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SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
"AN EMERGING STRATEGY"

BY

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Smaller-scale Contingency Operations

"An Emerging Strategy"

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ABSTRACT

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Balancing available means to carry out our National Security Strategy (NSS) of Shape, Respond, and Prepare is no easy task. The resource versus strategy driven Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) helped identify this resource shortfall to our strategic leaders. It also helped them realize that new approaches are required to deal with the realities of asymmetrical small-scale contingencies (SSC), while preparing for two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTW) and modernizing the force to achieve technological superiority over a future peer competitor. New ideas for RC utilization, contractor support, burden sharing, force mix, and resourcing are emerging on a daily basis within the "beltway" to redefine a military strategy that more efficiently balances resources with strategic interests. This paper is offered as a basis of study for all strategic thinkers responsible for meeting these future challenges by offering points for future consideration and analysis.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper acknowledges the efforts of our military leaders and personnel who have successfully met the challenges of small-scale contingency (SSC) operations. It also recognizes the efforts of our senior leadership that continue to identify, analyze, and prepare our military institutions to meet these challenges. To our political leaders who have prudently invested in programs to face emerging threats and their ongoing efforts to refine our national security strategy (NSS) to an end state which will allow our military to overcome SSC challenges of the 21st Century.
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INTRODUCTION

The Book of Revelation, verses 7:8 describes future events that offer a striking resemblance to the nature of current day smaller-scale contingency operations.

When the lamb opened the third seal, I heard the third living creature say "Come!" I looked, and there before me was a pale horse! Its rider was named Death, and Hell was following close behind him. They were given power over a fourth of the earth to kill by sword, famine and plague, and by the wild beasts of the earth.¹

In the book, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, Andrew S. Natsios speaks of his frightening glimpses of the four horsemen of the apocalypse's destructive work over the past seven years working in humanitarian relief operations. Natsios addresses the ethnic cleansing campaigns in Bosnia, the savage genocide in Rwanda, the remnants of the Cambodian killing fields, and the terrible famine that swept Somalia in 1992.²

The National Security Strategy (NSS) for a New Century calls on the U.S military to conduct smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations to vindicate national interests. These operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, no-fly zones, reinforcing key allies, limited strikes, and interventions.³ The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) May 1997 describes SSCs the same as the NSS, but refers to them as joint military operations beyond peacetime engagement activities short of major theater warfare. The QDR definition
also expounds on the NSS definition to include show-of-force operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace enforcement, maritime sanctions enforcement, and counter-terrorism operations.\textsuperscript{4}

The newly repackaged term, small-scale contingency (SSC) as defined in the QDR, is nothing more than another name for what the Army and other services have been doing since the end of World War II. Between 1950-1989, the Army deployed ten times, to include limited war in Korean and Vietnam to civil unrest and riots in Detroit, Chicago, and Watts. From 1990 to the present, the Army deployed over twenty-five times to provide assistance for U.S. citizens for disasters such as Hurricane Andrew, the Midwest floods, and fire fighting in Florida and Yellowstone National Park. Internationally, the military provided humanitarian assistance to Somalia, Haiti, the Kurds during Provide Comfort and Rwanda. They also conducted peacekeeping in Bosnia, the Sinai, and between Ecuador and Peru, and disaster relief for the Hondurans after Hurricane Mitch. Without a doubt, the most troublesome threat to our National Security is our battle against rogue regimes and transnational terrorists that possess the will and potential means to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Our military continues to check the Iraqi Regime through the United Nations and with military operations like Desert Fox. These types of operations only confirm the QDR's claim that, based on our recent experiences and
intelligence projections, the demand for SSC operations is expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years.\textsuperscript{5} With PACETEMPO 300\% higher since 1990, our strategic leaders will expect to do more with less while continuing to develop innovative means to balance near-term challenges with focused investments to counter long-term threats.\textsuperscript{6} Current innovative trends to balance near-term threats include: increased use of the Reserve Component (RC), widening the range of unit capabilities, use of contractors, and improved mission focused and routine training.

**SSC OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS**

If SSC operations are not conducted on behalf of self-evident strategic interests, they are politically difficult to sustain. For example, would the U.S. be involved in the Middle East if oil were not an issue? In addition, unexpected casualties exacerbate the situation by rendering such operations vulnerable to early termination. The humiliating departure of American forces from Lebanon and Somalia illustrate this reality. To complicate the strategic environment even further, we now face the inevitable transnational, domestic, and state unconventional acts of violence from despots who are prepared to wage a protracted struggle. Iran, and nations like it, are willing to absorb what the United States would consider a disproportionate amount of punishment to achieve their goals. "Street Fighter" States such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Somalia
exploit American social weaknesses, such as impatience and aversion to casualties, while at the same time denying U.S. firepower decisive targets or at least easily identifiable ones. For our national leaders, deciding which SSC to engage in that will protect our strategic interests will continue to be a challenge into the 21st Century.

**IMPACT OF SSC OPERATIONS ON CURRENT STRATEGY**

In both the 1997 National Security Strategy and the QDR Report, the President and the Secretary of Defense introduced an integrated strategic approach embodied by the terms Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now. The 1997 National Military Strategy is based on these concepts. It builds on the premise that the United States will remain globally engaged to Shape the international environment and create conditions favorable to U.S. interests and global security. It further states that as we pursue shaping and responding activities, we must also take steps to prepare now for an uncertain future.

Today, executing our National Security Strategy and remaining globally engaged has not been without significant costs. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army's end strength has shrunk nearly 39% from eighteen combat divisions to ten combat divisions with corresponding decreases in Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) Units. The military budget has also decreased correspondingly with end strength reductions while PACETEMPO increased 300% primarily for unprogrammed SSC
operations. For example, at the beginning of 1995, the United States had almost 23,000 troops deployed worldwide performing unprogrammed operations. This increase in PACETEMPO motivated Congressional and other critics to rightly point out disparities between stated requirements for waging two nearly-simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTWs) and the existing and planned forces that would actually be available. Widely known shortfalls in airlift, sealift, and long-range aerial bombardment only exacerbate the funding, training, and readiness shortfall of personnel and units due to increased worldwide deployments. Critics failed to point out in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review the impact of Haiti- and Bosnia-like operations on our capacity to fight another Korean and Persian Gulf war at the same time. The 1997 QDR Report recognized a defense strategy that requires our forces to be able to respond across the full spectrum of crises— including deterring aggression and coercion in crises, conducting SSC operations, and fighting and winning MTWs.\textsuperscript{9} However, even though this requirement for a flexible force was identified, the QDR is still criticized for being solely resource driven. During the inception of the QDR study, the Clinton administration imposed an assumption that defeated its purpose. It declared that the American people would not support a defense budget of more that $250 billion. The result was not a plan for meeting America's security needs but a way to cut forces to stay under an arbitrary budget ceiling.\textsuperscript{10}
Closely linked to Joint Vision 2010 policy of engagement is the President's National Security Strategy to Respond. Extremely ambitious, the strategy calls for a flexible military with the capacity to conduct SSC operations and MTW in two different theaters from a continuous posture of global engagement. The strategy also seeks to prepare the nation against the asymmetrical threat of terrorism, WMD use, or sabotage. In order to Shape, Respond, and Prepare as required by the National Security Strategy, the military needs to be able to conduct joint military operations across the entire operational spectrum. Although consistent with the NSS and QDR, Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) defines Full Spectrum Dominance to include jointness, but it fails to adequately address the appropriate funding and force mix required to meet these challenges.

Army Vision 2010 (AV 2010) takes JV 2010 one step further by providing the directional azimuth necessary to size, organize, and equip of the Army to support our National Security and Military Strategies. It also develops the doctrine for land force operations in support of JV 2010 and requires leader development and training programs to be continually refined to keep the Army prepared to execute these full-spectrum operations as the force of decision. What our leadership does not satisfactorily address is a strategy that permits our military leaders to balance the available means with the structure and capabilities required to respond to full-spectrum operations
while modernizing to defeat a future peer competitor in the 21st Century.

**STRATEGY VERSUS RESOURCES**

In spite of an expansive strategy, the President's FY99 defense budget continues a 14-year real decline in defense spending. The Administration's defense budget request of 270.6 billion in budget authority is a 1.1 percent real decline from current defense spending levels. Today, the unofficial motto of the U.S. military is "doing more with less" for good reason: missions increase as forces and resources decline.\(^3\) Even though the NSS is reasonable, the gap between strategic requirements of the post-Cold War world and the levels of resources continue to widen. Measured by any of the QDR's benchmarks of Shaping, Preparing or Responding, the current defense program is insufficiently resourced.\(^4\) The strains of SSC operations, which are an integral part of the Shaping portion of our strategy, continue to degrade the Army's ability to modernize in preparation for the potential of a future peer competitor. Also, military capabilities essential to this Shaping effort underestimate the magnitude of the task. As recent trends indicate, the constant employment of military power strains today's smaller military forces.\(^5\) For example, during a press conference highlighting battle damage assessment (BDA) in Operation Desert Fox, William Cohen and General Shelton indicated that the B-2 Bomber was not employed due to readiness concerns of
the weapon system. Continual deployments to and from the Gulf have strained the B-2s airframe, which have impacted on its ability to respond as a strategic asset in the event of a MTW.

While the QDR's requirement to "shape the international environment" is essential to the protection of American security interests, the subject of resources is far from understood.16 Achieving the QDR's goal of "promoting regional stability" requires continued global military presence as in Bosnia and Kuwait. As we move into the 21st Century, "doing more with less" will continue to be the norm while increasing forward presence continues to be the trend. From developing a homeland defense; projecting power to Europe, the Pacific Rim, the Gulf, and the expanding regions responsible for world energy supplies; to combating a wide variety of transnational threats, demands on available means continue to challenge our leadership. In spite of the growing nature of the threat, the U.S. military continues to be the force of choice to meet these challenges. However, with the nature of asymmetrical and transnational threats and their potential impact on our allies and overall world stability, increased burden sharing with our allies and potential coalition partners to balance resource requirements to meet these future threats is vital for mission success.
SSC OPERATIONS AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS

The FY99 defense budget for modernization is already identified as falling $11 billion short of the Joint Chiefs of Staff $60 billion per year target in procurement funding. It is the fourth year in a row this target has not been attained. Whether modernizing today's military or preparing tomorrow's force, the current level of investment is inadequate. Sustaining the technological edge of our forces, without a doubt gives us an unsurpassed edge wherever they operate to secure our national security interests.

Participation in smaller-scale contingency operations carries with it significant strategic and budgetary opportunity costs as well as domestic political risks. In February 1995, the Defense Department requested a $2 billion supplemental appropriation to cover the $124 million in costs incurred the previous year in Haiti and for what it estimated it would spend in Haiti and other humanitarian and peace operations for the remainder of fiscal 1995. Similar supplemental appropriations were made for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. For the first time in history, Congress gave the Army $1.5 Billion in the beginning of 1999 to fund future Bosnia operations. This will reduce funding migration in Operations and Maintenance Accounts (OMA) for that mission, but this type of up front funding for contingency operations is not expected in the out years. The
Department of Defense (DoD) fully expects that such operations will continue to be financed out of service OMA accounts in the future.

**PREPARING THE FORCE FOR THE FUTURE**

Predicting what the future threats to U.S. national security interests will be in the 21st Century is like predicting when and where the next earthquake will occur. Strategists can reasonably assume that our traditional adversaries like Iran or Iraq could acquire more accurate ballistic missiles, WMD, or advanced conventional weapons that could threaten regional stability. They can also assume that a retrenched Russia or ascendant China will provide them the technology. What we can't predict, without an entrenched human intelligence capability, is what means terrorists groups, transnational threats, drug traffickers, or ethnic nationalists possess, their will to employ them, and where and when they will be employed against the U.S. and its allies. What we do know is they will be employed by asymmetrical methods. Based on these facts and assumptions, it is prudent to conclude that wherever these threats originate, failure to resource our forces to respond and prepare for these threats through well executed SSC operations will only encourage America's enemies.

**SHAPING THE FUTURE FORCE**

Across the services, changes in force structure and personnel end strength will be made to reflect improvements in operational concepts and organizational arrangements and to protect the full
spectrum of combat capability to the maximum extent possible. In this manner, we seek to attain the long-term benefits of an increased modernization program while minimizing the near term risk of reducing combat forces.\textsuperscript{20}

Recently, the Joint Staff proposed that the Army take down one combat armored division and convert the structure to combat support in order to take the strain off of high demand support units deployed on a continual basis for SSC operations in Bosnia and elsewhere around the globe.\textsuperscript{21} At face value, this proposal appears to be a quick fix to address the resource rather than strategy driven QDR study shortfalls. With the realities of increased PACETEMPO to meet the requirements of our full-spectrum dominance strategy, the Joint Staff is attempting to balance SSC operational requirements and fund modernization accounts by reducing the Army's ability to fight two nearly simultaneous MTWs. Whether or not the Army will make sweeping force structure changes to their combat divisions or Congress will fund future modernization efforts through funding supplementals remains to be seen. Whatever path we take, the Army is prepared to restructure parts of its force to meet future challenges of SSC operations. Any restructuring efforts made by the Army will reflect increased efficiencies in support of activities and in anticipation of further organizational change, including the redesign and downsizing of its heavy divisions as it integrates the results of ongoing warfighting experiments.\textsuperscript{22}
MISSION TASK ORGANIZED FORCES (MTOFS)

One way the Army is attempting to meet mission requirements while preventing resource migration, for SSC operations is the development of Mission Task Organized Forces (MTOFs). MTOFs are tailored force packages designed by the CINC and the services to meet MTW and SSC operations most likely to occur within their Area of Operations (AOR). This initiative was designed based on historical and future probabilities of a given crisis to occur. Bosnia and Haiti are perfect examples where MTOFs can be developed. Having provided numerous rotations to Bosnia for peacekeeping provides the Army a historical basis for determining the correct force mix and capabilities required to carry out the operation. Total Army Analysis 2007 (TAA07) is currently in the process of developing over twenty MTOFs to support future regional MTWs and SSC operations. Examples of MTOFs being developed for a CINC may include SSC operations to include: Humanitarian Assistance in PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and EUCOM; MTWs in PACOM and CENTCOM; Baseline Engagement Force (BEF) in EUCOM; and Peacekeeping in the Balkans and Haiti, etc.

Table 1 (Sample USAR MTOF for Bosnia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) COMPO</th>
<th>(2) SRC</th>
<th>(3) ANAME</th>
<th>(4) NO. UNITS</th>
<th>(5) NO. PAX</th>
<th>(6) UIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 20017L000</td>
<td>50th MH Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>WQ90AA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 20017L000</td>
<td>51st MH Det</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>WQWQAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 45500LA00</td>
<td>MPAD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>WSQMMA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 55580LF00</td>
<td>50th MCT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>WV4BAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 55580LF00</td>
<td>50th MCT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>WQ6ZAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table is an example of the USAR portion of an MTOF for Bosnia. The actual MTOF will include units from the Active Component and both Reserve Components. Column 1 indicates the Army Component or the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). Column 2 indicates the Source Resource Code (SRC) or unit type. Column 3 indicates the unit designation. Column 4 indicates the number of units required per rotation. Column 5 represents the number of personnel per unit. Column 6 indicates the Unit Identification Code (UIC). There are several benefits for creating MTOFs. First, the services can budget for each tailored MTOF in their Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and will prevent the likelihood of OMA migration in event the SSC occurs. Second, units assigned to the MTOF will be able to train together in training exercises that focus on the tasks most likely required for the SSC.

BETTERING THE BALANCE

In light of the increase in SSC missions, force structure reductions have left the Army thin in critical capabilities primarily found in the Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) career fields. In addition, readiness effects on Army units participating in SSCs are widely misunderstood. SSCs, particularly extended humanitarian and peace operations, erode the Army's capability to fight two MTWs. To reduce this erosion, the Army can employ several relatively simple options to expand its capability to carry out these operations.23 The following four
options describe methods for enhancing the Army's capability to carry out SSCs while preserving its warfighting capability.

1. Use of Contractors. Skills such as construction, transportation, and road building can easily be provided through the private sector by contract support. These types of contract support have already been utilized in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti and preserve the Army's capabilities for their wartime requirements. However, contractors work within a limited prescribed scope and may not always be responsive or as flexible as military units that perform the same function. Also, contractors are not without cost and their expense can cut into the Army's operating and acquisition accounts.24

2. Army reliance on the Reserve Component (RC) to restore its warfighting capability. The RC is the primary resource for capabilities such as civil affairs, public affairs, firefighting, echelons above corps CSS, and rail units, etc. Use of RC units for SSCs works best when planning horizons are long, such as for Bosnia. On the other hand, RC units use can be burdensome during SSCs of short duration where a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up (PSRC) is not required. In this case, however, RC individuals with unique capabilities can be employed through volunteerism. Finally, the RC is more efficiently utilized for restoring the Army's warfighting capabilities for a MTW.25
3. Redesign existing organizations to widen their range of capabilities. Building greater flexibility into the force through modularity can enhance force-tailoring requirements for SSCs. For example, spreading out capabilities of a battalion into separate companies can reduce piecemealing of the parent organization and create several fully function cohesive units without degrading overall unit capabilities. Having integrated support at the company level will enable the Army to tailor its forces to the scale of the mission.  

4. Improve routine training and provide focused training prior to deploying to SSCs. Many skills required for SSCs overlap those needed during major conflicts. For both, discipline and combat effectiveness are essential and can be acquired during normal wartime preparation. In contrast, SSCs can require skills such as negotiation, use of nonlethal weapons, and cultural awareness. Typically, soldiers and units receive this type of training once they are identified to deploy. For future operations, the Army can include skill training unique to SSCs into institutional instruction for officers and noncommissioned officers and this could prove to be extremely beneficial. This improved training package for leaders/trainers will provide a foundation for further focused training once these soldiers join their new units.  

The requirement for creative solutions to enhance the Army's existing capabilities in a resource-constrained environment
continues to be refined to meet its wartime and SSC operational realities. Preparing for and participation in both requires unique solutions that deviate from the practice of "business as usual". The four options mentioned above, either employed in concert or individually, can significantly enhance the Army's capability to carry out its obligations to meet these challenges, but by no means can be considered a "cure all" solution. The Army must continue to explore new options to expand its capabilities to meet future demands on the force.

SSC OPERATIONS AND "BURDEN SHARING"

Historically, "burden sharing", better known as alliances and coalitions, have been the rule and not the exception. In 1100 B.C., Gideon's Coalition of Israelites and the Abiezritesan, Clan of Mannassa fought the worshippers of Ball which was also a Coalition of Zebah and Zalmunna's Midianites, Ameleelites, and Arabians. The Trojan War also included coalitions on each side as well as Alexander the Great's Hellenic League that defeated Darius III's Persians, Scythians, Parthians, Yrcanthians, Bactrians, and Chaldeons in Persia. In modern times, each war the United States has been involved in has consisted of coalition or Allied Warfare, from the Mexican-American War, through both World Wars, Korea, the Cold War, Desert Storm, and more recently in Bosnia. The degree of unity and cohesion has varied widely, but all were coalitions and several were even alliance efforts.
From a military standpoint, alliances and coalitions are not the same. A coalition is an informal agreement for common action between two or more nations and an alliance is a more formal arrangement for broad, long-term objectives. For example, NATO is an alliance and is responsible for executing the Bosnia SSC operation of Peacekeeping, whereas the Gulf War was executed by a strong Arab and Western Coalition made up of 37 nations. In contrast, while the Gulf War Coalition was disbanded after the political endstate was achieved, the NATO continues to be the most enduring example of an alliance lasting over fifty years. The success of NATO in SSC operations in Bosnia and its shared security interests to counter future asymmetrical threats make "burden sharing" more of a reality for a 21st Century Security Strategy.

ANALYZING THE EMERGING STRATEGY

Thus far we have discussed the impact of SSC operations on strategic interests and current strategy, delved into the problems of resourcing the strategy, and looked at several fresh ideas to shape the future force. This paper will now attempt to bring together the previous exposition of ideas and use it to analyze three separate paths the Army can travel in order to meet the strategic needs of the 21st Century. The first two paths are from the QDR while the third is a new alternative not previously discussed in the NSS, QDR, or NDP.
Before analyzing each path, this paper will recognize the following facts and assumptions.

1. Secretary of Defense William Cohen opted to balance near-term challenges with focused investments to counter longer-term threats.\textsuperscript{31}

2. The military budget will remain constant at $250 billion.

3. QDR mandated personnel cuts of 315,000 (active, reserve, and civilian) through 2005.

4. The National Security Strategy calls for a flexible military with the capacity to conduct SSC operations and conduct two nearly simultaneous MTWs in two different theaters from a continuous posture of global engagement.\textsuperscript{32}

5. There will be a "strategic lull" through 2010 due to the absence of a peer competitor.

6. The nation will use the "strategic lull" to restructure and modernize the force to meet current SSC operational requirements while developing a technologically advanced force to overwhelm any future peer competitor.

The first path studied during the QDR was to achieve the present at the cost of preparing for the future. This path recommended maintaining the force at current levels while accepting risk over the long term. The trade off would be preserving force structure at the expense of modernization and leveraging the potential in revolution in military affairs.\textsuperscript{33} To start, it does not meet the Secretary of Defense's intent to
balance near-term challenges with focused investments to counter longer-term threats.\textsuperscript{34} It is consistent with the available budget of $250 billion, but it disregards the QDR manpower cuts and ignores the "strategic lull" to prepare for the future. It could addresses the current- and near-term requirements of SSC operations provided that the services restructure the force and increase the number of the high-demand, low-density units mentioned in NDP Report. Disregarding the need to modernize and leverage the potential of future technology mortgages our future national and economic security to a future peer competitor and makes this alternative a political non-starter.

The second path from the QDR focused on leveraging technology at the expense of reduced forced structure by taking advantage of the "strategic lull" with the long-term objective of achieving technological dominance of future competitors. First, it does not meet the Secretary of Defense's intent to balance near-term challenges with focused investments to counter longer-term threats.\textsuperscript{35} This alternative does recognize the $250 billion budget, the "strategic lull", and the long-term objective of achieving technological dominance of future competitors. What this alternative ignores is the demand on our services to conduct SSC operations. It has the potential to raise PACETEMPO for a reduced force and increase the readiness gap caused by migrating OMA dollars to fund SSCs, thereby negating any resource gains received from a reduced force. Based on the potential for this
alternative to fail in the current world environment makes this option dangerous to pursue and not favorable for consideration.

The third path was not studied in the QDR and is recommended here for further consideration and analysis. First, this alternative requires a change in our National Security Strategy. It calls for a flexible military with the capacity to conduct one MTW and SSC operations from a continuous posture of global engagement and enlargement through increased reliance on NATO and coalition forces in the event two MTWs occur. This alternative meets the Secretary of Defense's intent to balance near-term challenges with focused investments to counter longer-term threats. It relies more on our NATO Allies and "burden sharing" from coalition forces. It recognizes current budget limitations of $250 Billion, force reductions, the "strategic lull", and the need to restructure the force to deal with current and projected SSC operations while leveraging technology to meet and defeat a future peer competitor. The reliance on our NATO Allies and coalition partners will provide the U.S. the needed time and flexibility to disengage from SSC operations, expand the force through increased levels of mobilization, and reliance on a highly integrated and relevant reserve force.

In retrospect, the QDR and the NDP reports do not recognize the available means required to support a strategy that will take us into a resource-constrained 21st Century. The U.S. government needs to continue to leverage the means of NATO and coalition
forces through increased "burden sharing". This will reduce the demand on our military and provide it the capability to balance the near-term challenges of SSC operations while focusing investments to counter longer-term threats. By maximizing the available means at the political level, the President can redefine his National Security Strategy. This will allow the military to organize, equip, train, sustain, and maintain a Total Joint Force capable of efficiently executing today's SSCs operations as well as future MTWs with advanced technology and a reliable "burden sharing" enlargement strategy with our NATO Allies and future coalition partners.

(Word Count: 4,552)
ENDNOTES


5 Ibid, pp. 11.

6 QDR, 13-14, 22-23.


8 National military strategy: Shape, respond, prepare now—a military strategy for a New Era, Disam Journal of International Security Assistance Management; Wright-Patterson AFB; Winter 1997/1998; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Volume 20, Issue 2, pp. 47-49.

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30 Ibid, pp. 16.

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33 QDR, 21

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