SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM "OSTEUROPA"

ON SINO-SOVIE RELATIONS AND AGRARIAN SYSTEMS

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FOREWORD

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[Following are two translations from Osteuropa Vol X, No 11/12, Stuttgart, November-December 1960, on the subjects listed below in the table of contents. Additional bibliographic information is contained with each item.]

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PEIPING AND MOSCOW:

STATUS OF THEIR RELATIONS IN THE FALL OF 1960

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[Following is the translation of an article by Klaus Mehner in Osteuropa (Eastern Europe) Vol X, No 11/12, Stuttgart, November - December 1960, pages 729-744.]

The first International Conference of the Authorities on Soviet Affairs was held in Muenstereifel in September 1956. This conference was called by the German Society for East European Information. In September 1958 a second conference was held in Bad Aussee; this time under the auspices of the Austrian Labor Association East. Osteuropa has reported on both of these meetings in Vol 6/1956, pages 485 ff, and in Vol 1/1959, pp. 14, ff. From 19 to 24 September 1960, the third conference was held. This was in Japan, under the auspices of the Japanese Study Association, Oa Kyokai. The German Society for East European Information acted as general secretary for the European delegates. The conference site was a nicely situated hotel in a beautiful countryside at the foot of Fuji on the shore of lake Kawaguchi. Forty-six experts on Soviet, Chinese and Asiatic questions came from twelve countries in Asia, Europe and America. (The list of names is given on page 770.) There were also thirty-four observers present, predominantly diplomatic. The German-language press was represented by Harry Hamm (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) and Fritz Stock (Neue Zuercher Zeitung).

The general conference topic was: "The Soviet Union, Communist China and Asia." Originally, and according to the agenda (see pp. 766 ff) it was intended that equal emphasis should be placed upon the three sides of this question, and the connections existing between those blocks. During the course of 1960, however, general interest turned more and more to the Moscow-Peking problem, so that by the time of the conference, this was the most important topic. Even the connections existing between the red blocks and the rest of Asia were discussed, for the most part, in terms of the Chinese-Soviet relations.

In accordance with the general concepts of a scientific conference there was never any intention to formulate final results for the delegates at the close of the meeting or to publish...
a communique. On the contrary, experts had been expressly in-
vited who held many different points of view ranging from the far
right to the far left. Among the Japanese for example was a lead-
ing member of the Socialist Democrat Party. A member of the very
left wing Socialist Party also attended. No one was invited
from the communist countries. According to the words of the Japa-
ese conference organizer, only countries should be represented
at the conference whose citizens had the possibility of taking
part in a free exchange of ideas. Japanese and English were used
as the conference languages. The problem of simultaneous transla-
tion, which is difficult for the Japanese language, was well handled.

In the following report an attempt will be made to summarize
the most important lines of thought developed at the conference.
For this purpose both the written lectures and the discussions
will be used. Over forty written lectures were turned in before
the conference, and throughout the conference, the discussion were
carried on in a very intensive fashion. Taking the official and
the semi-official discussions together, they lasted from six and
a half to eight and a half hours daily. The discussion over the
topic: "The attitude of the two big red powers towards co-existence
and war, "which was originally scheduled for three hours, lasted
for almost four hours longer. New points of view were constantly
coming up which demanded further discussion. According to an
agreement reached by the conference delegates the confidential
character of the discussions shall be preserved by not mentioning
in reports about the conference the names of any discussion speakers.
The written lectures, however, which were turned in previous to the
meeting, may be quoted under the author's name. It has been plan-
ne to publish a part of the lectures in English and in book form.

At the beginning of the conference there was a quick ana-
lysis of the Soviet Union and Red China. Under the influence of
the discussions, the tenor of this investigation changed, however,
to a study of the mutual relations existing between the two red
neighbors. As an indication of the initial phase of the conference,
a comparison was made which took into consideration both traditional
and historical events and the question of organization and economics.
Special attention was paid to various developments in agriculture.
Professor Schiller gave a lecture on the subject, and several pa-
ragraphs from it are quoted in pp. 745 ff in this volume.

Professor Shummann's report, which maintained that the
Chinese communists were more flexible than the Russians, set off
a long discussion. It was pointed out to him that China was in the
early period of post-revolutionary development, and that during
this same period in Russia things were less bureaucratic and run
strictly. It was possible, therefore, that in a decade or so, the
same, similar symptoms of set-ways and organized bureaucracy might appear in China as in present day Russia. (Our readers will find the significant part of Shurmann's report on pp. 749 ff.)

Finally most of the Conference was devoted to the differences of opinion which have showed up in the last few years between the two red neighbors, and especially since the beginning of 1960. As to the extent and meaning of these differences, the opinions of the delegates varied greatly. As to the actual fact that these differences of opinion existed, however, they were united, especially since the quarrel between the two allies, especially in April, reached a volume of unprecedented proportions.

It would be strange if two allies, basically different in so many respects, didn't disagree on many matters. The surprising thing about this quarrel, is not that it exists, but that it is carried on so publically in newspapers and magazines with millions of readers. The Chinese have also entered this quarrel with the same identical qualities of volume and publicity. On this above point, the Conference was also united. Two questions, therefore, were investigated very thoroughly: First, what essential reasons did the Chinese have for their opinion which deviates from that of Moscow? And second, what tactical reasons did they have for making these differences so public?

Differences of Opinion Between the Red Neighbors.

In the last few years the list of essential differences has grown considerably. Several delegates believed that the most important point of disagreement between Peking and Moscow was to be found in their different judgments of the so called neutral countries, especially of those outside Europe. As in so many other respects, the Chinese are much more impatient in this matter than the Russians. They believe that they see immediate and very promising revolutionary situations and are anxious to exploit them. It is repugnant to them to work together with non-communist, moderate, and partly outspoken bourgeois politicians like Nehru, U Nu or Nasser. They don't like to do it, not even to consolidate their position in the way Moscow does. They consider these people to be "lackies of imperialism," and moreover, it is well known that they suffered bad experiences in the Twenties when Moscow forced them to collaborate with the official Chinese powers: the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-Chek. Animosity over this false advice from Moscow is still very much alive among the Chinese communists, and much of it can still be seen in their attitude now towards the Russians. Professor Seton-Watson contributed a report on a theme which belongs to this complex of questions: "Communists
and National Bourgeoisie." It is printed in this volume on pages 753 ff with minor deletions.

A cynical, but certainly not necessarily a false definition of "national bourgeoisie" was contributed by one of the participants in the discussion which followed Professor Watson's talk:

"National Bourgeoisie was originally defined by the communists in terms of economic criteria. During the course of time however, the question as to whether someone belonged to the National Bourgeoisie or not was based increasingly on his attitude towards Communism and the Communist Party in the country concerned. If he worked with the Communists, he was a revolutionary, but if he didn't then he was a counter-revolutionary."

In practice, Peking and Moscow are not so far apart. For Peking has also collaborated several times with leaders of the "National Bourgeoisie." Take for example the Algerian Ferhat Abbas, if not indeed with the "National Aristocracy," such as Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia. And after their unhappy experiences in their aggression against India, China has again become somewhat more reasonable with this Asiatic neighbor. But on the whole, and most clearly in the case of Iraq, the Chinese, when it comes to a question of supporting Communist party groups outside the Soviet Bloc, are much bigger go-getters than the Russians.

A short summary about the attitude of the Soviets will be given shortly. In this respect, Mao plays a much freer role in propaganda as the great father of all Afro-Asiatic peoples than his colleague in the Kremlin. The picture of Mao among the circles of the yellow, brown, and black revolutionaries belongs to the permanent repertory of Chinese propaganda.

In his report on the Peiping Policy towards neutral states, Dr. Halpern drew the following conclusion:

"Apparently the Chinese evaluate the power position of the Eastern Bloc in a much more optimistic way than the Soviets do themselves. While the Chinese are inclined to exploit this power position by way of an active tactical approach in the economic war and in various military feeler attempts, the Soviet Union appears to prefer in its attitudes towards the West diplomatic methods and an attempt at (detente political relaxation.)"
"According to the Chinese view, the meaning of neutrality for them seems to consist basically in supporting the aspirations of the already neutral Asiatic countries in order to bring them into a front position against the West, and in favoring the growth of neutrality in the non-neutral countries. Both goals would benefit Chinese military security.

"This strategy has not been completely without success, for sooner or later it meets with an echo of approval from opposition groups in countries friendly to the US. But for the most part the developments of this strategy have taken a contrary course. The successes they expected have not been obtained in their carrying out of economic war and military feeler attempts. The argument with Yugoslavia has shown several implicit contradictions between the declared good will of Peiping and its actual intentions. At the same time both China's inner political development, as well as its collaboration system which benefitted itself but did not involve it completely with other Asiatic countries began to limit Chinese endeavors.

"At the present, and in the future, possible failures of an inner and outer political nature may bring about a still more radical development on the part of radical Chinese leaders. Memories of earlier successes seem to have influenced them much more than a close study of present day realities. The Chinese make stereotyped judgments of the social forces in other countries according to the concept: revolutionary or counter-revolutionary.

"The importance of these forces is judged purely in terms of China's immediate goals. In the case of set-backs, they refer to their renewed, confirmed and chilastic belief in the final victory of the proletariat. Whenever any military weaknesses have shown up in either their near or distant spheres of interest, they have pretended to find an explanation in the diabolical capabilities of
the capitalistic world to conspire against them. This has led finally to discrepancies in action with their neighbors, and to a violent controversy with their most powerful ally.

"As a result of Russian intervention, the Chinese returned to a pragmatic management of their relations to the various neutral countries of Asia. This could not, however, reestablish the situation which existed two years before. Today their attitude towards the Asiatic countries is a secondary aspect of their total world view and apparently they will change still more, according to the outcome of the Chinese-Russian controversy. But even if a pragmatic management of Asiatic neutrality is now the main concern of radical Chinese leaders, they still may stick to their once occupied positions, and fundamentally they will hardly want to change their ideas."

Several delegates were of the opinion that the Chinese became especially enterprising after the Soviet successes with long range missiles and Sputnik in the fall of 1957. Apparently the Chinese believed it was necessary to transform the advantage achieved by Soviet technicians into a world revolutionary victory. It is to be supposed that Moscow on the other hand must have evaluated the still existing "Balance of Fear" in a much more realistic fashion.

Almost without exception it was maintained that the Chinese are ready to take bigger chances than the Russians. In opposition to this, it was doubted that Peiping would really want to bring upon itself the dangers of an atomic war. By many thunderous explanations, such as the statement that the atom bomb is a paper tiger, Peiping plays the role of a strong man in order to impress its own population and the whole world through its display of self-assurance. But when things get tough, Peiping has steadily looked for unwarlike ways out of its own self-created difficulties. The most striking example is the case of the shelling of Quemoy in the late Summer of 1958. As an indication of Peiping's attitude, several discussion speakers made the uncontradicted statement that red Chinese leadership had adopted a policy of "prudent behavior." In contradiction, however, to the advice of US president Theodore Roosevelt "walk softly and carry a big stick," the Red Chinese talk very loudly and make many threats, but up until now at least and probably for several years to come, they
have only a very moderate sized stick for the Atomic Age. Big brother Moscow has the big stick, and it has not given equal right of use to any of its allies. About the relationship between two partners, only one of which has a big stick, a quotation from Professor Brzezinski, given later in the text, will give cause for thought.

Both in Formosa, as well as in Berlin, the great danger for world peace is to be seen less in the fact that the Communists would knowingly pick a quarrel to start World War III, than that they should misjudge their opponent. If Peiping is sure that America will defend Formosa even at the risk of Atomic war, then under the conditions of present day power relationships a military attack can hardly be expected from the Chinese. For the further maintenance of peace it is critically important that no false calculations be made. A clear position and a convincing speech from Washington along these lines would prevent the Chinese from one day believing in their own talk about a "Paper Tiger America," and then going into action. Stalin maintained that the appearance of atomic weapons had not changed the character of war, but since 1955, however, Moscow has conceded that the atomic weapon has basically influenced the whole nature of war. It is quite possible that today the Chinese are well aware of this fact, but do not yet want to have the answer to it.

As to whether Formosa is as important for the Chinese as their talk would indicate, opinions varied. Many believed that red Chinese leadership considers the Formosa challenge, with its alternative solution, its counter government, its successful land reform, and its ties to America to be a very serious problem, and the red Chinese are angered by the lack of support which Moscow has given its claim to Formosa. Others were of the opinion that at the present time, Red China had more pressing concerns, and perhaps was not at all unhappy to be able to drum up patriotic passions in the people with references to the "not-yet-freed" Formosa. One speaker believed that he could explain the now quite frequently appearing community of interest between Peiping, Pankow, Sofia, Tirwana by the fact of their constant unsatisfied wishes for new territory.

A long discussion was held over Peiping's attitude towards Moscow's efforts at working things out with the United States. Dr. Dut at the following to this discussion:

"To a certain degree the Chinese communist leaders have raised what they consider to be their national interests up to the international level. They demand that these interests should be recognized as the
international interests of the whole world Communist movement. Apparently they were convinced that they had nothing to win from a detente between the Soviet Union and the United States, and perhaps even had much more to lose. It must have been clear to them, that such a detente would leave the question of China's international position still open, and certainly it would not secure for them their strived for seat in the UN or in the Security Council. In this period of affairs a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the US would not have automatically brought with it recognition of China as a world power. To just as small a degree, it would not have brought about either the annexation of Formosa or a completely satisfactory regulation of its relations with Japan. SEATO, the American strong holds in Japan, Formosa, and in many other Asiatic countries would have continued to exist as before.

"All this meant that the Chinese Communists could have had but very little interest in the planned detente between Khrushchev and Eisenhower. And from this logical point it was only a step to a position of opposition to such a detente and to the involved clothing of this opposition with many ideological arguments. Their widely spread campaign emphasizing the worthlessness of international agreements with the "imperialistic powers" stems mainly from this turn of affairs.

"During this time the Chinese gave a new ideological line to the world communist movement. They reminded the communists of Lenin's words, that the nature of imperialism could not be changed, and they argued that war is not to be avoided as long as imperialistic countries continue to exist. As a matter of fact, the Chinese said that constant talk of peaceful co-existence as a real possibility of the future would tend to "disarm" all the people in the world. It would arouse false hopes in them and would cause them to give way in their "vigilance" against the "ranks of imperialism."
Apparently disagreements over leadership in the red block has already shown up in the Chinese polemic with Moscow. A short time ago it was pointed out in this magazine (Osteuropa, 1960 Volume 7/8, p. 514) that in China the "ideas of the Mao Tse-Tung" are praised to the skies, but no one thinks of talking about "Khrushchev's ideas." To many Chinese communists the Soviet Union's direction under Khrushchev appears to be a false one, since it leads away from Communism. According to them, it is easy to see that the Russian people are becoming more and more bourgeois, and this they believe is especially true of upper levels in Russian society. The Chinese believe that the center of World Communism should be there, where the quickest receipt is offered for communist victory in the whole world. Therefore, in Peking. After the appearance and growth of Lenin's quarrel over questions of ideology, there have been many disagreements over leadership in the communist realm, and, therefore, over who was to hold communist power. In the Spring of 1960 and especially in the April articles the Chinese have been going through a process of consolidating their own ideological positions (of course well supplied with quotations from Lenin,) and have announced their claims to leadership.

In opposition to this concept, it has been pointed out, that in comparison with the Soviet Union, China is much too weak to make such claims. I am not of this opinion. We live in an age of such rapid development, that we all must consider the future more than ever in any of our calculations. More and more, we see at the same time the actual and the potential -- the future. Whenever we judge a country, we think not only in terms of its present day situation, but of its situation of tomorrow. And, of course, it depends on circumstances, but this future situation may be considered to be stronger or weaker than its present one. At the conference the possibility was also mentioned that the Chinese communist experiment could lead to a complete fiasco. But the majority believed that we have to reckon with an increase both in the Chinese population and in their production. (In this instance to be sure the growing production will be raised to some degree by the still faster growth of the population.)

Naturally, the Chinese see themselves as the leading world power of the future -- with a billion people and a powerful production, and surely one day atomic weapons -- and they vision themselves then as being by far the stronger partner in the red alliance. It would be strange, indeed, if even today that did not influence their attitude towards their presently still stronger ally. Throughout the Conference, it was considered that traditional Chinese wishes for world power were an important factor in their present day development. As a matter of fact, one of
the chief supports for Mao's influence with his people has been his success in the far-reaching restoration of Chinese National Pride - a pride which suffered for more than a century. Obviously, China's attitude towards the Western Powers has been strongly conditioned by the bad experiences which they have had historically with the West. Yoji Hirota had this to say on that point:

"Even in Communist countries the experiences and the relics of pre-communist times still exercise a strong effect upon the country. Not only are these facts known to the leaders of communist countries, and certainly they don't try to conceal them, but indeed, they make use of them to further the realization of their own political goals. Moreover, the experiences and the scars which both communist nations (Russia and China) have had in connection with the question of "imperialism" are diametrically opposed. Therefore, it is not surprising that their concepts of the character of "imperialism" vary. The Russians seem to think it possible, insofar as they are concerned, to find some formula for compromise with the "imperialistic countries" of the West. But the Chinese, on the other hand, maintain that such a compromise with the West is impossible.

"The Russians are able to look back on a long period of peaceful "co-existence" with the West during the period of the Romanov dynasty. But from all the experiences which the Chinese have had with Western people, they can gather no such optimistic conception of things. Taking into consideration these historical consequences which still are at work in both nations, it is only natural to find that they both have different concepts as to the inevitability of a final and devastating war with the "imperialistic countries." Just as such a war seems to be inevitable to the Chinese, the Russians are inclined to consider it to be avoidable. It is impossible for a Chinese communist to imagine that the Western "Imperialistic People" could give up under any other circumstances their "monopolistic" position in the world. It is always clear to a Chinese communist that history offers no starting point for such a conception, and, moreover, he believes that a revolu-
Why The Loud Public Quarrel?

The various considerations of the topic given previously explain why the Chinese communists have taken a position which deviates from that of Moscow. But they do not explain why the Chinese decided to proclaim their differences with Moscow with such volume and with such full publicity. In an attempt at answering this question, Dr. Brzezinski proposed an original "hostage" theme, and at the same time analyzed the relationship of the weaker partner in a coalition. He wrote:

"One can paraphrase the difference of opinion (or the conflict, if one wants to emphasize the stronger word) as a disagreement between two unequal partners, who - given their mutual assumptions and purposes - can only win out, as long as they hold together, but must lose, as soon as they try to stand alone. This results in a very specific type of conflict; namely, a conflict which has a matter of common interest placed over everything else. Beyond this factor of unity, both sides have certain universal assumptions in common, and they use in their relations with each other the same terminology. As a result they have few misunderstandings in their talks, but then they must pay much greater attention to exactness in their choice, or their leaving out, of words.

"In the course of the conflict, unity plays the same role as that of hostages which bind both sides together. If hostages from both parties are placed in the open between the two sides, then a situation occurs in which one may threaten the life of the hostages; but such a threat is only effective as long as the hostages remain alive. Once they are dead, then the threat to kill them is no longer effective. The same thing is true of unity. The destruction of unity is the worst possible thing for both sides, and, therefore, the weaker partner must limit his efforts to self-assertions, and the stronger partner must express his condemnations in a limited
fashion or speak in a veiled way. But as long as the hostages are alive, that is to say as long as the joint, common fate remains in evidence, then they lessen the unequal nature of the power on the two sides, or they cause this imbalance to disappear completely. They make the weaker stronger, and the stronger weaker. Indeed, they make the one, who can maintain in a believable manner about himself that he is less dependent upon this unity, to be the stronger of the two. Therefore, the statement that the Soviet Union is the stronger does not necessarily mean that in the Chinese-Soviet disagreement the scales must automatically weigh to the favor of the Soviets.

"These observations partly explain, however, why the dialogue is so often carried on from the Chinese side of the fence. Since Peking is the weaker of the two, it has to show Moscow, that it is serious in its intentions, and that it is even ready to take certain risks in order to obtain them. It is for this reason that China can not present its opinions in a quiet, confidential manner. Then they would not have the necessary weight of importance. (It is always necessary in this circumstance to torture the hostages a little publically in order that everyone should believe one is very serious in one's demands.) This is especially important, because the Soviets know the Chinese respect definite limits, and because the Chinese threats would not appear believable in terms of these limits unless they caused a definite tension.

"In short, the Chinese have to make politics on the "Edge of Rupture" (of Unity.) Through their own actions they must allow the situation to slip a little out of control, so that Moscow has the choice of either cementing the break or of risking open rupture. At the same time, however, the Chinese do not stop asserting their responsible stand for unity. In this way, Moscow has both the job of finding the right answer and of preserving the unity. In the relationship between China and the Soviet Union such politics on the "Edge of Rupture" appear in the form of an open and mutual criticism. Such criticism implies that one has to go far enough in order to make one's threats valid and believable."
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A still further reason for the volume and publicity of the Chinese arguments can be seen in Peiping's wish to put pressure on Moscow in order to obtain bigger economic aid. During the discussion it was pointed out again and again that China was in a big hurry and was greatly irritated by Moscow's lack of understanding for this hurry. China finds itself at the beginning period of development, a development which the Russians went through some time ago, and China would like to overcome this backward state - in comparison to the Soviet Union - as fast as possible. China believes that it has to be supported in a suitable manner by Moscow. This belief was strengthened when Khrushchev explained in public at the XXI Party Rally, that the Soviet Union, China, and the other Bloc countries would enter simultaneously into the Age of Communism. According to Soviet doctrine, the transition into Communism is only possible when based on the foundation of a high state of industrialization. Even for the Soviet Union this is still in the far distance, and if China wanted to reach this point, its economy, therefore, would have to grow even faster than that of the Soviet Union. This progress on the other hand would demand Soviet economic aid totaled in countless billions of Rubles every year. And far and wide there is none of this to be seen. On the contrary, for years now, the Soviets have not given the Chinese a Copek of credit more. It may be, therefore, that Peiping wants to put pressure on the Russians by means of its present quarrel in order to show its dissatisfaction with the Soviet economic aid in front of the world.

Moscow's Reaction.

If the considerations, which have been set forth here, are right about the material causes for Chinese differences with Moscow and the manner of Chinese procedures, then the Soviet reaction can also be explained in the same way. Certainly it has not been easy for Moscow to decide upon a public quarrel. The stronger partner in an alliance obviously has no real reason to make public a matter of internal differences of opinion. But under these given circumstances the Russians had no other choice.

Everyone in Kawaguchi believed that Khrushchev's and Mao's final goal was the same, and that they were working for "Communist victory in the whole world." Therefore, these differences of opinion are only concerned with methods. However, history gives more than one example for the importance of difference in methods. Since Stalin decided - had to decide - to give temporary precedence to the "build up of Socialism in one country" over that of the "permanent revolution," the Kremlin has steered on the whole a very careful course and has aimed itself at "certainty." Under
Khrushchev that concept has not been changed. Given his innate sense of optimism, Khrushchev is convinced of communist victory in the world and will try to reach it at any cost, just as long as it does not come to a world conflagration. More than once he has stated that an atomic war could lead to a catastrophe for whole nations of people. For example he made this statement in Bucharest (Pravda 22, June, 1960,) where he also used the words: "Only fools and madmen could call for a new world war today." Khrushchev believes that after this seven year plan and then perhaps one more, then it is accomplished - then the power relationships will be shoved so far out of place that automatically everywhere the future development of things will proceed in his favor. Naturally, Khrushchev is ready to make use of whatever "revolutionary possibilities" turn up, say in the Congo, or in Cuba, but never beyond that point, where the question of atomic war comes close and becomes risky. If the situation turns out to be bad, then he feels it is better to pull in the red flag and be quiet, as happened on the 17th of September in Leopoldville.

From this complete and throughout logical concept of things, Khrushchev has decided in no case to let the decision over war or peace to get out of hand, not even in the case of the Chinese. Apparently, they seem to him in their present state of mind like those revolutionaries, against whom, Lenin forty years ago directed his battle slogan: "The childhood diseases of the Left Radicals." It was just this same document which was so highly prized and set forth as being of present interest on the evening before the Bucharest Conference in Moscow (Pravda 12, 6, 60). To be sure, Khrushchev enjoys baiting the Americans, but this is a pleasure which he takes upon himself alone, since he trusts himself - but apparently not the Chinese - to be able to switch over to a smile just at the right time.

In part of his report, Professor Schapiro developed the following, very illuminating theory about the organizational aspects of the disagreement and Moscow's general attitude:

"In the ideological sense, the most serious point of dispute between the Soviet Union and China is to be found in the gulf between the "left" and the "right" view as to the correct attitude which is to be taken towards the "Imperialistic Powers." But behind this main point of dispute, which is also clothed with the discussion over "the inevitability of war" and Leninism, stands the naked fact that China is ready to take the risk of an atomic war in order to further the spreading of world communism, but Russia is not. In contrast to this matter, all other
points of argument — especially the question as to which period China finds itself in on its way to Socialism or Communism — are relatively unimportant. But as always in the case of debates about communism, when it comes to the question of "right" or "left" divergences, then a whole series of other themes may be grouped around this venerable formula. For example the people's communes are considered by the USSR as a deviation to the left, while, in China on the other hand lack of trust in the people's communes is considered to be a deviation to the right. Among other things Chinese leaders may say someone who objects to the people's communes supports himself too much upon Soviet experiences.

"It is vitally important, therefore, that in the last few months the debate between China and the Soviet Union has brought into the open the question of "right" or "left" deviations in international relations. This started with the speech of Kang Scheng in February 1960. Perhaps one may also consider Khrushchev's allusion to Trotsky in his speech of October 1959 as being directed towards China. And this argument continued in the theoretical journals of both countries up into the Fall of 1960. Since both sides must be well aware of the damage that such a public quarrel over key questions could mean for the strength of world communism, one can only assume that the public discussion has become necessary for some undisclosed but practical reason. The whole history of communism testifies to the fact that a quarrel between party leaders is only debated in public when practical or organizational reasons make it necessary. What factors then may have been so important for the Soviet Union?

"It is quite unlikely that the Soviet Union, when it allowed the discussion to be carried on in public, was guided only by its fear that China might eventually start an atomic war which in the long run could involve the Soviet Union. To be sure we have no proof of it, but one may at least label it as unlikely that the Soviets have already delivered atomic weapons to the Chinese. Therefore, any rash procedure on the part of the Chinese would not absolutely need to drag the Soviet Union into a war, when the Soviets did not
want to let themselves be pulled into one. It would be naive to suppose that purely the fact of a Mutual Assistance Pact between the two countries could keep the Soviet Union from remaining neutral, if she considered that to be the correct political action for her to take.

"Besides this weighty question of war, there is still another reason which could have brought the Soviets to a state of giving in to a public discussion of "right" or "left". That namely is the fear that the leadership position in world communism, both the ideological as well as that of organization, could go over to China. Whenever China for example recommends a bolder, risk-ready policy in the "anti-colonial battle," China achieves with this line great popular approval among extreme nationalist movements in those under-developed countries, which communism wants to bring under its control.

"But still another deeper cause may lie at the bottom of the Soviet fear of Chinese rivalry for the leadership position. This may be expressed in terms of other communist parties or in terms of the communist final goals. A position of leadership means organizational control, and organizational control is realized through individuals, who appear to be acceptable to the leading party. If, therefore, China is striving for an ideological position of leadership (let us point for example to the Soviet Zone of Germany where there have already been some indications of this,) then it is only a little step to the appearance of a left party leader, in this case in the Soviet Zone, whose unfriendly attitude towards the right leadership: the Soviet Union would be an opportunity for his support by China. Even when this prospect exists only as a possibility, even as a distant possibility, then the "right" leadership of the Soviet Union has to take steps, if she wants to prevent such a development, and she must condemn the concept of a "left" position a long time in advance. Therefore, she has to carry out the theoretical discussion in public."

After the Kremlin had to decide upon fighting out its differences in the open, (perhaps caused by the considerations here mentioned by Professor Schapiro,) then it went about bringing the communist parties of the world into line with a great deal of energy. The Rumanian Party Congress in June 1960 offered an occasion for this. It was shown at the time that the overwhelming majority of
the Communist Parties held to the same point of view as that of
the Soviet leadership. Therefore, in Bucharest even the Chinese
communists placed their signature on a communique clarifying Mos-
cow's philosophy.

After Bucharest, Peiping showed a noticeable reservation
in the defense of its own line. On the other hand the Russians
continued to sound a call that all communists should hold true
to Moscow's general position. This is shown for example in an essay
by A. Butenko and W. Ptchelin in Volume 12 of Kommunist, published
on 23 August. Probably Moscow is still not quite convinced that
Peiping is holding true to the party line, and apparently Moscow
is right in this respect. In any case some of the speakers at
Kawaguchi were of the opinion that the Kremlin would try to create
a clear impression once and for all on the subject. They would
try to do this: First, in order to leave no doubt as to where the
general party line is formulated, and second, in order to be free
of the worry that the Chinese might pull the Soviet Union at some
unfavorable time into a world war either through direct intention,
rashness, or miscalculation.

Since the Chinese have frequently expressed themselves ambi-
guously and also have admitted several times that as a result of
the strength of the communist block a world war could be pre-
vented (for example: Jen-min Jin-pao, 9 May 60,) they have been
holding open a line of retreat. It is interesting that even
Chiang Kai-chek, who up until a short time ago spoke increasingly
of the apparent monolithic unity of the red block, explained in an
interview on 6 September 1960 to an AP correspondent, that in the
question of war risk there was a difference between the two red
allied (China News, Taipei, 7 Sep 60.)

In my own opinion, I think it is necessary here to mention
another further reason why the demands of the Kremlin have been
fixed so decisively on the maintenance of the general party line.
That is their wish to keep in their own hands the formulation of the
methods for the "Conversion of Socialism into Communism."

Any disagreement over this problem touches on the very
heart of the communistic creed. Such a matter has to be taken very,
very seriously in Moscow. For in a world movement, which is direct-
ed towards the communistic final aims, the ideological leadership
has to please those, who can make it appear believable that they
hold the key to this future paradise. Today, inside the red block,
plausibility for this receipt of "conversion into communism" is
what the legitimate succession was during the days of the monarchy.
Apparently the Chinese-Soviet quarrel would have never reached such
volume and publicity, if in actuality it wasn't a tight question
of who, while claiming to have the true teaching, then laid claim
to the total power.
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In a report on the Chinese-Soviet economic relations, Dr. Hoeffding pointed out that during the last few years the tension between Moscow and Peiping was reflected time and time again in these relations. To be sure, and above all in 1958, the year of the "great advance," the Soviet economy has several times granted short term aid to the Chinese in order to help them out of their own self-occasioned difficulties. But seen on the whole, the economic involvements of both neighbors lack that degree of "brotherly affection," about which they talk so much in the banquet talks given on both sides. (Probably Dr. Hoeffding's report will be published in the next volume of Osteuropa-Wirtschaft.)

The Red Bloc and Japan

One session of the Conference was devoted to Moscow's relation to Japan. In his report, Dr. Langer drew the following conclusion:

"The Political leaders in Peiping are much more concerned with the Japanese question than are their counterparts in Moscow. The events in May and June 1960, when the rati-
ification of the American-Kapanese Security Treaty came up, show that clearly. Radio Peiping gave much more time to these events, and the headlines in the Chinese press were concerned almost constantly with this Battle in Japan. Indeed, one could get the impression that 650 million Chinese were mobilized to take part in the battle of the progres-
sive forces in Tokyo. Quite different than in the Soviet Union, the people in China were mobilized to give explicit support to the forces fighting against the treaty. Even the figures went into the streets, and in Tschungschen Park in Peiping a poem was recited publically which began with the words:

White dove fly on swift wings into the blue sky,
Over the snowy peak of Fudschiyama, over the
bay of Tokyo,
Announce to the fighting youth of Japan the
feelings of our burning hearts,
Say to the striking young workers ... 
Say to them: the youth of China greets you;
And the youth of China will forever stand by our
side.

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"Such an engagement is the result of certain historical and geopolitical facts. It is at the same time a result of the anti-American feelings fanned by Peiping, for Peiping considers Japan to be the main enemy fortress in Asia, a fortress, which because of its close position threatens the red Chinese regime much more than it does that of the Soviet Union.

"But Red China's attitude towards Japan differs from Moscow's in much more than the intensity of the engagement. The Soviets are inclined to follow strictly limited aims and to move forward step by step. They carefully develop a complex of contacts in the cultural, economic and political area, and in this way they allow the unpleasant memories of Japan dating from the Second World War to fade slowly away. They are ready to grant smaller concessions, and to avoid as much as possible hurting Japanese feelings. In this context, one only has to compare the Soviet expressions about their much hated opponent, the former Prime Minister Kischi. At the height of the communist campaign against him, they called him at the worst: undemocratic or fascist. But Peiping used such terms of abuse as Traitor, "Blood Covered Hangman," and Spit Licker of US Imperialism. The Kremlin procedure is based upon the idea that it must make its policies palatable to the Japanese, and that a too severe threat could have an unfavorable effect on the slowly improving Soviet position. Moscow's Japanese policy seems to be based on self assurance and strength, and it makes use of every advantage in a non-instant but effective way. Peiping's procedure on the other hand - insult, threats, a break in trade connections and similar things, indicates a different strategic conception. Peiping considers toughness without compromise and the intensification of the dispute to be profitable things. Peiping is carrying on a policy of high stakes with the expectation of a quick win.

"This same tendency shows up in the trade connections. Red China is inclined evidently to pull these questions over into a strictly political realm. Trade connections were immediately severed when Japan did not accept Peiping's political conditions. Moscow, however, tried to increase its contacts with Japan, and renounced any too great open political use of economic means of applying pressure.

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In spite of the sharp attack on the signing of the American-Japanese Security Pact by the Kischi government, Moscow was ready to renew the Trade and Fish Agreement with Japan.

"Peiping is also more inclined to take part directly in internal Japanese communist disturbances. In the propaganda programs which Peiping beams to Japan, it refers to the US, usually, as a Paper Tiger and admonishes the Japanese people - which doesn't go with the metaphor - to throw off the American yoke. In its relation to the internal Japanese political forces, Moscow on the other hand is rather cautious. It even renounced going along with North Korean and Japanese left wing groups in the publication of appeals calling for the fall of the Japanese government. Certainly Moscow's and Peiping's various interpretations of the "co-existence" concept show up in this divergent position of the Chinese communists. But they show up more in the differences between Chinese-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations. In contrast to the Soviet Union, Red China sees in the case of Japan a whole list of unfulfilled hopes. Above all else Peiping wants the diplomatic recognition of its exclusive claim to the name "China." This holds important consequences both for its position in Asia as well as for the outcome of its battle with the US. Also Japan is much more of a rival for Red China, than it is for Moscow, especially insofar as South East Asia is concerned. At the same time these differences in red Chinese and Soviet attitudes towards Japan are an expression of an unequal political and economic development and the greater inner pressure which Communist China has to face."

Outlook.

The Kawaguchi Conference was concerned with discovering facts, plausible answers for the Soviet-Chinese relation, their general analysis, and not with making forecasts for the future. The outlook which is sketched in the following paragraphs contains merely some of my own personal conclusions based on the work of the conference. On the last day there was a discussion over the question of whether it was at all possible to make forecasts for the Communist Bloc. One of the speakers stated that it was meaningless to attempt forecasts when one had to deal with fanatics. According to him, it is impossible to tell how they are going to act from one moment to the next. It was pointed out to him - and it

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seems to me rightfully so — that one has to actually deal, to be sure, with fanatics among the communist leaders, but they are cold fanatics. They strive to obtain rational ends with rational means, and inside of their philosophical system which is open to all they act logically. It is only necessary to compare a Mao with a Lumumba, in order to recognize the difference between a cold fanatic, who knows what he wants, and an unreasonable and almost irrational man, who contradicts himself at all times. Therefore, an outlook into Chinese-Soviet relations of the future is not completely in vain.

After all the things which have happened in the five years since the 20th Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party, it is difficult to imagine that the connection between Peiping and Moscow could ever return to that relative state of no problems which existed in the years before Stalin’s death. Therefore, to a state where Moscow was clearly the master in the red block, since 1956, when Khrushchev threw Stalin from the pedestal, and the flames of the battle for freedom flared up in Hungary, the self-assurance of the Red Chinese leadership has grown by leaps and bounds. And in this way the relation of both great powers has become a dialectical one. Both sides now take part in it. It is no longer a one-way street with Moscow acting as the only center of control. By and large, and taking into account Chinese strength and self-assurance, this process will continue to grow. The relation between Peiping and Moscow will never again be as simple as it was in Stalin’s time. And new problems will be added to those which have become visible in the last few years.

But between the establishment of this fact and the forecast of an imminent break there is a big difference. Certainly such a break is possible in theory. What in this world isn’t possible? But is it likely? No. It is even very unlikely, if one thinks in terms of a break such as that which occurred between Tito and Stalin 1948–49. There are numerous differences of opinion between the Kremlin and the Forbidden City. Many things about the Chinese do not please the Soviets, and vice-versa. But, when both partners measure their present anger in terms of a yes or no for rupture, then they have to conclude that their anger is very slight in comparison to the catastrophic damages which such a break would mean for them and the cause of world communism.

We know very little about the personal relationships inside the Kremlin and even less about those inside the Forbidden City; and, therefore, we can not judge, whether due to an internal power struggle, Khrushchev or Mao would try to force a break in the red alliance in order not to be overpowered by internal opponents. As far as can be seen, there has been no occasion for Khrushchev to
do this, since we have to assume that his opponents are pro-Maoists, and certainly he could not in them over by breaking with Mao himself. This sort of thing would be more conceivable for Mao. Since the Spring of 1958 (the "great advance" and the people's communes) his policy has been based on the creation of tensions - certain ones inside Red China and others in regard to the non-communist foreign countries. The surrender of the "sharp" course under pressure from Khrushchev would amount to a confession of its defeat, and could only benefit China's opponent which it accuses of "right deviation." The picture would be different if China were to find itself one day in a doubtful position because of a great food shortage. As a matter of fact the Chinese outlook at the moment in this respect is bad. The people are going through a hard winter. But, whoever remembers the beginning of the Thirties in the Soviet Union will hesitate to predict for Red China either the downfall of the regime or chaos.

It is only possible to imagine one case in which Moscow would be ready for a break with Peiping, and that would be an immediately imminent Chinese plunge into World War at an inconvenient time for the Kremlin. As far as the Chinese are concerned, I can not presently imagine any situation at all in which they could wish to break completely with Moscow. The only one would happen if they should try to beat a break already decided upon by Moscow.

Hence the most likely forecast is that in the future the differences of opinion between Moscow and Peiping will grow in importance, but that both parties will not allow a complete break since they are too well aware of the fatal consequences.

If these assumptions should prove false, if in spite of expectation it should come to an open break, then this would be the most important world political event of our decade. It would bring about a completely new political constellation. World communism would then experience its heaviest and perhaps fatal blow, and this in turn could open up extraordinary new perspectives. But all this the men in Peiping and Moscow know just as well as we do.

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From the Editors: A day before the printing of this volume the full contents of the Conference in Moscow: "Explanation of the Deliberations of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers Parties," arrived here from the Soviet Union (Pravda 6 Dec 1960.) The conference lasted three weeks and the document is first of all a battle plan and a propaganda action sheet for the spreading of Communism throughout the world. Besides this is throws light on the position of the ideological disagreement between Moscow and Peiping.
and how they view communism. And in this regard the "Explanation" further confirms the analysis which was made at Kawaguchi. From the outside it looks as if the unity inside the camp had been restored. But have they succeeded in abolishing the internal differences of opinion between the two centers of world revolution? We doubt it.
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THE SOVIET AND CHINESE AGRARIAN SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON

- Intrabloc -

[Following is the translation of an article by Dr. Otto Schiller in Osteuropa (East Europe) Vol X, No 11/12, Stuttgart, November-December 1960, pages 745-749.]

Wherever communism has come into power, whether from internal development, as in the case of Russia and China, or through external force, as in the case of the Eastern European and Asiatic Satellite countries, one of its first measures has been the uncompensated expropriation of large land tracts and their division among the farmers. Not until a later period, and when the communist rule has been satisfactorily established, then the second step is carried out, whereby the land is taken away from the farmers, which at first had been divided among them, and placed on the road to collectivization. For this first reason, this procedure has proved to be an excellent tactical means for the communists. It offers them the possibility during the critical period of power seizure of neutralizing the farm population and securing their communist rule by appearing to make the farmers a present.

During the beginning of period of power seizure, the Chinese procedure in the agrarian matter was not basically different from the pattern which was established by the example of the Soviet Union. To be sure, a certain deviation from this pattern is to be seen in the fact that China did not at once nationalize the land and soil. Both small farms and large farm elements were allowed in the first period as much freedom of movement, as occurred only later in the Soviet Union during their Second Period, that is to say in the so called NEP Period. This development shows that the Chinese communists were able to profit from Soviet experiences to this degree at least. They did not need to repeat all the mistakes and economic nonsense, which brought the economy of the Soviet Union during its period of martial communism to the very brink of disaster.

Perhaps this also explains the fact, that a much shorter time period was needed in China, before they proceeded to carry out the second step. As a matter of fact in the Soviet Union it was twelve years after the Bolshevik Revolution before they set about the so-called socialistic reorganization of agriculture. In China they allowed only five years from the seizure of power before they followed the Soviet example and decided upon the second step of beginning with a complete collectivization of farming. During the
beginning period of collectivization, the Chinese tactical procedure was considerably different from the well known Soviet example. At the time many Western observers were of the opinion that China was not striving for the same agrarian political ends as the Soviet Union. Since China was supported by the intellectual potential of an old, highly developed culture, the observers believed that the Chinese communists were willing and capable of developing their own agrarian political economy.

It is known that especially in India the circle of authorities were of this opinion. In 1956 an Indian Coop delegation traveled through China in order to study the agriculture production Coops. The report of this delegation, which was published in Delhi, is one of the most informative agrarian-political documents of present times. Namely it introduces that question which is so important for the future development of all Asiatic countries including Japan. What possibilities are actually present for the realization of a coop philosophy in a non-communist country? Also the contradicting opinions of two members of the delegation are published in this report. In contrast to the other commentators, they were not convinced of the voluntary attitude nor of the Coop nature of the collectivization of Chinese Farmers. Later developments, as they have been carried out at an unexpectedly fast tempo after the publication of this report, must have strengthened the present opinion of Indian officials that the contradictory opinion of the minority was apparently correct.

In China the collectivization was begun at first more carefully than it had been done formerly in the Soviet Union, where they had decided from the beginning upon a very rigorous procedure. But after a short starting time the Chinese then out-trumped the Soviet example. Without many detours and with no less rigorous methods they put through the universal collectivization of agriculture and proceeded with the change from the half-socialistic form of operation to the full-socialistic form. In this way they achieved the collectivization of the total agriculture in a shorter period of time than was the case in the Soviet Union. As yet, there appears to be no sufficiently complete explanation for the reasons which led the Chinese to force and push the speed of collectivization in such a radical way. The great economic and political risks which they took upon themselves must have been clear to Mao Tse-Tung, who personally was the authority for this decision.

The People's Communes.

After the Chinese had developed their agrarian system for a number of years quite plainly along the pattern of Soviet example,
it was a big surprise when suddenly in 1958 with the creation of the people's communes a new phase of development was introduced in China for which there was no parallel in the Soviet Union. It is not easy for the outside observer to create for himself a picture of how the Chinese people's communes are to be judged from the viewpoint of operation, economy, and agriculture. The people's communes have only been in existence for two years. Already in the first period they have gone through in principle and methods various fundamental changes. It still isn't possible to see in all details what their final form will be.

It is possible, however, to establish that in spite of continuous difficulties the Chinese are not thinking of doing away with the people's communes. Apparently also in the future, they will present a definite sign of the Chinese economic and social structure. This would mean, that a new phenomenon has appeared in China, and there is no analogy for it in its present stage either in the Soviet Union or in the other East block countries.

The Payment System.

During the first period in the people's communes it was apparently believed that they could also use communist principles in the payment system at the same time as they did away with the norm system. The work accomplishments, to which the members were compelled by military like forms of organization, were compensated mainly by community dining facilities, and other social benefits to make up for the very low wages. In general during this concept of things it was necessary after a time to decide upon a more moderate procedure. At the present time, there is no standard payment procedure in the people's communes, but on the whole it is based upon a norm system with a production quota. In most cases the commune members are paid a low monthly wage which is subtracted from the sum of their final yearly wage. This is paid to individuals based on a system of their production units. In this case the low monthly payments represent advance instalments from the final wage settlement. In this final settlement, both the principle of production units and the so called free benefits are taken into consideration. The free benefits represent dining in the canteens for example and other things. For all practical purposes there is an equal basic wage for all. It represents a greater or a smaller part of the total wage payment. After the people's communes went through their very first period of development, the difference, now between them and the Soviet Kolkhoz in terms of the payment system does not appear to be great, but in practice, as in so many other things, it can still be an important one. In the Soviet
Kolkhoz at present there exists, to be sure, certain beginnings towards a change in the payment system and pointed in the direction of a gradual change to a fixed wage. But this does not mean a departure from the production point principle, as was the case in the first period of the Chinese people's communes, but on the contrary is supposed to create a stronger stimulus for production.

The Position of the People.

According to Western measurements the decisive criteria for judging the agrarian systems of both communist countries is the position of the individual in the state and in respect to the whole society. The opinion has been offered in various ways by observers that the newest phase of economic development in the Soviet Union means that the economic life will become more liberal and democratic. In this connection, they point to the decentralization of the economic administration, to the greater autonomy of local economic officials, to the disbandment of the MTS, by which the Kolkhoz are now given a greater economic independence of operation, and to a certain relaxation of the State Police ties, to which people are submitted in all communist countries. In such a method of observation, they overlook the fact, however, that institutional changes, as for example the disbandment of the MTS, although they may have a fundamental importance for the apparatus and the position of the economic units to each other, for the position of people in the economic structure under such circumstances, they have but little importance.

The individuality and independence of the Kolkhoz farmer as an individual in respect to the Kolkhoz farm family has in the process of the newest developments not increased, but has clearly decreased. The larger the units of the operation are, and the process of enlarging the Kolkhoz has not been definitely concluded, then so much more impersonal is the position of the individual member in the Kolkhoz. And the pseudo cooperative elements have even less importance, even though they have been preserved for the sake of form. The more the Kolkhoz begins to resemble the Sovkhoz, then there is smaller and smaller space for the remains of the farmer nature and the farmer way of life, which the Kolkhoz farmers have kept until now.

In a similar way, but at a much faster rate of speed, this represents the present development in China. The big "Advance Step," namely the creation of the people's communes, did not have at once such a big importance for the operational structure and the operational organization of Chinese agriculture as one might.
suspect. It has, however, for the position of people in common operations very perceptible effects. If after their abolition of private small enterprises and the limitation of private family life, if after the first radical steps, the Chinese communists tried to restore some of these things, nevertheless, also in China, and to a stronger degree and at a faster pace than in the Soviet Union, in all this course of the newest development, the position of men to the state, to society, and to the economic apparatus in general has gradually grown worse. And now in this decisive question of man's place inside the economic system, the newest development in the Soviet Union shows a similar tendency to that in China. In both countries, the further development of the agrarian system does not lead to strengthening the position of those people involved in agriculture production. On the contrary it has led to a removal of even the last remains of a farmer's individuality and independence. Placed under a bigger pressure than ever, people have to submit to being just a number in a work force in a large and impersonal operation.

Summary.

(The summary includes the whole report and not just the paragraphs given above.)

1. In contrast to the Soviet Union, during the beginning period of power seizure, the land and soil were not nationalized at once.

2. Since they could profit from Soviet experience, a shorter period of time was required in China before going over to agrarian collectivization.

3. During the beginning period of collectivization the forms of the change-over played a bigger part than formerly in the Soviet Union.

4. During the further course of collectivization China has gone about it much faster and in a much more rigorous manner than the Soviet Union.

5. In contrast to the Soviet Union, in China during the first phase of development, private property in land and soil was maintained in a formal way as such. This was even true of the beginning period of collectivization, when the "half-socialistic" production associations still played a role. The members were then paid a dividend for the contributed land.
6. In contrast to the Soviet Union, China decided from the beginning upon collectivization without a simultaneous mechanization.

7. The small private industries of the Kolkhoz farmer in China have been from the beginning much smaller and much less important than in the Soviet Union.

8. Resulting from the lack of mechanization the MTS in the collective farm system in China have not played the same role as in the Soviet Union.

9. Also in China, in contrast to the Soviet Union, the state properties have only small importance.

10. Before the formation of the people's communes in China the wage payment system and the pseudo co-operative forms of collective operation were the same as in the Soviet Union.

11. The Chinese collective operations were subjugated to a similar registration system as the Kolkhoz in the Soviet Union.

12. Neither for the Chinese nor for the Russian farmer has the thesis been justified that he was predestined for the collective system.

13. In the Soviet Union the newest phase of development is characterized by the joining of the Kolkhoz and the Sovkhoz. In China on the other hand it is characterized by the formation of the people's communes.

14. In dimension and end purpose, the Chinese people's communes do not correspond to the agriculture communes which existed from 1919 to 1930 in the Soviet Union.

15. The carrying out of non-operational functions within the framework of the Chinese people's communes corresponds to the creation of intermediate operational institutions in the Soviet Kolkhoz operations.

16. The restriction of private economic and living forms is carried out at a faster pace in the Chinese people's communes than in the Kolkhoz in the Soviet Union.
17. In the Chinese people's communes the wage payment system is closer to the communist final goal than it was, or is in the Soviet Union.

18. Man's position in the agrarian economic system both in China and in the Soviet Union is characterized by a tendency towards stronger operational ties and by elimination of the last remains of a farmer's character and a farmer's individuality.