable elements that increasingly cannot be neglected in party rehabilitation.

Why Do Party Members Abandon Party Activities?

On 21 June 1990, the Hau Giang Province party organization had 23,530 party members, including 833 Khmer and 217 of Chinese nationality. The ratio of party members is too low (.86 percent) compared to the population in the province. The level of party members in Hau Giang is neither great nor strong. The province has 136 hamlets still without a party member. The Provincial Party Committee asserts that along with those comprising many generations of politically strong individuals dedicated to their work and closely attached to the people, there are also party members who waver, lack combat will and take advantage of their authority and weaknesses in the mechanism for personal gain. Worthy of concern is that not a few party members have abandoned their work and party activities. During the first six months of 1990 alone, 868 party members abandoned party activities and many in this number have petitioned for release from the party. Why does this situation exist?
The Hau Giang Province Party Committee has submitted a number of proposals to the Party Central Committee for timely regulations on the system of party base organization in production and business sectors consistent with the new mechanism; and at the same time regulations on block party committee organization for unity between provinces and efficient activity.

The Provincial Party Committee has also suggested that the Party Central Committee promptly issue unified regulations on organizing party chapters whose members are comprised of the increasingly greater numbers of retired cadres, with conditions for rational activity and an effect of elevating the combat strength of party base organization. Along with the problem of salaries, the Provincial Party Committee has suggested that primary level cadres have a retirement system. The Hau Giang party organization has learned from experience that renovation of the political management mechanism must be closely connected with renovation of the party's leadership formula. It is important that regular consolidation of party organization accompany strengthening of the flesh and blood relationship with the masses on the basis of purifying and elevating the combat strength of the cadre and party member ranks. During the past few years, party organization has emphasized purification of the ranks. In many localities however, this requirement has not been closely connected with the task of elevating the combat strength of party base organization. Consequently, the activity of many party organizations and primary level party chapters has been limited in quality.

Hau Giang is a province with a large Khmer population (390,000), concentrated most of all in the districts of My Tu, My Xuyen, Vinh Chau, Long Phu, and Thanh Tri. Of the 617 party members who are of Khmer nationality, many participate in district and village management, even in the positions of district party secretaries and chairmen. However, the percentage of Khmer party members is presently still too low (.22 percent). The region where they live is one of saline soil, rice monoculture, and many difficulties in life. Educational and intellectual standards are generally extremely low. This demands that Hau Giang party committee echelons give greater concern to building party base organization, including suitable investment and creation of conditions for economic and cultural development in this region.

From the real situation of party base organization above, the Hau Giang Province Party Committee has correctly defined requirements for purifying the ranks and emphasizing inspection and prosecution of first of all those party members with erroneous political viewpoints and negative behavior relating to socialist property, etc. The Provincial Party Committee has selected as key elements a number of production and business units and internal affairs agencies, a number of cadres taking advantage of their authority, taking advantage of weaknesses in the mechanism for personal gain under various forms of corruption, bribery, etc. The process of revamping party
base organization in Hau Giang is closely connected with consolidating political power and mass organizations at the primary level.

**Haiphong Strengthens Party Structure**

912E0006A Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by Thinh Giang: “Haiphong Consolidates Basic Party Organization, Improves Party Member Quality”]

[Text] Reorientation and Initial Results

Haiphong has 1,173 party chapters, including 454 basic units in the production and business area (accounting for 38 percent), and 213 basic organizations in subwards, villages, and towns (accounting for 18.2 percent). The most positive activity of basic party organizations is the development of party directives and resolutions, causing cadres and party members to fully understand achievement of the renovation task. To conform with the new mechanism, rearrangement of party organization and activity themes at the basic level has been gradually renovated. In the rural area, the reorganization of party chapters by hamlet in place of production unit and the formation of a number of chapters not directly engaged in production leadership (comprised largely of retired party members) have overcome a situation of party chapters “meeting without decision or making decisions without achievement” and of “those working not speaking or those speaking not working.” In subward-level party chapters, 48 percent of the party members actively participate in social work. Through specific activities, the comprehension and responsibility of party members to comply with party statutes are gradually raised. Surveys conducted in 11 basic units indicate that 66.7 percent of the party members complete their regular mission and only 10 percent fail to fulfill their assigned mission.

Thanks to consolidation of basic party organizations, the task of training and admitting new party members has regularly emphasized quality in all three stages: before, during and after admission. Annually, more than 50 percent of the party chapters conduct good party development work. Last year, the entire city had 567 party chapters admitting new members.

Why Are There Many But Not Strong Party Members?

Easily seen in a number of basic party organizations in Haiphong is a decline in combat strength, with many party members but a lack of strength. A clear indication in the party chapters is confusion in achieving a leadership role and control function. There are usually two trends: either undertaking to replace or deeply intervene in the management and operations of administrative echelons or becoming lax in the leadership role, falling into administrative routine and gradually leading to a decrease in the role of the party organization. Party activities and discipline in a number of basic units are not strict, and the quality of party chapter activity is largely of a formalistic nature. In some locations, party chapters meet only once every six months and some party organizations have not collected party dues for a year. The number of party chapters meeting strong and stable standards has swiftly declined. During 1986, 34.5 percent of party chapters throughout the city were strong and stable but this number declined to only 26.5 percent by 1989. Of the party members evaluated and classified by the city, 40 percent are developing a limited effect and have failed to complete their party member mission. This is generally revealed by the fact that these cadres operate in a moderate manner with “neither rewards nor punishment,” use difficult circumstances as a pretext, are reluctant to participate in party work and fail to strictly implement policies or the law, a number have fallen into outdated traditions, superstition, alcoholism, gambling, etc. Some party members with authority have taken advantage of weaknesses in economic management for personal gain and illicit riches, typified by a number of leadership cadres in the Municipal Federation of Grain Corporations. Up to 21.7 percent of party members at the basic level engage in irregular party activities. In 18 party organizations directly subordinate to the Municipal Party Committee, 617 cases have occurred since 1987 of abandoning party activity and failing to move to a new unit.

Why does this situation exist? The foremost reason is management that is lax, organization unable to control cadres and party members, loose discipline, and locations where party activity is of a “guild” type.

The second reason is that a number of deficient basic party units have not yet received prompt disposition. About 20 percent of the city’s basic party units are deficient and despite inspection and examination, conclusions have been indecisive and methods of disposition have been unsynchronized and inconclusive. A situation exists in which party member evaluation and criticism are still “avoiding” the leadership echelon, and party member disciplinary action is not equitable between ordinary party members and those holding leadership positions.

Concerning the cadre forces engaged in party work, despite renovation and appropriate efforts for the new mechanism, most have still failed to meet requirements. Surveys conducted in 91 basic party units indicate that 43.3 percent of basic party unit cadres are lacking in ability with 11 percent in the area of local industry, six percent in villages and those at the subward level accounting for up to 14 percent. These cadres, besides the “three shortages” (a shortage of information on line, policy, law and knowledge in party construction and mass motivation, a shortage of ability in organization and achievement, and a shortage of responsibility, enthusiasm and a concept of disciplined organization), are still affected by irrational mechanisms and policies failing to encourage them to maintain close contact with the basic unit movement. These very reasons have led to a situation in which the party construction task of
Haiphong City during the past few years, despite orientation with many specific directives and methods, has failed to achieve high results with party members and basic party organizations that are great in number but not yet strong.

Some Urgent Measures

Recently, originating from requirements and the actual situation, a conference of the Haiphong Municipal Party Executive Committee set forth urgent measures aimed at consolidating basic party organizations and improving party member quality.

The first is to accurately evaluate party member quality through strict quality classification, including an absolute necessity for opinions contributed by the masses. On the basis of these party member classification results, strict disposition must be conducted, not permitting those lacking the confidence of the masses to remain in the party. Stipulate a period of struggle for those party members with shortcomings in each aspect. Gradually make party member management and education a procedure while at the same time expanding forms of training to improve the quality of party chapter activity and the development of new party members.

The second is to renovate the theme and activity of basic party organization consistent with the new mechanism asserting that basic party units and organizations must be a nucleus of leadership in achieving the political mission. From the model experience of activities by the Maritime Shipping Federation and the rural party organization in Kien Thuy District, the Municipal Party Committee has studied and transformed the model of enterprise federation party committees into specialized sector basic unit “secretary councils” or “secretary clubs.” The establishment of “rural party chapters” and populated area party chapters is consistent with the new contract mechanism in the rural area.

The third is to streamline the key cadre ranks at the basic level. The selection of basic party cadre ranks must rely on specific qualifications with simultaneous concern for training in work standards and abilities, a policy of prompt compensation and reward, and regular replacement with young cadres. To improve the operational ability of basic party organization, the Haiphong Party Committee is strengthening direct supervision of basic units by various forms such as the organization of elementary and advanced training classes and programs in coordination with the city’s party school, joining local party committee echelons to gain experience, concentrating efforts to urgently resolve problems arising in substandard basic units, and gradually making the activity of basic party organization a procedure.

MILITARY

General Cites Need for Adequate Equipment, Technical Facilities

[Article by Senior Lieutenant General Dao Dinh Luyen]

[Text] Weapons and equipment are structural elements of the combat strength of the armed forces and an important factor in determining victory in war. Countries have given much attention to studying strategies for developing military technology, in which weapons and equipment are integral elements of a national defense strategy, and to formulating programs and long- and short-term plans in accord with their specific political and economic situation, their scientific and technical standards, and their national defense potential.

The developed industrial countries that have great economic and national defense potential can produce all or almost all of the weapons and equipment needed based on the motto, “if needed, make it.” They can ensure synchronization, exploit all the capabilities, and provide technology for the weapons and equipment. The developing countries must use crude weapons and try to obtain help from friendly countries. They can purchase only small amounts depending on their capabilities.

Vietnam holds a special position in Southeast Asia. The enemy still cherishes the dream of destroying socialism and enslaving the Vietnamese people. Adhering to the law of “building the country along with defending the country,” our army and people must make an effort to solidify our newly-won but still insecure peace, increase vigilance, and maintain control in every situation in order to defend our socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

The political report of the Sixth Party Congress mentioned “building an all-people’s national defense, building stronger armed forces and a stronger rear area, providing all-people’s national defense education, and building a regular and more modern army.”

In order to carry out this strategic task, a very important element in building up our national defense is to ensure that our people’s armed forces have sufficient high-quality weapons and equipment. Our people’s armed forces have accumulated a rather large number of weapons and much equipment from a variety of sources. This is a material and technical base and a very valuable national defense potential that can be used to deal with any situation. But this equipment is composed of a wide variety of items that were produced at different times. The equipment is not synchronized, modern standards are generally low, and there are many difficulties in using and maintaining these items.

On the other hand, our country is still poor, scientific and technical standards are low, and the national defense industry is undeveloped and cannot produce weapons or
equipment to equip the armed forces. But our forces must be prepared to deal with enemies having great economic and scientific and technical potential. If a people's war to defend the fatherland breaks out in the future, it will be very violent, complex, and tense. Material and technical losses will be very large, and joint service and branch combat operations will be at a high level. Because of this, the national defense industry must promptly satisfy the need for large amounts of equipment immediately after war breaks out.

In the face of the special situation mentioned above, providing weapons and equipment for the armed forces requires that we invest in research in a serious and scientific manner in order to find the best solutions. Here, I would like to give a number of initial thoughts.

There must be a thorough understanding of the people's war and all-people's national defense line, things must be tied to Vietnam's military arts, and there must be adherence to practical and developmental viewpoints in order to determine appropriate guidelines and targets and practical measures with the aim of effectively solving the problem of providing weapons and equipment for the armed forces. The general guideline can be: Based on strengthening the material and technical base of socialism, we must gradually build a modern national industry, strengthen capabilities for providing weapons and equipment for the armed forces, and gradually build a national defense industry in order to achieve an appropriate degree of self-sufficiency in providing equipment and satisfy the essential needs of national defense and security. At the same time, we must strive to obtain the help and cooperation of fraternal countries. The targets are to: maintain the existing equipment and weapons in order to maintain combat readiness; improve combat results; produce and perfect a number of new types of weapons and equipment; and have sufficient reserves in peacetime and prepare to satisfy unexpected requirements in wartime. A spirit of self-reliance, independence, and creativity must be manifested, things must gradually be strengthened, emphasis must be placed on quality, results, and frugality, the preconditions for development must be maintained and prepared, and conservatism, sluggishness, and manifestations of subjectivism must be opposed. The weapons and equipment improved or produced must be varied, easy to use but highly effective in combat, and capable of being deployed widely and to the troops. They must also be in accord with the environment in which they will be used and with Vietnamese military arts.

As an integral element of national industry, during peacetime, the national defense industry must be structured so as to coordinate the production of essential military goods with the production of economic goods. But it must have the capability to satisfy needs during wartime. The national defense industry must be closely coordinated with the wartime mobilization industry, with the national defense industry serving as the activist. A developed and expanded national defense industry will ensure the production and repair of weapons and equipment and support the restoration of the national economy (much data from abroad regards this as a "legacy" in the economy). The immediate thing is to maintain production at the national defense plants. In the present situation, coordinating the production of military goods with the production of economic goods is a good way to maintain and improve the production capabilities of the existing national defense plants.

Along with investing intensively in the existing production installations, we must gradually build a number of new installations in order to increase production capabilities and ensure that they work as the activists in mobilizing the national economic industry in time of war. At the same time, plans must be formulated to mobilize industry to support national defense and move toward systematizing state aspects in a unified and scientific management mechanism from top to bottom.

In the socioeconomic strategy, attention must be given to the need to coordinate things with the national defense industry, promote investment in a number of sectors such as the chemical, precision tool, and electronic sectors, and produce materials and raw materials in order to synchronize weapons and equipment production capabilities. The task of building the national defense industry can be carried out only under the centralized and unified guidance of the state based on a strict plan. The economy must be coordinated with national defense, the national defense industry and the scientific and technical forces in the military must be coordinated with industry and the scientific and technical forces of the state, and two-way cooperation must be expanded. The material, scientific and technical, human, and intellectual potential of the country will create a great force for providing weapons and equipment for the armed forces.

The application of the advances in science and technology must be promoted, and scientific and technical research must support maintaining, improving, and producing weapons and equipment. Military science and technology must be closely tied to the various processes in an organic way. This is an important factor in each process, which will create a force based on a progressive scientific and technical foundation. In conditions in which our economy is still encountering difficulties and our scientific, technical, and industrial capabilities are still limited, if we have correct formulas and policies and if we give attention to discovering and using the new achievements of the world scientific and technical revolution, not only will it be possible use science and technology to serve the immediate tasks better but it will also be possible to use these new achievements to contribute to gradually modernizing the material and technical base and gradually increasing the combat strength of the armed forces. To do this, attention must be given to building the ranks of scientific and technical cadres and skilled workers, formulating good utilization policies, and creating favorable conditions for these ranks to make large and practical contributions. An effort must be made to build a rank of scientific and technical cadres
and skilled workers in the army with the ability to work as the activists and, together with the scientific and technical forces in the private sector, gradually solve the scientific, technical, and managerial problems so that the national defense industry can satisfy the immediate and long-term requirements.

Production must be tied to use and provide weapons. Equipping the armed forces must go hand in hand with building people to master the weapons and equipment. No matter how modern the weapons and equipment, they are just tools in the hands of people. In previous wars, our cadres and soldiers have built a precious tradition of maintaining and using the weapons and equipment skillfully and exploiting the capabilities of the weapons and equipment in order to defeat the enemy invaders. Today, maintaining and using the weapons and equipment is placing even greater requirements on each person with respect to a spirit of responsibility, a concept of discipline and standard behavior, and capabilities and physical condition. Exploiting the spiritual and intellectual factors and technical standards of the people is a basis for both improving and manufacturing weapons and equipment and for exploiting and using that equipment.

One of the important tasks of the armed forces today is to exploit, use, and maintain the existing weapons and equipment. In a broad sense, exploiting the weapons, and equipment means to maintain techniques and tactics based on the plans, making correct and full use of the capabilities of the equipment, keeping the equipment from becoming damaged, making full use of the time allotted, making improvements in order to achieve even better combat results, and, finally, disposing of the weapons and equipment in the most profitable way possible when the weapons and equipment can no longer be used for military purposes. Carrying out the above requirements well is a manifestation of a spirit of responsibility and a concept of economizing in building the people's armed forces and a manifestation of the organizational, managerial, and leadership capabilities of commanders at all echelons.

In particular, the model regarding the development of weapons and equipment in recent decades is the uniform nature of means of war and the close relationship between the separate elements of these means to form a unified whole and exploit the strength of the armed forces. Thus, in order to exploit the equipment, conditions with respect to materials, spare parts, and means to maintain things and provide assistance must be fully prepared in order to ensure synchronization of the main equipment. (Here, I have not mentioned use standards, control movements, or use conditions.)

Maintaining techniques means to integrate the various measures with the aim of maintaining the existing weapons and equipment, ensuring combat readiness, and maintaining confidence in the equipment. These are integrated technical operations of many forces of a mass nature. Based on the time period, expenditures for maintaining techniques will increase. With modern equipment or old equipment that must be maintained, the technical maintenance requirements will increase, as will expenditures for maintaining and repairing things. As compared with the gross value of the weapons and equipment, America's annual budget for technical maintenance accounts for 25-30 percent while that for the Soviet Union ranges from 20 to 25 percent. And if the equipment is to be used until the end of the period stipulated, expenditures will increase many times. In our country, that percentage is now very low.

In order to carry on technical maintenance, the quantity and quality of the weapons and equipment must be studied in order to formulate plans and classify things. Types that can be put into regular use must be given priority for use in the combat ready units. Types that can still be used for a long time must be put into reserve in the storehouses and vehicle and artillery depots built according to the technical specifications. Other types should be used for only a certain period of time and then disposed of. Based on this, plans to maintain and repair things must be formulated. The table of organization and equipment and command system must be improved, and technical maintenance management for the entire military by sector and echelon must be guided. A technical maintenance system must be built and implemented strictly based on the regulations, and widespread use must be made of the research results obtained in past years regarding materials that are resistant to humidity, mold, rust, and deterioration. We must continue to look for new materials that are in accord with our maintenance and use environment.

Maintaining things must go hand in hand with repairing things if we are to maintain the technical and tactical capabilities of the weapons and equipment. The system of repair enterprises in the military must be built up, solidified, and improved, and dividing the repair echelons, sectors, and zones must be coordinated in an efficient manner. Some of the capabilities of the national defense production enterprises must be mobilized to repair weapons and equipment. Studies must be done on restoring the components and old parts, manufacturing components and replacement parts, and gradually overcoming the lack of uniformity in equipment based on improving assimilation. At the same time, we must study the special characteristics of the designs and techniques and the capabilities of the weapons and equipment in the table of organization and equipment that we cannot yet produce as a basis for making major repairs, improving structure and design, and manufacturing replacement elements.

Under the leadership of the party, along with the maturity and victory of our people's armed forces, our weapons and equipment have developed rapidly in terms of both quantity and quality. The Vietnamese working class, national defense workers, and the scientific and technical forces both in and outside the military have proven themselves to be very bold and clever in
very difficult conditions. They have improved and manufactured many types of simple but highly effective weapons, gained much valuable experience, and built a glorious tradition for the Vietnamese arms sector. Today, in a situation in which the national economy is growing and in which the material and technical base and the scientific and technical forces are being strengthened, if we exploit the potential of the entire country, coordinate the economy with national defense, and continue to use the world's scientific and technical advances, we will be able to maintain and improve the existing equipment based on modernizing things and produce a number of new types of weapons and equipment in much greater quantities and with higher quality in order to equip our armed forces so that they can defend our socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

Cooperation Between Public Security Forces Army
912E0004B Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Aug-Sep 90 pp 25-30

[Article by Major General Duong Thong, Interior Ministry]

[Text] Since accepting the mission of leading the regime, the party has always tied the task of solidifying national defense to the task of maintaining security in protecting the fruits of the revolution, defending the young worker-peasant regime, and, today, defending our socialist Vietnamese fatherland. The resolution of the Fourth Party Congress stated that “vigilance must constantly be increased, national defense must be solidified, and political security and social order must be maintained.” Recently, the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] Central Committee, 6th Term, stated that “the integrated strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat must be manifested, and national defense and security must be closely coordinated with the economy in leading and managing the country.” This strategic line clearly shows that the party has affirmed the key role of the two main tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat—the people’s army and the people’s public security forces—and the need to coordinate these two forces in opposing both internal and external enemies. This is a necessary requirement and a factor for ensuring construction and protecting the fruits of the revolution and the security of our socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

Looking back at the past 45 years, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the people’s public security forces and the people’s army have always enjoyed solidarity and close cooperation. They have completed every task in the struggle against aggression and in the struggle to liberate the nation, protect the fruits of the people’s revolution, and defend the party, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and socialism. This solidarity and cooperation has become a principle of strategic significance and a precious tradition of these two forces.

In each period of development of the revolution, particularly during periods when the revolution faced great difficulties and challenges and turning points, the solidarity and cooperation between these two forces could be seen more clearly, and they were perfected with new themes and forms.

History also shows that during the first years after the country won its independence, external enemies launched fierce attacks against us in an attempt to destroy our young democratic republic. In response to the appeal of the party, all the people took up arms to protect the revolution and defend the first worker-peasant state in Southeast Asia. Our army had to deal with plots and aggressive actions of French, Japanese, Chinese, and American bandits. In that situation, with the support of the imperialists and reactionaries, reactionary parties and political organizations sprung up “like mushrooms” and formulated plots to topple our worker-peasant regime. Our public security forces waged a successful struggle against the various activities aimed at causing disruption and destroying security and order and punished these reactionary forces. Smashing the plot of the reactionary Viet Que group to topple our regime in Hanoi in July 1947 was a typical example of the military exploits of our security forces.

During the wars of resistance against the French colonialists and the American imperialists, our public security and military forces showed great solidarity and cooperated closely in order to oppose our “internal foes” and annihilate our “external enemies.” Together with the people, the people’s security forces did an outstanding job in maintaining security and political stability in the rear area and supporting and enabling the armed forces to defeat the enemy forces at the front. These two forces coordinated things in developing and teaching the people a concept of vigilance and in organizing and implementing the movement to “guard against tricks and protect secrets” and the “three noes” movement. They also worked together in carrying on operations to annihilate traitors, eliminate dishonest people, and smash the anti-revolutionary and puppet groups. Examples are their efforts in putting an end to the disorder at Dong Van and Ba Lang, opposing forced evacuations, and coordinating things in opposing the enemy commandos and spies sent into socialist northern Vietnam in an effort to cause disruption and destroy things in the hope of reducing the support provided by the great rear to the great front in southern Vietnam. This contributed to building people’s war and people’s security. The people’s security forces constantly coordinated things with the military forces to maintain safety in the military recruitment campaigns, protect military shipments, and protect military secrets and military operations in the north and in the liberated areas in the south.

From 1975 to the present, the cooperation between the military and the people’s public security forces has been manifested on many work fronts, at many struggle points, and in many spheres. There has been cooperation
in winning the wars along the southwestern and northern borders and in maintaining security along the borders, at sea, and on the islands, maintaining our sovereignty, and defending the territory of the fatherland. There has also been cooperation in maintaining security and order, promptly annihilating the internal reactionary forces as well as invading forces, such as the FULRO [United Front for the Struggle of Oppressed Races] group and the Hoang Co Minh reactionary group, and maintaining socialist construction. In 1980 and 1981, the ministries of interior and national defense issued joint directives 01 and 02. Those provided a basis for guiding and coordinating things between the two forces in solidifying national defense and maintaining security in the new stage.

Today, the struggle to protect the peaceful labor of the people, defend the achievements of socialism, and defend the Communist Party of Vietnam and the dictatorship of the proletariat is going new tasks for these two forces. The anti-socialist plots of the imperialists and international reactionaries have not changed. In fact, these plots are even fiercer and more insidious than before. They have openly stated that their intention is to destroy socialism. Because their “blocking” strategy has been defeated, the imperialists, led by the United States, have switched to a “strategy of going beyond blocking” and to attacking the socialist countries in order to “defeat socialism without going to war.” In order to implement this ambitious strategy, they have used new and clever measures. The imperialist and international reactionary forces are exploiting the difficulties of the socialist countries in order to intervene in and destroy these countries using such measures as economic embargoes and political isolation. In particular, they are waging ideological and psychological destruction using such slogans as “demonization” and “pluralism” in order to implement “peaceful changes” and destroy socialism. At the same time, they are still using “military deterrence” as a precondition for using military force if necessary.

In the plots to destroy socialism, the enemy regards Vietnam as one of the key points. The complex changes taking place in the socialist countries in East Europe and the Soviet Union are affecting our country. Since the beginning of 1990, the enemy’s destructive acts aimed at Vietnam have become even fiercer. They have implemented “peaceful changes” and used the reactionary groups among the Vietnamese exiles to promote an “operation to transfer the fire back home.” They have stepped up their psychological warfare activities, distorted the leadership of the party, attacked socialism, spread propaganda about “political pluralism and many parties” and about a degenerate way of life. They have also stepped up their aggressive activities and sent reactionary groups and anti-socialist elements into our country using secret passages and through such activities as “travel,” “investment,” and “scientific and technical cooperation” in order to incite and appeal to reactionary and opposition elements within the country. The anti-revolutionary groups in the country, the puppet troops and puppet authorities who have refused to reform, the reactionaries among the religious groups and tribesmen, the opposition elements, and the opportunists are all making an effort to use renovation to rise up and carry on activities against the party and state and take us out of the socialist orbit.

The target of the enemy’s attack on us today is to weaken and destroy our party, regime, and armed forces. The realities of this fierce struggle show that we must constantly be on guard against reactionary propaganda aimed at “making the military and security forces apolitical,” separating party leadership from the army and security forces, reducing the prestige of the army, and arousing and dividing the army and security forces in the hope of reducing the combat will power of these two important tools of dictatorship. They have even audaciously called for the abolition of the party and the important tools of party dictatorship, that is, the security forces and the military. These are very dangerous and insidious plots. Thus, solidifying and increasing the combat strength of the people’s armed forces and people’s security forces, exploiting the tradition of solidarity, and strengthening combat cooperation between these two forces are very important and pressing tasks. This is also a factor in increasing the combat strength of each of these forces.

In order to build a pure and strong army and public security force with the strength to defeat each enemy, oppose internal regression, and always be worthy of being the trusted tool of the party, state, and people in the new struggle, the following tasks must be carried out well:

First, the results of implementing joint directives 01 and 02 of the Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Interior must be exploited. The purpose of this is to perfect the contents, requirements, and measures to coordinate the activities of the two forces in accord with the situation in the present struggle based on the viewpoint “national defense and security are one.” Positive steps must be taken to enable each force to complete its tasks.

In the present struggle to protect socialism, the task of maintaining national security is the leading task. More than ever before, the public security forces and the military must resolutely struggle to protect socialism, maintain security, oppose destructive acts from within, maintain the political stability of the country, create the conditions for renovation to expand, and be prepared to defeat every type of war of aggression of the enemy and defend our socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

The close cooperation between these two forces is aimed above all at maintaining security and order at the key points—along the border, at sea, and in the large cities—protecting the leading organizations of the party and state and the important political, economic, cultural, and
ideological targets, and opposing the intelligence activities of the enemy, the activities aimed at causing ideological and economic destruction, the activities that seek to make use of religion, and the activities that seek to divide the people and separate the public security forces from the military. There must be plans for dealing with unexpected situations. Defending the sovereignty and territorial boundaries of the fatherland on the mainland, at sea, and in the air must be tied to maintaining internal security. We must concentrate on and resolutely struggle against the most dangerous activities of the enemy, that is, their activities aimed at causing disorder and inciting uprisings. We must be alert and immediately crush things in the bud in order to prevent anything unexpected from happening. The enemy must not be allowed to use the party’s and state’s policy of expanding democracy and expanding cooperative foreign relations to destroy us. The imperialists and foreign reactionaries must not be allowed to establish links with internal reactionaries.

The armed forces must immediately coordinate things with the public security forces in campaigns to attack criminals, smash the plots of the reactionaries, block extremist activities, invalidate the propaganda attacking the communist party and socialism, and struggle against other types of crime.

Second, the “fish and water” relationship between the army, the public security forces, and the people must be strengthened, and there must be a thorough understanding and correct implementation of the viewpoint of using the people as the root and as the master. The army and the public security forces originate from the people and are there to serve the people. These two forces must rely on the people, and, under the leadership of the people, they must contribute to building an all-people national defense and to building a mass movement to defend the fatherland from the primary echelon to the center echelon. They must become a strong people’s security front to satisfy the new requirements, actively participate in protecting the ownership rights of the people, struggle against negative activities that harm the rights of the masses, and help the party committee echelons and authorities solve the problems that arise from internal conflicts among the people, such as land disputes, complaints, and conflicts between primary level cadres and the people. In maintaining security, prompt attention must be given to handling the “hot spots” and manifesting the role of the forces so that they can participate in satisfying the legitimate needs and wishes of the people. On the other hand, the enemy and other evil elements must not be allowed to use this situation in order to stir up trouble.

Third, the army units and public security forces must strengthen political and ideological education, improve the cadres’ and soldiers’ concept of vigilance and combat spirit, resolutely implement the laws of the state, have a lofty spirit of responsibility, and consciously protect military and national security secrets. The weapons, equipment and other property of the army and security forces must be closely controlled so that these things do not become damaged or lost. The enemy must not be allowed to use our weaknesses to attack us.

The cadres and soldiers must be taught about the tradition of solidarity and combat cooperation of the military and public security forces. Those units and individuals who have scored achievements in solidarity work and combat cooperation to maintain security and order must be promptly rewarded. The cadres and soldiers must be made aware of the insidious plots of the enemy, which are to do everything possible to destroy and divide the military and public security forces, promote the idea of bourgeois liberalism, promote the idea of opposing the party and socialism, corrupt our forces from within, and render these two forces ineffective.

Maintaining political security and social order is a major concern of every party committee and administrative echelon and the legitimate hope of every citizen. Today, our country is implementing Council of Ministers Directive 135. The localities are organizing operations to attack criminals. In these operations, the military forces have coordinated things well with the public security forces to oppose the criminals in society. They have coordinated conducting patrols and making inspections, especially in crowded places where security and order is a problem. They have cooperated in waging a struggle against criminals posing as public security forces and troops and against criminals who have used the public security forces and troops to carry on their criminals activities.

Fourth, in order to manifest the tradition of solidarity and strengthen the combat cooperation between the people’s army and the people’s public security forces, each force must manifest its positive and active nature and put forth themes for coordinating things between the two forces. Based on this, the heads of the various-echelon units, from the central echelon to the primary level, must develop themes and regulations to coordinate things. Coordinating things must be concretized at each military and security unit along each border, at sea, on the islands, and in each province, city, district, village, and street. Things must be coordinated under the direct leadership of the party committee echelons and the control of the authorities. Each force having a staff element must help lead and command the echelons in coordinating combat. Based on determining specific coordination themes for each site, the two forces must formulate plans to implement the themes and regularly coordinate the training based on these plans. Along with this, the two forces must regularly notify each other about the destructive plots of the enemy, the security situation, and the results of the joint activities. At the same time, specific work requirements and themes must be put forth for the coming period.

The enemy’s plots against our country are very insidious. Can they implement those plots? That depends primarily on our strength and ability to resist. Solidarity and close cooperation between the people’s public security forces
and the people's army is a decisive factor in developing the strength necessary to smash the plots of the enemy, protect the lives and peaceful labor of the people, protect the party and dictatorship of the proletariat, and defend the fruits of the socialist revolution.

Results of Ha Nam Ninh Defense Exercise
912E003B Hanot TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Jul 90 pp 29-32

[Article by Mai Hanh: "From the Defense Zone Maneuvers in Ha Nam Ninh—Thoughts on the Activities of the Party Committee Echelons in the New Leadership Mechanism"]

[Text] Recently, in holding maneuvers in the defense zones, many provinces and cities have gradually implemented a new leadership mechanism with respect to the national defense tasks in the localities. This is a mechanism in which the party leads, the authorities manage things, the military organizations serve as the staff, and the commanders command the local armed forces in a unified manner. The defense zone maneuvers in Ha Nam Ninh Province at the end of March 1990 again concentrated on studying this problem. The province learned the operational lessons of the leadership mechanism in the maneuvers of neighboring provinces and applied these lessons to local conditions. It gradually overcame formalism, improved the positions, and clearly manifested the capabilities of this leadership mechanism during the maneuvers. Although the initial results achieved during the maneuvers were limited, they still contributed to solidifying the understanding and confidence of the various echelon and various sector cadres, particularly leading cadres, in the advanced nature and operational effectiveness of this leadership mechanism.

However, the new situation and today's life requires that the leadership mechanism continue to be perfected in order to undertake the task of leading the consolidation of national defense in the localities and satisfying the new requirements of people's warfare to defend the fatherland.

I would like to mention a number of initial ideas concerning the activities of the party committee echelons in this new leadership mechanism based on the lessons of the maneuvers in Ha Nam Ninh.

The most important point is that the party committee echelons must perform the leadership functions and tasks correctly. This is the basic problem in order to manifest the real capabilities of this mechanism. At the same time, this is in accord with the need to renovate the leadership of the party committee echelons with respect to the administrative and social organizations. Ordinarily, in the national defense leadership mechanism in the localities, the functions and tasks of the party committee echelons (the provincial CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] committee, standing committees, and local military party committee) and of the people's committees and provincial military commands are quite varied and complex. In tense conditions, it is often difficult to tell the difference between leadership functions and tasks and administrative and organizational tasks. On the other hand, in reality, the boundary between these organizations is relative. There is a close relationship between them that cannot be severed. This is because the process of building defense zones in particular and the process of preparing the localities, armed forces, and people to oppose every type of war of aggression and the enemy's strategy of total destruction are unified processes. The various spheres of activity, such as the political, ideological, economic, military, combat, and production spheres, have both uniform tasks and requirements and their own special problems, and sometimes there are conflicts. Thus, in order to achieve results and avoid duplication and overlapping, each element—the party committee echelons, various echelon authorities, and provincial, municipal, district, and ward military organizations—must perform its functions and tasks correctly.

The provincial, municipal, district, and ward party committee echelons must perform their leadership functions and tasks correctly. This is the decisive factor for manifesting the effect of the mechanism and ensuring the success of national defense consolidation in the localities.

Based on the basic contents of the recent defense zone exercises, a number of problems requiring the leadership of the provincial and municipal party committee echelons can be mentioned:

1. The real situation and the danger posed to the locality by the enemy must be correctly determined. This is something on which the intelligence of the provincial and municipal CPV committees and various echelon military party committees must be concentrated in order to promptly determine the direction of action for the military units and people in the locality. During the past period, even though the military and people have had to deal with the enemy's strategy of total destruction and other armed activities by the enemy, in general, the activities of the people have turned to peacetime activities, that is, economic development and expansion. Thus, whenever there is a threat of enemy aggression or direct intimidation against the province, the leadership themes of the party committee echelons must clearly reflect this strategic change. This is a basic problem in order to determine the ideological and operational leadership tasks in all the party organizations and among all the people and military units in the locality.

Correctly determining the real situation and the danger posed to the locality by the enemy is the important basis for affirming the switch from peacetime to wartime with respect to a particular force or for switching all the activities of the province to a war footing in an appropriate and timely manner. But this must not be done too soon, and we must not fall victim to enemy deceptions.
Recently, a number of provinces on the "second" front of the military zone and provinces near the border decided not to switch all their activities to a wartime footing. Instead, they decided to put a number of districts and cities and a number of forces in a state of combat readiness. Naturally, this depends on the orders and instructions of higher echelons.

2. The tasks that the local troops and people must carry out and the main targets that they must deal with must be determined. During the time that the province is switching from peacetime to wartime and at the beginning of the war, there are many tasks that will have to be carried out, such as guiding the work of perfecting the local defense system, mobilizing people and means to reinforce the combat units, dispersing the people, stores, and agencies, adjusting the direction of economic and social development, and maintaining production so that people's living conditions and the local economy are not disrupted too much. Among all these tasks, the party committee echelons must determine the key tasks in order to concentrate the forces and set priorities. They can then promote other tasks in each stage.

In reality, there are many war tendencies in each locality. Some localities have to contend with enemy invasions from the sea or from across the border. Other localities have to deal with enemy sea or air attacks. A number of localities have taken steps to maintain political security and social order and control internal disorder. Thus, the combat tasks and combat targets of the local soldiers and people are different. The party committee echelons must make correct decisions based on the specific situation.

The determination of enemy targets must be based on the general situation and made in accord with the orders and instruction of higher echelons. A good reconnaissance and information network must be organized in order to keep abreast of the situation. Enemies, including both external and internal enemies, must be analyzed and evaluated in a scientific and accurate manner in order to determine whom to attack, which troops to eliminate, and which enemy actions to oppose and in order to decide whether to concentrate on external or internal foes or whether to deal with both simultaneously.

3. The main activities of the local troops and people in the face of the real situation and the tasks assigned by higher echelons must be confirmed. These include opposing and attacking enemy troops that land on the coast; opposing enemy air attacks, carrying out defense work, and overcoming the effects of the attacks; and waging a struggle against and smashing uprisings instigated by internal reactionaries. Based on analyzing the above problems, the main activities of the troops and people must be determined: to fight the enemy or maintain political security, and to defend the locality or mobilize human and material resources for the front. That is decisive for the process of assigning tasks to the various echelon authorities and forces, determining the things on which efforts must be concentrated, adjusting battle forces, organizing forces, and deciding which method of attack to use and how to carry out the tasks in accord with the tasks assigned by higher echelons and in accord with the locality's specific situation.

4. Guiding ideas and viewpoints must be determined for the actions of the party organizations, people, and troops in the locality. Based on an analysis of today's political, military, economic, and social situation in the country and world, a number of provincial CPV committees have a thorough understanding of the concept of being self-reliant and of both fighting and producing and building the country. There must be leadership in switching the economy from peacetime to wartime in accord with the new conditions of war and of renovation in general. Switching the economic management mechanism in accord with wartime conditions must be guided. But the entire mechanism must not be changed to a state subsidies mechanism. Depending on the situation, elements can be changed. In places where there is fighting, a wartime supply system can be implemented (provide things according to orders, record the debts, and settle accounts when the fighting ends). New economic and social policies must be implemented in the agricultural and industrial production and commercial spheres in order to mobilize human and material resources to ensure military victory. Depending on the specific tasks and situation of each province, city, and provincial and municipal CPV committee, appropriate guiding ideas and viewpoints can be put forth. These must not be formal or mechanical.

The exercises held in Ha Nam Ninh have shown that in order to determine the leadership contents and prevent these contents from becoming either too general or too detailed and specific, the secretary of the provincial CPV committee must, together with the members of the standing committee, the chairman of the people's committee, and the military commanders, study things and make careful preparations. In particular, the secretary must formulate a central plan or have such a plan drafted by the office of the provincial CPV committee under the guidance of the secretary of the provincial (municipal) CPV committee.

As the person in charge of the activities of the provincial (municipal) CPV committee, the secretary must affirm his position by proposing correct, concise, and clear combat leadership themes for the party organizations. The secretary is also responsible for his decisions on the key problems during a period of changing conditions. He is also responsible for organizing things and for preparing for combat and carrying on combat operations. These requirements are within the grasp of the provincial (municipal) CPV committees if these people really rely on a party committee collective that has a lofty spirit of responsibility, intelligence, the ability to carry on activities to defend the fatherland, and actual experience accumulated during past fighting.
Kinds of Material Supplies Needed by Local Defense Program Discussed
912E0004A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Jul 90 pp 70-72

[Article by Colonel Nguyen Thuong Huu]

[Text] The basic tasks of the defense zone rear services in a war to defend the fatherland are to ensure that the local armed forces are ready to fight, coordinate things with the main-force corps [binh doan] of the military region and combat commands in the locality, and provide reinforcements for neighboring provinces when necessary and in accord with the requirements of the central echelon.

In reality, the defense zone rear services are composed of the local military rear service, the local rear service, and the people's rear service. These three elements form an integrated strength, with the local rear service regarded as the central element in order to mobilize the economic and national defense potential of the locality to provide a rear service so that the armed forces can operate as effectively as possible. Besides this, the defense zone rear services have the participation, to varying degrees, of the main-force corps rear services operating in the locality. Or they are provided support by the Rear Service General Department. This is particularly true for those defense zones located in strategic areas.

As for the structure of the defense zone rear services as presented above, basically, everyone is agreed. But from the actual exercises held in a number of provinces and cities, there are many different opinions about what the size of the rear service reserves should be. The military thinks that there should be sufficient material reserves for 3 months. The civil affairs organizations are in a quandary: With the new economic management mechanism, we must practice economic accounting. If there are material reserves for several months, there will be a large amount of capital sitting idle, and that will affect production and business. Who will put up the money to maintain the defense zone rear service reserves at a time when the Council of Ministers hasn't issued a directive on this? There must be a common understanding. Studies must be done to determine how large the defense zone rear service reserves should be so that they are in accord with the specific economic conditions of each locality and with the tasks and functions of defense zone rear service elements and so that they can promptly satisfy [the needs] when war breaks out.

In principle, the local military rear services are part of the military rear service organizational system. Thus, their material reserves depend on the capabilities of the strategic rear services and military region rear services, the combat situation and tasks of the local armed forces, and the economic and technical potential of the provinces and cities. These material reserves must be sufficient to maintain a state of high combat readiness and maintain continuous and protracted combat in specific periods. Thus, it's essential to make preparations during peacetime and determine the size of the combat readiness reserves for each echelon. The local rear services and people's rear services are elements outside the rear service organizational system of the military. Because of this, their material reserves are not dependent on the subjective wishes of the military. This is closely tied to and has a great effect on the production processes and economic growth of the localities. At the same time, this creates a material base for maintaining the vitality and long-term combat capabilities of the local armed forces and of local people's warfare during a war to defend the fatherland.

Economically, according to Marx, reserves are formed based on three forms that are organically related to each other. First are the material reserves in the form of raw materials, fuel, and equipment and machinery at the plants and mines during the production process to create the products of the economic elements. Second are currency, materials, food, and the means of life among the people. Third are the commodity reserves in the storehouses of the state and joint public-private stores and the commodities being circulated at the markets in order to maintain production and life. From this, it can be observed that the national reserves for war are composed of the entire national economy. Thus, when this is applied to the economic scope of the localities, the size of the material reserves of the defense zone rear services must be studied carefully. There must be unity between the economy and the military, and things must be in accord with the economic potential and situation of the locality. The amount of material reserves stored in storehouses cannot be arbitrary or based on subjective wishes, because if the authorized amounts are exceeded, there will be an imbalance between the three forms of reserves and this could lead to stagnation in production and have an adverse effect on the relationship between the economy and national defense.

On the other hand, the material base of the local military rear services is usually smaller than that of the local rear services or people's rear services. Thus, at a time when the defense zone rear services need the guidance and support of the national rear area and strategic rear service, they must rely on the local economy and exploit the potential on the spot. Thus, the concept of the military rear service reserves cannot be identical to that of the defense zone rear service reserves. It must be seen that the size of the material reserves of each province and city depends on two basic factors: the combat tasks and combat readiness of each locality and the capabilities for mobilizing the local economic and material and technical potential. Coordination between these two factors means coordination between the material reserves and the method of mobilizing the economic potential of the localities, either altogether or gradually, depending on the situation and the changes in the war to defend the fatherland. Thus, depending on the nature of the military tasks and the economic situation of the locality, each province and city must make a decision on the size of the material reserves of the defense zone rear.
service. But decisions should not be made for all the localities in a rigid manner. Doing things this way will end the following tendency: in the military sphere, reserving and readying things in the storehouses in excess of the capabilities and economic potential of the localities, which has a negative effect on economic development, while the localities that rely on the new mechanism and on economic accounting do not have sufficient reserves as compared with the requirements.
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