Arms Control
ARMS CONTROL

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SOVIET ATTACKS ON U.S. RADAR IN GREENLAND REPORTED

Foreign Ministry Statement 24 July

LD241900 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1818 GMT 24 Jul 87

["Statement of the USSR Foreign Ministry" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, July 24 (TASS) -- Follows the full text of a statement of the USSR Foreign Ministry:

The Soviet Union's national monitoring [kontrol] means have registered the placing on operational readiness of a new large U.S. "Pave Paws" phased-array radar station near Thule, Greenland, which, as the U.S. side, too, admits, is a missile-attack warning radar station.

The Soviet Union views these U.S. Administration actions as a direct violation of the timeless Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABM) of 1972 which is the basis for maintaining strategic balance and the foundation for strategic offensive arms limitation and reduction. The ABM Treaty strictly limits the deployment of new missile attack warning radar stations to the periphery of national territory of either side. The "argument" put forward by Washington that it is allegedly only modernization of the station that already existed there is groundless.

The radar station in Thule is a new phased-array radar station of the type which did not exist when the treaty was signed, built a new instead of the old radar station that did not have such an array.

Article Six of the ABM Treaty was formulated to ban this new construction. So, by deploying the aforementioned radar station outside its national territory, the United States has clearly violated the ABM Treaty.

Starting from 1985, when the national technical verification means of the USSR established the fact of U.S. activity leading to a violation of the provisions of the ABM Treaty -- the construction of a radar at Thule -- the Soviet side warned on more than one occasion about the incompatibility of the work underway with that treaty and demanded that measures be taken to remedy the situation. However, the United States continued building the radar near Thule and has completed its setup by now. Moreover, it started building another similar radar, which violates the treaty, at Fylingdales Moor, Britain. The Soviet side is seriously concerned over the fact that the radar set up in Greenland and the one planned to be set up in Britain are stations of "Pave Paws" type, which have characteristics allowing them to cope both with the tasks of warning against a missile attack and potentially with the tasks of antiballistic missile defense.
To cover up its illegal actions in the ABM sphere, the United States is referring to the radar under construction in the Krasnoyarsk area in the USSR, ascribing to it functions it will not have. The Soviet side has thoroughly explained that that radar will be a station for tracking space vehicles and that the limitation under the ABM Treaty thus does not apply to it. The United States will be able to get convinced of it through the use of its national technical means when the radar in the Krasnoyarsk area starts operating in the emission mode.

U.S. Response 'Meaningless'

LD261102 Moscow TASS in English 1046 GMT 26 Jul 87

[Text] Washington July 26 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Igor Borisenko:

A spokesman for the U.S. State Department got off with meaningless phrases in answer to the question of the TASS correspondent about the going into service of the new U.S. big phased array radar Fave Paws in the area of Thule (Greenland). The fact that these actions by the U.S. Administration are a direct violation of the Soviet-American Treaty of the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Defence Systems (ABM) of 1972, which is without time-limit, was pointed out in a statement issued last Friday by the USSR Foreign Ministry.

The spokesman for the U.S. State Department claimed that the U.S. radar station in the area of Thule is a modernisation of the radar, which existed at the time when the treaty was signed. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger noted in the annual report of the Defence Department to the Congress for the 1986 fiscal year that the USA was replacing outdated radars in Thule and Fylingdales Moor. Yet the Pentagon experts felt that they made a blunder in their annual report for the 1987 fiscal year and instead of the word "replacement" used the term "modification". [sentence as received]

This and other similar facts are pointed out in the report on compliance and the future of arms control, which was prepared by the working group on problems of international security and control of Stanford University. Thus, for example, the similar radar station under construction in Fylingdales Moor (Britain) as is pointed out in the report, will be at a distance of several miles from the old radar station. Then what sort of modernisation is it?

As regards the characteristics of radiation, says the Stanford University research paper, the new radar stations in Thule and Fylingdales Moor can be potentially used with the aims of anti-missile defence. Thus, the authors of the report say, they not only fall under the category of the radar stations, which must be placed along the national territories periphery with outside orientation, and could be potentially be seen as ABM components covered by the restriction of Article IX..."of the ABM Treaty." [sentence as received]
IZVESTIYA Commentary

PM271525 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Sychev report: "Greenland-United States: Violating the ABM Treaty"]

[Text] Stockholm — The construction of a radar station at the U.S. Air Force base at Thule in Greenland is complete.

It was commissioned 24 June without undue ceremony. However, this event, which was preceded by violent political battles between the government and the opposition in Copenhagen and early elections to the Landsting (parliament) in Greenland, has only just become known.

Let us recapitulate. This question centers on a U.S. radar station which has been operating in Greenland since 1952 and which Washington has allegedly been "modernizing" since 1983. But it is essentially a modern new station which has been built and is now operating at Thule.

A phased-array station has been sited in the base's special sector codenamed "Department 3," and in conjunction with the electronics already installed it greatly increases the radar complex' potential and its operating range. The base commander has announced, LAND OG FOLK writes, that "Department 3" can maintain communications with 25 military satellites and watch and listen over a vast area of the globe, from the Soviet Union to Central America.

With the commissioning of the radar station Washington has effectively violated the Soviet-U.S. 1972 unlimited duration Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Systems and its protocol. These documents unequivocally prohibit the radar at Thule. The countries which signed the document committed themselves in particular not to possess radar stations outside their own territory and not to carry out work at existing stations to increase their potential.

In addition, the "modernized station" will be part of the system of armaments currently being created in the United States under the "Star Wars" program. Many prominent U.S. experts have pointed out its function in this regard. This is also indicated by the decision to make "Department 3" as of 1 October directly subordinate to the "U.S. space command," which will control all elements of the strike systems of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" armaments.

Thus Washington's activity at the Greenland base in enlisting a number of Danish companies in the construction of an SDI project deals a severe blow to Denmark's foreign policy principles as expressed by the country's parliament in recent years and which include, among others, nonparticipation in the realization of U.S. ambitions in space.
Krasnaya Zvezda Comments

LD262157 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1335 GMT 26 Jul 87

["Another Dangerous Step"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 26 Jul (TASS)—The U.S. Administration—Krasnaya Zvezda writes today—has taken another step in violation of the international obligations it has assumed. A big new phased array radar designed to give warning of a strategic ballistic missile attack has been put on alert duty in the Thule area (Greenland). This step crudely flouts two clauses simultaneously of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the Limitations of the Systems—Article VI and the agreed "Declaration."

The installation of large phased array radars on foreign territory is being undertaken by the United States in order to ensure the creation of a radar basis for the large-scale ABM system with space-based elements envisaged by the SDI program, in spite of the ABM Treaty (Article 1), notes the paper. It was precisely to raise confidence in the effectiveness of the restrictions on the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment [razvertyvanie] of antimissile defense that the ban on the deployment of early-warning radar stations beyond national territorial boundaries was instituted. And yet the "Pave Paws" type radar in Thule, just as the one that is being built at Fylingdalesmoor (Britain), is, by its nature, capable not only of fulfilling the functions of advance warning, but also of tackling the tasks of an ABM radar station. Such a radar station, beyond the borders of U.S. territory, continues the paper, allows targets to be detected at great distances and target designations to be relayed to other ABM on the territory of the United States. Thus, these radars, together with the "Pave Paws" radar stations situated on territory of the United States at the Robins, Otis, Beale and Goodfellow bases, as well as the ABM radar station at the Grand Forks base could create a basis for the deployment of an ABM defense (?) [word indistinct] the territory of the country.

"The deployment in Greenland and Britain of large U.S. phased array radars with ABM capabilities, ought to be regarded as a potential breach of Article IX of the Treaty banning the "deployment outside one's own national territory of ABM systems or their components," remarks Krasnaya Zvezda.

Having recalled that the Soviet Union has, on more than one occasion, warned the United States that its action in creating the "Pave Paws" type of radar station, including outside the territory of the United States, is unlawful in nature and is out of keeping with the ABM Treaty, the paper writes: "However, each time the United States has ignored these representations. It is becoming evident that the United States observes its international undertakings for only so long as they do not interfere with its militaristic plans. That is how it treated the SALT II Treaty at the end of 1986 and that is how it is getting ready to treat the ABM Treaty."

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CSO: 5200/1619
USSR REVIEW OF UK BOOK ON SDI TECHNOLOGY, STRATEGY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 (signed to press 16 Mar 87) pp 155-156

[A. Kireyev review: "Technology of Nuclear Insanity"]

[Text] The evolution of military-political doctrines traditionally depends on the level of development of military technology and the economy which has been reached. The politics of the "cold war" would have had no material basis had not the United States possessed nuclear weapons. For this reason the problem raised in the book of a leading associate of the Oslo Peace Research Institute, Marek Thee, "Military Technology, Military Strategy and the Arms Race," would seem pertinent and urgent.

The author sees as his goal analyzing the influence of the progress of military technology on military strategy and their cumulative impact on the arms race. Raising this problem in the political, economic and general philosophical sense, he immediately defines the main practical task of the study: finding a way of bringing military R&D under political and social control, which is today, he believes, a key point in the efforts being made with respect to arms control and disarmament (p 4).

Military technology develops unevenly, frequently spasmodically. The transition from conventional to nuclear weapons was accomplished under the influence of the S&T revolution. American imperialism, nurtured by illusions of the achievement of military superiority, is straining for near-Earth space, endeavoring to impart to the arms race a new, space, dimension. The "Strategic Defense Initiative" did not emerge as a political doctrine in a void: work had been under way for many years in the United States on the creation of various ABM systems, antisatellite weapons, combat lasers and so forth.

The book outlines an approximate timeframe of the preparatory "technology" period. The "development--technology--creation of prototype--repeat testing and refinement--start of production" cycle usually takes 10-15 years (p 16). This timeframe may change depending on the degree of complexity of the arms systems being created and the method of obtaining the source technology. There are several such: the development of fundamentally new technology based on fundamental theoretical research; a new technical effect as a result of the
combination of a number of techniques known earlier or their use for other purposes; a radical modernization and sophistication of known technologies.

The "strategic defense initiative" (SDI) put forward by R. Reagan is geared by way of a combination of all these methods to a sharp leap forward in eight fields of technology, each of which "is the equivalent of or superior to the Manhattan Project (the creation of the atomic bomb)" (p 85). The scale of the SDI exceeds all postwar research programs of the creation of nuclear arms and their delivery systems together.

A "technology lobby," which has become an avowed defender of the plans for the militarization of space, has gradually crystallized out in the course of the domestic political struggle in the United States. It consists, as M. Thee observes, primarily of employees of military research labs, for whom the development of new types of weapons is an official duty. It also incorporates scientists not formally connected with military business, but involved in strategic problems within the framework of a variety of independent research organizations of the Rand Corporation type. And, finally, experts of the Defense Department and government organizations specializing in an assessment of the degree of feasibility and usefulness of the creation of new weapons systems and with an impressive say at the time decisions are made concerning the purchase thereof may be attributed to it. The SDI "technology lobby" has also incorporated certain important scientists like, for example, E. Teller, "father" of the hydrogen bomb, who had at least four confidential meetings with R. Reagan on the eve of his "star wars" speech.

An independent commission led by J. Fletcher, present director of NASA, was formed to substantiate the S&T possibilities and strategic necessity of the development of space-based arms systems. The report which it prepared, which has never been published in full, drew the conclusion based on an analysis of the development of military equipment and technology as to the readiness of American science and industry to begin the development of space-based ABM systems.

According to estimates, as of the end of the 1950's the United States has already spent more than $50 billion on military-space projects. Various departments have already spent approximately $2 billion on the creation of combat lasers alone (p 85). Currently military research is swallowing up approximately one-third of the resources allocated in the United States by private companies and the government for R&D. The proportion of expenditure on military developments in the federal budget is even higher—60 percent. The proportion of the major states in aggregate world spending under this head is of the order of 90 percent; one-fourth of all scientists and engineers are working on war (pp 105, 107).

The great dimensions of military R&D and its growing influence on the formation of political and military doctrines compel the author to pose the question: what place does militarized science occupy in the system of the military-industrial complex? In the scholar's opinion, two new structural components are now revealing themselves clearly in the composition of the military-industrial complex: a government political bureaucracy with a vital interest in the use of weapons as an instrument of policy and diplomacy and a
"scientific-technical community" engaged in military R&D. For this reason the book proposes a broader interpretation of the military-industrial complex as a "military--industrial--bureaucratic-technological complex" (p 116).

There is no doubt that under the conditions of the acceleration of S&T progress in all spheres of the economy such an expanded understanding of the military-industrial complex has a right to existence. Moreover, we believe, M. Thee has lost sight of a very important component of the military-industrial complex--the militarized propaganda machinery. The reasons for the growing impact of the military-industrial complex on all aspects of the political and economic life of capitalist society cannot precisely be determined without considering this structural component and without investigating the forms of ideological cover of the activity of the latter.

At the same time economic science should hardly endeavor when analyzing the military-industrial complex to simply articulate all its new structural components, of which there could be a great multitude. Its task, I believe, is primarily to reveal the most important cause and effect relationships between those of them which determine to the greatest extent the functioning of the military-industrial complex as a system.

The work in question contains interesting propositions in this connection. The author believes that the military-industrial complex, which is increasingly becoming a "self-developing," "self-stimulating," "self-reproducing" system, is "an alliance of rivals" in which individual elements fight for resources, influence and a strengthening of positions (p 124). In his opinion, the formation of military-industrial complexes in major countries is connected with the accelerated development of industry, the revolution in science and technology, the concentration of economic and political power, the increased exploitation of natural resources, the growing control of the state over its citizens and the growth of organized violence in domestic and international affairs (p 117).

Unfortunately, the scholar underestimates the first cause of the appearance of military-industrial complexes--the merger of the power of the monopolies and the power of the state and the formation of state-monopoly capitalism. He sees as a method of limiting the arms race a tightening of social control of military R&D and a reduction in the rate of development (p 128). The fact of the acceleration of work in the United States on the "star wars" program, which is being advertised in the West as a purely "research" program, affords grounds for such a conclusion to a certain extent.

Indeed, Washington's abandonment of realization of the SDI would not only reduce the rate of growth of military R&D as a whole but would be an important step along the path of an easing of international tension. However, general prospects of a limitation of the arms race cannot be connected only with reduction in military R&D. The creation of the all-embracing system of international security proposed by the 27th CPSU Congress could be a radical method of the achievement of progress here.

American imperialism's policy of an outlet into space with the latest weapons within the "strategic defense initiative" framework runs counter to the hopes
and cherished aspirations of the majority of people in the world, who are increasingly emphatically opposed to the plans for the development of new, more sophisticated types of technology of nuclear insanity.

FOOTNOTE


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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987

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CSO: 1816/8
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA CRITICIZES TURKISH SDI INVOLVEMENT

LD050932 Moscow TASS in English 0912 GMT 5 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 5 TASS -- Demonstrating importunate "concern" for Turkey's security in the face of an alleged Soviet threat, Washington is out to secure that country's involvement in its plans to militarize outer space at all costs, the Soviet army newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA said today.

It quoted Gerold Yonas, a deputy director of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) organization, as telling the Turkish newspaper CUMHURIYET that "some ground-based facilities deployed in Turkey under the 'Star Wars' program could provide a reliable shield in the path of Soviet missiles".

Edward Teller, one of the architects of the SDI project, was even more outspoken about U.S. plans to use Turkish territory in its militarist preparations in March 1986 when he said that if the United States was able to set up four laser stations in Turkey, where there were many clear days and the atmosphere was transparent, that country would be the most important for fighting "Star Wars".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA said Turkey itself had supported President Reagan's position on the "Star Wars" program from the very beginning.

Turkish Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu way back in November 1985 said bluntly that SDI represented "global technological progress", while countries failing to take part in it would shoulder grave responsibility. He added that "Turkey should necessarily get its share and make its contribution".

"U.S. attempts, which, it is clear, Turkish authorities do not object to, to use the territory of Turkey in the interest of realizing the SDI program and also possibly for deploying the ABM system's components there in the future are extremely dangerous and a source of concern both for the Soviet public and for the Turkish public.

"It is perfectly obvious that by joining SDI, Turkey would assume responsibility for the dangerous consequences of American plans to put weapons in outer space," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA said.

"Any support by Turkey of the SDI program, the more so involvement in it in any form, can only be seen in the Soviet Union as direct assistance to the plans jeopardizing peace and international security," it added.
USSR: PENTAGON PLANS 'MAJOR' SPACE EXPERIMENTS

LD051045 Moscow TASS in English 1012 GMT 5 Aug 87

[Text] Washington August 5 TASS -- TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev reports:

The Pentagon plans at least 13 major space experiments over the next five years effectively to lay the groundwork for the first phase of a limited anti-ballistic missile defense.

Some of the details are contained in documents prepared by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) for a SDI review by senior Defense Department officials.

It is planned, in particular, to launch four to seven Minuteman ballistic missiles from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and attempt to knock them out by interceptor rockets based at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific.

THE WASHINGTON POST said the SDIO documents had been described by the organization's spokesman as "providing the first official glimpse of technologies needed for the initial phase of a missile defense."

The total cost of the experiments planned under the "Star Wars" program until 1993, according to the paper is estimated at billions of dollars.

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CSO: 5200/1619
POLITICAL PARTIES' REACTION TO SDI PACT WITH U.S. NOTED

OW220415 Tokyo KYODO in English 0409 GMT 22 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo, July 22 KYODO — Japanese reaction Wednesday to a Japan-U.S. agreement on Japanese participation in the research phase of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ranged from outright and guarded approval to condemnation.

At a press conference, Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda highly rated the agreement signed in Washington Tuesday saying Japan's position regarding the right to use technologies developed under the program was kept intact.

He said the government will not introduce any new legislation for protection of technology secrets since that can be done under respective domestic laws and bilateral agreements such as the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.

The major opposition Japan Socialist Party described the accord as a dangerous action and said it will not only expand the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race into outer space but will also endanger their arms control negotiations.

"In view of a national consensus for the abolition of nuclear weapons, we must lodge a strong protest with the Yasuhiro Nakasone cabinet against its rash action," it said.

The No. 2 opposition Komeito said the SDI is new deployment of U.S. nuclear strategies and said the signing of the agreement without clarifying problems related to the program is extremely regrettable.

It said the Japan-U.S. accord will leave many problems to the future as no concrete conditions for Japanese participation were made public.

The Democratic Socialist Party, Japan's third largest opposition group said the agreement specifies the basic framework for Japanese firms to take part in the SDI research program and its contents are "appropriate."

It called on the government to try to deepen public understanding of the program and to implement it in a way enabling participants to properly use technologies developed under the program.

The Japan Communist Party said the agreement is a clear indication showing Japan's growing incorporation into U.S. nuclear strategies and thus violates the constitution and the three nonnuclear principles of not possessing, manufacturing or introducing nuclear arms.
Japanese industry sources said the agreement paves the way for domestic firms to take part in the program but said industry as a whole is taking a cautious attitude.

The sources said industry cannot be sure as to what extent the United States will allow rights to use technologies developed since the memorandum of understanding detailing particulars was not made public.

The electronics industry is especially concerned about a possible limitations on use, the sources said.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry plans to hastily set up a system to prevent leaks of classified U.S. information from Japanese firms participating in the program, MITI sources said.

They said distrust of Japanese enterprises is fast spreading in the United States following Toshiba Machine Co.'s milling machine exports to the Soviet Union in violation of rules of the Cocom, a multinational watchdog group monitoring exports to communist nations.

/9604
CS0: 5260/123
JAPAN NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN NUCLEAR-RELATED SDI RESEARCH

OW231027 Tokyo KYODO in English 1012 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo, July 23 KYODO -- A senior Foreign Ministry official Thursday ruled out the possibility of Japan participating in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research using nuclear detonations. Hiroaki Fujii, chief of the ministry's North American Affairs Bureau, cited Japan's nonpossession of knowledge about nuclear explosions and also said the SDI program involves very little laser research utilizing nuclear explosions. He made this and other remarks in reply to a Socialist questioner in the House of Councillors Budget Committee.

Fujii noted that the recently concluded agreement between Japanese and U.S. Governments on SDI states that Japan will take part in the research phase of the space-based antimissile defense system but will not join in the SDI deployment phase.

He also said the bilateral arrangement on implementation of the agreement has not been announced, because the United States does not wish to disclose any arrangements concerning national security, and four other countries with similar arrangements with the U.S. have not announced them. Fujii said only Japan made public the government-to-government agreement. However, Fujii said he would explain as much as possible about the bilateral arrangement to Japanese enterprises participating in the SDI program regarding the areas of their interest.

Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari said not all results of joint research would be classified as secrets.

In this connection, Koji Kodama, chief of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's Machinery and Information Industries Bureau, said that participating businesses would be informed of classified data in advance, and that the Japanese Government would negotiate with the U.S. Government, in case it objected to the classification.

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CSO: 5260/124
NAKASONE DISCUSSES SDI AGREEMENT WITH U.S.

OW221247 Tokyo KYODO in English 1243 GMT 22 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo, July 22 KYODO -- Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said Wednesday Japan's agreement to participate in the research phase of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) project will help promote world peace because the arms to be used in the project are defensive and nonnuclear in nature. Commenting on the agreement signed Tuesday in Washington between the two countries, Nakasone said that the pact will help Japanese firms take part in the project and help provide them with the (patent) right of spin-offs resulting from the international research. "The agreement is the one in which the government should take the initiative," Nakasone added.

Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari also expressed his satisfaction with the agreement, saying the U.S. "almost accepted the standpoint of Japanese business and the government."

Nakasone and Kuranari made the remarks in the upper house Budget Committee in response to questions from Diet member Wakako Hironaka of Komeito.

The agreement sets basic principles for Japanese companies and government research institutions regarding bidding conditions, protection of classified information, and the right to use and transfer technologies to facilitate their joining the U.S.-proposed antimissile project. The agreement says Japanese companies wishing to join the project will be in "equitable" and "genuine" competition with U.S. participants.

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CSO: 5260/122
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: KARPOV HOLDS FOREIGN MINISTRY BRIEFING 11 AUGUST

FRG Pershings 'Main Obstacle'

LD111348 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1213 GMT 11 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow, 11 Aug (TASS) -- At the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva the most promising direction at present is the problem of medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles, said Viktor Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Problems of Arms Control and Disarmament Administration, at a briefing here today. The Soviet proposals on the "global double-zero" on these two classes of Soviet and U.S. arms open up real opportunities for achieving accords in the nearest future. At the same time, the issue that, in essence, has become the main obstacle on the way to an agreement remains. This is the of the issue West German Pershing-I A missiles and the U.S. warheads for them.

Speaking at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament the other day, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze posed the question bluntly to the United States and the FRG: Which of them is responsible for maintaining this obstacle, and what do they intend to do to make an agreement possible?

It is already difficult to hide behind diffuse formulas about the "systems of third countries". It is clear that the warheads for the Pershing IA missiles belong to the United States; at least, neither the U.S. nor the West German spokesman deny that. It is these warheads the Soviet Union is talking about at the negotiations with the United States on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. We are not raising the question of eliminating the West German Pershing-I A missiles, we are raising the question of eliminating U.S. warheads for missiles of the operation and tactical missile class. The United States gave its agreement to the "global double-zero," and to secure such a solution, missiles in the 500-5,500 km range and the warheads for missiles of these classes should be eliminated. This concerns all Soviet and U.S. means, regardless of whether they are intended for their own missiles or for missiles belonging to another country. We cannot accept a solution that would leave open the possibility of evading the accords. Yet the United States would like to leave such a possibility open by leaving at its disposal the warheads for the Pershing-I A missiles.

Despite certain widespread views in the West these warheads are not some "trifle". The power of the 72 warheads for the Pershing 1-A's equals that of 216 atomic bombs like the one dropped on Hiroshima. We do not have the right to ignore this potential from the view of the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. We are talking to all intends and purposes about scrapping all Soviet medium-range and operational and tactical missiles while the United States maintains this potential, which is a direct threat to the security of the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
What is more, the United States would like to retain for itself the right to produce Pershing-1B missiles, to pass them on to the FRG to replace the Pershing-1A missiles. And this, in turn, means the possibility of returning the Pershing-2 to Europe, since it takes less than 48 hours to turn a Pershing-1B missile into a Pershing-2.

Thus, the accord to scrap medium-range missiles would become a fiction. This is why the Soviet Union considers it essential for the United States and the FRG to finally and clearly determine their attitude to this problem.

We are conducting negotiations with the United States and the solution must encompass Soviet and U.S. weapons, leaving no loopholes for evasion of the accords. But the FRG must take a position. The Bonn representatives' assurances to the effect that the FRG is not a nuclear power and has no desire to become such should be backed by real deeds. For the time being, however, there is a lot of talk, not about how to secure elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe, but about how to strengthen NATO's nuclear potential, including on FRG territory.

Plans are being discussed to arm Tornado aircraft with nuclear missiles; there is discussion of deploying [razmeshcheniye] French Pluton missiles in the FRG, of strengthening the British nuclear presence in the FRG, and so forth. One is put on one's guard, too, by statements from a number of FRG politicians close to the government, who, citing the fact that British and French nuclear weapons are not the subject of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations, would like the FRG to have the same status of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on space and nuclear weapons as do the nuclear powers, Britain and France.

If one finally lays out the essence of the problem, it consists of the following: Bonn must repudiate its nuclear power pretensions and must not raise obstacles to the Soviet-U.S. accord on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical weapons.

For its part, the United States must take a responsible political decision; it must stop attempting to bargain military superiority for itself by means of the contrivances connected with the Pershing missiles and their warheads, and by means of other attempts to circumvent the planned agreements through its NATO allies. It is such a decision that is required for the agreement on "global double-zero" on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles to become a reality.

FRG as Nuclear Power

LD111909 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 11 Aug 87

[Text] As we have already reported, a briefing on current questions of international policy took place for Soviet and foreign journalists today at the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Our special correspondent, Aleksandr Kuzin, reports:

[Kuzin] Comrade Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Problems of Arms Control and Disarmament Administration, who spoke at the meeting, dwelled on the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. He stated in particular that the FRG Pershing-1A missiles and the U.S. warheads for them had become the main obstacle on the path to achieving a Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. Questions were asked afterward.
Two of them drew my attention. The first was on the possibility of the FRG’s gradual transformation into a nuclear power in connection with the unwillingness of the United States and the FRG to abolish the 72 U.S. warheads. In this regard, Comrade Karpov noted:

[Begin Karpov recording] We are now realistically facing the fact that, as a result of maneuvering within the NATO framework by both the United States and the FRG, and by the other NATO countries, a situation is being created that could bring one to the conclusion that perhaps there are some secret considerations about turning the FRG into a nuclear or near-nuclear power. [end recording]

[Kuzin] The second question was this: Th U.S. side asserts the talks in Geneva are on missiles and says that warheads need not be considered. Is this so?

[Begin Karpov recording] They weren’t about missiles all the time, but also about warheads. Even the U.S. proposals submitted in Geneva said reductions would be carried out by calculating on the basis of warheads. That is, in the final analysis, in reducing medium-range missiles, it is the warheads that are counted. The United States has taken this approach from the very beginning, and it is for this reason that warheads have always been considered at the same time as medium-range missiles. The destruction of the warheads for medium-range missiles, just as for operational and tactical missiles of course, is the guarantee that these armaments will not be restored in contravention of the ban on which an accord has been reached. [end recording]

Denies SALT II Violation

LD111336 Moscow TASS in English 1317 GMT 11 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 11 TASS—Neither the statement by Senator Helms and the White House statement nor the Western press reports that the USSR has exceeded the key limits of the 1979 SALT-2 Treaty by deploying new SS-24 ground-based missiles as well as submarine-launched missiles correspond to reality, Viktor Karpov, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament directorate at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said today.

He made the remark in a response to a question at a briefing for Soviet and foreign correspondents.

Modernizing its strategic forces in full compliance with the provisions of the SALT-2 treaty, the Soviet Union is replacing obsolete stationary silo launchers with mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. These replacements are allowed within the established limits.

Under the SALT-2 Treaty, the Soviet Union may have 820 MIRV'ed ICBM's. The number of MIRV'ed ICBM's the USSR has does not exceed this limit. The Soviet Union may have a total of 1,200 ICBM's and SLBM's with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. It has fewer than this. The combined number of the Soviet Union's ICBM's SLBM's and heavy bombers, which belong to a category that is limited to 1,320 systems under the SALT-2 Treaty, does not go beyond the limit either.
As far as the Soviet Union's replacement of stationary ICBM's with mobile ICBM's is concerned, it is meant to increase the survivability of Soviet retaliatory-strike forces. Mobility adds to survivability and hence it adds to stability and strengthens the retaliatory-strike forces.

American representatives at talks in their time agreed to this point of view as well. The Scowcroft Commission in the United States, too, recently expressed itself in favor of the U.S. having mobile rather than stationary ICBM's for enhancing strategic stability. So the Soviet Union's actions in question are in strict compliance with the SALT-2 Treaty.

The United States, by contrast, renounced compliance with the SALT-2 limits in a statement by President Reagan way back on May 27 last year and in November last year it exceeded those limits.

IZVESTIYA Reports Briefing

PM121547 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 87 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Kuvshinnikov report: "A 'Mere Trifle' Equivalent to 216 Hiroshimas. From Our Correspondent at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Text] "The main obstacle to reaching a Soviet-U.S. agreement on 'global double-zero' in medium-range and operational and tactical missiles is presented by the question of the 72 U.S. nuclear warheads for West German Pershing-IA missiles," V. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Problems of Arms Control and Disarmament Administration, told journalists.

Despite widespread views in the West, these warheads can in no way be considered a mere trifle since they equal 216 of the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima. We do not have the right to overlook this potential from the viewpoint of the security of both the Soviet Union and our allies.

Furthermore, V. Karpov emphasized, the United States would like to reserve the right to produce Pershing 1-B missiles and supply them to replace the aging Pershing-1A's. This means a possible return of Pershing-2's to Europe. The conversion of one missile into another takes no more than 48 hours. As a result of this, any accord on eliminating medium-range missiles would become a work of fiction.

Replying to questions from correspondents of THE NEW YORK TIMES and THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, he stressed: Regarding the missiles themselves, West Germany can retain them until their "obsolescence." But if we are talking about a "zero option" on operational and tactical missiles, the U.S. warheads for them must be destroyed. Otherwise this will no longer be a "zero option." If the United States is turning down the "zero option" on operational and tactical missiles, then let the U.S. Government say so directly.

One also gets the impression that the United States and the FRG are literally clinging like grim death to the ill-starred 72 warheads. One cannot help thinking: Does their dogged stubbornness not reflect the existence of a secret long-term plan to gradually transform the FRG into a nuclear power, a plan that is suddenly jeopardized because of the "unplanned" progress at the Soviet-U.S. talks?
It is possible that such plans exist, V. Karpov replied to your correspondent's question. In any case, we are realistically facing a case where, as a result of U.S. and FRG maneuvering, a situation is developing within the NATO framework that could encourage the thought that there are some sort of secret ideas of turning West Germany into a nuclear or near-nuclear power.

It is quite obvious that Bonn needs to abandon its nuclear-power pretensions. For its part, it is time the United States ended its attempts to obtain military advantage for itself through its trickery over the Pershings and their warheads.

A KUNA correspondent asked: If the United States insists on retaining 72 warheads, could the Soviet Union make a new compromise so as to avoid wrecking the agreement?

"We have already proposed everything we could," V. Karpov replied laconically. "It is not up to the United States."

The question of the 72 warheads is undoubtedly an awkward and disadvantageous one for NATO diplomacy. The U.S. and West German press are trying to switch attention to a more advantageous topic: By deploying SS-24 ICBM's and SLBM's the Soviet Union, they claim, has exceeded the limitations established by the SALT II Treaty.

The Soviet Union, V. Karpov stressed in response to questions from U.S. and Soviet journalists, is modernizing its strategic offensive weapons in complete accordance with the provisions of the 1979 SALT II Treaty. We are replacing obsolete, stationary, silo-based launchers with mobile ICBM's. The SS-24 is the new missile type permitted under the SALT II Treaty. Its deployment is being carried out within the limits permitted by the treaty. The Soviet Union is allowed 820 ICBM launchers equipped with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRV'S). The number of existing missiles in this category does not exceed this level. The Soviet Union is allowed a total of 1,200 ICBM and SLBM launchers equipped with MIRV's. We currently have less than that level. The replacement of stationary ICBM's with mobile ICBM's is aimed at improving the survivability of Soviet counterstrike forces -- their destruction by a first strike is made more difficult or altogether impossible -- and therefore promotes a strengthening of stability.

It is apposite to recall that back in President Reagan's 27 May 1986 statement the United States refused to observe the SALT II Treaty restrictions and in November of that year exceeded the limits established for them.

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CSO: 5200/1617
MOSCOW COMMENTATOR ON 'OPPORTUNITIES,' 'OBSTACLES' IN TALKS

LD092236 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 9 Aug 87

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Nikolay Shishlin]

[Text] Hello, comrades. Evidently we all have to get used to the fact that political life now no longer knows either pause or respite. Its pulse used to die down over the summer: vacation time would come around, and politics would also take a break. But summer this year isn't like that. What we have been witnessing during the last weeks and days is both dramatic and significant.

Evidently, the top issue is the fate of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva, and it seems to me that everyone already knows the agenda of these negotiations by heart. First, there's the issue of eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles, now on a global level. Then there is the issue of deep reductions in strategic offensive arms, and finally, there's the problem of tightening the ABM Treaty, or, to put it another way, the problem of not allowing space to be militarized. How do things stand? Regarding medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles, as a result of the bold Soviet initiatives, broad initiatives, there are opportunities, quite realistic opportunities, for reaching an accord there and for achieving a breakthrough that would lead not to a limitation of definite classes of arms but to the elimination of two classes of modern nuclear arms. It is true there are still obstacles and hindrances on the path to an accord, but I'll talk about them a little later.

Regarding strategic offensive arms, there are two drafts on the negotiations table: the Soviet and the U.S. ones. The Soviet draft envisages a 50-percent reduction in this class of arms over 5 years. The U.S. draft also envisages a 50-percent reduction in this class of arms but over the course of 7 years. So why has this difference arisen, although 5 years was talked about in Reykjavik? Generally speaking, one can ask the question: Is 5 or 7 years really such a great difference? To answer this question one has to touch on the third point of the agenda: the Soviet Union proposes the sides voluntarily pledge not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years. The United States proposes that this pledge be limited to a period of 7 years, once again. Why? For the simple reason that in 7 years the United States is counting on accelerating their "Star Wars" plans and on breaking away here, along this channel, to the unattainable, i.e., securing military superiority for themselves. And here one must say quite definitely that if the ABM Treaty is not tightened, then there won't be anything. Neither will there be any reduction in strategic offensive arms, since this is not some sort of tactical linkage but a linkage of a fundamental nature, a linkage of a strategic order.
Regarding the obstacles to elaborating an accord on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles, as you know, the whole thing is tied up at the moment around the 72 Pershing-1A missiles in the West German Bundeswehr's armory and the 72 U.S. nuclear warheads for these missiles. The United States says that, on the whole, it does not discuss the armaments of third countries. But we did not intend to discuss the armaments of third countries at these negotiations. What is being discussed is the 72 U.S. nuclear warheads, i.e., what is being discussed is zero for the Soviet Union and zero for the United States. Then the United States says that 72 warheads are small-fry compared to the 7,000 warheads that should be eliminated.

But if it is small-fry, then why don't they give it up? Presently, there are some variations on resolutions to this problem knocking about in the world press, but these variations aren't serious, and official Washington and official Bonn are silent. Moreover, they're staking out their position.

Regarding the Soviet approach, it has been stated quite definitely in Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze's recent statement at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The Soviet Union firmly maintains its stance that an accord on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles is a very essential prologue to elaborating an accord on deep reductions in strategic offensive arms and tightening up the ABM Treaty, i.e., not allowing the militarization of space. That is indeed the way things stand on this sore issue in all world politics.

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CSO: 5200/1617
Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 (signed to press 16 Mar 87) pp 19-33

[Article by V. Avakov and V. Baranovskiy: "In the Interests of the Preservation of Civilization"]

[Text] The "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Mankind" international forum was held 14-16 February in Moscow. M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, met its participants and addressed them. The forum had assembled at the initiative of the international group of prominent scholars who had organized the previous meeting in July 1986. They were supported by figures of literature and art, physicians, political scientists and representatives of business circles and various religious communities. Approximately 1,000 persons from more than 80 countries took part in the forum altogether.

People of various professions (many of them of world renown) holding different political and ideological views and religious beliefs gathered in Moscow for the purpose of expressing their concern at the threat of mankind's self-annihilation engendered by the continuation of the nuclear arms race on earth and the plans for the militarization of outer space. They were all united by a common concern for the future of our planet. At a meeting with the group of figures of world culture--participants in the "Issyk-Kul Forum"--in October 1986 M.S. Gorbachev recalled the profound thought expressed by V.I. Lenin back at the start of the century concerning the priority of general values over the tasks of this class or the other. "Today, in the nuclear age," the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee observed, "the significance of this thought is perceived particularly keenly. And I would very much like the proposition concerning the priority of the general value of peace over all others to which some people or other adhere to be understood and recognized in another part of the world also." The meeting in the Soviet capital, which gathered together the flower of modern science and culture, showed the vitality of Lenin's idea and was evidence of the capacity of mankind for mobilizing at its difficult moments reason, conscience and responsibility.

The forum was a kind of "intellectual assault landing" in the future to ensure that the expedition of the species Homo Sapiens into the unknown not result in a headlong race into the abyss. The idea of the meeting had been prompted by
life itself. Mankind had found itself at the crossroads—either survival or the outer darkness of nonexistence. It was seemingly frozen in astonishment in the face of its own monstrous creation, which could play a tragic part in its life. Of course, it is not obligatory to see the future in black and white, living two extremes—destruction or progress. There is one further alternative—living in fear, continuing to stockpile the warheads of pessimism and uncertainty. But this is a sorry prospect, which we have no right to bequeath to posterity.

Destiny has presented the generation of people living now with the happy opportunity of making its appearance and living at a time of the flowering of civilization and harvesting the fruit of the experience accumulated by mankind. How much spiritually richer we are than those who were born before Raphael, Pushkin, Lenin, Gandhi and other geniuses of the human race! But history has had much to teach also: in order for all this to reach us the blood of millions had to be spilled. The present generation must preserve and, having enriched it, pass on the inheritance it has been bequeathed to posterity. Otherwise a backward time count will begin. But the way back will be short, and there will be no one, possibly, to judge us. After a nuclear war, M.S. Gorbachev observed at the meeting with participants in the forum, "no problems will remain and there will be no one to sit down at whatever kind of negotiating table—a stump or stone. A second Noah's Ark will not emerge from the nuclear flood. Everyone, perhaps, understands this intellectually. The point is to recognize that we can no longer count on 'everything turning out all right of its own accord,' but there are still many people in the world who think precisely thus. It is essential, postponing it no longer, to bring international intercourse and the behavior of governments and states into line with the realities of the nuclear age."

I

The work of the forum was conducted per the professional principle in eight sections: "roundtables" of natural scientists, medical figures and physicians, representatives of the business world, culture and art, religious figures, political scientists, ecologists and sociologists were formed. A meeting of participants in the Generals for Peace and Disarmament movement was held in Moscow simultaneously.

Scholars of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO participated actively in the organization of the political scientists' "roundtable". Four sessions were conducted—chaired by Academician Ye.M. Primakov, E. Bahr, director of the Security Problems Institute (FRG), Academician G.A. Arbatov and R. (Legvold), director of the A. Harriman Institute at Columbia University (United States). The subject matter of the discussion—"Ways of Survival in Our Interdependent World"—attracted the attention of a large number of specialists from several dozen countries. Among the foreign participants were, for example, J. Galbraith, professor at Harvard University (United States), R. Aliboni, director of the Rome International Relations Institute, S. Lodgard, director of the Norwegian Pugwash Committee, the influential Japanese politician K. Saeki, K. Subramaniam, director of the Defense Research and Analysis Institute (India), Adm (ret'd) G. Larocque, leader of Washington's Center for Defense
Information, the Italian general L. Kalligaris and K. Kaiser, director of Bonn's International Relations Institute (FRG).

In the course of the 2 days of work a broad range of issues connected with the search for effective ways, means and methods of easing tension, lessening the military danger and halting the arms race was discussed (1). The participants in the "roundtable" were essentially unanimous in their recognition of the urgent need for a diminution in the currently extremely high world level of military confrontation, which is jeopardizing mankind's very existence. However, the most diverse and frequently mutually contradictory opinions were expressed on the question of what the strategy and tactics of the struggle to overcome the military danger should be.

Thus, for example, a target of criticism in some speeches was the entire available experience of negotiations and agreements on questions connected with a limitation of and halt to the arms race. Specifically, it was said that whereas at one time the question of general and complete disarmament had been put on the agenda, in the past 2 decades this task had found itself relegated to the background, while the main attention had been concentrated on individual, particular problems, and their solution, what is more, had been the result of protracted "bargaining" and, as a rule, had proved palliative. The participants in the negotiations had been concerned not so much as to halt military rivalry altogether as to "not lose" as the result of the compromise which had been reached and at the same time reserve for themselves a certain freedom of maneuver in the areas of military organizational development which appeared to them promising.

Therefore, the adherents of a negative approach to the available experience of negotiations emphasized, there has been no real advance in the direction of disarmament. Rather may we speak of the reverse. The 1963 treaty banned nuclear tests in three environments, and opened wide for them underground firing ranges, not having halted the process of the improvement of nuclear weapons in the least. The SALT I agreement merely recorded the ballistic missile and missile-firing submarine levels reached by the Soviet Union and the United States, but did not prevent them undertaking the modernization of their strategic nuclear arsenals. The ABM Treaty was concluded merely because the very creation of a broad-based antimissile defense was considered hopeless; when, however, new technical possibilities emerged and the idea of a defense against ballistic missiles ceased to be rejected as totally unrealistic, the ABM Treaty itself was called in question. The list of "inadequately working" treaties is supplemented by a list of agreements which for this reason or the other have not come into force (the 1974 Threshold Treaty on Underground Nuclear Tests, the 1976 Treaty on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, the 1979 SALT II Treaty). It was concluded from all this that the available experience in the disarmament negotiations sphere has proven highly disappointing: instead of disarmament, the "streamlining" of the arms race, which has created merely the illusion of some achievements, but which in practice has only stimulated military preparations in new and for this reason even more dangerous areas.

This viewpoint gave rise to objections on the part of other participants in the "roundtable". First, however limited the existing results might seem, they
nonetheless exist, and in the event of their absence, the arms race would in all probability be implemented on a far broader scale. For example, the ABM Treaty permits each side no more than 200 antimissile launchers, and the protocol concluded 2 years later reduced the number of permitted launchers to 100. Yet, according to some estimates, continuation of work on the creation of ABM defense of a country's territory could by 1980 even have increased their number to 10,000. Second, is it at all feasible to counterpose the purpose of general and complete disarmament on the one hand and specific measures, albeit limited in scale, aimed at the achievement of this goal on the other? It should rather be a question of something else--integrating both these aspects and striving to ensure that the overall direction of movement not be lost sight of at the time of preparation of this agreement or the other.

In this context emphasis was put on the exceptional significance of the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik, which made it possible to rise above, as it were, the routine practice of lengthy negotiations and outline a prospect of really radical solutions opening the way to the elimination of the most dangerous and destructive strategic arms and, subsequently, all nuclear arms altogether. And it was a question in the Icelandic capital, what is more, as is well known, not of some abstract vision of a nuclear-free world but of a decisive breakthrough in this direction being accomplished within a clearly designated 10-year period, when all strategic offensive arms would be eliminated. The thought that there was no going back from the Reykjavik frontiers was heard distinctly in the speeches of many participants in the "roundtable".

A different viewpoint was expressed also. The essence thereof was that in the foreseeable future it was unrealistic to look for the complete elimination of strategic offensive arms (or just ballistic missiles even if the American interpretation is adhered to) and that for this reason the "second half" of the Reykjavik formula (based on a 10-year timeframe) is allegedly confusing, creates unwanted illusions and prevents concentration precisely on the tasks whose accomplishment is provided for in the first 5 years. In the channel of this approach is the argument about whether it is now worth negotiating about a nuclear-free world at all inasmuch as nuclear weapons are an important component of the existing balance of forces between the USSR and the United States and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and that removal of this component would lead to a growth of instability and thereby to a growth of the threat of war. The logic in this reasoning amounted to the following: under the conditions which exist today nuclear deterrence performs a key role in safeguarding security; the elimination of nuclear weapons would of course remove the threat of nuclear war, but the inevitable price which would have to be paid for this would be a considerable increase in the danger of nonnuclear war.

Many participants in the political scientists' discussion objected to the proposition concerning the stabilizing role of nuclear deterrence. Of course, an understanding of the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons has a sobering effect even on confrontationally-minded politicians. But after all, nuclear weapons provide no absolute guarantees in this connection. And if World War III has not erupted in the first 40 years of the
nuclear era, this has perhaps been not thanks to but in spite of the existence of nuclear weapons.

And the 40-year period of peace itself (far from general if we recall the multitude of local conflicts, whose casualties run into the tens and hundreds of thousands) proves nothing. As one speaker observed, 40 years after the Franco-Prussian war no one knew that there were just 3-4 years before World War I.

The problem is not only the absence of a satisfactory answer to the question of what will happen if deterrence does not "work" and the stockpiled 50,000 nuclear warheads (or even a small portion of them) crash down on mankind and wipe it out. There is added danger in the fact that the very process of the buildup and sophistication of nuclear arsenals justified by the tasks of strengthening deterrence destabilizes relations between states, increases mutual distrust and suspicion and prompts "retaliatory measures" in terms of a buildup of military potential, which, in turn, brings about the corresponding reaction. And so on ad infinitum.

Mention was made of one further aspect connected with the fact that only a small circle of states possesses nuclear status at the present time. If some of them consider nuclear weapons essential for safeguarding their security, why may those who do not have such weapons not reach the same conclusion? In other words, the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament threatens to erode the practice of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which could lead to the emergence of new and highly complex problems for the international community.

The closest attention was paid to the discussion of questions of the practical implementation of the accords in question in Reykjavik. Many people emphasized that it was the United States' endeavor to preserve inviolate the SDI program which made impossible a Soviet-American agreement which could have been of historic significance for the fate of peace. In this sense the SDI has now become the main obstacle to the cause of disarmament.

At the same time the following opinion was expressed: this program, in the estimation of serious specialists, has virtually no practicable prospects and is being used increasingly by the opponents of arms limitation for purely political purposes— as a means of blocking negotiations with the Soviet Union. There is no reason to dramatize this issue: if the USSR, as its leadership has declared repeatedly, does not "fear" the SDI and could, if necessary, find an appropriate answer to it, would it not be easier simply to circumvent this obstacle and negotiate measures to reduce arms where this is possible today? Specifically, abandon linkage of the question of the nonmilitarization of space with the two other most important subjects which are being discussed at the Geneva negotiations and which were studied at the time of the Reykjavik meeting— strategic offensive arms and medium-range missiles? The USSR was reproached for allegedly having retreated from its recent position (when it expressed its consent to tackle the problem of medium-range missiles separately from the other issues), once again tying everything into the single package put forward in Reykjavik. The Soviet Union, according to this line of reasoning, is depriving itself of the possibility of today even reaching
important accords with the United States, which, in turn, could lend impetus to the search for compromise in other fields also.

The following idea was expressed in response: arguments about whether the Reykjavik package needs to be "untied" or not only distract attention from an examination of the heart of the problem in respect of its three components. After all, the achievement of accords in principle is still far from a treaty; the agreeing of details and the elaboration of specific provisions could take much time and effort. For this reason it is now important to concentrate attention on progress in each of the three areas.

The following was also heard in the course of the discussion: the proposals presented by the Soviet Union represent a balance sheet of compromises which contain the USSR's highly significant approach toward the United States on some questions and the expectation of reciprocal movement. But it is the latter which has not been observed either in Reykjavik or since—instead, it is proposed that the Soviet Union once again consent to new concessions. But it is not actually a question of carefully totting up who has conceded what and to what extent to whom but of averting a destabilization of the entire strategic situation and preventing an arms race in space. As some participants in the discussion recognized, it would be unjustified demanding of the Soviet Union deep cuts—of 50 percent and more—under conditions where it had no confidence that the United States would not attempt to "cover itself" against the remaining missiles and thereby appreciably diminish their role as a means of deterrence. As far as the question of medium-range missiles is concerned, since the forum even the Soviet Union adopted the exceptionally important and responsible decision to consent to its separate examination for the purpose of concluding the appropriate agreement as quickly as possible.

There was a serious discussion of the specific problems which require solution following Reykjavik. It was observed, for example, that there are many contentious issues of both a technical and legal nature surrounding the problems of the nonmilitarization of space; in connection with the Soviet proposals for the confinement of the work being performed on the SDI program to a laboratory framework and the prohibition of any tests of components of ABM defenses in space difficulties arise concerning definition of the very "laboratory" and "ABM component" concepts, which are absent in the ABM Treaty; and even some of the concepts contained therein may also be interpreted variously ("tests for ABM purposes," for example, and "creation" in the Russian text and "development" in the English).

At the same time the unanimous opinion was expressed that preservation of the ABM Treaty is a paramount task; a erosion of the conditions which it has created and attempts to undermine the significance of this most important document or circumvent individual propositions thereof would have the most unpleasant consequences both for Soviet-American relations and for a halt to the arms race. It was emphasized that the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, toward whose unilateral adoption the U.S. Administration is disposed, is absolutely illegitimate; the purpose of this operation is perfectly obvious—opening the door to the creation, testing and deployment in space of "exotic" ABM systems and components based on new physical principles.
Discussing the prospects of an agreement on deep cuts in strategic offensive arms, some participants in the "roundtable" expressed the idea concerning the need not only to cut them in half but also to provide for a preferential reduction in the most destabilizing systems, that is, those capable of performing the assignment of delivering a first nuclear strike at protected targets on enemy territory. Other scientists, while agreeing with the fact that destabilizing systems do indeed merit special attention, objected to the arbitrary attribution to this category only of the Soviet SS-18 heavy missiles. It was observed, inter alia, that the American Trident 2 SLBM’s would have even greater potential opportunities for delivering a first strike—considering their accuracy, reduced flight time and the increased element of surprise in the event of their launch on flat trajectories and with unpredictable directions. The following thought was expressed in this connection also: both sides could strengthen strategic stability by adopting a policy of a renunciation in the future of ballistic missiles with multiple warheads and their replacement with single-warhead missiles of mobile basing.

Essentially the arguments advanced in support of such an approach reproduce the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission, on the basis of which the decision on the Midgetman missile was adopted in the United States. And a number of participants in the "roundtable" had every reason to note that the calls for a "structural rebuilding" of the strategic forces (for the purpose of ensuring a more stable balance) are addressed, as a rule, only to the USSR. Also attesting to this is the United States' endeavor to amend the Reykjavik accords after the fact and present matters such that only ballistic missiles and not heavy bombers were to have been destroyed by the time of the expiration of the 10-year term provided for therein. As is known, the United States has far more of the latter than the Soviet Union, and the latter would have in order to maintain equality to embark on a sharp increase in strategic aviation. This "logic" is essentially oriented toward conversion of the arms limitation process into its opposite.

A serious problem, the possibilities of whose solution remain unclear, concerns sea-based cruise missiles. They could be fitted both with nuclear and conventional warheads, and there are as yet no in any way reliable methods of distinguishing both modifications from one another with the aid of national technical means of supervision. As a participant observed in this connection, this example demonstrates very graphically the current flawed practice: when some weapons system proves difficult to monitor, it is taken out of the bounds of an agreement and is not subject to any limitations. Yet it has long been time to take as the rule an entirely different principle here: if a weapons system and the tasks of supervision are in conflict, the worse for the system: compliance with the quantitative limits determined for it needs to be verified by all, the most far-reaching, methods of supervision, including—in the given example of sea-based cruise missiles—the mandatory inspection of ships and submarines when leaving port, spot checks on the high seas and so forth.

As a whole number of participants in the discussion observed, there are practically no in any way fundamental difficulties concerning a medium-range missile agreement, and it is now merely a question of the signing of the corresponding Soviet-American document. However, some speeches pointed highly insistently to the close interconnection of this question and the problem of
"equalization" of the military balance in Europe at lower levels—in respect of missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km and also conventional arms and armed forces. The following idea was expressed even: uniting the negotiations on medium-range missiles with the Vienna talks on a reduction in armed forces and arms in Central Europe. The reasoning behind this proposal is interesting: on the one hand the problem of medium-range missiles has to be tackled in as broad a regional-European context as possible; on the other, this might help resuscitate the Vienna talks and impart to them some new impetus, without which they are doomed to endless deadlock.

The proposal, despite these arguments, gave rise to serious objections. After all, it is a question of a new "linkage" of the medium-range missile problem—on this occasion not with a higher but a lower level of military balance. And, furthermore, there are no particular grounds for expecting that it will in this way be possible to extricate the Vienna problems from deadlock, rather the contrary: it could "drown" the question of medium-range missiles, which has already been solved in principle, in the quagmire of incomplete and uncoordinated positions at negotiations which are now into their 14th year.

But the very formulation of the question of the need to head for a reduction in conventional arms and armed forces in Europe gained broad support. It was in a number of instances seen from different viewpoints, it is true. Thus, for example, its solution—on the basis of far deeper reductions for the Warsaw Pact than for NATO, what is more—was declared a necessary prior condition for embarking on a search for ways to lessen the role of nuclear weapons in Europe, not to mention their complete destruction. Advanced as an argument in support of such an approach was the traditional Western proposition concerning the "salutary role" of nuclear deterrence supplemented with arguments to the effect that only with the aid of nuclear weapons is NATO capable of resisting a hypothetical attack by the Warsaw Pact's conventional armed forces. Advanced as a counterweight was the idea of the need for simultaneous and parallel progress—both along the path of Europe's conversion into a nuclear-free zone and of a deep, radical reduction in conventional arms and armed forces on the continent. And the great significance of the Budapest proposals of the Warsaw Pact states organically supplementing and reinforcing the efforts geared to a diminution in the role of the nuclear factor in Europe was pointed out in this plane also.

The "roundtable" participants discussed with great concern the question of so-called alternative principles of safeguarding military security providing for a change in the entire organization of the armed forces and arms such that be adapted for the performance only of defensive functions and may not be used for attack purposes. Just some time ago even the ideas of "nonprovocative defenses" were frequently perceived as naive dreams divorced from real life. Today many serious specialists see this as an extremely important reference point for the efforts being made for the purpose of a diminution in the threat of war and for overcoming the mutual suspicion and misgivings which exist in relations between states.

The rebuilding of military structures and potential on purely defensive principles is, as the participants in the discussions observed, an exceptionally difficult task, of course. Its accomplishment would require the
surmounting of tremendous obstacles—of a purely organizational nature, those connected with singularities of operational planning, those conditioned by financial factors and problems of logistical supply and those concerning, finally, the purely psychological aspect even. Easy and rapid results are not to be expected here. But even now the very concept merits more in-depth, detailed study and also "attachment" to some parameters of the negotiations already being conducted on disarmament topics and states' proposals and initiatives being advanced in this sphere. Mention was made in the course of the discussion, for example, of the undisputed significance which is attached from this viewpoint to the initiative concerning the creation of a nuclear-free corridor along the line of contact of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the idea of a reduction in or withdrawal from the borders of the most dangerous offensive arms and the proposal concerning a ban on large-scale military exercises.

Other questions connected with disarmament and with ensuring international security were also discussed within the "roundtable" framework. The most diverse proposals were expressed—sometimes winning general support, sometimes highly contentious (for example, for the purpose of averting a surprise or accidental unleashing of a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact creating along the border between them a demilitarized zone which would be patrolled by a "triple force" composed of military subunits... of the USSR, the United States and Finland).

No document was adopted as a result of the discussions. Nor, strictly speaking, was there any need for such. It is far more important that a large group of specialists was able to exchange opinions on the most pertinent problems, on whose solution the prevention of war and the strengthening of international security depend. And not only exchange opinions but also better understand one another's arguments, ascertain the possibilities of a compromise being reached and determine the areas and specific questions which require the very close attention of both politicians and scientists.

II

Great and interesting work was performed by the scholars working in the sphere of the natural sciences. In accordance with the decision of the international organizing body, four questions were submitted for discussion at the "roundtable": a radical reduction in nuclear weapons as a first step on route to their complete destruction; nuclear disarmament and European security; nuclear disarmament, strategic defense and the ABM Treaty; the banning of nuclear weapons. A meeting was held in the work group 2 days prior to the forum. Proposals were expressed pertaining to verification of the way in which the USSR and the United States would comply with an arms reduction agreement in the event of such being concluded. The participants in the meeting agreed that American and Soviet experts would be perfectly capable of providing for reliable verification of compliance with such agreements and formulating the technical and legal procedures of this process.

A seminar on technical aspects of the ABM Treaty also was conducted within the framework of the scientists' "roundtable". Particular significance was imparted to the discussion conducted within the framework thereof by the fact
that the ABM Treaty was undergoing a competent scientific analysis at the international level precisely at a time when Washington is stirring passions concerning the deployment of the first echelon of the SDI and when it would like to cancel out this document under the cover of its "expanded interpretation". A resume was adopted on the problem discussed. Although not all the participants supported every clause thereof, general agreement with the content of the document was recorded.

In the course of the discussion the participants in the seminar recognized the importance of preservation of the ABM Treaty conditions as an appreciable factor of ensuring strategic stability. It was observed that the development of the technology potentially applicable in antimissile defense systems could jeopardize the treaty itself. For this reason it would be useful to reach mutual agreement at U.S. and USSR government level in an interpretation of the terms of the treaty with reference to new hardware which could be used in ABM systems. The common viewpoint was ascertained that the prohibitory provisions of article V pertain to all ABM facilities, including those based on "different physical principles". The Soviet participants expressed particular objections in connection with the "broad interpretation" of the treaty by the U.S. Administration. They also expressed the opinion that the devices enumerated in the treaty performing the functions of components of ABM systems are not necessarily the sole ones subject to limitation. It was observed that the "components" concept should incorporate such devices as observation, detection, guidance, damage assessment and battle management systems. A number of Western scientists objected to the extension of the limitations to battle management systems, observing that such measures are not verifiable by national technical means.

During discussion of the question of compliance with the treaty some Western participants spoke of their concern in connection with certain Soviet actions. Specifically, the question of the building of a radar installation in Krasnoyarsk (2) and the work under way in the USSR on the creation of directed energy weapons was raised. The Soviet side did not agree with such an interpretation and simultaneously recalled numerous violations of the treaty by the United States, particularly in connection with work on the SDI program.

The seminar also discussed the problem of the achievement of mutual understanding in the interpretation of the provisions of the treaty, including the question of the boundary between prohibited and permitted work. Specifically, mention was made of measures clarifying the limitations on technology potentially applicable in ABM systems. Coordination of quantitative parameters would make it possible to draw a line between the development and testing of devices which could be used in ABM defense systems and devices not possessing this capability. Specific limitations on the intensity of directed energy systems, certain specifications of kinetic weapons, the capacity of power generators designed for deployment in space and the dimensions of the mirrors for lasers and sensors.

Concern was also expressed that certain limitations on systems connected with ABM defense could complicate scientific experiments for which analogous hardware is used. International cooperation in the realization of such projects would be a guarantee of their peaceful nature.
All the participants agreed with the exceptional importance of verification. Some limitations on technical parameters could create certain problems for verification by national technical means. A number of American scientists expressed the supposition that limitations on detection facilities would probably cause greater difficulties compared with quantitative limitations on assault devices. However, other participants favored verifiable limitations on all types of detection facilities used for ABM purposes.

Misgivings were expressed at the seminar that the development and deployment of ABM systems intended for destroying tactical ballistic missiles could lead to the erosion of the ABM Treaty. It was observed also that the development, testing and deployment of antisatellite arms could represent a destabilizing factor. It was stressed in this connection that the draft treaty banning antisatellite weapons presented by the Soviet Union in 1983 remains valid, as before.

Both in the course of the seminar and during the discussions at the forum itself various, at times contradictory, assessments could be heard. Although it should be mentioned for fairness' sake that it did not reach the point of acute clashes. There were evidently two reasons for this. First, the popularity of the very idea of a nuclear-free world discussed at the forum. Second, the kind of "boomerang effect" caused by the unseemly attempts of certain circles to boycott or, at least, compromise the Moscow meeting, declaring it a routine Soviet "propaganda stunt". The U.S. State Department, in particular, recommended against American scientists taking part in the forum, while the Energy Department went even further, prohibiting its employees, specifically physicists from the Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories, from traveling to Moscow. For this reason, for example, the SDI--the most contentious military program of recent decades--had essentially no advocates at the forum.

A particular feature of the forum was also the fact that no one endeavored to foist his opinion on others. The participants in the meeting did not set themselves the tasks of reducing everything to a common denominator. The main thing was to build up as large a sum total of ideas and proposals as possible, having interpreted which the scientists might in time suggest the optimum alternatives of a solution of general problems, primarily that of survival in the nuclear age.

The paper of F. von Hippel, professor at Princeton University and chairman of the Federation of American Scientists, containing a program of deep reductions in nuclear arms was received with great interest. Much therein echoes the nuclear-free world concept put forward by the USSR, although the Soviet participants in the discussion could agree in far from all respects with the scientist, whose proposals merit, in our view, more detailed illustration as the viewpoint of an authoritative specialist offering a comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament from the standpoints of the new thinking. A reality recognized by all is, according to him, the fact that given the present level of stockpiling of nuclear weapons and their power of destruction, even the strongest powers have found themselves defenseless in the face of a nuclear attack and could be destroyed in a short period of time. The new thinking
recognizes this truth. Nuclear weapons have made war unthinkable. The main danger now is the possibility of the outbreak of an accidental or unsanctioned war. Therefore in the short term a fundamental task is to make the situation stable as far as possible. In the more distant future, the scientist observes, the new thinking directs us toward a gradual lowering of the level of the threat which both sides represent for one another. But counterposed to such thinking is the old approach, whose essence is defined by the aphorism of ancient Rome: "If you wish for peace, prepare for war". In particular, many people in the West believe that it is necessary to be prepared for the use of nuclear weapons to defend West Europe against a "Soviet invasion". Such a way of thinking stimulates the arms race.

Von Hippel's paper adduced new estimates of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. He considers unduly high, for example, the well-known "McNamara levels". "After we had learned more about the effect of nuclear weapons," the American scientist declared, "we understood that both the Soviet Union and the United States could be annihilated by a considerably smaller number of nuclear weapons than he (R. McNamara--authors) contemplated. In Princeton, for example, we calculated that as a result of the large conflagrations which would occur following large-scale nuclear explosions 70 1-megaton explosions would wipe out as many people as, according to the estimates of McNamara's analysts, would be wiped out as the result of a single 200-megaton explosions." It follows from this that the Soviet Union and the United States have stockpiled nuclear arsenals several orders of magnitude in excess of their requirement for maintaining a situation of "holding one another hostage".

This situation is leading to a further undermining of stability in the world. To avoid such a development of events von Hippel advances a program of "stabilizing reductions". The group which he heads at Princeton studied the possibility of a 90-percent reduction in the total number of nuclear arms in the arsenals of the United States and the USSR. Such a reduction, experts believe, should be effected exclusively thanks to the destruction of nuclear weapons intended for combat operations.

The elimination of theater or so-called tactical nuclear weapons is contemplated primarily. The nuclear arsenal of the two sides could be approximately halved. Currently the Soviet Union and the United States, von Hippel observed, have approximately 10,000 short- and medium-range nuclear missiles each. This means a high degree of probability that nuclear weapons could be used practically in any conflict between the United States and the USSR. Fearing a defeat, commanders on the battlefield would request permission to use nuclear weapons at the most elementary stages of such conflicts and in some cases would even have recourse to them without authorization. Such is the logic of the dilemma which arises in connection with nuclear weapons: "use or lose". The elimination of theater nuclear weapons would not, of course, remove the threat of nuclear war, furthermore, it would not avert the possibility of the use of long-range missiles against troops or ships but it would, on the other hand, permit the creation of a situation wherein decisions would be made in more considered and centralized fashion.
The rest of the two sides' nuclear arsenals is delivered by long-range strategic delivery systems. Some missiles may carry 14 warheads, and American bombers, 24. If, as the Princeton group proposes, missiles with multiple reentry vehicles were replaced by missiles with a single warhead and the armament of each American bomber reduced to 5 nuclear weapons, the total number of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles on each side would be reduced approximately from 10,000 to 3,500. In addition, the destruction of missiles with multiple reentry vehicles would do away, it is believed, with the reasons prompting a first strike.

But it is even more important, von Hippel emphasized, to preserve for the nuclear forces remaining after the reductions inviolability against a surprise enemy attack even if a large number of missiles with multiple reentry vehicles still secretly remained for each of them. The American military command even now keeps approximately half the nuclear-powered submarines permanently at sea, and one-third of the heavy bombers are always ready to take off at the alarm in a matter of minutes.

For subsequent reductions in warheads from the level of 3,500 it is contemplated reducing the number of delivery vehicles. "We believe that a reduction to 2,000 warheads is perfectly feasible. Even if all warheads were to have a yield of 100 kilotons, that is, 10 times less than the customary yield of single-warhead missiles, they would nonetheless possess a greater power of destruction than 10,000 of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima. This is many times in excess of what is required to maintain a 'holding one another hostage' relationship." The proposed reductions, von Hippel believes, are practicable only in the event of a renunciation of the orientation toward a preventive strike and also given the preservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty.

A lively debate developed at the forum during discussion of the problem of the correlation of nuclear disarmament and European security. Mention was made of the special role of Europe in the history of mankind and in modern international relations. Many participants expressed the opinion that it is here, in the "laboratory of detente," that the first steps should be taken along the path leading to a radical reduction in nuclear arms. There was particular emphasis here of the interrelationship between nuclear disarmament and reductions in conventional arms.

The paper presented by Prof. A. Boserup (Denmark), "Mutual Reduction in Offensive Potential: Key to Disarmament and Security in Europe," emphasizes that the problem of nuclear weapons on the continent is not only (and, possibly, not primarily even) their physical presence here but rather the role which they are assigned by military doctrines, Western particularly. Tactical nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles are sources of danger and instability not because they are deployed in Europe but by virtue of their very purpose. The opinion is current in the West that it is considerably inferior to the Warsaw Pact in terms of conventional arms. It is not even that important whether this corresponds to reality, Boserup observed. But inasmuch as such a viewpoint has become firmly established, it will always be advanced as an argument by opponents of disarmament proclaiming tactical nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles a guarantee of the West's security.
Stability and security in Europe, the Danish scholar believes, are possible only in a situation of "mutual defensive superiority," which he expressed by the formula: D(a)>O(b) and D(b)>O(a), where "a" and "b" are the opposed sides, and "D" and "O" are their defensive and offensive potential respectively. The meaning of A. Boserup's arguments is as follows: since the West proceeds from the presence of an imbalance in terms of conventional arms, its equalization is a condition of nuclear disarmament on the continent. The obvious difficulty, however, is that "balance" does not amount to a formal numerical equality between the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. What is important is something else: each side must feel that it possesses everything necessary to resist an attack, even under the most unfavorable conditions. For this purpose a reorganization of the sides' armed forces should be effected whereby defensive operations would guarantee greater success than offensive operations. It is such a situation which Boserup terms "mutual defensive superiority". He considers important conditions of its achievement a renunciation of assault forces, specifically, highly mobile tank units and attack aviation, and also a revision of the "offensive defense" doctrine. The speaker called on the West to abandon the strategy of "nuclear escalation," whose destabilizing nature is obvious. He also proposed abandonment of the corresponding "strikes in depth" concepts.

It is indicative that the ideas of "nonoffensive defense" like that presented in Moscow by the Danish scholar have become widespread in Europe in recent years. Analogous or essentially close proposals have been advanced by a number of European socialist and centrist parties. But as yet this idea has far more opponents, who assert that its realization would signify a unilateral concession to the Soviet Union, weaken the West and turn it into an object of political pressure on the part of the USSR. In this connection Professor Boserup called on Western countries to familiarize themselves more closely with the proposals of the socialist states put forward in Budapest in 1966: "In this statement the Warsaw Pact countries recognized the need for basing military concepts and the doctrines of military alliances on defensive principles and proposed the formulation of procedures for a reduction in troops and arms such that this process lead to a lessening of the danger of surprise attack and the consolidation of military-strategic stability on the European continent."

Other Soviet initiatives in the sphere of nuclear disarmament were supported at the forum also. Thus summing up the work of the scientists' "roundtable," Prof von Hippel evaluated highly the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions and advocated a halt to nuclear testing everywhere. Speaking in the Kremlin at the behest of the organizing committee, he summed up the conclusions reached by the scientists in the course of the discussions. In particular, they recognized that "the conditions exist for a reduction in nuclear arms; it is essential, however, to formulate a program which would permit the disarmament process to be implemented." The scientists confirmed that an absolutely reliable defensive system cannot be created and that the deployment in space of ABM systems would subject the existing stability to great danger. They emphasized that renunciation of the ABM Treaty would create a threat to the whole world. Simultaneously the participants in the "roundtable" emphasized the need for the creation of a basis for mutual
understanding and the conclusion of an agreement on the nondeployment of arms in space. Particular concern was expressed in connection with missiles with multiple reentry vehicles and also cruise missiles.

Of course, the participants in the other "roundtables" could not compete with the scientists in the degree of competence of the discussion of problems of nuclear disarmament, primarily its technical aspects, procedures and so forth. However, the questions which they examined are exceptionally important from the viewpoint of the future of mankind and serve as a reference point of civilized intercourse between peoples and states. It is clear that an indispensable prerequisite of prosperity in the world is the normal development of economic and trade relations between states of different social systems. There cannot and must not be exclusive economies in an interconnected world. All this demands an improvement in world-economic relations and a further search for new forms of business cooperation. Speaking in the Kremlin, R. Ossola, president of the Italian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce, stressed that a strengthening of economic cooperation between different states "will create conditions conducive to the further development of all countries and a strengthening of peace worldwide, which is mankind's principal goal." the participants in the "Problems of Peace and Business Cooperation" "roundtable" discussed such questions as "East-West Economic Cooperation: Problems, Prospects," "New Forms of Business Cooperation," "Disarmament and States' Economic Security: New Thinking and Approaches" and "The Role of the Banks in the Development of Economic Cooperation".

The participants in the "roundtable" of representatives of the business world agreed that East-West economic and political relations had improved considerably. Much attention was paid to the economic reforms being implemented in the Soviet Union. There was detailed discussion of the question of the creation by Soviet legislation of conditions conducive to the development of economic cooperation with capitalist states and private firms, in the formation of joint ventures included. Many captains of Western business supported the development of cooperation at bank level.

No less significant problems of a general dimension were examined by the participants in the other "roundtables": by figures of culture and art, men of medical science and physicians, ecologists and sociologists. Merely the list thereof attests the broad range of the questions discussed: the new thinking—way to salvation and the solution of global problems of mankind; the role of culture in the defense of civilization and general values; creativity and preservation of habitat; medical-psychological aspects of the nuclear threat; the lessons of Chernobyl and medical-biological aspects of nuclear war; the stereotyped "image of the enemy" as an obstacle in the way of fruitful negotiations; protection of near-Earth and outer space against pollution; the disastrous ecological consequences of a nuclear conflict; the ecologization of S&T and socioeconomic progress; the cooperation of ecologists in the sphere of environmental protection and the defense of general peace; and so forth.

Representatives of all six world religions from 56 countries and West Berlin assembled a "roundtable" of religious figures. "The threat of a nuclear holocaust makes it incumbent upon all of us to immediately channel our creative activity into the sphere of peace-making, rethinking from the moral
and theological viewpoint the realities of our age. It is essential to awake in each individual a sense of responsibility for the fate of everything living on Earth," Metropolitan Krutitskiy and Kolomenskiy Yuvenaliy declared at the forum. The religious figures adopted a joint document in which they appealed to the leaders of the leading nuclear countries: declare once for all that nuclear war is immoral and unacceptable from the human viewpoint; condemn once for all the doctrines of nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction; unconditionally respect existing arms limitation treaties, including the ABM Treaty; immediately embark on the conclusion of new treaties in keeping with the hope kindled in Reykjavik.

The religious figures' appeal concludes highly symbolically. The question heard therein reflected the frame of mind of perhaps all participants in the forum: "If not I, who? If not now, when?"

The Moscow forum was a major present-day event. Its main result was the triumph of the new political thinking. The best minds of mankind had assembled in Moscow to once again evaluate the extent of the nuclear threat and ways to eliminate it. On behalf of the participants in the forum Academician Ye.P. Velikhov supported the program put forward on 15 January 1986 by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for the stage-by-stage removal of nuclear weapons by the start of the next millennium. "We see this as the main task of our generation," he declared.

The idea of the creation of "open laboratories," that is, a sector of science not connected either with military or commercial secrecy which within the framework of open extensive international cooperation would conduct research into universal human problems, was discussed in conclusion of the work of the forum. This idea gained the scientists' extensive support. To promote the development of such a sector it was decided to set up a special foundation. A number of the projects discussed provides for an improvement in education and medical assistance in the world, earthquake forecasting and extension of the boundaries of human knowledge.

The forum's work was evaluated highly in the speech to its participants by M.S. Gorbachev. He supported the active participation of the Soviet public--both material and intellectual--in the activity of the Foundation for the Survival of Mankind and assured the participants in the forum that the Soviet Government would treat attentively all that had been expressed in the course of its work.

The discussions in Moscow made it possible to take one further step forward in the world community's comprehension of the scale of the nuclear threat and lend new impetus to the struggle for its removal. And it cannot be denied, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee stressed, that this struggle "has now become a grand moral-political school in which the people's masses and whole nations are learning a difficult, but essential art: living with one another in the world. Finding a balance of general and particular interests. Boldly and honestly looking the present and future in the eye, comprehending them and, comprehending, opportunely drawing conclusions for practice." The Moscow forum was confirmation of this.
FOOTNOTES

1. In order to impart a freer nature to the exchange of opinions it was decided to conduct it behind closed doors; for this reason the main propositions of the political scientists' discussion reproduced below have been depersonified. The authors of the papers are mentioned merely in the cases where written versions of their speeches were distributed at the forum.

2. We may recall in this connection the readiness expressed by the Soviet Union not to complete the installation of the radar station near Krasnoyarsk in the event of the United States agreeing to dismantle the powerful phased-array radar station built in the guise of "modernization" in the Thule area (Greenland) and abandoning the construction of a similar station on Fylingdales Moor (Great Britain).

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

RETIRIED SOVIET GENERAL ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DETERRENCE

Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in Russian No 6, Jun 87 pp 19-23

[Article by Maj Gen (Ret) Milshtein under the rubric "Expert's Opinion," "Does Moscow Need the Military-Nuclear Race?"]

[Text]

Contr. The Soviet Union's proposals to remove from Western Europe medium-range nuclear missiles gave rise to some questions from our readers (both "ours" and foreign). We would like to put these to you as a specialist.

Why has Moscow "changed its mind" and removed these proposals from the Reykjavik package? The USSR rejected Reagan's so-called "zero option". Following Reykjavik in Warsaw last December, the Committee of Defence Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Member-Countries said at their meeting that they had planned measures in the sphere of defence of their countries to prevent the breach of the available parity between Warsaw Pact and NATO. Some of our Western partners, participants in the antiwar movement, then asked us with concern: did that mean that the USSR was going to join the nuclear race in order to preserve the parity?

M. M. I cannot agree with this. Nothing can force the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty Member-Countries to abandon the policy of stopping the arms race and the idea of disarmament. Our country knows through deeps and not words, its adherence to the cause of peace and disarmament.

As for the problem of medium-range missiles, it is not a simple question. It cannot be regarded separately from the whole complex issue as only a problem of medium-range missiles.

Why was this problem separated from the general "package"? The matter is that Moscow really does want to find outcomes in the spirit of Reykjavik. Thus, the Soviet side invites the US administration once again to continue the search for mutually acceptable decisions taken in Reykjavik.

This decision involved serious work, and it was decided to make another step which could lead to important change. If an agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) is a success—the Soviet Union considers that it is possible—it would have great political meaning because up till now there has been only armament and now disarmament is possible. A situation of a greater trust would be created. This proposal is also important militarily because a considerable part of the whole class of nuclear weapons would be eliminated and a whole continent would be freed from them.

The USSR would like to see an agreement on INF acting as a stimulant for the talks on reduction of strategic weapons and for adherence to the ABM Treaty at the same time. That agreement must provide an impulse to starting talks on conventional weapons and armed forces. Speed up progress in limitation of chemical weapons and improve psychologically the perspective of settling regional conflicts. The first real step in disarmament is very important.

Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal of February 26 must not be regarded as the Soviet Union's diversion from its general aims in the sphere of armament limitation. The main idea is the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons. To do this, all the channels for new types of weapons should
be blocked, including those for the deployment of weapons in space. Concrete radical measures on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons and strengthening security in Europe and Asia must be taken.

New disarmament proposals were made during Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to France this April. As soon as a separate agreement on limitations of Soviet and American medium-range missiles is signed, the USSR will withdraw missile complexes of the operational-tactical, short-range which have been deployed in Czechoslovakia and in the GDR as a retaliatory measure for the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe. The USSR is ready for immediate talks on the reduction and complete liquidation of operational-tactical missiles stationed on the European continent.

The fulfillment of the proposals of the CEE and the GDR on creating a zone free from chemical weapons in Central Europe as well as a nuclear-free corridor along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO would strengthen all-European security. Moscow is ready to withdraw all Soviet nuclear means from this corridor and to guarantee and respect its nuclear-free status.

New proposals by Moscow only show the feasibility of the Soviet Union’s position, which does everything to free humankind from nuclear weapons. Therefore, one must not say that Moscow has changed its position or adopted “Reagan’s zero option”. Attempts to discredit the USSR on disarmament belong to the circles which have no interest in achieving any progress in talks. Even now our proposals on complete liquidation of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe provided a new incentive to the Geneva talks. These circles in the USA are trying to bring such elements to the position of the American defense in which question the possibility of real liquidation of their INF in Europe. We mean here the intention of our partners to preserve all the potential of medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe by making Pershing-2 into short-based cruise missiles. Washington insists on its right not to destroy those deployed in Europe but to shift them onto sea vessels. That is, to build floating bases targeted at the USSR.

They say that it seems that they only need to be firm in relations with the USSR and to speak from a position of strength to obtain concessions. But the USSR will go only as far as mutual concessions based on the principle of equality and equal security for all, including the creation of nuclear weapons and the creation of nuclear-free zones.

What is parity? This is an approximation of military might and military capabilities between confronting sides. Such equilibrium strengthens stability and normalizes their relations. Limitation and reduction of armaments and the stopping of the arms race on the principle of equality and equal security can be carried out only under conditions of parity. And on the other hand, breach of parity by one side attempting to achieve military superiority immediately disrupts stability and forces the other side to adopt retaliatory measures and thus leads to the arms race.

The so-called “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI) of the present US administration is a bright example of Washington striving to obtain military superiority over the Soviet Union and to return to the position of-strength policy.

As is known, parity is just as possible with a high level of confrontation of military power on both sides, as with a low level. Our country considers that the present level is too high. It is necessary to drastically reduce the level of this parity and military confrontation in general. The degree of security is universally proportional to the rates of accumulating and modernizing the armed forces and armaments. The more so that it is impossible to win the arms race today.

But, according to the supporters of the nuclear arms race, the USA must be either ahead or behind, which means the race must have a “winner” and a “loser”.

This idea is rather widely spread among the US population. During recent public opinion polls, Americans said that the United States must not strive for victory in the arms race. At the same time, they stated that they didn’t want to see themselves in the position of a “loser” if the Soviet Union gained superiority Western
Propaganda constantly reiterated that the Soviet Armed Forces are superior to those of the Americans.

Corr. President Reagan's opinion on this matter is also known: "I have to admit that the United States... is still considerably lagging behind the Soviet Union in all types of offensive weapons." We can understand the worries of a Palestinian. But how can one not trust his or her president?

M. M. Such statements are made to mislead public opinion or to give a push to certain military programmes through Congress to receive additional military allocations, and so on. We must admit that they exert influence on rank-and-file Americans too.

But let's go back to our review of the idea of parity. As I have already said, our permanent desire is to lower its level, that is to find a way out of the arms race. The excerpt from the Warsaw Treaty document you mentioned in the beginning of our interview must be considered in the context of the whole context, the main idea of which is an appeal to NATO to start negotiations on reduction of armed forces and armaments.

Corr. As is known, a fantastic amount of weapons has been accumulated in the world. The total power of all arsenals considerably exceeds any possible plan of waging war. An absurd situation form the point of view of a non-specialist.

M. M. Security, and its strengthening lies not in the arms race, but in its cessation and gradual transition to disarmament. Nuclear first of all. At present, this is understood and openly recognized by all who are responsible for forming the military-strategic policy. The Soviet Union has proposed a new concept of security which corresponds to the interests of all peoples and states, based on the idea that the security of each state directly depends on the security of all universal, mutual and equal. No one must be interested in greater or lesser security for oneself! Any other condition leads to mistrust, gives birth to instability, stimulates the arms race and increases the likelihood of war. Those who say that the greater the number of weapons, the lower the level of security are right. Unfortunately, not everyone in the West adheres to this point of view.

Corr. The history of the arms race mostly comes down to the West's technological research aimed at giving it long-term military superiority. How realistic are these hopes?

M. M. The arms race cannot be won. We consider this an axiom but, unfortunately, some Western powers, the United States first of all, do not agree with us. Many people in the USA today are nostalgic about the period when they had superiority. The former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara noted that in 1965, the ratio of warheads on strategic carriers was 10:1 in favour of the US.

Americans believe in the wonderful capabilities of technology. And we must not think that only President Reagan and his circle are convinced that technology will ensure their breakthrough. There are many such people in the USA, and they see a solution in a large-scale antimissile defence system with space-based elements. They consider that SDR gives the United States an opportunity to use nuclear weapons without apprehension of the catastrophic consequences of a retaliatory strike.

The Soviet Union considers this a pure adventure, but whether we want this or not, we are forced to act in such a manner that the USA and other NATO countries can understand that they cannot escape the condition of parity. There will be parity in any case. Any use of nuclear weapons is dangerous for them in the same degree as for the country against which they use them. We realize that our nuclear weapons have become a sort of guarantee and a deterrent against unleashing nuclear war.

Corr. Why did we suggest a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons by exactly 50 per cent? Maybe the reason for this was discussed at the 27th CPSU Congress.
M. M. First, the approach to negotiations must be changed. The whole process of talks on reduction of armaments shows that while they are in progress, while they are dragging on, new types and new samples of weapons appear whose effect increases the nuclear threat, was registered, in the documents of the talks. The main attention must be given not to static, and secondary arguments, and unnecessary figures, which lead to an impasse, but to radical reductions.

Corr. More often than not use is made of a loophole such as modernization of available weapons, destruction of old weapons and their replacement by new ones. Sometimes it turns out that old weapons are not destroyed but just stored in depots, and that they are quite usable for waging military operations.

M. M. It is modernization that is today the important, and perhaps the main direction of the arms race. Just look at the tricks of the American side. It declares that the Soviet Union has adopted some new missile systems while the United States has not accepted any new systems, except missiles MX. But it says nothing about the fact that all missile systems have been modernized—their range, accuracy and the power of warheads increased. Take, for example, missile Minuteman. It was not equipped with MIRV before. The same is true with Polaris, which was later replaced by Poseidon with ten warheads. It seems that there is no change, but in fact we see here the build-up of nuclear potential.

Corr. A man who is not an expert on armaments, but who understands that nuclear war in any form would be a worldwide catastrophe, does not understand words about parity. If the speech is about nuclear weapons, or even about their adequate number, if it is not equal to zero. One arrives at the conclusion that neither side will lose if one adopts even a unilateral reduction of its nuclear arsenal. Why do politicians not take this into account? Is the argument that nuclear war is suicide is not serious enough or some reservations are needed? What kind of reservations then?

M. M. More than a year ago the Soviet Union made concrete proposals for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within fifteen years in addition to the destruction of other types of mass annihilation weapons and reduction of levels of conventional types. It seems that the whole world must welcome these proposals. Their realization would suit everyone without giving any favours, and would eradicate nuclear threat constantly looming over humankind. But very few influential personalities and governments in the West supported these proposals. So many arguments were brought about against them. It was said that it was impossible to liquidate nuclear weapons since it is impossible to liquidate the know-how and technology of their creation. It was asserted that their liquidation is profitable for the Soviet Union because it is superior in conventional forces. It was even said that nuclear weapons are a guarantee of security and that their presence deters the emergence of nuclear conflict. Yet, in the heat of debates, intentionally or unintentionally, they didn’t mention the current talks on the banning and destruction of chemical weapons, that biological weapons had been prohibited know-how and technology not hindering trust, and that the Soviet Union suggests simultaneous reduction of conventional weapons, and so on.

Is it possible under the condition of absence of agreement between nuclear powers, first of all the USA, on halting of nuclear weapons and even on partial steps in this direction to go for unilateral nuclear disarmament? Back in 1982, the Soviet Union adopted an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and called upon other nuclear powers to take similar obligations. However, Western nuclear powers didn’t follow the Soviet Union’s example.

The USSR unilaterally stopped all nuclear explosions. Other nuclear powers didn’t follow this example. On the contrary, the USA increased the number of nuclear tests.
Under these conditions, the Soviet Union's unilateral nuclear disarmament would have the opposite effect instead of being a deterrent against aggression.

Now the USA is speeding up the design of strike space weapons. According to American specialists, the design of a new, more complex weapons system for SDI will require at least 200 or 300 nuclear explosions, while in the past the creation of new weapons required about six.

The USA refuses to preserve the temporary agreement on limitation of strategic weapons of 1972, and the SALT-2 treaty, and is striving for the speedy deployment of SDI elements. The USA military budget has reached a record high of 312 billion dollars. Different military concepts exist and are used in America: "decapitated strike", "prolonged nuclear war", "limited" and so on.

Soviet nuclear weapons are intended as a deterrent against war. Therefore, while the threat to universal peace exists, the Soviet Union’s Armed Forces, including nuclear means, must be kept at a level reasonable for defence.

Interviewed by V. Bogdanov

/9604
CSO: 5200/1617
USSR'S VORONTSOV: 'AMERICAN CLAIMS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE'

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 30, 2-9 Aug 87 p 4

[Article by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuli Vorontsov, under the rubric "Viewpoint": "Security Is Within Reach. Do Americans Care?"]

[Text]

An agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe coupled with an agreement concerning the basic provisions of a 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear arms and a ban on space weapons could provide what's needed for a new Soviet-American summit meeting. But what remains is that the USA takes a serious and positive approach to the talks in Geneva. This is something which we still have not seen. What we see is a pile of American claims which the Soviet side finds totally unacceptable. And therefore it seems to us that our partners simply cannot make up their own minds at the talks. We are sure that all obstacles can be easily overcome provided there is a concerted effort to accomplish this on the part of the American leadership. Do they care?

THE SOVIET UNION and the United States have really come close to the attainment of an agreement on the elimination of their medium and shorter-range missiles in Europe. The world has not yet witnessed anything like it. After all, the question in the past was arms limitation. And now the issue is the physical dismantlement of a brand-new combat materiel. It would be, however, premature to say that a "mere pace" has remained to the signing of this agreement.

Last April the Soviet Union put forward new initiatives concerning the problems which (as the American side claimed) were hampering agreement. Thus we tried to give new hope to the talks. But now this hope, obviously, is in jeopardy: the American side wants to introduce new conditions into the agreement reached at Reykjavik. These new conditions are acting like a brake on the way to reaching agreement.

The USA, in particular, insists on incorporating in the treaty provisions on its right to re-equip its Pershing-2 missiles into shorter-range Pershing-1B missiles, instead of dismantling them altogether. Should the Soviet side agree to accept this condition, the USA would be in a position to claim that it really adheres to the principle of destroying medium-range missiles in Europe. The problem, however, is that Pershing-1B missiles can be re-equipped into Pershing-2 missiles within a matter of only two days.

The United States is reluctant to destroy one more class of medium-range missiles deployed in Europe, namely, cruise missiles. The Americans have suggested that this problem be tackled by simply removing warheads from them or transferring these missiles to warships off the shores of Europe. But as a result, the agreement on ridding Europe of longer and shorter-range operational-tactical missiles would turn into a chimera.
One more important problem is the American proposal now in force to the effect that at the first stage of the agreement the Soviet Union should unilaterally reduce and dismantle its missiles, moreover, under American inspection. At the same time, the American arsenal would be kept intact, whereas Soviet inspectors would not be allowed on American bases.

The "zero option" on longer- and shorter-range operational-tactical missiles must really be "zero". If the American warheads are preserved in Europe under some pretext, it would hardly be possible to call this situation "zero". I am sure that Washington would put forward the same argument if the Soviet Union wanted to store up a certain quantity of warheads for its own or any other missiles in any country in Eastern Europe.

The 72 American warheads (for West German missiles) also amount to a real and serious problem. There are other problems as well. For instance, the American draft allows developing new types of medium-range missiles, but this extends only to the USA, whereas the Soviet Union is denied the right to develop land-based cruise missiles. The Americans want to deploy the remaining Pershing-2 missiles in Alaska, thereby increasing the nuclear threat to Soviet territory, moreover, in the absence of a similar reciprocal threat to US territory.

It must be pointed out that we have agreed to definite limitations in the deployment of our remaining SS-20 missiles, namely, not to deploy them to the west of the 80th meridian of the Eastern Hemisphere, which, incidentally, was done at the request of the American side to prevent these missiles from reaching the territory of the USA's West European allies. Our medium-range missiles would not reach American territory either. Why then does the United States continue to insist on the deployment of Pershing-2 missiles in Alaska?

The reports about contemplated American and NATO programmes for the buildup and improvement of nuclear weapons also provide us with grounds for concern. On the pretext of preserving American "nuclear guarantees" for Western Europe it is planned, among other things, to increase the number of submarine-launched cruise missiles, to deploy additional bombers and nuclear artillery, and increase the range of Lance tactical missiles. NATO has resorted to one more means of undermining the likely agreement by putting forward an unending chain of linkages. After we had decided the question of operational-tactical missiles on account of which, as we were told, the West felt concern, talks were started about tactical and battlefield weapons, and then about conventional armaments and troops.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization's reply to all these linkages has long been known: there is a need to resolutely end all imbalances by cutting the armaments of either side which has an advantage and by establishing equally low ceilings for the troops and armaments of both sides. The levels of both sides' troops and armaments must be sufficient for defence, but preclude the possibility of carrying out offensive operations. These questions, along with the problem of remaining tactical nuclear weapons, should be examined at separate multilateral negotiations.

From the Soviet point of view, all medium-range missiles in Europe must be eliminated, and we regard the recent decisions of NATO countries as a reply to our proposals on a "double zero option" in Europe. But unresolved questions remain. For instance, we are prepared for a "global nuclear option" on condition that the American nuclear weapons in the Far East, including those deployed in Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, are taken into account and the American aircraft-carriers in the Pacific are withdrawn beyond definite agreed lines.

Sometimes we are asked: "Why are you in such a hurry to sign this agreement?" I would put the question differently: "But why should we wait with our hands in our pockets?" Real disarmament has to start sometime, somewhere. At present the possibility of eliminating medium-range missiles has become more plausible, and we do not want to miss this historic chance. Why put off this question and have to start all over again when a new American administration takes office?

No one can guarantee that we humans will have another such chance in the future. After all, the continuing arms race goes on to generate and fuel mistrust. President Reagan said recently that the USSR and the United States have arms because they do not trust each other. It is not so important whether mistrust gives rise to the arms race or vice versa. The important thing is this: the arms race and mistrust are interconnected, and it is possible to get rid of them only together.

And the sooner this is done, the better. Don't you agree?
Canadian Editorial Assess Gorbachev INF Proposal

Globe and Mail

Toronto The Globe and Mail in English 24 Jul 87 p A6

[Text]

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev elevates arms control to striptease. Not for him a hurried exposure of the bare essentials of Moscow's nuclear posture. He prefers to reveal his charms in measured movements that titillate international opinion.

First, Mr. Gorbachev shed his objections to a separate deal on intermediate nuclear forces (INF). At last November's Reykjavik summit, he had linked an INF deal to superpower accords on strategic nuclear forces and Star Wars. But the United States resisted such linkage, and in February the Soviet leader backed down.

Then the Western Europeans, especially West Germany, fretted that removal of U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in return for the elimination of Soviet SS-20s would leave them exposed to Moscow's shorter-range INF missiles forward-deployed in Eastern Europe. So last April, Mr. Gorbachev proposed that shorter- as well as longer-range U.S. missiles in Europe be scrapped.

Now, in response to concerns over Soviet INF missiles deployed in the Soviet Far East, Mr. Gorbachev has accepted a U.S. call for the elimination of all INF missiles. Mr. Gorbachev's latest blandishments may appear seductive even to a U.S. administration with little prurient interest in arms control.

The superpower leaders had decided at Reykjavik that, while longer-range INF missiles would be eliminated from Europe, the Soviets could retain 100 INF warheads east of the Urals and the Americans could deploy 100 INF warheads in the United States.

This residual INF provision became a headache for both sides. The U.S.'s Asian chums, Japan and China, moaned that the Americans would rid Europe of the threat of SS-20s but not the Pacific. The Europeans fretted that, in a crisis, the Soviets could quickly shift the missiles west of the Urals and again target Bonn and Brussels.

The Soviets, too, had reason to rue a residual INF deployment, especially when they remembered that Alaska was part of the United States and that INF missiles deployed there could reach Soviet territory. Initially, however, Moscow decided to seek extra U.S. concessions in return for its assent to a complete INF ban.

Yuli Vorontsov, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, recently wrote in The New York Times, 'We are ready for a 'global zero option' provided that American nuclear weapons in the Far East are taken into account, including those in Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, and that the American carrier-based force in the Pacific be removed beyond certain agreed-upon boundaries.'

As Max Kampelman, the chief U.S. arms negotiator, replied in the same newspaper, 'What we are negotiating here are intermediate-range missiles, and the United States has no INF missiles in the Far East. The nuclear-capable aircraft that he would have us remove are dwarfed in number by Soviet nuclear-capable aircraft, which would not be limited by Mr. Gorbachev's proposal.'

In his latest offer, however, Mr. Gorbachev has wisely doffed this dud of a demand. His acceptance of a complete INF ban will please U.S. allies in both Asia and Europe, and ease the problem of verification. (It is easier to ensure compliance with an arms pact that scraps all INF missiles rather than only some.)

Still to be resolved is the fate of the 72 Pershing I-A missiles
deployed in West Germany. The missiles are Bonn’s, but the United States owns and controls their nuclear warheads. The Soviets want the missiles included in the INF bonfire; the U.S. and Germany do not. But this

Soviet demand is very recent: Moscow did not address the German Pershings at the two Reagan-Gorbachev summits. One more bump and grind by Mr. Gorbachev should do it.

OTTAWA CITIZEN

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 24 Jul 87 p A8

[Text]

It is easy to welcome the new Soviet offer to abolish, with the United States, their intermediate-range nuclear forces. This may be more gambit than concession, but the Soviet proposal could lead at last to an INF treaty.

With typical attention to publicity, Mikhail Gorbachev advanced the offer first through an Indonesian newspaper. His proposal, after all, is to dismantle the missiles in Soviet Asia that can only strike his Asian neighbors.

Gorbachev says he will no longer insist, at the INF talks in Geneva, on keeping 100 INF warheads in Asia after removing them from Europe. The United States (which has long favored this “zero option”) would in turn drop its claim to a corresponding 100 warheads of its own.

In some sense this is no concession. Neither side much liked leaving the other with 100 INF warheads.

The Soviets’ rockets could hit U.S. allies and bases in South Korea and Japan. U.S. officials feared the Soviet missiles could also be trundled west to menace Europe again.

Washington, for its part, was proposing to deploy its 100 in Alaska, where they could threaten Soviet territory in Asia. That, to the Soviets, was a threat worth avoiding.

Both sides saw the issue as an obstacle to agreement, so this latest Soviet shift represents progress. Since it includes a Soviet offer to take down its shorter-range missiles (range: under 1,000 km), it gives hope for a treaty eliminating a dangerous arsenal.

These weapons are especially dangerous precisely because they can only fight at relatively close quarters — which requires them to be fired on hair-triggers that can get all too sensitive in a crisis.

They are also nearly useless militarily. In the overkill stocks of all the nuclear-weapons states, these INF rockets add nothing significant to anyone’s security.

Complete abolition also simplifies yet another impediment to any INF treaty: the issue of verification. In the nature of these things, it is much easier to verify that no missiles exist than to discern exactly how many, of what sort, are where.

There remains much else to be settled at Geneva before any treaty is signed; zero options have been floated before by each side, only to fall under the weight of provisos or second thoughts.

There is, for example, a stubborn disagreement about West German Pershing missiles bearing U.S. nuclear warheads. Moscow wants them gone, and Washington says they do not belong in the treaty at all.

Yet the Soviet move — one of many in this long game — marks real progress, not just smart public relations.

/9274
CS0: 5220/51
DAILY ANALYZES INTENT BEHIND USSR 'DOUBLE ZERO' OFFER

Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 24 Jul 87 p 10

[Editorial: "Missile Offer for Political Gains"]

[Text]

MR GORBACHEV'S willingness finally to accept a US offer to ban all medium-range nuclear missiles means that the superpowers could be on the verge of concluding a historic nuclear disarmament agreement. By agreeing in principle to the "double zero option", Mr Gorbachev has thrown new life into the floundering Geneva negotiations and renewed hope for a summit meeting with Mr Reagan this year. Why the Soviet leader has changed his mind, however, is not immediately apparent. The military costs of this agreement will not arouse overwhelming enthusiasm among the armed forces of the USSR. Clearly, though, Mr Gorbachev has persuaded his colleagues that a "zero-zero" INF agreement will bring them broad political gains which will offset potential military risks.

Under the "double zero option" the superpowers would eliminate all medium-range missiles, not just from Europe, but also from Asia. Combined with a renewed Soviet offer that each also eliminate short-range missiles, Mr Gorbachev is suggesting that the Soviets will dismantle twice as many missiles as the US, and nearly five times as many warheads. Moreover, he is prepared to take this step without insisting on changes in the nuclear arsenals of Britain or France, or existing US forces in South Korea, the Philippines or Diego Garcia.

This would seem to be an irresistible offer for the US and that impression may survive more detailed examination. But Moscow has become adept at exploiting such proposals for its own advantage and this is likely to be no exception. An earlier offer on a "zero option" for Europe, while retaining 100 medium-range missiles in Asia, managed to drive a wedge between the US and its European allies. Although the proposal was originally made by Mr Reagan in 1981, few observers believed Moscow would be interested. When Moscow announced its interest, NATO members were alarmed that their defence doctrine of "flexible response" would be weakened. So long as the US seemed attracted to the idea — as a
feasible foreign policy achievement for itself — suspicion was also aroused about the credibility of the US commitment to the defence of Western Europe.

Mr Gorbachev may be simply trying to keep that wedge in place, and he clearly wants to retain the initiative in global arms control politics. For some years now, that has won the Soviets a new level of international respect, especially with the peace movements of Western Europe. He may also be trying to keep alive the recent momentum toward an INF agreement. Moscow may also fear that the White House will remain paralysed by the Iran-Contra scandal, that it will take time to build up trust with the next Administration, and that the costly nuclear arms race will continue unabated.

Mr Gorbachev's decision to announce his concession in an Indonesian newspaper suggests that his political strategy is twofold; he is not merely appealing to the beleaguered Mr Reagan to strike a new global balance between the superpowers. By using the occasion of the anniversary of his major Asia-Pacific policy speech given at Vladivostock last July, he is clearly using this new concession on missiles based in Asia to reinforce his other recent diplomatic initiatives in this region. Whatever the merits of his offer, once it is discussed in detail at Geneva, Mr Gorbachev is clearly making a bold new political gesture toward China and Japan, in particular, and more broadly to anti-nuclear elements across the whole Asia-Pacific region.
JAPANESE OFFICIALS COMMENT ON GORBACHEV INF OFFER

Nakasone Comments

OW230617 Tokyo KYODO in English 0606 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo, July 23 KYODO -- Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone told a Diet session Thursday that he welcomes Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's offer Wednesday of removing Soviet intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles from Asia. In answering questions from Diet member Hisamitsu Sugano of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) at a meeting of the upper house Budget Committee, Nakasone said, "The offer means that the Soviets will remove 100 warheads on medium-range missiles deployed in Siberia provided that the U.S. does the same on its mainland.

Gorbachev said in an interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA that the Soviets are ready to accept a "double zero option" for the removal of Soviet and U.S. INF warheads not only from Europe but from Asia.

Nakasone also referred to his remarks made at a summit meeting of seven democracies in Venice last June, claiming that his support for a U.S. proposal to deploy 100 INF missiles in Alaska was proved right. At a summit meeting last October in Reykjavik, Iceland with Gorbachev, U.S. President Ronald Reagan reportedly insisted on the right to retain 100 warheads in Alaska. It was this which Nakasone later supported at the Venice summit meeting.

Commenting on Gorbachev's offer, Nakasone also said that "the offer has been made to counter U.S. plans to deploy Pershing II missiles. It will bring the U.S.-Soviet (arms reduction) negotiations in Geneva right back to an acceptable situation (for the U.S.)."

He also went on to say that the Japanese Government will carefully analyze the offer to determine whether it is largely Soviet propaganda.

Gotoda on Proposal

OW230425 Tokyo KYODO in English 0420 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo, July 23 KYODO -- Japan Thursday welcomed Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to scrap all the medium-range missiles in the world. Gorbachev's offer "corresponds with what Japan has been saying, and should therefore be appreciated," Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda said Thursday.
Gotoda, who acts as the government's principal spokesman, said Japan will welcome a Gorbachev visit if the Soviet leader wants to come to Japan. "It is not good for our two countries to have cold relations since the Soviet Union is Japan's neighbor," Gotoda said of a possible Gorbachev trip to Japan.

Gotoda said the Japanese Government must study more closely the Gorbachev offer to accept the "global double zero" proposal to eliminate all short- and long-range intermediate nuclear weapons before it could make further comment. He said Japan had "some information" about the "double zero" proposal before the Soviet leader outlined it in an interview with an Indonesian newspaper.

The Soviet proposal was carried by the official TASS news agency Wednesday. During the interview, Gorbachev also said he wants to visit Japan.

/9604
CSO: 5260/125
GORBACHEV ASIAN MISSILES PROPOSAL GIVES WORLD HOPE

Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST in English 24 Jul 87 p 20

[Editorial]

[Text]

ASIATIC Russia has been considered more of a problem than an asset from the time of the Czars right up to the present. However, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, seems more interested than his predecessors in finding new approaches to the region. Once again, Mr Gorbachev has said he is ready to eliminate all medium-range missiles from Asia.

But the most significant new point made by Mr Gorbachev, in an interview with an Indonesian newspaper editor, is that the Soviet offer would not be linked — as Moscow has insisted until now — with the withdrawal by the United States of sea-borne nuclear weapons from the area of Korea, the Philippines and the Indian Ocean base of Diego Garcia.

The US has welcomed Mr Gorbachev's offer, but wonders what it might be expected to give up in return. Although Mr Gorbachev did not announce preconditions, it is apparent the Russians will expect a quid pro quo from the US and by requesting a formal plenary session on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) at the Geneva arms control talks it is likely that Moscow will reveal there its hidden conditions.

Whatever the Soviet demands, Mr Gorbachev's manoeuvre gives the US and the world reason for encouragement for an accord on INF missiles as well as a possible summit from which more agreements for the reduction of nuclear weapons might flow. Whether discussions about the removal of Soviet medium range missiles from Asia and some similar action by the US can be separated from disarmament talks focused mainly on Europe is not yet certain. President Reagan has every reason to aggressively pursue disarmament agreements with the Russians to lend a substantive international achievement to his administration.

Although the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea represent military and political action unacceptable to most of the outside world, the rest of Asia has enjoyed unprecedented peace, prosperity, and some remarkable democratic developments in the 12 years since the US pulled out of Saigon.

Although it is not quite correct to call either China or the Soviet...
Union “establishment powers”, their present leadership seems anxious to abandon military adventurism for economic development, modernisation and prosperity at home. China unquestionably is further along this road than Russia, but Mr Gorbachev definitely is a new Soviet leader anxious for new and innovative policies. His initiatives about removing intermediate range missiles from Asia is an example.

The Soviet Union has vast territories, immense mineral resources and few people in Siberia and its Asian Maritime Provinces. This Soviet frontier has been considered of great strategic importance and is heavily militarised. The Soviets have spent a fortune improving rail and other communications to its Asiatic region, maintaining dozens of divisions and nuclear missiles along its border with China and constructing and operating a huge blue water naval fleet that ranges from Khabarovsk to Antarctic waters to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.

It has much to gain, economically and geopolitically by a de-escalation of its military involvements in Asia. The Japanese have the money, expertise and interest in developing the natural resources and mineral wealth of Siberia, but this is not going to be forthcoming until the Soviets are ready to consider serious negotiations for return to Japan of the islands north of Hokkaido which Moscow seized in the final days of World War II. Mr Gorbachev clearly would like to pull his military out of Afghanistan but requires a similar face-saving formula to the one Mr Henry Kissinger patched together with the North Vietnamese.

As a start, and independent of the other several sets of disarmament talks, the US should accept Mr Gorbachev’s offer of negotiations about the removal of Soviet missiles from Asiatic Russia. All nations in the region, with the possible exception of North Korea, should have a vested interest in the success of these negotiations. A prosperous and better populated Asiatic Russia, with less emphasis on militarisation, would benefit the overall prosperity of the Soviet Union as well as the stability of Northeast Asia. The inevitable de-escalation of Sino-Soviet border tensions would release scarce resources for more productive uses, too. A Russian-American agreement on a major disarmament program in Asia would be a strong step in the right direction.
PRC JOURNAL: TALKS MOVING TOWARD 'PARTIAL AGREEMENT'

HK120613 Beijing BAN YUE TAN in Chinese No 14, 25 Jul 87 pp 55-57

[Article by Ju Mengjun (0215 1322 6511): "Soviet-U.S. Relations as Viewed From the Intermediate-Range Missile Talks"]

[Text] Currently there is hope that the two major powers, the Soviet Union and the United States will conclude a partial disarmament agreement. However, since the two sides are on their guard against each other, and there are numerous differences between them, disarmament will still proceed at a slow and difficult pace on the bumpy road of Soviet-American relations.

Improving relations with the United States, and in particular scaling down the level of armaments, is a necessity for the overall Soviet strategy for current domestic social and economic development. After assuming the post of General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev put forth an overall strategy for "speeding up social and economic development." To put an end to the economic stagnation which has lasted for years and to enhance its economic strength, which is far behind that of the United States, the Soviet Union is eager to change its policy of persisting in conducting an arms race with the United States in order to concentrate its main forces on accelerating the state economy.

Currently, although the military might of the Soviet Union is not inferior to that of the United States, its economic strength, in particular the people's living standard, is far behind that of the United States. The Soviet Union is deeply aware that without a powerful economic foundation, it will be difficult for it to confront the United States for a long time. Meanwhile, the depressing state of its economy is sapping the Army's morale and the people's will. In terms of political considerations, this is also detrimental to waging a trial of strength with the United States in the long term. Therefore, the Soviet Union is compelled by the situation to adopt the policy of reducing armaments to work for economic development. On the other hand, the policy serves Soviet long-term interests.

In the last few years, the Soviet Union has made disarmament proposals one after another. This reflects its eager desire for disarmament. The development of events over the last few months is more illustrative of this point.
On 28 February, changing his consistent position of linking the conclusion of an intermediate-range missile agreement with restriction of the U.S. "Star Wars" plan, Gorbachev expressed his willingness to conclude an agreement on elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe with the United States alone. Immediately afterward, the Soviet Union accepted the U.S. principles concerning "on-site verification." In the face of Soviet concessions, the United States proposed that the solution of the problem of intermediate-range missiles be linked with that of the problem of short-range missiles, and demanded inclusion of the reduction of intermediate- and short-range missiles in the agreement on intermediate-range missiles. Again the Soviet Union made a concession on this issue. On 10 April, Gorbachev explicitly agreed, writing Soviet commitment to eliminating all its intermediate- and short-range missiles in the short term into a future U.S.-Soviet agreement on intermediate-range missiles.

Soviet concessions on the question of Euromissiles, which constitute an offensive against the United States, have driven the United States to express its "welcome."

However, Soviet concessions are limited. On the question of endangering the Soviet military balance, the Soviet Union will not retreat. The current Soviet military strategy with regard to the United States is to maintain an overall military balance with the United States, to work hard to get armaments to a lower level and not to lose its superiority in some aspects, and to proceed to strive for synchronous disarmament with the United States as the above goals are achieved.

The Soviet Union has maintained its firm opposition to the U.S. "Star Wars" plan, vital to space military superiority. The Soviet purpose is to prevent the United States from implementing the "Star Wars" plan, or at least to postpone the deployment of the system so as to avoid an immediate space arms race with the United States that would consume large amounts of money.

Under current circumstances, the United States also needs to improve its relations with the Soviet Union, and is willing to conclude one or two disarmament agreements with the latter. As everybody knows, President Ronald Reagan's tenure will expire at the end of next year. If he can do something worthwhile diplomatically with the Soviet Union, in particular conclude one or two disarmament agreements, he will be able to step down from the presidential throne as a "president of peace." In addition, if President Reagan, currently perplexed by the "IranGate" affairs, can make fairly great advances in the arms control negotiations, this will help him get out of the passive position. Moreover, concluding one or two disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union, such as an agreement on intermediate-range missiles, will neither affect the defense forces of the United States and Western Europe nor weaken the U.S. capacity to compete with the Soviet Union. Out of the above-mentioned considerations, the Reagan administration's attitude toward the goal of signing an agreement with the Soviet Union is becoming increasingly clear.

Although, out of their own considerations, the Soviet Union and the United States have expressed the initiative to conclude an agreement in varying degrees, disputes between the two sides remain very fierce. One is that the United States and West Germany demand that the 72 Pershing-1A missiles deployed in West Germany be retained. On this question, a spokesman of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the United States of "adopting an outflanking tactic" that demanded the Soviet Union reduce its intermediate- and short-range missiles to zero while the United States itself retained a considerable number of such missiles. [paragraph continues]
Another is that the United States advocated eliminating intermediate-range missiles worldwide, rather than those in Europe alone. To this, the Soviet Union made a counterproposal: If the Soviet Union is not allowed to retain 100 intermediate-range missile warheads in the Soviet Asia region, the United States must dismantle the nuclear weapons it deploys in such areas as South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. This Soviet counterproposal was promptly rejected by the United States. The third dispute is that the United States intends to redeploy the dismantled cruise missiles to warships at sea and to convert the Pershing-I missiles into short-range ones. The Soviet Union claims that if the United States does so, the Soviet Union will convert all the SS-20 intermediate-range missiles it has deployed in Europe into intercontinental missiles capable of striking the territory of the United States.

Nevertheless, generally speaking, both sides are slowly moving towards the conclusion of a partial agreement. Real and comprehensive disarmament is no easy task, for numerous factors determine that Soviet-American relations will be antagonistic in nature.

Since Soviet Leader Gorbachev is pursuing a "flexible strategy" in diplomatic affairs, and is anxious to achieve synchronous disarmament with the United States, it is therefore possible for the Soviet Union and the United States to extricate themselves from the past deadlocked and icy situation in their relations and to have more dialogue.
USSR: PENTAGON 'SLANDER' AIMED AT CONCEALING U.S. BW ACTIVITY

LD101806 Moscow TASS in English 1736 GMT 10 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow 10 August TASS -- Follows commentary by Vladimir Chernyshev, a TASS military news analyst:

Washington has cooked up a fresh malicious invention. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL published an article alleging that in demonstrating unusual interest in biotechnology and proposing a broadening of East-West information in that field, the Soviet Union pursues military aims. The newspaper quotes as "proof" another allegation contained in the Pentagon's latest report on "Soviet military power" claiming that the Soviet Union uses the said technology to develop bacteriological weapons.

Why this fresh attempt at slandering the Soviet Union? The motive behind that is obvious. First, some people in the USA have been very much frightened by our country's broad peace offensive, as a result of which a Soviet-American treaty can be concluded soon on eliminating two classes of nuclear weapons at once on the global scale.

Second, at the time when international public ever more persistently demands that all types of mass destruction weapons be withdrawn from the military arsenals and, again due to Soviet initiatives, people worldwide can convince themselves that this is a practicable aim, Washington has set out to "camouflage" by means of the anti-Soviet slanders its own effort to create bacteriological weapons.

Since, as the influential American BUSINESS WEEK weekly stressed, under the Reagan administration the Pentagon's programmes for the development of bacteriological weapons grow faster than stems of bacteria in a test-tube. The appropriations channelled to the Pentagon for work in the field of biological weapons grew from 15 million dollars in 1981 to reach 90 million dollars in 1986. Besides, the U.S. Defence Department has requested five million dollars in the current year for the construction of a new test range in Dugway, Utah.

And take, for example, the enthusiasm of U.S. officials over the "grown potentialities" for the creation of bacteriological weapons. It is apt to recall how U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Douglas Feith bluntly said last August, touching upon the subject of the "amazing" successes in biotechnology over the recent five-ten years, that it had become possible to synthesise biological substances designed for combat use. That high-ranking representative of the Pentagon noted, expressing his department's credo on that subject, that it had changed its view on the military uses of bacteriological weapons. He described the potentialities of these weapons as truly great.
Use is made in the Pentagon's programmes of the latest methods of biological science, above all, of gene engineering, enabling to make these weapons even more effective. The claims by a spokesman for the U.S. State Department that these programmes are of a "purely defensive" character and are aimed at developing vaccines for the protection of American soldiers are no more than a camouflage. It is not accidental that the BUSINESS WEEK asks the reasonable question that if this research effort is directed above all at the defence of people, why not place it under the auspices of civilian departments.

It would be apt to ask another question: Why is Washington so much afraid of an East-West exchange of information in the field of biotechnology?

And, at last, it is also apt to recall that the U.S. delegation at the second conference in Geneva (September, 1986) to review the implementation of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction did not support the proposals of other countries that additional international legal commitments, including on the perfection of the mechanism to monitor the implementation of the convention and some confidence-building measures, be outlined.

All this is evidence that the U.S. malicious invention is going to play a role directly opposite to the one assigned to it by its initiators: It will only attract world public attention to the dangerous and illegal actions of the United States itself.

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CSO: 5200/1624
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: REPORTS ON CD DISCUSSION OF SHEVARDNADZE CW OFFER

U.S.-Soviet Consultations

LD101458 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1123 GMT 10 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva, 10 Aug (TASS) -- The sixth round of Soviet-U.S. consultations in Geneva on banning chemical weapons, which are being conducted in accordance with the understanding reached at the Geneva summit meeting in November 1985, has come to an end. In the course of the consultations there was discussion of the key problems, solution of which would promote the early conclusion of an international convention on a complete, effective ban, subject to verification, on chemical weapons and on eliminating the industrial base for producing them.

The Soviet delegation detailed the new initiatives in banning chemical weapons put forward in E.A. Shevardnadze's speech at the Conference on Disarmament 6 August.

In connection with the proposal on mandatory inspections upon request without a right to deny such inspections, it was emphasized within the context of a future convention that the USSR favors establishing the most rigid system of international control over the observance of obligations by countries party to the convention.

Practical aspects of a possible visit by U.S. representatives to a Soviet military facility near the town of Shikhany to get acquainted with standard specimens of chemical munitions and with the technology for destroying chemical weapons on a mobile complex were discussed.

It was agreed that in October 1987 Soviet representatives will visit a U.S. facility for destroying the stocks of chemical weapons at Thule.

U.S. representatives will be invited to visit a special plant for destroying chemical weapons. The plant is under construction in the USSR near the town of Chapayevsk.

The Soviet side emphasized that the realization of the U.S. Administration's plans to begin the production of binary chemical weapons would seriously complicate the conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons.

The Soviet delegation at the bilateral Soviet-U.S. consultations was headed by Ambassador Yuriy Nazarkin, and the U.S. delegation was led by Ambassador Max Friedersdorf.
Nazarkin Addresses Conference

LDI11334 Moscow TASS in English 1327 GMT 11 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva August 11 TASS — The new Soviet initiatives directed at speeding up talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons, set forth by Eduard Shevardnadze on August 6 at a plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, are getting widespread support, it was stated by Yury Nazarkin. The head of the Soviet delegation at the Conference on Disarmament spoke at a regular meeting here today.

The Soviet foreign minister stated that the Soviet delegation at the talks on this question will proceed from the need to make legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without right of refusal, the head of the Soviet delegation went on.

It can be said without exaggeration that this problem now is the key one at the talks. Advance along a whole number of other directions depends on its speediest solution. The purpose of our new initiatives is to make a tangible contribution to the speediest solution of this problem, Yury Nazarkin said further.

On making an all-round study of the existing situation and striving to facilitate the speediest attainment of accord and also proceeding from the need to establish the strictest control over observance of the convention on chemical weapons the Soviet Union decided to go further than the British proposal by accepting the principle that these inspections should be mandatory. We are now applying the mandatory nature of inspections to all possible cases and making this principle universal, Nazarkin said further.

In our opinion the procedure of conducting challenge inspections should reliably ensure the impossibility for a state to conceal the fact and consequences of a violation of the convention, the head of the Soviet delegation stated.

It goes without saying that each challenge should contain the necessary data: what provision of the convention was violated, where and when this suspected violation happened or is happening, and the substance of the suspected violation.

We hold that the challenge for inspection can be made by every signatory state of the convention without exception, the head of the Soviet delegation said further. All should have equal fights. There should be no discrimination whatsoever in connection with the form of ownership of those sites and installations that must be checked.

In our opinion the demand for inspection can be made in respect of any facility and any site on the territory of a signatory state or under its jurisdiction or control, and also belonging to any physical or juridical person of the signatory state regardless of location. This, we believe, would be the necessary condition for making challenge inspections a really effective instrument.
The question of the bodies that will be set up in accordance with the international convention has been discussed lately ever more vigorously and in greater detail, Yurii Nazarkin said. We believe that a preparatory commission consisting of states that signed the convention should be set up after the convention has been signed. This commission, in particular, would work out the necessary measures for the convention's entry into force and implementation (recruitment of staff members of the technical secretariat, the working out of the rules of procedure of the bodies that will be set up under the convention, financial questions, etc). This should be followed by the setting up of the bodies which would begin to function after the convention's entry into force.

In our opinion the speediest completion of work on the convention prohibiting chemical weapons demands the most intensive utilisation of the possibilities that we have, Yurii Nazarkin said. In this connection I would like to draw attention to the question raised by Eduard Shevardnadze on August 6 about holding this year an additional session of the conference with the aim of completing most of the drafting of the convention, the head of the Soviet delegation said in conclusion.

Nazarkin Details Policy Guidelines

AUI11355 Paris AFP in English 1350 GMT 11 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva, Aug 11 (AFP)--The Soviet Union suggested Tuesday in talks here on banning chemical weapons, that alternative verification methods, such as "visual observation," could be used to avoid risks of abuse in a system of on-site inspection. The proposal was made at U.N.-sponsored talks here which aim to introduce a new international convention totally banning the manufacture or stockpiling of chemical weapons.

On Thursday, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told the conference that Moscow accepted the principle of urgent on-site verification if a country was suspected of violating the terms of the new convention.

Soviet representative Yurii Nazarkin explained Tuesday that alternatives to the "thorough inspection of the suspect site" should also be envisaged to avoid abuses of the convention to obtain information unconnected with the manufacture of chemical weapons.

"Such measures must not weaken the principle of mandatory inspections or make exceptions to it," Mr. Nazarkin added. Alternative proposals should also be approved by the country challenging another government, he said.

In Moscow's view, the deadline between a request for verification and carrying out the demand should not exceed 48 hours. Verification procedures should include "a complete access to the facilities by the inspectors." There should also be "visual observation of the facility from the outside, photographing it, chemical samples analysis, a partial access inside the facility," Mr. Nazarkin said.

In the event of unjustified suspicions, the accused country should be allowed to ask for compensation for the losses incurred through the closure of the works due to inspection, Mr. Nazarkin proposed.

The Soviet representative added that the Shikhany works where chemical weapons were being destroyed would be open to inspection on October 7-8 this year, ten days before the inspection of a plant in the U.S. state of Utah offered by Washington on Monday.
IZVESTIYA Cites Nazarkin

PM121609 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Kuznetsov dispatch: "At Disarmament Conference: To Speed Up Conclusion of Convention"]

[Text] Geneva -- The speech by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze came at a moment when the international situation demands new initiatives and new forms of thinking. Argentine delegation head Mario Campora declared, addressing a plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament.

He emphasized the importance of a comprehensive and thorough study of the new Soviet proposals aimed at accelerating the elaboration of specific decisions. Support for the Soviet initiatives was also expressed by the delegations of Peru, Sweden, and other countries.

The plenary session was addressed by Ambassador Yu.K. Nazarkin, head of the USSR delegation. He detailed the new Soviet proposals on banning chemical weapons. It can be said without exaggeration, he declared, that the principle of mandatory inspection on demand without the right to refuse such inspections is now a key problem at the talks.

Progress along a whole series of other avenues will depend on its swiftest solution. We believe the procedure for effecting inspections on demand must reliably guarantee the impossibility of a state concealing the fact and consequences of violations of the convention. Clearly, no more than 48 hours should elapse between the time of the demand and the arrival of an inspection group on site.

In proposing measures to prevent any abuse of such demands and the use of inspections for purposes incompatible with the tasks of verifying pledges under the convention and world also prevent the disclosure of secrets unrelated to chemical weapons, Yu.K. Nazarkin said, we believe such measures ought to be elaborated within the framework of the principle of mandatory inspections rather than contrary to this principle, and they ought not to weaken this principle or create any exceptions to it.

There is no need to repeat how important confidence-building measures are to accelerating the talks. Proceeding from the need to strengthen an atmosphere of trust and guided by the interests of the swiftest conclusion of a convention, the Soviet side has issued an invitation to visit a Soviet military installation near Shikhany to see standard models of chemical munitions in our country and techniques for destroying chemical weapons in the form of a mobile complex. We intend this to take place 7-8 October 1987.

In the future, as construction work is completed on a specialized enterprise for destroying chemical weapons now being built near Chapayevsk in our country, we will invite experts to visit it too. Some time ago the U.S. side invited us to visit an enterprise for the destruction of chemical weapons in Tooele, Utah. We have already informed the U.S. delegation that we accept this invitation, seeing it as a step toward the strengthening of mutual trust.
Only a short time remains, the head of the Soviet delegation said, until the end of the conference's summer session. In our view, the swiftest conclusion of work on a convention to ban chemical weapons demands the most intensive utilization of all the opportunities available to us. In this context, I would like to draw attention to the question raised by the USSR foreign minister 6 August on holding an additional session of the conference this year to basically conclude the elaboration of a convention. Such a session could be held from mid-November (following the conclusion of the examination of disarmament questions in the UN General Assembly's First Committee) through the end of December.

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CSO: 5200/1624
SPANISH PREPARATIONS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE DEFENSE FRUSTRATED

Madrid CAMBIO in Spanish 10 Aug 87 p 7

[Text] The army is planning to equip itself with anti-nuclear and anti-biological warfare materiel. However, the general staff of the army is facing financial difficulties in its attempt to attain the level of other NATO countries in this field.

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CSO: 5200/2854
NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR BLASTS IN OIL, GAS EXPLOITATION STUDIED

For Geological Survey

LD220921 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0830 GMT 22 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow, 22 Jul (TASS) -- A nuclear explosion with a yield of 20 kilotons which was carried out in Yakutiya on 7 July was to step up geological survey work on oil and gas in the Siberian plateau, Aleksandr Zoteyev, general director of the Association for Geological Surveying in the area, said in an interview to the weekly MOSKOVSKIY NOVOSTI.

The nuclear explosion was carried out at a great depth, causing a small earthquake at the epicenter. It was hardly felt at all in the populated areas nearest to it, nor in Mirnyy, the center of the diamond extracting industry, which is situated some 150 km away.

Zoteyev explained that more than twenty encouraging deposits have been found now in eastern Siberia, which includes Yakutiya. A large raw material base for the oil and gas industry of the USSR is being established here.

Recently geologists have discovered very enticing carbonate deposits running along almost the whole of the Siberian plateau. They are laid down in great 400-700 meter oil and gas bearing hard rocks, containing hundreds of millions of tonnes of hydrocarbons, specialists believe. But the low temperatures of the strata and the complex structure of the deposits makes their extraction by conventional methods difficult.

That is why it was decided to use an atomic explosion to act on a deposit which has been more greatly studied and previously determined to contain gas, in order to create artificial cracks on a wide area, thereby increasing by several times the flow of gas. The final data on the results of the experiment will be known in about 6 months time.

To Stimulate Oil, Gas Inflow

LD131226 Moscow TASS in English 1204 GMT 13 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 13 TASS -- An underground nuclear blast conducted yesterday in Yakutiya, in the north of the Soviet Union, was within the framework of experimental work intended to stimulate the inflow of oil and gas from low-permeability rock lying among thick beds of rock salt. A statement to this effect was made to a TASS correspondent by Aleksey Zolotov, head of the oil and gas administration of the USSR Geology Ministry.
"Rock containing oil and gas, but unable to give it out without external impacts is broadly found in the entrails of the earth. Particularly high is the potential of such rock in East Siberia and in Yakutiya," Aleksey Zolotov explained. "The USSR Geology Ministry is studying the possibility of working such deposits. To this end a special technology with the use of underground blasts of nuclear charges is applied.

"Such work was conducted by us before the USSR adopted its unilateral moratorium on nuclear blasts was in effect in the USSR, albeit the experiment has not been completed. In 1987, work was resumed. Three blasts have been conducted. A study of oil in-flow from the bed is currently underway in the field."

Answering the question of how the safety of this work to the environment is ensured, Zolotov said that "blasts are conducted in special, reliably hermetically sealed wells. The technology of work with the use of underground blasts of nuclear charges is well mastered, reliable and excludes any escape of radioactive products to the surface, into subterranean waters and the atmosphere. In so doing use is made of modern instruments and control equipment capable of registering even insignificant changes in the environment. [no end quotation mark as received]"

The explosions were conducted at a large depth. Wells were drilled in the area of the beds and then a nuclear charge was placed in them. The bores were cemented up to the very surface. After a careful check on the air tightness of the shaft a blast was conducted. After the blast there was not even a deformation of the upper layer of the earth in the area of the well.

In about half a year the bores will be opened and then the experts will sum up the final results of the experiment. There is no doubt about its high effectiveness, Aleksey Zolotov said.

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CSO: 5200/1618
TASS REPORTS UPCOMING U.S. NUCLEAR TEST

LD120628 Moscow TASS in English 0627 GMT 12 Aug 87

[Text] San Francisco August 12 TASS -- The U.S. Department of Energy has announced the upcoming regular nuclear test. An underground nuclear explosion rated at between 20 and 150 kilotons will be staged Thursday at eight hours local time, according to a UPI report from the Nevada Nuclear Test Site.

The official spokesman warned that earth vibration caused by the explosion could be felt far beyond the test site. The owners of high-rise buildings in Las Vegas were recommended halting outdoor repair work.

The blast, which was code-named "Tahoka," will be the 11th announced underground nuclear test in the United States since the beginning of 1987. It is conducted by the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory for military purposes.

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CSO: 5200/1618
EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SHEVARDNADZE REPLIES TO MEDITERRANEAN NONALIGNED

LD081811 Moscow TASS in English 1742 GMT 8 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 8 TASS -- The Soviet Union is a staunch supporter of the positive processes in Europe to spread as soon [Moscow TASS in English at 1750 GMT on 8 August transmits a repeat of the item substituting the word "fully" for "soon"] as possible to the Mediterranean as well, says a reply by the Soviet Government to the statement of the Non-Aligned Mediterranean States-Participants in the conference held in the Yugoslav island of Brioni last June, addressed on their behalf by Raif Dizdarevic, federal secretary for foreign affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to the USSR Government. The reply was issued here today.

The reply which Eduard Shevardnadze, foreign minister of the USSR, sent to Raif Dizdarevic points out that the Soviet Union treats with full understanding the non-aligned countries' aspiration to give a decisive impetus to the process of relaxing tension, to make their contribution to lowering the level of military confrontation and enhancing security in the Mediterranean.

This is consonant with the goals of the Soviet foreign policy as well, including in its Mediterranean direction. The specific measures proposed by the non-aligned Mediterranean countries, that aim at achieving military detente in that region which is important to us, are largely congruent with Soviet initiatives.

In the reply the Soviet Government expresses support of the proposal by Malta, Cyprus and Yugoslavia for convening a conference of the CSCE participating states on issues of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean.

The Soviet Union considers it important that all CSCE countries take part in the talks on reducing the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. The non-aligned Mediterranean countries' interest in not to be left outside this process is understandable.

The Soviet Government's reply confirms the readiness to promote dialogue with these countries in the interests of turning the Mediterranean into a zone of stable peace, goodneighborliness and cooperation.

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CSO: 5200/1622
CARPATHIA TROOPS TO HOLD EXERCISES 17–22 AUG

LD101051 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0550 GMT 10 Aug 87

[Embargoed until 1600 GMT 10 August]

[Text] Moscow, 10 August [TASS] — An exercise of troops of the Carpathian Military District will be held between 17–22 August inclusive on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR in the Rava-Russkaya, Yavorov, Gorodok, and Nesterov region. The exercise is being conducted to further improve field training and matters relating to the direction and interaction of various troop arms during the execution of military training tasks.

Formations and units of land troops and air forces totaling 18,000 men will take part in the exercise.

In accordance with the Stockholm conference document, observers from all member states of the CSCE have been invited by the USSR Government.

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CSO: 5200/1622
KASHEV MAKES 'HARSH ATTACKS' ON WEST OVER CSCE DELAY

AU310933 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 31 Jul 87 p 2

[Excerpts] Vienna -- At a summarizing press conference yesterday, 1 day before the summer recess of the CSCE Vienna follow-up meeting, Soviet delegation head Yuriy Kashlev made some rather harsh attacks on the West, especially on the United States. He blamed the NATO states for the fact that the follow-up meeting cannot be concluded today, Friday [31 July] as planned. He said they consciously delayed, even prevented, editing of a final document.

Kashlev called the fact that security questions will continue to be negotiated within the CSCE process the greatest success of the Vienna meeting. He described the proposal presented by the NATO states on Monday [27 July] with regard to a mandate for a future disarmament forum of the 23 members of the military alliances as "interesting, but insufficient." As reported, the East bloc states have different views in particular on the issue of integrating tactical nuclear weapons into the negotiations and on the question of which territories have to be included.

Concerning the participation of the neutral and nonaligned states in future disarmament negotiations, Kashlev said that these 12 states should be guests and that the interests of the neutral and nonaligned states would have to be considered "to the maximum extent."

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CSO: 5200/1622
GERASIMOV VIEWS JARUZELSKI PLAN'S EFFECTS ON TALKS

LD070214 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 2040 GMT 6 Aug 87

[Interview with Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov by correspondent Witold Stefanowicz; date and place not given; live or recorded — Gerasimov speaks in Russian with superimposed Polish translation]

[Text] [Stefanowicz] He is eloquent, witty, and erudite. Sometimes mischievous. The 56-year-old head of the reorganized Department of Information of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Gennadiy Gerasimov, is best known in Poland from press conferences and briefings. He has been interviewed twice by the television news. Together with his main job as spokesman, Gerasimov is also one of the presenters of a weekly review of international events on Soviet television; and it is this role in which we see him now. When asked why he was appointed spokesman, Gerasimov replied: I think they wanted some fresh blood. Diplomats had no training as spokesmen, especially in the past, when it was customary to appear gloomy-faced and answer everything with the word no. His quick-witted remarks circulate around the journalistic community but basically Gennadiy Gerasimov is matter-of-fact, decisive, and, when necessary, hard. This professional journalist, formerly editor-in-chief of the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI weekly, also studied English, French, and German at the well-known Moscow Institute of International Relations. He worked as a correspondent in Prague and then for 5 years in New York.

Despite everything I have just said, the AP agency calls you a former journalist in referring to your post. What would you say to that?

[Gerasimov] I have noticed by now that the AP agency sometimes makes mistakes, just like REUTER. REUTER, for example, gave my age wrong when they wrote about me. AP also made a mistake because I still keep a finger, if I may say so, on journalism. So, as the Americans say, I have two hats. I put them on according to season: either the journalist’s hat or the diplomat’s hat.

[Stefanowicz] Let me ask you the first question of the interview, mainly about the new Polish initiative for arms reductions and confidence building in central Europe: the Jaruzelski plan and the Polish Government memorandum. Could you tell us to what extent the Jaruzelski plan could promote the course of the negotiations in Geneva and Vienna?

[Gerasimov] Well, I like the Jaruzelski plan because it introduces into the negotiating process a proposal for stages, for quantification, let us say. We know the word quantum from physics. No process and I think it is also true of the disarmament process — proceeds smoothly, but through a quantum method, in discrete leaps. The Polish memorandum and the Jaruzelski plan propose decidedly specific stages. We have
published this in PRAVDA. These are stages for the reduction of nuclear weapons; stages for the reduction of conventional weapons; stages for the discussion of doctrines and for formulating what is meant by sufficient quantity. This is interesting. We speak of sufficient quantity regarding the United States and the Soviet Union, but so far we have not spoken of sufficient quantity regarding medium-sized states. I think the memorandum and the Jaruzelski plan represents a significant intellectual contribution to this work.

[Stefanowicz] The Jaruzelski plan for the first time presents the idea of guaranteeing the evolution of military doctrines. Do you think this applies exclusively to military doctrines?

[Gerasimov] That is item three. It is a very interesting item. The point is that we, the Warsaw Treaty states, put forward a document on military doctrines at the last session of the Political Consultative Committee in Berlin. We are proposing to the West: Let us sit down and have a discussion. It is not a theoretical matter, but one connected with the art of war. But the NATO countries are refusing to discuss it because they have developed the strategy of flexible response. Our principle of sufficient quantity does not fit in with the strategy of flexible response. That is why they now do not want to discuss this matter. But if we continue to persist, perhaps something might come of it. It is necessary for NATO military thinking and Warsaw Treaty military thinking to get closer to one another. If both sides, as it is emphasized, are proceeding exclusively from defensive positions, then precisely here we have grounds for agreement on military doctrines.

[Stefanowicz] That is right, everything is based on confidence. Could you remind us of the Soviet Government’s position on the Jaruzelski plan and our memorandum?

[Gerasimov] We fully support the plan and the memorandum. I have spoken about this at one of my conferences. I hope the Polish press noticed it and published it. So, we welcome it with satisfaction. We generally welcome all fresh initiatives on disarmament.

[Stefanowicz] How, in your view, could the Jaruzelski plan help in realizing the Soviet Union’s plan to take mankind into the 21st century without nuclear weapons — the idea that is called the Gorbachev plan?

[Gerasimov] Our plan is strategic, monumental, and we think practical. The Polish plan, if I may say so, is a tactical, concrete plan, connected with reducing arms in central Europe on both sides. This can, of course, be treated as one of the first steps in realizing our global plan. So I think there is something of a correlation between a part and the whole. I think both plans supplement each other. The Polish one, just like ours, represents a reflection of our philosophy, which always proclaims nuclear disarmament.

[Stefanowicz] Thank you, Gennadiy Ivanovich.

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CSO: 5200/1622
USSR'S KARPOV ON EUROPE'S DISARMAMENT BORDERS

NC130747 Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 10 Aug 87 p 15

[Unattributed report: "Karpov: The Key Man"]

[Excerpts] Moscow (HURRIYET) -- While the Soviet Union is trying to avoid adopting a definite stand on the question of including the Turkish-Soviet border region within the zone in which conventional arms will be reduced, a matter about which Turkey is very sensitive, Viktor Karpov, the chief soviet arms negotiator, has told HURRIYET: "The boundaries of the zone in which conventional arms will be reduced will be determined by the talks in Vienna." [passage omitted]

HURRIYET's correspondent in Moscow, Ertugrul Ozkok, has asked Karpov: "Various initiatives regarding arms control have mentioned a zone stretching from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. Can you define this region?"

Karpov said "It is common knowledge that proposals forwarded by the socialist countries in Budapest regarding arms reduction in Europe have defined Europe's geographic boundaries as stretching from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. In terms of the Soviet Union, it becomes obvious that all Soviet territory in Europe will be included in this zone. We are maintaining this approach at the Vienna talks and in unofficial consultations between the Warsaw Pact and the 23 NATO countries. The geographic boundaries of the zone will be delineated during efforts to determine the task related to the talks."

Karpov's remarks indicate that the Soviet Union is trying to avoid a categorical stand on the boundaries within which conventional arms will be reduced.

/9604
CS0: 5200/1623
USSR COMMENTS FURTHER ON DPRK'S PEACE PROPOSAL

Moscow Echoes PRC Support

0W010345 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1500 GMT 30 Jul 87

[Text] China holds that the U.S. Government and the South Korean authorities should respond positively to the new and important proposal made by the DPRK and enter into serious consultations with the DPRK on how to ease the situation on the Korean peninsula. This is stated in the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement released by XINHUA. The statement supported the 23 July 1987 statement made by the DPRK Government. The following is our observer's commentary on this report:

The Soviet people are very pleased to hear reports that the Soviet Union and China, the largest socialist countries in the world, hold identical opinions on important international problems, including that the problem of eliminating the cause of the long, tense situation on the Korean peninsula should be resolved. What concerns the Soviet Union and China is how to create the necessary conditions for the two sides on the Korean peninsula to end confrontation, for the U.S. troops to withdraw from South Korea, and for the two sides to hold dialogue aimed at achieving independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

The Soviet Union and China support the new proposal spelled out in the 23 July 1987 DPRK Government statement. The new proposal was made for the very purpose of attaining the aforementioned objectives. People's Korea proposed a series of steps. The first step is for the two sides to carry out an initial reduction of armed forces between 1988 and 1991, bringing the number of troops on each side down to about 100,000 men by 1992. In addition, it is proposed that the United States gradually reduce its military presence in South Korea during this period. After the two sides have each reduced their troops to 100,000 men, all U.S. troops should be pulled out of South Korea. The United States should not only remove its nuclear weapons from South Korea but also dismantle its military bases there.

The Soviet Union has steadfastly taken the position that no foreign military bases should be established anywhere in the world and that all troops stationed in the territory of other countries should be withdrawn. Comrade Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet Union, completely affirmed the above position in his speech at Vladivostok.

The new proposal made by People's Korea has laid the concrete groundwork for Pyongyang, Washington, and Seoul to hold political talks. The purpose of the three-party talks would be to realize at an early date a stage-by-stage reduction of the foreign military involvement on the Korean peninsula. The proposal made by People's Korea called for holding such talks in Geneva in March 1988.
TASS Cites DPRK Statement

LD061820 Moscow TASS in English 1754 GMT 6 Aug 87

[Text] Pyongyang August 6 TASS -- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea holds that the USA must take part in the North-South talks on disarmament as well, a spokesman for the DPRK's Foreign Ministry said in a statement released by the Korean Central News Agency today. This statement comes in reaction to the August 3 reply by South Korean Foreign Ministry to the DPRK proposal on disarmament. Seoul offered to hold bilateral talks on this issue.

The disarmament issue should be solved first of all if there is to be a dialogue on the relaxation of tension and the preservation and strengthening of peace on the Korean peninsula, the statement points out. The responsibility for a build-up of armaments in southern Korea and for an exacerbation of military confrontation rests with the USA. Therefore, the question of effective measures on disarmament cannot be solved without the participation of the USA.

In this connection, it is suggested that foreign ministers of northern and southern Korea hold talks in the near future in Geneva or any other convenient place, attended by the U.S. secretary of state, to examine the concrete issues of disarmament. The DPRK proposes to hold a preparatory meeting of deputy ministers in Panmunjom. It can take place in late August this year or any other time agreed by the sides.

If the USA and South Korea regard this three-way meeting unacceptable, the DPRK proposes as an alternative to organise two bilateral meetings, one between the South and North and the other between the DPRK and the USA.

As for other, domestic, problems involved in the reunification of the motherland, they must be discussed at the table of negotiations by representatives of the North and South, the Foreign Ministry Spokesman points out in the statement.

TASS Further Examines Statement

LD071212 Moscow TASS in English 1115 GMT 7 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 7 TASS -- TASS Political News Analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has issued a statement on the issue of lowering the level of military confrontation and easing tension on the Korean Peninsula, which details related proposals for multilateral talks made last month by the DPRK Government and takes into account the reply to those proposals by South Korea which has suggested, for its part, resuming bilateral dialogue to "discuss outstanding issues" between the north and south of the country.

Greeting in principle the readiness to such dialogue, the DPRK, nonetheless, proceeds from the conviction that the basis for discussing any problems should be the resolution of the issue of disarmament and detente on the Korean Peninsula.

Obviously, it is essential in dealing with these issues to act with regard to reality which is very disquieting. Facing each other on the Korean Peninsula are major contingents of the armed forces of north and south.
The state of confrontation is aggravated by the presence in the south of a considerable contingent of U.S. Armed Forces, which are continuing to build up their military might there and moving newest offensive weapons into South Korea, including delivery vehicles for nuclear munitions already deployed there.

Any accidental occurrence and unpremeditated incident can again ignite the flames of a military conflict which can escalate into a nuclear war.

This must be allowed by no means [sentence as received]. This is why it is vital without delay to bring down the level of military confrontation and achieve balance between the armed forces deployed on the opposite sides of the military demarcation line at the lowest possible level by making phased cuts in the armed forces of north and south, reducing and evacuating American troops, up to, and including, their complete pullout, and eliminating nuclear weapons and American military bases from the south of Korea.

U.S. military presence is an integral and may be the most essential part of the present dangerous confrontation on the Korea Peninsula and a factor for continuously exacerbating it.

This is why the proposals by the DPRK Government appear quite natural and sensible.

The Foreign Ministry of the DPRK said in its statement that it is the United States that is responsible for the build up arms in the south of Korea and the heightening of military confrontation on the peninsula and for this reason no effective measures are possible without its participation.

The DPRK suggests in this connection holding in Geneva or any other convenient place talks between the foreign ministers of the north and south of Korea with the participation of the U.S. secretary of state to examine specific disarmament issues.

It proposes holding a preliminary meeting at deputy minister level in Panmunjom.

If the United States and South Korea consider such a tripartite preliminary meeting unacceptable, the DPRK suggests as an alternative organizing two bilateral meetings -- between north and south and between the DPRK and the United States.

As for the issues of the homeland's reunification, they should obviously the resolved at the negotiating table by the Koreans themselves without any outside interference.

The DPRK has demonstrated its active stand and flexible and constructive approach to the issues of promoting disarmament and improving the situation in the Far East and the Asian-Pacific Region as a whole. The ever new peace proposals it has been making have met with increasing understanding and support on the part of the world's nations and the entire international community.
PRAVDA Reports

PM071403 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Aug 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "For Detente on the Korean Peninsula"]

[Text] Pyongyang, 6 Aug -- The DPRK believes that the United States should also participate in the North-South talks on disarmament, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman statement released today by KCNA states. It is the United States which bears the responsibility for the arms buildup in southern Korea and for the exacerbation of military confrontation on the peninsula. That is why any effective measures would be impossible without its participation.

Repeating to the recent DPRK proposals to hold multilateral talks on the disarmament question, the statement goes on to point out, South Korea for its part has proposed resuming bilateral dialogue in order to "discuss questions awaiting solution" between the North and the South. Welcoming in principle the readiness for such a dialogue, the DPRK nonetheless proceeds on the basis that the resolution of the disarmament issue and the easing of tension on the Korean peninsula should be the basis for a discussion of any problems.

In this regard it is proposed in the very near future to hold talks in Geneva or another suitable venue between the foreign ministers of North and South Korea with the participation of the U.S. secretary of state, and to examine specific disarmament issues. With a view to preparing for such talks the DPRK is proposing holding a preliminary meeting in Panmunjom at deputy minister level. If the United States and South Korea consider such a tripartite preliminary meeting unacceptable, the DPRK proposes as an alternative organizing two bilateral meetings -- between the North and the South and between the DPRK and the United States.

As for the questions of the unification of the motherland, these must undoubtedly be resolved around the negotiating table by Koreans themselves without outside interference, the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman statement stresses.

Shevardnadze Support Cited

LD081519 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 8 Aug 87

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze, foreign minister of the USSR, today met Kim Yong-Nam, foreign minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), who is on a stop-over in Moscow enroute to the homeland.

Kim Yong-Nam conveyed the personal message by Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee, president of the DPRK, to Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

During the talk the ministers discussed some urgent matters on the further development of Soviet-Korean relations and also central issues of the situation in the Far East and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.
The importance of the Soviet Union's new initiatives contained in Mikhail Gorbachev's interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA was noted. The Soviet Union supports the proposals for normalization of the situation in the Korean Peninsula contained in the DPRK government statement of 23 July. The participants in the discussion expressed confidence that the deepening of all-round Soviet-Korean cooperation on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism corresponds to the interests of the peoples of both countries and promotes the strengthening of peace and security in the Far East.

The talk passed in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding.

/9604
CSO: 5200/1625
MALAYSIAN PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES ASIAN SECURITY IN MOSCOW

Arrives 29 July

PM311149 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jul 87 Morning Edition pp 1, 4

[TASS report: "Official Visit"]

[Excerpt] Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed arrived in Moscow on 29 July on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

At Vnukovo Airport Mahathir bin Mohamed and his wife were greeted on the tarmac by V.S. Murakhovskyi, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and his wife; E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister; and N.V. Talzy, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The welcoming party included V.M. Kamenshev and B.L. Tolstykh, deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers; M.S. Smirnykov, USSR Council of Ministers administrator of affairs; USSR Ministers B.I. Aristov, A.N. Volkov, B.I. Gostev, and N.V. Lemayev; K.F. Katushev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; K.M. Kharchev, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Council for Religious Affairs; V.I. Tikhonov, USSR first deputy minister of the maritime fleet; I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister; F.I. Potapenko, USSR ambassador to Malaysia; Army General S.I. Postnikov, ground forces first deputy commander in chief; and other officials.

The welcoming party also included M.M. Sathiah, Malaysian ambassador to the USSR, and the heads of Southeast Asian countries' diplomatic missions in the USSR.

On the same day Soviet-Malaysian talks began in the Kremlin.

On the Soviet side the talks are being conducted by V.S. Murakhovskyi. Taking part are E.A. Shevardnadze, N.V. Talzy, V.M. Kamenshev, B.L. Tolstykh, B.I. Aristov; USSR Maritime Fleet Minister Yu.M. Volmer; B.I. Gostev, N.V. Lemayev, K.F. Katushev, I.A. Rogachev, and F.I. Potapenko;
On the Malaysian side — Mahathir bin Mohamed; Sami Vellu, minister of works and utilities; Lim Keng Yaik, minister of primary industries; Rafidah Aziz, minister of trade and industry; Abu Hassan Omar, foreign minister; Lau Khiyeng Ding [name as published], deputy minister of science, technology, and the environment; M.M. Sathiah; Ahmad Bin Yusof [name as published], director general of the prime minister's department; General Datuk Khashim Mokhd Ali [name as published], ground forces commander; and Razali Ismail [name as published], deputy secretary general of the Foreign Ministry.

On 30 July the Malaysian Government head visited the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and laid a wreath. He observed a minute's silence in memory of the founder of the Soviet state.

Mahathir bin Mohamed paid tribute to the Soviet troops who gave their lives in the struggle against fascism for the sake of world peace. He laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier near the Kremlin Wall.

The visitor was accompanied by B.L. Tolstykh and other officials.

Gorbachev-Mahathir Talks

LD311753 Moscow TASS in English 1731 GMT 31 Jul 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 31 Jul (TASS)—The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev had a meeting in the Kremlin today with the Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir bin Mohamed, who is on an official visit in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has outlined the concept of its relations with countries of the Asia-Pacific region in Vladivostok, Mikhail Gorbachev said. This concept is based on an analysis of real processes in this huge region. One of the realities characteristic of this region and of the world in general is the striving of countries and peoples for independent development.

Mahathir bin Mohamed said that the ideas contained in the Vladivostok speech and the interview to the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA were received with interest in Malaysia. He said his country proceeded from the premise that the Soviet Union is an Asian and Pacific power and has interests in that region and in the world as a whole. The Malaysian Government holds that in showing interest in the Asia-Pacific region the Soviet Union guides itself not by a striving for rivalry but by interests of strengthening stability in the Asia-Pacific region which needs it. Malaysia is not worried by the Soviet initiatives. As an independent country Malaysia has its own point of view and intends firmly to uphold it.
Murakhovskiy Speech

PM311133 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report on speech by V.S. Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at 30 July Kremlin dinner in honor of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed under the general heading "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Excerpts] V.S. Murakhovskiy's Speech

We also discussed other questions of a global and regional nature of interest to both sides. Common approaches and common interests on many of these questions came to light, although our viewpoints did not coincide in everything. It is important that a comparison of assessments and views leads to better mutual understanding and expands the scope for cooperation and joint quests for solutions to urgent problems.

I would like to dwell particularly on the tasks of safeguarding peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The still tense and sometimes explosive situation in the area, the continuation of the arms race, and strong-arm confrontation in various parts of the region are leading to a further growth in world tension and are threatening the stability of international trade and economic ties. All this directly damages the national interests of the peoples living there.

The USSR is a consistent and convinced proponent of turning Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans into an arena of peace, good-neighborliness, and cooperation. We consider security in this region to be an important prerequisite and component element in the creation of a comprehensive international security system.

Our vision of a peaceful and secure future for the Asia-Pacific region and our understanding of the ways and means of advancing toward this goal were clearly and precisely set forth in the program issued exactly 1 year ago by M.S. Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech and subsequently developed and made concrete in his speeches during his visit to India. That was where a document of historic importance -- the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent and nuclear-free world -- was launched. These two events were important milestones in the search for peace and security in a vast part of the world inhabited by more than half of all mankind.

The major initiatives which M.S. Gorbachev recently advanced in his interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA were weighty new confirmation of the USSR's resolve to promote an improvement in the situation. They were received positively both in Asian countries and worldwide, because they are consonant with the peoples' aspirations.

We highly assess the fact that these initiatives also met with a positive and interested response from the Malaysian leadership.

An opportunity has now appeared to conclude an agreement with Washington on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles both in Europe and in Asia -- in other words, to implement the "global double-zero" concept. This first step could open up prospects for other larger-scale accords linked in the most direct fashion with the problems of international security, including in Asia and the Pacific.
A reduction in military confrontation, the elimination of foreign military presence, and the comprehensive development of interregional and pan-Asian dialogue as an inalienable part of the process of strengthening confidence among states would be of great importance for improving the region's situation.

The implementation of the constructive program advanced recently by the DPRK Government for a phased reduction in armed forces in the North and South and for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea by 1992 would radically improve the situation on the Korean peninsula.

The Soviet Union takes a positive view of the joint efforts being made by Malaysia along with the other ASEAN countries to improve the situation in Southeast Asia and to create a nuclear-free zone in the region, which would be an important contribution on the road to a nuclear-free world.

Relationships in the modern world are such that no one country -- however far removed it might be from the line of nuclear confrontation -- can live a peaceful and full life until the threat of nuclear war has been averted and until people are faced with the alternative of surviving together or perishing together. This is the situation in which -- as the Malaysian expression vividly puts it -- "the victor turns into ashes, and the vanquished into coal."

The Soviet-Malaysian talks are not yet over, but already one fundamentally important conclusion can be drawn: Both sides have expressed their firm conviction that now more than ever it is vital to step up our efforts along with all other interested states with a view to maintaining and strengthening peace, averting the nuclear threat, and seeking ways leading to a just political solution to Asian and global problems.

Mahathir Speech

PM021427 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report on speech by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed at 30 July Kremlin dinner in his honor under the general heading "In a Friendly Atmosphere"; "Speech by Mahathir bin Mohamed"]

[Excerpts] As a nonnuclear country firmly devoted to the cause of peace and disarmament, Malaysia welcomes your nuclear disarmament initiatives. We agree with you that the world must overcome the threat created by nuclear confrontation and that new thinking and political courage are needed to stop the arms race. We hope that the Geneva talks will soon bear definite fruit for the good of mankind. If the threat of nuclear war is averted and a spirit of goodwill prevails in relations among countries, that would make it possible to resolve without difficulty many other urgent questions. One need only imagine the enormous resources which would thereby be released for the constructive development of states and all mankind.
As a nonnuclear country firmly devoted to the cause of peace and disarmament, Malaysia welcomes your nuclear disarmament initiatives. We agree with you that the world must overcome the threat created by nuclear confrontation and that new thinking and political courage are needed to stop the arms race. We hope that the Geneva talks will soon bear definite fruit for the good of mankind. If the threat of nuclear war is averted and a spirit of goodwill prevails in relations among countries, that would make it possible to resolve without difficulty many other urgent questions. One need only imagine the enormous resources which would thereby be released for the constructive development of states and all mankind.

Our talks revealed a coincidence of views between the Soviet Union and Malaysia on many global problems. We share your interest in disarmament and your desire to strengthen security on a global scale. Both our countries support the role of the United Nations and the UN institutions. Both you and we wholly support the struggle for freedom and human dignity under way in southern Africa. Our views coincide with regard to the position on the Near East. As a nonaligned country, Malaysia welcomes the understanding with which the Soviet Union approaches the aspirations of the Nonaligned Movement.

Malaysia recognizes that the Soviet Union is part and parcel of the Asia-Pacific region. In this context we welcome the important statement on the questions of security in Asia and the Pacific issued by General Secretary Gorbachev in Vladivostok last year. This statement was a timely reminder that the Soviet Union attaches due importance to its place and role among the Asian and Pacific countries. We recognized with satisfaction that the Soviet Union is prepared to cooperate with the United States in ending the arms race, to improve relations with China and Japan, to withdraw its troops from other countries' territories, and to strengthen its relations with other states in the region, including Malaysia.

Malaysia and the other ASEAN members are profoundly concerned about the prospects for peace, stability, and regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, we clearly recognize that in view of the complexity and diversity of the Pacific countries these questions cannot be resolved on the basis of the customary approaches used in the past.

The settlement of the aforesaid unresolved conflicts and the subsequent demilitarization of the region in conjunction with other "confidence-building measures" will undoubtedly allow the countries of the Asia-Pacific region to pool their efforts to utilize the region's immense potential in the interests of ensuring the prosperity of its peoples. Without progress on the questions I have mentioned the region will remain split and potentially unstable.
End of Moscow Talks

PM040939 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "In a Constructive Atmosphere"]

[Excerpts] Talks between Vsevolod Murakhovskyi, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed, who is in the Soviet Union on an official visit at the Soviet Government's invitation, ended in the Kremlin on 31 July.

Participating in the talks on the Soviet side were: E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister; N.V. Talyzin, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; V.M. Kamentsev and B.L. Tolstykh, deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers; B.I. Aristov, Yu.M. Volmer, B.I. Costev, and N.V. Lemayev, USSR ministers; K.F. Katushev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister; and F.I. Potapenko, USSR ambassador to Malaysia.

Participating on the Malaysian side were: Samy Vellu, minister of works and utilities; Lim Keng Yaik, minister of primary industries; Rafidah Aziz, minister of trade and industry; Abu Hassan Omar, minister of foreign affairs; Lau Khiyeng Ding [name as published], deputy minister of science, technology, and the environment; M.M. Sathiah, Malaysian ambassador to the USSR: Admah bin Yusof [name as published], director general of the prime minister's department; General Khashim Mokhd Ali [name as published], commander of the ground forces; and Razali Ismail [name as published], Foreign Ministry deputy secretary general.

Views were exchanged in detail on ways to develop Soviet-Malaysian relations and ways to solve pressing international problems, including problems in the Asia-Pacific region and Southeast Asia.

The Soviet side stressed that its approach to solving international problems is based on the pressing need to save mankind from the nuclear threat. [paragraph continues]

It was noted that thanks to the Soviet Union's constructive initiative real prospects have now been opened for drafting and quickly signing an agreement between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons -- medium-range and theater missiles in Europe and Asia.

Mahathir bin Mohamed stated that the restructuring in the Soviet Union, the expansion of openness, and the dynamism and flexibility of its foreign policy are having a positive impact on the world and are creating more favorable conditions for the development of Soviet-Malaysian relations. He spoke highly of the Soviet disarmament proposals and noted their great importance for ensuring mankind's survival.

When the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and Southeast Asia was discussed, the Soviet side stressed that the USSR fully supports the constructive course of the three Indochinese countries to achieve a political settlement of the situation around Cambodia and views as fruitful the idea of national reconciliation in Cambodia. Malaysia and other ASEAN countries could play a positive role in this process.
On stating Malaysia's positive attitude toward the Vladivostok initiatives, Mahathir bin Mohamed welcomed the new Soviet proposals outlined by Mikhail Gorbachev in his answers to the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA.

A joint communiqué was adopted on the results of the visit and will be published.

Mahathir Interview

LD312146 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 31 Jul 87

[Interview with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed by commentator Sergey Alekseyev on the "Vremya" newscast in Moscow on 31 July "following the news conference"—recorded; Mahathir's answers in English with superimposed Russian translation]

[Excerpt] [Alekseyev] Thanks. The second question: In his recent interview for the Indonesian daily, MERDEKA, Mikhail Sergeyvich Gorbachev highly appraised the potential ASEAN countries have for achieving stabilization, security, and peace in East Asia. Could you say what specific steps ASEAN countries and Malaysia in particular intend to take along this path in the immediate future?

[Mahathir] Malaysia is very interested in a stabilization of the situation in Southeast Asia. We are ready to examine any measures conducive to a settlement of the situation surrounding Cambodia and are of the opinion that the USSR can play an important part here, possibly having suggested ways acceptable to all interested sides for the purpose of solving the problems. I see one such way in the talks with Hanoi.

As for the ASEAN states' antinuclear efforts, we have plans to create a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. However, we want all the world to be nuclear-free. That is why we support the proposals to eliminate medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles from Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. We are striving for disarmament to be achieved, and we want this region to be free of nuclear weapons.

[Alekseyev] On behalf of our television viewers, I thank you and wish you a successful conclusion to the program of your visit to our country.

TASS Report on Malaysian Press

LD011228 Moscow TASS in English 1031 GMT 1 Aug 87

[Excerpt] Kuala Lumpur, 1 Aug, TASS — "The Soviet Union Supports Efforts To Ensure Security in South-East Asia," "Malaysia Welcomes the Soviet Union's New Approach." These two headlines have been given by the newspaper "UTUSAN MALAYSIA" to the reports on the official visit to the USSR of Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad. They most accurately reflect the reaction in Malaysia to the course of the visit. After the meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, Mahathir bin Mohamad said that the Soviet Union and Malaysia are unanimous in their realisation of the need for a new approach to the resolution of international problems, further search for a peaceful, political settlement.

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The central subject of the local press comments is the unanimity of the Soviet and Malaysian leadership on international issues. "UTUSAN MALAYSIA" points out that Mahathir bin Mohamad has carried from his conversation with the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee a "firm conviction of the seriousness" of the Soviet Union's intentions to work for peace, including in the Asia-Pacific region. The USSR's preparedness has again been stressed to eliminate medium-range missiles in the Asian part of its territory is evidence of their determination to ensure the security of the peoples of Asia and the Pacific.

The sincerity of Moscow's peaceful strivings is seen, in the opinion of "UTUSAN MALAYSIA" from the attention with which it treated the efforts of Malaysia and the other ASEAN member countries to stabilise the situation in South-East Asia, to turn the region into a nuclear free zone.

Mahathir News Conference

LD311625 Moscow TASS in English 1522 GMT 31 Jul 87

[Excerpt] Moscow, 31 Jul (TASS)—"We are quite satisfied with the results of the visit to the Soviet Union and hope that the conversations that took place will help extend relations with the Soviet people in the interests of both countries," said Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed, in the USSR on an official visit. He made this statement today at a press conference held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Centre for Soviet and foreign journalists.

The prime minister said that there was a coincidence of views in Moscow on a whole set of international issues, but there were, of course, differences in views as well. As for bilateral relations, the prime minister said, areas were outlined for extending cooperation, which included not only trade but also political and cultural ties.

The Malaysian Government closely studied Mikhail Gorbachev's interview to the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA and Malaysia agrees on the whole with the position expressed in it. Malaysia supports the provisions put forth by the Soviet leader in the Vladivostok speech.

"We understood," Mahathir bin Mohamed said, "that the Soviet Union shows serious interest in normalising the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, which could lead to lessening tensions in the world. "The Soviet Union," the prime minister stressed, "is prepared to cooperate with the United States as well in the interests of peace."

ASEAN countries have officially proclaimed the creation of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South East Asia. The problem of a nuclear-free zone in the region is yet to be solved. However, Malaysia favours this and would like to see the entire world free from nuclear weapons.
Mahathir Remarks in Leningrad

BK050842 Kuala Lumpur International Service in English 0600 GMT 5 Aug 87

[Text] Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir has stressed that differing political systems practised by the two different countries should not be a hindrance to them seeking cooperation for mutual benefit. He said although Malaysia and the Soviet Union have different systems of government, both face numerous problems, including that of raising sufficient funds to improve the living conditions of their people. As responsible people, both have to find ways and means of solving these problems. The prime minister, who ends a 1-week official visit to the Soviet Union today, said this after attending a briefing on efforts of rebuilding the city of Leningrad following its destruction by Nazis during World War II. The briefing was given by the deputy mayor of the city, Mr Labetskiy. Present were members of the city council's executive committee and senior members of the prime minister's delegation.

Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir said he had visited the Soviet Union to enhance bilateral relations and to increase trade. He said that after his week-long visit and discussions with a number of Soviet leaders, he was more than convinced of a considerable potential for the two countries to broaden economic links. Earlier, Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir laid a wreath at the Piskarevskoye memorial cemetery.

Soviet-Malaysian Joint Communique

PM061505 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Aug 87 Morning Edition pp 1, 4

["Soviet-Malaysian Joint Communique" -- IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed of Malaysia visited the Soviet Union 29 July through 5 August on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

During his stay in Moscow the Malaysian head of government visited the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and laid a wreath. A wreath was also laid at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin Wall. The ranking guest and his party visited the Uzbek SSR where they toured the sights of Tashkent, Samarkand, and Khiva, and they also visited Leningrad where they laid a wreath at Piskarevskoye Cemetery. A warm reception was accorded to the Malaysian Prime Ministers and members of his delegation everywhere.

M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had a meeting with Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed.

Talks were held between V.S. Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Malaysian Prime Minister which were attended by:

E.A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and foreign minister; N.V. Talyzin, CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member, Council of Ministers first deputy chairman, and Gosplan chairman; V.M. Kamentsev, Council of Ministers deputy chairman; B.L. Tolstyk, Council of Ministers deputy chairman and State Committee for Science and Technology chairman; B.I. Aristov, foreign trade minister; Yu.M. Volmer, maritime fleet minister; B.I. Gostev, finance minister; N.V. Lemayev, minister of petroleum refining and the petrochemical industry; K.F. Katushev, chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; I.A. Rogachev, deputy foreign minister; and F.I. Potapenko, ambassador to Malaysia, on the Soviet side;
Samy Vellu, works and utilities minister; Lim Keng Yaik, minister of primary industries; Rafidah Aziz, minister of trade and industry; Abu Hassain Omar, minister of foreign affairs; Law Hieng Ding, deputy minister of science, technology, and environment; M.M. Sathiah, Malaysian ambassador to the USSR; Ahmad Mohamed Yusof, director general of the prime minister's department; Hashim Mohamed Ali, commander of the ground forces; Akhmad Sardzhi Abdul Hamid [name as published], secretary general of the ministry of trade and industry; Vong Kum Chun [name as published] secretary general of the ministry of primary industries; Razali Ismail, deputy secretary general of the ministry of foreign affairs; and Abdul Rakhim Mohamed Nur [name as published], chief of the police department, on the Malaysian side.

The talks were marked by a spirit of friendship, goodwill, and a desire for cooperation and the achievement of greater mutual understanding.

The distinguished Malaysian guest was briefed on the initial results of the restructuring now being carried out in the Soviet Union, the steps to accelerate the country's socioeconomic development, and the progress of preparations to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Mahathir bin Mohamed described the progress of the implementation of Malaysia's national development program.

The current state and prospects of Soviet-Malaysian relations were discussed, as were key international problems of mutual interest.

The participants in the talks expressed gratification with the positive development of bilateral relations and confirmed their mutual desire to expand mutual cooperation and exchanges in various spheres on the basis of existing bilateral agreements and the Soviet-Malaysian joint communique of 26 September 1979.

Recognizing the usefulness of regular consultations between the two countries' foreign ministries and of consultations and cooperation within the framework of international organizations and forums, the sides agreed to continue to expand such consultations. A Soviet-Malaysian protocol on consultations was accordingly signed during the visit.

It was emphasized that contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Malaysian parliament help to deepen mutual understanding between the peoples of both countries.

When examining bilateral trade and economic relations, the sides agreed to continue to develop cooperation on a mutually advantageous basis. They agreed to assist the expansion of contacts between representatives of business circles and the establishment of cooperation between the two countries' chambers of trade and industry.

An agreement on maritime transport and an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation between the governments of the USSR and Malaysia were signed during the visit.

A cooperation agreement was also signed between the USSR Chamber of Trade and Industry and the Malaysian National Chamber of Trade and Industry.

The sides will continue to encourage contacts and exchanges in line with the 4 October 1972 agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation.
During the exchange of opinions on international problems, both sides expressed concern at the persisting international tension and especially the whipping up of the nuclear and conventional arms race and the development of new types of nuclear and other weapons. They agreed that all states, regardless of their size and socioeconomic system, must be aware of their responsibility to mankind and pool their efforts for the purpose of preventing a nuclear war, terminating the arms race, and securing disarmament.

The Malaysian side's attention was drawn to the decisions adopted at the Berlin conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee, and in particular to the ideas and initiatives put forth there concerning these states' military doctrine, which is defensive in nature. Emphasis was placed on the great importance of the USSR's comprehensive proposals on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe and Asia.

Mahathir bin Mohamed noted the great importance of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space arms and expressed the hope that specific results will be achieved at them in the interests of international peace and security.

The Soviet Union and Malaysia advocate the termination of all nuclear tests, the speediest conclusion of a multilateral treaty on their complete and final prohibition under effective international verification, the speediest elaboration of an international convention banning chemical weapons, the prevention of the spread of the arms race to outer space, and the development of international cooperation in the utilization of outer space for peaceful purposes.

The sides affirmed their principled position in favor of the need to settle conflicts and arguments by peaceful means, on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national independence of states.

Having pointed out the imperative need for a just, all-embracing, and lasting settlement of the Near East conflict through talks, the sides agreed that a significant contribution to the cause of solving this major international problem could be made by the convening of an international peace conference on the Near East under UN auspices, to be attended on an equal basis by all interested sides including the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The participants in the talks expressed serious concern in connection with the explosive situation in Southern Africa. They reaffirmed the common viewpoint that the settlement of the conflict in that region demands the elimination of its primary causes, like the disgusting and inhuman apartheid system in South Africa and the ongoing occupation of Namibia by Pretoria’s racist white minority regime as part of its policy of destabilization and aggression against neighboring countries, and also the restoration of majority rule. They expressed solidarity with the Frontline States and called on the international community to take energetic measures to immediately ensure genuine independence for Namibia strictly in accordance with UN and OAU resolutions. Emphasis was placed on the immediate need for the UN security Council to impose all-embracing mandatory sanctions against the racist regime in Pretoria under Article VII of the UN Charter.

The USSR and Malaysia expressed profound anxiety in connection with the continuing war between Iran and Iraq and called for the speediest political settlement of the conflict. In this context they acclaimed the role played by the UN Security Council in the quest for ways for an immediate cease-fire and the restoration of peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region.
During the discussion of the situation in Asia and the Pacific stress was placed on the need to achieve lasting peace and stability and establish equal and mutually advantageous cooperation between the countries in the region. The sides agreed that close joint efforts by all states in the region are needed in order to advance toward these goals.

The Malaysian prime minister was briefed on the practical steps being taken by the Soviet Union to implement a policy of cooperation, peace, and security in the Asian and Pacific region, as outlined by M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok a year ago and developed and concretized during his visit to India and in his recent interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA. The Soviet side also emphasized the importance of the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons, as formulated in the Delhi declaration.

Mahathir bin Mohamed declared a positive attitude toward the Soviet Union's desire, expressed in the Vladivostok speech by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to preserve and strengthen peace in the Asian and Pacific region. The Malaysian prime minister also acclaimed the new Soviet initiatives outlined in M.S. Gorbachev's interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA. [paragraph continues] He declared that the implementation of these proposals would be of considerable assistance in improving the situation both in Asia and the Pacific and throughout the world. The Malaysian prime minister simultaneously emphasized that the implementation of the broader tasks proclaimed in Vladivostok requires cooperation for the purpose of achieving the speediest settlement of regional conflicts.

The sides outlined their respective positions on the question of Afghanistan. They expressed support for the UN secretary general's efforts in the direction of seeking an all-embracing political solution through the holding of indirect talks in Geneva and voiced the hope that a mutually acceptable accord can be achieved.

The Soviet Union and Malaysia advocate the creation of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean and in this context support the UN General Assembly resolution on convening an international conference on the Indian Ocean in Colombo not later than 1988.

The participants in the talks share the opinion that the creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world would contribute to international peace and stability. They acclaimed the conclusion of the treaty to create a zone free of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. The Soviet side also declared support for the idea of creating such a zone in Southeast Asia.

The two sides share the opinion on the imperative need for a solution to the Cambodia problem by political means through talks. They emphasized the need to seek ways to solve it taking the interests of all interested sides into account.

In this context the Soviet side drew attention to the relevant proposals made by the Indochina countries, which the Soviet Union fully supports.

The Malaysian prime minister declared that an all-embracing political solution to the Cambodian problem must be based on the complete withdrawal of foreign troops, the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, the achievement of national reconciliation, the self-determination of the Cambodian people, and the establishment of a neutral and nonaligned Cambodia. Mahathir bin Mohamed confirmed that the 21 September 1983 joint appeal by the ASEAN countries' foreign ministers remains in force.
The Soviet side confirmed its readiness to continue, within the limits of its possibilities, to cooperate in the solution of the Cambodia problem together with all interested sides and to guarantee, together with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, any generally acceptable accords. Mahathir bin Mohamed expressed gratification with the Soviet Union's readiness to play such a constructive role.

Both sides noted the important contribution made by the Nonaligned Movement to the solution of fundamental international problems, including disarmament, the settlement of regional conflicts, and the establishment of a new international economic order.

The Soviet Union and Malaysia perceive economic and technical cooperation between developing countries as one of the most important factors for mobilizing their domestic resources and accelerating economic development. In this context they believe that the nongovernmental Independent Commission of the South on Development Questions, being set up on Malaysia's initiative, will be able to make a useful contribution to the establishment of such cooperation. [paragraph continues]
At the same time the sides note that this cooperation will help to expand economic ties between developing countries and other states, including the socialist countries.

When examining the question of the present state of international economic relations both sides spoke out in favor of establishing predictable and stable trade and economic relations between all countries regardless of their social system and establishing a new international economic order on a just democratic basis. In this context they stressed the need to stabilize international economic relations, secure broad mutually advantageous cooperation between countries, and ensure the economic development of all states.

Noting the close interconnection between disarmament and development, the sides attach great importance to the forthcoming UN special international conference on this question. They hope in particular that the conference would be able to elaborate effective mechanisms to transfer to development purposes part of the resources which would be released during the process of disarmament.

The participants in the talks expressed concern over the widespread abuse of drugs in the world and the illegal trade in drugs and declared their determination to combat this most dangerous evil at both national and international level and their commitment to the decisions made by the June 1987 international conference in Vienna on the struggle against drug abuse and illegal drug trade.

Aware of the importance of the Antarctic from the viewpoint of international peace and security and economic, ecological, and scientific research, the sides agreed on the need to continue the exchange of opinions on this question on the basis of each side's position.

The USSR and Malaysia, having confirmed their commitment to and support for United Nations objectives and principles, declared again their readiness to assist by all means in enhancing the efficiency of its activity, primarily in questions of ensuring international peace and security and establishing broad international cooperation for the solution of global problems.

Both sides expressed gratification with the results of the visit by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed and their belief that this visit and the exchange of opinions which took place will help the further development of Soviet-Malaysian relations in the interests of the peoples of both countries.
Mahathir bin Mohamed expressed profound gratitude for the warm reception and cordial hospitality accorded to him and the delegation members during the visit. He also invited N.I. Ryzhkov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Council of Ministers chairman, and V.S. Murakhovskiy, Council of Ministers first deputy chairman, to pay official visits to Malaysia. The invitations were gratefully accepted by the Soviet side.

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CSO: 5200/1615
MOSCOW TELEVISION AIRS DISCUSSION ON ASIAN SECURITY POLICY
LD082210 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1415 GMT 8 Aug 87

["For Peace and Security in Asia" program chaired by Political Observer Farid Seyful-Mulyukov with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev; Mikhail Kapitsa, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Oriental Studies Institute; and Yuriy Lebedev, deputy head of a directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces]

[Text] [Seyful-Mulyukov] Good afternoon, esteemed viewers. We are beginning an international television program, entitled: "For Peace and Security in Asia." What is taking place in this region and on the adjoining expanses of ocean is of national and state interest for our country. The Soviet Union is an Asian power as well as European one. Thus, peace in Asia and peace in Europe are equally important to our policies. Nearly two-thirds of mankind lives in the Asian and Pacific region: What will it be like as it enters the new millennium? The global situation will also depend upon this to a large extent. Our approaches to constructing a secure, nuclear-free, and peaceful future for this enormous region and to settling conflicts have been deeply elaborated in documents that are well known to you: Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, his speeches in India, the famous Delhi declaration, and in the Soviet leader's recent interview with the Indonesian newspaper, MERDEKA.

To discuss different aspects of this problem, we have invited to the studio some eminent Soviet specialists. I would now like to introduce them to you: USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Alekseyevich Rogachev; Deputy Mikhail Stepanovich Kapitsa, director of the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries; and Major General Yuriy Viktorovich Lebedev, first deputy head of a directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

Igor Alekseyevich, let my ask you to begin our conversation by describing the Soviet Union's concept of strengthening peace and security in the Asian and Pacific region. What are the main directions and special features of this?

[Rogachev] This is a completely new approach to a whole range of problems in Asia and in the Pacific. Our platform stems from the following aims: First, we are striving to unite the efforts of individual countries in the region to strengthen peace and security. We are calling for movement toward this objective in all directions, including bilateral accords, subregional accords and in the final analysis, if this becomes realistic with the passage of time, through the conclusion of a regional agreement on questions of security. Further, we want to strengthen military and political stability in the region through reducing nuclear weapons in the Asian and
Pacific Ocean region, taking this as far as the ultimate abolition of these; through lowering the level of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States and the total quantity of armaments in the region. Then we want to make all possible efforts toward settling regional conflicts in Asia. Clearly, we are going to talk in greater detail about this today. Finally, we want to establish mutually-advantageous bilateral and multilateral cooperation between all countries of this region in economy, culture, science, and technology.

In the foreign press they often write that the Soviet Union is now turning its face toward Asia, and there is a large amount of truth in this. In this important region, as in other regions, we seek what the different Asian countries have in common regardless of their size. We propose that an integrated system of security for the Asian and Pacific Ocean region be worked out. We do not have in mind any hard and fast, once and for all, definite framework: we repeat insistently the idea that in setting up the structure of regional security, priority is given to the creative approach, to the open expression and discussion of any ideas and proposals from all interested countries, organizations, and even individuals. Understanding is growing of the fact that the Soviet concept of a political solution of the region's problems, rather than one based on a military approach and force, is constant with the mood dominant in Asia and the Pacific Ocean basin. It is a fact that the West has no constructive platform for Asia and nothing to set up to compare to Soviet ideas.

Introducing this thinking into political circles, ruling circles, and the public of the countries in the region is a new phenomenon, a phenomenon of significance for the whole of Asia, one which has a great force of attraction and a great potential for exerting influence. The line based on strength being pursued by the United States and other Western powers loses in objective terms both politically and on the propaganda level.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Of course, and this is because the United States and its ideologists and politicians view all processes and manifestations taking place in this region within the framework of Soviet-U.S. confrontation, that is to say, purely within the narrow military aspect. Well, we can say that our concept of security in the Asian and Pacific region is distinguished by the fact that it considers first and foremost the real situation. It is clear that our concept of security did not develop in a vacuum: it is, so to speak, a synthesis of many ideas and proposals that originated in Asia itself and in the countries of the Pacific Ocean basin. Let us recall that the Nonaligned Movement formed here.

[Kapitsa] That's right. Since World War II most military conflicts have taken place in Asia and the Pacific region. There are four wars taking place in Asia currently -- the war in the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, the war around Afghanistan, and the one around Kampuchea. Arms are being amassed in Asia. Searches are being made for new blocs. For example, a tripartite alliance consisting of the United States, Japan, and South Korea is being worked out. In this regard it is natural that the leading minds of Asia should seek ways out of this situation. The five principles of peaceful coexistence were worked out in 1954. The authors of these were India and China. In 1955, the well-known conference took place in Bandung, at which 10 principles were worked out for peaceful coexistence, cooperation, and the struggle against colonialism and against violence. The Nonaligned Movement made its appearance and was formed in Asia. This has now become a powerful political world force. Many states expressed their own thoughts. For example, the MPR has proposed that a pact should be concluded covering nonaggression and the nonuse of force between the countries of Asia and the Pacific. The countries of Indochina have proposed that a zone of peace and friendly
cooperation be set up in Southeast Asia. The DPRK has proposed that the peninsula should be turned into a nuclear-free peace zone. Very many proposals aimed at strengthening peace and at peaceful cooperation in Asia and the Pacific have been proposed by India.

What I would say is most important is that we have sensed the concern the countries of the Asian and Pacific region have shown for their security interests. Sometimes people ask whether this decision of ours might damage the defense interests of the Soviet Union.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] That's a very important question.

[Lebedev] What I would say is that in making that decision, the assessment of the effect on the Soviet Union's security was thoroughly weighed by the chiefs of the Defense Ministry also, and the decision we made does not reduce the defense potential of our country nor does it harm it. Moreover, preventing this class of U.S. missiles — with a range capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union — from being stationed in Alaska even introduces some sort of positive element with regard to our security.

[Rogachev] I would like to add to what Yuriy Viktorovich said, that in making the decision and expressing readiness to eliminate the 100 warheads on the medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, we naturally took account of the concern expressed by certain Asian countries, such as China and Japan. In coming out with this decision, which was not simple, we of course considered the interests of Asian public opinion.

The initiatives that our friends — the socialist countries in Asia — formulate blend very nicely with the global initiatives forwarded by the Soviet Union, complementing and developing them. This goes for all the proposals forwarded by the fraternal socialist countries in the past few years. It goes for the convention on nonaggression and abstention from force that was forwarded at the 19th MPRP Congress. Very useful proposals — and this is now being recognized not only in the socialist world but also in the West and even in the United States — have recently been forwarded by the DPRK leadership. Their proposal for a stated reduction of troop numbers in the North and the South to 100,000 by the year 1991 and their readiness to reduce unilaterally the number of their armed forces by 100,000 men by the end of the year speak for themselves. Unfortunately those initiatives by our Korean comrades are not meeting with a commensurate response from the Seoul regime. As far as the activity of our friends in Indochina is concerned — by which I mean Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia — a great many things have recently been proposed by them to find ways of a political settlement to the conflict in Indochina. We hope these proposals will be correspondingly studied and examined. There are a lot of positive things in them, and they contain elements of similarity with the proposals aimed at a political settlement forwarded by such countries as Indonesia and Malaysia.

This was shown by Prime Minister Mohamed Mahathir's visit to the Soviet Union. It was shown by the talks with Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila in Moscow in May. It was shown by the visit by Comrade Shevardnadze, foreign minister and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, to the countries of the Asian-Pacific region, and in particular his talks in Thailand, Indonesia, and Australia.
[Seyful-Mulyukov] We have been speaking here of a whole series of peace initiatives and steps by the socialist countries, but our Western opponents speak of some sort of threat to the Asian-Pacific region that is supposedly represented by our alleged naval base on the Cam Ranh peninsula in Vietnam. Yuriy Viktorovich, could you please explain to our viewers the essence of this question?

[Lebedev] I would say that this is a very clumsy attempt to conceal, to try to conceal behind these words about our Cam Ranh base, the existence of a large number of really major U.S. naval bases located in this region. Actually the Cam Ranh port is used by our ships as an intermediate point to refuel, carry out repairs, and replenish their food stocks during trips.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] A temporary material and technical supply point.

[Lebedev] Yes, it is a temporary material and technical supply point. There are no stockpiles of military equipment, not to mention weapons, at that port.

[Rogachev] Yuriy Viktorovich, it is probably useful to remind our viewers of how many bases the United States has in the region.

[Lebedev] Well, I could say this about the bases: the United States has in the region about 350 bases and military facilities of which 83 are major military bases.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] In considering how to improve the whole situation in the Pacific basin, one must not forget the effect that could be exerted on this by such a great Pacific power as the United States.

[Rogachev] I think, Farid Mustafyevich, that your are raising a question of considerable importance. In his interview with MERDEKA, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev singled out the role of the United States in the whole region and the significance of this power. We are concerned with the so-called U.S. aspect of the problem of Asian security. The United States, just like the Soviet Union and a number of other major states, is an integral part of the region, and it is connected with this region by a very large number of threads. Of course, together with the Soviet Union and certain other key countries of Asia and the Pacific, it bears particular responsibility of everything that occurs here. We in the Soviet Union do not abdicate our share of responsibility. If, however, we speak of the public opinion of the countries of the Asian and Pacific region, there exists a widespread view that the military and political aspects of the situation in the region are to a large extent predetermined by the nature of the interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States. We are waiting for the U.S. Administration to show a constructive approach to the affairs of the Asian-Pacific region. We are prepared to hold a dialogue with the Americans on the most important issues of disarmament in the Asian-Pacific region.

[Lebedev] In this regard, I would like to add a little to what Igor Alekseyevich has said, in the sense that one of the most important points in the interaction is curbing the arms race, although it is, perhaps, not as developed in this region as in Europe. And yet over the last 2 years, 1986 and 1987, the United States has manifestly not shown restraint. In this period, two Ohio-class submarines with Trident-I ballistic missiles have been introduced into the U.S. Navy and the number of cruise missile launchers on the ships and submarines of the Pacific Fleet has been approximately doubled. Moreover, a squadron of F-16 fighter-bombers has been sited at the Misawa Air Base in Japan. It is primarily essential that the United States follow the same road as the Soviet Union in showing restraint in the arms and armed forces buildup here.

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Mikhail Stepanovich, Asia is called the continent of arguments and conflicts. We understand very well that each of these conflicts has its own roots, its own history, and its own means of reaching a settlement.

One thing is obvious: regional conflicts, wherever they occur in this region, poison the whole international atmosphere and complicate the situation of the countries of Asia and the Pacific basin. And so the settlement of explosive situations is one of the most important elements in securing peace and security in the whole region.

We base our views on the fact that, without settling current conflicts there, it will be impossible to make any progress toward the aim of securing peace and security in Asia. The most acute conflict in this region is currently the Afghan one. The Soviet Union regards the Afghan people with profound sympathy; they are defending the gains of the April revolution and repulsing the attacks of the forces of imperialism and of regional reaction. The Afghan land, worn out by bloodshed, wants peace and tranquility. This is what the policy of national reconciliation is aimed at. The Soviet Union fully endorses the position of the Nonaligned Movement in favor of Afghanistan remaining an independent and nonaligned state.

I would like to add something to what Mikhail Stepanovich said. In Afghanistan we have adopted a course directed at stopping the bloodshed and at solving the problem around Afghanistan by peaceful political means. It is a matter for the Afghans themselves to decide what sort of government they will have, what the composition of that government will be, what its program will be, and what the country itself, the republic itself, will be called after approval of the constitution. What have the U.S. and its partners countered this with? A course directed at expanding the war; a course directed at continuing the regional conflict, which makes the situation in the region difficult; and an attempt, so to speak, to create a permanent sore spot on the southern borders of the Soviet Union. They send Stingers, Blowpipes, and other modern weapons that primarily affect the civilian population, which is borne out by cases of passenger aircraft being shot down. Of course, we too could counter the Stingers and Blowpipes with more effective countermeasures. But we don't embark on this because we are against broadening the confrontation. We are for peaceful paths of settlement, and we are for the Afghans meeting and resolving all questions connected with national reconciliation. This is what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said, accurately, that in general the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is...

Resolved, resolved.

And we are prepared to do this quickly. But it is important to achieve an end to this interference and a guarantee that this armed interference in Afghanistan's affairs will not be resumed.

That was said literally a few days ago.

(?Another) conflict is taking place in Southeast Asia. In 1979, the people of Cambodia, with the support of Vietnamese volunteers, got rid of the Pol Pot clique. In 4 years, this clique killed 3 million people, 2 million according to other estimates. But is 2 million not enough? That is one in every three or four of the country's citizens. In discussing the Cambodian situation, international specialists forwarded a whole series of ideas. One of the ideas is that in present conditions
there remains nothing else for the Cambodians and the Vietnamese beyond putting up armed resistance and destroying those who invade the country and carry out murders. At the same time various variations of a political settlement are being examined. Vietnam, for example, has already reduced the number of its volunteers in Cambodia several times. The Vietnamese Government has stated that by 1990 the Vietnamese Volunteer Army will be totally withdrawn from Cambodia. The People's Republic of Kampuchea is ready to hold negotiations with representatives from the opposition forces, all of them, excluding Pol Pot's clique.

[Rogachev] We've held talks with the leaders of a whole series of countries in Asia and the Pacific Ocean; we are not avoiding a discussion of the Cambodian problem; we are open for dialogue with any country on this problem. Incidentally, we are conducting a discussion on the Cambodian settlement with our Chinese colleagues as well, at Soviet-Chinese political consultations. This was the case this April in Moscow, and, evidently, it will be continued at the next round to be held in Beijing.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] I would not start confining an examination of the danger and the process of settlement of regional conflicts just to Afghanistan and Cambodia. In this region there are quite a few other very acute, and I would say, even more potentially explosive conflicts, which at present occupy the minds not only of politicians but also of the broad circles of the world public. Currently, the public's greatest attention is drawn to the events in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the U.S. has concentrated around the Persian Gulf a large, so to speak, fighting group of vessels, up to fifteen. Presently, the U.S. Battleship Missouri is sailing full steam ahead to this region. U.S. journalists report that its artillery leaves craters the size of a baseball field. One can imagine that if the U.S., in reply to an explosion of another mine -- let's suppose, under a tanker -- or to some action from Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards, hit Iran's coastline missile installations or another target with all their shipborne artillery and air force, what a situation could arise in this region and how this could affect the situation as a whole. In fact, I want to ask you, Yuriy Viktorovich: You know that we've forwarded a series of proposals on limiting the scale of naval activity in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In light of the latest events in the Persian Gulf area, these proposals acquire a particular topicality. How would you, so to speak, assess the situation?

[Lebedev] Yes, absolutely. In the Persian Gulf, it is indeed the strong-arm politics of the United States that have been displayed very clearly. For the time being, it cannot give up in any way. The Soviet Union has always deemed it necessary to resolve such conflicts at the negotiating table, that if a military confrontation arises here, if weapons are used by the United States, then, first of all, this will of course inflict heavy casualties on the countries in this region. Apart from this, it is also fraught with more serious consequences not only for this area. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's proposals on reducing naval activity and reducing exercises in the Asian and Pacific area would undoubtedly promote strengthening the security of the countries in this area, naval activity in particular. I would like to draw attention to the fact that a fleet has some peculiarities: the fact that it can move quickly, and now, given that the United States has nuclear-equipped aircraft carriers -- incidentally, the Soviet Union has no aircraft carriers -- but aircraft carriers are weapons of an offensive nature, they are weapons that can move quickly and strike surface targets and naval bases. Strictly speaking, this is planned in the U.S. Navy strategy. So, limiting naval activity and reducing the intensity of exercises, including that of naval forces, in this area would of course promote the security of the states in this region.
[Seyful-Mulyukov] In the Soviet concept of security in the Asia and Pacific region, an important role is assigned to developing bilateral relations between the USSR and countries in that region. With many of them, as we know, large ones and small ones, our country maintains multilateral and, at times, friendly relations. I think it has become axiomatic that relations between two large countries like the Soviet Union and India exemplify interstate relations in Asia.

[Kapitsa] This is indeed the case. Two great powers, hand in hand, are conducting a struggle for disarmament, primarily to eliminate nuclear arsenals and strengthen peace. Cooperation in the economy and science and technology has reached a high level. A broad cultural exchange spiritually enriches both peoples. A new era in the history of relations between the USSR and India was opened by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's visit to India last November. The Delhi Declaration on the Principles of a Nuclear Free and Nonviolent World, signed by the Soviet and Indian leaders on 27 November 1986, is an embodiment of new political thinking and points the way for humanity's survival in the nuclear era and the establishment of broad international cooperation, without nuclear weapons and without violence.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Soviet-Chinese relations are of inestimable significance for peace processes in this region. I would ask you, Igor Alekseyevich, to throw light on this issue, which indisputably interests all Soviet television viewers.

[Rogachev] Our country pursues a consistent policy for achieving total normalization of relations with the PRC. We proceed from the fact that good-neighborly cooperation between the two countries would meet the fundamental interests of the peoples of these two countries and would contribute to strengthening peace in Asia and peace throughout the world. It is well-known that in recent times, in recent years, we have had sound progress in the trade and economic sphere, in scientific and technical cooperation, in cultural and sports exchanges. In the last 5 years the value of our trade turnover, for example, has increased almost 11 times. Both countries are showing a great deal of interest in those internal processes developing in the neighbor's country. We are following with great interest and sympathetic eye those processes, the processes of reform, taking place in China, or the modernization, as the Chinese comrades call it themselves. In turn, we feel the interest experienced in China, literally at all levels, so to speak — both at the upper level and among the ordinary Chinese — over the processes of restructuring developing in the Soviet Union.

Recently a delegation from the Legislative Proposals Commission of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet headed by CPSU Central Committee Secretary Georgiy Petrovich 7azumovskiy visited the PRC. Some very interesting debates and discussions took place during the visit to Beijing and other cities in China, and everywhere we felt interest on the part of the Chinese comrades in how the restructuring is developing. Of course, we share with China quite a few features that testify to the similarity of the two major socialist states' stances on key problems today. Both China and the Soviet Union are resolute opponents of nuclear war and reject a policy of preparing for such a war. We welcome the statements in Beijing about the necessity to end the arms race and about the inadmissibility of militarizing space. The Soviet Union and China, as is known, have pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and for the time being they are the only two nuclear powers to have taken this pledge. We hope the latest Soviet initiative announced by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his interview to MERDEKA will put an end to the various speculations about the fact that the Soviet medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union are directed against China.
Seyful-Mulyukov: Well, regarding this, could one say that the very fact of adopting the decision to eliminate the medium-range missiles and the operational and tactical missiles in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union has been, to some extent, the result of the process of normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations and the removal of those, so to speak, features that you've just been talking about? [sentence as heard]

Rogachev: I think you're right when you talk about this aspect, and in turn, we hope that the process of eliminating these... [changes thought] the action as such on eliminating the 100 warheads will promote the further deepening of mutual understanding and strengthening of trust between the Soviet Union and China.

Seyful-Mulyukov: And how are relations at the political level? Another round of consultations is beginning in Beijing.

Rogachev: Well, before we begin the round of consultations we will hold another round of negotiations in border issues. We think the border negotiations will promote further expansion of relations between the Soviet Union and China, and in October, in Beijing, there will be another round of political consultations. There we will discuss problems of any exclusively political nature, and we are confident that both these and other talks will contribute to the gradual expansion of relations and the improvement of mutual understanding. Of course, we also have disagreements with China, we cannot shut our eyes to this. We have quite different approaches to, let's say, problems such as Afghanistan and Cambodia, which have already been discussed today...

Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting: A settlement of these problems.

Rogachev: Yes, a settlement of the problems around Afghanistan and Cambodia. But I think those active and energetic steps being undertaken both by the Afghan leadership and the Cambodian leadership, the policy of national reconciliation, of national agreement, will remove the acuteness of the tension surrounding these problems.

Seyful-Mulyukov: I think a very important element in the security of the Asian-Pacific region is Soviet-Japanese relations. To a considerable extent, the situation in the Far East will depend on their normal progress. I will ask you, Mikhail Stepanovich, to touch upon the question of Soviet-Japanese relations, at the present stage.

Kapitsa: Soviet-Japanese relations were restored in 1956, and since then their development has been varied, there have been rises and falls. At the end of 1985 and in the beginning of 1986 the Japanese Government began gradually taking Soviet-Japanese relations out of the refrigerator and a warm breeze began to blow. As a result, the negotiating mechanisms started, and political consultations were resumed. The Soviet foreign minister visited Japan during which time a number of important agreements were signed. Soon afterward, the Japanese foreign minister visited the Soviet Union. There was discussion about a visit to Japan by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. But progress in this constructive direction soon came to a standstill. Japan sharply increased her spending on militarization.

On Japanese territory, as close as possible to Soviet borders, joint Japanese-U.S. maneuvers were conducted that were of an openly provocative nature. The Japanese Government introduced restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union. Incomprehensible campaigns directed against the Soviet Union flared up more and more frequently in Japan. A cold wind came up, and it was Tokyo's fault. This is a great pity. We in
the Soviet Union consider the main thing to be political will and realism, a mutual aspiration to seek and find mutually acceptable outcomes to the ties of contradiction and disagreement. We would not like to lose optimism, and we are counting on Japanese common sense and on their aspiration to peace and business-like cooperation. We as before, are open for all-round cooperation with Japan.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Let's go over, let's throw a bridge, from politics to economics. An important lever for creating a peaceful and secure situation in the region is economic links.

[Rogachev] That's right. It has particular significance for us because the Soviet Far East and eastern Siberia border this region, and we have a great interest in accelerating the development of our regions bordering the Pacific Ocean. Over the last year we have witnessed gradual development of mutually advantageous economic contacts between the Asian-Pacific countries. But right from the beginning we have advocated all interested countries, without exception, participating in this process. We welcome the activity of the Conference on Pacific Economic Cooperation; within the framework of this conference, all questions on the economy are discussed. We are prepared to participate in this conference.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] To sum up, I would like to say that over the past year we have proceeded even further in developing our concept of securing peace and security in Asia and the Pacific Ocean basin. There is a certain positive content, an accumulated potential, in the struggle for the set aims. Many questions remain open and there are very many difficult problems. For example, confrontation is escalating in certain regions. Nevertheless, the reference points that have been mapped out in our Pacific program have become a real, practical instrument for achieving really clear aims to create a peaceful, secure situation in this enormous region, where, as we have already said, two-thirds of mankind lives. In conclusion, I would like to thank all those who took part in our program and the viewers for their attention to the theme we have presented for discussion. Thank you and goodbye.

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USSR ACADEMICIAN PREFERENCES GENERAL DISARMAMENT TO DETERRENCE

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[Article by Academician M. Markov: "Learning the New Way of Thinking. Nuclear Deterrence Is a Dangerous Illusion"]

[Text] In a recent television discussion T. Renton, a prominent British statesman, described the idea of general and complete disarmament as utopia. He said this in passing, as something self-evident that does not merit any discussion whatsoever. His voice even expressed a hint of surprise that his opponent was saying the reverse so persistently and passionately.

What arguments do the people who describe general and complete disarmament as utopia use?

At the Soviet-American summit in Geneva mutual understanding was reached on the point that nuclear war must never be unleashed. However, after Reykjavik a sort of syndrome of fear of general and complete disarmament appeared in certain Western capitals. People there again started talking a lot about nuclear weapons as a factor of mutual deterrence. In this context I cannot omit to mention M. Thatcher's speech on Moscow television and repeated statements by J. Chirac.

In his speech at the international forum "For a Nuclear-free World, for Mankind's Survival" M.S. Gorbachev, as if foreseeing statements of this kind about the role of nuclear deterrence in the preservation of peace on the planet, said: "There still are quite a few people who genuinely believe that this evil is necessary in order to avert a bigger evil, that is, war. It is this thesis which forms the basis of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence." And, criticizing this thesis, he went on to develop his argument in detail: "Even if one accepts this doctrine, it must be admitted that the 'nuclear guarantee' is not fail-safe or unlimited. It may at any moment turn into a death sentence for mankind. The more nuclear weapons there are, the smaller the chance that they will 'behave obediently.'"

The improvement of nuclear weapons, on which trillions of dollars have been spent over the past few decades, has in fact resulted in a weakening or erosion of the concept of nuclear deterrence and an increased probability of nuclear war.

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More than 30 years ago Bertrand Russell wrote in an article entitled "The Road to Peace": "Politicians defending thermonuclear weapons regard them solely as a deterrent; in other words, it is assumed that they are useful only if they are not used, that is, that they are useless as weapons. If the role of nuclear weapons is exclusively to prevent nuclear war, I think that it would be simpler to accept and legalize the impermissibility of nuclear war."

To say that progress in the improvement and development of nuclear weapons pursues solely the aim of strengthening the deterrence factor, which enhances security, is to assert a deliberate untruth. It is possible to claim responsibly that all the colossal material expenditure and titanic efforts expended on forging more sophisticated nuclear weapons have, on the contrary, substantially reduced the security of the opposing sides.

A great danger has arisen of an accidental, unpremeditated nuclear catastrophe. It is compounded by the so-called "time factor," whereby the time for the adoption of crucial military and political decisions in conditions of emergency or crisis situations is reduced to minutes and seconds and therefore these decisions must be entrusted to complex technical equipment which it is known in advance cannot be perfect and, on the contrary, may malfunction.

In short, the nuclear weapons slumbering in silos could be awakened by His Majesty Chance. Chance has made itself felt in the instructive accidents with U.S. nuclear weapons and also in Chernobyl. Faith in the total perfection of technology, and especially safety equipment, was substantially and really undermined by the "Challenger" disaster.

None of the known attempts at disarmament in the course of history was dictated by a categorical need arising from the danger of the annihilation of all mankind as a result of war. However, the Russell-Einstein manifesto, which appeared more than 30 years ago, claimed: "We must learn to think in a new way. We must not ask ourselves what steps are necessary for the camp to which we belong to achieve a military victory, because such steps no longer exist; instead, we must ask ourselves the following question: What steps can be taken to forestall an armed conflict whose outcome would be catastrophic for all its participants?" The meeting in Reykjavik produced a concrete answer to this question.

The leaders of Western powers never tire of declaring their desire for peace, and from time to time they even put forward proposals of one kind or another for partial arms reductions, but at the same time they keep their "daggers" at the ready. Such proposals, unless they are closely linked with the prospect of general and complete disarmament, frequently amount to conscious or unconscious attempts to reassure, and sometimes also to deceive or mislead, the broad circles of the public concerned about the threat of a world nuclear conflict.

Indeed, even real and substantial reductions in the stocks of nuclear munitions do not rule out entirely the possibility of a global nuclear conflict which would result in the annihilation of human civilization. The prospect of living without the threat of mutual destruction and without mass destruction
weapons presupposes the step-by-step creation of a really well founded political atmosphere of mutual trust at every stage of arms reduction. Well thought-out and far-reaching measures for the verification of all phases of disarmament must become a factor for the creation of mutual trust.

Such a political climate can only be created on the planet as a result of new thinking and the sides' corresponding actions.

Thus the choice is between initially programmed and phased general and complete disarmament and deceiving the peoples, consciously or unconsciously, by means of endless talks about partial reductions while the arms race goes on and ultimately ends in mankind's destruction.

A most dangerous role here is played by the essentially "legitimized" practice of so-called arms modernization, which, in the case of partial reductions, can more than compensate for them.

Phased arms reductions must by their content and terms and the nature of verification be linked from the outset to measures and plans for general and complete disarmament. Moreover, verification of partial arms reductions, if it is isolated from the problems of general and complete disarmament, can always be declared insufficient if this is convenient.

In this sense it is not general and complete disarmament, where verification must and really can be exhaustive and on a global scale, but partial disarmament not linked with general disarmament which may prove to be utopia, as many years of talks bear out.

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