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Hopes Expressed for INF Treaty
52200005 Vancouver THE SUN in English
19 Sep 87 p B6

[Text] Foreign policy stewards George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze have taken a step of hope for the world with their agreement in principle of banning short- and medium-range nuclear missiles.

Their efforts will reflect well on their political superiors when President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev meet in Washington later this year, as has now been agreed as well.

Both leaders need the political credits such a substantial step toward arms reduction brings. For Mr. Reagan, it helps rebuild the credibility in international relations that has been so badly shaken by his administration's devious doings in the Iran-contras quagmire. A major success in global terms always helps shift the focus of debate away from domestic issues where the chances of emerging unscathed are far slimmer. Now in the autumn of his presidency, a good work in the cause of peace would be a find addition to his record.

For Mr. Gorbachev's part, it is tangible evidence of his new style of government in the soviet Union. What a change from the far colder approach of Konstantin Chernenko and Leonid Brezhnev.

The new agreement's aim to eliminate more than a thousand short- and medium-range missiles stationed in Europe by the Americans, aimed at the USSR, and by the Soviet Union, aimed at Western Europe, China, and Japan, reduces one sector of the arms race. But the more important long-range arsenal remains. As Mr. Shultz said, "we have along ways to go."

But a start is a start, and can show the way for other negotiations. Perhaps as important is the two sides' agreement to work through a three-stage process toward an ultimate ban on nuclear testing. Included would be resumed attempts to find acceptable verification procedures that would revitalize treaties concluded in the 1970s.

The joint U.S.-USSR statement said: "This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination." That is a concrete step toward confronting the much larger nuclear threat, one that should give cause for cautious optimism, and maybe a great deal more, to even the most doubting dove.

/9738

Decision to Allow Continued Cruise Testing
Reported

Unofficial Report
52200003 Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in
English 1 Oct 87 pp A1, A2

[Article by Jeff Sallot]

[Text] The Government will allow testing of the controversial U.S. Air Force cruise missile to continue in the Canadian North this winter, senior federal sources say.

The decision, which has not been announced officially, marks a major policy shift for the Conservatives.

The Tories have long linked an end to cruise-missile testing with the emergence of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that would eliminate ground-launched cruise missiles and other intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe.

Negotiators for the superpowers have reached a tentative arms-limitation agreement, and President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev are expected to sign the final pact on Intermediate Nuclear forces this fall.

Despite the tentative INF agreement, Canadian officials are saying it is important to continue tests in the Arctic to verify the reliability of what is considered to be an important part of the West's strategic deterrent arsenal.

Canada, as part of the West, should be willing to test the missile, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty said.

Successive Liberal and conservative governments have refused to develop nuclear weapons for the Canadian Forces, but have said Canada's defence depends to a large extent on the strength of U.S. nuclear deterrent forces.

The United States has been testing cruise missiles over the Canadian Arctic each winter since 1984. The snow-covered terrain is considered to be similar to that of parts of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Beatty said there is no logical link between the success of the INF talks and calls to end cruise testing.

But the Conservatives have indeed made that very link in the past "and they are doing a shuffle now. They've found a new reason to love the cruise," Simon Rosenblum, a spokesman for the Canadian Council of Churches Project Ploughshares said.
The original decision to allow flight tests in Canada of the cruise was made by the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau in 1983. Senator Allan MacEachen, who was minister of external affairs at the time, said it was a hard-fought battle in the Liberal Cabinet to get the test approved.

But what carried the day was the argument that tests would be linked with the INF issue and the so-called two-track policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mr. MacEachen said in an interview this week.

The first track was for the United States to begin deploying cruise and Pershing II nuclear-tipped missiles in Europe. The second track was to push the Soviets in arms talks to remove their own intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

Canada, as a NATO country, could not jeopardize the solidarity of the alliance and thus the chances for an arms agreement by refusing to test the cruise missile, Mr. MacEachen said.

"It wasn't appetizing, but I was determined that Canada would do its part," he said. "How could we have refused to even test a guidance system when we were asking the European members of the alliance to accept the deployment of nuclear missiles on their soil?"

Under the test agreement, Canada is allowing its North to be used as a range for testing the guidance systems of cruise missiles. The guidance systems of cruise missiles. The guidance systems are the same for both the air-launched and the European-based, ground-launched versions of the missiles.

With the apparent success of the INF talks, it will be time to review the cruise decision, Mr. MacEachen said.

The cruise missile issue, which almost split the Trudeau cabinet in 1983, did divide the Liberal caucus in March of this year. Four MPs broke ranks with Leader John Turner and voted in favor of a New Democratic Party resolution calling for an immediate halt to the tests because of U.S. breaches of an earlier strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviets.

The Tories in opposition in 1983 were also divided.

The Tory defence critic, Allan McKinnon, told the House that his caucus had a long debate on the issue, but in the end agreed to support the Liberal government if the INF talks failed to get the Soviets to remove their missiles and NATO felt it had to deploy the U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe.

Since they came to office in 1984, the Tories generally have held to the position that Canada's decision to test was tied to the INF issue in Europe.

When asked whether progress at the INF talks in Geneva might mean that Canada could end the cruise-testing agreement, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark told the commons in March that "we will determine Canadian Government policy on the basis of what is actually decided in Geneva."

A few days later Mr. Clark again linked the cruise-testing question with the INF talks.

At that point the talks were at a crucial stage and if Canada broke the cruise-testing agreement the Soviets would seize on the division in the alliance and the INF talks could unravel, he said. But he also started dropping hints about a new rationale for allowing testing. Tests to verify the reliability of the air-launched missile might become of even greater importance if the Soviets and the Americans reached an INF agreement for Europe, he said.

Canada has no NATO treaty obligation to test the cruise missile, Geoffrey Pearson, the executive director of the federally endowed Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, said.

But the Government seems to have accepted the view that there is a political obligation, Mr. Pearson said.

"We're doing it presumably because we accept the theory of strategic deterrence and we believe the ALCM (air-launched cruise missile) is an important part of that," he said.

Mr. Pearson and other arms control analysts believe that because Canada is testing the cruise Ottawa should be able to insist the ALCM limits be set in any agreement coming out of the next round of arms-control negotiations between Moscow and Washington.

CITIZEN Editorial
52200003 Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 5 Oct 87 p A8

[Text] No wonder Joe Clark sounded so uneasy explaining away the next round of U.S.-Canadian cruise missile tests. He was forced back against a bad excuse that was not even of his own making.

It was the Liberal cabinet of Pierre Trudeau that contrived the phony reason for permitting the missile tests; Trudeau argued that they were required to support NATO's deployment of cruise batteries in Europe.

This was untrue at the time (in 1983), but the lie had its purpose. The "peace movement" was at full strength, and it opposed the tests. The cabinet and caucus were divided, and Trudeau himself seemed of two minds. He decided to agree to the tests, but needed an excuse.
He found it in NATO’s earlier decision to station cruise and new Pershing missiles in Europe while negotiating with the Soviets for a reduction in this same category of weapons. The tests up North, he said, strengthened the “two-track” strategy in Europe.

False, as U.S. authorities more candidly affirmed. The tests were for breaking in air-launched cruise missiles; the ones in Europe are ground-launched.

Moreover, the tests were to expand the arsenal of U.S.-based, long-range strategic forces, specifically the B-52 bombers. The missiles in Europe are intermediate-range.

So handy was the NATO-solidarity excuse, however, that the Mulroney government adopted it holus-bolus when it took office. Which is why the external affairs minister now sounds embarrassed: the arms reduction treaty now being completed in Washington and Moscow will remove the cruises—and the excuse for the tests.

Permitting these tests might well be Canada’s humble little contribution to the nuclear arms race; or conversely, by underlining even a specious NATO “solidarity,” they might have helped bring the Soviets to serious dealing. But let’s not kid ourselves. The main reason for our agreeing to cruise tests is this: to sweeten Canada-U.S. relations.

There is nothing disreputable in that. Only if we are on speaking terms with the United States do we get a hearing when we want one. Consentng to the tests was Trudeau’s way of improving the mood, and Brian Mulroney’s way of keeping it improved.

Trudeau could never concede such a thing, and Mulroney chose not to. It was the truth nonetheless, and still is.

Such truths can often embarrass, but (as Clark can testify) so can a bad excuse.

/9738

Reaction to Soviet Arctic Peace Zone Proposal

Clark, Beatty Skeptical

52200004 Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 3 Oct 87 p A16

[Text] Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s proposal for a “zone of peace” in the Arctic was met skeptically by Canada on Friday, with External Affairs Minister Joe Clark saying he wants details on what Gorbachev has in mind.

“It’s an interesting proposal,” Clark told reporters. “It would be more interesting if the Soviet Union made it clear that they were prepared to act as they are talking.”

Clark and Defence Minister Perrin Beatty both said the Soviet Kola Peninsula, which thrusts into the Barents Sea, contains one of the world’s heaviest concentrations of arms and armed forces.

The Kola bristles with hundreds of thousands of crack Soviet troops, bases for nuclear-armed aircraft and ships, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) sites and is the main port region for the Soviet fleet of ballistic-missile submarines.

But Clark said Canada is interested in discussing arms control with the Soviets, and “if there is a serious initiative that they want to take, we would be interested in seriously looking at it.”

In any such arrangement to demilitarize the Arctic, Canada would be a key player. Although Gorbachev’s proposal deals more with limiting air and naval activity in the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland seas, Canada has a direct interest because its Arctic archipelago stretches to the Arctic Ocean, over which would fly U.S. and Soviet ICBMs in a nuclear exchange.

And the Arctic Ocean, with its vast ice cap, has become a playground for nuclear submarines of East and West. Submariners hide under the ice cap, making them virtually invulnerable to detection and attack.

Clark said Canada is prepared to extend existing avenues of communication between Ottawa and Moscow to discuss proposals for decreasing the arms race in the Arctic. And, he said, Ottawa would be interested in increasing other kinds of exchanges with the Soviet Union.

Beatty, architect of a defence policy that calls for an increased Canadian military presence in the North, echoed Clark’s skepticism, saying the Soviets have not made any direct approaches to Canada on the “zone-of-peace” proposal.

“We’ll be interested in seeing what (Gorbachev) has to offer,” Beatty said in an interview.

“If he is offering something on the Kola, then we’re certainly pleased,” he said.

Beatty said Canada is interested in anything that increases mutual security and the prospects for peace, but “a discussion of some sort of zone of peace that didn’t include the Kola Peninsula would not be meaningful.”

Concerns about the Soviet’s military might in the Kola and other Arctic areas led Beatty to propose the purchase by Canada of a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to patrol the Arctic and keep watch on possible incursions by foreign powers.
As well, the white paper on defence presented by Beatty in June would put more Canadian fighter aircraft on Arctic standby, establish forward bases for CF-18 fighters in the North, increase the level of training and equipment of Canadian northern forces and step up efforts at surveillance of key Arctic waterways.

Gorbachev’s speech Thursday in Murmansk included proposals for talks on curbing northern military activities, for a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe, for international cooperation to develop northern resources, a conference to discuss scientific exploration in the region and a joint environmental protection plan.

He also suggested that foreign vessels might be allowed to use the Soviet northern sea route between Europe and the Far East, if there is concrete progress in relations between East and West.

STAR Editorial
52200004 Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR in English 13 Oct 87 p A8

[Text] Canada should beware of bears bearing peace offerings.

Obviously encouraged by his success in reaching an agreement with the United States over nuclear disarmament, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has turned his peace and security initiatives to Canada.

It was bound to happen. Despite our small population, we are the most strategically located country in the world. Lying squarely between the Soviet Union and the U.S., straddling the shortest route over which ground-based ballistic missiles would pass, we have a great potential to provide early warning to continental defence as well as a forward launching capability.

Gorbachev has made no direct overtures to the Canadian government. But in a recent speech he called for an agreement with Canada to make the Arctic a nuclear-free zone, encourage bilateral scientific research in the Arctic and open the most direct route through the Soviet Arctic between Europe and Asia.

That it was not a casual reference to his wish to improve relations with us was borne out by the promptness with which Soviet Embassy officials in Ottawa expounded on his theme.

Alexei Makarov, minister-counsellor, noted that “this proposal is not a proposal for a minute, for a day, for a month, but for a long time to come. It is a very serious proposal which, if applied, will be very important for the security of our countries.”

While harping on issues of peace, security and scientific cooperation, Makarov ventured to hope that any agreement on these worthwhile causes would also include an end to U.S. cruise missile tests over Canada. More important, he would like to see an end to Canada’s new Arctic defence policy which will be enormously bolstered by the addition of nuclear-powered submarines, the only kind that can patrol under the ice, for Arctic duty.

For Gorbachev to suggest that Canada should compromise its commitments to its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to join the Soviet Union, against which the alliance was formed, in a bilateral mission of polar peace, is a transparent attempt to weaken NATO. It is therefore unacceptable. Had Gorbachev been sincere in his pursuit of “a zone of peace” and cooperation in the Arctic, he would have included in his proposal the U.S., whose Alaska also borders on the Arctic.

Considering that Soviet subs have often ventured under the polar ice well beyond the Soviet Union’s territorial limits, and are suspected of having mapped part of the Arctic bottom in their search for the easiest and most advantageous routes to the North Atlantic, we suspect that Gorbachev’s call is not prompted by a desire for peace but rather for avoidance of competition and confrontation with Canadian subs in the Polar Region.

/9738
Commentaries on Nuclear Disarmament, Prior to INF Signing

Need To Limit Strategic, Space Arms
11020857 Beijing XINHUA in English
0707 GMT 2 Dec 87

["Commentary: First Step Toward Nuclear Disarmament (by Wang Chongjie)"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, December 2 (XINHUA)—After years of strenuous dickering, the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to sign a pact on scrapping intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in the long-awaited summit next week, marking the first step toward nuclear disarmament.

The course leading to this step has been full of twists and turns. Starting from December 1981, the two superpowers were locked in a head-on conflict in the INF talks for two years. Washington insisted that the Soviets dismantle all of their SS-20 missiles which they began to deploy in 1977, while the Kremlin urged the Americans to halt installation of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe.

The bargaining, however, ran into an impasse as neither side wanted to give in. The deadlock escalated the nuclear arms race, strained East-West relations, and prompted grave concern in the international community over an unstable world.

Since the resumption of the INF talks in March 1985, the two sides seemed to have struck a more reconciliatory tone in the wrangles. Frequent consultation and accommodation have eventually led to a breakthrough in the INF talks.

It is the first time in history that an accord can actually reduce, rather than limit as shown by numerous cases before, the superpowers' nuclear armament. This is a striking feature of the agreed-upon INF treaty due to be signed on December 8 by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

It is also the first time in history that a whole category of nuclear weaponry will be eliminated under a superpower treaty. In light of the "global zero option," the two sides will rid themselves of more than 1,000 medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles, and preclude the deployment of such weapons in the days to come.

Another characteristic of the INF treaty is that there is no parity in the slashing of nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. The Soviets, with more intermediate-range missiles deployed, have agreed to trim more than the Americans do, leaving the latter no room to maneuver except following their rival's suit.

The INF treaty also refrains from preconditioning itself on progress in other fields of disarmament. The Kremlin has stopped linking an INF pact with talks on space weaponry while the Western countries have withdrawn from connecting the treaty with conventional arms negotiations.

For all the fresh sparkling in the tunnel of nuclear disarmament, a brighter future is still a long way off. The intermediate-range missiles merely account for about 3 percent of the superpowers' nuclear pileup. The INF treaty will be rendered meaningless if no real progress is achieved in strategic arms talks and if the superpowers intensify their arms competition in outer space.

Treaty Not Linked to Other Aspects of Disarmament
11030049 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0811 GMT 1 Dec 87

["Commentary: The Difficult First Step"—by XINHUA reporter Wang Chongjie]

[Text] Washington, 1 Dec (XINHUA)—According to the schedule for the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting announced here, the morning of 8 December is set aside for U.S. President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev to officially sign a pact on completely scrapping intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in the next 3 years. This is the first decision made by the United States and the Soviet Union since the end of the war to reduce the nuclear weapons they already possess. If this will lead to large-scale reduction of various types of armament by both sides, the aforementioned step will mark a good beginning.

The United States and the Soviet Union have gone through a process of considerably tense and complex twists and turns, starting from their deployment of intermediate-range guided missiles to their agreement to scrap such missiles. More than a decade has passed since the Soviet Union deployed its SS-20 missiles in 1977. More than 4 years have passed since the United States began to deploy Pershing-II missiles and land-based cruise missiles in Western Europe in November 1983. More than 6 years have passed since the United States and the Soviet Union began their talks in Geneva in November 1981 on the intermediate-range forces issue. The sharp conflict and intense competition between the United States and the Soviet Union over intermediate-range guided missiles have further escalated the arms race, aggravated the European situation and strained the entire East-West relationship. The United States and the Soviet Union made no concessions to each other in their talks between November 1981 and November 1983. The United States insisted that the Soviets dismantle all the deployed SS-20 missiles, but the Soviet Union refused. Similarly, the Soviet Union urged the Americans to halt the installation of intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. The United States refused. As a result, the talks ended without achieving anything. Since the
resumption of the talks in March 1985, the two sides have finally reached an agreement after fiercely crossing swords, and frequently going through the necessary consultation and accommodation.

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over intermediate-range missiles during the past decade indicates that whoever seeks to gain military predominance in this realm is unrealistic and that the two sides may possibly achieve their goal of completely destroying and banning this type of nuclear weapons through earnest negotiations. This should be an extremely useful experience and lesson to other arms race and disarmament talks being held between the United States and the Soviet Union, and should provide much food for thought.

The INF treaty due to be signed by the United States and the Soviet Union has the following features:

First, it can actually reduce armaments. The so-called agreements or treaties on limiting armaments signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in the past not only failed to eliminate a single weapon, but provided plenty of room for the continuous development of all types of weapons in quantity and quality.

Second, in light of the “global zero option,” the two sides will rid themselves of all intermediate-range guided missiles. After the INF treaty becomes effective, the United States and the Soviet Union will completely destroy, within a period of three years, all the launchers and nuclear warheads of the intermediate-range (1,000-5,000 kilometers) and medium- and shorter-range (500 to 1,000 kilometers) guided missiles. The treaty also precludes the deployment of these types of guided missiles on their own territories or abroad in the days to come.

Third, there is no parity in the slashing of the intermediate-range missiles by the two sides. The numbers of the missiles reduced by the two sides are different. The Soviets, with more medium and long-range and medium and shorter-range missiles deployed, will trim more than the Americans do. This will leave the latter no room to continue deploying more arms of this category.

Fourth, the treaty also refrains from preconditioning itself on progress in other fields of disarmament. The Soviet Union has stopped linking the INF pact with strategic arms and space weaponry. And the Western countries have withdrawn from connecting the treaty with negotiations concerning the reduction of conventional arms.

This shows that specific ways to reduce arms can always be found, as long as both sides show their sincerity.

However, the signing and implementation of the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty marks the first step taken by the two sides on the road toward disarmament. The intermediate-range missiles account for merely 3 percent of the nuclear stockpile of the two sides. The INF treaty will be meaningless if only intermediate-range missiles are prohibited; if the two sides intensify their competition in developing even more menacing strategic arms or space weaponry; or if they continue to strengthen their conventional armament. Still less would this treaty be regarded as “historically significant.” It is obvious that the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to stop their arms race, continuously reduce various types of weapons on a large scale, and completely scrap all their nuclear arsenals, will become a severe test for both countries.

Premier Welcomes Agreement
11031550 Beijing XINHUA in English
1539 GMT 3 Dec 87

[Text] Beijing, December 3 (XINHUA)—China’s Acting Premier Li Peng met here today a delegation from the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Foreign Trade headed by Yoshio Sakurautchi, president of the society.

During the meeting Li was asked to brief on China’s reform and open policy, saying that these current policies will continue and China will try to maintain a stable economic development next year while deepening the reform.

Asked to comment on the coming INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, Li said China welcomes the INF agreement, but stressing, “this is only the first step forward in the reduction of nuclear weapons.”

He said China hopes the agreement be implemented in real earnest and that the two super powers make further efforts in continuing to reduce the nuclear weapons.

This afternoon, Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun also met the Japanese visitors.

All Aspects of Disarmament Reviewed, ‘Talks Most Encouraging’

Questions of Common Concern
11082029 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
7-13 Dec 87 pp 14-17

[Article by Ye Ruan]

[Text] For the past year the United States and the Soviet Union have been engaged in wide-ranging disarmament talks. How far have these talks progressed? What are the factors that keep the two superpowers together at the negotiating table, yet at the same time prevent them from stopping their arms race? Is an agreement on
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) likely to accelerate talks on other disarmament issues? These are the questions of common concern to the international community.

In the year since the Iceland summit an INF agreement in principle has been reached; headway has been made in the talks on banning chemical weapons; and preparations for pan-European conventional disarmament talks have got under way. The talks on strategic and space weapons remain stalemated and the talks on a nuclear test ban seem likely to make some progress.

The INF talks are the most encouraging aspect of the U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations. If everything goes smoothly, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union will sign a formal INF agreement during their summit this week.

The issues of strategic nuclear arms and space weapons are fundamental and are associated with the balance of power between the two countries and their future rivalry. The two sides have held firmly to their positions in the negotiations. In the past year, nothing substantial has been achieved apart from arriving at ways to calculate and limit heavy bombers and airborne weapons.

The Soviets insist that agreement on space weapons is a "necessary precondition" for strategic nuclear arms cuts. But they have readjusted their tactics to curtail the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, "Star Wars" programme). The United States, on the other hand, has not budged in its stance in hopes of ensuring that it can carry out its planned SDI testing and deploy its space-based weapons in the early 1990's.

Although the talks on European conventional disarmament are multi-lateral, the United States and the Soviet Union, as leaders of their respective military alliances, are undoubtedly the most important participants. The 14-days talks on simultaneous, and balanced disarmament in central Europe, which have produced no results, came to a standstill early this year. The issue of conventional forces seems to be more prominent in the light of a possible INF accord between the two superpowers. After more than half a year's consultations and informal talks among the various parties concerned, it was agreed that all-European disarmament talks should be started on the basis of the confidence-building and security measures proposed at the disarmament conference in Stockholm in September 1986.

The difference now is that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies maintain that on the whole, the conventional forces of both the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are roughly equal and that the talks on conventional disarmament should also include tactical nuclear weapons. Not only the United States but all the countries that have such weapons should participate, the Warsaw Pact countries say. This stand would require Britain and France to reduce or eliminate their tactical nuclear weapons. The United States and NATO are opposed to including tactical nuclear weapons in the negotiations. They insist that the West should increase its tactical nuclear weapons until the Warsaw Pact ends its superiority in conventional forces.

The banning of nuclear testing has been an important part of the arms talks between the superpowers since 1980, when the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain suspended their negotiations on a total nuclear test ban. In bilateral talks with the United States and the 40-nation Geneva Disarmament Conference, the Soviet Union has tried to press the United States into substantive talks on an agreement that would ban all nuclear testing. The United States has stressed that at complete nuclear test ban is a long-term goal. Until large-scale nuclear disarmament is realized and means of verification are perfected, the United States is determined to continue nuclear testing in order to ensure the reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent.

The Soviet Union implemented a unilateral nuclear test moratorium in August 1985 and prolonged it three times in an attempt to force the United States to suspend its nuclear testing under international pressure. But the Reagan administration refused to yield and the Soviet Union finally lifted its moratorium at the end of January this year. Washington maintains that nuclear tests of small TNT equivalence are necessary for the development of space weapons. It regards the next four years as critical for the testing and deploying of a new generation of strategic nuclear arms. The Soviet Union, after its abortive attempt to force the United States to halt nuclear testing, resumed its tests on February 26. Between then and mid-August, it carried out 13 tests. In the same period, 11 tests were conducted by the United States.

Earlier this year the Soviet Union put forward some concrete proposals on limiting the size and number of nuclear tests. The United States has agreed to discuss the proposed limitations, but it intends to challenge the Soviet Union mainly on the issue of verification.

Another factor is complicating the test ban negotiations and making them more difficult. The Soviet Union, in an attempt to impose restrictions on Washington's development of space weaponry and its strategic arms modernization programme, wants the problem resolved as part of a blanket agreement. The United States sees the test ban negotiations as an important means to force the Soviet Union to make significant concessions on strategic offensive arms. Because of these differences, prospects for the test ban negotiations are generally regarded as dim.

Chemical weapons are another issue in the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks. After years of negotiations, the Geneva Disarmament Conference has reached agreements on most clauses of a draft treaty banning chemical
weapons. The Soviet Union has made concessions on some points. For the first time it admitted to possessing chemical weapons and revealed where they are stored. It announced a unilateral halt to chemical weapons production and built plants and other facilities to destroy existing weapons. Although the United States also wants to promote negotiations and reach a pact on chemical weapons, it is still trying to squeeze more concessions out of the Soviet Union.

A survey of the disarmament talks over the past year shows that the two superpowers have adopted different attitudes and tactics on arms control and disarmament. The Soviet Union has waged an offensive through frequent proposals and has made concessions from time to time while standing firm on critical issues. It has also adopted more flexible tactics. The United States, comparatively speaking, has been unyielding from the outset. It tried to press the Soviet Union to make maximal concessions. These different postures basically reflect the superpowers' new national strategies under changing historical conditions.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's strategy is to accelerate Soviet economic development, raise scientific and technological standards and reduce military spending through all-round reform. With these aims in mind, Moscow hopes to ease international tension and improve relations with foreign countries, especially the United States. But it has not abandoned its strategic rivalry with the United States or resigned itself to giving up its position as a superpower. It is simply using new tactics. Over the past six years, the Reagan administration's national security strategy has been to expand the U.S. military buildup, to offset Soviet superiority in numbers with U.S. superiority in technology and to compel the Soviet Union to reach arms control or disarmament agreements that are favourable to Washington.

Given this struggle, why have the disarmament talks progressed even to the point where the signing of the INF treaty looks probable? The reasons are many.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have many difficulties and problems, both internal and external. Moscow and Washington both need an arms control pact to improve their situations; Moscow is especially eager.

The two sides are aware that the matter is pressing. The U.S. general election is coming, and the Soviet reform is arriving at a critical point. It would be disadvantageous for both sides to miss the opportunity. The superpowers are under increased international pressure to reach an agreement as soon as possible and fulfill their special responsibilities for world disarmament. Their final acceptance of the double zero option is closely related to the urging of Eastern and Western Europe, China, Japan and some other Asia-Pacific countries. As for promoting the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, neutral European nations and nonaligned countries have played an active role. Medium-range and shorter-range missiles account for only 3-4 percent of the total nuclear warheads of the two countries. The elimination of these missiles will not affect the general balance of military strength between the Soviet Union and the United States, or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Both the disarmament negotiations and the arms race between the two superpowers have entered a new stage since the beginning of the 1980's. The aims of talks changed from limiting the number of weapons to reducing and destroying part of the nuclear and conventional arsenals. The arms race evolved into a contest to develop high-technology weapons.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have expressed their willingness to reduce (even slash) armaments through negotiations, not because they want to slow down or stop the arms race but because of the following factors:

—The nuclear and conventional arsenals of the two countries are beyond the saturation point. Both sides understand that the general military balance cannot be upset even if one side gains quantitative superiority in some field through increased expenditure.

—Many weapons systems deployed in the 1960's and some deployed in the 1970's are obsolete and outmoded. If they are not eliminated, the cost to maintain them will increase sharply while their potential value in combat declines. There are so many of these weapons that the two sides could easily agree to reduce their strategic armaments by 50 percent.

—With the application of high technology to the development and production of new weapons and the improvement of existing ones, the efficiency and power of weapons has been raised by a margin big enough to offset any reduction of quantity.

—The economic difficulties of the United States and the Soviet Union are also an important element in encouraging arms reduction. The Soviet Union's economy has stagnated since the mid-1970's and reached the brink of crisis in recent years. The manpower, material, and financial resources that were put into the arms race with the United States have undoubtedly been a drag on the national economy. As for the United States, the Reagan administration raised military spending substantially in the past few years, resulting in huge budget deficits, trade deficits, and the adverse balance of international payments. This led Congress to cut the military budget for two years running, which caused delays of one to two years in plans for the modernization of major weapons. Even the funds for SDI are far from the amount sought by the administration, forcing cuts in the original plan. Certainly, the United States and the Soviet Union can reduce and destroy part of their nuclear and conventional arsenals. This is better than their trying to increase their weapons to keep up with each other. It will, after all, help relax international tension and improve the
relations between Washington and Moscow and between the East and the West. But an agreement to reduce the quantity of weapons without limiting improvements in quality and the development of new weapons cannot stop the arms race. People are upset to note that even as they negotiate arms reductions, the United States and the Soviet Union are speeding up their plans to modernize their weapons in order to vie for military superiority or prevent the other side from gaining the upper hand.

The new round of the arms race involves not only the research, testing, and development of space weapons, but also the improvement of existing weapon systems and the research and development of new generation, high-technology systems. After deploying the SS-25 mobile land-based intercontinental ballistic missile last year, the Soviet Union began to deploy SS-24 mobile missiles with multiple warheads this year. The United States has deployed 21 MX missiles each with 10 warheads, and plans to deploy a total of 100 of these missiles. Its high precision “dwarf” mobile single warhead missile is expected to appear soon.

The United States and the Soviet Union are also competing in nuclear submarines and antisubmarine technology. According to reports, the Soviet Union has deployed four new kinds of nuclear submarines since 1983 and is trial manufacturing nine other kinds. Since the Soviet Union obtained advanced technology for the manufacture of submarine propellers from Japan’s Toshiba Machinery Co. and a Norwegian company, the noise of Soviet submarines has been greatly reduced. Moscow has also improved its submarines speed, depth of dive, survival capacity, automation and nuclear reactors. These advances took the United States by surprise. To maintain its leading position, the United States plans to spend U.S. $100 billion on new attack submarines and antisubmarine aircraft in the next 10-20 years. The U.S. Navy also is researching new detection methods. As for conventional weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union are both seeking to improve their quality and precision. Optical fibre, laser and other advanced technologies are gradually being applied to all types of conventional weapons.

From the nature of the U.S.-Soviet talks and the principal aims of both sides in recent years, it is possible to make a rough prediction about the future of disarmament.

The Soviet Union’s main goal is to limit the U.S. Star Wars programme, while its secondary goal is to force the United States to join it in ending all nuclear testing. The Soviet strategy is to link these two issues to the talks on reducing strategic weapons. According to the Soviet plan, after the two sides eliminate 50 percent of their strategic weapons, Moscow will press Britain and France to join the process of nuclear disarmament. In the pan-European disarmament talks, the Soviet Union, starting from its superiority in conventional forces, will work towards the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons and the gradual removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe.

The principal aim of the United States is a big reduction in offensive strategic nuclear weapons, in other words, to weaken or eliminate the Soviet edge in land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and maintain its own edge in the submarine-launched strategic missiles and strategic bombers. The U.S. strategy is to try to resolve the issue of strategic arms reduction separately, without tying it to the issue of the space weapons.

Washington is not necessarily opposed to a package of agreements on the condition that it does not interfere with crucial SDI testing and the future deployment of SDI. The United States will maintain its tactical nuclear weapons and troops in Western Europe and its basic military ties with Europe. However, the United States would probably reduce its troops in Western Europe if it could modernize its nuclear and conventional weapons and if its allies agreed to share more military responsibilities.

The United States and the Soviet Union will try their best to overcome some technical disputes and sign the INF treaty in accordance with the global double zero option before the end of the year. It is almost certain that they will succeed. The signing will probably be followed by optimism about detente and disarmament, but this treaty will do nothing to promote rapid progress in other fields of the U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations. It is likely that an agreement on a global ban on chemical weapons will come next. Many observers think that such a pact will be signed within one or two years. There could be delays because other countries besides the United States and the Soviet Union are involved in the bargaining and the final agreement will not be decided entirely by Washington and Moscow.

In the middle term, the United States and the Soviet Union will probably make some compromises on reducing strategic weapons and limiting space weapons by the end of the 1980’s or the beginning of the 1990’s. The two sides have reached agreement in principle on some major limitations in their talks on strategic weapons. It is time for the negotiations to get down to substantive issues.

As for the talks on space weapons, both sides are now discussing the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 to arrive at an acceptable interpretation of how the treaty relates to space weapons. Based on this, a list of weapons banned from entering outer space will be worked out and limitations on activities in space will be defined. It would be hard to resolve the issues of strategic and space weapons together during President Ronald Reagan’s term in office.
There is also a possibility that the two sides will eventually agree to limit the size and number of underground nuclear tests. But they will do this only if nuclear testing technology and verification methods are improved and the limits do not affect the tests which both sides want to conduct for various aims. This could not happen within one or two years. Even if they reach an agreement, its significance would not be great. Like the U.S.-Soviet treaty of 1974, which limited nuclear test to the equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT, such a pact would not prevent the superpowers from developing their nuclear weapons.

The European-wide disarmament talks will be more difficult, complicated and prolonged than those relating to central Europe. Because the pan-European negotiations are more extensive, with broader content and more participants, and because of the big differences among various countries' military equipment and advantages and disadvantages, an agreement on the large-scale reduction of the military presence of the two military blocs is still far off. This does not exclude the possibility that the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries concerned will reach a limited agreement on reducing some outdated weapons and a symbolic reduction of U.S. and Soviet troops. Such an agreement would not change the balance of the military forces between the United States and the Soviet Union, and NATO and Warsaw Pact, or the political or military situation in Europe.

To sum up, people take a cautiously optimistic attitude towards the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks and do not pin high hopes on the agreement which may be reached. To oppose the new round of the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union is natural.

The INF Treaty, the first genuine nuclear disarmament pact ever reached by the two superpowers, represents only a first step they have taken in the disarmament process, as the missiles to be dismantled under the treaty account merely for three to four percent of their nuclear arsenals.

The two leaders, while speaking highly of the treaty on separate occasions, hinted yet that arms control is still a long way off.

Reagan described the treaty as "history-making", but stressed it marks only the first step; Gorbachev lauded it as a great step toward the future but warned "it is probably still too early to bestow laurels upon each other."

One cannot help asking the question: Could the INF treaty really become a turning point in the long-running arms race between the two superpowers?

Reagan said, "our peoples for too long have been both the masters and the captives of a deadly arms race. This situation is not preordained, and not part of some inevitable course of history."

Gorbachev stressed the need "to undo the logic of the arms race by working together in good faith" and expressed the hope that December 8, 1987 will become "a date that will mark the watershed separating the era of a mounting risk of nuclear war from the era of demilitarization of human life."

However, deeds speak louder than words. Whether the arms race could be reversed will depend on what options the two superpowers would share in the days to come.

All the two leaders did on December 8 is nothing but a ceremonial signing of a treaty that has emerged from years of uphill bargaining. This, however, cannot cover the fact that the two sides still hold very different views on many urgent issues.

Both sides, though having long indicated willingness to halve their strategic offensive weapons, are yet being deadlocked on such issues as how many in each category of such weaponry should be slashed on each side, and whether the reductions should be linked with the controversial "Star Wars" program.

As for the reduction of conventional forces, there is still no light at the end of the tunnel.

In fact, the INF Treaty will be rendered meaningless and the U.S.-Soviet arms race will continue if they merely destroy medium- and shorter-range missiles while leaving intact their strategic arms and space weapons which pose an even greater danger to mankind.

Commentary on Next Steps
11100756 Beijing XINHUA in English
0658 GMT 10 Dec 87

["Commentary: What's To Come After INF Treaty? (by Wang Chongjie)" — XINHUA headline]
Some regional conflicts, caused directly or indirectly by the two superpowers, are also waiting for early solutions. This gives another challenge to U.S.-Soviet relations. The whole world is expecting what answers Reagan and Gorbachev could offer during their summit talks.

**Media Review U.S.-Soviet Summit Situation**

**Both Sides Prepare**

06080412 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese 8 Dec 87 p 6

["Commentary" by staff reporter Zhang Yunwen (1728 0336 2429): "Washington on the Eve of the U.S.-Soviet Summit"]

[Text] Washington, 7 Dec—The U.S.-Soviet summit will be held in 2 days. Those involved, including the President, the secretary of state, security personnel, and press officials, are busy preparing for the summit.

Last weekend, President Reagan was reading a 2-inch thick "brief introduction to the situation" at Camp David. Security personnel were making careful preparations to ensure the convening of the summit. Some people said that the "countdown" for the summit started on 30 October, when the date of the summit was announced.

The U.S.-Soviet Washington summit has drawn the attention of reporters throughout the world. A responsible person of the press centers told a group of reporters that although about 6,000 interview cards had been issued, reporters were still requesting the cards. In the large office where interview cards are issued, there are many handbooks, reference booklets, and other material provided by some social organizations, all for reporters to read. The U.S. Information Agency has sent over 100 people to handle reporters' interviews. In addition to the original reporters' center, two press centers have been set up, one in the Department of Commerce and the other in the Marriott Hotel; both are near the White House and the reporters' center. Three thousand telephone sets have been installed at the press centers.

Apart from the concerned government officials and press personnel, the busiest of those involved are probably experts on the Kremlin. Almost every day they make appearances on television, attend discussions or meetings, or write articles for newspapers. This has continued for quite some time. People of different schools of thought in Washington are taking this opportunity to expand their influence.

Over the past week, government officials and experts have given news briefings on the summit almost every day at the press centers. The press officials of the two countries have made preparations to engage in "combat for news briefing." The Soviet Union has sent 20 press officials and 160 experts. They held a press conference immediately upon their arrival at the Madison Hotel in Washington. The White House spokesman also gave a news briefing in the press center of the Department of Commerce.

Over the last few days, demonstrations representing all types of views and opinions have taken place in the downtown area near the White House. Yesterday, a group composed of many disarmament organizations held a mass activity under the slogan of "providing an opportunity for peace." In the area between the White House and the Soviet Embassy, the participants formed a human chain called "a bridge toward peace." They sent 10 children of different races representing European nations to the White House and the Soviet Embassy to express the peace cherished by the younger generation. Questioned by a reporter, a little girl said that she wished to see the "elimination of big missiles after the elimination of small ones." The children who went to the Soviet Embassy were warmly welcomed, but the 10 children who wished to convey peace to the White House were denied entrance.

The debate between President Reagan and the conservatives in his party has also drawn people's attention. Quite a number of people in Washington feel particularly uneasy about the summit and the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles. Many conservative organizations have recently taken every opportunity to severely attack the U.S.-Soviet treaty on medium-range missiles. During a joint interview by reporters of four television studios 3 days ago, President Reagan made this significant remark: The minds of these people are deeply affected by the concept that a war is inevitable between the two superpowers. This remark infuriated the conservatives, who openly accused Reagan of breaking his promise to keep to the conservative movement, of giving up his principles, of changing his stand, and of allowing himself to be manipulated by the Soviet Union. However, President Reagan is well aware that, as indicated by a recent public opinion poll, the majority of the people in the Republican Party are in favor of the treaty on medium-range missiles and the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations.

For Washington, visits by foreign heads of state are quite normal, but this time is different. The arrival of Gorbachev at Andrews Air Force Base on 7 December will be the first visit by a Soviet leader in 14 years. The White House spokesman reminded reporters not long ago that the U.S.-Soviet summit will be a "summit between two old opponents." People keep asking whether this summit will serve as the beginning of new relations between the two old opponents.

**Balancing Act with Strategic Offensive, Defensive Weapons**

11080237 Beijing XINHUA in English 0223 GMT 8 Dec 87

["Commentary: Nuclear 'Spears' and 'Shields' at the Summit (by Wang Chongjie)"—XINHUA headline]
[Text] Washington, December 7 (XINHUA)—What U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev really will be doing at the upcoming summit meeting in Washington is a balancing act—with strategic offensive and defensive weapons.

If they can pull it off, their performance will begin to accomplish reductions in nuclear arsenals.

In recent years, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have declared their willingness to scrap half their strategic offensive weapons. The more difficult question is how to reduce the defensive ones. Three years of negotiations between the two sides have produced no substantial progress.

In ancient times, arsenals produced spears for offense and shields for defense. The nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States are likewise divided—weapons are regarded as spears and shields, although their natures and differences have become infinitely more complicated.

The United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in May 26, 1972. The time was seen as ripe for such accords since the United States and the Soviet Union had by then reached a parity on nuclear strategic offensive weapons.

Both countries also had come to realize that there was then no defense against ballistic missiles—the one that struck first would not survive destructive retaliation from the other side.

In these two treaties, the U.S. and the Soviet Union noted the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive weapons and took it into consideration in their attempt to reduce the risk of nuclear wars. The ABM Treaty stipulates that both the United States and the Soviet Union could each deploy a ground-based shield, or an anti-ballistic missile system.

However, the ABM Treaty did not, as expected, lead to reductions in the spears, or strategic offensive weapons. The two nuclear giants kept striving for military superiority through the 1970s and into the 1980s, despite a limitation on missiles established by the second U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in 1979. That limit has already been broken, and both countries now possess enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other dozens of times over.

Now, however, the United States and the Soviet Union are indicating subtle changes in position. On strategic offensive weapons, they appear ready to discuss their long-discussed reduction of strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent.

However, the United States demands a greater reduction of ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) in which the Soviets have an advantage, while the Soviet Union calls for greater reductions in submarine-launched Cruise missiles and nuclear-weapon-carrying strategic bombers, two of the mainstays of the U.S. nuclear strategic offensive arsenal.

There is also a dispute on the timetable for reductions. The United States wants ten years to accomplish them while the Soviet Union demands a five-year deadline. In a bid for compromise, however, it now suggests a willingness to link offensive and defensive systems for ten years.

During that period, the Soviet Union proposes restricting anti-ballistic missile tests for space defense to laboratories and manufacturing sites. In addition, it proposes to negotiate a list of weapons not allowed to be sent into space during this exploratory stage.

The United States, in a counterproposal, specified seven more years to comply with the ABM Treaty during which the tests and studies now permitted by the treaty will be continued. Unless other agreements are reached, the two sides, according to the U.S. suggestion, will be free after that to deploy their strategic defense systems.

There the sword-shield argument has stalled. While it would be possible to begin the 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons in the first half of next year, President Reagan says over and over that his country will never give up the space defense system, and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev says if the SDI goes ahead, the Soviet Union will take countermeasures.

In this nuclear era, scientists tell us that no strategic offensive weapon is invulnerable, and that strategic defensive systems are not infallible. It is obvious that the best way to solve the problem of the contradictory relations between the “nuclear spears” and “nuclear shields” is to drastically reduce and finally eliminate both sides' arsenals of strategic offensive nuclear weapons and to stop the escalation of arms race into space.

Both Sides Attempt 'To Cheat'
06071437 Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO in Chinese
5 Dec 87 p 3

["
"Newsletter from America" by reporter stationed in the United States Chiang Kuo-yuan [1203 0948 0337]; "American-Soviet Strategic Talks as Seen From Medium-Range Missile Agreement"]

[Text] The Stock in Nuclear Arsenals Will Only Be Reduced by 4 Percent [subhead]

It is incorrect and illogical to regard the efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce medium-range missiles as a breakthrough in disarmament talks,
which have been at a deadlock for many years. It is also incorrect and illogical to think that the rugged path will be smoothed out in the future.

The figures concerned mislead people into incorrectly believing that the number of missiles and warheads being reduced is enormous. The United States will reduce 256 Cruise missiles and 108 Pershing 2 missiles, each with 1 warhead per missile. The Soviet Union will destroy 270 SS-20 missiles with 3 warheads per missile, the kind that West Europe fears most; 20 SS-23s, 112 SS-4s, and 110 to 120 SS-12s, each with 1 warhead per missile. A total of 850 missiles and 1,390 to 1,400 warheads will be demolished.

However, the number of reduced warheads will only account for 4 percent of the stockpile of the two countries. Behind the medium-range missiles reduction deal, both the United States and the Soviet Union have made their own smug calculations. The United States hopes that after getting something out of the deal, the Soviets will make a concession regarding the issue of long-range missiles. As far as the reduction of medium-range missiles is concerned, the concession made by the Soviet Union is greater than that of the United States. Apart from long-range missiles, the Soviets intend to talk with the United States about the “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative. The United States has always refused to put this issue on the agenda for discussion.

Medium-range missiles are tactical nuclear weapons with a maximum range of 3,000 miles. Their power of complete destruction is also limited. The explosive power of the SS-10 missile with 2 warheads is the greatest and is roughly equal to 500,000 tons of TNT. Both sides are holding out medium-range missiles as bait, but their eyes are set on long-range missiles. The range of long-range missiles with several warheads generally exceeds 8,000 miles. Each warhead is equal to more than 1 million tons of TNT.

Reducing Strategic Weapons Is by No Means Easy [subhead]

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have always expressed the desire to reduce strategic weapons by 50 percent. But how should they be reduced? This problem is much more complicated than reducing just medium-range missiles. Relative strategic missile strength between the United States and the Soviet Union is not equal. The Americans have the upper hand in the areas of nuclear submarines, airborne capability, and so on. The United States’ Trident submarines and B-1 and B-52 supersonic and stratosphere bombers have left the Soviets far behind. However, the ground-based long-range weapons of the Soviet Union are not weak. Apart from developing missiles with underground launching pads, in recent years the Soviet Union has made special efforts to enhance the mobility of long-range missiles. A mobile land and air force armed with a number of long-range missiles has been established. Missiles can be launched from both railways and highways. This not only enhances Soviet troop mobility but can also prevent the total destruction of their long-range missiles in a first attack by the United States. This is a serious, hidden problem for the United States.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have their own intentions with regard to the destruction of long-range missiles. It took 6 years to talk about the issue of medium-range missiles. In 1972 Nixon and Brezhnev signed the first treaty on long-range missiles. Later, Carter and Brezhnev signed the second treaty. But the treaties were not smoothly implemented. The two superpowers try to cheat or outwit each other. They try to perpetrate a fraud by making use of loopholes in the treaties. At the summit meeting, there is little chance for accomplishing a specific plan concerning the reduction of long-range missiles by 50 percent.

Cannot the “Star Wars” Program Be Touched? [subhead]

As far as the “Star Wars” program is concerned, the United States “concealed” it a long time ago and regards it as a final weapon. They do not want to talk about it. The talks on medium-range missiles repeatedly ran aground last year and this year because the Soviets intended to make the “Star Wars” program one of the conditions for bargaining. Xiang Jiang performed the sword dance as a cover for his attempt on Liu Bang’s life. The Soviets’ attempt is on the “Star Wars” program rather than on medium-range missiles. For 3 years, the United States spent $300 billion, on research concentrated in Massachusetts, to study the “Star Wars” program. The United States aims to thwart Soviet superiority in long-range missiles with this program. What merits our attention is that recently the Soviet Union has time and again mentioned their interpretation of the Anti-ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty. The treaty was concluded in an atmosphere of mutual trust. In 1972, the cold war between the East and the West had not ended. The articles and clauses contained in the treaty are, of course, ambiguous and vague. Now, with the treaty in hand, the Soviet Union can argue with the United States about whether the “Star Wars” program violates the ABM Treaty. Therefore, it is appropriate to say that longer talks than the talks on long-range missiles are needed in order to make progress in the settlement of the problem of “Star Wars” program.

We should avoid proceeding from our own subjective desire or being blindly optimistic about the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to demolish medium-range missiles. However, in any event, the United States and the Soviet Union will eventually destroy medium-range nuclear weapons. This can be regarded as the first step taken on the rugged path to seek peace for mankind.
‘Serious Differences’ Exist
11061326 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in
Chinese 0819 GMT 6 Dec 87

[Commentary by XINHUA reporter Wang Chongjie: “‘Nuclear Spears’ and ‘Nuclear Shields’ — on Dilemma Facing the U.S.-Soviet Summit”]

[Text] Washington, 5 Dec (XINHUA)—The dispute in handling strategic offensive and defensive weapons is currently the key issue affecting the large-scale reduction of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union for a halt of further escalation of the arms race between them. It is also a serious problem to be faced by Soviet leader Gorbachev and U.S. President Reagan when they meet in Washington next week.

Obviously despite their common willingness to each cut down their strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent, serious differences exist between them regarding the strategic defensive weapons. This is why no substantial progress has been made in the negotiations over the past 3 years.

The spears for offense and shields for defense have always been the two major components of an arsenal since ancient times. In the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race, they have been confronted with a complex problem of defensive and offensive weapons, and this problem is more complex than and even essentially different from anyone ever encountered before. As early as on 26 May 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed at the same time the “Treaty on the Limitation of Antibalistic Missile System (ABM Treaty)” and “Interim Agreement on Certain Measures to Limit Strategic Offensive Weapons,” which, of course by no means accidentally, became the treaties for limiting strategic offensive weapons in the first phase. At that time, the United States and the Soviet Union had roughly the same quantity of strategic offensive nuclear weapons, and without further developing the antiballistic missile system, offensive moves by either side could be repelled by the other with a crushing blow. Therefore, in the aforesaid treaty and agreement, the two sides clearly stipulated that the treaty and agreement “have taken into account the interrelationships between strategic offensive and defensive weapons” and that they were aimed at “gradually reducing the danger of war involving nuclear weapons.” According to the ABM Treaty, the two countries are allowed to each deploy a ground antiballistic missile system.

However, the ABM Treaty did not lead to serious reduction of strategic offensive weapons. In the 1970’s, both countries attempted to gain military supremacy. As a result of the escalation of the nuclear arms race since the 1980’s, the quotas stipulated in the 1979 U.S. Soviet treaty on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons in the second phase have been broken. Both the United States and the Soviet Union now have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the rival scores of times. Under such circumstances, it has become less practical to increase the quantity of strategic offensive weapons, and the focus of attention has been shifted to the establishment of a strategic defensive system capable of invalidating or reducing the destructibility of the rival’s strategic offensive weapons.

In March 1983, Reagan formally announced the U.S. “Strategic Defense Initiative” (that is the “Star Wars” program), and decided to use the most advanced science and technology to set up an antiballistic missile system based in the space. The Soviet Union promptly accused the United States of openly violating the ABM Treaty, while the United States charged the Soviet Union with not only violating the treaty but also having started the development of space defense system. This has been the bone of contention in their negotiations in Geneva since March 1985.

During the U.S.-Soviet summit in Reykjavik in October 1986, the two sides once agreed to cut down their strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent over 5 years. They also mentioned the possibility of total elimination of nuclear weapons on both sides over 10 years. However, Gorbachev emphasized that both the Soviet Union and the United States must not withdraw from the ABM Treaty in the next 10 years, during which “experiments of antiballistic missile system in the space should be banned, except for those for research purposes in the laboratory.” In reply, Reagan indicated that the United States could postpone the deployment of strategic defense system for 10 years, but he insisted that the United States had the right to conduct experiments related to the strategic defense program outside the laboratory. As the two sides are diametrically opposed to each other, no concrete agreement has been reached.

In the last year, the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand continued to increase and renew their offensive strategic weapons; on the other hand they were actively engaged in developing strategic defense weapons in space. According to the annual report issued by the London International Strategy Institute in November this year, the number of strategic missile warheads of the United States and the Soviet Union increased by 1,000 and 400 respectively in the past year. U.S. funding for the strategic defense program for fiscal year 1987 was $3.5 billion; for fiscal year it is $3.9 billion. In September this year, the U.S. defense secretary had given approval to starting the work of developing space-based interception missiles to prepare for possible deployment in the middle of 1990’s. Soviet leaders have also admitted that the Soviet Union is doing basic research on a strategic defense system.

Since spring this year, the United States and the Soviet Union have been repeatedly haggling with each other over the relationship between reduction of offensive strategic weapons and limitation on the antiballistic missile system. Some delicate changes have taken place in their positions. They still agree to a 50 percent
reduction of offensive strategic weapons. However, regarding the categories of strategic weapons to be reduced, the United States demands to reduce more land-based ICBM's in which the Soviet Union maintains a superiority; while the Soviet Union urges reduction in more submarine-launched missiles and nuclear-carrying strategic bombers in which the United States keeps a superiority. As for the timetable, the United States calls for completing the reduction in 10 years while the Soviet Union insists on completing the reduction in 5 years. To conclude an agreement on reduction of offensive strategic weapons, the Soviet Union proposed that both sides guarantee not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for 10 years, during which time it will be permissible to conduct research in ground laboratories, ABM proving grounds, and manufacturing plants, on ABM's in connection with defense in space; and the two sides may decide through consultation a list of space weapons and devices that should not be launched into space in the course of research. The United States proposed that both sides adhere to the ABM Treaty for 7 years, continue research and tests that are "permitted" by the treaty in the meantime, and freely deploy advanced strategic defense system 7 years from now, unless the two sides reach other agreements.

Not long ago, American and Soviet leaders announced that the two sides may be able to reach an agreement in the first half of next year on a 50 percent reduction of offensive strategic arms. However, Reagan recently reiterated that the United States will never give up the plan for building a space defense system. Gorbachev reiterated that if the United States persists in doing so, the Soviet Union will make its own response. How the situation will develop remains to be seen.

Many authoritative scientists have pointed out that in the present nuclear era, no one can build an offensive strategic weapon system that will make others unable to strike back, nor can anyone build a perfect strategic defense system. It is very clear that the only effective way to solve the contradictions between "nuclear spear" and "nuclear shield" is to drastically reduce offensive strategic nuclear weapons, eventually destroy them all, and stop extending the arms race into space.

However, the reality is that the rivalry between the two superpowers centers on world hegemony. Whether they compete for military superiority or for expansion of their spheres of influence, their ultimate aim is world hegemony. Therefore, it's difficult for the two countries to enjoy genuine detente, no matter how relaxed they may appear at one time or another.

For many years, the U.S. and the Soviets have paid lip service to nuclear disarmament and have continued to bargain while actually each has tried to overtake the other in a nuclear arms race.

Their rationale for this race lies in their belief that the strength of nuclear arms is a major means in striving for hegemony. So both the quality and quantity of their nuclear weapons have continued to improve.

The medium-range missile treaty, to be signed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Washington next week is welcomed worldwide just because it will be the first genuine nuclear disarmament treaty. And if it can be genuinely implemented, it deserves welcome, because any disarmament is better than a continued arms buildup.

Nevertheless, the missiles to be destroyed account for merely three percent of the nuclear arsenals of the two powers. The fact that it took more than six years for the superpowers to conclude even this agreement shows disarmament is far more difficult for them than continuing the arms race.

 Principally, however, the U.S. and Russia contend for nuclear superiority with strategic nuclear missiles, and they have negotiated for almost 20 years on limiting these weapons. While they have been talking, the number of such weapons has increased to a point where each can destroy not only the other but the whole globe several times over.

It was not until two years ago, however, that both sides appeared to be reaching a point where they might be willing to reach an agreement actually to reduce strategic arms. Apparently this mutual concession stems both from a strong worldwide protest against the nuclear arms buildup and from the fact that further increases in the number of these weapons became less important after a saturation point was reached.

In fact, no agreement to reduce strategic nuclear arms could now affect either their nuclear arms strength or their status as big nuclear powers. Nor will it unbalance the nuclear parity between them.

Still, each side wants to cut down the advantage of the other while maintaining its own. The Soviets want to check the U.S. development of space weapons, while the Americans refuse flatly. Compromises on these issues might be possible, but they will require long and arduous negotiations.

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Hegemony 'Ultimate Aim'
11050222 Beijing XINHUA in English
0131 GMT 5 Dec 87

["Commentary: A Difficult Process of Disarmament and Detente (by Wu Jin)" — XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, December 5 (XINHUA)—The U.S.-Soviet summit to be held in Washington next week has promised hopes that the two superpowers might be truly relaxing, and that their disarmament talks would substantially benefit world peace.
It also will be just as difficult to resolve outstanding disputes between the two countries over regional conflicts. For the time being, the Russians are in a more difficult position. More than 100,000 Soviet troops occupying Afghanistan for almost eight years have not succeeded in suppressing the resistance there. The Soviets also fell short in attempting to support Vietnam in settling the Kampuchea issue by force.

The United States, on the other hand, found itself in difficulty both externally and internally for interfering in Nicaragua. Moreover, its adventurist policy has embroiled it in the Gulf conflict.

On regional issues as a whole, the two adversaries seem to have discovered their need for mutual compromise—or at least a modus vivendi. They have been talking privately on regional issues, but even though no agreements have yet been announced, it is difficult to forecast whether a deal might not come out of the summit.

Considering how quarrelsome the Soviet Union and the U.S. were during the first half of the present decade, it seems reasonable to expect progress, more or less, to come out of the summit, and possibly even further relaxation in their relations in the immediate future.

However, U.S. President Ronald Reagan said a few days ago that “the Soviets are and will continue to be our adversaries,” and that “we must deal with the Soviets soberly and from strength.” His words are helpful and timely for those now overconfident about a U.S.-Soviet detente.

‘Differences Still Exist’
11070308 Beijing XINHUA in English
0206 GMT 7 Dec 87

["Backgrounder: Three Reagan-Gorbachev Summits"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, December 7 (XINHUA)—U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev are to meet from December 7-10 in Washington for the third time in three years.

During the summit, they are expected to sign the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) treaty and discuss possible reductions of strategic nuclear arms, regional conflicts, human rights and relations between the two countries.

Their first meeting was held in Geneva in November 1985, which ended a six-year impasse in U.S.-Soviet relations. During that meeting, the two leaders agreed to improve relations and announced plans to hold additional summits. They also signed agreements to accelerate contacts and exchanges in fields of science and technology, education and culture, and establish a consulate general respectively in New York of the United States and Kiev of the Soviet Union. However, they failed to achieve any progress on reducing nuclear arms or settling regional conflicts. Moreover, the Soviet demand that the United States give up its “Strategic Defense Initiative” known as the “Star Wars” program was refused by the U.S.

From that first meeting until October 1986, the two countries had a hot-and-cold relationship and no substantial progress was made in their arms reduction talks. And an original plan for Gorbachev to visit the United States in 1986 and Reagan to go to the Soviet Union in 1987 fell through.

The two leaders met for a second time in October 1986 in Reykjavik, Iceland, to consider proposals for scrapping medium-range missiles and reducing long-range missiles. But a deal fell apart amid recriminations when Gorbachev demanded restrictions on the U.S. “Star Wars” program, and Reagan refused. No date was fixed then for Gorbachev’s visit to the United States.

The Reykjavik summit, though it ended with no specific achievements, laid a foundation for the third summit. In February, Gorbachev put forth a proposal that the INF talks be separated from the U.S. “Star Wars” program, which provided a favorable turn for a new round of talks.

Nevertheless, major differences still exist between the two superpowers on reducing strategic nuclear arms and regional conflicts. Those differences make it highly probable that next week’s third summit will not be a thoroughly happy and relaxed occasion.

Media Analyze INF Accord

Welcomes Accord
06091104 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
9 Dec 87 p 1

[Commentator’s article: “This Is Only the Beginning”]

[Text] The U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has been brewing for a long time. It was finally officially signed by Reagan and Gorbachev on 8 December during the U.S.-Soviet Washington summit. The treaty provides that the two sides shall eliminate all their intermediate-range and intermediate-short-range missiles within 3 years. Although it covers only a small portion of the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals, it is after all the first nuclear disarmament treaty that has ever been signed since the emergence of nuclear weapons in the world. For this reason it has become a topic of common concern and is appreciated by the international community. If this treaty can really be put into effect it will be the first step taken by the United States and the Soviet Union toward nuclear disarmament. To some extent, it will help to relax international tensions. This is a development deserving applause.
Six years have passed since the U.S.-Soviet intermediate-range missile talks opened in 1981. During the protracted talks, both sides drove a hard bargain and struggled hard against each other. Anyway, because of the strong demand and pressure of world public opinion, and out of consideration of their own needs, the United States and the Soviet Union finally reached a compromise which lead to the present accord.

In recent years people of all nations have voiced stronger and stronger opposition to the arms race and made just appeals for peace and disarmament. Not long ago, the 42d UN General Assembly adopted dozens of motions concerning disarmament, urging the United States and the Soviet Union, who maintain the world’s largest nuclear arsenals and conventional armaments, to undertake special responsibilities in the disarmament process and to take the lead in going into action. The adoption of all these motions reflected the strong desire of the world’s people. The strong determination of people of all nations in demanding disarmament has given a great impetus to the nuclear disarmament talks between the two superpowers. The conclusion of this INF Treaty represents an achievement for the world’s people in their struggle for disarmament.

However, one must be aware that the signing of the INF Treaty is merely the first step, since these types of missiles account for only about 4 percent of the U.S. and Soviet arsenals. Even if these missiles were eliminated, the two countries would still have the power to completely destroy the world several times over. Therefore, on the whole, the signing of the accord should definitely not be regarded as a sign of a drastic reduction in the danger of nuclear war, nor of a fundamental relaxation of international tensions. Strategic nuclear weapons are the mainstay of the nuclear force of both the United States and the Soviet Union. At present each side owns over 2,000 strategic nuclear weapons and more than 10,000 nuclear warheads. What is more, both sides are stepping up their development of space weapons. For this reason the world is still under severe nuclear threat. There is undoubtedly a long way to go before genuine and thorough nuclear disarmament can be achieved.

During previous U.S.-Soviet talks, leaders of the two countries repeatedly expressed the hope of reducing strategic nuclear weapons by 30 percent. This issue has also been placed on the agenda of the current summit. Of course, this is a good indication. However, over the past few years very little progress has been made in this respect. There is considerable divergence of opinion on the issue and both sides have been plunged into endless haggling. Facts show that any intention to have nuclear superiority over the other is not conducive to a reduction of nuclear weapons. Instead, such intentions will lead to a spiralling rise in the nuclear arms race. Therefore, how to drastically reduce strategic nuclear weapons and thoroughly destroy them, and how to prevent the nuclear arms race from developing into space remain arduous tasks for all countries. These issues are also a test of the sincerity of the United States and the Soviet Union regarding disarmament.

The Chinese Government and people have always believed that the struggle against the arms race and for disarmament constitutes an important aspect of safeguarding world peace. We have consistently stood for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. We welcome U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks and the signing of the INF Treaty. We also hope that following the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union will, in accordance with the will of the people of the world, seriously and sincerely continue their negotiations, considerably reduce nuclear weapons and conventional weapons in real earnest, and stop the space arms race. This would virtually ease the threat of a nuclear world war and let the people of the whole world live in peace and freedom under a clear, blue sky. To achieve this, people of all countries should continue to make unremitting efforts.

Foreign Ministry Welcomes INF Signing 11091116 Beijing XINHUA in English 1100 GMT 9 Dec 87

[Text] Beijing, December 9 (XINHUA)—The Chinese Government welcomes the official signing of the INF treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said at a weekly news briefing here this afternoon.

Asked to comment on the official signing of the INF treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, the spokesman noted that the signing of the treaty is the first step toward nuclear disarmament.

She pointed out, “the large number of strategic nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union remains a grave threat to the security of mankind, and the arms race is still far from being halted.”

“We hope that the United States and the Soviet Union, the two powers with the largest amount of arms, will continue to hold serious negotiations on drastic nuclear arms reduction, reach agreements, and implement them truly,” she said.

“China consistently stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and biological weapons, and drastic reduction in conventional weapons, and is opposed to the extension of the arms race into outer space,” she stated.

“Along with all the other peace-loving countries and peoples of the world, we will continue to make unremitting efforts to promote comprehensive disarmament and genuine relaxation of international tension,” the spokesman said.
U.S., USSR Move To Legalize Space Arms Race
11122027 Beijing XINHUA in English
1830 GMT 12 Dec 87

[News Analysis: "Guard Against Legalization of Space Arms Race (by Shi Lujia)"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, December 12 (XINHUA)—The outcome of the three-day U.S.-Soviet summit indicated that the two superpowers have made some compromise on space weapons and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty so as to give impetus to the stalemate Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

A joint communique at the end of the summit said U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev have agreed to instruct negotiators in Geneva to speed up talks. The aim is to achieve an early agreement on a 50-percent cut in the present strategic nuclear arsenals, hopefully to be signed in the first half of 1988 when Reagan visits Moscow.

The communique also showed that after intense consultations, the two countries' differences over certain specific issues have been narrowed. The issues include what is the acceptable proportion for nuclear killers of all kinds (land-based and submarine-launched missiles and long-range bombers) after the 50-percent cut, how to calculate warheads carried by different weapons, and how to conduct verifications after the agreement is reached.

However, just as officials from both countries admitted, these issues are more complicated and a lot of problems remain to be solved. Moreover, with a new agreement, the Geneva negotiators have to consider the question of whether both countries could continue to maintain a relative strategic balance, or whether one country is to maintain superiority in certain areas.

Therefore, since the bargaining will be hard and exhausting at the negotiation table, it remains a question whether an agreement could be reached by the first half of 1988 as expected.

Even so, Washington and Moscow can still each destroy the other several times with the remaining 1,600 nuclear weapons and 6,000 warheads, and it is still far away from a nuclear-free world with peace and security they bragged about.

But it is certainly a good thing that the two countries are willing to continue arms reduction talks. And they are of course hoping to reach a new agreement as soon as possible.

The two superpowers announced in the joint communique that while the START talks are going on, they will discuss the non-withdrawal period of the 1972 ABM Treaty, during which they will be allowed to continue the research, development and testing of space-based defense systems.

This, however, leaves a loophole. The two countries each has its own understanding and interpretation of the treaty and the communique did not stipulate that they should have the same.

In a bid to test space weapons freely both in the laboratory and in space, the United States insists that the ABM Treaty should be interpreted in a broad sense while the Soviet Union stands for a narrow interpretation of the treaty. The wording of the communique showed that the two sides may each carry on with its own space program in line with its own interpretation.

As one senior U.S. official put it, "nothing that was done today restrains U.S. or Soviet strategic defense research, development and testing efforts."

It is also clearly written in the document that unless a new agreement is reached after the non-withdrawal period of the ABM Treaty expires, "each side will be free to decide its course of action." Says the American official: If by then Washington has completed its "star wars" program, "we will have ability and the right to deploy it." "When we have a defense ready to deploy, we will do so," President Reagan told TV viewers.

Gorbachev had stated earlier his country will respond to such deployment, although Moscow this time did not make similar remarks.

Here one question arises: Are the two superpowers trying to legalize their arms race in space through signing some agreements? An AP report yesterday described Reagan and Gorbachev's agreement to drop differences on the ABM Treaty as a move "that could legalize a race to develop space-based defenses against nuclear missiles."

No doubt, willingness to reduce nuclear arms is welcome. But at the same time the United States and the Soviet Union should take effective measures to prevent the arms race from extending into space. However, if they partially reduce their nuclear buildup while developing space defense systems, people will surely conclude that the summit promise to work for a safer world is mere propaganda.

Gorbachev on Western Attempts To Undercut INF, Accelerate SDI
11122219 Beijing XINHUA in English
2005 GMT 14 Dec 87

["Gorbachev Accuses Circles in the West of Intending To Make Up for Elimination of Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Moscow, December 14 (XINHUA)—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev accused tonight certain circles in the West of intending to make up for the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles.
In his nationwide television speech, Gorbachev said that only three days have passed after his return from Washington, "but definite circles in the United States and other Western countries are already rising to prevent a change for the better."

The circles demand that urgent measures be taken to make up for the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles by bringing into Europe and nearby new nuclear forces, modernising the nuclear and other weapons remaining there, Gorbachev charged.

Gorbachev returned to Moscow last Friday after three days of summit talks in Washington with U.S. President Ronald Reagan, during which a superpower treaty to scrap intermediate nuclear forces (INF) was signed.

Gorbachev said some people in the West are even trying to claim that the Washington summit has settled the differences on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and under this pretext they call for accelerating the SDI program.

"I will frankly say that these are dangerous tendencies, and they shall not be underestimated," Gorbachev said, adding that "they can undermine the turn which has outlined [as received] in the process of demilitarisation of international relations."

Gorbachev told television viewers that it is yet early to speak about a fundamental improvement of Soviet-American relations.

China's position on nuclear disarmament is consistent, said the spokesman at this afternoon's weekly news briefing.

He said that China has pointed out on many occasions that the United States and the Soviet Union possess the largest nuclear arsenals and should take the lead in stopping the test, production and deployment of nuclear weapons of all types.

The spokesman said that the two superpowers should also take the lead in drastically reducing nuclear weapons of various types and destroying those on the spot deployed in any place both at home and abroad, adding that in this way, positive conditions can be created for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear powers and wide representation to further discuss the nuclear disarmament and the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

Up to now the United States and the Soviet Union have failed to put into action the abovementioned "three cessations and one reduction," the spokesman said.

In answering to reporters' questions, the spokesman said that yesterday Edward L. Rowney, special advisor to the President and secretary of state of the United States for arms control, briefed Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on the summit meeting of the United States and the Soviet Union. During the meeting, Qian reaffirmed China's views on the summit meeting and its principles on disarmament, the spokesman said.

He said that on the question of intermediate range missiles, China believes that those missiles deployed in Europe and in Asia should be destroyed simultaneously because the security of Europe and that of Asia is identically important.

He said, China will, as always, make its own contribution to genuine disarmament.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Foreign Minister Lauds INF Treaty
08091538 Prague CTK in English
1328 GMT 9 Dec 87


Both officials, meeting to discuss economic and social developments in their countries, agreed the accord represented a significant contribution to boosting confidence between nations and the first step toward a total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Adm Kostev On Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine
180100212 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 87
(signed to press 19 Aug 87) pp 9-15

[Article by Professor and Vice Admiral G. Kostev: "Our Military Doctrine in Light of New Political Thinking"]

[Text] Warsaw Treaty member states adopted a new military doctrine at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (PKK) in Berlin on 29 May 1987. This doctrine had attracted a lot of attention from world society and this is understandable. The document that was signed in Berlin is an example of new political thinking in the nuclear missile age as it is based on halting further replenishments of nuclear arsenals, stopping the expansion of military confrontation, pressure, international tension and hostility and recognizing the necessity of overcoming suspicion and distrust. Comrade M. S. Gorbachev stresses, "Warsaw Treaty signatories have clearly stated their military doctrine, one that is subordinated to the task of preventing both nuclear and conventional war, is oriented on reasonable sufficiency in both the volume and nature of arms and armed forces and is exclusively defensive in nature."

The open statement of their military doctrine by countries of the socialist community is an expression of the defensive nature of socialism's military strategy. In officially coming out with a united doctrine, the fraternal countries are being guided by the desire to reduce international tension by adopting measures that will facilitate the reduction of armed forces and weapons and reduce the threat of war. They are speaking out so that experts from the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO will meet and objectively and impartially examine and explain the contents and trends in their military doctrines to one another, compare them and study the conceptions together to strengthen international trust and expand understanding of the goals and intentions of the confronting military-political alliances. And they have made every effort to express their common point of view to further increase their restraint and become more consistent in considering the realities of the nuclear age.

This open expression of political will by Warsaw Treaty member states is an irrefutable argument in favor of employing the socialist states' peace-loving policy and tearing the mask of hypocrisy off of the anti-Soviets who are spreading hysteria under the decrepit flag of the "Soviet military threat." The document covering the Warsaw Treaty Organization's military doctrine is yet another clear confirmation that it is not the Soviet Union and socialism that are guilty of continuing war on this planet, but rather the imperialist ambitions of the U.S. and other capitalist states.

Aggressive circles in the U.S. and other NATO countries are continuing to prepare for war in answer to the USSR's initiative to eliminate nuclear weapons and to the Warsaw Treaty's recommendation that military concepts and the doctrines of the military blocs and their participants be based on defensive grounds. The U.S. is planning to put nuclear weapons into space and to significantly increase their own strategic potential by the early 90's.

So long as international reaction whips the arms race and it has not renounced the policy of social revanchism and its "crusade" against socialism, the CPSU and its fraternal parties will do everything possible to support the defensive might of our country and the socialist cooperative at the necessary level. The party and the people are objectively evaluating the real situation and consider the defense of the Socialist Fatherland and the support of its security as one of the most important functions of the Soviet State. Socialism has never of its own will linked, nor is it now linking its future to the military solution of international problems. As noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, the Soviet Union has planned in the military area to "act in the future so that no one has any reason for even imaginary fears for their own security." These fundamental attitudes are expressed in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

Warsaw Treaty military doctrine is a system of fundamental views about averting war, military construction, preparing the fraternal countries and their armed forces to repel aggression and about the methods for waging armed combat in defense of socialism. This is also the basis for the doctrines of each member of the Warsaw Treaty, to include Soviet military doctrine.

There are usually two parts to military doctrine — political and military and the latter is usually called military-technical.

The political side of military doctrine, as a rule, consists of views on the social and political essence of the future war, if the war will be started by the imperialists, and especially the political goals of the state and the requirements for military construction that result from these goals. The other part of doctrine, the military side, is associated with determining the strategic military nature of war, the missions for the armed forces, their development and the basis for the country's military preparations. The two parts of doctrine are dialectically interrelated and the essence of this link is their mutual inseparability and the total conformity of the political goals and the methods for conducting military operations.

The provisions of Soviet military doctrine are based on the laws and principles of dialectic and historical materialism and Leninist teachings on defending the Socialist Motherland. These take into account the reality of the modern era, the powerful forces of socialism and its ability and desire to resolve international problems through peaceful and political methods.
The political content of Soviet military doctrines is derived from the socialist nature of our social structure, from the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet government and from the interests of its people. And it is for this reason that the main feature of our military doctrine is its defensive inclination. The document that was signed in Berlin on 29 March 1987 stresses the decisively defensive nature of the military doctrine for all Warsaw Treaty member states.

The defensive nature of our military doctrine is expressed in the following basic provisions: Under no circumstances will the Soviet Union begin military operations against any state or alliance of states if the Soviet Union itself has not become the object of an armed attack. And we should stress that since the Soviet Union is a socialist type state, wars of conquest are foreign to it and it has never prepared for or waged a war to establish political supremacy in the world or to change the existing structure in other states; The Soviet Union has no territorial pretensions toward any state either in or outside of Europe and has no need to expand its state borders, but if its borders are attacked, the aggressor will be totally routed and our people will defend themselves with total resolve; The Soviet Union will defend both itself and any Socialist Treaty member state in like manner to repel an attack from without; The Soviet Union does not consider any state or any people as its enemy; on the contrary, it is prepared to build relations with all the countries of the world without exception on the basis of mutual consideration for the interests of security and peaceful coexistence.

Because the Soviet Union, as the other countries in the Warsaw Pact, has been forced to maintain Armed Forces and the means for repelling any attack from without, the military part of our doctrine includes the problems of improving the Army and the Navy and maintaining their military preparedness at a level that will not allow us to be surprised. The most important aspects of these issues are: the basic trends in preparing the Soviet Army and Navy, their equipment level and organizational structure, training for their highly-qualified personnel, the requirements for military training for the troops, and the education of personnel in the spirit of high vigilance and constant readiness to repel aggression.

The defensive nature of our military doctrine, one that counts exclusively on repelling aggression, in no way signifies that our operations will be of a passive nature. In the event an aggressor attacks, Soviet Armed Forces along with the armies of the fraternal socialist countries will defend the revolutionary achievements of their people with full resolve. The security of the Motherland and of the entire socialist community is sacred to us.

Just as Soviet military doctrine, the military doctrine for the Warsaw Treaty member states is subordinate to the task of preventing both nuclear and conventional war. This very important political issue, one that has been enunciated by the Warsaw Treaty countries, again expresses the basic principles that are at the foundation of the socialist states' military doctrine.

If we were able to eliminate war from human society's life there would be a very critical and at the same time simple decision — whether or not a military policy or military doctrine were necessary — and the elements of these two part would disappear in and of themselves. But this is as yet not realistic.

The CPSU program states that so long as the danger of imperialism starting aggressive wars and military conflicts exists, the party will focus unwavering attention on increasing the defensive might of the USSR and strengthening its security and the readiness of the Armed Forces to rout any aggressor so that the USSR's Armed Forces are at a level that precludes strategic superiority by imperialism's forces. This is also the initial position for the entire system of views that comprise contemporary Soviet military doctrine. And this covers both the political and the military parts.

The current stage in the development of Soviet military doctrine (in its very dynamic military part) is appropriate to the 80's. By this time the two leading nuclear powers, the USSR and the U.S.A., have accumulated enormous nuclear might. In addition, there are another several states that have established reserves of nuclear weapons and have improved them. This is the main feature of the present stage that has caused new opinions in socialist countries about the nature of future war and the fundamental changes since the 40's and 50's, a time when effective means of mass destruction were just entering the inventories. These opinions are reflected in the new political thinking and in the idea that a world nuclear war must not occur. At the same time, since the other side is not abandoning its policy of force, is not taking those radical, practical steps to eliminate nuclear weapons and does not want to limit the use of conventional weapons, wars on this planet still remain a harsh reality and we, the real opponents of weapons of mass destruction and armed conflict in general, cannot unilaterally disarm and thus become weaker than the aggressor. This means that there are two extremely important tasks.

The first and primary task is to rule out nuclear war. This essence of this task can be expressed by the words of V. I. Lenin: "Take as many simple, clear decisions and measures as possible that will really lead to peace, if not totally eliminate the dangers of war" (Complete Collected Works, volume 45, page 241). This Leninist direction is reflected in the current stage of CPSU policies.

The second task is to have the opportunity and the ability to repel any aggressor's attack and to have the Armed Forces prepared to conduct military operations that include the extensive use of any type of weapon.
And we should teach our Army and Navy forces to do this in a realistic manner. This task is totally a result of the military doctrine on defending socialism against an aggressor.

Imperialism was and remains the source of wars and the military threat. It is therefore understandable that we inherently link our untiring struggle for peace with a readiness to harshly repel any aggression. This principle is totally and fully expressed in the Soviet military doctrine whose essence is expressed with utmost simplicity: "The Soviet Union does not want greater security for itself at the expense of others, but it will not accept less security." And while there is a threat of an encroachment against the achievements of October and a threat to general peace we will even further strengthen our Armed Forces.

There is one more important feature of the current stage in the development of Soviet military doctrine. Its direct and immediate goal is to prepare the country and its Armed Forces to defend against aggressors, i.e., to wage a just war. This is an important feature that also distinguishes the common doctrine of Warsaw Treaty countries from the doctrine of the capitalist states.

The military doctrine of Western countries is based on totally different principles. For example the military doctrine of the U.S. in the 80's is the strategy of "direct confrontation" with the USSR on global and regional levels. It is aimed at achieving "total and indisputable U.S. military superiority." And there are other variations of imperialist strategy that are little different from this. These are represented by official U.S. and NATO military doctrines such as "flexible response" and "nuclear containment." Western leaders cannot give up these outdated views on military confrontation that are representative of yesterday. They persistently oppose agreements on mutually repudiating a nuclear first-strike and using force to resolve political differences.

However the time demands other approaches. The inherent link between the struggle of mankind's survival and measures to strengthen national security and also the increased role of the technical military side of war urgently dictate the need for new political thinking.

Military doctrine is affected by the development of military science. Therefore changes that are introduced into our military doctrine because of new political thinking objectively require refinements in the theory of military art which has been enriched today by a number of new provisions.

First, the Soviet Union will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and will never use them against those countries that do not have such weapons in their territories. The USSR will do everything possible to drastically reduce the nuclear weapons that it has amassed and then eliminate them.

The obligatory decision to not be the first to use nuclear weapons is not simply a verbal statement, but an irrevocable requirement of our military construction. It is reflected in the training for commanders, staffs and forces and in the organization of extremely strict controls that guarantee that the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons cannot happen, in the increased military preparedness of our forces to repel aggression and in their equipment levels, in the improved command and control and the increased political and moral state of our servicemen.

Second, at the foundation of our Armed Forces' construction is the principle of defensive sufficiency. This means that the composition of our Army and Navy forces and the quality and quantity of the means for armed combat are strictly commensurable with the military threat level and the nature and intensity of imperialism's military preparations. It is effected by the requirements to reliably guarantee the security of the USSR and all Warsaw Treaty countries and to repel aggression. The limits for reasonable defensive sufficiency are determined by the need to prevent an unpunished nuclear attack under any circumstances, even the most unfavorable, and also by the currently existing strategic military parity that is a decisive factor in preventing war. A further increase in the parity level will certainly not bring greater security. Therefore the situation dictates the necessity of maintaining military force equality, but at the lowest possible level.

Third, there have been changes in the content of Soviet military doctrine. If the imperialists start it (war), it will unavoidably be a nuclear missile war, the type war where nuclear weapons will be the primary means of destruction and missiles will be the primary delivery system. Yet this is not appropriate to the real situation. The U.S. and NATO understand the extraordinary danger of nuclear war. Therefore, by not repudiating the policy of "from a position of power," their military strategy of "flexible response" envisions active preparations to conduct not only a nuclear war, but also an extended conventional war. And they are therefore creating military assets whose characteristics are the same as low-yield nuclear weapons. This means that our country has to prepare an armed defense using not only nuclear weapons, but also highly effective conventional means of destruction. Our problem is that we have to be as strong as our probable enemy.

Fourth, today war is a reality of our times and is an unavoidable part of the policy of violence by reactionary imperialist circles. The Army and Navy exist to carry out armed combat and are the weapon for this violence. Therefore it is extremely important that we maintain strategic military parity by strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces which are undermining all imperialist attempts to violate the equality of forces. In this regard it is very important that we train the Army and Navy for war under conditions where the enemy has weapons of enormous power. We are not talking about improving
weapons and military equipment, but about intensifying the human factor, decisively increasing the command skills of officers and generals and increasing special training for our personnel. The task is to radically improve the quality of military training for army and navy forces so that every hour of training in the classroom, in the field and at sea is saturated and effective.

The party is openly talking to the people today about economic and social problems and about persistently resolving them. And the problems of military construction and of reliably defending the conquests of October demand this same businesslike approach. The trends and content of army and navy training and their equipment level must be refined by considering the requirements and provisions of military doctrine. Also the methods for more effectively training army and navy forces and increasing the military preparedness must be defined in connection with the conditions that have changed.

As noted at the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the violation of Soviet air space by the West German sports airplane is yet another reminder of how strong and alive the negative phenomena that were exposed by the April (1985) Central Committee Plenum and the 27th Party Congress are in our society and even in the army. This underscores the need to increase vigilance, act even more decisively and strengthen discipline, organization, responsibility and execution everywhere and at all levels. The defensive nature of our doctrine in no way means that we are to reduce our vigilance and military preparedness.

The theory of military training and education as an integral part of Soviet military science has special role in realizing the requirements of military doctrine. It is this theory that develops the forms and methods for training conscientious and skillful defenders of the Motherland. It provides recommendations to coordinate subunits, units and major units and increase their combat capabilities and combat readiness.

Moral, political and psychological training designed to get the Motherland's defenders to conduct decisive, active combat operations has an extremely important place in the nuclear missile age where the imperialists are preparing for an uncompromising and shattering war (they themselves do not disclaim this). Pacifist inclinations cannot be allowed among the soldiers since this reduces the Armed Forces' combat capability at the moral and psychological level. Why? Because every serviceman must be indoctrinated with the ability to fight to his last drop of blood and with the willingness to sacrifice himself to achieve success in battle and in a fight. We must be prepared for victory both on a tactical and an operational level without any reservations and while considering the employment of any type weapon. Without this, an attack, a battle, a fight or an operation will be lost even before it begins. This is an axiom of military art. Remember our basic principle: "The forces have to learn what is necessary in war." We cannot achieve victory in battle without observing this and violations during peacetime reduce the level of the individual elements in the Soviet Armed Forces' military potential, elements such as military skills and faithfulness to one's patriotic duty. And as a result, this reduces the effectiveness of the human factor in the Armed Forces.

The Soviet people know and remember the difficult days and months during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. They write about the reasons for the failures and argue about them to this day. But the main thing that unites the people is the conviction that this will not be repeated. Neither the people nor history would forgive us for that. The country's defense and the strengthening of our security are sacred to us and every Soviet person has committed himself to this. And it is very unfortunate that our press often has arguable and simply incorrect statements about the problems of defending the Motherland and service in the Army.

Military and patriotic education for young people will have an extremely important role as long as there is a threat of war. It is precisely this education that develops a love and respect for their Armed Forces and it is a necessary prerequisite and a definite step along the path toward creating cohesive military collectives. Military patriotic education helps young people understand, acutely feel and recognize the party's important program requirement that the defense of the Socialist Motherland is a sacred responsibility for the citizens of the USSR. Unfortunately there are still a number of places where training young people for service in the Army does not meet today's needs. We must tell ourselves that the aggressor's plans are evidently considering this as it would any other of our weaknesses. The defense of the Motherland today requires special attention and demands that the Soviet man be prepared for severe trials if an aggressor dares to disturb our revolutionary transformations, a continuance of the business that was started in October 1917.

The CPSU Central Committee's resolution "Preparations for the 70th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" stressed the need to expand efforts to develop devotion to the business of Great October among the younger generations and to strengthen the defensive might of the Soviet Motherland. The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member states serves the cause of reliably defending the USSR and our fraternal countries and the great cause of peaceful socialist construction. It has a strictly defensive nature and is a clear example of new political thinking.

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[Article by Anatoly Dobrynin, Secretary of the CPSU CC]

[Text] In the community of states and peoples, which abounds in contradictions and is simultaneously interdependent, national and regional problems are woven into one knot with general human problems. The main problem in this intricate complex is that of preventing mankind's nuclear self-annihilation and of its survival in the nuclear-missile age. The solution of this problem and the assurance of universal and regional security largely depend on the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR), with its great diversity of countries, big and small, socialist and capitalist, non-aligned and aligned in military blocs. The assurance of peace and security in the APR is a part of the general problem of establishing a comprehensive international security system.

The Soviet Union is an Asian and a Pacific state, and the problems of this vast region are among its concerns. Our understanding of the approaches to their solution, and the conceptual basis and practical programme for ensuring peace and security in the APR through the joint efforts of all its countries, as Mikhail Gorbachev proposed at Vladivostok a year ago, are informed by a clear vision of the existing realities in the light of the long-term interests of the peoples of the region, and are oriented towards the future.

The most vital of these realities is that human civilisation is confronted with a threat from the accumulation of vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and it is a reality which is fully present in the APR as well. Militarisation within it is a process gathering dangerous momentum. The APR is being turned into an area of military-political confrontation and a hotbed of armed conflicts, and these always carry within them the latent danger of developing into global conflicts.

The responsibility for the tension in the region falls primarily on the United States, whose ruling circles do not want to give up the arms race, including the nuclear arms race, and have no intention of dismantling their bases or withdrawing their troops, air force and navy from foreign territories and waters.

A group of US troops, the second largest abroad after the group in Western Europe, is deployed in the Pacific region, with a concentration of large quantities of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Submarine-based missiles are tipped with something like 1,500 warheads, aircraft-carrier-based planes with about 1,000 warheads, and other US warships carry roughly as many. Tactical nuclear weapons are deployed on US bases in South Korea.

US imperialism has the objective of locking the APR into a system of US military bridgeheads stretching from Europe across the Middle East, East Africa, the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, all the way to Japan, South Korea and Oceania.

Military-political partnership within the United States-Japan-South Korea triangle is being activated. The United States regards its bases in Japan and South Korea, together with the armed forces of these two countries, which are being modernised with US aid, as a single military-strategic complex. Japanese ruling circles have steadily built up the combat strength of their armed forces in support of Washington's global course.

The Pentagon seeks to preserve the old military blocs and agreements in the APR, and to knock together new ones. Everything is being done to establish the unlawful US military presence in Micronesia. Washington has tried in various ways to foist military cooperation on the ASEAN countries.

As a result, the countries of the region are being increasingly involved in the ruinous arms race. In 1985, for instance, the ASEAN countries spent over $7 billion—2.5 times more than in 1975—on the maintenance and modernisation of their armed forces.

There is a continued and growing danger of a spread of nuclear weapons in the region. The military orientation of Pakistan's nuclear programme is a cause for special alarm; nor are there any technical impediments to some other states acquiring nuclear weapons.

The build-up of the military potential of countries in the region evidently tends to increase the mutual uneasiness and has an adverse effect on the condition of broad masses of the population by diverting vast funds from economic and social development.

The military preparations of the United States and Japan are aimed not only against the socialist countries. There is no doubt that US military bases in APR countries also have the purpose of dictating to these countries the will of the imperialist monopolies. The US armed forces abroad are an instrument for putting pressure on the peoples and governments of the liberated countries and a means for enabling the US and Japanese transnational corporations to throw their weight about in the region and to go on making huge profits. The rate of profit in the region is almost twice as high as it is in the developed countries (15.2 percent as compared with 8 percent). The so-called economic aid of the United States and Japan to less developed countries in the region in effect turns out to be downright bondage. The APR countries account for a sizable part of the less developed countries' debt, which is now in excess of $1 trillion. Thus, with an external debt of $26 billion in 1986, the Philippines has to use virtually one-half of its export earnings to meet its
annual interest payments. Indonesia's debt is even larger—$42.2 billion—and over 40 percent of its export earnings go to pay interest to foreign creditors.

Militarisation frequently gives the military circles a growing role in a country's political life, and that is fraught with the danger of the installation of reactionary military dictatorships and a drive against democratic rights and freedoms. In this context, one needs merely recall the case of South Korea.

The continued existence of dangerous hotbeds of tension and armed conflict is a specific features of the present situation in the APR. Efforts to unite these knots meet with resistance from the imperialist forces.

It is Washington that has hampered in every way a normalisation of the situation around Afghanistan and Kampuchea, and in the Korean Peninsula. The imperialists have speculated on the difficulties of the historical and revolutionary process and have resorted to patent provocations, setting themselves the goal of fighting socialism, and discrediting and wearing out the socialist countries.

Washington has also conducted an aggressive line with respect to the non-socialist states of the APR who strive to pursue an independent policy. That is exemplified by the bitter campaign against New Zealand, the intervention in the internal affairs of the Philippines, and the events in Fiji. The United States has put massive pressure on the ASEAN countries so as to prevent them from setting up a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia.

India is being subjected to constant pressure by the United States. A special threat to its security and stability is posed; by the activity of US special services in fanning ethnic and religious conflicts in the country, and throughout South Asia generally. India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had a very good reason to say on one occasion that there was an international conspiracy encouraged by reactionary forces inside India.

Alongside of all these negative phenomena, there is also evidence of other, positive trends in the APR, and of the vast potentialities of the whole region. There is ever more profound comprehension in the region of the vital need for a change in the present dangerous situation. The forces striving to erect a barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons have been acting with greater vigor and demanding that the peoples should be assured of a peaceful and secure future, free from threats, violence and fear.

More and more countries have taken a stand in favour of negotiations, national reconciliation and normalisation of the situation around the hotbeds of conflict. In this way, they have begun to make more active use of their right to take part in world affairs.

The Soviet Union and the CPSU have sought actively to promote this process and have structured their foreign policy in the light of the interests of consolidating peace in Asia and the Pacific, as on the globe as a whole.

All the Soviet foreign policy initiatives are based on our universal approach to the principles for structuring international relations in the modern epoch, on what we call the new thinking. In the most general terms its substance may be set forth in the following propositions. First, nuclear war cannot be a means for attaining any reasonable objectives in the international arena whatsoever. Second, in the present-day conditions, the arms race cannot be won either. Third, no state can have security without equal security for all. Fourth, each people, big or small, has the sovereign right to a free choice of its economic and social system and way of development. Fifth, with the growing interdependence of states, the differences in economic and social systems, ideologies and world outlooks must not be an obstacle to broader mutually advantageous cooperation between all the countries concerned.

The application of the new thinking to the concrete conditions of the APR has produced a programme, which Mikhail Gorbachev set forth in his Vladivostok speech in July 1986, and which he further elaborated in his interview with the Indonesian newspaper MEMDEKA on July 21, 1987.

The principal elements of this programme are as follows:

—elimination of regional hotbeds of tension by means of political settlement;

—a halt to the nuclear arms race;

—a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments;

—creation of nuclear-free zones;

—dismantling of military bases on foreign territories;

—confidence-building measures in the military field;

—arrangement of equitable and mutually advantageous economic cooperation between all the countries of the region;

—efforts to set up a new international economic order;

—preparations for the eventual convocation of an all-asia conference for a joint search for constructive solutions.

The Soviet Union's consistent line for a phased elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world, and our concrete proposals at Reykjavik and since have done much to give the APR palette an anti-nuclear hue. The South Pacific has been declared a nuclear-free zone. The
idea of a similar zone in Southeast Asia is being actively advanced. There has been a spread of protest against French nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll. There is growing demand to rid the Korean Peninsula of nuclear weapons. Anti-nuclear provisions have been written into the fundamental laws of the Philippines and some other countries. The People's Republic of China has been ever more active in stating its views on disarmament problems.

The Delhi Declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World, which was signed last November, is the latest example of the politico-philosophical approach to the vital problems of interstate relations. Although the document sprang from the development of relations between two countries, it goes well beyond bilateral and regional frameworks—it is an expression of the aspirations of mankind as a whole.

The Soviet Union's readiness to dismantle all its medium-range missiles not only in the European but also in the Asian part of our territory was a major step towards the wishes of the Asian countries. Shorter-range missiles are also to be dismantled.

The significance of this initiative is amplified if one takes into account that the USSR has not linked it up with the issue of the US nuclear presence in Korea, in the Philippines, and on Diego Garcia, although it does hope that it will not be built up. What is more, the USSR has declared its readiness to commit itself not to increase the number of its nuclear-armed aircraft in the Asian part of the country, if the United States does not additionally deploy nuclear weapons in the area within reach of Soviet territory.

The states of the South Pacific that declared their region a nuclear-free zone under the well-known Rarotonga Treaty were given support by the Soviet Union and China, which signed the protocols to the Treaty, but met with a high-handed disdainful refusal on the part of the United States, Great Britain and France. The government of New Zealand, which proclaimed its nuclear-free status, likewise met with understanding from the USSR, but became the object of an unprecedented campaign of blackmail, vilification and discrimination mounted by Washington. The Soviet Union has officially voiced its positive attitude to the Southeast Asian countries' concept of turning their region into a nuclear-free zone, but US statesmen want them to abandon the idea. We have welcomed the intention of our Korean comrades, who have formulated the concept of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula.

For a number of years now, the Soviet Union has urged the need to work out and put through confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific. There is the useful European experience, and it appears to be meaningful for the APR, where military activity is on a very high level. The Soviet Union has proposed that here as well the question of confidence-building measures should be translated into the practical plane, with special attention to the security of maritime and air communications and international straits. We generally favour the start of negotiations on reducing the activity of naval fleets in the Pacific Ocean; through their contract runs the line of confrontation, which generates the danger of conflicts. There could be a limitation on the areas of navigation by nuclear-armed warships, so that they should not approach the shores of the other side within the range of operation of their onboard nuclear weapons. There could also be an understanding on limiting anti-submarine rivalry. Confidence-building could be enhanced by the limitation of scale of naval exercises and maneuvers in the Pacific and a Indian Oceans and in the adjacent seas, by advance notification of them, by a mutual renunciation of naval exercises or maneuvers in international straits and adjacent areas, and of the use of combat weapons in the course of exercises in the area of traditional maritime routes.

Many useful things can be done to strengthen security in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union has continued its consistent support for the idea of turning it into a zone of peace in complete accord with the aspirations of the coastal countries and the non-aligned states. That could be prompted by an international conference on the Indian Ocean in accordance with UN resolutions. Preparations for it have been under way for several years, but they have kept coming up against Washington's resistance and sabotage.

It is time to set up international security guarantees for shipping in the Indian Ocean, on its seas, straits and gulfs. Given the political will, the question of security for air communications, of collective measures against terrorism on maritime and air routes in the Indian Ocean could also be settled.

The Soviet Union will persevere in working for a full-scale agreement on ending nuclear tests, whose repudiation by the United States, Britain and France has caused legitimate indignation in the APR countries, which have not forgotten that the first US nuclear-weapons tests were staged in the Pacific and deprived many inhabitants of the region of their health and even of their life.

The Soviet Union attaches much significance to reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia down to the limits of reasonable adequacy. We are aware that there must be a phased solution to this problem. For its part, the USSR has already taken practical steps to reduce its military presence in the APR. A number of military contingents have been withdrawn from Mongolia and Afghanistan by agreement with the governments of these countries. WE have reduced the numerical strength of our troops in Afghanistan in the hope of stimulating the process of national reconciliation, and we have not been mistaken.

We have issued resolute calls for an end to the fratricidal Iran-Iraq war, which has already taken more than a million human lives and has ceased to be a bilateral
affair. We want to see the withdrawal from the Persian Gulf of all warships not belonging to the countries of this region. We have just as resolutely condemned the attempts on the part of the United States and some of its allies to internationalise this conflict.

The Soviet Union wants to have the military confrontation, which is embodied in bloc politics, reduced to a minimum. If the time is not yet ripe for a disbandment of the existing military alignments, it is now already a fully realistic and topical objective to prevent the establishment of new closed groupings of states, notably in the APR. The important thing is to expose in due time the actual schemes of the architects of the bloc policy, who have covered up their plans with calls for economic and technological cooperation, as they have with the idea of what they call the 'Pacific community.'

The Soviet conception of universal security organically includes international economic security. The best way to ensure it is to implement the principle of 'disarmament' for development. The Soviet Union is also prepared to develop regional economic cooperation, a goal to be served by the national committee for Asian-Pacific economic cooperation now being set up in the USSR.

The socialist states' peace initiatives, which they have taken at various times, run along the course of ensuring peace and security in the APR. The Soviet Union and the CPSU are in accord with Mongolia's proposal to conclude a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-resort to force in relations between the states of the region. We put a high value on the Afghan leadership's course towards national reconciliation, and the readiness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to enter into military-political negotiations between the North and the South on a summit level and to agree on a phased reduction of the armed forces of the DPRK and South Korea down to 100,000 men on each side with a subsequent withdrawal of all US troops from South Korea. The USSR has supported the initiatives of the countries of Indochina on arranging peaceful good-neighbour relations with the ASEAN countries, on establishing a zone of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and their course towards a political solution of the Kampuchean problem in the spirit of the conception of national reconciliation. Implementation of Vietnam's proposals on adjusting Vietnamese-Chinese relations would be of great importance for normalising the situation.

The Soviet Union would like to cooperate with the People's Republic of China in the matter of ensuring peace and security in Asia and the Pacific region, and of great significance here is the two countries' identical position on the no-first use of nuclear weapons and on the inadmissibility of the militarisation of space, and the fact that in most cases China, the USSR and the other socialist countries vote the same way when major world policy issues are considered in the United Nations. China has criticised a number of aspects of US policy in the region, condemned the resurgence of Japanese militarism, and supported the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on ensuring peace in the Korean Peninsula.

Positive shifts in relations between the USSR and China have taken place in the recent period, and a political dialogue is under way, although there also remain some differences in their approach to a number of international problems. We are sure that a further improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations would do no one any harm and would, in fact, serve the cause of peace and stability in Asia.

The Soviet concept of strengthening peace in the APR naturally implies the involvement of the United States and Japan in the process. The US and Japanese peoples would only stand to gain from a lowering of the level of the nuclear-missile threat in the APR, and from the establishment of an atmosphere of good-neighbourhood and cooperation in the region. There is now evidence in the United States of greater activity by public forces opposing nuclear weapons. The anti-nuclear attitudes are even stronger in Japan, where the militaristic trends are opposed by the communists and the Socialists, and by broad public circles.

The principle of universality is a part of the soviet view of peace and security in the APR, and it signifies that all the countries of the region, big and small, whatever their political and social order and foreign policy orientation, are invited to join in the dialogue. Mikhail Gorbachev's idea of the eventual holding of an all-Asia conference in the future for a joint search for constructive solutions is just such a working hypothesis, an invitation to discussion. The APR countries' specific world outlook and political and cultural uniqueness could enable them to suggest off-the-beaten-track measures which are understandable and acceptable to one and all for solving the problems of this vast region of the globe.

It is a most challenging task to involve all the APR states in the process of elaborating the principles for ensuring security in the region, to say nothing of completing the endeavor with the convocation of an authoritative conference on security and cooperation. It took a whole decade to produce the final document on European security. There should be no illusions concerning the difficulties which will have to be surmounted in the APR, but we think that a start could even now be made on shaping the practical mechanism for attaining this goal. It could evidently be erected both along the state line and the public line, and could include bilateral and multilateral meetings, scientific seminars and international conferences.

The ideas of achieving peace and security in Asia and the Pacific through joint efforts by the countries of the region, the pivot of Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, have produced a wide resonance. But we have kept in touch with reality and are aware that the way to
consolidating peace and security in the APR will be neither short nor easy. The main obstacle is that the ruling circles of the United States and Japan are still captive to the old, militaristic thinking. They like the present situation in the APR, in which there is either direct hostility, all the way to armed conflicts, between the individual countries, or mutual mistrust and suspicion, which the imperialists themselves have also tried hard to stoke up. In such a situation, they find it more convenient to dictate their will and to try to justify the massive US presence in Asia and the Pacific region.

One also has to say that some less developed countries in the region have taken a contradictory and inconsistent stand. On the one hand, they are seriously disturbed over its militarisation and the general sharpening of the situation in the world. On the other, they are now and again inclined to reduce the entire problem to Soviet-US disagreements and to avoid taking an active part in standing up for peace.

It is now more important than ever before in the past to mobilize the common sense potential, the partnership of catastrophe, as Mikhail Gorbachev said in Vladivostok.

There is also such a potential in the APR. It includes above all the socialist countries, whose role and efforts were described above.

The communist movement in the non-socialist countries has an important role to play. The Communists’ struggle to realise the idea of Asian-Pacific security dovetails with the struggle for democratising political life and extends the basis for the communist parties’ activity. The fraternal parties want public opinion in the countries of the region to regard the Communists as consistent champions of national interests and fighters for saving mankind from a nuclear catastrophe.

The Consultative Meeting for Peace, Security and Good-Neighbour Cooperation in the Asia and Pacific Region, which was held in Ulan Bator last July on the initiative of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, provided a good opportunity for an exchange of opinion and a joint search for ways of effective and concerted action. It was the first such multilateral meeting of communist and revolutionary-democratic parties of the region, and it was attended by the representatives of 21 parties from 18 countries of Asia and Oceania.

It was said at the meeting that life itself has shown the meaningfulness of the Soviet Union’s Vladivostok call on all the APR countries to cooperate for the sake of peace and security. It was simultaneously stressed that the concentration of attention and effort on preventing a nuclear war as the priority problem cannot be a reason for underestimating the acuteness of the class contradictions in the capitalist world, for playing down the problems in defending the interests of the working class and all the other working people which have to be tackled by the democratic and revolutionary forces. It voiced solidarity with those who have spared no effort in the frontline of the struggle for these interests so as to pave the peoples’ way to a better future. The participating parties agreed to hold such meetings in the future as well, and to invigorate and extend bilateral and multilateral exchanges of views on the problems of peace, security and good-neighbour cooperation in the region, and on other matters of mutual interest.

The meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev said, was an important contribution to the establishment of a security system in Asia and the Pacific and the strengthening of world peace.

The non-aligned movement, the conception of which, incidentally, took shape in Asia, has increasingly acted as a powerful anti-war force. Imperialism has tried hard to lock the movement on regional issues so as to prevent its participation in seeking solutions for the truly major problems of our day. But there is also a clear-cut urge of the movement as a whole and of most of its participants to have a decisive say on the substance of such problems as disarmament and development. India’s foreign policy is of special significance. The international role of this major state, which this year marks the 40th anniversary of its independence, has been growing in Asia and throughout the world.

One can also look to the partnership of reason among realistically-minded leaders within the ruling circles of developed capitalist countries who are capable of discerning the scale and reality of the danger hanging over mankind and of putting the task of its survival above all else.

The general shift in world public consciousness and the greater activity of various public forces and movements against militarism, for disarmament and for saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war will, of course, have an effect on the situation in the APR, but one must also see that the level of the anti-war movement in most, if not all, non-socialist countries of the APR, is far from adequate to the level of military danger. An understanding of the nuclear-missile threat hanging over mankind has far from everywhere made a deep penetration into the public mind of the countries in the region. The reasons are, evidently, diverse: they are historical, political, social and psychological. But, we feel, the main thing here is the relatively low level of political awareness and information of broad masses of the population, together with the ceaseless influence of anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda on the masses. All of that makes it more difficult to carry on a joint struggle for greater peace and security, and for the creation of an atmosphere of good-neighbourhood and cooperation, both in the region and on the world scale.

That is why special attention needs to be given to the task of extending the basis of the anti-war movement by involving new social strata and groups. In this context,
importance attaches to the practical experience of the International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity, which was held in Moscow, and which was attended by personalities representing the most diverse public strata with the most different political views and ideologies, but united by a single purpose: to preserve peace. The recent World Congress of Women, the broadest and most authoritative congress in composition in the whole history of the women's movement, was another positive example.

As Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized during his meeting with Nguyen Van Linh, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, on May 19 this year, the efforts of the countries of Europe and Asia towards building regional security systems could be merged into a single Eurasian process that could give a mighty impetus to creating a comprehensive international security system. In this vitally important matter, there is a need for close cooperation between the fraternal parties of the countries of Europe, Asia and the Pacific. It is most important, we think, to take account of the useful experience in the struggle for peace and security in Europe and on other continents, while using it, of course, with a full sense of the specifics of the Asia-Pacific Region.

What are the problems that, in our view, need to be jointly solved, if the conception of peace and disarmament is transformed into action by broad popular masses?

It is important above all to convince the doubting that the struggle for peace in our day is an organic and necessary part of the struggle for democracy and social progress, and that the prevention of a nuclear war is a necessary condition for the advance of any society along the way of democratisation and social transformations; there is a need to convince millions of men and women who are worried over their daily bread that along with hunger, they are confronted by another mortal danger, that of mankind's self-annihilation in a nuclear war. There is a need to demonstrate that the struggle against the nuclear-arms race is simultaneously the way to escape death from hunger.

There is a need to enter into a dialogue which is open and based on mutual consideration of each other's positions with all the social forces capable of joining in the anti-war movement in one form or another. It is highly important to hone the arguments in favour of peaceful and constructive initiatives and to present them in such a way that they reckon with the social psychology of the various strata of the society, and that they are intelligible and convincing for the given region and the given country. To seek ways to combine the struggle for the working people's specific interests with the anti-war and anti-nuclear movement of the broad masses is a task that fully stands before us.

There is a need for wide-ranging and patient explanatory work to overcome the fairly widespread mistaken assumption that the issues of war and peace boil down to contradictions between the two so-called superpowers, and that they have to be tackled by them alone.

Over the past year, the USSR has markedly invigorated its foreign policy ties in the region and has raised them to a higher level. Much importance attached to Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to India, and Rajiv Gandhi's visits to Moscow, and also to Eduard Shevardnadze's official visits to a number of APR countries, parliamentary exchanges are being widened, and the volume of contacts has increased along various lines.

We have given much attention to expanding economic, commercial, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation with APR countries. A plan is being drawn up for the development of the Soviet Far East as a highly efficient economic complex, incorporated in the international division of labour system.

The CPSU wants the closest cooperation and coordination of efforts in the region by the socialist states and the fraternal parties of the non-socialist countries. We are ready actively to promote the advance of new peace initiatives and proposals coming from our friends and partners.

/9738
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CDU/CSU Bundestag Group Chairman Interviewed
17030730 Bonn DIE WELT in German 2 Dec 87 p 8

[Interview with CDU/CSU Bundestag Group Chairman Alfred Dregger by Manfred Schell; date and place not given]

[Text] DIE WELT] You have stressed repeatedly in recent months that the INF agreement should be followed by further disarmament steps. To that end, you called for a general NATO disarmament plan. That position was adopted by the alliance's foreign ministers at their Reykjavik meeting. We understand there is opposition in the NATO Standing Council, which was asked by the foreign ministers to draft such a plan.

Dregger: I urgently recommend to put into practice what the foreign ministers decided. I am saying that as a declared supporter of the alliance and as a man who substantially helped push counterarmament [Nachreustung] in Germany.

NATO is facing a test. It has to show that it is able to work out a disarmament plan that would not be confined to individual weapons categories, but, being a comprehensive disarmament concept, would also be a Security concept guaranteeing equal security to all alliance partners. Such a concept would have to be introduced by the West into future negotiations with the Soviet Union. That certainly would be better than allowing Mr Gorbachev to repeatedly surprise us with new proposals that make it necessary for Western capitals to coordinate their approach and leave the leadership of public opinion in the West to Mr Gorbachev. That was the case with the two zero solutions.

[DIE WELT] What should the Western disarmament and security plan be?

Dregger: These are the details:

First, we want disarmament and a balance in the conventional field, meaning tanks and aircraft that are face to face in Germany. The Soviet Union is superior in conventional weaponry, which it does not generally dispute. Conclusions should be drawn from that realization without delay. Instead of wasting time counting current forces, an agreement should be reached on what each side should be allowed to have in the future, and on that basis verifiable disarmament steps should be taken.

Second, we want total and global chemical disarmament. We urge the East and West to agree and implement it as soon as possible. However, because we do not know at this point when that will happen we intend to keep to the agreement reached by Federal Chancellor Kohl and President Reagan on the fringes of the Tokyo meeting. Under that agreement, all U.S. chemical weapons would be removed from German soil as soon as new chemical weapons were produced and deployed in the United States. My colleagues, Wimmer and Todenhoefer, and I discussed that during our visit to Washington 2 years ago.

Third, we also want disarmament of those nuclear systems that are not covered by the double-zero solution. That applies to the strategic systems that the two superpowers intend to reduce by 50 percent. It applies in particular to the superpowers' land-based nuclear systems, which, because of their short ranges of less than 500 km, threaten almost exclusively the Germans on both sides of the border.

[DIE WELT] Do you think a third zero solution would be possible for short-range nuclear missiles?

Dregger: We want to disarm short-range nuclear weapons to the lowest possible level sufficient in my view to prevent the concentration of conventional units of attack. A zero solution for that area is out of the question as long as the immense imbalance of chemical and conventional weapons continues.

Let me remind you that regarding short-range missiles, the ratio is 1,365 missiles in the East, and 88 in the West. That is a 15:1 ratio, the most unfavorable ratio there is for the West in any weapons area.

[DIE WELT] Should nuclear artillery also be considered in the overall disarmament concept?

Dregger: Yes, it should. If nuclear artillery, in addition to short-range missiles, were to be unnecessary—which would have to be studied militarily—such nuclear artillery, which has a tremendous destructive force, should disappear from German soil.

[DIE WELT] Some people urge conventional and chemical disarmament, before the elimination of imbalances in short-range nuclear missiles can be discussed...

Dregger: There is no reason at all to postpone the reduction of Soviet short-range superiority until the Soviet Union's chemical and conventional superiority has been eliminated. There can be no zero solution for the reasons I mentioned earlier.

[DIE WELT] You did not comment on allied ideas about modernization in the less-than-500-km range. Where do you see starting points for a joint position within NATO?

Dregger: The modernization of nuclear weapons of a range of less than 500 km requires a Western security and disarmament plan. That would be the only basis on which to determine the minimum number of short-range nuclear weapons that would be necessary to prevent the concentration of conventional units of attack on both sides of the dividing border in Germany. The only replacement for the deterrence systems that would be
removed under the double-zero solution would be weapons with a range sufficient to reach the potential aggressor. Therefore, before the modernization of short-range weapons can be discussed, two things should be clarified:

—The question of whether and how the loss of the superpowers' land-based intermediate-range weapons of ranges of between 500 and 5,500 km could and should be replaced by air- and sea-based systems; and

—The question to what minimum level the systems with ranges of less than 500 km could be reduced without jeopardizing the limited deterrence potential of such systems.

Before those questions have been clarified, I must warn against discussing the modernization of nuclear weapons with ranges of less than 500 km.

Chancellor's Advisor Comments on 'Third-Zero Option'

Teltschik: Surprising New Proposals
08051725 Hamburg DPA in German
1527 GMT 5 Dec 87

[Excerpt] Stuttgart (DPA)—The chancellor’s adviser, Horst Teltschik, does not expect Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to confront the West with an offer of a third-zero option. In an interview with West German radio, Helmut Kohl’s foreign policy adviser described the Soviet party head as a “dynamic and creative leader” with surprising new proposals. However, there has to be doubt as to whether a new “shop window proposal” by the Soviet Union will aim for a zero solution on nuclear missiles with a range of under 500 kilometers. The Soviet Union arms these missiles not only with nuclear weapons, but with conventional and chemical weapons as well. If the USSR goes for zero on this, it will lose three options in the process Teltschik said. [passage omitted]

Analyzes East-West Disarmament
17061235 Bonn DIE WELT in German 4 Dec 87 p 6

[Article by Horst Teltschik, department chief for foreign and intra-German relations and external security in the chancellery]

[TEXT] The gravest NATO crisis — that is Henry Kissinger’s judgement about the Western alliance’s current situation. Even if one does not share the pessimistic assessment—after all, such a fate has been often predicted for NATO throughout its history—there are certain signs of a calm before the storm.

The cause is an event that various political observers in the West and East are already calling historic — the double-zero solution, the worldwide abolition of all medium-range missiles with a 500-5,500 km range. Such an agreement is unprecedented, because for the first time in the history of arms control a whole category of weapons is to be eliminated.

It ought to be reason for great satisfaction for the Atlantic alliance. In 1982-83 the Soviet Union categorically rejected the U.S. proposal of a zero solution for nuclear intermediate-range missiles with a longer range. At that time the Western alliance had stood a decisive test by implementing, despite shared threats from the Soviet Union and the strongest domestic political pressure from so-called peace demonstrations, NATO’s 1979 two-track decision, and by beginning to deploy U.S. intermediate-range missiles. Had NATO proved incapable in 1983 of implementing that decision based on its own security interests, it would have caused a grave crisis.

However, today—4 years later—hasn’t the Western alliance with the double zero solution achieved an almost spectacular success that should fill it with pride and happiness?

Western answers to that differ. They range from a euphoric agreement to bitter resentment about an alleged pyrrhic victory. Some believe that peace is more secure, others fear increased risks. But all seem to agree on one point: The time has come to make a comprehensive inventory in the alliance and to draw a joint conclusion from the disarmament process of the past 6 years. It must now be the joint goal: First, to determine how to safeguard the security of all alliance partners in the future. Second, priorities must be set for the necessary continuation of the disarmament process. Why should the alliance not be able to master that task? The past 6 years have demonstrated the alliance’s strength. If we learn from this experience, there is no reason for pessimism.

What are the significant lessons to be learned from negotiations with the Soviet Union?

1. The negotiating strength of the United States, or of the Western alliance as a whole, is based on the solidarity and cohesion of all the alliance partners. The Soviet Union must not find a chance to play one NATO member state against the other. This presupposes permanent and intensified mutual information and consultation, which is sometimes toilsome but remains indispensable.

2. The negotiating goal of the West must not be unilateral but bilateral disarmament. Only in the process of mutual give and take is mutual confidence created, something that makes disarmament possible.

3. Soviet disarmament proposals must not be taken immediately as being the last word. As long as the West reacts flexibly, remaining on the political offensive with
its own proposals, the Soviet Union will remain able to negotiate and prepared to compromise, as has been repeatedly shown in the past 6 years.

4. The West must not allow the Soviet Union to reduce relations more or less exclusively to security issues. Problems of security, disarmament, and arms control belong to the most difficult East-West relations. They presuppose a degree of mutual confidence that can build up only if relations develop in all spheres and at all levels—politically, economically, in science and technology, and culturally. The summit diplomacy between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev has achieved important breakthroughs in disarmament negotiations.

Atlantic alliance experiences:

1. Decisions on disarmament and arms control must not be made separately from those of security and defense policy. Disarmament proposals must be consistent with the security interests of all alliance members and be incorporated in the general plan. Only then can the alliance be prevented from examining every Soviet proposal out of context, stumbling from one zero proposal to the next, hoping eventually that after the dismantling of weapons it can meet its own security needs.

2. The disarmament process of the past few years has shown that the security interests of the United States and Europe are not necessarily identical. That might, at any time, lead to different priorities in disarmament policy. That had already become evident by the U.S. President’s Strategic Defense Initiative of March 1983, which was linked with the demand to reduce all ballistic nuclear missiles. Also the worldwide reduction of all intermediate-range missiles alone is less satisfying for the Western Europeans than for the United States as long as other disparities in Europe are not included in the negotiation process.

3. However, experience—in particular regarding the discussion about the second zero option—has also shown that even among Europeans there are differences of opinion about how the alliance strategy of preventing war can be maintained in the most efficient way and what significance should be attached to the next disarmament steps. Nobody should be surprised about those differing interests of Western Europeans. Nuclear countries must come to terms with non-nuclear countries. Differences regarding the respective threat situation, or threat consciousness, should be considered so as not to offend new sensitivities, or create misunderstanding or false suspicions among the friendly Europeans.

If we want to secure the Western alliance’s solidarity in the future, if we want to prevent zones of contrasting security to emerge within the alliance, then the time is ripe for all the alliance partners to draw the necessary conclusions from that experience:

1. The alliance partners should continually study the threat situation and jointly arrive at convincing results. What matters is to pursue not only military developments within the Warsaw Pact, but more closely than ever the political process initiated by Gorbachev’s reform policy. Political and societal restructuring within the Soviet Union can influence its military and arms control policy more than ever before. We will have to observe whether Gorbachev’s policy of openness (glasnost) will lead to the reduction of enemy images and thus to substantial changes in Soviet foreign policy.

2. Against the background of that political and military assessment of the Warsaw Pact, the alliance should find a new definition for its own security interests and guarantee its defense capability and preparedness. Almost all experts agree that only nuclear systems that can reach its territory can prevent the Soviet Union from possible aggression. If the double-zero option becomes reality, NATO and the Europeans first will be faced with a new starting position. The alliance will lose its ability to reach Soviet territory from European soil with U.S. nuclear missiles. That certainly means the renunciation of one of the most efficient instruments of war prevention.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union is keeping all its nuclear options toward Western Europe open, even if it has to reduce three times as many nuclear intermediate-range missiles. Its remaining strategic nuclear potential will be great enough to cover Western Europe targets in the future. The European alliance partners, for their part, again will have to rely for their security essentially on U.S. nuclear systems that can reach the Soviet Union from U.S. soil or from the sea. Thus the alliance is confronted with the revival of a discussion that we had in the sixties and seventies: Is the United States also prepared to use those systems for the survival of Europe?

Free Europe should not carelessly doubt the political will of the U.S. to guarantee the security of its European alliance partners. There is no reason for that. The presence of 300,000 U.S. soldiers in Europe remains the most visible and convincing guarantee of nuclear protection. Those in the United States who would like to continue the discussion on reducing the U.S. troops presence in Europe should know that they would evoke—particularly now—a deep crisis of confidence among many Europeans toward the United States. Against that background the Federal Government welcomed in particular that the foreign and defense ministers of the seven WEU member countries adopted a "Platform: European Security Interests" in The Hague on 27 October 1987, in which they again confirmed that Western Europe’s security is only possible in close connection with the North American allies and that the presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in Europe is unrenounceable.

The problem remains the strategy of the flexible answer and how it can be implemented in the future. Influential
voices in the alliance have already answered that question negatively. They even doubt the strategy of the "flexible response" [quoted words in English] itself.

In his government statement of 18 March 1987, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl also mentioned that the alliance strategy should be further developed because of the disarmament results, but also because of new forms of threat. Because of new weapon systems or changes in the ratio of offensive and defensive, and of nuclear and conventional weapons. Thus the federal chancellor pointed out expressly that a new assessment of threat to our security situation should also include the development of new weapons systems in the offing.

In the alliance we will have to study the question—carefully and without pressure of time—of how to ensure militarily our highest objective of preventing war through deterrence and defense capacity. The common conviction remains undisputed in the alliance that to that end we need to have a balance of conventional and nuclear armed forces.

The Atlantic alliance will therefore not agree to a worldwide or European denuclearization. In view of the continuing Soviet superiority in conventional and chemical weapons, that would mean a constant vital threat to us Europeans because war in Europe would become possible again.

However, following a possible double-zero solution for medium-range nuclear missiles, the alliance will have to examine and decide which and how many nuclear systems we will need in the future to prevent war. Are the remaining nuclear systems with ranges of less than 500 km, the aircraft able to carry nuclear weapons, and the sea-based systems under SACEUR's command sufficient or not? Are modernizations or changes necessary or not? Are additional systems necessary, or are further reductions possible, and if so, under what conditions?

The alliance will have to find a common answer to all those questions. However, the principle is correct for the alliance to leave all options open—that of modernization as well as that of new nuclear systems—as long as it considers nuclear systems indispensable for preventing war. Decisions have to be oriented solely at the objective to prevent war and the alliance's defense capacity and security interests, and not at a short-lived domestic policy and partisan interests and opportunist feelings.

Therefore, the opposition leader's call for a third-zero solution for systems with ranges of between 150 and 500 km is as foolish as are the statements that further modernizations are not necessary.

3. In that process of examining our security interests and the resultant consequences for future nuclear and conventional armaments, the European partners have to play a key role in the alliance more than ever before.

Specifically the Europeans now have to start strengthening the European pillar of the alliance without delay. Starting points in that respect are efforts to "reactivate" the WEU and the close German-French cooperation as a motor to reach the objective of a defense union in the larger scope of the WEU or beyond.

In that context the question has to be examined whether and how Europe's conventional defense could be strengthened by integrated European units. The future role of French and British nuclear potentials for common European defense will eventually have to be clarified by both governments. Such considerations and specific endeavors are not intended to weaken or replace NATO. We therefore welcome the fact that President Reagan has backed the many various European efforts aimed at leading to a durable equal partnership.

4. Since the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Reykjavik in June this year, the development of an overall NATO arms control and disarmament concept has been given high precedence by the alliance. It is a concept that takes into account the progress achieved in individual disarmament negotiations as well as the alliance's security requirements and deterrence strategy.

It is a matter of course for the Federal Government to introduce its priorities into that concept regarding the three arms control areas that are particularly important for us—the elimination of the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority; the worldwide ban of chemical weapons, and a substantial reduction of U.S. and Soviet short-range systems to equal upper limits.

With the Federal Chancellor's 26 August, 1987 statement we renounced the modernization of the Bundeswehr's Pershing-1A's on condition that the U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 km be removed worldwide. Thereby we have helped bring about the INF agreement. That has been appreciated worldwide. That is why we rightly want the efforts that are being made to achieve progress in disarmament and arms control to focus on those areas where our specific security interests are. In that respect we still have a long and stormy way to go. Our task is to bring about agreement with our alliance partners so as to be able, on the basis of cohesion in the alliance, to continue the successful road of disarmament negotiations.

There is no reason to be pessimistic, nor is there a reason to be over-optimistic. But a comparison of the years 1983 and 1987 shows what difficult hurdles between East and West have already been overcome, and what far-reaching political processes have been started—within the Soviet Union as well as regarding European cooperation. Those processes contain risks, but in particular far-reaching opportunities. The past 5 years have repeatedly confirmed the alliance's stability. Only a fool would want to change that state of affairs.
Kohl Speaks on INF Treaty to CDU/CSU Group

Cites Historic Moment
0881629 Hamburg DPA in German 1601 GMT
8 Dec 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—In the view of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the signing of the treaty on the removal of medium-range missiles by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev marks "a historic moment." Speaking to the CDU/CSU parliamentary group on Tuesday, Kohl described the agreement as an important step in the right direction. At the same time he expressed the hope that there would be disarmament in other sectors, Kohl stressed that in the process the interconnection between nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons systems should be observed.

Kohl reaffirmed his view that the signing of the agreement had only become possible because of the "clear position" of the FRG Government. "This is our success, too," said the chancellor. At the same time, he called upon the CDU/CSU to give nothing away to the SPD in the discussion of how the INF agreement came about. The Social Democrats had to be reminded again and again of false prognoses and disloyalties towards the alliance.

The chancellor also spoke in favor of cooperation with the East in the economic, technological, and cultural sphere. In its treaties with the East, Bonn would continue to insist on the observance of human rights. In particular, it would draw attention to the Germans living in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states.

Hails Agreement
17082124 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German
930 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Television address given by Chancellor Helmut Kohl—recorded]

[Text] Dear fellow citizens. We all are witnesses of a great event. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed an agreement which has historic significance. For the first time in disarmament history, a whole weapons category is to be destroyed. Soon more than 1,500 nuclear intermediate-range missiles in East and West will be removed. Since I was elected federal chancellor my government policy’s aim has been to create peace with fewer weapons. In 1989 the first medium-range missiles will be removed from the FRG. In 1991 all of them will be removed. That is something that we all can be glad about today. That grand success has had many contributors. Most of all the U.S. President Ronald Reagan. He was much criticized—in our country, too. Today we have every reason to thank him heartily. The Atlantic alliance has shown solidarity in a difficult period.

More than 10 years ago the USSR began deploying new, modern intermediate-range missiles. In 1981, the alliance proped the zero solution. That means the total renunciation by both sides to do without nuclear INF missiles. At the time the USSR was not prepared to accept that offer. For the sake of our security we had to recreate the balance by deploying fresh U.S. INF missiles in the FRG. Thereby we made it clear that we would defend our freedom. The people were much stirred by our decision. You all will remember that. That decision was necessary. Only that decision was able to make the Soviets continue negotiations with seriousness. Tribute must be paid also to General Secretary Gorbachev that he paved the way toward a compromise and a good result.

This day proves how important it is in foreign and security policies to stick to basic principles and be steady. I want to give my thanks also to you, dear fellow citizens, that you accompanied us on that difficult path. By behaving that way, you, too, contributed to today’s disarmament success. We all are aware that the Washington result reflects just a first step toward a world with fewer weapons. There are still too many weapons, especially in Europe and in the FRG. Together with our friends in the alliance we hope that the disarmament process goes on, based on the condition that our security is greater and not lower in the end. Chemical weapons must be banned world-wide finally. We seek a balanced relationship between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons below 500 km range for Europe—on a lower level.

However, we must not forget about one thing—a safe, just peace will never be the result of arms control and disarmament alone. We are called upon to shape a peace order that makes peoples and countries approach each other and that opens up borders for the people.

Our commitment to the world-wide observation of human rights will not cease—doing so is serving peace. That goes most of all for our divided fatherland. We in Germany want to initiate peace among men by creating more togetherness and more freedom. A fruitful East-West dialogue can bring us closer to that end, in free self-determination, to accomplish the unity and the freedom of Germany.

To secure peace in liberty, we will resolutely continue our path. Reason and the people’s longing want East and West to approach each other, thus creating new trust among one another. For that purpose, dear fellow citizens, I wish your support to continue, and I wish your confidence. I promise you, for the Federal Government, that we will also in the future use all our strength in favor of such a work of peace.
Press Comments on Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting
17081120 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in
German 1605 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Press Review]

[Excerpts] Today's main topic is the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Washington.

AACHENER VOLKZEITUNG writes: It was a long way from Geneva and Reykjavik to Washington. However, Mikhail Gorbachev has now set foot on American soil. The third summit meeting can begin with small disarmament steps or end with historical surprises. Who can predict today, particularly with so much having happened? After great success, Ronald Reagan has gotten stuck in the swamp of weapons supplies to Iran and his enormous budget deficit is threatening suffocation. Gorbachev has announced a great reform program, but he is beginning to falter because of resistance from his marshals and functionaries. [passage omitted]

ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, published in Mainz, states: The third summit meeting of the two most powerful men in the world offers every prerequisite for becoming an epochal turning point and to go down as such in the history books. Since the end of World War II, the will to disarm has been heard in many tongues, but the treaties that came from the main world powers were merely descriptions of continued hectic armament in East and West. Now the first real disarmament agreement is to be signed. All medium-range nuclear missiles are to disappear from Europe and be scrapped. There is also reason to hope that a treaty will be concluded in the very near future to halve the stock of intercontinental missiles.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE maintains: With the signing of the agreement on medium-range missiles, a discussion will come to an end that has kept the Western alliance busy for 10 years and that has twice put it to a serious test: First, in the early eighties, when the peace movement was mobilizing people in West Europe against deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles, and second, after Reykjavik, when the first and then the second, the double-zero solution—the withdrawal of all U.S. medium-range missiles from Europe—became the bone of contention in the Atlantic alliance. As controversial as the reasons were, the result of the debate was equally paradoxical: If the U.S. Senate did not sign the INF agreement that most European Governments do not like, NATO would be facing a dark future. Antinuclear movements and parties would strengthen again, and Washington would become for many peace movements the final place of discord.

RHEINISCHE POST, published in Dusseldorf, points out: Reagan and Gorbachev are under pressure to be successful if they want to strengthen their reputations in their countries and to demonstrate their leadership qualifications to the world. However, both men must deal with the conservative groups in their own ranks if they want to achieve their goals. The fall of Gorbachev's close aide Boris Yeltsin showed that those who want to slow the reform policy still have great political influence, and can make life difficult for the party chief. Gorbachev needs a result that goes beyond the intermediate-range missiles agreement if he wants to implement his domestic policy reform plans. Reagan needs success after his series of setbacks to brighten the picture of his Presidency. However, both of them must pursue careful tactics so as not to be criticized in their own country of having given too much. [passage omitted]

SCHWARZWÄLDER BOTE, published in Oberndorf, notes: Mikhail Gorbachev carefully planned the route of his flight to the Washington summit. The CPSU general secretary could hardly have wished for a better general rehearsal for his meeting with President Reagan than the talk with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. It is not just that relations between Washington and London are particularly close; the basic political convictions and the way in which Reagan and Thatcher pursue their goals are sometimes surprisingly similar. Therefore, and because of the role Great Britain plays in the European nuclear balance, it seems logical that Gorbachev chose the island for a stopover. However, the party chief's brief visit is hard to reconcile with his formula of the common European house, where the British play the role of an outsider.

The daily DIE WELT emphasizes: In the future British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher can cite more than her special relations with President Ronald Reagan, because it seems that she has succeeded in establishing a similar connection to Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev. It is known that Mrs Thatcher is convinced she can do business with Gorbachev. He indicated that he respects the senior West European government chief, and that he was happy to use the opportunity to hear new ideas. The fact that both are getting along well is based mainly on the prime minister's attitude. Her directness and her power of conviction quickly create the impression that she does not care about diplomatic niceties.

WESTDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Dusseldorf, writes: Tonight the two most powerful men in the world will sign their names to one of the most significant treaties that has ever been concluded between two nations. When the signatures have dried, mankind will have come a small but significant step closer to safeguarding peace. The sealing of the agreement on the abolition of medium-range nuclear missiles is linked with the hope that further disarmament steps will follow, but that is quite a lot in a world bristling with weapons.
Kohl Addresses Bundestag on INF Agreement
17101001 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German
0805 GMT 10 Dec 87

[Statement by Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the Bundestag in Bonn—live]

[Text] Mr President, ladies and gentlemen: The summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev is ending in Washington today. That meeting will go down in history because it has produced the first real disarmament agreement. Based on the INF agreement signed on 8 December 1987, all U.S. and Soviet land-based nuclear intermediate-range missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 km will be abolished worldwide. Thus the security of millions of people, especially in Europe, will be improved.

That day, 8 December, also marks a great success for the Atlantic alliance, which has worked toward such an agreement since the 1979 NATO two-track decision. [applause] The threat to Europe posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles will end. Some 108 Pershing-2 missiles and 46 cruise missiles will be removed from FRG territory. In addition, the alliance will discontinue the current deployment of cruise missiles.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen: The agreement is of basic importance for the disarmament process because it removes an entire weapons category and because it envisages highly asymmetric reductions and a comprehensive verification system, including checks upon suspicion. Many people did not believe that such a result would be possible at all, and we often discussed that here in the Bundestag. Many people helped achieve that great success, particularly U.S. President Ronald Reagan. [applause] He has often been criticized, including by us, but we have every reason to thank him cordially today. General Secretary Gorbachev should also be given credit for having cleared the way for compromise and a good result. [applause]

The alliance’s solidarity was a basic prerequisite for that success. The United States has continuously consulted its partners on all important negotiation issues in a trusting way. The alliance partners for their part have backed the United States at crucial stages of the negotiations, thereby contributing to the result that has now been achieved.

However, the history of that success also includes the fact that the alliance had to deploy intermediate-range missiles and cruise missiles before really serious negotiations were started in Geneva. At the time, we did not find it easy to take such a step. The opposition then urged us to reject the NATO two-track decision and thus breach the agreement. It was ready to accept the threat posed to our country by the SS-20 missiles. We rejected that and carried out the NATO two-track decision.
Ladies and gentlemen, I understand very well why you are restive at this point, because today the hour of truth has come for you. [applause] The result that was achieved in Washington was only possible because we resisted your defamations and wrong predictions. [applause] The FRG’s history knows but a few examples of trading in people’s anxieties in such a miserable way. [applause]

Let me remind you how much it hurt us that from this rostrum we, the CDU/CSU, were told we were incapable of peace. [commotion] Mr Apel, I will cite some more recent examples. You should not make any interjection because you were among those insisting on the issue of war and warmongering. [applause, shouts] Mr Bahr said on 22 December: We will have to pay for the decisions made by the Bundestag majority, including in our relations with the East. Mr Bahr added: The Federal Government is wrong; the negotiations should be easier following deployment. The Russians should be more compromising following deployment. The contrary is correct. I think, our colleague Bahr should say he was wrong. That is possible, and it is true. [applause]

Deputy Vogel, you said at the SPD congress in Essen in May 1984 that it is deliberately misleading for the Federal Government to claim that the beginning of deployment has improved security and enhanced the readiness for understanding, whereas it is very obvious the arms race is accelerating and tensions between the two powers have intensified since November last year. Deputy Vogel, you were wrong [applause], and by creating fears of war you misled the German public. That is our experience. [applause, shouts]

When the superpower negotiations were resumed in March 1985 the Federal Government brought all its political importance to bear on the Western camp and on the Soviet Union in an effort to achieve the removal of those superpower intermediate-range nuclear systems by way of negotiations. The Federal Government’s course and policy have been logical and clear, and the successes of our policy are obvious to everyone today. With that policy we have made peace for our people more secure. [applause]

Our policy has always been predictable and therefore successful. By the way, our policy is an excellent confirmation of the alliance’s Harmel concept in East-West relations.

Deputy Vogel, on a day like today you should be silent because you were one of the false prophets. [applause, shouts] For the sake of some partisan advantage and out of power policy considerations, you jeopardized the country’s security. [applause, shouts]

On the basis of a secure defense capacity and deterrence, we worked hard for a negotiated solution. We were always confident that it is only possible to achieve results in disarmament negotiations if all other areas of East-West cooperation are included. The Federal Government has made substantial contributions to achieving that agreement. That has been recognized all over the world.

During their Copenhagen meeting, the EC state and government heads called the INF treaty a milestone in East-West relations. We should note particularly two things: First, the satisfaction over the result; and second, the expectation that the agreement is a first step toward secure peace with fewer weapons.

It is indispensable that the arms control and disarmament process in Europe and worldwide continues. The FRG Government strongly advocates that the recently triggered dynamics on control and further reduction of weapons will be utilized resolutely. The INF treaty can improve the overall East-West climate, and it can contribute decisively to creating confidence between the world powers. We should not forget that the treaty provides the most thorough and comprehensive mutual verification on suspicion that has ever existed. The FRG Government’s expectations involve the 50-percent reduction of the number of strategic nuclear weapons, a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, the creation of a comprehensive stable conventional forces balance of power by removing imbalances, and negotiations over clear and verifiable reductions of U.S. and Soviet surface-based shorter range nuclear missile systems leading to equal upper limits.

Those four chief negotiating positions correspond to the NATO priorities that were established by the NATO foreign ministers in June this year in Reykjavik. Concurrently they represent the framework of our alliance’s overall concept of arms control policy, which is currently under deployment by the ministerial NATO panels. The FRG Government, of course, is participating in shaping that concept. In the process, we proceed from the following assumptions:

1. The close interrelationship between arms control and defense policy requires the examination of individual arms control policy steps and their implications for one’s own deterrence and defense capabilities. The alliance’s overall security situation must be constantly checked.

2. The strategy of preventing war by deterrence must remain credible and capable of being implemented. For that purpose, for the foreseeable future a balanced ratio between conventional and nuclear forces will remain necessary—which has just again been stressed by the WEU’s seven member countries in their joint European security platform. The U.S. troop presence in Europe is particularly important.

3. No arms control field should be considered in isolation or outside the context of Europe.
4. Any step toward disarmament or arms control must be reliably verifiable. That is the only way to build mutual confidence.

5. It must be the goal of any single arms control step to achieve a stable ratio of power at a lower level.

6. Arms control agreements that produce grey areas must be prevented.

7. Disarmament is not an end in itself. It must contribute to increased joint security. Security must be greater at the end of a disarmament process than at the beginning. [applause]

According to the FRG Government's current state of information, the Washington summit has also brought about significant rapprochement on halving the strategic offensive potentials of the United States and the USSR. That refers to the upper limits for individual strategic weapons systems. Moreover, there is partial agreement on temporarily sticking to the ABM treaty. Thus, a long-term agreement between the great powers on the offensive-defensive systems ratios comes closer—something that the FRG Government has time and again suggested here in the Bundestag. Thus a START agreement—scraping more than 10,000 nuclear warheads by the great powers—came very close. We will not cease encouraging both sides to find agreement on such a treaty.

The United States and the USSR have a special responsibility for concluding a convention on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. We Germans have always, because of our very special interests, advocated such a ban. The Geneva negotiations over those issues have made much progress. The verification issues yet to be solved are quite complicated. We are convinced that they can be solved. Therefore, I appeal to all parties involved to agree to a comprehensive and verifiable inspection system. [applause]

For the future development of East-West relations, a cardinal point is the course of future negotiations over conventional arms control in Europe. I assume that we, in the next few months, will come to a joint mandate with the Warsaw Pact countries over such negotiations. One of those negotiations' goals must be to achieve stabilization of the conventional ratios of power in Europe. That means removing the imbalances in favor of the Warsaw Pact. General Secretary Gorbachev only last week conceded such asymmetries. The USSR's superiority and its invasion capability results from the strength, the deployment, and the equipment of its troops. Understandably, the FRG Government will pay special attention to those negotiations. They will probably be especially difficult and drawn-out, particularly the verification problems—and because asymmetric reductions are really necessary.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: The problem of short-range missiles below the 500 km range is very significant for us Germans because of the deployment, the range, and the excessive number of the Soviet missiles. Those excessive Soviet missiles that threaten us are not justified by defense. Renouncing some of them would not affect the USSR’s security—but it would enhance the credibility of the new thinking. [applause]

We must ask the USSR its intentions with the 600 SCUD systems. Those missiles become obsolete, too. Are they to be modernized in light of the SS-23 successor model's inclusion in the INF treaty?

The Federal Government will continue to exert its influence so that—according to the communiqué adopted by the foreign ministers in Reykjavik—the Soviet and U.S. ground-based nuclear short-range missiles will be operationally included in NATO's arms control concept. [applause] The Federal Government will reserve its final decisions. The essential criteria, as elaborated by the alliance, will be the requirements of common security, the continuation of disarmament and arms control negotiations, and the further development of the entire East-West dialogue.

What must be given precedence now, ladies and gentlemen, is putting the INF agreement into effect. The Federal Government is glad that the U.S. Senate will discuss the INF treaty in its committees in mid-January. We will use every opportunity to elucidate our good reasons for the treaty, and our interest in rapid ratification. A reopening of negotiations between the world powers would not be in our interest. Our own contractual integration into the INF agreement, the so-called deployment countries agreement (stationierungslaenderabkommen) has to be ratified here in the Bundestag, because it commits us to accept inspections on our national territory for 13 years. The day before yesterday, the federal cabinet authorized the foreign minister to sign the agreement in the course of the NATO foreign ministers' fall meeting in Brussels. The Federal Government will then immediately initiate the parliamentary procedure. In addition, the general concept of our alliance for disarmament and arms control will be on the Brussels agenda. The joint assessment of the strength ratio should be the basis of that general concept. That task, ladies and gentlemen, will gain increasing significance in the forthcoming talks and negotiations in the conventional field. For us, and for our allies, the decisive question is: How can we guarantee continued common security on the basis of a secure defense capability, at an armament level as low as possible along with specific disarmament measures, arms control, and confidence building?

Ladies and gentlemen, the Washington summit again confirmed our basic experience. Top-level meetings are especially appropriate— with adequate preparations—to further stimulate East-West relations. Since I took office I have repeatedly and consistently urged such properly prepared summit diplomacy, and I state with
satisfaction that we have made good headway. It is a particularly good example that a place and date for the next meeting have already been fixed. In 1988 a fourth meeting will take place. What matters is to increase the potentials for such meetings, and to make them a kind of normal form of East-West relations.

This year the Federal Government has consistently taken advantage of such high-ranking meetings in order to make use of the improved climate in bilateral East-West relations for the welfare of the people. That was the sense of the meeting with General Secretary Honecker, with Secretary General Zhivkov, as well as with Hungarian Prime Minister Grosz. I expect the same in connection with my meeting with Secretary General Husak and General Secretary Gorbachev.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, East-West relations must not be limited to disarmament and arms control. [applause] They must cover all fields of cooperation. I am pleased that the U.S. and USSR have made progress not only in security problems and confidence building, but also in the peaceful solution of regional conflicts, in their economic cooperation, and in cultural exchanges. It was the President's particular concern at the summit to achieve progress on humanitarian matters, and to promulgate human rights. They are and remain in reality the decisive foundation of enduring peace. [applause]

A comprehensive dialogue and the development of relations in all fields are a successful recipe for a lasting stabilization of the West-East relationship. We must thank the U.S. President in particular, because he—as he had done at his other summit meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev—has brought up two essential German matters: In connection with the desire of Soviet Jews to leave the country, he has supported the problem of ethnic German Soviet citizens; and continuing his Berlin initiative of last June, he has urged that Berlin, our old capital, should be fully included from the very beginning in improvements to benefit the city and the solidarity of the people living there. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, we hope the summit meeting in Washington will give a fresh impetus to the problem of the war in Afghanistan. After almost 8 years of war, with more than a hundred thousand dead and millions of refugees, we hope in the interest of that long-suffering country that peace will come. We are convinced that economic cooperation between West and East will be for the benefit of both sides. We expect the U.S. and USSR to broaden their trade. The reforms, in particular the economic reforms, which General Secretary Gorbachev has initiated for his country and the majority of the other CEMAC countries, offer quite a few opportunities for new rational methods of cooperation. To that end, I proposed to General Secretary Gorbachev in summer 1986 an East-West economic conference. That initiative, ladies and gentlemen, is now on the Vienna CSCE table as a joint proposal of the EC countries. The Federal Government considers it one of the most important tasks during its forthcoming EC presidency not only to implement that EC proposal of an East-West economic conference, but also to lead the Vienna follow-up conference to success.

During our EC presidency we would like to be able to conclude the negotiations on an agreement between the EC and CEMA.

Ladies and gentlemen, another summit—the European Council in Copenhagen—has understandably provoked critical headlines. We have not made any final decisions. However, in 2 days of intensive discussion we succeeded in making headway on essential problems of the future of common policies, the so-called Delors package. Still, on a number of significant points, no compromise solution was possible on basic decisions for the future. In this situation I suggested to my colleagues to postpone the European Council meeting on 11 and 12 December in Brussels. That proposal has been accepted. Naturally, I would have preferred a positive conclusion in Copenhagen to concentrate the work of the German presidency on other issues, particularly the domestic markets. Naturally, that must naturally be done.

I proposed the earliest date to make it clear that we, as the future presidency, are determined to make decisions as quickly as possible and not to postpone them to the European Council session in late June 1988 in Hanover. The community needs decisions on the Delors package to obtain the necessary orientation of agricultural and structural policies and for a solid financial basis. As an interim balance of Copenhagen, it can be said:

First, structure funds will be clearly increased. They will be concentrated more than before on structurally weak countries of the community. That is a necessary sign of solidarity, especially regarding Spain and Portugal. Structural help is simultaneously a significant prerequisite to implementing a working market. I am deeply convinced that we will achieve the goal of political unification only if we have an internal market, and we will have an internal market only if the different living conditions and the economic situations in individual EC countries undergo some rapprochement soon.

Second, the community's financing system will be reformed. Next to the already existing revenues of the community, taxes, revenues, and part of the value-added tax, we will create a fourth financial source. The goal is to orient community revenues more according to the prosperity of individual member states.

Third, the European Council achieved significant progress in the very difficult agricultural sphere, progress that is of special significance for German agriculture. The commission and the other member states realized that in view of the surplus, discontinued cultivation is a significant contribution to decreasing the burden of the market and to lowering costs.
The big test in Lower Saxony showed that discontinued cultivation is the right thing to do. Before we can return to income-oriented price policy, the wrong developments of the past must be corrected first. [applause]

Until then, income in the agricultural sphere must be supported and structural change must be made socially acceptable. The respective necessary and acceptable measures must be taken within the EC and nationally.

Fourth, the European Council again committed itself to follow strict budget discipline. The Community administers more and more means of individual countries. For such expenditures the same strict rules must be valid as in individual countries, such as the FRG. [applause]

From the beginning of the presidency we will, together with the commission and our partners, turn the progress achieved in Copenhagen into concrete proposals for decisions. On the basis of the preparatory work done, we ought to be able to make the necessary decisions in Brussels in February.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, the Community must now concentrate more on a decisive matter of the joint European market, the joint European act—implementation of an internal market.

This borderless area contains more than 320 million people. It should guarantee free transport of goods, persons, services, and capital, as the joint European act says. Such an internal market is an indispensable basis for the Community’s economy, and thus for our economy in the FRG, in order to prevail in world competition. However, and I say this on purpose, we must all realize that the internal market demands considerable adaptation of the economies of all states, including the German economy. All kinds of difficulties will have to be overcome.

Europe must face the tasks of the future. It is a challenge and a chance at the same time. We, the Federal Government, will contribute what is necessary to give the integrative process of the market the new impetus.

Neither this European Council, the experience of the past, nor the difficult tasks we are facing in the internal market are reasons for resignation on my part. On the contrary, European unification is a difficult and long-lasting process, as we know. It must and it will go on. Everybody knows there is no alternative to that development in Europe. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, despite all kinds of irritation about the state of the current discussion, we must not forget what has been achieved in the past 30 years. Many people, including in the FRG, forget too easily and too quickly that today more than 50 percent of the our exports go to the other countries of the community. Those exports safeguard every fifth job in the FRG.

Ladies and gentlemen, the community for us is not merely the market. The community has developed in the past years to a tone of economic and monetary stability. These framework conditions are of decisive significance for an export-oriented economy, such as that of the FRG.

Europe—EC Europe—has shown in view of recent events on international markets through its closely coordinated action that it is not only aware of its responsibility, but that it is living up to it. Naturally we discussed in Copenhagen the recent turbulence and its possible aftereffects on economic developments in the coming weeks.

At the meeting, the president of the EC commission and the other chiefs of government assessed positively the recent measures taken by the Federal Government and the Federal Bank to consolidate growth and employment. In that context we should note interest rates. We should point out that for some time now German interest rates have been very low, compared internationally, and that the German Federal Bank in recent weeks has repeatedly lowered short-term interest rates and on 3 December 1987 lowered the discount rate to 2.5 percent—the lowest post-war rate ever.

Regarding German financial policy, I stressed that from 1986 to 1990—in only 4 years—we reduced taxes by roughly DM50 billion, meaning by about 2 and 1/2 percent of the gross national product; that due to the international situation, we extended tax cuts for 1988 to DM14 billion; that for economic reasons we have consciously tolerated growing budget deficits; and that in the next 3 years we intend to make available to the communities and medium-size enterprises additional low-interest credits totalling DM21 billion.

Ladies and gentlemen, the positive reception by our partners — and that is more important than your comments [applause, commotion] — is all the more understandable. I said in Copengahen that for about 2 years the FRG has made a substantial contribution to reducing foreign trade imbalances. Since the fall of 1985, net visible and invisible exports in the gross national product—meaning the export and import surplus in real terms—has continuously declined. That has led to a markedly reduced annual real economic growth because the foreign trade realignment process is still in full swing — by the way, for our trade partners’ benefit and at our own expense. In other words, considering solely the dynamic development of our domestic demand, its growth rate in 1987 will be about 3 percent. Ladies and gentlemen, we have rightly stressed those successes in the European discussion.

International developments have taken an unexpected course in recent years. I think that for all justified skepticism about some policy areas, it is not irresponsible to say that the prospects for next year are hopeful. In
the interest of its mission, the Federal Government will
do everything in its power to secure peace in freedom for
our country and contribute to peace in the world.
[applause]

GREECE

Papoulias: Government ‘Warmly Applauds’ INF Pact
10082125 Athens Domestic Service in Greek
1930 GMT 8 Dec 87

announced that on the occasion of the signing of the
U.S.-Soviet agreement to eradicate medium-range mis-
siles on a world-wide scale, Foreign Minister Karolos
Papoulias made the following statement:

The Greek Government warmly applauds the agreement
signed in Washington between Ronald Reagan and Mik-
hail Gorbachev for eradicating medium-range missiles.
This is a truly historic agreement which will play a
definitive role in the future of East-West relations. It is
also the first such agreement between the two superpow-
ers for the eradication of an entire category of nuclear
weapons on a worldwide scale.

In addition, this agreement must serve as first step
toward the reduction of nuclear weapons in other cate-
gories, particularly strategic weapons, where there are
prospects of a 50 percent reduction, as well as toward the
total cessation of nuclear testing and the prevention of
the arms race in space.

The Washington agreement demonstrates, in the best
possible manner, that all goals for safeguarding peace
and security of the peoples is possible when there is the
political will.

The Greek Government has particular reasons for being
happy over this agreement because, as is well known, one
of the basic axes of its foreign policy is the short-term
reduction of nuclear arms to the lowest possible levels,
with the long-term prospect of their total eradication.

Our efforts and initiatives toward this end are well
known both unilaterally, as well as within the initiative
of the Six. This is why we express our deepest satisfac-
tion over the agreement of the total eradication of the
INF. We underline that we will continue to work toward
preserving the positive climate prevailing in East-West
relations.

ITALY

Andreotti: INF Pact Eliminates Threat to Europe
LD0082246 Rome Domestic Service in Italian
2130 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Excerpt] Here are the first Italian comments on the
agreement on medium- and short-range missiles between
the USSR and the United States. In Andreotti’s view,
Europe sees a threat eliminated, one particularly
directed at Europe, thanks to a 7-year negotiation peri-
od. To the foreign minister, positive expectations for the
outcome of other negotiations are justified, particularly
those ranging from the reduction in strategic arms to
those aimed at achieving ever lower balances of power.
[passage omitted]

NETHERLANDS

Commentator Stresses Need for Conventional
Arms Reduction
52002414 Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 2 Oct 87 p 19

[Article by Ton Crijnen: “The Cool Self-Interest of the
Superpowers”]

[Text] The source of disillusionment, as is so often the
case, was the East. While the euphoria about the achieve-
ment in principle of the INF agreement—dismantlement
of all European-based intermediate-range nuclear mis-
siles and part of the short-range weapons—had such a
hold on many CDA figures that there seemed to be no
higher priority than discussing the Netherlands’ nuclear
responsibilities, Soviet General Yevgeniy Aleksandro-
Vich Nozlin announced; “Even if all nuclear weapons
are destroyed, the next war will be a nuclear one.”

Nozlin, who retired five years ago, made this remark-
able statement during a meeting in Eindhoven of the
international organization Generals for Peace and Dis-
armament. His explanation: “Even if only conventional
weapons are used in such a (European) war, the civilian
nuclear power plants will be important targets, with all
the attendant repercussions. Just think about Chernobyl
in this regard.”

Nozlin is right. After years of having public debate
concentrate almost exclusively on nuclear weapons, it is
time to shatter the misconception shared by many people
that a conventional war with the Russians would offer us
in Western Europe a considerably better chance of
survival than would a nuclear confrontation. That is an
illusion.

For example, a bombing attack on the Botlek and
Europoort area of Rotterdam, resulting in the destruc-
tion of the entire chemical industry there, would cause
such an enormous quantity of poisonous gas to be
released that very few people in the western part of the
Netherlands would have a chance at survival. To say
nothing of the radioactive deluge that would swamp the
Netherlands if nuclear power plants were flattened on
either side of our borders.

Even modern conflicts such as the war in Vietnam and
the current military confrontation between Iraq and Iran
dale in comparison to the level of violence and destruc-
tion that would be unleashed if a conventional tug-of
war between the East and the West were to take place in
this densely populated and highly industrialized area.
Jeopardized

This is why the first priority after INF is not, as suggested by some segments of the peace movement, eliminating all nuclear weapons in Europe, nor is it a step-up of non-nuclear arms as advocated by NATO generals; rather, the first priority is the attempt to scrap a great deal of the conventional weaponry that is piled up in the West and (even more abundantly) in the East.

Now that the INF agreement has completely jeopardized America’s nuclear guarantee towards Western Europe—what U.S. president, after removing the intermediate-range Euromissiles, will risk the destruction of his country by deploying strategic nuclear weapons during a Russian offensive against Western Europe?—conventional arms have clearly become much more important.

Added emphasis here is given to the existing Soviet superiority: more troops, more tanks, more aircraft, more chemical weapons. If Western Europe wants to keep Moscow from exploiting this politically (Finlandization) or perhaps even militarily (blitzkrieg), then it will have to reach arms control agreements in short order. Indeed, whoever thinks that this goal is best served by first negotiating away the rest of the tactical nuclear weapons is underestimating the cool self-interest that largely defines the policy of superpowers like the USSR (and the United States).

If Western Europe is not careful, it will pay the price for the non-policy that Reagan has pursued for years in the area of peace and security. Instead of carefully fitting the INF agreement within the framework of a general policy, in which agreements on strategic and conventional disarmament have their own well-balanced and unwavering place, the President has ultimately been trapped by the wrong reasons (Iranate) into concluding an isolated agreement. It now remains to be seen whether such an accord will take place, and if so, what kind and when. One thing is at any rate certain here: Europe will not stipulate the sequence.

It is thus hardly reassuring that Reagan’s security advisor Carlucci senses from Moscow “no real willingness to consider conventional reductions.” That says something about the Russians and their relationship to Eastern Europe, but also about the Americans, who obviously have put this point just as low on their list of priorities.

No Alternative

As far as Western Europe is concerned, a joint conventional security policy has been lacking for years. The FRG and France in particular are very mistrustful of the idea of thinning out their own conventional forces. Now that American nuclear protection has become extremely dubious and even the permanent presence of U.S. troops no longer appears to be a given, Bonn and Paris have little desire to throw their conventional arms into the negotiations.

Nevertheless, this will have to be done if Western Europe wants to remain assured of peace and security in the future. The alternative—stepping up and streamlining conventional arms—is clearly unworkable, aside from the threat of war associated with it. The European NATO countries do not appear to be willing to increase their defense budgets by three percent a year, as agreed upon.

Let alone the possibility that they will raise the 40 percent more in defense spending that is necessary in order to do what experts have been advocating for years: to assume more of the burden of the defense of Western Europe and not leave this largely up to the Americans. A government, such as the Dutch one, that dared to propose this would immediately be sent home by the parliament.

And then there is the idea, developed in part by former FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, that the leaky American atomic umbrella be replaced by the French Force de Frappe, with the German Bundeswehr as the conventional force. Aside from the fact that the French have thus far shown precious little inclination to devote their nuclear forces to any other purpose than their own national security, it is very doubtful whether a German-French military “axis” could in fact provide the conventional strike power that Schmidt attributes to it.

Western Europe thus has no other choice than to exert frontal pressure on Washington to directly link further negotiations in the area of nuclear arms reduction to the issue of conventional weaponry. It is Europe’s only guarantee for a safe, independent future.

12271

SPAIN

Gonzalez Calls INF Treaty ‘Important Step’

Call for Further Agreements
08091820 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1700 GMT 9 Dec 87

[Text] The disarmament agreement signed by the United States and the Soviet Union is an important step toward a disarmament movement which has to be completed with other agreements, according to Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, speaking on his arrival at the congress of deputies. The prime minister also called for further agreements to be reached on strategic and chemical weapons and for an agreement to be reached on conventional weapons by maintaining balance.

Government Welcomes Treaty
08082022 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 2000 GMT 8 Dec 87

[Text] The Spanish Government has welcomed with great satisfaction the signing of the treaty on the elimination of medium-range and short-range missiles
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In a commune, it expresses its wish that the treaty come into force soon and that verification and compliance be assured. At the same time, the Spanish Government points out that chemical weapons represent another category of weapons of mass destruction and hence it argues for their immediate eradication.

**UNITED KINGDOM**

**Caution Urged in Limiting Strategic Arsenal**
52500008 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 1 Oct 87 p 12

[Text] Strategic weapons are next on the agenda for arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. With Intermediate Nuclear Forces slated for elimination, the superpowers are now committed to discussing "deep cuts" in intercontinental weapons, of up to 50 percent in their inventories. These inventories consist of three categories of launchers—land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and long-range bombers—numbers of which are limited to some 2,000 on each side. The limitation is not statutory since the SALT treaties which impose it were not ratified by the United States but are observed nonetheless. Further limitation is now prompted by the technical changes made to launchers since the SALT treaties were negotiated 15 years ago. These have endowed missiles with the capacity to launch "maneuverable" warheads on to as many as 14 separate targets, with very high accuracy. As a result, each superpower deploys as many as 12,0900 warheads on strategic launchers, as against the limit of 2,000 agreed upon by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev in the early Seventies.

Clearly these totals far exceed the number needed to threaten an adversary with the damage which, by any rational calculation, would deter him from risking an intercontinental attack. There was no theoretical justification for arriving at such totals and there is no reason for clinging to them for their own sake. Nevertheless, there are strong grounds for arguing that the West must proceed very cautiously in agreeing to strategic reductions on the heels of the INF elimination. The first such ground is a technical one. Soviet developments in intercontinental launcher technology may have endowed them with a strategic advantage. They have from the start built much larger launchers than the United States, a decision imposed, it was thought by Western scientists, because they needed to lift larger warheads to compensate for lower accuracy. But Soviet ICBM missiles are now believed to be as accurate as America's and thus far more powerful in their total effect. This development gives the Army the capacity for "nuclear war-fighting"—that is, to attack selected American military targets whose destruction would not provide the pretext for major retaliation. Worse, such attacks might "decapitate" the American command system, making the direction and control of a response impossible.

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END
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