Future Naval Cooperation With Latin America: Final Report

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)  2. REPORT DATE  3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
   April 1996  Final

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Future Naval Cooperation with Latin America: Final Report

6. AUTHOR(S)
MD Hayes, RD Kohout, PH Roth, GF Wheatley

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Center for Naval Analyses
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22302-1498

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
CRM 94-63.20

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Distribution unlimited

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)
In response to a request from the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), for options regarding hemisphere naval cooperation, CNA conducted a study of the mid- and long-range importance of Latin America for U.S. Navy and CINCLANTFLT strategic planning. The study considered the full range of navy-to-navy relations and projected developments in light of the changing international security environment, new roles and missions, and the roles that Latin Americans can play within U.S. Navy plans. We developed a framework for evaluating the U.S. Navy's cooperative programs with Latin America in terms of their scope and impact on a continuum of U.S. national security objectives that range from goodwill through broad foreign policy objectives, to national defense goals, and specific military goals. We examined the evolving Latin American national security environment, developed a typology of naval roles and missions, and projected force structure to the year 2000. Finally, we cataloged the U.S. Navy's programs, evaluated their scope and impact, and assessed their contribution to national security goals.

14. SUBJECT TERMS
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, cooperation, foreign policy, international relations, interoperability, Latin America, military capabilities, military forces (foreign), national security, naval operations, naval planning, Navy, Peru, policies, western security (international), South America

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
115

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
298-102
MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS

The enclosed document, *Future Naval Cooperation with Latin America: Final Report* (CRM 94-63), has recently been approved for public release. We believe that this study and its related volumes, *Future Naval Cooperation: Program Descriptions and Assessments* (CRM 94-64), and *By Example: The Impact of Recent Argentine Naval Activities on Southern Cone Naval Strategies* (CRM 94-111), continue to have relevance and be of interest to a broad policy community.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) asked CNA to undertake this study in early 1993. CNA's research was to assist the Fleet Commander in assessing the direction in which forces from various Latin American countries would evolve over the medium and longer term; to determine their interest in working with the U.S., and the benefits of such activities to the U.S. Navy; and to evaluate and fine-tune modes of navy-to-navy engagement in the context of *Forward...From the Sea* and the evolving strategies of the Commanders in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic and Southern Commands, for whom CINCLANTFLT serves as Naval Component Commander.

This study was completed in February 1994. It reflected assessments gained from extended interviews with Unified Commanders and their staffs, the heads of a wide variety of U.S. Naval activities, and the Commanders in Chief of Latin American navies and their staffs, as well as defense ministers and political and academic security specialists in the region. The report was well received. A number of its specific recommendations have been implemented, and it has helped institutionalize Navy activities in the region.

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Summary

In response to a request from the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), for options regarding hemisphere naval cooperation, CNA conducted a study of the mid- and long-range importance of Latin America for U.S. Navy and CINCLANTFLT strategic planning. The study considered the full range of navy-to-navy relations and projected developments in light of the changing international security environment, new roles and missions, and the roles that Latin Americans can play within U.S. Navy plans.

Study approach

We developed a framework for evaluating the U.S. Navy's cooperative programs with Latin America in terms of their scope and impact on a continuum of U.S. national security objectives that range from goodwill through broad foreign-policy objectives, to national-defense goals, and specific military goals. We examined the evolving Latin American national-security environment, developed a typology of naval roles and missions, and projected force structure to the year 2000. Finally, we cataloged the U.S. Navy's programs, evaluated their scope and impact, and assessed their contribution to national-security goals.

Key findings

The principal findings of our study of the U.S. Navy's cooperative programs with Latin American navies and the benefits these provide the U.S. Navy are summarized below, followed by a listing of recommendations for Navy and Fleet action.

Latin American navies can play a role in U.S. naval strategy

Latin American navies have been substantially restructured over the past decade and today they are light, modern, and primarily frigate and submarine navies. They have three distinct mission emphases. Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile have “near-NATO” professional, blue-water-capable navies able to operate out-of-area if they wish. Northern-tier navies are more limited, but Colombia and Peru have professional Services able to do limited out-of-area operations. Northern-tier navies also have a growing riverine emphasis. Most South American navies (Argentina is the exception) also count coast-guard functions among their missions. Central American and Caribbean navies have brown-water and coast-guard functions.

The United States has worked with Latin American navies for more than 34 years in UNITAS, a proven vehicle for building interoperability with non-NATO forces. UNITAS experience made it possible for Argentina to participate in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In the coming years, Latin American navies will focus mainly on domestic concerns, but they can also support regional coalition efforts under Organization of American States (OAS) or United Nations (UN) auspices, as well as multinational coalition efforts out of area.

**Operations in the region yield substantial benefit to the Navy**

Operators who have worked with Latin American navies uniformly praise the training experience. Ships on UNITAS and transiting carriers note the continuous, high-tempo operations at sea, and stressed logistics of South American deployments. Latin American counterparts offer “opposition” that is “different from what we usually do,” according to a carrier Air Wing Operations Officer. An S-3 squadron “got a year’s worth ofquals in one week (in Argentina), ... you can’t do this in the Med.”

Latin America is a “laboratory for ... From the Sea” training and doctrine development. The area has geography, facilities, and equipment (diesel submarines, aircraft, missiles) that mirror the environments in which U.S. forces may be called upon to operate in the future. The Latin Americans are expert at operating in these environments and present real challenges to U.S. units engaging with them.

Latin America also is a prime training ground for riverine operations and low-intensity conflict. Navy and Marine Corps programs assisting Colombian counterparts in developing a riverine-control capability have yielded real-life experiences from which doctrine is being revised and updated.
Professional Navy contacts have high payoff

The “generation gap” of contacts with officers below Flag rank is one of the Navy's chief concerns in its Latin American relationship. Professional Navy contacts—deckplate-level contacts—were found to have high payoffs on all dimensions of the national-security spectrum. They build goodwill and "mental interoperability," as well as institutional support for U.S. foreign-policy and national-security objectives. They also enhance readiness for both parties in the process.

Many opportunities for benefit are lost for lack of coordination

The Navy lacks an overall vision of its goals in Latin America to help manage the bureaucratic complexity of the hemisphere, in which Caribbean and Latin American responsibilities fall to two different unified commanders, and Mexican responsibilities to a third. Operations are controlled by the Fleet, U.S. Commander, South Atlantic Forces (USCOMSOLANT), CINCLANTFLT’s Detachment, Southern Command (CINCLANTFLT Det South), Joint Task Force-4 (JTF-4), and individual Type Commanders. Political-military relations respond to Office of Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Joint Staff, and Fleet policy staffs.

Coordination across these lines of authority is inadequate to manage this complexity, and many opportunities for U.S. Navy (USN) benefits are not exploited. As a result, decisions regarding deployments are made without regard to interests in the region. Port visits are scheduled without regard to opportunities to work with the region's blue-water navies; and for lack of adequate time and funds, the USS Constellation made its 1993 interfleet transit without stopping in South America.

Furthermore, too much responsibility for coordinating and implementing interactions with Latin American navies has devolved to OPNAV or Fleet N5 staffs. Interest in and ownership of opportunities in the region by operational arms of the Navy is lost. Navy interests and perspectives are barely visible at the U.S. Southern Command.

1. The generations of Latin American officers below Flag rank have not had the same amount of exposure in U.S. Navy schools and on U.S. Navy equipment that older generations had. Beginning in the late 1960s, U.S. restrictions on equipment transfers, and human-rights-related constraints, turned Latin American navies to European markets and hence to European training.
Recommendations

The U.S. Navy has a special relationship—unique among the U.S. Services—with its Latin American counterparts. It is a relationship based on years of working together as maritime professionals. In a era of coalition operations, often in Third World environments, and ... From the Sea, Latin American cooperation can be important to the United States. To derive optimal benefits from activities with Latin America, however, CNA recommends the following actions:

Broad Navy initiatives

Consider developing regional guidance for naval activities.
Designate a policy coordinator for the region.
Invite regional CNOs to consult on regional maritime strategies.
Support developing a regional Riverine Operations Training Program.
Develop a long-term plan for ship transfers to the region.
Use political-military sub-specialities more effectively.

Fleet initiatives

Continue to pursue C3 initiatives aggressively.
Expand Latin American invitations to FLEETEXs.
Implement targeted navy-to-navy activities during routine port visits.
Exercise with South American navies en route to routine port visits.
Treat carrier transits as deployments.
Provide emphases for Flag visits to the region.
Expand the out-of-area shiprider program.
Expand Fleet participation in wargaming.
Explore use of Latin American operating areas.
Examine assignments of liaison officers.
Expand senior enlisted exchange opportunities.
Promote opportunities for Refresher Training (RefTra) exposure.
Share Latin American experiences with the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT).

Recommendations regarding UNITAS

Consider inviting Mexico to Phase 0.
Invite South Americans to expand “lessons learned.”
Pursue multinational aspects when possible.
Explore UNITAS doctrine with Navy Doctrine Command.
Brief UNITAS around the Navy/defense community.
Background

This project was undertaken at the request of CINCLANTFLT to assess the importance of the Latin American region and Latin American navies to the United States and possible roles for Latin American navies in future U.S. Navy planning and strategy. As Naval Component Commander to both U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) and SOUTHCOM, each with responsibilities in the waters of Latin America, the Fleet commander believed it timely to examine the directions in which forces from various Latin American countries are evolving over the medium- and longer-term time frames, to determine their interest in working with the United States, and the utility for the U.S. Navy and the United States of working with them.

The tasking was assigned in the environment of profound changes in U.S. defense policy that have accompanied the end of the Cold War. For the Navy, these changes have entailed downsizing and reallocating forces, while coping with increased demands for building coalitions for participation in multinational peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts. In addition, the Navy is changing its force structure and training requirements to accommodate the Navy’s revised doctrine, ... From the Sea, which emphasizes littoral warfare and forward presence. During the Cold War, Latin American navies were expected to play a role in defense of the South Atlantic sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Today, the U.S. Navy’s activities in Latin America include counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific; riverine and coastal-patrol training and operations (largely oriented to counternarcotics) in Central and South America; and UNITAS, the Navy’s longest continually running multinational exercise.

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With changing demands for ships, regionally in narcotics operations and globally to meet U.S. overseas obligations, a growing debate over foreign-assistance-supported military training missions; and debate over UNITAS funding requirements and demand for dedicated ships that might be employed elsewhere, the full range of naval activities in Latin America has been opened to review. In addition, as Naval Component Commander to SOUTHCOM, the smooth functioning of that relationship was of concern because SOUTHCOM will begin implementing its withdrawal from Panama at the end of 1995. All of these reasons called for a new look at relations with the region.

CNA divided its analytic effort into five distinct tasks:

- Establish a set of definitions and a broad national-security framework within which to assess programs.

- Describe Latin American national security goals in the current regional environment.\(^3\)

- Assess Latin American naval capabilities, the roles that Latin American navies might play in U.S. strategy given their capabilities, and U.S. interests and requirements.

- Evaluate the broad spectrum of U.S. Navy programs of interaction and cooperation with Latin American navies and Marines, assessing their utility to Latin American countries and to the U.S. Navy.

- Develop a set of recommendations for specific actions by the Navy generally, and by the Fleet in particular.

This final report summarizes the findings of our study. It is divided into four sections:


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3. This task was implemented, in part, by conducting interviews with senior navy personnel, ministers of foreign affairs and defense, political leaders and members of defense committees in national legislature, and senior defense- and national-security scholars in the Latin American countries. See appendix for a list of contacts in Latin America.
• The national-security objectives of different Latin American countries and their capabilities to meet those objectives or to support U.S. objectives.

• A summary of key findings of our analysis of the full scope of U.S. Navy programs of cooperation with Latin America. (Full descriptions and evaluations of these programs are presented in supporting research memoranda.4)

• Finally, conclusions and recommendations for the Navy.

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4. CNA Research Memorandum 94-64, Future Naval Cooperation With Latin America: Program Descriptions and Assessment, by Margaret Daly Hayes et al., Unclassified, forthcoming; and CNA Information Memorandum 353, Latin American Navies to the Year 2000: A Projection, by Capt. Patrick H. Roth, USN (Ret.), FOUO, forthcoming.
The changing national-security environment

This project was undertaken in the context of a changing national-security environment; changing U.S. goals and objectives, globally and in the hemisphere; and an evolving U.S. Navy adaptation to the perception of threat and likelihood of conflict in the world. No clear consensus on U.S. interests in the post-Cold War environment has emerged to drive our national-security relations and objectives.5

Defining U.S. interests in the post-Cold War era

The Clinton administration has identified “economic security” as the principal concern of the United States in the near-term future. This emphasis is directed primarily at the U.S. domestic economic environment, but it entails an international emphasis on open markets, trade, and investment. In the foreign-policy arena, the administration has identified a target list of foreign-policy priorities that support post-Cold War goals. These are now codified in revisions of U.S. foreign assistance, export-control, and arms-transfer legislation that have been submitted to Congress. The Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act (PPDA)—the proposed substitute for the Cold War-oriented Foreign Assistance Act of 1961—identifies the following goals of U.S. foreign policy:

- Encouraging broad-based economic growth
- Protecting the global environment
- Supporting democratic participation
- Stabilizing world population growth.

Goals for U.S. defense policy have been reviewed in the Secretary of Defense’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR) and in recent drafts of Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The documents identify the dangers of the post-Cold War environment as dangers posed by proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction; regional dangers, including large-scale aggression, regional conflict, state-sponsored terrorism, and subversion; dangers to democracy and political and economic reform worldwide; and economic dangers that threaten U.S. prosperity. The DPG drafts outline a strategy for countering these dangers that is defined by three characteristics: engagement, prevention, and partnership. This entails

- Preventing threats to our interests by promoting democracy, economic growth, open markets, and human rights
- Attending first to regions critical to U.S. interests
- Pursuing an international partnership based on fair and equitable relationships with friends and allies across political, economic, and security dimensions.

Underlying the strategy of engagement, partnership, and prevention is the recognition that the United States will increasingly call upon friends and allies to accompany it in crisis scenarios, and that the ability to operate efficiently and effectively with those forces will be a key variable, perhaps determining the outcome of the undertaking. As Secretary of the Navy John Dalton has noted, “As navies get smaller, multinational cooperation and maritime coalitions become more and more essential. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps recognize that cooperation is not a luxury, it is an absolute necessity.”6 Similarly, it is recognized that most conflicts in the future are more likely to be regional, not global, with naval operations in a littoral, ... From the Sea, environment rather than on the high seas. Navy units may be in demand “more than ever,” but this demand, coupled with a smaller Fleet, will mean that the U.S. Navy can “no longer afford an unbroken presence in all areas simultaneously.”7 Again, responses by coalitions

will be the more likely solution in the future, as has already been demonstrated in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and elsewhere.

The administration’s statements of foreign policy and defense purpose can be summarized in a hierarchy of goals and national-security objectives that characterize the current environment, and against which U.S. foreign policy and defense programs will be measured. The hierarchy ranges from general, unspecified engagement and generation of goodwill, to the specific foreign-policy objectives identified in the PPDA, through the more specific defense objectives stated in the Bottom-Up Review and defense-planning discussions, and finally, to the still more specific military capabilities necessary to meet those objectives. Figure 1 describes this national-security environment.

Figure 1. U.S. national-security objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goodwill</th>
<th>Foreign policy</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Military capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendships</td>
<td>Sustainable development</td>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>Force structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural understanding</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive attitudes toward U.S.</td>
<td>Promoting peace</td>
<td>Coalitions</td>
<td>Sustainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Prevention of threat</td>
<td>Readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade and investment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advancing diplomacy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These concepts not only shape national and service policy, but they also guide priorities and define which activities can and should be supported with budget resources. In this report, they will be used to assess the “utility” or benefit and importance of U.S. Navy interactions in Latin America.
U.S. Security interests in Latin America

Broad U.S. interests in Latin America have always been derived primarily from the region's economic importance. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States intervened frequently in the region, largely for economic reasons. U.S. multinational corporations established their foothold in the early twentieth century, certain that U.S. power would defend their interests. In the 1970s, the United States again turned to the region when Latin America was growing rapidly under the stimulus of petro-dollar recycling, and quickly lost interest in the 1980s, when the debt crisis struck. Economic interests were subordinated to security concerns—Central American insurrections and narcotics trafficking.

In the 1990s, following a decade of economic crisis, aptly known as the “lost decade,” Latin America once again is emerging as an economically important world region. The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on January 1, 1994, marks the beginning of possible regional and hemisphere-wide economic integration and has stimulated both trade and investment in Latin America. With renewed growth, the region has become the fastest growing U.S. export trade market in the world, with countries like Colombia leading the way. Latin America includes five of the world's fastest growing “emerging capital markets,” with Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela all attracting billions of investment dollars. Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina are the world's eighth, twelfth, and twentieth largest economies. Latin America represents a market of 430 million people and a regional economy of more than a trillion dollars.

Table 1 compares the market of today's major emerging trade blocs, the Western Hemisphere, the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), and the European Union (EU). The United States belongs to APEC, and through NAFTA is likely to be part of any Western Hemisphere trade pact. The Latin American market (measured by

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8. Over the years, about one-third of the United States use of force short of war has taken place in the Western Hemisphere, mainly in the Caribbean Basin.
population) falls between the European and Asian markets, but is the only one of the three that the United States dominates and with which it has a trade surplus. The region's GDP is still small compared to the European and APEC economies (Japan represents more than 30 percent of the latter market), but after 12 years of stagnant growth is primed to boom.

Table 1. Characteristics of global economic blocs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Gross domestic product (U.S. $ trillions)</th>
<th>Exports (U.S. $ billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S./Canada</td>
<td>280,300</td>
<td>6,174,390</td>
<td>397,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>430,454</td>
<td>1,013,788</td>
<td>155,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Community</td>
<td>509,926</td>
<td>4,281,201</td>
<td>546,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Community</td>
<td>330,783</td>
<td>6,053,182</td>
<td>1,119,088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank: World Tables, 1993

With this growth potential, Latin America takes on new significance for the United States, as the country defines its interests in terms of "economic security." With economic issues assuming primacy in the post-Cold War environment, the United States, the European Community, and Japan will compete as roughly equal economic powers, each dominating its geographical region. Latin America enjoys strong economic ties with Europe and Japan, but its strongest ties are with the United States. It is the natural trade partner of the United States, to whom it is important that the region grow as efficiently as possible. It is important, not only in terms of competition among global trading blocs, but also because political and economic instability frequently follow declining economic performance.

Notwithstanding the primacy of U.S. economic interests in Latin America, countries of the region historically have been the principal "allies" of the United States outside the European context. There have been several efforts to build hemispheric union since the last century—Pan-Americanism was an important motivator behind
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy in the 1930s; land forces and naval units from several Latin American countries fought alongside the United States in World Wars I and II, and in Korea. Since 1947, U.S. security interests in the region have been defined by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), a collective security agreement intended to unite the region against the threat of international communism. Latin American countries have long wished to see the treaty revised to reflect more contemporary security concerns.

In spite of a rich history of U.S.-Latin American naval relations, the region has been regarded as a "backwater" in the post World War II period. During the Cold War, U.S. security interests were dominated by the concern to maintain strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. In that strategic context, Latin America played a minor role—"Latin American nations, with few exceptions, (were) firmly in the U.S. camp in the East-West conflict, but largely on the sidelines." U.S. security interests in Latin America were largely defined by the concern that the region not offer a base for Soviet expansion in the hemisphere, by our economic interests in their raw materials, and by their support for the United States in the bipolar balance. U.S. security priorities in the region were focused first on the Caribbean Basin; second on the South Atlantic countries (Brazil and Argentina), which might play roles in defense of shipping in the region; and last on the Pacific coast countries. In the aftermath of the closing of the Suez Canal and growing Western dependence on Middle East oil, and with Soviet advances in mineral-rich African countries, the United States took a sharper interest in South Atlantic shipping lanes. The notion


11. See Hayes, op. cit., Chapter 6, "Dimensions of Security Interests in Latin America."
of a South Atlantic security alliance patterned after NATO was briefly discussed, but rejected.

The United States maintained a close security relationship with the countries of the region through the mid 1960s. This changed during the 1970s, as major Latin American countries acquired the industrial capacity and wealth to establish their own competitive arms industries. Restrictions on U.S. arms sales to the region, based on both human rights and proliferation considerations, reduced U.S. interaction with the armed forces of the region, who nevertheless modernized their inventories by buying European-manufactured equipment. With Latin Americans training in Europe with European equipment, the United States gradually lost contact with younger generations of officers, so much so that today one can speak of the “lost generation” in the region—those officers who have been trained principally in European, not U.S., military academies. Empirically, this group includes officers from the grade of Navy Captain and below.

Furthermore, as governments in the region were taken over by military authoritarian regimes, U.S. contacts further diminished. Throughout the region, Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and Military Groups (MilGrps) were downsized (from about 800 personnel in the region in 1985 to about 200 today). With the exception of the Navy, U.S. armed forces nearly severed relations with the Chilean military. Again, with the exception of the Navy, Peru’s military became very close to the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Brazil dissolved the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission (JBUSDC) in 1977 in reaction to the first U.S. human rights report. Finally, during the 1980s, the global debt crisis brought on a decade long period of budget austerity and economic recession, reducing Latin America’s ability to engage the United States meaningfully on security issues.

Latin America is not a strategically vital region for the United States. Both the Panama Canal and the Straits of Magellan are potential maritime “strategic waters,” but neither is likely to be threatened in the foreseeable future. In any case, while both passages are extremely
“convenient” and “useful,” neither is vital to U.S. security. Alternative maritime passages can and will be found.12

Between now and the end of the century, Latin America is not likely to be a focal point of U.S. security concerns. There is no threat posed to the United States from the region. It has intervened in the region (mostly the Caribbean Basin) frequently in the past out of concern that “another Cuba” was building. Except for Cuba, the region is not even mentioned in the Secretary of Defense’s Bottom-Up Review. Current security involvement is mainly focused on counternarcotics activities, and withdrawal of forces from Central American conflicts and from the Panama Canal bases. Nevertheless, as the Commandant of the Marine Corps observed in his 1990 policy guidance for the region, “U.S. security is inextricably linked with the security of the hemisphere.”13

U.S. Navy interests in Latin America

In the post-Cold War context, the region can play a different set of roles with the U.S. Navy than it has in the past. It is the consensus of former Commanders, South Atlantic (COMSOLANTS) that the Latin American navies—particularly Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru—are “near-NATO” navies. Although they may lack capabilities in some areas (anti-air warfare (AAW) is a weakness, for example), in those areas in which they train, the former COMSOLANTS maintain that they perform with capability and professionalism that are “as good, sometimes better” than comparable U.S. or NATO units. U.S. Navy officers operating with Argentina and Chile remarked that they are “better than Spain, and as good as France” in aviation skills. Argentina participated successfully in Desert Shield/Desert Storm; deployed to the Gulf of Fonseca in UN peacekeeping


operations; and has joined the multinational force off of Haiti. VS-22, returning in December 1993 from a two-week deployment to Argentina for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exercises, was impressed with the professionalism of the Argentine submarine, surface, and naval-aviation units, and also with the rich training opportunities. The squadron Commanding Officer (CO) remarked, “we got a year’s worth of (ASW) quals in one week.” The CO of USS Monterey, operating in a passing exercise (PASSEX) with a Brazilian carrier battle group was surprised at how well the Brazilians were able to operate with U.S. units, even with minimal planning.

Latin America is also a diverse environment and “the only place we have ever practiced ... From the Sea in laboratory conditions.” The region offers the essential elements for training for littoral warfare:

- A diverse, cluttered littoral environment
- Access to training ranges, facilities, and unfamiliar hardware (e.g., diesel submarines)
- Modern, professional counterparts who know and practice littoral warfare
- Non-traditional (i.e., not NATO) coalition partners
- Stressed logistics and sustainability.

The Latin American region offers diverse environments, including deep and shallow, tropical and arctic waters; fjords and inlets; different bottoms; plenty of unique operating areas, including amphibious landing zones and gunnery ranges. Many of these environments are denied to the United States in other parts of the world. The combination of unique operating areas and the skill of local navies offers opportunities for testing the limits of U.S. weapons—including radar, missiles, and sensors—in the littoral environment. Moreover, the


15. The observation is that of RAdm. John Dalrymple, USN (Ret.), former USCOMSOLANT.
navies of the region are expert in operating in these areas and have surprised U.S. units more than once in open free-play exercises.

In addition, most Latin American armed forces are comfortable with and have plenty of experience working in multinational peacekeeping operations. They have participated frequently in the past, and today are engaged in ten UN peacekeeping operations around the world, including Haiti, India/Pakistan, El Salvador, Iraq/Kuwait, Western Sahara, Angola, Croatia and Bosnia, Sinai, Cambodia, and Central America.

Finally, for the first time since the early 1950s, Latin American countries are eager to work with the United States. Political and economic change in the region, overtures from the United States to establish special trade regimes with the region, and the obvious failure of the Marxist alternative have made it more acceptable to “follow” the United States, particularly in economics.

The changing Latin American security environment

Latin American national-security concerns are changing, but, in contrast to the United States, not as a result of the end of the Cold War. Political and economic transformations, internal to the region and prompted by the debt crisis of the 1980s, have had a much more profound effect on the region’s national-security outlook. Similarly, internal conflicts in Peru and Colombia and the growing power of drug cartels to operate with impunity in national territory have shaped military thinking and influenced doctrinal concepts. These realities were readily apparent in different degrees in interviews held over the summer and fall of 1993 with senior military commanders, civilian defense leaders, and students of the armed forces in Latin America. Latin America’s profound transformation over the past decade can be summarized in four trends:

- A region dominated by military governments has become a region of democratically elected civilians. Many countries are now experiencing their second and third constitutional changes of government.
• With the transition to elected civilian government, the region experienced a wrenching decade of economic austerity in which the regional GDP grew only 1.2 percent between 1980 and 1989, and per capita incomes fell by more than 10 percent overall and much more in some countries.16

The “lost decade” has ended, but the experience has brought about a revolution in economic thinking as governments shifted from state control and import-substituting industrialization to market economies, privatization (including of previously sacrosanct defense industries), and government downsizing. Most economies are now growing again. In 1993, the region as a whole posted its second year of greater than 3-percent growth, with countries like Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Panama growing at much higher rates.17

• The new economic thinking has led to increased integration. Brazil and Argentina have been engaged in aligning their economies since 1985. NAFTA and the Bush administration’s Enterprise for the Americas Initiative prompted both subregional integration and a greater interest in trade with the United States.

• Economic integration has contributed to renewed political accommodation, increasing dialogue between countries, and has contributed to the resolution of an unprecedented number of outstanding conflicts in the past several years.

These changed circumstances have led to new thinking about the roles of armed forces in Latin American societies and about specific roles and missions of different forces. This section reviews the changes as they affect Latin American national security thinking and the changing roles of navies in the region.

The transition to civilian government

The transition to civilian government and “return to the barracks” by the military has not always been smooth, and relations between

17. Ibid.
military and civilian establishments vary from country to country. Nevertheless, there presently is a firm commitment on the part of the armed forces to leave civilians in charge. This commitment is likely to be compromised only by the most profound civil unrest, events that are unlikely in the near-term time frame.

A major consequence of the return to civilian government is growing civilian interest in and authority over military budgets. One hypothesis pursued in this study was that civilian governments would not agree to fund the armed forces at a level sufficient to maintain force and readiness. The armed forces would not enjoy the prestige to warrant continued resources, or they would resist and contribute to hostility between civilians and the military.

Historically, Latin American military establishments have operated with considerable autonomy even under civilian governments. Many militaries develop their own budgets without civilian oversight.

Nevertheless, civilian authority over the military and civil-military cooperation in defense affairs is expanding around the region. It is most obvious in Argentina, where civilians staff the defense ministry and a strong academic tradition of research and cooperation within war colleges and collaboration with legislative oversight committees has taken root. Civilian authority over the military is far less evolved in Chile, where suspicions remain in both civilian and military camps. However, the Chilean military hierarchy remains committed to fulfilling its obligations to civilian leaders, and civil-military contact and competence is expanding. The Chilean government, inaugurated in March 1994, will reinforce the trend to increased cooperation between the defense ministry and the different Services. Similar patterns also are slowly occurring in other countries in the region.

The issues of institutional prestige in the society at large, and civilian consensus on defense roles and missions, are critical to evaluating future support for the military, particularly insofar as resources are concerned. Given strained relations under authoritarian regimes, there was no certainty that new civilian governments would sustain support for the armed forces, particularly when faced with pressing claims on government resources. Because of austerity-driven reductions in government spending, armed forces have seen their budgets
reduced dramatically over the 1980s. Similarly, force levels have been cut, so that the region's armed forces are considerably smaller in the 1990s than they were at the beginning of the 1980s. Acquisitions have been reduced and maintenance has suffered. Current budget allocations make meaningful readiness difficult to maintain. Salaries are at all-time low levels, so that many officers and enlisted personnel maintain second jobs to support themselves. These factors were in part responsible for the unrest within the Venezuelan younger officer corps that led to two coup attempts against constitutional authority in the past four years.

Low military pay and expanding opportunities in other areas of the economy have dramatically reduced recruitment into the services, particularly from the educated middle class. A Peruvian officer noted that applications for the military academy barely cover openings in the entering class, whereas in the past applications exceeded by many times the number of seats. The implications for the quality of the future Peruvian forces are clear. The pattern holds for every other military establishment in the region. From the armed forces' perspective, a key issue in the evolving civil-military relationship is the support that civilian leaders will provide for operation, modernization, salaries, force size, and structure.

Although recruitment may be down for economic reasons, the armed forces as an institution generally enjoy high regard among the populations. In nearly every country where the question is asked, public opinion polls show the armed forces ranking at the top of respected institutions, along with the Catholic Church. Little distinction is made between Services.

Return to growth and support for the armed forces

Latin American leaders have repeated their support for a "lean" and efficient armed force that is prepared to exercise a variety of missions. Nowhere is there support for elimination of the armed forces, as has sometimes been proposed in this country, nor for converting the military into a police entity. The principal concern of governments is how to pay for the desired force.
Growth in the region is not yet sufficient to allow defense budgets to expand, but there is a growing recognition among political leaders that operating budgets cannot be cut further without serious harm to the armed forces. Presently, 80 percent and more of some budgets are allocated to salaries and pensions. Leaders are beginning to recognize that, in this increasingly technological world, pay and preparation must be adequate to retain good people in the Services.

Adequate budgets will remain a key area of concern for most of the decade, and it is unlikely that most forces will see increases in budget above and beyond inflation. This will dramatically affect modernization and acquisitions.

**Economic integration**

Regional and subregional economic integration is in many ways a consequence of the region's new economic outlook. NAFTA is the most dramatic manifestation of the trend toward economic integration, and has the greatest impact on the United States. Throughout the hemisphere, integration movements have taken root where they have never before been successful. Central American countries have revived the moribund Central American Common Market. Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia have dramatically revised the terms of the Andean Pact, opening their economies to trade and investment. Trade between Colombia and Venezuela is now booming.

The customs union of Southern Cone countries (MERCOSUR) has resulted in dramatic expansion of regional trade. Brazil and Argentina are now each other's most important trading partners, replacing the United States in each case. Although Chile does not belong to any of the subregional pacts, Chileans are investing heavily in both Argentina and Brazil. Chile is now the second-largest investor in Argentina after the United States. In 1993 alone, $1.1 of $1.4 million Chilean overseas investments were in Argentina.¹⁸ Chile now owns a significant portion of the Argentine power network. The English-speaking Caribbean countries have similarly revised and

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streamlined operation of the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) to facilitate intraregional trade, develop economies of scale, and streamline relations with the United States and regional trade blocs. Mexico, for its part, has established “free-trade” relations with each of these groups.

Economic integration is revitalizing the regional marketplace, providing further attractions to investors and businessmen. U.S. goods are particularly in demand, resulting in a renewed U.S. identification with specific economic interests in Latin America.

**Political rapprochement**

Economic integration has led in turn to political cooperation on a scale previously unseen in the region. One by one, border differences are being resolved, and countries are officially putting aside animosities that have driven foreign policy and defense spending since independence. 19

Argentina and Chile recently resolved the last of more than 30 boundary disputes between the two nations. Paralleling their economic integration, the two countries' armed forces are working at enhancing cooperation between Services. The two armies cooperate frequently because of activities along the mutual border. Chief of Staff of the Argentine Army General Martin Balza invited his Chilean counterpart, General Augusto Pinochet, to Argentine “Army Day” ceremonies and decorated him to signal Argentina's commitment to reverse the animosities that almost led to war over the Beagle Channel in 1978. The Argentine and Chilean navies remain distant, in part because of Chilean reluctance to engage, but engagement does take place and it is possible that future leaders will decide to improve relations more aggressively.

19. Although nations may sign treaties putting aside traditional hostilities, children still learn different histories in the classroom. Public opinion polls in Latin America frequently identify strong concerns about hostilities from neighbors. This will continue until the textbooks are changed.
Argentina and Brazil have been engaged in strengthening political and military ties since 1985 and have developed a complex set of mutual agreements and inspections designed to allay any concerns between the contracting parties. Argentine authorities stipulate that no animosities remain between the two countries, and this has been underscored by a series of combined efforts in recent years, including operation of Argentine naval air from Brazil’s carrier, the *Minas Gerais*, and renewal of South Atlantic exercises with Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. For its part, Brazil’s attention is focused on its internal political crisis, which has distracted it from hemispheric and global commitments of the recent past.

Peru and Chile are also in the process of resolving a long-standing border dispute concerning, Peru’s claim to the northern provinces of Chile, which were taken in the War of the Pacific (1879–1883). Agreements signed in November 1993 recognize present borders, establish confidence-building mechanisms, and commit both governments to improved relations. Peru recognizes that it needs investment capital available from Chile. Moreover, Peru’s security attention is drawn elsewhere. Peruvian officials acknowledged in interviews that, as a consequence of the decision by political authorities to end hostilities with Chile and because of dire budget constraints, future defense planning could not focus on massive defense of the Peru-Chile border. Instead, it would emphasize counterinsurgency operations and humanitarian and civic-action programs.

In contrast, Peru’s relations with its other neighbor, Ecuador, remain tense. In interviews, Peruvian authorities reiterated their lack of confidence in any Ecuadorian commitment on the border, and any settlement of the dispute remains distant. At the same time, the Peruvian Navy has invited Ecuadorians to come aboard their ships during UNITAS, and though the invitation was not accepted for lack of concurrence by the Ecuadorian parliament, the initiative was a positive one.

Finally, Colombia and Venezuela continue to have problems at the political level, but maintain contact at the Service level and cooperate in patrolling vast common interior frontiers, both land and riverine. The two countries work together regularly along their common
border and relations between Services are good. A visit by the Venezuelan CNO to Colombian Navy headquarters was an important event. Informally, officers blame civilians for maintaining hostilities. Boundary differences in Lake Maracaibo seem to be the outstanding point of contention between the two countries and the issue is complicated by the prospects of rich oil fields in the region.

Latin American national-security goals

Latin Americans endorse a broader definition of "national security" than we in the United States have historically embraced. Whereas we are only beginning to consider the implications of "economic security," Latin Americans always have insisted on a three-pronged security equation of economic and political concerns, as well as defense of territory. Moreover, for the Latin Americans, defense of territory includes not only defense of borders, but also internal defense. Where, in the past, internal defense has been interpreted (with U.S. help) in ideological terms, control over territory has become a significant concern as a consequence of operations of recalcitrant guerrilla bands in Colombia, Ecuador, and Chile, as well as the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and contraband and narcotics trafficking throughout the region. Exercise of sovereignty over internal territory is a real challenge for Latin American forces operating in the largely unoccupied and undeveloped interior of the continent. Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and Brazil are increasingly sensitive to the fact that they do not exercise real sovereignty over the vast riverine networks of their countries.

These changing emphases have important implications for armed-forces' leadership. Latin American armed-forces' strategic thinking and training have traditionally been oriented toward conventional theater warfare. Although they have engaged in counterinsurgency, they have prepared and trained for warfare of a different nature and, by their own admission, have only recently begun to recognize the need for specific doctrine and training in unconventional warfare. As

regional hostilities subside, as the lessons of unconventional war are slowly internalized, and as budget resource availabilities decline precipitously, strategic thinking is changing as a new leadership adjusts to politically and economically driven requirements.

Finally, Latin American navies are painfully aware that their own equipment is not at the same level of technology that they see in First World fleets. They are keen to stay abreast of technology and would like to reverse, in a practical way, their dependence on European suppliers so that they would be more interoperable with the United States. Across the region, senior naval officials reiterated in interviews with us their “regrets” about the lack of U.S. equipment in their inventory. They insisted that U.S. policy forced them to shop elsewhere when they would have preferred to buy U.S. equipment, thus maintaining the close ties to U.S. industry and armed forces. They also expressed the hope that in future they would be able to return to U.S. equipment.

**Latin American naval roles and missions**

By the end of the century, the region’s navies overall can be expected to be about 10 percent smaller than they are today (in addition to a 25-percent reduction during the 1980s). There will be a drastic reduction in destroyer assets, leaving a frigate-based surface force, diesel submarines, diversified naval air, and some amphibious capability for the region. The fleet will be modern, with most, if not all, World War II-vintage vessels retired from inventory. Modernization, operational efficiency, and incorporation of technology will be the prime goals for the region’s navies.21

Budget resources and practical demands on forces have resulted in gradual redefinition of roles and missions by all the Services in the region and by navies in particular. Like other forces, Latin American navies developed a doctrine of preparation for conventional war at sea and were postured against rivals in the region. Today, roles

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and missions, and priorities among those roles and missions, are changing. Priorities and realistic capabilities vary across the region.

All countries of the region recognize that they have important challenges to control their 200-mile maritime Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Navies recognize that "control" over the EEZs has become an important mission throughout the region. Several have concerns about international fishing within their zones; the environment also is a growing concern, as is the use of territory to import contraband—arms in the case of Peru and Colombia.

Major navies of the region, especially Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, maintain a sea-control mission. This traditional mission and control of the EEZs influenced the Chilean and Argentine navies' recent efforts to define a maritime strategy—Mar Presencial in the Chilean case, and Maritime Strategy in the case of Argentina. These are not new missions. Argentina and Brazil, particularly the latter, have long held sea control in the South Atlantic as a prime mission. The United States bought into that mission during the Cold War, and in the late 1970s gave serious consideration to the role that Brazil and Argentina, then at the peak of their military expansion, could play in supporting U.S. defenses in the region.

In this context, Brazil and Argentina are conducting combined exercises (Fraterno) in the South Atlantic, and are renewing ties with South Africa that have lain dormant since the 1970s. A three-part combined exercise with South Africa is planned.

Argentina has already defined its interest in multinational naval cooperation and cooperative security, and has demonstrated its capability to operate in coalitions in both Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the Haitian embargo. The coalition effort is a conscious (civilian) government effort to reinsert Argentina in key developed-world forums. Both the Brazilian and Chilean navies would have liked to have participated in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, recognizing that they missed unique opportunities to interoperate with First World fleets.

On the basis of research and interviews conducted in Latin America, we can represent the principal roles and missions of Latin American navies as shown in figure 2. Argentina, Chile, and Brazil define their
naval missions primarily in the blue-water context. They are the three countries that today might be interested in and capable of joining the United States in multinational, out-of-area operations. Although neither Chile nor Brazil has ventured into major multinational naval operations, both have expressed continuing interest in such operations. Brazil did not participate in Desert Storm “for budgetary reasons.” Chile did not participate for “political” reasons. The event occurred in the time frame of the latter country’s transition to civilian government and relations between the new administration and the out-going military regime were tense.

Figure 2. Roles and missions of Latin American navies
The remaining navies of South America and the navies of Central America and the Caribbean are essentially green-water, coastal navies. Colombia maintains a modest blue-water capability, but future budget resources will be devoted to coastal law enforcement and riverine activities. Both of these activities belong to the Colombian Navy, and personnel rotate through the various assignments, but resources will be targeted at coast-guard and riverine capabilities. Civilian authorities express little support for blue-water missions, especially submarine force missions.

Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil all have important riverine missions. Colombia's is the most familiar because the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps were instrumental in developing it. Peru and Brazil both devote significant resources to riverine missions. The riverine network of interior South America encompasses tens of thousands of miles of waterways in remote areas, as seen in the accompanying map. In the future, commercial development of the Paraná-Paraguay waterway, the Hidrovia, in the center-south of the continent, will enhance riverine missions as the 2,000-mile “Mississippi of South America” draws economic activity to the rich and underdeveloped interior of Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Argentina.

22. U.S. and Colombian authorities have expressed concern that Colombia will have difficulty sustaining the growth of these undertakings with reduction in U.S. military assistance and counternarcotics funding.
U.S. naval cooperation with Latin America

The project tasking included a mandate to examine the full scope of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps programs of cooperation with Latin America. These were divided into ten categories, ranging from high-level political-military contacts, to use of facilities in the region, exercises with Latin Americans, educational and operational exchanges, research and development activities, and humanitarian assistance. The categories and their components are summarized in table 2. The individual programs are described in detail in a supporting research memorandum.23 The following sections summarize the key points discovered in our examination of the implementation and impact of cooperative programs.

Political-military interaction

Political-military interactions are those activities that implement a long-range conceptual vision of the purpose to be achieved and the benefits to be derived from relations, in this case, with the navies of Latin America. Today's defense planners describe a strategic vision of engagement, partnership, and prevention of threat. Engagement is necessary to ensure influence in matters affecting U.S. security. Partnership is necessary to adequately manage the tensions and crisis spots that are likely to confront the world in the post-Cold War environment. Prevention of threats to security is to be achieved by promoting democracy, economic growth, free markets, and human dignity, and will require drawing on the full range of economic, political, and military resources.

23. CNA Research Memorandum 94-64, Future Naval Cooperation With Latin America: Program Descriptions and Assessment, by Margaret Daly Hayes et al., Unclassified, forthcoming.
Table 2. Programs of naval cooperation with Latin America

Political-military interactions
Policy guidance
Strategic talks/Navy-to-Navy staff policy talks
Statements of mutual interest and common strategic consideration
Senior officer/VIP visits
Conferences
Joint staff talks
Naval attachés

Facility access in Latin America
Overseas U.S. naval bases and facilities
Port visits
Aviation access
Use of ranges, targets, low-level routes
Access to repair facilities
Fuel-exchange agreements

Exercises and other operations
UNITAS
Other afloat exercises
U.S. Southern Command-sponsored exercises
Navy Construction Brigade operations

Operational exchanges
Personnel Exchange Program (PEP)
Liaison officers
Shipriders
Inter-American Naval Telecommunications
Network Secretariat
Orientation visits
War games

Professional military-education programs
U.S. Naval Academy
Training cruises
Naval Postgraduate School
Naval War College
Specialized USN schools

C3/Interoperability
Operational-communications improvements
Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network (IANTN)
Doctrine development

Research and development
Co-production/Co-development
Joint Primary Aircraft Training Systems (JPATS) competition
Oceanographic research
Scientist exchanges

Miscellaneous programs
Humanitarian assistance programs: Project Handclasp
Inter-American organizations
U.S. Coast Guard involvement in Latin America
Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission (JMUUSDC)

These goals are implemented in one way or another by all of the interactions undertaken by the U.S. Navy in Latin America. At the senior Service level, they are implemented through specific policy guidance, strategic and navy-to-navy talks, Flag and senior officer visits, and high-level conferences engaging peers within the Latin American navies. The national-security framework described earlier in this report guided our assessment of political-military interactions in the region.
Policy guidance

In contrast to both the U.S. Coast Guard and the Marine Corps, the U.S. Navy does not have an overall policy approach explaining the goals and purpose of its programs of cooperation with Latin America (or any other region).

The Marine Commandant’s guidance of October 1989\textsuperscript{24} stipulated that (U.S. Security)... “is inextricably linked with the security of our hemispheric neighbors,” and described a program of increased presence in the region, increased emphasis on skills needed to operate in the region (including language training), a better understanding of security-assistance programs, more creative use of Operations and Maintenance (O&MMC) funds, and more frequent and effective operations and training, including a review of force structure and planning with a focus on opportunities in Latin America.

Coast Guard guidance for the region was dictated in 1990 as part of the Commandant’s international strategic plan. It argued for strengthening international ties; assisting nations in developing maritime capabilities; enhancing Coast Guard leadership in international forums, and improving awareness and support of international efforts.\textsuperscript{25} The Guidance directs high priority to the Caribbean region.

The closest the Navy has come to similar policy guidance has been former CNO Admiral James D. Watkins’ efforts to promote a program of cooperation with Latin American navies in the context of the navy’s global maritime strategy of full forward presence. Roles were not unlike those conceived and implemented during World War II. Latin American countries would be relied on to perform tasks in their littoral, relieving USN units for forward activities. The program was intended to develop a strategic dialogue with the countries of the region and led to strategic talks between OPNAV and some Latin American navies, as well as bilateral statements of mutual interest and strategic understanding.

\textsuperscript{24} See “Commandant’s Guidance: Latin America,” \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{25} COMDTINST 16000.21 of 20 Sep 1990 is excerpted in \textit{op. cit.}
Strategic talks

Strategic talks began in 1984 and focused on strategy issues and the role of Latin American navies in an overall maritime strategy. Between April 1984 and February 1990, strategic talks were held with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In the course of dialogue, Statements of Mutual Interest and Common Strategic Consideration were drawn up with the various countries. Although the statements did not have the force of a treaty, they did reflect common intent and were submitted to the State Department for approval before they were signed. Both Argentina and Chile renegotiated their statements in 1992 and 1993, respectively, indicating their ongoing interest in cooperation with the U.S. Navy. Argentina also sought to sign subsidiary agreements in the areas of surface and air warfare.

In the early 1990s, OPNAV’s interest in strategic talks waned, and with the exception of talks with Argentina, which maintained a unique interest in continuing the dialogue, the program ended. Since OPNAV’s reorganization in October 1992, the focal point of OPNAV interface with Latin America has been concentrated in the N3/N5 Western Hemisphere political-military branch (N523).

Flag visits

Senior officer visits to and from Latin America provide important venues of political-military interactions. Visits provide an opportunity to develop specific areas of cooperation or to signal concrete interest in interaction. Latin American heads of navies regularly visit the United States as guests of the CNO under the CNO Counterpart Visit Program. The CNO visits Latin America in conjunction with the biannual Inter-American Naval Conference and holds bilateral meetings with chiefs of other navies at that time, but otherwise has not visited the region since 1984. Each year, several other Navy Flag officers generally visit Latin America in the course of their duties. Most of these visits are protocol events (e.g., Mexican Independence celebration) or meetings of Specialized Inter-American Naval Conferences (SIANCs). A few, perhaps too few, are planned to initiate or follow up on specific policy programs.
Conferences and symposia

Most Latin American chiefs of Navy frequently make the trip to Newport, Rhode Island, for the biannual International Sea Power Symposium, and several play key roles in the proceedings. The Navy does not use that venue for selected bilateral meetings, either by the CNO or Fleet Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Given the infrequent opportunities for engaging senior officers, it would appear an appropriate venue for following up on selected initiatives.

The Inter-American Naval Conference (IANC), with its Specialized Naval Conferences and Special Commissions, is the regional policy forum. The IANC includes the chiefs of all major navies and many smaller navies in South America, as well as Mexico, Canada, and the United States. The consensus format of the IANC and SIANCs does not encourage bold initiatives, but the conferences can serve as forums for launching and testing ideas and for developing consensus.

With careful study and diplomacy, IANC could provide a venue for a number of U.S. foreign, defense, and Navy policy initiatives, such as intraregional cooperation, multinational operations, and doctrine development. For example, Colombia had hoped to win support for intraregional riverine cooperation within the Specialized Intelligence, Coastal and Riverine Patrol, and Narcotics and Arms Trafficking SIANC, but was not able to get its issue on the agenda (which it perceived to be dominated by U.S. intelligence-collection concerns). The Navy will have to develop mechanisms for liaison and follow-up, and, in some cases, should send more senior personnel to cover SIANC meetings. With the exception of the conferences of Naval War College directors, U.S. Navy delegations to specialized conferences generally have been drawn from within OPNAV.

Additional operational and Fleet representation at these meetings would support CINCLANTFLT's role as component commander in SOUTHCOM; would enhance relations with the different Latin American navies; and would indicate greater operational interest in regional activities. Latin American navies would likely respond very positively to a well-crafted, higher-profile U.S. Navy presence.
Exercises and operations afloat

Afloat operations are clearly of greatest interest to the Fleet. We examined many categories of exercises and operations afloat, ranging from UNITAS; Latin American participation in FLEETEXs; exercises undertaken in conjunction with intermittent carrier inter-Fleet transfers; S-3 ASW exercises, and a variety of JCS-sponsored exercises organized by U.S. Southern Command. Table 3 summarizes the review.

UNITAS

UNITAS is clearly the crown jewel of Navy programs in Latin America. It is the USN’s longest continually running multilateral exercise and has been held annually, in spite of political crises in the region and elsewhere, for 34 years. All of the countries of South America, except Bolivia; and all major navies, except Mexico, participate in one or more country phases of this “round-the-horn” deployment. The exercise is extremely important for Latin American participants. Almost every senior Latin American officer will have participated in at least one UNITAS exercise in his career and many in two or three. Many services save their operating budgets for the UNITAS exercise.

The U.S. Navy is the only U.S. Service to maintain this kind of intense, mutually beneficial, professional interaction with another Service in the region. There are many reasons to believe that such an exercise could only be a Navy exercise, one of the most important being that there are never questions of naval forces occupying a neighbor’s sovereign territory. UNITAS is also unique on a global level—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) is examining the experience as a model for navy-to-navy programs in his region.26

Table 3. Summary of scope and dispersion of Navy participation in exercises in Latin America

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<th>Fleet exercise</th>
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- ● Ship/squad/staff-level involvement/ more than one ship
- ○ Unit/staff-level involvement/ approximately one ship
- ○ Limited involvement/ less than 25 personnel
UNITAS has permitted Latin Americans to maintain interoperability with the United States and was credited by Argentine CNOs with making it possible for Argentina to participate in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. UNITAS is an annual exercise, planned by countries of the region and the United States. It is a vehicle for Latin Americans to maintain readiness at as near to First World levels as possible. It is the only model to which most are exposed.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, UNITAS has historically been a multilateral exercise. In its early years, it was organized in essentially two phases—Atlantic and Pacific. Latin Americans operated together in either ocean. With few exceptions, at least three navies operate together in several multilateral exercises during each UNITAS. Today only Chile prefers to operate bilaterally with the United States.

Initially, UNITAS was primarily an ASW exercise, but today it includes all warfare elements. Carriers generally have not been involved, though the USS John F. Kennedy was scheduled to participate in 1983 and had stopped at Rio de Janeiro when it was ordered to steam to Lebanon. More recently, an effort was made to include USS Abraham Lincoln (on inter-Fleet transit) in UNITAS exercises with Brazil, but scheduling, and possibly Brazilian Navy reluctance to share the Navy exercise with the Brazilian Air Force, ultimately made it impossible. UNITAS has emphasized War at Sea in the past, but the Latin American operating environment is also an excellent laboratory for ... From the Sea, and efforts are being made to better exploit exercise opportunities in that environment.

27. See table 5, page 47, in Future Naval Cooperation With Latin America: Program Descriptions and Assessment.

28. Since 1978, Chile has declined to operate with its neighbors, believing, according to CNO Admiral Jorge Martinez-Busch, "In this way we keep the peace with our neighbors." However, before 1978 (Beagle Channel incident with Argentina), UNITAS' historical records indicate that Chile operated frequently with Peru during UNITAS, though not with Argentina. Given the rapprochement with both neighbors, it would be an important advance to draw Chile into regional multilateral exercises. Argentina has indicated its interest in operating with Chile.
One of the strengths of UNITAS is its joint ownership by U.S. and Latin American navies. In principal, Latin Americans determine the exercise content. In fact, exercise scenarios seem to vary little from year to year, and some Latin Americans have expressed concern that in the past (and, by implication, today) UNITAS has been oriented too much toward U.S.-preferred ASW exercises, ignoring Latin American exercise interests. In the early 1980s, Latin Americans complained to USCOMSOLANT about the lack of challenge in UNITAS and major improvements were made. COMSOLANTs interviewed in the course of this project uniformly regarded the UNITAS deployment as an excellent training opportunity, and a stressed deployment with four months of high-tempo operations at sea.

In spite of the excellent training opportunities offered by UNITAS, the exercise is not well-known or understood in the U.S. Navy. Questions are raised frequently about continuing at the current level of activity (most recently three ships and one submarine) and whether the Navy derives real benefit from the exercise. Senior officers of the Navy often still think of UNITAS as the “Piña Colada cruise.” Many regard the exercise as “not challenging to the United States,” intended primarily to promote goodwill in the region, not to train and enhance readiness. The belief that UNITAS is not a serious military exercise has persisted at senior levels, in spite of reports to the contrary from numerous USCOMSOLANTs.

In interviews, COMSOLANTs stressed the continuing struggle to get high-capability ships assigned to the deployment. In recent years, the number of surface ships assigned to the deployment has been cut from four to three, and the deployment itself has been shortened by a month. In spite of these difficulties, and aside from routine after-action briefings for CINCLANTFLT and the CNO, there is little apparent effort to share information and lessons learned outside of the relatively small community involved with UNITAS planning and support.

As noted above, Latin Americans sometimes complain as well. Operating under budget constraints, and lacking the mind-set of out-of-area operations, they are not prepared to suggest enhancements

29. CINCLANTFLT has committed four ships to UNITAS 35 (1994).
that might be mutually beneficial. Participating navies review the exercise experience at the end of each phase of UNITAS. It might prove useful to try to incorporate an enhanced "lessons-learned" evaluation that would help identify areas for redesign and improvement. This is particularly important for those navies that may begin to consider out-of-area operations with the United States. In any case, a mechanism is needed to stimulate Latin American initiative in developing new and more-challenging exercise scenarios (as well as topics for in-port symposia).

Other afloat exercises

Other major at-sea exercises in the region also had real benefit for both the U.S. and Latin American participants. Aircraft carrier inter-Fleet transfers are a good example. For carrier air wings, the transits offer unencumbered air space, unusual low-level routes; Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT); operations against defended targets; use of new air-to-ground targets; as well as diesel-submarine ASW, surface warfare, and carrier air defense. U.S. participants found exercises with their Latin American counterparts to be challenging—"not what we expected," with the Latin Americans operating "better than Spain, as good as France." All carrier COs remarked that they would have liked to have done much more, but were restricted for various reasons, particularly high speed of advance (SOA). Designation of carrier transits through the region as "deployments" would facilitate maximizing both diplomatic and training opportunities offered by carrier visits to the region.  

ASW exercises

Sea Control Wing One S-3 operations have taken place since 1986 with Colombia, and in 1993 with Argentina. Participating squadron, VS-22, noted that in the Argentine operations units achieved a "year's worth of (ASW) quals in a two-week period," far surpassing what they would have gotten on a typical Mediterranean deployment. Costs for the exercise were only marginally higher than they would have been

had VS-22 gone to Norfolk from Jacksonville, and most of the additional costs were borne by the Space and Naval Warfare System Command (SPAWARS), which achieved unusual technical breakthroughs. ASW operations were conducted in shallow waters similar to those of the Middle East or North Africa, where the S-3 crews have not been permitted to train. Argentina was very generous in employment of its TR1700 submarine. Pilots reported that interoperability with Argentine ships and S-2 aircraft was very good. Both Sea Control Wing One and Argentine naval air would like to institutionalize the exercise. Argentina would prefer to do so outside of annual UNITAS planning.

**FLEETEX participation**

Venezuela and Brazil have participated in Second Fleet exercises in the past, and Argentina participated in FLEETEX 2-94 (April). Given the costs of deploying ships to and from South America, it is important to encourage Latin American navies to take advantage of opportunities to exercise with U.S. units close to U.S. ports. With adequate planning horizons, they can be expected to take advantage of invitations offered and opportunities presented, as they have demonstrated with Argentina's FLEETEX (2/94) participation, and Brazil's five-ship battlegroup PASSEX engagement in the Puerto Rico Operating Area (PROA) in March 1994.

It should be noted that most of recent blue-water exercises have taken place with Argentina, at Argentina's initiative. We have not had the same opportunities to engage Brazil and Chile. Both have declined invitations to operate in PASSEXes in the past. Brazil's very positive response to CINCLANTFLT's invitation to the 1994 PROA PASSEX suggests that the United States should persist in seeking opportunities to exercise together. Chile has expressed interest in participating in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) and this interest should be exploited.

**Special warfare exercises**

Apart from the blue-water exercises with Southern Cone navies described above, most other recent USN activities have been concentrated in northern-tier South American Andean countries, Central
America, and the Caribbean. Most are with green- and brown-water navies and engage relatively few people (often fewer than 25). The Capabilities Exercise (CAPEX), an annual (since 1992) Naval Special Warfare exercise staged in Panama, attracts a few officials to observe USN Special Warfare (SPECWAR) units and Latin American students at Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTs) in operation. CAPEX was previously targeted at Flag and senior personnel engaged in counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations, but invitations are currently distributed to operational-level personnel, perhaps because of lack of adequate coordination between USN and U.S. Embassy personnel. Within its realm, CAPEX is an impressive operation and an excellent demonstration of state-of-the-art U.S. riverine warfare equipment. It is through contacts made in the CAPEX context that USN SPECWAR units were able to initiate contacts with the Brazilian jungle warfare training school in Manaus. This was regarded in the Special Warfare community as a major coup.

USN SPECWAR units and selected Marine units also participate in Kings Guard, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-sponsored riverine surveillance and interdiction exercise in Central America. Seabee detachments participate in Fuertes Caminos, an engineering reserve-deployment exercise in Central America and Bolivia.

**JCS-sponsored exercises**

Most SOUTHCOM-sponsored joint exercises have minimal USN content. This may be because SOUTHCOM's goals have been focused on nation-building and humanitarian assistance and rely heavily on support forces—civic action teams, engineers, Seabees. Many of the exercises are Deployments for Training (DFTs). Although these do enhance U.S. personnel readiness, or at least the deployability of U.S. forces (often reserve units), they do not engage many Latin American counterparts. Moreover, in some circumstances, they may duplicate activities that could be done by Latin American forces, enhancing their training and readiness in the process. Argentine Army Chief of Staff, General Martin Balza, commented to us: "We welcome your Medical Readiness Exercises (MEDRETEs) to Argentina, but we could do this ourselves. Why don't you just assist by supplying the medicines!" Given recent diplomatic incidents involving U.S. forces
deployed for training in Honduras and Colombia, the DFTs program should be examined for impact and coordination. Perhaps civic-action activities should not be undertaken in countries generally able to meet the humanitarian and civic-action needs of their own citizens.

There were more than 110 Navy DFTs to the region in the 1989 to 1993 time period, and 21 Marine Corps DFTs in 1993 alone. The vast majority of these DFTs were in support of SOUTHCOM joint exercises (Kings Guard, Cabañas, Fuerzas Unidas, and Fuertes Caminos), and in support of the Marine Corps program in Colombia.

By their nature, DFTs are often routine. There is a downside to this. Seabee battalions that had deployed frequently to Central America on joint exercises found that they were unprepared to support themselves when they operated in San José de Guaviare, Colombia. They had become accustomed to relying on Army and Air Force logistics planning and support and didn’t have their logistics train organized for the more stressed, longer-term deployment in an unusual (jungle) environment.

**Operational exchanges**

Operational exchanges were defined as professional personnel exchanges at the working navy—deck-plate level—rather than educational exchanges. They include exchanges ranging from the formal, worldwide Personnel Exchange Program (PEP), liaison officers assigned to CINC and Fleet headquarters, long-term shipriders, the Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network Secretariat, war games, and general orientation visits, symposia, and conferences. These exchanges have a major impact on bridging the generation gap and putting the best Latin American officers to work with peers in the U.S. Navy. They are highly valued by Latin Americans and build what Argentine CNO Admiral Jorge Molina-Pico called “mental interoperability.”

Table 4 summarizes participation by Latin Americans in selected operational exchanges. Three of the operational exchange programs can be called “formal” programs—PEP, IANTN, and war games. Liaison officer assignments, out-of-area shiprider invitations, and general orientation visits are conducted on an ad hoc basis.
Table 4. Selected operational exchanges with Latin American countries

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<th>Shipriders</th>
<th>Bilateral wargames</th>
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Personnel Exchange Program

The Personnel Exchange Program is the best known program and generally requires a one-for-one exchange of personnel into established billets. Latin Americans value this program and send their best officers, whereas the United States has considerable difficulty recruiting candidates for the exchange (and for exchanges in general). The fact that some are recruited out of the Reserve, and that most do not advance in their Navy careers, is not lost upon the Latin Americans.

There is limited concern about this problem in the Navy. The Chief of Naval Personnel said on one occasion that “PEP is more important than ever,” citing that “...with smaller naval and military forces, it is imperative that we operate jointly and collectively...” and that the U.S. Navy has a “lot to learn” from foreign navies in areas such as mine warfare, shallow-water ASW, near-land antiair defense and so forth. 31 Privately, he also admitted that the exchange billets are not “career enhancing” and that good officers “fight like hell” to avoid them. It should be noted that although foreign-area programs are better organized and regarded in the Army and Air Force, the career results of the programs are not much better in those Services than in the Navy.

The Navy could use PEP assignments much more effectively. With an ensured follow-on assignment in the Fleet, more officers might be

attracted to the overseas experience. If PEP assignments were made part of foreign-area specialization (as the Army does with its Foreign Area Officer [FAO] Program), a productive career path might be developed. The Navy and the U.S. Embassy could each provide more support to the PEP officer and take more advantage from the close contacts that most officers establish in the host service. Presently, the Navy makes little effort to debrief officers following the exchange. Reporting by incumbents is minimal to non-existent, and the PEP officer is often denied routine interaction with other U.S. Navy personnel working in the U.S. Embassy, during UNITAS, or even in the context of non-routine ship visits or exercises. 

The point is that “military diplomacy” can be an important element of “forward presence” in the current political environment. Exchange programs then become more useful and the Navy could enhance the value of its programs by making efforts to ensure follow-on Fleet or staff assignments for exchange officers. Alternatively, one-way exchanges to the United States are still highly desirable from the Latin American point of view and should perhaps be expanded. This may require adjustments to current law.

War games

War gaming is an inexpensive and effective mode of interaction with Latin American navies and an excellent vehicle for introducing new concepts at very different levels of command. Games can be used effectively to develop common and combined operating procedures, and to work out practical problems of bilateral and multilateral interactions. They are a tool for developing doctrine and policy consensus,

32. In an exception to this pattern, a USN PEP officer accompanied ARA La Argentina to Norfolk for FLEETEX 2-94.

and should be explored as a vehicle for working out implications of “cooperative security” in the hemisphere, as well as out-of-area participation by the Latin Americans with the United States.

The annual Inter-American War Game (IWAG) is sponsored by the Specialized Inter-American Conference of Directors of Naval War Colleges. It is a “distributed” game with a centrally located team (usually at the Naval War College) coordinating player teams at war colleges in the region and is conducted via the Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network. IWAG has tended to be a tactical game focused on defense of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and efforts to introduce more varied, relevant, and contemporary scenarios have been resisted by navies (particularly Brazil and Colombia) that use the games for specific purposes within their war college curricula.

Bilateral strategic war games have been played with several Latin American countries since 1986, but sponsor (OPNAV) interest waned in the 1990s and currently games are held only with Argentina, largely at their initiative. The 1991 game is an excellent example of what can be achieved with the war-gaming tool. The game was organized to explore Argentine rules of engagement (ROEs) in a Persian Gulf maritime interdiction environment. The Argentine Navy applied lessons learned in the game when it deployed to Desert Shield/Desert Storm later in the year, and subsequently gamed ROE issues in a national-level game that included national decision-makers as players. The national decision-making process was adjusted to incorporate the lessons suggested by the game and practical experience. The exercise also gave U.S. participants unusual insight into the Argentine decision-making process. Argentina continues to use the war-gaming tool to explore implications of its participation in out-of-area activities. Canada, Argentina, and the United States played in a West African Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) scenario in April 1994. Brazil and Chile have not responded to invitations to undertake war games like those played with Argentina, but efforts to engage them should continue.

Senior-level (06) OPNAV staff participate in the strategic games. Similar-level Fleet participation enhances Latin American
receptiveness to games by indicating Fleet interest in the scenarios and demonstrating operational-level decision-making in a realistic context. Moreover, it facilitates practical follow up. The Fleet should make its interest in exploiting this tool known to OPNAV and the Naval War College’s Naval War Gaming Center.

**Liaison officers**

The Liaison Officer Program is an institutionalized, but informal, program started in the mid 1980s in response to CNO efforts to promote interaction with Latin American navies under the Maritime Strategy. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru send 05-level officers to the CINCLANTFLT staff for a two-year assignment. Beginning in 1993, Chile, pursuing its interest as a Pacific nation, assigned an officer (04-grade) to COMTHIRDFLT. Mexico also assigned an officer to COMTHIRDFLT. The liaison officers are uniformly regarded as front runners within their own navies. COMTHIRDFLT uses the Latin American liaison officers in the same way he uses Australian and Canadian personnel on his staff, that is, in fully integrated operational assignments. Officers assigned to CINCLANTFLT staff rotate through various Fleet staff offices, prepare a political brief on their country, take on additional assignments, assist with high-level visits, and visit various U.S. facilities.

Fleet commanders should compare notes on the results of these programs. We believe that the CINCLANTFLT staff assignments are too superficial, focus coordination on a small and already overburdened N582 staff, and leave the Latin Americans too much on their own. The Third Fleet assignments put Latin Americans in the position of working side by side with USN personnel, learning USN procedures and operations—"walking in our shoes," as it were. 34 Liaison Officer Programs and assignments should receive continuing scrutiny.

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34. From the Spanish proverb, "To understand a man, you must walk a day in his shoes."
Shipriders

Latin American officers have a long tradition of deploying briefly aboard U.S. ships operating in the region, whether in the UNITAS context, or on other transiting ships. UNITAS commanders have invited Latin Americans to make the full deployment aboard U.S. ships, but space constraints (exacerbated by the reduction in the number of ships deploying with the Task Group), as well as Chilean reluctance to have third-party participants in its phase, have limited these initiatives.

CINCLANTFLT's 1991 invitation to Argentina to deploy two officers to the Mediterranean with the USS Saratoga Battle Group, and subsequent invitations to Chile, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador, have been received with enthusiasm in the region. Such deployments offer unique opportunities for Latin Americans to work with U.S. personnel and to familiarize themselves with U.S. procedures, equipment, and technology. The navies send front-running individuals who will very likely become Flag officers in their services. The deployment thus has considerable payoff for future relations with the Latin American navies. This program should be formalized and planning conducted sufficiently in advance that Latin American services can schedule their best personnel. PACFLT should be encouraged to extend invitations to Chile and perhaps to Mexico.

Facility access in Latin America

In addition to U.S. naval facilities in the Caribbean Basin, the U.S. Navy enjoys access to ports, ranges, and naval facilities throughout Latin America. The region's diverse climate and terrain includes excellent opportunities for training in ... From the Sea. These have not been exploited fully to date, and, because of decreasing access to training areas in other parts of the world, they are becoming more important. Naval Special Warfare Units regard the Balboa Range in Panama as the last riverine warfare training area, now that facilities in the Philippines have been lost. Similarly, U.S. Marine Corps elements engaged in Colombia remarked that "this is where we are developing the next generation of jungle-warfare doctrine."
Three points can be made about facilities in the region.

- The number of U.S. facilities in the region is diminishing.
- Latin America itself is rich in operating areas and facilities.
- Port visits offer unexploited opportunities to access facilities and to promote navy-to-navy relations.

By the end of the decade, Naval Station (NS) Roosevelt Roads may be the only general-purpose facility. Latin Americans schedule regular visits to PROA. Several navies make use of Refresher Training (RefTra) at NS Guantanamo Bay. Efforts should be made to ensure continuing access to RefTra at other nearby facilities (NS Roosevelt Roads or in the United States) if Guantanamo is closed.

Figure 3 depicts ranges and facilities available throughout South America. These include a number of NGFS ranges, spectacular low-level routes, a diversity of amphibious-operation areas, a variety of SPECWAR environments, and excellent naval facilities. UNITAS commanders are well aware of the variety in the region. Transiting carriers have taken advantage of these facilities on an ad hoc basis. USN SPECWAR units and Marines increasingly take advantage of riverine and jungle operating environments in conjunction with counternarcotics training programs with the countries of the region. While OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO, and operating costs affect decisions regarding operations in South America, many training opportunities for U.S. ships and personnel, and opportunities to work with the navies of the region are lost for lack of planning. The Navy needs to view the region as a target of opportunities for training and for developing coalition and ... From the Sea doctrine and tactics.

Port visits

The third opportunity for access to navies in the region is through port visits, which provide occasions for building goodwill, showing the flag, establishing presence, and providing rest and relaxation for crew members.
Figure 3. South American facilities and ranges

- **DACT**: Low-level / ordinance delivery
- **ASUW**: Air-to-air refueling
- **NGFS**: Amphibious operations
- **AAW**: Underway replenishment
- **ASW**: Mine countermeasures
- **SPECWAR / Riverine**: Major Naval Base
- **Naval Air Base**: Naval Air Base
- **Major shipyard / repair facility**: Major shipyard / repair facility

**Additional Capabilities**
- Argentina
- Ecuador
- Brazil
- Peru
- Chile
- Uruguay
- Colombia
- Venezuela

**Brazil**
- Goiânia
- Punta Arenas
- Rio Grande
- Punta Indio
- Mar del Plata

**Chile**
- Punta Arenas
- Talcahuano
- Valparaíso
- Vina del Mar
- Tumbures Training Area

**Colombia**
- Cartagena
- Covenas
- Cangrejera
- Bahía Malaga

**Ecuador**
- Guayaquil
- Quito

**Argentina**
- Buenos Aires
- Bahía Blanca
- Puerto Belgrano
- Comandante Espora
- Baterías Marine Infantry Base

**Uruguay**
- Punta del Este
- Montevideo
- Rio de Janeiro
- Marambaia Island
- Santos

**Paraguay**
- Estancia Olivares Training Area

**Bolivia**
- Salinas/Ancon Training Area

**Peru**
- Lima
- Callao
- Iquique

**Venezuela**
- La Guaira
- La Orchila
- Punta La Cruz

**Brazil**
- Belém
- Recife

**French Guiana**
- Cayenne

**Suriname**
- Paramaribo

**Chile**
- Punta Lenga de Vaca
- La Serena
- Coquimbo

**Argentina**
- Puerto Aldea

**Uruguay**
- Punta del Este

**Bolivia**
- Quito

**Colombia**
- Ciénaga

**Venezuela**
- Dawson Island
We examined data from the Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems (WWMCCS) Operational Support Detachment (N3.11ND) on port visits outside the scope of UNITAS between 1989 and 1993, counting only those stops at foreign installations (thus not visits to the U.S. Virgin Islands), and only those longer than one day (i.e., not fuel stops). Figure 4 shows the frequency and location of these port visits.

The data reveal an interesting story.

- **Aside from carrier interfleet transits, no visits were made south of Ecuador.** Clearly, the long distance to Southern Cone ports explains why this is the case. Nevertheless, it is significant that in the past five years, the U.S. Navy has had extremely limited contact with the principal blue-water navies of the region (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). This fact needs to be borne in mind so that compensating programs can make up for the lack of “visits.”

- **Visits are skewed to countries with no navy or with green- or brown-water navies (i.e., countries of the Caribbean and Central America).** This is explained in part by the fact that most ships operating in the region are deployed on counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean.

- **Visits are heavily skewed to the Windward Islands/Netherlands Antilles—excellent liberty ports.** Of 516 visits to the region, 166 stops were made in the Windward Islands, and 93 in the Netherlands Antilles. In stark contrast, only 7 stops were made in Venezuela and only 11 in Colombia. The small number in Colombia is surprising given the scope of U.S. security assistance programs in Colombia. None of the Venezuelan visits was to Puerto Cabello, headquarters of the Venezuelan Navy, which is only 116 n.mi. from Curacão, where we made 69 visits. By the same token, Curacão is 155 n.mi. from Venezuela’s NGFS range at La Orchila, the only live-fire range in the region outside of PROA.
USN Port Visits Outside of UNITAS (1989–Aug 1993)

To be counted, length of stay for port visit must last at least one day.
*Associated with Interfleet carrier transfers
• Only six visits had a definable navy-to-navy professional interaction as a primary activity during the visit. Admittedly, port visits are intended primarily for crew liberty. Schedulers look for the best beaches, shopping, and recreational facilities to accommodate the sailors, and rightly so. At the same time, scheduling is a routine activity and the familiar is prized. Lost in the process are significant opportunities for interaction in Latin American navies, particularly those of the northern-tier countries.

We spoke with a number of captains and operations officers who had been on drug station in the region. Most observed that there were not enough opportunities to exercise war-fighting skills while on counter-narcotics station. USS Virginia indicated that JTF-4 OPCON is very willing to have ships work with other navies. There is some feeling, however, that interaction with Latin American navies is CONSOLANT's job, and as a consequence, there is reluctance to exercise scheduling initiative.

Greater focus on use of port visits for activities in addition to liberty would likely yield major benefits to both the Latin Americans and to the USN in its efforts to engage them and to help them maintain their operational skills. With adequate planning, USN ships could exercise with host navies before and after port visits. Such activities would not require early moves off station, just a bit of advance planning and coordination to schedule events en route or professional exchanges while in port. Additional costs would be minimal. Moreover, only a few additional events need be planned, as it would be necessary to avoid overwhelming the local navies, which operate with tight budget constraints. However, because of these resource constraints, the navies operate rarely and their own skills suffer. Exercising with them from time to time would enhance their skills as well as U.S. skills.

Professional military education

Professional military education includes higher-education programs in U.S. institutions such as the Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, and Naval Academy; educational opportunities for U.S. personnel in Latin American schools, principally War Colleges; programs about Latin America offered in U.S. institutions; and programs for Latin Americans in U.S. institutions.
Professional military education also includes technical training in U.S. specialized schools. Latin American attendance at U.S. specialized schools has dropped dramatically over the years, mainly because Latin American services have been required to purchase equipment in other countries, and therefore train in other countries. Most Flag officers in Latin American services did their specialized training in the United States. The ranks below Flag have trained in other countries or in their own, and it is at those grades that the “generation gap” appears.

**Academic programs**

Latin Americans take good, but limited, advantage of U.S. military institutions of higher education. The Naval War College's Naval Command College is the principal senior training program for Latin American officers at the 05-06 level. Of 250 Latin American officers graduating since 1957, 148 or 59 percent have reached Flag rank and 31 have become chiefs of their naval service. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico receive annual invitations to the Command College and other navies receive biannual or triannual invitations. Latin Americans would accept more, and more frequent, invitations, but school policy seeks to maintain focus on the larger world navies. Argentina and Chile leave their Command College students at the War College for a second year as “research fellows.” A similar arrangement was explored with Brazil in 1990, but not pursued subsequently. Brazil apparently prefers to rotate more officers through the school with only a one-year tour.

U.S. personnel have an opportunity to take specialized courses on Latin America at the Naval Postgraduate School and at the Naval War College. The Postgraduate School provides instruction leading to a Western Hemisphere political-military sub-specialization. USN enrollment has fluctuated between two and nine students per year since the program was inaugurated in 1987. Since 1991, the Naval War College has offered a one-semester elective course on Latin America, with enrollment capped at 20 students. The program generally has been well subscribed, but it failed to attract sufficient students in Spring 1994.
Table 5 summarizes the professional military-education contacts for U.S. and Latin American personnel on average per year. The data demonstrate that U.S. contact with Latin American subjects in the Navy's professional military-education programs is mostly ad hoc and affects few persons in any one year: 5 to 10 midshipmen may be involved in midshipman training cruises; fewer than 10 students enroll in the Western Hemisphere sub-specialty at the Postgraduate school; up to 20 students may or may not take a one-semester course on the region at the Naval War College, and up to 7 students may be enrolled in Latin American war colleges. Most important, most of these individuals will not use their experience in their Navy careers.

Greater emphasis on political-military sub-specialization within the Navy would make these courses more attractive. The Navy is conducting a review of political-military sub-specialization usage and billet requirements. Preliminary evidence suggests that usage is low, with about 30 percent of sub-specialty billets being filled by personnel lacking the requisite sub-specialty. A further problem is that many billets involving political-military activities are not coded for that sub-specialty.

Table 5. Summary of professional military education contacts (per year on average)

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From the Latin American perspective, the entire region, including South and Central America and the Caribbean may send 7 to 8 midshipmen on U.S. exchange cruises, enroll up to 12 students at the Postgraduate School, 6 in the Naval Command Colleges, and up to 12 in the Naval Staff College. Many enrollees in Postgraduate School,
Command College and Staff College are financed in part with grant security assistance funds (IMET). The IMET program is under severe budgetary pressure and up to 25 percent of appropriated funds are being targeted at civilian defense experts. This could limit these countries' ability to enroll military students in these highly valued courses in the future.

**Specialized school training**

Latin American navies have access to many Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard specialized schools under the Navy Security Assistance Training Program (NSATP). However, enrollments are limited by lack of funds and the applicability of the training involved (generally on specialized weapons systems). Table 6 summarizes specialized schools' quotas used between 1989 and 1993. The data indicate:

- Attendance at specialized schools is very concentrated and is driven today by counternarcotics policy.
- NAVSCIATTS takes more than 50 percent of quotas.
- Colombia is the single largest user.
- Central American and Caribbean countries take nearly half of quotas, a result of counternarcotics efforts in the Andean Ridge.
- Most of the schools' programs are supported by IMET, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) cases, or counternarcotics resources.

South American navies prefer to use their schools' quotas for professional education (Postgraduate School or Naval War College). Some can train their personnel at home, but often they do not take U.S. courses because their equipment inventory no longer contains U.S. equipment.

Some countries (mainly Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador) continue to use a few professional skills quotas—International ASW junior officer; International Department Head; Non-NATO Combat Information Center (CIC); International Electronic Warfare Officer
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<th>AVSTP courses</th>
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* a. Majority of courses support 1989 ship transfers to Brazil.
* b. Forty-seven of 51 quotas represent Bahamian law-enforcement personnel receiving aviation/sea-survival training.
(EWO) and International Diesel Submarine Training. Colombian officials indicated that they place graduates of these courses directly into training billets in their own service to make the most effective use of the U.S. education.

Other training venues

Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) are one solution to space problems and IMET shortages, but MTT training situations often cannot replicate those of U.S.-based training schools, particularly in more skilled areas. The International Diesel Submarine Training Program (IDSTP) found it could not take some sophisticated equipment on the road, and did not have the undivided attention of students in MTT situations.

The data in table 6 demonstrate that ship transfers offer real opportunities for training, particularly when “hot ship” transfers are made. Brazil’s Garcia-class frigates and two LSDs yielded 450 schools quotas and more than 1,600 Brazilians were in training as a result of the transfers.

Refresher Training at Naval Station Guantanamo is highly regarded by Latin American countries, especially Colombia, which uses the service to “train up to U.S. standards.” Colombia has put two ships per year through RefTra in the past and still sends one frigate per year. Both the intangible goodwill generated by “being treated just like a U.S. ship” and the enhanced readiness training is valued. Limited space at Guantanamo, as the Naval Station is reduced, has forced the reduction in Colombia’s use of RefTra. As Guantanamo is phased out, the Navy will need to find another site for this service, in PROA, or in Florida. A conscious effort should be made to include space for the frequent Latin American users, and perhaps to encourage other participants.

Interoperability and doctrine initiatives

Command, control, and communications interoperability is essential to multinational coalition operations, and remaining interoperable with the United States is the primary interest of Latin American
navies. We raised the subject in all of our interviews in the region. Although UNITAS has provided a common operational interface with Latin American navies, communications interoperability has been a recognized problem—addressed on an ad hoc basis—for some time. Technological difficulties encountered by Argentina in the Gulf War, and Argentina's continuing interest in multinational peacekeeping in the region and elsewhere underscore the limits of UNITAS procedures for modern-day real operations. CINCLANTFLT's ongoing efforts to upgrade C3 links with Argentina and other navies of the region will be viewed as a sign of substantial U.S. Navy commitment to the region.

UNITAS command-and-control doctrine is based on NATO tactical and communications documents that, over time, have been released to Latin American navies on a country-by-country basis. The arrangement has been tested with success for 34 years, and U.S. and Latin American navies have no problems operating together in a non-UNITAS context. The UNITAS concept could serve as the basis for multinational naval doctrine currently being developed by the Naval Doctrine Command, in response to the CNO's directive to develop standardized command-and-control doctrine to facilitate coalition operations.

UNITAS is a blue- and green-water exercise. Navy and Marine green- and brown-water operators interviewed during this study emphasized the need to harmonize Navy Special Warfare, Marine and other Service Special Warfare riverine warfare doctrine. The main focus of these efforts worldwide is in Latin America with Marine Corps, USN SPECWAR units, and NAVSCIATTS operations in Panama, Colombia, and Bolivia. These operations serve as an excellent test bed for developing joint and combined doctrine in this area. There is an important Coast Guard maritime law-enforcement interface with these programs as well, which should not be overlooked.

**Marine Corps and Coast Guard programs**

Many Latin American marine corps and coast guard forces are branches (sometimes semi-autonomous) of the Navy, with officers rotating through billets, rather than specializing in a particular function. U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard programs in Latin
America parallel navy programs, with personnel exchanges, academic exchanges, shiprider programs, MTT training, and participation in UNITAS. In addition, both services have been intensively and extensively involved in recent U.S. counternarcotics programs in the region. The activities they have developed are likely to expand over the coming years, in some countries at the expense of blue-water operations.

U.S. Marine Corps Guidance focuses USMC efforts on supporting national security, U.S. foreign policy, and USCINCSOUTH goals through increased Marine personnel "presence," expanded Marine Corps regional-affairs capabilities, expanded military assistance to the region, and operations and training in the region.

Under this guidance, the Marine Corps manages student exchanges, and participates in UNITAS and most SOUTHCOM-sponsored exercises. It maintains PEP exchanges with Chile (two of three are NCOs), Argentina, and Brazil, and has a program whereby Marine Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) spend a year in Latin America. The Marine Corps has become an observer participant at IANG, and a member of the Riverine Steering Group that coordinates the U.S. Government's Andean counternarcotics strategy. Since 1991, the USMC maintains a liaison officer at SOUTHCOM headquarters. Up to 80 Latin American Marines can be found in training in Marine Corps schools at any one time. Most programs with the region are relatively new. The Marine Corps' most intense involvement in the region is in the Colombian counterdrug and riverine program.

U.S. Coast Guard International activities emphasize combined search and rescue, marine safety, and law-enforcement activities, particularly with the navies of the Caribbean Basin; helping to establish international maritime standards; and exchanges to help develop expertise in other countries. As Latin American countries and their navies focus on issues of contraband, drug trafficking, and control of maritime frontiers, and as they seek to adopt appropriate law-enforcement

35. For details on Marine Corps and Coast Guard programs in Latin America, see Chapter 6 and Chapter 10 of Future Naval Cooperation with Latin America: Program Descriptions and Assessment.
practices under democratic governments, they have increasing interest in Coast Guard procedures and training.

The U.S. Coast Guard supports exchange and training programs throughout the region, mainly in Central America and the Caribbean, though its most frequent interaction in the region is with Venezuela. The Coast Guard participates in UNITAS, and has been engaged, since 1988, in law-enforcement training in Bolivia, where it helped establish the Waterways Law Enforcement School and, since June 1992, in standing up the Coast Guard arm within the Colombian Navy. Coast Guard MTTs conduct drug-law-enforcement MTTs in the region. A number of Caribbean coastal defense forces send students to NAVSCIATTs for training in small-boat maintenance and repair. Although the NAVSCIATTs program is geared to a Spanish-speaking population, it might be desirable to expand offerings for the English-speaking Caribbean to cope with the serious need for improvements in basic boat-maintenance skills. Coast Guard trainers often find that a need for boat-maintenance assistance impedes their ability to teach other skills.

Colombian programs

Colombia has been the focus of more than 40 percent of all U.S. security assistance to Latin America in the past several years. The Navy/Marine Corps and Coast Guard have implemented many of the activities there, developing a riverine training program (1989) and launching a Coast Guard (1992). This intensive engagement in the development and modernization of forces adapted to the unique circumstances of the region reveals a number of lessons to be learned and applications to other situations in the region.

Marine Corps Counterdrug and Riverine Program

The riverine interior of the South American continent is the contemporary frontier for the navies of Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and Bolivia. Unpopulated, uncontrolled, largely uncharted,
covered by triple-canopy rain forest or dense savanna, the region is a haven for criminals, contrabandists, radical movements like *Sendero Luminoso*, and drug traffickers. Navy riverine forces and national police (or counternarcotics police) have the task of extending national authority and law enforcement to this region. The Colombian, Peruvian, and Bolivian navies have launched special efforts in the riverine interior. The Colombian experience provides useful lessons learned for U.S. efforts to assist in riverine force development.

Colombia is a vast country with 90 percent of its population and 85 percent of its economic activity concentrated in the narrow Central Cauca valley. More than 50 rivers are shared with other countries in the region (Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru). Of 24,000 kilometers of domestic riverway, 10,000 are navigable by major craft and 19,000 by small craft. Rivers are the only means of transportation in the eastern and southern portions of the country, which are also covered by dense tropical forest.

Colombia determined to develop the riverine arm of the Colombian Navy in order to control contraband, weapons, and precursor chemicals trafficking into the country and to more effectively cope with guerrillas operating in the remote territories. Colombia’s Marine Corps, a branch of the Colombian Navy, was not equipped or trained to operate in the vast riverine interior of the country. In 1989, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Alfred M. Gray met with Admiral Roberto Serrano, then Commandant of the Colombian Marine Corps, and agreed to help develop a Mobile Riverine Task Force within the Colombian Marine Corps. The program was supported by USSOUTHCOM and implemented by the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Navy.

Colombia’s plans were initially ambitious—45 riverine combat elements by the end of the decade. The U.S. Marine Corps, working with Colombian Marines, developed a three-year plan, ending in FY 1994, to establish 15 riverine combat elements (RCEs), each consisting of three 22-foot Boston Whaler “Piranha Class” patrol boats, with a 3-man crew and 9 Marines; a Ground Assault Section (about 22 Marines); and a Support Platoon. RCEs are trained by Marine Corps MTTIs organized by the counterdrug section, Coalition and Special Warfare Division, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (CSW/MCCDC), and often include Navy and sometimes U.S. Army Special Forces personnel. All MTT personnel go through rigorous preparatory training. Classes are taught in Spanish and include human-rights material. MTTs deploy to the region for three to six months.

The Colombian program is regarded as a tremendous success, both in the U.S. Marine Corps and in Colombia. In interviews, senior Colombian Navy personnel frequently recognized the importance of the USMC “mystique” to the success of their program, the “lessons learned” about their own operations, and the successes in dealing with guerrillas and weapons trafficking, as well as counternarcotics operations on the rivers. At the same time, they expressed concern that, without continued U.S. presence in training and doctrine development, they will not be able to sustain the program. U.S. Marines regard the Colombian experience as a key opportunity for developing contemporary riverine and low-intensity conflict doctrine.

Marine Corps organizers have stayed with the program since its inception—designing, implementing and fine-tuning the evolutions. This continuity of personnel is widely regarded as one reason for the program’s success. USSOUTHCOM, Navy International Programs Office (IPO), NAVSCIATTs, and USN SPECWAR units have collaborated in the program. Navy Seabees have built some of the more-sophisticated forward-base infrastructure. Lessons learned have been incorporated along the way, so that training packages are now tailored to the unique Colombian environment and to the stage of development of target units. Supplementary programs have been undertaken as their need has been identified.

37. From the Colombian perspective, guerrillas present the foremost security threat to the country. They frequently provide armed support to drug traffickers, and drug traffickers provide funds for weapons. U.S. efforts to maintain clear distinctions between the parties of this symbiotic relationship have complicated security assistance efforts in Colombia.

38. The USMC and the U.S. Navy have developed doctrine from this experience. See Navy Special Warfare Center, Strategy and Tactics Group, NSW/USMC Riverine Operations Handbook, January 1993.
• The Colombian Navy had no repair capability and boats were quickly "used up" in the harsh jungle and river environment. Therefore, Colombian personnel have been enrolled in increasing numbers at NAVSCIATTs, learning small-boat maintenance and repair, as well as riverine tactics. NAVSCIATTs MTTs have worked with the RCEs.

• Colombia had no system for tracking trained personnel through an enlisted career, but it is beginning to implement an enlisted personnel system.

• Colombia had no supply and logistics system to track parts and keep the remote RCEs supplied with replacement spares. Consequently, equipment was "run till it quit," by which time repairs were impossible or expensive. A central supply system is now being implemented.

A number of factors continue to constrain program development.

• The Colombian Navy is a largely volunteer force, about 14,000 strong, 9,000 of whom are Marines. The Navy hierarchy is very blue-water oriented, with only one Flag officer assigned to the Marine arm. The requirements of maintaining existing forces, plus expanding both riverine and coast-guard dimensions, strain the manpower pool. The riverine force is about 2,000 strong, half the size of the blue-water navy.

• Colombian basic instruction procedures were inefficient, and recruits left schools undertrained and unprepared for the combat environment. The U.S. Marines have adopted a "Train the Trainers" program at the Riverine Combat School at Puerto Leguizamo, but this long-term program will require monitoring and continual fresh input if momentum and standards are to be maintained.

• Military district commanders are most often army commanders who do not understand the use of riverine forces. Colombia must learn "jointness." This problem is being dealt with in special seminars for senior officers developed by the Marine Corps Coalition and Special Warfare Division.
• Communications is a problem, as there are no secure communications between RCEs, forward bases, or headquarters. In contrast, drug traffickers use sophisticated commercial secure equipment.

• Spare parts and logistics support are critical. The jungle riverine environment is particularly harsh on equipment and it is difficult to supply or maintain replacement parts in the remote environment.

• Fuel supplies are a problem. Fuel has to be flown in to remote posts.

• Airfields are inadequate to support the supply operation. No airfield in the area of operations is yet certified for U.S. aircraft landing, though limited C-130 certification at Puerto Leguizamo is expected in 1994.

• For the most part, there have been no adequate Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), either. Navy Seabees completed construction of the first FOB at San José del Guaviare in May 1993,39 and a second at Puerto Lopez began construction in September 1993. Construction is complicated by the lack of adequate airfields for supply operations.

Each of these issues has been recognized and is being addressed, but successful integration will take considerably more time.

Colombian riverine authorities observed in interviews with us that their key concerns in carrying out the program are continued U.S. involvement in training, fuel supplies for the RCEs, budgets to support spare parts,40 and a permanent school for developing tactics, “since the drug traffickers, in particular, learn how to avoid us.” Several expressed concern that the riverine program would not be sustainable without continued U.S. training and support for some time.

39. This was a real learning experience for the Seabees, who were unaccustomed to working in the isolated, logistically stressed jungle environment. See Future Naval Cooperation With Latin America: Program Descriptions and Assessment, page 65.

40. Colombia is attempting to implement a multi-year budget that will support operations.
Coast Guard programs in Colombia

Colombian President César Gaviria determined to reactivate the Colombian Coast Guard in 1992, following the second Cartagena drug summit. At the time, Colombia was not able to patrol its more than 800,000 km of coastline, and was unable to control the inflow of weapons or precursor chemicals, nor the outflow of drugs through its ports.

Increasingly, authorities recognize that the vast majority of drug trafficking takes place over maritime routes, and improved control of ports is necessary. The Colombian Coast Guard plan projects up to 24 stations (first to third class), with some 50 boats in six to ten major sites initially. Only one site (Cartagena) is currently operational.

The Coast Guard force is recruited from Navy ranks. It currently stands at about 300 persons and is projected to grow to some 2,500 in five years. Officers are in short supply. Training is dependent on U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement MTTs. The Coast Guard is being equipped, in part, with excess U.S. defense articles, some of which arrive in unusable and hard-to-repair condition. Colombian Coast Guard officers recognize that Coast Guard procedures are quite different from military procedures and express concern that their forces are not yet prepared for the law-enforcement tasks that have been laid out for them. Current funding is believed insufficient to keep up the effort. In interviews with us, Colombian and U.S. personnel expressed concern that support for the Coast Guard effort is overly bureaucratic and is not supported efficiently by USSOUTHCOM.

Lessons learned

The Colombian experience is important, not only because of the goals and resources involved, but also because of high impact that the United States has been able to have on maritime developments in that country. It is useful to reflect on successes and shortcomings of the program to improve service delivery in other countries of the region.
Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard impact in Colombia has been very high, but dramatic results remain in the future. Although programs have been initiated, sustainability will occur only with continued U.S. contributions to training, institution building, doctrine development, and “leading by example.” U.S. personnel presence is key to the mid- and long-term success of the program.

Colombia and other countries in the region are beginning to develop major missions in coast-guard activities and control of riverine interiors. Navy hierarchies often remain oriented toward blue-water activities because that is the way they have been trained, but a new generation of officers is being exposed to different specializations. Public support is strongly behind extension of “law and order” to the interior areas.

- The programs have emphasized simple, easy-to-maintain and repair technology, appropriate to the environment in which it will be used. Preventive maintenance procedures are being introduced, which, as they are internalized, will extend the lifetime of the equipment. As military personnel trained in maintenance and preventive maintenance procedures return to civilian life, they will take useful skills with them.

- Navy/Marine Corps MTTs and NAVSCIATTS training is targeted at senior enlisted and junior officer personnel, many of whom have no other opportunity for exposure to the United States or to U.S. military practices and procedures. Officers who advance will carry their training with them, as will career enlisted personnel.

The programs are a laboratory for continuing education and doctrine development in riverine operations. The Marine Corps has acknowledged the lessons to be learned from operating in this challenging environment.

The Colombian experience has applications throughout the Andean region and in Central America. In the Andean area, cooperation between services across borders is increasingly sought. Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Bolivia confront problems similar to those of Colombia. Peru, Brazil, and Bolivia have invested in developing
riverine expertise and doctrine. These experiences can be shared, region wide. The Riverine Combat Training Program at Puerto Leguizamo is the core of what could be a multinational collaborative effort in the region. In this vein, there has been discussion of expanding participation in the Bolivian Waterways Law-Enforcement School to students of other countries. Continued U.S. association with the program would enhance its prestige and value.\textsuperscript{41}

The Colombian program also highlights ongoing problems of implementation on the U.S. side, including the following:

- **Low Navy profile in the SOUTHCOM AOR.** MilGrps have been staffed mostly by Army and Air Force. The Navy has been perceived as having no interest in the AOR. The Marine Corps and Coast Guard have only begun to place liaison officers at SOUTHCOM and in MilGrps in the past few years.

- **CINCSOUTH has been perceived to have little interest in Navy/riverine issues and CINC staff have ceased active participation in Riverine Steering Group (RSG) meetings.**

- **Coordination between the Services is deficient.** The RSG has not been aggressive enough in integrating the efforts of the various Services and agencies involved, or in raising difficult problems to appropriate-level attention.

- **The United States has not taken the initiative in developing obvious regional interest in a regional riverine training program.** This requires both CINC and country-level diplomatic support.

### Security assistance

#### Funding the relationship

Security assistance finances the majority of U.S.-Latin American military-cooperation programs, including academic exchange

\textsuperscript{41}. One interviewee suggested that the best possible exchange to the region would be a USMC captain and Navy lieutenant detailed for two years as instructors to regional training institutions.
programs, training in U.S. schools and in the region by MTTs, and equipment acquisition. Security-assistance funding levels are determined annually by the U.S. Congress and funding for programs in Latin America has declined dramatically both in absolute dollar terms and as a percentage of worldwide totals in recent years. Moreover, the programs have become increasingly concentrated in Andean Ridge and Caribbean countries as a result of the emphasis on counternarcotics activities in those regions. Proposals for revisions to security assistance legislation are before Congress, but regardless of whether existing programs survive under different labels in the future, funding levels are likely to remain very low.

**International Military Education and Training Program**

Lowered funding can put some programs in jeopardy. The International Diesel Submarine Training Program (IDSTP) takes a large number of IMET-funded students and is not able to support its U.S.-based operation because of the shortfall between IMET-supported tuition incomes and actual costs. IDSTP MTTs to Latin America are also IMET supported. Further cuts in IMET could put an excellent program out of business.

NAVSCIATTs is also supported by IMET. (It is the sole remaining Panama Canal Area Military School [PACAMS].) The majority of its students are funded either by IMET or by State Department International Narcotics Matters (INM) funds. Many, if not most, students from small navies in Central America and the Caribbean would not be able to attend the school without U.S. support. U.S. institution-building programs in those regions would suffer as a consequence.

The Marine Corps program in Colombia is supported by INM and other counternarcotics designated funds, as is the Coast Guard development program in that country. Funding for these programs terminates in FY 1994, and there are limited resources for follow-on. Colombians in both branches expressed concern to us that it would not be possible to sustain these programs without continuing U.S. input. From their perspective, the professional contacts and visible “models” that are provided by the U.S. training programs are as
important to the equation as funding. Because the U.S. goal has been to assist countries in developing a domestic capability to deal with narcotics trafficking "at the source," serious consideration should be given to the timing of funding cutoffs.

Equipment transfers

Sales and transfers of defense equipment to Latin America are financed by security-assistance appropriations, Latin American navy direct procurement, and "no cost" transfers under various legislative authorities. These transfers are an important basis for ongoing navy-to-navy relations. They tie foreign acquisition of parts and spares to the U.S. industrial base, create demand for training in U.S. schools, and are a powerful vehicle for sustaining professional relations. In interviews with us, Latin American officials frequently lamented the fact that restrictions on U.S. sales to their country had forced them to make purchases elsewhere, and had resulted in a rupture of the close professional relationship with the United States that had developed after World War II. Latin American navy officials are just as concerned with the "generation gap" in navy-to-navy contacts as the USN and they would like to work to bridge it. Working together is the preferred vehicle.

In recent years, the majority of equipment transfers to the region have occurred in support of counternarcotics efforts and have gone to Andean Ridge and Caribbean countries. The transfers have had a major impact on the force structure and capabilities of receiving navies (providing a coastal and riverine capability that didn't exist previously), but not all resources have been effectively absorbed into the navy inventory. Although much of the equipment is new, some items are excess defense articles transferred "as is, where is," and are not usable without major additional investment and training.

Latin American navies are also candidates for lease of ships that are excess to U.S. Navy requirements. They are interested in the Knox-class FF-1052 and Newport-class LST programs, and will be interested in Perry-class FFG-7s when these become excess. The costs of reactivating ships placed in safe storage are sometimes prohibitive.
and limit the opportunities to build bridges to these navies. Disclosure issues can also complicate transfers, and approvals for excess article transfers can be prolonged. According to security-assistance personnel in Navy IPO, more consistent Fleet interest in the transfer programs could facilitate the process and ensure maximum consideration for both U.S. and Latin American interests, as was demonstrated in the case of the Knox-class delivery to Brazil.

In addition, more aggressive U.S. Navy interest in security-assistance programs, particularly IMET and FMF programs that include significant navy-to-navy contacts either through participation in schools in the United States, or MTT deployment to Latin America, is necessary if these programs are to survive. The Navy should work closely with other services, the Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense to articulate the utility of the security-assistance programs.

Other programs

The major Navy programs with Latin American countries are summarized in the above paragraphs. Most other programs are small in scope, with minimum impact. This section reviews a few small programs of interest because of possible greater importance in the near future.

42. Brazil has reduced its lease of FF-1052s from six to four because of the reactivation cost (about $30 million per ship). Brazil had previously received four Garcia-class FF-1040s as “hot ship” transfers, which not only eliminated expenses related to reactivating the ships from safe storage, but also entailed training some 1,600 Brazilian seamen in U.S. schools as the ships were transferred from USN to Brazilian Navy crews. Both the United States and Brazil benefited. Similarly, the costs of reactivating ex-USS Takelma for transfer to the Argentine Navy were estimated to run from $1.2 million (safe to steam) to $4.2 million (full activation). Argentina elected to have the ship reactivated to minimal safe-steaming conditions by a private U.S. shipyard. The remaining yard work will be done in Argentina. Colombia has not been able to incorporate some ships intended for its Pacific coastal patrol because of the expense of making them operational.
Research and development

Over time, the Latin Americans have explored a number of research and development efforts with the United States. Most of the region’s navies conduct oceanographic research with the U.S. Navy. The Naval Oceanographic Office’s Hydrographic Cooperation Program (HYCOOP), and Naval Research Laboratory efforts with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile build effective personal and institutional relationships in this specialized research area, and substantially reduce the cost to the United States for data acquisition. These efforts should become more important as the Navy focuses on littoral warfare and shallow-water ASW.

Larger Latin American countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil, each of which has significant indigenous defense industries, have raised the possibility of co-production or co-development of systems. No initiative has ever been pursued. Recently, however, two Southern Cone aircraft manufacturers have teamed with U.S. manufacturers to compete in the USAF/USN Joint Primary Aircraft Training Systems (JPATS) Program. Further economic integration with Latin America, projected under administration economic and foreign-policy statements, will likely increase the opportunities for teaming between U.S. and Latin American industries. The Navy International Programs Office has proposed a working group to examine cooperative development program “candidates” in an effort to reduce the overall costs of USN programs. The industrial countries of the region would appear to be ideal candidates for this program.

Inter-American military organizations

Inter-American military cooperation is formally based on agreements developed in the context of mutual-defense concerns of World War II. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty or TIAR in Spanish and Portuguese) was signed in 1947, but is now considered a relic of the Cold War, particularly by Latin Americans. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was created in 1942 to recommend measures for defense of the hemisphere. It is funded by the Organization of American States (OAS), but is not a subordinate body to the OAS and has no formal advisory role to the organization.
It holds observer status at the Inter-American Naval Conference (IANC) and specialized conferences. An OAS Special Committee on Security has been established and Argentina has taken the lead in proposing a new hemisphere security concept, "Cooperative Security," that could lead to greater intraregional military cooperation in confidence building, multinational peacekeeping, monitoring of EEZs, and perhaps, riverine oversight.

The Inter-American Defense College (IADC) is administered and controlled by the IADB and is funded by the OAS. The curriculum focuses on political, economic, and social analysis of the hemisphere, and offers little in terms of strategy. At the same time, the IADC is the senior professional military educational institution in the hemisphere and it is a joint program with officers from all services in attendance. Most (though not all) officers attending are front runners who will return to occupy senior posts in their own Services. Most will make Flag rank.

The U.S. Navy takes little advantage of these organizations. N31/N52 provides Flag-level representation in the U.S. delegation to the IADB, but takes little interest in the organization. It should monitor the process for opportunities to influence developments through Navy contacts, gaming, and other activities.

The Navy sends one captain to the IADC, but does not take advantage of additional seats at the IADC that often become available when Latin American countries do not fill all of their quotas. The vacancies are offered to U.S. Services and are generally filled by the U.S. Army. As is the case with other academic exchanges with Latin America, students generally are not briefed before or after their attendance at the college.
Impact of programs on U.S. national-security objectives

In this study, CNA specifically assesses the value of programs in Latin America to the U.S. Navy. In the preceding section we reviewed the key dimensions and highlights of U.S. naval programs with Latin American navies. We identified both successes and shortcomings in a number of programs and outlined actions that could be taken to improve performance. In this section, we examine the impact of programs in the context of broad U.S. national-security objectives.

Many, perhaps most, of the programs that we conduct in the region have at least a salutary impact on U.S.-Latin American goodwill. Indeed, many individuals put very high value on the goodwill generated, which supposedly can be called on in a crisis. Although we believe that goodwill is an important result of engagement with other navies, we also understand that programs will be highly valued by the Navy and in the overall process of resource allocation only if they also serve other, more-specific, more-timely, and more-important purposes. USSOUTHCOM objectives, for example, are focused in terms of specific, hemisphere-oriented U.S. foreign-policy objectives: strengthening democratic institutions, supporting economic progress, enhancing military professionalism, defeating drug trafficking, and assisting in eliminating threats to national security. Notwithstanding these missions, various USCOMSOLANTs, and by extension, CINCLANTFLT, have not been successful in overcoming the Navy's general perception that UNITAS is not an important exercise for the Navy itself. COMSOLANTs report having to struggle every year for appropriate assets for the deployment, and, as we have noted previously, in recent years the number of surface ships have been cut from four to three, and the total time of deployment has been shortened by a month.

The purpose of the following analysis is to provide a broad gauge of the utility of naval cooperation programs with Latin America.
National-security framework for evaluating programs

To assess the contribution of these programs to the U.S. Navy or Latin American navies and to U.S. national-security objectives, we developed an analytic framework and tool to help us evaluate the programs in terms of the scope and impact of their contribution to contemporary U.S. national-security objectives. The framework is presented schematically in the diagram below.

National-security objectives

The national-security objectives themselves were drawn from Clinton administration statements of new U.S. foreign and defense policy goals as described earlier is this report. These objectives range across four categories:
• **Goodwill:** Create positive attitudes, develop cultural understanding, build personal friendships, be able to deal personally with a friend in a crisis (call in a chit).

• **Foreign policy:** Promote sustainable development, democracy, and peace; promote trade and investment for the United States; and advance diplomacy. Countering drug trafficking has been a stated foreign-policy goal in recent administrations, and promoting the "role of professional military in democratic societies" has been one way of promoting democracy in this hemisphere.

• **Defense policy:** Engage other countries in common defense goals; prevent threats to U.S. interests through presence abroad and develop partnerships that demonstrate widespread support for U.S. values; build defense partnerships to permit coalitions to attend to crises; and promote interoperability so that coalitions will function effectively.

• **Military readiness:** As in standard JCS definitions of military capability and readiness, increase capabilities, including force structure, modernization, sustainability, and readiness, which in turn reflects the status of personnel, equipment, and training. In this study, we are mainly concerned with the impact of cooperative activities on readiness.

**Impact on U.S. Navy or Latin American navy**

Programs of interest had to have some measurable impact on the U.S. Navy. It is difficult to justify activities, especially Fleet activities, in terms of goodwill alone. To receive continued support, an activity must contribute in a specific way to U.S. foreign policy or national-security goals. From the Navy's perspective it is important that it contribute to Navy objectives—training and readiness, coalition interoperability, and doctrine development and implementation. The more a program contributes to higher-order goals, the more sustainable it should be.

Impact was reported on a four-part scale:

• **Minimal:** All programs have some impact, but that impact may be barely noticeable; hardly worth the effort.
• **Limited:** Impact of program is clearly visible, but neither broad nor deep. Worth limited or focused investment.

• **Moderate:** Impact is clearly present; may be broad, generally not deep, or may be narrowly focused.

• **Significant:** Impact is clearly definable, profound, broad, and/or deep; makes a difference in host attitudes, performance.

**Scope of engagement**

The scope or size of programs varies dramatically in the region, from single person exchanges to annual UNITAS deployments with some 1,200 sailors visiting the region and interacting with an equal or larger number of Latin American naval and civilian personnel in each country visited. To assess impact adequately, it is necessary to distinguish between very small programs with minimal goals and impact and small programs with significant impact. Scope was defined in three categories:

1–25 persons  Accommodating the single-person exchanges up to the platoon-size units that the Marine Corps or USN SPECWAR units deploy for exercises, or Deployments for Training.

25–250 persons  A single ship or company-size ground force.

250+ persons  A major unit (an aircraft carrier), a Task Group (UNITAS), or several smaller units.

**Applying the framework**

The results of our evaluations are summarized in table 7. The table orders the program categories roughly in terms of operational content. That is, exercises, operational, and at-sea contacts are placed above academic exchanges, training, and programs of military diplomacy. This order reflects the Navy’s particular interest in and responsibility for operational readiness and naval coalition interoperability.

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43. The evaluations presented in the table are based on the full set of programs analyzed in CNA Research Memorandum 94-64, *Future Naval Cooperation With Latin America: Program Descriptions and Assessment*, by Margaret Daly Hayes et al., Unclassified, forthcoming.
Table 7. Impact of U.S. Navy's Cooperative Programs With Latin America

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a. High potential in ... From the Sea.
b. Important to SPECWAR units only.
c. Important for deploying unit.
d. Little Navy participation.
e. Latin Americans are using Guantanamo, PROA.
f. Use of ranges can have significant impact.
g. High potential if Navy targeted.
h. For Argentina 4+.
i. Wargames have potential; only Argentina is currently exploiting.
j. Scope is limiting factor.
k. Important for U.S. SPECWAR/riverine forces.
l. Depends on navy involved.
m. Important in USMC riverine doctrine development.
n. All political-military efforts have potential for greater benefit if orchestrated correctly.
o. Impact is potential.
p. Mostly civilian contacts; cost savings to USN.
In assessing the impact of programs on national-security objectives, each individual program was evaluated first for scope of Navy involvement and given a score reflecting the scope categories: 1–25 (up to a platoon); 25–250 (ship or company); 250+ (major platform, several ships). Then the program was evaluated for its impact (minimal, limited, moderate, significant) on each national security objective category.

Individual program scores are summarized in the categories presented in table 7. The "score" in the table represents the median value given to the set of similar programs. Thus, while UNITAS represents a single program, "Other at-sea exercises" include operations during carrier transits, S-3 operations with Colombia and Argentina, and FLEETEXs. Similarly, under "Professional military education," academic education includes midshipmen exchanges, Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College programs, USN students assigned to Latin American schools and seminars and electives about Latin America in Navy institutions.

When the median point fell between two categories, the higher value is used, accompanied by a minus sign. When we believed that a program had potential beyond that reflected in the current circumstances, a plus sign is appended to the value. In assessing the impact of programs on individual navies (U.S. Navy or Latin American navies in general, or on a specific navy), we phrased questions as follows: "This activity enhances goodwill toward the United States (Latin America) (minimally, to limited extent, moderately, significantly)." Impact for the United States and Latin America were assessed independently.

Some programs within categories are clear outliers. For example, under professional military education, aggregated training programs were scored as having limited impact (score 2) on Latin American national defense goals overall, but NAVSCIATTS programs were judged to have a very high impact (score 4+). To reflect this disparity, comments are included in the footnotes to the table.
Interpreting the results

In this section, we discuss first the scope and symmetry of programs and then the impact of programs on U.S. and Latin American national security objectives.

In analyzing the results presented in table 7, we are interested in several patterns. One set of patterns relates to symmetry of involvement (scope) and impact. Programs of low scope with high impact are good investments. Those high in scope, but with low impact, are bad investments. In general, Navy programs with Latin America are implemented with considerable symmetry. Scope of involvement is low, particularly for the United States, but payoffs are generally high. The programs are a good investment for the United States.

A second set of patterns relates to the impact on highly desired objectives. Throughout this research, we have expected programs to generate goodwill. Outcomes on other dimensions of the national-security spectrum had to be empirically determined and our expectations were not high. From the Navy's perspective, payoffs on the readiness dimension are clearly desirable. In the broader national-defense context, the willingness and capability of navies from the region to support U.S. policy out-of-area meets a significant national-security goal.

Scope

The first two columns of table 7 reflect the scope of activities measured by the number of persons or units involved. With the exception of UNITAS and operational exercises at sea, U.S. Navy contacts with the navies of the region are small, often very small (i.e., individual to platoon) in scope. UNITAS, of course, includes several ships and the personnel aboard those ships meet with a similar number of Latin American ships in each country visited; shore activities ensure personal contacts among officers and enlisted personnel. The scope of contact by Latin Americans with USN personnel is potentially quite high; hence the plus. Other operations at sea range in scope from carriers with multiple-contact activities
(scope = 3) or one or more ships or squadrons operating together (as in FLEETEXs off the coast of the United States or PROA). In contrast, small unit exercises (most USN SPECWAR exercises) involve a single platoon (SEAL team plus Special Boat Unit) and are scored 1 to 2 for the U.S. Navy and 2 for Latin American navies. Most JCS exercises engage from a single person to a platoon or squadron from the Navy, and thus rate 1 to 2 for scope on either side.

Scope of involvement is generally symmetric when viewed from an individual-country perspective. The U.S. Navy and each of the Latin American navies fields about the same number in different programs. The exceptions are humanitarian activities, where a single U.S. citizen or organization can engage numerous Latin Americans; and training activities where, whether in U.S. specialized schools or in the region via MTTs, a few USN personnel may have contact with many Latin Americans. The NAVSCIATTS program or the Marine Corps MTT in Colombia are prime examples of programs with high payoff in terms of shaping administration, operational, and doctrinal thinking within Latin American services.

**Impact of programs on national-security objectives**

In assessing the impact of programs, we are interested in examining their impact on targeted national-security objectives—goodwill, foreign policy, national defense, and operational readiness. The results are straightforward.

**Goodwill**

Almost all programs generate goodwill, generally more for the United States than for the Latin American participants. Exercises, particularly large-scale Navy at-sea exercises are scored 4 for significant impact on this dimension. Operational exchanges, training opportunities, political-military interactions and C3 initiatives also were rated "significant" in generating goodwill toward the United States. Peer-level operations such as these were generally judged to generate more goodwill than training relations. Small unit exercises such as USN SPECWAR unit exercises in Central America and in the South American riverine environment were judged to have less impact than the at-sea exercises, mainly because of their limited scope
and the specialized community at which they are targeted. At the same time, these operations are highly valued by Latin Americans for the "professional model" that they offer for host-nation units. Similarly, Navy participation in JCS-sponsored exercises is relatively small and Navy impact is limited or minimal. This is not to say that considerable goodwill is not derived from some specialized exercises, such as Seabee deployments to build schools and clinics, and dig wells in Central American and Caribbean countries.

We judged that exercises and access opportunities, particularly port visits (especially if navy-to-navy contacts are scheduled in conjunction with them), carrier transits (if port calls are scheduled), and U.S. use of Latin American ranges have substantial potential for greater impact in this category.

A unifying characteristic of the interactions that were rated high on this dimension is that they consisted of face-to-face, professional naval interactions.

Foreign policy

The entries in the table reflect our judgment that Navy programs do not have as much direct impact on foreign-policy objectives as they do on other national-security dimensions. Exercises, port visits, and training are scored 3 (moderate impact) on U.S. foreign-policy objectives. Exercise and access opportunities score 5 on Latin American foreign-policy objectives that were defined to include approximation to the United States. Moderate impact is also consistent with the relatively greater scope of these activities.

Specific programs, aimed at developing Latin American defense capacity to operate in the counternarcotics arena, do have a positive and significant impact in the foreign-policy area. The Marine Corps Colombia Project is rated 4 (significant) for impact on U.S. foreign-policy objectives. The NAVSCIATTS program, included in the training category, and related USN SPECWAR unit efforts in Panama, Colombia, and Bolivia, were also rated a 4 for impact on foreign-policy goals. All of these programs contribute importantly to host-country ability to contain, control, and eventually eliminate drug trafficking in their territory.
There is some asymmetry in impact on this dimension, since U.S. and Latin American foreign-policy objectives are not necessarily parallel. For example, the thrust of most U.S. programs in the Andean countries follows U.S. counternarcotics concerns, but that issue is not a major tenet of Latin American foreign policy. Indeed, in drug-trafficking areas, fighting guerrillas and terrorists is a higher priority for host countries. Both nations’ purposes are served by the training programs, however.

**National defense**

U.S. defense goals, as defined in policy guidance, include preventing threats to the United States or to friendly nations and building coalition capability and interoperability with us. Most navy programs in Latin America have a limited (score = 2) impact on these goals, primarily because they are not targeted at these objectives, but also because of their limited scope. However, we believe that many of the programs have potential for contributing more significantly to national-defense objectives—preventing threats, developing reliable coalition partners, engaging other countries in support of our objectives—if they could be used more effectively and organized with this goal in mind. UNITAS itself can be exploited in this way, though it already serves these purposes in a significant (score = 4) way. Other at-sea exercises could well be developed to enhance interoperability and develop specific task capabilities (score = 2+). C3 initiatives could have a major impact in enhancing Latin American interoperability with the United States, and should therefore be pursued aggressively. Operational exchanges are scored 3- in this category, but only because of their limited scope. We believe these programs make an important contribution to engaging future Latin American officers in U.S. coalition objectives and to providing the model for naval performance. Finally, political-military initiatives by the CNO or CINCLANTFLT to establish interest and guidance in this area would be necessary to ensure follow-through.

Latin American national-defense objectives are also served by Navy programs. We can highlight UNITAS and C3 initiatives as affecting blue-water navy capabilities in the region (score = 3). Other at-sea exercises have potential in this area. Training programs were judged to have limited (score = 2+) impact on defense objectives because of
their geographic concentration and counternarcotics orientation. The Colombian Marine Corps program also has a significant impact on Colombia's national-defense objectives (exerting sovereignty over the riverine interior and controlling guerrilla activities and contraband supply in the country). Such reorientations of Latin American naval goals may be important to the United States, for example, helping them to define their professional military roles in democratic societies. U.S. use of Latin American ranges would have an important (score = 3) impact on Latin American defense objectives by engaging the United States in the region and providing Latin Americans with more opportunities to exercise with a First World navy.

Readiness

The ability to deploy quickly and to perform initially in the way the force was designed to perform is a function of personnel, equipment, and training. Exercises with Latin Americans were judged to have significant impact on U.S. personnel readiness by offering challenging training opportunities, occasions to test equipment performance in the ... From the Sea context, as well as in remote river and jungle environments. Potential for increased impact was seen in UNITAS, at-sea exercises, small unit exercises (because of limited unit involvement other than USN SPECWAR units), the use of ranges in the region, and the Colombian riverine project.

U.S. Navy activities with Latin American counterparts have an even more substantial impact on Latin American naval readiness. All exercises, training, and exchanges were judged to have a significant impact on the specific units involved. We've noted earlier that most navies in the region save their operating budgets for UNITAS.

Officials of all of the navies interviewed in the course of this study stressed the importance to them of "working together." The Colombian CNO stressed the importance of "the model" offered by the U.S. Navy in annual RefTra, or by the U.S. Marine Corps presence in the Riverine Program. Many navies lamented the fact that their equipment was no longer compatible with U.S. Navy equipment and that this reduced their opportunities to train with us.
Overall, our analysis suggests that payoffs to the U.S. Navy of operations in the region are very high, limited only by the fact that so few units deploy to the region. Payoffs are especially high in terms of readiness, but are also strong in terms of the broad national-defense objectives of developing capable coalition partners. Payoffs to Latin Americans from operating with the United States are very high, and enhance their ability to respond as partners with us. With some singular exceptions, Navy programs have not been targeted at broad U.S. foreign-policy goals—building democracy, counternarcotics. Nevertheless, the programs have a positive impact on developing a professional military ethos.
Conclusions

The evidence assembled in this study suggests that Latin American countries can play a positive supporting role to U.S. security objectives in the coming years. We believe that the U.S. Navy can benefit from a well-crafted engagement with the navies of the region that recognizes mission and capability differences among navies, takes maximum advantage of training opportunities in the region and with the navies of the region, and is focused on the mid-term time frame. This section summarizes the possible roles that Latin American navies can play in U.S. naval strategy and recommends actions that the Navy can take to optimize opportunities available in the region.

Latin American governments look positively on their relationships with the United States to a degree unprecedented in recent decades. The return to democracy, economic growth, and regional integration all give the United States a renewed stake in the region's political and economic future. Latin American countries are likely to support U.S. objectives in the global arena and will participate, when able and when they perceive their interests to be engaged, in multinational missions. Engagement on all dimensions of the national-security spectrum will reinforce this trend.

Notwithstanding the convergence of U.S. and hemispheric interests, U.S. attention to Latin America is likely to remain low-key for the foreseeable future. It could take on greater significance should instability occur in this hemisphere (a post-Castro Cuban crisis, for example), in the event of increased demands for multinational peacekeeping or support for democracies, or should regional trade blocs become rigid with the European community and Japan competing against the United States.

The countries of Latin America are looking for U.S. leadership in addressing regional and global issues. Regional tensions have receded to an unprecedented degree, permitting cooperation
between armed forces and Services that once were postured against each other. As one officer stated, "Our situation is unique. We have no enemies." With this recognition, armed forces of the region are redefining their roles and missions to focus on contemporary dangers. Argentina has taken the lead in defining civilian-led foreign and defense-policy objectives for its armed forces. These objectives include sovereign defense, multinational participation, and a "cooperative security" approach to intraregional security that focuses on confidence building and cooperation among militaries of the region to prevent conflicts.ª4

Roles of Latin American navies in USN planning

As we noted earlier, the Latin American region is a mix of naval capabilities. We have identified three distinct mission characteristics in the region. The Southern Cone nations—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—have professional blue-water navies that are able, if willing, to operate out of area. Argentina is committed to multinational operations, whereas both Chile and Brazil are interested, but not yet persuaded. Brazil, with the greatest reach, is presently distracted by internal political concerns. Northern-tier countries—Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela—have more limited capabilities. Budget priorities in these countries will probably be directed away from blue-water activities to support riverine and coast-guard activities in the coming years. Central American and Caribbean naval forces play essentially brown-water and coast-guard functions.

Although the Latin American navies will scale back further over the next several years, their major cuts have already been made. The blue-water components of the navies will remain a modern, light, primarily frigate and submarine-based "fleet" until well into the twenty-first century.

The roles that these navies can play in U.S. Navy strategy are limited only by the vision adopted toward the region. We suggest that they are able to play the following five supporting roles in the coming years:

- They can enhance their effective responsibility for the security of sovereign maritime/riverine territory by exercising effective coastal patrol, maritime law enforcement and customs control, and control of their riverine frontiers.

- They can support the United States in regional coalition efforts, organized primarily under the aegis of the UN and OAS. The Haiti embargo is one example; peacekeeping patrols off Central America are another.

- They can provide support to U.S. and other countries’ efforts in multinational-coalition operations out-of-area, enhancing the legitimacy of such actions, as with Argentina’s participation in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Chile and Uruguay’s UN efforts in Cambodia.

- They can operate as partners with the United States in testing and developing doctrine and tactics for ... From the Sea and riverine operations.

- They can be partners in training with the United States, participating according to their needs and financial capabilities, but “training up” to enhance interoperability and coalition capability.

With this in mind, a goal of U.S. defense policy and military diplomacy should be the ability, in the future, to mobilize elements of navies of the region in combined efforts that take advantage of the unique capabilities of individual navies and in which Latin American navies are interoperable with the U.S. Navy and with each other.

These goals support broad U.S. foreign- and defense-policy objectives.

- The United States seeks to engage partners for coalition efforts in the region and around the globe. Several Latin American navies are able to participate, depending on locale and political support.
• U.S. counternarcotics policy intends that drug trafficking be halted at the point of origin. Only by enhancing the capabilities of local armed forces and police can this realistically occur. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard programs currently support these efforts, and have had a strong and positive impact on local naval professionalism and readiness.

• Finally, the region is an excellent training environment. U.S. naval operations with the navies of Latin America, particularly the Southern Cone navies, have had a high payoff for the United States. Reports from UNITAS participants, carrier COs, Air Wing Commanders, S-3 pilots, and others have been enthusiastic about the blue-water and ... From the Sea training opportunities and challenges presented in the region. “You can't get this kind of intense training in the Med!” was characteristic of comments.

Notwithstanding the above, most U.S. Navy operational contacts with navies of the region take place with the green or brown-water navies of Central America and the Caribbean, or with the South American northern-tier countries. These programs tend to be small in scope, have limited impact on defense and readiness goals, have little Fleet involvement, and are not exploited by the Fleet. They are foreign-policy (counternarcotics) driven and, though largely successful, do not have a strong constituency within the Navy itself. They are financed almost entirely by foreign assistance and State Department counternarcotics appropriations. Should the counternarcotics emphasis wane, excellent programs such as the Marine Corps’s Colombian program, the U.S. Coast Guard’s programs in Colombia and elsewhere, many Navy MTT/DFT training opportunities, and enrollments in the Navy’s highly regarded NAVSCIATTS could be in jeopardy.

Recommendations for action

Our analysis of Navy programs reveals that the U.S. Navy benefits when it operates with Latin American navies. However, optimal benefits are constrained by several factors, among them:

• Absence of overall Navy vision of its objectives in the region
• No overall coordination of efforts in the region

• Concentration of operational responsibility in too few staff hands.

The above conclusions underscore several areas in which Navy initiatives might enhance the benefits to be derived from interaction with the region. These are presented below as a series of recommendations. These recommendations are divided into three parts:

• Recommendations for broad Navy policy

• Recommendations for the Fleet

• Specific recommendations regarding UNITAS.

Recommendations for broad Navy policy

Consider developing regional guidance for naval activities

Many of the shortcomings associated with implementation of programs for Latin America derive from the low or negative profile that the region has within the U.S. Navy. We believe that, by and large, this is because Navy decision-makers don’t know the region and have had no reason to focus even brief attention on it. As a consequence, little thought is given to the possibility of opportunities to exploit in the region. Experience has shown that when senior attention is drawn to the region, opportunities for USN benefits are seen.

To overcome the lack of information about the region, CINCLANTFLT should develop a guidance document that would focus dispersed Navy component attention on the need to exploit opportunities in the region and emphasize the desirability of doing so. Regional guidances have permitted both the Marine Corps and Coast Guard to focus on Service requirements for implementing specific goals in the region.

CINCLANTFLT provides forces to both USACOM and USOUTHCOM. JTF-4 is active in the Caribbean and northern South America area, while USCOMSOLANT is responsible for UNITAS. PACFLT, and, more specifically, COMTHIRDFLT, also have interests in the region. COMTHIRDFLT has made excellent progress in working with
the Mexican Navy in coincidental drug operations and in eliciting Mexican support for U.S. elements operating off shore. These relations should be pursued.

Though CINCLANTFLT serves as Naval Component Commander to USSOUTHCOM, the latter's interests and priorities in the region are different from Fleet interests. The present structure, which has a Navy captain representing Fleet interests to the CINC, does not work effectively. Navy interests are not visible at SOUTHCOM.

CINCLANTFLT does not have adequate staff to deal with the complex relations in the region. His own Type Commanders may not be aware of opportunities to benefit from interaction with Latin America. Throughout this study, COs reported that they were not able to get information about Latin America in a timely fashion and they did not know what capabilities and opportunities were available in the region.

In recommending that CINCLANTFLT define a strategy for the region, we recognize that implementing such a vision is a medium- to long-term task. No one Fleet CINC can accomplish all that could be accomplished in this region. The way needs to be paved carefully, and extracting maximum benefits will require overcoming some reluctance on the part of Latin Americans to commit to U.S. programs, as well as continued budget support for the operational activities of the respective Latin American services. We also understand that the Navy traditionally has not had "regional" approaches to its relations in the world. Global circumstances may be such that the time has come for such approaches. Latin American experiences—UNITAS and IANC—have already served as a model for WESTPAC-area activities.

**Designate a policy coordinator for the region**

We have made the point that the Latin American operating environment is bureaucratically complex. At the same time, across the Navy, too much responsibility for coordinating and implementing interactions with Latin American navies devolves to a few offices in OPNAV (N525) and Fleet (N532) staff. This concentrates ownership, and as a result, the operational arms of the Navy lose interest. The operational arms are the intended beneficiaries of the programs, so they have to
be well apprised of the opportunities available. They also need to develop the personal contacts that can facilitate interactions over the long term.

In the course of interviews with Navy personnel responsible for programs in the hemisphere, the argument was heard repeatedly: "You need a Flag to manage this complexity." Coordination of programs and policy requires an operational focal point, not a staff or action officer and "ownership" of opportunities across the Navy. Coordination of operations, training, security assistance, and political-military activities would be the primary tasks of the Latin American Fleet coordinator.

Ideally, USCOMSOLANT should be the point for coordination. He is the logical Flag-level choice, the key naval player in the area, and it is unlikely that any other Flag billet will be otherwise available. As presently structured, however, COMSOLANT is too operational, too far from Fleet headquarters, and too long at sea with both UNITAS and WATC. He has not been helpful to ships interacting with Latin America outside of UNITAS. Furthermore, the coordinating operation needs to be close to the Fleet, not at CINCSOUTH and not in Puerto Rico.

If COMSOLANT and his staff were moved to Norfolk, he could serve as both the Latin American naval policy coordinator and as CINCLANTFLT's Component Commander to USSOUTHCOM (This might be even more desirable if and when SOUTHCOM headquarters moves to CONUS). COMSOLANT would need more staff to accomplish these enhanced tasks, and to maintain a detachment in Norfolk during the UNITAS deployment. Additional staff could come from transferring CINCLANTFLT N532 and Detachment South billets to COMSOLANT. The CINCLANTFLT Latin American liaison officers could also work with COMSOLANT. COMSOLANT would have to travel more during the UNITAS deployment and his job would become a more demanding (and competitive) one. He would, however, greatly increase his access and contact with CINCLANTFLT and his increased viability and prestige would not be lost on the Latin American navies. Although such a move might not have been practical in the past, modern telecommunications and reliable, high-speed air transportation could make the arrangement work today.
An alternative approach is found in the LATAM Task Force created by the Chief of Staff of the Army to resolve what appeared to be “disjointed” Army policy toward Latin America. All Army staff agencies and MACOMs dealing with Central and South America and the Caribbean are participants and respective Army elements of country teams, USOUTHCOM, USACOM, J-5, and OSD/RSA/I-AA provide coordinating conduits.  

The Riverine Steering Group (RSG) that coordinates counternarcotics and related programs is another model for a Navy approach to coordinating agency idiosyncracies and differences into more-responsive action. However, some believe the RSG has not been sufficiently successful in raising issues to appropriate levels for solution.

**Invite regional CNOs to consult on regional maritime strategies**

CINCLANTFLT or the CNO through CINCLANTFLT should invite Latin American CNOs to examine together the various maritime interfaces in the region and, if desired, to develop a strategy for enhancing cooperation in the future. Subjects that could usefully be treated include coordination of blue-, green-, and brown-water initiatives; lessons learned from multinational coalition experiences; experiences gained in regional multinational cooperation in efforts such as the Haiti embargo or riverine operations; intraregional collaboration in the riverine environment; and coordination of training efforts in subjects of shared interest. IANC is the logical venue in which to bring this up, but an independent initiative, well-coordinated in advance, at the Fleet-CINC level might also be appropriate.

This kind of initiative must come from CINCLANTFLT, rather than COMSOLANT. COMSOLANT is an operational one-star removed from the policy and decision process. The targets of the proposed initiative are the chiefs of naval operations of the region, and they must

45. ODCSOPS (DAMO-SSM) “Concepts of Future Defense and Military Relations with Counterparts: Army to Army Relations,” presentation to USCINCSOUTH, February 24, 1994. The Air Force has a similar coordination unit in its International Affairs staff.
be addressed by an appropriately senior peer. They will be very alert to the symbolism of the senior Flag initiative.

Support developing a regional Riverine Operations Training Program

The riverine environment is a training and operations frontier for naval forces in Latin America. The interior of the continent is a maze of river networks criss-crossing the borders of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Argentina. Riverine operations combine elements of law enforcement with amphibious and special-warfare operations. The United States is helping to develop the capabilities of both navies and police units operating in these areas. The Navy and Marine Corps have been engaged in setting up both the Waterways Law Enforcement School in Trinidad, Bolivia, and the Riverine Combat School at Puerto Leguizamo, Colombia. Students of these programs attend NAVSCIATTS in Panama for training in small-craft maintenance and other skills, which are taught by Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard MTTs in the region. Virtually all of the navies in the region require training in the programs offered at these institutions. They need a regionally oriented program that will promote a common approach to military operations, counternarcotics, and law enforcement throughout the region, and one that will permit the most cost-effective expansion of training opportunities in a period of budget austerity. Enhanced contact between navies of the region would be a valued side payoff to this project and could contribute significantly to confidence building in the region.

A regional training program located in Latin America and open to all countries would facilitate U.S. interagency cooperation and intraregional Latin American cooperation in this critical skill area, particularly as NAVSCIATTS is relocated after 1999. U.S. involvement in training would provide opportunities for long-term engagement with the respective services and access to a training and doctrine-development environment that is without equal. The U.S. Department of State, USSOUTHCOM, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Navy and Marine Corps all need to be engaged in this effort.
Develop a long-term plan for ship transfers to the region

Latin Americans are interested in acquiring excess U.S. defense articles. They would like to become more compatible with USN equipment and will take good advantage of training opportunities associated with transfers. The Fleet should be an ally in this effort, as appropriate.

Identifying and supporting acquisition requirements necessitates a long-term plan for the region that identifies Fleet requirements in the region and targets U.S. excess defense articles appropriate to meet those requirements. OPNAV, Navy IPO, and USSOUTHCOM should be engaged in that plan.

“Hot ship” transfers are preferred, when possible, to minimize acquisition cost and maximize training opportunities with U.S. crews and in U.S. schools. Reactivation costs are very high and the major navies would acquire more U.S. equipment if they were able to realize savings on reactivation.

Use political-military sub-specialties more effectively

Throughout this study, Navy personnel at all levels have lamented the poor use of individuals with regional political-military experience, the “not career-enhancing” nature of exchange assignments, and the ad hoc process by which Naval attachés are selected. At the same time, sub-specialty billets are not always filled with individuals with the indicated expertise, and those with expertise have great difficulty advancing in their Navy careers.

Peacetime forward presence, military diplomacy, and building multinational coalitions all demand political-military as well as operational skills and the Navy must find ways to put value on both. Billets at all activities dealing with regional affairs should be reviewed for sub-specialty requirements. Afloat billets like SECONDFLT and THIRDFLT staffs, deployed staffs, SEACONTROLWINGSLANT, and other commands that have regular interaction with a region, should be reviewed for area expertise requirements. Bolstering these billets with area expertise would help the commands perform their missions, create “career enhancing” afloat and major staff ashore billets, and address the non-selection problem.
Identified follow-on assignments in the Fleet would make PEP and other exchanges more attractive. Area expertise and language capability should be primary requirements for liaison and attaché billets.

**Recommendations to the Fleet**

In addition to the above broad policy and organizational recommendations, we recommend aggressive pursuit of recent initiatives or new initiatives in a number of areas to enhance the potential benefits of existing relations.

**Continue to pursue C3 initiatives aggressively**

Interoperability is the primary issue of concern to Latin American officers and CINCLANTFLT’s recent initiative is a welcome remedy to outdated UNITAS solutions. Efforts to improve C3 links will be viewed as an important sign of U.S. Navy commitment to the region.

**Expand Latin American invitations to FLEETEXs**

Latin American navies look forward to working with the U.S. Navy and need the experiences that such interactions offer. They need to plan in advance to husband resources, but they will come north to operate, as was demonstrated by Argentina’s planned participation in FLEETEX (2/94), Brazil’s five-ship deployment to the Puerto Rico Operating Area in March 1994, and Chile’s planned submarine deployment to Keyport, Washington, to interact with U.S. Pacific Fleet elements.

More of these kinds of interactions can be worked out, lessening costs to the U.S. Navy and allowing it to gain unique operating experiences. Argentina and other navies are interested in spreading their exercise opportunities across the year, so they view exercises outside of the UNITAS context as attractive. Brazil is reluctant to share UNITAS with other Services, but the Brazilian Navy and Air Force have interacted with U.S. carriers outside of UNITAS.

The Navy may wish to use Latin American liaison officers to develop opportunities for interaction between and among Fleets. Naval attachés should be alerted to explore opportunities, and COMSOLANT might take on the additional task of promoting engagements outside of UNITAS. U.S. Navy Research and
Development departments need to be exposed to the opportunities available in the region. Operation Ghost I (S-3 ASW exercise with Argentina in December 1993) was paid for, in part, by SPAWARS, which accumulated significant test and evaluation data, while keeping costs to the Fleet to a minimum. Additional funding to support Latin American deployments to operate with U.S. units could be sought within Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP) budgets.

**Implement targeted navy-to-navy activities during routine port visits**

Detailed analyses of port visits indicate that navy-to-navy contacts have not been exploited during routine port visits. These are invaluable opportunities to build rapport with navies of the region and to encourage their professional development. Efforts to conduct in-port professional seminars and navy-to-navy contacts would signal a more serious, professional U.S. interest in the region. As U.S. ship visits in the region are frequent, care must be taken not to overwhelm the smaller navies. Selected port visits should be targeted for intensive professional navy-to-navy interaction, and events should be planned well in advance. Word should go out to schedulers, ship COs, and naval attachés in the region that navy-to-navy contacts are to be sought and cultivated.

**Exercise with South American navies en route to routine port visits**

The U.S. Navy could exploit opportunities for training by consciously integrating operational, training, and engagement activities in the region. Ships operating on station in the Caribbean often complain of difficulties in maintaining readiness. Were ships to schedule exercises in conjunction with liberty port visits from time to time, both U.S. and Latin American readiness would be enhanced. Many operators in the region appear to believe that the interface with South America is USCOMSOLANT’s responsibility and they are reluctant to take initiatives. The chain of responsibility needs to be made clear.

**Treat carrier transits as deployments**

Treat CV interfleet and other South Atlantic transits as deployments and give them high-priority interface to the region. Though carrier transits provided the only occasion, outside of UNITAS, for port visits
in the Southern Cone, carrier COs uniformly complained that the 56-day window imposed for inter-Fleet transfers forced them to adopt a high speed of advance (SOA) and caused them to miss opportunities for engagement in the region. Since carrier visits to the region are infrequent, and offer a variety of opportunities for interactions, they should be exploited to the utmost. Most carriers transiting the region in recent years have been en route to, or from, the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), and a longer deployment would have had no impact on PERSTEMPO boundaries. In any event, any carrier visit to the region should be given high priority, adequate funding, and appropriate support.

**Provide emphases for Flag visits to the region**

The best Flag visits are those with a purpose, ones that occur early in the job and that entail specific follow-up, with perhaps a return visit with the idea of passing along the interface to a successor. A Flag Group Commander (GRUCOM) should be assigned to carriers transiting the region to accommodate the high-priority State Department and Navy diplomatic activities that normally accompany such visits.

**Expand the out-of-area shiprider program**

This excellent CINCLANTFLT program offers maximum exposure to U.S. Navy procedures and values at almost no cost to the Navy. It will contribute significantly to bridging the generation gap between mid-ranking officers. PACFLT should be encouraged to extend invitations to Latin American Pacific navies (Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico).

**Expand Fleet participation in wargaming**

"Just because ships can sail together doesn't mean they can cooperate in combat operations, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement. ... Elements such as command and control, rules of engagement, and logistics need to be worked out."  

Wargaming is a cost-effective way to learn how potential partners think and make decisions, to identify problems in advance and to

46. Secretary of the Navy, John H. Dalton, *loc. cit.*
work toward solutions. Games should be used as tools for developing doctrine, consensus on issues such as rules of engagement, and for working out problems of "cooperative security" in the region and multinational operations out of the region. Expanded fleet participation in strategic wargaming would signal operational interest in the outcomes of games. Strategic games should have strong, senior-level, active-duty Navy participation from operational arms.

Explore use of Latin American operating areas

... From the Sea directs that the Navy will have missions in diverse environments. The U.S. Marine Corps regards the riverine and jungle-training environment of Colombia as a venue for developing a contemporary riverine doctrine. Navy SEAL teams view the jungle-operating areas of Panama as "last good jungle-operating site available" with the Philippines gone. In short, Latin America is a laboratory for ... From the Sea and there are few more attractive and accommodating regions in which to develop, test, and train in littoral warfare doctrine and tactics.

Examine assignments for liaison officers

The Liaison Officer Program is another excellent initiative. We believe that the THIRDFLT operational assignment provides more "deckplate" experience for officers and builds friendships at the operating level. Fleets should compare experiences in implementing this program and should ensure that the liaison officers are exposed to both operational and staff aspects of the U.S. Navy.

Expand senior enlisted exchange opportunities

One of the most frequently cited weaknesses of Latin American navies is the officers' failure to delegate to junior officers and senior enlisted personnel. This is a cultural characteristic. Latin Americans are aware of the different U.S. practice and its effect on capabilities. They should be exposed to U.S. practice as much as possible. Chilean CNO Martinez-Busch specifically asked for more senior enlisted exchanges. It can be argued that such exchanges support more democratic behaviors within the military, and economic opportunities for sailors who return to the civilian economy.
Promote opportunities for RefTra exposure

Colombia uses RefTra at NS Guantanamo very effectively to train personnel and to maintain readiness. The service generates considerable goodwill toward the USN within the Colombian Navy. Venezuela and the Dominican Republic have been intermittent users of the service and would benefit from more-frequent exposure. Other navies in the region (Ecuador) should be encouraged to take advantage of this relatively low-cost service. It will be highly desirable to ensure continued access to RefTra, either in CONUS or at NS Roosevelt Roads, as the Guantanamo facility is phased out. It should be brought to the attention of MilGrps and U.S. naval attachés in the region.

Share Latin American experiences with PACFLT

A number of excellent CINCLANTFLT programs could be adopted in PACFLT (especially THIRDFLT), including the out-of-area shiprider program, which would benefit Chile, Peru, perhaps Colombia, and possibly Ecuador. Chile should be invited to participate, at least as an observer, in RIMPAC.

CINCLANTFLT should share his experiences with shipriders and in exercises with individual Latin American navies to encourage PACFLT consideration of initiatives with PACRIM Latin Americans.

Recommendations regarding UNITAS

Consider inviting Mexico to Phase 0

Mexico has one of the largest fleets in the hemisphere. Historically, it has avoided operating with other navies, and has not operated with the United States since World War II. As a consequence of counternarcotics-related interactions with both the Navy and the Coast Guard, Mexico may be interested in pursuing professional naval interactions in the region. An invitation to observe UNITAS, Phase 0, with U.S., Latin American, and Canadian or European participation, could be well received. Such an initiative should be worked carefully within the U.S. Navy (COMTHIRDFLT maintains very good relations with the Mexican Navy), and through navy-to-navy as well as diplomatic channels. Mexico has declined invitations in the past, but the issue should be pursued.
Invite South Americans to expand lessons learned

UNITAS is criticized by both supporters and detractors as often "routine," "the same thing year after year," UNITAS After Action reports often cite as "firsts" activities that have taken place in more than one previous evolution. COMSOLANTs argue that the South Americans frequently plan from a previous-year's OPORDER. Although each UNITAS phase includes a debriefing, it is not apparent that lessons learned during the exercise are effectively incorporated into COMSOLANT planning or host-navy planning and training. In part, this is due to between-phase personnel changes on both sides.

A more formal mechanism for identifying areas of interest and incorporating these into both UNITAS planning cycles and U.S. and Latin American work-up cycles would be desirable.

U.S. Navy units will probably take note of their own lessons learned, particularly in ... From the Sea operations. However, if UNITAS is to serve as a mechanism for challenging the Latin American fleets, learning coalition skills, and enhancing performance and readiness, a feedback mechanism for lessons learned is necessary for Latin American navies as well. As these tools are a forte of the U.S. Navy, it is appropriate that CINCLANTFLT and COMSOLANT propose mechanisms for incorporating lessons learned into individual UNITAS phases as appropriate.

This initiative is best worked bilaterally. Latin American navies will not wish to appear to be "shown up" in comparison either with the USN or with their neighbors. Nevertheless, they should be encouraged to pursue the lessons learned to enhance interoperability, coalition capabilities, and their own training procedures. They probably would be interested in how lessons learned are used within the USN and perhaps in developing a UNITAS lessons-learned system or database over time, particularly as a training device for new mission-specific operations such as multinational coalitions, EEZ protection, and maritime law enforcement.
Pursue multinational aspects when possible

UNITAS has always included multinational operations, but these may be more important in the future, particularly if countries in addition to Argentina begin to engage in out-of-area coalition operations. Building South American multinational coalition capabilities should be incorporated as a primary mission of UNITAS.

Chile is the only country that, since 1978, has opposed multinational participation in its phase. With bilateral civil and military relations with its neighbors improving, it is timely to approach Chile on this issue. Chile can be reminded that before 1978 it routinely operated with Peru and others in the Pacific. The USDAO should be tasked to pursue this issue over time, backing up the CINCLANTFLT and COMSOLANT initiative.

Explore UNITAS doctrine with Navy Doctrine Command

UNITAS C3 doctrine is based on NATO doctrine and has been implemented over 34 years with demonstrable success. The concepts should provide a useful starting point for a multinational naval doctrine for use with non-NATO coalition partners. Starting with UNITAS would avoid the delays often associated with downgrading NATO doctrine.

Brief UNITAS around the Navy/defense community

UNITAS is virtually unknown in the Navy outside the narrow group of people whose job it is to know about it. It is the Navy's longest standing multinational exercise, and the U.S. military's longest standing engagement in South America. Moreover, it is a “stressed” deployment, five months away from logistics base, operating at high tempo, working with less-experienced navies, operating in a ... From the Sea laboratory environment.

UNITAS lessons learned should be briefed at the Naval War College and other Navy institutions of higher learning, the National War College, the Inter-American Defense College, at USSOUTHCOM, and to other CINCs.
## Appendix: Latin American contacts

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