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Adm Kostev on Military Doctrine
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[Article by Professor and Vice Admiral G. Kostev: “Our Military Doctrine in Light of New Political Thinking”]

[Text] Warsaw Treaty member states adopted a new military doctrine at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (PKK) in Berlin on 29 May 1987. This doctrine had attracted a lot of attention from world society and this is understandable. The document that was signed in Berlin is an example of new political thinking in the nuclear missile age as it is based on halting further replenishments of nuclear arsenals, stopping the expansion of military confrontation, pressure, international tension and hostility and recognizing the necessity of overcoming suspicion and distrust. Comrade M. S. Gorbachev stresses, “Warsaw Treaty signatories have clearly stated their military doctrine, one that is subordinated to the task of preventing both nuclear and conventional war, is oriented on reasonable sufficiency in both the volume and nature of arms and armed forces and is exclusively defensive in nature.”

The open statement of their military doctrine by countries of the socialist community is an expression of the defensive nature of socialism’s military strategy. In officially coming out with a united doctrine, the fraternal countries are being guided by the desire to reduce international tension by adopting measures that will facilitate the reduction of armed forces and weapons and reduce the threat of war. They are speaking out so that experts from the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO will meet and objectively and impartially examine and explain the contents and trends in their military doctrines to one another, compare them and study the conceptions together to strengthen international trust and expand understanding of the goals and intentions of the confronting military-political alliances. And they have made every effort to express their common point of view to further increase their restraint and become more consistent in considering the realities of the nuclear age.

This open expression of political will by Warsaw Treaty member states is an irrefutable argument in favor of employing the socialist states’ peace-loving policy and tearing the mask of hypocrisy off of the anti-Soviets who are spreading hysteria under the decrepit flag of the “Soviet military threat.” The document covering the Warsaw Treaty Organization’s military doctrine is yet another clear confirmation that it is not the Soviet Union and socialism that are guilty of continuing war on this planet, but rather the imperialist ambitions of the U.S. and other capitalist states.

Aggressive circles in the U.S. and other NATO countries are continuing to prepare for war in answer to the USSR’s initiative to eliminate nuclear weapons and to the Warsaw Treaty’s recommendation that military concepts and the doctrines of the military blocs and their participants be based on defensive grounds. The U.S. is planning to put nuclear weapons into space and to significantly increase their own strategic potential by the early 90’s.

So long as international reaction whips the arms race and it has not renounced the policy of social revanchism and its “crusade” against socialism, the CPSU and its fraternal parties will do everything possible to support the defensive might of our country and the socialist cooperative at the necessary level. The party and the people are objectively evaluating the real situation and consider the defense of the Socialist Fatherland and the support of its security as one of the most important functions of the Soviet State. Socialism has never of its own will linked, nor is it now linking its future to the military solution of international problems. As noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, the Soviet Union has planned in the military area to “act in the future so that no one has any reason for even imaginary fears for their own security.” These fundamental attitudes are expressed in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

Warsaw Treaty military doctrine is a system of fundamental views about averting war, military construction, preparing the fraternal countries and their armed forces to repel aggression and about the methods for waging armed combat in defense of socialism. This is also the basis for the doctrines of each member of the Warsaw Treaty, to include Soviet military doctrine.

There are usually two parts to military doctrine — political and military and the latter is usually called military-technical.

The political side of military doctrine, as a rule, consists of views on the social and political essence of the future war, if the war will be started by the imperialists, and especially the political goals of the state and the requirements for military construction that result from these goals. The other part of doctrine, the military side, is associated with determining the strategic military nature of war, the missions for the armed forces, their development and the basis for the country’s military preparations. The two parts of doctrine are dialectically interconnected and the essence of this link is their mutual inseparability and the total conformity of the political goals and the methods for conducting military operations.

The provisions of Soviet military doctrine are based on the laws and principles of dialectic and historical materialism and Leninist teachings on defending the Socialist Motherland. These take into account the reality of the modern era, the powerful forces of socialism and its ability and desire to resolve international problems through peaceful and political methods.
The political content of Soviet military doctrines is derived from the socialist nature of our social structure, from the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet government and from the interests of its people. And it is for this reason that the main feature of our military doctrine is its defensive inclination. The document that was signed in Berlin on 29 March 1987 stresses the decisively defensive nature of the military doctrine for all Warsaw Treaty member states.

The defensive nature of our military doctrine is expressed in the following basic provisions: Under no circumstances will the Soviet Union begin military operations against any state or alliance of states if the Soviet Union itself has not become the object of an armed attack. And we should stress that since the Soviet Union is a socialist type state, wars of conquest are foreign to it and it has never prepared for or waged a war to establish political supremacy in the world or to change the existing structure in other states; The Soviet Union has no territorial pretensions toward any state either in or outside of Europe and has no need to expand its state borders, but if its borders are attacked, the aggressor will be totally routed and our people will defend themselves with total resolve; The Soviet Union will defend both itself and any Socialist Treaty member state in like manner to repel an attack from without; The Soviet Union does not consider any state or any people as its enemy; on the contrary, it is prepared to build relations with all the countries of the world without exception on the basis of mutual consideration for the interests of security and peaceful coexistence.

Because the Soviet Union, as the other countries in the Warsaw Pact, has been forced to maintain Armed Forces and the means for repelling any attack from without, the military part of our doctrine includes the problems of improving the Army and the Navy and maintaining their military preparedness at a level that will not allow us to be surprised. The most important aspects of these issues are: the basic trends in preparing the Soviet Army and Navy, their equipment level and organizational structure, training for their highly-qualified personnel, the requirements for military training for the troops, and the education of personnel in the spirit of high vigilance and constant readiness to repel aggression.

The defensive nature of our military doctrine, one that counts exclusively on repelling aggression, in no way signifies that our operations will be of a passive nature. In the event an aggressor attacks, Soviet Armed Forces along with the armies of the fraternal socialist countries will defend the revolutionary achievements of their people with full resolve. The security of the Motherland and of the entire socialist community is sacred to us.

Just as Soviet military doctrine, the military doctrine for the Warsaw Treaty member states is subordinate to the task of preventing both nuclear and conventional war. This very important political issue, one that has been enunciated by the Warsaw Treaty countries, again expresses the basic principles that are at the foundation of the socialist states’ military doctrine.

If we were able to eliminate war from human society’s life there would be a very critical and at the same time simple decision — whether or not a military policy or military doctrine were necessary — and the elements of these two part would disappear in and of themselves. But this is as yet not realistic.

The CPSU program states that so long as the danger of imperialism starting aggressive wars and military conflicts exists, the party will focus unwavering attention on increasing the defensive might of the USSR and strengthening its security and the readiness of the Armed Forces to rout any aggressor so that the USSR’s Armed Forces are at a level that precludes strategic superiority by imperialism’s forces. This is also the initial position for the entire system of views that comprise contemporary Soviet military doctrine. And this covers both the political and the military parts.

The current stage in the development of Soviet military doctrine (in its very dynamic military part) is appropriate to the 80’s. By this time the two leading nuclear powers, the USSR and the U.S.A., have accumulated enormous nuclear might. In addition, there are another several states that have established reserves of nuclear weapons and have improved them. This is the main feature of the present stage that has caused new opinions in socialist countries about the nature of future war and the fundamental changes since the 40’s and 50’s, a time when effective means of mass destruction were just entering the inventories. These opinions are reflected in the new political thinking and in the idea that a world nuclear war must not occur. At the same time, since the other side is not abandoning its policy of force, is not taking those radical, practical steps to eliminate nuclear weapons and does not want to limit the use of conventional weapons, wars on this planet still remain a harsh reality and we, the real opponents of weapons of mass destruction and armed conflict in general, cannot unilaterally disarm and thus become weaker than the aggressor. This means that there are two extremely important tasks.

The first and primary task is to rule out nuclear war. This essence of this task can be expressed by the words of V. I. Lenin: “Take as many simple, clear decisions and measures as possible that will really lead to peace, if not totally eliminate the dangers of war” (Complete Collected Works, volume 45, page 241). This Leninist direction is reflected in the current stage of CPSU policies.

The second task is to have the opportunity and the ability to repel any aggressor’s attack and to have the Armed Forces prepared to conduct military operations that include the extensive use of any type of weapon.
And we should teach our Army and Navy forces to do this in a realistic manner. This task is totally a result of the military doctrine on defending socialism against an aggressor.

Imperialism was and remains the source of wars and the military threat. It is therefore understandable that we inherently link our untiring struggle for peace with a readiness to harshly repel any aggression. This principle is totally and fully expressed in the Soviet military doctrine whose essence is expressed with utmost simplicity: "The Soviet Union does not want greater security for itself at the expense of others, but it will not accept less security." And while there is a threat of an encroachment against the achievements of October and a threat to general peace we will even further strengthen our Armed Forces.

There is one more important feature of the current stage in the development of Soviet military doctrine. Its direct and immediate goal is to prepare the country and its Armed Forces to defend against aggressors, i.e., to wage a just war. This is an important feature that also distinguishes the common doctrine of Warsaw Treaty countries from the doctrine of the capitalist states.

The military doctrine of Western countries is based on totally different principles. For example the military doctrine of the U.S. in the 80's is the strategy of "direct confrontation" with the USSR on global and regional levels. It is aimed at achieving "total and indisputable U.S. military superiority." And there are other variations of imperialist strategy that are little different from this. These are represented by official U.S. and NATO military doctrines such as "flexible response" and "nuclear containment." Western leaders cannot give up these outdated views on military confrontation that are representative of yesterday. They persistently oppose agreements on mutually repudiating a nuclear first-strike and using force to resolve political differences.

However the time demands other approaches. The inherent link between the struggle for mankind's survival and measures to strengthen national security and also the increased role of the technical military side of war urgently dictate the need for new political thinking.

Military doctrine is affected by the development of military science. Therefore changes that are introduced into our military doctrine because of new political thinking objectively require refinements in the theory of military art which has been enriched today by a number of new provisions.

First, the Soviet Union will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and will never use them against those countries that do not have such weapons in their territories. The USSR will do everything possible to drastically reduce the nuclear weapons that it has amassed and then eliminate them.

The obligatory decision to not be the first to use nuclear weapons is not simply a verbal statement, but an irrevocable requirement of our military construction. It is reflected in the training for commanders, staffs and forces and in the organization of extremely strict controls that guarantee that the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons cannot happen, in the increased military preparedness of our forces to repel aggression and in their equipment levels, in the improved command and control and the increased political and moral state of our servicemen.

Second, at the foundation of our Armed Forces' construction is the principle of defensive sufficiency. This means that the composition of our Army and Navy forces and the quality and quantity of the means for armed combat are strictly commensurable with the military threat level and the nature and intensity of imperialism's military preparations. It is effected by the requirements to reliably guarantee the security of the USSR and all Warsaw Treaty countries and to repel aggression. The limits for reasonable defensive sufficiency are determined by the need to prevent an unpunished nuclear attack under any circumstances, even the most unfavorable, and also by the currently existing strategic military parity that is a decisive factor in preventing war. A further increase in the parity level will certainly not bring greater security. Therefore the situation dictates the necessity of maintaining military force equality, but at the lowest possible level.

Third, there have been changes in the content of Soviet military doctrine. If the imperialists start it (war), it will unavoidably be a nuclear missile war, the type war where nuclear weapons will be the primary means of destruction and missiles will be the primary delivery system. Yet this is not appropriate to the real situation. The U.S. and NATO understand the extraordinary danger of nuclear war. Therefore, by not repudiating the policy of "from a position of power," their military strategy of "flexible response" envisions active preparations to conduct not only a nuclear war, but also an extended conventional war. And they are therefore creating military assets whose characteristics are the same as low-yield nuclear weapons. This means that our country has to prepare an armed defense using not only nuclear weapons, but also highly effective conventional means of destruction. Our problem is that we have to be as strong as our probable enemy.

Fourth, today war is a reality of our times and is an unavoidable part of the policy of violence by reactionary imperialist circles. The Army and Navy exist to carry out armed combat and are the weapon for this violence. Therefore it is extremely important that we maintain strategic military parity by strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces which are undermining all imperialist attempts to violate the equality of forces. In this regard it is very important that we train the Army and Navy for war under conditions where the enemy has weapons of enormous power. We are not talking about improving
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weapons and military equipment, but about intensifying the human factor, decisively increasing the command skills of officers and generals and increasing special training for our personnel. The task is to radically improve the quality of military training for army and navy forces so that every hour of training in the classroom, in the field and at sea is saturated and effective.

The party is openly talking to the people today about economic and social problems and about persistently resolving them. And the problems of military construction and of reliably defending the conquests of October demand the same businesslike approach. The trends and content of army and navy training and their equipment level must be refined by considering the requirements and provisions of military doctrine. Also the methods for more effectively training army and navy forces and increasing the military preparedness must be defined in connection with the conditions that have changed.

As noted at the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the violation of Soviet air space by the West German sports airplane is yet another reminder of how strong and alive the negative phenomena that were exposed by the April (1985) Central Committee Plenum and the 27th Party Congress are in our society and even in the army. This underscores the need to increase vigilance, act even more decisively and strengthen discipline, organization, responsibility and execution everywhere and at all levels. The defensive nature of our doctrine in no way means that we are to reduce our vigilance and military preparedness.

The theory of military training and education as an integral part of Soviet military science has special role in realizing the requirements of military doctrine. It is this theory that develops the forms and methods for training conscientious and skillful defenders of the Motherland. It provides recommendations to coordinate subunits, units and major units and increase their combat capabilities and combat readiness.

Moral, political and psychological training designed to get the Motherland's defenders to conduct decisive, active combat operations has an extremely important place in the nuclear missile age where the imperialists are preparing for an uncompromising and shattering war (they themselves do not disclaim this). Pacifist inclinations cannot be allowed among the soldiers since this reduces the Armed Forces' combat capability at the moral and psychological level. Why? Because every serviceman must be indoctrinated with the ability to fight to his last drop of blood and with the willingness to sacrifice himself to achieve success in battle and in a fight. We must be prepared for victory both on a tactical and an operational level without any reservations and while considering the employment of any type weapon. Without this, an attack, a battle, a fight or an operation will be lost even before it begins. This is an axiom of military art. Remember our basic principle: "The forces have to learn what is necessary in war." We cannot achieve victory in battle without observing this and violations during peacetime reduce the level of the individual elements in the Soviet Armed Forces' military potential. elements such as military skills and faithfulness to one's patriotic duty. And as a result, this reduces the effectiveness of the human factor in the Armed Forces.

The Soviet people know and remember the difficult days and months during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. They write about the reasons for the failures and argue about them to this day. But the main thing that unites the people is the conviction that this will not be repeated. Neither the people nor history would forgive us for that. The country's defense and the strengthening of our security are sacred to us and every Soviet person has committed himself to this. And it is very unfortunate that our press often has arguable and simply incorrect statements about the problems of defending the Motherland and service in the Army.

Military and patriotic education for young people will have an extremely important role as long as there is a threat of war. It is precisely this education that develops a love and respect for their Armed Forces and it is a necessary prerequisite and a definite step along the path toward creating cohesive military collectives. Military patriotic education helps young people understand, acutely feel and recognize the party's important program requirement that the defense of the Socialist Motherland is a sacred responsibility for the citizens of the USSR. Unfortunately there are still a number of places where training young people for service in the Army does not meet today's needs. We must tell ourselves that the aggressor's plans are evidently considering this as it would any other of our weaknesses. The defense of the Motherland today requires special attention and demands that the Soviet man be prepared for severe trials if an aggressor dares to disturb our revolutionary transformations, a continuance of the business that was started in October 1917.

The CPSU Central Committee's resolution "Preparations for the 70th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" stressed the need to expand efforts to develop devotion to the business of Great October among the younger generations and to strengthen the defensive might of the Soviet Motherland. The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member states serves the cause of reliably defending the USSR and our fraternal countries and the great cause of peaceful socialist construction. It has a strictly defensive nature and is a clear example of new political thinking.

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Adm Sorokin on Improving Party-Political Work
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[Article by Adm A. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Good Results from Party Work—Results of the Discussion Conducted in the Pages of the Journal on the Fighting Spirit of Primary Party Organizations"]

[Text] The armed forces' successful fulfillment of their destiny is justly linked today with restructuring, and first and foremost with bringing the work of primary party organizations into strict accordance with the behests of the times. Only a restructuring of their activity will make it possible to transform them into a real force for ideological-political, organizational and moral potential and in fact to carry out the leading role in soldiers' collectives and display activeness and fighting spirit.

The importance of accelerating and deepening the restructuring of party work is conditioned by the fact that there are people in the primary party organizations upon whom the assurance of fighting spirit and strict discipline, the resolution of assigned tasks, daily life and the relations among soldiers depends entirely. And the higher the reputation of communists, the closer their link with non-party members and the more topical their work, the stronger the influence of party organizations will be on the nature of military activity and the preparedness of the personnel for it and the more substantive the human factor will be in the cause of defending the conquests of socialism.

It is natural that the problem of raising the role and strengthening the influence of party organizations on all aspects of the life of the troops and naval forces is considered to be a most topical and urgent one, and its resolution is among the paramount concerns of political organs, the party activists and all army and navy communists. It is no accident that the roundtable discussion published in the journal on the essence of the fighting spirit of the primary party organizations and ways of increasing it, conducted by the Political Directorate of the Baltic Fleet, has evoked a widespread and interested response from readers. This near correspondence seminar for communists went on for six months. Commanders and political workers, party secretaries and members of elected party organs as well as rank-and-file communists set forth their views and opinions on the goals and course of the restructuring of party work in accordance with the directives of the 27th Party Congress and the January and June (1987) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, revealed grains of accumulated experience and boldly raised keen and vital issues, calling the stiff elements of the braking mechanism by their true names. This was in and of itself a sign of the growth in sociopolitical activeness and principled nature of the communists.

One cannot fail to agree with the conclusions of participants in the discussion that restructuring is more and more seizing hold of the minds and thoughts of communists, military personnel and army and navy personnel, that a fresh breeze of renewal has roused the stifled zones of inertia, indifference and stagnation, awakened feelings of conscience, duty and responsibility among many and has illuminated the moral atmosphere in our party and military collectives. Definite changes really have occurred in the last two years in the vital activity of the majority of party organizations in units and on ships, in staffs and directorates, military-training institutions, military construction sites and enterprises. Irreversible processes of democratization in intra-party life, a cleansing of party work of formalism, and turning away from paper-shuffling, conference-room formalities and official-duty measures toward vital work with people and their mobilization for the fulfillment of official duty with a full return on their efforts are occurring. Glasnost, criticism and self-criticism are expanding, and intolerance of ostentation, complacency and conceit is on the rise. The fight for communists to serve as a personal example in service, combat training and discipline and for a clean and honest image for party members is being waged more purposefully. Dedication to concrete results, professional caliber and the moral aspect of the work of political organs in leading the primary party organizations is changing for the better. Today, at the end of the training year, the first steps of these changes have made themselves known. There are more units, ships and subunits that have taken a step forward in combat training and that are operating without breaches of discipline.

But all of this can only be considered the first real signs of the qualitatively new situation taking shape in our party house and the army and navy environment. An alarming trend of a lag by a number of party organizations from the dominant inclinations and dynamic processes that are spreading throughout society, as spoken of by M.S. Gorbachev at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, are also being manifested in the armed forces. Many of our primary party organizations are working in an old-fashioned manner and have not interpreted their place in restructuring as they should, often seeing it as an end in itself, and not as the chief means for a decisive increase of party influence on the state of affairs. Such miscalculations have been tolerated by some party organizations in the Moscow PVO [Air-Defense] District and the Transbaykal and Odessa military districts. It is no coincidence that there is no change for the better in these collectives, and some have even lost the gains made earlier.

The unprecedented instance of a violation of the airspace of the Soviet Union by a West German sport plane, revealing chronic shortcomings in the organization of combat readiness and the performance of operational readiness, testifies to the fact that the inertia in party political work, social indifference, psychological conservatism and negligence and carelessness that has become
habitual that have accumulated over many years are being overcome much too slowly. A rift between word and deed, between that which is being done and that which the actual situation requires be done, is being observed as before—and this was confirmed by the convincing instances of Lt Col G. Dmitriyev, Capt 2nd Rank V. Moroz, Capt Yu. Nazarov and other participants in the discussion on the pages of the journal.

Far from all communists have become aware of a seemingly simple truth that to restructure, to proceed further and to achieve more, to master a new way of thinking, style of work and new, more creative attitude toward the matters charged to them, is required of everyone. The numbers of hundreds of members and candidate members of the CPSU who are displaying poor activeness, and sometimes even passivity, in service and social work could be added without any particular difficulty to those dozens of names in the party organizations of every military district or group of troops of fleet cited by the authors of the features on this score. The specific and detailed analysis done by the Political Directorate of the Strategic Missile Troops of the activity of a number of unit party organizations demonstrated that about half of the communists actually do not participate in party political work. Many of them, in an exacting verification of knowledge and skills, did not demonstrate a mastery of military affairs at the specialist 1st-class level. There is no doubt that doing this analysis and this verification in other branches of the armed forces would obtain indicators that would not differ much.

The task of strengthening party influence first and foremost on the unconditional fulfillment of the requirements of the party Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo for a decisive rise in vigilance and the combat readiness of the armed forces, discipline, organization, responsibility and assiduity at all levels is arising in all its magnitude today. The time allotted for elucidating the ideas, essence and requirements of restructuring has passed. The time has come for real results.

Deeds and acts that meet the spirit of this crucial period, a Leninist style of work and the results of its immediate influence are today the chief criteria of the role of vanguard and the political and professional maturity of the communist. It seems that Capt 3rd rank V. Kharkhadinov and Capts V. Klimchuk and Yu. Kasperovich, reflecting on the direct dependence of the fighting spirit of the primary party organizations on preparedness and discipline and the responsibility of every communist in them, came to the correct conclusion on the necessity of constant and high exactingness toward members and candidates members of the CPSU for their moral image and the fulfillment of party and service duties. It is completely clear: the power of party influence on eradicating mores and customs alien to the nature of a socialist army in relations among soldiers and resolving the tasks facing military collectives takes shape from the personal example of communists and their active participation in educating their fellow servicemen. There can be no discussion of any influence whatsoever if there are breaches of discipline among communists, who have a slippish attitude toward the matter and who avoid vital work with people. And unfortunately, there are more than a few of them.

It is no secret that divisions and disruptions, the poor-quality execution of assignments in combat training and distractions from them by a considerable portion of the personnel for various types of administrative chores has taken root in many formations and units and on many ships. These new-chronic shortcomings do not exist in and of themselves. Behind them is a lack of principle, negligence, a lack of conscientiousness and an inability to execute by specific officials, the majority of whom are communists. But they are not called strictly to account for their irresponsible attitude toward the fulfillment of official party-organization duties. In the best case, questions are asked of the communists of platoons, companies and battalions. But the communists that are leaders of regimental, ship and other higher-up levels, staffs, services and branches of service, due to whose ineffectiveness, lack of demandingness and lack of control the disorder is created, remain in the wings.

The party organizations take the same unprincipled position of permissiveness and non-interference on issues of military discipline as well. As a rule, communists are subjected to party responsibility, and even then hardly everywhere, only for gross personal disciplinary misdemeanors or after accidents that occur in the military collectives they head. The main thing is lacking—a knowledge of the real situation, the ability to compare one’s own actions with regulation requirements, a demand of what each communist has done personally to eliminate shortcomings in the sector entrusted to him. Who he retrained in what, what he taught in ensuring, raising and reinforcing discipline, who he helped and how to correct the state of affairs in the subunit. What personal contribution was made to elaborating to soldiers the requirements of the party, the USSR Ministry of Defense, Soviet laws and the military oath and charters. How close and attentive he is to people and how he responds to their needs and aspirations.

Real results in the example of communists, a strengthening of their influence on improving the quality of combat and political training and a reinforcing of military discipline is evident in party collectives where they are proceeding along the path of making high demands of communists and the creation of conditions that rule out their non-fulfillment. All members of the party, starting with the commanders of regiments and ending with conscript soldiers, in the formation that whose political section was until recently headed by Maj Gen V. Sein, who has been promoted, in particular have picked themselves up appreciably after the introduction of a system of personal demand for the matters charged to
the obligations of a member of the CPSU. An atmosphere in which a person is restrained from poorly thought-out steps and deeds and from inclinations toward dependency by the party conscience and shame before his comrades.

All of us, passing through the difficult school of restructuring, are at once in the role of pupil and teacher. We must all learn straightforwardness, honesty, principle and a respectful and demanding attitude toward each other along with the judicious utilization of such powerful tools of democracy as glasnost, criticism, self-criticism and public opinion. It is clearly time to stop being seduced by the overall considerably increased critical mood and not to note negative particulars behind a positive event. And many of them can be uncovered by a more or less attentive analysis. Those criticizing are principally those who had earlier not kept silent in favor of personal interests and reckonings. Many communists do not make use of their statutory rights and fulfill their statutory obligations boldly or speak candidly to their comrades, including leaders, on their shortcomings or incorrect behavior. Even at meetings of the party aktiv, logically called upon to be models of a genuine principled and businesslike nature, roundabout speeches and condemnations of shortcomings continue to be heard that supposedly have no specific guilty parties, and remarks are only rarely and timidly directed toward the workers of political organs and staffs.

Self-criticism and the repeated acknowledgment of one’s own errors, omissions and failures to follow through have acquired a broad sweep today and have “come into fashion” with repeated assurances to correct and eliminate them that really are not the point. This is, after all, nothing other than a profanation of self-criticism. Instances are frequent where the basis for criticism, sometimes quite insidious, is personal resentment or a touchy pride. The waves of glasnost have lifted up the heads of hidden and obvious spiteful critics and demagogues. Garbling and sometimes even wittingly distorting facts that are two, three or five years old,without troubling with proof, lumping fact and fiction together, they write and signal all levels of authority regarding violations and abuses. And when checked out, these accusations most often prove to be inflated or unfounded.

Such approaches and acts cannot remain without strict party evaluations. These idle talkers and demagogues must doubtless answer fully, while all communists learn the culture of constructive and comradely criticism that unifies rather than divides the collective and incites the person to look around and add to the work, not hacking away at his faith in himself. And it is no less important to cultivate and develop a correct attitude toward criticism. The extraordinary instance published in the materials of Maj V. Shevlyuga “Instead of Leadership Administration,” when the chief of the political department of the formation, Yu. Bulatovich, entered onto the path of oppressing criticism and petty vengeance for it, is
far from being the only one. Many leader-communists of various ranks have already been subjected to party responsibility for such actions, but the recidivists of the notorious defense of "the honor of the uniform" through methods that are not permitted still make themselves known. A situation where other leader-communists, political organs and party organs acknowledge criticism directed at them in word, but draw no conclusions from it and do not correct their errors, also cannot be considered normal.

It is evidently proving difficult for some comrades to renounce obsolete ways of thought and action and to switch to approaches and work methods that give the requisite results. It is understandable that yesterday's psychology cannot be changed suddenly. It is not so easy for a person to master himself and reject the comfortable habit of not intervening in anything or to hide behind the screen of words about one's own lack of obligation, or else even an inability to arrange matters. Needed here is willpower, a certain courage, conviction, exactness and an attractive example.

The practice of efficient and businesslike reaction to critical observations and suggestions by CPSU members and candidate members and regular information for the collective on the results of their realization that has become established in many political organs and party committees and buros is having a beneficial effect on the development of the activeness, principles and responsibility of communists. Moreover, in places where they act in just this manner after every party meeting, people are convinced with their own eyes that their opinions and positions play no small role, and they rid themselves of the political infantility of the detached observer and divergent Philistine views of the "it's your funeral" or "the weakest goes to the wall" type. It is especially valuable when the commander of the unit or formation or chief of the political department keeps the communists informed on the realization of the observations and suggestions concerning improving the training and educational process, the elimination of violations of the norms of party life or principles of social justice. Of course, such experience deserves every kind of support and dissemination. An inattentive and formalistically bureaucratic attitude toward the opinions and suggestions of people must be decisively and persistently eradicated.

The point of view of Capt 1st rank I. Bogachev and Lt Cols A. Mikhaylov and I. Tustov, who feel that professional level and energy, firmness and consistency in the work of elected party organs, from the fighting spirit of which begins, in essence, the fighting spirit of the primary party organization, must be raised is indisputable. In point of fact, who else but party committees and buros can serve as an example of dedication to the ultimate result and a businesslike nature in work and high morality in it? Many of them are indeed taking such a position.

Instructive in this regard is the experience of the party committees and buros that include Lt Col Sagal, Capt 3rd rank V. Girushiev and Gds Capt S. Shagunov. Having begun restructuring with themselves, these party organizers have turned to face the people, have put the person at the center of their activity and are striving to see authentically both the strong and the weak sides of them. They begin any matter with devising a clear understanding of its significance among communists and non-party soldiers for the fighting spirit of the unit or ship and the role and extent of responsibility that is charged to each. Reports of CPSU members and candidate members, individual conversations with them, an open evaluation of their official and social activity at party meetings—all of these are used by the activists to incite the communist to look more strictly after himself, have a sober evaluation of his own capabilities and make fuller use of them in the performance of operational readiness, the organization of classes in combat and political training, increasing professional mastery and his contribution to educating subordinates or fellow servicemen and ensuring discipline. Topicality, benevolence and an exacting candidness in party discussion later reinforced by monitoring and assistance will, as a rule, achieve the goal.

Working hand in hand with the commanders and political workers of units and ships, these party committees and buros are well representing the whole complexity of the problems of cohesion of military collectives and ways of expanding it and are taking a solid and principled party position in evaluating negative phenomena, be they the embellishment of training or competition results, the state of discipline, the offering of an unworthy officer for promotion or a callous and inattentive attitude toward the everyday life and rest of the soldiers. And it is no accident that people have come to turn more and more to these party committees and buros with their urgent questions and suggestions. The party organizers have filled out their ranks with the best officers and warrant officers and have strengthened their influence over the personnel, as testified to by the increasing quality indicators of military work.

At the same time, we still have not a few elected party organs that have been unable to show their worth under the new conditions. At first glance, they seem to be working actively and intensively, much is said about restructuring, elements of novelty are introduced into the work, but there is no apparent return from it. What is the reason for this? Old approaches, it seems. A concern for the results they are called upon to produce is not being felt behind the diversity and quantity of measures, and thus the reports of communists are frequently conducted in haste and are of a formalistic nature. Individual conversations instead of a quest for truth and the devising of constructive solutions are for the same reason often transformed into boring edifications or terrible pufbery. The open confirmation of party references is replaced with their secret composition and discussion among a narrow circle of activists with the
observance of form rather than essence in bringing a question to the party meeting. Collegiality in the work is lacking for such party committees and buros. Here all and everything is done by a single secretary, while the members of the elected organ are just present and voting at the sessions. There is little benefit from this work, of course, and it leaves the imprint of formalism on all of the activity of the party organization as well.

I would especially like to mention the secretary of the party committee, buro or party organization. Communists want to see in him a bright personality, bold thinker and an active organizer of collective work who is able to rely on the reason and initiative of people. In short, a leader who is competent, attentive, keen and responsive, but at the same time firm and principled in everything that concerns the conduct of party policy and decisions in life and the observance of the norms of party life. There are many such secretaries, as they say, by recognition and capabilities in the army and navy. But unfortunately, communists are also encountered that have proven to be at the head of a party organization accidently. They know poorly and thus do not like party work, gravitating more toward fussing with paper and armchair seclusion than to living exchange with people. There are also so-called “pocket” secretaries, hanging on the words of the superior officer, trying to anticipate his opinion or desires concerning everything, fearing not so much speaking out against covering up shortcomings in combat training or the concealment of disciplinary misdemeanors so much as to utter a contrary word.

A serious problem in the work of elected organs and party organizations overall is their weak influence, still observed in some places, on restructuring and democratizing the activity of trade-union and Komsomol organizations, organs of people’s control, women’s councils and other social army and navy organizations. Other party committees and buros, at the recommendation of the communists in them, have considered the matter closed. This stands out in especially sharp relief in the party leadership of the Komsomol. The turnaround that was observed after the Komsomol Congress in favor of the development of initiative and independence and a strengthening of attention to the ideo-political and moral tempering of the youth has been taken in tow in many places, or else has sunk altogether in others. Administration and double-safe guardianship that have long been outdated and that hinder the development of socio-political activity of the Komsomol members and their active participation in the unification of military collectives, raising the intensiveness and efficiency of military labor and resolving issues of improving everyday life and relaxation have not yet been overcome.

All of these undesirable errors, harmful to the fighting spirit of party organizations, are a direct reflection of omissions and failures to follow through of political organs and their leaders. Some political departments are nonetheless not elaborating this most crucial sphere of their activity and are not devoting proper attention to the selection, training and cultivation of the party aktiv, and personal work with the secretaries is replaced with mass functions. Can it really be normal when the chief of a political organ encounters the party secretaries only at assemblies and seminars or has contact with them basically over the presidium table or from the rostrum? Can instances that exist, albeit rarely, when representatives of political organs engage in the selection of candidates for future secretaries and members of party committees and buros during reporting and elections in secret fashion, only with the commander and the unit political worker or ship, fail to be a drag on the development of intra-party democracy? Can the fact that political organs do not support the basic positions of the party committee or party organ in resolving personnel issues, as was described in the presentations of Lt Col V. Tur and Capt 3rd rank V. Apanovich, really correspond to the times? Due just to such practices by political organs, other commanders and deputy commanders for political affairs of units and ships try to command the party organizations, committees and buros, foisting their own willful solutions on them. Conflicts thus arise between chiefs and party secretaries or party committees that, naturally, only inflict harm on the common cause. Confirmation of this is the example cited by Maj V. Volovik in his correspondence “When Comrades Do Not Agree.” The personal ambitions of the superiors at the military institution of A. Gorbatyuk (already ex-leaders) engendered squabbles and created an unhealthy climate in the leading collective, and it careened backward. Such examples are not alone.

Political organizations today are ridding themselves more and more of an armchair style of work. They are concentrating their efforts in the primary party organizations and have considerably reduced the amount of paperwork and directives. And this gives hope for change. But it is not only important where efforts are concentrated, but what they are directed toward as well, how the party organization steers party work toward the achievement of the requisite results. It is not permissible today to perform solely in the role of strict reviewers, dispassionately uncovering shortcomings, the role of liberally dispensing general directives, advice and recommendations suitable for all cases in life. An effective mastery of political methods of management is required today. And this assumes a good knowledge of the situation, demands posed and tasks faced, the ability to find the role of the party organizations in their resolution to raise them up as a cause. They also consist of an ability to evaluate the urgent problems of party and military life from a political and party-wide perspective, determine their essence and significance in the overall chain of the struggle for higher fighting spirit and to find the best methods of resolving them.

The discovery, consolidation, support and dissemination of the sprouts of new approaches, the kernels of the concrete experience of restructuring, the determination of the causes for stagnation phenomena and the development and realization of steps to overcome them are
taking on especial significance today. It seems that the following tested forms of work are deserving of attention and dissemination in particular: work in primary organizations on discovering and bringing into action reserves and possibilities for ensuring the high intensiveness and quality of combat training, and eradicating instances of non-regulation mutual relations and unifying military collectives with a summation of the results of it at meetings of the formation's party aktiv, the communists of the units and party committee sessions. Listening to the reports of party committees and party buros to the fullest at party organs on specific issues of activity and the reports of members of elected organs before party organizations on their work in the entrusted sector. Obtaining information on the fulfillment of party decisions, the personal example of communists in training and discipline and the growth and reinforcement of party ranks not from the deputy commander for political affairs, but from the secretary of the party committee or buro, which, undoubtedly, would increase his reputation and responsibility. Presenting communists with broader opportunities for making themselves heard on the eve of reporting and elections, when their opinions are studied on who they want to see as part of the elected party organ and heading the party organization. Preliminary acquaintance of CPSU members and candidate members for several days preceding a meeting with report topics and draft formulations...

More persistent efforts are required of political organs and elected party organs in work on summarizing and incorporating existing positive experience and eliminating factors of drag in the fulfillment of the regulation duties of primary party organizations to bring to life the personnel policies of the party. After the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, greater fighting spirit and principles have appeared here. Communists have begun to approach more strictly the evaluation of the political, business and moral qualities of their comrades in discussing and approving their party references at meetings. The attitude of the party member toward restructuring and his real actions are being taken as the chief criterion. His organizational abilities, degree of closeness to people, ability to rely on their intellect, initiative and energies and how he conducts himself as an officer in day-to-day life and his family is not lost from view herein as well. But it sometimes happens that the party organizations make a deal with their consciences and keep silent about the shortcomings of a person when the issue is advancement in the service or dispatch to training, not gathering the courage to come out against the protectionism. It happens, and not infrequently, that other leaders and personnel organs do not consider the opinions of the party organizations. There are still many omissions in educational work with officer personnel. USSR Minister of Defense Gen Army D. Yazov, at a recent meeting with cadets and the command-instruction staff of the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School Imani the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, in speaking of the lofty and crucial mission of the Soviet officer, emphasized that in order to cultivate subordinates, he must himself be ideologically tempered, professionally prepared, know party policies and the life of the country and understand what is being done abroad and what steps are being undertaken or could be undertaken against us by a probable adversary. One can hardly refute the fact, however, that the contribution of many party organizations in forming these qualities in officers, especially young ones, still leaves much to be desired.

It must be acknowledged in general that ideological educational activity—the chief weapon of the primary party organizations—is still the weakest link in their work, which for some reason, by the way, evaded the attention of the participants in the discussion. The practices of ideological educational work and the moral cultivation of the soldiers is being renewed in extremely miserly fashion. Issues in ensuring a unity of combat and political training are not being resolved. There are still differences of opinion in them. Students are poorly taught in classes to apply political knowledge in life and in practice. Many communists that lead groups for the Marxist-Leninist training of officers, political training for warrant officers and political classes for soldiers, sailors, non-commissioned officers and members of agit-prop collectives and groups have a careless attitude toward the fulfillment of party duties. Individual leader-communists have a poor mastery of Marxist-Leninist dialectics and thus have a superficial evaluation of the complex social phenomena and processes transpiring in military collectives, not seeing the actual contradictions of life and ways of overcoming them. And party work, after all, is work with people, influencing their awareness, a concern for their ideological tempering, moral strength and the reinforcement of that chief core in the man that predetermines his conscientious attitude toward restructuring, the matters entrusted to him and social duty. Based on the unwavering fulfillment of the requirements of the 27th Party Congress on the principal directions for restructuring the system for political and economic training for workers, political organs and party organizations must be engaged more decisively and efficiently in raising the quality and effectiveness of political training and ideological work.

Communists have a good opportunity upcoming to evaluate their own work in demanding fashion. I have in mind the reporting and election meetings in party groups and party organizations numbering less than 15 CPSU members. They have already begun at military-training institutions, and they will take place in November and December in military units and on ships. In accordance with the decree of the June (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, meetings of all primary party organizations and meetings of the party aktiv of formations, military-training establishments and those equal to them will be held, at which party committees, party buros and political organs will have to report to communists on the course of restructuring of party work, the activity of military personnel and the fulfillment of the resolutions of the 27th Party Congress and the subsequent plenums.
of the CPSU Central Committee and the requirements of the Central Committee decrees. It is important that all communists be charged with a feeling of healthy dissatisfaction with what has been done, be inclined toward sober and principled analysis of the state of affairs and concentrate their attention on unsolved problems. And, the main thing—increase their practical activity in achieving those results that the party requires of us.

The training year is coming to a close. The results of military labor and socialist competition are being summed up for a worthy greeting to the 70th anniversary of Great October. Army and navy personnel are greeting the glorious anniversary closely united around the Communist Party and its Central Committee, full of determination and still greater zeal and responsibility for fulfilling their patriotic and internationalist duty in the reliable defense of the conquests of socialism. Commanders, political organs and primary party organizations are called upon to have concern that the creative initiative and energy of communists, Komsomol members and all soldiers be concentrated on the priority directions of raising vigilance and combat readiness, ensuring solid military discipline and fulfilling unswervingly and with high quality the broad-scale and difficult tasks of the new training year—a year for incarnating restructuring in real affairs. In them, and only in them, will the genuine fighting spirit of every primary party organization be expressed.


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Party Concern on Upgrading Operational Readiness
18010020a Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 87 (signed to press 4 Aug 87) pp 3-8

[Unattributed article: “Party Concern for the Quality of Operational Readiness”]

[Text] The soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces are on constant operational readiness at the launch positions, airfields, radar stations, command posts, and guidance stations that are part of the ready forces. They fulfill a mission of state importance that requires exceptional vigilance, high training and skill, maximum inner self-possession, assiduity and organization.

The interests of ensuring the security of the Motherland require constant efforts to raise combat readiness further and educate the personnel in a spirit of vigilance. In considering the circumstances connected with the violation of USSR airspace, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee has pointed out serious shortcomings in the organization of the performance of operational readiness, a lack of the requisite vigilance and discipline and major omissions in the leadership of the air-defense troops. The Politburo has emphasized once again the fundamental importance and necessity of a decisive rise in the level of combat readiness of the troops and ensuring their constant readiness to interdict any encroachments on the sovereignty of the Soviet state.

This party requirement places especial responsibility on military personnel, especially those servicemen on operational readiness. Even the slightest instances of placidity, carelessness, lack of organization or uncertainty are impermissible. A recent meeting of the party aktiv of the USSR Ministry of Defense addressed improving the style of work of political-command personnel, the essence of which is to improve decisively the leadership of the troops and maintain combat readiness at the highest level.

Maintaining the ready forces in readiness for immediate combat operations, forming a sound moral, political, and psychological tempering among the personnel and the ability to fulfill combat missions selflessly, assumes a further improvement in party political work. There are examples among the troops and in the fleets that testify to the fact that the extant system of organizational and ideological measures actively fosters the cultivation of a feeling of high responsibility for the vigilant performance of operational readiness among commanders, officers of the command apparatus and all of the personnel. Take the anti-aircraft missile division where the party organization secretary is Capt V. Romashkin. Here, before they assume operational readiness and while performing it, every soldier is embraced by political influences, the professional training of the people is taken into account along with the specific features of their natures and the mutual relations extant among the servicemen, and those who display negligence or a lack of self-possession are strictly called to account. Party political work is set up in differentiated fashion for each category of soldiers with a regard for the specific nature of the missions being fulfilled and the extant situation in the air. Its restructuring in the spirit of the times is manifested first and foremost in dynamism, aggressiveness, and purposefulness toward a concrete result—raising political vigilance, combat readiness, and the soldierly skills of the missile troops.

Many such examples could be cited. Practice in the leading units confirms that commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations are shifting the center of gravity of their activity to vital organizational and ideological work addressed directly at the individual, at his heart and mind. The weight of party word is greater when it has precise aim, addressed both to those who have reputations as experienced specialists and to those who have only recently been brought up to the performance of operational readiness. Young soldiers are in need of particular attention. The best assistance for them is practical advice, an approving word from a senior. Coarseness, lack of self-restraint, and a nervous reaction to the errors of subordinates are
especially intolerable on readiness duty. The whole atmosphere should be permeated with high exactingness and, at the same time, mutual respect and comradely teaching.

An effective means of party influence on the quality of operational readiness is political information for the personnel, readings and discussions of materials from periodicals, individual discussions, local radio reports or loudspeaker communications about things of note. Technical means of propaganda, visible and topical agitation, special issues of photo newspapers, combat leaflets, and bulletins are of invaluable service herein.

One also cannot fail to see, however, that the organization of party political work in operational duty does not everywhere meet the growing contemporary requirements. Serious shortcomings, as is well known, have been revealed in a number of collectives of the Moscow PVO [Air-Defense] District. Its ready forces, having displayed negligence and a lack of organization, did not interdict the flight of the airspace violator. Those immediately guilty of what happened, especially Generals Yu. Brazhnikov, N. Markov, and V. Zernichenko, were unable to evaluate the air situation correctly or to display willpower, flexibility, and decisiveness in the employment of all of the forces and means at their disposal to halt the violation of the country's airspace. They were severely punished and have been expelled from the ranks of the CPSU.

The reasons for such major omissions in the organization of operational readiness are also explained by the fact that the political command of the district and the political organs of the formations did not display persistence in a timely fashion to impel the commander-communists toward decisive changes in the style and methods of their activity and were unable to overcome stagnation and the separation of party work from the vital tasks associated with the readiness of duty troops. A strict party evaluation of instances of negligence, an irresponsible attitude toward duties by officials, indifference and self-complacency has been made in the district, the correct conclusions have been drawn from the serious miscalculations in combat readiness and energetic measures to eliminate them have been taken.

Operational readiness is fulfilling the combat mission of defending the airspace of our country. The first obligation and duty of commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations is thus coordinated efforts and characteristic forms for solving problems in the arrangement of crews, shifts, and teams, the improvement of tactical and firing readiness, and a persistent search for additional opportunities for reducing standards and improving management. The selection, training, and education of the leading specialists, operational duty officers, combat team commanders, guidance and launch officers, pilots, navigators and operators are in need of special party attention. It is important to know the level of their training and to have a topical influence on raising it and cultivating boldness and initiative among them along with responsibility for making decisions in extreme situations with their firm execution in practice.

Enhanced requirements are being made today of generals, officers, and staff workers, combat-command organs and the central apparatus. Political organs at all levels and party organizations have been summoned to constant concern for improving organizational and political work in the fulfillment of operational-readiness missions and all forms and methods for facilitating the professional, moral, political, and psychological training of command personnel in extreme situations and the cultivation among the personnel of a heightened sense of responsibility for the efficient performance of reconnaissance, the timely detection of air attacks, and the ability to destroy them.

Unfortunately, substantial shortcomings exits in the work of certain staffs and combat-command organs. Proper attention, for example, is not devoted everywhere to training with duty officers and command-post officers on probable adversaries, their tactics, possible groupings of units, strike sectors, and the like. A number of units are resolving too slowly issues of the utilization of technical equipment that assist commanders in evaluating the air situation in the shortest possible time, and the experience of air defense accumulated in the war years, as well as the experience of large-scale exercises, are being poorly taught. Not all staff officers know profoundly the true situation in the localities or the abilities of leading specialists.

Such shortcomings cannot be tolerated. Political organs must sharply turn the communists of the staffs and command party organizations to the specific cause, raise their reputations, strengthen their influence on the growth of skills in the command apparatus, and be concerned with the competence of the party aktiv on military issues. It is also important to make more strict requirements in advance of the communists of staffs, departments, and rear services for the timely support of the ready forces with everything essential for maintaining them at constant readiness and to display unflagging concern for improving material and living conditions, food, rest, and medical and cultural support for personnel on operational readiness, especially in remote radar subunits.

Proceeding from the decisive role of the staffs in the competent and uninterrupted command of the troops, it is essential to take into account more fully in party political work the special responsibility entrusted to the combat teams of the PVO headquarters for the management of all of the ready forces of air defense and the coordination and operational and combat interaction of the command organs and the ready subunits of the
branches of the armed forces. This requires the purposeful political education of these personnel and the assurance of a link between the political organs of the interacting units, the implementation of mutual operational information on the extant situation and the party political work being conducted to fulfill the missions of operational readiness. It would be expedient to practice more actively the execution of applied-sciences conferences and special classes with the political-command personnel of the interacting units and formations on issues of raising the efficiency of combat command, along with assemblies of political workers to exchange experience in work being done.

Among a number of components that ensure the model performance of operational readiness, an important place is assigned to ideological and educational work. Its chief purpose is forming among commanders and superior officers and all personnel, using all forms of ideological influence, a profound understanding of the responsibility for the high-quality fulfillment of a whole set of measures to strengthen the defense of the airspace of the country. The improvement of ideological education in operational readiness is moreover proceeding too slowly. Persistence in seeking effective forms and methods of propaganda and agitation that would facilitate high responsibility among commanders, officers in command organs, and all soldiers for the vigilant performance of operational readiness is not being displayed in all units and subunits by any means. By way of example, in the unit where officer H. Misharin serves, over the course of a month, all of the ideological functions held during the ready shifts, only three touched on issues of operational readiness to any extent.

Constant concern for the effectiveness of ideological support for operational readiness means raising the quality of everyday political information for the operational-readiness personnel, diversifying the forms for encouraging and propagating the experience of the best specialists, departments, crews and shifts, regularly conducting gatherings to honor outstanding soldiers and ensuring the personal participation of commanders, political workers, propagandists, lecturers, and Komsomol workers in political-education functions. The political organs are summoned to ensure the full outfitting of units and subunits with the requisite cultural-enlightenment and technical equipment of propaganda and regularly prepare informational and reference materials for the ready forces. The task consists of equipping rooms for political-education work in operational-readiness locations, outfitting them with essential literature, topical visual agitation, and TSP [expansion unknown]. The practice of regular support for subunits that are performing duty with specially created agitational-art groups and brigades in troop districts and groups and in the fleets deserves universal incorporation.

Taking into account the special responsibility charged to the personnel of the ready forces, especial significance in party political work should be imparted to a reduction of the time periods for bringing them up to readiness, the assimilation of complex equipment and weapons, the full utilization of their combat capabilities, and raising the working life of PVO equipment. The experience of those commanders, political organizers and staffs and party and Komsomol organizations that make paramount issues of raising the technical culture of soldiers, the cultivation of a profound faith in the reliability of the equipment they operate, the development of initiative and quickness, good reactions, and a readiness to wage prolonged and intensive combat operations deserves approval and dissemination. Located among the complement of ready shifts, teams, and crews, communists have rich opportunities for supporting and sharpening a feeling of psychological readiness for decisive action among their fellow servicemen and helping them to gain mastery and acquire confidence in their weapons, develop skills of assiduity, high culture, and precision in military work. It is important herein to combine skillfully forms of mass agitation with methods of individual work and a demanding attitude toward oneself, to manifest exactingness toward others as well and to have an uncompromising attitude toward all digressions and weaknesses.

Commanders, political organs, and all party organizations are called upon to use all means of ideological, educational, and organizational party work to confirm in the consciousness of political-command personnel the necessity of constantly improving the operational, tactical, special and technical training of personnel that are fulfilling the mission of operational readiness, along with the need to bring it closer to the requirements of contemporary air defense with a fuller regard for conclusions from local wars and exercises. The organization of socialist competition in tasks and standards is in need of further improvement. It is essential to practice matches and competitions for the title of best specialist and best crew for this purpose.

The time factor acquires enormous significance in the performance of operational readiness. Under modern conditions, a delay in the transmission of operational information, the making of decisions or the use of equipment and weapons, albeit for seconds, can lead to irreparable consequences. Whence the acute necessity of irreproachable discipline on duty. It requires that each man take up his combat post as well as maximum assiduity and punctuality in the execution of functional obligations, initiative, resourcefulness, the highest vigilance, and the upkeep of equipment and arms in readiness for immediate use. The slightest violation of the directives, orders, and rules governing operational readiness should be strictly judged.

A most important task for commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations is raising the role and reputations of military charters and the military oath and educating the military cadres and all personnel in a spirit of high assiduity and responsibility along with intolerance of the slightest manifestations of carelessness and complacency. The state of discipline on operational
readiness must be analyzed exactly and efficiently in political organs and party organizations, as well as at meetings of the officer corps. Those who negligently fulfill their functional duties should be mentioned aloud in summarizing the results of duty on the shifts and in the crews, in the wall press and on local radio broadcasting.

The efficiency of party political work on operational readiness depends largely on the political worker and the level of his professional training, competence, and knowledge in the most difficult situation of having an influence on the moral cast of people. A matter of exceptional importance for the political worker and the party aktiv is to elucidate to soldiers in a clear and reasoned fashion the policies of the party and the world military and political situation and to assist them in drawing the correct conclusions from the complex and contradictory world situation and the growing aggressiveness of imperialism, and to emphasize the necessity of constant vigilance, watchfulness and readiness to fulfill combat orders at any moment.

Unfortunately, not all political workers know how to react quickly to the changing situation and sometimes do their work in a vague manner, without looking deeply into issues that affect the combat readiness of the ready forces. There have been instances where political workers have presented the substance of guiding documents for the organization of operational readiness and socialist competition in the course of it in unclear fashion and are reconciled to indulgences and oversimplifications.

All of this says that a radical improvement in the political training of the political personnel of the command organs and subunits in the performance of operational readiness is essential, imparting to them the knowledge and ability to have a skillful effect on the actions of officials in the fulfillment of the tasks they face in a complex and non-standard situation. And it is important first and foremost to raise the professional competence of the political-organ apparatus and its ability to analyze skillfully and affect actively the practice of educational work aimed at the vigilant performance of duty.

The party organizations and communists in the command organs are charged with an especial responsibility for the moral and military cast of the personnel in operational readiness. There are communists in every military collective that arrange their work skillfully. Noteworthy in this regard is the experience of Maj Meshcheryakov. The strongest aspect of his mutual relations with the soldiers is the ability to approach every specialist. The forms of influence are moreover quite diverse. They are the timely expressed heartfelt word, praise, specific observations, businesslike advice and assistance. Over the course of duty, this makes it possible to rid a soldier of psychological tension and to support in him a military frame of mind, faith in his abilities and knowledge, and a high sense of vigilance.

Deserving of approval is the experience of those communists who conduct educational work with people in a differentiated fashion rather than in a general way, with a regard for their education, character, and degree of moral, political, and psychological tempering, who know well what this or that soldier, sergeant, warrant officer or junior officer is capable of, what makes him live and breathe. Being in the thick of things, communists are called upon to note everything that is new or progressive that is born in the duty process and to uncover more deeply the causes of roughness in the actions of individual specialists, so as to have a positive effect on the common success and the course of socialist competition on tasks and standards. The role of personal example of communists in observing the requirements of the oath and the charters, the honest and conscientious fulfillment of functional obligations and the irrefutable and precise fulfillment of the orders of commanders and superiors is great in operational readiness.

Demonstrating a party concern for the quality of operational readiness means to affirm persistently in the thinking and behavior of commanders and political workers new approaches to the solution of urgent tasks, independence and responsibility, and to raise exactingness toward communists for the model fulfillment of duties in the course of the fulfillment of the combat mission. For this purpose, it is essential to implement the most expeditious arrangement and instruction of communists in the organs of military command and duty subunits, to define the specific charge of each one, to systematically hear out the reports of members and candidate members of the CPSU at party organizations, to discuss questions of the responsibilities of communists at all meetings and conferences, and to raise the demands made for their personal participation in training the lower-level aktiv in the practice of educational work.

Operational readiness is the fulfillment of a combat mission in peacetime. All of the multifaceted organizational, ideological, and educational activity of commanders, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations is summoned to facilitate actively the maintenance of the forces and equipment that perform operational readiness in constant readiness to resolve the combat missions charged to them at any moment and in any situation.


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Military, Political Means in Defense of Socialism
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No 18, Sep 87 (signed to press 3 Sep 87 pp 9-16

[Article by Lieutenant General of Aviation V. Serebrian-
nikov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Professor:
"Correlating the Political and Military Methods in the
Defense of Socialism"]

[Text] History has concluded that the victorious realiza-
tion of the socialist revolution and the successful con-
struction of a new society directly depends on the
workers' readiness to defend their revolutionary achieve-
ments. The general regularity that was discovered by V.
I. Lenin, "any revolution is only worth something if it
can be defended," is inexorably in effect.

The extreme changes in the current world situation,
imperialism's increased aggressiveness and the reality
of the nuclear age are introducing many new aspects into
the theory and practice of defending socialism.

The essence of defending socialism in and of itself is
nothing more than being prepared and able to prevent,
exclude, and if necessary, repel attempts by reactionary
forces to destroy socialist achievements and restore the
exploiter system. Although defense, and especially the
military preparedness of the socialist army, has the
deciding role in this, military methods have never been
the "only method" for guaranteeing our security. The
defense of socialism is attained by employing the entire
complex of both military and non-military methods.

The best condition for the development of socialism and
for human society as a whole is durable peace and the
creation through political means of a system of mutually
beneficial relationships among states with opposing sys-
tems that will reduce and then totally eliminate the
danger of war. Socialism was forced to create and
develop military methods and to employ them as a last
resort in answer to armed attacks. It was through polit-
ical methods (negotiations, agreements, treaties and so
forth) immediately after the victory of Great October
that Soviet authorities planned to prevent military inter-
vention by imperialist powers and civil war. Only impe-
rialist reaction's refusal to conduct peaceful business
with us and also internal counterrevolution led to the
bloody Civil War and foreign intervention by fourteen
states.

Even in wars that we are forced to fight to defend the
Socialist Fatherland, when armed battle moves to the
forefront, it is waged successfully when it is closely
coordinated with political, diplomatic, ideological, intel-
ligence and other means. For example, Soviet politics,
diplomacy and ideology had an important role in our
military victory over Fascism.

Socialism's entire historical experience confirms our
allegiance to Lenin's approach to defending socialism—
having a consistent, peace-loving policy while maintain-
ing an excellent ability to decisively repulse any military
invasion.

Under current conditions the role of political means to
maintain security and defend socialism is substantially
increasing. This is objectively caused by the nature of
nuclear weapons, the development of other weapons and
the drastically increased destructive means for contem-
porary war, means that could destroy all life on Earth.
As was stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, "The nature of
modern weapons does not leave any state the hope of
defending itself through only military and technical
means, for example, by creating even the most powerful
defense. Security's guarantee is more and more becom-
ing a political problem..."

As opposed to purely military means, the political means
for defending socialism includes such forms, methods
and ways for state (coalition) activities as provide for a
peaceful resolution to problems that arise in the mutual
relationships between states and world systems.

Political means are very diverse. First, they include the
entirety of the scientifically based opinions, ideas and
provisions on the destructiveness of nuclear war, the
necessity of preventing it and the methods for saving the
world. These were expressed very comprehensively,
totally and realistically in the new political thinking and
were developed in materials from the 27th CPSU Con-
gress and the congresses of our fraternal parties. Univer-
sal approval for this new thinking is the first require-
ment for reconstructing international relations, for a turn-
about in consciousness will certainly bring about an
enormous social turnaround.

The realistic program for globally restructuring inter-
national relations as calculated to the year 2000 and
proposed by the USSR is an example of this new
thinking. Its accomplishment would guarantee the cre-
atation of an all-embracing system of international secu-
rity and would ratify peaceful coexistence as a universal
principle for international relations.

Second, political means are those practical methods and
ways of international activity that are called upon to
restructure the relationships between states with oppos-
ing systems and especially between the USSR and the
U.S. and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and
NATO, to move them into the channel of detente and
then exclusively to the principle of peaceful coexistence.
Positive foreign policy initiatives, dialogues, the de-
velopment of contacts, negotiations, the concluding of
treaties and agreements, the honest information
exchange on intentions and so forth are designed to
strengthen the atmosphere of mutual understanding and
trust and establish solid legal and political, economic,
spiritual and cultural and humane obstacle to the use of
war and violence. One example of this is the Final
Report from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that was signed in 1975 by leaders from 35 countries in Europe and North America. This envisions the elimination of aggression and other such types of violence from relations among states.

Third, these are measures that directly serve reducing military tensions, improving the political and military situation and establishing dialogues and trust in the military area and also disarmament. A new example of this is the adoption of and open statement about the “Military Doctrine for Warsaw Treaty Member States” document at the Berlin Conference of the Political Consultative Committee.

The correct understanding of military doctrines is exceptionally important, for they embody the goals and intentions that states and coalitions have in the military area and are where most of the suspicion and distrust is developed. The socialist countries propose a comparison of military doctrines so that the sides can become mutually convinced about the sincerity of the goals and aspirations of the parties and can come to a single opinion about the trends in their further evolution. It is important for NATO countries to look at their own military doctrine through the prism of objective reality. However NATO country leaders prefer to keep silent, continuing along the line toward exacerbating the situation, spurring the arms race and moving it into space and they are developing their arms program into the 21st Century.

Yes, there are many things that divide the two worlds and the division is deep. But there is another thing that is also clear — people have an ineradicable desire for peace. As was noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, “The need to resolve the most urgent problems must… arouse the as yet unprecedented forces of man’s self-preservation.”

The key to realizing the possibilities of preventing war and saving life on Earth is the active use of political means which under contemporary conditions have objectively become the only means for resolving conflicts and arguments and guaranteeing security.

The effectiveness of political mean to guarantee a reliable defense for socialism is determined by successes in the internal development of socialist countries, by the force of their example, authority and influence, by their international solidarity, the united strength of the world’s communist workers and the national liberation movement and the increase in the wide popular mass’s activity in fighting for peace throughout the world. Reconstruction that is being carried out in all spheres of our society’s life and is designed to accelerate social and economic development is a powerful factor in the international position of the USSR and the entire socialist community and expands and intensifies links between the East and the West.

We are, of course, not pacifists and have not set our hopes on the imperialists’ regeneration, on appealing to them in “good faith” and on their repudiation of militaristic plans. Socialism must also be able to defend itself with weapons as long as the imperialist bourgeoisie remains armed and, more importantly, expands its military might and nurtures plans for social revanchism by force. The reduction in the role of military might would signify capitulating to reaction. It is not yet time to “dismantle” our defense for this depends on more than just our wishes. It also depends on the actions of others who have not yet given up their strategic plans to destroy socialism, to include through military methods. V. I. Lenin’s precepts on the necessity of the workers mastering military art are now very real. We must be respectful and serious in our attitudes toward military affairs, for otherwise people will be treating workers like slaves. And Leninist criticisms for those who entertain themselves with miserable and cowardly dreams about living weaponless alongside armed bourgeoisie have not lost their importance.

The current situation required an exceptionally flexible, harmonious and interdependent combination of political and military means to guarantee the security and defense of socialism. We have to count on the ruling circles of the West inspiring their peoples by saying that their security depends totally on increasing military means and on the presence and improvement of nuclear weapons, on the creation of the insidious SDI and on achieving military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The further militarization of the social consciousness that is going on represents moral-political and psychological preparations for war. A Pentagon document entitled “Directives on the Construction of U.S. Armed Forces” openly states that in a nuclear war “the U.S. must gain the upper hand and have the capability of forcing the USSR to cease military operations under U.S. conditions.”

This forces the countries of the socialist community to worry about the effectiveness of their defense and to improve and maintain their military assets at a high level of preparedness. However, while maintaining a high readiness to defend themselves with military means, in this situation the USSR and its allies are continuing to consistently conduct their constructive, peace-loving policy whose essence is to protect humanity and our planet from destruction.

Actions by the USSR and the other socialist countries during crisis situations in the nuclear missile age, even in its remote historical past, are instructive. Remember how extensive, acute and dangerous the “Cuban Crisis” (1962) was. It was caused by the threat of an American invasion of Cuba and brought the world to the brink of war. The U.S. which had caused the crisis was using a policy of blackmail, was relying on force and refused to use diplomatic means to resolve the conflict. Only the actions taken by the Soviet Union saved mankind from catastrophe. The USSR provided international support
to Cuba and combined a firm rebuff to the aggressor with a search for a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The intense diplomatic struggle combined with military measures (we shipped weapons and experts and warned the aggressor of a retaliatory strike in the event of an attack) allowed a peaceful conclusion to the crisis, defused the situation, removed the threat of a direct attack against Cuba and strengthened socialism’s security.

The comprehensive combination of political and military means to defend revolutionary achievements is also expressed in the national conciliation in Afghanistan, Campuchea and other countries. The strengthened defenses of those countries and the decisive repelling of military attacks by counterrevolutionaries who are incited by the West support the primary purpose — using primarily political means to halt the bloody undeclared war of imperialism and its minions.

A mismatch between political and military means and the violation of their harmony and especially an underestimation of proper military means can do a great deal of harm to the matter of defending socialist achievements. The lessons of the Great Patriotic War say a lot about this. The leaders of our party and our country correctly evaluated the USSR’s international situation and the growing military danger from Fascist Germany. However the political measures that were taken to avoid war were not correctly linked with concern over maintaining the Armed Forces at a high state of vigilance and combat readiness. And this is more than just I. V. Stalin’s errors in estimating the times for Fascist Germany’s attacks on the USSR, errors that certainly had a negative impact and held up the accomplishment of major strategic measures. There were also serious omissions in the activities of the People’s Commissariat for Defense, the General Staff and the western military district commands. The basic law of an primary activity, being ever immediately ready to repel aggression or any armed provocation, was essentially violated.

Facts and documents tell us that there was a lack of coordination between foreign political and defensive military measures and no thoughtful work was done to correctly orient command and other army and navy personnel, especially in light of the various negotiations, treaties, official statements and TASS information. This caused some people to incorrectly remain calm and hope that “everything would work out.”

There were certainly people in the command structure who had evaluated the situation correctly. They made full use of their rights and brought the troops subordinate to them to increased combat readiness before they were given the appropriate instructions by the General Staff. As we know, these army and navy forces entered battle in a more organized manner and conducted powerful attacks against the enemy in the initial hours of aggression.

There is one question that comes up. Don’t military methods that are in effect for some reason or another hinder political methods? One would think that there were reasons for I. V. Stalin’s fears that bringing the army to full combat readiness, declaring mobilization and moving forces to the border could harm the political actions being done to prevent or lessen the chance of war. And another thing is that this caused excessive care in resolving the issues of mobilizing and deploying forces and getting units and major units in the border districts combat ready.

As we can image, the difficulty in coordinating political and military methods brought about the idea of reasonable sufficiency in the area of defense. In other words, we are talking about the coordination of political and military methods which would not harm either of these methods individually and therefore would not cause the common matter.

The lesson of 1941 teaches us how important it is to flexibly and harmoniously combine political and military methods to defend socialism without reducing the role of a strong and invincible defense. In addition, history provides many other examples where aggressors used negotiations and even “adjustments” to relationships to weaken the vigilance of future enemies.

The desire to outwit socialism, break away to a level of absolute superiority and mask preparations for war is now hidden behind the peace-loving phrases of Western politics. And this has to alert the Soviet people. Comrade M. S. Gorbachev notes, “As is apparent from numerous letters that have been sent to the Central Committee, a lot of our people are upset. They ask, ‘Isn’t the West using the cover of talks about peace and fruitless negotiations to make a dash toward weapons so that we will not be able to react?’ I can assure my comrades that this will not happen. And it will not happen because the Soviet leadership can easily see the difference between words and deeds. Therefore the Soviet Union is basing its policy on the totality of real factors. We will not allow ourselves to be taken unaware.”

The high level of military preparedness in the socialist community’s armies is increasing the effectiveness of political methods under the conditions of military confrontation. Certainly if disarmament is accomplished and trust is established in the future, we will reduce the role of military methods. But this is only in the future and will be the consequence of coordinated actions by the parties to change historical competition exclusively into the channel of peaceful forms.

The relative share of political methods will increase as the ruling circles in Western states begin to transition to the new political thinking and are forced to peaceful relationships with socialism through pressure from the masses. Peace-loving forces can force Western politicians to accept peaceful coexistence.
Now, at a time when socialism had reached strategic military parity and any military actions that aggressors try against it are doomed to failure, imperialism’s military force is objectively losing its former role. Socialism’s historic achievement in strengthening its defense is actually serving as a catalyst for disarmament. The problems of preventing war have become the main element in the policy of the ruling communist and worker parties and in the Warsaw Treaty Organization’s military doctrine. In the business of strengthening our defense and constructing and improving the socialist armies. A document from the Political Consultative Committee’s 1987 Berlin Conference states, “Just as those of its member states, the Warsaw Treaty military doctrine is subordinate to the task of preventing both nuclear and conventional war. Because of the very nature of socialist society, these states are not linking their future with the military resolution of international problems. They are for resolving all debatable international issues only through peaceful, political means.”

The Warsaw Treaty Organization’s military doctrine, just as the military doctrines of the socialist states, has a consistently defensive nature and is coordinated with the new political thinking that was wholly and systematically expressed in materials from the 27th CPSU Congress and documents from fraternal communist and worker parties.

Soviet military doctrine is that system of views as adopted by the CPSU and the Soviet state on the methods for using defensive might to prevent a new war, guarantee the security and defense of the Socialist Fatherland under conditions of nuclear confrontation, maintain strategic military parity between the USSR and the U.S. and also the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO and on preparing the people and the army to decisively repel any aggressor who might decide to attack the USSR and its friends. Our military doctrine reflects the peace-loving nature of the USSR’s foreign policies and its resolve to decisively repel any aggressor.

For the first time in history the main provision in a military doctrine was to prevent war. This goal was reached by political methods and also by maintaining the country’s defense and the Soviet Armed Forces’ military potential at the necessary level. The prevention of war and the readiness to repel any aggressor are two tasks that are mutually linked and are caused by the fact that the U.S. and NATO are not refusing to be the first to use nuclear weapons and are expanding their strategic potential to enormous dimensions. The U.S. is planning more than 1000 nuclear weapons tests in the 90’s to improve them and is talking about the necessity of being prepared for 200 wars and conflicts during those years.

Soviet military strategy, just as the national doctrines of the other socialist countries, approaches the military issues from the comprehensive position of resolving war and peace as a whole. In essence, this is a doctrine for saving the world and promoting the improvement of the world situation. It is designed to maintain strategic military parity, reduce the level of military confrontation, maintain a course toward the mutual reduction of weapons with the West and to eliminate nuclear weapons.

It is important to stress that our military doctrine suggests a definite restructuring of the military activities of the state and of the Armed Forces in particular. The decision not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons and not to be the first to start combat operations is reflected in the training of commanders, staffs and forces, in increasing their combat readiness, through their equipment level, in improving command and control and communications and in improving their political and moral state.

The development, life and activities of the Armed Forces are carried out in such a manner as to promote as much as possible the improvement of the world situation, to strengthen trust and cooperation between states with opposing social systems and to overcome fear and distrust. We are employing various special measures to increase military trust. These include notifying the West about exercises and maneuvers that are being carried out and inviting representatives from the military circles of Western countries to come as observers. This was recently done at a military exercise in the Ukraine. Finally there was the publishing of the military doctrines themselves.

The concept of reasonable sufficiency in the area of defense as was advanced at the 27th CPSU Congress and that is the result of the new political thinking increases the effectiveness of political methods in defense of socialism and the world. The principle of reasonable sufficiency is aimed at equally having enough military assets as necessary to defend against an attack from without. While guaranteeing socialism’s security, reasonable sufficiency does not threaten the security of other countries.

The limitation on the military potential of the opposing parties to within the limits of reasonable sufficiency is aimed not only at reducing the arms race, but also at significantly reducing arms.

Reasonable sufficiency is closely linked with strategic military parity. Both concepts provide relative (approximate) equality in the military forces and capabilities of the opposing countries. The difference is that whereas reasonable sufficiency proposes a much lower threshold of military opposition, strategic military parity can be at various levels right up to the highest (clearly unreasonable) where the equality of military forces has already ceased being a factor in the military and political containment of aggression. The Soviet Union and its fraternal socialist countries is persistently fighting to reduce the level of strategic military parity to the minimum, considering this a step toward general disarmament.
Socialism's military assets, assets that are now called upon primarily to support the effectiveness of the political measures to strengthen peace, have retained their specific purpose, to decisively repel an aggressor in the event he attacks. And therefore there is still the need of the times — to master the art of routing an enemy on the field of battle and to preserve the stable formula "teach the forces what is necessary in war."

We will not allow an aggressor to launch a nuclear attack without reprisal. The Armed Forces of the USSR together with its fraternal socialist armies are fully resolved to defend socialism's achievements.

The interests of reliably defending socialism under any combination of events demand that we take an attentive look at the content and forms for illuminating the problems of war and peace. Even without this, at the present time scientific publications, fiction, the theater and mass media have an increasing and very extensive flow of information about the horrors and catastrophic results from possible war. On the whole these are necessary warnings aimed at stimulating the people's fight for peace. There is undoubtedly great need for this, especially if people intend to have an effect on the thinking of Western politicians.

Of course this information creates a special emotional mood and forces man to think. At the same time there is a need for more works to strengthen the people's faith in the possibility of preventing war and in the fact that this possibility is based on the defensive might of states, the military preparedness of the Armed Forces and their ability to make the inevitable reprisal against any aggressor. It seems that some writers and publicists have forgotten the pride of our great Soviet people, their feats, their achievements and their strong patriotic spirit. It is annoying to see advertisements in a number of our publications where the authors use their right under glasnost to actually wash away unquestionable values — both political and moral. Literally competing with one another, they are trying to give their "denunciations" as caustically and sensationally as possible. And in doing this they completely forget that we have a right to be proud. It is especially alarming that some literary works are expressing degenerate, cowardly thoughts and are sowing the kernels of pacifism.

V. I. Lenin was sharply critical of those who denied the very possibility of defending the Fatherland by stressing the destructing nature of war and also those who lost heart and said, "Well, how can you discuss defending the Fatherland when we are faced with such a brutal war." Lenin warned us that it was important not to intimidate ourselves under the weight of the horrible impressions of war (see: Complete Collected Works, volume 30, page 68).

It is clear that contemporary war has incomparably more horrors and misfortune than past wars. But so long as it is only a threat, we have to fight against it and not become like the ostrich who hides his head in the sand at the moment of danger. We must soberly develop a line of action for all possible situation. The dialectic of life is such that there is still the need to morally and psychologically prepare the people for organized, selfless, courageous actions under the increasing threat of nuclear war. A nuclear attack could force us to such an extreme retaliatory measure as nuclear weapons. Therefore the question of being morally and psychologically prepared for such a retaliatory strike is just as urgent as the problem of technical military preparedness. I am talking about the development of spiritual strength in soldiers, a strength that would help them resist in any combat situation and would provide them with decisiveness and courage. It is very important to indoctrinate personnel with faith in the correctness of their action and with the desire to defend as reliable as possible that which was achieved in the flames of Great October and that which we have defended in fierce battles against the enemies of the Motherland. We must indoctrinate them with a readiness to meet their end if necessary with the conviction that we are correct. This is the moral and political foundation for the high level of military preparedness in the Soviet Armed Forces and in the armies of the fraternal socialist states.

The CPSU and the Soviet government are very concerned about maintaining the Armed Forces' military preparedness at a high level and about eliminating imperialism's strategic military superiority. By constantly feeling this concern, Soviet soldiers are striving to carry out the military and political training plans in the best possible manner, to serve vigilantly and to be at a high state of readiness to inflict a crushing blow on any aggressor who infringes on the freedom and independence of our Motherland and on the achievements on socialism.

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Restructuring, Democratizing Army Life
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[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences Maj Gen V. Fedorov, Col Ye. Zabavin, and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Col V. Podolets: "Restructuring and the Democratization of Our Army Life." Passages in bold-face as published]

[Text] The Soviet Army and Navy are organically linked with the life of the country and the people. All of the processes that transpire in socialist society are also reflected in the armed forces. Democratization as the heart of reconstructing is no exception. It is being further
developed in army and navy life, facilitating the development of official activism among the servicemen, the cohesion of military collectives, a reinforcement of discipline and, ultimately, a rise in combat readiness.

**At the Foundation—The Democratic Nature of Our Army**

Restructuring, whose beginning was laid by the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, has become the strategic direction for accelerating the socioeconomic development of the country. A central link and pivot for it is the actual realization of Leninist ideas on the development of socialist democracy.

In the armed forces, accumulating within themselves the whole aggregate of social relations of the new society, the democratic nature of our social and state structure is fully reflected. This is manifested first of all in the socio-political and organizational principles of their construction and in the principles of training and education; second, in the methods of build-up; third, in the forms for implementing sole responsibility and reinforcing discipline; and, fourth, in relations among servicemen, superiors and subordinates, senior and junior. New procedures have been approved in our army that define its social look. M.V. Frunze wrote that the Red Army, since its first steps, was the most democratic army in the world (see: Frunze M.V. Selected Works.—Moscow: Voyenizdat Publishing House, 1984.—p 57).

Democratism does not contradict the requirements of law and charts, but only stresses the socialist nature of our armed forces. It permeates all spheres of army and navy life: military and professional, social and political, leisure time and everyday life.

The activity of army and navy personnel typical of the military and professional sphere of its life is organized on the basis of the strictest possible observance of the equality of rights and obligations of servicemen regardless of racial or national affiliation, faith, education, way of life or social and property status. The USSR Constitution proclaims military service in the ranks of the armed forces as the honorable duty of all Soviet citizens. Equal opportunities to fulfill military duty and to complete service are an effective means of developing social activism among servicemen, and their initiatives facilitate the achievement of good results by them in military and political training, raising responsibility for the performance of combat duty and mastering soldier's skills.

The activeness of servicemen in the socio-political sphere and their participation in representative and direct forms of democracy allows them to join in the concerns and affairs of the state, army and the military collective. Soviet soldiers are fully enfranchised citizens of the socialist state, enjoying the full range of constitutional rights and bearing all of the obligations envisaged by the Fundamental Laws of our state. They participate actively in social and state affairs and elections, and are themselves elected to all organs of power.

In the rest and leisure area of the life of military collectives, democratization favors the fuller and higher-quality satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of servicemen, the active participation of each of them in arranging day-to-day life and the organization of good leisure time and permits them to achieve steady success in education and an expansion in their cultural world view.

Naturally, specific traits of military organization impart their own specific features to the process of democratization in the army and navy. It is no coincidence that questions arise among some officers: how to combine the processes of the democratization of our society, extending to the armed forces as well, with the requirement to reinforce sole responsibility and military discipline? Is there not a contradiction here? There can only be one answer to this: no contradiction exists between them. The life of army and navy personnel, as is well known, is structured on the basis of charts and the orders of commanders and superiors. The necessity of sole responsibility arises out of the requirements of military science and the general laws of its development. The whole path of the armed forces and their victories in the defense of the Motherland testify to the intransient significance of this most important principle of Soviet military construction. It best ensures the firmness and flexibility of troop command, clear order and discipline and the high personal responsibility of command personnel for the training and education of the rank-and-file, as well as the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces.

The very principle of sole responsibility is realized in our army with a regard for the democratic nature of the armed forces. It is implemented on a party basis. This means that the solely responsible commander is the representative of the party and state among the troops, the executor of the party line and the guardian of Soviet laws and military charters; he is supported in his work by the party organization and uses the power of party influence in the interests of the successful resolution of the missions of combat and political training, reinforcing discipline and ensuring constant combat readiness. An indispensable condition for the implementation of sole responsibility is party political work and the active participation of commanders in its organization and execution.

Sole responsibility in our armed forces as the principal form of management does not rule out collegial forms as well that are sensibly combined with it. By their very essence, the military soviets are democratic organs for the leadership of the troops and the naval forces. They discuss the most important issues of the life and activity of the troops, which gives the commander greater confidence in troop leadership and the execution of party and state policies. In the course of restructuring, the task is
being posed of raising the activeness of the military soviets and to breathe new life into their work, to see that they really serve the businesslike exchange of opinions on topical issues of raising combat readiness, reinforcing discipline and developing the social sphere.

Under the conditions of democratization, the ability of the solely responsible commander to approach any matter from a party perspective is acquiring ever greater weight. The discussion concerns the objective evaluation of what has been achieved and omissions in combat and political training, of eradicating everything that hinders the utilization of every hour of training for increasing the combat skills of subordinates, educating them in the spirit of high vigilance and constant readiness for decisive actions in defense of the Motherland.

Our military charters provide for the realization in practice of the principles of democracy and its combination with the laws of army life. Under army and navy conditions, democratization signifies ensuring the indissoluble unity of sole responsibility, solid discipline and unconditional assimilation with the widespread participation of party organizations, the Komsomol and trade unions as well as all personnel in the matters of military collectives and the resolution of the tasks facing the army and navy.

The Principal Directions of the Democratization of Army Life

The social nature of the armed forces creates the objective preconditions for the development of democratic principles in army and navy life with a regard, understandably, for the specific nature of the military organization. These preconditions, however, are not realized automatically, in and of themselves. In order for them to become a reality, the active participation of commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations is required. On this plane, in our view, it is possible to delineate several directions in the democratization of our army and navy life.

A deepening of democracy signifies the ever more active participation of servicemen in resolving the tasks facing the armed forces. A socialist democracy offers every individual the broad opportunity of revealing his abilities, creativity and initiative in the interests of improving military skills, reinforcing discipline and raising combat readiness. Socialist competition in the units and on ships is imbued with the living spirit of democracy. Soldiers voluntarily take on obligations and compete with each other and subunit against subunit in striving for ever higher levels of military maturity and moral tempering. The effectiveness of patriotic initiatives of the servicemen is greater when the comparability of the results of what has been achieved is greater and there is glasnost in the determination of victors and leaders. Concern for raising the mobilizing role of competition and providing the essential conditions for the complete fulfillment of obligations without "reportomania" and the embellishment of the true state of affairs are today all creating good preconditions for a worthy greeting for the 70th anniversary of Great October.

The creative activity of the personnel is evaluated in a special way under the conditions of restructuring. In places where exactingness by the senior commander is combined with the initiative of subordinates in the life of the officers' collective, there are usually greater successes in all matters and order is more solid. What is to be done is determined by the superior, and how to do it is correctly resolved by the subordinate—this formula well expresses the chief direction of the initiatives of the commander and the political worker.

Any substitution of the commander for a junior in the resolution of the simplest tasks kills initiative, creates mistrust and, most importantly, has a negative effect on the effectiveness of joint work. Sometimes this substitution is justified by the fact that the subordinate, they say, has insufficient experience. But then the question arises, How will a commander poorly trained for independent action accumulate experience if he does not make decisions independently?

The further democratization of life assumes the utmost development and encouragement of rational initiative, the creativity of subordinates and trust in and comradely support for them combined with high exactingness and constant monitoring. Only thus is it possible to ensure growth in the official activeness of people, a rise in the efficiency of their work and the surmounting of inertia, passivity and indifference toward the matter entrusted to them, which is still encountered in life.

The strict observance of socialist legality and the reinforcement of the guarantees of the rights of people as granted in the USSR Constitution, laws and charters serves to expand democracy in army and navy life, as in all of society. Under socialism the ideas of liberty, human rights and the dignity of the individual are filled with real and vital substance. They ensure ever more reliably the legal and organizational activity of the Soviet state. New evidence of this is the law adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet "Procedure for Lodging a Complaint to the Court of Illegal Actions by Officials that Encroach upon the Rights of Citizens."

The armed forces are a social institution with a broad legal regulation of vital activity. At the same time, cases are encountered where the orders and directives of some commanders and superiors are issued in violation of the requirements of general service charters and other legal norms or are in clear contradiction with the principles of socialist democratism. The principal cause of this phenomenon is the officers' poor knowledge of the essential documents and insufficient competence, as well as inability to foresee the educational consequences of his directives. In order for the order to have moral and juridical force, it should correspond to the law. Under the conditions of democratization, commanders and
political workers are summoned to strict observance of the rights granted to the soldier, to defend the personal dignity of the individual, to display constant concern for providing them with authorized allotments: food, uniform, personal gear etc.

Strengthening the guarantees of the rights of servicemen assumes their organic combination with their strict fulfillment of service obligations. The process of expanding democracy requires an increase in responsibility before society, the necessity of subordinating one's own interests to the interests of the collective and the strict fulfillment of military obligations. Only their unwavering execution by every person ensures the unity of joint actions that is a precondition of success for the whole collective.

Democratization signifies a further increase in the activity and initiative of army and navy party organizations. The CPSU is a voluntary union of like thinkers. This is brought about by the democratism of its internal life. The communists conduct all party affairs with equal rights either directly or through comrades elected to leadership organs. And the more strictly intra-party democracy is observed, the more confidently communists act. Under the conditions of restructuring, an atmosphere of openness, candidness and genuine comradeship in party life is being affirmed and the initiative and principled nature of CPSU members and their mutual exactingness is increasing.

A most important precondition of a healthy and full-blooded life of party organizations is the consistent affirmation of the principle of the collective nature of leadership. The role of party meetings is growing appreciably in this regard. Their thoughtful preparation, having nothing in common with excessive organization, and the creation of a climate at them that favors the free and businesslike exchange of opinions and an atmosphere of mutual exactingness and comrade criticism and self-criticism facilitates an increase in their effectiveness and a strengthening of the influence of communists on all aspects of the life and activity of military collectives. In practice, however, there occur instances where individual communist-leaders exceed their rights at party meetings, trying in every way possible to emphasize their superiority, seniority or official status. Some comrades resort to commenting on the speeches of communists and allow themselves to point to party organizations, trying to shift responsibility for existing shortcomings onto their shoulders. All of this is a result of low political culture and a failure to understand the essence of party work.

The consistent utilization of the charter right to resolve personnel issues by party organizations serves to confirm democratic principles. Glasnost is expanding appreciably in the consideration of them, and the collective opinion of communists in promoting officers, sending them to training, awarding them the next military rank or decoration etc. is being taken into account more attentively. This is being expressed in the further improvement of the practice of regular reports by CPSU members and candidate members before their comrades, as well as discussions and approvals of party references, in which the political, business and moral qualities of communists are evaluated, at meetings. At the same time, the democratization of work with military personnel far from decreases, but rather greatly increases, the responsibility of commanders and superiors for advancing ideologically mature, highly qualified and morally pure servicemen for leadership posts.

Democratization also assumes a further increase in the activity of Komsomol and trade-union organizations and the organs of people's control and courts of honor, women's councils and other social institutions of the army and navy. It is no secret that some of them do not display initiative or independence. This is a result of serious miscalculations by commanders and political workers that do not devote the necessary attention to their activity, and sometimes consider the democratic forms of these institutions as some kind of impediment to bureaucratically understood sole responsibility.

Restructuring envisages a rise in the role of such social institutions as the personnel meeting and sergeants', warrant officers' or officers' meetings or the soviets they elect. Eased by the trust of their comrades-in-arms, these soviets can have a serious influence on raising the quality of training and the education of people in a spirit of high morality. Many commanders and political workers are members of these elected organs, which gives them the opportunity of participating in the realization of critical observations and the preparation and implementation of decisions being made, in that manner mobilizing the personnel for the fulfillment of the tasks facing the units and subunits.

In our opinion, the necessity of raising the effectiveness of officer-corps meetings has become acute. They serve as a good democratic forum for the joint discussion of the tasks facing the collective and the decisions being made. Moreover, these meetings, like the meetings of warrant officers and sergeants, are frequently used only to announce orders, and are sometimes turned into a place for "blowups" and the punishment of subordinates. In many cases, the meetings are in the nature of a monologue. The poorly thought-out improvisations of the speakers, and first and foremost commanders, make them excessively long and burdensome. From the point of view of the matter at hand, only meetings that are maximally capacious in content and brief in form, forming a common opinion, can make a contribution to creating an atmosphere of confidence, candidness and mutual respect, without which the successful operation of any military collective is impossible.

Based on democratic institutions, the commander and political worker obtain the broad possibility of studying and taking into account in their work the political and moral state of the servicemen and the nature of the
mutual relations extant among the soldiers in the primary collective. As is well known, so-called informal groupings based on a unity of interests, sympathies and attachments can appear in any subunit. In our army the needs and interests, goals and forms of the activity of such groups usually do not contradict the tasks being resolved by the subunits or units. But one also cannot fail to see that the contradictions that sometimes arise lead to breaches of military discipline and non-regulation mutual relations among servicemen along with some other negative phenomena. Without studying the situation in informal groupings, the appearance of their leaders and active purposeful influence on them, it is more difficult to accomplish training and education and to reinforce discipline.

Genuine democracy does not exist outside of the law or above the law. In the army and the navy, it is being achieved through the affirmation of strictly regulation mutual relations among servicemen, comradely relations conditioned by the nature of military organization.

The democratization of army life assumes a regard for the real processes transpiring within military collectives. It seems that all social institutions working in the army and the fleet will become a more active factor in the course of restructuring, facilitating the resolution of the tasks facing the units and subunits.

Learning To Work Under the Conditions of Expanding Democracy

The call of the party to learn to work under conditions of the expansion of democracy is reflected in the modern requirements toward the style of activity of military personnel as well. It is not enough to have the opportunity to realize one's rights, to be based in service and work on democratic principles in army and navy life. Persistence, as well as ability, are required here. In the last elections to the local sovets of people's deputies, for example, not all political organs and political organizations were able to consider several candidates for deputy instead of one at pre-election meetings. Both the lack of experience, probably, and the lack of ability to make full use of the rights granted to the electoral system had an effect, which understandably could not be reflected at the level of the activeness of the electors.

The party's call to learn to work under the conditions of expanding democracy is also topical because instances of bureaucratism, haughtiness and arrogance among some leaders and their contemptuous attitude toward people have yet to be eliminated. As is well known, instances of malefascence and manifestations of coarseness, foul language and diminishment of the personal dignity of the individual are still encountered among the troops. It is namely this type of leader, as was noted at the June (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, that is not pleased by democratization and fears the open and unhypocritical evaluation of his behavior by his comrades in the party and the members of his collective.

To learn to work under the conditions of democratization means to develop the ability to make use of such a keen and powerful means of socialist democratization as criticism and self-criticism. Revealing the contradictions, errors and shortcomings that arise for objective and subjective reasons, it facilitates the surmounting of them and is an important means of educating people and improving their activity. Criticism under the conditions of restructuring is more and more revealing its creative nature and has a beneficial effect on the state of affairs in all areas.

In the army and navy, only the orders of commanders and superiors may not be subjected to criticism, which is conditioned by the specific features of military organization and the nature of the missions fulfilled by the army. The order of the commander or superior is law for subordinates and should be fulfilled irrevocably, precisely and on time.

Whereas the order itself is not subject to discussion and should be fulfilled unswervingly, the question of how to ensure its fulfillment on time and in the best manner can and should be discussed at party and Komsomol meetings and at meetings of the personnel and official meetings of officers when the time and conditions for this exist. These discussions facilitate a deeper understanding by the personnel of their tasks and the mobilization of soldiers for the fulfillment of the order.

Such is the state of affairs with the order of a commander or superior. As for other aspects of his activity, and the more so his behavior, they can and should be in the crosshairs of criticism. Those commanders and superiors who, striving to evade an answer to their comrades for errors and mistakes committed, treat the situation too broadly as a prohibition on criticizing an order are incorrect. Certain commanders and political workers would like to "tuck" all of their activity and behavior under this position.

Criticism is an effective means of improving the work style of all personnel and raising their professional level and ideological and moral tempering. As is stated in the "Instructions for Organizations of the CPSU in the Soviet Army and Navy," communists have the right to criticize any member or candidate member of the party at party meetings regardless of the position he occupies.

The ability to criticize and perceive criticism correctly is an essential element of the culture of human relations under the conditions of democracy. Truthfulness, a comradely and businesslike nature, an orientation toward seeking specific ways and means of surmounting existing shortcomings are the features of criticism that should be developed and encouraged in every collective. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that persecution for criticism is considered to be a crime under our legislation for which administrative and even criminal liability could ensue.
Under the conditions of expanding democracy, the critical speeches of servicemen at party and Komsomol meetings resound more and more sharply. The elimination of phenomena of stagnation, which have also developed in military life in recent years, is ensured to a certain extent in this manner. But the one-sided attitude toward criticism that has become customary is still nonetheless having a powerful effect. In many places, it is still heard only downward from above. Critical voices from below are poorly heard. A distinctive approach to criticism has been affirmed in many party organizational staffs and administrations. In such organizations, they gladly criticize commanders and political workers that serve among the troops. As for the activities of the communists of the staff or administration, their names are not even mentioned, and they are spoken of in the most general terms.

A most important condition for the expansion of socialist democracy is glasnost—the principle that envisages openness in the discussion of problems and solutions that touch immediately on the interests of all members of society and the collective. Without glasnost, as was noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, there can be no political creativity by the masses or a vested interest by them in social affairs and the open and basic struggle against negative phenomena. A leader that is honest and hardworking, conscientious and open to people cannot be an opponent of glasnost. Its limitation is an advantage only to those who know that they are unwittingly committing illegal or immoral acts.

The process of restructuring in the army and navy is making the life of military collectives and party and Komsomol organizations more active. It happens, unfortunately, that it is sometimes aimed not at one's own miscalculations and shortcomings, but rather in the direction of one's neighbors and higher levels of authority. It is difficult to expect an objective evaluation of the affairs of the collective and the uncovering of existing reserves or a search for the most efficient solutions for impending problems with such an approach. Instances where someone is not averse to using the climate of openness not in the interests of restructuring at all, but rather to achieve his own narrow mercenary aims, in turn have nothing in common with democratization.

Glasnost is not manifested only in the criticism of shortcomings. It is everything that is done in constructive fashion to affirm what is new and progressive. The sense of glasnost is visible in the fact that the military collectives know well who stands for what and makes what contribution to the common cause and who is succeeding or coming up short in it. It is understandable that glasnost should not serve for the disclosure of military secrets, as well as tactless intervention in exclusively intimate aspects of the life of the individual or to diminish his honor and dignity.

Learning to operate under conditions of expanding democracy for military personnel means to strengthen the link between the masses and the servicemen. For the military leader, this link is an objective requirement, since he can really only lead by being engrossed daily and hourly in the life-giving spring of communion with those he has been entrusted to teach and educate.

Closeness to people is one of the most important principles of the activity of a leader under the conditions of expanding democracy. In its most humanitarian manifestations, closeness to people has nothing in common with familiarity, playing up to people or ingratiating oneself with toadying and eagerness to please. It categorically excludes protectionism as a way of creating beneficial conditions for the completion of service by elected individuals. At its foundation is a fair exactingness toward people combined with a truly paternal concern for them.

The democratization of army and navy life assumes a restructuring of political-education work and the active participation of all military personnel in it. Such most democratic forms for elucidating knowledge and truth as the live conversations, discussion, debates and others are advancing to the forefront in propaganda, agitation, the Marxist-Leninist training of officers and the process of political classes with personnel. They make it possible to express openly one's opinion on this or that event or phenomenon. Today, without a real increase in the political awareness of soldiers, a feeling of anxiety for the quality of combat training and the state of combat readiness of the subunit, unit or ship and a need for personal involvement in the transformations taking place, along with a keen desire to perceive and support the sprouts of what is new and progressive, will not be formed.

The chief guarantor and bearer of socialist democratism in the country and in the armed forces is the Communist Party. Its leadership and theoretical, organizational, ideological and educational work ensure the development and reinforcement of the whole system of democratic institutions of our society, a rise in the social activism of people and an increase in their contributions to the economic and defensive might of the Motherland.

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National Formations for Army Rejected

18010028 [Editorial Report] Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA on 27 October 1987 published on pages 2 and 3 in Russian a 4000-word article by A. Kuchinas entitled “Don't Substitute Nationalistic for National.” The article includes a letter written to the editor and signed with the pseudonym Al'gis Butrimas. The letter writer proposes, among other things, a “review of the nationality policy of the CPSU,” including “the recognition of the languages of the original nationalities of the Union Republics as the state languages of these Republics,” and
the "reestablishment of national formations of the Soviet Army," so that Republic youths might serve in forces within their own Republic and within their own cultural-linguistic milieu.

The author of the article rejects these ideas in straightforward fashion, referring to them as "frivolous." He points out that military units are intended to defend the state and all of its' citizens and, therefore, cannot bear a minority nationality character.

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Gen Army Lushev Article on 70th Anniversary of Revolution
18120010 Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 9, Sep 87 pp 54-63, 95

[Article by General of the Army Pyotr Lushev, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR. Hero of the Soviet Union: "Defending the Gains of the Revolution"]

[Text] 70 years have elapsed since the historic day when the Aurora fired the shot announcing the advent of a new era in the destiny of humanity. From then on the Soviet people, led by the Leninist party, have invariably been in the forefront of the struggle for socialism, peace, freedom and happiness on Earth. On this arduous path the party's peace-loving, honest, open and noble home and foreign policy has provided favourable conditions for defending the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Soviet state.

The finest sons of Russia took up arms to defend the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution. These gains were also defended by the newly-established Soviet diplomatic service, which skilfully used the growing possibilities of the Soviet Republic to peacefully solve international political problems. It owed its successes to the country's advanced socialist social and political system, the party's leading role, the power of the communist ideology and the close coordination of diplomatic activities with the armed operations of the revolutionary forces. All this assured Soviet diplomacy considerable advantages in making well-founded forecasts of political developments as well as in resisting the diplomacy of aggressors. From the first foreign policy act of the Soviet state—the Decree on Peace—to the principles of a comprehensive international security system proposed by the 27th CPSU Congress, the party has maintained continuity in the chief sector of the struggle to consolidate the achievements of our revolution. "All our politics and propaganda, however," Lenin wrote, "are directed towards putting an end to war and in no way towards driving nations to war." (Footnote 1) (V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 31, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1974, p 470) Immediately after the victory of the October Revolution, the Communist Party came up against numerous challenging problems. Foremost among these was the problem of organising the armed defence of the young Soviet Republic against the savage onslaught of the foreign and domestic counter-revolution. To accomplish this formidable task, our state assembled on a new class basis armed forces whose mission was to defend the gains of October with revolutionary efficiency.

They were preceded by the Red Guards, which were formed during the preparation for, and realisation of, the armed uprising which overthrew tsarism. Detachments of worker Red Guards and revolutionary soldiers and sailors constituted the armed mainstay of the Soviet Republic in the early months of its existence. Operating with selfless determination, they did away with the major seats of the counter-revolution, enabling Soviet power to march on. In the very first battles with the class enemy, the Red Guards defeated the anti-Soviet rebellions of General Krasnov at Petrograd, Ataman Kaledin on the Don and Ataman Dutov in the South Urals.

The threat of armed intervention was growing. In view of this, Lenin on January 15, 1918, signed a decree under which volunteer regiments and detachments were formed. On February 23, 1918, they blocked advancing German troops at Pskov and Narva. That date marked the founding of the Red Army which was later on renamed the Soviet Army. In line with Lenin's dictum that a revolution is worth something only if it can defend itself, the party and people spared no efforts to form and build up an army as the main instrument of defending their socialist country against encroachments from imperialist aggressors.

In that crucial hour, with the republic still lacking an organised army that could fulfil major military tasks, the Soviet government signed on Lenin's insistence the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany (March 3, 1918). This was a courageous and wise diplomatic move. The leader of the revolution, showing vision, made a correct assessment of both the military strategic and political situation and the outlook for the development of international relations. Thereby Soviet power was saved; the republic gained time to consolidate itself politically and to set about forming Red Army units in order to defend the revolution. "In concluding a separate peace," Lenin wrote, "we free ourselves as much as is possible at the present moment from both hostile imperialist groups, we take advantage of their mutual enmity and warfare which hamper concerted action on their part against us, and for a certain period have our hands free to advance and to consolidate the socialist revolution." (Footnote 2) (V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 26, 1964, pp 448-449) As soon as a revolution began in Germany and the situation took a turn for the better, the Soviet government abrogated the predatory Brest Treaty (November 13, 1918).

Lenin, demonstrating the need to organise a new type of army, worked out scientific lines the social, political and organisational principles of building, training and educating it and of using it in action. He showed that the formation of our armed forces was an objective, historical necessity for the victory of socialism in one country was bound to bring about "not only friction, but a direct attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the socialists state's victorious proletariat." (Footnote 3) (Ibid., Vol. 23, p. 79)

Taking advantage of the small number of organised revolutionary troop units, the Entente countries, together with the domestic counter-revolution, started an open armed struggle against the Soviet Republic. Though still young and lacking proper strength, the republic was compelled to fight single handedly with virtually the whole capitalist world, which exceeded it
many times over in military strength and economic resources. A civil war ensued that lasted three years. "Our war," Lenin said, "is the continuation of the politics of revolution, the politics of overthrowing the exploiters, capitalist and landowners." (Footnote 4) (V.I. Lenin, _Collected Works_, Vol. 30, 1965, p 224) At the same time it was a patriotic liberation war, a war for the national independence and freedom of the Soviet Republic.

In the course of heroic and bloody battles and in spite of tremendous difficulties, a well-organised and efficient regular Red Army came into being thanks to great efforts by the party under Lenin's leadership. It stood its ground against all White Guard and interventionist forces and defeated them in the end, covering itself with undying glory. The desperate attempt by domestic enemies of the revolution to overthrow Soviet power by force and the first onslaught of world imperialism fell through.

Throughout the years of civil war and imperialist armed intervention, the Red Army served its victorious people as the shield and sword of the revolution. Soviet troops, fulfilling major strategic tasks, always achieved the military political aims set to them by the Communist Party.

Lenin, speaking of the sources of our victories during the civil war, of the unexampled courage and mass heroism of our troops, pointed out that, "for the first time in world history, an army, an armed force, has been created, which knows what it is fighting for ... for the first time in world history, workers and peasants are making incredible sacrifices in the knowledge that they are defending the Soviet Socialist Republic, the rule of the working people over the capitalists; they know that they are defending the cause of the world proletariat socialist revolution." (Footnote 5) (V.I. Lenin, _Collected Works_, Vol. 29, 1966, p 221)

The Red Army, formed during the October Revolution and steeld in battle, emerged from the Civil War as a strong regular army. It taught a good lesson to our enemies who tried to destroy our workers' and peasants' state. Its military victory enabled the Soviet Union to engage in peaceful socialist construction even though it was encircled by capitalist countries. Our country's army, an embodiment of the class alliance of workers and peasants and friendship among peoples, emerged on the world scene as a dependable military force of the revolution equal to defending the freedom, honour and independence of our socialist country.

Historic credit for the fact that the Soviet state overcame the greatest internal and external difficulties of the early years of its existence is due to the party led by Lenin, whose far-sighted leadership enabled the republic to successfully defend its freedom and independence, the achievements of October. The country's consistent and firm foreign policy played a big role in this victory.

In those grim years, Soviet foreign policy was directed towards resisting armed intervention. Persevering efforts by Soviet diplomacy, which was based on the Red Army's gains in the Civil War, led to the signing of peace treaties with Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. "We have waged the war for peace with extreme vigour..." Lenin said at the Ninth Party Congress as he evaluated these early diplomatic successes. "We have made a very good showing in this sphere of the struggle at any rate, not inferior to the showing made by the Red Army on the front." (Footnote 6) (V.I. Lenin, _Collected Works_, Vol. 30, 1965, p 453)

The building of the Soviet Armed Forces played a large role over the twenty years of peaceful construction that followed the civil war. It proceeded on the basis of the growth and consolidation of the socialist economic, social and political system. However, peace was extremely fragile at the time, for imperialism refused to give up its plans for the destruction of the Soviet system. Therefore the party, bearing in mind the capitalist encirclement and the permanent threat of armed attack, called on the people to be vigilant and prepared to repulse aggression. All measures for the buildup of the armed forces were carried out with due regard to Lenin's warning: "We must remember that we are always a hair's breadth away from invasion." (Footnote 7) (Ibid., Vol. 33, 1966, p 148)

By the early 1930s, our army's fighting strength had considerably increased as a result of the implementation of defence measures mapped out by the party. This was confirmed by the defeat of the Chinese and Manchurian militarists, who seized the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929. The imperialist attempt to test the strength and efficiency of Soviet troops in action ended in an ignominious failure for the enemy. Our troops successfully defended the interests of the Soviet state, showing courage, endurance and sound training.

The fulfilment of the early five-year plans made it possible to establish an economic basis and to substantially strengthen the country's defences by producing military equipment on a mass scale for all three armed services. An increasing war menace from the East and the West compelled the Soviet government to set about preparing extensively for resistance to possible aggression, re-equipping the army and training its entire personnel in using new equipment. Special attention was devoted to the further buildup of the ground and air forces, since a continental war was seen as the likeliest. They were built up in a way that enabled them to fight for long periods against the armies of a coalition of imperialist countries and to conduct major offensive operations.

The Soviet Army, while continuing to consolidate its strength, at the same time vigilantly defended the country's frontiers and safeguarded the people's peaceful labour. It had to ward off recurrent attacks from armed bands and invading troops. Our armed forces gained
important experience by repulsing a raid on the part of a sizable Japanese force in the area of Lake Hasan in 1938 and at the Halyn-gol River, Mongolia, in 1939. Those were, in effect, the first serious clashes since the civil war with a well-trained and armed enemy. The encirclement and complete destruction of troops of the Sixth Japanese Army at Halyn-gol had far-reaching favourable military political effects for us and, moreover, demonstrated a high standard of troop training and competent military leadership on our part. The aggressor was discouraged from resorting to armed provocations to seize foreign territory. Japan's rulers had to revise their strategic plans and aggressive intentions with regard to the Soviet Union.

Soviet foreign policy in the years of peaceful development was directed towards establishing normal political and economic relations with capitalist countries, since this could contribute to our socialist construction and create favourable conditions for strengthening our defences. Accomplishment of these complicated international tasks necessitated great political and diplomatic skill in taking advantage of contradictions between imperialist powers and in manoeuvring against this background. The Soviet government's correct foreign policy line made it possible to end the Entente's blockade, conclude state treaties with many European and Asian countries and foil imperialist plans for a united anti-Soviet front. On the other hand, our sustained struggle against warmongers and for a collective security system failed to win support from the governments of Britain, France and the United States, which virtually refused to resist aggression, thereby encouraging fascist countries to step up their aggressive activity and contributing to the outbreak of the Second World War.

The Great Patriotic War began with a surprise invasion of the Soviet Union by the combined forces of the fascist coalition. Due to the Trianon effort of the party and the people the Soviet Armed Forces were by then in no way inferior in combat capacity to the armies of the leading capitalist countries and were far superior to them morally and politically. Even so, they found themselves at a great disadvantage when the war broke out. We had had too little time for their direct training. Nor had the Soviet command had time to complete the concentration and deployment of troops or form the groups envisaged by its plans for repulsing aggression.

The invading army comprised 190 divisions, over 4,000 tanks, about 5,000 warplanes and upwards of 47,000 guns and mortars. (Footnote 8) (See 1939-1945, Voyenizdat, 1974, Vol. 3, p 327) In the sectors of the main blows, where particularly compact groups were formed, the enemy had three to four times as much strength and weapons. Its troops were fully mobilised and carefully trained and had two years experience of warfare. Exploiting temporary advantages and capturing the strategic initiative, fascist armoured and motorised troops supported by aircraft pushed deep into Soviet territory. The invaders imagined that victory was near at hand.

To defend the country, repulse aggression and defeat the enemy, the Communist Party had to mobilise all the forces of the people, to use all the huge economic, social, political, ideological and military potentialities of the Soviet socialist system. In so doing, it followed Lenin's advice; "Once things have led to war, everything must be subordinated to the war effort; the entire internal life of the country must be subordinated to wartime needs; the slightest hesitation on this score is inexcusable." (Footnote 9) (V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, 1974, p 133) With a view to resisting the enemy, the whole economy was put on a war footing, and the country became a military camp.

In the early period of the war, which lasted 17 months, the Soviet Army and Navy, backed by the people, tipped the balance in their favour by dint of immense exertion and provided the prerequisites for the definitive capture of the strategic initiative.

Maintaining this initiative, Soviet troops in 1943 and 1944 inflicted enormous casualties on the Nazi invaders, expelled them from Soviet soil and set out to fulfil their internationalist mission, the liberation of European peoples from fascism. By reaching the frontier of fascist Germany and transferring military operations to the territory of its satellites, our troops achieved a major result in a successful offensive which meant that victory was near. They won the upper hand in the Berlin operation, in which they routed a million-strong enemy group. Fascist Germany was overcome, with its armed forces completely defeated.

After eliminating the main seat of war in the West the Soviet troops proceeded in August 1945 to abolish the scat of war in the East according to their commitment as an ally. It took Soviet and Mongolian troops only 20 days to defeat the million-strong Kwantung Army of Japan, drive the invaders out of Northeast China and North Korea and regain South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. And that ended the gamble of the German and Japanese militarists, who had started the Second World War in a bid for world domination.

During the war, Soviet foreign policy was geared to hastening the defeat of the enemy. From the day Hitler Germany launched its bandit-like attack on the Soviet Union to the end of the Second World War, the foreign policy activity of the Communist Party and the Soviet government concentrated on accomplishing four key tasks: forming and building up an anti-Hitler coalition, undermining and eliminating the bloc of fascist states, completing the war at an early date with as few casualties as possible, and working out durable foundations and guarantees of postwar peace and security. In spite of covert and overt resistance from bourgeois diplomacy, the Soviet Union succeeded on the whole in fulfilling all these tasks. To fight the fascist aggressor, a sufficiently solid military political alliance was formed, a second front opened in Western Europe and the Hitler coalition split, with fascist Germany finding itself in complete
military political isolation, a development which hastened the common victory over the enemy. Soviet diplomacy made a great contribution to the restoration of the right of European nations to self-determination and an independent choice of social development path and to the establishment of just frontiers in Europe.

The results of the Great Patriotic War showed that the Soviet Armed Forces had, by fighting the main forces of the fascist coalition, fulfilled the mission assigned to them from the outset: defending the historic achievements of the October Revolution. They stood the test of war and demonstrated in decisive battles their indisputable superiority over a deadly enemy. Our troops emerged from the war as a strong and seasoned force. They showed a high morale on the battlefield and were crowned with everlasting glory. They far exceeded the armies of the other belligerents in courage, efficiency, endurance, boldness and the ability to fight in the most difficult and tense situations.

The victory of the Soviet Union and the defeat of fascism and aggression were predetermined by the entire history of the Soviet state and by the potentialities inherent in the very nature of socialism. The socialist system showed in a years-long war its viability and its unquestionable economic, political, ideological and military superiority over the capitalist system.

The war brought to light the lasting role and greatness of the CPSU as a collective leader and organiser equal to directing all the resources of the country and the titanic strength and energy of the people towards defeating the enemy. The party’s strategy and tactics were based on taking full account of the laws of social development and of war and on the unqualified trust which the Soviet people placed in the party by following its lead. The firm and far-sighted leadership given by the party, its organising and inspiring role and purposeful ideological and educational work ensured the close unity of the people and the solidarity of the war and home fronts, all of which ultimately led to our great victory.

We know by experience that aggressive imperialist forces generally choose the most dangerous manner of triggering war: a treacherous surprise attack using powerful forces readied in advance. Invasion of foreign territory without declaring war has become something of a normal procedure used by imperialism, a stereotype of aggression and plunder. By mounting a surprise attack to the accompaniment of propaganda lies and disinformation, the invader places all peoples before a fait accompli; this also applies to its own people, who are thus dragged into the maelstrom of bloody events against their will and prevented from actively resisting the aggressor from within. Countries and their armies, being under a massive surprise attack, find themselves in exceedingly difficult conditions while the aggressor is able to capture the initiative, which becomes very hard to wrest from him afterwards. It should be obvious how much more dangerous surprise attacks are nowadays.

History invites the conclusion that to avert acts of aggression and surprise attacks, it is necessary to keep a watchful eye on a potential aggressor’s war preparations, expose his designs and intentions in time and take effective steps ensuring that no provocation comes unexpectedly. It is also necessary to expose those who encourage an aggressor by their behaviour, by giving him moral, political and economic support and taking an active part in the establishment of military bases and bridgeheads for aggression.

The Second World War serves as a stern warning that war must be prevented using all might and main before it breaks out. And it is essential to remember that an aggressor may act in a manner and use ways and means of struggle that are the least expected. To frustrate the enemy’s designs and keep the Soviet Armed Forces in battle readiness, it is imperative, therefore, to master all the forms and techniques of armed struggle which the enemy may use. Lenin pointed out that “any army which does not train to use all the weapons, all the means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess, is behaving in an unwise or even criminal manner.” (Footnote 10) (V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, 1974, p 96)

Worthy of special note in this respect is the party’s experience of fostering the Soviet people’s political awareness and vigilance, both before and during the Great Patriotic War. To give the troops a correct political orientation in the event of aggression, the party Central Committee stressed the need to train painstakingly and steadfastly for stubborn fighting with a strong enemy. Our troops were therefore all set to staunchly defend their country in case of an enemy attack. Every commander and every private knew well that they must be on the alert, must be fully prepared to beat off and defeat the enemy. The Leninist party conveyed to the hearts and minds of all servicemen the patriotic slogan “Defence of the Socialist Motherland Is the Sacred Duty of Every Citizen of the USSR”; it heightened their political consciousness and infused them with hatred for aggressors and with a high morale, which subsequently translated into unprecedented steadfastness and heroism on the battlefield.

After the war, the Soviet Armed Forces were faced with new important tasks: ensuring the inviolability of their country’s frontiers, guarding its socialist achievements and being ever ready to defeat imperialist aggression against the socialist community. The importance of these tasks grew inasmuch as the rulers of the United States, Britain and other capitalist countries had gone back on the agreed principles of the postwar settlement in the world; they had embarked on power politics and had begun calling for “pre-emptive” strikes against our country with nuclear weapons. In conformity with their aggressive concepts, the NATO countries set up numerous military bases and bridgeheads and deployed powerful forward-based groups of ground troops and aircraft.
In this situation the Communist Party and the Soviet government, continuing to work for the preservation of peace and international security, took—and go on taking—steps to build up the economic, moral, political, scientific and military potential of the country seeking a solution to the main problem: staying off a third world war. In the years that have passed since the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Army and Navy have undergone a notable change, with their capability rising to a qualitatively new level. By the early 1970s, a military strategic parity had formed between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the WTO and NATO; this strengthened the positions of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and all progressive forces and upset the calculations of aggressive imperialist circles hoping for victory in a nuclear world war. The CPSU and the people have done all that is necessary for the Armed Forces to maintain the existing balance and repulse an attack from any aggressor.

This state of affairs does not suit the imperialists. To be able to dominate the world and impose their will on other nations, the rulers of the United States are trying to achieve unilateral military superiority. They therefore cast aside agreements limiting nuclear armories, cling to old dogmas in seeking illusory military superiority and hope to make an “absolute weapon” under the Star Wars programme, such as would help them avoid retaliation in a nuclear war while at the same time enabling them to deliver strikes from outer space with impunity.

These are vain hopes cherished by military adventurists. The arms race has reached a stage at which nuclear weapons cannot really be used, to say nothing of using them in the foreseeable future, because nuclear war cannot be a sensible, rational means of politics. To start a war using means of mass destruction would amount to accepting self-annihilation. The road to security under these circumstances runs through a lowering of the level of confrontation, through a reduction and ultimately the complete abolition of nuclear and other means of mass destruction. The CPSU and the government are of the opinion that nuclear capabilities should be reduced to levels needed for defence and not for attack. Yet contrary to common sense, the United States, which possesses an enormous destructive capability, is still set on preparing for a global nuclear war or at least for local wars of the same nature, counting on force, military confrontation and the subordination of politics to the cult of force.

Realising the threat of war posed by aggressive imperialist forces and aware of their adventurism, the CPSU considers defence of the socialist Homeland, the buildup of its defensive capability and the strength of its Armed Forces a sacred duty of the Soviet people and a highly important function of the socialist state. Hence the chief mandate given by the 27th CPSU Congress to the Army and Navy: “Today, as in the past, one of the most important tasks of the Party, the state, and the people is to increase to the maximum the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, to educate the men and officers of the Army and Navy, and all Soviet people, in a spirit of vigilance and constant preparedness to defend the great gains of socialism.” (Footnote 11) (Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986, p 148) This mandate reflects the wisdom of Lenin’s recommendations, the experience of the struggle against aggressors and the profundity of the political conclusions drawn from an assessment of the contemporary international situation.

At present the highest form of vigilance for the Soviet Armed Forces is proper combat readiness as the decisive factor restraining the enemies of peace from military provocations and adventures and from unleashing a third world war. Constant preparedness is an objective necessity, a sacred law and the primary rule of our entire military policy. Therefore a most important object of building the Armed Forces is to be at a level of battle readiness making it possible to maintain the parity that has been achieved and a stable balance of forces and to repulse aggression at any moment, no matter where it comes from. As Mikhail Gorbachev said at the 27th Party Congress, today “the defence capability of the USSR is maintained on a level that makes it possible to protect reliably the peaceful life and labour of the Soviet people.” (Footnote 12) (Ibid., p 78) Preparedness and vigilance of our troops are particularly important when the international situation is sharply aggravated by provocations from militarists that put the world on the brink of war. This being so, the Armed Forces need to be at the highest level of battle readiness. And for as long as a political mechanism of blocking war is lacking, the Soviet Army and Navy must guide themselves by the incontestable truth that the better prepared they are, the less likely it is that an aggressor will start a nuclear conflict.

Our servicemen are well aware of the gravity of today’s international situation and know why the party and the people want the Armed Forces to be on the alert at all times. They stand vigilant guard over peace and are continuously mastering the powerful weapons and other materiel at their disposal, improving their ground, air and naval training, steeling themselves morally and politically, improving organisation, strengthening discipline, working to fulfil in exemplary fashion their combat training tasks and preparing to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution in a fitting manner.

The Soviet Union and its Armed Forces do not infringe on the sovereignty of any country, threaten no one’s national interests, do not seek grounds for military confrontation with any state, do not want greater security for themselves at the expense of others but nor will they allow or agree to lesser security. Neither a nuclear war, nor preparations for it can politically or militarily benefit anyone. In today’s world security cannot be based on nuclear deterrence or on other power politics.
Such a policy dooms mankind to the permanent threat of self-annihilation, destroys all hopes for the future. Therefore the USSR and other socialist countries refute the concept of “nuclear containment” advanced by imperialist aggressive circles as fallacious, dangerous and amoral. Indeed, nuclear weapons cannot be a guarantee of security; on the contrary, the more nuclear weapons there are in nations’ arsenals, the less security they have. And now there is no task more important than the struggle against the threat of nuclear war. Not force but reason should govern politics.

In today’s conditions it is imperative to master the art and science of conducting oneself on the international scene with restraint, to solve emerging contradictions through political means, through negotiations. To do so it is important to establish a comprehensive system of international peace and security which embraces the military and political as well as the economic and humanitarian spheres. Such a security system would more reliably lead to the construction of a nuclear-free world in which relations between peoples would be built in the spirit of mutual respect, friendship, cooperation and trust. To do this it is necessary first of all to get rid of the mutual suspicion and distrust that have accumulated over the years, attain a better understanding of one another’s intentions. And all countries must observe the principles of national independence and sovereignty, the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and other generally recognised standards of international relations.

The new military-political thinking demands from all states and military blocs that they adhere in their policy to exclusively defensive military doctrines and military concepts. An example of this is the military doctrine, developed and adopted by the Warsaw Treaty member states. This doctrine reflects the community of defensive military-political aims of its participants and their national military doctrines. This military doctrine of the fraternal alliance of socialist countries is a strictly defensive one, the main task of which is to prevent war—both nuclear and conventional. It clearly reflects the defensive character of socialism’s military strategy and proceeds from the view that the Warsaw Treaty member states will never and under no circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons, will never start hostilities against any state or alliance of states, unless they are themselves made the target of a military attack. Due to the very nature of the socialist social system they come out for solving all international conflicts only through peaceful means.

Proceeding from these basic views and from the desire to finally exclude war from the life of humanity, the governments of the Warsaw Treaty states announced the necessity of reaching an agreement with the NATO countries on a joint radical lowering of military confrontation, an end to nuclear testing and the arms race and the reduction, and then complete elimination of missiles and nuclear warheads, the withdrawal of troops within the confines of national borders, the elimination of military bases located in other countries and the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive types of armament from the zone of direct contact of the two military alliances, as well as the lowering of the concentration of armed forces in the European zone to the agreed minimum level.

Of principal importance are the new Soviet proposals with regard to Asia. In his answers to the questions put by Indonesian newspaper Merdeka. Mikhail Gorbachev stated: “The Soviet Union, meeting the Asian countries half-way and taking into account their concern, is prepared to eliminate all its medium-range missiles also deployed in the Asian part of the country.”

The allied socialist states under the existing conditions, when international reaction is spurring on the arms race, consider it their main duty to reliably protect their own people. The existing military-strategic parity remains a decisive factor in preventing war. However, further raising the level of parity does not yield, as experience has shown, greater security. Therefore, the WTO states will continue to apply their efforts to maintain the balance of military force at an even lower level.

All provisions of the defensive military doctrine adopted by them are practically incorporated into the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government, in their concrete actions, their initiatives and proposals directed at removing the threat of war, creating a safe and stable world, completely eliminating nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, and reducing the military potentials to within the limits of reasonable sufficiency for defence. The defence capabilities of the USSR—a stronghold of the growing potential of the forces of peace—have no other purpose than to check imperialism’s aggressive aspirations and to reliably protect socialist achievements. The Soviet Union will never make concessions that might threaten the security of our country, of our allies. We will never take steps that jeopardise mankind’s future.

In protecting the interests of world socialism, the provision of closer all-round cooperation among the fraternal socialist countries in the economic, political and military spheres is crucial. The stronger is the friendship among peoples and armies, the more reliable is the defence of socialism and peace on Earth. Therefore, the CPSU considers the deepening interaction among the socialist states a priority of its international activities and strives towards making the USSR’s foreign policy moves meet the interests of all socialist countries, of all world democratic forces.

The steadfast increase of the socialist states’ collective defence capabilities helps prevent war and provides the peoples of the socialist community with favourable external conditions for carrying out constructive tasks. As long as the aggressive imperialist NATO bloc exists,
the defence of each socialist state's national interests will be organically linked with the task of collectively defending the socialist community countries and of rendering internationalist assistance to the developing countries. History has entrusted the socialist countries with the special task of maintaining peace and removing the threat of war. It is those countries, coordinating their actions in international affairs and relying on the powerful wave of the peoples' peaceful aspirations, which today are the most powerful force capable of checking imperialist aggressive forces, preventing them from pushing mankind into the abyss of a nuclear catastrophe.

Essentially, the defence of peace and the defence of socialism have merged into a single whole and have become an important element in the struggle for civilization's survival. Today the prevention of a new world war means defending the gains of our revolution and of socialism and providing favourable opportunities for implementing the impressive plans for the building of communism.

The Soviet people can rest assured that the present generation of those who defend their Homeland are worthy heirs and successors to the fighting traditions of their heroic forefathers who defended the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution, held up under imperialism's onslaught, repulsed aggression and liberated many peoples from oppression. The Leninist party equipped the Soviet soldiers with Marxism-Leninism, an inexhaustible source of moral conviction, political maturity, militancy and class hatred for the aggressor. No force exists in the world which can shake their faith in the righteousness of our just and humane cause, in its triumph. The pledge of this is in the USSR's growing economic and defence might, the indestructible unity between the army and the people, the CPSU's wise and far-sighted guidance in all matters of the building of socialism, the defence of peace, of our Soviet Homeland.


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Letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Editor, Responses: May–July 1987

Irregularities Lead to Demotion of General's Son 18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 87 p 2

[Article: “Epilogue to Patronage”]

[Text] Such was the title of an article published on 28 March under the rubric “Restructuring: A Communist's Position.” The editor's office received a reply to this article signed by Colonel General M. Makartsev, chief of the railroad troops, and Lieutenant General A. Stolyarov, chief of the political directorate of railroad troops. It is stated in the reply that the article was discussed by the military council and political directorate of the railroad troops and by the party committee of the main directorate. The issues raised in it were recognized to be correct.

It is communicated in the reply that Colonel V. Zhudinov, chief of the personnel division, was subjected to disciplinary punishment and was compelled to appear at a meeting of the party committee for shortcomings in personnel work. Colonel V. Shecherbinin, chief of the political department, was censured by the party commission of the troop political directorate for submitting unobjective service materials in support of the promotion of Senior Lieutenant D. Volkov. Lieutenant General A. Vinogradov, troop chief of staff, was criticized for irregularities in the work of selecting candidates for promotion to staff position and studying their moral and political qualities. The personal file of communist Lieutenant General A. Volkov, deputy chief of troops and rear services chief, was placed under scrutiny by the party commission of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The order promoting his son, Senior Lieutenant D. Volkov, was rescinded.

All other persons involved in this incident were punished by the party organizations with which they are registered. Specific measures were determined to improve work with personnel in light of today's requirements and to exclude improper appointments, patronage and nepotism.

Regiment Deals With Heat Supply Problems 18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jun 87 p 2

[Article: “Who ‘Let Down’ the Regiment, and Why”]

[Text] On 25 April KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article by Lieutenant Colonel O. Faltchev titled “How the Regiment Was ‘Let Down.’” It discussed shortcomings in the organization of the training process in one of the units of the Moscow Antiaircraft District.

Lieutenant General of Aviation P. Khaytiev, deputy troop commander for political training of the Moscow Antiaircraft District, informed the editor's office that the facts cited in the article were stated correctly. The article was discussed at party meetings and conferences in the unit, the formation and the district's combat training department. Measures to correct the revealed shortcomings were planned. All measures having no bearing on combat training were excluded from the plans. Planning for each month was made specific and timely. The combat training department assumed control over the periodicity of demonstration exercises and the procedures employed in them.

Work done in the troops by officers of the district and formation headquarters was improved.
Officers of the district's combat training department provided assistance to the leadership of the regiment in organizing the training process and introducing advanced methods of summarizing the results of combat and political training and competition results.

Regiment commander Colonel V. Terentiev was dismissed from his post for negligence in his work.

The editor's office also received a reply signed by officers A. Karasev and V. Morozov. It states that the article validly criticizes the overemphasis on demonstration exercises by this unit. This practice has now been halted.

The question of improving the organization of combat and political training in the unit was discussed and communist officers V. Trofimov, N. Dorofeyev and A. Batalin were required to explain themselves at a meeting of the party committee.

For unsatisfactory preparation for lessons with the personnel, unit chief of staff Lieutenant Colonel V. Nadezhdin was given the warning that his work was substandard. Unit deputy chief of staff Captain P. Agarkov was given a strict reprimand. Major S. Misyurin, the regiment deputy commander for armament, was dismissed from his post for failing to live up to his responsibilities as the chief of the armament service and for the low technical training level of the personnel. He was given a strict reprimand by the party. A reply from the district's billeting directorate signed by Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Pustarnakov states that steps were being taken in the regiment in the spring-summer 1987 period to improve heat supply to residential and work buildings. A specialized organization is completing the work on the garrison's heat supply networks.

From the editor:

The replies persuade us that measures have been implemented in response to the critical article. But there is one circumstance that elicits dismay. The request for action in response to the article was sent to the political directorate of the Moscow Aircraft District. The political directorate deemed it possible to forward it to the district's combat training department. That is, to the organization that was criticized in the article for passiveness. The department did not take decisive steps to correct the shortcomings that had flourished in the surface-to-air missile regiment.

Some things that were said in Colonel Pustarnakov's reply raise concern. In particular: "Assuming that the boiler house is fully manned and adequate control is maintained over its work by the military unit's command, the military post will be supplied with heat unconditionally in the fall-winter period of 1987-1988." This sounds as if the unit command and not the district billeting directorate is at fault. But the real problem is this: A large number of new consumers were recently connected to the post's heat supply system with the awareness of the appropriate chiefs. Now the old boiler house is unable to handle the load. In some classrooms and in the regiment headquarters the people are forced to work in overcoats in winter. It is apparent that even if the boilers are replaced, as Colonel Pustarnakov communicates, the problem will not be solved.

And yet the problem needs to be addressed head-on. The regiment, the billeting directorate and various services in the district have long been discussing conversion of the boiler houses of this and other units to progressive forms of fuel. This would raise their output and permit them to operate without overloads and interruptions. There would be no need to take soldiers away from combat training in order to carry coal from one place to another. This is why it is too early to make a conclusive evaluation of the repairs presently being carried out. Let this evaluation be made by the residents of the military post.

Navy Technical School Dismisses Ill-Trained Instructors

18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jun 87 p 2

[Article: "It Seems As If Things Have Quieted Down..."

[Text] An article by Captain 3d Rank V. Pasyakin published on 2 April with this title discussed the low quality of training in the navy's technical school. Captain 1st Rank K. Shovgenov informed the editor's office that this article was discussed together with the school's command and political staff.

The officers mentioned in the article—V. Sarychev, P. Krasiev, V. Nesterov and M. Mitrov—are in fact insufficiently trained instructors for a number of reasons. This is reflected in their work certification records. The conclusions reached from the certification process are presently being acted upon according to a plan. Thus officers V. Sarychev and P. Krasiev were recently transferred from the technical school to other posts.

Captain 1st Rank Yu. Pakhomov and captains 2d rank B. Khodas and Ye. Serbin were strictly criticized for failing to solve personnel problems promptly.

Northern Fleet Responds to Poor Flight Instructor Preparation

18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jun 87 p 2

[Article: "Why There Is a Shortage of Instructors"

[Text] An article with this title published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 30 January of this year discussed the fact that flying political workers of the Northern Fleet's air forces were not fulfilling their responsibilities as flight instructors.
It was reported to the editor’s office by Major General of Aviation M. Prokudin, deputy commander for political affairs of naval aviation, that in view of their high work load, flying political workers were devoting inadequate attention to their personal preparation for their work as flight instructors, with the consequence that they were responsible for some near-accidents in the air.

Permission to fly as instructors is now being granted on an individual basis by the fleet air force commanders with regard for their training level and proficiency as instructors.

The article was discussed at an assembly of naval aviation executives.

The editor’s office received a reply signed by Major General of Aviation V. Pupynin, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Northern Fleet’s air forces. Noting that an acute and timely issue was raised in the article, he reports that the command and political directorate of the Northern Fleet’s air forces adopted a decision to use a number of pilots and navigator-political workers as flight instructors. A number of additional measures to improve the occupational training of flying political workers were developed.

Helicopter Pilot-Navigator Complains of Poor Training Opportunities
18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jun 87 p 2

[Article by Capt N. Lebedev, squadron navigator-pilot. Red Banner Carpathian Military District: “Minus a Pilot?”]

[Text] The crew of an Mi-8 helicopter contains the position of pilot-navigator. As a joke we refer to it in mathematical parlance as “pilot minus navigator.” A biting issue stands behind this joke. Let me explain it with a specific example.

Senior Lieutenant G. Sokolov graduated from the higher military aviation school for pilots in 1979, after which he was assigned to the Transbaikal Military District as a pilot-navigator (he is presently serving in our unit). An individual training schedule was set up for him at the direction of the subunit commander in order that he could be broken into his job faster.

It was not long before Sokolov qualified to fly at his work station to the right of the crew commander as a navigator, during the day in good weather. In keeping with the requirements, he made a promise to himself to master the technique of piloting the helicopter from the left seat—the commander’s. But then he was astounded to hear that as a pilot-navigator, he should not be in such a hurry. The words of one of his friends about the future of a pilot-navigator spoken, some time ago with anger and irony, came to his mind: “The job of the man on the right was not to bother the pilot on the left.”

The years go by. In the end, every pilot-navigator raises this question: When will they finally allow him to fly in the left seat as the crew commander? And then promises are made to him. Except that I do not remember a single case where a flight navigator-pilot or pilot-navigator was ever awarded the qualifications of a military pilot 2d class promptly. Take for example pilot-navigators senior lieutenants S. Kurban and V. Balabantsev, who submitted documents for 3d class as far back as in early 1986. Moreover Balabantsev did so twice while he was serving in Afghanistan. But an order awarding the qualifications has yet to be published. But without 3d class qualifications, it is of course impossible to obtain 2d class qualifications. Senior Lieutenant Sokolov, the person with whom I began this letter, was not awarded 3d class until more than 5 years after graduating from school.

The fact is that the service program of a pilot-navigator requires that he fly in the left seat—that is, in the crew commander’s place—as a prerequisite of class qualifications. But as a rule such training flights are not foreseen in the planning table for pilot-navigators. At the same time things are much simpler for “pure” navigators. Given the appropriate permission they fly with the crew commander and at the same time attain their 1st class rating in 2 years, or 3 years at the most, for their specific navigation skills.

Another problem associated with this is the amount of training time pilot-navigators are allowed in piloting techniques. Before, piloting techniques were tested every so often, and now the time between testing has been doubled. But this change makes sense only if pilot-navigators are allowed fly in the left seat regularly. But in practice things are different. If a pilot-navigator is lucky, the crew commander may sometimes turn control over to him while in horizontal flight, while an instructor might allow him to land. But that’s all; on the other hand sometimes a pilot-navigator may not be given the opportunity to control the helicopter independently for an entire year.

More than half of our squadron’s pilot-navigators are not qualified to fly at night and in adverse weather. If anyone of the left-seat pilots falls ill, or if he is away on temporary duty or on leave, the additional load is transferred to the remaining crew commanders. And little is being done to prepare replacements for them. People forget that pilot-navigators had graduated from pilot school, and not navigator school. Moreover our unit is not the only one in this situation. When I met with my associates from other regiments I hear their complaints about the same problem. What sort of crew, flight and squadron commanders will we turn out to be
as a result? I know from my own experience that piloting habits gradually fade when you fly in the right seat; you lose confidence in yourself, and your work begins to get careless.

I do not think there is any need to remind anyone that we are talking not about how this affects pilot-navigators personally, but rather about the combat readiness of the subunits. In my opinion it is time to look more responsibly at the problem of combat training for pilot-navigators in their category as specialists.

More On-the-Job Training Suggested for NCOs

18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jun 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Deynekin, adjutant, department of social and military psychology, Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin: "The Most Reliable NCOs"]

[Text] I would like to state some ideas in connection with the results of research recently carried out by the department of social and military psychology of the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin jointly with the command of the Belorusov Military District.

An analysis of the personal and work characteristics of NCOs transferring into the reserves was made in a certain unit. Of them, 74 percent were graduates of training subunits, while the rest had become junior commanders while serving in the unit itself. Moreover almost three-fourths of the latter were driver-mechanics, gunner-operators and so on who had undergone training in a training subunit. As a rule they were appointed to NCO positions at the end of the first year of work without any kind of additional training.

One interesting thing is that “home-grown” NCOs do not do any worse than those who have been specially trained in training subunits. Moreover according to the survey only 30 percent of NCOs who had undergone special training in training subunits were able to assimilate their responsibilities in their full volume by the end of their time of service. For “home-grown” NCOs this indicator was three times higher.

There is a certain pattern to this. An NCO comes to the troops from a training subunit without sufficient practical training. And therefore on many occasions we find that rather than he teaching the soldier—the way it should be, the soldier helps him assimilate the equipment and the work routine. This makes the young NCO psychologically and practically dependent on his subordinate. On the other hand when one of the best specialists of the subunit, one enjoying authority among fellow servicemen, is appointed commander of a detachment, crew or squad, his development proceeds much less painfully.

This thought came to me: Why not make a wider practice of the existing experience of training the best graduates of training subunits to be junior commanders directly within the combat units? At least for example in month-long courses of instruction provided at the unit between regular training periods. But these would have to be official courses following a particular program; persons attending these courses should be awarded certificates of completion, and they should receive orders appointing them to NCO positions in their own subunits.

Crane Operators Complain of Inefficient Construction Methods

18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Jun 87 p 2

[Article by V. Artushin, Ye. Izusin and others, a total of six signatures: “Using the Crash Program Method: A Letter to the Editor”]

[Text] Dear editor! We are workers of the operations section of a motor transport and mechanization enterprise headed by Colonel A. Gvozdenko. Our section provides services to a military construction organization headed by Major General Yu. Shesterov.

The tower cranes on which we work are categorized as major mechanization resources; they are the basis of the industrial method of construction. We are certain there is no need to prove that expensive equipment must be used carefully. The planning indicators assigned to us are based on two-shift operation of each tower crane.

But in fact, builders often use the cranes in only one shift, as a result of which the shift coefficient fluctuates around 1.5. This happens because they work in the old way, they complete their facilities through a succession of last-minute rush efforts. During such times other construction projects are temporarily shut down, and consequently the tower cranes standing at those sites remain idle as well.

When such a situation arises, some construction organizations immediately begin “juggling” the planning indicators. Thus the work supervisor’s section headed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Shender wrote up our work orders as follows: Three percent of the completed work was categorized as construction and installation, while the remaining 97 was defined as services or, in other words, moving loads from one place to another.

To go on with the example, in the fourth quarter of the past year this organization paid us only “for services.” Their explanation for this was that they had completed the construction and installation plan long ago. But this is nothing more than window dressing, fictitious fulfillment of plans, and defense of local interests. A similar situation also evolved in our “interaction” with the organization headed by Colonel N. Malakhov.
What is the result? Cranes are actually operating, but from the documents furnished by the builders it appears as if they are not there at all. No matter how hard we try to keep working without interruption and raise labor productivity, we are unable to fulfill our construction and installation quota. What sort of cost accounting is this, what sort of stimulus is this for effective, quality work?

A year ago we asked the leadership of the central Main Military Construction Directorate to take the appropriate steps to see that tower cranes would be used in two shifts, and that builders would fulfill their contracted obligations. The complaint was put into arbitration. But practically nothing has changed since then.

We would also like to say a few words about shortcomings in the planning of our activities, which is based on indicators attained in the previous planning period. As a result the directive norms for one crane call for so many working hours that almost no time is left for planned technical maintenance. That is, we are compelled to operate the cranes until they break down completely. Consider also the time it takes to overhaul the mechanisms, and to move the cranes from one facility to another. This time cannot be ignored either.

It is being said at all levels that planning must be realistic, justified and supported both materially and technically, so that people could work at peak effort. Unfortunately things have not gone farther than eloquent words in our enterprise. Old, harmful habits have obviously rooted themselves too strongly among some executives who recognize no methods of construction management other than crash campaigns and last-minute rushes.

We feel that we cannot drag our heels any longer, it is time for us to begin restructuring our work as well. We are prepared to honor any wishes of the builders, but the desire to improve order and organization must be mutual. The barriers that keep each person at his work station from completely realizing his possibilities must be removed.

Air Regiment Criticized for Poor Training
18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 87 p 2


[Text] An article by Major General of Aviation V. Stepanov published on 13 May in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA with the title “And Back into the Second Echelon” discussed serious negligence and irregularities in the organization of combat training in the Guards bomber air regiment that had initiated the competition in the air force.

Lieutenant General of Aviation A. Maslov, first deputy chief of the air force political directorate, reported to the editor’s office that because of the important significance of the issues raised in the article, and because it was recognized that immediate and effective measures had to be implemented to provide assistance to the command and party organization of the initiating regiment, the air force military council met to examine and discuss the progress being made by the Guards air regiment that initiated the socialist competition in the air force in fulfilling its pledges, and measures to deepen its restructuring in light of directives of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and decisions of the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The military council entertained reports from regiment commander Guards Colonel A. Labkovskiy, his deputy for political affairs Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Tarusov and Major General of Aviation V. Kozlov.

It was noted that competition has not yet become an inseparable component of combat and political training in the regiment. A real effort to achieve high end results was not evident. The quality of tactical training and the condition of the training materials and equipment remain the weakest link. The regiment is attempting to carry out the most important tasks of the current training year by old methods. The reason for this is that higher authorities were unable to orient the command completely toward the new tasks and the new work methods, toward the need for executives to develop a new way of thinking, a new psychology and new approaches to the criteria for assessing their activities.

The critical article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Manushkin “Making Up Unfinished Work,” which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 11 February of this year and which revealed serious shortcomings in the management and organization of socialist competition in the regiment, failed to encourage the unit commander and party organization to take effective steps to correct them. Major General of Aviation V. Stepanov subjects the regiment command to justified criticism, but he sidesteps the fact that higher chiefs and he personally had not provided the regiment the help it needed.

The air force military council criticized the officials concerned for poor participation in the development and implementation of measures to raise the effectiveness of competition in the regiment, and it turned attention to the poor practical assistance being given to the regiment in fulfilling its combat and political training plans. The air force military council agreed that the criticism in the article published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 13 May was valid.

A recommendation was made to bring the competition more in line with the tasks of every training day. The air force military councils of all districts and groups of forces and the commanders, political organs and staffs of formations, scientific research institutions, institutions
of higher education and air force services were asked to monitor the progress in the fulfillment of socialist pledges by units and subunits that had pledged to earn the outstanding title.

It was recommended that every unit should set up a Board of Honor that would bear the names of the victors of the socialist competition and of the best in particular occupations for the month, for the training period and for the training year as a whole. Competition winners will participate in rallies at the eve of the 70th anniversary of Great October in the district air forces, groups of forces, scientific research institutions and institutions of higher education.

A resolution of the air force military council foresaw a wide program of measures called upon to ensure a higher role for the main headquarters and directorates of the air force commander-in-chief in organizing competition.

A reply signed by Major General of Aviation A. Shakhunov was also received. He reports that Major General of Aviation V. Stepanov was given the responsibility of maintaining constant control over the state of affairs in the regiment that initiated the socialist competition in the air force. Communist Lieutenant Colonel V. Bukhrov was given a reprimand by the party commission for submitting an unobjective report.

A flying tactics course focusing on combat use of weapons was conducted. Communists and persons to blame for poor results in bombing and missile launching exercises were ordered to explain themselves before a meeting of the squadron party bureau. The party committee criticized the squadron commander, Communist Lieutenant Colonel N. Volkov, for the inadequate level of training in flight tactics exhibited by flight commanders and navigators. Communist Lieutenant Colonel N. Gritsenko received personal party punishment for this same deficiency.

Colonel N. Volodin, who signed the formal reply sent to KRAASNAYA ZVEZDA concerning Lieutenant Colonel A. Manushkin's article, was strictly counseled as to the need for taking a more responsible approach to critical articles in the newspaper.

Problems concerned with improving political indoctrination work with the personnel and making active use of printed materials were examined at meetings of political organ chiefs and ideological workers.

Repair Enterprise Pleads for Support in Automation Effort

18010007a Moscow KRAASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jul 87 p 2

[Article by S. Shestov, secretary, tank repair enterprise party committee, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "We're Losing Time"]

[Text] The collective of our tank repair enterprise, which is headed by Colonel V. Bulava, welcomed the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and materials from a session of the USSR Supreme Council with interest and hope. The party's course toward fundamental restructuring of the economy's management is eliciting an avid response in the hearts of the people. Now during work breaks one often hears people debating different provisions of the document.

We all understand quite well that the fate of the restructuring effort is decided not in the office of the chief but right at the work stations, in the labor collectives. They have now been granted extensive rights and possibilities. But much also depends on us, the party leaders. If we are successful in drawing the people after us, and activating their work, we will achieve real changes.

It is pleasant to note that efforts to improve production control in our enterprise are not starting from ground zero. Two years ago we began modernizing the equipment in the shops and automating control of the production process in response to a decision of the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

Twenty-five robot-manipulators, 6 numerically controlled machine tools, 18 automatic lathes and 8 robot complexes were installed and are now operating in the enterprise. The modernization effort has increased labor productivity by several times, raised product quality to a new level and eliminated the chronic shortage of workers. Now, as an example, three operators service all of the automatic lathes and numerically controlled machine tools.

One other innovation was introduced at the plant during the time of the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum—an industrial television camera unit. Two months are usually allocated for setting up and tuning one. Our specialists—engineers V. Chizh and V. Kritarsov, laborer F. Lavrentyev and others—managed to complete all of the work much faster under the direct supervision of Lieutenant Colonel V. Zichenko. Now the plant leadership has the possibility for efficiently monitoring the course of the production process in all of the shops.

Extensive introduction of computer technology at the enterprise raised the creativity of the people and their interest in the end results of their work. Labor and executive discipline increased, and the number of efficiency experts and inventors has grown. Introduction of just a single efficiency proposal by a young worker—fitter-adjuster A. Sinyukov—produced an economic impact of around 10,000 rubles at the plant.

Soon our enterprise will switch to the new management conditions. We are impatiently awaiting this day, and preparing for it. By fulfilling and surpassing its plan, the collective will be able to make a high profit. We are already using this profit to build a cultural and health recreation center, a sports complex and housing, to outfit
hothouses and to develop beekeeping. The people see that concern is being expressed for their social needs, so they are naturally trying to make the enterprise their home.

But at the same time experience persuades us that success cannot be achieved without serious efforts, without fighting stagnation and routine. This brings up a certain paradox. Specialists from civilian enterprises visit us from thousands of kilometers away to study our experience in introducing the enterprise automated control system and the robot technology. We share our developments and documents with them, we copy programs on magnetic disks for them, and we teach their operators. But no one comes here from kindred military enterprises. Apparently the reason for that is that certain executives of higher organizations are overly cautious, they are dragging their feet with introduction of the accomplishments of science into production. After all, this means reorganizing the planning, financial and supply organs, which judging from everything are not yet ready for all of this. For example we raised the issue of approving a new manning table and reexamining the pay rates on several occasions, but no progress has yet been made.

We are also concerned by the fact that many programs of various kinds have to be developed and machine tools have to be frequently readjusted for production of small parts in connection with introduction of the new technology. This takes time and materials. But we could economize by coordinating the actions of other kindred enterprises. Here once again we need the higher leadership to intervene, but it is taking its time in doing so. We would hope that the decisions of the plenum will help to remove the barriers and to create a control mechanism which would make everyone interested in fundamentally increasing labor effectiveness. We are wasting precious time.

Poor Quality Plans Make Construction Work Harder

18010007a Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian
11 Jul 87 p 1

[Article: "The Quality of the Plan"]

[Text] "Dear editor!

"I work with construction planning documents. Often, unfortunately, the quality of these documents is low, and they contain disappointing errors. I am not even talking about the content of the plans themselves, though it would not be difficult for me to come up with examples of irrational, obsolete decisions made in relation to a number of facilities. The transition to a new level of quality and the effort to restructure our work require a certain amount of time. But the documents could be improved significantly and the convenience of using them could be raised right now. What do I mean?"

"Take for example the thermomechanical section of a certain plan for erection of a boiler house. The light-sensitive paper bearing the drawings and text is brittle and fragile. Working with this paper and reading the drawings is real agony. The albums are poorly stitched, and the sheets keep falling out. That's the external side of it, so to speak. But the content is not any better.

"Consider the album titled 'Plumbing Fixtures.' Carelessness and confused use of symbols are encountered at every step. For example the album does not give a total figure for the amount of steel required, which creates all kinds of inconveniences when it comes time to draw up orders for materials. As a result the builders and installers end up having to make hand corrections in seven albums of just the thermomechanical section of the plans alone.

"Oftentimes the nominal pressure of valve fittings is not indicated, and then we are forced to seek the information in other sources. There are many inconsistencies in the units of measurement applied to different systems. As a rule the order in which materials and articles are listed is contrary to that adopted in catalogs.

"This is but one example, but such carelessness is also typical of other plans drafted by military establishments. The impression is created that this has now become the norm. But when you get right down to it, taking care of loose ends in plans is the job of planners, not the builders and installers."

Colonel (Reserve) I. Badretdinov

The editor's office asked Major General S. Kostromin, acting chief of the technical directorate of capital construction of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to comment on this letter. Here is what he communicated to the editor:

"Comrade Badretdinov validly turns attention in his letter to the low quality of a number of the documents published by military planning organizations. Nor can I disagree with him when he says that many of the mistakes can be corrected without material outlays or any special creative effort. They occur only due to an irresponsible attitude and poor work on the part of certain workers. Steps are now being taken to correct the noted shortcomings.

"We have also planned and implemented major measures to improve planning and estimates. Thus we have basically introduced a quality control system for planning documents. The client now rates each plan personally. The effort to restructure the work of planning organizations is being assisted in many ways now that the collectives have now switched to new conditions of economic stimulation, and now that the brigade contract is being introduced."
"We are now facing major tasks associated with implementing the decisions of the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which has charted the transition to new economic conditions. Implementation of these decisions should noticeably improve the quality of the work of military planners."

**Flawed Selection Process Produces Poor NCOs**

18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jul 87 p 2

[Article by Capt. N. Lisitsa, Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "Where Weak NCOs Come From"]

[Text] When poorly trained NCOs are encountered in the troops, the commanders of training subunits get the blame as a rule. But does it all depend on them alone?

I do not think there is any need to discuss the role the most numerous detachment of our command personnel—the NCOs—have to play in carrying out the most important tasks posed before the armed forces by the party. And yet changes in their training are still unnoticeable, even though it seems to me that it should have been reexamined long ago.

Here is a fresh example. During a certain fire exercise Junior Sergeant Gogolev, a recent graduate of a training subunit, was essentially barred from participating further in combat training exercises. On seeing how many gross errors the NCO was making in his work, the battery senior officer took over his responsibilities. But even he was unable to make up the resulting time loss. On learning of the reasons for the delay, battery commander Captain T. Pogovich lamented: "Where do they get the gall to train such NCOs?"

In general, the incident and the reaction to it are typical.

For example Captain A. Shvachich, the commander of the training battery in which Gogolev had undergone his training, knows beforehand that there is little chance that some of his present subordinates would ever become good specialists. As is evident from the fact that they get mediocre grades, artillery science, in which everything hinges upon mathematics, is difficult for them. And this is not the first case suggesting that military commissariats are not critical enough when they select conscripts for training subunits. And it is difficult to correct such mistakes.

It is true that a special commission selects the young complement for training subunits. But for practical purposes it turns young men away only for reason of health. It figures that the others would make it through on appeal, and that the troops need specialists.

The commanders of training subunits find themselves in the same situation. Even if a cadet fails to show an aptitude for learning in his first days, the commander can only petition to transfer him to another subunit. But he must stay within the unit. However, such "exchange" between neighbors does little good. And a failing student cannot be dropped once the training begins. This is why NCOs that require additional training end up in the units.

Of course, no one is trying to relieve the commanders of training subunits of their responsibility. Nonetheless I think that when we talk about the qualities an NCO should have today, we must begin with the question as to who gets to be an NCO. Commanders of training subunits should be given greater independence in answering this question, and the responsibility of military commissar workers for candidate selection needs to be increased.

**Several Officers Punished for Illegal Activities**

18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jul 87 p 2

[Article: "Contrary to One's Conscience"]

[Text] An article with this title by Lieutenant Colonel A. Ladin published on 22 March cited cases of abuse of official position by some workers of the Enbekshikazakhskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Alma-Ata Oblast, who illegally issued several certificates of participation in the Great Patriotic War.

Major General M. Kakhrimanov, deputy chief of the political directorate of the Central Asian Military District, and Colonel of Justice A. Afanashev, military procurator of the Alma-Ata garrison, reported that a special commission consisting of representatives from the political directorate, the personnel directorate, the district's financial service, the military procurator's office, the military commissariat of the Kazakh SSR and the oblast party committee checked out the facts presented in the article.

Colonel B. Yarmukhamedov, military commissar of the Kazakh SSR, was given a strict reprimand for serious irregularities in managing the military commissariats subordinated to him. The same reprimand was also given to Colonel V. Gedrovich, chief of the political department of the republic's military commissariat. Lieutenant Colonel R. Zhunusov and Major A. Zhigalov were given administrative and party punishments.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Galaktionov, military commissar of Enbekshikazakhskiy Rayon, who treated a war veteran's petitions with coldness, formalism and red tape, was dismissed from his post and subjected to party punishment. Moreover cases in which A. Galaktionov used conscripts to build his own house and acquired construction materials illegally were revealed in the course of the procurator's inspection. It was decided that he would pay restitution for the material loss inflicted on the state. The district's military council is examining the suitability of this officer's further presence in the USSR Armed Forces.
Lieutenant Colonel V. Tulepbergenov, who was aware that the military commissar of Enbekshikazakhskiy Rayon was ordering documents illegally, was retired into the reserves for abusing his position and discrediting the name of a Soviet officer. Lieutenant Colonel V. Kondrashov was demoted and expelled from the CPSU for the same violations. A comrades court of honor of senior officers decided to submit a petition to reduce his rank. Major V. Kovalchuk, who submitted several illegal requests for certificates of war participation for persons who had never actually served in the active army. It was also decided that Kovalchuk would pay restitution for the material losses he inflicted on the state. Majors V. Seredkin and V. Ageyev, workers of the rayon military commissariat, were subjected to administrative punishment and given a party reprimand for carelessness in fulfilling their official duties.

The military commissariat of the Kazakh SSR is currently conducting an inspection of war participation certificates.

**Construction Accidents Reveal Flaws in Safety Practices**

18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jul 87 p 2

[Article: “Managing Labor Protection”]

[Text] Captain I. Ivanyuka’s article “At Any Price” published on 10 April discussed the unfavorable status of industrial safety in the construction directorates of some districts and fleets and in military construction organizations. The editor’s office received a number of official responses to the article.

Thus Major General M. Simakov, first deputy chief of the political directorate for military construction units, reported that the newspaper article was discussed in all main construction directorates at official executive conferences, and that it was recognized to be objective and timely. Reports were heard from the chief engineers of the main directorates—Major General A. Guts and colonels L. Konovalov and Yu. Obodovskiy—on steps being taken to create safe working conditions at military construction sites and enterprises.

Specific measures for eliminating the noted shortcomings were determined. In this case special attention was turned to raising the responsibility of executives, engineers and technicians for preserving the life and health of people, for organizing and conducting preventive work and for promptly correcting the causes of accidents and injuries at work stations. A labor protection month was conducted in the Main Military Construction Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, in the Central Main Military Construction Directorate and in all organizations subordinated to them. The purpose of this month was to improve engineering preparation of the

work and its organization, to bring it into correspondence with industrial safety regulations and norms, and to improve sanitation and personal services.

The chief engineers of the construction directorates of the Baltic Fleet—Colonel V. Nikiitin, of the Northern Fleet—Colonel V. Tokarknitskiy, and of the Far East Military District—Colonel F. Bobrovskey were disciplined by order of the deputy USSR minister of defense for construction and troop billeting for failing to take steps to improve labor protection. Communist colonels A. Kosovan and B. Siukhin, chiefs of construction directorates, were subjected to party punishment.

According to a report from acting chief of the Main Military Construction Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense Colonel Yu. Obodovskiy, accidents decreased by a factor of 2.5 in the construction directorates of the North Caucasus, Turkestan and Odessa military districts as a result of measures recently implemented.

The center for labor protection training methods was moved into a new building. There are plans for reequipping the local labor protection offices of all construction directorates of the districts and fleets and to open 42 labor protection offices in organizations and enterprises before the end of the year. Courses of advance training for line engineers and technicians in industrial safety practices were started in May.

It is also communicated in the response that persons to blame for the death of Private V. Krivko were punished.

It is noted that construction and installation organizations are constantly experiencing difficulties in supplying personal protective resources to laborers, engineers and technicians, especially helmets and safety harnesses. District and fleet rear services are systematically failing to satisfy the needs of the builders. The main directorate is presently studying the possibility for covering the shortage of helmets and safety harnesses with equipment from the Central Clothing Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. A response signed by Major General A. Borovtsev, chief of the Main Directorate of Construction Industry of the USSR Ministry of Defense, states that the sector conducted a conference on labor protection with the participation of the chief engineers of the lumber mills. Specific measures to eliminate the existing shortcomings were planned. The work done so far has already noticeably decreased the injury rate at the lumber mills mentioned in the article.

Other responses received by the editor’s office discuss what is being done specifically in the districts and military construction organizations to improve industrial safety at enterprises and construction sites.
At the same time this discussion has not exhausted the problem of creating safe working conditions. This is evident from the responses of readers to the newspaper article, two of which are published today.

It Will Be Compensated a Hundredfold, by I. Mikhaylenko

Prior to being transferred into the reserves I served as a physician in a military construction detachment, meaning that I was directly involved in problems concerned with labor protection. Naturally, more with the consequences of safety violations, though also with their prevention, as far as my resources would allow.

The author of the article validly notes that military builders in their first year of service have a higher injury rate. But from my point of view their low qualifications are not the only reason for this. Moreover low qualifications are at times not even primarily responsible. Rapid tiring is at fault in many ways. Many of yesterday’s schoolchildren are not accustomed to physical labor, they are not prepared for the considerable loads that await them at construction sites. When we say that one must prepare for service in the army, we should obviously refer to future military builders as well.

It should be added here that some commanders and production organizers try to stretch the work day beyond all measure. And not just at the construction site. On returning to the unit they send their subordinates out for housekeeping and load handling jobs, frequently unofficial ones. I am certain that certain manifestations of illegal mutual relationships and violations of the principles of troop comradeship also play a certain role. I am referring in particular to cases where a first-year soldier is saddled with additional physical loads. Can a military builder be attentive at work, and avoid injury, if as an example he has not had enough sleep, or if he is in emotional turmoil? Such things did happen during my time as a physician.

One of the reasons that the same accidents occur again and again at construction sites is, I believe, the desire to make things look better than they are. Some commanders who are reluctant to “spoil” good reports, to complicate their lives, simply conceal certain cases of injury rather than taking steps to prevent them.

Nor can we of course discount causes of what you might call a technical order. Military builders often have to work with obsolete machinery and equipment that often breaks down, and they are not provided adequate quantities of good tools.

I am deeply certain that all labor protection measures must begin mainly with a concern for people, with creation of a healthy climate in the collective. This approach would be compensated a hundredfold in production as well.

Not for the Sake of Formality, by Colonel (Retired) V. Chumichev, RSFSR Distinguished Builder

I feel that the newspaper posed the issue correctly: It is time to progress from recording safety violations to managing labor protection and preventing possible incidents. Frankly speaking, little has been done yet in this direction.

In all honesty we builders count mainly on what is referred to as trilevel control over industrial safety. I personally feel that in the form in which exists today, it cannot produce the needed result, because the administration essentially passes on the responsibility of primary daily inspection to public inspectors. There can be no debate that they are a large and mobile army, and that they should doubtlessly be utilized to make inspections, but judge for yourself: What sort of responsibility do they bear for their work?

Instead, what if we obligate the section chief or work supervisor to carefully check out every work station each day prior to the start of the shift together with the company commander, and correct any deficiencies on the spot? I am certain that their attitude to the work would change. Especially if they are required to attach their own signature to the corresponding journal permitting the personnel to go to work. If the first level of the trilevel control system were organized in this way, I think it would be effective. I would like to note that we employed such a system at a number of construction projects, and it bore its fruits. It noticeably increased collective responsibility of the production organizers for creating safe working conditions at every work station.

At the moment essentially the only organizer (and simultaneously the only controller) of safe work in a construction organization is the safety engineer. And to be perfectly frank I have to say that incompetent and even illiterate people are often placed in this position; moreover from time to time they are taken away from their jobs to perform special assignments. On the other side of the coin others, who feel that they are carrying out “more important” tasks in the effort to fulfill the planning indicators, feel that it is unnecessary to help them.

One of the causes of injury is the low qualifications of military builders working as mechanics. If we wish to make things right, we need to fundamentally change their training. It is no secret that cadets who should be studying are often used as the “reserve of the main command” for housekeeping work, and that training is conducted with old models of equipment.

But I feel that the chief problem lies in a formal attitude toward safety. If we believe all the paperwork, then the trilevel control system works, safety engineers are doing what they are supposed to do, and the on-site inspectors are on site. But the truth is that we cannot prevent
accidents. Things must be done not for the sake of formality, but in order to somehow guarantee that accidents would not occur at a construction site.

Belated Action Taken on Unfinished Construction Work

18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jul 87 p 2

[Article: “After a Reminder”]

[Text] Official responses to an article titled “Things Are Going Smoothly Only on Paper” by Lieutenant Colonel V. Borzasekov, Captain V. Zubtsov and A. Ryabkov (4 February) were published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 10 May. They noted that the criticism addressed toward builders who turned a facility over for operation with a large quantity of unfinished work was valid. At the same time rather than taking specific steps to correct the shortcomings the construction directorate of the Transbaykal Military District limited its reaction to letter writing. Nor was there a principled assessment of the situation in the response received from the district’s political directorate.

After a reminder, a letter bearing the signature of Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Anufriyev, the deputy chief of the district’s political directorate, was received by the editor’s office. It reported that the issues raised in the articles carried by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA were discussed at a meeting of executives of the military construction organizations and units. The causes of waste and report padding arising in the course of the enterprize’s reconstruction were analyzed. Specific measures to correct the shortcomings were planned and are now being implemented.

Work supervisor’s section chief Major V. Rubtsov and chief engineer Major V. Salnikov, both communists, were punished by the party commission under the political department of the district’s construction directorate for failing to meet the construction and installation plan, for report padding and for creating a false impression of the actual conditions. Both were given a strict reprimand, which was entered into their records.

Reports of Wrongdoings Ignored

18010007a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jul 87 p 2

[Article by Senior Lieutenant N. Chanyshev, air defense troops: “No Results Yet”]

[Text] Dear editor. I am Senior Lieutenant N. Chanyshev, an officer in the air defense troops and a communist. I feel compelled to write you about a difficult situation I have had to deal with because of problems still existing in our unit.

After graduating from the Kiev Higher Engineering Radiotechnical School of Air Defense Troops in 1983 I was appointed to a command post. As I was signing for the new expensive equipment I discovered in amazement that not only was it not combat ready, it was not complete. Simply put; some parts of it had been stolen. An investigation was initiated under the direction of Major I. Basov. The total value of the misappropriated articles was over a thousand rubles. The materials of the investigation together with the names of the guilty officials were transferred to the appropriate agencies. But for unknown reasons the guilty were never punished. And I was ordered to accept the equipment in the sorry state in which I had found it.

But now, sometime later, the question of responsibility for its condition has arisen again, and it looks like I’m the one to take the fall. I admit that I did not stick to my principles like I should have or displayed adequate persistence when I first came on the job. But I am astounded most of all by the fact that now I’m being encouraged to sign various false documents.

I reported the situation to the appropriate chief and raised the issue at a party meeting. But there have been no results yet. I find it shameful that certain of our communists speak eloquently of restructuring from the podium, but follow the old principles in their life and work, including one that says if you want it, do it.

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Kurkotkin on Competence of Rear Service Specialists
18010010a Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SOD in Russian
No 15, Aug 87 (signed to press 20 Jul 87) pp 9-16

[Article by Mar SU S. Kurkotkin, deputy minister of defense and chief of rear services of the USSR armed forces: “The Competence of Rear-Service Specialists as a Factor in Raising Combat Readiness”]

[Text] Today, in the stage of restructuring, to achieve visible results and practical results in every area of work and every sphere of our activity—such is one of the requirements of the party toward the personnel, as advanced at the June (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. It relates fully to commanders and superiors who are the organizers of rear services as well, answering for the timely, complete and all-round support of the life and training of the troops and naval forces. Any rear-service organ—a base or depot, a rail, road, trucking, pipeline or aviation unit, an integrated supply ship, a repair enterprise, a hospital—can undoubtedly fulfill the tasks facing it when the rear-service specialists have good professional training.

Life confirms in convincing fashion that training is better where senior commanders devote attention to personnel teaching and education, where they are able to draw the correct conclusions from failures, where they direct their energies not to justifying them using various “obligatory” reasons, but rather to eliminate shortcomings in a businesslike manner. A year ago the rear-support unit in which Lt Col R. Kasimov serves received a poor rating in an inspection. The reason was the poor professional training of the individual rear-service specialists. This fact was a serious reproach to the communists. The reasons for the shortcomings were deeply explored at an officers’ conference and a party meeting, and the circumstances that facilitated the appearance of complacency among the comrades, who had clearly overestimated their skills, were analyzed. It became clear first and foremost that there were gaps in command training. It had been conducted in a formalistic manner, without a regard for the tasks that would be faced in the future, it did not approximate the possible real actions of troops and the officers were not equipped with progressive techniques for teaching and educating the personnel.

The correct conclusions were drawn in the collective. Restructuring was begun from the fact that a simple and capacious formula was determined—the attitude toward the duties entrusted to them. The commander and staff of the unit began to pay more attention to the command training of officers and the observance of planned discipline and monitored the organization of classes and analyzed their results more strictly. The political department of the rear-service district also paid particular attention to the work style of the party organization of this collective. Its workers were specifically delved into the state of affairs and the moral climate of the collective, assisted the party and Komsomol activists in finding their place and strengthened their influence on the fulfillment of assigned tasks. The party bureau regularly heard reports for this purpose at their sessions from officer communists on how they were fulfilling the requirements of the CPSU Charter, and they analyzed the efficiency of their work and the specific returns from it. Stricter demand was made of those party members who did not display the requisite responsibility toward the matters entrusted to them. Serious complaints existed on this plane against Capt U. Runov. The criticism had a positive influence on the officer. In a short time, he not only became a good specialist, but he raised his subordinates to a suitable level as well.

Gradually, step by step, the combat training entered normal channels. Moreover, and this is very important, the principal stress in training the rear-service specialists here was laid on the formation of field skills among them under conditions approximating those of combat. A climate is being created in classes and exercises in which the personnel must operate under strict time limits with high psychological overloading and employ rational methods of delivering materiel and ensuring the reliable and uninterrupted nature of subunit management. This unit is today leading in the socialist competition in honor of the 70th anniversary of Great October.

Initiative, creativity and profound competence are characteristic of many other specialists in rear-service support units as well. At the same time, one cannot fail to see that some rear-service workers lack the essential knowledge and abilities to select the optimal ways of resolving the tasks they face and, this means, the most rational distribution of existing resources to achieve the greatest efficiency. The necessary persistence in seeking ways of raising the qualifications of subordinates are also sometimes lacking. Speaking of restructuring, some of them are in effect changing nothing in the organization of the training process and are not taking into account the growing demands of combat readiness. The deputy commander of a rear-service unit, officer P. Tverdyakov, for instance, deserves a serious reproach in this regard. Formalism in organizing the professional training of specialists still makes itself felt in his work style. There exist instances where classes in the field and exercises are conducted according to variants worked out in advance on familiar terrain. There are analogous shortcomings in other collectives as well.

And every time one runs up against such instances, one involuntarily poses the question: why are they possible? It is difficult to give an unambiguous answer. There is a whole tangle of causes on different levels here—from the poor professional preparedness of individual leaders and an inability to train subordinates to a lack of principle on the part of party committees and bureaus that do not delve sufficiently into the specialist training process or their education in a spirit of high morality. Most often, the
criteria in analyzing what has been achieved are artificially low, and these collectives thus evaluate the results of their work inefficiently and strive to conceal shortcomings in their activity.

It seems that ways exist to treat this "illness." They are raising the fighting spirit of party organizations, developing criticism and self-criticism and strengthening gnost in surmounting shortcomings. Everyone has the opportunity to display his abilities today. And those that want to work need help and advice along with a comradely exactingness. And as for those that are chained to the old, that are indifferent to the changes that are occurring or else are simply opposed to them—we are naturally not going the same way as them. Real affairs and an intolerance of shortcomings and old routines are the deciding criteria in evaluating personnel today.

Restructuring the work of rear-service organs depends first and foremost on the training of the personnel and their competence. The correct placement of rear-service specialists is thus taking on more and more significance today. Every promotion of an officer to a higher post is a great event for him. It is an expression of the high trust and conviction in the fact that he will carry out the assigned tasks in the area entrusted to him with increased responsibility. In selecting and promoting leaders, V.I. Lenin advised the most cautious and patient feeling out and recognition of existing organizers, people with a sober mind and practical quickness that combine dedication to socialism with the ability without fuss (and in spite of fuss and turmoil) to arrange solid and fraternal joint work among a large number of people...

Military practice verifies the fact that where the commanders and party organization have an objective approach to the evaluation of the person, solid barriers are created to the promotion of those that do not suit the vacant position. It is erroneous to feel that the knowledge obtained by a rear-service specialist at a higher military educational institution is enough for a lifetime. Military science does not stand still, and five or seven years after completing the academy, if an officer does not supplement it, he lags hopelessly in professional growth. Our personnel organs do not always take this aspect into account. I will cite an example. Lt Col G. Sklyaruk was at one time designated as the deputy commander of a rear-service formation. But less than a year passed until the formation commander and the political organ came to the opinion that he “did not fit,” was working poorly and was incompetent on many issues of rear support. And, the main thing, he did not want to raise his professional level. Lt Col G. Sklyaruk had to give up his position to someone else. Too much depends on the rear-service specialist in the fight for firm discipline and high combat readiness. And when a person who is unable to handle matters sensibly and cannot mobilize people for intensive labor falls into a leadership position, the main thing that ultimately suffers thereby is the cause of training the personnel.

And it is only possible to raise the competence of rear-service specialists with well arranged and well thought-out training. The contemporary specialist should not only look closely into questions of organizing rear-service support, but should also have good operational and tactical training and know the capabilities of rear-service equipment and military pedagogy and psychology. At the same time, the times demand new approaches to raising the qualifications of personnel and the formulation of their economic thinking. It is completely possible that the necessity has already become acute of combining economic teaching with the professional training of rear-service specialists. Only thus can their competence be maintained at the level of contemporary requirements today and their specific knowledge in the realms of economics, science and technology and the resolution of social issues be supplemented and improved.

The main principle for the organizers of the training and education of rear-service specialists is to teach the troops what is essential for war. Efforts therein are concentrated on resolving such theoretical and practical problems of rear services as survivability and autonomy, the maneuverability of materiel-support organs and rear-service support for branches of the service and small subunits operating in concealed or dispersed conditions. Much attention is devoted to improving the system of rear-service management. After all, the achievements of modern scientific and technical progress, especially computer technology, are being incorporated into the training process and practical activity of rear-service subunits.

Positive experience in the employment of computers in practice exists in many rear-service organs. The extant system of management based on many years of experience and existing equipment is fundamentally sound. It, like any other, however, requires constant improvement with a regard for new tasks, and first and foremost those connected with the necessity of raising the efficiency of management. The application of automation equipment in staffs and directorates of the rear services is thus especially topical today. There are successes. The work with computers has been well organized in the Baltic Military District. They have a well-prepared training and material base there. Comprehensive training using computer technology and other achievements of scientific and technical progress is conducted with rear-service specialists. They thus obtain the opportunity for regular practice in working with computers in both conventional and dialogue modes.

Training in the use of computers is actively underway in the organs of military communications and medical institutions. At the Chief Military Clinical Hospital imeni Academician N.N. Burdenko, for example, currently charged with the methodological leadership of issues of computer applications in military treatment facilities, they have modern hardware and software and a widespread network of terminals installed at workstations that permit medical personnel to work with all
programs. The experience of Maj Gen Med Serv N. Krylov andCols Med Serv K. Korytnikov, V. Sabin, V. Rebrow and others in this realm is being widely incorporated into the practice of other specialists.

It should be noted, however, that this is only the beginning of work on the incorporation of ASU management automated systems into the everyday activity of all rear-service organs. Also important for the future is training officer-specialists in methods of employing computer technology. Various methods are being used for this today, including planned refresher training for leadership personnel and rear-service specialists. Their successful execution depends largely on how responsibly their organization is approached in the localities, how they are planned, how high the competency level of the leaders is and, finally, on the state of the teaching material base. And if they lose sight of just one of these issues, these important functions are in danger of disruption. The optimal planning of combat and special training, including the refresher training, is facilitated by careful study of command documents, a firm knowledge of organizational and methodological directives and a profound analysis of the results of combat and special training for the preceding training period. All of this aids in finding the optimal forms and methods for conducting the classes.

Refresher training of rear-service specialists is unfortunately not being conducted in an organized manner everywhere. Many shortcomings in the course of holding them were noted in the Belorussian Military District. Creativity, clarity and concreteness in the conducting of classes were clearly insufficiently displayed there. The issues advanced at them are being developed at a low methodological level. As a result, the knowledge and practical skills of some specialists still leave a great deal to be desired. And their leaders prefer to stand off to the side on issues of the problem of the professional training of officers, trying to evade the acute and urgent questions and remove responsibility for solving them from themselves. Working in such conditions and delaying in anticipation of directives and prescriptions from above is impermissible today.

The quality of professional training of rear-service specialists and their economic education also depends on how responsibly they approach the organization of training in the localities, how the classes are planned and how high the level of methodological literacy of the leaders is. Troop practices prove convincingly that the principal stress herein must essentially be on the formation of economic thinking and an expansion of the practical skills of those studying. This is achieved in the course of the teaching-methodology assemblies and demonstration and group classes and exercises, as well as in the course of independent work. There are unfortunately many shortcomings herein. Especially in the conduct of classes. There were thus deficiencies in this regard in the Odessa Military District. Here a large portion of the training time is spent on lectures and seminars to the detriment of practical classes. As a result, the skills of some specialists leave much to be desired. A failure to follow through is visibly manifested during training exercises, when rear-service specialists demonstrated a level of training that cannot satisfy the requirements of modern battle. In the course of an inspection, the command personnel of the district was given specific recommendations and ways were jointly planned to eliminate the shortcomings revealed. But everything that was conceived remained on paper. Subsequent inspections showed that the earlier shortcomings remained as they were, while the officials that answer for the training of rear-service officer-specialists tried to evade the acute and urgent issues and escape responsibility for resolving them. The party administrative organizations should have a material word to say here, and they could justly ask the leader-communists to answer for their lack of care and discipline.

This especially stimulates my interest. Because where there is the opportunity of making things better, but it is not done, there is only one explanation—the proper order is missing. This was addressed quite sharply by the June (1987) Plenum of the party Central Committee. It was noted that the causes prove to be the same, as a rule, for different mishaps: lack of discipline and slovenliness. This means that we, military people, must increase our vigilance and act more decisively and raise discipline, organization and assiduity at all levels.

Far from all that could be done has been done by the workers of the central rear-service organs—staffs, directorates and political departments. I will state bluntly that not all of them have taken the course of restructuring and ridding themselves of auditing habits. After all, in order for what is planned to become reality, and not a silent reproach of idle talk and phrase-mongering, monitoring and assistance are required. How to measure the needs of life and the opportunities in the localities, in which area are concentrated our available resources, in which sector the restructuring for rear-service officers of the district level is ultimately carried out—this and much more could and should have been suggested by our comrades. Unfortunately, it was not. They have thus had to draw certain conclusions for themselves. Renewing the forms and methods of work is a vital task for today. This is difficult, of course, and stereotypes will make themselves felt. But it must be done. And begun with the chief echelon, not middle or intermediate ones.

Under conditions of the rapid development of military science and technology and continuous improvements in the ways of waging combat operations and their all-around support, the requirements made on organizing the training and educational process in the rear-service military-training institutions are growing as well. Whence it is fully comprehensible what qualities an instructor should possess. The military pedagogue should be a creator, a researcher able to conduct academic inquiry. Much has been done recently in this direction at the Rear Services and Transport Military Academy. There they
have developed a program for training academic personnel from the perspective of several years. Its chief goal is to turn the whole training and educational process toward the needs of military practice and coordinate the creative efforts of the departmental committees. Unfortunately, however, the commanders and political section of the academy are still paying too little attention to this issue. Instead of academic work and a search for techniques, the departments are frequently engulphed in the paperwork of all kinds of reports, plans and papers. It diverts both manpower and time, undermines initiative and leads to the fact that the desire to develop academic research and methodological inquiry is squandered among the young instructors. There are unresolved issues in the organization of their training and educational process at the higher rear-service military academies as well. These include first and foremost the lack of exactness in the professional selection of candidates for the higher rear-service schools.

Improving the professional mastery of rear-service specialists and their economic educational level is a prolonged and uninterrupted process. And the fact that the professional training of the graduate of a higher military institute, as a rule, does not end within its walls means a great deal. It should be actively continued in the unit where the young officer is assigned. There are many commanders and political workers among the troops that understand the importance of individual work with young officers. In the unit where officer V. Krasilov serves, for example, they are patiently taught professional skills, and elucidatory work is conducted among them. Good experience has been accumulated in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Commanders, political organs and party organizations there actively disseminate progressive work methods, understand the role of certification and follow the professional growth of rear-service specialists. It is no accident that many graduates of our institutes that serve in the GSGF handle the duties entrusted to them successfully. As a result, the vital activity of the subunits is ensured at a high level and the daily life of the personnel is well arranged.

One sometimes unfortunately sees the opposite picture as well. A lieutenant arrives in the regiment and takes his position. At the same time, a multitude of obligations is placed on his shoulders, and at first, without adequate practice, it is difficult for him to manage them. He needs support, advice and practical assistance at that time. But instead, punishment rains down on him as out of a horn of plenty. Such an approach to educating young specialists inflicts serious harm to the cause, has an effect on the state of morale of the young person and ultimately on the combat readiness of the area entrusted to him. That is just what happened with a recent graduate of the Volsk Military Institute imeni Leninist Komsomol. Lt Yu. Sirenko, who was named chief of the clothing service for one of the regiments of the Siberian Military District. No one gave him any help during the period of assimilation of his duties. As a result, his placement as a specialist was dragged out. And it is the unit commanders and the party activists that are guilty first and foremost in this.

Work is being poorly conducted in educating young rear-service officers in some parts of the Transbaikal Military District as well. A streamlined system for introducing recent graduates of military institutions into the ranks has not yet taken shape here. No monitoring of their professional training is done, and as a result some of them are losing their qualifications.

I would especially like to dwell on the organization of good living conditions. The CPSU feels that one of the principal tasks of their social policies is an unwavering ascent in popular welfare. Army and navy commanders and political workers make use of every opportunity for achieving this. The scope of housing construction has increased in recent years, and the material and technical base of the food, clothing and medical services along with military trade have been strengthened. This is greatly facilitated by the parade-competition for the best daily life in the military district, group of forces, fleet, formation, unit and subunit now underway. The soldiers' collectives where officers B. Kumaneyev and S. Lanovik serve are among the leading ones according to results from the first stage.

At the same time, an analysis of the state of affairs shows that not all such collectives have arranged daily life so competently or with such knowledge of the matter. In a number of places there remains an acute housing shortage, and communal structures and communal networks are in need of reconstruction. The requisite attention has not been paid for a long time to the state of boilers or the repair of cleaning facilities or water-supply systems in several military towns. This sort of shortcoming is characteristic of a number of garrisons in the Turkestan, Transbaikal and North Kazakhstan military districts. In considering the question of instances of interruptions in the heating supply for the population of cities in Gorky and Murmansk oblasts, the CPSU Central Committee has given a basic evaluation of the serious shortcomings in the city of Severomorsk. The causes for it were the negligence and carelessness of individual leader communists in the preparation of the communal facilities for the winter. Commanders, political organs and party organizations should make a demanding evaluation of similar phenomena. After all, in those garrisons where the barracks and residential housing have been fueled up, the cold did not hinder the precise course of the training process or personnel services.

A well-ordered daily life undoubtedly includes, of course, housing, trade, the activity of medical institutions, municipal services, bathing and laundry facilities and much more. The ability of people to work and their mood depends greatly on them, as do ultimately the combat readiness of the units and ships. Instances still frequently occur, however, when manpower and equipment allotted to domestic and material support is distributed without regard for the primary tasks and is squandered or used for intolerable wastefulness. For example, when the so-called "model" cities that define the face of the district, fleet or group of forces are
sometimes allotted a greater amount of resources to the
detriment of the others. People justly regard such an
unfounded approach to equipping the military settle-
ments with services and utilities as a violation of the
principle of social justice.

And here it should be acknowledged that there are more
than a few deficiencies on our part as well. We some-
times look the other way when much is given to some
and only crumbs are left for others. And just try to
compete with a model settlement under such unequal
conditions. This is not competition, but rather a decep-
tion of the first order, the same situation the leaders have
planned and what the people protest against. The officers
and generals of the staff and directorates of the Rear
Services of the Armed Forces must display greater exact-
ingness in the localities and not forget their party con-
sciences. The political organs and party organizations
also have something material to say here. Who else but
them will be concerned about social justice and put the
overstepping "small proprietors" in their place, who will
try anything to withdraw excessive resources and put
themselves in a better position.

And here is something else that is important, in my
opinion. To reach a point where everything stipulated
for a soldier, sailor, warrant officer or officer is brought
to the person in the form that it should be. It must be
owned up that it happens in the course of tactical exer-
cises that the personnel do not see hot food for quite
a while and do not have an adequate amount of personal
gear or equipment to carry out certain operations. Sev-
eral leader communists moreover pass this off as almost
an attempt to create conditions that most closely approx-
imate wartime ones. In actual fact, this is simply some-
one's irresponsibility or inefficiency, for which a most
strict reckoning must be demanded. Even at the front,
under the severest of conditions, in the short respite
between battles the commanders manifested concern for
the people and did everything so that the soldiers were
fed, equipped and washed. If one speaks on the larger
score, then, every communist in the rear services must
make it a rule to call things by their true colors. And so
that in the sector for which he bears responsibility, the
soldiers are provided with everything essential for nor-
mal combat training. Then there will be no reproaches
for the workers of the rear services (of which, unfortu-
nately, there are plenty today). Much must be done just
for this. And first and foremost to change the conscious-
ness and psychology of many of our specialists.

The important role played by political organs and party
organizations in ensuring the responsibility of rear-
service specialists for raising their competence is well
known. The spirit of criticism and self-criticism is
actively affirmed in them today, and a keen and principl-
eval evaluation of those whose who permit errors in
organizing the professional training of specialists is being
made. It is just this style of work that is characteristic, for
example, of the political department of the rear services
of the Kiev Military District, where the chief is Col A.
Poshatalov. Working in the garrisons, the officers of this
political organ delve deeply into the state of affairs in the
localities. Keenly perceiving the climate, they render
assistance in word and deed and direct the efforts of
people toward resolving the main issues. The political
department has a considerable influence on the activity
of the party organizations of units and subunits. Com-
manders, political workers and service chiefs are often
invited to seminars along with the secretaries of the
CPSU organizations here. Topical issues of communists
serving as a personal example in the fulfillment of
service and party duty and the resolution of tasks in
material, medical, trade and everyday support for the
personnel are considered.

Matters are not at all thus everywhere, however. And
after all, we really do get justly indignant over all sorts of
shortcomings and their specific bearers—the people that
are neglecting their duties, are indifferent to social
interests, bad workmen, self-seekers and bribe-takers.
But they live and work in specific collectives, in a given
organization, and not simply apart from us. And who
else besides communists will point them out, declare at
the top of their voices that each is obliged to work for his
conscience in our labor society, to live in unwavering
observance of the norms of socialist communal life,
which norms are the same for all? After all, how is the
question being posed today? If the party organization
lives a full-blooded life based on principled relations, if
communists are engaged in concrete actions, and not just
talking shop in generalities, then success is assured. It is
not enough to see shortcomings and flaws and stigmatize
them, everything must be done to see that they cannot
be.

Great tasks face the armed forces today. They can be
fulfilled only with good rear-service support. And the
competence of specialists must be high for this. And it
will be high if every communist leader and political
organ and every party organization places concern for
training and educating people at the center of its atten-
tion and ensures the concreteness and purposefulness of
their influence on the formation of ideo-political, busi-
ness and moral qualities.
Marshal Zhukov on Soviet Leadership on the Eve and in the Early Days of War
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[Text] How come Stalin had his pre-war misconceptions for which we paid so dearly. I think in the beginning he was convinced that he would be able to outwit Hitler with the aid of the pact he signed with him. But later things worked out differently.

There is no doubt, however, that both sides had this intention when they signed the pact.

Stalin overestimated the measure of Hitler’s involvement in the West, thinking that he got bogged down there and would not be able to fight against us in the near future. Building all his forecasts upon this assumption, Stalin, after the defeat of France, apparently could not bring himself to making a re-assessment of the situation.

Many Commanders Were at a Loss

The war in Finland showed Hitler the weakness of our army. But it also showed this to Stalin. That was the result of 1937 and 1938, the worst result.

If we compare the level of training of our cadre before the events of those years, that is in 1936, and after these events, in 1939, we shall see that the level of combat training of troops had fallen dramatically. Besides being decapitated, the army, beginning from regiments, was also demoralised by those events. Discipline had deteriorated to such an extent that AWOL cases and desertions were not infrequent. Many commanders were at a loss and incapable of setting things to rights.

When after the Finnish affair I was recalled from the River Kholka and appointed commander of the Kiev Military District, Stalin was very angry with Voroshilov. “He boastfully told me that we would counter that strike with a strike three times as powerful, that everything was all right and ready, but it turned out...”, Stalin said to me.

In December 1940, when I was still in command of the Kiev Military District, we held a major military exercise. In that game I commanded “blue”, that is played for the Germans. Pavlov, commander of the Western Military District, commanded “red”, that is our Western Front army. Shtern supported him in the south-west.

Knowing the real figures about the enemy’s forces, I started “blue” operations in areas where the Germans carried out their operations later. I delivered the main blows where the Germans later delivered the main blows. The situation developed in roughly the same way it developed during the war. The configuration of our border, the terrain and the situation prompted me to take the decisions which the Germans took later.

The exercise lasted nearly eight days. The people in charge deliberately held up the advance of “blue.” But on the eighth day “blue” advanced as far as Baranovichi, though, I repeat, their progress was deliberately impeded.

In January 1941, the strategic game was discussed by the chief Military Council. In the main report I was instructed to make I decided to deal with some disquieting facts, especially the unfavourable location of the system of new fortifications along the new border. The configuration of the border made that location unfavourable. It would be better if those fortifications were moved about 100 kilometres into the country. I knew the idea would cause displeasure because the system of fortifications I criticised was approved by the Labour and Defence Council, that is by Stalin. Nevertheless, I decided to go ahead.

Stalin listened to my report attentively and asked me and the other speakers some questions. He asked, for instance, why “blue” were so strong and why we engaged so many German forces at the beginning of the game. I told him that that corresponded to the Germans’ capabilities and that we were guided by a real estimate of the forces which the Germans could throw against us, creating a great advantage in the area of the main strike. That was why “blue” advanced so fast in the game.

Shortly after that discussion, I was appointed Chief of the General Staff.

I had no previous experience of staff work and I knew at the beginning of the war that I had not enough experience and training for the job. Moreover, by nature and past experience, I preferred command work rather than staff work.

Letter Exchange Between Stalin and Hitler

Early in 1941, when we learned about the major concentration of German forces in Poland, Stalin wrote a letter to Hitler, telling him that we knew about that, that we were surprised and that we had the impression that Hitler intended to make war on us. In his personal message to Stalin—Hitler wrote it was strictly confidential—the Fuhrer wrote that the information we had was correct, that he did concentrate big army formations in Poland, but assured that, since he was confident that this information would not go beyond Stalin, he could tell him that this concentration of German troops was not directed against the Soviet Union and that he was determined strictly to abide by the pact he signed. Hitler said that he promised that as head of state and that his troops were in Poland for a different reason. The territory of western and central Germany was subjected to heavy bombing by the British who could see it well from the air. Therefore, he had to transfer big contingents of troops to the East in order to be able secretly to re-arm and regroup them in Poland. I think Stalin believed Hitler.
Meanwhile, the situation was becoming more and more disquieting. The People’s Commissariat (ministry) for Defence kept receiving alarming information and eventually it succeeded in obtaining Stalin’s permission for a partial call-up of half a million reservists and transfer of another four armies to the western districts.

As Chief of the General Staff, I realised that the transfer of mobilised reservists to their places of service could not be kept secret from the Germans. It would alarm them and the situation would grow tenser. If so, those necessary measures had to be complemented by alerting the troops of the border districts. I said so to Stalin, but he—it had taken two weeks to persuade him to agree to the first two measures—refused to agree to the third one. He said that the putting of border troops on the alert could provoke war and that he was convinced we would be able to manoeuvre and explain away the partial call-up and transfer of troops so that Hitler would not suspect anything.

So we did some things, but failed to do others. In fact, we took half-measures and half-measures always portend trouble.

We also had problems with the mobilisation plan for putting industry on the war footing. In May, three months after I had taken over from Meretskov as Chief of the General Staff, I signed the mobilisation plans which had been drawn up before I took office. I plucked up my courage and went to Voroshilov, who was then Chairman of the State Committee for Defence, and literally forced these plans on him. I simply left them in his office.

In spite of my telephone calls, he did not touch the plans for a month and only a month after my new call told me to come to see him. He said we had to decide who should discuss the plans and when. Realising that there may be a new delay, I did not go to him but called Stalin and complained to him.

On the next day, we top military commanders were invited to a Politburo meeting.

"Why haven’t you considered the plan?” Stalin asked Voroshilov.

"We have just received it,” Voroshilov replied.

"When did you give him the plan?” Stalin asked me.

I said I gave it a month ago.

Eventually, a commission was appointed to study the plan. There was a lot of disputes in the commission. Some of its members said we had many other problems to deal with, that the plan calls for a radical overhaul and we couldn’t afford it, and so forth.

Putting Industry on a War Footing

Things dragged on and on, so we decided to pull through at least the ammunition part of it. When the war began, the entire plan had not been approved yet.

Ammunition was the most serious problem that winter and spring. The new artillery systems adopted by the army, including anti-tank ones, had been supplied merely with experimental batches of shells. Delays in the supply of shells caused delays in the production of guns.

We demanded that ammunition reserves sufficient for one year of war should be created, for we know that after industry was put on the war footing, it would take a year to produce enough ammunition for the army.

Arguments followed.

Voznesensky, who knew economics, immediately calculated how many shells we wanted to have in reserve and started to prove with pencil in hand that we wanted to have 500 shells to hit one enemy tank.

"Is it possible?” he asked.

We explained that it was not only possible but necessary and that it would be even better if we had 1,000 shells to hit one enemy tank.

"What about the number of shells which you need to hit one tank according to all army rules?” Voznesensky asked.

"It’s good for exercises but not for war.” A commission was appointed.

After all calculations, they became convinced that there is enough metal to produce that number of shells but not enough powder. The situation with powder was very bad.

As a result, the commission recommended that our request be met by 15-20 per cent.

Speaking about the pre-war period and about the causes of our failures in the beginning of the war, one should not explain everything only by Stalin’s mistakes or, to some extent, by the mistakes made by Timoshenko.

True, there were mistakes, but we must remember some objective conditions too. We must remember how far ahead of us Germany was in terms of military capability, industrial level, economic efficiency and preparedness for war.

After their conquest of Europe the Germans had not only a strong, battle-tested, deployed and poised-for-combat army, not only staffs operating with ideal smoothness
and hourly-coordinated teamwork for the infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft. The Germans had a great advantage over us in military-industrial potential. They surpassed us by almost three times in coal, and by 2.5 times in cast-iron and steel. We still had, however, an advantage in oil—both in stocks and output. But even so we, for example, never had enough high-octane petrol for newly-supplied modern planes, such as MiGs, at the start of the war.

In a word, it must not be forgotten that we entered the war as still an industrially backward state in comparison with Germany.

Role of American Aid

Speaking of our war preparedness in economic terms, the factor of subsequent allied help cannot be ignored. Primarily, of course, from the Americans because the British in this sense helped us minimally. This must be counted in an all-round analysis of the war. We would have been in a difficult position without American gun powder, we could not have produced the quantities of ammunition we needed. Without US Studebakers we would have had nothing with which to pull our artillery. They largely provided our front transport altogether. Producing special steels, necessary for the most diverse needs of war, also involved certain US supplies.

That is, these supplies, as well as our own military-industrial resources at the war’s start, accounted for the development of our munitions industry in the course of the war. This also has to be remembered, comparing with what we entered the war and with what did Germany, possessing in addition the war industries of all the European countries occupied by it.

Finally, it must be added that Hitler had since his coming to power focused absolutely on a future war effort; everything was built hoping for victory in this war, everything was done for this purpose and for this purpose alone. Whereas we did not take such a position, stopping at half measures. Departments’ interests clashed, there went on an endless item-by-item haggling on equipping the army and preparing for war. All this also has to be thrown into the scales, explaining the causes of our defeats and setbacks in the first year of the war.

Stalin believed—correctly—that we needed at least two more years to prepare for war. There was military-strategic development of the areas we took in 1939 to be accomplished, as well as a reorganisation of the army, including its much belated technical updating. Though quite a lot was done in the year between the end of the Finnish Campaign and the start of the war, we really needed about two more years for complete war preparation.

The Surprise Attack Question

Information about the impending German attack that came from Churchill and other sources was seen by Stalin as a logical wish of the British to pit us against the Germans and draw us into a war as soon as possible for which we, in his belief, were not ready. He also suspected provocations not only from the British, but also from some German generals who he thought favoured a preventive war and were ready to place Hitler before an accomplished fact. About Sorge’s messages, though I then held the post of Chief of the General Staff, I knew absolutely nothing at that time. Obviously, there were reported directly to Stalin through Beria, and Stalin did not think it necessary to tell us about this information available to him.

We did know of the considerable military forces deployed in Poland, but Stalin in principle held it natural for the Germans to keep large units near our borders, considering the possibility of a violation of the pact by us. For we too in turn kept a significant amount of troops on the border. German striking forces were not directly concentrated until the last 2-3 days before the war. And in those 2-3 days intelligence men could not pass us full-picture information.

What is surprise?

Surprise, as now interpreted or by Stalin in his speeches, is incomplete and incorrect.

What does surprise mean when we speak of actions of such a scale? For it is not merely a sudden crossing of the border, not merely a surprise attack. The sudden border crossing decided nothing by itself. The main danger of surprise lay not in that the Germans unexpectedly crossed the border, but in that the German army’s striking power came as a surprise for us; we were surprised by their six-fold and eight-fold superiority in forces in decisive areas; we were also surprised by the scale of their troop ammassment and the force of their strike. This was what predetermined our losses in the first period of the war. And not just the sudden crossing of the border alone.

At the outbreak of the war I headed the General Staff. The conditions for work in it in those days were very difficult. We constantly lagged and were behind and took belated, ill-timed decisions.

Finally, Stalin asked me straightforwardly:

"Why are we always behind?"

My answer was also straightforward. I told him it couldn’t be otherwise under our system of work.
People's Commissar Also Couldn't Take a Decision

"As General Staff chief I receive the first summary of operations at 9 am. Urgent steps should immediately follow. But I can't do that myself. I report to People's Commissar Timoshenko. But the People's Commissar also cannot take a decision. We must report it to you—come to the Kremlin and wait for a reception. At 1 or 2 pm you take a decision. We go and draw up and send orders to the localities. By then the situation has already changed. We wanted to keep a point, for example Ivanovka—to move forces towards it. But the Germans had already taken it during this time. Conversely, we wanted to withdraw troops from another point. The Germans meanwhile have already turned and cut it off. Seven to eight hours pass between the receipt of data that call for an immediate decisions and the decisions which we take. During this time German tanks make 40-50 kilometres, and we, receiving new information, take a new decision, and again fail behind."

I told Stalin I thought a two-tier command system was impossible.

"Either I as General Staff chief must report to Timoshenko so that he, without agreeing it with anybody, may at once take decisions, or I must report all this directly to you so that you may take these decisions at once. Otherwise we shall continue falling behind."

By the beginning of July the incorrectness of the system and the perilous nature of the delays had become clear to Stalin himself. Timoshenko was appointed commander of the Western Sector, and Stalin assumed the functions of a Supreme Commander in Chief. With the removal of the intermediary link our work gradually became more normal and more efficient. Besides that, the state of shock in which we had been for the first ten days of the war had somewhat eased. Though grim events continued, we were already psychologically accustomed to them and did our best to mend things, proceeding from the real situation.

Enormous Faith in Stalin

Recalling the prewar period, it must be said that, of course, we the military bear the responsibility for not being sufficiently insistent on army readiness and the early adoption of a number of war contingency measures. Obviously we ought to have done it more resolutely than we did, especially as, despite Stalin's unquestionable authority, somewhere deep down in you there was a worm of doubt, an uneasy feeling of the danger of a German attack. Of course, one must realistically imagine what going against Stalin in assessment of the general political situation would have meant then. The recent years were still fresh in everybody's memory. To declare aloud that Stalin was wrong, that he was mistaken, plainly speaking could then mean that even before you left the building, you would already be on your way to "coffee" with Beria.

And yet this is only one side of the truth, whereas I must say the whole of it. I did not feel then, before the war, that I was more clever or far-sighted than Stalin, that I assessed the situation better or knew more than he. I had no assessment of events of my own which I could have opposed with confidence as more correct too the assessments of Stalin. I had no such conviction. On the contrary, I had enormous faith in Stalin, in his political wisdom, his far-sightedness and his ability to find ways out of the most difficult situations; in this case his ability to avoid war or to push it back. Anxiously kept gnawing me. But the faith in Stalin and that everything would in the end turn out to be precisely as he assumed was stronger. And whichever way one may look upon this now—it is the truth.

In this chapter are given certain notes on Zhukov's perception of Stalin, which he had developed by the outbreak of the war.

During the war Zhukov came to know Stalin much closer. His view of Stalin, developed in the course of the war, is of particular value because this view is based on the big four-year experience of joint work. For Zhukov Stalin in the years of the war was primarily the Supreme Commander in Chief, with whom he all those years, as a rule, dealt without intermediary instances, directly, both as chief of the General Staff, as the commander of different fronts while remaining a member of the General Headquarters and as First Deputy Commander in chief and a coordinator of actions for several fronts.

For Zhukov Stalin during the war was the man who shouldered the most difficult job in a fighting state. And Zhukov notes primarily the traits of Stalin's character which showed themselves in the performance of just this job. Therefore this portrait of Stalin that comes over in these notes based on Zhukov's works, while not claiming fullness, is distinguished by the concreteness of the observations linked with the common work which they both did. I shall add that personal emotions, introducing a moment of subjectivity, are also present in this portrait, of course.

Konstantin Simonov

Note by the Miliary Bulletin editors:

Nikolai Voznesensky (1903-50)—from 1935 chairman of the state planning commission. From 1938—chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, from 1941—first vice-chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars. 1942-45—member of the State
Defence Committee. From 1943—member of the Committee for Rehabilitation in the Areas Liberated from Fascist Occupation. From 1939 member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B).

Richard Sorge (1895-1944)—a Soviet intelligence officer. From 1919 member of the Communist Party of Germany. From 1925—member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the 30s and the 40s was a German journalist in China, Japan and other countries. In October 1941 arrested by the Japanese police and in November 1944 executed.


Afghan Vets' Problems, Suggested Memorial Discussed
18010013 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
24 Sep 87 p 1

[Article by A. Turvandyan, chairman of the City Internationalist Soldier Council and knight of the Red Flag Combat Order: "Conscience Calls"]

[Text] The end of the undeclared war against Afghanistan is approaching, and peace will envelop even this tortured ancient land. The withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops is now a reality which, unfortunately, we have had to wait many years for. But this is a letter to the editor and not a survey of the world's political situation, which is stabilizing primarily because of our country's policy of glasnost and democratic government. What is bothering me is something else.

My comrades and I have heard many people say we ought to forget those years, the idea being that they have brought us little but sadness. It is hard for those of us who have gone through the unforgiving school of life in Afghanistan to listen to this. There may be some people who can allow themselves to ignore the duty we performed, but can we—former internationalist soldiers? In Yerevan alone there are more than 500 of us. My comrades have run across many cases of apathy or callousness toward them. Apathy. Lately, this has become an almost natural part of our behavior. What are the roots of this social evil that meets with so little resistance? It saddens and disappoints me when I think of the 17- and 18-year olds sent there by our country to perform their internationalist duty. They spared no effort, and many of them were never to return to their homeland alive. We cannot forget this. In our view, to do so would be the height of immorality. Our country sent us to Afghanistan, and no one has the right to forget that.

I feel that in what I am about to say I reflect the unanimous opinion of my comrades and the hundreds of people with whom I have discussed it. The issue we discussed was the construction of a monument to the internationalist soldiers. The Armenian komsomol could be in charge of this patriotic endeavor. What is there to keep us from having a contest for the best theme and opening a bank account. I am sure many of our countrymen—young and old—would be happy to make a financial contribution. This will be purely a peoples monument, a place of patriotic and internationalist education for the next generation. We former internationalist soldiers see accomplishing this as our most important duty.

The city committee (which has 13 Afghan vets among its members) I head has numerous plans, and we are bound to succeed with some of them. But we have plenty of problems. The roof over our heads, which is in the office of the manager of the Palace of Youth's restaurant, is only ours temporarily, and it is anybody's guess how long we will be able to hole up there. We would like to get more vets involved in what we are doing and let them know about the government benefits they frequently do not even know they are entitled to. The council should address their hopes and concerns more carefully. A preliminary poll has showed that the situation with respect to housing, employment, and sanatorium space for internationalist soldiers is poor. Many vets have health problems that need to be taken care of. And finally, there is patriotic education. We have learned something that both schoolchildren and our contemporaries need to be taught. At present, the efforts in this direction are somewhat halting. To put it bluntly, we have a lot of other things to do too, and cannot accomplish everything. And this is why we need tangible assistance and support from party and soviet agencies.

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