ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

SDI, SPACE ARMS

USSR: APN on C3I Automation, Possibility of Accident
(Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN, Nos 9-11, Apr-May 87)....... 1

Ivanov, Severtsev Letter
Sergeyev on C3I & Strategic Stability (Part II)
Severtsev on Submarine's Response to First Strike
Sergeyev on C3I & Strategic Stability (Part I)
Kulik on Reliability of Strategic Weaponry

PRAVDA Cites American Physical Society Report on SDI
(V. Gan; Moscow PRAVDA, 29 Apr 87)......................... 12

TASS: CD Space Arms Committee Resumes Work
(Moscow TASS, 24 Jun 87)........................................ 14

Moscow on Japan's Participation in SDI Research
(Kalinin; Moscow to Japan, 28 May 87)......................... 15

PRAVDA Views Canadian Role in U.S. Space Station Project
(V. Shelkov; Moscow PRAVDA, 6 May 87)...................... 17

-a-
Canada: Mulroney Warns Against SDI First-Strike Threat
(Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 25 May 87; Ottawa
THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, 29 May 87)......................... 20

Prime Minister Mulroney's Remarks, by Jeff Sallot
OTTAWA CITIZEN Editorial
20

Australia Reiterates Nonsupport of SDI
(Melbourne Overseas Service, 24 Jun 87)..................... 22

U.S.–USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR's Gerasimov on 'Reasonable Sufficiency' Theory
(Gennadiy Gerasimov; Moscow Television Service,
24 May 87).................................................. 23

USSR: UN Sponsors Experts Meeting in Sochi 'After Reykjavik'
(Various sources, 8-12 Jun 87).................................. 25

Meeting Opens, by Mikhail Svetlichny
Borovik, Chervov on Conference
Bessmertnykh Addresses Meeting, by Mikhail Svetlichny
Chervov on Different Approaches
Graham, Chervov Meet Journalists, by Mikhail Svetlichny
Rowny, Bessmertnykh Remarks
Bessmertnykh, Rowny on Linkage, by A. Ivanko
25
26
27
28
28
30
31

Moscow Talk Show: INF in Asia, ABM, West Europe Opinion
(Pavel Kuznetsov, et al.; Moscow to North America,
19 Jun 87).................................................................. 34

USSR's Vorontsov Meet With Kampelman, Glitman, Lehman
(Moscow TASS, 23 Jun 87).......................................... 39

USSR Foreign Ministry Press Briefing 24 June
(Moscow TASS, 24 Jun 87)........................................... 40

FRG Pershings
Space Research Pact Discussed
40
40

Briefs
USSR's Vorontsov Meets U.S. Senators
42

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Soviet Media Focus on Issue of FRG Pershing 1-AS
(Moscow PRAVDA, 15 Jun 87; Moscow TASS, various
dates)...................................................................... 43

PRAVDA Commentary, by Yevgeniy Grigoryev
TASS Commentary, by Vladimir Bogachev
Kampelman Statement Criticized, by Vladimir Chernyshev
Kohl 'Determined' To Brake Accord
43
44
45
47

- b -
USSR: APN Data on French Force De Frappe
(Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN, No 10, May 87) ..... 48

USSR's Gontar on Rationale for SS-20's in Asia
(Philipp Gontar; Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN, No 10,
May 87) ............................................. 50

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR's Nazarkin on Elimination of Chemical Weapons in Europe
(Yuri Nazarkin; Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN, No 11,
May 87) ............................................. 51

Soviet CD Delegate Views CW Convention Prospects
(Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 16 Jun 87; Moscow Domestic
Service, 23 Jun 87) ............................................. 53

Newspaper Article, Yu. K. Nazarkin Interview
Radio Commentary 53

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: Chances for Conventional Arms Limitation in Europe Viewed
(Vladimir Katin; Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW, 3 Jun 87) ..... 60

USSR: NATO-Warsaw Pact 'Unofficial Consultations' 22 June
(Moscow TASS, 22 Jun 87; Moscow Television Service,
22 Jun 87) ............................................. 62

Kashlev Submits Working Document 62
FRG Delegate Cited 62

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: News Conference on Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine
(Various sources, 22, 24 Jun 87) ............................ 64

Broadcast on TV 64
More on Petrovskiy Remarks 67
Karpov on U.S. Proposals 68
Chervov on Nuclear Deterrence 69
Gareyev Outlines Doctrine 69
More on Gareyev 70
Gerasimov on Pact Document 70
TASS Report 71

USSR: Further Commentary on Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine
(Various sources, 16, 17 Jun 87) ............................ 75

Shevardnadze Interview 75
Pact 'Passivity' Denied, by M. Ponomarev 76
NATO Publication Assailed, by Vikentiy Matveyev 78

-c-

Moscow Talk Show: Pact Session, INF, SALT
(Viktor Aleksandrovich Tsoppi, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 21 Jun 87).......................... 80

Gorbachev: 'Few Special Reciprocal Steps' From West
(Moscow IZVESTIYA, 22 Jun 87; Moscow Television Service, 21 Jun 87)............................... 84

Comments While Voting
Broadcast on TV 85

TASS: UN Disarmament-Development Conference Prepared
(Sergey Baybakov; Moscow TASS, 22 Apr 87)................. 87

USSR: UN Preparing Study on Nuclear Winter
(Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW, 5 Jun 87)....................... 88

USSR's Korniyenko Attends Tokyo Antinuclear Symposium
(Vladimir Kuchko; Moscow TASS, 15 Jun 87)............... 90

/12223
SDI, SPACE ARMS

USSR: APN ON C3I AUTOMATION, POSSIBILITY OF ACCIDENT

Ivanov, Severtsev Letter

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 9 (15), Apr 87 pp 1-4

[Text] Dear editors! We find it important to call public attention to what we see as a substantial aspect of the Strategic Defence Initiative.

As it is generally known, the pivotal element of the overall SDI system is sophisticated computer equipment. It will decide practically everything: the targeting and homing of strike elements, the placing of the strike-back system on combat alert, and the adoption of final decisions on the actuation of the whole system. The time gaps involved are so small that they practically rule out man’s participation in the adoption and execution of decisions. In other words, the fate of the planet with the materialization of SDI will be in the hands of computers. Can mankind really feel safe about its future in that situation?

Two decades before the announcement of SDI, the father of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, said, referring to the use of computers for military decision-making: "That would be extremely unwise. How do they teach soldiers the military skills? By way of war games. If you have a formal criterion deciding the victory in war, you may try such games with a computer. However, you should be well advised to make sure that your criterion is not some kind of formalization of wishful thinking. Otherwise you may end up with a computer which will technically win the war but will also destroy the whole world. Such a machine must be programmed by people—experts on atomic warfare. An expert is a man who has experience. Luckily, there are no such people. As for war games programming on the basis of artificial success criteria, it is a highly dangerous exercise which may lead to a bad end. Such a trend does exist, though, and that stupidity really astounds me."

We are positive that these words by Wiener have lost none of their relevance. The reliability of any computer system is decided by the reliability of its three major components: the hardware, the software and the man-machine interface. This classification, though, is somewhat relative like any other: the failure of one of these components can lead to the failure of another or of the whole system. It must be borne in mind that a potential cause of a computer failure may remain "latent" for years until it manifests itself. This is
due to the fact that in practice only a very minor share of the possible data-processing routes is used. In large data storage and processing systems 20 percent of the most active commands account for 80 percent of the operating time, so latent causes of failure on untried data-processing routes may stay hidden for many years.

The problem of reliability arises at all stages of the development and application of computer systems and depends on many factors. Even the comparatively simple integrated circuits have a certain degree of unreliability. All those backup, overflow and duplication circuits built into the computer layout to raise its reliability cannot prevent computer failures. With the modern component base with its hyper-integration and extremely sophisticated bond patterns between transistors and especially between integrated circuits, reliable backup is impossible, for otherwise the speed element of computers will be lost.

Far from reducing the risk of failures, the growing sophistication of modern computers actually makes it higher still. In recent years experts have turned their attention to a sharp decline in computer reliability because of bonds at the submicron level. The search for new principles of data processing has so far produced no promising results, whereas all that talk about the "superchip" which would rather go out of fashion than malfunction within decades to come, or would "mend itself" without the user's interference by way of some "magic algorithm" remains a kind of poor science fiction.

Once fed into the computer system, the cause of failure—be it mistakes in designing or programming—are eliminated by way of lengthy processing. The number of necessary improvements in the hardware of a new large computer system averages one per each 80 chips. This means that for a computer system comprising 10,000 chips the number of such necessary readjustments will add up to a thousand. What's more, new mistakes can be introduced into the system in the process of those readjustments. Experts believe that the software for SDI must be in the order of 10 million programme lines. The international estimate of the density of errors per 1,000 programme lines is 5 to 20 errors. This means that the overall software will comprise 50,000 to 200,000 potential failure sources. After comprehensive debugging of what software there will still be some 5 percent of the failure sources left, which is regarded a pretty good figure, and that means that during the actual operation of the American SDI 2,500 to 10,000 errors can pop up at any moment, each of which may prove irreparable.

There are many examples of such computer failures. They occurred on the Shuttle and in the NORAD system, and during the Falklands war. The latest example was the delay in the docking of the Mir orbiter with the Kvant module, caused by the programmers' failure to foresee an extremely unlikely coincidence which did occur in practice.

The elaboration of the software alone for SDI will take more than 30,000 man-years. This means that at least 3,000 programmers will have to work for ten years, which will greatly increase the probability of additional errors if only because of the natural personnel rotation over those ten years.
We are therefore convinced that the attempts to develop and tune up a computer system for handling the strategic defense initiative verge on suicide. A suicide for the entire population of the planet.

We urge all computer experts regardless of their political convictions to take an active part in broad and open discussion of that extremely poignant problem of today's world. Mankind has the right to know the experts' view before entrusting its very survival to computer systems.

Professor Valery Ivanov, Lenin Prize winner, Doctor of Technology

Rear Admiral (Ret) Nikolai Severtsev, USSR State Prize winner, Doctor of Technology

Editors' note: We have mathematical backup for the authors' conclusions. Those interested: mathematicians, computer programmers or editors of specialized journals may order it from us free of charge.

Sergeyev on C3I & Strategic Stability (Part II)

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 11 (17), May 87 pp 5-7

[Text] One can identify the two following approaches to military and political decision-making. This differentiation is exceptionally important in terms of the application of high information technology (HIT) to the decision-making process.

1. The factual approach, based on the following decision-making formula:

   If <fact> then <action>.

2. The interpretational approach, based on the interpretation of a set of facts through one of a series of possible situations where the basic data are introduced in a coordinated fashion, and only when actions congruent with the accepted interpretation are taken.

An analysis of decision-making systems interaction in a conflict, an analysis drawn from the study of historical precedents, shows that the factual approach represents a major destabilising factor conducive to the escalation of the conflict. The factual approach serves to make enemy reflexes extremely primitive, focusing attention on its actions rather than its plans and objectives, and implies a rigid interpretation of its actions, assuming the adversary plans and objectives remain unchanged.

The formula of "if ---- then" makes plans inevitably rigid, and political manoeuvre impossible.

With the realization of the military and political decisions in line with the factual approach, the functions of the political and military leadership are
 delimited as follows: the political leadership ascertain the facts, say, an attack, and authorize the use of military plans, which are made in advance and, naturally, do not envision a wide range of diverse military-political settings. Political range of diverse military-political settings. Political leaders find themselves totally dependent on pre-conceived military plans, possibly drafted without political control.

By contrast, the interpretational approach to military and political decision-making means the following in terms of organisation:

1. Constant monitoring of changes in the plans and objectives of the adversary, including the provision of channels for direct diplomatic contacts between the opposing sides.

2. Political control over strategic planning.

3. Special machinery for military-political planning to develop and assess military-political scenarios, and to monitor and interpret events and facts.

Application of HIT, particularly state-of-the-art artificial intelligence, does not appear to assure adequate decision making. At the present time, most expert systems designed to help the decision-making process work along the principle of IF ( ) -> THEN ( ), and it is unlikely that in the near future systems will be developed at least marginally comparable to man in terms of the ability to interpret the given situation.

Meanwhile, in the military field there is a certain euphoria with regard to artificial intelligence. What seems particularly dangerous is the use of artificial intelligence programmes in the C(3)I system, and not only because programmes of this kind are unwieldy, and, consequently, inevitably lead to many mistakes. It is hardly conceivable that these systems may develop an adequate interpretation capability in the very near future. Yet their application in one form or another is inevitable if the SDI plans go ahead.

The very nature of a space-based ABM defence is such as to allow just several dozen seconds for decisions on the destruction of the launched missiles to be taken, something which inevitably leads to most, if not all, decision-making procedures being automated. And an euphoria over the potentialities of high information technology is particularly dangerous in this context. Given the use of the now prevailing factual approach to automating the decision-making process, the risk of a conflict breaking out accidentally inevitably rises.

Of course, HIT is bound to have increasingly wider application in the military sphere in the future, and political scientists and political leaders as well as HIT developers would do well to give serious consideration to military and political implications of this process.

The foregoing arguments appear to prove that a "new strategic order," characterised by the increased stability of the strategic interaction system and stronger international security, cannot be brought about by unilateral action to improve any particular technological systems, notably the C(3)I; it must result from serious agreements between the parties concerned.
Severtsev on Submarine's Response to First Strike

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 11 (17), May 87 pp 7-10

[Text] Editor's note: This year's 9th issue of the Military Bulletin featured the letter "A suicide for Five Billions" by two Soviet scholars, Valerii Ivanov and Nikolai Severtsev, which has attracted special attention of our readers. A number of specialists have sent in requests for mathematical substantiation of the authors' conclusions. We have also received questions on specific aspects of the topics raised in that letter. The readers' questions make up the foundation of the MB's interview below with Doctor of Technology Nikolai Severtsev, a well-known Soviet expert on the reliability of modern technical systems.

QUESTION: You have warned against over-confidence in modern electronic systems. In most cases, however, computers come together with human operators. What can a top-notch specialist do in case of a sudden computer failure? How high are the chances of his quick and effective interference?

ANSWER: Sizable experience has been accumulated by now in tackling the tasks of controlling the reliability of sophisticated systems, including their most crucial element which is known as the man-machine interface. The mathematical model of the operator's dependability substantially differs from the models for purely technical systems. This is because he can make decisions proceeding from his personal experience and can keep working even after the computer hardware has broken down. In many a critical situation an experienced operator can work out and make a decision to take the system out of the inoperative condition. Estimates show that the minimum time for passing and bringing into effect such a decision is ten minutes. For the ordinary computers and control systems extensively used in national economies that figure is perfectly acceptable. Trouble-shooting within that or even longer time can hardly lead to irreversible consequences.

Everything is much more serious, however, when we deal with weapons systems, especially under the emergency conditions. For example, if the operator works in space or on a patrolling submarine, the time for making what may well prove the most crucial decision in mankind's history is confined to just a few minutes.

QUESTION: What must be done by the operator to cope with a computer failure within such a short time?

ANSWER: Mathematically, his work boils down to developing an appropriate decision-making algorithm. By the Miller rule which is well-known in cybernetics, the operator can simultaneously handle 5 to 9 objects in his memory even if it is superquick. This means that the maximum number of computer leads and exits which he may try to repair within that limited time must not exceed seven. The efficiency of the operator's performance is characterised by the so-called Stroud number which is the number of cerebral identifications of which the operator is capable within a unit of time. Experiments show that the Stroud number ranges between 4 to 20 cerebral identifications per second (depending on the operator's skill, health, the degree of fatigue, working
conditions and so on). This means that for relatively small systems the time for the development of a decision-making algorithm will be the same ten minutes. As for more complex algorithms, the operator will not be able to develop them within limited time without the risk of serious mistakes.

QUESTION: To what results can such a mistake by the computer operator lead?

ANSWER: Examples of these results are readily available. In the long run, what has happened in Chernobyl can be described as a gross mistake by an operator. The main concern for him at work must be the condition of the system entrusted to him.

A point of special importance is what decision an operator makes to get the system out of the inoperative condition in the armed forces. For example, at the moment of the failure of the data-relay equipment linking a particular strategic arms system with the superior command link, crucial decisions will have to be passed within minutes if not seconds. The degree of sophistication of such systems is very high, especially in the case of SDI. In these conditions, the person passing the decision can only actuate the algorithms developed earlier, but cannot take any effective measures to repair the whole system. This means that decision-making will be based on false data concerning the man-machine interface and may lead to unpredictably grave consequences. In other words, even the most qualified expert will be powerless in such a situation.

QUESTION: Finally, one last question from a hypothetical future, although it will not be too unreal with the materialization of the SDI programme. How will a Soviet submarine commander act if the enemy deals a first nuclear strike, even though as a result of one of those probable errors of which you have spoken? Will he press the strike-back button?

ANSWER: This is a difficult question, but it certainly must be answered. The submarine commander will act in line with the standing instructions which notably envisage the hypothetical situation described in your question. I may add here that any accident, including the outbreak of an unsanctioned nuclear war, is fraught with unforeseeable and formidable dangers and consequences.

Sergeyev on C3I & Strategic Stability (Part I)

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 10 (16), May 87 pp 4-8

[Text] Today the prospects of using the achievements of computer engineering and information technology in the military sphere are widely discussed. In numerous papers it is maintained that in the near future control, communications and reconnaissance systems, the fifth-generation computers and smart weapons will be able to change the aspect of armed forces.

At the same time, in analysis of the consequences of incorporating advanced information technology into the military sphere rather little attention is
given to the military-political aspects of this process. In what way will this process influence strategic stability? Will the risk of the unforeseen breaking out of a nuclear war increase or diminish? The discussion of these problems is difficult due to the necessity of combining very sophisticated analysis of the technical aspect of the problem with sophisticated political analysis. But undoubtedly these problems should be discussed.

Let us take as the basis the definition of strategic stability given in the report by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Threat of Nuclear War:

1. The political and military-strategic situation provide no stimuli for each side to use nuclear weapons first. Retaliatory actions of the side attacked rule out rational exploitation of the first strike.

2. Not a single side has the ability to deal a disarming first strike. Any version of attack leave the attacked side a potential for dealing unacceptable and comparable damage to the aggressor.

3. There are no conditions for an unsanctioned and accidental use of nuclear weapons which, in its turn, presupposes that the sides have reliable and survivable control and communications systems and systems of missile attack warning.

These aspects of strategic stability are directly linked with the use of advanced information technology. The work on the U.S. SDI programmes has imparted particular importance to the possible national space-borne ABM system as a factor of strategic stability. Initially, the incorporation of advanced information technology into control, communications and early warning systems has several objectives:

a) to increase the sensitivity of early warning systems;

b) to increase the survivability of systems controlling the armed forces;

c) to reduce the time of decision-making through effective handling of information;

d) to enhance the reliability of control, communications and early warning systems on the whole.

However, the prospect of the incorporation of advanced information technology into C-cubed-I systems is not so radiant, as it seems from certain advertising-propaganda publications. Moreover, with the introduction of advanced information technology the risk of the unintentional nuclear war may increase. Traditionally in studying the problem of unintentional nuclear war two factors have been analyzed—technical errors (especially, in the analysis of SDI programme) in the system (technical factor) and the possibility of human errors (psychological or, to be more precise, ergonomic factor).

Such an approach is accounted for by the fact that the C-cubed-I system is, on the whole, presented as
We believe that the overall structure of the situation looks in a different way:

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 1**

Such an approach to the analysis of the C-cubed-I systems singles out another major factor—the organizational one. Not only the quality of performance and reliability of man and the technical system are important. Of no less importance is the organization of information processing and organizational procedures. The stability of the entire system operation may depend precisely on this. It is of prime significance that in a real conflict two or more control, communications and early warning systems interact, fusing into a single giant sociotechnical system—the strategic interaction system. Its stability must be analyzed on the whole (including the stability as regards the unintentional emergency of a nuclear war).

Let us consider the organizational factor in more detail. Using qualitative methods of the automatic control theory, Boris Raushenbakh (see Military Bulletin No 3/86) has recently demonstrated that under certain circumstances such an integrated system will behave in an unstable way despite the fact that
each of its parts is stable separately. I think that we can go further and estimate the possible instability in quantitative parameters.

Let us consider the following model. Each side has different levels of combat readiness. Let us denote them by $n_A$ and $n_B$. The idea of each side about the adversary's combat readiness $n^*_A$ and $n^*_B$ appears as a result of the functioning of control, communications and early warning systems.

$$
n^*_B = I_A \ n_B \quad n^*_A = I_B \ n_A
$$

During the time $\tau_A$ and $\tau_B$ the combat readiness level evens out which makes it possible to determine the rates of the increase of combat readiness $\dot{n}_A$ and $\dot{n}_B$.

$$
\dot{n}_A = \frac{1}{\tau_A} (I_A \ n_B - n_A)
$$

$$
\dot{n}_B = \frac{1}{\tau_B} (I_B \ n_A - n_B)
$$

This set of equations coincides in form with the well-known Richardson equation used for analysing the arms race and allows studies of stability by standard mathematical methods. Stability is achieved when $I_A \ I_B < 1$. $I_A$, $I_B$ are characteristics of C-cubed-I systems. If it is greater than unit, this implies that the system is supersensitive and detects the nonexistent increases in the adversary's combat readiness. We see that "supersensitivity" of C-cubed-I leads to the instability of the strategic interaction system and to the greater risk of nuclear war.

The most important point in assessing the effect of the introduction of advanced information technology on strategic stability is that the "supersensitivity" of C$^3$I grows with the sophistication of systems. This growth is not only due to technical and human errors, but also owing to the large degree of the information integration in advanced C$^3$I systems. The paper by Anne Grinyer and Paul Smoker contains an interesting example from the history of the 1956 Arab-Israeli war. It shows that the coincidence of several accidental, erroneously interpreted events brought about quite a wrong assessment of the strategic situation by the U.S. military leadership. It is hard to say what would have followed in such circumstances if the degree of the information integration had been the same as that reached at present in the C$^3$I system.

We see that the information collection structure is determined by the principles of the organization of C$^3$I systems and may have a very adverse effect on strategic stability. I don't mention here defects in procedures of making decisions about the start of military operations and in case when such procedures are transferred to computers.
Kulik on Reliability of Strategic Weaponry

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 10 (16), May 87 pp 1-3

[Text] As armaments are becoming ever more sophisticated and refined, specialists, politicians and military experts increasingly wonder if growing complexity of modern arms systems will be compatible with their reliability.

Let us illustrate the point with a few simple examples. Imagine that a Christmas tree has been decorated with 10 lights each of which is expected to be on for 100 hours with an estimated probability factor of 99 percent. There can be no 100 percent probability factor. However, the actual probability factor for all ten lights on a single string to be on for 100 hours amounts to only 90 percent (0.99 to the power of 10), rather than 99 percent. If the number of lights on a string is doubled, and probability factor will drop to 82 percent. To put it differently, the more units and parts a sophisticated system consists of, the lower the probability that it will operate reliably.

Such a model for composing one of the reliability indicators, safe operation, cannot reveal on its own the complexity of linkage between technology sophistication and reliability. So U.S. military experts use a different indicator—system operational time between errors. Researchers conceded that this indicator, too, shows that reliability drops with growing sophistication. They say the running time between failures of a system that consists of 30 components is 2,000 hours, while that of a system composed of 200 elements is 160 hours.

Another indicator is the need for logistic support to ensure a system's reliable operation. A less reliable system requires more repair and maintenance.

Some theoretical and practical conclusions are corroborated by "leaks" from the Pentagon's classified materials. In 1980 the then U.S. Defense Secretary Brown stated in a planning directive on air force systems that a bid for higher efficiency (through making technology more sophisticated—S.K.) conditioned lower reliability of systems.

The advocates of further refinement and sophistication of weapons have proposed two counter-arguments. They say, first, that more sophisticated technology is easier to handle, and, second, that the reliability of components in weapons systems is being enhanced of late. While the first argument is only indirectly related to reliability, the second one is based on conclusions about scattered programs used as components of weapons systems. According to one document leaked from the Pentagon, priority refinement of technology has facilitated higher efficiency of weapons systems and their components. Yet growing potential has triggered vast growth in the number of components and, consequently, system sophistication. As a result, an increase in system reliability has not been achieved.

While the Defense Department normally succeeds in preventing or delaying public announcement of numerous, if scattered accidents, it cannot easily conceal
the fact that entire pools of certain types of hardware have been removed from combat duty due to technical failures. The U.S. Army recently halted down 700 Blackhawk and 70 Apache helicopters for the above mentioned reasons. From 1965 through 1985 U.S. nuclear-armed submarines reported 628 "incidents" involving nuclear weapons, of which 364 happened due to technical failures in the sophisticated support systems, not nuclear warheads themselves.

The U.S. logistic arm faces innumerable difficulties, as it bears special responsibility for ensuring a reliable operation of nuclear arms systems. The B-1 strategic bomber requires so sophisticated repair and maintenance that, according to chief of department in charge of B-1 maintenance, nobody in the Universe knows how to repair those bombers.

For their part, manufacturers, in quest of sophisticated and therefore more costly technology, often supply weapons components and whole systems with hidden defects. According to the Pentagon's estimates, 10 to 30 percent of the money spent on arms purchases every year are wasted on defected systems. The Defense Department recently blamed a contractor for using silver instead of gold to make coatings for parts used in equipment to monitor the flight and nuclear warheads of Minuteman strategic missiles and B-52 bombers.

While paying hundreds of millions of dollars for a single B-1 bomber, the Pentagon is trying to save money on PAL devices designed to prevent an unsanctioned launch of nuclear weapons. Apropos, there are no PAL devices on nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles.

Continuing refinement of weapons and development of weapons systems consisting of hundreds of thousands of components, units and parts, backfires with declining reliability of sophisticated systems. In their bid to make their high-tech arms and hardware do better, fly faster and hit targets with greater precision, manufacturers largely ignore the consequences of such a race.

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PRAVDA CITES AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY REPORT ON SDI

PM051535 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 87 First Edition p 5

[Correspondent V. Gan reports: "Behind the Scenes of SDI"]

[Text] Washington, 28 Apr--The "Strategic Defense Initiative"--a beautiful fairytale or a malicious anti-Soviet scheme? Is an "impenetrable antimissile shield" feasible or are the fables about it merely the pretext for extorting mind-boggling sums from U.S. taxpayers? From the moment in 1983 when President Reagan solemnly announced the introduction of a "missile-proof umbrella" promising to save Americans from the nuclear threat, these questions have disturbed scientific opinion here.

Those scientists dependent on Pentagon grants in their research came out in favor of SDI. Their more or less independent colleagues argued that the idea is unrealistic and that it has a solely political and economic purpose, being exclusively aimed at involving the USSR in costly new rounds of the arms race, which, so its initiators hope, will bring it to political capitulation. The split in opinion was exacerbated by the fact that there was no decisive word.

At last this word has come. A commission of the American Physical Society, consisting of 17 scientists well known here as the "most brilliant," recently published an analysis of the pet project of the anti-Sovietists in the Reagan Administration. The leading U.S. physicists, including Nobel Prize winners, patently cut the ground from beneath the feet of the "Star Wars" apologists. Their report states in black and white: "...although considerable progress has been achieved in many technological spheres over the last 20 years, there are still substantial gaps in scientific and technical understanding of the problems associated with the development [razrobotka] of directed-energy weapons, which are being considered for use in defenses under the SDI program." J. Sullivan, a scientist from Illinois State University, expounded the main conclusion of the report as follows: "Even in an ideal situation it will take 10 years or more of intensive research to reach a valid decision regarding the potential effectiveness and survivability of the laser weapons and particle-beam weapons of a full-scale 'Star Wars' system."
Commenting on the physicists' report, ABC TV declared: "President Reagan will not like their conclusions. The scientists say a decision on whether to create this system must not be made until 1997 at the earliest. They conclude there are still many scientific unknown quantities in this program's path and many scientific discoveries are needed for the construction of the huge stations. Furthermore, the question of how to assemble these stations into an operational system will depend on the availability of information that does not yet exist. The physicists went further, pointing out that the early deployment of SDI the Reagan administration is seeking cannot be considered a good idea." In turn CBS TV pointed out: "Criticism of SDI has come not from the USSR this time, but from leading U.S. scientists. The most prestigious commission of scientists has warned that the Pentagon is still a long way even from the certainty that laser weapons will work. This report differs from all its predecessors in that the scientists were given access to secret Pentagon research documents."

Besides all this, the commission's members quite clearly state that the Pentagon's claim concerning the "nonnuclear" nature of SDI, to put it mildly, does not correspond to the truth.

The natural question is: Is the opinion of the most authoritative scientists capable of influencing the administration's space adventurism? One does not have to be a great expert to answer this in the negative. It is not enough that the Pentagon deleted many essential points from the physicists' report, sheltering behind the "interests of national security." Its representatives hastened to make statements trying to repudiate the commission's conclusions by alluding to "subjectivism and unjustified pessimism."

Such a reaction is easily explained. In the words of ABC, the "Pentagon's genuine fears are that the scientists will infect the Capitol with their doubts"—after all, last year Congress cut funds for SDI by 40 percent. In other words, the comments of the Defense Department itself, the legislators, and the press show that the "Star Wars" program has turned into a sort of ideology. At the present stage its lobbyists are interested more in today's result than in the end result; that is, in blocking arms control in every possible way, eliminating the last existing accords, and, most importantly, making SDI irreversible, thereby guaranteeing the military-industrial complex corporations a "golden rain" of appropriations.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1548
TASS: CD SPACE ARMS COMMITTEE RESUMES WORK

LD241650 Moscow TASS in English 1603 GMT 24 Jun 87

[Text] Geneva June 24 TASS -- The special committee on preventing an arms race in outer space resumed its work in the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. One of the key provisions for resolving this problem is the preservation and consolidation of the existing system of treaties and agreements related to the outer space, above all of the ABM Treaty in full volume as a timeless document providing the necessary basis for arrangements on substantial cuts in strategic offensive arms, for preventing an arms race in space.

The attempts of the U.S. Administration to undermine that important agreement, to interpret the ABM Treaty in such a way as to prove its "compatibility" with SDI cannot but cause concern. The U.S. delegation at the same time declares that as applicable to international agreements related to space it interprets the term "in peaceful purposes" as "in non-aggressive purposes". In other words, it tries to present the SDI programme as a "non-aggressive" one.

Research and development to create an ABM system for Western Europe, conducted in the complex with the U.S. SDI, clearly mean bypassing the ABM Treaty. There is no doubt that the implementation of the plans to create a West European ABM, which would actually be part of the U.S. SDI, would undermine efforts aimed at lessening war danger in Europe, consolidating mutual confidence, encouraging mutual openness in relations between the two parts of the European continent.

Criticising the United States approach, the Soviet delegation in the committee called the attention of other participants to the answer of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev to a joint statement of leaders of six countries of May 22, 1987. The proposals contained in that document constitute a serious and constructive basis for working out a new agreement which would bar the road to turning space into an arena of the arms race.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1548
MOSCOW ON JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION IN SDI RESEARCH

OW311101 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 28 May 87

[Kalinin commentary]

[Text] According to KYODO, the Japanese Government intends to reach an agreement with the United States on Japan's participation in the SDI Program prior to the summit of the seven advanced industrialized countries to be held in Venice from 8 to 10 June. It is expected that the agreement will be officially signed in Washington in late June. In this connection, commentator Kalinin writes as follows:

In an attempted denial of the report that an agreement on Japan's participation in the Star Wars program would be signed soon, a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Ministry stated not long ago that more time would be needed in negotiations on this issue and that the Japanese Government was not in a hurry to conclude agreements. Nevertheless, the fact is, as early as next month Japan will officially take up responsibilities in carrying out this space militarization project of the United States.

It seems that the current step does not merely indicate continuation of the Japanese leadership's policy of strengthening military and political cooperation with the United States. To some extent, Japan decided to take this action because it wants to defuse the trade war between the two countries, and particularly to have the United States lift its economic sanctions against Japan [words indistinct].

Seizing every opportunity, Japan is indicating its loyalty to the United States as a political and military ally. This is clear if we take a look at the facts, such as the high-handed measures taken under U.S. pressure against the Machine Company and the anti-Soviet campaign launched in Japan by those who are paranoid about espionage in accordance with the scenario provided by the United States.

Another such fact is Japan's intention to join in the SDI program shortly [words indistinct] Japan has made great concessions to the United States on this issue. For example, Japan has, in fact, withdrawn its original demand concerning the right to use the results of research. In other words, all such rights will belong to the United States and it will be up to the U.S. Government whether Japanese companies will be allowed to use the results developed by using advanced technology. No such approvals are expected to be given.
In its attempt to involve Japan and other allies in its SDI program, the United States is apparently after its own economic interests. The United States is probably trying to strengthen its position on the world market by obtaining advanced technology. Since the United States has already lost its position in various fields, it is inconceivable that it will give the right to use advanced technologies to its competitors. Incidentally, the United States will be able to reject demands for this right with the respectable excuse that its space militarization program must be kept secret.

The following example may also be recalled. In 1985, a report on a pilot program of the SDI project, complete with details, was submitted to the U.S. Congress by the agency responsible for the project. A year later, all the data were deleted from the report, and it was decided that the report would not be published in the following fiscal year. This was a matter that concerned the initial period of research work. Furthermore, the data concerning the SDI project have been concealed from Congressmen. It will not be difficult to imagine how foreign companies will be treated when further development is made in research work. This may be why less and less publicity is given in Japan on the economic advantages of participation in the SDI program.

At present, the United States is putting great emphasis on publicizing its SDI program, saying that it will guarantee the security of its allies. However, as pointed out correctly by the journal DISARMAMENT ISSUES, the Star Wars program has nothing to do with Japan's security. From the viewpoint of a country's defense, the weapons system that will be developed in accordance with the SDI program will be utterly meaningless. It should also be pointed out that the SDI program is utterly incompatible not only with Japan's security but also with the security of the international community as a whole. Whiel destroying strategic balance, the Star Wars program will also expand armament into space. This will further step up armament on earth. As a result, there will be greater danger of world war. Furthermore, war may break out accidentally not because of a political decision but because of some defect of technology.

In this connection, during his recent visit to the space center in Baykonur, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev termed the attempt to justify the SDI program as a serious attempt to deceive the peoples of the world.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1548
PRAVDVA VIEWS CANADIAN ROLE IN U.S. SPACE STATION PROJECT

PM071055 Moscow PRAVDVA in Russian 6 May 87 Second Edition p 5

[Report by own correspondent V. Shelkov under the "International Notes" rubric: "They Are Trying to Lay Hands on It"]

[Text] Ottawa—In recent weeks people in Canada have started talking again about the plan to create a large manned space station through the efforts of a number of Western countries. But in contrast to last year's delighted response, this time the statements have been marked by perplexity and alarm. This is explained by the fact that signs of special interest on the Pentagon's part in the future station are emerging the United States, which is the main participant in and financer of this space venture. And this has not been negotiated, as they say.

In January 1984, asking Canada, Japan, and the West European states to take part in the station's joint production, U.S. President Reagan did not say a word about its possible use for military purposes. At the time it was a question of creating in the mid nineties at an altitude of 500 km a large civilian scientific facility with a crew of eight which would have at its disposal first-class laboratories equipped to observe the earth and other celestial bodies, to assemble large-scale spacecraft in orbit, and to produce materials with set properties under conditions of weightlessness.

The cost of the plan is assessed at 15 billion dollars. Japan and the European Space Agency, which includes 13 Western states, have agreed to make their contribution to its implementation. Back in 1985 during the U.S. president's stay in Quebec, Canadian Prime Minister B. Mulroney notified R. Reagan of Ottawa's decision to take part in creating the station. In March last year, on a visit to Washington, the head of the Canadian Government announced that his country would take on the production of one of the basic components of the entire space system--the mobile service center. It will play a key role in assembling the station in orbit and in servicing it and also in various operations performed by the astronauts.

The cost of the Canadian part of the plan will be 800 million dollars over 15 years. Here Ottawa has earmarked 220 million dollars for the first 5 years of the plan's implementation, that is over one-fourth of all the country's expenditure on space research. A number of other scientific programs have had
to be sacrificed here. In embarking on this step the government believed that participation in this international space consortium of Western states would promote the development of leading Canadian scientific and industrial thinking, particularly in fields like robot technology and electronics.

The Canadian side invariably noted that the entire plan is of an exclusively civilian nature. Last year F. Oberle, minister of state for science and technology, said he could not imagine a situation in which the Americans would try to use the future station for military purposes. Less than a year after that statement it had already become obvious that the Canadian minister is proposing, as they say, and the U.S. military department is disposing.

The Canadian press notes that initially the Pentagon did indeed have no interest (or was seeking to pretend to have no interest?—V.SH.) in the station. But its attention toward it obviously increased after last year's Challenger catastrophe and the emergence of some doubts as to the cloudless future of "shuttle" spacecraft. A reflection of this change in attitude among U.S. military circles toward the new space plan was an article published toward the end of 1986 in the magazine AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY. The Pentagon, the article says, intends to prevent U.S. participation in the creation of a station under terms which are incompatible with potential U.S. military operations on board this space facility. In this connection the magazine cites the opinion of U.S. Air Force Colonel Dzh. Mey [name as transliterated], who is responsible for the space field in the National Security Council. "We must have a free hand," he has said in a speech, "to carry out on the station the experiments necessary to ensure U.S. national security."

The Pentagon's impudent attempts to sound out its allies regarding its presence on the future station is meeting with a guarded reception in Canada too, although this country has in the past frequently succumbed to Washington's bombastic arguments about the need to always display "Western solidarity." This time, however, this "solidarity" could be completely at variance with Ottawa's officially proclaimed position: Canada is taking no part at government level in the White House's "strategic defense initiative."

The Canadian side's reaction is therefore no accident. Back at the beginning of the year J. Clark, secretary of state for external affairs, said that the country's government may review the question of its own financial and technical participation in the plan's implementation if the Pentagon insists on its plans for using the station for military purposes.

In late April timid reports appeared in the Canadian press to the effect that the U.S. side was giving assurances that all the contradictions would soon be resolved. It is hard to say, however, how the United States intends to reassure its partners. Perhaps simply by promising them that it will not drag military programs on board the station? But it is hard to believe such promises. Particularly if you take into account the content of a letter sent
by C. Weinberger to G. Shultz and cited recently by the Canadian newspaper THE CITIZEN. The United States, the Pentagon chief writes in his missive to the secretary of state, should examine the possibility of excluding its allies from the plan to create the orbital station if they object to the project's use for military purposes. We must be ready, the U.S. defense secretary continues, to perform work without anyone's participation since the price of such cooperation is too high.

In trying to lay hands on the space station before it has even appeared Washington is again showing how dangerous its adherence to the mirages of the USSR's military-space supremacy is and how burdensome to all members of the international community. In the Washington corridors of power the Pentagon's "star needs" now prevail over everything else: over the common sense which prompts the path toward disarmament, over the vital need to keep space peaceful, and, finally, over the interests of its own allies and the recognition of their autonomy in determining their own goals and priorities. Canada's fears on this plane have not disappeared but, on the contrary, have intensified since President Reagan's April visit to Ottawa.

/9738
GSO: 5200/1548
CANADA: NULARNEY WARNS AGAINST SDI FIRST-STRIKE THREAT

Prime Minister Mulroney's Remarks

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 25 May 87 pp A1, A2

[Article by Jeff Sallot]

QUEBEC

In a clear warning to Washington, the Canadian Government says that the Star Wars program must never pose a first-strike threat to the Soviet Union.

There is a danger that a Star Wars system of strategic defence could be linked with U.S. weapons systems in such a way as to threaten the Soviets with a first-strike knockout punch, Canadian officials believe.

The admonition to avoid that possibility was delivered here on the weekend by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and other Canadian officials during a meeting of influential legislators from the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries.

As envisioned by President Ronald Reagan, Star Wars — officially known as the strategic defence initiative — would be a system of defences to intercept and destroy Soviet ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads before they could reach targets, such as U.S. missile silos.

The Soviets and some prominent arms control experts in the West believe a Star Wars system, if integrated with existing U.S. nuclear weapons system, would tempt the United States to launch a pre-emptive first strike in some future East-West crisis.

Star Wars is only in the research phase and many technical experts believe it will be several years before a working system can be deployed.

Nevertheless, the Soviets are particularly wary of U.S. intentions with Star Wars. They note that Washington has always kept open the option of using nuclear weapons first in the event of armed conflict with the Warsaw Pact.

In a speech here on Saturday, Mr. Mulroney said Canada continues to support Star Wars research, but with two important notes of caution.

"First, extreme care must be taken to ensure that (strategic) defences are not integrated with existing forces in such a way as to create fears of a first strike.

"And second, we cannot allow strategic defences to undermine the arms control process and existing agreements," Mr. Mulroney said.

The Prime Minister said any move toward ballistic missile defences as a way of maintaining the strategic balance must come only through mutual consent by the United States and the Soviet Union.

"Without such mutuality, chaos would follow and stability would crumble," he said.

The two superpowers must reach consensus on strategic defences "if the logjam of strategic arms control is to be broken at Geneva," Mr. Mulroney said.

That line in the speech was interpreted by NATO experts here yesterday as another clear signal to Washington to show greater flexibility in the Geneva arms reduction talks. The U.S. side has shown great reluctance to discuss Star Wars.

Mr. Mulroney was asked later by reporters whether Canada is confident that Mr. Reagan will show flexibility and keep Star Wars research within the strict limits set out in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Moscow.

"I wouldn't presume on the future, but you know our position. The treaty, even though it is not ratified by the (U.S.) Senate, is a very important parameter, in our judgment, of international conduct. And it's a lot better than nothing in this business," Mr. Mulroney replies. (The Prime Minister appears to have confused the ratified Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the unrati-fied Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.)

Mr. Mulroney declined to elaborate on his fears about Star Wars and a first-strike threat. "It's all in the text of the speech."

Mr. Mulroney also dismissed as hypothetical a question about whether Canada might pull out of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) if it were integrated with a Star Wars system.

The NORAD agreement with Washington was renewed last year after a political debate in Canada about whether NORAD might draw
OTTAWA CITIZEN Editorial

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 29 May 87 p A8

[Text]

When Prime Minister Mulroney spoke to the North Atlantic Assembly in Quebec City last Saturday, media reports highlighted his "warning" to Washington about the dangers of America's Strategic Defence Initiative. There was no mention of Soviet-initiated dangers of a similar nature.

What exactly did the prime minister say — and in what context? Although Mulroney ranged all over the lot, he gave most attention to arms control and security, as befits a talk to NATO parliamentarians.

His lead-in to Star Wars was a philosophical treatise on disarmament, its limitations, and the fact that the process is not a real substitute for security.

Then the speech zeroed in on INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) — "the most urgent issue we have to face" today. Mulroney rightly gave credit to the West for putting the key proposals on the table.

The real highlight of the Mulroney lecture came next; it is entirely in line with his political philosophy:

"We must also remain united, demonstrating solidarity with the United States on this issue… We are all aware that the coming months represent the last best hope for an arms accord during Mr. Reagan's presidency. Canada stands firmly behind the American leadership in the pursuit of peace and security."

That declaration of solidarity with Washington was what deserved more attention from interested observers. It was a statement of trust delivered by Canada's chief minister about a leader and a country he should know better than most.

Only then did Mulroney broach Star Wars.

He sounded the traditional warning to both sides — nowhere did he point the finger only at the U.S. — about ensuring that strategic defences integrated with existing forces must not create fears of a first strike.

The Soviets have both a major Star Wars program of their own and the overwhelming means to deliver a strike against NATO. Fear in the West about a Soviet first strike is far more justified than fear among us about a U.S. one unauthorized by NATO.

As for Soviet fears, Mulroney had this to say: "The transition (to strategic defence regimes) should be mutually agreed upon. Without such mutuality, chaos would follow and stability could crumble. Clearly U.S.-Soviet consensus on strategic defences will be necessary if the logjam of strategic arms control is to be broken at Geneva."

He should have substituted, "if disaster is to be avoided."

Reagan foresaw this need from the beginning and offered to share research and to work together with Moscow. This essential prerequisite, U.S.-Soviet joint planning, should be the focus of all future Star Wars speeches. Mulroney and his speechwriters were dead right to emphasize it.

/9274
CSO: 5220/49
AUSTRALIA REITERATES NONSUPPORT OF SDI

BK240211 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0030 GMT 24 Jun 87

[Excerpts] The prime minister, Mr Hawke, yesterday launched the Australian Labor Party's campaign for next month's federal election with the main undertaking to provide a new program to help families.

On foreign policy, Mr Hawke said Australia's international affairs would continue to be marked by responsibility, self-reliance, and self-respect. He said the alliance with the United States was a healthy and constructive partnership between equals.

[Begin Hawke recording] Our alliance relationship with the United States--its close and constructive nature has been reaffirmed in the past 2 days--has given us the position of influence from which to work constructively for peace. As befits two great democracies, which we are, this fundamentally close relationship does not depend on absolute uniformity of views. For example, without calling into question the integrity of the United States in developing its concept of space defense, we have made it quite clear, consistently clear, that Australia will not participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative.
[end recording]

On defense, Mr Hawke said the government's policy would be to reinforce its commitment to the security of Southeast Asia as well as the southwestern Pacific.

/9738
CSO: 5200/4314
USSR'S GERASIMOV ON 'REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY' THEORY

LD242109 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 24 May 87

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] I remember, when Robert McNamara was U.S. Secretary of Defense, he reasoned that to deter another country from attack, there was no need to adhere to the old military principle of the more the better. McNamara was in favor of preserving, to start with, tens or hundreds of nuclear weapons. When he was the defense secretary he cited the figure of 400. In general, he was in favor of preserving a minimal number. Furthermore, he regarded this minimum as an interim while approaching ultimate nuclear disarmament.

No one has a monopoly on wisdom. Quite a while ago, in the 1960s, Professor Oskar Morgenstern, coauthor of the Theory of Games applied systemic analysis and came to the conclusion that a finite and very modest number of nuclear weapons was sufficient to secure strategic stability, on condition that they are invulnerable to a first strike. He suggested abolishing land-based missiles and bombers and throwing a few submarines into the ocean.

Now, a quarter of a century later, we are returning to this not particularly complex idea for securing the possibility of a destructive retaliatory strike against an aggressor. This April, the Soviet Scientists' Committee in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat published a brief report on their research into the theme: Strategic Stability in Conditions of Radical Reductions of Nuclear Weapons [Strategicheskaya Stabilnost v Usloviyakh Radikalnykh Sokrashcheniy Yadernykh Vooruzheniy]. The working group of this committee carried out a systemic analysis, that is, an analysis taking account of the mutual link between various factors, and came to a number of conclusions. One of these is that in conditions where nuclear weapons are present, parity is far from being just an approximate quantitative balance of forces of the sides. The main issue, after all, is to guarantee the ability to inflict a destructive retaliatory strike. The report points out that 400 warheads each with a capacity of about 1 megatonne are enough to ensure complete annihilation of each of the two states. If this arithmetic is correct, why build a bridge wider than the stream?
The authors of the report examine an option to reduce the sides' nuclear arsenals by 95 percent. That will leave approximately 600 single-warhead intercontinental mobile ballistic missiles, that is, mobile missiles, is difficult to destroy immediately with a first strike. The strategic stability also remains, because the side which has been subjected to a first strike will retain enough forces to inflict a retaliatory strike in retribution. Then, it will possible in one attempt, with the growth of confidence, to cut the remaining 5 per cent to zero.

It is time to review military doctrines, from the point of view of the principle of reasonable sufficiency, minimal restraint and a nonnuclear prospect.

From this reasonable sufficiency point of view the disputes in the West over whether to agree to elimination of medium-range missiles or not appear very parochial. Is it necessary to go into trivialities? For the proportion of these missiles in nuclear arsenals is not so very great: the United States has 380 warheads in Europe, we have 841. According to simple arithmetic, with such an imbalance, the West ought, one would think, to rejoice. But there is confusion and vacillation, just like the swan, the crab, and the pike in Krylov's fable.

/9738
CS0: 5200/1550
U.S.—USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: UN SPONSORS EXPERTS MEETING IN SOCHI 'AFTER REYKJAVIK'

Meeting Opens

LD082326 Moscow TASS in English 1410 GMT 8 Jun 87

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Sochi, 8 Jun (TASS)—By TASS special correspondent Mikhail Svetlichny:

A meeting of experts opened at the Hotel complex Dagomys here today within the framework of the United Nations-sponsored World Campaign for Disarmament.

The meeting, held under the motto "After Reykjavik: Planning for the 1990s," will consider issues related to nuclear, space and conventional arms.

Reykjavik opened up real prospects for establishing a nuclear-free, safer world, Genrikh Borovik, chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, told the opening.

"The forum is important by its direction into the future, in the 1990s, when these prospects could be realized."

"Prominent experts from more than 20 countries will analyze the world situation and try and work out specific approaches to tackling global problems facing mankind."

"The current meeting," Borovik said, "is a manifestation of our organization's cooperation with the U.N. Secretariat and the disarmament department."

The Soviet peace campaigners believe that by pooling efforts of all forces committed to peace at government and non-government levels, it is possible to stop mankind from sliding toward the dangerous abyss, which is nuclear war."

The aim of the meeting, said Yaasuhi Akaashi, U.N. assistant secretary-general for public information, was to analyze Reykjavik's influence and define approaches to establishing a safer world.

He pointed out the need for working out a common attitude to such problems as cutting conventional and nuclear arms and related verification issues.
Preventing an arms race in other regions and in outer space was an important task, he said. Akashi expressed the hope that the meeting's participants would use their vast experience and knowledge to define specific steps towards creating a more stable and safer world.

The meeting's participants will discuss today questions connected with the reduction and elimination of conventional weapons, measures to strengthen confidence and verification and problems of regional agreements.

Borovik, Chervov on Conference

LD082337 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 8 Jun 87

[Text] A meeting of experts is being staged in Sochi under UN auspices within the framework of the world disarmament campaign. The Soviet Peace Committee is one of the organizers of the meeting, entitled "After Reykjavik — Planning for the '90's." Our correspondent Arkadiy Melkanyan interviewed the committee's chairman, writer Genrikh Borovik, and Lt-Gen Chervov, head of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces' General Staff.

[Borovik] We are going to try here to discuss the question of what to expect from the situation, and what the world can expect in coming years, following the meeting which might have been a historic one, in Reykjavik, but which did not become (such) because of well-known reasons, the stand of the United States.

[Chervov] The summit meeting in Reykjavik marked a new frontier and showed mankind that achievement of a nuclear-free peace on earth was possible. The event is not a transient one, but a long-term one, and everything achieved in Reykjavik is now fully supported by the Soviet leadership and the Soviet Union, and is being implemented at all forums and talks. In practice the present situation is such that thanks to the Soviet Union's initiatives and proposals there exists a real possibility of resolving the problem of medium-range missiles. There exist real possibilities for conclusion of key provisions or outline provisions concerning strategic offensive weapons, and also on problems of space. There also exist real possibilities for commencement of talks on a considerable reduction of conventional weapons; that is, implementation of the Budapest program of the Warsaw Pact states. Unfortunately, there have so far been no steps in response from the NATO side. And so, at the Dagomys meeting the experts should, I think, try to see what the obstacles are in the disarmament issues of interest to the whole of mankind.

[Melkanyan] In brief, yet another step toward peace is being made.

[Borovik] Indubitably. Experts from 25 countries have come together; the majority of them are people sincerely concerned by the situation that Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov was just talking about. There are major scientists, major experts, major public figures here, and their view on the issues, based not just on emotion but on profound knowledge as well, will naturally be a weighty contribution to the possibility of solving the problems we face.
Bessmertnykh Addresses Meeting

LD091619 Moscow TASS in English 1555 GMT 9 Jun 87

[Text] Sochi June 9 TASS -- By TASS Special Correspondent Mikhail Svetlichny:

The Reykjavik meeting marked a turning point in the practical solution of the key issues of our day, the elimination of nuclear weapons, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said. He made this comment today at the expert meeting held as part of the United Nations-sponsored world disarmament campaign.

Reykjavik's practical effect consists in that the talks on strategic offensive weapons, medium-range missiles and on strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty (the sides have agreed to abide by it for another 10 years at least) are based, despite persisting differences in Soviet and U.S. positions, on agreements and understandings reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in the capital of Iceland.

The Soviet side finds it expedient to take a broader action to tackle the problems of security and strategic stability, that will include conventional and chemical armaments in addition to nuclear ones, the strengthening of the regime of existing treaties and prevention of the arms race in outer space.

Among short- and medium-term measures, the treaty on medium- and short-range missiles has a real chance of being implemented today. The document is important in that it will help free Europe from a whole range of nuclear missile weapons. Subsequently, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh continued, certain aspects, like control provisions, may serve as a good example for drafting agreements on reducing other types of nuclear weapons.

The reduction of strategic offensive weapons and prevention of the arms race in outer space present a more serious problem. Here the Soviet Union thinks that they key provisions of future agreements can be formulated already within the next few months. What is most important today is to preserve the ABM Treaty. If it is preserved and strengthened, there will open a prospect for the fast movement towards the goal of a nuclear-free world.

Radical reductions of nuclear weapons already on the first stage of their elimination will give the sides valuable experience in applying these procedures, principles and mechanisms of mutual verification. The experience itself will be a factor in ensuring security. The USSR stands for the most stringent verification, checks and inspections on the sites where missiles are dismantled and eliminated, test sites and military bases, including third countries, at warehouses and factories, either private or state-owned.

The whole complex of measures on disarmament and building up mutual trust, in accordance with the Soviet concept, must be accompanied in the long run by the creation of an all-round system of security in the political, economic and humanitarian fields, the Soviet deputy foreign minister stressed.
Chervov on Different Approaches

LD102200 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 10 Jun 87

[Text] The international meeting of experts from 25 states who are discussing the problem of disarmament will continue in Sochi today. A report, whose subject can be summed up as international security and space, will be delivered by Colonel General Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. Our correspondent interviewed him. Here is the recording:

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] The issues for discussion today are of extraordinarily great importance for the preservation of peace throughout the world. Nikolay Fedorovich, would you tell us what is the basic difference in approaches to resolving these issues between the Soviet and Western sides, in particular the U.S. side?

[Chervov] At present there are no weapons in space, Soviet or U.S. The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that there should not in fact be such weapons in space. Our leaders have stated repeatedly that the Soviet Union will not be the first to take weapons into space. That is our pledge. The Soviet Union will be making every effort to persuade other countries, first and foremost the United States, that they too should refrain from such a fateful step. Any strike weapon in space, antimissile weapon, or antisatellite weapon, or some other kind of weapon, if it were to be put into space, would immediately render impossible the reduction of nuclear weapons, in particular the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. An uncontrollable new twist in the arms race would begin, and the threat of nuclear war would be significantly greater.

Representatives of the U.S. side such as General Rowny represent Cold War attitudes and are stubbornly intent on showing here too that the United States is sure to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union, and even here at the conference they would like to spread the idea of U.S. global pretensions. An absolute majority of the 25 countries' representatives fully support all Soviet proposals, especially on the issues of radically reducing nuclear weapons, keeping weapons out of space and reducing by 25 percent conventional weapons in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals and favor the confidence measures that were advocated by the Warsaw Pact member states in Budapest and now again in Berlin. [end recording]

Graham, Chervov Meet Journalists

LD102215 Moscow TASS in English 2101 GMT 10 Jun 87

[Text] Sochi (Northern Caucasus) June 10 TASS -- TASS correspondent Mikhail Svetlichnyy reports:

What is in store for mankind in the 1990s, on the eve of the 21st century: A "star peace" or is it destined to become a hostage of computer monster threatening all life on earth from space? This question was highlighted today at the international meeting of experts sponsored within the world-wide campaign for disarmament under the U.N. aegis, which is under way here.
U.S. Retired Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, who proposed President Reagan in 1980 the pretentious project for deploying a large-scale system of anti-missile defence in space, now known as "Star Wars programme", alleged in his report that the implementation of the SDI programme was only a means of guaranteeing peace and security and could, eventually, lead to eliminating nuclear weapons.

Such an approach, noted Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, department head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, is based on a speculation of people's fear of nuclear weapons. The U.S. authors of the concept of a stage-by-stage transition from nuclear offensive to non-nuclear defensive means suggest that strategic offensive weapons be deployed even further and that "space anti-missile system" be established, that is strike space weapons. After that, according to them, it will be possible to cut or even liquidate nuclear weapons.

The Soviet side agrees with the concept that the SDI programme be limited to research. "In our opinion," noted Nikolay Chervov, "this means to conduct investigations and tests under the SDI at research institutions, manufacturing plants and proving grounds under stationary conditions. But we are against testing weapons in space. This is banned by the ABM Treaty."

Differences in the approach of the Soviet and American sides to the issue of space weapons developed especially clearly during a meeting of journalists with Daniel Graham and Nikolay Chervov. D. Graham alleged for instance that a system of the latest weapons deployed in space would be purely defensive and would be a reliable shield against a premeditated nuclear attack.

"One need not be versed in military matters to comprehend that it is possible to create a "space shield" and then to threaten the other side with strategic missiles and to turn to a nuclear blackmail," parried N. Chervov. In actual fact, this line leads to undermining Soviet-American relations and upsets the existing strategic parity.

Despite the difference in opinions and approaches to solving global issues of our times, many meeting participants appraise highly a chance of discussing jointly pressing questions of ensuring peace and security. The dialogue is of frank and honest character, despite the fact that the positions of the sides are very different sometimes, James Dougherty, professor of Saint Joseph's University, USA, told TASS.

"Discussions which took place during the meeting, were useful. They helped compare our approaches to the issue of bridging the arms race," noted Peter Klein (GDR), director of the Institute of International Politics and Economy. The positions of the sides on the SDI issues were also different. The present-day epoch, he noted, made it necessary to comprehend the fact that peace cannot be guaranteed any longer only with military means. For this purpose a broad programme of measures needs to be carried out in the political, economic and humanitarian spheres.
Rowny, Bessmertnykh Remarks

LD120420 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 11 Jun 87

[Text] In Sochi the meeting of experts from 25 countries within the framework of the world campaign of disarmament has ended. Here is our correspondent Arkadiy Melkanyan.

[Melkanyan] Over the past 4 days, prominent scientists, military leaders, politicians, public figures and diplomats exchanged views on the most burning issues concerning nuclear, space and conventional weapons. The issue of Soviet-U.S. relations and political as well as military aspects of international security were at the center of attention there. These questions were also discussed at a news conference with the participation of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs and Edward Rowny, special adviser to the U.S. President and U.S. secretary of state for arms control. This is what Mr Rowny said in particular.

[Begin Rowny recording in English with superimposed Russian translation] In spite of the fact, as I have already said, we recognize the importance of arms verification; we consider it important to concentrate attention on three aspects of our relations, which are: first, the general questions whose importance is recognized by all; second, on the aspect of bilateral relations between our countries, for example, in the field of exchange of people, and third, there is the very important matter of human rights. Then it is of course unnecessary to take up the question of arms control.

These problems are of importance but their order of priority should be considered in the context of those problems which I have just mentioned. Of course, we are advocating the idea of concluding an agreement on nuclear and medium-range missiles, but at the same time we believe that one must not pay attention to this area alone without considering all other major problems which are, so to speak, on the other side of that range of problems which I have just described. [as heard]

We fully agree with what Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was saying. He was talking about the importance of reducing the strategic system. We have indeed advocated a 50 percent reduction of strategic weapons. It is also necessary to resolve the problem of conventional weapons. [end recording]

[Melkanyan] In reply Comrade Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, noted:

[Begin Bessmertnykh recording] I will permit myself to disagree with what the esteemed general said when he inverted the order of priorities. According to him, first are regional problems, then those of bilateral relations, then human rights, and then disarmament. I do not wish to belittle the importance of the first three issues. Undoubtedly they are important, each in their own way.

We are not only prepared to have talks with Americans on all these matters, but we are actually conducting them. We have our own answers for the U.S. and misgivings about each of these questions, including that of human rights. We are inviting the U.S. to actively discuss with us this problem. However, a question arises: Do we need waste such valuable minutes of which we are generally short, unfortunately, at this meeting of experts, who have gathered together specifically for the examination of questions on
arms limitation, to consider questions which are according to some definitions key questions? They are of course important, I repeat this. We are ready to discuss them. But let us then get together for a meeting of experts on regional conflicts. Incidentally, a meeting like this between, the USSR and the United States is intended. A meeting on bilateral matters is also on our agenda. As far as humanitarian matters are concerned, there are not only multilateral but also bilateral questions on our agenda. We are ready to discuss all this. [end recording]

[Melkanyan] According to the view of the participants of the present forum, whose co-authors are the United Nations and the Soviet Peace Committee, another step has been made toward mutual understanding.

Bessmertnykh, Rowny on Linkage

PM150827 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own special correspondent A. Ivanko: "Security Must Be All-Embracing"]

[Text] Sochi — A meeting of experts conducted as part of the UN-sponsored world disarmament campaign has ended in Sochi's Dagomys hotel complex. For 4 days representatives of 25 countries discussed current vital problems. Reports were delivered to the meeting by A. Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy foreign minister, and Ambassador Edward Rowny, special adviser to the president and secretary of state on arms control matters.

Edward Rowny: We approach such conferences with great interest, since these meetings provide the opportunity to present one's own country's stance to participants. The United States favors arms control and arms reduction. Nevertheless, I want to draw attention to the importance of those fundamental problems from which all the rest ensue. I think it is essential to secure a situation where all agreements signed are observed. As President Reagan said, people do not distrust one another because they are armed; they are armed because they do not trust one another. Therefore, as I have already said, although we all recognize the importance of arms control, we also deem it essential to focus attention on three pillars of our relations. The first is regional questions. That is to say, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. Then there are questions of bilateral relations between our countries — the opening of consultations and exchanges among people. The third and very important question is that of human rights. Until human rights are universally respected and observed the dignity of individuals will not be ensured. [paragraph continues]

The problem of arms control has its own place in the context of these questions. Of course we favor an agreement on medium-range missiles. But attention should not be paid exclusively to that. We are fully in accord with Mr Gorbachev. He has also spoken about the importance of reducing strategic systems, and we indeed advocate a 50-percent reuduction. It is also essential to solve the problem of conventional arms and chemical weapons. We favor a broad approach — it ensures not only the conclusion of agreements but their observance.
A. Bessmertnykh: During the meeting we have already touched on certain nerve centers of the problems of arms limitation and reduction. Is there something new and common in the experts' approach to the central problems of arms limitation? The vast majority of participants think that new approaches are now essential, that this gives us the opportunity to find compromises and mutually satisfactory solutions. Moreover, almost everyone is agreed that Reykjavik was an important landmark in our understanding of existing problems and the search for possible solutions. Many experts are taking a new look at the problem of security. Security was previously regarded as one of the most self-interested problems of state policy. Echoes of that stance were heard at the meeting. This applies particularly to Mr. Rowny's speech. Nevertheless, most participants said security is becoming all-embracing, and this is a significant sign of the new approach to the problem of security. I venture to disagree with the way that Mr. Rowny set out the priorities. He put regional questions first, then bilateral relations and human rights, and only then disarmament. You get the impression the U.S. experts are trying to place to the fore problems which have nothing to do with the meeting to avoid discussion of certain fundamental questions of disarmament.

Strategic offensive armaments are a current, fundamental problem. But the problem of strategic nuclear armaments cannot be solved without strengthening the terms of the ABM Treaty.

Question: The United States constantly links an accord in the arms control sphere with other problems, particularly the observance of human rights in the Soviet Union. Congress is conducting hearings on this issue, but Soviet people, after all, have serious complaints regarding the observance of human rights in the United States.

A. Bessmertnykh: Questions concerning human rights in the United States undoubtedly concern Soviet people. Human rights violations in the United States — and this is acknowledged by the Americans themselves — are truly blatant. Soviet people voice their indignation at the current civil rights situation in the United States. But there is something I want to say. We recognize the importance of all these questions and put them to the U.S. side. True, so far they have not given any convincing answers. All right, we could wait, but from the arms limitation standpoint this waiting for answers from the U.S. worries me. If we committed ourselves to Rowny's conception, it turns out we should have to wait until all the problems of the homeless and the unemployed in the United States were solved before switching to questions of nuclear arms reductions. As I understand it, General, you cannot promise us to solve these questions within 5 years. I do not think the fate of disarmament should be made dependent on solving the problems of human rights anywhere.

E. Rowny: We agree the solution of one problem should not be linked with the solution of others — there is an enormous number of them, but they are particularly important. No one disputes the fact there are unemployed and homeless people in the United States, and this disturbs us profoundly, but we are still more worried by the fact that some people in the United States, and this disturbs us profoundly, but we are still more worried by the fact that some people are denied the opportunity to leave their country and are denied the most fundamental human rights. [paragraph continues]
Yes, let us solve the problem of disarmament, but do not forget about human rights, bilateral problems, or regional problems. [Rowny ends]

...The discussion was sometimes stormy, sometimes calm. However, most participants at the meeting sought joint ways to solve the very complex questions of disarmament.

The results of the meeting have been summarized. Its participants, however, are continuing to discuss the problems raised there. We want to end this report with the words of G. Borovik, chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace: "Even during the most pointed discussion we have remained partners. Since contact and exchange of opinion are essential preconditions in the nuclear age."

/9738
CSO: 5200/1550
MOSCOW TALK SHOW: INF IN ASIA, ABM, WEST EUROPE OPINION

LD201415 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 19 Jun 87

["Top Priority" program, presented by Pavel Kuznetsov, with Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov, "of Moscow's United States of America and Canada Institute"]

[Text] How do you do ladies and gentlemen, welcome to "Top Priority." I'm Pavel Kuznetsov your host, and with me in the studio are our guests professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov, both of Moscow's United States and Canada Studies Institute. The topic for today's discussion is this: Recently President Reagan has proposed a global ban on the elimination of medium and shorter-range missiles. Well, as far back as in January last year, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev put forward a three-stage plan for a nuclear free world by the year 2000. So with us the elimination of shorter range missiles and medium-range missiles, any kind of missiles, is more than fine. But nevertheless, President Reagan's plan has come under criticism, so in this connection I would like one of you to explain our position on this issue, in the first place, and also to explain the nature of our objections to the Americans plan. Who'd like to begin? Professor Plekhanov?

[Plekhanov] Well you see, the idea that all missiles of a given class should be eliminated is of course a fine thing, and the problem is how do you reach that goal? At the present time there is a consensus between the United States and the Soviet Union on most of the elements of a plan for eliminating all the medium-range missiles and tactical missiles....

[Kutnesov] ... Shorter range, shorter range.

[Plekhanov] Shorter range, yes, tactical missiles belonging to the United States and the Soviet Union, and stationed in Europe. Now it was not an easy task to reach that model of agreement which we now have, I mean there are still questions to be finalized there, but the basics have been agreed upon. And the problem of the missiles, medium-range missiles, which do exist in the territory of the Soviet Union in the Asian part, that problem was sort of put off until the next stage in negotiations. We are prepared to negotiate on the elimination of those missiles.

[Kuznetsov] What about the Asian part? What kind of missiles are to be kept there? I understand that 100 warheads on each side...
[Plekanov] Yes, 100 warheads on each side, and since the SS-20 missiles are [pause] each of them has three warheads, that means about 33 missiles with 3 warheads each. Now of course, that's peanuts, of course that's peanuts, that is it's largely symbolic. You see there is a problem. The United States has very substantial nuclear potential in the Far East.

[Bogdanov] And in the (immediacy) and in the Pacific.

[Kuznetsov] Like what?

[Plekanov] In the Soviet Far East. Well they have, they have nuclear...

[Kuznetsov] Aircraft carriers, their task forces or what?

[Plekanov] They have a lot of nuclear-capable and nuclear-armed aircraft, fighter bombers, stationed in Japan, in South Korea, in the Philippines, and of course, Hawaii. The United States has a whole network of military bases there. And of course, that's a substantial capacity, nuclear capacity, which the United States may use against the Soviet Union.

[Kuznetsov] What you're driving at is that those Soviet missiles in Asia are counterweight to all those weapons. (Is that so?)

[Plekanov] In a way, in a way I think it is. But you see, the problem of counting each warhead and the capabilities of each warhead, I think is not as important as the symbolic idea of a counterweight between the nuclear potentials of the two sides.

[Kuznetsov] One more question. A technical question - if you don't mind. I understand that no medium-range missile, American missile, can reach Soviet territory from the Philippines or South Korea. What's the worry then? What's our concern then?

[Plekanov] Well, you know, it's not a question of missiles, it's a question of nuclear-armed bombers which can reach the territory of the Soviet Union, obviously, and quite easily.

[Bogdanov] But you know, Pavel, let me comment a little bit on that. I belong, as you know, I belong to the rather pessimistic crowd of people, and I believe if you have military bases, you know, then I don't claim that I know something, that I have hard facts, but still I know one thing: If you have military bases you can hide on those military bases everything, including INF and something else. And of course as, you know, as a country which has to defend itself, and I mean our country, is counterweighing, it has to have a counterweighing, you know, capabilities of course we have to keep in mind always the worst case possibility. [as heard] That on those bases in Philippines and in South Korea, the American side might have something that we [pauses] we just don't know, we just don't know.

[Plekanov] Yes, I agree with you, but as far as I understand a strong naval presence, wherever it may be, is a threat, for example, because many naval vessels are equipped with sea-borne cruise missiles, nuclear...

[Kuznetsov] That's right.
[Bogdanov] That's right, which are exactly the type which the United States has agreed to [word indistinct].

[Kuznetsov] So let's go back to this global plan. I understand that the U.S. plan expressed and put forward by President Reagan does not include certain elements of the American nuclear potential in that plan. Is that so?

[Bogdanov] Oh yes, that's why we have some, you know, doubts about that plan. It is not, it is rather American-oriented, in American favor oriented plan, than a fair deal. That's what worries us, you know.

[Plekhanov] By the way, there's one thing that our listeners should keep in mind. According to the current principles of agreement which we have with the United States, the United States has a right to retain 100 nuclear warheads, medium-range warheads, on its own territory. So it's not just, it's not just, the Soviets that will have those missiles.

[Kuznetsov] Okay, in Reykjavik, the American President agreed with our idea to eliminate strategic offensive arms in 10 years, am I correct?

[Bogdanov] Yes, you are.

[Kuznetsov] So. But later on, he backed off from what he had himself endorsed. So I understand that this inconsistency has become, well, a pretty consistent part of American foreign policy. And perhaps this is one of the reasons that American, certain American plans dealing with arms control are treated with a grain of salt. You agree with that assessment?

[Plekhanov] I think one of the reasons with there is a distrust for the United States in many parts of the world today, and that's a clear tendency: A recent USIA poll has found out that among the Europeans people who think that the Soviet Union or the Soviet leaders are doing the most to strengthen peace outnumber those who think that it's the American side that's doing the most by four to one, and that was a startling revelation. And of course there is a great deal of concern in the administration about that tipping of the balance, of the moral high ground, in favor of the Soviet side. But I think that's a very logical result of what people have been seeing coming from Washington. I think one problem is that there are doubts about the sincerity of the commitment of the current administration in Washington to the ideas of nuclear disarmament. They have been very consistent, I think, in increasing the tempo of the arms race and bringing new types of weapons into...

[Bogdanov interrupts] Sergey, I'm very sorry interrupting you, but I believe you are too benign to this administration when you say there are doubts about their, you know, (commitment) and sincerity in dealing with nuclear arms. They declare it openly that they are for the conservation of nuclear weapons. There is no question of [change in thought] It's a settled question for this administration, but you know, my theory is that all that, what we witness with this administration, this inconsistency, because it's a very weak administration, I'm sorry to say that. And I mean by weak administration a lot of factions, or some factions within the administration fighting with each other, and the man on the top who doesn't want to take sides, you know.

[Kuznetsov interrupts] He wants to please all kinds of audiences. He wants to please.
[Bogdanov interrupts] He wants to please all kinds of audiences and at our expense. I'm sorry to say that. And we cannot blame our policy on the American domestic, domestic (?)games you know. Of course we have to take into consideration political reality. My worry is that the faction which is very much anti, anti, is antiarms control, is gaining upper hand in this administration.

[Kuznetsov] One of the latest reports from Washington says that President Reagan has ruled out negotiations with the Soviet Union on how to interpret the 1972 ABM Treaty limiting antiballistic missile defenses, and the idea to get together experts to convene a meeting between experts from both sides was advanced by the Soviet Union during a recent trip to Moscow by Secretary of State George Shultz. This report from Washington DC shows clearly that this administration has taken a very consistent line with regard to the ABM Treaty: It must go.

[Bogdanov] I fully agree with your assessment, and let's look at that, you know, statement from another angle. It means that the American side has a very weak point, you know, about (?ABM). That's why they're just afraid to meet experts because they're afraid that when they meet the case, their case is so weak that they'll be destroyed within maybe the [word indistinct].

[Kuznetsov] Yes, yes, absolutely right, because this is one of the areas of concern to the Reagan administration...

[Bogdanov] Yes, yes, yes. And (?there) you have another, you know, proof of the, proof of the public opinion, that that is a very wrong and a very weak case. In this administration it just (?began like) that. And what they are doing, their main, you know, task, to try to carry on that wrong thing, you know, until the next administration comes and to oblige the next administration to carry on their policy by any means. That's my belief. What do you think Sergey, I'm right?

[Plekhanov] Yes, I think that the administration has a legal problem with the SDI. The legal problem is that the United States did sign in 1972 the Antiballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union, which means very clearly that programs like the one designed by the Reagan administration should not be pursued. It's against the treaty. Now, breaking a treaty is not a nice thing, and of course it's not a popular thing, especially since we're talking about this treaty which is the main, which is the cornerstone of the whole structure of arms control. The Reagan Administration has destroyed a lot of the elements of the arms control structure. The administration did try to prove, to make a legal case that the ABM Treaty creates no problems for the SDI, that the United States can pursue the SDI within the framework of the ABM Treaty. But that idea was very thoroughly discussed and I think the final judgement was passed by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who made a 13-day speech on the subject, going over all the details, all the legal technicalities, in coming to a clear cut conclusion; No, the only interpretation of the ABM Treaty is the one that the United States Government held previously...

[Bogdanov] Yea, and you know, you can imagine now what amount of pressure of antiarms control (?crowd) you have on the President, that the President does these things, you know.

[Kuznetsov] We've already touched on the recent public opinion poll conducted in Western Europe for the United States Information Agency by a number of services, including the Gallup poll, and as we've already said, that by a margin of five-to-one, West Europeans believe that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has done more for arms control than President Reagan.
Well, the USSR, this country, has been so often accused by Washington of violating arms control accords that the absence of trust, the lack of trust has become one of the major snags in arms control talks, and nevertheless, despite the fact that we were the side at which all the accusing fingers were pointed, in that same poll, West Europeans believe that the United States is more likely than the Soviet Union to violate arms pacts. Now what has gone wrong? Is the mass media in the West less effective these days in brainwashing people?

[Bogdanov] It's as simple as that, Pavel. You have an empty table, and you have an American sitting at one end, and you have a Russian sitting at the other end, and you have Europeans, Western Europeans all around the table looking at what they are doing. As to the Soviet end, you have plenty of food at this end, I mean plenty of proposals, and very juicy, if you like, proposals, very concrete proposals, and you have such verification proposals that convince everybody that the American accusations were false about the Soviet violations of the treaty made just for the sake of their own domestic, you know, gains.

Now they look at the American end, and they are trying to find out what is on the (plate or) what is on the American plate. And they see just zero. It's an empty plate.

[Kuznetsov] Or only some gravy. [laughter]

[Bogdanov] I believe that a reasonable commonsense people, judging by the objective facts not by emotion, they, of course, they say look at those Russian guys, they are doing something, and look at those American guys, they are just shouting, but doing nothing. This administration doesn't care about public opinion in Western Europe, they care only about their own (bit). That's one of the main reasons, they don't take into consideration, they snap their fingers (really) at what is going on in Western Europe, and they have to pay for that one way or the other.

[Kuznetsov] Our foreign policy has been always based on that famous dictum by the father of our state, Vlamimir Lenin, that disarmament is the ideal of socialism. Nevertheless, we have, we have never been nearly as effective in reaching millions of people as we are now. Have we learned the necessary tricks of (or) perhaps the [word indistinct] of effective public relations?

[Plekhavanov] I would say that (in fact) there are several things. One reason is that it is a cumulative effect of decades of our proposals, of our work in the area of disarmament. There have been ups and downs, disappointments, movements forward and backward, but the general process of educating the public has been, I think, effective. And secondly, I think this climate of greater openness, honestly tackling the problems, admitting our own faults, I think is having an effect too. Truth is the best public relations.

[Kuznetsov] The restructuring of foreign policy, in a sense, which has become more flexible.

[Plekhavanov] That's right, that's right. We have more confidence in our position and we are more flexible in preparing to meet the ideas of the other side.

[Kuznetsov] Thank you very much for taking part in this program. That was "Top Priority." I'm Pavel Kuznetsov, your host, signing off till next week at the same time. Goodbye.
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S VORONTSOV MEET WITH KAMPelman, GLITMAN, LEHMAN

LD231216 Moscow TASS in English 1213 GMT 23 Jun 87

[Text] Geneva June 23 TASS -- In recent days Yuliy Vorontsov, the leader of the USSR delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms, first deputy minister of foreign affairs, has had a number of meetings with Max Kampelman, the leader of the U.S. delegation, counsellor of the U.S. Department of State, as well as with Ambassador Maynard Glitman and Ambassador Ronald Lehman, U.S. representatives in the groups on medium-range missiles and on strategic offensive arms.

Headway in coordinating the provisions of a draft text of a treaty on medium-range missiles was pointed out during the meetings.

At the same time the Soviet side specially emphasised that the desire of the U.S. side to keep its nuclear warheads for Pershing-IA missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany directly contradicted with the U.S. consent to full elimination of the Soviet and U.S. shorter-range missiles in Europe.

Such an approach by the United States is obviously aimed at gaining a unilateral advantage. Therefore, it cannot serve as a basis for a mutually acceptable accord and should be reconsidered.

The Soviet side again pointed out the need to reach agreement on measures to consolidate the regime of the ABM Treaty and to prevent an arms race in outer space, which would open up a prospect for a solution to the major issue of 50-percent cutbacks in strategic offensive arms of the sides on the basis of the mutual understanding reached at the summit in Reykjavik.

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CSO: 5200/1550
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS BRIEFING 24 JUNE

FRG Pershings

LD241151 Moscow TASS in English 1137 GMT 24 Jun 87

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Moscow June 24 TASS — Under the disguise of the existing forms of cooperation with allies, the United States is seeking to reserve the opportunity to circumvent the would-be agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

The U.S. wanted to take out from the agreement 72 American warheads for West German Pershing-I/A missiles without admitting that the USSR even had the right to measures in compensation.

It was also claimed, said the Soviet spokesman, that the Soviet delegation raised the issue of warheads for the Pershing-I/A's only lately.

"The question has long been raised within the overall context of the agreement. It is simply now, when the elaboration of the treaty entered the practical plane, that the U.S. grasped at the West German Pershings as a new opportunity to fix special terms of itself.

From the viewpoint of common sense, the total elimination of Soviet and American medium-range forces and shorter-range missiles implied inadmissibility of leaving any warheads for medium- or shorter-range missiles in Europe. Any other approach would be illogical and dangerous.

Space Research Pact Discussed

LD241110 Moscow TASS in English 1101 GMT 24 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 24 TASS — Agreement on the list of devices banned for deployment in outer space would meet the interests of both the USSR and the United States, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.
"This would delineate the boundary between permitted and outlawed activities in outer space," he said. "Naturally, the provisions of the ABM Treaty would remain unchanged, and the sides, as agreed upon Reykjavik, would pledge not to break out of it for ten years.

The pragmatic decision we offer would create an atmosphere of stability necessary for implementing deep cuts in strategic arms."

"The decision would ensure, on the one hand, the preservation of the ABM Treaty and would make it possible, on the other hand, to conduct research and experiments which would not violate the treaty," Gerasimov said.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said the American side adhered to a destructive stance on questions of outer space.

"The U.S. is arbitrarily replacing the Reykjavik agreement on the 10-year period of compliance with the ABM Treaty with a provision enabling it to conduct unrestrained work on developing a large-scale ABM system for seven years and start its deployment after 1994.

Something quite different is being offered as an alternative to preserving the ABM Treaty and strengthening strategic stability." In order to advance the Geneva talks, Gerasimov said, the U.S. should correct its non-constructive stand.

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CSO: 5200/1550
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

USSR'S VORONTSOV MEETS U.S. SENATORS--Geneva, 22 Jun (TASS)--A meeting was held here today between the head of the Soviet delegation to the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space armaments, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Yuliy Vorontsov and a group of American senators led by Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Claiborne Pell. The Soviet side elucidated the USSR's stand on questions of curbing the nuclear arms race and underlined the need of the first real step in this direction, namely the undelayed conclusion of a treaty on medium-range missiles. Also underlined was the importance of solving the question of consolidating the ABM treaty regime, preventing the arms race from spreading to outer space, without which radical reductions of strategic offensive armaments of the sides are impossible. Answers were given to senators' numerous questions in connection with the current Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space armaments. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1853 GMT 22 Jun 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1550
SOVIET MEDIA FOCUS ON ISSUE OF FRG PERSHING 1-AS

PRAVDA Commentary.

PM151101 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jun 87 Second Edition p 6

[Yevgeniy Grigoryev article under the rubric "Political Diary": "Honest Reckoning"]

[Text] Eight months lie between the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, at which a
principled accord was reached on eliminating medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe,
and the recently concluded session of the North Atlantic Alliance Council at Reykjavik,
at which its members finally agreed on the stance to be taken on this highly topical
problem. Eight months! If it had not been for the world public's virtually unanimous
"for," the North Atlantic snail would have crawled even more slowly, as had been the
case in the majority of other disarmament issues. But better late than never.

Judging by the NATO communique, the Atlantic allies, including Bonn, which dodged the
issue until the very end, are now generally and on the whole in agreement with the
"double zero option," the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles
in the European zone and the same fate for operational and tactical missiles. Western
commentators optimistically interpret this as the West European allies giving the White
House the "green light" for the finish in Geneva.

Well, thanks to the Soviet proposals, the prospect of reaching an agreement on
medium-range missiles is now tangible. One would like to think common sense will make
it possible to make this prospect reality. Common sense is greatly needed, because even with the "green light" a number of conditions are clearly apparent in the NATO
position. In addition, every one of these conditions could easily be turned into a
stumbling block if so desired. Let us quote France's LE MATIN as evidence: "The West
Europeans have said 'yes' to the so-called 'double zero option.' However, one cannot
fail to notice the numerous nuances and provisions accompanying this decision. They
could complicate talks on a final agreement in many ways."

Take, for example, the question of the 72 Pershing-1A missiles at the disposal of the
West German Bundeswehr. The U.S. Army in the FRG is keeping the same number of nuclear
warheads for these missiles "under lock and key." These missiles fall into the
operational and tactical class. They have a range of 750 km. But, as Federal
Chancellor H. Kohl said in the Bundestag, "these 72 German Pershing-1A missiles and
their U.S. warheads cannot be incorporated in the U.S.-Soviet 'zero option.' These
missiles have never been under discussion." The U.S. President's national security
adviser, F. Carlucci, said recently that these missiles "must not be part of the
negotiating process."
Why does Bonn need these 72 missiles and, the main question, the nuclear charges for them? It is sometimes said this is the "bone" which the chancellor has allegedly been forced to throw to the "steel helmet" (the militarist Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union faction) for domestic policy reasons. But can the "pacification" of the far right in any NATO country at the expense of European security be tolerated? Can it be allowed to objectively become a demand for unilateral military advantages, moreover in the nuclear sphere? It appears that while officially renouncing nuclear weapons, Bonn actually wants to be a "near-nuclear power" with its finger on the button of nuclear missiles.

The Pentagon would willingly take refuge in the Bonn formula. In this case, after the removal of Soviet operational and tactical missiles, with the technical complicity of the Bundeswehr the Americans would be virtually the sole "users" of this class of nuclear missiles in Europe (France and Britain have no operational and tactical missiles).

The concern felt by Poland, discussed recently in Warsaw, is understandable. Everywhere in Europe, in fact, including the FRG, people cannot understand or accept NATO's artificial stratagems surrounding the Pershing-IIA missiles.

Only one thing is true in Western statements on this issue: The Bundeswehr missiles have indeed never been and are not the subject of the USSR-U.S. Geneva talks. They deal with the question of eliminating medium-range missiles, operational and tactical missiles, and the corresponding nuclear warheads of these two powers alone. No one is taking these treasured Pershing-IIA missiles away from Bonn's generals. Let them get on with it, although this is a dangerous "game" for the world.

The U.S. nuclear warheads under discussion are another matter entirely. Legally and in practice these 72 charges are U.S. property, U.S. weapons. If we are going to calculate when eliminating medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in the European zone we must calculate honestly, which means including and destroying all the relevant Soviet and U.S. missiles and charges. Any other logic is inappropriate here.

TASS Commentary

LD181409 Moscow TASS in English 1339 GMT 18 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 18 TASS — By Vladimir Bogachev, TASS military writer:

The dialogue between Moscow and the capitals of NATO countries on the issue of West German Pershing-IIA missiles and U.S. nuclear warheads for them has lately become very strange in character.

Speaking at a regular news conference in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov explained in detail that at the Geneva talks the Soviet Union did not insist on the dismantling of West German shorter-range missiles and that the Soviet draft treaty on the medium-range and shorter-range missiles provided only for the elimination of U.S. nuclear warheads for those Pershing-IIA's.

However, in these reports about the Moscow news conference Western mass media alleged that the Soviet Union had demanded the elimination of West German Pershing-IIA missiles.
Speaking in an interview to the newspaper BILD, Friedhelm Ost, a spokesman for the West German Government has continued to engage in polemics, arguing in favor of the preservation of the West German Pershings, although there was nobody to argue with.

The newspaper PRAVDA reaffirmed yet another time that the Bundeswehr's missiles were not among the subjects discussed at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. PRAVDA said that the case in point at the talks was the elimination of the medium-range and shorter-range missiles and the corresponding nuclear warheads belonging only to those two powers.

Nonetheless, President Ronald Reagan told the West German newspaper DIE WELT that in the past the Soviet Union had not insisted on the elimination of West German missiles but that its position allegedly changed by now.

Trying to force the open door, the U.S. President declared that the United States was not going to negotiate with the Soviet Union weapon systems belonging to "third countries".

Evidently the matter is not that NATO leaders are "deaf" and not that inaccurate information has arrived in Washington from the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks. No one is threatening the Bundeswehr's missiles and Washington knows that perfectly well. The matter is that the White House is now trying to cause confusion on the issue of who owns the warheads for shorter-range missiles in a bid to "save" them from destruction after the agreement, now in the making, is concluded.

Today Washington is putting the label "third countries" on its nuclear warheads. Who knows, maybe tomorrow the White House will go even further and openly proclaim them to be "part of independent deterrence forces of the Federal Republic of Germany"?

Kampelman Statement Criticized

LD231646 Moscow TASS in English 1520 GMT 23 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 23 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

Max Kampelman, the head of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms, said that the Soviet side was allegedly hindering progress in working out an agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles, by raising the issue concerning nuclear warheads for West German Pershing-1A missiles.

That statement as well as the U.S. stand at the Geneva talks prompt the question: Does Washington really want to conclude an agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles?

For it is actually the American side which has created obstacles holding back progress. A big number of elements in the U.S. position cannot be accepted by the Soviet side because of their discriminatory and unilateral character. Moreover, some of them -- let's put it straight -- do not make sense. For instance, it is simultaneously proposed to eliminate shorter-range missiles completely and at the same time the proposal still stands which allows the re-fitting of Pershing-2's into shorter-range missiles.
If the American scenario is followed, the Soviet Union is to destroy physically its SS-20, SS-4, SS-12, and SS-23 missiles. But what will the American side destroy? Washington's answer is simple -- nothing! Everything is to be re-fitted on the American side (Pershing-2's) or redeployed (cruise missiles -- from land installations to combat ships).

Furthermore, the United States refuses to take part simultaneously with the Soviet Union in the process of abolishing medium-range missiles from the very outset, trying to postpone the commencement of that process by the U.S. till a much later date.

U.S. claims to the deployment of its remaining medium-range missiles (100 warheads) in Alaska, that is within reach of Soviet territory, cannot be considered as something promoting the reduction of the level of military confrontation.

As to the issue related to U.S. warheads for West German Pershing A-1's, all statements of the American side that armaments of third countries are not discussed at the Geneva talks are irrelevant as far as that problem is concerned. The Soviet Union is not raising the question of missiles and launchers belonging to the third country, that is, the Federal Republic of Germany. The case in point is warheads belonging to the United States. But if one follows Mr Kampelman's "logic" it appears that the warheads, too, belong to Bonn.

But if it is so, a really serious problem arises -- the problem of breach by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. For under Article 1 of the said treaty the United States undertook not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over them to any country either directly or indirectly, while under Article 2 of that same treaty the F.R.G. undertook not to accept from anyone nuclear weapons either directly or indirectly.

If both countries are observing the treaty the United States still remains the owner of the warheads for the West German Pershing-1A missiles and, consequently, it is absurd to consider them to be armaments belonging to "third countries." Hence, the legitimate nature of the demand for the destruction of those warheads in case of the complete elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles from the European continent.

So, it is plain that progress in actual fact depends on the United States. So far Washington has been saying a lot of lofty-sounding words and making few steps to walk its half of the way -- steps that would respond adequately to the constructive Soviet proposals.

However, no words or assurances can substitute for practical actions. It is high time Washington rectified its deficit of realistic politics. The Soviet Union is of the opinion that if the negative elements listed above are removed from the U.S. position then there will appear every possibility for having a coordinated draft treaty on medium-range and shorter-range missiles by the autumn of the current year.

Such a draft could become a subject of discussion and then be signed at the next Soviet-American summit meeting.
Kohl 'Determined' To Brake Accord

LD241745 Moscow TASS in English 1524 GMT 24 Jun 87

[Text] Bonn June 24 TASS — Bonn is determined to continue acting as a brake preventing an agreement to eliminate medium-range and shorter-range missiles from Europe, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has made clear in his remarks at the CDU-CSU fraction in the Bundestag.

He insisted that the agreement should not cover American nuclear warheads for the Bundeswehr-controlled Pershing-1A shorter-range missiles.

He argued that they fell into the "weapons of third countries" category which did not belong to the subject of Soviet-American talks in Geneva.

This logic, which is at least strange, does not stand criticism. The subject of the Geneva negotiations encompasses all American nuclear weapons in Europe, including, of course, nuclear warheads.

In keeping with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty, the United States is bound not to transfer nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices to anybody, either directly or indirectly.

And in keeping with Article 2 of the same treaty, Bonn is bound not to accept nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices from anybody, either directly or indirectly.

The nuclear warheads for Pershing-1A missiles thus can by no means be described as "weapons of third countries". They are American nuclear weapons which will be subject to destruction if a U.S.-Soviet agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles is signed.

Bonn's striving to preserve these warheads is neither more nor less than an attempt to circumvent the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and find a way for the Bundeswehr to come in possession of such weapons.

Besides, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is keen to satisfy the growing appetite of West German military-industrial concerns hoping to win multibillion-deutschmark contracts to produce a new generation of shorter-range missiles, Pershing-1B's, to replace Pershing-1A systems.

/9738
C50: 5200/1545
USSR: APN DATA ON FRENCH FORCE DE FRAPPE

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 10 (16), May 87 pp 9-11

[Text] Certain shifts in the disposition of nuclear armaments in Europe would take place this year if the USSR and the United States reached an agreement on eliminating their medium- and, possibly, shorter-range missiles on the continent. France would become the owner of the most destabilizing weapons capable of hitting any targets in Europe and outside it.

The table below gives data on French nuclear weapons and shows the essence of the so-called perimeter defence doctrine. The range of the Hades (to be adopted in 1991) and Pluton shorter-range missiles and the prospective Mirage-2000 and Super Etendard bombers with ASMP guided missiles is 120, 350, and 1,200 km respectively.

DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(Program for 1987 - 1991)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of carriers</th>
<th>Number of warheads on carriers</th>
<th>Year of adoption</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>As of May 1, 1987</th>
<th>End of the Year</th>
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<td>4000</td>
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<td><strong>H - 5</strong></td>
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<td>6400</td>
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<td>1600</td>
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- MISSILES AND PLANES WITH GUIDED MISSILES

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<th>carriers</th>
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<td>350</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td><strong>Tactical aviation</strong></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1200</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td><strong>Super Etendard with ASMP</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
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- MISSILES AND PLANES WITH GUIDED MISSILES

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**NOTE:**

The figures after the dash indicate the number of submarines.
French submarines provided with M-20, M-4, and from 1994, M-5 carriers, whose range is 3,200, 4,000, and 6,000 km respectively, will be able to hit targets in practically any spot of the globe.

(Military Review information)
USSR'S GONTAR ON RATIONALE FOR SS-20'S IN ASIA

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 10 (16), May 87 p 12

[Article by Maj Gen Philipp Gontar, Expert of the USSR Defence Ministry: "Why Does the USSR Leave 100 Warheads on SS-20s in Asia?"]

[Text] All in all there are about 500 American nuclear-capable aircraft in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and on aircraft-carriers of the U.S. Seventh Fleet (84 F-16's and F-4's in South Korea, 32 F-16's in Japan, 48 F-4's on the Philippines, and more than 300 deck assault planes on aircraft-carriers). Their range is up to 1,000 and more kilometres, so they can reach the territory of the USSR, China and other Asian countries. In addition, the United States has about 150 nuclear-capable assault planes which are part of its naval aviation, and more than 250 pieces of nuclear artillery. The U.S. has started to deploy its tactical Lance missiles in South Korea, and is building up the number of longer-range Tomahawk cruise missiles on its surface ships.

The infrastructure of the U.S. armed forces in Asia and the Pacific includes more than 350 military installations, among them 80 major bases for air force, naval and ground troops. Thousands of American nuclear charges are stored at 11 stationary depots of nuclear weapons in South Korea, Japan, on the Philippines, and on Guam.

All these American nuclear weapons are permanently trained on the Soviet Far East and other Asian countries. This is the main reason which compels the USSR to preserve its nuclear missiles in its eastern regions.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly stressed that it seeks the elimination of medium-range missiles on a global scale, and is ready to discuss the elimination of Soviet and American short-range systems in the East, but, of course, only if the threat from the counterpart American weapons is removed.

/9274
CSO: 1812/233
USSR'S NAZARKIN ON ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE

Moscow MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 11 (17), May 87 pp 1-3

[Article by Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin: "Elimination of Chemical Weapons in Europe -- The Time for Responsible Decisions"]

[Text] Complete prohibition and destruction of chemical arms is now being qualified with good reason as one of the most promising avenues of disarmament. By the end of the spring session the Disarmament Conference worked out a draft document in a form in which (provided it is polished and harmonized subsequently) it may be open for signing. Earlier, just individual clauses of the future convention had been formulated.

Without waiting for the polished final document, the Soviet Union has taken a number of practical steps which facilitate the solution of the problem. First, it has discontinued the production of chemical weapons. Secondly, it has started building an enterprise at which chemical weapons stockpiles may be destroyed. In addition to that, it has taken a number of other measures to prepare for the implementation of the proposed convention. Many participants in the Disarmament Conference believe that the work on the convention may be completed within a year.

Needless to say, we do not shut our eyes to the difficulties which are still impeding success. The main one is that the United States, a major participant in the talks, intends to effect chemical rearmament, and is getting ready for large-scale production of binary weapons. France seems to be committed to the same aim. The question is: if the goal is chemical disarmament, what is the point of producing these weapons and building the plants? At any rate, they will have to be destroyed after the signing of the convention. Actions contradicting common sense and one's own statements about the "desirability" of agreement are, naturally, evoking mistrust. I doubt the sincerity of the positions occupied by those states which are producing or getting ready to produce new-generation chemical weapons.

The position of some states which do not have chemical weapons at present, but which have a developed chemical industry is having an adverse impact on the talks. These states do not want the future convention to impose limitations on their commercial chemistry. One can, of course, understand their interest in an unimpeded development of this industry. But what if it is so "unimpeded" as to result in the development of a combat chemical potential? Apparently, one should seek such solutions here which would consider the interests of civilian chemical industries and prevent the development of chemical weapons.
The main outstanding issue at the talks is inspection by challenge. The point is that it may concern very "sensitive" objects and visits by international inspectors to them could prejudice supreme state interests. What could be done in this respect? A useful proposal was made by Britain. Under this proposal, when full-scale access to such objects cannot be granted, the state in question would suggest alternative measures. It could present, for one, corresponding information, allow inspectors to conduct visual observation of the suspected facility from the outside, take samples of the air, discharge waters, etc. The proposed measures should supply objective evidence that the convention is not being violated.

During the spring session of the Disarmament Conference the Soviet Union suggested that inspections by challenge should be effected automatically in two cases—when there are suspicions about the use of chemical arms, or about their presence at declared enterprises and depots. Alternative measures should be used to reveal secret storage or production of chemical arms. It is important that such measures should be carried out in the spirit of goodwill, when both sides are interested in revealing the truth. The British proposal offers a good example of reaching a compromise.

The main condition of inspections by challenge, and of all other measures of verifying compliance with the future convention is complete equality of the contracting parties, and lack of any discrimination. We proceed from the premise that the procedures for making challenges, conducting inspections and assessing their results should place the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and all other participants in the future convention into an equal position, and grant them equal rights and opportunities. Any deviation from this principle would damage the security interests of one side.

The main question arising in this context is linked with the difference in the forms of property between the socialist and capitalist countries. It is my conviction that one and the same regime of limitation and verification should be applied to both private and state-owned enterprises producing equally dangerous chemicals. Private form of ownership should not serve as a pretext for slackening this regime.

It is also important for all participants in the convention to take the necessary measures (in conformity with their obligations) to ensure that the TNC's should not become a channel for circumventing its provisions.

The order for the destruction of chemical arms is still to be harmonized in order to ensure that the security of any side should not be prejudiced in the process. The question of the line-up of the Executive Council and its procedure of work also has to be solved. Legal aspects (such as conditions for the entry of the convention into force, the right to withdraw from it, etc) have not yet been worked out.

At the session of the Conference which opens on June 9 we shall work energetically to remove the problems which impede the signing of the convention.

/9274
CSO: 1312/233
SOVIET CD DELEGATE VIEWS CW CONVENTION PROSPECTS

Newspaper Article

PM171445 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jun 87 p 3

["Topical Interview" with Ambassador Yu.K. Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation to the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva, by A. Novikov: "The Planet Awaits" -- date and place not specified]

[Text] Talks on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons continue at the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva.

The editorial office told me to go and see Yuri Konstantinovich Nazarkin, USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary and head of the Soviet delegation to the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva. He is an exceptionally busy person, so I had to ask for help from someone he has known for a long time, since their time together as students -- KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA observer Aleksandr Yefremov. Yuri Konstantinovich was flying the next morning to Geneva, where the talks on banning chemical weapons were continuing; there were countless things to do, and consequently our conversation was being constantly interrupted by numerous telephone calls. But it did take place and began, so to speak, at the very beginning.

[Nazarkin] One could say that the history of chemical weapons goes back to the birth of Christ, and even earlier than that. Poisoned wells, noxious fumes.... All these have been used from time immemorial -- in the wars in ancient India, in China under the Song dynasty, and so on. Turning to the modern history of chemical weapons, they were first used on 22 April 1915: The Kaiser's troops used chlorine and phosgene against French soldiers on a sector of the front on the Ypres River. The poison affected 15,000 men, 5,000 of them fatally. A total of 1.5 million men were wounded and 100,000 were killed by gas during World War I.

That was when the world first learned of the existence of such terrifying weapons as chemical weapons and, possibly under the effect of this, on 20 July 1925 40 countries signed the Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It was subsequently ratified by a further 90 countries, even though some of them took quite a long time to do it. The United States, for example, ratified that document only 50 years after its adoption.
The Geneva Protocol did, of course, play a useful role: In any event during World War II Hitler simply did not dare use chemical weapons even though he had considerable arsenals of them. But the point is that this document was being measured against the standards and level of knowledge of that time: It did not ban the creation [sozdaniye], stockpiling, and developing [razrabotka] of new types of these weapons, and quite a few of them have appeared since then.

This question had to be solved. So, bilateral talks began in 1976 between the USSR and U.S. delegations to the UN Disarmament Committee. They continued through 1981, at which time they were broken off by the Reagan administration and interrupted for 3 years. Multilateral talks started in 1984 at the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva, and still continue. Their goal is to elaborate a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

[Novikov] What has been achieved so far?

[Nazarkin] It can already be said that the talks on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons are one of the most promising avenues in the disarmament sphere. Some 70-80 percent of the text of the future international convention has already been elaborated, and many formulations have been agreed. Of course, the problems which remain cannot be measured in percentages, but we are striving to find a common denominator to deal with them.

[Novikov] How realistic is the date of 1 October 1987, described by Britain as the date on which the convention could possibly be signed?

[Nazarkin] It was not only the British but we too who named this year as the possible time for the conclusion of the convention.

[Novikov] So, when will it be?

[Nazarkin] If we manage to demolish the obstacles which still exist in the course of this summer's session, then... There is no reason why the convention could not be signed by the end of this year or the beginning of next year.

Generally speaking, these multilateral talks progressed very sluggishly until 1986, and picked up only after M.S. Gorbachev's January statement. At that time we submitted a whole series of major proposals which made it possible to reach accord on systematic international verification of the cessation of the production of chemical weapons and the destruction of the weapons and the production base for their manufacture. A further important step was taken through M.S. Gorbachev's statement, made in Prague this April, that we have ceased the production of chemical weapons and have started building an enterprise where they will be destroyed. It was also announced that the USSR has no chemical weapons outside its own territory.

[Novikov] Are there any factors which cast shadows over the atmosphere at the talks?

[Nazarkin] Yes, and quite important ones at that. I mean primarily the U.S. plans for chemical rearmament and the creation [sozdaniye] of binary weapons. This fall the U.S. Congress will again examine the question of appropriating funds for the large-scale production of such weapons. A strange situation is developing: On the one hand a state participates in talks to ban chemical weapons, and on the other it prepares for their production. U.S. spokesmen say: "As soon as the convention is concluded, we will immediately destroy our binary weapons." But what is the point, one could ask, of wasting vast sums on something which will have to be destroyed in 1 or 2 years' time? This gives rise to doubts: Do the Americans really want to conclude such a convention?
Incidentally, similar doubts exist regarding France, which has also announced its intention to create [sozd] binary weapons. Yet France is also participating in the talks!

[Novikov] At the start of our conversation you said certain problems still must be resolved at the talks. Which of them would you describe as paramount?

[Nazarkin] The verification problem. It is the most complex problem in all disarmament talks, and especially so in chemical disarmament.

After all, identical components could be used for the manufacture of both toxic substances and materials for exclusively peaceful purposes, without which our society's life would be impossible. How is one to monitor the purpose for which they are being created [sozdayutsya]: for war or for peace? For example, organic compounds of phosphorus are toxic substances for the production of nerve gases and, at the same time, the base for plastics and certain types of fertilizers.

One the whole, the verification system will consist of two blocks. First are the so-called conventional international inspections of enterprises and chemical weapons stores whose location must, according to the convention, be notified by states. There is also the second block in this problem: What happens if a country fails to report some of its enterprises and stores, what happens if chemical weapons continue to be either produced or stored in contravention of the convention? How is this to be monitored? This is a very complex aspect of the problem, and it can be solved only with the help of so-called inspections on demand. In other words, if one state becomes suspicious that another state is violating the treaty, it can demand an inspection, and it is incumbent on inspectors to go there as soon as possible to monitor any location and any enterprise in the state under suspicion.

But this also contains an objective complication. Every state has locations conventionally described as "sensitive," where foreigners cannot gain access. These may be military enterprises, installations, or command centers, and they are not all necessarily involved with chemical weapons. But theoretically they could be the objects of a demand.

[Novikov] In other words, there is a chance that "inspection on demand" could be used as a cover for espionage, simply for the purpose of finding out "what is hidden behind the fence."

[Nazarkin] In principle, yes. But generally speaking, this is based on reciprocity: After all, if they request that inspectors be sent to, for argument's sake, our General Staff, we could send an inspection team to the Pentagon.

[Novikov] But even so, what is the Soviet Union's stance on "inspections on demand"?

[Nazarkin] From our viewpoint, the British put forward a useful idea by suggesting that, in the event of inspectors' encountering difficulties in gaining direct access to an installation, some alternative measures should be sought to prove a state's innocence. These could include external inspection of the installation to detect any ventilation systems necessary for the production of chemical weapons, the collection of atmospheric and effluent water samples, and so on. Regarding "non-refusible" inspections, we have already declared that we are prepared for them only if genuine suspicions exist that chemical weapons have been used and if installations notified by us are involved.
The production of chemical weapons ceased in 1969 on orders from President Nixon and has not resumed. The Americans play this trump card at every step: in talks, at news conferences, in articles.... It must be said that this impresses uninformed people. Could you comment on this?

It is obvious that they stockpiled toxic substances in such bulk that they have enough of them.

Later they started developing binary weapons, so there was no point in resuming the manufacture of obsolete arms, especially since these old-fashioned single-component weapons are difficult to store owing to the danger of leaks, accidents, and so on. But in any case, the United States did not cease the production of chemical weapons at that time for the sake of getting rid of them. It was, actually, in 1969 that the socialist countries submitted at the United Nations a draft convention on banning the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on their destruction. Bacteriological weapons were indeed banned, but the Americans were unwilling to even discuss chemical weapons. In contrast, the Soviet Union has now renounced the production of chemical weapons precisely for the purpose of creating all the conditions for the conclusion of a convention to ban them.

Has the Soviet Union already notified the location of our enterprises where toxic substances were being produced and the stores where they are kept?

Such notification has to be made only after the convention comes into force, and we will certainly do so as soon as that happens.

How many countries are there now with arsenals of chemical weapons?

Only the United States and the USSR have officially admitted the existence of such weapons. Various signs indicate, however, that there are between 9 and 15 such countries. The figure 20 was also mentioned recently.

My conversation with Yuriy Konstantinovich was interrupted by yet another telephone call. The conversation came to an end. Of course, numerous questions remained and I would have liked to have them all answered — after all, we were talking literally about life and death. But time was short. Never mind, let us hope that Geneva will soon answer all these questions unambiguously and concisely by releasing people forever from the fear of chemical weapons, those most abominable inventions of the human mind.
Radio Commentary

LD231249 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 23 Jun 87

[Program entitled: "Geneva: The Disarmament Talks; The Problem of Eliminating Chemical Weapons" with Yuriy Konstantinovich Nazarkin, head of the USSR delegation in Geneva]

[Text] The total banning and elimination of chemical weapons is now quite justifiably seen as one of the most promising directions in the area of disarmament. Many years of effort, which began with the initiative of the socialist states in 1969, have begun to be consolidated in the form of an international convention. The text of this document appeared toward the end of the spring session of the disarmament conference, in a form that is open for signing, with further agreed amendments and refinement, naturally.

Prior to this, there existed only the texts of individual provisions. This has been made possible as a result of a noticeable speeding up in the last year of the pace and effectiveness of talks. May I remind you that on 15 January 1986, the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev noted that the talks on banning chemical weapons had been delayed intolerably, and the task of intensifying them was at the same time posed. During the last year and spring of this year, several series of proposals were put forward by the Soviet side, aimed at clearing the way toward conclusion of a convention. We declared our readiness to announce the location of stockpiles of chemical weapons, on a reciprocal basis, naturally, and the quantity and composition of chemical weapons at each of these stockpiles, and we also offered a whole range of similar measures. Naturally, this readiness of ours should not be understood as agreeing to give up any secrets unilaterally. The exchange of classified information must be carried out on a mutual basis, and the correctness of such information must be checked with the aid of international verification.

Once the convention is concluded, if states exchange information which was previously not made public, then this is done with the aim of promoting the strict checking of observance of the treaty, without compromising the interests of one's own security.

These steps of ours produced a genuine turning point at the talks. As a result, a real possibility for concluding the convention emerged. Meanwhile we take as our premise that it has to be complete this year. Proceeding from the real prospect for the successful conclusion of the talks, the Soviet Union has embarked upon a number of practical steps. Firstly, production of chemical weapons has been stopped in our country. Secondly, construction has begun of an enterprise at which they will be destroyed. Both of these facts were announced by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev during his visit to Czechoslovakia in April this year. Also then, it was announced that the Soviet Union has no chemical weapons beyond its own borders. These steps have shown that we have in essence embarked on the practical preparations to implement the convention, and this in turn has to a large extent fostered the strengthening of a situation of trust at the talks.

In general, I have to say it is hardly possible to assess the prospects for the talks if one restricts oneself just to the context of what goes on at the negotiating table. Factors existing outside the bounds of the Geneva Palace of Nations, where the participants in the talks meet, have a very great effect on them. I have already cited an example of a positive kind. The main negative factor hampering the successful progress of the talks is the fact that one of the main participants, the United States, continues to follow a course toward chemical rearmament, preparing for large-scale
production of binary weapons. This fall, the U.S. Congress will examine the issue of funding for this purpose. France has also stated its intention to build binary weapons. A question emerges: If one is to remain on a platform of speedy chemical disarmament, then why produce this weaponry and build enterprises which will all the same have to be destroyed once the convention is concluded? Common sense provides no reply. Hence there naturally arises a question of trust in the policies of states which are preparing to produce a new generation of chemical weapons, one of doubts about their sincerity at the talks.

The issue of verification of a chemical weapon ban is very complicated, both from the political and the technical points of view. The convention has to guarantee the banning and destruction not only of chemical weapons stockpiles, but also of the production base for creating them. What is this production base? In many cases, it means the same chemical industry that produces substances from which it is possible to manufacture chemical weapons, but at the same time without which modern civilian chemical industry is inconceivable — production of fertilizers, various plastics and so on. Thus, a dual task arises — ensuring verification which would provide complete confidence regarding the observance of a ban on chemical weapons, while on the other hand not hindering the development of the civilian chemical industry.

It has already been agreed in principle at the talks that the verification system has to be made up of two basic parts, the so-called ordinary international verification, and the challenge inspections (proverki po zaprosu).

Ordinary verification is intended for checking of all the chemical weapons stockpiles and enterprises for production of them which will have been declared once the convention comes into force. The system of this ordinary verification has already been agreed upon in general at the talks. But there exists another facet of verification; how can one verify that every signatory state has declared everything that it should, and has not concealed some part of its chemical weapons stockpiles or part of the industrial base for production of them? It is for this that the challenge inspections are intended.

But how are these to be conducted? This is now, in essence, the main question unresolved at the talks. The difficulty here lies in the fact that sites to be inspected on request may be extremely sensitive spots where visits from international inspectors could threaten supreme state interests. Will not the temptation arise to abuse such visits for ends not linked to observation of the convention? What is to be done in such a case?

Great Britain has put forward a useful proposal on this. This stipulates that in those instances where full access proves impossible, the state asked could put forward "alternative measures." These could include presenting relevant information, visual inspection from the outside of suspect sites, air and sewage samples, and so forth. The aim of such measures must be to convince the state that has made the request of there being no violation of the convention. The main condition of the challenge inspection procedure, as indeed of all other elements of verification [kontrol] under the convention, is the complete equality of the states in agreement and the absence of any discrimination.

The main question that arises here is connected with the various forms of ownership which exist on the one hand in the socialist countries, and on the other in the capitalist countries. It stands to reason that the same conditions of restriction and control [kontrol] must be applied to both private and state enterprises producing chemicals of the relevant danger level. The private form of ownership must in no way serve as a basis for being indulgent in relation to these conditions.
Considerable difficulties arise in connection with the multinational corporations. With their branches in the territories of the developing states they act sometimes as a state within a state. It is therefore important that all parties to the convention, adopt the necessary measures in accordance with their obligations for the multinational corporations not to become a channel for circumventing its articles.

Several other questions also await attention. It is essential to agree upon the procedure for abolishing chemical weapons so that the security of the sides is not violated at any stage. Each participant in the convention which possesses chemical weapons must abolish its stocks, in our opinion, on an equal percentage basis. At each stage of abolition the correspondence in stocks would thereby be retained as at the moment the convention came into force. I must point out in passing that the entire abolition process is intended to be conducted over 10 years. This relatively protracted time span is determined by the fact that from the point of view of technical capacity the destruction of poisonous chemical substances is a matter of extremely high labor intensity.

In addition, the question must be solved of the composition of an executive council and its methods of making decisions.

The legal aspects of the conditions for the convention coming into force and the right to withdraw from it have not yet been worked out. At the same time it is possible to state that favorable conditions have been forced for rapidly working out an international convention on a comprehensive and complete ban on chemical weapons. This is an historic chance.

What would the conclusion of a convention on banning chemical weapons give humanity? First of all, we would be rid of one of the forms of weapons of mass destruction whose use would cause immense human casualties, not only moreover among those directly involved in military action but among the civilian population. Even the storage of chemical weapons is a danger in itself. True, since 1925 the Geneva protocol has been in force banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. A full guarantee of nonuse, however, can only be provided by abolition of the weapons. The use of chemical weapons during the First World War demonstrated its great danger. These weapons have now so increased their strike potential that the chemical, along with the nuclear, threat has, to put it simply, acquired ominous features. It is well known that the basis of the chemical arsenals in the United States are the so-called nerve bases. Acting on the whole nervous system they instantly affect the muscles and lead to immediate death by paralysis of the respiratory organs. The binary weapons being prepared for production are based on this same effect. The convention would also have a wider significance once it had excluded such a terrible type of weapon from our lives. It would demonstrate the possibility of reaching accords in the disarmament sphere and become a political fact improving the international atmosphere and facilitating attaining other accords in the disarmament sphere as well.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1547
USSR: CHANCES FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS LIMITATION IN EUROPE VIEWED

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 3 Jun 87 pp 1-2

[Vladimir Katin article under the rubric "Personal View of a NOVOSTI Analyst": "Conventional Armaments in Europe Coming Next?"]

[Text] There is finally some light of hope at the end of the tunnel of long waiting, probing and negotiating concerning the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. So, let us knock on wood and hope that it will happen soon.

The next logical step should be the reduction of conventional arms and troops on the continent. And, if the job is to reduce tension and bring down the level of war danger, it should proceed in all directions. Besides, that approach is prompted by life itself as a must which is acknowledged today both in the East of Europe and in the West. The NATO countries have repeatedly spoken of a troops imbalance supposedly in favor of the Warsaw Pact nations. For their own part, the Warsaw Pact leaders have stated their preparedness to sort that question out and to balance out the armed forces of the two alliances at the lowest possible level.

So, there is every indication that this problem needs to be seriously tackled next, all the more so since that will be done not on an empty spot but on the firm basis of the existing Warsaw Pact proposals. A year ago the Warsaw Pact countries suggested reducing the troops and conventional armaments in Europe by 25 percent. That should best be achieved by the early 90s, to be followed by more substantial reductions.

As I see it, however, there is the danger of a repetition in this case, too, of the sad situation which has developed at the Vienna talks on troops and arms reductions in Central Europe, which have been going on for 14 years now. Real negotiating there has got drowned in endless figures, calculations and their different interpretations. To prevent that, a more effective negotiating mechanism and a more constructive approach to the negotiations themselves are needed.

The best forum for discussing these issues would be the second stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. There can also be other variants, of course, including the convocation of a special conference on that subject.
As for the negotiating procedure, it would be fine if the sides agreed on a unified principled approach. If say, one of the sides has more weapons of a particular category, it should reduce them, just as the other side should reduce the weapons in which it holds the lead.

The Warsaw Pact is being accused of having more tanks than the Western alliance. I think that if the talks prove really constructive, that problem will be easily resolved. After all, as it was stated a few days ago in Berlin, the Warsaw Pact countries are seeking reduced levels in all arms categories. Besides, it is known that NATO has accumulated enough anti-tank systems to destroy all the tanks in the world. That is why, in dealing on the basis of reciprocity with the problem of the asymmetry in those two classes of armaments, NATO should commensurately reduce its antitank forces, thereby balancing them out with the Warsaw Pact's armour strength.

The same principle of equality and reciprocity could help resolve all the other problems associated with conventional armaments. The important thing, though, is that the NATO leaders should show a genuine desire to do so and political will for reducing the level of military confrontation between the two alliances. That is the crux of the matter and, indeed the main stumbling block at the moment.

(APN, June 2. In full.)

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CSO: 5200/1549
USSR: NATO-WARSAW PACT 'UNOFFICIAL CONSULTATIONS' 22 JUNE

Kashlev Submits Working Document

LD221305 Moscow TASS in English 1303 GMT 22 Jun 87

[Text] Vienna June 22 TASS — Representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries to informal consultations for preparing talks on cuts in armed forces and armaments in Europe from the Atlantic on the Urals held another meeting here today.

Ambassador Yurii Kashlev, leader of the Soviet delegation, tabled a working document on behalf of the allied socialist nations, which defines the key elements of a mandate for the future talks.

It basically reflects the socialist countries' suggested program for bolstering security in Europe through mutual, phased and substantial reductions of armed forces and conventional arms, which has been reaffirmed at a recent meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty members in Berlin.

The proposals of the socialist countries at the Vienna consultations are geared to specific and effective steps to scale down military confrontation considerably and enhance strategic military stability in the continent.

The working document submitted by the socialist countries, the Soviet representative said, offers the basis for proceeding to practical work to draw up the mandate of the future talks.

FRG Delegate Cited

LD222120 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 22 Jun 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Another meeting between representatives of Warsaw Pact and NATO member-states within the unofficial consultations connected with the preparation of negotiations on reducing armed forces and arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals took place today at the USSR Embassy in Vienna:

[V. Mikheyev identified by screen caption] The meeting took place in the room where at one time the negotiations between Soviet and U.S. delegations which led to the signing of an agreement on limiting strategic arms — the so-called SALT II were held:
[Begin recording] [K. Citron, head of the FRG delegation identified by screen caption, speaking in German with superimposed Russian translation] We consider the negotiations between the representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to be of extraordinary importance. This dialogue is leading to an improvement in relations and promoting the attainment of an accord on creating stability in Europe. And this is especially important, equally from the West's and the East's points of view, as it could lead to an agreement within foreseeable future. We are hoping that both sides' proposals will make it possible to reach a solution to the problems. There are still many difficulties along the way but we are hoping to overcome them. [end recording]

[Mikheyev] At today's session the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Kashlev, on behalf of the delegations of all Warsaw Pact member countries presented a working document containing the main elements of the mandate for the future talks. The document's leit motiv is a mutual, significant reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons which would lead to a reduction in the level of mutual confrontation and a strengthening of the military-strategic stability, as well as maintaining the balance of armed forces at the lowest possible level. This fundamental objective was recently reaffirmed at the conference of the Warsaw Pact Standing [as heard] Consultative Committee which took place in Berlin.

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CSO: 5200/1549
USSR: NEWS CONFERENCE ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY DOCTRINE

Broadcast on TV

LD222108 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1845 GMT 22 Jun 87

[News conference by Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs; Colonel General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, chief of a department of the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry; Gennadiy Ivanovich Gerasimov, USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesman; Colonel General Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, head of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces; on 22 June in Moscow presented by correspondent Molchanov; accompanying video shows, from left to right of screen, Karpov, Petrovskiy, Gerasimov, Gareyev, and Chervov on the platform, and close-ups of each as he speaks]

[Text] [Molchanov] In Moscow today, a news conference was held for Soviet and foreign journalists on the theme: The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Organization and its interpretation in international politics. A statement was read out by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy. He said:

[Begin Petrovskiy recording] The new initiative by the socialist countries on the question of military doctrines is restructuring in action, in the most sensitive area of international relations, the area of military security. It is visible proof of the purity of the intentions and plans of the socialist countries. Taking into account the proposals still in force on meetings of commanders in chief of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact, and on contacts between their general secretaries, this initiative expands the perspective of development of dialogue between the military-political alliances with the aim of strengthening trust and reducing the level of military confrontation.

But, dialogue is not a theater for one actor; we again invite NATO to step onto the political stage with constructive thoughts and proposals. Unfortunately, on the part of the West there are more words than concrete countermeasures in response to our initiatives. As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said yesterday, in the West today there is a shortage of realistic policy. Prenuclear thinking is too strong over there in the West, a fascination with the shields and swords of dogma and confrontation. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries — with their new initiative on military doctrines, just as with their other genuinely tangible deeds on all paths of the movement toward a nonnuclear and nonviolent world — are visibly showing that making the political and military behavior of states accord with nuclear and space realities is entirely possible and realistic if there is a sincere aspiration for this, and if people operate with a recognition of responsibility for the fate of their own people and for mankind's survival. [end recording]
What is the main characteristic of the Warsaw Pact Organization's Military Doctrine? Colonel General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, deputy chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, talked about this at the news conference:

I want to stress that the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact also defines the destination, the direction of the construction and preparation of the Armed Forces, or, in other words, the major tenets of the military-technical aspect of military doctrine. What are its main characteristics? First, taking into account the reality of the nuclear age, for the first time in military history, the main task of the armed forces is to prevent, not to allow war, both nuclear and conventional.

Second, a major characteristic of the Warsaw Pact member states' military doctrine is that it has a profoundly defensive direction. It is reflected in the fact that the socialist states will not start a war under any circumstances — neither nuclear nor conventional — against any state, be it in Europe or in another part of the world if they themselves are not the object of attack. They will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The USSR and the other socialist countries do not have territorial claims on any state either in or outside of Europe. [end recording]

Replying to a question from the correspondent of the Japanese paper ASAHI on practical measures the Warsaw Pact countries are proposing to reduce the level of military confrontation, Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, chief of a department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said:

These initiatives are formed from initiatives both from the line of collective actions of Warsaw Pact members and from individual initiatives by members of the alliance. Briefly, these initiatives cover various directions on nuclear arms, chemical weapons, and conventional arms. As for nuclear weapons, pride of place here goes to the practical, realistic proposal for elimination by the Soviet Union and United States of medium-range missiles in Europe. Apart from this, our proposal is still in force to the United States on halting nuclear weapons testing. The Soviet Union is ready to resume its moratorium, if the United States declares its readiness to halt testing. We also propose concrete talks with the aim of gradually reducing the nuclear quantity and power of nuclear tests and their subsequent complete banning.

On the question of chemical weapons, our delegation at the disarmament conference, and in cooperation with the delegations of the other socialist countries, comes out actively in favor of completing work on preparing a convention on banning chemical weapons and eliminating their supplies. As far as conventional troops and armaments are concerned, a whole series of initiatives in this direction has been formulated by the Warsaw Pact states. First and foremost, there was the appeal of 11 June 1986 in Budapest, which became further developed and consolidated in other proposals by the Warsaw Pact member states. In this context I would like to draw attention to the proposal by the GDR and Czechoslovakia on the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in Europe which was completely and in its entirety supported by the Soviet Union. Guarantees were provided that should such an agreement be concluded, the Soviet Union would withdraw all its nuclear armaments from this zone. Poland's proposal for creating a zone of reduced armaments and enhanced trust in Central Europe is also being further developed. There is also a proposal by Bulgaria and Romania regarding turning the Balkans into a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons, and so on. I have merely given the basic directions along which practical, specific measures are being proposed.
[Gerasimov] The U.S. BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS has counted 25 proposals by us over the past 2 years. In this hall they are asking all the time: What will your next be, the 26th? [end recording]

[Molchanov] THE NEW YORK TIMES put the question: Does the Warsaw Pact intend to take any unilateral steps on reducing conventional armed forces and arms? Colonel General Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov replies.

[Begin Chervov recording] Esteemed, THE NEW YORK TIMES, you are always expecting unilateral steps from the Warsaw Pact. Gennadiy Ivanovich has just said that there have been 25 proposals, and they are waiting for a 26th: Apparently they still can't sort things out.

But what's so complicated, say, about understanding a moratorium on nuclear tests? For 1 and 1/2 years the USSR has maintained a moratorium on nuclear tests. Do you mean to say the Americans can't understand the essence of this initiative? For a whole year the NATO countries have been unable to respond to the Budapest program — a reduction in conventional armed forces and arms in Europe. How can this be a complicated problem? So, obviously, one should approach an appraisal to the Warsaw Pact's proposal in a more serious and balanced way. We have more than once made unilateral concessions. But the NATO countries have merely shoved these unilateral concessions into their pockets and, even for propaganda purposes, turned them on their head. For example, we have withdrawn 20,000 tanks and a large quantity of other equipment from Europe, but Western propaganda has presented matters in such a way...[pauses] Well, this is how they put it: Tanks are loaded at one station and unloaded at another. That is, in fact, they have been suggesting to public opinion that there has been no reduction.

At the present time there is a balance of forces in Europe and an approximate military equilibrium in conventional armaments, despite an asymmetry and imbalance in conventional armaments. That is why a unilateral reduction would damage the security of the Warsaw Pact which, incidentally, would also be of disadvantage to the NATO countries. Therefore, one should not expect unilateral steps on the part of the Warsaw Pact. The NATO countries must themselves take practical steps to meet the Warsaw Pact halfway. [end recording]

[Molchanov] Many of the journalists present at the news conference were interested in the question of how much the probability of achieving an agreement on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles has recently increased.

[Begin recording] [Karpov] Unfortunately, so far the U.S. proposals still contain elements which cannot be accepted by the Soviet side in view of their discriminatory character toward the USSR, these elements which remain in the U.S. position are hampering the achievement of an accord. What I have in mind are even such absurdities in the U.S. position as the putting forward simultaneously of proposals for total elimination of operational and tactical missiles and retaining at the same time, proposals which allow Pershing-2 missiles to be refitted as missiles having a range of 500-1,000 km. That is, absurdities such as this remain in the U.S. position.

[Chervov] As far as the absurdities are concerned, Viktor Pavlovich has hit on just the right term. At the moment the situation is this: According to the U.S. proposal, the Soviet Union is supposed to physically destroy the SS-20, the SS-4, the SS-12 and the SS-23. Ask a U.S. spokesman what the U.S. side will physically destroy, and they won't reply, since everything on the U.S. side is to be refitted, and nothing is to be destroyed. There's an absurdity for you.
[Gerasimov] RUDE PRAVO asks: It is asserted in the West that 40 years of peace are the result of nuclear deterrence opposing the superior military might of the Warsaw Pact. What can you say about that? Who will speak?

[Chervov] I will say a couple of words. Peace in Europe has been maintained for more than 40 years not because of the existence of nuclear weapons, but because there exist the countries of the socialist community, which do not allow the imperialist states to plunge Europe into new wars. It is the mighty military potential, the military-economic potential of the socialist countries that is the obstacle to the unleashing of war in Europe. Our compromise proposals on radical reductions and total elimination of nuclear weapons have one aim: To reduce nuclear confrontation in Europe, to avert a threat of war, and to save mankind from nuclear catastrophe. [end recording]

More on Petrovskiy Remarks

LD221338 Moscow TASS in English 1328 GMT 22 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 22 TASS -- "The survival of mankind and the building of a nuclear-free and ultimately demilitarised world are incompatible with doctrines which associate the future with a military solution to international issues and which rely on the experience of past wars", Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, stated today. He spoke at the ministry's press centre before foreign and Soviet journalists.

Setting out the essence of the document, which was adopted in Berlin recently by the Warsaw Treaty member states and which formulates the fundamental provisions of their military doctrine, he emphasized that it was subordinated to the task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional one.

The participants in the session in Berlin stated that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, that they would not start military operations unless in reply to an attack, and that they lacked a hostile attitude or territorial claims to any member of the international community.

"Security", Vladimir Petrovskiy said, "is not in the pursuit of an elusive spectre of victory in a nuclear war but in the ability to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and to use political means, and not military ones, in international affairs".

"For the first time in history they proclaimed not just a defensive doctrine but the one which is directed against wars and is aimed at consolidating the foundations of security for everyone. Already the very fact of the proclamation of the doctrine is having a salutary effect on the climate and situation in the world".

Another reason why the "Military Doctrine" document, advanced by the Warsaw Treaty member-states, has international significance is because they have approached their Atlantic partners with a proposal for consultations at an authoritative expert level with the participation of military specialists already this year, who will compare the military doctrines of Europe's two military political alliances.

"We are for qualified experts from both sides," the deputy minister continued, "to meet and explain in a fully objective and unbiased way the contents of the military doctrines of both sides, jointly study them and try to reach a consensus. This is most important today. Our proposals on this score have been handed to NATO, but we have not received an answer yet."
The Warsaw Treaty member-states have a right to expect the NATO countries to produce at the consultations evidence backing up statements by their leaders that they would resort to military force only in reply to an aggression. We again invite NATO to come up with constructive ideas and proposals. Unfortunately, there are more words from the West than concrete steps in reaction to our initiatives."

The Soviet Union and socialist countries provide graphic proof with their new initiative on the military doctrine that it is quite possible to bring the political and military conduct of states in line with the nuclear space realities, if there is a sincere striving and awareness of the responsibility for the destinies of their people, for the survival of humanity.

Karpov on U.S. Proposals

LD221525 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1438 GMT 22 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow, 22 Jun (TASS) -- We interpret the proposals put forward by the U.S. side at the Geneva talks as a response to the USSR proposal which was made during U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz' visit to Moscow this April, said Viktor Karpov, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at a news conference here today.

At the same time, the U.S. proposals raise the task of eliminating operational and tactical missiles not only in Europe, but also in Asia, that is on a global basis. This position does not contradict our approach either, V. Karpov pointed out. We also propose that the question of operational and tactical missiles could be resolved, including on a global basis. But for this, just as on questions relating to medium-range missiles in the Asiatic part of the USSR, a number of other factors must be taken into consideration, which the U.S. side has so far failed to take account of; namely the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Asia and the means to deliver them.

Taking these factors into account, we are willing, as we have already repeatedly declared, to tackle the question of medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles on a global basis.

Unfortunately, said the head of the USSR Foreign Ministry department, the U.S. proposals still contain elements that the Soviet side cannot accept because they discriminate against the USSR. We have in mind such absurdities in the U.S. position as the fact that they are simultaneously putting forward a proposal for the total elimination of operational and tactical missiles and retaining the proposal that would allow them to adapt the Pershing-2's into missiles with a range of from 500-1,000 km; and the persistent desire of the United States to deploy 100 warheads on medium-range missiles in Alaska to put them within range of the USSR.
Chervov on Nuclear Deterrence

LD221541 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1455 GMT 22 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow, 22 Jun (TASS) — Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, head of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, has stated that there are no justifications at the present time for the concept of "nuclear deterrence" which relates to the "cold war" period. Speaking at a news conference here today, he noted that this concept is egotistic by its very essence. To some extent it guarantees the safety of the nuclear states. But what is to become of the other countries and regions which do not have nuclear weapons, and which are the absolute majority of states, N. Chervov asked.

The concept of "nuclear deterrence" is in effect the concept from a "position of strength." At the present time, military and strategic parity is a factor in averting war. The arms race, however, makes this parity ever more elevated and ever more unstable, and there may come a moment when parity will no longer serve as a factor in averting war. Therefore, Nikolay Chervov stressed, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states are proposing an alternative to the concept of "nuclear deterrence." This is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Gareyev Outlines Doctrine

LD221357 Moscow TASS in English 1339 GMT 22 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 22 TASS -- "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member countries is a visual reflection of their new thinking on the issues of war in the nuclear age and on the problems of defense and of ensuring both security for each state and equal security for all states," Colonel-General Makhmut Gareyev, a deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, told a news conference here today. He said a new feature of the doctrine was that it represented a system of fundamental views on ways of preventing war, military development, preparing countries and armed forces to repulse aggression and methods of waging armed struggle to protect socialism.

"This doctrine," Gareyev said, "is of purely defensive nature, as reflected in the fact that the socialist countries will under no circumstances start war, nuclear or conventional, against any state, in Europe or elsewhere, if they themselves are not attacked."

"They will never be the first to use nuclear weapons," he added. "The USSR and other socialist countries do not lay territorial claims to any state, either in Europe or elsewhere."

"The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is aimed at achieving an ever lower level of military confrontation of the sides as genuine equal security today is guaranteed not by a high but the lowest possible level of the strategic equilibrium.

"This is its main difference from the military doctrine of NATO, which in actual fact is far from having the defensive nature publicized in the West," Gareyev said.

He cited official documents and statements by leaders of the United States and other NATO countries and also pointed to their actions that do not fit into the frameworks of a defensive doctrine.
"Isn't this why the NATO countries have refused to pledge no-first-use of nuclear weapons and sign a non-aggression pact with the Warsaw Treaty Organization?" Gareyev asked.

"In conditions where the danger of war for socialist countries has not been removed, the Warsaw Treaty member states have to keep such a level as to enable themselves to repel any outside attack against any state participating in the treaty.

"The Armed Forces of the allied countries are maintained in sufficient combat readiness to prevent themselves from being taken unawares, and if they are nonetheless attacked, they will issue a crushing rebuff to the aggressor," Colonel-General Gareyev said.

More on Gareyev

LD221446 Moscow TASS in English 1427 GMT 22 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 22 TASS — Reduction of troops can only be mutual, said deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Colonel-General Makhmut Gareyev at a press conference today. The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member-states, just as the Soviet military doctrine, is the defensive one.

The NATO Armed Forces have big groups of Armed Forces in the European continent and the adjacent water area, said Makhmut Gareyev. For a whole number of means, for instance, tactical and nuclear weapons, strike aviation, anti-tank means NATO has a considerable advantage over the Warsaw Treaty organization. Therefore, if one is to take all-round, but not selective appraisals, the conclusion can be only one — the combat possibilities of the NATO troops are approximately equal to those of the Warsaw Treaty organisation.

But by the reserve components the advantage is on the NATO's side, since the strength of the NATO troops exceeds 50 per cent that of the Warsaw Treaty organisation. NATO has an advantage by the production capacities of the war industry, by a number of specific types of armaments. Therefore the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member-states with relations to the Armed Forces of the North Atlantic Alliance are in a defensive position, and therefore any attack is out of the question, stressed Makhmut Gareyev.

Gerasimov on Pact Document

LD241219 Moscow TASS in English 1203 GMT 24 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 24 TASS — A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman today described the joint working document tabled by the Warsaw Treaty members in Vienna on June 22 as setting forth the basic elements of a mandate for future talks on cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

The spokesman, Gennadiy Gerasimov, said that the allied socialist countries were seeking the agreement of other European nations to the commencement of full-scale negotiations within the framework of the Helsinki process for reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.
The working document, he explained, contained specific formulations covering the purposes and subject area of the talks and stressed that cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments should be carried out as a package with reductions in tactical nuclear systems which, Gerasimov said, were, as a rule, dual-purpose weapons capable of delivering either conventional or nuclear warheads.

The socialist countries, he continued, had expressed readiness in the context of the suggested cuts to start working out priority measures to strengthen the confidence of all European nations that surprise offensive operations would not be mounted against them.

"We shall be seeking at these talks to achieve an arms balance at a lower level by dint of mutual reductions and with account taken of the sides' advantages in these or other weapons.

"We are for removing disparities between the sides, but this should be done through cuts in the arms of the side that has got ahead rather than through an arms buildup by time lagging side.

"We are for effective and stringent arrangements to verify treaty obligations, which should be done both with the help of national technical means and with the help of international procedures, including on-site inspections," the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

TASS Report

PM241427 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jun 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Text] The Warsaw Pact Organization's Military Doctrine and its interpretation in international politics was the subject of a 22 June news conference in Moscow. V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, made a statement to Soviet and foreign journalists. On the initiative of the socialist Warsaw Pact states, he said, the important question of military doctrines has been brought to the forefront of European and international politics. Correctly understanding the nature of military doctrines embodying the aims and intentions of states and military-political alliances in the military sphere is a most important component of international confidence, without which it is impossible to mold a comprehensive system of equal security for all.

The question of military doctrines as an international factor was posed at the 27th CPSU Congress. In the Central Committee Political Report the thrust of Soviet military doctrine was described as unambiguously defensive. At the Political Consultative Committee Conference in Berlin 28-29 May this year the Warsaw Pact states adopted a document formulating the principled provisions of their military doctrine.

The doctrine formulated the essence of the new philosophy of military security in the nuclear and space age. Security does not lie in seeking the evanescent phantom of victory in a nuclear war, but in the ability to avert a nuclear cataclysm and use political rather than military means in international affairs. The innovatory feature of the doctrine is also seen in the fact that, by accepting the achievement of accords on radical reductions in the level of military confrontation as a major way of reliably ensuring security, it reflects interests of a general human nature.
Thus, for the first time in history, a doctrine that is not only defensive but aimed against war and at the consolidation of the foundations of security for all has been proclaimed. The very fact that such a doctrine has been proclaimed has had a healthy impact on the climate and atmosphere in the world. The socialist countries have not simply set forth the fundamental provisions of their military doctrine but have proposed that their Atlantic partners hold consultations this year at an authoritative level with a view to comparing the military doctrines of the two military-political alliances in Europe.

Our proposals on this score have been passed to NATO, but we have received no official response.

The socialist countries' new initiative on the question of military doctrines is restructuring in action in the most sensitive sphere of international relations -- the sphere of military security -- and graphic testimony to the purity of their intentions and plans. [paragraph continues]

Taking account of the proposals, which are still on the table, for meetings between the Warsaw Pact and NATO commanders in chief, as well as for contacts between their general secretaries, this initiative expands the prospects for developing a dialogue between the military-political alliances with a view to strengthening confidence and reducing the level of military confrontation, the USSR deputy foreign minister stressed.

Colonel General M.A. Gareyev, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, delivered a statement at the news conference on the military-technical aspects of the military doctrine.

I want to stress that the Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine also defines the role and direction of the building and training of the armed forces, or, in other words, the most important provisions of the military-technical side of the Military Doctrine, he said.

What are its main features? First, taking account of the realities of the nuclear age, the prevention of war -- both nuclear and conventional -- is set as the armed forces' main task for the first time in military history. Strategy and military doctrine as a whole had never before tackled this question on such a scale and with such clarity. This can be explained by the fact that under present-day conditions the use of military methods to resolve any dispute is impermissible.

The socialist countries' Military Doctrine is aimed at ensuring adequate defense and deterring an aggressor. The Warsaw Pact states have submitted a number of specific nuclear and conventional arms reduction proposals, as well as proposals for the creation of nuclear and chemical weapons-free zones and zones with reduced concentrations of arms, to ensure that neither side has the means or conditions to carry out a surprise attack on the other or to launch offensive operations in general.

Second, a highly important feature is that it is profoundly defensive in nature. This is reflected in the fact that the socialist states will not start a war -- nuclear or conventional -- under any circumstances against any state, be it in Europe or any other part of the world, if they themselves are not attacked. They will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.
The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Organization is aimed at achieving a lower level of military confrontation between the sides on the basis that genuinely equal security in our era is guaranteed by extremely low rather than high levels of strategic balance.

Third, the provisions of the Warsaw Pact Organization Military Doctrine are a compulsory part of the military skills and building of the Soviet Armed Forces and the other allied armies, including questions of defense planning, the training of command and troop organs, and the means of conducting an armed struggle. The main means of action to be used by the Soviet Armed Forces in repulsing aggression will be defensive operations and combat actions.

Thus, the speaker noted, there are no contradictions between the political and military-technical sides of the Warsaw Pact Organization's Military Doctrine, they are a united whole and are consistently defensive in nature both in terms of their goals and in terms of the methods used to handle defense tasks.

Also taking part in the news conference were V.P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Arms Limitation and Disarmament Problems Administration; Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate; and G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration.

Replies were given to journalists' questions.

Question. What dictated the Warsaw Pact states' statement on their military doctrine, and is it linked with the course of expanding openness?

Answer. The proposal to embark on the discussion and comparison of the NATO and Warsaw Pact Organization military doctrines was dictated by the urgent need to bring the approach to security problems into line with the new thinking and the realities of the nuclear and space age. Reaffirming the defensive nature of their military doctrine, the Warsaw Pact states at the same time indicated the path mankind must travel toward reliable security. Needless to say, the action of a plan such as the comparison of military doctrines would be a very tangible and real contribution to the process of building international confidence. We made this proposal in the spirit of the publicity and openness which now exist in our society and which we propose applying to the sphere of international relations as well.

Question. The document on military doctrine talks about the need to maintain armed forces and arms only within the bounds of sufficiency for defense. How realistic is this?

Answer. The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that military confrontation should exist at the lowest possible level. It advocates restricting military potentials to the limits of sensible sufficiency to ensure that armed forces are structurally capable of conducting solely defensive operations.

The USSR is prepared to make any reductions to its arms on a reciprocal basis — up to and including the complete withdrawal from military arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and other types of mass destruction weaponry — and to make radical cuts in its conventional arms and armed forces. The specific steps taken will depend on the position adopted by our partners in the West.
Question. What immediate practical measures are the Warsaw Pact countries proposing for reducing the level of military confrontation?

Answer. The proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States scrap their medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe is now being spotlighted in a practical and realistic manner. Our proposal that the United States end its nuclear weapons tests remains in force. The USSR vigorously advocates the completion of the preparatory work on a convention banning chemical weapons and eliminating stockpiles of such weapons.

In conventional forces and arms there is the Budapest Appeal from the Warsaw Pact states, which has been developed in other proposals from the socialist countries.

The news conference participants also answered other questions from correspondents.

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CSO: 5200/1546
RELATED ISSUES

USSR: FURTHER COMMENTARY ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY DOCTRINE

Shevardnadze Interview

AU211435 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 17 Jun 87 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, by "a representative of RABOTNICHESKO DELO's EDITORIAL BOARD": "A Summit From Which One Can See a Long Way"—date and place of interview not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] How, in your view, do the results of the Berlin conference of the Political Consultative Committee [PCC] of the Warsaw Pact member-states affect the East-West dialogue, particularly the military aspects of security? How do you evaluate the reaction of the United States and the other Western countries to the latest initiatives of the socialist states?

[Shevardnadze] Indubitably, the decisions adopted at the PCC conference created a more favorable atmosphere for this dialogue and add to it a number of important, substantive elements on the military aspects of security.

The Warsaw Pact member-states adopted a document on the military doctrine of their alliance. At the highest level, our countries declared the strictly defensive nature of this doctrine, based on the principle of adequacy [dustatuchnost].

On this basis it was stated that our countries "will never, under any circumstances, start military actions against any state or alliance of states whatsoever, if we ourselves are not a target of armed attack." In the context of the struggle for peace, this historic declaration acquires the character of a material force. Just such actions by states can form political and legal guarantees within the framework of the conception of an all-embracing system of international security proposed for discussion at the UN by the socialist countries.

The importance of the military doctrine document strengthens the accompanying proposal to the NATO countries on holding consultations to compare the military doctrines of the military alliances. If they accept the proposal, this will be a huge step toward creating trust and removing mutual suspicions. We would very much like to hope that the proposal of the socialist community will elicit the appropriate response from the other side.

75
In replying to the second part of your question, I will point out that so far we have received no official reaction from the United States to the socialist countries' latest initiatives. We will continue to wait, as we realize that a serious reply needs time. However, misgivings exist that this time is being used for another purpose -- namely, to seek pretexts under which either our initiatives are to be rejected or great political losses are to be avoided. Let's be frank, the task is no easy one, but people experienced in such work will surely solve it.

Nonetheless, we will wait before reaching final conclusions and will once again give the American side the benefit of our trust.

[Question] The world has been following the development of Soviet-U.S. relations with great interest. Can progress be expected in the near future within the framework of the existing system of disarmament negotiations between the USSR and the United States, and specifically with regard to the issue of concluding an agreement on eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe?

[Shevardnadze] Substantial progress would be a fact even today, had the NATO countries not so long delayed their reply to the proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz as far back as in the first half of April.

Unfortunately, much valuable time has been lost. This delay in making a political decision, among other things, has also held up the Geneva nuclear and space weapons negotiations.

As far as the decision adopted by NATO is concerned, it reiterates the usual scheme of things in the West: to accept one thing, but immediately push forward something else. In this case, the sticking point may be the Pershing-I A missiles belonging to the FRC, but equipped with U.S. nuclear warheads.

It is evident that now the negotiations have become even more complicated in certain respects, and this may lead to disappointment. The Soviet side will continue to persistently seek a mutually acceptable solution, but the agreement on medium-range missiles will only become possible when the American side makes the decisions it has to make, and if they really want to conclude such an agreement.

Pact 'Passivity' Denied

PM181551 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jun 87 First Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer M. Ponomarev replies to reader's letter under heading "Ready To Repel the Aggressor" under rubric "We Answer a Reader's Question" -- first two grafs are reader's letter]

[Text] "As stressed at the Political Consultative Committee conference in Berlin, the Warsaw Pact military doctrine is defensive in nature and geared to the task of preventing both nuclear and conventional war. At the same time it is well-known that the military doctrines of the United States and the North Atlantic bloc are clearly offensive and aggressive, which is fraught with the threat of a universal nuclear catastrophe. Is it not true that the Soviet Union and its allies are taking a passive stance in the face of this threat?"

O. Pchelov, Rostov-on-Don.
The 27th CPSU Congress defined the main aspect of our party's activity in the world arena as the struggle against the nuclear danger and the arms race and for the preservation and strengthening of universal peace. This viewpoint is shared totally by the communist and workers' parties of the Warsaw Pact countries. At the Political Consultative Committee conference in Berlin its participants reaffirmed their belief that the main task is to prevent war, remove it from mankind once and for all, preserve peace on earth, end the arms race, and move in the direction of specific disarmament measures, primarily nuclear disarmament measures, with the aim of achieving general and complete disarmament. By virtue of the nature of the socialist social system, the Warsaw Pact states have never linked and do not link their future with military solutions to international problems. They are in favor of resolving all international disputes by peaceful, political means alone.

But we live in a complex, contradictory world. The new political thinking is still only forging a path for itself in the international arena. The leaders of the largest capitalist states, and primarily the United States, continue to cling to outmoded dogmas, think in terms of confrontation and force, and aspire to military superiority over the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and to world hegemony. These political aims are reflected in the military doctrines by which the United States and its NATO partners are guided in their military activity. AS KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observed recently when answering a question from reader A. Yeremenko, however much it may try to disguise itself as defensive, current U.S military doctrine is offensive and aggressive.

This, of course, cannot be ignored by the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states. While being in favor of implementing disarmament measures, they are forced to maintain their armed forces at the level of strength which would allow them to repel any outside attack against any member of the Warsaw Pact. Considering the complex international situation and the growing aggressiveness among reactionary imperialist circles, the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo devote unremitting attention to the country's defense capability, the combat might of the USSR Armed Forces, and the reinforcement of military discipline.

The strictness with which the party approaches these issues was illustrated by the discussion at a CPSU Central Committee Politburo session of a report from the USSR Ministry of Defense on the circumstances connected with the violation of the Soviet Union's airspace on 28 May this year. The Politburo once again stressed the fundamental importance of the task of decisively raising the level of combat readiness and discipline in the Armed Forces, skilfully controlling troops, and ensuring their constant ability to prevent any encroachment on the Soviet state's sovereignty. These demands are a program of action for all Soviet Armed Forces personnel.

It is therefore obvious, Comrade Pchelov, that the Soviet Union and its allies are certainly not adopting a passive stance in the face of the threat of imperialist aggression. In the document "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact" the participants in the Berlin Political Consultative Committee conference stated: "The armed forces of the allied states are maintained at a level of combat readiness sufficient to ensure we are not taken unaware; and if an attack should nevertheless be made against them they will give the aggressor a crushing rebuff." This is the unshakable will of the allied states expressed in their military doctrine.
NATO Publication Assailed

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 16 Jun 87 pp 1-3

[Article by IZVESTIYA political observer Vikentiy Matveyev: "Playing Hide-and-Seek"]

[Text] The most tendentious versions on the topic of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty states are still being circulated in the West. Thus, a publication entitled "The Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy" has just been brought out in the FRG. It states that this doctrine was supposedly never announced in the press! It allegedly "demands superiority over the enemy, specifically, the NATO forces in the European theatre".... Supposedly "the Soviet leadership still hopes to win a nuclear war"....

The document "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member States adopted in Berlin has been issued in the press and circulated through the ambassadors of the GDR together with other documents of this conference of the PCC to the respective governments; furthermore, in most instances even officials of NATO countries, by and large, reacted positively to these documents. It was pointed out that they would study them and formulate their replies, and that this would require time.

The latter is only natural, although the aforementioned documents are not of such a nature that the NATO countries' governments would have to make their way through a labyrinth. The stand of the Warsaw Treaty countries is set forth in a clear-cut manner. Aside from the proposal on holding consultations on military doctrines, the proposal was advanced to arrange a meeting of the foreign ministers of all the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A decision could be adopted at it inaugurating large-scale talks to radically reduce armed forces and conventional armaments, and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, with military expenditures to be culled accordingly.

These questions are being heatedly debated both on the official level and amongst the public in the West. Their topicality is indisputable. In a policy-making speech on June 4, i.e., after the publication of the corresponding documents of the Berlin conference of the Warsaw Treaty countries, FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl said, among other things: "I reiterate that in view of the unthinkable destructive force of modern conventional weapons systems, our country would find itself faced with a threat to its existence as a result of a conventional war, just as it would as a result of nuclear clash."

What does the document of the Warsaw Treaty countries say on the issue? "The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty, just as of each of its member countries, is subjugated to the task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional."
The Kohl statement expresses in general terms—and no more!—approval of the documents adopted in Berlin by the Warsaw Treaty countries. What is needed, however, are not general compliments, but a clear-cut, businesslike reaction. Meanwhile, it is on the subject of the concreteness contained in the documents of the Berlin conference of the Warsaw Treaty countries that there is absolute silence on the part of the FRG leader, as if this concreteness does not exist! But how can one be combined with the other: an expression of concern over the "unthinkable force of modern weapons" and disregard for the essential that is being proposed by the Warsaw Treaty?

That the point at issue is not chance omissions but an intentional line, conscious attempts to sidestep practical consideration of the fresh initiatives of the socialist countries in Europe is also graphically illustrated by the document on East-West relations adopted in Venice by heads of seven leading capitalist countries. It does not contain a single word about the new proposals by the socialist countries. Instead, the conferees at Venice are veritably forcing their way through wide open doors when they call upon the Soviet Union to "hold talks in a positive and constructive spirit".

Or don't they realize that what is needed are not declarative appeals but concrete action at the negotiating table?

After the conclusion of the Venice meeting journalists asked U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz how the Western governments intend to respond to the new proposals by the Warsaw Treaty countries. The State Department chief indicated that this question would be discussed at the NATO council session in Reykjavik. The final communique of the session once again contains the stereotyped claims of an "imbalance in conventional, chemical and nuclear weapons", but nothing about the new proposals to NATO advanced by the Warsaw Treaty countries.

Thus, the NATO officials are patently reluctant to seriously tackle questions which are posed by the practice of international relations and by the public at large and on which officials of NATO countries themselves are commenting, while avoiding anything concrete.

NATO officials cannot go on playing hide-and-seek like this forever. Life is ever more persistently demanding a definite response to the clear-cut initiatives and proposals of the Warsaw Treaty member countries.

Izvestia, June 15. Abridged.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1546
MOSCOW TALK SHOW: PACT SESSION, INF, SALT

LD21216 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 21 Jun 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Viktor Aleksandrovich Tsooppi, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI observer; Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Shishkin, first deputy director general of TASS; and Igor Pavlovich Charikov, All-Union radio foreign political commentator]

[Excerpts] [Charikov] Hello, esteemed comrades. The further World War II that great battle with fascism which began for the peoples of our country on 22 June 1941, recedes into history, the more insistent and acute becomes the need to remember it and remind others of it. Not only because that war brought us and the peoples of other states hardships and sufferings which cannot be compared with anything in the past. It was not the longest war in history, but it involved the greatest numbers and the greatest bloodshed. Three-fourths of what was then the world's population were actively involved. Military operations took place on the territory of 40 countries, on the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Let me remind you that more than 50 million people lost their lives in that war; the Soviet Union alone lost 20 million people. For the first time in the history of warfare civilian casualties outnumbered those who actually perished on the battlefield. One could prolong the list of ominous records set by World War II. The need to remind ourselves of all this, distressing though it is, is dictated by today's realities. Today's world faces the threat of a new war, whose consequences even the military experts have difficulty in imagining. Another war could mean the destruction of world civilization. It would cut short all life on our planet.

How can we avert the threat of such a war? By stockpiling arsenals of weapons and creating ever more destructive ones? That way has resulted in a situation in which the very existence of vast quantities of arms, primarily nuclear, has become a threat, a terrible threat. Our desire to achieve a secure world by accumulating and perfecting weapons has brought the directly opposite result. How then, if at all, can we escape from what seems to be a vicious circle?

There is a way out: All countries which possess nuclear weapons should adopt a new approach in keeping with the present stage of the development of science and technology, a new way of thinking in the nuclear age. They must agree to end the arms race, and then to abolish armaments altogether. The experience of cooperation between
states belonging to different socioeconomic systems that was amassed, not without difficulty, during the years of World War II serves not only as an example but also as proof of the fact that, given good will and an understanding of the fateful nature of the situation that has arisen in the world, all difficulties can be overcome.

Current problems can be solved not from a position of strength but only from a position of common sense. A realistic foundation for solving the problems of nuclear weapons is provided by the large-scale program for their total abolition by the year 2000, and also by the other specific proposals submitted by the Soviet Union and its allies. The lessons of World War II, which began for our country on 22 June 1941, urge us to halt the dangerous process of drifting toward the nuclear abyss. That is the context in which we remember 22 June.

[Shishkin] When we remember that day that brought us so much sorrow, of course we think about what conclusions we should draw from it for the future.

We remember that it was the Soviet Union that assumed the main burden of opposing Hitlerite aggression. At the time we were the only socialist country in Europe. Today, our peace-loving policy is based on coordination of our actions with our allies, with our friends in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. In that sense, our mature strength today, the strength of the world socialist community, is influencing the entire development of the international situation. We observe in our time that it is forcing the other side, the imperialist camp, to seek a modus vivendi that will enable us all to live on this planet, even though it's difficult. It is difficult because the force of inertia is operating, because of certain fears that are no longer justified today. The socialist community is still coordinating its foreign policy and submitting one new initiative after another; and at times this drives the Western politicians and the Western generals into a corner.

The last few days have been notable for Comrade Shevardnadze's visit to three socialist countries of East Europe: Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. I'd simply like to quote the short passage from his speech in Sofia in which he speaks of the comparison between our military doctrine and that of the West. He dots all the I's very clearly and plainly specifies the tasks facing the foreign policy of the socialist countries. Comrade Shevardnadze reminds us of Maksim Gorkiy's saying that knowledge comes from comparison. Knowledge of what the countries of the Warsaw Pact and of the North Atlantic alliance represent and what aims they set themselves can be obtained by comparing and collating the military doctrines of each of these military-political alliances. Tranquillity, good-neighborliness and trust only come into existence when there is clarity and certainty regarding the intentions and and sincerity of the other side. This, really, is just what we have offered our Atlantic opponents: a chance to satisfy themselves of the sincerity of our intentions and, in turn, to present us with arguments in favor of their sincerity. We have presented our arguments. As Comrade Shevardnadze reminded us, the Warsaw Pact countries have declared at the highest level they will in no circumstances attack any other state and will never be first to use nuclear weapons.

In reply, we have heard nothing. That is not surprising, because the doctrine of the Atlantic bloc does not bear open comparison, either from the viewpoint of its tendency or in respect of its nuclear element. NATO has not renounced, and is unwilling to renounce, the first nuclear strike.
Thus I believe today we have a succinct and laconic formulation of the problem of our mutual relations with the Western world, of our desire to join with them in seeking a way out of the exceedingly dangerous international situation. Today there are perfectly clear signs that a way can be found, let us hope, in the very near future.

[Tsoppi] While we're on the subject of associations connected with historic dates, I'd like to remark that there are some among them that remind us how consistently, year in, year out, the Soviet Union has been struggling to break the spiral of the arms race. For example on that same date, 22 June, but this time in 1973, an agreement was signed in Washington between the Soviet Union and the United States on the prevention of nuclear war. Here's another date: 5 years ago, on 15 June 1982, the Soviet Union, guided by the desire to do all in its power to deflect from the peoples the threat of nuclear devastation and ultimately to rule out its very possibility from human life, undertook an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The whole world applauded that extraordinarily important unilateral undertaking. People expected that that decision would be followed by reciprocal steps on the part of the other nuclear powers, above all, the United States. After all, the 1973 Soviet-U.S. agreement placed it clearly on record that the aim of their policy was to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.

Under that accord the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to act in such a way as to prevent situations that could dangerously exacerbate their relations and to avoid military confrontations so as to rule out the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war between either of the sides and other countries. By all its activities in the international arena the Soviet Union is repeatedly demonstrating its loyalty to its obligations, undertaken both unilaterally and under agreements and treaties with other states. In this, our country relies upon the fraternal support of the whole socialist community, which is really what you have said, Viktor Aleksandrovich.

The latest proof of this is the document signed in Berlin on the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states. They declared at the highest level that they will in no circumstances attack any state, and that they will never be first to use nuclear weapons. On the whole, the reply from the United States and NATO has so far been silence. This is not surprising because the doctrine of the Atlantic bloc does not bear open comparison, either from the viewpoint of its tendency or as regards its nuclear component. NATO has not renounced the first nuclear strike and does not wish to do so, as the United States has shown by systematically breaking the treaty obligations that it has undertaken. Take, as just one example, the unceremonious way the Reagan administration tossed aside the SALT II treaty signed 18 June 1979 in Vienna. That was the treaty that was seen throughout the world as a major contribution to solving a problem of concern to all mankind: that of stopping the nuclear arms race. The unceremonious scrapping of SALT II by the United States proves that Washington still cherishes the hope of breaking the parity and gaining superiority over the Soviet Union.

Further confirmation of this is the fact that the United States and NATO are doing everything possible to evade practical implementation of the zero option on medium-range missiles in Europe that they themselves originally proposed. They took 6 weeks to ponder the corresponding Soviet proposal. In the face of the world public, which unanimously demands acceptance of that proposal, they were forced at the NATO Council session in Reykjavik to consent to it. But that decision is accompanied by reservations that place the achievement of agreement at the Geneva talks in jeopardy.
As we see, quite a few obstacles remain in the way of achieving the aim of ridding Europe of its nuclear missiles. So we can describe as clearly premature the tendency that has now emerged in the capitals of the North Atlantic bloc to paint the results of the Reykjavik session of the NATO Council in glowing colors. A genuine evaluation of them will depend on what specific position the United States adopts at the Geneva talks.

[Charikov] You know, at the same time, Gennadiy Arkadiyevich, in a recent television speech President Reagan was at no small pains to appropriate to himself all the laurels for the positive changes that are beginning to be seen at the Geneva talks. He even employed the phrase: at a time when we and our allies are trying to seize this historic opportunity. I believe this has a blasphemous ring against the backdrop of all that the administration is continuing to do, and it's continuing to do things that are the very opposite. For example, the Pentagon, the U.S. war department, is making practical preparations for nuclear war. They're setting up a network of command, control, communications, and so forth for surviving a nuclear war and emerging into a so-called postwar phase. You know? Despite all this, the administration claims to be loyal to the spirit of the agreement you mentioned, the 1973 agreement on prevention of nuclear war. There's a bit of a contradiction here, a discrepancy between words and deeds that's characteristic, actually, of the U.S. Administration. Yet it is reproaching us for not extending openness [glasnost] to the military sphere, for instance.

Just recently, Edward Rowny, special assistant to the U.S. President at the Geneva talks, declared that it would be a good thing if the Soviet Union were to carry openness over into the military sphere. It's hard to say what he meant by that, but it seems to me that in any case he was addressing the wrong person. He'd have done better, it would seem, to have said that to Washington itself, to the administration, because what question can there be of openness at the White House when it's up to its ears in a quagmire of political corruption and intrigue?

[Shishkin] And of deception and political lies.

[Charikov] Well, I can just give one final example — I won't discuss it at length — Iran gate. The upheaval's still going on, the dust still hasn't settled, but it's hardly likely — I have almost no doubt about it — hardly likely that the U.S. public, which has the right to know as that favorite U.S. expression has it, will ever know all the ins and outs of this scandal.

[Shishkin] I think all you've just been saying, Igor Pavlovich, proves one thing: A lot of fine words are spoken in Washington, but there are no deeds whatsoever to back them up. So it’s at least obvious to the whole world now that the Soviet Union, for its part, has already traveled more than half the distance toward an agreement, has met the other side more than halfway, whereas the United States on the other hand has yet to show any practical desire or willingness to cover its half of the distance. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was 1,000 times right when he noted at his meeting on 2 June with representatives of the physician's movement that when we do try to get things moving we meet with no real political response: All we get is the skulduggery of politicians.

Yet we are all living through a very crucial time, in that it is now clear to all right-thinking people that there is indeed a real chance of breaking through the dangerous trend created by the war game of the United States.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1546

83
GORBACHEV: 'FEW SPECIAL RECIPROCAL STEPS' FROM WEST

Comments While Voting

PM211855 IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Meeting at the Polling Place"]

[Excerpts] Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, cast his ballot in local government elections today at the polling station of electoral precinct No 5 in Moscow's Krasnaya Presnya Rayon.

After voting he had a meeting with other constituents, which was marked by warmth and trust. The conversation was about the reorganization, its first results, about the difficulties, outstanding problems, tasks for the future, about the qualities that man, the main motive force of the acceleration, should have.

Mikhail Gorbachev then answered questions of Soviet and foreign reporters.

"Tomorrow will be June 22, a special day for our people", said the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. "In this connection I would like to say once more: Whatever task we might be undertaking, we must first of all remember that preserving peace is a priority for all of us and for all nations. I would also like to tell you: The Soviet leadership is concerned with the following. They are calling on us in the Soviet Union to take further steps. The Soviet Union will continue taking real steps to meet our partners in the West halfway and look for solutions to the major issues, so as to improve the situation and ease tension. The main thing is to clear the path to disarmament. To achieve these aims, words need to be matched by deeds -- both in politics and in the press which serves politics."

There are quite a few words in the West, but few specific reciprocal steps adequately responding to our proposals. Politicians in leading capitalist countries are concerned lest they lose stature in the eyes of the public opinion. Well, if one thinks about this rather than how to turn the world away from confrontation, from tension and from the arms race to a different direction, to the path of setting international relations right and starting disarmament -- no words, no assurances can replace realistic policy. We believe that there is a dearth of realistic policy in the West today. This is the most important thing. I would like this idea of mine to reach all public opinion in the world. This is the most important thing about which we are concerned. Just think how many specific steps we have taken over the past two years. You know, this has played its role.
The situation has changed. The main change, to my mind, is that the people all over the world joined in the struggle for peace for they are concerned about the present situation. They know that if another war breaks out, it will first of all affect peoples. This is why people do not want to sit on their hands and just watch on. The Soviet leadership welcomes this attitude.

As far as detente and the curtailing of the arms race are concerned, we are prepared to cooperate with all forces. But there is a deficit of realistic policy in the West. There they are only concerned with saving face. What we need, however, are specific steps to a healthier international situation, to a nuclear-free world without violence, and to cooperation.

Constituents and journalists thanked Mikhail Gorbachev for the conversation.

Broadcast on TV

LD211440 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1050 GMT 21 Jun 87

[Special newscast: "Today Is Election Day"]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Polling Station No 5 of Moscow's Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon for the elections to the city soviet of people's deputies and Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon Soviet. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is voting here. [Video shows exterior of polling station. Gorbachev and Raisa Gorbacheva are welcomed by officials on the steps. Once inside, they are given flowers, then their ballot papers, which they proceed to place in the ballot boxes. They come outside, and Gorbachev is shown with a crowd of people in the street.] After the polling, Mikhail Sergeyevich chatted with members of the electorate.

[Announcer] Mikhail Sergeyevich then answered questions from foreign correspondents.

[video shows Gorbachev and wife moving away from the crowd; Gorbachev speaking to journalists]

[Gorbachev, fading into audio at mid sentence]...to think that the priority for all peoples is the preservation of peace.

What I would like to say to you is that we in the Soviet leadership are worried, and this is what we are worried about. We are being called on for the Soviet Union to do something more, to take some steps. We believe that on the part of the Soviet Union real steps will continue to be taken to go halfway to meet our partners in the West and search for solutions to the most major questions to improve the situation, to remove tension and, most importantly, to open the path toward disarmament. Let us have that as the way the question is posed, everywhere — both in politics and in the press, which serves politics. What is needed is unity of word and deed. What I would say is that we in the Soviet leadership today see a lot of words being spoken in the West, but few concrete steps, steps to meet us halfway and give a corresponding reply to our steps.
What is it over there that worries the current generation of many politicians, at least in the leading capitalist countries? They are worried about losing stature in the eyes of public opinion. But you know, if that is the only basis for your actions, instead of thinking about how the world can in fact be turned from confrontation, tension, and the arms race onto another track, along the path of improving international relations, making them healthy, and disarmament...[video shows Gorbachev waving hands in despair]

No words and no assurances can replace real policy. We believe that today there is a deficit of real policy in the West, and that is the most important point. I want you to convey that idea of mine to all world public opinion. That is the most important thing that worries us.

You just think how many concrete steps we have taken over these past 2 years, steps halfway to meet the other side. That has played its own role; you know that. That situation has, after all, changed. The most important change, in my mind, is that ordinary people have become involved, because the situation today worries them. They know that if another war breaks out, it will primarily affect ordinary people. That is why they don't want to stand on the sidelines simply as observers. We in the Soviet leadership welcome this.

We are ready to internationalize any question as far as detente and the arms race are concerned. We are ready to cooperate with any forces. But there is a deficit of real policy in the West. All they are worried about there is how best to save face. What is needed, however, are concrete steps along the path of improving the world situation, toward a nuclear-free world, a world without violence, toward cooperation. All the best to you! [video shows Gorbachev walking away, surrounded by a group of men]

/9738
CSO: 5200/1546
TASS: UN DISARMAMENT-DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE PREPARED

LD220850 Moscow TASS in English 0644 GMT 22 Apr 87

[Text] New York, 22 Apr (TASS)--TASS correspondent Sergey Baybakov reports:

The preparatory committee for an international conference on the connection between disarmament and development, slated to open in New York next August, began a regular session at the United Nations Tuesday to complete all-round preparations for the representative forum, including its draft final document.

The conference is to review the connection between disarmament and development in all its aspects, study the consequences of growing military spending, and look for ways of releasing extra resources for development purposes as a result of disarmament measures.

The first deputy representative of the USSR to the United Nations, R.M. Timberbayev, said in an interview with this correspondent that preparations for the forum had touched off a keen political struggle between forces seeking to block it and those pressing for constructive discussions on the connection between the two more important problems of the times.

Washington, which has refused to attend the conference on the grounds that it allegedly fails to see a connection between disarmament and development, has been making active efforts to frustrate its opening.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries as well as non-aligned nations with the active participation of India, one of the initiators of the conference's convocation, have on the contrary been busy assisting preparations for the forum.

They stand for holding the conference successfully and intend to take a constructive stand there.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1546
USSR: UN PREPARING STUDY ON NUCLEAR WINTER

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 5 Jun 87 pp 1-3

["'Nuclear Winter' Must Not Come"]

[Text] For the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly a group of experts chosen by Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar is preparing a report on so-called "nuclear winter" and its consequences for the environment, the economy and people's health. One of the 11 experts is G. Golitsyn, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and head of the theory of climate department at the Academy's Institute of Atmospheric Physics. Here is his story.

The discovery of the "nuclear winter" phenomenon was a major event in science over recent years, which had great repercussions.

To specialists it became clear that explosions of a large number of nuclear weapons can lead to a destruction of stratospheric ozone, which protects life on the Earth from the ruinous effects of hard ultraviolet solar radiation. My colleague A. Ginzburg and I in the early 70's happened to study the problem of global dust storms on Mars where the winds throw into the planet's air an enormous amount of dust. As a result, the air gets strongly heated up, while the surface of Mars excessively cools down. The data of Soviet and American space probes that have explored Mars in the last few years have confirmed our estimations. It is now clear that Martian dust storms are a physical analogue of what may happen to our planet after a global nuclear incident when millions of tons of smoke will get into the air.

In the spring of 1983 the USSR Academy of Sciences' Computing Center led by Academician N. Moiseyev started working on a numerical modeling of climatic nuclear-war effects. These studies, carried out by V. Alexandrov and G. Stenchikov, have again proved that in many regions of the planet, especially the Northern Hemisphere, the temperature would fall significantly below zero after a possible nuclear cataclysm.

The latest working meeting of scientists from different countries researching problems of "nuclear winter" took place at the beginning of this year in Thailand's capital Bangkok. At this meeting, in which Soviet specialists also
participated, a memorandum was adopted. It emphasizes that the consequences of a nuclear war for the atmosphere and climate of the Earth will be most serious. If only last year it was held that 90 percent of particles of the smoke from nuclear-war fires in the process of liftup into the air would precipitate, now this portion is being assessed at only 10-20 percent. This means that a very considerable amount of smoke—150 million tons and over—will be thrown into the stratosphere where it will remain for many months if not years. The estimates made by the Computing Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by the Academy's Institute of Atmospheric Physics, and by Australian researchers show that this smoke in the stratosphere may become the cause of a long cold snap, which will tell perilously on most agricultural crops. Therefore a famine will pose the main threat to the population of the Earth, since current available world food stocks would last just approximately 3 months. In other words, whereas several hundred million people may become the direct victims of an atomic war, the unavoidably resultant "nuclear winter" would kill 4 out of the 5 billion inhabitants of our planet.

At the first meeting of experts on "nuclear winter" in the UN, which discussed a general outline of the future report, several communications were heard. We were all unanimous in the view on the exceptional danger of the aftermath of a nuclear war for all mankind and the environment. I happened to make a communication on the work to assess the impact on the Earth's atmosphere of large forest fires and heavy dust storms.

The identification of natural effects is important because they serve to prove that predictable ruinous changes of the Earth's climate in the event of a nuclear conflict are not a scientists' fiction. The entire history of the study of the possible consequences of nuclear war teaches us that researchers are learning them gradually and that there is no confidence that we have learned everything in full. Thus, in 1945 after Hiroshima and Nagasaki mankind learned about radiation sickness. In 1958 as a result of American high-altitude nuclear tests we learned about an electromagnetic impulse that can put out of action all the communication systems and electrical networks on vast territories. In 1973 the effect of the destruction of ozone in nuclear blasts was discovered. In 1983 we learned about "nuclear winter"—the climatic aftermath of the fires of a nuclear war.

From what I have said above only one conclusion can be drawn: there must be no nuclear war. Humanity must stop the arms race, which is leading to self-destruction.

(Sotsialisticheskaya Industria, June 5. Abridged.)

/9738
CSO: 5200/1546
RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S KORNIYENKO ATTENDS TOKYO ANTINUCLEAR SYMPOSIUM

LD151953 Moscow TASS in English 1448 GMT 15 Jun 87

[Text] Tokyo June 15 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vladimir Kuchko reports:

An international symposium on "The struggle for the prevention of nuclear war and elimination of nuclear weapons, for the common cause of peace and democracy" sponsored by the Communist Party of Japan opened here today. The symposium is attended by representatives of 30 communist and workers parties, including the CPSU delegation led by member of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee Georgiy Korniyenko.

The two years that have passed since the previous forum saw considerable progress in the elimination of nuclear menace, chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan Kenji Miyamoto said, welcoming the participants in the symposium. The Soviet Union's programme of ridding the world of nuclear weapons within a specified period of time exerted great effect on the international public opinion, particularly on those who were skeptical about the elimination of nuclear arms, said the leader of the Communist Party of Japan. The Soviet proposals in Reykjavik extended the hope of achieving concrete results at the talks on nuclear arms limitation. Elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe might become a substantial step toward nuclear disarmament.

The struggle for the prevention of nuclear war, for a complete ban on and elimination of nuclear weapons has entered a qualitatively new stage, said Georgiy Korniyenko. A concrete programme of action to achieve this aim within a short historic period, by the end of the current century, has been proposed.

It is necessary now to concentrate the main effort on destroying the basis for adherence to nuclear arms, on showing the abominable essence of the thesis that it is allegedly due to the existence of nuclear weapons that humanity has been living without a "major war" for over 40 years now. Deplorably, the concept of "nuclear deterrence" still seems convincing to a lot of people. The efforts aimed against the U.S. "Star Wars" programme are an important direction of the anti-nuclear struggle. The struggle against SDI means at the same time the struggle for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Having advanced the programme of complete elimination of nuclear arms, the Soviet Union presses for the implementation of effective partial measures which promote the advance to that goal.
An agreement which would lead to the complete elimination of Soviet and American medium-range and shorter-range missiles from Europe and their sharp reduction in the Asian part of the USSR and in the United States territory would be of much importance in this respect.

It is only by vigorous actions of all peaceful, democratic forces on a broad basis regardless of political, ideological, religious and other views that humanity can be rid of the menace of nuclear annihilation, the CPSU representative said in conclusion.

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CSO: 5200/1546

- END -