EAST EUROPE REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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BRIEFS

SOVIET LABOR NEWSMEN VISIT—A group of Soviet trade union journalists visiting Poland at the invitation of collegium of chairmen of National Trade Union Organizations ended their working visit on 25 August. "During our stay here we learned that trade unions in Poland are a permanent feature of working class life, have a set of specific plans, and are scoring a number of concrete gains. You can now talk openly about the prospects for building up uniform structures within the Polish trade union movement. We intend to transmit these impressions to our readers, the Soviet trade unionists." These words were addressed to the Polish hosts by the group leader, Yuriy Skvortsov, from the paper TRUD, organ of the Soviet trade unions. On 25 August the Soviet journalists met with Stanislaw Gabrielski, director of the PZPR Central Committee Social and Vocational Department. He explained the current social and political situation in Poland and gave an accounting of all of the factors having an impact on the work being done by Poland’s trade unions. He also answered a number of questions that were raised. The meeting was attended by the collegium president, Tadeusz Cieslak. [Text] [Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 27 Aug 84 p 2]
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

TANK REGIMENT REFUELING OPERATIONS DESCRIBED

East Berlin AR-ARMEERUNDSCHAU in German No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 15 May 84) pp 70-75

[Article by Lt Col Horst Spickereit: "Fuel Driver; With the Fuel and Lubricants Service of the 'Soya Kosmodemyanskaya' Tank Regiment"]

[Text] One Who Sought the Right Path

The unit is traveling towards its area of operations on separate routes. The column to which private Schneider belongs as the driver of a tanker truck turns into a clearing to rest. But the private does not have a chance to rest. A call for help has come over the radio. A tank tractor is stuck about 40 km away. It fuel tanks are empty. More quickly than planned, because it is towing a T 55 that has broken down and is using more diesel fuel. A road map is handed to the private, the location of the one seeking help is explained briefly, and already he is steering his heavy vehicle onto the highway. His first thought is, "I hope I find them before it gets dark," because dusk is already falling. Mario Schneider knows that two tank drivers are eagerly awaiting him far in front and are relying on help coming very quickly. And he is determined not to make any mistakes in the presence of the younger soldier and his superior officer. "It's up to you," he tells himself. "Those two have to keep going, because the forces need them." Using the map and road signs, he finds his way kilometer by kilometer. But--on the last section no map can help him. Nothing but paths. More ponderings, frequent stops. He comes to a fork in the track. Left or right? He chooses the latter, sees after 10 minutes that he is in a blind end. Back again, the other path. Up ahead two people are waving. He thinks, "I hope it's the right ones." It is. "Finally," yells the tractor driver happily. A smile flits across Mario Schneider's face. He is proud of having completed his mission without complications. One thousand liters change containers. Signature, handshake. "Take care and thanks!" The two tracked vehicles rumble away.

Private Schneider returns to his unit. But even now he has no chance to catch his breath. He has to refuel tanks, to look after things on his vehicle. He has hardly finished a plate of lentil soup, drunk a cup of tea, when his column leaves again.
One Who Breaks a Record

Carefully soldier Lenz steers his Ural with its trailer along the forest paths. His constantly recurring thought is, "Just don't sink into a hole like the night before last." "And then have to look for a tank to pull you out again." He cannot afford to suffer a breakdown, a loss of time like this now. Two tank companies are waiting for him in defensive positions, they have to be refueled.

Arriving at the first unit, he is taken aback. What's this? Well dug in, the T 55's are scattered and in shallow concealment in the ground. "I can't reach them, they'll have to come out!" A palaver starts among the tank soldiers. They do not want to leave their well-camouflaged positions, they would like to avoid any extra exertion. Many minutes pass before the company commander gives the order to drive out.

An officer from the other company comes running up, tapping on his wristwatch. Would they manage to refuel all his tanks as well, couldn't it go faster? He said that he had just received orders to change his position in 1 hour. "It will not be because of me," Eberhard Lenz replies. It can be done if the tanks are well positioned and if the drivers lend a hand.

In this unit everything goes much better. The tank soldiers accomodate him, take the refueling nozzle out of his hand, shoulder the hoses. In this way they do not need to be constantly rolled out and rolled up again. Soldier Lenz has enough other work: stick the ground stake into the earth, place the breakdown kit and the fire extinguisher ready to hand, start the engine, turn on the pump and the valve, watch the indicator scales, write down the amounts dispensed on the refueling card, along with the unit and name. Ask for a signature .... The same thing again with each new T 55, the vehicles are standing far apart and concealed under trees. Scarcely has the last driven signed the receipt than he is thundering off in his tank. Soldier Lenz wipes the drops of sweat from his brow, looks at his watch and then at the empty tanker truck: "2 hours and 45 minutes!" A record time, in spite of the initial delay. What he did not think was possible before has happened. "If the vehicle is running well, if you make an effort and everything is perfectly organized--it can be done!"

One Who Lost His Way

Clouds of dust upon clouds of dust are thrown up by the 20 wheels of the two tanker trucks driving over the parched tank driving range in the training area. The feeble beams of light from the blackout headlamps prod through this thicket of nocturnal darkness and dust clouds with difficulty. One of the two drivers who is out tonight is soldier Stuerzebecher. It is his first mission of this kind. He has an NCO next to him, who is leading him to the units that have to be refueled, who belongs to one of them himself and knows his way a little in the area. The 2nd and 3rd tank companies will have their diesel fuel, the BMP's [infantry combat vehicles] of the motorized infantry and later the self-propelled antiaircraft guns. The NCO takes his leave, he has arrived at his battery. "Where is the 1st tank company?" asks Franz Stuerzebecher. The
NCO shrugs. "I think it's farther on ahead and then to the right." Soldier Stuerzebecher starts out on the surmised path. Since the second tank truck is taking a different route, Frank is completely on his own. But at the location given to him he does not find a single tank. Uncertain, he drives on. He meets no one, no point of reference to the right or left of the road. "What should I do?" he thinks. "Go back to the depot? You can't give up! One vehicle is still full." Thoughts of this kind race through his head. Almost in despair he criss-crosses the countryside, he has long since passed the time he was ordered to return. He is completely downcast when finally at dawn he meets an officer who guides him back to the base. Fortunately the last part of the journey has no consequences subsequently. The T 55's of the 1st company still had their tanks 80-percent full. Still: the unit had neglected to erect a marker to guide the tank truck and its trailer safely to the final location. Soldier Stuerzebecher learned his lesson as well. "The next time I'll be smarter," he says. "Rather ask 10 times than simply drive off. Better to get a more exact description than to be content with generalities."

Many Who Are Thinking Economically

Those were three episodes from the last big regimental exercise. The military drivers/refueling mechanics—their official designation—hardly had time for sufficient sleep. Day and night these "rangers" were asked questions, had to supply the numerous wheeled and tracked vehicles constantly with gasoline and diesel fuel and lubricants. Following each exercise, each trip. They call it restoring the initial fillup. No sooner were their own tankers and trailers, the barrels and cans empty than they had to fetch fresh supplies from the next higher depot. The regiment's operational readiness—for the comrades of the fuel and lubricants service (abbreviated to F/L service) this means: service to the units day and night. By supplying all the various vehicles quickly and with the proper selection and quality, they are making their contribution to their comrades in arms ability to fulfil their combat mission at all times.

The comrades are often called "juice drivers." "But," says staff sergeant Ilse, the depot administrator, "we don't have any juice. But we do have diesel fuel and gasoline." He can list up to 35 kinds of fuels and lubricants, oils, greases and special fluids which the F/L service in his regiment manages. Thorough knowledge is required, and attentiveness at all times, in order to match these types to the correct engines and powertrains, not to confuse anything, for example, the seven different hydraulic fluids. "Picking up the wrong can, the wrong bottle could have severe consequences, including equipment failure," the experienced career officer says. The hundreds of different cans, drums, refueling pallets and flexible containers, buckets, small cans and bottles have to be laid out clearly. Just moving 10,000 liters of fuel each month requires conscientious work.

Order and cleanliness are the mark of a F/L service. The performance comparisons within the division show that the comrades of the "Soya Kosmodeymanskaya" regiment have something to say here. Their results were good and very good. In addition to these two criteria, questions are asked about the condition of the refueling equipment, how it is prepared for the new period of use, standard times in preparing for refueling and marching and for transferring
drums. And their annual success in reclaiming secondary raw materials. The F/L service not only dispenses. It also attends to the collection of specific used oils and detergents in order to recycle them. In the past year the comrades collected 45 percent of the new oil again and reclaimed more than 66 percent of the pure glycol that was passed out.

In other ways also, the comrades keep an eye on the economical use of fuel, even if some of them forget occasionally. Filling up with fuels, for example, if an inexperienced driver is not instructed in the use of the nozzle, is allowed to release the lever too late and causes the valuable fluid to spill over. Staff sergeant Ilse is even more conscientious, telling some of the regiment's Ural drivers who leave the motor running in the winter when the vehicle is stopped: "That costs 18 liters an hour!" And, which many people are unaware of: It is a violation of the environmental protection law! Last but not least, the "juice drivers" maintain their own vehicles carefully to guarantee refueling at all times and they can get very angry if others do not respect their efforts. Such as a T 55 that puts a dent in the bodywork. They will not hear any criticism of their refueling equipment. "To serve for 1 and 1/2 years without any unusual incidents, to be discharged with the rank of private, to pass on the vehicle entrusted to me in immaculate condition." Those are Eberhard Lenz's principles. And he acts accordingly.

9581
CSO: 2300/621
In the last few decades, probably no linguistic phenomenon has been so controversial as the increasing use of foreign words in nearly all realms of life. And probably in no other case has the actual development of the language remained so unaffected by the concerns and warnings of the purists.

Comparing the latest edition of the Duden [dictionary of the German language] with an older one, one gets an idea of the broad stream of foreign words entering our language in a continuous flow. Twenty years ago, the editors of this dictionary had not considered it necessary to include the following terms from the realms of fashion and everyday life: baby sitter, blue jeans, clever, comeback, feature, nonstopkino [nonstop cinema], party, petticoat, payboy, publicity, service, teenager, tester, twen, twinset. Now the Duden provides the correct spelling of these foreign words (as a "Rezipientenservice" [service to the user])—obviously because they are being used more frequently now.

The Broilers Were Stronger

No one can predict whether the foreign words entering the language will be permanent guests or whether they will be staying for a short time only. Many years ago, when the first broilers appeared in the butcher shops, people concerned with the purity of the language groaned about the intolerable incomprehensibility. There actually were linguistic commentaries on the subject. Presently, however, even preschoolers are familiar with this term.

Thus, whether a word is German or non-German (or even "un-German") cannot be the criterion determining rejection or acceptance. Today science, technology, commerce, art, sports and other realms of life are influenced by intensive international contacts (both direct and indirect) to such an extent that "pure" national languages are even more inconceivable now. Words reflecting the most vital concerns of all working people ("Koexistenz" [coexistence]) and words designating splendid technical achievements ("Sputnik") or convenience-related inventions ("Spray") quickly take root in everyday usage. This also goes for popular words such as "Datsche" [from the Russian dacha: summer...
house] and "Camping." Similarly, words that can conveniently be used in various contexts, e.g. "attraktiv," "interessant," "Initiative," "Service," and "Komplex," are readily accepted.

Since the foreign words obviously do not heed the admonitions of the teachers of German (for how long they remain part of the language is subject to different, inherent laws), one could gain the impression that this linguistic phenomenon can safely be ignored. This is not true, however, for the journalist in particular must be concerned with foreign words for at least two reasons: there are foreign words that should be explained to all readers as soon as possible; but then there are foreign words that are superfluous and thus detrimental to general comprehensibility, words that may even intimidate the reader.

Unavoidable Foreign Words

The foreign words that are necessary include terms designating significant concepts and political phenomena of immediate interest that cannot easily be described without recourse to foreign words. Some of these words—e.g. "Intensivierung" [intensification], "Arbeitsproduktivität" [labor productivity], "Initiative" [initiative], "Kooperation"—have been used for some time. But their importance alone does not guarantee that all readers will now be totally familiar with these words. After all, there always are "new" readers. Consequently, explanation or occasional replacement of these words by synonyms is quite appropriate. This is even more true of significant political phenomena such as the nuclear "moratorium"—a term that is new to almost all readers. The Duden defines this term as an extension of the time allowed for payment, but this definition ignores the political meaning. This is where the journalist comes in; since by virtue of their international nature such political terms cannot easily be translated into German, he or she must again and again explain and paraphrase. It is not sufficient to explain only once. Again and again, the key criterion is general comprehensibility. There are no hard and fast rules as to how often a new foreign word has to be explained. In this respect, information obtained in talks with the readers is the only guide.

Continuing Explanation

A poll on the readers' reaction to encountering unknown foreign words in the newspaper yielded the following replies: "I put aside the paper"; "I just skim all the incomprehensible passages"; "I stop reading." Only every seventh of the individuals questioned stated he or she would look up the word in question in the Duden or in the dictionary.

There are two reasons why by no means all of the foreign words found in the newspaper are necessary. Firstly: As a result of the justifiable wish for scientific substantiation of statements made, even rare technical terms that often happen to be foreign words get into the newspaper. But only in exceptional cases is the newspaper the appropriate place for these terms: "Urbanisierung" [urbanization], "Oeuvre," "votieren" [to vote, opt], "Selektieren" [to select], "Briefing," "Passimeterverkehr" [not further identified], "paraphieren" [to initial], etc.
Secondly: Some foreign words, it seems, aim only to polish up something all too ordinary: "kapazitative Möglichkeiten" [capacity-oriented possibilities], "florale Assoziationen," "tarifarische Berechnung" [rate calculation], "Outsider," "gastronomische Objekte" [gastronomic projects], "Primärimpressionen" [primary impression]. Thus the plain proverb "Lügen haben kurze Beine" [lies have short legs, i.e. truth will out] turns into the weighty assessment: "Incorrect statements of information have extremities of limited range of action."
A misunderstanding, is it not? Every Hungarian Christian is happy that our country for the first time since the 1938 Bucharistic World Congress has come to the center of Christian world attention thanks to the Lutheran World Congress. We are also happy because all this indicates the successful path which Hungary’s churches and the Hungarian socialist state have covered in recent decades in the field of better mutual understanding and establishment of national unity.

Among the more than 1,000 official participants arriving from every region of the world, our country is being visited at the invitation of the Lutheran World Federation by Cardinal Johannes Willebrands, the head of the Vatican’s Christian Unity Secretariat, and Danish Bishop Martensen, who together with the representatives of the Hungarian Catholic Church will participate as observers in the work of the World Congress.

For this reason we stand uncomprehending before a front-page story in our companion newspaper the EVANGELIKUS ELET of 24 June. Material provided with the initials K.L. and based on a Neuendettelsau press release of Risto Lehtonen, department head of the Lutheran World Congress, states that there are today 77 million Lutherans in the world, 54 million of whom belong to the World Congress. Thereafter it lists those countries—including the Soviet Union—where the number of Lutherans is increasing. Then a paragraph begins which we quote here exactly:

"The committee which met at the time is also preparing for the Budapest World Congress and has turned against the discriminatory nature of the Catholic 'Eastern policy' and declared it outright absurd. The first world Congress in a socialist state—with this theme 'with hope for the world in Christ' is the sign that the message of the Gospel is crossing over political boundaries—they said;" we read in the quote.

There are a number of things we do not understand. First of all, it is not evident what kind of committee it was, when and where in its preparations for the World Congress it turned against the so-called Catholic Eastern
policy with its discriminatory nature, calling it outright absurd. We would like to have our companion newspaper give us additional and more exact information on this committee because to our knowledge a Catholic Eastern policy does not exist and therefore it cannot be discriminatory in nature toward the socialist countries, and even if one existed, this would actually be an absurdity. Consequently, this news appears to be absurd.

Therefore, no Catholic Eastern policy exists unless we interpret as such the opening initiated by Pope John XXIII at the beginning of the 1960's toward the socialist states. This diplomatic activity contributed to a large extent to the liquidation of the Cold War and the beginning of the process of detente. We add only parenthetically that it is still today in this spirit that discussions are being conducted between the Vatican and, for example, the Hungarian state.

We hope that there is nothing here but some mistake in editing or translating, and we wish our Lutheran brothers much success in the work of the World Congress and in its service to Christian unity.

6691
CSO: 2500/567
KALDY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF LUTHERANS IN BUDAPEST

Kaldy Gives Opening Speech

Budapest EVANGELIKUS ELET in Hungarian 22 Jul 84 p 1

[Speech by Zoltan Kaldy]

[Text] Grace to you all! The line is the last sentence in the letter to the Israelites. Originally it was directed to a congregation which had carried heavy burdens and meanwhile it repeatedly experienced that "the grace of God is sufficient" also for them. I cite this word of God to greet the representatives of the member churches of the Lutheran World Federation who have already started from Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, Latin America and Australia toward Budapest by the time these lines appear. And I quote the very same words to greet the Hungarian Lutheran Church, its congregations and members who are expecting the delegates and are preparing with open hearts and homes for their reception.

By the grace of God, in the summer of 1980, at the Augsburg session of the Lutheran World Federation, the Hungarian Lutheran Church was able to invite its Seventh Congress to Budapest. Also applicable here is: "Our being accepted is derived from God." In our historical situation, first we had to find the path and then we had to learn to walk on the road discovered; moreover, we had to serve well with the gospel in order to open our gate to the Lutherans of the world. But it is also by the grace of God that a relationship could be developed between the state and our Lutheran Church which made it possible for it to request that we could hold the general assembly of the Lutheran World Federation in Budapest and that every participant could receive an entry permit to Hungary. Only those can truly appreciate it who were active participants in seeking the path of our church and in establishing the present, fruitful and good relationship between the state and the church. The accusations which have appeared in certain press organs abroad, that our church received permission from our government to organize the general assembly in Budapest "at the cost of compromises in matters of principle" are not quite the creations of innocent phantasy. No one asked us for any compromises of principles and thus we did not have to offer any.

It is also by the grace of God that our invitation was accepted by the Lutheran World Federation--more precisely by its executive committee session in
Augsburg. Namely, during the past nearly 40 years, the Hungarian Lutheran Church and its leadership, searching for a path and starting on the path found, had faced the most varied accusations in numerous foreign countries and churches. Some criticized our direction, theology, mainly our "excessive adaptation to the state" and that even the diaconal theology was invented to support our social order. Many were misled or were at least made reticent toward our church by the press campaigns. God has willed that they visit us now and convince themselves that reality is the opposite of the many false reports. We believe that the majority of our guests—who had never been in a socialist country and thus could not before gain an insight into the life of the Lutheran Church here—will experience great surprise and joy at what they will find in our assemblies.

It is also by the grace of God that the representatives of foreign churches and the many thousand members of our church can meet directly with each other. Although many foreign guests have already visited our assemblies before, nevertheless, we have not yet experienced a visit on such a scale. We can get enriched "through our mutual faith" and can be inspired to practice the acts of love, even more forcefully than before, in our church, in our country and at an international level alike. But the guests can also gain initiatives from us to pause in their faith and to experience love.

It is also by the grace of God that the representatives of global Lutheranism will gather in Budapest precisely at the time when Europe first of all has become a stage for confrontation and threats. The Lutheran World Federation has a great opportunity to raise an unequivocal voice for peace, disarmament, social and economic justice, and to demand an end to the arms race, the destruction of nuclear weapons, the abolition of racial discrimination, the conquest of hunger on this earth, and that something be indeed done.

It is also by the grace of God that the 97 member churches of the Lutheran World Federation will discuss, precisely in Budapest, how they plan to carry out the mission, the evangelization, and how they plan to cultivate even better the unity among the member churches and to build ecumenism. It will be by the grace of God if resolutions are made which advance the services of the church and promote the healing of our world.

Therefore, guests and hosts:

"God's grace be with all of you."

German Commentary on Kaldy Leadership

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 1 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by Karl-Alfred Odin]

[Text] The leading bishop of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Hungary, Zoltan Kaldy, was elected president of the Lutheran World Federation on the second ballot Tuesday afternoon, in Budapest. After the announcement of
the result and Kaldy's acceptance, the full assembly stood to hear the Hungarian national anthem. On the second ballot, Kaldy received 173 votes and his opponent, general secretary of the Aid Service of the Danish Church, Mrs Solling, received 124 votes. On the first ballot, Kaldy had 136, Mrs Solling 78, Preus, the American bishop, 52 and Nostbakken, the professor of theology from Canada, 31 votes with 14 abstensions. For seven years, Kaldy will succeed Kibira, the bishop from Tanzania, who stepped down on the expiration of his term.

The speakers of the Hungarian church created the impression as if the widespread displeasure with Bishop Kaldy would be a slight to the small and poor Lutheran Church of the East Bloc on the part of the large, rich and politically unencumbered churches of the West. On Tuesday, the Hungarian advocates of Bishop Kaldy once again used all the available arguments to hammer in this view. As far as it can be ascertained, there was no such passing over the wishes of the East European church members on the part of those opposing the election of Kaldy, Representatives of the Lutheran Church in other Eastern Bloc countries replied when asked that it was of no political significance to them whether Kaldy was elected or not. It was also not the impression that Kaldy would be the common candidate of the East European churches. To the delegates of churches in other countries, the vote was not a political decision.

The delegates of the Lutheran World Federation had spent the Sunday at a hundred Hungarian Lutheran assemblies and gained different impressions there. They talked with the various groups, with laymen and ministers and also with local people in the Communist Party. It turned out that some of the ministers and communities are satisfied with the imperious manner in which Kaldy is leading the church; because thereby—everybody concedes—he has obtained a free space for the Lutheran Church within the state. The Lutheran ministers can work relatively freely in spiritual care and church services, without restrictions from the state apparatus. But in the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Hungary, there are much louder voices heard against Bishop Kaldy, as evidenced by the letter from a minister, Doka, in which he has warned from electing Bishop Kaldy. The massive propaganda, spiced with accusations and innuendos, for the vote went as far as to threaten with expulsion a foreign journalist who had published an unfavorable report, although it was explained later that it was a misunderstood interpretation of a discussion. The mode in which the election of Bishop Kaldy was carried out confirmed, already on Tuesday, that the nucleus of objections against him was indeed there in the pressure on opinions, which can produce the impression of "terror in the church" in ministers dependent on Kaldy, which was described in the letter by minister Doka.

The image that Kaldy is a red or even a politicizing bishop is, according to a general opinion, false. Even his diaconic theology does not transgress the limits between the gospel and socialist ideology. Kaldy does not belong among those Hungarian Evangelical Church leaders who look on evangelical teachings through socialist glasses and who completely mix-up Socialism and Christianity. But Bishop Kaldy's personal power and the absence—for two
and a half decades—of a gesture of conciliation toward Bishop Ordass—who was driven out of office in 1957—and his followers are now appearing ominous. Only immediately before the general assembly had Kaldy acknowledged Bishop Ordass, at his grave, as the revered teacher of the church.

The dilemma with this election shows that, at present, it is difficult for Protestantism to find suitable ministers to lead the church, not only in Germany but in general. In the Lutheran World Federation, they helped themselves in Budapest by changing their constitution to increase the number of vice presidents from 3 to 5. Thereby a leadership group was established within the executive committee in which the various regions and trends of the Lutheran Church can be represented. But, thereby, the Lutheran churches merely sidestep the problem that today, suitable people to lead the churches are often lacking. Because devotion and charisma, which could be an example to many and could inspire cooperation within the church, do not originate in committees, they need individuals with great stature. No matter how unsatisfactory it may be from the theological standpoint, the credibility of the Word also largely depends on the personality. In German Protestantism, after the war, nearly every established church had its own convincing bishop, head of synod and church president. Through the mission of a unique man, Reinhold von Thadden-Trieglaff, now deceased, for a decade after the war, the church meeting became an all-German evangelical people's movement before it became crippled for a long time with the fading of hopes for reunification.

Only in retrospect does it appear that these great figures of the Evangelical Church in Germany and in the ecumenic unity had been the great old men, all like the bishops Meiser, Wurm and Dibelius. Individuals like Lilje, Niemoller and Schaf, who much more effectively drew the line determining the future of German Protestantism, were young men after the Second World War for the views of the time. The fact that, except for the unknown Canadian professor, Nostbakker, only individuals over 60-years old were selected for election to president of the Lutheran World Federation indicates how much stronger current Lutheranism is influenced by the thinking of the last generation than by the future, in spite of the forward-looking main theme: "In Christ—the Hope of the World." The church is paying a high price for the democratization of the last two decades since, in the church also, so many committee advicements took the place of decisions that time must be spent with thrashing empty straw in the committees. The spiritually flexible, forward-going people, whom one would wish among the leaders, are repelled from this work, which brings them to withdraw to an office or professorship because there they can work in a meaningful manner without having to listen in committee sessions to the same matter incessantly repeated. Thus, it is precisely the gifted theologians who are not enlisted at the right time in leadership tasks.
ORTHODOX LEADER DESCRIBES CHURCH

Budapest UJ EMBER in Hungarian 29 Jul 84 p 3

[Interview with Feriz Berki about the Hungarian Orthodox Church; date and place not specified]

[Text] Orthodox Christianity has a thousand-year-old history in Hungary. During the times of the Arpad dynasty, many kinship ties linked the ruling house to Byzantium: Saint Laszlo II gave in marriage to Byzantine Emperor (Comnenos) John his daughter Piroska, who is revered in the Orthodox Church as a saint; Bela IV took to wife the daughter of Emperor Theodoros I; and the daughter of Istvan V became the wife of Emperor Andronikos II. "The Hungarians had ecclesiastical relations not only with Byzantium and Bulgaria—we read in Feriz Berki's book "Orthodox Christianity" (Budapest 1975)—but also with Kiev Russian, one of the proofs of which is that Ugrin (Hungarian) Moses, who was of Hungarian origin, has been revered as a saint in the Russian Orthodox Church since the 11th century."

[Question] But how does this church with such an extremely great past live on into the present? We sought for the answer to this question from Protoiery Periz Berki bishop-administrator, whom Patriarch Alexiy ordained as a priest 30 years ago and named him head of the Hungarian Orthodox Church.

[Answer] The Orthodox Church in Hungary is divided into a number of jurisdictions. The Serbian diocese with its seat at Szentendre and under the leadership of a bishop vicar belongs to the Belgrade Patriarchate; the Romanian diocese with its seat at Gyula also under the leadership of a vicar belongs to the Sofia Patriarchate; and two Bulgarian parishes belong to the Patriarchate at Sofia. Finally, the Hungarian bishopric, with its seat at Budapest, has six parishes (Szentes, Szeged, Miskolc, Nyiregyhaza, and Budapest on Petofi Square and Lendvay Street); two affiliate parishes (Gyongyos and Kecskemet) are under the church authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. In 1949 the Moscow Patriarchate granted the Hungarian Orthodox churches canonical jurisdiction and right to hold worship services in Hungarian. The jurisdiction of the Hungarian bishopric extends to the Hungarian and Russian parishes and to scattered believers, including the Greek. We do not have priests at Nyiregyhaza, Gyongyos and Kecskemet. A historic-type church still stands in Karcag, but there are no faithful. In Tokaj our church is used as a museum.
We have a total of six priests, we are lacking three others where we have been unable to fill positions. We have almost 5,000 faithful in our bishopric; including the above-mentioned churches, we may have together with the nationalities about 40,000 faithful.

If I should want to summarize briefly the essence of my service, I would consider it our most commanding need to finish the Hungarian translations of our ritual books.

The magyarization trend began in Hungary at the end of the 18th century, chiefly with the Greek-founded churches, with the result that in those places the urban Greek merchants—who because of their lifestyle were quickest to assimilate could not understand the liturgical language already in the middle of the 19th century.

An important role in translating liturgy into Hungarian was played by the Budapest Greek Orthodox Theological College, which in 1942 reached three class years, and then died out for the lack of teachers and students. I taught at the school and also participated in the translation of the St John Chrysostom liturgy (1944). Up to then there were only a few prayer books and spiritual reading materials in Hungarian. In 1946 I published the translation of the canon, and in 1955—on basis of a 1944 translation—I published Liturgikon Volume I. These were followed by a prayer book (1956), the Evchologion (1959), the Hymnologion Volumes I-II (1969) and Liturgikon Volume II (1972). The first volume of Liturgikon also appeared in a new edition in 1980. These translations are used in the Hungarian, Transylvanian, Subcarpathian and Slovak Hungarian Orthodox parishes.

My second service goal was to make the Hungarian Orthodox Church known, something which— I may say—has been attended by success.

I also regard as very important the ecumenical work of the Orthodox Church. I participated in Rhodes in the Pan-Orthodox Conference which met parallel with Vatican Synod II. Since the beginning of the dialogue we have come constantly closer to each other. The common prayers we hold at the initiative of Cardinal Primate Laszlo Lekai at the Inner City and here at the Petofi Square churches fill me with hope that the time is not too far distant when Eucharistic unity will also be realized.

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Finally after the tormenting trip by ship the first Hungarian settlers who happened to get to the huge and uninhabited Canadian flatlands were swept into a part of the country, today's Saskatchewan, some eight times as large as the old country, as they were escaping from their unfortunate fates. Having started out from the Danube-Tisza vicinity they did not even know if they were still on the map and which way God might be, as they had gotten so far behind His back. They carried with them their only possessions, the bundled collection of their memories. In their guts, their stubborn determination and turbulent consciences they carried that beloved world in which they grew up.

The 5,000-6,000 km distance from the Eastern cities, the extreme continental climate and the difficulties accompanying it did not promise a great future to the newcomers who had migrated here. But the 160 Hungarian acres of free land they were offered enticed many Europeans here to populate and tame the desolate flatland. The sign noting the first Hungarian settlement was stuck into the ground in 1886 and significantly had only this much on it in the very middle of the Canadian prairie: ESZTERHAZ. Thanks to the emigration wave after the turn of the century, the number of houses and the population were increasing. The Hungarian peasants arriving here in groups thought they had found what they had started out for and suffered so much in their soul, without a homeland. Then the villages were built, one after the other: Otthon, Mariavolgy, Kaposvar, Magyar, Zala, Balaton. But the most famous settlement was named Bekevar by its residents. This was the one to keep its Hungarian character the longest: the people preserved their traditions carried with them even across the great ocean to such an extent that for decades it became the guiding force in their lives. Even more so since the older people never mastered the difficult English words, and their children also started school without having learned a single word of the language, and this caused much embarrassment. Thanks to the society turning to itself for comfort, the third and in some cases even the fourth generation speaks the Hungarian language in tangy dialect, or at least understands it well. But it is useless for the outsider travelling there to look for the sign identifying the wonderfully named Bekevar /Peace Castle/ any more; the settlement is now called Kipling.
The first thought of the settlers was to build a church and a school. The school in Bekevar was named after Lajos Kossuth. A photograph preserves the memory of the enthusiasm of those glorious days. I have also seen a picture on which the Hungarian-faced people riding American horses and wearing American clothes gathered in front of the school built of American lumber, so that they could gaze into the photographing machine. The history of Bekevar has not ended to this day: it is one of the little islands of the decreasing number of Hungarians in America, in the stream of assimilation. Dr Ferenc Hoffman, a Lutheran minister, has already done research on the history of the life of Saskatchewan's Hungarians. At the time he visited the most secluded Hungarian societies on horseback for years, without concern about religious differences. And university professor and historian Dr Marton Kovacs is now writing his third book on this topic, summarizing his research. Others are searching in Australia, Europe, South America and in the United States looking for information on the fate of Hungarians, in order to unravel the history of Hungarian emigration which can now look back on a thousand sad years.

The time is ripe now for the researchers busying themselves in the world outside and in the old country to thoroughly inform each other about the results of their work, to trade their experiences, to review the directions of the uncovering work and of the next tasks. Motivates by these ideas the World Federation of Hungarians (and within this framework the Hungarian Forum, the sponsor of conferences of Hungarian intellectuals), the MTA's /Hungarian Academy of Sciences/ Institute of Historical Sciences and the National Széchenyi Library are organizing the scientific conference of those researching the situation of scattered Hungarians, with the participation of 14 professionals from 6 foreign countries, and several domestic experts. The topic of this significant meeting is the formation and mobility of the diaspora; problems in standardizing the popular census data and statistical sources in studying the ethnic group; development and present problems in the identity awareness of the Hungarian diaspora.

The fear of melting in, the justified worries weighing on the conscience have followed the fate and the entire turbulent history of the Hungarian diaspora. It is clear to everyone that the number of Hungarians abroad who know the Hungarian language will continue to decrease. Preservation of the Hungarian language and Hungarian identity abroad is in practical terms the function of implementing continuous bilingualism. Each and every nationality-propagating conscience of the Hungarians is needed for this. That is, we have been witnessing for years that Hungarians living in blocks in Western countries are dispersing, to that the "Hungarian streets" are disappearing or have already even disappeared in Toronto, Cleveland, New Brunswick and elsewhere. Therefore the future belongs to forces which create togetherness in this dispersion, which will always tie together the Hungarians everywhere, scattered all over the world. With the knowledge that everyone should primarily be a good citizen of the country accepting him, it is necessary to stimulate and in many cases wake up the Hungarian conscience. Many are committed to laboring on preserving the Hungarian heritage, those who establish and maintain Hungarian associations and schools abroad; who care for our language and teach it to the next generations; who foster and hold together the Hungarian life of the small and diminishing societies; who uncover the past of these; who, while preaching from pulpits in beautiful Hungarian, keep awake with their conviction the honor of knowing the native language; who with the never ceasing devotion of the song, dance, music and literary mementos bind together the past of the old country with the present of the new homeland.
Conference Overview After Its Conclusion

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 10 Aug 84 p 5

Article: "The Situation of Hungarians in the Diaspora, the Research Continues"

The 3-day scientific conference organized in Budapest about the situation of research into the Hungarian diaspora was concluded on Thursday afternoon in Budapest. It was initiated by the Hungarian Forum operating under the aegis of the World Federation of Hungarians. The conference dealt primarily with the life, Hungarian awareness, sentimental and conscious ties with the Hungarian nation of Hungarians who live in the West.

Evaluating the series of meetings, Zoltan Szabo, member of the MVSZ's World Federation of Hungarians presidium and chairman of the Hungarian Forum said that the approximately 30 presentations called attention to this: scientific research and well-based study are needed for us to obtain a realistic picture here at home about all those who live in the Western countries but profess to be Hungarians or of Hungarian descent. Based on the results of their own research, scientists, university professors, church persons and practitioners of the historical sciences, sociology and folklore shed light on the situation of scattered Hungarians. An agreement developed among them that the last century's concept and criteria of "nation" are no longer applicable today to the rather dispersed and scattered Hungarians of this age. Today we can consider the historically developed common culture, professing this history and fostering this culture to be the main criterium for belonging together as a nation. Consequently there are several categories and degrees of national existence and identity: according to the conference participants it is theoretically justified and also practically expeditious to differentiate between the nation living in Hungary, Hungarian minorities and the scattered Hungarians. At the same time we also consider those generations as belonging in part to the Hungarians, which have a so-called secondary identity as Hungarians: awareness of descendency, respect for the Hungarian ancestors, sympathy and interest in the old homeland are alive in them.

The meeting's domestic and foreign participants—who now for the first time had the opportunity to conduct a scientific exchange of ideas about the situation of the Hungarian diaspora—decided that in the future they will also better organize their research work among themselves, and will report on the results of their work at future scientific conferences.

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IMPLICATIONS OF AMNESTY LAW DISCUSSED

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 31 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Artur Bodnar: "Political Aspects of the Amnestry"]

[Text]  The amnesty proclaimed on 21 July 1984 was not a surprise. There was talk about it for some time. However, stormy discussions, voices of protest and hope, and voices of satisfaction were heard just a few days before the July holiday.

The amnesty benefits about 35,000 persons, almost one-third of those detained and in prisons. The scope of this act is truly extensive. Among the approximately 30,000 people mentioned above, 1.9 percent committed offenses for political reasons. Probably, all kept isolated for political offenses will be released. The lawsuits at the State Tribunal against Piotr Jaroszewicz and Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk will be also discontinued. These are the basic facts.

The amnesty caused mixed feelings in the West. Of course, foreign interest is limited to a small group deprived of liberty for political reasons. Newspapers in the West were filled with matters related to those persons for a long time because politics demanded it: for example, there is "black" propaganda about the majority of European socialist countries needed to counterbalance bad news about the growing technological unemployment, about expenditures for arms, strikes, inflation, etc.

Propaganda about our difficulties and conflicts, even if just individual, does not create warm feelings toward the forces of the left in the West because it forces them to defend the reality of the socialist countries or, more often, to distance itself from our worries. President Mitterrand's anti-Soviet attitude is based on such feelings. In the same class are passionate assurances of some politicians from communist parties who declare that they will respect all kinds of civil rights if they gain power through elections and forming a democratic majority. Finally, the "black" propaganda is needed to justify all cold war actions while exerting spectacular pressure on Poland and other socialist countries of Europe. Is our propaganda paying back? I believe that it does, but to an incomparably lesser degree. Morality and politics in Poland are, at least in what is said by ordinary citizens as well as members of government circles, much closer together than in other countries.
The amnesty of people who are in conflict with the law for political reasons neutralizes crucial anti-Polish arguments used by Western propaganda, at least for a time. Despite the fact that LE MONDE recently wrote that it is the duty of the beneficiaries of amnesty to return to antistate activities. Probably, those abroad who wish us well are afraid of the same. They suspect that among the beneficiaries of amnesty, especially among representatives of KSS KOR and the extremists of NSZZ "Solidarity," there are people incapable of thinking in terms of realistic politics, people who have decided that their vocation is to cooperate closely with anticommunist circles in the West. I had an opportunity to observe at close quarters some advisors and activists of the former "Solidarity." They are extremely self-centered, sort of mystics and doctrinaires, who act on the principle of "all or nothing." Moreover, they believe that their names must be included in history books in boldface. Let us not delude ourselves that they are for any kind of compromise. It so happened that they brushed against great politics, for a moment they were the actors, or, more correctly, they were and will remain just the pawns in a political game on a large scale.

One could question then, what is the benefit of granting amnesty to the above-mentioned category of people? I suppose that these people believe in a variety of political ideologies which can be found in our society and dominate among the people who are energized by the myth of "solidarity." These people followed a different path than those who decided to break with the attitude of "refusal" and decided to operate within the normal structure of our public life, be professionally and socially active disregarding numerous doubts and reservations. This process of reorientation and return to thinking in terms of the whole country and state could be observed in the early spring of 1984. Thus, the amnesty of persons sentenced for political offenses serves as a symbolic act of agreement between the authorities and the majority which is troubled by doubts.

The amnesty is a closing act of an important section of the most recent Polish history; it is an optimistic flourish on the 40th anniversary of People's Poland; it proves that "round table" techniques are not always necessary to find out people's opinions and to reach agreement on important national matters. And what about the beneficiaries of amnesty? They should go back to their families, to work and to normal life. Will they take advantage of this? A majority certainly will. And the others? Some of those will find the doors closed by their opposition minded friends and colleagues. This will happen to those for whom the isolation in prison did not serve as a school of realistic thinking which in politics must always have roots in the processes which take place in the society. The amnesty places on the map new ideological divisions and irrevocably closes certain chapters in the history of our native opposition. Forecasting future meandering of this political opposition would be, of course, pure fantasy.

The amnesty also means discontinuance of the lawsuit at the State Tribunal against two politicians. I have heard expressions of satisfaction although nobody could care about the future of T. Wrzaszczyk who did not have any political achievements. His claim to fame was a fast career in the state administration; for some he was a "tough guy", there was demand for such types;
for some he was an embodiment of primitivism and other disgusting traits. P. Jaroszewicz is defended by the veterans who say that there were times when he did more for People's Poland than E. Gierek in all the high offices which he has ever held. In public consciousness, political responsibility for errors committed is more important than the state responsibility while, according to the letter of the law, it is the opposite. For this reason the case of Edward Gierek will come up in many discussions as a symbol of socially harmful organization of power in the 1970's and of the style in which it was discharged.

The amnesty included former representatives of the government who were responsible for pushing economic policy which was ignoring the legal regulations in force a few years ago or was against them. Today, we have many more such regulations and safety precautions. The law, however, is an instrument of politics, it creates a framework that limits or supports political actions. The rest, and it is very important, depends on society's interests, on the positive, democratic interpretation of the law and on the social imagination of those who make the decisions.

The amnesty included the opposition if it broke the law or was upsetting the established order. That is the way it is all over the world. This also applies to those who became active adversaries of the People's Poland government structure, such as the activists of KSS KOR and KPN. It may be assumed that both of these groups, consisting of a few persons each, will be released.

The amnesty placed at the same level people who violated the law in a variety of ways. Accident or deliberate intent? I would say the latter. The socialist law must treat everybody in the same way who, regardless of political motivation, visibly harm their own state. This is not moralizing; one must consider that 5-10 percent of adult population show the negative attitude of the opposition. A long time will pass before we learn how to channel such attitudes or prevent their arising at all through good internal policies at all levels of our sociopolitical system. Opposition attitudes feed to a great extent on the condition where both economic reform and the reform of national councils are just in the initial stages of their introduction. The still burning protest emotions and the avoidance of dialog and expressions of constructive opinions supporting everyday state policies still characterize the attitudes of many people.

Socialist law must be equally effective regarding those who fail to perform their duty as government employees and those who exceed their prerogatives whether in matters apparently minor or of national importance. Pretexts are provided by, for instance, a crisis and by the still unshed habits of the past years.

I consider the amnesty for all kinds of political offenses a firm desire of the authorities to close the books on the recent past without passing ideological and moral judgments. Ideological debates will be with us for some time because the past is still fresh and the future is just emerging.
from the economic and governmental reforms which are being introduced and whose rules may take root in social practices only as time progresses. These reforms have their supporters and their adversaries. The former deserve strong backing, the latter should be persuaded and resisted. Also, there will be debates regarding morale and public behavior of individuals and groups during the difficult era between success and crisis.

Thus, the political aspect of the amnesty does not decide many moral and ideological matters, but, from the state point of view, it closes a difficult period of Polish political history of recent years.

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OSMANCZYK DISPELS FEARS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 10 Aug 84 p 5

[Speech by Edmund Osmanczyk: "No Fear of German Unity—Thoughts of a Polish Intellectual about the Future of Europe"]

[Text] Edmund Osmanczyk, an author and journalist, also is a member of the Polish parliament. He held this address, which was not published in Poland, at the Silesian Institute in Oppeln [Opole]. A slightly edited version of the text, which reached DIE ZEIT by accident, is published below.

In 1984, it is 40 years since the Germans delivered the most cruel blow of all against us: the devastation and destruction of Warsaw. At the same time, we suffered unimaginable loss of life.

In 1985, it will be 40 years since the unconditional defeat of Germany and the Potsdam Agreement. At that time, Prussia was liquidated; the German mark was worthless; in Poland, it could be purchased for 0.30 zloty then. Per capita income in that year "zero" in Poland was slightly higher than on the other side of the Oder and the Elbe. Today, 40 years later, one GDR mark is worth 100 zloty and an FRG mark is worth 300. According to UN statistics, per capita income in Poland today is half as high as in the GDR and three-and-a-half times as low as in the FRG.

"That nation," I wrote in 1946, "which works off its debts fastest and reaches the point of having no outstanding debts will acquire the friendship and respect of the big powers without regard to its past history. If that nation should turn out to be Germany, then it could happen to us that we revert once more to the status of a subordinate buffer state, situated between nations which are mighty because of their efforts."

That is exactly what did happen. We are a debtor country in Europe once again. Germany, on the other hand—though amputated in Potsdam and divided into two states with different social systems—today is the primary political and economic partner in Europe for both the United States and the Soviet Union—which is to say for the two dominant powers of the post-war era.
Against this background, the thesis propounded in POLITYKA's 17 March 1984 issue is a dangerous illusion. I am speaking of the argument by Ryszard Woyna, the chairman of the foreign policy committee of the Sejm, which is that "a decisive weakening of the German political and economic positions in Central Europe" has occurred in the aftermath of Germany's defeat some 40 years ago.

Exactly the opposite is the case. The strengthening of the German political and economic positions in Central, Western, northern and southern Europe has been so marked that one must assume that the role played by the two German states as the foremost political and trading partner of the United States and the USSR will continue until at least the close of this century—and that is a certainty, if one further assumes that the existent period of nuclear peace will endure. This is all the more likely, since there is no one in Europe today—East or West—to whom these two might cede their leadership role.

France, which suffered such heavy losses in World War I, has not been able to become an equal partner for Germany until this day. The same goes for Poland, Germany, on the other hand, whose war losses were offset by the resettlements resulting from the Potsdam Agreement which turned out to be a blessing for the Germans; by the "family reunions" achieved through negotiations and by the guest workers, has strength enough and is therefore able to master the problems in that area where its two different political systems which have close economic ties are located.

Both these Germans and those Germans—let us be quite open about it—have made full use of the past several centuries to pass all their language examinations with flying colors—in English and in Russian. But among themselves they still communicate in German but not like one German with another German but only—and let me quote—"as one human being with another."

I am quoting Helmut Kohl who met with Erich Honecker at a palace in the Lenin Hills near Moscow on the eve of Yuri Andropov's funeral. Communist leader Honecker called this 2-hour humanitarian dialogue "excellent."

As far as Poland is concerned, we swallowed the initial German bait to the tune of about $1 billion when we /sold/ them 120,000 ethnics—"to the satisfaction of both sides," as the Bonn correspondent of the Polish Press Agency put it during the course of the negotiations. The Bonn foreign ministry was generally pleased with "the humanitarian reunion of families" in exchange for DM and the Warsaw foreign ministry was satisfied because it thereby robbed West Germany of the argument that there was a "German minority" in Poland. 10 years later, however, Bonn is once again speaking of a "German minority in Poland" and of the need to continue with the "reunion of families" which is something our Polish countrymen, who are scattered all over the world, are not permitted to do.
It is an undeniable fact that the past several years have dealt our relations with both German states a serious setback and, what makes things even worse, in the economic field as well. In this regard, we must freely admit that the main reason for it is the ineptitude of our economy which simply does not permit us to adhere to contracts once concluded. We have once more become a trading partner who has debts.

Given this situation, we must ask ourselves two basic questions: What will the Germans do in the future? And what can we do to improve Poland’s relations with the two German states? Passivity, at any rate, would be tantamount to suicide.

With regard to the first question, my answer has been the same for the past 40 years—emphatically so. Our neighbors on the far side of the Oder and Elbe are learning to live or have already learned to live with the Oder-Neisse frontier; but they will not resign themselves to the division of Germany. The past 100 years have left an imprint on the modern German nation for a long time to come. We are gradually beginning to understand that the differences in the systems in the GDR and the FRG do not have a bearing on [the issue of] national unity. The return to Prussian civic virtues in both German states has strengthened the homogeneity of the German nation far more than life under two diverse economic systems was able to weaken it.

The socialist economy of the GDR has officially been integrated into the EC since 1958—namely by means of the Rome Treaty dealing with interzonal trade which provides the GDR with privileges for making use of the blessings of EC which no other socialist country enjoys. For a quarter century now, the GDR has been breastfed by two mothers, which is why it has been gaining weight year after year. By today, per capita income [in the GDR] has reached the FRG level of 5 years ago. It is twice as high as ours.

It is worth noting that Germany also received a gift from the East in that same year of 1952. It was Khrushchev’s Macchiavellian idea to suggest to the nations of the Warsaw Pact that they adopt a resolution to the effect that the issue of German reunification had ceased to be a matter for the big powers—although the four powers would still be responsible for Germany as a whole. From now on, the Warsaw Pact resolution stated, [German reunification] was solely a matter of the sovereign will of the two German states. We might add that the Warsaw Pact nations did not come out against the concept of a confederation of the two Vietnamese states which were also living under two different systems.

Now neither of the two world powers would agree to a unification of Germany on the basis of a common social system because that would destabilize nuclear peace. On the other hand, a confederation of two social systems would constitute a new model of a world that is divided by two different social orders but is completely unified on the human level. In this way,
the Germans could play an important role in keeping the peace in central Europe—a continent that is studded with missiles the explosive power of whose thermonuclear warheads is equal on both sides. We must make it clear to ourselves that such a confederation does not constitute any revision of its borders whatever for Poland. That opportunity never did exist for the Germans because that would have required the approval of all four powers. In reality, they were never interested in it either. For a drive to the East [Drang nach Osten] they are simply lacking in biological strength—both in the GDR and in the FRG.

Let us openly admit that the threat of a frontier revision has been our domestic policy bogeyman for about 40 years with which we have emphatically confronted Poles of all generations for a variety of reasons. Let me stress once again that Germany does not have the physical resources at its disposal to bring about a revision of its eastern frontiers. And not even the Germans are interested in a third world war with Russia because that would result in their third and final defeat.

In the long-range policy assessments of both Germanies, the existence of Poland between the Oder and Bug rivers has been considered a permanent factor for some time. It is another question whether the leaders of Prussia believe that lasting weakness of Poland and its lasting dependence on Russia are a requirement for the existence of a strong Germany.

Polish-German relations do not develop in a vacuum but as part of a concrete international situation. Because of the overwhelming power they possess on the strength of the means of mass destruction at their disposal, the two world powers must look for new ways of coexisting unless they are willing to engage in a suicidal conflict.

The epoch during which political wisdom called for weakening one's neighbor has come to an end. If mankind wishes to survive the nuclear threat and if ways toward a lasting peace are to be found, then the big, the medium-sized and the small states of this world have to devise a formula of coexistence which is based on general and mutual strengthening. I know that we still have a long way to go; but I also know that there is no other way and that our foreign policy must concentrate on this possibility.

I will now return from these global prospects to our Central European region and would like to point out the following in conclusion:

As the author of "The Problems of the Poles," I have had the courage over the past 40 years to call on my countrymen—both inside Poland and abroad—to pay proper respect to the Germans and the Russians; to look to their virtues and not to their faults and to leave them to worry about the latter. From a domestic policy point of view, Poland's future
irrevocably depends on our industriousness, our economic capabilities and our law-abiding attitude. But from a foreign policy point of view, it depends on our ability to work together with all the world's peoples, to engage them in dialogue—and to start with our industrious neighbors.

One should not be permitted to leave the nation with the impression that Germany may have stopped being an important factor in Central Europe but that she is still in a position to bring about a revision of the frontiers which might even result in a renewed partition of Poland—but this time of socialist Poland by two socialist neighbors—as parliamentarian Ryszard Wojna did on television in September 1978. I protested against this in the Sejm then and I am now raising my voice in protest one more time.
LIPSKI BELITTTLES ANTI-GERMAN PROPAGANDA

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German Vol 38 No 34, 20 Aug 84 pp 90-91

[Article by Jan Jozef Lipski: "Two Bandits"]

[Text] Lipski, 58, literary scholar and adviser to "Solidarity," was among the principal defendants at the trial of the KOR leadership, which has since been cancelled. His topic is the Polish borders, the continuing trauma of the Poles of his generation.

There is a reliable barometer one can use to measure the need felt by the government and the party at any given time to establish real contact with the people.

That barometer registers the number and type of attacks in the press, on radio and on television against revisionist trends in the FRG—where revisionism, of course, is construed as the desire to redraw the Oder-Neisse line.

It is an inaccurate barometer; it can be thrown off, for example, by the expectation of German credits at which time virtually no objective connection to the emergence of such trends can be detected.

Generally speaking, the matter of Germany serves Polish propaganda as a domestic theme and not one relating to Polish-German relations. Simply put, it is the only issue which—appropriately tinted and garnished with half-truths—will elicit a positive response among a large part of the population.

To understand why this happens is extremely important both for the Poles and the Germans in my opinion. At this very juncture, the barometer is registering bad weather, but it is more important to understand how this mechanism has been operating for years than to analyze a particular situation.

The primary cause for the operation of this mechanism is the permanent socio-psychological state of mind peculiar to the Poles since the time of World War II—although its roots reach farther back into the past.
In general terms, the Poles are very sensitive when it comes to their Western neighbors. One should not be surprised about that. The author of this article lives in a city which went through 5 years of German occupation during which there were uninterrupted arrests, torture, deportation to concentration camps and executions. For almost one-half year, in 1943 and 1944, mass executions of one or more dozen people took place every day in the streets of Warsaw with the horrified pedestrians looking on.

I, too, was a helpless witness of the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto. I saw the mountains of corpses of civilians murdered during the Warsaw uprising in August and September 1944. In the cemeteries of dozens of villages the victims of the pacification programs are buried side by side: children, a few months or years old; their parents, grandparents and great-grandparents. And that is the way it was from the Baltic Sea down to the Carpathian Mountains.

The initial reaction of anyone who remembers those days is to take flight when he suddenly hears someone speaking German on the street behind him.

How easy it is under such circumstances to manipulate human phobias and resentments en masse. Those who are too young to remember got their information through the family or national tradition.

Thus, it is a very simple matter to portray manifestations on the fringes of life in the FRG as representative of the entire country; to make it appear as though it were a breeding ground for neo-Nazism and expansionism—while the GDR, of course, is skillfully exempted from any such verdict.

Everyone knows how easy it is to elevate marginal issues to the rank of major problems under proper conditions and as for the Poles, their fears are aroused even though they know perfectly well they are being manipulated.

Fear of a return of German expansionism or, worse still, Nazism takes concrete shape in the fear that existing trends in the FRG calling for a return of territory might become reality. It is these fears which are being cleverly manipulated by the mass media.

Many Poles today either know or understand that the Potsdam Agreement which resulted in the expatriation of the Germans from the Oder-Neisse territory and the settlement of Poles from the eastern regions of Poland in that territory is a two-edged sword.

For the Poles, the problem was to find enough territory for millions of their compatriots who had lost their own homes to continue living. For Stalin, it was a reliable means of chaining Poland to Moscow for all eternity.
Since that time, any sign of Polish disobedience opens up a variety of perspectives ranging from Soviet intervention to the vision of a Poland which might have an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with a Germany intent on revising national frontiers all the way to a repeat performance of the partition of Poland, including the infamous Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 1939.

It should be pointed out that the problem of the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line, which was part of the Third Reich prior to 1945, is by no means an easy one.

The view represented by the author of this essay cannot count on a majority of the Poles or, for that matter, of the Germans of today. Some time ago, I attempted—perhaps in too fragmentary a fashion—to put this view of mine forward in an article entitled "Two Fatherlands—Two Kinds of Patriotism" which has also been publicized in Germany.

Why did the Poles enter these regions in the second half of the 20th century? Generally speaking, the Germans are loath to recall that the Nazi government—which was not lacking in support of the German population at the time—was the one which signed that pact with Molotov. It called for still another partition of Poland; Poland was to be removed from the map of Europe for all time.

The consequences of that agreement can still be felt today. After World War II, millions of Poles from the eastern regions of their pre-war republic were given the choice of remaining in the Soviet Union, which inspired them with fear or of living within the borders of a newly emerging Poland which not everyone at the time could foresee, to be sure, would turn into a mere protectorate.

For that matter, the decision on the new borders was reached by the big powers without Polish participation although with Polish acquiescence.

At that time, the expatriation of the Germans from these territories was decided upon and accompanied by a propaganda campaign inside Poland which attempted to buttress the new state of affairs with the help of historical and ethnic evidence, most of which was of doubtful value.

After all, only one argument was really convincing. If Poland had been waylaid by two bandits—namely Hitler and Stalin—then it could not be right that those who were the victims of the attack would have to pay for all the damages.

The problem was resolved at the Germans' expense; of those Germans who had been living in the region east of the Oder and Neisse until 1945. Only a precious few Poles are aware of the fact that these people suffered an injustice—where expulsion from the house of one's fathers
house has always been viewed as such—and that it makes no difference how
great a share of guilt any given one of them bore.

Among the expatriated Germans there surely were some who had taken part
in the extermination of Jews, Poles and others and there also were some
who had strongly supported the Nazis. But there also were others who had
done almost nothing wrong—unless we are thinking of the general con-
ception of sin of the Catholic Church which speaks of sins of omission or
in other words of passivity in the face of evil.

But these are the very ones who are entitled to our deepest compassion.
They were the victims of a kind of collective responsibility; of a prin-
ciple, in other words, which cannot really be accepted without any re-
servations whatever.

Otherwise, those who came and took over their homes would have been the
only ones who fell victim to foreign attack. The choice that was made
was but the more advantageous evil for the Poles and, for that matter,
probably the lesser evil as well. But it would certainly be deplorable
if the majority of my countrymen were unaware of the moral ambiguities
involved in making that choice.

We cannot accept the principle of historic collective responsibility as
a kind of moral law. Still, one cannot reject it in its entirety either.
If a Polish ship were to sink the largest oil tanker in the world today,
for instance, all Poles would have to pay the damages as a matter of
solidarity. The Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, on the other hand, was not an
unfortunate accident.

I believe that anyone who was unfortunate enough to be deprived of the
house of his father is at least entitled to some kind of moral compen-
sation—and understanding as well. After all, just as there are many Poles
who still dream of returning to Vilnius or Ivov, these people are full
of longing for Wroclaw and Szczecin.

They would even have been entitled to this type of moral satisfaction and
understanding, if not a single individual in Germany had ever acknowledged
his obligation to make some kind of moral restitution to the Poles for
everything that happened in Poland between 1939 and 1945.

But that is not the way it is. The attitude of the majority of Poles is
not one of understanding. This might be explained by the perception of
an unequal amount of unjustified suffering which easily makes one forget
that lesser guilt is guilt just the same.

And that is the reason why most Poles do not think about why the Polish
bishops told the Germans some 20 years ago: "We forgive and ask for your
forgiveness in return."
Now then—in the Szczecin, Gruenberg and Wroclaw area there are people living today who settled down there around 1946. The young army veteran or the man who was resettled there from the shores of Lake Njemen opened up a new chapter in the history of that region. Now, the fourth generation is starting out in life there.

Now and then, these people read in their newspaper or hear in the news on television that someone has plans to drive them out of their homes. Where to? Why? What for? They are seized by fear and by anger at the same time. They are under no illusions as to what that would look like. They just know it from history and from family tradition and the older ones among them know from personal experience. They reach the conclusion that the history of injustice will never come to an end.

Whenever the Poles as much as start dreaming of throwing off the Yalta yoke, they are reminded of the German threat at their very gates. Dozens of highly qualified scholars and journalists work on this project and it is at this very juncture—on the basis of memory and fear—that a strange kind of national understanding or perhaps only a partial substitute for it becomes possible.

Whenever communist power in Poland does not feel it is strong enough to ignore the man in the street completely; whenever it feels the necessity to look for an albeit limited sense of community, the country is deluged by a massive wave of propaganda dealing with the issue of the German danger.

These efforts would be for naught, of course, if they could not be supported and illustrated by authentic quotations from statements made by German politicians and journalists. This type of material can always be found somewhere. And that is how fear and the perception of danger can once again be aroused among the Poles.

Only a real expert can tell how serious and credible such quotes actually are. The tendency, in any case, is to believe in the authenticity of the quotations. What is familiar—the post-Yalta order—suddenly appears safer than anything that might conceivably take its place.

For all that, the Poles not only worry about revisionism and the call for a return to the borders of the Third Reich. There is another phenomenon which crops up in the German media that nettles the Poles. As an expression of praiseworthy concern for the fate of peace in Europe and the avoidance of conflict in Central Europe which would break out as a result of any possible destabilization of the situation, voices are frequently raised in Germany calling the Poles to order—which is another way of telling them to accept their enslavement in perpetuity. To Polish ears, this sounds as though the Germans and many other peoples...
had a natural right entitling them to freedom, sovereignty and a democratic way of life while the Poles, by definition, deserved nothing but serfdom.

Such help to the Kremlin—coming from an unexpected quarter—makes the Poles terribly unhappy. The image the Poles have of Germany is multi-layered in several respects. On the one hand, it is an image tainted by memories of the occupation years and solidified by propaganda of a hostile and dangerous land and at the same time an entirely different image as well—the image of well-governed and well-administered country with a functioning economy and beyond that of a democratic country in which many a Pole would very much like to live. How these two images can exist side by side is not easy to understand.

The average Pole is not expecting the Germans to occupy Warsaw, Poznan or Cracow these days. But it is not difficult for the Poles to imagine a scenario where the Germans would make a grab for Silesia and western Pomerania. What an opportunity for the propaganda machine to arouse such anxieties and fears!

The younger generation is much less given to resentments and fears than the older generation. Young people are not so sure whether they should believe in the television broadcasts which are always warning them of the Germans and of which they know that they are almost always untrue.

More concretely, they are afraid of the Russians and the Soviet tanks nowadays. They are aware of the fact that no one (except the Poles living in the West) helped them more than the Germans during the most difficult months of the crisis and the imposition of martial law in their country.

But it takes only a few ominous statements from West Germany and a few well-designed broadcasts and articles in Poland's communist media to spoil what has just begun to sprout. The fear and the memory of German execution squads of 40 years ago return; the feeling of being threatened and having to defend oneself.

The successes—and conversely, the failures—of the manipulators of Polish propaganda which chains us to the Kremlin thus depend in large measure on the Germans.
BRIEFS

HYDROCHLORIC ACID SPILL—Throughout the night of 22-23 August an 80-man firefighting crew worked to clean up and contain a dangerous hydrochloric acid spill from a tank containing more than 20,000 tons of this substance located in the storage area of the "Chemia" Chemical Products Marketing Enterprise in Katowice-Ligota. A large quantity of this caustic substance was discharged from the tank due to a leaky or half-opened valve. For a while, clouds of hydrochloric acid vapors posed a threat to citizens in nearby homes and in the vicinity of the railroad station. However, it did not prove to be necessary to issue the call for their evacuation. Fortunately, no injuries were sustained by citizens or by the firefighters taking part in the clean-up action. After the leak in the tank was repaired, firefighting units working in special acid-resistant suits set to work cleaning up the contaminated area. An investigation is under way into the causes of this dangerous accident. [Text] [Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 24 Aug 84 p 2]

CHEMICAL PLANT EXPLOSION—A tragic accident occurred on 21 August on the premises of the "Pollena" Chemical Industry Plant in Gdansk. For reasons that are not yet clear, an explosion occurred during the collection of waste liquors, as a result of which Leszek Olczak (30) and Ryszard Molenda (27) were killed instantly. The governor of Gdansk Province has convened a special commission headed by the vice mayor of the City of Gdansk to determine the circumstances and causes of this accident. [Text] [Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 22 Aug 84 p 2]

CSO: 2600/1227
To his excellency Mr Nicolae Ceausescu, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania:

Esteemed Mr President,

I take pleasure in writing you this year on the occasion of Romania's National Day, the 40th anniversary of Romania's liberation, to convey to you sincere greetings and best wishes on behalf of the American people.

In your recent message to me on the occasion of America's independence, you expressed your satisfaction with the upward trend in Romanian-American relations. I too, am pleased.

In the past year, your country continued to make important contributions to easing tension and solving international problems. We very much appreciate the talks between our two governments in the interest of strengthening security and peace throughout the world. Trade between our two countries is increasing to the benefit of both sides.

In Los Angeles, a few weeks ago, Romanian athletes won distinctions for their country and new friends for the Romanian people from all over the United States.

The events of the past year reasserted the mutual friendship and respect which characterizes relations between our countries and peoples, and I am convinced that these relations will continue to thrive in the future.

Yours sincerely, Ronald Reagan.
CEAUSESCU DECORATES RADULESCU ON BIRTHDAY

AU042011 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1852 GMT 4 Sep 84

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 4 September 1984—During a festive meeting held at the headquarters of the CC of the RCP on Tuesday, 4 September, Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the RCP, president of Romania, handed over to Gheorghe Radulescu, member of the Executive Political Committee of the CC of the RCP, vice-president of the State Council, the order "The Star of the Socialist Republic of Romania," First Class, conferred under presidential decree on his 70th birthday for his contribution to the implementation of the policy of building the multilaterally developed socialist society promoted by the RCP and the Romanian state.

The festivity was attended by Elena Ceausescu, Prime Minister Constantin Dascalescu, and the other members of the party and state leadership of Romania.

Gheorgha Radulescu thanked and conveyed to the party leadership, to President Nicolae Ceausescu personally his deep gratitude for the high distinction awarded to him.

President Nicolae Ceausescu took the floor congratulating the feted.

The other members of the party and state leadership also congratualted Gheorghe Radulescu cordially, wishing him good health and work further successes in his activity.

The Executive Political Committee of the CC of the RCP (sent) a letter to the feted whereby it expresses esteem and appreciation for his long-standing in the service of the lofty ideals of the party, of the building of socialism and communism in Romania, and wishes him ever greater achievements in his future activity.

CSO: 2020/84
EVANGELICAL CHURCHES ASSESSED

Budapest EVANGELIKUS ELET in Hungarian 15 Jul 84 p 5

[Article by Emil Koren: "Sister Churches in Romania"]

[Text] Two independent Evangelical ecclesiastical bodies exist in the Romanian Socialist Republic: the Augustine Confession Evangelical Church and the Augustine Confession Evangelical Presbyterian Council Church. On the basis of native language the former are called the Transylvanian Saxon Evangelicals and the latter Hungarian Evangelicals, although—as we shall see below—they are quadrilingual.

The Transylvanian Saxon Evangelical Church is the older and it also has larger membership. In 1518 in the Reformation Era, Janos Honterus published in Nagyszeben the writings which popularized the Reformation; his statue stands in Brasso at the base of the famous "black church." This church also had a strong ethnic unity. The settlements of the Transylvanian Saxons can be recognized even today by their enclosed buildings: they do not have an open fence facing the street, the large, closed gates of the households are girded by a high stone wall. This ethnic solidarity always meant unity in faith as well. The travel reports speak of them as an island living in the embrace of the Eastern Carpathians and the Fagaras Alps. In recent years this isolation has been significantly relaxed. The flow of people from the provinces to the cities has broken down this closed world, and many have migrated, and still are migrating, to the FRG. The church leadership is trying to hold down this loss, particularly with a strong maintenance program for ministers.

Today about 170,000 members of the church are registered who live in almost 200 congregations under the pastorship of 150 ministers. A bishop governs the church at the top, at present Albert Klein, who lives in the ancient Transylvanian Saxon city of Nagyszeben. Their theological branch is also located there, conducted in the German language. Nagyszeben is also the center of their cantor training.

Their ministers wear Lutheran jackets but not with the usual twin, white tablets, rather with a bejeweled bronze disc hanging downward on a long chain from the neck; this is their ancient tradition.
Their clergy training takes place at the only ecumenical institution in the Romanian Protestant world. The university-level United Protestant Theological Institute since 1949 unites the training of the Romanian Reformed, the Hungarian and Transylvanian Saxon and Unitarian clergy at Kolozsvár (Cluj), with a branch at Nagyszeben.

This is also where the clergy of the other Romanian Evangelical ecclesiastical body is trained, that is, the future ministers of the Augustine Confession Evangelical Presbyterian Council Church. This ecclesiastical body is the smaller of the two. It has scarcely 30,000 members in hardly more than 30 congregations. But while the Saxon Evangelicals form a close ethnic unity, this ecclesiastical body is characteristically fragmented. The bishop's seat is at Kolozsvár, and the bishop is Pal D. Szedressy, who has honorary doctorate from the Budapest Theological Institute. In its dispersal, this small church is divided into three bishoprics. Most of them are native Hungarian speakers, but the thing of interest about them is that they hold services in four languages—Hungarian, German, Slovak and Romanian. In Bucharest they have a congregation that is purely Romanian in language and had its origin from a Norwegian mission. On the western border, on the other hand, there is a Slovak-language congregation living in one bloc. Scattered in their other congregations, they also hold services in German—as a result of their being interspersed with Transylvanian Saxons in many places. Between the two world wars the famous leading personality of blessed memory was Andor Jarosi. This Kolozsvár minister who was known as a polymath also attracted a number of scholarly theologians from our place to Kolozsvár. Among other things, he compiled the holy liturgy used there.

We have sisterly relations with both ecclesiastical bodies, relations that under the given conditions are understanding and developing. One sign of this is that our bishop Dr Zoltan Kaldy is honorary doctor of the joint Protestant theological school at Kolozsvár. At the conferral of his degree, the Romanian Orthodox Church was also highly represented. The Kolozsvár theological school engages in constantly good discussions with them.

The two ecclesiastical bodies of the Romanian Evangelicals live in close mutual contact. The historical example of this is that once when the church was being built by the Transylvanian Saxon Kolozsvár congregation, Marton Liedmann, Transylvanian Saxon minister, commemorated in German-language verse the community that was being built of "Magyars, Szekelys and Saxons." At the 150th anniversary celebration of the church which was held 4 years ago, I wrote in their memorial book the following verse:

"Magyars, Szekelys, Saxons"
we think of you with a blessing!
You bore the burdens of life
and you put in stone
the dreams and plans of your heart.
It ripened into a church.

39
Its walls are filled with music, 
the prayers and thanks resound: 
Your faith was not in vain; 
we think of you with blessing: 
"Magyars, Szekelys, Saxons!"
'POLITICALIZATION' OF CASE OF 28 DETAINNEES DEPLORED

Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jun 84 pp 12-13

[Article by Zoran Erak under the heading "Case of the 28": "Simple Methods--Complicated Consequences"]

[Text] The act 2 months ago of hauling the "group of 28" out of a Belgrade apartment has, in spite of the belief that it was a matter of a routine operation, unexpectedly become a "case with complications" and an example of negative interest politicization.

A full 2 months have already passed since that well-known act of hauling off the "group of 28 in the company of Djilas," but indeed not enough is known about the results of what was thought to be merely an ordinary, routine finale to a security agency operation. On the contrary, it seems that the 2-month-long course of this particular incident has been rather rocky, and that it is hard, other than in terms of all sorts of speculation, to assert with confidence what the final outcome will be.

A recounting of the events demonstrates how even customary and routine operations can develop complications, to the extent that what are the most natural acts within a sought-after simplicity of operation become jeopardized.

First of all, we should recall that the abovementioned group was hauled off on 20 April from a Belgrade apartment, that most of them were released practically immediately after interrogation, and that according to official reports "reasonable suspicion" was confirmed that the abovementioned 28 individuals had "gathered for purposes of hostile activity."

Allusions and Illusions

The return of those persons for renewed questioning and the detention of some of them resulted in the opening of an investigatory procedure and the assembling of evidence needed to fill in the blanks in possible indictments of some of the members of that group. However, things got, almost certainly in spite of the desires of those carrying out the investigation, considerably more complicated.
First of all, there occurred the suicide of Radoslav Radovic (one of the "28"), a young Belgrade worker, and talk surfaced in terms of some truly fantastic schemes concerning the causes of his death. In the avalanche of petitions which subsequently followed, the security agencies were directly or indirectly accused of being guilty of the death of the young man, and some people went as far as putting the word suicide in quotes—with the obvious allusion.... But there is little discussion of the fact that that allusion (stirred up in spite of the official report) is plainly illusory, because every reference—whether biased or unintentional—to the possibility of Radovic's death having been a violent one runs counter to the most normal logic. An concerning that death what is being speculated both at home and abroad, and in the most perfidious fashion, says more about intent to "exploit" a particular case than about intent to find out the real truth.

And the further course of events tells us that during the stay on official premises of one of the individuals carried off from the apartment he attempted suicide by cutting his veins with glass from broken eyeglasses and then swallowing the pieces of glass; this again has been used for speculations concerning systematic features of the procedures of security agencies. Of course there is no need to explain the motives for all the dimensions and qualities that could be (and were) attributed to this latter occurrence among those who want to see it (and explain it) in the fashion that suits them....

Furthermore, the whole business, which we said should have been carried out with the routine ease customary for activities of this kind, was complicated by the decision of the individuals brought in at a later stage and held in detention to go on a "hunger strike of unspecified duration." That decision of theirs gives, of course, this whole story something of an odor which cannot be easily gotten rid of, and it is initiating what is in our country, at least up to now, an unfamiliar (from the standpoint of its "mass" nature) situation. Woven into everything is the inevitable and unavoidable international factor, and circulating among the public in Yugoslavia, hungry for information about the real state of affairs, are new petitions with demands that the detainees be freed. Because, it is asserted, "this [detention] is an act which (according to the detainees—Z.E.[Zoran Erak]) causes damage to this country," all the sooner since we are talking, several "sources" maintain, about individuals whom it is hard to put any higher than in the bottom ranks of a classification of opposition figures and enemies.

Petitions of "Non-Controversial Individuals"

One characteristic of some reactions in petition form is that on the petitions are to be found, in addition to heretofore familiar names in terms of such actions, also the signatures of persons who up to now, at least so far as is known, have not utilized that method of communication with state or party organs and whose personal life and employment histories are not burdened with any "compromising data." And even if we take the stand of those who think that a petition is something which cannot be fitted at all easily into the nature of this society and its mechanisms of public activity (and
thereby we are probably endowing the "vaguenesses" of the latter with clarity), there does surely remain a question: What is the reason for "non-controversial" individuals as well, all of them otherwise prominent and respectable intellectuals of diverse professions, to utilize that method in this situation? That is, to put it simply, a fact which even in the most superficial political analyses cannot be neglected—quite the contrary—but it is neglected.

Nowadays it is hard to say how much influence (those) petitions could or did have because, among other things, the way out of this unexpectedly complicated situation is imply not easy at all. Indications from "ordinarily well-informed sources" that a solution will soon be found and the hunger strike of several of the detainees will be ended cannot be confirmed at this time (the time of this writing), but it is nevertheless realistic to believe that a rational way out of the situation is possible.

In the "market in information" which usually gets quickly set up when it is a matter of these or similar kinds of things and when there is a lack of real information, one learns the following about the evidence assembled to date concerning the abovementioned "gathering for purposes of hostile activity:" although the evidence is, as has been asserted, "substantial" (in physical terms), it allows one to conclude that a possible trial could last a marathon length of time and could give rise to a series of additional complications, especially if one also takes into consideration the fanatical stubbornness with which the accused refuse to acknowledge guilt of any kind. But until there is official and complete information everything is, however, merely surmise.

Various Interests

And in the "analyses" of the vent in foreign circles, far-reaching conclusions are of course presented. In addition to the "explanations" regarding the so-called tactical reasons for this action on the part of Yugoslav security agencies, those analyses unfailingly float several "strategic" rationales as well. First of all, there is the customary statement that the event is absolutely definite proof of a certain nervousness on the part of the leadership in a situation of domestic trouble in the economic area, and so it is a "natural" act with a "warning" and "preventive" significance. The analyses go further, asserting that it is a sign of a certain change of course in the direction of harsher action toward any "different way of thinking," as well as toward the use of different, and not just political, mechanisms. How they justify those assertions is not hard to figure.

And there is noticeably intensified activity on the part of a number of international organizations (and the well-known Amnesty International is allegedly stating a desire for direct involvement in the outcome of the affairs), some of which are already "known" to be "very interested in the fate of intellectuals and fighters for democracy in Yugoslavia."

And of course we are not going to be able to escape those kinds of "interest" in the future either, but it is more than certain that in the domestic arena it is not impossible to do more so that easy pretexts for that interest are not provided.
It would seem that "cases" like this one could most probably be prevented by political actions. And certainly one example of those would be severe politico-scientific criticism of the ideas of some of those who were imprisoned (such as the ideas concerning the reorganization of Yugoslavia along the lines of creating just four republics), using mechanisms which exist in our country and which are indeed this country's democratic heritage.

However, in our country there obviously exists (in addition to some disagreement about this case) some disagreement about which methods for that "countering" struggle would suit the nature of our society, notwithstanding the fact that we are also all systematically agreed that such methods would not be repressive methods. The trouble is that sometimes, due to certain day-to-day needs, principled decisions are not carried out in principled fashion, and some isolated act of this kind (apart from demonstrating that decisionmaking cannot be made on a routine basis) calls into question the very aim of that act, notwithstanding that aim being determined in the best fashion.

Real Ones and Other Ones

Speculation in these types of circumstances, as to the interpretation of acts such as the one in question, is naturally unavoidable, but it cannot be allowed to "cancel out" the need of any society, and ours as well, to fight against /real/[boldface] enemies with all available means. And it is logical that those enemies may not be in nor in fact are only in the "intellectual" realm but are also to a considerable extent in the "material" realm—to provisionally term as enemies those persons who, for example in the economy, have been carrying out a genuine counterrevolution for a very long time. Failed investments, drastic undermining of the material basis of work, economic crime—these would be suitable occasions for our transforming firm determination to defend the foundations of our society—even by repressive methods--into action which would have general public support.

Neither is there nor has there been any dispute over the existence within our society of various enemies at work in truly intensified fashion. Those enemies openly call into question socialism and self-management and the SKJ [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] and openly state that it is time for those ideas—concepts of our reality—to finally exit the historical scene, while some of those enemies demonstrate extreme aggressiveness and militancy. Regarding political analyses, as much as the cores of that kind of attack have their basis in our current social environment, they seek and find the areas of their attack in ideas which are not merely an expression of criticism of current happenings in society. And we know that there are such persons, and we are acquainted with many such.

Instead of having public attention occupied by some important and preordained acts which we are obliged to either perform or to faithfully follow through after they have already been performed, we obviously need to avoid situations in which negative politicization occurs for cases neither the scope nor the nature of which—nor the most significant ramifications of which to any extent at all—can seriously influence our situation. On the contrary, the influence works the other way round.

And lastly, however political in its meaning and its echoes the event is which has been the subject of the foregoing lines, the resolutions to be prescribed are obviously up to the state agencies.

9631
CSO: 2800/393
Candid Discussion of Kosovo Problems

[Interview with Ismail Bajra, member of the Presidium of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee and chairman of the provincial committee's Commission for Inter-ethnic Relations, by Aleksandar Tijanic, acting editor-in-chief of INTERVJU, on 13 July 1984 in the headquarters of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee: "The Flag—Yes, Rehabilitation—No"]

[Text] One superbly organized and armed irredentist group will no longer cause havoc in Kosovo, since Bata Zivojinovic has put them in the hands of the law! This was in the film "Dangerous Trace," of Dragan Markovic and Miki Stamenkovic, which was shown a week ago to police experts in Kosovo headed by Mehmed Malici, provincial secretary of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs [SUP].

Immediately after the special showing Malici turned to Abdurahman Salja, the well-known Kosovo actor, who in the film renounces his irredentist son and assists in his arrest:

"It was a good thing that you gave the boy away."

"Forget it," Salja retorted. "You are just rubbing your hands because someone is helping you do your job."

However, that was only partly true, since Malici had been rubbing his hands 2 hours before the film began. That was when he appeared before newsmen with the official announcement of the arrest of 41 lovers of Trepca's silver. Over a period of 8 years this group had transported in hidden spaces of 14 automobiles and "melted down" several tons of silver from this mine (actually refinery) and thus utterly exposed the emptiness of the irredentist slogan "Trepca
Works—Belgrade Gets Built. How many billions this theft will run to will be shown by the final results of the inquiry, since many of those taken into custody have not yet had their turn at interrogation.

The police showed quite unusual haste in making the official report, since the most fantastic versions about the arrest of such a large group have begun to circulate through Kosovo. The action, which is like an object lesson for all those who are interested, demonstrated the highest capability of the revamped state security system in the province, which played this game simultaneously on "41 boards" without a single error or casualty.

Although this theft in Pristina is the topic of the day, another news item threatens maximum politicization with all the consequences whose outcome is probably not even guessed at now. This is the debate, who knows how many there have already been, about use of the Albanian flag. This time it all began with a question by Miodrag Stefanovic, delegate of Serbia in the Yugoslav Assembly: Why had the initiative on use of the flags of the nationalities, which had been sent from the Serbian Assembly to the Yugoslav Assembly, not entered into the regular procedure after more than a year? A few days later Nebi Gasi, chairman of the provincial state presidency, referred to his question in a conversation with a delegation from the Croatian Assembly, saying:

"Who are these people asking the questions and what is it about the flag of the Albanian nationality that bothers them?"

In the next session Stefanovic protested this kind of calling of the roll, appealing to the delegate's right to put a question. All of this, however, was indicative of the nonsense, which is not over yet: In some regions of Yugoslavia this flag, until the authorities make a final decision, has been proclaimed undesirable, while in others it has equality with the other insignia of the republics and provinces. This has confirmed the theory of absurdity, since in one and the same federal state one can go to jail in certain regions for the same act (displaying the flag of the Albanian nationality), while in others its display is considered a duty.

Since this topic is galvanizing the debaters and observers, we went to the headquarters of the provincial committee to find people to talk to who would present the view of the Kosovo leadership on the "case of the flags." We received answers to all questions provided we not give the names of those we spoke to. According to them, matters stand this way:

"The views adopted by the highest bodies of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia are that all the flags of the nationalities, in their present form, are equal to all the others. Thus we consider the policy positions on flags adopted while Comrade Tito was alive to be still in effect and binding on all segments of the LCY. They are an expression of our internationalism, of our revolution and of our community."

In response to the observation that the most numerous objections to the flags of the Albanian nationality have to do with the absence of any sort of Yugoslav symbol on it, we received this answer:
"These are artificial dilemmas. What flag of any nationality of Yugoslavia has any sort of joint symbol of Yugoslavism? What do the Serb, Croat and Slovene flags have in common, and what is now being demanded of the flags of the ethnic minorities?"

We mentioned the large red star.

"The Albanian flag also has the red star which our Partisans from Kosovo placed above the medieval eagle back in 1941, and Enver Hoxha placed that same red star on the same flag only 2 years later. It should be stated that we understand from everyday contacts in the field that people perceive this question, put after 15 years of lawful use of this flag, as a suggestion that "they want to take away our flag." That is why we feel that any change represents a new source of troubles for our leadership in Kosovo, since only political laymen can take the view that adoption of any sort of "new" flag can be settled by decree.

Radio-TV Pristina made no mention at all of last week's debate about the flag, while JEDINSTVO wrote about it extensively.

That day the tropical heat drove Kosovo's party presidium and state presidency to hold their joint meeting, devoted to the results of investments and future projects, in the woods of Grmija. At the same time, in the incandescent city—while boys in swimming trunks, just like in the fountains of Rome or under the hydrants of New York—splashed about in the fountain in front of the "Boro and Ramiz" Center, the perspiring leadership of party members at the university and of the city of Pristina recommended that penalties be pronounced because of opportunism against three professors: Dr Gazmend Zajmi, Dr Fehmija Agani and Ekrem Murtezaj. Two days later the opstina committee authorized its presidium to render a decision on the final version of the proposed penalties.

Given this crowded calendar, it is difficult to get to competent people for an interview, but thanks to old connections we did after all speak with Ismail Bajra, member of the Presidium of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee and chairman of that committee's Commission for Interethnic Relations. Bajra is otherwise known for his frank statements, which are often appraised and reacted to in opposite ways.

[Question] Let us start with numerous reports in the press, including our own paper, that the provincial committee has been debating the rehabilitation of Kadri Reufi, Jovo Sotra, Milos Sekulovic and others who were expelled from the League of Communists during the leadership of Mahmut Bakali.

[Answer] In the last 3 years the provincial committee has not debated any rehabilitation whatsoever. Such a request has not been submitted by a single party organization, nor, as far as I know, has anyone in that group filed a petition for rehabilitation. It is even difficult to talk in these terms about them since some of them are no longer alive, although I must say that the true state of affairs is not as it has been presented in the newspapers. For instance, Reufi was expelled from the Serbian Central Committee on the
same day as Latinka Perovic and Marko Nikezic. The Central Committee excluded him because of his work against the party in that period.

[Question] Which means that he was not expelled from the provincial committee and Central Committee because of a conflict with the Bakali line?

[Answer] After all, the people sitting in the Serbian Central Committee are not children! Everyone who was a member at that time knows why he was expelled. His rehabilitation today would constitute rehabilitation of that policy which Tito himself condemned in the meeting of the political activ of Serbia. It is true, however, that Reufi maintained a correct posture to the end of his life, but at that time there were many arguments in his statements similar to those of Nikezic. Matters stand differently with the other people in that group. In the seventies, at the time of the amendments, we had a small group here of members of the provincial committee who could not understand or did not wish to understand the essence of the changes being made at that time, and that was the basis of their conflict with the party. Among them were people who publicly criticized the two amendments related to the person of Comrade Tito. They contested his right to be elected to succeed himself without limitation, and they criticized his being simultaneously made president of the republic and chairman of the party presidium. People in that group put the question: On what basis is Tito granted such privileges? No one did that in this country except enemies. Incidentally, there are transcripts of those meetings, and you can see them.

In addition, that group did not even accept the new position of the autonomous provinces in the constitutional system, but spoke about "a threat to republic statehood." Some of them even propounded the argument of constituting all Kosovo's representative bodies on a parity ethnic basis. Descriptively stated, they advocated a Kosovo constituted on the principle of the "Cypriot community"—the Greeks to themselves and the Turks to themselves! When their cases were written about later, someone intentionally passed over all this in silence. It is an irrefutable fact that their policy was profoundly antiparty. That was the judgment at all levels—in Kosovo, again in Serbia, and also at the level of Yugoslavia. Incidentally, Tito himself kept constantly abreast of the events. It is interesting, however, that some spokesmen of their rehabilitation are now appearing in the newspapers with their articles, and those are the same ones whom at the time called that group "class enemies."

[Question] Yet one gets the impression that some of the assessments of the so-called "expelled group" received their confirmation in the subsequent course of events.

[Answer] That is true! There naturally was Albanian nationalism even at that time, and Sotra was right about that. It is true that back in 1968 we had a counterrevolution, but the essence of their criticism was premised on positions of Serb nationalism, statism, technobureaucracy, and even, believe me, certain positions which had been condemned at the fourth plenum. They did not demand realization of their proposals within the framework of policy, the party and self-management. As far as I am concerned, I am not one of those party members who says that fellow fighters who make a mistake do not deserve
another chance, but there are mistakes which we will not forgive. We will not forgive the followers of the Cominform, nor the forces defeated at the fourth plenum, we cannot rehabilitate those associated with the "mass movement," those associated with Nikezic, nor the Albanian nationalists and irredentists, since the "to be or not to be" of our society was involved in all the cases enumerated. Finally, I would not be able to favor the rehabilitation of people who have doubts about Tito.

[Question] Let us go back to the more general situation. All the official assessments indicate that the present situation in Kosovo is better this year than previously. What evidence do we have of that?

[Answer] Time has confirmed the realism of our assessments—and also of the debate in the Serbian Central Committee and LCY Central Committee—that thanks to the broadest support of the workers, peasants, young people and intelligentsia of Kosovo, we have achieved major victories in the struggle against the class enemy. The victories are all the more significant, since we achieve them without the physical presence of Tito and under difficult economic conditions.

[Question] The term "victory" is used in the essential definition of the word?

[Answer] No! We have achieved very important results, though not a final victory. However, we have managed to get people to understand that a battle is now being waged against traitors to the nationality and to the class, and we have thereby increased the ability of young people to resist the opium of nationalism. Of course, the real battle is won only on the ideological plane, and here we have not fully exposed with sufficient arguments the sinister nature of the slogan concerning an ethnically pure Kosovo and Kosovo as a republic. We have to do this thoroughly, since for all of us and for our society even one seduced or recruited Albanian child is too high a price to pay.

Of course, we will continue to use all administrative measures against the irredentists and nationalists, since whereas there were those who were led astray and uninformed before 1981—3 years later there are no longer any who are led astray, but only those who are convinced. So far we have won criminal convictions against 800 persons, although I believe that by the end of the year that number will increase to nearly 1,000, and more than 2,000 people have been punished for misdemeanors.

[Question] The situation is better, and the Irredenta is no longer carrying out a frontal offensive, but perhaps that is not even necessary if it is achieving its aim by the mere fact that the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins is still continuing by force of inertia, and now even mathematically the nationalists are planning the year in which, if the outflow continues at this pace, Kosovo will actually become ethnically "pure."

[Answer] The exodus is the most serious political and human problem in Kosovo. Today, thanks to the general improvement of the political and security situation, the number of applications for departure has dropped off somewhat. But we must be realistic and understand that the atmosphere of moving away because
of direct or indirect pressures is a serious infection requiring lengthy treatment. The principal slogan of the Albanian irredentists is an "ethnically pure Kosovo," but that is not our local specialty, since all the nationalists in this country want "their own" territories to be "purged" of others. It is an increasingly frequent case that workers and peasants are coming back to Kosovo, although objectively it is most difficult for them here, but I do not know of a single case in 3 years when any Serb or Montenegrin leader has returned with his family. It is as though they are doing forced labor here. I do not know how this will be taken, but I must make the observation that many Serb and Montenegrin leaders have houses, apartments or building lots ready outside Kosovo. This imparts such an atmosphere that one should not be surprised that the exodus should continue from the largest and most advanced communities—Pristina, Titova Mitrovica, Pec, Gnjilane, or say, Leposavic, where 99 percent of the population is Serbian.

[Question] I would not condemn the people. They have always carefully analyzed the gap between the words and deeds of officials, and they have probably come to the conclusion that if the leaders are already "taking care of themselves" outside Kosovo, they must "know more than they are telling."

[Answer] Well, there are also Albanian leaders who have long ago gone off to Belgrade with their families and will no longer return. We have almost made a kind of "Kosovo leadership" in Belgrade. But in those departures of Serbs and Montenegrins, aside from what is referred to as the concern for children and relatives—I see personal and political commercialism. I do not believe that any communities outside the province are so rich that they can just like that offer leadership positions and housing. There are firms in Belgrade where the entire management team is from Kosovo. We have cases when with half an hour's notice a university professor goes off and leaves his students though we have invested 30 years in him and educated him all the way from here to America. Incidentally, it is worth knowing that virtual encomiums about Kosovo are written in a majority of the applications for departure. One gets the impression that they are regretfully leaving "this communism," but "they must" because of children, family connections, better pay, or housing. We know, however, that a communist society has not yet been built in Kosovo, and we are surprised by the fact that once these people have gone, they say that they left because of pressure. It is time to clear up the matter of whether they are lying here or they are lying there.

[Question] There is quite a bit of talk about both Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism in Kosovo. In your opinion, what strength does it actually have?

[Answer] There is, of course, both Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism here, but it is less dangerous, less well organized and less aggressive than the Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism that comes from outside the territory of Kosovo, through various forms and channels, indeed even through certain newspapers and pronouncements.

[Question] Some of the respected members of the Albanian intelligentsia are still keeping a wise silence, obviously awaiting the outcome of the duel between the nationalists and the communists, not wishing to play the "wrong card" by committing themselves "too early" on either side.
[Answer] Our state has built up 99 percent of the Albanian intelligentsia since the war, and that thanks to the fact that we punished the parents, forcing them to send their children to school. If in these conflicts we had not had the massive support of the intelligentsia, we would not have been so effective recently. For instance, in recent years we have had almost half a million young people in school, and so far we have identified only 4,000 young people who participated in the disorders. And then, for a long time now we have not had a single interethnic conflict in the schools except for the case in Gnjilane. When that is the case, what right do any intellectuals have to keep silent for 3 years while we are fighting against Albanian nationalism and irredentism? In my opinion, these people are not just keeping an astute silence, but are traitors to the nationality because they are committing the greatest sin of not acknowledging the Albanian nationality's ability to judge who is a friend and who is an enemy. In that way they are courting the enemy, and they behave toward us as though we were calling upon them to go out in the street and spit on their own people. On the contrary, all we have asked is that they do their job for the party and the nationality. Which is why I have no idea why they should be regarded as better Albanians than me. To be sure, it should not be forgotten that all nationalists have always said they were the best part of the nation. That was asserted by the Balists, by the Chetniks and by the Ustashi. Thus we have cases today when traitors to the Albanian people refer to us in their leaflets as "traitors to the Albanian people, Serbophiles and people who are attacking Albanian culture and the Albanian people and intelligentsia."

[3 Aug 84 pp 12-13, 37-38]

Survey of Kosovo's Political Situation

[Article by Aleksandar Tijanic: "The Exodus, an Arithmetical Operation"]

[Text] A deep gap has opened up between certain leaders and the people in Kosovo! That is, in spite of the voice of the people, a month ago the leaders brought in Vukasin Visnjevac to be the coach of the "Pristina" soccer team.

Of course, Mehmed Malici, president of that team and head of the provincial police, knows best when to display a firm hand. And thus, although the fans here do not forgive Visnjevac for having at one time, when he was the coach of "Vardar," belittled the players on his present team, Malici did not give in. He was right. Today the training sessions of the soccer players are attended by 3,000 fans, who expect the new coach and the front line of Batrovic--Vokri--Salja to qualify for some of the European cup championships. That is the only way, say the malicious, of paying back the billion old dinars spent in this transitional period.

Azem Vlasi, by contrast with Malici, did not have that kind of problem. Having listened to the constituency, regardless of the wishes of the sports bosses here, he "arranged" for Aziz Salihu, suspended "Pristina" boxer, to go to the Olympics and to beat two or three heavyweights there, which was enough for a medal.
We owe this "Olympic" beginning to this sketch of the province's political panorama to the stance taken by those with whom we talked here. They say that newsmen are free of the obligation to give evidence of their assertions only when they write about soccer and—about Kosovo.

Because of the explosions in 1981, we were told in Pristina, this is the only federal unit in Yugoslavia about which newsmen do not hesitate to judge authoritatively after a visit of only a day or two: "The situation is bad or good," no matter which. What would happen, they ask here, if newsmen went, say, to Bosnia-Hercegovina and judged that "the political situation is bad or good"; and that the "police of Bosnia-Hercegovina are doing a good job or a bad job"? What would happen if the players on "Pristina" refused, like those of "Red Star," to go to a reception in honor of the winners of the Marshal Tito Cup? (Truly, would that doorman, of whom the "Red Star" management says that he is at fault for not having brought the players to the reception, be expelled from the party?—author's note)

The Period Since Rankovic

The atmosphere of the "political grill" on which the Kosovo activists are sizzling was described by Rade Glavic, member of the LC Provincial Committee, at a meeting of that committee 2 months ago. Serbian nationalism and Montenegrin nationalism, which arise in the form of revanchism, are conducive to the spirit of "living together, but separately," at least that is the assessment of certain comrades in Serbia, he said. Moreover, Glavic says that these nationalisms are manifested in different ways even though they are evoked by the actions of Albanian nationalism and irredentism.

"Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism have supposedly manifested their presence since Rankovic's funeral, and unfortunately a great deal of this is not being spoken about or written about," he says.

Acknowledging nevertheless the "constructive wave" on the part of some of the press, Glavic at the same time reproaches it for writing about "certain communists who at one time came into conflict with the party and for publishing posthumous interviews and a program of Radio Belgrade about the battle of Kosovo in the form of a parody of the counterrevolutionary events in 1981."

Glavic's analysis continues as follows: "If one is to write about those comrades, then the writing about them should be realistic and objective. I do not know their behavior or posture at that time, since I was not a member of the provincial committee, but I know that one group was engaged in factional activity against Kosovo and that at the time when the amendments and constitution were being written it was categorically against the autonomous rights which we have set down in the constitution. And then I remember quite well that one of them took the view that Comrade Tito should not be given the status of president of the republic for life.... The same reproach can be made to Comrade Milija Kovacevic, since everything he wrote about (newspaper articles about the genesis of irredentism—A. T.) seems to me to have been rather contradictory, and it turns out that he contradicted himself. I did not have occasion to hear him before the demonstrations, but I have heard that he had an
absolutely opposite view, and that even the leadership at that time had to
distance itself from its views, whereas today he has now gone to the other ex-
treme—attacking the entire leadership and pinning various labels on it...."

Glavic's exposition in the subsequent debate has been mentioned as urgently
necessary and as a useful model. So much for the questions which in part are
also touched upon by our feature "Letters to the Editor" in today's issue
(p 2).

Who Are the "Spies"

This has really been a hot summer in Pristina. It is no wonder that the in-
spectors have closed 87 private restaurants because 91 percent of the meat sam-
ples taken contained the bacteria which make it "unfit for human use." Even
the elite provincial hotel "The Grand" (five stars) was threatened with clos-
ing.

According to what we were told by the people at the reception desk, this hotel
is in many respects a symbol of the way they conduct business here. "The
building seems monumental and solid, but the walls of a large number of rooms
have been considerably damaged and contaminated with water coming from broken
drain pipes, and 50 telephones have disappeared." Before our eyes the bar-
tenders brought beverages from a nearby store to sell on their own account.

Well, those are only "illustrations" which can be found in a majority of the
hotels all over our country. But the following examples are somewhat less
common in other regions:

On 18 July, at 2230 hours, immediately after the woman announcer reading the
television news in the studio in Pristina finished reading the verdict against
the irredentist group, the chanting of several dozen people echoed in time
from the rooms in four student dormitories where the program was watched:

"Down with the spies! Down with the traitors!"

These "demonstrations" addressed to the province's judicial authorities lasted
some 10 minutes or so, but order was restored without any sort of intervention
by security authorities. Otherwise the situation at the university has been
given a passing grade, although it is said that there is still quite a bit of
opportunism, inactivity and passivity on the part of both students and profes-
sors. Those who are informed say that the situation will be still better
since the School of Philosophy will soon open a section for nationwide defense
and social self-protection for 60 students in the Albanian language and 20 in
Serbo-Croatian. It is expected that the proposed punishment of certain dis-
tinguished professors will have a constructive effect on the 14.3 percent of
the university's academic community who are members of the party. The action
conference there, however, is not satisfied with that percentage since party
members represent 48.2 percent of Belgrade students and 36 percent of those in
Nis.
Pope Cira and Pope Spira?

Whereas the chanting we have mentioned, one would say, is the standard way of heating up the political atmosphere in forms that appear to be self-generated and spontaneous, certain occurrences noted in Kosovo require a completely new "set of instruments" for analysis. That is, several gravestones of Albanians who were Catholics have been damaged in Prizren. At the same time in two churches (Janjevo and Letnica) a conflict broke out between two Catholic priests who were preaching one in the Albanian and the other in the Croato-Serbian language. To tell the truth (although the latter case has been referred to in several pieces of material and although VJESNIK wrote about it in an article by Nadira Avdic-Vlasi) the priests in Janjevo, with whom we talked, categorically reject the possibility of any sort of conflict, since they are both Croats.

Nevertheless, cases like this within religion, which supposedly does the maximum to erase ethnic differences, claiming universality, probably represent an extremist warning to Catholic Albanians to the effect that they belong exclusively to the Albanian nation and that any sort of points of contact with other nations will "not be tolerated," not even in the domain of the faith.

Probably for the same reasons Ismet Begoli, a newsman of TV Pristina (sentenced to 12 years in prison), who is the author of several programs in the Serbo-Croatian language about the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo declared before the court that he did not understand—"that language." The other 70 or so irredentists recently convicted behaved similarly. To be sure, the trials, compressed into 1.5 months, have obviously left the impression of a "crash program," so that some of the trials have been left to the autumn. However, the iconography of the entire judicial process speaks for itself:

The defendants are brought into the courtroom, where they are awaited by numerous relatives, among them quite a few children; they greet the public in the courtroom with a clinched fist, and they do everything to take advantage of the trials to "present the programs" of their own parties; the desperation of those who "qualified" for only 3 years of imprisonment was obvious, as was their shame before the "heroes" who were appraised at 14 years, which drove them to say that they had committed much worse things than those they were charged with in the indictment. This also confirmed the fact that there are no longer any misguided people among the four large illegal organizations which the state security system has broken up in recent years. These are all people with a thoroughly incorporated fixed idea.

The escalation of their minimal joint program—from an ethnically pure Kosovo, by way of a Kosovo republic, to armed actions and the maximum goal, which takes the form of "A Great Albania headed by Enver Hoxha" (whose stereotype was shaped on the anti-Tito principle), has also been obvious. Their program for armed action and thereby for speeding up some sort of "anticipated processes" is an obvious sign of nervousness and dissatisfaction with the way events are going in Kosovo.
The plan which has been made public for members of "one party" to blow up the bus between Donja Brnica and Pristina has driven people from that Serbian village to always examine all the corners suspiciously when they enter the bus. This settlement of 150 houses near Pristina recently renovated its church, although they do not have a permanent priest. Completely in line with the current fashion of competition in building mosques and churches, the peasants there tell us that there were hardly any households which did not help in renovating the place of worship. For example, many party members pledged contributions in the names of their unemployed wives. The local people also say that after the "explosive plans" were discovered, practically every household has bought a building lot outside Kosovo. "It is just that some people are still concealing this," the people of Brnica said.

By contrast with them, a sizable group of householders in Decane Opstina, both Serbs and Montenegrins, pooled their capital "in the self-management way" to purchase lots for building houses in the vicinity of Belgrade. A colony from Decane is expected to spring up on that site soon.

Living in Details

Those we spoke with in Kosovo expressed satisfaction with the general political situation almost without exception, but they unfailingly added a postscript—that they were not satisfied with the details. Yet the problem of the ordinary citizen is that he lives in the details and not in the general situation.

It is, of course, quite accurate that the general situation is incomparably better, that the government agencies are functioning incomparably more effectively, that the number of interethnic conflicts has been essentially reduced, and that many communities are being unfairly accused of being "in a state of disruption," just because in their jurisdiction someone has taken a piece of chalk and written the slogan "Kosovo a Republic" on a rural fence, but it seems that the concentric circles of action lose vigor as the radius increases.

At one of the meetings of the provincial committee it was said that a diminished number of outbreaks or their complete disappearance does not automatically signify a wholesome political situation. For the League of Communists, it was stated, this is only one of the parameters, just as the exodus is also only one of the indications. Unfortunately, even after 3 years the latter "indication" is not going as well as it might. That is, the exodus from Pristina has even intensified in the first 5 months of this year. Fourteen more people left than in the same period of last year. Those who are well-informed say that the results could be even worse, since many announced their departure only just in advance of the beginning of the school year, or after the summer vacation.

When one looks closely at the report not yet published and referred to as "information on the activity of the Kosovo LC in carrying out the conclusions of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee to stop the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo" (which has yet to be debated by the provincial committee), one draws the following general conclusions:
Many opstina committees of the LC have been late in furnishing information on people moving out. The figures from Prizren and Djakovica arrived only after several interventions and with a long delay. This is officially interpreted as the "attitude toward this major and complicated task of the Kosovo LC." Aside from the fact that the exodus is continuing on a disturbing scale from the largest centers: Pristina, Titova Mitrovica, Prizren, Pec and Gnjilane, 3 years after such records began to be kept it has been discovered that the opstina committees are using a differing methodology to tabulate those who have moved away. Some record the number of families who have moved away, others only parts of families, and still others record only the number of written applications for departure, yet others do not add up the individuals who have left.... All of this, according to the report, means that in "certain communities a formal approach is still being taken to this problem area, the problem is not fully grasped, and there is inertia and opportunism."

These facts had a bearing on the departure of 204 families and 2,285 persons leaving Kosovo from the beginning of the year up to 1 April. For the sake of comparison, last year 451 families with 1,444 members departed, aside from 2,897 individuals.

Stardust

The most recent figures, just published for the first time, show that between 1 January and 1 May of this year 418 people left Pristina, and 70 returned; 111 left Titova Mitrovica, and 37 requested return; 74 left Urosevac, but 46 families decided not to leave after talking with officials. One has returned. Pec saw 67 people go, Istok 18, and another 7 families have announced their departure. Five have returned. There were 106 who left Gnjilane, and 42 came back. Dragas Opstina said it had no exodus in this period, although, according to the data of the provincial bureau of statistics, this opstina "is short" 102 people. In Djakovica 22 have left or have announced their departure, and another 65 from Prizren. But nine have returned.

If we add to these figures the fact that should serve as a warning that in most of the field reports mention is made of a "potential exodus," which is to say that "feelers have already been put out," farms and building lots have been purchased outside Kosovo, the children have been sent to school in other areas, and there is a general hue and cry about the numerous leaders and enterprise directors (Serbs and Montenegrins) who have already done this, then it is worth asking:

"Have we found an effective political antibiotic for the crucial problem of Kosovo—the departure of Serbs and Montenegrins—which inevitably brings us closer to achieving the first aim of the Irredenta, an ethnically pure territory."

Speaking in one meeting, Sonja Scepanovic, member of the provincial committee, said that no analysis whatsoever was being made of how a majority of the Albanians in Kosovo were taking it hard that people who until yesterday were their friends, neighbors and workmates are leaving.
"I know people for whom the departure of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo is a drama of their own, but neither emotions, nor big words, nor phrases can bring back trust between the nationalities...."

In that kind of atmosphere the numerous official and unofficial reproaches addressed to the commissions for prevention of the exodus, either because of their formalism, inactivity or their merely statistical method of operating, quite seriously jeopardized their further existence, at least in their present form. With probably all this in mind, Sveta Dolasevic, chairman of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee, said in a meeting of the Pristina Opstina Committee of the LC concerning the political situation:

"The action to suppress adverse occurrences is not yielding the anticipated results. We have ranted and raged, we have raised a fuss, and the dust has settled and covered both us and the problems."

What we have placed under the category "details," which, however, is what everyday life consists of, remain in the shadow of the major strategic issues. Our attention was called to one such detail by a school principal and professor for many years in Pristina, who says that all the people there have their own political barometer for measuring both the general and the particular situation:

"In recent years I have noted certain changes in the children. If we give a score of eight to the general psychological condition, level and amount of lack of concern and enjoyment in the classes with instruction in Albanian, and a score of six to those with instruction in Turkish, then the score of the classes with instruction in the Serbian language would be a four. I get the impression that they are growing up and taking shape with some kind of psychology of a minority people with less rights. That again is a problem that is solved through the highest quality of interethnic relations among their elders."

It is precisely these interethnic relations, the exodus and the very serious economic situation (industrial output in the first 5 months fell 11.3 percent short of the plan and 4.3 percent short of last year) will be on the agenda of the Kosovo LC during this hot summer and fall.

However, during the entire year 2,006 Kosovo basic organizations of the League of Communists, out of a total of 3,389, have not enrolled a single member.

Who would dare to put his hand in the fire if those other "organizations" had behaved in the same way?
Letter to the Editor and Rebuttal

[Letter to the editor by Ismail Bajra, member of the Presidium of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee, and rebuttal by author Aleksandar Tijanic, acting editor-in-chief of INTERVJU]

To the Editors of the Newspaper INTERVJU

On 13 July 1984 in the offices of the Kosovo LC Central Committee, on the initiative of the Sector for News and Propaganda of the Presidium of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee and the Serbian LC Central Committee, I received Aleksandar Tijanic, acting editor-in-chief of your newspaper, for an interview.

Since A. Tijanic abused that conversation with me, I distance myself and regard as null and void those parts of the article which have to do with me (attributed to me) published in No 82, 20 July 1984, in the first installment of the feature article entitled "What Didn't Happen in Kosovo."

The abuse of the interview has to do with the following:

i. the author's failure to abide by the agreement to submit the interview for approval;

ii. the incomplete publication of my answers to some of the questions that were put, and

iii. attribution to me of his arbitrary, subjective and one-sided views and assessments of certain issues concerning the situation in the province.

Since the author did not abide by the agreement, I call upon the editors in the succeeding installments of that article not to mention my name in any context, nor to publish anything related to that interview.

I believe that the editors will respect this serious reproach and will take measures against the person who has committed a kind of professional (and not only professional) abuse.

Pristina, 20 July 1984

Ismail Bajra,
Member of the Presidium of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee

[Rebuttal by Aleksandar Tijanic]

Comrade Bajra, I am sorry for what we might call the misunderstanding, since you kindly received me and answered all my questions in exactly the same way as we had talked 8 months ago for NIN. Although your present answers are all but identical as 8 months ago, at that time you had no objections to my interpretation (the conversation was taped).
In your letter you do not indicate or correct a single substantive error, sentence or position in the published article, but remain at the level of objections in principle—which are not valid for the following reasons:

i. it is true that we agreed on approval of the text, but only if in my judgment there were things that were not clear in the writing. However, there were none;

ii. it is possible that certain answers were abbreviated, but only because of the technological requirements of the newspaper—any sort of expert evaluation by anyone's experts can ascertain from my notebook that this did not distort the essence of what you said;

iii. you say that I have attributed to you my own "arbitrary, subjectivist one-sided views and assessments of certain issues concerning the situation in the province." Throughout the entire article entitled "Flag, Yes—Rehabilitation, No," there is not a single "objectivistic or subjectivistic" assessment, but only four facts (the theft of silver, the showing of the film "Dangerous Trace," the punishment of the inactive professors, and the discussion of the flag of the Albanian nationality) and my conversation with you.

After you sent the letter to INTERVJU (and to certain other addresses as well) you verbally requested that we not publish its content, since you wanted, you said, exclusively to call the attention of the editors (and certain institutions) to errors in our article on an "internal" basis. However, the letter bore the seal of the Kosovo LC Provincial Committee and the designation "official" so that those facts compel us to publish it.

At the same time, your "internal information" raises certain essential questions about my professional, political and personal moral integrity, so that I am more inclined to settle accounts in public.

We will respect your desire, and we will not mention you in today's installment, since it is clear from the article in the last issue that our conversation had been brought to an end.

P.S.

Finally, as to your request in the last paragraph of the letter, the editors will examine the entire case and, as you say, "take measures against the person who has committed this professional (and not only professional) abuse"—as soon as they judge that it has occurred.

Incidentally, we hereby inform you that the editors cannot honor your request "not to publish anything related to that interview," since in their work they abide by certain other rules, but also regulations (among them the Law on Public Information).

Respectfully,
Aleksandar Tijanic

7045
CSO: 2800/456
LCY ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE FOLLOWING 13TH PLENUM

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jul 84 pp 8-9

[Article by Slavko Curuvlija]

[Text] The resolution of the 13th session of the LCY Central Committee announced a democratic, politically open discussion in basic LC organizations about differences and disagreements concerning essential questions that will determine the future direction of self-management. The elimination of state centralism and economic willfulness, the role of workers in decisions on income levels, federalization and factionalism in the LCY will all be discussed.

The publication of the Draft Resolution of the LCY Central Committee on realization of the leading role of the LCY and strengthening its ideological and operational unity officially opens the party-wide debate in which more than two million members of the LCY will participate, along with at least that many more working people and citizens in direct or indirect discussions. An organized process will be begun in the party base for critical testing and evaluation of the positions, weaknesses and competencies of the League of Communists for resolving current problems and establishing its role at the present stage in the development of Yugoslav society. The nearly 30 pages of text contain certain familiar formulations, for they include certain highly crucial items. For example, there is the exceptionally significant formulation at the very beginning of the text that asserts that we have "arrived at a crossroads that will determine the long-range future, content and prospects of socialistic self-management." We must keep in mind that this is no sort of rhetorical figure, not a demagogic concession to the lovers of bold expressions and great words; rather, it is a fact. The measures now being taken will determine the fate of self-management for a long time to come. Thus we must talk about the struggle for initiating the stabilization program in the resolutions as elsewhere as "the fundamental distinguishing mark of the present state of our society." But this says nothing about with whom and against whom the struggle will be joined. Doubtless that will become clear during the debate.
With political bravery, the membership is being told that the LC's activities are "hampered by differences in perceptions and in implementation of individual positions and determinations included in the stabilization program." The meaning of this assertion is emphasized by the realization that this is a matter of "differences and disagreement" in perceptions of certain "key questions, foundations and presuppositions of socioeconomic relationships that form the basis of socialist self-management." Thus, not inconsequential but "key questions". It is a matter of differing views of the manner for eliminating centralized state control and economic willfulness, respecting economic principles, and implementing the role of workers in basic associated labor organizations in deciding income matters... Everything including elimination of the causes for unjustified social differences. Nevertheless, presenting these facts increases the responsibility of those who are conscientious and who seek their immediate involvement. That obligation is placed directly on the LCY Central Committee and its Presidium. It is stated word-for-word: "We must confront indecisions, inconsistencies and resistance to implementation of the Long-Term Economic Stabilization Program. Communists, and especially those in prominent positions who implement LCY stands are once more opening up debate on positions of this program that have already been determined, and they are acting irresponsibly toward obligations for its implementation. They must bear the consequences, up to and including dismissal from their duties and expulsion from the LC. Among other things, the resolutions initiate questions concerning affirmation of the goals of mutual material and social development, coordination of strategies for economic, scientific and technical-technological development and determination of immediate tasks in the development of industry, energy, commerce, agriculture, retail trade and employment.

Efforts are also required for establishing mutual strategies for export programs and entry into foreign markets. All members of the LC leadership are obliged to provide for these discussions in institutions prescribed by the Constitution, and primarily in the LCY Central Committee and its Presidium. These requirements will be accepted by all who in the least way know the ties and the level of cooperation between individual regions of Yugoslavia in the areas listed.

Another part of the resolution relates to intraparty problems related to intraparty democracy, organization, manner of work, ideological work, personnel policy and, particularly, to problems related to manifestations of disunity in the LCY. In some places there is even mention of concepts of "federalization" and "factionalism" in the LCY. In this instance as well, the resolution goes somewhat beyond current general stories about disunity, insisting on the stand (which incidently is included in the LCY Statutes) of the central and provincial committees and their political executive bodies. They bear responsibility before their members, and also before the congress and the LCY Central Committee. There is talk of the duty of these committees to "develop their organizational structure, the content and the methodology of their work in a way that the LCY Central Committee will be able successfully to carry out the role of the highest agencies of the LCY between congresses." It obligates the Presidium of the LCY Central
Committee to conduct direct, permanent supervision of the situation in specific areas and of the implementation of resolutions of the LCY Central Committee in Leagues of Communists of the republics and provinces." As far as federalization is concerned, the resolutions state that it is expressed particularly in inconsistent application of the principle of democratic centralism in the LCY, in "inadequate and uniform, arbitrary perceptions and interpretation of the independence of the LC, the republics and the provinces," in "varying practices and differing interpretations" and implementation of "essential objectives of LCY policy" and "a voluntary and subjective attitude toward the resolutions of the LCY Central Committee."

Without much compromise or limitations, the resolutions insist on the responsibilities of the LCY Central Committee and its Presidium for "carrying out decisive action against such tendencies and their adherents in the LCY."

In all of this can be seen that much more is expected from the LCY Central Committee and its Presidium in the time to come.

The terms used in connection with these tasks do not, however, leave many dilemmas. They assert "they are responsible for assuring...", "they are responsible to keep records (of performance)..."

Along with well-known assertions and general requirements for reselection, rotation and the like, the section on personnel policy speaks quite specifically about the fact that "a stand must be taken in favor of nominating a larger number of candidates for various elective offices." We stress this since in past elections and election years, in most cases the supporters of this idea were not aided even by reference to the same words stated by Tito at the 11th LCY congress. Now the same stand is appearing in a completely official form, which nonetheless is still somewhat surprising, particularly since the debates about the functioning of the political system and the number of candidates still include conflicts between the adherents of this idea and those who resist its official acceptance.

The resolution draft puts forward a total of 56 different questions, of which we have mentioned only those that offer different proposals than previously heard. Among them is the stand that the LC should constantly monitor the implementation of the stabilization program and record determinations that contribute to growth in labor productivity and the development of self-management relationships. At the same time, efforts will be made for "timely supplementation and change" of everything that in practice turns out to be insufficiently effective for material and social progress.

Last Tuesday, the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee also approved the program for organizing and monitoring the debate. According to that program, during July and August of this year the LC will prepare a concrete program to establish the manner and time period of the debate. It will take into consideration the complete mobilization of the membership for considering urgent social questions. The debate will be dominated by
constructive proposals that will make a contribution to "reaffirming the role of the LC and escaping from the social crisis," assure proposals reflecting authentic opinion, and carry out ideological and operational differentiation through the debate. The debate in basic LC organizations will be conducted mostly in September and October of this year, according to established programs, especially at numerous meetings in every basic LC organization. One-session "processing" of materials is undesirable. The central and provincial committees will obligate their members to keep abreast of the debate in individual locations and organizations, and in addition, to form special groups to monitor these activities. Such groups will be composed of members and executive secretaries of presidiums responsible for the development of the LC, for ideological work and informational and propaganda activities. During the debate, an evaluation will be made as to whether it is necessary to organize special consultations and similar forms of activity about specific questions. The LC leadership will inform the LCY Central Committee about these problems and activities in its regular monthly information bulletins. At the end of the debate, the central and provincial committees will hold sessions devoted to analysis of the debate "on the basis of the total information gathered during the entire course of the debate."

On the basis of these analyses, the LCY Central Committee will hold a session and adopt the conclusions, by year's end. This in brief is the scenario as currently anticipated. The notes on the manner for conducting the debate contain a request that it be carried out in a critical, creative, democratic manner, with creative involvement and not simply formal statements.

Along with that, it is stressed that we should "eliminate the danger of extremist and radical approaches that would produce a negative attitude toward the proposed resolutions of the LCY Central Committee and toward the overall practice and accomplishments of our society."

Of particular interest and newness in monitoring the debate will be the fact that, on the basis of a decision of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee, the Presidium Center for Social Research in cooperation with the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade and the Marxist centers of central and provincial committees will organize scientific supervision of the course and results of the debate in 400 basic LC organizations throughout Yugoslavia (50 in each republic and province), and 40 opstina committees. The instruments for monitoring and analyzing the debate have already been prepared.

What is expected from this activity and the debate? It is expected to generate and develop presuppositions for further development of our socialist society and to strengthen the leading role and ideological and political unity of the LCY."

At a recent meeting with reporters, Marko Lolic said that this social action is of the greatest significance, while Jure Bilic stressed that there
is a question as to how we will prepare for the 13th LCY congress if nothing is changed in the next 2 years.

When this is tied to the stand mentioned above on being at the crossroads that will determine the long-range fate of self-management, then it is clear what is expected from this debate.

12131
CSO: 2800/440
PRAISE FOR SLOVENIAN OPENNESS TO DIFFERING VIEWS

[Editorial Report] An article, "Slovenian Cultural Crossroad," in the 4-5 August 1984 issue of the Belgrade Daily BORBA, page 2, by Zoran Medved praises Slovenia's cultural openness to differing views and to taboo subjects, citing the current interest in "moral dilemmas from the past" (in reference to recent criticism of the party over the so-called "Dachau trials" of 1948-52 and the Slovenian LC's attempt to justify them).

The article says that Slovenia's great diversity of cultural life has required a change in cultural policy, especially since in Slovenia there exists a continuity of openness and pluralism, i.e., principles which have since "the time of the Liberation Front [the forerunner of SAWP] formed a foundation of tolerance toward all those who think differently but are not therefore enemies of society. In this context an important place is held by Christian socialism, the ideas of which have signified progress in European countries and which are becoming stronger again today," although Medved adds, "unfortunately, Christian socialism which in a certain way continues to be linked to the church still has its other side: clericalism."

Also, he says there has been an "alternative youth scene" in evidence which "with strong moral demands has urged that integrity be reaffirmed in society as one of the essential values of socialist society. Although some radical advocates of this 'scene' have also been condemned, mostly because of their... lack of clarity, their demands require support."

The author says it would be a mistake to try to synthesize these ideas or separate the good ones from the bad. "Society can only benefit from a wealth of ideas which in Slovenia is also the basic motto for the work of SAWP as the front of progressive socialist forces."

He concludes: "The positive experience of [our] cultural policy was specifically expressed at the cultural workers plenum of the Liberation Front, a cultural parliament, which gathered together people of various world views formed under different social systems (minorities)." While this plenum laid the early basis for the democratic cultural concept in Slovenia, he said younger people are now taking over from the monopoly of the older generation, marking a "crossroad" in Slovenian cultural policy.
PERSONNEL CHANGES IN CROATIA DISCUSSED

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jul 84 p 11

[Text] Nominating the same number of candidates as available positions can at times be proper election.

At its largest meeting the Croatian League of Communists Central Committee coopted four members and selected one member for its Presidium and three members for the Croatian LC Statutory Commission. It is nothing new for the bodies and forums of the LC to change their composition during a term in office (the statutes permit up to one-third of the membership to be changed), since in 4 years there can be a number of reasons for supplementary elections. After the election of Josip Vrhovec to the Presidium of Yugoslavia a position remained vacant in the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee and Nikola Lapov, general director of the Plitvice National Park, was elected to fill the vacancy. For well-known reasons, Pavle Gazi ceased to be a member of the LC several months ago. In the meantime, Blazenka Bosnjak resigned from membership, as did Josip Vrhovec and Jure Bilic (a member of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee), as requested by the leadership of the Central Committee since as members of the LCY Central Committee they have all membership rights. By secret ballot the Central Committee filled these openings by electing Dragan Kolic, director of a basic associated labor organization of the Pastor enterprise in Zagreb, Tome Ribaric, president of the administrative offices of the "SOUR" [expansion unknown] at the Associated Metals Industries, Bjelovar, Zvonimir Vrbanc, vice president of the Basic Encounter Chamber, Rijeka, and Gordana Damjanic, special collaborator at the Varazdin Silk Factory. The new members of the Statutory Commission are Mirko Bojanic, Ivo Krile and Slavko Oreskovic, while Ivan Gregoric was elected president.

In all the information, one candidate was nominated for each post, so that the talk in the corridors was about what kind of elections were those when the only option was to circle a single proposed name?

Those who think this way were wrong this time, for the procedure used by the Presidium in this "mini-election" was an innovation in the practice of the entire League of Communists and in no way can it be said that it was not democratic and public.
Previously, the practice in such situations has been for the Presidium to prepare a list of candidates and send it to the regional leadership, with the stipulation that the list could be expanded but not changed. This time, instead of a completed list, criteria for nominating candidates were sent to the inter-opstina organizations. Thus, they avoided the earlier requirements that a candidate must be from associated labor, not older than 40 years of age, or a candidate must be female, if possible a member of the Youth League and in addition, from the field of education. Instead of that, the criteria offered by the Presidium seemed more like a public competition, for they stated that candidates must have labor and sociopolitical respect in their working environment and in a broader context, that they must be regarded as highly productive, creative and competent in their work, that they must not be from an employment situation that was working unsuccessfully, they must have shown progress in their work, and they must not have been long-time professional officials. Finally, a candidate was required to agree that he or she was seeking selection to the Central Committee as a sociopolitical obligation, and not as a means for realizing professional career advancement, and that by their reputation, knowledge, capabilities and possibilities they could be candidates for members of the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee in the next elective period, so as to assure working continuity. Candidates were also to be less than 50 years of age.

With obligatory consultation with opstina committees and members of the Croatian and Yugoslav LC Central Committees, all inter-opstina organizations sent their lists of candidates to the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee, on the basis of the criteria above. The lists contained 15 nominations for LC membership, 11 for membership in the Presidium and 12 for membership on the Statutory Commission. A new and interesting fact is that these organizations nominated candidates who were not among their membership, because they believed that the nominees were individuals who had attained a reputation among the broad republic. In only two cases, the nominators violated the criterion that a candidate could not be more than 50 years old.

All of these candidates were discussed at a joint session of the Presidium and representatives of the inter-opstina leadership, where a final list was proposed. But the selection process was still not completed. The inter-opstina leadership, together with the opstinas, had one more chance to give their opinion about the list. In this manner the definitive proposed list of candidates reached the members of the Central Committee, who approved it as submitted.

In deciding on this type of selection procedure, the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee made a significant step toward the democratization of personnel policy, and showed that one of the basic criteria for selection to the highest party positions must be work experience. That is best seen from the biographies of those selected. The manner for writing biographies was also changed fundamentally. Besides the customary data on the year and place of birth, nationality and specialization, now there are special sections that follow the nominee's record in major sociopolitical, public, self-management and social positions.
These are all new biographies and all new people, who as a rule were born and who grew up in this self-management socialist society. The biographies show that a new generation has arrived on the scene, that important political and social functions are being taken over by people in the middle years, in the prime of their vitality but with extensive work, life and political experience. The best illustration of such a biography is that of Nikola Lapov. Born in 1937, he has been a member of the LC since 1956, he began work as a warehouseman and continued in that work until 1967. After his education he became the chief of the business office, then director of a basic association labor organization and finally, general director. His sociopolitical career followed a similar route. He was a member and then president of the Opstina Associations and in the Croatian Assembly, then president of the Presidium of the LC Conference of the Opstina Association, Gospic, and finally a member of the Croatian LC Central Committee.

Thus it is true that the Central Committee members nominated the same number of candidates as were selected, but this time it was nonetheless done differently.

12131
CSO: 2800/440
BELGRADE POLITICALLY LIBERAL THEATER DISCUSSED

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 7 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Christine von Kohl: "Politics on Stage—the Impression of a Liberal Atmosphere in Yugoslavia Is Deceptive"]

[Text] Belgrade. First night at the theater: The first rows of the sold-out hall in the "Jugoslovensko Dramsko Pozoriste" are occupied exclusively by clergyman of the Serbian Orthodox Church; dressed in their black coffins, almost all of them have a full beard and long hair. On the stage, there are generals of the royal Serbian army, Premier Nikola Pasic, soldiers, common folk, and the then successor to the throne, Alexander Karadjordjevic. The play being performed is "Kolubarska Bitka" (Battle on the Drina), the dramatization of a novel by Dobrica Cosic. It is not so much a good play as impressive tableau vivant from the time this battle was fought on the eve of World War I, when parts of the Serbian army—suffering terrible losses—succeeded in inflicting a bitter defeat on the Austro-Hungarian army—an enemy far superior in number.

The moment that on the stage the folk hero, General Misic, falls to his knees, crosses himself and prays with the God of the Serbian Church for support, there are rounds and rounds of thunderous applause. When the curtain drops for the last time, all of the enthusiastic spectators, many of whom are moved to tears, remain seated until the clergymen rise.

This is a spontaneous demonstration vis-a-vis this church, which in times of oppression sided with the people. This whole night at the theater is a manifestation of the Serbs' well-nigh ardent love for their own history, in regard to which the heroism of the people and of the soldiers is more important to them than military victories or defeats. They suffer under their "tragic fate"—and this suffering comprises a political dimension reaching into the present.

The Serbs accuse the political regime in Yugoslavia of pursuing an anti-Serbian policy—a policy initiated by Tito (a Croat). On the political level, these emotions have been reflected in the Serbs' oversensitive reaction to what has been happening in Kosovo since 1981 and in the mass demonstration in August 1983, at the funeral of Minister of the Interior Alexander Rankovic who had been demoted by Tito (and who until his fall was considered the protector of the Serbian positions vis-a-vis the Albanian people in Kosovo).
Second night at the theater: The Little Auditorium of Belgrade's "Student Cultural Center" is packed with spectators of various age groups. The "Satirical Cabaret" with its polished musical interludes is presenting "The Unsuccessful New Year's Eve of 1953"—a title that to the uninitiated is hardly comprehensible. It is to be understood as a symbol of change, as it were, of the transition from one political era to the next.

Satire on Helpless Functionaries

The focus is on texts by Milovan Djilas and on the behavior of his party comrades in the winter of 1953-54. The cabaret presents a collage of texts published at that time, primarily excerpts from the series of critical articles that Djilas—who at that time was at the pinnacle of his political career—had published in the party organ BORBA.

The satire ridicules the helplessness and unprincipled behavior of functionaries who at first enthusiastically accepted the new ideas of comrade Djilas and proclaimed them at party rallies—until they realized that Tito had dropped his "crown prince" and had ordered him to be ousted.

The audience is having a great time—but there are differences: in the back row, the enjoyment is louder—among the younger generation that never had the opportunity to read any publications by Djilas, since for nearly 30 years he has not been allowed to publish anything in his homeland—than in the front row which are occupied by "more distinguished" people. In the second row, there is Djilas himself, accompanied by his wife and some friends.

After the performance, the organizers come up to the "protagonist" of the play, greeting him in an unconstrained, friendly manner.

Such events could give one the impression that a "liberal" atmosphere prevails in Yugoslavia or at least in Belgrade—an atmosphere permitting a degree of criticism, of elimination of taboos, such as has not been seen in any communist state since the Prague events of 1968.

That this impression is deceptive is evident from the fact that at about the same time, i.e. in the course of 2 to 3 months, three plays were prohibited.

One of these plays—"Politics as Destiny" by Ezad Cimic—was taken off the program immediately after the premiere in response to a signal of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Party organization. A second play—"Spawning Season of the Carp" by Alexander Popovic—which premiered in the East Serbian town of Fizot, fell victim to the criticism of the local Association of Veteran Partisans. The third play—"The Judge" by Vuk Draskovic—which had been performed for some time in Belgrade's "House of Youth" apparently did not suit the taste of Party circles in the capital.

A political theater scandal had occurred before, the previous year, making a stir in political and intellectual circles. After a few performances in the National Theater of Novi Sad, the capital of the autonomous province of Vojvodina, the play "Golubnjaca" was banned by the local Party organization, but it has since been staged in Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia.
The message of this effective, if not very good, play was a warning against the dangerous consequences of the repeated, one-sided and self-righteous accounts of the partisans' exploits vis-a-vis the enemy in the civil war (which coincided with the struggle against the occupation forces in World War II), i.e. in this case against the Croatian Ustashi.

Few Rehearsals to Evade Censorship

What nearly all of these plays have in common is the fact that they are based on texts that have already been published in one form or another. So they have cleared one of the obstacles of the censorship system. Another feature they share is that the actors show special enthusiasm in tackling projects that sometimes are apt to put their careers in jeopardy.

For the last few years, however, the political plays have been sharing something else: After all too few rehearsals, most of the productions staged are of inferior quality. The reason: The producers are always anxious to forestall a possible "intervention from above" effected before the premiere. The audience and the critics understand this.

Such interventions are effected with surprising harshness and without any punctilious regard for the—likewise imposed—self-administration system of the theater collective concerned. Since not a single production may be staged without the approval of this internal censorship body, the Party has to exert massive pressure if a play is not to its liking.

If there is no other way, the theater's directors are demoted— as was recently the case in Belgrade's "House of Youth" and—in the initial stage—in Belgrade's "Student Cultural Center."

The vocabulary the angry political organs employ in addressing the "socialized theater" includes concepts such as "petit-bourgeois," "antisocialist," "ultraleftist," and "harmful to the accomplishments of our revolution"—but they never put up for discussion the subject matter of the plays in question.

Nevertheless, this example shows that within the Party neither side can have its way: neither the "more liberal" forces that allow critical publications and plays nor the "more dogmatic" forces that ban these works.

8760
CSO: 2300/623
YUGOSLAVIA

SERBIA'S YOUTH PAPER MOCKS AUTHORITARIAN ATTITUDES

[Editorial Report] Belgrade OMLADINSKE in Serbo-Croatian on 12 August 1984, page 2, continues to live up to its reputation for outspoken contempt toward authoritarian attitudes. In a satirical commentary headed "The Train Named Provocation" and signed with the initials M.B., the weekly publication of the Federation of Socialist Youth of Serbia seems to be ridiculing the handling of the case of Vojislav Seslj, who was sentenced to prison for political offenses on the basis of testimony that included references to casual conversation with strangers in the compartment of a train years earlier.

The commentary is worth quoting in its entirety:

"I recently took a trip by train. Some guy who frightfully resembled a court witness was sitting alongside me in the compartment. I was scared and did not dare to utter a word. The other members of my family immediately grasped that they should say nothing, except the youngest child, who was talking to herself about all sorts of things. I am now terribly afraid for her. The girl is completely crazy, she is not yet 4 years of age and already knows how to chatter.

"The man in the compartment kept the questions coming. The first provocation was his supposition that we had known each other somewhere, and he asked whether I had attended the Belgrade Boy's Gymnasium. [Traditional academic secondary school, abolished some years ago as elitist]. I answered abruptly that I did not know what a gymnasium was nor did I know whether I was a boy or a girl.

"He asked if I was from Belgrade. I said that I was not acquainted with this comrade Belgrade and that the latter is of absolutely no interest to me. The guy is intelligent, apparently, so he caught on that I did not want to tell anything about myself.

"After a long silence, he said that the heat in the compartment was unbearable and asked if he could open the window. I answered that the situation in the train was ideal, just like everywhere else, and that the unbearable heat and stuffiness were terribly good for me, because I have a weak heart. Then he asked me for just a little airing out, because he sensed some sort of stench after we passed through the tunnel. I did not want to be taken in by that provocation, either. I said that every airing out is unhealthy and that things were always best when the situation remained the same."
"But he started in again on the closed window. I couldn't stand to be silent any further, I had to say something. I told about how it would be best if everything in the world were closed, all objects and all human beings, and how in that case absolute freedom would exist, which no one would be able to endanger. He observed that I was a philosopher, to which I responded that I never had been one, nor would I ever be, and that I terribly despised that breed of people.

"When we entered a long tunnel, he said, 'Will we ever emerge from this tunnel?' I said that I saw no tunnel and that I held the opinion that we had never been in any kind of tunnel so there was no need for us to emerge from one. Again he let slip the observation that I was a philosopher, to which I reacted sharply. At that point, my spouse broke in to say that I am far from a philosopher because I do not have a clue as to anything in life.

"The provocation peaked when we passed over the highest bridge in Europe. Then he said that we were neither in heaven nor on earth and that he was therefore afraid. Again, I had to speak up. We well know, says I, where we are, and we well know who is pushing such theses and what he wants to achieve thereby. My little daughter badgered me by saying that we were in heaven, that we were in the clouds. I was compelled to slap her around and read her a lecture on where we were. The man began talking about how intelligent the child is and how she knows how to tell stories, in contrast to me. I was forced to exit into the corridor to avoid hearing the child's blabbering, because I feared having to be a witness, and against my own child at that. I have to say that there were a lot of other petty provocations, but I just waved my arm or shook my head. Mostly, I pretended to be asleep.

"When we parted, he did not want to say goodbye. Perhaps he was some sort of an honest person, yet how am I to believe that?"
FINANCING, MANUFACTURE OF NEW TANK DETAILED

Belgrade FRONT in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jul 84 pp 36-38

[Article by Mileta Danilovic: "A Yugoslav Tank"]

[Text] The best greeting for members of the armor-mechanized units for their holiday -- the 40th anniversary of the units establishment and operation -- will be the news that this year they will receive new tanks -- of domestic manufacture! This is not only a significant event for the members of this branch of our army, but also for the armed forces as a whole, since for the first time since their establishment until the present day, they will receive tanks produced by our domestic industry. But this is also significant news for our entire country as well, since after 40 years since its creation, Yugoslavia has become capable of producing the most complex modern weapons for all three branches of our armed forces. In addition to Yugoslav aircraft and Yugoslav ships, Yugoslav tanks have also been produced. Thus we have finally freed ourselves from importing one of the three most expensive types of weapon on the world arms market, and we have become one of the 18 tank-producing countries, and one of the 8 that produce tanks almost completely independently.

Tito's Idea

The idea of beginning to produce tanks was originated personally by Comrade Tito seven years ago. After a detailed familiarization with the characteristics of what were then the most modern tanks in the world, and the possibilities for producing and further improving them, the Commander-in-Chief then decided, as is well known, that we would begin licensed production of the T-72 tank. It had already been decided then that this would not be just a simple copy of that well-known tank, but that we would fully adopt our own parts, materials, and systems, that wherever possible, we would incorporate more modern systems and assemblies developed domestically, and that as soon as possible we would obtain a modernized tank produced from our own materials and parts, according to our own technological procedures. The task was clear from the beginning -- the independent production of tanks under license. In addition to this, it was necessary to build and equip Yugoslav industry for the production of these technologically very modern and very complex products.

Although in those years our industry was not capable of anything like that, Comrade Tito believed in a visionary manner that it would be possible to equip it for that very quickly -- and he was right.
Two years after the adoption of the decision on production, the license documentation was obtained. For almost two years, it was received, processed, and reworked, and at the same time documentation was prepared for modification of the tank. At the same time, the distribution of the production was carried out... In the next two years, the first experimental tanks were produced and sent for field testing. This year, series production began.

Three and a half years after receiving the license (permit) for production, we produced the first tanks. No one else in the world is known to have succeeded in producing such a modern tank in such a short time. It is likely that for many years this Yugoslav record will be a challenge for all tank producers in the world, since the average period for developing and mastering the production of tanks elsewhere in the world is 7 to 14 years. Some countries, which have been producing tanks for 30 years, have mastered the production of this tank in 5 to 7 years.

What then is the secret of Yugoslavia's success? How is it that as newcomers in this business, we have succeeded in beating all past records in the production of such complex combat systems?

The Secret of Success -- in the Organization of Production

A tank is a very expensive product of high technology. Much effort was necessary to produce it -- equipping the firms (building shops and purchasing machinery), purchasing or producing various materials, developing technological procedures, training personnel... Consequently it was first of all necessary to settle on a system for financing the tank production such that there would be enough money for the tasks planned for each phase of the production, and that it would be made available to the firms in accordance with their needs as the program was carried out.

"For the first time until now, an original financing method was used," says Col Engineer Vladeta Jeftic, deputy director of the newly formed management of the project for conducting the production of the tanks. "The production of the tanks, along with equipping industry to produce them, was declared to be a project at the national level. Every republic and province participated in carrying it out. A distribution was made at the highest level of who would produce what -- in accordance with production orientation and capabilities. The republics and provinces committed themselves, under a Social Agreement, to each of them financing its "own" firms involved in carrying out the project. This is a practical confirmation of the concern and responsibility of a society organized under self-management for matters of nationwide defense.

The basic principle in the financing was that the equipment purchased for the production of the tank and its parts would be general-purpose, i.e. that it could be used both for military and civilian production. This eliminated at the start the fear and danger of a narrow specialization of firms in production with a narrow application.
Since about 240 firms participated in the production of the domestic tank, and along with their subcontractors they constituted a list of over 1000 producers, it was necessary to decide effectively on a system for monitoring the production. A total of about 375 thousand different parts are produced just for one tank! And this monitoring system was decided on in a uniform manner.

"The contracting for the work, the monitoring of the production by the subcontractors, and the manufacture of parts and final assembly operations are monitored by a specially designed computer information system, UPINS (management-production-information system)," says Col. Pero Skrbina, the chief coordinator for the production of the tanks at the final assembly plant. "At any moment, one can obtain information on how much of which material is needed by which subcontractor, what kind of tool is used to make any part, what phase of manufacture it is in, and where the problems are... Thus, one could say, it is possible to react immediately and solve the problem. This kind of computerized monitoring of the entire process of the implementation of the project is used only by large world producers of combat systems."

Due to all of this, the self-managing associated Yugoslav economy succeeded in producing very quickly an exceptionally complex and expensive product. Individual assemblies are already being produced for export. The new tank was the giant that carried Yugoslav industry on its shoulders, so that now it can produce high-technology products that in the past we imported for expensive foreign exchange, in addition being dependent upon the knowledge of others. The level of production quality that was required for this complex combat system also influenced the quality of other products in industry. For the first time before now, an enormous number of producers are instituting their own specially organized quality control for products, and so they have now become more competitive for exporting their products on the world market.

There are many known and unknown heroes of labor who have contributed to having this first-born of Yugoslav industry see the light of day. In addition to the names already cited, let us mention as well Ivan Tofolini, Ilijaz Kreso, Esad Riznic, Ramo Krivdic, Ivan Tovilovic, Stjepan Plascevic, Gojko Nisevic, Stjepan Zajic, Zvonko Blehinder, Mato Vukovac, Ivan Aznoh, Marin Gabrovsek, Stevan Zaki, and Mile Karovski...

Formula 1 on the Ground

Our tank has been written about several times before now, the last time during the testing of the experimental tanks at the Kozara field. Thus many of its characteristics and capabilities are already well known. What such a tank represents for our armor-mechanized units could be concluded at the autumn exercises in Macedonia last year, when our units destroyed the "enemy" at a fantastic rate of attack.

Our version of the tank retained the best technical and combat characteristics of the original tank, the weight, dimensions, external appearance, and most of the main systems. It has been modified, however, in such a way that these
changes raised the tank to an even higher level of modernness, so that, without false modesty, we can even add the epithet "most" modern, so much desired but so difficult to achieve. This tank is the only one in the world that has a gun of the largest caliber, 125 millimeters, with a smooth bore, whose shells can penetrate all the armor thus far known for modern tanks, automatic loading of the gun, and a three-member crew, the lowest weight, the lowest silhouette, the highest average combat speed... On the ground off the roads it is a real "formula 1" compared to the rest of its "armored colleagues." With an average combat speed of 38 kilometers per hour, none of the existing tanks can catch up with it. And that is a characteristic that tank troops appreciate very much today in their "armored knight."

Although it has a weaker engine than the rest of the tanks in its class, in spite of its lower weight and lower specific strength per ton, nevertheless, due to its original and exceptionally well planned design for force transfer and the moving portion, on the battlefield this tank manages to achieve a speed that is beyond the reach of the other more powerful "armored units." Thus, in the words of the head of the OMJ [expansion unknown] administration, Major General Stanko Hihalic, "Our tank, with its other characteristics, is one of the best tanks in its class. What are the other devices? In addition to the automatic loading of the gun and the programmed control of the main operations for sighting and aiming, we should also mention the reliable and modern antitank and antineutron protection, the automatic devices for radiological and chemical protection of the crew, for automatic fire extinguishing, for removing gunpowder gases from the working area, and for heating and cooling, followed by equipment for sighting, tracking, aiming, and driving at night, the bomb and smoke bomb thrower, and through an exhaust system, the possibility of creating smokescreens; improved protection of the source of heat radiation from observation IC, the barrel of the gun has thermal protection (to protect the barrel from deformation while aiming at extremely low temperatures), a device for driving underwater, semi-combustible shells..."

All of this, in addition to very good communications equipment, makes it possible for the crew to be in an excellent position on the battlefield and to utilize all the capabilities of their "armored centipede."

Our tank is at the peak of world achievements with respect to several significant systems. Let us list just a few of them. The fire control system [SUV] makes possible a maximum range for sighting and aiming, since the laser distance meter registers targets at almost twice the distance possible with tanks of earlier generations, and consequently it has greater precision in firing and faster reaction to targets. Our device has an electronic ballistic computer of a digital type for instantaneous processing of data and providing aiming elements to the executive mechanism, along with a meteorological sensor for entering data on the atmosphere into that computer, an indicator of speed by direction for entering data on the turning of the turret with respect to the target (for calculating the lead, etc.), a modern gyrounit with three gyroscopes and two pendula, followed by the commander's command panel which has a switch that prevents the gunner from guiding the
guns by azimuth while the commander is aiming the guns at the target. Our tank has a combined day-and-night commander's sighting apparatus of a passive type, with a range of 6,000 meters in the daytime and 1,000 meters at night, with an image magnification of 6 times and a light intensification of 70 thousand times. The driver's periscope is also passive, with an increase in illumination of up to 50 thousand times, with a range of 150 meters and a field of view of 40 degrees.

Our radiological-chemical detector [DRHT] is built into a device for protecting the crew from radiation and combat poisons. It can react to a large number of combat poisons. If radiation, combat poisons, or secondary radiation appears in the atmosphere outside the tank, the device gives an alarm, turns on an automatic mechanism for hermetically sealing the tank, and creates an overpressure in the tank such that the contaminated air cannot penetrate within. The system can also detect neutron radiation, and the tank has a permanent protective neutron layer developed by our producers.

The tank's radio equipment has several channels (about 2,000), with the capability of programming a certain number of channels. The tank can hook up to a chain of communications, for the transfer of communications from tank to tank over a great distance. The radio equipment has special filters (noise suppressors) that prevent eavesdropping. These devices consume much less electricity.

We obviously have a tank that we can be proud of for years!

[Boxed paragraph: "The Second Attempt Was Successful"]

This was not the first time that Yugoslavia has produced tanks. To be exact, this was the second attempt at producing tanks, but it was successful. The first tanks, modelled after the T-32, were produced by our industry immediately after the war, during the period from 1946 to 1950, when they appeared in a parade. Only an experimental lot of five tanks was produced, but this tank was not put into service. Because of many difficulties in production and the difficult economic situation at that time, our leadership decided to import armored vehicles. It is only now that imports of them have stopped.

[Caption for photo on page 36]

The first Yugoslav-produced tank in field testing

[Captions for photos on page 37]

For pressing the bottom of the tank and other special parts that were imported in the past, a high-pressure universal press, up to 10,000 tons, was purchased, which makes it possible to produce such parts several times more quickly and cheaply

Preparing the gun for installation