THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS' RESPONSE

A MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT

THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS' RESPONSE
by Major M.J. Popovich, USMC, 64 pages

This monograph explores the Marine Corps' response to the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act which influence joint education, joint doctrine, and joint officer assignments. It focuses on the Marine Corps' response to the initial legislation of 1986, and to subsequent policies and requirements that were an immediate outgrowth of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

This study asserts that while the Marine Corps has taken substantial steps to comply with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it has not completely implemented all provisions involving education, doctrine, and joint officer assignments. This monograph describes the changes that the Marine Corps has made to its education system, its doctrine division, and its manpower management system. Analysis conducted throughout the study aims at determining the degree to which the Marine Corps complies with the Goldwater-Nichols Act and subsequent policy.

This monograph concludes that the Marine Corps has made great strides in implementing the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Marine Corps must, however, more thoroughly incorporate joint concepts in its professional education programs and its service doctrine to ensure its leaders are adequately prepared to meet the challenges of modern warfare.
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1 INTRODUCTION

The Defense Reorganization Act (Public Law 99-433), sponsored by Congressman Bill Nichols and commonly referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), has been the most overarching defense legislation since the National Security Act of 1947. Designed to unify the armed forces by altering the manner in which they are raised, trained, commanded and employed, the GNA affected all major elements of the Department of Defense. Through effective implementation of the GNA, our nation's leaders ensured effective civilian control of the Department of Defense (DoD), improved the quality of military advice given to the National Command Authorities, clarified the authority and responsibilities of the combatant commanders, and provided for more efficient use of military resources.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, changes in the international security environment which called for the effective planning, employment and synchronization of all the nation's armed forces drove defense reform and reorganization. Despite nearly continuous measures to improve the overall efficiency of the national defense apparatus, military failures in Vietnam, Iran, and Beirut, and a lack of service interoperability in Grenada pointed to the need for a close review of the Department of Defense. The areas which received the greatest scrutiny from Congress and senior officers were those involving military advice to the NCA and service interoperability.

Since the passage of the GNA, the legislation has been the target of both praise and criticism. Many have argued that in implementing the GNA, the military establishment has
gone too far in consolidating authority in the offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the expense of the military departments and the separate services. While military successes in Panama and Desert Storm may serve as evidence of the effectiveness of the GNA, many of the legislation’s provisions have not been fully implemented.

The focus of this study is to assess the Marine Corps’ response to those provisions of the GNA which influence joint education, joint doctrine, and joint officer assignments. This study assumes that the GNA requirements pertaining to doctrine, education and joint assignments contribute to larger reforms intended by the legislation. In some cases the GNA is vague in defining the actual requirements. For example, the GNA mandated that the CJCS develop doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces, but did not define the intent, goals, and parameters for this doctrine.\(^2\) Likewise, the GNA required senior and intermediate level Department of Defense schools to increase their focus on “joint matters,” yet provided a very generic, incomplete definition of “joint matters.”\(^3\) The intent of Congress, however, was clearly to reorganize DoD, strengthen civilian authority, and place increased responsibility on the commanders of unified and specified commands. Additionally, Congress sought to enhance military operations through more effective planning and more efficient use of defense resources.

Several policies and requirements resulted from the legislation of 1986. This study considers both the GNA and the subsequent policies and requirements. The study assumes that to meet the legislation’s original intent, the Marine Corps must meet the requirements of subsequent legislation which was an immediate outgrowth of the GNA itself.
This monograph will initially describe the factors which led to the call for defense reform in the 1970’s and 1980’s. This section of the monograph will also describe the key initiatives which led to the GNA, and a description of the Congressional intent of the legislation.

This monograph will then describe in detail the steps the Marine Corps has taken in regard to education, doctrine and billet assignments to comply with the legislation. Throughout this discussion, the study will analyze whether or not the steps the Marine Corps has taken in these areas have in fact accomplished the original intent of the GNA.

The study concludes that although the Marine Corps has made great strides in all three areas of focus, it retains a hesitancy in thoroughly incorporating joint concepts in its doctrine and education system. Additionally, the study concludes that the Marine Corps has developed effective procedures for assigning quality officers to joint duty assignments, but has failed to comply with all of the GNA’s provisions. The final section of this study describes the implications of the Marine Corps’ shortcomings in implementing GNA requirements, and recommends solutions to ensure the service retains its viability and relevance.
II Defense Reform

The National Security Act of 1947 remains the most significant defense reform legislation of the twentieth century. The events leading to the enactment of this legislation were shaped by a power struggle between the executive and legislative branches of the government, fractures within the military branches, and continuous bargaining between military and civilian lobbies. The call for comprehensive administrative reorganization against the backdrop of interdepartmental competition which occurred prior to the National Security Act would be repeated in the 1980s.

In the early 1980’s, the services were enjoying the benefits of a Republican administration content on robust military budgets and continued support to the military establishment. Reform-minded Congressman, however, were alerted to potential problems evidenced by the failed 1979 Iran hostage rescue attempt, the 1983 bombing of the Marine Amphibious Unit Headquarters in Beirut, and significant service interoperability problems during the 1983 invasion of Grenada. DoD inquiries into the Iranian rescue and the Beirut bombing noted the inability of the services to conduct joint operations under ambiguous command structures.

From 1981-1986, intense debates accompanied the numerous studies which targeted the deficiencies of military advice, planning and execution, and resource management. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, USAF, played a critical role by strongly advocating the urgent need for defense reform. General Jones publicly criticized the JCS structure through professional journals, national newspaper, and congressional
testimony. Even after retiring in 1982, General Jones continued to call for sweeping defense reforms. In a *New York Times* article, he outlined the deficiencies plaguing the Department of Defense:

- strategy is so all-encompassing as to mean all things to all men
- leaders are inevitably captives of the urgent, and long-range planning is too often neglected
- authority and responsibility are badly diffused
- rigorous examination of requirements and alternatives are not made
- discipline is lacking in the budget process
- tough decisions are avoided
- accountability for decisions or performance is woefully inadequate
- leadership, often inexperienced, is forced to spend too much time on refereeing an intramural scramble for resources
- a serious conflict of interests faces our senior leaders
- the combat effectiveness of the fighting force—the end product—does not receive enough attention.4

Fueled by the observations and criticisms of General Jones, influential Congressman Ike Skelton, and Senators Barry Goldwater, Sam Nunn, and the late Les Aspin sought an active role in defense reform. Citing the lack of national consensus in determining clear political aims through the use of military force, Senators Henry Jackson and John Tower directed the Senate Committee on Armed Services to study the organization and decision-making process of the Department of Defense.5 The Senate Committee’s report, along with the report of a 1985 study headed by Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, addressed a wide range of issues affecting Department of Defense performance and recommended massive reform.

Concerned that Congress might impose unnecessary changes on the Department of Defense, President Reagan in June 1985 established the “Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,” informally known as the Packard Commission (after its
Chairman, David Packard). The Commission’s findings mirrored the Congressional view that reform was necessary. Congress later adopted many of the Commission’s recommendations in formulating the reform legislation. This interaction between the executive and legislative branches was extremely important. It created a political environment conducive to reform, and it allowed the legislative and executive branches to reap the political capital generated from the reform. Despite the services’ opposition, this interaction established unanimity and a call for action.\textsuperscript{6} The consensus between the executive and legislative branches on the need for change set the stage for enactment of historic legislation.

**The Goldwater-Nichols Act**

With strong bipartisan support, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, thereby fundamentally changing the Department of Defense. While correcting the operational and administrative deficiencies plaguing the Department of Defense, GNA retained the organizational framework established by the National Security Act of 1947. The major provisions of the GNA are provided in Appendix 1.

The GNA includes seventy-six pages of complex legislative language. Fortunately the intent of Congress was very straightforward and clearly written in Conference Report 99-824, which summarized the legislation:

1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
7) to improve joint officer management policies; and
8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.7

The GNA mandated significant changes to the organization and operation of DoD. By expanding the authority of the Secretary of Defense, the GNA enhanced civilian control of the military establishment. By placing the combatant commanders directly under the National Command Authorities, Congress ensured that military power remained defused among the CJCS, the Service Chiefs, and the Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs)—all under civilian control. To accomplish congressional intent, the CinCs of the unified and specified combatant commands were elevated to a “warfighter” status, and employed resources provided by the Service Chiefs. To coordinate these two distinct functions, the responsibility and authority of the CJCS was also significantly expanded.

The GNA significantly changed the roles of both civilians and military officers at the highest levels in the military establishment. These changes have far-reaching impact on the way American forces are committed to conflict and subsequently employed, but do not directly affect the day-to-day training and assignment of officers. The focus of this study are those GNA mandates involving joint education, doctrine, and joint billet assignments, all of which significantly impact the entire officer population of the armed forces. By complying with the GNA mandates in these three areas, the services provide their respective
officer corps with the education, indoctrination, and professional experience to deal with the challenges posed by modern warfare. The degree to which the Marine Corps complies with the GNA's mandates in these areas directly affects its ability to function effectively as a member of the joint team.
III Joint Education

A primary objective of the GNA was to strengthen the military services' ability to execute joint and combined operations. The complexity of these operations require intermediate and high-level leaders who understand the inherent capabilities and limitations of other services. These same officers must be familiar with the doctrine of other services, and be able to plan and execute complex operations with the other services. While on-the-job joint experience greatly enhances such understanding, initial familiarization with joint concepts is most efficiently attained through joint professional military education. Through the GNA and subsequent policy which clearly defined joint education goals and objectives, Congress and the CJCS have established procedures for coordinating joint professional military education.

In 1987, Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, established the Panel on Military Education. Aspin's committee empowered the panel to assess the ability of the Department of Defense professional military education system to develop officers competent in both strategic and joint matters. The House Armed Services Committee gave the panel a dual charter:

The panel is to review the Department of Defense plans for implementing those provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act relating to education, specifically, to verify if the education systems links Service competency to Joint competency. Second, the panel is to assess whether the Department of Defense military education system encourages the development of exceptional military thinkers. 8

In the years immediately following its establishment, the House Panel on Military Education served as an agent for change in the military education system.
The GNA expanded the concept of joint education. It required that all officers attending service professional military education (PME) schools study joint matters. To develop criteria for assessing PME schools, the panel found it necessary to define “joint matters.” The panel used the original definition provided by the GNA, and the input of a 1987 Senior Military Schools Review Board study. The panel concluded that “joint matters” include: 1) the elements contained in the GNA, 2) other elements subsumed in the GNA definition, and 3) joint force development, including certain military aspects of mobilization.⁹

While the panel recognized that joint education should begin early in an officer’s career, it concluded that the intermediate level schools should be the principal schools for learning jointness, and that attendees of these schools should learn the particular mechanics of joint matters: other service capabilities and limitations, doctrine, and the relevant joint procedures and processes.¹⁰

During the academic year 1987-1988, the panel examined the ten intermediate and senior PME schools, to include the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia. The Panel on Military Education reported its findings to Congress in April 1989. The Panel’s report on the Command and Staff College (CSC) was hardly favorable. The school’s curriculum at the time had a strong service emphasis, and focused on the teaching of combined arms operations at the tactical (regimental and battalion) level. The school’s failure to adequately incorporate joint doctrine and concepts received sharp criticism:

Quantico is not comparable to other service and joint intermediate schools. Its level of focus is on the regimental or tactical level, and it is narrower in scope. This characteristic can also be seen in the small part of the curriculum devoted to joint matters. Although Quantico may argue that joint content is high, they
include the study of the Navy-Marine interface in calculating a high joint curriculum. Considering they are all one department, the panel did not support this contention.\textsuperscript{11}

The Panel concluded its findings by suggesting the Marine Corps review its overall educational structure to determine whether it appropriately prepared graduates for follow-on operational assignments in both service-specific and joint assignments. In the years immediately following this report, the Marine Corps took significant measures to alter the focus and structure of its PME programs, with the aim of enhancing the joint orientation of all officers. The Marine Corps based its efforts on the recommendations provided as part of the Panel's final report to Congress.\textsuperscript{12}

The Panel's sharp criticism of the Marine Corps education system drew an immediate reaction. On 1 August 1989, General A. M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, established the Marine Corps University (MCU). The Commandant's intent was to "create a world class educational institution, unprecedented in military history."\textsuperscript{13} The mission of MCU is to "develop, implement, and monitor the resident and non-resident Professional Military Education (PME) policies and programs for all Marines, regular and reserve."\textsuperscript{14} The President of MCU serves as the Commandant's agent for PME. He is responsible for the development of education policy for the Marine Corps, and for coordinating joint education with the Joint Staff and other services.\textsuperscript{15}

The influence of the House Panel on Military Education went well beyond the establishment of MCU. The Panel's recommendations have directly affected Marine Corps PME, specifically, the joint portion of the curriculum offered at the CSC.\textsuperscript{16} Because the
efforts of the CSC are critical in meeting GNA’s requirements, this particular educational institution is the focal point for Marine Corps joint professional education initiatives.

In 1991, CSC was the focus of a General Accounting Office (GAO) report to the Panel on a select list of recommendations from the 1989 report. The GAO addressed such subjects as service and joint experience of the school staff; teaching of service and joint systems; military faculty mix; student mix; and jointness initiated at the intermediate level. The GAO report concluded that the College had implemented or partially implemented all of the Panel’s recommendations relating to the development of effective professional military education, to include those recommendations which specifically address joint education. The most significant improvements were made in the area of the college’s curriculum. The GAO reported that “The College devotes about forty percent of its curriculum to operational art as its primary focus. In addition, about fifty percent of the curriculum is devoted to joint education.”

A critical aspect of ensuring PME schools maintain a joint focus is an effective review and accreditation process. The GNA mandated that each DoD school concerned with professional military education periodically review and revise its curriculum for senior and intermediate grade officers in order to strengthen the focus on joint matters. DoD policy that was an outgrowth of the GNA provides a review and accreditation mechanism. On 1 May 1990 the CJCS published CM-344-90: The Military Education Policy Document (MEPD). The MEPD was updated in 1993, and after revision in 1996, was renamed the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP).
CJCS Instruction 1800.01, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), outlines a series of learning areas and standards as criteria for the evaluation of educational institutions. The learning areas address course content, while the standards relate to course design, instructional methods, student assessment, and instructor recruitment and selection. The OPMEP also establishes a strict accreditation process whereby the Chairman can monitor service compliance with DoD objectives for the professional education of field grade officers.

CSC’s mission statement acknowledges the need to prepare officers for service in the joint environment. The mission of the College is:

To provide intermediate and advanced intermediate professional military education to field grade officers of the Marine Corps, other services, and foreign countries to prepare them for command and staff duties with Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and for assignment with joint, multinational, and high level service organizations.

The College curriculum is designed to educate students in the relationships between, and the complexities associated with, the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Graduates are expected to be able to plan and execute the employment of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), anywhere along the spectrum of conflict and to articulate the capabilities of the MAGTF within the joint and multinational environment.

CSC’s Professional Joint Education Syllabus refers to the OPMEP’s learning areas and standards in its opening pages. The curriculum outlined in the syllabus includes five courses: Theory and Nature of War, Strategic Level of War, Operational Level of War, and Operations Other Than War. Recurring themes in CSC’s curriculum include joint warfare, coalition warfare, geo-strategic considerations, and operational planning systems.
The OPMEP is also used throughout the accreditation process: initially, by the evaluated institution in conducting a self-study to determine its degree of compliance, and subsequently, by the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) Team. The C\textsuperscript{J}CS PAJE Team conducted a review of CSC 26-31 January, 1997 for the purpose of reaffirming the institution’s accreditation as an intermediate-level Program for Joint Education (PJE).\textsuperscript{26} The PAJE Team found that the college met both the standards and learning objectives mandated by the OPMEP, and recommended reaffirmation of joint accreditation of the CSC resident program for five years.

**Joint Education Deficiencies**

The Marine Corps Command and Staff College fosters joint awareness and perspective through its sister-service representation on the faculty and in the student body, its class organization, and its curriculum.\textsuperscript{27} Like the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), CSC relies on a student population comprised of both sister-service and foreign officers to enhance the diversity of each student’s educational experience. Classes are organized to maximize Marine students’ exposure to sister-service and foreign officers. Also like CGSC, CSC’s faculty includes officers from all four services, as well as civilian instructors with impressive and diverse credentials.

CSC differs greatly from CGSC, however, in the manner in which it administers joint education in its curriculum. Unlike CGSC, the college does not have an instructional department solely dedicated to joint and combined operations. Nor does CSC provide courses which deal exclusively with joint doctrine, concepts, and procedures. Instead, CSC
attempts to meet joint education objectives by addressing OPMEP learning areas and objectives throughout the entire curriculum. In many classes, time is divided between meeting joint (OPMEP) objectives and service-specific objectives. This diluted approach to incorporating joint doctrine and concepts into the curriculum results in a lack of focus. The potential impact of a class dedicated solely to joint concepts is lost.

CSC has made great strides in increasing the level of joint awareness and perspective among its graduates. A significant portion of time in the CSC curriculum is dedicated to the learning areas and objectives dictated by the OPMEP. CSC uses an “Overall Joint Matrix” to depict the hours of instruction dedicated to addressing OPMEP learning areas and objectives (See Appendix 2). Figure 1, a simplified version of CSC’s Overall Joint Matrix, provides an hourly breakdown of time dedicated to OPMEP learning areas in each course. Figure 1 suggests CSC has thoroughly integrated all OPMEP requirements into the curriculum. In both its joint education syllabus and its self-study prior to evaluation for accreditation, the College uses matrices (provided as Appendices 2-4) to demonstrate coverage of OPMEP objectives.
<table>
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<th>AREA 3</th>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>16.5</td>
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<td>16.9</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>200.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>34.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>571.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1

Using the same methodology, however, analysis suggests that the curriculum fails to thoroughly integrate joint doctrine, concepts and the joint planning process. Although CSC dedicates time in each course to particular OPMEP learning areas and standards, a theoretical and historical bias dominates the CSC curriculum. CSC dedicates over 570 hours to addressing OPMEP objectives. Thirty-eight percent of this time (218.3 hours) is spent in Learning Area 3 - *Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War*, while approximately sixteen percent of the time addresses Learning Area 2 - *Joint Doctrine*, and eleven percent of the time is dedicated to Learning Area 4 - *The Joint Planning Process*. Although CJCS Instruction 1800.01 does not require that all learning areas receive equal emphasis, CSC’s treatment of the learning areas suggests some disturbing trends.
Very little time is dedicated to joint doctrine, the joint planning process, and the employment of joint forces.

Appendix 2 is CSC's "Overall Joint Matrix," which depicts the hours of instruction dedicated to the OPMEP learning objectives in each learning area. A closer examination of Learning Area 3 is revealing. This area is designed to provide a basic knowledge of joint and multinational force employment at the operational level of war, and includes five learning objectives:

a. Summarize the considerations of employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.

b. Explain how the theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.

c. Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.

d. Review wars, campaigns, and operations and explain the link between national objectives to supporting military objectives, and the importance of defined conflict termination.

e. Summarize the relationship among the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. 28

Objectives a and c specifically address planning for and employing joint forces at the operational level of war. These objectives clearly pertain to concepts critical to effective participation in joint planning and joint operations. CSC graduates operating in a joint environment would clearly benefit by the education which addresses these two objectives. Yet of over two hundred hours dedicated to learning area 3 in the CSC curriculum, only sixty-three hours (less than thirty percent) are dedicated to learning objectives a and c. The PAJE Team found that CSC met the learning objectives in Learning Area 3, but observed:

There are several instances where the course cards cite Learning Objective 3a as the learning objective, but the lesson does not appear to support this linkage (i.e., Lesson 3104 - Classical Theorists, Lesson 3105 - War in the Early Modern Era, and Lesson 2715 - Counterinsurgency: Case Study Algeria). 29
Learning objectives b and d, which have a theoretical and historical basis, absorb over fifty percent of the hours dedicated to this learning area.

Learning Area 2 - Joint Doctrine, is designed to ensure students review current service and joint doctrine and examine factors influencing the development of joint doctrine. Learning objectives in this area include:

a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.
b. Give examples of the factors influencing joint doctrine.
c. Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
d. Summarize the relationship between service doctrine and joint doctrine.\(^{30}\)

The curriculum allots over twenty-five hours to “comprehending current joint doctrine,” less than five percent of the total time dedicated to OPMEP objectives. Likewise, the hours allotted to “summarizing the relationship between service doctrine and joint doctrine” represent less than three percent of the time dedicated to OPMEP objectives.

CSC’s two most expansive courses are Operational Level of War, which is over five weeks in duration, and Warfighting from the Sea, which is three and a half months in duration. The College’s overall joint matrix suggests that over two-thirds of the classroom time dedicated to addressing OPMEP learning areas is absorbed in these two courses.\(^{31}\) The titles and length of these courses suggest that a significant portion of time might be dedicated to joint concepts, doctrine, and procedures. Yet the deficiencies reflected in the analysis of the overall curriculum are even more profound in these two courses.

Appendix 3 is a breakdown of the Operational Level of War course by OPMEP learning area and learning objective. One hundred sixteen and one-half hours of the CSC curriculum are dedicated to OPMEP objectives in this course. From this total, only seven
and one-half (less than seven percent) are dedicated to learning area 2, *Joint Doctrine*.

Learning area 4 - *The Joint Planning Process*, consumes only fourteen percent of the total hours. Sixty-six percent of the time dedicated to OPMEP objectives is used in learning area 3. Yet only fifteen hours are dedicated to learning objectives a and c (objectives dealing with the planning for and employment of joint forces), while over fifty hours are dedicated to learning objectives b and d (the objectives which deal in theory and history).

Appendix 4 is a breakdown of the *Warfighting from the Sea* course by OPMEP learning area and learning objective. Over two hundred hours of the CSC curriculum are dedicated to OPMEP objectives in this course. An examination of learning area 3 shows that less than four percent of the time is allotted to learning objective a, and only six percent of the time is allotted for learning objective c. Less than eighteen hours (18.4 percent) are dedicated to learning area 4. In contrast, over fifty-two hours (26.3 percent) are allotted to two learning objectives in learning area 1 (objective 1a - “Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces;” objective 1e - “Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint and multinational operations.”)

Clearly, the issues of joint doctrine, the joint planning process, and planning for and employment of joint forces are not the focus of CSC’s curriculum. Instead, the curriculum focuses on the study of theory and the principles of war, using historical campaigns to draw conclusions and teach lessons at the operational level of war. While history provides certain benefits, it is not a substitute for applying the ways and means available to today’s operational commanders in a modern conflict steeped in complexity and uncertainty. More importantly, CSC fails to stress the importance of joint doctrine, the capabilities of joint...
forces, and the planning processes which bring joint forces to the modern, complex
battlefield.

In contrast, CGSC’s Department of Joint and Multinational Operations (DJMO) is
dedicated solely to the planning, conduct and support of joint and multinational operations
or exercises. As part of CGSC’s core curriculum, all students take Fundamentals of
Operational Warfighting I. This seventy-two hour course, divided into Modules 1 and 2,
deals exclusively with OPMFP learning areas and objectives.

Module 1 focuses on how the United States employs armed force as an instrument of
power.

Students study the complexity of the international security environment, U.S.
national interests and objectives, national- and theater-level strategies, the
Defense Planning System (DPS), national- and theater-level command and
control systems, strategic logistics, force mobilization and deployment,
multinational operations, the range of military operations, and operational
planning concepts.32

Module 2 addresses the fundamentals of campaign planning. The intent of this thirty-two
hour course is to prepare officers to participate in operational war planning efforts.33 While
the intent of CSC’s course, Operational Level of War, is similar, JPE objectives are diluted
through the course’s organization and heavy theoretical and historical basis.

The distinctly different approaches taken by CGSC and CSC affect the impact of the
joint instruction each college provides. A possible disadvantage of the CGSC approach is
the concentration of joint instruction in two core courses. The DJMO faculty has limited
ability to ensure joint concepts are emphasized in other CGSC courses. Conversely, the
CSC approach forces instructors to ensure the appropriate time is dedicated to joint
objectives in each class. This author believes the CGSC approach yields greater impact.
The complexity of the international security environment and the likelihood that U.S. military involvement in future wars will involve more than one service dictate effective joint education of the officer corps. Marine Corps efforts to integrate joint concepts in the Command and Staff College curriculum have been noteworthy, but fail to provide appropriate emphasis and focus. To better prepare its officers for joint service, the CSC curriculum expand its treatment of joint doctrine, the joint planning process, and the employment of joint forces.
IV Doctrine

Doctrine is the foundation upon which military forces operate. Each service maintains its own doctrine, which addresses the manner in which that particular service intends to prepare for and execute its warfighting mission. While each service has historically developed and adapted its doctrine to changes in contemporary warfare, very little joint doctrine existed prior to the GNA. This chapter will address the Marine Corps' participation in the joint doctrine development process, as well as the linkage between joint doctrine and Marine Corps doctrine.

In 1985 a Senate Armed Services Committee staff report on the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense identified “poorly developed joint doctrine” as one of the nine major “symptoms of inadequate unified military advice.”34 This report went on to say that “the joint operational effectiveness of military forces is dependent upon the development of joint doctrine and sufficient joint training to be able to effectively employ it.”35 In response to this report and other studies, as well as extensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in the DoD through the GNA. Included in the expanded authority given the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the legislation was the requirement for the chairman to develop doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces.

One of the earliest changes emerging from this new authority was the establishment of a comprehensive process to discover and address in a systematic way voids in joint doctrine and training. This analysis suggested that much more than JCS Pub 1, Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, and JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, was required to furnish the U. S. armed forces adequate joint doctrine. As a consequence, the Joint Staff and services began writing more than 75 new joint publications.

The capstone joint doctrinal publication, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, was intended to articulate an overall philosophy for the other publications. The focal point of this publication is that joint warfare is team warfare.\textsuperscript{36} Joint Pub 1 defines broad concepts which address the values and fundamentals of joint warfare, the nature of American military power, and the characteristics of a joint campaign. The authors of Joint Pub 1 stress the importance of both joint and service doctrine:

Because we operate and fight jointly, we must all learn and practice joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures; feed back to the doctrine process the lessons learned in training, exercises and operations; and ensure service doctrine and procedures are consistent. This is critical for our present and future effectiveness.\textsuperscript{37}

Joint Pub 1-01, "Joint Publication System," governs the development of joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. This publication also incorporates the Chairman's new authorities and responsibilities, and defines procedures for the development of joint doctrine. These procedures include the requirement for all joint doctrine to be approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Echoing the team warfare philosophy set forth by Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1-01 also states that service doctrine to be consistent with joint doctrine.\textsuperscript{38} The intent of the GNA and the resulting capstone joint doctrine mandates that the separate services have the responsibility to: 1) participate in the joint doctrine development process, and 2) link service doctrine to joint doctrine.
The President of Marine Corps University (MCU) is the Marine Corps' lead agent for the development, review, maintenance and publication of service doctrine and participation in the development of naval, joint and combined doctrine. The instrument for these doctrinal efforts is the Doctrine Division, whose mission is "to develop service doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures that reflect the Corps' fundamental beliefs on warfare; to coordinate service input to joint and naval doctrine development; and to manage the Doctrinal Proponency Program." The Doctrine Division is comprised of an administrative section and ten functionally organized branches. To ensure participation in the development of both joint and service doctrine, the Doctrine Division groups these branches into two teams, a Purple Team and a Green Team. The Purple Team is responsible for the development of joint doctrine, and the Green Team is responsible for service doctrine.

**Joint Doctrine**

The Doctrine Division’s Purple Team interacts mainly with the Joint Staff and the other services to contribute to the development of joint doctrine. The review of joint doctrine is based on an established two-year Program of Objectives and Milestones (POA&M). The review process involves collecting, screening, consolidating and submitting review comments to the lead agent. Assigned by the JCS J-7, lead agents develop and maintain assigned publications. The Marine Corps is the lead agent for four joint publications:

- Joint Pub 3-02.1, *JLTO for Landing Force Operations*
- Joint Pub 3-02.2, *JLTO Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation*
Joint Pub 3-07.5, JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Joint Pub 3-09.5, JTTP for Close Air Support

The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) is assigned by Headquarters, Marine Corps, to be the review authority for all other joint publications. Review authorities are responsible for coordinating the joint doctrine process for their respective CinC or Service. MCCDC coordinates with the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Naval Doctrine Command (NDC), Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC), JCS J-7, and the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) in the joint doctrine process.

The Marine Corps also participates in the development of joint doctrine through membership in working groups such as the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center. ALSA is a multi-Service organization chartered by NDC, TRADOC, the Air Combat Command (ACC), and MCCDC. ALSA serves as a major command level agency that develops multi-Service tactics, techniques and procedures. It is manned by a Director, Assistant Director, and fourteen action officers, all of which occupy joint billets. There are two Marine Corps designated billets. Current ALSA projects include Army-Marine Corps Integration, Joint Application of Firepower, and Theater Air Ground Systems.

Additionally, the Marine Corps participates in, supports, and helps shape the efforts of Naval Doctrine Command. Changes in the strategic landscape and increasing Navy-Marine Corps forward presence requirements has resulted in the convergence of the two services’ strategic vision and operational concepts. "...From the Sea" and "Forward...From the Sea," published as a combined Navy-Marine Corps vision for the twenty-first century, describe the strategic concept of littoral warfare. Marines working with the Naval Doctrine Command are developing a Naval Operational Concept (NOC) that
flows from "Forward... From the Sea" and "Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)." This concept is designed to provide a framework for the development of all future naval doctrine. By working closely with its Navy counterparts, the Marine Corps will strengthen its ties with its traditional sister service.

Through interaction with the Joint Staff, participation in joint and multi-Service working groups, and the Naval Doctrine command, the Marine Corps is meeting its GNA obligation to participate in the joint doctrine development process. By serving as the lead agent for several joint publications and participating as a review authority for all joint publications, the Marine Corps ensures joint doctrine incorporates the strengths the Corps brings to the joint environment.

Service Doctrine

The Doctrine Division’s Green Team works primarily on service-specific projects. In 1995, the Doctrine Division began a review of all Marine Corps publications. The goal of the review was to determine the relevance of the Corps’ doctrine, and to scrutinize the organization and hierarchy of the doctrinal publications system. The review revealed that the numerical designation system used to organize Marine doctrinal manual and reference publications was inconsistent with both the joint and naval doctrinal publications systems, and did not provide a clear distinction between different categories of doctrinal publications. All Marine Corps service publications now fall within one of three distinct categories: doctrinal publications, which establish warfighting philosophy, concepts, and doctrine; warfighting publications, which provide tactics, techniques and procedures; and
reference publications, which contain historical, reference and emerging concept information. This publication hierarchy coincides with the joint publication hierarchy.

For development of service doctrine the Marine Corps relies on the system of doctrinal proponents through which the President of MCU coordinates the development, review, and maintenance of doctrine. Proponents are Marine agencies, or Marine elements attached to other service agencies most closely connected to developments in tactics, techniques and procedures. The intent of the proponency program is to capitalize on the potential of the Corps' expertise and ensure the most effective tactics, techniques and procedures are reflected in current service doctrine. The proponency system is a cooperative effort between MCU and the designated proponent.

Doctrine Division, MCU, develops the purpose, scope, and general outline for each publication, prepares a production schedule, supervises the staffing of the various drafts, and provides close and continuous guidance. The proponent researches, writes, and revises the manual, delivering a production-ready final draft to the Doctrine Division. Doctrine Division then obtains formal approval for the manual and performs the final editing, layout, printing, and distribution functions.

Doctrinal proponents coordinate with the Fleet Marine Forces, appropriate agencies within Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and other sources during the research stage of doctrine development to ensure the most current resources are being used. Proponents also play a critical role in the review process. By periodically reviewing publications, proponents incorporate input from the Fleet Marine Forces, Marine Corps Schools, and other authoritative sources to ensure service doctrine remains current and relevant.
Doctrinal Deficiencies

Although the Marine Corps is actively involved in the joint doctrine development and review process, it has failed to meet the requirements of GNA in regard to linking service doctrine with joint doctrine. While changes to the Doctrine Division and recent efforts to update Marine Corps doctrinal publications have produced more current service doctrine, the Marine Corps has not integrated joint doctrine into service doctrine. Although a great deal of joint doctrine has been published, joint concepts are not addressed in the Marine Corps' doctrinal manuals. In failing to include joint concepts in these publications, the Marine Corps fails to address critical subjects, such as the role of Marine forces in joint operations, and how the Marine Corps will operate and function as part of a Joint Task Force.

FMFM 1, Warfighting, the Marine Corps' capstone doctrinal publication, was designed to set a new direction for Marine Corps doctrine. Warfighting was well-received when it was first published in 1989. Yet in the ensuing years, numerous masters theses and articles in the Marine Corps Gazette and other professional journals suggest that many Marines today feel Warfighting is in need of revision.\textsuperscript{46}

The purpose of FMFM 1 is to provide broad guidance in the form of values and concepts to express doctrine which:

\ldots establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting, a philosophy for leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, and a common language. In short, by establishing a way we practice our profession, doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding.\textsuperscript{47}
While the broad doctrinal guidance described by FMFM 1 remains relevant, a more effective description of how the Marine Corps prepares for and wages war is required.

FMFM 1 does not address joint warfare. Domestic political realities, the force structure of today's armed services, and the complexities of modern conflict require the participation of more than one service in most contingencies. Joint Pub 1, Air Force Doctrine Document 1, and Army FM 100-5, all capstone doctrinal publications, address both an intention and a requirement to link the capabilities of air, land and sea forces to achieve national goals. In its opening Chapter, Army FM 100-5 states that:

A key member of the joint team, The Army serves alongside the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to protect the nation's vital security interests. The Army must train to fight as part of a joint, combined, United Nations or interagency force.48

Likewise, Air Force Doctrine Document 1 repeatedly refers to the services' contribution to the joint force, and states that: "Service doctrine would be incomplete without surfacing the relationship of current doctrine and capabilities to the emerging joint vision of the future."49

FMFM 1 makes no mention of the requirement to fight in a joint environment, or to link service doctrine to joint doctrine.

Changes in national policy, relative national strength, and enhanced military capabilities resulting from technological and organizational improvements require the review and possible change to doctrine. The strategic landscape has changed greatly since FMFM 1 was first published, as has the positioning of America's armed forces and the relationship between separate services. These factors, as well as the publication of Joint Pub 1 and "...From the Sea," which defines a combined vision for the Navy and Marine Corps, dictate the revision of FMFM 1.
Just below FMFM 1 on the hierarchy of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDP) are MCDP 1-1 *Strategy*, MCDP 1-2 *Campaigning*, and MCDP 1-3 *Tactics*. These publications were all released in 1997 following review and approval by General Charles C. Krulak, the current Commandant of the Marine Corps. All make frequent use of historical examples, address the full spectrum of conflict, and emphasize the requirement to link tactical action, operational objectives, and strategic goals. However, the publications make no reference to joint warfare requirements, the role of the Marine Corps in a joint task force (JTF), or the possible reliance on other service for certain combat, combat support, or combat service support. While Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWPs) and Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs) acknowledge the need for cooperation between and integration of joint systems and procedures, MCDPs are service-specific.

Marine Corps doctrine focuses on the Corps’ concept and philosophy of warfighting, but does not address the way the Marine Corps intends to fight in the joint/combined environment. The approach is service-dominant, and neglects to include critical joint concepts which address the realities of modern warfare. While current Marine doctrinal publications thoroughly link the Marine Corps maneuver warfare concepts to tactics, techniques and procedures, they do not consider the modern battlefield’s requirements for joint and combined operations.

The Marine Corps’ most genuine efforts in the development of joint doctrine are those involving the Naval Doctrine Command. “...*From the Sea,*” and “*Forward...from the Sea*” stress the viability of naval expeditionary forces which can provide the initial enabling capability for joint operations in conflict and can participate in a sustained effort. 50
In developing the naval expeditionary force concept, the Marine Corps continues to go to
great lengths to define the responsibilities of the joint force maritime component
commander (JFMCC), who commands the JTF while the operation is primarily maritime.
Service doctrine, however, fails to address the shift of the campaign landward, when Marine
forces are likely to fall under the command of a land component commander, which in
many cases will be a senior Army officer. Current doctrinal publications do not address
how Marine forces will function as part of a JTF operating ashore in a sustained campaign.

The Marine Corps' failure to link service doctrine to joint doctrine and the realities
of modern warfare seriously undermine the effective participation of Marine forces in future
conflict. The speed at which conflict unfolds and the potential political consequences of
small unit tactical actions require the seamless transition of Marine forces between
component commanders when the situation dictates a change in command. While service
doctrine must ensure common thought and harmonious action among Marine forces, it must
also act as a guide when circumstances require that operations be conducted across service
lines.
V Joint Officer Management

The legislation pertaining to joint officer management is Title IV of the GNA. Title IV has had a profound impact on the careers of officers of all Services, and on manpower managers who must meet a variety of often competing requirements. While a detailed analysis of the impact of Title IV on career management lies beyond the scope of this study, this section will address the GNA’s basic requirements in regard to joint specialty officers (JSO), the Marine response to this portion of the GNA, and a synopsis of the challenge facing manpower managers.

A 1985 Senate Armed Services Committee report made two key recommendations that ultimately formed the basis for the GNA’s joint officer management system. The first recommendation was aimed at producing officers with a heightened awareness and greater commitment to DOD requirements, a multi-Service perspective, and an improved understanding of other Services. The second recommendation viewed the need for a joint duty career specialty within each Service. Recommendations on this issue resulted in Title IV of the GNA, Joint Officer Personnel Policy. The policy was designed to effectively manage Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps active duty officers who are trained in and oriented toward joint matters.  

Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) involves work in a position in a multinational command, or in an activity that integrates land, sea and air forces of at least two Armed Forces. JDA involves matters related to national military strategy, joint doctrine and
policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of operations under a unified command.

Title IV imposes three principal tasks on the Services: 1) to ensure that a small group of field grade officers is annually qualified for designation as a JSO; 2) to select quality officers for assignment to JDAs; and 3) to ensure most colonels recommended for promotion to flag rank have completed a tour in a joint duty assignment. The first two requirements impact a large percentage of the Marine field grade officer population, and significantly challenge manpower managers.

To meet the first requirement of Title IV, the services must produce a pool of Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs). To be designated a JSO, an officer must complete Phase I and Phase II professional joint education (PJE), complete a full tour in a JDA, and be selected by a board. A JSO nominee is one who has completed the prerequisites for designation as a JSO. Phase I credit is obtained through completion of a certified resident or non-resident course of instruction at an intermediate level school, such as Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Naval War College, or Army Command and General Staff College. Phase II credit is conferred upon completion of the twelve-week program provided by Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. The National War College (NWC) and Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) each provide both Phase I and Phase II PJE credit upon graduation. To obtain full joint duty credit, the officer must be a field grade officer and must complete a joint assignment tour.

The minimum tour lengths, originally three years for general officers and three and one-half years for all other officers, were designed to ensure continuity within joint
organizations. The requirement to fill joint billets with quality officers creates a dilemma for manpower managers, who must meet the legal requirements of the GNA and staff the Fleet Marine Forces with quality officers in critical service billets.

The GNA’s second requirement under Title IV related to joint officer management addresses the selection of quality officers for JDAs. In an effort to ensure the Services assign quality officers to JDAs, and also to ensure that officers were not later at a disadvantage for promotion by having served in a JDA, Title 10, U.S. Code, section 662 sets forth three promotion comparisons:

1) Officers who are serving on, or have served on, the joint staff are expected, as a group, to be promoted at a rate not less than officers of the same armed force who are serving on, or have served on, the headquarters staff of their armed force.

2) Joint specialty officers are expected, as a group, to be promoted at a rate not less than officers of the same armed force who are serving on, or have served on, the headquarters staff of their armed force.

3) Officers who are serving in, or have served in, joint duty assignments are expected, as a group, to be promoted at a rate not less than officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive category.

Meeting the promotion objectives within the categories defined by these promotion objectives has proved to be one of the toughest challenges of implementing the GNA.

The GNA places considerable emphasis on the selection of quality officers for assignment to JDAs. On an annual basis, the Secretary of Defense submits a Goldwater-Nichols Implementation Report to the President and Congress. This report provides comprehensive information pertaining to joint officer management, underscoring congressional importance of attracting quality officers for joint assignments. On the Joint Staff, the Joint Officer Management Office (JOMO) administers and executes the Joint
Staff’s oversight and management responsibilities for the CJCS. The JOMO, through the Joint Duty Assignments List (JDAL), promulgates the joint billets within the combatant commands, DoD, and the Joint Staff that the services are required to fill.\textsuperscript{56}

The GNA’s third requirement under Title IV is to ensure most colonels recommended for promotion to flag rank have completed a JDA. Because of the limited time an officer spends in the field grade ranks and the critical assignments necessary for maintaining service proficiency, this requirement presents a significant challenge to the manpower management of career officers.\textsuperscript{57}

The additional possibility of service in a joint assignment significantly impacts career timelines. A successful career officer will spend fourteen years in the field grade ranks. Given the time spent in service-critical assignments, school, and Title IV mandates, manpower managers have little flexibility in facilitating career success for quality officers and meeting both service and joint requirements.\textsuperscript{58} While in the 1980’s a field grade officer could be reasonably assured of career success by virtue of multiple service assignments—both Fleet Marine Force (FMF) and non-FMF—the assignment path resulting in career success in the 1990’s is far more ambiguous.

**The Marine Response to Title IV**

To assist in meeting GNA joint officer requirements, the Marine Corps has created its own Joint Officer Management Officer (JOMO). This officer tracks the selection of officers for all JDAs, and assists in the preliminary screening of officers for intermediate and top-level schools. Because of GNA’s stringent joint officer requirements and the
limited number of school seats available for Phase II PJE, joint officer management receives strong emphasis within the manpower management office at Headquarters, Marine Corps.

The greatest obstacle to meeting GNA’s first joint officer requirement (to annually qualify a small group of officers for JSO nomination) is the limited number of Phase II PJE slots for the Marine Corps. Currently, the Marine Corps is allotted thirty-nine school seats annually at the Armed Forces Staff College, and six school seats annually at the National War College. The number of seats at both schools is regulated by the Joint Staff, and is based on the size of the Marine Corps compared to the other services. Although the number of seats available varies, the Marine Corps is typically allotted forty-five to fifty-five Phase II PJE slots per year. In FY 96 and 97, the Marine Corps filled all available seats at the Armed Forces Staff College and National War College.59

The Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report, an annex to DoD’s annual report to Congress, addresses the degree to which the separate services comply with the joint officer management provisions of the GNA. In regard to the GNA’s first joint officer management requirement, the report includes the number of JSO designations, JSO nominees, and a summary of officers who are serving in joint assignments. In FY 96, the Marine Corps created one hundred forty JSO nominees, and in FY 97, another fifty-six JSO nominees. Considering the number of Phase II seats available, the Marine Corps is creating JSO nominees at the maximum rate.

Meeting GNA’s second joint officer requirement (selection of quality officers for JDAs) involves more complicated procedures. To meet this requirement and still select the
most qualified officers for promotion, the Marine Corps carefully screens all field grade officers prior to assignment to a JDA.

The intermediate level school (ILS) selection board, established in 1991, is the tool used to screen Marine majors. The board selects attendees for the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, equivalent sister-sister service schools, and certain foreign school equivalents. To meet Phase II PJE requirements, this board also selects officers for attendance at the Armed Forces Staff College. In this manner, Marine majors are board-selected as future JSOs. Because the officers selected for attendance at ILS generally represent the board’s best estimate of the best available officers, (the top twenty percent of available field grade officers are selected annually for ILS) assignment to JDAs for majors is normally linked to selection for ILS.

All majors selected for ILS are informally pre-screened for assignment to JDAs. Those selectees leaving Fleet Marine Force (FMF) assignments to attend ILS (and therefore are not scheduled to return immediately to the FMF) are prime candidates for JDAs. The criteria for screening include success in previous command and staff assignments and potential for continued promotion. While manpower managers are not bound by this informal slating to JDAs, the process identifies a pool of officers available for selection to attend AFSC after completion of ILS. On an annual basis, a significant portion of Marine ILS graduates not scheduled to return to the FMF are assigned to JDAs.

Command screening boards for Marine colonels and lieutenant colonels have been in place since 1991 and 1992, respectively. In addition to identifying those officers best qualified to command, these boards assist manpower managers in meeting joint promotion
objectives to colonel and brigadier general. Priority for assignment to JDAs is given to senior field grade officers who screen for command (the JDA to be completed after command or attendance at top-level school). Like the ILS/AFSC board for majors, the command-screening and top-level school boards for lieutenant colonels and colonels aim to select the best officers from those eligible.

None of the boards previously described amount to pre-screening for future promotion. Each board is comprised of different members, and several years may elapse between screening for school or command and consideration for advancement. Nevertheless, school and command-screening boards substantially assist manpower managers in meeting Title IV requirements.

The Marine Corps’ screening process has been effective. The FY 97 GNA Implementation Report indicates that the Marine Corps is meeting GNA’s promotion objectives and is selecting quality officers to serve in JDAs. In the field grade ranks, (major through colonel) officers serving in joint billets were promoted at a rate greater than the promotion board average, and at a rate equal to or greater than officers serving in a service headquarters. Clearly, the Marine Corps is meeting GNA’s requirement to assign quality officers to joint duty.

The Marine Corps has consistently failed to meet the GNA’s third joint officer management requirement. In fiscal year 1997, eight of the Corps’ fourteen brigadier general selectees required a waiver. The fiscal year 1998 list includes twelve selectees, four of whom do not have the required joint duty experience. While the Marine Corps is not unique in this respect (all three of the other Services have difficulty selecting general
officers with the required joint experience), manpower managers have made a top priority of determining ways to groom more potential general officers with the requisite joint experience.

As suggested earlier in this study, timing is critical; with limited time spent at each grade, officers must complete schools, as well as required FMF and non-FMF assignments and still be afforded the opportunity to serve in joint billets. The Marine Corps has attempted to revise career development paths to accommodate early joint assignments; assign more former (lieutenant colonel and colonel) commanders to joint duty; educate the officer corps on joint education opportunities; and toughen the quality standards for JSO designation. To create more opportunities for senior officers to serve in joint billets, manpower managers have options, which include:

- reducing command tour lengths (from twenty-four to eighteen months)
- shortening joint tour lengths (each service is permitted to cut 12.5% of its joint tours by fourteen months)
- changing the convening dates of the brigadier general section board (by selecting brigadier generals later in the year, selectees will have more time to meet minimum requirements in current assignments)
- filling more billets (finding more billets for Marine officers to fill would generate greater opportunities for joint assignment)

Beginning in FY 1999, waivers for GNA’s third joint officer management requirement will no longer be granted, and all services will be required to meet the challenge of selecting flag officers with joint experience.

Although the Marine Corps has routinely failed to select general officers with joint experience, the Corps continues to play a significant role in the joint environment. Prior to the GNA, only two Marine generals were appointed as Commanders-in-Chief. In 1980, General P.X. Kelly was appointed as CinC, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. (This task
force later evolved into the U.S. Central Command.) In 1985, General George B. Crist was appointed as CinC, U.S. Central Command. Since the legislation, four Marine generals have been appointed as CinCs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tr>
<td>General Joseph P. Hoar</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>Sep 91 - Sep 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General John J. Sheehan</td>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
<td>Oct 94 - Sep 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Anthony C. Zinni</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>Aug 97 - Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Charles E. Wilhelm</td>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>Sep 97 - Present</td>
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The Marine Corps’ response to GNA joint officer management policy has been significant and profitable. By selecting quality officers for joint duty assignments, the Marine Corps supports effective participation of Marine forces in joint and combined operations. While other services are being reduced, the Marine Corps has actually increased its number of general officers. This fact, combined with the increased authority of combatant commanders provided by other GNA mandates, further enhances the Marine Corps’ ability to train and provide adaptive forces to meet national objectives.
VI Conclusion

The Armed Forces of the United States have changed dramatically since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Senator Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, summarized the impact of the legislation: "By effectively implementing Goldwater-Nichols, DoD has enormously improved both the conduct of military operations and the management of defense resources." The combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces in Panama and in Southwest Asia demonstrated that the military had significantly improved its capability to conduct joint and combined operations. Yet over the past year, largely because of the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), significant retrospection and analysis of the legislation has been conducted. Notwithstanding the debate on the issues that advocate further changes within DoD, it is important to review the broad impact of the Marine Corps' response to the legislation in terms of joint warfighting.

Professional Military Education

The Marines Corps' efforts to improve the quality of its educational institutions have won the praise of other services as well as influential Congressman. As a strong proponent of PME, Congressman Ike Skelton has been intimately involved with service schools for over fifteen years. He routinely lectures students at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and was the driving force in Congress in establishing the Marine Corps Research Center. He observed that prior to the legislation, "the Marine Corps had the worst schools
compared to the other services." "Since then," he notes "the Marine Corps has come on
board, and although the schools are small, they have become good by changing the
instruction from management to strategy."\textsuperscript{64}

Despite vast improvements and joint PME accreditation, the Command and Staff
College's organization and curriculum lack the focus required to adequately prepare
graduates for high level service and joint assignments. While no education plan is perfect,
those curriculums offering lessons that can be readily applied in future assignments are the
most valuable. To better prepare its students for future assignments, the Command and
Staff College must amend its curriculum to provide more emphasis in the joint planning
process, joint doctrine, and the planning for and employment of joint forces in the
operational environment. While the study of theory and history is always valuable, the
contemporary principles of theater design and operational planning are frequently absent
from historical campaigns. Attempting to define the operational framework used in the
design of a campaign fought in decades or centuries past yields little more than frustration,
and often fails to consider the requirements of modern warfare.

\textbf{Doctrine}

The GNA placed great emphasis on developing a common doctrine that facilitates
service integration and enhances the warfighting capability of a joint task force. Over one
hundred joint doctrinal publications now available provide a framework for conducting joint
operations. Furthermore, \textit{Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010)}, and \textit{Concept for Future Joint
Operations - Expanding Joint Vision 2010 (CFJO)}, provide a vision based on new
operational concepts that allow the services to develop a common vision in meeting the uncertainties of future challenges.

The Marine Corps actively participates in the joint doctrine development process. The Marine Corps supports multi-service working groups, continuously interacts with sister-service doctrine commands, and serves as lead agent for several new joint doctrinal publications. In this manner, the Marine Corps provides service-specific expertise and assists in validating joint concepts, tactics, techniques and procedures.

Conversely, the Marine Corps’ failure to recognize the criticality of joint warfare in its service doctrine represents a hesitancy to subscribe to any potential reliance on the Army and Air Force. As the only service to routinely combine land, sea, and air operations, the Marine Corps as a service has an intuitive understanding of jointness. Yet the Marine Corps seems less inclined to operate hand-in-hand with services other than the Navy. Marine Corps doctrine is a product of its culture and values. Doctrine, however, must also reflect the manner in which a force intends to fight. Despite an apparent hesitancy to do so, the Marine Corps must admit its reliance on the other three services. Failure to do so will result in Marine staffs and commanders unprepared to face the realities of modern warfare.

**Joint Officer Assignments**

Marine Officers assigned to joint commands play a critical role in the planning and execution of joint operations. In a joint command, service representatives must be able to candidly and effectively articulate their service’s inherent strengths, capabilities and weaknesses. The complexity of modern warfare requires that planners have the ability to
process information, combine that information with experience and judgment, and make sound tactical and operational decisions. The expanded responsibility of combatant commanders requires that their staffs and subordinate commanders are the very best the services have to offer.

The Marine Corps screens and selects officers for joint duty assignments with scrutiny equal to its coveted school quotas and command billets. This process provides joint commands with quality officers capable of functioning effectively in joint and coalition exercises and operations. Marine manpower managers must continue to refine career progression goals and promotion timelines to ensure its senior, most qualified officers obtain joint experience earlier in their careers. The Corps' most talented officers clearly have an impact in the joint environment, and continued attention to selection criteria for joint duty assignments will pay dividends for the United States military establishment as well as the Marine Corps.

**Operational Relevance**

The Marine Corps' amphibious capabilities, its integration of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft, and its maneuver warfare philosophy provide organizational agility and flexibility that allows it to function across the full spectrum of conflict. Impacted by the Goldwater-Nichols Act like other services, the Marine Corps retained its relevance as a force. The legislation has made the Marine Corps even more relevant as an essential pillar of national military strategy by making the Corps an equal participant. Although the Commandant was a co-equal member of the JCS prior to GNA, the expanded role of the
Joint Staff and joint organizations such as the JROC has significantly enhanced the Marine Corps' participation and influence in strategy formulation and defense acquisition.

As a result of GNA, the combatant commanders play a greater role in determining the force requirements supporting their theater strategy and war plans. Given the post Cold War strategic landscape, Navy and Marine Corps forces lend themselves to a CinC's theater strategy. These forces have the capability to send a strong message and, if desired, demonstrate U.S. commitment. On any given day, over twenty thousand Marines are forward deployed in support of the combatant commands. Working in combination with land and air forces, Marine forces provide a unique capability which enhances the options available to a CinC in the formulation of theater strategy. By enhancing its ability to operate with the other services, the Marine Corps will continue to play a vital role in the accomplishment of national goals and objectives.
APPENDIX 1

MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE GOLDFATER-NICHOLS ACT

1) Designate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the principle military adviser to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense;

2) Require the JCS Chairman to submit to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense and any JCS member's advice in disagreement or in addition to the Chairman's advice;

3) Require the JCS Chairman to convene regular JCS meetings; to consult, unless impracticable, with other JCS members; and to consult, when appropriate, with the unified and specified commanders;

4) Transfer to the JCS Chairman the principal duties now performed by the corporate JCS and update and expand those duties;

5) Require the JCS Chairman to prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans;

6) Require the JCS Chairman to advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands;

7) Require the JCS Chairman to submit a report every 3 years to the Secretary of Defense on the appropriateness of the roles and missions of the four services;

8) Specify that the term of office of JCS Chairman shall end no later than 6 months after the beginning of a new Presidency;
9) Create a new position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the grade of 4-star officer and designate the Vice Chairman as the second-ranking military officer [1993 Authorization Act made the Vice Chairman a member of JCS];

10) Assign the JCS Vice Chairman, unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the duty of serving as Chairman in the absence of the JCS Chairman;

11) Specify that the JCS Chairman manages the Joint Staff and prescribes its duties and staffing procedures;

12) Specify that the operational chain of command, unless otherwise directed by the President, runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified combatant commanders;

13) Authorize the President or the Secretary of Defense to place the JCS Chairman in the channel of command communications between the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders;

14) Authorize the combatant commanders to specify the chains of commands and organizational relationships within their commands;

15) Strengthen and expand the "full operational command" authority of combatant commanders;

16) Strengthen the authority of the combatant commanders over the selection, retention, and evaluation of their staff members and their subordinate commanders;

17) Set out general principles for the Secretary of Defense to follow ensuring that the personnel policies of the four Services enhance the ability of officers to perform joint duties;
18) Repeal the authority of the Secretary of Defense to reorganize DoD positions and activities that have been established in law;

19) Direct the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures for the effective review of the programs and budgets of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities;

20) Direct the JCS Chairman to advise the Secretary of Defense on the wartime preparedness of certain Defense Agencies;

21) Specify the responsibilities of the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Secretary of Defense;

22) Require the elimination of duplication between the headquarters staffs of each Military Department;

23) Specify that the functions of the Military Departments (to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, etc.) are undertaken to meet the operational requirements of the combatant commands;

24) Reduce personnel in DoD headquarters staff by 8,232;

25) Reduce the personnel in non-headquarters elements of the Defense Agencies by 9,462; and

26) Waive the requirements for 268 Presidential or DoD reports, notifications, and studies to be provided to the Congress.

## Overall Joint Matrix

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Note: Numbers represent hours dedicated to OPMEP objectives.
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Note: Numbers represent hours dedicated to OPMEP objectives.

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*Note: Numbers represent hours dedicated to OPMEP objectives.*

Appendix 4 (cont'd)
## Warfighting from the Sea Matrix

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**Note:** Numbers represent hours dedicated to OPMEP objectives.
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid., Section 668. Definitions. Chapter 3 of this monograph will detail the manner in which the GNA's definition of "joint matters" was expanded to provide better focus for curriculum development in service Professional Military Education schools.


5 Lovelace, 9.

6 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger letter to Honorable Les Aspin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, 12 March 1986; Commandant of the Marine Corps letter to Chief Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy, 24 March 1986. These documents state that the Pentagon and the Marine Corps do not support H.R. 4234, 4235, 4236, and 4237. These four bills were precursors to H.R. 4370. Entitled "Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," H.R. 4370 consolidated the four separate defense reorganization bills.


9 Panel Report on Military Education of the 100th Congress, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, First Session, April 21, 1989, 59. The Goldwater Nichols Act defines "joint matters" as "...matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters related to: 1) national military strategy; 2) strategic planning and contingency planning; and 3) command and control of combat operations under unified command. The Senior Military Schools Review Board, appointed by the Chairman, JCS, in 1987, concluded that joint matters should also include: "...national security policy... joint and combined operations, joint doctrine... [and] actions related to mobilization of forces/resources, joint logistics, communications, and intelligence, and the joint aspects of the planning, programming, and budgeting process." The Panel on Military Education concluded that "joint matters" include: 1) The elements contained in the GNA; 2) Several other subjects subsumed in the elements contained in the GNA definition (joint and combined operations, joint doctrine, joint logistics, joint communications, joint intelligence, theater campaign planning, and joint military command and control systems and their interfaces with national command systems); and 3) Joint force development, including certain military aspects of mobilization.

10 Ibid., 58.
11 Ibid., 189.

12 Ibid., 81-83. The Panel on Military Education formally reported its findings to Congress in April 1989. In addition to describing the strengths and weaknesses of the Professional Military Education system and the separate service schools and colleges, the panel submitted recommendations for improvement. The vast majority of these recommendations dealt with curriculum, faculty-to-student ratios, student mix (sister service and allied officer participation), and methods of instruction.


14 Ibid.


18 Ibid., 16.


20 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 1800.01: Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), Washington, D.C., February 1996. OPMEP Standards: 1) Develop joint awareness, perspective and attitudes 2) Employ predominantly active and highly effective instructional methods for the subject matter and desired level of learning 3) Assess student achievement 4) Support the needs of the joint community 5) Conduct a quality faculty recruitment, selection assignment, and performance assessment program 6) Conduct faculty development programs for improving instructional skills and increasing subject matter mastery. OPMEP Learning areas: 1) National military capabilities and command structure 2) Joint Doctrine 3) Joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war 4) Joint planning and execution processes 5) Systems integration at the operational level of war (Description of learning areas and standards from PAJE report on CSC)


23 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Professional Joint Education Syllabus, Quantico, Virginia, January 1997, 3-4.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE)*, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, February 1997, 1.


CJCS Instruction 1800.01.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE)*, 13.

Ibid.

Command and Staff College Professional Joint Education Syllabus. Overall Joint Matrix, 13.


Ibid.


Ibid., 165.


Ibid., I-4.

CJCS, Joint Pub 1-01, I-2.


Publications involving two or more services that have not been reviewed and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be referred to as “multi-Service” and will identify the participating services. (Joint Pub 1-01) I-1.


While a student at SAMS, Major C. A. Tucker wrote a monograph titled, "False Prophets: The Myth of Maneuver Warfare and the Inadequacies of FMFM-1 Warfighting." The study concludes that Warfighting is based on a philosophy which ignores the practical requirements of modern warfare. Likewise, Majors P. E. Knobel and R.S. Trout wrote essays in 1992 that called for the revision of FMFM-1. Both authors received an "Honorable Mention" in the Marine Corps' 1992 Chase Prize Essay Contest. Excerpts of both essays were later published in the Marine Corps Gazette. This is but a small sampling of numerous articles, essays and studies which suggest FMFM-1 is in need of revision.


Ibid., Title IV.

A JSO is an officer who is educated and experienced in the employment and support of unified and combined forces to achieve national security objectives. Creating the JSO designation was Congress' attempt to create a pool of officers trained in joint matters, but still knowledgeable in their individual service skills. Congress intended for the services to nominate their best officers to become JSOs. JSOs were envisioned as those officers who would provide continuity for joint matters and act as mentors within the joint arena and their own service.

In one of the few concessions made by Congress following the passage of the ACT, Title IV was modified to reflect a minimum tour length requirement of two years for generals, and three years for all others. The Secretary of Defense may waive up to 12.5 percent of the total number of joint specialist officers' three-year duty assignment requirement, thereby reducing the tour length to twenty-two months.

U.S. Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Title IV, Section 662. In addition to these promotion objectives, the Secretary of Defense, to monitor the quality of officers serving in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), has added the requirement that officers serving in the OSD should be promoted at a rate not less than those serving on the headquarters staff of their armed force.

The Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL), published by the Secretary of Defense in cooperation with the Services and the Joint Staff, currently includes over 9000 joint billets. This list further categorizes billets as either "joint" or "joint critical." A joint critical billet is one which must be staffed by an officer who already has joint experience. Since 1994, the Services have been required to fill one hundred percent of these critical joint duty assignments (CJDAs) with JSOs.
A major will spend approximately five to five and a half years in grade. To remain competitive for selection to battalion-level command, a Marine major must serve as either a Battalion Operations Officer or a Battalion Executive Officer, and must complete the course of instruction at an Intermediate Level PME School. A lieutenant colonel will also spend five to five and a half years in grade, while a colonel will routinely spend three years in grade before being considered for selection to brigadier general. Critical assignments during this eight-year period include battalion-level command, regimental-level command, and top level school.

Service-critical assignments for field grade officers include Battalion Operations Officer/Executive Officer, Battalion-level command, and Regimental-level command. Educational requirements include Intermediate Level School and Top Level School, each of which spans a one year period.


Ibid.

Mr. George Harris, Assistant to Marine Corps JOMO, interview conducted 27 March 1998.

Congressman Ike Skelton, speech given to the School of Advanced Military Studies, 27 February 1998.
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 1800.01. Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), Washington, D.C., February 1996.


CJCS Memorandum of Policy No. 7 Joint Strategic Planning System. 17 March 1993.


JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 84 Joint Strategic Planning System. 1 February 1989.


**STUDIES**


**SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS**

Harris, George. Headquarters Marine Corps, Assistant to Marine Corps JOMO, telephone interview conducted 27 March 1998.

Skelton, Ike, Member of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, speech given to the School of Advanced Military Studies, 27 February 1998.