East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ATA CITES COMBINE LETTER TO HOXHA ON 76TH BIRTHDAY

AU161045 Tirana ATA in English 0945 GMT 16 Oct 84

[From the Press Review]

[Text] Tirana, 16 Oct (ATA)--The working people of Enver Hoxha Automobile and Tractor Combine in Tirana have undertaken scores of revolutionary actions and movements. Their initiatives to raise the efficiency of economy and improve the proletariat discipline have become known throughout the country, the newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT writes today in one of its articles, entitled the Workers Always on the Vanguard at Work and Thought. [No quotation marks as received] The article says among other that some days ago the working people of the combine sent a letter of wishes to our beloved leader of the party and people, Comrade Enver Hoxha, on the occasion of the 76th anniversary of his birthday. The letter said among others:

We inform you joyfully that the working collective of the Enver Hoxha automobile and Tractor Combine successfully concluded the great action it undertook in September on the occasion of the 76th anniversary of your birthday. The total industrial production was realized 114.8 per cent. The production of the spare parts for automobiles was fulfilled 110.7 per cent while that of new machinery and equipment 113.4 per cent. The index of labor and the financial indices were perceptibly improved. The net income of the enterprise was realized 112.5 per cent, whereas the cost was reduced by 400 thousand leks more than planned. After reporting on the other important achievements on this occasion, the working people of the combine undertook new pledges for the five year plan.

...We wish you wholeheartedly a good health and a long life, may you live as long as our mountains for the good of the party and people, the letter concludes.

CSO: 2020/13
HOXHA THANKS FOR BIRTHDAY GREETINGS

AU201430 Tirana ATA in English 0900 GMT 20 Oct 84

["Message of Thanks of Comrade Enver Hoxha"--ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, 20 Oct (ATA)—Today's press carries the message of thanks that the beloved leader of our party and people, Comrade Enver Hoxha, has sent to the collectives, organizations of the party, mass organizations of work and production centers, units of our armed forces, families of martyrs of the national liberation war, the compatriot brothers and sisters living abroad and far from the homeland Marxist-Leninist, old comrades and friends, who sent him messages of greetings on occasion of the 76th anniversary of his birthday.

Comrade Enver Hoxha's message of thank says:

On occasion of the 76th anniversary of my birthday, I have received many telegrams and messages of greetings from collectives, party organizations of work and production centers, from units of our armed forces, families of the martyrs of national liberation war, from old comrades and friends.

Their cordial wishes and greetings as well as the reports on the successes they have scored in realizing the planned tasks and the tasks set in the context of the glorious jubilee of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the country, have pleased me so much.

Brothers, sisters, and friends and comrades.

I thank all of your wholeheartedly for the warm wishes you sent me. I too, extend to you my warmest greetings and wish you good health, joys in your family life, successes at work. All together, as a single body, in steel unity with the party, with lofty revolutionary spirit and optimism, with sharp vigilance towards the imperialist and revisionist enemies of every hue, let us see to the great November celebrations stronger than ever and with a rich balance sheet of success. [sentence as received]

I have received messages of greetings also from the compatriots living abroad and far from the homeland. Their wishes are an expression of their great love for their beloved motherland, from which nothing can separate them.
My compatriot brothers and sisters.

I am proud of your ardent feelings for our beloved people and homeland, so much dear to all of us. The wishes you sent me give me more strength and arouse my sense of responsibility to work and fight relentlessly for the consolidation of the independence and the flourishing of our homeland. I wish happiness and joy to you and your families.

I have also received warm greetings and wishes, cordial and full of sympathy from many respected friends and well-wishers of socialist Albania and Marxist-Leninist comrades from different countries of the world.

Dear and respected friends, Marxist-Leninist comrades.

Your wishes, are, first of all, an expression of the love and respect you have for the Albanian people and for their party of labor, and a powerful support for our struggle for the construction of the socialist society in Albania. In the name of the people and the party, I thank you and wish you the working masses and the fraternal peoples you represent, happiness and prosperity.

Once again I wholeheartedly thank you all.

Yours, Enver Hoxha.

CSO: 2020/13
DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER AT ORCHESTRA ANNIVERSARY

AU191856 Tirana ATA in English 0700 GMT 18 Oct 84

[Text] Tirana, 18 Oct (ATA)--On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the creation of wind orchestra of the People's Army, a jubilee meeting was organized in the central house of the People's Army in the capital yesterday afternoon. Attending were ex-orchestrators and members of this troupe, military-men, working men of art and culture, youths, etc.

Present were also the member of the Central Committee of the Party Ali Vukatana, the secretary of the Writers' and Artists' League of Albania Feim Ibrahimi and other comrades.

The militaryman Petref Mucaj spoke on the 40-year-long activity of the wind orchestra of the Army.

The Vice Minister of People's Defense Bajram Mane greeted on behalf of the Ministry of People's Defense.

Then greetings were read out in the name of the veterans and the effectiveness of this orchestra, which comes to its festivity with a broader repertoire and a higher level of execution and interpretation, being mobilized to crown with success the activities in this jubilee year of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and the triumph of the people's revolution. This troupe has staged 1,000 concerts over the last 5 years alone.

CSO: 2020/13
GDR LEADERS GRATITUDE MESSAGE TO ZHIVKOV, FILIPOV

AU221202 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 19 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the State Council, and Grisha Filipov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, have received the following telegram from Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, and from Willi Stoph, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers:

Esteemed Comrades,

On behalf of the SED Central Committee, the State Council and Council of Ministers of the GDR, as well as on behalf of the GDR people, and on our own behalf we would like to express most sincere gratitude to you for the congratulations conveyed to us on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the GDR.

We fully share your opinion that the relations of fraternal friendship and cooperation between our two parties, countries, and peoples are constantly expanding and strengthening. Our two countries will also in the future continue to make their contribution to the consolidation of the unity and cohesion of the socialist community and will actively support the preservation of lasting peace, security, and cooperation in Europe and the world.

We wish you and all working people in the People's Republic of Bulgaria great new successes in the struggle to implement the decision adopted by the 12th BCP Congress and we wish personal health and creative strength to you in your highly responsible activities.

CSO: 2200/16
BCP DECIDES TO INTRODUCE COMPUTERS IN EDUCATION

AU191622 [Editorial Report] Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian on 18 October 1984 carries on page 1, a 1,200-word decision of the BCP Central Committee Politburo on "Providing Comprehensive Conditions for Education and Work of Youth With Computer Technology." This document explains that after "ensuring comprehensive political, material-technological, organizational conditions and cadres for realizing the initiative launched by the Dimitrov Komsomol," the BCP Central Committee Politburo decided to introduce computers into the education and work of the coming generation because of their "strategic importance for the comprehensive socioeconomic development of our country" and because they are a factor for the "multifaceted and communist education of personality."

The decision further deals with details on the activity of the various organs and organizations that should provide "comprehensive cadres, material-technological, financial, and other conditions for developing a mass movement which will enable the young generation to be trained and work with computers." According to the decision, the party-state commission for problems of youth, the BCP Central Committee departments and the Council of Ministers are assigned to constantly check up on "the coordinational activity of the party, state, economic scientific and public organs and organizations" for the timely training of youth in computer technology. In conclusion, the decision calls on the information mass media to widely popularize and assist the initiative of the Komsomol. The BCP Central Committee Politburo also expresses the conviction that effective work with computers will give "a second faculty" to the younger generation.

CSO: 2200/16
ZHIVKOV GREETINGS MESSAGE TO HUNTERS UNION READ

AU171401 [Editorial Report] Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian on 16 October carries on pages 1 and 6 a 1,500-word report by Petranka Dimitrova, BTA correspondent from the town of Veliko Tarnovo where the centennial of the "Organized Hunting Movement" in Bulgaria was solemnly celebrated on 15 October 1984. The main report was read by Lieutenant General Khristo Ruskov, chairman of the Bulgarian Hunting and Fishing Union, who described the development of the hunters' movement in Bulgaria.

At the centennial meeting, Vasil Tsanov, secretary of the BCP Central Committee, read a 500-word greetings message from Todor Zhivkov, BCP Central Committee general secretary, to the festive jubilee plenum, in which it is emphasized that since the "very beginning of the organization's existence the Bulgarian hunters have been struggling for the preservation of the game resources in Bulgaria." In the letter Zhivkov further states: "The organized hunting movement in Bulgaria found the best conditions for the implementation of its noble goals in the years of socialist construction and particularly throughout the most recent decades. The democratic principles of the organization have broadly expanded and the initiative, as well as the creative efforts of its members to establish a modern, intensive hunting and fishing economy have been consolidated."

Zhivkov's letter also emphasizes that the Hunting and Fishing Union "has asserted itself as an authoritative, social organization."

Zhivkov's letter further points out that "it is necessary to improve educational work and discipline within the entire organization and to wage an even more offensive struggle against selfish consumers' attitudes and their most ugly manifestation—poaching."

Manifesting his personal interest in the organization, Zhivkov points out as follows in his letter: "As you know, I am a long-time and regular member of the union, and as a hunter I am constantly interested in the life of our organization. This justifies the reason for my expressing our joint confidence that the program adopted by the 10th jubilee congress of our union will be implemented, and that our noble and patriotic movement will attract new members and supporters."

CSO: 2200/15
BULGARIA

BRIEFS

GENERAL TRUNSKI AWARDED—The State Council has issued a decree awarding Slavcho Stamenov Trunski, Hero of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, with the title Hero of Socialist Labor on his active participation in the struggle against fascism and capitalism, his extraordinary merits for the Bulgarian People's Army, and on his 70th birthday. [Text] [Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 21 Oct 84 AU]

'LYUDMILA ZHIVKOVA' FOUNDATION'S ANNIVERSARY—Sofia, 20 Oct (BTA)—The second anniversary of the "Lyudmila Zhivkova" palace of culture. The celebration of the anniversary of this organization which has dedicated its work to most humane aims was attended by the founders and members of the foundation's bureau and council. In his speech at last night's celebration, Mr Vladimir Zhivkov, chairman of the international foundation, deputy chairman of the committee for culture and chief director of the "Banner of Peace" center announced that foreign foundations and companies have granted the foundation scholarships thanks to which talented Bulgarian youths have the opportunity to study abroad. The foundation maintains close contacts with UNESCO, it made a gift to this organization and will grant scholarships for students from the developing countries. Mr Vladimir Zhivkov pointed out that one of the important aspects of the activities of the foundation is its joint work with the "Banner of Peace" movement. In the International Year of Youth their common task will be organization of the international children's "Banner of Peace"—Sofia '85" assembly. [Excerpts] [Sofia BTA in English 0800 GMT 20 Oct 84 AU]

ZHIVKOV, WFTU LEADERS AT MEETING—On 18 October at Sofia's Lyudmila Zhivkova People's Palace of Culture a festive meeting marking the 80th anniversary of Bulgaria's revolutionary trade union movement took place. Party and state leaders led by Comrade Todor Zhivkov, as well as the Secretariat of the WFTU, took their seats in the presidium of the meeting. Veterans of the trade union movement, Heroes of Socialist Labor, and trade union figures also attended the meeting. The State Council has awarded the Bulgarian Trade Unions for the second time with the Georgi Dimitrov Order on their anniversary. The order was festively conferred by Comrade Todor Zhivkov. A speech on the glorious road of the Bulgarian trade union movement was read by Petur Dyulgerov, chairman of the Central Council of the Bulgarian Trade Unions. Ibrahim Zakaria, secretary general of the WFTU, read a message from the participants in the 36th session of the WFTU General Council to the Bulgarian Trade Unions on their anniversary. [Excerpts] [Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 18 Oct 84]
CSSR DAILY ATTACKS FRG REVANCHISM

AU051540 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 3 Oct 84 p 6

[Jan Kovarik article: "Yen For Revenge Is a Part Of Imperialist Plans; Activation of Revanchism In the FRG"—passages between slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] /Revanche means yearning for revenge for a military or political defeat. This yearning is one of the driving forces of world imperialism, which since the October Revolution has been striving with all means to bring about the reversal of the world's development. And a part of this social revanche also is territorial revanchism, the yearning to recover territories lost as the consequence of war and to change the existing borders anchored in international treaties. This was stressed at the international scientific symposium on revanchism and militarism, held in Prague on 18-20 September. /

In the case of the FRG, revanchism was already laid in its cradle, in the form of some constitutional formulations, created with U.S. connivance. These formulations were invoked by West German imperialism in the fifties, when it wanted to liquidate the GDR, it pleaded them in the seventies when opposing the FRG treaties with the socialist countries and the Helsinki Final Act; it was on these articles of the Constitution that Chancellor Kohl formulated in the parliament in 1983 and in Braunschweig this year the following sentence: "The German question remains open." By saying that, he identified himself with /revanchism as a state policy concept of the perception of the results of World War II. /

The Role of American Missiles

The FRG ruling circles are aware that they need prominent support to assert its revanchist plans. They have received it, above all from the United States, whose president has declared a "crusade against communism" with the objective of "destroying socialism as a social system." By a surprise first-strike nuclear attack with weapons deployed on West European territory. Therefore those on the Rhine are so vehemently pushing through these weapons, and that despite the opposition of the majority of the population. On Reagan's crusade and missiles, the West German bourgeoisie hinges the hope that they will help to bring the day of "German unity" nearer.
The Bonn cabinet is obviously already preparing for that day. On 18 September 1984, the chancellor declared before voters in Krefeld (within the framework of the campaign prior to the local elections in North Rhine Westphalia), that by of the very title of his office he is "dutybound to think about his fellow countrymen in the GDR." His Finance Minister Stoltenberg again said at the rally of the Pomeranian and Mannschaft in Dortmund on 17 June 1984 that the objective "of changing the conditions in the communist sphere of power for the better" remains. There is no need to ask for whose benefit these changes are to occur. In June in Munich, Interior Minister Zimmermann was glorified by Sudeten Germans for having depicted them as "the country's first peace movement." At a rally of West Prussians in Munster in May, Minister Windelen was termed a "clever and correct adviser, who inspires courage," because he publicly included "Dresden and Warsaw, Prague and Budapest" in their Europe.

Political and Material Support

The words of support for the 21 Landsmannschaften associated in the so-called Union of Expellees are followed--on the part of the government--also by deeds. For example, according to the decision of the Lands' Ministers of Culture all atlases depicting the "Third Reich" in the 1937 boarders must be removed from schools in the FRG. The explanatory notes of the teaching syllabus pertaining to the "German question" contain the following words: "The population today living on the territory of the GDR, as well as the Silesians and the inhabitants of East and West Prussia belong to our nation." A so-called East German textbook was also published for schools, which is intended to keep pupils in contact with "the entire German nation." Minister of State in the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs Merted [title and name as published] demands that not only the "open German question" be propagated in schools, but also the "question of borders."

The revanchist unions claim that they have 2.5 million members and that they exert influence over at least twice as many voters. In the West German parliament they are represented by 44 deputies and it is no secret that offices in various Landsmannschaften are a springboard for a higher political career./ The state budget bankrools the activity of these organizations with millions of D-Marks in various areas, from the social all the way to the cultural and educational spheres. And in the Bundeslaender and municipalities the situation in similar.

For example, a Sudeten Germans' center is currently being built in Munich at the cost of DM25 million, another center is being built in Lubeck, in Ratzenburg and so forth. Mostly with taxpayers' money. In dozens of places there are some sort of small museums that are not cultural institutions, but centers for schooling the revanchist young generation and for poisoning the minds of youth. And because the Landsmannschaften are facing the problem of a dwindling number of members, any FRG citizen can join their ranks, regardless from where he originates. The main thing, allegedly, is enthusiasm for working on a "common German task." The "patronaxes" of dozens of West German cities over individual revanchist groups are also intended to help this aim.
Who Is Troubled By the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements

And thus while antifascists and peace-defenders are being prosecuted in the FRG, revanchists are enjoying the favors of official quarters. The activity of the Landsmannschaften has increased since the election of R. Reagan as president of the United States, and this declaration of a "crusade against socialism," and also since the current Bonn CDU-CSU/FDP Government coalition came to power.

Within the NATO framework today, the U.S. and the FRG forces are being augmented, forces that constitute the axis of that offensive grouping. They are exerting pressure on smaller countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands, to be subordinate and deploy new American nuclear weapons. The Landsmannschaften also are betting on that course. They are cherishing the hope that this could reverse the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, which were meant to contribute to speeding up the defeat of Nazism and transform Germany into a democratic, peace-loving state, from the soil of which war must never again emanate./

It is true that the majority of the West German population does not agree with the revanchists. On the other hand, however, one has to see what pressure from the revanchist, nationalist and almost chauvinist propaganda the West German public is currently subjected to. Also the change of the leading functionaries of the Landsmannschaften shows that revanchism is undergoing a "rejuvenation treatment." It is obvious that international imperialism counts with revanchism as a factor of its global strategy of "direct confrontation" with the countries of the socialist community, as an element of the "crusade" against socialism and progress, against peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Therefore the struggle against revanchism is the struggle for security and peace in the world.

CSO: 2400/24
KORCAK SPEECH AT PRAGUE RALLY

AU091520 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 5 Oct 84 p 2

["Speech by Comrade Josef Korcak," CPCZ Central Committee Presidium member and premier of the Czech Socialist Republic, as head of the delegation of the CPCZ Central Committee, the Central Committee of the CSSR's National Front, the CSSR Government, and the CSSR Ministry of National Defense to the festive gathering of Prague's Army, held on 4 October in honor of the 40th anniversary of the Carpathian-Dukla Operation and the Day of the Czechoslovak People's Army at Vinohrady Theater in Prague]

[Excerpts] On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the culmination of the Czechoslovak people's national liberation struggle against Hitlerite fascism, and of the gradual liberation of the territory of our fatherland by the glorious Soviet Army, we are recalling a number of historical landmarks.

Already, 40 years have passed since the historical Dukla events. This is not a long time in the history of nations and states. The path to the present was neither easy, nor simple. We have achieved convincing results on this path, because we proceeded from the longings of whole generations of working people; because we relied on the lasting values and dearly bought experience of the national liberation movement; because we acted in harmony with the vital interests of the people and constantly kept in mind the socialist perspective.

The fulfillment of our plans is guaranteed by new creative deeds; by heroism in overcoming the present obstacles; by the ability to think and act within the criteria of the socialist community and to actively contribute toward developing the CEMA economy; by the revolutionary spirit in everyday work, in the enforcement of progress in research and development, and in the defense of the people's socialist achievements.

We rely on a strong economic base, on the qualifications and cultural maturity of the people. But the requirements set by life are stepping up the demands placed on our state, and also on every working man. We have a lot of worries ensuring sufficient energy, raw materials and foodstuffs. We must improve our handling of the economy so as to be able to acquire the means for necessary imports through the exports of our products, and so as to be able to devote a greater part of the national revenue to raising living standards. We are faced with the task of achieving better harmony between the development of
production forces and environmental protection. For all of this we need, above all, good work, a responsible approach, and a sense of all-social interests. The sooner, speedier, and more surely we progress in this, the better we will fulfill the purpose of socialist patriotism and socialist internationalism. We are also mobilized to this end by the conclusions of the CPCZ Central Committee session which ended yesterday.

Together with the economy and other spheres of our domestic policy, the CPCZ and the socialist state are devoting primary care to the defense of our fatherland and to the security of our country. The international situation is exacerbated, the fight against the forces which threaten socialism and peaceful work is becoming increasingly urgent. To frustrate imperialist threats, to overcome the dangerous policy of armament and aggression, requires the preparedness of armed forces, requires the necessary material means for defense, and also requires the population's conscientious patriotic and international attitude toward the issues of the defense of our fatherland. We have forgotten neither the harsh lessons of Munich and of the occupation; nor the losses and sacrifices of World War II. That is why in our country, too, alarm and just indignation are evoked by all attempts to revise the postwar realities in Europe, and by all expressions of revanchism. The endeavors to continue the anticommunist crusade campaigns and to revive the legacy of the brown plague [of fascism] show that not everybody has learned his lesson from the past. Together with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, we are constantly striving to prevent anything like that from ever being repeated. The serious nature of our times requires that we refrain from merely longing for peace, but that we actively contribute toward developing our socialist society; that we work so as to make all things that weaken the strength of our republic disappear from our life.

The socialist community has set itself a great task—to rid mankind of world wars; and it is doing all that is necessary and possible to achieve this goal. The response to the militarist policy of "peace from the position of strength," to the military programs of accumulating increasingly destructive arms, and to the aggressive intentions of imperialism is provided by the economic summit of cema member states, which was held in June: "No world problem, and that also applies to the historic conflict between socialism and capitalism, can be resolved by military means." With the long-term program of peaceful economic construction we have demonstrated to the whole world the advantages of the socialist social system and the inevitability of the victory of its humanitarian ideals.

The countries of the Warsaw Pact will permit nobody to speak to them from the position of strength; we will not permit any military supremacy. We are and will be advocates of resolving all complicated international problems via negotiations; but only via business-like negotiations, honorable negotiations which would be neither an evasive maneuver, nor a cover for deceiving the world public. They should really lead to a halt of feverish armament and to a reduction of nuclear arsenals, right up to their total liquidation.

Our line is the firm protection of political and military-strategic positions of socialism, combined with a coordinated, active, and enterprising effort to
achieve practical results in the limitation of feverish armament. We are in favor of searching for ways out of the present situation; we welcome every specific step in the direction of real detente. A mere change in the vocabulary used, and mere promises, will not deceive us.

The problems of our contemporary world cannot be resolved by perfecting and amassing arms, or by building new military bases, militarising outer space, and deploying new kinds of American weapons in Western Europe. In our nuclear century, thinking in categories such as "strength," "intimidation," or "supremacy" must be replaced by terms such as nonuse of force, trust, equality, and mutual respect for the interests of security. This standpoint, voiced last week from the platform of the UN General Assembly by the USSR representative, expresses the stand maintained by our own people, too.

In the interests of truth, we are openly pointing to the authors of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. The source of the danger of war is imperialism—and particularly the current U.S. and NATO policy, which is based on false hopes of a change in the correlation of forces in the world, on prospectless notions about the possibility of acquiring military supremacy, on illusions about possible victory in a nuclear war.

Together with our allies, we know how to achieve progress in the field of disarmament. This is proven by the many dozens of initiative proposals submitted by the USSR, the Warsaw Pact, and also our own republic. At present we consider the achievement of an agreement on freezing nuclear arms to be the primary thing.

The orientation of the CSSR's policy toward peace and disarmament, the easing of international tension, and the development of peaceful cooperation among all nations is well known. In harmony with this, we again declare that the deployment of new American missiles in Western Europe has increased the realistic danger that the United States would inflict a catastrophe not only on the nations of our continent, but also on all of mankind. We cannot remain indifferent or passive toward this. In keeping with our historic experience, Comrade Gustav Husak stressed that, "recalling the historical lessons of Munich and the occupation, we assess most seriously the consequences of the deployment of new American missiles in Western Europe; and we draw the inevitable conclusions from this for the security of our country." In view of the situation that has emerged, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact have been forced to adopt necessary retaliatory measures to ensure their security.

We are preparing to extensively celebrate the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite fascism, this second most important event of the 20th century after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In May 1945 the Czechoslovak people, too, promised to fight against the outbreak of a new war conflagration. Together with our allies we have been persistently striving to achieve this aim. It is primarily thanks to this that peace could be preserved on the European continent for all of 4 decades. We are prepared to exert every effort to transform our continent into a zone of permanent peace, into a secure home for our nations.
The aggressive imperialist circles would like to make use of the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite fascism to justify their policy. Nevertheless, the historic memory of nations—both of older and of younger generations—will not permit this. The truth about Hitlerite fascism, the truth about World War II, must become an effective tool in the fight against the preparation of new conquest plans, against a repetition of dreams about hegemony and of aggressive plans against socialism.

We are not closing our eyes to the dangerous development of the international situation. We ensure that the alertness of armed forces is enhanced to the level of the demands of contemporary warfare; and we ensure the effective defense of our fatherland and of the borders of the entire socialist community.

We are raising the demands placed on high quality, efficiency, and thrift in combat and political training, on the knowledge and skillful mastery of contemporary weapons, on consolidating the moral-political state, discipline and organized life of the army. The increased preparedness of the Czechoslovak People's Army is also borne out by the recently concluded "Shield-84" allied expertise.

An important source of the growth in combat strength of the Czechoslovak People's Army is close collaboration and cooperation with the other armies of the Warsaw Pact member states, and particularly the Soviet Army. We appreciate and esteem the highly efficient cooperation with the Central Group of Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia.

Permit me, on behalf of the delegation of the CPCZ Central Committee, the CSSR National Front Central Committee, the federal government, and the Ministry of National Defense, to thank our Soviet friends on this occasion most sincerely for their all-round and selfless assistance and to wish them many successes in their combat and political training, in ensuring the security of the countries of the socialist community. By its significance every historic event speaks to the present. The same is true of the legacy of the Dukla battles.

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To implement the legacy of Dukla means to consistently realize the conclusions of the 16th CPCZ Congress, above all in consolidating the defense ability of
our socialist fatherland. This demands that we develop further the collabora-
tions and comradeship between the Czechoslovak People's Army and the Soviet
Army, and the armies of the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, in the interests
of successfully defending peace and averting a nuclear catastrophe. Not social-
ism, but imperialism was, and is, the initiator of feverish armament. Together
with our allies we will not permit any disruption of the military-strategic
equilibrium in Central Europe, either, in favor of American imperialism.

By consciously fulfilling the exacting tasks of the 16th CPCZ Congress, by
comprehensively strengthening the defense of our country, by enhancing the
combat preparedness and readiness of the Czechoslovak People's Army, we are
fulfilling the legacy of the living and dead Dukla heroes of 40 years ago,
and acting in the spirit of their glorious combat and revolutionary traditions.

Honor and glory to the courageous fighters of the Carpathian-Dukla Operation!

Honor and glory to the heroic Soviet Army--our liberator!

Let the combat comradeship of the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact member
states consolidate and develop further!

Long live the CPCZ, the inspirer and organizer of the victorious national
liberation struggle of the Czechoslovak people and of the building of socialism
in our fatherland!

CSO: 2400/24
DELEGATIONS ARRIVE FOR DUKLA CELEBRATION

LD052139 Prague Domestic Service in Czech and Slovak 1700 GMT 5 Oct 84

[Text] A delegation of the CPCZ Central Committee, the Central Committee of the National Front of the CSSR, the Federal Assembly, and the federal government headed by Gustav Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee and president of the republic, arrived in Kosice today for the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the Carpathian-Dukla operation and the Day of the Czechoslovak People's Army. The delegation consists of Lubomir Strougal, federal prime minister; other members of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium: Vasil Bilak, Peter Colotka, Alois Indra, Josef Korcak and Jozef Lenart; candidate member of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium Jan Pojtik; deputy chairman of the National Front Central Committee Tomas Travnicek; Minister of National Defense Army General Martin Dzur; Minister of the Interior Vratislav Vajnar; Antonin Brabec, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Czechoslovak People's Army; Vladimir Blechta, head of a department of the CPCZ Central Committee; Jan Pirc, chief secretary of the East Slovak Regional CPSL Committee; Vaclav Horacek, chairman of the Central Committee of the SVAZARM [Union for Cooperation with the Army]; Chairman of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party Bohuslav Kucera; Chairman of the Czechoslovak People's Party Zbynek Zalman; Chairman of the Slovak Revival Party Jozef Simuth; Chairman of the Federal Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Union of Antifascist Fighters Frantisek Misej; and Chairman of the Socialist Union of Youth, Central Committee Jaroslav Jeneral.

At the festively decorated airport, the members of the delegation were welcomed by representatives of the party and state bodies of the Slovak SR headed by Jozef Tenart, member of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee and first secretary of the CPSL Central Committee; Jan pirc, chief secretary of the East Slovak Regional CPSL Committee; and other leading officials of the region and the city of Kosice. After the playing of the Czechoslovak national anthem, Gustav Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee and president of the republic, carried out along with Defense Minister Army General Martin Dzur an inspection of the guard of honor, the march past of which concluded the welcoming ceremony. The distinguished guests afterward left for their residence in the regional capital. Along the festively decorated road leading from the airport, Comrade Gustav Husak and other members of the delegation were warmly greeted by large crowds of the inhabitants of East Slovakia.
Other guests who will be attending the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the victory on the Dukla were welcomed cordially at the airport in Kosice today: A delegation of the Soviet Army headed by Army General Aleksey Yepishev, chief of the main political directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy; a delegation of the Polish People's Army headed by General of Armes Jozef Baryla; a delegation of the CPSL Central Committee the Central Committee of the National Front of the Slovak SR, the Slovak National Council, and Slovak Government; delegations of the Czechoslovak People's Army, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the People's Militias, and the Federal Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Union of Antifascist Fighters.

Among the guests who will be attending the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the Carpathian-Dukla operation are; Viktor Lomakin, ambassador of the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia; and Andrzej Jedynak, Polish ambassador to Czechoslovakia; a delegation of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans headed Lieutenant General Vasily Petrenko, hero of the Soviet Union; a delegation of the Central Group of the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia headed by its commander, Colonel General Grigoriy Borisov; and a delegation of the chief command of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states headed by the senior representative of the commander in chief attached to the Federal Ministry of National Defense, Colonel General Ivan Volashin.

Welcomed cordially at the airport in Kosice today were Major General Yuriy Chelpanov, military and air attache of the Soviet Embassy in Czechoslovakia; Major General Ryszard Mielczarek, military and air attache of the Polish Embassy in Czechoslovakia; and military attaches of other socialist countries accredited in Czechoslovakia.

CSO: 2400/24
CHNOUPEK ASSESSES UNGA SESSION BEFORE DEPARTURE

LD071305 Prague Domestic Service in Czech and Slovak 1100 GMT 7 Oct 84

[Unidentified correspondent's New York report]

[Text] Bohuslav Chnowpek, minister of foreign affairs, head of the delegation to the UN General Assembly, evaluated the course to date of the 39th session of this organisation before his departure from New York.

He said that although general discussion has not ended, it is already clear that the vast majority of nations are deeply concerned about the worsening of the international atmosphere. The increased danger of a nuclear conflict, an increase in the arms race and the continuing economic difficulties, of developing countries in particular, which is a direct result of the militarist policy of confrontation of the most reactionary imperialist forces. In almost all speeches, appeals can be heard for pressing measures to improve the situation, for detente, disarmament and for a smooth development of peaceful relations.

Bohuslav Chnowpek emphasized in particular the importance of the Soviet proposal for the prevention of the militarization of space and the proposal concerning the unacceptability of a policy of state terrorism and actions designed to undermine the social and political systems of other sovereign states. He went on to say that representatives of developing and nonaligned countries strongly support the requirement for strengthening peace and security of nations, disarmament, and economic development founded on a change of international economic relations based on just and democratic foundations.

Bohuslav Chnowpek then concerned himself with his meetings with foreign ministers of other countries. He said that the United Nations is an irreplaceable, important place for the development of dialogue, to which it gives the necessary framework. Bohuslav Chnowpek emphasized that all meetings took place in a friendly constructive atmosphere, and he expressed the conviction that they will undoubtedly contribute to the further development of mutual relations and the implementation of the process of detente in the world.

CSO: 2400/24
ROCK MUSIC ATTACKED

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 9 Sep 84 p IV

[Article by Dagmar Vaneckova: "Young People in the Ideologues' Straitjacket"]

[Text] An article in the weekly party newspaper TRIBUNA sounded the first note for a cultural pogrom. The text opposed the "New Wave" in the Czechoslovakian music scene. Fearful party functionaries knew only too well what has to be done following a "push" from above of this kind. Those who suffer are the musicians and followers of punk rock, which lends expression in a spontaneous, tight-fitting and often provocative way to the way the young people of the country feel about life. 

Not long ago, more than 50 rock groups were active in Czechoslovakia: bands like "Prague Selection," "Clear Lever," "Ketchup," or "Dog Soldiers" (English names—for example "Rangers" and "Greenhorns"—were banned long ago). But in spite of their large number, it is very difficult and often dangerous to want to hear one of these bands.

Recently the "Patents," one of the best known groups in southern Bohemia, were banned. Immediately afterwards, the editorial offices of the central organ of the CP, RDUDE PRAVO, was flooded with letters of protest, as the newspaper had to admit in an article. Three young people sent their criticism to the editors, in which they said that banning the music of the "Patents" was exactly like taking a child from its mother. The editorial board of the CP newspaper replied: This very sentence was directed against society, in the same way that the attitude of the musical group was questionable, and consequently a ban was the only possible and correct solution.

"Black lists" which contain the banned bands prove that this is not an isolated case. At the present time, 27 of the best and most popular groups are banned in central Bohemia alone.

But, according to the intent of the party ideologues, not only one musical and life style is to be affected. The "Prague Jazz Days," which are organized and announced annually, have been banned year after year. This topic was the object of criticism of Charta 77 document No 31, of August 1973, which was addressed to the parliament, the Ministry of Culture and the musicians association.
This cultural terrorism is not entirely new. At the beginning of the 1950's, jazz was banned almost entirely in Czechoslovakia. Dixieland was attacked as the "product of the degenerate bourgeoisie" and the "symbol of Western decadence." Things did not go too much differently with the rock wave of the 1960's, although it came in a time of increasing liberalization. Following a short period of relatively undisturbed development—1968 to 1969—the time of state supervision, of authorization procedures and qualification tests began again for the modern music scene.

This caused most of them either to move into the shadow of official popstars as band musicians or to emigrate, such as singer Karel Kryl, who has been resident in Munich for 14 years but is today still loved in Bohemia.

The story of the "Plastic People of the Universe" can also be mentioned here as an example. They were founded 4 weeks after the Warsaw Pact troops marched in and were able to work for a few months as free professionals, according to their tenets, which their artistic director Ivan Jouris formulated as follows: "It is better not to play any music than music that does not express the true conviction of the musician. It is better not to play at all than to play what the establishment demands." Being without employment for longer than 8 weeks is considered parasitism and can draw up to 3 years in prison. "Plastic People" continued to play as workers, and therefore amateurs, at private parties and small school gatherings, until two of their members were sentenced in 1976 in a trial together with other musicians.

At the time domestic critics of the regime and dissidents sided with the persecuted young musicians with an open letter, among them respected personalities such as the national poet Jaroslav Seifert, the philosopher Jan Patocka and the historian Vaclav Cerny. The famous song "One Hundred Points" comes from this time, which the "Plastic People" set to music using a text of the former journalist and later boilerman Frantisek Vanacek: "They fear the old for their remembrances/ They fear the young for their honesty/ They even fear the schoolchildren/ They fear the dead and their burials . . . / They fear socialism . . ./ So why do we fear them?"

An incident from 1974, when the rock band "Adepts" was giving a concert in Budweis—Rudolfov, shows that the myrmidons of party culture do not stop in the face of these musicians public. The police—with German shepherds—had all the access roads blocked and subjected cars and pedestrians to a search. Five hundred young people were given fines of 200 to 500 korunas without reasons being cited, 200 of them had their hair cut on the spot, innumerable interrogations followed and a trial with 8 defendants, 3 of whom were sentenced. The police sent reports—so-called cadre appraisals—to their schools and places of work.

A little later in Budweis there was a wave of arrests among the jazz fans who occasionally met at the house of an elderly, half-blind mailman to listen to cassettes and records. Host Jiri Gans was put on trial and sentenced to 15 years in prison for alleged espionage. In 1982, commentator and police major Jelinek stated on Prague television that Gans was a music-loving enemy of socialism, because he had obtained his records from the America Club of the U.S. embassy in Prague.
Whatever the methods of evasion that were sought, they were sooner or later condemned to failure. For instance, the idea of the "barracks meetings," initiated by the artist Mirek Skalicky, who has been a resident of Vienna since 1980: Old, decrepit country villas were purchased and private performances of the banned musicians were organized, such as "Water Closet" or accordion player Jim "Devil" Horacek. One after the other, these barracks were expropriated by the authorities under various pretexts and destroyed, some of them even being blown up.

Even the possession of cassettes and records of the banned music movements is dangerous, as those people could discover who used to meet regularly in a Prague square to hold a small music fleamarket. When that was no longer permitted, they moved to a small wooded area outside the city until the police eliminated their final refuge in a giant raid.

At the time of Hitler's Germany, Heinrich Mann was able to report about the country of his exile, the CSR, "Prague received us like relatives." Today the singer and Protestant pastor Svata Karasek sounds quite different in his songs: "Perhaps we will be guests in our own homes." He is living in Swiss exile, deprived of his citizenship, like Jaroslav Hutka, once the idol of students in Prague, in the Netherlands, Charlie Soukup in France, Vlasta Tresnak in Scandanavia, Vladimir Veith and Dasa Vokota in Vienna, all of them not only singers and musicians, but also poets and composers.

Those in power in Czechoslovakia take action against young people as if they were serious criminals, but whose only "failure" consists of wanting to be themselves, of being able to live with their own wishes. Enormous anxiety about the system seems to be the reason for this iron hand, which is tightening around every area of private and public life, with the intent of allowing nothing to grow up that smacks of freedom.

Still, the walls in Prague are constantly reinscribed with the names of the extremely popular "new wave bands" and of banned singers such as Karel Misik and Vladimir Merta.

But the omnipotent opponents are unyielding in their crusade against the "excesses of the rockers." The latest reports from eastern Bohemia prove it: On Saturday, 18 February 1984, about 100 young people from Hronov-Zbecnik and from distant areas gathered there. The event was approved by the authorities. Without having given any cause, the participants were surprised by a huge detail of police and state security service men. All the young music lovers were searched, and the event was broken up without any justification. The only answer to any protests were clouts on the head (which resulted in a concussion for one youth).

One day before, six young persons had appeared before the court in Pardubice, who had been dispersed forcibly by police at a evening musical event in a nearby village. As always, the incident was used to imprison those involved, who were accused of attacking an official. The result: 15 months in prison.
It is no surprise that youth, the majority of whom are regarded by the authorities as an element hostile to the state, shows no enthusiasm at all for any type of social integration. They are seeking their own path to free themselves from the straitjacket of countless regulations and orders.

"Nothing that we do can find favor with the representatives of the official culture; it cannot be used to sustain the illusion that everything is in order."

This statement is from the 30-year old art historian Ivan Jiřous, who was sentenced for the third time in 1982—this time to 3 years imprisonment—and sent to the regional penitentiary Valdice near Jičín.
SOCIAL SCIENCES REVIEW NOTES ANTAGONISMS UNDER SOCIALISM

AU101243 [Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 9 October carries on page 4 the 2,200-word second and last part of an article by Ing Jozef Sevc, candidate of sciences, and Jozef Migas, doctor of philosophy and candidate of sciences, entitled "Social Sciences and the Practical Activity of the Working Masses," and published in the "On a Theoretical Topic" column. The authors begin by stating that the practice of building socialism has shown how significant it is to ask in what way are those forces formed under socialism that become pioneers of the new and progressive, but also those that are the bearers of obsolete and retrograde ideas. "To show our development as free of conflicts, in an idealized manner, is to benefit least our socialist sciences and the real practice of building socialism," the authors add.

After quoting from the materials of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee session (on such negative trends as local patriotism, departmentalism, bureaucracy, and conservatism), the authors continue: "Life has unambiguously affirmed that the law of unity and of the battle of antitheses as the general law of dialectics operates, and is manifested, even under socialism (although different opinions have appeared in the social sciences literature in the socialist countries). The social, political and ideological unity of the socialist society does not exclude conflicts and battles between antitheses."

The authors go on to state that "it must be stressed that even scientific management does not exclude conflicts and contradictions in the socialist society. Scientific management cannot abrogate contradictions as the immanent moving force of socialism's development. The contradictions are objective, but also internally inevitable in the given phase of building the developed socialist society. The role of scientific management as the purposeful activity of social and political subjects lies in the ability to select suitable means and methods for resolving the contradictions, for averting conflict situations, and for making use of the moving forces that emerge in the battle of antitheses for further developing the socialist society. The conscious solution of contradictions in the process of political leadership and management becomes a form of operation of the law on unity and the battle of antitheses—a method for resolving contradictions in the socialist society that is developing according to plan."

After stressing the "most urgent and responsible social and party task" to orient social sciences toward the "deep and fundamental study of the individual kinds of contradictions and of the ways and methods of resolving them," the authors deal with the role of social sciences in the battle for the mind of socialist man and with their ideological function.
"One of the main shortcomings of an incorrect approach to the mastering of Marxist-Leninist theory and of scientific socialism is the tendency to make light of them, to simplify, to interpret them in a dry way, without mentioning problems; to master them noncreatively." The authors add that "a noncreative, formal approach to mastering Marxist-Leninist doctrine is dangerous also for other reasons: It distorts the idea of the significance of Marxist-Leninist knowledge and of the knowledge of social sciences for man's practice and his life; it harbors the danger of shaping a split awareness in certain people (theory is one thing, and practice another; disunity of words and deeds); it contributes to the emergence of such negative phenomena in man's world outlook as Cynicism, lack of principles, and so forth. The result of such an 'interpretation' and 'mastering' of scientific socialism and of Marxist-Leninist theory," the authors continue, "is that, periodically, certain people in our country show scepticism and disenchantment on the one hand, and dogmatism and exaggerated pedantism on the other."

The authors go on to say: "Social sciences have an irreplaceable function in unmasking the various endeavors and intentions of bourgeois philosophers, sociologists, politicians and reformists in denigrating and "improving" socialism, and in defending and embellishing the world of capital. Social sciences must comprehensively contribute, including with the use of arguments, toward ideologically arming our working people and toward consciously enlisting them for the united front against hostile ideology in the current exacerbated international situation."

The authors then deal with the role of party organizations in assisting social sciences in their work, and stress that "bold, searching workers, who are achieving valuable results in the sphere of social sciences, must also be adequately remunerated, in both the material and the moral sense." The authors also stress the importance of selecting good cadres for social sciences and the need to take good care of them.

The authors conclude by reminding of "the history of the years 1968-69 in the CSSR, which graphically showed how many unexpected things can happen if the party is not consistent in resolving the topical issues in the society—if it gives up the perspectives."

CSO: 2400/24
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BRIEFS

DZUR HOSTS FRIENDLY MEETING—Army General Martin Dzur, minister of national defense, organized a friendly meeting on the 40th anniversary of the Capathian-Dukla operation and the Day of the Czechoslovak People's Army in the Cernin Palace in Prague. Present were Gustav Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, president of the republic, and other members of the Presidium of the party's Central Committee, Peter Colotka, Alois Indra, Milos Jakes, Josef Kempny, Josef Korcak and Jozef Lenart. Also present were Josef Haman, candidate member of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee, secretaries of the party's Central Committee, Mikulas Beno, Josef Havlin, and Jindrich Poleadnik; Jaroslav Hajn, chairman of the Central Control and Auditing Commission of the CPCZ and other representatives. Among the guests were Lieutenant General Ivan Volsin, senior representative of the main commander of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces attached to the Ministry of National Defense, and Lieutenant General Grigoriy Borisov, commander of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia. [Text] [Prague Domestic Service in Czech 2250 GMT 4 Oct 84 LD]

CONTADORA GROUP AMBASSADORS RECEIVED—Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Stanislav Svoboda received in Prague representatives of diplomatic missions of three countries in the Contadora Group. The ambassadors of Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico, empowered by their governments, handed to Stanislav Svoboda the document of the Contadora group on peace and cooperation in Central America and an additional protocol in which the signatories pledge to respect the principles of the document and to help the peace effort in Central America. In this context they praised the active support given by Czechoslovakia from the very beginning to the activities of Contadora group. [Text] [Prague International Service in Czech and Slovak 2230 GMT 4 Oct 84 LD]

CSO: 2400/24
PARTY PAPER CRITICIZES FALSE IDEA OF FREEDOM IN WEST

Magdeburg VOLKSSTIMME in German 12 Sep 84 p 6


[Text] In any contemplation of freedom, the question arises: "Freedom for which class and for what concrete purpose?"

When the working class and its allied partners speak of freedom, hope, battle and revolution are associated with it—a life of peace, social progress and safety. The Paris Communards and the victorious Russian proletariat fought for freedom from exploitation and oppression and for an existence worthy of human beings. Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and Ernst Thaelmann fought and died for freedom from exploitation and oppression, and for a life of peace, social security and safety.

The Leap Out of the Realm of Necessity...

We become alert when imperialism and monopolistic parties manipulate the concept of freedom. For those political forces, this word is part of their ideological weapons arsenal. Like no other word, it is distorted and abused by bourgeois ideologues. They are concerned with the jurisprudence of their system and solicitation of trust in order to abuse it in the interest of monopolistic profit.

This word conceals dangerous traps, disappointment, misery and counterrevolution. Under the banner of freedom, the United States destroyed in Grenada all basic social, economic and political achievements of the people's revolution. They intend to do the same with the people's revolution in Nicaragua.

When the bourgeoisie flaunts this word, it is pure hypocrisy and mass fraud. Humanitarianism and freedom are foreign to the nature of capitalist society.
The concept of freedom comes from freeing, and if one wants to set oneself free, one must get rid of the oppressors; one must free oneself from those who start wars for power and profit motives. This necessitates changing the conditions of society from the bottom and creating new economic, political and social conditions—conditions based on the political power of the working class and its allies, on society's ownership of production means, and on Marxism-Leninism as the ruling ideology. Those are the conditions of a socialist society.

The societal practice of the real, existing socialism confirms that only in socialism does true freedom become reality. This freedom consists in the fact that the workers who are the producers and owners of the production means and the holders of political power have, and use, the chance of establishing their life in society deliberately and in a planned manner, under the leadership of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party. In this way, socialism produces progress in freedom in a way never known before. Here starts, as Friedrich Engels said, the leap out of the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom. However, this does not mean that action no longer has to take into account necessities and objective laws. What is new is that necessities are recognized, are made into measuring sticks for all of society and are deliberately utilized, and that the intended effects can be achieved.

In the major task of a united economic and social policy, this necessity of being active, and the intended goal, finds its most incisive expression. It is a matter of further raising the material and spiritual standards of life. Freedom does not consist in doing, or not doing, as one happens to please, as some think. The establishment of the new socialist order, completed in our country, has convincingly affirmed: socialism, that means freedom, it means security, it means peace, humanism, and the realization of human rights.

Our new socialist conditions of society offer the guarantee to work together in democratic freedom, to codetermine, to live in social safety and security. However, real socialism as an expression of true human freedom also carries the obligation to make daily use of this freedom as a part of constitutionally guaranteed citizens' rights and duties. We make use of it by strengthening our state on all sides, led by the party of the working class.

More Important than a Hundred Sonorous Speeches

We know that strengthening our state in the economic, political and intellectual-cultural areas mean a further gain of freedom. And we also know that every worker, or farmer on a cooperative, who contributes to an increase in work productivity through his suggestion for improvement, every scientist or engineer who invents a new, more productive solution in his field of work, does infinitely more for the free development of his personality and for the free development of his people than any imperialist politician with a hundred sonorous speeches.
This, also, is proof of Erich Honecker's statement in NEUS DEUTSCHLAND of Sept. 6, 1984: "Generations of upright Germans had dreamed of a new and peaceful Germany freed from exploitation and oppression, a friend to all nations. For this they had fought and risked their lives. In the GDR, their legacy became reality."

What No Whitewash Can Cover Up

There are appearances in the everyday life of capitalist countries which produce and feed the illusion of freedom. But the basic bondage of the workers, to be exploited, to be forced to sell oneself anew every day, cannot be covered up by the fact that they are allowed to vote from time to time, under the "ringing of the freedom bell," and that the political and economic rulers now and then grant those dominated by them the possibility of protesting, striking. The real "freedom" of the dominated people consists in experiencing how, under the cloak of a "free democratic basic order," phrases full of hope are mouthed, but everything stays the same, such as when Helmut Kohl says: "Things are looking up," but keeps silent about what is really going up: the budget, for armament, unemployment, a lack of teaching positions, rent usury, drug abuse, etc.

The real freedom of those dominated by capitalism consists in having anxiety attacks while standing at the employment office, or when threatened by the danger of losing their job.

The real "freedom" of those dominated by capitalism consists in being subjected to inflation and rent usury. It consists in being "allowed" to become a drug addict, to sleep on park benches.

We freed ourselves from those freedoms long ago.

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CSO: 2300/14
CITIZENS OF TWO GERMANYs BECOMING INCREASINGLY ESTRANGED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 26 Sep 84 p 1

[Article by F.K. Fromme: "Two Kinds of Germans"]

[Text] Some people in the FRG, under the influence of dutiful speeches about the cohesion of the nation (SPD), and the ultimate goal of reunification to be kept in view (CDU), airily divide the inhabitants of the GDR into two groups.

One group, the minority, are those who, as members of the communist Unity Party (SED) or perhaps only to further their own careers, promote and maintain the present system. The majority then are those who, in case of reunification, would have to be integrated into the FRG without further ado.

After the war, there were many reasons for staying on in the Soviet zone, from love of homeland to family ties, property still owned, or the realization that "the West" at that time was not necessarily an El Dorado of freedom and prosperity; in some professions one could manage better in the Soviet zone. There were opportunities for artistic development, since the Soviets wanted to display "Kultura:" in individual cases, respect was shown for German culture, while less understanding was shown by the type of local commandant in the American zone from Kentucky, USA.

Thus in the early Soviet zone, the old Germany of before 1933 and perhaps even that of before 1918, buried only imperfectly under the ruins of cities, continued to exist—perhaps more persistently than in the Western zones. This varied according to professions; wherever it was a matter of a direct change-over of society to communism, the old traditions broke off quickly. In the case of engineers, physicians, opera singers, for example, a slower transition was tolerated. A period of suspension existed. It may have lasted until the end of the Fifties; an absolute, final break came in 1961, the year the wall was built. During that suspension period the Soviet zone (since 1949 the GDR) appeared as a "Germany" which, more than the "Americanized" Western zones, preserved the past and was "unifiable," as it were. Honecker's present attempts to claim the national idea for the GDR may tie in with that.
But time is gradually running out also for those who worked in such "privileged" professions in the Soviet zone after 1945, later in the GDR, and who determined a part of the reality of society, and perhaps even transmitted something to the next generation. The last of those who were still used to arranging their lives in the old, basically bourgeois way, are now going into retirement. A patient in a GDR hospital, for example, only in exceptional cases can count on being able to speak there in a manner openly critical of the regime. It is not that the refractory patient would be denounced by the nurse or doctor—probably already a product of GDR education and perhaps even motivated by feelings of gratitude (laudable from a human standpoint) toward the GDR which "made all this possible" for him--; but the sense of agreement against the regime is no longer evoked; it becomes risky to raise it. The term "our GDR" has lost its quotation marks.

This means that one can no longer count on the fact that phrases about reunification have a solid premise in the way of thinking of GDR citizens. The 25,000 emigrants, who came in an unusually large contingent this spring, are not proof to the contrary. These were people who inwardly tended toward the FRG, anyway, and were therefore let go by the GDR. Whoever in the GDR does not agree with the regime today—and that is probably an overwhelming majority—does not necessarily fit into the FRG for that reason. The Germans [over] here also have changed; for better or for worse, they have moved away from what the nation had been before national socialism, in its way of thinking and culture, in tradition and civilization.

There are opposition members in the GDR who have looked for strength—dourly tolerated by the regime—in the (Protestant) church; a strict and self-denying social philosophy protects these people from being considered outright enemies by the regime. There are still some adherents of an old German bourgeoisie (in professions where one can afford to), but even in this way one would no longer find a homeland in the FRG.

A common tendency, which does not appear very consoling, is that of doing little work and enjoying much leisure time. A decline in that which is considered civilized also has taken place on both sides. But in many aspects, the Germans in the two states have become estranged in life styles and life goals, even in terms of speech. Some things can be bridged through "encounters" and "talks"; but perhaps the breaking up of bridges can only be delayed. A cohesive element disappears with the retirement of the last generation which had experienced a nation half-way united in a single German state (with all the reservations vis-a-vis Nazi Germany, and in a different way, also vis-a-vis the Weimar Republic). But the Germans, who in their history did not experience for long the self-evident situation of a single state resulting from a unified nation, will bear the separation of states and the orientation toward different goals of society. Prosperity alone, however, is not enough for that.
AMERICAN POLICY SAID TIED TO TERRORISM

[Text] One usually associates the concept of terrorism with killings or kidnappings performed either by individuals or by groups for the purpose of frustrating or scaring the opponent. Few people remember that, as the Dictionary of the Polish Language published by the State Scientific Publishing House says, this concept also involves "forcing upon the governments of countries certain concessions or benefits to one's advantage."

It is this last definition that applies to the state terrorism performed not by individuals or groups, but by state organizations (or their agencies) acting against another state.

The concept of state terrorism is now new. That is the name commonly given to Israel's aggressive armed attacks on its Arab neighbors in the Middle East. It applies especially to the bombing of Lebanese cities and villages containing Palestinian settlements. Israel's earlier armed attacks on Jordanian territory were also of this nature. It is not only the Palestinians who have been the targets of Tel Aviv. These bloody attacks were meant to force the Lebanese and Jordanian governments to alter their relations toward the Palestinian liberation movement.

State terrorism is also conducted by the Republic of South Africa, which is not only trying to make its neighbors revise their stance toward the racist Pretoria regime, but also to undermine the existing political system, as is clear in the case of Angola.

These are very drastic examples, but not the only ones. Comprehensive activity against a certain group of states has increased in recent years, with the clear and un concealed purpose of undermining the existing social order and political system. A target of state terrorism by the United States in Cuba, against which such measures have been applied as economic blockade, attempts to create political isolation, psychological warfare, and the organizing and financing of armed groups meant to overthrow the legitimate government by force.
One can say that the measures used against Cuba are applied in a flexible manner toward other states as well. In the case of Grenada, a small and very weak state, even marines have been used. In actions against Nicaragua, one of the chief roles is played by mercenaries armed and equipped by the United States and under the direct command of the CIA, a fact which has been officially confirmed in connection with the mining of Nicaraguan waters. In Afghanistan, two features have been combined—the financing and arming of the counterrevolution, and psychological warfare.

In all the abovementioned cases—and the list is not complete—the U.S. Administration uses various pretexts. If we leave aside the cloak of propaganda and pretty words, these "explanations" boil down to three points. First, Washington is encouraging those elements or forces that want to gain or regain power in a given country. Second, the U.S. Administration supports these elements and forces because it sees in their activity its own political, military or economic interests, whatever the actual results of this activity may be. And third, the American Government is ready to alter its conduct if the existing legitimate authorities bring their domestic solutions in line with the recipe fixed by Washington. Typical here is that it does not matter what the contents of the solutions are, but whether or not their implementation will suit the interests of the United States.

It is this very pattern that has been applied toward Poland in a classic way in U.S. politics. The trade and economic restrictions which have caused about $13 billion worth of losses, have been directed against the existing political system so that, by making it difficult to overcome obstacles, social dissatisfaction may be aroused. The propaganda aggression from American-Polish-language radio stations subsidized from the U.S. budget not only openly spreads disinformation and calls for an overthrow of the legitimate authorities in Poland, but even says how this should be done. This obviously centrally formulated and centrally steered plan receives considerable funds for antistate activity inside Poland, which even in the United States is not called by any name other than sabotage, conspiracy, and espionage, and is subject to severe criminal sanctions. It is the U.S. legal system that is making American citizens who take advantage of the above funds register themselves as "foreign agents."

It ought to be stressed that the U.S. President openly refers to all these activities in various ways and uses them as blackmail in order to dictate to our government how it should behave in order to conform to American wishes.

This attitude is exceptionally characteristic and at the same time exceedingly important. It shows that state terrorism is the most brutal form of intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, and is a sign of unbridled hostility short of war itself.

Second, the phenomenon of state terrorism is not a function of bilateral relations and is not the result of a threat from a state against which blackmail, and force are being applied. None of the cases where the United States has used these methods involved the defense of U.S. national interests. It is worth recalling here that the victorious Cuban revolution made immediate efforts to establish normal relations with its powerful northern neighbor,
which rejected these attempts solely because of the nature of the sociopolitical transformations in Cuba, which in any case were far short of socialist transformations at the time.

In other words, looking at the matter in the above category, in no case has the United States been provoked into hostile activity or reaction. Everything is taking place on another level—it is a global imperial strategy aimed at conquering the world. In this sense, terrorism is an instrument of aggression.

Therefore, hostile actions against any state whatsoever, even if there is nothing military about these actions, cannot be regarded solely as a part of bilateral relations. To do so would have a direct and negative bearing on coexistence between states and peoples, and hence would threaten peace. That is why the sixth CSCE final act, a document also signed by the U.S. President, declares that the participating countries are obliged to "refrain under all circumstances from exerting any military or political pressure whatsoever aimed at subordinating to their own interests the execution by any other participating country of its powers, these being inseparable from its sovereignty...."

In Washington, where by the way the CSCE final act is often arbitrarily but loudly remembered, the above requirement is forgotten, as well as many others. The dangerous course of events has therefore placed this issue on the agenda of UN talks.

The draft resolution presented by the USSR delegation for consideration at the General Assembly forum categorically rejects the use of "force from a position of strength," and the organization of "crusades," "psychological warfare," or any other actions aimed at altering or undermining the sociopolitical system in another state or at upsetting and overthrowing legitimate governments. A declaration banning state terrorism is required by international principles accepted by society, such as that of every nation's right to determine its own fate and establish its own development paths.

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PZPR THEORETICAL ORGAN INVITES DEBATE ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

Controversial Monuments, Economic Decentralization

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 8, Aug 84 pp 101-110

[Article by Aleksander Bochenski, writer, journalist: "Accord Versus Understanding" under the rubric "Problems, Discussions"]

[Text] In presenting below the personal reflections of Aleksander Bochenski, followed by the polemical responses of Bohdan Czeszko and Grzegorz W. Kolodko concerning certain of their aspects, the Editors wish to continue in subsequent issues the discussion of these topics in the broadest possible context. We invite interested readers to join in this discussion.

Introduction

I. I do not agree in everything with the government's policies nor with all the measures taken by the PZPR. Sometimes also reason prevents me from following public opinion. To begin with the most symbolic and general, but not at all trivial, decisions, I am opposed to the erection of two monuments, one to the Warsaw Uprising and the other to those fallen in the defense of the socialist system of society during the immediate postwar period. In my opinion, erecting the first of these monuments would be highly improper and, from the educational standpoint, a mistake because, although each and all of the Warsaw insurgents were heroes and deserve a monument, the Uprising itself, its outbreak and excessively protracted duration in the absence of any chance of victory, was a major political and military mistake and deserves to be condemned rather than honored with a monument. It has caused losses, both human and material and cultural, which are practically incalculable, without giving anything in return. Why [not] then a monument to the insurgents themselves? Because it is warranted by the existence of a certain granitic law of national upbringing, enunciated by Dmowski as late as almost 100 years ago, but which no one continues to teach young or old Poles. Because the duties of officers and servicemen are different from those of the army commander, which in their turn are different from those of the politician who decides on the
moment when combat is to be launched and when it is to be ended. It is the duty of the enlisted man and the officer to fight as ordered by the commander, risking wounds and death—even certain death—without trying to reason whether the order makes sense, and whether the war is just or not. That is how the insurgents had fought, and that is why they shall always remain a symbol of heroism deserving the greatest honor and praise. But it is the duty of the commander to win the battle, while it is the duty of the politician not to commence war in the absence of chances for victory. His decision should be guided solely by cold calculation and common sense. A monument to the Uprising rather than to the insurgents obfuscates this crystalline logic and will befuddle the awareness of the future generations.

II. I am equally opposed to erecting a monument to the victims of the struggle to perpetuate the socialist system of society in the immediate postwar period. Although these fallen ones also performed their supreme duty, sacrificing their lives in the combat resolved upon by the decisionmakers who guided them, and although these decisionmakers had, in view of the then existing worldwide political situation, unlike the leaders of the Warsaw Uprising, made infinitely more valid decisions, still that fighting constituted what the world terms from times immemorial "civil war," that is, fratricidal struggle. Those fallen in combat against the socialist system of society and the Soviet Union, often also merely performed their soldierly duty, because they simply obeyed the orders of their commanders. In general, they had been unprepared to understand the crucial, deep and unexpected changes that occurred in the Polish geopolitical situation. After all, for 4 Occupation years, the extensive conspiratorial press had not prepared them at all for this situation, ... on the contrary. Thus, whatever the merits of those who had salvaged the sole then possible shape of the country's independence and frontiers, I do not believe that their tragic struggle against errant countrymen should be treated on par with struggle against foreign invaders of our land who wanted to rule us.

III. Now concerning decisions that are increasingly more topical and practical, I am not a supporter of the new civics curriculum at schools which will, after all, greatly influence the lifelong attitudes of our children and grandchildren. A large part of this curriculum consists of the teaching of history, and it recommends the abandonment of "Polonocentrism," that is, of focusing primarily on issues topical in Poland of yore and evaluating facts depending on how they influenced our fate, and its replacement with anthropocentrism, that is, with the history of mankind rather than of Poland. I am diametrically opposed to this. Integration into the Polish national community should be promoted instead of weakened, because in the absence of a lively feeling of belonging to this community, and in the absence of an ardent wish to make sacrifices for its sake, the individual cannot be happy and mankind cannot progress. The effect of the nation-state community on the development of technology and culture has become so great that the absence of personal bonds, or weak bonds of statehood due to the population's permanent resentment of its own government, paralyzes progress and prevents the concentration of the efforts of millions of individuals on the common goals most important to all. This emphasis on Polish issues, so necessary in my opinion, cannot be anti-Polish, that is, it cannot foster dislike and contempt
for the history of one's own country, as has been done in more than one
textbook, and instead it should provide on every page models full of praise
and merit, worthy of emulation and capable of being emulated.

When I recently expressed this admonition during an editorial discussion at
MIESIECZNIK LITERACKI, Rykowski, a columnist at TU I TERAZ, instructed me that
youth should be taught to think rather than to pattern itself on national
heroes. This is a superficial judgment. Thinking can give Poles good
politics, while absence of thinking can result in bad politics. But no kind of
thinking can make a person a Pole unless this is accomplished earlier by
attachment and esteem for his country's own past rather than by derision and
contempt.

IV. And lastly—a "lastly" that may mean "above all"—I am strongly and openly
critical of the government's economic policy and, what is more, of the system
for selecting collaborators in shaping and implementing this policy. Anyone
familiar with my previous comments is aware that this refers to the manner in
which the economic reform is applied. To put it in a nutshell, I accuse it of
being inseparably tied to a vision of free competition, which its creators
preferred to term "market mechanisms," thus befuddling quite a few people. But
whoever doubts the role of free competition in the "3 S" system [self-
financing, self-autonomy, self-government], let him look up the "Report on the
This report, prepared by the Economic Advisory Council, which is probably the
agency most conversant with the reform's intentions, states: "The ultimate
system of the economic reform was constructed on assuming the existence of an
approximate market equilibrium, that is, of the operation of a certain
mechanism of competition...." Actually, however, free competition has not
arisen and cannot arise, because it requires: 1) new production capacities,
whereas we lack even sufficient capacities for elementary repair of our
machinery and plant; 2) surplus manpower, whereas its shortages already are
paralyzing many existing factories; 3) a cadre of individuals who would have a
vested interest in organization, that is, in the difficult task of acquiring
needed capital and labor force and initiating the production of competitive
goods. What has happened is that not one of these indispensable conditions for
the rise of free competition is present, and its advent is hardly likely.
Hence, in my opinion, the existing structures for the concentration and
planning of production should not be demolished, as this would cause chaos and
dispersal, and instead a thorough analysis of the problem should be carried
out. The questions to be resolved are: why have the decision-concentrating
structures in our country performed badly and caused backwardness, whereas it
is precisely the equally large and even more complex economic organizations in
the Western countries that were and are the bearers of progress and
development? Is competition really indispensable to economic progress? Should
not the levels of operation and formation of the higher productivity of labor,
machinery and raw materials, as well as of improved quality and innovations,
be thoroughly investigated? In other words, the question is whether other
motivations that are as effective (at the highest level) as free [open-market]
competition might not, given the same directive-type mechanisms, produce the
same results at the workplaces where progress arises.
V. The mistakes in implementing the reform, which was and is needed but in a different shape than what we behold, I derive from another and still more fundamental mistake of the PZPR, mentioned in the Introduction [as published], namely, the entrusting of the conception and implementation of economic policies to academics. In no other government in the world are there as many professors as in Poland. My comments are not intended to denigrate this highly important group, but I believe that the profession of a scientist and researcher is not good training for the duties of an economic decisionmaker. Bread is a good thing, but it is not suitable for paving streets. A scientist explores and must explore general and imminent laws: this is his great role and duty. Hence, he cannot be and is not prepared to adjust his reasoning to new premises that do not fit his ready-made schemas. By contrast, a politician must keep an open mind to whatever happens next and continually explore new approaches. Thus, I believe that economics professors should rather be sent back to their books and their place in directing economic life should be taken by practitioners—of course not by a score or two of plant directors each of whom promotes the parochial interests of his own plant but by a couple of individuals who know how to delegate authority and bear responsibility for the whole.

VI. As can be seen from the above, my list of criticisms addressed to the government and the PZPR, as well as to other opinion-shaping centers, is lengthy and raises issues that are not trivial at all. I presented these issues in a greatly abbreviated form and omitted mentioning others that are no less important, such as our propaganda policy on the daily TV news broadcast; the policy of low agricultural prices, so fatal to feeding the nation; or the incomprehensible production and sales of 300,000 cars a year in this country at the same time when there exist shortages of so many items that are hundredfold as much needed, e.g., protective clothing. I say all this so that those who do not know me but wish to read these reflections would realize that I am neither a blind nor an uncritical adherent of Gen Jaruzelski's government and that, were it to depend on me, I would alter its principal directions of action.

But now, after and despite all this, I declare that I am definitely an adherent of that government, and that I believe that every thinking Pole should be one. Here is why:

Part One

VII. Above all, I believe that our economic and political situation is dramatic, more, and in a different way at that, than we are accustomed to view it. Usually, our complaints and grievances concern the level of consumption, which we feel to be low. But it appears that it is the future that will be truly dramatic, unless labor productivity, technological progress and economic development start moving at a pace totally different from that at which we are at present advancing toward the future.

Judgments of this kind have previously been expressed, but in an insufficiently austere and minatory manner, so that as a result no one is aware of the real scope of the threat to our sovereignty.
Gen Jaruzelski said that "the greatest difficulty lies ahead of us." Prof Andrzej Tymowski expressed in Odra of November 1983 the opinion that we are not emerging from the crisis, since it is looming in front of us instead of receding into the past. He attributed this to the difficulty of renewing our, as he termed it, "technical infrastructure," which in plain language means that we allot inadequate materials and manpower for the needed repair and modernization of "fixed capital," that is, machinery, equipment and buildings—let alone for new and also indispensable investments and technological progress.

VIII. Is that really so? In 1985 decapitalization will spread to more than 50 percent of construction-industry capacities, and even now all machinery is under repair 30 percent of the time. The number of dwellings needing modernization and renovation is estimated at about 1 million, but processing capacities and replacement housing are lacking, considering that the entire socialized construction provides 130,000 dwelling units annually. In industry the depreciation of fixed capital is about 50 percent; in transport and communications, 56 percent; and in science and technology, as much as 70 percent.

IX. There arises the problem of how to augment the pool of materials and manpower allocated for repair so as to overcome the threat of decapitalization as well as the lag in investments. The difficulty is that more funds for machinery and construction would mean less funds for the production of consumer goods.

And the volume of these goods already is too low anyway in relation to purchasing power and, what is worse, the actual needs of the broad masses. I have already mentioned such indispensable products as protective clothing for construction workers. Seven hundred thousand warm shirts are needed, but only about 200,000 are available for these workers. Boots sometimes come apart after a couple of weeks of work, and gloves too are of poor quality. Enterprise autonomy is not conducive to low-cost and mass production. Clearly, in production of this kind, the output of staple consumer goods should not be reduced; on the contrary, it must be expanded. On the other hand, the billions of zlotys that are absolutely needed for increasing repair and accomplishing indispensable investment projects can be gotten only by increasing labor productivity and the production of necessities while at the same time reducing the demand for less indispensable goods by either raising prices or curtailing wage increases. This dilemma represents a dramatic problem that is hellishly difficult to solve. And let no one say that it is these or those decisions of the government alone that are to blame. The high amount of money in circulation, in relation to the production of goods, was extorted from successive governments by us ourselves in the form of higher wages and social services. In sum, in the last 3 years Poland has become a country of widespread and ceaseless bargaining for ever higher living standards accompanied by declining productivity. This is illusory bargaining, because it consists in disputes for higher wages that can be granted only by printing more zlotys, of which there already are too many in circulation, rather than by expanding the output of things wanted for purchase with these zlotys.
X. Now the general pressure for increasingly higher wages, combined with a shorter work week and a low state of discipline in every element of the socialized economy, prevents the recovery of the bogged-down sector of modernization and investments, owing to lack of funds as the figures cited previously indicate. The wage increases in 1980 were too numerous, uncoordinated and too often designed for show, "for display," to make wages supposedly equal to those paid in richer countries, e.g., in the automotive industry, rather for the production of indispensable goods and services for the laboring masses. We lack sufficient manpower for even the needed repair and modernization, and it is difficult to restructure production, that is, to convert plants manufacturing unneeded things to the production of necessities. And yet—and this is precisely where we behold that part of the nation's future which is strangely overlooked in our periodicals and books—how can the disintegration of much of the most needed machines, facilities and even factory buildings, housing, etc., be avoided? What stream of resources should be allocated for this purpose and whence can they be gotten? What does the menace of the regression that is unfortunately spreading day after day, hour after hour, signify? After all, the decapitalization of machinery will affect consumption. The limited resources allocated for modernization and repair, let alone for indispensable investments, and the low productivity that increasingly perpetuates itself, can ultimately result, despite the growing amount of bank notes being paid to us every month, in steadily declining living standards. The dependence on imports and the inability to compete for export markets—owing to the continuing neglect of microelectronics and automation—may acquire a scale so large as to result in curtailing our economic sovereignty as well as in all the materially hurtful and morally humiliating consequences of the collapse of an independent economy.

XI. That is why I added the term "Understanding" to the title of my article, which was to treat of certain elements of national accord. Figuratively speaking, there exist three hinges of understanding indispensable to turning and opening the gates to a better future for the Polish Republic.

The first hinge is understanding that we should manage and work more economically and productively. This vector of thought is generally understood and universally accepted. But this hinge alone will not open for us gates to anywhere.

The second hinge is understanding the particular and genuine menace we are soon going to face. If this hinge does not move, we shall ignore two others: the first and the third.

Because the third hinge is understanding not only the general principle of what should be done, as with the second hinge, but also what should we do about it and how. How can this art be accomplished, considering that it absolutely has to be accomplished?

XII. Now what is the meaning of a more economical and productive economy? Undoubtedly it means adaptation of the money in circulation to the quantity of goods and, conversely, of the quantity of goods to the money in circulation.
That is, it means curtailing consumption for those 3 million families that are better situated. Next, it means eliminating unneeded jobs and paying lower wages for lower productivity. Further, it means changes in industry structure, which can be achieved only by allocating to selected fields the resources for modernization and new investments, which too means nothing else than, above all, discontinuing both certain investments and the operation of certain plants as well as again resorting to a temporary but painful curtailment of resources for consumption. How? How can such unpopular but sole roads of salvation be entered? What is the paramount obstacle to entering them? My answer is that all these measures require a marked strengthening of discipline, which besides had been absent even before 1980. I do not mean a discipline imposed by force, because that is a last resort which we will not avoid unless we ourselves rectify our ways. Will discipline be accepted by that part of the society which is still smarting after awakening, in time, from the lofty but completely unreal theoretical daydreams of Solidarity?

XIII. What we need is voluntary discipline, that is, first, general understanding of these three hinges on which the future is inexorably contingent, and second, a national consensus that would consist in accepting even those measures that seem to us painful and difficult to accept.

I believe that a major mistake is being made by those who wish to relieve decisionmakers at every level from the duty of making and implementing unpopular and necessary decisions and replace them with self-government elements. The voluntariness and understanding of the implementing teams should go so far as to accept in a disciplined manner the dispositions of the central center. It would be in itself a great and difficult step forward if this voluntariness could be attained. It is difficult to expect more. This can be achieved only in a climate of a mature understanding of not only our real domestic economic situation but also the international situation.

Part Two

XVI. For Poland's problem consists in the indispensable and urgent need for the voluntary acceptance of the transfer of resources from consumption to plant repair and modernization as well as to indispensable investments. This also is a problem of voluntariness, that is, of, first of all, understanding our actual situation, and then of an accord or consensus between all centers and the government. At present, I say, this problem in itself is extremely difficult to resolve, and it is becoming even more complicated to both parties owing to the differences in interpreting our foreign policy—and owing to the effect of these differences on the explicit orientation and understanding of the three hinges on which the future of the nation must be based if it is not to slide into still deeper backwardness and doom.

The international threat to Poland insofar as influence on the domestic situation is concerned consists in that at present, to the misfortune of the
entire world, there exists a sharp dispute for competition and superiority in armaments which the President of the United States Ronald Reagan wants to impose, instead of parity, on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies. To this end, the United States Government calls itself the defender of civil rights in our country, the protector of the groups which demand these rights and desire to weaken or disrupt our alliance with the Soviet Union. To extort from Poland such a domestic and foreign policy, the United States Government has introduced the so-called economic restrictions which greatly curtail the opportunities for our exports, which have been small anyway, as well as for purchases on credit.

XV. What is more, there are Poles living abroad who regard these measures of the United States against our country as an expression of genuine concern for the civil rights of its inhabitants. This is an extremely grave if not fundamental difference in interpreting the international situation, because other Poles point to the difficulty of reconciling this belief with the explicit activities of the same American government in support of many other countries where restrictions on civil rights are infinitely more severe than in our country. Precisely in the weeks during which I have been writing this article, the tragedy of losing not only these rights but also national sovereignty has been experienced by a small state in South Asia, namely, the island of Timor, without receiving any publicity. It has a population of barely half a million and until recently used to be a Portuguese colony. After it regained its independence, Indonesian troops landed on the island, occupying it in its entirety, ruling it and repressing with mass terror any resistance or suspected future foci thereof. In the early spring of 1984 the Portuguese premier visited the United States and asked its President to intervene with its ally Indonesia so that it would discontinue the cruel occupation of Timor. The President refused, precisely because the aggressor and occupier was an ally and a major arms customer of that great power. It so happened that an isolated, tragic and painful fact—the death of a single Polish student owing to a beating received at a militia station or while being transported in an ambulance—has become the subject of many months of propaganda against the alleged cruelties of the Polish Government, while the lawless occupation of Timor is tacitly accepted by the propaganda of the United States and its Western allies, headed by France. This is a minor example, but other and better known ones also exist. Similarly, the dictatorial government in El Salvador, whose slain opponents number several dozen thousands, not only does not meet with criticism or sanctions but enjoys far-reaching financial and arms support. Then also there is the government in Turkey, where several hundred condemned political prisoners had been awaiting death sentences or pardons at the moment when sanctions against Poland were resolved upon. This does not exhaust the list of countries where civil rights are curtailed to an hundredfold greater extent than in ours, but nevertheless their governments not only are not subject to sanctions by the United States but, on the contrary, receive outright American financing or even military support.

XVI. The danger to us harbored in intervention into domestic Polish affairs exists primarily because, as I noted above, some Poles, both emigres and those living in this country, consider precisely this intervention to be useful and
even attempt to have these restrictions made as sharp and far-reaching as possible.

More than one reader will at this point mentally query the author: Is it possible? What is the sense of it? How can it happen that a great power with a population of 230 million and the world's mightiest industrial potential takes certain measures which hardly affect its own volume of trade solely and exclusively in order to harm a distant 36-million nation? This at first glance strange fact can be understood if we define more precisely the role played by Poland in the composition and overall strength of the Warsaw Treaty. The member countries of the treaty have a combined population of 400 million, of which the Soviet Union 268 million and the socialist countries of Central Europe 110 million. Among these latter countries Poland figures first in size and population and second in industry, which provides some idea of the importance of its position in international politics. But that is not all. The geographical position of our country is such that the communication and strategic lines of nearly all European CEMA countries lie athwart it, so that any deterioration in Poland's economic and domestic situation, any lack of understanding and accord at moments as difficult as the ones we are experiencing now, must weaken, and considerably at that, the bloc of the socialist countries, while tranquility and intense work to strengthen Poland are bound to result in strengthening that entire bloc as well. This means that any step forward leading toward the further collapse or regression of our industry, agriculture, construction, etc., any collapse or regression of consumption in our country represents success to the policy which, to the misfortune of the world and America, but especially of Europe, was chosen and is being consistently pursued by the government of President Reagan.

XVII. In itself understanding this elementary threat might warrant abandoning the illusion of the disinterested commitment of the United States to defending civil rights in Poland, since it is clear that, to the policy of President Reagan, the worse off we are the more his aggressive strategy benefits. But understanding this fundamental truth has to be complemented with another and equally obvious truth. Namely, our situation is neither indifferent nor unimportant to the entire politics and fate of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and other Warsaw Treaty countries. Need we understand how inconceivable it would be for these countries to accept the existence of a neighbor country that is constantly riven by internal strife, undisciplined, ever more backward economically and technologically, and is at the same time a key communications and strategic point. After all, any weakening of our economy is a disaster to them, too, and any strengthening, a success. Hence also the NATO camp strives to weaken us in a completely explicit manner—it would be stupid not to exploit the naivety and gullibility of certain of our citizens. And conversely, the CEMA countries understand clearly what aid is needed by Poland, particularly as regards imports, in order to clamber out of the quagmire in which it temporarily finds itself. The aforementioned repair and modernization require imports of parts and machinery. To obtain these imports, we must export—and exporting requires the modernization and repair of our factories. The 15-year program for Polish-Soviet cooperation adopted in May 1984 affords us a chance to break out of this vicious circle. Without that
prospect for us, this program would make no sense at all for the Soviet Union. But our extremist opposition does not want to understand this.

XVIII. Such a far-reaching difference in interpreting our foreign policy would be menacing and would weaken the extent of our sovereignty even if it had not been concurrent, as mentioned previously, with the entirely exceptional period of the economic crisis which harbors dangers that are no less grave and, in the event of continuing passivity, ineluctable. Dangers that above all require a far-reaching understanding of the gravity of this crisis, and hence also understanding the need for voluntary acceptance of discipline and changes in our life that may be temporary to be sure but would be difficult and painful. The combined operation of the [underground] propaganda directly intended to undermine confidence, that is, discipline, to induce resistance, strikes, and riots, that is, to obstruct what seems to be the sole road of salvation, provides the whole picture of the dangers looming in front of us and of the needed mental effort that alone can rescue us from them.

Conclusion

XIX. In the above summary sketch of the cardinal and most essential issues I left out one issue whose importance cannot be underestimated. This is the problem of the government's credibility, that is, of conditions binding on the party of the second part as well, so that credibility may be regained and all of the nation's forces may operate to advantage and the conclusions presented above may be accepted. The means of gaining credibility are many, and quite a few of them have been tenaciously pursued by Gen Jaruzelski. He has convinced quite a few people, but he has also met with greater injustice and illwill from among the most obstinate adversaries. One of these means is drafting a longrange plan for surmounting the regression. I will not reiterate various possible economic measures mentioned in my Introduction with the object of making the reader perceive the particular vantage point from which I view the Polish horizon. I will not again restate these issues. Let me merely add that, among the various tremendously difficult means of regaining this credibility, priority should be given to a thorough revision of personnel policies in our economy and administration. A different treatment and different responsibilities of [enterprise] directors represent instruments used in highly industrialized countries to streamline efficiency. I do not doubt that we employ many industrious and conscientious individuals in managerial posts. Unfortunately, the personal worth of the executive is not always the decisive criterion for nominations to these posts. Neither their emoluments nor their prestige equal the importance of their work to the country. We consider it normal when some ass wins a million zlotys in the lottery. I have never heard of any great organizer of our industry or socialized agriculture that was awarded a million zloty bonus. Hence arise mistakes on various sectors which subsequently serve to promote the vicious and absurd—but not necessarily weak and ephemeral—opinion that supposedly mistakes hobbling economic progress here and there were due to a deliberately poor performance not so much by individuals inefficient and unfit to hold managerial posts as by the system itself that controls them.
XX. Will such changes in personnel policies suffice—in addition to attentively listening to the postulates of the masses, and in addition to the concern for implementing them—to change the attitude of that part of the society which still tenaciously persists in its aspiration to translate into reality its surely lofty but totally unrealistic theories that are inconsonant with elementary conditions? I do not know. The difficulties in breaking through the chalk circle that imprisons as in a vicious circle our political thinking and commands it to reiterate helplessly, "But we tried to many times,..." and "But it is the system that is at fault and no one can help it,..." are tremendous. Perhaps it would be easier for us to understand how barren this thinking is if we would accept two fundamental axioms applying to any nation that wishes to preserve its own statehood. The first axiom is that the worst domestic government is better than the best foreign government, and the second is that only a madman would look for enemies in the neighborhood and for friends afar.

11 May 1984

No Monument for Uprising Initiators

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 8, Aug 84 pp 110-112

[Article by Bohdan Czeszko, writer, journalist: "Comments on the Modern History of the PPR"]

[Text] Reading the article by Alexander Bochenski inspired me with some reflections, which in itself is a positive effect. I will begin with the issue of form, which is not indifferent to me as a writer. I am gratified to note that the author avoids the euphemisms to which we have been accustomed by publicists for so many years. Thus he does not operate with phrases like "certain isolated shortcomings," which "are despite everything noticeable," of course only "here and there," and similar equivocations. Hence I commend the author for the austere simplicity with which he expresses his opinions. I shall begin my reflections on the theses contained in that article with issues on which I have the least to say, namely, economic issues or, as was the fashion to say until recently, issues of "economic philosophy," with philosophy being discoursed on in relation to the price of milk or the halting, feasible in theory but never yet in practice, of the senseless wage increases, that is, the attainment of the unattainable "solid currency."

It seems to me as a layman that the leadership of the state made a mistake in specifying the time stages of emergence from the crisis. I understand perfectly that in 1982 we all, including the leadership, had needed a shot of optimism in the arm, because the reality looked so hopeless, but now, fortunately, no one is any longer offering such predictions. For nowadays we all—we laymen too—know well that in reality that road which we were to traverse so quickly is much longer and much more tortuous than could have been imagined at the time. I believe that the deleterious apathy of the society ensues from the nugatory nature of the accomplishments compared with the expectations; in the mind of the average man, little progress has been made, much less than shown by the indicators of growth in industrial output. To the
economist, surmounting the crisis probably means attaining a quantitatively and qualitatively tolerable output level, whereas to the average citizen surmounting the crisis means the abolition of market controls and a fairly adequate supply of everyday necessities. "The greatest difficulty still lies ahead of us": that is for certain. The question this raises is: "how difficult will that greatest difficulty be?"

The year 1985 will probably be a year in which a minimally satisfactory output will be attained. It will be at the same time a year in which any further curtailments of the renovation and repair of the machinery pool and facilities, if not of investments as well, will be no longer bearable. A. Bochenski's arguments appear irrefutable to me. Besides, the recent conference of trade unions with representatives of the PPR Government has made these tasks clear and explicit. The references in the speech by Comrade Jaruzelski to the trend toward self-consumption, so unfortunately present in our reality, were particularly convincing and telling to the imagination.

Were I a young man, these difficulties might offer a challenge to me, but I am of advanced age and feel not so much embittered as simply exhausted by dozens of years spent in the pursuit of a worthy life, a life hallmarked by accomplishments rather than by social and economic cataclysms.

I wondered whether to say a few words on the subject of propaganda, especially that practiced by television programs, which are addressed to their own imaginary audience of simpleton viewers with a low level of intelligence. On thinking it over, I abandoned the notion, because the author of the article regards it—unjustly in my opinion—as not so important.

I shall now discuss the theses which I consider debatable. To wit, Aleksander Bochenski is opposed to the erection of two monuments, one to the Warsaw Uprising and the other to those fallen in defense of the socialist system. Were this to concern, in the case of the monument to the Warsaw Uprising, commemorating what we call armed action, that is, commemorating also the military, and particularly the political initiators of that tragic event, I would be resolutely opposed to this undertaking. On the other hand, I am in favor of erecting a monument to the insurgents of Warsaw, to the soldiers of the Uprising, and especially to the Varsovians, the contemporary inhabitants of the city, of whom tenfold as many as the soldiers themselves had died in that massacre, although the casualties among the soldiers alone were 20,000. Such numbers of such brave troops could bring Germany to ultimate defeat much closer. The flower of Warsaw's youth had fallen, and the irretrievably lost intellectual forces, talents, and simply that firmness of limbs mentioned in "Marsz Mokotowa" [Mokotow March] are simply incalculable. No one so far has limned the sufferings of the "civilians" surprised by the Uprising. I doubt whether it can be put into words at all. And hence, to my mind, the best book ever written about the Warsaw Uprising is Miron Bialoszewski's "Pamiętnik z powstania warszawskiego" [Diary of the Warsaw Uprising]. I myself was an insurgent and saw all that could be seen, for, together with my AL [People's Army, leftist] "Czewartaki" Battalion, I had taken part in the fighting in Wola, Starowka, City Center and Czerniakow [districts of Warsaw]. Only every fourth member of the battalion has survived. No one is going to spin fairy
tales about the Warsaw Uprising to me: I have always regarded and still regard the launching of the Uprising as an inexcusable crime, but the victims of that crime demand to be remembered; this is demanded by the inhumanly bleeding soldiers who remained faithful till the end.

I repeat: this is the only way in which I perceive the monument. But who will sculpture it? Warsaw is full of bad monuments and bad monumental sculptures, headed by the Warsaw Nike.

The question of erecting a monument to the victims of the struggle to perpetuate people's rule is answered negatively by Aleksander Bochenski for reasons of an ethical or, if one prefers, moral nature. His point is that it was a fratricidal struggle and those fallen had fallen in a civil war. That was so indeed. A. Bochenski observes that the WIN [Freedom and Independence] and NSZ [National Armed Forces] troops had, owing to their life under the Occupation, been exposed to anticomunist, extremist and, one could say, bloodthirsty propaganda and were incapable of grasping the irreversibility of the geopolitical changes occurring in our country, not to mention the fact that these people were bound by their military oath. That is true, but there is more to it. Those fighting against people's rule were perfectly aware of what they were doing: In the initial stage of that fighting they had not been isolated in the country and moreover they received material and political support from the Western countries, particularly from Churchill, who had abruptly reversed the direction of his, for the time being, political attacks, as well as from the contemporary American administration. At a later stage these detachments either disbanded themselves, availing themselves of the amnesty and the possibility of resuming normal life, or inevitably degenerated into bandit gangs. The issues were, of course, more complex than what I am schematically outlining here. The fighting methods of the anticomunist underground were resolute and ruthless, and its terror took on bestial forms. No one has prepared, and probably no one ever will prepare, a balance sheet of the losses incurred in that struggle. I am not certain how the scale would tilt. Besides, that is not the point.

Let us recall that after 1956 war-veteran status was gained by all soldiers of the Home Army and the NSZ. This status was also conferred sometime in the mid-1980s [as published] on those who had fought to perpetuate people's rule. From the tribune of the Sejm I had supported voting for this decree.

I have seen what kind of war that Polish civil war was. To be sure, I viewed it with the eyes of a reporter rather than a soldier. I viewed it with eyes which, it seems, have seen everything that can be seen in war. What I saw was too much for my writing skills to describe at the time, and too much for me as a human being. There are affairs and tombs in the history of nations which it is seemly to pass over in silence. I would want to erect that monument to all those who had at the time been reviving Poland to a life in hunger and cold, including and perhaps in first order the soldiers defending that then still barely nascent life. But since the purpose of the monument has already been resolved upon,... let it be.
'False' Claims on Economic Reform

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 8, Aug 84 pp 113-117

[Article by Grzegorz W. Kolodko: "Some Reflections on the PPR Economy"]

[Text] A. Bochenski formulates in his reflections rather categorical views on many aspects of the current economic situation and, against this background, voices reservations concerning economic policies and offers his opinion on the needed changes in the directions and implementation of these policies. We all have this right. However, the formulation of assessments and of the attendant conclusions requires the consideration of at least two premises: first, familiarity with facts and a satisfactory analysis of our economic reality and, second, viewing socio-economic trends in their overall context and complexity, without abstracting from conditioning factors and consequences—not only economic but also political ones, in cases where such abstracting is simply impermissible. This concerns in particular the ability to distinguish between objective and subjective barriers to socioeconomic development. The latter are still too numerous, but let us not locate them where they do not exist in reality.

Aside from several details, in themselves debatable, which serve the author as arguments in favor of the position he advocates, in principle he concentrates on two groups of problems, namely, those concerning the economic reform and those concerning changes in the proportions and structures of the economy from the standpoint of attaining particular economic and social goals in the future. These are truly crucial problems, which we face and will still continue to face for many years, and whose time frame transcends the end of the 1980s.

/A. Bochenski, while unequivocally criticizing the manner in which the economic reform is implemented, accuses it of being "...inseparably linked to the vision of free competition, which its creators preferred to term 'market mechanisms.'" His subsequent inferences on this topic stem from the adoption of this thesis. But this thesis is simply fallacious./ [emphasized]

The basic directions of changes in the operating mechanism of the national economy, adopted by the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress, have in no case been linked to any "vision of free competition," and this applies even more to the insufficiently consistent implementation of the resolutions of that congress. However, the qualitative systemic changes which we wish to implement within the framework of the economic reform must be, more broadly than we have succeeded in doing so previously, based on the utilization of commercial relations as a mechanism for the autoregulation of some economic processes. This is so because the role of these relations is growing rather than diminishing with the growth of social production forces and socialist production relations. Hence, curtailing the scope of their operation be sailing against the current of history.

The [open] market in this connection is only one—in addition to planning, which we are not at all abandoning—of the subsystems in the entire control
system of the national economy. Unless its role is strengthened, the chances for streamlining the economy's performance are nil. [emphasized]

In this connection, the need to augment the importance of [open-] market relations—which has nothing in common with the "vision of free competition"—ensues from three assumptions:

—/first/ [emphasized], market forces represent an important source of information on societal needs, to whose satisfaction the entire development strategy must be subordinated;

—/second/ [emphasized], market forces should play a greater role than previously in the adoption of allocation decisions, this being a basic condition for streamlining effectiveness relations and shaping an appropriate structure of the national economy;

—/third/ [emphasized], there exists an urgent need to discipline more tightly the complex whole of economic activities through the mediation of the zloty as a factor limiting the incessant drive toward expansion, especially toward the expansion of investments.

/The development of commercial relations, accompanied by the broadening of domains in which the laws of supply and demand regulate the processes of macroeconomic reproduction, is thus a necessity rather than a question of subjective choice/ [emphasized]. The sooner we grasp this truth the better. But this has nothing in common with the vision of free competition! On the other hand, it has a great deal in common with competition.

A. Bochenksi's question, "Does competition really stimulate progress?", has to be answered affirmatively. But this concerns not free competition but a desirable state of equilibrium of the national economy combined with a maximally possible curtailment of monopoly practices, which can be achieved only and above all through a broader and more skillful exploitation of /objective/ [emphasized] market laws. For only then competition among producers for purchasers of their products can become possible. Only this can stimulate a tendency to reduce production cost and improve production quality, and even to reduce unit prices while at the same time expanding the volume of output. Hence also A. Bochenksi's view that "...the existing structures for the concentration and planning of production should not have been demolished" is unacceptable. For precisely the converse is true: this demolition should have been carried out, and more extensively at that than has been possible so far. Indispensable institutional changes in the organizational structures existing within our economy are a fundamental prerequisite for reaching a kind of critical mass on whose course hinges the success of the economic reform. That is because the new economic-financial mechanism cannot function properly when old and inadequate organizational-institutional structures are retained.

Strengthening the role of the market [forces] does not contradict the systemic principle of central planning of the process of macroeconomic reproduction. But the functions of the plan are then different, and the methods of fulfilling it then also must be different. It is the plan that must resolve
the strategic problems of socioeconomic development and determine the basic economic macroproportions. As for the market [forces], they should aid the plan in the sense of representing a source of a great deal of important information, on the one hand, and a criterion of the validity of allocation decisions and the size of indispensable outlays, on the other.

Thus, A. Bochenski addresses his critical comments to the wrong place. This is because his addressee could and, in my opinion, should be criticized for not availing himself sufficiently of market instruments, although it should be borne in mind that these instruments do not have only good sides. Such solutions do not exist. The objective reality is represented by numerous barriers of a social nature which hamper the pace of the "marketization" of the economy. Their disregard would reflect lack of realism in assessing the economic and political situation. The author should rather have addressed his accusations to a sizable group of economists—nota bene, not being an economist himself—who display the strange (?) proclivity toward identifying an economy operating on the principles of a rational utilization of economic mechanisms with the model of the free-competition economy (or at least of "Marktwirtschaft" [market economy]). The myths of the all-encompassing role of the market [forces] are all the more perplexing when one considers that, even in the capitalist countries, no one any longer doubts—and for many, many years at that—that this is not the right road. An attempt to interpret the meaning of the economic reform in the spirit of [Adam] Smith's "invisible hand" of the market, which supposedly regulates everything optimally, would signify utter disregard of the realities of our economy. In both these cases, both the economic reform and the economic policy are criticized now from the right and now from the left, instead of being viewed from the standpoint of common sense.

In reality, the national economy cannot function and develop properly when economic and social processes are guided solely by the "invisible hand" of market [forces] or solely by the "invisible hand" of the central planner. The point is that both these hands should be visible and perform mutually coordinated movements consonant with the wishes of the "head," i.e., of the state's socioeconomic policy reflecting the real interests of the society and effectively controlled by the society.

The other group of issues raised by A. Bochenski pertains to the structure of our economy and the desirable macroproportions of the division of national income. Along this line of reflections the author formulates a number of controversial views. In particular, the claim that "...plant autonomy is not conducive to low-cost and mass production" cannot be left uncontested. First, the current unfavorable production trends are by no means a consequence of the autonomy gained by enterprises under the reform, insufficient as it is anyway, and they rather stem from the deep economic disequilibrium that could only grow worse if the author's postulates were to be implemented. Second, from his claim ensues the logical conclusion that production decisions should again be centralized. Such a conclusion must be unequivocally rejected. What then, in A. Bochenski's opinion, should the economic reform essentially consist in? In a return to some one of the "models" applied in the past.
The basic problem concerns, however, changes in the national economy. A restructuring program has not yet been drafted. Hence we still do not know much just what particular changes in the material structure of the economy are meant. In general, the only thing we can state with certainty is that the desirable structure of the economy should be, on the one hand, definitely better subordinated to the structure of social needs and, on the other, it should be pro-effectiveness, anti-inflation, pro-export and based to a greater extent on the processing of indigenous raw material resources, and that moreover it should promote innovations and the application of technological progress. Accomplishing these aims thus requires differentiating the growth rates of discrete elements of the material-technical base, with the development of some of these elements to be simply halted.

Hence also the alarmist assessments of the progressing decapitalization of productive capital, such as the one contributed by Bochenski, have to be viewed in relative terms. First, not everything is becoming decapitalized. It is worth noting that in 1983 enterprises spent on capital repair as much as about 1 billion zlotys, which was included in their production cost. Some of these outlays are indeed in the nature of renovation and even modernization investments. Thus, the actual degree of the depreciation of fixed capital differs from the statistical degree. Secondly, the degree of capital depreciation varies, and hence statements that decapitalization extends to the entire economy represent generalizations that are pushed too far. Third and last, the sooner certain elements of fixed capital, including certain entire plants, undergo decapitalization the better. This should be regarded as a natural process of the elimination of inefficient facilities, technologies, workplaces and even entire enterprises. This is because guided decapitalization/ [emphasized] should be a major instrument for accomplishing indispensable structural changes. Now the problem is that this instrument still is not sufficiently utilized owing to, among other things, the pressures being exerted in behalf of reproducing the largest possible proportion of the component elements of the productive capital installed in the past.

But it is new investments that are the principal means of effectuating these changes; without their appropriate level and structure/ [emphasized] the intended goals cannot be achieved. And here we face the other crucial problem of the current socioeconomic situation, and one broached by A.Bochenski, namely, the magnitude of investment outlays. He presents the view, which he is far from alone in advocating, that the volume of investments should be much greater than it is at present, while at the same time asking: "What stream of resources is needed for this, and whence can it be gotten?"

The postulate of a marked augmentation of the scale of accumulation and investments is, in view of the development pace characterizing our national economy, identical with the postulate of increasing the investment rate, that is, increasing the proportion of national income to be set aside for accumulation at the expense of reducing the proportion of consumption in that income/ [emphasized]. Owing to the need to fulfill part of our foreign obligations ensuing from our huge foreign indebtedness, the growth rate of the per capita distributed national income will be low in the next few years.
Hence, a decline in the consumption part of that income signifies a decline in the absolute level of consumption. A. Bochenski realizes this fully, unlike some others who are convinced that augmenting the scale of investments would produce rapid consumption and production effects, although, in view of the improper allocation of resources against the background of the [economic] disequilibrium, in the short term an increase in investment rate is bound to only aggravate the situation in this field—there are no guarantees. Similarly, in postulating the—of course, temporary—lowering of the living standards of the society, which already have fallen drastically during the crisis, he is aware that this would necessarily intensify inflationary processes still further and compound—again "temporarily"—the already deep disequilibrium between currency in circulation and market supplies. In other words, an increase in the volume of investments at a rate that is more rapid than the growth rate of distributed national income would, in the Polish situation, have to occur at the expense of reducing the absolute level of consumption and would have to be financed by further intensifying inflation. Postulating a thus construed acceleration of investments reflects lack of political realism. The Polish society, and especially the working class, will not accept any further decline in consumption, the more so considering that this would have to be accompanied by a parallel increase in labor productivity, production and national income/ [emphasized].

A. Bochenski thus is only partially right in stating that specific changes have to be carried out in "...industry structure, which can be achieved by allocating to selected fields resources for modernization and investments, and which too means nothing else than discontinuing both certain investments and the operation of certain plants as well as, again, resorting to a temporary but painful curtailment of resources for consumption." Only the first part of this statement is acceptable. /For the problem consists not so much in the volume of investments as in their structure and—this being closely related to that structure—the effectiveness of the outlays incurred/ [emphasized]. According to GUS [Main Statistical Office] estimates, the share of net investments in Poland last year was 18.3 percent, and will be no smaller this year, whereas the share of net accumulation in distributed national income was at the level of 22.3 percent (see "Maly Rocznik Statystyczny" [Little Statistical Yearbook], GUS, Warsaw, 1984, p 60). These are relatively high indicators, not matched in many countries. It is worth noting here that, in order to preserve the attained consumption level, last year the share of net investments in Hungary was reduced to about 12 percent, while in the GDR the share of net accumulation in distributed national income was reduced to about 16 percent. Thus, the entire effort, both in the sphere of government economic policies and on the sector of streamlining the economic machinery, is oriented toward maintaining or accelerating the growth rate of the economy not by expanding the scale of investments but by allocating them more rationally and attaining a basically higher effectiveness than in the past.

Given the situation of the Polish economy, our efforts should not be concentrated on again mobilizing the extensive factors of growth by means of an expansion of investments. This will not be acceptable to the society in view of the direct consequences of this measure to the sphere of consumption in the form of its "temporary" curtailment. For such a curtailment "will not
pass." The aim instead should be to mobilize intensive factors. This is to be reflected in attaining a definitely higher level of the effectiveness of investment outlays, without increasing their share. This, among other things, is to be promoted by the economic reform. Unfortunately, the appeals for additional investment outlays also demonstrate that the reform's pro-effectiveness effects so far still remain inadequate. But this should lead to the conclusion that further systemic changes consonant with the already adopted decisions are needed, rather than reducing the level of consumption and ignoring the role of the relationship between money in circulation and market supplies. This is because a rise in that level is largely contingent on the further development of that relationship.
ROLE OF RELIGIOUS 'PARISH CENTER' DESCRIBED

Wroclaw NOWE ZYCIE in Polish 26 Aug-8 Sep 84 pp 6, 14

[Article by Pawel Kadziela: "The Role of the Parish Center"]

[Text] In early June of this year a seminar on the topic of "The Architecture of Church Structure—Parish Center" took place with the participation of the chairman of the Episcopate Commission for Church Architecture, Bishop Julian Wojtkowski, Bishop Jan Wieczorek and Bishop Jan Michalski, at the site of the Main Board of the Society of Polish Architects in Warsaw. The first meeting of this kind was organized in Kazimierz Dolny on the Vistula in November 1982. It concerned matters relating to the building of places of worship. Topics such as liturgical requirements in the building of churches and problems of symbolism and allegory in designing church interiors were taken up. The following topics were also discussed: basic assumptions in church architecture—the criteria and means of evaluating designs for church construction; the status of the architect during the building of church structures; and the position of the investor and parish council in a community venture that is so significant from both a spiritual and economic point of view.

This year's seminar was devoted to the architecture of the parish center. In his opening remarks, Bishop Jan Wojtkowski outlined a response to the question of what the people of God anticipate from the investor and designer in building a church structure. Church structures should generate an atmosphere of the experience of reconciliation between God and the people, of consolation and pardon. It should be a place of meeting with holiness, a place offering a chance to shake off the cares of the world, a place that offers not only physical but mental security.

Translating these desires into the language of architectural specifics, people expect brightness, but not dazzle, a harmony of sounds, speech that is audible in every spot, areas that are neither too hot nor too cold, aesthetic, harmoniously finished interiors, comfortable pews, a confessional placed in a discreet area, and an entrance to the place of worship designed to provide access for invalids and the handicapped. The responsibility for taking care of all these matters rests in equal measure with the investor and the designer, and let us remember that the moral consequences stemming from poor church design are enormous.
Bishop Wojtkowski noted that, considering the extremely low standards of urban planning in Poland and the lack of any kind of rational land-use design in this country, the situation of modern people is characterized by a feeling of menace, fear and mental defeat. Large-panel prefabricated buildings—cramped, erected tastelessly and cheaply, often unhygienic, even hazardous to one's health—are conducive neither to rest nor to the development of proper family bonds. At the same time, the great delay in the building of the residential cultural infrastructure (cinemas, theaters, clubs, libraries, sports structures) results in more and more people anticipating that their cultural needs will be satisfied in the parish. This situation places new spiritual and organizational tasks before the church.

Rev Dr Jan Miazek presented the doctrinal justification for these tasks. He declared, among other things, that the constant deepening of the Christian formation of members of the parish community is imperative, that for a person conscious of his faith, taking part only in liturgical rites—hearing the word of God, receiving the sacraments, etc—is not sufficient. This is the foundation, but one's everyday attitude toward one's neighbor and the ability to evangelize in the world every day testify to the maturity of a Christian's inner life. The task of serving another human being and not limiting oneself to the relationship of self and God, but perceiving one's neighbor as well, is the fundamental problem of the contemporary church in Poland. However, for there to be community, for the commandment of love of neighbor to be actively realized, there must exist some kind of material base, some space in which one can work in the area of catechesis on all levels and with all possible methods and means, as well as in the area of broad scale charitable activity. Thus, in the majority of places of worship currently under construction (1,200 churches are being built nationwide), parish centers are being designed.

The parish center is a set of facilities attached to the church: 1) residential (apartments for priests, nuns, if necessary for church employees such as the organist, catechist, etc.); 2) administrative (the parish chancellery, offices); 3) catechetical (rooms that should be multifunctional, e.g., when circumstances require, there should be no problem in quickly rearranging the traditional classroom into a type of scouting room where it is possible to sit in a circle and, generating the appropriate mood, to talk candidly or sing to guitar accompaniment); 4) sociocultural (e.g., athletic halls, rooms for sports activities, a "storeroom" for the children of parents who are involved in parish work, multifunctional rooms for lectures, shows, theater, cinema, a library with a reading room, a stand with books and magazines, a small coffee bar where it is possible to talk quietly for medical offices); 5) storage and technical (garages, workshops, storerooms). Only a parish center so conceived and designed forms the basis for breaking the still deeply rooted stereotype in our consciousness that the parish is the priest and the nuns. We constantly forget that we all make up the parish and we are all obliged to be concerned about the lot of the community in whose life we participate. One can easily be convinced of how admirably the cooperation between the parish priest and laity can take shape and what fruits the activity of a rationally conceived parish council can bring to the community by reading the interview conducted by Kazimierza Kijowska with Rev Franciszek Cгод,
pastor of the parish of St Elizabeth in Wroclaw (W DRODZE' No 4, 1984, pp 89-100). Father Franciszek Glod says this about the statute and work of the council appointed by him in accordance with the decision of the Second Vatican Council: "...the statute is the framework of our activity and our capabilities. It outlines the main direction of the work of the parish council, which should assist the pastor in organizing the liturgy and by its own example draw the faithful, especially the young, to participate in religious life and parish activity, through active cooperation in catechism, development of the reading of good books, charitable help, free family or legal counseling, popularizing information about church activities, through organizing lectures on religious subjects, helping the Catholic missions and caring for church structures. We would also like to organize a parish synod, and I am considering a broader outreach to the workers. No one is reaching out to them. We must form a group of people very dedicated to the church from the workers themselves, so that they can exert an influence on their own circle. The question of how to do this is a task for a group of priests and lay people, how to reach them with the gospel, how to transform that circle."

Extremely interesting reflections on the subject of the social identity of the church in Poland were the focus of a report by Rev Bronislaw Plasecki. The task of the church is to preach salvation for all, to be a symbol of salvation. The designing of space is also a symbol, and architects should remember this. In the past, the church was always deeply rooted in social structures (e.g., education, health care, social assistance). [Article 2, point 1, law on the control of publications and performances, 31 July 1981 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99, amended DZIENNIK USTAW No 44/83, item 204)]. The task of the church is to attempt to reconstruct social consciousness—to propose and co-author social structures which on one hand would stem the atomization of the parish community and on the other would not be limited only to family and professional relationships. The church is particularly qualified for such action, since the liturgy is itself a creator of community and should unite believers, not divide them. In any case, this is the direction of the spiritual life of Polish society; the need for community experiences is growing. This can be seen most vividly in the pilgrim movement or the various spiritual youth groups, such as the neocatechumens, the charismatics, the "Light-Life" movement, the "Muminki," "Gaudium Vitae" and many others. Communities of this kind should also have their own "space" in the parish center.

Rev Plasecki noted the urgent need to build, alongside parish centers, retreat houses (especially in towns situated not too far from metropolitan areas) in which days of contemplation and retreat can be organized for the parish community.

The seminar organized by the Association of Architects of the Polish Republic and Polish Episcopate was valuable and profitable both for the priest-investors and for the architect-designers. It allowed both sides to think
through and exchange their views and observations. It was a response to the words of John Paul II, who said in Mistrzejowice on 22 June 1983: "Through the work of evangelization the complex matter of the kingdom of heaven remains in the hands of the parish. 'I will give you the keys to the kingdom of heaven' (Mat 16:19), Christ tells Peter. These 'keys' extend to every parish--through it they are to open the gates of the 'future era' to people of all generations."

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INTELLIGENTSIAS ROLE IN SOCIETY SCRUTINIZED

Intelligentsia vs Workers

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 35, 1 Sep.84 p 3

[Article by Stanislaw Kwiatkowski: "What Is Owed to Whom?" under the rubric "Polemics"]

[Text] More than half a year ago Prof Celina Bobinska wrote in POLITYKA (No 53, 1983) on the "encouraging model of the poor and honest 'intelligent' [member of the intelligentsia]." She argued that in recent years the intelligentsia in Poland had become pauperized and that we would have to pay for this a high price in the form of a civilizational lag and, what is most important, that this is a consequence of not only the crisis but also also an anti-intellectual bias that is not so much authentic as incited. This was not to initiate yet another discussion of the intelligentsia, because does not all that is happening in world culture, science, technology and economy demonstrate that no progress can be made without the intelligentsia? Subsequent comments in this newspaper by professors Jan K. Kostrzewski, Kyszard M. Rudnicki and Napoleon Wolanski pointed to the scale of Poland's science and technology lag and supported and elaborated the arguments in favor of the "encouraging model..." These authors proposed various methods for a better utilization of the creative potential of our indigenous intelligentsia or criticized it bitterly, but they all agreed on one thing, namely, that ignoring the intelligentsia's role in the present-day world of great and historical changes in methods of production deprives us of the chance to move abreast of other [countries]. In his turn, Jan Ruranski also offered a diagnosis of the causes of the intelligentsia's situation (POLITYKA, No 26). By contrast, the article presented below by Col Docent Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, director of the Center for Public Opinion Surveys (CBOS), provides other rationales
and another view, which is fairly widespread in Poland nowadays and thus deserves to be more broadly publicized.

The Editors

The Polish press is echoing the intelligentsia's outcries about the injustices it is meeting with: it is undervalued, paid less than blue-collar workers and blamed for the crisis, the prestige of white-collar work is declining, and higher education and academic degrees and rank are being deprecated.

I have nothing against those who assert their rights. But I resent it when comparisons of this kind are used to promote anti-worker claims. I am especially surprised at the party-member "inteligents" who scribble such things or publish them uncritically.

The loudest claims are being made concerning the low emoluments, "the degradation of both the very prestige of intellectual labor and its pecuniary criterion." I am of the same mind and will not dispute this issue. Let me add however that emoluments for blue-collar labor also do not always assure adequate replenishment of the labor force. Relatively low wages represent a broader problem rather than a problem of the intelligentsia alone. What is more, I am completely opposed to inferring in this connection to inferences on the proportions between emoluments for physical and mental labor.

I understand and share the opinion of Prof. R. M. Rudnicki of the Institute of Horticulture and Floriculture (POLITYKA, No 26) that scientists should receive much higher wages so that they would not have to engage in moonshining on private farms in order to earn 2,000 or 3,000 zlotys per work day by cutting fruit trees (is science indeed always losing thereby?). But how can one accept the context of that article, as when its author compares the [monthly] salaries of professors (21,500 zlotys) and blue-collar employees (12,800 zlotys) at the Institute with the 20,000 zlotys monthly paid to a welder in the machinery industry, and comments: "We thus have a wage system that penalizes both blue-collar workers and scientists for working at the institute."

Please note the verb "penalizes" on the grounds that science personnel earns less than industry personnel. Why should science personnel be privileged and paid more than machinery-industry personnel, whether welders or riveters? It says a great deal that the professor does not want to notice the difference between a blue-collar employee of the institute and a blue-collar worker (welder) in the machinery industry.

I read that the lowest-paid groups (at, e.g., the URSUS [Tractor Plant]) are engineers and charwomen. How far have things gone! Mister engineer and the charwoman. And yet, we are overproducing engineers. They are a dime a dozen; we graduate twice as many as the highly industrialized countries, while charwomen have long been scarce in those countries and now are beginning to be scarce in ours. I am reminded of a cartoon in a Western periodical, showing one charwoman complaining to another about having to take on a second job.

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because, in addition to supporting her son the engineer and her daughter the M.A., she now also has to support her son-in-law the doctor.

Artur Bodnar declares in ZYCIE WARSZAWY, No 194: "What good then can be said of the minister who publicly expresses his gratification over the fact that blue-collar workers at [the enterprises under] his ministry earn more than he himself? This is pro-worker demagogy."

I would prefer to say only good things about Prof Bodnar, but I wish he would save his epithets of "pro-worker demagogy" for certain others whom both he and I know well. The minister surely knows what he is saying and would not change places with a blue-collar worker.

J. Ruranski (POLITYKA, No 26) states: "The revaluation of labor and the elevation, in the social hierarchy, of simple arduous physical labor above intellectual labor results in the degradation of knowledge and science as factors in progress." And he stresses the point by declaring: "Thus, alarm has to be sounded."

/Making much ado over the fact that some get paid more than others is pointless/ [emphasized].

After all, we are not paying wages simply because some shake their heads while others wave their hands, or because some are better trained than others. Yes, alarm has to be sounded, but in behalf of just wages equivalent to one's creative contribution to what he is doing—equivalent both for the "inteligents" and for the workers. The latter also are doing creative labor (I recommend to the reader a brochure on this topic, "Jak czy ile?" [How or How much?] by Michal Krajewski.) A just wage is meant here as a wage that equitably compensates for the effort invested and regenerates the strength and health expended.

There are quite a few intellectual professions everywhere, even in a sawmill. I just happened to read a complaint by workers from a sawmill in Lidzbark Warminski who wrote that, in return for their extremely arduous labor, they receive an average wage of 7,500 zlotys montly plus allowances in kind such as cooling beverages which they "have not yet received this year and there are no prospects for receiving them...."

In another letter, a railroad worker from Wrzesnia enumerated his earnings in considerable detail: "We work at loading and unloading. This is hard work, done at night and on days off, and what are we to get for it? For example, the proposed new overtime pay is extra 15 zlotys per hour (on weekdays), and 30 zlotys extra per hour for night work and work on days off. (Once we used to get overtime pay of 50 percent extra on weekdays and for night work and 100 percent extra for work on days off.)"

"At present we get overtime of 32 zlotys extra per hour (without pay allowances and compensation pay). Our wage allowances are to be eliminated, that is, our hourly rates are to rise to 50 zlotys and the extra pay for overtime work is to be, as I mentioned above, 15 and 30 zlotys per hour."
"Is overtime pay worth it to us? No. But we must work overtime anyhow, because the PKP [Polish State Railroads] operates round the clock. Our work should be worthwhile to us, but the management is bent on reducing overtime pay to a minimum. If the management wants to avoid stoppages, it must pay better, because we are definitely going to get paid less than at present.

"Let me ask, just how much is that 12,000 zlotys monthly, more or less, plus allowances?... Is not it ridiculous when a worker earns 80 zlotys per hour on a Sunday and cannot even afford a beer? Working on railroad cars in the open, in the heat, he sweats more, but he does not get any coffee or tea because the depot's kitchen is closed."

Much longer passages could be cited from such letters, personal as they are and dealing with the problems of individuals. If need be, I can also provide findings of surveys. I have already more than once contradicted those who confidently cite figures showing that workingmen receive high wages, higher than those of engineers, Masters of Arts, Ph.D.s, docents and various other valuable members of the intelligentsia. People! But that is untrue. I shall demonstrate the fallacy of such notions by discussing one of the nationwide studies of the big-industry working class (at plants employing more than 3,000 workers each). The poll on [worker] self-government (taken last year) covered 37 large enterprises with an average workforce of 2,211 each [as published], consisting of 1,785 blue-collar workers and 426 white-collar workers each.

Blue-collar workers: average [monthly] family income, 24,908 zlotys; average monthly wage, 16,117 zlotys.

White-collar workers: average family income, 26,779 zlotys; average monthly salary, 18,328 zlotys.

Blue-collar workers: males 80 percent, average age about 36; basic vocational background, 51 percent; elementary educational background, 20 percent; secondary educational background, 20 percent. Years of work: average 17 years (of which 12 years in the present plant). Family size: three to four persons. Only seven persons were single.

White-collar workers: males 72 percent; 42.4 percent performed managerial functions; 21 percent were specialists; and 36.6 percent were clerical personnel. Secondary educational background, 60 percent; higher educational background, more than 30 percent. Years of work, average: 18.6 years. Family size: three to four persons (76 percent).

These figures can be said to speak for themselves. But let us assume that at least a part of the blue-collar workers derive higher incomes than do the white-collar ones. I consider this healthy and normal, particularly in a state with a socialist system of society which, following its ideological premises, wants to relieve the working class of heavy manual labor in dust and noise that are dangerous to life, noxious to health, filthy, providing no work satisfaction, done at night or on a three-shift basis, etc. Why should the
white-collar worker, who is exempt from all this solely because he engages in "intellectual" labor, receive greater honors?

It is beyond the capacity of the professors' brains to [accept the idea] that a worker employed by a municipal sludge treatment plant or a water-supply and sewer maintenance enterprise can earn more than in academe or an institute. The professor is worried that no one will be interested in higher studies, that a minister's portfolio might be refused solely because "dirty" manual work pays more.

/ The time is coming when it will be more difficult to find a sewer maintenance man or a charwoman than a physician. [emphasized] /

Whoever feels wronged has the right to change himself. And it is not surprising that our "inteligents" willingly provide various services of this kind by departing for the West precisely for this reason. Because it pays! Our slogan should be that in Poland it would also pay to do manual labor.

I myself would not exchange my lower salary as a white-collar worker for the higher pay of a miner, metallurgical worker, power-shovel operator and other persons laboring under equally difficult conditions. I have done my part of manual labor in the past and I know something of it. I am glad to be fortunate enough to free myself of it. I would like to help others so that they too would not have to do it.

In the early 1950s we had worshipped a kind of unnatural "proletkult" [cult of the proletariat]. It is embarrassing to admit but in those times elegant and neatly dressed individuals with well-groomed hands used to be "class suspects." Fortunately, this did not last long. What persists much longer, however, ever since the beginnings of People's Poland, is the reasoning of the well-bred madame with a "prewar academic degree" who feels exalted by her educational background and views a "grease-jockey" with disdain. Every petit bourgeois has been frightening his children, threatening them that, unless they study hard, they would become "common menials." The petty gentry's aversion to engaging in private enterprise, whether in commerce or industry, has evolved into contempt for physical labor. An office, an official "white-collar" position, has been the criterion of happiness. The stupidest officials and girls with a secondary-school degree considered themselves superior to a skilled worker. Such ideas have even been formally supported by, e.g., differentiations in the length of job leaves, payment of salaries that are nearly twice as high, etc.

But education does not confer the same privileges that a title of nobility used to. The times are different. Whoever used to be a count, something was owed to him on this account, much more than at present is owed to, say, a Ph. D., even a habilitated one. These days the equivalent of a title of nobility is conferred by one's work contribution whether or not one is an "intelligent" or a blue-collar worker. "To each according to his labor" and "remuneration according to labor." I dispute those who appeal for wage differentiation from motives of personal gain. They invoke the bogeyman of "uravnilovka" [a Russian term meaning wage egalitarianism] on the part of workers, but they
refuse to admit that the need for differentiating wages could result in higher wages for workers.

I also have listened to party-member "inteligenciki" [a contemptuous diminutive for "intiligency," meaning pointy-headed intellectuals or eggheads] who declared that at the 16th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, called "the worker plenum," "opinions, formulated in a demagogic spirit, deprecating the intelligentsia were voiced." I reread the stenographic record of the plenum's deliberations and I can confidently ask: please, just show me a comment by a worker, whether or not a party member—because their comments basically did not differ—reflecting such demagoguery. I stress: a comment by a worker.

That is so even if somebody among them were to exaggerate something. One has to be impervious to a sense of shame in order to voice such grievances after all that which happened in the past. The worker has the right to view matters extremistically and sharply. He is not accustomed to playing the intelligentsia's games of subtlety and verbal nuances; he is not accustomed to employing locutions like "thus in general," "circumstantially," "it sometimes happens that... here and there... at times... certain ones." His speech is bluff and he raises specific issues clearly and emotionally, like the the man worn by toil that he is. Besides, most of the workers attending the 16th Plenum had been /invited/ [emphasized] to confide in the leadership of /their own worker/ [emphasized] party—the party whose duty it is to nurture class awareness, to bring up and educate, to reconcile that /elemental vigor/ [emphasized] inherent in the worker movement with the latest achievements of science.

The pointy-headed intellectuals have pretensions because "The prestige of knowledge and education in our society is falling. It is precisely chiefly owing to this trend that the percentage of youth of worker and peasant origin attending higher studies is declining." Others consider this to be the cause of our country's technology gap. All because the intelligentsia earns less than the workers.

/It is argued that "it doesn't pay to study," although there are no convincing statistics to back this up/ [emphasized].

On the contrary, the number of applicants for white-collar jobs remains large. Likewise, the argument that worker and peasant children are drawn away from higher education by the high wages paid for physical labor is a fallacious one. I have just read in ITD (No 32) an interview with a university student, the son of a shipping clerk and a manual worker. He said: "I wanted to study in order to have a better life, in order to know more and understand more, that is, to live better. Besides, I am afraid of physical labor. I have seen my parents toil so hard for so many years. I look at the calluses on my mother's hands and am aware that she got them at work. This affects the imagination strongly."

If a young man desires higher education solely in order to get better pay, he should better take up the "shovel." He would be of greater use as a "physical"
rather than "mental" worker. The children of worker families have never taken up higher education in order to get better (higher) pay. Only a pointy-headed intellectual could claim otherwise. To the father-worker and the mother dreaming of her son's or daughter's advancement what chiefly matters is that their children would not have to toil as hard.

I read, "the intelligentsia is politically undervalued and hence of little use and relatively unutilized," and I gather what is the point. As known, the 16th "worker plenum" has taken place and the leading role of the worker class as well as the interests of workers are being ceaselessly mentioned. Workers this, workers that, but "what could be achieved without the intelligentsia?" "Without the intelligentsia there would be no progress." Well now, it is rhetorical questions that are the most difficult to answer. Such banalities point to a fundamental lag in the party's ideological work. It appears slogans alone are hardly the proof that meeting the interests of the working class first of all meets the public interest.

J. Ruranski could hardly find many proofs in favor of his argument that "the workers saddle the intelligentsia with the responsibility for the poor organization of labor, the low living standards, the country's indebtedness and the continuing crisis." This is yet another symptom of the intelligentsia's hypersensitivity. If a worker has a complaint about poor management, about the little use that is produced by the large number of engineers at his plant--because such is the chief nature of his complaints--is not he right after all? This does not mean that he blames the intelligentsia. But the argument is formulated to imply that. And the fact that the intelligentsia argues in such a manner shows that it has an axe to grind.

Let me again refer to that letter by the railroader from Wrzesnia. He writes: "A worker wants to accomplish a great deal of labor at a low production cost, but as known he cannot do so unaided. He must be aided by science, that is, by scientists, but not in the form of a lowering of living standards.... It also is our opinion also that we shall not restore the economy's health by [hiking] prices. Only diligent and productive labor can produce results (while scientists keep arguing heatedly). At present in our railroad depot the actual situation is chaotic: instead of working we are debating (not the work itself) but prices and wages--we have become derailed. What is the engineer-technician cadre doing? Instead of working conceptually and scientifically and improving the organization of our labor, they too are debating wages and prices. Again the conclusion that suggests itself is that this group of employees (and not only the workers) should be kept accountable for their work. This would produce results. The engineer with an M.S. degree should be asked what he accomplished last week, for example...."

Such worker voices would have to be interpreted very tendentiously in order to regard them as anti-intelligentsia. Inasmuch as the "intelgent" has his perks (for example, an engineer with an M.S. degree who is the director of an enterprise has the right to a chauffeured limousine while on duty, which a wise worker would not envy him), the worker has by the same token the right to expect being well-managed, to expect that his work would be properly organized by the plant management. He has the right to voice his complaints on this
account to the plant management and the party. He has the right to hold the management and his party accountable for this.

The intelligentsia is being discussed in an intelligentsia-like fashion, "thus in general." The intelligentsia, however, never was nor is monolithic. Malicious persons say that it has always been venal, because it served this side or that, this class or that. Now it is flirting with the West for the sake of receiving [food, etc.] parcels from it, producing films for this side and that, writing and publishing here or there [abroad]—depending on whether this pays or not. There is something to this.

One must decide on which side he stands. One must think twice before resenting the "privileged position" of the working class, particularly if such resentments are expressed by a party-member "intelligent."

Part of the Polish intelligentsia is the classical petit bourgeoisie, including the "pink petty bourgeoisie" which sides up to the authorities. They view the "robole" [an amalgam of "robot" and "proletarian"] haughtily or even contemptuously, adopting the gentry's disdain for physical labor.

I do not expect the issues raised here to meet with universal agreement. I have learned this from the reaction to my earlier article, "Menaces and Opportunities" (TU 1 TERRAZ, No 35, 1983), which dealt with the menaces to and opportunities for the worker cause, that is, for socialism in Poland, because to me this is the same thing. All the principal ideological disputes, including those within the PZPR, deal with the worker cause. This is the criterion of the PZPR's ideological strength or weakness. If there is no clarity on the worker issue, vicarious discussion gets under way. The debating parties are convincing each other of, e.g., the necessity of a social division of labor or the menacing technology gap, or arguing who is at fault: the workers or the intelligentsia.

Criticism Rebuffed

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 37, 15 Sep 84 p 16

[Article by Daniel Passent: "Neither Proles Nor Pointy-Headed Intellectuals"]

[Text] I had thought that I would never again take part in a discussion of the Polish intelligentsia, because all that could be written about it has already been written, and how long can a dog chase its own tail? However, this topic is obsessively pursued in weeklies which carefully sidestep more dangerous subjects. To anyone who wants to impress readers as a trenchant pamphleteer, and a progressive-minded one at that, and cause a storm in a teacup, nothing is easier than joining in a witchhunt against, say, higher school graduates for not following the professions they were trained for, or against the so-called intelligentsia in general. Volunteers for lancing the abscess of the intelligentsia on the nation's healthy body can always be found.

Promising myself that I would no longer take part in these antics, I did not respond to the typically anti-intelligentsia article by Romuald Karys in the
24 June issue of ZYCIE LITERACKIE. Karys not only declared that the traditionally construed intelligentsia no longer exists in Poland, and not only stated that the concept of the intelligentsia is "by now a fiction," on the grounds that Poland is simply a "country of working people," a country of "simply one extremely unified category of workers who call themselves WORKERS," but also was not at all pained by this. On the contrary, he rubbed his little hands in glee, because, in his opinion, the intelligentsia has always been politically unreliable if not simply reactionary.

Thus, e.g., Karys believes that during the period of the personality cult the authorities were not much mistaken in their attitude toward the Polish intelligentsia. He states: "In my opinion, that was a period of distortions but not necessarily of mistakes. Was the contemporary attitude of people's rule toward the intelligentsia among these distortions? I believe that it was simply a consequence of the political struggle... And so the contemporary authorities caused the intelligentsia only a fraction as much trouble as that threatened by the intelligentsia to the 'boors' in power as soon as the political card would be reversed."

I did not dispute Karys until he met with support by Stanisław Kwiatkowsk in POLITYKA a week ago, as nothing that concerns POLITYKA is alien to me with the exception of the views of S. K. on the intelligentsia. I am raising my voice with a torn heart, because your periodical owes a great deal to its outside associates and contributors, whose articles account for one-half and in some weeks even for a majority of the contents of each issue.

But it sometimes happens that a valued associate contributes an egg which may seem to readers, and even to some editors, as somewhat rotten. This is how I view the article "What Is Owed to Whom" by Stanisław Kwiatkowski, which in theory is a squib against the intelligentsia but in reality represents a serious misconception. Every publicist occasionally lays an egg, but this time we are dealing with a broader phenomenon. That article is a product of certain anomalies in our intellectual and political life. These anomalies include lauding the workers always and everywhere, courting all workers, the conviction that while one charwoman may not be wiser than one professor, 100 charwomen certainly are more right than 100 professors. Being aware of the strength of the working class and fearing to offend these or those of its representatives, the clique for workers blames every evil on "pointy-headed intellectuals," to such a degree that Docent Kwiatkowski does not hesitate to employ the contemptuous term "inteligencik" [pointy-headed intellectual or egghead], although his hand would wither before the epithet "robol" [an amalgam of robot and proletarian, a "prolé"] ever issues from his pen.

It is long since I have witnessed anyone pour flattery on workers as thickly as did Stanisław Kwiatkowski. Wherefore? Why? After all, the fact that the working class is the strongest class in the socialist society, and reminds others of it once every few years if its interests are disregarded, does not at all imply that this class is spotless or, even more so, that it is so vain as to expect homage at every step. Having been raised not only among workers, as Docent Kwiatkowski states, but also in the traditions of the art of war, he
would admit that it does not behoove a knight to kowtow to one who is stronger.

Raking the "pointy-headed intellectuals" over the coals while at the same time making obeisances to workers considered as a bloc is characteristic of a certain way of thinking which unfortunately is broader and transcends the confines of publicistics and yet another discussion among several journalists. This trend of thought operates with several stock phrases. They always are pro-worker phrases which the working people do not need, having them in superabundance. Secondly, these phrases advocate a one-sided egalitarianism which neither metallurgical workers nor miners nor shipyard workers nor even charwomen want at all.

A sports reporter recently tried at the Games of Friendship to pump the trainer of Cuban boxers for information on the stimuli he applies to his charges, who won 11 gold medals. The trainer answered: "We in Cuba follow the principle of 'to each according to his labor,'" thus saying everything and nothing. Similarly, the egalitarians and their adversaries refer to this principle, which no longer sheds much light, because it is variously interpreted by Kwiatkowski or Gulczynski as opposed to KTT or Lagowski.

S. Kwiatkowski may pull out of his sleeve sociological studies showing that workers opt in favor of relatively limited wage differentials, but in practice those engaging in heavy physical labor willingly accept emoluments that are even higher than those paid to a professor or a minister, let alone a physician or a teacher. It is this kind of mentality that promotes the tergiversations of pseudointellectuals and pseudoprofessors on the subject of, e.g., "to have or not to be," as if this were an authentic dilemma in a country where the purchase of a schoolgirl's apron or a sewing machine has been for years a problem, where an ordinary bread-roll cannot be bought at eight o'clock in the morning in the Nation's Capital because it is "sold out." It is this kind of ideological climate in which--God have pity on us--are concocted lengthy diatribes against the consumerist lifestyle, which indeed is a vacuous one but which can be tamed not through useless scribbling but by providing the conditions under which staple goods readily available in many countries, and once readily available to us, will cease to be objects of covetousness. Primitive pro-worker views and egalitarian slogans as well as immuring oneself in the vicious circle of imaginary problems lead to divorcement from reality, to frustrations which these gentlemen vent on the intelligentsia. Sensing that their mentality is rejected, or at any rate not shared by the intelligentsia as a whole (and not just by it but also by workers), these individuals feel frustrated and have a grudge against "pointy-headed intellectuals" for, among other things, our common failures and crises. Being unable or unwilling to blame workers for anything, they blame teachers, physicians, engineers, economists, officials, bankers, lawyers, journalists, and others for everything. Their imagination has not progressed beyond the stage of Lentz's painting, "The Strike," and the Krajewski canvases of the "Pass the Brick" kind. Subconsciously they view every metallurgical worker, miner, welder or mason as men of bronze, without a flaw. By contrast, anyone
who is backward, venal, drunk, in opposition, avid for money and material goods, lazy, siesta-loving, etc., must be an "inteligent."

S. Kwiatkowski's article is a product of this misconception. He presumes the existence of some contradiction, if not enmity, between the worker and the intellectual and supposes them to be made of entirely different clays, although nowadays when so many workers have a secondary and higher educational background, service complex machinery and equipment and know computers better than more than one university lecturer and editor, such assiduous segregation of the intelligentsia from the workers appears just as artificial as the obliteration of differences between them in Karys's article. Recent events have confirmed that political divisions run not between but across these groups. The reasoning presented in the pamphlet "What is Owed to Whom?" Is anachronistic and runs counter to the spirit of the times, because technological progress, even if it advances as slowly as in our country, causes a growing part of the labor force to perform white-collar labor or, e.g., work for the service industries, while at the same time the number of persons wielding pickaxes in their hands is declining. If we continue to genuflect only before men working with hammer and anvil, it will not be long before we shall ascribe hegemony to a small minority, opposing it to the suspect educated majority of "pointy-headed" intellectuals with uncalledous hands.

Like many other tirades, Kwiatkowski's pamphlet, too, begins with money, because this is what arouses the greatest passions. First, he objects to the claim that workers earn more than "intelligents." He writes: "People! But that is untrue," and, as always, cites statistics. However, public opinion does not guide itself by statistics but evolves on the basis of what people see and experience on their own skin. Recently, R. Karys in ZYCIE LITERACKIE cited figures that do not lie: At the Ursus [Tractor Plant] the average [monthly] wage of an engineer, inclusive of all allowances, is 14,500 zlotys, whereas an electrician earns 16,000 zlotys, a welder 19,000, an adjuster 17,000, a forging-equipment operator 21,000, a foundryman 23,000, and a "not-forging" worker 26,000 zlotys, i.e., nearly twice as much as an engineer. At the FSO [Passenger Car Factory] the average [monthly] wage of an engineer is 2,000 zlotys lower than that of a worker. Perhaps this situation is not yet nationwide, but in the large plants, where the principal detachments of the working class are concentrated, these proportions are even more explicit. The armchair egalitarians unfortunately are ignorant of the world they live in. As to who and with what funds is to narrow the widening technology gap between our country and the leaders in high technology, the foes of the "pointy-headed intellectuals" do not know the answer: they leave this problem to the central authorities but they themselves prefer the pay for simple labor to be higher than for intricate labor. To be sure, they readily refer to the classics [of Marxism-Leninism] and are masters at citing them, but they do so only when this is to their advantage. Now the classics, as known, wrote a great deal.

On first denying that workers earn more than the intelligentsia, Kwiatkowski switches his tactics and states that, even if this were not so, it is normal and healthy, particularly in a state with a socialist system of society. He asks why should the "inteligent," who is freed from arduous, dirty and noxious
physical labor, receive higher pay to boot? He warns that the time is coming when a sewer maintenance man or a charwoman will be more difficult to find than a physician.

This is muddle-headed and sloppy thinking, but the fact that it issued from the pen of a docent does not make me an anti-docent. If the author guides himself solely by the criterion of the number of those willing to wield brooms or service sewers, let him have his children trained as charwomen or sewer maintenance men or charwomen, and lie down himself on the operating table, because he would be operated on by what would be by then a large—because well-paid—number of well-paid charwomen in the presence of a single orderly, a pointy-headed intellectual undergoing reeducation. It is a pity that Docent Kwiatkowski has by now forgotten what he had been taught in economics courses. The difficulty of finding people willing to accept arduous physical work cannot be the decisive factor in determining wages, because then garbage men would indeed earn more than professors or generals, considering that nowadays they already are earning more than engineers. Qualifications, responsibility, and the importance of a particular profession to the society also count for something. Men are not angels, and only some of them work for the sake of an idea. If we decide that "intelligentsia" are less needed than sewer maintenance workers, because we can anyway buy licenses for everything, while -- unfortunately alien—culture and science can be provided to us gratis by others, we will regress to the level of the cultural revolution in China. What is more, the shortage of manpower in certain occupations and its relative surplus in others will not become alleviated by the method of Stanislaw Kwiatkowski. Thus, e.g., as known, we have a relatively large number of engineers, more than in the FRG, but we are experiencing shortages of, e.g., miners and shipyard workers. In Poland there exist notorious shortages of manpower in many fields, from construction to mining. The principal reason is the low productivity, and one of its causes is the upside-down wage system, which besides is currently being reformed not for the first time. Why should the society invest in educating engineers if it cannot later benefit from the knowledge hammered into their heads? If we were to follow the reasoning of our esteemed author, physicians and engineers should be trained and then paid little: let their qualifications go to waste, and the children of sewer maintenance workers will anyway willingly pursue the sweet life of the intelligentsia and accept low wages so long as they would not have to toil as hard as their daddies.

It is not that I wish to be a self-proclaimed and horse-blinkered defender of the intelligentsia, because it, like the blue-collar workers, is widely smitten by such contagious diseases as laziness, a decline in work ethics, chiseling, etc. Teachers have demonstrated arm in arm with workers in behalf of Saturdays off and, moreover, they succeeded in obtaining an earlier minimum retirement age. Some careerist physicians are notoriously tardy and treat their patients like the evil stepmother, while government officials turn their backs on applicants and do not feel restrained by their presence from making personal trunk calls at government expense. Personal interests often are more important to them than public interest.
I do not like though the condescending if not patronizing treatment of the worker in S. Kwiatkowski's article, combined with paying compliments to the worker. He states: "The worker has the right to see things extremistically and sharply." But why is it that precisely the worker has the right to see things extremistically and sharply? I had thought that this was a linguistic lapse, but somewhat farther the docent states that an elemental vigor is natural to the worker movement. Since we are not discussing the revolution of 1905 or the Manchester strikes of more than 100 years ago, it turns out that nowadays in Poland the worker can see things sharply and react elementally, while others are to think for him. It would be interesting to know just who these others are, considering that Stanislaw Kwiatkowski himself also sees things extremistically and writes elementally!

Kowtowing to the workers and patting them on the shoulder, S. Kwiatkowski allows himself simply uncouth insinuations addressed to the intelligentsia. Our docent points out: "Malicious persons say that it has always been venal, because it served either this side or that, this class or that. Now it is flirting with the West for the sake of receiving parcels, making films for this side and that, writing and publishing here and there [in the West]-- depending on whether this pays or not. There is something to this." This implies the Wajda complex, which also applies to several other artists who work both here and in the West, as well as the complex of ladies who engage in philanthropy and help distribute donations. But is the docent working for no one? Are workers working for nothing and no one? Are not they or their families going to the churches to pick up parcels, and are not the children of sewer maintenance men returning from catechism classes with a bag of flour or powdered milk? Have disposable syringes been rammed only into behinds flattened from sitting behind desks?

Venting his anti-intelligentsia passion, attacking the weak and ogling the strong, Docent Kwiatkowski also frightens the reader with a political weapon. He declares that the worker cause and socialism are the same thing, as if socialism were possible without the intelligentsia. He states that workers confided at the 16th Plenum in the leadership of "their own worker party." But is not the party also a party of the intelligentsia? Or is the intelligentsia supposed to found its own party? Not only should the author not speak on behalf of workers but also he has no right to suggest that the party does not need the intelligentsia and vice versa. For there is a difference between the conditions more than 100 years ago when two individuals (nota bene, intellectuals) had addressed the Communist Manifesto to workers and the conditions at present in a state where workers are to be the bosses.

Summing up, if that is to be the kind of dialogue with the intelligentsia, and if that is how it is to be won over, thank you kindly for this dialogue and let me descend into the sewer.
Pros, Cons Discussed

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 38, 22 Sep 84 p 10

[Letters to the Editors: "Polemics: Re the Article "What Is Owed to Whom?"]

[Text] Too Few Arguments, by J. G. (Name Known to the Editors), Biebrza:

I had imagined that the chief of the Center for Public Opinion Surveys is so much better situated than the readers because he has at his disposal extensive data on the topic he writes about. He could thus convince us of his rationale in an objective manner supported by material proofs. Yet, a number of theses contained in the article by S. Kwiatkowski (POLITYKA, No 35) is poorly argumented and couched in an agitator's language. Examples:

1. On mentioning the cutting of fruit trees on private farms by moonshining scientists, the author asks, without answering the question, whether this is indeed a loss to science. Well, and what kind of gain is that to science? What does it profit thereby? Could not this gain be accomplished differently? I am reminded of a comment made by a Chinese neurosurgeon who was assigned to planting tree seedlings: he declared that this was useful work, because it was all whether holes were drilled in the head or in the earth.

2. Elsewhere, the author states: "The time is coming when a sewer maintenance worker or a charwoman will be more difficult to find than a physician. Whoever feels wronged thereby, has the right to change." This is surely demagogy....

3. One can dispute the thesis that education or an academic degree should not be rewarded at all. After all, in order to gain that education or degree, one has to toil long and have specific abilities and predispositions, demonstrate competence and make sacrifices. Of course, it is the results that decide everything, but this is where a system eliminating persons who have not genuinely earned their degrees should come into play. Comparing academic degrees with titles of nobility is pointless.

4. The author claims that the thesis "It doesn't pay to study"is not supported by any convincing data. Perhaps so, but it is a glaring omission not to cite findings of specific studies refuting this thesis.

5. Regarding J. Huranski's observation that "workers burden the intelligentsia with responsibility," the author claims that this is simply another symptom of the intelligentsia's hypersensitivity and that it does not mean at all that the worker blames the intelligentsia. I do not, of course, have at my disposal stenographic records of [plenum] deliberations, but reading the newspapers will do. Consider the comment by Ignacy Drabik, Central Committee member, foreman at the PREDOM MESKO Plant, made at the PZPR Central Committee plenum in 1982: "Among the working class there is a growing belief in the incompetence of the intelligentsia. Among the workforce members at my plant and other plants as well, the discontent with this social stratum which, in their opinion, has caused the successive crises, is growing. Thus, for example, at many institutions of higher education and scientific institutes the particular policies pursued underlay the economic and moral decline of our socialist society."
After all, such comments were made by a notable public figure who does not represent himself alone.

Charwoman Instead of Physician, by W. Pruszyńska, M. D., Warsaw:

I was astounded to read (in POLITYKA, No 35) of "a time when it will be more difficult to find a sewer maintenance worker or a charwoman than a physician." Were Mr Docent to take the trouble of telephoning the Health Department in Warsaw, he would be told how many positions for physicians remain vacant in Warsaw itself.

Even now the wage differences between a charwoman and a physician are nugatory. I thus hope that in 30 years, if the current wage trends continue, Mr Docent (and probably by then Professor) Kwiatkowski would receive medical treatment from a well-paid charwoman.

No Privileges, by Włodzimierz Krzeminski, Lodz:

It is very bad when anyone refers to workers as "robole" [proles]. The "inteligencik" [pointy-headed intellectual] is just as opprobrious an epithet, except that it is hurled at the other side.

Basically, what concerns the author is that a blue-collar worker is justified in earning more than those who work with their heads, and that any other opinion conflicts with socialist ideology and is unfair and stems from the petty-bourgeois bias of the pointy-headed intellectual.

"Some say that the intelligentsia has always been venal, because it served either this side or that. Now it is flirting with the West for the sake of receiving parcels, making films for this side or that, writing or publishing here or there—depending on whether this pays or not. There is something to this." What exactly? Did the author mean to say that various individuals make up the intelligentsia, and therefore all should be rapped on the knuckles, while all the workers are shining paragons and therefore let the sun shine only on those performing "physical" toil? Perhaps he has never seen entire brigades of workers seated for hours beside an excavated roadways or "skilled workers" pilfering whatever they could lay their hands on in order to hire themselves out later for exorbitant fees. Has he never seen beer and vodka dives that are crowded on workdays? All these people earn much better than the so-called "inteligenty," solely because officially they are classified as persons doing heavy manual labor. They also get a much higher pay than those "inteligenty" who, until they are 30, got no pay at all because they had been acquiring education and now have normal work days of 14 hours. After all, it is not the intelligentsia alone that support "this side and that," and it is not it alone that "flirts for parcels," and how!

Let me sum up: one should not get paid extra just because an M.A. degree figures on his working papers, but he should not get penalized for this either on every step (wages, child care centers, articles like the one discussed here). Persons with academic degrees should be genuinely educated persons and, together with the entire mass of "white-collar workers" lacking such degrees,
work conscientiously and productively. And blue-collar workers also should do their share of real and no less conscientious and productive work. No privileges for anyone!

Workers Don't Think So, by W. Pekalski, Lodz:

I'm a worker. Articles such as the one by S. Kwiatkowski do not reflect our views but, on the contrary, are disgusting toadyism that horribly distorts our views.

We need the intelligentsia very much and, considering that it devotes many years to study (unlike [some workers who need] just a few months to learn an occupation), it should not only become the country's intellectual and cultural elite but also be remunerated suitably. Workers don't think like S. Kwiatkowski does: it is he who is trying to impose his views on them. We protest: such toadies should not be published because what they say is directed against the country, against Poland, whose culture and civilization rest on educated and creative individuals whom we workers respect. If Mr Kwiatkowski does not respect them, then instead of writing for POLITYKA he should show up at our spinning factory, which has job vacancies.

Science Loses, by Dr Wieslaw Caban, Kielce:

I don't understand the author's peev against the party-member intelligentsia for raising the issue of its low pay. I suspect that in the author's view everyone indeed is entitled to assert his rights so long as this does not include the party-member intelligentsia because, being the most aware stratum, it is supposed to get reconciled to its fate and nod its assent.

I likewise do not share the opinion that science does not always lose when Ph.D's and docents hire themselves out for work-days to private farms in order to supplement their low salaries. The reigning universal conviction is that the Polish construction industry has been wrestled to the floor because, in principle, only peasants-workers work in it. Thus if we are to aspire for having peasants-docents work in science, it seems that we shall pin down on the floor several other domains of socioeconomic life as well.

We Are Dispensable, by Jacek Knapik, Lodz:

I'm a higher-school graduate, my father is a technician and my grandfather was a common workingman. It may be that my child will become a workingman, thus completing the cycle. My acquaintances include workingmen who are sons of "intelligents" and vice versa. Where is that dividing line which supposedly runs and is a barrier between us?

I'm not familiar with the author's educational background, but he does not know much about economics. Marx in his time had already introduced the concept of the "collective worker," meaning not only the worker who makes a particular product, e.g., attaches a screw, but also other workers who tell him where to attach the screw, what kind of screw, what tools to use in this operation, etc.
In general, the "collective worker" is represented by all working members of our society (oversimplified as this may be). Thus, I don't understand why it should be a normal daily pattern for the wages of workers directly engaged in production to exceed those of, e.g., an engineer, an economist or a lawyer. Their activities are at least as essential as those of the blue-collar worker.

The author readily cites examples from the capitalist countries, in his attempts to demonstrate the justice of paying higher wages to a charwoman than to an engineer. I suggest that he investigate more closely the wage structure in the West. Let me assure him that he would not find one instance in which the average workingman earns twice or thrice as much as an engineer or an economist, yet this is becoming the rule in our country.

I don't know whether the author considers it normal for, e.g., about 20 percent of the graduates in my field of studies (organization and management) to opt for emigration to the West and another 20-30 percent to take all kinds of jobs in the private sector, and only the remainder to find with difficulty some or other miserable positions and, after a year of work, start to receive wages that are equal to or below the nationwide average wage.

Are we really not needed? Considering that our wages are below those paid to the worst manual worker, we are indeed dispensable. As a result, to a "pointy-headed intellectual" like me, it is an unattainable dream to afford buying a few books monthly after my basic subsistence needs are satisfied. Lacking access to books, periodicals and the theatre, I shall soon drop out of the derided group of the intelligentsia.

A Cultural Revolution Is Needed, by Ryszard Kulakowski, Kielce:

[Kwiatkowski's] article is the first sober voice to be raised anent the question of the intelligentsia versus the workers. In my opinion, the problem is not whether or not to raise wages but what to pay wages for. A professor who copies his lectures from a book should earn much less than a workingman. On the other hand, a professor who makes an epochal discovery should become a millionaire. The intelligentsia's problem consists in that it is paid little for its accomplishments and much for the positions it occupies. Hence, the aim of this social stratum is not to display creative initiative but to climb the tenure track. In my opinion, an incompetent engineer should earn less than an expert engineer who has several inventions on his record. And this is the gist of the matter: salaries should not be increased for the positions occupied but instead opportunities for higher earnings should be provided to capable and ambitious individuals. For an academic degree in itself is no longer such a mark of distinction. The entire problem consists in that the knowledge thus gained be put to use. The proper approach to the matter should be a reform of the wage system for the intelligentsia rather than some egalitarian wage increases.

If a workingman develops some labor-saving idea or invention, if he writes novels, plays, philosophical treatises, or if he performs scientific research in a laboratory at his home, is he a worker or an "inteligent"? And
conversely, a manager whose thinking is barren, who makes no contribution but merely implements the recommendations of his superior—is he really an "intelligent" despite his higher educational background? Is thus the criterion of one's occupation or profession an adequate one?

Of course, the intelligentsia professionals have great advantages over the workers: they control the press and can defend their own interests by manipulating public opinion. As for the workers, the only kind of press available for voicing their own interests is TWORCZOSC ROBOTNIKOW and the BEZ PRZYSŁONY wall newspaper, which do not reach broader segments of the society. On television, too, there are no regular programs presenting the problems and culture of workers. Book publishing is done under the patronage of the intelligentsia professionals. Anything that conflicts with their interests will not see the light of the day. This kind of negative selection results in that, being freed of competition, all sorts of mediocrities are imposing their style. Hence I believe that the country could benefit from a kind of purgative cultural revolution, which must take place sooner or later.

Overheard in the Trolley, by Docent Dr Witold A. Werner, Warsaw:

The Center for Public Opinion Surveys is a government institution which, as I understand it, is to serve progovernment and prosocialist propaganda, and comments made by its director are identified with the official position of the PRL Government. The views advocated in the article by Col Kwiatkowski are hardly calculated to fire the intelligentsia with enthusiasm, ... on the contrary.

The author has lumped together all pointy-headed intellectuals (?), whether employed in science or industry or government, etc. He cites statistics selected at random that do not substantiate his conclusions.

The whole of the article is a demagogic attempt to oppose the interests of the intelligentsia to those of the working class as well as to perpetuate (or create) the division into party members and non-party members. Comparisons of the supposed "privileges" of scientists with those of the nobility are ludicrous, on the one hand, and on the other they induce fear of the second coming of an era which the author resurrects in his article while at the same time claiming that it is long past.

The author is simply shocked by the "height" of a professor's salary, 21,500 zlotys [monthly], but he goodnaturedly states: "I have nothing against those who assert their own rights." Yet, in his further reflections he sees nothing [im-]proper about scientists who supplement their salaries by moonshining on private farms, etc.

[My letter] is not for "asserting one's rights" but a desperate appeal for saving Polish science and economy, for putting a halt to the widening technology gap and infrastructural gap, for stopping the decapitalization of our nation's assets. It is the patriotic duty of scientists to draw attention to the looming outright menace to the existence of the state.
It would also be worthwhile to recall here certain statistical ratios. Employment in the branch "Science and Technology Development" is 118,000, i.e., 0.7 percent of total employment in the economy. The average wage for this branch is about 88 percent of the national average, whereas in all the other socialist countries it is at least 125 percent.

The cost of R&D work (which is linked to wages) in Poland in 1982 was only 1.1 percent of the distributed national income, whereas, e.g., in the USSR it was 4.6 percent, in Czechoslovakia 4.0 percent, in Hungary 3.6 percent, etc.

We have 3,860 fulltime professors in Poland, that is, 0.5 promille in terms of blue-collar employment in the socialized economy alone. Hence also, professors' salaries (which are definitely too low) are not an economic problem on the national scale but rather a reflection of a certain attitude toward this employment group.

In the socialist countries, e.g., in the USSR, a professor is paid three to four times as much as the average national wage and no one is complaining about it.

The author writes: "The minister surely knows what he is saying and he would not want to change places with a blue-collar worker," while at the same time expressing his gratification because "workers at his ministry earn more than he himself." Consider that, according to figures recently published in POLITYKA, a minister's salary is 45,000 zlotys [monthly] as of 1 July of this year, and will rise to 54,500 zlotys as of 1 January 1985. Thus if workers earn more than a minister, just how high is the ratio of their earnings to those of a professor?

Since, unlike the author, I do not receive letters from strangers, let me quote an equally "scientific" view that I had happened to hear voiced in a trolley on route 2. A worker said to another worker: "How am I supposed to respect that engineer if he's worse off than I, since he couldn't afford a vacation or even buying a concert ticket from a scalper." Another overheard conversation between workers: "How can I trust the doctor at the employee infirmary considering that he is paid less than I and must moonshine?" Can such "voices" be considered typical?

Too Unripe for Their Role, by Jozef Rosinski, Chojnow:

Congratulations to Mr. S. Kwiatkowski for demolishing the cliche about the wronged intelligentsia. The traditional view is that those working with their brains should earn a lot and work little, while those working with their brawn are plebs good only for manual work and should not receive equal pay as that would "lower" the prestige of the "brains." The whole misconception ensues from the fact that a large number of individuals regarding themselves as "inteligenty" are too unripe for their role.

They Should Earn More, by Witold Szostakowski, Suwalki:
Although I am a white-collar worker with a higher educational background, I do support high wages for workers engaging in arduous physical labor.

At one time, in 1976, I used to be the director of the Agricultural Circles Cooperative and earn much more than the national average. In the summer months, tractor operators, who accounted for most of the workforce, earned almost twice as much. Not all, of course. I never envied them this. We provided services on hilly land with heavy clayey soils. I saw them returning from 10 and more hours of plowing, bespattered with clay from head to foot and tottering with exhaustion. Office work is simply no comparison. I believe that this should be taken into consideration in discussions of the wages of blue-collar workers in relation to the salaries of office workers.

For 20 years I have been periodically visiting my wife's family in Lomza Province. In the 1960 and early 1970s the principal subject of conversations was education and social advancement. As years passed, a new and still current conversational topic has been persons buying their own cars, makes of cars, and persons building their own private homes in town. In my opinion, this points to a change in views on the education and social advancement of the daughters and sons of peasant families.

Incidentally, let me add that S. Kwiatkowski's articles are among the best to be published in POLITYKA.

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WORK OF MILITIA, SECURITY SERVICE REVIEWED

AU041513 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 2 Oct 84 p 5

["Report" on speech by Czeslaw Kiszczak, PZPR Politburo candidate member and minister of internal affairs, at 1 October Warsaw solemn session of the Sejm Commission for Internal Affairs and the Administration of Justice in connection with coming 40th anniversary of the Citizen Militia and Security Service]

[Text] C. Kiszczak recalled that the Militia and Security Service was set up under conditions of war and an armed struggle against the domestic political adversary, the reactionary underground, the units of the Ukrainian National Insurgent Army, and the bands of werewolves established by the withdrawing Hitlerites. The task of the Militia and Security Service was to ensure security and order behind the front, to help organize state administration, to aid settlers and repatriates in new territories, to safeguard the agrarian reform, the 1946 referendum, and the 1947 elections to the Sejm, and to protect the industrial plants turned over to the state.

One of the main goals of reaction, C. Kiszczak continued, was to make it impossible for the left-wing forces to rapidly rebuild the economy from the ravages of the war. For this reason the security bodies had to fulfill considerable tasks in protecting the national economy against subversion and sabotage. At that time, the effective functioning of the country's economy and administration depended to a great extent on the quality of the performance of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Over 12,000 functionaries of the Security Service and Citizen Militia, soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces, Internal Security Corps, and Border Guard, and members of the Voluntary Citizen Militia lost their lives in the struggles to defend people's rule.

After almost 40 years of its existence, C. Kiszczak said, the PPR was again faced with the threats posed by domestic counterrevolution aided by alien centers.

During the period of that threat, common criminality became much more intense, and laws continued to be violated for political motives. The country's
internal situation, which became increasingly complicated in 1980-81, posed many new tasks for our ministry. All of them were implemented. Our basic task was to cross the plans of our adversaries, to prevent a counterrevolutionary coup, to put an end to anarchy and to the disintegration of the state, and to remove the threat of civil war.

In December 1981—in the same way as in the years 1944-47—the functionaries of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the soldiers of the Polish People's Armed Forces stood shoulder to shoulder to defend people's rule and in a timely manner prevented a fratricidal strife pressed for by the adversary, whose plans to tear Poland out of the camp of the socialist states were also frustrated.

The apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has continued at all times to improve the system and forms of its performance. The most modern achievements of criminal technology and many other pure and social sciences are at its disposal. The qualifications of our functionaries continue to increase consistently. Some 22 percent of these functionaries have higher education and over 60 percent secondary education. They obtain their education in several schools run by our ministry as well as at three university-type schools and in many military and civilian schools.

Despite enormous progress in science, technology, and work organization, man continues to be the main factor in determining the quality of performance. Each functionary's conscientiousness, creative initiative, professional skills, specialist and general knowledge, and devotion to duty help to determine the results of our ministry's work countrywide.

C. Kiszczak discussed some of the work aimed at improving public law and order and recalled that the Council of Ministers Committee for Observance of Law, Public Order, and Social Discipline was set up last December in order to ensure a fuller coordination of the activities of various state bodies charged with protecting the rule of law. The committee has organized long-term activities to control the performance of the railroads, automobile transportation, and the fuel economy. As of last April, consistent checks have been carried out on selected sectors of the private economy, primarily on trade and small-scale production. Work is also continuing to update various regulations, including the penal ones, in order to accelerate judicial proceedings against offenders, to improve the administration of apartments, and to raise the standards of order and security on the railroads.

In this connection C. Kiszczak stressed that the prosecuting bodies should not be left on their own in the struggle against crime and that they need extensive support from the people and close and effective cooperation from state and economic administration at all levels, because this makes for increased responsibility for the property and employees in their charge.

C. Kiszczak discussed the activities designed to acquaint the people with the problems of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and said that one aspect of such activities is government work done with the "curtain up." The Sejm and its commissions as well as the State Council and the government continue to
receive information about the problems and results of the work done by the echelons of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and about their achievements and failures. Members of the ministry's leadership and heads of the voivodship offices of internal affairs continue to meet with work forces, young people, and journalists. The central and local press continues to publish a great deal of information about our ministry's work once a month, and radio and television programs on this subject are also frequent.

All these activities continue to produce tangible results, and our people's confidence in our ministry is continuing to increase. As we all know, this confidence was undermined for many years by the internal and external adversary's violent propaganda, which employed every possible means. The subversive radio stations broadcasting in the Polish language have played a special role in this by continuing to attack every form of the activity of our ministry aimed at protecting our order and security. These stations continue to fabricate and broadcast various myths about the working and pay conditions of our functionaries—about their housing condition, health care, and recreation. All these activities of our adversaries are particularly subversive and are calculated to undermine our people's confidence in the bodies run by our ministry and to pit the people against the internal affairs apparatus.

But reality is quite different from what the opponents of socialist Poland are trying to put across with varying intensity and methods. A large number of our functionaries, especially many young functionaries, have no apartments of their own and live in very difficult housing conditions. Barracks living conditions are also difficult for certain units, and medical care provided by our ministry leaves much to be desired.

The cooperation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the Sejm Commission for Internal Affairs and the Administration of Justice is very good. C. Kiszczak stressed that the importance of this cooperation is reflected in the complete implementation of the commission's observations and views, in the extensive explanations given to many questions on the detailed aspects of the work done by the ministry and its echelons, and in the joint legislative initiatives, as attested to by the laws on the office of the minister of internal affairs, the powers of the bodies run by him, pensions for militiamen and their relatives, modified passport regulations, the public registration office, identity cards, state and service secrets, and offenses. A bill on new regulations of the militia service is under consideration.

CSO: 2600/70
JARUZEKSKI ADDRESSES ZYCIE WARSZAWY STAFF

AU901202 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5 Oct 84 pp 1, 2

["Report" on Speech by PZPR First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski at his 4 October meeting with ZYCIE WARSZAWY editorial staff in connection with the coming 40th anniversary of the daily]

[Text] Our jubilee meeting, W. Jaruzelski said, is an occasion to exchange views and reflections. It is also an occasion for the party and government leadership to praise the devoted work of ZYCIE WARSZAWY staffs in the part 40 years and to stress the performance of all those who have contributed to the originality and popularity of your daily. May ZYCIE WARSZAWY continue to develop and, primarily, to be effective in its activities for the good of socialist Poland.

What counts in propaganda is its results and effectiveness, and this is why we are not afraid of tackling controversial issues. Actually, every issue should be tackled, but two conditions must be fulfilled before it is. First, the author's intentions must be positive and must be effectively expressed. Second, each publication must be addressed to readers and not to some specific tastes in line with some morbid moods or streams which lead nowhere.

We think that if an article takes into account people's true doubts, complexes, and worries, it is much better that these worries are brought to light instead of continuing to harass and frustrate one unarticulated. An honest presentation of a doubt or worry makes it possible to take a position that it better balanced and consistent with social interests. Discussions and honest polemics make it possible to ensure that which we regard as correct takes the upper hand and helps formulate readers' objective evaluations and correct views.

View have been expressed here, W. Jaruzelski continued, that there are cases when there is no official reaction to complaints and criticism. The party and government continue to devote much attention to this issue, as attested to by a special resolution of the ninth party plenum. We have made considerable progress in this regard, but much is still to be done, because indifference and tardiness still assert themselves here and there. We will not tolerate any failure to respond to letters and publications, especially those that report wrongs done to people. Sensitivity to any kind of evil is the basic duty of all party cells and the socialist state's bodies.

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We spoke of the difficult material conditions of various strata of our society, W. Jaruzelski said, especially of all kinds of pensioners. This is true. Many people’s lives are indeed difficult, and we are aware of this. However, we must always bear in mind in this connection that much depends on our economic potential and national product. Only on the basis of economic and humanitarian factors is it possible to determine whether what we do is right and whether we are able to do more.

It is the very task of the press to indicate what fat can be tapped in our economy and to stimulate social, intellectual, and job activity in order to better tap this fat. As we all know, only better economic results are able to tangibly improve the living conditions of our people, especially of the poorest ones. At the same time, we must condemn whatever violates the principles of social justice, offends socialist morality, and harasses the poor people.

There are many ills in our life which intensify our difficulties. However, I do not want to create the impression that the authorities address claims to the people. On the contrary, I personally think that the authorities bear primary responsibility for whatever happens, because they fail to convince the people that something should be done or they fail to see that something has been done. To make the performance of the authorities more effective we need the stronger support of the press. Please regard my statement as an attempt to jointly search for the best roads to social awareness and thus to further positive changes in our life.

I would like to discuss some issues that are connected with the agenda of the coming 17th party plenum. It is a fact that some strata of our society feel that there is not enough democracy and that its potential is not being sufficiently exploited. The thing is that the present expanded legal framework of socialist democracy has not been made to work at full pace in practice as yet. We must learn the lessons of democracy.

The present greater scope of self-government and decentralization should favor initiative and responsibility, but things are not so good in this regard. For example, a few weeks ago I had to spend much time explaining to people in a rural cooperative shop why the bread sold in their shop was of bad quality. I had to spend much time doing this, although it is not the government that bakes bread. Nor does the government employ the local baker. People often criticize us for such things as low production discipline, coming late to work, and drinking alcohol in plants. It is the plants that should see that this is not done, because they are independent now, because self-management bodies are in existence, and because it is for them to see that regulations are observed. The premier has dismissed a deputy voivoda for drinking during office hours. It is a pity that institutions and plants display too little initiative with regard to similar cases in their own areas.

As for economic reform, W. Jaruzelski continued, it was said in 1981 that the government did not want any reform, that it kept postponing it, and that the bureaucrats wanted to strangle it. Some people do dislike the reform, but their dislike does not really matter. What matters is that not all the powers and opportunities provided for by the reform are being
exploited, which is a feature that is also true of many other sectors of life. The rich infrastructure of socialist democracy must be made to work better. This is our historical opportunity and a kind of great experiment.

It also happens that extensive democratic powers are abused and distorted, as is the case with the higher education law, for example, which has greatly responded to the academic community's expectations insofar as self-government and autonomy are concerned. This law was proof of trust and goodwill on the part of the authorities. However, disturbing events, which are in conflict with the socialist intention and spirit of the law, are taking place. It is for the press to indicate how to make greater use of democracy and to point out how harmful the abuse of democracy is and how necessary it is to maintain responsibility and discipline.

We discussed international affairs here, W. Jaruzelski said. I agree that, while sticking to principles, it is necessary to write about these events in a more lively and convincing way. What is also most necessary is to present the achievements of the socialist countries more extensively. Our crises and difficult problems have led some people to believe that all this is the fault of socialism. It goes without saying that the achievements or People's Poland in the past 40 years are our irrefutable argument in this connection, but I think that the great achievements and harmonious and rapid development of other socialist countries are even a better argument.

When you write about Warsaw you no doubt need to inject a modicum of historical sentiment into your writings, but what you also need is to paint a broad background of the events connected with our capital, including the prewar areas of poverty and want, the wartime ravages, and the great postwar reconstruction.

What we want is the return to our capital of the famous [word indistinct] speed of doing things, which should be the focus of whatever is best in our country. That is why it is so important to eliminate whatever hinders its development.

The party and government leadership attach great importance to the work of your daily, which is a great tribune of Warsaw. We count on your greater contribution toward intensifying the line of socialist renewal and strengthening People's Poland. I thank you once again for your achievements in the past 40 years, including the most difficult recent period. Please extend my cordial greetings to your colleagues and best wishes to your readers.

CSO: 2600/66
PRESS CONFERENCE ON RFE SUBVERSION REPORTED

AU181234 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 Oct 84 p 4

["Transcript" of press conference given by government spokesman Jerzy Urban to foreign journalists at the INTERPRESS Center in Warsaw on 9 October]

[Excerpts] Urban: I would like to say a few words about recent research on listening to "Free Europe" in Poland. This research was carried out in September by the Center of Public Research and Radio and TV Program Studies, on a representative random group of people representing adult residents of Poland aged over 15. In the light of this research, 1 percent of the adult population listens to "Free Europe" regularly, 4 percent occasionally, and 7 percent very rarely. Altogether, 12 percent of the population of Poland listens to Radio "Free Europe." Similar research was carried out in May 1983. At that time, 17 percent of the population listened to "Free Europe" either regularly, or seldom, or occasionally, in other words we observe a 5 percent drop in the current number of listeners. Faith in what Radio Free Europe says is low, even among inveterate listeners. It emerges from this that less and less can be said about the ill effects of the domestic Polish activity of this radio station, which broadcasts lies completely and with premeditation. To an increasingly greater extent, "Free Europe" programs are quite simply a criterion by which to assess the United States' intentions toward Poland.

Robert Strybel, POLISH EMIGRE PRESS: Mr Minister, do persons listening to "Free Europe" encounter interference, and are there any other foreign stations that are being jammed right now? And could you briefly describe Polish attitudes toward other well-known stations such as the Voice of America or the BBC? Thank you.

Urban: I will not answer the first part of your question. Our attitude toward Voice of America is the same as toward "Free Europe." As for the BBC, this is a radio station about which we have far-reaching reservations, a station which, in our opinion, exceeds the rights of information and comment that stem from normal principles of international cooperation. However, I would not include it in the same category as the clearly aggressive American propaganda.

Kevin Ruane, BBC: Could you tell us how many people have come out into the open as a result of the amnesty?
Urban: Up to yesterday, 254.

Christopher Bobinski, FINANCIAL TIMES: I would like to ask when we start talking about new political prisoners. If we assume that the 22 prisoners at present is the old portfolio, do we already have a new portfolio?

Urban: I find it difficult to accept your jocular tone, yet we can speak about anything. I know of 2 people who were arrested after the amnesty, suspected of having operating a printing press and printing illegal literature. I cannot promise that there are no other such cases, but I do not know of any.

Callina Johnson, AP: Last month, or in any case soon after the latest round of fighting in Lebanon, very many people left that country for Western Europe, and also a large number of them went to Sweden in the hope that they might obtain the right to stay there. I know that 19 of those people ended up in Poland and are staying at the Polish Red Cross headquarters. Could you tell us what will happen to them? Will they be sent back to Lebanon, or will they be able to stay?

Urban: I do not know what will happen to them, because it also depends on what they want. They wanted to go to Sweden and failed. Polish organizations have taken them under their care, and the rest is up to them and depends on the possibility of fulfilling their desire.

Callina Johnson: Does that mean they will be able to stay in Poland if they want to?

Urban: I will be in a position to answer that question when they express such a desire. In the meantime, please ask the Swedish Government why it does not want to take refugees from a country which is experiencing civil war. I can generally say that Poland is a country that grants humanitarian asylum to people from areas where there is activity endangering life. However, I cannot apply this general principle to persons who have not yet asked the Polish authorities for permanent residence because the Polish authorities only consider such issues when someone actually asks them for the right to stay in Poland.

R. Strybel: Mr Minister, are books published by church circles in Poland or imported by various channels and sold in churches after avoiding Polish censorship legal, or is this phenomenon simply tolerated?

Urban: I cannot answer such a general question because the place where books are sold does not determine their legality or illegality. Besides, books published by the church are, of course, legal, and are not subject to censorship.

CSO: 2600/71
BRIEFS

GDR ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATED—PAP—To mark the 35th anniversary of the emergence of the GDR, Horst Heubauer, that country's ambassador, gave a reception in Warsaw on 5 October. It was attended by representatives of the highest state authorities, together with Premier and Army General Wojciech Jaruzelski, PZPR Central Committee first secretary. The following were present: Edward Kowalczyk, chairman of the SD Central Committee; PZPR Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat members Kazimierz Barcikowski, Jozef Czyrek, Zbigniew Messner, Miroslaw Milewski, Marian Wozniak, Jan Glowczyk, and Wlodzimierz Mokrzeszczak; members of the ZSL Supreme Committee Presidium; members of the SD Central Committee Presidium; Sejm vice marshals Halina Skibniewska and Jerzy Ozdowski; Deputy Premiers Manfred Gorywoda, Zenon Komendear, and Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski; PZPR Central Committee departmental heads; ministers; generals; representatives of the leaderships of social organizations; representatives from the world of science and culture; and journalists. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 6–7 Oct 84 p 1 AU]

ARMY—TEACHERS AGREEMENT—Lieutenant General Jozef Baryla, chief of the main political Directorate of the Polish Army, and Kazimierz Pilat, chairman of the main board of the Union of Polish Teachers, have signed a cooperative agreement. Under the agreement, the Union of Polish Teachers will make the traditions of the Polish People's Army, its history, defense tasks, and participation in every sphere of life well known. The armed forces, on the other hand, will render all-round assistance in the implementation of the teaching and upbringing program and organize days of open barracks aimed at integrating military and civilian circles. [Text] [Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0400 GMT 9 Oct 84 LD]

CSO: 2600/68
BRIEFS

UNESCO EDUCATION MEETING ENDS--Bucharest AGERPRES 17/10/84--The twelfth session of the CEPES Consultative Committee (European Center for Higher Education of the UNESCO) ended in Bucharest on October 17. The session analyzed the activity of CEPES in 1984 and adopted proposals regarding the programme for the previous year and until 1987. Highlighting the positive results scored this year in collaboration between European countries in the field of higher education, recommendations were advanced regarding the enhancement of the role played by that specialized UNESCO institution in the diversification of cooperation between universities, as a major contribution to the establishment of a climate of peace and understanding in Europe. Special attention was paid to the observance of the International Youth Year in 1985 and of the International Year of Peace in 1986. [Excerpt] [Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1900 GMT 17 Oct 84 AU]

COMAN, OLTEANU ATTEND MEETING--Bucharest, AGERPRES 20/10/84--A homage-paying session was held in Bucharest on October 20 to mark the 40th anniversary of the day of the Army of the Socialist Republic of Romania, organized by the Ministry of National Defense. Attending were Ion Coman, member of the Executive Political Committee, secretary of the CC of the RCP, Lieut-Gen Constantin Olteanu, member of the Executive Political Committee of the CC of the RCP, minister of national defense, party and state activists, generals and officers, antifascist war veterans, researchers in history. The participants addressed a telegram to the general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, supreme commander of the Armed Forces, Nicolae Ceausescu. [Text] [Bucharest AGERPRES in English 2020 GMT 20 Oct 84 AU]

CSO: 2020/14
PARTY VIEWS ON NATIONAL QUESTION IN PAST EXAMINED

Historian Vlajcic Interviewed

Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian No 270, 30 Jun 84 pp 10-13

[Interview with Gordana Vlajcic, professor in the School of Political Science at Zagreb University, by Ratko Pekovic: "Some Other Games"; date and place not specified]

[Text] We did not begin our "pleasant conversation" on the nationality question with Gordana Vlajcic with reports from the two centers, but by telling Belgrade-Zagreb jokes. We reminded the subject of our interview both of a scholarly discussion and the jest of her Belgrade colleague about the "women's corps" in writing the history of the CPY (Desanka Pesic, Zorica Stipetic, Stanislava Koprivica-Ostric, Ubavka Vujosevic, Latinka Perovic, Milica Kacin-Wohinz, and Gordana Vlajcic) and about their particular interest in the nationality question.

"Perhaps women are bolder.... But it might also be something else: they have been writing for years now, they have been anonymous, and they have been waiting for the men to get tired. It's an old strategy in athletics: wear down your opponent."

Gordana Vlajcic, once a member of "Lokomotiva" of Zagreb and of the national team in basketball and net ball, a Dalmatian, professor at the School of Political Science of Zagreb University (just promoted to full professor), and the author of six books, added with a broad smile:

"Well, perhaps we work slowly and systematically, over the long haul, as women long have done.... For me personally that breadth of spirit which at one time prevailed in sports helped a great deal when I began to be concerned with the nationality question. Nor should the fact be overlooked that my mother was a Croat and my father a Serb."

In the course of the conversation she would wring her hands and caution:

"Oh, no, look at the problems you are getting into.... You know, we must not let nationality questions from the past be used for manipulation in the present.... When nationalism emerged in the seventies I said: nothing could be
more normal, since certain issues have not been cleared up. Some of my colleagues saw in that statement of mine enthusiasm with this political phenomenon. However, I wanted to take note that overall relations in a multinational community which have not been fully stated are always reflected as problems of interethnic relations.... Let us not allow ourselves to be drawn into nationalistic discussions once again. After all, where does it lead?"

Gordana Vlajcic has just published the book "Jugoslavenska revolucija i nacionalno pitanje (1919–1927)" [The Yugoslav Revolution and the Nationality Question (1919–1927)], which is a continuation of her research over several years into the ideological development of the CPY between the two world wars. She has often gone back to the same problem, striving once again to clarify it, remaining consistent as a historian to her basic attitudes and endeavoring to elucidate the ideological currents in an epoch through synthesis. That is why this discussion is not burdened with quotations, footnotes and petty details, but rather broad sweeps and unambiguous judgments predominate in it. The voluminous material of the documents of the CPY and Comintern from that time which have been published may represent something of particular value.

"I have been led back to concern with these problems by the newly published material from all seven congresses of the Comintern. It is an illness of mine, I constantly go back to the same topic. The nationality question pursues me unceasingly. I receive material subsequently and I carry on a dialogue with myself. It seems to me that the time has come where we can offer a synthesis of certain problems of the working class movement. We can no longer concern ourselves solely with facts which are an end in themselves. In studying the history of ideas, we should extend ourselves full length and make analytical judgments. So the book has come out, but I know that I will go back to it again. Some new material which has been discovered in the meantime by Desanka Pesic, Latinka Perovic and Ivan Katardzijev concerning the debates in the Comintern and the Balkan Communist Federation should be taken into account in preparing the second edition.

How To Quote Marx

[Question] It is obvious that two views of the nationality question are represented among historians. Stated in simple terms, some people view this as a tactical question, as a means toward the revolution as an act. Appealing to Marx, for whom, according to them, the nationality question was secondary, they say that ethnic conflicts are a hindrance to the class struggle. Others consider that solving the nationality question is one of the essential problems of the socialist revolution which only it can solve successfully. What is your view?

Vlajcic: I do not know which Marx they were quoting. They all quote those first two sentences from [a passage in] the Communist Manifesto: "The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got." However, that is not the whole passage, and what comes after is very interesting: "Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word."
That is the essence of the problem, and the proper thing would be to undertake to study it. It is true that what the workers do not have cannot be taken away from them. After all, the proletariat must capture political power, but to become the leading force in the nation, it must be national. Those who think that the nationality question is good because it boosts revolution do not grasp its essence.

Even the CPY did not grasp it during one period of time. The nationality question is not a reserve which the revolution possesses, but a segment of the proletariat's class struggle. And if the bourgeoisie is incapable of solving the nationality question, and the bourgeoisies of our nationalities demonstrated that they were incapable of it between the two wars—then the proletariat will take over that role. Otherwise it will lose prestige in the nation. Anyone who thinks that using the struggle to solve the nationality question is the most effective way for the proletariat to come to power has not given Marx a good reading and he cannot blame me for that.

The essence of the CPY's attitude toward the nationality question lay in this (some people have not grasped this even today!): that the communist movement, as the vanguard segment of the nation, is also ethnically conscious, and that the proletariat must put an end to certain things. This is not just a theoretical question, but also a quite practical one; it is concretized through the creation of federal relations in the Yugoslav state, whose nationalities were neglected for centuries. Not even within the Serbian state itself, not to mention the Serbs outside it, did the bourgeoisie resolve the Serbian nationality question, since unification into a state does not also signify socioeconomic liberation of the nationality in the class sense.

Who Cheated the Revolution

[Question] Yet wasn't the process of constituting the Serbian nationality completed and wasn't the Serbian nationality question resolved thereby?

Vlajcic: The Serbian nationality question was resolved, but from the standpoint of the bourgeois class. And a fine job they made of it! We are now asking ourselves: Which of the bourgeois politicians offered the better solutions? As far as I can see they are all the same. That is the concept of the bourgeois class and does not extend outside the framework of the capitalist system. That is why they entered in agreements from 1918 to 1941 and that is why there were so many changes of government. And they were all fiercely class-oriented beneath the skin.

We now debate the question of who was closer to a solution, who was more rational, more appropriate. We reduce it all to the question: Did someone desire to preserve or break up Yugoslavia, and we do not ask who was offering solutions and what sort of solutions did he offer? We have forgotten to state that not a single bourgeois party managed in its programs to go outside the limits of its own nationality and become Yugoslav. And do you know what that means? We did not have a Yugoslav bourgeois class, a Yugoslav bourgeois political thought. So that they did not manage to develop even the capitalist system the way it should have been. That is evidence of their overall level.
However, in that period the CPY was the only all-Yugoslav party which was thinking about a Yugoslav revolution. Yet we harshly criticize it because it touched on the question of the boundaries of capitalist Yugoslavia. So what? The criterion of the revolutionary nature of the CPY is not its attitude toward Yugoslavia, for goodness sakes, but its attitude toward revolution! The criterion: disintegration or not—is an expression of the lowest approach to studying the history of the CPY. After all, didn't we start all over again in 1941? These are recurrent revolutions. This time national and class revolutions under the leadership of the CPY under different conditions.

[Question] And the continuity of Yugoslavia?

Vlajcic: There is no continuity in the sociopolitical sense; it was broken in the period 1941–1945. Let us look at things from the class aspect of the revolution of the proletariat in that period. The CPY condemned bourgeois Yugoslavia, but not Yugoslav community. The evidence to back up this assertion lies in its struggle to preserve the class unity of the Yugoslav proletariat.

[Question] Do you think we can nevertheless speak of a discontinuity of the positions of the CPY on the nationality question?

Vlajcic: Only if we are talking about its attitude toward the Yugoslav state. Only there. But if you will allow me, the position toward the Yugoslav state is not the same thing as the position toward the nationality question. Yugoslavia does not come first, and the Yugoslav nationalities afterward. You know, the nationality has a right to say whether or not it wants to live in it. So that it was not an accident that Yugoslavia fell apart. And presumably it was not solely because of the Ustashi.

[Question] There is one position you take in your book which seems rather dissonant by contrast with the views of many historians. You write that Yugoslavia was not created as a result of a series of bourgeois-democratic revolutions and that the process of its creation, carried out under the leadership of the bourgeoisies of the nationalities, was basically a counterrevolutionary act (pp 13 and 31).

Vlajcic: Right. I stick by that. Was that a natural process? Did the six nationalities plus the ethnic minorities sit down at the table with the dynasty and arrive at an agreement about Yugoslavia? I must constantly repeat: I view the nationality question from the standpoint of the communist movement, not the bourgeois movement. After all, the bourgeois class did not want revolution in 1918. It cheated it. The manner and the form whereby the state was unified constituted a counterrevolutionary act; even from the standpoint of the bourgeois national revolutions it was not progressive, since the nationalities were halted in their process of political embodiment. But today, as soon as you write that that kind of unification was a counterrevolutionary act, you are immediately an opponent of Yugoslavia, and that of our socialist Yugoslavia.
Sima Markovic Was Not a Unitarist

[Question] Quite a few disputes have been aroused as well by certain new interpretations of the views of Sima Markovic. According to some Markovic should be rehabilitated, while according to others there is no basis for any essential correction of the assessments of his views that have held up to now.

Vlajcic: You mean his rehabilitation as an individual or his views? As an individual, I did not consider him proscribed, but his views can hardly be rehabilitated.

In my judgment Markovic had two exceptional and wonderful traits. He did not accept the opinions of others without thinking them through, and he actually offered the most scientific arguments to back up the thesis of the existence of the three nationalities: the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes.

Dr Sima Markovic is not an exponent of the unitaristic concept. As did the entire party, he did propagate unitarianism up to 1923, when his book "Nacionalno pitanje u svetlosti marksizma" [The Nationality Question in the Light of Marxism] appeared. However, in his case there is something else involved which has to be cleared up. First: Should a solution to the nationality question be incorporated into the content of the Yugoslav revolution under the leadership of the CPY? And second, in Yugoslavia should the peasants be taken up as natural allies in the revolutionary struggle of the working class?

Those assertions are not correct which are made occasionally that Markovic was against including the nationality question in the content of the CPY's tactics because he felt that the time for revolution had not come, so that that question should not be raised. The problem is one of fundamental principle and strategy for the communist movement. Not a single communist party would have managed to win a nationality over if it had turned to its problems immediately before the revolution. This is a long-lasting battle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for the leading role in the nation which the proletariat, led by the communist party, cannot win if it enters into it in a situation that is actually revolutionary, especially not in Yugoslavia, where the bourgeoisies of the nationalities, thanks to the Social Democratic period, had a time advantage.

Markovic did not understand that historical obligation of the Yugoslav working class to complete the national revolutions under the leadership of the CPY and to take political power, nor has it been understood by those today who think that the nationality is a secondary segment of socialist Yugoslavia. It was this approach that led to his demand that constitutional regulation of inter-ethnic relations be left to the bourgeoisies of the Serbian, Croat and Slovene nationalities, since revolution was not on the agenda (which was accurate). But the revolution was being prepared deep within each nationality under the leadership of the working class; it is not a matter of the spontaneity of a given moment, but a process of profound transformations.

Here lies the essential difference between the view of Dr Sima Markovic and the view of the so-called party Left, which took up the views of the Comintern,
which is why it cannot be imputed that it was Russophile and all but anti-Yugoslav. The conflict which broke out in 1948 between our own party and the Soviet party must not be a criterion for evaluating the entire history of these two parties and their mutual relations. What should be emphasized in the views of the "party Left" is the fact that it took up the struggle for leading positions in the Yugoslav nationalities and ethnic minorities as a part of the tactics of the movement, seeking allies in them and finding them in the peasantry. Seeking allies for the revolution on the one hand and waging a battle for the leading position of the proletariat in the nationality on the other is not in any case the same thing, but it is better to begin seeking allies than leave the nationalities to the bourgeoisie until the revolutionary denouement.

Charges Against Broz

[Question] It is thought by some that the views of Sima Markovic were integrated into the 1974 Constitution and that in 1923 he was closer to the truth than others.

Vlajcic: I have already explained how much closer to the truth he was. As for the thesis about his views being incorporated into the 1974 Constitution, that assertion lacks sound logic. That is, if that were true, then this constitution ought to be a constitution of bourgeois Yugoslavia, grounded on autonomic foundations. As far as I know, we do not have that kind of constitution. What is more, those same people who assert that in 1974 we used Markovic's solutions persistently advocate that that constitution be revised because it allegedly decants the Yugoslav spirit of community. And they persistently push Dr Sima Markovic forward as all but the only defender of preserving the integrity of Yugoslavia. Well then, you decide for yourself.

[Question] Yet certain dilemmas arise in interpreting the conflicts within the CPY in the twenties and thirties. Why did the contest of opinions dry up at one point, and can the closing down (zatvorenost) of opinions be justified solely by the party's illegal status?

Vlajcic: There lies in that dilemma the very subtly concealed tendency to lay charges against Josip Broz and his action at the 8th Conference of Zagreb Communists to liquidate the members of the leftwing and rightwing factions in the CPY in February 1928, an action which was continued thereafter by the Comintern, since Josip Broz was in prison until the spring of 1933. Factional struggles are one thing, and ideological conflicts are something else. Every ideological conflict is not a factional struggle, but rather factional struggles are underhanded work that is not permitted in communist parties based on the principles of democratic centralism. This does not have to do with the conditions of working underground, since they did not in fact exist in 1923. Let us bear in mind that the movement had already been completely shattered under the conditions of the dictatorship. But the assertions to the effect that there was no dialogue at that time are completely negated by the fact that the great debates within the party were conducted precisely in the mid-thirties. We might agree with them or not agree with them, but the fact remains that those debates did occur. However, our agreement or disagreement with them is only evidence of our preference to speak about the present through
the past. I sincerely hope that we do not have the misfortune to fall among those nations who live off their past.

[Question] There is also the thesis that the factional struggles did not exist and that Stalin invented them in order to take control of the communist movement more easily.

Vlajcic: In essence that thesis conceals the assertion that the CPY was Stalinistic because it smothered discussion within its own ranks. For example, the one with Dr Sima Markovic. That can be asserted only by someone who does not know the history of the CPY. The years passed after 1924, when the new program and tasks of the CPY with respect to all the fundamental issues in development of the movement were adopted (not only on the nationality question), before Sima Markovic, removed from active participation in the CPY, went over to Moscow and experienced a tragic fate around 1938. The CPY was not always responsive to certain problems, but Stalinist labels cannot be pinned on it today because it refuses to adopt solutions which destroy the achievements of the National Liberation Struggle and socialist revolution in Yugoslavia. You ought not to put questions to me today about whether it is Stalinistic, nor would I dare to answer them.

[Question] Did bolshevization of the CPY occur in that period?

Vlajcic: We obviously place a negative sign in front of the term "bolshevization." It has become the fashion to equate it with Stalinism. Why do we do that? After all, that process cannot contain a revolutionary act of creating a party of the Leninist type which will incorporate into its program the appropriate content suitable to the concrete situation. That kind of bolshevism—Leninist—has remained even to this day, and it is being called into question! So now we have come to a point where we must clear up certain things.

Too Shallow Manipulation

The views of the CPY on the nationality question which Gordana Vlajcic followed synthetically in her book up to 1927 underwent an essential evolution in the period that followed. A decision of the 3d CPY Conference in January 1924 adopted the tactics of the struggle to carry out the Yugoslav revolution in two stages: the first stage was in fact conceived as completion of the nationality question by creating a federation of worker-peasant republics in Yugoslavia. However, that same year the 5th Congress of the Comintern called upon the CPY to express the slogan of self-determination all the way to separation in the form of a demand for the creation of independent worker-peasant republics of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia within the framework of a Balkan federation of worker-peasant republics. That is when the demand was first made for disintegration of the Yugoslav state, which was to be broadened, based on the decisions of the 6th Comintern Congress in 1928, to Montenegro, Kosovo and northern Vojvodina as well.
[Question] How do you evaluate that position of the Comintern? It is well known that not a single political party, except those most extreme ones, has had the breakup of Yugoslavia in its program.

Vlajcic: When we speak about the disintegration of Yugoslavia, we should bear in mind that the CPY perceived the breakup of bourgeois Yugoslavia through socialist revolution, and that not only in Yugoslavia, but indeed in the Balkans and in the Danube Region. It was thinking about the decanting of capitalist Yugoslavia! Since if it did not pull it down, it believed it was unable to wreck the bourgeois system. Let us be altogether calm and sensible and reflect on things from the standpoint of the communist movement of that time. After all, an agreement between the bourgeois class of the oppressed nationalities and the bourgeois class of the Serbian nationality signified preservation of the existing political system in the country. We forget that it was not a question of Yugoslavia, but of the Yugoslav revolution. Presumably the CPY did not think that Vojvodina should be attached to fascist Hungary! The problem is no longer being raised of anyone’s borders, not even those of Yugoslavia. It is another question how good a solution was the Balkan-Danube Federation.

In any case, there has been a certain tendency in histories written about the CPY—I hope that we will combat it with arguments, since otherwise there is no point—to the effect that both the Comintern and the CPY, at least until 1935, were intentionally enflaming ethnic passions in the Yugoslav state and were playing the cards of the extremist nationalistic movements, that is, all those who included disintegration of the Yugoslav state in their program. It is my personal opinion that these views have come into being under the impression of current developments in interethnic relations in our country and that they have nothing at all to do with the actual attitude of the CPY toward the nationality question in the twenties and thirties. Yet if someone today wants to alter relations in the Yugoslav Federation, let them take a more up-to-date line of argument, if, of course, they can find one!

If I might go back to the question of the CPY's attitude toward certain extremist movements in the early thirties. For example, much has been made of the CPY's proclamation in 1932 calling for all nationalities in Yugoslavia, including the Serbian nationality, to aid the Partizan (Ustasha) movement of the Croatian people in its struggle against the Great Serbia concept of Yugoslavia. Manipulation of the history of the CPY is evident in this example and excessively shallow. That is, only if it lacked common sense would the leadership of the CPY call upon the Serbs to help carry out the concept of the Ustasha butchers in resolving the Croatian nationality question. That move on the part of the CPY leadership can only be explained by the fact that it was programming the revolution in Yugoslavia from Vienna and that—trying to paralyze the influence of the fascist ideology in the Croatian people and at the same time attacking Pavelic and Percec in the same proclamation, it was waging a battle in its own way for the leading role in the Croatian nationality.

That was a bad move, no doubt about it. But it is certainly not an argument to support the assertion that the CPY's attitude in Croatia toward the nationality question is one of traditional nationalism and chauvinism. Nor evidence
for the thesis that the kind of state we have is not essential, what is essential is that the party be in power. You will allow that 1971 or the overwhelming events in Kosovo cannot be explained by the views of the CPY at the end of the twenties and in the first half of the thirties.

The Answers That Do Not Exist

[Question] It is thought by some that the Serbian question has not been sufficiently treated in Yugoslav historiography. On several occasions in your book you take it up, but you do not seem to fully articulate it.

Vlajcic: I have already said something about my fundamental approach to this important question. Allow me to go back a little to its genesis.

We know that after 1919 the CPY favored a unitaristic conception and that it was convinced of the possibility that the three medium-sized nationalities would merge into one. However, after 1924 it adopted the thesis of the three established nationalities (Slovenes, Croats and Serbs) and accordingly fought the battle for a worker-peasant federal Yugoslavia. But in that period it was not simultaneously concerned with the question of delineating these three federal units. The CPY looked at the Macedonian question from the standpoint of the unification of Vardar, Aegean and Pirin Macedonia, in the framework, of course, of the worker-peasant republics in the Balkans; taking a broader view, it saw that unification as a precondition for formation of the Macedonian nation. Which means that at the outset the party had two approaches to resolving the nationality question: creating a national state for the nation which was formed and creating an independent state which would be a precondition for the institutionalization of the nationality.

However, from the moment when the Comintern raised the issue of separation of the parts of the Yugoslav state the CPY changed its attitude toward the Serbian question. Analogous to Lenin's approach to the role of the workers and peasantry of the Russian nation in the revolution, the leadership of the CPY (there were different demands in the rank and file) felt that there did not exist a Serbian nationality question in the Yugoslav state. What it had in mind was that right up until 1918 there existed a Serbian national state and that the Serbian nationality question had been resolved by the creation of the Yugoslav state. Of course, just as in the approach to the Slovenian and Croatian nationality question, the problem of the political emancipation of the nationality is here again bound up with the creation of a national state. Taking over the bourgeois political doctrine, the CPY leadership equated the question of liberation of the nationality and completion of the process of its emancipation with the concept of the national state. That lasted for several years. Here it was neglecting the basic fact that an independent state (outside of or within the framework of Yugoslavia) is not the only guarantee for emancipation of the nationality, but that a real guarantee is its socioeconomic position, which can be manipulated regardless of the constitutional aspect of regulating its status in the community. This assertion, of course, applies to all nationalities and ethnic minorities.
The CPY also took over this thesis from bourgeois doctrine: one nationality—
one state, and where there is no numerical superiority of one nationality,
there cannot be a national state (there cannot be a state of any other kind).

What follows from these two views? First, the leadership of the CPY felt that
there was no need for a national worker-peasant republic of Serbia; second,
that the prerequisites did not exist for the statehood of Bosnia-Hercegovina;
and third, that all those parts of the country formerly taken by force in wars
should be returned to neighboring nations. This referred primarily to Kosovo
and in part to Vojvodina. In connection with the creation of the Balkan or
Balkan-Danube revolution, the CPY normally anticipated that the neighboring
nations would return to the Slovenes, Croats and Macedonians what had been
taken from them in the imperialistic war and before it. That approach of the
CPY contains answers as to its attitude toward the Serbian question, which was
not fully elaborated even at the 5th conference at the end of 1940. It also
contains an answer to the question of why a Communist Party of Serbia was not
created in 1937.

In 1941 the Serbian nationality question was opened up, as was the question of
a national state of the Serbs within Yugoslavia.

[Question] Let us go back at the end to the beginning of the conversation and
to your warning that, motivated by current problems, we sometimes seek answers
in the past of the CPY.

Vlajcic: Do not suppose that I am not disturbed by these things. If some peo-
ple think that answers to all current problems can be found in the past of the
CPY, I tell them: you will not find them, you will be disappointed. It is
particularly impossible to find answers to some of them. After all, let us
remember: the party is one thing in the struggle for power and the party af-
after the revolution is something else!

If someone says that the party has erred, that is true. It has made mistakes,
and it makes mistakes. But if a conclusion is drawn from that that it is in-
capable, that its mistakes down through history are its permanent attribute,
then that is a different game.

One thing is certain: the party's revolutionary attitude toward the national-
ity question has been carried out in practice. And there is no return to the
old, to centralism, to unitarianism. After all, the CPY has traveled the road
from the unitaristic to the present-day concept.

The conversation ended with beer and sandwiches and in the spirit in which it
began:

"Alas, will you find your way in all this! You know, we should discuss these
matters calmly and soberly. I will be very happy if I have been of any help....
But the devil take it, I have to take your word that you will be sportsmanlike
and not commit any fouls. And that you will send me the text for authorization.
Response Raises New Questions

Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian No 271, 14 Jul 84 pp 6-7

[Reaction by Ljubisa Ristovic of Belgrade to the interview with Gordana Vlajcic: "There Was After All Meandering"]

[Text] One contemporary philosopher has written that everything that happens in the present we learn about as a rule only in the future. The thought is philosophically sarcastic, but it is also scientifically grounded. It is from a distance that historical science ties together the threads of past events, removes the veils from them, confirms or rejects previous assessments, and places political movements, ideas and individuals in their true place.

This also applies to the nationality question. In that complicated area there are many things which are still unknown and unelucidated. Along with objective scientific research, we also confront, especially in the recent past, an absolutization of the infallibility of the nationality policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (LCY) in all segments, usually by passing over the sensitive topics in silence, in the name of "peace in the house." That is not the right road in the struggle against nationalism, and I consider especially unsuitable the so-called theory of discontinuity, which is used in an attempt to sever the cause-and-effect relationship between the past and the present. Nothing in history and politics is without its past, and that also applies to the nationality question.

That is why in searching for the truth we must still go back to 1919, which is not so distant, when a new social force emerged on the Yugoslav political scene—the CPY. Our historiography has long ago established that the constituent nationalities of the newly created state were the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The other peoples obtained their national identity later, after a shorter or longer delay. Following the relatively short period of so-called integral Yugoslavism, which the CPY also opted for, the Slovene national interest was identified. The genesis begins with adoption of the right to self-determination, including the right to secession, and with the struggle of the Slovenian communists for the federal conception in arranging the state. Then the future Slovene state territory was identified, and it was in fact recognized by the tripartite agreement among the CPY, the Communist Party of Italy and the Communist Party of Austria; by the formation of the national Communist Party of Slovenia in 1937, by the theoretical elaboration of the Slovene nationality question in the writings of Edvard Kardelj a year later; and finally, by the formation of institutions of the nationalities within the National Liberation Struggle.

Identification of the Croatian national interest began before the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes came into being. Out of the nightmare of differing ideas the left wing of the Social Democrats adopted the Yugoslav idea and entered the CPY with the theory of Yugoslav integralism. In the tumultuous debates about the causes of the defeats and blows inflicted by the Obznana [proclamation making the communist party illegal] and the Law on Protection of the State, the nationality question entered the orbit of theoretical considerations.
and ideological differences in the CPY in 1923. Regardless of the disputes, the Croatian nationality question was given its place, and it was to enter into all programmatic documents of any importance. Formation of the Communist Party of Croatia in 1937 was also a manifestation of that commitment.

The socialist movement in Serbia before World War I saw realization of the national goals of the Serbian people in the relations of the Balkan Federation. It adopted the Yugoslav idea later, and members of the Serbian Social Democratic Party entered the newly created Communist Party of Yugoslavia with the conviction that the revolution was on the threshold, that mental effort and forces should be directed toward destroying the order and creating a Soviet republic. In that framework the nationality question, even that of the Serbs, simply did not have any major importance for them.

Perhaps that is why, examined in the continuity of the CPY's strategy and tactics, the Serbian nationality question remained undefined, the theory unelaborated, pushed to the margins of political positions and commitments, although this also had to do with the nationality which had not resolved its nationality question by the act of creating the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, although it entered into a world war in order to resolve it. That is, the CPY did not accept the bourgeois theoretical concept and the bourgeois governmental framework for resolving the nationality question for the Slovene and Croat nations, and so analogously it was unable to adopt this for the Serbian nationality either. How it happened that a vacuum and a certain inconsistency developed in the nationality policy of the CPY in the treatment of the national rights of the other Yugoslav peoples and thereby also in treatment of the Serbian nationality question comprises another question.

The Bolshevik Ideological Arsenal

The causes are certainly complex, but I see one of the essential ones in the uncritical adoption of the definition taken over from the Bolshevik ideological arsenal of the "oppressive" (Serbian) and "oppressed" (other) Yugoslav nationalities.

It was not unknown, that is, for the CPY to be under the strong influence of the Comintern. According to the assessments of that international communist organization, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was an artificial creation of the imperialistic world war and of the policy of the powers of the Entente. Since the Serbian bourgeoisie did play a decisive role in its creation, by the very fact that it was the ruling class of the victorious nation, one which had taken the heaviest losses for the liberation and unification—it was soon designated as the principal cause of the exacerbation of class and ethnic antagonisms, and Yugoslavia was denoted as a country in which there existed the economic and political hegemony of the Serbian bourgeoisie. In time the Serbian bourgeoisie was more and more frequently equated, even in the documents of the CPY, with the entirety of the Serbian people, and the odium of historical responsibility for the ethnic inequality of the other Yugoslav nationalities was passed on to it.
The underestimation and displacement of the Serbian nationality question can be followed over a lengthy continuous stretch of time, including occurrences of anti-Serb slogans and behavior. For example, in 1923 the Balkan Communist Federation nicely inverted the "hegemonistic claims of the Great Serbian bourgeoisie" as the "principal culprit for aggravation of political conditions in the Balkans" into "Serbian hegemony," which the CPY also took up. In the Theses of the CPY Central Committee prepared for discussion in the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1925 there is mention of the "Serbian and Entente imperialism"; a decision dating from the same year speaks of stepping up the struggle against "chauvinism and nationalism of the leading nationality and Great Serbian prejudices which are to be found in the Serbian workers and peasantry." During the period of the 6 January Dictatorship the decisions of the regime were interpreted in such a way in the official party organ PROLETER that one could even draw the conclusion that the dictatorship had a pillar of support in the Serbian people. A particular inconsistency in nationality policy was manifested at the time when the national communist parties of Croatia and Slovenia were created, but not a Communist Party of Serbia.

Only further research will reveal whether and to what degree the nationalities to which the leaders of the CPY belonged had something to do with the evolution of positions in nationality policy.

In that context there is some importance in the fierce conflicts over political ideology which took place within the leadership of the CPY between 1923 and 1933.

This would especially manifested during and after the formation of the national parties within the framework of the CPY and the change of course that occurred under the influence of the Comintern after 1933, when the CPY opted for defense of the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and for rallying all forces ready to resist fascism, which was on the march.

The arguments for formation of the national parties (using the terminology of the time) were these: a grounding within one's own nationality; equating the national parties with the interests of the nationality and the right of one's own people to self-determination; the need to develop national cadres; broader opportunities to wrench the peasant masses away from the influence of the bourgeoisie parties, especially in the western parts of the country; and taking out of the hands of the bourgeoisie the argument that communists are "anational."

Oppressors and Oppressed

Within the framework of this global strategy the Communist Party of Serbia—if such a decision had been made—could have been a political force capable of direct confrontation with the Great Serbian claims of the bourgeoisie; the Serbian people would have better understood its identification of the interest of the nationality; and it could have represented the Serbian national interest within the unified CPY with the same rights as the two newly formed communist parties.
The rationale as to why no Communist Party of Serbia was formed states that the Serbian people was not oppressed as a nation; the Serbs are the dominant nationality and do not feel ethnic oppression; the Serbian people is not even demanding formation of its own communist party. Overemphasis of the ethnic factor as being decisive for the formation/nonformation of the revolutionary party of the working class is debatable and subject to critical evaluation. In any case the most sizable nationality of Yugoslavia went into the decisive battles without a party of its own and without definition of the nationality question and the interest of the nationality.

Many questions can be put in connection with the observations made above, and they have not yet been answered by historiography. One of them is certainly this: Is the existence of national parties an essential prerequisite for the participation of the various Yugoslav nationalities in the revolution? The Serbian nationality, for example, answered the call for the uprising in large numbers and was the first to enter into combat even without its own national communist party.

Why the Delay

Through its overall policy the CPY later confirmed itself as a force capable of leading the masses into the fight to bring down the prevailing order and to carry out revolutionary transformations. The nationality question was given the most distinguished place in the strategy of the revolution when it took on the form of the national liberation struggle. This was specifically formulated by Tito as commander-in-chief of the National Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia in a well-known text dating from December 1942 and entitled "The Nationality Question and the National Liberation Struggle".

"Today's National Liberation Struggle and the nationality question in Yugoslavia are inseparably bound up with one another. Our National Liberation Struggle would not have been so persistent and successful if the nationalities of Yugoslavia had not seen in it, aside from the victory over fascism, also a victory over what had been during the past regimes, a victory over those who were oppressive and desired further oppression of the nationalities of Yugoslavia. The phrase National Liberation Struggle would be only rhetoric, and indeed even a deception, if aside from the general Yugoslav meaning, it did not also have a national meaning for each nationality separately...."

The Serbian people did not enter the National Liberation Struggle in large numbers without definite goals and interests as a nationality. It did not enter it exclusively in order to help the other nationalities of Yugoslavia to achieve goals which had not been realized in the old Yugoslavia. It saw its long-range interests in brotherhood and unity, in ethnic, political and economic equality with the other Yugoslav nationalities, which is indeed why it anticipated that certain inconsistencies would be corrected more quickly, and its historical interests would be realized insofar and at the same time as they were realized for the other peoples comprising the constituent nationalities of Yugoslav federalism.
The studies which I have made lead to certain quandaries. That is, during the National Liberation Struggle there was a considerable delay in forming the national institutions which are an expression of sovereignty, the interest of the nationality and the rights of the Serbian people.

In the field of history it is felt that the decision to form the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was made on Vis in June 1944; this datum was communicated to the delegates of the Founding Congress, and it thus entered into various documents and books. However, this does not correspond to the historical facts.

Two decisions pertaining to the Serbian nationality question and the Serbian position in the future federal community were adopted in a meeting of the CPY Central Committee held from 16 to 18 October 1943 on the eve of the 2d Session of AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia], which was devoted to political preparations of this historic event (the minutes were kept by "Fiser"—Lola Ribar). The first: "To Create the Serbian CP Central Committee Instead of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party for Serbia"; the second: "To Speed Up Creation of a Council for Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and the Regional People's Committees for Vojvodina, the Sanjak and Eastern Bosnia." The decision did not specify whether to form the Communist Party of Serbia first, which could be assumed, since the political leadership of the uprising in the various parts of the country existed first, and later the effort followed to form the representative bodies of the nationalities.

In adopting two decisions of such importance the highest political leadership had to take note of the illogicality of the most numerous Yugoslav nationality, whose sons were participating in combat in large numbers, at a time when decisions fateful to the future of Yugoslavia were being taken, did not have a single body of any importance expressing the sovereignty and national rights of the Serbian people. I have not found, not yet at least, a confirmation that the decision to form the Communist Party of Serbia was communicated to the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party for Serbia, nor reasons why it was not communicated, and only further research will reveal why all of 19 more months would pass between the decision taken in October 1943 and the Founding Congress of the Communist Party of Serbia.

A Congress Without Publicity

The Founding Congress of the Communist Party of Serbia was held following the liberation in the first half of May 1945 and took place without any publicity whatsoever (except for a small item in BORBA). Following the victorious revolution, one might have anticipated more thorough analysis of the causes of the delay in establishing the Communist Party of Serbia. Yet those same reasons which applied in 1943 were presented to the delegates, which is surprising. I think that even then they could not withstand critical evaluation, much less today. The science of history has not yet deciphered the currents and events in the last years of the war which concerned the interests of the Serbian nationality. The Great Antifascist Assembly of Serbia was held in Belgrade in November 1944, only after Belgrade was liberated. Perhaps the delay was brought about by events, which did succeed one another rapidly. These were

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the final months of an epic which was to determine for a long time the destiny of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities of Yugoslavia. But it is worth analyzing whether the most numerous Yugoslav nationality had to be among the last in getting its highest representative bodies.

The war and the revolution also placed on the agenda the geographic aspect of the nationality question, which became an urgent one after the 2d Session of AVNOJ. Without entering into the national rights of the Serbian people in the other federal units, according to the decisions of AVNOJ federal Serbia was to be the national state of the Serbian people, honoring and respecting, of course, the rights of other nationalities and ethnic minorities living on that territory. The same principle also applied to the other nationalities of Yugoslavia.

The problems of Serbia as a "composite federal unit" existed in embryo even immediately following 1945. The processes could have followed the direction of overcoming them, respecting the Serbian national interest and the interest of the ethnic minorities, and why they followed another direction, to what degree this was a consequence of the policy known from the slogan "Weak Serbia—Strong Yugoslavia" and political-ideological recrudescences from the prewar period, is a matter for scientific study. If the ethnic aspect had already been put ahead of the class aspect, instead of being a function of the great goal of the liberation of labor, then one must separate what in all this is the interest of the working class constituted as a nation (following the Communist Manifesto) and what is ideological ballast and the practice of a bourgeois society, from which nationalism is being reproduced.

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'MYTH' SURROUNDING DOBRICA COSIC DISCREDITED

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 25 Sep 84 pp 42-45

[Article by Dr Zarko Papic, reprinted and excerpted from an article published in KNJIZEVNOST, No 6-7, 1984: "The Reality and Myth in the Thought of Dobrica Cosic"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Under the title given above Dr Zarko Papic published an article in the journal KNJIZEVNOST (No 6-7, 1984) from which we are publishing excerpts with the author's consent because of the quite wide interest of the public. The excerpts reprinted here were also taken from the sections in which the author examines and shatters the myth of the Prophet.

In methodological terms one can easily agree with P. Vranicki, who issues a caution about the inappropriateness of that criticism in which "a thesis is argued and proved on the basis of quotations out of context" as well as with his suggestion that in "evaluating a text or a person we must first of all undertake an overall analysis of the person's work or the text." But it seems to me that an answer to the question stated previously requires even more than this kind of precisely defined correctness in textual analysis. It requires an inquiry into the real meaning of the author's textual statements.

From this standpoint it seems important to study the real historical context to which a certain statement applies: that is, the relations between reality and the statement. The actual meaning of that same statement is not defined solely and exclusively by the statement itself, but is also defined by its relation to the real situation, the statement's fit with reality constitutes its truthfulness. That is why the same statement may have a different meaning in different historical contexts, and it would seem improper to determine the real meaning of a statement made in one context by the reality of some other context. Thus today, for example, it would be quite wrong to draw from the fact that Stalin was well spoken of in the CPY in, say, 1947 the conclusion that it was Stalinistic at that time, which, incidentally, some of our criticism altogether overlooks in its analysis of "pure" texts.

It also seems important to study the real meaning of statements (categories) in their relation to other statements (concretization of categories) of the
same author. One can arrive at the real meaning of the category democracy, for example, by studying interpretations of everything derived from that category as a vision of its practice or in "contact" with it. This kind of analysis seems to be necessary if for no other reason because many categories enjoy the privileged status of general norms, and they are in general use even when their real meaning is contrary to the formal statement.

The investigation of real meaning, presupposing, that is, the correctness of the textual analysis, tries to go further, to analyze ideas rather than words, the "effectiveness" of the ideas, rather than their textual expression.

Debates of essential social issues do not promise much if the approach to them is colored by an irrational attitude toward the topic under discussion. A prerequisite for a discussion of the work of D. Cosic is elimination of that situation which is the functional context of the myth of the Great Prophet, who has, of course—as in every proper myth—paid for the truthfulness of the prophecy with his own, evil, destiny, and continues to pay. The myth of D. Cosic is based on certain standards of a more recent method of constructing a political myth in our country. It is enough for some "high-level politician" to lose his position for our "construction ideology" to weave around the "act" itself and the "objects" of a political defeat a network of commentaries which mystify the newly fallen, assigning to him and to his fall their own meanings, basing them on the consciousness of the average petit bourgeois, who interprets them with mythical features. If that situation is associated with an ethnic topic, if the newly fallen has been criticized for nationalism, his "recommendations" for acquiring a myth increase considerably. His fall will take on meaning in ethnic terms, and the fall itself will be given a firmer mythical basis. In our case there are altogether specific aspects of the origin of the myth of D. Cosic which are additionally operative. First of all, there is no doubt that we are dealing with a big name in the culture of the nationality. More interesting, however, is that the work of the Great Writer, the specification of his own view of society and history, suits the possibility of building myths on that view; it is open to the "installation" of a myth, even one of its own. An analysis of the relationship between Zeus and Prometheus and the "use" of Prometheus by the Great Prophet and Rebel, cannot omit establishing an attitude toward the myth of D. Cosic himself, nor can an analysis of his work neglect the aspect of self-production of the myth in that work. This seems to me essential to understanding the myth about Cosic. Which is exactly why we are dealing with a myth in action, with an effective charisma which is today having a certain influence on the practice and consciousness of our cultural and social life.

The cornerstone of the myth is the Prophecy dating from 1968, in which D. Cosic, by virtue of what he said in the discussion at the 14th Meeting of the Serbian LC Central Committee, referred to as "Criticism of the Prevailing Ideological Conception in Nationality Policy," alarms the League of Communists, establishes the "failure" of the bureaucratic particularism which is leading to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and establishes the very rapid spread of Albanian nationalism and irredentism threatening both the Serb and the Montenegrin population in Kosovo, taking the view that no one can any longer be unaware "of the pressures for moving out, of the systematic displacement of
Serbs and Montenegrins from places of leadership, of the desires of specialists to leave Kosovo and Metohija, of the inequality before the courts and of the disrespect for lawfulness...."

A stronger passage cannot be found for the thesis of Prophecy, and we have, of course, "wrenched" this quotation from its context not out of a mere desire to be correct, but out of an analytical need to take hold of the matter at its very heart. That is, the quotation above is the central passage of the myth of Prophecy.

We will study the real meaning of the Prophecy from the standpoint of the historical context and through the mutual relationship among D. Cosic's categories.

The identification of the "prevailing ideological conception" itself and its fate in the practice of society is crucial to one's attitude toward "Criticism of the Prevailing Ideological Conception in Nationality Policy."

In that sense the 8th LCY Congress, held in 1964, is the place where the conception was defined, and the line which that definition took deserves unfailling examination.

There are two key directions defined by the 8th congress toward resolving society's contradictions. The first has to do with an essential step in the development of self-management by radicalizing abandonment of the centralistic organization of socioeconomic life. This refers to the transfer of capital for expanded reproduction as well as the related responsibilities and rights from government and political bodies to work collectives in the economy, and in developing self-management within work organizations, but also in opposition to the centralization of income on which decisions had been made by the bureaucratic-technocratic "bloc." One of the things which the 1965 Reform did was to abolish the federal, republic and opstina investment funds; that is, the accumulation of capital was degovernmentalized.

The second had to do with the development of interethnic relations. Not only were interethnic relations spoken about for the first time since the war from the standpoint of problems and contradictions, but harsh criticism of nationalism, separatistic and unitaristic, was initiated. Moreover, unitarianism was subjected to the sharp edge of criticism for the first time. I think an extensive excerpt from Tito's speech at the 8th congress will best express the elements of the "prevailing ideological conception" in interethnic relations.

"Nationalistic deformations are also occurring because of statist-bureaucratic tendencies, which are hampering the processes of interethnic integration. On the one hand they lead to bureaucratic-centralistic tendencies, unitaristic neglect of the socioeconomic function of the republics and autonomous provinces, while on the other they result in encapsulation 'within one's own borders.' Both tendencies are nationalistic in essence and are equally harmful to the normal process of economic and social integration.
"The greatest damage is done to such deformations by work collectives, by worker and social self-management, since they tend toward socialist integration in production, which suits their interests, rather than toward nationalist disintegration or toward unitarianism and centralism. For producers boundaries do not exist, since the interests of producers are identical with the interests of our entire social community. Producers find their interest in various forms of cooperation and division of labor, and the barriers represented by the republic borders are a hindrance to that kind of cooperation. This is sometimes reflected most drastically on our domestic market....

"In all our republics, that is, in all our ethnic regions, individuals sometimes express concern because the interests of the nationality have supposedly been threatened. Such people see only the negative consequences of various measures of our economic policy for 'their own' regions and on the other hand only the benefit of that policy for other regions."

It is evident that the "concept" contains a precisely expressed balance in its criticism of particularism and unitarianism. It is also evident that this criticism is founded in the need for practical development of self-management in the future. Nationalism in both its "variants" is only the ideological wrapper worn by bureaucracy; that is, the center of the problem is self-management. At the same time self-management and ethnic equality represent one process in opposition to statism and nationalism.

It is not possible, then, to attribute to the concept a "disintegrative" role, nor in that sense do arguments exist to support a demand for its revision. The fact that the concept commenced the criticism of unitarianism, which was its essential innovation, is certainly not an argument for the thesis of a conceptual particularization of Yugoslavia; or, to be more precise, that line of argument would rather initiate criticism of the conception of Yugoslavia which is the viewpoint of that line of argument.

Let us ignore for the moment that D. Cosic speaks exclusively about the "prevailing ideological concept," and let us remove the text given above as a possibility of a sufficient answer so that we might put the question as to practice, as to the actual state of relations in our country in the mid-sixties.

Yugoslavia at that time was entangled in the contradiction of statist and centralistic tradition and practice and social pressure toward the self-management and equality expressed by the "concept" of the LC, which still had a fight to wage for the real position of the "prevailing concept." The statist legacy was dominant in practice in its primary and classical forms, from the governmental centralization of investments to the extensive use of the political police, which our later "humanism" has suddenly forgotten; that is, the latter "concept" was actually the one "in power." Achievement, then, of the "concept" of the 8th congress was stumbling along against great resistance, so that later matters had to be resolved through the open ideological and political conflict which took place in 1966 at the 4th (Brioni) Plenum of the LCY Central Committee.

The particular occasion was characteristic of the form of statism in that time, abuse of the state security service. As is well known, the plenum ended
with the resignations of A. Rankovic and S. Stefanovic, and later their accountability was expressed in even harsher form.

The essential thing is that the question of differing conceptions of the development of socialism in our country was raised at the 4th plenum itself. At the basis of the conflict between the security service and society "lay the conflict between two conceptions as to the way to build our social relations, i.e., in actuality a conflict between administrative management, central mismanagement by individuals and the self-management development of society...." At the plenum itself it was sufficiently clear what line would be followed by the resistance to the decisions of the plenum and to realizing what had up to that time been by and large the only ideological "prevailing concept." "We in Belgrade already had various slogans which had been launched by hostile elements. One, for instance, was that this was a fight against Serbian personnel, and the other—what would happen now to Serbia, who would represent the interests of Serbia, and so on, and so on" (J. Veselinov).

At the 6th Meeting of the Serbian LC Central Committee (September 1966) criticism of the "concept" of the security service in interethnic relations was especially developed in the discussion on the "activity of the Serbian LC since the 4th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee"; the real state of the practice up to that point was taken in "pure" form and subjected to radical criticism.

In the report submitted at the meeting it was stated "... that a policy of personnel discrimination against ethnic minorities had been conducted in the security service on the territory of SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia.... Nor did the problem lie only in the number and proportions of personnel. It is a question of the ideological basis on which that policy was conducted. The ideological foundation of that kind of policy within Serbia was in fact nationalism and chauvinism."

It has been judged that criticism of the activity of the security service in Kosovo does not pertain to the period of the showdown with the counterrevolution, nor to the period of the Cominform, but to the time from 1954 to the 4th plenum, and that actually we are dealing with a special kind of reaction by the statist forces to the development of self-management and to the participation of the masses in the social life of Kosovo.

Serbian nationalism is not nurtured only within the confines of remnants of the old bourgeois and petit bourgeois reaction; it also rallies together those bureaucratic forces which were exposed politically by the Brioni Plenum as well as petit bourgeois liberals and anarchistic elements.... The nationalists foist off on the public the opinion that today social factors are "too much concerned with the nationality question," while they "are forgetting our people," that Serbia is "excessively preoccupied" with the problems of ethnic minorities, and that even "to the detriment of the Serbian people," that that kind of policy has "threatened the Serbian population" in certain regions. In some places even members of the party fall under the influence of such "opinions," although this is a typical alliance between nationalism and everything that is the opposite of socialism.
Nationalistic elements in the ranks of the nationality negate the efforts and results in achieving ethnic equality, disseminate suspicion as to the possibility of conducting a policy of ethnic equality, brotherhood and unity: they proclaim the successes to be demagogy... they demand rehabilitation of certain hostile elements, and they give nourishment to irredentism. In carrying out the social and economic reform they take advantage of all the difficulties in order to aggravate antagonism in ethnic relations.

One-sidedness in their attitude toward nationalisms or an uncritical and governmentalizing affirmation of the autonomous provinces are the last thing these attitudes can be accused of. On the contrary, the text of the Tasks pleads in a separate section (Realism in Politics) for a realistic approach in building ethnic equality, determining that realism by the level of economic development (underdevelopment) and by the existing capabilities of society. In that real historical context the demand of the Member of the Highest Body "that we critically examine as soon as possible the prevailing ideological conception of the LCY in nationality policy and in the practice of creating social self-management" can have as its real meaning only opposition to the "programmatic principles and constructive achievements of the LCY in nationality policy and signify a discrediting of the present efforts by the party members of Serbia to correct the inconsistencies, shortcomings and deformations manifested in the period before the Brioni Plenum and the 6th Meeting of the Serbian LC Central Committee," as the Serbian LC Central Committee did in fact conclude.

It is essential to note that D. Cosic also issues here an equal demand for criticism of the "prevailing ideological conception" in the practice of creating social self-management, which is certainly methodologically correct. That is, it is not possible to question the "concept" of interethnic relations without also contesting the "concept in the practice" of self-management.

Perhaps the real meaning of D. Cosic's criticism becomes clearer when we quote his evaluation of what has happened in the past in interethnic relations, "... if all the constructive principles have not been realized in some places and in some respects, which is an indisputable truth, Serbian nationalism is not the principal cause of that failure at realization, but the overall Yugoslav Government and party policy, that is, the level of our social development and objective capabilities." This assessment obviously shatters the very political existence of the Brioni Plenum and the 6th Meeting of the Serbian LC Central Committee and in fact called for their revision.

D. Cosic sees the principal danger in "bureaucratic nationalism, which is displacing Marxist internationalism and universality" and in an "ideology which equates socialist self-management with the sovereignty and framework of the nationality and the government, which degrades worker and social self-management to regional particularism...."

Yet we will arrive at the real meaning of the categories which Dobrica Cosic uses only when we see their application. What, then, is "particularism," and what is "internationalism and universality"? "This spring," D. Cosic said way back in 1968, "our public was also surprised by the decision to break up the
republic fund for science, to divide up the funds into provincial funds and the fund of the Belgrade Pashaluk. It is not too much to say of that conception of provincial, regional and autonomous sciences that they hold a solid place in the anthology of reactionary stupidities."

It seems that for our Anthologist of Reactionary Stupidities "particularism" is a situation in which the decisions on the resources for science are made by the economy of some Province, and the province itself, while it is a synonym for "internationalism and universality" when the decision on those resources is made at the center of the republic. It is difficult, then, to accept the criticism of "particularism" and affirmation of "universality" when their real meanings remain within the confines of a "central" interpretation of everything. It is still more difficult to understand the Great Writer's endeavors in favor of liberty and democracy when an elementary act to democratize the disposition of the material base of creativity is disputed. Need we add that at the moment when the words quoted were uttered there did not exist, for example, a university in Kosovo. It is also difficult to agree with the Author's view on the way to work out interethnic relations in our country:

"This is the way to create a society in which belonging to a nationality is only a 'primary attribute,' as Gramsci would put it, one of the cultural-historical definitions, a matter of the integrity of human civil rights. This is the way to create the material, cultural and general social conditions in which the human personality becomes so free, independent and whole that its belonging to a nationality is a matter of its private sphere.... I do not think that this social orientation is unfeasible and that it should be postponed. On the contrary."

The real meaning of this indubitably attractive vision, however, cannot escape that real historical context in which centralism was standing in the way of affirmation of the nationality (more precisely, was withholding its economic foundation) and in which there did not exist even all the institutional conditions for affirmation of the nationality and ethnic equality not in the sense of relations among the nationalities, but in the sense of their relation to centralism. It is a question, then, of substitution of arguments; it was necessary, as the "prevailing ideological conception" insisted, to create the prerequisites for integration on new historical foundations through self-management and affirmation and equality of the nationalities. Overlooking that, the "vision" remains ineffective with respect to its own goal and conservative with respect to the real historical context.

The foregoing "vision" is on the other hand supported by a truly "nonvisionary" thesis which is not without importance to understanding the real meaning of the "vision" itself. "If in Yugoslavia the victories of traditional, that is nationalistic-statist, policy and a particularistic orientation persist, if the democratic forces of socialism do not win a definitive victory over the bureaucratic and petit bourgeois forces and unorganized elements, the old historical goal and national ideal might blaze up in the Serbian people--unification of the Serbian people in a single state. It takes no political imagination whatsoever to foresee the consequences of such a process." D. Cosic is
not, of course, advocating the "nonvision," but for him it is the alternative of the "vision." So, either the "vision" with its conservative "effectiveness" or the "nonvision."

It seems to me, then, that this statement is meant to back up the "conservative" effect of the "vision" itself.

Cosic's criticism of Serbian nationalism is also essential in this context. It seems to me that Serbianism also deserves particular attention in an examination of the negative aspects of Serbian ethnic and social consciousness. This is an essentially primitive and anachronistic political mentality: this is a vision of Serbia from Uzica to Zemun, this is a complex of a mythology of the nationality and of constituting it as a state: it involves nonrecognition and underestimation of "those who live on the other side of the river" [i.e., in Vojvodina]... Only an anachronistic, retrograde and primitive Serbianism and glorification of everything Serbian: people are caught up by the antique myths of history, they turn backwards, they lose the capacity to understand reality and a critical attitude toward subjective shortcomings: socialist perspectives are broken up in the dirtiness of everyday matters and egoism.... There is something troubled and crumbled and much that is neurotic and psychotic in our life." [Text unclear]

There are two objections which can be made to this criticism of Serbian nationalism. I am afraid that it reduces it to a "folklore" dimension, to "primitive glorification of everything Serbian," while the more important part remains outside its field of vision: the nationalistic conception of the regulation of our relations, which is not exactly "primitive." And second, even if we provisionally adopted the view above as serious criticism of nationalism, we would have to take note that it is partial, that it pertains to a "separatistic fraction" of Serbian nationalism, while the existence of the "unitaristic" fraction escapes it, and a critical attitude toward it is not established.

That is, in full agreement with D. Cosic in nonacceptance of the view "that Serbs are statists, unitarists, assimilators, centralists, and conservatists, in short, that they only want to subjugate, to rule, to play the policeman," we should add that it does not follow from this that unitaristic Serbian nationalism does not exist. Of course, the Serbian people has nothing to do with it, but centralistic statism does exist, and an open struggle was being waged against it at the time when the Author overlooked it in this passage.

It seems to me, then, that criticism of that aspect of Serbian nationalism which was the most relevant at the time of the discussion has been omitted here.

More essential, however, is what the "exodus" is associated with, what are its causes in the interpretation (the immediate and the broader contextual interpretation) of the Author.

As Dobrica Cosic sees it, the "exodus" is related to the Brioni Plenum ("nothing critical is said about the policy of the Provincial Committee of Kosovo and Metohija and about the outcome of its involvement in carrying out the
directives and intentions of the 4th plenum," p 59) and to the Albanian nationality. ("The chauvinistic disposition and nationalistic psychosis in the Shqipetar nationality are not seen in the proper proportions," p 59.)

The "exodus," by contrast, does not stand in a causal relationship with the Brioni Plenum, nor with the "psychosis" in the Albanian nationality (that is, as a whole).

The exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins under nationalistic pressure from Kosovo is certainly one of the greatest defeats of the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia and has an abundance of very dangerous immediate and long-term consequences. The causes lie in the organized activity of the Albanian Irredenta, which has spread its influence on waves of bureaucratic spontaneity in Kosovo, on the strengthening of statism in the province, which needed to play the coquette with Albanian nationalism to play off its own workers and strengthen its positions, and so on.

But in D. Cosic's text the thesis concerning the "exodus" does not have the independent meaning of pointing to the problem; it exists only as a function of the Author's principal thesis, of the "criticism" of the prevailing ideological concept ...," i.e., in support of the thesis concerning the need for revision, especially of the Brioni Plenum. In that sense D. Cosic's ambitions were not "prophetic," they were even greater, a break with the concept of the 8th congress—the 4th plenum—the 6th Meeting of the Serbian LC Central Committee.

In any case, according to all the assessments the exodus under pressure increased very rapidly and emerged as a political problem after the demonstrations of the Albanian nationalists in late November 1968, that is, several months after Cosic spoke about how the "belief had spread" about actual occurrences of people moving out.

This political anomaly of the "case" of D. Cosic, I think, can be synthesized with the thesis that the 1966 Brioni Plenum is the key place for understanding the "case" itself, not the Prophecy dating from 1968. The real meaning of Cosic's speech in 1968 is intimately close in all essential points with the unitarian and central-statist conception of socialism in our country. That is the root of the conflict between the Great Writer and the League of Communists.

Let us also call upon an indirect argument here. How can one explain the Great Writer's silence, when his texts are alive with libertarianism and humanism, when there is talk about the abuses of state security, repressions and dossier and 20 months later only one single mention of the Brioni Plenum in the context of its "outcome" in the "nationalistic psychosis in the Shqipetar nationality." Did Zeus or Prometheus keep that kind of silence and speak that way; who carried the "fire" and who put it out?

Still more interesting in this indirect respect is an analysis of the structure of the statement made by the Great Fire Carriers and the structure of the Platform for discussion (Tasks ...). Cosic does not raise a single new topic. All "his" topics (particularism, bureaucratic nationalism, internationalism ...) had already been raised in the Tasks (differently, of course). By
contrast with the Tasks, however, he would close the topics of unitarism, the Brioni Plenum, and so on. He would go on to enter into critical communication with the criticism of specific manifestational forms of Serbian nationalism contained in the Tasks, assigning a different and nonnationalistic meaning to those specific occurrences.

It seems to me that we are dealing with a pragmatic politician's assessment that the time had come to change the "course." That is, what is essentially new is that the Tasks prepared for the 14th Meeting of the Serbian LC Central Committee pointed emphatically to the danger of particularism and to realism in further dealing with the problem. Did this not seem to our Firefighter (mistakenly, of course) a moment for ringing the alarm to extinguish once again the Fire of self-management and equality.

Which is why what would later become Prophecy was nothing other than Zeus' anger and effort to take the fire away from people as a punishment.

In the world of the Greek myths, we recall, Zeus' Oracle at Dodona was the oldest as well as the best known in Olympia. Hera, Zeus' wife, was Zeus' equal in power in only one respect; she could at will grant the power of prophecy to any man or animal. The power of prophecy comes from Zeus, and in the end the prophet is his person.
PRIESTS IN HERCEGOVINA BLAMED FOR NATIONALIST OUTBURSTS

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 25 Sep 84 p 9

[Article*: "Fra Zovko and Company Are Still Active"]

[Text] The Duvno Opstina Committee of the League of Communists, in collaboration with the city's other sociopolitical organizations, issued a few days ago an official "report on negative phenomena in Donji Brsnik," including the following passage:

"During the night between 31 July and 1 August 1984 in Donji Brsnik, Duvno Opstina, a sizable number of persons participated in the singing of Ustaša songs in the house of Jozo Pranjic during a party to celebrate the departure of his son Dragan to serve in the Yugoslav People's Army....

"One of the songs sung was the anthem 'Our Beautiful ...,' during which all those present stood up at attention and saluted the song with a raised hand, and some of those present shouted the fascist salutation 'Heil Hitler.'"

This was followed by the names of some 18 young men who had participated in singing these songs, half of whom were sentenced by the Court for Misdemeanors to 60-day jail sentences, and proceedings are still being conducted against five of them. All those convicted were born between 1961 and 1966, and they included Ante Belic and Slobodan Prijevic, students of nationwide defense and social self-protection at the School of Political Science of Zagreb University, who are also members of the LCY. In the second and larger section of the report it is stated that all the sociopolitical organizations, working people and citizens of Duvno have harshly condemned the nationalistic behavior of the young people from Brsnik, emphasizing that this is not the first time that such things have happened in that area. "We dare not overlook the fact that for a lengthy period of time certain priests, especially those of the Catholic Church, have been openly endeavoring and attempting in our area to manipulate the religious sentiments of the citizens, especially young people.... Most extreme among them have been Fra Jozo Zovko, Fra Jozo Krizic, and Fra Ante Perkovic. The first two, together with Fra Ferda Vlasic, former guardian of

* NASI DANI, the newspaper of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Socialist Youth League, published an article on 14 September (No 820) entitled "... Pavelices Are Hatching Inside You" which we are reprinting as abridged by the editors.
the Monastery in Duvno, have been convicted and are serving a prison sentence. We are firmly convinced, based on the evidence, that they do not have a good opinion either of people here, or of this country, nor of the enormous majority of the honest and loyal clergy..." the report says.

All those we spoke with are unanimous in the assessment that this case, like many similar ones which have occurred in the recent past, are the consequence of activity by individual priests, clericalists and cleronalists, who are rather difficult to deal with.

We also heard the assertion that this is actually a "deliberate effort by the top level of the clergy, which deems this region to be very fertile for that kind of activity, and it is no accident at all that these brothers who were convicted were given places precisely in the churches of Duvno Opstina, which have an incredibly large amount of money and are able to organize various programs such as excursions, dances and the like, having nothing whatsoever to do with religion, but are very suitable for manipulation of young people."

The accused (and now already convicted) young people were called to account for violating the Law on Public Peace and Order, Article 2, Subparagraph 7 (SLUZBENI LIST SR BiH [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA], No 31, 2 December 1980), judge Susilovic explained. During the inquiry and in the trial itself the young men behaved properly, they were all sorry for what they did, and they all acknowledged and calmly accepted their part of the guilt. However, none of them could or wished to recall who started first singing those songs, but rather said that they all jointly took the blame and went off to serve their sentences in the Mostar prison.

It is quite certain that the church is taking very effective advantage of the slack effort of the youth organization in this area, and in the absence of socially organized programs and content is bringing together young people, who are very devoted and attached to it. This was in fact evident to a reporter from NASI DANI who went to Brsnik, the place where songs were sung about Ustashism and other "stupidities" on a night last July. It is a rather large village with a great many new houses "which Germany built," comprising a community with nearly 300 young men and women. They do not have their own basic organization of the Socialist Youth League, nor did they ever have one, and no one remembers their having been visited by any of the youth leaders from the city, but they do have the church in which Fra Zovko preaches and which every year, for example, takes them on free excursions to Siroki Brijeg or to Rome, and there is even an elaborate party which is always held to celebrate graduation from high school.

Fra Jozo Zovko, who has been fiercely attacked (he is also known to the general public as the "inventor" of the Citluk Madonna), who was assigned here after he served his sentence, according to the assessments of all the officials is the principal initiator and culprit for the recent events, enjoys all the blessings offered him by his superiors and the abundant money support of the members of the congregation, and he is living normally without responding to the charges as though the entire case was of no interest to him whatsoever. He has refused any interview with the newspapers, saying that "I have already said everything I had to say, and people have come to know my attributes, and it is a true pleasure to celebrate masses for such devoted believers." That is how NASI DANI ends its article.

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RUSSIAN ORTHODOX PATRIARCH VISITS BELGRADE, KOSOVO

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 10 Oct 84 pp 25-26

[Article by Nenad Ivankovic]

[Text] "His Holiness and Eminence," Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and all of Russia, arrived the Saturday before last for a 7-day visit to the Serbian Orthodox Church accompanied by several metropolitans, bishops, archpresbyters, archimandrites, archpriests, archdeacons and deacons. In all, 14 prestigious church officials and, it is said, some 64 suitcases. They reached Belgrade aboard a "semispecial" aircraft (a commercial passenger tupoljev which had a space set aside for them), and they were met, along with Patriarch German of the Serbian Orthodox Church, by representatives of the federal and republic commissions for relations with religious communities and the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade Nikolay Rodionov and embassy personnel.

A few days before that PRAVOSLAVLJE (the newspaper of the Serbian Patriarchate) wrote enthusiastically about the Russian patriarch's visit, emphasizing its importance in this manner: "Which of the local Orthodox churches has the largest congregation?—The Russian! Which the largest number of priests?—Again the Russian! Which church has the most beautiful temples?—The Russian! Which has the largest number of martyrs and witnesses of Christ?—Indeed, the Russian! Which church furnished the richest theological literature in the last century?—The Russian! Which church produced the greatest number of church composers and heavenly, wonderful church compositions?—Again the Russian! Which church has withstood the most serious test in this materialistic and atheistic period and passed it with the most splendid marks?—Again the Russian!"

The character of the visit is also indicated in a way by the fact that the Soviet Embassy arranged a reception for the delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church, that it made its chayka (a luxury automobile manufactured in the Soviet Union) available to Patriarchs Pimen and German on the occasion of their going to the ceremonies in the Russian chapel in Belgrade, that the Soviet ambassador and embassy personnel (including even the military attaché) sat in a place of honor at the luncheon given in honor of Patriarch Pimen by the archpriest of the chapel of the Russian Orthodox Church in Belgrade Vasilyi Tarasev. Finally, the visit of the Russian patriarch has been attentively followed by the Soviet press (TASS correspondents in Belgrade). On the other
hand the head of the Russian Church was also received in the Palace of the Federation by Lazar Mojsov, member of the SFRY State Presidency.

Certainly this was not the first time that a Russian patriarch has visited the Serbian Orthodox Church; in 1961 Pimen's predecessor, Patriarch Aleksey visited Belgrade and was received on that occasion by President Tito. Eleven years later Patriarch Pimen came to our country the first time (he was received by Milenko Bojanic, who at that time was chairman of the Executive Council of SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia), and this is his second visit. A year later (1973) Patriarch German made a visit to the Russian Church (he was received in the Supreme Soviet). We should add to this that the Soviet Orthodox Church maintains relations with all local Orthodox churches, and there is no church which Patriarch German has not visited. And he is also visited: recently he was visited by the Romanian patriarch and Greek archbishop (they were received in the Federal Executive Council).

The Orthodox Church, by contrast with the Catholic Church, does not have any world administrative center or any "visible head in some world figure." It is completely decentralized, but its spiritual unity is nevertheless constant. In that respect the mutual visits of the heads of the various local Orthodox churches "are a special expression of that spiritual unity." There does, of course, exist an honorary primacy among them (first among equals) but without any sort of jurisdictional and administrative prerogatives. For example, at any official luncheon the place of honor is taken, to be sure, by the patriarch of Constantinople, and then that of Alexandria, Antioch ... and fifth in order would be the Russian patriarch (this honor was recognized by the eastern patriarchs in 1589, when the Russian Orthodox Church was raised to the level of a patriarchate), but he would not be higher than that.

Yet more important than that fifth place is certainly the fact that the Serbian and Russian Orthodox Churches have collaborated closely down through history, that the priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church have been educated in the academies of the Russian Orthodox Church, that for centuries religious books and financial and other aid have come to the Balkans from Russia. PRAVOSLAVLJE describes this as follows (on 15 September): "That joy in the hearts of us Orthodox Serbs is all the greater in that this time our guest is the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, that same great church with which down through history we have had the closest contacts and strongest mutual influences. Those influences were manifold, not only in the field of church life proper, but also in the field of general cultural development. The same faith, the same Slavic blood, the same language of the liturgy, the same Cyrillic alphabet, the same pains, the same sufferings, the same hopes and national ideals imprinted many times by common struggle against common enemies."

Part of the reason for that "comprehensiveness of influence" down through history is, of course, accounted for by the fact that the Orthodox churches have always been traditionally tied to the state, and in that sense (especially at the international level) they follow the logic of the interests of the state, and quite often they were subject to constantinian constraints. Some of that "traditionalism" is present even today in Orthodoxy, and to some extent this
explains the fact that in the Soviet Union, for example, there are no fric-
tions worth mentioning between the Orthodox Church and the state in spite
of the atheism museums and so on there (which certainly is not the case with
the Catholic Church, nor in some measure is it true of the Islamic religious
community either). Finally, PRAVOSLAVLJE, which cannot be said to be benevolent
toward "atheistic systems," writes: "Anyone who wants to see the strength
of the Orthodox faith, all its indestructible resilience, its ardent vital
strength, need not wander around the world. Let him go right to Moscow, to
Zagorsk, to Kiev and the former Petrograd, and let him see the kind of living
and profound faith with which countless thousands of Orthodox Russians sing
'They Believe,' 'In Dignity,' 'Our Father,' and other hymns, and it will be-
come crystal clear to him that even the gate of hell will not win out over His
Church...." Another newspaper (KALENIC in 1983) has written: "Publishing ac-
tivity is being revived (in the Russian Orthodox Church, author's note), the
monasteries are full of monks and nuns, and the religious academies cannot en-
roll all the applicants who would like to study theology. This is in fact a
living and growing church that is spiritually very rich."

At the official luncheon prepared in the Belgrade luxury hotel "Metropol" by
the head of the chapel of the Russian Orthodox Church (that is, for some 60
years there has been a Russian Church in Belgrade under the jurisdiction of
the Russian Patriarchate; it is located in Takovo Street behind Belgrade's
largest church structure, Saint Mark's Church) Patriarch Pimen also spoke.
Emphasizing the "kinship in blood and spirit" and the "linkage between our
churches and between our peoples," he devoted a large portion of his speech to
the struggle for peace, including this passage: "The Lord has seen fit that
we should live and work in a very unsettled time. Particular unrest is caused
by the hotbeds of international tensions, and above all by the deployment of
new types of lethal weapons in western Europe aimed against the Soviet Union
and the other socialist countries. It is our obligation to sincerely pray and
to help with all the forces at our disposal, both spiritual and material,
for the victory of the forces for peace, which are opposing with all their
strength the advocates of antihuman ideologies which hate man and which want
to push the world into an atomic war." At the press conference held in the
building of the Serbian Patriarchate, which was conducted by Metropolitan
Filaret of Minsk and Belorussia, peace was also discussed, but more from the
standpoint of religion, and the ecumenical importance of this visit was also
emphasized ("Orthodoxy can aid the rapprochement of churches which have the
same faith, the same gospel, the same baptism [original reads "transgression"]
and yet are divided"), and he said that Pimen's visit to the Serbian Orthodox
Church is also evidence of good relations between the USSR and the SFRY." Inci-
didentally, the press conference was held in Russian, without a translator,
and the only question was put by a TASS reporter (on the specific contribu-
tion of the Russian Orthodox Church to the struggle for peace in the world).

Kosovo

During the visit of Patriarch Pimen in Belgrade (from Saturday to Wednesday)
no more than a few hundred people attended from the doxology (the hymn glor-
fying the Holy Trinity) in the Cathedral, the vigil and liturgy with the dedi-
cation of two gold crosses for the domes of the Russian Church, all the way to
the "memorial service" at the grave of the defenders of Belgrade, and the ceremonies and singing of liturgical chants. Yet the luncheon mentioned and the service in the Russian Church were attended by Monsignor Michele Cecchini, pranuncio of the Holy See in Belgrade and Archbishop of Belgrade Alojz Turk, which gave a certain ecumenical splendor to this visit. It is also worth noting that the luncheon in the Hotel "Metropol" was attended not only by representatives of government bodies and agencies, but also by Zika Radojlovic, chairman of the Serbian Republic Conference of the SAWP. In an informal conversation, be it noted, with Patriarch Pimen, who although he is not yet 60, has visible troubles with his legs, Radojlovic told him that he should come to our seaside, to which Patriarch German added that that would indeed be good, especially if he went to Igalo, since there "people come on crutches and later go home singing."

The last 3 days of the Russian patriarch's visit were reserved for a visit to Kosovo: Grakanica, Prizren, the Pec Patriarchate, and the monasteries of Decani, Devic and Studenica.

Of course, no church is an altogether unambiguous and monolithic reality. It also has its "right" and its "left" and its "center." That is also the case in the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the expectations related to Pimen's visit to Serbia and indeed his actual reception in the hearts of the bishops, archpriests, monks and deacons were in accord with those realities. Some, as we ourselves were able to see during the visit in Belgrade, were more restrained, while others again acclaimed: "May you long be active, Your Holiness, for many years!"

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BORBA CARRIES SERIES ON CONFEDERATION

AU161209  [Editorial report] Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian in three consecutive issues on 12, 13, 14, and 15 October, each time on page 5, carries approximately 10,000 words of excerpts from a book by Dr Jovan Miric, professor of the political sciences faculty of the Zagreb University, entitled "System and Crisis."

In a 500-word editorial on 12 October on page 1, BORBA introduces the book, which is to be published "shortly" by the Zagreb Center for Cultural Activities, as "an introduction to the discussion on the political system and its functioning."

Mirc begins with AVNOJ, the anti-fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, and its decision in Jajce in November, 1943, to set up Yugoslavia on a federal basis. "In contrast to some beliefs which we have been meeting in the past dozen years, to the effect that the Yugoslav federation is a matter of agreement among the republics and provinces. The AVNOJ decisions point out that Yugoslavia is a common homeland of all the peoples of Yugoslavia," Miric points out.

In the second installment, Miric discusses various federal systems in the world, quotes Edvard Kardelj at length, and states: "The explicitly pronounced sovereignty of the several units in the federal constitution implies a dependence of the power of the federation the powers of the republics and provinces, and even a determination by them, which is one of the characteristics of a confederatively ordered community, or rather of a confederation, for it cannot be said of a confederation that is either a community or a state." Miric argues that in other states, the federal powers continue to strengthen at the expense of the powers of the several constituent units.

In the last installment, Miric examines the SFRY Constitution to show that not only the republics, but also the provinces, have the right to veto on important decisions, and thus the power of the federal state is not sovereign.

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END