SOVIET UNION
MILITARY AFFAIRS

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DIRECTED DISCUSSIONS OF WARSAW PACT COMMITTEE MEETING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jul 87 p 2

[Article: "Unity in the Struggle to Prevent War and in Our Preparedness to Defend the Socialist Gains"]

[Text] How to Conduct Classes on the Document Approved at the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States

All of the personnel received with great interest and approval the results of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States held in Berlin at the end of May of this year and the document on military doctrine approved at the conference. Right now lectures and discussions are being set up, political information sessions are being held and other mass political activities are being conducted in the units, on the ships and at military educational institutions and other establishments. The results of the conference are to be studied in all of the different forms of political education.

A two-hour class (lecture or discussion) must be conducted on the results of the Political Consultative Committee's conference within the system of Marxist-Leninist preparation for generals, admirals and officers. It is recommended that the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy conduct a conference at the end of the training year at the unit, ship and establishment level on the subject "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States."

A two-hour class (a three-hour class where only one weekly political class is held) must be conducted on the subject "The Results of the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States and the Tasks of the Personnel With Respect to Enhancing Vigilance and Combat Readiness" within the system of political training for shore-based and seagoing warrant officers and in the political classes for soldiers and NCOs, seamen and petty officers, and students in training subunits.

It is recommended that two main topics be discussed in the classes:

1. The results of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states;

2. On the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states, and the tasks of the personnel with respect to enhancing vigilance and responsibility for the fulfillment of their military duty.
In the discussion of the first topic the fact must be stressed that the enemies of security and cooperation among peoples are not renouncing their peace threatening schemes, that they are doing everything possible to prevent a lessening of international tensions. The times demand that the course of world events be changed for the better. The socialist commonwealth nations operate in the spirit of this demand.

This is graphically confirmed by the important, constructive proposals set forth by the Warsaw Pact states at the Berlin conference of the Political Consultative Committee.

The document on military doctrine approved at the conference states that "the Warsaw Pact states will never under any circumstances initiate military action against any state or alliance of states whatsoever unless they themselves become the target of an armed attack."

The Warsaw Pact states reject as false, dangerous and immoral the concept of "nuclear deterrence" advanced by the aggressive circles of imperialism. Nuclear weapons cannot be a guarantee of security. On the contrary, the more of them there are in the arsenals of nations, the less security they will have. Only the Soviet program for a nonnuclear world opens up real prospects for achieving international security. The PKK [Political Consultative Committee] conference put forth specific steps to cleanse Europe of nuclear weapons.

The question of whether or not there are to be nuclear weapons in space continues to be critical. The position of the fraternal socialist nations is clear: there must be no weapons in space. The Antimissile Defense Treaty must be strictly observed; outer space must be used only for peaceful purposes.

The socialist nations are fervent champions of the establishment of a climate of trust, mutual respect and friendship among peoples on the planet. They are filled with resolve to actively promote the elimination of areas of tension and the just, political settlement of regional conflicts, no matter where they might arise. The fact should be stressed, however, that the West has unjustifiably delayed in responding to many initiatives proposed by the socialist states for resolving problems troubling the European peoples.

The conference participants discussed certain aspects of the world economic situation, including questions pertaining to the overcoming of underdevelopment and the establishment of a new international economic order. A document was approved on these matters and was published in the press.

There was a thorough exchange of opinions at the conference on the development of cooperation among the allied socialist states. A decision was adopted to set up a multilateral group for the routine exchange of mutual information. It was also decided to set up a special commission on disarmament for exchanging opinions and information among the Warsaw Pact states.

The PKK heard a report from the Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States on the practical work performed by the command element, and approved a decision on the matter.
The conference was held in an atmosphere of friendship and comradely cooperation. It demonstrated a unity of views on all the issues discussed.

The most important result of the conference was the unanimous approval of the document on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states.

When the discussion of the second topic is begun the students' attention should be directed to the definition of the concept of military doctrine as a scientific theory or as the currently accepted set of views on the objectives and the nature of a possible war, on the preparation of the nation and the armed forces for such a war and also on methods of conducting it. (See "SEV" [CEMA], Vol.3, p 225.)

The document approved at the conference convincingly demonstrates the fact that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states is strictly defensive. This document reflects the new political thinking of the leadership of the socialist commonwealth states and of their Marxist-Leninist parties. The document defines the fundamental principles of the military doctrine on which the Warsaw Pact activities are based. It reflects the commonality of the military-political objectives of the participants and their national military doctrines.

During the talk and discussion (this is the method recommended for conducting political classes) the fact should be stressed that the Warsaw Pact states consider it to be their primary duty to their peoples to reliably protect their security. The allied socialist states do not aspire to greater security than any other nations have, but they will also not agree to less. The present strategic military parity remains the crucial factor for the prevention of war.

During the class it is essential to thoroughly explain the basic principles set forth in the document, the decisive dialectical unity of the struggle to prevent war and the readiness to protect the socialist gains. "The Armed Forces of the allied states," the document states, "are maintained in a state of combat readiness adequate to prevent us from being taken by surprise, and even if an attack were to be carried out against them, they would still inflict a devastating rebuff upon the aggressor." In connection with this, the attention of the students should be focused on the accomplishment of the specific tasks stemming from the party Central Committee's demands with respects to enhancing the vigilance and the combat readiness of every subunit and responsibility for the fulfillment of our military duty. It is important to underscore the fact that during the summer training period every soldier and seaman, NCO and petty officer, shore-based and seagoing warrant officer, every officer, general and admiral must do everything possible to correct the shortcomings noted in the summarization of the results of the winter training period and become more active in the accomplishment of the tasks facing the units, ships and subunits.

**READING LIST**


11499
CSO: 1801/212
JURISTS EXAMINE QUESTION OF UNAUTHORIZED SYSTEM OF CONTROL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 87 p 1

[Article by Col Justice V. Dzyuba, Chief of Legal Services of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "On the Matter of 'Proxies' [otvetstvennye]; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The newspaper articles "Not Covered by Regulations" (21 January of this year) and "Just Who Doesn't Want to Work?" (29 March) about the practice of appointing various kinds of "proxies," "inspectors" and "monitors" in the units and subunits generated a vast amount of mail. Many of our readers asked us to return to the discussion of this subject and not only publish the responses of officers, but also to give the military legal expert an opportunity to speak out on the problem. We are meeting those requests.

Major General R. Beshchev, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Southern Group of Forces: The report "Just Who Doesn't Want to Work?" was discussed at an expanded session of the unit party committee. The participants discussed the practice of substituting and providing petty tutelage for those in charge and outlined specific measures to enhance the responsibility of the Communists for the fulfillment of their official duties. The formation political section heard reports from Communists N. Filippovych, G. Menshenin, A. Zubarev and V. Oleshkov. The erroneousness of the practice of appointing "proxies" was pointed out to them, and their attention was directed to the need to resolutely improve the political, military, moral and legal indoctrination of the personnel, to improve the system of individual indoctrinational work with the personnel, particularly members of the daily duty detail, and to be more demanding of themselves and their subordinates with respect to the strict fulfillment of their official duties.

The matter of responding promptly and correctly to criticism was emphatically mentioned in the report and the speeches at a meeting of the formation party aktiv, in which Colonel General A. Demidov, Commander of the Southern Group of Forces, took part.

Major General V. Krayushin, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Carpathian Military District: There have in fact been cases in which "proxies" were appointed to see that order was maintained in the subunits and units on days-off and holidays, as pointed out in the letter from Lieutenant
Colonel V. Aleksandrov, even though there have been and there are no directives on this matter. At service conferences for command and political personnel the chief of the district political directorate and the chief of staff directed attention to the need to eliminate the harmful practice of providing substitutes for those officially in charge. We have begun monitoring the implementation of instructions for regulating the work days of the officers. It has been recommended to the political organs that they discuss the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article at meetings of officers and warrant officers.

Major General Yu. Pankratov, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Turkestan Military District: The letter from Captain L. Kniga published in the newspaper was discussed in the district political directorate. It was noted that certain commanders and chiefs who are disinclined to deal specifically with the indoctrination of subordinates attempt to create the appearance of well-being by using so-called officer "proxies." The incident cited by the letter writer was discussed at a conference of leading personnel of the district air forces and at a unit officers' conference. The commander of district air forces issued instructions to abolish all of the nonregulation types of control. Instructions worked up on this matter in the unit have been removed as something not consistent with the general military regulations. The political section had a talk with the unit commander and his deputies, in which the officials were sternly informed of deficiencies in their personal work to see that the regulations are strictly followed and to organize the service activities of the officers.

Commentary from the Legal Service of the USSR Ministry of Defense:

We frankly say that the appointment of "proxy" servicemen in the subunits and units, which the readers have written about, is not consistent with military regulations. This is not just a matter of some isolated, once-only, occasional instruction from a commander for purposes of organizing and monitoring a specific activity, but a sort of duty system. The regulations do not provide for this kind of duty. And there is a reason for it. Experience has shown that its adoption not only does not contribute to the strengthening of regulation order and military discipline but actually hampers it.

There are people in the units and on the ships for maintaining order, people who answer for it. They are the commanders and chiefs and members of the daily duty detail. Finally, according to regulations, every serviceman is required to assist commanders, chiefs and other superiors in maintaining order. The existence of additional "duty men" in the barracks or the crew's quarters only creates disharmony in this smoothly functioning system.

For example, will the platoon commander periodically attend reveille and the evening roll-call, as called for by the regulations, if someone does it for him? Is there any reason for the section commander to demonstrate demandiness of subordinates if he always has a "proxy" officer, shore-based or seagoing warrant officer alongside him? And the duty personnel and orderlies are deprived of their independence (and therefore, their responsibility for maintaining order) in the presence of the latter.

All those who are forced to perform in the role of "keepers" of the servicemen also suffer a loss of prestige in this situation. Furthermore, the regular
performance of the additional duties cannot help affecting the performance of the direct duties with which officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers are charged in the positions they occupy, and unjustifiably reduces their leisure time.

Finally—and this needs to be stressed in particular—the constant presence of the extra "duty men" in the subunit and unit complicates the struggle for regulation order also by depriving the command element of the opportunity to correctly assess the effectiveness of the organizational and the indoctrinational work performed with the personnel. After all, no serious infractions of military discipline are committed in front of the "proxies." But what would happen in the subunit if they were not there? In other words, the "proxies" prevent the situation in the subunit and unit from being monitored well, which is essentially what they are supposed to be designated for.

There is every basis for saying that good intentions sometimes actually conceal not so much concern for the establishment of regulation order as an attempt to safeguard against trouble and hide deficiencies in the work of strengthening order and discipline.

Unfortunately, the military justice agencies were for a long time unable to unequivocally define their attitude toward these occurrences. The situation has now changed, however. It has been recommended to the legal service subunits in the army and navy that they actively oppose attempts to introduce nonregulation control systems into the daily praxis.

The commanders, political organs and staffs have the main role in this work, of course.

11499
CS0: 1801/222
SHORTCOMINGS IN KOMSOMOL ORGANIZATION NOTED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 8 Jul 87 p 2

[Article by Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent Maj A. Goncharov: "With a Single Stroke of the Pen a Vigorous Komsomol Organization Was 'Disbanded'"]

[Text] The Red Banner Volga Military District--This story started a year ago. It was then that there was one Komsomol organization less in the accountability report of the district's department for construction and billeting. At the transport and mechanization base (commanded by Lt Col N. Ovsyannikov) it had been decided that there was no place for it in the collective and it had been disbanded. Meanwhile, the nine members of the Komsomol and the former secretary, driver Vladimir Sergeyev of the Soviet Army, were still working in their earlier positions.

Let us say immediately that this event occurred largely thanks to the efforts of the now former secretary of the base party organization, chief mechanic Yu. Roshchin. In his own words, Yuriy Yevstifeyevich informed the secretary of the party committee in the office of the work supervisor, Lt Col V. Vasiliyev and the aide to the chief of the district political directorate for Komsomol work, Lt V. Vedekhin, that the number of Komsomol members at the base had declined sharply and that it was "inadvisable" for them to have their own organization.

The base chief had heaved a sigh of relief when he heard Roshchin's glib report:

"That's it, Nikolay Makarovitch. We shall close down our Komsomol!"

Neither Lt Col Vasiliyev (the party organization at the base is run by the party committee in the office of the work supervisor) nor other comrades looked into the matter.

And the Komsomol organization ceased to exist.

"I was convinced," Lt Vedekhin told me, "that there were only two members of the Komsomol at the base. If I had known that there were nine I would hardly have agreed with Roshchin..."
But he should have known. The transport and mechanization base is located close to the political directorate. More attention should have been paid: the place should have been visited and the situation assessed.

"No, it was not the best decision that we took then," signed Yuriy Yevtifyevich. "Now we have to prepare for a 'reprimand.'"

He waved his arms in annoyance, as if to say: whoever is responsible for the fate of a youth organization must watch out for himself if it fails.

Detailed thoughts about the restructuring can be heard at the base. About strict control over discipline, productivity and work quality. The free life among those who love strong liquor is over. This is not easy. A lot of nervous energy is being burned up. But this is not always to the common good. There are those who "pray only to the ruble"; there are problems of cohesion in the collective and the maintenance of a healthy moral climate. The base leadership should have relied primarily on the young people and their energy and enthusiasm. But there was no place for a Komsomol organization in the restructuring.

The earlier activity of the Komsomol organization had amounted mainly to collecting members' dues. When required, the secretary wrote down the exceptionally positive characteristics of those attending training. And month after month the minutes were kept for some kinds of meetings and assemblies. And then even this purely office housekeeping activity ceased.

It is a remarkable fact: when Sergeyev was elected as Komsomol secretary he honestly acknowledged this: "If they give me a task I do it, but there is no way I can be a Komsomol organizer."

But no one paid any heed to this. And that was a pity. The fledgling Komsomol leader could not even organize the collection of dues. He had to be helped and strict concern was shown by the party organization. Lt Col Ovsyienko and chief mechanic Roshchin decided to simplify matters.

"In the morning we stood by at the gates to catch those who had not paid their dues," one of them recalls with vexation.

"We had no need of a Komsomol that had to be led by the hand and even reminded about its dues." This confirmation came from party secretary I. Kuklin, who was elected to replace Roshchin last autumn.

This is how they work with the Komsomol. It is hardly any surprise that for a year no one at the base could even remember the "disbanding" of the organization. The question was raised when the senior instructor for the Komsomol Work Department in the district political directorate, Maj S. Sorokin, found the "missing" Komsomol members. Then the alarm was sounded: the life of the youth organization had been snuffed out despite the requirements of the Komsomol Rules. It became clear that the drivers at the base had been dreaming for a long time of setting up a Komsomol youth brigade. To be specialists who were not set apart from the Komsomol. But they lacked the strength to break through the wall of indifference...
An organizational meeting was soon convened. It seemed that now everything would be done in a new style and that the Komsomol members would show their combative nature. However, enthusiasm soon waned. The chiefs and the party secretary I. Kuklin followed the previous line and ignored the plans and aspirations of the youth collective. Even during an event such as the 20th Komsomol Congress the base was left on the sidelines. Even the sharp issues raised at the congress were not discussed.

The young and inexperienced Komsomol organizer Olga Isayeva was confused. Her legacy was not one to be envied. Some Komsomol members did not have membership records, others had no Komsomol cards. Yet others had all their documents but were reluctant to pay their dues. And the debt increased during the period when the organization had been disbanded. It was assumed that in practice no one in the neighboring military detachment would be accountable.

When I arrived at the base an impatient Lt Vedekhin was waiting for me. Just give us the orders and tell us what to do.

"But why have you not put things to right yourselves," I asked the representatives of the ruling "triumvirate." "Why not help the secretary, for a start?"

The position taken by all three of them—the base chief, who incidentally, is a member of the party committee in the office of the supervisor, the party secretary, and the trade union chairman A. Reshotko—was the same: let them decide things higher up. They can see things better from there. And then they started to list the mistakes supposedly made when Major Sorokin was restoring the Komsomol organization.

I do not dispute it: perhaps there were flaws. But I was amazed that these flaws were talked about in the kind of tone that suggested that everything that happened had nothing to do with their own collective. As if the mistakes and shortcomings had nothing at all to do with them, the communist leaders...

The Komsomol organization is now still growing. An accountability report was recently presented by private N. Kuznetsov, who has served in the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Aleksey Chernyy was also transferred to the reserve after demobilization. One involuntarily thinks of how their Komsomol record would have been complicated, say, a year ago, when the "Komsomol was shut down" at the base. Perhaps they would also have become lost among the unorganized youth. Like, for example, Yu. Stupakov. He joined the Komsomol when he was working at the base. Now his record card cannot be found. That's Stupakov! There are people there who have criminal records, but they are still numbered in the Komsomol ranks...

Communists and our socialist system are interested in an active youth that is politically mature and takes part in the resolution of all the issues of the times: these words rang out at the 20th Komsomol Congress, and also fully apply to party members Ovsiyenko, Kuklin and Reshotko. It is essential to work with youth. Otherwise nothing will happen. As ye sow so shall ye reap.
Meanwhile, the youth at the base has now raised I don't know how many times the question of setting up a Komsomol youth brigade. And this is the answer they receive: the specific conditions are not right. But the conditions do exist; and the difficulties also. Although if the desire were there, everything could be resolved. But that well-known attitude is making itself felt: if we get into this a mass of other problems will arise that also have to be dealt with.

On the day of his departure Yuriy Yevtifyevich Roshchin again advised that "the youth is not ready for this." In some way we can agree with him. The period of stagnation must have had its effect on the behavior of some of the workers. The sense of responsibility and collectivism has been dulled.

The great building for the technical servicing center, now under construction for many years, looms above everything. Technical servicing is difficult now. Removing engines from vehicles is a problem. There are no small-scale means of mechanization. I looked sadly at the "huddle," which is what they call the corner in which the fitters and vehicle operators take shelter in winter and summer. A close, dirty little premises. Tractor drivers and bulldozer drivers wash themselves right there at the faucet that has been set up in the heating battery.

We were reminded of the complaints from the workers whose leisure time had not been organized in the collective and who had nothing to do. Someone purchased a billiard table but there was nowhere to put it. Now the cloth has been ripped.

There are many sectors on the base where the Komsomol members could lend a hand. But a firm organization must be forged in order to raise them up to solve the tasks facing the enterprise. And up to now this organization has been lacking in the collective. And there are Komsomol members who are laboring honestly.

Lt Col N. Ovsiyenko thinks that restructuring at the enterprise is moving ahead at full pace. But one of its indicators is the attitude toward youth. And no advance can yet be seen here...

9642
CSO: 1801/251
EDITORIAL CALLS FOR UPGRADING QUALITY OF POLITICAL TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jul 87 p 1

[Editorial: "The Effectiveness of the Political Classes"]

[Text] The restructuring of ideological work in the army and navy in accordance with directives issued at the 27th CPSU Congress and at the January and June 1987 Central Committee plenums is creating good opportunities for effecting profound changes in the existing system of political classes for the personnel. The CPSU Central Committee's draft "Main Direction for Restructuring the System of Political and Economic Training for the Workers" also orients us toward this. In many cases, however, the opportunities provided are not being realized with the necessary persistence and purposefulness.

A study of the state of the fightingmen's political training and their political knowledge demonstrates that there are important shortcomings in its organization, that it is isolated from life and from specific tasks pertaining to combat readiness and the strengthening of discipline. In many cases what is provided in the classes, which still bear the stamp of formalism, empty talk and ostentatious edification, does not conform to the educational level of the personnel, to the intellectual needs of the fightingmen. One rarely finds in the classes open discussion, an involved exchange of opinions or lively dialogue. Because of this the fightingmen frequently lose interest in the political education. And the fulfillment of the demands set forth by the party Central Committee with respect to enhancing vigilance, combat readiness and the responsibility of the military cadres should evoke in every serviceman a natural desire to theoretically comprehend the changes occuring in the society and in the army.

For example, how could the personnel be satisfied with the political classes conducted by Major V. Solovyov and Lieutenants S. Barabanov and N. Dunayev in the air defense subunits, in which the old textbooks were used for conducting the classes during the entire winter training period? Nothing the officers said from the rostrum was confirmed in the books. This lent confusion to the explanations and disoriented the students. It turned out that no one had concerned himself in good time with acquiring the new textbooks by the established procedure. Nor were the proper visual aids and film strips acquired for the subjects being studied. Not one of the instructors was provided with the new methodological material issued to assist the propagandists. Unfortunately, these are not isolated cases. Stagnation, ostentation, inertia and lack of initiative all ultimately produce areas in which the spiritual quality is lacking, and in that soil sprout the weeds of nonregulation relations and other negative things.
As an extremely important component of the overall process of combat and political preparation, training and indoctrination in the army and navy, the political classes are expected to promote the ideological and theoretical growth of the personnel, to motivate the fightingmen to engage in constant political self-education and study the works of the Marxist-Leninist classics and CPSU documents, and to give them the ability to think and act with political maturity and clearly see their place and role in the struggle for good combat readiness and firm discipline. It is important to instil in the young fightingmen a desire to master the Leninist methodology for studying social phenomena. Only by achieving an understanding of the basic Leninist concepts, enriched and developed by the CPSU, is it possible to make every student profoundly aware of the theoretical depth of decisions coming out of the 27th CPSU Congress, which have accelerated our social and economic development. They contain the essence of a realistic program which organically combines the grandness of the goals involved in the building of communism with the meeting of specific needs in the life and the work of the Soviet people.

This unquestionably increases immeasurably the role of those in charge of the political study groups. They are expected to fully satisfy the fightingmen's interests in the events of domestic and international life, in the processes occurring in science, literature and art, in information presented in the press, on radio and television, in past history and in the affairs and developments of today. There are many good examples of this.

Lieutenant A. Kokhanets of the Kiev Military District conducts political classes in a creative and interesting manner. He knows how to draw the students into the discussion and how to lead them to the only correct conclusions. In each class the propagandist employs such methodological techniques as the creation of situations involving special problems, the raising of questions involving not just the memory (What? Where? When?), but also thinking on the part of the students (How did it happen? Why?), and forces the audience to use this as the basis for modeling situations for the practical resolution of this or that problem. This is the kind of classes which help to turn knowledge into personal convictions in the students. It is not surprising that the personnel of this subunit make an all-out effort, perform their assigned tasks in an exemplary manner and commit no infractions of military discipline. The propagandist considerably enhances the effectiveness of the political classes by making skillful use of all the possibilities for the parallel study of matters of world outlook and issues of military, moral and legal indoctrination.

Each training period produces outstanding people and brings out the names of the best propagandists in charge of political training groups. Their work methods produce good results. This know-how is frequently not used effectively, however. It sometimes does not spread beyond the subunit at all. This is what happened in the unit in the Belorussian Military District in which Officer V. Pavlenko is a political worker. For weeks on end political classes were not conducted with the NCOs and lower ranking personnel in general, and the political and indoctrina-

ional measures could not hold up under any sort of criticism. This is in a unit in which beneficial experience was acquired at one time in the ideological praxis.
Preparations for the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution are opening up extensive possibilities for enhancing the quality and effectiveness of the political training. This work must convincingly reveal the organic linkage between the accomplishments of Great October and the present, essentially revolutionary reforms taking place in all aspects of the Soviet society's life.

As we strive to stimulate the human factor, we should devote special attention to eliminating the gap between words and deeds. There is nothing more pernicious to the indoctrination of the personnel than to hear the ideological workers make urgent appeals for smoothness and regularity in the combat training and the entire structure of life of the troops, while at the same time watching these same workers demonstrate inertia and sometimes indifference with respect to resolving problems preventing the tasks from being performed well.

Open dialogue and discussion, the contrasting of diverse points of view and a joint search for answers constitute the main method of developing an active political stance in the personnel. It is an extremely important task of the propagandist not to be afraid of burning issues, to explain world problems in a well reasoned and convincing manner and to help the young fightingmen analyze the complexities and conflicts of modern life on their own.

The political organs and party organizations are expected to perform the main role in the restructuring of the political training of the personnel. The methodological skill of the propagandists, the quality of each class, the provision of literature, training and visual aids, and the improvement of the use coefficient of the technical propaganda equipment depend upon their concerned involvement. Possibilities for personal participation in the political classes by political workers and leading personnel of the units, ships and formations must be fully utilized. It is particularly important to activate all reserves for improving the political training right now, when we have universally begun conducting political classes on materials of the June 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 7th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

11499
CSO: 1801/222
PROPAGANDA PERSONNEL AND RESTRUCTURING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 4, Apr 87 (Signed to press 2 Apr 87) pp 59-64

[Article by Major General R. Gorelov, first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, under the rubric "Ideological Work--Its Essence and Effectiveness": "Propaganda Personnel and Restructuring"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Plenum convened in January of this year once again confirmed that success in restructuring, including restructuring in the ideological sphere, depends to a decisive degree on how quickly and thoroughly our cadre accept the necessity for changes, and on how creatively and purposefully they promote party policies. It is entirely clear that this will require them to be able to think and act in a new fashion, to evaluate what has been accomplished using stricter standards in response to the spirit of our times. Today we see a sharp increase in the demands made of our ideological cadre, their manner of activity and its final results. We are relying on people who are superbly trained ideologically and professionally, who are acutely sensitive to changing times, capable of working creatively and achieving a solid coordination between ideological work and the practical effort of restructuring. Actuality itself dictates such an approach and substantiates its correctness at the same time.

Not long ago, for example, in evaluating organizationally assigned propagandists with respect to their political, duty-performance and moral qualities, we saw that on the whole they are responding to requirements. They exercise a moderate degree of initiative, know their job and are capable of convincing and mobilizing personnel. One out of five is recommended for promotion and there are none unfit for their job. They stand upright in the foreground, the "arithmetically average" worker. We have not always looked closely at the particulars and the situation here has therefore seemed to be all right--no cause for special concern.

But now some more recent facts. Propagandist Major V. Pronin was expelled from the party and discharged from the USSR Armed Forces. Majors A. Kulibaba, A. Zaostrovskiy and V. Lopato are performing poorly. Many officers are operating the old-fashioned way, often engaging in formalism or producing eyewash--you seldom see them at the firing range, tank training or vehicle
testing area. There are some who have completely forgotten how to converse with servicemen on an unofficial basis. Here is an instance worth mentioning—in preparing for their regular session, a group of political directorate members decided to set up a special showcase that would depict, specifically and convincingly, the ideal propagandist, highly professionally skilled with exemplary job-performance qualities and morals beyond reproach. What happened? They finally found a candidate after exceedingly great difficulty. This is the way things are—we see specific people and their problems which need to be resolved. The situation can in no way be reassuring. Corrective measures must be taken immediately.

Well, what essentially has changed in the relatively short period of time since the occurrence of these instances concerning organizational propagandists? Perhaps people have suddenly been regenerated, or sharp turn-arounds taken place? No—it is that restructuring has dictated a new approach in evaluating ideological cadre and has moved to the forefront the relationship of each individual to his duty, his actual contribution to the implementation of changes.

However, to limit ourselves to a simple statement of facts—to say that here things are going well, here not so well—means to stop at the point of origin of all the work which needs to be done. We must ourselves learn now to function in the spirit of our time and teach it to others. This is one of the major lessons of the January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. He who fails to learn it, who fails to transform conclusions into specific actions, will inevitably turn out to be an ineffectual town-crier for restructuring, but not an implementer.

In analyzing the activities of organizational ideological cadre we came to the conclusion that a differentiated approach was required in working with them. Here is why. There are certain separate categories of people. One of them comprises experienced propagandists who know their job. They include officers I. Petrishchev, A. Isayev, A. Makhnaboroda and many others. They have accepted restructuring with their minds and hearts and have already begun to operate in new fashion. They have introduced, for example, a variety of innovations into techniques for delivering lecture propaganda and conducting political training. But sometimes, unfortunately, they do not find the required support and understanding in their senior comrades, and this, of course, paralyzes their initiative.

This kind of propagandist needs assistance, including that from the district political directorate. Their experience is highly valuable—without any doubt it must be propagated as quickly as possible. But here we see the other side of the coin—the orientation of those who set limits to creativity, who attempt even to "batten down all the hatches" of initiative must be corrected. Intolerance of subordinates' independent activity and courageous thought, expressed by certain leaders at the CPSU Central Committee plenum, was appraised as simply unacceptable. Steadfastness and consistency are necessary here, but to no lesser degree than exactingness. As the party teaches, we cannot deal "kindly" in matters of mission accomplishment. Genuine concern for personnel has nothing in common with an indifferent or all-forgiving
attitude, philanthropy and spoiling. There are, unfortunately, quite a few examples of this sort of thing.

Serious dereliction is evident in the organization and conduct of ideological work in the units (chast) where officers D. Ivanov and V. Timofeyev are directly responsible. The level of basic forms of servicemen's political education here is low in its ideological and teaching-methods aspects. And things are generally quite bad in the groups these warrant officers deal with. The unit commanders, political officers and party committees know about this, but have taken no measures to correct the situation. No one has held communist Lieutenant Colonels V. Yermilsev and V. Zharko accountable for the dereliction, although they are the group leaders for the warrant officers' political training. At the same time there has not been a single party meeting, official conference, party committee session or seminar of non-organizational propagandists in which the "active conduct" and "ever-broadening" restructuring effort in ideological work has not been discussed. At times even the slightest improvement in results achieved through a hastily conducted all-out effort has been attributed to operating in the new fashion. The town-criers of restructuring have created this illusion. True implementers are not to be found.

The situation is completely different when leaders are able both to exercise exactingness and to unite ideological cadre, when they can create an atmosphere of amicable, joint activity, support innovation, listen attentively to the opinion of their party comrades and, when necessary, use patience in changing their minds. Indeed a principled approach, exactingness and attentiveness constitute the ingredients of a Leninist work style.

A noticeable step forward with regard to strengthening the practical orientation and efficacy of ideological activity has been taken in the political section in which Major A. Yepifantsiev serves as propagandist. Here they have learned in proper and timely fashion that the core of restructuring for their activity lies in a decisive reorientation towards the life of the military collective, towards people, towards the specific individual. And they have concentrated their efforts in achieving precisely this.

Thanks to a great degree to the initiative and creativity of Major Yepifantsiev, unit personnel have been able to fully utilize all ideological means available in enhancing the effectiveness of political training for servicemen. Command personnel and members of the agitation and propaganda collective have begun to participate actively in conducting political instruction, especially in matters of military education. A counter-propaganda group prepares interesting and instructive reference material for each subject area. The club and library provide group leaders with literature, slides and records. Party and Komsomol organizations of the subunits conduct a variety of theme-oriented activities—Lenin readings and lessons, oral magazines and interviews.

It would be fair to note that these activities, the first real steps in restructuring ideological work, were made possible thanks to the attention and—most importantly—the receptivity of leaders to the initiative of their
subordinates, to the new approach. In addition, the leaders themselves have begun to participate more actively in this effort.

Means of effecting propaganda here were recently augmented by a television center. Every day during the time allotted to political education, one may observe presentations from leadership personnel containing the responses to numerous questions posed by servicemen. Televisions in Lenin Rooms are turned on for 10-12 minutes for political instruction. The broadcasts consist of material prepared by television center personnel from the programs "Vremya (Time)," "I Serve the Soviet Union!" and "International Panorama," among others.

Elements of true restructuring are also evident in consultations conducted by certain officers—specifically Colonel G. Andreyev, a 27th CPSU Congress delegate, and Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Bobrov—with servicemen in their subunits with respect to personal matters.

All in all we may note that efforts are being made in this political section to function in an atmosphere of seeking new approaches, to confirm the new in deed and not just in words, to be concerned not about external appearances, but about actual improvement in the education of personnel.

We return, however, to an analysis of the position towards restructuring taken by our organizational propaganda personnel. They include perhaps the most numerous category of such people—those who understand the necessity for change and want to restructure, but do not know how to go about it. They are unaccustomed to independent activity and use any excuse to await direction from above. But now is the time when we see an urgent necessity to clearly view the reality that surrounds us, to exercise creative, ideological enterprise, if you will. Yet it is in precisely these qualities that we see an acute void.

In the unit where officer S. Grinenko serves as propagandist, the overwhelming majority of political instruction group leaders are platoon leaders. There are quite a few gaps in their theoretical and instructional-techniques training. A check revealed, however, that many of these young officers seldom attended methods-of-instruction course work, instructional demonstrations, seminars or lessons in which questions relating to lecture content, discussions and group seminars were comprehensively treated. A propagandist's development in theory and instructional methods is impossible without this. It would seem that just a small correction would be necessary to set things right, but the situation was turned around only after intervention by the political directorate.

It is impossible to begin suddenly and immediately to function independently, creatively and swiftly, to react in businesslike fashion to the problems and difficulties that arise. This must be studied. As Comrade M. S. Gorbachev noted at the CPSU Central Committee plenum, "in essence, we all are required to take a political examination with respect to having mastered the new work and leadership methods in all spheres of socialist construction." And here we must stress an important fact—the overall situation gives us neither the opportunity nor the right to first acquire the knowledge and experience, gain
the skills, and then utilize all of this in a transformational process. And where do you find the knowledge and the skills if the tasks to be accomplished are new? We must learn restructuring during the very process of restructuring and, in this regard, we must not lose sight of the party's most significant conclusion—that everyone must learn without exception, no matter what his job, rank, former distinctions or sphere of activity. There are grounds for once again bringing to mind this directive of the Central Committee.

We sometimes observe a phenomenon whereby those who by virtue of their job position are called upon to lead and monitor the restructuring of ideological activity, including personnel of the district political directorate, adopt a position which suits them—they say, in essence, that they have already accomplished restructuring; it is simply necessary to check things out at the lower echelons. They visit the units, study various plans, enumerate deficiencies and, based on this, consider their mission accomplished. In the best case, they will visit again. But then we are puzzled—how can it be that so many officers from headquarters and district directorates have conducted visits to the units over the course of a month, yet there remains the same number of unresolved problems as before? There is really nothing here to be amazed about. Visits conducted from above, as it were, "for cause" have become conspicuously outdated. In order to move forward with restructuring, we must learn how to thoroughly analyze problems at the unit locations, draw specific conclusions and immediately organize their implementation. Political directorate workers are now striving to operate in this manner. They are conducting special-purpose, comprehensive exercises to check the organization and content of political training and various educational measures. The result, as a rule, has been to successfully develop specific recommendations for various categories of ideological cadre and assist them in strengthening the practical orientation of their influence on personnel.

In the regiment where Major V. Kiselev serves as propagandist, 44 ideologically-oriented measures were planned for just one month, beginning with discussions and concluding with a theory conference. But basic good sense should have suggested that there was neither the time nor the organizers for achieving all these measures. The lesson plans for many of these activities became estranged from the actual agenda of the military collective, which was basically stationed in the field. In short, the plan had been formulated not in the interests of duty, but rather in view of an impending inspection. And the planners were relying on the inspection being one of form, trusting that the existence of a broad syllabus and wide variety of measures would be sufficient—no one would "dig" further. Decisive measures had to be taken with respect to correcting the planning of ideological work in the regiment.

We can justly fire off a good many critical shots at the planners here. But in order to understand the roots of such a phenomenon as formalism and counter it effectively, we must not lose sight of another aspect of the problem. Frequently the only previous criteria for evaluating ideological work were plan quality, degree of plan implementation, and the official and social-political activity of communists and servicemen—very important indicators,
beyond a doubt. But without ties to the actual situation in one collective or another, all the rest is formal just the same. Here is a real-life example.

The inspector is shown information, from which it may be concluded that the number of communists conducting discussions with personnel on various topics has increased 10 percent. Such a fact by itself can only be welcomed and, in the evaluation of ideological work conducted in the collective, is reflected as a great "plus." At the same time everything is not so--because combat training results show that the net effectiveness of subunit firing "fell" by 20 percent over the same period. Why was ideological effectiveness so low? Perhaps because the discussion topics had little in common with real life? Or the propagandists' message left the servicemen feeling indifferent? Upon evaluation of the state of affairs in the collective, answers to these very important questions remain hidden. And if today we note quite justifiably that there is a great deal of stereotyping in the activities of some ideological cadre and that independence and creativity are lacking, we must not forget that formalism in leadership channels, especially monitoring and supervisory aspects, invariably leads to formalism in local unit activity. Restructuring cannot flow from higher to lower or the reverse--it requires simultaneous, constant effort in seeking and implementing new approaches in all echelons of ideological activity. The criterion by which such effort is judged is synonymous with the specific results of enhancing unit and subunit combat readiness and consolidating military discipline. These comprise the objective index as to how effectively work has been conducted with personnel, how closely linked it has been with real life.

In the unit where Lieutenant Colonel G. Degtyarev serves, a thorough and painstaking analysis was recently conducted with respect to officers' independent training--the basic method by which they enhance their ideological and theoretical level. The conclusion was drawn that reliance upon effective work being accomplished by course participants in Marxist-Leninist instructional activity, conducted at home as a rule, in the evening, without the required literature, meant allowing an important matter to drift into neglect. It was then decided to adopt the following course--the unit was equipped with a training aids section for independent study, "outfitted" with the necessary literature and manuals. The library was opened in the mornings of political instruction days and it was that time which was designated for officers' independent study. Strict supervision was put into effect for self-training and consultations were organized. Matters took a turn for the better.

It would be a mistake, of course, to suppose that the improvement in quality of independent study itself resulted in all problems being solved. Nonetheless, it would be impossible not to notice that, in time, the ideological-theoretical level of many officers increased considerably. This was reflected not only in their responses during seminar activity, but, most importantly, in their relationship to official obligations. Their responsibility, initiative and efficiency became more pronounced.

The question might arise--what is new in this? It must be admitted that in order to enhance the effectiveness of officers' independent work in the unit, measures were adopted which had before been used successfully in several other
collectives. Therefore, we are not talking about some new innovation in principle. But people here thought about how to improve the situation, and exercised initiative and an enterprising approach in following the measure through to its conclusion. It would be impossible to avoid seeing the initial sprouts of change in this.

Sometimes we look for something exceptional, beyond the framework of ordinary phenomena, as a mark of restructuring in the work of ideological cadre—let us say, the use of some entirely new form of influencing personnel, or application of a hitherto unknown method. And it is true—innovations are demanded by the very nature of changes taking place. But here we must not forget about something else—if a collective has been able to fulfill a work scheme approved long ago with today's matters and substantially increase its efficiency coefficient, it is felt this can also relate to the aggregate of positive changes, because it is an indicator of the relationship people have to their duty, the same relationship that restructuring begins with.

Today like never before we can see the weaknesses in ideological work conducted in the units. Some units are marked by poor supervision of the activities of organizational and non-organizational propagandists; serious flaws can be seen in their training and information program. Educational measures are often conducted not taking into account the realities of life in the military collectives or the particular circumstances of the people involved. The striving to literally encompass everything in planning the ideological effort leads to a paperwork prison. There is another causative factor here—a fear exists here and there in the units that an inspector will find gaps in their plans. This fear drives propagandists to compile a variety of supplemental, completely unnecessary paperwork, one piece duplicating another and resulting in an accumulation of superficial material, discussions and instruction.

The quality of political training is cause for the most serious anxiety. Students summarize lectures in many collectives. Officers and warrant officers make seminar presentations from newspaper and magazine articles; soldiers and sergeants present from copied notes. Responses are frequently unrelated to real life or the missions accomplished by the servicemen. One of the chief reasons for this is non-organizational propagandists inadequately trained in theory and instructional methods, and a low level of responsibility on the part of attendees. What is being done to solve these problems? Supervision of officers' independent study is being intensified and higher quality preparation made for meetings and seminars. Today non-organizational propagandists in certain military collectives of the district are using so-called support abstracts in preparing their lessons. Such abstracts are seen as enabling quicker and clearer understanding of the structure and logic of a topic being studied. This is a new approach, still "in the experimental stage." Clearly there cannot be any sort of strict "directive regulation" here. We will judge by the final results of the instruction. If the innovative approach is justified, we will certainly give it the green light. An active search is also on-going with respect to developing the method of narrational discourse and intensifying the interest level of students. But all of this is just a first step. In general, I will say again that we
consider the problem of quality in political training as being very important. Many things need to be done.

If we are to summarize the deficiencies in ideological work, we draw the conclusion that they are all related primarily to shallow content and the incomplete planning and organization of ideological-political education. Fundamental improvement is required here. But we must not lose sight of the fact that plans, measures, lectures and conversations do not exist by themselves. Specific individuals stand behind them—those who prepare, organize and conduct them. This means that work must be accomplished first of all not with paperwork, but with propaganda cadre. Only this kind of approach will lead not to "small improvements" but to a true restructuring.

Precise recommendations have been developed by the district political directorate and delivered to the units so that current and future planning will identify and select those ideological measures which lead directly to enhanced combat readiness and consolidated military discipline. We are talking about theme-oriented evening sessions where experiences are shared, technical quizzes and examinations, competition for the title of best soldier in the company, battalion, battery, squadron and regiment. Or, for example, evening programs held in honor of the best servicemen, portraits made of soldiers and sergeants who have, let us say, not committed a single violation of regulations over the course of a year. We have recommended that propaganda personnel seek daring, new approaches and not fear experimentation (when it is directed towards promoting the cause, of course). Local implementation of these recommendations will not come easy. Obstacles are presented by inertia in thinking and the habit of functioning the old-fashioned way. Acceleration of the process of change and abandonment of a formal approach to one's official duty can and should be accomplished to a significant extent by personnel of the political directorate and political organs whose duty responsibilities entail supervising plans and monitoring the organization of their execution. A great deal depends on how these personnel are attuned to operating. Sometimes they will check over the text of a lecture or presentation, evaluate it and make corrections—and that is the extent of it. They will attend a seminar, let us say, express their opinion, give a recommendation and head back to where they came from, considering their mission accomplished. The result in all these instances is the same—that "small improvement." Because there is no assurance whatsoever that the next lecture, presentation, essay or seminar will not duplicate its detrimental predecessor, albeit with a few corrections.

Today we must work differently with propaganda personnel. First and foremost, a thorough study must be made of people's moods and issues that disturb them. The causes which underlie negative phenomena in the military collective must be discussed and practical methods learned for influencing the state of affairs. Only on such a basis can propagandist training be beneficial. As we have seen, the subject under discussion is not taking corrective action here and there. Ideological cadre must be armed with a system through which they can provide a high interest level and quality organization of the ideological-political education of servicemen. It is to this end that monthly instruction with non-organizational propagandists is conducted in the units by officers of the political directorate.
Today it would already be impossible to imagine a military collective in which people failed to realize the vital necessity of restructuring and did nothing to further its practical implementation. We are seeing ever stronger confirmation of an atmosphere of initiative and creativity, sharp rejection of formalism, routine procedure and social injustice, a search for new approaches in resolving long-pressing problems and expanding openness. All of this is the determinate result of ideological work and activization of the human factor. Yes, something has been accomplished. But far more needs to be done. Many questions must be answered--how can we raise the ideological-theoretical and instructional-methods level of our propaganda cadre? How can we improve the content of ideological activity, enhance its effectiveness? How can we enrich and renew tried and tested operating methods so that they actively facilitate the achievement of optimal results in combat readiness and in the execution of socialist obligations undertaken in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Great October? How can we insure that our methods facilitate the consolidation of military discipline and increased social-political activity on the part of personnel? Real life has presented these issues in full scale to be resolved by our ideological cadre. And we must spend less effort today talking about the importance of restructuring, and more on how to actually implement it. We must now effect a more intensive transition from task assignment to practical mission accomplishment.


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OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS IN MASTERING COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY

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[Article by Colonel I. Morozov, Major Ye. Khrustalev and other officers under the rubric "High Quality in Training and Education": "Opportunities and Problems in Mastering Computer Technology"]

[Text] Computer technology is invading our lives on an ever more widespread scale. It has become the key element in many weapons systems and has qualitatively altered the nature of various types of weapons and guidance systems. This has had a direct influence on the managerial activity of commanders and their staffs and presented them with new requirements. Officers' knowledge of computer technology and their ability to use the great and diverse opportunities it presents today comprise one of the most important considerations in enhancing the combat readiness of military collectives.

This may be explained primarily through the fact that the dynamic, transient nature of modern combat, with sharp and frequent changes in the situation, has significantly augmented the role of time as a factor. The combatant who plans and organizes combat operations more quickly, who readies his subordinate forces earlier, gains a practical advantage over the opposing side. It is possible to compress time and transform it into an ally only when the commander and his staff have mastered advanced methods and techniques for accomplishing their administrative and managerial activity, primarily when they are able to make effective use of the means of automation available to them through which many tasks may be achieved. Such tasks include performing the most diverse calculations, providing necessary information and reference data in the organization of combat operations, evaluating the effectiveness of numerous decision variants, enhancing real-time capability with regard to unit (soyedineniye, chast) command and control and direction of weapons systems, etc.

Many other aspects of troop command and control have become substantially more complicated in modern times. The number of tasks requiring coordination among many services is increasing. The influence of such factors as the nature and duration of control operations on the final outcome is growing. The total volume of work falling within the purview of one officer or another is increasing. The flow of activity is literally overwhelming the military
leader, denying him at times the ability to thoroughly analyze his actions and take long-range considerations into account. We can cite as an example the great influx of directives that reach staffs from higher headquarters. Analysis shows that many of these duplicate one another, often containing instructions issued earlier. A way out of the "paperwork prison" is envisaged through the systematic processing of incoming materials, impossible without the use of advanced informational methods and techniques. One of these, the hypertext method, is designed precisely for resolving this complicated task.

In other words, we have the capability today to shift a great portion of the material tasks and all routine operations to automated means of information processing, to free command personnel from a significant share of this laborious effort and allow them the opportunity to turn their main attention to resolving matters of tactical operations. Experience shows that commanders, service chiefs and staff officers who seriously approach the use of computer technology do not even consider the thought of subsequently operating without it, all the more so in view of the fact that the sphere of application of computer programs is constantly expanding.

Not very long ago, for example, it would take several individuals at least one and a half working days to compile a flight operations schedule. Today the computer takes care of this in one-sixth the time. Errors made at times by specialists performing exhausting manual calculations have been eliminated. Moreover, the computer-obtained scheduling contains a great deal of supplementary, intermediate-stage data, allowing the operational process to be monitored.

But this in no way means that life has become simpler, that we can roll up our sleeves and relax a bit. The intensive development of information processing has necessitated a sharp increase in officers' computer knowledge and skills, new approaches to accomplishing the normal, traditional tasks, and a restructuring of the psychology and thought processes of commanders and directors of all ranks. Actuality indicates, unfortunately, that not everyone is ready for this.

Many words of praise have been addressed to the officers of one of the departments in our headquarters adroitly utilizing computer technology in their work. And the praise is well deserved. Experienced leaders such as Colonel K. Senkov have long understood the importance of computers. They tirelessly popularized its use, striving to make it their reliable ally. In particular, it is these officers who acquired a professional knowledge of computers and presented programmers and technical implementation experts the task of automating resolution of a number of important problems faced by the department. This has been an intensive effort. But now Col Senkov is being transferred to the reserves and the department chief is leaving to assume a job with higher responsibilities. The new leadership has not shown any special interest in the innovative program and the effort initiated has practically been curtailed. Today a major command-echelon department is in fact unable to manage its available computer equipment and must function as before, using unjustifiable methods.
It is hardly necessary to search long and hard for an explanation of such a situation. The reasons are generally right out in the open. The complexity of modern computer technology, especially in its utilization, becomes for certain leaders a unique kind of psychological barrier which they find themselves unable to overcome. They therefore prefer to operate the old-fashioned way. As we all know, the attitude of the commander or director towards one matter or another is often the deciding, determinant factor in forming the atmosphere within the collective he heads. If this commander or director looks upon the computer as an overly complicated entity which he simply will not ever come to learn, then his subordinates will form the same opinion with respect to computer technology.

We also encounter another variety of leader today in this regard. There are those who have not yet realized what advantages can accrue through full utilization of computer technology. They believe computerization should not be forced, that it just amounts to paying homage to fashion. It is true that the numbers of such enemies of computer technology have decreased lately, an indication of its ever more widespread acceptance in army life. Computerized data processing has been introduced into the course work of military higher educational institutions and the techniques and methods used by cadre are being restructured everywhere. Nonetheless, every once in a while you will find a leader profoundly convinced that his effort is an intellectual one and, therefore, no machine is going to be able to deal with it.

The restructuring of psychology and thinking is, of course, a difficult process and at times a painful one. It is possible to impart the necessary impetus and direction to this effort only with the help of instructional methods, still limited in certain collectives. The leader's personal example must be apparent in this regard. There must be an atmosphere of interest in enhancing the quality and labor productivity of every worker and rigid demands must be made of those who prefer the well-beaten path to the new. Sometimes, unfortunately, this is forgotten. What do officer efficiency reports show, for example? They show that some leaders still do not consider it necessary to evaluate how their subordinates relate to mastery of computer technology. They neglect this important factor in their ratings, even though the most casual treatment of it would reveal a great deal with respect to the low level of computer literacy.

There are certain party organizations too which timidly approach working with the computer, if we may phrase it that way. This is not difficult to explain. A party organization's orientation is determined to a great extent by that of its secretary and bureau members. And if the elective party organ is dominated by those who either underestimate the potential offered by computer technology or fear the complexities of mastering it, then it would be difficult to expect a strong orientation on their part with respect to such matters as enhancing the computer literacy of officer communists. At best party organization efforts are limited to the measures of individuals; at worst, you do not even see that. An example of how essentially nothing is done in a party organization can be seen in the one where Lieutenant Colonel P. Khimenko serves as secretary. Not once, not even at the party meetings,
have matters dealing with communists' mastery of progressive methods of working with automation systems been discussed.

Nonetheless, when we are discussing modern computer systems and the need for every leader to be intimately familiar with them, it is difficult to overestimate the role of the party organization, especially that of the headquarters. Modern electronic technology is so complex that it often requires a scientific foundation for the techniques of its mastery and application. The staff officer’s sphere of responsibility encompasses the generalization of practical experience, analysis, development and verification of recommendations, and dissemination of results. Accomplishment of these difficult tasks will be facilitated by augmenting their responsibility and equipping them with the necessary knowledge and skills of computer technology. It is understood that this entails a broad scope of activity for the party organization of any headquarters—from individual work with each communist through the generalization and propagation of methods and techniques used by the best personnel, who have mastered the means of managerial automation available in their department or duty station.

A great number of examples which may be cited to confirm the correctness of this conclusion. There are party organizations in our headquarters that consider communists' computer literacy their vital concern. Major A. Andrianov heads one of these organizations. Party meetings here include discussion of matters relating to the enhancement of quality and efficient use of available computer equipment, mathematical and computer program support. Communists are tasked regularly to prepare lectures and practical exercises on information processing and computer programming, generalizing the experience and methods of the best personnel. The Komsomol members here, headed by bureau secretary Captain V. Filimonov, are a match for their senior comrades. And it is far from accidental that there are no problems with respect to mastery of computer technology in the collective under discussion. Every officer here possesses strong skills with regard to its practical use.

In the sake of fairness it must be said that this kind of change towards accomplishing one of today's most vital tasks is being felt in the overwhelming majority of party collectives in the headquarters. This can be attributed for the most part to the party committee headed by Lieutenant Colonel V. Aleksyenko, a communist who seeks progressive innovation and exercises initiative. Party activists have charted and already partially completed a number of specific measures to facilitate enhancement of officers' computer knowledge and promote their deeper realization of party demands for accelerated scientific and technological progress. All the same, it would be impossible to state that a restructuring of the work style and methods of party committee members has been accomplished. Up until now activists have been displaying unwarranted tact, especially in dealing with communist leaders. The fact of the matter is that in not a single instance where it has been deserved has strict accountability been demanded for a lack of conscientiousness in mastering computer technology.

The participation of party organizations in resolving this problem is clearly required. Sophisticated computer systems afford broad opportunities for enhancing the effectiveness of party political efforts. They can be used by
political workers and party activists to more thoroughly analyze numerous intra-collective processes and the state of military discipline, to "calculate" with a sufficient degree of probability the consequences of educational measures they may undertake. Computer technology is also capable of quickly and thoroughly evaluating those factors which may influence the political and moral state of personnel in combat and training exercises. It would be difficult to overestimate the value of such data. Unfortunately, the computer is seldom used today in this regard, and the reasons remain the same—fear of the new and an unwillingness to bother oneself with studying the computer and methods of utilizing it.

There are some officers who reason this way—why should I rack my brain over something that falls under the responsibility of others? And they add that most of the time they do not deal directly with the computer anyway, but rather through a technician at the computer center. Most operations are in fact conducted by a computer programmer. But it is necessary to correctly present the problem to him and be able to evaluate how it has been solved, arrive at proper conclusions, etc. Without the ability to do this, even the highest quality work of the programmer can turn out to be a waste of time and energy.

This is what happened essentially at one section headed by Colonel A. Novikov. Computer specialists developed a program which would significantly speed up and facilitate the work results of section officers. Yet in spite of the fact that the program was tested and accepted for implementation, the benefits reaped from it have been small. Why? Because those who should be using the program were not prepared to do so. They lacked the knowledge and experience of working with computers as well as the desire.

Another area requiring the attention of leaders and party organizations is the attitude of certain officers who exaggerate the capabilities of computer utilization, who contend without justification that the presence of the computer in itself will insure high-quality fulfillment of the tasks with which they are faced. One of the authors of this article had occasion to deal with just such a situation. A staff officer evaluating a complex tactical situation had at his disposal a modern computer and a well-qualified programmer to run it. Unfortunately, this leader was unable to exercise effective management. His training-exercise decision was in error. During the critique as to why this had occurred, it became clear that he entrusted too much responsibility to the computer. It must be clear to every one of us that, yes, the computer can effect complicated and laborious calculations in an extremely short period of time, provide specific data and predict one situation or another with a high degree of accuracy. But all this information means little if it is not critically thought through. Computer-originated recommendations do not preclude creativity and initiative on the part of the military leader.

Today such lack of computer literacy cannot be tolerated. Our modern leader is an all-around individual sensitive to everything that appears new on the military scene. Or so he should be. And, being tactful, it is not becoming of him, of course, to shun what comprises the essence of the leading edge of
management science. Or, equally significantly—to idealize the capabilities of technology.

Our experience shows that one of the ways to increase the computer literacy of personnel in leadership positions is to introduce in the officer training program a special discipline for computer studies. Special sessions of department and section chiefs should also be conducted, at which leaders acquire the necessary knowledge and skills enabling them to work independently with the computer. They should learn, for example, how to feed initial data into the computer from a display screen, elicit instructions for executing certain programs, etc. In addition, it would be useful for staff and service sections to make provision for non-organizational (and organizational, in the future) duty positions for computer programmers and technicians which would encompass basic functions associated with data programming systems sub-elements.

It is not easy, of course, to organize officer training on the computer. Mastery of modern computer technology must take place directly on the equipment, since suitable training facilities are not yet available. And this is not always possible in view of the fact that free computer time practically does not exist. Nonetheless, experience shows that the problem can be solved. Thanks to the efforts of leaders and party committee members of our headquarters, the most modern external apparatus for providing operational computer access is being installed. Responsibility for introducing this equipment belongs to the subunit of Lieutenant Colonel S. Kashkin. His collective has been exerting maximum effort to make the equipment operationally ready as soon as possible. Lt Col Kashkin, Captains S. Marchenko and G. Nepomnyashchly and other officers have been doing everything necessary to equip department and section premises with the apparatus in timely fashion, allowing computer access to be established and providing conveniences for military leaders and other personnel utilizing the computer.

There is another issue which must not be disregarded. The large-scale utilization of computer technology in the army and navy requires that special attention be devoted to organizational aspects of its assimilation. It must be confessed that there are times when automation is duplicated by manual effort in our headquarters and other management agencies. One staff officer, for example, collected and processed certain information using the traditional methods, i.e., he used telephone and cable, made personal observations, analyzed the data he obtained and recorded information in a special log. But then there appeared a computer program enabling automation of his effort. Now all data are specially coded and fed directly into the computer for processing. It would seem that the officer could now limit himself to intellectual involvement—master the computer process and work with it. But such was not the case here. All calculations continued to be conducted manually as before. The computer method had to be assimilated as an additional measure, insofar as a higher-level director required the information in computerized print-out format. Thus, a blessing turned into a detriment. Time required for computer assimilation was being dragged out and the effectiveness of its application sharply reduced. In order to eliminate this, it is necessary to determine right at the initial stages of computer utilization the possible reorganizational variants of management procedures.
The computer can become an effective aid to leaders of all ranks in accomplishing complicated, never-ending work which requires an exceptional degree of attention to detail, such as monitoring execution of orders, plans and directives. This type of activity is extremely important because there are people in every collective who postpone tasks they have been assigned "until later on," or who forget their task, caught up in the everyday flow of events, or who arbitrarily extend task deadlines without the approval of their superiors. If such individuals are reproached for carelessness, they complain as a rule of being swamped with work, not having sufficient time, etc. The superior who issues such an order to an officer is not always able to monitor its execution in timely fashion and must sometimes go to great lengths to make up for wasted time, involving others in this endeavor who have their own full share of work to accomplish. The computer is capable of accurate and timely monitoring without connivance.

The departments and sections of our headquarters utilize an appropriate programming system whose operational results show convincingly the high degree of effectiveness of the new methods.

New and progressive ideas have been and always will be the foundation upon which a communist's active, vital orientation is based. Computer technology is no exception. To a great degree it determines the pulse of time and every military leader must clearly recognize this fact. Every leader must concern himself with enhancing computer literacy—his own and that of his subordinates—for it is here where significant potential lies for further increasing the combat readiness of military collectives.


9768
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WILLINGNESS TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY STRESSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 87 (signed to press 18 Jun 87) pp 3-8

[Editorial: "The Willingness to Assume Responsibility"]

[Text] Our people think of the Soviet officer as an ideologically strong person with an excellent knowledge of military affairs, decisive and prepared to take on responsibility in any situation. He confirms his loyalty to the homeland and the oath with his military work, his selfless service and exemplary conduct. This incident from the Great Patriotic War is well known. K.K. Rokossovskiy, commander of the Central Front, learned in the night that the Hitlerites would switch to an offensive on the entire front the next morning. Without asking Headquarters, Supreme High Command--there was no time for that--he issued the order for a pre-emptive artillery strike.

How like the deeds of the front-line soldiers are the actions of many of today's officers. Colonel N. Andrusenko and Captain M. Sokolov were recently decorated with the Order of the Red Star for courage and valor, and Lieutenant Colonel V. Kashevitskiy was awarded the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," 2nd degree. While performing missions in the difficult situation which had developed, the officers assumed full responsibility and operated with calmness and calculation, with good professional skill. This helped them to emerge victorious from the situation.

The demand of our times is clearly manifested in the actions and accomplishments of the fightingmen of today. Attaching enormous importance to the enhancement of combat readiness and the strengthening of discipline and organization in the army and navy, the CPSU demands that the officers perform with a great sense of responsibility, that they increase and improve their skills and enhance their vigilance. A recent session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, which considered a violation of the Soviet Union's air space, stressed once again the fundamental importance of the task of resolutely raising the level of the combat readiness and discipline in the Armed Forces, of skillfully directing the forces and assuring that they are constantly capable of cutting off any encroachment on the sovereignty of the Soviet state.

Taking responsibility for the assigned job and being prepared to act with boldness and initiative means being thoroughly aware of and foreseeing the effects of one's actions. It means acting in strict accordance with the military oath and military regulations, and with the interests of our society. It means having a strong will and firmly implementing a decision once it is adopted.
The commander or political worker has the greatest responsibility when he is a member of a team or crew standing alert duty which is the same as a wartime combat mission. He must be able to accurately assess the situation and carry out orders and instructions, be familiar with the weapons and equipment, be able to avoid becoming disconcerted, to perform competently and decisively at any time of day, be capable of withstanding great moral-psychological tension over a long period of time and be thoroughly aware that the homeland's security depends in great part upon his actions.

The rigorous logic behind alert duty is that one must always be prepared to perform in extreme situations and make a full effort. Both the commander and the political worker must set an example, develop in their subordinates a sense of being at the forward edge, a sense of the exceptional nature of the assigned mission, and do everything possible to combat a lowering of vigilance, an habituation to the situation in which the collective is operating. Any relaxation, even the slightest willfulness or deviation from an established regulation, instruction or a manual is inadmissible. Indoctrinating the military cadres and all of the personnel in a spirit of acutely felt responsibility for the successful accomplishment of the defense missions and irreplaceable fulfillment of their duty and their day-to-day obligations—this is what must be at the forefront today.

A remarkable combat and moral quality of the Soviet officer is his willingness and his ability to assume responsibility in any situation. It is based on his professional skill, his thorough understanding of military affairs, his high level of ideological conviction, honesty, uprightness, will, determination and boldness in making decisions, and is shaped by the entire structure of military life, in the process of the intensive combat training, in exercises, on flights and naval cruises.

Commanders, political organs and party organizations are expected to persistently develop in all the officers a readiness and the capacity to take determined action in any situation. Well organized classes, exercises, flights and naval cruises play a large role in this. They shape good fighting qualities only when they are conducted in accordance with the demands of modern combat and the level of development of the equipment and weapons, using advanced methods, with a high caliber of military work and good discipline. Nothing harms the cause as much as do simplifications, callousness or a race for percentage points, which obscure people and their attitude toward the fulfillment of their service and party duty. Unfortunately, we still have frequent cases in which formalism, sometimes bordering on deception, and laxity are tolerated in the combat training. Exercises are sometimes conducted in versions worked out in advance, without taking the specific situation into account.

The officer training helps to develop skilled cadres with a profound knowledge of military affairs, acute tactical thinking and strong will. It should conform to the maximum degree to possible real operations, equip the officers with advanced methods of training and indoctrinating subordinates, teach them to think with perspective, make it possible for them to reinforce their skills in military art and help them to master modern forms and methods of warfare in complex situations.
The commander's personal example is a powerful means of developing a willingness and the ability to take on responsibility. He bears direct responsibility for the combat and mobilizational readiness of the unit, ship or subunits entrusted to him, for the combat and political training, the indoctrination, the military discipline and the political-moral state of the personnel. The officer's subordinates compare their deeds and actions with the way he adopts decisions, issues orders and instructions and carries them out, emulating their senior comrade.

Many commanders are going to have to review the positions they have taken in the restructuring. They need to put an end to indulgences in the combat training and to the practice of taking the personnel away from the performance of their regulation duties, assume particular oversight over the state of the equipment and not delude themselves with an avalanche of excellent evaluations frequently earned in a simplified situation. The conscience of the Communist cannot be reconciled to a distorted interpretation of the laws governing the military service and cannot accept compromises in matters pertaining to the duties he has accepted with respect to ensuring that his assigned section is at the highest level of combat readiness.

Experience has shown that the missions will not be successfully accomplished where the commanders operate in the old way, where they consider the main thing to be not the successful resolution of questions pertaining to combat readiness and the strengthening of discipline but how to make the best reports, where they pay attention only to the "visible" aspects of problems and, as a rule, do not get to the bottom of them, where they have taken on airs and replaced constant demandingness with rudeness and humiliation of the people. It was pointed out at a meeting of the party aktiv of the Moscow Air Defense District that the actions of Major General of Aviation P. Toropov, Major General of Aviation N. Kozlov and Colonel N. Naumov convincingly demonstrated the undesirable effects of rudeness, boorishness and intimidation, which resulted in their loss of party qualities, the flouting of the principles of socialist justice and moral illnesses.

The commander is vested with great authority. He also bears great personal responsibility for the people, for his decisions and his actions. Authority and responsibility are integrated in the commander's work. When advancing an officer, appointing him to a new position or promoting him in rank, it is a good thing to objectively assess his ability to use his authority, to organically combine rights and duties. This is the best way to help shape good service and personal qualities in the officer.

Unfortunately, in the just completed certification of cadres, certain commanders and chiefs, political and personnel organs did not maintain principled positions, and such qualities as the ability to train and indoctrinate subordinates, to demonstrate organization in the work, firmness and decisiveness in the adoption of decisions, the ability and preparedness to take on responsibility were poorly and not entirely precisely or objectively reflected in the certifications.

Concerning oneself with developing professional qualities in the commanders means strengthening the principle of sole-responsibility, enhancing their authority and developing in them a sense of personal responsibility for the assigned job, for the security of the homeland. It means striving to achieve a high level of training and indoctrination of the personnel. There is broad scope for action
in this matter on the part of political organs and party organizations. How can and how must their role be exercised? In increased demandingness of the commanders themselves, on the one hand, and in all-around support of the demandingness of commanders, on the other. Demandingness and more demandingness, embodied in the commander's ability to see a decision through to the end, is needed today as never before. A great sense of responsibility of subordinates for the assigned job is developed only in a climate of demandingness and verification. Only in an atmosphere of regulation demandingness does concern for good professional training for the personnel, organization and discipline, which is also concern for the combat readiness of the unit and subunit, produce perceptible results.

While doing everything possible to strengthen sole-responsibility on a party basis it is important to focus the efforts of the military cadres on achieving a high level of combat readiness for the troops and naval forces, on achieving concrete, positive results in the combat and political training, on the strengthening of military discipline and regulation order, and on establishing a wholesome moral climate in the military collectives.

The military councils, commanders, political organs and party organizations, in accordance with the authority granted to them, must hold the Communists in charge strictly accountable in the party manner for omissions in the Marxist-Leninist education of the officers, for concealing negative occurrences in the combat training, for deception, abuse of service position, perversion of disciplinary praxis and personal lack of discipline. Advancement is inconceivable without this kind of demandingness.

A great deal remains to be done in the area of ideological-political tempering of the officer cadres. Equipping the commanders and the political workers with a thorough knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, developing in them a creative approach to the resolution of combat training questions, indoctrinating them in a spirit of honesty and truthfulness—this is far from a complete list of the tasks which are assuming great importance.

Staff officers and officers at the tactical control levels serve at the forward edge of the battle for a high level of combat readiness in the army and navy. A great deal depends upon their personal sense of responsibility, their readiness to act decisively in any situation, their ability to thoroughly look into the course of the combat training and work with people. The staff officer and the officer at the command and control level, more than anyone, must have a feeling for the new, be highly demanding and capable of spotting and supporting in subordinates the urge to seek [new ways], initiative and independence, the ability to develop the creative element, decisiveness and a readiness to accept responsibility at any time. He is relentless in combating bureaucracy, the proliferation of paperwork, formalism, empty talk, leniency and obsequiousness, and boldly opposes those who operate according to the principle of "avoiding trouble."

Political organs and party organizations are expected to thoroughly study the work of the officers—and Communists of the staffs and the command and control elements, to see that they improve their work style, to develop good ideological-political qualities in them and publicize the experience of those who achieve good results on each trip into the forces, those who actually teach what the modern commander should be like. In order to do this the officers with the political organs and
the secretaries of party organizations must themselves have extensive and all-around competence, good professional training and a clear understanding of the complex processes occurring in the world military-political situation and the dynamics of the development of military affairs. It is important for them to be more independent and aggressive, to do the job without waiting for instructions from above, to enhance initiative and activeness, to resolutely eliminate the habit of "listening for" and copying others. Today, as never before, we need people who think on the large scale, people capable of making nonstandardized decisions, people prepared to assume extensive responsibility not because of pressure from above but with awareness, in accordance with their personal conviction and with their duty as Communists.

We need to hold strictly accountable those who limit every visit to a unit, a ship or a subunit to issuing instructions and reprimands, who constrain initiative in people and suppress their inclination to think, who do not listen to the opinions of subordinates and do not assume responsibility for the resolution of problems. The fact should be persistently explained that an example of indecisiveness in very small things can affect the big picture. We need painstaking and deliberate work which can influence subordinates. We need practical action worthy of emulation. Those who do not want to see this, who do everything possible to make themselves look good, who look for all sorts of "objective" factors to justify their irresponsibility, must be told right to their face that they are performing poorly.

Representatives of the political section in which Officer A. Makarenko serves, for example, are greeted in the units and subunits as experienced mentors capable of helping with their words and deeds to successfully master advanced know-how in the training and indoctrination of subordinates, and to organize the work at a high level. This is because people know that these officers are concerned about the state of the combat readiness and the strengthening of discipline, attentive and sensitive but also demanding. They look into every issue thoroughly and in detail. They make decisions and strive persistently to see that they are carried out, taking into account the situation, the opinions of the collective, the party and Komsomol aktiv and the Communists.

The officers in the political section strive to develop in the personnel a sense of independence, initiative and boldness in decision-making. When they consider any issue, before expressing their opinion, their recommendations and suggestions, they invariably ask the other person: "What would you have done in this situation?" or "What decision do you consider to be the best?" This forces the individual to think, to ponder, to seek the best ways to resolve any matter, and develops responsibility for his actions and initiative in him.

An important feature of the work of those in the political section is the fact that once they have detected shortcomings in the unit or subunit, they themselves also take responsibility for the shortcomings with their inherent demandingness and principle, rightly considering that the officer in the political section is equally to blame for omissions along with the commander, the political worker, the party and Komsomol organizations. This truly party stance on the part of the political section workers has great indoctrinational importance. The party demands of every Communist and particularly those in charge that they not shift the blame
onto others, not seek justifications for their deficiencies, but thoroughly analyze them and take decisive steps to rectify the situation.

Unfortunately, not all of the workers in the political sections have this sense of responsibility in their work in the units, on the ships and in the subunits. During their abrupt visits, some of them do not thoroughly study the life and work of the military collectives, do not bring proper pressure to bear to establish a climate of demandingness and earnestness there, and do little to teach the commanders, political workers and secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations how to work with people. A poor knowledge of the situation, lack of competence, a disinclination to burden themselves and indifference prevents them from making efficient decisions to eliminate deficiencies in the combat training and in the organization of the political training and various activities. The main thing for this kind of officer is to reveal deficiencies and report them to superiors—and that is the end of it. This work style on the part of officers in the political sections produces little benefit. It frequently has a negative effect on the development of a great sense of responsibility for the assigned job in the officers, Communists and Komsomol members.

The chief sets the tone in the work performed by the political section to develop in the officers a great sense of responsibility for the assigned job. His personal example, his self-criticalness, his boldness and decisiveness in combating negative occurrences teach people to work effectively, at full capacity, to be principled and persistent in achieving the objective. Indifference, lack of competence, attempts to sweep aside all accusations with respect to deficiencies and omissions, to place the responsibility on others, and a divergence of words and deeds, in turn, have a detrimental effect both on the collective of the political organ and on the indoctrination of the officers.

The political section in the unit in which Officer A. Burdyug serves was recently severely criticized. The political organ had been unable to accomplish the tasks set for it. This was primarily because the work had not been performed effectively and because proper attention was not given to the specific individual. The workers in the political section did not burden themselves with analyzing the effectiveness of their work. All of this resulted in significant omissions on the part of the political section in the struggle to improve the training process and the party and Komsomol work, in the struggle to strengthen discipline and ultimately, the struggle for a high level of combat readiness.

In order to develop in the military cadres the qualities needed by the commander and the political worker it is essential to improve the work style of the political organs, to enhance the responsibility and the competence of their officers in the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them, to increase their influence upon all aspects of the combat training and alert duty, to strengthen discipline, maintain good morale in the military collectives and increase the effectiveness of the socialist competition and the political indoctrination of the masses.

The Communists have always set an example of good efficiency, demandingness, intolerance of shortcomings, a great sense of responsibility for everything occurring in the military collective and an active struggle to enhance combat readiness, organization and order. They are even today in the front ranks of those to whom the interests of the homeland and its security are dear, resolutely
increasing the successes in the socialist competition and actively combatting that which hampers the attainment of new frontiers. Their ranks still include many people, however, who are indifferent to the successes and shortcomings of their collective, who do not experience pangs of conscience for failure to accomplish their tasks, who think least of all about their own professional skill, who live according to the principle "it's no concern to me." This kind of Communist never says "I am responsible for everything," does little to improve the training process and help the new fightingmen to master the weapons and equipment as rapidly as possible, and does not straighten out the negligent individual or the violator of discipline. He will not assume responsibility for the state of affairs in the military collective, even though he understands very well that his action—or rather his inaction—is detrimental to the combat readiness of the unit or the ship, and therefore of the Armed Forces, but has grown accustomed to his situation. He has grown accustomed to it because no one has held him accountable on the large scale.

Party demandingness, active ideological–indoctrinal work, strict monitoring of the training, the self-education and the practical work of the Communists, and openness are an effective remedy for this "illness." The task of the party organizations is one of thoroughly stepping up the struggle against all manifestations of complacency in the collective and of seeing to the establishment of a climate of demandingness and the development of public activeness in each Communist. A most resolute rebuff must be given to those Communists who throw up their hands when they encounter bad situations, who relax their creative and practical activeness, who try to conceal their far-from-militant character with various kinds of grumbling "with or without cause."

The Communist's avant-garde role is not a generalized thing; it is expressed in practical action. For the army and navy Communist this means, first of all, establishing in each military collective an atmosphere of great demandingness, intolerance of shortcomings and an orientation toward working selflessly to ensure the homeland's security and reliably protect the gains of socialism. The officer–Communist is evaluated from his actions and deeds. His readiness to accept responsibility for everything occurring in the military collective is also confirmed with specific action aimed at enhancing the fighting capability of the unit or the ship.

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11499
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COMPETITION: RESERVES FOR ENHANCING EFFECTIVENESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 87 (signed to press 18 Jun 87) pp 37-46

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Tkachev and Lt Col A. Nekrylov under the rubric "For the Training and Indoctrination--Good Quality": "The Competition: Reserves for Enhancing Effectiveness"; first two paragraphs are KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL introduction]

[Text] The Traveling Editorial Team of the Magazine KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Investigates the Problem

The restructuring underway in the army and navy has touched all aspects of the life of the personnel, including the socialist competition. What is being done in the units and on the ships to bring it into conformity with the demands of the times? What new approaches to the organization of the competition are helping to enhance its mobilizing and indoctrinating role? What is preventing it from having a greater impact on the quality and the results of the fightingmen's military work, the development of their creative initiative and the establishment of unity of words and deeds?

With the help of commanders, political workers and the party and Komsomol aktiv, the magazine's traveling editorial team studied these issues in the Guards Motorized Rifle Proletarian, Moscow-Minsk Division, in an airborne division and in two formations of the Baltic Fleet. The journalists learned how the competition was launched and the socialist commitments were accepted at the beginning of the training year and inquired about how they had been fulfilled during the winter period, attended the final spring testing and conducted a survey covering both the organizers of the competition and its participants. This article is about the nuggets of positive experience already acquired, about negative factors and still unutilized reserves for improving the organization of the competition.

The Commitments--Stimuli to or Brakes on Initiative?

One of the most typical signs of the restructuring in the competition is the intensification of its democratic principles and increased possibilities for vital creativity on the part of the personnel and for the demonstration of initiative by the people. In most of the military collectives in which the traveling editorial team worked the Leninist principle of voluntary acceptance of socialist commitments was so fully applied perhaps for the first time in recent years.
The fightingmen willingly exercised the right to independently define their goals for their combat and moral improvement, to choose those with whom they would compete. Soldiers, seamen, NCOs and petty officers 18 to 20 years of age also need the help and advice of senior personnel in a matter as complex as this, of course. That is what they received, help and advice, and not instructions to be followed unquestioningly. Some of the places where this was done: the airborne regiment in which Officers Yu. Pashchenko and A. Bobkov serve, the missile cruiser Groznuy, the battalion headed by Guards Lieutenant Colonel P. Mikitenko and the small ASW ship Komsomolets Bashkirii. More than 90 percent of the participants surveyed there said that they had defined their goals themselves but that they had been helped to orient themselves by the commanders of the platoons, companies, batteries, groups, battalions (divizion) and combat units and the subunit political workers.

As a result, we do not have the "blanket" commitments with 10, 15 or even 20 points, which it is difficult just to remember. Cases of identical commitments dictated by the commander or the political worker have almost been eliminated. Most of the fightingmen set an average of four to six specific goals for themselves for the winter training period: to earn the excellent rating, to pass the tests for 2nd or 1st class, to master a related specialty, to perform exercises or missions with a rating of excellent or good, to better the norms by so much, to meet the VSK [military sports complex] standards or the standards for a sports rating. The individual commitments added up to fairly large but perfectly realistic team commitments.

The competitors themselves feel that the public defense of the individual socialist commitments had a considerable effect. Having observed the defense of commitments, we can say with all responsibility that this is something which is needed and worthwhile, something which deserves every kind of support and dissemination. The defense of the commitments was conducted as an experiment, and it is perfectly understandable that different approaches would be taken. In the aforementioned battalion the Communists in charge themselves set an example of democracy and openness. In the batteries, where the fightingmen, the sections and platoons defended their intended commitments, the commanders and the secretaries of the party organizations reported theirs first. During the defense of the commitments by the batteries in the battalion, the commander and the political worker were the very first to inform the collective of their own personal plans in the competition. Guards Captain S. Naumenko, deputy commander for political affairs, saw nothing embarrassing about the fact that Guards Sergeant A. Borets jokingly commented: "You have pointed us toward the maximum, but you yourself agree to achieve only a four in the drill training." The political worker replied: "I accept the criticism. I'll go higher. I'll earn an excellent evaluation also for the drill training. But where is the maximum for your team, if you are aiming for only a good evaluation in the physical training"? Amidst good-natured laughter from those present, the entire team decided to achieve the highest rating.

On the ships the public defense of the commitments was conducted by categories: seamen and petty officers, in the parties, groups and batteries; officers and warrant officers, at their meetings. Everyone without exception is listed on the boards showing the individual commitments and their fulfillment. There is complete openness.
We shall demonstrate the actual benefit from the defense of the commitments, using the example of a meeting of staff officers in a unit of sea frontier ships. Captain 2nd Rank I. Shulman, deputy chief of staff, was informed by his comrades that it would not be a bad thing to begin looking for new tactical procedures for interaction among the ships in a training battle. They also straightened out Captain-Lieutenant V. Golovach, squadron chemical officer, who had attempted to make a socialist commitment out of his service duty to conduct regular and good classes in the specialty for his subordinates. Major of Medical Service V. Kozlov, squadron medical officer, made the same mistake and corrected it with the help of the collective.

A weighty argument in favor of the public defense of the commitments is the fact that in those collectives where this was done the commitments were either completely fulfilled or only isolated individuals did not achieve the goals they had set.

Initiative needs to be not only encouraged and developed; it also needs to be directed into the proper channels. We know the enormous importance of increasing the number of masters among the officers, shore-based and seagoing warrant officers with respect to improving the combat training and maintaining the units and the ships at a high level of combat readiness. In the formation of surface ships in which Captain 3rd Rank A. Pervushin is secretary of the staff party organization, however, many officers and warrant officers avoid the competition for the title of master of combat skills. Calculations have shown that the number of specialists with the highest skills rating would almost double if everyone who is entitled to take the tests for master would pass them. Many seagoing officers and warrant officers, however, claim that they are too busy indoctrinating subordinates, that there is no time left for their own technical growth. The formation staff officers, most of whom are experts on the weapons and equipment, could set an example worthy of emulation. They do not do so because of a disinclination to bother taking the tests. They are almost all Communists. Why, one asks, does the party organization not make it a matter of principle for each of them to realize his potential and become a master? After all, the CPSU Charter required that each party member improve his skills. There have been numerous discussions of this matter in the collective, but the party bureau is not demonstrating proper principle. And the cause ultimately suffers.

Bureaucratic administration, which is still in evidence in some places, also causes considerable harm to the rivalry of the fightingmen. In the Guards motorized rifle regiment in which Guards Major O. Zaporozhets is a member of the party committee, for example, socialist commitments were accepted easily and rapidly in accordance with the expression used in the forces: "initiative from below under orders from above." The battalion commanded by Guards Major A. Yunakov was ordered to reach for the excellent rating. At a general meeting the tasks facing the unit were explained to the fightingmen, a few words were said about the conditions, about the need to learn to fire with excellence and to operate the infantry combat vehicle skilfully, and the men were "called upon" to set high goals in the competition.

"I had just taken over the company and had not yet gotten to know the personnel the way I should," Guards Captain A. Shmelev said. "I could see when I first got acquainted with the collective, however, that there was a lot of work to do, and the most optimistic commitment would not be above a four. The unit command element felt otherwise, however."
Another commander also tried to convince the Communists in charge that his company was not capable of reaching the excellent level. His arguments were not considered either, however. Guards Captain P. Golikov alone succeeded in getting his point across. "The company will be an excellent one by the end of the year," he announced firmly. "We are not yet ready to accomplish this during the winter training period. Our training is not up to it."

The commander's principled position deserves respect, because it reflects concern that the competition not be turned into a rigidly organized formality which constrains initiative and interest as soon as they emerge. Let us cite a few opinions about this.

Sergeant G. Gafarov: "The deputy company commander for political affairs took us into the Lenin room and dictated the text of our commitments. They were the same for all of us, and I therefore have no interest in competing. Furthermore, I do not have a rival." Petty Officer 2nd Rank O. Chekmarev: "The commander of the communications division held a talk on the acceptance of commitments. Not with each of us specifically, but with all of us together. I added several points to my commitments for the winter period. In general, though, it is just a routine. All of us have the same...." Lieutenant S. Smirnov: "Every soldier should follow his own conscience and accept commitments to fit his capabilities. There would then be interest in the competition."

This is all true. It requires more than simply giving the fighting men scope for initiative, however. We also have to get around to every individual, to work with each of them. Only 18 percent of the competition participants who filled out the questionnaire indicated that individual work had been performed with them, however, 70 percent said that there had been "collective discussion," and 12 percent stated that "there was no discussion at all." The statistics clearly do not favor the organizers of the competition. At any rate, this approach does not give the people the proper orientation toward the intense, conscientious work which is the only way to achieve the goals set.

In Order for Words to Become Deeds

This is the third year the small ASW ship Komsomolets Bashkirii has held the excellent title. It is considered the best ship in the Baltic Fleet in ASW training and the best in the formation with respect to artillery training. The crew fulfilled its commitments entirely during the winter training period. All of the missions and combat exercises were accomplished with excellent or good evaluations. Three combat sections confirmed their excellent title, and complete interchangeability was achieved in two of them. Every second seaman is an excellent specialist, and two thirds of the personnel are specialists 1st or 2nd class.

We asked the ship's commander, Captain 3rd Rank A. Zhitenev, to tell us how the crew is able to turn words into deeds.

"How do we do it? There is nothing special about it. I teach the commanders of the battle sections, monitor things and demand that thorough preparations be made for every class, exercise and drill, that they be conducted with methodological competence, intensively, that no one be allowed to take it easy. They do the same with the warrant officers and petty officers. We total up the results as soon as
the training is ended and post the evaluations, which are shown on competition charts, given in the radio newspaper and announced to each collective at formations. We make examples of and reward those who try hard. We look into the situation of the remiss on an individual basis. We talk with them, shame them and penalize them along service, party and Komsomol lines.

"I suppose you could call this the general system of action. The core element, however, is the fact that one has to work with the specific individual day after day. Lieutenant O. Aliferov did not organize the classes properly. Senior Lieutenant A. Burykin totalled up the results of the competition for the week in haste, as a necessary formality. Warrant Officer V. Shcherbina was careless in preparing the ship for a cruise. A seaman committed an infraction of discipline. A petty officer stood a watch poorly.... In short, life has a full range of unexpected things and people have inherent weaknesses. Indoctrination takes up the lion's share not just of my time and energy, but of all the officers and the party and Komsomol secretaries. The most difficult thing is to help the person understand why he needs to put everything he has into the training, the service, the competition. It is not for the sake of an excellent evaluation or a good result—although, these too are needed as indicators of our combat development—but for that most important thing, the combat readiness of the ship, which depends upon literally every person. In order not to miss a submarine or an aircraft in case something should happen, in order not to permit it to dump its deadly cargo upon our nation. Seamen M. Gadelshin, Kh. Magafurov and Yu. Travinilev served on our ship. They felt that everything was "up to the lights" [on the panels]. One could not count the times they sat here in this compartment, how many conversations were held with them, how many discussions and meetings, before what would appear to be a simple fact got through to each of them. There was no other way. If you want to stimulate the human factor, then work with each specific individual, work with him as he is. Elevate the good individual in the eyes of the collective and, together with the collective, help the poor performer to improve. Strictly speaking, this is what the competition is for. Therein lies its indoctrinational value."

We hardly need to add anything to what the commander has said. There is just one thing. Alongside the Komsomolets Bashkirii are the ships commanded by Captains 3rd Rank Ye. Travnikov and M. Antonov. The know-how is right at hand: adopt it and apply it on your own ships. To tell the truth, they are interested. And both ships did make some progress during the winter period. Their results are still far more modest, however, their commitments were not completely fulfilled and the competition among their crews lacks the effectiveness found on the leader. There is just one cause: the organizational and indoctrinational work performed by the officers, the party and Komsomol organizations is not as good, and the individual has still not been placed at the center of that work. The system and the work methods can be adopted, but they must be supplemented with one's own style and attitude toward the job.

All of the participants in the competition say that it becomes an effective force for improving the combat and political training when you engage in it constantly, developing in people a spirit of rivalry, responsibility for their words and intolerance of shortcomings. Since the new commander arrived a great deal of work has been done in this area in the Guards motorized rifle regiment, which not long
ago was not a shining example of success, to put it mildly. The command element and the party organization, working together, succeeded in involving the men in the struggle for a fitting reception for the 70th anniversary of Great October and for the fulfillment of decisions coming out of the 27th CPSU Congress. A climate of earnestness and demandingness is being established in the collective. The results of the winter training period are the best proof that the regiment is on the right track. The motorized riflemen, whose training was tested by a district commission, performed well in general. Not all of the subunits fulfilled their commitments, however. This was mainly due to errors in the organization of the competition.

We have already mentioned the fact that personnel in the battalion commanded by Guards Major A. Yunakov "committed itself" to become an excellent battalion. The spring inspection convincingly demonstrated that the socialist commitments handed down "from above" were too much for the collective. Among other things, this was true of the fire training, the main discipline for motorized riflemen. Many of the fightingmen received low evaluations in the firing exercises. Some of them gave the excuse of a crosswind, which, they said, prevented them from destroying the targets. Such claims can not be taken seriously, however. The cause of what happened was more likely something else. It was complacency stemming from irresponsibility. This can be judged from the following. The motorized rifle company commanded by Guards Captain V. Semukhin went to the firing line to perform the firing exercises without having ranged their weapons or tuned the communication equipment. This had to have a negative effect on the firing, of course. Although the company commander himself and Officers N. Isayev, O. Kharchenko and O. Chashkin, platoon commanders, received good evaluations, they were below those called for in the commitments. Nor did their subordinates distinguish themselves. Furthermore, all targets were destroyed by only one of the nine gunner-operators. Incidentally, these were considered to be the best in the battalion. Nor did personnel of the military collectives commanded by Guards Captain A. Shmelev and Guards Lieutenant M. Takhtov demonstrate brilliant skill.

Almost 80 percent of the subunits failed to reach their goals. Naturally, the battalion did not fulfill its commitments. Furthermore, there was a considerable discrepancy between the evaluations given by the group leaders and those posted by the inspectors. A total of 40 percent of the students in the Marxist-Leninist training group, 27 percent of the students in the political study groups and 47 percent of the warrant officers in the political training group failed to confirm their previous evaluations. One cannot help thinking that there was an attempt to force the progress up to the level indicated in the commitments.

The professional training level of certain Communists in charge also proved to be low. Almost half of the officers at regimental headquarters failed to fulfill their commitments, for example, and only every fourth Communist who took the test achieved the goals he had set.

Afterward, when the causes were analyzed, the regimental commander, his deputy for political affairs and the secretary of the party committee frankly admitted that not all of the possibilities contained in the very nature of the competition had been fully utilized in the collective. One has to agree with this. How can we talk about rivalry when, during the firing from the infantry combat vehicle,
the gunner-operator was from one crew and the commander and the mechanic-driver were from other crews? This meant that there was no rivalry between organic crews and no striving to surpass a comrade in one's skill. Classes were sometimes postponed or even cancelled because headquarters had scheduled simultaneously classes for many subunits in the field, and there in the "postage-stamp" area the companies had no room to deploy, or because under instructions "from above" some of the fightingmen would be taken away from the classes to rehearse for amateur performances or to help some enterprise. When it came time to total up the results, the evaluations were made practically from sight. According to Guards Captain B. Golikov, a subunit commander, they frequently did not consider how well the fightingman fired, drove the infantry combat vehicle or knew the equipment, but his public work. And the people can see all of this. They sense the undisguised phoniness, and as a result they do not have the proper attitude, without which competition is not competition.

"Our companies did not rush forth with a commitment to achieve the excellent rating," Guards Captain V. Semukhin said, with a nod toward Guards Captain A. Shmelev. "We are not ready for that yet. We were given the order, however, and we had to obey it. And do you know what the worst part of it is? The personnel are accustomed to accepting these instructions. When commitments are forced upon them, they accept them without a murmur, although they could vote for either a good or an excellent evaluation."

Is that all there is to it, though? Have some people not used the large commitments imposed upon them as a convenient excuse for not particularly exerting themselves? The regimental commander believes that this is exactly what has happened. Some company and platoon commanders have poor professional skills and do not have an adequate grasp of the methods for training and indoctrinating the personnel and organizing the competition. The most alarming thing, however, is the fact that they are not particularly trying to improve their professional training. They rarely begin the firing in order to demonstrate to their subordinates how to destroy targets, and frequently avoid this altogether, so that there is no reason to talk about their setting a personal example in the competition, about their enthusiasm or creative zeal. What is more, some of them sometimes lack even the elementary sense of responsibility.

"This is proof," the regimental commander said. "Guards Captain Shmelev's company was supposed to practice firing from an infantry combat vehicle. The time was set, the equipment was allocated and the company left for the range. A few hours later I asked how they were doing. I was told that they had not yet begun to fire. I was surprised, of course, and I decided to find out myself what was going on. I arrived at the field and saw the company commander and other officers relaxing, while the soldiers and NCOs were doing various things. I asked why nothing was getting done. I was told that their vehicles had not been prepared for firing. You will agree that even manageable commitments will hardly be achieved with this kind of attitude toward their fulfillment."

A reasonable conclusion. On the other hand, however, there are serious deficiencies in the officer training in the regiment. They are caused by a lack of basic organization. The classes are not conducted regularly, and not always conducted well. Certain officers have used the pretext of urgent matters to get out of them, assuring the instructors that they could already hit a fly from a combat infantry vehicle. When it came time for the final test, however, they could not even hit an elephant, figuratively speaking.
Certain officers therefore do not have the opportunity or do not want to work persistently and regularly to improve their officer training. The virus of inertia and irresponsibility is very infectious. It is easily contracted but is difficult to destroy, particularly when the people are not held accountable either along service or along party and Komsomol lines. A study has shown that of all the commanders receiving serious complaints from the Communists in charge for inadequate responsibility in organizing the competition, only 27 percent were discussed as party procedure. The figure is even lower for the Komsomol. It is not surprising that more than half of the officers surveyed frankly said that party demandingness needed to be increased.

One cannot say that the regimental party committee did not concern itself with developing a sense of responsibility in the Communists for achieving the goals set in the competition. This was discussed at almost all of the party meetings. The party committee heard reports from Guards Major A. Yunakov, battalion commander, and Guards Captain V. Semukhin on how they were fulfilling the requirements contained in the CPSU Charter and what kind of personal contribution they were making to the improvement of the combat training and the fulfillment of the commitments accepted by the subunits. Deficiencies were pointed out to these and certain other Communists, and they were given recommendations as to what needed attention. The criticism and the advice were not followed up with monitoring, demandingness and assistance, however.

The party committee simply did not demonstrate principle when the large goals were set. It did not actually rouse the party organizations of the battalions and regimental headquarters for the struggle to see that every Communist set a personal example in the training and the competition. Unfortunately, workers from the division political section, who repeatedly visited the units, did not set the party committee straight in good time.

Daily rivalry among the personnel in expertise, practical skill, ingenuity and mental quest are the soul of competition, its internal engine. The spirit of involved rivalry does not become extinguished only when there is complete clarity as to whom one is to measure his abilities against, in what respects and for the achievement of what specific results, and when there is regular, public comparison of the results. It is precisely this kind of exact definitiveness, openness and comparability which are lacking in the Guards motorized rifle regiment and on the escort vessel Svireppy, however, and in certain subunits of the airborne formation. Around one third of the competition participants surveyed were unable to name their rivals or to say who was ahead, and about half of them responded by saying that the results were not totalled in the company (or battery) each week as they are supposed to be.

We believe that there is something to think about here. First and foremost, about the fact that behind every figure there are living people with a specific attunement, with an already developed attitude toward the competition, one which cannot be altered with directives or willful decisions. What is needed is a set of measures aimed at renewing the competition. They must essentially add up to the simple but far-reaching formula: beyond the words there is action, beyond the commitments lies a great deal of organizational work to ensure their absolute fulfillment.
Overcome the Formalism and Complacency

Formalism is impeding the restructuring of the competition and reducing its effectiveness. Such is the unanimous opinion of the officers. In talks and in the questionnaires many of them fairly convincingly revealed the multiplicity of the negative manifestations of formalism as rust eating away at everything not insulated from it.

"The organization of the competition is a sham," wrote Captain A. Shelepov, assistant regimental chief of staff, "when there is no rivalry but evaluations are given, when the results are not summed up but winners are announced, when words take the place of concrete results." "This is replacing vital activity with paperwork," Senior Lieutenant S. Lagosha declared. "The personnel are tired of writing out commitments for each ocean cruise, for each exercise, for the period of each combat training mission." Captain 3rd Rank A. Vasilenko, commander of the navigation section, the smallest on the ship, presented physical proof in the form of a thick pile of paper he brought to a party meeting. "These are the 'commitments' of my subordinates for the year. The large sections must have a lot more than this. One wonders just who needs all of this paperwork?"

Indeed, who needs it, and for what? Even today, when it is precisely specified that the personnel are to accept commitments for a training period, and the results of the competition by task and norm are to be determined even as they are worked on, the unneeded paperwork continues. We looked through dozens of filled-in school notebooks with our own eyes, in which the goals set by a soldier, a seaman, an NCO or a petty officer for a 6-month period were repeated almost word for word in the commitments accepted for periods of specific combat training missions or forthcoming exercises. This can be called nothing other than lessons in formalism. The force of inertia and the habit of working for the inspectors is truly great, and the latter, unfortunately, have not yet rid themselves of the obsolete canon of evaluating the competition based on the presence of paperwork.

M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, called formalism the most vicious enemy of competition as vital creativity of the masses. The organizers themselves consider formalism to be the biggest evil. And everyone is unanimously for eradicating it. If everyone is "for," however, then who is "against"? What is actually hampering the campaign to root out formalism, the campaign for the practical organization of the competition in accordance with Leninist principles and the demands of the party? We believe that no one and nothing is hampering things except for inertia and the habit of complaining about obsolete procedures and a shortage of time, of waiting for instructions from above at every step.

In the competition, as in everything else, the restructuring must be started with oneself. Is it not clear to those superiors who impose unrealistic commitments that willful pressure is inadmissible in the competition? They know that very well. Guards Major A. Yunakov and Guards Captains A. Shmelev and V. Semukhin are well aware also that the acceptance of commitments is a voluntary matter and that they, like Guards Captain A. Golikov, could stand up for their point of view. If worse came to worst, they could turn to the party committee or the party section for support. And how difficult would it be for the formation commander and the chief of its political section to simply decide to put an end to the writing up of so many commitments?
We know that the commander bears personal responsibility for organizing the competition and for its day-to-day supervision. He shares it with the political organ (his deputy for political affairs) and the staff, and with active participation by the party and Komsomol organizations. This is what one sees in reality, however. It is mainly the commanders of platoons, companies, batteries and equivalent subunits who handle the immediate organization of competition among the fightingmen. Nor is it any secret that the subunits are headed mainly by young officers with inadequate experience and skills in organizing and supervising the competition. And supervision of the competition is something of an art. An art which has to be mastered, of course. But what do we have?

Almost 70 percent of the officers at the platoon and company level candidly wrote in the questionnaire and stated in the discussions that they are not taught how to supervise the competition or are taught that which they do not need to learn—things like how to make up charts and display boards and how to compile reports. In the officer training plans, for example, we could not find a subject pertaining to methods for organizing the competition, for achieving rivalry in the exercises and classes, for summing up the fulfillment of the commitments, or ways to encourage those out front to work with the laggards. It is therefore not surprising that probably half of the subunit commanders have no idea or have an extremely vague idea of how to supervise the competition. "We were taught some things about this at the school," one officer acknowledged, "we were taught it with the expectation that we would acquire this science mainly in the forces. Everything is clearer there. This is my fifth year in the unit, however, and I have only heard the competition discussed in general terms. It appears that the restructuring will not affect the competition any time soon so that we can finally move on from general discussion to actual work. We therefore do not have competition today, but only the appearance of competition."

But let us be objective. The data show that far from all of the officers have a burning desire to master methods and know-how for organizing and supervising the competition. A certain portion of the subunit commanders demonstrate indifference, a disinclination to burden themselves with "extra problems," and an inclination to depend on others. The senior chiefs accuse many of the young officers of this. It is also true, however, that the young officers are so burdened with service and public matters and worn out from handling various hypothetical problems assigned by inspectors from the unit and formation headquarters that, as Senior Lieutenant N. Varlaamov said and backed up with facts, they simply throw up their hands and lose interest in the service. All sorts of reports, plans and charts are increasingly required of the commander of the company or section, and suggestions given as to how they should teach, help and support their men. We feel that orders such as "Officers to the wardroom!" "Officers form up on the poop!" and "Officers to primary control station!" are heard too frequently over the ship's intercom system. And too many inspectors from headquarters, political organs and directorates at various levels visit the ship every day. The officers receive so many instructions that they sometimes do not have the time to work with the men.

What do the participants feel is needed in order to improve its organization and make it more effective? More active personal participation by the commanders of units and ships in the resolution of pressing problems. More systematic and focused training of the officers, particularly at the battalion, company and platoon
levels, in the methods and praxis of organizational and indoctrination work. Specifically, they need to be taught the essence of the Leninist principles of competition, the party's contemporary demands and directives issued by the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The subunit commanders and political workers need constant individual work and help from their immediate and direct superiors. The party and Komsomol organizations need to increase their influence on the restructuring of the competition, which still leaves a great deal to be desired. Here are a few opinions.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Sokolovskiy: "The party organization is clearly not exerting enough influence on the socialist competition. The work lacks specificity, and Communists who do not fulfill their commitments are not held accountable."
Major S. Radionov: "The party organization gives little attention to the socialist competition. There is a great deal of talk but little action. When one sees this, one knows how it will end: in a loss of desire not just to compete but even to work." Lieutenant I. Pidserkovny: "In our party organization one does not feel that force which could somehow shake up and alter the course of the competition. The people have grown accustomed to this as to something consisting of paperwork, and nothing is being changed as of now...."

With respect to the Komsomol organizations, the opinion is even more absolute and unequivocal: they have either extremely little influence on the competition or none at all.

These statements are not without foundation. We have already mentioned the fact that the regimental party committee of which Guards Major O. Zaporozhets is a member has not gotten its bearings in or found methods of influencing the competition, and the party organization of the formation directorate of which Captain 3rd Rank A. Pervushin is secretary is not seeing to it that the Communists play a personal, avant-garde role in the improvement of combat skills. Many more such examples could be cited. The battalion party organization headed by Captain V. Khankin and the ship's party bureau with Senior Lieutenant N. Babeshko as its secretary have been timid about moving into the area of the competition and are not seeing to it that the Communists set an example in the competition. The only influence they exercise consists of discussions, matter-of-fact appeals, criticism (frequently without naming names) at party meetings, the rendering of reports by a few Communists and the calling to account of one or two CPSU members from among those who fail to fulfill their commitments. It was with good reason that the questionnaire reflected the thought that certain party committees and bureaus are turning into "agencies of appeals and punishment."

The Komsomol organization on the escort vessel Svirepyy was not involved in the competition. Lieutenant V. Rybchenko, its secretary, was unable to say which of the officers-and-Komsomol members he had worked with, whom he had helped and what the Komsomol bureaus of the sections were doing in this respect. Nor did the secretary know which of the Komsomol members had failed to fulfill their commitments during the winter training period. But then the Komsomol leader did not even know the names of the secretaries.

All of this shows that the political organs are doing a poor job of supervising the party and Komsomol organizations and the restructuring of the work style and methods, that they are not doing enough to teach the aktiv new approaches to the job or how to work with a specific Communist or Komsomol member.
The skillful use of morale-boosting incentives for the competition participants is an important reserve for making it more effective. Everyone likes it when his work is singled out and set up as an example for others. This motivates people to work even better, to strive for more. In the opinion of most of the officers, there should be no restrictions on this. Those out front should be discussed loud and clear (without going overboard, of course), so that the idler does not have it easier than the outstanding individual, so that the "mediocrities" feel uncomfortable against the background of the outstanding. Initiative and creative zeal should be encouraged and not penalized.

The formation of surface ships is doing the right thing in publicly honoring and rewarding the outstanding. A rally of competition winners was held in the formation prior to the 20th Komsomol Congress. Orders and medals were presented to the outstanding officers, warrant officers and petty officers. Many of the seamen who had achieved excellent results in the training were rewarded with certificates, letters to their hometowns and short leaves. And they were issued not just a pass but a train ticket as well. Fightingmen who had not fulfilled their commitments were also invited to the rally. Not a single critical comment was made about them. There is no doubt that the ceremony honoring the outstanding left a mark on their ego and in their mind, however.

Morale-boosting incentives are skillfully utilized on the missile cruiser Groznyy, which applies the entire range of measures covered in the regulations and seeks additional ones. For example, the winner of the competition is granted the right to hoist the Navy Flag, and the ship's commander announces this each time the formal and exciting ritual is performed. Trips to the oblast center and cultural visits to the theater are arranged for the winning subunit collectives. They are granted the right to select a film to be shown, and they can request songs to be played over the ship radio. On the initiative of the Komsomol committee these collectives are photographed at the Red Banner of the Komsomol Central Committee, and each of the fightingmen received a copy with an appropriate inscription as a memento.

The study showed, however, that some commanders are still making infrequent use of such incentives as reporting to the hometown on the achievements of an individual excelling in the combat and political training, honoring competition winners at general meetings of the personnel, issuing special leaflets and posters devoted to the best specialists, rewarding the fightingman with a photograph taken by the unfurled unit standard, and entering his name in the Book of Honor. Some are just stingy with rewards in general.

Most of the complaints were about the inadequate use of morale-boosting incentives for officers out front in the competition. The official documents state that officers whose subunits, military units or ships have held the excellent title for 2 years in a row may also be recommended for state awards, granted early promotions in rank and given priority for advancement in the service. While the first measure is used and has a beneficial effect on the personnel, the last two are used extremely rarely. Officer Ye. Korobko cited the following example.

When the formation was taken over by its present commander—who, incidentally, has done a great deal to make the competition more effective and introduced a set of criteria for objectively determining the winners and additional forms of
morale-boosting incentives for those out front—he decided to take advantage of the possibilities officially provided. Recommendations for early promotions in rank for the commanders of subunits which had held the excellent title for 3 to 5 years were periodically sent through the chain of command. More than 10 of them were sent, but they got neither a yea nor a nay, so to speak. It could not even be determined at what level they were being held up.

Or take advancement in the service. The personnel agencies do not respond to recommendations from the site. When they want to reward an officer for consistent successes in the competition, they immediately advance him and send him for training. This is what happened just before the end of the past training year on the escort ship Sviyryp. Almost all of the commanders of the departments, divisions and batteries were replaced within a short period of time. This was the main cause of serious failures in the training. The ship and three departments lost their excellent title. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated case.

Most of the officers with whom we spoke expressed the hope that this harmful practice would be ended in the course of implementing decisions coming out of the January Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

We also heard many complaints about the reporting requirements. At least 90 percent of the officers could not understand who needs preliminary "average approximate" data during the second half of April, and why, when the rating tests have not yet been taken, the outstanding personnel have not been announced, and many veteran specialists will leave for the reserve in May, to be replaced by new men. Complete and precise totals can be provided by the beginning of the summer training period. The information is demanded ahead of that time, however, and the semi-sham paper mill keeps turning.

Formalism and indifference are multifaceted and tenacious, as we can see, and they cannot be rooted out without an uncompromising struggle conducted on the basis of party principle.

Socialist competition is a powerful means of stimulating human activity. Healthy rivalry is a great help in the work and the service. In the competition, as on a cinder track, the one behind pulls toward the one who has broken out front and does his best to draw near and pass him. The individual puts everything he has into it, mobilizes all his reserves, makes a creative quest and demonstrates a will to win. And when this is the case, there is no stagnation but a constant striving forward, toward new heights in the combat skills. In order for the competition to be that way, however, to have that kind of morale charge, the creative spirit and innovativeness inherent in the nature of the competition must be resolutely returned to it.

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ARMY JOURNAL: COMMUNISTS LIBERATED MOSLEM WOMEN

Moscow AGITATOR ARMI I FLOTA in Russian No 13, 1987, pp 18-19

[Question from reader and reply by A. Loginov, Senior Scientific Editor of ARGUMENTI I FAKTY, under the rubric "You Asked": "'Khudzhum' Means an Offensive"]

[Text] My grandmother told me about how here, in Fergana, a woman was formerly not considered to be a human being, about the movement to get rid of the outdoor robe (parandzha). Only after that did the treatment of women change completely. Could you tell about how this happened.——Private Sh. Akhunov

A. Loginov, Senior Scientific Editor of the bulletin ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, answers the reader's question.

Prior to the revolution there were numerous customs degrading to women in Turkestan. The body of sacred Moslem law (shari'a) and the customs of Islam (adat) made her a slave within the family, while the dense weave of the outdoor robe and veil separated her from the public. Decrees abolishing the payment of bridemoney and polygamy, banning child marriages, providing legal protection for women who had abandoned the seclusive clothing, and others were passed in Central Asia following Great October.

The proclaimed equality had to actually be put into effect, however. The difficult conditions of the civil war in Turkestan prevented the immediate implementation of the legislative acts granting equality to women of the local nationalities. Not until 1926 did the political and the economic situation in the Central Asian region make it possible to begin resolutely destroying these social customs and truly undertake the emancipation of women.

In a report presented at the 3rd Central Asian Conference on Women's Work in June 1926, I. Zelenskiy, chairman of the Central Asian Office of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee, advanced the "khudzhum" (offensive) as a slogan. That is, he called for the beginning of a mass struggle against religious and social biases which degraded the honor and dignity of women.

The Communists were the first to begin. They removed the outdoor robe from their wives at meetings, took the women to groups for the elimination of illiteracy and helped them to find jobs. Increasingly, following the explanatory work, the women of local nationalities threw off their outdoor robes and burned them.
The reactionary clergy, the baits and their accomplices initiated terror against those drawn to the new life. During the night of 15 March 1927, in the village of Nazar-Makhram (near Andizhan), bandits killed Kh. Gaibova, representative of the party raykom for working with women, and her husband. N. Yuldashkhodzhayeva, one of the first Uzbek actresses, paid with her life for wanting equality. Reactionaries brutally murdered around 2,500 female activists from 1926 to 1928 in Uzbekistan alone.

The enemy resistance was unable to halt the movement toward the new life by women of the East. During the first decade of Soviet power thousands of women of the local nationalities were elected to the soviets and people's courts. There were only around 928 female Communists in the Central Asian region during the first year of the "khudzhum," but there were 11,701 in 1932.

That was 60 years ago. The women of Central Asia take an active part in public life today. A total of 183 women (35.9 percent of all the deputies) were elected to the Union republic Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation, in Uzbekistan, 183 (35.9 percent) in Kazakhstan, 127 (36.3 percent) in Kirghizia, 126 (36 percent) in Tajikistan, and 118 women (35.8 percent) were elected in Turkmenia. Women account for around 50 percent of all the deputies in the local soviets of people's deputies in the Central Asian republics. Many women are in management positions in industry, in consumer services and public health. Girls account for half of the students at Central Asia'a higher educational institutions today.

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ARMY PAPER REJECTS USE OF FORCE ARGUMENT

[Article by observer Manki Ponomarev under the "International Observer Replies to Reader" rubric: "Concern for Security -- Genuine and Affected"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction and reader's letter]

[Text] A letter from reader F. Yesikov from Kazakhstan attracted attention in the editorial mail. He writes in particular:

"I cannot agree with the way in which we treat the defense of our country's vital interests in a number of cases. The United States and several other Western states do not hesitate to resort to military force in defending their interests in various parts of the world. I believe that in a number of cases we too should take resolute measures, including military measures. This would only add to the Soviet Union's prestige."

I have no grounds for doubting, Comrade Yesikov, that in sending this letter to the editorial office you proceed from the best motives and are indeed concerned for the Soviet state's interests, for its security and international prestige. Moreover, some other readers, for instance A. Krasnov from Groznyy, express a similar viewpoint. Here A. Krasnov, like you, emphasizes that he is no longer young, that he knows life, that he experienced enough grief during the war. Nonetheless I cannot agree with your opinion. And here is why.

As the basic argument justifying your position you cite the example of the United States and even Israel which, you say, "goes out to get its enemies on the territory of other states and is afraid of no one." But surely you cannot forget that U.S. ruling circles are pursuing an imperial expansionist policy aimed at establishing world rule. They have even put forward the so-called "neoglobalism doctrine" which not only justifies Washington's chase after world hegemony but also indicates ways and means of achieving it. This doctrine is based on the gamble on force. Arrogantly arrogating the right to be the shaper of the world's destiny, the U.S. Administration does not stop at the direct use of force wherever and whenever it considers it to be to its advantage. Remember, for instance, the occupation of tiny Grenada or the rocket and bomb attacks on the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Banghazi.
In the chase after world rule the United States arbitrarily declares vast regions of the world, often many thousands of miles from U.S. shores, to be the sphere of its "vital interests" and, having turned them into seats of tension and conflict, seeks to assert its military presence there. The most recent example is the Persian Gulf. Using as a pretext the attack on a U.S. frigate here, the White House and the Pentagon have hastened to send additional warships there, are seeking the "right" to use airfields belonging to a number of Arab states for their own aircraft, and are threatening to strike against Iranian territory. And this is all being done under the flag of "defending vital U.S. interests" and "ensuring security" in international waters.

So, you ask, can these provocative actions undertaken to the advantage of U.S. reactionary and militarist forces, monopoly capital, and the military-industrial complex, not serve as a model for emulation by the USSR, a socialist state? Surely you cannot -- even mentally -- put our country and its policy on a par with Israel and its predatory, aggressive policy which generates righteous anger and indination among all honest people of the world?

But, Comrade Yesikov, it is not only a matter of moral categories, although of themselves they are of enormous importance. I should like to draw attention to a number of other extraordinarily important circumstances.

The times of the imperial policy which the United States is still trying to pursue have receded into the past. The time has come to reexamine former foreign policy concepts in line with the new realities. That is the new political thinking by which the Soviet Union is guided in its actions in the world arena. The USSR and the other socialist states have not linked and do not link their future with the military solution of international problems and they advocate the solution of all vexed international issues solely by peaceful means, by political methods. The conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee clearly stated that the fraternal countries "firmly base" their international relations "on respect for the principles of independence and international sovereignty, the nonuse of force or the threat of force, the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, the solution of conflicts by peaceful means, noninterference in internal affairs, equal rights, and the other principles and goals envisaged by the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act and universally recognized norms of international relations."

Does that mean that the Soviet Union and its allies neglect their security and are not concerned for it? Of course not. The socialist states do not lay claim to more security than other states, but they will not accept less. Under the real and complex conditions of the world today the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states are obliged to maintain their armed forces with a composition and at a level enabling them to repel any outside attack against any Pact state. That is why the allied states' armed forces are maintained in a state of combat readiness sufficient to prevent them from being taken by surprise: And if an attack is nevertheless undertaken against them they will deliver a crushing rebuff to the aggressor. That is how genuine, not affected, concern for security is manifested.
As for the Soviet Union's interests in various parts of the world, they do of course exist. For instance, they exist in the Near East and consist primarily in establishing lasting peace, security, and good-neighborliness in the immediate vicinity of Soviet borders.

In general the USSR is aspiring to a widespread quest for ways of ending conflicts not only here but also in other parts of the world. That also applies to the Persian Gulf. Events here are approaching a dangerous boundary beyond which the regional conflict runs the risk of developing into an international crisis situation. This cannot fail to worry the Soviet Union, which is situated in the immediate vicinity of the expanding hotbed of conflict. What course does our country choose under these conditions? The same principled course of a political solution for the crisis situation. "The acuteness of the situation in the Persian Gulf zone, the need for a rapid end to the Iran-Iraq conflict," the Soviet Government's 4 July statement says, "require that all states pursue not a 'gunboat policy' but a policy of real constructive deeds, a policy dictated by the supreme interests of preserving peace and effectively strengthening international security."

And it is in vain, Comrade Yesikov, that you think that this approach might give a pretext for conjectures over the USSR's weakness and have an adverse effect on its prestige. On the contrary, an increasing number of people in various countries highly assess Soviet policy. According to a public opinion poll carried out by the British newspaper THE INDEPENDENT, the population of the West European countries believes in a ratio of 3 to 1 that the Soviet Union is doing more than the United States to slow down the arms race and ease the danger of war.

All this, of course, does not mean that the USSR totally rejects any military measures to defend its interests. But it always proceeds from a consideration of whether its actions will strengthen or weaken international stability, strengthen security or undermine it. In some cases the Soviet Union has even been obliged to send its warships to conflict hotbeds. For instance, several Soviet ships are now in the Persian Gulf. But they are escorting our merchant vessels and have nothing to do with fueling tension in this region. And they were sent there at the request and with the permission of the littoral states.

It is appropriate to recall here that the Soviet Union has never abandoned its friends and allies in trouble. Thus, our country responded to the Afghan Government's request to send a limited contingent of Soviet troops to that country to help the Afghan people to thwart the intrigues of hostile forces which had unleashed an undeclared war against the DRA. The Soviet Union thereby confirmed yet again that for it international duty means not fine words but a matter of honor.

That, Comrade Yesikov, is how matters stand regarding concern for the security of our country and all countries and peoples. This problem is constantly the focus of the Soviet leadership's attention. I think that it will be appropriate in this connection to cite M.S. Gorbachev's words from his report at the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum: "On behalf of the Politburo and the Defense Council I firmly state that among neither the party nor the people should there be any doubts as to the USSR Armed Forces' ability to defend the country."

/12624
CSO: 1801/224
ARMY OFFICER CRITIQUES NATO DOCTRINES

PM150929 MOSCOW KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Markushin under the rubric "Observer's Notes": "Two Policies -- Two Doctrines; Why There Is No Reply from NATO"]

[Text] Some 6 weeks have already elapsed since the day when the Warsaw Pact states proposed to the NATO countries that they hold consultations with a view to comparing the two unions' military doctrines. The motives for this step were simple and understandable: removing the mutual suspicion and distrust which has accumulated with the years, reaching a better understanding of each other's intentions, and ensuring that military concepts are based exclusively on defensive principles.

But to this day no answer to this constructive proposal has come from the NATO leadership. How to explain such a long silence?

There is obviously just one reason here: NATO leading spheres are reluctant to enter into a frank talk on the subject. They are reluctant, it is to be supposed, first because an objective comparison of the two doctrines would not be in favor of the numerous statements and hints from the West's officials regarding the existence of the "Soviet military threat." And, second, this comparison would show the whole world that the NATO countries' military doctrine has a far from defensive nature, that its key element -- the "flexible response strategy" -- pursues offensive, aggressive goals.

As is well-known, the "flexible response" strategy was adopted by the NATO military-political leadershkip as official strategy for the whole bloc in 1967. This was NATO's reaction to the change in the correlation of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism and enforced agreement with the fact that military supremacy over the Soviet Union, above all nuclear supremacy, had been lost and parity was ensuing. The strategy's provisions included renouncing "massive retribution" as the main strategic concept and recognizing "limited war" with or without the first use of nuclear weapons as one of the likeliest types of war. This, in fact, was what the strategy's "flexibility" consisted of.
In this case the word "response" was not chosen by accident. In the political sense an attempt was being made here to conceal the aggressive nature of the new coalition strategy and to present matters as though it had a defensive function (reaction to a "threat" or "aggression" from the East so to speak). In the purely military sense the "flexible response" strategy provides for the possibility of waging short-term and protracted wars, local and global wars, using conventional armaments and nuclear weapons -- from tactical to strategic. It draws a picture of the prospect of the development of any conflict into a nuclear conflict and is "the strategy of the threat of escalation," as FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner put it.

The "flexible response" strategy thus directs the NATO countries toward military preparations of any nature and on any scale. It thus justifies the astronomical sums earmarked by the military departments, which ensures that military business obtains growing profits from the arms race. Behind the fine arguments about "the need to defend the West from the threat from the East" lies the old dream of using force to resolve in its favor the historic dispute between capitalism and socialism and of achieving world rule.

Pursuing these aims, NATO strategists have always been and continue to this day to be concerned with how to avoid retribution from a responsive strike. U.S. Defense Secretary Macnamera once likened specific form to the "flexible response" concept in the so-called "counterforce" concept. It calculated that it was allegedly possible to avoid destruction during a responsive strike if one's own missiles and command points were dug deeper into the ground.

Today the champions of this senseless venture across the ocean are engaged in seeking the "missing link" of a first-strike potential. They are emphasizing the creation of a space shield which even if it has holes will, it seems to them, still be capable of "swallowing the enemy's weakened return strike." The idea of creating their own shield -- a Euro-SDI -- is being mooted among the United States' West European NATO partners. And this is being done instead of helping to achieve an agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles.

In recent years vigorous efforts have been made within the framework of the "flexible response" strategy to implement the notorious idea of delivering massive strikes against the Warsaw Pact troops' follow-on forces with a view once again to depriving them of the opportunity of halting and repulsing the aggressor. The NATO leaders themselves do not conceal the fact that this idea provides for the use of a gigantic quantity of conventional munitions and nuclear weapons.

In West Europe many people treat the "deep strike" concept critically, believing that it is of an openly aggressive and destabilizing nature. The opinion that the U.S. plan was drafted with a highly selfish purpose -- selling as many weapons and as much combat equipment as possible to their allies -- remains very widespread.
Despite the fact that the "deep strike" concept has been officially approved by the NATO members, in the opinion of Western observers doubts as to the possibility of its implementation remain even among some of the bloc's leading figures. That is why Washington is making constant attempts to dispel these doubts. The following fact is notable in this connection. A report by the Office of Technology Assessment -- an institution operating under the U.S. Congress -- was published in the United States recently. The report's title is eloquent: "New Technology for NATO: Implementing the Follow-on Force Attack Concept." This latest bellicose work was prepared for an entirely specific purpose: mobilizing NATO members to extensive new expenditure, preventing the partners from any slackness in military preparations, and strengthening "Atlantic solidarity."

Let us note that another, more "liberal," idea of struggling against "worldwide evil" is also haunting the imagination of the Atlanticists: breaking socialism economically, forcing it to capitulate and to lose a war without war, so to speak. But this rosy illusion is not preventing the strategists from focusing their main attention on training troops for resolute offensive actions.

The structuring of all the biggest NATO command exercises, for instance the Wintex-simex series held once every 2 years to check the realism of operational plans, attests to the aggressive, offensive nature of all the concepts elaborated within the framework of existing strategy. As a rule the leaders of these exercises decided to make first use of nuclear weapons as a "deterrent means." They rehearse with particular care the questions connected with delivering surprise strikes. The attempts made recently to avoid the complete fulfillment of the Stockholm accords concerning notification of military activity are evidently not fortuitous on this plane. In late May, for instance, one West German division and one U.S. division were put on alert. Notification was given 7 hours late -- a very substantial period of time at present speeds.

No, however the NATO headquarters may decline the word "defense," in whatever combination it may use the word "deterrent," the aggressive orientation of NATO strategy does not change. The Atlanticists' desire to present themselves in the guise of defense champions is entirely understandable. They would like to consolidate forever in the consciousness of the man in the street the fear of "the threat from the East" and the naive belief that the NATO ruling clique is concerned exclusively for peace when it channels the national funds of the bloc's states into preparing for war.

Italian Foreign Minister C. Andreotti, discussing recently the evolution of views of the nature of modern war, noted that the changing state of affairs in the world is of itself leading to a change in military doctrines. I think that drawing this conclusion today means making out that what you want is reality. Unfortunately, so far fear of nuclear disarmament and the inability to abandon old prejudices are gaining the upper hand in NATO leading circles.
All this is obviously also the reason why the official NATO representatives are so far producing more words than real steps to meet the specific Soviet proposals. It seems that some people would not be averse to the agreement on medium-range missiles, like other urgent agreements on arms reduction, remaining merely "within the limits of feasibility." M.S. Gorbachev called this "a lack of real politics." You could probably also call it a lack of flexible thinking, which will in no way replace the notorious "flexible response."

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COMPUTERS ASSIST WEAPON TRAINING OF POLISH TANKERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jul 87 p 3

[Article from ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, central organ of the Ministry of National Defense of the Polish People's Republic, under the rubric "From the Press of the Fraternal Armies": "The Computer Posts the Evaluation"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The newspaper tells about a new electronic device designed to make the fire training for tank crew members more effective.

Two control panels have been set up in one of the huge buildings at the Central Military Design-Technology Office of the Army. One is for the range controller, the other for the fire control officer. Both of them are equipped with television monitors and a computer keyboard. Deep inside the building are nine hoisting devices with target mockups, and safety devices. Colonel Tadeusz Rosiak, chief designer, demonstrated the use of the new system. He and Lieutenant Colonel Milosz Bialy from the Main Combat Training Directorate explained the benefit of the system.

What can the new system do?

More than 200 targets, including six moving targets, can be set up at the range. The instructor can activate any nine targets at any given time. It takes no more than 2 minutes to switch from one type of fire to another. The commander only has to prepare a sheet of data on the firing conditions and the terms for evaluating the results.

Both the instructor and the operator follow the performance of the fire missions by means of monitors. The keyboard includes a button for selecting the version. When it is pressed a microprocessor automatically selects one of them. In this way the next crew to fire does not know what the target range will be like, even if it has observed the crew before it. The results are known immediately. And one only has to press the proper button to have a printing device register them on paper. Furthermore, the computer can even lower an evaluation—for exceeding the time allocated for firing and overcoming positions, for not selecting targets in the proper sequence, for stopping the tank, for exceeding the amount of time allocated for a brief halt, for hitting a neighbor's target or for firing before the order to begin or after the order to halt has been given, for example.
Is the evaluation absolutely objective? The designers say that the computer is incapable of deception. Attempts to get it to deceive have been unsuccessful. And so, the newspaper states, "Watch out, tankmen!" Even if the instructor wants to give special consideration to someone, it will not work. The computer dispassionately evaluates everyone and reveals all the weak spots to the benefit of the tankmen's training.

The commander, located at the command and observation post, immediately sees the errors made by his subordinates. The instructor with foresight can program for his subordinates fire missions of varying degrees of difficulty, depending upon the training level of the crews. The new device will make it possible to conduct several firing sessions in a single day practically without a break. This is due to the modern computer equipment. According to the designers, this will double the pace of the combat training.

The fact should also be mentioned that the new system is extremely simple to service. Five patents have been issued for the design innovations produced during its development. The new electronic system will soon be installed at the range.

11499
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GENERAL BELIKOV: CADRES -- FOCUS OF RESTRUCTURING IS REGIMENT

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 10 Jul 87 p 2

[Article by Army Gen B. Belikov, Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, under the rubric "The Military Cadres: Duty and Responsibility": "The Regimental Commander"]

[Text] A period of practical action.... This is what the present, most important stage of the restructuring was called at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum identified the enterprise and the labor collective as the starting point, the basic element, for restructuring management of the economy. The basic element in the army is the regiment, which has been and continues to be the key tactical, administrative and internal management unit in the forces. The regimental commander is one of those most expected to be the "work superintendent," the organizer, of the restructuring. This is why the group's military council is focusing its attention on intensifying the work directly in the regiments, on improving the work style of the regimental commander and increasing his responsibility for the assigned job. The restructuring, which requires vigorous and determined action, raises the role of the sole-commander, including the regimental commander, to a new level. He, first of all, is required to increase his effort in the practical work. This is all the more important in service abroad, where the regimental commander has to perform numerous complex and specific tasks everyday, tasks requiring an increased sense of responsibility, self-discipline and independence.

If one were to ask how the latest tactical exercise in tank regiment "X" differed from the preceeding one, the answer would be brief: the combat intensity was greater. Naturally, this resulted from the creation of a situation conforming to the maximum possible degree to the possibility conditions of modern combat. It is particularly important that under these difficult conditions the subunit demonstrated improved field training and Lieutenant Colonel Platonov, the regimental commander, demonstrated the ability to organize a battle and confidently directed subordinates. The tankmen thereby answered the broader question of where one sees signs of positive changes in the unit and in the work style of its commander. It is primarily in the increased practical orientation and specific focus of the training and indoctrination of the subunit personnel. The rule that most of the exercises are to include tactics is strictly followed in the regiment. The closest
of attention is given to command and control of the subunits. The regimental commander strives to see that every combat unit (yedinitsa) is controllable and capable of carrying out the mission in any situation. He gives constant attention to problems involved in making the competition more effective.

Yes, the combat training is the main and crucial area of work for the regimental commander, the main area of application of his talent, energy and abilities. And he must be more than merely a skilful organizer and director. He must also be an innovator tirelessly seeking new means and ways to enhance the effectiveness of the combat training, motivate his subordinates to do the same and steadfastly implement the principle of "teaching that which is essential in war." Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Kozlov set an example of this kind of approach to the job in a recent exercise. By skilfully setting up the defense of the motorized riflemen, he was able to exhaust and defeat the "enemy" with smaller forces. This commander's slogan is to fight by means of skill and not numbers.

One thinks about precisely such cases as this when one attempts to answer the question of what it means for the commander to put extra effort into the work. Less general talk and more practical action, greater intolerance of negligence and complacency, more vital organizational work aimed at establishing regulation order and improving the training of subordinates. Also a greater preparedness to take on responsibility and autonomy. Let us never forget that the regimental commander who is capable of taking determined action on his own will be able to carry out the most difficult mission in combat.

Decisions coming out of the June plenum, which provided an instructive example of demandingness in assessing what has been done and of a critical approach to analyzing the work of the cadres, are motivating us to look at all of our affairs, including the shaping of regimental commanders, from the same standpoint. One is forced to admit that far from all of them are yet fully justifying the trust vested in them and becoming actively involved in the restructuring. It was necessary recently to consider transferring Lieutenant Colonel V. Nazarenko, a regimental commander, to a different job. The burden had proved to be too much for him. What he had considered to be demandingness had amounted to harassment of the personnel. This restrained their initiative, reduced their sense of responsibility and created disorganization. The regiment began to fall back in the training and in discipline.

Why did this happen? One of the reasons was the fact that the officer took over the position without adequate experience, without having been prepared for it by his previous service. Other such cases could be cited. I believe that it is more important, however, to stress the fact that deficiencies on the part of the senior chiefs lay behind each of them. An analysis shows that the development of these commanders at previous services levels took place in a situation of inadequate demandingness, and sometimes, permissiveness and poor individual work. This is why certain officers do not demonstrate a proper sense of responsibility or service zeal when they take over a regiment. Frequently, they are primarily concerned about how they will be evaluated and not about the results of their work, not about the actual combat training. A desire to show off with eloquent statements and baseless assurances frequently comes out, and when it comes time to render account for the work and deficiencies are revealed, they attempt to cover themselves with claims of so-called objective factors. Cases like these, even
though not so widespread, force us over and over to return to the idea that in the indoctrination of the cadres we are still not placing sufficient stress on developing in them a sense of duty and an understanding of the fact that sole-command involves first of all the duty to know and perform one's job well and to bear the personal responsibility—party, service and legal—imposed by the position.

The restructuring is increasing the demands made of the regimental commander also as an indoctrinator. He must be able to unify the process of training and indoctrination, to unite the multinational military collective and feel a sincere need for vital communication with and constant closeness to the masses of fightingmen.

The importance of the commander's demandingness is increasing. It serves as the most important tool for exercising sole-command. Firm troop command and control and victory in combat are inconceivable without it. By demonstrating constant demandingness, sometimes even harshness, and striving for an accurate understanding and fulfillment of regulations, of orders, the daily schedule and class schedules, the commander instills in the personnel an awareness of the rigidity of the standards and laws governing military life. For example, the regulations call for the company and platoon commanders to periodically attend reveille and the evening roll-call and precisely define the procedure for monitoring the organization of the service for other people in charge and their performance. The regimental commander is required to strive for the undeviating implementation of these regulations, to take all the steps necessary to maintain regulation order and discipline, and to develop in subordinates a desire to work as much as this requires. Naturally, what is needed is demandingness backed up by a thorough knowledge of the job, good ideological and moral qualities, personal example, constant concern for the people and tactfulness. No one has the right to forget that a person does not cease to be an individual in the army.

Only that commander who begins the demandingness with himself, who cannot imagine his work without the constant support of his deputies, the staff, the strength of the party and Komsomol organizations, acquires solid and unshakeable prestige. It is becoming increasingly important for the regimental commander to be able to employ such methods as officers' meetings, comradely courts of honor and general personnel meetings as tools for shaping healthy public opinion. This is a reliable way to stimulate the human factor. It is important to thoroughly understand that the establishment of sole-command and the development of democratic methods of working such as these are not conflicting, but mutually supplementary processes.

Guards Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Golovkin only recently assumed command of the Guards Tank Chertkovskiy Regiment imeni Marshal of Armored Troops M.Ye. Katukov, but he has already achieved a great deal. A large sense of responsibility combined with his abilities as a commander and his industry helped him to confidently prove himself in the difficult position. People in the regiment say: Our commander sees everything, always brings to strict account anyone committing an infraction, always spots zeal in a person, points it out and rewards the individual. This is why the personnel in the regiment demonstrate initiative, enterprise and a creative attitude toward the job, and look sharp. This is why the spirit of the restructuring and a desire on the part of the personnel to make an extra effort in the work are felt more strongly in this regiment than in others.
One other feature in the regimental commander's performance as an indoctrinator... It is the day the military oath is being taken. A recording of the vow taken by the Katukov front-line fighters is played. The young soldiers then formally take the oath. It is an exciting ceremony symbolizing the succession of the generations, which is felt particularly acutely right now, during preparations for the 70th anniversary of Great October. The regimental commander himself put a great deal of creative work into establishing it. He and Guards Major N. Matskevich, deputy regimental commander for political affairs, also gave a great deal of attention to indoctrinating the personnel in the spirit of socialist internationalism, combat fraternity of fightingmen of the Warsaw Pact states and friendship with the workers of the German Democratic Republic.

I cannot refrain also from sharing my impressions from a visit one Saturday to motorized rifle unit "X" commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Prygunov. The commander was not there. The duty man informed me that he had left for the garrison hospital to visit a soldier undergoing treatment there. Lieutenant Colonel Prygunov soon returned. I asked him about his meetings at the hospital. It turned out that he had visited all of his sick subordinates at the hospital, told them the news from the regiment and left them gifts. And it is not just an occasional thing for Prygunov to visit the hospital, the unit club when a film is being shown or a concert is being held there, or the soldiers' messhall. It is a rule typical of his work style as a whole. He cannot conceive of it without being close to and concerned with the people. He feels a need to do this. Therein no doubt lies the essence of the commander's talent as an indoctrinator. He knows how to get close to people, to see and sense because of this all of the subtleties in the life of the multinational military collective.

People are telling the truth when they say that the regiment is the soldier's home. And the better and the dearer it is, the more prestige is enjoyed by its master and head of the regimental family, its commander. We strive to see that every regimental commander understands his role this way and try to improve the work in this area. It is one of the urgent demands of the times, after all, that we increase our attention to the social area and daily life, and are concerned for the spiritual wealth and culture of the personnel. For the regimental commander the social area includes maintaining regulation order in all things, arranging for the troops to be fed and providing medical, trade, consumer service services and financial support for subordinates. It includes concern for the living conditions of the families, working with the women's council and devoting attention to the officers' residence. It seems only natural to regularly see the regimental commander in the soldiers' messhall and snack bar, at the party of a young officer's family, at a rehearsal of the amateur performing group, at a readers' conference.

One can name formations in which the regimental commanders develop more rapidly and surely. The 'secret' is simple: they are worked with constantly and specifically. Individual work and a benevolent attitude provide the foundation. The fact is very important that along with the formation commanders, the political organs also devote considerable attention to the regimental commanders, equipping them with the ability to rely on the party organizations and developing in them a sense of great responsibility for the assigned job. This is one of the ways to reinforce sole-command and the regimental commander's prestige.
Unfortunately, not all of the senior chiefs and the political organs develop the regemental commanders with such patience and skill. There was not a single unit commander who did not receive a penalty last year in formation "X," for example. Is that a fitting way to do things? I believe that the regemental commander should be punished only in extreme cases. One should not forget that this is a matter of the prestige of the sole-commander, who is in the view of hundreds of people and who is entrusted to perform jobs of state importance.

The regemental commander's development depends in great part upon the stance of the senior chiefs, particularly us, the commanders of military districts and groups of forces, whose duty it is to study the abilities, the performance and political qualities of the cadres and to weigh all of the facts about a candidate for advancement with particular thoroughness. And we have to observe these when the candidate is on the job.

It has been noticed that the commanders of the units subordinate to Colonel General of Aviation A. Goryainov, air force commander of the group of forces, have recently been developing more rapidly than before. This is due in great part to his personal work style. This leader considers it to be his service and party duty to work painstakingly with the regemental commanders. We orient all of those in charge toward this work style, while cautioning them against engaging in petty tutelage of the unit officers. Increasing the number of various kinds of inspections, which sometimes only introduces crash-effort elements into the commander's life, accustomes them to be dependent on others.

We also set for ourselves the task of relieving the regemental commander of as much paperwork and red tape as possible.

One is forced to acknowledge, however, that our shortcomings are due to a significant degree to the imperfect work style of a number of command and control agencies, including the style of work performed with the cadres of regemental commanders.

Making more active use of the extremely rich Great Patriotic War experience and that of the military chiefs, who have acquired a lot of schooling in that position, constitutes an extremely important reserve for improving this work. This is our priceless possession. A great deal can be learned from the front-line commander of our 55th Tank Brigade, now Colonel General and twice Hero of the Soviet Union D. Dragunskiy, who was able to find the right way out of what appeared to be absolutely hopeless situations. I know dozens of other remarkable people still working today, whose experience in commandng units during the war will not be retired for a long time yet even in peace time.

Many ideas about the regemental commander's role, ideas which stick in the mind, are to be found in the works of our reknown military leaders. "...The regemental commander," Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev wrote, "is the main figure in the army in both peacetime and time of war, the main organizer of combat.... He is sole-commander, and he holds in his hands literally everything pertaining directly to combat and military life, to the training and indoctrination of the people and to the maintaining of discipline." How important it is today for the illumination of history to help the regemental commander choose the correct
reference points in the service. This will unquestionably help him in the accomplishment of the contemporary, exceptionally large-scale missions.

Dealing with the restructuring not with words but with action and being able to implement its requirements, taking the complex contemporary international situation, the existing danger of war and the new principles contained in Soviet military doctrine into account, represent the crucial criteria for determining the maturity of the regimental commander and of the leader of any rank.

11499
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COMMENTARY ON WEAKNESS OF RESERVISTS' TRAINING IN BELORUSSIAN MD

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jul 87 p 1

[Letter from reader and commentary by Maj Gen M. Dernovoy, communications chief of the Belorussian Military District, under the rubric "Letter and Commentary": "The Reserve Officer's Assembly in Unit "X" Did Not Produce a Proper Return"]

[Text] For a decade and a half, as a reserve officer, I have been periodically called up for assemblies in a unit in the Belorussian Military District. Unfortunately, I have to say that they have been extremely ineffective.

Formally, everything would appear to be in order. I know, for example, that a detailed plan was worked out in the unit prior to our last assembly. It called for practical classes at the radio facilities, for practice in meeting the norms for protection against weapons of mass destruction, for fire training and for lectures on ways to perform party-political work with the personnel in special situations. That plan was not actually implemented, however. To put it simply, those in charge were unable to fit everything planned into the time allocated for the assembly. While attempting to encompass more than was possible, they were forced to limit themselves to the minimum. In the classes in the specialty, for example, we were given only a general idea of the different types of radio sets, their design and operating principles. And while those who had served in the army fairly recently had their memories refreshed to some degree, the others received essentially nothing from this superficial theoretical overview.

And now, something about those who taught us. We are sincerely grateful to Senior Warrant Officer V. Breus for his expertise, for example. His classes were interesting, and he tried to see that we derived the maximum benefit from them. Unfortunately, however, there were few instructors like Breus. In general, one had the impression that most of our classes were conducted by random people, by people who had simply turned up for the commander or the chief of staff, so to speak.

And what is the result? We are taken away from our jobs and the state spends a considerable amount of money on our training, but there is no return. -- Senior Lieutenant (Reserve) I. Krysak, Minsk

At the request of the editors Major General M. Dernovoy, chief of communications for the Belorussian Military District, comments on the letter:
In the first place, we need to remember that the training of reserve officers is carried out in accordance with an established procedure, in the form of training assemblies and officer classes held in the district units and subunits. Appropriate training paraphernalia and technical equipment are allocated for them. Naturally, the best specialists are supposed to be used as instructors. And it should be said that these requirements are observed in many cases. Take unit "X," for example, in which Officer N. Rezvov arranges the assemblies. I have repeatedly visited the classes for reserve officers there. As a rule, they are conducted on a good methodological level.

Unfortunately, this attitude toward the improvement of the reserve officers' training is not found everywhere by far. Some commanders regard the assemblies conducted in the units entrusted to them as something secondary. This is confirmed by the letter from Senior Lieutenant (Reserve) I. Krysak.

Let me say right off that an administrative investigation was conducted in response to it. It confirmed the fact that Major A. Nizovtsov, Senior Lieutenant I. Mikhno and a number of other officials drawn upon for conducting classes for reserve officers in the unit mentioned in the letter were negligent and irresponsible in their handling of the assigned job. Severe measures have been taken against the guilty parties.

But this is only a partial solution, so to speak. From a broader perspective, the fact should be mentioned that the district headquarters has decided to analyze the system of organizing the assemblies for reserve officers in the units and subunits. We hope that this will help to find the best possible ways of conducting the assemblies, to make the advanced know-how available to all, to better see deficiencies and take effective steps to correct them. Specifically, the unit commanders have been required to take a more differentiated approach for making up the training groups of reserve officers and assume greater responsibility for this, and to consider the importance of the task when selecting the instructors for the assembly participants. We will also take into account the requests of the reserve officers that more time be allocated for practical training on the equipment. Naturally, we will be constantly monitoring the implementation of these plans.

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OFFICER CALLS FOR MORE AUTONOMY IN PLANNING SUBUNIT TRAINING

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[Article by Maj I. Abramov, chief of staff of a motorized rifle battalion, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "The Commander's Autonomy: What Is Preventing It From Manifesting Itself in the Combat Training"]

[Text] As one studies materials of the June 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, one is reminded over and over again of the tasks assigned the military cadres by the party. Their meaning is clear: it is essential to enhance vigilance, to perform even more decisively and universally strengthen discipline, organization, responsibility and performance efficiency at all levels. When one begins to measure our practical work against these requirements, however, one can see the extent to which we are still falling short. But is it just we officers at the platoon, company and battalion level, which is where most of the complaints about deficiencies in the combat training and discipline, for example, are heard?

The fact is indisputable that the officers in charge of the subunits are primarily responsible for the state of affairs there. But is it always possible for them to operate with independence, as specified by the regulations, within the limits of the authority granted to them?

I have served in the battalion more than 3 years. Naturally, I can say who is capable of what and how conscientiously this or that officer performs his job. I can honestly say that most of them suffer for the combat training. Despite this, a recent inspection showed that it is not the very best in the battalion. Then what is the matter? What is preventing our generally conscientious officers from striving for a perceptible improvement in the training of their subordinates?

I shall attempt to answer these difficult questions. I would like to begin with the planning of the combat and political training, a matter of such vital importance to the battalion.

I have it here in front of me, this plan, tastefully drawn up and representing, figuratively speaking, a dynamic program for improving the personnel's combat skill. Just a cursory glance, however, shows that far from everything indicated therein is carried out. The plan is literally strewn with notations on
changes. These represent extensions of dates for classes, classes not conducted at all for one reason or another.... Even the roughest calculations show that at best we have made full use of only half of the hours allocated for training during the winter period. The rest of the time was spent on things not related to the combat training.

People might ask: Why, dear comrade, did you not provide for all of this during the planning? This is to some degree a justified approach. Various kinds of hitches do in fact frequently occur in the training process because the plan was not adequately thought out. Not everything is due to this alone, however.

Could we plan for the time when the personnel would be called away from the scheduled classes as an emergency to clean up the grounds assigned to the units? It is precisely this kind of unexpected situations which frequently throw the training process off schedule. This kind of unexpected tasks and the ensuing crash-effort most frequently had to do with the arrival in the unit of various kinds of commissions, inspectors and superior chiefs. This happens once, twice, a third time, and the people begin to feel that spit and polish on the grounds, having the borders painted the right color, and other, external indications that all is well are more important than anything else. The combat training gradually ceases to be the main and definitive factor in their eyes and recedes into the background.

Life is life, of course, and one cannot avoid various kinds of housekeeping matters. In addition, not all of the subunit commanders demonstrate enough persistence in their day-to-day work with respect to implementing regulations, including those pertaining to keeping the territories assigned to them clean. However, the alarming thing is that concern with appearances, so to speak, overshadows the most important thing, which is the combat training, in the work of some staffs.

I am not speaking about some isolated cases. I know of cases in which, at the instructions of higher headquarters, a unit has spent almost 3 days in a row conducting inspection parades, learning songs and making the buildings and the grounds shine. And all of this was at the expense of training time. A scheduled tactical exercise was postponed twice for this reason just in our battalion, for example.

I understand that a great deal depends upon us too. We can no doubt be criticized for various kinds of omissions, including, as I have already mentioned, omissions in the work of maintaining regulation order in all areas. And we should no doubt take a more active stance with respect to protecting the battalion's interests where the combat training and combat readiness are concerned. It is easy to talk about activeness and autonomy, however. Everything is far more complex in reality. A disagreement on the part of an officer at the battalion or the company level with the existing style of management of the combat training—even if the latter does not conform to the demands of the times—frequently comes up against counteraction which is not easy to overcome. Some people in charge have a very strong habit of substituting show and the illusion that everything is in order, achieved by means of crash-efforts, for daily work to establish regulation order and to keep the training process proceeding smoothly.

I believe that there are even more serious retarding factors in the combat training. First of all, there is the element of routine in the thinking and in the approach to the accomplishment of the tasks involved in the training.
Take just the combat and political training. What is it? A part of the regimental plan. And the latter is in turn a part of the division plan. On the one hand, this is natural, because the battalion's missions stem from the regimental and division missions. But this should not keep the subunit commanders from demonstrating independence within the framework of the overall missions. In our case every step taken by the subunit commander is governed by instructions from higher headquarters. Everything is spelled out by the day and by the hour. Furthermore, this frequently does not take into account the specific conditions under which we live, the specific nature of our missions or what we have already achieved. His hands literally tied by the plan sent down "from above," the subunit commander is frequently practically deprived of the possibility of manipulating the time or the subjects of the classes in accordance with the specific situation or with urgent tasks which arise. And no one can know better than he, the commander, what should be given priority at a given point in time by the platoon, the company or the battalion. Would it therefore not be beneficial to give him greater autonomy for making decisions on routine matters and hold him accountable not for deviating from the set routine in the organization of the combat training--and unfortunately, this frequently happens--but for the end result?

Incidentally, we are oriented toward this approach also by directives coming out of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which stressed the need to enlarge the autonomy of enterprises. This means providing the labor collectives with greater freedom of action also in the planning of their operations. And why should the platoon, company or battalion commander himself not decide, within the limits of the number of training hours allocated to him and within the framework of the specified subject matter for the classes, what should receive more attention today and what should receive less? The end result would then show who is capable of what.

Probably not all of my ideas fit within the conventional concepts of the subunit commander's role in the organization of the combat training. I can foresee questions such as this, for example: But are all of the officers at the platoon, company and battalion levels prepared to resolve the problems, sometimes very, very complex problems, involved in this? Are we all capable of taking on the responsibility and demonstrating will and resolve in overcoming stagnation and routine ways of doing things? Are we all prepared to work as much as the job requires, as much as the combat readiness calls for? I feel that each of us should answer these questions for himself, in accordance with his own conscience. And depending upon what his conscience tells him, he should take action, work on himself and train his subordinates in such a way that he can be confident of each. I feel that it is very important to remember that no one except us can do this, because no one is as close to the soldier as we, the officers at the platoon, company and battalion levels.

A heightened sense of responsibility for the assigned job is only one facet of autonomy, of course. We frequently do not pass the very first test of our independence of action, not because we do not understand the importance of the missions assigned to us and do not understand our responsibility for their accomplishment. In one case this occurs because we do not have a solid knowledge of the regulations and other guiding documents. In another, it may be due to incompetence in matters of methods, tactics, and so forth. This certainly does not mean, however, that either case necessarily demands petty tutelage. It would be
far more expedient to use the time and energy spent on this for improving the professional training of the officers. It is perhaps practice in commanding, in the contemporary interpretation of the term, which is lacking in the officer training right in our regiment. I personally feel that the officer training should contribute not only to the improvement of their knowledge and skills, but also to the development of their creative abilities. The attention given to this matter is clearly inadequate at the present time.

There are officers in our battalion who have always been intolerant of doing things according to a routine and of inertia, and have worked persistently to improve. It was more difficult for them than for anyone else, however, because their quest and their striving for independence in the resolution of pressing problems did not always meet with support and understanding. Take Captain N. Yavayev, a company commander, for example. He was schooled in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, has combat experience and holds the Red Star order. Yavayev set about the job with zeal when he first joined the battalion. Not everyone liked his bold approaches to the resolution of problems pertaining to the organization of the combat training or his innovations in methods of training subordinates, however. The officer's nerves suffered a great deal before he succeeded in demonstrating that his approach to the job, one based on personal combat experience, could be beneficial.

The company commanded by Captain Yavayev is one of the best in the regiment today. What did it cost him to achieve this, however? And some people simply throw up their hands when they encounter stagnation and routine. I recall well how Lieutenant K. Nashshupskiy began his service. He took his first steps with confidence, but one would not recognize him now. What happened to his initiative, his goal-oriented outlook and his enthusiasm? And he is not alone. That is what is alarming.

Naturally, there are also many other sensitive areas which constantly make themselves felt and prevent the work from proceeding normally. Strange as it seems, today, when we are combatting palaver and excessive paperwork, we are engaging in this intensively and sitting through endless hours at all sorts of conferences. And how many reports have to be prepared every day! We sometimes do not know which one to start first. When the company fires, a report has to be written on just about every soldier. It is the same when the combat vehicles are driven.... I recall how we prepared for the last exercise. More than one night was spent preparing various charts and tags. What is more, it is my profound conviction that no one needed them. Why, for example, was it necessary to write up an operation order for every soldier? After all, valuable time needed for working with the personnel was spent on this paperwork.

The custom of resolving every question in the daily life of the subunits by directive, with mandatory reporting "from the bottom up," not only generates torrents of paperwork; it is also an irritation in our work.

Yes, we still have a lot to think about and a lot to do in order to raise the level of the combat training up to a qualitatively new high.