SOVIET UNION
MILITARY AFFAIRS

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LT GEN BABYEV ON MILITARY ECONOMY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 87 p 5

[Report by Col P. Altunin: "A Meeting With Military Journalists"]


After describing the state of finance and economic work in the Armed Forces, he discussed in detail the role and the responsibility of commanders, military management and finance workers in the efficient utilization of money and matériel. Comrade Babyev particularly stressed the importance of creating good living conditions for the fightingmen, of conservation and thrift, and of combating such negative occurrences as theft and losses.

Lieutenant General V. Babyev answered questions from the journalists.

11499
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ROLE OF PARTY COMMISSION IN OVERSEEING COMMANDER

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 87 (signed to press 4 Mar 87) pp 9-15

[Article by Lt Gen Ye. Makhov, military council member and chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "A High Measure of Modern Requirements"]

[Text] Changes which took place in the work of district party organizations after the 27th CPSU Congress are indicative of the fact that many communists have actively engaged in the process of restructuring, are more boldly renouncing outdated views and concepts, and are striving to increase responsibility for the affairs of their military collectives. More than 80 percent of CPSU members and candidate members show good or excellent results in combat and political readiness. The number of instances of negligence, lack of discipline and infractions of moral standards has dropped noticeably. In short, certain changes have taken place in people's consciousness and their relation to party and duty responsibilities. But--let us say it right out--the changes are not great and they haven't come easy. They have required political organs and party organizations to intensify supervision of every communist's efforts, increase demands in setting personal example and exhibiting the straight and honest demeanor of a party member, and evaluate more fundamentally the contribution of CPSU members and candidate members towards enhancing combat readiness in the subunit (podrazdeleniye) and unit (chast).

A decisive approach in evaluating personnel was stressed at the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, consisting of an attitude towards restructuring and the practical matters of accomplishing it. Political organs and their party commissions are also governed by this requirement in their efforts to consolidate party discipline, supervise and monitor execution, and create in the primary party organizations an atmosphere of intolerance towards deficiencies, indifference and lethargy. We have accumulated quite a few serious and pressing problems. A number of party organizations have lacked sufficient combat readiness and exactingness of party members. They have not paid enough attention to imbuing them with high political-ideological qualities. Some communist leaders have not been subject to supervision or criticism, a fact which has led to serious deficiencies in their organization of combat training and education of personnel.
All of this obliges political organs to restructure their efforts more vigorously and show greater concern for the quality of their party ranks. Party commissions have an important role in this matter. Their membership has grown stronger in recent times thanks to communists of principle and initiative with considerable life experience who have established skills in educating people and strong organizational abilities. Methods used by political organs to manage their activities have also been gradually changing. Chiefs of political sections talk with party commission members more often, give them detailed instructions, and assist in planning their efforts and distributing responsibilities, taking into account their professional activities and work conditions. To a great degree this explains the growing influence of party commissions in enhancing the leading role of communists. In light of today's requirements they are improving CPSU membership admittance procedures and scrutiny of members' personal affairs. They have become more involved in supervising communists' fulfillment of the requirements of party statutes, congress decisions and CPSU Central Committee decrees. The main focus of attention in this regard is unit (chast) party collectives, which have been slow to apply the results of combat training and where acute questions of consolidating order, discipline and organization are evident.

Until recently we have not always paid this aspect of party commission activity the attention it deserves. And this automatically narrowed the scope of commission influence on the environment in party organizations. It happened that party commission members examined personal affairs without first becoming acquainted with the life and atmosphere of the party collective, without thoroughly studying the conditions that contributed to one delinquency or another. Not only did this often interfere with providing an objective evaluation of a communist's conduct, but also sometimes hindered other possible violations of the CPSU Statutes and party discipline from being averted.

Proximity to people and an effective knowledge of sentiments in the party environment comprise one of the most important conditions for effective party commission work. We are therefore striving on a broader scale to encourage their members to participate in performance checks as part of the working groups of political organs, and we often entrust them to make an independent study of one issue or another. The range of problems party commission members are required to deal with is constantly expanding. And this is only natural considering that the indifference, lack of conscientiousness and laziness shown by party members today in all spheres of our lives are particularly intolerable.

Results of combat training, the state of military discipline and the efficacy of educational work are determined to a great extent by the ideological qualities of communists, the degree of their personal effort and the intensity with which they fulfill the obligations entrusted to them. This applies first and foremost to communists in leadership positions.

We make no secret of the fact that there are still those among our leaders who exceed what they are entitled by military regulations, who use their official position for mercenary aims, who display haughtiness and conceit, who crudely treat their subordinates and disregard the standards of party life. And
sometimes the party organization lacks the courage and decisiveness to demand that communists change their conduct. A lack of control, connivance on the part of superiors, a low level of criticism and an unprincipled atmosphere in the party collective lead, as a rule, to a situation where a communist loses his true moral orientation and tolerates digressions from the requirements of CPSU statutes.

The absence of strict demands and an all-forgiving environment in the party organization have led, in particular, to a situation in which Lt Col V. Pronkin, a communist leader, grossly violated party and military discipline. Erosion of the moral principles of a party member did not come about all of a sudden. It began with an exaggerated sense of self-importance. He treated insignificant successes of subordinates in combat training as major achievements, striving to show himself in a favorable light in front of his superiors, and he concealed serious errors in the organization of personnel training and education. Although they did so timidly, other communists expressed how they regarded this eyewash. The officer haughtily brushed aside any valid criticism, however. And the party organization secretary lacked the courage to stand up for his own view and inform the political section. Sensing the relaxation of party exactingness and senior leaders' lack of control, the officer gradually backed away from fulfillment of his official responsibilities and conducted his everyday life in immoral fashion.

A party commission of the political section carefully studied all the circumstances of this matter and decided to make communist V. Pronkin answerable to the party. His CPSU membership was revoked and he was removed from his position by the command. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated instance. Severe party punishment was imposed upon communist leaders I. Kovalevskiy and V. Yushchihiev for dereliction of duty and substandard moral qualities; N. Yegorov, A. Soldyanov and B. Sorvirov were eliminated from CPSU ranks.

The 27th CPSU Congress has stressed that there should not be leaders who are immune from criticism and accountability to the party. In meeting this demand, political organs and their party commissions have begun to watch more closely how communists observe the CPSU statutes and our moral standards. At the same time, analysis shows that party commissions are still not taking full advantage of the opportunities they have to increase demands of communist leaders in fulfilling their official and party responsibilities, to intensify exactingness in areas on which the quality of combat training depends. The political directorate has reached certain conclusions from this. In particular, almost all members of the district party commission have recently participated in conducting inspections as members of composite groups. Included in such inspections are individual discussions with communists who occupy leadership positions with regard to the party program and statutes, materials from the 27th Congress and the January CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The practice of conducting regular evaluations of the duty activities of every communist, as well as of his social and political activities, is being actively instilled. Emphasis is being placed here on the personal example CPSU members and candidate members set and the leading role they play in training and duty performance, how they observe moral standards.
We are exercising continuous supervision of those communists who are undergoing party punitive action and who are the subject of criticism at party meetings of the active district membership and during the reporting of inspection results. For example, communist leaders A. Baranov, Yu. Shirokikh and B. Bulgakov were asked to appear before a session of the political directorate party commission after such criticism. Here in strict fashion they were shown their errors in managing subordinates and the ineffective support they rendered the party organization in matters of personnel training and education. A specific period of time was established for the elimination of deficiencies.

Following recommendations of the political directorate, inspections prescribed by party commissions now focus on questions posed by political organs as to the responsibility personnel have for neglect and dereliction evident in the quality of combat training and in the consolidation of military discipline. Constant supervision and all-encompassing evaluations of communists' activities provide timely reminders as to their party responsibilities, their duty to make critical observations and, when necessary, to raise the issue of calling people to account before the party.

The leadership exercised by the party commission of the political section where Lt Col V. Usoltsev works provides an experience deserving of our attention. Indulgence and oversimplification in the organization of weapons training were permitted in certain subunits (podrazdeleniye) on one occasion. While the unit (soyedineniye) commander took measures with respect to the guilty parties, the political section got involved as well. Its chief charged the party commission to make assessments of a number of communists who displayed a careless attitude towards fulfillment of their duty responsibilities. Serious charges were leveled specifically against officer I. Tustov, who devoted little time to the organization of combat training, failed to systematically monitor the skill improvements of his platoon leaders and company commanders, and allowed socialist competition to run its own course. A single fact explains this—the communist leader rested content with what had been achieved and stopped viewing his own activities with a critical eye. Asked to appear before a party commission session, he was shown in comradely fashion how he had exhibited complacency. He was advised that he must deal with people more frequently and better understand his subordinates, that he should better allocate time spent on the job and rely more on guidance from the party organization.

The errors committed by officer V. Safonov, CPSU member, were far more serious. An exacting commander and good organizer, he was inclined to claim for himself successes achieved by his personnel but attribute deficiencies exclusively to the organizational abilities and negligence of his subordinates. Given to feelings of hostility towards certain company-level officers, communist Safonov allowed himself to relate to them in a coarse, haughty manner. This was immediately reflected not only in the moral climate of the collective, but in the organization of training and the quality of tank-gunfire drills as well. The chief of the political section decided to bring communist V. Safonov to accountability before the party. He was reprimanded for being deficient in organizing the training process and for coarsely treating his subordinates.
During the same period, Lt Col I. Ilchenko, party commission secretary, and LtCols G. Manvekyan and A. Danilyuk, commission members, paid a visit to tank crew personnel during exercises at a training center. There they became convinced that, as before, the target field was in poor operating condition and officer communist Yu. Kuzmin, responsible for the readiness of training aids and equipment for exercises, was doing nothing about it. He was confronted directly with the question—why does a communist show indifference and passivity bordering on negligence? Serious critical reprimands were delivered to communist Kuzmin at a meeting of the unit's (soyedineniye) active party membership that convened soon afterward.

A high measure of exactingness and a principled approach on the part of members of this unit political section's party commission have a positive influence as well on the atmosphere within primary party organizations. Criticism is being heard more frequently at party committee and party bureau sessions, not only directed from above, as was often the case before, but aimed towards communist leaders as well. Those who are guilty of violating CPSU statutes are required to answer for their misdeeds primarily before their party organizations. Communists are regularly rebuked in front of their comrades with respect to compliance with regulations.

Participation of party commission members in the work of local political organ groups consolidates their ties to unit (chast) and subunit (podrazdeleiniye) party organizations, helps direct their joint efforts towards timely and objective assessment of the activities of every CPSU member, and facilitates intra-party communication. Based on inspection results, communists who are slow in improving their duty performance are brought before party commissions for discussion. The irresponsible conduct and duty attitudes of some are examined on a personal basis, as determined by the chiefs of political organs. In this regard, the active party membership and primary party organizations must be apprised of the results of such discussions, without fail.

In the spirit of self-criticism, however, we must admit that regular participation in inspections by party commission members, their nearness and close cooperation with party committees and bureaus, has not by any means become standard practice. Many still operate by the old procedures, associate little with party secretaries, the elective and active membership or ordinary communists. They are unwilling to get involved in the problems party collectives have to live with. Chiefs of political organs judge their efforts according to the number of people admitted into the party and number of individual matters examined.

The January (1987) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee resolutely denounced a pro-forma approach to the organization of supervision, inattention to indicators of abuses and violations, and keenness on secondary issues. One of the causes of serious dereliction in personnel policies, it stated, was a weakening of the role of supervisory organs both in the party and in the realm of state and social organizations. The plenum stressed that these organs must justify their high position and provide an example of fairness and adherence to principle.

These requirements make it incumbent upon the party commissions of political
organs to show greater urgency in restructuring their activities. We must still deal with instances where party commissions close their eyes to delinquencies of communists, where they respond too slowly to indicators and local complaints. The commissions release violators of party discipline from accountability and unwittingly encourage actions contrary to CPSU statutes, complacency and an all-forgiving attitude. Once strict exactingness is gone from everyday activities, the prospects of eventual punishment seldom yield the desired result. For punishment is imposed at a time when it is only necessary to ascertain the fact of a communist's gross violation of statutes.

The necessity to increase objectivity and adherence to principle by party commissions, to enhance their educational role and cease beating them on the tail, figuratively speaking, is urgently dictated in the interests of maintaining the example-setting, leading role of communists. Today only the first steps have been taken in the restructuring of party work--and only in some places at that. Certain political organs are approaching the matter of enhancing party exactingness timidly, looking all around before they make a move. Only in certain cases do they charge party commissions with conducting inspections to ascertain how communist leaders are fulfilling CPSU statute requirements with regard to improving their professional skills, showing honesty and unpretentiousness, treating people with attention and tactfulness, courageously exposing deficiencies and effecting their elimination, and observing the party and state discipline which is mandatory for all party members. There are times when our moral standards are disregarded and no timely assessment of the situation is made. It is a fact that everything related to a party member's moral make-up is felt especially acutely in the military collective. Indeed, we see instances where CPSU members and candidate members are severely punished by commanders and supervisors for drunkenness, crudeness and abuse of their official position, but they bear no party responsibility for their delinquent behavior.

It sometimes happens that party commission members display a blatant unscrupulousness. For example, officer Yu. Domorov, a unit (chast) deputy commander, was guilty of grave neglect in his official duty performance and personal behavior. He was accepted, nonetheless, for CPSU candidate membership and, one year later, became a party member. Even as a member, however, he continued his gross violations of party and military discipline, started on the road to alcoholism and followed an immoral lifestyle, for which his was expelled from the party. Here we see an example of inadequate scrupulousness on the part of the unit's party organization. And members of the party commission waived their objectivity in accepting Domorov as a party member, giving the officer reason to believe that there was nothing reprehensible about his behavior and leading him to think he'd be able to get away with it in the future.

Political organs and their party commissions do not always show consistency in the struggle against eyewash and abuse of one's official position. Any delinquency is, in fact, subject to party assessment--and public assessment at that. Sometimes party commissions and committees examine violations of CPSU statutes, bypassing the primary party organizations. Critique of an individual matter will take place behind closed doors and communists will not be informed of the examination results. Thus rumors get started, facts are
interpreted inaccurately and the instructional value of criticism is diminished. Understandably, none of this in any way facilitates establishment of a businesslike disposition, reciprocal high standards or an attitude of irreconcilability to deficiencies in the party environment.

Let us refer to just this one case. For a long time the serious faults of communist leaders A. Fomin and N. Voychenkov were not addressed by the party. Individual discussions were conducted, but that was the extent of it. It must be admitted that even workers in the political directorate who knew about the officers' unseemly conduct failed to insist on bringing them to accountability before the party.

The January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee evaluated the absence of an atmosphere of openness and genuine, collective involvement in the work of party organizations as a serious violation of the principles and standards of party life. The plenum made clear and concise recommendations as to how to avoid covering up deficiencies and solving problems in private. Here the most important thing is to develop constructive criticism, especially from below, and exercise supervision to eliminate deficiencies.

The political directorate assigns party commissions an important role in accomplishing this task, requiring them to make a scrupulous assessment of any attempts to suppress criticism or ignore the opinions of ordinary communists, and demanding they effect a regular accounting of CPSU members before their party organizations. In this regard, each accounting must be accompanied by lively discussion based on principle, by criticism and self-criticism, and by businesslike proposals. The accounting will conclude with an evaluation of the person who has rendered it.

In addition to intensifying demands we make in the job entrusted to us, we must resolutely avoid such "methods" as dressing people down or shoving them aside. A high measure of exactingness must be orchestrated with sensitivity and respect for other people. Communists guilty of one misdemeanor or another are not always given the attention their case merits—all the pertinent circumstances are not always thoroughly taken into account. We still see instances of prejudice, and an inability or unwillingness to investigate the details of a case. Disdain is sometimes shown for the arguments presented by one who has been called to account. In this regard, hastiness and premature conclusions in making an assessment which hinder objective appraisal of an individual's guilt can undermine that person's faith in justice, and in his own qualities and capabilities.

The political directorate considers improvement of the management of party commissions by political organs to be an important way of enhancing the effectiveness of commissions' work. We have achieved a situation where political section chiefs participate regularly in discussing plans for inspections, give personal instruction to party commission members on the eve of such inspections and analyze the results with them. But this is only half of what needs to be done. Most errors and miscalculations in organizing the supervision of communists, in educating them and investigating their personal affairs, can be attributed to a lack of competence on the part of secretaries,
especially those appointed for the first time to such a post. Most of them have not yet given enough study to the details and fine points of their job and require assistance on a daily basis. We therefore invite secretaries to the conferences of chiefs of political organs in addition to political workers' assemblies. We ask that they attend the quarterly, all-day sessions where experienced party workers make presentations. Members of the party commission of the district political directorate participate actively in the training of the lower-level active party membership.

We are discussing here a fairly broad range of problems. Specifically, we see where certain party commissions do not always react keenly to instances where an improper attitude is shown toward criticism, where no timely scrutiny is given to critical commentary made by communists during meetings. There are many instances where party commission decisions are afforded no timely discussion at the party organization level. Some issues are brought up for consideration there without any analysis of the reasons and faults which underlie them. In a number of cases the time devoted to investigating certain personal matters is drawn out without justification. The matter is now keenly being raised where we see certain party commissions taking a passive stance when officer communists who have committed serious faults are transferred from one position of leadership to another. Commissions fail to conduct individual interviews with CPSU members receiving punishment.

A subject of special concern to party commissions—and we constantly bring this to the attention of secretaries—is maintaining purity within CPSU ranks upon admission to the party. There are still cases where individuals try to enter the party based on mercenary, career-oriented motives. It is not always easy to identify them, which makes it all the more important to select young replacements using greater strictness standards, to better study the job-performance and moral qualities of prospective members, to avoid haste and condescension in affirming the decisions of primary party organizations. The way to do this is to consult more with communists and give more consideration to the opinion of servicemen who are not party members. And, of course, hold those providing recommendations further responsible for their objectivity and the assistance they offer prospective members. One out of every five communists in a district who recommend fellow workers to party membership renders a report on the instructional work the individual has conducted at party committee and bureau sessions. And it turns out that certain comrades have never been interested in the duty performance or actions of those they're vouching for. Then there are those who have deliberately recommended undeserving people, individuals who have shown serious negligence in their work. We have had to hold these party members strictly accountable for their lack of principle.

Although party commissions of political organs recently have noticeably increased the demands made of prospective members, we have still not managed to completely eliminate mistakes. This is due to inadequate responsibility being shouldered by the primary party organizations in preparing prospective party members, and by the fact that party commission members often acquaint themselves with the facts of admittance only at their conferences—they seldom attend the meetings during which applications are discussed. Nor is the substance of membership recommendations always analyzed in depth.
Further improvements in managing party commissions comprise an important aspect of the restructuring of party work. The deeper political organs delve into their problems, and the more they strive to enhance the role of commissions in organizing supervision, performance inspections and the education communists receive, the stronger will be the links between party commissions and the party organizations, the more appreciable will be the influence of CPSU members and candidate members on improving combat readiness and consolidating military discipline.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

GLAVPU CENSURES RR TROOPS FOR SHORTCOMINGS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 87 (signed to press 4 Mar 87) pp 16-22

[Article by Lt Gen A. Stolyarov, military council member, chief of the railroad troops political directorate: "Using the Criterion of Quality"]

[Text] The 27th CPSU Congress stressed the task of fundamentally improving quality of production in all of our efforts, a task which must become the concern of every communist and every worker. This requirement is fully applicable to railroad troops, who participate in a number of construction projects related to efforts which largely determine the extent of acceleration of the country's economic and social development. Such efforts include the Baikal-Amur Main Line, projects involving the railroad network presently in operation, power and fuel energy enterprises...

We aren't starting from scratch in fighting the battle for quality. Commanders, political leaders, military collectives, party and Komsomol organizations have had a great deal of experience in accomplishing transportation construction tasks and the organizational and political work involved in mobilizing people to provide a conscientious, intensive labor effort. This is precisely what has allowed us to fulfill the intense production tasks of the first year of the 12th Five-Year Plan and insure project implementation.

Among those who have made a substantial contribution towards accomplishing these plans we should mention soldiers of a separate railroad brigade—the Warsaw Order of Kutuzov, Red Star Order Brigade, three times awarded the challenge Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, All-Union Trade Union Council and Komsomol Central Committee. The brigade was awarded the memorial emblem "For Great Effectiveness and Work Quality in Support of the 11th Five-Year Plan," and entered on the All-Union Board of Honor at the Exhibition of Achievements of the USSR National Economy. Also among our right-flank units are the military collectives commanded by officer communists V. Baranov, V. Larin, I. Marchuk and A. Nikulin, also awarded challenge Red Banners. Instructive experience in party and political work directed towards insuring high quality of labor was gained in the collectives whose party organizations are headed by comrades V. Yefremov, Yu. Servachinskiy and G. Shashin.
But it is not enough today simply to consolidate what has been achieved. The search for more effective means of accomplishing significantly greater production tasks is being conducted in party organizations and in military and labor collectives. During the course of discussions in party and Komsomol organizations of the tasks proceeding from the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum, communists and Komsomol members have introduced many specific proposals for increasing production quality and efficiency. The military council has examined, confirmed and dispatched to the troops a plan containing measures to resolve this serious problem. A system of quality control has been developed and introduced. Military personnel are actively participating in socialist competition under the motto "We will execute the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and will celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Great October with selfless military labor!" As opposed to prior years, the main emphasis with regard to obligations here is on introducing the achievements of scientific and technological progress into production, on growth in labor productivity, lowering construction costs, increasing the quality of work accomplished and efficient use of material, technical and labor resources.

In short, we have set great goals. The road to them, however, is fraught with serious difficulties. The bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy has pointed out to us in strict fashion deficiencies in production activity and weak party influence in a number of units (chast), subunits (podrazdelemy) and labor collectives. Results of the first year of the five-year plan and two months of the second indicate that we still have not managed to take advantage of every opportunity to accelerate the speed of construction and increase production efficiency. Measures are planned properly and in timely fashion at troop level but, unfortunately, not all of them harmonize to achieve real output. The quality of construction at a whole number of projects remains low at present.

For example, work timetables at the collectives where Lt Cols N. Koryakovskiy and S. Ogrokhin serve as chief engineers often fall apart and the supply of construction materials is beset by stoppages. This leads to crash work, technological disturbances and low labor productivity. These deficiencies did not arise today. Time and again they were discussed at production conferences and party meetings. Not by a long shot, however, have all leaders managed to put the control mechanism right and become psychologically fine-tuned to a smoothly functioning operation. It is for these reasons that production targets in the units where officers A. Pinchuk, V. Leshchev and V. Kartshev serve are not being met.

For us, railroad troops, the plan is law. But we strive to see something else in fulfilling it--what stands behind the figures, what the price is of realizing what has been planned. The essence of increasing labor efficiency lies in doing more, with high quality and less expenditures. Presently in some collectives, a great deal of work remains to be done by hand, personnel and material resources are used inefficiently, and system violations are committed with respect to economizing on construction materials, lubricants, combustibles and electrical power. Large, non-productive expenses, losses and over-expenditures remain as a result, which lowers the economic indicators.
All of this is a result of inadequate responsibility on the part of personnel in accomplishing their duty obligations. Political organs and party organizations, however, do not always evaluate such instances in principled fashion. They sometimes play the liberal when strict demands and constant supervision are required. And they have been devoting little attention to the moral education of communists and of all personnel. It is for precisely this reason that we still have to deal with instances of extravagance, misappropriation, inflated volumes, work costs and hauled-off freight.

The low quality of work at several projects is especially disconcerting. Waste is, as a rule, the result of people's negligence, including communists, and a compromising attitude shown by party organizations with respect to deficiencies. The battalion which, until recently, was commanded by Maj Yu. Bogomolov, for example, was poorly prepared for the start of construction work. Even the commander himself and his technical engineering personnel failed to exercise practical supervision of compliance with technical standards and regulations and neglected to monitor the organization of geodetic work. With their direct connivance, construction on two projects was begun with design deviations. The work was halted only after senior leaders intervened. As a result, people's efforts went for nought, the construction deadlines were shattered and material losses were incurred, not to mention the moral harm suffered with regard to the soldiers' upbringing which is so difficult to repair. Officer Yu. Bogomolov received severe punishment through duty and party channels. Other responsible individuals were brought to accountability as well.

In this instance it is evident that leaders are to blame. But there is another cause for alarm—construction of these projects took place in full view of communists of the battalion. Although most of these individuals have an engineering background, no one paid any attention to work quality. Nor did members of the battalion party bureau, formerly headed by secretary Capt V. Khvastunov, and workers of the unit's political section rise to the occasion. They could not help but know that project construction was taking place accompanied by serious technical violations. In their hurry to report work initiation, however, they simply closed their eyes to this. It became clear during the course of an inspection that the political and organizational effort of the political section and party organizations, like the production effort as a whole, was based generally on volume and lacked any search for ways to increase quality and effectiveness, to make efficient use of equipment. Moreover, many communists failed to get properly involved in the details of organizing the construction and in the economic side of things. They were therefore unable to adjust the political aspects of specific production tasks. The party bureau and political section exerted too little influence on the quality of economic training for officers, warrant officers and conscripts, and on enhancing their qualifications. We see cases such as these as consequences of neglect by unit political directorates and political organs in the training and education of the party's active membership, in increasing the effectiveness of primary party organizations.

As is well known, quality is measured in many ways. It comprises competence, job mastery, responsibility, conscientiousness and the worker's sense of professional honor. The struggle for quality begins, therefore, with an
individual's training and upbringing, showing him concern and helping him psychologically to restructure his efforts from scratch and work to the full extent of his strength and abilities. Unfortunately, not all our commanders, political workers and party activists have turned their faces towards people. Not all have put the individual in the center of educational and organizational efforts. There are those who operate as before, setting their hopes on stark appeals or administrative pressure.

Such phenomena had to be dealt with in the brigade where Lt Col M. Shirokov works in the political section. Soldiers in the brigade's subunits were charged with a new construction project—they were allotted little time to accomplish a significant amount of work on construction of a military post, living quarters for servicemen's families. In this difficult environment, however, certain communists in leadership positions were unable to play their role in organizing and mobilizing. Project construction is taking place slowly, and quality is not high.

The political section tried to explain construction deficiencies here through a variety of objective reasons, but had little to say with regard to measures being taken to put the post in order. Sluggishness, lack of initiative and failure of certain leaders to take responsibility for improving everyday living conditions for personnel and establishing order—these were the main reasons for the unsatisfactory situation that had arisen. All the same, there were many officer communists in this unit who got to work without delay, providing high-quality construction work and showing daily concern for satisfying the everyday needs and requirements of the soldiers. People respond to this concern with high-quality labor and a conscientious attitude towards their job.

It would seem that political section workers and party activists would support progressive methods and make strict demands of communists who show negligence towards accomplishment of their job responsibilities. But, until recently, they lost sight of the issues dealing with educating CPSU members and candidate members. And the political directorate for the troops was unable to provide this political organ timely assistance in restructuring its work style, in abandoning its impractical management methods and overcoming complacent attitudes.

The January CPSU Central Committee plenum stressed that one of the lessons learned from working with personnel lies in reinforcing responsibility for jobs entrusted, increasing discipline and creating an atmosphere of mutual exactingness. Today we are aiming political organs and the active party membership of units in this direction. Indeed, using political methods to influence quality means, first and foremost, influencing people, increasing their conscientiousness, their sense of duty and professional honor.

Experience gained in the foremost military collectives confirms that where the party nucleus is stronger, where the party organization helps the commander mobilize personnel to perform conscientious work on a daily basis, there you will find construction work going on at a faster pace, with less imperfection and less waste. Thus, in a certain repair and maintenance organization, units
and assemblies which had just been fixed were often breaking down. Along with the commander, the party bureau sounded the alarm and advised that a public supervision group inspect the organization of repair work. The group, headed by Capt Ye. Pasternak, uncovered serious violations in the technical execution of certain operations and deficiencies in the work of the technical supervision section. Results of the inspection were put on the table for discussion by communists. During the course of strict and constructive discussion it was decided to focus on mobilizing people's efforts to achieve high quality in maintenance and repair work, to put this at the center of all educational work and socialist competition. Many communists were given specific tasks. Special requirements were presented to certain party members—the chief of the department of technical control, the public supervision group and a commission established under the party bureau, headed by Sr Lt S. Anokhin, to monitor quality. The best specialists from among Soviet Army soldiers and workers have joined the command in the struggle to achieve quality. In monitoring the quality of each worker's efforts and exposing to public view the results of execution of socialist obligations, they have forced people to tighten up and view their duties more responsibly. The commander and the party bureau held those guilty of negligence and irresponsibility strictly accountable. Instances of low-quality repair work and production defects have, with time, become the exception. Personnel have assumed the obligation of increasing the service life of repaired units and assemblies by a factor of 1.5. And the soldiers are keeping their word.

A search for available reserves and efforts to put them to use characterize the work of many of our military and labor collectives today. Enhancement of quality is seen as an extremely important ingredient in accelerating scientific and technological progress. In the enterprise party organization where V. Shchukin serves as party bureau secretary, for example, we see broad expansion of organizational and educational work in drawing people into the competition for the "Outstanding Quality Producer" title, for the right to work with a personal trademark. Much has been done for the certification of work places. "Quality Days" are being introduced, during which the finest production organizers—true masters of their art who have long operated without any waste—share their experience with comrades.

Unit political organs and party organizations are constantly steering people in the direction of conscientious and effective labor. More than half of all party and Komsomol meetings, mass political measures, presentations by members of agitation and propaganda groups and large-circulation newspapers are dedicated to the issue of quality and timely fulfillment of production goals. The political organ in which officer A. Samsonov serves and in which officer N. Rubeko is a member insures through purposeful and well thought-out political measures that production activity maintains a high degree of quality. These individuals thoroughly examine questions of production and economic life, the organization and management of construction, and the planning process. Their job knowledge therefore enables them to reinforce political work, joining with those categories of personnel on whom production success depends in one sphere or another.

Unfortunately, there are political organ workers and party activists who lack experience in working on specific things with specific people. They sometimes
substitute an administrative posture for this, exerting pressure when what is needed is an all-encompassing analysis and well thought-out approach, taking into account actual conditions and helping set things right, mobilizing people. Thus, in studying the work of the unit party organization where Capt. Ye. Nikitin served as secretary, we see that stark appeals prevailed; prolonged conferences and punishment of communists were relied upon. Naturally there was little benefit from such "influence." The collective lacked rhythm in its operation; plans were scuttled. What specific measures did the party bureau take in order to correct the situation? When posed this question Capt Nikitin replied: "The chief engineer of the battalion will be brought to accountability before the party." When the conversation turned to deficiencies in the organization of professional training, the secretary again hastened to assert: "We intend to investigate the chief of staff personally in the next few days." And he viewed bringing an administrative worker to party accountability as a reflection of party bureau efforts to improve everyday living conditions for personnel.

Of course it is necessary to be more demanding of every communist, but in so doing we cannot simply reduce everything to punishments and substitute them for painstaking work accomplished day after day in educating communists. The political directorate and political organs of units have therefore begun to teach political workers and the active party membership more with regard to forms and methods of political influence in resolving specific production problems, improving technological and economic construction indices, establishing in the collectives an environment where instances of low-quality work accomplishment are not tolerated, where people show increased conscientiousness and responsibility, where party work is more effective.

The political address to the CPSU Central Committee at the 27th CPSU Party Congress stressed the task of making fundamental improvements in production quality. This task must become the pursuit of every communist and every Soviet citizen, of every person who respects his own labor and for whom the honor of the enterprise and of the department matters. Its fulfillment demands that continuous improvements be made in the work methods and style of the troop political directorate itself, that new approaches be developed in the struggle for quality, and that everyone's activity be evaluated strictly and in accordance with principle. The center of gravity for all political and organizational work has shifted to the local areas. Political directorate workers often visit units, assist political organs and party organizations in reinforcing their ability to effect accelerated scientific and technological progress, speed up the application of progressive technology and mechanization in production, show greater urgency in eliminating planning and supply deficiencies and shortcomings in labor accounting and the organization of socialist competition. Individual work with communist leaders responsible for quality in target quota fulfillment has been emphasized. Better work conditions have been established in the production arena and more safety technology violations have been averted. Political directorate workers visiting the local areas discuss things in detail with communist leaders and join with political and elective party organs in urging them to show greater courage in exercising creativity and initiative, to learn to work under conditions of broader democracy and growth in people's political and labor activity.
Along with this, we are striving to direct party organization efforts towards providing effective assistance to leaders with respect to using political means to insure fulfillment of socialist responsibilities, and consolidating discipline and organization. Positive steps are being taken in this direction but, quite frankly, it's going slower than it should. And this includes the activity of leaders in the upper echelon of troop headquarters. Only this can explain the fact that in a number of places, like before, projects are turned over incomplete, production work stoppages occur and we see annotations.

Housing construction and projects designated for social and cultural use are specially needed. We are proceeding here from the directives of the January CPSU Central Committee plenum, which noted that ties to the social sphere are an indispensable criterion for the political and business maturity of any leader. We must note that the everyday-living issues are being dealt with more effectively today. The housing projects where officers N. Koshman and N. Tikhonov serve have been completed ahead of time. But there are also examples of returning to the past. How much discussion there was, how many appeals were made with regard to completing the housing project in the military collective where officer P. Karpov serves as a political worker—especially in view of the fact that many families of servicemen are on the lists to obtain living quarters here. The task of putting these homes into service, however, was frustrated primarily by a lack of administrative and organizational ability. Or let us take the unit in which officer T. Ratlashvili serves, where a barracks was built to replace the old one. This was not just a poor-quality job—there were obvious defects, elimination of which would require additional expenditures. But neither the unit political organs nor party organizations held the guilty parties duly accountable for failure to fulfill the established plans and poor-quality workmanship.

We consider our main task to consist of increasing party responsibility at all levels for breaches of discipline, waste and defects. Serious steps have been taken to improve the activity of staff and directorate employees, to increase the role and effectiveness of staff party organizations. Many of these have begun to make principled evaluations of deficiencies in production planning and organization, instances of crash work, and the inclination of certain leaders to accomplish production tasks at any price—to correct the situation at a project site not by searching for internal reserves, but by acquiring additional means and resources.

We are also concerned about improving the education of personnel in economic matters. Every leader has been assigned the job of making a thorough study of and becoming intimately familiar with the practical aspects of the entire set of issues related to accomplishment of the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures to Improve the Economic Mechanism in Construction." Economic instruction is included in the officer training plan. The network of universities, lecture bureaus for economic and technological studies, and technical clubs for various categories of servicemen and employees has been expanded. However, the quality of their efforts today is not high. The chief means we have at our disposal for dealing with the situation involves, as before, improving the skill levels of
our specialists, and increasing the classes and categories of construction personnel.

We associate the implementation of these means with intensification of ideological work in imbuing our personnel with feelings of responsibility for high-quality achievement of target goals and the socialist obligations they have undertaken. Matters related to increasing the quality and effectiveness of troops' production activity are being studied in all forms of political instruction, and lie in the forefront of agitation and propaganda work and cultural enlightenment efforts. Slowly but surely such studies are supporting production needs and being applied specifically to the economy, organization of labor, education of personnel in economic matters and assimilation of the most progressive methods. In working with people, more and more emphasis is being placed on the moral aspect of the quality question. Servicemen's training is stressing pride in one's unit and enterprise, the overall contribution railroad troops are making to strengthen the country's defense and economic might. Substantial changes are being made today in the organization of agitation and propaganda work and the entire effort to thoroughly study and interpret the decisions of the January CPSU Central Committee plenum.

The construction process, with its achievements and shortcomings, is inseparably linked with the processes of organization, military order and discipline. No matter how much we might talk about improving quality, there will be no change for the better until such time as we introduce appropriate order and procedures into all sectors of the work place, until we put an end to crash work once and for all. There is a direct interrelationship here--quality will improve when we are able to work in precise rhythm.

I will state directly that we have still not succeeded in overcoming a disposition some communist leaders have to dealing only with production issues, a striving to meet target quotas at any price--by violating established procedures or disregarding people's everyday needs and material welfare. Production itself suffers in the end. This is exactly what happened in the collective where officer S. Ivanov heads the party committee. Indeed, we know that people will perform high-quality work where there is conscious discipline, varied and interesting leisure pursuits and comfortable living conditions. When the soldier's intensive work day is scheduled according to a timetable, literally down to the minute, when precise schedules are observed for both work and leisure and there's no wasted time, that's when you see people looking smart and well-disciplined, who will provide the greatest quality output. This is why we are orienting personnel, all communists, towards a more active psychological restructuring, towards putting things in perfect order in every sphere. We are teaching people to begin with the moral formula--a conscientious, creative attitude towards one's work.

The military council and the political directorate for railroad troops see their first task as shifting construction management to a qualitatively higher
level and perfecting work styles and methods in both the organizational staff and the outlying areas. We do have reserves—first and foremost in the consolidation of discipline and organizational methods, in overcoming mismanagement and in increasing the personal responsibility of all our personnel for the state of affairs in our assigned sector.

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9768
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PROBLEM OF TRAINING QUALIFIED SUBMARINERS IN LIMITED TIME-SPAN

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNIKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 87 (signed to press 4 Mar 87) pp 37-42

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Ivanov, nuclear ballistic missile submarine commander, under the rubric "High Quality in Training and Education": "Ocean Navigation--A Test of Maturity"]

[Text] A submarine at its mooring appears heavy and clumsy. But out there in the ocean from which we just came, it is maneuverable and obedient to man's will. Its powerful nuclear engine, sophisticated instrumentation and modern armament enabled our crew to defeat the underwater "enemy" in single combat. All the same, while rendering the perfection of our ship its due, I well understand that this training battle has confirmed once again what we know is true—even the most reliable technology will do what it's designed to do only when it is under the capable command of an experienced specialist, a master of his art. The poorly trained sailor, petty officer, officer or warrant officer has never been and, most assuredly, will never be a true master of technology.

But let us pose this question—how long does it take to turn a novice into the master we require? Can it be done in a year? In two years? Quite possibly. But an extremely high state of combat readiness is necessary not years from now, or even months, but today—always and at every moment. How can we provide this if not just a few, but many crew members still have a long way to go before they reach true mastery?

A problem? No doubt about it. Inevitably it confronts every collective, commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations. Our crew is no exception. In recent years we have been distinguished by a rather high level of training. We never received less than excellent ratings in all our missile and torpedo firing exercises. Although it seemed we couldn't want anything more, we had to ask ourselves—do we have room for improvement with respect to enhancing our combat readiness? Time does not stand still. It trudges on, presenting people ever increasing requirements, requirements of their skills and knowledge. As it turns out, we did have room for improvement. There were interference-causing factors—not highly significant, but present nonetheless in many elements. An unfavorable convergence of events could cause these factors to affect the results of the next exercise. For example, errors on the part of men in the torpedo department headed by Captain 3rd Rank S. Ivanov led to a delay in firing a salvo during one of the
cruises. This indicates a low level of training. The sonar system, under the direction of Captain Lieutenant A. Surzhenko, was operated below capability. Mistakes were evident in the performance of the navigation officer, Captain Lieutenant L. Sidorov, who at times lacked perspective in his thinking and the ability to predict complex situations. He sometimes failed to develop judicious proposals for the ship's battle plan.

We might reassure ourselves, of course--people are learning after all. Time will pass and shortcomings such as these will be a thing of the past. The submarine's combat readiness requirements, however, did not allow such thinking. In other words, we had to find another way. We had to see to it that our subordinates squeezed far more into their time by way of acquiring knowledge and assimilating skills than ever before. Experience suggested we might achieve this primarily through an efficient alignment of theoretical and practical training for our specialists. What do we mean by this? Even with the most intensive training, today's specialist cannot in a short time delve into all the fine points of the functioning of one or another mechanism, instrument or complex system. But he can be taught fairly quickly how to execute well the necessary operations. More attention must therefore be devoted to sailors' practical training.

One of the main ways to achieve this is continuous drills and training exercises, whose purpose is to prepare each crew member to execute the tasks he is assigned. This is especially true with respect to officer personnel. Officers receive their theoretical schooling at naval institutions and improve their knowledge in military and individual studies conducted on shore. They all basically acquire the practical aspects at sea--this is where a submariner becomes a submariner. This is why training conducted during cruises relies fundamentally on those forms which encourage their tactical thinking, their ability to make the best decision under the given circumstances and decisively implement it. Here we are talking about tactical coaching sessions, drills and exercises. Critiques and lessons learned from the experience of top officers are very valuable here.

One thing we have adopted as a rule--to develop new, not previously encountered or seldom encountered issues for every training period in the officer training system, to create an unusual, ambiguous, contradictory environment. This type of approach will encourage officers' creative thought and accelerate their development, and will have a most spontaneous effect on the ship's combat readiness. In the course of solving these non-standard problems, instructive tactical novelties will come up from time to time. Thus, during the most recent extended ocean cruise, we worked out a method that reduces considerably the execution time for a torpedo firing. The idea arose during one of the exercises in officer training. The proposal by certain communists was discussed at a session of the party bureau. Specialists made the necessary calculations. The torpedo attack which was then conducted against the training target showed the effectiveness of this new tactical approach.

At the same time, when we see everywhere we look today the ongoing struggle to restructure consciousness, psychology and our thought processes, it is impossible not to notice that officer training requirements are increasing
significantly. So many times over my period of service I have seen ship
captains and department heads strive to conduct a short tactical exercise in
an interesting, instructive fashion; yet they are unable to attain the desired
result. The professional skills of their subordinates improve slowly. The
ranks of "average performers" are not thinning out. Why is this? It is
because communist leaders in the collective demand little of those who,
figuratively speaking, do not like to break their backs? Sometimes the party
organization fails to provide true support to the commander in working with
people. Yet one of its chief tasks is to increase party influence over all
aspects of people's jobs and in their lives. How can this be done except
through communists themselves?

This is why I, my political officer and party activists have attempted to
imbue in CPSU members a special disposition, to develop in them a feeling of
navy comradeship, high exactingness of themselves and their comrades, and a
faith in one another's trustworthiness. The responsibility communists have to
establish a healthy moral and psychological atmosphere has been the subject of
discussion at party meetings and at party bureau sessions where CPSU members
and candidate members delivered reports on their party and official duty
performance.

The ability of party activists to delve into the fine points of combat
training exerts a tremendous influence on officers' professional training
development. We can't hide the fact that we had specialists in our day who
demanded more from their subordinates than from themselves, who were satisfied
with sustaining an average training level. These people started to feel
uncomfortable when Captain 3d Rank S. Prisyazhnuy took over the party
organization, a man of principle and great authority. Under his direction,
party bureau members became increasingly demanding of officer communists with
regard to their professional training level and progress achieved in the
officer training program. Laudatory comments were heard less frequently at
party meetings and more criticism was presented. The party organization set
about popularizing progressive methods in a serious fashion. Especially
important here is the fact that the methods under discussion were based not on
general, overall experience, as was the case before, but on specific examples.

An interesting proposition, for example, was made by Captain 2d Rank L.
Voronkov, chief engineer. Based on extended observations, his proposal
envisioned a number of measures which, if implemented, would reduce the ship's
overall noise level, enhance secrecy and conserve energy resources
appreciably. Party bureau members helped to put the officer's idea into
effect, then organized its debut before his colleagues. Not an extraordinary
measure in principle, this enabled officer communists to direct their thoughts
to the arena of solving an important problem. This is attested to by virtue
of the fact that, over the course of several days following its discussion, a
number of proposals were presented developing and expounding on the engineer
officer's idea.

Certainly there are other problems in the development of officer professional
training. Let us correlate facts and figures. One of the flagship
specialists, for example, calculated that if specialty-oriented instruction is
conducted twice a week, and drills--three times a week (although,
realistically, you would get more on a cruise), then over the course of a year it would be necessary to compile about a hundred different plans for conducting instruction and drills. Plans for developing tasks in the area of general training would have to be added to this. And each plan would entail drawing conclusions, making evaluations and entering them in the records. Spending a great deal of time compiling plans, the commander deprives himself of the opportunity to seriously prepare for training. Commanders therefore choose another route, more often than not, and simply rewrite the same thing year after year.

I do not think it would be very difficult to resolve this situation. We must simply reduce the number of such plans, leaving them in those instances where it would really be difficult to get along without them—in the organization of complex training exercises and drills. For the remainder we should limit ourselves to working outlines. As far as inspections are concerned, officers should be evaluated based not on how much paperwork they have produced (as is still the case at times), but on how people are actually being trained.

Let us consider the question of planning for training over the period of a cruise. Sometimes training is scheduled not only by the day, but by the hour. But circumstances might dictate that it would be better to conduct instruction rather than drills. What do you do? Conduct instruction. A plan is not dogma, but guidance for action. In any case, it should not prevent the commander from exercising initiative. The experienced commander will always find an opportunity to teach his subordinates what they need to learn. At sea, for example, we took advantage of a favorable situation to conduct a complex instructional exercise. This took a lot of time, of course. And we didn't manage to complete some of the drills that had been planned. We wanted to scrape up an hour or two for them but the crew was given first one new tasking, then another. Nonetheless, the sailors assimilated what they had to. Captains 3d Rank S. Slyusarenko and S. Prisyazhnnyy and other officers organized the material which had been missed during inspection, repair and testing of technical equipment.

In general, if our topic of conversation is specialized training for submariners, I would say that the system today does not provide for rapid growth in specialists' acquired skills and knowledge. The technology has become too complex for people to learn how to use it in a short period of time if we are to limit ourselves to traditional forms of training. We must therefore look for non-traditional forms. What are they? A series of measures is used on our ship in order to intensify the training process—sailors study their areas, load ammunition, conduct maintenance and repair of assemblies and machinery, and accomplish a variety of measures with technical orientation.

And here I should say quite candidly that much depends on the commander, on his ability to seek new ways and think creatively. The sole commander is the one who sets the tone with respect to personnel training and education. It is he who tunes the collective to a certain working pitch, and combat training results depend on the course he takes. Here is a typical example of this. On our most recent ocean cruise we conducted a complicated exercise with a certain final purpose in mind. Earlier such operations were conducted in the
form of group or small-scale tactical exercises in which only officers took part. Of course these exercises provided some combat training benefit. But practicalities forced us to ponder—where can we derive the greatest benefit? During the cruise I conferred with a political worker and party activists and we weighed the possibilities. It was proposed that we conduct an exercise in which the entire crew would participate, an environment that would simulate combat to the greatest possible extent. The effectiveness of this complex exercise exceeded our expectations. Our specialists enriched their practical skills as well as their moral and psychological readiness. True, certain cautious voices were heard—it's a bit early to be celebrating, isn't it? How will they look at our independent activity "up there"? But senior commanders supported us. The benefit to the mission was evident.

We must not operate today always looking back, avoiding innovation and non-standard solutions to problems out of fear of what will come of it. I will note the following feature in this regard. The ability of a commander to rely upon his subordinates means a great deal—especially on his political officer, and the party and Komsomol organizations. They have it in their power to set up any measure. But the commander must steer the energy of his activists in the proper direction. This is the way, in principle, things have been arranged on our vessel. Initiative and creativity has been engendered in a great many interesting forms in communists and Komsomol members like officers V. Kidanov, V. Sorokin and others. This has allowed us to significantly intensify the training process. For example, unofficial get-togethers with experienced submariners—men who have quite a few extended cruises under their belts—have become a regular occurrence in our collective. At one of these meetings, Captain 3d Rank S. Slyusarenko, Senior Warrant Officer V. Moysya, and Warrant Officers V. Latyuk and A. Usichenko shared their impressions as to certain peculiarities of extended cruises and related some of the more complicated situations they encountered. They explained how they were able to overcome one difficulty or another. The experience of the best thus becomes the property of all.

I would like to touch upon another area. High-technology equipment has long been an integral part of the navy. Today's sailors live and serve, in essence, inside a gigantic machine. A significant amount of time is devoted to servicing machinery and weapons systems by ship personnel on a single combat shift who comprise part of the crew. Rotating combat shifts operate the propulsion system equipment, effect steering and maneuver, provide communications, conduct observation, loading and surfacing, and take prerequisite action in bringing weapons and technical equipment to an immediate-action readiness condition. Submariners perform their duties at their combat posts and sections isolated from one another. Each sailor, petty officer and officer must therefore have an especially high sense of responsibility and be able to function independently, competently and decisively, dealing with the situation as it develops.

All these factors leave a definite imprint on the physical and psychological state of personnel and must constantly be taken into account in the party's political work. Political plans are developed basically for the entire period of the cruise, taking into account the peculiarities of each stage—movement to the designated areas, mission execution and return to port. But to foresee
all the details ahead of time, to guess how events will develop would be unrealistic. Measures planned can and should undergo changes, depending on the circumstances. Ways to improve educational work must also be looked at in this light.

Experience shows that education is most effective when political influence is exerted on individual servicemen or groups of personnel on their shifts, in their elements and sections, at their combat posts. Naturally this does not exclude mass-scale measures, including general assemblies. But a differential approach yields a weightier output all the same—especially when we give a great deal of thought to placement of the party aktiv among the combat posts. Through their personal example, communists encourage their colleagues towards high-quality performance of their assigned duties, provide assistance to comrades who are on their first extended cruise, and participate actively in political education work. The political worker and party bureau secretary must approach the matter of exerting party influence on all aspects of servicemen's lives with creativity. The placement of communists will change with changing conditions.

There is one aspect I would like to turn to. Today's facts of life point out the urgent necessity to master the art of approaching subordinates on an individual basis, an approach which presupposes not so much a familiarization with the data in people's records as it does a thorough study of how they perform in practical matters, especially in the execution of combat training missions. Prior to the latest cruise, the ship's political worker drew up quite a few useful measures for implementation at sea, which would train officers in the art of working individually with people. Worthy of attention among them are conversations, lectures and seminars devoted to the forms and methods sailors might employ in studying on a cruise. Problems related to improving individual educational work were discussed at party and Komsomol meetings, at party bureau conferences and Komsomol committee sessions. This provided for a unified, coordinated approach in the education of crew members and consolidation of military order and discipline. A positive influence was also felt in this regard when the practice was adopted on the vessel of department officers devoting time to conduct purposeful, individual discussions with one or two crew specialists.

Socialist competition offers tremendous opportunities for improving the professional training of military personnel. When thoughtfully and creatively organized, it permits specialists to expand and improve their skills and achieve ideological growth. On all of our cruises, the joint efforts of officers and the party and Komsomol organizations have created an environment of creativity on the part of servicemen in accomplishing their assigned tasks. Thus, the party organization always keeps training of communists in mind. Personal example here means a great deal in developing competition, generalizing and disseminating the experience of leading individuals, and helping specialists here and there assimilate new, more efficient work methods. This enhances the authority of the party organization and all crew members follow the example of communists. The fact that 80 percent of the ship departments and 75 percent of the combat services were rated "excellent" attests to the great efforts of party members.
Our submarine bears the title "excellent," and continues to execute missile and torpedo firings with consistently high results. This does not, however, provide any kind of basis for complacency. The January 1987 CPSU Central Committee plenum pointed out quite definitively how especially important it is today to be realistic in our outlook, to proceed based on an objective evaluation of what has transpired, to look at the final results of our work not only from the point of view of the past, but--very importantly--to proceed based on the plans the party has announced, the promises it has made. The party's plans are grandiose and they devote significant attention to us, the protectors of the peaceful, socialist labor of the Soviet people. This means we must do everything we can to justify the faith in us that has been shown.

(Editor's note: It became known at the time this material was being prepared for release that Captain 1st Rank V. Ivanov had been appointed to a higher position.)

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9768
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REVIEW: TYUSHKEVICH ON WAR IN MODERN ERA

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[Review by B. Kanyevskiy, professor and doctor of philosophical sciences, under the "Criticism and Bibliography" rubric of book "Voyna i sovremennost" [War and Modern Times] by S. A. Tyushkevich, Moscow, Nauka [Science], 1986, 216 pages]

[Text] Man has reached a fatal crossroads in history, where a step in the wrong direction might fling him into the abyss of nuclear war. In this situation peace becomes the main thing of value to all mankind. In order to maintain it we must attach special significance to peoples' comprehension of the real reasons behind the increased threat of nuclear war, its true sources, and promote their clear understanding of the forces which are capable of counteracting nuclear insanity. This is all possible only within the framework of the new political thinking, which is manifest so clearly in the documents of the 27th CPSU Congress. It is in this vein that Doctor of Philosophical Sciences S. Tyushkevich has written his book, published by the "Nauka" publishing house. In it the author analyzes the fundamental problems of war, looks at its alternatives and ways of ridding mankind of the threat of self-destruction that proceeds from the reactionary forces of imperialism.

Consisting of seven chapters, the monograph reveals the internal logic of the difficulty to the reader in concise fashion, explains the methodological significance of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and peace in analyzing today's international environment and the on-going struggle between the forces of war and peace, in finding ways to avert nuclear missile war. It is with complete justification, therefore, that the first chapter of the book is dedicated to an analysis of the fundamental ideas of the classics of Marxism-Leninism on the essence and political substance of war and peace, their dialectical interrelationship, their place and role in the historical process.

Of special interest is the author's detailed and thorough characterization in this chapter of the creative contribution made by the 27th CPSU Congress to Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and peace. The documents of the congress show the vital necessity for new political thought, for a re-interpretation of the entire set of factors comprising today's world development. They point
out the need for developing new approaches, methods and forms of mutual relationship between different socio-political systems and reveal the dialectic of war and peace in our modern times. The author gives detailed justification to his claim that avoidance of nuclear war in an interdependent, integrated world is possible only through the joint efforts of all peace-loving forces on the planet.

In characterizing the party congress's contribution to the theory of war and peace, the author also shows how decisions of the congress organically interrelate the political philosophy of a secure peace with the full-scale program of accelerating the development of socialist society. And the external politics of the strategy of peace is just as organically linked with the necessity to strengthen the defensive might of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, as factors promoting peace and the security of nations.

The book creatively examines a whole series of theoretical and political questions. Thus, in comparing the dialectic of war and peace in the era of imperialism's undivided sovereignty and in the modern era, the author shows that at that time there was no alternative to an unjust, forced and predatory peace. Today, however, when the correlation of social forces on the planet has changed so fundamentally, there exists the objective possibility of achieving a just, durable and democratic peace.

The book emphasizes that peace today has acquired a qualitatively new essence—it is not only a primary condition of mankind's existence, but that of his social progress as well. The achievement of a truly democratic peace is possible only through an offensive on the part of the forces opposed to war, a decisive offensive which gathers strength.

The conclusions and generalizations of the 27th CPSU Congress have enriched the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on peace and war and take into account not only the realities of today's world, but also the deeply meaningful experience of World War II and that of local wars arising through the fault of imperialism in the post-war period. It is entirely correct, therefore, that the author has set aside several of the book's chapters to give a convincing portrayal of how scientific conclusions drawn from past experiences, from the history of wars gone by, can and should serve in our time to show people the correct line of behavior in resolving the main issue—the establishment of a durable, genuine and democratic peace.

The experience mankind has accumulated teaches first and foremost that we must struggle to prevent the outbreak of war. The politics of deciding controversial inter-governmental issues through the use of arms is catastrophic primarily for those who conduct such use. The crushing defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism has shown that the striving of aggressive imperialist forces to achieve global hegemony is in the final analysis doomed to failure. Moreover, the experience of World War II has made the truth apparent that, regardless of their social structure, states are capable of engaging in active and fruitful cooperation in the interests of combatting the common danger.
Today, as global nuclear war has become such a danger, the opportunities and necessity of cooperation have increased significantly. Cooperation can be achieved through already existing international organizations, capable of optimally matching the interests of nation-states and all mankind when political will is exerted. The experience of the anti-Hitler coalition, its establishment and activities, is interpreted through the prism of the post-war years, and called upon to help the peoples of the world resolve the most important issue of our times—the prevention of world catastrophe.

The second world war provides an instructional lesson to all those who have relied chiefly on a policy of strength in dealing with socialism. Through its decisive role in crushing fascism, socialism revealed the entire lack of perspective in such a policy and convincingly demonstrated the ability to defend its interests. Moreover, as post-war events show, it became the main initiator of the peaceful development of civilization. The book under review turns the reader's attention to a most important lesson of history—the necessity to strengthen in every way possible the international solidarity of the working class, and of all the forces of democracy and progress, in the struggle against the forces of war and aggression.

It is from this point of view—from drawing instructive conclusions and learning lessons—that the book analyzes the experience of post-war local conflicts. The author conducts a comparative analysis of these and local wars of the past (prior to World War II) and shows that, along with the significant increase in the number of such conflicts unleashed by imperialism in the post-war period, there have been substantial shifts in their political content as well. More and more such conflicts can be defined in terms of class goals in the overall struggle of imperialism against world socialism, the communist working man and movements of national liberation. The geography of local wars has expanded significantly as well—an indication of the globalization of imperialism's aggressive plans. Local conflicts of the post-war period also differ sharply from their predecessors in their social and political consequences. More and more they break out at the initial scheming of their instigators, the imperialists, and more and more they wind up in a defeat for them.

We are able to see the author's creative originality and non-standard interpretation of the issues being examined in the chapter in which he reveals the nature of nuclear missile war as a senseless means of pursuing policy and discloses the possible consequences for mankind. The book stresses that the gap between assumptions and actual results in the matter of nuclear war cannot be calculated. One thing is certain—the colossal destructive force of such a war makes forcible means of solving political problems senseless.

Consequently, nuclear war can not be tolerated as a means of achieving political goals in modern times. In this regard, the author subjects to reasoned criticism proponents of an unrestrained arms race, those who would draw a line between nuclear war—by virtue of its extreme destructiveness—and the aggressive policies of imperialism's governments and ruling classes, and in so doing shift the blame from imperialism to scientific and technological progress, the socialist countries or some other circumstances.
The book underscores the methodological necessity to distinguish between two related issues—the essence and political reasons for nuclear war, and whether or not such a war can serve as an instrument of policy.

The author bases his claim of the senselessness of nuclear war as a means of policy not only on the disastrous consequences it would have for civilization, but also on its incompatibility with social progress and the revolutionary process. It is outdated in the proper military sense as well, in that the natural and logical result which has always provided the incentive for waging wars becomes impossible.

In an interesting chapter, the author analyzes the objective and subjective factors which create the dilemma of whether or not there will be another world war. We must agree with the author that, in full consideration of the importance of individual factors, the key role in the correlation of forces determining the outlook for solving the problem of war and peace is played by a comprehensive assessment, establishment of the overall tendency. And as is clear from the basic stages of change in the correlation of forces in the world arena examined in the book, such an assessment indicates that the law of inevitability of world wars is no longer valid, that we have seen a break in the tragic cycle of "world war--rest period--world war."

The change in correlation of forces in the world arena to the benefit of socialism and the achievement of a military strategic balance between the USSR and USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, have allowed our party to conclude that a fatalistic inevitability of war has today ceased to exist. Parity has become the foundation of a relaxation in international tension and has provided a realistic outlook in the struggle to prevent a new world war. Parity in itself, of course, has still not been able to provide a full guarantee of peace, but it minimizes the possibilities of waging aggression with impunity and serves as the basis for arms reduction and limitation.

In an environment where real and objective prerequisites have taken shape for eliminating world war from the lives of nations, the outcome of the struggle for peace depends to a decisive degree on subjective factors, on what course world politics will take—the course towards strengthening peace and confirming peaceful coexistence among states with diverse social structures, pursued by the USSR and other socialist countries, by all peace-loving nations, or the course towards aggravation of the international situation and preparation for nuclear war as is being pursued by the imperialist nations, primarily the United States.

The Soviet concept of security takes into full account the realities of the nuclear and space age. It proceeds from the inseparability of the security of individual countries and international security overall, from the priority of political over military and technological means in providing security, and from the necessity of having reliable, international-security guarantees and a judiciously sufficient level of military might and combat potential. It envisions a lowering of the military strategic level of parity and eventual elimination of the very phenomenon of nuclear confrontation. This uniquely wise and promising policy is opposed by the egoistic, adventurist concept espoused by USA ruling circles. Oriented on the achievement of security for
itself alone, and at the expense of others, the USA policy insures the use of military technological means to achieve it.

The book concludes with a chapter detailing the ever increasing role of the ideological factor in the struggle for peace and analyzing the ideological confrontation of war-and-peace issues, the confrontation between the two socio-political systems in the world arena as a whole.

While we would evaluate the monograph as an interesting and successful work for the most part, its shortcomings should not go unmentioned. In his treatment of certain questions the author sometimes fails to justify his assertions, or provides little to promote full understanding of an issue. His desire to encompass as broad a range of problems as possible sometimes leads to an analysis of propositions which have no direct bearing on the theme of the monograph. Moreover, there are certain difficult-to-understand issues that plead for a more complete explanation. For example, a more well grounded work would require, in our view, a discussion of a very important question, especially for the military reader—how do we correlate the thesis that victory in a nuclear missile war is impossible with the necessity of increasing combat readiness of the army and navy so as to be able to crush any aggressor? We would like to see the author's position on a whole series of debatable questions. In the section dealing with a state's military power, for example, the author should not have failed to treat approaches existing in our literature to determining the place of combat potential within the system that comprises all forms of military potential. We cannot acknowledge as correct the thesis that, by the beginning of the 20th century, wars waged by the bourgeoisie against feudalism had exhausted their progressive capabilities. The fact of participation by the national bourgeoisie of a number of states liberated not so long ago in wars against internal and external reaction contradicts this thesis.

All in all, we would like to underscore the chief merit of the work under review—a creative, largely original approach to interpreting the issues it has considered, an approach steeped in the spirit of the new political thought.

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9768
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REVIEW: UGLOV VOLUME ON DRINKING, ALCOHOLISM

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 87 (signed to press 4 Mar 87) pp 88-90

[Review by Colonel N. Kushner, lecturer of the political directorate of military construction units (chast), RSFSR Honored Culture Worker, under the rubric "Criticism and Bibliography" of "Iz plena illyuziy" [Out of the Captivity of Illusions] by F. G. Uglov, academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya [Young Guard], 1986, 288 pages]

[Text] After the party's resolution on measures to overcome hard drinking and alcoholism, publishing houses in our country issued a number of books and brochures propagandizing the sober lifestyle. Worthy of attention among publications on this theme is the book by Academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences F. G. Uglov, Lenin Prize laureate, distinguished surgeon and foremost specialist in the sphere under discussion.

It must be stressed that the book studies the subject in an all-encompassing fashion—from economic, social and medical points of view, based on rich scientific material from the author's professional and life experiences. The work is addressed primarily to our youth and answers the most burning questions. Why do people drink? How can we safeguard man's health and spiritual wealth? How can we see to it that every person leads a bright, valuable life and doesn't lose his personality? The line of discourse follows Marxist-Leninist methodology and the modern demands our party makes of Soviet citizens' lifestyles, their development of the highest and most noble aspirations.

It is good that the author's presentation of the historical side of the question is based on a great deal of factual material. These scientifically verified data are not only of academic interest. They can be used today in explanatory work, now that the fresh upsurge of the anti-alcohol movement has become so reassuring. For example, the figures the author provides of per capita alcohol consumption in the European countries in the first decade of this century expose western researchers who slanderously maintain that hard drinking is a "Russian sickness," from time immemorial characteristic of the Russian people.
On the contrary, as is readily apparent from this book, a powerful propaganda campaign of sobriety waged by the leading intelligentsia—first and foremost by members of the Bolshevik Party—resulted in the per-capita consumption of alcoholic beverages in Russia being at almost the lowest level, when compared with the European countries and America. And this is true in spite of resistance by the Czarist government, which was interested in propagating the wine monopoly, a source of great revenues for the state budget.

A fundamentally new verdict based on principle was delivered against the problem of alcohol and drunkenness by the first socialist state in the world. The Soviet government, headed by V. I. Lenin, immediately announced the most relentless struggle against home-brewing and abuse of alcoholic beverages. In December 1919, the RSFSR Soviet of People's Commissars passed a resolution "On Prohibiting the Manufacture and Sale of Strong Drinks and Alcohol-Containing Substances Unrelated to Drinks on the Territory of the Country."

The struggle to promote temperance was also reflected in the program of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), adopted at the Eighth RCP(b) Congress in 1919. Alcoholism was entered in the program as a social phenomenon right alongside tuberculosis and venereal disease. V. I. Lenin spoke out decisively against hard drinking and endeavors to receive profits from the sale of alcoholic beverages. In his address on the foodstuffs tax at the 10th All-Russia RCP(b) Conference in 1921, he stated that "in trade you have to reckon with those who demand." At the same time, he noted that "as opposed to the capitalist countries, which put out such things as vodka and other dope, we do not allow this because, no matter how good they would be for trade, they drag us back towards capitalism, and not forward towards communism..." (Complete Works of Lenin, vol 43, p 326).

The data presented by the author show the effectiveness of measures taken by the government and society in the struggle against alcoholism. The per-capita level of alcoholic beverage consumption in 1950 was 1.85 liters, i.e., decreased to two-fifths of its 1913 level. The figures are somewhat animated, and at times—bitter. (Who can remain unconcerned when he finds out that after 1965, when the production growth rate increased sharply, so also did the consumption of alcoholic beverages, and in 1980 it had exceeded the 1940 level by a factor of 7.87?)

The author does not retreat from an explanation of this negative process. The main reason for what occurred, however paradoxical, lies in the fact that people began to live better materially and had more free time. Alcohol was readily available and, insofar as the level of the anti-alcohol campaign was—putting it mildly—inadequate, the wanton traditions of drinking around the table impetuously entered our lives and the alcohol consumption curve extended upwards. The reader will find detailed answers in the book as to why such a dangerous situation arose. He will also receive a thorough explanation of the assortment of measures taken to eliminate it, adopted by the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers in 1985.
The value of this book lies in the fact that it provides an easily understood, clear answer to the question of just why alcohol is dangerous. The author uses convincing examples to show that alcohol is a poison which entails the most serious consequences for man's health, especially his brain. Research data prove conclusively that alcohol is the major factor in personality degradation, eroding one's morals and dulling the conscience. The book uses every argument to appeal to the consciences of people who may be inclined to drink—think it over, show some will power, stop using alcohol! Realize that even in the most minute quantities, you are irreparably harming your posterity.

Medical statistics published in the book provide serious material for reflection and a call to action. We cannot delay—alcoholism is the cause of every third death. "Of every 100 alcoholics," academician V. M. Bekhterev testifies, "are born 10 freaks, 8 imbeciles, 15 falling-sickness victims and 5 alcoholics." Statistics of the World Health Organization show that over half the cases of trauma on the world's highways are alcohol-related. Every year more than 250,000 persons die on the roads. Up to 50 percent of them are young people. The author emphasizes working with teenagers. His discussion on young people and preserving one's honor from youth is presented in a highly interesting fashion. His material is based on medical observations reinforced by specific examples from private practice.

In his chapter entitled "The Social Scourge," the author traces the destructive influence of hard drinking on the country's economy. The reader is provided accounts of prominent scholars and the author himself as to the losses society has incurred due to alcohol. Numerous and varied, these include losses stemming from work discipline violations, the resultant reduction in productivity, and losses due to accidents and occupational injuries, highway incidents... Many statistics are published here for the first time and provide material for propagandists' use in the struggle against this evil.

Each of the book's 12 chapters is unique. But they all hold the reader's unabated interest and deliver a powerful precautionary message. The chapter entitled "Why Do People Drink?" is especially worthy of merit. It would seem that its contents are extremely significant at this time in particular—now that the first frontier has been conquered in the struggle against hard drinking and intensification of this effort far and wide is required. In this chapter the author discusses the so-called "theory" of moderation with respect to alcohol and "social drinking." This is an extremely pressing issue today—there are many who remain prisoners of the "theory" of moderation. The academician's reflections on the harm of this "theory" comprises a valuable acquisition for all readers, but particularly for those who are conducting the propaganda war against alcohol.

The "theory" of moderation had a broad following, unfortunately, among certain "experts" in the struggle against drinking. Its adherents tried to show that one thing acted as a panacea for all the detriment brought about by hard drinking—a cultural use of alcohol. As if to say it's not wine and vodka that are to blame, but rather a lack of skill in drinking. Such non-scientific arguments, I will say quite directly, were widely popularized by V.
and M. Levin, G. Podorov, Z. Kishkovskiy and, however paradoxical it may be, until recently by the chief of the USSR Ministry of Health's directorate for the introduction of new medicinal products, E. Babayan. It is understandable that their "authoritative" judgments would have bewildered people and even today bewilder people here and there. Indeed, library shelves still hold quite a bit of this—if you'll pardon the expression—literature, yet you won't find very many books like the one under review. Now is the time to look carefully through our libraries for anti-alcohol literature, get rid of everything that reflects the "theory" of moderate use of alcohol, and pick up material that correctly examines the problem.

The question arises—where can we pick up this material? Such literature does not lie around the stores for long and, up until now, it has been published exceedingly sparsely. Take for example our Military Publishing House. In 1983 it published a brochure by A. Voropay entitled "War On Drinking" and, apparently, considered the job done. This is the only explanation we can offer in trying to explain such a great lapse on the part of a respected publishing house in its output of anti-alcohol literature. Right now we are in such great need of books that would debunk, for example, non-scientific theories concerning the harmlessness of alcohol. It is important that servicemen receive the assessment given them by the Committee for Party Supervision under the CPSU Central Committee (PRAVDA, 30 October 1985): "...In a number of his works, articles and speeches, Babayan took an unprincipled, inconsistent position in evaluating the harm alcohol inflicts on human health. Instead of taking a decisive stand against alcohol, he associated alcoholic beverages with 'food products' and advocated their consumption in 'judicious measure' and in a 'cultural environment.'" For serious dereliction in his work, and for exhibiting a lack of principle and inconsistency in evaluating the harmful effect alcohol has on human health, the Committee for Party Supervision under the CPSU Central Committee delivered Babayan a stern reprimand to be recorded on his registration card. This is how the party evaluates the "theory" of moderate, cultural use of alcohol. And it is necessary to proceed from this evaluation in conducting practical work aimed at overcoming hard drinking, in pursuing the struggle in support of a sober lifestyle.

It is also necessary to debunk in propagandistic activity, the author states justifiably, the "contribution" to alcohol made by some of our authors and poets (these line of Rasul Gamzatov, for example—"Everyone may drink. It's just necessary to know when and with whom, what for and how much.").

Not far behind these people, the author points out—again, justifiably—are the artists and film makers. Radio and television too have not been standing on the sidelines. We will say it sharply but honestly—they have done quite a bit to bring turmoil to people, especially young people. In fact, prior to May 1985, it was rare that a film didn't have drinking around the table in it. In this regard, lecturers have many times been thrust into difficult situations—they try to convince people that drinking is harmful, showing that alcohol is a poison, that vodka brings along many ills, etc., and in response they hear: "How can it be harmful when there is drinking in every movie? People drink, so there can't be anything terrible about it—it's normal." No, it is not normal! The book under review exposes this abnormality in many
ways. The arguments academician F. Uglov brings to bear against the "green serpent" provide great assistance to commanders, political workers and propagandists in the effort to educate personnel. The book concludes with a thorough analysis of the situation today in the struggle against hard drinking. Noting projected trends for the better, the author appeals to the reader to make the hard and true choice of sobriety as his standard for living, a standard that "will provide a healthful and beneficial influence on all aspects of life, will help everyone realize more fully how beautiful and multicolored is our world, a world of creative labor and resourcefulness, a world of search and discovery, and will assist in multiplying our efforts to promote the power of our Motherland."

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9768
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REVIEW: VOYENIZDAT VOLUME ON RESTRUCTURING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 87 p 2


[Text] The Military Literature Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense has published the collection "On the Paths of the Restructuring" in the series "On the Course of the 27th CPSU Congress." The authors analyze the performance of commanders, political workers and party organizations in light of demands put forth at the 27th CPSU congress with respect to restructuring the work in all areas of our life. Particular attention is devoted to the restructuring of party-political work in the units and on the ships, based on a decisive shift toward the people, toward vital matters, toward stimulation of the human factor.

The collection begins with an article by Admiral A. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, "At the Center of Party Work—the Individual." Relying on positive experience in the restructuring of the political work in the spirit of the demands of the times, which already exists in the army and navy, the author demonstrates that the shift toward the people, toward vital matters, is the right way to resolve urgent problems, to improve the political and military indoctrination and to enhance the combat readiness of the Armed Forces in every way. The fact is stressed that every Communist must begin the restructuring with himself, with a critical analysis and vitalization of his own service and public activities, and by increasing his total responsibility for the assigned job, for the end results. While revealing the restructuring experience with positive examples, the author also notes that we still have numerous party organizations which have not yet been touched by the fresh wind of change. This makes it necessary to step up the search for forms and methods of intra-party relations which will involve every Communist in active party work.

In the article "Think and Work in the New Way," Colonel General V. Lobov discusses how the course toward the restructuring of the work style of commanders, political workers and staff officers is being implemented. He notes that it is too early, of course, to speak of a breakthrough, but certain advances have occurred in the psychology, the mood and the attitude toward party and service
duty of many unit commanders and political workers. There has been a marked decrease in smugness, complacency and attempts to cite objective circumstances as a cover for one's own failings. The author backs this up with concrete examples, while pointing out that the restructuring process is encountering certain obstacles. They need to be overcome, and obstructions to the renewal of our life and work need to be removed.

"It is apparent, one can say, that we have absorbed well the demand that the entire society and each of us individually must restructure." This is how Capt 1st Rank V. Ivanov, commander of a nuclear-powered missile submarine of the Red Banner Northern Fleet, begins his article. Concrete action is needed, however. The author discusses such action in detail, shares his experience and openly discusses shortcomings and omissions. He believes that an additional reserve for advancing lies in eliminating them.

Guards Colonel A. Labkovskiy, commander of a Guards Red Banner bomber regiment and delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress, Lieutenant Colonel S. Voronkov, secretary of a regimental party committee, Guards Colonel N. Shevchenko, chief of a formation political section, and others share interesting experience accumulated on the restructuring path. In their presentations they discuss the mobilizing force of the openness and objectivity of party information and ways to strengthening military discipline.

11499
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KRASNAYA ZVEZDA FEATURE: READERS' RESPONSES ON RESTRUCTURING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Mar 87 p 2

[Letters from readers continuing the discussion begun by Gds Maj A. Papakin, tank battalion commander, in the letter "If Everyone Would Ask Himself..." published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 11 February, under the rubric "The Restructuring Is Firmly Established With Action"]

Officers Negligence, Lack of Involvement

[Letter from Capt I. Tsvetlichnyy, commander of an excellent radio company, Air Defense Forces: "Collective Demandingness Is Also Needed"]

[Text] I cannot forget the incident in which the company radio broke down. When the cause was ascertained, it was learned that when the set was received from the warehouse, instead of thoroughly "revving it up" and checking it out in all the operating modes, Senior Lieutenant I. Ursol, company commander, did nothing more than hastily measure the main parameters. He then reported that everything was normal and that the equipment was fully ready for prolonged operation.

Let me say at the outset that the problem was rapidly detected and corrected, and it did not affect the mission. One would like to know what made the incident possible, however. The cause was quite simple: negligence on the part of the officer. This was particularly disappointing in view of the fact that Senior Lieutenant Ursol is in general a diligent officer.

I recalled that unpleasant incident in connection with Guards Major A. Papakin's letter "If Everyone Would Ask Himself...." Yes, we talk a lot about the restructuring, but some people feel that a restructuring is needed by anyone but them.

Some people might ask what the restructuring has to do with it, when the officer committed an act of elementary negligence. Well, the restructuring has to do with eliminating everything which hampers us, which slows our advance. It seems to me that negligence is one of those deficiencies which are still inherent in many of us and which must be resolutely eliminated. How do we do this? First of all, it seems to me, we must have collective demandingness.

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I would refer once again to the example involving Communist Igor Ursol, with which I am so familiar. When he was told that he was to render account at a party meeting, he was somewhat offended: you do your best, make the platoon an excellent one, and then you get.... But when the company Communists, one after another, expressed their opinion of him and pointed out his shortcomings, directly and candidly, he took perhaps his first objective look at himself. It should be said to Communist Ursol's honor that he responded correctly, in the party manner, to the comments of his comrades and did not take offense.

We also sometimes have situations in which, if the individual is performing his service duties well, then not only he but others in the collective find it somehow awkward to hold him accountable for other things.

Warrant Officer Yu. Denisov is radio chief in our company. A good specialist, he skillfully trains his subordinates. In short, everything is OK, as they say, with respect to his service. But Komsomol member Denisov has isolated himself from public affairs in the subunit. If they try to give him some sort of assignment, he takes offense at once: why do I have to do it? That is all. That is the end of it. The Komsomol members have still not been bold enough to require that he render account at a meeting or at the bureau, however, and strictly "explain" to him why a Komsomol member must carry out his regulation duties.

As I enumerate these examples, I find myself wondering whether it is necessary to recall the negative instances. The company is an excellent one, after all. Are there not numerous examples of conscientious, selfless labor? There are. The times demand that we not be taken by what we have achieved, however, but rid ourselves of that which prevents us from moving ahead.

Neglect of Officer Housing

[Letter from Lt Col V. Anoshin, military pilot 1st class, Red Banner Far East Military District: "They Are Not Stingy With Promises"]

[Text] ...Senior Lieutenant A. Krivko was preparing for flights. Out of habit, he glanced at the corner of the room. It had been covered with silvery hoarfrost all winter long. This time there was no frost on the wall. Instead, a dark spot was taking shape, swelling from the moisture within. "It's spring," Krivko thought with a sigh. "Time to get the buckets ready."

Concerned with similar problems, Major Ye. Gorbenko, aircraft and engine engineer, and other aviation specialists were organizing preparation of the combat equipment for the flights.

This state of neglect of housing on the military post has been going on for a long time, and there is no end in sight. People just cannot get used to being given the runaround year after year, so to speak, however. They believe the promises of officials from the rayon billeting unit and the local housing directorate that the housing will be repaired, and they wait patiently for this to happen.

It seemed quite realistic to the airmen and their families last fall. Lieutenant Colonel A. Gorbunov, chief of the rayon billeting unit, arrived at the military
post after repeated invitations. When I showed him my pictures of officer Krivko's apartment, the chief of the billeting unit decided to see for himself whether it was a critical situation. Lieutenant Colonel Gorbunov and I climbed up to the roof of the building. He walked along the roof, making his way cautiously through the depressions. He complained about the inaction of workers with the housing directorate under his command. Impressed by what he saw, he promised the airmen to take specific steps. The people gave a sigh of relief: his words sounded encouraging.

That was 6 months ago. Lieutenant Colonel Gorbunov's words disappeared into the realm of the not-to-be like the thaw water sinking through the sieve of the roofs on the housing. And once again, all winter long, the officers and warrant officers stuffed the cracks in the walls of the buildings with whatever they could in order to retain a little bit of heat in the apartments and working areas. Since the arrival of spring, they have been stocking up on containers to prevent flooding.

People might ask me whether it is really necessary to discuss such predicaments of daily life. It is! After all, no one can remain on the sideline when it comes to the restructuring, including people responsible for the state of the housing. They are not stingy with promises, but when it comes to doing something....

Foot-Dragging With Restructuring

[Letter from Capt. A. Kozlov, tank company commander, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "It All Begins in the Company"]

[Text] I share the opinion of Guards Major A. Papakin. It is a fact that not all of us are yet basing our work on the premise that the success of the common job depends upon each individual. Let me tell about my personal observations. Frequently, when the subject of the restructuring comes up, one hears a platoon or company commander say: "We are just small fry...." But the labor collectives are the central element in the restructuring, as the January Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee underscored. In the army situation these are the platoons, companies and battalions.

In my own case, had I been able to raise the level of the classes this training year, my subordinates would probably be considerably better trained today. I was not able to do this, though. I was unable to prepare properly for some classes, since I was taken away from the training, and I took a formal approach to others, assuming that I already understood and knew everything well. The platoon commanders operated in approximately the same way.

And this was the result: the platoon commanded by Lieutenant V. Gerasimov let us down at a crucial time in a battalion tactical exercise. The attack was not smooth and coordinated. The company, and along with it the battalion, did not achieve the goals set in the competition and received a low rating. Naturally, this is also affecting the evaluation for the regiment and the division. It it we, the company level officers, who let the division down.

This and many other examples show that we are restructuring too slowly. It is not enough today merely to spend time in the service. The time has to be used
skilfully and produce the greatest possible effect. I put it this way because I can see that most of the officers are in the regiment from daylight to dark, so to speak, but sometimes little comes of it.

I recently read the following in an instruction booklet on scientific organization of labor: "Remember that meetings are one of the most costly types of service activity." That is true. Many commanders and chiefs are apparently not aware of this, however. After all, how much time do we spend on discussions at all types of meetings and conferences?

And consider this. We frequently reproach an officer for adhering to the old work methods, to routine, and call upon him to work in the new manner. All such discussions will be just hollow talk, however, until we actually teach people to work in the new way. But are we doing much to accomplish this? Unfortunately, we are not.

Unsatisfactory Use of Naval Training Facilities

[Letter by Capt 2nd Rank V. Kulakov, Red Banner Leningrad Naval Base: "Circumstances Are to Blame"]

[Text] It would appear at first glance that the training facilities in our unit are used at full capacity. Regrettably, an inspection sometimes shows that this impression, created by the sight of classrooms full of students, is deceptive. Some comrades appear to be satisfied with the very least, with that which is frequently obsolete and long since discarded.

I shall illustrate this by citing a drill conducted by Captain Lieutenant A. Koryakovtsev with a ship's combat crew. There was a detailed briefing, the training missions were assigned, and the norms were defined before it began. Everything made it seem that the officer was optimistic and that his attitude was shared by his subordinates: this was not the first time they had practiced the activity involved in the drill. The tester only had to complicate the drill slightly a short time later, however, and not a trace of the optimism remained in the trainees. It turned out that most of them were incapable of departing from the routine. The crew received a low rating as a result.

Later, Captain Lieutenant A. Koryakovtsev attempted to justify what had happened. A classroom is just a classroom, after all, he said, and had they been at sea they would have performed the way they should.

Such a conclusion could hardly taken seriously. And I am more than confident that even the instructor himself did not believe this. He had to somehow justify his own failings, however.

Let us be frank: today, in the situation of the restructuring, not everyone by far has been in a hurry to increase his effort in the work. In order to stay afloat, some people have "increased their effort" elsewhere—in a search for all sorts of excuses. It has simply become an epidemic, when the slightest thing happens to point to circumstances, to claim that the right conditions were not provided for us. Take Captain 3rd Rank Kh. Ogins, a squadron specialist. He
prefers to blame shortcomings in the training of seamen-gunners on inadequate training of the seamen when they arrive from the training subunits and on the failure of ship commanders to complete their training.... Not a word about his own failings.

This is particularly well illustrated by the example of Captain 3rd Rank A. Kiryanov, a divizion staff officer.

"Just what can I do?" he once asked when criticized for the poor organization of training in the specialty. "The personnel are overloaded with special duties...."

But who, one asks, if not the staff is supposed to provide this order?

Yes, we need to make a lot of corrections and adjustments in the work style of certain officials today. And it is precisely in the use of the training facilities, totally modern and capable of markedly increasing the intensity of the training process, perhaps as nowhere else, where the old and new methods are in acute conflict. Some people think more about the formal aspect of the work, while others—Captains 2nd Rank V. Banshchikov and V. Toporovskyi, for example—have been able to make the basic training of the specialists highly effective. They simply do not recognize anything which could interfere with productive work. There are no justifications for inaction. The experience of the outstanding officers is convincing proof of this.

Lt Cited as Model in Restructuring

[Letter from Capt O. Zhuravlev: "Lieutenant Koryazhkin's Rule"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Do we not sometimes forget that the officer's personal example and his very style of behavior constitute a powerful factor in the indoctrination and the strengthening of discipline?

Do not inundate the restructuring with talk about restructuring—this is what all of us need to keep constantly in mind. And I believe that a very good motto is now gaining force: get the restructuring established with action. Furthermore, it is important "to undermine" what I would call the attitude of selectivity. This is when people feel that someone is able and perhaps required to be active in the changes because of his official position, while someone else does not have any room to maneuver, has nowhere to demonstrate initiative, does not have the scope.

I want to tell about a person with a modest scope of action. This really depends on how one looks at it, however. He has little experience, and he is quite young. Again, this is a matter of how one looks at it. Does the officer just beginning his service not need to restructure? He does. Life has succeeded in exposing even him to certain truths which are being reconsidered today.

Lieutenant Aleksandr Koryazhkin is in his 2nd year of service in our unit. He has a sort of personal rule not to let a minute go by without working hard, not
to take a step without self-scrutiny, not to let a day go by without improving himself. You will agree that this is a goal-oriented individual. The lieutenant's colleagues have noticed his conscientiousness and his refusal to be satisfied. A deputy company commander for political affairs, he was elected secretary of the party organization.

As the party secretary he orients the Communists toward in-depth work with the personnel, and this, as we know, is one of the requirements of the restructuring. And he himself sets a personal example as a political worker. He communicates constantly with the fightingmen and is able to talk heart-to-heart with them. Through the conversations he gets to know his subordinates better, and through the conversations he influences them, unites them, brings out problems and "painful" matters.

Everyone recalls the case of Junior Sergeant A. Tokmakov. He was violating discipline. The question of severely punishing him came up. Only the young political worker was opposed, because he knew the individual better than anyone else. And he succeeded in reeducating the man. They now say that Tokmakov "is the most conscientious sergeant."

When one looks at Koryazhkin, one also thinks about the fact that we frequently try to find "big ways" to influence people, while the most powerful effect is frequently achieved with something we no longer even give any thought to. I have in mind, as an example... appearance. This reflects one's inner quality, of course. Koryazhkin is always sharp, neat and proper. And you should see how this influences his subordinates, how they adopt his manner of behavior.

Koryazhkin is genuinely interested in people. He is sincerely concerned, and not just for show. He tries to uncover something good in every fightingman. He will always drop in at the regimental medical post to visit a sick man. Nor will he forget to wish a subordinate a happy birthday, to wish him success in the service. When a fightingman distinguished himself in some way, he sends a letter to the fightingman's parents. "Tell About Yourself" evenings, talks and morning discussions on military comradeship and international indoctrination are conducted in an interesting manner in the company at his initiative.

Not everything proceeds without a hitch for him, of course; he does have his problems. He also has his achievements. His work with the personnel has contributed greatly to the fact that the company is listed among the best. He establishes that spirit in relations and that attitude toward the job demanded by the restructuring. And so, it has no limitations with respect to age, experience or position.

11499
CSO: 1801/157
'PARALLEL METHOD': TIME PARAMETERS IN ORGANIZATION OF BATTLE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Col V. Yaremko, candidate of military sciences, docent, under the rubric "New Weapons and Tactics: The Scientist's Viewpoint": "With a Rigid Time Limitation"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The changes occurring in the nature of modern combat as a result of the intensive development of military affairs demand new approaches to the organization of combat. It would be interesting to learn what our military scientists think about this. Specifically, how do they believe we can speed up the work of the management elements during preparations for combat operations, and their dynamics, in view of the increasingly rigid time limitation.

(from a speech by Guards Major Yu. Khorochkin at a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers' conference)

There has always been a struggle to gain time in a combat situation, of course. Never before, however, has this struggle been so acute and intense, even in the last war, as it is today. After all, what was previously achieved in determined fighting over a period of several days or even months, let us say, can now be accomplished in hours, minutes or even seconds. Naturally, the greatly increased importance of the time parameters of combat demands a different approach also to the organization of combat, to troop command and control, support, and so forth. The quest in this area today should obviously be regarded as one of the most important requirements for improving the training of commanders and staffs.

Experience tells us that certain advances have already been made in this area. The parallel method of organizing combat on the part of commanders, staffs and services is becoming more and more widespread in the forces, for example. It makes it possible to resolve organizational questions almost simultaneously at several command levels, which provides a significant saving of time. Computerization of the command and control processes, and the use of automated systems, computer and other equipment, which are assuming an ever increasing scale in the army and navy, are extremely promising.

This does not exhaust the possibilities for accelerating the work of various command and control elements in the organization of combat and in its dynamics, of course. In view of the more rigid time limitation in modern combat,
I believe that it would therefore be worthwhile, as Guards Major Yu, Khorochkin rightly pointed out, to take a new look at certain traditional elements defined by combat regulations in the work of commanders and staffs.

Take what might be called a primordial element in the commander's work of organizing combat and assessment of the situation, for example. Strictly speaking, the development of the plan begins with this.

We know that during the Great Patriotic War a division commander, for example, was allocated 5-7 days or more for organizing a breakthrough of a prepared enemy defense. And around 24 hours was used just to assess the situation. Even more if circumstances permitted. During the East Prussian Operation the commander of the 144th Rifle Division used 2 of the 25 days allocated for preparing the offensive just for assessing the situation.

Circumstances at that time made it possible—although far from always—to assess the situation by the classical pattern, so to speak: by systematically analyzing the enemy, one's own troops, adjacent forces, the terrain, the season and time of day, and the weather. Partial conclusions were drawn from the analysis. These partial conclusions were then compared, and a general conclusion was arrived at, on the basis of which the plan was defined. This method of assessing the situation was justified at that time. It did not conflict with the time parameters of combat.

That was more than 40 years ago, however. More than a single generation of weapons have come and gone since then. Methods of conducting combat operations have also changed. But do the commanders and staffs take this into full account in their practical work?

When one asks officers this question, they frequently reply that combat regulations specify that when the commander assesses the situation, in addition to the above factors he must also study the radiation, chemical and bacteriological (biological) situation. You cannot, they say, go against the regulations....

What does one say to this? Yes, generally speaking (when the regulations are followed formally), when the commander assesses the situation he is still required to systematically study the enemy, one's own troops, adjacent forces, the terrain, and so forth. This certainly does not mean, however, that he must analyze the elements of the situation in isolation from one another. Furthermore, the regulations specify that the procedure to be followed by the commander in organizing combat depends upon the specific situation, upon the mission and the availability of time. With this in mind, the commander should demonstrate creativity, initiative and tactical boldness.

For training purposes and in other situations in which the commander is not facing a shortage of time, he may naturally employ also the systematic method of assessing the situation and draw partial conclusions based on the components of the situation. One has to assume that the situation will most frequently have to be assessed within limited time periods, however. It would therefore seem expedient to single out from the whole list such crucial factors as the enemy and one's troops. They should be assessed not in isolation, as inspectors sometimes demand in the
exercises and in officer training classes, but in combination with other factors in the situation. That is, the enemy and one's troops should be assessed simultaneously with the assessment of time and space. By space we mean the area; by time, weather conditions, season and time of day.

On what can this kind of conclusion be based? We know that combat operations are conducted by opposing forces. It is these forces which primarily have the crucial influence on the situation, on its development. This is why it is most important to study them. The opposing forces do not exist in and of themselves, however. They are in specific conditions of terrain, weather, season and time of day, which can make their operations either easier or more difficult. How significant this influence is depends upon many factors. They include, of course, the technical equipment of the troops. This factor has reached a level today at which the terrain in and of itself does not have as great an influence upon the outcome of a battle as it did in the past. Even mountains, from the standpoint of traveling through them, are increasingly manageable for the troops. One can still not underestimate the importance of the so-called local factor, however. Experience has proved that it, in combination with other components of the situation, can have a major, sometimes crucial influence upon the outcome of a battle.

Take mountains again. A skillfully organized defense and the employment of modern methods can turn them into an insuperable obstacle. When we figure in adverse atmospheric occurrences, the situation becomes even more complex. And if the enemy and his troops are studied in isolation from the terrain conditions, and the terrain in isolation from the weather or the radiation (or chemical) situation, in isolation from the environment as a whole, it is fairly difficult to fully reveal the cause-and-effect linkage of all the factors in the situation or to assess their combined influence on operations. It is therefore expedient to study and analyze the status of the enemy and his troops, and simultaneously the environment, including space, as a single component of the situation.

The advantage of the comprehensive method of assessing the situation is obvious from the standpoint of saving time, as they say. In a systematic analysis of the situation (when its individual components are studied and partial conclusions are drawn), for example, the commander needs to study at least eight components. And he needs to draw a partial conclusion based on each. He then compares them and defines the overall conclusion and the plan itself. The rigid time parameters of modern combat do not always permit the commander to do this properly. The comprehensive method, as already stated, calls for assessing only two factors in the situation: the enemy and one's troops, together with space and time. Consequently, two partial conclusions have to be drawn. Naturally, this requires less time.

The method being discussed for assessing the situation is not the only acceptable method in all situations, of course. And in general, preference cannot be given to a single method, even the most universal. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge teaches us that every object or phenomenon must be studied in those conditions of time and place, in those linkages with other phenomena, in which the given object exists and develops. The commander needs to base his work, including his selection of the method for assessing the situation, on this. As already stated, greater flexibility, creativity and initiative must be demonstrated in this process. Combat and the conditions under which it is prepared and conducted are always distinctive and unique, after all.
Furthermore, the Great Patriotic War and contemporary experience have shown that even the sequence in which components of the situation are studied can differ. At VUZs, for example, within the system of officer training in the forces, the analysis of the situation ordinarily begins with a study of the enemy. The combat manuals also indicate this for commanders. In reality, however, it may happen that a commander will have to begin assessing the situation not with a study of the enemy. Specifically, this sequence broke down during the last war. The commander of the aforementioned 144th Rifle Division, for example, began organizing one of the battles in December of 1944 by hearing reports from commanders of subordinate units on the status of their personnel and equipment. In other words, he began his assessment of the situation with a study of his own forces. And this was justified. The status of the division's units and subunits was thus the crucial factor for determining the concept of forthcoming operations in the existing situation.

Such examples tell us that we cannot adhere blindly to an established sequence for assessing elements of the situation. We need to base this each time on which of the components has the crucial role in the specific situation.

Yes, modern combat situations are diverse, each one unique. And it would be profoundly erroneous to impose upon the commander some sort of pattern worked out in advance for assessing the situation in all cases. This would doom the commander to passivity and make him totally dependent upon the developing situation. First of all, he himself must take a creative approach to selecting the optimal method for accomplishing every mission, including assessment of the situation. In this case he will not have to waste mental or physical effort for adopting a plan under the circumstances. He will be able to work efficiently and purposefully, counting entirely on his personal independence and responsibility.

11499
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NOVOSTI ON SDI, C31 AUTOMATION, POSSIBILITY OF ACCIDENT

Ivanov, Severtsev Letter

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 9 (15), Apr 87 pp 1-4

[Text] Dear editors! We find it important to call public attention to what we see as a substantial aspect of the Strategic Defence Initiative.

As it is generally known, the pivotal element of the overall SDI system is sophisticated computer equipment. It will decide practically everything: the targeting and homing of strike elements, the placing of the strike-back system on combat alert, and the adoption of final decisions on the actuation of the whole system. The time gaps involved are so small that they practically rule out man's participation in the adoption and execution of decisions. In other words, the fate of the planet with the materialization of SDI will be in the hands of computers. Can mankind really feel safe about its future in that situation?

Two decades before the announcement of SDI, the father of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, said, referring to the use of computers for military decision-making: "That would be extremely unwise. How do they teach soldiers the military skills? By way of war games. If you have a formal criterion deciding the victory in war, you may try such games with a computer. However, you should be well advised to make sure that your criterion is not some kind of formalization of wishful thinking. Otherwise you may end up with a computer which will technically win the war but will also destroy the whole world. Such a machine must be programmed by people--experts on atomic warfare. An expert is a man who has experience. Luckily, there are no such people. As for war games programming on the basis of artificial success criteria, it is a highly dangerous exercise which may lead to a bad end. Such a trend does exist, though, and that stupidity really astounds me."

We are positive that these words by Wiener have lost none of their relevance. The reliability of any computer system is decided by the reliability of its three major components: the hardware, the software and the man-machine interface. This classification, though, is somewhat relative like any other: the failure of one of these components can lead to the failure of another or of the whole system. It must be borne in mind that a potential cause of a computer failure may remain "latent" for years until it manifests itself. This is
due to the fact that in practice only a very minor share of the possible
data-processing routes is used. In large data storage and processing systems
20 percent of the most active commands account for 80 percent of the operating
time, so latent causes of failure on untried data-processing routes may stay
hidden for many years.

The problem of reliability arises at all stages of the development and appli-
cation of computer systems and depends on many factors. Even the comparatively
simple integrated circuits have a certain degree of unreliability. All those
backup, overflow and duplication circuits built into the computer layout to
raise its reliability cannot prevent computer failures. With the modern
component base with its hyper-integration and extremely sophisticated bond
patterns between transistors and especially between integrated circuits,
reliable backup is impossible, for otherwise the speed element of computers
will be lost.

Far from reducing the risk of failures, the growing sophistication of modern
computers actually makes it higher still. In recent years experts have turned
their attention to a sharp decline in computer reliability because of bonds at
the submicron level. The search for new principles of data processing has so
far produced no promising results, whereas all that talk about the "superchip"
which would rather go out of fashion than malfunction within decades to come,
or would "mend itself" without the user's interference by way of some "magic
algorithm" remains a kind of poor science fiction.

Once fed into the computer system, the cause of failure—be it mistakes in
designing or programming—are eliminated by way of lengthy processing. The
number of necessary improvements in the hardware of a new large computer sys-
tem averages one per each 80 chips. This means that for a computer system
comprising 10,000 chips the number of such necessary readjustments will add up
to a thousand. What's more, new mistakes can be introduced into the system in
the process of those readjustments. Experts believe that the software for SDI
must be in the order of 10 million programme lines. The international estimate
of the density of errors per 1,000 programme lines is 5 to 20 errors. This
means that the overall software will comprise 50,000 to 200,000 potential
failure sources. After comprehensive debugging of what software there will
still be some 5 percent of the failure sources left, which is regarded a
pretty good figure, and that means that during the actual operation of the
American SDI 2,500 to 10,000 errors can pop up at any moment, each of which
may prove irreparable.

There are many examples of such computer failures. They occurred on the
Shuttle and in the NORAD system, and during the Falklands war. The latest
element was the delay in the docking of the Mir orbiter with the Kvant module,
caused by the programmers' failure to foresee an extremely unlikely coinci-
dence which did occur in practice.

The elaboration of the software alone for SDI will take more than 30,000 man-
years. This means that at least 3,000 programmers will have to work for ten
years, which will greatly increase the probability of additional errors if
only because of the natural personnel rotation over those ten years.
We are therefore convinced that the attempts to develop and tune up a computer system for handling the strategic defense initiative verge on suicide. A suicide for the entire population of the planet.

We urge all computer experts regardless of their political convictions to take an active part in broad and open discussion of that extremely poignant problem of today's world. Mankind has the right to know the experts' view before entrusting its very survival to computer systems.

Professor Valery Ivanov, Lenin Prize winner, Doctor of Technology

Rear Admiral (Ret) Nikolai Severtsev, USSR State Prize winner, Doctor of Technology

Editors' note: We have mathematical backup for the authors' conclusions. Those interested: mathematicians, computer programmers or editors of specialized journals may order it from us free of charge.

Sergeyev on G31, Strategic Stability (Part II)

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 11 (17), May 87 pp 5-7

[Text] One can identify the two following approaches to military and political decision-making. This differentiation is exceptionally important in terms of the application of high information technology (HIT) to the decision-making process.

1. The factual approach, based on the following decision-making formula:

If \( \text{fact} \) then \( \text{action} \).

2. The interpretational approach, based on the interpretation of a set of facts through one of a series of possible situations where the basic data are introduced in a coordinated fashion, and only when actions congruent with the accepted interpretation are taken.

An analysis of decision-making systems interaction in a conflict, an analysis drawn from the study of historical precedents, shows that the factual approach represents a major destabilising factor conducive to the escalation of the conflict. The factual approach serves to make enemy reflexes extremely primitive, focusing attention on its actions rather than its plans and objectives, and implies a rigid interpretation of its actions, assuming the adversary plans and objectives remain unchanged.

The formula of "if \( \text{----} \) then" makes plans inevitably rigid, and political manoeuvre impossible.

With the realization of the military and political decisions in line with the factual approach, the functions of the political and military leadership are
delimited as follows: the political leadership ascertain the facts, say, an attack, and authorize the use of military plans, which are made in advance and, naturally, do not envision a wide range of diverse military-political settings. Political range of diverse military-political settings. Political leaders find themselves totally dependent on pre-conceived military plans, possibly drafted without political control.

By contrast, the interpretational approach to military and political decision-making means the following in terms of organisation:

1. Constant monitoring of changes in the plans and objectives of the adversary, including the provision of channels for direct diplomatic contacts between the opposing sides.

2. Political control over strategic planning.

3. Special machinery for military-political planning to develop and assess military-political scenarios, and to monitor and interpret events and facts.

Application of HIT, particularly state-of-the-art artificial intelligence, does not appear to assure adequate decision making. At the present time, most expert systems designed to help the decision-making process work along the principle of IF ( ) —> THEN ( ), and it is unlikely that in the near future systems will be developed at least marginally comparable to man in terms of the ability to interpret the given situation.

Meanwhile, in the military field there is a certain euphoria with regard to artificial intelligence. What seems particularly dangerous is the use of artificial intelligence programmes in the C(3)l system, and not only because programmes of this kind are unwieldy, and, consequently, inevitably lead to many mistakes. It is hardly conceivable that these systems may develop an adequate interpretation capability in the very near future. Yet their application in one form or another is inevitable if the SDI plans go ahead.

The very nature of a space-based ABM defence is such as to allow just several dozen seconds for decisions on the destruction of the launched missiles to be taken, something which inevitably leads to most, if not all, decision-making procedures being automated. And an euphoria over the potentialities of high information technology is particularly dangerous in this context. Given the use of the now prevailing factual approach to automating the decision-making process, the risk of a conflict breaking out accidentally inevitably rises.

Of course, HIT is bound to have increasingly wider application in the military sphere in the future, and political scientists and political elders as well as HIT developers would do well to give serious consideration to military and political implications of this process.

The foregoing arguments appear to prove that a "new strategic order," characterised by the increased stability of the strategic interaction system and stronger international security, cannot be brought about by unilateral action to improve any particular technological systems, notably the C(3)l: it must result from serious agreements between the parties concerned.
Severtsev on Submarine's Response to First Strike

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 11 (17), May 87 pp 7-10

[Text] Editor's note; This year's 9th issue of the Military Bulletin featured the letter "A suicide for Five Billions" by two Soviet scholars, Valerii Ivanov and Nikolai Severtsev, which has attracted special attention of our readers. A number of specialists have sent in requests for mathematical substantiation of the authors' conclusions. We have also received questions on specific aspects of the topics raised in that letter. The readers' questions make up the foundation of the MB's interview below with Doctor of Technology Nikolai Severtsev, a well-known Soviet expert on the reliability of modern technical systems.

QUESTION: You have warned against over-confidence in modern electronic systems. In most cases, however, computers come together with human operators. What can a top-notch specialist do in case of a sudden computer failure? How high are the chances of his quick and effective interference?

ANSWER: Sizable experience has been accumulated by now in tackling the tasks of controlling the reliability of sophisticated systems, including their most crucial element which is known as the man-machine interface. The mathematical model of the operator's dependability substantially differs from the models for purely technical systems. This is because he can make decisions proceeding from his personal experience and can keep working even after the computer hardware has broken down. In many a critical situation an experienced operator can work out and make a decision to take the system out of the inoperative condition. Estimates show that the minimum time for passing and bringing into effect such a decision is ten minutes. For the ordinary computers and control systems extensively used in national economies that figure is perfectly acceptable. Trouble-shooting within that or even longer time can hardly lead to irreversible consequences.

Everything is much more serious, however, when we deal with weapons systems, especially under the emergency conditions. For example, if the operator works in space or on a patrolling submarine, the time for making what may well prove the most crucial decision in mankind's history is confined to just a few minutes.

QUESTION: What must be done by the operator to cope with a computer failure within such a short time?

ANSWER: Mathematically, his work boils down to developing an appropriate decision-making algorithm. By the Miller rule which is well-known in cybernetics, the operator can simultaneously handle 5 to 9 objects in his memory even if it is superquick. This means that the maximum number of computer leads and exits which he may try to repair within that limited time must not exceed seven. The efficiency of the operator's performance is characterised by the so-called Stroud number which is the number of cerebral identifications of which the operator is capable within a unit of time. Experiments show that the Stroud number ranges between 4 to 20 cerebral identifications per second (depending on the operator's skill, health, the degree of fatigue, working

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conditions and so on). This means that for relatively small systems the time
for the development of a decision-making algorithm will be the same ten
minutes. As for more complex algorithms, the operator will not be able to
develop them within limited time without the risk of serious mistakes.

QUESTION: To what results can such a mistake by the computer operator lead?

ANSWER: Examples of these results are readily available. In the long run,
what has happened in Chernobyl can be described as a gross mistake by an
operator. The main concern for him at work must be the condition of the sys-
tem entrusted to him.

A point of special importance is what decision an operator makes to get the
system out of the inoperative condition in the armed forces. For example, at
the moment of the failure of the data-relay equipment linking a particular
strategic arms system with the superior command link, crucial decisions will
have to be passed within minutes if not seconds. The degree of sophistica-
tion of such systems is very high, especially in the case of SDI. In these
conditions, the person passing the decision can only actuate the algorithms
developed earlier, but cannot take any effective measures to repair the whole
system. This means that decision-making will be based on false data concerning
the man-machine interface and may lead to unpredictably grave consequences.
In other words, even the most qualified expert will be powerless in such a
situation.

QUESTION: Finally, one last question from a hypothetical future, although
it will not be too unreal with the materialization of the SDI programme. How
will a Soviet submarine commander act if the enemy deals a first nuclear
strike, even though as a result of one of those probable errors of which you
have spoken? Will he press the strike-back button?

ANSWER: This is a difficult question, but it certainly must be answered.
The submarine commander will act in line with the standing instructions which
notably envisage the hypothetical situation described in your question. I
may add here that any accident, including the outbreak of an unsanctioned
nuclear war, is fraught with unforeseeable and formidable dangers and conse-
quences.

Sergeyev on C3I, Strategic Stability (Part I)

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 10 (16), May 87 pp 4-8

[Text] Today the prospects of using the achievements of computer engineering
and information technology in the military sphere are widely discussed. In
numerous papers it is maintained that in the near future control, communi-
cations and reconnaissance systems, the fifth-generation computers and smart
weapons will be able to change the aspect of armed forces.

At the same time, in analysis of the consequences of incorporating advanced
information technology into the military sphere rather little attention is
given to the military-political aspects of this process. In what way will this process influence strategic stability? Will the risk of the unforeseen breaking out of a nuclear war increase or diminish? The discussion of these problems is difficult due to the necessity of combining very sophisticated analysis of the technical aspect of the problem with sophisticated political analysis. But undoubtedly these problems should be discussed.

Let us take as the basis the definition of strategic stability given in the report by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Threat of Nuclear War:

1. The political and military-strategic situation provide no stimuli for each side to use nuclear weapons first. Retaliatory actions of the side attacked rule out rational exploitation of the first strike.

2. Not a single side has the ability to deal a disarming first strike. Any version of attack leave the attacked side a potential for dealing unacceptable and comparable damage to the aggressor.

3. There are no conditions for an unsanctioned and accidental use of nuclear weapons which, in its turn, presupposes that the sides have reliable and survivable control and communications systems and systems of missile attack warning.

These aspects of strategic stability are directly linked with the use of advanced information technology. The work on the U.S. SDI programmes has imparted particular importance to the possible national space-borne ABM system as a factor of strategic stability. Initially the incorporation of advanced information technology into control, communications and early warning systems has several objectives:

a) to increase the sensitivity of early warning systems;

b) to increase the survivability of systems controlling the armed forces;

c) to reduce the time of decision-making through effective handling of information;

b) to enhance the reliability of control, communications and early warning systems on the whole.

However, the prospect of the incorporation of advanced information technology into C-cubed-I systems is not so radiant, as it seems from certain advertising-propaganda publications. Moreover, with the introduction of advanced information technology the risk of the unintentional nuclear war may increase. Traditionally in studying the problem of unintentional nuclear war two factors have been analyzed—technical errors (especially, in the analysis of SDI programme) in the system (technical factor) and the possibility of human errors (psychological or, to be more precise, ergonomic factor).

Such an approach is accounted for by the fact that the C-cubed-I system is, on the whole, presented as
We believe that the overall structure of the situation looks in a different way.

Such an approach to the analysis of the C-cubed-I systems singles out another major factor—the organizational one. Not only the quality of performance and reliability of man and the technical system are important. Of no less importance is the organization of information processing and organizational procedures. The stability of the entire system operation may depend precisely on this. It is of prime significance that in a real conflict two or more control, communications and early warning systems interact, fusing into a single giant sociotechnical system—the strategic interaction system. Its stability must be analyzed on the whole (including the stability as regards the unintentional emergency of a nuclear war).

Let us consider the organizational factor in more detail. Using qualitative methods of the automatic control theory, Boris Raushenbakh (see Military Bulletin No 3/86) has recently demonstrated that under certain circumstances such an integrated system will behave in an unstable way despite the fact that
each of its parts is stable separately. I think that we can go further and estimate the possible instability in quantitative parameters.

Let us consider the following model. Each side has different levels of combat readiness. Let us denote them by \( n_A \) and \( n_B \). The idea of each side about the adversary's combat readiness \( n_A^* \) and \( n_B^* \) appears as a result of the functioning of control, communications and early warning systems.

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{n}_B^* &= I_A \ n_B \\
\dot{n}_A^* &= I_B \ n_A
\end{align*}
\]

During the time \( \tau_A \) and \( \tau_B \) the combat readiness level evens out which makes it possible to determine the rates of the increase of combat readiness \( \dot{n}_A \) and \( \dot{n}_B \)

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{n}_A &= \frac{1}{\tau_A} (I_A \ n_B - n_A) \\
\dot{n}_B &= \frac{1}{\tau_B} (I_B \ n_A - n_B)
\end{align*}
\]

This set of equations coincides in form with the well-known Richardson equation used for analysing the arms race and allows studies of stability by standard mathematical methods. Stability is achieved when \( I_A \ i_B < 1 \). \( I_A \), \( I_B \) are characteristics of C-cubed-I systems. If it is greater than unit, this implies that the system is supersensitive and detects the nonexistent increases in the adversary's combat readiness. We see that "supersensitivity" of C-cubed-I leads to the instability of the strategic interaction system and to the greater risk of nuclear war.

The most important point in assessing the effect of the introduction of advanced information technology on strategic stability is that the "supersensitivity" of C³-I grows with the sophistication of systems. This growth is not only due to technical and human errors, but also owing to the large degree of the information integration in advanced C³-I systems. The paper by Anne Grinyer and Paul Smoker contains an interesting example from the history of the 1956 Arab-Israeli war. It shows that the coincidence of several accidental, erroneously interpreted events brought about quite a wrong assessment of the strategic situation by the U.S. military leadership. It is hard to say what would have followed in such circumstances if the degree of the information integration had been the same as that reached at present in the C³-I system.

We see that the information collection structure is determined by the principles of the organization of C³-I systems and may have a very adverse effect on strategic stability. I don't mention here defects in procedures of making decisions about the start of military operations and in case when such procedures are transferred to computers.
Kulik on Reliability of Strategic Weaponry

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 10 (16), May 37 pp 1-3

[Text] As armaments are becoming ever more sophisticated and refined, specialists, politicians and military experts increasingly wonder if growing complexity of modern arms systems will be compatible with their reliability.

Let us illustrate the point with a few simple examples. Imagine that a Christmas tree has been decorated with 10 lights each of which is expected to be on for 100 hours with an estimated probability factor of 99 percent. There can be no 100 percent probability factor. However, the actual probability factor for all ten lights on a single string to be on for 100 hours amounts to only 90 percent (0.99 to the power of 10), rather than 99 percent. If the number of lights on a string is doubled, and probability factor will drop to 82 percent. To put it differently, the more units and parts a sophisticated system consists of, the lower the probability that it will operate reliably.

Such a model for composing one of the reliability indicators, safe operation, cannot reveal on its own the complexity of linkage between technology sophistication and reliability. So U.S. military experts use a different indicator—system operational time between errors. Researchers conceded that this indicator, too, shows that reliability drops with growing sophistication. They say the running time between failures of a system that consists of 30 components is 2,000 hours, while that of a system composed of 200 elements is 160 hours.

Another indicator is the need for logistic support to ensure a system's reliable operation. A less reliable system requires more repair and maintenance.

Some theoretical and practical conclusions are corroborated by "leaks" from the Pentagon's classified materials. In 1980 the then U.S. Defense Secretary Brown stated in a planning directive on air force systems that a bid for higher efficiency (through making technology more sophisticated—S.K.) conditioned lower reliability of systems.

The advocates of further refinement and sophistication of weapons have proposed two counter-arguments. They say, first, that more sophisticated technology is easier to handle, and, second, that the reliability of components in weapons systems is being enhanced of late. While the first argument is only indirectly related to reliability, the second one is based on conclusions about scattered programs used as components of weapons systems. According to one document leaked from the Pentagon, priority refinement of technology has facilitated higher efficiency of weapons systems and their components. Yet growing potential has triggered vast growth in the number of components and, consequently, system sophistication. As a result, an increase in system reliability has not been achieved.

While the Defense Department normally succeeds in preventing or delaying public announcement of numerous, if scattered accidents, it cannot easily conceal
the fact that entire pools of certain types of hardware have been removed from combat duty due to technical failures. The U.S. Army recently halted down 700 Blackhawk and 70 Apache helicopters for the above mentioned reasons. From 1965 through 1985 U.S. nuclear-armed submarines reported 628 "incidents" involving nuclear weapons, of which 364 happened due to technical failures in the sophisticated support systems, not nuclear warheads themselves.

The U.S. logistic arm faces innumerable difficulties, as it bears special responsibility for ensuring a reliable operation of nuclear arms systems. The B-1 strategic bomber requires so sophisticated repair and maintenance that, according to chief of department in charge of B-1 maintenance, nobody in the Universe knows how to repair those bombers.

For their part, manufacturers, in quest of sophisticated and therefore more costly technology, often supply weapons components and whole systems with hidden defects. According to the Pentagon's estimates, 10 to 30 percent of the money spent on arms purchases every year are wasted on defected systems. The Defense Department recently blamed a contractor for using silver instead of gold to make coatings for parts used in equipment to monitor the flight and nuclear warheads of Minuteman strategic missiles and B-52 bombers.

While paying hundreds of millions of dollars for a single B-1 bomber, the Pentagon is trying to save money on PAL devices designed to prevent an unsanctioned launch of nuclear weapons. Apropos, there are no PAL devices on nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles.

Continuing refinement of weapons and development of weapons systems consisting of hundreds of thousands of components, units and parts, backfires with declining reliability of sophisticated systems. In their bid to make their high-tech arms and hardware do better, fly faster and hit targets with greater precision, manufacturers largely ignore the consequences of such a race.

/9274
CSO: 1812/233
MORATORIUM ON DEFENSE SPENDING INCREASES PROPOSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 87 p 3

[Proposal by the Warsaw Pact Participant-States to the NATO Member-States on the Matter of a Moratorium on Increases in Military Outlays]

[Text] 1. The Warsaw Pact states have firmly and consistently advocated decisive actions and specific steps for halting the arms race, for turning toward real disarmament and eliminating the threat of war. They advocate a comprehensive approach to consideration of the disarmament problem in order for the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to be accompanied by reductions in armed forces and conventional weapons, and a corresponding reduction in military outlays.

Military outlays continue to grow rapidly. They stimulate the arms race, which has extremely dangerous consequences for international peace and security. They are a heavy burden on the peoples of all nations, regardless of their level of economic development, and retard economic and social progress. Deeply concerned about this, the Warsaw Pact states believe that a reduction in military outlays, primarily by states possessing nuclear weapons and a large military capability, would effectively help to restrain the arms race and move toward disarmament. The funds which would be freed should be used for social and economic development needs, including those of the developing nations.

2. Proceeding from these considerations, the Warsaw Pact states proposed in the Political Declaration approved on 5 January 1983 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Prague that direct talks be started between the Warsaw Pact states and the NATO nations for purposes of achieving practical agreement on the freezing of military outlays, with a subsequent reduction in percentages or absolute numbers. This initiative was affirmed and made more specific on 28 June 1983 at a Moscow meeting of leading party workers and statesmen of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, who appealed once again to the NATO states to begin talks for achieving agreement not to increase military outlays as of 1 January 1984 and on specific steps toward their subsequent practical, reciprocal reduction.

On 5 March 1984 the Warsaw Pact states sent the NATO nations a proposal for immediately starting direct talks on the matter of not increasing and of reducing military outlays. Steps were also indicated which could lead to the resolution of this matter.
In a statement approved on 24 October 1985 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Sofia, the Warsaw Pact states reaffirmed their proposal for direct talks with the NATO nations on not increasing and on reducing military outlays.

3. On 11 June 1986, in an appeal approved at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Budapest to the NATO states and to all European nations, which contained a program for reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, the Warsaw Pact states advocated accompanying specific steps in the area of nuclear disarmament and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons with a corresponding reduction in military outlays by the states. The funds freed as a result of these reductions should not be used for creating (sozdaniye) new types of weapons or for other military purposes; they should be used for economic and social development needs.

4. Guided by this basic approach to the problem of disarmament, the Warsaw Pact states appealed to the NATO nations to announce a reciprocal moratorium for 1 or 2 years on increasing the military outlays of the states in the two alliances.

Such a step would promote the beginning of specific talks on reductions in armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe and would create the necessary conditions for subsequently moving on to an effective reduction of military outlays by the participant-states in both military-political alliances. It would help to strengthen trust between the states and to improve the political and economical situation in the world.

The Warsaw Pact states express their hope that the NATO nations will respond rapidly and positively to this proposal.

11499
CSO: 1801/157
COMMUNIQUE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 11 (17), May 87 Supplement pp 1-11

[Text] 1. The participants in the meeting studied in detail the situation in Europe and in the world as a whole. They believe that world developments, changes in international relations, the growing inter-dependence of states, advances in science and technology and the creation of weapons of unprece- dented destructive power require a new thinking, a new approach to questions of war and peace, disarmament and other complex global and regional problems, a renunciation of the concept of "nuclear deterrence" according to which nuclear arms are a guarantee of the security of states. There can be no victors in a nuclear war.

They confirmed their conviction that the cardinal task is to avert war, rule it out for ever from the life of mankind, preserve peace on earth, stop the arms race and move onto concrete measures of disarmament, first of all nuclear disarmament, directed at general and complete disarmament.

This requires the pooling of the efforts of all states, of all peaceloving forces, the strengthening of trust in relations between states, especially those belonging to different social systems, and their military-political alliances, a correct understanding of each other's concerns, aims and intentions in the military field.

The Warsaw Treaty member states again declare that their military doctrine is of a defensive nature, proceeds from the need of maintaining a balance of military forces on the lowest possible level, the expediency of reducing military potentials to the limits of sufficiency necessary for defence. A document was adopted on this question at the Meeting and will be published.

2. The participants in the meeting believe that a possibility has now appeared for taking the following practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament in order to stop mankind from sliding towards nuclear catastrophe:

—to conclude without delay an agreement on eliminating all American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe on the basis of the fundamental accord reached in Reykjavik. Upon its signing and on agreement with the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia Soviet missiles deployed in those countries as
reply measures to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe will be withdrawn.

--to eliminate simultaneously Soviet and American shorter-range missiles in Europe and to hold talks on such missiles stationed in the East of the Soviet Union and on the territory of the United States,

--to solve the question of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including tactical missiles, at multilateral talks as proposed by the Warsaw Treaty member states at their meeting in Budapest.

--to reach agreement on a radical reduction of strategic offensive arms coupled with a strengthening of the ABM treaty regime. The allied socialist states come out for a 50 percent reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States in the course of five years and for talks on their subsequent reductions.

--to press for a full prohibition of nuclear tests as a high priority measure designed to put an end to the development, manufacture and perfection of nuclear weapons and to bring about their reduction and elimination. The Warsaw Treaty member states propose that extensive negotiations be started without further delay to work out pertinent accords.

The meeting's participants firmly support the idea that outer space be kept free of weapons, that the ABM Treaty be strictly observed and that agreements be concluded banning anti-satellite systems and "space-to-earth" weapons, preventing an arms race in space, that all activities in outer space be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes on a rational basis, for the benefit of all of mankind.

The leaders of the allied socialist states advocated the elaboration of "key provisions" for agreements between the USSR and the United States on strategic offensive weapons, the strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime and the conducting of nuclear tests which, along with the conclusion of a treaty on medium-range missiles, could be a subject of a Soviet-American accord at the highest level and provide a basis for drafting legally binding Soviet-American agreements.

They deem it necessary for all European states, above all members of both alliances, to actively contribute to nuclear disarmament and ensure success of the relevant negotiations. The Warsaw Treaty member states will do everything in their power to achieve specific accords, bilateral and multilateral, with a view to eliminating nuclear and other weapons of mass annihilation by the end of this century.

3. The states represented at the meeting favour the earliest possible elimination of chemical weapons. They reaffirm their readiness to complete already this year the elaboration of an international convention on banning chemical weapons, destroying their existing stockpiles and the industrial facilities for their production. They recall their statement to this effect, adopted in Moscow on March 25, 1987.
4. Ways of implementing the programme for reducing the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe by 25 percent in the early 1990's, advanced by the Warsaw Treaty states in June 1986, were discussed.

Such reductions would be carried out simultaneously and together with tactical nuclear systems. Along with the implementation of the proposed reductions, the meeting's participants deem it necessary to work out new measures making it possible subsequently to turn to even more substantial cuts in the armed forces, armaments and military spending by the year 2000.

The Warsaw Treaty member states hold the view that the reduction in military confrontation in Europe should be a continuous process with the military balance being secured at the lowest possible level at each stage.

Taking into account the asymmetric structure of the armed forces of the two sides in Europe, determined by historical, geographic and other factors, they express readiness to have the imbalance that has arisen in some elements redressed in the course of reductions proposing that the side which has an advantage over the other side make the appropriate cutbacks. The process of reducing corresponding reduction in the states' military spending.

The states represented at the meeting call on all states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to hold a meeting of Foreign Ministers, which would adopt a decision on starting large-scale talks with a view to reducing drastically the armed forces and conventional armaments and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe along with a corresponding reduction in military spending.

It would be advisable that these talks also discuss a number of top-priority measures connected with the lowering of military confrontation and the prevention of the threat of sudden attack, reciprocal withdrawal of the most dangerous, offensive types of weapons from the zone of direct contact of the two military alliances, and the reduction of the concentration of the armed forces and armaments in the zone down to the lowest agreed upon level.

The second stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe would be the best forum to discuss these issues.

There are other options for discussing disarmament issues, above all within the CSCE process, including the convocation of a special forum.

The allied socialist states attach great importance to the informal consultations held in Vienna between the representatives of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries and called upon to assist in formulating a mandate for future negotiations.

Confirming their goodwill and striving to create the best possible conditions for future talks, the Warsaw treaty member states express their readiness to display maximum restraint regarding the development of their military potentials, and on the basis of reciprocity, not to build up armed forces and
conventional armaments, as well as to proclaim a one or two-year moratorium on the growth of military spending. They call on all NATO countries to display a similar approach.

5. The Warsaw Treaty member states attach great importance to steps on reducing military confrontation and strengthening security in individual parts of Europe and establishing zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans, in the Centre and in the North of the continent. They reaffirm their determination to press for the implementation of the proposals on this score, advanced by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.

As to the proposals of the GDR and Czechoslovakia for establishing a nuclear free corridor along the dividing line between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO 300 kilometres wide (150 km on either side), all nuclear weapons could be withdrawn from it on a reciprocal basis: nuclear munitions, including nuclear mines, shorter-range and tactical missiles, atomic artillery, nuclear-armed tactical strike aircraft and nuclear-capable surface-to-air missile complexes.

The Warsaw Treaty member states also favour the continuation and deepening of the multilateral dialogue on establishing in the Balkans a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons.

The states represented at the meeting fully back Poland's plan for arms reduction and confidence-building in Central Europe. Its implementation would be an important factor for strengthening peace and stability in the continent.

6. The implementation of disarmament measures would be guaranteed by an effective system of verification that would accord with the content of disarmament measures and include on site inspection. Proceeding from the premise that in the event of transition to real disarmament verification becomes one of the most important measures of ensuring security, the Warsaw Treaty member states come out for working out a set of the strictest verification measures at all stages of arms reduction.

Verification of the reduction of nuclear-missile weapons should be ensured everywhere—at the places of the dismantling of missiles and their elimination, at proving ranges and military bases, including in third countries, at training centers, storages and manufacturing plants, both state and private ones.

In the field of conventional armaments measures of verifying the very process of reduction would be accompanied by observation of the military activity of troops remaining after the reduction.

7. Having studied the course of the Vienna meeting of representatives of states participating in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, which has entered the responsible stage of working out generally acceptable accords, the states represented at the meeting stated their resolve to facilitate in every way its successful conclusion, the adoption at the meeting of
substantial and balanced decisions facilitating real progress in disarmament, the strengthening of trust and development of relations between participating states in the political, economic and humanitarian fields on the firm and reliable basis of all the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. They come out against the continent's division into opposing military blocs, for their simultaneous dissolution, for goodneighbourhood and cooperation in the common European home.

The states represented at the meeting express the conviction that the proposed meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of states taking part in the ECSC could facilitate not only the commencement of talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe but also the solution of other questions of European security and cooperation.

The participants in the meeting were at one that lasting peace and good-neighbourly cooperation in Europe could be ensured only on condition of respect for the existing territorial-political realities on the continent. The activity of revanchist forces, specifically of all in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the encouragement of revanchism anywhere else run counter to the interests of detente and security, the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. In the future, too, such activity will be most resolutely repulsed.

The interests of peace, of creating a climate of trust, mutual respect and friendship among nations demand an end to the policy of hatred, to any attempts to implant anti-communism, preach racism, use any whatsoever forms of discrimination, and to disseminate chauvinistic and nationalistic theses.

8. The Warsaw Treaty member states are prepared to search for ways leading to a further development of mutually advantageous economic, scientific and technological cooperation with all countries, come out for the removal of barriers in the field of trade and economic exchanges, for a deepening of economic ties among ECSC participant states so as to facilitate the strengthening of detente, security and peace in Europe.

The Warsaw Treaty member states come out for extensive interaction in the humanitarian field. They are convinced that everything should be done to ensure the rights of man to live and work in conditions of peace and freedom, and the full implementation of political, civic, economic, social and cultural rights in their sum total and interdependence in conditions of respect for the sovereignty of states.

9. The states represented at the meeting confirm their resolve to press for the formation of an all-embracing system of international peace and security that would encompass military, political, economic and humanitarian fields. Interaction in the field of ecology would be its component part. Such a security system would lead to the creation of a nuclear-free world in which the use of force or the threat of force would be ruled out and relations between nations would be based in the spirit of mutual respect, friendship and cooperation.
The socialist countries' initiative is directed at overcoming confrontational approaches, at asserting civilised standards, an atmosphere of openness and trust in international relations.

The participants in the meeting welcomed the extensive exchange of views on these matters that has begun in the United Nations Organisation. They come out for continuing and developing an effective dialogue along all directions and at all levels in order to move on to concrete measures of forming material, political, legal, moral and psychological guarantees of peace, to a practical creation of security for all. They express hope that the 42nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly will make its important contribution to this end. The United Nations organisation could become an effective guarantor of an all-embracing system of international peace and security.

The states represented at the meeting stressed the need for strict respect by all states for the principles of national independence and sovereignty, non-use of force or threat of force, inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs, equality and other principles and goals of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and other universally recognized rules of international relations.

10. The leaders of the Warsaw Treaty member states exchanged views on areas of tension and conflicts in the world and reaffirmed the resolve to facilitate actively their fair political settlement through negotiations.

In the Middle East, holding an international conference under the UN auspices with the equitable participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, would be of great importance for attaining a comprehensive settlement and ensuring lasting peace in that region.

Setting up a preparatory committee with the participation of five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all parties concerned would be a practical step towards convening such a conference.

The earliest cessation of the Iraq-Iran conflict and the resolution of contentious problems via negotiations with due account for the legitimate interests of both states on the basis of generally recognized rules of international law and order would meet the interests of international peace.

The participants in the meeting welcomed the creation of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Southern Pacific, and expressed the conviction that the interests of international security would be promoted by the consolidation of peace in the Korean Peninsula, resolution by political means, through talks of all conflicts and problems existing in South East Asia, on the basis of respect for independence and sovereignty of every country, by the development of relations of goodneighbourliness and cooperation in the area. The participants in the meeting supported the course at achieving national reconciliation in Afghanistan, an early political settlement of the situation around it on the
basis of ending any interference in the internal affairs of that country, respect for its independence and sovereignty. Interest was expressed in an early implementation of the Soviet-Afghan arrangement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in the framework of the political settlement.

The states represented at the meeting confirmed their solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Southern Africa against imperialism, colonialism, the racist apartheid policies, with the struggle of the Namibian people under SWAPO leadership for liberation and genuine independence. They condemn resolutely the aggressive actions of the Republic of South Africa against the peoples of Angola and Mozambique, of other neighbouring independent states.

The participants in the meeting proclaimed full support for the efforts aimed at a fair political settlement in Central America, declared for an end to aggressive actions against Nicaragua, for the recognition of the right of each people to determine ways for their political and economic development freely and without outside interference.

The participants in the meeting discussed some aspects of the economic situation in the world, including ways for overcoming underdevelopment and establishing a new international economic order. A document was adopted on these issues. It will be published.

11. A thorough exchange of opinion on the development of cooperation among the allied socialist countries was held at the meeting. The work of the Committee of Foreign Ministers and the Committee of Defense Ministers over the period passed since the Budapest meeting of the PCC was positively assessed. Their further tasks were outlined.

When the issues of interaction in the framework of the Warsaw Treaty were discussed the participants in the meeting declared for imparting greater dynamism to cooperation in the foreign policy sphere, for upgrading its mechanisms, for the steady observance of the principles of equality and mutual responsibility in the system of political relations among the allied states. They attach importance to enhancing activity and initiative of every allied state in international affairs in the interests of conducting a concerted foreign policy course.

In this context it was decided to set up a multilateral group consisting of representatives of the Warsaw Treaty member states to provide continuous mutual information.

It was also decided to create a special commission of the Warsaw Treaty member states on questions of disarmament consisting of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defense to exchange views and information on questions of arms limitation and disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, including the discussion of initiatives of allied states and the working out of joint proposals in this field. The creation of the commission is called upon to facilitate a still more active participation of all Warsaw Treaty member states in joint efforts in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.
The Political Consultative Committee heard a report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states on the practical work done by the Command and adopted an appropriate decision.

/9274
CSO: 1812/233
MILITARY DOCTRINE OF MEMBER STATES

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 11 (17), May 87 Supplement pp 1-6

[Text] The importance of correctly defining the aims and intentions of states and military-political alliances in the military sphere incorporated in their military doctrines increases in the present-day situation. Being aware of this and proceeding from the need to rid humanity of wars, end the arms race, preclude the use of military force, consolidate peace and security and implement general and complete disarmament, the Warsaw Treaty member states decided to set out the fundamental provisions of their military doctrine which is at the basis of the activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, reflects the community of the defensive military-political aims of its member countries and their national military doctrines.

I

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty, just as of each of its member countries, is subjugated to the task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional. Out of the very nature of the socialist social system these states have never linked and do not link their future to the military solution of international problems. They declare for a solution of all disputable international problems peacefully, by political means.

In the nuclear-space age, the world has become too fragile for war and power politics. Humanity is faced with the problem of survival in conditions when huge volumes of the deadliest armaments have been stockpiled. A world war, the more so nuclear war, would have catastrophic consequences not only for the countries directly involved in the conflict, but also for the very life on Earth.

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member states is strictly a defensive one. It proceeds from the view that the use of military road for resolving any disputed question is intolerable in the present conditions. Its essence is that:

The Warsaw Treaty member states will never, under no circumstances, start hostilities against any country or an alliance of countries, unless they become the target of a military attack themselves.
They will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

They have no territorial claims to any state either in Europe or outside it.

They do not view any state, any people as their enemy. Quite the contrary, they are prepared to build relations with all countries without exception on the basis of mutually taking into account the interests of security and peaceful coexistence.

The Warsaw Treaty member states declare that they firmly base their international relations on respect for the principles of independence and national sovereignty, non-use or threat of force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, resolution of conflicts in a peaceful way, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and other principles and goals envisaged by the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act and generally recognized standards of international relations.

While favouring the implementation of disarmament measures, the Warsaw Treaty member states are compelled to maintain their armed forces in a composition and at a level that would enable them to repulse any attack from outside against any Treaty member state.

The combat readiness of the armed forces of the allied states is maintained at a sufficient level so as not to be caught unawares. In the event of an attack, they will give a devastating rebuff to the aggressor.

The Warsaw Treaty member states never had, nor have an aspiration to possess armed forces and armaments in excess of what is necessary for these purposes. Thus, they strictly comply with the limits of sufficiency for defence, for repelling possible aggression.

II

The Warsaw Treaty member states regard ensuring reliable security of their peoples as their prime duty to them. The allied socialist states do not claim greater security than other countries, but they will not agree to lesser security either.

The existing military-strategic parity remains the decisive factor of preventing war. Further raising the level of parity does not yield, as experience shows, greater security. That is why they will continue applying efforts to maintain the balance of military force at an ever lower level.

Under these conditions, ending the arms race and carrying out measures of real disarmament are acquiring truly historic significance. The states nowadays have no other path but reaching accords on the drastic lowering of the level of military confrontation.

The Warsaw Treaty member states come out resolutely from these positions. In full compliance with the defensive essence of their military doctrine, they are consistently seeking the following principal goals:
First. The earliest comprehensive ban on nuclear testing as a top-priority measure to end the development, production and perfection of nuclear arms, their stage-by-stage reduction and total elimination, prevention of the spread of the arms race into outer space.

Second. Prohibition and elimination of chemical and other types of weapons of mass annihilation.

Third. Reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe down to the level when neither side, while ensuring its defence, would have means for a surprise attack on the other side, for starting offensive operations in general.

Fourth. Strict verification of all disarmament measures, based on the combination of national technical means and international procedures, including the establishment of corresponding international bodies, exchange of military information and holding on-site inspections.

Fifth. The creation in various regions of Europe and elsewhere of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons and also of zones of reduced concentration of armaments and enhanced confidence, the implementation of military confidence-building measures in Europe on a mutual basis and the attainment of accords on such measures in other areas of the world and also on seas and oceans. The mutual renunciation by Warsaw Treaty member states and North Alliance Treaty member states of the use of armed force and the adoption of commitments to maintain relations of peace, the liquidation of military bases on the territory of other states; the withdrawal of troops within the confines of national borders, the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive types of armaments from the zone of direct contact of the two military alliances and also the lowering of the concentration in that zone of armed forces and armaments to the agreed-upon minimum level.

Sixth. Regarding Europe's continuing split into opposing military blocs as abnormal, the Warsaw Treaty member states come out for a simultaneous disbandment of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and as the first step for the liquidation of their military organisations and ultimately for an all-embracing system of international security.

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The Warsaw Treaty member states propose to the North Atlantic Alliance to hold consultations with the aim of comparing the military doctrines of both alliances, analysing their character and jointly studying the directions of their further evolution with a view to removing the mutual suspiciousness and mistrust that have accumulated for years, attaining a better understanding of each other's intentions and ensuring that the military concepts and doctrines of the military blocs and their members be based on defensive principles.

The existing imbalances and asymmetries in separate types of armaments and services of armed forces and the search for ways of removing them on the basis
of reductions by the side that is ahead on the understanding that such reductions would lead to the establishment of ever lower levels could also be a subject of consultations.

The socialist member states of the Treaty propose such consultations be held at an authoritative expert level with the participation of military experts of countries of both sides. They are prepared for holding such consultations already in 1987. The consultations could be held in Warsaw or Brussels, or in each of these cities alternately.

For the People's Republic of Bulgaria

Todor Zhivkov
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

For the Hungarian People's Republic

Janos Kadar
General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party

For the German Democratic Republic

Erich Honecker
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic

For the Polish People's Republic

Wojciech Jaruzelski
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Chairman of the State Council of the Polish People's Republic

For the Socialist Republic of Romania

Nicolae Ceaucescu
General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Gustav Husak
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Berlin, May 29, 1987

/9274
CSO: 1812/233 73
RECENT VOYENIZDAT PUBLICATIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Mar 87 p 2

[Unsigned article: "Voyenizdat Publications"]


The collection includes letters, memoranda, telegrams and telephoned messages which reflect the military side of V.I. Lenin's multifaceted work during the period 1917-1922, as well as certain draft decrees and resolutions on military matters which he worked up for the Council of People's Commissars.

The book was written for military readers.


The textbook contains information on the terrain and its influence on combat operations, and information on topographical maps and aerial photographs. It describes methods for finding one's position and the procedure for making graphic combat documents. An appendix contains samples of topographic maps and conventional topographic symbols.

It was written for cadets at higher military schools and for officers.


The manual provides information on the repair and recovery of weapons, and discusses general questions pertaining to organizing the repair work, as well as the technology for repairing the most typical parts, assemblies and systems of weapons and equipment.

It was written for specialists studying the maintenance and repair of weapons, and for students and instructors at educational institutions.

The book summarizes experience in conserving motor vehicle fuel. It discusses the influence of the properties of fuel, the structural features and various operating conditions of vehicles on fuel consumption. It provides recommendations for making thrifty use of fuel. It discusses in detail questions pertaining to the conservation of fuel when the equipment is operated under difficult climatic conditions.

It was written for specialists involved in the operation of motor vehicles and other military equipment, and in the transportation, storage and use of fuel.

11499
CSO: 1801/157
BRIEFS

MILITARY TRIBUNALS CONFERENCE HELD—A conference of chairmen of military tribunals of military districts, groups of forces and fleets was held. Reports presented by Lieutenant General of Justice S. Maksimov, chief of the Military Tribunal Directorate, and Lieutenant General of Justice G. Bushuyev, chairman of the Military Cases Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, analyzed the work performed by the military tribunals toward fulfilling decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and defined the tasks involved in the restructuring of the work in light of demands set forth at the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Strengthening Socialist Legality, Law and Order, and Strengthening the Protection of the Rights and Legal Interests of Citizens." The address by Admiral A. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, stressed the fact that under the restructuring it is essential to vigorously eliminate shortcomings in the work of the military tribunals, to increase demandingness of the cadres in every way, and to constantly improve the professional training. The work of the military tribunals, the speakers stated, must focus on enhancing the combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces, strengthening military discipline and order, and socialist justice, and improving the legal education of servicemen. USSR Minister of Justice B. Kravtsov and Lieutenant General of Justice B. Popov, chief judge advocate, participated in the conference. [By Col Justice S. Morozov] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 87 p 2] 11499

JOINT CONFERENCE: TRADE -- PROCURACY--A conference organized by the management and the party committee of the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense jointly with the Main Judge Advocate's Office has been held. The report by Major General N. Sadovnikov, chief of the Main Trade Directorate, and the talk by Colonel of Justice P. Goroshkov, senior assistant chief judge advocate, stressed the fact that under the restructuring the directors and all officials in military trade must increase their effort to eliminate or prevent mismanagement, waste, the padding of figures, drunkenness, violations of the rules governing trade, planning, contractual and labor discipline, and other negative occurrences. Specific recommendations were put forth for eliminating shortcomings, and the state of affairs in the military trade system was analyzed. [By Col Justice A. Vargolomeyev] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 87 p 2] 11499
DIVISION WITHDRAWN FROM MONGOLIA—In accordance with a decision of the Soviet leadership and by agreement with the government of the Mongolian People's Republic, the previously announced removal from Mongolia to the Soviet Union of one motorized rifle division and several separate units of the Soviet forces temporarily located in the Mongolian People's Republic has begun. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 87 p 1] 11499

CSO: 1801/157
TRAINING FOR LOWER LEVEL TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 87 p 2

[Report by Col I. Ivanov, military pilot 1st class, Col G. Grechkin, military pilot-sharpshooter and senior inspector-pilot, and Lt Col V. Usoltsev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "An Unannounced KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Inspection: A Methods Quest": "And the Know-How is Nearby"]

[Text] The fighter-bomber squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Aldokhin, military pilot 1st class, was to carry out a missile and bomb strike against an "enemy" airfield. After the squadron acquainted his subordinates with the tactical and air situation, and assigned each flight its mission, he announced:

"The flight commanders will select the weapons for destroying the assigned targets, the altitude for approaching them, the type of combat maneuvering, and the mode of attack. They are to report their plans at 15:00."

This was not quite the usual way of assigning the mission. As a rule, not just the target, but also the flight route and the route of approach to the assigned ground target, and the maneuver to be used for dropping the bombs or launching the missiles are indicated for each subunit. But now...

"It is not as much trouble to assign the mission in flights to the range in the old way, of course," Lieutenant Colonel A. Chopovoy said. "Today, however, we are getting not only the flight commanders, but also the rank-and-file pilots, used to tactical thinking, teaching them to correctly assess the mission ahead of them and to make the right decision. In short, we are teaching that which is essential for combat."

The airmen themselves confirmed that they derive more from this kind of training than from classes conducted "in the tried and tested manner." Each minute of training time is now used more effectively. Take Captain L. Mamchits' flight. This time the flight commander carefully studied the tactics textbook and made the necessary calculations before making his decision. His subordinates also went over possible alternatives for approaching and attacking the ground target and calculated which type of weapon would destroy it with the greatest certainty. This was followed by a discussion within the flight, and the alternatives were run through by the "on the ground as though in the air" method. Only then did Captain Mamchits take his report to the squadron commander.
The subunit commander or the deputy regimental commander attending the readiness check has the right to make adjacments in the plan, of course, or to reject it altogether. The very fact that the airmen worked fruitfully, with interest, for several hours, went over certain aspects of tactics, aerodynamics and the airborne equipment, and searched for new and more effective combat techniques, however, would unquestionably be beneficial. Preparations for the flights to the range were made equally well, with a creative methods quest, in the other squadrons of the regiment.

The methods used for rating the performance of the combat training missions have also been changed there. Target destruction was previously the main factor considered in the rating. This might at first glance appear to be the right way: if the bomb hits the bull's-eye, you get a five. Any kind of combat application also involves a large number of other elements, however. For example, the pilots sometimes simply maneuvered through the air defense for the sake of "checkmarks," because it was only a hypothetical enemy. Or take the attack on the target. The target was frequently destroyed on the second or even the third approach. No one was afraid that the rating would be lowered. They did have a hit, after all. Today, however, one can only earn a five if the ground target is destroyed on the first approach.

The target destruction was previously assessed "by sight." The blunders of senior chiefs" were not noted." These and many other simplifications have been eliminated today. We heard a formation commander say upon returning from the range:

"You only received a three for firing the gun. You need to practice."

Had this happened a few months ago, the flight operations officer at the range would undoubtedly have given the senior chief a four "out of respect for his position." The formation commander himself issued instructions to make known the errors of all the flight personnel, however.

A great deal is being done with respect to improving the methods used for preparing the military pilots in that advanced air regiment. Unfortunately, however, this does not mean that all of the old and ineffective ways have been eliminated there. Take the drills on the trainer, for example. Each pilot must make a "flight" on the trainer, and the training complex is loaded down. Experience has shown that the return from this is not very great, however. The airman is at best able only to run through the takeoff and landing and the circular flight during the quarter-hour "flight." It is far from always possible to "squeeze out" some time for practicing the various combat application components.

What can be done? The answer to this question lies in the training methods presently being adopted by airmen in the neighboring fighter regiment in which Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Peredera, military pilot 1st class, serves. The new methods consist in turning over the training complex for the entire day to the individual flights by turn. In the course of the training the air fighters perform flights along the route, overcome enemy air defenses, reach the target area, search for and attack the target. They also practice other complex components of flights for combat application. In addition to all this, an abundance of various hypothetical problems are introduced.

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This kind of training demands that the pilots spend a great deal of mental and physical effort and put their all into it. Taking turns, the pilots on a flight carry out several such "flights" in a day. These 2- to 3-hour training sessions are considerably more effective than the 15-minute ones. While their comrade is "flying," the other airmen study tactical innovations and aerodynamics, and analyze errors in the performance of their colleagues.

Despite certain difficulties--primarily of a psychological nature--the new methods are being adopted more and more actively, and they are finding more and more supporters. The neighboring airmen in the fighter-bomber regiment also know about them. For the time being, however, they are only planning to adopt the experience and have not indicated a schedule for mastering it. This is despite the fact that it is clear to everyone that, combined with innovations already adopted in the regiment, these methods hold the promise of a significant gain in the matter of enhancing the combat training of the airmen.

Although the fighter pilots know about their neighbors' methods quest, according to the regimental command element, they too have not adopted everything by far. Judging from the findings of the inspection, the exchange of advanced know-how and methodological discoveries is not at the proper level there, even though the regiments are in identical circumstances. In our opinion, the progressive flight training methods should be boldly adopted also in other district air force sub-units. The restructuring demands that new ways of doing things be adopted without delay.

11499
CSO: 1801/157
BRIEFS

RUST 'LANDED IN MOSCOW'--Violation of USSR air space. A light engine sports plane piloted by citizen of the FRG M. Rust violated the air space of the Soviet Union during the day of 28 May 1987 in the area of the town of Kokhtla-Yarve. The flight of the aircraft over the territory of the USSR was not stopped, and it landed in Moscow. Competent agencies are conducting an investigation into this matter. (TASS). [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 May 87 p 6] 13052

CSO: 1801/190
IZVESTIYA ON RECENT NATO MEETINGS

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 May 87 p 4

[Article by V. Antonov under the rubric "NATO": "With A Former Policy"]

[Text] Brussels. (IZVESTIYA'S own correspondent.) The North Atlantic bloc intends to follow the path of building up military preparations further and accelerating the arms race. This is indicated by the results of the conference of leaders of military agencies of this organization which was held in the NATO headquarters in Evere. Chiefs of the general staffs of NATO member countries and top NATO military leaders met for 3 days in the strictest secrecy within the parameters of the military committee, the "Eurogroup" and the military planning committee of the ministers of defense. As is clear from the communiqué, which abounds in resounding phrases about the dedication of the alliance to the "cause of maintaining peace," the conference participants emphasized a readiness to implement a coordinated bloc "deterrence strategy," to strengthen nuclear arsenals and to secure an increase in real military expenditures.

Particular stress was placed on the necessity to realize extensive programs for the deployment of the newest types of conventional weapons. Local observers indicate in this connection that the persistent intentions of the Atlantic allies to improve the "classical" types of weapons are prompted first and foremost by their efforts to obtain a definite advantage in the sphere of conventional weapons in the event of a possible signing of a Soviet-American agreement on medium range nuclear missile weapons and tactical operational missiles.

Standing up for strengthening the military power of the alliance, NATO General Secretary Lord Carrington and U.S. Minister of Defense K. Weinberger during a press conference held in Evere urgently referred to a supposed superiority of the Warsaw Pact over the North Atlantic bloc in numbers of weapons.

It was remarked in the lobby of the NATO headquarters building that the military leaders also discussed problems associated with medium range nuclear missiles on the European continent in the context of the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons going on in Geneva. A summary document of the military planning committee notes, in particular, that the position of the bloc allies relative to RSD [medium range missiles] did not
undergo any changes from the time of the session held by NATO's nuclear planning group in Stavanger (Norway) not long ago.

As is known, the crux of the given position is that in the words "welcoming an improvement in the prospects for the conclusion of an agreement between the U.S. and the USSR" in this sphere, the NATO countries simultaneously are attempting to advance numerous stipulations and additional conditions for the constructive proposals about cleansing Europe of nuclear weapons.

The bulletin "Nouvelle Atlantik" points out in this connection that the participants of the conference in Evere were not able to develop a common point of view on RSD, because the government of the FRG had not yet defined its official position on this question.

13052
CSO: 1801/190
NAZARKIN ON ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 11 (17), May 87 pp 1-3

[Article by Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin: "Elimination of Chemical Weapons in Europe -- The Time for Responsible Decisions"]

[Text] Complete prohibition and destruction of chemical arms is now being qualified with good reason as one of the most promising avenues of disarmament. By the end of the spring session the Disarmament Conference worked out a draft document in a form in which (provided it is polished and harmonized subsequently) it may be open for signing. Earlier, just individual clauses of the future convention had been formulated.

Without waiting for the polished final document, the Soviet Union has taken a number of practical steps which facilitate the solution of the problem. First, it has discontinued the production of chemical weapons. Secondly, it has started building an enterprise at which chemical weapons stockpiles may be destroyed. In addition to that, it has taken a number of other measures to prepare for the implementation of the proposed convention. Many participants in the Disarmament Conference believe that the work on the convention may be completed within a year.

Needless to say, we do not shut our eyes to the difficulties which are still impeding success. The main one is that the United States, a major participant in the talks, intends to effect chemical rearmament, and is getting ready for large-scale production of binary weapons. France seems to be committed to the same aim. The question is: if the goal is chemical disarmament, what is the point of producing these weapons and building the plants? At any rate, they will have to be destroyed after the signing of the convention. Actions contradicting common sense and one's own statements about the "desirability" of agreement are, naturally, evoking mistrust. I doubt the sincerity of the positions occupied by those states which are producing or getting ready to produce new-generation chemical weapons.

The position of some states which do not have chemical weapons at present, but which have a developed chemical industry is having an adverse impact on the talks. These states do not want the future convention to impose limitations on their commercial chemistry. One can, of course, understand their interest in an unimpeded development of this industry. But what if it is so "unimpeded" as to result in the development of a combat chemical potential? Apparently, one should seek such solutions here which would consider the interests of civilian chemical industries and prevent the development of chemical weapons,
The main outstanding issue at the talks is inspection by challenge. The point is that it may concern very "sensitive" objects and visits by international inspectors to them could prejudice supreme state interests. What could be done in this respect? A useful proposal was made by Britain. Under this proposal, when full-scale access to such objects cannot be granted, the state in question would suggest alternative measures. It could present, for one, corresponding information, allow inspectors to conduct visual observation of the suspected facility from the outside, take samples of the air, discharge waters, etc. The proposed measures should supply objective evidence that the convention is not being violated.

During the spring session of the Disarmament Conference the Soviet Union suggested that inspections by challenge should be effected automatically in two cases—when there are suspicions about the use of chemical arms, or about their presence at declared enterprises and depots. Alternative measures should be used to reveal secret storage or production of chemical arms. It is important that such measures should be carried out in the spirit of goodwill, when both sides are interested in revealing the truth. The British proposal offers a good example of reaching a compromise.

The main condition of inspections by challenge, and of all other measures of verifying compliance with the future convention is complete equality of the contracting parties, and lack of any discrimination. We proceed from the premise that the procedures for making challenges, conducting inspections and assessing their results should place the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and all other participants in the future convention into an equal position, and grant them equal rights and opportunities. Any deviation from this principle would damage the security interests of one side.

The main question arising in this context is linked with the difference in the forms of property between the socialist and capitalist countries. It is my conviction that one and the same regime of limitation and verification should be applied to both private and state-owned enterprises producing equally dangerous chemicals. Private form of ownership should not serve as a pretext for slackening this regime.

It is also important for all participants in the convention to take the necessary measures (in conformity with their obligations) to ensure that the TNC's should not become a channel for circumventing its provisions.

The order for the destruction of chemical arms is still to be harmonized in order to ensure that the security of any side should not be prejudiced in the process. The question of the line-up of the Executive Council and its procedure of work also has to be solved. Legal aspects (such as conditions for the entry of the convention into force, the right to withdraw from it, etc) have not yet been worked out.

At the session of the Conference which opens on June 9 we shall work energetically to remove the problems which impede the signing of the convention.

/9274
CSO: 1812/233
CONTAR ON RATIONALE FOR SS-20'S IN ASIA

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 10 (16), May 87 p 12

[Article by Maj Gen Philipp Gontar, Expert of the USSR Defence Ministry: "Why Does the USSR Leave 100 Warheads on SS-20s in Asia?"]

[Text] All in all there are about 500 American nuclear-capable aircraft in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and on aircraft-carriers of the U.S. Seventh Fleet (84 F-16's and F-4's in South Korea, 32 F-16's in Japan, 48 F-4's on the Philippines, and more than 300 deck assault planes on aircraft-carriers). Their range is up to 1,000 and more kilometres, so they can reach the territory of the USSR, China and other Asian countries. In addition, the United States has about 150 nuclear-capable assault planes which are part of its naval aviation, and more than 250 pieces of nuclear artillery. The U.S. has started to deploy its tactical Lance missiles in South Korea, and is building up the number of longer-range Tomahawk cruise missiles on its surface ships.

The infrastructure of the U.S. armed forces in Asia and the Pacific includes more than 350 military installations, among them 80 major bases for air force, naval and ground troops. Thousands of American nuclear charges are stored at 11 stationary depots of nuclear weapons in South Korea, Japan, on the Philippines, and on Guam.

All these American nuclear weapons are permanently trained on the Soviet Far East and other Asian countries. This is the main reason which compels the USSR to preserve its nuclear missiles in its eastern regions.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly stressed that it seeks the elimination of medium-range missiles on a global scale, and is ready to discuss the elimination of Soviet and American short-range systems in the East, but, of course, only if the threat from the counterpart American weapons is removed.

/927/
CSO: 1812/233
IZVESTIYA NOTES NEW F-16'S AT MISAWA

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jun 87 p 1

[Article by S. Agafonov under the rubric "Report from Abroad": "Japan: Aircraft Land in Misawa"]

[Text] Tokyo. (From IZVESTIYA'S own correspondent.) As the Kiodo Tsusin agency reports, five new F-16 fighter-bomber nuclear weapon carrying aircraft have arrived at the American Air Force base in Misawa, which is located in the Japanese prefecture of Aomori.

The total number of aircraft of this class now deployed in Misawa has reached 27. This July, Kiodo Tsusi reports, this figure will grow to 50, because it is in July that the full deployment of two F-16 squadrons, initiated by the Pentagon in 1980, will be completed.

You do not have to be a great military specialist to determine the consequences of this action. According to its characteristics, the F-16 is a means of delivering nuclear weapons, and its operational radius covers a vast area of the Soviet Union and other countries of the region. The disposition of these aircraft can be interpreted in only one way: as the strengthening of an American first strike capability in the Far East. All of the talk that these measures are dictated by the need "to withstand Soviet military power" looks entirely futile and conflicts with the facts.

The Soviet Union does not have military superiority in the region and does not seek it. According to general opinion, recent Soviet initiatives regarding medium range nuclear weapons in Asia became eloquent evidence of the constructive approach of our country to problems of preserving peace and security in this region of the planet. Against the background of these proposals, the strengthening of the strike force of the Pentagon in Misawa says that the U.S. adheres to a different policy and that it is guided by considerations that are far from that of maintaining and strengthening peace.

13052
CSO: 1801/190
NOVOSTI DATA ON FORCE DE FRAPPE

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 10 (16), May 87 pp 9-11

[Text] Certain shifts in the disposition of nuclear armaments in Europe would take place this year if the USSR and the United States reached an agreement on eliminating their medium- and, possibly, shorter-range missiles on the continent. France would become the owner of the most destabilizing weapons capable of hitting any targets in Europe and outside it.

The table below gives data on French nuclear weapons and shows the essence of the so-called perimeter defence doctrine. The range of the Hades (to be adopted in 1991) and Pluton shorter-range missiles and the prospective Mirage-2000 and Super Etendard bombers with ASMP guided missiles is 120, 350, and 1,200 km respectively.

DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(Program for 1987 - 1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of carriers</th>
<th>Number of warheads on carriers</th>
<th>Year of adoption</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>As of May 1, 1987</th>
<th>End of the Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Storage missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hades</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical aviation</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage 2000 with ASMP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage 2000 with ASMP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSILES AND PLANES WITH GUIDED MISSILES</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>1164</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| MISSILES AND PLANES WITH GUIDED MISSILES | 162 | 242 | 222 | 1164 |

NOTE: The figures after the elipses indicate the number of subsections.
French submarines provided with M-20, M-4, and from 1954, M-5 carriers, whose range is 3,200, 4,000, and 6,000 km respectively, will be able to hit targets in practically any spot of the globe.

(Military Review information)