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MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY: A ROLE THEORY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND INTEGRATION

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The purpose of this thesis was to look for the existence of role conflict in Muslim military members. Both the military and Islam were argued to be "greedy institutions" (Coser 1974) in that each demands its members to enact "master statuses" (Hughes 1945: 357). This thesis focuses on three potential areas in an effort to determine the existence of role conflict: military policies, military chaplains, and Muslim military members. Although evidence was found of role conflict, many Muslim military members were able to integrate these two roles by viewing their work as a calling or looking forward to opportunities to change existing policies.
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A ROLE THEORY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND INTEGRATION

by
Gina D. Swanson

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and the Graduate School of the University of Wyoming
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CHAPTER 1--INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

On January 22, 1998, the Pentagon Chaplains' Office and the American Muslim Council's Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Department hosted the first Iftaar (the breaking of the fast at the end of Ramadan) in the Pentagon. President and Mrs. Clinton, as well as then Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and current Air Force Chief of Staff), General Michael E. Ryan, attended the event. The American Muslim Council estimates that there are approximately 10,000 Muslims currently serving in the United States military, across all branches of service. Additionally, there are three Muslim Chaplains currently serving the Army and Navy, with nine more in training (American Muslim Council 1998b; Agbere 1998).

Qaseem Ali Uqdah, Director of the American Muslim Council's Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Department, made the following comment regarding the celebration: "This event is paving yet another path so that one day Muslims in the Armed Forces will have the same religious freedom as other faith groups" (American Muslim Council 1998b: 2). The American Muslim Council holds that Muslim military members have enjoyed some positive changes in recent years to reflect acceptance of their beliefs. Examples include changes in the insignia worn by chaplains to reflect Islam and provisions for Islamically-legal duty and meal accommodation during Ramadan where possible (American Muslim Council 1998b).

Muslim beliefs differ in many ways from religious beliefs of the majority of Americans serving in the armed forces. The number of persons claiming Islam as their religious belief system is rising at the world-wide level (Regan 1993), and one may also expect the number of Muslim military members to continue to increase. Islam oftentimes encompasses the whole of one's life--"it is a complete moral, legal, and administrative code of behavior" (Tahir-Kheli 1981: 6). Further, as Regan (1993) concluded in his analysis of Islamic resurgence, "sociologically, Islamic resurgence...has placed an important nail in the coffin of a once regnant secularization thesis" (265). In
that same research, however, Regan claimed, "despite the aspirations of Islamic
movement leaders to political and economic power, for most Muslims the main issue
remains one of cultural identity" (265).

The military can also be viewed as an institution that prescribes certain roles or
identities that can encompass the whole of one's life as illustrated by the popular
advertisement: "It's [the military] not just a job—it's a way of life". In *The Military:
More Than Just a Job*, Moskos and Wood (1988) premised their discussion on a similar
understanding of the military (see also Moskos 1978 and Segal 1986). Many of the
parameters for religious accommodation are set by the military's overarching governing
body, the Department of Defense (DoD). Each military branch (Army, Air Force,
Marines and Navy), down to the level of the individual commander, is charged with
meeting the ideals outlined by the DoD.

Further, both the military and Islam have the characteristics of "greedy
institutions" (Coser 1974) in that "they seek exclusive and undivided loyalty and they
attempt to reduce the claims of competing roles and status positions on those they wish
to encompass within their boundaries" (6). The military can even be viewed as a "total
institution" (Goffman 1961: xiii). Therefore, both military soldiers and Muslims are
expected to enact "master statuses" (Hughes 1945: 357) in relation to each of these roles.
If conflict does occur between the Muslim role and the soldier role, it will most likely be
intense due to the fact that each of these roles expresses a master status. Given the status
of Islam as a fairly new and rising minority religious belief system in the United States,
the probability of role conflict for Muslim soldiers is high.

In an attempt to address the religious needs of its personnel, the DoD issued
Directive 1300.17, "Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military
Services" (1988), which begins, "The Department of Defense places a high value on the
rights of members of the Armed Forces to observe the tenets of their respective religions"
(1). Further, "It is DoD policy that requests for accommodation of religious practices
should be approved by commanders when accommodation will not have an adverse
impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, standards or discipline" (1). Such wording
can result in varied and inconsistent interpretations of religious accommodation not only by particular organizational branches and commanders within the armed forces, but also by military chaplains (who serve as intermediaries between commanders and military personnel) and military members.

In particular, the growing Muslim population in the military poses new challenges to such military policies and paradigms. Islam is a minority religion in the United States, and in many cases the military is not prepared to accommodate all aspects of Islamic practice (e.g., diet, special prayer times and the wearing of religious attire). Additionally, such aspects of Islamic practice may be disruptive of military routine. According to the above cited military instruction, however, the military organization is charged with meeting the religious needs of its personnel when those needs do not directly conflict with the demands of meeting its mission of national security. This situation is most likely to result in various institutional dilemmas for the military organization in deciphering when religious needs do or do not compromise the mission.

The purpose of this thesis is to look for evidence of the existence of role conflict as experienced by Muslim military members in embracing these two master statuses. This analysis will occur at three levels. First, the organizational dilemma of the military will be discussed, particularly in relation to how and where military policies have been tested on the basis of religious conflict. Second, the crucial role of the Muslim military chaplain will be explored in an attempt to show how the military chaplain is charged with reconciling the demands of the organization with the needs of the Muslim military member. Finally, the roles of the Muslim military member herself or himself will be examined in depth. If role conflict is present between these two master statuses, the behavior of the Muslim military member should evidence its effects.

**STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

The purpose of this thesis is to look for evidence of role conflict as experienced by Muslim military members in embracing these two master statuses. In the context of either the greedy or the total institution, role choices become extremely limited. This
thesis will proceed with the notion that both Islam and the military exist as greedy institutions (although the argument might be made that the military and many forms of Islam exhibit characteristics of the total institution). However, as greedy institutions, each prescribes not only a specific mode of behavior for its adherents, but oftentimes a value system as well.

The focus of this research is exploratory in its quest to identify how the demands of these two greedy institutions can result in role conflict for the Muslim soldier. This research seeks to outline pertinent areas of conflict, should they be discovered, for the Muslim soldier, the Muslim chaplain, and the military organization in an effort to provide useful information for further research. For those interested in the processes underlying either the institutionalization or occupationalization of the military, the insights derived in this context should also be of some importance. The notion of work as a calling may be particularly helpful in understanding how the Muslim military member successfully navigates between these two greedy institutions. Further, this research may also contribute to further understanding of secularization--or lack thereof--in non-Christian denominations in the United States.
CHAPTER 2 -- REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

LITERATURE REVIEW

To the best of my knowledge, no sociological research has been conducted on Muslims in the United States military prior to this endeavor. The following journals were examined for the time period of January 1988 to September 1998 to look for possible entries on the topic: American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, and Armed Forces and Society. Sociological Abstracts were also checked for the same time period with negative findings on this topic. Therefore, the review of literature included here will focus on related topics, including religion, Islam, work, and the military.

Hammond (1988) explored the thesis that the role the church plays in people's identities changes as a function of secularization. Specifically, Hammond posited the existence of a grid with two dimensions regarding the role of religion in the formation of identities. Hammond offered the defining features of collective-expressive individuals as involuntary involvement in church emerging out of overlapping primary group ties which cannot be easily avoided. As for individual-expressive individuals, Hammond posited their involvement is largely voluntary and independent of other social ties. He also posited the influence of secondary group ties, in addition to primary ones, and enlisted further research to examine the effect of specific primary and secondary group ties on church involvement. In sum, Hammond concluded that the role church plays in people's lives changes with secularization as a result of three related factors. Differential involvement in primary and secondary groups by persons influences the meaning church can have for the individual which then influences the type of religious identity available.

Religion and the meaning of work was the focus of Davidson and Caddell's (1994) research which challenged previous research claiming that religion has no influence on the way people view work. In their review of previous literature, the authors concluded that previous researchers simply assumed that religion has no effect
on people's views of work but did not actually test for the effects of religion in light of the pervasive secularization thesis. Davidson and Caddell studied 31 Christian congregations in Indiana to test their hypotheses, one of which involved the idea “that church members who stress social justice beliefs will view work as part of their calling to build a more just and equal world” (138), while those who do not emphasize such beliefs will more likely view their work as a career or job.

Davidson and Caddell found that salience of religious beliefs was highly related to viewing work as a calling, thereby providing contemporary support for Weber’s (1905) Protestant ethic thesis. Further, the authors observed that respondents who worked in the public sector were somewhat more likely to view their work as a calling or a career, while those who worked in the private sector were more likely to view their work as a job. The researchers did not find a significant relationship, however, between level of participation in religious activities and viewing one’s work as a calling; therefore, they concluded that religious beliefs must be internalized for one to view work as a calling. In sum: “The more people think of themselves as religious, the more they are active in their churches, and the more they stress social justice beliefs (good works), the more they also view work as a calling” (145-6).

Moskos and Wood (1988) also examined the military as more than just a job. The authors began their compilation of essays with, “discussion of the future of the armed forces usually involves a concern with technological developments of global strategy. Most members of the armed forces, however, understand and experience the military as a social organization” (3). Moskos and Wood acknowledged that “in recent decades, the members of the armed forces have felt increasing conflict between internal pressures toward institutional integration and societal trends that push toward identification with like occupational groups in the larger society” (4).

In a related essay, Moskos (1988) examined role commitment as varying with the institutional versus the occupational military. See attached Table 2.1 (Moskos and Wood 1988) on the next page regarding the specific variables of the institutional and occupational military social organization.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Occupational</th>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Normative values</td>
<td>Marketplace economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal regard</td>
<td>Esteem based on notions of service</td>
<td>Prestige based on level of compensation</td>
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<td>Role commitments</td>
<td>Diffuse; generalist</td>
<td>Specific; specialist</td>
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<td>Reference groups</td>
<td>&quot;Vertical&quot; within the armed forces</td>
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<td>performance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Basis of compensation</td>
<td>Rank and seniority; decompressed by rank</td>
<td>Skill level and manpower shortages; compressed by rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of compensation</td>
<td>Much in noncash form or deferred</td>
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<td>Female roles</td>
<td>Limited employment; restricted career pattern</td>
<td>Wide employment; open career pattern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>Integral part of military</td>
<td>Removed from military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>Work and residence adjacency; military housing; relocations</td>
<td>Work and residence separation; civilian housing permanence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-service status</td>
<td>Veterans’ benefits and preferences</td>
<td>Same as nonserver</td>
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</table>
Segal (1986) also examined the military as a "greedy institution" (see Coser 1964), but she focused on the relationship between the military and the family as both evidencing characteristics of greedy institutions. Greedy institutions "exercise pressures on component individuals to weaken their ties, or not to form any ties, with other institutions or persons that might make claims that conflict with their own demands" (Coser 1964: 6). Segal differentiated between the greedy institution and the "total institution" which Goffman (1961) defined as "a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life" (1961: xiii). A total institution oftentimes involves physical arrangements which separate certain individuals from other groups of individuals (Goffman 1961), whereas Coser's greedy institutions "tend to rely mainly on non-physical mechanisms to separate the insider from the outside and to erect symbolic boundaries between them" (1974: 6).

The aspects of the military which Segal (1986) cited as greedy include the specific pattern of demands on service members and their families, including risk of injury or death, geographic mobility, separations, residence in foreign countries, normative constrains on the behavior of spouses and children. In her conclusion, Segal offered interesting insights into the results of future trends toward occupationalization or institutionalization of the military. Particularly, Segal explained that "[t]o the extent that the military views the family as an outside influence with which it competes, the military will likely move in an occupational direction" (34). Segal offered, however, that "[t]o the extent that the military works to incorporate the family within itself and adapts to it, the result will be institutional change but preservation of the institutional nature of military organization" (34). Based on Segal's hypotheses, one would explain integration of Muslims into the military environment as evidence of further institutionalization of the military.

Dunivin (1994) analyzed change and continuity within military culture and posited a continuum of military culture ranging from a traditional model which stresses conservatism, moralism, exclusion, homogeneity and separatism to an evolving model
which favors conservatism, moralism, inclusion, heterogeneity, egalitarianism and tolerance. Dunivin claimed that the United States military does not currently fit either model but is moving towards the evolving model. In examining the inclusion of women and African-Americans in military service, Dunivin claimed, “Most social change within the military has been externally imposed” (529). Dunivin focused mainly on the masculine-warrior image and issues of sexuality and gender in her research; however, some of the cultural paradigms listed above--conservatism, moralism, exclusion and homogeneity--will most likely influence views on religious tolerance as they relate to Muslims in the military.

In the case of Seventh Day Adventists, a Christian denomination, the main issue regarding military service has been the practice of conscription (Lawson 1996). Lawson (1996) studied the position of Seventh Day Adventists on conscription over a 130 year time period. In researching the tension between the Seventh Day Adventists and American society on military service, Lawson concluded that part of the process regarding tension reduction between the sect (the religious group) and the state is accommodation by one or both parties. In regard to the beliefs of Seventh Day Adventists, Lawson found that although both sides (the church and the military) accommodated on different occasions, overall the church accommodated on a deeper level and more frequently.

Lawson proposed further that the state (military) is more likely to tolerate alternative beliefs and views by its citizens when that group “wins respect” (113) from the larger society. All in all, Lawson claims that changes in the group’s stance on military conscription resulted in a move from being regarded as a sect to being viewed as a “denomination”. (97). Many of the issues of Seventh Day Adventists are similar to those of Muslims (alternative religious worship practice and dietary needs), but some are not (views on combat in general).

This literature review identifies some of the related issues to the practice of Muslim religious beliefs by military members which other researchers have analyzed. Of particular importance are the ideas of institutionalization and occupationalization of
the military, perception of work as a calling, secularization, greedy and total institutions,
and military culture. In order to narrow the focus of this research, however, the concept
of role conflict will be utilized.

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Turner (1968) claimed that the concept of role is most useful in sociological
analyses that link the functioning of an organization with the characteristics and behavior
of its members. He chose an interactive approach to define role. First, he claimed that a
role "provides a comprehensive pattern for behavior and attitudes". Second, a role
"constitutes a strategy for coping with a recurrent type of situation". Further, the role is
"socially identified, more or less clearly, as an entity". Additionally, a role "is subject to
being played recognizably by different individuals". Finally, the role "supplies a major
basis for identifying and placing persons in society" (552).

Turner distinguished between actual and expected behavior in relation to roles.
Most theorists, including Turner, focused on role as expected behavior, and not as
enacted behavior. As for the process of role acquisition, Turner claimed "[i]n any
interactive situation, behavior, sentiments, and motives tend to be differentiated into
units, which can be called roles" (553). He continued, "Once roles are differentiated,
elements of behavior, sentiment, and motives that appear in the same situation tend to be
assigned to the existing roles" (553). What follows, then, according to Turner, is "that
one should study degrees of differentiation, as indicated by clarity of role definition and
degree of role overlap" (553).

Under the topic of allocation consistency, Turner described how individuals tend
both to be assigned and to assume roles that are consistent with one another and how
role conflict arises from failure of this process. In examining role strain, Turner argued,
"The actor tends to act so as to alleviate role strain arising from role contradiction, role
conflict and role inadequacy and to heighten the gratifications of high role adequacy "
(556). Turner explained role conflict as existing "when there is no immediately apparent
way of simultaneously coping effectively with two relevant other-roles, whether coping
is by conformity to expectation or by some other type of response” (37). Hughes (1945) also alluded to such processes in his research on contradictions of status. In particular, Hughes described a “master status-determining trait” (357). In defining this, Hughes explained, “it [the master status-determining trait] tends to overpower, in most crucial situations, any other characteristics which might run counter to it” (357). Hughes provided the example of professional standing as a master-status determining trait.

Turner (1962) also examined role-taking as a process rather than simply as conformity and argued that role-making, as well as role-taking, was a core process in interaction (22). Turner attempted to outline a theory of role conflict “firmly grounded in a sophisticated conception of normal role-playing and role-taking as processes” (21). Turner qualified military and bureaucratic behavior, however, as not being the “ideal-typical case” (22) of role-making and role-taking as a normal process of interaction. Of military and bureaucratic behavior, he stated, “The formal regulation system restricts the free operation of the role-making process, limiting its repertoire and making role boundaries rigid” (22). “As the context approaches one in which behavior is completely prescribed and all misperformance is institutionally punished,” Turner explained, “the process of role-taking-role-making becomes increasingly an inconsequential part of the interaction that occurs” (22).

In what Turner claimed is the normal process of role-taking and role-making, he concluded that “external verification [of roles] includes a sense of what goes together and what does not, based upon experience in seeing given sets of attitudes, goals, and specific actions carried out by the same individuals” (31). For Turner, behavior acts as symbols which convey important information to others about their roles and identities. Turner further explained, “Acceptance of the role behavior of an individual model as a standard may lead to the inclusion of much otherwise extraneous behavior within a role and to the judgement that kinds of actions which, by other criteria are contradictory, as actually not inconsistent” (31). Therefore, Turner offered that “the basic normative element in role-taking-and-playing is the requirement that the actor be consistent--that
his behavior remain within the confines of a single role” (36). Further, as long as the behavior remains within the role, others generally will be prepared to cope with the behavior, whether they approve of it or not.

In summarizing his overall analysis of the relationship between the person and the role, Turner (1978) concluded:

In a complex, loosely ordered society like our own, there are many possibilities for developing and maintaining a personal organization centered about roles that are not salient in the community’s view of persons. But the potential strain is considerable and may help to explain uneasiness and unpredictability in role behavior (18).

Stryker and Serpe (1982) also analyzed the concept of role, yet chose to examine the relationship between role and identity. In defining role, however, they chose an approach advanced by Stryker in previous work and based in symbolic interactionism: “Among the class terms learned in interaction are the symbols that are used to designate ‘positions’, the relatively stable, morphological components of social structure” (204). Further, “it is these positions which carry the shared behavioral expectations that are conventionally labeled ‘roles’” (204). The authors also embraced another proposition regarding roles: “To the degree that roles are made rather than only played as given, changes can occur in the character of definitions, in the names and the class terms utilized in those definitions, and in the possibilities for interaction” (205). Finally, “[s]uch changes can in turn lead to changes in the larger social structures within which interactions take place” (205).

Stryker and Serpe further analyzed commitment as it relates to roles. The authors defined commitment as “the degree to which the person’s relationships to specified sets of others depends on his or her...occupying a particular position in an organized structure of relationships and playing a particular role” (207). In their analysis of roles, Stryker and Serpe chose to examine more specifically religious roles. They claimed that “[the religious] role was chosen...because of its straightforward and clear appropriateness for examining identity theory [and] the religious role is not overly complicated by statistical interactions with the presence or absence of other roles” (209). Additionally, “religious
role performance...is realistically subject to choice” (209).

Their research indicated an inverse relationship existed between the salience of religious identity and the occupancy of other roles, therefore allowing the authors to conclude that an identity salience hierarchy exists for individuals. Further, in regard to the relationships between identity salience and reported satisfaction experienced from the role and between satisfaction and time spent in the role, both were positive.

Later, Serpe and Stryker (1987) acknowledged the problematic nature of role performances and turned to identity theory and symbolic interactionism as promising better explanatory power of the problematic nature of role performances. The causal ordering of identity theory’s specification of symbolic interactionism theory involves the following sequence of events: “Large scale social structures impact commitment, which in turn impacts identity salience, which in turn impacts role-related choices” (46). In sum, the researchers concluded that if “commitment to a role is high, the salience of the identity reflecting that role will be high, and, the identity will play a central role in the social actions of the person” (60). Lastly, “if the salience is high, the person will work at becoming or remaining a member of groups permitting the behaviors appropriate to the identity, and the continued salience of that identity will be affected by one’s success or failure in obtaining or maintaining group membership” (60).

Others have used role theory in business and management research. Van Sell, Brief and Schuler (1981) attempted to integrate previous research on role conflict. The researchers concluded that consistency in the focus and results of previous research on role conflict has been only moderate and many areas of role conflict or ambiguity have yet to be examined. Choosing the organizational context, Van Sell et al. defined a role as “a set of expectations applied to the incumbent of a particular position by the incumbent and by role senders within and beyond an organization’s boundaries” (43). As for role conflict, the researchers embraced the idea of individuals being confronted “with situations in which they may be required to play a role which conflicts with their value systems or to play two or more roles which conflict with each other” (45).

The researchers proposed the role episode model to explain the various factors
that influence "the interpersonal process between the person being sent expectations (the focal person) and those sending the expectations (role senders)" (46) (See Fig. 2.1 below from Van Sell et al. 1981).

Fig. 2.1

![Diagram showing the interpersonal process]

The Role Episode model (adapted from Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964).

Although citing the evidence as equivocal, Van Sell et al claimed that "the best-documented outcomes of role conflict are job dissatisfaction and job-related tension" (1981: 48). The researchers also posited a positive relationship between role conflict and other organizationally dysfunctional results, such as unsatisfactory work-group relationships. Additionally, Van Sell et al reported that review of laboratory studies resulted in the finding of lower productivity, dissatisfaction, tension and psychological withdrawal from the group in the presence of role conflict. In their conclusion, Van Sell et al summarized, "It appears that experienced role conflict and ambiguity are partially a function of a complex interaction of job content, leader behavior and organizational structure" (1981: 66).

Turner's definition of role conflict, which involves role conflict arising when no
immediately apparent alternative means of simultaneously coping with two relevant roles exists, will be used in this research. Since the military and Islam exist as greedy institutions, one can expect that instances would arise when acting in concert with one of those organization’s goals would result in acting in direct opposition to the other organization’s goals. Further, as Turner described, the process of role-making will be assumed to be limited and constrained within both the military and Islamic contexts. Role-making will not be assumed to be an absent process within the military organization, however, due to recent changes which have tested the traditional model of the military organization, such as the inclusion of women in some combat roles.

Further, this thesis will accept Stryker and Serpe’s understanding of the salience of religious identities in one’s role hierarchy, yet at the same time acknowledge one of their key tenets regarding religious identity—the presumption that religious role performance is ultimately subject to choice. To make sense of this particular presumption in the context of this research, further explanation is warranted. Religious role performance is often subject to choice in less regimented and ritualistic religions. In Islam, however, a greater proportion of one’s behavior is religiously prescribed. In relation to the military environment, one can assume that religious role performance (Muslim or not) is oftentimes more of a choice than military role performance due to the existence of punitive laws which ensure compliance with military roles. Regarding the posited salience of religious roles by Stryker and Serpe, then, this thesis will proceed with the notion that religious role performances can be problematic in the context of the military environment.

Van Sell et al.’s prediction of dissatisfaction, tension, and psychological withdrawal in the presence of role conflict in the work setting will guide this analysis. Muslim military members may exhibit one or more of these states in the presence of role conflict. An expanded version of Van Sell et al.’s partial theory of role conflict within the work setting will also be utilized. Van Sell et al. acknowledged the complex interaction of job content (soldier), leader behavior (commanding officer), and organizational structure (military) that oftentimes resulting in role conflict for the
individual. This thesis will embrace those factors but also add the presence of relevant, alter-roles, such as that of being a Muslim, as possibly contributing to role conflict for the individual soldier.

Finally, while acknowledging that the process of role-making is constrained within the military environment, it is unlikely to be entirely absent. In such cases, we may expect to find instances of reformulation or redefinition of some aspect of either one or both of the military or Muslim roles. All of the theorists acknowledged the ongoing, cyclical nature of sending, receiving and defining of role performances both within the individual and between the individual and the social group. Unless every Muslim military member is constantly struggling with his roles or with the military organization, we can assume that at least on some level the process of role making or redefinition of roles is occurring.
CHAPTER 3--METHODS AND SOURCES

Given the dearth of sociological research on Muslim military members, my research was largely exploratory. Most of my data were derived from secondary sources. In my research, I had a three-fold aim in identifying potential areas of role conflict for Muslims in the military. First, I wanted to analyze existing policies regarding the issue of religious accommodation in the military. Second, I needed a comprehensive understanding of the role of the chaplain who serves as an intermediary between the Muslim and the military. Third, I attempted to identify sources representing viewpoints of Muslim military members regarding their roles as Muslims and military members.

Before pursuing these three aims, however, it is important to note that no formal questionnaires or interviews were conducted in the context of this research. Information on religious belief systems of military members currently on active duty is protected by the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. Access to Muslim military members is limited due to several factors: (1) whether or not military members seek religious services on base, (2) my having to justify expenditure of time by Air Force personnel, and (3) their willingness or ability to reveal religious beliefs to an individual of differing rank and position to them. Additionally, the Air Force, my funding agency, mandated specific and stringent requirements for the completion of this research, and questionnaire approval by Air Force agencies is time-consuming and complex. Therefore, in order to generate as much information as possible without administering formal questionnaires or interviews, secondary sources, informal interviews and non-participant observation were employed as research methods.

In order to examine possible areas of role conflict for the Muslim military member, I first sought to identify areas of discrepancy between existing military policy and the practice of Islam. Since the Muslim minority in the military has experienced its

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1 I was serving as a First Lieutenant in the United States Air Force while conducting this research.
growth fairly recently, I assumed--based on my initial research--that many policies have yet to be challenged by Muslim military members. Hence, I sought to specify potential areas of conflict between the two by analyzing both the tenets of Islam and military policy. Further, I attempted to identify similarities between the challenges of other religious groups and the military to Muslim beliefs. To analyze existing policies regarding the issue of religious freedom in the military, I began with policy directives issued by the Department of Defense, specifically, Department of Defense Directive 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices within the Military Services (1988), and Department of Defense Directive 1304.19, Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Services. (1993). These overarching directives apply to all military branches.

Further, I looked at specific military branch directives and instructions to assess differences in meaning or interpretation of the broad Department of Defense policies. Because of my access to and familiarity with the Air Force, I utilized Air Force Instruction 52-101, Chaplain Service (1997) and Air Force Policy Directive 52-1, Chaplain Service (1993). I also used databases for legal documents to identify legal challenges and judicial rulings regarding the practice of religious freedom or accommodation within the military context. Judicial rulings and legal interpretations were assumed to act as a predictor of future rulings of religious concerns of Muslim military members. In the course of my research, I also discovered the e-mail address for Captain Mel Ferguson, a military spokesperson involved in the rewriting of Department of Defense Directive 1300.17 regarding the accommodation of religious practices in the military. Captain Ferguson offered brief comments on the revision process and referred me to non-Muslim chaplains serving at the Chief of Chaplain's Office for each particular military branch.

The second aim--exploring the Muslim chaplain's role--is important in understanding the full picture of Muslim and military relations. The chaplain serves a leadership function, not only for the Muslim soldier, but for the military organization itself. In order to examine the crucial role of the chaplain, I used some of the above listed sources. Specifically, the Department of Defense and Air Force instructions
regarding Chaplain Service were of importance in delineating the exact functions of the chaplain. I also spoke informally with two chaplains at the chaplain’s service at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming, about possible information sources regarding Muslims in the military. Those chaplains referred me to individuals at the Navy and Air Force Chief of Chaplains’ Offices. The military is highly supportive of the use of e-mail where possible so I was able to write each of these offices in an informal context of information seeking.

Early in my research I had contacted the head chaplain at the Air Force Chief of Chaplain’s Office, Chaplain Dixson, who informed me that Quaseem Ali Uqdah of the American Muslim Council, served as the head of the Muslim chaplain endorsing agency. I was advised to contact Mr. Uqdah, Director of the American Muslim Council’s Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Department and former advisor to the Air Force on issues regarding Muslims; however, I was not able to contact Mr. Uqdah. Later in my research, another chaplain spokesperson at the Air Force Chief of Chaplains’ Office, Chaplain Karen Stocks, pointed me to the new endorsing agency for Muslim chaplains in the military--the School of Islamic Social Sciences (SISS) headed by Iqbal Unus. I spoke with Mr. Unus informally on the telephone. I briefly asked him about three issues of Muslim military members identified through that particular aim of my research (the wearing of a beard, the lay leader program and recent changes in the endorsing agency to SISS); otherwise, he spoke during most of the interview on topics of his own choosing.

Through the e-mail forum I monitored as part of my information on Muslim military members themselves (see below), I was able to obtain the e-mail address of an Army Muslim Chaplain, Chaplain Mohammad Khan. I contacted Chaplain Khan via e-mail regarding general information he might wish to contribute to my study. On his own accord, Chaplain Khan called me at my home and we spoke briefly and informally regarding his role and the roles of Muslim military members in general. Lastly, through Dr. Unus, a Muslim Chaplain candidate--Lieutenant Dawud Agbere--obtained my e-mail address and contacted me regarding my research. Once again, he offered general insights into historical changes in the Muslim Chaplain endorsing agency and issues of Muslim
military members. Finally, secondary sources, including both articles and monographs, were obtained through the Military and Educational Resources Learning Network—a comprehensive database on the world-wide web of the holdings of all United States military libraries.

In my last aim of examining the roles of Muslim military members, I also tapped secondary sources as well as one primary source involving non-participant observation. In this aim, my attempt was to try to monitor discussions of concerns of military members themselves. For secondary sources, I utilized periodical abstracts, Newsbank databases and the Foreign Broadcast Index Service. Periodicals published by specific Muslim groups were indexed but not often easily available to the general public. My goal was to identify various forums which have allowed the concerns of Muslim military member to be addressed openly. To this end, I was able to identify two different interviews conducted by journalists with Muslim military members—one by Jonah Blank of Newsweek and one by Michel Olivier, a French journalist.

In addition to the secondary sources listed above, I monitored a Listserv/e-mail forum sponsored for Muslim military members by an agency called the Islamic Information Office (IIO). The suitability of cyber-mediated communication for analysis of communities and social networks is well-documented (see Mckerji and Simon, 1998; Sproull and Faraj, 1997; Wellman, 1997; Baym, 1995; Jones, 1995; Stone, S. 1995; and Stone, A. 1991). The IIO is a non-profit organization which is financed through donations. The listed goal of the Islamic Information Office is “to become the gateway of Islam to the Pacific, thus bringing Islam full circle around the globe” (Islamic Information Office 1998b:1). The Muslim Military Members Net forum is sponsored and chaired by a military member “to try to provide some kind of organizational support for those serving in the US Armed Forces to include DoD civilians [and] dependents” (Islamic Information Office 1998a: 2).

The President and co-founder of the IIO also serves as an Islamic Lay Leader for the 25th Infantry Division (Light) and United States Army Hawaii as well as a regional representative for Muslim military members. When I first visited the website on the
internet on May 22, 1998, the Muslim Military Members page had had 531 visitors since March of that same year (Islamic Information Office 1998b). With the permission of the President of the list, I was allowed to receive the e-mails posted by the members of the forum. I did not post any messages myself; therefore, the only person who knew I was monitoring the forum was the president himself. The forum, however, is considered to be a public space. Therefore, I confronted no ethical concerns monitoring the forum. In order to protect the identity of those who openly voiced their opinions, however, participants will not be identified in this research by either name or e-mail address.

Over a three-month time period (from May 19, 1998 to August 26, 1998), I received over 400 e-mails from at least 50 different members (as evidenced by different e-mail addresses) regarding a variety of issues surrounding Muslim experiences in the military. Of those, 193 were more closely examined, because they represented either ongoing dialogue between military members or other miscellaneous postings more directly related to military members. The 193 e-mails were broken down further into categories in order to try to identify rhetorical or thematic concepts. The topics which received the most active postings were concerns over national identity (23 postings), opinions on the wearing of a beard or hijab (a woman’s headdress) in uniform (23 postings), viewpoints on democracy as a form of government (19 postings), and feelings on life as a Muslim in the military (16 postings).

Additionally, 12 postings referenced the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa. Nine more were sent directly from the President of the forum to address administrative issues regarding use of the forum. Examples of such e-mails include rules for posting, procedures for unsubscribing, reminders of the purpose of the forum, and goals for the net in the future. Further, approximately seven more provided contact information on the Muslim chaplains or information on becoming a Muslim lay leader in the military.

The remaining 84 postings were not easily grouped into definite categories and were therefore labeled miscellaneous. A wide variety of topics pervaded the last set of postings. Examples included current events information on Muslim-related topics in the
United States at large, general knowledge on the practice of Islam, and business propositions. Further, baby announcements, requests for lodging or help in relocating to another town, and other information about the Muslim community as a whole were included in this last set of postings. Also included in this section were e-mails voicing anti-Jewish and anti-homosexual sentiment, opinions on the use of credit cards and television, and the proper format for a Muslim will or marriage.

Overall, the listserv was extremely active. With over 50 active members constantly posting information, the receipt of over five e-mails a day was not uncommon. Although occasional heated arguments offended one member or another, the tone of the list was generally positive. One active, vociferous individual was removed from the list following self-identification that he was not a military member and another individual left the forum for unrevealed reasons. As the list owner repeatedly pointed out, the net’s intent was to “provide a ‘resource’ for Muslims in the military to easily interact and network with each other” (Islamic Information Office 1998a).

Assuming that a relationship exists between the topics most often discussed on the forum and their importance to the Muslim military member, the postings grouped under the four most often visited topics—identity, wearing a beard or hijab, concerns over democracy and military service—were reviewed for the evidence of role conflict. Due to the sheer volume of comments contributed by net members, the full text of these discussions are not included in this paper. Instead, only comments evidencing—or attempting to cope with—role conflict have been included. In sum, the purpose of this research—given the novelty of the topic—was to search for thematic concepts which could potentially guide future research. Methodology considerations of content analysis, secondary research and non-participant observation were obtained, however, from Marshall and Rossman (1989), Stewart and Kamins (1993), and Krathwohl (1991).
CHAPTER 4-THE SOCIOHISTORICAL CONTEXT

Making predictions about potential areas of role conflict for Muslim military members requires preliminary examination of the rise of and response to Islam in American society at large. The military does not exist as a separate entity from civil society but rather as an extension of civil society. As Dorn (1990) explained, “there appears to be a consensus in the United States that the armed forces should be a reflection of the society” (115). Alternatively, as Dunivin (1994) interpreted this last statement in her analysis of cultural change and continuity in the military: “The military should mirror society’s social demographic makeup as well as its core values” (539). Therefore, this chapter locates the issue of Islam in the military within the larger sociohistorical context in an effort to understand the environment that influences military beliefs and values.

MUSLIM BELIEFS

Before proceeding any further, however, a general understanding of the basics of Islam as a religious belief system is essential. The purpose of providing a concise outline of Muslim beliefs is not only to provide an objective view of Islam as a religious belief system but also to allow the reader to understand the tenets of Islam most relevant to this research. Muslims share with Christians and Jews the belief in a single God (“Allah” in Arabic). Muslims believe, however, that Christians and Jews wavered in their obedience to God’s commandments and therefore God contacted an illiterate shepherd from Mecca, Mohammed, in the period of 610 to 632 C.E. Although Muslims view Mohammed as a prophet, they do not worship him or attribute divine characteristics to him (American Muslim Council in Cooper 1993; also Corrigan et al. 1998).

The Qur’an--Islam’s sacred scripture--is believed to be the holy word of God as received by Muhammad. The Qur’an is read in its original language of Arabic and holds teachings and commandments that act as the ultimate source of guidance for Muslims. In addition to the Qur’an, however, Muslims use Hadith and Shariah as guidance for
everyday and civil life, respectively. The Hadith is a collection of reported sayings of Mohammed that was compiled after his death, while the Shariah is the body of Islamic law in the Qur'an that is the foundation of civil law in Muslim states. In addition, Muslims are called upon to follow the “five basic pillars” of the faith (American Muslim Council in Cooper 1993; Corrigan et al. 1998).

The first pillar, which is termed Shahada, is a declaration of faith of a belief in God and Mohammed as his prophet. The second pillar, Salat, involves a daily regimen of prayer five times a day. Prayers usually take less than ten minutes and are accomplished by bowing on the ground and facing Mecca. Sawm is the third pillar and involves a period of fasting during daylight hours of the Islamic holy month called Ramadan. Abstinence from eating, drinking, smoking and sexual activity is mandated during the fasting period. This action is accomplished as a reminder of one’s reliance on God for each individual’s well-being and of the responsibility to help those in need (American Muslim Council in Cooper 1993; Corrigan et al. 1998).

The fourth pillar, Zakat, involves an annual offering of money to the poor which is prescribed to be 2.5% of one’s total earnings. The last pillar, Hajj, involves a pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca at some point in one’s lifetime if possible. The pilgrimage is said to symbolize unity, equality and brotherhood of all Muslims. Additionally, Muslims abstain from alcohol, pork, drugs, gambling, homosexuality and sexual relations outside of marriage (Corrigan et al. 1998). In sum, “religious Muslims adhere to a strict code of personal behavior that places them at odds with some practice in secular societies such as the United States” (American Muslim Council in Cooper 1993: 368). Islam literally translates into “submission to the will of God” which Muslims believe was the message of Abraham, Moses and Jesus. Therefore, one can begin to see how Islam serves as a guiding framework—not only through its ritual but through its ideology—for all aspects of a believer’s life (American Muslim Council in Cooper 1993; Corrigan et al. 1998; see also Tahir-Kheli 1981).
AMERICAN REACTION TO ISLAM

Immigration and Conversion

The recent rise of Islam in the United States can be viewed as resulting partly from three factors: The Kennedy-Johnson Immigration Reform Act of 1965 (Alam 1994), the rise—and fall—in the number of Muslim (Moslem) adherents to Nation of Islam beliefs (Terry 1993; Blank 1998), and the Gulf War (Olivier 1992). Regarding the influence of the Immigration Act, one Muslim scholar claims that, "almost three-fourths of the Muslims residing in America today took advantage of it [to immigrate to the United States]" (Alam 1994:129). Haddad (1993), another leading Muslim scholar, cites a more conservative estimate of a two-third/one third split of the breakdown between immigrant and indigenous Muslims in this country (in Terry 1993). Although estimates vary, most scholars cite the total number of Muslims living in the United States as being between four and six million (Terry 1993; Weeks 1992). (See Table 4.1 below from American Muslim Council in Cooper 1993)

Table 4.1

Sizes of Religious Groups in the U.S.

With an estimated 4-6 million* adherents in the United States, Islam ranks among the country's largest religious groups. At Islam's present rate of growth, Muslims will outnumber Jews in the U.S. by the turn of the century.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Group</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>19,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Churches</td>
<td>4,057,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews†</td>
<td>5,944,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslims</strong></td>
<td><strong>4-6,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Catholic, Polish National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic, Armenian Churches</td>
<td>979,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants ‡</td>
<td>79,386,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholics</td>
<td>57,019,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous ‡</td>
<td>200,329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimates of the number of U.S. Muslims vary from 2-12 million, though Islamic experts generally put the figure at 4-6 million.
† Including Orthodox, Conservative and Reformed branches
‡ Some bodies included here, such as various Latter-day Saints groups and Jehovah’s Witnesses, are, strictly speaking, not "Protestant" in the usual sense.
‡ This is a grouping of bodies officially non-Christian, including those such as Spiritualists, Ethical Culture Movement and Unitarian-Universalists.

Source: Yearbook of American & Canadian Churches 1991
(It is important to note, however, that precision of measurement is challenged by a variety of factors including lack of religious affiliation data on U.S. census compilations and immigrants and the absence of Islam as a choice for religious affiliation on many demographic surveys in the United States.)

Although most claim that the number of its adherents is decreasing (Terry 1993; Blank 1998), the Nation of Islam or Black Muslims cannot be overlooked as a highly influential subgroup of Islam in the United States. Most sources concur that most Black Muslims have entered the mainstream of Islamic beliefs (Terry 1993). Estimates of the number of Black Muslims range from 500,000 to 1.5 million (Terry 1993). Although highly sensationalized, Reverend Louis Farrakhan—the current leader of the Nation of Islam—claims allegiance from only 20,000 to 50,000 of those Black Muslims (Terry 1993; Blank 1998). Finally, although not reported by any American news source, a French writer for the conservative paper Le Figaro made the following claim regarding the influence of the Gulf War on Islam in the United States: “One of the unexpected effects of the Persian Gulf war was the conversion to Islam in Dhahran, Jidda, or Riyadh of hundreds of U.S. soldiers and civilian personnel” (Olivier 1992:40).

The Birth of American-Islamic Relations

Gerges (1997) thoroughly examined the manner in which the public, media, and interest groups propel the wings of American policy in relation to Islam. Gerges cited a poll of Americans taken in 1981 which revealed that, “50 percent of the respondents described ‘all’ or ‘most’ Muslims as ‘warlike and bloodthirsty’, 49 percent described them as ‘treacherous and cunning’ and 44 percent as ‘barbaric’ and ‘cruel’” (70). A recent Roper Poll found similar results. Over one-half of those polled described Islam as, “inherently anti-American, anti-Western, or supportive of terrorism” (Blank 1998: 2). Of those same persons polled, however, only five percent admitted to having much contact with Muslims personally (Blank 1998). The attached table shows the results of a poll of Americans regarding their opinions regarding different religious groups (See Table 4.2 on the next page from American Muslim Council in Cooper 1993).
Table 4.2

What Americans Think About Islam

Compared with several other religious groups in the United States, American Muslims have an image problem, according to a recent nationwide poll conducted for the American Muslim Council. Islam scored the lowest favorable rating (23 percent) and the biggest unfavorable rating (36 percent) of any group in the survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalist Christian</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormon</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The poll was conducted for the American Muslim Council on March 16-23, 1993, by the John Zogby Group International, Inc., of New Hartford, N.Y.

Gerges claimed that the Iranian revolution caused Americans to view secular revolutionary nationalism as a security threat to American interests and resulted in fear of a clash between Islam and the West. Additionally, the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and assaults on American military and civilian personnel and at sites in such areas as Lebanon and Kuwait have raised concerns about the extent of Islamic fundamentalism. Americans' access to and media portrayals of many of the above incidents have led to the perception that most Muslims are from the Middle East (Blank 1998; Gerges 1997). In reality, the largest majority of Muslims at the worldwide level live in the Indian subcontinent, numbering about 100 million more there than in all Arab countries combined. In the United States, fewer than one out of every eight American Muslims is of Arab descent. Rather, African-American converts comprise 42 percent and South Asian immigrants account for 24 percent of American Muslims. (Blank 1998; Nu'man 1992).

"Although no evidence emerged about the existence of an 'Islamic Internationale'," Gerges explained, "the World Trade Center bombing did considerable
damage to the Muslim image and presence in the United States” (72). Gerges claimed the bombing linked “Muslims and domestic terrorism in the minds of many Americans,” and made Muslims vulnerable targets for racism and political discrimination (72). Gerges used two other surveys of American attitudes toward Islam taken just after the World Trade Center bombing to support his point. These surveys found that more than 50 percent of respondents said that “Muslims are anti-western and anti-American” (72). Additionally, the surveys revealed that of the various religious groups that respondents were asked to list as the most unfavorable, Muslims were cited most frequently.

“It was within this charged atmosphere,” Gerges claimed, “that Muslims in the United States became targets of harassment after the April 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City” (72). Many of the media’s “terrorism experts” (72) linked Arabs, Muslims and Middle Easterners to the crime. In the three days following the bombing, over 200 violent attacks against Muslim Americans were recorded. Another leading scholar of Islam summarized the understanding many Americans have of Islam based on many of the events listed above: “Islam is associated with terrorism, with irrationality, with hatred, with obsession to destroy Christianity, Judaism and the West” (Haddad in Cooper 1993:365).

President Clinton, however, cautioned against leaping to any conclusions in the face of preliminary accusations of Middle-East style terrorism (Gerges 1997). President Clinton stated: “This is not a question of anybody’s country of origin. This is not a question of anybody’s religion. This was murder, this was evil, this was wrong. Human beings everywhere, all over the world, will condemn this out of their own religious convictions, and we should not stereotype anybody” (Gerges 1997:73).

An Uncertain Legislature

Uncertain attitudes towards Muslims exist not only in the American public, but also among its policy makers. Gerges cited former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s objection to a military mission to rescue American hostages in Iran as the specter of an Islamic-Western War: “Khomeini and his followers, with a Shi’ite affinity for
martyrdom, actually might welcome American military action as a way of unifying the Moslem world against the West" (Cyrus in Gerges 1997:71). Others have claimed further that “[w]ith the demise of the Soviet-U.S. superpower rivalry, some geopolitical big thinkers speculate that Muslim religious fanaticism, sometimes dubbed ‘the Green Menace’ because green is the color of Islam, may replace Communism’s fading ‘Red Menace’” (Kirschchen 1993:1258). Additionally, Sciolino (1995) of the New York Times made the following comment regarding such a Green Menace: “‘In the absence of other compelling threats to the United States, Islamic radicalism has also seized the imagination of some in Congress’” (in Gerges 75).

From 1992 to 1998, the President and members of Congress have taken a series of steps reflecting the uncertain nature of Islamic relations. Examples include a push for more stringent immigration and anti-terrorism laws, control over Islamic nations acquiring nuclear weapons and concern over the security of both Israel and the Gulf nations (Gerges 1997). One congresswoman’s words were particularly indicative of one extreme of the views on Islam. The congresswoman claimed that Islamic groups represent a monolithic movement, “sworn to fight the Great Satan America for the global supremacy of Islam” (in Gerges 1997:75).

Conversely, Lovell (1983) in her analysis of Islam in the United States found more favorable actions taken towards Muslims by policy makers. Lovell reported that in 1976 Gerald Ford became the first president to mention Muslims when listing various religious faiths. Additionally, the United States Congress adopted a resolution to recognize Islam in its 1400th year and vowed greater effort toward better understanding of the religion. In 1993, President Clinton signed into law the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. This law declared that the “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion if the burden results from a general rule of applicability” (American Muslim Council 1998c:1). American Muslims claimed success in the passing of the law in that it allows them to abide by religiously-mandated dietary and clothing restrictions in the workplace. In a separate incident, when a Muslim soldier was offended by a military training film involving Muslim terrorists as the enemy, the
commanding officer at the Department of Defense took the film out of use at the urging of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (Cooper 1993: 376).

On August 6, 1998, two members of the U.S. House of Representatives introduced a Resolution that “condemns anti-Muslim intolerance as wholly inconsistent with the American values of religious tolerance and pluralism” (American Muslim Council 1998c:1). Additionally, the proposed Workplace Religious Freedom Act currently being reviewed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate would make employers less able to deny requests for religious accommodation. The bill more specifically delineates what constitutes hardship for the employer and the need to prove either significant difficulty or expense to the employer. This Act is aimed at resolving the increasing number of religious discrimination complaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission which has increased by 43 percent or from 1192 to 1707 charges from 1991 to 1997 (American Muslim Council 1998c).

A survey conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management of 750 human resource professionals revealed that 13 percent of the workers’ companies allowed the wearing of religious attire and 15 percent provided space for religious observance, study or discussion (Meyers 1998). One employer described the dilemma that legislation such as the Workplace Religious Freedom Act would impose upon many employers: “We now live in a 24 hour, global economy. In order to stay competitive, companies find that they must operate non-stop, seven days a week. Should this bill pass, many of these companies could find themselves hamstrung by a workforce unwilling to work on Sundays” (Karpeles in Meyers 1998:21). One begins to see how many civilian employers view the free market as a military battlefield in its own right.

Despite these claimed piece-meal advances, no Muslim lobby, Senator or Congress member serves Muslim interests (Abdul-Rauf 1983). In his analysis of the future of the Islamic tradition in North America, Muhammad Abdul-Rauf (1983) claimed the American Muslim community is too young and small to be effective politically and “[f]orces unfriendly to Islam take advantage of the situation” (277).
In determining the current standpoint of military leaders in relation to Muslim military members, one can not proceed without understanding the influence of the overarching environment in which American/Muslim relations are formed. As Dunivin (1994) concluded in her analysis of military culture, there is a prevalent view that the military’s composition should reflect not only the demographic composition of American society but its value system as well. In this case, some Americans feel that the existence of Muslims in the military conflicts with one or both of the above parts of military culture.

In comparing the core values of Americans to those of Muslims, the picture becomes even more confusing and charged. Opinions range from that expressed by the Congresswoman above to the following American Muslim soldier’s comment regarding his involvement in the Gulf War: “Whether it is Iraq or anywhere else in the world, my first duty is to defend my country” (Blank 1998:6). The attached political cartoon succinctly expresses Americans’ ambivalence towards Islam (See Fig. 4.3 below from New York Times in Cooper 1993).

Fig. 4.3
CHAPTER 5--POLICIES AND ROLE MAKING

Military doctrines, legal documents and judicial rulings considerably influence the free practice of religion within the military environment. This chapter outlines military policies as they exist in the present as well as the legal and judicial results of actions taken by other religious minority groups in the past in an effort to explicate the meaning of religious accommodation and freedom of religion in the military context. The concept of role making is particularly helpful in understanding many of the policies, legal rulings and military policies as they relate to the existence of Muslims in the military. In many ways, the status of religious freedom in the military described below outlines the expected behaviors of military members in regard to their religious roles and sets the stage for newly-enlisting Muslims.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND MILITARY POLICY

Department of Defense Policies

To address the religious needs of military members, United States Department of Defense Directive 1300.17 (1988) specifically outlines the accommodation of religious practices. The directive states:

A basic principle of our nation is free exercise of religion. The Department of Defense places a high value on the rights of members of the Armed Forces to observe the tenets of their respective religions. It is DoD [Department of Defense] policy that requests for accommodation of religious practices should be approved by commanders when accommodation will not have an adverse impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, standards or discipline. (1)

The directive further provides a list of goals to be used by the military departments in developing guidance on the exercise of command discretion concerning the accommodation of religious practices.

The first goal area of the directive is the accommodation of worship services, holy days, and Sabbath observances except when precluded by military necessity. The second goal enlists the military departments to include religious belief as one factor for
consideration when granting separate rations and to permit commanders to authorize individuals to provide their own supplemental food rations in a field or “at sea” environment to accommodate their religious beliefs. Another listed goal is for the military departments to include relevant materials on religious traditions, practices, and policies in the curricula for command, judge advocate, chaplain and similar courses and orientations. Further, the Department of Defense directs the military departments to develop a statement advising members about Department of Defense policy on individual religious practices and military requirements to applicants for commissioning, enlistment and reenlistment.

The last two goals directly address the wearing of religious accouterments and apparel. First, the directive allows for the wearing of religious items or articles not visible with the uniform, provided they shall not interfere with the performance of member’s military duties or with the proper wearing of any authorized article of the uniform. Lastly, under Public Law 100-180, section 508, the directive allows members of the Armed Forces to wear visible items of religious apparel while in uniform, except under circumstances in which an item is not neat and conservative or its wearing shall interfere with the performance of the member’s military duties.

Another Department of Defense Directive, 1304.19, was released for guidance on the appointment of chaplains for military service in 1993. In that directive, the broad policy is that "professionally qualified clergy shall be appointed as chaplains to provide for the free exercise of religion for all members of the Military Services, their dependents and other authorized persons" (2). Regarding the chaplain’s specific roles, the directive further explains, “They shall minister to personnel of their own faith group, and facilitate ministries appropriate to the rights and needs of persons of other faith groups in a pluralistic military environment” (2).

In order to determine the number of chaplains available for each specific religious group, the military uses a system of representational matching between the percentage of military members and chaplains. For example, Air Force Instruction 52-1 (1997), Chaplain Service (1), determines “Religious Grouping Status” (3) in the
following manner. The instruction states: "religious grouping status will be assessed by measuring the percent of religious groups represented by active duty chaplains against the religious preference of active duty Air Force personnel" (3). This process is accomplished annually. As stated in the introduction, there are three Muslim Chaplains currently serving the Army and Navy, with nine more in training (American Muslim Council 1998b; Agbere 1998). To the best of my knowledge, there are no specific buildings (mosques) set aside for Muslim worship on military installations. A variety of minority religious groups oftentimes will share facilities.

Department of Defense Directive 1300.17 has been under revision from 1996-1998 (Ferguson 1998). Regarding the revision, a spokesperson for the Department of Defense made the following comment: "Each military branch has had direct and repeated input to this draft directive--and Service grooming policies are based upon military necessity" (Ferguson 1998:1). This spokesperson further added, "It is also the case that not all religious ‘rights’ can be accommodated in the military setting: not by reason of discrimination, but for reasons of unit or individual safety, security, good order and discipline" (Ferguson 1998:1).

Although the role of the commanding officer in the particular military organization will not be examined at length in this thesis, it is important to note that the commander’s role in relation to accommodating Muslim or any religious beliefs is a very difficult one in and of itself. A military commander oftentimes must make decisions based not only on the broad religious policies described above but also in consideration of the mission and goals of the particular military unit. Further, given the novelty of Islamic practice in the United States and the small number of Muslim chaplains currently serving the military, one can safely assume that a particular commander’s knowledge of Islam may be very limited. The above policies outline very broad policies and rarely specify action to be taken in relation to particular religious groups. Therefore, oftentimes the commander is left with the task of doing exactly what the military expects him or her to do--lead and make tough decisions. For many Muslims, however, the ability to practice their religious beliefs is too important to be left to the discretion of individual
military commanders.

Overall, then, the military embraces the idea that freedom of religion is a constitutional right of United States citizens and interprets its responsibility as providing chaplain services and required resources. Some specific problems exist, however, which often preclude the military from reaching such goals. In order to examine further such situations, one must turn to recent judicial and legislative interpretations of the meaning of freedom of religion in the military.

POLICY ON TRIAL

Sincerity and Military Necessity

Major Duane Zezula (1987) wrote an article on religious accommodation for a Department of the Army Headquarters publication called The Army Lawyer. This monthly periodical is published by the Judge Advocate General’s Office to aid Army lawyers in carrying out their legal responsibilities. Zezula opened his argument with the following example of Dunivin’s analysis of a synonymous relationship between American society at large and the military. Zezula stated, “How the Army decides which religious practices can be accommodated and which cannot is a matter of intense national interest” (3). Zezula wrote the article in response to policy changes required by the Department of Defense Authorization Act in 1985. This act followed a report on religious accommodation in the military mandated by the Department of Defense. Major Zezula specifically considered the problems surrounding the observance of Sabbath from two actual incidents in the Army in light of applicable case law and regulatory guidelines.

Zezula began his analysis with a review of applicable court decisions which have shown that conscription, veterans benefits and Social Security are all deemed government interests that outweigh an individual’s right to exercise his or her freedom of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution. Zezula analyzed the Supreme Court case of Goldman v. Weinberger (or Goldman v. Secretary of Defense 1986) in which an Air Force Captain sought judicial support following the issuance of a letter of
reprimand and threatened court martial for wearing a Jewish yarmulke in uniform. Goldman felt this action violated his right to free exercise of religion (D. Sullivan 1988).

In the Goldman case, the United States Supreme Court took note of a two-pronged test for analyzing whether “legitimate military ends are sought to be achieved” and “whether the military rule is designed to accommodate the individual right to an appropriate degree” (Goldman 1986: 1313). Overall, however, Zezula claimed that the opinion by the majority in this case stressed deference to decision making by military leaders and merely showed “flirtation” (1987: 7) with the Goldman test. In the case of the Army, then, the new regulation resulting from this decision “requires commanders to consider the sincerity of the requester and surrounding military necessity when faced with requests for accommodations of religious practices” (Zezula 1987: 7).

Zezula further explained that the burden of establishing insincerity lies with the Army and claimed that this standard is “the narrowest standard of review known to the law” (8). The second part of the Army regulation requires commanders to consider whether accommodation will adversely impact military readiness, unit cohesion, standards, health, safety or discipline. Specifically, the Army regulation lists five separate factors to consider in granting requests for accommodation. These include the importance of military requirements and the religious importance of the accommodation to the requester. Also, the regulation enlists commanders to consider the cumulative impact of repeated accommodations of a similar nature and any alternate means available to meet the requested accommodation. Lastly, a commanding officer should consider the previous treatment of the same or similar requests, including treatment of similar requests which were made for other than religious reasons (AR 600-20 in Zezula 1987: 8).

In his analysis of a fictional military member (created to mirror real incidents of religious accommodation), Zezula concluded that the Army Regulation ultimately embraced the two-prong test created under Goldman. Additionally, Zezula concluded that the regulation forces unit commanders to consider issues of accommodation at an early stage and hence to provide better documentation for situations that may
subsequently be challenged in the federal courts. Zezula seems to base his conclusions on two fundamental ideas. The first is the deference that the Supreme Court has shown towards decision making by military commanders. The second is his conclusion that the two-pronged test applied in Goldman—and subsequently in Army Regulation 600-20—truly provides the best result for both the military member and the military environment. One can begin to see, however, the nature of religion in the military as a “matter of intense national interest” (Zezula 1987: 3) and its resultant confusion.

Further Examination of Goldman

First Lieutenant Dwight H. Sullivan (1988) also examined the Goldman case. Sullivan more specifically delineated subsequent congressional attempts in response to the ruling to protect military members’ right to free exercise of religion. Citing the case as the first time the Supreme Court considered a military members’ right to exercise freedom of religion, Sullivan explained the deference cited by Zezula as heavy reliance on the doctrine of “military necessity” (129). Sullivan claimed the Supreme Court’s recognition of military necessity as evidence of the Court’s acceptance that the need for discipline in the military sometimes requires the sacrifice of certain constitutionally protected rights.

Further, Sullivan claimed that the court exercised significant deference to Congress in its acceptance of the military necessity doctrine. The Supreme Court cited the need for such deference in relation to Article I of the United States Constitution which gives Congress the power, “to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” (D.Sullivan 1988: 130). Although Sullivan acknowledged the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief in balancing competing interests in such cases of religious accommodation, he ultimately concluded Congress’ role is more central due to its duty to adopt laws designed to govern the military.

Following the Goldman decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals, several members of Congress heavily criticized the Air Force for its uniform regulations. Subsequent debate within Congress over military necessity and the wearing of religious apparel
while in uniform sparked a series of legislative attempts to enact more tolerant standards within the military branches. Ultimately, Congress passed the 1988 defense authorization bill with an accompanying religious apparel accommodation statute. This statute applied a neat and conservative standard to the wearing of religious apparel while in uniform. Despite the passing of this significant piece of free exercise legislation, Sullivan contended that the process under which the legislation was passed indicates the extreme caution exercised by Congress in dealing with military matters (D. Sullivan 1988).

To support this argument, Sullivan provided as evidence the length of time Congress debated over the legislation, deference shown to the Department of Defense in the decision-making process, and adoption of a loosely defined policy. In sum, Sullivan concluded that the legislature, like the judicial system, has also shown interest in protecting both the needs of the individual military member and the military. In its efforts to determine areas of friction between military guidelines and the religious beliefs of military members, Congress created a Joint Service Study Group. This group reported problems areas centering not only on the wearing of religious articles but also on several other potential problem areas between implementation of military policy and free exercise of religion. Sullivan predicted that resolution of such conflicts in the future will also be deferred to Congress. Given the ambivalent nature of the social policy leaders described earlier in this paper, predictions regarding Congressional support or rejection of the needs of Muslim military members do not come easily.

Religious Accommodation or Civil Religion?

Mary Sullivan (1992) explored the legal issues surrounding the military’s endorsement and use of the conscientious objection clause in her review of recent court rulings on the topic of conscientious objection. Sullivan argued that its use constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Establishment Clause mandates a separation of church from state and Sullivan argued that “the conscientious objection process makes the military the arbiter
of acceptable religious beliefs” (764).

More than that, however, Sullivan’s argument allows other issues relevant to this research to surface, such as how the military (and hence, the federal government) handles disentangling long-established national holidays with Judeo-Christian holidays (Christmas/Hanukkah) if recognition of religious holidays is deemed illegal or unconstitutional. Some have even argued that the only religion in which the United States can participate is a kind of “civil religion” (Bellah 1984: 40) with its own holy days, holy texts and holy sites (e.g., the Fourth of July, the Declaration of Independence and the Washington Monument, respectively). Otherwise, as Sullivan argued, the military is left with accommodating—and hence legitimating—a plethora of religions. It is within this confusing context of legal and constitutional questions in which Islam is arising and in which the roles of the military are being questioned.

The Gulf War

Immediately following the Gulf War, Lasson (1992) examined how military policy regarding free exercise of religion was curtailed under the guise of friendly relations between the United States and Arab nations. Lasson used the term “Operation Desert Shield” (471) to describe the approach the military adopted to protect the free exercise of religion among its members. Citing specific prohibitions on discussions regarding American-Jewish relations of a non-military nature, Lasson claimed, “American troops were asked to submerge the values of tolerance, pluralism and open-mindedness that have made the United States a unique democratic society” (472).

Lasson delineated a number of actions reflective of military necessity policy gone awry: denial of assignment to the region for Jews and African-Americans prior to 1990, prohibition of media access to chaplains and religious services, removal of religious faith insignia from chaplains’ uniforms and inadequate representation of Jewish chaplains. Overall, Lasson claimed that Jewish military members were the most consistently and significantly affected religious group during the deployment.

Ironically, restrictive actions on religious liberty taken in the name of friendly
relations between Americans and Arabs were, “for the most part...friendly fire, and entirely unavoidable” (474). Further, Lasson claimed directives were oftentimes simply disregarded by chaplains and commanders. Ironically, for the chaplains, Lasson claimed, “the rigidly puritanical cultural environment in Saudi Arabia allowed for greater spiritual opportunities” (474) and the senior chaplain serving in the Gulf claimed that the religious program which was ultimately enacted was the best he had ever seen. Lasson concluded, then, “So whatever restrictions there were seem to have been honored more in the breach than anywhere else” (475).

In the context of legal jurisprudence, Lasson also examined the idea of military necessity as a determining force in the allowance of free exercise of religion. Lasson claimed that the impact of the military being defined as a “separate community” and resultant judicial approach as “hands off” (480) has created the possibility of a total lack of deference to the First Amendment by military leaders in the name of military necessity. Lasson offered a solution to the extremes of complete religious tolerance or intolerance. Seeking more specific instruction, Lasson proposed the military divide requests for accommodation into categories (such as wearing of religious apparel, time off for religious observances and dietary restrictions) and handle requests individually, on a case-by-case basis.

In his review of “Current Practice, Cases and Controversies” (483), Lasson concluded that the military practice of unwillingness to make exemption for members based on religious beliefs is derived from British policy and fear of a breakdown in discipline. Lasson claimed further that Congress has abandoned this approach and the military needs to follow suit and enact more specific guidelines rather than vague policies. In that case, the court’s role would then be to simply judge if specific actions were taken within prescribed guidelines.

Additionally, Lasson examined the stance which other countries have taken on the issue of free exercise of religion. Lasson concluded the premise of U.S. policy is similar to that of many other countries: “Accommodation is allowed if it does not adversely affect national defense” (493). Lasson claimed that ultimately, “such
comparisons illustrate the relatively liberal regulations in the U.S. Armed Forces" (498). In his conclusion, Lasson implored Congress and the military to enact better guidelines on religious accommodation. Lasson’s argument is that more specific guidelines accompanied with individual situational analysis will result in policy more consistent with both the free exercise of religion and a deference to Congressional policy-making and military necessity.

**DISCUSSION**

Turner’s (1968) analysis of roles in organizational settings provides a useful vantage point from which to view the relationship between the military organization’s roles and those of its members, in any particular capacity. “To the extent to which the organization has well-defined goals, the most salient role differentiation will be according to different kinds of tasks that together accomplish the goal” (Turner: 555). Turner further explained, “The expectations assigned greatest legitimacy and held with most consensus will tend, under these circumstances, to be those with most obvious task relevance” (555). In other words, Turner is describing—in very vague terms—the conflict between the national security goals of the military and demands of free exercise of religion by its military members.

The “well-defined organizational goal” for the military is “military necessity” for national defense. In this case, then, role differentiation in terms of soldier of God versus soldier of America reflects this organizational goal. Tolerance of religious freedom in the military will most likely continue to reflect this goal hierarchy of national security over religious freedom. The problem, however, comes in defining the extent to which certain minority beliefs and practice ultimately compromise issues of national defense. This is exactly where Muslims will most likely enter the debate.

For members of minority religions in this country, deference to Congressional legislation and military necessity by the courts ultimately has resulted in poorly defined dicta and role confusion between the two. The diffuse nature of responsibility between the judicial and legislative branches can also be analyzed using Turner’s ideas. In this
case, the nation’s overall goal is less defined (national defense versus civil liberties) and a topic of much debate. Hence, there is resultant confusion over the proper action to be taken by each branch. This, too, is an area of ambiguity which will serve as a breeding ground for debate over the practice of Islam by military members.

Lastly, Muslims exist as a minority in this country and as such they find themselves constantly challenging the status quo. According to Turner’s analysis, their religious views may be of secondary importance in comparison to the religious views held by the majority of Americans. Therefore, the question of whether Islamic practice is protected by Constitutional Amendments will often be secondary to the fact that Muslims differ from most, and therefore require special accommodations. For some Americans, a novel minority status in and of itself creates an anomic situation and possibly questioning of minority values as a whole.

This chapter has attempted to show the ambivalent nature of social policy regarding the free exercise of religion in the military, especially in regard to Islam as a minority religious belief system. Although as yet seldom challenged by Muslims in this country, free exercise of religion in the military is likely to be of significant importance in the future. One can not, however, point out the military as anomalous in American society as a whole. Rather, the military simply functions as a microcosm of such paradigms and policies.
CHAPTER 6--THE MUSLIM CHAPLAIN

The role[s] of the Chaplain is [are] outlined in Department of Defense Directive 1304.19 (1993), "Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Services." Specifically, the broad policy is that,

professionally qualified clergy shall be appointed as chaplains to provide for the free exercise of religion for all members of the Military Services, their dependents, and other authorized persons. Clergy appointed as chaplains shall be designated by the title 'Chaplain' and shall wear the insignia designating their distinctive faith group, in accordance with uniform regulations of the Military Services. They shall minister to personnel of their own faith group, and facilitate ministries appropriate to the rights and needs of persons of other faith groups in the pluralistic military environment. Chaplains shall also provide professional staff support to the military department concerned (2).

As outlined in the directive, the chaplain plays a key role in ensuring the free exercise of religion within the context of the military. The chaplain exists not only as a leader or a guide to those who follow his or her particular religious beliefs, but also as a liaison between the military institution or leadership and its members. Finally, the above policy outlines the pluralistic religious environment within which chaplains will provide guidance to both those who follow and those who do not follow their particular religious beliefs. The attached poem on the cover page of a volume commemorating the heroic efforts and death of four chaplains on a navy boat during World War II provides a more romantic--yet effective--description of the role of the chaplain:

Weep not for them nor for their cause,  
Brave sons who faltered not;  
Weep only for ourselves who failed,  
Who vowed the vow forgot.  
Weep for ourselves, then vow again.  
Pledge in our children's blood.  
To keep the faith,  
To win the peace,  
To make the world a brotherhood  
(White 1977:30).

Both of these descriptions of the chaplain acknowledge the wide range of roles he
or she will perform in carrying out both military and religious duties. Not referred to as a minister, preacher, priest, rabbi or imam, or by his or her rank, the chaplain is somehow charged with melding all of these roles together. In this chapter, the unique position of the chaplain in relation to a growing Muslim populace in the military will be explored.

POLICY GUIDANCE

In response to Department of Defense Directive 1304.19 (1993) regarding the Chaplain Service, the Air Force has issued two separate directives. These directives address the Chaplain Service and Chaplain Service Responsibilities and Procedures, Air Force Policy Directive 52-1 (1993) and Air Force Instruction 52-101 (1997), respectively. The major difference between the two is that the directive outlines the policy, while the instruction implements the policy.

The policy directive states, “Freedom of religion is a constitutional right of US citizens. The Air Force provides the opportunity for military members and their families to exercise this right by providing chaplain service personnel and allocating required resources.” (1) Further, the directive explains that “[t]he Air Force will meet the religious needs of the Air Force community at permanent bases, industrial complexes, medical facilities and deployed sites [and] provide religious ministries of worship, religious education, pastoral care, counseling and visitation” (1). Additionally, the policy is that “[t]he Air Force will train and deploy chaplain readiness teams, consisting of chaplains and enlisted support personnel, [who] will provide religious ministries during war, contingencies, national emergencies, and military exercises” (1).

The directive also states that “[t]he chaplain service will manage the faith balance of chaplains, use of religious facilities, chaplain nonappropriated funds and ecclesiastical material” (1). Further, “commanders through the chaplain service accommodate the religious practices of assigned personnel and family members by providing resources for a comprehensive religious program” (1). Finally, “[t]he wing, or equivalent, senior chaplain engages the assigned chaplain service personnel, contract services, and volunteers to design and operate religious ministries to meet the needs of
the Air Force community” (1).

_Air Force Instruction 52-101 (1997)_ attempts to outline implementation of the broad policies described above. The first section of this instruction addresses Chaplain Service Standards and states the chaplain should wear the insignia appropriate for his or her faith group. The delineation of this insignia for Christians, Jews, Buddhists and Muslims is the cross, the tablets with the Star of David, the prayer wheel and the crescent, respectively. Insignia are worn by all military members and serve to identify a member on his uniform by his or her occupational grouping. The insignia worn by chaplains are similar in color and style to those worn by all other military members.

Regarding chaplain attire, the instruction prescribes one to “wear the prescribed Air Force uniform or worship material consistent with your faith group tradition when conducting religious services” (2). As for the issue of chaplain service duty restrictions, the instruction states, “do not perform duties incompatible with your professional role and noncombatant status. You do not have to conduct or take part in religious activities that conflict with your faith group doctrines or personal religious convictions” (2).

Under the topic of worship, the instructions mandates that “Air Force or auxiliary Chaplains [will] conduct all major faith group worship services. These include Jewish, Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic. A Jewish lay leader may conduct Jewish services” (2). Further, “[w]hen scheduling worship, [the senior chaplain should] give major faith group services priority over denominational services” (2).

In order to provide a weekly allotted time for Protestant worship, the instruction provides that, “[e]very Sunday [the chaplain service will] conduct one morning Protestant worship service that addresses as many of the Protestant community’s shared faith commitments as possible” (2). As for religious holy days, the policy is that “senior chaplains at all levels identify holy days and major faith group requirements and advise commanders accordingly” (2). The instruction states that religious symbols will not be permanently displayed in any common areas or worship or religious facilities: “Display religious symbols in these areas only during religious services” (5). Additionally, it is the senior chaplain’s responsibility to ”make sure that religious literature is available and
recommend to the commander the removal of materials that solicit, proselytize or malign any religious group.”(2).

The Air Force Instruction also addresses the need for additional personnel. These guidelines are particularly important to Muslims due to the presence of only three Muslim chaplains across all military branches in 1998. The instruction states that when additional personnel are needed to meet the religious needs of military personnel, “[t]he senior chaplain, in consultation with the commander, authorizes qualified resource personnel to provide for specific religious needs that assigned Chaplain service personnel cannot meet” (2). Auxiliary chaplains can be hired “to provide worship services, hospital ministrations and pastoral counseling within the applicable Air Force Manpower Standard. However, “auxiliaries must meet the same educational requirements as Air Force chaplains and be approved in writing by their religious body” (2). The senior chaplain reviews the need for auxiliary chaplains annually (2). The role of resource personnel, however, is “to perform a religious service, rite or program for a specific need, such as a Bible study series, marriage enrichment seminar, choir workshop, wedding or baptism” (3).

As described previously, the military uses a system of representational matching between the percentage of military members and chaplains in order to determine the number of chaplains available for each specific religious group. For example, Air Force Instruction 52-101, “Chaplain Service” (1), determines “Religious Grouping Status” (3) in the following manner. The instruction states, “religious grouping status will be assessed by measuring the percent of religious groups represented by active duty chaplains against the religious preference of active duty Air Force personnel” (3) (see Fig. 6.1 on next page from United States Air Force 1997).
This process is accomplished annually (3).

The Air Force policies on the chaplain's role(s) in providing religious accommodation for military members provide a relatively fixed and specific set of guidelines for the pluralistic religious environment of the military. Of importance to note is that more specific guidelines are often listed for those faiths that claim a larger percentage of followers from military members. Oftentimes Protestant, or more generally Christian, and even Jewish services or practices are specifically mentioned. Other religious faiths are not specifically mentioned. With regard to some of the issues important to Muslims, then, the issue seems to be not so much what is said but what is not said in such directives.

*THE MUSLIM CHAPLAIN ENDORSING AGENCY*

The American Muslim Council

When this research was initiated in May 1998, the American Muslim Council (AMC) served as the official endorsing agency for Muslim chaplains wishing to enter
military service (American Muslim Council 1998a). Actually, the AMC currently serves many interests of the American Muslim community—civilian and military—across the United States. A single department at the AMC—the Office of Armed Forces & Veteran Affairs headed by Quaseem Ali Uqdah—plays a particularly important role for Muslim military members. The department provides information to Muslim military members and has assisted in the endorsement project for chaplains (American Muslim Council 1998b). On April 21, 1998, the responsibility of endorsement for Muslim chaplains was changed from the AMC to the Islamic Society of North America (Stocks 1998), another leading Islamic organization in the United States (Alam 1994). Although no official statement has been made available regarding the reason for the change, one military chaplain alluded to issues involving different expressions of the Islamic faith.

The School of Islamic Social Sciences

On August 28, 1998, an individual from the Muslim Military Members Net posted information on the Muslim Military Members Net Listserv regarding the transition of chaplain endorsement duties from the AMC to the Islamic Society of North America (Ansari). The post consisted of minutes from a meeting held by an official at the School of Islamic Social Science (SISS) in Virginia. Apparently, the Islamic Society of North America appointed SISS to serve as the endorser for Muslim chaplains. Two active duty military members, two civilians and two chaplain candidates attended the meeting.

The minutes from the meeting provided much information on the process of Muslim chaplain endorsement. To begin, SISS assists the process of endorsement by providing a Master’s Degree in Islamic disciplines. SISS enrolls students from an international arena. In addition to training individuals for positions as military chaplains, SISS also prepares individuals for positions as imams (prayer leaders) for mosques and for penal institutions. Further, concerns of Muslim military members were discussed in the meeting.

To address these concerns, SISS outlined three specific goals. First, the school
would provide training for Muslim candidates for chaplain status. Second, SISS would "provide critically needed (sound and practical) support to Muslims in the military" (2). Third, SISS stressed the importance of offering "sound Islamic management practices, decisions, and advice" (2) to the Department of Defense when it is requested "as it will affect thousands of military members and their families living and working in environments in the US and abroad" (2). As a last note, the individual who posted the minutes from the meeting added a comment stressing the fact that the transition of endorsement duties from the AMC to SISS had not been finalized and emphasized the need for keeping both the AMC and the Air Force Chaplains Board notified of any important information or changes.

At the direction of personnel working at the Air Force Chief of Chaplains' Office, I was advised to contact the individual in charge of SISS' endorsing functions for chaplains, Dr. Iqbal Unus. Dr. Unus also serves as Dean of Students at this school (Stocks 1998). An informal interview conducted with Dr. Unus (1998) covered such topics as the transition of endorsement duties from the AMC to SISS, the lay leader program and the wearing of the beard or hijab. As for the first topic, Dr. Unus stressed the importance of SISS being able to function as a combined endorsing agency, providing both educational development and chaplain endorsement. Dr. Unus explained that AMC has grown significantly and serves many functions for the American Muslim community, including much lobbying and political activity. As for the process of change-over in endorsement agencies, however, Dr. Unus explained that SISS would be working closely with AMC.

Dr. Unus explained that a lay leader can be either an active duty military member or a civilian from the local base community. As outlined above in the policy section, lay leaders augment functions which can not be provided by the chaplain service at a particular military setting. In order to become a lay leader, Dr. Unus explained, an individual goes through a certification process held at SISS. Additionally, individuals previously certified under a different agency attend the SISS certification upon renewal of their lay leader status. As for the issue of Muslim military members desiring beard
and the hijab, Dr. Unus stressed a long-term view of potential change. His goal, he stated, was to produce Muslim chaplains who will educate military commanders on the requirements of practicing Islam.

The Muslim Chaplain

As stated in the introduction, there are three Muslim chaplains currently serving the Army and Navy, with nine more in training (American Muslim Council 1998b; Agbere 1998). The three currently serving in the military are Army Chaplain Abdul-Rasheed Muhammad, Navy Chaplain Monje Malak Noel and Army Chaplain Muhammad Muqsood Ali Khan. Of the nine in training, four will serve with the Army, three with the Air Force and two with the Navy (Agbere 1998). Chaplain Khan posted his e-mail address on the Muslim Military Members Net and at my request to talk with him, an informal phone interview was conducted.

In the interview, Chaplain Khan (1998) mentioned a recent Hollywood movie called *The Siege* in which a group of Arab Muslims are portrayed as the “bad guys”. Chaplain Khan also spoke of recent international political events involving Muslim terrorists. Chaplain Khan perceived such events in a positive light, providing the opportunity for the Muslim community in the United States to educate Americans on Islam and Muslim stereotypes. Chaplain Khan acknowledged the issue of wearing the beard by males and the hijab by females as a concern of some Muslim military members, however, he deferred to the necessity of embracing the Five Pillars as the only essential in embracing Islam despite the existence of some factions within Islam. When asked about the presence of Nation of Islam members within the military service, Chaplain Khan dismissed this movement as political and once again deferred to the necessity of embracing the Five Pillars as the defining feature of a true Muslim.

One of the Muslim chaplain candidates, Lieutenant Dawud Agbere (1998), contacted me regarding my research. Lieutenant Agbere attends SISS and also attended the meeting held at SISS referenced above regarding the transition of endorsement agencies for Muslim chaplains. Lieutenant Agbere attempted to explain his
understanding of the need to switch endorsing agencies. In relation to the chaplain candidates themselves, he stated that shuttling between the two institutions (SISS for training and AMC for endorsement) to get their concerns across has been a source of frustration for him and other Muslim chaplain candidates. Further, he added that SISS will be required to maintain contact with chaplains currently serving “in order to withstand the ever changing dynamics of the military and incorporate these challenges in its training program” (1). Lieutenant Agbere stated that he is aware of the Muslim Military Members Net Listserv but rarely browses it.

The position of Muslim chaplain is a unique one in many ways for a Muslim imam or prayer leader. In Islam, the imam does not possess church authority in the same sense as a priest, minister or rabbi. The term imam is understood as a prayer leader. Each Muslim is thought to possess his or her own particular relationship with God that is not contingent upon any other human medium (Corrigan et al. 1998; Tahir-Kheli 1981). The elevation of the imam to chaplain status will most likely result in a transformation of the imam in general in the military context. In many ways, the process of commissioning Muslim chaplains can be viewed as evidence of a Westernizing or bureaucratic trend in Islam. As Dr. Unus stated, however, the Muslim endorsing agencies and military Muslims themselves see the appointment of Muslim chaplains as a necessary step in gaining institutional support for the free practice of their religion. Therefore, the Muslim chaplain’s role as prayer leader and advisor to commanding officers on religious needs will also be melded with his political role as he comes to participate in the bureaucratic institution of the military.

**THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY TODAY**

Van Iersel (1996) has explored changes of the modern military and the military chaplaincy from the standpoint of practical theology in *Religion and Ethics in the Context of the Armed Forces*. In the introduction of his book, Van Iersel explained that “the implied image of the Islam as an enemy of the West as an indirect context of military chaplaincy shows that pastoral education in the field of interreligious dialogue is
both necessary and potentially fruitful” (1996: vii). As evidence to support his theory of
the Muslim enemy, Van Iersel offered conclusions drawn from the work of Samuel
concluded “that the fundamental demarcation line and source of [international] conflicts
will not be primarily economic or ideological, but cultural” (4). Based on the importance
of culture in international conflicts, Van Iersel offered the dilemma which he claimed
ensues.

“A demand - contradictory at first sight - upon cultures emerges; they are,
namely, required to simultaneously both found fundamental values and promote
tolerance,” (6) Van Iersel explained. Further, he added that, “in fact, both
fundamentalism - making moments in a religion or conviction about life absolute - and
indifferentism - cultivating cultural and life-philosophical indifference - do increase the
problems instead of contributing to their solution” (6). Adding to these conclusions,
however, the author explained that “[i]t is, however, important that attention to cultural
and religious factors will not...nourish unnecessary enemy images. The latter do arise
when certain religions, like Islam, are integrally incorporated into the enemy image” (6).

As far as the church’s role, Van Iersel explained that “[i]n the search for an
alternative between fundamentalism and indifferentism a first step should be to break off
the exclusivistic connections between religion, on the one hand, and ethnicity and
nationalism, on the other hand (7)” Further he pleaded, “[c]ultures and the religions
living therein will have to take responsibility for their mutual right of existence and
chances of development and education” (7). Lastly, he added, “[t]ogether, they will also
have to take responsibility to prevent cultural conflicts from escalating into religious
wars” (7).

In Van Iersel’s analysis, these factors lead to a responsibility for the military
chaplaincy “to give attention in its pastoral programmes to the religious factor in
international conflicts and to the different ways in which it can be dealt with” (8).
Further, he claimed the chaplaincy will have to “take responsibility for the development
of all cultures and religions in the Armed Forces” (8). Ultimately, in Van Iersel’s
opinion, “[w]hen military chaplaincy will take adequate care of this, it will substantially contribute to the tempering of inadequate enemy images” (8).

The author more closely examined and challenged the approach to ethics in the Armed Forces. Of the manner in which ethical themes are confronted, Van Iersel depicted “a development both relevant for the authorities and for the Armed Forces, namely, the weakening of the position of religion and conviction about life in the public realm of modern societies” (16). This, he claimed, “render[s] it increasingly attractive for organizations which operate in this public domain...to look for ‘neutral’ and abstract ethical orientations instead of for religious and life-philosophical ones, as an instrument for integration of this public terrain” (17). In his opinion, “[t]he function of ‘civil religion’ is, in that case, taken over by ‘ethics’” (17). However, in Van Iersel’s view, “ethics can nevertheless not replace religion and convictions about life” (17).

The problem with “ethical standardizations” (17) in Van Iersel’s mind is that they may become procedural—”analogous to the principle of equality in the democratic constitutional state - in which pluralization is no longer compensated for by the formation of public consensus as far as contents are concerned” (17). In his view, then,

In the field of ethics, religion and conviction about life thus add something essential: they put the concrete questions as to the guidelines for a man’s moral conduct in the broader perspective of the portrayal of mankind and the views on transcendency that go with it (17).

In the last section of his book, Van Iersel examined the identity of the chaplain himself or herself. The author provided comparative analysis of the chaplaincy between the United States and Dutch armed forces. The Dutch military chaplain service is similar in organization to the United States military: “The chaplain in the armed forces is thus in this sense not an official in an organisation but with an organisation” (54).

DISCUSSION

Many of Van Iersel’s insights are critical in understanding the role of the Muslim chaplain. Although much of what Van Iersel offered seems to be advice for non-Muslim
chaplains serving in the modern context, the implications for Muslim chaplains are also significant. Muslim chaplains are in a precarious leadership role in a military which is fed by--and itself influences--the oft-spoken and new enemy image of Islamic fundamentalism. As both Dr. Unus and Chaplain Khan stressed, however, Muslim representatives in the military seem to be accepting negative stereotypes and false information as providing opportunities to educate non-Muslims about Islam. This optimistic attitude regarding the future of Muslims in the military is likely to shape military policy not only in relation to the concerns of Muslim military members, but possibly also in relation to the ever-present Muslim fundamentalist enemy image pervading American society today.

The Muslim chaplain is in a unique position in that he or she exists not only as a Muslim military member, but as a representative to military leadership regarding the needs and interests of Muslim military members. Although all of the Muslim Chaplain representatives I spoke with offered no evidence of role conflict other than the desire of some Muslim military members to wear a beard or the hijab in military uniform to be consistent with Muslim law, their comments must be taken in light of their appointed capacity. That is, they all serve as military leaders--dedicated to upholding the interests of both the Muslim military member and the military organization itself. In many ways their position may be viewed as potentially problematic; however, they seem to have melded their roles quite successfully. As Chaplain Khan's comments indicate, the only key actions necessary for being a Muslim simply involve following the five pillars, which in and of themselves do not directly conflict with military service. Alternatively, some may argue the small number of chaplains may keep them from voicing significant concerns to any great extent, and that with increases in the number of Muslim Chaplain representatives, new concerns may emerge.

The reason behind the change in endorsing agencies from the American Muslim Council to the School of Islamic and Social Sciences is not clear. One could possibly suggest that the integration of training and endorsing functions for future Muslim chaplains into one agency may have resulted from a recognition of role conflict within
the Muslim community itself, independent of the military environment. Alternatively, one might conclude that the need to combine training and endorsing functions evidences role conflict for the Muslim chaplain himself or herself. As alluded to by Lieutenant Agbere, lack of integration of the two functions in the past has often resulted in confusion for the Muslim chaplain.

Based on the military policies reviewed in this chapter regarding the chaplain service, however, many potential sources of future conflict exist. As an example I will offer the requirement mandated by the Air Force Instruction that published material on all of the major faith religious groups will be made available to military members. I asked all of the Muslim chaplains and the chaplain candidate, as well as Dr. Unus, about the existence of such material. All claimed none exists. Concerns over the use of buildings and military space, as well as Muslim chaplain availability, are also likely to be problematic in the future for the Muslim chaplain as he or she is directly charged with ensuring those requirements are met for his or her faith group.

In sum, if the number of Muslim military members continues to increase at the same level of Muslim growth experienced in American civil society, many of the unmentioned and unaddressed concerns of Muslim military members in military instructions are likely to become problematic in the future (see Chapter 7 for further delineation of concerns of Muslim military members). The individuals most likely to serve as the bridge between the concerns of a growing Muslim populace in the military and the military organization will be the chaplain.
CHAPTER 7--MUSLIM MILITARY MEMBERS

"As Muslims see it, injustice would be triumphant in the world if good men were not prepared to risk their lives in a righteous cause."

The American Muslim Council estimates the number of Muslims serving in the U.S. military across all branches at 10,000 (American Muslim Council 1998b). This number is double the estimate given in 1991--just seven years before--by the Department of Defense (Nu'man 1992). Although information regarding religious affiliation of military members is protected under the Privacy Act, Blank (1998) also supports the 10,000 figure. The American Muslim Council created the following bar graph to illustrate the number of Muslims in the military by branch from the years 1988 to 1991 (see Fig. 7.1 on next page from American Muslim Council in Nu'man 1992).
In an article published for a French newspaper in 1992, Olivier detailed the growing Muslim populace in the military as partly resulting from the Persian Gulf War: “The holy book revealed to Muhammad in the desert was opened to Americans, surprisingly enough, in Operation Desert Storm” (40). One soldier Olivier interviewed said that he saw 300 persons converted to Islam at the King Faisal base in Dhahran in a three month period. The soldier said, “And that was only one base. About 75 percent [converted] were African-Americans and 25 percent, Caucasians” (40).

Unfortunately, articles published in the United States detailing such activities and comments of Muslim military members are few and far between. The number of Muslim military members has increased, however, as evidenced by the need for the military
departments to increase the number of Muslim chaplains by 300% within the next few years—going from three to twelve serving across all branches. In this chapter, the roles of the Muslim military member will be examined. Data were elicited from secondary sources describing the military Muslim populace, as well as from the Muslim Military Members Net Listserv which was monitored over a three month time period in the summer of 1998.

MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
A Journalist’s Perspective

Although not a social scientist himself, Olivier’s (1992) information provides interesting anecdotal information on the topic of Muslims in the United States military. Olivier travelled to Fort Hood, an Army base in Texas, in 1992 to interview military members serving there. Osmond Danquah, a 44 year-old sergeant, imam [prayer leader], and convert of 18 years, had the following comment on the growth of Islam: “Islam is the fastest-growing religion in the United States. Tomorrow, it will be the religion of America, and then, inshallah [God willing], the religion of the whole world” (40).

One of the Muslim military members Olivier interviewed said the Saudi Arabians set up Da’awa areas, or proselytising tents, in some of the military bases during the Gulf War. The Saudi Arabians reportedly provided information on the Qu’ran, Muhammad, and the practice of Islam in everyday life. Another Army member, a 22 year-old soldier named Otha, said, “I read several books on Islam [and] I found that Islam was more open to and clear about the problems of everyday life” (41). A 21 year-old soldier known as Abdel Rahman to fellow Muslims focused on the necessity of practicing Islam everyday. This helicopter maintainer stated, “I would like to go and live in Saudi Arabia, to be closer to the holy places...Islam is a religion that you apply every day. Among Christians, it’s only on Sunday” (41).

As one of the converts explained, however, “practicing Islam in the United States is not always easy” (41). Another convert, Daoud, shared the experiences of some Muslim military members when it came to fighting in the Persian Gulf. “It is true,”
Daoud explained, “some soldiers refused to bear arms” (41) against the Iraquis. Daoud further explained, “So, one day the authorities called me and asked me which side we were on—Muslim or American” (41). The result, according to this soldier, was “that those troops were left in the rear” (41).

Of his departure from his interview with Muslim military members serving in Fort Hood, Olivier stated, “In the rear view mirror I can still see him [Osman] smiling, more convinced than ever that tomorrow, America will be Muslim” (41). Olivier also added [at the request of those he interviewed] that the Muslim community at Fort Hood is seeking donations to help build a new mosque in Killeen, the city adjacent to Fort Hood. From Olivier’s experience with these few Muslims one can begin to see some concerns of many serving in the military.

The Muslim Military Member as ‘Mainstream’

Jonah Blank (1998) in his report on “The Muslim Mainstream” also included some thoughts of a military member on being a Muslim. Sergeant George Curtis served as Commander of a M1A1 Abrams tank at Fort Carson army base in Colorado Springs and also served in the Gulf War. Blank reported that Sergeant Curtis sees no contradiction in his roles of being a Muslim and a military member. Sergeant Curtis relayed that the Army has provided meals for him that are consistent with his beliefs on not eating pork and even relieved him of daily physical fitness training during the month-long fast of Ramadan. Sergeant Curtis is the individual who made the comment quoted earlier in this thesis: “Whether it’s Iraq or anywhere else in the world, my first duty is to defend my country” (6).

THE MUSLIM MILITARY MEMBERS NET--

NATIONAL IDENTITY, BEARDS, DEMOCRACY, AND MILITARY SERVICE

The Muslim Military Members Net electronic forum is sponsored and chaired by a military member “to try to provide some kind of organizational support for those serving in the US Armed Forces to include DoD civilians [and] dependents” (Islamic
Information Office 1998a: 2). Over a three-month time period (from May 19, 1998 to August 26, 1998), I received over 400 e-mails from at least 50 different members (as evidenced by different e-mail addresses) regarding a variety of issues surrounding Muslim experiences in the military. Of those, 193 were examined more closely because they represented either ongoing dialogue between military members or other miscellaneous postings more directly related to military members. The 193 e-mails were broken down further into categories in order to try to identify rhetorical or thematic concepts. The topics which received the most active postings were concerns over identity (23 postings), opinions on the wearing of a beard or hijab (a woman’s headdress) in uniform (23 postings), viewpoints on democracy as a form of government (19 postings), and feelings on life as a Muslim in the military (16 postings). In order to outline specific issues discussed on the listserv, each topic area will be examined more closely.

National Identity

The issue of identity first came up on the Muslim Military Members Net forum in a discussion regarding the practice of Islam through Hadith (non-Qur’anic Muslim practice) versus following Islam through the teachings of the Qur’an. Specifically, the issue was whether a Muslim should imitate the ways of Arabs because of the heritage of Muhammad and the preference for Muslims to read the Qur’an in Arabic. Twenty-three postings related to the issue of identity occurred over a 42 day period.

Overall, two themes emerged in the discussion of identity. The first theme was that those commenting did not feel a need to imitate Arab culture in cases where there was no support for a custom in well-established Islamic law. Second, a few members emphasized the universality of Islam. Such individuals appealed to the hope for not grouping one another according to nationalities, but rather as Muslims first and foremost. Select comments from the members of this debate will illustrate further the course of the discussion.

One member began the debate, “We have to remember that we are non-Arab
Muslims and therefore have a culture of our own. You cannot make an Arab out of an American or European.” This person further added, “We have a tendency to turn our potential converts off with our excessive use of Arabic or our attempt to be little Arabs.” The listserv member explained the need for separating the things which the Prophet Muhammad followed as a matter of culture during the time of his life versus dictum of Qur’anic law and Hadith (holy laws).

Other members quickly chimed in with their opinions on the topic. One member explained, “One of the beauties of Islam is diversity within singularity. We all comprise the human race, yet within the whole is a myriad of cultures, languages, tastes, perceptions, and expressions.” He further added, “From my understanding, Allah...created this diversity for our growth and health.” Another individual attempted to explain the need for adopting other’s cultures. He stated, “A person will only adopt another culture or characteristics from it if he is not totally satisfied with ‘his own culture’ or aspects of it or just prefer aspects of another culture.” Further, the person explained, “While studying a language in depth sometimes we gain part of the culture because of its association with the language.” In his conclusion of this posting, however, the member stated, “I am well aware of who and what I am and I am content with being an African-American who is first and foremost a MUSLIM.”

Another member clarified the purpose of the argument as not being to arouse anti-Arab sentiment. Rather, he explained, “...imitating other Muslim cultures, when you are not of that culture, gives the impression to non-Muslims, that you must act like you are from another country to be Muslim. Which means that you alienate Islam from the general public of America.” This individual ended with his own definition of being American: “...we can be American but be Muslim. American does not mean we subscribe to US government ideologies or the general society at large. We do not have to be a part of the Status Quo.” His solution in the end: “Find the Tawazzal. The balance. Take the middle path.”

Yet, others defended the defining feature of being Arabic as speaking the language. “Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said, ‘anyone who utters the Arabic
language is an Arab’...from this we must summarize that ‘Arab’ doesn’t denote race, ethnic group, culture or creed.” Another said, “If you can speak Arabic you are considered to be an Arab.” This person added, however, that “which country we come from is actually irrelevant (and actually wrong) because all kingdoms, republics, etc., are man-made concepts outside from (sic) al Islam.”

Others attempted to finalize the argument with similar sentiments. One member stated, “We are Muslims--our origins are important, but not as much as Allah.” Yet another added, “So what if I’m an Arab or not an Arab? What’s the importance? I’m a MUSLIM.” Further, “The very fact that this is an issue of discussion is indicative of the fact that we have fallen into the trap of the American need to be classified according to ethnic or racial criteria.” Another comment: “The only word that can really give some inkling to who and what I am, how I live, what I believe, what I do and do not like, and etc is MUSLIM - so that should suffice, at least it does for me.” In the end, however, the President of the forum had the last word. He attempted to explain the need to imitate Arabs. “...Many Muslims from America, have a tough time when they go to a Masjid (mosque) that is dominated by Arabs,” he explained, “They feel alienated because they cannot understand what is going on, and often they are not included in the social circle.”

His conclusion: “I hope to see the day when there is no such thing as ‘all the Muslim countries’ but instead I want to hear ‘THE MUSLIM COUNTRY!!’.”

Identity was important to the individuals monitoring this forum. In the course of the discussion, opinions surfaced regarding the need to avoid stereotyping and classifying and attempts to cope with life in a non-Muslim society. Although the debate did not directly address identity in relation to one’s military role, it did address identity in relation to one’s role as a citizen of the United States. As such, the discourse can be said to be representative of some of the general identity issues in a non-Muslim country and most likely similar to those issues which pervade the thoughts of non-military Muslims.

A Beard and a Hijab

An item that was discussed as often as identity was the issue of religious attire or
adornment (23 total postings), specifically, the wearing of a beard (for males) and a hijab (for females) while in military uniform. Unlike the issue of identity which surfaced for a short duration on the listserv (six weeks), wearing religious attire was a frequent topic. Entries began within two days of initial monitoring of the listserv and continued up until the last day it was monitored, a total of 99 days. The biggest debate on the listserv was whether these items are mandatory for the correct practice of Islam.

The first post on the listserv was an article called “Shaving the Beard: A Modern Effeminancy”. The premise of the article was, “Shaving the beard results in a series of Islamic violations, as is obvious from Allah’s book and His Messenger’s Sunnah.” Further, the article stated, “Shaving the beard is a disobedience to Allah,” and, “to the Messenger [Muhammad].” Also, “Shaving the beard is an imitation of the disbelievers,” and “a means of imitating women [since] the beard is a major distinction between men and women.” Finally, the author claimed that, “They used to consider the person who shaved his beard effeminate.”

After the article on shaving the beard sparked some controversy on the listserv, the member who posted it apologized. The individual explained he just wanted to share one person’s view and, “It was not meant for dispute. So I apologize to anyone...who was offended by it.” Another listserv member focused on a particular statement of the article: “Growing the beard is a wajib (mandatory act) for all males who are capable of doing so.” The listserv member clarified the meaning of this in the military context. He added that a “beard would not allow for a field protective mask to seal and would therefore endanger the soldier.” Additionally, the listserv member pointed to the practice of many Shi’ites (a Muslim sect most commonly found in Iran) who do not grow beards.

On that same note, another net member pointed to practices within the Saudi Arabian military. He explained: “Saudi Arabia, the original home of Islam, the keepers of our sacred sites, the home where all of the Holy Qur’an and Hadiths originated, does allow their military member to CUT and NOT maintain a beard.” This person iterated,

1 Oftentimes listserv members posted articles written by other Muslims or scholars.
“Allah gave us minds to use, if we are just to take everything that is written, we may as well be Parrots.” In sum, this individual emphasized the influence of local culture—or even military necessity—in the wearing of a beard.

Yet another net member sharply criticized the practice of not wearing a beard and embraced the topic as an opportunity to condemn military service as a whole. The member stated, “If they have beards [and] they are still willing to deploy to areas where they may have to fight and kill Muslims then obviously the beard isn’t the issue.” A further appeal: “If there are Muslims who will be dropping bombs loaded with Gas I suggest to the brother not to shave his beard but to insure that he is not placed in a situation where he will possibly be killed by a Muslim or where he will kill a Muslim.” He also added, “What are a few mere dollars that the US government give as a salary compared with the price of your soul?” In sum, “If you are a new Muslim get out [of the military] at the first opportunity. There is no need for a Muslim to enlist/re-enlist in the military.”

At this point in the forum, the President intervened and attempted to explain his version of the necessity of wearing a beard. In a statement that seems most representative of communication regarding the beard on the net, he wrote: “I know there is not a consensus on this issue.” He went on to explain the varying degrees of prescribed behavior in Islam as ranging from optional to highly desired to mandatory. “If there is nothing explicitly commanding this [the beard],” he said, “then it is not Fardhu [mandatory].” However, the leader of the forum did admit, “Now I wish I could have a beard, however, as long as I am serving in the Army, and until we UNITE and change the regulation...I cannot grow it fully.” Regardless of his more moderate stance on the wearing of the beard, this individual did see a more urgent calling for working on changing military policy to allow women to wear their hijab (head covering). Of the hijab, he stated, “THAT IS FARD [mandatory].”

Within a few days of the above submitted comments, a military member appealed for help from the net members regarding a female military member’s experience while stationed in Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. He began, “I’m writing to inform you all of the
injustice that is happening over here in this so call Muslim country [Turkey].” Based on
the member’s description of the situation, the policy on base in Turkey was that
American military women who are Muslim were allowed to cover themselves on base.
The member relayed portions of an incident involving a particular female member who
was accidentally photographed wearing her head covering in the background of a picture
of a Turkish general officer.

According to the e-mail, the general became upset about being photographed with
the female. The reason for this general’s being upset was not explicitly stated in the e-
mails, but the general contacted the base commander regarding the incident. The results
of this contact were detailed in another e-mail sent by a different military member
approximately nine days later. This military member reported that the female military
member’s commander issued the following policy regarding the wearing of head
covering:

1. You are hereby ordered not to wear any headscarf
   or headwear that covers any part of your face, forehead, or
   front portion of neck. You may only wear scarves that
   leave your face and frontal neck area uncovered.
2. This order is consistent with the policy and regulations
   of the Incirlik Installation Commander and applies to
   all personnel both Turkish and American on Incirlik
   Air Base. The policy is based on Turkish headwear law.

After reporting the commander’s policy, the net member began his analysis of the
military oath of enlistment and concluded: “According to the POISON oath² that I and
many of you took, we are not supposed to defend our sister in Islam when she disobeys
this order.” Further, he explained, “Not until the kuffar [disbelievers of Islam] decides IF
and WHEN to rescind it.” He pled, “My dear brothers and sisters, PLEASE start
planning to get out.” Also, he explained, “It is necessary that we practice this deen
[Islam] without compromising it, and by now It should be clear that the oath of

² I assume here this individual is referring to the oath of enlistment which all American
soldiers take upon joining the armed forces. See full text of this oath later in chapter.
enlistment/commissioning does just that.”

The female military member involved in the incident also posted her version of the incident. Beyond that which is described above, she explained the wing commander’s actions following the incident. In her words, the wing commander, “requested my gate pass and told me I was restricted to the installation because the Turkish general fears for my safety...Also, he highly suggested that I leave the country of Turkey and return to the United States.” The context of the postings regarding this incident does not clearly relay the nature of the conflict in this incident involving the wearing of hijab (not in uniform) by a female military member. The assumption might be made, however, that the ethnic or racial qualities of the member involved differed from those of the majority of Turkish Muslim women and this difference resulted in the Turkish general’s embarrassment of being photographed with her.

Another post submitted over a month later detailed the experience of a different female who wore a hijab while in uniform. Although initially she was ordered to remove it, according to this person, she was allowed to continue to wear it briefly while the commander sought clarification on the issue of the wearing of the hijab. The individual submitting the post explained that he was consulted on the issue but so was a Muslim who was of a higher rank than he. The commander, he said, “talked to a MSG [Master-Sergeant] (E-8) who follows a leadership geared primarily to African-Americans (I won’t name the name), and according to ‘their’ thinking, hijab is not mandatory, and he told our CO just that.”

Continuing, the net member explained, “Because this MSG [Master-Sergeant] had the rank, my CO [Commanding Officer] figured that he obviously knew more about deen [Islamic practice] than a little E-1.” In closing his posting, the member wrote, “This story just illustrates what the result is when you have other Muslims standing in the way of Muslims fulfilling their deen.” Beyond providing some insight into issues regarding the wearing of the hijab by Muslim military women, this last posting emphasizes two other pertinent points. First, even within the community of Muslim
military members, Islam is factionalized to at least some degree. Second, rank of Muslim military members may be an important means through which policies are or are not endorsed.

The last five postings in this section directly address efforts of one forum member to revise Department of Defense Directive 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices within the Military Services. In his first posting, this individual attached e-mails which he both sent to and received from the coordinating office of this revision process. In one of his letters sent to this office, the member explained, "The fact that regulations do not permit the wearing of a beard except by medical exception does not simply render military life for the observant Muslim objectionable; it sets up an almost absolute bar to the fulfillment of religious duty."

Further, he added, "The painful dilemma the Army has presented the patriotic Muslim - the choice between fulfilling a religious obligation and serving the country - serves as a deterrent to both recruiting and retention of qualified personnel." In a different posting, this net member provided other correspondence between himself and the coordinating agency for the revision. The e-mail response of this agency was forwarded through the net and contained the following remark: "I will certainly consider this recommendation, but cannot assure you of its adoption in that this matter has received an abundance of attention and discussion over the past 18 months.'

At the request of a different member of the forum--an Air Force member--the individual attempting to change the regulation detailed the history of his plea for wearing a beard in uniform. In addition to using his chain of command in the Army to request permission for the beard, the member contacted the American Muslim Council, the former endorsing agency for Muslim chaplains. According to this net member, the American Muslim Council's stance was that the beard was not a necessity. The military member explained, however, that he is attempting to contact the new endorsing agency for Muslim chaplains, the School of Islamic Social Sciences, for possible help from them.

In a last posting by this member, he included a revised and more lengthy letter to
the coordinating office for the revision of the Department of Defense directive. In this letter, he began, “The painful dilemma the Army has presented the patriotic Muslim - the choice between fulfilling a religious obligation and serving the country - is clearly the result of insensitivity rather than by design.” Regarding the issue of women wearing head coverings, the member explained in his letter, “policies or accommodations already exist that allow women to wear make-up, earrings, skirts, and keep their hair longer than that of men.” Further, he iterated, “It is not unreasonable to require the services to allow the wear of a conservative black or OD green scarf under the existing headgear to accommodate religious obligations.”

In order to support his case, the member detailed a short history of similar cases which have brought about changes in policy--such as sexual harassment, racial discrimination, and civilian and local government employers who have been sued for failing to accommodate religious practices. Additionally, he pled, “Some would like to say religious accommodations adversely affect discipline. It is my contention that discipline is actually undermined by this unjust inequitable treatment.” Further, “Respect for the individual forms the basis for the rule of law, the very essence of what makes America.”

The conclusion of his letter to the coordinating office for the revision of the directive focused on military service and constitutional rights. He explained, “A failure to cultivate a climate of respect or a willingness to tolerate discrimination on any basis, not just religion, eats away at this trust and erodes unit cohesion.” Finally,

This right [free exercise of religion], guaranteed in the Constitution that we swear to support and defend, and reinforced by the Courts for the population whose freedom we protect, can only be realized for service members in uniform by changing DoDD [Department of Defense Directive] 1300.17.

Throughout the posted comments included regarding the issue of uniform exceptions for Muslims, the sensitive--yet highly debated--nature of the topic is obvious. Many Muslims have gained acceptance of these practices in the civilian workforce and those who support the change will most likely continue to focus on such perceived
successes. Alternatively, at least two members supported moves to separate or release themselves from military duty due to the stated importance of wearing these religious items. We can conclude, then, that some Muslims experience role conflict as a result of attempting to live in concert with Muslim practice while serving in the military.

Democracy and Voting

The third-ranked topic (19 posts) was the issue of democracy and practice of the democratic process within Islam. This topic, unlike the issue of the wearing of the beard or the hijab, was discussed by net members over a period of a few weeks (20 days) and then dropped. The discussion of democracy centered around Islamic restrictions on voting for non-Muslims and democracy as a form of government.

The listowner began the discussion this time, most likely in response to a posting by an outside agency on the net, such as the American Muslim Council or the Council for American Islamic Relations. He started, “In America, I believe it is imperative that Muslims not only vote, but participate as much as possible in the political machinery, if only to guard their own rights which are being trampled on, and guard the rights of [those] who cannot help themselves.” He qualified, however, “If you vote for non-Muslims, you are putting your trust in them. This we cannot do.” This individual felt that voting for policies was allowed if they were appropriate under Muslim practice: “If you want to vote on a POLICY and not a person, then there is nothing against this.”

In another posting in response to anti-democratic sentiment posted on the forum, the listowner continued. He stated, “If you were in a Muslim Nation, how would you see to it that your ideas [about government] were submitted, to be considered as a solution.” Further, “I hope you think strongly about the issues I am raising, because when you make political statements, you must consider their consequences and be prepared to show an alternate solution.” “I believe there is one[solution] Islamically,” he concluded, “I am just waiting to see the individual who can show a modern model that is viable in today’s world.”

Another person defended democracy, just not as it is practiced within the United
States. "The only problem with the government," he said, "are the outside influences not its form." This member referred to the election of caliphs in Islamic history. To clarify the difference between elections in Islamic practice and elections in democracy, a third member entered the debate with a different focus. He stated, "As Muslims we are bound to one 'Dictator' and that is Allah...all human leaders under Him are selected by the people." Regarding voting, he declared, "we should first come up with leaders and reps who will uphold Islamic Morals and Values and then work hard towards getting them elected." A fourth member reiterated this sentiment with stronger language: "So-called democracy is the biggest shirk known to man." He continued, "Democracy means 'the government of the people, for the people, and by the people.' Where does Allah ...come into this equation?" He also displayed a sense of hopelessness regarding the situation: "The kuffar [disbelievers of Islam] will never let you get the upper hand in any of their elections, and if you do, you have Algeria and Turkey as examples of what they will do."

With the introduction of the last group of statements, the debate grew stronger. A member replied, "If the Christians can place 'In God We Trust' on a coin for a planned godless government then what does that tell us?" Continuing on, he said, "When they see us they see the grace of a people blessed by Allah....Our actions in the government should be to protect our beliefs and rights, not many states allow this opportunity, this is something we must take advantage of."

At the challenge of one member to another to provide an appropriate way under the dictates of Islam to deal with a current political issue, the second member tackled health care. His response largely involved actions that should be taken to provide for Muslims by Muslims: "Encourage our children to learn medicine and other technologies but use them inward towards the Muslim community" and other similar comments characterized his response.

In response to this proposal for isolated Muslim communities, a list member replied: "We have no choice but to participate in this society in which we live as full partners with full rights or subservant with no rights." He further explained, "We
Muslims here in America cannot survive in a vacuum, we cannot provide jobs for the ummah [community], we cannot provide medical services or housing.” Yet another member tried to separate the true issue: “Are we criticizing the American government or the idea of democracy. There is a big difference, it is the people running it.”

Despite such sentiment, a different forum member defended the United States. He stated, “To be honest, I would not want to live in any other country but America. Is America perfect? No. But I believe this country allows me the most free expression of my religion.” Further, he said, “It kills me to see some people defend the wicked actions of dictators (the Farrakhans, Gadhafis, Saddam Husseins, etc.), just because these dictators and mass murderers claim to be Muslim.”

Attempting to delineate the good practice of democracy from the bad, the list owner cited specific examples. He claimed that legal acceptance of abortion and homosexuality is in direct conflict with Islamic law. As for “good examples of democracy”, he cited laws against sodomy and alcohol use and laws supporting “freedom for all men and women”, “suffrage for all men and women”, and “children must go to school”. He also added in a different posting, “By default I was born here. So I will fight to improve this land”. Additionally, “Islam is not a dictatorship but a liberation of mind and soul.”

The last post regarding democracy and voting was submitted a few weeks prior to the end of monitoring. This individual’s comments were similar to some of those already quoted; however, he did offer some unique insights. “The media has demonized and distorted Islam. The CIA (The hidden power) has declared Islam the next threat to America. Do you think that they would place Muslims in key leadership positions?” Additionally, he added, “And instead of spending time worrying about this government, we should spend our time studying and putting this deen...into our heart.” In the final analysis, he claimed, “We have to take Allah as our Walee (protector) and stick to the beliefs of Islam without compromise, even if we are living in the land of Kufr [disbelievers].”

The debate regarding the democratic process offered insights into the
ambivalence expressed by many Muslims regarding following Islam within the context of the democratic system as they perceive it to exist within the United States. Although some sources of reported conflict were unique to one’s experience as a Muslim within the United States, a large majority of the postings consisted of criticisms not infrequently offered by non-Muslim Americans. Additionally, it is important to note that Muslims are scarcely represented in high level government positions. Whether this lack of representation is due to the absence of desire or the unavailability of opportunities would probably be a source of considerable debate. What is pertinent for the present analysis is that this lack of involvement undoubtedly colors the sentiment voiced hereby Muslims.

Military Service

The last and fourth most frequently visited topic on the Muslim Military Members Net was the issue of serving in the military as a Muslim. Forum monitoring began in the middle of this debate so I can not be sure how long this debate had been ongoing, but it continued for the first 13 days of my monitoring the forum for a total of 16 postings. The owner of the net began the debate by providing a response to someone else’s description of life in military service. The previous person had stated that military service potentially could require a Muslim to miss Friday prayer/worship time and to stand when his or her commander enters the room. Further, the member explained the military member would be required to shave his beard or not wear her hijab and potentially have to order others to do so also. Also, the member stressed that as a doctor a military member might have to tend to those wounded in battle, even if they are non-believers of Islam who are fighting Muslims. Lastly, the member mentioned requirements for participating in various ceremonies at the Officers Club. In this case, the member’s concerns were with the presence of alcohol at such ceremonies as well as the possibility of having to shake a woman’s hand (many Muslims believe it is inappropriate for a Muslim to shake the hand of a woman to whom he is not related).

The list owner, however, attempted to take a more moderate stance on some of these concerns. As for salat (prayers which are required five times daily), he did not
think that missing prayers or Friday worship services would occur often: “If there is a mission that means you must miss salah [prayers], and you are a Muslim, it could only mean that this is life and death.” As for standing up when one’s commander enters the room, this person likened the practice to “standing for brothers to shake their hands when they come into the masjid [mosque]. Is it me or is not that a sign of respect...Showing respect was something practice by Muhammad.” Also, he added, “Just because someone is a non-Muslim doesn’t mean they are the scum of the earth. It just means they are exactly where you were some years ago...a disbeliever.”

The list owner continued his criticism of the previous post. As for the beard, he voiced his discontent over the policy but explained, “If your job mandates, you can shave...Remember if something is Wajib [mandatory] or Fardhu [prohibited] then there would be SPECIFIC order in the Quran or Sunnah.” As for the hijab, this individual stated he knew of instances where women have been allowed to wear them and focused on future Muslim commanders’ authority also to allow this. Lastly, regarding participation in programs involving alcohol and mixing with women at the Officers Club, he reiterated the previous members’ concerns. He stated, “If you feel strongly about this, you must insist that you cannot participate. If they don’t understand, let them boot you out. Then you got a case!”

A different forum member provided an alternative view to military service. He explained,

In fact, what we need to be working on is making our presence in the military so strong - that when the administration wants to go fight some Muslim, 40% of the entire military says ‘we’re not going’, because most of them have become Muslim, and the rest have become Muslim sympathizers.

Another member returned to the issue of shaking hands with women. His words, “I ask only this, if you don’t walk into the masjid [mosque] shaking sisters’ hands, then why would it be acceptable to go around putting your hands on non-Muslim women...” Further, he offered a comparison: “Or, is the respect we give our sisters in Islam only due to them as Muslims, and its perfectly okay to not treat non-Muslim women the same
way."

During the debate over military service, the list owner took the opportunity to remind the members of the purpose of the list. He added, "This e-mail list is here to SUPPORT muslims in the military. If you do not want to be in the military, then leave." As for his own actions, he explained, "I, myself, got out and joined the National Guard, further distancing myself from being on active duty." "However, " he added, "I must say...I never missed Jumah [Friday prayers/worship] during my 7 years in the Army."

As for advice to others on gaining approval for prayer time, he offered: "It just depends on who is your supervisor and how you present yourself. If you present yourself with a cocky attitude then hey!, what kind of attitude you think you are going to get in response?" Further, "If you are a Muslim and came to me, asking me for this and that, and you were cocky about it, me being a Muslim, would still shrug you off because you came to me with improper manners." In sum: "Treat non-Muslims with the same respect as Muslims. In fact, you most likely will have to treat non-Muslims with greater kindness cause they are ignorant to Islam."

As the debate continued, one forum member framed the issue differently. "There are over 10,000 Muslims in the military and the number is increasing everyday. We should make the best of what is present by increasing our influence to fit our Islamic needs better," he explained. He also noticed, "A few years ago no Muslim would have thought of having Muslims in the US military or government. Now we see both present." In sum, his opinion was that, "The US military is one way to contribute to the growing of Islam, and at the same time serve this country for all the freedoms we take for granted, which are not experienced in so-called Muslim countries." Yet another added his experiences: "I have only been in the military for 8 yrs (sic) and Muslim for only 3." He explained, "I didn't feel a contradiction until this last year and some may never feel it at all." He qualified his and others' comments, however: "These are our opinions from our experiences. Yours could be better or worse. I may not have become Muslim if I hadn't joined the military." Another forum member returned the discussion to the topics of hand-shaking with women and gaining approval for prayer time.

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"A brother suggested that by being in the military, you will be 'required' to shake hands with women. This is completely untrue," he said. The member continued, "It is true that this is a military custom at award ceremonies and such. However, as a Muslim, if you...explain to people that you don't shake hands with women because it is disrespectful to...you will probably find, as I did, that that garners respect." As for informing supervisors, he offered, "Whenever I got to a new duty station or was placed under a new NCOIC [Non-Commissioned Office in Charge], I made sure that I with them to let them know up front that I pray 5 times a day, have to go to prayer on Fridays, fast Ramadan, and etc." "Additionally," he explained, "I just tried to excel at my job, not because I wanted to be a 'super soldier', but because the Prophet...said in paraphrase - whatever a Muslim endeavors to do, he seeks to perfect it."

One forum member explained the importance of Muslims in the military: "The reality is significant persons revert to Islam as a result of receiving the invitation from another Muslim in uniform." Also, he pled, "Let us strive to change the environment for those Muslims in uniform, by ensuring they have officers (chaplains) that are most representative of the faith, not their individual personality." As for notifying fellow military members of one's being a Muslim, he offered, "Let me echo the comments on letting your command know up front. Some commands will be receptive some will not. However, you never know unless you ask..."

A last individual added his insights on being a Muslim in the military. He stated, "I accepted islam (sic) while in the army but would not have enlisted if I was a Muslim." Further explanation revealed he was, "still in the army because I'm in a non-deployable status soon to retire and my position allows me to study Arabic at the Arabic and Islamic center at ..university for free." As for others, he offered, "Study and research deeply what Islam is and what the U.S. military is." In particular, he suggested others study the oath of enlistment:
I do solemnly swear to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same that I will take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help me God.

This individual challenged other military members to “look at the future and see what your role could be. Will you be in armed conflict against Muslims? I’m sure that there are Muslims in the military who will take exception to this line of thinking and present a more patriotic position.”

A final comment offered by a forum member is particularly indicative of the range of sentiments held by military members on the issue of being a Muslim in the U.S. military. He explained, “I constantly hear people downing the military - it is only a reflection of the larger society it draws from.” His final words: “While I am not a fan about what the U.S. government does or who it supports...I don’t believe that Muslims in American should retreat into the shadows and let all the Kufrs [non-believers of Islam] have their input into matters and laws which concern us.”

Although some individuals mentioned others they had known who had separated from the military and a few even voiced their own discontent with military service, a large majority of individuals spoke of instances in which the Muslim military member resolved or perceived being able to resolve differences resulting from their beliefs. Different interpretations exist on how one must live as a Muslim, however, most on the forum have found ways in which life as a Muslim can be or will be practiced within the military context. More importantly, many seem to view their position in the military as a particular calling: “The US military is one way to contribute to the growing of Islam, and at the same time serve this country for all the freedoms we take for granted, which are not experienced in so-called Muslim countries.” Not only may they act in concert with the will of God in serving the U.S. military, they may also convince others to do the same.
The Mini Musallah

One member who frequently contributed to the Muslim Military Members Net forum often advertised his own web page for military Muslims and their commanders. (See Appendix 1). This web page reveals the sponsor's status as being a retiree from the Army after 21 years of service. His web page explains,

I know that most Muslims in the Army find it difficult to find reliable Islamic information and training, at the same time I realize that most Army commanders of Muslim troops have no idea of what Islam is or how to treat Islamic troops. Insha Allah [God willing] I hope that this information will [be] of some assistance to both.

The site also provides picture of a mosque and what a Muslim looks like when he or she is praying. Additionally, the retiree provides an explanation of the key elements needed by praying Muslims—including times, washing facilities, and trained leaders.

Further, the site provides links to over 37 other articles and other printed material, including an English translation of the entire Qur'an. Additionally, the page creator cited specific titles under the following heading: “All you need as a commander of Muslim troops is available by clicking on one of the line below” (Hassan 1998: 5). The topics included in this section include “An index of the Holy Qur'an for proof per Islamic traditions”, “E.H. Palmers translation of the Holy Qur'an”, “The last sermon of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) [Peace Be upon Him]”, and “The Truth about Al’Islam”. Other topics are “Prerequisite for the declaration of faith (Shaddah)”, “The fall of Mecca”, “Myths spread by Europeans about Islam”, “Islamic questions and answers” and “Jinn”. Each link represents a large amount of information about the practice of Islam and assumes a certain level of general knowledge about Islam.

**DISCUSSION**

Although limited in both their generalizability and predictability to the majority of Muslims serving in the United States military, the comments and actions of Muslim military members as outlined in this chapter provide a useful means of gauging the existence of role conflict for the Muslim military member. As the number of Muslims in
the military continues to increase, the diversity and magnitude of concerns resulting from role conflict is also likely to increase. It is important to note, however, as the Muslim Military Members Net list owner repeatedly stated, the purpose of that particular forum is to support Muslims serving in the military. As such, Muslim military members most likely to use the forum are those attempting to integrate the two roles of Muslim and soldier. In most cases, individuals attempting to separate from either their military or Muslim role would not participate in this forum. Such individuals are not the concern of this thesis, but recognition of the supportive nature of the forum is crucial in understanding the discourse of its members.

The issue of identity was repeatedly touched upon by the members of the listserv, although the Muslim military members interviewed by the newspaper reporters did not manifest this concern. In all of the discourse regarding identity of the Muslim military members on the listserv, however, not once did a listserv member list his or her identity as soldier first and foremost. The debate was waged over the use of American versus Arab versus Muslim categories, but never over the use of soldier, airman, enlisted person or officer. Given the lack of reference to the military role, one might conclude that the military role is of less importance to these individuals than either the national or religious role, or, alternatively, that Muslims military members take for granted the salience or primacy of the military role. The accuracy of either argument cannot be tested within this research, but the picture perhaps becomes a little clearer when the other topics of the listserv are considered.

Many of the forum members also voiced discontent over the practice of democracy in the United States as it exists today, and some even spoke in favor of aspiring to the ideals of a complete Islamic state. This debate over the merits of democracy was never framed, however, in terms of the Muslim military members’ roles in upholding that same democracy. As previously stated, although some appealed to the abandonment of democratic ideals altogether, the majority seemed to focus on the practice of democracy as it exists today rather than the practice of democracy in general. Some even offered the sentiment that despite its shortcomings, the democracy that exists
in the United States offers the chance for greater expression of religious beliefs than that which is offered by a majority of other states in the international arena. Although the issues of identity and democracy were frequently discussed on the listserv (but not in the journalists’ interviews), their content and focus seemed to be more philosophical than practical and action-oriented. In sum, although this topic was frequently visited on the Muslim Military Members Net forum, it may simply reflect the general interests of Muslim military members, but not sources of role conflict. Except for the lack of reference to the military role in the discussion of identity and upholding democratic ideals, evidence of role conflict cannot be directly deduced from these two frequently visited topics on the listserv.

The role conflict involved in wearing a beard or a hijab in uniform and other concerns regarding serving in the military was evident in all of the data sources in this chapter. In instances of individuals attempting to enact specific Muslim practices in the military environment, however, members offered a range of interpretations and expressions of faith as response to perceived role conflict. For example, while one member focused on the inability to engage in war against fellow Muslims, another focused on the existence of “good” and “bad” Muslims. Additionally, when a member voiced concern over standing for a non-Muslim commander when that commander enters the room where the Muslim is working, another member offered the obligation of Muslims to display respect for all individuals, regardless of their religion. Finally, while the majority of individuals agreed on the need for a female Muslim to wear a hijab at all times, a range of opinions surfaced regarding the obligatory versus optional practice of male Muslims wearing a beard.

The leader and a majority of the forum members—in the attempt to provide a supportive resource for the Muslim military member—often attempted to re-frame the reported role conflict of some members within the religious context. Focusing on the resilience and adaptability of religious roles in general, such members endeavored to relay acceptable alternatives—behavioral or intellectual—to coping with one’s role conflicts. Examples include individuals quoting Muslim sources that supported not
having to act in concert with Muslim practice under certain circumstances—such as in the military—or growing a beard and wearing a hijab during one's time off from military service. Despite such attempts, however, several of these issues repeatedly surfaced on the forum. As such, the following areas of role conflict seem most problematic for the Muslim military member in general: the wearing of a beard or hijab, inflicting violence in a military context against fellow Muslims, and missing Friday prayer time.

A final point must be included in an effort to explain how the majority of the Muslims included in this chapter defined their military role in relation to their Muslim role. Most of the Muslims focused on the military environment as a place to enlist potential converts to Islam and enact policies more favorable to Muslims. Therefore, although the Muslim military members acknowledged their status as an often underprivileged minority, they seemed to find solace in the fact that they could offer themselves as sacrifice for the majority of future Muslims, not only within the military, but also within the national and even international arenas. Such a status is probably not unique to Muslims as similar sentiments have been voiced in the past by other minority groups in the military, such as women and African-Americans.

The evidence of specific areas of role conflict included here serve not only to support the existence of role conflict for Muslims in the military environment, but also to acknowledge the resilience and redefining of both the soldier and the Muslim role that allows them to coexist. That is, although each acts as a total institution, efforts to integrate the two roles may support Segal's (1995) hypothesis regarding the inclusion of the family within the military environment—that further integration of the Muslim role within the military environment is itself evidence of the institutionalization of the military.
CHAPTER 8--CONCLUSION

Muslims in the United States Military

The presence of Muslims in the military probably will change the nature of religious freedom within the military context as well as influence the practice of Islam within the military. As Turner (1978, 1968, 1962), Stryker and Serpe (1987, 1982) and Van Sell et al. (1981) noted, roles are marked by a continuing, ongoing, cyclical process of exchange and interchange between the individual and the social group. In the military environment, the terms individuals and groups can refer to Muslim and non-Muslim military members, Muslim and non-Muslim chaplains, and Muslim and non-Muslim Americans. The dichotomy of focus in this thesis between Muslim and non-Muslim, however, serves to emphasize the basis of the conflictual—or possibly at times anomie—situation which exists in the military.

In the overall analysis, Muslim military members and Muslim chaplains seem to be integrating their roles as Muslims and as military soldiers. Many view their work in terms of a calling and as a chance to influence American policy in relation to the free practice of religion and the avoidance of actions taken against Muslim countries. Their view seems to be one of change from the inside out. Further, as many Muslim military members have found Islam while serving in the military, they see their role as providing a missionary function for non-believers of Islam. Muslim chaplains have accepted the role they must perform in the military environment as providing much-needed leadership for a new minority.

Some Muslims, however, are likely to continue to experience role conflict resulting from specific interpretations of Muslim practice, including such issues as the wearing of a beard or hijab, participating in violence against fellow Muslims in a war context, and attempting to say one’s prayers during normal duty hours. My research has shown that the majority of Muslims perceive these particular issues to be problematic. Although currently most of the Muslims examined here accept some of the blocked avenues of religious expression, many seem to be working for changes in attitudes and
policies of non-Muslim military leaders. As such, role conflict is lessened in that the acceptable alternative to meeting particular role demands is to work on changing policies which would allow one to meet his or her Muslim role demands. Such a stance further reveals that Muslim military members are optimistic about the possibility of change.

In regard to policy leaders, as well as the American public, the integration of Muslim and soldier roles does not present itself so optimistically. Public opinion of Muslims is poor (American Muslim Council in Cooper 1993) and the majority of information obtained about Muslims comes from distorted media images. As history has shown with other minority groups in this country, a tendency exists for majority persons to stereotype minorities. Rare but highly publicized fundamentalist actions taken by Muslims magnify this negative perception. In sum, the American public will probably perceive role conflict as existing between the Muslim and soldier roles while the Muslim soldier himself or herself in many cases does not experience role conflict. 

Although the military has become more culturally diverse in past years in allowing African-Americans and women in particular services, Muslims may not enjoy even the limited welcome of those groups. One might be tempted to assume that the existence of newly converted Muslim members reflects a passing fad or sympathy with "the enemy", based on the information provided earlier in this thesis regarding the influence of the Gulf War on converting military members to Islam. This might be a plausible explanation when one examines the military environment in isolation. When one considers the overall growth of Islam not just internationally but within the United States itself, as well as the growth in organizations supporting the Muslim minority in this country, such an explanation becomes defunct.

Although most Americans support freedom of religion as a right inherent within the Constitution of this country, few realize the extent to which history has truly colored the meaning of that belief. The pervading secularization of the United States has resulted in the belief by most Americans that religion is private. In other words, the viewpoint is that a person can practice whatever religion he or she wishes to as long as he or she keeps it to himself/herself and recognizes the primacy of other social
institutions--such as economic and political--in everyday social life. For Muslims, however, religion is by no means a private event. Further, if Islam were practiced as prescribed by the Qur'an, religion, politics and economics would exist under the same umbrella. The result of this clash between the secular and the sacred manifests itself in the struggles between Muslims and Americans today.

More specifically in the military environment, when a Muslim asks for Friday afternoon off to say his or her prayers, the response of a commander might oftentimes revolve around the view of the standard work week and work hours of Monday through Friday from 7:30 A.M. to 4:30 P.M.--a system that works fine for the majority of Christians and Jews. Further, the default answer may be that the supervisor did not create the work week but merely abides by it. Inherent in these responses is the guiding assumption that religion is private and the dominance of Judeo-Christian culture in a work week built around Jewish and Christian sacred days, Saturday and Sunday respectively.

The last 40 years in the United States have seen a rise in concern over civil rights. Based on recent trends in Islamic resurgence in the West, the next 40 years are likely to see social and political concern over religious rights. As Salam Al-Marayati, a spokesman for the Muslim Political Action Committee, stated, "We'd like people to start thinking of the U.S. as a Judeo-Christian-Muslim society" (in Sarna 1992: 377). Alternatively, as Tahir-Kheli (1981) predicted in his analysis of "The Future of Islamic Revival", "[t]he Islamic world is no longer dormant; rather, it is assertive and is continuing to evolve more dynamically" (9). Jonathan Sarna (1992) went one step further in his suggestion for proposed policy changes within the United States: "...we shall have to expand the [religious] circle to include the full rank of American religious denominations, Eastern religions as well as Western ones" (378).

However extensive the changes involved in redefining religious practice within the United States, Muslims in particular present a growing and concerned minority within the military. Although some Muslims may plan to exit the military at the next possible opportunity, a significant majority have chosen to continue to serve a country
that expresses ambivalence about them. In viewing their work as a calling, Muslims can fit perhaps any role, including the soldier, within their higher goal of religious freedom for Muslims.

Sociological Implications

Placing the findings of this research within the larger context of sociology further illuminates many of the issues touched upon in the literature review regarding concepts of secularization, work as a calling, institutionalization/occupationalization of the military, greedy institutions, and last but not least, role theory. The evidence here supports the contention that individuals working in the public sector are likely to view their work as a calling (Davidson and Caddell 1994). Many of the Muslim military members included in this research did voice such sentiments regarding their work. Comparisons were not made, however, between public and private sector employees in this research. As Davidson and Caddell’s (1994) work focused on Christian employees, research comparing private and public sector employed Muslims might illuminate the relationship between being a Muslim and viewing one’s work as a calling. The case might be that a large majority of Muslims view their work as a calling, regardless of the sector.

In many ways attempts by policymakers to avoid the introduction of specific dictates addressing the needs of Muslim military members can be viewed as evidence of further occupationalization of the military (Moskos 1988 and Moskos and Wood 1988). Moskos (1988) argued that role commitment in the occupational military is job-specific and the organization shows no concern for the worker’s behavior away from work as long as that behavior does not affect job performance. The military’s current stance in relation to role commitment of Muslims seems to be exactly that described by Moskos in the occupational military. Many Muslim military members, however, see the situation differently. They point to military provisions that specifically address Christian and Jewish groups, and seek the same privileges. In this case, Muslim military members seem to be pushing for a more institutionalized military, while the military itself is
supporting the occupational military, or, alternatively, the military is simply expressing institutional lag regarding Muslim beliefs and practices. Similarly, Segal (1986) concluded in her analysis of the military family that "to the extent that the military works to incorporate the family [or Muslim] within itself and adapts to it, the result will not be institutional change but preservation of the institutional nature of military organization" (34).

Although Islam and the military are probably not total institutions (Goffman 1961), the evidence supports defining them as greedy institutions (Coser 1964). Although the two institutions may conflict in some areas, they do not conflict in all facets of an individual’s value or belief system. Ideologically, the military attempts to support the practice of religion by its members. The problem in the case of Muslims is that some of their convictions and practices differ so sharply from the American norm that defining the extent to which this minority religion can be practiced in the military context seems to represent more of an anomic, rather than an inherently conflictual, relationship.

In addition to evidence of role conflict within the Muslim military member, other insights from role theory apply. As predicted, role making occurs. That is, some Muslims defined their conflictual roles in terms of a calling or a sacrifice for future Muslim military members. Although the military role oftentimes determined the ultimate role chosen in particular conflictual instances, some Muslims looked forward to the opportunity to change the policies defining religious freedom in the military. Further, although much of the American public has embraced an Islamic enemy image, some of the Muslim military members interviewed here viewed this as an opportunity to educate non-Muslims. Muslim military members’ roles can even take on a missionary function.

In sum, later theories on role conflict (Turner 1978; Van Sell et al 1981) address the complex nature of the interplay between roles both in society at large and within the organizational context. The findings of this thesis are consistent with a complex interplay of role choices. Further research on Muslim military members should delineate that interplay more clearly.
Directions for Future Research

The regnant secularization that pervades the United States today has resulted in a majority of social scientists neglecting the study of religion as a social institution. In the course of my research, I found many studies that might have provided useful information on the topic of military or occupational institutions had the researchers simply collected data on religious affiliation (see also Davidson and Caddell 1994). The secularist assumption underlying such omissions constrains the study of a range of social institutions in this country and is no longer appropriate given the recent growth of religious minorities. Future research on Muslim views of work, for example, might indicate either the pervasiveness of Muslim beliefs across all social institutions, the lack thereof, or possibly even a Westernizing trend of Muslim secularization.

Although the value of cyber-mediated communication and the internet has been established generically in the formation of social networks, more research into cyber-mediated religiosity is also warranted. With the existence of five million web pages on the Internet on Christianity, one million on Judaism, half a million on Islam, a quarter of a million on Buddhism and 80,000 on Wicca (Weiss 1998), one can conclude that the Internet has expanded and redefined the parameters of missionary work. Of significant importance in the area of cyber-mediated communication is the ability of Muslims to interact with other Muslims in a manner that in many ways alters the very experience of minority status—either reducing or heightening the sense of isolation of minority members.

Military policy would most likely benefit from further research regarding the extent to which uniformity in matters of religious beliefs and practices truly contributes to successful national defense policy and is a matter of military necessity. Congress and the Supreme Court have often deferred to the special status of the military. Ultimately, this creates an onus upon the military itself to justify such a status. Further, this status causes members first to turn to the military when questioning religious accommodation policies. Re-evaluation of allowances considered for other religious groups might allow the military to more closely examine the true meaning of religious freedom.
Finally, in line with the focus of this thesis, further research on Muslims in the military is warranted. As this research attempted to outline some of the key sociological ideas pertaining to Muslims in the military, subsequent research facilitated by the use of participant observation and questionnaires and supplemented with secondary data sources compiled by directly involved agencies such as the School of Islamic Social Sciences and the American Muslim Council would illuminate the overall picture. In sum, more direct means of probing the Muslim experience in the military are warranted. Although this research was limited in terms of time, money, and access to those particular methods of gauging the Muslim experience, future research potentially could navigate successfully such parameters to add other contributions to this novel field of knowledge.
Appendix 1  Islam On Line and Mini Musallah Web Site (Hassan 1998)
Islam On Line & Mini Musallah
For all US Army Muslims and their military commanders

DISCOVER

ISLAM

US Army Infantry

http://www.gabn.net/hassan/islam3.htm
US Army Signal Corps

I am retired from the US Army after 21 years of service. I served my first Army tour as a "Grunt" and the rest of my time in the Signal Corps. I served two tours in the "Nam" with Macy, 1st Signal Bde, 25 Inf Div and the 9th Inf division. I served in all of the major campaigns from Dec 1965 to Dec 1966 and from Aug 1967 to Aug 1968. Now that my credentials are out of the way we can proceed.

I know that most Muslims in the Army find it difficult to find reliable Islamic information and training, at the same time I realize that most Army commanders of Muslim troops have no idea of what Islam is or how to treat Islamic troops. Insha Allah I hope that this information will of some assistance to both.

Muslims pray and study in a Masjid( Mosque), the word means place of prostration and
http://www.gabn.net/hassan/islam3.htm
normally have ritual washing facilities, library, office and study areas. I understand that large
ones (Masjids) have living quarters. The prayer room can be upstairs or downstairs but street
shoes are not allowed in the praying areas. Men and women pray in separate areas due to the
manner in which we pray (ie bending over). Primary Masjid day is friday and all male Muslims
are expected to attend. Your troops will require a place that has washing facilities and clean open
space to pray and hold meetings. The troops should have enough open space so that they can face
towards Mecca during prayers. A leader should be chosen by the group that is the most learned,
pious and honest of the group per Islamic traditions. Prayer times are: Morning (Fajr) dawn to
day break rak'at 2 Noon (Zuhr) from noon til the sun caste a full image of your shadow, rak'at 4
Afternoon (Asr) from ending of the noon prayer til sunset, rak'at 4 Sunset (Maghrib) after sun set
until the sky is dark, rak'at 3 Night (Isha) after the sky is dark until dawn , rak'at 4 Note: 1
complete prayer cycles are call a rak'at (see prayers and how to) NOTE: 2 See diet.txt on Witr for
exception. Note: 3 Duha,Asr and Isha prayers may be reduced to 2 rak'at if traveling more than
48 miles.

A Muslim praying in the Sajda position

- Islamic prayers and how to do them
- Salat with charcoal pictures
- Free Salat program in three parts
- Basic prayer positions w/pictures
- What you say when you pray

http://www.gabn.net/hassan/islam3.htm
The Holy Qur'an

- The Holy Qur'an and how it came about
- The Pillars of Islam
- The Islamic Creed
- Zakat (Charity)
- Hajj to the Holy City of Mecca
- The Hajj explained
- Hajj Visa
- Yes, we believe in Angels
- A list of fatal sins in Islam
- Birth and science in the Holy Qur'an
- Circumcision in Islam
- Muhammad (PBUH): The sword of Islam
- The Sharia, Islamic Law
- Things to avoid during prayers
- Additional Islamic learning sources

http://www.gobn.net/hassan/islam3.htm
The Shahada is to bear witness that there is no God worthy of worship except Allah and that Muhammad is his messenger. Ashhadu an la illaha illallah asshadu anna Muhammadar rasoolullah.

Food: Muslims and Islam are basically like the old testament in as far as what we can eat. We cannot consume pork or fish without fins and scales. We cannot consume meat that has blood in it (ie) blood wurst, blood pudding or organ meats. We can eat food provided by people of the book, Christians and Jews as long as it does not go against the Holy Qur'an on what is haram. The mess hall is not a real good place for Muslims since it processes and serves all kinds of pork products and we are forbidden to even touch or distribute any haram products. The cooks have to either be Christian or Jewish for us to define their food as halal ( permitted). In a field environment all commanders should make a sincere effort in providing their troops of the Islamic faith with rations that are permitted for them to consume. The pork and filler hotdog packs are definitely out, even "GI GIN" the old cold medicine is not permitted to them for consumption. In a actual emergency all food and products are permitted but must be discontinued as soon as the emergency is past. I understand that Halal ( permissible ) field rations and copies of the Holy koran may be ordered by National Stock Number through the Chaplin's office.

My abbreviated homemade Islamic dictionary

All you need as a commander of Muslim troops is available by clicking on one of the lines below

- A index of the Holy Qur'an for proof per Islamic traditions
- E H Palmers translation of the Holy Qur'an
- The last sermon of the Holy Prophet ( PBUH)
- The Truth about Al-Islam
- Prerequisite for the declaration of faith (Shaddah)
- The fall of Mecca

http://www.gsnb.net/hassan/islam3.htm
Myths spread by Europeans about Islam
Islamic questions and answers

Goto Islam On Line Bismilla Page
Goto Islam On Line Haji/Pilgrimage Page

Goto to Islam On Line Main Page
REFERENCES


Islamic Information Office. 1998a. E-mail to the author. 19 May 1998.


