Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL
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WORLDWIDE REPORT
Arms Control

CONTENTS

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

Soviet Commentaries: Reagan Rejects Compromise on SDI in NST
(Various sources, various dates)............................. 1

August Speech Cited
'Stormy Debate', by Aleksandr Yevdokimov
Ignores West European Views
U.S. Proposals 'Not Constructive', by Dmitriy Biryukov
Army Paper Commentary, by V. Chernyshev
Abrahamson 'Debunked Propaganda', by Petr Fedorov
'Cannot Accept' 15-Year Ban, by Vladimir Chernyshev
'Experts Skeptical' of Fig Leaf', by Anatoliy Lazarev

Canada: Editorial on SDI Budget, Arms Race Escalation
(Vancouver THE SUN, 2 Jul 86)................................. 9

USSR: SDI Would Undermine Crisis Stability, Mutual Deterrence
(R. Sagdeyev, S. Rodionov; Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 5, May 86)........... 10

USSR's Konovalov Interviewed on SDI by CSSR Party Journal
(Alexandr Alexandrovich Konovalov; Prague TVORBA, No 25,
1986)....................................................................... 17

IZVESTIYA: U.S. Views SDI as Offensive Weapon
(Melor Sturua; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 13 Aug 86)............... 22

Briefs
Soviet-Dutch Consultations
TASS: First Industrial SDI Lab

- a -
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

Indian Paper Says Talks 'Have Eye on Gallery'
(Editorial; Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH, 23 Jul 86) ............... 25

Canada: Editorial Approves Reagan Consultation With Allies
(Ottawa THE CITIZEN, 25 Jul 86) .................................. 27

SALT/START ISSUES

Soviet Colonel Views Implications of U.S. SALT Stance
(A. Nesterov; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 Jul 86) .......... 28

TASS Military Writer on U.S. 'Undermining' of Accords
(Vladimir Bogachev; Moscow TASS, 7 Aug 86) ................. 30

Soviet Gen Chervov Interviewed on Importance of SALT Accords
(Nikolay Chervov Interview; Prague RUDE PRAVO, 11 Aug 86)... 32

USSR: Press Conference on July Extraordinary SCC Session
(Moscow TASS, 4 Aug 86; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 6 Aug 86) ..... 35

U.S. 'Misinterprets' Results
U.S. Stance Criticized .............................................. 35

TASS Announcements of Missile Test in Pacific
(Moscow TASS, 9, 12 Aug 86) ........................................ 37

Warning Announcement
Tests Over ............................................................... 37

USSR: Comments on U.S. Strategic Bomber Plans
(Various sources, various dates) .................................. 39

ALCM's on B-52's
Stealth Program, by G. Vasilyev
Secrecy on F-19 Crash, by Yuri Ustimenko ................. 40

Briefs
TASS: B-1 Tests in Canada
TASS on House MX Vote ............................................ 42

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

Soviet Reports on End of U.S.-Soviet Test Ban Talks
(Moscow TASS, 31 Jul 86; Moscow Television Service,
4 Aug 86) ................................................................. 43

Broad Range of Issues
September Resumption Planned ............................... 43
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

IZVESTIYA Cites U.S. Admiral on Tomahawk Deployment Schedule (S. Agafonov; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 7 Aug 86) 44

TASS: U.S. To Supply Nuclear Warheads to British Rhine Army (Moscow TASS International Service, 27 Jul 86) 46

TASS Alleges U.S. Brings Nuclear Arms Into Japan (Sergey Logachev; Moscow TASS, 30 Jul 86) 47

Soviet Army Paper Hits U.S. NST View on Medium-Range Missiles (Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 Aug 86) 48

PRAVDA Commentary Discusses U.S. Nuclear Buildup in ROK (Boris Barakhta; Moscow PRAVDA, 10 Aug 86) 50

Moscow Commentary on French Nuclear Buildup (Vsevolod Mikhaylov; Moscow in French to France and Belgium, 5 Aug 86) 52

PRAVDA Scores FRC's Cruise Missile 'Ambitions' (Stanislav Zyubanov; Moscow PRAVDA, 3 Jul 86) 54

USSR: Reports on Accident With Pershing-IA Warhead in FRC (Various sources, various dates) 56

Attempt at Secrecy Alleged 56

SPD Member Urges Inquiry 'Anger' Over Accident 57

Soviet Military Journal on Pershing-2 Characteristics (L. Migunov; Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA, No 5, May 86) 58

TASS Commentary on U.S. Cruise Missile Tests (Leonid Ponomarev; Moscow TASS, 5 Aug 86) 61

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

Soviet Reports on Support for Test Ban in Congress (Various sources, various dates) 63

Draft Resolution, by V. Shukhov 63

Congressmen Cited 64

Resolutions Pass 65

House Appropriations Amendment 65

TASS Reports on Delhi Six Meeting Urging Test Ban (Moscow TASS, 8, 13 Aug 86) 67

Send Messages to Gorbachev, Reagan, by Valeriy Fesenko 67

Conclusion Noted, by Boris Shabayev 68

Circulated by Mexico 69

- c -
Soviet Army Paper Criticizes U.S. Stance on Tests
(M. Ponomarev; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Aug 86).............. 70

TASS Military Writer Calls Test Ban 'Top Priority'
(Vladimir Chernyshev; Moscow TASS, 4 Aug 86)..................... 74

USSR Military Writer on Importance, Verifiability of Test Ban
(V. Chernyshev; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 Aug 86)............. 76

Moscow Claims Americans Uninformed of Moratorium
(Valentin Zorin; Moscow in English to North America
12 Aug 86)........................................................................... 80

Moscow Outlines 'Trend' Toward Nuclear-Free Zones
(Viktor Levin; Moscow Domestic Service, 12 Aug 86)............. 81

PRAVDA Commentary Calls for Southeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone
(Dmitriy Kosyrev; Moscow PRAVDA, 4 Aug 86)...................... 83

USSR: South Pacific Forum August Session on Regional NFZ
(Various sources, various dates)............................................ 85

IZVESTIYA Preview, by F. Yevgenyev
Session Opens
Communique Reported, by Alexey Voronin
Soviet Support Noted, by Viktor Konnov
PRAVDA Commentary, by O. Skalkin

TASS: Gorbachev Accepts Scientists' Declaration on Test Ban
(Moscow TASS, 14 Jul 86)...................................................... 90

TASS: Bulgarian Scientist on Nuclear Test Verification Procedures
(Moscow TASS, 21 Jul 86)...................................................... 91

RELATED ISSUES

FRG: Disarmament is Only One Part of East-West Picture
(Kurt Becker; Hamburg DIE ZEIT, 27 Jun 86)......................... 92

PRC People's Daily: Disarmament Requires Sincerity of Superpowers
(Liu Ban; Beijing RENMIN RIBAO, 8 Aug 86)......................... 95

/6539
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET COMMENTARIES: REAGAN REJECTS COMPROMISE ON SDI IN NST

August Speech Cited

PM081307 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Aug 86 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Militarist Course"]

[Text] Washington, 7 Aug -- U.S. President R. Reagan has made another speech defending the "star wars" program. Meeting with representatives of right-wing organizations and military-industrial monopolies, Reagan stated that the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" could not under any circumstances be a subject for arms limitation talks. The United States, he stressed, intends to see through the development of a space-based ABM system and subsequently to deploy it.

In the opinion of observers, Reagan's speech is meant to pressure congressmen, who are currently having stormy debates over the U.S. draft military budget for the next fiscal year. The Senate and House of Representatives are now criticizing the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) increasingly vocally.

The White House's militarist course undermines fundamental arms control documents and makes it impossible to conclude new agreements in this sphere, Senate Edward Kennedy stated. "While President Reagan insists on moving toward deployment of a 'star wars' system," he stated, "the chances of reaching any significant arms control agreement are nil."

The ABM Treaty, Gerard Smith, former head of the U.S. delegation at the SALT talks, writes in THE NEW YORK TIMES, has restrained an arms race in the sphere of defensive systems for 14 years. But now the administration is proposing to replace this treaty with the "star wars" program, which will lead to an escalation of the arms race.

'Stormy Debate'

OW091232 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 8 Aug 86

[Aleksandr Yevdokimov commentary; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] U.S. President Reagan has come out with another speech in defense of the star wars program. Here is our commentary:

[Yevdokimov] Hello comrades. Stormy debate is going on these days in the U.S. Congress on the U.S. military draft budget for the coming financial year. Criticism of
the so-called SDI is becoming louder and louder, and demands for reducing the budget requested by the White House for implementing this program are increasing in the Senate and the House of Representatives. The atmosphere in Congress cannot but arouse certain concern of the administration chief over the future of his favorable creation; therefore, he has resorted to the tested method of pressuring congressmen.

Observers think that the President's speech at his meeting with representatives of rightist organizations and military industrial monopolies serves the same purposes. He said again that under no circumstances will SDI become an issue at arms limitation talks. The President stressed that the United States intends to complete the development of the ABM space system and then deploy it.

The defensive character of SDI and that it can serve the cause of eliminating nuclear arms on earth was emphasized in every way, but all this is sheer demagogy. Reagan claims that SDI is a space shield, but in fact, it represents the deployment in space of first strike weapons capable of hitting any target, any objective on land, at sea, and in space.

More and more soberminded U.S. politicians are becoming aware of the danger of moving the arms race into space.

They are urging the administration not to wreck existing arms control documents; they are urging it to sign new agreements in this field with the Soviet Union. Gerald Smith, former U.S. delegation leader at SALT meetings has said that joint efforts by the USSR and the United States must be directed at reducing, and not creating more complicated and more dangerous offensive arms.

Our country has never spared efforts in this field, but for the United States, using Senator Edward Kennedy's words, the chance of reaching any significant arms control agreement is nil as long as President Reagan insists in progress in the deployment of the star wars systems.

Ignores West European Views

LD082257 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 8 Aug 86

[Text] In his speech in defense of the star wars program, President Reagan said that in no circumstances would the SDI be a subject of arms limitation talks. He stressed the intentions of the United States to complete the development of antimissile space defense and deploy it. What was the response to the suggestion in the United States and what might be the response in Europe? Nikolay Borin:

[Begin recording] When the bill on the military budget was put to vote in Washington, star wars were sharply criticized. Both senators and congressmen feared that loyalty to the SDI (amounts to) the refusal of the White House to hold serious disarmament talks. Many of them were alarmed by the fact that instead of discussing and seeking a compromise, the Reagan administration excluded key questions of the East-West balance of force from the agenda of the talks. Senator Kennedy said that, while President Reagan insisted on advancement to the deployment of the star wars system, the chances of any notable arms control agreement were equal to zero. Senator Albert Gore said if we want an agreement there has to be some trade off between arms control and cost in weapons. Though there has been no official statement in Western Europe in Reagan's speech yet, I think most American allies in Europe share this viewpoint of the senators. [end recording]
But according to a number of reports from Washington, President Reagan offered a star
wars compromise in a confidential response to disarmament proposals for Mikhail
Gorbachev.

[Begin Borin recording] Well a close look at these reports show that there was actually
no offer of a compromise. The President still sneaks of deploying arms in space, only
now he says that the deployment will take place in 7 years' time. THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR has remarked that the proposed postponement is not a concession to
Moscow because, in any case, the USA won't be able to station such a system ever.
General Abrahamson, heading the SDI has said that at least 10 years will pass before
the United States will be able to start stationing (fits missiles). So a true
compromise was actually put forward by Moscow when (?suggesting) limiting work under
the SDI program to laboratory research and agreeing to abide by antiballistic missile
treaty for at least 15 years. [end recording]

Senator Sam Nunn, senior Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that to
declare now an intention to deploy the system means to ignore questions that the
President raised in his own national security directive. The directive said that the
SDI was a research program which had to be proved cost effective, survivable and
technically feasible. Not only the senator, but also the allies who agreed to
participate in the SDI, stressed that it was a research program, didn't they?

[Begin Borin recording] West European terms of supporting the SDI were formulated for
the first time by Prime Minister Thatcher in December 1984, during her visit to the
United States. And the main condition was to draw a line between research and
deployment that should become a subject of negotiations and could not be carried out
without the consent of the opposite side. However, in his speech at the White House
meeting with the star wars support group, President Reagan fully ignored this stand of
Britain. [end recording]

U.S. Proposals 'Not Constructive'

LD082138 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 8 Aug 86
[From "The World Today" program presented by Dmitriy Biryukov]

[Text] Over the last few days the U.S. press, television, and radio have, frequently
and in different forms, foisted on the public the notion that in his reply to the July
letter from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the U.S. President proposed some kind of
compromise; that is, that Reagan, it is alleged, showed a readiness to abandon the
Strategic Defense Initiative in response to a number of concessions from the USSR.

But, when addressing a group of SDI supporters, mainly belonging to right-wing,
conservative organizations, Reagan declared: When the time comes and SDI research is
completed, we intend to deploy it. I wish to emphasize that in a number of leading
U.S. publications commenting on the U.S. President's reply to the Soviet leader,
mention is constantly made of a supposedly expressed readiness to postpone the
deployment of the SDI system for 7 years. This is a very cunning statement. During
the period indicated, the United States is technically unable to carry out the
deployment of such a system. But now, already, while continuing to design and test
components of the system, which is banned by the ABM Treaty, they are trying to extract
from the Soviet Union an agreement to its deployment in any case.
According to the U.S. press, another part of the U.S. proposals contained in the President's letter has a hidden angle: Here it is a question of eliminating strategic ballistic missiles. The aim of this proposal is transparent enough: to ease the functioning of the U.S. star wars system. After all, they remain silent about the prospects of reducing the numbers of heavy bombers of sea-based long-range cruise missiles.

And, finally, I want to draw attention to the political side of the question: The current U.S. proposals are, unfortunately, not at all constructive. They pose as an effort by Washington to compromise, to take a far-reaching step. It is probably not fortuitous, therefore, that the conservatives, those who attended the meeting I mentioned — and I want to stress once more that they were representatives of extreme right-wing organizations — greeted the President's latest pronouncements with a real ovation. They have calmed down, after deciding that no real changes in the position of the Washington administration have, so far at least, taken place.

Army Paper Commentary

PM1134 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Aug 86 Second Edition p 5

[V. Chernyshev article: "President's Revelations"]

[Text] Addressing a group of supporters of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" — representatives of right-wing conservative organizations — U.S. President Ronald Reagan refuted the theory that has recently been greatly blown up by U.S. mass information organs that in his reply to the June letter from M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, he allegedly proposed some "compromise" — rejection of SDI in exchange for a strategic arms reduction. "When the time comes and the development (of SDI) is complete, we intend to deploy it," the President said in plain terms.

As is well-known, as a result of the stand taken by Washington, which has no wish to place a total ban on space-based strike weapons, the Soviet-American Geneva talks have taken the path of fruitless discussions. Guided by the desire to get the talks moving, the USSR proposed to the United States that an agreement be reached on partial measures that could be taken now and each of which would make a substantial contribution to resolving the task of preventing the militarization of space. These measures would primarily concern the sides' obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 15 years while strictly observing the restrictions it envisages.

In his letter to the Soviet leader, THE NEW YORK TIMES and THE WASHINGTON POST wrote, the head of the White House expressed willingness to postpone the deployment of space-based ABM systems for 7 years. During 5 of these years the United States intends to develop and test ABM components in addition to research. In the following 2 years talks must be held on the conditions for deploying a space-based system while simultaneously reaching mutual agreement regarding the elimination of strategic ballistic missiles. [paragraph continues]

If, in these 2 years such an agreement is not reached, each side will be within its rights to deploy a space-based ABM system after giving the other side 6 months notification.

This means that, while forgoing absolutely nothing, as the United States would be technically unable to begin deployment of SDI within 7 years, and continuing to develop
and test ABM components prohibited by the treaty, the White House would simultaneously like to secure the USSR's consent now to the United States subsequently deploying this system in any case. But the ABM Treaty prohibits the creation of such a system.

With regard to the other part of the American proposal — the elimination of strategic ballistic missiles — here also Washington is trying to reserve for itself the possibility of gaining a military advantage. It does not propose eliminating or even reducing the number of heavy bombers or sea-based long-range cruise missiles. The aim of eliminating ballistic missiles alone is quite clear — to facilitate the functioning of the future American "star wars" system.

Representatives of the U.S. Administration have tried to present this formulation of the issue as some kind of "compromise" and "far-reaching step" by Washington. The propaganda sensation even misled some "hawks" in the United States. But now the President has put everything in its place. It is for this reason that the representatives of such well-known "hawk" organizations as "High Frontier" and the "Heritage Foundation" who filled the hall gave his statement an ovation.

This once again confirms the fact that, whereas the Soviet leader's letter contains major compromise proposals, no countermovement is to be seen in the reply from the White House. Its contents are in line neither with the principle of the sides' equal security nor with the task of ending the arms race on earth and preventing one in space. "The President's response makes no concessions," the Canadian GAZETTE concluded. An aspiration for one-sided military advantages and an attempt to propose talks on certain rules" relating to the space arms race and the development of military competition in near-earth space — this is the essence and the direction of official Washington's "response."

Even in the United States itself, sober-minded political figures have given an appropriate appraisal of the President's letter. "As long as President Reagan insists on moving forward toward the deployment of a 'star wars' system, the chances of reaching any significant agreement on arms control are nil," Senator E. Kennedy said, for example. One cannot help but agree with this.

Abrahamson 'Debunked Propaganda'

LD120943 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0230 GMT 12 Aug 86

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Petr Fedorov]

[Text] The problem of disarmament and the matter of averting the militarization of space, difficult enough in themselves, are being even further burdened by the policies being pursued by the White House. Here in part is what U.S. Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, leader of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative program has said. Appearing on an NBC television program, he stated that the United States intends to progress with the implementation of the star wars program as far as possible. Thus with a soldiers's plain speaking he has debunked the efforts of the White House's official propaganda that has recently been contending that Reagan allegedly proposed a form of compromise to the Soviet Union in a message to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 25 July, which could have paved the way for a new arms treaty. The key position of the proposed formula is the deferment of deployment of armaments in space for 5-7 years. This deferment is completely unprincipled because even the very first elements
of the system could not be deployed into space by the United States any earlier than in 10 years. The crux of the trick is that Washington would like to force our country to admit right now that it will all the same be possible to realize the Strategic Defense Initiative in 5-7 years.

"Cannot Accept" 15-Year Ban

LD121509 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT 12 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow August 12 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev

Washington is continuing its attempts to inspire world opinion with optimism about prospects for limiting and reducing arms.

U.S. Administration officials claim the basis for the hopes for progress in the field has been furnished by a "constructive approach" allegedly demonstrated by the White House.

The U.S. President asserted a few days ago that given a constructive Soviet response, important headway could be made.

White House spokesman Larry Speakes claimed, for his part, that the United States had made a serious proposal in response to a serious Soviet proposal, while Kenneth Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, voiced the conviction that the USSR would give a positive reply to a U.S. proposal to legalize SDI deployment in seven years' time.

The Soviet leadership will, no doubt, spell out its attitude to the White House reply to Mikhail Gorbachev's letter in due time. But there already has arisen a whole number of questions to the U.S. Administration.

Why is the United States, for example, reluctant to accept a Soviet proposal for plodging not to break out of the ABM Treaty for 15 years, with strict compliance with the limitations it has set?

Why is Washington suggesting a term of five to seven years and also seeking to win permission to develop and test ABM components?

In my personal opinion, the answer to these questions is as follows: the U.S. present leadership has decided to deploy a "star wars" system anyway, and take the program to a deployment stage as soon as possible.

The President and his representatives make no bones about admitting this. Patrick Buchanan, director of the White House Office of Communications, said bluntly, for instance, that the goal of talks conducted by a U.S. delegation in Moscow was to ensure the SDI's future and that was all there was to it.

This is why Washington cannot accept a deployment ban lasting 15 years.

First, this is because some kinds of SDI-related weaponry will apparently be developed in the United States much sooner, namely as early as the beginning of the 90's. It is known that contracts awarded by the Pentagon to develop and test anti-missile missiles provide for completing those jobs early next decade (one with McDonnel Douglas, for example, has January 1991 as the deadline).
It has been decided that the SDI defense will be a seven-tier system which will be deployed tier by tier as the relevant new technologies are evolved and mastered.

James Abrahamson said the United States would be able to deploy first-generation space weapons, including orbiting battle stations armed with miniature homing vehicles, as early as the beginning of the '90's.

The Pentagon has already made the necessary computations concerning the first stage of deployment.

Second, the U.S. Administration fears that if the United States commits itself to observing the ABM Treaty for a longer time, Congress will make substantial cuts in appropriations for the SDI and it will not be possible to speed up the program's fulfilment.

Some people in Washington believe it is essential right now, during the Reagan administration's tenure, to lay such groundwork for the "star wars" program and spend so much money on it as to make it hard for succeeding administrations to abandon it after all the inputs.

It is evidently all these considerations that have made the White House propose a seven-year term: It will do no harm to the SDI plans as there isn't yet anything to deploy in any case.

The United States, in the meantime, will press on with its "star wars" efforts, including the development and testing of ABM components that is banned by the ABM Treaty, and be bound by no treaty obligations by the early 90's.

This is why the White House proposal is, to all appearances, nothing more than a propaganda cover.

It was with good reason that THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER observed that the U.S. Administration as fooling people and that the formula proposed by the White House in effect made for an arms buildup and spelled death to arms control. The paper said the most important was the condition the President wanted in return for his so-called deployment delay, and that was to make the Soviet Union acknowledge that the United States would have the right to deploy the SDI in five or seven years.

So the artificial optimism Washington is trying to inspire is hardly justified and appropriate in this case.

'Experts Skeptical' of 'Fig Leaf'

LDL22001 Moscow TASS in English 1845 GMT 12 Aug 86
[Text] New York August 12 TASS -- TASS correspondent Anatoliy Lazarev reports:

Experts on arms control are sceptical about Reagan's proposals expressed in his reply letter to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR newspaper writes. First, the deferment of the deployment of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements, mentioned in Reagan's answer, cannot be described as a concession, since under no circumstances will the United States be able to deploy such a system within the next seven years. In this connection the newspaper cites the opinion of director of the Strategic Defence Initiative organisation Lieutenant General James Abrahamson,
who noted that it will take at least ten years to embark on the deployment of the anti-missile defence space system. Head of the Center for Defense Information, David Johnson, described Reagan's proposal as a "fig leaf."

Representatives of the Institute of Security and Cooperation in Outer Space, Joseph Lovis said that Reagan's gesture cannot be viewed as a proposal. This actually means an ultimatum to the Soviet Union to agree to the implementation of the "star wars" programme.

Having analysed the proposals of the White House, member of the leadership of the Federation of American Scientists John Pike, arrived at the conclusion that there have been no essential changes in the administration's stand on the question of star wars.

PEOPLE'S DAILY WORLD newspaper writes that the aim of Reagan's proposal is to impart a semblance of legality to the star wars programme and the elimination of the ABM Treaty. Contrary to Washington's assertions, the road to mankind's peaceful future does not lie through the implementation of the SDI. The road to it was indicated in the Soviet Union's proposed programme of stage-by-stage elimination of weapons of mass annihilation, above all, nuclear weapons, by the year 2000, the newspaper writes.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1520
President Ronald Reagan's final ambition, the strategic defence initiative, has encountered its first serious opposition in the United States Senate. There a bipartisan coalition of 48 senators, almost half the total membership of 100, does not propose to abandon research into space weaponry but only to prolong it and hold down the enormous cost.

Last year Mr. Reagan sought expenditures of $4.17 billion and the Congress granted him $3.1 billion. This year he asks for $5.4 billion to expedite his program, hoping that it can be completed in the 1990s, soon after he has returned to private life.

The Congress seems unlikely to approve his timetable when it is struggling with a huge budgetary deficit and has been warned by more than 1,600 leading scientists that defence in space "is not feasible in the visible future."

Even if last year's appropriation is not increased, the scientists warn that a more limited goal "represents a significant escalation of the arms race and runs the serious risk of jeopardizing existing arms control treaties and future negotiations."

Many of the United States' allies share this alarm, but the president has assured them that he would not actually deploy the ultimate weapon without consulting the Russians. Mikhail Gorbachev is unimpressed. He knows that Mr. Reagan will have left the presidency long before the weapon is invented and the views of his unknown successor are unforeseeable. Meanwhile, the strange hot-and-cold relationship between the world's two most powerful men continues, the Russian offering a series of disarmament plans, the American rejecting and then promising to consider them.

These exchanges must increasingly bewilder the public and a Congress now fighting a mid-term election. Though it does not control foreign policy, an executive function, the legislature alone frames the budget. Its next Star Wars appropriation will show whether the president can speed up a project of dubious utility in the long run, and calculated to aggravate the mad armament contest in the short.
USSR: SDI WOULD UNDERMINE CRISIS STABILITY, MUTUAL DETERRENCE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 86 (signed to press 11 Apr 86) pp 15-20

[Article by Academician R. Sagdeyev and S. Rodionov: "On the Question of the Strategic and Economic Consequences of the SDI"]

[Text] Three years have elapsed since the R. Reagan administration declared its intention to create a global strategic defense system designed to render nuclear weapons "obsolete and useless". And there has been no letup all 3 years in the debate surrounding this decision, as, equally, surrounding the "strategic defense initiative" (SDI) program proposed by the administration for the development of a broad-based antimissile system with space-based components.

But the nature of the debate has changed with the passage of time. At the first stage critics of the administration's actions showed convincingly that the desire to create a "total shield" against all nuclear weapon delivery systems is an illusion, at least, in the foreseeable future. And not only, furthermore, because the specifications of individual components of such an "ideal defensive system" could prove beyond the limits of technical possibilities (in a number of instances it is indeed still a very long way to the desired level) but primarily as a consequence of the fact that the efficiency of an antinuclear shield could be reduced sharply by countermeasures by the other side.*

Currently both the opponents of SDI and its supporters agree (with the rare exception) that the outcome of this program could be at best a defensive system of limited efficiency incapable of tackling the task of defense of the entire country and affording an alternative to the principle of "mutual nuclear restraint," which at this time determines the strategic stability in the world. We would emphasize in this connection that, granted abandonment of the total antinuclear shield concept, abandoning the principle of "mutual nuclear restraint" is impossible.

In addition, the deployment of such a limited system by one side would inevitably lead to a sharp destabilization of the strategic balance and inevitably spur competition with offensive forces, which are economically considerably more efficient.

The supporters of SDI soon preferred to avoid discussion of the strategic and economic aspects of the program, referring to the fact that prior to its completion (when the appearance of the future antimissile system has been developed) such discussion would appear insufficiently specific.

But the discussion did not pass without trace. A reflection thereof was, inter alia, the so-called "Nitze criteria" (P. Nitze is a special adviser to the U.S. President on the arms reduction talks) formulating demands on a potential ABM system lacking satisfaction of which there can be no question even of its creation, even less, of its deployment. Their essence is invulnerability to the potential enemy's countermeasures and economic efficiency (defensive weapons must be cheaper than offensive weapons).

Recently the debate surrounding the SDI has touched on aspects of the consequences of the development and deployment of a broad-based antimissile defense which are invariant in respect of the specific type of defensive system. It is primarily a question of problems of strategic stability, particularly of how stability based on the "mutual nuclear restraint" principle changes given introduction to the balance of forces of a defensive component.

The supporters of SDI believe that, given a defensive system of limited efficiency, the other side will not be able to cater with sufficient certainty for all the consequences of its own first strike inasmuch as the actual efficiency of such a system will be unknown to it. They believe that this fact increases "restraint".

We would permit ourselves a small observation in this connection. In reality no one knows the actual efficiency of a defensive system. It can be determined only on the basis of full-scale tests, which would in themselves be the equivalent of a global nuclear war. For this reason it has to be recognized that a side possessing a limited defensive system cannot from the very outset be absolutely sure of "guaranteed protection".

To stick to the facts, the said situation will contribute to the development of the "instability" formulated by R. McNamara (U.S. defense secretary in the 1960's). He called attention to the obvious fact that the natural reaction to the creation of a defensive component of the strategic forces by one side would be the deployment of additional offensive forces by the other—until the losses of the forces of restraint anticipated from the effect of the defensive system were compensated. Ignorance of the actual efficiency of a defensive system only increases this instability since the other side will begin to evaluate a rival's defensive capability in a "worst-case" scenario. This will lead to an inordinate growth of its offensive potential from the viewpoint of the first side, whose natural reaction will be either to increase its own defensive weapons or bring the offensive potential up to the level of the other side. In turn, the latter will respond in a perfectly definite way... and so forth.
The first of the "Nitze criteria" does not influence the development of the "McNamara instability" principle since even the most invulnerable defenses have a number of inherent weaknesses (this applies particularly to space-based components): the battle reserve and rate of fire of the different components of defensive systems are limited. Consequently, the defense capability could be saturated by way of a simple increase in offensive weapons.

The development of such "instability" could be stabilized by satisfaction of the second "Nitze criterion," which currently would seem extremely dubious. Indeed, as follows from the speeches of a number of former U.S. defense secretaries (R. McNamara, J. Schlesinger, H. Brown), the expected expenditure ratio is approximately 3:1 in favor of offensive missiles (that is, they are three times cheaper). The supporters of SDI hope that in the course of its realization it will be possible to find ways of creating extraordinarily inexpensive defensive weapons, which will satisfy the second "Nitze criterion".

Making the corresponding economic calculations is as yet premature, it would seem. Nonetheless, certain estimates of a general nature are possible even now. Let us examine the weapons which are being studied within the SDI program framework and compare the weight of the payload of a ballistic missile with the analogous weight of space-based components of a defensive system which is directly designated for missile destruction. Let us further assume that the main expenditure is the cost of putting the corresponding weight in space and disregard the cost of the payloads (an assumption favoring the defensive system). Finally, let us take it that the payload of a typical MIRV'd missile (that is, a missile with many independently targeted warheads) constitutes several tons.

Let us examine first of all the space-based hydrogen fluoride chemical laser—the most developed weapon within the SDI framework up to the present. As the estimates of many American and Soviet experts show, the supply of energy for each laser firing in order to ensure that the missile is hit in the boost phase of its trajectory has to constitute 200 megajoules. We would recall that defenses in this phase are the basic requirement of any ABM system.* Otherwise the assignment will be reduced merely to the protection of ground-based facilities basically by methods which were developed 20 years ago.

In the chemical laser the energy is released thanks to the "consumption" of the chemical fuel on board a space station. Estimates of the specific energy release of the hydrogen fluoride laser span quite a wide range: from 100 to 1,000 joules per gram of effective gas mixture. Despite this spread, a value of 100 joules per gram or 100 megajoules per ton would seem more realistic. This means that 2 tons of fuel would be spent per laser firing.

The components of a defensive system are to provide for the great dependability of the missiles' destruction. Proceeding from the "worst-case variant," the possibility of an occasional miss or insufficiently full destruction of a target has to be assumed. Whence the need to envisage and cater for the possibility of a triple firing at one and the same target.

* For more detail see MEMO No 11, 1985, pp 14-23.
Besides the fuel, other components (fuel tanks, the laser itself, the optical system, the guidance system, the maneuvering system and so forth) are deployed on the station whose weight is equal to at least the weight of the chemical fuel. If, however, the demands for ensuring the invulnerability of the battle station are considered, this ratio is at least doubled.

The entire contemporary "philosophy" of SDI is based on defense against a single, but full-scale attack. For this reason there can be no question of some depreciation of the equipment put into space—it is a single-acting system.

Thus, it transpires, to hit a single missile it is necessary to put in space as part of a battle station up to 18 tons of payload. But this is not yet all the outlays—the number of battle stations has to be considered also. In order to provide for the destruction of a missile launched from any point of the earth's surface at any time a substantial number of battle stations is essential since their range is limited, and the earth is spherical. The so-called "deficiency factor" defined by the relationship of the total number of stations to the number which may be employed at a given moment to destroy a target is inputted in this connection.

The minimum value of this factor for a range of destruction of 3,000 km (estimates show that this is a sufficiently sound indicator for the weapons), given the even distribution of launch pads over a territory, is of the order of 10. Consequently, in order to ensure the destruction of one missile it will be necessary to put approximately 200 tons of payload in space. We would recall that the payload of a missile is only several tons. A ratio manifestly not in favor of defense.

Let us turn to such weapons as, for example, charged particle accelerators or railguns. The huge power capacity necessary for their operation of the order of 1-10 gigawatts in one-tenth of a second cannot be secured either by space-based solar or nuclear power stations. The most natural path, seemingly, is connected with the advance storage of energy. But as yet the power capacitance of the storage tanks is small—a magnitude of 100 joules per gram would as yet seem quite a remote frontier. For this reason the conclusions arrived at for chemical lasers hold good in this case also, namely, the second "Nitzze criterion" is not fulfilled.

We should now examine the X-ray lasers triggered by a nuclear explosion, which do not require a heavy energy source. The mass of the laser itself is put at several tons, which is the equivalent of a missile payload.* It is not yet clear how a single explosion of a nuclear primer can provide for the destruction of several targets, that is, each laser will have to be "exchanged" for one missile.

The deployment in space of several thousand nuclear charges for destroying missiles in launch emasculates the whole idea of defense against nuclear weapons. For this reason the X-ray lasers are viewed merely in the "launch on warning"

system, for which it is contemplated putting them on submarines deployed in the
Indian Ocean or the Sea of Japan at a distance of 4,000-5,000 km from the areas
of Central Siberia—the potential missile launch zone.

With regard for the curvature of the earth's surface and the fact that X-ray
radiation is abruptly absorbed even in the upper strata of the atmosphere
it follows that the X-ray laser has to ascend to a considerably greater altitude
than the missile which it is to destroy, but it has to do this in a shorter
time since some time is spent on detection of the missile launch and on
communications with the submarine and laser-carrying rocket launch.
Consequently, the rocket carrying the laser into orbit has to develop a
greater speed and for this reason be of a greater launch mass than a
stationary ballistic missile. Whereas the typical launch mass of the latter
constitutes approximately 40-50 tons, the "laser" rocket may weigh several
hundred tons. Modern strategic submarines accommodate several dozen
conventional missiles, consequently, the number of "laser" rockets may be
computed in single figures. The "exchange" of one submarine for several
rockets is hardly an economically profitable transaction for defense.

Homing intercept missiles launched from a space battle station could be used
as weapons. The initial weight ratios here are in favor of defense, but two
factors remain on the side of the enemy: the possibility of the launch of a
large number of decoy missiles without a payload and a change in the nature
of deployment of the launch bases on its territory (increase in the
"deficiency factor"). More detailed calculations show that in this case also
the second "Nizite criterion" is not sustained, and by a wide margin, what
is more.

Finally, let us examine the defensive structure in which ground-based lasers
with space-based distributing and focusing mirrors are employed. It could be
that in this plan the condition of the second "Nizite criterion" would be met
and the first not since a mirror in space is considerably vulnerable.

So available estimates show that the "McNamara instability" will inevitably
be present in the version of a limited-efficiency unilateral defensive system.

More, the very nature of the SDI program brings about in this version one
further instance of "instability," which could provisionally be called
"cruise missile instability". The point being that the efficiency of its
contemplated components against different nuclear weapon delivery systems is
far from identical. One cannot escape the thought that this program is
aimed precisely against ICBM's—the basic component of Soviet strategic power.
The projected space system will be less efficient against low-flying missiles—
submarine launched and intermediate-range. It is possible that strategic
bombers will become vulnerable to a certain extent. And, finally, cruise
missiles of any type of basing and tactical nuclear weapons will prove to be
beyond the limits of the destructive effect (we would recall that the SDI
presupposes the space basing of the main components of the weapons). This
placement of emphases inevitably predetermines the reaction of the other side:
it will proceed toward the deployment of increasingly new cruise missiles of
a basing mode which takes into consideration the location of the opposed sides
to the greatest extent.
A further type of instability characteristic of the version of a unilateral limited defensive system is called "crisis instability". It could arise in a situation where there is an increased temptation for the side possessing a defensive system to launch a first, preemptive strike and hide behind the defensive system from the severely weakened retaliatory strike of the enemy. And in this case also it should be remembered that the efficiency of a defensive system is an enigma for everyone, including the side possessing such a system. Of course, the latter would be taking a considerable risk, which would grow even more if the other side switched to a "launch on notification" strategy (when the missiles are launched even before enemy missiles hit its territory).

Let us turn to the following possible version, when both sides have limited-efficiency defensive systems. The "instability" inherent in such a situation is connected with the vulnerability of space-based systems to an attack from the "double"—the defensive system of the other side. It would have to expend only a negligible proportion of its battle reserve for this.

Indeed, each battle station is designed to destroy approximately 1,000 enemy targets (missiles or warheads) at a distance of several thousand kilometers. In order to destroy its "opposite" from the other side's defensive system or, in the last resort, appreciably reduce the efficiency of his operations, approximately the same amount of energy would be required as is needed for destroying one missile. It further has to be considered that the battle stations move along well-known trajectories and that they could be within the field of vision quite a long time, while the distance between the facilities belonging to the opposite "flotillas" could prove not that great. These circumstances facilitate the task of destroying battle stations compared with destroying missiles.

So in a crisis situation the temptation to launch a preventive strike against the enemy's defensive system to limit his first-strike capability would be great.

Attention should also be called to the following fact. An attempt to satisfy the demand made by the first "Nitze criterion" would serve as a kind of trigger for a race in specific types of arms. In actual fact the creation of a defensive system by one side would give rise to the natural desire of the other to neutralize its efficiency. This could be accomplished primarily on the basis of special countermeasures. Guessing the reaction of the first side is not difficult—it would begin to develop "anticountermeasures". The subsequent moves are obvious also. The result would be an endless race for advantage accompanied by an increase in arms in space.

All that has been said above illustrates the proposition that insertion of limited-efficiency defensive components in the balance of strategic forces will eliminate the strategic equilibrium. The attempts to achieve if only a temporary state of equilibrium entail a buildup of strategic nuclear arsenals. By virtue of the specific instabilities inherent in defensive components, such an increase could continue as long as one wished, until the "interruption"—global nuclear war.
The question arises: a total defensive system is perhaps capable of changing this picture and creating an equilibrium based on new principles different from "mutual nuclear restraint"?

We would recall that the "mutual nuclear restraint" concept has a great dynamic range from the viewpoint of the correlation of the opposite sides' nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this determines the stability of the equilibrium also. The dynamic range is really very great. It is sufficient to recall that at the time of the Caribbean crisis the correlation of the numbers of nuclear warheads was roughly 20:1 in favor of the United States (according to American data). *

The "mutual guaranteed defense" concept, on the contrary, has no dynamic range, which attests an unstable equilibrium.

Let us illustrate this assertion in the example of hypothetical defensive systems with an efficiency close to 1.

The concept of 100-percent efficiency is some idealization inasmuch as efficiency depends on the level of development of technology, technical "breakthroughs" and so forth, and its value could change with the passage of time. For such hypothetical systems the strategic parameter is not efficiency itself \( \varepsilon \) but the system's penetrability \( \eta = 1 - \varepsilon \). As already observed above, the correlation \( \varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2 \), may be satisfied for a certain time, particularly if the possible asymmetry in the organization of the sides' defensive systems is considered. Let us suppose that at some moment \( \varepsilon_1 = 0.990 \), and \( \varepsilon_2 = 0.995 \). The degree of unbalance is slight, seemingly \( \Delta \varepsilon/\varepsilon = 1/200 \), but penetrability here would differ doubly. The said unstable condition is typical of the values \( \varepsilon \) close to 1, that is, of almost ideal defenses.

So defensive systems in any form thereof do not contribute to the establishment of stable strategic equilibrium: on the contrary, they will promote a rise in the level of strategic nuclear forces and initiate a space arms race. It is this which is causing disquiet in the world. But it is this aspect of the SDI program which is being ignored or glossed over by its supporters. True, the latter are reminiscent here of a chess player who, enamored of a move he has made, does not bother attempting to analyze the position on the board, if only for the next move.


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USSR'S KONOVALOV INTERVIEWED ON SDI BY CSSR PARTY JOURNAL

Prague TVORBA in Czech No 25, 1986 p 14

[Interview with Alexandr Alexandrovich Konovalov, chief-specialist on questions of military equipment at the Institute of the United States and Canada of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, by Oskar Krejci: "An Umbrella for Billions of Dollars"; in Prague at the beginning of June]

[Text] At the beginning of June, Alexandr Alexandrovich Konovalov, chief specialist on questions of military equipment at the Institute of the United States and Canada of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, visited our country at the invitation of the leadership of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and the Trade Union of Education and Science Employees. At the end of his stay in Prague, he provided the following interview for the readers of TVORBA.

[Question] Comrade Konovalov, one of the key factors which is currently making international relations worse is the American "Star Wars" project. How do you, as a technician and mathematician who has devoted himself to the problems of international politics for a long time, evaluate this project?

[Answer] In creating a system such as the "Star Wars" project, it is necessary to resolve an enormous number of extraordinarily difficult technical problems. Many of these appear to be insoluble not only at the current level of science and technology, but also from the standpoint of the foreseeable future. Let us take just one example. It is obvious that the "Star Wars" system can only be controlled through the use of computers, since the human brain will never be able to process such an immense flow of information in the necessary timeframe. From the standpoint of the project, it is also necessary in the space of a few tenths of a second to designate thousands of targets, carrying out aiming of the system, hit the targets being launched, and transmit information on the targets hit and those not hit to the next layer of the system so that this layer can continue to complete the task that the previous layer did not. Human intellect can never adapt to such a flow of information with the required speed. It is therefore necessary to control the system by computer. At this time, the biggest of the known systems is connected with the computer programs for the shuttle project and these programs contain around 3 million
instructions. As the Challenger accident showed, these programs are not perfect. In this case, information on the trouble with the rocket vehicle was passed to the central computer after lift-off, but it did not react properly. This does not mean that the computer or the program were bad. They were good ones, but such a combination of input information simply was not anticipated. According to American specialists, the program for "Star Wars" is supposed to contain some 100 million instructions. And where the programs for the shuttle project were fine-tuned for several years on earth, the program for "Star Wars" is supposed to work perfectly without any testing. To fine-tune it would require the launching of thousands of missiles and the testing as to whether all of them are destroyed are not. And this would be just for one combination of missile paths. Let us remember that in its accident the Challenger was confronted only with natural laws but the "Star Wars" project is also facing human intellect which is just as advanced as that which put together the "Star Wars" project.

The "Star Wars" project is a gigantic technical problem. Let us assume that it can be resolved from a technical standpoint. What about morality then? Do we want to live in a world where machines decide about the initiation of combat operations, carry them out, destroy their own makers, and do not consult with anyone? Is this really the world for which we have been striving and which we want to create in the future?

Today it is possible to say responsibly that the idea which President R. Reagan connected with the "Star Wars" project that with the aid of this space umbrella "all nuclear weapons would be made obsolete and unusable? can never be realized. It is possible to speak only about several variations of partial defense of important military installations. But this is no "umbrella", but a defense against a retaliatory strike after carrying out one's own attack against another party. The entire project is therefore highly destabilizing from the standpoint of the international situation.

[Question] As far as the military technical capabilities of this umbrella, some important American specialists, public officials, and politicians take the same skeptical position. Why then is the current administration of the USA putting so much effort into implementing the "Star Wars" project?

[Answer] This project is connected with ideas about political advantages for the ruling class and for the tradition of American power politics. But in my opinion, there are also no less important economic motives. Primarily, these are the relationships of the government to the military-industrial corporations. The plans for militarizing the nuclear triad and the plans for modernization of the general purpose forces with which R. Reagan came to the White House have basically been carried out. Enormous resources will be spent on them by the beginning of the 1990's. The military-industrial complex, which has an internally built-in tendency toward self-growth, needs a new plan. This plan has appeared and it is the "Star Wars" project. Just this plan should ensure the continued existence of the military-industrial corporations without any problems for 20 to 30 years into the future.
And then there is the matter of relations with their allies. By means of the "Star Wars" project, the Americans want to drag them into a firm military technical cooperation and create a certain organizational network. Within its framework, the allies in the first place will not be able to get ahead of the USA as economic competitors, since they will have their subordinate role. In the second place, the United States want to involve the intellectual potential of the other countries in working out their own military technical plans. They also know that such a large project can use up their scientific capabilities and not leave anything left over for other research. And finally there is the attempt to burden the economies of the socialist countries with new military expenditures. This is an effort which is not in keeping with the level of modern political thinking. To build policies today on breaking down the economies of other countries means to bury one's own future as well.

[Question] What kind of response are the Soviet peace initiatives, especially on the "Star Wars" project, getting among the American public and American politicians?

[Answer] According to public opinion polls, today already more than half of the population of the United States supports the Soviet proposals for a moratorium on nuclear testing. If we talk from the standpoint of forms of propaganda, then the struggle to stop nuclear testing is, however, more simple than propaganda against "Star Wars." In the United States, the "Star Wars" project is also given out to be a "defense initiative" under the very humanitarian label as a plan to protect people and the territory of cities whose goal is to make nuclear weapons obsolete and useless. This is an attractive slogan. The Soviet initiative of 15 January 1986 proposes the same result. However, it proposes achieving it in a much more rational, cheaper, simple, and forward-looking manner. We do not propose building a space umbrella like the Americans, which would cost billions of dollars and still it would not be clear whether it would work or not. As a specialist, I am moreover convinced that it would never work like the American representatives say it would. We propose making nuclear weapons obsolete and useless by doing away with them. Our proposal also shows possible specific stages in their abolition. I think that this proposal will have a constantly growing number of proponents because it is very clear, honorable, and understandable. The recent Soviet peace initiatives are so forward-looking, bold, and broad that their possible consequences are increasingly hard to hide from the public in the West, if it is possible at all.

The representatives of the Western countries have today gotten into a situation where they either prove their peaceful slogans with real actions or they demonstrate that they do not correspond to their actual policies. Recently in a television interview, the director of our institute, Academician G. Arbatov, said that we are living in a period of "political autumn" and the falling fig leaves of the peaceful slogans will reveal what the politicians in the West are trying to hide from the global public. Since today, when you want to call a warlike act peace you must give confirmation to this title by practical actions. And this is in a situation
where the United States has apparently taken a course of demolishing what was agreed upon in Geneva. And this is not being done through any kind of counterinitiative, but by attempts to divert the attention of public opinion from the basic problems and the danger of today's policies. They are increasing international tension in various areas of the world, for example, because of the action of the contras in Nicaragua, attacks on Libya, their warships are sailing into Soviet territorial waters, etc.

And what was the most important question to be covered at the meeting of the group of seven in Tokyo? It was not the question of nuclear war or even "Star Wars" but had to do with international terrorism. This is of course also a serious problem which it is necessary to resolve. But let us ask ourselves the question: is international terrorism in the American sense the greatest danger for that country?

[Question] In his television appearance after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, Comrade M. Gorbachev characterized this misfortune as still one more peal of the bell. About what danger is this bell primarily warning us?

[Answer] At the recent Second All-Union Scientific Conference on the Problems of Peace and the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Chairman of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR Academician A. Alexandrov spoke about the fact that we live in a world which is very complicated from the technical standpoint, where mistakes and unforeseen events can have very serious consequences. This is in relation to civil, peaceful technology. What then about the use of military technical force to resolve political problems? At the same time, on a continent such as Europe where there is a great concentration of population and industrial centers, the boundary between nuclear and conventional war is disappearing. And not just because the power of the so-called conventional weapons is approaching that of some nuclear weapons, but also because there are many atomic power plants in Europe and a hit on such a power plant with a non-nuclear shell can have consequences which are comparable to a nuclear explosion. War is not a means for resolving political conflicts. Massing weapons is the logic of yesterday, as was said at the 26th CPSU Congress. Security can be achieved only at the lowest level of military-political balance determined by the boundaries of reasonable sufficiency.

[Question] How would it be possible to define the responsibility of scientists at this time?

[Answer] Currently the responsibility of scientists is growing not only as far as participation in militaristic programs is concerned. The responsibility of scientists is also growing as people who can lay before the general public the correct expert evaluation of both a situation and also the possible political consequences of military technical projects. As never before, it is necessary for people of science to speak honorably and openly about the danger of the "Star Wars" project, as well as about all other plans for improving military equipment. Their role is also important
in casting light on the myth that military research is the generator of progress in research and development and that the country would necessarily fall behind economically without participation in military research projects. Analyses of the postwar decades show that military research in its totality has been a drag on progress in research and development.

Currently in Moscow preparations are being made for the international symposium "Science, Technology, and Peace", which is supposed to convene at the end of July under the sponsorship of the World Federation of Scientists. Here we will again have an opportunity to discuss in a broad, representative forum both the technical and the moral problems of the development of modern science and to demonstrate the responsible nature of the scientist before all humanity.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

IZVESTIYA: U.S. VIEWS SDI AS OFFENSIVE WEAPON

PM131802 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Melor Sturua "Rejoinder": "When Comparison Proves Everything"]

[Text] Comparisons prove nothing, according to the French, those matchless Cartesians who prefer skepticism to romanticism. That is true in most cases. However, there are exceptions. I would like to talk about one or, to be precise, about two such exceptions in this commentary.

The "star wars" program has as many advocates as it has contractors. The latter produce the lethal weapons to militarize outer space, whereas the former laud them, all but comparing them to an olive branch of peace. The orchestra of advocates is led by U.S. President Reagan himself, who claims that the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) will save mankind from nuclear Armageddon.

There are other advocates too -- the suitors for the hand of the laser-beam-weapon lady with the aspect of a mythological Medusa. In contrast to their chief, they do not disguise the nature of SDI, on the contrary, they stress it in the most unequivocal manner, using the most unequivocal comparisons.

The first comparison belongs to U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger: "If we have an effective SDI system that will definitely render the enemy's weapons impotent, we will again be in the position when we were the only country with nuclear weapons."

The second comparison is U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle's: "The decision to deploy SDI is comparable to former President Truman's decision to create the hydrogen bomb. If Truman had decided not to create the hydrogen bomb, the world today would be a completely different place. I think that we are now at a similar historically important turning point..."

Let us discuss these two comparisons. What do they have in common? First, a longing for lost military superiority and an ardent -- boundless -- desire to regain it. Weinberger is carried back by his dreams to the times of an atomic bomb monopoly, his younger assistant to the times of a hydrogen bomb monopoly. As is well-known, both were of very short duration. The Soviet Union restored military-strategic parity. It ought to be clear to the Pentagon comparison-fanciers, given that they are capable of learning lessons if only from the near past, that we will also find an appropriate response to SDI -- a response not necessarily commensurate in form but undoubtedly commensurate in content. The balance of military parity will not alter, although it will be raised to an even higher, truly cosmic level.
But let us now look at those comparisons in earnest, so to speak. It is far from coincidental that Weinberger compares SDI to the atomic bomb and that Perle compares it to the hydrogen bomb. These comparisons convincingly demonstrate that the "star wars" program is offensive rather than defensive in character and that it pursues the aim of creating a new kind of first-strike weapon, this time from outer space, rather than destroying nuclear weapons, as Reagan maintains.

The SDI laser "umbrella" bears the clear outlines of a nuclear mushroom cloud.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

SOVIET-DUTCH CONSULTATIONS--Moscow, 18 July (TASS)--On 14-16 July Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, participated in consultations at the Dutch Foreign Ministry on questions of international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space and on the agenda of the 41st UN General Assembly. This was made public here today. Vladimir Petrovskiy was received by Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van den Broek. During a detailed conversation they discussed a wide range of international problems of mutual interest. Aleksandr Blatov, Soviet ambassador to the Netherlands, participated in meetings. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2000 GMT 18 Jul 86 LD] /12858

TASS: FIRST INDUSTRIAL SDI LAB--San Francisco, 24 July (TASS)--The IRT Corporation of California is the first among U.S. private companies to start construction of a laboratory for testing components of a future ABM system with space-based elements under conditions closely resembling combat operations. The aim of the long-term program, according to IRT President Dennis Swift, is to test survivability of "Star Wars" electronic equipment under intense radiation in space and in a nuclear explosion destruction zone. Up to this time, such investigations were conducted on a small scale by federal laboratories in New Mexico, Maryland, and Tennessee. Involvement in them of a private corporation means the switchover to industrial footing of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" designed for a nuclear war. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1841 GMT 24 Jul 86 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1520
There seems to be a silver lining at last to President Reagan's strategic policy with Washington announcing its acceptance of a Soviet offer to resume negotiations on two fronts: banning of nuclear arms tests and Mr Reagan's decision to scrap the limits stipulated by Salt-II. While talks on a nuclear test ban were broken off six years ago, President Reagan announced his decision to opt out of Salt-II in May this year, alleging gross violation of the treaty by the Soviets. This softening in the US stand has not, however, been prompted by the opposition to the announcement regarding Salt-II among presidential aides or a new desire to salvage the efforts of four former Presidents to check the nuclear arms race. More mundane consideration about having to also win the other war, over propaganda, may have prevailed. Mr Gorbachyov, unlike his aged and staid predecessors at the Kremlin, correctly gauged the pulse of Third World nations and his socialist allies soon after he came to power and was quick to exploit their desire to see an end to the arms race and militarisation of poor nations. Moscow has since then shown a keen interest in disarmament, both in the conventional sphere and involving nuclear forces. To prove his good intention, Mr Gorbachyov even launched talks with individual nations of Nato, though to this he did not receive a favourable response. Then came his announcement of a unilateral ban on nuclear tests and the latest in the line is his plan to counter President Reagan's dream child, the Star Wars plan, with a "Star Peace" programme. Such efforts have been widely acclaimed by the six-nation group fighting for disarmament, of which India is a member, and not insignificant sections of the western public. Of late it has appeared as if Mr Reagan is the only leader advocating stockpiling and developing nuclear arms, with members of Nato becoming increasingly critical of his attitude, as was clear when he found no supporters of his decision to abandon Salt-II. (Even Sir Geoffrey Howe, representing Mrs Margaret Thatcher who at present is Washington's strongest ally, spoke out against the decision.)

The propaganda war has a domestic dimension also for Mr Reagan. After all, the euphoria over the invasion of Grenada has run its course and the air raids on Libya hardly received a favourable national reaction. It is time once again to refurbish the image of both the presidency and the nation. Another factor which has motivated Washington's decision is the fact that scrapping of Salt-II
would, in the long run, be harmful to US security. The accord prohibits the Soviets from increasing their total number of strategic missiles and bombers and limits land-based missiles with multiple warheads—the weapon most feared by Pentagon. And the Soviets are just two short of the limit. If the accord goes, so do all limitations and this could hardly be in the interest of Washington. After all, the four Presidents who negotiated a limit on strategic arms could not have done so because they trusted the Soviets or because they wanted to do Kremlin a favour. They pursued Salt for only one reason: because they believed it to be in the US security interest. In the light of these reasons, it is doubtful whether Washington and Moscow will be attending the proposed talks with the sole intention of rolling back the arms buildups but also with an eye on the gallery. That is not an ideal situation but better than not talking at all. For starts, the Soviets have proposed "cuts of one-third on both sides" arsenal of strategic nuclear missiles, provided the US limits its research on Star Wars to the laboratory. For Washington, this need not be too high a price to pay, for the time being at least. After one very preliminary test, which has been conducted, the developers can go back to the drawing boards for some time. When the need to conduct tests arises again then the strategy can be reconsidered.
The United States has not always been scrupulous about consulting its allies before taking actions that affect them. Thus it is heartening that President Ronald Reagan dispatched disarmament ambassadors Paul Nitze and Edward Rowny to discuss his proposed response to Mikhail Gorbachev's letter of last month with NATO nations including Canada, as well as Japan.

This is the way the NATO alliance should always work. Disarmament and world peace are too important to be left in the hands of the superpowers alone.

The most important part of the U.S.-Soviet exchange has to do with the relationship between strategic defence and the reduction of offensive intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It has long been a U.S. and Western aim to engage the Soviets in a discussion of this vital question.

From the inception of the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI or Star Wars), the official Washington line has been that it won't drop this project even in return for Soviet agreement to large ICBM cuts. But Washington has usually made a distinction between research on the one hand and development and deployment on the other. The first is permitted by the 1972 ABM treaty. The others are not.

Gorbachev's latest proposal suggests that the ABM treaty be strengthened as part of a reduction agreement so that neither side would deploy additional ABM weapons for a minimum period of some 15 years. The latest known version of the proposed U.S. reply — doubtless discussed during Rowny's low-key visit to Ottawa Wednesday — is intriguing. It's also vintage Reagan.

In brief, the U.S. would offer a five-to-seven-year delay in deploying ABM defences, in return for Soviet agreement to mutual testing and development of SDI components during that period. The present six-month notice of withdrawal from the ABM treaty would be extended to five years, and even seven, if the Soviets agreed to discuss sharing ABM technologies — an offer in the original Reagan Star Wars speech.

At one time some people thought that SDI was really a bargaining chip to be given away in exchange for Soviet concessions on deep strategic cuts. It's now evident that wasn't so.

Only after further research determines the feasibility of developing an effective ABM system will a decision be required about deployment. Now the U.S. is prepared to make that a joint decision. This may be too much for the skeptical Soviets to swallow all at once.

Nevertheless the latest superpower proposals could lead to productive bilateral arms control negotiations for the first time in recent years. And that, in turn, could virtually guarantee that elusive second summit between Reagan and Gorbachev.
SOVIET COLONEL VIEWS IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. SALT STANCE

PM300918 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jul 86 Second Edition p 5

[Colonel A. Nesterov article: "Where This Could Lead"]

[Text] The world public, perturbed by the White House's announcement of its refusal to fulfill the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II treaty, is asking: Where could this lead?

The answer is evident: Whereas fully defined limitations on U.S. and USSR strategic offensive arms have existed hitherto, now all barriers blocking the path of the arms race are being eliminated. Specifically, there will be no limitations on the total number of strategic delivery vehicles, the number of MIRVed strategic delivery vehicles, the number of warheads on each ABM and SLBM type, and the number of cruise missiles on heavy bombers. Nor will there by any qualitative limitations at all on strategic offensive arms and their modernization, as envisaged by SALT II.

The question of how the Pentagon intends to make practical use of its refusal to observe agreements that have proved their worth has been considered at length by the U.S. press for some time now. It is being pointed out that the main efforts will now be directed toward the mass deployment of long-range cruise missiles of all baring modes; the fitting of the entire pool of heavy bombers with such missiles; the replacement of "Minuteman-2" missiles (with one warhead) by "Minuteman-3" missiles (with three warheads); the development [razrabotka] of "Midgetman," another new type of mobile ABM, in addition to the MX missile; and the utilization of other opportunities for unrestricted buildup of its nuclear arms. In other words, the repudiation of the agreements by the White House gives the green light to an uncontrolled arms race along all avenues and undermines strategic stability.

Nor is this the full extent of the negative consequences stemming from the demolition of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II treaty. Agreements on the most complex questions in the sphere of international security, which had previously seemed insoluble, were reached for the first time in the seventies. A legal treaty basis was laid for the first time, regulating the activity of states in the sphere of strategic arms and helping the elaboration of new and even more radical steps toward the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. In the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms -- a component of the SALT II treaty -- the sides pledged in particular to pursue significant, not only quantitative but also qualitative, reductions of strategic offensive arms on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.
The U.S. departure [vykhod] from the SALT treaties will mark the beginning of the destruction of the system of treaties and agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, which was created with such difficulty. The degree of mistrust will rise sharply, undermining the stability of international relations still further. While the task of arms limitation is already exceptionally complex, in future it will be even more complicated.

The following question arises in the prevailing situation: What attitude should be adopted toward the U.S. Administration's thesis that SDI will save the world from nuclear weapons? The U.S. President's repudiation of SALT I and SALT II clearly shows that this thesis is just a propaganda bluff. In reality, the United States is striving to create [sozdavat] space-strike weapons and build up strategic offensive weapons simultaneously. Convincing evidence of this is provided by the 1981 "all-embracing strategic program" and the 1983 so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" adopted by the U.S. Administration.

Having launched the programs in question and then abandoned the pledges given in the strategic arms limitation sphere, the Reagan administration has virtually obtained a free hand in the sphere of creating [sozdaniye] a strategic offensive "sword" and a defensive space "shield," whose purpose is not to eliminate nuclear weapons but to build them up still further and to create [sozdat] the potential for a nuclear first strike.

These U.S. actions certainly cannot be ignored, and the Soviet Union will take the necessary measures to prevent disruption and to preserve the military-strategic parity. But this parity will be at a higher and more dangerous level.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries are against such a development of events. They are in favor of proceeding along the path of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons while preserving everything positive that has been achieved in the strategic arms limitation sphere. In the communiqué of the 10-11 June Budapest conference of the Political Consultative Committee, the Warsaw Pact states confirmed their commitment to treaties and agreements in the arms limitation and disarmament sphere and persistently called on the United States to observe rigorously the agreements on the limitation of strategic arms.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1518
SALT/START ISSUES

TASS MILITARY WRITER ON U.S. 'UNDERMINING' OF ACCORDS

LD071651 Moscow TASS in English 1618 GMT 7 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow August 7 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

It has now become perfectly evident that, upon having announced its decision in May 1982 not to take actions which would undermine the unratified Soviet-U.S. Salt-2 treaty, the Reagan administration had never intended to observe the obligation.

The meaning of that step by Washington was to try to convince the world public opinion of the U.S. Administration's "peaceful intentions" and at the same time, without firmly committing itself, to get an opportunity to realize claims to military superiority.

Fred Ikle, U.S. undersecretary of defence, had once stated in a moment of frankness that the arms control treaties suited the United States only in the part which concerned limitations for the other side and that they should be immediately discarded as soon as they begin to hinder the United States from building up its own military arsenals.

In 1986 the United States was confronted with the alternative of either stopping the deployment of cruise missiles on strategic bombers above the 'ceiling' established under the SALT-2 treaty or to abandoning the treaty.

In such conditions Washington without hesitation declared the SALT-2 treaty to be defunct.

The U.S. Administration's assurances about its commitment to the idea of reducing arms through international accords proved mendacious from beginning to end at the very first practical check-up.

Finalizing the course started in 1981 towards undermining the accords aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war, the U.S. Administration is now trying to present the process of reducing arms through talks as a propaganda competition. Not more than that.

Official spokesman of Washington try to prove that by violating the existing treaties the United States ostensibly wants to create a new arms control pattern which would be based on maximum restraint without any formal agreements.

Edward Djerejian, deputy press secretary of the White House, stated recently that the United States would not deploy more strategic weapons' delivery systems or strategic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.
Several days later the U.S. NUCLEAR TIMES magazine reported the U.S. Administration's decision to deploy additionally 13,000 nuclear warheads in the coming ten years.

No one can guarantee that the Pentagon would not demand soon that the number of nuclear munitions in U.S. arsenals be trebled.

The "concept of restraint" which Washington is now suggesting in place of the arms limitation treaties being violated by it inspire still less confidence than Reagan's 1982 declaration about his determination not to undercut the SALT-2 treaty.

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CSO: 5200/1518
SOVIET GEN CHERVOV INTERVIEWED ON IMPORTANCE OF SALT ACCORDS

AU131144 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 11 Aug 86 p 6

[Interview with USSR's Colonel General Nikolay Chervov by APN correspondent V. Morozov: "Why Does the American Government Want To Destroy SALT II? Betting 'On Superiority" -- first paragraph is paper's introduction]

[Text] Until recently, the American Government tried in all possible ways to conceal the steps it was taking to torpedo the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of strategic weapons, SALT I and SALT II, documents constituting an exceptionally important factor regarding maintaining the two countries mutual military-strategic balance. In Washington they have now come to the conclusion that the time has come for an overt attack on SALT II. In this connection, V. Morozov, APN's military observer, asked Soviet military expert, Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, for an interview.

[Morozov] Previous American Governments stated that SALT II corresponds to American interests. Why does the current government assert the contrary?

[Chervov] SALT II undoubtedly corresponds to the security interests of the Soviet Union as well as the United States. In his time, President Carter stressed that it was "the most important step ever taken to establishing control of nuclear weapons," and that the rejection of SALT II would be a "heavy blow to peace and the security of the United States." Despite that, in the discussions about the ratification of the treaty in the United States those forces that opposed detente and were pushing for increased military potential and strategic superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union gained the upper hand. As it is known, SALT II enshrines strategic parity between the USSR and the United States. In so doing it has become an obstacle for these forces.

The American refusal to ratify SALT II, which stood in the way of the Pentagon's new armament plans, untied the hands of the treaty's opponents. This was tellingly revealed in the so-called strategic program proclaimed by the United States on 2 October 1981.

Realization of this program is now approaching a stage when Washington is obliged to choose to either continue the path of increasing the arms buildup or observe SALT II. The White House has decided to reject SALT II. It has declared that SALT II is a "bad treaty," because its stipulations allegedly cannot be verified, and thus it is impossible to limit offensive nuclear weapons. There is not a speck of truth in these assertions, however.

[Morozov] What concrete things have SALT I and SALT II brought regarding limitation of strategic armament?
[Chervov] First -- they qualitatively limited the strategic offensive weapons of both sides. The overall number of strategic carriers (ICBM's, ballistic missiles on submarines, and heavy bombers) was not permitted to exceed 2,250 units. In addition, the number of warheads of each ICBM and of ballistic missiles on submarines, and of cruise missiles carried by heavy bombers was limited, and it was forbidden to build additional stationary launching facilities for ICBM's.

After signing the treaty the USSR dismantled 72 launching facilities for ICBM's and 21 heavy bombers. [paragraph continues]

On the basis of the time-limited SALT I and SALT II treaties, it dismantled a total of 540 carriers of strategic weapons, and the United States dismantled 168 carriers.

Thus the accords did function and they very effectively slowed down the race in strategic offensive weapons.

Second -- it is important that for the first time an agreement was achieved on the most complex issues of international security, which seemed insoluble before. A contractual-legal basis was created, which regulated the activity of states in the sphere of strategic armament. In a joint communiqué, the two sides noted that the signing of the aforementioned treaties is a practical step on the path of ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war, and corresponds to the vital interests not only of the Soviet and American people, but of all nations of the world. The USSR values the SALT I and SALT II treaties as stages in the preparation of new, more far-reaching agreements on the limitation of nuclear weapons. One can say without exaggeration that SALT I and SALT II had a beneficial effect on the overall creation of the international climate.

[Morozov] What is the situation regarding verification of observance of the treaties?

[Chervov] During the elaboration of SALT II, individual stipulations were always formulated taking into regard the verifiability of their observance by national technical means.

In cases where it was necessary one also worked out additional measures aimed at strengthening verification functions. The current American assertion about the alleged inadequate verifiability of SALT II is nothing more than an expression of the negative attitude of the United States toward the observance of the treaty, which stands in the way of new American military programs, and therefore the White House rejects it.

[Morozov] President Reagan has stated that the United States will show restraint regarding the proliferation of its strategic offensive weapons, and calls on the USSR to respond in the same manner. What can you say about this?

[Chervov] The President promises that in exchange for SALT II, worked out on the basis of equality and equal security, the United States will allegedly not build more "strategic nuclear transportation systems" than the Soviet Union, or more "warheads for ballistic strategic missiles," that is, only warheads for ICBM's and ballistic missiles for submarines. As you see, here the American President does not mention with a single word the parity in the number of nuclear missiles launched from heavy bombers. It is precisely here that he wants to achieve at least a three-fold superiority, without giving the Soviet Union the right to compensate for this imbalance by ballistic missiles, which are the basic Soviet means of strategic defense. Neither does he speak about cruise missiles launched from naval vessels. The United States intends to have
several thousand of these. He is also silent about American intermediate-range missiles in Europe, which -- so far as USSR territory is concerned -- are strategic weapons. What is all this talk about restraint then? The Soviet Union has always been in favor of restraint on the basis of mutuality. What R. Reagan proposes under the mantle of "restraint" is miles away from real restraint.

[Morozov] The Pentagon is rapidly realizing all its armament programs, and is strengthening its nuclear potential qualitatively and quantitatively.

[Chervov] Yes. The first MX ICBM's, of which there are to be 100 altogether, have already been deployed in combat positions. Each one carries 10 warheads. [paragraph continues]

There are in preparation new Trident-2's, B-1b heavy bombers and Stealth bombers, and the latest strategic cruise missiles, and there are under development various offensive space weapons, new nuclear projectiles (the program provides for 17,000 units), binary chemical weapons and so forth. This, then, is supposed to be that "restraint"?

Washington is incapable -- if we forget the propaganda zigzagging -- of giving a serious answer to these two simplest of questions: What does the United States propose in place of the SALT II treaty? How does the American Government intend to conduct the talks in Geneva under the conditions of the destruction of the process of the limitation of strategic armament?

Washington is grasping at the vision whereby the unleashing of new arms races will economically weaken the USSR and, since the USSR is allegedly more interested in talks on the limitation of weapons than the United States, one can put pressure on it with the objective of gaining unilateral advantages.

Outwardly, these "propositions" of the American Government seem logical. In reality they are a profound mistake, however. The U.S. attempts to undermine military parity are illusory. If SALT II provisions limiting the number of missile launching facilities and warheads cease to be valid, the Soviet Union will have more possibilities for developing its strategic forces -- and this within a short time. That, however, is not our choice. The USSR favors halting the arms race. Washington's betting on achieving unilateral superiority is doomed to fail; it will not bring the United States greater security, precisely the opposite. It will increase the risk of war and will reduce its own security as well as the security of the other NATO states.

Washington continues to think in the old categories -- expanding the arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons, militarizing outer space, and striving for world hegemony with military force. But the USSR has enough will and determination not to permit anyone to speak the language of force with it. It has everything it needs to prevent the existing military-strategic equilibrium from being upset. There is only one sensible road: One has to conduct equal, mutually acceptable negotiations and refrain from all steps that undermine all that has been achieved at the meeting at the highest level in Geneva.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1518
SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: PRESS CONFERENCE ON JULY EXTRAORDINARY SCC SESSION

U.S. 'Misinterprets' Results

LD041259 Moscow TASS in English 1244 GMT 4 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow August 4 TASS -- In recent days spokesmen for the U.S. Administration came forward with statements which misinterpret the course of the work and results of the extraordinary session of the Soviet-U.S. Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), the session which we held in Geneva from July 22 to 30, stated Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He spoke at the military's Press Centre at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists here today.

"During the session", the Soviet Ministry's spokesman said, "the Soviet delegation emphasized that the U.S. Administration's decision to abandon further adherence to the SALT-I Interim Agreement and the SALT-2 treaty would entail extremely dangerous consequences.

That decision is aimed at upsetting the military-strategic balance and leads to an uncontrolled and predictable arms build-up, to an increased threat of nuclear confrontation, and to higher international tension. "The fact is that, as the treaty obligations enter into conflict with the realisation of new U.S. military programmes, the United States unilaterally relieves itself of the obligations, thereby opening the floodgate for an uncontrolled arms race, putting the security of all countries in jeopardy.

"The entire course of the SCC's extraordinary session," Gennadiy Gerasimov emphasised, "confirmed the validity of the concern expressed by the Soviet side over the U.S. Administration's decision to abandon the Interim Agreement and the SALT-2 treaty".

"It is necessary that the U.S. side seriously weigh all the consequences of its decision and take effective measures which would make it possible to stop the process of breaking up the treaty system for restraining the nuclear arms race", the Soviet Foreign Ministry's spokesman pointed out.

U.S. Stance Criticized

PM061036 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 4
[TEXT report: "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"

[Text] At a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center on 4 August, G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry
Information Administration, gave information on the extraordinary session of the Soviet-U.S. Standing Consultative Committee held in Geneva the other day. It was convened on a proposal from the Soviet Union in connection with the U.S. Administration's decision to abandon observance of the Interim Agreement (SALT I) and the SALT II treaty.

During the session the Soviet delegation stressed that the afore mentioned U.S. Administration decision was fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. It is leading to an unchecked and unpredictable arms buildup and an intensification of international tension. The U.S. side's attention was drawn to the fact that the U.S. abandonment of the Interim Agreement and the SALT II treaty seriously complicates the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms. How can Washington talk about its desire for reductions in offensive arsenals when it is abandoning its existing treaty commitments regarding quantitative and qualitative limitations on those armaments. At the Standing Consultative Committee session the Soviet delegation also expressed its serious concern with regard to the fact that the U.S. lines of abandoning treaty commitments could jeopardize the ABM Treaty, which is the foundation of the entire strategic arms limitation process.

The United States hardly answered a single question about the negative consequences of the step it has taken. Instead of a substantive discussion, the U.S. delegation at the Standing Consultative Committee issued comments on a certain "system of restraint" [rezhim sderzhannosti] that would in fact serve to cover up the arms race being conducted by the United States and in those avenues Washington considered advantageous. If the United States does want to "restrain" something it is only the development of those types of Soviet strategic arms through which the USSR could compensate for U.S. attempts to undermine strategic parity.

An assessment was made of the U.S. President's recent message to Congress, which openly states that the United States will soon start production of binary chemical weapons and indicates the Washington administration's intention to deploy these mass destruction weapons in Europe. It was noted that this statement, which attests to the U.S. leaders' reluctance to take into account the essence of the Soviet-U.S. Geneva accords and ignores the will and interests of the people of Europe, initiates a new round in the chemical arms race.

A number of other problems of current policy were touched upon and answers were given to journalists' questions.

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CSO: 5200/1518
TASS ANNOUNCEMENTS OF MISSILE TEST IN PACIFIC

Warning Announcement

LD091723 Moscow TASS in English 1715 GMT 9 Aug 86

["Booster Rocket Launches -- TASS Announcement" -- TASS headline]

[Text] [no dateline as received] -- Booster rockets will be launched in the Soviet Union from August 12 to 22, 1986 into the regions of the Pacific Ocean, limited by:

The circumference with the radius of 10 nautical miles, centered in latitude 15 degrees 30 minutes north and longitude 177 degrees 00 minutes east;

The trapezium with the vertexes in latitude 31 degrees 00 minutes north and longitude 175 degrees 30 minutes east, latitude 24 degrees 00 minutes north and longitude 173 degrees 00 minutes east, latitude 31 degrees 00 minutes north and longitude 173 degrees 30 minutes east.

TASS has been authorized to state that the Government of the USSR, in order to ensure safety, requests the governments of other nations, which use sea and air routes in the Pacific, to instruct corresponding authorities so that ships and aircraft do not enter these regions and the air space above them daily from 6 a.m. to 7 p.m. local time. [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1645 GMT on 9 August transmits this identical announcement providing the Russian for booster rockets as "Rakety-nositeli"]

Tests Over

LD121347 Moscow TASS in English 1331 GMT 12 Aug 86

["TASS Report" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 12 TASS -- In connection with the end of the planned launches of carrier rockets, TASS is authorized to state that the areas of the Pacific Ocean limited:

First, by a circle with a radius of 110 nautical miles and with the centre having the coordinates of 15 degrees 30 minutes of northern latitude and 177 degrees 00 minutes of eastern longitude.

Second, by a trapezoid with the following coordinates of the vertexes: 31 degrees 00 minutes of northern latitude and 175 degrees 30 minutes of eastern longitude, 24
degrees 00 minutes of northern latitude and 177 degrees 00 minutes of eastern longitude, 24 degrees 00 minutes of northern latitude and 173 degrees 00 minutes of eastern longitude, 31 degrees 00 minutes of northern latitude and 173 degrees 30 minutes of eastern longitude.

That were announced on August 9, 1986, are free for navigation and flights starting from August 13, 1986.

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CSO: 5200/1518
SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: COMMENTS ON U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBER PLANS

ALCM's on B-52's

LD150642 Moscow TASS in English 0625 GMT 15 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 15 TASS - Washington's decision to stop abiding by Soviet-U.S. strategic offensive arms limitation agreements in the future has been prompted by its desire to have its hands untied to carry out the so-called comprehensive strategic program for America's re-armament in full and thereby upset the existing strategic military parity between the USSR and the United States to give itself an advantage, the newspaper "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" said today.

It pointed to crash U.S. efforts to modernize and build up all legs of the strategic "triad" and give these weapons first "crippling" nuclear strike capability.

The paper mentioned, in particular, work continuing to re-fit B-52 bombers to enable them to carry long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's). The United States has also launched the full-scale manufacture of new B-18 supersonic heavy bombers and plans to have 100 such planes by 1989.

Busy work is under way to develop a Stealth advanced technology bomber (ATB) and the U.S. Air Force Strategic Command plans to have 130 of them by the mid-90's.

The Pentagon attaches a prominent place in its adventurist plans to gain military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization to a new nuclear-tipped air cruise missiles (ACM) being developed to be substantially superior to the present ALCM for its combat performance characteristics. Some 1,500 new missiles are to be produced within the next several years. U.S. strategic aviation is to phase in some 3,200 long-range nuclear cruise missiles by the early 1990s.

"KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" also mentioned Pentagon plans, which came to public knowledge recently, to develop and buy 1,900 nuclear air-to-surface SRAM-2 short-range attack missiles for strategic bombers, which in the 1990's will replace the SRAM systems now in service. The new missiles will be more accurate and reliable and have better performance characteristics.

Even this far from complete data leaked into the press, the paper said, shows incontrovertibly that the Reagan administration, renouncing further compliance with the SALT-2 treaty, is out to achieve military superiority over the USSR.

39
Stealth Program

PM081401 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Aug 86 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent G. Vasilyev report under the rubric "Behind the Scenes": "The 'Furtive' Bomber"]

[Text] New York, 6 Aug -- The "Stealth" bomber invariably figures among the sinister arsenal of sophisticated types of arms whose production is being started up by the American administration. The word "stealth" means "sly," "furtive," "like a thief."

According to the Pentagon's plans, because of its configuration and because of being equipped with every possible electronic device, this plane will be imperceptible on radar screens, which will enable it to penetrate enemy territory "like a thief in the night."

Life will undoubtedly once again thwart the calculations of those who cherish the impossible dream of wrecking the military-strategic parity and forging ahead through technical innovations. But the Stealth bomber has already justified its name, without having come into service. It is cleaning out the Americans' purses, and doing this in a truly furtive way, like a thief in the night.

As the press here writes, appropriations for the Stealth bomber are "invisible" in every sense. Even the congressmen and senators examining the new U.S. military budget do not know what resources are allocated to the program and how much the militarists' new "toy" will cost. These figures are concealed from the legislators on the pretext that the work is top secret. In Pentagonese, such programs are called "black." In voting for the new budget, the members of Congress can only rack their brains over the meaning of poetical titles like "hazel branch" and "dreamland," which cover up such programs.

The quantity and volume of coded military programs is rapidly growing. Whereas in the present administration's 1st year appropriations for such programs totaled $892 million, in the budget for fiscal 1987 they will amount to $8.6 billion. Theoretically, all this takes place in the interests of military secrecy. In fact the "invisible programs" have become one method by which the U.S. military-industrial complex gets funds out of the Congress.

As for the Stealth bomber, despite its "invisibility" and secrecy, its cost has become known. According to Congressman M. Synar from Oklahoma, each new Pentagon machine will cost the Americans $600 million -- twice what the long-range B-1B bomber, now in production, costs.

Secrecy on F-19 Crash

LD091356 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0902 GMT 9 Aug 86

[Text] San Francisco, 9 Aug (TASS)--TASS correspondent Yuriy Ustimenko reports:

A huge black spot of burnt soil -- this is all that reminds one of the recent catastrophe in the mountains of the district of Kern in California where the Pentagon's highly secret aircraft F-19 (Lat) had an accident and crashed. For almost 1 month the
region was being combed by special detachments of the Air Forces that gathered up and took away all debris. Only after that had been done were the sentries and patrols that formed a cordon removed. The authorities took every measure to ensure that the world did not learn about what had happened in this place.

At the Pentagon they refuse to even acknowledge the very fact of the existence of the F-19 fighter, which, according to press information, is constructed in such a manner as to make it as difficult as possible to discover by radar, and is intended for carrying out "special operations" above the territory of other countries. It has also become known that this type of aircraft has been developed for 10 years now. The funds for the program come from the Pentagon's secret budget, noted the television company NBC. The U.S. military department is taking every possible measure in order to surround its operations with a cloak of secrecy, perhaps the densest since the creation of the atomic bomb, NBC emphasized.

According to a report by the news agency UPI, the findings of the commission carrying out research into the catastrophe in Kern "will never be made public."

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CSO: 5200/1518
BRIEFS

TASS: B-1 TESTS IN CANADA--Ottawa, 24 July (TASS)--According to the
Pentagon's plans, test flights of the U.S. strategic bomber B-1 at a low
altitude will be made in the northern districts of Alberta Province in
June 1987. According to a report in the newspaper CALGARY HERALD these
tests in which B-52 strategic bombers and F-111 fighter bombers will also
be used, will be held in the framework of the "Global Shields" joint
military exercises in the north of Canada. The aim of the tests is to
verify the efficiency of the Canadian antiaircraft defenses and also to
establish the ecological consequences of the flights of supersonic bombers
at a low altitude. It is characteristic that the government of Alberta
Province learned about the plans of the U.S. military from the newspaper's
report. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2231 GMT 23 Jul 86 LD] /12858

TASS ON HOUSE MX VOTE--Washington, 12 August (TASS)--The U.S. House of
Representatives has voted in favor of retaining the 1987 draft military
budget allocations for the purchase of intercontinental MX missiles. The
administration's plans to build an arsenal of these "first-strike potential"
missiles have sparked off numerous protests throughout the country and inside
U.S. Congress. Nevertheless, from the outset of debates on the draft
military budget, the House rejected by a majority the amendments calling
for abandoning further purchases of MX missiles. The House military budget
option provides for the allocation of funds for buying 12 MX missiles. Last
week, the Senate voted in favor of acquiring 21 missiles, each armed with
ten nuclear warheads. The House-Senate Conference Committee will have to
find a compromise option. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0625 GMT
12 Aug 86 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1518
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET REPORTS ON END OF U.S.-SOVIET TEST BAN TALKS

Broad Range of Issues

LD312240 Moscow TASS in English 2156 GMT 31 Jul 86

[Text] Geneva August 1 TASS -- Soviet-American talks on the problem of ending nuclear weapons tests have closed here. The talks cover the whole range of control issues and of outlining ways towards total renunciation of nuclear testing. Broad discussions and a detailed exchange of views have been held. Both sides intend to meet again Geneva early in September 1986 after the break announced on August 1 for a further study of the issues under discussion.

September Resumption Planned

LD041657 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1555 GMT 4 Aug 86

[From the "Novosti" program]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. talks on ending nuclear weapons tests ended in Geneva today. The talks covered the whole range of issues of monitoring and defining means of complete abandonment of nuclear tests. The sides intend to meet again in Geneva at the beginning of September 1986.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1517
IZVESTIYA CITES U.S. ADMIRAL ON TOMAHAWK DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

PM080744 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent S. Agafonov dispatch: "Rear Admiral's Revelations; Japanese News Agency on U.S. Tomahawk Deployment Schedule"]

[Text] Tokyo -- The superiority syndrome -- that is increasingly the diagnosis for the Washington administration. Its manifestations are different but always equally dangerous. Japanese newspapers have been devoting their front pages to it.

Specifically, it is a question of the Pentagon's wide-ranging plans to equip the U.S. Navy with Tomahawk cruise missiles. This, to put it bluntly, is not a new topic. Deployment of sea-launched Tomahawks began in June 1984. However, this is the first time that specific facts about the deployment schedule for Tomahawks with nuclear warheads and about the genuine aims of the Pentagon's new naval doctrine, which has previously been alluded to, have appeared in the press.

Japan's JIJI news agency has disseminated a SHORTHAND REPORT OF THE SECRET HEARINGS ON MILITARY ISSUES OF A U.S. CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEE. [Previous passage published in boldface] Rear Admiral Hostettler, leader of the comprehensive cruise missile building program, gave evidence to the legislators.

According to him, the military department plans to equip 198 U.S. Navy warships with nuclear-armed Tomahawks by the mid-nineties. The specific breakdown by type of ship is as follows:

Some 91 surface ships will receive nuclear-armed Tomahawks, including 4 battleships, 5 nuclear-powered missile cruisers, 22 conventionally powered missile cruisers, 31 destroyers, and 29 missile destroyers, as well as 107 submarines, including 39 nuclear strike submarines.

In the current fiscal year, JIJI writes, citing the rear admiral's statement, nuclear-armed Tomahawks will enter service with 8 surface ships and 15 submarines, as a result of which the total number of naval nuclear-armed cruise missile platforms will double in comparison with the existing level.

Those are the figures. But they are not the only rich vein in the shorthand record that reached the Japanese newspapers. Rear Adm Hostettler also talked about the targeted thrust of the Tomahawk operation.
After completing Tomahawk deployment, the United States — so he put it — will have 198 nuclear attack platforms, which will "significantly increase our operational nuclear deterrence capability." But is it a question of deterrence? The rear admiral stated bluntly that the Tomahawks will "considerably expand the number of targets on Soviet territory we will be able to strike." Hostettler's comments are exhaustively frank and need no addition. [paragraph continues]

There is no doubt about the diagnosis in this instance — the same old superiority syndrome, pursuit of nuclear advantage, and gambling on strength.

Only one question remains unanswered: why such acute attention to the Tomahawks in Japan? This was answered by the newspaper YOMIURI, which quoted J. Lehman, U.S. secretary of the Navy: Forecasting future conflict situations, he noted that in the event of war half of the sea-launched Tomahawks would be deployed in the Pacific region — which means in direct proximity to Japan, if not actually in its ports.

And yet another fact in conclusion. On 24 August, a U.S. squadron led by its flagship the battleship New Jersey — which has already been equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles — will enter the U.S. Navy Sasebo base in Japan for a week's visit. Who will guarantee that the New Jersey's missiles are nonnuclear?

/12858
CSO: 5200/1519
TASS: U.S. TO SUPPLY NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO BRITISH RHINE ARMY

LD271641 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0710 GMT 27 Jul 86

[Text] London, 27 July (TASS)—Representatives of the British Government and the NATO high command are holding secret talks on equipping the British Rhine Army with new U.S. W-79 nuclear warheads. The OBSERVER reports that the United States developed this warhead in accordance with the decision of the autumn session of the NATO nuclear planning group at defense minister level at Montebello in 1983 on modernizing battlefield nuclear weapons. According to U.S. plans, the warhead should be taken into their arsenals by the British, Belgian and Turkish Armed Forces before 1992.

The OBSERVER notes that not even national parliaments have been informed about the talks that are taking place on this matter. The reason for such high secrecy is the Reagan administration’s fear of raising a mass protest movement in the North Atlantic bloc countries, as was the case after the NATO decision to site cruise and Pershing-2 first strike nuclear missiles in the territory of a number of West European countries.

The new U.S. warhead, the newspaper points out, could easily be turned into a neutron projectile. As is well known, the United States attempted back at the end of the seventies to impose neutron weapons on its West European allies. Under pressure from public opinion in the countries of Western Europe it was, however, forced to give up the deployment of these barbarous weapons. In order to avoid causing a fresh storm of indignation, the Pentagon is planning to bring these warheads into Europe as normal nuclear ones. They can easily be transformed into neutron weapons. The weapons will be situated in U.S. territory and brought into Western Europe only in the event of a so-called crisis situation.

According to the newspaper’s information the W-79 warheads are by no means the only new nuclear weapon to have been developed by the United States under the NATO program to modernize battlefield nuclear weapons. Nuclear shells of the class W-83 for 155-mm howitzers, air-based cruise missiles, surface-to-surface missiles with a range of about 500 km, and portable atomic mines also belong to this category.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1519
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS ALLEGES U.S. BRINGS NUCLEAR ARMS INTO JAPAN

LD301356 Moscow TASS in English 1305 GMT 30 Jul 86

[Text] Tokyo July 30 TASS — TASS correspondent Sergey Logachev reports:

There exists a secret arrangement between the governments of the United States and Japan not to regard U.S. nuclear-armed ships' calls at Japanese ports as the bringing of nuclear weapons into the country's territory. This is pointed out by Edwin Reishauer, former ambassador of the United States in Tokyo, in his memoirs entitled "My Life Between Japan and America". The memoirs have been published in the United States.

It is not the first time that Mr. Reishauer comes forward with exposures which snatch the ground from under the Japanese Goovernment which maintains that the established system of the so-called preliminary consultations between Tokyo and Washington fully guarantees the observance of the three non-nuclear principles which ban the possession and production of nuclear weapons by Japan, as well as the bringing of nuclear weapons into the country.

Under the system, the Washington administration should notify Japan in advance that a nuclear-armed ship or submarine is heading for Japanese shores. There have been no such notifications from Washington so far. If so, it is reasoned in Tokyo, it means that U.S. nuclear weapons were not brought to Japanese islands.

What such credulity results in is well known from proofs provided by Retired Rear Admiral Gene Laroque, an authoritative military expert, and by other no less reliable sources. It follows from the proofs that the Pentagon repeatedly brought nuclear bombs and missiles to Japan in the fifties and the sixties.

At present, the problem of the secret bringing of U.S. nuclear weapons to Japan has reappeared on the agenda in connection with the forthcoming "visit" to the port of Sasebo by the battleship "New Jersey" at the end of August. According to the data of the U.S. anti-war organisation, the battleship is literally stuffed with nuclear-tipped "Tomahawk" cruise missiles.

The Japanese peace-loving public demands that the government of the Liberal-Democratic Party avert the appearance of missile-carrying battleship at Sasebo roadstead.

However, spokesmen for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs have already stated that they do not see grounds for closing the door to the "New Jersey", thereby confirming that Tokyo intends to continue to blink at the violation of Japan's non-nuclear status by the United States.

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CSO: 5200/1519

47
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER HITS U.S. NST VIEW ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES

PM312015 Moscow KRASNYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Aug 86 First Edition p 3

[S. Gudilov article: "Does the United States Have the Desire To Reach Agreement?"]

[Text] Today millions of ordinary people in the countries of Western Europe are addressing this question to official Washington. They are disturbed by the U.S. stance on problems of medium-range nuclear missiles. There are substantial grounds for their alarm for the destiny of the European Continent's security: The fifth round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons has ended, behind lie a year and a half of discussions, but "things have not gotten moving [a voz i nyne tam]." Practical accords on a problem of vital importance for the Europeans have not been achieved.

What is the reason for the absence of progress at the talks?

The Soviet Union proposed that the first step be taken along the path of ridding Europe of nuclear weapons. It is a matter of the total elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in the European zone — both ballistic and cruise missiles. This solution accords with the agreed aims and tasks of the talks. The elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe would clear the way for profound reductions in nuclear arsenals and would serve as a point of departure for changes for the better in the situation within and beyond the European Continent. For the purposes of the practical implementation of the Soviet proposal a corresponding draft agreement was submitted at the Geneva talks.

However, an adequate response was not forthcoming from the American side. The United States continues to defend its old, long discredited "zero option" which from the very outset was aimed not at achieving understanding, but at preventing it. Such an approach reflects the U.S. line toward pursuing superiority in the military sphere it is trying to secure not only with the aid of the arms race but also at the negotiating table.

Just consider one of the main elements of the U.S. "zero option" — the so called "global approach." Its essence lies in the fact that it is proposed that ground-launched medium-range missiles be eliminated everywhere as a class of armaments. [paragraph continues]
It is tempting at first glance. But in reality, the U.S. proposal turns out to be patently detrimental to the USSR's security. This option is constructed in such a way as to spearhead the reductions chiefly against the Soviet Union's armaments. It deliberately does not take into account the real situations in specific regions. For example, in the Asian zone all Soviet medium-range missiles would, according to the U.S. approach, be eliminated. But the U.S. forward based nuclear means opposing them would remain outside the scope of the limitations and could even be built up. Yet, after all, in this region the United States has already concentrated a considerable nuclear potential -- hundreds of aircraft that carry nuclear weapons based on aircraft carriers, U.S. fighter bombers in Japan and South Korea, and sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles, the number of which is constantly increasing. Under these conditions it is vain to seek equality and identical security of the sides. The American concept of "globality" is in essence an expression of claims to global advantages in the military sphere.

The U.S. stance regarding the nuclear armaments of Britain and France is also directly at variance with the aims of strengthening strategic stability in Europe. It is perfectly fair that if all Soviet and American medium-range missiles in the European zone are eliminated, then third countries should not build up their own corresponding nuclear means here. Otherwise NATO and thereby the United States itself would have the opportunity to circumvent an agreement concluded and acquired one-sided military advantages. However, the United States is in every way resisting the objective facts and blocking progress at the talks on this issue too.

The Soviet viewpoint regarding the participation of European countries in the matter of ridding the region of nuclear weapons is well-known. The situation today is such that ridding Europe of medium-range means is a matter not just for those powers that possess them, but also for those countries on whose territories they are stationed. Should U.S. missiles be withdrawn from the FRG or any other state of Western Europe, the USSR, would, of course, respond with equivalent [adekvatnyy] reductions of its nuclear means.

Moreover, the U.S. attempts to introduce the question of missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km onto the register of problems being discussed at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms is not promoting the solution of the problems of medium-range missiles. These attempts cannot be regarded other than as a tactical maneuver aimed at retarding the talks and introducing for discussion elements not envisaged in the mandate of the talks. The Soviet Union is prepared for Europe to be rid of all types of nuclear weapons and this stance is reflected in its program for the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction on earth. But this must be brought about in such a way as not to damage the security of any of the sides. It is also well-known that through the proposals of the Budapest conference of the Warsaw Pact member-states' Political Consultative Committee, the prospect was opened up also for the radical settlement of the question of nuclear means with a range of up to 1,000 km. If they were adopted, the solution of the task of freezing all tactical nuclear means and of their subsequent elimination, as set down in the Soviet program, would also be expedited.

What has been said makes it possible most definitely to draw the conclusion that it is by no means an urge for agreement that determines the U.S. strategy at the negotiations on the question of medium-range missiles. A dangerous chasing after mirages of military superiority shapes Washington's line at Geneva.
PRAVDA COMMENTARY DISCUSSES U.S. NUCLEAR BUILDUP IN ROK.

PM130957 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Aug 86 First Edition p 5

[Boris Barakhta "Commentator's Column": "Emptying the Nuclear Powder Magazine"]

[Text] KCNA has reported that the United States has plans to build in South Korea over 30 special nuclear weapon dumps and underground hangars for fighter-bombers on around-the-clock combat readiness. One of the major nuclear "powder magazines" is being constructed near the city of Kongju, next to the U.S. Camp Eustis military base.

These facts show that the Pentagon strategists are continuing to deploy nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads in one of the crisis zones of the Asian-Pacific region -- the Korean peninsula.

The United States has already turned South Korea into a whole complex of nuclear bases. The nuclear munitions stored there, numbering in excess of 1,000, are many hundreds of times more powerful than the bomb the Americans dropped on Hiroshima. Moreover, Washington has not abandoned its plans to deploy Pershing-2 and cruise missiles and neutron weapons south of the 38th parallel.

A variety of military exercises is carried out periodically during which they tend more and more to simulate nuclear strikes in the "northern sector." During the major annual "Team Spirit-86" militarist games in the southern part of the Korean peninsula "combat operations involving the use of nuclear weapons" were organized in direct proximity to the DPRK's borders.

It has to be said that the militarization, the growth of the threat of war, and the policy of nuclear blackmail in this part of the world are beginning to assume dangerous proportions. As a result of the aggressive imperialist forces' actions the Asian-Pacific region is turning into an area of military political confrontation. And the people who live there are getting increasingly worried.

One needs to point out that this policy is futile, for it leads to an impasse. The time has come to face reality and to abandon the imperial approach and the traditions of brute force regarding problems of war and peace, defense, the security of individual states, and international security.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist states of the region are displaying a constructive approach to the urgent problems of this extensive part of the world. This applies also to the task of placing a reliable barrier in the way of the spread and buildup of stocks of nuclear weapons there. This is evidenced by the USSR's
wide-ranging new initiatives put forward in Vladivostok the other day. The DPRK's proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in the Korean peninsula is also becoming more and more a matter of urgency.

It is not new nuclear powder magazines but goodwill and a positive reaction by the West and its allies in the region to the socialist countries' proposals that are needed in order to strengthen peace and security and develop good-neighborly cooperation in Asia and the Pacific basin.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1519
MOSCOW COMMENTARY ON FRENCH NUCLEAR BUILDUP

LD052313 Moscow in French to France and Belgium 1730 GMT 5 Aug 86

[Vsevolod Mikhaylov Commentary]

[Text] The French Government intends to raise the military budget of the country next year 7.1 percent. This is reported by the Paris newspaper LE MONDE quoting government sources. The military budget will rise to 169.5 billion francs. As the daily stressed, the draft military budget, which still has to be approved by parliament, brings France close to the level where its defense will take up 4 percent of the gross national product.

What immediately attracts attention, considers our observer Vsevolod Mikhaylov, is the continuing and diverse increase of the nuclear potential and the corresponding growth in expenditure allocated this. In future years the government wants to extend the specter of the French strike force by deploying medium-range mobile missiles with nuclear warheads. The program for the construction of nuclear submarines carrying new missiles will continue. A large part of the planned finance will be devoted to research into the production of new weapons, both nuclear and conventional.

Defense Minister Andre Giraud not only approves of the plan to build the first French atomic aircraft carrier "Richelieu," but he considers it necessary to build another. Each of them will cost 20 million francs. At the same time it has been decided not to reduce the armed forces any further.

The 1987 military budget is part of the new law on military planning the government is in the process of drawing up. It is the biggest and most costly program in the nuclear and conventional arms race that France has ever had.

At the same time one of the axes of the law is toward an even closer coordination of action with the armed forces of the NATO countries, first and foremost with the FRG. Government representatives consider an independent defense system expensive, but believe that military independence makes it worthwhile. One wonders, however, if the increase in military expenditure is aimed at strengthening national defense. It is known that some in the military consider the number of warheads France has are enough to protect its territory and what it is agreed to call its vital interests.

All the same, Paris intends to increase its nuclear potential, to the extent that in a few years it will have some 500 nuclear warheads, capable, according to the assertions of the military, of destroying dozens of towns, taking millions and millions of human lives.
The increase in nuclear forces clearly exceeds the framework of the real need to guarantee national security. On the other hand, it is precisely in conformity, in the first place, with the interests of the military strategy of the United States and NATO, which are trying to force the military policy of France to meet their demands. As in the past, the leaders of the parties currently in power, particularly those of the Union for French Democracy refer to the attachment of De Gaulle’s concept of the military and political independence of France. Well, in reality they are increasingly aligning France’s military policy on the strategic concepts of NATO by, in particular, aiming their missiles in the same direction as the Atlantic alliance, despite the multi-directional defense system of De Gaulle.

Further evidence of this is the statements repeated by the government leaders that approve, the military level, the so-called American Strategic Defense Initiative, whose operation would give rise to the risk of a destabilization of the international situation.

The allusions of French Defense Minister Andre Giraud to the possibility of his country's participation, with the FRG, in the so-called European defense initiative, in other words, in the program to create a joint anti-missile defense system, gives another subject for concern. Paris is continuing its dangerous flirtation with West German militarism. Thus the French are planning to extend their cooperation with Bonn in the production of ultra-modern weapons. Plans for a Franco-West German tank and combat helicopter are already known. Another project that is a risk for security and stability in Europe, is the plan prepared on both sides of the Rhine to construct a Paris-Bonn military alliance, by completely integrating the defense policy of the two countries, a policy that makes provision for the sharing of responsibility between French politicians and members of the military are already being heard to assure their allies in NATO, and particularly in the FRG, of their solidarity.

But in these conditions, what will remain of an independent defense force? The draft defense budget for 1987 shows that Paris is still ready to take part in the arms race, including nuclear weapons, and to align its military policy on Atlanticism and the strengthening of links with NATO. Now, the international situation demands a completely different approach toward questions of security. This is precisely what the Soviet Union suggests, pleading the case for the abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, as a guarantee of security for all. If we can judge by the draft defense in budget, the aspirations of Paris are quite different, writes Vsevolod Mikhaylov conclusion.
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA SCORES FRG'S CRUISE MISSILE 'AMBITIONS'

PM110917 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jul 86 Second Edition p 5

[Stanislav Zyubanov "Commentator's Column": "Missile Ambitions"]

[Text] "The FRG Ministry of Defense is planning to equip the Bundeswehr with 500 cruise missiles." This item of news which has just penetrated the curtain of secrecy and appeared in the pages of the West German press has seriously alarmed the FRG's progressive public and served as the basis for a special question in the Bundestag.

In response to the Federal Defense Ministry's clumsy attempts to refute the existence of such plans, H. Scheer, a Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] expert on disarmament issues, told journalists that official Bonn is telling lies. People on the Rhine, what is more, have resorted more than once to juggling the facts and understating the real dangers of armament. For example, such maneuvers were undertaken fairly recently when H. Kohl's government was obliged to counteract the vigilance of peace supporters who spoke out against the siting of new U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles in the FRG or FRG concerns' participation in the U.S. program for the militarization of space.

Now the West German public again has every reason to be profoundly concerned. For the first time since the Western European Union's 1984 decision to remove from the FRG the last remaining restrictions on its manufacture of all types of conventional armaments, including bombers, and long-range missiles, Bonn is reaching out for weapons capable of performing certain strategic tasks.

The new cruise missiles--on whose creation, DER SPIEGEL reports, the major FRG concerns Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm and Dornier will work jointly with U.S. and British firms--will have a range of up to 600 kilometers. It is planned to launch these missiles from Tornado aircraft, which considerably increases their operation range (as far as the western regions of the Soviet Union!). It is clear even to the initiated that the Bundeswehr certainly does not need these new missiles for defense but for offensive actions within the framework of the so-called "Rogers plan," which provides for "hitting targets deep inside the enemy's defenses." After this, how is one to understand the solemn assurances of the FRG's current leaders concerning the fact that the Bundeswehr has only defensive functions?
The implementation of the secret plans to equip the Bundeswehr with cruise missiles and other missile systems capable of delivering nuclear warheads will initiate a new spiral of the arms race. And the entire responsibility here will rest with the FRG. Are the West German leaders aware of the serious consequences of such a provocative step for the fate of detente and security in Europe? The unseemliness of the FRG's position becomes still more obvious insofar as this new militarist venture has been contemplated at the very time when the whole world is discussing the new peace proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1519
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: REPORTS ON ACCIDENT WITH PERSHING-IA WARHEAD IN FRG

Attempt At Secrecy Alleged

LD030513 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2100 GMT 2 Aug 86

[Text] Vladimir Kondratyev, our correspondent in the FRG, reports: On 30 July, the nuclear warhead of a Pershing IA missile in a combat position broke off because of a mistake by service personnel at an air base not far from the Bavarian town of Landesberg. This incident only came to light 2 days later. The FRG Ministry of Defense was obliged to confirm it, admittedly with the proviso that there was no danger. At the same time, the proviso was added for the soldiers, as if in a case of danger only they would suffer.

There is an obvious attempt here to belittle the significance of the accident, and to lead astray the public, which is expressing anxiety at the presence of U.S. missiles on FRG territory. There are about 100 Pershing IA's in the country. These missiles, with a range of action of 750 km, are Bundeswehr armaments, but the United States implements control over them.

The Pershing incident is far from being the only one. Once, during maneuvers in Wechselberg, a tractor carrying such a missile caught fire. The missile blew up. It was sheer luck that there was no warhead on it at that moment. In autumn 1982, an accident also took place on a tractor near Karlsruhe. A Pershing blew up, damaging three cars, whose drivers perished. Fearing an explosion, the police evacuated a great number of people. Finally, this is what happened in January, 1985 in Heilbronn, with a Pershing-2. One of the mortars blew up on that occasion. Three U.S. soldiers died and several people were injured. Literally hundreds of meters away there was a nuclear warhead dump. In those cases too, statements were made about the allegedly nondenonatural nature of the accidents. The accident at Landesberg is, again, an alarm signal. Millions of people who are resolutely demanding that lethal weapons be completely removed from the FRG understand this. That is the most reliable barrier against mistakes, everyone of which can be fatal.

SPD Member Urges Inquiry

LD042201 Moscow TASS in English 2148 GMT 4 Aug 86

[Text] Bonn August 5 TASS -- Manfred Schmidt, a deputy to the West German Bundestag from the Social Democrat Party of Germany, demanded that the West German Government open an inquiry into the causes of the accident that occurred at a NATO military base in Bavaria July 30 and involved an American Pershing IA missile.
In the opinion of the West German MP [as received], the accident comes as yet another proof of the fact that the American nuclear missiles stationed in West Germany pose a constant threat to the country's population.

Schmidt urged Bonn to remove from West Germany all nuclear Pershing missiles sited there and to prevent the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles in the country.

'Anger' Over Accident

PM051419 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Aug 86 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Fraught With Catastrophe"]

[Text] Bonn, 4 Aug — An incident involving a U.S. Pershing 14 missile on a NATO military base in Bavaria has caused an outburst of indignation and anger among the FRG democratic public. It is pointed out in local political circles that this is not the first accident threatening to evolve into a nuclear catastrophe with all the ensuing consequences.

It was already reported that a crane arm knocked the nuclear warhead off the missile in the course of maintenance work on 30 July. It was only by sheer luck that no one was hurt. People here recall in this regard that a major catastrophe occurred last January at the U.S. missile base near Heilbronn as a result of the explosion of a Pershing-2 missile deployed there. Three U.S. soldiers were killed and nine injured as a result. The fire that was started almost caused nearby nuclear warheads to explode.

Karsten Voigt, foreign policy expert from the Social Democratic Party of Germany faction in the Bundestag, pointed out in connection with the incident the growing danger posed by the deployment of nuclear missiles on West Germany territory. He demanded that the FRG Government immediately inform the parliament of details of the 30 July accident and the measures to ensure the safety of the population in regions where missiles with nuclear charges are deployed.

In this regard, the newspaper WESTFAELISCHERE RUNDSCHAU accuses the Ministry of Defense of trying to play down the seriousness of the accident.

For its part, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU notes that more nuclear weapons are deployed in the FRG than in any other country. The incident Bavaria offers an opportunity to give some thought to the fact that the withdrawal of the other type of this missile, the Pershing-2, from the FRG would reduce the threat hanging over the country's population.
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET MILITARY JOURNAL ON PERSHING-2 CHARACTERISTICS

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 86 pp 42-43

[Article by Colonel L. Migunov, candidate of technical sciences: "The Pershing-2 Missile According to Foreign Press Materials"]

[Text] Ignoring the peace-loving initiatives of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community, and the demands of progressive society to halt the arms race, the Pentagon is continuing to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing-2 missiles in Europe. The latter are located at launch sites in the FRG and are intended to destroy targets located on the territory of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states.

The Pershing-2 intermediate range two-stage guided ballistic missile has been developed to strike hardened and unhardened targets (command posts, military bases, above ground and below ground ammunition and fuel supplies, etc.). Judging by data published in the foreign press, it is a fundamentally new type of weapon and not some modernized variant of the Pershing-1 missile, as some in the West assert. For illustration let us note some of the tactical and technical specifications of these missiles (in parentheses are those of the Pershing-1). The length of the Pershing-2 is 10 meters (10.5); launch weight 7,200 kilograms (4,600); maximum range 1,800 kilometers (160-640); accuracy (circular error probable) less than 30 meters (400); guidance system -- inertial with terminal homing (inertial).

The Pershing-2 missile consists of a first and a second stage, in which solid fuel jet engines are located, and a warhead (GCh), with three compartments: nose (radar), middle (warhead proper) and tail (instrument).

In the nose compartment is a terminal guidance radar (RADAG system) with stabilized antenna. The compartment is covered by a streamlined casing made of radio-permissive ablation material, which is capable of withstanding the greater amount of heat which occurs when the GCh enters the dense layers of the atmosphere.

The warhead portion is equipped with nuclear warheads of two types. The first, which has a flexible yield with a maximum of 50 kilotons, is for air or ground bursts. The body of the second is manufactured of high-strength steel, has an elongated form, a weight of approximately 1,800 kilograms and a warhead
on the order of 1 kiloton. When it strikes the target this warhead penetrates 30-45 meters into the earth and then explodes. As a result, a large diameter crater is formed with a high level of radioactive contamination.

The Pershing-2 can also be armed with conventional warheads. One is a penetrating warhead with a 460 kilogram charge or several relatively small warheads, (each weighing 8.15 kilograms and having a charge of 1.59 kilograms), capable, according to foreign specialists, of penetrating a concrete shelter up to 60 centimeters in thickness.

In the instrument compartment is an inertial guidance system and an on-board computer. Here are located aerodynamic control surfaces; a system of propulsive nozzles to guide the movement of the GCh in the trajectory; a gas generator; turbo pump; power sources; radar equipment and means for its cooling; a warhead separation system and other equipment.

The flight trajectory of the Pershing-2 is divided into three sections: initial (active), intermediate and final (terminal homing).

The active sector of the trajectory begins at the moment the missile is launched and concludes upon separation of the GCh. When the first stage engine is operating the flight is controlled along its heading (deviation of the longitudinal axis from the flight trajectory plane characterizes the angle of the heading or yaw) and pitch (the angle of pitch is the angle between the longitudinal axis of the missile and the plane of the local horizon) with the help of a diverting engine nozzle. Roll control (the turning of the missile around its longitudinal axis shows the angle of roll or rotation) is accomplished by the two rotating aerodynamic planes of the cruciform tail. The other two aerodynamic planes are immobile and serve to stabilize the position of the missile in flight.

During operation of the second stage engine, control of the flight of the missile by heading and pitch is also accomplished with the aid of a diverting engine nozzle, and control of its heading is accomplished by aerodynamic planes located in the warhead section.

Fuel for the engines of both stages is ignited from primers placed in their tail sections. After the engine stops operating each stage is separated.

At the moment the second stage engine ceases firing the warhead section acquires its assigned estimated speed and direction of flight, after which it moves on a ballistic trajectory (the middle flight sector), most of which is exo-atmospheric at an altitude of approximately 300 kilometers. The speed of the GCh is Mach-12. Control of pitch and yaw is accomplished by a system of propulsive nozzles, as well as aerodynamic control surfaces when the GCh enters the atmosphere.

The terminal guidance flight sector begins after the RADAG radar system is turned on. A stabilized radar antenna rotates at a speed of 2 revolutions per second and can illuminate on the flight path (for example, from an altitude of 4,500 meters) a circular shaped terrain sector of up to 35 sq. km. The reflected signals enter the receiver, are then changed into digital form and
transmitted to the computer. The signal received is compared with the reference information about the terrain in the area of the target placed in the computer memory, which was prepared in advance according to photo reconnaissance data or taken from maps. The comparison is made several times at various altitudes as the warhead section approaches the target. According to its results the amount of deviation of the GCh is determined and the command correction for the inertial guidance system is worked out.

The Pershing-2 missile is launched from self-propelled transport launch platforms (TPU), which include prime movers and semi-trailers. The TPU with its missile can move up to 60 kilometers per hour. The launch platform contains assemblies for power supply, a hydraulic system, winches for horizontal movement of the missile on the launch pad and other equipment.

After deployment on the launch pad the missiles are set up in a vertical position and prepared for launch. Data about targets (geographic coordinates and a reference depiction of the terrain sector in digital form), as well as the coordinates of the launch point are entered into the on-board computer. Preliminary data permits the missile to be aimed with sufficient effectiveness. In the opinion of American specialists, in the future the Pershing-2 will also be able to destroy unplanned targets which are detected suddenly, information about which was not previously entered into the computer memory. It is only necessary that the distance between the new target and an object for which data in the computer exists not exceed 160 kilometers.

In conclusion, it is necessary to emphasize that the Pershing-2 missiles deployed in Europe, according to the nature of the tasks which they perform, are with respect to the Soviet Union essentially strategic weapons and are intended for a first strike. They are capable of reaching targets in 8-10 minutes; i.e., much more quickly than intercontinental ballistic missiles based on U.S. territory. Consequently, the Pershing-2 is a direct threat to the security of the USSR and the socialist countries, and forces them to take additional measures to strengthen their defense.

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9069
CSO: 1801/205
TASS COMMENTARY ON U.S. CRUISE MISSILE TESTS

LD051545 Moscow TASS in English 1524 GMT 5 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow August 5 TASS -- TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev writes:

The U.S. Navy flight-tested near Florida's coast sea-based "Tomahawk" cruise missiles capable of nuclear delivery. Last Saturday one such missile launched from the "Iowa" battleship landed near Monroeville in Alabama. During the tests, missiles flew over populated localities. This poses a serious hazard for people of those regions. And what could happen if a missile carried a nuclear charges?

The Pentagon leaders speed up the further development of a long range sea- air- and land-based cruise missiles with nuclear charges. It is, specifically, planned to bring the number of such missiles to 8,000. These missiles are one of the components connected with the "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI) system developed now, the system that is known under the name of the "star ware" programme.

The build up of medium-range and long-range cruise missiles by Washington reflects the Pentagon's overall strategy aimed at linking in one system SDI space-strike weapons with the U.S. land- air- and sea-based nuclear weapon systems.

The Soviet Union, conducting consistently the policy aimed at the limitation and complete elimination of all kinds of nuclear weapons advanced a comprehensive programme of ridding humanity of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass annihilation in the current century.

And the Soviet Union expressed the readiness to decide separately the question of U.S. medium-range nuclear weapon systems which, because of their positioning close to Soviet borders can reach the Soviet Union's territory, and the question of long-range land-based cruise missiles. The complete elimination of medium-range missiles of the USSR and the USA in the European zone is envisaged with an understanding that Britain and France will not be building up their respective nuclear arms, while the United States will not be transferring its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries.

Moreover, the Warsaw Treaty member-state suggest to NATO countries also a considerable reduction of armed forces and armaments of the sides in Europe. For instance, it is suggested to reduce the armed forces in the European Continent by one million troops with their combat equipment and armaments.
Advancing these and other proposals for the lowering of the level of confrontation, the Soviet Union proceeds from the view that in the present situation there is no reasonable alternative to peaceful coexistence of states. Meanwhile, if they in Washington talk for propaganda purposes about the striving for restricting some kinds of armaments, they simultaneously build up other, even more dangerous kinds of arms. This is confirmed by regular tests of cruise missiles and the implementation of the "star wars" programme by the U.S. Administration.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1519
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET REPORTS ON SUPPORT FOR TEST BAN IN CONGRESS

Draft Resolution

PM040831 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 86 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Shukhov report: "Voices Full of Anger: The American Public for a Nuclear Moratorium"]

[Excerpt] New York, July -- [Passage omitted] On Capitol Hill a draft resolution is being discussed that provides for an end to appropriations for underground nuclear tests unless Washington joins in the moratorium declared by the Soviet Union.

The bill, submitted by Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder (Democrat, from Colorado), has already won the support of 111 congressmen. Among them are Senators E. Kennedy, C. Mathias, C. Pell, J. Danforth, A. Cranston, and M. Hatfield, and Congressmen E. Markey, T. Downey, B. Boxer, and C. Schneider. "A ban on nuclear weapon tests is a problem that must not recede into the background under any circumstances," E. Markey stated in the journal NUCLEAR TIMES.

What about the administration? It continues to react with irritation to any proposals for an end to nuclear explosions, and intends to continue them, citing the "higher interests of U.S. national security." Either Congress takes the side of the administration, or...it will be siding with the USSR," U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Perle warns the congressmen meaningfully. As if coming out in favor of the moratorium means "betraying the motherland."

The reasons with which the White House explains its refusal sound like a very old tape recording they have forgotten to renew. Chief among these reasons is this: A complete end to tests is, they say, impossible to verify.

The effectiveness of this "argument" in the United States has not been finally undermined by the joint experiment which American and Soviet scientists are conducting in Kazakhstan. Soviet specialists will go to Yucca Flat (Nevada) in the fall to continue the experiment. There are far more problems in organizing their work. No U.S. state institution is really helping the scientific operations of American and Soviet geophysicists.

Gerard Smith, former head of the American delegation at the SALT I talks, recently posed the following question in the press: "What would we Americans think of the Soviet Union if it:}
"Refused for nearly a year to follow a unilateral moratorium we had announced, and continued its nuclear explosions;

"Said 'no' to all our proposals to meet to discuss the problem of ending nuclear explosions;

"Persistently proposed that we, who had stopped tests, send observers to be present at their next nuclear explosions?"

"That is how we are acting," G. Smith observed, as if in answer to his own question. "So the concern the Soviet Union and the entire world feel about our policy is understandable." [passage omitted]

Congressmen Cited

LD051231 Moscow TASS in English 1207 GMT 5 Aug 86

[Text] Washington August 5 TASS -- TASS correspondent Aleksandr Lavrentiyev reports: The refusal of the Reagan administration to join the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions triggers off widespread protests of the U.S. public. A group of U.S. congressmen came up with an amendment to the draft law on military appropriations. The amendment, if it is approved by the Congress, provides for the United States joining the moratorium for a period of one year starting from January 1, 1987. Congressman Thomas Downey said at a press conference devoted to the submitting of the amendment that the American people have waited too long for the administration to take positive steps in this sphere. Now the time for resolute actions has come. He pointed out that, according to the results of public opinion polls, most Americans supported the demand on the banning of nuclear tests. Congressman Edward Markey said that the stance of the Reagan administration on nuclear explosions had led to an unusual phenomenon in the political life of the country — the rallying of people of various, sometimes opposite political convictions who now support the moratorium. Congressman Richard Gephardt, one of the authors of the amendment, said that the continuation of nuclear explosions served as a basis for building up arsenals of death-carrying weapons and posed a threat to the future of mankind in general. There are no arguments to justify this stance.

The authors of the amendment emphasized that they would work for its adoption by both chambers of the congress. New York August 5 TASS -- Bruce Morrison, a democratic congressman, said in an interview with the TASS correspondent Arkady Sidoruk that he hoped the U.S. Administration would heed the voice of the public and, taking advantage of the new opportunities existing today, would take positive steps in the sphere of disarmament. He pointed out that it referred, in the first place, to the moratorium on nuclear tests which was observed unilaterally by the Soviet Union. The U.S. should follow its example. It refers, in an equal measure, to SALT-2 and new agreements which, he hopes, could be reached by means of talks and would put an end to the arms race. According to Bruce Morrison, Americans have come to realize that the nuclear arms race does not ensure security to neither of the sides, that it jeopardizes us all and can eventually destroy the world.

Jessie Cocks, national coordinator of the "American Peace Test" public organization, said that the U.S. should join the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions until it was too late. She recalled in a press statement that the USSR had twice prolonged its unilateral moratorium, demonstrating its goodwill. The Reagan administration continues
to allege that his step taken by the Soviet Union is nothing but another propaganda exercise. This approach proves that Washington is pursuing a policy of stepping up the arms race and spreading it to space.

Jessie Cocks urged all the people of goodwill in the U.S. to take part in nationwide protest actions against the militaristic policy of the Reagan administration scheduled for August 6. They are to be held outside the Pentagon's facilities where nuclear weapons are produced and tested. According to WASHINGTON POST, we are the eve of the 41st anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. During Reagan's presidency this date will be observed for the fifth time already. However, there is no arms control agreement in sight. A year ago the Soviet Union stopped testing nuclear weapons hoping that the U.S. would do the same, but Reagan answered in the negative to the Soviet proposal.

Resolutions Pass

LD091435 Moscow TASS in English 1420 GMT 9 Aug 86

[Text] Washington August 9 TASS -- As the hearings on the 1987 military spending bill continued in the U.S. Congress, the House of Representatives passed a resolution urging the U.S. President to take a decision on a one-year ban on nuclear explosions with yields of over 1 kiloton starting January 1. Earlier the Senate had passed a resolution urging accession to the moratorium instituted by the Soviet Union. That document had also called upon the administration to start talks on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Although both resolutions are not binding, they reflect clearly enough the mounting demands in the United States that it join in the Soviet moratorium and conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

House Appropriations Amendment

PM120937 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA PRESS SERVICE report: "Signal From the Capitol"]

[Text] On 8 August, the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress voted 234 to 155 in favor of an amendment to the military appropriations bill for the next fiscal year that establishes an interim moratorium on nuclear tests with a yield in excess of 1 kiloton for 1 calendar year beginning 1 January 1987. The authors of the amendment are Les Aspin, Wisconsin Democrat and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee; Richard Gephardt, Democrat from Missouri; and Patricia Schroeder, Democrat from Colorado.

Insofar as Congress' other chamber, the Senate, has not adopted an analogous amendment to the Pentagon budget, the House of Representatives' initiative will be examined by a conference committee of the Senate and House. If this committee adopts the aforementioned amendment it will enter into force in the new year.

The results of the voting on the amendment submitted by the three congressmen are being viewed as a perceptible blow to the plans of the Reagan administration, and primarily the Pentagon, both of which are striving to prevent its adoption. What is the essence of the amendment? The 1-kiloton threshold it establishes promotes the attainment of the main goal of the advocates of a test ban "by preventing the testing of the majority
of nuclear armaments inasmuch as tests with a yield below 1 kiloton are only of little
direct military significance," the amendment's authors claim in a short explanation of
their initiative. The point is that within the confines of this ceiling it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to develop [razrabatyvat] new strategic armaments,
including such as are envisaged for the "star wars" program.

The step taken by the House of Representatives is not only of practical but also of
substantial political significance.

It is a signal reflecting the mood on Capitol Hill and in the country opposing the
further intensification of the nuclear arms race and favoring a complete ban on all
types of nuclear tests. As Les Aspin has emphasized, "The vote must push the Reagan
administration toward serious negotiations on nuclear tests." Congressman Edward
Markey from Massachusetts said of the adopted amendment that "a first step, and a big
one at that, has taken toward halting the nuclear arms race."

In the opinion of one of the authors of the amendment, Gephardt, it will promote the
security of the United States better than the Pentagon's chosen course of further
intensifying the arms race.

An amendment adopted by the Senate that same day, by 64 votes to 35, also merits
attention. It calls on the President to immediately resume negotiations with the
Soviet Union on a total and universal ban on nuclear weapon tests and the ratification
of two agreements already signed — the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground
nuclear weapon tests and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful
purposes.

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CSO: 5200/1517
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS REPORTS ON DELHI SIX MEETING URGING TEST BAN

Send Messages to Gorbachev, Reagan

LDO80923 Moscow TASS in English 0743 GMT 8 Aug 86

[Text] Ixtapa (Mexico) August 8 TASS -- TASS correspondent Valeriy Fesenko reports:

The leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden have urged the USSR to extend the Soviet moratorium, and the USA that it give up nuclear testing before the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting. Addressing newsmen, the heads of state and government of the "Delhi Six" said that they had sent messages containing these proposals to Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan. As is pointed out in the "Mexican Declaration" adopted by them, an immediate termination of nuclear blasts is the necessary step towards reaching an agreement to ban any nuclear weapons tests. It is necessary, the declaration says, that first at least the United States join in the nuclear moratorium announced by one of the nuclear powers.

Nuclear disarmament and, in the long run, the total elimination of the nuclear arsenals, is mankind's top priority objective, the declaration said. The leaders of the six have warned against the danger of a militarisation of outer space. Creation of space weapons, they emphasized, would lead to an irreversible escalation of the arms race and destroy every opportunity to reach agreement. The declaration stresses the pressing need for putting an end to the perfection of anti-satellite weapons in order to facilitate the conclusion of an international treaty on their prohibition.

The participants in the meeting also offer their countries' assistance in verifying a nuclear test ban. These measures could help towards building up confidence between the USSR and the USA and mark a step forward towards creating a control system to ensure abideance by the nuclear test ban treaty.

The leaders of the "Delhi Six" have welcomed the USSR's constructive stand on the issue of ending nuclear testing. This stand is praiseworthy and we are deeply grateful for it to the USSR Government, Rajiv Gandhi told newsmen.

Regrettably, Andreas Papandreou pointed out, only one of the sides -- the USSR has so far given a positive response to the appeal by the "Delhi Six" for an end to nuclear testing. On his part, Julius Nyerere expressed regret over the fact the the U.S. Administration, on whose actions progress in the field of nuclear disarmament depends in a considerable measure, is passing over the Soviet peace initiatives in silence. Therefore, he said, it is important that the American people should wake up to the
realization of the true scope or the threat hanging over the whole mankind. The leaders of the six countries, who repeatedly pointed out that their efforts are centered in the first place on assisting towards resolution of the most important task, ensuring peace and disarmament, and pointed out the disastrous consequences of the arms race for the developing nations. An end to the arms race, above all of nuclear arms, President De la Madrid of Mexico said among others things, would make it possible to release enormous funds in order to be able to resolve the foreign debt problem of many countries.

Conclusion Noted

[Text] Moscow August 8 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Boris Shabayev writes:

A regular meeting of the 'Delhi Six' -- the leaders of Argentina, India, Greece, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania -- has ended in the small Mexican town of Ixtapa. Slightly more than two years have passed since the leaders of these countries appealed to the leaders of the nuclear powers to ban the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapon systems and their delivery vehicles.

The peace initiatives by these authoritative leaders who represent a considerable part of mankind, and their readiness practically to promote an end to nuclear tests, has always found full understanding and support in the Soviet Union. Washington, however, up to now does not pay heed to the voice of reason. This necessitated the holding of a new meeting of 'the six', timed for the 41st anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

When opening the meeting, President Miguel De la Madrid of Mexico emphasised that the threat posed by nuclear weapons to the very existence of mankind should be countered by a still more powerful weapon -- the will of millions of people for peace and for the preservation of life on earth. This will was shown by the participants in the Mexican meeting.

They adopted a declaration pointing out that nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, complete elimination of nuclear arsenals is the first priority goal of mankind. Immediate cessation of all nuclear tests should become the major and indispensable first step in this direction.

The leaders of 'the six' again draw attention to the extreme danger of the space militarisation plans, emphasising that the development of space weapons would lead to an irreversible escalation of the arms race and would nullify any possibility of reaching agreement on a ban on nuclear tests. Speakers at the Mexican meeting expressed deep gratitude to the Soviet Union which is firmly resolved to continue to press for a solution to the acute problem of completely banning nuclear tests, the problem which brooks no delay.

To our great regret, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou of Greece pointed out, a different stand is held by the U.S. Administration which does not give a positive reply to the appeals of the 'Delhi Six' and ignores the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union. In these conditions, stated Julius Nyerere, representative of Tanzania, the task of awakening in the United States the realisation of the true scope of the danger which hangs over mankind and of responsibility for mankind's future is taking on a paramount importance.
A call to do everything possible to prevent a recurrence of the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was conveyed in messages addressed to the participants in the Ixtapa meeting by the mayors of these Japanese cities which had been the first victims of nuclear recklessness. Time should not be lost, they write, for tomorrow it could be late.

When reading these messages one cannot but recall Antoine de Saint-Exupery, a great humanist, French air pilot and writer whose life had been severed in the battle against fascism, for a peaceful and free future of mankind. His behest to people was that in order to get saved one should make a step. Nowadays such a step — immediately to end any nuclear explosions — is essential as never before. It is up to Washington.

Circulated by Mexico

LD131830 Moscow TASS in English 1801 GMT 13 Aug 86

[Text] Mexico City August 13 TASS -- The leaders of the "Delhi Six" gathered in Ixtapa, Mexico, to discuss measures which could promote a balanced control over armaments and disarmament, says the message of the "Delhi Six" to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev.

The document dated August 7 was circulated by Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Affairs today.

The leaders of the "Delhi Six" noted with satisfaction that the USSR and the USA had recently embarked on bilateral talks on nuclear tests.

The leaders of the "Delhi Six" propose a meeting of experts from their countries with Soviet and American experts. The date and venue of the meeting could be agreed upon by mutual consultations.

The meeting could be aimed at a detailed setting out of the proposals of the "Delhi Six", the studying of the methods of their implementation in practice and other possible measures by means of which the countries could promote verification of the ban on nuclear testing.

The "Delhi Six", the message says, declares for a broad working programme comprising any aspect of verification which the experts might deem important.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1517
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER CRITICIZES U.S. STANCE ON TESTS

PM121330 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 10 Aug 86 Second Edition p 3
[Colonel M. Ponomarev "Military-Political Review": "Ignoring the Will of the Peoples"]

[Text] To begin with I would like to quote from a number of U.S. officials' statements and guideline documents. "Strength," the head of the White House has said, "is the most convincing argument we have..." The following remark is also his; "Today and in the foreseeable future the security of the United States and its friends and allies must be based on a reliable and effective nuclear deterrent." "Without the sum total of superior military forces that are maintained in a state of combat readiness or can be swiftly mobilized, the policy of deterrence, which is in fact a policy of systematic and gradual coercion, is nothing but a bluff," says one of the National Security Council memorandums. To cap it all, the chief of the Pentagon has stated categorically: "The present state of our relations with Moscow depends on our ability to continue to act from a position of strength...The West's security and peace throughout the world depend entirely on U.S. military might."

I could cite many more remarks like these. But those that have been cited make it very plain that the United States continues to bank on military might, that it would like to conduct affairs in the international arena "from a position of strength" and to implement its globalist and neoglobalist policies. And in order to secure this position it is forcing the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, and seeking to extend it to outer space.

In fact, over the past 5 years Washington has spent $1.3 trillion, that is, $1,300 billion on the implementation of the program for a radical modernization of the strategic nuclear forces put forward by President Reagan back in October 1981 and on other militarist preparations. What was this money spent on? The creation [sozdanie] of new ICBM's is in full swing. D. Hicks, U.S. undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, recently announced that as early as December this year the first 10 MX missiles will be placed in a state of combat readiness at the Warren U.S. Air Force Base in Wyoming. He said that a total of at least 50 such missiles are to be deployed there and in Nebraska and at the same time confirmed that the development [razrabotka] of the Midgetman mobile ballistic missiles is advancing successfully and that at present the Pentagon contractors are working on its motors.

New Trident class missile-carrying nuclear submarines and B-1B heavy strategic bombers are being brought into service and the equipment of the strategic aviation and of naval vessels with long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles is continuing. An indication of the scale of the U.S. nuclear arms buildup is provided by the stenographic transcript of secret hearings on military questions at one of the U.S. Congress' subcommittees that has come into the possession of and been published by the Japanese Jiji Press.
agency. Rear Admiral Hostettler, director of the comprehensive cruise missile program, who spoke during the hearings said that by the mid-nineties, 192 U.S. warships will be equipped with nuclear-tipped Tomahawk cruise missiles. According to what he said, 4 battleships, 5 nuclear missiles cruisers, 22 missile cruisers with conventional engines, 60 destroyers, and 107 submarines including 39 nuclear strike submarines will be equipped with these missiles. At the same time the rear admiral declared bluntly that these missiles will "considerably increase the number of targets on the USSR's territory that we can hit."

In short, it is a question of improving and enhancing the combat might of the whole "triad" of the U.S. strategic offensive nuclear forces as well as of forward-based means. In particular, the deployment is continuing of medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

A decision has also been adopted to site U.S. binary chemical weapons right here, on the territory of West European countries. According to a report published in the British newspaper THE OBSERVER, new U.S. nuclear munitions are being secretly deployed in the FRG, munitions that are designed in such a way that they can swiftly be converted into neutron munitions that destroy all life but keep property intact.

Reports about plans to increase the U.S. arsenal by 13,000–20,000 nuclear warheads over the next decade have frequently appeared in the press. A total of up to 23,000 such munitions are to be produced over this period (bearing in mind that a number of old nuclear bombs and war heads are to be replaced). It is a question of creating and adopting as part of the arsenal new nuclear warheads for the MX, Midgetman, and Trident-2 (D-5) missiles, B-61 aerial bombs (for tactical aviation), B-83 serial bombs (for strategic aviation), 155-mm and 203.2-mm nuclear artillery shells, antisubmarine nuclear depth charges, ship antiaircraft missiles with nuclear war heads, SRAM-2 air-to-surface nuclear missiles, and so on and so forth. According to THE WASHINGTON POST it is planned to modernize and expand the enterprises that produce the nuclear explosives -- tritium, uranium, and plutonium -- so as to be able to make all these and other nuclear munitions.

Yet everything that has been mentioned here so far relates to "second generation" nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, work is gathering momentum in the United States on the creation of even more destructive types of weapons, classed as "third generation" nuclear weapons. They are to be used mainly to equip strike systems to be deployed under the "Strategic Defense Initiative" program and sited in space. They include in particular nuclear-excited x-ray lasers, beam weapons, and so forth.

The unending series of nuclear tests that have been carried out one after another at the test side in Nevada serve the aim of creating all these types of nuclear arms. This year alone, eight such tests have already been carried out. And since 1951, and total of 654 officially announced nuclear tests have been carried out here. The total number of these types of tests in the United States is approaching 800.

Washington has claimed more than once that the nuclear tests are of vital importance for the United States. They -- that is, the tests -- serve "to ensure the effectiveness of our deterrent forces and also the reliability and safety of the U.S. nuclear arsenal." Furthermore their intensiveness will continue to rise. The press has cited U.S. scientists from the Los Alamos laboratory as saying that whereas 6 nuclear explosions were needed to create any 1 of the nuclear munitions of the first 2 generations, between 100 and 200 tests will be needed to develop just 1 type of the much more complex "third generation" weapons. Yet several types of such arms are being developed simultaneously.
There have been reports that it is planned to carry out up to 1,000 tests within the next 10 years -- that would mean one nuclear explosion every 3-4 days.

It is not surprising therefore that the White House has declared: From the U.S. viewpoint, a complete and general nuclear test ban is only a "long-term objective" at the present stage. And an official spokesman of the State Department stated categorically: A moratorium on such tests "does not accord with our interests in the security sphere."

In actual fact ending nuclear tests is the simplest, most realistic, most effective step toward strengthening international security because it leads to an end of the arms race. Proceeding from this main, fundamental consideration, the Soviet Union announced more than a year ago its decision to establish a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions and invited the United States to join the moratorium.

Since then, the moratorium that came into force 6 August 1985 -- on the day of the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima -- has been extended more than once. This was not an easy path to follow for our country, it was not easy because the United States proceeded with the modernization of its nuclear missile arsenal. In military terms, the USSR, naturally, suffered a certain amount of damage. However, the political gain resulting from this step in the struggle for ending nuclear tests and curbing the nuclear arms race was, without any doubt, much greater than the purely military loss.

The ending of nuclear tests in the USSR was highly appraised by the world public and sober-minded politicians and statesmen. They regard the Soviet Union's actions as a responsible approach to the danger hanging over mankind, they regard it as its readiness and ability to heed the opinion of the world community. Speaking on Soviet television on 14 May 1986, M.S. Gorbachev reiterated his proposal to President Reagan to meet without delay in the capital of any European state prepared to receive the Soviet leader and the U.S. leader, or in Hiroshima, to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban.

The United States did not reciprocate. It rejected the Soviet proposal. One of the arguments used most frequently by the transatlantic "hawks" to justify their refusal to end nuclear tests is the alleged impossibility of verifying [proverit], monitoring [prokontrolirovat] the observance of a ban. The Soviet Union has pointed out more than once that this "argument" is completely unfounded. It has emphasized that should the United States and all nuclear explosions on a mutual basis, the necessary verification [kontrol] of the observance of the moratorium would be fully guaranteed by national technical means as well as international procedures even including on-site inspection [inspektsiya] where necessary and using all the achievements of seismology.

The final blow to the false arguments of the opponents of a nuclear test ban was dealt by the agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council under which seismological equipment was installed by U.S. and Soviet scientists on Soviet territory in the vicinity of Semipalatinsk. This equipment did not register Soviet explosions, of course, not because of the cunning or perfidy of the Russians but because of the simple reason that there were none. Instead, another explosion carried out at the test site in Nevada was registered.

Support for the Soviet peace initiative and its wise and far-sighted policy aimed at ending the nuclear arms race has been demonstrated particularly convincingly at present when the 41st anniversary of the atomic attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is being marked. This anniversary has furnished yet another motive for pondering the horrific threat presented to mankind by the military uses of atomic energy and ways of eliminating this threat. The measures adopted by the Soviet Union are beginning to gain support among U.S. lawmakers.
The U.S. House of Representatives has adopted a decision calling on the United States to join the moratorium on nuclear tests for the period of 1 year beginning 1 January 1987. Since the Senate has adopted no such decision, the proposal will be passed on to the conference committee.

A meeting of the leaders of the "Delhi Six" -- Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden -- has just ended in the Mexican resort town of Ixtapa. Their work is valued highly in the Soviet Union because, by their efforts, they contribute to the improvement of the international atmosphere through their quest for mutually acceptable accords in the interests of universal security. During the meeting at Ixtapa the goodwill of the Soviet Union, which has observed its unilateral moratorium on all types of nuclear weapon tests for a whole year, was given a high appraisal. The meeting adopted the "Mexican Declaration" in which its participants call for the adoption without delay of concrete measures to curb the nuclear arms race and forestall the militarization of space.

On the eve of the meeting at Ixtapa, President R. Alfonsin of Argentina declared: Reason and goodwill must triumph. These words expressed the aspirations and the will of all the world's people which Washington still continues to ignore.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1517
TASS MILITARY WRITER CALLS TEST BAN 'TOP PRIORITY'

LD041643 Moscow TASS in English 1612 GMT 4 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow August 4 TASS -- Follows commentary by Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS military writer:

Complete and general ban on nuclear weapons tests is the top priority objective in the context of nuclear disarmament. For more than three decades talks were held on putting an end to nuclear blasts and nuclear weapons tests.

Twenty-three years ago -- on August 5, 1963, representatives of the USSR, the USA and Britain signed in Moscow a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. Then treaties were concluded on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests (1974) and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (1976), which have never been ratified by Washington.

Moreover, the current U.S. Administration has broken off all talks on that issue, repeatedly demonstrating that it does not intend in principle to give up nuclear blasts.

On its part, the Soviet Union has made quite an effort so as to make it possible jointly with the USA and then with other nuclear powers to prevent the creation of increasingly deadlier nuclear weapons and pave the way for the "withering away" of nuclear weapons. For already a year now -- since August 6, 1985 -- the unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear blasts has been in effect. The USSR has repeatedly urged the United States to join in it. The Soviet Union has several times proposed that work be started to draft a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests and to that end resume or begin appropriate talks.

Another evidence of the goodwill of the USSR, its preparedness to go far in the field of control over non-conduct of nuclear weapons tests and to contribute to putting an end to all such tests, is the invitation to American experts to come with control equipment to the area of the Soviet test range, where they are now carrying out research jointly with Soviet scientists.

Yet, the USA does not display any wish to use the real opportunity, which has emerged, to put an end to the nuclear weapons race. Some people in Washington still hope for ensuring military-strategic superiority. It is precisely with that aim that the current U.S. Administration is implementing a programme for the production of nuclear weapons, the biggest over the past twenty years. While during the last year of the Jimmy Carter administration in power, appropriations on the production of nuclear weapons stood at 3.7 billion dollars, they are planned for the 1987 fiscal year to the tune of 8.2 billion dollars.
Can one who requested now from the Congress 1.9 billion dollars to modernise the nuclear test range in Nevada state think of a ban on nuclear testing? Is that possible for those who, while the Soviet moratorium has been in effect, have already conducted 15, officially announced alone, nuclear blasts?

By its conduct the current U.S. Administration proves that it is acting in conflict with the aim requirement of this nuclear and space age. It is high time for Washington, at last, to follow the Soviet Union's example and thus to usher in an important stage in international relations and pave the way towards curbing the arms race.

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CSO: 5200/1517
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR MILITARY WRITER ON IMPORTANCE, VERIFIABILITY OF TEST BAN

PM061405 Moscow KRASTAYA ZVEZDA In Russian 2 Aug 86 Second Edition p 5

[Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel of Reserves V. Chernyshev article under the rubric "Military Scientist's Opinion": "The New Approach: Supporters and Opponents; On the Significance of the Soviet-American Experiment in the Verification of Nuclear Test"]

[Text] The banning and, ultimately, the complete destruction of nuclear weapons has always been the objective of Soviet foreign policy. [paragraph continues]

A concrete program for achieving this noble goal in a historically short space of time -- by the end of this century -- is set forth in the 15 January statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The priority task in the nuclear disarmament context is a general and complete ban on nuclear weapon tests. The point is that even a reduction in nuclear arsenals, without a ban on nuclear explosions, would not eliminate the nuclear threat, since the possibility would remain of modernizing outdated systems and creating increasingly sophisticated and lethal weapons.

Talks on ending nuclear explosions and nuclear weapons tests were conducted for more than 3 decades. Treaties were concluded on banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water (1963), on the limiting of underground nuclear weapon tests (1974), and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (1976). Unfortunately, Washington never ratified the last two treaties. The lack of an accord on a total end to nuclear tests led to the creation of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles; a tenfold increase in the number of nuclear weapons; and the emergence of cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. In the future, unless a barrier is erected, various types of "third generation" nuclear weapons will appear, including some designed for deployment in space.

The Soviet Union has made considerable efforts to prevent events from turning in a direction dangerous to mankind. Take just the recent facts. Since 6 August 1985 a unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions has been in force. Several times the USSR has proposed commencing the elaboration of a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests on an international legal basis, and to this end resuming or commencing appropriate talks -- bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral.

What about the United States? From the very beginning it has adhered to a negative position on the question of a moratorium on nuclear tests and opposed the Soviet proposal for talks on a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons. To "justify" this negative position, they have cited, and continue to cite, first and foremost, the "difficulties of verification."
The false nature of the American "argument" becomes particularly clear in the light of the fact that the Soviet Union attaches particular significance to this question of verification. It is well-known that modern national technical means available to the USSR and the United States make it possible to determine without difficulty whether or not nuclear explosions are being carried out. The fact that it is entirely possible to carry out such verification by national means, it was pointed out in M.S. Gorbachev's report to the 4th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation, was clearly demonstrated, in particular, in 1985, when the Soviet Union recorded an underground nuclear explosion of a very small yield that was carried out in the United States and not announced.

Moreover the USSR has stated that if the United States agrees to the ending of all nuclear explosions on a reciprocal basis, proper verification of the observance of such an accord will be ensured, in addition to national technical means, with the help of international procedures — including on-site inspection where necessary. The Soviet leadership has also expressed the readiness to take advantage of the proposal by the leaders of the six states (the "Deti Declaration") for help in the verification of the ending of nuclear tests, including on-site inspections. The conservative British newspaper THE TIMES was forced to admit: The USSR's readiness to ensure on-site inspection put the United States in an extremely difficult position.

Nonetheless the U.S. Administration continues to go on about the "inadequacy of means of verification." This far-fetched, artificial way of putting the question has been exposed for what it is more than once even in the United States. As prominent American specialists stated in August 1985, "the present level of development of seismology and the existing technical means of observing seismic waves make it possible to be confident that with the help of a network of seismological stations it would be possible to detect secret tests even if the yield of nuclear explosions does not exceed 1 kiloton." A treaty banning nuclear tests, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL stressed, is now entirely verifiable.

Today the world is following with keen attention the joint research by Soviet and American scientists in the sphere of the methodology of verification of nuclear tests. Under an agreement reached by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council, seismological recording centers equipped with highly sensitive instruments are to be sited in Kazakhstan and Nevada. This work has already begun in the Soviet Union, near Karkaralinsk; observations and the first recordings have been made.

The political significance of the implementation of this agreement is enormous. First, it is further evidence of the USSR's goodwill and readiness to go far in the sphere of verification and promote the creation of an atmosphere of confidence, and of its desire to put an end to nuclear tests. As Prof (F. Van Khippel) of Princeton University (United States) stated, the USSR's consent to the installation of American seismological equipment in the region of Semipalatinsk, that is, in the region where Soviet nuclear tests are conducted, shows that the new way of thinking, so necessary in the nuclear and space age, exists in practice in the Soviet Union and is manifested in the desire "to let others see what the USSR is doing." The Americans, allowed into the holy of holies, were given the opportunity to "record" the music of the Soviet moratorium.

Second, American scientists on the spot, so to speak, on Soviet territory, were able to see for themselves the justice of the USSR specialists' viewpoint: It is possible to
exercise verification of a moratorium on nuclear explosions with the help of national technical means. Even the not very sensitive instruments so far installed by the Americans registered the two nuclear explosions carried out in the United States during the Soviet-American experiment. And today considerably more sensitive equipment exists in the USSR, the United States, and other countries. The practical conclusion arising from this fact is quite clear: Today it is impossible to conceal the testing of even the smallest nuclear device, national technical means fully ensure reliable verification.

Third, the joint Soviet-American experiments simultaneously blew sky-high two theses used by the U.S. Administration to cover up its reluctance to reach agreement on a total nuclear test ban: on the "inadequacy of verification" and on how the USSR supposedly conceals its secrets, so that the "possibility of violation" of a future accord cannot be eliminated. The scientists experimenting in the Semipalatinsk region proved convincingly that the problem of verification, as a technical problem, does not exist, and that verification by the methods that have been developed by geophysicists is totally reliable. The very presence of U.S. scientists and American equipment in Kazakhstan demolishes the second thesis, exploited by those who support the creation of new nuclear weapons, whereby the Soviet Union will not agree to accept the broadest forms of verification — national and international, including on-site inspection and the installation of equipment. This has already been done, it turns out, and with no red tape.

Fourth, the practical possibility and effectiveness of joint work by Soviet and American representatives in the verification of the arms limitation process, as well as the idea of international cooperation in this sphere in general, is confirmed.

Fifth, on the admission of the scientists from the United States, their efforts help to restore the tarnished image of American science as a creative force. This image is indeed tarnished, since nearly any scientific achievement in the United States is very rapidly adapted to destructive purposes. This should not be: Science should serve mankind's prosperity.

The unique cooperation between Soviet and American scientists had a tremendous influence on world public opinion. But representatives of U.S. official circles reacted in various ways. Some with restrained curiosity, others with unconcealed displeasure. Pentagon chief C. Weinberger stated: "No, I don't think this is a decisive change. But I will be interested to know what they discover." They have discovered it! American nuclear explosions, and total silence on the Soviet range. This infuriated the well-known Pentagon "hawk" R. Perle, assistant defense secretary, who described the joint Soviet-American program as "absurd" and as playing "into the hands mainly of the Soviet Union."

Prof I. Cochran, chief geophysicist in seismography at the American Natural Resources Defense Council, replied to Perle in an ABC television program. "Richard Perle," he said, "does not want a ban on nuclear tests. As a result he slanders the entire project and tries to do everything he can to minimize its significance. Listen to what the scientists say at the Livermore Laurence radiation laboratory, listen to what the head of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences says. They are full of enthusiasm for the project. For the first time foreign citizens have been allowed into the Soviet Union to monitor activity connected with nuclear arms. That is a real success, and we must develop it. Now we have better opportunities than ever before for reaching agreement on a total nuclear test ban."

78
Yes, every opportunity now exists for this. The USSR's firm, consistent policy on this question, its practical steps in this direction -- the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, the invitation to American scientists with their equipment -- all this has created a good basis for agreement to be reached. The meeting that began in Geneva on 25 July between Soviet and American experts on a wide range of issues -- verification of nuclear explosions, ways of totally renouncing nuclear tests -- could help get things moving. As for verification, as the Soviet Union stated, there is one fundamental issue on our side -- verification of the ending of tests, verification that tests are not being held, rather than verification of their continuation and the improvement of nuclear weapons.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW CLAIMS AMERICANS UNINFORMED OF MORATORIUM

LD120129 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 12 Aug 86

[Valentin Zorin commentary]

[Excerpts] It is just over a year since the Soviet Union introduced a moratorium on all underground nuclear tests, urging the United States to follow suit. Valentin Zorin comments and this is what he writes:

Are all the Americans aware of the Soviet moratorium? Some time ago I had occasion to speak on the subject with an eminent American scientist who was in Moscow. He told me he thought that not all Americans were informed of this important Soviet step. [passage omitted] The silence in the American media on Soviet peaceful initiatives has now turned into a bad habit. But issues are involved that affect all people, including Americans. What does it mean to fully stop nuclear testing everywhere? I think that even a layman can see that without testing it is impossible to develop new types of nuclear weapons, consequently a freeze on tests stops the process of creating more and more dangerous and destructive types of weapons of mass annihilation. You will agree that this is quite important by itself.

Until recently the opponents of a half to testing in the United States made the assurance that their country could not allegedly stop the tests without a reliable system of verification, since the Soviet Union is supposedly certain to defeat the United States and to carry out secret tests. This argument could not stand up to criticism from the very beginning since the Soviet Union is interested in reliable verification as much as the United States. Regrettably we have no reason to trust the Pentagon more than it trusts us, therefore we supplemented our proposal for a moratorium with another constructive proposal providing for a reliable reciprocal system of verification, including at the nuclear test sites. [passage omitted] And so it has become clearer than ever before that the verification problem does not exist.

Having introduced the moratorium on nuclear arms tests more than a year ago the Soviet Union did not pursue any goals of propaganda. It is the fault of the United States that it is now sustaining a moral damage in the eyes of the whole world because of its shortsightedness and a stubborn stand. [passage omitted]

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW OUTLINES 'TREND' TOWARD NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

LD121459 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 12 Aug 86

[Mayak commentary read by Viktor Levin]

[Text] The prime ministers of Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have come to the common view on the need to appoint a commission of experts to study the possibility of creating a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe at a meeting in Steensgard near the Danish town of Odense. This was reported by TASS. At the microphone is Viktor Levin with a commentary:

The idea to create a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe was first expressed by Finnish President Kekkonen a good 20 years ago. The public was very well-disposed to it but the position of the northern countries included in NATO -- or to be more exact, the pressure from NATO circles on these states -- froze the implementation of the important proposal. Now it is obviously finding second wind in the creation of a commission of experts; this may not be decisive but it is an important step forward.

Why are the northern countries taking this step now? The week of commemorating Hiroshima and Nagasaki going on throughout the world probably helped to create the appropriate political atmosphere. And it is no accident at all that a session of the South Pacific forum was held over the same days at which the 13 member countries of this organization affirmed their resolve to set up a nuclear-free zone in the south of the ocean. And in Chicago, one of the major cities in the United States, the ceremonial unveiling of a memorial plaque took place certifying that Chicago is a nuclear-free zone.

The anniversary of the atomic bomb of the two Japanese towns has aroused a new wave of mass protests against the threat of nuclear destruction. However in my view, for all the importance of this factor, you cannot call it the single and determining one. Such anniversaries were marked previously as well and no less vigorously but the trend toward setting up nuclear-free zones was not displayed so graphically. The roots of this trend lie deeper and precisely in the fact that a new thinking in keeping with the nuclear age is taking possession of the consciousness of ever broader masses of the population of various countries and is providing an effective impetus for practical deeds.

Of particular significance is the fact that one of the greatest nuclear powers, the USSR, is actively facilitating not only the spread of this thinking but it is expressing it through such practical actions as the introduction of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear blasts -- in force a whole year -- and a plan for the phased
scraping of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Our policies show that mankind’s striving to deflect the threat of a nuclear catastrophe is not a good wish from those with whom, according to mythology, hell is paved, but a completely attainable reality if other nuclear states, primarily the United States, embark on this same road. Although as yet the United States has been demonstrating an unwillingness to listen to the voice of reason the new thinking is making itself felt increasingly strongly. This is being reflected in part in the development of the trend toward setting up nuclear-free zones.
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA COMMENTARY CALLS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

PM060854 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Aug 86 First Edition p 5

[Dmitriy Kosyrev commentary: "The Right Course"]

[Text] The idea of forming a zone free of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia is gaining increasingly broad support in the countries of this vast, populous region.

As is well known, this idea was put forward by Indonesia this summer at a conference of ASEAN foreign ministers held in Manila and met with a positive response there on the whole. It was decided to put the matter in practical form. And so the other day Indonesian Foreign Minister M. Kusumaatmaja confirmed: A corresponding draft treaty is now being drawn up in Jakarta.

Nuclear-free zones are now being formed in many regions of the world. It is the command of the times. It is also being felt in the Pacific Ocean basin, where it is becoming increasingly necessary to place a barrier in the way of the proliferation and buildup of nuclear weapons. Thus, 1 year ago a treaty was concluded to declare the entire south Pacific Ocean just such a zone. This document has been signed by Australia, New Zealand, and the island states in the region. It is planned for ratification next week.

Of course, the task of forming a nuclear-free zone under specific conditions of Southeast Asia is complex. There are a considerable number of problems involved here. In particular, there is the question of the Philippines, where two very large American military bases are sited with nuclear weapons, according to numerous reports. At this point it is appropriate to recall that Philippines President C. Aquino has stated the need to hold a referendum in the country on this issue, as there are constant pickets by demonstrators with protest placards at the gates of the bases themselves.

It is precisely the question of these bases that has long been regarded as the main obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the region. Back in 1971 the concept of a nuclear-free Southeast Asia was accepted by the ASEAN group, among others. However, for a long time it was believed that its practical implementation was in the distant future. Now, as we can see, the situation has changed. Life itself demands that this problem be resolved.

Indonesia's initiative in drawing up a nonnuclear treaty for Southeast Asia is based, as we can see, on a correct assessment of the mood of the public and a number of governments in the region and on the fact that the formation of a nuclear-free zone will strengthen peace and security in Southeast Asia, and also the prestige of those states which support this idea. Jakarta's efforts in this direction recently have been
persistent. It is very noteworthy that one of the Indonesian president's advisers said the other day that his country is also in favor of nonnuclear status for the whole of the Indian Ocean.

All this clearly shows that Southeast Asia is striving, as is the entire Pacific Ocean region, to rid itself of the nuclear threat and to become involved in the general process to establish an all-embracing international security system.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM AUGUST SESSION ON REGIONAL NFZ

IZVESTIYA Preview

PM071405 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 5

[F. Yevgenyev article: "Fresh Winds Over the Ocean"]

[Text] The 17th session of the South Pacific Forum (SPF) — a regional political and economic organization uniting 13 states and self-governing territories of the South Pacific — opens in the Fijian capital of Suva 8 August. The participants in the session, which is being held at head of government level, intend to discuss an extensive range of questions concerning the vital interests of the region's peoples.

It is expected that the session will finally formalize the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. In particular, it is planned to complete work on protocols to the treaty on a nuclear-free zone, which was approved by the previous SPF session held on Rarotonga Island (one of the Cook Islands).

The treaty envisages the rejection by the parties of the development [razrabotka], production, acquisition, and siting on their territories of any nuclear explosive devices and prohibits the holding of nuclear tests as well as the burial of radioactive waste within the zone covered by the treaty. It observes the principle of freedom of shipping on the open seas and of overflights. There are three protocols to the treaty which stipulate the nuclear powers' obligations in respecting the status of the nuclear-free zone, not using nuclear weapons against the parties to the treaty, not threatening to use them, and not testing any nuclear devices within the zone covered by the treaty.

The "Rarotonga treaty" has already been signed by 10 states: Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Western Samoa, Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Cook Islands, Niue, Papua New Guinea, and Nauru. Four of them — Fiji, the Cook Islands, Tuvalu, and Niue — have ratified the treaty, which will come into force after ratification by at least 8 countries.

The upsurge in antinuclear sentiments in Oceania is the direct result of the attempts by militarist U.S. circles to turn the Asia-Pacific region into an arena of military-political confrontation by siting U.S. nuclear forces there. Alarm is also generated among the local population by the continuing nuclear tests in the region.

The Soviet Union has always viewed the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world as an important measure in the struggle to narrow the sphere of nuclear preparations. From the outset our country has support the South Pacific states'
peace-loving efforts. The creation of a nuclear-free zone would be a contribution to the cause of setting up a multilateral security system in the Asia-Pacific region and consequently to the implementation of the historic task facing mankind — to entirely finish with nuclear weapons for ever.

It was stated at the February 1986 Moscow consultations between an SPF delegation and the Soviet side that the treaty together with the protocols under discussion would be largely in line with the criteria put forward by the USSR with regard to nuclear-free zones. At the same time the importance of indeed entirely ridding the states party to the treaty of nuclear arms was pointed out. This means prohibiting nuclear weapons from passing through their territories, including port calls or landings at airfields by foreign warships and aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard.

In our attitude to nuclear-free zones we make no exceptions for any states on the basis of their participation or nonparticipation in military alliances. We have one criterion: If a certain country does not have any nuclear weapons and none are present on its territory, it can be confident that the USSR will not use nuclear weapons against it.

The Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated in Vladivostok, supports the declaration of the South Pacific as a nuclear-free zone and calls on all the nuclear powers to guarantee its status either unilaterally or multilaterally.

Advocating the prevention of the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe and the elimination in this century of all types of mass destruction weapons, the total prohibition of nuclear tests, and the creation of a comprehensive international security system, the Soviet Union proceeds on the basis that the global foreign policy initiatives that it has put forward fully apply to the South Pacific and accord with the interests of the peoples who live there. Our country's course of developing friendly equal relations with the region's countries on the basis of respect for their independence is aimed in this direction.

It is from this standpoint that the USSR approaches the development of trade, economic, cultural, and other ties with our traditional partners in the South Pacific such as Australia and New Zealand, and the organization of mutually advantageous cooperation with Oceania's young states. The Soviet Union advocates giving these relations the necessary dynamism and making them progressive. Positive results have already been achieved on this path: A fishing agreement has been concluded with Kiribati and talks are under way on a similar agreement with Vanuatu, with whom diplomatic relations were recently established.

In extending the hand of friendship to the South Pacific states, the Soviet Union is not pursuing some kind of selfish aim nor striving to obtain unilateral security in this part of the world and to participate in extensive cooperation on the basis of the international division of labor are the aims of Soviet policy.

The strengthening of mutual confidence, good-neighborliness, and friendship among all the region's countries and the pooling of their efforts in the common search for constructive solutions to security problems would have a favorable effect not only on the situation in Asia and the Pacific but would also be a contribution to the cause of maintaining and strengthening universal peace.
Session Opens

LD081357 Moscow TASS in English 1207 GMT 8 Aug 86

[Text] Canberra August 8 TASS -- The South Pacific forum, an umbrella organization of 13 Pacific nations formed 15 years ago, opened its annual session in Suva, the capital of Fiji today. The top items on the agenda are the issue of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and New Caledonia's struggle for independence.

The first issue was discussed also at the forum's meeting last year, which worked out a treaty to proclaim the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone. This time several participating countries intend to press for strengthening the treaty to include a ban on the passage of nuclear-powered ships and ships with nuclear weapons on board anywhere in the zone and a provision prohibiting the production of uranium there and its export from there.

These countries include Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands which are not going to ratify the treaty in its present form. It is feared, however, that the United States, whose ships ply the waters in this part of the Pacific, and, following its example, also London and Paris will refuse to sign protocols to the treaty, which guarantee its observance. The Suva session will also pay much attention to the matter of independence for New Caledonia. The meeting is expected to take a decision to ask the U.N. Decolonization Committee to take up the issue.

Communique Reported

LD11627 Moscow TASS in English 1603 GMT 11 Aug 86

[Text] Canberra August 11 TASS -- Tass correspondent Alexey Voronin reports:

The 17th session of heads of the countries of the South Pacific forum ended today in the capital of Fiji, Suva. The participants in the forum that lasted for four days discussed topical questions of the further development of the economic and political cooperation and other forms of cooperation of countries and non-self-governing territories situated in the South Pacific. Particular attention was paid to questions of creating a nuclear-free zone in the area.

The final communique contains a resolute protest against nuclear testing and burial of any radioactive wastes in the ocean. The authors of the document criticized the policy of France which continued implementing a programme of nuclear weapon tests in the Mururoa Atoll.

The treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific endorsed by the South Pacific forum at its previous session promotes the strengthening of the security of the countries of the region, the communique says. The participants in the session expressed the hope that all nuclear powers will sign protocols to the treaty to ensure the observance of the non-nuclear status of the southern part of the Pacific. As is known, the Soviet Union and China declared in support of the treaty on non-nuclear zone. The communique reflected the fact that much attention at the session of the South Pacific forum was paid to the question of independence for New Caledonia, which remains an overseas territory of France. The participants in the meeting confirmed support for an early and peaceful transition of New Caledonia to independence and decided to ask the United Nations to have that question monitored by the world
community. The session expressed profound concern over the worsening of the situation in South Africa and expressed indignation over the policy of the South African authorities with regard to the country's African population. The communiqué also expresses "disappointment and concern" over the United States' unwillingness to take into consideration the interests of insular countries of the region in the sphere of fisheries. The United States stubbornly refuses to pay out to countries of Oceania compensation for fish caught in their economic zones, the document says. It has been decided to hold the next session of the forum in Western Samoa in 1987.

Soviet Support Noted

OW081407 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0200 GMT 8 Aug 86
[From the "Novosti" newscast: Viktor Konnov commentary on the conference of Southern Pacific antinuclear organizations in Suva, Fiji]

[Text] Hello comrades. First a short reference: Exactly 1 year ago representatives of 13 states of this region, including Australia, New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Fiji, and others adopted a decision to declare the southern part of the Pacific Ocean a nuclear-free zone. In this vast area, which stretches thousands of kilometers from the equator to Antarctica, from Australia to the shores of South America, the possession, use, stockpiling, and testing of nuclear devices are prohibited — as is the storage of nuclear waste. This decision is quite natural in view of the fact that the economies of a majority of the countries in this region depend on fishing.

The local people say: The ocean is our breadbasket. Therefore, the islanders are protesting French nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll, which pollutes the ocean, as well as American and Japanese attempts to dump nuclear waste near the islands.

At the conference in the Fijian capital, antinuclear organizations of the southern part of the Pacific Ocean once again demand a stop to the militarization of this region and an end to French nuclear tests in Polynesia. A special report prepared by the organizers of the conference exposes the underhand activities of the CIA, which is attempting to contain the rise of the antinuclear movement in this part of the world.

The Soviet position on this question is well known. It was once again reiterated in the speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Vladivostok. Comrade Gorbachev said: We favor placing barriers in the path of the spread and growth of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific Ocean. The USSR supports the announcement of the establishment of the southern part of the Pacific Ocean as a nuclear-free zone and calls on all nuclear powers to guarantee its status, either unilaterally or bilaterally.

PRAVDA Commentary

PM121459 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Aug 86 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent O. Skalkin dispatch: "Pacific Means Nonnuclear; South Pacific Forum Session Ends; 13 Members Reaffirm Resolve To Create Nuclear-Free Zone in South Pacific; Documents Urging Nuclear Powers To Observe Provisions of Treaty on Zone Adopted"]

[Text] Suva -- The latest, 17th session of the South Pacific Forum [SPF] was held in the Fijian capital of Suva 8 through 11 August. It generated extensive international interest. At their previous meeting a year ago the SPF countries adopted a document
whose importance transcends the regional framework. It was then in Avarua (Cook Islands) that the so-called treaty of intent on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific was proclaimed. This initiative by the 13 SPF states was greeted worldwide as an important measure in narrowing the sphere of nuclear preparations.

The document prohibits for all time the siting, production, and testing of nuclear weapons throughout the vast zone, as well as the burial of radioactive waste.

The forum, the Suva meeting communiqué states, reaffirmed its viewpoint that the treaty serves as a significant addition to the existing system of controlling the arms race and ensuring disarmament and will be an important contribution to providing a favorable climate for security in the region.

The present meeting discussed practical steps in creating a nuclear-free zone. Final versions of protocols developing the principles of the Avarua agreement were adopted and the commitments of the states party to the treaty were specified.

Documents accompanying the treaty were specially addressed to the United States, Britain, and France, which have dependent territories in the Pacific, urging them to observe the treaty's main principles in these territories. It is proposed that all nuclear states respect the zone's nuclear-free status. As is well known, this is an extremely vexed question for the United States, which is building up its militarist activity in this part of the world. France's attitude to nuclear tests on Mururoa also remains the same. According to reports from Paris these tests will continue.

The Soviet position on the nuclear-free zone made an enormous impression in the SPF countries. The Soviet Union's support for its proclamation and M.S. Gorbachev's appeal to all nuclear powers to guarantee the zone's status unilaterally or multilaterally remain the center of public attention as an act demonstrating love of peace and friendship. The Soviet proposals to develop just relations with the Pacific countries have fallen on good soil.

The course of the present session and its results have reaffirmed the SPF members' common desire to prevent their region's involvement in the nuclear arms race. As expected, sentiments in support of further strengthening and making comprehensive the nuclear-free status of the emergent zone were expressed at the session. The Solomon Islands, for instance, Peter Kenilorea, the country's prime minister, stated, "believe that the treaty does not go far enough as regards the monitoring of nuclear activity in the Pacific." A similar position is taken by Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea. These countries' governments would like the treaty restrictions to be extended to include nuclear weapons crossing the nuclear-free zone aboard warships or aircraft. In its present form the treaty leaves these questions to the discretion of the SPF members themselves. "It also sidesteps the fact," the newspaper THE AUSTRALIAN writes, "that Australia has permitted the creation on its soil of (American — O.S.) communications centers and tracking bases which are part of the nuclear submarine backup system..."

This dilemma was not resolved at the session. Its great achievement was the support given by the forum countries to the New Caledonian national liberation movement. The SPF countries' collective appeal that the United Nations register French possessions in the Pacific as countries suitable for decolonization will promote the elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism in this part of the world.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: GORBACHEV ACCEPTS SCIENTISTS' DECLARATION ON TEST BAN

LD141959 Moscow TASS in English 1946 GMT 14 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow, 14 July (TASS)—Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today met a group of scientists, founders of the forum for a nuclear test ban, at the request of foreign participants in it.

Giovanni Marini-Betolla, professor of Rome University and a member of the Papal Academy of Sciences, handed to Mikhail Gorbachev on behalf of all the participants in the forum the text of the declaration unanimously approved by them. It is addressed to the leaders of all the nuclear powers, first and foremost the USSR and the USA. Presenting the document, the Italian scientists stressed that the adoption of the declaration had become possible thanks to a special atmosphere created by the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and by the joint work of Soviet and American scientists to establish a seismic system to verify compliance with a nuclear weapon test ban.

Accepting the text of the scientists' declaration, Mikhail Gorbachev welcomed all the participants in the international forum. Your meeting, he noted, was devoted to the most urgent problem of our time, which is related to the preservation of human civilization. The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee said: "It is a responsible document, which meets the interests of all countries regardless of which political system they belong to. It has a special significance because it was drawn up and approved by competent people, and approved by consensus, which lends it even more weight. Your address will be examined most closely. The Soviet Government will take a decision, which will be conveyed to you."

Mikhail Gorbachev had a far-ranging conversation with Soviet and foreign scientists. In conclusion he expressed the hope that the cause initiated by the participants in the forum would be developed and win the support of all those who are worried by the current world situation.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: BULGARIAN SCIENTIST ON NUCLEAR TEST VERIFICATION PROCEDURES

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[Text] Moscow, 21 July (TASS)—"The main 'argument' of the United States to the effect that it is impossible to verify the termination of nuclear explosions has been refuted scientifically and unconditionally, and not by 'the Soviets', but by Americans themselves," Vladimir Topencharov, a member of the Academy of Sciences of Bulgaria, wrote in PRAVDA today.

He commented on the report that American scientists registered the nuclear explosion conducted 17 July at the U.S. test range. They did so in the Soviet city of Karkaralinsk which is situated at a distance of fourteen time zones from Nevada.

"The Karkaralinsk 'echo' of the nuclear blast in Nevada has demonstrated," Vladimir Topencharov went on, "that modern science and technology enable political leaders to look into the future and forecast with exceptional accuracy that if armament is not stopped we will be faced with the terrible danger of a universal nuclear holocaust, the end of both civilization and humankind."

"This is the reason why the conclusions made by the scientists who attended the Moscow forum for the termination of nuclear explosions are so timely and important," Vladimir Topencharov wrote. "These are the conclusions that the problem of terminating nuclear tests of all types must not be postponed any further. A delay may well prove to be fatal and lead to a situation whereby the fate of the world will be decided not by the presidents, like today, but by the equipment gone out of control."

In this connection Vladimir Topencharov emphasized: "At a meeting with a group of scientists in Moscow Mikhail Gorbachev demonstrated in full view of the whole world the trust of the Soviet Government in the conclusions of modern science and its readiness to do everything possible to safeguard life on this planet."

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RELATED ISSUES

FRG: DISARMAMENT IS ONLY ONE PART OF EAST-WEST PICTURE

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 27 June 86 p 5

[Article by Kurt Becker: "Hopes for Detente: In an Independent Role: Bonn's Special Interest in Disarmament"]

[Text] It is traditional in Bonn to measure the quality of the East-West relationship first and foremost according to prospects for an arms limitation, and lately even according to prospects for disarmament. Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher do not miss a single opportunity to hold forth the seriousness of the Soviet disarmament offer for nuclear weapons, and now of the Budapest Declaration by the Warsaw Pact states on conventional disarmament as well. And they do so with a sense of relief, because, unexpectedly, President Reagan now sees a possible turning point in these proposals as well.

Another particular characteristic of Bonn's interest in a reasonably promising continuation of the negotiations is the fact that it does not view disarmament as a valuable goal in and of itself, but moreover—to a much more pronounced extent than other partners—is concerned about the driving force that could radiate from disarmament results to the area of general cooperation with the East. This is shown most clearly in Genscher's continual plea for the revival of the policy of detente. It is betting on a breakthrough to "new shores." Germany's geostrategic position and the existence of two German states set standards for Bonn's disarmament policy that are in no sense always shared by our allies or even at least taken into consideration.

The West German government must hope and attempt to see to it that the United States fulfills the premises for promising negotiations, because otherwise the goals of disarmament, which primarily relate to Europe, would remain hollow words, even if it is a conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals, as Soviet leader Gorbachev has proposed. Because experience has shown that the forces reductions negotiations in Vienna (MBFR) as well as the Stockholm forum, where trust-building measures for Europe are to be decided upon, are both in the doldrums, and that this is because a rapprochement between the big two in strategic questions has not yet come to pass.

For this reason, Bonn's role in the disarmament business consists of working on the creation of a consensus with the United States. At the moment, the fundamental conditions being promoted by our European allies as well are: no
violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with the USSR, and an acknowledgment in principle of the SALT model for arms limitation and disarmament. Otherwise, the dialogue with Moscow would dry up. At a time at which criticism of Washington is growing on all sides and conversely the tendency in the White House to make unilateral decisions in the alliance is also increasing, this attempt at a conceptual rapprochement is a continual tightrope act. On the one hand, the West German government cannot, for reasons of security policy, neglect intellectual affinity with Washington. On the other hand, it must be able to participate in the overall strategy, because it has assumed the lion's share of the conventional defense of Western Europe.

Unfortunately, it is precisely in this regard that European unity is lacking. It is true that the Europeans have managed to establish a high-ranking group of experts within the alliance so that a joint negotiating position vis-à-vis Gorbachev's proposal for a conventional disarmament can be drawn up. But nowhere is there a precise idea of the form of desired stability.

The response to Gorbachev's Budapest appeal is a matter for the alliance, but it would seem reasonable for Bonn to come forth with an exceptional wealth of ideas, because of its tradition as spokesman for the reduction of forces in Central Europe and as the state most affected by this. It is true that the Soviet offer raises many questions; but the positive assessment carries weight. This refers to the Soviet willingness to see plans for disarmament, which were previously geared exclusively to nuclear arms, expanded to the important components of conventional arms. Through this, the objection that Gorbachev is ignoring the conventional superiority of the Soviets and concentrating exclusively on nuclear disarmament is no longer applicable. Furthermore, the Soviet leader is confronting the traditional objection that the region thus far foreseen for reductions in forces within the framework of MBFR—from the Rhine to the Bug—is too small geographically; in view of present-day transport possibilities, the important Western negotiating goal of making a standing Soviet attack impossible is allegedly sheer illusion. And finally, the Soviets have replaced the hitherto pursued upper limit for conventional forces with the concept of a reduction in several phases, ultimately to 500,000 troops on each side.

On the other hand, however, Gorbachev's proposed involvement of the neutral states in the negotiating process is not without its problems. How will their arms potential be calculated? Not insignificant is also the fact that no Western European medium-sized power is as interested in conventional disarmament in equally political and military terms as is the FRG—least of all France, our most important European partner. The reciprocal reduction in forces vehemently championed by Bonn was always a thorn in the side of former President Giscard d'Estaing. He feared that a European region with a special status of armaments could develop into a separate political league of states. In particular, however, a watering down of the German approaches was not in keeping with his security policy or with the priority of nuclear armament, which continues to this day and which has always taken place at the expense of conventional weapons. The question is which of these reservations will continue to apply even if the region of conventional disarmament now extends from the Atlantic to the Urals.
Nowhere are the variations of conventional disarmament linked so intensely with the hope for stabilization in Europe, for detente and for cooperation with the East, as they are in Bonn. The reduction of forces at one time even seemed to be a Western boost to the attempt to find a political balance in Europe. Especially since the FRG was involved in the drafting of this plan. Almost all differences in Western disarmament policy can today be traced back to the enormously divergent assessments of Soviet policy. They are one of the main causes of the transatlantic conflicts, because the White House does not think much of detente. It is not even making the attempt any longer to employ disarmament policy as a lever for international moderation of the USSR. This naturally makes cooperation within the alliance difficult. And yet the question remains of whether Gorbachev’s method of publicly pursued diplomacy is not oriented towards continuing to pursue the old goal of increasing the already-existing political distance between Europe and the United States—and in particular of tempting Bonn to seek unusual possibilities in the area of disarmament in order to alleviate the antagonism between East and West.

There is a price to be paid for our special geographic and political position. Bonn must give special priority to disarmament and correspondingly assert its influence in the alliance. But the limits are also to be considered. They are to be found at the point at which Bonn is threatened by isolation.

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