Near East & South Asia

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Al-Dajani Hopes for Egypt-Iraq Missile Production
43000087 Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF
in Arabic 22 Jan 90 p 5

[Text] Dr. Burhan al-Dajani, secretary of the Arab Chambers of Commerce, has asserted that Egypt will enjoy tremendous advantages with regard to industrialization, especially over the coming 10 years, providing a technical, scientific, and handicraft base.

Dr. Burhan also mentioned his hope that there would be opportunities for the economic cooperation between Egypt and Iraq in missile production.

Saudi-Iraqi Pipeline Project Inaugurated
44000186 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English 3 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Hasin Al-Binyan]

[Text] Riyadh, Jan 2—A $2.7 billion Iraqi pipeline project will be inaugurated on Jan 9 at a special ceremony in Yanbu to be attended by senior Saudi and Iraqi officials. The pipeline can pump 1.65 million barrels of oil per day.

The multimillion dollar project, located at al-Mu'ajiz port, 50 kilometers south of Yanbu, was implemented by Saudi companies in five years.

The ceremony is to be attended by Petroleum and Mineral Resources Minister Hisham Nazir and his Iraqi counterpart Isam 'Abd al-Rahim al-Jalabi.

"The project will serve as a major boost to the Iraqi economy as the pipeline will help export a large portion of the country's oil," informed Iraqi sources told Arab News.

The 1.575-kilometer pipeline, originating from Iraqi oil fields in Rumaylah and Zubayr, moves southward to the Iraqi-Saudi borders, then to the Wasi' region. 100 kilometers east of Riyadh, to finally reach al-Mu'ajiz port, along the Red Sea.

The project was implemented in two phases. Work on the first phase, with an estimated capacity of 500,000 bpd, began in December 1984 and was completed in September 1985, while work on the second phase (1.15 million bpd) started in December 1987.

The first phase includes:

The main pumping station in Zubayr region, south of Iraq;

A 615-kilometer pipeline from Zubayr to the Iraqi pumping station near the third Saudi pumping station along the Petroline line in the Wasi' region, east of Riyadh;

A pumping station with two tanks, each with a capacity of one million barrels, for collecting crude oil;

Construction of pipeline on difficult terrains of Najd (50 kms) and Hijaz (126 kms).

The second phase includes:

A 960-kilometer pipeline from Wasi' to Ra's al-Mu'ajiz, 50 kms south of Yanbu;

Six pumping stations, one in Iraq on the Saudi-Iraqi border, two along the pipeline constructed in the first phase, one near the Iraqi pumping station and two between Wasi' and Hijaz mountains. Each station comprises three pumping machines which work with gas turbines, a refinery for producing fuel for the turbines, housing for employees, public utilities and tarmacs (at station No 3, 4 and 5) for landing Boeing 737 aircraft.

The main warehouse with 10 tanks at al-Mu'ajiz port and supplementary pumping machines;

Three well equipped wharfs to receive different kinds of containers and big tankers;

A one-kilometer bridge linking the marine and terrain sides of the project;

Workshops, and service and maintenance buildings;

Communications system covering all pumping stations and other facilities.

Israel-Egyptian Trade Relations Remain Frozen
44000206 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 18 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] Cabinet Secretary Elyakim Rubinstein said yesterday that a decade after signing the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, trade relations between the two countries remain frozen. The direct trade turnover (excluding oil sales) between Israel and Egypt was $5 million, the same amount as last year. Since the initiation of diplomatic relations between the two countries a decade ago, there has been no real chance in the trade turnover between them.

Egypt: Israelis in Ethiopia Have 'No Link' With Nile Source
JN1702182790 Cairo AL-AKHBAR
in Arabic 16 Feb 90 p 1

[From Hazim Nasr in al-Mansurah]

[Text] Engineer 'Isam Radi, minister of works and water resources, has stressed that the Israeli experts in southern Ethiopia are working outside the Nile basin and have no link whatsoever with the fountainheads of the Nile river. They are members of a consultative body undertaking some water studies there, he said.

The statement was made during a meeting Thursday between the minister and the professors of the al-Mansurah Faculty of Agriculture; the meeting dealt with the subject of water economy.
The minister said, "Egypt does not mind entering into negotiations with Ethiopia to discuss all issues related to the Nile."

Conférence Reports $670 Billion in Overseas Banks
45000089 Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF
in Arabic 5 Feb 90 p 9

[Report by Amin Taha Mursi]

[Text] Tripoli—The Arab Conference of Bank Employees, which has concluded its business in the Libyan capital of Tripoli, warns against continuing to deposit Arab accounts in overseas banks, exposing them to grave dangers resulting from the spread of global monopolies and upheavals related to the rise and fall of the price of the dollar.

The discussions disclosed that the amount of Arab funds in these banks totals 670 billion dollars in 31 international banks, among which are 20 billion dollars in British banks and 200 billion of Arab citizens' dollars in American and European banks. At one time, Arab deposits amounted to 271 billion dollars.

The conference praised the responsible heads of Arab countries for exerting every effort to return these funds to the Arab region so that they might be invested in an Arab development plan. The conference also praised the Arab system for returning these accounts, which amount to hundreds of billions of dollars. The conference also considered whether the continuation of depositing these funds abroad was national disloyalty.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Capital Fund for Palestinian Industry Established
44000193 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 31 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Joel Bainerman]

[Text] With almost no internal commercial credit infrastructure, raising money for West Bank and Gaza-based business ventures is difficult. Now, with a $400,000 grant from the Canadian Government and the European Economic Community, the first venture capital fund for Palestinian industry has been established.

Based in East Jerusalem, The Economic Development Group (EDG) was founded in 1986 to promote economic development in the West Bank and Gaza. Its charter calls for the fostering of an entrepreneurial spirit in the Palestinian community and the creation of employment opportunities for university graduates and women.

The fund allocates loans ranging from $1,000 to $30,000 (the average is $10,000) to entrepreneurs with a good idea. Rather than taking equity positions in companies, EDG operates solely on a loan basis. It also serves as a liaison between entrepreneurs and investors.

Like a venture capitalist in the West, EDG acts as a consultant, offering the expertise of its board of directors to start up companies. It assesses the business potential of ideas and helps the entrepreneur determine market potential and existing competition.

Thus far, EDG-funded business ventures include a grinding wheel manufacturer, a banana ripening operation, a dental laboratory, a bakery, and machinery which dries vegetables using solar energy.

Unlike a typical venture capital pool, EDG has certain political aims: To support the development of business that produces commodities to promote self-reliance. In addition to the aim of creating new businesses and jobs, its charter says that through these new ventures, "the Palestinian community will reduce their economic dependence on Israel." Its prospectus states it will not accept funds from any organization or country which doesn't agree with the goals and objectives as defined by EDG, i.e., the national rights of the Palestinians.

EDG is headed by Dr Hisham Awartani, an economist and the leading expert on Palestinian industry.

Regardless of the political future of the two territories under Israeli control, local employment opportunities and the West Bank and Gaza industrial capacities must be expanded. Awartani says, pointing out that nine percent of the residents of these areas (27,000) are unemployed out of a labour force of 300,000. An additional 15,000 workers are added each year, and more than 100,000 are employed in Israel. Where in the past employment in the Gulf States was available, today these countries are experiencing budget deficits and have been forced to fire many of their foreign workers.

Awartani reveals that a dramatic socio-economic transformation of income distribution amongst the Palestinians has taken place since 1967. The middle class has grown at the expense of both ends of the spectrum, creating more storeowners and daily labourers.

"One of the major fears Palestinians have is of a change in this trend. It has become our 'experience,' and we don't want our society reshaped by other Arab 'socio-economic models,'" says Awartani. "The reduction of labour in Israel and the reduction of the bureaucratic class in Jordan has created a more equitable wage structure. In one stroke, 40 percent of the low-income stratum rose a notch on the socio-economic ladder. This created a much more stable population, less prone to socio-economic unrest."

Awartani cautions any future Palestinian leadership against tampering with these trends, and helped establish EDG's fund with the aim of continuing the process. The ultimate aim is to foster entrepreneurship among the
university educated, with the goal of creating small-to-medium sized businesses to absorb the local labour force.

Over time, says Awartani, Palestinian industrialists have learned a lot from Israeli industry, either by working for Israeli firms or by providing sub-contracting services to them. Despite the official policy of encouragement, few joint ventures have been established, owing to the restraints imposed by the political situation.

Although concentrated in certain industries (food, textiles, quarries), Palestinian entrepreneurs have performed admirably, considering the difficulties they face: no subsidies and little industrial infrastructure, lack of credit, stiff competition from Israeli firms and a dearth of marketing and packaging skills.

A major problem Palestinian entrepreneurs face is closed markets. Israel restricts products coming from the West Bank and Gaza for fear they will undercut their goods. Jordan demands that any West Bank and Gaza products it sells must contain Jordanian raw materials. Arab boycott laws forbid the exporting of West Bank and Gaza products through Jordan to other Arab countries as “they may contain Israeli sub-components or parts.”

Awartani contends, however, that even if these markets were open and free, future exports to the rest of the Arab world would not be as easy as many of his colleagues claim. He doubts whether sentiment alone will provide enough incentive for these countries to buy Palestinian products if they cannot meet European price and quality standards.

Another problem is that Arab countries would probably put up trade barriers to Palestinian products. While the future potential growth of Palestinian industry will likely be in the agro-industries, canning and processing, pickling, fruit juices, tomato pastes, etc., other Arab countries are at about the same level of industrial development.

“I can also see them becoming jealous over the fact that the Palestinians can produce these products, while they can’t or don’t. Free trade in the Arab world is still a long way off.”

EGYPT

AL-AHARAM Urges Soviet Action on Jewish Settlement

NC1702094690 Cairo MENA
in Arabic 2351 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] Cairo, 16 Feb (MENA)—The AL-AHARAM newspaper calls on the USSR to move from the stage of denunciation and condemnation to that of action to stop the colonialist settlement of Soviet Jews in the occupied territories. The paper says that this is an issue that the Arabs will never forget.

In an editorial in Saturday’s edition, the paper expresses hope that the current contacts between Egypt and the USSR will produce a solution that conforms to the requirements of justice and Arab human rights. The paper refers in this context to the visit to Moscow by Dr. Usamah al-Baz, first Foreign Ministry undersecretary and director of the President’s Office for Political Affairs, prior to President Husni Mubarak’s visit to the USSR in mid-March.

AL-AHARAM notes that Egypt and the Soviet Union are linked by a long history of strong ties that witnessed significant industrial, constructional, economic, and trade achievements standing as living symbols of the two countries’ mutual interests.

The paper adds that President Mubarak’s tenure has seen the restoration of Egyptian-Soviet relations to their former status and the return of understanding and dialogue between the two countries.

The paper says that the immigration of Soviet Jews and their settlement in the occupied Arab territories represents a blatant threat to pan-Arab security in light of Israel’s expansionist ambitions. It adds that this matter requires that firm measures be adopted to halt this settlement, which constitutes a glaring assault on the Palestinian people’s rights to their land and the Arab people’s right to peace and security in the Middle East.

‘Source’ Wants To Give Soviet Bidders ‘a Chance’

45000085 Cairo AL-Wafd in Arabic 6 Feb 90 p 2

[Report by Muhammad Fahmi]

[Text] An official source in the Ministry of Industry affirmed the necessity of utilizing the protocol signed between Egypt and the Soviet Union to cover Egypt’s needs for power plant equipment and components. The source asserted the superiority of Soviet equipment in many areas. He added that it is necessary to give Russian establishments a chance to bid in international tender auctions that are held in Egypt. An official source in the Ministry of Economy asserted that the entry of Russian interests into international bidding and tendering will affect the parade of “commissions” marching into the pockets of these bidding and tendering auctions’ senior officials.

Doctors, al-Azhar Students Protest Azerbaijan Events

45000084 Cairo AL-SHA’AB in Arabic 6 Feb 90 p 1

[Report by Hani ‘Ammarah]

[Text] Four thousand students at al-Azhar University demonstrated in protest of the bloody massacres carried out by Soviet forces in Islamic Azerbaijan. The students burned the Soviet flag and distributed a statement issued by the university’s student union protesting these massacres. The statement also called for the salat al-gha’ib
[death prayer for one buried previously or on foreign soil] for the souls of the martyrs.

The Physicians' Union also issued a statement deploring the loathsome, violent events perpetrated by the Soviet forces against the Muslim people in Azerbaijan.

The Soviet Government had called for a commitment to objectivity in dealing with the Muslims of Azerbaijan.

**Musa Allots L.E. Five Million for Prison Productivity**

45000086 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 8 Feb 90 p 6

[Text] Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, minister of interior, agreed to allocate five million Egyptian pounds [L.E.] for industrial and agricultural production in prisons and detention centers under the Prison Administration. He also agreed to establish a new lumber manufacturing project costing L.E. 2.65 million.

The minister issued orders to Major General Nabil 'Uthman, assistant interior minister and director of the Prison Administration, to increase incentives given to prisoners who work in any sort of production.

The minister decreed this after yesterday's opening of the new central operations and communications room and computer center at the Prison Administration.

**Import Restrictions Said To Cost L.E. 500 Million**

45000088 Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 29 Jan 90 p 1

[Report by Muhammad al-Minyawi]

[Text] A report prepared by the Central Accounting Office [CAO] has revealed that decisions to restrict imports led to the nation's losing 500 million Egyptian pounds [L.E.] over a year because of smuggling.

The report asserted that restricting imports caused a rise in smuggling operations and raised the price of spare parts for production units.

The report indicated that some production units resorted to replacing parts with parts provided locally, which led to a 40-percent drop in the machines' life expectancy.

The CAO requested opening the door to imports without imposing any restrictions.

**Consulting Firms Active in African Development**

45000090 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 2 Feb 90 p 44

[Text] Certain Egyptian companies have begun preparing feasibility studies for a number of development projects in the African countries of Mauritania, Senegal, Zaire, Burkina Faso, and Benin. This comes within the framework of supporting technical cooperation between Egypt and the African countries via the Federation of African Consultants.

Engineer Husayn Sabur, vice president of the Consultants' Federation, said that the African nations began seeking out Egyptian expertise and gradually dispensed with foreign consulting offices after the technical development recently achieved by Egyptian companies working in these areas.

He said that these projects are set up with financing from the World Bank, the African Development Bank [name as published], and certain Arab funds. These projects include building roads; erecting dams; digging wells; and extending power lines, drinking water pipes, and railroads.

**Press Secretary Comments on East Europe, World Affairs**

900A0296A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 30 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Mahmud Bakri: "Whoever Depends on the Aid of Others Is Deluded; Recalculations Are Needed Regarding Self-Reliance"]

[Text] Dr. Mustafa al- Faqi, President Mubarak's press secretary, delivered a lecture in a scholarly meeting held at the Book Exhibition last Friday, in which he dealt with the effect of the winds of change in the world on the Arab world. He emphasized their effect in three dimensions: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the explosion of national minorities in the Arab world, and Arab political and economic development.

Of these dimensions, he regarded the political and economic development dimension as the most consequential. He indicated that this dimension in our Arab world will be negatively affected, inasmuch as we are Third World countries accustomed to receiving grants, loans, and assistance from the Western states. He stressed that we are therefore now required to recalculate earnestly and objectively, especially since experience has shown that successful experiments can only be built by peoples themselves. We will not be able to continue depending on foreign investments or loans, nor can we expect aid from abroad. The employment of all individual capabilities to serve the national economy has become an urgent priority.

Dr. al-Faqi added: Following the fall of the Iron Curtain around Eastern Europe, the United States and Western states are overwhelmed with joy at the return of the "nephew or cousin" who had remained a prisoner behind the Iron Curtain for 40-50 years. They are now hastening to help and support Eastern Europe economically, giving it greater attention than that given to Asian or African states. If the Arab world is close to some of these [donor] states, it is not closer than the single European house, which exists eastward and westward. Accordingly, the Western, or donor, states are now reordering their priorities. They are discussing limiting
aid to Third World countries and giving priority to several states, such as Poland, because supporting such states is a political priority of the donor states that surpasses and outstrips their political priorities pertaining to other states in the world.

Dr. Mustafa al-Faqi emphasized: All aid has a political objective. Aid is not granted to achieve a mere humanitarian goal. Humanitarian goals become prominent only in helping disaster and famine victims, which is another matter. All bilateral grants have a political objective. You reorder all your political priorities. Naturally, you give Eastern Europe greater attention. Aid and tourist groups will pour into these areas. Investments will be channeled. Some of them—and this may not valid for Arab investments—will be directed toward Eastern Europe based on the assumption that it is a new market, and based on a desire to quench the thirst from which this market suffers.

The president’s press secretary emphasized that the alternative needed to face this change requires us to orient toward industrial Asia (the Japan-Korean-Taiwan triangle). However, this orientation must not divert us from the need for self-reliance, because only peoples themselves produce their own experiments and progress. One who relies on others has illusions and will later discover that he had depended on a mirage, because bilateral relations between donor and recipient states are also subject to influence. In light of that, the current requirement is for an awakening of the Arab conscience, according to which the states of the Arab fatherland recalculate on the basis of the creation of a type of economic aggregate to face post-1992 Europe and the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe.

Regarding the effect of world changes on the traditional division in the Arab world between states closer to the Eastern camp and states closer to the Western camp, Dr. al-Faqi stressed that: The world is no longer a world of two great powers, inasmuch as there is a shift to a new polarization phase in which the world’s power is concentrated in one of the two poles. These developments will produce a reexamination of alliances in the Arab world itself, which will in turn be reflected in the positions of the different Arab states regarding the demonstration of maximum flexibility in the peace process vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In this connection, he cited the Soviet Union, whose position on the Palestinian problem has changed, insofar as the phase of slogans, which spoke of hostile imperialist acts, the connection between imperialism and colonialism, and Israel being an extension of Western imperialism, has ended. A kind of political reconciliation has begun, and contacts are being held daily between the Soviet Union and Israel. Moreover, the Soviet Union is advising those close to it in the Arab world of the need for flexibility and the attainment of a political settlement. Thus, the assistance given to us by the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states in the past is no longer axiomatic. There is a sort of quest for the national interest of each state separately, and there is no longer an obligatory ideological framework in the form of an inflexible model that enjoins all states to adhere to a specific political form.

Dr. al-Faqi spoke of the party experiment and the issue of democracy in Egypt, stating that the margin granted for political expression in Egypt is better now than at any previous time. Also, the freedoms that are guaranteed in general herald a better future. He indicated that democracy cannot be perfected overnight. If democracy is a right and not a gift from the ruler, it is nonetheless an issue that pertains to the objective circumstances of each state. You cannot come to enjoy it overnight. It is impossible to imagine the application of British and American democracy in Egypt overnight. Nonetheless, expression has increased because of the party experiment in Egypt, no pen has been blown away, and no writer has been banned. Even the newspaper that was banned, (SAWT AL-ARAB), was banned for a reason connected to foreign policy, which could happen in another country. A problem started developing between us and a sister state because of the newspaper’s attacks against it. Consequently, what happened was not suppression of opinion or the stifling of voices. Rather it was a serious attempt at control for the sake of the public interest. In every state of the world, there is a red zone to which the opposition cannot gain access without coordination with the ruling regime. This zone includes discussing military problems and dealing with state security matters. Discussion of sectarian problems must also be calculated and coordinated, because such matters pertain to national problems.

The president’s press secretary concluded by saying: I am not saying that anything is better than what must be, or that it is impossible for anything to have been more wonderful than what was. However, I think that the currents now enjoying political representation are enjoying a phase which was not available previously.

Doctor Claims Government Interfering in Medical Work

Islamic Doctors Under Surveillance

900A0282A Cairo LIWA’ AL-ISLAM
in Arabic 30 Dec 89 p 62


[Text] Dr. Salim Najm began by discussing restrictions imposed on Islamists in professional syndicates. He said: Restrictions are not limited to Islamists but are also imposed on all members of the opposition. The government does not recognize opposing viewpoints.

The government does not leave syndicates alone to play their role but always blocks the way of their leaders.
At a seminar sponsored by the General Physicians Syndicate on organizing children, security forces arrested a large number of attendees as they left the syndicate building. The government places syndicate officers under restriction, detains them at airports, and attempts to raise doubts about them. An example is the action of security forces of Daqahlia governorate which circulated to hospitals in the governorate a notice warning against caravans that provide citizens with medical examinations at nominal fees! Another example occurred in Dumyat where the government terminated the Bilharziasis eradication campaign launched by the Dumyat Physicians Syndicate in cooperation with the local governor. The government terminated the campaign on the pretext that it is run by extremists who are setting out to dupe citizens! Pesticides worth 100,000 pounds were subsequently stolen from Health Department warehouses and sold for less than 3,000 pounds. The people lost an opportunity for treatment and state funds were squandered. Why? To keep syndicates from discharging their duty towards the citizenry.

Dr. Salim Najm said of the syndicate’s role in supporting physicians who get arrested: The syndicate stands by and assists physicians who get arrested. It adopts their cases and handles their defenses through its lawyers. The syndicate also reports the torturing of detainees to international and domestic human rights organizations.

The syndicate is furthermore collecting evidence against physicians accused of supervising torture and will bring them to trial should the charges be verified.

Islamists win landslide victories in all professional syndicates where they run for elections. Recent examples are lawyers and merchants syndicates. Dr. Salim Najm attributes this to the high degree of awareness among professionals and educated classes and to the role models Islamists create in the syndicates they run. They provide members with eminent services. Compare this to flawed state policies, influence peddling, and self-serving which permeate the National Party. The masses are also turning fast towards Islam because it is the refuge and savior of Muslims. To Muslims, responsibility is a trust, discharging it is a duty, and slackening would be severely punished by God the Almighty.

On the role of The Committee for Physician Solidarity, he said: A furniture showroom will be opened to help young physicians furnish their apartments or offices. Misr Bank’s Al-Azhar Branch for Islamic Transactions has agreed to finance the project and has allotted 15 million pounds for the purpose.

Memo on Medical Caravan
90OAO282A Cairo LIWA’ AL-ISLAM
in Arabic 30 Dec 89 p 63

[Article: “Without Comment”]

[Text] Following is full text of a memo to the Daqahlia governorate regarding action by the Daqahlia Physicians Syndicate to launch medical caravans to examine citizens at a nominal cost. Governorate forces treated that as a crime against which immediate and urgent action had to be taken:

Memorandum

Elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, officers of the Physicians Syndicate in Daqahlia, have persisted in exploiting the suffering of citizens by launching medical caravans to examine citizens at nominal cost.

Those elements have been recently using treatment vouchers displaying their election slogan: “Supporters of God. Islam is the Solution.”

They have habitually exploited government buildings for such activity. For example, the Mustafa Kamil elementary school in the town of al-Jamaliyah has been exploited to hold a medical day on 20 October 89.

Building supervisors have been instructed not to allow such activity without the permission of their executive leaders in order to avoid exploiting such activities in the interest of extremist action.

Governorate of al-Daqahlia Office of the Secretary General

Urgent and Confidential

The above is copy of a memo to the minister governor about the practice of elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, officers of the Physicians Syndicate in Daqahlia, in exploiting citizen suffering to launch medical caravans to examine citizens at nominal cost.

The memo has been inscribed by the governor minister as follows:

Circulate to all governorate agencies in general. Repetition will be cause for action against the person with primary responsibility for the site. Any such incidence should be immediately terminated. Report to us that this has been stopped once and for all.

For your information. Issue the necessary orders and keep us posted.

Respectfully, Under-secretary of Ministry/Secretary General Brigadier General Hamid Amin al-Sa’idi

IRAQ

Text of ‘Secret’ Documents on Political Reforms
90OL0239A Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI’
in Arabic 22, 29 Jan, 5 Feb 90

[Article: “Secret Minutes of Iraqi Leadership’s Discussions on Democracy and Free Parties and Press; Saddam Husayn: We May Not Leave Iraq to Fate; Historic Leadership Must Lay Down Foundations of Iraq’s Unity for Long Time To Come”]
[22 Jan pp 8-11]

[Text] This secret Iraqi document discusses the developments that have engulfed Iraq since the end of fighting with Iran and the need to move from a position of power to introduce changes into Iraq's political structure with the purpose of expanding the framework of democracy, party plurality, and free press in order to enable Iraq to better play its political role in the region. AL-YA'AM AL-SABI' publishes here a brief summary of the document.

AL-YA'AM AL-SABI' publishes here a secret Iraqi document on the discussions held within the Iraqi leadership (the RCC [Revolutionary Command Council] and the Regional Command) on the changes planned to be introduced into Iraq now that the war with Iran has come to a halt.

The meetings about which the document speaks—printed in the form of an internal book distributed to prominent state officials only—began in the first months of 1989 and then followed in succession.

All the meetings were headed by President Saddam Husayn and were attended by all the leadership members who expressed their numerous and varied opinions.

The discussions focused on the structure of the Iraqi regime and of its institutions, on whether they should remain unchanged or whether changes should be made in them, on whether the change should be partial and superficial or profound and fundamental, and on whether the party alone should make the change or whether nonparty elements should participate.

The issues of democracy, the free formation of parties, rewriting the constitution, of the National Assembly elections, who should run for election, public and individual liberties, and releasing the freedom of the press were submitted to thorough discussion.

Two opinions materialized during this discussion: An opinion arguing for maintaining the existing institutions—the party, the constitution, the National Assembly—unchanged, and for moving toward entrenching democratic action within these institutions, only for fear of the reemergence of the opposed and hostile tendencies in political life. A second opinion advocates change—broad democratic change—in the direction of releasing the freedom of forming parties, giving these parties the freedom to wage the National Assembly elections, releasing individual and public liberties, and abolishing the previously issued laws that restrict these liberties.

The first opinion is argued on the basis of concern for the Ba'th Party, for its rule, and for its accomplishments in Iraq.

The second opinion is argued on the basis of the changes occurring in the world, the strength the Ba'th Party has come to enjoy among the masses after 20 years of rule, and after the victory in the war, and the importance of developing the party and its concepts so that the party may remain in the leadership position.

President Saddam Husayn supported the second opinion strongly. Rather, he was the force promoting the second opinion and defending it warmly.

These discussions went on within the Iraqi leaderships throughout 1989. In the wake of the discussions, committees were formed to draft a new constitution, a new parties law, and a new press law. These committees have completed their work.

At the conclusion of this serious work, President Saddam Husayn chose the occasion of the Iraqi Army anniversary to announce an impending popular referendum on the new constitution, considering that the constitution is the basis of the democratic transformation process which Iraq will witness in the next few months.

A new era will dawn in Iraq and it will have its impact on Iraq's position and on the Arab region.

AL-YA'AM AL-SABI' publishes here the secret minutes of the Iraqi discussions, having selected the parts connected with the main issues and excluded only the discussions on administrative and subsidiary issues.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] The historical record shows that our country was denied balanced continuity for nearly 800 years and denied Iraqi leadership for nearly 1,500-1,600 years. All this had to affect our country's conduct in one way or another.

Democracy: Ambiguity and darkness bring to power models that may be angelic or demonic. My human concern is that Iraq's affairs must be arranged in such a way as not to permit the demon to pass to the position of power. We may not leave Iraq to fate. We want to see Iraq through 3,000 years (p. 37).

Let us make long-range plans for Iraq, including a plan for a democracy that ushers in individuals whose lineage is well known and who are tested, and not any individual whose father is not even known and who may immediately put the Iraqis in God knows what situation and lead them in God knows what direction.

As a historical leadership, we must lay the foundations for Iraq's unity for a long time to come so that Iraq's unity may be firm forever.

We must engage in the kind of actions that bring about a natural birth that is attended by prominent Iraqis who attest to the birth and the care given so that they may lead each to his right position under the umbrella of principles (p. 38).

How do we start? We must begin with composed and daring steps; composed in the sense that they are preplanned, totally envisioned, and not impeded by any criticism of the ideas offered (p. 39).
We begin with democracy in the leadership. The first manifestation of democracy is to adhere to tranquility when stating an opinion. We must transmit the spirit of democratic dealing to the party, to our cadre, and to our comrades.

What is democracy? It means a humane and friendly attitude in listening and responding to an idea, in listening to and correcting criticism, and in accepting criticism when the viewpoint of the base is more just than the viewpoint of the top, because justice is the essence of democracy.

In the party's organizational structure, the relationship must be democratic. The comrades must transmit this spirit to the citizens, to the factions, and to the partisans. Consequently, a new spirit will prevail among the people (p. 40) as a prelude for the arrival of parties with which we hold dialogue in front of the people.

Parties: But should we take the step of forming parties before we see the signs of peace with Iran? I have not yet made my mind on this issue. However, I have firmly made up my mind on the issue of spreading the spirit of democracy in the party's internal life, on the party's relationship with the people, and on building relatively stable institutions (p. 41).

[Comrade Muhammad Banaz] It is my opinion that there should be two phases: First, we should begin with ourselves, should give the people a broad opportunity, and should apply the law according to what comrade Sa'dun Hammadi said by providing a very broad scope of freedom in accordance with objective controls before we embark on the tumult of parties. This will be a phase of mobilization for the creation of parties and organizations. In this phase, there should be free press, opportunities to criticize the state and its agencies, and democratic actions in the party organization. The other thing is, in my opinion, that we—meaning we as a presidential state where the head of state is the prime minister—must continue as we are, and must disregard the appointment of a prime minister, because we are undergoing an economically uneasy circumstance. The country's circumstances dictate that the head of state exercise direct control until we move to another phase. A prime minister can then appointed (p. 42).

Constitution: The other issue I wish to touch on is the constitution. What you have kindly mentioned is very likely. It is supposed to combine all ideas. The first point with which we start should be the constitution.

Elections: Insofar as the National Assembly elections are concerned, my opinion is that they should remain unchanged. I believe that providing a broader opportunity of democratic debate among people who meet the requirements of candidacy is a better formula than the previously-followed formula. Let them compete in the elections, win or lose.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] Why don't we try something in the coming elections. Let us suppose that we are in a phase when parties already exist. Let whosoever meets candidacy requirements and wishes to run for election to the National Assembly run with God's blessing, be he a Ba'thist or a non-Ba'thist. Let us see what this "mix," which is a phased "mix," will produce for us. When parties are founded later, the assembly will be dissolved so that the parties may take part in the election (p. 43). Let us reexamine the controls and the Higher Committee (the committee which sorts out the candidacy applications) and let us make them more compatible with the new spirit.

[Comrade Muhammad Banaz] Presidential council: I support a presidential council which will assist the president in a certain way. It should not have many members—perhaps 17, 15, 13, or 9. It should be within these limits (p. 44).

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] We must make a distinction between a presidential council which duplicates the powers, i.e. a council which issues laws and decrees that have the force of law, and a purely advisory council. We must make a distinction because advocating a purely advisory council means that the sole source of legislation is the National Assembly, in addition to whatever powers are assigned the head of state (p. 45).

[Comrade Taha Yasin Ramadan] Democracy: I am very proud of the procession. But I cannot put the possibility of continued attempts by the procession's foes out of my mind, regardless of how strongly we imagine that the developments have dwarfed these foes or have driven them to despair. Therefore, in any condition we choose, we must reduce the possibility that this situation will create umbrellas for the hostile forces abroad and at home. When we discuss the issue of controls and of calm phased steps, I hope that the discussion will be understood on this basis, and not on the basis that some of us want democracy and the others don't. I believe that concern for true democracy makes this democracy clear, protects it from manipulation and exploitation, and blocks the path of backsliding behind it. I do not mean that we should stand still and should not enter this path. We should enter it, but calmly and with controls that are compatible with the phase, with our principles, and with our people's situation.

As for the demand for parties, I cannot say that if parties are founded now they will find the opportunity to express external demands that go beyond the government's will. But when the time comes and when we have surpassed numerous problems and needs—in two or three years, for example—the situation will be different. Therefore, we must examine the issue calmly and without haste. I don't believe that we have missed the train.

What is important now is that the discussion on democracy is a significant step in itself because this discussion comes at a time when we are completely relaxed, especially with the state of victory (pp. 45, 46).
Therefore, I am for elections. First, the National Assembly elections should be held on schedule and should not be postponed until parties emerge. The other point, Mr. President, is that I support your excellency in that we should begin with this program, i.e. begin by agreeing on certain provisions and steps and by implementing them while continuing to discuss other steps. What I mean is that we should not begin by discussing 50 provisions and then not implement anything until we have agreed on all of them. Our people need phased steps like these which they can absorb.

Press Law: I, for example, do not link the idea of beginning the formation of parties with the press. I believe that in light of the phase, we can now draft a press law with an acceptable degree of freedom. What I mean is not absolute freedom. There has to be a law that gives the press, including the government press, party press, and private press, a greater role in the democratic process and issue. What I mean is that we should draft a law that regulates the press established by a party when parties are formed or the press founded by an individual or an establishment. A committee can be formed now and draft a press law.

Parties: On the parties issue, I support in principle those who have stated with conviction that the Ba'th Party will not fear one, two, or five parties. But I do not support the formula which advocates that we invite so and so or such and such from parties which were dissolved 30 years ago and ask them to form parties.

I say that we should issue a parties law and should promote it in the media in accordance with the rules. Then let those who wish to form parties, whether from elements previously engaged in party action or not, do so. The matter is up to them. The important thing is that they form their parties in accordance with the law which will be drafted and issued. Therefore, I see that we should confine the discussion to the principles of drafting the parties law, not to who will form these parties (pp. 50-51). I have ideas on the principles that must be observed by the parties and I will talk about these principles in future meetings when we discuss the parties in detail (p 52).

I believe that the laws, especially the press law, have priority for me. The parties law must contain no ambiguity.

I believe that the constitution should be promulgated before any party emerges. The constitution should be issued by the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party under the regime existing at present, meaning that no other party should participate in drafting the constitution. Our party deserves this honor after this long struggle (p. 53).

[Comrade Tariq 'Aziz] This is the first step and it is the basis (p. 56).

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] We have made things easy. Haven't you drafted and presented the formula, Ahmad (presidential office chief)?

[Comrade office chief] Sir, I have notified the agency heads according to your instructions. Everything (laws
concerning individual liberties) is suspended and abolished. They are making proposals (p. 57).

[Comrade Sa'di Mahdi Salih] To us, democracy is a principled and fundamental position. However, we must not rush into this area. We must proceed according to the following steps: Work promptly to draft a constitution for the country.

Considering that symbol is of great importance in the hearts of Iraqis, I find it necessary that the president be given a prominent position. The president is the president of Iraq and of all the Iraqi people, not just the president of a certain party or of part of the people.

Attention should be given to individual liberties in accordance with the constitution. Utmost and prompt importance should be given to this issue.

The press should be given the opportunity to engage in constructive criticism.

The National Assembly elections should be held before parties are formed.

The formation of parties on a chauvinistic ethnic basis and on a sectarian basis should be prohibited.

A way must be found to maintain the RCC formula because of the RCC's place in the heart of the Iraqis.

[Comrade Saddam Husayn] Hamid, you send to each of the comrades the statements he has made so that he may check them carefully in order that we may print and distribute them to our other comrades to read them and to be familiar with them in the next meeting. We may agree to acquaint a certain level of the cadres with a certain phase of our debate so that they may view us as part of the democratic action and may be familiar with all the conflicting and harmonious ideas, because this is, perhaps, a new condition in the Ba'th Party branch in Iraq.

(At this point, President Saddam Husayn ended the session).

**Joint RCC-Regional Command Session**

(President Saddam Husayn opened the session)

[Comrade Sa'dun Shakir] Parties: Propagating a democratic climate requires that such a climate be propagated in the party first and then transmitted to the masses. To come and revive dead parties is something that serves no interest and brings no desired benefit. Proliferating, generalizing, and entrenching a democratic climate amidst the public is likely to create a more beneficial condition for us.

The other thing is that if we cast a glance at our party, we find that it has nearly 1.5 million followers, supporters, and members. With friends and backers, the number grows to more than 2 million. If we consider that each of these people influences three kinsmen, then the number ranges from 5 to 6 million. If we discount children who are less than 14 or 15 years old, it becomes obvious that 90 percent support the Ba'th procession. We notice that practically all our people are “politicized” in our direction, meaning that they are either Ba'thist, pro-Ba'thist, friendly to us, or in harmony with the procession (p. 75).

Yes, there are opposing political parties. But how big are they? Besides, they are lackey parties.

If new parties are created, they will certainly be card-board parties and they will not be convincing to the people.

We can practice democracy. In addition to what we practice in the party and what we transmit to the masses, we have labor unions and professional federations. We may find more democratic formulae in elections for labor unions and for professional and popular federations.

Constitution: Insofar as the constitution and its content are concerned, we need to redraft the constitution democratically.

It should be noted in the constitution that the RCC will consist of nine, 10, or 11 members, without mentioning names.

National Assembly: Regarding this assembly, the question is whether we should hold elections and form the National Assembly now or whether we should postpone the elections until parties are formed? I believe that it is better that the National Assembly be elected now. We can draft for this assembly a constitution that enables it to play a more advanced and democratic role.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] We have settled this issue. The National Assembly will be elected on schedule and it will not be suspended (p. 76).

[Comrade 'Izzah Ibrahim] Democracy: Democracy has a large place in our procession and in peoples' life. It starts where we started on the first day of the 17 July 1968 revolution. What part of our democratic experiences, whether inside the party or with the people, and even of the reckless democracy currently existing in the west should we embrace? I believe that we should embrace what befits the the level of the Iraqi citizen's cultural development, plus an added measure, so that we may expand the broad base that we have created throughout the past 20 years. At this level, the citizen can exercise democracy with a creative and inventive spirit (p. 78) because democracy is a double-edged sword. If democracy follows formulae which the citizen cannot absorb and use in a disciplined, organized, and creative manner, then the citizen will inevitably use democracy in a negative manner that harms the procession and that may lead to dividing and destroying national unity. The other restrictive exercise, i.e. narrow democracy, can also harm the procession because it curtails the release of the citizen's intellectual efforts and capabilities.

Therefore, I agree with you that we must begin discussing the provisions one by one.
First, we have the currently applied democratic formula which offers a broad arena for democratic action, including the National Assembly. There will also be a better change toward democracy in the amendments which we will discuss in connection with the National Assembly law and the election bylaws. Second, is the issue of the people's councils, their law, their powers, and their relationship with the state's legislative and executive institutions.

Third, are the state institutions, the reorganization campaign that you are leading, and the democratic climate and stability this reorganization will offer the state institutions.

Fourth, is the tangible development undergone by the structures, powers, and elections of the popular and professional organizations.

Fifth, is the legislative assembly of the self-rule region (Kurds) and the self-rule institutions generally.

Sixth, is the administration of education, especially at the university level.

Parties: As for the issue of forming parties, we are supposed to examine it in light of Iraq's current situation (p. 79).

I do not wish to talk of the parties which existed previously, such as al-Da'wah and Communist Parties, because they were lackey and treasonous parties which have fallen and disappeared, or of the parties which committed treason and stood with the enemy during the war. These parties have no right to return to the national political action arena.

We are not entitled to form parties from among the people with our authority. There are 15 million Ba'thists and each is supported by no less than 10 kinsmen. There are now 15 million Ba'thists. Rather, all the people are Ba'thists, even though they have not joined the party. I don't believe that it is in the public interest that we bring people or create the conditions for people who do not basically believe in the Ba'thist course or even in the national and pan-Arab course to come and form parties. How can we create parties from among this circle? So, we will be compelled to bring people from the Ba'thist circle and to tell them to form parties. They will form their parties from the same Ba'thist circle (p. 80). I don't think that such action is in our interest.

The Iraqi people's psychological, intellectual, and moral makeup is different from the makeup existing in the Arab homeland and in the world at large. The Iraqis have a special characteristic. When you put an Iraqi in a certain place and you tell him: So and so, this is your place and this is how you are responsible for it, then this Iraqi develops psychologically in a manner which influences his place. With the passage of time, he develops the feeling that he has an independent share in the place. He begins defending his share and begins to aspire to develop it and to confront whoever opposes his course.

Do we bring a [Ba'th] party member to form another party and say this is the Iraqi national party or the people's party which exists side by side with the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party? What I mean is: Should the Iraqis form a party while continuing to belong and to psychologically believe in the principles of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, and while following the course of our party, the leader party? I don't believe that such Iraqis exist at present.

I do not understand how another party or other parties are to be formed next to our party!

As for reviving the Democratic National Party or the Independence Party, I do not believe in this principle because those parties have become a thing of the past, they are outdated, and they have no base now.

A party with 10 or 20 members may be formed out of them, except in one case, i.e. if we find evil people who are sick in the heart and who harbor malice for the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and for the procession.

There are also those who have dropped out of the procession. When these failures meet they will certainly be tantamount to scorpions for us and we will be forced to dissolve their parties by law. Consequently, we will emerge as people who have distorted democracy.

We should discuss the issue of expanding democracy and of developing the democratic course within the framework of the existing course, namely the course of the leader party. We should develop the existing parties with formulae that are more expressive (p. 81). They should be Iraqi parties and not sectarian, ethnic, racial, or feudal parties. We should not permit the creation of sectorial parties so that they may not affect the Iraqi people's unity.

We should work to expand the National Assembly with greater openness and we should give it more powers.

Democracy and powers must be given to the state institutions which will be set up in accordance with the new transformation and the new democratic course.

More powers should be given to the president of the republic and the commander-in-chief and to the other officials in the procession, and the powers of the central leaderships, which have to convene and discuss matters, should be reduced so that their meetings may not delay the decisionmaking.

So that nobody may think that I am against forming parties, I say that I wish the real situation permitted the formation of other parties that would produce the results we desire on the path of building a democratic course that reflects our need and our aspirations to develop the national pan-Arab experience in this country. But I am not optimistic that we will produce from the Iraqi people a condition at this level. [Comrade Taha Muhyi-al-Din Mad'ruf] Constitution: I believe that it is necessary to have a transitional period before the new constitution is proclaimed and political parties are formed—a period in
which various committees are formed, including a permanent constitution committee formed of the people concerned (p. 82) to draft the main features of the constitution. After the committee drafts these features, the constitution should be presented to a team of legislators and should then be submitted to a public referendum after its provisions and its final formula are completed.

Parties: I am for holding the National Assembly elections on schedule. I believe that a committee should be formed to lay down the principles of the political parties law. The parties bill should be then presented to the National Assembly to debate and pass it.

I am for the formation of political parties, including new Kurdish parties, within the concept of the new law that will be legislated. I am opposed to having the government invite certain individuals to form the new parties. All factions of the people, regardless of whether their ethnic belonging is Arab or Kurdish, should be allowed to form political parties in accordance with the rules and principles of the new law because this approach strengthens our country’s democratic procession and democratic movement.

The provisional constitution guarantees the formation of political parties and guarantees the freedom of expression and of publication.

Similarly, we are on the threshold of establishing a formula of economic cooperation with the Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Yemen) and this framework may develop into a formula for a broader political union. So how can we prohibit the presence of political parties at a time when there are in Egypt, for example, numerous political parties that have been formed democratically and that have representatives in the People’s Assembly?

Kurdish restrictions: As for forming new Kurdish parties, I am for forming such parties as long as those in charge of creating them are Iraqis who primarily believe in the principles of our great revolution, in your historical leadership, and in the unity of Iraq’s soil and people, and who support the self-rule achieved for our great Iraqi Kurdish people. I say that if Iraqi Kurds apply to form a political party, it is not in the public interest to reject their application, because prohibiting the formation of such a Kurdish party is likely to encourage Kurdish youth to join the underground Kurdish parties or to join branches of the Kurdish parties existing outside the country (p. 83).

Lifting restrictions: I propose that we start as of this moment of the transitional phase by lifting the restrictions existing at present as a result of extraordinary circumstances, be they the aggression or the rebellion in the north. At the same time, we must encourage free expression in the press and must abolish the restrictions imposed on the movement and residence of citizens in the country and on free travel.

Article 24 of the provisional constitution clearly underlines the issue of free travel and states that a citizen may not be prohibited from leaving the country or from returning to it. I believe that allowing free travel and granting the other benefits which the Iraqi citizens, especially the professionals and the specialists, enjoy, will encourage the return of thousands of citizens who left Iraq and who are living outside the country temporarily. Therefore, I am personally for launching a series of measures to gradually lift the restrictions on the Iraqi citizen while taking our financial circumstances into consideration.

[29 Jan pp 12-15]

[Excerpts] Here is the second part of the secret document on the discussions within the Iraqi leadership to develop democracy. This part consists of the text of President Saddam Husayn’s address. We are publishing it here complete and unabridged by virtue of its significance in clarifying the new Iraqi thinking.

Within the context of the discussions on developing democracy in Iraq in the direction of party plurality and of releasing the freedom of the press, President Saddam Husayn presented a detailed review of the reasons and motives that dictate developing and releasing democracy, beginning with the party issue and with the controls on forming new parties.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] Parties: What is meant by a national party is to say that such and such a party is perhaps an Arab party headed by an Arab from al-Basrah. But the party says in its constitution or its program: I put at the top of my party’s struggle the development of Kurdistan’s self-rule in accordance with the following, for example: Membership in this party may not be confined to Kurds alone. However, the said party’s objectives may include Kurdish national objectives. This is understandable and acceptable. As long as our constitution provides for this, then why should we prohibit it?

Let us assume that another party, called party “x” or the independence party, for example, is formed and that this party’s constitution includes an article which says: “We struggle to entrench the Turkomen’s cultural rights.” The higher authority accepts this position. But in its membership and organizational system and in other aspects, the party must be Iraqi in character. If we agree that the party may espouse such an objective, then we can license the party or we can say that such an objective does not exist in practice. But if we then find that the party constitution includes an article which says “we struggle to develop the cultural conditions and gains of the Turkomen and the Syriacs,” then we should approve the party because this objective exists in our policy in the first place. So why should we prohibit it?

But if we find in the party constitution or policy articles which exclude Syriacs, Turkomen, or others, then we say that this is a racist ethnic party and that it is rejected. When the party is open to all Iraqis, both Muslims and Christians, and when it strives for certain objectives which fall within the essence of the existing policy and
which are not in conflict with it, then we are not supposed to view it in such a [disapproving] way. Here is another example. There was a party called the Iraqi Democratic Party. Its program called for developing the Kurdish self-rule and for struggle to develop the minorities’ cultural rights. These objectives exist within the framework of the constitution. On the other hand, we have agreed to draft a constitution which spells out the controls on what is prohibited. If a party’s program is found to contain articles conflicting with these controls, then it should be abolished immediately. The minister of interior should directly notify the applicant that his party’s program is in violation of the constitution and that he has to withdraw the program, amend it to make it compatible with the constitution, and then resubmit it so that the higher authorities may express their opinion on it.

There is a difference between a national position and a racist position.

I will deal with the issues about which we have talked, particularly with permitting the formation of other parties in addition to the already existing parties. The basis of this discussion is that we don’t have parties as parties should be, either because they are not as effective as they should be or because they only include Kurdish parties, considering that there are no other parties at the level of Iraq. This is one aspect. The other aspect is: Does the formation of additional parties reflect a desire or a vision? It reflects a vision, not a desire. If the matter were confined to the presence or absence of desire or to just creating another color, perhaps all of us would prefer not to have a color other than the color for which we have mortgaged our future. We did not join the party superficially. We joined the Ba’th Party with profound commitment and we tied our lives to accomplishing the party’s slogans and objectives.

So we are talking of a vision. As usual and as you have known since 17-30 July and to this day, we are not the type of people who do not talk of vision until they are encircled. Our vision has always gone beyond the likely hoop which the forces of life or the hostile forces try to place around us.

Accordingly, the discussion on these ideas began after 1979. Then the war erupted and halted the discussion. But the war did not halt the serious thought given to these ideas. Even though the ideas were presented clearly for discussion a long time ago, it was not the purpose to make a decision on the ideas and on their details at the time. I say that these ideas were presented a long time ago in order to underline a historical position. More than two years prior to the end of the war, this position was intended to prepare the colleagues attending the leadership and cabinet meetings not to drop these ideas from of their consideration.

I first raised this issue in the leadership in 1982. It was subsequently raised in the cabinet and in joint meetings and we have been constantly reminding of it.

So it is a vision. Is a vision not supposed to be examined and debated carefully until the people demand that we do it or until life encircles us? Or is it better that we steer life and lead the people? What is the meaning of initiative? It means that you are not forced to accept an idea that is determined to be true by forces outside yourself before the idea matures properly in your mind and is transmitted to your behavior at the right time. Rather, you determine what is right without coercion and without encirclement. Let me repeat that by encirclement, I do not mean encirclement by the enemies but also by life. Life can also besiege a party, a faction, or an individual who lags with his vision behind life’s given facts and requirements.

Yes, we are not talking of democracy and its applications in emulation of others because there are fundamental differences that prevent emulation, considering that we are a nation and a people who have their special national and pan-Arab characteristics that have been formed and perfected throughout thousands of years. Our condition is not the same as that of some other countries who have asked those coming from the Soviet Union to write their doctrine for them. We are a people whose doctrine exists within ourselves, our conscience, our heritage, our history, and our nation.

So we are not talking of emulating or imitating an existing condition. But we have already said that we must not forget that the environment of the modern age brings nations closer to each other. The view of the world’s living affairs has moved closer to the so-called internationalist thinking. So it is my assessment that in 20 years, a closely similar thinking pattern will develop, at least in solving human problems whose effects surpass national borders. It is a thinking pattern that is close to being internationalist in character. A behavioral pattern close to this characteristic in nature will develop as a result of this thinking. Can we disregard this development that is occurring in the world and in human societies under the impact of the talk about the special national and pan-Arab characteristic? The answer is: We may not because if we disregard it, time and life will leave us behind. We will then find that those who were quite a few notches below us are thinking better than we are. In this case, the law of life will dictate that we be moved aside in order that those who are better may replace us.

It is not my purpose with this characterization to link the process of elimination or of continuance with the vision. This is not the basic factor, even thought it is an objective factor in life. The basic factor is the issue of the Socialist Arab Ba’th Party role as we believe in it, so that this role may be consolidated within the context of true development and concepts that mesh and interact with the
development of the life around us and the life beyond, because we always want our party to lead and not to lag behind the procession.

What will elevate you even higher in the eyes of your people and will consequently enhance your influence on and through the people is your raising the question of participation by others not under critical circumstances, as other regimes and governments ordinarily do, but under circumstances when you sit atop the peak of victory and of power, having proven that you are capable of solving your people’s economic, intellectual, political, and military problems. Historically, this is not an easy thing. The most significant thing that must be underlined in our democratic experience is this capability so that it may confirm that our party is genuine in character and that the Ba‘thists are sincere to their party’s principles when they tell others while they are at the peak of their power: Come and share the power, but in accordance with principles. Is this participation merely intended to adorn the regime and the party?

The issue we are discussing is broader in nature. It is not the issue of permitting the formation of additional parties because democracy is broader and deeper than such permission. The issue pertains to all of life’s political, social, economic, intellectual, practical, informational, and cultural affairs, as well as other affairs.

Pan-Arab Role...How?

We have withdrawn from the field of intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab countries. When we speak of the party, we do not speak of a regional party. Originally, we were not the party’s starting condition, but a condition within the party. We became fundamental with the party’s development. We were not the beginnings of the party. Therefore, we must remember that we shoulder a pan-Arab role. We in Iraq do remember that we shoulder a pan-Arab role, even while we refrain or while we withdraw from the field of intervention in the Arab countries’ internal affairs. One of our most prominent pan-Arab duties is to facilitate the struggle of our party’s branches in the other Arab countries, but in a different way, namely by example. The most significant obstacle our party’s branches will encounter when they demand to play a role in the licensed struggle is that they will be told: Your initial experiment did not permit the formation of parties. So why are you demanding an officially licensed role? If these branches’ experiment in Iraq is an advanced experiment in all its aspects, then this experiment will supply the Ba‘thist with additional moral amunition because he will then be struggling while filled with faith, considering that his struggle is just, sound, and right.

When we talk of democracy we should not talk of it as if its principled aspect is a subject of discussion. The talk about the principled aspect of democracy must emanate from a deep faith in democracy. The talk about democracy must focus on clarifying democracy and on how to express it in connection with the circumstances, the phase, and the capabilities solely. Democracy is a fundamental mainstay of our party, and even of our revolution. Because democracy is a fundamental mainstay of life, man may not and should not close his eyes to it. So our talk today is about the applications of democracy. When we speak of these applications, we must not discard from our calculation that talking about this aspect of democracy is not the first step that we should take. What I mean is that what we are doing today is not the beginning. Our entire procession has involved application of the essence of democracy, but in a gradual manner that is compatible with life, with the phases of power, and with the stages of our people’s awareness of their human, national, and pan-Arab role. So let us remember the first step. But we are talking of democracy not on the basis of the first step nor on the basis of the open and unrestricted condition. We are talking about the present. We should characterize the present and then say: This is the proper step for the present, without disregarding an open development line to the future.

Party and Development

The other point is that all of us who are sitting here are Ba‘thists. None of us is not a Ba‘thist. We all understand the party by one degree or another, at least by more than what minimal degree of understanding is required by the party dictates. But where did you get the mandate to lead Iraq endlessly without permitting the others, who may be better than you, to have their say in life’s affairs? Even though I speak as a Ba‘thist, who can say that the Socialist Arab Ba‘th Party’s thinking and policy are the best condition forever, even when the party cannot develop in a manner that enables it to respond to life’s dictates? You should not exclude the likelihood of the development of a condition that is more capable than our party should our party lag behind its role. A condition of the sort will encourage many, including those present at this meeting, to join it. When we joined our party, we did not join it as a name but as an essential concept. We joined it when we came to believe that it is our path to the nation’s great objectives and because it was ahead of the others with its thinking and vision. I believe that what I am saying today is mere theoretical assumptions that will continue to be so for a long time and that will not materialize in our life so that somebody who is better than the Socialist Arab Ba‘th Party may come and take the leadership position. However, ideological vision must never be closed. If it is closed, it will lead to fanaticism which blinds the eyes and the minds and prevents them from seeing life as it should be seen. For sacrifices, for strengthened affiliation, and for party adherence, we believe that the Ba‘th Party is the best condition. But to be responsible, we must open our minds to life. Should we ignore the question that is colliding with your thinking and creating resounding noises and explosions? This is perhaps the first time in which the Ba‘thist confronts himself with this question: Should we monopolize the political life for a long time? Today is not the first time I have presented this idea. I presented it seven or eight years ago (verbally and in
writing). Let us ask: What are the circumstances that will keep the Ba'ath Party a leader? The leadership I understand is not administrative leadership. What I mean is: How can our party continue to be a leading party at the highest intellectual, political, and behavioral level? What are the conditions and circumstances for such continued leadership? Are they in keeping our party the single party, to which nobody can say you are wrong or you are right, and the single party whose mistakes nobody can criticize, so that we may correct such mistakes in our behavior and thinking?

This is unsound and it is tantamount to killing the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party. Insulating the party is tantamount to abandoning the party's leadership role because the party will be inevitably removed, and life is what will remove it. Purity alone is not enough to prevent removing our party from the leadership position. The party will be removed, as all the movements that insulated themselves from society and from life have been removed, if it abandons the leadership role in its vision and behavior.

So if we want our party to lead, we must constantly look for the means to keep it vigorous and to keep it, in the eyes of life and of the majority and not just in the eyes of a faction of partisans who are fanatic to the party's thinking and to the name of the Ba'ath Party, a leader in society. [passage omitted]

Principles

When we speak of the importance of expanding the base of participation in the government and of innovating formulae to apply democracy, we urge this in accordance with principles which must not be disregarded. These principles include principles that accommodate the current development phase while keeping the door open to the future, and that include al-Qadisiyyah experience as a fundamental condition in this experiment. Accordingly, we issued yesterday, for example, a directive instructing all state agencies to sell state property in public auctions first to those who made an outstanding intellectual, political, military, or financial contribution or other contributions to the second al-Qadisiyyah, and then to let the others participate. The revolution's bounty and Iraq's bounty may not be ladled out to those who have played no role in defending Iraq while being capable of playing such a role. The gradual benefits of this type of situation must be arranged according to the order of sacrifice and loyalty without undermining eligibility and the other objective requirements. The framework for forming new parties is the revolution's thought. Where and how can the revolutionary thought be found without any ambiguity? It is found when the constitution and the laws, including the parties' law, incorporate the part of the revolution they should incorporate. The people in their entirety must vote on the constitution in a public referendum so that nobody may later come and easily alter or disregard the constitution or refrain from enacting its provisions. It is important that the people understand the constitution. If the people understand the constitution, they will play a watchdog role in protecting it. For the people to understand the constitution, the constitution must be submitted to and discussed by the people. [passage omitted]

As for the president of the republic, I will tell you that for as long as I am in this position, the constitution must provide for referendum on the president of the republic, and must give whoever meets the candidacy requirements the freedom to compete for election with whomever the party nominates as its candidate.

These are the facts on which we must build the foundations of the new policy in Iraq. This policy must reject the formula of inherited imposition and must select a formula that reaffirms the right of whoever deserves to lead to be elected by the people within a framework of broad competition and of uniform requirements and principles. Our party, our policy, and our persons will be periodically subject to a referendum.

Only absolute religious thinking says, "They should consult on their affairs." Positive thinking and a policy that is not passed by prophets must be subjected to a referendum. The leaders of this policy, whether within the party's internal life or at the people's level, must be selected by election. It suffices that we have served our people, that we have struggled, that God has granted our revolution success, and that we have risen to these positions. After all this, the party's thinking, conduct, policies, persons, and the state positions need to be subjected to popular referendum periodically.

What is wrong with this? You say that our party is great and big. I also believe in this and I am fully confident of it. So nominate people from the party. If you wish to nominate Saddam Husayn or somebody else you select, then let the party promote its candidate and tell the people to elect so and so. But let the others nominate somebody else. What should we do with them if they don't win? And what should we do if we also fail to win? We should go un regretted because the people must decide. [passage omitted]

Maturity With Practice

One of you, a citizen, or a Ba'hist from another level may say: But have the people attained the required level of maturity and culture to behave rationally, objectively, and fairly toward the new formulae of democratic practice, including the licensing of new parties, so as to avoid the problems that may emanate from dishonest competition and from unobjective, unfair, and undisciplined behavior and vision?

We are talking of formulae that reflect democracy within its [current] phase, meaning that we are talking and deliberating to develop the formulae that most beneficially reflect democracy in this phase and a following phase. This dictates that we measure this reflection against the people's awareness and against our capabilities to implement the program to be adopted. We should take into account that when any mature act or formula
reflecting their phase are delayed for a time, they will require at least the same effort at a later time and will produce more serious and dangerous possibilities. Moreover, practice is likely to contribute to the maturation and awareness process. We cannot deal with the revolution as we should unless we control it. We cannot deal with need until we experience it. Therefore, the people do not mature until they exercise their responsibilities gradually in all the areas. It is hoped they will exercise these responsibilities in the desired manner. We do not seek here to apply the highest formulae reflecting democracy as we desire it and as we wish it for our people. At the same time, we do not seek applications copied from the experiences of other peoples and nations. We do not seek to exercise the highest forms of democracy because we, and our people as well, have not reached with our experience a level of accumulated expertise and knowledge to make us aspire for the higher final forms. In life, there are no final forms. The phrase "higher forms" is tied to the phase and it reflects the circumstances and dictates of the phase. It is subject to development and change through observation, emulation, interaction, and dialogue according to life's terms. We aspire to develop all our formulae according to bases that provide no opportunity except for those who are loyal to Iraq and to the revolution's genuine course and great principles. But we must not confine our vision to a narrow corner and imagine that such bases and conditions will inevitably lead to the selection of parties that look like replicas of our party.

Other replicas of our party will do us no good. Such replicas are not what is intended by our program. What is intended is to provide the opportunity to loyal Iraqis and to open the door to life so that it may produce experiences and formulae of the sort that can compete with the Ba'th Party sincerely and honestly and that can deal with the experience and accomplishments of the revolution and al-Qadisiyah carefully, following a course that takes a single general direction toward noncontroversial objectives. In any case, we must realize that any great step has to be countered by some sort of sacrifices on the other side of the scales. The act we are talking about is a great act. It is a genuine interpretation of our party's fundamental principles. When we interpreted the economic aspect of our party's principles in accordance with the phase we reached two years ago, and coupled this interpretation with specific practical measures in the socialist sector and private sector, were you not, comrades, initially reluctant, especially in connection with expanding the private sector's role and with the administrative revolution within the socialist sector?

So what has happened since then? Had you not developed your economy and administration after the war ended, when your budget came to contain nothing but the oil revenues, which also diminished, and when all Arab aid was cut off; what would you expect now if you had not anticipated the developments at an early time and had not developed a sound vision?

Why are you afraid, comrades? I do not mean fear in its ordinary sense. What I am saying is: Why are you reluctant to embark on important issues in the people's life and to establish objective controls for them?

RCC

How does the constitution characterize the RCC?

"The RCC is the institution which led the people's and the armed forces' struggle in the 17-30 July revolution." This is how the constitution characterizes the RCC. Does this characterization actually apply to all the RCC members? Not so. Why don't we get to the heart of the matter? Isn't it a disgrace that we should continue to rule with superficial procedures that do not befit us, and that we should continue to force matters?

Let us put matters in their proper perspective and say, for example: "The RCC is the state's supreme political institution which emanates from a decree by the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party Regional Command." I beg you, embrace formulae that steer you and your institutions clear of superficialities. As I have said, by submitting the idea of forming additional parties for discussion, I do not seek a superficial adornment for the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party. No, I am submitting a serious issue at the right phase—the issue of a comrade-for-life for the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, a comrade that competes with this party in an open and clear arena in which the resources, the policies, and the influences are open and clear, and the common objectives and general framework are shared.

In response to the words of comrade Sa'dun Shakir who assumed in his statement that the families of all the 1.6 million members of the Ba'th Party are also Ba'thists, even though they do not belong to the party, I ask: Do all our families actually think as we do?

I don't think that all 1.6 millions are Ba'thists, even though they are enrolled in the party. If all 1.6 millions are Ba'thists, then this means that the people have reached a higher level. If all 1.6 millions were Ba'thist according to our understanding of the qualities of Ba'thism, then we would be in a better condition in all areas of life, even though we deserve to be proud of and to rejoice in our present condition. So there are within these numbers many who are not Ba'thist.

Let us trust in God and determine what we plan to do. You may call for a transitional period to allow for parties to emerge. Let us agree on this, declare it, and say that in the agreed period we will do this and that. The atmosphere will then become clear for forming parties. If it is one year that we want, then let us say it will be done within one year, and if it is six months, then let us say that it will be done within six months. We have already announced publicly the idea of permitting the formation of other parties next to our party. With this announcement, I sought to put you before a fait accompli. I know what these issues signify, and I know how embarrassed you feel when you approve the ideas when we present them for discussion. Had I not announced the idea, you would not have approved any new party and you would
have probably established a better democracy within the Socialist Arab Ba’th Party only.

Democracy and Ba’th Party

Let us have a little talk. Have you established democracy in the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party? No, the desired democracy does not exist in the party. Moreover, I and you cannot establish the democracy we wish in the party. Why can we not establish the democracy we wish in the Socialist Arab Ba’th Party?

I don’t believe that we can create a green oasis in a desert of moving sands, that we can keep the oasis area green and undiminished, and can make it produce a fruitful and abundant crop.

So we cannot establish true democracy in the party’s internal life if we do not establish true democracy among the people. The party wall has not permitted ideas, visions, and models to penetrate it. As the people are open to the party, let us open the party to the people. What I mean is: Let the people see the party and see its arteries.

Had the revolutionary ideas produced by our experience remained the captive of the party’s internal life and of the pamphlets we issue to the members and supporters, hoping that the party would transmit the ideas as they are to the people, the interaction achieved between the party and the people and between the revolution and the people would not have been accomplished and the results achieved would not have been accomplished. Let us give the people their role and let the party have its leading role. I don’t recall that the party constitution or its principles contain anything that dictates that the leader be imposed. As a Ba’thist, I do not condone and will not stay in a party that does not lead. Since joining the party, I have seen it a leader in the arena—a leader leading the present and leading the future. Let us struggle to keep our party leading rightfully and with the people’s conviction. I believe that this is the path that truly makes our party the leader. Have our people reached the level that would give the party its due credit, even though 20 years have lapsed since the revolution? The answer is no. What I mean is that not all Iraqi personalities have become so selfless as to give our party the credit it deserves. Like you, I am not unaware of the Iraqi personality. I am aware that despite the great stride which the Iraqi personality has made since the revolution and during al-Qadisiyah on the path of refinement and crystallization, there is a distance that still separates this personality from what vigilant Iraqis wish for it and from what we wish for the Iraqis. I know. I have, in addition to the good models, numerous models who renounce that which may not be renounced as soon as they are moved from one place to another. A considerable percentage among them confuse trivialities with big issues, dues with wishes, criticism with abandonment of the criticized, and objectives with what is possible. This confusion and this failure to separate does not occur among mature peoples. These peoples do not turn from white to black, from dry to green, from faith to infidelity, or from loyalty to disavowal and estrangement without a prelude. I have such models among those who are as close as can be to me and those who are as far as can be from me. I also have contrasting models who reflect a constancy of standards, concepts, faith, and a sound view of life and of its requirements. He who criticizes the Iraqi personality has his reasons, of which the most prominent is abandonment of the profound performance of its role and the absence of the national state for at least 799 years, namely the period from the fall of Baghdad in 1258 to the modern age.

Comrades, our personality and the personality of our comrades and people is the product of its tragedy. Yes, the product of its tragedy. A thousand years of oppression and a thousand years with no role. Let us give them [the people] the opportunity to shoulder their role so that their personality may be developed logically.

Democracy’s Weariness

So let us provide the opportunity, hold dialogue, and endure the bitterness of the new expression of democracy and of the democratic formula until we get a splitting headache. Let us begin with the press and the popular organizations, because the bitterness caused by this opportunity is easier than the bitterness of lost principles. What is this bitterness? It is the bitterness of daily weariness and of discomfort with an annoying condition. But it is not the bitterness of lost principles. What is truly bitter is the loss of principles. Therefore, you should take the initiative to prevent life and the enemies from besieging you.

What is our democracy? From the outset, the party has said that our democracy is a popular democracy connected and balanced with formulae of central institutions, meaning that it is a central democracy or, as it was amended by the sixth National Congress, a democratic centralism. In what forms is this democracy applied? If we were to ask those who changed the phrase and put centralism ahead of democracy to give us an explanation for this change, we would find that nobody can give us a practical explanation. But we can now clarify the matter and can find its reflections in all aspects of life, including its presence, for example, in the connection between the existence of a supreme legislative institution, such as the RCC, side by side with the National Assembly to determine legislation binding to the state and to its institutions.

The RCC relationship with the National Assembly and the fact that both are legislative institutions involved in decisionmaking in the same state is, in part, an expression of the meaning and concept of democratic centralism or central democracy. Accordingly, centralism and democracy are life’s two wings in political, economic, and social action, and in other forms of action. Economically, there is—regardless of whether it is central democracy or democratic centralism—a socialist sector and a private sector next to it. Both have been
balanced by the revolution's principles and procession. The form and size of each sector has gradually developed with the development of life as the revolution sees it. This is democratic centralism. So the development is popular, democratic, and central. Isn't this what we read in our literature? Come let us see how to apply it to the National Assembly in a certain phase. I do not mean by this that we should draft a formula that lasts a hundred years, but that we should, as best as we can, draft formulae, including articles of the constitution, that befit the phase concerned and that are subject to alteration and development, taking into consideration the stability that laws generally require and the relative constancy that the constitution requires, especially when it is put to referendum. The position given the principles of government and the state institutions in the constitution strengthens the new Iraqi authority with the clarity it needs and provides society with the opportunities to take the initiative. Stability gives the revolution its profound meaning in this area.

When the Iraqis, in case of disagreement, resort—through a logical succession of institutions—to the articles of a constitution that has been subjected to referendum for arbitration, then this conduct reflects a stable condition that makes the Iraqis more confident, that helps them avoid treacherous pitfalls, that reveals to them the difference between a careful step and a confused step and between harmful interpretation and the interpretation dictated by the law of development, and that further strengthens and bolsters their unity. If after we hold a referendum on the constitution somebody comes with an interpretation on self-rule and on how far it should develop, we will tell him: Go to the National Assembly and to the Iraqi people's representatives and convince them of your viewpoint. Thus, instead of confining the disagreement in viewpoints between the party and a group of people, the disagreement will be between such a group and the people in their entirety, both Arabs and Kurds. Other issues will also be subjected to arbitration according to the same criterion. If Jalal al-Talabani or others come to us after a while and present to us an approach and opinions on self-rule other than those contained in the self-rule law, I will not tell such people: Comrade Tariq 'Aziz will discuss with you whatever opinions you have on self-rule. Rather, I will tell them: If you want to develop self-rule in a manner other than the one we are following, then self-rule has its law. So go to the National Assembly to decide whatever it deems fit. When a tendentious individual or somebody with an opinion on this issue or on some other issue finds that he has to convince both Arabs and Kurds in the Iraqi National Assembly, he will strive to consider his ideas carefully before he presents them. Consequently, the area of sick ideas, motives, and formulae will diminish and the door of separation and of exploiting the Kurdish issue to drain Iraq will be shut. I have done my duty by talking of the future. Nobody may assassinate your revolution. The assassination I am talking about is not embodied in a coup staged by somebody. If anybody stages a coup, we will cut off his tail. But I don't believe that any of you thinks that he will live as long as Noah. We are all in our fifties or a little older or younger. The "smart" among us who are not perturbed by tremors and who do not saddle themselves with the burden of deep thinking may live 30 more years. Can a Ba'th Party politician live to be 100 or 130 years old with all this inequity? So let us put our trust in God and let us discuss practical formulae. Should we permit the religious thinking to emerge in the form of a party? Let us discuss the matter and decide. Should we permit Marxist thinking, but without a communist party? Let us also discuss this issue and decide. Should we license old parties or new and young parties? Let us discuss this and decide. So parties have to be formed in Iraq. If they are not formed, we will lag behind. With this great revolution, it is a disgrace for us to lag behind. In any case, the general intellectual framework and the general tendency and objectives of all must emanate from the revolution's thinking and must rely on the constitution which we will submit to referendum by the people. We will reject any party that submits a program conflicting with these principles. We must include in the constitution an article that will remain in force for at least 20 years and that will stipulate that anybody who has not contributed to the second al-Qadisiyah shall not be permitted to belong to or, at least, to form such parties, that any member dismissed from the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party may not join any other party, that any person convicted by the revolution court on the charge of economic embezzlement or of other crimes may not join a party... So what more do you want? There will be a Ba'th party. But this party will be competitive and strong and will develop the original party. It will not be a branch of the original party but will have an independent identity and independent status and it will stand as an equal to the original party in action and ideas. (It may have [new] ideas or may not necessarily formulate [any new] ideas and may present something faulty, and then allow others to discover something that is sounder). (pp. 84-100)

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[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Comrade 'Adnan Khayrallah] We are now facing a phase that dictates reexamining the developments, as well as the rapprochements, in the manner desired by the leader president and by the comrades. Like many daring developments, the phase may be faced with opinions ranging from the reserved and anticipatory to the enthusiastic. We have established constants in the preceding procession, and we have developed a degree of confidence that does not permit us to bear the presence of other parties with us. These parties will be faced with the simple question of what they have been doing for the past 20 years. This will put them in an accountable position. But regrettably, it will also put them in a very complex and sensitive position. As for our experience throughout 20 years, it is an experience of maturity and action (p. 100).

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] And of power. Power is very important because it is what puts people
under wings, whereas weakness makes one steer away from whatever leads to legitimate competition in the new society.

[Comrade 'Adnan Khayrallah] The intellectual condition in which we believe says that parties and democracy are added guarantees for the process (p. 101). [Leader Comrade Saddam Husayn] If you achieve this accomplishment, you will leave nothing for the devious. This is the final card. You have done everything. You have protected Iraq. Nobody can seriously criticize your economic practices. Your theory of socialist development is sound. In the past, all these were cards which the enemies could have used against you. You have eliminated all these cards by applying your principles. The enemies are left with nothing to brandish other than the talk of democracy and its applications. Our duty dictates that we apply our principles in the field of democracy. Wrest this card and let the revolution go on. The enemies will then be left with nothing because the people are vigilant and alert. Clarity expels demons as a candle expels darkness.

[Comrade 'Adnan Khayrallah] Parties should not be formed in the manner whereby anybody ascends a podium, as in Hyde Park, and says whatever he wishes to say.

[Comrade Saddam Husayn] To start, our country does not need such a practice (p. 102).

[Comrade 'Adnan Khayrallah] There is nothing to prevent us from opening the doors to the people who do not belong (to the Ba'th Party) so that they may say a word of their hearts. We can listen to their word, embrace whatever is beneficial in it, and disregard what is useless, premature, or behind the times.

Finally, I propose that this excellency the leader president instruct that a team of the comrades be assigned to gather all the ideas to be discussed. We can then say, "This is the right formula," and can proceed with God's blessing.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] Even though you want to be brief, I am inclined on an issue like this to fully open the door so that all may speak and say what is in their hearts and on their minds. I could have formed committees to study the issues of our discussion and to present to us ready-made opinions. But I wanted you to examine the issues thoroughly from the beginning. Why? Because you lead the people's masses. When you present the constitution shortly, the party will not be able to lead the people's masses expertly and profoundly if you do not lead the party expertly and profoundly. Permit us, comrades, to give this matter the effort it merits (p. 103).

[Comrade Hasan 'Ali] Major democratic accomplishments have been made and have flourished since the 17 July revolution and to the present.

In the initial years of the revolution, a dialogue was held with the political parties at the time and it produced a democratic front.

At the national organizational level, your excellency has shifted the party from the concept of the single party to the concept of the leader party. Your struggle also opened the horizon for the establishment of the constitutional institutions, such as the National Assembly, and for solving the Kurdish issue peacefully (p. 104).

We also cannot but stand with admiration before your initiative for dropping the idea of the unopposed election list and before your reaffirmation of the principle of free and legitimate competition in the professional and popular unions through the nomination of twice as many candidates as there are contested seats. All these are major influential democratic actions which we must keep before our eyes while discussing the question of developing democracy.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] All these measures have not been explained to the people in an understandable way that entrenches the measures in their minds. When the war broke out, we insisted that the self-rule elections be held in Kurdistan, whereas in the entire world, such practices are brought to a halt when war breaks out.

[Comrade Ibrahim 'Izzah] And the National Assembly elections as well (p. 105).

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] The first National Assembly elections were held prior to the war. By-elections and subsequent elections were held during the war. But the self-rule elections to elect a legislative council for Kurdistan were held for the first time with the onset of the war. Even some comrades wondered whether we should carry on with those elections or not. I said: Let us carry on because the time has come for us to show our genuine principles as they truly are. This was in addition to the changes made in the powers of the National Assembly which was given major new powers that had not been included in its original law and duties. All this was done during the war years.

[Comrade Hasan 'Ali] Constitution: In light of the above, I would like to point out that we are practicing democracy from a triumphant and strong position. The broad democratic applications have not, for example, followed a crisis, as has happened in some other countries.

Let me begin with the constitution. The constitution is the state's highest legal document and I believe that the constitution tops all other issues. The beginning should be completion of the constitution. I believe that a plenary committee should be formed to reexamine the constitution (p. 106). It should include a number of nonparty political elements, if they can be found, to benefit from their expertise. It should also include legislators and specialists. After it is discussed by the authorities concerned, the constitution should be submitted to a popular referendum.

Press: The national press has its importance and I believe that it is essential to establish an advanced press
law. In this case, the private sector and nonpartisan citizens may be permitted to establish some papers to reflect the viewpoints of a broad sector of independents. This press may be more attractive to the independent sectors than the affiliated press.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] All the ideas should be presented and then we can crystallize whatever we agree on finally, God willing.

However, I believe that the idea of licensing a person and not a party, a union, or an association to issue a newspaper is undemocratic. At least we don’t need to begin with this idea in order to reflect an expansion of the press base. I don’t believe that this idea will achieve the popular democracy in which we believe. One individual may not own a higher medium than he deserves. A party’s, a union’s, a federation’s, or an association’s possession of a mass medium is one thing and an individual’s sole possession of a newspaper is another thing in the understanding of the popular democracy, at least within a certain phase of the revolution’s current development.

The practical aspect of the issue is: Is a newspaper a means of investment or a means of expression, enlightenment, and of beneficial debate? It is, of course, the latter (p. 107).

[Comrade Hasan 'Ali] As for the parties, the existing law is called the “law regulating associations and parties.” In accordance with its provisions, a small association is subject to the same legal articles governing a political party. To give special attention to the political and party life, I believe that it is important to issue a special law to regulate Iraq’s political life.

I am for adding a number of parties. The plurality issue is the subject of conversation currently. I believe that a general meeting should be held between your excellency and a number of notables and independents so that you may explain to them the various aspects of the democratic experiment in this phase.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] I will meet with nobody until we agree on and decide everything (p. 109).

[Comrade Hasan 'Ali] I believe that when the parties law is discussed, the election method must be clarified and, for example, the relative representation system, the absolute election system, or some other formula should be adopted.

I also wish to stress that the parties planned to be formed must not be sectarian or regional and must not have political extensions abroad. The traitors who plotted against Iraq and opposed it in its honorable battle against the Iranian-Zionist enemy must be prohibited from forming parties. The licensing of any party connected with an external or foreign circle or directed in any form by such a circle must be prohibited.

As for the National Assembly issue, it was settled in the previous session (p. 110).

[Comrade 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Abd-al-Ghafur] I support the opinion that calls for holding the National Assembly elections on schedule. I also wish to stress that the party and the media should put more emphasis on free elections than they did in the past.

Press: The other issue is the parties and free press issue. I am for providing a period during which the emphasis is put on free press before parties are formed or concurrently with the formation of parties, because I believe that parties and the press are linked.

Many of the well-known parties did not announce their presence until they had promoted their ideas. An example is the Iraqi Democratic National Party which did not proclaim itself until after AL-AHALLI newspaper was founded and after al-Ahali Group was formed. It was then that the Democratic National Party was formed (p. 111). By noting this, I do not mean that newspaper concessions should be issued to individuals. Rather, they should be issued to organizations or to national figures who issue newspapers that promote the ideas of the parties they wish to form.

Parties: On the parties issue, I believe that there are national and pan-Arab constants. As I see them, these constants are:

1) Iraq’s independence and unity and its being a part of the Arab nation.

2) The principles of the 17-30 July revolution.

3) Saddam’s glorious Qadisiyah and the prohibition of any party or faction that stood with the enemy.

4) His excellency the leader president’s leadership as a symbol of the Iraqis.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] No, that final item is not a constant. This is your opinion. My opinion is that we must not establish individuals as constants because they are not (p. 112).

[Comrade 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Abd-al-Ghafur] There are proscriptions that must be stated clearly. They include:

- Prohibiting a newspaper or a party founded on a sectarian or racial basis.
- No planned newspaper or party may harbor or promote atheist or anti-Arab ideas.
- Organization within the armed forces must be prohibited to the other parties. Such organization must continue to be confined to our party (p. 113).

What is important is the absence of atheism. There is a connection between the atheist and anti-Arab movements, such as the Zendiks and the Karmathians. Therefore, I believe that it is important for the democratic procession and for the nation’s future to state explicitly that any party advocating atheism or operating with anti-Arab ideas may not be licensed.
[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] We must say in the constitution that faith is a duty and atheism is rejected. These are constant principles.

[Comrade Sa'dun Hammadi] But will the law punish atheism, mr president, and is atheism a crime?

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] It is my opinion that the law should punish atheism. Faith is essential in the minds and hearts of our citizens. Atheism should be prohibited and should not be allowed to express itself in any form. As to whether the law will or will not punish atheism, this is subject to discussion (p. 114).

[Comrade Sa'dun Hammadi] The law does not punish all that is wrong. There are numerous faulty things which the law does not punish.

[Comrade 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Abd-al-Ghafur] Regarding the relationship of the government structure with the application of democracy in the coming phase and as to whether the RCC should continue to exist or whether there should be a presidency to replace it, I believe that it is necessary that the RCC continue to exist, considering that it is linked with the accomplishments, including the democratic accomplishments that have been made and the democracy that we are discussing now.

As for the Council of Ministers, I propose the presence of a prime minister and a council of ministers that is tied to a clear cabinet program which is announced to the people. I am stressing announcement of the program because in case the council of ministers fails, the failure will influence the council and not the revolution’s principles.

The prime minister should be accountable to the leader president and to the National Assembly. The prime minister and the council should have specific and defined powers.

I believe that we should put our trust in God and start (p. 116).

[Comrade Kamil Yasin] Every National Assembly election session is better than the one preceding it. We have established requirements and controls and we have given citizens who do not belong to the party a broad opportunity, more profound directives have been issued in the interest of the nonpartisan citizens. Instructions have even been issued to impose party penalties on any party member who does not win election. If people do not believe in such a member then why should we keep him in the party?

One point on which we have been reluctant is party plurality. But now that your Excellency has clarified the dangers inherent in the party’s continued monopoly of power, that the citizen’s concepts may change in 50 years, and that the party’s leadership role may weaken, we support your opinion on pluralism, provided that we set controls and a deadline of two to three years.

We can begin with free press before we issue the constitution.

As comrade Taha said in the previous session, your excellency can exercise the role of prime minister. We should plan the state’s future structure as of now.

Sir, will the RCC continue to be a source of legislation side by side with the National Assembly, will the RCC have in the future powers that differ from those of the National Assembly in accordance with the constitution, or will legislative duality continue?

[Comrade Saddam Husayn] Presidential term: In the previous session, the participants just about settled this issue with the idea of a dual legislative center, meaning that the National Assembly will engage in decision-making, and so will the RCC. I believe that the State of Iraq needs this approach for a period of years to come.

In the future, I believe that we must take into account the benefits of stability and the drawbacks of short presidential terms. If a referendum is to be conducted on the presidency, a 10-year presidential term may be appropriate.

[Comrade Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma'ruf] In France, the term is seven years (p. 117).

[Comrade Taha Yasin Ramadan] A seven-year term renewable only once may be better than a 10-year term.

[Comrade Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma'ruf] Why shouldn't it be 10 years. They must have had their own calculations when they set the seven-year term. We have our calculations regarding the 10-year term.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] I prefer the 10-year term on the grounds that we always have five-year plans and we hold elections in the party and in the Regional Command every five years. Our party election term fits the idea of presidential election every 10 years, at least for a certain period of time on which we should agree.

My talking of these ideas has nothing to do with who the president of the republic is. I am talking about principles for the country.

[Comrade Tariq 'Aziz] Ten years is a long period.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] We will discuss the matter. There is no problem.

[Comrade Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma'ruf] Our country is a developing country and it needs complete stability.

[Comrade Taha 'Aziz] The 7-year term embraced by France is good (p. 118).

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] Seven years are not a short period.

[Comrade 'Ali Hasan al-Majid] I believe that we should not rush to create the climate for reviving the old
political parties. We may find among the people politicians other than those politicians.

[Comrade Saddam Husayn] We will certainly find among the people figures who are better, more energetic, and more capable than the veterans of comprehending the revolution thought.

[Comrade 'Ali Hasan al-Majid] On the issue of democracy, we may be swept by enthusiasm, may preoccupy ourselves with the application of this issue, may give greater flexibility than should be given, and may then find ourselves compelled to back down on democracy (p. 119).

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] As I have already said, I believe and I propose to my comrades in the leadership that we refrain from taking any step unless it is genuine and fundamental and refrain from going too far when we think that we may retreat because retreat is rejected. A genuine short step is better than a genuine long step if we have to retreat on a vital part of this step (p. 120).

[Comrade 'Ali Hasan al-Majid] Regarding the transitional period, a two-year duration has been mentioned. Mr. President, I hope that this period will not be lengthy. I propose that the period not exceed one year. Before the period starts, a parties law should be issued and the people should read it. As to who forms parties, it is up to the others.

[Comrade Leader Saddam Husayn] Comrade 'Ali, we have not set a period. When I spoke of a period, I did not mean that we should announce to the Iraqis [that they have to do this or that] within a given period. What I meant is that we should undertake to fully develop our steps on this issue, including full development of the constitution. I believe that the succession of steps should be as follows:

- The leadership should fully develop the constitution and present it to the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party congress to pass it.
- The constitution should be then presented to the people and debated democratically and openly, without any restrictions.
- After the leadership and the RCC pass the constitution, it should be presented to the National Assembly.

There may be those who say: No, the constitution should be passed by the National Assembly and then parties will be formed accordingly. This point needs to be discussed at length in order that we may decide on what is best. The constitution will be the arbitrator in every case (p. 122).

[Comrade Samir Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab] Democracy is an advanced formula of collective action. The principles you, Mr. President, have presented form in their entirety a complete system for developing society and building the government structure in a manner that reflects the intellectual philosophy of the Ba'thist program led by Comrade Saddam Husayn.

But the question is: How do we begin?

Do we begin by presenting this complete system suddenly and all at once, even though we may believe that by submitting it in this manner we will create an unbalanced condition in society and in the state institutions and will cause harm by allowing the infiltration of opportunistic or conspiratorial elements?

I don't think that matters will reach this level for the following reasons:

1) The Iraqi citizen's principles, namely loyalty to the homeland, the leader, the people, and the procession, have been tested.

2) The Iraqi citizen's national and intellectual identity has developed greatly, thus diminishing the scope of deviation resulting from intellectual currents injected into the society (p. 125).

The question we ask again is: How do we build? I propose that we begin moving in two directions simultaneously:

1) Work to make the party's internal life a democratic life.

2) Numerous steps taken by the government go unrecognized by the party members who then learn of the steps from the press. I believe that before such steps are taken, they should be presented to the party apparatus and that their intellectual, political, and social dimensions should be explained so that the party may campaign for them and not take a negative position toward them (p. 126).

3) We should begin by issuing laws, such as a free press law and free expression law, which the current phase can absorb and with which it can deal well. What I mean by free expression is not permitting the entry of publications but providing a broader opportunity than is available at present to the scientific and specialized associations, such as the Economists Association or the Lawyers Union, to debate the laws and the economic plans issued by the government and to express their opinions on them with utter freedom.

The point concerning revival of the parties which engaged in political action for a certain period of time: I don't find it necessary to move to revive them. Let us allow the democratic life and the age to determine which are the parties that will have to operate in this phase.

To sum up, we should move in two directions:

- The direction of legislation, of the constitution, of the parties law, and of the press.
- The other direction is the direction of fully developing the political life and the state institutions in the coming phase to enable them to deal with society's new life properly (p. 132).
Iraqi Firm Begins Regular Cement Deliveries
90EF0242Z Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 30 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by Harish Chundunsing: “‘Rishi’ Cement for 61 Rupees by the End of February”]

[Text] Dr. Jagdish Chander Rishi’s Venus Cement and Steel Limited (VCS) is expecting a first shipment of 200,000 bags of cement towards the end of February. This is what Vikash Bhatia, the manager of the company, reported to LE MAURICIEN this morning.

Mr. Bhatia said that the cement was at this very moment being loaded for shipment at the Iraqi port of Basora and that his company would publish an announcement as soon as the ship was en route to Port Louis.

According to Mr. Bhatia, the VCS signed a contract to purchase 100,000 tons, or 2 million bags, of cement with an Iraqi firm. Dr. Rishi’s company is planning to supply the Mauritian market on a regular basis.

In fact, the VCS is expecting to receive a delivery of 10,000 tons (200,000 bags) of cement every two weeks beginning this March.

Mr. Bhatia also confirmed a previous statement made by Dr. Rishi to LE MAURICIEN to the effect that the VCS will sell the cement at 61 rupees a bag. At the same time, he gave assurances that the quality of the cement that the VCS is planning to sell meets international standards, or in other words that it is of the BS-12-1978 type.

The VCS obtained a permit to import 4 million bags of cement in November of last year.

The public is still waiting for it to put its first bag up for sale, especially since it has promised to offer it at a price considerably lower than the one offered jointly by Mauritius Portland Cement and the State Trading Corporation, which import cement in bulk and bag it locally.

ISRAEL

Shamir Urges ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ on Moscow-Tel Aviv Flights
44000208 Tel Aviv MA’ARIV in Hebrew 18 Feb 90 p 8

[Text] Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir on Friday rejected a request by former Soviet Prisoners of Zion Ida Nudel, Yosef Mendelevitch, and Sasha Khomariansky to undertake a public struggle both in Israel and abroad against the Soviet authorities for refusing to ratify the direct flights agreement between the USSR and Israel. Mendelevitch came out of the Friday meeting at the prime minister’s office saying: “Shamir told us that it was forbidden to anger the Russians and that we had to use quiet diplomacy.” According to Mendelevitch, the prime minister hinted that within a few months developments would take place which would allow the departure of a much larger number of Jews.

Analyst Foresees Changes in Syrian Foreign Policy
44000199 Tel Aviv THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 9 Feb 90 p 8

[Article Jacob Schreiber: “Syria Ripe for a New Strategy”]

[Text] Syria’s President al-Asad could score a diplomatic coup by jumping on the bandwagon of negotiations—in doing so, he may succeed in derailing the peace process at the same time.

The Glasnost-inspired, European winds of change have begun blowing through the Middle East and are affecting Syria’s strategic posture vis-à-vis Israel.

The recent Syrian-Egyptian reconciliation—arranged at Damascus’ request—is most telling with respect to the gradual shift in Syrian thinking. By restoring diplomatic relations with Cairo al-Asad has implicitly admitted that his campaign against the Camp David accords has failed. He has recognized that negotiations—not war—may indeed prove the most judicious avenue for dealing with Israel and retrieving lost Arab territory.

This does not suggest a change in al-Asad’s negative attitude towards Israel nor even the abandonment of his ideologically motivated dream to ultimately destroy the “Zionist entity.” However, current international realities—the Syrian-Egyptian rapprochement and Damascus’s reported readiness to discuss coordination with the PLO on the peace process—strongly suggest that Syria’s most judicious option for retrieving the Golan is to de-emphasize its battlefield option in favour of an assault on Israel at the round table. In fact, by Syria’s own definition, it has few other choices.

In the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Syrian strategists concluded that in order to wage war successfully with Israel, four elements were necessary: tangible superpower backing; substantial global diplomatic support; strategic parity; and a unified Arab war front. None of these conditions exist today.

First, during al-Asad’s 1987 visit to the Soviet Union, Moscow explicitly expressed its support for a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, stating that the concept of a military solution had been “discredited.” To underscore the Kremlin’s commitment to its “new thinking,” Moscow began issuing statements in November 1989, rejecting Damascus’s objective of achieving strategic parity with Israel and declaring that its military support would henceforth reflect Syria’s defensive requirements—not its offensive ambitions.

Second, international support for war against Israel has been all but buried under the debris of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, not only has the traditional hostility of the
anti-Israel Eastern bloc states waned, but most of them are clamouring to restore diplomatic and economic ties with Jerusalem.

Third, though al-Asad’s drive to close the strategic gap has provided Syria with a credible defensive deterrent against Israeli attack, it has failed to achieve “enough” parity with Israel to face the IDF [Israel Defense Force] alone. And, not only is the moribund Syrian economy proving incapable of sustaining al-Asad’s drive to close the military gap with Israel (not to mention providing a reasonable standard of living for its citizens), but neither the Kremlin nor the Gulf states are willing to continue bank-rolling an ambitious Syrian military buildup. Thus, it appears that al-Asad’s drive for strategic parity with Israel has hit a dead end.

While Israeli leaders are quick to point out that Syria continues to purchase weapons and prepare for war, they do so without mentioning that Israel similarly pursues its war preparations by upgrading its weapons systems and increasing its military might. It is not unreasonable, therefore, for Damascus to sustain moderate military expansion (relative to its 1983-86 buildup), particularly considering al-Asad’s sincere fear of Israel’s hostile intentions towards Syria.

To be sure, the memory of the Israeli attack on Syrian troops in Lebanon in 1982, after repeated assurances from the Likud-led government that Israel had no hostile intentions towards Syria, obliges al-Asad to maintain a credible military deterrent against any Israeli challenge. And, with Ariel Sharon—the orchestrator of Israel’s 1982 Lebanese campaign—vying for the supremacy of the Likud, the necessity for a strong Syrian defence is further emphasized in the eyes of the circumspect Syrian leader.

Last, not only has al-Asad failed to create an Arab war front, he has estranged a large part of the Arab world through his support of Iran in its war with Iraq, and through his rejectionist and subversive policies. Moreover, with the most immediate threat to Syrian territorial integrity emanating not from Jerusalem but from Baghdad, and considering that Syria is the only Arab country in the region to be excluded from any formal economic grouping, al-Asad has apparently recognized that it is time to start building bridges with the Arab and Western worlds in order to save his economy and secure his borders.

One way to achieve this would be to fall in line with the moderate Arab states by not only discontinuing his covert efforts to thwart the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, but to actively support a political resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The reconciliation with Cairo—which has direct lines to Washington, Jerusalem and the PLO—represents the requisite first step.

By jumping on the Palestinian-Israeli peace bandwagon and energetically promoting an international conference which would yield some kind of Syrian-Israeli political “arrangement” (e.g. peace or even “non-belligerency” in exchange for the Golan), Syria would stand to score a diplomatic coup.

Such an initiative would be hailed by the international community, particularly the Soviet Union and the EC, which have long supported the convening of an international conference to facilitate a “comprehensive” solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Active Syrian encouragement of such a peace forum would help repair Syria’s negative image and might be rewarded through various forms of Western economic assistance.

In addition, such a political posture would be applauded by a majority of the Arab world. Though most Arab states currently support Arafat’s piecemeal peace effort, they do so because it is “the only game in town.” Given the choice, they would prefer the “comprehensive” solution route via an international conference, as proposed under the terms of the 1982 Fez Agreement.

Another major incentive for joining the peace process is to ensure that a Palestinian-Israeli territorial agreement is not reached unless a concurrent Syrian-Israeli Golan settlement is achieved. Al-Asad’s only realistic chance for retrieving the Golan by political means is to ride behind the Palestinian-Israeli peace train, which is fueled by extraordinary amounts of international sympathy.

To be sure—due to the glaring demographic disparities between the West Bank and Gaza, and the Golan—Damascus will not be independently able to garner the kind of international and/or Israeli domestic support the Palestinians have achieved for their territorial demands. And, devoid of such public pressure, Israel will not deal with the Golan because it is not interested in returning territory to a foe it views as being bent on its ultimate destruction. Thus, an exclusive Palestinian-Israeli territorial settlement would all but foreclose al-Asad’s political option for retrieving the Golan, leaving him only with an unpromising military alternative.

This last point warrants further explanation because it represents a most intriguing twist as to why al-Asad might publicly promote a “land for peace” arrangement with Israel: namely, that the “carrot” approach might prove more effective in derailing the Palestinian-Israeli peace process than al-Asad’s traditional “stick” strategy because his offer would be rejected by Jerusalem.

The Israeli leadership has no intention of ever relinquishing military dominion over the strategic Golan Heights. Israeli strategists are familiar with al-Asad’s joint politico-military strategy and believe that al-Asad would exploit any territorial concessions gained via negotiations to bolster his ultimate military ambition of destroying Israel. Also, an overwhelming majority of Israelis oppose returning the Golan to Syria, rendering the return of the Golan politically unfeasible.

Well aware of this, al-Asad might offer a political settlement as a diplomatic strategy for delegitimizing Israel in
the international arena by demonstrating Jerusalem's unwillingness to abide by UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which stipulate "land for peace." Indeed, al-Asad's "magnanimous" offer of "land for a peaceful" arrangement, when stymied by Jerusalem, would make Israel—and not Syria—look like the "rejectionist." Thus, al-Asad can hope to garner some spillover support for his cause among an international community which is already miffed at the Israeli government for being what they perceive as intransigent on the Palestinian "land for peace" issue.

Most interesting, however, (assuming al-Asad's desire to wage war on Israel is indeed pre-eminent) is the possibility that the real objective of such a Syrian gambit would be not only to derail peace, but to prepare for war. Once Israel rejects al-Asad's offer of peace or non-belligerency for the Golan, al-Asad's "Israelis intransigence" argument will gain more legitimacy and his quest to compose a united Arab war front might gain impetus (particularly should the Palestinian-Israeli peace process break down).

Moreover, with Syria acting as a serious player in the peace process, 'Arafat may have to abandon his separate solution scheme and coordinate a "comprehensive" strategy with Damascus—the pre-eminent Arab power in the Levant—under the umbrella of an international conference. This would spell the end of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process because Israel will under no circumstances attend a political forum whose agenda includes the concurrent relinquishing of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan.

Though the above scenario is indeed speculative, it warrants consideration because as we are currently witnessing in Eastern Europe, anything in the political arena is possible. And, though Israeli policymakers—in an effort to discourage discussions which would alter the status quo on the Golan—portray Syria exclusively in military terms, the fact remains that ever since the 1974 Disengagement Agreements, al-Asad has quietly expressed his readiness to forge some kind of Syrian-Israeli settlement if Israel returns the Golan and addresses Palestinian rights.

Again, this does not suggest that al-Asad does not aspire to destroy Israel, but that he is capable of employing the political as well as the military option in order to help facilitate this goal. And, now that the political atmosphere is ripe for invoking such a strategy, al-Asad may finally be ready to deploy his diplomats instead of his soldiers.

Politico-diplomatic maneuvering is not foreign to al-Asad, and just as the Israeli leadership must remain prepared for a possible Syrian military offensive, it must now be alert to the moderate winds of change in Syrian strategy, lest it be caught off-guard by a sudden gust of Syrian diplomacy.

Fifteen Percent Cutback in Defense Budget Estimated
44000207 Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 18 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] NIS [New Israeli Shekels] 200 million and $100 million will be cut from the 1990-91 defense budget according to the yearly work plan approved by Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. According to the cutbacks there will be a reduction of 700,000 reservists' service days, 100 positions in the career army, and IDF [Israel Defense Forces] acquisitions, equipping, and purchases are also seriously affected. This is estimated to be a 15 percent cutback in the budget.

DFLP Activists Apprehended in Ramallah
44000210 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 14 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] Security forces in Ramallah have apprehended Rabbah Jabbar, wanted since 1985, and considered to be one of Nayif Hawatimah's Democratic Front's foremost activists, together with others identified with the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine]. Jabbar is suspected of having been one of the leading organizers of the intifadah. Among the others arrested were journalist Yusuf al-Jabih, Amar Asif, and Mihnah Nimr.

Kinneret at Lowest Level Since Establishment of State
44000209 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 14 Feb 90 p 6

[Text] Tzvi Ortenberg, chairman of the Kinneret directorate, said that the water level in the Kinneret is at its lowest point since the establishment of the state, and that only 100 millimeters of uninterrupted rainfall could improve the situation. According to Ortenberg the water level is half a meter lower than in past dry years. This situation is extremely serious when taking into account the fact that during this entire period not one drop of water has been pumped from the Kinneret to the National Water Carrier. The growing aridity is the result of a serious depletion in aquifer reserves brought about during three years of very little rainfall. Operation of the National Water Carrier has been postponed until April. It is doubtful, however, that it will be operated at all this spring.

LEBANON

Efforts To Defend Syrian Reported
900L0207A Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Dec 89 p 23

[Article by 'Abd al-Karim Abu-al-Nasr]

[Excerpts] Paris—High level Lebanese political sources have told AL-QABAS that the Lebanese government has launched an undeclared diplomatic campaign in both the Arab and international arenas aimed at requesting the
world countries to stop calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The sources said that this diplomatic campaign, the first of its kind since the Syrian forces entered Lebanon in 1976, is based on a new concept of the Syrian role in the Lebanese arena. It stresses in particular that the Syrian forces' presence in Lebanon is legitimate and that these forces do not violate Lebanese sovereignty. It also stresses that the world countries that recognize the Lebanese government's legitimacy must accept what this government decides regarding the future of these forces' presence in this country. The same sources said that this campaign is based on a memo drawn up by Lebanese Prime Minister Salim al-Huss which he distributed to the Arab governments and requested that it be considered as an official Lebanese document. Al-Huss distributed the memo, which is comprised of 11 pages, to the Arab foreign ministers during their participation in the ministerial Arab-European dialogue conference that was held in Paris last weekend. He also delivered a copy of this memo to Arab League Secretary General Chedid Klibi as an official Lebanese document.

The importance of this document lies in the fact that it contains the Lebanese government's viewpoint regarding the question of the Syrian forces' presence in Lebanon in a new and specific manner. According the memo, it is in the Lebanese government's view that the al-Ta'if agreement has laid down a practical formula for a scheduled withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon.

The memo also reveals that not once did former Lebanese president Amin al-Jumayyl, during his repeated visits to Damascus in the last four years of his term, ask Hafiz al-Asad to withdraw the Syrian forces from Lebanon.

We cite here what the al-Huss memo says about the Syrian forces' presence in Lebanon:

In explaining and analyzing the national reconciliation document that was endorsed by the Lebanese deputies at al-Ta'if and known as al-Ta'if agreement, the memo says that this document "provided for a practical formula for a scheduled withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon."

This is the first time an official Lebanese memo confirms that the al-Ta'if agreement calls for the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon according to a timetable. The al-Huss memo further contains an analysis and evaluation of the question of Syrian military presence in Lebanon, of which we quote the following: "Discussion of the question of Syrian military presence in Lebanon first calls for registering a point of principle—that sovereignty is a fundamental and inseparable right of the state which the legitimate authority, represented by the government, exercises. Therefore, whoever recognizes the legitimacy of the Lebanese government, the national reconciliation government, must recognize the legitimacy of what originates from it and its right alone to exercise sovereignty, articulate it, and speak on its behalf."

"It is self-evident that what the constitutional government accepts is within the framework of exercising sovereignty and what it rejects falls in the category of violation of sovereignty. Consequently, the presence of non-Lebanese forces on Lebanese territory does not constitute an aggression or violation of Lebanese sovereignty unless that presence is contrary to the will of the Lebanese government." [passage omitted]

"The national reconciliation document is supposed to have resolved this issue since it provides for a specific, mutually agreed upon timetable for the future withdrawal of Syrian forces. The Chamber of Deputies has approved this document and the national reconciliation government has adopted it as a launching point for its program on the basis of which it won a unanimous vote of confidence from the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, the presence of the Syrian Arab forces in Lebanon is at present linked to the Lebanese government's stand which is based on specific, mutually agreed upon timetable for their withdrawal from the Lebanese territory.

"This is primarily one of the jurisdictions of the Lebanese government relating to the exercise of sovereignty. It is recalled that when this question was raised by what used to be called the military government, whose legitimacy was not recognized by the Lebanese majority, during the stage characterized by division of the government, the matter developed into a new political conflict. With regard to the military authority in question, escalating the situation to the point of declaring the so-called war of liberation has led to exposing the situation, under the divisive conditions prevailing then, to the danger of the confrontation actually developing into a new level of civil war that threatened the national destiny with the most dire consequences."

Here ends the text from al-Huss's memo regarding the Syrian forces' presence in Lebanon.

Highly placed Lebanese political sources told ALQABAS that the memo is the launching point and basis of the new diplomatic campaign that has been launched and which in the coming stage will concentrate on requesting world countries to stop calling for the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon and to stop statements or resolutions on this subject, on the grounds that the question of the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon is a matter concerning the jurisdictions and authority of the legitimate Lebanese government and Lebanese rule. Al-Huss has explained this stand to the European foreign ministers during the Arab-European dialogue conference in Paris as well as during bilateral meetings with some of them. Al-Huss also explained the Lebanese situation to the French officials with whom he had talks in the French capital. These sources expect the Lebanese government in the coming days to convey these new policies to the major powers, as well as to other countries, and that Lebanese ambassadors and diplomats abroad be given clear instructions with regard to the matter that would be consistent with the content's of al-Huss' memo.
Alleged Project To Form Independent State Reported

90OL0208A Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Dec 89 p 23

[Article by Wafaii Diyab]

[Text] AL-QABAS has obtained the complete official project for the establishment of "Free Lebanon State" that was prepared by a special working team set up by Michel 'Awn on 11 October 1989.

The project-report consists of three main chapters. The first deals with justifications for the establishment of the Free Lebanon State, the second with the mechanism of implementation, and the third with the economic components of this state.

The project includes a supplement on administrative organization of the Free Lebanon State, proposing the establishment of four provinces in the following manner:

1) Jubayl province: including Jubayl district, Jurd al-Bairun, and some neighboring villages.

2) Kasrawan-al-Futuh.


4) Al-Matin province, including the central part of northern and southern al-Matin and the "liberated" part of 'Aliyah district.

In the secret report it is noted that some of the measures and proposals have already been implemented, particularly with respect to dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the attempt to strike at the Christian forces opposed to this trend, and the call for holding general elections beginning this month.

In the report it is also noted that the economic components of the proposed state are based on revolutionary measures such as nationalization of Christian endowment properties, American companies, and factories and plants, and the sequestration of banks as well as other measures.

Political sources in Beirut say that General Michel 'Awn will go ahead with his plan if no acceptable settlement for the present crisis is found, and that he has informed the countries that influence the Lebanese situation to this effect.

The preamble of the project-report says: "At the personal instructions of General Michel 'Awn on 11 October to a special working team... to study the prospects of the future stage in the light of the discussions taking place between members of the Chamber of Deputies in al-Taif in order to deal with all potential situations... and on the basis of reports received from al-Taif by the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign and Expatriates Affairs and the Army Intelligence Directorate and the data available regarding regional and international trends at this stage, and after discussion, exchange of views, and sifting of ideas, the special working team submits to his excellency the prime minister the following report:

"The conference of parliamentarians now in session in al-Taif which represents one of the links in the Arab seven-point plan... aims at ousting General Michel 'Awn from the presidential palace and ending his legitimate authority in the liberated areas.

"Consequently, the special working team draws attention... to the need to lay down an urgent plan to be put into effect when the need arises, in order to confront contingencies of any kind. After a prolonged and thorough discussion of all the possibilities, the team has reached the conclusion that the opposition of the Muslim majority to the war of liberation has revealed the intensity of conflict in basic political aspirations and choices between the Christian community and the Muslim community, which frustrates hopes for any future effort for joint action against Israeli occupation, and places the burden of resistance exclusively on the Christian community."

The report defines the constitutional and political justifications for the establishment of the Free State of Lebanon and the mechanism of implementation as follows:

"1) The constitutional justifications: The special working team considers the government headed by General Michel 'Awn as the only legitimate government constituted in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and, therefore, this advanced situation must be preserved and not abandoned because it lends legitimacy to the decisions that can be implemented. Consequently, in order to thwart the completion of holding presidential elections after the deputies return from al-Taif, we suggest that the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved so that its actions, including the presidential elections, be constitutionally null and void.

"2) The political justifications: The working team notes that many states came into being after the United Nations was established as a result of their secession from other existing states, which strengthens the possibility of establishing the Free Lebanon State on the remains of the Lebanese Republic, without this causing a worldwide uproar, since there are several precedents in this field. Our reading of these constants in the international politics toward Lebanon is based on the position of three regional and international forces, namely Israel, France, and the Vatican, whose interests converge on a well-known point, namely preventing any Syrian military action against the liberated areas that might subject the Christians to Syria's will, and seeking to preserve the status quo in Lebanon."

With regard to the mechanism to implement the project, the report dwells on the following points:

"Internal unity: The working team believes in the need to identify the political forces in the liberated areas in order to seek to isolate the opposition forces either by
attempting to come to understanding with them or strike them with the aim of reaching a unified political decision.

"The report divide these forces into three factions and suggests taking the following steps in their regard:

1) Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfayar: We suggest making a final attempt with him, aimed at convincing him of this project. In case the attempt fails, gradual steps should be taken that would lead to forcing him to adopt our project, or else expel him from the liberated areas. This step could be followed by establishing a patriarchal council...

2) The Lebanese Forces: The Forces are expected to oppose this plan for reasons concerning the power struggle in the liberated areas...but it is possible to come to understanding with them...provided that we prepare a future plan to absorb the Lebanese Forces in the structure of "Free Lebanon". In extreme cases steps can be taken to neutralize them and, consequently, eliminate their direct influence on all the parties...

3) The Lebanese Front: ...We suggest seeking to paralyze the Front's activities and deal with every party individually."

The report suggests laying down a plan to strike at the Phalangist and the Liberal parties from within and keeping this plan ready for implementation when the need arises.

The report also suggests the following:

- Dissolving the Chamber of Deputies in order to create constitutional justifications for the legitimate government headed by General 'Awn to remain in office, provided that this is preceded by a call, even if hypothetical, for general elections.
- Expanding the government "in order to give it a comprehensive representative character and to strengthen and preserve internal unity."
- Declaration of a state of emergency "so that the armed forces will assume authority over the territory."
- The setting up of a constituent body "to lay dawn a constitution...and prepare for electing the people's representatives in the liberated areas."

Regarding the economic components of the Free Lebanon State, the report calls for the implementation of nine principal points that in effect would be measures to strengthen these components:

1) Setting up popular councils to take care of economic problems and find solutions for them.
2) Creating new financial transaction activity based on equality among people.
3) Nationalization of Christian endowment properties.
4) Nationalization of American companies.
5) Nationalization of factories and plants, disbanding their administrative boards, and replacing them by general councils made up of workers.
6) Sequestration of banks in order to prevent smuggling their assets abroad.
7) Confiscation of properties of Lebanese emigrants and investing them in the interest of the treasury of the Free Lebanon State.
8) Establishing food and cultural cooperatives in order to meet the citizens' requirements.
9) Imposing heavy taxes on capital at home and abroad.

LIBYA

Citizens Urged To Destroy 'Bases of Oppression'

[Text] In order that man may not fall, he must know that knowledge is the instrument of influential action in the social processes that occur as part of minor and compounded units of behavior within the framework of the social motive and according to society's philosophy and objectives.

Knowledge is to know right and wrong, "oppression and exploitation," and suppression and tyranny, and to know the rules of uncovering oppression. This requires knowing the Jamahiriya society and its issues. The Jamahiriya citizen is the only one who possesses real criteria that enable him to uncover and destroy the bases of oppression in society because he has knowledge.

Knowledge consists of a number of public ideas, beliefs, rules, concepts, and opinions which ultimately form man's world of knowledge. Poor knowledge is reflected in the individual's behavior and actions and in the manner with which he tackles the problems he faces. Consequently, it influences the performance and method of his work.

If, for the sake of the argument, we assume that individuals who fall within this framework are incapable of producing properly and harmoniously in the work they perform, then this inability is due to the various cultural and professional patterns in the economic, social, political, and artistic spheres. What is meant here is that the values, the modes of behavior, and the criteria form in their totality the structure of the cultural patterns that constitute the controls for all the actions which emanate
from the individual or the institution that serves the citizen or the entire society. In case such controls do not exist or in case they are unbalanced and incapable of performing their task as controls, then we become the victim of a backward mentality created by "ignorance, poverty, and disease"—the backwardness trio—and this mentality becomes responsible for destroying the principles that govern the makeup of the educational and legal values in human societies through the economic, political, and educational institutions, considering that these agencies organize the doers who interact with each other according to the various patterns. These patterns are formed by the customs, traditions, ideas, opinions, and heritage of the society which tries to instill them in the doers through the institutions that regulate the doers' daily and future activities. If the patterns are not instilled sincerely, honestly, and constructively, then the structure will be likely to collapse. The collapse of the values and morals that govern human societies through the institutions that these societies create to manage their life; this collapse begins with the minor behavioral units which consist of the family, the school, and management.

When action in the minor behavioral patterns begins to collapse, then the value criteria and standards in these units become unbalanced and the units lose their function as an instrument responsible for developing these values and standards in their members, in their workers, or in the groups forming them. Consequently, these values collapse in the face of the individual needs and desires. Need is the reason for the destruction of many rules and laws. When man's need is confronted by a barrier, man destroys the barrier to get his need. The barriers, regardless of whether legal or illegal, lose their value as soon as they become barriers. What concerns us is the destruction of legal barriers. The law was established to organize people's relations with each other through the coercive power which the law exercises and which is called the "legal power." A law becomes unlawful or loses its value when it is violated by those in charge of regulating it.

If, for example, we take housing and we find that an individual has submitted an application meeting all the legal requirements to obtain housing and that he has done so in accordance with the legal procedures and that his serial number is seven. But if we then find that number 10 has gotten his housing before number seven, then this is a violation of the law. When we investigate the cause, we find that somebody has resorted to paying graft money, to connections, or to an immorality to attain his objective. In this case, misconduct emerges in the minor behavioral units of "management" and "family." Thus, the minor behavioral units, which in their entirety form the compounded behavioral units and which extend to the other units, begin to fall like beads in a broken string of beads. Consequently, society becomes void of moral controls, regardless of whether their source is religion and tradition or any referential framework to which individuals resort for arbitration. If the referential framework's values and behavioral criteria and patterns are destroyed, society disintegrates and experiences unrest as a result of anxiety, despair, and despondency. It becomes incapable of performing its functions and of responding to people's needs, feelings, and sentiments. Consequently, society resorts to graft-money, bribery, robbery, favoritism, hypocrisy, lies, trickery, and deception. If standards fall, man falls. Society then seeks justifications.

A mentality of domination is a mentality of terrorism because it is a weak mentality. Weakness produces nothing but the weakness behind which the weak hide. The weak engage in domination and violence to hide their inability and their weakness. They overlook, outflank, and exploit the law to serve their individual interests and not the interests of the group because the values have collapsed, bringing down with them the behavioral patterns they have created. Thus, the black market has flourished because the social control laws, meaning the law of shame which is embodied in tradition, have fallen. A dollar is sold in the street for a dinar. This is tantamount to sabotaging the economy. The homeland is no longer a homeland. A homeland has people concerned and the people concerned are the citizens.

The citizens are selling dollars and honor through middlemen and they are sabotaging the institutions. An individual importer is definitely an enemy of socialism in any form. Such an importer will not hesitate to purchase a dollar for a dinar in order to import goods whose importation has been the responsibility of society. It would have been better to offer such individuals annual allocations, because a commodity currently sold for 10 dinars at the black market prices would cost just one dinar. Such people do nothing other than steal money from the citizens' pockets to buy with it dollars with which to import goods that are sold for twice what they should be sold for. When a young woman needs to buy something but cannot find the money to pay for it, she will do whatever the situation dictates to get what she wants. Thus, values fall in the face of need and "in need lies freedom." These things do not need to be explained by the intelligence agencies, by the revolutionary committees, or by the municipal guard. We know that society did not import bananas and did not import "almonds." This means that a certain circle or certain individuals imported them. If, for the sake of the argument, we assume that importation is permitted through bartering for dates or truffles, then there have been no truffles this season. This means that they were imported for hard currency from the people's treasury, or through crooked ways devised by some people, or by individual importers who are enemies of the people and, at the same time, a part of the people. The individual importer in his present condition is a parasite living at the expense of destroying the economic institutions and the future trade management vision. Mistakes may have been made in marketing or in the people's markets. But these mistakes are due to the presence of rats that were born in the old society, that moved to the new society under the banner of the people's management, and that have squashed every spirit of renewal. As a result of poor performance, we have come to imagine that what we have
done is wrong. We have developed this belief under the influence of Pharaoh’s magicians, even though what they do is false, and even though Moses’ staff—which, in other words, signifies popular creativity through the Jamahiriyah theory which is sweeping the world currently—is the truth.

The rats have succeeded in distorting the people’s management because its leaders are less capable. The previous capitalist administration harbored the remnants of the society of injustice and oppression because the cultural and professional makeup of the popular leaders was weak. Because they were weak and not firm, they retreated before the middlemen and the false exploiters. Consequently, they have become the same as the rats, even worse, because they have hidden themselves and sought protection behind the masses’ slogans. To begin with, they do not belong to the masses or to the masses’ culture. However, they have formed a strong framework to resist shocks and blows. We will not be able to strike them unless we penetrate this framework which is made of the remnants of the society of oppression and exploitation, the products of the gang of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd-al-Wahhab, the agents of foreign intelligence, the dollar middlemen, and the importers and those who deal with them.

These people are tantamount to a tumor in society and they have been behind the corruption of the minor behavioral units of which society is formed. Thus, the reactionary force has been able to drive the wedge of hostility within the revolutionary force by dividing this force into two clans and two groups that have been totally preoccupied with fighting each other, while the reactionary force has been scheming to strike all of them by corrupting and falsifying the revolutionary accomplishments and by weakening and fragmenting the revolution’s strength. Some of these leaders are busy defending their positions while reaction is working to destroy the objectives and their attractive nature and to offer the alternative objectives of the individual importer, of the middleman, and of the dollar vendor. Thus, new values which have nothing to do with the masses’ society are growing in this society. They will bring about this society’s collapse and will cause the maladies of the backward societies, such as bribery, theft, corruption, indifference, middlemanship, and falsehood, to rise in it.

The real solution lies in having the revolutionary force rediscover itself by rereading the “Green Book” which promises a new age and a new era which the Romanians and Gorbatchev may reach before the Libyans do, because the Libyans are unjustifiably plotting against themselves.

Authorities Arrest Demonstration Participants

900A0317A London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 15 Jan 90 p 5

[Article: “Al-Qadhafi and Arab Jews”]

[Text] In a recent press conference, Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi announced that he plans to permit Arab Jews to return to Libya and he urged them to settle in the

Arab, European, and American countries from which they have departed. Addressing the Jews, al-Qadhafi said: “The states that encourage you to settle in Palestine harbor you no friendship or love but want to push you to the incinerator.”

The Libyan president referred in his press conference to the “Islamic tendency” issue, saying that it is not the “awakening” but the killing of Islam. In a speech he made last October, Colonel al-Qadhafi likened the radicals to “AIDS patients.”

At another level, some Libyan opposition sources report that a major demonstration was staged in the city of al-Bayda’ last week, that it was followed by a campaign of arrests, and that six participants were executed. The same sources say that the causes of the demonstration lie in the appointment of individuals unacceptable at the popular level to head the people’s committees and that these individuals include Muhammad Hijazi, the brother of ‘Abdullah Hijazi, the ex-chief of military intelligence in the city of Benghazi. The causes also include poor economic conditions, reduced salaries, and inflation.

Press Reacts to Uprising in Romania

900A0316A Tripoli AL-MUWAZZAF in Arabic 28 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[Editorial: “Word for Situation”]

[Text] There is no doubt that the developments undergone by Romania recently have confirmed more than one fact and have shown and demonstrated the credibility of immortal statements made on the soil of the great 1 September [revolution] and proven to be true, sound, and correct by the developments our modern world is undergoing.

The Romanian people’s masses moved last week and this week in a holy march and in a sweeping popular revolution which besieged the Republican Palace and the government and party headquarters—the symbols of tyranny, terrorism, and oppression—to topple the regime and to end the party’s domination and terrorism in order to attain the masses’ right position and their usurped right and to take over power without anybody’s custodianship or domination after having lived powerless, oppressed, miserable, and sad for long years. Now that the time and the opportunity have come, these masses have erupted in a tumultuous popular revolution that is confronting its enemies, the masses’ enemies, and struggling and striving desperately and bitterly for the masses’ freedom, happiness, salvation, and liberation from the oppressive agencies and tyrannical and exploitative regimes.

Romania’s developments have proven the failure, invalidity, and falsehood of the government and party theory and the tyranny and suppression of the oppressive dictatorial regimes. These developments have also proven the correctness, soundness, validity, and credibility of
the Jamahiriya theory and of government by the people who control the power, the wealth, and the weapons and who are their own masters on their land.

The Romanian people’s victory is, in fact and reality, another victory scored by the Jamahiriya theory in another international arena. It is expected that the coming years will witness the fall of more party government regimes in other positions and that the peoples will triumph. The age is the age of the peoples, of the masses, and of the jamahiriya.

No matter what forms the world’s dictatorial regimes devise to exercise power on behalf of the masses in an abortive attempt to persuade the masses to maintain their current conditions and to let these regimes continue to rule on their behalf, the popular deluge is coming and the age of the masses is marching ceaselessly with the new dawn to prevail in the entire world where the peoples who have triumphed in their battle are taking over power, setting up their jamahiriya, and building the new society where the freedom and the happiness embodied in the “Green Book” thinking prevail. This is the thinking which saves mankind from torture and humiliation, which rose as a strong voice and a resounding call, and which has now become a positive movement emanating from the first jamahiriya in history to reach every spot and to liberate peoples from the regimes that rule them and the shackles that bind them.

Commentator Calls for Tunisian-Libyan Unity
900A0317C Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR
in Arabic 15 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Husayn 'Aqilah al-Warfali: “Island That Toppled Idol”]

[Text] When did Tunisia separate from Libya? When did Libya separate from Tunisia? What was the area located between al-Sallum in the east and Tubruq in the west called?

Several questions preoccupy the minds of the Arab people who live in this area. The cause of these questions is the premeditated suffocation and blackout imposed by hirelings and colonialism on this area and on the Arab region generally in order to entrench the imaginary borders between the united masses of our Arab homeland.

When did borders emerge between Tunisia and Libya? No borders existed. What existed from ancient times until the imperialist France imposed its control on the region currently called Tunisia were the same tribes, living on the same land, getting their water from the same wells, intermarrying, and forging closer relations with each other. Because the region currently called Libya was under Turkish rule at the time, France forced the Turkish—Ottoman—Government to separate Tunisia from Libya and to delineate the borders in order to prevent Libyan Arabs from entering Tunisia and Tunisian Arabs from entering Libya.

And so it was that the borders were delineated and that the single tribe was split into two. Italy then jumped into Libya to further underline the borders.

What then?

Imperialism kindly granted the Arab homeland independence. Consequently, Libya came into existence and a king who was a puppet in the hands of imperialism was appointed as its king. Tunisia came into existence and a president-for-life was installed in it and this president implemented the policy of estranging the Tunisian people. But despite the estrangement, the poverty, and the backwardness, the revolution’s sun shone bright in Libya and drove away the darkness with a revolution that toppled idols installed by imperialism. Libya thus became free and gigantic.

Since its inception, the Libyan revolution set itself a number of tasks, led by the task of reuniting the Arabs and destroying the borders established by imperialism so that the Arab people may embrace anew in a single state whose masses confront Zionism and the imperialist plots. At the time of the Libyan revolution’s inception, the only other revolution existing in the Arab homeland was 'Abd-al-Nasir’s revolution in Egypt which was waging its battles against imperialism and Arab reaction all by itself. Imperialism, through its lackeys, had been able to even break the back of the union which had reunited Egypt and Syria. Thus, the borders reappeared and struck their roots in the Arab homeland. Subsequently, the Libyan revolution restored to the Arab nation its spirit which imperialism had tried to kill with the secession plot and with the 1967 setback. Unitary steps were taken by the Libyan and Egyptian revolutions but fate again frustrated the Arab hopes. 'Abd-al-Nasir departed and imperialism’s lackeys resurfaced. The buried al-Sadat disavowed all the covenants and all the aspirations of the Egyptian and Libyan peoples. The unity plans were turned into malicious missiles which the buried al-Sadat poured on the Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir base in Tubruq—a base which graduated hundreds of pilots. Numayri, the felled lackey, followed al-Sadat’s path. Consequently, all unity plans were torn to pieces and the aspirations of the Egyptian and Sudanese masses for unity were devastated, but only for a time.

A climate of stagnation and disappointment prevailed in the Arab homeland. Only the Libyan revolution persisted in this homeland and it continued to raise the torch of unity, hoping that some Arab rulers would see it and rush to join it. But this did not happen. Not a single ruler volunteered to extend his hand to unity. Everybody feared for his seat. If the masses united, as the rulers thought they would, then the rulers’ seats would be destroyed. Those rulers never understood how Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi could resign to allow al-Sadat to rule the united state.

Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi did tender his resignation for the sake of unity but none of the rulers could understand this.
The unity-oriented Arab revolution, i.e. the Libyan revolution, had no option but to involve those rulers and test them before the masses.

The Libyan revolution turned to the nearest Arab country whose people it considers one and the same as the Libyan people and who are the same masses, even though they have been divided by imaginary borders and by French imperialism, and even though our masses in Tunisia are ruled by one who is entrenched in estrangement and who himself leads the policy of estranging this people.

The Libyan revolution is aware that hatred for unity runs in the arteries of the ruler of our people in Tunisia and that he is obsessed with whatever is western. Despite this, the Libyan revolution has extended its unionist hand toward this regime, disregarding the instrument of government and taking into account only the masses who yearn for unity. After Libya had made a strenuous effort, unity talks were held in the Island of Jurbah which embodies the unity of the masses and even the unity of the waters which extend from Tobruk in the west to al-Sallum in the east. An agreement proclaiming the establishment of the first unity—a merger unity combining two Arab countries that were originally a single country—in the Arab Maghreb was concluded. The masses thirsting for unity came out marching, applauding, dancing, and singing the unity anthems. But the joy did not last long. The imperialist hands moved quickly to strike the masses' joy and to suppress anew their love for unity. Habib Bourguiba denied that he had signed the Jarbah agreement, thus striking the Arab Tunisian people's aspirations. The borders reappeared and barbed wire was erected to imprison the Arab Tunisian masses. Tunisia’s lackey regime was not content to disavow unity but went beyond, instructing its propaganda trumpets to promote division between the two countries' masses and to sow the seeds of sedition between brother and brother.

But regardless of what the lackeys do, the day will inevitably come when they will fall under the masses' feet and when only the unity-oriented will survive. Al-Sadat, who hit unity with the lackeys' guns, was killed by the free men of the Arab Egypt. Numayri, who disavowed all values and principles, was expelled in the worst manner by a sweeping popular revolution.

And now, here is the island on which Bourguiba signed the unity accord which he then disavowed and here is the Arab Tunisia submerged in a new light after having toppled the idol who considered himself president for life.

The masses, whose patience and endurance is unmatched, explode like a volcano at the decisive moment to topple imperialism's puppets and the regionalists.

If we are celebrating today the anniversary of the Jarbah experiment which was the first step on the path of the Arab Maghreb unity, then we aspire now for a greater stride toward the Maghreb unity, considering that the revolution leader has destroyed the imaginary gates. We also aspire to see the free Tunisians destroy the gate that continues to stand erect on the imaginary borders which Bourguiba wanted to perpetuate. Will the free Tunisians destroy this gate which is no longer beneficial and in which we continue to see the image of the borders created by the French imperialism and by one of its puppets—a puppet who collected the price for torpedoing what he had signed in Jarbah?

While recalling the Jarbah proclamation, we aspire for a single army and a single flag flying over our Arab Maghreb. Jarbah was the beginning.

Editorial Questions Arab Goals After Europe Unification
900A0317B Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR
in Arabic 27 Nov 89 p 16

[Article by Imhammad al-Ghil al-Qa‘idi: "Inter-Arab Dialogue"]

[Text] It seems that the world's two superpowers have agreed on a plan that is more serious than the Yalta plan and that seeks to arrange their interests and strategy and to expand the sphere of their influence east and west endlessly at the expense of the small people with force, deception, tyranny, oppression, exploitation, piracy, and blackmail.

West Europe will accomplish its political, economic, and military unity at the outset of the next decade.

The divided Germany has begun to reunite, thanks to the strength of the people's power.

The Zionist enemy in Palestine persists in his arrogance, supported by a nuclear power. He is trying to besiege the Arab nation's southern borders through Africa so as to implement the imperialist strategy that seeks to set up pro-Zionist regimes in the Arab region so that Zionism may control the sources of Arab water.

The question that dictates itself urgently is: Where do the Arabs stand on this international map vis-a-vis these major developments?

Has any Arab considered the world's political developments and the serious political, economic, geographical, and military changes that have occurred in the post-World War II map and which the world will experience throughout the final two decades of the 20th century? Has any Arab profoundly analyzed the conflict of ideologies and wondered where the Arabs stand vis-a-vis this conflict?

What are the dangers and the significance of convening the Bush-Gorbachev summit at the same spot which the U.S. Sixth Fleet used to attack the great Jamahiriya people and the leader of the revolution in the month of al-Tayr 1986?
Whatever uncivilized and disturbing results this summit may produce will definitely not be in the interest of the Arabs. How can these results be confronted, fought, and foiled?

Has any Arab considered the serious nature of the disturbing statement recently made by the terrorist Yitzhaq Shamir, the so-called prime minister of the Zionist enemy, who said, “A million Soviet Jews will leave the Soviet Union for occupied Palestine”?

Has any Arab considered the renewed and serious Zionist infiltration of Africa, the restored relations between a number of African regimes and the Zionist entity, and the imminent dangers these activities pose to the Arab national security?

Has any Arab pondered the ramifications and danger of the emergence of a comprehensive European unity after 1992 to the Arab region?

Has any Arab pondered the dimensions of the medium 1,300-km missile which the Zionists launched from Jerusalem in mid-September 1989 and which landed north of the city of Benghazi, and has any Arab pondered the Zionists’ launching of several satellites which they are using to bolster their military capabilities?

Has any Arab thought of the method and means with which to break the siege surrounding the stone-throwing soldiers in Palestine and with which to support their popular revolution which is at the threshold of its third year, to dress their wounds, to soothe their grief, and to alleviate their pains and sorrows?

How can the Arab ignore these important facts on the international political map and these developments which will undoubtedly have their direct or indirect impact on the Arab region, with or without Arab consent?

The Arab masses and rulers must ponder and evaluate the above questions and must find the solutions to confront them and confront the malicious Jewish-Crusader onslaught against the Arab nation, especially since the Arabs are not so much in need of Arab-foreign dialogues as they are in need of an inter-Arab dialogue, founded on the belief that Arab nationalism is what will fill the void, considering that nationalism is the basis of the survival of nations and of their absorbing and adjusting to the developments of a world approaching the 21st century. The Arabs need this inter-Arab dialogue so that they may enter anew the international political map which has no place for dwarfs, for the weak, or for small entities.

The tremors and developments occurring in the world under the pressure of the masses who are marching to seize power have dropped all the previous so-called scientific ideological givens and have demolished the lofty and solemn walls. There is no doubt that these developments indicate that the world is rearranging its affairs to enter the next century and is looking for ways to redeem and liberate itself, and for a fundamental alternative to solve its major political, economic, and social crisis.

The world will only find its alternative in the three chapters of the small “Green Book” of a simple bedouin whose book is similar to the annunciation of Jesus, to the tablets of Moses, or to the short speech of the camel rider [Prophet Muhammad]. Some of you perhaps know this simple bedouin. As for the others, look for him through a visit to his tent, which became known to the world after it was raided and strafed by 170 aircraft, whose aim was to burn the draft alternative for which the world is looking in order to solve its critical modern problems.

Will the Arabs comprehend all this?

Meanwhile, we find a number of Arab political symbols preoccupied these days with discussing wasteful and treasonous schemes, plans, and initiatives presented to us by the enemies in an open and exposed attempt to strike and destroy the unitary plans and steps the Arab nation has built in the past two years on the path of its unity from the ocean to the gulf. These symbols are preoccupied with these schemes on the instructions of foreign forces that seek an Arab position which serves their strategy and accomplishes their ambitions. The Arabs will get nothing in return. Rather, they will have to relinquish and make concessions under the pretexts of the “slogan” of Arab-European dialogue, and of what is called U.S. State Secretary James Baker’s plan for the Palestinian issue.

The fact that must be stated is that there can be no dialogue between a weak party whose land is occupied, whose forces are dispersed, whose riches are plundered, and who is governed by the theories of oppression and exploitation and a strong party who will unite his continent at the outset of the next decade.

The enemies are wagering on Arab meetings that promote defeatist positions and they are ceaselessly trying to collectively Arabize the chain of treasonous acts which, on the superpowers’ instructions, always precede the superpowers’ summits in a premeditated and programmed manner. We are not opposed to the convening of a summit between the two superpowers. Rather, we support detente and world peace, provided that this detente is not at our expense and the expense of our national causes, aspirations, and generations. If we have
any other objection, it is confined to the place and the form. We support the Bush-Gorbachev summit if its outcome includes:

- Departure of the Soviet and U.S. fleets from the Mediterranean Sea.
- Elimination of the U.S. bases from the Mediterranean Sea and from the countries overlooking this sea.
- Exploiting the latest developments—developments which had been predicted by Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, the internationalist revolutionary leader and the leader of the world revolution, at the ninth nonalignment summit in Belgrade and which are embodied in the latest developments in Germany—to settle the Jews in the Alsace-Lorraine, so as to prevent the emergence of any new signs that may cause another war between the German nation and France.
- The summit outcome should also make the United States give West Germany its freedom as the Soviet Union has given East Germany its freedom.

This means that any outcome of the two superpowers’ summit that does not incorporate these cultural human tendencies will obstruct international detente and peace and will pose the threat of igniting the fuse of a Third World war. Likewise, any Arab-European dialogue that does not seek to lift the European blockade against the great Jamahiriya and against Syria is an act of treason and relinquishment, an attempt to strike the Arab Maghreb Union, and the plan to develop the Arab League charter, and is a premeditated tendency to perpetuate the climate of official estrangement between the Arab regimes and the revolutionary regime in Libya, and to prepare the world and Arab public opinion for an imaginary gain which the Palestinians wish to make through the PLO—a gain which aims to get the Arabs involved anew in recognizing the Zionist enemy instead of liberating Palestine from the river to the sea. They have been content to declare this Palestine a state on paper, on maps, and in official correspondence, and many have been trumpeting this gain and exchanging congratulations on making it.

So any Arab meeting that does not include as one of its priorities establishing comprehensive Arab unity and liberating Palestine from the river to the sea is an exposed meeting that is rejected by the ordinary Arab and by all the popular and revolutionary circles and that will be confronted with all the means. Such a meeting will compel the revolutionary forces to declare an all-out war on the advocates of this defestivist logic and to strip all the regimes and governments suppurating this scheme of their legitimacy and view them as traitors. The revolutionary force will urge the masses to punish them. So, this force will continue the open struggle to build a single and legitimate pan-Arab state from the ocean to the gulf and liberate the Arab soil from the imperialist presence, regardless of the cost involved.

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**MOROCCO**

Large Trade Deficit Increase Noted
900A0274B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE
in French 15 Dec 89 p 6

[Article: “Trade Deficit Up 75 Percent in Last 8 Months”]

[Text] The trade balance continues to be a source of concern. In the first eight months of 1989 the commercial deficit reached rather alarming proportions. It was up 75 percent over the same period of the previous year, so that exports covered only 56.5 percent of import costs, compared to a 73.1 percent coverage ratio for the corresponding period in 1988.

This situation apparently results from a combination of two unfavorable developments, namely the decline in exports (5.8 percent down as of the end of August) and the vertiginous increase (18.2 percent) in imports. Overall, exports were down 998.6 million dirhams, declining from 17,621.8 million dirhams on 31 August 1988 to 16,623.2 million dirhams in the first eight months of 1989. This decline is due to a slump in sales of phosphoric acid, which totaled only 639.5 million dirhams, compared to 3,183.4 million dirhams in the same months of the previous year.

In November, however, OCP [Moroccan Phosphates Office] resumed deliveries of phosphoric acid to India.

But that only partially explains the deteriorating trade balance. The underlying cause is the unprecedented and dizzying growth of imports.

As noted above, imports increased by 18.2 percent, growing from 24,902 million dirhams in the first two-thirds of 1988 to 29,426.4 million dirhams in the corresponding period in 1989.

As we mentioned in a previous issue, this trend calls for more in-depth analysis of the causes and implications. It has been learned that two ministries—finance and commerce and industry—are currently digging into the question. We endeavored to get the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to shed some light on this, but our repeated requests for information have gone unanswered so far.

A look at the figures shows that imports have increased primarily in the areas of energy (+1,032.8 million dirhams), semifinished goods (+1,434.8 million dirhams), capital goods (+1,826 million dirhams), food products (+418.9 million dirhams), and finished consumer products (+353.9 million dirhams). Apart from the cost of imported hydrocarbons, therefore, one is justified in speculating that the increase in imports may be explained in large part by the boom in economic activity and investment.
### Sectoral Imports and Exports January-August¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food, beverages, tobacco</td>
<td>2,597.1</td>
<td>3,016.0</td>
<td>4,333.0</td>
<td>4,621.7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy and lubricants</td>
<td>3,410.5</td>
<td>4,443.3</td>
<td>358.1</td>
<td>424.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unprocessed animal or vegetable products</td>
<td>1,956.9</td>
<td>2,291.9</td>
<td>767.4</td>
<td>813.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unprocessed minerals</td>
<td>1,842.1</td>
<td>931.5</td>
<td>2,695.9</td>
<td>3,013.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semifinished goods</td>
<td>6,523.9</td>
<td>7,958.4</td>
<td>4,979.3</td>
<td>3,016.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital goods (agricultural)</td>
<td>270.7</td>
<td>304.4</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital goods (industrial)</td>
<td>5,421.6</td>
<td>7,247.7</td>
<td>244.0</td>
<td>451.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finished consumer goods</td>
<td>2,879.3</td>
<td>3,233.2</td>
<td>4,243.5</td>
<td>4,281.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,902.6</td>
<td>29,426.4</td>
<td>17,621.8</td>
<td>16,623.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Source: Foreign Exchange Office

### Summary of Imports and Exports January-August¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>17,621.8</td>
<td>16,623.2</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>24,902.6</td>
<td>29,426.4</td>
<td>+18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance</td>
<td>-7,280.8</td>
<td>-12,803.2</td>
<td>+97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import Coverage (Percent)</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Source: Foreign Exchange Office

### Cereal Crop Production Termed Excellent

**900A4073A Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 8 Dec 89 p 8**

[Text] As forecasted¹, the 1988-89 cereal harvest was very good, even excellent. Indeed, the final figures—that we compiled from the Ministry of Agriculture—show that production of the four main cereals (soft wheat, hard wheat, corn, and barley) exceeded 73 million quintals (73,284,200 quintals to be exact). This is a slight increase over initial predictions¹.

Analysis of the distribution of the harvest supports this positive assessment.

Indeed, although there was a drop in production of about 5.6 million quintals compared to last year's season (1987-88, which was an exceptional, record harvest), nearly all of the decline was in barley. Production of "strategic" cereals, on the other hand, remained stable (hard wheat) or down very slightly (soft wheat).

As for the 1989-90 season, atmospheric conditions are very favorable for now.
### Corn (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seasons</th>
<th>Land Area in 1,000 Ha</th>
<th>Yield in Qs/Ha</th>
<th>Production in 1,000 Qs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>434.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2,583.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>383.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2,639.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>401.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3,210.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>375.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>3,067.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>368.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2,402.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>405.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>4,028.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Barley

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seasons</th>
<th>Land Area in 1,000 Ha</th>
<th>Yield in Qs/Ha</th>
<th>Production in 1,000 Qs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>1,819.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>15,853.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>2,177.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>28,604.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>2,316.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>13,450.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>2,388.6</td>
<td>9.74</td>
<td>23,261.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>2,168.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>18,861.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>2,149.8</td>
<td>10.28</td>
<td>22,096.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>2,228.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>10,390.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>2,046.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>23,337.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>2,150.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>12,276.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>2,126.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>14,046.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>2,382.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>25,413.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>2,471.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>35,628.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>2,314.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>15,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>2,551.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>35,007.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>2,398.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>29,986.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Hard Wheat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seasons</th>
<th>Land Area in 1,000 Ha</th>
<th>Yield in Qs/Ha</th>
<th>Production in 1,000 Qs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>1,238.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12,039.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>1,454.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>16,518.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>1,392.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10,358.0</td>
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<td>1977-78</td>
<td>1,297.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>14,408.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>1,166.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13,069.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>1,269.0</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>13,309.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>1,165.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6,104.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>1,106.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14,062.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>1,285.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12,385.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>1,122.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11,712.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>1,115.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>13,415.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>1,191.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>19,812.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>1,107.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>17,693.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>1,169.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>17,665.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Production of 4 Main Cereals 1988-89 Season

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season</th>
<th>4 Main Cereals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>73,284.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>78,901.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>42,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>76,787.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>52,204.7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Production of 4 Main Cereals 1988-89 Season

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production (1,000 Qs)</th>
<th>Land Area (1,000 Ha)</th>
<th>Yield (Qs/Ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soft Wheat</td>
<td>21,604.4</td>
<td>1,459.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Wheat</td>
<td>17,665.2</td>
<td>1,169.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>29,286.2</td>
<td>2,398.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>4,028.4</td>
<td>405.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73,284.2</td>
<td>5,433.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MARA

### Footnote


**Coal Imports Register 22-Percent Increase**

900402738 Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 5 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] Imports of coal and coke for power plants, cement factories, sugar refineries, and foundries totaled 1,303,898 metric tons in 1989 compared to 1,067,848 tons in 1988, up 22.1 percent.

In 1986 and 1987, imports of the same were 817,224 metric tons and 1,014,637 tons respectively.

SOCOCHARBO (Coal and Wood Marketing Company) imported nearly 80 percent of the total, or 1,041,362 metric tons, compared to 866,011 tons in 1988, or a jump of 20.2 percent.
The electricity industry accounted for 59.8 percent of the total with 780,150 tons, and cement factories 35.2 percent, with 458,341 metric tons. Sugar refineries and foundries represented 5.0 percent, with 65,407 metric tons.

### Tables

#### Distribution by Consumer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consumers</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>% Variation 89/88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEO Plants</td>
<td>599,222</td>
<td>600,993</td>
<td>723,005</td>
<td>+20.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement Factories</td>
<td>172,302</td>
<td>219,599</td>
<td>207,456</td>
<td>(-5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan Coal Supply</td>
<td>57,145</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Refineries</td>
<td>26,134</td>
<td>35,870</td>
<td>48,832</td>
<td>+36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundries and various</td>
<td>16,150</td>
<td>9,349</td>
<td>4,924</td>
<td>(-48.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOCHARBO Total</td>
<td>813,808</td>
<td>866,011</td>
<td>1,041,362</td>
<td>+20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Imports—Cior, Asmar, Agadir Zellidia</td>
<td>200,829</td>
<td>201,837</td>
<td>262,536</td>
<td>+30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco Total</td>
<td>1,014,637</td>
<td>1,067,848</td>
<td>1,303,898</td>
<td>+22.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Distribution by Port

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casablanca</td>
<td>861,811T</td>
<td>1,041,362T</td>
<td>+20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agadir</td>
<td>104,042T</td>
<td>127,501T</td>
<td>+22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nador</td>
<td>101,995T</td>
<td>135,035T</td>
<td>+32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,067,848T</td>
<td>1,303,898T</td>
<td>+22.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Source of Coal Imported by SOCOCHARBO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>458,315T</td>
<td>0T</td>
<td>660,649T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>270,379T</td>
<td>635,998T</td>
<td>27,263T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>22,830T</td>
<td>159,696T</td>
<td>280,885T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>20,000T</td>
<td>0T</td>
<td>18,810T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0T</td>
<td>24,898T</td>
<td>0T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>15,750T</td>
<td>16,750T</td>
<td>19,589T</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,304T</td>
<td>6,192T</td>
<td>17,396T</td>
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<td>FRG</td>
<td>13,900T</td>
<td>6,000T</td>
<td>0T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benelux</td>
<td>10,330T</td>
<td>16,477T</td>
<td>16,770T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>813,303T</td>
<td>866,011T</td>
<td>1,041,362T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1988 Unemployment Statistics Reported

900410273C Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 8 Dec 89 p 6

[Article by M.C. entitled: “Drop in Urban Unemployment Rate in 1988”]; editor’s lead is “At 13.9 percent, the urban unemployment rate has dropped for the second consecutive year. But nearly half the unemployed are under 25.”]

[Text] According to findings of the annual study conducted by the statistics directorate², the urban unemployment rate¹ took a downward turn during 1988 for the second year in a row. This decline, the study stresses, is consistent with economic activity, since a record growth rate (up 10.3 percent) was recorded for last year. The principal figures are reviewed below.

Active Population: Up Four Percent

The number of active people³ in the cities grew about four percent in 1988, reaching about 3,500,000, which means that 133,681 people (net flow) were added to the labor market. Active townpeople make up 31.5 percent of total urban population: in other words, one person in three is either employed or looking for work.

The inequalities between the sexes remain at fairly much the same level. 74.6 percent of the active population are men. Unemployment affects women (17.3 percent) more than men (12.8 percent). The gross rate of activity for women is only 15.8 percent compared to 47.5 percent for men.

The unemployment rate dropped from 15.5 percent in 1986 to 14.7 percent in 1987, then to 13.9 percent in 1988. Because of the relatively large jump in the number of active people, the number of jobseekers has only slightly declined: it was reduced from 481,610 in 1987 to 476,123 in 1988 (-1.1 percent).

High Unemployment Among the Young

The chief characteristics of urban unemployment are as follows:

- a labor market characterized by either surpluses, or inadequate supplies, of degree manpower;
- a particularly high unemployment rate among the young: 27.5 percent for the 15-to-24-year-old group. It affected 221,358 people: nearly one unemployed person in two (46.5 percent) is younger than 25;
- the unemployment level remains moderate (10.1 percent in 1988) for active people between the ages of 25 and 60;
- those with diplomas from teaching or training establishments did not profit fully from the easing of the labor market. This is particularly true for those with professional training, university degrees, and high school diplomas.

Moreover, there are fairly significant disparities among regions. Thus, while the unemployment rate is 21.8 percent in the east, it is only 8.4 percent in Tetouan province. The unemployment rate has certainly dropped overall in the Kingdom, but it has risen in the Tensift and remained stable in the central-south.

In 1988 net creation of jobs was 139,168, nearly 46 percent of which were salaried positions. Industry (including crafts) and the service sectors were the main creators of jobs, with an increase in job offers of 46.4 percent and 49.8 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes in Employment Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Active Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Active Pop. Employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Active Pop. Unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Gross Activity Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Activity Rate by Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Activity Rate of Pop. 15 and older</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Unemployment Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Unemployment Rate by Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59 years</td>
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</table>
Changes in Employment Indicators (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60 and older</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Including the active population 15 years and older in 1988: 3,417,087

Active Population Unemployed, by Age and Diploma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diploma</th>
<th>15-24 Years</th>
<th>25-44 Years</th>
<th>45 and Older</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No diploma</td>
<td>96,715</td>
<td>96,039</td>
<td>27,603</td>
<td>220,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade-school diploma</td>
<td>43,530</td>
<td>30,608</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>75,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-school diploma</td>
<td>34,330</td>
<td>29,717</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>64,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baccalaureat diploma or equivalent</td>
<td>6,106</td>
<td>14,326</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher degrees</td>
<td>2,121</td>
<td>12,993</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>15,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-level management degrees</td>
<td>6,059</td>
<td>11,016</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>17,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional diplomas or certification</td>
<td>32,497</td>
<td>30,772</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>63,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>221,368</strong></td>
<td><strong>225,471</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,294</strong></td>
<td><strong>476,123</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unemployment Rate by Age and Diploma (In %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diploma</th>
<th>15-24 Years</th>
<th>25-44 Years</th>
<th>45 and Older</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No diploma</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade-school diploma</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-school diploma</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baccalaureat diploma or equivalent</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher degrees</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-level management degrees</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional diplomas or certification</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Directorate

Footnotes

1. Defined by the ratio of unemployed active people and the active population 15 years of age or older.


3. By active population we mean all those employed or who, at the time of the study, were seeking employment. The inactive population includes all those not active, for a variety of reasons: age, retirement, studies, homemakers, work-disabled, etc.

Development Bank Increases Project Support

900440301C Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 15 Dec 89 p 19

[Article: "Major Increase in BNDE Activity in 1988: Up 41 Percent"]

[Text] Generally favorable economic conditions encouraged the BNDE [National Economic Development Bank] to step up investment financing activities in 1988, according to the yearly report just made public. The bank approved loans totaling 1,749 million dirhams, 41 percent over its 1987 total.

These positive developments are the result of changes made by BNDE to streamline and speed up financing procedures, to delegate decisionmaking authority, to improve the quality of customer service, and to promote its services with investors, according to the report.

Predominance of Direct Loans

We note that much of the growth in approved credit was in the form of direct loans, which rose to 1,210 million dirhams, a 68-percent increase from 1987. Direct loans represented 69 percent of all BNDE activity, compared to 58 percent in 1987.

The substantial increase in direct loans was evident in both long-term (+59 percent) and medium-term (+82.6 percent) activity, and reflected the number of projects approved as well as the size of the investments financed.
Some 30 percent of loan activity was in medium-term rediscordable credits [MTR], which increased 22.3 percent over 1987, despite a decline in MTR loans under the PMI [small and medium-size industries] program, which dropped sharply in 1988 (70.5 percent).

Credit conventions between BNDE and banks for the financing of PMI’s declined 77 percent as a result of the establishment of the CIC [expansion unknown], the Bank Al-Maghrib program, and depletion of the World Bank credit line. (Editor’s Note: In 1989 commercial banks provided MTR loans under the program set up by Bank Al-Maghrib.) BNDE invested directly in two projects totaling 240,000 dirhams.

**Bigger Projects**

Overall, the average size of projects approved by BNDE increased by 30.3 percent, primarily because of the greater number of large projects (40 million dirhams and over).

At the same time, though, loans of less than 10 million dirhams were up 41.5 percent over 1987.

The number of loans in the 10 to 40 million dirham range was up 35 percent; these projects accounted for 49 percent of all loans approved.

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### BNDE Loan Approvals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
<th>Cumulative to 12/31/88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Long-Term Loans</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Medium-Term Loans</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTR Loans</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNDE-Bank Conventions</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share Participations</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>1,749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Sectoral Distribution of Loans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Projects</td>
<td>Credits</td>
<td>Percent of Total</td>
<td>Number of Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and leather</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foods and beverages</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMME2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Source: BNDE Activity Report
2. [expansion unknown]

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### Industrial Development Activities Reported

900A0274C Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 8 Dec 89 p 9

[Article: “Industrial Investment Takes Off in October”]

[Text] The first important effects of the Royal Letter on investment are beginning to make themselves felt. In fact, the number of industrial investments approved in October shot up dramatically, showing the remarkable speed with which applications are being processed. Industrial investments to the tune of 851 million dirhams were approved, an increase of 108 percent over the previous month and 235 percent over October 1988, according to figures published by the Industrial Authority.

Cumulative figures at the end of October show that intended investments, as measured by projects approved, now total 5,560.3 million dirhams (up 27 percent) and involve the creation of nearly 52,000 jobs (up 15 percent). In sectoral terms, 36.3 percent of these
investments were in textiles and leather, 22.8 percent in the chemicals industry, and 16.6 percent in agrofood, which has had significant growth.

The table below gives detailed figures for October.

Some 234 applications were approved by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in October (including 154 investment expansions), 91 more than in September and 139 more than in October 1988.

The 851 million dirhams in investments approved in October will require outlays of 507 million dirhams in foreign exchange.

Some 7,638 jobs were created in October, a 72-percent increase from the previous month and 166 percent over the same month last year.

Of the projects initiated in October, 53 percent are export oriented.

Financing for these investments comes from the following sources:

- Self-financed: 52 percent.
- Bank loans: 31 percent.
- Leasing: 3 percent.
- Supplier credits: 2 percent.

Private Moroccan investors hold the lion's share of stock—some 80 percent—in these ventures. Foreign investors own a 16-percent interest, while the other 4 percent is held by public sector entities.

It is remarkable that the largest single concentration of investment (25 percent) is in the chemicals industry, rather than textiles and leather as in the past. In terms of regional distribution, the wilaya of Greater Casablanca is pulling in 38 percent of the total investments. The provinces of Kenitra (15 percent) and Fes (7 percent), are in second and third place, respectively.

Foreign investment initiated in October amounted to 135 million dirhams, about 16 percent of the total approved. These foreign investments come from France (37 percent), Netherlands (18 percent), Luxembourg (13 percent), West Germany (6 percent), Kuwait (6 percent), Syria (3 percent), and Switzerland (3 percent).

Also, 136 of the 234 applications approved—about 58 percent of the total—were for PMI's [small and medium-size industries], including 63 new investments and 73 expansions.

The PMI projects will create 4,143 jobs, about 54 percent of the total, and will require an investment on the order of 171 million dirhams, or 20 percent of the investment volume approved.

The average PMI investment was 1.2 million dirhams, yielding a mean investment cost of 41,000 dirhams per job.

Thus the PMI investment of 171 million dirhams will create 4,143 jobs, whereas, the big industries will be creating only 3,495 jobs with an investment of 680 million dirhams. This means the PMI's are five times as cost-effective as big industry at job creation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Investments (1,000's of dirhams)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agrofood</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>4,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and leather</td>
<td>30,001</td>
<td>32,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>4,703</td>
<td>6,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metalwork and machinery</td>
<td>2,947</td>
<td>2,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical and electronics</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial enterprises</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>3,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial service enterprises</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45,365</td>
<td>51,958</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Special Tariff Rate for Citrus Goods
900A0274D Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 5 Jan 90 p 10

[Article: “EEC: Morocco Will Get Tariff Modification”]

[Text] Starting this year, as provided for in the supplementary accord negotiated after Spain joined the EEC, Morocco will benefit from modification of the tariff formula used to calculate the entry price of certain agricultural products. That figure, as we know, is reached by first levying enough duty on the market price of the import to bring it to within 30 percent of the reference price, then adding the ad valorem tariff.

But the modification will be conditional, depending on the value of exports the previous year.

Article 3 of the supplementary accord says (paragraph 1) that for 1990 and subsequent marketing seasons, the Community will decide—on the basis of net totals, the analyses made per paragraph 2, and factors pertinent to
the objective of maintaining traditional export flows in the context of the expanded membership of the Community—whether it is appropriate to modify the entry price established under EEC Regulation No. 1035/72 for the following products originating in Morocco, within the limits indicated hereinafter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Tariff Item Number</th>
<th>Kind of Merchandise</th>
<th>Quantities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08.02 ex A</td>
<td>Oranges</td>
<td>265,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.02 ex B</td>
<td>Small citrus fruits</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.01 ex M</td>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>86,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April tomatoes</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May tomatoes</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paragraph 2 stipulates that from 1987 on, at the end of each growing season the Community will carry out a statistical analysis of the aforementioned exports from Morocco to the Community.

The total amount to be deducted from the tariff in calculating each product's entry price is based on the percentage accorded to Spain.

As noted below, this is equal to one-sixth of the TDC [Common Tariff].

But what matters for now is that while Spain will enjoy enormous advantages starting in 1990, Morocco will find it difficult to remain competitive in Community markets. In the second transitional stage envisaged under the Spanish treaty of accession, the Iberian peninsula will be granted substantial benefits deriving from its status as a full-fledged EEC member state.

Competitiveness in Question

Article 147 of the treaty of accession says that starting 1 January 1990 the EEC regime for products covered by Regulation 1035/72 will be applied in full to Spain...

Domestically, therefore, Spain will benefit from the community offering price (rather than the frequently higher reference price) for certain fruits and early vegetables (including clementines and tomatoes). Greece provides a past illustration of this: in the 1984/85 growing season it was subject to the community offering price of 40.14 ECU [European Currency Units] per 100 kg, at a time when the reference price applied to third countries was 48.44 ECU/100 kg. In the case of Spain, there are indications that the offering price may be 15 percent lower than the reference price.

In addition, the tariff rates used to calculate the entry price will automatically move one-sixth of the way toward the TDC each year up to 1995.

By then, the entry price for Spain will be the same as the price in the marketplace.

Externally, Spain will also get special consideration, which it already enjoys with respect to oranges going to certain destinations. These provisions will undoubtedly be broadened to include clementine exports, if the new member state asks for it, because the regulations falling under 1035/72 are eligible.

In practical terms, the modification with respect to Morocco is clearly of some importance, but that fades into insignificance against the EEC's declared intention to maintain traditional trade flows within the framework of the enlarged EEC. Because assessments will be determined by the entry price, not the reference price.

Moreover, the modification will have scarcely any effect on clementines this year, because exports of the 1990 crop are almost finished, while the reference price for oranges remains somewhat low.

Partisan Employment Practices Criticized

900A0601D Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE ET AGRICOLE in French 5 Jan 90 p 6

[Editorial: "Economic Efficiency" and Clientism"; passages within slantlines published in English]

[Text] When the economy is booming one can overlook errors and live with halfhearted compliance, but when economic crisis becomes a palpable reality in our daily lives, the standard of economic (and social) efficiency must be enforced strictly and doggedly. This is what economists mean when they talk about optimization.

These days, in the developing countries, "economic efficiency" is more vital than ever. Rationalization of budgetary decisions (both private and public) is not just for the government and public sector. A new concept of public affairs is needed and efficiency needs to be a part of it. In other words, the governmental sector is where it seems most urgent to replace cronyism and partyism with standards of competence and professionalism. At present, whenever a new official is named, the first thing he does is engage and surround himself with a crowd of partisan supporters. Often these newcomers know nothing at all about the field in which they are supposed to make decisions that affect the whole nation. In such cases nepotism and partisan employment practices kill competence and professionalism, and we don't get "the right man at the right place".

The mind-set is reminiscent of the social system described by the illustrious "Ibn Khaldoun," where "Al Assabya" (patrilineal kinship solidarity) plays a dominant role in the distribution of power, responsibilities, and roles. But nowadays those who embrace and act on these sorts of attitudes are no longer wearing turbans: they are today's elite, thoroughly "hooked up" to modernity and "wired in" to the visible symbols of modern living.
But doesn't this go directly against the wishes of the builder of modern Morocco? Don't these kinds of attitudes obstruct the path toward Hassanian modernization? We think so, and the building of a new Morocco open to competence and excellence will require mid-level decision makers to adopt standards that transcend regional and partisan favoritism.

In many of our ministries, experts thoroughly familiar with their subject have been displaced in favor of people whose only "qualification" is belonging to a particular party, the minister's party. Is this practice healthy for our young democracy?

Many "technical" ministries suffer from these attitudes and behaviors, which though "profitable" to the individual are harmful to the national interest, which by definition and theory transcends partisan considerations.

At a time when His Majesty Hassan II has built "AL AMANA" as a symbol of decentralized management of the affairs of the "Moroccan city-state," there should be a clear separation between party considerations on the one hand, and the national interest and socio-economic efficiency on the other. But so long as the ministries are filled by party hacks, the "efficiency" of partisan machinery will distort and inhibit overall economic and social efficiency. Separation of powers and the clear, distinct delimitation of areas of jurisdiction is healthy, and indeed quite necessary to consolidate the progress independent Morocco has made toward modernization.

Results of Media Study Released
900A0301A Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 19 Jan 90 pp 11-12

[Article: "Results of Multi-Media Study: We Are Top French-Language Weekly in Morocco"]

[Text] On 16 January the Creargie company[1] made public the results of a multimedia study commissioned by ADAM (Moroccan Advertisers Association), public relations firms, and the media². Advertisers, consultants, and the media organs themselves were eagerly awaiting this report, whose primary purpose was to measure audience size, recognition, and listening and reading habits affecting the advertising value of the three main media divisions: television, radio, and the printed press (see technical note below).

Television: Pecking Order Established

As everyone knows, the major changes in Morocco's media landscape since the last study³ have to do with the advent of a private television station, 2-M International [2-MI], and to a lesser extent with Casablanca's TV-5.

Previously, TVM [Television Morocco] and SAP, its advertising division, had an extremely comfortable near monopoly. In terms of audience, TVM was overwhelmingly ahead of all its rivals, which were able to compete—and feebly at that—only in selected regions: Rabat and Marrakech (TV-5), the north (Spanish TV), and the east (Algerian TV).

With the arrival of 2-MI and TV-5's move into the Casablanca reception area, a rather interesting pecking order seems to have emerged, and advertisers now may choose between two television outlets. Relative ratings can be measured in terms of: each station's coverage area; popular viewing habits; and size of the previous day's audience. The latter criterion is the most reliable, but the three are evidently related, as shown in the following table (numbers are percentages of the Moroccan population 16 years of age and older, i.e., 14,592,000):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moroccan Television Viewing Habits</th>
<th>Stations Received</th>
<th>Usually Watched</th>
<th>Watched Yesterday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TVM</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-MI</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV-5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian TV</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish stations</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TVM seems to have special appeal to advertisers⁴ because its habitual viewers spend more time in front of their sets: 164 minutes per day (national average), compared to 120.3 minutes for 2-MI, and 82.1 minutes for TV-5.

On the other hand, 2-MI has a mostly urban audience, which from the viewpoint of many advertisers makes for a better market in terms of habits and consumer propensities.

2-MI offers four types of advertising vehicles:

- The time block between 1200 and 1400 hours, free to all viewers: 2-MI scores best in this block, as it is almost the only station on the air. On an average day, more than 1,200,000 people⁵ watch the soap opera aired at 1230 hours; most viewers are young women (under 40) in categories C and D, fewer than 10 percent of whom have gone to college.
- Subscriber-only (scrambled) programs during the day, when less than one percent of the population 15 and older is watching (fewer than 145,000 people.)
- Free programs in the 1930-2100 time block. 2-MI has a second ratings peak in this block, with viewership between 580,000 and 730,000. The audience is young, relatively well educated, and occupationally mixed.
- The subscriber-only block after 2100 hours; its average audience size is 250 to 300,000, mostly in the well-to-do and educated categories. Note that two-thirds of the viewers in this block are men.
Viewership for TVM, which is still far and away the leading station, can be described as a bell-shaped curve, with a peak audience of 4.5 to 4.7 million.

Programming: A Fundamental Role

But the relative audience shares of 2-MI and TVM are not set in concrete. All takes is one program change to upset the pecking order: a good film or sports event can double audience shares. Moreover, viewer preferences during the course of the day vary with the audience:

- 2-MI’s audience is most fond of the 12:30 soap opera (much higher rating than any other 2-MI program), followed by films, “Santa Barbara,” other soap operas or series, “Hit,” news, and sports broadcasts.
- Films top the list for TVM’s audience, followed by news, soap operas, artistic performances (Saturday evenings), sports events, and sports news.

The same is true for the other stations: for example, it could be said that virtually no one watches TV-5, except when news or certain other programs are on the air.

Medi-I Fills Its Niche

Unlike television, radio has only one vehicle for advertisers: Medi-I. Though RTM [Morocco Radio and Television] in Arabic is unbeatable in terms of audience size—in fact, it is the only station with true nationwide coverage—it must be noted that in urban areas Medi-I holds its own, with 38.3 percent of the urban population, compared to 43.2 percent of the urban population for RTM in Arabic (average daily audience). Medi-I also has more listeners in occupational categories A and B, which, of course, are prime targets for radio advertisers.

But what is most interesting is the length of time people spend listening and the way this changes over the course of the day. It will be recalled that music and news programs draw the most listeners. Both are big drawing cards for young people in the relatively well-educated categories B and C.

The audience chart for Medi-I peaks between 1200 and 1300 hours with more than 580,000 listeners. Saturday and Sundays the peak is in the 1000-1200 time period, with a slightly larger audience.

Printed Press: Small Sample

Although the radio and television ratings are rather precise, with a margin of error sometimes less than one percent, the same is not true for the printed press: the “effective” sample is, in fact, too small to measure the real readership of the press with precision. Actually, the illiteracy rate alone is sufficient to show how weak the printed press remains in Morocco. It must be noted, however, that with respect to the wealthiest and most educated categories, especially in urban areas, the press has had rather impressive penetration. In any event, the main point is that the figures for the printed press have both quantitative and qualitative significance.

As might be expected, four of the country’s dailies stand out from the pack: MATIN DU SAHARA, L’OPINION, AL ALAM, and AL ITTIHAD AL ICHTIRAKI.

In terms of instant recognition, AL ALAM is far ahead of the rest, which comes as no surprise to us, given its prestigious 44-year history and the qualitative improvements it made some time back. Next come L’OPINION and AL ITTIHAD AL ICHTIRAKI (tied for second), followed by MATIN DU SAHARA. In urban areas, this pecking order is reversed, with MATIN DU SAHARA moving to third place ahead of AL ITTIHAD AL ICHTIRAKI.

With regard to reading habits in the urban population, (“Name the daily papers you usually read every day.”), MATIN DU SAHARA is in first place, followed by L’OPINION, AL ITTIHAD AL ICHTIRAKI, and EL ALAM. But the margin of error is too high in relation to the percentages obtained, so it is impossible to say whether MATIN or L’OPINION should be rated number-one.

Somewhat more precise figures were obtained for the previous day’s audience (“What daily newspapers did you read yesterday?”):

- MATIN DU SAHARA: 516,000 +/-101,000 readers.
- AL ALAM: 362,000 +/-92,000 readers.
- L’OPINION: 288,000 +/-82,000 readers.
- AL ITTIHAD AL ICHTIRAKI: 269,000 +/-80,000 readers.

The margin of error is rather high, as we have noted, due to the small sample size. One might also be astonished at the difference between readership and the actual print runs of the dailies. Newspapers are widely read in Morocco, sometimes even on a rental basis (illegally, to be sure). A single copy may be read by more than 10 people! An average of no less than seven people read each copy of LA VIE ECONOMIQUE.

Among the periodicals, LA VIE ECONOMIQUE performed much better than last year, a fact amply confirmed by our increased sales and print runs. In terms of instant recognition, experience and reading habits, LA VIE ECONOMIQUE further strengthened its position as Morocco’s leading economic publication. Just to illustrate, here are a few statistics about our reading audience:

- Number of regular weekly readers: more than 65,000.
- Irregular readers (one to three times per month): more than 72,000.

In addition to that readership—impressive in its own right for a specialized publication—we also have occasional readers (less than once a month). But what is of special interest to advertisers is the quality of our readership. As the study points out, our readership is especially strong in occupational categories A and B; a great many of these readers are young men who have gone to college and live in urban areas. What is astonishing and
remarkable for a publication as narrowly targeted as ours is that LA VIE ECONOMIQUE is more widely read than any other French-language weekly in the whole country, including the leading overseas magazines.

This multimedia study provides valuable information from which advertisers and consultants will no doubt draw pertinent conclusions. It should be added that next time around there will be two separate surveys: one for television and radio, with one national sample, and another for the printed press, with a broader sample more representative of real and potential readership.

'Images' of the Television Stations

The Creargie survey also investigated differences in the public image—no pun intended—of the various television stations. Here are some of the interesting responses to the question "How does the programming on TVM (or 2-MI or TV-5) differ from what is available on other stations with which you are familiar?":

- TVM: good Arabic-language films (nearly 2 million viewers), good news programs (more than 1.3 million), the fact that it is in Arabic (more than 1.2 million), religious programs (nearly 600,000), standards of decency (more than 350,000), etc. On the negative side, there is only one item, but a rather significant one from the prospective advertiser's point of view: more than 475,000 people think it has too many commercials.
- 2-MI: the network that shows good films (1.3 million viewers), soap operas, and series (nearly 1 million). The other components of its public image, including music and sports, are much less significant. However, nearly 180,000 viewers believe it broadcasts the most daring programs!
- TV-5: This station has a distinctively cultural image. In addition, nearly 650,000 viewers cited it for the quality of its news programs.

Technical Note

This study was performed by Creargie during the period 13-30 November 1989 using a nationally representative sample of 2,041 persons aged 15 and older. It was carried out by means of face-to-face interviews, making use of a stratified random sample configured as a scaled-down model of the reference population. The sample population was stratified according to the following five criteria: region, habitat (rural or urban), sex, age, and social-occupational category.

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<tr>
<th>Readership of Moroccan Weeklies (at least once per month) (both Arabic and French-language periodicals)</th>
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<td>Publication</td>
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<td>AL MOUNTAKHAB</td>
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<tr>
<th>Readership of Moroccan Weeklies (at least once per month) (both Arabic and French-language periodicals) (Continued)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Publication</td>
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<td>7 JOURS A CASA-BLANCA</td>
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<th>Readership of Weeklies (Post-Secondary Readers)</th>
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<td>Publication</td>
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<td>AL MOUNTAKHAB</td>
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<td>7 JOURS A CASA-BLANCA</td>
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<td>LE MESSAGE</td>
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<td>LIBERATION</td>
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<th>French-Language Weeklies Read Every Week (percent of urban population)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>LA VIE ECONOMIQUE</td>
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<td>L'EXPRESS</td>
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<td>L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI</td>
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</table>

Footnotes

2. 2-M International, Medi-I, LA VIE ECONOMIQUE, TVM and the "MAROC SOIR" group.
3. Survey taken during the last quarter of 1988 by SECODIP Morocco.
4. For mass consumer products, that is. For more specifically targeted advertising campaigns, various qualitative factors must be taken into account. Nearly 50 percent of whom live in urban areas. But daily fluctuations can be significant. On weekends, 2-MI loses more than one-fourth of the audience 1230 hours, which drops to 870,000.

6. According to the 1982 census, only 5 million Moroccans 11 and older could read and write, less than one-fourth of the total population.

7. Not counting “7 JOURS A CASA,” a commercial brochure distributed free of charge.

**Water Reserve Statistics Reported**

90040274A Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 15 Dec 89 p 6

[Article: “Rebuilding of Water Reserves Continues”]

[Text] As of 10 December, 377 million cubic meters had been added to water reservoirs under ONE [National Electricity Office] administration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reservoir</th>
<th>Water Volume (millions of cubic meters)</th>
<th>Percent of Capacity</th>
<th>Water Volume (millions of cubic meters)</th>
<th>Percent of Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bin El Ouidane</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Massira</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed V</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oued El Makhazine</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Kansera</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idriss I</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalla Takerkoust</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>99.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansour Eddahbi</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moulay Youssef</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Hassan I</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,201</strong></td>
<td><strong>53.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,833</strong></td>
<td><strong>48.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus as of 10 December reserves were up to more than 50 percent of overall capacity, while last year at the same time they were at only 48 percent. The slow work of building up reserves will continue this month because rainy weather has continued.

Although reservoirs in the south are full, there is a serious problem at the Idriss I reservoir on the Innaoueene, the only one seriously low. The water deficiency at Al Massira is due to major diversions made in early autumn for irrigation.

Mansour Eddahbi is completely full and now overflowing.

**SAUDI ARABIA**

**Officials Discuss Aspects of Five-Year Plan**

**Plan Objectives Described**

44000182 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English 2 Jan 90 p 2

[Excerpts] Riyadh, Jan 9 (SPA)—Industry and Electricity Minister 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Zamil has expressed his expectation that the Kingdom’s exports would increase by 50 percent during the next five years.

Al-Zamil disclosed the government’s plan to establish a separate industrial estate in Riyadh for setting up projects under the Economic Offset Program.

“Licenses have been issued to establish four projects under the program, with the cooperation of the United States and Britain. And we will try with the support of other ministries to remove hurdles before the projects,” he added.

In an interview with Saudi Television last night, al-Zamil expressed his hope that some 300 new large, medium and small scale industries will be implemented during the next five years at an estimated cost of SR1.5 billion. “Most of the fund for these new industries is expected from the private sector and the government’s share in them will not exceed SR4 billion,” he noted. Al-Zamil expects a greater role for Saudi banks in future industrial development efforts.

The minister views more prospects for investment and joint firms and announced that the SR400 million Saudi Industrial Development Company will start functioning shortly.

Al-Zamil believed that the Kingdom’s railway network could be expanded to cover regions like Qasim, Ha’il and the Western Province to facilitate the transportation of goods.
He sees a good future for metallurgical projects particularly after the discovery of huge mineral resources in different parts of the country.

Al-Zamil described industry in the Kingdom as a unique experiment where state and citizens are pooling together their resources to ensure its progress.

Al-Zamil said that Saudi industry was built by citizens with the assistance and encouragement of the state, adding that Saudi citizens, consumers and businessmen alike have responded positively to the call of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to invest their money in the industrial sectors inside the Kingdom.

Al-Zamil said this response was a natural reaction to the attractive incentives extended by the state to the industrial sector and has resulted in the establishment of advanced industries.

Although these industries are on the threshold, he said they have approached the takeoff phase represented by about 2,000 productive factories.

Al-Zamil said that industrial plants has been spread all over the Kingdom, and are not only concentrated in the region.

He said the total sales of the industrial sector amounted to SR25 billion including SR8 billion in exports. Al-Zamil said these sales signify a good start and are very promising.

The minister said the Kingdom's pioneering experiment in the field of petrochemical industries and the success they have achieved has given a strong impetus to industrial development in the Kingdom.

He went on to say that the decision to establish the master gas gathering complex has been an important strategic decision which has resulted in the exploitation of the gas for the establishment of advanced industries at Jubayl and Yanbu'.

The important thing about these industries, al-Zamil said, is that they are providing raw materials for other industries which will emerge soon. "Moreover, these industries are run and operated by well-trained Saudi cadres," he added.

As for the future, al-Zamil said it will be very difficult to estimate the number of projects which will be established, adding that the state is not planning to centralize a number of factories but has left the option to the citizens themselves.

"I expect 300 more industrial projects involving a capital investment of SR15 billion during the upcoming five years," he said.

Al-Zamil made his predictions on estimations and statistics available to the ministry and the plans of citizens interested in industry.

Al-Zamil also predicted the expansion of the private sector and a significant increase in its activities, adding that the trend will be to establish investment and public shareholding companies.

He disclosed the private sector initiative to launch a new company under the name of the Arab Industrial Development Company based in Dammam.

He said this company was the brainchild of the Eastern Province Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Saudi businessmen and said its shares will soon be floated for public subscriptions.

Al-Zamil said the private sector has taken the initiative to establish the Saudi Industrial Exports Company in Riyadh and added that the company will start functioning next month. He said the company will be involved in marketing non-oil and non-petrochemical products such as carpets, cables and building materials. He predicted a good future for this company, unanimously accepted by Saudi businessmen.

Asked whether there were plans in the future for the establishment of new industrial cities in the Kingdom, al-Zamil said in addition to the two big industrial cities in Jubayl and Yanbu' there are five other complete and well-planned industrial estates in Riyadh, Jeddah, Damman, Qasim and Hufuf, and added that the Riyadh Industrial Estate alone has accommodated more than 300 factories so far.

Al-Zamil announced the construction of industrial cities in Medina, 'Asir and Jizan and said studies will be carried out for constructing more industrial cities in different parts of the Kingdom.

He noted the discovery of precious mineral resources like aluminum ore in a region between Qasim and Ha'il, phosphates in Turayf and iron ore at Wadi al-Sawawin which could lead to the establishment of basic industries once the necessary infrastructures were completed, including the construction of railways because it will be difficult to transport large amounts of minerals through ordinary transportation means.

He disclosed that SABIC [Saudi Basic Industries Corporation] is currently conducting a study on the exploitation of aluminum ore at Zubayrah in association with the Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ministry.

Asked about the latest developments of the Offset Economic Program and its future impact on the national economy and industrial development, al-Zamil said the Kingdom has benefited much from the defense purchases from abroad since the companies which get contracts from the Ministry of Defense and Aviation are obliged to establish advanced industrial and service projects in the Kingdom and thus these companies are investing part of their income inside the Kingdom.

Al-Zamil said licenses for four offset projects have been issued so far and added that beside their provision of
commodities necessary to the national economy, these projects will provide job opportunities for the citizens.

Concerning coordination between the GCC [Gulf Corporation Council] countries in the field of industry, al-Zamil noted the high turnout during the third business conference of the GCC which was held recently in Muscat due to the spirit of confidence which has developed among businessmen and described the conference as a channel for promoting coordination between industrialists.

Al-Zamil said there was coordination in most industrial fields during the formal meetings of the GCC industry ministries and noted the increase in the flow of GCC industrial products in the local markets.

He said Saudi industrial exports to the GCC countries last year were worth SR1.6 billion and that imports accounted for SR1.5 billion.

Al-Zamil noted the existence of about 60 joint Saudi-Gulf ventures in the Kingdom in which the Saudi side is paying 70 percent of the capital and the Gulf side 30 percent and called for the establishment of more joint ventures that will further bolster ties between GCC members.

Concerning future projects in the electricity sector, al-Zamil said the new plan has given priority to houses and industrial consumption and said 75 percent of the generated power in the Kingdom is consumed by the citizens and the remaining 25 percent by the industrial sector.

In the new plan, the state plans to provide electricity services to citizens all over the Kingdom.

In the new plan, the state plans to provide electricity services to citizens all over the Kingdom.

In the new plan, electricity will be supplied to about 500,000 more houses and installations, al-Zamil said and urged citizens to rationalize their power consumption, specially during the high season in summer when consumption rates go up.

Regarding the GCC integrated power grid, al-Zamil stressed the importance of the grid which will save fuel consumption and control emergency cut-offs and said studies on the project have already begun and are to be finalized within six months.

**Economic Prosperity Predicted**

44000182 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English 13 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Muhammad Ibrahim]

[Excerpts] Jeddah, Jan 12—Through the launching of its Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1990-95) and the announcement of its budget for 1990, Saudi Arabia will further consolidate its mammoth development leap during this decade and will achieve more prosperity and welfare for its citizens, Secretary-General of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry Dr 'Abdallah Sadiq Dahan told Arab News in an interview.

Spelling out his predictions about the budget and Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, recently announced by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd, Dr Dahan foresaw more economic stability and greater prospects of prosperity during the next 10 years. He said the new fiscal year is coming in the light of many signs indicating the ability of the Saudi economy for consistent expansion and growth.

He listed these indicators as:

- The rise of GDP [gross domestic product] from 1.9 percent in 1988 to 4.9 percent in 1989.
- The growth rate of 4.4 percent registered by the private sector last year against 2.8 percent in 1988.
- The growth rate of 11.3 percent and 10.4 percent respectively registered by the agricultural and industrial sectors.
- The remarkable improvement in the performance of commercial banks.
- The rise in the value of exports by 12 percent to reach more than SR108 billion.

"These achievements will undoubtedly give more impetus for the economy during the coming phase and will increase its chances for yet greater expansion and growth," Dr Dahan said.

According to him, the new budget is characterized by four areas of significant increase:

- Allocations for human resources have in

Overall, the new budget’s stipulations will help improve growth rates for all segments of the economy and will improve economic opportunities for all citizens. Dr Dahan predicted.

Looking at the economy's prospects in the next five years, Dr Dahan pointed to six trends:

- Regarding infrastructure and utilities, the half-decade will be “a period of reaping what has been sown during the past four five-year development plans.”
- The economy will enjoy greater stability, first, by a lessening of inflationary pressures, which have had an adverse effect on investment and productivity; second, by a firming of the exchange rate between the riyal and other major currencies, which will benefit the Kingdom’s cost-of-living rate.
- The economy will depend less heavily upon oil, thanks to a strong and diversified base for production and services. This diversity is seen in the new five-year development plan’s projected increase in the contribution of the non-oil sector from 38.5 percent in 1988-89 to 43.3 percent in 1994-95. Much of that projected increase will involve growth in the private sector.
- Major sectors of the economy will share in the expected growth, including an estimated 7.5 percent
for industry, a further 7 percent for agriculture, 8 percent for petrochemical industries, and 5.4 percent for oil-refining capacity.

- The Saudi work force will continue to grow, with a particularly noteworthy rise in the youth sector. The total of Saudis employed in the Kingdom is expected to reach 575,000 (men and women). That number includes 294,000 new jobs and the “Saudization” of 281,000 existing jobs. A total of SR141 billion is earmarked for the development of human resources in the new budget, representing 35 percent of the entire allocations.

- Finally, the atmosphere for the private sector will improve markedly. This is seen in such features of the new five-year plan as: the allocation of 3,000 major new projects to this sector—projects with a value of SR136 billion; a greater emphasis on cooperation between public and private sectors in all phases of the new plan; and the government’s promise to make available to the private sector the results of all national research studies having commercial and investment implications.

Rise in Industrial Exports Foreseen
44000182 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English
10 Jan 90 p 3

[Excerpts] Riyadh, Jan 1 (SPA)—The following is the full text of a press release issued here yesterday by the Planning Ministry on Saudi Arabia’s Fifth Development Plan (1990-95).

Major themes of the fifth plan

The Fifth Development Plan, along with its strategic principles, general objectives and methodology, is considered to be a continuous link in the series of the successive development plans, and extensions for their long-term objectives. The fifth plan has placed more emphasis on the following aspects:

Expansion of the government revenue base with the aim of increasing non-oil revenues.

Ensuring and maintaining stability of the national economy through the adoption of a stable methodology for annual government expenditures.

Consolidation of reliance of the national economy on the activities and available resources of the private sector through stimulating national capital for investment within the Kingdom.

Providing job opportunities for the Saudi work force.

Substitution of foreign imports with local imports, and effective penetration in the export markets through consolidating the competitiveness of national industries, and hence increasing the volume of exports and improving the position of the balance of payments.

Expansion and diversification of the economic base by means of exerting continuous efforts for increasing the contribution of producing sectors toward the national economy, along with the adoption of new initiatives which will pave the way for the private sector to effectively carry out its activities.

Placing more emphasis on the realization of balanced development in the Kingdom’s various regions.

Fifth plan elements:

General objectives

The Council of Ministers has identified, through its Resolution No 38 dates 21/3/1409 (Oct 23, 1988), 13 objectives for the Fifth Development Plan as indicated below:

To safeguard Islamic values, defend the faith and the nation.

To develop human resources and form a productive national work force.

To reduce dependence on the production and export of crude oil and to continue with real structural changes in the Kingdom’s economy, developed mineral resources along with the concentration on qualitative development process.

To continue with the encouragement of the private sector to participate in the development process.

To achieve balanced development in the Kingdom’s various regions and realize socio-economic integration among the GCC countries.

The fifth plan underscores its objective to direct all efforts toward consolidating the stability and positive growth of the economy, supporting its continuity and providing more stability for its self-capabilities in order to continue with its development particularly as the basic factors for its growth and prosperity have been secured such as: the completion of infrastructure, realization of tangible progress in the diversification of the national economic base, enhancing the capabilities of Saudi manpower, improvement of management efficiency at government agencies and the development of the private sector and enhancement of its advancement and efficiency.

Planning methodology and approach of the fifth plan

The fifth plan continues with the methodology of the fourth plan in terms of adopting “program-oriented approach” as a method that concentrates, regarding government expenditure planning, on the identification of priorities and shares rather than details commitments as per specified priorities. Furthermore, programs within this methodology represent a linking instrument between the development plan strategy and the annual budget, whereas each program comprises a specific expenditure level in each of the plan years, a matter which provides government agencies with ample flexibility in the selection of projects within the framework of each program’s
allocations with due consideration to the realization of balanced and consistent regional development.

Role of the private sector in the national economy during the fifth plan

The development objectives and strategies have placed more emphasis on improving the role of the private sector so that it can undertake a more effective part in the national economy through taking part in the process of developing the production, industrial, agricultural and mineral sectors as a policy that aims at intensified structural change in the national economy. The fifth plan also includes several measures that aim at supporting the private sector and consolidating its participation in the promotion of the various development sectors, it is considered to be the cornerstone for the realization of overall socioeconomic development. Thus, emphasis will mainly be placed, during the coming years, on developing policies necessary for encouraging the private sector to assume its role, realizing close cooperation between the public and private sectors in order to expand the incentive base for the private sector to provide it with opportunities for the establishment of new private organizations which will shoulder the responsibility for providing services of a higher standard, commensurate with the same quality of the services previously undertaken by the government.

The role of the private sector and the investment of its resources within the Kingdom is considered to be among the key issues during and beyond the fifth plan period. However, it is imperative to pave the way for this sector regarding investment fields, so that it can effectively make use of the available opportunities in the national economy and in the international export markets. Consequently, the fifth plan places more emphasis on ensuring an adequate atmosphere for consolidating and increasing economic activities through providing government policies, management regulations, financial incentives and data necessary for the encouragement of these investment activities in order to realize the fifth plan objectives which call for boosting the dependence of the national economy on the activities and resources of the private sector by stimulating national capital for investment within the Kingdom, along with introducing regulations and rules for financing some development programs and projects through private firms and establishments under government supervision and guarantee.

Volume of expenditure in civil sectors during the fifth plan

The volume of government expenditure necessary for the implementation of the fifth plan programs and projects is estimated at SR140 billion, of which SR149 billion has been allocated for civil expenditure.

Development agencies' expenditure will account for SR358 billion in addition to SR37 billion to be provided in loans by the specialized credit institutions. Thus, the volume of expenditure planned for the development agencies during the fifth plan period will become SR395 billion, of which SR140 billion has been allocated for human resources development (35.4 percent), SR73 billion for the economic resources sector (18.5 percent), SR116 billion for infrastructure (29.3 percent) and SR66 billion for the social and health services sector (16.8 percent).

The above structural distribution of expenditures reflects the priorities which should be emphasized during the fifth plan years, whereas the human resources sector has enjoyed top priority within the expenditures of the development agencies, followed by the economic resources development sector, then the social and health services sector.

Development sectors and supporting agencies

The development sectors comprise natural resources, producing sectors, human resources, social development and infrastructures. It is noteworthy that other agencies are not classified as development sectors, but served as support ones, such as services and some other agencies.

The following is a summary of the objectives of the development and support sectors, planned targets to be realized as well as the volume of expected expenditure.

Natural resources include water, energy (oil, gas and solar energy).

Main objectives of natural resources sector

To meet the present and future water needs of society.

Development and conservation of all water resources and rationalization of consumption.

To conserve and manage hydrocarbon resources for the maximum long-term benefit of the Kingdom taking into consideration the matter of environmental protection.

To establish integrated oil industry and diversify oil product export outlets.

Development of solar energy as an alternative source of energy in the Kingdom.

Investigation and exploration of the Kingdom's prospective mineral resources.

To continue exploration of promising mineral deposits and evaluate the feasibility of exploitation.

To encourage both the private and public sectors to exploit mineral resources.

Quantitative objectives of natural resources

To increase water production and electric power generation capacity of desalination plants by one million cubic meters a day and 560 megawatts respectively to a total output of three million cubic meters a day of water and 3,517 megawatts of electricity by 1994-95.

Implementation and expansion of 300 water projects, of various sizes, in cities and villages, and drilling of 450
water wells, deepening and repairing of 100 wells, construction of 49 dams, and supply and installation of 350 water pumping units in various regions of the Kingdom.

To increase the production and distribution of gas, and develop refineries' capacity to match demand for oil products.

Development of local distribution network of oil products to meet efficiency and public safety requirements and expansion of pipeline network by 334 kms/year.

To increase the storage capacity of oil products from 21 million barrels to 29 million barrels by the end of the plan period, and implementation of seven new solar energy research projects.

To continue geological mapping and survey activities for civil and hydrogeological engineering and conduct geohazard studies.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>(SR billion)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Water</td>
<td>22,193</td>
<td>90.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>24,513</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identification of 50 prospects for precious and basic metals, five prospects for exploring of industrial metals.


Planned government expenditure in natural resources sector

Production sectors

Non-oil producing sectors include agriculture, industry, electricity, construction and the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu.

Main objectives of producing sectors:

To increase agricultural production at a reasonable rate, while maintaining cost effectiveness and proper utilization of water resources.

1. Ministry of Agriculture and Water (water affairs)—Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC), al-Ahsa' Irrigation and Drainage Authority (HIDA).


3. Deputy minister for mineral resources.

To enhance the effective contribution to the growth and diversification of the Saudi economy and to reduce dependence on the production and export of crude oil as the main source of national income.

To support and maximize the industrialization process which depends on local raw materials specially oil products and petrochemicals.

To encourage import substitution and export-oriented industries with comparative advantages.

To provide reliable electricity service to all population centers.

To encourage energy conservation and rationalize use of electricity.

To improve efficiency and productivity in the electricity sector.

To encourage and support the Saudi construction industry.

To increase the capabilities of Saudi contractors, providing them with opportunities by the adoption of the “thirty percent rule”, whereby at least 30 percent of construction value of government contracts must be awarded to Saudi construction firms.

Road Construction Plans Described

44000182 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English
21 Jan 90 p 3

[Excerpts] Riyadh, Jan 20 (SPA)—The Kingdom has so far constructed 116,511 kilometers of asphalted and agricultural roads at a cost of SR110 billion, says Communications Minister Husayn Mansuri. “The government has allocated SR2.69 billion this year for road projects and SR70 million for railways,” he added.

Talking to Saudi Arabian Television Channel I last night, Mansuri said the road projects implemented include 2,757 kms of expressways. He said the ministry has signed contract with a company recently to complete the Riyadh-al-Ta'if expressway. “The company will start work on the project soon,” he added.

He said during the current Fifth Five-Year Development Plan the ministry plans to construct 430 kms of expressways, 2,572 kms of service roads and 2,500 kms of agricultural roads. “We will also undertake the maintenance of 32,400 kms of existing roads during the next five years,” the minister added.

The new national budget has earmarked SR433 million for ordinary road maintenance, SR310 million for road protection and SR44 million for the maintenance of railways.

Mansuri said the number of Saudi contractors involved in road construction works has increased to 90. “We have now 15 Saudi consulting offices specialized in
designing roads and about 200 qualified Saudi engineers," he said. The ministry plans to provide training to 779 engineers during the current five-year plan.

The minister commended the rapid strides made by the communications sector during the last two decades. Before 1985 there were only 8,500 kms of asphalted roads and 3,500 kms of farm roads. Each five-year plan increased the length of roads and during the third plan a record 36,649 kms of roads were constructed.

He said the ring road around Riyadh will be completed this year. “Other projects planned this year include the completion of Mecca road in Riyadh, linking of al-Ahsa’ and Baqaaq regions as well as the newly constructed King Fahd international Airport with Riyadh-Dammam expressway.

A number of vital projects including ring roads in Mecca, Medina and Buraydah, dual carriage roads in Qasim and road networks in ‘Asir, Jizan, Najran and al-Bahah he added.

Mansuri stressed the important role being played by the country's state-of-the-art communications network in the economic development. Roads and highways have facilitated transportation of construction materials, raw materials and industrial and agricultural products.

Saudi Arabia achieved substantial economic growth last year as the country's non-oil Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased by 4.6 percent. The agricultural sector registered a growth rate of 11.3 percent while the industrial sector 10.4 percent, the minister pointed out.

He noted the difficulties faced by the ministry in constructing roads and highways across the Sarawat, ‘Asir and al-Ta’if mountains. In the ‘Asir region alone the ministry had to construct 115 bridges and 34 tunnels in its bid to link the region with other parts of the Kingdom at an estimated cost of SR1.34 billion.

He described the communication facilities as the country's major investment. “They are constructed after a lot of studies and research, spending a large amount of money and using the most modern technology,” he added.

Mansuri said his ministry will continue its efforts to improve technical standard of construction works, to replace single lane roads with dual roads and boost scientific research.

Speaking on transportation services, he said the ministry will try to improve the standard of city and inter-city bus service as well as bus services to neighboring countries.

He attributed the crowd of vehicles on the roads and traffic points in Riyadh and other major cities to the increasing number of cars owned by Saudi families. However, he said, studies are under way to reduce traffic along Khalij flyover in the capital. He suggested using public transport as the best way to reduce the traffic.

**TUNISIA**

Trade Ministers Discuss Investment Potential
900A0303A Tunis REALITES in French
2-8 Feb 90 pp 19-20

[Interviews with Moroccan and British ministers conducted by special correspondent to London Taieb Zahar, dates and places not specified: “Collaboration and Openness to the Outside World”; first paragraph is editor’s lead]

[Text] Conferences and meetings were held last week in London between Tunisian and English officials and businessmen. At the close of these work sessions, Mr. Moncef Belaid [Tunisian minister of the economy] answered questions put to him by Taieb Zahar. The minister explains below Tunisia’s willingness to open itself up to outside markets and categorically rejects the notion that our government favors cooperation with some countries over others.

[REALITES] What were the principal lessons you gained from these meetings between British and Tunisians?

[Belaid] The meeting gave us an opportunity to increase knowledge about the new Tunisia, its economic options, its openness to the outside world, and our desire to develop a partnership that can lead to more investments, more jobs, more creation of wealth and, most important, more exports.

We are seeking technology. Well, we know the English are important both in industry and tourism, as well as services. We are collaborating right now with the British in the oil industry. It is British Gas that is developing one of the biggest projects off the coast of Gabes.

[REALITES] You are referring to the Miskar deposit?

[Belaid] Yes. The deposit has been identified. It can be developed. Starting this year, we are drilling the first development well. A final evaluation well will be drilled in the coming months and will clinch development options.

[REALITES] There is talk of 23 billion cubic meters....

[Belaid] The 23 billion are what we call sure reserves. Probable reserves are on the order of 30 billion cubic meters.

We very honestly believe we can attain that figure, based on estimates and studies available to us. Therefore, there is in my view, a lot of spadework to be done with the British. There are findings on which we must base [our plans], in the not-too-distant future.

Initial British operations, such as Lee Cooper, Unilaver, etc., have already been quite successful.

[REALITES] Your British counterpart spoke of two-percent trade between the two countries in 1989. How do you intend to further develop these exchanges?
[Belaid] We think we can develop exchanges through a partnership and joint enterprises. If we take the case of Belgium, where our volume is much higher, we see it is largely due to the 100 Belgian or Tunisian-Belgian companies established in Tunisia.

We proposed to the English to work together, produce together, and increase wealth and exchanges. It is natural that we would develop exchanges with those who have more confidence in Tunisia and our country's potential. I think our British friends got the message and we felt it was possible to work together and develop our exchanges along that line.

[REALITES] Rightly or wrongly, the British think Tunisia favors cooperation with France. What do you have to say to that?

[Belaid] First of all, it is the English who think so. We don't think so at all. Tunisia has no a priori conditions for collaboration with those ready to collaborate with it. It is even ready to educate those who do not know about either our economic options or our openness to the outside world. It is not a superficial task—we must convince, take the necessary time to affect decision-makers, reach out to them so they can mull over, with us, possibilities in Tunisia.

[REALITES] You, therefore, refute the idea that cooperation with France is favored?

[Belaid] There are figures to refute it and there is a state of mind. With respect to the figures, our trade with France accounts for 22 to 23 percent, while exchanges with the EEC represent 70 percent. It is thus a real figure, with all the significance that implies.

The state of mind of Tunisians in general is one of openness to the outside world, without any predispositions. We are very ready to work with our British friends. The creation of new commercial exchanges, the development of new or existing English-speaking institutions in Tunisia, Tunisian students sent to study in Great Britain: all are arguments we could make to those who think Tunisia favors one partner at the expense of another.

[REALITES] Can we reach trade of five percent in 1992?

[Belaid] Multiplying the current figure by 2.5 is ambitious. We must work to be able to move ahead. Even retaining the idea that commercial exchanges will be developed through investment, two years seems too short a timeframe to me. But we must work, step up the number of contacts. What I can tell you is that Tunisian exports have surged in less than two years.

Between the last trade week in March 1988 and today, the leap has been considerable. Furthermore, we are encouraging our companies to continue on the same track, to not believe that the English market is terribly difficult.

Terms To Increase the Share of the Tunisian Market

Lord Trefgarne, British trade minister, replies below to REALITES's questions. He says the British Government is willing to develop trade with Tunisia.

[REALITES] Mr. Minister, you have just met with your Tunisian counterpart. What conclusions do you draw from this encounter?

[Trefgarne] The visit allowed us to study our trade potential and the relations between Tunisia and the United Kingdom. We discussed the possibility of stepping up exchanges in both directions, but especially from the United Kingdom to Tunisia.

Last year, exports from Tunisia to the United Kingdom increased about 143 percent. In that sense, I would like to increase the volume of exports from the United Kingdom to Tunisia.

Of course, Tunisia makes its purchases based on free and equal competition. Thus, if we are going to step up this trade to Tunisia, we will have to make sure that companies' offers are made at very competitive prices.

The government also has a role to play. First of all, through the activities of our mission in Tunisia, which can inform British exporters of opportunities in the Tunisian market, and secondly through the ATB [expansion unknown].

It is a way of offering preferential financing to products that interest Tunisian buyers. We cannot use the ATB provision in all sectors, but we can certainly do so where there is a clear-cut interest affecting development.

Finally, thirdly, the government can back our exporters' efforts through the CGD's (export insurance) support in facilitating bank financing. All these measures to ease exporting are put in effect to help British exporters increase their share of the Tunisian market.

[REALITES] How do you explain, Mr. Minister, the low figure of two-percent trade between Tunisia and Great Britain? Do English companies lack aggressiveness, or do you feel the Tunisian market is closed?

[Trefgarne] The two percent I mentioned represents the current percentage of the Tunisian market captured by British exporters. I think that percentage is too low. The reasons for it are not simple. One of the reasons is that, in the past, Tunisia did not trade as much with the United Kingdom as it did with other European countries. But I am sure now that Tunisian buyers are going to look a little further than in the past, and I can assure you that British exporters will not take long to react.

I would like to stress that exports go hand in hand with investment. The United Kingdom has already invested heavily in Tunisia and I think investment will grow. We now have an accord to promote and protect investment in Tunisia, signed last year by my predecessor.
That improved the climate, which was already favorable to investment in Tunisia. This year, in May, there will be an exhibition on Great Britain in Tunisia. I hope it will help still more to encourage trade and investment in both directions.

Finally, I would like to mention the new flight between London and Tunis, offered by G.B Airways, and which is doing very well.

UGTT Official Affirms Proper Worker Representation
900A02794 Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE
in French 20 Jan 90 p 5

[LA PRESSE interviews Ismail Sahbani, UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] general secretary; first two paragraphs are LA PRESSE lead]

[Text] Positive social dynamics defines the current phase.

An appeal for the democratization of business reflects the country’s democratic process.

[LA PRESSE] You recently met with the prime minister, together with Moncer Rouissi, minister of social affairs, and Hedi Jilani, the UTICA [Tunisian Union for Industry, Commerce and Cottage Industries] president. What were the main issues discussed during that meeting?

[Sahbani] To begin with, we should recall that the latest speech of the president of the republic gave a new impetus to the process of social negotiations, particularly in the matter of wage policy.

We used this speech during the meeting as the basis for studying the opening of negotiations and, above all, revising sectoral agreements. Thus, the UGTT expressed the views of both the workers and the Administrative Commission and the Expanded Executive Bureau, namely, that the latest increases of the SMIG [Guaranteed Minimum Interoccupational Wage] and the SMAG [Guaranteed Minimum Agricultural Wage] announced by the president of the republic are the basis for opening the negotiations.

Negotiations are moving forward and there will be other meetings with the prime minister. To that end, Hamed Karoui—who will also meet with the UTICA Executive Bureau—will meet with the UGTT Executive Bureau at the end of next week, in order to study the ways and means of the collective agreements negotiations.

[LA PRESSE] Precisely, what is the status of the negotiations that were announced some time ago?

[Sahbani] It should be specified that several issues are being discussed: the revision of collective (some 40) and sectoral agreements and the promulgation of statutes.

Negotiations have already been successful in various sectors, namely the PTT [Postal and Telecommunications Administration], bakeries and flour mills. Agreements have been signed in the tourism, food, construction, lightering, handling (and negotiations are moving forward at the sectoral agreement level), air controllers and health sectors. Results of the negotiations pertaining to the financial sector will be announced on Tuesday, 23 January. At the STEG [expansion unknown] level, negotiations for the promulgation of statutes are proceeding. As for the RTT [Tunisian Radio and Television] statute, it will be published in the very near future.

In short, a positive social dynamics defines the current phase after a four-year freeze.

Moreover, we hope that negotiations concerning sectoral agreements will soon begin, and suitable solutions will be found, the more so as President Ben Ali is very sensitive to the workers’ problems and, generally speaking, the government has expressed its understanding and inclinations.

As for us, we want to reiterate our will to defend, as full partners, both the country’s and the workers’ interests.

[LA PRESSE] As a full partner in the recovery and, in particular, in the economic restructuring now being experienced by the country, have you adapted your work methods to this new data?

[Sahbani] We have always known how to adapt ourselves to all the new situations. The UGTT distinguishes itself by its capacity to adapt. We have no doctrine concerning privatization, but we remain against privatization stemming from an ideological imperative. We are against privatization for privatization’s sake, that is our principle. However, the Trade Union Federation is sensitive to the situation of private business that is experiencing difficulties and the aim of our participation is to seek solutions needed for the interest of all parties.

[LA PRESSE] In this context, how can economic efficiency and the defense of the workers’ interest be reconciled?

[Sahbani] We believe that there is no contradiction between the two needs; on the contrary, we strengthen everything that is likely to give new impetus to the development of the national economy, for the defense and guarantee of the workers’ rights contribute to better production and improved productivity, and, therefore, to the achievement of efficiency.

In this context, in order to reflect the democratic process being experienced by the country, I call for the democratization of life within the enterprise. The efficient participation of the workers in decision making and management, in short, in the life of the enterprise, is a rallying factor likely to give positive results. The opposite is also true. In other words, it is a question of establishing new ties among the various players.
[LA PRESSE] What is the Trade Union Federation’s attitude toward the plan to reform the Labor Code?

[Sahbanj] We shall submit our proposals when we will be confronted by this problem.

[LA PRESSE] You are a signing member of the National Pact. You also participated in the last meeting of the Higher Pact Council. What is the UGTT’s contribution to such a structure?

[Sahbanj] We subscribed to the National Pact because its content fulfills the people’s aspirations, and the principles that our Federation has always demanded and defended for which trade unionists have often paid a heavy price.

As for the 9 January meeting of the Pact Council, the members of the Expanded Executive Bureau had unanimously decided on 8 January to participate in the meeting, so convinced are they of the role played by the Federation—on both a social and political level—in the strengthening of the democratic process.

The UGTT participation will be effective, the more so as we are the country’s largest social organization and as we have always played an important role in the upholding of social and political stability.

Based on the principle that there is no development without democracy, we are, therefore, insisting on the necessity to confer on the National Pact a social dimension calculated to give it a public foundation.

PUP Hosts Discussion of Electoral System

900A0287A Tunis REALITES in French
12-18 Jan 90 p 21

[Article by Chokri Gharbi: “Which Electoral System Should We Pick?”; first paragraph is REALITES sub-head.]

[Text] Which electoral system is best suited to a country like Tunisia that aspires to pluralism and democracy? The People’s Unity Party organized a roundtable discussion on the subject.

The People’s Unity Party (PUP) believes that the current electoral code does not encourage real democratic debate and that it should be amended to allow for greater pluralism. It is making its participation in the next municipal elections conditional on such an amendment.

But which electoral system is best suited to a Third World country like Tunisia?

In an attempt to answer that question, on 6 January 1990 the PUP organized a roundtable discussion on electoral systems with the participation of Abdelfattah Amor, a professor of the College of Legal and Political Sciences, and Naceur Ben Ameur, a lawyer and PUP member.

Mohamed Belhaj Amor opened by recalling that the current electoral code “does not reflect the image of people with its various sensitivities. It should provide more guarantees before, during, and after elections.”

Abdelfattah Amor spoke next describing the various electoral systems.

A majority vote with one or more rounds of elections allows an independent candidate (or a list) to be elected if he (or it) receives the absolute majority of votes. This type of election is applicable for presidential, legislative, and municipal elections.

In the opinion of A. Amor, when independent candidates are involved, this system does not strengthen the political importance of the parties. It allows for debate among individuals and not among party programs and positions.

In addition, a broadening of the voter pool can squeeze out small parties, to the extent that it gives the most highly structured parties a chance to assert themselves.

Many Small Parties

A. Amor went on to talk about proportional representation. Under this system, a quarter of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies would go to the lists or parties that received a quarter of the vote. This election method (with closed lists) only applies to legislative and municipal elections, not to presidential elections.

Full proportional representation consists of dividing the number of votes by the number of seats. A party cannot be represented unless it has received at least the number of votes necessary for one seat. For example, if there were 25,000 votes per seat, a party that received 70,000 votes would get two seats, with 20,000 votes left over.

Near proportional representation resembles full proportional representation, except that the leftover votes are accounted for. The party with the greatest number of leftover votes takes one seat, and so forth in descending order.

According to A. Amor, proportional representation encourages pluralism. It can even lead to many small parties, especially in the case of full proportional representation. This electoral system is applicable when there is no consensus on a country’s fundamental problems, as in the Scandinavian countries. In other countries, this type of system can have disastrous consequences.

In his contribution, Naceur Ben Ameur emphasized the need to protect the rights of free and direct elections and secret balloting guaranteed by the constitution.

The electoral code has several shortcomings that have damaged election credibility. On 25 July 1988, the president spoke of certain excesses in the 2 April elections. The Committee of Appeal also noted certain irregularities in ballot counting. However, the real figures do not change the announced results in any way. “That does not mean that the people who tampered with the results cannot be penalized,” Mr. Ben Ameur said.
"Tunisian law is distinguished by the presence of legislation protecting the government and the absence of repressive legislation."

He went on to talk about the Committee of Appeal for legislative elections, which is made up of the chairman of the Constitutional Council, the presiding judge of the Court of Cassation, and the presiding judge of the Administrative Tribunal.

On the other hand, the members of the Committee of Appeal for municipal elections are appointed by the minister of justice on the advice of the governor, who generally belongs to a specific party. It was suggested that this committee should be constituted in the same way as the one for legislative elections.

Several PUP members spoke during the course of the discussion.

"Is the current electoral system in tune with the democratic process we want to institute in Tunisia?" one speaker asked.

Some maintained that voting for candidates from different parties instead of from a set party list contradicted the constitutional stipulation of secret balloting.

Lastly, it was suggested that elections should not be linked to the citizen's right to a political, private, professional, and family life.

**Transition Period**

Taking the floor again, Abdelfattah Amor emphasized that current laws are not at odds with the economic and political situation. He then retraced the history of the electoral code.

"It is true that, for a certain period of time, in order to encourage national unity, the electoral system was used to favor the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party], which had more influence than the other parties. Moreover, women were not granted the right to vote until 1957."

The question remains of whether the discourse of the elite can satisfy the aspirations of the people.

Mr. Belhaj Amor agreed that individual behavior must be changed. "This requires maturity and a new collective awareness," he concluded.
INDIA

Failure of Democracy Said Fueling Kashmiri Rage
90010138A New Delhi NAVBHRAT TIMES
in Hindi 22 Dec 89 p 5

[Analysis of the Kashmir situation by Bal Mukund.]

[Text] In the state, in which “Down With India” slogans were raised following the release of five extremists in the Dr. Rubya Sayeed case and where an attempt was made to celebrate Victory Day, in that state 20-22 years ago, the Congress Party candidates were elected unopposed. There is a very deep connection between these two events and, to understand this, one will have to get rid of the prejudice which, during the last few years, has been prepared by the information media and government statements in the rest of India.

In the 1967 general elections in the state two Congress candidates were elected unopposed, three candidates won with a majority, and one candidate came second by only a slight margin. Had the state residents been traitors, how could the Congress have received so much respect and support? It was not as though the voters in that election remained confined to their homes. Over 50 percent cast their votes in the parliamentary constituencies in which voting took place.

This means that violence has flourished during these two decades. If this is so, there can be three reasons for it. Firstly, it may be that during these 22 years, there has grown a generation which is born only to oppose India. They are born and without any reason they begin their hostility to that country where they are born. The second reason may be that, during these years, foreign elements have been successful in their propaganda in the state. They continued their nefarious activities and we watched unconcerned. Finally, there came a situation when a class began to celebrate Victory Day over events which brought India humiliation. And the third reason may be that the people that the public of that state elected with great hopes, those people misbehaved in such a manner that, in opposition, extremist tendencies began to emerge and gather force.

The person who was shown on the television remarking that “the Indians have made us into a colony” was not pretending. He has been meted out that treatment. The people, who meted out that treatment, are the same people, who, sitting in the center, ruled over that state’s public in the name of India. This is not an exaggeration, but the truth. If you consider the results of the general elections from 1967 to 1989, you will discover that gradually the people began to throw out of the state, like an evil, that very party which had got five out of six seats in the state, two of them unopposed. And by and by, this opposition became so vehement that they began to oppose every such authority in which they saw this party.

Consider the results of a few election constituencies. In Anantnag of Jammu and Kashmir, 95 percent of the people are Muslims. When in 1967 the Congress nominated its candidate in this area, no one even came forward to oppose. In 1971, an independent candidate stood in opposition, but the Congress candidate won with a majority of over 60 percent. Also, in the 1977 elections the Congress candidate was the victor, but he received only 32 percent of the votes. The number of independent candidates in opposition went up. In the 1980 elections, the National Conference won, and in the 1989 elections the situation is that the Congress can not field its candidate here. Now it has become the National Conference’s camp follower. The candidate who came second has received only 186 votes. In other words, the Congress votes in the area dissipated gradually, but the people feel no opposition to the National Conference.

Anti-India slogans were raised in Srinagar. There, over 90 percent of the population is Muslim. Therefore if any one raised his head there, the rest of India is given to understand that he is anti-Indian. This is what has been done so far. The people comprehend it very easily. In 1967, the Congress got 39.5 percent of the votes in this very area. In that election, this was the only seat where the Congress had to suffer defeat. But the victorious National Conference got only 46.8 percent of the votes, which means only 6.3 percent more than the Congress. What happened, after all, that since 1977 the Congress candidates simply ceased to contest. The party that came second in 1967 and which was ruling the state from the center, disguised itself and began supporting an independent candidate. In the meanwhile, the National Conference kept marching from strength to strength. This time it has won unopposed. In 1980 also, it won that seat without any opposition.

In areas like Anantnag and Srinagar, the Congress used to function as the saviour of Muslims. With the rise of the National Conference it has not merely lost power, it has been virtually wiped out. In Jammu and Udhampur, it used to play the role of the representative of the Hindus. Now consider the results here.

In Udhampur 20 percent of the people are Muslims. The rest are Hindus. In 1967, the Congress got 54.9 percent of the votes here and the National Conference received 13.4 percent. In this very constituency, in 1980, the Congress (S) polled 53.4 percent of the votes but the National Congress votes rose to 36.6 percent. This time too, the Congress has managed to snatch this seat but it has obtained only 16 percent of the votes. The votes polled by other parties shows that the majority of the voters are against the Congress.

Can it be maintained that, during these six years, there is no connection between the plummeting popularity of the Congress in the general elections and the raging resentment against the center? Can it be maintained that the ruling party and the elected party are not at all to blame for this?

We will have to consider all these developments in the context of other events around us. The local public has
been electing, with renewed vigor, the people whom the Center has been branding extremists and traitors. There has been heavy polling in the Punjab. It cannot be said that here the people remained within four walls, cowed down by fear. But the people elected and returned those who had been described as extremists or pro extremists. In this connection, keep in mind the Mizö movement and the Assam movement. All the leadership here had once been branded extremists and traitors.

While Dr. Farooq Abdullah was opposed to the Congress, he was a traitor. His government was dismissed even though the National Conference was in majority. When in 1987 the National Conference and the Congress came together, he was pronounced to be patriotic and clean. When this kind of treatment is meted out at the leaders’ level, it becomes a topic of discussion. But when this kind of treatment is meted out to the people, they suffer in silence. Their rage keeps accumulating and then bursts like a flood. Both the people and the local leadership of the valley have seen through the game of deception that the Congress had been playing there. In reply, they have out-HEROed Herod. The violence raging in the valley is its very manifestation.

Given control over the communication media, it is very easy to instill in the minds of the rest of India that “Muslims are in the majority there. They are traitors.” Or that “There, the Sikhs are a majority. They are traitors.” There are many such regions in the country, where the national flag has been mutilated and copies of the Constitution burned. But they are not considered traitors.

By watching a few residents of Srinagar dancing on the television, it would be partisan to draw the hasty conclusion that they are traitors. And to jump in the fray with deadly weapons, in order to correct the situation, would be to accept the prejudice, which has been sought to be instilled into the minds of the rest of India. Acute understanding is needed to distinguish to what degree it is the country that is being opposed and to what degree the opposition is directed against the party, which has been a symbol of the country’s power. Which has been changing the definition of nationalism to suit its convenience? And why has this kind of opposition now become so prominent?

It is not to say that anti-national sentiments were never present in Kashmir, Punjab, Mizoram or the adjoining states and that it is not present now. There has been tremendous intrusion from the neighboring countries into these regions, and the minds of the people have been influenced by their propaganda. But even today, the situation in the Kashmir valley is not what has been depicted. We should learn to distinguish between the propaganda of intruding powers and the resentment of our own people. This distinction is possible only if we recognize that in 1967 we had a golden opportunity in our hands.

But the political party which was entrusted with power misused that power in such a manner that it resulted in violent opposition. While foreign intruders were preparing the grounds for their propaganda, the ruling party was hatching schemes to nip in the bud the other political forces emerging in the valley. The forces which were forcibly put down have now become a springboard for foreign conspiracies. It is the foreign intrusion that should be dealt with. But as for the anger and the hatred found in the valley, they need to be examined with great patience and an open mind.

Indian Drug Accord; Areas of Cooperation Noted
90EF0242Y Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French 1 Jan 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Jacques David: “India and Mauritius Sign an Agreement; The Two Countries Pledge To Join Efforts in Their Fight Against Drugs”]

[Text] The Mauritian and Indian Governments signed an important agreement during the prime minister’s current visit to India. It involves cooperation between the two capitals in the area of combatting drugs and expresses their determination to “put a stop to this scourge.” We know that the Bombay-Plaisance axis is one of the links in the long drug-trafficking chain—especially since publication of the Miranda affair, which was in the news so much in 1985 and 1986—and that people are still talking about this Indian-Mauritian route in the context of international drug cartels.

Moreover, a number of Indian citizens have been arrested upon their arrival in Mauritius and a few have been sentenced to death.

The Indian-Mauritian agreement was signed by Bhimod Bacha, secretary of internal affairs, for Mauritius and by the head of economic and political relations for India, in the presence of Mauritian Prime Minister Sir Anerood Jugnauth and Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh. This cooperation agreement basically provides for stepping up efforts to curb drug trafficking in the two countries. In the Indian capital, it was pointed out that a rapid and effective exchange of information would take place between the two countries to control the entry and trafficking of drugs. A joint “antenna” will be created between the Narcotics Control Bureau and the National Narcotics Agency in India for more effective collaboration.

India and Mauritius expressed their concern over the extent of the drug problem internationally and the need for concerted and effective action. India, for its part, expressed its appreciation for “the excellent work done in Mauritius thanks to the determination of the prime minister.” This agreement also includes provisions for training programs and programs to exchange personnel working in the field of drugs.
For Better Use of Credit Lines

Prime Minister Sir A. Jumauth held talks with Finance Minister M. Dhan Dennata, Foreign Affairs Minister Gijral, Commerce Minister Arun Nehree, and the state minister of science and technology.

As regards economic relations, the discussions centered around better use of credit lines granted by the Indian Government. Measures will be agreed on to promote Indian tourism in Mauritius.

The talks also covered measures to be adopted for a better trade balance.

Commerce Minister Arun Nehree said that joint ventures should help in this effort.

To improve cooperation in the fields of science and technology, India is in favor of technical aid to the sectors of telecommunications and the environment, especially to meet Mauritius' training needs. An Indian mission will help define these needs in the priority sectors.

Giving New Impetus to Indian Investment in Mauritius

A working meeting to discuss new investment efforts was held in New Delhi at the initiative of the Indian Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

This meeting with entrepreneurs and major industrial groups provided an opportunity to raise problems encountered in promoting joint ventures in Mauritius.

The prime minister referred to tax and other advantages offered and potential investors raised very pertinent issues related to inflation, wage levels, and existing infrastructure.

The sectors of interest are textiles, deep-sea fishing, electronics, data processing, and engineering.

The investors present unanimously agreed that Mauritius' economic performance had been miraculous, an example of good management for developing economies. They called the prime minister an "economic Messiah," who showed the world that a small country could succeed.

India today is an industrial power that has made a name for itself internationally in fields as sophisticated as data processing and electronics. India would like to transfer technology to Mauritius, which offers the guarantee of a European market interested in products manufactured in Mauritius.

Several investment promotion missions have already taken place. A group of potential investors is expected in Mauritius at the end of March.

An Indian commercial fair is scheduled for August 1990. A meeting of the Joint Business Council is to be held in New Delhi in the near future, and it will be attended by Mauritian and Indian businessmen.

Reservation Policy: Review Urged

90OI0127A New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi
12 Dec 89 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text] The Janata Dal leaders had clarified their policy regarding scheduled castes and backward castes even before the elections, and both groups supporting the Janata Dal Government—the Bhartiye Janata Party and the Socialist parties—do not object to this policy. Therefore, the central government will introduce, in the parliamentary session beginning 18 Dec, a bill extending reservations by another 10 years. The Congress also cannot have any disagreement with this bill. Therefore it can be expected to sail through without any problem. The term of reservations is due to expire in January, therefore the bill will have to be passed in this very session. That is why this matter cannot brook any long deliberations or neglect. During his Rajasthan visit, Deputy Prime Minister Devi Lal has suggested a few changes in the reservation policy. According to him, the benefits of reservations are becoming limited to a few families. The scheduled caste and backward caste societies on the whole are not deriving any benefits from it. Therefore the reservation policy can be amended to see that only one member of a family receives the benefit of reservations. Devi Lal's suggestion has nothing to do with making reservations widely available because often reserved vacancies do not get filled, on the basis of the contention that qualified candidates are not available. And if there is objection to government jobs becoming limited to a few families, why is this objection only regarding scheduled castes and backward castes? Leaving aside all other sectors, notice the manner in which dynasties has flourished in the parties and sectors of politics, but why has no restriction been placed on this? It may be said that this is a personal suggestion from Chaudhry Devi Lal, and the opinion of the central cabinet is not likely to be much swayed by it. There is so little time left now that it is not possible to have any worthwhile reconsideration of the reservation policy.

In Northern and Western India, significant opposition to the reservation policy has grown. In Gujarat, there was a large scale movement against reservations. This movement is emerging in Madhya Pradesh also and now, in Allahabad, believing extension of reservations to be imminent, its opponents have expressed their opposition by surrounding Rajmohan Gandhi and blocking his way. Opponents of reservations have always contended that merit instead of reservation should be the yard stick in education and government jobs. But the fact is that informally a sort of undeclared high caste reservation system has prevailed every where from educational institutions to government departments. During the last 100-150 years, education and administration have been
organized on the European principles of merit, and the high castes are dominant everywhere in the administration. Due to this dominance, candidates from these castes have been getting an advantage, and even if there is no overt discrimination, high castes are expanding into all sectors of power. This is why leaders like Kan-shiram have started saying that they do not want reservations for themselves. The reservation policy should be extended to all castes, and seats should be reserved in proportion to their numbers in the population. If this is really done, there will be a widespread change in the caste ratio in today's administration. Anti-reservation sentiment is raging among the high caste youth because expansion in job opportunities has ground to a halt. The country's administrative system has grown as much as it can and now there is no more room for its expansion. As a result, the sons and daughters of government employees find their future dark because they do not possess any outstanding qualifications for other professions. When they find that, out of the few jobs open, a few are given to the protected classes in order to fulfill reservation quotas, their disappointment takes the form of casteist anger.

It is not as though the reservation policy has done any great good to the scheduled castes and backward castes. What bigger proof of the failure of this policy can there be than the fact that, even after four decades, reservation quotas do not appear to be achieved anywhere, and everywhere one hears that there is a shortage of qualified candidates for the vacant places. This means that whatever was supposed to have been done to end the weakness in those classes as the result of 100-150 years has not been accomplished. In fact, there has been retrogression. Untill 50 years ago, one could find some bits of cultivable land in the hands of these classes. Whatever the declared objectives of our land reforms, their result has been that the depressed-class share croppers lost their lands and those with a little land were forced to sell their land, either because of economic compulsions or due to casteist pressures. Overall, their position has only weakened even though, as a result of the expansion of markets, they may well have more money.

The greatest damage caused by the reservation policy has been in debilitating the self-respect of these castes. It is not known how the makers and enforcers of these policies came to believe that these castes had been depressed for hundreds of years. This baseless and absurd notion produced, among the castes, a permanent feeling of inferiority. In the earlier casteist society, notwithstanding slight economic and social inequalities, an attempt was made to provide them with broad equality by linking all castes to various saints and their families. Now the talk is of economic and social equality, but psychologically they are being rendered inferior. The most revealing instance of this is the recent movement of Kevartos of Orissa, which they launched against being branded scheduled castes. They said why should they accept casteist inferiority for the sake of a handful of government jobs. These aspects of reservation must be studied. Instead of spreading inferiority, this should be used to make the administration representative of all castes.

IRAN

Value of Non-Oil Exports Up 41 Percent
90OJ0172C London KEYHAN in Persian 1 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] In the first seven months of this year (1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990]), the Islamic Republic exported a total of about 184,357 tons of goods and agricultural products to other countries and has deposited 20,222 million rials in its treasury. A comparison between the amount and value of these exports this year and a similar period in 1367 [21 March 1988-20 March 1989] indicates an eight-percent decrease in weight and 41-percent increase in value.

According to statistics published by the center for the development of exports of the Ministry of Commerce, Iranian merchants and exporters have sent about 3,030 tons of caraway seeds to the world markets in the seven months from Farvardin [21 March-20 April] to Mehr [23 September-22 October], which indicates an increase of about 151 percent compared to the value of this exported item in the previous year. Among other exported agricultural products during the period in question, the export of fruits and fresh vegetables during the first seven months of this year is 1,126 million rials. The amount and value of the fruits and fresh vegetables exported from the country during the first seven months of 1367 [21 March-22 October 1988] amounted to about 74,000 tons and 623 million rials, respectively.

The reports of the center for the development of exports of the Ministry of Commerce state that in the first seven months of this year, the value of pistachio nuts, shelled pistachio nuts, and raisins exported from the country increased significantly and, on the other hand, the export of dates, dried fruits, and apricots decreased in weight and value compared to a similar period last year. This decrease in regard to dried apricots amounts to 42 percent.

KEYHAN published in Tehran printed a detailed report on the export of Iranian agricultural products and, quoting an expert, wrote in regard to the existing problems: "The list of some of the export products in 1367 [1988-89] included fresh fruits, fresh foods, dates and dried apricots, with a value share in proportion to the total non-oil products of 26.23 percent, whereas strategic products such as cotton had a value of three percent of the total non-oil exports." The above expert added: "Such a trend will result in an increase in fruit orchards and a decrease in valuable products."

The Iranian export center announced in its statistical report that in the first seven months of this year a total of 5,144 tons of cotton and linter [the fuzz of short fibers that adheres to cottonseed after ginning] were exported.
while 151,085 tons of fresh fruits and dried goods were exported. In other words, the export of fresh and dried fruits was 30 times that of cotton.

**Tehran To Be Connected to Damascus by Rail**

90010172D London KEYHAN in Persian 1 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] During the next six months, the special Iran-Turkey railroad which is being built jointly by Iran and Turkey will be ready for operation, and some of the Iranian passengers to Europe will be able to make use of this railroad.

The above report was given some time ago by Sa'id-Kya, the minister of roads and transport of the Islamic Republic, to media reporters. The above-mentioned minister, who was visiting Bandar 'Abbas to participate in a seminar, said to reporters: “During the five-year developmental plan, with funds amounting to 1,200 billion rials and the use of $4.3 billion in foreign currency funds, expensive projects will be implemented in the area of improving the national railroads and ports and completing the port building projects.”

Referring to the Bafq-Bandar 'Abbas railroad, the above-mentioned official added: “It is hoped that during the first five-year plan, this railroad will be connected to the cross-country railroad and add 16 million tons to the transport capacity of the railroad networks in the country.”

The minister of roads and transport of the Islamic Republic added: “This year, the Sirjan railroad will join the national railroad networks.”

Sa'id-Kya said: “During the next two months, the project for building an expressway between Qazvin and Zanjan will begin with the investment of the National Bank [Bank-e Mell], and several other expressways will be built afterwards.”

**Thousands of Land Deeds To Be Handed Over to Farmers**

90010087G Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 25 Nov 89 pp 1, 2

[Text] Tabriz—KEYHAN Correspondent: Land deeds for over 6,000 hectares of land designated for temporary harvest were presented to over 1,000 families of farmers in the townships of Neyriz, Maragheh, Ahar, Hashtrud, Marand, and Mianeh by Hojjat ol-Eslam Fazel Harandi, the representative of the valli-ye faqih [supreme jurisconsult] in the central headquarters of the Land Distribution Organization.

During the ceremonies to present the deeds of ownership, the valli-ye faqih's representative in the central headquarters of the Land Distribution Organization presented the deeds for lands designated for temporary harvest to 1,087 families residing in the villages of the townships of Tabriz [as published], Maragheh, Ahar, Hashtrud, Marand, and Mianeh. The land totals 6,000 hectares.

According to this report, Hujjat ol-Eslam Fazel Harandi, the valli-ye faqih's representative in the central headquarters of the seven-member delegation for land distribution and allocation and chairman of the Islamic Consultative Majles' agriculture committee, in an interview, announced that during the National Five-Year Plan over ten billion dollars has been allocated for expansion of the agriculture sector and creation of tangible industries in rural areas.

He said: In this program, the government has paid special attention to the agricultural sector and attempts have been made to eliminate the barriers for agricultural production. Also, it has been determined that the foreign exchange deficits of this sector shall be covered by the unused credits of other sectors.

In regard to the allocation of land to farmers who do not own any land, the valli-ye faqih's representative in the central headquarters of the seven-member delegation for land distribution and allocation said: In this connection, with the implementation of the law for deciding about the land designated for temporary harvest, so far more than 8,500 hectares of land in various parts of the country have been turned over to farmers.

In conclusion, he mentioned the increase in per-hectare harvest from 1.9 tons to 3.2 tons by the end of the Five-Year National Economic Expansion Plan. He called this a fundamental objective which by its realization the overall wheat production of the country will increase from its present seven million tons to more than 11 million tons by the year 1372 [21 March 1993-20 March 1994].

**Basijis To Play Major Part in Country's Reconstruction**

90010087C Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 28 Nov 89 p 2

[Text] Khorramabad—KEYHAN Correspondent: “Circumstances dictate that we maintain our extensive presence on the scene so that the Iraqi regime and those who might want to take advantage of our good faith—and our absence from the scene—submit to Resolution 598.”

This was stated by Hujjat ol-Eslam Rahmani, the administrator of the National Basij-e Mostazefin [oppressed], in a talk with reporters from the mass media. He added: The Basijis, in general, are considered to be the strongest defensive asset and crucial element of the national defense strategy. Our revolution will be implemented when we can maintain our readiness and presence on the scene, as we have done in the past. This is a divine matter which ensures our success in the international arena. It will also result in our peace of mind during the period of reconstruction while we work to improve the conditions of the nation and the country. He added: For national defense, determining a strategy, and ensuring national security we must, as in the past, depend on the
public. This is the tradition of Islam which considers defense as a duty for the people.

While pointing out that the main defensive asset is the people and its guidelines have been drawn up by the late Imam, in regard to the position of the Basij in the Five-Year Plan he said: The Basij will continue to fulfill its duty—to be followed up by the efforts of the Revolutionary Guards Corps—which is to absorb, train, and organize the public, in full force, until the objective of the late Imam for creation of a 20 million-man army is realized. He indicated that safeguarding the ideals of the Islamic revolution depends on the creation of Basij's 20 million-man army. While pointing out the role of the Basij in reconstruction of the country and mentioning that the exalted leadership considers solutions to the people's problems to come through organized public participation, he added: Sincerity and expertise which can be found in all Basijis can overcome the problems resulting from the war and play an important role in reconstruction of the country. The Basij's participation and placing these individuals in overall administrative and central organizations will be very effective. Hojjat ol-Eslam Rahmani called the Basij a keepsake of the Imam and pointed out the ceremonies for the anniversary of the formation of this force, and the gatherings scheduled for this purpose. He called the latest message of Ayatollah Khamenei, leader of the revolution, the main and guiding factor for determining the future of the Basij.

According to this report, the administrator of the Basij arrived in Khorramabad by plane. He was received by hojjat ol-Eslam Hoseyni Mianehji, the representative of the vali-ye faqih [jurisconsult vice-regency] and the Friday Prayer Leader of Khorramabad; Engineer Ahmad Entezari, the Governor of Lorestan; Hojjaj-e Eslam Sadeqi, the temporary Friday Prayer Leader of Khorramabad; Musavi, the Commander of the Lorestan Revolutionary Guards Corps; Rasuli, the Deputy Governor for Political Affairs; the clergy and commanders of military and law-enforcement forces.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Rahmani stated that the purpose of this visit to this region was to meet with the Basiji and fighting people of Khorramabad and participation in the big gathering of Lorestan Basijis.

**Basijis' Military Training To Be Repeated Yearly**

90010087B Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 28 Nov 89 p 2

[Text] Rashit—KEYHAN Correspondent: To ensure the combat readiness of the Basiji forces for the future defense of the revolution, all Basiji forces will undergo 20 to 30 days of military training in their respective units and divisions every year.

This was stated by Rahim Safavi, the Deputy Commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, in the ceremonies marking Basij Week in Rashit.

He said: With this program, the Basij can become a model for other countries as an invincible army.

Safavi then pointed to the victory of the revolution and the threat of super powers to prevent the spread of the revolution. He explained the necessity of the formation of the Basij and its importance in the Islamic government and stated that the spread of the Islamic revolution threatens the existence of world arrogance. In regard to the strategic importance of Iran in the Middle East he said: Our defense strategy will be realized by formation of the 20 million-man army.

In another part of his speech, he emphasized on more closeness between Basijis and the clergy and their covenant with the people. He stated that the separation of the Basij from the society will result in the failure of the revolution.

**Skilled Medical Assistants Must Serve in Deprived Regions**

90010087F Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 25 Nov 89 p 3

[Text] In order to fulfill the need of the country's deprived regions for a trained medical workforce, specialized and para-specialized medical assistants are obligated to serve one month of their last year of training in areas where they are needed (which will be determined by the office of the assistant for treatment affairs). The participation of medical assistants in the specialized board examination will be contingent upon completion of the one month tour of duty. Service of more than one month will not be considered as a part of this service.

This was announced by the spokesperson for the Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education who also added: Graduates of various specialized medical groups, who have passed the specialized board examinations, must report to the office of the Health Ministry's deputy for training, within one month after the announcement of their acceptance, in order to determine their legal service and clarify the issue of their legal obligation. Also, those who have passed the "para-board" examinations but have not passed the specialized board examination must report to the deputy minister of health within one month. In case they fail to do so, they will be barred from retaking the specialized board examination. Obviously, issuing the card to authorize such persons to participate in the specialized board examination will be contingent upon presentation of their work permit, issued by the office of the deputy for rehabilitation, subject to their pledge.

He added: In accordance with a directive issued for this purpose by this ministry, medical science universities and provincial regional health and treatment organizations must refrain from employing such individuals. Also, public sector hospitals and rehabilitation units—not under the jurisdiction of this ministry—and the private sector are not permitted to employ such individuals otherwise they will be treated in accordance with the
regulations. Such individuals will be dispatched to areas where their services are needed by the Headquarters for the Investigation of the Wounded and Injured, in Tehran, and provincial medical science universities or regional health and treatment organizations, in other cities.

It should be noted that this directive does not include the medical assistants who are scheduled to participate in the board examination of the current year's month of Dey [22 December-20 January].

Thousands of Tons of Copper Ready for Export

90OI0087E Tehran KEYHAN in Persian
28 Nov 89 p 17

[Text] Economic Service—330 new copper mine sites have been discovered across the country. Also, this year's production level at the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex will reach 78,000 tons. This was announced by Engineer Shiri, Chairman of the National Iranian Copper Industries Company, in an interview with a reporter, dispatched from Tehran, at the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex.

According to the reports from our reporter, the Sarcheshmeh copper industry is a unique complex capable of producing the latest products with the highest purity of up to 99.99 percent. The Sarcheshmeh copper mine holds 1.2 billion tons of copper with seven percent purity.

Investment in the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex is estimated to be 12 billion tomans and 800 million dollars, in fixed prices of the 50's [21 March 1971-20 March 1972] and later. This complex is capable of producing 144 thousand tons of Anode Copper, and 171 thousand tons of Cathode Copper which can be increased up to 240 thousand tons. According to Engineer Shiri, every year 400 kg gold and 12 tons of silver are purified in this complex.

According to him, the production of wire, round tubes, and copper bullion during the first eight months of the year 68 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990] reached 48 thousand tons. It is estimated that by the end of the current year this production will reach 78 thousand tons. The production schedule for next year is forecast to be around 90 thousand tons.

In conclusion he added: With this level of production we can fulfill domestic needs and export the surplus.

New Decisions on Nurses' Retirement, Working Hours, Salary

90OI0087A Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 28 Nov 89 p 2

[Text] According to a bill presented to the Cabinet, the nursing cadre will retire with 25 years of service, which includes their training period. According to this new regulation, nurses with bachelors degrees will retire after 21 years of service and those with two-year associate degrees will retire after 23 years of service.

Mrs. Mohtaram Talu'i, the Director General of the Health, Treatment, and Medical Education Ministry's office of nursing and midwifery and Heydar'ali 'Abedi, the deputy for this office, announced this in an interview with the press. In addition to this announcement regarding the said bill, she also explained about the programs designed for Nursing Week.

She said: According to this bill, the salaries of nurses working in the afternoon shift will increase by 10 percent, the night shift by 25 percent, and holidays by 10 percent. Also their working hours will be reduced from 44 hours per week to 39 hours per week.

Mr. 'Abedi then pointed out that, with the new programs set in place, nurses and aids will be able to take advantage of educational missions facilities. He added: Presently, some of the employment problems which, during the past several years, plagued the new graduates who were not absorbed by the job market have been resolved and in the future a larger number of them will be hired. Also midwives who have not completed their out-of-capital tenure can, from now on, fulfill this requirement without special restrictions in various towns.

He then added: In order to ensure noninterference by various medical cadres in the field of nursing and providing nursing services based on scientific principals, job descriptions for various strata of the nursing profession have been drawn up and will shortly be sent to the respective centers.

Then, in regard to the Five-Year Plan for the nursing cadre Mrs. Talu'i said: In the Five-Year Plan, we have determined that for every 100 hospital beds there is need for 50 nurses, 35 nurses' aids, and 15 technicians. According to this estimate, the shortages by the end of the Five-Year Plan will be 22,150 nurses and 2,300 midwives. Presently we are planning to fulfill this shortcoming and as of early 69 [21 March 1990-20 March 1991] until the end of 72 [21 March 1993-20 March 1994] 16,000 nurses and experts will enter the job market.

At the conclusion of the interview, in regard to Nursing Week (11 to 17 Azar [2 December-8 December]) and the dedication of each day of the week, Mr. 'Abedi said: The days of Nursing Week are named as follows: 11 Azar [2 December], the day of nursing and covenant with the Imam. 12 Azar [3 December], the day of nursing and allegiance with the Imam. 13 Azar [4 December], the day of nursing and the Islamic revolution. 14 Azar [5 December], the day of nursing and the legacy of sacred defense. 15 Azar [6 December], the day of nursing and health and treatment. 16 Azar [7 December], the day of nursing and research and training. 17 Azar [8 December], the day of nursing and the people.

He added: During Nursing Week outstanding nurses will be introduced and their services will be glorified. Also,
on the last day of Nursing Week some units called "Health Consultants" will be positioned around the location of the Friday Prayer in Tehran so that people can get advice on their health related matters.

Assigning of 200,000 Telephone Numbers Announced

9001087D Tehran KEYHAN in Persian
28 Nov 89 p 17

[Text] By the end of the current year 200,000 telephone numbers will be assigned, of which 50,000 will be allocated for Tehran. Also, in order to implement the cabinet-approved directive to allocate 20 percent of the communication facilities to government employees, so far 18,000 telephone numbers have been assigned to them. This will reach 30,000 by the end of the current year. The said allocation will be put at the disposal of the Government Employees Welfare Headquarters which is a part of the President's office. This headquarters will be responsible for implementing the allocation in accordance with the share of ministries and governmental offices.

Engineer Ja'far Zabihi, the Islamic Republic of Iran's Telecommunication Company's deputy for maintenance and exploitation of urban communication, in an exclusive interview with KEYHAN, announced this news and answered our reporter's questions. In regard to assigning telephone numbers in Tehran he said:

The Telecommunication Company invited 130,000 applicants in Tehran last year. The telephone numbers of 86 thousand people were operational last year, and 25 thousand were operational during the current year, and the rest will start operation by the end of this year. In addition, 30 thousand new applicants have been invited this year. They, also, will be given telephone numbers by the end of this year.

He added: The types of telephones being assigned in Tehran this year will be six and seven digits. For instance, telephones of the RESALAT Center in the east of Tehran will be six digit numbers, and those of Center 69 (North Amirabad) will be digital seven digit numbers. These will begin operation by the end of the current year.

Engineer Zabihi then announced the names of Tehran regions—which will receive telephone numbers by the end of the current year—as follows:

- Three thousand numbers in Center 90 (Meydan-e Azadi)
- Four thousand numbers in Center 99 (beginning of Saveh Road, Azari three-way)
- Ten thousand numbers in North Amirabad
- Three thousand numbers in Martyr Chamran Center (Daryannew Street)
- Two thousand numbers in Center 57 (Helaq Ahmar Street—Ghappan Intersection)
- Two thousand numbers in Piruzi Center
- Five thousand numbers in East Tehran (Tehran Pars)

The Telecommunication company's deputy for maintenance and exploitation of urban communication continued this interview by saying that this year's assignment of telephone numbers scheduled by the Telecommunication Company will reach 200 thousand in towns and cities other than Tehran. So far 70 thousand telephone numbers have been put into operation and the rest will be eventually activated by the end of the current year. He said: Statistical studies show that towns with populations under 50,000 people have reached near saturation in terms of telephone numbers. Also, the telephone needs of cities with populations of between 50 to 90 thousand will be fulfilled by the end of the Five-Year Plan.

He then stated that the guideline for the increase in the cost of extended long phone calls is under preparation. In regard to the fee for telephone numbers that will be assigned to applicants this year he said: The finished cost of telephone numbers for slip holders in Tehran, taking into account all the fees and deposits, will total 40,000 tomans and there will be no change in the price of telephone numbers.

In regard to the malfunction in communication of some seven-digit lines, Engineer Zabihi said: The quality of digital type seven-digit telephones is much better than the six-digit ones and there are better facilities in regard to local as well as international connections. Minor difficulties in the connection of such telephones is due to the incomplete operation of some of the new centers which will be corrected shortly.

PAKISTAN

U.S.-Pakistan Relations Examined

'Client State' Status Criticized

46000078 Lahore THE NATION in English
4 Jan 90 p 6

[Article by Khalid Mahmud]

[Text] Pakistan's enduring American connection has been a disaster for the country's intellectual and moral growth. Thank God, the moral strength inherent in the people has saved it from becoming another Taiwan or South Vietnam, but the disposition to curry favour with the Americans as a national pursuit has become outrageously disgusting. The Prime Minister wants them to help her save democracy in the country, the opposition seeks a 'green signal' from them for destabilising the government, the bureaucracy solicits 'free trips' and scholarships for their children and an army of fortune-hunters is willing to barter their self-respect for a 'green card'. Above all the entire nation has been mortgaged in lieu of the money and arms we borrow from them, ostensibly to underwrite national development and security.
When the first big consignment of doled-wheat had arrived in Pakistan, the then Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra had plates of ‘thank you America’ hung round the necks of camels carrying it. The big show of gratitude to the distant benefactor was symptomatic of the virus that had infected the nation’s elite and in the years to come paralysed the thinking faculty. The onslaught of U.S. influence was so overwhelming that in case between mid-fifties and mid-sixties witnessed key government departments, autonomous bodies, universities, and labour unions swarmed by U.S. experts and advisers. Ill-bred advisers drawing fantastic salaries at Pakistan’s expense and behaving like pompous asses were placed in key positions. Widely circulated jokes about their performance such as the difference between an ‘operative’ and an ‘advisory’ bull lucidly described the popular perception about their contribution, but they were the virtual decision-makers.

The abject surrender of autonomy in different areas was manifest in the facility given to the Americans to play around with higher education. University departments opened with U.S. aid were headed by the Americans and though it sounds ridiculous, even the adviser to the Student’s Union in Punjab University was an American. A comprehensive plan to control the Labour Unions included direct grants (through Asia Foundation) to the unions, free trips abroad for labour leaders and especially designed training programmes for trade union activists. There was a long list of vital places where the Americans sat to oversee policy formulation and administration but the focus of their attention were the GHQ and the Planning Commission through which they sought to have the last word on the country’s security and economy. The U.S. spy plane U-2 flew from Badaber (near Peshawar) on reconnaissance missions over the Soviet territory. Following its shooting down, Pakistan was served with a notice by Nikita Khruschev but no one at the helm of affairs had the vision to anticipate the dangerous implications of twisting the tail of a powerful neighbour at the behest of a distant godfather.

Pakistan’s joining the U.S.-sponsored military alliances in 1954 was defended by the ruling elite as a ‘security umbrella.’ H.S. Suhrwardy, Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1956 dismissed with disdain the idea of small nations staying away from power blocs saying “Zero plus Zero plus Zero is equal to Zero.” Ironically there were no two opinions about the ‘threat perception’, yet the explicitly designed anti-communist alliances, the SEATO [South-east Asia Treaty Organization] and CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] were sold to the people as deterrents against Indian aggression. It was conveniently overlooked that John Foster Dulles on the eve of the signing of SEATO had insisted on including the proviso that the United States will be obliged to help only in case of Communist aggression. Thus it was no surprise that when the matters came to a crunch in 1965 and 1971 the illusory security umbrella was nowhere in sight.

It is a pity that the bitter reality of the U.S. ‘leaving Pakistan in the lurch’ in the wake of two wars with India was of little consequence to the ruling elite, it had the audacity to continue to advocate U.S. patronage as the only available recipe for national security and development. There is no denying the fact that Ayub Khan did make some efforts to explore alternative sources of aid and assistance and to reduce exclusive dependence on the United States, but his short-lived honeymoon with autonomy in foreign affairs was thwarted by the lack of popular support for his authoritarian regime. American aid was deemed to be crucial for Pakistan and without it, it was said Pakistan’s economy would collapse and security torn to pieces. Yet with all the American arms the Pakistan Army had acquired as a favoured ally, it could only fight a 17-day war in 1965 and surrender 90 thousand prisoners to the enemy in 1971. And the only viable deterrent against Indian aggression Pakistan has ever managed to develop—its nuclear programme—was an independent initiative violently opposed by the Americans.

Isn’t it disgusting that each time Pakistan seeks U.S. aid it has to furnish a certificate of ‘honourable intentions’ vis-a-vis its nuclear programme and successive governments have had to be apologetic about the only significant achievement the country has made in terms of its defence capability. Why were the Americans annoyed with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto? Not because he introduced land reforms or nationalised private enterprise. Leaving the SEATO was also no big deal, the alliance had become redundant in the wake of Sino-Soviet split and normalisation of relations between China and the United States. But making the ‘Islamic bomb’ was an offence which could not be forgiven by the Americans. They were not willing to let any unpredictable Third World leader with an ‘Islamic World’ connection get away with it. Nevertheless they would have reacted in the same manner, had it been not ZAB but someone more palatable to their biddings.

The basic issue involved in the Pak-U.S. nuclear controversy is the divergence of perceptions between the so-called ‘friends and allies’ regarding their ‘relationship.’ What has been projected in Pakistan as a relationship based on ‘mutuality of interests’ is seen by Washington as a “one-way traffic between a ‘benefactor’ and a client.”

A ‘client state’ in the U.S. scheme of things, is not permitted to take initiatives likely to go beyond what has been decreed by the big brother. Washington has continued to brow beat Pakistan on the nuclear issue to bring home Pakistan’s vulnerability to its pressure. Had it been a different kind of relationship such as Indo-U.S. ties, the response would have been at variance with its current stance.

The U.S. economic assistance, officially described as ‘aid’ but in actuality loans with high interest rates and attached political strings, may have been a source of ‘kickbacks’ and other fringe-benefits for the bureaucrats who have been negotiating the deals. But it has neither improved the quality of life for the multitude, nor
enhanced the country’s ability to stand on its own feet. Far from being able to move towards self-reliance the country today is a hostage to the debt-trap and has to borrow more money in order to pay the soaring interest. Ironically the single enterprise likely to provide an indigenous base for industrialisation—and lead to a semblance of self-reliance has been with Soviet assistance—the enemy we have been trying to ward off with American support.

The tragic history of a proud and self-respecting nation’s humiliating surrender to perpetual dependence has been the logical outcome of its ruling elites’ intellectual servitude to the American connection. The establishment is so thoroughly infested with weaklings that the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] need not recruit any formal agents. There is no dearth of psychopaths willing to run errands for the Americans, to pass on information to them and to play the ‘his master’s voice’ when it comes to vital decision-making. Another category of ‘intellectual serfs’ comprises the ‘Babus’ who would have been at-ease with themselves serving the colonial masters and now regard the Americans as the new ‘White Sahibs’. The ‘Babu’ mentality is not peculiar to low-paid functionaries who have become more self-assertive than their superiors in the post independence era. Among the top echelons of administration there are quite a few prophets of doom who foresee a catastrophe for Pakistan if the American patronage is withdrawn. We have no option but to follow the American lead is their appreciation of Pakistan’s destiny.

The question of dependence does not merely relate to a set of policies or lack of them, but more basically to attitudes and orientation which have given rise to the ‘culture of dependence’. While occasional outbursts of mass anti-Americanism have brought to the fore the popular perception of the U.S. role, the ruling elite has unashamedly clung to its traditional disposition of outbidding one another for currying favour with the Americans. The U.S. Ambassador has the licence to function like a Viceroy offering advice to politicians, intervening in domestic political disputes and setting the pace of policy directions. It is not only the government which seeks U.S. patronage but also the opposition and both are more concerned about their equation with Washington than their image among their own people.

Nothing would be more apt to illustrate the culture of dependence, now in vogue, than the reported SOS of a newly-appointed Federal Minister from Punjab to a well-connected friend to secure the help of a U.S. diplomat for putting the fear of God in his ‘official’ visit to his constituency. Isn’t it enough to bring home the point that the malaise has become malignant and needs a major surgery.

U.S. Involvement Probed

46000078 Lahore THE NATION

in English 21 Jan 90 p 6

[Article by Musahid Hussain]

[Text] Following the restorations of democracy in Pakistan, the question of American involvement in our politics is much discussed. There have been statements issued by the American Ambassador in Islamabad regarding the “important role” that his country played in the period leading up to the elections in November, 1988. After the induction of the PPP [Pakistan People’s Party] Government, there has been speculation regarding the appointment of certain key personnel at the behest of the United States. Whatever the truth of this speculation, there is little doubt that the American involvement in the politics of Pakistan is long standing and has a basis in the past history of Pakistan-American relations.

An interesting pointer to this fact is the recent publication of a 500-page volume on South Asia by the U.S. Department of State as part of its series on “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57.” Under American laws, official documents are declassified after every 30 years and these include diplomatic correspondence, memoranda of conversations between American officials and foreign leaders plus despatches from their embassies. This volume, based on original official documents of the United States Government, is quite instructive and informative in that it brings out with candour the American interests and activities in Pakistan during that period, the U.S. attitudes towards various individuals, particularly those it is trying to promote politically, plus the manner of interaction between leaders of Pakistan with U.S. officials and diplomats. There is, as evidenced from these papers, a degree of mutual blackmail between Pakistan and the United States when it comes to dealing with each other regarding their respective areas of interest.

In an assessment prepared in March 1955 on “probable developments in Pakistan,” the United States felt that “after more than two years of recurrent crises, political power in Pakistan has been openly assumed by a small group of British-trained administrators and military leaders centering around Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad and his two principal associates, General Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan” and the assessment, written four years before Pakistan first formally granted bases to the Americans, adds: “We believe that the present leadership would be favourably inclined to U.S. peacetime development of air bases for U.S. use.” Ayub Khan seems to be a special focus of American
interest, much before he became President. In a despatch sent to the State Department, by Ambassador Horace Hildreth (whose daughter was to marry the son of Iskander Mirza), Ayub Khan is referred to as the “final arbiter of the destiny of Cabinets.” In a follow-up despatch in October 1955, it is said that “we should strengthen Ayub’s position in Pakistan” and calls him “statesman with integrity.” However, the Americans do not seem to be unmindful of Ayub’s political power base since he was Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the need to meet his request for military aid. In another assessment in November 1955, Ayub is referred to as “an extremely powerful figure in the country” and there seems to be concern that “he may be strong enough to bring about, if he chooses, a general feeling of disappointment and frustration towards the United States by asserting that we have failed to keep our promise to Pakistan.”

The Americans seem to be quite clear during that period regarding who are “their boys” and those deserving favourable treatment as compared to those who are not quite in their camp and who should, therefore, be treated accordingly. For example, soon after the induction of Ch. Mohammad Ali as Prime Minister in August 1955, an American official memorandum says: “The combination of General Mirza (who had become Governor-General) and Ch. Mohammad Ali represents a top leadership very friendly to the United States.” Conversely, the United States seems to be suspicious of politicians like Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy and Abdur Rab Nishtar.

They fall in the category of those who were then derided by the Americans as being “neutralists.” In an August 1955 despatch sent by Ambassador Hildreth to the State Department, regarding the possibility of inclusion of Suhrawardy in the Cabinet, it is stated in a somewhat imperial tone: “Ambassador (of the U.S.) has told Iskander Mirza, and it will make clear to Suhrawardy by others, that the United States has no objection to inclusion of Suhrawardy in a high Cabinet Post.” The apparent reason for this NOC [No Objection Certificate] to Suhrawardy is because the United States desired that “One Unit legislation be done on non-partisan basis and Suhrawardy’s talents and cooperation as legislator could be of utmost importance” in this regard. The assessment of Ambassador Hildreth regarding his own country’s role in Pakistan and attitude towards Suhrawardy in the same despatch is even more interesting. It continues: “While fully understanding necessity to avoid U.S. involvement in internal politics through any public stand, the fact is that U.S. relationship is so important to Pakistan that complete non-involvement is impossible. If Embassy officers ignore Suhrawardy, for example, for the next two weeks this may well be interpreted here as official policy indicative of disapproval of his inclusion in Cabinet; if he is cultivated by Embassy even on purely social basis, interpretation of U.S. approval may be placed on such actions. Conclusions, in light of our appraisal are that (1) we should encourage Suhrawardy through third parties to take a Cabinet post under the new Prime Minister, protecting our public position at all times. (2) Embassy officers should make some effort to maintain pleasant personal social contacts with Suhrawardy.” In another despatch, Hildreth refers to Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar as “no friend of the West or United States.”

Despite the apparent intimacy between the two governments, occasional suspicions also crept up regarding each other’s intentions. For example, in a February 1956 despatch, Ambassador Hildreth wrote: “The U.S. Embassy is convinced there is deliberate effort at least encouraged by the government of Pakistan to stage a campaign prior to the visit to Pakistan of the U.S. Secretary of State (Dulles) to squeeze the United States for additional aid and probably a substantial element of Pakistan officials and public opinion earnestly believe the best way to get the most from the United States is to emulate the example of Afghanistan, India and Egypt and try to play both sides.” However, the U.S. Ambassador adds that if this is the game that Pakistan may want to play, then it should be told by the United States in no uncertain terms: “If now you wish to follow the same course as India then Pakistan, considering its size and resources necessarily must become the tail of the dog and our interest in Pakistan will tend to diminish and our interest in India increase.”

The most unflattering portrait of any Pakistani leader that emerges from these recently declassified documents is that of President Iskander Mirza. He comes across as bumbling over backwards to appease the Americans, is critical of his own Prime Minister (Ch. Mohammad Ali) and is threatened to this extent by the United States, has a first-name relationship with the American Ambassador, is critical of the Chinese, of Gamal Abdul Nasser and is contemptuous on “neutralists” and reaffirm to the United States that he “would not stand for change in Pakistan’s foreign policy.” Worst still, as a September 1956 despatch by Hildreth clearly indicates, Iskander Mirza showed Hildreth and his British counterpart a copy of a four-page letter that he had drafted, but had not yet sent to Suhrawardy regarding foreign policy. In other words, the President of Pakistan showed a private, official communication addressed to his Prime Minister to the foreign ambassadors even before it was seen by the Prime Minister! Perhaps, even more unbecoming than this, breach of security, is Iskander Mirza’s assessment of his Prime Minister (then it was Ch. Mohammad Ali) which he conveyed to Ambassador Hildreth and which the Ambassador sent to Washington in a telegram in February 1956. Calling Ch. Mohammad Ali “timid, weak and perhaps cowardly,” he even went to the extent of telling Hildreth to advise U.S. Secretary of State Dulles to talk “very bluntly with the Prime Minister and scold him for allowing an official of the Foreign Office for publicly saying that the reception given to Chinese Vice-President Madame Sun Yat-Sen was greater than that given to Vice-President Nixon.”
While the conduct of Pakistani leaders, as manifested in these documents, is truly not befitting those of a sovereign state, some American self-images are also interesting and perhaps even relevant to the present situation. There is, for instance, an American assessment contained in a November 1957 despatch that “the only reason why Pakistan is able to keep going is U.S. aid.” And finally, there is an interesting reference in a May 1957 despatch from the American Consul-General in Lahore which mentions a slogan then making the rounds in Pakistan that “the real Pakistan Prime Minister is a person named Hildreth.”

Bhutto In-laws Accused of Atrocities in Sindh
90010134 A Islamabad HURMAT in Urdu
20 Dec 89 pp 44-45

[Article by Zubir Ahmad Mujahid: “Zardaris Causing Havoc in Lundu; Providing Protection to Armed People”]

[Text] Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has claimed in a recent press interview that the situation in Sindh has improved. Perhaps Sindh looks peaceful to the prime minister when she views it through her glasses of power from the prime minister’s house. Sindh is burning in the fire of anarchy, lawlessness, mugging, prejudice, hate, and atrocities. This has hurt our nation. Only the people who live in Sindh and support the ideology on which Pakistan was established understand it. The separatist movement in Sindh has gotten more momentum than ever before during the PPP [Pakistan People’s Party] rule, which claims to be a strong supporter of a federal government. The government is helping the separatist elements. Anyone raising a slogan in Pakistan’s support has a bleak future in Sindh. The government is helping develop an environment that forces non-Sindhis, who are the major block against the Sindhu Desh movement, out of Sindh. In such a state of affairs, the prime minister’s claim that “the situation in Sindh is better” is nothing more than a joke. Sindhi patriotic circles are amazed at the prime minister’s “lack of knowledge.” Only a few days prior to the prime minister’s announcement, some very embarrassing incidents happened to non-Sindhis in Sindh. The PPP government is not paying attention to the incidents of robberies, murders, kidnapping, terrorism, and inhuman treatment of non-Sindhis. Instead, it denies every such incident.

Atrocities committed against Muhajirs and Punjabis in Sindh made headlines in the newspapers during the second and third weeks of November, and the government of Sindh has, as usual, either denied these incidents or given a watered down version in the government press releases. The incidents of armed attacks on Muhajirs in Lundu, in Nawab Shah district, by members of the Zardari clan resulting in the loss of homes by muhajirs, police and government officers’ atrocities on the people demonstrating against the Babri Masjid in Obaro, and the looting of train and bus passengers in Digri, in the Thar Parkar area, all portray the dangerous situation in Sindh and prove that the prime minister’s statement is incorrect. These incidents also prove that the people raising slogans to break up Pakistan are safe, and there is not justice for the people who support one [unified] Pakistan during the rule of Benazir Bhutto, whose father, Zulfiquar ‘Ali Bhutto, was responsible for breaking Pakistan into two pieces.

Muhajir families remembered the day when they had arrived in Pakistan in beaten up condition from India after the 13 November incident in Lundu. Over 100 muhajir families moved to Punjab and Karachi after this incident. Lundu is a small town near Sheh dadpur, in Nawabshah district, where hundreds of Rajput families have been living for over 40 years. Hundreds of armed people surrounded the town at noon on 13 November and began to loot homes. The armed attackers took away all cash, jewelry, and other expensive things. They threw the occupants, including women and children, outside and locked their homes. The armed attackers continued their atrocities for several hours, and the police or government officials did not come to interfere. The homeless families took refuge in Lundu railway station to save their lives. They shivered on the platform all night. Some women and children did not even have shoes on their feet. The armed intruders had not let them take anything from their homes. The attackers took control of all the homes and shops owned by Muhajirs. The local police watched the whole drama quietly. The Rangers arrived at night and the attackers began to flee. When a team of journalists arrived in Lundu some members of the affected families told them how dozens of families were at the railway station with nothing but the clothes they wore and how it reminded them of lakhs [hundreds of thousands] of beaten Muslims arriving in Pakistan from India. At that time also under this very sky there was no help except from God. These families rejected the state government’s statement that only a few people were affected and that they were already rehabilitated as a bundle of lies. They also said that dozens of the evacuated families had spent the whole night on the railway platform and some of them moved to Karachi and Punjab to save their lives and respect. According to the affected families, some families returned to their homes after government officials and the Rangers assured them of safety and that their possession would be returned to them. They were also told that their attackers would be apprehended. So far some of the things stolen from them have been returned, however, expensive items such as cattle are still with the attackers. The police and the administration is making excuses for the delay. These families also said that the people they identified as the attackers in the inquiry live around that area. They are know to them, and those people belong to the Zardari clan. They added that the police and the administration is helpless because of the great influence of Benazir Bhutto’s father-in-law, Hakim ‘Ali Zardari, and husband, Asif ‘Ali Zardari. The attackers have not been arrested because of their interference. A prominent resident of Lundu hinted that there is proof that the prime minister’s husband and Public Accounts Committee’s
chairman Hakim Ali Zardari were present in Nawabshah at noon on the day of the attack, and that they had met with the leaders of the attackers. The government circles and the PPP are referring to the Lundu incident in the context of a disputed farm. This farm in Lundu is allotted to over 45 persons, but it has been under the government's custody for several years. During the last Ramazan festival, the Zardari clan took over this farm with the help of the government and the police and kicked out the 57 families settled there. The government did not do anything to stop this. The families displaced from the farm moved to Karachi or Punjab. Armed members of the Zardari family are still occupying the farm. They have started razing houses and have sold mango and other fruit trees worth lakhs of rupees. They burned standing crops and have murdered many people. The murderers and the thieves are walking around freely after committing all these atrocities. The law enforcement personnel are helpless. Ninety-eight percent of the residents of Lundu are non-Sindhis and they have been persecuted by the Zardaris for a long time. The people in Lundu are terrified now and are begging the government for protections and justice. All parties, including IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad], the Muslim League, Jamaat-i-Islami, MQM [Mujahir Quami Movement], Muhajir-Punjabi-Pathan Ittehad, and Muhajir Rabita Council have expressed great concern over the Lundu incident and have called it an example of the government's inefficiency. Still, no PPP office holder condemned this incident. They did not even think it necessary to express sympathy.

Mr Iqbal Ahmed Khan, however, did not elaborate as to which individual had been taking decisions on behalf of the party.

It is interesting to note here that Mr Ghulam Haider Wyne MNA and Secretary-General, Punjab Muslim League also attended the meeting. Mr Iqbal Ahmed Khan said that 22 other former MNAs who had been invited could not attend the meeting because of their own engagements or ailment.

Due to some unknown reasons three other General Secretaries of the provincial parties did not attend the meeting. Prominent amongst the participants were former Federal Ministers Nasim Ahmed Aheer, Nisar Muhammad Khan, Haji Saifullah Khan, former State Minister for Foreign Affairs Zain Noorani and former NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] Governor Abdul Ghafoor Hoti.

Mr Iqbal Ahmed Khan said that Mr Junejo agreed with the former MNAs that they were not being given due importance both by the IJI MNAs, and MPA [Member of Provisional Assembly], Mr Junejo assured the former MNAs that in future only the President of the party or the Central Working Committee would take "party decisions".

Mr Junejo also called upon the former MNAs to get ready for the mid-term polls, and remain in touch with the central leadership in connection with the reorganisation of the party.

Reorganization of PML (J) in the Offing
46000081B Lahore THE NATION in English
21 Jan 90 p 12

[Text] Islamabad—The PML (J) [Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo)] has decided to contest the next general elections as a separate entity and at the time of the elections it will be decided whether it should collaborate with other parties or not, revealed Secretary-General of the party Mr Iqbal Ahmed Khan.

Briefing the newsmen after a meeting of former MNA [Member of National Assembly]s with Mr Muhammad Khan Junejo in the chair here at the PML House on Saturday, Mr Iqbal Ahmed Khan pointed out that with the expiry of the term of the present Assemblies, the association of the PML with IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] would come to an end.

It may be mentioned that the Punjab Chief Minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif on more than one occasion has said that the PML will contest the next polls as a component of the IJI. It is, therefore, obvious that this decision will not be acceptable to him.

Mr Iqbal Ahmed Khan said that Mr Muhammad Khan Junejo while addressing the meeting which according to him was attended by 60 members of the previous National Assembly said that "no individual will be allowed to take decision on behalf of the party in future".

APP adds:

Pakistan Muslim League meeting of ex-MNAs chaired by PML Chief, Muhammad Khan Junejo, here on Saturday demanded the Government of Pakistan to draw the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations towards the plight of the Kashmiri people, for obtaining the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris, under the past UN resolutions.

Through a resolution adopted on the occasion, the meeting pledged the support of the people of Pakistan towards the genuine rights of the Kashmiri people, who had resolved to fight for their rights.

It expressed concern for the tense situation in Occupied Kashmir and called for conduct of a fair and impartial plebiscite.

Article Analyzes Constitution With Regard to PM Appointment
46000081D Lahore THE NATION in English
24 Jan 90 p II

[Article by Salman K. Chima: "A Constitutional Dilemma?"; first paragraph is THE NATION introduction]

[Text] For all that is happening on 20.3.90 is that a power conferred on the President, by the constitution, to
appoint the PM, in his discretion, is coming to an end. But there is no logical reason why the expiry of that power should, in any way, affect the status of the PM! True the PM was appointed, to begin with, by the President in the exercise of that power which is now coming to an end. But that does not detract from the fact that she is the PM, at present, not because of that appointment. Rather because of the vote of confidence she was required by the constitution to get within sixty days of such appointment.

Constitutionalism brings with it, quite inevitably, a certain number of constitutional debates. And harm in it there is none. For such debates reflect only that the system is wanting to conform to the Supremacy of Law and the Constitution. Hardly something to worry about.

For us it is a particularly welcome departure from the past. Not too long ago there were no such debates. But also, at the time, there was no Constitution. There was, instead, a person who sat at the helm of affairs and considered himself quite above the law. That era of "unconstitutionalism", however, is now, at last, over and behind us. And we have made a fresh beginning, with a renewed resolve, to secure and uphold the Rule of Law. The various constitutional debates that have surfaced in the recent past pay tribute to the struggle of those who have made this change possible.

It is in this spirit that we should consider the controversy surrounding the 20th of March, 1990. The question raised by it is, "Must the Prime Minister on that date, get the National Assembly [NA] to reposs fresh confidence in her? Or, is there no such obligation imposed by the Constitution?" It is the endeavour of this article to confront this issue.

The debate stems from Article 91 of the Constitution. In particular sub-Articles (2) and (2a) thereof. They read as under:

(2) The President shall in his discretion appoint from among the members of the National Assembly a PM who in his opinion is most likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly.

(2a) Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (2) after the 20th day of March, 1990, the President shall invite the member of the National Assembly to be the PM who commands the confidence of the majority of the members of the NA as ascertained in a session of the Assembly summoned for the purpose.

The purport is obvious. "After" 20.3.90 the President must invite (and can no longer appoint in his discretion) the member of the National Assembly to be the PM who commands the confidence of the majority of the House as determined (not by the opinion of the President, any longer, but) by the House itself. In other words, after that date, the National Assembly, alone, and not, at all, the President, is the arbiter of who is to assume the office of the PM. So far so good. But can that be taken to mean, further, that the PM on that date would need fresh mandate from the House?

Difficult to maintain so. For all that is happening on 20.3.90 is that a power conferred on the President, by the Constitution, to appoint the PM, in his discretion, is coming to an end. But there is no logical reason why the expiry of that power should, in any way, affect the status of the PM. True the PM was appointed, to begin with, by the President in the exercise of that power which is now coming to an end. But that does not detract from the fact that she is the PM, at present, not because of that appointment. Rather because of the vote of confidence she was required by the Constitution to get within sixty days of such appointment, and which she, in the event, quite comfortably managed.

Logic aside, even on a literal interpretation of the Constitution, the result is the same. The word "after" has been highlighted (by myself) in sub-Article (2a) quoted above. It suggests a certain indefiniteness of time. It refers to no particular date after 20.3.90. Indeed 20.3.91 may be as good, in this behalf, as 21.3.90. If the intention of the Constitution were that the present PM would need fresh mandate from the House on that date, the word "after" would not have been used. Instead the word "on" would have been employed. But since the Constitution is satisfied with the use of the word "after" in sub-Article (2a), the conclusion is inevitable that this sub-article is only identifying the date after which the new rule (that the PM would be elected, even in the first instance, by the National Assembly, with the President having no say in the matter) would become "effective". And, quite significantly, it does not, in any way, also spell out the "occasion" when the new rule would, in fact, be first applied (as would have been the case if the word "on" instead of "after" had been used). The actual "occasion" for the application of the new rule, it is evident, has been left by the Constitution to be spell out by the other articles thereof. The occasion, indeed, would arise if the PM resigns, or is defeated by a vote of no-confidence, or there is fresh election to the National Assembly, and there is need consequently to choose, after that date, a new PM—but not otherwise.

We must, however, also consider Article 130(a) in this behalf. For those who oppose this interpretation of the Constitution seek sustenance from this sub-article. It reads as under:

(2a) Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (2) after 20.3.88 the Governor shall invite the member of the PA [Provincial Assembly] to be the CM [Chief Minister] who commands the confidence of the majority of the members of the PA as ascertained in a session of the Assembly.

Provided that nothing contained in this clause shall apply to a CM holding office on 20.3.88 in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
It is the proviso, rather its absence in Article 91(2a), that catches the eye. It is argued that had the Constitution, in fact, intended the PM not to be affected by the expiry of the President’s power, under Article 91(2), it would have specifically stated so. As it does, the argument goes, in the case of the Chief Minister. The absence of such proviso, it is further argued, suggests that the PM would, indeed, require a fresh vote of confidence on 20.3.90—or else the proviso in Article 130(2a) will have been rendered redundant.

The argument is appealing, but only superficially so. Let us see how.

It is significant that while the Governor’s power to appoint the CM expired on 20.3.88, as witnessed from Article 130(2a), the President’s power to appoint the PM is to last till 20.3.90. This difference it is submitted is, indeed, material and has, in fact, inspired the inclusion of the proviso in Article 130(2a); on whose absence from Article 91(2a) so much emphasis is being placed. But what, one might ask, is the magic about this, apparently insignificant, difference?

The previous assemblies, Provincial as well as the National, were inducted in March, 1985. In the ordinary course of things they would have lasted till March, 1990, when their constitutional term of five years would have expired. The expectation of those who passed the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985, by virtue of which both Articles 91(2a) and 130(2a), were included in the Constitution, was, indeed, that the assemblies would operate till March, 1990. (Of course, this expectation was belied. But that is quite irrelevant for our purposes.)

Now had the expectation not been mutilated, in the way it was, there would have been fresh general elections in March, 1990—the same time, virtually, as the expiry of the President’s power to appoint the PM. Inclusion of a similar proviso, as the one appearing in Article 130(2a), in Article 91(2a), was deemed, under the circumstances, not necessary. Not because it was desired that the incumbent should, on that date, have to seek fresh vote of confidence. But because it was expected, in view of the anticipated general elections in March, 1990, that the term of the incumbent, by 20.3.90, would in any case, have run out. And one would have, had the expectation not been belied, been waiting for the new National Assembly, after the general elections, to be inducted, and to, soon thereafter, choose a new leader.

The position of the Chief Ministers, however, according to the same expectation, was quite different. Although they, along with their respective assemblies, too, were expected to remain in office till March, 1990, yet, the Governor’s power to appoint the Chief Minister was coming to an end mid-way through that term—on 20.3.88, to be precise. The proviso in Article 130(2a) was included, under the circumstances, to remove all doubts, and to make it absolutely clear, that mere expiry of such power, mid-way through the (anticipated) term of the Provincial Assembly, would in no way affect the position of the incumbent Chief Minister. But this should not mean that the omission of a similar proviso from a parallel article dealing with the PM should suggest otherwise—for that omission, to repeat, was introduced because of the different date on which the President’s power was expiring and which rendered such a proviso unnecessary.

Now, it is an unexceptionable rule with regard to the interpretation of the Constitution, as also any other legislation, that it is the intention of the legislature which is to be ascertained and given effect to. When we keep in mind the expectations of those who passed the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985, it becomes abundantly evident, as discussed above, that the mere omission from Article 91(2a) of the proviso does not suggest, in any way, that the incumbent PM on 20.3.90 should have to get the National Assembly to repose fresh confidence in her. To suggest otherwise would be against logic as also against the literal interpretation of the Constitution.

Curiously, it has also been argued by certain circles that even if Article 91(2a) does not say so, the President can, and should, under Article 91(5), ask the PM to seek a vote of confidence on 20.3.90. But this view misses the point completely. Article 91(5) says that the President, if he is satisfied that the PM does not command the confidence of the majority, can require the PM to get a vote of confidence. This article can only be employed when the President is satisfied that the PM does not command the requisite confidence, and not otherwise. If the President is, in fact, not so satisfied, and there appears no reason why he should be given that only very recently the House has reposed confidence in the PM, this article cannot, and must not, indeed, be invoked, in order, ostensibly, to deal with the dilemma arising out of Article 91(2a). That would be wrong solution to a problem that does not exist.

Center-Punjab ‘Peace’ Initiatives Discussed
46000080C Karachi DAWN (Economic & Business Review Weekly Supplement) in English
27 Jan-2 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Majid Sheikh]

[Text] The first signs of Centre-Punjab peace are being seen in the move by the Punjab Industrial Development Board [PIDB] to sell off its two profitmaking sugar mills after a federally managed financial institution has agreed in principle to negotiate its 490 million dues.

This startling move is being seen as a major financial concession to the Punjab Chief Minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, by the PPP [Pakistan People’s Party] government. The move is being described as a personal concession because the two concerned sugar mills are located in the same area as the new massive Brothers Sugar Mills of the Sharif brothers. The sale may well be managed in such manner that the Brothers Mill will have monopoly power over sugar cane growers in the entire area. It will
also mean the effective end of the PIDB, an institution that has earned a reputation as a pioneering institution. The board has, as a first step, dropped its prime project, the Kamalia Paper Project, in what is also seen as a major concession to other private sector interested parties.

The PIDB owes the NDFC [National Development Finance Corp. (Pakistan)] approximately Rs 490 million and the board is not in a condition to sell off its mills unless it got a "no objection certificate" from the financial institution. Given the existing condition of the board it is not possible for the bank to provide such a certification. However, the two mills, the Pattoki and the Kamalia sugar mills are profitmaking concerns providing over Rs 60 million a year. This helps the board to run its affairs as the Punjab Government does not provide the board with any funding. With these funds the board sets up projects that the private sector is shy of investing in. Over the last one year all project work has been stopped, including two major defence-oriented projects, with the new managing director of the board being briefed to set the ball rolling to wind up the board. This, has, always been officially denied.

An official of the NDFC commenting on the move said: "We will tackle the matter as a purely business proposition. We normally accommodate all our clients if they are in trouble. We will do all we can for the PIDB, especially if we are given additional securities." Asked if any additional securities had been offered, he said: "We have not taken a complete look at the proposition." According to the source, the PIDB will start preparing the process internally, and only then will the matters be finalised. However, negotiations with the NDFC have already been started and matters are at an advanced stage. One source claims that the final decision has already taken and it is just the modalities that have to be worked out.

But there could be considerable trouble in store for the Board, as officials working in the Board, fearing the loss of jobs, are considering taking action against the Board in the Lahore High Court. They allege that denationalisation of profitmaking units is illegal as it is a violation of the Pakistan Industrial Investment Schedule. They claim that the new Board is deliberately mismanaging the mills as they could be shown as loss-making. Even given this the mills are making massive profits. According to one source the persons interested in the mills are all political figures and that the sale will in reality be political bribes.

However, the Punjab Government is known to be offering senior officials of the Board with government jobs so that the backlash is minimal. The senior management of the board does not expect any trouble on this score as they feel that the matter will resolve itself within the next two years, well before the next elections are held.

Three Tehrik Parties Propose 'Egalitarian' Society

46000079B Karachi DAWN in English 11 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] Lahore, Jan 10: Three political parties, Tehrik-i-Istiqlal [TI], Pakistan Awami Tehrik, and Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafria [TNFJ], have decided to coordinate political efforts under a 19-point programme to "eliminate exploitation and to establish an egalitarian society in Pakistan."

A nine-member coordination committee has been set up to work out further details of the extent of cooperation among the three Tehricks. A 40-day period has been given to it to take a decision which will be announced at a rally at Minar-i-Pakistan here on March 2. All the three parties would be equal partners and would keep their separate identity intact, it was stated.

Giving details of the decision at a joint news conference by Air Marshal (retd) Asghar Khan, Prof (Dr) Allama Tahirul Qadri and Allama Sajid Husain Naqvi, here on Wednesday, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal chief said the step might lead to emergence of the "third political power" which was badly needed in view of the disillusionment of the masses at the hands of both the ruling parties, the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittihad].

A written statement issued on the occasion described the efforts as "a crusade" against injustices and socio-economic disparity. It invited various sections of society to respond to their call. Mr Asghar Khan and Prof Tahirul Qadri said they had initiated efforts to contact other political parties and groups separately. "Our doors are open to all," the TI chief said the step had been taken in "slow haste" so that a firm leap forward could be taken. The leaders made it clear that they had not yet entered an alliance.

19-point Programme: The 19-point programme however is limited to only the broad principles and details of several major political issues which have yet to be decided. The three leaders said in reply to questions that issues like provincial autonomy and the Eighth Amendment would be sorted out later. They agreed, however, that there was no need for immediate mid-term polls.

In reply to a question, Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan said none of the three parties had decided to launch a movement against Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. "We want change in the system not the removal of individuals," he emphasized.

To another question, the TI Chief said his party had never advocated secularism, but always pleaded for a society based on Quran and Sunnah.

As for clarification of the first point in their programme regarding supremacy of the Quran and Sunnah, Prof Tahirul Qadri said public law would be "hanafi" but all other sects would be governed by their own public laws. As for the Shia community, TNFJ would decide
their personal matters. Similarly, non-Muslim minorities would be allowed to practice their own religion and have complete communal freedom.

Asked about his relationship with Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif, Prof Tahirul Qadri said “Mian Sahib had occasionally sought from me spiritual guidance, not political consultation.” Both the PPP and the IJI were “idols of evil,” he remarked.

To a question, Prof Sajid Naqvi said the TNFJ had concrete evidence that Lt Gen (Retd) Fazel Haq was involved in the murder of Allama Arif Hussain Al-Hussaini, and that a number of institutions and personalities were also involved. But investigation of the case had not been done properly. If an impartial inquiry was instituted, the TNFJ would provide the evidence, he assured.

The nine-member coordination committee comprises Mian Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Ms Mehnaz Rafi and Syed Zafar Ali Shah (TI), Mr Raisat Ali Chaudhry, Mr Iqbal Mahmood Awan and Allama Ahmad Ali Kasuri (PAT) and Syed Wazarat Husain Naqvi, Syed Munir Husain Gilani and Dr Mohammad Ali Naqvi (TNFJ).

Need To Check Waste in Development Programs Stressed
4600080A Karachi DAWN in English 11 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Sultan Ahmed]

[Text] The Sindh Cabinet was last week considering not the protests of opposition leaders nor angry comments of perceptive professionals against the quality of work done on numerous development projects in the province but the loud complaints of its own Ministers against the poor quality of work in the projects in their respective areas with hardly any exception.

Neither the annoyance or anger of the Ministers nor the reality of the poor work done nor the setting up of a high-powered inspection committee of the Cabinet to stamp out such persistent evils was new. This sorry picture of waste, greed and fraud in the development sector afflicts other provinces as well. In fact, such an anti-thesis of development in a poor country is almost as old as the history of development in Pakistan.

The exhortations of successive rulers to the officials not to do such grievous injuries to the country, the severe criticism of the opposition leaders in one wave after another, exposure in the Press of the follies in this sector which have caused heavy losses to the country, the anti-corruption establishments in the provinces and the Centre, the President’s and later the Prime Minister’s and the Chief Ministers’ inspection teams have not altered the quality of the work done in most development projects, small or large.

The setting up of a large anti-corruption committee of 19 MNA [Member of National Assembly], headed by Lt-Gen. Majeed Malik earlier, with all the thundering headlines it made, could not check the pervasive evil nor get the wrong-doers punished even when identified clearly. Whether the new committee, headed by Malik Mohammad Qasem can succeed, where its predecessor had dismally failed, remains to be seen.

The officials concerned are so accustomed to doing such shoddy work or is it the outcome of the kind of contract system with its varied corruptions, large kickbacks, including that is in vogue in Pakistan, that they are not able to break out of that hardened habit. But broken it must be at any cost, and through any means, and this is the time to do that as we embark on the 1990s.

The number of such projects which can benefit from checking such shoddy work is very large. There are 2,114 on-going schemes in Sindh. 951 more were marked for execution in 1988-89, making a total of 3,065. Out of them 561 projects were completed. It is against the quality of work done on those projects, and alike executed earlier, the Ministers were protesting.

If all the projects, financed out of provincial, federal or foreign borrowing, are executed in time, and in good order, the province, which is afflicted by poverty and unemployment at one end and dacoities and major other crimes which are an offshoot of them, can gain a great deal. And if they are delayed, and the poor quality of the work done persists along with a sharp rise in the cost of the projects, the problems of the province will multiply.

Delay in execution of the projects could initially be due to delay in sanctioning them, and later allocating the funds. The proverbial red-tape could hold up the project further, particularly if they are federally or foreign aid funded projects. As the execution starts the negligence of the officials and endemic corruption pulverise the projects. Delay in the execution and inflation push up the cost of the projects far in excess of the estimate. Sub-standard work on the project follows, and when completed maintenance cost of the project is high, and yet its life is shorter than estimated. This kind of tragic environment in a developing country is created not by the officials alone but also by the politicians acting in concert or otherwise.

Hence the persistence of this evil. The Hub Dam is an outstanding or outrageous example of a project which has cost several times more than the original estimate because of delay in execution or sub-standard work. So its teething troubles are too many and quite costly. The record for the cost exceeding many times the original estimate is held by the Bolan Medical College Building, and ultimate figure will not be known until it is completed.

When it comes to the latest instance of poor workmanship, the runway for Boeings at Lahore Airport, which cost far more than originally estimated is a nightmare for the PIA [Pakistan International Airlines]. Because of the rough and uneven runway parts of the rattling Boeing planes keep on falling, making the flight more expensive for PIA.
For that matter in the home of the Federal Government, the Capital Development Authority is replete with scandals. The work done may not be too sub-standard but the cost has often shot through the roof.

The committee, headed by Gen. Majeed Malik said it had finalised 200 major corruption cases. After examining them, and adding more, Malik Qasem places the figure of cases under processing at 157.

The Sindh Cabinet has now set up a committee under Senior Minister Aftab Shaban Mirani, and comprising the Finance and Law Ministers and Adviser on Development Mr. P. K. Shahani and the Chief Secretary to inspect the projects at random and submit its report to the Cabinet within six weeks.

It will be easy for the committee to identify the weakness of each project it inspects with the help of technical experts, but it will be difficult to apportion the blame on the various persons and agencies concerned with it specifically. In the prevailing climate it may be harder to prevent it and punish the proven culprits. But the government has to try or try hard, eschewing all political pressures, party considerations and the manoeuvrings of the bureaucrats who are past masters in covering up their weakness by acting in close concert. If the committee does a slipshod work that will be bad as that would encourage the corrupt, inefficient and wasteful elements to go the same way as they have been at the cost of the province and the country.

Chief Minister Qaim Ali Shah has now to strengthen his inspection team of officials and make it more active and productive. Such inspection should not remain a ritual but become effective and pinpoint the weakness of each project and the culprits or gainers by that, and bring them to book. The anti-corruption machinery too should become more effective and result-oriented instead of passing through the prescribed motions as in the past.

Otherwise larger funds for development, which the provinces have been legitimately clamouring for, would mean larger waste and heavier corruption, and the corrupt elements would gain far more than the provinces. Large development funds, including in the health and education sectors, should not come as a bonanza for corrupt elements and add another chapter of corruption and waste in our development history.

The number of small projects in the country through which heavy loss of public funds is possible is increasing. There is the People’s Programme for which Rs. 2 billion was earmarked last year on a non-lapsable basis and Rs. 3 billion more this year. There are the MNAs’ and Senators’ programmes costing Rs. 50 lakh each year and the MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly]’s programmes costing Rs. 30 lakh annually. Possible waste and corruption in these areas have to be checked diligently instead of letting the politicians vie with the officials in practising or promoting corruption.

Of course, the delayed completion of too many projects which enhances the cost and increases corrupt practises must be ended. As Mr. Qaim Ali Shah says the thin spread of funds over a large number of projects must be stopped and projects completed as early as possible. That may not be easy as all the areas will clamour for early commencement and completion of projects within their limits. Yet everything possible has to be done to check the delay that results in large cost escalation.

Bureaucratic bottlenecks, like delayed sanction of the projects, red-tape which hampers their execution further after sanctioning, and undue delay in providing funds will have to be eliminated diligently. If this is done earnestly the projects will cost far less than they do now and will become useful to the country earlier, particularly in Sindh where unemployment is a major problem and rural poverty is appalling.

Not that the Sindh Government does not have the officials with the know-how to check such evils. But they have only to be enabled to do that without political intervention but also goaded to do that, and punished for serious failures.

Above all, quality must become the hallmark of our economic sector in the 1990s. That has to begin with the development projects, big and small. If instead the very projects, which are to provide goods and services go wrong, the end-result will be far worse.

Article Calls for ‘Tolerance’ in Nawaz’s Treatment of PPP

4600008080 Karachi DAWN in English 11 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Ayaz Amir: “Where Is Punjab Headed?”]

[Text] Now that Mian Nawaz Sharif, the Punjab Chief Minister, has shed his underdog image, it is time perhaps to look more closely at his style of politics. When he became Chief Minister of Pakistan’s most powerful province in December 1988 he caused consternation in PPP [Pakistan People’s Party] ranks. The loss of Punjab, hitherto the power-base of the party, was the last thing they were expecting. So they had a hard time reconciling themselves to this ugly reality. Hence the Prime Minister’s ill-advised remark, in her very first Press conference, about “selective rigging” in Punjab. Hence also the ill-conceived attempts to overthrow the Punjab Government.

Very rightly the PPP got egg on its face for its pains. As for Mian Nawaz Sharif, he gained in public sympathy, with even neutral observers looking askance at the PPP’s maladroit manoeuvres. That situation, however, no longer holds.

Far from being the underdog any longer, Mr Nawaz Sharif has been on the offensive for some time now. Whether in the moves to unseat the Frontier Government or the no-confidence motion against the Federal Government, the principal hand behind them has been
the same. Indeed Mr. Nawaz Sharif has let no opportunity go by without trying to exploit the numerous chinks in its armour. Any issue, whether big or small, has been an occasion for a full-fledged publicity campaign. The Fricos milk scandal and the outcry over the fertiliser shortage are cases in point. Furthermore, all manner of charges have been levelled against Ms. Bhutto—from surrendering national rights over the Wular Barrage issue to passing national secrets to the Indian Government. And lately, of course, heavy-handed attempts have been made to defeat the People's Works Programme.

Till such time that the Federal Government was the principal offender in the matter of Centre-Punjab relations it was possible to see Mr. Nawaz Sharif, unlikely though the thought may sound, as a knight on a white charger keeping the dragon of Federal high-handedness at bay. But with the PPP chastened by its experiences and sipping the cup of humility, those roles have been reversed. Mr. Nawaz Sharif is now the dragon breathing fire and defiance and Ms. Benazir Bhutto the embattled figure at the barricade (Mr. Jehangir Badr, Mr. Faisal Saleh Hayat and the other knights of the PPP's round table notwithstanding). This being the case, is it any surprise if Mr. Nawaz Sharif should begin to be judged by a more rigorous code of conduct?

For one thing, it is becoming hard to understand, let alone sympathise with, the mainsprings of the hostility that the opposition bears for the PPP. The opposition threw in every resource at its disposal into the no-confidence motion against the Federal Government. It put up a brave show and came within a sliver of success. But since these designs were thwarted in the end, should the Opposition not show a bit more grace and accept with a better heart the workings of destiny? But far from doing anything of the sort, they seem merely to be stocking the old fires with redoubled fury. To accuse the PPP, as the opposition leaders did at their recent gathering in Karachi, of working against democracy and victimising political opponents is a bit unfair.

The PPP Government has many faults but being high-handed with its opponents is not one of them. As for Ms. Bhutto herself, she is much more tolerant of her critics than many of those now sitting in the opposition. At a recent press briefing in Islamabad for a select group of journalists she had to put up with some very blunt criticism, including some charges that would have tried the patience of a saint. But she remained composed throughout and tried to answer the charges coolly. I have seen Mr. Nawaz Sharif and Nawab Bugti, not to mention the ubiquitous Mr. Altaf Husain, deal far less tolerantly with hostility at Press conferences.

This hardly means that the opposition parties should fold up their tents and forswear all opposition to the PPP Government. Pakistan does not deserve the quiet of the graveyard of which in any case it had more than its share during the years of martial law. But it certainly means that some wisdom and good sense should temper any outpouring of wrath and denunciation. As I have already said, the PPP Government seems chastened by its experiences and even the Prime Minister now admits that gross mistakes have been committed. Normally this should have led to a lowering of political tensions. But nothing of the sort has happened. Instead, things have only got worse, with the more extreme elements of the opposition keeping political temperatures raised.

How is it possible to look kindly at Mian Sahib's remark at a public meeting recently that anyone opposing him will have to face the gauntlet of the Muslim Students Federation [MSF]? The MSF's activities in fact have been so reprehensible of late that they have succeeded in alienating the Islami Jamiat-t-Tulaba, the student wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami which is an integral part of the IJI [Islamic Jamhoorri Ittehad]. This rhetoric is all the more noticeable when contrasted with the moderate tone of such opposition figures as Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Khan Wali Khan and even the leaders of the Jamaat-i-Islami. Perhaps these are the symptoms of success, for within the space of a year Mian Nawaz Sharif has risen to be a national leader. Still, hubris is not a quality beloved of the gods.

What to talk of political opponents being hounded by the PPP Government, there are recurring charges on the part of those IJI MNA [Member of National Assembly]s who supported the PPP in the no-confidence motion that they are facing victimisation at the hands of the Punjab Government. None of these charges has been conclusively denied. There have been, besides, heavy-handed attempts to put a stop to the People's Works Programme in the province. There may be many faults with the People's Works Programme but two wrongs do not make a right.

Punjab should not have to carry the burden of such politics. Better to keep the Nawab of Kalabagh a distant memory than a model for present-day imitation. One caveat, however, remains in order. Bluster need not be met by bluster. Some of Malik Ghulam Mustafa's recent statements (like getting rid of Mian Nawaz Sharif in three months) owe more to valour than discretion. The crucial task facing the PPP in Punjab is to reorganise its ranks and infuse them with a new spirit. Once that is done, other problems will come closer to a solution. At any rate, the tone and language of politics in Punjab must improve. Mazhar Shah and Sultan Rahi are good for an evening's entertainment but scarcely role models for today's politics.

State Bank Annual Report on Economy Cites Growth

460000794 Karachi DAWN in English
11 Jan 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Karachi, Jan 10: A GDP [gross domestic product] rise of 5.1 percent indicates that the national economy maintained its growth momentum in spite of a decline in industrial production in some parts of the country and
the damage wrought by floods, says the State Bank of Pakistan's Annual Report, 1988-89 released here on Wednesday.

Pakistan's macro-economic performance during the fiscal under review shows encouraging signs and also underscores areas of weaknesses, the report says.

Tangible progress was witnessed in the area of demand management and cautious fiscal policies led to a sizeable reduction in the Budget deficit from 8.4 percent of GDP to 6.7 percent.

Determined efforts to mobilize additional resources and to curtail expenditure alone could make that possible, the report said.

The report notes that Federal expenditure on general administration, which had registered a decline of 28.5 percent during the previous year, increased by 9.1 percent in 1988-89.

Increased reliance on foreign assistance and non-bank borrowing to bridge the budgetary gap has obvious implications for national indebtedness—both domestic and foreign, the report said.

Despite declines in rice and cotton production, value added in the agricultural sector rose by 6.1 percent during the year as compared to 2.7 percent in the previous year, according to the report.

Because of an increase in wheat and sugarcane, production of major crops rose by 7.8 percent in 1987-88; minor crops, too, registered an increase during 1988-89, albeit small—2.9 percent—as against a decline of 2.8 percent a year ago.

While national savings rose by 6.1 percent, as against a negative growth of 5.3 percent in the past year, the bulk of this growth came from the public sector; private savings edged up a meager 0.5 percent compared to the 57.9 percent increase recorded in public savings.

As a result, the share of public savings in national savings rose from 9.8 percent to 14.6 percent, while that of private savings fell from 90.2 percent to 85.4 percent.

A slow growth was witnessed in the country's f.o.b exports which increased by only 5.3 percent from 4,457 million dollars to 4,693 million dollars in 1988-89, mainly due to a decline in per unit values.

The largest increase was registered in the export of primary commodities which rose by 22.2 percent. Semi-manufactures showed a small export growth rate of 1.6 percent. Manufactured goods, however, declined by 2.5 percent.

Imports (c.i.f.) aggregated 7,069 million dollars during 1988-89, up 10.5 percent over the previous year's imports.

A deficit of 117 million dollars over the previous year's figures pushed the services account in the red by 1,498 million dollars, adding to the trade deficit that expanded by 2.1 percent from 2,557 million dollars to 2,611 million dollars in 1988-89.

Slower growth in exports and an appreciable decline in remittances coupled with an increase in imports and service payments (notably debt servicing) exerted much pressure on the balance of payments, causing the current account deficit to increase from 1,682 million dollars to 2,027 million dollars. At 4.9 percent of the GNP [gross national product], this was the highest on record.

Prices generally maintained an upward trend during 1988-89. The 12 month average of Consumer Price Index worked out to 10.4 percent as compared to 6.3 percent a year ago. The Wholesale Price Index, however, declined to 9.7 percent from 10 percent.

Another disturbing factor was the Rs 18.4 billion rise in the consolidated expenditure of the Federal and Provincial Governments, which totalled Rs 198.7 billion during the year. While current expenditure increased by Rs 17.16 billion to Rs 150.7 billion, development expenditure rose by only Rs 1.3 billion to Rs 48 billion.

This was partly offset by a 19.6 percent rise in government revenues which increased from Rs 117 billion to Rs 140 billion.

Gross fixed investments and the country's external resources both declined during the year. Their growth rates were 10.5 percent and 27.3 percent respectively as compared to 11.2 percent and 139.8 percent respectively in 1987-88.

Monetary expansion in 1988-89 saw a declaration with assets growing by 4.7 percent during the year and credit expansion rising by 7.1 percent. The respective growth rates during the previous year were 12.1 percent and 12.6 percent.

Aggregate market capitalization of ordinary shares listed on the Karachi Stock Market increased by Rs 5.8 billion but the turnover of shares in the ready market declined by 1.4 percent during the year.

The State Bank report holds that Pakistan's economy being basically resilient and considerably diversified, it should be possible to achieve a GDP growth rate of five percent in the coming years together with effecting some reduction in the size of the twin deficits.

The report suggested priority attention to problems relating to additional resource mobilization and to balance of payments.

It also called for a serious effort towards reducing the degree of dependence on external resource flow, besides emphasis on a greater role for the private sector and market mechanisms in the economy.

Stressing the need to continue with the process of financial reform, the report said that the structure of rates of return on financial institutions' instruments, particularly
on Government's borrowing from banking and non-banking sectors as well as on various schemes of concessional lending, needed to be rationalized.

Summary of State Bank Report in EBR.

Commentary: Free Press From Violence, Pressures

46000079C Karachi DAWN in English 11 Jan 90 p 7

[Text] There are solid moral and professional reasons why the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors [CPNE] is today observing a "Freedom From Violence and Pressure Day". The Day is being observed against the background of repeated attacks on newspaper offices and their staffs in an increasingly vicious manner. In Pakistan's history attacks on Press freedom have mostly come from the Government. But latterly the attacks have started coming in a mounting crescendo from a new quarter—motivated lobbies and militant groups which are ever willing to unleash violence and use intimidation against the organs of the Press in order generally to secure publicity for themselves or have it denied to others. Most political parties, whether in government or in opposition, are guilty in varying degrees of resorting to pressure tactics against newspapers and thus endangering not only the freedom of the Press but also the newly revived democratic order. This is surprising in a country where the four decades since independence have witnessed colossal political tragedies stemming from a denial of civil liberties and political freedoms. By now, almost all political parties have had the heady taste of power and also have endured spells of rigor and persecution while in the opposition. More than anyone else, the political parties have a direct experience of the trauma of suffocation and anguish when civil liberties are denied and the Press is gagged. Yet, surprisingly, now that we are having a fresh experiment with democracy, no political party has shown the good sense of respecting the freedom of the Press consistently or acting in a manner that would strengthen rather than undermine democratic values, of which Press freedom is a vital one.

Even in the highly developed countries with strong democratic traditions, newspapers have to live in an uneasy relationship with the government and more so with vested interests and commercial lobbies—but within the accepted parameters of mutual tolerance and respect. Lobbies and special interest groups may not always be very vocal and may operate discreetly and unobtrusively. But they do wield immense power and in some cases manage to influence newspaper policies. But higher literacy rates, mass circulations—running into millions of copies daily—and an enlightened and alert public opinion committed to propriety and democratic values come to the aid of newspapers which in turn are alive to the expectations and sensitivities of the readership. Newspapers in those societies have also to show proper respect for the sensibilities of ethnic and religious minorities and are careful about not publishing anything that might be derogatory to them or hurt their feelings. Yet, whenever a newspaper has erred on any of these counts, every citizen, directly offended or not, has the unquestioned right to demand rectification in the form of a retraction or a correction in the same paper. Citizens also have the right to take legal action or register a protest where such a course is called for by a prima facie imputation or offence in print. In Pakistan, it seems many political parties and student unions have forsaken these established methods in their dealings with newspapers and consider resort to force as the best or only means of seeking redress for a real or imagined grievance. Virtually all newspapers have a sorry tale to tell. Many of them have had their offices attacked, ransacked, in some cases, even burnt, their staff manhandled, unlawfully detained or held hostage by men audacious enough not to hide their party or group affiliations. Yet not one political party is on record having expressed regrets or concern over such happenings or making amends for acts of vandalism and coercion. The phenomenon was registered in central Europe in the 1930s when Fascism ultimately triumphed and destroyed democracy and all organs of constitutional government.

In our context, it is disquieting to note that most political parties contain elements with Fascist tendencies in their ranks, and the top leaderships make no attempt to restrain them or wean them out. Silencing newspapers by terror and violence may fetch temporary benefits to a political party or faction. But by their very nature, such methods have a tendency to recoil ultimately on the practitioners by producing a snowballing effect and creating a general pattern if irresponsible and high-handed conduct in which yesterday's perpetrators become today's victims. In the longer run, when all light is blown out, the nation itself is the loser. Today, when the CPNE is observing the "Freedom from Violence and Pressure Day", we hope all political parties will do a spot of solemn introspection and reassess their relationship with the Press from the point of view of propriety and democratic norms. The foremost need for them is to remove the Fascist elements from their ranks. It is not enough to profess faith in democratic politics and values; what is more important is to adopt a truly democratic and tolerant attitude and make it the ruling norm of conduct at every level. Unless the political parties uphold by word and deed the virtues of tolerance and reasoned restraint, the future of freedom of expression—and, indeed, of democracy—will be very bleak.

Editorial Views Lawlessness, Security Barricades

46000079D Karachi DAWN in English 11 Jan 90 p 7

[Text] Iron gates on public roads may be a grotesque sight. But those who have erected them in Karachi have valid reasons for doing so. These gates give people a sense of protection against sniping and sudden mob attacks as also against robberies or kidnappings. Built on both sides of a street they can be shut in emergencies. Locked up at night, they can keep dacoits away. This is the citizens' way of ensuring for themselves a semblance of security in an environment where the law enforcement
agencies have failed to provide protection against the machinations of lawless elements. The move to demolish them without providing for adequate security arrangements is agitating the citizens. Recognizing this anxiety, the Commissioner of Karachi has assured the citizens that the gates already built will not be pulled down and warned, at the same time, that the administration will not allow new gates to come up. Up to a point, the administration is justified in taking note of streets barricaded by these iron gates. In some localities, the gates interfere with traffic. Those who have built them are sometimes in a hurry to close them a little too early in the evening, and this often causes great inconvenience to motorists who, as tax payers, have the right to use roads at all hours of day and night.

Nevertheless, the administration would do well to realize that water, power and transport—which were previously considered Karachi's main problems—have now taken a secondary place to the law and order situation. What every Karachiite now wants first and foremost is security of life and property. He wants to go to his place of work and return safely.

He wants his children to return from school and college safe and sound. At night he wants a good sleep free from fear of burglary or dacoity. If the administration cannot ensure this basic security, it is difficult to see how it can convince the people that they should not adopt security measures of their own, even barricading their streets by building new gates. Meanwhile, the police have to dispel the impression that some of their staff are mixed up with society's criminal elements. It cannot be denied that in many areas, where people have handed over security arrangements to private agencies, there has been an appreciable fall in crime. To gain any measure of public confidence, the police will have to improve their performance by weeding out the corrupt and inefficient from their ranks. Unless they visibly succeed in bringing the crime graph down, people will be within their rights to make their own security arrangements—including the building of gates. While doing so, however, it is their civic obligation to ensure that their private security systems do not become a cause of inconvenience for pedestrians and motorists.
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