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The following selections from Soviet media on the aftermath of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident and the mobilization of labor and technology in the clean-up effort will be published in the series USSR REPORT: POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS under the subtitle AFTERMATH OF ChE RNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT. This is a representative list of the items selected for that report.

BELORUSSIYA EVACUATES CHERNOBYL'S CONTAMINATION ZONE
Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 8, 9 May 86 pp 3, 4

92,000 EVACUEES RECEIVE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, CLOTHING, SHELTER
Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 13 May 86 p 3

KIEV DAILY EDITORIALIZES CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 14 May 86 p 1

TRANSPORT WORKERS' EFFORTS AT CHERNOBYL DETAILED
Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 16 May 86 p 4

TRANSPORT WORKERS DISCUSS MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES TO CHERNOBYL
Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1435 GMT 16 May 86

ACTIVITIES AT KIEV VEGETABLE MARKET
Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 May 86 p 6

PARTY COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES AT CHERNOBYL
Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 May 86 p 6

TROOPS WORK TO CHECK CONTAMINATION
Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 86 p 1

IZVESTIYA DETAILS HEROISM OF CHERNOBYL FIREMAN
Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 May 86 p 6
MOSCOW INTERVIEWS CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICIAL ON CHERNOBYL CLEAN UP
Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 19 May 86

MINERS DIGGING TUNNEL UNDER CHERNOBYL
Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 20 May 86

UKRAINIAN DOCTOR DESCRIBES CONDITIONS IN CHERNOBYL
Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 May 86 p 10

CHERNOBYL AUTHORITIES PATROL, PROTECT PRIVATE PROPERTY
Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 21 May 86

CHERNOBYL ROAD BEING WIDENED TO AVOID DUST CONTAMINATION
Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 21 May 86

MOSCOW, KIEV ESTABLISH FUND FOR PRIPYAT, CHERNOBYL
Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0815 GMT 22 May 86

TRUD REPORTS ON CHERNOBYL AES CLEAN UP
Moscow TRUD in Russian 22 May 86 p 4

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF CHERNOBYL AES FIRE FIGHT
Kiev LITERATURNAYA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 22 May 86 pp 1, 2

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF CHERNOBYL TOWN, LIFE
Kiev LITERATURNAYA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 22 May 86 p 2

UKRAINE FORESTRY MINISTRY OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED
Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 25 May 86

VOLUNTEERS BUILD DIRECT ROAD TO CRIPPLED CHERNOBYL PLANT
Kiev PRAVDA UKRAYINA in Russian 25 May 86 p 3

KIEVAN METRO BUILDERS INSTALL PIPE FOR LIQUID NITROGEN TO COOL REACTOR
Kiev PRAVDA UKRAYINA in Russian 27 May 86 p 3

UKRAINIAN HEALTH MINISTER INTERVIEWED
Kiev in English to Europe 1800 GMT 2 Jun 86

DIFFICULTIES FACING CHERNOBYL ZONE EVACUEES CITED
Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 6 Jun 86 p 3
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Editorial Review of Arms Control, Foreign Policy Line
(KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 4, Feb 86).............. 1

Serebryannikov on CPSU, Military Building
(V. Serebryannikov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 4,
Feb 86)................................................................. 8

Modern Technology Increases Need for Upbringing Work
(A. Shulkin; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 4, Feb 86)... 17

Impact of District's Senior Officers on Unit Work Discussed
(V. Bogdanovskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Apr 86)............. 24

(KOMMUNIST, 29 Apr 86).............................................. 27

WARSAW PACT

Rigidity, Lack of Command Initiative in Combined Arms Exercises
(N. Korshunov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Apr 86)................. 28

Briefs
Army Gen Kessler's Visit

ARMED FORCES

Army Paper on Maintaining, Boosting Combat Potential
(A. Dmitriyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Jun 86).................... 33

- a -
Leading Personnel of Army, Navy Profiled
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates) .............................................. 40

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Major General Comments on PVO Training Results
(V. Usoltsev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Apr 86) .............................. 42

Role of Thrift in Flight Training Discussed
(A. Borsuk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Apr 86) .............................. 45

NAVAL FORCES

Two Generals Relieved From Pacific Fleet Aviation
(Editorial; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 Apr 86) .............................. 49

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

Georgian Draftees' Performance, VUZ Enrollment Assessed
(KOMUNISTI, 1 Apr 86) .............................................................. 50

Briefs
Obituary: Maj Gen Lobanov
Computerized Trainer at Malinovskiy Academy .......................... 51

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: USSR Will Not Be Drawn Into 'Confrontation'
(Editorial; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Jun 86) .............................. 52

French Medium Range Missile Discussed
(Editorial; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 Apr 86) .............................. 54

/12675
A party congress is always an important event in the life of the Soviet state. It is also an event of lasting international significance, however. The Soviet nation is a pioneer on the path of human society's progressive development, a beacon for millions of people abroad. More and more peoples are refusing to trust capitalism, do not wish to link prospects for their development with it and are persistently drawn to the kind of social structure and the kind of social relations which have already developed in the socialist nations.

True to Lenin's principle with respect to the Marxist party's directing role in the development and implementation of the socialist state's foreign policy strategy and tactics, the CPSU, its Central Committee and the CC Politburo give daily attention to questions of foreign policy and international life. They work out and direct the foreign policy course of the USSR on the basis of in-depth Marxist-Leninist analysis of the situation in the international arena and with proper consideration for the balance of power in the world and for the natural laws and factors determining the main trends of world development and its prospects.

The Soviet state's foreign policy course is rightly called the Lenin course. V.I. Lenin's works and Communist Party documents contain a thorough elaboration of the theory of foreign policy activity and define the general line in the struggle for and the defense of peace and socialism. Every peace initiative of the Soviet Union and our every foreign policy move embody the great Lenin's behests. The Lenin peace strategy and the Lenin socialist foreign policy principles define the international activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the contemporary situation.

A peace offensive developed on the foreign policy front during preparations for the Communist Party congress. Speeches by Soviet leaders in the spirit of Leninist traditions and based on political realism and a sober assessment of the world situation expressed an appeal for serious and constructive dialogue on urgent international problems. Our nation's will to revive the process of detente, make it universal and establish a lasting and just peace on earth, was reaffirmed.
In the situation in the world, a situation which has grown significantly more complicated, the Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth as a whole, while demonstrating vigilance and issuing a fitting rebuff to the intrigues of international reaction, have devoted and continue to devote particular attention to strengthening the solidarity of our ranks and to further intensifying cooperation both on a bilateral basis and through their political and defensive alliance, the Warsaw Pact Organization, as well as within the framework of CEMA. Regular meetings of the leaders of fraternal parties and nations have contributed a great deal to this process. Joint steps in the foreign policy area have been worked out and coordinated during such meetings and at sessions of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact States.

The fraternal socialist nations have not succumbed to the provocations of imperialist forces and are actively pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy course in the international arena. In the process of this multifaceted and complex work, they have unvaryingly put forth the constructive, peace-loving initiatives contained in joint documents adopted by them, particularly decisions of the PCC of the Warsaw Pact States.

The role of the Soviet Union and the peace-loving socialist commonwealth is growing at the contemporary stage. Today, socialism functions as a powerful world system with an enormous influence on the development of mankind and on its future, and is an invincible factor for peace and a guarantor of the secutiry of peoples. All of progressive mankind looks to us with hope. History itself has charged the fraternal nations with extraordinary responsibility for maintaining peace on earth and for preserving civilization itself.

Consistently pursuing a course of universal cooperation and drawing together of the socialist states, the CPSU and fraternal parties proceed from the basic commonality of their interests and from the inseparable linkage between those interests and the international tasks and objectives of the world socialist commonwealth. Relations among the fraternal socialist nations are based on the principles of socialist internationalism, which are embodied in the voluntary alliance of independent and equal socialist states and in the close cooperation and selfless mutual assistance in the common struggle to build socialism and communism.

Loyalty to socialist internationalism is an inseparable feature of Soviet foreign policy with respect to the socialist nations. This is why the undeviating expansion and intensification of cooperation between the USSR and the fraternal nations and all-out promotion of the strengthening and the progress of the world socialist system constitute the priority direction in the CPSU's international policy.

The Warsaw Pact is of lasting importance in this respect. For 30 years it has reliably served to strengthen all-around cooperation among the participants, to ensure their sovereignty, the security and inviolability of their borders, and the joint development and implementation of a peace-loving foreign policy course, and has played a prominent role in the preservation and strengthening of peace in Europe and throughout the world.

The socialist commonwealth nations hold high the banner of the struggle for peace, the struggle to preserve life on our planet. The Warsaw Pact states
counter the policy of undermining detente, of the arms race and military confrontation pursued by the USA and other NATO nations with a consistent course of strengthening peace and developing international cooperation, reducing armaments and strengthening neighborly relations.

All of the joint decisions and actions of the Warsaw Pact nations are based on precisely this course. In the '80s it has been further affirmed in documents from the conferences of the Political Consultative Committee held in Warsaw in May of 1980 and in Prague in January of 1983, at the meeting of leading party and state officials of the seven socialist states held in Moscow in June of 1983, at the economic summit conference of CEMA held in Moscow in June of 1984, at the conference of the PCC held in Sofia in October and at the meeting in Prague in November of last year.

Restraining the arms race and disarmament constitute a task of historical scope. Socialism's ideal, the draft new edition of the CPSU Program stresses, is a world without war, without weapons. The USSR and other fraternal nations are endeavoring to eliminate the threat of war emanating mainly from imperialism, which is steadily building up its military arsenals.

Eliminating the threat of a world war continues to be the main element in foreign policy actions of the CPSU and the Soviet state. Only with favorable external conditions is it possible to perfect the socialist society and advance toward communism in the USSR. In the interest of mankind, for the sake of the present and future generations of our people and all peoples on the planet, we are supporting an extensive and constructive program of measures aimed at halting the arms race and ensuring peace and security.

Imperialism, primarily American, having placed its stakes on destroying the current balance of military power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, between the USA and the USSR, to its benefit has launched an arms race on an unprecedented scale. One after another, ruling circles of the USA advance aggressive documents for conducting nuclear war—brief or drawn-out, limited or universal. They arbitrarily declare vast regions of the world to be a "sphere of vital interests" of the USA.

The aggressive, imperial ambitions are making themselves felt in increasingly crude intervention in the affairs of other nations and peoples, in the inflaming of hotspots of tensions and conflicts and in increasing manifestations of police-like, great-power, self-assumed rule. Attempts to take weapons, including nuclear weapons, into space constitute a particular threat to mankind.

The CPSU proceeds from the premise that there are powerful forces acting in defense of peace, that greatest of common human values. The efforts of the socialist commonwealth nations and of the international communist, workers' and national liberation movements are merging into one today in the struggle for the noble ideals of peace. The wave of antiwar demonstrations in the capitalist nations is growing.

Inexorably convinced of the historical correctness of the forces of peace and trusting in their selfless preparedness to do everything possible to block imperialism's military adventures, the Soviet Union is striving to prevent a new world
war, to preserve our civilization and life on Earth. This policy is therefore meeting with understanding and support on the part of peace-loving states and of all antiwar forces.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that there is no type of weapon which our nation would not be prepared to limit or reduce on a reciprocal basis. If the weapons build-up is continuing—more than that, intensifying—if the pace of the arms race is so great that it is outstripping the achievement of agreements on their limitation, if agreements already reached in this area are being placed into question, this is a result of the NATO bloc's aggressive course.

The Soviet Union has made a great effort to get talks started with the USA on nuclear and space weapons. Soviet and American representatives are presently meeting at the negotiating table in Geneva. This is a positive development.

A desire to gain from the Soviet Union concessions detrimental to its security interests can be clearly seen in the U.S. approach, however. There is no progress in the group dealing with space. Of all the strategic forces possessed by the USSR and the USA, Washington arbitrarily picks out only land-based missiles, which make up the backbone of our nation's strategic capability, and proposes engaging in a reduction of these. Those types of weapons in which the USA has superiority—submarine-based missiles, strategic bombers and cruise missiles—however, it would like to leave out of the talks.

With respect to limiting medium-range nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union proposes eliminating ground-based missiles, including those which we have had for more than 20 years. When it comes to NATO's medium-range nuclear capability, however, the American side feels that it should be retained, and it is even planned to increase this capability. The bias and the lack of logic in this position is apparent, and the Soviet Union can naturally not agree to it. It is advancing at these talks proposals which conform to the interests of equal security and the achievement of mutually acceptable agreements.

In order to make it easier to surmount the palisade of obstacles and stipulations, the Soviet Union is prepared to consider an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe separately, without linking it directly to the problem of space and strategic weapons. We propose to France and England, which also possess nuclear weapons, that a dialog be started on the European balance of nuclear forces in an attempt to find an acceptable solution through joint efforts.

It is our firm conviction that the principle of equality and equal security must be the main principle in talks on limiting the arms race and disarmament, a principle from which the Soviet Union cannot deviate. If our partners accept this basic principle, the talks will move firmly ahead. If, however, the tasks are used as a screen for the further strengthening of military muscles, the situation can only become more complicated. Neither party can count on achieving superiority to the detriment of the other's security. This is the only real logic possible in talks on such serious problems affecting the interests of peoples and the fate of universal peace. Hotspots of military conflicts have arisen in recent years in first one and then another region of the world, frequently threatening to develop into a conflagration. They are rooted in the imperial behavior of those who do not consider the legitimate interests of other nations and peoples,
attempt to intervene in their internal affairs and impose their will upon them. This is precisely the policy conducted by ruling circles of the USA. As a result, dangerous "hotspots" and conflict situations are emerging in various regions of the world, whether it be the Near East, Southwest Asia, the South Atlantic, Central America or the Caribbean Basin. It is not easy to extinguish them, and such spots must be prevented from developing. It is an extremely important area of our policy to help eliminate conflict situations.

The foreign policy work performed by the CPSU and the Soviet government throughout the period between congresses has been active, consistent and aggressive. It reached its apex during the last months of last year and the beginning of this year, however. A system of peace initiatives and steps to establish cooperation were announced during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to France. At the Geneva summit, both the USSR and the USA, acknowledging their special responsibility for preserving peace, stated that nuclear war must never be unleashed, that there could be no winners in one. Persistent efforts by the Soviet side in Geneva got the USA to confirm its intention to improve relations with the USSR and to help reduce the threat of a nuclear war, prevent a nuclear arms race in space and halt the race on earth.

/In January the CPSU and the Soviet state took a new and fundamentally important step, which opened up a real prospect for ensuring a peaceful future for mankind. CPSU CC General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev presented the Statement on Limiting the Arms Race and Disarmament/. This political document contains an extensive and specific program for totally eliminating nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction within the next 15 years—that is, by the end of the current millennium—with the condition that the creation (sozdaniye), testing and deployment of space strike weapons be rejected. Every line of the Statement is imbued with concern for the fate of peace and is dictated by the need to overcome the negative, confrontational trends, which have grown in recent years, and to establish trust as an inseparable element of relations among states.

In accordance with our proposals, the first stage of the program, which is calculated for a period of 5-8 years, would involve cutting in half the nuclear weapons of the USSR and the USA which can reach each other's territory. The parties would retain no more than 6,000 charges on the remaining carriers.

At the same time, there would be a total elimination of medium-range missiles, both ballistic and cruise, of the USSR and the USA in the European zone. In addition, the USA would not provide these kinds of missiles to other nations, and England and France would not build up their nuclear armaments.

At the very beginning it is essential for both powers to reach agreement on the halting of all nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union extended its bilateral moratorium an additional 3 months—that is, to the end of March 1986. This was clearly not an easy decision. It was the only way to actually and reliably close off the channels for perfecting nuclear weapons, however.

In the second phase, no later than 1990, the remaining nuclear powers would join in. They would first freeze and then reduce all weapons with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers. The process of eliminating nuclear weapons completely and universally should be completed in the third phase, during the period 1995-1999. The Soviet program calls also for the elimination of barbaric chemical weapons.
Speaking for the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev has also proposed reducing conventional weapons and armed forces. The way to accomplish this is to reach agreement at the Conference on Measures to Strengthen Trust and Security and on Disarmament in Europe and at talks on reducing armed forces and weapons in Central Europe.

Our new proposals are addressed to the governments and peoples of all nations on all continents. They are addressed to the USA, which, together with the Soviet Union, bears the main burden of responsibility for preserving peace, and to Europe, since the flames of world war have flared up twice on that continent. They are addressed to Asia, where the residents of two cities experienced the horror of a nuclear bombing, and to Africa and Latin America, which suffer more than others from poverty and backwardness produced by the arms race.

We could have begun far earlier to cleanse our planet of the nuclear and chemical danger which threatens to destroy all life. It is not too late even now, however. And we need to begin not tomorrow but today, right now, without losing a single day. Every line of the comprehensive Soviet program for establishing peace, a program directed to all peoples and states, attempts to convince people of this. We can still reach agreement on a specific plan of practical action aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We can still prevent weapons from being placed into space. We can still eliminate stockpiles of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production. We still have the opportunity to prevent a world catastrophe.

The program set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's Statement conforms to the interests of the Soviet Union and makes the life of the Soviet people more secure. Our people have grand plans of social and economic development for the nation. We are to almost double our economic capability within 15 years. And for this we need peace and security. Implementation of the Soviet program will benefit all peoples on the planet.

The Soviet Union believes that current international problems can be and must be resolved by peaceful means, at the negotiating table. The USSR is prepared to cooperate on a constructive basis with all the nations of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America in a struggle for peace, a struggle to improve the situation and develop normal, good relations among states. We are for the development of equal, friendly relations with the liberated nations and for maintaining and developing relations with the capitalist states based on peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous, practical cooperation.

Securing a lasting peace and protecting the right of peoples to independence and social progress are the unvarying goals of our foreign policy. A peaceful life has been provided for the Soviet people and for most of the planet's population for the longest period in the 20th Century precisely as a result of the peace-loving foreign policy course combined with the strengthening of the nation's defense capability. During these precongress days the Soviet people and fighting men of the Armed Forces are expressing their profound gratitude to the Communist Party for its concern for preserving peace on earth and for strengthening our defense capability in the interest of protecting the homeland.
It is the great historical mission of the Soviet Armed Forces to stand up for and protect peace. We cannot relax our vigilance in the face of imperialism's aggressive preparations. In the complex international situation in which imperialist "hawks" are attempting to force peoples onto the path of hostility and military confrontation, the Communist Party and the Soviet government will continue to concern themselves with maintaining our defense capability at the proper level.

It is the duty of Soviet fightingmen to steadfastly guard the security of our homeland, of our friends and allies, and to maintain a high level of vigilance and a state of preparedness to deliver a devastating rebuff to any aggression.


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The CPSU and the Soviet state steadfastly pursue a course of peace and consistently implement the Leninist peace-loving policy. This is convincingly borne out by the Statement of M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. It sets forth a specific program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The Soviet Union considers it to be a completely realistic task to totally eliminate chemical weapons, that barbaric means of mass destruction of people, also by that time. The Soviet Union is striving purposefully to resolve major problems of the contemporary era with the force of its own example, constructive ideas and realistic, practical proposals based on the principle of equality and equal security, on the interests of strengthening peace both in individual regions and throughout the world.

At the same time, our party and the Soviet people always remember Lenin's instructions on the need to enhance vigilance and be on the alert with respect to imperialism's aggressive intrigues. The CPSU and the Soviet state concern themselves constantly with strengthening the nation's defense capability and the fighting strength of the army and navy. "The Communist Party's direction of military organizational development and of the Armed Forces constitutes the very foundation for the strengthening of the socialist homeland's defense," states the draft new edition of the CPSU Program.

In its direction of military organizational development the party has always proceeded and continues to proceed from the premise that it is an inseparable part of the state's overall development. This is precisely why all of the characteristic features of our Armed Forces have undergone further development and been enriched with new substance at the contemporary stage. Today, the Armed Forces of the USSR are the armed forces of a state of all the people. They serve as a powerful tool for defending the interests of the entire people and ensuring the socialist homeland's security. Soviet fightingmen, loyal sons of their people, are closely united round the Leninist party and the Soviet government. They are distinguished by profound love for the people, a high level of political awareness and responsibility for the fate of the homeland. Indoctrinated in a spirit of friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism, fightingmen of our army and navy are steadily strengthening their combat cooperation with fightingmen in the armies of fraternal socialist nations.
The party bases its direction of Soviet military organizational development on the fact that in today's situation there is a continuing exacerbation of the problem of war and peace and increasing complication of foreign-policy conditions resulting from imperialism's growing aggressiveness and the need to maintain the state's defense at a level providing reliable protection for peace and socialism. The tasks involved in military organizational development have become more complex and multifaceted. They require judicious use of the society's economic, social and political, scientific and technical, and spiritual capabilities. The development of military affairs, primarily the improvement of weapons and equipment, is bringing many new things to military organizational development.

The CPSU directs Soviet military organizational development and develops its defense policy on the unshakeable theoretical basis of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army and Leninist doctrine on the defense of the socialist homeland. This theoretical basis is constantly being developed and enriched. The theoretical development of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army serves highly humane goals. The study of war is not conducted for its own sake but in order to use this knowledge as the basis for providing reliable protection for socialism, for preventing and then, in V.I. Lenin's words, "disposing of war."

Party policy in the area of defense and national security (military policy) scientifically defines the goals and tasks in the area of military organizational development and the strengthening of the army and navy. All of the work of party, state and public organizations and institutions, officials and citizens in the military defense area, as in all other spheres of public life, is based on the precise fulfillment of Communist Party decisions. The strength and vitality of the party's military policy lies in the fact that it is consistently scientific and expresses the basic interests of the Soviet people. The draft new edition of the CPSU Program states: "Policy in the area of defense and national security, and Soviet military doctrine, which is totally defensive and focused on protection against attack from without, are developed and implemented with the party playing the directing role." The party's military policy essentially amounts to ensuring that the Soviet state's defensive strength and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces are at a level which guarantees the absolute defeat of any aggressor.

CPSU policy, including its policy in the area of strengthening the national defense, has been expressed consistently and in concentrated form in its programs, in decisions coming out of party congresses and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and in decrees passed by the Central Committee. Historical experience has shown that the implementation of this policy is of enormous importance both for our nation and for all mankind. As a result of the implementation of principles contained in the Third CPSU Program adopted in 1961, large successes were achieved in the society's development, and the national defense was brought into conformity with the requirements of the new situation, taking into account the fundamental changes occurring in military affairs. The Soviet Union's role as a powerful factor in the struggle against the imperialist policy of oppression, aggression and war has grown. The peace-loving foreign policy course worked out by the party and consistently conducted by the Soviet state, combined with the strengthening of the nation's defense capability, has provided the Soviet people and many other peoples on the planet with a peaceful life for 4 decades.
The establishment of strategic military parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO, was a historic achievement of socialism. It secured the positions of the USSR, the socialist nations and all progressive forces and ruined plans for victory in a nuclear world war on the part of imperialism's aggressive circles. The preservation of this balance is a real guarantee that peace and international security will be preserved, the draft new edition of the CPSU Program stresses. Life has confirmed the correctness of the theoretical and practical principles contained in the Third CPSU Program, in other party and state documents and in decisions on problems of war and peace, the defense of socialism and the strengthening of the USSR's economic and defensive might.

At each new historical stage the CPSU creatively develops its policy in the area of defense and security as applicable to the new conditions, demands and capabilities. The most important, promising and long-range aspects of the party's military policy in the contemporary situation are expressed in the draft new edition of the CPSU Program, in decisions coming out of a number of CPSU Central Committee plenums and in speeches by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Precongress documents have set forth innovative ideas and principles which enrich CPSU policy in the contemporary situation and for the future. They also discuss ways and means of resolving that most acute problem of war and peace and defensive measures necessitated by the exacerbation of the international situation, the continuing military threat coming from imperialism's aggressive circles, the activity of the sources of tensions, the growing militarization of the NATO nations and their initiation of a new round of the arms race under U.S. leadership.

In its foreign policy the CPSU consistently combines solid protection of the Soviet people's interests and determined counteraction to imperialism's aggressive policy with a readiness for dialog and for the constructive resolution of international tensions through talks. This was convincingly demonstrated by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with the U.S. President in Geneva. The USA and its NATO allies are not moderating their belligerent ardor, however, and imperialism's war machine continues to be revved up.

The draft new edition of the CPSU Program precisely identifies those social forces which are the instigators of preparations for unleashing war. The party document states that monopolies producing weapons, the top military officers, the state bureaucracy, the ideological apparatus and militarized science have merged into a military-industrial complex and become the most zealous perpetrators of adventurism and aggression. The sinister alliance of the manufacturers of death and imperialist state power is the buttress of reaction, a constant and growing source of the danger of war and convincing confirmation of the political and social-moral unsoundness of the imperialist system.

Political, economic, scientific and technical, moral and psychological preparations for war have become the main element in the activities of the NATO states. They have armed themselves with adventuristic and belligerent foreign policy programs and plans. The USA is the main aggressive force. It is attempting to unite reaction for the destruction of socialism, the suppression of the revolutionary and liberation movements and the restoration of imperialism's world supremacy.
Our party defines the tasks involved in strengthening the nation's defense capability on the basis of an assessment of the military-political situation, the military preparations of the imperialists and the development of military affairs. For example, the draft new edition of the CPSU Program stresses the fact that protecting the socialist homeland, strengthening the national defense and ensuring state security constitute one of the most important functions of the Soviet state of all the people.

The Soviet Armed Forces are the main means of protecting socialism and the main factor in our defensive strength. The party's military policy therefore focuses attention precisely on strengthening and developing them. The CPSU has defined the basic views with respect to strengthening the national defense and to the contemporary and future development of the Armed Forces, and has defined the criteria for the level at which they must be kept—to wit, a level which precludes strategic superiority for imperialism's forces. The creatively developed and enhanced position on the contemporary combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces set forth in precongress CPSU documents is of great political and practical importance.

Among other things, the draft new edition of the party Program states: "The CPSU will continue unvaryingly to see that the combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces represents a solid alloy of military skill, ideological steadfastness, organization and discipline on the part of the personnel, their loyalty to their patriotic and international duty, and a high level of technical equipment." It follows from this that activating the human factor is the main way to strengthen the combat capability of the army and navy. In other words, the further improvement of the Armed Forces will depend to an immeasurably greater degree than before upon the fightingmen themselves, upon their awareness, initiative and discipline.

Not only does the development of more and more awesome and complex weaponry not reduce the importance of human beings, but on the contrary, it actually increases their importance. The ideological steadfastness and the combat training of the fightingmen determine to a considerable degree the speed and effectiveness with which the latest weaponry is employed. The increasing role of the human factor is making it necessary to intensify the communist indoctrination of Soviet fightingmen and to increase party influence upon the life and work of the military collectives. The need to intensify the class and ideological tempering of the personnel is also dictated by the drastic exacerbation of the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism.

The party considers it especially important to improve the training of the officers, improve their work style, enhance their sense of responsibility, their initiative and creativity, and see that they have irreproachable discipline and set an irreproachable example in the fulfillment of their military duty. The ideological-theoretical preparation and the moral indoctrination of the officers are becoming more and more important.

The CPSU and its Central Committee give unweakening attention to improving the quality of the party-political work. The effectiveness of the party's direction of the Soviet Armed Forces is directly dependent upon our vitalizing the work of political organs, army and navy party organizations, which conduct the party policy directly in the forces, in the masses of fightingmen. All of the many years
of experience with Soviet military organizational development attests to the fact that it is impossible to achieve new successes in the training and indoctrination of the personnel, in the strengthening of one-man command and the enhancement of the vigilance and combat readiness of the units and formations without increasing the role and influence of the political organs and party organizations. This extremely important lesson from the history of our Armed Forces has been consolidated and developed in the draft new edition of the party Program, which states: "The CPSU considers it essential to further intensify its organizing and directing influence upon the life and work of the Armed Forces, to reinforce the principle of one-man command, to enhance the role and influence of political organs and party organizations of the Army and Navy and to strive to make the vital connection between the army and the people even stronger."

It is the main task of party-political work for the period ahead to ensure the thorough study and practical fulfillment of the CPSU Program, 27th party congress decisions and the USSR Minister of Defense's demands with respect to the training of personnel of the Armed Forces at the contemporary stage. It is important to see that party decisions are thoroughly understood and accepted by Soviet fightingmen as their own, vital cause. The CPSU demands that party-political work be resolutely altered, that its effectiveness be enhanced, that party influence with respect to accomplishing the increased tasks involved in combat readiness and the strengthening of military discipline be intensified. Life is making it essential to concentrate the main efforts on organizational work right in the units and subunits and on the achievement of good end results in the training and indoctrination of the personnel.

The establishment of a truly Leninist work style is one of the main requirements for intensifying the role and influence of political organs and party organizations and for raising the level of their work to correspond to the CPSU's contemporary demands. Experience has produced directions of work for the political organs and party organizations which assure that the Communists take the leading role, that the CPSU Charter and standards governing party life are strictly observed, that the results of the work and the conduct of the Communists are publicized, that their actual fulfillment of party and service duty is monitored and verified, that they are close to the people, have vital ties with them and be able to lead them. The thorough comprehension by army and navy Communists of the program requirements, as well as the principles contained in the CPSU Charter and changes made in it, which fully correspond to the principles of the new edition of the Program and which enrich the Charter with accumulated experience in party construction, organizational and political work is expected to play a crucial role in this matter.

The elaborated description of the Communist's duties, the improved procedure for accepting members into the CPSU, the increased authority of the primary party organizations and other changes are designed to strengthen the CPSU organizationally and increase the responsibility of Communists for the assigned jobs, which will ultimately help to further enhance the party's directing role.

In its policy in the area of defense and national security, the CPSU proceeds from the Leninist position that the socialist state's defense capability is based on the dialectical unity of the economic, social, scientific and technical, spiritual and specifically military factors. Today, as never before, ensuring the necessary level of defensive strength depends precisely upon a balanced combination of these and a high level of development for each.
The course of resolutely accelerating the nation's socioeconomic development, the implementation of which will move the Soviet society to qualitatively new positions in the economic, social, political and spiritual areas, opens up fundamentally new possibilities for reliably protecting socialism and peace.

The further development and strengthening of the Soviet state's military-economic capability and the material and technical foundation of its Armed Forces constitutes one of the most important directions in the CPSU's supervision of the strengthening of the nation's defense and its security. The party documents give paramount attention to the matter of making optimal use of the achievements, the advantages and possibilities of the socialist economy and the planned national economic system. Converting production to new and flexible technology, distributing the production forces more efficiently over the nation's territory, implementing the Energy and Food Programs and correctly distributing the manpower are very important with respect to accomplishing the defense tasks.

The CPSU's scientifically based technical military policy and the party's concern for providing scientific support for socialism's defense requirements are becoming increasingly important in the situation in which the imperialists are whipping up a new round of the arms race. The party is forcefully underscoring the increased role of science with respect to resolving all of the problems involved in perfecting the socialist society. The CPSU demands that science make a resolute turn toward praxis and that it increase its contribution to the society's dynamic development and the enhancement of the Soviet state's economic and defensive strength. The party's correct technical military policy is ensuring that the army and navy are outfitted with the most modern weapons and combat equipment. This is frustrating the imperialists' plans for monopolizing certain of the latest types of weapons.

The CPSU's role with respect to strengthening the sociopolitical foundation of the Soviet state's defense capability and the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces is increasing substantially. The party is the nucleus of the Soviet society's political system, and all of the other components of that system—the Soviet state, the trade unions, the Komsomol, cooperative and public organizations—which reflect the unity and diversity of all the strata of our population, of all the country's nations and ethnic groups, function under its leadership. Directing and coordinating the work of all elements in the nation's political system, the party strives to see that they make a contribution and precisely carry out the tasks assigned to them with respect to strengthening the national defense and the Soviet Armed Forces.

The social and political strength of our state of all the people is an inviolable and constantly strengthening alliance of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the working intelligentsia. It is the fraternal friendship of all nations and ethnic groups populating the country, the moral and political unity of the Soviet people and their close, inviolable solidarity round the Communist Party and the Soviet government. It is the solidly established socialist way of life, socialist democracy.

The Soviet society's sociopolitical and ideological unity, which has resulted from the building of socialism, is a totally new historical phenomenon and is inherent only in socialism. There has been nothing like it in the past, and it is impossible under capitalism.
The people's unity has recently grown even stronger. It is the powerful source of our strength. The monolithic solidarity of the workers with the CPSU, the tested leader, director and organizer of the masses, constitutes the Soviet society's unity in its highest form.

Our society's unity, which is based on socialist ownership, communist ideology and common goals, is an important factor with respect to ensuring a strong defense for the nation, its reliable protection from aggressors and a high level of combat capability for the Soviet Armed Forces. In wartime the nation, directed by the Communist Party, becomes a single, powerful military camp with this as its foundation. History contains many brilliant examples of this.

The all-around improvement of our entire socialist way of life is one of the vivid examples of our society's social and political progress. An atmosphere of true collectivism and comradeship, solidarity and friendship among all the country's nations and peoples, which are growing stronger by the day, and the moral health which makes us strong and steadfast—these are the facets of our way of life; these are the great gains of socialism, which have become a part of the flesh and blood of our reality.

Thanks to the efforts of the CPSU, the spiritual underpinnings of the nation's defense capability are developing and growing stronger. Through the party's efforts a scientific world outlook has become firmly established in the consciousness of the Soviet people. Its foundation consists of Marxism-Leninism as an integral and well-balanced system of philosophical, economic, social and political knowledge. Our people's spiritual makeup is characterized by good moral fiber, devotion to the cause of communism, a developed sense of Soviet patriotism and proletarian, socialist internationalism, and an aware attitude toward labor.

Defining the long-range tasks in the area of ideological and indoctrinational work and pointing out the need to increase our efforts in the shaping of a scientific world outlook, the establishment of communist morality, the labor, patriotic, international, atheistic indoctrination, and the campaign against bourgeois ideology, the CPSU stresses the fact that military-patriotic indoctrination and the development of a readiness to defend the socialist homeland, to give our all, our lives if necessary, to it is an important task in the party's ideological and indoctrinational work. The party organizes military-patriotic work among all citizens to provide all of the people with the moral-political preparedness to defend the homeland. "Every Communist and every Soviet individual are required to do everything within their power to maintain the nation's defense capability at the proper level. /It is the honored obligation and the sacred duty of a citizen of the USSR to defend the socialist homeland and serve in the ranks of the Armed Forces"—this concept has been established as one of the most important of our party's program principles in the draft of its main theoretical and political document.

The CPSU's increased role in military organizational development is a result of the need to strengthen the socialist commonwealth's joint defense. The defense of socialism today consists of coordinated, multifaceted and scientifically based political, economic, ideological and actual military activity by the fraternal parties, governments, peoples and armies to ensure our reliable security and universal peace and to prevent a new war. The Warsaw Pact is a concrete manifestation of the socialist nations' inviolable defensive military alliance. The pact's
member nations have achieved and are maintaining a defense capability which dooms to failure any attempt by imperialism to encroach upon the gains of socialism. The unanimous decision of the Warsaw Pact nations to extend our defensive alliance is of great political importance.

The CPSU underscores anew the fact that defending the revolutionary gains against encroachments by the class enemies is one of the general laws governing the development of nations setting out on a path of socialist development and that the creative application of this law as applicable to the specific circumstances is the foundation for successful advancement of the socialist states and the strengthening of their international solidarity.

The draft new edition of the party Program is embued with the CPSU's concern for strengthening cooperation among the socialist nations. It defines the basic ways and forms for the development of their cooperation, including cooperation for improving the functioning of the Warsaw Pact Organization as an instrument of joint defense in the face of imperialism's aggressive aspirations.

The CPSU's important role in Soviet military organizational development is also a result of the fact that the substance of international duty is expanding as time goes by. Our nation occupies an important place in the process of providing all-around support for the just struggle of peoples for national freedom and independence and against the imperialist policy of oppression and dictation. The Soviet Union helps nations with a socialist orientation to build a new life and to enhance their defense capability. The principles of cooperation with nations liberated from the yoke of imperialism have been further enriched.

The analysis of the specific features of our era and of world processes contained in party documents makes it possible to gain a more thorough understanding of the essence and the nature of wars and of the mechanism by which they develop and begin. This is of paramount importance with respect to the theory and praxis of military organizational development.

Performing its directing role in our society and specifically, in military organizational development, the party, following the Leninist traditions, is first of all bringing its organization and its activities into conformity with the new conditions and tasks, mobilizing its forces, vitalizing the work of party organizations and all the Communists, and raising the level of party supervision. The qualitative makeup of the party ranks and the distribution of the Communists in the most important areas are being improved. Increasing demands are being made of them with respect to the conscientious handling of their public duty and the fulfillment of party decisions. The CPSU Central Committee is taking vigorous steps to strengthen the cadres. Such qualities as political maturity, competence, an acute sense of responsibility for the assigned job, initiative and creativity, the ability to work with people and moral purity are placed at the fore in the indoctrination of leading workers. All of this fully applies also to the military cadres.

All of the party's work in the area of military organizational development and the strengthening of the nation's defense and security is the concrete embodiment and creative development of Lenin's immortal concepts with respect to defending
socialism. The party's policy and its direction of the Armed Forces have been, are and will continue to be the vital foundation of Soviet military organizational development and a guarantee of invincible defensive strength for the socialist state.


11499
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MODERN TECHNOLOGY INCREASES NEED FOR UPRISING WORK

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[Article by Gds Col A. Shulkin, chief of a formation political section and delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress: "Live Amid the Masses"]

[Text] The connection between the service activeness of the fightingmen and the quality of the combat training is invisible but strong. The party teaches us that it is impossible to achieve solid success in matters unless the approach is through the mind and feelings of the specific individual. And what does this mean as applicable to army conditions? It means doing everything possible to conduct the combat and political training classes, the competition and political-indoctrinational measures so that the people are aware of being active participants in everything taking place and feel the warmth of the commander's concern and attention in all things.

Recently, I have frequently asked myself the generally simple question of whether we leading workers in the formation know our officers and soldiers. Not as an aggregate, not all together, but each one individually, his inner world, his concerns, needs and interests—in short, everything of importance in his life. Unfortunately, some of our Communists lack the ability to establish a rapport with their subordinates. Some leaders are convinced that they are constantly with the people, but are in fact far removed from them.

It would be difficult to accuse Officers V. Gonchar and V. Krupnik, for example, of spending their time in their offices, of being isolated from the personnel. One can hear them say that they have visited the drivers at the motor vehicle training ground, the artillerymen at the training center or nighttime firing practice. The officers seem to be among the masses all the time. A closer look, however, shows that they have only been interested in how the equipment is operating, how the training systems are functioning, whether there have been breakdowns in specific assemblies or units. They frequently pay no attention to the lives of the fightingmen servicing the complex equipment, however.

When this error was pointed out to Communists Gonchar and Krupnik, they cited the specific nature of their service. Due to the fact that the weapons are becoming more and more complex and that more and more effort is required to master them, they said, they simply had no time for anything else. It was necessary to seriously correct the comrades, to remind them of the old truth that every activity
is organized by man. And the more complex the equipment, the more attention must be given to the individual. Training and indoctrination are a single process, after all. The further enhancement of combat readiness and discipline, the improvement of military skill and the fulfillment of commitments in the competition are all accomplished through people. We need to go to the people, to talk with them and influence them with our party word.

The command element and the political section of the formation demand that the service chiefs and all of the officers-and-Communists make the company and the battery the center of their attention and not decide a single matter without thinking about the people, without determining what sort of problems are brought out in the process.

Conferences and meetings in the units and at the formation level constantly discuss the need to step up the work among the personnel, to get around to every individual. But there is sometimes not even an echo, so to speak, of these discussions in the platoon or the company. It is difficult to break up old, entrenched routine ways. Not all of our officers are yet psychologically prepared to readjust, to work under the new conditions. The force of inertia and conservatism are still making themselves felt. Certain leaders, while verbally advocating the improvement of work forms and methods, continue to operate according to the old patterns and do little to combat formalism and bureaucracy. I will not say that this harmful phenomenon is widespread among us, but some people still manifest it in the form of a superficial, "paperwork and telephone" style of supervision of the indoctrinational process in the subunits.

I shall cite an example. The reports from Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Goloshchapo- pov during the past training year created the most favorable opinion in the formation command element and the political section with respect to the situation in the commandant's company. We could not even imagine that the officer rarely entered the barracks, which were literally a couple of steps away from his office. If some question had to be decided, instructions issued or information obtained, Goloshchapolov would telephone. He also visited classes in the company sporadically, which, naturally, did not help to reveal gaps in the knowledge of the fightingmen. He placed all of the concerns upon the shoulders of Guards Captain Yu. Usen, the company commander. They were his subordinates, after all, so let him handle their indoctrination. And Usen had only an extremely vague idea of relations among the servicemen, although he was in contact with them almost from reveille to retreat. This was because he was alienated from his subordinates, immersed almost entirely in purely technical and administrative matters. Naturally, the isolation from the personnel and a lack of knowledge of their lives on the part of those in charge inevitably resulted in a weakening of party influence upon the people. The company commander and the secretary of the party organization reacted to shortcomings, to be sure. They would begin taking feverish action only when one of the soldiers would commit a disciplinary infraction, however. They would hastily convene conferences and meetings of the personnel and get the Komsomol organization involved. Fine-sounding appeals and "scoldings" resounded, and penalties were imposed right and left. After a while, everything would quiet down until the next infraction.

And there was no indication that changes would be made until the formation command element and the political section intervened. The intervention could not be
called timely, but it was effective. Communists in charge V. Pavlov, V. Kolesnikov and N. Dolbunov talked confidentially with the soldiers and sergeants, learned about relations in the company and did everything possible to help Guards Captain Yu. Usov and Guards Warrant Officer N. Melashchenko, secretary of the party organization, to alter their style of working with the personnel. And the situation in the company began to improve. A good moral climate developed in the collective, and real seriousness and efficiency became established. This did not occur all at once, of course. The work of the political section and the persistence of the formation directorate's party bureau had their effect. The bureau members put it like this: The Communist's participation in the indoctrinational work with the people is not just a matter of good intentions but a regulation requirement. Communists Usov and Goloshchapov were called to the political section and asked to tell how they were fulfilling their party duty. Questions having to do with improving the ideological work have recently been discussed three times at meetings of the directorate party bureau, and officers V. Smirov and N. Gibalo, Communists in charge, have been brought to strict account for passivity in the agitation and propaganda work.

Many of us have still not done what is required today, however, or have not done it with proper thoroughness and specificity. The habit of working with a large audience and of assessing ideological measures according to quantity makes itself felt. We have learned how to work out resolutions and compile all sorts of plans, memoranda and reports fairly well, but the individual work with the fightingmen is frequently conducted poorly.

The party teaches us that we must readjust universally and in all matters. There has been a lot of improvement in the daily work style of the political section and the party-political apparatus in the units. We devote the maximum amount of service time to working in the lower collectives and the primary party organizations. The officers no longer have a tendency to work from their desk, which some of them previously did. They are with the people every day. And what are the results? We are still far from completely satisfied with them.

In the unit in which Lieutenant Colonel A. Budarin serves I frequently assembled the young platoon commanders and asked them to show me where the bunks of their subordinates were located. I learned that many of the officers do not know where the soldiers sleep. I believe that such things are not entirely innocuous. They confirm the idea that being close to the people is not an abstract concept, and even such things as this, which might appear trifling at first glance, indicate a lack of attention to subordinates and a remoteness from them on the part of certain commanders. In short, many of us have something to think about with respect to readjusting our work. The precongress party documents devote the most serious of attention to the problem of bringing all of the ideological and indoctrinational work closer to the individual.

Today, no one needs to be persuaded that commanders and political workers need to communicate constantly with the personnel. Everyone understands the importance of being close to subordinates. When I talk with Communists A. Tsalko and P. Mikhailkevich, however, I learn some strange things. It turns out that these officers have an extremely vague idea of the moral climate in the collectives they head. The names of the soldiers, where they are from, who their parents are and who worked where prior to entering the army—this was perhaps everything they
could say about the fightingmen. And not even that about every soldier. Why did they have such meager information? Because these officers communicate with the soldiers only on service matters. Yes, Communists Mikhailkevich and Tsalko do drop into the barracks. As a rule, however, it is only to check on the performance of the duty shift, to admonish someone for bunks poorly made or for lack of proper order in the area. But one cannot truly get close to subordinates in this way.

The facts cited do not reflect the best indoctrinational work style in the unit in which these comrades serve. Indoctrinational matters there frequently amount to educational activities, meetings, conferences and instructions, the same old large-scale measures. The Communists in charge were themselves recently setting this tone. A group of officers led by Lieutenant Colonel S. Gasparyan, for example, recently checked on military discipline in Major Tsalko's subunit. The paperwork merry-go-round went on for several days. The minutes from meetings, all sorts of plans and other documents were studied. And not one of the inspectors saw fit to talk intimately with the fightingmen, to learn how they felt not from reports but firsthand, as they say. We all give verbal support for the restructuring of our work style but are in fact in no hurry to reject the old, accustomed methods of directing the indoctrinational process. They are very tenacious of life and firmly rootled.

I do not want to play the role of a chief who addresses "guiding" criticism primarily to subordinates while striving to remain in the background himself. The more deeply I ponder the drafts of the new edition of the party Program and the CPSU Charter with the proposed changes, the more clearly I can see what important additional reserves we political section workers are still failing to use and how tolerant we sometimes are of formalism in the work. We sometimes place the paperwork—a good situation with respect to plans, accounts and reports—ahead of the vital work.

I feel bad when I think about this. Our requirements, recommendations and advice unquestionably conform to the current tasks of further enhancing combat readiness, strengthening military discipline and restructuring the organizational and ideological work. In whom have we ordinarily instilled these truths, however? The commanders, political workers and activists. We have regarded conference, seminars and meetings with the party and ideological aktiv as our area of work, figuratively speaking. We have been so involved with these matters that we have sometimes forgotten about the soldiers, sergeants and warrant officers.

We have recently improved some things. The number of meetings and conferences has been reduced by a third, for example, and there is less preoccupation with paperwork in the political section, at headquarters and in the directorate of the formation. The Communists in charge are doing more work directly in the company and the battery and are attempting to infuse fresh spirit into barracks life any time they visit. Naturally, we are not talking about taking the place of the commander, the deputy for political affairs or the secretary of the party organization when we come to a subunit, of doing that which they are supposed to do. No, let every person do his own job. It is our duty, however, to keep a constant finger on the pulse of life, to influence the course of events unobtrusively but at the same time, objectively and purposefully, to be not registrars of the indoctrinational process but active organizers of and participants in it.
We have become convinced that success in our work depends greatly upon a precise system, upon how we plan the political section’s work for the training period and how we concern ourselves with organizing the planned forms of political training for all categories of servicemen and with the work of the agitation and propaganda team. We attempt to achieve maximum effectiveness for the main forms of political indoctrination of the fightingmen, particularly the political classes. Filling them with profound substance, giving them clarity of form and the convincing force of influence upon the mind of every student is the sure way to reach the soldier’s heart and intellect. And this requires performing a great deal of carefully conceived work with those in charge of the political training groups. A great deal depends upon them, after all.

The leaders of all of our Marxist-Leninist training groups for officers and political training groups for warrant officers are unit commanders or political workers. We try to pack the seminars for this category of supernumerary propagandists with new substance, to help them master propaganda methods well, and attempt to get them used to addressing the personnel frequently. In addition to the scheduled classes, on the first and third Mondays of each month leading workers present political briefings to the personnel, and unit political workers and service chiefs do so on the second and fourth Thursdays of the month. Evening political indoctrination work is similarly planned and conducted. The Communists in charge thus present talks in the company, the battery or equivalent subunits at least two or three times a month according to a plan. When we add to this talks made in accordance with the agitation and propaganda team’s plans, we find that more than half of the lectures and reports presented last month, for example, were conducted by Communists in charge.

General political days, in which practically all of the Communists in charge take part, provide a good opportunity for direct and open communication with the personnel.

We have to admit that for a long time monologs predominated on our general political days. It cannot be said that we have gotten away from this entirely today, but the fact is indisputable that the meetings with the people are increasingly assuming the form of vital and interested discussion with the audience on matters of concern to the fightingmen. The fact that questions of interest to the people are now collected in advance when preparations are made for the general political days in the units and subunits is a great help. Criticism, recommendations and proposals submitted directly to the speakers are summarized, and specific steps are taken in response to them.

We try to make all of the agitation and propaganda work systematic and periodic. Every week 3 hours, plus 1 hour on the day-off, are allocated for mass political work. In view of the fact that it becomes somewhat more active and purposeful on days of preparing for and conducting public-political celebrations, final inspections, exercises and trips to the field, we have worked out detailed recommendations for the entire training year for conducting party-political and agitation and propaganda activities. This not only enables us to establish regular communication between those in charge and the servicemen, but also makes it possible to specifically assess the degree of activeness of the indoctrinational work performed by those in charge right in the subunit.
Talks conducted in the political section as a form of indoctrination and monitoring of the work of the officers-and-Communists are also becoming a solidly established practice. While mainly people in charge who had deficiencies in the training and indoctrination process, those who worked with subordinates "in a general and overall manner," were previously called in for talks, we now try to meet more frequently also with those who understand the essence of the readjustment and are achieving fairly good results but from whom we can expect more.

As active fighters for the party and the agents of its ideas, the Communists cannot restrict themselves to the rostrum. We must take advantage of every opportunity to get close to the people, to influence their convictions and their service. Where is the best place to get to know the fightingmen? Under what conditions? Life has convinced us that it is during the overcoming of difficulties, in a situation approaching combat to the maximum possible degree—in exercises, firing practice and drills.

Our fightingmen conduct exercises in the field for several months at a time. Not so long ago Major N. Yevtushenko's subunit performed a complex combat training mission. And the entire time, commanders, representatives of the political section and the chiefs of various services were alongside the fightingmen, inspiring them to perform skillfully and competently. When brief breaks occurred, individual and group talks, political briefings and political hours were conducted with them.

The political influence on the fightingmen was intensified as the combat training missions became more complex. The subunit repeatedly had to execute marches over many hundreds of kilometers. But during those hours every individual received the attention of Communists D. Makarov, V. Bessonov, P. Kachanovich, N. Yevtushenko and N. Marchuk. They took advantage of every opportunity to elicit an open exchange of opinions in subordinates and attempted to cheer them up and lend warmth to the service relations with sincerity and cordiality, to focus the efforts of the fightingmen on the accomplishment of the new missions. As a result, the USSR Minister of Defense's gratitude was conferred upon the subunit personnel for performing the combat training missions with precision and coordination.

It is no less important to perform daily work with the soldiers, sergeants and officers outside of the mass activities and to react promptly to their moods, their statements and actions than it is to present lectures and reports, as an example. Experience has taught us that a judicious combination, an alloy, of scheduled activities and painstaking individual work has a large effect and builds the shortest bridge to the fightingman's heart.

Indoctrination work can be performed everywhere. I know from personal experience that when you drop into the barracks during off-hours or talk with a soldier during a break between classes about the service, about his home and his family, his mood improves. And after each such discussion, you too know more about the character of your subordinates, about their inclinations and interests.

It is certainly not enough merely to produce a good effect upon the heart of a subordinate. It is important that it help him in his service. And this requires that we who are in charge constantly be close to the people and influence them, bearing in mind V.I. Lenin's behest: "Live in the thick of the working life, know it inside out, be able to unerringly determine the feelings of the masses and
their real needs, aspirations and thoughts on any matter, at any time... be able to gain the infinite trust of the masses with comradely treatment, with concerned satisfaction of their needs." This applies most directly also to the work style of leading personnel of our army's units and subunits, of course. Most of the commanders, political workers and party activists organize their work in accordance with these instructions of Lenin's.

In connection with this, I would like to cite the experience of Communist A. Zakharenko. Aleksandr Pavlovich knows how to thoroughly study everything pertaining to the life and work of the servicemen and members of their families, how to get down to the essence of everything. More than once I have seen him in the dynamic situation of organizing a training battle. I have seen him talk with the people and seen how attentively they listen. Strictly demanding of subordinates for deficiencies in the service and indulgences in the training process, Officer Zakharenko is always sensitive and responsive to the people. The Communist's good professional training, his irreproachable moral image, his accessibility and modesty draw subordinates to him and motivate them to open up their hearts and confide their innermost thoughts. This has a beneficial effect upon the indoctrination of the fightingmen, helps to unite them and lead them forward.

It is pleasing to say that we have more and more leaders whose style of working with the personnel measures up to the modern demands, for whom daily concern for the servicemen and the members of their families and a desire to understand their joys, fears and anxieties are a spiritual need. There are still leaders, however, for whom closeness to the people has not yet become the norm. We see this, and we know it. We are taking steps along both service and party lines to see that every officer-and-Communist possesses the qualities of an organizer and indoctrinator and is an active champion of effectiveness in the combat training, firm military discipline and a high level of combat readiness on the part of the units and subunits.


11499
CSO: 1801/172
They say words lose their luster from frequent usage. But today, when we speak of efficiency, such a sensation does not occur. They are seemingly the same words, but how they have begun to sound differently and fresh! It is probably because, speaking of efficiency, we imply energetic acts and actions—they are of special value today. They are the what we need today, not slogans and positive statements. The criterion of efficiency is how clearly we see the objectives and how concretely we are able to organize work in order to achieve them.

It is precisely from such a position that the participants of the party aktiv meeting of the Carpathian Military District approached the discussion of party organization tasks stemming from the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. These tasks are linked primarily with maintaining high combat readiness and strengthening good organization and order. This is the main thing, as was emphasized in the report by the commander of the district Army Gen V. Belikov and in the speeches by military council member and chief of the district political directorate Lt Gen Ye. Makhov, and comrades A. Makarov, V. Malyuga, A. Kunitsa, D. Pirtskhalashvili, and others.

Time itself, they said, obliges each of us to work in a new manner, to work with initiative, creatively, and with a feeling of personal responsibility for our assigned work. The tone in this work, without a doubt, must be set by party organizations, which means they must largely reorganize their style and methods. Life provides more and more examples of such reorganization.

Things are fairly stable, say, in many units and subunits of the Samaro-Ulyanovsk, Berdichev, and Zheleznaya motorized rifle divisions. Party organizations have begun working more actively. In the collectives they are creating a situation of search, high exactingness, and responsibility and are approaching the solution of pressing problems in largely a new manner.

This was talked about at the aktiv meeting, and my memory immediately translated these words into the "language" of specifics. I recalled the party
organization headed by Maj V. Kryzhanskiy. I had occasion to be there many times and always sensed, I would say, an atmosphere of people charged up for harmonious work. This was not judged by reports and paperwork; here they were truly struggling with the paperwork "environment" which earlier had often covered up the lack of real work. The new approach is that paperwork and deeds, figuratively speaking, had to change places. Priority was given to the end results not good intentions, which were in surplus before. They approached organization and establishing control very seriously. Communist leaders and party activists work thoughtfully with people in companies and batteries. The come not to record shortcomings, but too help the young commanders and young communists. In this party organization they know how to support searching and conscientious people and also know how to hold strictly accountable those who relate listlessly to their duty. They make wide use of reports by communists on fulfillment of party and official duties. In short, they have put into action various key factors, which has noticeably increased the effectiveness of the party organization's work.

How often such intensity towards work is still lacking. The deed itself disappears in endless talk about it, and there is sometimes a solid distance between appeals for reorganization and real deeds. By no means are all the communists in the district energetically reorganizing. In no way can they give up outmoded style and methods: They say one thing, but follow the old path. There was sharp criticism at the meeting aimed at such comrades, without respect of position and rank. In particular, serious reproaches were cast at officers I. Kuzmenko and B. Bulgakov. They are good at making a brilliant display from the podium with "fashionable" phrases and zealously call upon others to work in the new manner, but themselves commit acts which are contrary to the requirements of the party. They have permitted eyewash treatment in evaluating the state of combat training and military discipline.

The need to increase exactingness of personnel and all communists was mentioned at the meeting. Furthermore, it is important not to substitute bursts of speed for it. Today, exactingness also must acquire a specific nature, efficiency, and validity. It must not be, as it is called "lashing the tails," but timely notification of mistakes and unfinished work.

They are not able to do this everywhere. Even in certain party organizations of the staff and directorates of the district they have not learned to truly evaluate the work of communists, and they are entrusted with great tasks. More often they are evaluated in general and as a whole: how many times some or other officer or general went on temporary duty; in what measures he personally participated; whether he gave a lecture to personnel; and so forth. They sometimes forget the main point—What is the effectiveness of a communist leader's work in units and subunits, and by what methods is it achieved?

The answer to this question is provided by the preliminary results of the winter training period. They say that the style of activities of certain officers and generals of the district staff and directorates have not yet undergone any serious changes; they travel to the troops not to help to organize things, but to "identify shortcomings." Criticized for this at the meeting were Col O. Zharov and Lt Col G. Leushin. They often traveled to their subordinate subunits, but the situation there still has not improved.
But for some reason, there are not special complaints toward these communists in the party organization.

Although the criticism was harsh, it essentially was timely and justified. It is dictated by those new demands which are being imposed on communists of the management level today. It would seem that everyone here should understand how great their responsibility is in resolving the great and complex problems. They must have an inherent acute sense for the new and an ability to see it in troop practice, and to support and help with advice and deed. If not the staff officers, who is obliged above all to take into account the changes taking place in the nature of modern combined arms combat and take effective steps to resolve pressing problems? You can count on your fingers the number of new recommendations they have issued to the troops. They often publish as new that which already was, but has become outdated. It cannot be considered normal when certain exercises and firings are conducted on a low methodological and organizational level in the presence of officers and generals from the district staff and directorates and therefore do not achieve their objective. It happens that the troops are given instructions which are not fully thought through, as a result of which unjustified personnel absences from combat training are permitted in the units. This affects not only the quality of the training process, but also the state of military discipline.

In short, a wide range of problems were discussed by the participants of the party aktiv meeting. Discussion was interesting, with a confidence that many of these problems will be resolved in the near future. It was emphasized that any matter today must be placed on serious foundation of organization and control. It is important that each person not simply master the party aims, but accept them as guidance for action.

If, say, we are talking about party documents on using the human factor, then the communist must clearly determine how better to do this in his work area and how to involve and lead people. Another question, for example: The documents of the party congress speak of the need to bring ideological work closer to life. How will this "approaching" be reflected in your political studies group or in the content of lectures you deliver as a member of an agitation and propaganda group? Or take the question of a communist's personal responsibility for strengthening discipline in his work section. Clearly it can successfully resolved only if there is a clear-cut system of actions, control, and accountability. In all directions there must be a clear understanding by each of the specific task and ways to complete it, and precise and consistent organizational work by party organizations.

Regardless of the topic, the participants in the meeting emphasized the growing importance of energetic, purposeful work of political organs and party organizations, not permitting it to slacken and giving it acceleration.

12567
CSO: 1801/181
MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

AzSSR: COUNCIL DISCUSSES MILITARY DRAFT OF 1985

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri on 29 April 1986 carries on page 3 a 300-word AzerINFORM article on a meeting of the Council for Civil Defense and Military-Patriotic Education of the AzCP Central Committee at which they discussed "results of the 1985 draft of youths into the USSR Armed Forces and duties in the preparation and organization of this work this year." It was pointed out that "measures have been taken to perfect the teaching of Russian to future recruits." It was also noted that "last year alone more than 1,000 youths from Azerbaijan, primarily from the local nationality, entered military schools." It was found, however, that "among the draftees there are still those demonstrating a passive relationship to military service and public works." /6662

CSO: 1831/432
According to the plan of the two-sided tactical exercise, the battalion commanded by Maj Yu. Paskar was to occupy a defensive position on an indicated line. The motor riflemen were to dig in, camouflage themselves and, in the event of an attack by the opposing side, operate strictly according to the simulation plan.

Such a deliberately passive scenario, apparently, did not suit the battalion commander. This is understandable: What can you teach subordinates sitting snug in the foxholes? In short, in making a decision, Maj Paskar chose an active version of defense. Specifically, he planned to organize ambushes on the proposed "enemy" advance routes and conduct a counterattack.

This decision, naturally, was based on a consideration of the real correlation of forces and equipment and terrain conditions. However, at the regiment headquarters the battalion commander was advised not to "let his imagination run away." They said, we have an exercise plan and must follow it...

Then, everything went according to plan. At the designated time the "enemy" attacked the strongpoint which the subordinates of Maj Paskar were "defending" and successfully seized it. Since no obvious mistakes were made in advancing, deploying into battle formation, and attacking, the actions of the attacking forces were rated highly. The defending forces were not offended, since their passive nature suited them.

Unfortunately, such a picture at two-sided exercises is not such an infrequent occurrence. This cannot help but catch one's attention. Contemporary combined arms combat, as we know, imposes high demands on training troops and staffs and assumes creative work, initiative, and a search for non-stereotype decisions. However, when organizing exercises, including two-sided ones, this is by no means always taken into account. As justification one often hears references to the specific nature of such exercises.
What makes it so difficult to avoid conditionalities in training combat? Especially when it involves a two-sided exercise where it is not targets and mockups being opposed, but real men and equipment. Here various restrictions, including those caused by safety measures, are simply unavoidable. In planning the actions of the sides and the working out of certain problems, senior officers and staffs cannot help but take this into account. But the trouble is that these plans are often compiled by stereotype and represent a sort of schedule in which literally every step of the trainee commanders and staffs is drawn in.

However, as the experience of the Great Patriotic War indicates, commanders and staffs were not always able to carry out fully the intended plan of battle or operation. This is quite understandable. It is quite difficult to predict everything in advance and foresee enemy actions and countermeasures. Therefore, various adjustments and often radical changes to the plans are made directly in the course of combat actions.

One must be prepared for this to a still greater extent in modern combat, a new characteristic feature of which is rapid and abrupt situation changes. This also leaves its mark on the troop training process. In particular, the exercise director must be prepared to change his plan to correspond to the developing situation and the decisions made by the trainee commanders and staffs. What is more, it is necessary to predict such a, shall we say, breakdown in the plan.

All this, of course, requires exercise organizers constantly to have a purposeful approach for searching, initiative, and creative work. But not everyone, as an analysis of the winter training results shows, is disposed to such work. So at exercises the sides operate strictly according to the established plan: the active side attacks, and the opposing side tries...not to interfere. Everything is easier that way. But couldn't things be done differently—not by stereotype?

In the course of an exercise the rifle battalion commanded by Maj V. Degtyarev was given the task of designating the "enemy's" shift to the defensive. After the attacking forces seized the strongpoint, the motor riflemen were to operate according to the tactical exercise plan without contact with the attacking side, independently.

The task was simple: occupy a line, dig in, wait for the attack, and allow the "enemy" to pass through... But Maj Degtyarev approached it creatively. During daylight the battalion, located in the field of view of all types of "enemy" reconnaissance, prepared its positions. But at night, strictly observing camouflage discipline, the battalion commander regrouped his forces and equipment so as to set up a trap for the "enemy."

He managed to do this. At daybreak, the subunits commanded by Maj N. Sukhoruchenko and Capt V. Shastikov shifted to the attack. The acted precisely in accordance with the exercise plan, and as a result won the battle.
Of course, the exercise director also could have acted as in the case with Maj Paskar mentioned above and placed Maj Degtyarev within the limits of the plan. But this time the senior commander showed preference to those who demonstrated initiative and creative work.

The director of the exercise in which the motorized rifle battalion commanded by Maj N. Yurov also was not afraid of breaking the plan. It turned out that as a result of skillful organization of reconnaissance, the battalion commander managed to figure out the "enemy's" intentions, which were to regroup his forces and equipment at night and attack on a different axis at daybreak. Having assessed the situation, Maj Yurov decided not to wait until the opposing side went over to the offensive, but to attack first.

Of course, this was contrary to the exercise plan. But the battalion commander's concept proved to be more interesting than the exercise plan, and the exercise director estimated this at its true worth and regarded with attention the proposal of the "passive" side. Convinced that the battalion commander's decision was thoroughly well-founded and dictated by the real tactical situation, he approved it.

The situation at the exercise and the work of the director and his assistants were considerably complicated when the opposing sides changed roles. Now there were not passive forces playing into the others hands on the battlefield. Everyone acted decisively and boldly and made quick, non-typical decisions. In short, the exercise turned out to be useful and instructive for all who participated in it.

Yes, combat practice and exercise experience again and again confirm the truth: Subordinates cannot be taught to act with initiative and creatively if the exercise director himself remains captive to old, already outdated ideas and prefers to follow the well-trodden track. The times require each of us to be more receptive towards initiative and to go more boldly against stereotype. Naturally, this also applies to exercise planning.

Needless to say, to quite an extent this depends on us, the officers of the combat training directorate of the group of forces. One would think we are doing quite a bit. In preparing for tactical exercises we conduct methodological and instructional classes with their directors, at which we work out questions of organizing two-sided play and command and control of subunits in the dynamics and give recommendations concerning evaluation of the actions of the sides. We pay special attention to seeing that commanders of units and large units do not stifle the initiative of subordinates who "violate" the plan of conducting the exercise.

Nevertheless, there are still quite a few reserves in our work which must be put into action in the near future. This was also a topic at our last party meeting, where we discussed the question of the personal contribution of officers of the combat training directorate towards improving troop field training. The need for such discussion was urgent. You see, many of the shortcomings mentioned above took place before our eyes. It must be confessed that, participating in two-sided exercises, we do not by any means always
strive to see that the opposing sides actually fight, and do not play into one another's hand.

A tactical exercise conducted recently by Lt Col N. Kostarev can serve as an example of this. The umpires, who incidentally were instructed by an officer of our directorate, evaluated only the attacking side and simply forgot about the defenders. By the way, there were quite a few errors in the actions of the attackers. In particular, they even did not consider it necessary to conduct reconnaissance of the "enemy." However, the umpires found it possible to give preference to the attacking side... That is what the exercise plan called for.

Ahead lies the summer training period, during which many exercises will be conducted, including two-sided ones. The personal contribution of each of us is needed in order for them to become a true school of courage, combat mastery, initiative, and creative work. Not in words, but in deeds.

12567
CSO: 1801/181
BRIEFS

ARMY GEN KESSLER'S VISIT--At the invitation of MSU S.L. Sokolov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, Army Gen H. Kessler, GDR minister of national defense and member of the SED Central Committee Politburo, will pay an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union in the first half of May. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 86 p 1] 12567

CSO: 1801/187
In response to readers' requests, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial office will publish a series of materials devoted to the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. Articles by military leaders, military scientists, and other authors will examine topical theoretical and practical questions pertaining to the strengthening and improvement of the Armed Forces' combat potential and the implementation of the tasks set them by the 27th CPSU Congress.

At the present extraordinarily complex and crucial stage in history, the development and improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces is determined by the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. On the basis of an analysis of the present realities in the sphere of foreign policy and of development trends in military affairs, the congress has enriched Lenin's teaching about the defense of the socialist fatherland with new ideas. It substantiated the objective necessity to further strengthen the country's defense capability, enhance the party's leading role in military building, and consolidate the vital bond between the army and the people, and it defined the thrust of Soviet military doctrine and the tasks relating to the further enhancement of the Armed Forces' combat capability and combat readiness.

The implementation of the ideas and aims put forward by the congress demands energetic practical steps and intensive political, organizational, and ideological work from military cadres in all these spheres. Priority importance is attached here to tasks connected with the acceleration and intensification of the training and educational process in the Armed Forces and the enhancement of their combat capability and combat readiness. The combat capability and combat readiness of the Armed Forces depend directly on their combat potential, that is, the sum total of the material and spiritual resources which determine the upper limits of the ability of the Army and Navy to fulfill the tasks they have been set. The importance of this indicator is so great that the attitude to it and to its components has been defined in the new edition of the CPSU Program. "The
party," the Program reads, "will invariably continue to ensure in the future that the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces represents a solid fusion of military skill and the high level of the personnel's technical equipment, ideological steadfastness, organization, and discipline, and of its loyalty to its patriotic and international duty."

This programmatic provision is based on a number of ideas which are of paramount importance for military science and practice. First, it aims at a comprehensive systems approach to the two key elements of the Armed Forces' combat potential, that is, people, the servicemen with all their inherent qualities, and the military hardware with which the Armed Forces are equipped. Second, it emphasizes that the decisive role here is played by the human factor, the great professional, political, and moral qualities of the Soviet serviceman. And third, combat potential is seen not as the mere sum of certain elements but as an organic system of these elements, as a solid fusion of man's best qualities and the capabilities of advanced military equipment.

The special attention paid to the human factor by no means detracts from the importance of weapons and combat hardware in maintaining the country's defense capability at the appropriate level and in ensuring the reliable defense of the gains of socialism. In conditions of the arms race unleashed and forced by imperialism, in conditions of imperialism's headlong pursuit of military superiority, its buildup of its nuclear potential and of other means of mass destruction, and its projected militarization of space, the question of the material base of the country's defense capability and of the might of its Armed Forces assumes an extraordinarily great importance.

In identifying technical military problems and determining the order of priority and ways of solving them, our party proceeds above all from the premise that a disruption of the existing military strategic equilibrium must not be allowed under any circumstances. The CPSU's stance on this question has been set forth in the documents of its 27th Congress with utmost clarity and emphasis: The Soviet Union is not seeking greater security, but neither will it agree to lesser security. "The Soviet state and its allies," the CPSU Program reads, "do not seek military superiority but they will not tolerate a disruption of the military strategic equilibrium which exists in the world arena."

This entails very complex and responsible tasks for our officer cadres and the entire personnel of the Army and Navy. Since military affairs are a relatively independent area, they have their own infrastructure and logic of development and their own mechanism for quantitative and qualitative changes. Consequently, this "mechanism" must be maintained in a state which will enable it at any moment to accept the "services" of the economy and of scientific and technical progress and ensure maximum returns from their achievements. It is a question of organizational structure, as well as of the time needed to assimilate new types of weapons and combat hardware and the standard to which this is done, a question of the
effectiveness of their application and maintenance, of the training of military specialists, the enhancement of the effectiveness of combat and political training, the reinforcement of military discipline, the scientific organization of military labor, and much else.

The dynamics of our time are reflected also in military affairs. In the Soviet Armed Forces increasingly vigorous steps are being taken in everything that leads to the Armed Forces' further improvement. But that is only the beginning of the vast amount of work on which the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress are targeted, including work to accelerate the qualitative development of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Despite all the unity and dialectic interconnection between the components of the combat potential, each one of them has its own qualitative specificity. However, there are also common issues which stem from the current tasks of the Armed Forces and the current demands made on the standard of professional training of military cadres and of the entire military personnel and on their moral and political qualities—demands for a high level of competence, a truly innovative spirit, useful initiative, political maturity, and moral excellence, in fact everything that leads to restructuring and an effective style of work and makes it possible to overcome the manifestations of stagnation and ensures accelerated progress.

In order to ensure the reliable defense of the gains of socialism we have to know a great deal and be able to do a great deal today. It is natural therefore that among the factors which make up the combat potential of our Armed Forces the acquisition of military skills takes pride of place.

Of late certain progress has been achieved in the Army and the Navy in personnel training and in improving the combat skills of subunits, units, ships, and control organs. The rhythm and efficiency of the training process is steadily improving. There are units, ships, and formations which achieve high results in combat and political training regularly, year after year.

However, the tasks in enhancing military skills are not being resolved sufficiently energetically and to a high standard everywhere. Last year certain military units which had pledged to gain the "excellent" rating achieved only mediocre results. Among the officers there are people who do not work sufficiently hard, whose improvement in operational-tactical respects is too slow, whose knowledge of armaments and organic equipment is poor, and whose performance in shooting and in driving combat vehicles is low. These flaws are a consequence of the fact that a good level of efficiency in combat training has still not been achieved everywhere, and they occur wherever the personal responsibility of a person in an official position for the implementation of the tasks entrusted to him is not rigorously enforced and where good initiatives are not backed up by the necessary organizational work.
Certain shortcomings also exist in servicemen's special training, and training subunits and units have been criticized. The acquisition of military skills by the personnel is sometimes still assessed according to the number of qualified specialists and servicemen achieving the "excellent" rating rather than according to the practical training [realnaya vyuchka] of soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and petty officers. This is an obsolete approach; today the most rigorous criteria must be applied when making assessments. The main criterion in assessing the performance and standard of training of subunits, units, and ship crews is the level of their combat readiness.

Naturally, the problem of the acquisition of military skills is becoming increasingly complex and multifaceted. The main attention here must be paid to the specialists on whom the combat readiness of subunits, units, and ships depends above all. A differentiated approach is also necessary to the professional training of every person in an official position. All this poses with special urgency the problem of the enhanced effectiveness and--let us emphasize--the practical orientation of combat, operational, and special training. Combat training is the main concern in the life and work of the troops and naval forces; it is the main workshop where military skills and combat readiness are forged.

The level of this readiness depends directly on the ideological staunchness of the personnel and their moral and political qualities. V.I. Lenin's conclusion that victory in any war ultimately depends on the morale of the masses which are shedding their blood on the battlefield will never lose its validity. Servicemen's morale is the expression of their world outlook, their ideological conviction, devotion to the cause of party and people, Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism, and the conscious readiness to discharge their military duty to the full. To this must be added such particularly important characteristics as psychological equilibrium, the serviceman's ability to take vigorous action in modern combat, and his endurance, courage, boldness, and selflessness.

The political training of personnel and the entire process of military education are geared to molding these high qualities in servicemen and enhancing their sense of responsibility.

Just like any other matter that is in the process of development, political, military, and moral education and the entire ideological work in the Army and the Navy need further improvement, and the content of this improvement and ways of achieving it are indicated in the documents and decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. Acting in accordance with the demands of the congress means resolutely overcoming the formalism which can still be found in ideological work, strengthening the link between political training and the subunits' life, and eliminating the gap between this training and the increased demands and higher general educational and cultural standards of the personnel. It means focusing the main ideological efforts on areas where the success of training and education is decided, and it means improving individual work.
One of the concrete manifestations of the servicemen's spiritual strength is their standard of organization and conscious discipline. The nature of modern weapons and military hardware, the sharply increased demands on combat readiness, and the acuteness and complexity of the international situation—all this calls for discipline of the highest order. It is important not just to be aware of the need for this level of discipline but also to achieve and firmly establish it. This is by no means always the case in practice. Instead of organizational work, certain officers confine themselves to noting violations of discipline and do very little to prevent them.

Purposeful educational work and the organization of combat and political training and of the life and leisure of the troops and naval forces in strict compliance with the regulations are of prime importance in the efforts to radically improve military discipline. It is a question of organization of the kind that precludes, makes impossible, any disciplinary misdemeanor and any deviation from the norms of military order and our morality.

Strengthening discipline means strengthening one-man command, teaching commanders to exercise the authority with which they are invested and to deeply analyze and persistently improve their disciplinary practice. There is much scope here for the work of Army and Navy political organs and party organizations. At the same time they are called upon to resolutely step up the work of the Komsomol in the struggle for a radical improvement of troop discipline and the maintenance of a sound moral climate in Army and Navy collectives.

The growing demands on combat potential raise the task of the further improvement of the Soviet servicemen's international education. The content of this work is at present determined by the party's programmatic demand for the strengthened combat collaboration of the fraternal socialist countries' armies, by the increased international tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces, and by the very fact of the multinational composition of our military collectives.

Thus every element of the combat potential fulfills its role within the system and at the same time all the elements form an organically united whole.

How is this unity ensured? A number of factors, both general social factors and specific factors, both objective and subjective factors, serve this purpose.

The role and importance of the general social factors is based on the fact that the Armed Forces' combat potential derives from the might of the country as a whole, is a part of the defense (military) might of the state which has deep-rooted origins and represents an intricate, complex organism.
A most important, indeed the main, indicator of the country's defense might is precisely its military potential which is mainly embodied in the Armed Forces' combat potential.

The Soviet state has everything it needs to maintain its defense potential—and its nucleus, the Armed Forces' combat potential—at the appropriate level. This potential of ours will be augmented by the implementation of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, which are revolutionary in spirit. The course set by the congress toward acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development and the aims it has set in economic strategy, scientific and technical progress, social policy, the development of the political system of Soviet society, and the improvement of ideological and educational work and the educational system—all this is leading to the further improvement of socialism and objectively serves also the purpose of ensuring the reliable defense of its gains.

The profound transformations in all the spheres of society's life constitute the general social preconditions for the successful building of the Armed Forces, the enhancement of their combat capability and combat readiness, and the achievement of the solid fusion of all the elements of the combat potential.

The key to the socialist motherland's strengthened defense is the Communist Party's leadership of military building and of the Armed Forces. Our policy in the sphere of the country's defense and security and the Soviet military doctrine are formulated and implemented with the leading role of the party, and the principles of the building of the Armed Forces and the specific ways of improving them are similarly determined. It is the leadership of the CPSU which ensures the maintenance of combat potential at the appropriate level and cements together all its elements. The practical implementation of the aims set by the 27th CPSU Congress, the new edition of the CPSU Program, and the CPSU Central Committee June (1986) Plenum on defense questions serves this purpose.

Consequently, practical work to maintain combat potential at the appropriate level consists of translating into reality the general party line in building and improving the Soviet Armed Forces. And this work is to be carried out by the military cadres and the Army and Navy political organs and party organizations.

One of the indicators of the Armed Forces' combat might is the standard of their organizational structure and the extent to which it matches their tasks and the level of their technical equipment. In turn, the effective functioning of Army and Navy structures depends to a decisive degree on the development of the command systems [sistemy upravleniya] and the qualities of officer cadres. And both the level of combat potential and the achievement of a solid fusion of all its elements depend on the art of troop leadership, the skillful organization of political and combat training, and the establishment and maintenance of order.
An increasing contribution to the implementation of these tasks, to the training and education of the personnel, and their mobilization for the selfless fulfillment of their military duty is to be made—in addition to commanders, political organs, and party organizations—also by Komsomol organizations. Their activity is inseparable from the strengthening of the Armed Forces' combat potential and the enhancement of their combat readiness.

The main indicator of this readiness is the time needed by units, ships, and formations to embark on the actual execution of combat tasks. The logic of the development of military affairs indicates that this time is getting shorter and shorter. We must not forget that an aggressor always tries to launch a surprise attack. This is why the question of high and constant combat readiness is so acute now. As the CPSU Program notes, while the danger exists of aggressive wars and military conflicts unleashed by imperialism, the party will pay unremitting attention to the strengthening of the USSR's combat might, the consolidation of its security, and the readiness of the Armed Forces to rout any aggressor.

The fulfillment of this goal of the party is the aim and purpose of the multifaceted activity of the command and political cadres and the entire personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.
LEADING PERSONNEL OF ARMY, NAVY PROFILED

[Editorial Report] Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian regularly publishes on page 1 articles entitled "Leading Personnel of the Army and Navy" with individualized sub-headings, e.g. "Personal Example" or "Military Innovator" in which promising younger officers are identified. Biographical details are usually sparse in these articles, but the officer's branch and at least one or two details of his career are reported. The following is a collection of summaries of all such articles appearing between 3 December 1985 and 13 May 1986.

BAKAROV, M., is a Lieutenant-Colonel. Presently he is serving as the Shalinskiy district military commissar which is in the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. Before this position he used to be in aviation. He completed the Syzran military aviation school in 1964. Later he served in Zapolyarye, Siberia, and Central Asia. Bakarov is a member of the Communist Party. (13 May 1986, 100-word article by Major S. Pashaev subtitled "Region Military Commissar").

BALETsov, M., is a Colonel. Col. Baletov has served as an officer of the main staff of air defense forces for more than ten years. Before that he was the deputy commander of a battery and served in staffs of units and large strategic units. He studied at the Academy. Recently he was appointed chief of one of the leading departments of the main staff. He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star. (25 March 1986, 200-word article by S. Gryazev subtitled "Officer of the Main Staff").

BYKOV, V., is a major and a tank officer. He has commanded a tank platoon, a reconnaissance company, and is now the Chief of a Reconnaissance regiment in the Northern Group of forces. Major Bykov served in Afghanistan. He was educated at the Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School imeni 50th anniversary of the Great October. He is a member of the Communist party and has been awarded the Order of the Red Star. (1 April 1986, 150-word article by Major V. Smolich subtitled "Chief of Reconnaissance").

CHERMOKHIN, Dmitri Vasilevich, is a Major and deputy commander of a guard's aviation regiment. He was trained at the Borisolebsk higher military aviation school for pilots imeni V.P. Chkalov. On one of his missions he was injured and hospitalized. In the hospital he was aided by Hero of the Soviet Union, S. Anokhin. Chermokhin was awarded the Order of the Red Star from the present commander of the air forces of the GSFG. A. Goryainov. (6 May 1986, 100-word article by Capt. V. Zotenko subtitled "Test of Courage").
CHIZHIKOV, A., is a Lieutenant-Colonel and is presently the commander of a missile battery in the Kiev military district. He was awarded The Citizen's Order "for service to the homeland in the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R." of the third class. (29 April 1986, 100-word article by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Polyakov subtitled "Reference Point-Mastery").

KAPUSTIN, S., is a Guard's Captain and the commander of an airborne battalion. He was awarded both the Order of the Red Star and the Order of the Red Banner. Kapustin also fought in the Kunar province of Afghanistan. There he fought with the commander of a battalion of the Afghan army, the senior captain Darakh. He is a member of the communist party and is on leave. (1 April 1986, 100-word article by Major A. Oliynik subtitled "Order for Battalion Commander").

MOROZOV, Anatolii Petrovich, is a Lieutenant-General and has served for more than ten years as the head of the Sumskiy Higher Artillery Command School imenni M.V. Frunze. He is also a Communist party member. (3 December 1985, 250-word article by Colonel V. Ivanov subtitled "School's Director").

STOLYAROV, Lev Nikolaevich, is a Rear Admiral who has spent much of his career working with atomic submarines. The article states that: "Vladimir Nikolaevich Chernavin, the current Commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral of the fleet, and at one time Commander of the Northern fleet, discussing the crew of the nuclear sub, which he commanded at one time, recalled his former assistant Lev Nikolaevich Stolyarov thus: as a 'Naximovite leader'." In 1966, as a Captain 2nd rank, Stolyarov commanded a fleet of atomic submarines and made an historic underwater voyage at the age of 36. For his achievements he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. He completed his training at the Naval academy. After graduating he unexpectedly was sent to be the director of the Nakhimov Naval school. (15 April 1986, 300-word article by Captain of the 2nd rank S. Bystrov subtitled "Nakhimov Director").

ZHAMPISOV, K., is a Captain 3rd rank. He is stationed in the Mediterranean Sea on the missile cruiser "Grozny". He is a member of the Communist party. (10 December 1985, 200-word article by Captain-lieutenant V. Ankov subtitled "On Mediterranean Headings").

CSO: 1801/204
By the voice over the air, Lt Col N. Dudarevich could tell that Lt I. Chervyakov asking for takeoff clearance was nervous. His nervousness was understandable: this flight was an evaluation of the officer's combat training results during the winter training period.

The mission was not one of the simple ones. The lieutenant was to penetrate strong "enemy" air defenses, detect a missile complex on terrain difficult for visual orientation, and photograph it at low altitude.

Lieutenant Colonel N. Berezhnoy, Maj A. Manko, Maj M. Levitskiy, Maj V. Zakharov, and other experienced pilots had already carried out complex missions successfully before Chervyakov. The fact that the aces were the first to take off was a distinctive psychological technique: their success was supposed to inspire the young pilots.

The lieutenant detected the objective and photographed it. However, the onboard objective control equipment recorded without bias that he had sluggishly carried out the maneuvers to overcome the "enemy" air defenses. That means that in real combat he also could not have penetrated to the target. In addition, the target was detected at the last moment and to the side of the flight course. For quality photography of it, Chervyakov had to make an additional pass.

Although the lieutenant demonstrated good flying technique, the rating was lowered for these "rough points". Some of the other young pilots also received less than maximum points for shortcomings in carrying out aerial reconnaissance and elements of combat maneuvering. As an analysis shows, the "flaws" in the young flyers are not incidental.

In the last training year this aviation regiment won the title of outstanding.

In the unit (chast) they figured that the amassed experience in combat training would help to put the military aviation school graduates into action
quickly. A training plan was compiled for each lieutenant, taking into account individual peculiarities. Instructor pilots possessing good methodological skills and sound knowledge were selected. Neither stepped up training nor excessive overcautiousness were permitted in the regiment. Of course, they also made use of the experience of combat masters who hit all targets on the first run and with the first bomb or missile.

But, as we know, the growth in professional skills is directly dependent on the quality of the training process. The process, in turn, cannot be effective without a modern training materials base. Specially equipped classrooms and the appropriate training aids—electrified stands and operational mockups—are needed in order to bring clearly to the novices the peculiarities of combat maneuvering, negotiating deeply echeloned "enemy" air defenses, carrying out new complex tactical techniques, and so forth. They are just what the regiment lacks.

True, today the aviators have re-equipped the classroom for aerodynamics and operation of aviation equipment. But the aerial reconnaissance classroom and other training facilities clearly do not correspond to the requirements.

It would seem that the aviators have an excuse: They have pledged to re-equip the training base by the end of the year. By that time they will have done so. But you see, as the evaluation showed, the classrooms are needed now in order for the young pilots to get rid of the identified shortcomings in combat training as soon as possible. This means that maximum efforts need to be concentrated on solving this problem.

The fact that the regiment has no simulator complex has also adversely affected the quality of training young aviators for carrying out combat application exercises. They promised to begin building it at the beginning of the year. But...the promise remains a promise, and the construction has been delayed for an unspecified period. While training in the aircraft cockpit may be quite useful, it will not take the place of a "flight" in the simulator, where one can practice the most complicated elements of carrying out certain combat exercises.

In short, the aviators of the regiment have to work very seriously in order to get rid of the young pilots' deficiencies in combat training as quickly as possible. Only with such an approach will it be possible to achieve the high goals outlined for the year.

At the request of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Maj Gen Avn A. Ruden, military pilot first-class and chief of staff of district air forces, comments on the results of the control exercises.

The evaluation of the winter training period shows that the units and subunits of district air forces have fulfilled their commitment as a whole. This also pertains to the aviation regiment commanded by military pilot first-class Lt Col N. Dudarevich.
At the same time, I must state that in this military collective, and in certain other aviation units as well, training of young pilots could be on a higher level. One of the main reasons for such a situation is insufficient work on improving the training materials base. You see, the quality of the training process, including training skilled pilots, largely depends on the clearness in instruction and the possibility of fully preparing on the ground for what must be performed in the air.

This question was examined at a meeting of the methods council of the district air forces, and recommendations were adopted for eliminating the shortcomings in working with pilot school graduates. It has been decided to complete the re-equipping of training classrooms in the units in the near future. Simulators will be used more widely in the process of preliminary preparation for flights and in working on eliminating the identified shortcomings in piloting techniques and combat application.

There are plans to review individual plans for putting young pilots into action. Already today, as they say, without putting this off, we have begun implementing the plans. This work is being monitored by the staff and political department of the air forces, and inspector pilots and other officials of the district air forces directorate are giving effective assistance in units. It appears that such an approach to the matter will help by the end of the year to fulfill commitments in competition under the motto "We will carry out the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and reliably defend the achievements of socialism!"
There is one very important aspect in combat training of aviators which, unfortunately, certain commanders, political workers, and engineers do not think about as often as the times urgently require. I have in mind the economic aspect of our primary department—the combat training department.

The cost of each hour of operation in the air of a combat aircraft, military transport, or helicopter has been determined on the average. Note, I said on the average. That means costs can be more or less, and material resources can be consumed at a great benefit for combat training or not efficiently enough. This depends entirely on the people planning and carrying out the flights, their professionalism, organization, discipline, and conscientiousness. In short, it depends on the human factor. It is precisely the intensification of this factor that makes it possible to achieve considerable savings, a decrease in unjustified expenditures, and an increase in the return from each ruble invested in combat training.

Perhaps, today it is hard to find a commander who in words does not recognize the need for efficient consumption of each liter of fuel, each training minute, and a thrifty attitude toward modern expensive aviation systems in the course of training aviators. But in fact, one sometimes encounters officials who permit thriftlessness and wastefulness, sometimes flagrant. They are even sincerely astonished when this is pointed out to them. This is explained by the following: Many aviators simply have still not gotten accustomed to and are not psychologically ready from an economic standpoint to analyze their work and critically examine each case of a "dry" sortie or damage to aviation equipment due to irresponsibility and lack of discipline of specific individuals.

I will cite an example. During a landing approach, pilot first-class Maj V. Imanov made incorrect calculations and overshot the landing at an increased speed. Incompetent use of the brake parachute resulted in it breaking loose. As a result, due to pilot error, the aircraft overran the concrete runway. The supervisor of flying was Lt Col A. Trichev. He saw everything that
happened and, according to flying rules, was supposed to raise the emergency braking device in order to stop the aircraft. However, this was not done. The result was a flagrant flying safety incident. At the flight debrief, of course, they talked about the incorrect actions of the pilot and the supervisor of flying, their incomplete training, poor preparation for the flight, and carelessness. But no one mentioned even a word about how much the repair of the equipment could cost the state. This fact was also not brought up at party and Komsomol meetings in the regiment dedicated to questions of economy and thrift, but turned the conversation only to the liters of fuel saved on the ground and the kilograms of metal scrap gathered.

Incidentally, such an approach is typical not only for this regiment. Many officers' struggle for economy up to now has been associated only with the mechanics and technicians not spilling a single drop of fuel when refueling aircraft and painstakingly draining off fuel sediment. Of course, one must be concerned about this. But it is inadmissible to limit oneself to this alone. The main source of saving considerable material resources is improving the organization of the entire training process.

One must start with a creative approach to planning combat training, since a well thought-out and comprehensively weighed plan for the year, month, or flying shift which carries an organizing beginning provides an opportunity for considerable savings. But making up a good plan is only half the job. Plans and good intentions should be converted more energetically into concrete deeds. Only when combat training work in a regiment is organized in strict accordance with the plan will there not be an excessive consumption of material resources. When interruptions begin or the plan is arbitrarily adjusted, there will inevitably be a need for additional expenditures for working out some elements of combat training.

By way of illustration, in certain Air Force units of the Carpathian Military District they allow unjustified breaks in flying to work on complex types of combat training. Due to this, pilots lose their skills, which requires additional training and check flights to restore them. This, in fact, also requires additional consumption of fuel, the service life of the engines, and training time.

A disparity between planning flying shifts and the monthly schedules disrupts the system in combat training and also leads to unjustified expenditures. Although the plan for the overall flying schedule--this distinctive "volume"--is carried out, the actual combat readiness of individual pilots, and that means the entire unit, suffers. Consequently, resources are not used up efficiently enough. In those areas where interruptions in flights are unavoidable due to bad weather conditions, creatively thinking commanders utilize the capabilities of simulators to the maximum. They enable pilots to maintain their skills and thereby reduce the number of flights needed to restore them.

Planning each flying shift requires great attention. It is precisely here that the greatest reserves for saving material resources are hidden. Both the even flow of flights and the effectiveness of each sortie, and as a result their thrift, depend on carefully regulated timetable.
However, when compiling timetables, certain commanders try to adhere to patterns and habitual plans and are overcautious. They explain this by their concern for flight safety. But these explanations often are beneath any criticism. They more often are a front for a fear of new approaches to training aviators.

To strive for safety does mean to waste engine service life thoughtlessly. Yes, pilots master the combat equipment or improve their skills according to strictly individual programs, and no one is permitted to violate the established methods. I emphasize no one! But with a creative approach a commander, demonstrating concern for flight safety, would not permit an experienced pilot from one flight to the next according to the timetable to repeat the same elements which he had practiced and mastered long ago. He must continually grow as an airborne fighter, that is, each sortie must give him something new. Being concerned about intensifying combat training (and intensification is directly linked to saving resources), a searching commander always will always think out the flight plan of each subordinate and, taking into account the level of his training, see to it that various combat training exercises are put together in one sortie within the limits of the prescribed program.

Such an approach toward planning and organizing combat training distinguishes, for example, officer supervisors of the aviation unit [soyedineniya] where officer V. Kushneruk serves. Here an aircraft does not take off with a full load of fuel just for practicing one exercise so as not to burn off fuel in the landing pattern. The mission for such a sortie includes, depending on the situation, the flight over the route, flying in the zone or aerial combat, a maneuver to overcome enemy air defense weapons, and so forth. The climb and sequence, naturally, are determined taking into account the training level of the pilots and, needless to say, without the slightest deviation from the requirements of documents governing accident-free flying.

Before the start of a flying shift all aircraft are fully refueled, as readiness for a sudden launch requires. Therefore, in this unit the exercises for the first sortie are planned taking into account the actual fuel reserve. If required, specialists pump out fuel from the tanks so that it is not needlessly burned. Together with the commanders, their deputies for aviation engineering service and the aircraft technicians see to this. The mastery of the supervisors of flying here ensures that the aircraft are on the ground a minimum amount of time with the engines running and land in a timely manner without excessive maneuvering in the area of the airfield awaiting their turn.

As a result of precise planning and good organization of combat training, the large unit (soyedineniya) is concluding the winter training period with high marks for all basic directions: the combat readiness of units has increased; the mastery of pilots has increased; and there are no flying safety hazards caused by personnel.

In talking about thrift, one cannot pass over the following in silence. Sometimes it happens that the opportunities opened up by the most precise plan and organization of the flying shift come to nothing if a pilot does not carry
out a mission due to poor personal preparation for it. Repeat sorties on the same exercise must be scheduled, which requires additional expenditures of material resources. Strict supervision of subordinates' preparation for airborne work by commanders of flights and detachments helps prevent such instances.

When evaluating a flight, it seems to me that the time has come to take into account its economic efficiency. One would think that it is hardly possible to give a high mark if the pilot generally handled the mission, but turned on the afterburner for no reason, did not select the most rational flight profile, or was in the air longer than required for carrying out the mission. An engineer-navigator calculation helps to avoid such losses. But facts indicate that fighter and fighter-bomber pilots frequently ignore it.

Thrift is not just efficient fuel consumption. He is a poor commander who does not concern himself with extending the service life of aviation equipment. You see, the results of flying for the sake of the notorious "volume" are using the service life of combat equipment, the need for additional periodic technical servicing, and the replacement of assemblies and components. It seems to me that in summing up the results of socialist competition in units it is advisable to name not only those who were thrifty and zealous, but also those who were the cause of excessive consumption of material resources.

In short, one can state without exaggeration that the struggle for economy and thrift today affects all aviators. The professional skills, discipline, and creativity of every pilot, engineer, technician, mechanic, and specialist of supporting subunits and services are economic categories. Taking this into account, commanders and party and Komsomol organizations must structure their activities and guide communists, Komsomol members, and all personnel of the Air Forces to reorganize their work in a new manner.

12567
CSO: 1801/181
TWO GENERALS RELIEVED FROM PACIFIC FLEET AVIATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Behind the Bureaucratic Fence"]

[Text] The letter from Capt 1st Rank Yu. Timoshchuk published on 23 January under this title discussed abuse of official position by Maj A. Ivanov, chief of a firing range, and the lack of supervision of his activities on the part of a number of officials of Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Forces (PACOFAF).

As Col A. Shcherbo, military council member and chief of the Political Department of PACOFAF, informed the editorial staff, the facts outlined in the letter indeed took place. Maj A. Ivanov has been removed from his position and transferred to the reserve. He has been expelled from the CPSU. Maj Gen Avn V. Makartsev has been suspended from his position and recommended for transfer to the reserve. By decision of the party commission of the PACOFAF Political Department, he was given a severe reprimand without being entered on his registration card. For dereliction of official duties, connivance, and absence of control, Maj Gen Avn P. Zhigalovskiy has been submitted for transfer to the reserve and Maj Gen Avn G. Kornev has been reassigned to a lesser position. Chief of the PACOFAF Rear Services Motor Transport Service, Lt Col A. Aksenov, has been submitted for transfer to the reserve. Chief of the PACOFAF finance service, Col I. Sagayduk, has been transferred to the reserve. Chief of the unit finance service, Capt K. Morokhov, has received non-judicial punishment. The deputy commander for political affairs, Capt A. Nikitin, has been given a severe reprimand with an entry on his registration card.

The perpetrators have made reimbursements for damages amounting to 5,653 rubles.

The correspondence has been discussed in the political department, rear services, and navigational service of the fleet aviation and in units and subunits. Steps have been taken to step up control and offer assistance to subunits separated from the units.

In the response signed by the acting staff judge advocate of the Far East Military District, Lt Col Justice G. Nosov, we are informed that criminal proceedings have been instituted against A. Ivanov.
Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian on 1 April 1986 carries on page 3 a 600-word unattributed report of a republic conference to discuss how well or how poorly the young men of Georgia have performed "their patriotic and internationalist duty" in the armed forces and in the higher military schools of the USSR. The materials discussed were based on data from the 1985 call-up. The main report was delivered by republic commissar Major General Sharashenidze. Health Minister Lezhava and Education Minister Vasadze, First Deputy Transcaucasian Military District Commander Kleymenov, and other important officials also took part.

Though few details are given, the overall assessment was favorable. The republic now has at least two representatives in nearly all higher military schools of the USSR, and certain highland districts have sent applicants for the first time in more than two decades. Thanks to excellent propaganda efforts in Tbilisi, large numbers of secondary school students are applying.

Nevertheless, too many young men from Georgia have been failing the entrance exams or have washed out owing to poor grades. Local military commissars must take a large share of the blame; to improve the situation it is necessary to provide better coordination of their efforts with those of the Komsomol, the schools, DOSAAF, and so on. Brief reference is made to the fact that many local commissars are "failing to comply with implementation discipline [ispolnitel'skaya distsiplina]" in regard to periodic call-ups.

In a Gruzinform interview in ZARYA VOSTOKA on 15 April, page 3, GSSR Military Commissioner Maj Gen Sharashenidze elaborates on these same themes and names several cities and rayons where draftee preparation and training are inadequate, along with other shortcomings. He also refers briefly to changes in the call-up procedure: One, eligible men who are enrolled in VUZes are to be called up only in the spring, after the semester ends. Two, the selection of candidates for "service abroad" is now in the hands of the republic commission, the city and rayon-level commissions being "relieved" of this duty.

/9317
CSO: 1813/410
OBITUARY: MAJ GEN LOBANOV—The command authorities and political department of the Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskii, friends, and comrades with deep sorrow inform us of the death of Maj Gen Boris Ivanovich Lobanov, chief of the engineering department and CPSU member since 1952, and express their condolences to the relatives and friends of the deceased. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 86 p 4] 12567

COMPUTERIZED TRAINER AT MALINOVSKIY ACADEMY—The training materials base of the Military Academy of Armored Troops imeni MSU R.Ya. Malinovskiy has been expanded with a new item. An experimental tactical trainer based on small and microcomputers has become operational in the tactics department. The trainer operates in the interactive mode ("man-machine"). Its purpose is to improve students' skills in command and control of subunits in the dynamics of battle. The trainer's software makes it possible to evaluate the decisions made by students in the course of tactical exercises, taking into account the operational configuration of their troops and those of the enemy, the effect of the terrain, and other operational and tactical factors, to make adjustments, and to analyze and compare various decisions. The evaluation is given with a detailed explanation of the mistakes made and factors not taken into account. The trainer was developed by instructors of the tactics department under the supervision of Professor Col N. Shishkin, doctor of military sciences Professor, and Col R. Balabolkin, candidate of technical sciences. [By Col A. Kozlov] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 86 p 2] 12567

CSO: 1801/181
[Excerpts] Our country has reached a sharp turning point. The great and complex tasks set by the 27th CPSU Congress require of Soviet people the maximum self-discipline, political and practical activeness, and efficient, good-quality work. We have to make more rapid progress, attain new goals, and reach new heights in every sphere of social life. This idea runs through the documents and decisions of the 16 June CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, that has just completed its work.

The foreign policy situation is still complex and there are as yet no grounds for speaking of a lessening of tension. This conclusion was drawn by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev when summing up at the plenum the results of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Budapest meeting. The plenum highly appraised these results and fully approved the Soviet delegation's activity at the Political Consultative Committee meeting.

The resolution taken on this issue notes that at the base of the present international tension lies the dangerous foreign policy course and imperial ambitions of the United States, which does not wish to consider the peoples' will and act in the spirit of the Geneva accords. In this complex situation the Soviet Union, like the other fraternal countries, will not allow itself to be drawn onto the path of deepening confrontation. It will continue to persistently implement its initiatives, which respond to the secret hopes of our people and all peoples of the world. But the USSR will never tolerate U.S. nuclear superiority. Its Leninist foreign policy course and defense might rely on the secure base of our strategy to accelerate socioeconomic development, elaborated by the party and given detailed reflection in the 12th 5-year Plan.

Together with all the people, Soviet soldiers unanimously approve and fully support the party's historic plans and also the documents and decisions of the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum and the Fifth USSR
Supreme Soviet Session. They state their determination to continue to do everything to increase the Armed Forces' combat readiness and to vigilantly guard the motherland, socialism, and peace.

The time is crucial and the tasks facing Soviet society are great. That we act with initiative, persistency, energy, and a great sense of responsibility is what life today demands of each and every one of us.

/9604
CSO: 1801/209
FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

FRENCH MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 86 p 2

[Editorial: "With a Nuclear Charge"]

[Text] According to information from the journal ZOLDAT UND TEKNIK, testing of the ASMP medium range air-to-surface missile begun 3 years ago is nearing completion in France. They plan to put it in service this year.

The missile has a launch weight of about 900 kg, a wingspan of 0.96 meters, and a flight speed of up to Mach 3. The flight range during the tests was 100-145 km. The ASMP is equipped with a combination rocket-ramjet engine and an independent inertial guidance system. The missile's nuclear warhead has a yield of 100-150 kilotons.

The journal reported that the platform for the ASMP missile in France's strategic nuclear forces will be the Mirage-IVP. In essence this is a Mirage-IV medium strategic bomber equipped with a new radar, a ventral pylon, navigation equipment, and a panel for inflight targeting of the missile guidance system. Already this year the French Air Force plans to form two squadrons of nine Mirage-IVP each in the 91st Bomber Wing.

In naval aviation forces it is assumed that 50 of the 60 existing Super Etendard carrier aircraft will be refitted as ASMP platforms. There are also plans to equip tactical aviation with these missiles beginning in 1988 (the new Mirage-2000 N aircraft).

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CSO: 1801/181 END