Worldwide Report

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Arms Control

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: LATE APRIL REPORTS, COMMENTARY ON PROGRESS OF TALKS

New Round Opens

LD231204 Moscow TASS in English 1150 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Text] Geneva April 23 TASS -- Aleksey Obukhov, ambassador at large, deputy leader of the USSR delegation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, met Ambassador Maynard Glittman here today thus starting a new round of talks for the group on medium-range missiles.

The task before the group is to prepare a joint draft treaty on the elimination of medium-range missiles of the USSR and the USA in Europe in accordance with the formula agreed upon at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

Reagan Comments

FM240937 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 87 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Geneva: Another Round"]


The United States, his written statement says, is returning to the talks determined to develop the progress achieved at Secretary of State G. Shultz' meetings in Moscow last week. Although a number of central problems need resolving and much remains to be discussed at the talks, the prospects for an agreement on medium-range weapons have improved.

The document notes that the basic formula for an agreement on medium-range weapons was discussed at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. The statement says that the problem of operational and tactical missiles remains one of the main unresolved issues. During U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz' recent meetings in Moscow the Soviet side expounded with the utmost clarity its position envisaging the holding of separate talks on operational and tactical missiles, assuming that they will result in the total elimination of these missiles on a global basis. The U.S. Administration, the document says, is continuing "close consultations" with the United States' NATO allies on this issue.

Speaking on the same day on a USIA Worldnet television network program, G. Shultz noted "certain advances on the question of operational and tactical missiles." At the
present time, he said, the United States, together with its allies, "is in the middle of the process of studying" the latest Soviet proposals in this sphere and "will be responding to them." The secretary of state did stress, however, that even if a Soviet-U.S. agreement is concluded on eliminating medium-range weapons the United States will continue to maintain an "awe-inspiring" ["vnutshayushcheye strakh"] nuclear presence in Europe.

Moscow Observer 'On My Guard'

LD232307 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1615 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Aleksandr Zholkver commentary from the "International Diary" program presented by Igor Surguev]

[Text] [Surguev] Today another round, the eighth, of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons opened in Geneva. A group on medium-range missiles in Europe was the first to start work. One must note that there is a favorable situation now for reaching accords on this issue. As is known, the Soviet Union has expressed its preparedness to eliminate not only medium-range nuclear missiles but also operational and tactical missiles on the European Continent, with the purpose of concluding the agreement as soon as possible. Now it is up to the United States. By the way, virtually on the eve of the resumption of the Geneva talks, President Reagan met U.S. congressmen in Washington.

The issue was prospects for Soviet-U.S. agreements regarding arms reductions. What has this discussion shown? I will ask our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver to reply to this question:

[Zholkver] The White House officially announced that during the meeting you mentioned, the President was in an optimistic, yet realistic mood. It is not clear, though, why these words should be set off against each other. Frankly speaking, I was put on my guard by another thing: In recent days, many voices could be heard among those close to the President and in Congress urging him not to hurry and to thoroughly think it all over; and by and large, there are quite a few barriers in the way of an agreement, and one does not know if it will be possible to overcome them.

Certain people in Washington started talking about difficulties of monitoring [kontrol] while emphasizing in every possible way that the issue of liquidating nuclear missiles in Europe is for the Europeans themselves to resolve. In short, the old game of passing the buck is starting all over again. In reality -- and this has been admitted by many major politiains, from the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives to the FRG minister of foreign affairs -- there is now a truly historical chance for eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons on European Continent.

I will recall that our country suggested liquidating all the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe and examinining and solving the problem of tactical nuclear systems. By the way, we are putting forward the most strict system of monitoring [kontrol] the fulfillment of all those measures, up to on-site inspection [inspektsiya]. One should say that our proposals were met with optimism in Europe indeed.
I will mention the peace marches that have only just ended in many countries of Western Europe. Their participants -- as writes, for example Bonn's GENERAL-ANZEIGER -- have addressed Western governments with an appeal to positively answer Gorbachev's recent proposal on disarmament. But one cannot fail to see other things: As Westfälische RUNDESCHAU, another Western German newspaper, points out, leaders of Western countries seem to be afraid even of their own previous disarmament proposals. The more wide-scale Gorbachev's initiatives become, the deeper they are hiding in a shelter. I would add that shells are being fired from those shelters at the idea of a nuclear-free Europe itself.

U.S. General Rogers, NATO's commander in chief, calls for deploying U.S. short-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The FRG Military Department plans to alter the U.S. Pershing missiles that are already here into short-range missiles, while in Paris and London, according to the local press, plans for joint work with the objective of developing [sozdaniye] air-based cruise missiles with nuclear warheads are being discussed. After all this, one can easily understand the West German Social-Democratic weekly VORWAERTS when it writes that a group of hawks is preparing a stab in the back and is trying to be both realistic and optimistic. The chances for nuclear disarmament in Europe are now as favorable as ever, and it would be simply unforgivable to lose them.

'Difficulties Surmountable'

LD271714 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 27 Apr 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] As has already been reported, at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva, the latest round of talks for the group concerned with medium-range missiles has begun:

[Begin recording] [Dmitriyev] The lively interest in this round of talks can be judged, if by nothing else, by the special correspondents who have come from Paris, Rome, Madrid, and other European capitals to cover the talks. The majority of journalists believe that there is potential for success at the talks. The two countries' specialists are faced with the crucial task of preparing a joint draft treaty to do away with Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe in accordance with the formula struck at Reykjavik. In the view of the Soviet side, there could be a treaty as early as this year. [video cuts to A.A. Obukhov, identified by screen caption as ambassador at large and deputy head of the Soviet delegation, addressing camera]

[Obukhov] The work ahead will not be easy, if one takes into account that the U.S. approach, as we now know it, includes some elements known to be unconstructive. Among these, for instance, are the suggestion that, instead of scrapping U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe, they might convert them to other types of weapons. Then there is the non-simultaneousness of medium-range missile reductions proposed in the U.S. draft. According to this proposal, for a lengthy period of time, only the Soviet Union would be engaged in reductions, while the United States would in fact even be able to build up its medium-range missiles. The U.S. intention of stationing its remaining medium-range missiles within range of Soviet territory is something else that does not accord with the goals of diminishing the nuclear threat.
However, difficulties of that nature are entirely surmountable, if one is striving to attain an effective and equitable accord that would equally consider the legitimate security interests of both sides.

[Dmitriyev] The coming weeks will show to what extent the U.S. side is prepared to display the political will so that the process of nuclear disarmament might at last move out of deadlock. [end recording]

USSR Presents Draft Treaty

LD271544 Moscow TASS in English 1540 GMT 27 Apr 87

[Text] Geneva April 27 TASS -- A plenary meeting of delegations took place here today at another round of Soviet-American talks for the group on intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles.

The delegation of the USSR at the meeting submitted the Soviet draft of a treaty between the USSR and the United States on eliminating the Soviet and U.S. INF missiles in Europe and on other measures to limit and reduce the INF missiles of the USSR and the United States, as well as draft agreed statements and general understandings concerning it.

The Soviet documents, taking into account corresponding elements of the American draft, furnish a constructive basis for working out in a short time provisions for inclusion in a joint draft INF treaty.

USSR Proposes Total SRINF Removal

AU281121 Paris AFP in English 1119 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] Geneva, April 28 (AFP) -- The Soviet Union has proposed total removal of short-range nuclear missiles (SRINF) in Europe and parity between Soviet and United States SRINF stationed elsewhere, in Soviet Asia and the U.S., Aleksey Obukhov, Soviet assistant chief negotiator said here Tuesday.

Mr Obukhov told a press conference that the Soviet proposals for a treaty on intermediate missiles, made at Monday's session, were based on the agreement sketched out at the Reykjavik summit last November between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

This called for elimination of missiles in Europe and reduction of other intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) to 100 warheads for each side, to be sited respectively in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and in the United States.

Mr Obukhov said the Soviet Union would oppose siting of American INF in places such as Alaska, within range of Soviet territory, and replacement of INF missiles by SRINF weapons in Europe.

The Soviet stance for the first time proposes either a separate agreement on SRINF, or inclusion of short-range weapons in a single intermediate-range treaty, Mr Obukhov said.
The Soviet negotiator rejected any linkage between certain types of nuclear weapons and conventional forces.

Answering a question, Mr Obukhov said any treaty would evidently apply to short-range U.S.-controlled Pershing I missiles stationed in West Germany.

Obukhov: Draft Is Compromise

LD281321 Moscow World Service in English 1300 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] An agreement on eliminating Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe can be signed as early as this year, deputy chief Soviet negotiator Aleksey Obukhov told newsmen in Geneva. As soon as it's signed it would be possible to start talks on ridding Europe of all Soviet and American tactical missiles and on substantially reducing the number in other parts of the world.

With reference to the draft treaty presented by the USSR yesterday, Obukhov said that the draft is based on a compromise and that it takes into account many important provisions of the American document submitted earlier. On questions of verification, for instance, the USSR favors even stricter control than the United States does. The American version contains a number of unconstructive elements but these difficulties can be overcome, Aleksey Obukhov stressed.

Draft 'Constructive Basis'

LD281827 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Victor Levin commentary]

[Text] A wide-ranging response has been provoked by the report that, at the latest round of Soviet-U.S. talks for the medium-range missiles group taking place in Geneva, the USSR delegation has submitted a draft treaty on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and on measures to limit and reduce Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles. A latest news commentary. At the microphone is Viktor Levin:

[Levin] The Soviet delegation has come to the latest round of Geneva talks with the firm intention of devoting maximum effort to the most rapid attainment of an accord on the elimination of medium-range missiles. In our country's opinion, the path to such an accord has been quite clearly designated. From Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's official statements, a complete picture of what the Soviet Union proposes can be seen. Let me review those proposals. The first one: To eliminate as early as in the next 5 years all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, keeping just 100 warheads each of such missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and on the territory of the United States. It should be added to this that our country proceeds from the premise that missiles deployed, respectively, in the Asian part of the USSR and in the United States should not be capable of reaching the other country's territory.

Second: We are proposing simultaneously to eliminate Soviet and U.S. operational and tactical missiles in Europe and to hold talks on keeping such missiles in the east of our country and on the territory of the United States. The intention is that after
igning an agreement on medium-range missiles -- irrespective of the course of discussions on the questions of operational and tactical missiles -- the Soviet Union, in agreement with the Governments of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, will withdraw from those countries the missiles that were deployed there as countermeasures to the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

Third: The Soviet Union is proposing the establishment of the strictest system of verification [kontrol], going as far as on-site inspection, of the fulfillment of the obligations on this score the two sides have adopted. For a long time, the question of verification was presented by the Western side as a stumbling block. Our partners in the talks persistently tried to create the impression that the USSR was rejecting effective verification and was thereby creating an insuperable obstacle to the attainment of an accord.

This question has now been clarified to the utmost. We are in favor of the strictest verification. It must be implemented on site as far as the installation of missiles, at the site where they have been eliminated, at testing grounds and military bases, including in third countries, at stockpiles and factories -- irrespective of whether they are private or state.

These are, in broad outline, the proposals of the Soviet Union. Incidentally, they also take account of corresponding elements of the U.S. draft. For this reason, one can say with full justification that the Soviet draft provides a constructive basis for working out -- in a short period of time -- a treaty between the USSR and the United States.

Obukhov Demands Removal of FRG Pershings

LD281636 Hamburg DPA in German 1524 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Excerpts] Luxembourg/Geneva 28 Apr (DPA) -- No visible progress was made today in Geneva and Luxembourg on the question of the total removal of shorter-range INF's from Europe. The foreign and defense ministers of the seven NATO countries in the Western Union (WEU) have adopted a stand on the Soviet proposals on this. At the arms control talks in Geneva the USSR demanded that the United States, in the event of a possible treaty, should also remove the Pershing-I A warheads deployed in the Federal Republic. [passage omitted]

Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who so far has spoken rather positively about a zero-option on shorter-range INF, expressed support for a careful checking of the Soviet proposals, just as Defense Minister Manfred Woerner did. [passage omitted]

The Soviet proposals encompass 72 German Pershing-I A missiles which can be equipped with U.S. nuclear warheads. Until now the Federal Government has assumed on the basis of a briefing of the NATO Council by Schultz that these systems were not to be included in the Soviet-U.S. negotiations. [passage omitted]

Aleksey Obukhov, deputy head of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament talks, justified the demand for the withdrawal of the Pershing-I A warheads by saying that they
are under U.S. control. If there were an agreement on the "elimination" of Soviet and U.S. missiles with this range in Europe then "these warheads ought to be removed."

Until now the West has assumed that the USSR did not include the Pershing-1A's, which have a range of 740km, in a medium-range treaty because the missiles are in the control of the FRG air force and the warheads are stored separately at U.S. bases.

Obukhov avoided the question as to whether the USSR has adopted a new position here. [passage omitted]

News Conference on Initiatives

LD281423 Moscow TASS in English 1413 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] Geneva April 28 TASS -- A press conference held at the USSR Mission in Geneva today was devoted to the Soviet Union's new initiatives aimed at resolving the problem of lessening war danger, of lowering the level of military confrontation.

Opening the press conference, USSR Permanent Representative at the United Nations office and other international organizations in Geneva Yevgeniy Makeyev emphasised that these initiatives reflect the Soviet Union's principled approach to disarmament problems and comprise the entire range of questions including nuclear and conventional armaments. These initiatives are in line with Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of January 15, 1986 and are aimed at practical implementation of the Reykjavik arrangements.

Deputy head of the USSR delegation to the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms Aleksey Obukhov said that the Soviet draft treaty on medium-range missiles submitted in Geneva on Monday opens a real way arrangement on a complex of medium-range and shorter-range missiles. The Soviet side is of the opinion that such a treaty on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe could be concluded as early as this year. At the same time the Soviet Union proposes to work out "key provisions" about strategic offensive arms, the ABM Treaty and nuclear testing. Alongside the signing of the agreement on medium-range missiles they could become the subject of arrangements at the summit level and the basis on which legally binding agreements between the USSR and the USA could be drawn up.

Head of the Soviet delegation to the conference on disarmament Yuriy Nazarkin spoke about the new Soviet initiatives aimed at speeding up the conclusion of an international convention banning chemical weapons. He expressed satisfaction with the fact that the necessary preconditions for finding mutually acceptable solutions to a number of outstanding problems have been created in this area. He stressed that the Soviet Union views early completion of this work as one of the main directions of its foreign policy.

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CSO: 5200/1454
[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS -- The Soviet delegation has the firm mandate immediately, from the first day of the Geneva talks, to start jointly with the U.S. delegation to draw up concrete agreements, Boris Pyadyshhev, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, said at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists today. He noted that those agreements should provide for the elimination of all the Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe already within the next five years, with only 100 warheads on such missiles preserved each in the Asian part of the USSR and in U.S. territory, and also envision the elimination of all the Soviet and American shorter-range missiles in Europe simultaneously. The Soviet spokesman drew the journalists' attention to a new element of the Soviet position: Talks are proposed on shorter-range missiles also in the east of the USSR and in U.S. territory.

These agreements also should provide for the establishment of the strictest possible system of verification, to the point of on-site inspections, to guarantee the sides' compliance with their obligations.

These are the clear-cut and explicit positions with which the Soviet delegation is starting work in Geneva, Pyadyshhev said.

He noted one more aspect, not related directly to the current Geneva talks. The USSR proposes that the question of nuclear systems in Europe, including tactical missiles, be examined and resolved in separate multilateral talks in accordance with the Budapest Initiative of the USSR and the other Warsaw Treaty countries.

We stand for finding solutions to these extremely important questions as soon as possible. We are closely analyzing relevant developments in Washington and keep record of statements of "cautious optimism" with regard to the possibility of concluding agreements on longer-range and shorter-range missiles already this year. The Soviet spokesman noted that the manoeuvres of those who were opposed to the agreements were not going unnoticed either. Their arguments are clearly losing their substance and forcefulness and becoming empty declarations.

We understand the U.S. need to consult the NATO allies on the matter of eliminating nuclear systems in the European Continent. But it is important that this natural process should not amount to passing responsibility back and forth and become a barrier on the road to agreements.
Fraternal States' Appraisal

LD231914 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Text] A briefing for newsmen on the agenda of the visit to our country by Hafiz al-Asad took place today in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center. The key international problems, first and foremost the issue of a Mideast settlement and an international conference on the Middle East, will be the subject of the forthcoming talks. Great attention will be devoted to the issues of bilateral relations between the USSR and the Syrian Arab Republic.

The attention of Soviet and foreign correspondents was drawn also to the Soviet-U.S. talks concerning the questions of medium-range missiles within the framework of the talks on nuclear and space weapons, which have resumed in Geneva.

It was reported at the briefing that in recent days, special Soviet representatives visited Warsaw Pact states and Yugoslavia. The leaders of the fraternal socialist states gave a high appraisal during discussions to the initiatives of the Soviet leadership, which aim to liberate Europe from nuclear missiles. They expressed full support for and endorsed the Soviet proposals on eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles from Europe.

The meeting was conducted by Comrade Pyadyshhev, first deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Department.

Nuclear Test Fact

LD231257 Moscow TASS in English 1243 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS — At a briefing for Soviet and foreign newsmen held here today a question was put to a USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman regarding the idea of reaching an agreement between the USSR and the United States on conducting underground nuclear explosions at each other's test sites.

The truth is that this idea was put forward during the Soviet-U.S. negotiations with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said. But this idea was not specifically discussed and the more so no concrete agreement on this score was reached. To put it shortly, this idea remains an idea as yet.

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CSo: 5200/1454
SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY NEWS CONFERENCE 28 APRIL

Discussions With Shultz

LD281404 Moscow TASS in English 1359 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 28 TASS -- "Moscow is following with attention the debate at NATO's leading circles of the Soviet initiatives on medium-range and shorter-range missiles.

"The talks between the prime ministers of France and Britain have become a noticeable feature in the European political landscape following Reykjavik," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Boris Pyadyshhev told a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists here today.

The USSR, he said, did not fail to notice actions and statements negatively assessing the Soviet proposals and statements of a positive character.

In this connection, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman drew attention to George Shultz' interview shown in Western Europe the other day in which the U.S. secretary of state dwelt on the issue of how the implementation of the Soviet proposals would affect the security of NATO countries.

"One cannot but agree with a number of remarks made by the secretary of state," Pyadyshhev said. He drew attention, in particular, to Shultz' remark on the reduction of Soviet medium-range missiles the elimination of which the NATO countries had sought and against which, according to the U.S. secretary of state, the deployment of American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles had been undertaken.

Quoting Shultz as saying that caution was necessary but that the West should not be afraid of saying "yes" to its own proposal, the Soviet spokesman said:

"One can only agree with that. One should also agree with the secretary's remark on shorter-range missiles which the Soviet side suggested eliminating."

Pyadyshhev quoted the secretary of state as expressing serious doubts that the offered option could weaken NATO militarily, while the agreement on medium-range missiles would undermine NATO's doctrine of flexible response.

The USSR was not going to interfere in NATO's internal affairs or analyze relations between the U.S. and its Western European partners, the Soviet spokesman said. "But one cannot but mention the fact that the secretary of state's considerations are well-considered and even sensible."
"The thoughts go in the correct direction. It seems that the discussions during the latest Soviet-American talks in Moscow had not been in vain."

INF, ABM Discussions

LD281449 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, 28 Apr (TASS) -- USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman Boris Pyadashev said that the Soviet draft treaty on scrapping medium-range missiles in Europe with its appendices, takes account of the U.S. draft previously presented, including the shortcomings it contains. He spoke here today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists.

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the Soviet draft takes as its starting point the need to foreclose possible channels for circumventing the treaty under preparation, something that is effectively not excluded by the U.S. draft, permitting as it does, for instance, the possibility of converting U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe into other nuclear weapons. Under the Soviet draft, the scrapping of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles should be effected stage by stage, with each side scrapping a correspondingly equal percentage of its missiles at each stage. The development [sozdaniye] of new types of medium-range missiles would also be banned.

The Soviet draft forms a good basis for an early elaboration of a mutually-accepted accord, one that could represent the first step on the road to freeing Europe entirely of nuclear weapons, and an important measure aimed at the destruction of nuclear weapons throughout the world. This, said B. Pyadashev, is a concrete embodiment of the accords reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik.

He went on to point out that reports have recently appeared in the U.S. press concerning statements by Paul Nitze, in which reference is made to the Soviet stance on strengthening the system of the ABM Treaty, as presented to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow. In connection with this, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman gave a reminder that in Moscow, the Soviet side submitted a proposal on drafting "key positions" which would include a fundamental accord on strengthening the system of the ABM Treaty, envisaging a mutual pledge by the sides not to withdraw from the treaty for a period of 10 years, while strictly observing it.

The Soviet side also expressed the consideration that it might be possible to make use of the examination of the matter at the session of the Geneva consultative commission this year in order to reinforce understanding of the issue of strengthening the ABM Treaty system. Moreover, it might be possible to hold this session at a higher level than usual -- for instance, at the level of defense ministers or their deputies.

As Nitze has reported, the U.S. side has taken note of the Soviet proposals, and they are being studied in Washington, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

**SOVIET OFFICIALS BRIEF WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS**

Adamishin in France

LD222351 Moscow TASS in English 2013 GMT 22 Apr 87


Yakov Ryabov, ambassador of the USSR to France, took part in the conversation.

Deryabin in Denmark

LD242359 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1646 GMT 24 Apr 87

[Text] Copenhagen, 24 Apr (TASS) --- The new initiatives on INF problems and other questions of European security submitted by Mikhail Gorbachev in Prague, and in the conversation with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, have been discussed during meetings between Soviet Special Representative (Yu. Deryabin), and B. Pastukhov, USSR Ambassador to Denmark, with Danish Deputy Foreign Minister S. Jakobsen, and (H. Gottlieb), adviser to the prime minister of questions of foreign politics.

Soviet-Danish consultations have also been held on issues of the Vienna meeting. T. Technagel, head of the Danish Foreign Ministry Political Department, and W. Friis, Miller, head of the Danish delegation in Vienna, took part in the proceedings.

Aleksandrov in Sweden

LD242349 Moscow TASS in English 2027 GMT 24 Apr 87

[Text] Stockholm, 24 Apr (TASS)---Ambassador Andrey Aleksandrov, special envoy of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Boris Pankin, the ambassador of the USSR to Sweden, were received by Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson.
The Soviet representatives informed the Swedish prime minister of the Soviet Union's recent initiatives in the field of nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of European security and universal peace, and of the results of the conversations and talks which Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders had had with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

The Swedish prime minister spoke highly of the Soviet Union's consistent peaceful policy, emphasized an urgent necessity to move onto reducing arms, particularly nuclear ones, as soon as possible, and wished the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva a successful development.

Deryabin in Finland

LD281650 Moscow TASS in English 1235 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] Helsinki 28 Apr (TASS) — M. Koivisto, president of the Finnish Republic, today received Soviet special representative Yu.S. Deryabin and V.M. Sobolev, the USSR's ambassador to Finland. During the conversation that took place the discussion covered topical problems connected with the new initiatives from the Soviet Union on medium-range missiles and on European security, as put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Prague and in conversation with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. A high appraisal was given by the Finnish side to the USSR's proposals, which open up a realistic path for reduction of nuclear arsenals in Europe. The Soviet representative also had a conversation with Prime Minister K. Sorsa and Foreign Minister P. Väyrynen. Soviet-Finnish consultations also took place on issues of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the CSCE states.

Aleksandrov in Iceland

LD281657 Moscow in English 1532 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] Reykjavik April 28 TASS — Icelandic Prime Minister Steingrimur Hermannsson received ambassador Andrey Aleksandrov, a special representative of the USSR, and Igor Krasavin, USSR Ambassador to Iceland.

The prime minister was informed of the recent Soviet foreign policy initiatives and the results of the talks and negotiations of the Soviet leaders with U.S. State Secretary George Shultz.

Steingrimur Hermannsson expressed gratitude for the received information, favoured an end to the arms race, liberation of the world from nuclear weapons and acclaimed the Soviet efforts taken in this direction.
Obukhov in Belgium

AU301952 Paris AFP in English 1948 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] Brussels, April 30 (AFP) — A Soviet envoy met here Thursday with Foreign
Minister Leo Tindemans to explain Moscow's offer to remove all medium-range missiles
from Europe and to establish parity between superpower missiles deployment elsewhere,
diplomatic sources said.

Alexey Obukhov, deputy negotiator at U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks in Geneva, told
reporters his visit was part of a European tour to outline Moscow's proposals. He
highlighted the "sincerity" of the Soviet offer and said his country wanted to make
headway in U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks at Geneva. "A new atmosphere, political and
emotional, will appear," he added. Mr. Obukhov said "Trust will appear that could have
an impetus on negotiations on conventional armament."

"We understand the Western counties have to discuss and weigh their response to (our)
proposals," he said.

The Soviet Union said Tuesday it had offered to remove all intermediate-range missiles
from Europe and called for an equal deployment of Soviet and U.S. missiles elsewhere.
Mr. Obukhov had said in Geneva that the proposals were based on the agreement outlined
at the Reykjavik summit last November between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Meanwhile at the United Nations in Geneva, the United States criticised the chairman of
the U.N. disarmament committee, Milos Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, for being biased
toward the Soviet Union in reporting the work of his committee.

Karpov in Spain

LD290742 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 2100 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] Viktor Karpov, director general for disarmament [title as heard] at the USSR
Foreign Ministry, had talks this morning with Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco
Fernandez Ordonez to explain the USSR's disarmament proposals. Correspondent Nacho
Hernandez reports:

[Hernandez] These talks were rounded off by an appearance before the foreign affairs
committee by the man who is seen as the Soviet diplomat on disarmament questions.
Viktor Karpov, speaking in the Upper Chamber [of the Senate], said that it is better to
have even a partial agreement on disarmament than no agreement at all.

Later, speaking on the second Spanish television news bulletin, he referred to the
Geneva talks. According to what he said, an agreement on reducing nuclear missiles may
be reached shortly, while he also emphasised that the head of the Soviet delegation in
Geneva possesses full negotiating powers.
Hernandez] Viktor Karpov, who has been explaining the USSR disarmament proposals to the Spanish authorities for the last 2 days, believes that the arms control verification mechanism offered in Geneva offers every guarantee.

[Begin Karpov recording in Russian with superimposed translation] In our plan it is clearly envisaged that at every stage in eliminating medium-range missiles an exact and rigid control system will be created, a system that will also foresee in situ verification, inspection, and (?visits) to the sites where missiles are being eliminated and those places where missiles are tested. [end recording]

Calls Meeting 'Useful'

LD282227 Madrid in Spanish to Europe 1130 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] [Soviet leader] Gorbachev's latest proposals on eliminating short-range and medium-range missiles from Europe will be one of the most important subjects of the talks between Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans and his Spanish counterpart, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez. This subject will undoubtedly be especially emphasized after the current visit to Madrid by top Soviet expert, adviser, and former negotiator Viktor Karpov, who is now Mikhail Gorbachev's close adviser. This morning he ended his official visit to Spain with a meeting with Foreign Minister Fernandez Ordonez.

Karpov had a 40-minute meeting with the Spanish foreign minister and briefed him on the Soviet peace initiatives promoted by the Soviet leader. Gorbachev's adviser on disarmament questions described the meeting with Fernandez Ordonez as very useful and briefly stated that he had briefed the foreign minister on details of the Soviet proposals. Tomorrow Karpov leaves Madrid. His visit is part of a tour of capitals of Western European countries by Soviet representatives to explain the Soviet position on disarmament matters. Viktor Karpov is seen as the outstanding Soviet diplomat on disarmament questions. He was Soviet ambassador in Washington and until last January led the Soviet delegation at the disarmament talks in Geneva.

Bessmertnykh in UK

LD291450 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1346 GMT 29 Apr 87

[Text] A Soviet minister met his British counterparts in London today to explain his country's attitude to arms control issues is particular proposals for removing intermediate range nuclear weapons from Europe.

Mr Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, visited the Foreign Office for a 70-minute meeting with Mr Timothy Renton, the minister responsible for arms control.

The Foreign Office said later he summarised recent developments in Soviet arms control policies including the talks in Moscow, involving U.S Secretary of State Mr George Shultz, and the negotiations with the U.S. in Geneva.
The Soviet minister did not deliver a copy of the draft treaty on the proposals for the removal of intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe which was tabled in Geneva two days ago. He is due to see Mrs Thatcher at Downing Street later today.

Mr Bessmertnykh is one of a number of Soviet envoys visiting European capitals on similar missions.

Talks With Thatcher

LD292009 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1919 GMT 29 Apr 87

[By Tom McMullan, PRESS ASSOCIATION diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Mrs Thatcher today drew attention to "difficulties" in Soviet proposals for eliminating intermediate range nuclear weapons from Europe, according to a statement issued after talks at Downing Street with the deputy Soviet foreign ministry.

Mr Aleksandr Bessmertnykh saw the prime minister for 50 minutes, and the talks, described as "substantial" were said to have taken place in a good atmosphere.

The statement said Mr Bessmertnykh called to brief Mrs Thatcher on the latest Soviet proposals in Geneva on intermediate and short range nuclear weapons.

The prime minister was said to have reaffirmed the government's commitment to achieving rapid progress in the Geneva negotiations, and emphasised the British Government accepted the zero option for intermediate range nuclear weapons, although would prefer this to be a global zero. But, according to the statement, Mrs Thatcher drew attention to "a number of difficulties" in the Soviet plans. She stressed that the alliance was engaged in urgent discussion on the Soviet proposals on shorter range nuclear weapons, and hoped a common position would soon be reached. Any agreement must preserve Europe's security and take account of the Soviet Union's substantial superiority in both conventional and chemical weapons.

Mr Bessmertnykh is one of a number of Soviet envoys visiting European capitals on similar missions.

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CPSU'S YELTSIN: U.S. 'DESIRE IN PRINCIPLE TO AGREE'  

LD261815 Moscow TASS in English 1806 GMT 26 Apr 87

[Excerpts] Sofia, 26 Apr (TASS)--Boris Yeltsin, an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU who led a delegation from the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU to Sofia, held a news conference for Bulgarian and Soviet newsmen here today.

Asked by a TASS correspondent about the results of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz' visit to Moscow, Yeltsin said:

"We felt that Americans' desire in principle to agree to a solution to the issue of intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles in Europe. The U.S. side is now examining a draft agreement on eliminating such missiles along with discussing the issue of shorter-range missiles.

"The matter is utterly clear. Europe and also the world as a whole will heave a sigh of relief if this first step -- the elimination of the INF in Europe and the restriction of the number of such missiles in Soviet Asia and on America's territory to 100 -- is taken.

"We are prepared for any reciprocal verification arrangements to monitor compliance with this agreement that the Americans will suggest to us."

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CSO: 5200/1454
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF INTERVIEWED ON INF

PM291655 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Major General Yu. Lebedev, deputy chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff directorate: "Major General Yu. Lebedev: Will the West Display the Political Will?" -- date and place not given]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms resumed in Geneva last week. The Soviet delegation was instructed to embark immediately, on the very first day of the new round, in conjunction with the U.S. delegation, on the elaboration of concrete accords on medium-range nuclear missiles and operational and tactical missiles.

"What nuclear armaments in Europe does it concern?" was the first question an IZVESTIYA correspondent put to Major General Yu. Lebedev, deputy chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff directorate.

[Lebedev] If we are talking about medium-range missiles, the United States currently has 380 in Western Europe. Of these 108 are Pershing-2's and 272 are cruise missiles. There are 355 missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union: 243 SS-20's and 112 SS-4's. As is known, the Soviet Union has suspended [priostanovleno] deployment of these missiles. Moreover, some of the SS-20 missiles have been taken out of service unilaterally. Deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles, however, is in full swing.

[IZVESTIYA] And apart from the medium-range missiles?

[Lebedev] There are Soviet operational and tactical missiles in Europe, that is, missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km, and tactical nuclear weapons with a range of 500 km and less.

As well as Pershing-2's and cruise missiles, the United States has other forward-based nuclear weapons on the European Continent: 640 carrier aircraft capable of striking throughout the depth of the territory of the European socialist countries and a substantial part of the USSR's European zone; in addition to this, the U.S. 6th and 2d operational fleets are operating permanently in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and around 300 deck ground-attack aircraft carrying nuclear weapons are based on their aircraft carriers. Finally, these fleet' surface ships and nuclear submarines continue to be armed with sea-based cruise missiles with a range of about 2,600 km.

Add to this the fact that the armed forces of the West European NATO states have more than 700 tactical strike aircraft with nuclear weapons on board, 72 Pershing-1A ballistic missile launch installations, and over 100 launch installations for Lance
missiles, which can carry nuclear charge. The Armed Forces of the United States and its NATO allied have over 2,000 nuclear artillery pieces and more than 7,000 nuclear warheads in Western Europe.

[IZVESTiya] What is to be investigated now, at the present round of the Geneva talks?

[Lebedev] The USSR delegation at the Geneva talks was instructed to embark immediately, on 23 April, in conjunctions with the U.S. delegation, on the elaboration of concrete accords on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. A Soviet draft treaty on medium-range missiles was placed on the negotiating table. In the other groups the U.S. side was requested to elaborate key provisions relating to a 50-percent reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States in their strategic offensive armaments in conjunction with the solution of questions concerning strengthening the ABM Treaty setup.

But first of all I would remind you of the following. During the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Reykjavik last October the sides reached an accord on the total destruction of Soviet and U.S. European medium-range missiles. The Soviet Union also proposed a freeze on the number of operational and tactical missiles in Europe with a range of less than 1,000 km. The Soviet Union would be able to have 100 medium-range missile warheads in Asia and the United States would be able to have the same number on its own national territory, stationed in such a way that they cannot reach one another's territory. Together with the other proposals -- on strategic offensive armaments, banning nuclear tests, and strengthening the ABM Treaty setup -- the medium-range missile proposals formed a package and required a comprehensive solution.

Immediately after the Reykjavik meeting, which demonstrated that nuclear disarmament is perfectly feasible, a number of Western figures tried to accuse the Soviet side of complicating the question of medium-range missiles on the pretext that the USSR was insisting that it could only be examined as part of a package.

Demonstrating in practice its adherence to eliminating nuclear weapons, and with a view to practical progress at the talks, the Soviet Union took one more step: On 28 February the Soviet side's readiness to single that problem out from the block of other questions and to conclude a separate agreement on medium-range missiles without delay was declared.

What is more, the Soviet Union announced that, immediately after an agreement is signed, by agreement with the GDR and CSSR Governments, it will withdraw from those countries the increased range operational and tactical missiles that were sited there as a countermeasure to the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, and it also expressed readiness to embark at once on talks on missiles of that category with a view to reducing and totally eliminating them. In so doing the Soviet Union reckoned that the West would finally undertake to conclude a corresponding accord.

It turned out, however, that there is a vast distance between the West's declarative statements and an actual agreement. They seem to have forgotten their recent assurances of their readiness to resolve the question of medium-range missiles without delay as soon as it is singled out from the total package, and they have begun inflating with new force the thesis of the "Soviet military threat" and presenting the matter as though West Europe will find itself "unarmed" and "defenseless" without U.S. Pershings and cruise missiles.

The U.S. side began departing step by step from the accord on medium-range missiles reached in Reykjavik. To that end intensive discussion began of options for
reequipping medium-range Pershing-2 missiles as Pershing-1B's with a range of less than 1,000 km and relocating U.S. cruise missiles from dry land onto warships. The infrastructure of the U.S. medium-range missiles would be preserved here so as to be able, if necessary, to revive them in Europe. In addition, it was planned to reduce medium-range missiles in such a way that Soviet missiles would be destroyed first of all, and only then U.S. ones.

In general, we did not see any U.S. desire to take advantage of the opportunities presented to improve the international situation.

[IZVESTIYA] In other words, the Soviet leadership's decision to remove [vychlenit] medium-range missiles from the total package of proposals which we advanced in Reykjavik was extremely complex?

[Lebedev] Yes, and I would like to point out that in the reduction and destruction of medium-range missiles the Soviet Union left to one side the U.S. forward-based nuclear means — hundreds of aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons based on dry land and on aircraft carriers, which can inflict strikes far beyond the borders of Europe's socialist countries. The British and French nuclear forces are not touched either.

[IZVESTIYA] Incidentally, what is the composition of those states' nuclear forces?

[Lebedev] Britain's nuclear force includes 4-nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines, each of which is equipped with 16 Polaris A-3TK ballistic missile launchers (each missile has 6 nuclear warheads), with a range of up to 4,000 km, as well as approximately 200 tactical aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In the early nineties it is planned to purchase Trident 2 ballistic missiles, with which the new British missile-carrying submarines will be equipped.

France's nuclear forces include 6 missile-capable nuclear-powered submarines with 96 launchers. In addition, France has 18 silo-based launchers for ballistic missiles with a range of over 3,500 km, around 30 Mirage IVA bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads and air-to-ground missiles, and also over 70 nuclear-capable tactical strike aircraft. France's ground forces have around 40 launchers for Pluton nuclear missiles with a range of over 120 km.

5-4 ground-based strategic missiles with a range of over 5,000 km and M-5 sea-based missiles (with a range of around 6,000 km) are at the development stage [stadiya razrabotki] in France. The Hades missile, with a range of over 350 km, is being developed [razrabatyvatsya] for the ground forces.

The difficulty of the decision the Soviet leadership made is also illustrated by the fact that our proposal on medium-range missiles was put forward in conditions when Washington is continuing the accelerated implementation of all its arms programs — both nuclear and space strike arms. At the same time, the Soviet leadership's decision was carefully balanced from the viewpoint of safeguarding the security of our country and its allies.

Speaking in Prague, M.S. Gorbachev developed the Soviet position so as to prevent our opponents from delaying the conclusion of an accord on medium-range missiles and ultimately from preventing an accord being reached. The proposal was made to begin the discussion of the question of reducing and subsequently eliminating operational and tactical missiles sited on the European Continent. Furthermore, in conversation with Secretary of State Shultz, M.S. Gorbachev expressed a readiness to include in a medium-range missile agreement the Soviet Union's commitment to simultaneously remove its operational and tactical missiles in Europe and hold talks on those missiles sited
in the east of our country and on U.S. territory. Furthermore, for the duration of the talks the two sides would assume a commitment not to build up missiles of this class.

The USSR is also ready to resolve the question of tactical nuclear facilities in conjunction with the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe at separate multilateral talks in accordance with the Warsaw Pact states' Budapest initiative.

Completely destroying the militarist circles' arguments regarding the "insincerity" of the Soviet proposals, the USSR once again showed its determination to overcome the obstacles in the way of eliminating nuclear missiles in Europe. This cannot go unnoticed in the West, and the U.S. side must give a response on whether it is ready for a mutually acceptable accord in this area.

Since we are talking about the reduction and elimination of whole classes of armaments, it is appropriate to add that the question of verification acquire a qualitatively new significance and becomes one of the most important means of ensuring security. Thus the USSR advocates the elaboration and application of the strictest measures in this sphere including on-site inspection, which must apply not only to the remaining missiles and launchers but all other facilities, in particular: test sites, manufacturing plants, training centers, and so forth. Inspectors must also be allowed access to the other side's military bases located on the territory of third countries.

[IZVESTIYA] How do you assess the prospects for reaching an accord?

[Lebedev] I will say this: Recent events have convincingly demonstrated the possibility of taking in Europe the first very important step along the path to a nuclear-free world. If the West, and above all the United States, shows the political will, the Soviet proposals on the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe can be implemented in the very near future and the breakthrough in the international situation the world's peoples hope for can be achieved.

Note must be made, however, of the unconstructive stance taken by Washington and some of its NATO allies which, to all appearances, is due to their lack of readiness to resolve the security problem on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Some cite their "Atlantic commitments," others cite the concept of "nuclear deterrence," a concept that is becoming obsolete -- they intend to retain the U.S. missiles in Europe and delay the solution of this most important problem. The essence of this stance was recently set out frankly by U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger. He stated that strength -- the "effective deterrent" -- is still the main factor in it. But the time of the "policy of strength" in the modern world is disappearing. The sooner this happens, the better. Better for all. The peoples of Europe have already understood this well -- now NATO's leaders must understand it, too.

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USSR: LATE APRIL COMMENTS ON U.S. RESPONSE TO INITIATIVES

Consultations on Shultz Trip

PN231245 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 4

["IZVESTIYA Press Service" report: "The White House: Consultations in Progress"]

[Text] Back from a 10-day Easter holiday which he spent at his ranch in California, President Reagan has begun a series of consultations with congressional leaders. The subject of the consultations are the results of the recent visit by George Shultz, secretary of state, to Moscow and the prospects of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear missiles in Europe.

The President has already had a meeting in the White House with leaders of the Republican Party and for Wednesday, 22 April, he had a meeting lined up with both Republicans and Democrats. A great deal depends on the stand taken by the latter: Enjoying a majority not only in the House of Representatives but also in the Senate, they in fact hold the key to ratifying any possible agreement. According to UPI, in organizing the consultations the President "would like to enlist the support of both parties" in the question of Euromissiles.

And what is the attitude of the White House itself? There is no plain answer. Reagan himself has said that he is "optimistic but realistic" regarding the possibility of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union. He has also said that "there are still a great many issues to be worked out." When asked whether an agreement on Euromissiles is possible this year, Reagan said that he would not like to hazard a guess. Statements like these have compelled the REUTERS correspondent in Washington to reach the conclusion that "a note of caution has been introduced to the mood of enthusiasm that was evident among members of the administration after Shultz' return from Moscow."

This note of caution is being intensified by certain remarks made by Shultz himself and also by Republican and Democratic leaders in the Senate. It is reported that, when present at Reagan's meeting with Republican leaders, the secretary of state told them that "major problems relating to verification" of the implementation of a potential accord "are still unresolved." In their turn, Robert Dole, Republican leader in the Senate, and Robert Byrd, leader of the Democratic majority in the Senate, have made it clear that they would like to retain a number of nuclear arms in Europe.

According to Dole, "We need some nuclear arms in Europe. These arms pose no threat to peace. They preserve it." And Byrd has cautioned the administration against "rushing into concluding an agreement" that he claimed, could lead to a reduction in NATO's defense capability and a split in the North Atlantic Alliance.
A different viewpoint was put forward by Republican Congressman Richard Cheney, who was a member of the U.S. parliamentary delegation that recently visited the USSR. "We have a multitude of nuclear arms in Europe," he said, noting that "even if the idea of a zero option for medium-range missiles is adopted, our potential will still be considerable."

White House, NATO Meetings

LD231611 Moscow TASS in English 1534 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 23 TASS -- TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev reports:

President Ronald Reagan met leaders of the U.S. Congress in the White House Wednesday. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger were present at the meeting.

House of Representatives Speaker James Wright informed those present about the outcome of his trip to the USSR and the discussion in Moscow of issues pertaining to nuclear arms limitation.

In a talk with journalists he noted that the proposal on shorter-range missiles made by the Soviet Union demonstrated the USSR's sincere wish to conclude an agreement on medium-range missiles and expressed the view that accepting this proposal was in line with the U.S. interests.

The President refrained from the commentaries on the Soviet Union's latest proposals. Prior to his meeting with the leaders of Congress, he expressed the hope, however, that the process of talks will be kept going and would lead to results substantial to all of them.

White House official spokesman Marlin Fitzwater called the USSR's proposal on shorter-range missiles very interesting. He said the administration continued consultations with the NATO allies and a final decision on the U.S. stand would not be made until they were over.

A two-day meeting of top NATO officials was held in the city of Albuquerque, New Mexico, within the framework of these consultations. As was already reported, the U.S. delegation was headed by such strong supporter of the touch course towards the USSR as Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle.

INF, Conventional Forces

LD281629 Moscow TASS in English 1624 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 28 TASS -- The U.S. Administration believes that there is no need to tie a solution of the issue of "conventional force imbalances" in Europe to an INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) agreement", spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told journalists on Monday. [quotation marks as received]

He explained the administration's stand on the issue in connection with an article published in THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper by Richard Nixon, former president of the USA, and Henry Kissinger, former U.S. secretary of state.
The Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and arms, according to the spokesman, enable the USA to state its concern over the issue and recognition of its existence. The USA regards such an approach as a right one.

Mr. Fitzwater said the USA agreed to an interim accord which reflected the concept which presupposes the keeping of 100 warheads on longer-range INF nuclear missiles on each side on the basis of an INF agreement.

He went on to say that the USA agrees that the elimination of the remaining warheads will broaden possibilities for the verification of an INF agreement. Mr. Fitzwater did not agree with the opinion of Mr. Nixon who had questioned the entire "Star Wars" program and who described the SDI as a myth.

28 April Interview

Lb291138 Moscow TASS in English 1029 GMT 29 Apr 87

Speaking of arms shipments to Iran, which have triggered off a resounding political scandal in the United States, he stuck to his earlier stand contradicting the generally known fact that by supplying weapons to Iran, the United States directly interfered in the Iran-Iraq war with the aim of stoking up that bloody conflict.

Reagan claimed that the purpose of the arms deliveries was merely "to establish that contact and see if we could not get a basis for a better relationship between our two countries."

Part of the proceeds from the secret arms sales to Iran were funneled as military aid to anti-Nicaraguan contras at a time when that was banned by the U.S. law.

The President in his interview again denied any knowledge of the diversion of funds to the contras.

Asked about the extent to which he shared the view expressed by Secretary of State George Shultz upon his return from Moscow that the United States should take the Soviet Union at face value when it said it was talking seriously about arms control because it wanted a less threatening and less nuclear world, the President replied the U.S. was prepared to conduct negotiations with the USSR.

But he added in a most fuzzy way right after that "that doesn't mean that you don't insist on verification and the safeguards that we must have in such an agreement or treaty" or "that you're going to roll over and just give into something without protecting yourself."

 Asked about the problem of a "Warsaw Pact conventional force advantage over NATO" in the event of an agreement with the Soviet Union on both medium-range and shorter-range missiles, Reagan said a complete "Denuclearization of Europe," or the scrapping of all nuclear weapons there, was not at issue.

"We're in touch with our allies in NATO," he said, but one should remember that even if a deal on such missiles was made, "There are still thousands of warheads left in nuclear weapons on our part -- airborne tactical-type weapons and so forth."
Reagan was also asked about his view on the causes behind a situation where one could see in the American newspapers day to day a society producing rogues, drug addicts, television evangelists swapping charges on amoral conduct, and even prominent individuals within his administration having been accused of wrongdoing.

In reply the President said the causes of that condition of American society were in cynicism, especially among the young, and in "value-free education" in the country that did not teach what was right and what was wrong.

Reagan, Shultz 'Ambiguous'

OW250456 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1115 GMT 24 Apr 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Valeriy Korzin]

[Text] The whole world today lives in hope that, due to initiatives and the flexibility of Soviet foreign policies, the question of the arms race may finally be solved. The position of our side is obvious. Now the matter rests with the United States. Therefore, special attention is being paid to the statements and remarks of the representatives of the U.S. Administration and above all, of course, the head of the White House, Reagan.

The U.S. President made a statement in connection with the beginning of the scheduled round of talks in Geneva. Although a number of central issues must still be resolved and there is much to be discussed at the talks, the statement says, the prospects of reaching an agreement on INF have improved.

Speaking on a television program, George Shultz, too, noted a number of breakthroughs on the question of operational and tactical missiles. At the same time however, he felt that it was necessary to note that even in the case of an agreement being reached between the Soviet Union and the United States on the elimination of medium-range missiles, the United States would continue to maintain an imposing threat -- as he put it -- with its nuclear presence in Europe. He undoubtedly had in mind the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on aircraft carriers and on submarines and battlefield nuclear arms and even strategic nuclear arsenals on the territory of the United States itself.

This ambiguous position naturally causes concern among the Americans who fully understand the necessity to end the arms race. Influential U.S. arms control experts held a news conference on this issue. The former U.S. head of the delegation to the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe, [name indistinct] said: Those people who aim their criticisms at the new Soviet proposals are, in my opinion, deliberately forgetting the proposal made by the U.S. President in 1981, the so-called zero option.

All this points supposedly to the fact that the West Europeans now are deliberately being forced to speak out officially against the impending and reasonable agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.
Weinberger 'Attack' Against Glasnost

LD300534 Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 29 Apr 87

[Text] The American Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's hostile attitude towards the USSR and its policies is notorious. His latest attack he mounted against glasnost, a policy of promoting the greatest openness of crucial national issues to public scrutiny. Viktor Ivanov now comments:

As he spoke in San Francisco, Mr. Weinberger described glasnost in the USSR as an exercise in rhetoric. He claimed that that policy was unable to bring any practical results and said the USSR's attitude to the problems of arms limitation was an example. According to Mr. Weinberger, the Soviet attitude has undergone no considerable change.

It's very likely that Mr. Weinberger had in mind the basic principle the USSR is strongly committed to in matters of disarmament -- that of equality and like security, a principle it believes must be complied with under any circumstances. This means that as armaments are reduced and eliminated, no disbalance [as heard] should appear that might cause damage to the security of either side. Acting otherwise would amount to sacrificing either one's own interests or the interests of one's partners. The USSR wants equality preserved at all levels of arms reduction. Its ultimate goal is to build a nuclear weapons-free world already in this century. To achieve this goal, the Soviet Union has made serious concessions hoping that these would repay many times over. For instance, the Soviet Union has agreed to take medium-range missiles in Europe out of the disarmament package, taken into account Western fears concerning shorter-range missiles and suggested radical measures to eliminate chemical weapons. It has reviewed dramatically its attitude to NATO's zero option. Incidentally, by doing so it exposed NATO's duplicity in relations towards nuclear arms in Europe. The zero option as we see it now has been used as a means of political gambling aimed at putting a number of conditions unacceptable to the Soviet Union and then accusing it of reluctance to compromise. Now that the Soviet Union has agreed to the zero option, NATO is suddenly unprepared to carry out its own proposal. Nothing can be farther from what is known as glasnost. That was a direct deceit of public opinion in the West.

In that San Francisco speech, Mr. Weinberger also accused the USSR of reluctance to reconsider its attitude towards SDI, a program for developing space weapons, and interpreted this as a lack of openness in Soviet policy. This view is biased. The current broad public discussion of disarmament and related issues, including SDI, is evidence of this. Not a single day passes without the topic being discussed in newspapers and on radio and television. There is a question the Soviet participants in the debates have repeatedly asked the United States but so far have failed to receive an answer:

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SOVIET PAPER COUNTERS KIRKPATRICK'S VIEW OF 'SOVIET THREAT'

PM220909 [Editorial Report] Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 April 1987 First Edition carries on page 5 under the headline "New Era on the Scales of Logic" a 900-word reprint of a Jeane Kirkpatrick article in THE BOSTON GLOBE on a "dangerous new period" in international relations, when the "bold Gorbachev leadership" has taken the initiative, the United States has "weakened," and the Europeans are being asked to "risk their security" for the sake of the "risky game" of arms control. The article is accompanied by the following response by Valentin Berezhkov, chief editor of the journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA:

"One can agree with J. Francois-Poncet's arguments cited in Jeane Kirkpatrick's article that the world has now entered a 'new and much more dangerous period of international relations.' However, the interpretation of this fact by the veteran of French diplomacy -- an interpretation with which, judging by everything, Mrs Kirkpatrick agrees -- is a typical example of old thinking and adherence to the 'balance of power' and the false thesis of the 'Soviet threat.' Not wishing to come to terms with the fact that Soviet proposals have generated a broad response worldwide, Jeane Kirkpatrick asks with alarm: 'Does the Soviet Union under Gorbachev really control the international agenda? This question is posed straight, after a warning about a 'European Munich.'

"Mrs Kirkpatrick can hardly be unaware of prewar history and everything linked with the shameful Munich deal. Of course, she knows British and French politicians sold out Czechoslovakia to Hitler in the expectation that he would then fulfill his promise to 'destroy bolshevism.' She must also know that at the time only the Soviet Union stated its readiness to help any country subjected to Hitlerite aggression and that this prevented France from refusing to fulfill its previous commitments. The Munich treachery did not save the Western democracies. They were among the first victims of the blitzkrieg. Needless to say, it is not these events Jeane Kirkpatrick wishes to recall. She counts on the ignorance of prewar history on the part of most Americans and a certain number of West Europeans, and, linking her vague presentation of the negative picture of Munich with the notorious 'Soviet threat,' she tries to persuade readers that Moscow's initiatives are allegedly dangerous for the West. All this is fully consonant with J. Kirkpatrick's negative attitude to the disarmament process, which she disparagingly terms a 'risky game.'"

"The international situation is indeed fraught with serious dangers, but by no means because of Soviet initiatives. The threat to mankind comes from the enormous weapons arsenals and the now real possibility of a nuclear war. This danger is compounded by the stubborn U.S. desire to put nuclear systems into space. That is why the Soviet Union believes there is an urgent need for new approaches and ways of solving
international problems. It is primarily a question of taking proper account of the realities of the modern world.

"Jeane Kirkpatrick's article evinces a quite different concept of security. It asks the question: Has the United States really lost the ability to get its own way in the international sphere? Kirkpatrick does not explain just what she is after. But this is stated with consummate clarity in President Reagan's report 'On U.S. Strategy in the National Security Sphere' published by the White House at the beginning of the year. Unlike the Soviet conviction that nuclear war is the main threat to mankind, the President's report says the Soviet Union is the most serious threat to U.S. security and national interests. That is why America must build up its arms to 'repulse any military offensive and end a conflict on terms favorable to the United States.' There is not even a hint of new thinking in it. The U.S. concept of security, as we can see, is based on military force and the thesis that a U.S. 'victory' in a nuclear conflict is possible.

"Again citing French people with similar views, she goes on to scare the public to the effect that, allegedly, 'the Soviet aim is first to rid Europe of nuclear weapons and then to destroy the Western alliance.' Surely Moscow is not proposing the unilateral elimination of nuclear forces in Europe. The USSR is prepared to destroy its own corresponding weapons, too, and moreover to agree to substantial conventional arms reductions. Speaking at a Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship rally in Prague, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made a very important proposal: To ensure the immediate conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union is prepared to start discussion on the questions of reducing and subsequently eliminating missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km deployed on the European continent.

"As for the 'Western alliance,' the Soviet proposals, as is well known, envisage the simultaneous disbandment of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization. Here, of course, an important role could be played by the West European countries, whose influence in the international arena -- and on this one can agree with Jeane Kirkpatrick -- does not yet correspond to their potential.

"Here too I would cite once again the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who stressed in Prague: 'It is high time to blaze a trail for new political thinking in Europe more than anywhere else!'

"All these processes must be accompanied by the development of mutually advantageous equal cooperation among all states, and the strengthening of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

"Mrs. Kirkpatrick could also have found an answer here to the 'transition from capitalism to communism' -- a problem that worries her. The Soviet Union is fundamentally opposed to exporting revolution, just as it is to exporting counterrevolution. Social formations change in any country when the time is ripe. Jeane Kirkpatrick's arguments about whether the United States has entered a 'period of historical decline' is an American concern.

"Unlike the aims set out in the President's report, we in the USSR are busy developing socialism in our own country. To do that we need peace."

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USSR'S KARPOV CRITICIZES U.S. INF-SRINF 'PACKAGE'

AUI81930 Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 15 Apr 87 p 4

[Article by Viktor Karpov, "Head of the Administration on Arms Limitation and Disarmament of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs," especially written for ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME: "The USSR Is for Liquidating the Nuclear Threat"]

[Text] The fact that the delegations of the USSR and the United States at the Geneva talks started to prepare a draft treaty on liquidating the medium-range missiles in Europe is unquestionably an important step forward. However, it is now too early to ask when the work will be completed and whether it will lead to the preparation of a fully coordinated treaty, which must be approved by the two states' top leaders. The USSR is doing everything possible to reach an agreement. During the negotiations it became apparent that the basis of the joint project is there. It was adopted in Reykjavik, and its precise materialization in the specific clauses of a future treaty is a guarantee that the problem related to the liquidation of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe will be solved.

However, there is something which evokes concern. Immediately after the USSR untied the Reykjavik package, separating the issue of medium-range missiles from the houses related to strategic and space weapons, the U.S. side submitted its own draft treaty, which creates a new package, despite the fact that the United States ostensibly supports the separate solution of the issue of medium-range missiles. What is the essence of this new package? The agreement on the medium-range missiles in Europe is being connected with the solution of the issue of the operational-tactical weapons under the pretext that the liquidation of the USSR's SS-20 missiles on the one hand, and the U.S. "Pershing-2" missiles, which have a great range, on the other, would leave Europe "defenseless before the Soviet superiority in operational-tactical missiles." This claim lacks any grounds. The groundlessness of this thesis becomes obvious when we analyze the general balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, taking into consideration that England and France have nuclear weapons. Those who rely on this claim forget that in 1979, when NATO adopted the so-called "two-track decision," the possibility of the United States relinquishing the deployment of its medium-range missiles in Europe was connected only, I stress only, with the liquidation of the USSR's SS-20 missiles and not with the simultaneous liquidation of the missiles having a strategic-tactical purpose.
Thus now, when there has emerged the practical possibility of reaching an agreement on the complete release of Europe from medium-range U.S. and Soviet missiles, it is putting forth additional conditions, conditions which did not exist before.

One is also alarmed by the possibility, assumed by the United States, of converting the "Pershing-2" missiles, turning them into "Pershing 1B" missiles, and keeping them on European soil. The specialists, including the U.S. ones, think that such an operation would not pose any difficulties. However, it is also obvious that an operation related to the reconversion of the missiles would not pose any difficulties either.

Under these conditions the actual potential of the U.S. medium-range missiles would remain in Europe, while the missiles themselves could be quickly reconverted if the United States decides some day to violate the agreement. If we also add to this the fact that Washington's position envisages not the destruction of the cruise missiles, but the possibility of deploying them on vessels or replacing the nuclear warheads with conventional ones, one clearly understands that under the mask of liquidating the medium-range missiles, an operation to protect the U.S. nuclear potential in Europe is actually being conducted.

Let us assume that the USSR would agree to such an approach but, as compensation, preserving its right to reequip its SS-20 missiles and turn them into intercontinental missiles. Such a reequipment would not mean an increase in the nuclear threat to Europe. However, the USSR's potential to inflict a responsive strike against the United States would increase by 243 missiles. I do not think that such a step would increase U.S. security.

However, this is not the road the USSR would like to follow. We do not support an increase in the nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the United States. We support its lessening and the total liquidation of the nuclear threat. Therefore, we do not want the negotiations on the medium-range missiles to produce decisions that would lead to the preservation of the high level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, albeit in a different form. We support the total liquidation of the Soviet and U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. As Mikhail Gorbachev said in his Prague speech, the USSR supports the radical reduction and, in the final analysis, the total liquidation of the operational-tactical missiles on the continent.

All these issues are now in the center of the talks being conducted in Moscow by Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. We hope that these talks will clarify the U.S. position.

The essential question is as follows: If the United States adheres to the mutual understanding about medium-range missiles achieved in Reykjavik, it must remove the artificial barriers which it itself has erected before the attainment of an agreement. However, if the U.S. side continues, as before, to connect the issue of medium-range missiles with that concerning operational-tactical missiles, seeking to increase their numbers and not to liquidate
them, and if Washington continues to insist on keeping the "Pershing-2" missiles in Europe, although in a masked form, and if it rejects the physical destruction of the cruise missiles deployed on European territory—all this evokes a natural suspicion on the Soviet side because of the complete difference between U.S. words and practical deeds. This is the question I posed in a recent interview for the Soviet daily IZVESTIYA: "Is not the U.S. 'zero option' for the medium-range missiles in Europe a bluff?" This question remains relevant. The U.S. secretary of state can give an answer to this question during his visit to Moscow.

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SOVIET ARMY PAPER HITS U.S. STANCE ON SRINF, VERIFICATION

PM240943 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Apr 87 First Edition p 3

["Military-Political Review" by observer Manki Ponomarev: "Time Moves On"]

[Text] The prestigious West German magazine DER SPIEGEL was obliged to acknowledge in a recent issue that "Only 44 percent of FRG Citizens trust the U.S. President when he says he desires disarmament while 60 percent trust the Soviet party leader here."

The fact is undoubtedly highly noteworthy, especially when you consider that the FRG population is constantly subject to the massive influence of bourgeois propaganda and often has no opportunity to obtain at first hand a full idea of Soviet foreign policy and the USSR's peace-loving initiatives. But the strength of the Soviet Union's active and constructive policy is such that it overcomes all the obstacles being put in its path at this crucial moment in the international situation's development. The times in which we live are posing the most difficult and sometimes perplexing questions concerning the fate of the world and mankind's future. A solution to them can only be found on the basis of new political thinking and abandonment of established stereotypes. This is precisely the approach being shown by the Soviet Union in international affairs, and the peoples throughout the world are bound to see this. That is why the authority of the USSR and its policy is steadily growing and why the policy pursued by the ruling U.S. circles and their devotees in other Western countries -- a policy of force, confrontation, and imperial ambitions -- appears increasingly unacceptable.

Events of recent days -- M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia and his speeches there and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz' visit to Moscow, the talks held during the visit, and Soviet leaders' conversations with him -- have illuminated all this with particular clarity.

How is the Soviet Union acting? True to its objective of ridding the world of the nuclear threat for present and future generations, it is demonstrating in action its determination to find a solution to what would seem to be the most difficult problems obstructing the way to this objective. Is any more convincing confirmation of this needed than the USSR's decision to single out from among the other questions that of completely eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and immediately concluding a separate agreement on it? After all, this proposal offers a real opportunity to remove a whole class of nuclear weapons from European soil and begin the process of eliminating them.

But our country did not stop there. To facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union also expressed its readiness to resolve in a
constructive way the problem of operational and tactical missiles. To this end it is proposed that discussion begin on the question of reducing and subsequently eliminating missiles sited in Europe that have a range of 500-1,000 km. Moreover, the sides would commit themselves to refrain from increasing the number of such missiles for the duration of the talks. Then, in conversation with G. Shultz in the Kremlin, M.S. Gorbachev expressed his readiness to write into an agreement on medium-range missiles a Soviet commitment to completely eliminate within a relatively short and clearly designated period its operational and tactical missiles on the European Continent. The USSR indeed went even further and stated its readiness to eliminate also battlefield tactical missiles.

Why has the author deemed it necessary to dwell on this point in such detail? First, because it graphically illustrates the Soviet side's resolve to work to realize the great opportunities for the preparation of specific agreements on these questions that worry all mankind that were opened up by the foreign policy initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union. The USSR, after all, proceeds from the premise that it is possible to reach agreement with the United States on the problem of medium-range missiles in linkage with operational and tactical missiles and expresses its readiness to destroy this type of nuclear weapon unilaterally over the course of roughly 12 months, thus providing one more opportunity to effect a crucial breakthrough in international relations. Second, the approach of the U.S. and Soviet sides to the problem serves as the touchstone for their approach to mutual relations in general and international politics as a whole. And this, ultimately, is what is of paramount and of greatest importance, for time moves on. It urgently demands solutions.

But how strange the picture turns out to be, although it cannot, of course, be called unexpected. The Soviet Union has only to take one step toward the U.S. position and the United States immediately takes one step, only backward, sometimes rejecting what it previously zealously advocated and described as an absolute condition for the achievement of accords with the USSR. This is what has occurred, for example, with the zero option on medium-range missiles. The Soviet Union had only to agree to it and loud voices were immediately raised across the Atlantic about its unacceptability to the United States and about the need to leave a certain number of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Europe or, in the last resort, convert the Pershings so that they would, as it were, cease to be medium-range missiles but could very quickly become so again. Or consider operational and tactical missiles. The West has dinned into everyone's ears that the USSR has superiority in this kind of weapon, but when the Soviet side stated its readiness to commit itself to eliminating its operational and tactical missiles in Europe, the United States began to insist on the right to produce these weapons and site them in Europe in numbers roughly equal to those that the USSR will have after the elimination of the operational and tactical missiles withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

This -- to put it mildly -- highly original, or more precisely, very, very dangerous position is on the whole quite apparent. The United States is persistently seeking to get the Soviet Union to destroy unilaterally particular kinds of its weapons -- operational and tactical missiles, for example. The United States, at the same time will deploy such weapons and upgrade, in this case, its operational and tactical missiles. After this, how is one to regard President Reagan's desire in the area of Soviet-U.S. relations, as expressed in a recent article in the LOS ANGELES TIMES, "to achieve arms reductions that are monitorable and lead to stability, with the emphasis on monitorability?" What kind of "stabilization" do we have here if Washington intends to make up for the alleged enormous superiority of the USSR in shorter-range [menshaya dalnosta] missiles in Europe by another arms-upgrading. After all, even according to American figures, as cited in THE WASHINGTON POST, the United States has 5,000 nuclear
weapon units in Europe, which far exceeds the Pentagon's calculations of Soviet tactical nuclear arms in the region.

By the way, regarding the "monitorability" R. Reagan so stressed, it has long been a cliche of Western propaganda that it is impossible to achieve serious results at talks with the USSR on arms limitation because the Soviet side rejects verification measures, but here is how the business of verification really stands. In the opinion of the USSR, verification to ensure observance of future treaties is one of the most important means of ensuring security. Therefore our country intends to adopt the most vigorous stance on verification and to demand monitoring and inspection everywhere -- at the places where missiles are dismantled, at the places where they are destroyed [likvidatsiya], at ranges, and at military bases, including those in third countries, and at depots and plants, irrespective of whether they are private or belong to the state. What about the United States, then? There they are now clamoring increasingly loudly that...such verification is unacceptable and that it is impossible to agree with the Soviet standpoint on this score.

The new Soviet initiatives include not just the proposals on medium-range, operational and tactical, or tactical missiles. The Soviet leadership has proposed to the U.S. Administration that they begin drawing up "key provisions" about further talks regarding strategic offensive armaments and the operation of the ABM Treaty and nuclear tests which, together with the signing of a treaty on medium-range missiles, could be the subject of a summit accord and provide the basis for the preparation of legally binding agreements between the USSR and the United States. A refined compromise proposal designed to find a solution to complex problems involving SDI has also been submitted. Assent has thus been given for researching the ABM sphere but limited to that carried out in laboratories.

But the United States -- and G. Shultz' visit to the USSR showed this unequivocally -- is not ready to respond constructively to the series of specific Soviet proposals. While verbally acknowledging the need to solve crucial security problems -- and who in our time could deny such? -- the U.S. leadership prefers to resort to all manner of ploys and subterfuges. A characteristic moment occurred during the news conference in Moscow. In his reply to a question from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA asking why Washington could not give a clear "yes" to the new Soviet proposals, which correspond to what the United States and its allies were themselves demanding not so long ago, G. Shultz said that as a member of NATO the United States and its administration could not give a response without prior consultations with the allies. I think it difficult to regard the secretary of state's words here as anything other than yet another attempt to avoid giving a specific and constructive answer to the Soviet initiatives -- particularly as it is reported from Brussels that these consultations will last 1 or even 2 months and moreover that in the course of them Shultz is insisting on retaining the NATO doctrine of "flexible response," which envisages the use of nuclear weapons. According to him, this strategy "will be retained irrespective of any decision NATO makes on medium-range or operational and tactical missiles."

The conclusions drawn by the U.S. Administration from the Soviet proposals expounded during the talks with G. Shultz in Moscow will determine whether it will be possible to find a solution soon to the major questions of disarmament, particularly medium-range and shorter-range missiles, and change the situation in Soviet-U.S. relations and international affairs for the better.

But time does not stand still. Time demands an answer to these burning questions that affect the very destiny of human civilization. Every day of delay threatens new dangers. Every day the enemies of peace and progress heap up new obstacles to the longed-for goal of all people of good will -- a life without nuclear or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction and a safe life for our generation and those to come.

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SOVIET ACADEMIC ON LINKING INF, CW, CONVENTIONAL ARMS

PM281136 Paris LIBERATION in French 24 Apr 87 p 19

[Interview with Vitaliy Zhurkin, deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute, by Carlos de Sa Rego — date and place not given]

[Text] LIBERATION: A large number of European leaders think that Mikhail Gorbachev wants a "nuclear-free" Western Europe which would make it vulnerable in view of the USSR's superiority in the sphere of conventional forces.

Vitaliy Zhurkin: The Soviet Union wants peace and stability in Europe based on equal security for East and West. We think we must start by reducing nuclear weapons which are the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons. Nuclear war today would mean the end of civilization and probably of mankind. But although we give priority to trying to reduce nuclear arms in Europe — and ultimately eliminating them completely — we also want a drastic reduction in the imbalances in the sphere of conventional forces. Moreover in Budapest last summer the Warsaw Pact proposed immediate reduction in forces — 100,000 or 150,000 men and a corresponding proportion of weapons.

LIBERATION: What proportion?

Vitaliy Zhurkin: The idea is to reduce in particular weapons that can be used for surprise attacks, such as tactical aircraft for instance or, as the Western countries, think, tanks.... I cannot give a list: This is precisely one of the purposes of negotiations. In any event, this kind of weapon must be reduced in a much more radical way than other types. Of course we must proceed in stages: It is impossible to eliminate these huge quantities of weapons quickly. The same is true of chemical weapons (moreover there are reasonable proposals in this sphere put forward by the West German social democrats, the GDR, and the USSR itself).

LIBERATION: Is the USSR prepared to massively reduce its troops in Europe and to withdraw completely from the GDR for instance?

Vitaliy Zhurkin: This is a problem: You are talking about the withdrawal of all foreign troops deployed in other countries, and their return to their national territory. Yes, the USSR is prepared to withdraw its troops in Europe to its national territory, in the framework of international agreements in which the other nations would do likewise. This too is a gradual negotiated process. In the Budapest proposal the Warsaw Pact puts forward an important initial step: a 25-percent reduction in forces on both sides.
LIBERATION: Percentage reductions change nothing: The USSR would maintain its conventional superiority.

Vitaliy Zhurkin: Okay. Then let us sit round a table and discuss the matter. Let us leave the military and politicians to discuss the problem quietly. Moreover, the USSR is proposing meetings between the NATO and Warsaw Pact general secretaries and between the commanders of the two alliances' forces. Practical dialogue must be launched to express all the grievances and disagreement on the number of troops, the quality of weapons, and other matters.... This is why Mikhail Gorbachev recently proposed a meeting of European foreign ministers to discuss conventional forces.

LIBERATION: Would it not be better to start the negotiations by discussing these forces before tackling tactical nuclear weapons? Surely the threat of a conventional war in Europe is as terrible as the threat of a nuclear war?

Vitaliy Zhurkin: I agree with you. A conventional war in Europe is inconceivable with all these nuclear power stations and chemical plants.... It would be disastrous for both sides. So, why not conduct the different negotiations at the same time?

LIBERATION: Does this mean that the USSR is determined to press for negotiations to start on conventional weapons?

Vitaliy Zhurkin: Yes, certainly, and according to the press, several Western countries are interested in this too. Why not have such negotiations? Everything should be discussed: If there are imbalances they ought to be remedied by a process of reducing the level of forces. Fairly low ceilings are adequate. Confidence must be established of course, but it will only come when the West sees the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact really reducing their arms and when we see the Western countries doing likewise.

LIBERATION: If there are considerable reductions in troops and even a complete withdrawal eventually, the two German states would have no foreign armed forces on their territory for the first time since 1945. They would thus regain full sovereignty. Could the USSR accept that?

Vitaliy Zhurkin: Many problems now settled by security initiatives could be settled by political means in the future. If by eliminating nuclear weapons and reducing conventional forces we succeed in developing a more balanced security system based on equality among the different European nations — which implies the withdrawal of foreign troops from the European territory where they are deployed — I think that the two German states would be able to coexist for a very long time. In principle we think that a stable situation in Europe is possible even if NATO and the Warsaw Pact are dismantled at some stage.

LIBERATION: Do you think that the idea of a peace treaty with Germany officially ending World War II could be revived in the next 5 or 10 years?

Vitaliy Zhurkin: That is too difficult a question. Moreover, it is not a decision for the USSR alone, but for the other World War II allies too.

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IZVESTIYA CALLS EURODEFENSE PLAN 'BARRIER TO PEACE'

PM090911 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Yu. Kovalenko "Letter From Paris": "Nuclear Axis for Europe"]

'Excerpts' [passage omitted] Today France stands at the head of those forces trying to accelerate integration processes in Western Europe, and now the military aspects are being moved to the forefront. This alteration in European development occurred after the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik, which revealed the possibility of reaching agreement on a reduction in nuclear arsenals, and particularly after the Soviet proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles. As one prominent figure admits, this proposal had the "effect of an electric shock" here. After a series of consultations, the allies headed by Paris have decided to take countermeasures.

New accents were clearly apparent in a message from the French premier to the heads of government of the 11 "Common Market" countries. It opens with an appeal to create a "force" (military force being the intention) which would allow "Europe to remain free and independent." For his part, speaking several days earlier at a meeting of the French Diplomatic Press Association, President F. Mitterrand once again stressed that he supports the idea of increasing "European defense." [passage omitted]

It is no accident that at the last session of the Western European Union, held in December last year, J. Chirac spoke in favor of adopting a "Charter of West European Security Principles" based on nuclear weapons (this proposal has been supported by Bonn). However, the Western European Union only has seven members at present (France, Britain, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and, despite the fact that Spain and Portugal have stated their intention to join this grouping, to some local strategists it nevertheless appears insufficiently representative and influential. That is why attempts are being made to involve the EEC in resolving the issues of "European defense."

At the beginning of the eighties the FRG and Italy offered a corresponding proposal which was not supported at the time.
This time the initiative has come from J. Delors, chairman of the European Communities Commission and former minister of the economy and finance in the French Government, who has proposed that the EEC discuss the issue of the Soviet proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles. However, the aim here is to use this discussion merely as a pretext for entrusting the "Common Market" with questions of organizing military cooperation in the future. Revision of the EEC's basic foundations has been opposed in particular by Belgium, which currently presides over this organization. Its foreign minister has reminded people that military issues are not within the competence of the "Common Market." This is indeed so, but many believe that the time has come to broaden the scope of this competence.

How do those on the banks of the Seine envisage this "European defense"? They have no clear idea at present. The pivot of this defense, in the opinion of a number of influential strategists, must be the French and British nuclear arsenals, to which all nuclear weapons at NATO's disposal should be added. Some believe it essential to form a new -- Paris-London -- nuclear axis while others prefer the idea of a Paris-London-Bonn triangle. The magazine L'EXPRESS which, it seems, lays claim to the role of generator of ideas in the "Eurodefense" sphere, has indicated the possibility of joint nuclear arms production and writes of plans to equip British nuclear submarines with the latest French missiles. Judging by press reports, the decision has already been taken to jointly patrol ocean waters with nuclear submarines under the French and British flags. Does the creation of European nuclear forces mean that West Germany is finally to have access to nuclear arms? A deliberately vague answer is given to this question to avoid causing alarm among the international public. However, it seems that even here there are no insuperable obstacles. FRG and French military experts are already sitting down to discuss the idea of using the tactical nuclear weapons that Paris has at its disposal.

Strategists intend nuclear weapons to form the spearhead of "Eurodefense" but, as F. Mitterand observed in a recent interview with the Italian newspaper CORRIERE DELLA SERA, it must be based on both nuclear and conventional weapons. A buildup of the latter is being accompanied by deafening propaganda about the Warsaw Pact's imaginary superiority in conventional armed forces and arms.

To all appearances, West European defense intends to equip its arsenals with every possible type of weapon, including chemical weapons. According to the magazine L'EXPRESS, the French doctrine of deterrence is becoming multifaceted: Chemical weapons are being added to nuclear arms, because France is ready to begin producing weapons of this kind. This is stated without any reservation in the draft of its new military program.

The question of creating a Euro-SDI (this idea still has supporters) which could be linked with the U.S. "Star Wars" project is also still on the agenda. J. (Bomel), deputy chairman of the French National Assembly Defense Commission, insists on strengthening nuclear defense by immediately beginning production of the neutron bomb, work on the creation of which is already complete.

The material base of "Eurodefense" will be the joint production of both nuclear and conventional types of weapons, that is, a course aimed at standardization, for which the NATO generals have been doggedly aiming for many years. They have now achieved their goal. During a recent visit to France by G. Younger, British secretary of state for defense, the question of creating a unified type of weaponry for the two countries' ground forces was discussed. Paris and Bonn recently reached an accord on the joint production of a fighter helicopter. According to the newspaper LE MONDE, France is also cooperating with Spain in this sphere.

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We will add another detail of considerable importance. Bilateral groups have been set up to study military-strategic problems: French-British, French-West German, British-West German, and so forth. After the meeting in Reykjavík, a new "strategic coordination" group was organized without any fuss, which involves high-ranking French, FRG, and British officials.

"Eurodefense" is not conceived of here as a substitute for the North Atlantic alliance or the American military presence in Western Europe, but as an additional mobilization of military resources, a kind of "mini-NATO." And it is quite clear that those on the other side of the Atlantic are following European military building with undisguised interest, voicing their approval and support. Not without foundation, Washington is counting on keeping "Eurodefense" under its control.

The ambiguity of the stand taken by Paris and other West European capitals on a number of key topical problems, and the questions of war and peace in particular, is striking. The French leaders often make statements in favor of disarmament and of reducing nuclear arsenals to the lowest possible level, and they have positively appraised the Soviet proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles. This is what they say, but in practice they are actively improving their nuclear and conventional weapons and have taken a course aimed at Western Europe's military integration — a policy directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

If put into practice, "Eurodefense" will be yet another barrier in the way of peace and disarmament. Do the West Europeans really want to see the blue flag with 12 yellow stars fluttering over their nuclear test sites in the future, with Beethoven's "Ode to Joy" accompanied by the grinding sound of the "European Army's" tank tracks?

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: LATE APRIL COMMENTARIES ON WESTERN ATTITUDE TO INF DEAL

West Europeans 'Afraid'

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 20 Apr 87 pp 1-3

[Article by APN political analyst Spartak Beglov under the rubric 'News and Views': "What Are They Afraid Of?--The Chernobyl Lessons Not Learnt by the Supporters of Nuclear Deterrence"]

[Text] French General Pierre Gallois, (ret) has estimated that the effects of a blast of a medium-range missile nuclear charge would equal at least "a hundred Chernobyls." But this ominous arithmetic did not cool the bellicose strategist. On the contrary, he is urging the West Europeans to love the atomic bomb even more and not to get into a "trap" of the latest Soviet proposals.

Yet the lessons of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident of a year ago deserve recalling not for the sake of the glorification of the nuclear bomb. Everybody knows the price of the Chernobyl tragedy: people died, considerable physical damage was inflicted.

But all this, we remind the reader, was not the aftermath of a nuclear explosion but of a radioactive outburst due to a power unit accident at an ordinary nuclear generating plant. What an incomparably greater disaster would occur if in any densely populated part of the Earth at least one of these smallest warheads, which according to the same General Gallois equals "four Hickshimas" explodes.

Looking back on that year, people now much more strictly judge the results of government policies in international affairs: how successful they have been in leading the world away from the nuclear abyss. Now the focus of attention of the public and statesmen is the latest series of Soviet moves aimed at clearing the way to elimination of a whole category of nuclear weapons--medium-range missiles in Europe. Moscow and Washington believe that agreements on this issue are within reach.

"We simply cannot afford to turn down this proposal," said Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. Many other West European statesmen share his opinion.
But it is also evident that two opposed approaches to the very fate of nuclear weapons have clashed: to leave this Damocles' sword over people's heads or to get rid of it as soon and reliably as possible.

When last week U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on his way home from Moscow via Brussels told his NATO partners that the new Soviet proposals had opened up an opportunity for a "good agreement," some newspapers in Paris and London came out with the headline: "Europe in Danger!".

What frightened them? Obvious is the calculation that the public will believe the story about the Warsaw Pact states just waiting for the destruction of medium- and short-range nuclear missiles in order to invade Western Europe with their "superior armed forces." Yet all that Eastern Europe is impatiently looking forward to is a concrete response from NATO to the Warsaw Treaty Organization's proposals of last June to start negotiating substantial cuts in the conventional arms and military forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. But NATO is in no hurry with response, and they are trying not to remind the public of that. Why?

Because they know that apart from readiness for a mutual conventional arms reduction and the liquidation of any asymmetry in this field, the Soviet Union has solemnly pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Whereas NATO has avoided making such a commitment. Consequently, the removal from Europe of even the shortest-range U.S. nuclear missiles will deprive the NATO warhawks of the possibility to deal the USSR a first nuclear strike from West European territory with American weapons. This is what they fear. It is not merely the product of nuclear paranoia, but a far-reaching scheme to make any military provocation fraught with a global conflict necessarily involving the USA. And this with U.S. forward-based systems remaining so far outside the negotiations (planes based in Britain, the nuclear missile submarines assigned to NATO and so forth).

Incidentally, the Far East is oversaturated with similar systems: U.S. nuclear delivery vehicles in Japan, the nuclear weapons themselves in South Korea, nuclear missiles targeted on the USSR from U.S. Sixth Fleet ships. Otherwise the Soviet Union would not need 100 warheads on medium-range missiles in its Asian part after a European medium-range missiles agreement is signed.

We say this just to point out that the world is brimful with nuclear explosives. And after the first agreement not one, but a whole series of subsequent accords will be required.

The politicians intimidating the public with a "new trap of the Kremlin" either are unable or deliberately refuse to see the fact that after Chernobyl Moscow all the more so does not conceive any other choice in trying to defuse the nuclear powder kegs in Europe and elsewhere. As Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in May last year, Chernobyl is yet another strike of the bell, yet one more stern warning and reminder that the nuclear age demands new political thinking. If the Western politicians start to run away in panic from the proposals which only recently they claimed as their own, the rest of the world will have to
recognize finally that the Atlantic alliance has never had any real, sincere intention to disarm and that this bloc has driven itself too deep into a nuclear trap of its own devising.

(APN, 19 April. In full.)

'Political Will' Needed

PM281047 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Apr 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Yu. Gavrilov: "Time For Important Decisions. Will the West Display the Political Will?"]


By mutual agreement, the groups concerned with medium-range missiles are starting this round somewhat earlier than the groups on space and strategic offensive armaments. It is in this area of the talks that the preconditions exist for decisive progress toward an accord.

In fact, the Geneva talks are resuming at a special time. New, real opportunities have now emerged for a fundamental change in international relations. Last week the Soviet Union again convincingly demonstrated that, given the political will, the problem of arms control and disarmament can be successfully solved. It is this that is giving the Geneva talks an important positive impetus. In fact, the new proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev during his visit to Prague and at the meeting with G. Shultz have created favorable prospects for the achievement of an agreement on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles and for progress in other areas of talks between the USSR and the United States on nuclear and space armaments.

The substance of these proposals was clearly set out by M.S. Gorbachev at the Kremlin luncheon in honor of W. Jaruzelski. For Europe it means:

First, eliminating all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe in the next 5 years, keeping only 100 warheads each on those missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and on the territory of the United States.

Second, simultaneously eliminating Soviet and U.S. operational and tactical missiles in Europe and holding talks on such missiles in the east of our country and on the territory of the United States.

Third, establishing the strictest possible system of verification, up to and including on-site inspections, of fulfillment of the sides' commitments on this score.

The USSR delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva has been instructed to immediately — that is, today — embark, together with the U.S. delegation, on elaborating specific accords on the issues in question.

Fourth, examining and tackling the question of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including tactical missiles, at separate multilateral talks in accordance with the Budapest initiative by the USSR, Poland, and other Warsaw Pact states on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments on the European Continent — from the Atlantic to the Urals.
Let us pose the question that bothers everyone: Will the USSR and the United States be able in the very near future to reach practical agreements in the disarmament sphere in view of the opportunities that are presenting themselves?

As was stressed at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo session, this will depend on what conclusions the U.S. Administration draws from the proposals put forward by the Soviet leadership during the talks in Moscow. As for the USSR, it is ready for a joint solution of questions of disarmament, above all medium-range missiles and shorter-range missiles, in an atmosphere of active dialogue and quest for mutual understanding.

Judging by reports from Washington, the President has made an optimistic assessment of the results of G. Shultz' Moscow talks. At the same time, people in the United States have been urging caution and even speaking out against an arms control agreement. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR points out that there is no concerted approach to arms control issues within the administration itself and there is a lack of agreement regarding the projected accord on nuclear missiles in Europe. "The Pentagon hardliners," the paper writes, "want to continue putting military, economic, and technological pressure on the Soviet Union." They are seeking to delay the achievement of accords and they "loathe the idea that Congress might find grounds for cutting military expenditure."

They are now saying in Washington that the Soviet proposals have to be discussed with the NATO allies. So what is the reaction to them in Western Europe? The impression is that despite the occasional expressions of optimism, the NATO capitals, where only recently they were pushing so hard for the "zero option," that is, the elimination of medium-range missiles, are now looking for "arguments" in favor of delaying the conclusion of an agreement. The old stereotypes of "Atlantic thinking" and the fear of abandoning the obsolete and dangerous strategy of nuclear deterrence are in evidence. They are employing the hackneyed thesis that the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe would allegedly tip the balance of power in favor of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. They are circulating myths about the "overwhelming superiority" of the USSR and its allies in conventional armaments, about the "Soviet military threat" to the countries of Western Europe. According to NATO's "topsy-turvy logic," ridding Europe of nuclear weapons would only increase the likelihood of war on the continent (?!).

In short, in the United States and the other NATO countries there are many influential forces that, unable to openly oppose the Soviet initiatives and fearing a negative reaction from the general public in their countries, are nevertheless prepared to put a spoke in the wheel of the achievement of an agreement between the USSR and the United States. Here is what the West German paper WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE notes in this connection: "The NATO partners, who have been trying for many years to get the world powers to the negotiating table, are now forced to apply the brake." A convenient position for those circles in the United States that do not actually want an accord and do not mind hiding behind the allies and taking refuge in the need for them to work out a "common stance!"

So the ambiguous and contradictory nature of the reaction by the United States and its partners to the Soviet proposals is obvious. Time will tell what their reply will be. In the meantime, the press reports, President Reagan is meeting with the leaders of both parties in the U.S. Congress and will then begin consultations with the NATO countries' leaders. Possible NATO responses will be examined in New Mexico (United States) at a session of the NATO group dealing with matters of military policy, and also at the end of April by the experts of the bloc group on matters pertaining to medium-range missiles. Nor does the press rule out the possibility of convening yet another extraordinary NATO Council session, as happened in Brussels recently.
This will take a certain amount of time. The main this is that it should not be spent searching for phony complications and tricks. The peoples of Europe and of the whole world have a right to expect of the leaders of the United States and its NATO allies a constructive response matching the Soviet proposals, practical actions and steps on the path to achieving agreements, and a display of political will in order to positively decide problems pertaining to safeguarding peace.

The U.S. observer F. Lewis writes in THE NEW YORK TIMES that a balanced approach and "caution" are needed, of course, in these important matters. But, she makes the reasonable observation, "it is no reason to hide in a ditch, especially as this ditch is 'bristling' with nuclear weapons. The time has come to pluck up courage and scramble out." Later on she writes: "So much effort has gone into the cold war, and virtually nothing has gone into the search for a way out, so we (that is, NATO -- Yu. Gavrilo) have no guides."

Well, one has to agree with the opinion expressed by F. Lewis, who chose a notable headline for her article: "Do Not Fear The Russian Word 'Da'." I will only add that there is a guide to show the way out of the blind alleys created by NATO: It is the initiatives put forward at the Moscow talks by the Soviet side, which, to quote THE WASHINGTON POST, "shook observers with its boldness, innovation, and fresh ideas."

NATO's 'Strange Logic'

PM300903 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 17, 26 Apr 87 p 3

[Gennadiy Gerasimov article: "Dr. Strangelove's Shadow Over Western Europe"]

[Text] Everything has been thrown into confusion in NATO's house. The Soviet Union has proposed a triple zero option. What should be the reply to it? The world is waiting.

The Soviet Union has proposed:

1. The elimination of all medium-range missiles in Europe. Wasn't this the proclaimed goal of the West?

2. The elimination of all operational-tactical missiles in Europe. Wasn't it Soviet superiority in this field that the West lamented?

3. The elimination of battlefield tactical missiles.

On the third point, expressive of Soviet anti-nuclear consistency, the West is admittedly unprepared for a businesslike discussion. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz has said that the elimination of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons "is not on the table and is not part of this negotiation."

Let is be so. But the first two proposals remain, taking the West's concern into account if this concern is not a feigned one.

It would seem that a holiday has at last come to NATO's "street." If so desired, the development of the Soviet position could be ascribed after all to the West's firmness or to the power politics pursued by it.
But no jubilation is visible. One rather witnesses despondency prevailing in some bystreeets adjoining the main thoroughfare.

As a correspondent of the American NBC TV company gave everyone to understand in a report from Santa Barbara, where President Reagan is having a rest, in NATO's restraint there is a hint of offence. Due to the fact that Mr Gorbachev has again compelled the Americans to go on the defensive.

There is a strange logic, seen from the outside. It seems that they are getting more than they asked for, but they feel offended.

The Western side has three options of a reply to the Soviet steps:

1. Not to accept anything. The inconvenience of this option is its high cost from the political standpoint. After all, the West's "no" would be tantamount to admitting the original insincerity of NATO's "dual-track decision" as well as of linking the elimination of medium-range missiles to the destiny of operational-tactical missiles.

Let us see whether the West will risk, as an English saying has it in such cases, eating it own hat.

2. To accept. This would be a bold step. THE NEW YORK TIMES on April 16 recommended that the United States should not miss the offered chance and influence the other bloc members accordingly. At a briefing for the NATO foreign ministers in Brussels on his way from Moscow to Santa Barbara the U.S. secretary of state, George Shultz, abstained from voicing his own attitude, shifting the burden of decision-making onto the allies. No recommendations!

3. To cause confusion. The absence of recommendations is already a recommendation. According to the canons of NATO's flexible response strategy, the leader's hint at the need to show independence and prudence has always been interpreted by the allies in an unambiguous way. It is taken as the need to apply themselves to identifying underwater rocks and to the danger of links falling out of the chain of nuclear deterrence.

The basis of the objections was the hardened conviction in Moscow's "crafty schemes." Moscow wants to "denuclearize Europe" in order to give vent at once to "its superiority" over the West in conventional arms.

This is not true. Moscow wants a demilitarized Europe where "denuclearization" is only a stage, although an important one. Moscow proposes beginning large-scale talks on a radical reduction of non-nuclear armed forces and armaments in Europe.

Political physicians have registered in this case that the West has the Dr. Strangelove syndrome (from the well-known film by director Stanley Kubrick) who "stopped worrying and began to love the bomb."
NATO 'Backs Against Wall'

LD270550 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 26 Apr 87

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov]

[Text] Some of the last week's events give one every reason to recall that at one time master gunsmiths decorated their gun barrels with the edifying inscription: The Last Argument of Kings. The saying was that if a monarch failed to convince his neighbors by his reasoning then guns would speak for him. Nowadays this method of resolving arguments has become no less old-fashioned than a cannonball compared with nuclear warheads. The future fate of mankind should be determined not by arguing with weapons but by using argument as a weapon and by recognizing the diversity and interdependence of the modern world.

These thoughts resounded again last week in the Kremlin. It was marked by visits from the leader of fraternal Poland Wojciech Jaruzelski and the president of friendly Syria Hafiz al-Asad. Soviet-U.S. talks on medium-range missiles resumed in Geneva on 23 April. Incidentally, NATO remains in a state of alarm caused by the visit to Moscow by the U.S. secretary of state. After their emergency session in Brussels the NATO people met again at a U.S. Air Force base. General Rogers, commander of the bloc's Armed Forces in Europe delivered a report to them. It was so secret that its contents were expounded at the same time in the weekly NEWSWEEK. Completely unabashed, the commander in chief reported the extremely unpleasant news that the Soviet Union is trying to turn Western Europe into a nuclear-free zone. But having exposed the full extent of the Kremlin's maneuver, the frankness of a soldier added: "We must be capable of using nuclear weapons first in response to a Soviet attack involving the use of conventional weapons."

With their backs against the wall, the NATO politicians are forced to point the finger, as the saying goes. In recent times, European leaders have not been averse to depicting themselves as supporters of the elimination of both Soviet and U.S. missiles. According to them, the problem has been that Washington and Moscow cannot agree among themselves. But now, to judge by all accounts, the partners have exchanged roles and it is now the U.S. Administration that is taking refuge behind someone else's back. Allegedly the United States isn't against it, but the allies are wavering.

It was sufficient for the Soviet Union to unlace the Reykjavik package for operational and tactical missiles to be declared obstacles to agreement on medium-range weapons. Then when the USSR expressed its readiness to eliminate them in full over a 1-year period, the NATO people kicked up a fuss, saying that that was not what they had meant. What they are interested in is not reductions by the Soviet side but in upgrading of arms by the U.S. side. The alarm in Western European capitals smacks of a crude farce. They are calling for a redoubling of vigilance and caution since allegedly Moscow is behaving suspiciously and taking repeated steps to meet the West.

USSR 'Attentively Following' NATO Response

PM291231 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 87 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Text] The Soviet draft "Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Soviet and U.S. Medium-Range Missiles in Europe and on Other Measures To
Limit and Reduce USSR and U.S. Medium-Range Missiles" creates a good basis for the speediest elaboration of a mutually acceptable accord. This was pointed out at a 28 April briefing at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center, where it was stated that Moscow is attentively following the discussion in leading NATO spheres of the Soviet initiatives relating to medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles.

In an interview relayed recently to West Europe U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz attempted to answer the question: How will the realization of the Soviet proposals affect the NATO states' security? It is impossible to disagree with a whole number of his ideas. This applies, for example, to the assertion that the Soviet proposals speak of reducing the very Soviet medium-range missiles whose elimination was sought by the NATO countries and "against which was undertaken the deployment" of U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in the past.

Addressing the concern expressed in certain NATO circles, Shultz continued that an agreement on medium-range missiles will not lead to the undermining of NATO's "flexible response doctrine" based on the use of nuclear weapons. In any case, he remarked, the West will be left with a large number of nuclear weapons — missiles on submarines, aircraft, and also Lance tactical missiles.

It is impossible not to note, it was emphasized at the briefing, the considered and reasonable nature of the views expounded by the U.S. secretary of state. Evidently, the discussions during the recent Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow were not in vain.

The U.S. news media have recently carried reports of statements by P. Nitze, arms control adviser to the President and the U.S. secretary of state. They refer to the Soviet stand on strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty, which was expounded to G. Shultz in Moscow. Correspondents were reminded that the Soviet side had submitted proposals on elaborating "key provisions," which would include a principled accord on strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty — an accord providing for the sides' mutual pledge not to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years, while strictly observing it.

'Contradictory Criticism' From West

LJ291910 Moscow TASS in English 1904 GMT 29 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS — Military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Some politicians in Western Europe and in the Far East have been caught off stride by the possibility of using new approaches to problems of war and peace, by the Soviet Union's proposal to shelve obsolete dogmas of safeguarding national security based on realities of the pre-nuclear age.

This, I believe, explains in part the extremely contradictory criticism of Soviet initiatives now sounding from Paris, London and Tokyo.

Representatives of the French Government, for instance, criticise the Soviet proposals for envisaging in the long run the total elimination of medium-range, short-range and battlefield missiles in Europe and "go much farther than the United States is prepared to go." Official Paris directly says that France wants "To prevent the emergence of a non-nuclear Europe".
On the other hand, Tokyo is not pleased that at the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik it was decided to retain 100 nuclear warheads on American medium-range missiles in the United States and 100 nuclear warheads on similar Soviet missiles in Asia. The Tokyo newspaper ASAHI writes that the Japanese "experience only a 'medium' joy about this perspective" [as received] because Soviet medium-range missiles with a hundred warheads remain in Asia.

The positions of Paris and Tokyo on nuclear missiles appear at first glance to be diametrical. But in both instances criticism of Soviet proposals is based not on criteria of ensuring equal international security on a global scale but on transient considerations of achieving superiority for military blocs headed by the United States.

Meanwhile contrary to assurances of the newspaper ASAHI American nuclear forces in the Far East are not limited to F-16 planes and in the event of an agreement the nuclear-missile forces of the United States in the Pacific area will not be limited to a hundred nuclear warheads mounted on medium-range missiles.

It was said in a report of the United States secretary of defense already in 1980 that the United States had deployed thousands of nuclear weapons outside of Western Europe, mostly in the Far East and in the Pacific Ocean area. Their number has grown substantially since then. American aircraft carriers with nuclear arms on board and other ships equipped with Tomahawk missiles constantly sail in direct proximity of Soviet shores. Sometimes the aircraft carriers approach Soviet ports with provocative purposes. The United States has nuclear arms on the territory of South Korea. In the near future it is planned to add Lance nuclear missiles to them. American ships with nuclear weapons on board regularly call at the Japanese port of Yokosuka which is a major base of the American 7th Fleet.

The Japanese press continues to write about the existence of a secret agreement between Tokyo and Washington on the unimpeachable introduction and deployment on Japanese territory of American nuclear arms in a "contingency" although this contradicts Japan's proclaimed three non-nuclear principles.

The Soviet side has in the Far East the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary to ensure its security. Soviet leaders have repeatedly stressed that if the United States refrains from building up its Armed Forces in Asia the Soviet Union will act likewise. If the situation changes for the better, the Soviet Union will respond in kind.

The Soviet programme of freeing mankind from nuclear weapons by the end of the 20th century provides for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Asia as well. The fulfillment of this programme would be greatly accelerated if the United States displayed readiness to conduct talks in a spirit of good will on the military bases which surround the Soviet Union for already forty years and on limiting navies, including in the Pacific area. But the United States flatly refuses to conduct talks in areas where it has an obvious superiority.

It should be remembered that the U.S. forward-based weapon systems in the Far East are capable of reaching targets on Soviet territory. The Soviet Union does not have any weapon systems, except strategic ones, capable of reaching the territory of the United States. In conditions of a reduction of the strategic forces of both sides the importance of forward-based weapon systems sharply increases. When solving this question the Soviet Union will never renounce the principle of the equality and equal security of sides.

The question arises: Why can talks be conducted, say, on land forces but cannot be conducted on aircraft carriers with nuclear weapons on board?
GRASPING A HISTORIC CHANCE

World politics is focusing on the questions of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe and the two sides' operational and tactical missiles and tactical nuclear means. If the West shows the necessary political will these questions could be resolved in a very short time. This opinion is based, in particular, on the results of the recent talks in Moscow with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. In accordance with them, the USSR delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks that resumed in Geneva 23 April was instructed to immediately embark together with the U.S. delegation on working out specific accords on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles.

Here it should be explained that, since the West European NATO countries expressed fears that the elimination of both Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe would allegedly give the Soviet Union military advantages because of its operational and tactical missiles, our country announced its complete readiness to unilaterally eliminate the corresponding Soviet and U.S. missiles on the European Continent and to hold talks about similar missiles in the eastern USSR and on U.S. territory.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva was instructed to ensure that any agreement envisaged the establishment of the strictest verification -- including on-site inspection [inspeiktsiya] -- of the fulfillment of the sides' commitments.

The USSR has also proposed examining and solving the question of tactical nuclear means in Europe -- including tactical missiles -- at separate multilateral talks in accordance with the Warsaw Pact states' Budapest initiative on armed forces and conventional arms reductions on the European Continent from the Atlantic to the Urals.

As for the U.S. side, President R. Reagan has given an assurance that "the United States is returning to the talks resolved to develop the progress achieved at Secretary of State G. Shultz' meetings in Moscow." To this it was added that "although a number of central problems need to be resolved and a great deal remains to be discussed at the talks, the prospects for reaching an agreement on medium-range means have improved."
Well, it really will take great efforts and political will from both the USSR and the United States to reach agreement on the questions of nuclear disarmament. It is important, however, for the resolve and will to reach agreement to be mutual.

At the same time the President's statement refers to the problem of operational and tactical missiles, and this is termed one of the "unresolved issues."

It was on this very issue -- a question about which there could seemingly be no doubt after the authoritative statement made in Moscow -- that the capitals of a number of West European NATO countries kicked up a terrible commotion last week. Those who until quite recently had been trying to pin the blame for the lack of progress in eliminating nuclear weapons in Europe on the Soviet Union are now openly opposing their elimination. All this looks like a shameless political条脱.

Writing about the behind-the-scenes aspect of the matter, the West German weekly VORWAERTS stated: "While U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz was sounding out in Moscow the possibility for another round in the Geneva talks between the great powers, a group of 'hawks' was preparing a stab in the back. Its aim was to wreck the last chance of achieving success in the disarmament sphere in the present decade." And VORWAERTS even named the "hawks" -- they include U.S., West German, and British politicians. But their arguments are the same: The destruction of medium-range missiles "would leave the West at the mercy of the East's advantage in short-range nuclear missiles." In turn, their destruction "would point up the Warsaw Pact's superiority" in the conventional arms sphere. And conventional arms reductions "would place NATO in a disadvantageous geostrategic position." Their conclusion is -- no disarmament!

Incidentally, let us not oversimplify matters. Not all supporters of the retention of nuclear weapons use such absurd "logic," demonstrating their reluctance or inability to eschew old ways of political thinking. The recent visit to our country by British Prime Miniter M. Thatcher provided a graphic example of a more sophisticated argument.

However, the realization of the need to eschew obsolete ideas, according to which the importance of certain states in international affairs and in the nuclear and space age depends on their military might, and the recognition of the threat to mankind posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons -- even with a view to "mutual deterrence" -- are winning over more and more people, including realistic Western politicians. They are waiting with ever-greater impatience, and demanding more and more persistently that the historic chance offered by the Soviet proposal to embark on practical nuclear arms reduction should not be wasted.

How will the current Geneva talks develop? This question is worrying many people at the moment. And not without reason. Over the last few years the world has repeatedly witnessed how the U.S. side, without running the risk of rejecting certain Soviet proposals from the outset, has subsequently backed away both from adopting the proposals and from seriously discussing them. And we have seen for ourselves how difficult it is to construct a realistic policy with the United States. Yet life and the Reykjavik experience in particular show that it is becoming more and more complicated to go back on your word in the face of the openness and consistency of Soviet policy.

Optimistic observers in the West also cite subjective factors in U.S. policy. We recall in particular how in the fall of 1984, when the election campaign with R. Reagan running for a second term was under way, the U.S. press constantly returned to the theme that if he were elected for a second term he would want to leave a good impression in history and would agree to conclude an agreement -- even a partial one -- limiting nuclear arms.
It is not discounted, however, that this topic -- patiently inspired from above -- was one of those election promises that is quickly forgotten after the elections. True, in this case it is worth noting. U.S. public opinion, of course, would also welcome a nuclear disarmament agreement. If so, has not the time come to recall this now that the President's second term is inexorably drawing to a close? This is being stated by observers, who note that a new and fruitful Soviet-U.S. summit could write a bright page in history.

However, we will not close our eyes to the fact that the international situation remains complex and is not getting any simpler. It will take an acute struggle to justify people's natural hopes for something better.

As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared to agree to a new summit, provided, of course, that it can really be crowned with specific results. Along with a treaty on medium-range missiles, a subject for agreement at such a summit could be the "key positions" proposed the other day by M.S. Gorbachev on a number of problems that are of the greatest importance not only for Soviet-U.S. relations but for improving the situation worldwide.

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MOSCOW: 'INTELLECTUAL FERMENT' IN WEST OVER SOVIET PROPOSALS
LD261709 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 26 Apr 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute; Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, political observer; and Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, all-union radio commentator]

[Excerpt]

[Levin] Nikolay Vladimirovich, I'd like to draw attention to another aspect of this dynamic process. Two years have passed since the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1985. What new things over these 2 years have contributed to the activities of the socialist community in the sphere of foreign policy? First, of course, they've brought a heightened dynamism. And I think that in the context of the unity of a general political stance in the international arena, the individual face of each of the socialist states is coming into view very clearly and ever more distinctly. If we recall, say, the Stockholm conference on measures to strengthen security and cooperation in Europe: Virtually every one of the socialist countries participating made its own proposals on various specific matters, and they added up to an extensive and detailed program that made it possible to bring the conference to a successful conclusion.

Or remember the Vienna meeting, which developed the General European process: Practically every one of the countries of the socialist community submitted concrete proposals of its own -- on economic cooperation, on cooperation in protecting the environment, on information science and so on and so forth. It seems to me that when we say that each country contributes much that is new in the economic sphere and in the social relations development sphere to the common fund of the socialist community, we ought, of course, to also mention the contribution to the general activities of the socialist community in the field of foreign policy.

[Shishlin] I agree entirely, because each socialist country is, indeed, special and unique in what it can do where foreign affairs and foreign policy are concerned. And while each clearly represents the interests of its own country, the national interests of its own country, on the international scene, the socialist countries have now learned, and are continuing to learn, to combine those national interests harmoniously. And this harmony in the foreign policy moves of the socialist countries, this coordination of their part in foreign affairs, will, of course, give each socialist country a more prominent voice. And I think that the very interesting
processes that are taking place in international politics are actually, in some degree, derived from this very dynamism and vigor of socialist foreign policy which has become a veritable hallmark of the last 2 years.

[Levin] To that one must, of course, add that all the radical and fundamental questions of the foreign policy of the socialist countries are very carefully coordinated; and this applies primarily to one crucial problem that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are trying to solve, together with the Western countries insofar as it's a bilateral matter: the problem of eliminating the U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles.

Here I want to direct the special attention of our listeners to what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has said: That the Soviet leadership has consulted the leaders of the countries of our alliance on the whole range of these important problems, and obtained their full support. Why am I drawing attention to this?

After his talks in Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz attempted, in his public statement, to represent the matter like this: that we have to consult with our allies; we have to get their opinions, whereas it was not the custom, supposedly, for the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to act in that way. But this was a typical attempt to cast a shadow over the principles of Soviet foreign policy and over the principles of socialist international relations. And it is very appropriate that Mikhail Sergeyevich should have issued this reminder that these are coordinated actions.

[Zhurkin] I think that at present, U.S. policy is really muddled. On the one hand, there are elements of disagreement with the allies; on the other, I think there's also a large element of sheer political gambling, in an attempt to get something from the Soviet Union by appealing to various external factors, notably the allies. And, indeed, Shultz and U.S. diplomacy are having a hard time of it, because they're under pressure from Soviet foreign policy initiatives. U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, a fierce enemy of the Soviet Union, recently published an article in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE in which he said, with very great displeasure, that in these matters the Soviet leadership is distinguished by two traits: patience and an iron will. And Weinberger has no liking at all either for one or the other.

[Levin] And these are qualities that are strongly evident in our proposals for solving the problems of arms limitation in Europe. And notice this, comrades: We are consistently, and, at the same time, very firmly and resolutely seeking to solve the questions posed by the Western side; and we are submitting proposals that open the way to untying all the knots.

In a speech on 21 April, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev detailed our position on questions of European policy and on questions of arms limitation in Europe. As this is a very important proposal, let me remind you of it: First, we would abolish within the next 5 years all the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, while retaining only 100 warheads for such missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and the same number on the territory of the United States. Second, we would at the same time abolish the Soviet and U.S. operational and tactical missiles in Europe and hold talks on such missiles in the Eastern part of our country and on the territory of the United States. Third, we would set up a very strict system of verification [kontrol] to check the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by both sides, and this would include on-site inspection.

On 23 April, the group on medium-range missiles at the Soviet-U.S. talks resumed discussions on these problems. We are fully determined to promote, now, at this
present round of talks, the drawing up of accords on the medium-range missile problem. In particular, you will remember that when we extracted the problem of medium-range missiles from the package at the talks on nuclear and space weapons, the Americans said: 'Let's bring together the problem of medium-range missiles with the problem of operational and tactical missiles. And we have now agreed to tackle these problems in parallel, because what we want is to really reach an agreement — really reach agreement.

Of course, I agree that Shultz needs to consult his allies, but you have quite rightly remarked, Vitaliy Vladimirovich, that behind the screen of consultations, attempts are very often made to avoid answering the questions we have raised. Brent Scowcroft recently let slip that the U.S. Administration acted very stupidly in 1981 in offering the zero option, since, he said, it's now very difficult for the Americans to refuse the zero option even though in reality it does not suit them at all.

Again, the Supreme commander of NATO forces, Rogers -- who is still fully active, though about to retire -- says nuclear weapons in Europe must not be abolished, that this must not be allowed to happen.

And very quietly, he is once again pressing his theory of a limited nuclear war. He said, we can’t -- that is, NATO can't -- renounce inflicting a first nuclear strike in retaliation for a conventional attack by Soviet forces.

But at the same time, Tom Wicker has written sensibly in THE NEW YORK TIMES that no right-thinking person can take upon himself the responsibility of being first to use nuclear weapons, since this would inevitably cause an escalation of the use of nuclear weapons, and that would be a disaster. There cannot be a limited nuclear war -- that much is absolutely clear. But the fact that this subject, to which life has already been devoted, is being discussed at all is an indication that the progress of Soviet-U.S. talks is very far from straightforward: It is by no means easy to persuade the United States to conclude agreements that would not undermine the least degree the interests of the security of the United States, or of the Soviet Union, or of NATO, or of the Warsaw Pact Organization -- that is, the equality here, equality of security, is obvious, but nevertheless, as we know, the talks are proceeding with great difficulty.

[Zhurkin] Viktor Nikolayevich, at the moment we are revolving around one question, which seems to me to be central, and to which, unfortunately, nobody has an answer: Will there after all be an agreement this year or not? At a time when, of course, as a result of the Soviet Union's enterprising approach, underpinned by support from the entire socialist community, things are progressing a little, we have, all the same, absolutely no firm conviction that that question will be successfully resolved.

Incidentally, the irony here also lies in the fact that U.S. politicians and the U.S. press have written a great deal about President Reagan realistically concluding an agreement this year. This is because some time around the end of the year, the election campaign will begin in the United States and, in general, there is no question of any major political or international steps being taken during that period -- certainly judging by past experience.

However, if time is in such short supply -- and evidently it is -- why is it that as soon as things draw close to the possibility of an accord, the United States puts forward new conditions and surrounds that agreement with various new details? One might think that the time restrictions would be a stimulus to quickly find solutions to one, two, or three issues, but not to increase this number to infinity. And among
other issues looming on the horizon is always that of reducing conventional arms and armed forces. Moreover, the United States and, in general, many West European leaders are pretending that they know nothing about the existence of last year's Budapest proposals by the Warsaw Pact countries for a radical reduction of both sides' armed forces by 500,000 — that is, by one-quarter — sometime around the beginning of the 1990's, and for extremely radical reductions of conventional arms.

[Shishlin] At any rate, our proposals have, of course, caused a strong intellectual ferment....

[Zhurkin, interrupting] Without a doubt.

[Shishlin] And moreover, an intellectual ferment that has drawn in the most varied political circles and the most varied political strata in literally every Western country and every NATO country. And this is happening in the United States as well. It was, for example, rather nice to hear that the U.S. Congress, as we know, refused to allocate an additional $500 million to the SDI program; in essence, the Congress has unequivocally advocated adherence to the SALT-II treaty by the United States. Congress voted for a whole range of such, on the whole, fairly sensible decisions, including... [changes thought] in essence, a majority in Congress now supports an end to nuclear tests and the introduction of strict limits on nuclear tests.

On the other hand, as Viktor Nikolayevich mentioned, the U.S. political elite, those who set the tone in the present U.S. Administration, are, of course, actually attempting to pile up all sorts of obstacles in the way to an agreement. And although the United States, including President Reagan, has given a very positive assessment of the meeting held in Moscow between Comrade Gorbachev and Shultz, there were, after all, not only pluses in that meeting but obvious minuses as well, in the U.S. stance — for example, on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. In Reykjavik they discussed and agreed on a 5-year period; in Moscow, Shultz stated that a 7-year period is needed. They discussed and negotiated about not breaking the ABM Treaty for 10 years, with each side taking such an obligation upon itself; in Moscow, Shultz spoke about that obligation being for 7 years only — that is, it is being reduced by 3 years, although it is precisely a reinforcement of the ABM Treaty regime that is particularly important at the moment. Thus, for the moment there are many shadows in the U.S. stance.

But I would like to take up the point mentioned by Vitaliy Vladimirovich about there being very little time now set aside for working out an agreement — very little time — and that, realistically speaking, if there is no agreement in 1987, then we will have to consider that it could then materialize only 2 or 3 years later. But still, one cannot write off the possibility — one cannot write off the possibility.

[Levin] Nor does one want to.

[Shishlin] Right. I would stick my neck out and say that there is, approximately, a 60 percent chance that an accord will be reached after all, but this leaves a 40 percent chance that an agreement might not be worked out.

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MOSCOW TO NORTH AMERICA ON NATO SECURITY CONCERNS

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["Top Priority" hosted by Pavel Kuznetsov, Radio Moscow observer, with Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov, both of the Moscow-based United States of America and Canada Institute]

[Excerpts] [Kuznetsov] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to "Top Priority." I am Pavel Kuznetsov, your host. Together with me in the studio on our weekly panel discussion are Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the Moscow-based United States of America and Canada Institute. As talks resumed in Geneva on medium-range missiles a major obstacle to an INF accord seems to be misgivings and squabbles within the NATO concerning what to do if both medium-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles are eliminated. Here in this country we understand the desire of the American administration to consult with its allies but we also believe that these consultations should not be a barrier to an agreement. Well, it is in sight, it may be close at hand, but having it in sight is not the same as being 100 percent sure that we will have it. What is it that the American allies fear? Who would like to set the ball rolling?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I agree with you, Pavel, that it's the natural desire of the American side to consult their allies. It's a very normal practice and I believe that if we were in the same situation we would have done the same. But there is another problem, not the consultations as such. I see two problems, or maybe three problems. Number one problem is what is the reality behind those consultations? What for they need them? [sentence as heard] As a formal, you know, step to inform their allies about the outcome of talks in Moscow it's OK.

[Kuznetsov] It was already done by Mr Shultz in Brussels.

[Bogdanov] It was already done by Mr Shultz in Brussels. Number two: To find out their opinion about the proposals, it's very normal and it's OK, too. But there is a third moment which worries me really. You have a number of obstacles, you know, from NATO allies, not all NATO allies but some NATO allies, but rather most important allies, and you have some obstacles within the administration, American administration, and from some important, you know, political figures outside the administration and what worries me... [sentence as heard]

[Kuznetsov] Would you name some of them?

[Bogdanov] Oh yes, I can name former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, General Scowcroft, [name indistinct].
[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Congressman Aspin.

[Bogdanov] Congressman Aspin, some other people, and, Pavel, what worries me is that it's kind of alliance, unholy by the way alliance, which has been created or about to be created, you know, against that very serious move in the arms control business. You never know, you know, with the American domestic politics or European politics what will come out of that alliance. You have very clearly, a cut, or if you like, a division within the ranks of the Western, you know, alliance. That's maybe [chuckles], that's a very rare occasion when we are not joyful about that, we are upset by that.

Maybe that's the rare case when we would like to have quite an accord between the USA and their allies, but you have a division. And what worries me — that lack of logic in the arguments which have been thrown on the table by the Western allies about our proposals. They create an impression, maybe for themselves, I don't know, that Europe becomes nuclearless, that if we destroy INF, a short-range, tactical battlefield, Europe is naked.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, we're coming to that, professor.

[Bogdanov] You know, I just would like to touch upon it because that's, I believe that's very, we have a number of counterarguments but it so looks like very artificial, you know, set of arguments aimed at one thing by, at any price to save nukes in Europe. That's what worries me.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, when some experts and some American allies say that a nonnuclear Europe is, would be actually more of a risk, more of a threat than while it is peppered with nuclear arms. They seem to forget to ignore the presence of thousands of battlefield weapons, like bombs which could be delivered by nuclear-capable aircraft than mines, shells and so on and so forth. Could you comment on that? Why are they so vehement against the elimination of missiles in Europe, both medium-range and shorter-range?

[Plekhonov] I think the Europeans have not yet come to grips with the change in realities of world politics and European politics in particular. I think what worries them is not so much the explosive power of the nuclear weapons that NATO or the Warsaw Pact have. What worries them is the appearance that the United States is turning away from Europe and, to some Europeans, that means that well, you know, how can we deal with the Soviet Union when the United States is looking the other way, because the nuclear presence of the United States has for decades served for the Europeans as a kind of a reassurance that in case there is something, if there is some Soviet threat, quote unquote, then the Americans are there.

[Kuznetsov] Excuse me for interrupting you at this moment, but isn't the presence of some 300,000 American GI's in Western Europe a guarantee against any onslaught on those babes in the wood?

[Plekhonov] Well, well of course, of course. And then there are so many arguments against that. It's just the argument, this idea that the United States, you know, even if you imagined that there is a threat from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union might attack Western Europe out of the blue, which is ridiculous. It's a nonissue. But still in politics myths play a very important role. Of course the GI's are there and then the -- Britain and France have their own nuclear weapons and a lot of them, by the way, and they're quite, quite capable of turning Europe into a pile of ashes, radioactive ashes.
But then, you know, it's not just nuclear weapons. For the Soviet Union the elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe is just a first step toward turning that place into a more peaceful and less burdened with armaments, because we are for drastically reducing the levels of conventional arms in such a formula which would satisfy both sides, which eliminate any asymmetries whatsoever. Not only that but withdrawing the offensive weapons of both sides away from each other, creating in the center of Europe such a situation where neither side would be able to make an attack against the other. [words indistinct]

[Bogdanov] Surprise, surprise!

[Kuznetsov] How many, how many tactical or battlefield weapons, nuclear weapons are there in Europe, about, about, how many hundreds, several thousand?

[Plekhannov] I think 3,600 or something like that.

[Bogdanov] But in any case, you know, we have very precise...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] We're talking about the elimination of some 300 warheads, or, or?

[Bogdanov] No, no, no. We have very precise figures, you know. In case we are lucky enough to strike a deal on INF and short range, then Europe will be still left with 4,600 nuclear warheads of different types, including aircraft carriers, mines, artillery shells, and so on and so on.

[Kuznetsov] Including the British and French forces or?

[Bogdanov] That I don't know. I believe it's only, only, you know, what is within the NATO alliance without France. That's my guess. I don't know exactly. And we, they are talking and they have in view only American, you know, nuclear capabilities, of, of, reducing only 250 nuclear warheads. So they're left with plenty, plenty, but in that case — and I'm absolutely sure that within the headquarters, NATO headquarters, they're absolutely aware of the real numbers with what they are left and they know the reality — then my question is if it is so, why they are so fearful, if you like? I think I know the reason, too.

[Plekhannov] I would like to go back to this backwardness of thinking. They still, the people who are afraid of this INF deal are the people who still believe that you can provide for security, for national security, by means of building up military power — that traditional approach. And, but I think that this old view will be superseded by a more sophisticated, more realistic view, that the only way you can provide for peace in Europe is on a joint basis, on the basis of joint agreements, joint formulas for international security worked out by East and West, and this INF agreement could be an important first step to this.

[Kuznetsov] Now please tell me how can nuclear weapons serve as a deterrent when everybody knows that a detonation of a single nuclear warhead or device would lead to an escalating exchange of strikes and counterstrikes. Nobody ever said that it can be controlled. What are they so fearful about then?

[Plekhannov] I wish we'd had Henry Kissinger in our program so that he could answer this question, because it's a, I, I think the question is, the answer is so self-evident that even, even a detonation of high-power explosives which are nonnuclear, a nonnuclear military engagement in Europe would already mean... [words indistinct]
[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Yes, we talked about that on our previous program...

[Plekanov, interrupting] But it's common sense.

[Kuznetsov] ...because of the huge amount of atomic nuclear power plants.

[Plekanov] Two hundred, two hundred atomic power plants.

[Kuznetsov] There's hardly a single Western official who would refuse to admit that the Soviet Union did meet the Western concerns halfway and that we have, in fact, incorporated some of their proposals and offers made in the past into our new offer on INF. Well, why are they so much against what they themselves proposed, say 2, 3, 4 years ago?

[Bogdanov] You know, there is a lot of irony in all that and I believe that our side has a right to say that we have been dealing for the last decades with the Western bluff, I'm sorry to say [laughs].

[Kuznetsov] And we called that bluff now?

[Bogdanov] And we called that bluff because now they don't take your yes for an answer. What really surprises me very much how they're not sure in themselves that they can sleep well only with nuclear mine under their pillow, even at the price that they can be blown up any minute, any minute. It means that their mind is so much poisoned by nuclear factors that it's really high time to deal with that cancer which is going to kill all of us. I see two problems, you know. One is honesty and the other one is dishonesty. I believe that we may have, and of course, we have, a number of people in the West who genuinely believe in the nuclear factor as a deterrent factor, but at the same time I believe that the majority of those who (claim) for nukes, they're dishonest people. They have self-interest in all that, if you like, material interest, they are busy, been busy with that for that last 40 years, supplying, you know, the political leadership with the ideas of how to use nukes, they are leaning on that, that is their, that is their, you know, comfortable living. And that is what I call dishonesty.

[Kuznetsov] Let me for a moment turn away from the issue of INF and take up another subject which I believe is very much now to be of much importance. Last Wednesday the American Physical Society issued a thick report concerning the prospects of building the so-called directed energy and particle beam weapons which are seen as the crucial components of SDI and the report is extremely pessimistic about whether the whole SDI project will work. It will take at least a decade and billions and billions of dollars in research to determine whether the project is feasible. So my question is I don't understand how a sound policy, present-day policy or any policy can be built on something that's technically uncontrollable, unknown, not feasible, and I'm talking about the attempts of this administration to put all its political eggs into this SDI basket.

[Plekanov] Well there have been cases like that in history. For instance, in the fifties the United States spent billions of dollars on trying to build an atomic plane, an atomic bomber, atom-powered, with a reactor-powered engine. The idea was that such a bomber could cruise for days and weeks around the globe and be able to bomb the Soviet Union whenever the United States would think it necessary. People believed in that very seriously and they even trained a crew to spend weeks on the plane and they even produced a menu for the crew which, for the stuff that they would eat.

[Bogdanov] And that was, I'm sorry, that was supported by, by an administration.
[Kuznetsov] But what, what, what worries me is that, well so what, this is is the line of SDI supporters. So what, let this SDI be a project, a long-term project, let it be on the horizon for many years to come. So what's wrong about it?

[Plekanov] Well I think if the United States does want to, to waste its best minds, waste its talent, its technical know-how on such a project it's up to the United States. I know for sure that we're not going to repeat the... [words indistinct]

[Bogdanov, interrupting] I don't understand why we should care for American money. If they're so rich let them waste it. [words indistinct]

[Kuznetsov] The problem is not that simple. We will not sit idle and watch that research go on. This is what I'm driving at.

[Plekanov] Right, but we will not duplicate that. Our response, as Gorbachev said several times, our response will be cheaper, simpler and more [word indistinct] than that.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, but that still will be a response in terms of perhaps more weapons built. There will be less, less trust and it will be more suspicious.

[Bogdanov] Let's call it, let's call it what is it. It's an arms, arms race spiral.

[Kuznetsov] I don't think the United States can have it both ways. I mean keep investing in the SDI project and seeking a healthier climate.

[Plekanov] That's right. I think that, I think the SDI is, is entering very stormy waters because the more research is carried out in those labs the more clear it becomes that this is a boondoggle, and I hope that the process will go (??flat).

[Bogdanov] Let me, let me look at that from the other angle, you know. The American side, at least some responsible representatives of the American administration accuse us that we already have all that. Now, we've been telling them, you know, on the highest possible level that there is no bit of truth in that. Now, if you look at this kind of report how we can have that if it's impossible to have? [chuckles] [words indistinct] How we can have all that, you know Pavel? That's my question.

[Kuznetsov] As time is running out on us I'd like to go back to the INF issue and according to the latest reports administration officials are impatient with the allies' misgivings. This in my view is an indication that the White House would like to get an arms accord with the Soviet Union. Do you share this point of view?

[Bogdanov] You know, I do share this point of view but I would like to say, to comment a little bit, you know. What they have among themselves that is their family business. Let's come beyond all that. We have a historical opportunity for the first time in the post world war period to get rid of existing nuclear weapons.

[Plekanov, interrupting] The whole class of them.

[Bogdanov] With, whole class of them. That's more important than any allies' consultations, quarrels within the administration, and again let's come beyond that.

[Kuznetsov] Thank you very much. We've come to the end of "Top Priority." I am Pavel Kuznetsov, your host signing off till next week at the same time and on the same wavelength. Goodbye.

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WEU ASSEMBLY DELEGATION DISCUSSES INF IN MOSCOW

Meets Parliamentary Officials

LD081243 Moscow TASS in English 1135 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS — A conversation was held in Moscow today at the Parliamentary Group of the USSR and its section on peace and disarmament with a delegation from the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU).

Main attention was given to European affairs.

The idea that mankind, Europe had ever less time to avert the threat of war, a threat that was being exacerbated by the arms race, tension and mistrust, was the starting point of the conversation.

The guests said that they were prepared to support talks between the USSR and the United States on medium-range missiles in Europe on the basis of Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of February 28, and request the governments of their countries to give this support.

The process should not be stopped at that, however. It was important to reduce gradually and then destroy other types of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons in Europe.

The Soviet participants in the conversation mentioned the Soviet position that was directed at putting an end not only to nuclear but also other types of arms and creating a reliable and comprehensive system of international security. The principal objective of Soviet policy was renunciation of force in international relations.

The dialogue was held in an atmosphere of free and open discussion. Both sides expressed the desire to move jointly along the path of building a lasting peace and look for ways to remove obstacles emerging in this way.

The conversation was attended by Chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group Lev Tolkunov, Supreme Soviet Deputies Georgiy Arbatov, Valeriy Bykov, Georgiy Zhukov and Vladimir Lobov, head of department at the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces Colonel-General Nikolay Chervov and deputy head of the Department on Arms Control and Disarmament at the Soviet Foreign Ministry Konstantin Mikhaylov.

A luncheon in honour of the visiting WEU delegation was given on behalf of the Soviet parliamentary group.
'Open' Talk with Dobrynin

LD081847 Moscow TASS in English 1822 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS — Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Dobrynin today received a delegation of the assembly of Western European Union on a visit in Moscow.

The question of medium-range missiles in Europe assumed special place during a lively exchange of opinions on questions of disarmament and European security.

The attention of the members of the delegation of WEU assembly was called to specific and large-scale Soviet peace proposals aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, at reducing conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe, at the elimination of chemical weapons. It was emphasized that the implementation of these proposals would open a prospect of consolidating security of all European countries, of establishing mutually-advantageous ties among them in every area. The Soviet Union is sincerely in favour of the further development of the European process.

It was also noted that it is only by political means that security can be ensured in the nuclear age. To continue relying on military means, on the policy of "nuclear deterrence" would mean in the long-run to court disaster.

The members of the delegation of WEU assembly declared in favour of lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe on all kinds of arms by means of appropriate talks and agreements. The known views of NATO countries which far from facilitating, actually hamper working out agreements were at the same time expressed in the statements of some of the delegates about concrete ways of achieving this aim.

The interlocutors arrived at the consensus that not only a nuclear war but even a conventional war cannot be fought in Europe since any military conflict in Europe would be equally disastrous for European peoples and their civilisation.

The problem of the Middle East settlement was touched upon in the conversation among other problems. The need for lowering tension in the Mediterranean as a whole was recognized.

Both sides declared for the further development of contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the assembly of Western European Union.

First deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee Georgiy Korniyenko took part in the conversation which passed in an open [Moscow TASS International Russian 081743, in an identical report, uses Russian "otkrovennoy"] and benevolent atmosphere.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: FURTHER COMMENTARY ON THATCHER VISIT TO MOSCOW

Thatcher Letter in IZVESTIYA

PM141545 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Letter from British Prime Minister M. Thatcher in response to reader's letter: "Prime Minister's Letter" -- first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The IZVESTIYA editorial office has received a copy of a letter sent by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to pensioner Margarita Pylychikova in Borissov, Belorussian SSR. It is the British prime minister's reply to M. Pylychikova's appeal, published by IZVESTIYA on the eve of Thatcher's visit to the USSR.

1 April 1987

Dear Mrs Pylychikova,

I am using the occasion of my visit to Moscow to reply to the letter you wrote to me, which was published in IZVESTIYA 27 March.

I am glad you were frank. I think it is important that the peoples of East and West should be clearly aware of one another's viewpoints.

I sincerely agree with much of what your letter says. The task of governments certainly is to create a good life for their peoples, life in conditions of peace, security, and freedom in a healthy and favorable environment. I believe this is the aim of the present Soviet leader, just as it is the objective of my government. My talks in Moscow this week were geared to this and, as you put it, to achieving a warmer climate of international relations, particularly British-Soviet relations. Although it would be wrong to expect too much too quickly, I believe the Soviet Government and I have made progress in the right direction.

At the same time, I was concerned about what you say about the United States. I know the American people and the U.S. Government well. Of course, there can be no question of the United States "seeking war" or intending to "drop the nuclear weapons it has accumulated on the head of mankind." We in the West want peace and healthy and mutually advantageous relations with the Soviet Union. The arms race, which you write so critically about, began not because of the evil designs of one side or the other but because of a tragic lack of trust between us. We must now pursue constant and painstaking work to create this trust and ensure that at each stage we maintain both sides' security while constantly reducing the level of weapons. I am working to
achieve gradual process, and I hope that, as the dialogue with the Soviet leadership develops, the Soviet people will support us so we will move forward toward the goals you and I certainly share.

Thank you for your letter.
With best wishes,
Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Arbatov TIMES Article 'Censored'

PM211529 [Editorial Report] Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 16 on 19 April 1987 publishes on page 5 a complaint, under the rubric "How A British Newspaper 'Touched Up' Arbatov," by USSR Academician Georgiy Arbatov about the treatment of an article he wrote published in Britain's SUNDAY TIMES. The complaint runs as follows:

"The following article, 'Mrs Thatcher in Moscow: Vintage Old Thinking', was written for the British newspaper THE SUNDAY TIMES and published on April 5, though, under a different title — 'Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered...'. I suppose that the reasons for the different heading are clear.

"The author (as well as many other people in Moscow) was neither bewitched nor even bewildered, but unpleasantly astonished by the obsolescence of the British Prime Minister's views on important foreign policy issues, showing a 'nuclear ignorance' which is especially dangerous when expressed by the head of a nuclear state. Those sentiments were reflected in the title. This was the impression produced by Mrs. Thatcher that THE SUNDAY TIMES was not willing to convey to its readers.

"The newspaper also considered it necessary to censor the original text and leave out the following words: 'Mrs. Thatcher, I guess, struck thoughtful Soviet audiences as perhaps the West's best and brightest representative (no offence meant to other conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic) of old thinking on peace and security.' A number of other abridgements made by THE SUNDAY TIMES show the same desire to conceal the critical idea of the article.

"After the text had been tampered with in this way I was not particularly bewitched, but bewildered. Naturally, I sent a letter to THE SUNDAY TIMES stating my opinion of the shameless censoring of my article and disrespect for my right as the author and requested the letter to be published."

MOSCOW NEWS follows this complaint with the "genuine" text of Arbatov's article under the heading, "Mrs Thatcher in Moscow: Vintage Old Thinking", which runs as follows:

"Nobody in Moscow doubts that the visit of the British prime minister to the USSR was a useful and important political event — both for bilateral relations and in the larger international context. It has helped broaden the East-West political dialogue and compare views on major issues of East-West relations, regional conflicts, and disarmament. It has contributed to a clearer understanding of both sides' positions and intentions. The agreements signed are of certain value. It was also good that Mrs. Thatcher saw with her own eyes today's Soviet Union and heard directly, from the first source, about both our plans and our problems. And, last but not least, I would hope that she has picked up at least a few things from the discussions on the main
subject of our time - the problem of nuclear weapons, even though the exchanges were rather heated at times.

"As for Soviet citizens' impressions of the prime minister, they seemed to me rather ambiguous. Some people who mostly just watched her appearances (and Soviet TV did give her a lot of publicity), without caring much about the sense of what she was saying, must have formed a very favourable opinion. A Soviet lady told me admiringly (and ladies, of course, are not overly given to admiring other ladies): 'I love her. She does look good, as if looking good has become her profession'. Other people not only admired her manners and looks but also tried to understand the message of her speeches published in Soviet newspapers and broadcast on TV. My impression is that they were baffled by some of the thoughts of our distinguished British guest -- and, where nuclear weapons are concerned, even appalled. Mrs. Thatcher, I guess, struck thoughtful Soviet audiences as perhaps the West's best and brightest representative (no offence meant to other conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic) of old thinking on peace and security.

"According to Mrs. Thatcher, it is the nuclear weapons that have kept the peace here for four decades. Well, well. First, it remains to be proven that it is due to nuclear weapons that there has not been a war in Europe since 1945. Why then was there no all-out war in Europe for 40 years prior to 1914? Because of machine guns?"

"And after all, what magic do nuclear weapons possess that have turned them into peacekeepers? Are chemical and biological arms less horrible? Even a conventional war in Europe would be Europe's 'final solution', because the continent is saturated with nuclear power stations and storage depots with oil and toxic chemicals. If there is need for fear to ensure peace, that can be provided without nuclear arms. But more and more people understand that peace built on fear is not only very expensive, but will sooner or later fall apart.

"Secondly, if the prime minister professes such a sacred belief in nuclear weapons, why does she speak of peace in Europe only? According to her logic, in order to achieve a lasting place in less than stable regions, like Latin America, Asia, Mideast, South and North Africa -- Iran, Syria, Libya, everybody out there should be in even greater need of nuclear weapons than Europeans. Would Mrs. Thatcher feel more secure in a world where everybody had a bomb, even if it was meant for peace?

"Her discourses on other military matters were similarly naive. For instance, on SDI. Or on the military balance -- in trying to prove that there is a Soviet superiority she was more than selective, choosing not to notice nuclear warheads, strategic bombers, cruise missiles and other such things where advantages are clearly on the West's side.

"Older people with good memories took Mrs. Thatcher's military ideas with a sense of deja vu: It all sounded remarkably like in the 1940s and 1950s. But what could be accepted at that time as an innocent delusion, has by now turned into superdangerous negligence. Again, I don't want to suspect bad intentions here. But, knowing how intensively the issues of security and nuclear weapons have been discussed in Britain and the rest of the world for the past 10-15 years, one is simply amazed: How did the head of government of a major nuclear power manage to hear nothing and ignore everything?

"Having said all this, I caught myself wondering: Does it follow that there was no real dialogue on problems of security and disarmament during Mrs. Thatcher's visit to Moscow? I don't think it does. We have to wait and see. Perhaps, some of British Conservatives' views may be modified. And the public discussion on nuclear weapons and security, undoubtedly stimulated by her visit, may turn out to be quite useful.
"All the more so, since there is a lot of new and important business to attend to in foreign policy. US Secretary George Shultz is coming to Moscow one of these days, followed by a delegation of US members of Congress headed by Speaker Jim Wright. It is seriously hoped in Moscow that these meetings will help remove the obstacles to an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). And if we manage to conclude an INF treaty, that may touch off a chain of other events as a result of which the world would be a safer and more attractive place to live in. I may assure British readers that the Soviet leadership is and will continue to do its absolute best so that history move in such a direction."

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SOVIET PAPER ATTACKS THATCHER'S 'NUCLEOPHILIA'

PM151541 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 4 Apr 37 p 7

[Gennadiy Gerasimov "Saturday Commentary": "London's Nucleophilia"]

[Text] Do you believe that nuclear weapons are evil? You are naively mistaken. Nuclear weapons are a blessing—because they have preserved peace in Europe and the world by ensuring so-called deterrence. Therefore they ought to remain in existence.

You do understand, obviously, that there was a need to "deter" the Soviet Union because of its military and ideological threat.

These are the causes of the love of nuclear weapons, of nucleophilia, as explained to us in Moscow by the high-ranking guest from London.

Traditions are strong there, and traditional thinking perceives the problem of national security primarily as a military-technical problem: It is necessary to maintain arms at a level making it possible to threaten the enemy with a crushing blow.

hence, a syllogism:

The more weapons there are, and the better they are, the greater the security.

Nuclear systems are weapons.

The more nuclear systems, the better the security.

But a minor premise transforms syllogism into sophism: Nuclear systems are not weapons at all, because they return like a deadly boomerang. Is it possible to "deter" by the threat: "If you attack me, I'll kill both of us?"

This is why nuclear systems threaten to ignite a universal conflagration through a technical accident, political miscalculation, or the insanity of some hierostratus.

U.S. President R. Reagan believes that the concept of nuclear deterrence is immoral and—even if only in words which differ from the Pentagon's practice—dreams of living to see a world without nuclear weapons.
Britain's Prime Minister M. Thatcher holds a different opinion.

But her point of departure as regards the preservation of peace so far thanks to nuclear weapons is a hypothesis whose correctness is impossible to prove. She asserts cause and effect relationships where they may not even exist.

Nucleophilia is an invitation to continue the arms race. After all, deterrence consists of actions and counteractions. The threat in one's own hand must be greater than that in the other side's hand. Hence the "green light" for military-technical thinking.

Last year the UN secretary general published a "Study of Deterrence" [Issledovaniye o sderzhivanii] prepared by experts from several countries. "Deterrence is leading us to destruction," Major General Ahmad Fakhr from Egypt wrote in it.

Nucleophilia is also an invitation to other countries to acquire nuclear weapons. According to the syllogism:

In order to guarantee its security, Britain needs nuclear weapons.

Country "N" strives to guarantee its own security, like any other country.

It needs nuclear weapons.

As a matter of fact, in what way is country "N" inferior to Britain?

And there are more than 10 such countries, "not inferior" to Britain, already having the knowledge and technical potential to create nuclear weapons.

The British position is an invitation to enlarge the so-called "nuclear club," while its Soviet member proposes that it be closed down. The British position runs contrary to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which the nuclear powers pledged to strive to end their nuclear status while nonnuclear countries pledged not to seek to acquire such status. London is not in line with international law.

There is one more example of be added to London's aforementioned divergence from logic.

Mrs Thatcher said in Moscow that without nuclear weapons the world become less stable and more dangerous. At the same time, she supported R. Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. But if we were to turn to the primary source, R. Reagan's 23 March 1983 speech explaining the objectives of his "Star Wars" program, we would discover that the British argument contains numerous loose ends. In actual fact, Reagan proclaimed that the end goal of SDI is "to render nuclear weapons powerless and obsolete." According to Thatcher, this would make the world less stable and more dangerous.... So why does she support SDI?

These brief remarks are not, of course, intended to produce a general assessment of M. Thatcher's visit to Moscow. I am talking only about attitudes
toward nuclear weapons. It would seem that such attitudes ought to be axiomatically negative, even Reagan himself.... It does appear, however, that there is also a different view. But how justified is it?

"It is necessary to examine the ways and means which the international community could use to escape from the trap of nuclear deterrence," K. Subrahmanyan, director of the Delhi Institute for the Study and Analysis of Defense Questions, wrote in the aforementioned UN study. "The doctrine of nuclear deterrence is not some abiding truth but is basically built on a system of impressions." But impressions do change. There was slavery, and it has disappeared. There was colonialism, and it has been pensioned off.

It is time to start thinking in a new fashion, in step with the age.

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USSR: FURTHER COVERAGE OF VISIT BY LUXEMBOURG FOREIGN MINISTER

Shevardnadze Luncheon Speech

LD230020 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1820 GMT 22 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow 22 Apr (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, hosted a luncheon today in honor of Jacques Poos, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Luxembourg, who is in the USSR on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Eduard Shevardnadze said in his speech: Mr Minister, the Soviet Union long ago established diplomatic relations with your country, with which we have never been in enmity, and for which Soviet people have feelings of sincere respect and affection.

By turning to the past we are asking questions of the future. We are not simplifying the issues of securing peace in a reliable way in the nuclear age. The conception of an all-embracing system of international security, brought to the fore by Mikhail Gorbachev, is built precisely on the interconnection and interdependence between political, military, legal, humanitarian, and economic factors. There is hardly any sense in trying to prove the obvious, such as it is better to live in peace, security, and sufficiency without nuclear weapons, than in enmity, with confrontation, with economic slumps, and with nuclear weapons. There is no such choice. A reply must be given to the question to the effect whether we can live in a world peacefully without nuclear weapons. Our view on that score was expressed in a practical form in the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev of 15 January 1986, in the Soviet position at the meeting in Reykjavik, and at the recent talks in Moscow with U.S. Secretary of State Shultz. At this time the Soviet side expressed itself in favor of the elimination — the total removal — of two classes of nuclear weapons: medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe.

They tell us, however, that such a version is unacceptable for the West. Yesterday they were still asserting that medium-range missiles must not be eliminated without reducing operational and tactical missiles. One respected West European statesman even compared these classes of missiles with "two coupled trucks." But when we proposed removing the "second truck" even ahead of the first, then it turned out that this version again also does not suit some of our partners.

Why? We are told it's because the Soviet Union has an advantage in other weapons. Let's assume that it is so. But does the USSR stand to gain, reducing a considerably larger number of missiles and warheads on them? Silence is maintained on that score, just as silence is maintained on our proposal for all types of weapons — nuclear
battlefield systems and conventional weapons — that balance be established at lower levels than at present. It is said that if U.S. missiles are removed from Europe it will remain without a nuclear defense. Unfortunately, even in that case Europe will still be a long way from a nuclear weapon-free status. Britain and France will retain big nuclear arsenals, U.S. nuclear-capable planes and battlefield nuclear weapons will still remain at European bases, and U.S. atomic aircraft carriers are always close at hand.

Regrettably, the conclusion here is obvious: The NATO leaders do not want to part with nuclear weapons, in a desire to maintain them out of considerations far removed from the interests of European and general world security.

The reaction to confidence-building proposals is also startling. We agreed with the U.S. secretary of state that the Soviet defense minister and his U.S. counterpart or their deputies would meet and discuss mutual concerns with regard to the observance of agreements currently in effect. It is known that we came out in favor of the commanders in chief of the two political alliances — NATO and the Warsaw Pact — discussing together the issue of so-called military imbalance in Europe. However, we received a negative reply.

Nor do we see any response to the proposal on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe. In our opinion, this initiative submitted by the Governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia could become a major measure of military detente.

The guests from Luxembourg should not get the impression that we are making a complaint. We just wish to explain our stand to a member of the North Atlantic bloc. I do not make a secret of our hope that during discussion of nuclear disarmament problems in NATO Luxembourg will favor making a decision on nuclear missiles in Europe in line with the aspirations of Europe's peoples. We believe that Luxembourg will support the right of Europe's nonaligned and neutral countries to take part in solving problems connected with reducing armed forces and conventional weapons on our continent. Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, is a single whole. In our common European home all states without exception should have a chance to discuss problems vital to them on an equal footing with others.

This is precisely the reason why we proposed to hold a special meeting of foreign ministers of participant states in the Helsinki process, at which it would be possible to consider the problems of disarmament in Europe in a comprehensive manner.

A unique chance has now emerged toward taking the first steps, not timid but bold ones, towards ridding Europe of nuclear weapons and reducing the levels of military confrontation. These steps can create a powerful impetus and open up the way to an accord on the primary problem of ensuring European and universal security. It is on our continent, it is through Europe that we can create a corridor to lead us out of the nuclear impasse, a corridor to the elimination of all types of mass destruction weapons everywhere, once and for all.

However, this is not just a path over the mountains of weapons, but a route toward trust and eliminating various obstacles still separating the European peoples, and the East from the West. In a Europe delivered from its nuclear chains, it will be easier for everyone who has a sincere interest in developing mutually beneficial cooperation, in expanding and enriching contacts between individual people and whole peoples to breathe.
I have already had an opportunity to talk about the fact that politicians, in
discussions about the best ways toward security and peace, are regrettably leaving out
of their sight the one for whose sake these ways must be paved.

Over many decades, Soviet–Luxembourg relations have formed smoothly and calmly. They
have been developing in a spirit of trust and mutual friendliness. The frank
[otkrovennyy] and constructive exchange of views that has taken place these days has
shown that out countries have considerable potential and possibilities for expanding
and deepening bilateral cooperation in various spheres of the economy, science, and
culture.

One would like to hope, Mr Minister, that your visit to the Soviet Union and
your conversations with Soviet leaders will enter as another fine page in the
chronicle of friendly links between our peoples.

Poos Speech

PM231551 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Talks End"]

[Excerpts] The talks between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee
Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and J. Poos, Luxembourg deputy prime minister and
foreign minister, ended 22 April. [passage omitted]

E.A. Shevardnadze gave a luncheon in J. Poos' honor. The ministers exchanged speeches
during the luncheon. [passage omitted]

In his reply speech J. Poos said: I am particularly pleased to be in Moscow as guest
of the Soviet Government. Meetings within the framework of the various organizations
and international conferences in which we participate take place often. Our economic,
trade, and cultural cooperation is proceeding normally. These numerous contacts and
visits have raised our bilateral relations to a new level.

Our peoples, who were attacked during World War II and experienced devastation and
suffering, showed unwavering courage and unshakable will in the struggle to retain
their independence. We have not forgotten the heroism of the Soviet soldiers who made
a significant contribution to the victory over the cruel occupiers and to the
eradication of their repulsive ideology.

The lesson that, I am convinced, our two peoples learned from these tragic events is
the same: It is necessary to build peace.

The nuclear era has opened up the terrifying prospect of destruction and wholesale
annihilation, the minister went on to say; political leaders must respond boldly to the
need to ensure disarmament and scrap all types of destructive weapon systems.

The conditions for implementing these steps have never been so favorable as today. The
proposals offered by the U.S. President and the CPSU Central Committee general
secretary in Reykjavik made it possible to embark on talks that despite their obvious
complexity, fully retain the possibility of reaching agreement. In this process the
stakes are very high. We must move forward gradually, to ensure that global
equilibrium and the security of all countries — large or small — are never questioned.
Luxembourg will welcome any agreement that makes it possible to implement the "zero" option on Euromissiles -- something that beyond all doubt, marks a historic breakthrough in the disarmament process. But we are equally convinced that one such agreement will be insufficient. It must be followed by other agreements in the sphere of shorter-range nuclear arms and by the total elimination of chemical weapons.

We greeted with great interest the proposals recently offered by General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev on eliminating the present inequality and monitoring the fulfillment of disarmament agreements. [paragraph continues]
Monitoring will undoubtedly be one of the key conditions for achieving success within the framework of the process now underway. Needless to say, lasting peace presupposes reductions in both nuclear and conventional military arsenals.

Undoubtedly there are considerable differences between our systems from the standpoint of their political and economic makeup. But these real differences do not diminish the universality of fundamental human rights enshrined in the universal declaration of 10 December 1948, just as they cannot hamper the maintenance of extensive cooperation and relations based on mutual trust between countries with different socioeconomic systems.

The discussions currently under way in Vienna within the CSCE framework show that the trust needed in East-West relations is being established only slowly and sometimes with difficulty. But any success like that reached last year at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures can bring us closer together and thereby reduce tension.

Today your country, under the leadership of General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev, has embarked on the path of modernization and restructuring. Important decisions have been made, particularly on questions relating to human rights, and they have generated the greatest interest on our side.

The openness on which your policy is based may in many respects serve as a stimulus in developing East-West relations. It is capable of making our "common European home" -- which the general secretary spoke about -- more open and reliable. Luxembourg will make its own contribution -- however modest -- to this cause.

The luncheon was attended by V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the leaders of a number of USSR ministries and departments, and other officials.

The guest visited the V.I. Lenin Study and Apartment Museum in the Kremlin.

J. Poos left Moscow the same day. He had been on an official visit to our country at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

He was seen off at the airport by Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, and other officials.

R. Bloes, Luxembourg ambassador to the USSR, was among the send-off party.
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: APRIL COMMENTARIES ON FRG INF ATTITUDE

Kohl, Public Opinion Cited

PM031122 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[Correspondent Yu. Yakhontov report: "Not Hiding Behind Words: Prospects for the Elimination of Medium-Range Missiles and the FRG"]

[Excerpt] Bonn, April — [Passage omitted] The Soviet initiative received a positive assessment in the course of debates on the government statement delivered in the Bundestag by Federal Chancellor H. Kohl. (PRAVDA reported this on 19 March.) He reaffirmed his adherence to the "zero option," but it was hard to see from the federal chancellor's statement what contribution to the realization of this highly important disarmament problem could be expected from the FRG. The deputies' speeches in the debates on the government statement showed that even within the ranks of the factions of the conservative CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] bloc, there are some signs of a new, realistic mood breaking through.

But not everything is developing smoothly in the approach to disarmament and the development of a climate of confidence in Europe on the main political highway in Bonn.

For observers familiar with political life in the Rhine capital, it is no secret that in the government, in Parliament, and mainly in the local "Pentagon" there are many people — and influential people at that — for whom the elimination of all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles now being planned is hard to swallow.

They know, of course, that the "zero option" on missiles was originally put forward by the United States and NATO, not without hopes that the USSR would never agree to it. Thus they hoped to make use of it for as long as they liked as an unbeatable propaganda trump card, in parallel with the spurring on of new spirals in the arms race. These "calculating" gentlemen are now having to "save face" — which way can they turn? They must grit their teeth, as the weekly DER SPIEGEL writes, and reconcile themselves to the real possibility of the conclusion of a Soviet—American agreement. Moreover this "zero option," in the form proposed by the USSR, is, in the opinion of 92 percent of those polled by the weekly STEERN, categorized as a "very good" or "good" proposal on disarmament.

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The camp of the opponents of a nuclear-free Europe and their camouflage are not homogeneous. These people include many who believe that much water will flow under the bridge before the point of genuine disarmament is reached. So why reject a proposal which is advantageous in propaganda terms, they ask. Let us support the "zero option" for the time being, they say, and then we shall see....

Others -- mainly representatives of the Defense Ministry and the Bundeswehr, but also certain high-ranking figures in the conservative CDU/CSU bloc, mainly from its extreme right wing, christened the "steel helmet' faction -- are trying surreptitiously to make the talks which have begun more difficult.

They are once again juggling with figures, manipulating the facts, and kindling the fears of ordinary and misinformed people about the USSR's "military superiority" and the "threat" to the FRG and Western Europe from the East....

This is also done in order to justify the demand to raise the ceilings on operational and tactical missiles, that is, to increase the number for the West, or in other words "upgrade" again. And not only in this sphere, but in all parameters and avenues, leading to a further intensification of the NATO doctrine of "deterrence." You might think the opponents of the "zero option" are deaf and blind. They stubbornly fail to notice M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February statement, which, of course, they have studied from the first line to the last, says clearly and specifically: "As for other operational and tactical missiles, we are prepared to commence talks immediately with a view to their reduction and total elimination."

How can there be talks of new, higher ceilings, of "upgrading," when the reduction and total elimination of this type of missile is being proposed? The same could be said of conventional arms and chemical weapons -- the socialist countries' proposals on this score have been on the conference table for a long time.

Naturally, the question arises among the progressive FRG public: Can and will the new government in Bonn overcome this half-concealed opposition, behind which are substantial forces which gamble on endlessly forging evermore dangerous weapons capable of exterminating the human race, and which has no intention of giving up its militarist positions without a fight? The answer can only be made clear by Bonn's concrete efforts, not by mere assurances of good intentions. The FRG public expects the government to promote disarmament in practice. The FRG has the potential for this: How much has been said and written here about the close friendship with the United States, the bonds of alliance, the fact that people in Washington "heed" Bonn's opinion on questions of European security?....

Schmidt Interviewed

PM071457 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 87 First Edition p 7

[Interview with former FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt by V. Mikhailov: "Helmut Schmidt: 'Time Is Running Out. We Must Hurry.' About New Thinking and the 'Zero Option'"; in Moscow; date not specified]

[Text] Before me is a man whose name is widely known. Helmut Schmidt, former chancellor of the FRG, who headed its government in the latter half of the seventies and the early eighties. The FRG was envisaged as the chief base for the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles. The chancellor found himself caught between two opposing forces -- the Pentagon with its European minions, and increased resistance within the country. Helmut Schmidt's role was not unequivocal at that complex time.
In Europe it was a difficult time for the new growth of detente. NATO was adopting the nuclear "arms upgrading" program.

Helmut Schmidt recently arrived with a group of prominent FRG politicians for the 10th meeting with Soviet partners named for the West German city of Bergedorf, where the first one was held. Although the meetings are of a closed nature, the winds of beneficial change in our country have penetrated them. The discussion participants were attracted by the dynamism of the Soviet initiatives and, above all, the proposals for ridding Europe of medium-range nuclear missiles.

The conversation also turned to changes in an interview which H. Schmidt granted to PRAVDA. Extremely exact, as always, he looked at the clock and said:

"I have been here just 36 hours, and it is hard for me to evaluate what is happening in the country. But it is perfectly possible to say how the Soviet Union now looks from abroad and to see a great deal without even coming here. What are most noteworthy are the changes in the intellectual and political climate. Soviet political leaders and the Soviet press are speaking far more freely and openly about their country and its problems, compared with the way I perceived this earlier.

"I would like M.S. Gorbachev to achieve positive results with the reforms. This is not only in the interests of the Soviet Union's peoples but also in the interests of others, of all the USSR's neighbors. This critical and self-critical approach is the first thing to attract attention.

"The second thing which can be discerned from outside and is confirmed by conversations here is the openness on the foreign policy plane. The most tangible changes are in disarmament policy, and I do not doubt their genuineness. The moratorium on nuclear tests, which stood for so long, should be singled out as something particularly positive. Unfortunately, the other side did not join in. But it as an action which should be remembered as being very positive.

"Or take the recent proposals at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting and the recent proposal on medium-range missiles. Gorbachev proposes a zero solution for both sides. I was pleased to learn that my role as a pioneer of the 'zero option' is known here. Now," H. Schmidt continued, "we can only fear lest Reagan abandons his previous consent. Of course, I am very satisfied that a useful idea has fallen on rich soil here. But we must hurry. Time is running out. The U.S. presidential election campaign begins next year. It will be hard to ratify any agreement in Congress. We -- rather, you -- already have sad experience. Consequently, a treaty must be drafted and approved during this year. I am wholeheartedly for this."

"As regards the Soviet Union, we are witnessing favorable development on the internal and the external plane."

"Could the U.S. European partners not exert a greater influence on Washington?" I asked H. Schmidt. "The process of destroying the arms limitation system is assuming menacing proportions. The SALT treaty is being cast aside and the ABM Treaty is being undermined."

"West European states advocate observance of the existing agreements," my interlocutor replied. "The Federal Government has come out quite clearly in favor of preserving the existing interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It considers it perfectly justified. However, the United States maintains that you too are conducting similar work for space. And it is difficult for West Europeans to know who is right -- they do not have monitoring satellites. In general, there is a definite uncertainty."
"What is your attitude toward the policy of strength? To the desire to seek security in more and more new wonder weapons?"

"I have never been a supporter of the policy of strength. My principle is equality. Nor have I ever considered it right to strive for military superiority. But not everyone is capable of switching to this thinking at once. People in the Soviet Union must be more patient. You cannot expect everyone to say 'Yes' and 'Amen' just like that, in a moment. But the principle of equality and identical security is extremely important for everyone. It must be adhered to at talks on any kinds of arms.

"On the whole, West Europeans welcome the new thinking that is taking root in the Soviet Union. There is no doubt about this. But the West Europeans' skepticism must be understood: Anything is possible in life."

In my view, answers like this and the preceding one are very diplomatic. My interlocutor has great experience here.

"Incidentally," H. Schmidt said, smiling, "the story of who was the first to propose the 'zero option' will undoubtedly not be printed in our country: This does not suit either my party or the others. Perhaps you will give it..."

PRAVDA Cites Genscher

PM061115 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[Tass report: "Genscher Interview"]

[Tex] Bonn, 3 Apr—FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has re-emphasized the need to achieve elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Such a step, he declared yesterday in an interview with the Deutschlandfunk radio station, would constitute major progress in the cause of disarmament, and this would be in keeping with West German and European interests.

The minister advocated that talks on operational and tactical missiles should start immediately after the talks on medium-range missiles. At the same time, he spoke against interlinking these problems.

At the same time, the minister again expatiated at length about the alleged "superiority of the Eastern side" in the sphere of conventional arms. Furthermore, he claimed that, given the present correlation of forces between West and East, it is apparently impossible to "abandon the strategy of deterrence, of which nuclear means are also a part."

FRG 'Torpedoing' Talks

LD121943 Moscow TASS in English 1930 GMT 12 Apr 87

[Text] Bonn, 12 Apr (TASS)—TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov reporting:
While advocating the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles from Europe in words, Bonn intends to go ahead with new programs for missile systems buildup. In doing so, it would torpedo disarmament talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, said Erwin Horn, a defense expert of the Social Democratic (SPD) group, in the West German Bundestag.

According to his data, the West German Government is to submit to the Federal Security Council as early as next May plans for converting Pershing-2 missiles into Pershing-1B's by removing one stage of the former.

Such systems with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers are called upon to replace 72 Pershing-1A missiles currently in service with the West German Air Force.

In addition to that, Erwin Horn emphasized, the West German Government plans to replace Lance tactical missiles with so-called Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS).

Pershing-1B's and ATACMS are dual-capable systems, the is, they can be fitted out with both conventional and nuclear warheads. This would blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and make verification and any disarmament accord impossible, Erwin Horn emphasized.

The Government of West Germany should recognize that by carrying out new military projects at the time when disarmament talks are in progress in Geneva it is torpedoing the complete elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles which Bonn is advocating in words, the expert said.

Thus, the West German Government is misleading the public as regards its approach to the "zero option" on medium-range missiles and issues related to it.

FRG Pershings 'Complicate' Talks

LD301501 Moscow TASS in English 1440 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 30 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Washington and Bonn are making fresh attempts to complicate agreement on medium-range missiles at Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva, by muddling up the issue of Pershing-1A missiles' place in the NATO military structure and the question of whom nuclear warheads for these delivery systems belong to.

The Federal Republic of Germany has in its arsenal 72 Pershing-1A shorter-range missiles of U.S. make. These missiles are of a dual purpose, which means they can be armed with either nuclear or conventional warheads.

Nuclear warheads for these systems are deployed on West German territory but are under the control of the U.S. military command. It goes without saying that the question of whether it is nuclear or conventional warheads that will be used on these missiles will be decided primarily by the United States.

This is why the Soviet draft treaty on medium-range missiles in Europe, which has been tabled in Geneva, provides, among other things, for eliminating also the American warheads for West German Pershing-1A's.
This part of the Soviet draft, however, drew a sharply negative reaction from Washington and Bonn.

Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] faction in the Bundestag, said in an interview with the Cologne-based newspaper EXPRESS that the Soviet proposals in Geneva "are patently unacceptable to the West" because, he contended, they covered the Pershing-I A's which were in service with the Bundeswehr.

A similar comment was made in Washington where White House Deputy Press Secretary Daniel Howard said the Geneva talks could not discuss the arms of a third side.

The Soviet draft, however, speaks not of the West German delivery systems but of the U.S. nuclear warheads for them.

So the following question is in order: Are they in Washington and Bonn acting out a comedy of "not understanding" the substance of the Soviet proposals or has the West German Bundeswehr already become the owner of nuclear warheads contrary to international agreements signed by the United States?

It is possible that West Germany has not given up hopes to be a nuclear power and sees control over U.S. nuclear warheads for its Pershings as the short cut to realizing these hopes.

It is not ruled out also that Washington and Bonn simply want to erect further impediments to a medium-range missile agreement.

The future will show which of the versions is the real reason why the American side objects to the Soviet proposals at the talks.

The West German press, in the meantime, reported the arrival in West Germany of a batch of U.S. neutron warheads for Howitzers which are in service with both the American and the West German Armed Forces in Western Europe.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: FRENCH GOVERNMENT SEEN AGAINST U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT

'Bitter Polemics'

PM211057 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 87 First Edition p 5

[V. Bolshakov article under the rubric "Hopeful Prospects": "The 'Prague Package' and Paris"]

[Text] The new Soviet peace initiatives put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Prague are referred to here as the "Prague package." They have rocked French public opinion. And the bitter polemics on the subject in the French press and among political circles reveal the difficulty with which the new thinking is forging a path for itself in France. The reason for this is that the claim that only nuclear weapons can guarantee French security has been regarded as axiomatic here for decades.

The day after M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Prague, the newspaper LE MONDE noted in an editorial that the Soviet leader had dealt "point by point" with all the "Europeans' fears" regarding an agreement on reducing Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe. "Tactical nuclear weapons? He has agreed," LE MONDE writes, "to discuss this issue without delay. Chemical weapons? The USSR has stopped producing them and is prepared to destroy its stockpiles. The imbalance in conventional weapons? In his opinion, these weapons should be very decisively reduced, rather than make some insignificant reduction. And regarding the verification of any agreements concluded in the future, in his words, it must be 'an important means of ensuring security.'"

This observation by LE MONDE contains the key to understanding the almost desperate reaction to the Soviet leader's Prague proposals which is now evident here in the right-wing pro-Atlantic press and among the French political circles whose opinion it reflects. The newspaper LE FIGARO, for example, has published an article entitled "Europe in Danger." Exactly what kind of danger is seen by the mouthpiece of the French right in the new USSR proposals? It transpires that these proposals, like the proposals to remove medium-range missiles from Europe, according to LE FIGARO, "represent a gigantic step along the road to the aim the USSR has always pursued: the 'denuclearization' of the continent so as to leave Western Europe at the mercy of the monstrous Soviet arsenal of conventional weapons and force the United States to remove its troops from Europe."

It is amazing that LE FIGARO could have arrived at this conclusion. Because literally on the next page the same newspaper — it must be given its due for this — faithfully reproduces in detail the whole complex of proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev in Prague. Any intelligent person will understand, on becoming acquainted with this
"Prague package," that neither France nor any other European country should be alarmed by the prospect of nuclear weapons being removed from our continent. All the more so in view of the fact that these weapons will be reduced gradually, with regard for the limits of reasonable sufficiency. Both conventional and chemical weapons can be reduced at the same time as nuclear weapons. Operational and tactical weapons can be reduced at the same time as medium-range missiles, and so forth.

French peace supporters are now in favor of Europe, and France especially, taking precisely this path rather than pursuing the arms race. An Action Week for Disarmament was held here 4 through 11 April at the call of the French Peace Movement. During this time tens of thousands of signatures were collected for an appeal by the movement to end the French nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll and against the production of space, chemical, and neutron weapons. Those who took part in the week appealed to the French Government to support the new Soviet peace initiatives and become actively involved in the task of disarmament.

Chirac Opposes Disarmament

LD271630 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT 27 Apr 87

["Atlantic Solidarity Obstructs Disarmament" — TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow April 27 TASS — By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

The Soviet Union's new initiatives on nuclear missiles compelled governments and political parties of West European countries to reveal their real approach to problems of war and peace. It turned out, specifically, that some members of the current French cabinet are in the lead of the attack of the conservative circles of NATO countries against nuclear disarmament in Europe.

The essence of France's stand on the "zero option", the real reason behind the French slogan "Neither SS-20, nor Pershing missiles" have been laid here. The attitude of French officials to the Soviet proposals is viewed by Western observers as "emotional," "critical," and as "being even tougher than in other capitals of the European NATO countries."

French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac came out on Sunday with a call to NATO countries to remain cautious against the Soviet proposals on nuclear disarmament. He declared that withdrawal of shorter-range missiles from Europe could be dangerous since it would weaken the deterrence potential in Europe. Andre Giraud, defense minister in the Chirac cabinet, went so far as to describe the planned agreement on medium-range missiles as "nuclear Munich."

Going by official statements made in Paris, the Chirac cabinet is much more concerned over the prospect of the reduction of its nuclear forces in future, then over the threat of nuclear war which heightens now as new U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles are deployed in Western Europe.

As is known, the Soviet Government proclaimed its readiness not to take into account the British and French nuclear forces in the overall balance of forces in a proposed agreement on nuclear missiles in Europe. And this was a serious concession, for the French military openly measure the might of their nuclear forces by the number of Soviet cities they can destroy in a war against socialist countries.
But high officials in Paris showing the political shortsightedness, constantly express concern that as soon as the USSR withdraws its theatre missiles from Europe it will be even more difficult for France to justify the existence of its nuclear force. And this is proclaimed in Paris to be as all but the main threat to peace in the European Continent.

Meanwhile France adopted a program of the intensive buildup of its nuclear forces. And there is no doubt that they target socialist countries. Paris expands its "zone of responsibility in Europe," as the Americans put it, and replaces Pluton missiles with range of 120 kilometres with Hades missiles that can hit targets in the territories of Czechoslovakia and the GDR. The number of nuclear warheads with which French sea-based and land-based missiles are fitted out will increase four-fold by 1992 to reach 600 units. As an American journalist noted, it the French nuclear forces are a joke, it becomes less and less funny.

The stand of Paris on questions of nuclear disarmament does not go together in the present conditions even with the declaration of France's striving to maintain a balance between independence and solidarity with the United States.

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WARSAW PACT ALLIES APPROVE GORBACHEV INITIATIVES

LD251747 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1605 GMT 25 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, 25 Apr (TASS) -- Over the last few days the leadership of the allied member states of the Warsaw Pact organization was informed in detail of the content of recent talks in Moscow with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

There was a detailed conversation on this issue in Moscow between M.S. Gorbachev and W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and chairman of the Polish Council of State, who warmly supported the whole range of Soviet initiatives aimed at limiting and subsequently eliminating weapons of mass destruction, reducing armed forces and weapons in Europe, and, on the whole, improving the international climate.

Special representatives of the Soviet leadership went to Berlin, Prague, Sofia, Budapest, and Bucharest.

Conversations that were held and took place in an atmosphere of frankness [otkrovennost] and cordiality showed that the leadership of the fraternal socialist countries fully approves and warmly supports the new major initiatives put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and proposed in talks with the U.S. secretary of state on key issues of nuclear disarmament, as well as the general line of the USSR, which combines firm advocacy of the legitimate interests of the allied countries with energetic and innovative efforts to improve the international situation and an important component of it -- Soviet-U.S. relations.

The senior leaders of the fraternal socialist states delivered special statements on the results of the consultations with the Soviet representatives.

E. Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, stressed in particular that the GDR supports wholly and completely the new initiatives on all key issues relating to arms limitations and disarmament put forward in Prague and Moscow by M.S. Gorbachev. Immediately concluding an agreement on scrapping Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, a way toward which is provided by the Soviet proposals, he stressed, would be the first and exceedingly important step that would realistically begin the process of halting the nuclear arms race and reducing nuclear weapons. Right now, after the USSR has displayed readiness to go a long way to meet the United States and its West European allies also on issues relating to operational and tactical missiles with a range of 500 to 1000 km, absolutely all doubts have been removed regarding the workability of the "zero solution" on INF in Europe put forward by the USSR. The GDR, E. Honecker stated, resolutely opposes attempts by NATO to respond to the Soviet proposal with plans for
"upgrading arms" and creating a nuclear potential in Western Europe that represents a qualitatively new threat to GDR security. Having stressed the importance of the strictest verification [kontrol] measures, E. Honecker pointed out that the territory of the GDR will not remain outside these measures.

G. Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee and president of the CSSR, noted that the package of Soviet proposals put forward in Prague and developed in the course of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow opens up a realistic path toward reducing the level of military confrontation on our continent and meets the vital interests of the Czechoslovak people and all European states.

He singled out the great significance of the Soviet proposal for strict verification [kontrol] of compliance with the relevant agreements. Monitoring [kontrol] on the basis of reciprocity would be carried out in line with this on CSSR territory as well. G. Husak pointed out that the CSSR fully supports these new initiatives and will facilitate their implementation. In this context the resolve of the Czechoslovak side was stressed to actively continue to implement the proposal to create a nuclear weapons-free corridor in Central Europe.

T. Zhivkov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian Council of State, expressed the full support of the Bulgarian communists and all the country's working people for the constructive and dynamic peace policies of the CPSU and the Soviet state and also expressed sincere thanks for the up-to-the minute and deeply interesting information provided on behalf of the Soviet leadership.

N. Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, welcomed the initiatives and proposals of the Soviet Union and M.S. Gorbachev on questions concerning the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and also on the complete elimination of operational and tactical missiles in Europe. He stressed the need to intensify the struggle of the peoples and all progressive and antiwar forces to end the arms race, to provide effective measures for disarmament and primarily nuclear disarmament, and to create a climate of trust and broad international cooperation.

The Soviet initiatives were received with full understanding and support in the Hungarian People's Republic. In the assessment of the Hungarian comrades, positive advances have now taken shape in the international situation under the influence of the new line in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the socialist community.

The exchange of opinions that has been carried out on central issues of world development at its present crucial stage serves as yet further vivid evidence of the fraternal solidarity of the socialist countries and of their unity and cohesion in the cause of uncompromising struggle against the military threat and of laying down the foundations of a firm and just system of all-embracing security.

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WARSAW PACT MAY MEETING PLANNED TO DISCUSS INF

LD301920 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] In accordance with the agreement reached, the next conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee will take place in Berlin at the end of May. Over to Nikolay Shishlin, foreign affairs journalist:

[Shishlin] The forthcoming conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee will undoubtedly be a major event. Europe and the world are awaiting it. This is connected to the fact that we are experiencing an extremely critical moment in international developments. As you know, as a result of the broad Soviet initiatives, in particular, the Soviet proposals for resolving problems related to the elimination of missile weapons in Europe, the prospect of attaining broad agreement both on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles has opened up, and the Soviet Union is prepared to go even further, toward the elimination of battlefield missiles and tactical missiles.

The prospect for a really major breakthrough is opening, in absolutely tangible action, aimed not at arms restrictions, but at cutting them back [svertyvaniye], and reducing them [sokrashcheniye]. It is to be expected that the forthcoming Political Consultative Committee conference will focus its attention on these extremely major actions that are now, in essence in operation, and are now being discussed at the Geneva negotiations, in which our representatives and U.S. representatives are participating.

It may be predicted that, of course, the Soviet stance will receive new confirmation in the stance of our socialist friends. Here no particular perspicacity is required to assert this, since the position of the Polish, Bulgarian, German, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Romanian comrades has already been declared.

I believe that the matter will not end here, however, since at this time three points are important. The first is that the situation should be soberly understood, and the prospects of international developments correctly determined. The second is that a truly in-depth study of the ideas that have already been announced by the Warsaw Pact member states is essential. The third point is that action will be an issue. Because while analysis and big ideas are essential, practical actions are just as essential.

For this reason it may be expected that the Political Consultative Committee conference will give the starting signal for a new round of major political work by the European socialist states, work aimed at achieving a noble end, a radical improvement in the situation in Europe, which will, of course, in its turn, have a favorable influence on the development of international relations as such.

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SOVIET, CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET IN MOSCOW

PM281437 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 87 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Conversations Held"]

[Text] On the evening of 25 April, E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, met with B. Chnoupek, member of the CPCZ Central Committee and CSSR foreign minister, who made a brief stopover in Moscow en route to Kabul.

During their conversation, the ministers expressed deep satisfaction at deepening Soviet-Czechooslovak cooperation in all spheres. The recent official friendly visit to the CSSR by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and his talks with G. Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee and president of the CSSR, and other Czechoslovak leaders demonstrated the joint desire of Soviet and Czechoslovak Communists and the peoples of the two countries to raise the whole range of this cooperation to a new and higher level.

The resolve to deepen the unity and cohesiveness of the socialist community countries and collaboration among Warsaw Pact states in the struggle for peace and social progress was stressed.

During their discussion of international problems attention was focused on questions of ending the arms race and creating an all-embracing system of peace and international security. The sides confirmed their desire to persistently strive to implement the specific collective measures designed to advance the Budapest initiative on reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe and developing the all-European process elaborated at the Moscow session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee.

E.A. Shevardnadze and B. Chnoupek stressed the urgency of concluding an agreement eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and reaching an accord on operational and tactical missiles and the need to clear Europe of nuclear weapons and begin a real process of demilitarizing the continent.

The special significance of the CSSR and GDR initiatives to set up in Europe a nuclear-free corridor and zone free from chemical weapons was noted. The hope was expressed that all European states, particularly NATO members, will make their contribution in this direction.

In this regard both sides again pointed out the importance of a constructive approach to the complex and mutually dependent realities of the present-day world in the interests of strengthening general security.

The conversation proceeded in a cordial, comradely atmosphere and demonstrated complete identity of views on all questions under discussion.

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CPSU COMMUNICATIONS TO WEST EUROPEAN CP'S ON INF

Pugo Addresses Danish CP

LD171938 Moscow TASS in English 1826 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Text] Copenhagen April 17 TASS -- "There are forces in the West that do not wish to see Europe nuclear-free." Joint efforts of political parties, public movements, and peoples of all countries in favour of elaborating as soon as possible and concluding an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe are particularly essential in these conditions", said Boris Pugo, member of the CPSU Central Committee, first secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia.

He spoke on Thursday at the current 28th Congress of the Danish Communist Party (DKP) here. Boris Pugo is heading the CPSU delegation at the DKP Congress.

"Together with other socialist countries", Boris Pugo said, "the USSR made bold and large-scale steps in the field of confidence-building measures, radical cut-downs in conventional arms and armed forces in Europe, and in the issue of banning and eliminating chemical weapons. The new Soviet initiatives proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in Prague have attracted universal attention". 

"The specific plan for the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, the plan which the Soviet Union suggested recently, could become the first step towards ridding Europe of nuclear weapons", the leader of the Soviet delegation pointed out.

"However, our proposals", he said, "have been overgrown with a whole package of conditions and linkage. With a view to facilitating the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe without delay, the Soviet Union, as Mikhail Gorbachev stated, is ready to conduct talks on a radical reduction in and, ultimately, complete elimination of shorter-range missiles as well".

CPSU Message To Danish CP

PM161523 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 87 Second Edition p 1

[Text] To the 28th Danish Communist Party [DKP] Congress.
Dear Comrades!

The CPSU Central Committee warmly greets the delegates to the 28th DKP Congress and wishes the congress success in its work.

Soviet Communists have a sincere affection for your party and are following its activities in defense of the vital interests of its country's working people and their social and democratic rights. We have a high opinion of the Danish Communists' contribution to the struggle of all Danish peace-loving forces for a Danish policy of relaxing international tension, maintaining peace and stability in Northern Europe, and creating a nuclear-free zone in that region.

The 27th CPSU Congress' strategic course toward accelerating our country's economic and social development and comprehensively strengthening socialism is part and parcel of the CPSU and Soviet state policy to establish an all-embracing system of international security in the interests of the cardinal solution of problems of war and peace and nuclear disarmament. The entire course of the development of the situation since Reykjavik has shown that vigorous efforts by the peoples and governments of countries great and small, political parties, and broad public circles are the only way to achieve a nuclear-free world and ensure the survival of mankind.

Our parties are carrying out their activities in different conditions, but they are united by ties of internationalist solidarity and the struggle for the common goals of communists — peace and socialism.

We express confidence your congress will be an important stage in rallying the DKP ranks, widening its social base, and strengthening links with the masses in the interests of the struggle for peace, democracy, and social progress.

Long live the Danish Communist Party!

May friendship and cooperation between the Soviet and Danish peoples strengthen.

The CPSU Central Committee

Norwegian CP Congress

LD242327 Moscow TASS in English 1825 GMT 24 Apr 87

[Text] Oslo April 24 TASS — The Communist Party of Norway opened its 19th congress in the People's House in the Norwegian capital today under the motto "For Disarmament, Stability and Unity."

More than 100 delegates, party veterans and representatives of 15 fraternal parties are taking part.

The party chairman, Hans Kleven, delivered a political report to the congress. The arms race had made another spiral through the fault of U.S.-led reactionary forces, he said.

The task of averting the threat of nuclear war should be raised to the level of the principal objective of the new mode of political thinking and action graphically demonstrated at the moment by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
The peace programme, advanced by the Soviet Union and aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000, was a specific initiative along these lines, he said.

The speaker stressed the exclusive importance of the Soviet proposal for eliminating medium-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe.

The Sword of Damocles, the immense stockpiles of nuclear weapons, was hanging over the world, Kleven said.

Resolute measures were required to limit nuclear weapons and totally eliminate them in the future. The party chairman pointed to the need for working out a single platform for Nordic countries on questions of campaigning for peace.

He stressed the timeliness of the joint efforts towards establishing a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe as a major step towards ridding the continent of nuclear weapons.

Kleven expressed the Norwegian Communists' resolve to press for an independent Norwegian policy in foreign affairs, against the country's dangerous involvement in the U.S. global nuclear strategy.

It is the nation's interests rather than the Pentagon's interest to turn Norway into its nuclear outpost that should dominate Norway's defence and security policy, Kleven said.

The congress is continuing its work.

PRAVDA on Norwegian CP Program

PM291814 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 87  First Edition p 4

[TASS correspondent report: "Defending the People's Interests"]

[Text] Oslo, 27 Apr — Defending the working people's interests, the Norwegian Communist Party [NKP] is waging a determined struggle for the safeguarding of the right to work, social and economic justice, the pursuit of an independent foreign policy course by the country, peace, detente, and disarmament and against the implementation of the dangerous plans to militarize space. The 19th NKP Congress, which ended here on 26 April, was held against the background of the stepping up of this struggle.

The congress approved the NKP Central Board's report and adopted the party's new program of principles and a number of other documents.

The NKP's new program maintains the continuity of the party's domestic and foreign policy course. It reflects the main strategic line and aims of the activity of the NKP, confirms the commitment to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and characterizes the present era and its main contradictions. The document has been formulated in light of changes which have taken place in the country and the international arena in recent years. Specifically, Norway's Communists highlight in particular the need to step up the struggle for peace and the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe as the main political task at the present stage.

The congress elected a new NKP national board.

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CPSU Greetings to Norwegian CP

PM291411 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 87 Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee greetings to 19th Norwegian Communist Party Congress]

[Text] To the 19th Norwegian Communist Party [NKP] Congress

Dear Comrades,

We send fraternal greetings to the delegates to the 19th NKP Congress and wish the congress fruitful work!

Your party forum is taking place at a crucial time in historical development when the problem of preventing a nuclear catastrophe and of mankind's survival has arisen in a most acute manner. The CPSU, which persistently struggles to create a nuclear-free world and to eliminate all kinds of mass destruction weapons, values the fact that the Soviet peace-loving initiatives meet with understanding and support among the Norwegian public -- in which fact we also see the NKP's contribution.

We understand that your party is operating under complex conditions. Soviet Communists express comradely solidarity with the NKP's desire to wage a resolute struggle for the rights and interests of Norway's working people and for your country's implementation of an active foreign policy course in favor of strengthening peace and stability in northern Europe and consolidating security and cooperation among the peoples on our continent.

We wish Norwegian Communists successes in strengthening the party's ranks organizationally and ideologically, in surmounting difficulties, in widening support among the masses for the NKP's political line, and in the struggle for peace and social progress!

With Communist greetings,

CPSU Central Committee

CPSU Message to PCPE

PM281104 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Apr 87 Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee message: "To the Second PCPE Congress"]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

The CPSU Central Committee sends greetings to the delegates to the Second Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain [PCPE] Congress, and wishes the congress successful work.

Spanish Communists, like all the planet's progressive forces, are waging an active struggle against imperialism and reaction, for the freedom and happiness of working people, for peace and international security, and for mankind's survival. Their actions considerably extend and strengthen the constantly growing potential of peace, reason, and good will.
The CPSU has made a principled choice in favor of a nuclear-free world, a world without weapons or violence, in favor of the strengthening of cooperation and mutual trust between states with different social systems. This choice is inseparable from the course we have set within the country toward revolutionary restructuring, the renewal of our society, and the acceleration of its socioeconomic development, broad democratization, and the upsurge toward new, significantly higher forms of social organization.

There has been wide international support for the program for the elimination of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons by the end of this century, put forward 15 January 1986 by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The USSR's recent initiative on medium-range missiles in Europe also meets with approval everywhere. These positions on the part of the USSR are a flexible combination of class interests, national interests, and the interests of all mankind, open the way to the lessening of international tension and the creation of a comprehensive system of international security, and bring closer mankind's deliverance from the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe.

Soviet Communists value the PCPE's contribution to the Spanish people's struggle for peace, against the threat of nuclear catastrophe, for the creation of an atmosphere of friendship and good-neighborliness on the European Continent, and for the transformation of the Mediterranean into a zone of stable peace and mutually advantageous, equal cooperation.

The CPSU has always displayed combat solidarity with the struggle of the Spanish Communists and all democrats for a new Spain. Soviet Communists wish the PCPE success in the struggle to achieve the unity of all Spanish Communists, eliminate all obstacles on the path of the implementation of the communist movement's mission, and above all in the struggle against the threat of war, for the working people's vital interests, and for democracy and social progress.

May the fraternal friendship and solidarity between the Soviet and Spanish communists and between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Spain strengthen and develop.

Long live peace and socialism!

The CPSU Central Committee.

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CSO: 5200/1454
GORBACHEV: USSR STOPS CW PRODUCTION, PLANS DESTRUCTION

LD101537 Moscow TASS in English 1524 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Prague, 10 Apr (TASS)--"We have consistently advocated early elaboration, this year, of an appropriate international convention on a ban on chemical weapons, and active negotiations on that score," Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said at a meeting of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship.

"I can inform you that the Soviet Union has terminated the production of chemical weapons. The other countries of the Warsaw Treaty organization are known to have never produced them and never had them on their territory.

"The USSR does not have chemical weapons outside its borders. As far as stocks of chemical weapons are concerned, I would like to inform you that we are constructing a special plant to destroy them."

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CSO: 5200/1453
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: ALLEGED U.S. BIOLOGICAL WAR PREPARATIONS DETAILED
Convention Violations Claimed

WA151110 Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 4, Feb 87 pp 9-12

[Article attributed to "MILITARY BULLETIN's own information": "Fifteen Years After the Signing of the Biological Convention of 1972 the Preparations for Bacteriological War Are Going on in the USA"]

[Text] Having joined the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the USA did not stop developing new generations of bacteriological and toxin weapons.

The main US Army centre at which bacteriological (biological) weapons are specially developed operates on the basis of the Dugway testing ground. The Baker biological laboratory functions on its territory, dozens of kilometres away from the military dwelling township of the testing ground and at a sizable distance from the technological centre in Dutt. At the beginning of the 1970s 440 specialists from other US centres of the development of bacteriological weapons – the special bacteriological laboratories of Fort Detrick (Maryland) and the Pine Bluff arsenal of the US Army (Arkansas) were transferred to the Baker laboratory. It continually builds up the equipment of its units. In the past two-three years alone 300 million dollars were allocated to it for purchasing a large-size chamber making it possible to experiment with the pathogenes of particularly dangerous infections and to carry out research into bacteriological (biological) weapons and to test samples of them. In 1985 the journal of the American Chemical Society wrote that the Baker laboratory did not need such large-size equipment for testing means of defence and that the aforesaid chamber had been supplied first of all for accomplishing a set of tasks directly relating to the development of bacteriological weapons which are used in practice. It was reported that 50 horses had simultaneously died near that laboratory from a rare African disease. The pathogene of this disease could get into the environment only as a result of the large-scale tests conducted at the testing ground.

The development of bacteriological weapons continues also in the Fort Detrick military garrison, despite the switching of its laboratories to peaceful research which was announced long ago by Richard Nixon. The military-medical research institute of infectious diseases situated in that garrison pays considerable attention to achieving great viability of the viruses of Rift Valley Fever (the strain was isolated during the epidemics in Egypt in 1977-1978), Japanese encephalitis B, Q Fever and Lassa Fever in the aerosol condition. In natural conditions these infections are spread by carriers — mosquitoes and arthropoda.
Analogous research is carried out by the Baker laboratory which studied the stability of the aerosol reoviruses of types 1, 2 and 3 which affect man's respiratory and digestive tracts.

Research into viral aerosols is conducted at the laboratories of the scientific-technical and testing base of the US Navy in Oakland (California), at North Carolina University and the University of California. Experiments are held to find out the lethal doses of various pathogens, including Lassa virus.

The US military laboratories conduct research into aerogenous infection of animals with cholera and diphtheritic toxins and staphylococcus enterotoxins. Such a way of intoxication is not found in natural conditions.

The studies of the mechanisms of transmission of viral infections by mosquitoes, arthropods and migrant birds continue, and the most suitable mosquitoes are selected.

The gene engineering methods are used to inculcate in saprophyte microorganisms, such as the colon bacillus, an ability to produce dangerous toxins. It was reported that a pathogenic strain of the colon bacillus has been developed in the USA through the introduction of the genetic information of Flexner Shigella into the cells of the colon bacillus.

The aforesaid examples show that a great part of the work with microorganisms carried out at the military and civilian laboratories of the USA has nothing to do with health protection. This research is conducted only with a view to developing bacteriological weapons of a new generation.

The Pentagon does not make a secret of the fact that it carries out some activities in violation of the Biological Convention. In the general budget of medical studies the planning and financing administration of the US Defence Department has a special item of expenditures on "defensive biological systems of weapons". The US Defense Department issues manuals on combat uses of bacteriological weapons and the rules of its storage and transportation. A military school for training specialists in the field of bacteriological weapons exists in the USA.

Production capacities, fit for operation, for manufacturing bacteriological weapons, including ferments, equipping lines and cryogenic installations in the system of underground storages, are preserved on the territory of the Army arsenal in Pine Bluff.

During the preparation of the second conference of the states-parties to the Biological Convention held in Geneva in September 1986 the Soviet Union voluntarily made a statement that it had not transferred bacteriological and toxin weapons, as well as information on the technology of its production, to third countries. At the same time it was stated that the USSR did not conduct research or tests of biological weapons on the territory of the allied or other countries. The USA did not make such a statement. It finances biological research conducted in Taiwan, South Africa, Pakistan and some other countries in execution of the Pentagon's order. For all that, the Bacteriological Convention to a certain extent restrains the development of biological weapons. This explains the clearly visible desire of the US military to lessen the significance of the Convention, to prompt the idea that it is ineffective. For instance, Douglas Feith, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, called the Convention false publicity of the idea that the problem of prohibition of bacteriological weapons can allegedly be resolved.
European 'Concern'

LD301235 Moscow TASS in English 1215 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 30 TASS -- "The Europeans have every reason to feel concern since the USA is effectively prepared for chemical and bacteriological warfare in Europe," says the commentary in the "VOENNIY VESTNIK" (MILITARY REVIEW) of the NOVOSTI press agency.

The commentary deals with the violation by the USA of the international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxic weapons and on their destruction. Prior to 1975, when the convention took effect, the USA conducted experiments to develop at least 113 types of combat bacteriological weapons. This follows from a report by the Science and Astronautics Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, which was issued in February 1977. After 1975 such work has no longer been conducted, U.S. representative say.

Yes it is noteworthy that at the second conference of the countries -- signatories to the convention held in September 1986 and at the meeting of science and technology experts in April 1987 the U.S. delegations opposed both the setting up of a mechanism of control and a system to monitor the character of the work carried out by the national bacteriological laboratories. This is a serious indication of the fact bacteriological research and development with military aims was not stopped.

Over the time since the signing of the above-mentioned convention the U.S. Army has also received the 13 types of bacteriological weapons, which were mentioned in the report of the house science and astronautics committee and another 17 projects, which were classified and completed over the period from 1975 to 1981. They are anthrax, cholera, botulinum toxin, brucellosis, spotted fever of rocky mountains, diseases caused by coxalgia, diphtheria and glanders viruses and other pathogenes.

The carriage of the above-said infections is regulated by the U.S. Army rules FM-3-20 put into effect since July 30, 1981.

Note shall also be taken of that also because the pathogenes and toxins are prepared for the carriage and real use by the U.S. Army as an offensive weapon precisely in the European theatre.

The command of the U.S. Army, Navy and the Air Force is in charge of support for the special operations by a task force in Europe with the use of chemical and biological weapons. The use of these types of weapons is the duty of a task force (landing forces).

The right of the decision on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is vested in the special operations commander without special consultations even with the U.S. allies in NATO. Consequently the situation is far more dangerous than it may seem.

In that connection the European have the right to hope for convicing proof from the USA as regards:

A. The lack of chemical and bacteriological weapons ready for actual use and means of their delivery in the U.S. bases in Europe.

B. Preparedness for the strictest control, including on-site inspection and inspection of laboratories suspected of carrying out biological research with military aims.

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CSO: 5200/1453 95
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: REPORTS ON EXPERTS' CONFERENCE ON BW CONVENTION

Information Exchange Discussed

LD161931 Moscow TASS in English 1903 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Geneva, 16 Apr (TASS)—A number of positive steps for consolidating the regime and raising the efficiency of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction [BW Convention] have been worked out by a conference of scientific and technological experts of the countries-signatories to the convention. The conference, the first one of this kind, was held here from 31 March to 15 April.

Participants in the conference agreed to exchange on a permanent basis information and data on the work of a certain type of microbiological research centres and laboratories, to inform each other of outbreaks of infectious diseases and epidemics constituting a departure from the norm, to develop contacts among scientists and to encourage publication of the results of research work.

Speaking at a press conference today, Soviet representatives positively assessed the work of the conference and expressed readiness to continue a businesslike and constructive dialogue. At the same time, it was pointed out at the press conference that the Soviet delegation had been ready for more comprehensive agreements on the problems discussed, including on a wider range of research institutions that would be included in the system of the exchange of information and data.

On the other hand, Western countries proposed to make the list of these institutions even shorter, and eventually a compromise decision had to be taken. The Soviet Union seeks to develop large-scale cooperation in the sphere of a peaceful use of the finds of biology. It is ready to exchange information on national research programs and to conclude bilateral agreements. So far as the convention is concerned, the USSR will continue to work for enhancing its prestige, including through the consolidation of the control system.
Soviet Proposals

PN221339 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Correspondent V. Kuznetsov dispatch: "To Establish Reliable Barriers"]

[Text] Geneva -- A conference of scientific and technical experts of the states that are party to the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons has completed its work in the Palais des Nations.

The experts' work was of great significance: They discussed the erection of further barriers in the way of such terrible mass destruction weapons as bacteriological weapons. Instances of the use of bacteriological means to spread infection among the population have long been known. The Kaiser's Germany intended to use bacteriological weapons on a large scale at the end of World War I, and Hitler's Wehrmacht also made intensive preparations for bacteriological warfare.

The Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons, drawn up within the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, came into force in 1975. The present conference of experts adopted a report reflecting agreement on a number of practical measures aimed at strengthening trust among the states that are party to the convention and broadening cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of the achievements of biological science. Specific accords were reached on exchanging information on the activities of a certain circle of scientific research establishments, notifying outbreaks of infectious diseases and epidemics that deviate from the norm, and also developing contacts among scientists.

At the experts' conference the representatives of the Netherlands, Ireland, and other countries advocated broadening the exchange of information on a wide range of scientific and applied activity in the spheres of bioengineering and genetic engineering. Such measures would prepare conditions for strengthening the system of verification under the convention.

Many public organizations and prominent politicians in the West are voicing alarm over the Pentagon's recently increased interest in developments in the use of microorganisms for military purposes. Such U.S. research is conducted not only by the military and by laboratories located in major scientific centers but also under contracts in many universities. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL reported this recently, emphasizing that 23 U.S. universities are engaged in activity directly or indirectly violating the convention.

The Soviet Union advanced far-reaching proposals in Geneva to strengthen the convention. The USSR delegation proposed agreeing on the circle of the participant states' corporate bodies which own scientific research establishments covered by the exchange of information, including government organizations, private firms and corporations, international consortiums, daughter companies, branches, also private persons, and so forth. The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that all the parties to the convention will ensure its strict observance by means of adopting corresponding national legal measures. Therefore it was proposed that the UN Department on Disarmament Questions prepare for dissemination at the third convention review conference a special report containing an analysis of the legislative, administrative, and other measures taken by the participant states to rule out all violations of the convention.

The USSR's proposals must form a basis for continuing the multilateral businesslike and productive dialogue within the framework of the Disarmament Conference.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL ON BLOC POLICY COORDINATION

PM031221 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with G.N. Gorinovich, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry European Socialist Countries Administration, by IZVESTIYA correspondents S. Dardykin and A. Shalnev: "Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee: A Step Forward Has been Taken" -- no place or date given]

[Text] [Dardykin/Shalnev] Did the CPSU Central Committee meeting with participants in the recent session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee discuss the restructuring of its work? What is its essence?

[Gorinovich] During the past year the allied states moved much more actively toward joint elaboration and implementation of foreign policy initiatives. Here are three specific examples: The Budapest address adopted last June on the question of reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe; the joint initiative regarding the creation of an all-embracing system of international peace and security that was submitted to the 41st UN General Assembly session; and the April 1986 appeal on the question of creating nuclear-free zones in Europe.

[Dardykin/Shalnev] But there have been joint initiatives before, have there not?

[Gorinovich] Yes, but on rare occasions. Now we are talking about a system. Work in this direction continues, and the steps I mentioned by no means signify its end. Previously we did not have the widespread system of foreign policy collaboration we have now -- the system of regular meetings of deputy foreign ministers from Warsaw Pact countries and conferences of experts. Previously, the groups of experts assembled essentially once every 2-3 years. Now, for example, seven or eight groups have been working simultaneously in the course of just 1 year. There are also other forms of effective collaboration, whose machinery is being constantly improved. I want to emphasize: A step forward has been taken.

[Dardykin/Shalnev] The following question recurs in Western press materials: Representatives of different states meet; they have identical goals and equal desire to attain these goals. But do they all say absolutely the same things?

[Gorinovich] At the latest session of the Foreign Ministers Committee, the ministers proceeded from the fundamental stipulations of the June 1986 Budapest Conference of the Political Consultative Committee and the stipulations of the working meeting of the leaders of fraternal parties from CEMA countries in November of the same year. These forums achieved a high degree of coordination on all fundamental questions. In this
context, the task of the Foreign Ministers Committee was to discuss practical steps concerning the implementation of the coordinated course along all basic avenues, bearing in mind the main goal of reducing and eliminating mass destruction weapons, primarily nuclear weapons, consolidating European and world security, and developing broad international cooperation. There is unity of views and actions among all allied states on all these problems, and therefore it would be incorrect to say that there were divergences of opinion or different interpretations [raznochentenye] at the session. There are, of course, slight nuances in the stances of individual socialist states, caused by the geographical location of these states, their national and historical traditions, and their particular views [osobennost] concerning specific ways to implement the ideas of reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe and the idea of ridding Europe of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles. But this is neither a difference nor a divergence on the essence of the questions: We are united on this point. But there are, I repeat, shades [ottenki] as regards some tactical moves. They are the subject of exchanges of opinions and deliberations aloud, and in no way prevent finding mutually acceptable proposals on the questions under discussion.

[Dardykin/Shalnev] The Foreign Ministers Committee session documents were not widely publicized in the Western press. But can those to whom they are addressed either pretend not to have noticed them, or simply pass them over in silence?

[Gorinovich] Not relying only on the publication of the text of documents in the newspapers of socialist countries, the host state of a scheduled Foreign Ministers Committee session sends its documents to numerous addresses. Let me name them. They are all the CSCE states and all the states participating in the Geneva Disarmament Conference. In addition, we have the UN secretary general, the NATO secretary general, the president of the European Parliament, the ASEAN chairman, and the leadership of the OAU, the OAS, and other international organizations.

[Dardykin/Shalnev] What is the initial international response to the three documents of the last session?

[Gorinovich] Positive on the whole. But the U.S. State Department expressed displeasure with the position regarding the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and the reduction and complete elimination of operational and tactical missiles.

Here is why: The Warsaw Pact states fully supported the proposals made by M.S. Gorbachev in the 28 February statement. Namely, readiness to conclude a separate agreement on medium-range missiles. Moreover, as soon as an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, the USSR, in agreement with the GDR and the CSSR Governments, will withdraw the increased-range operational and tactical missiles that were stationed there as countermeasure to the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West Europe. Afterward we would be prepared to embark at once on talks aimed at reducing and completely eliminating all operational and tactical missiles on the continent of Europe.

Recently, however, the United States has been insisting on including medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in one agreement. What can be said about this? The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states — and here there can be no uncertainty at all — advocate a comprehensive approach to reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe. This, incidentally, was one of the central topics of the Foreign Ministers Committee session. The package of questions that must be solved without delay includes elimination of Euromissiles, a complete ban on chemical weapons, reduction of armed forces and conventional arms, implementation of confidence-building measures, reduction of military expenditures, and creation of nuclear-free zones and
zones free from chemical weapons. The allied socialist states have submitted an entire package of proposals on all these problems -- clear, honest, and containing no "catch." We do not desire greater security for ourselves than for others, because that is impossible, but we do advocate that the first specific step be taken as soon as possible, especially in the important area of nuclear disarmament. The United States' attempt to tie up medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in one agreement is an attempt to find a pretext to drag out the conclusion of an agreement.

How many times did the West reproach us because the Soviet Union submitted its proposals in Reykjavik in the form of a package. Now the United States is creating its own package. Voices can be heard in NATO and in the United States itself that Euromissiles should be tied to conventional arms and, most recently, even with chemical weapons.

[Dardykin/Shalnev] As a matter of fact, one of the documents of the Foreign Ministers Committee session dealt with chemical weapons. Why was that?

[Gorinovich] Every opportunity exists now to conclude an international convention banning chemical weapons, maybe even this year. The sides' positions have come substantially closer. The time has come when it is important to avoid any additional difficulties in completing this work. The special statement by the Foreign Ministers Committee says specifically what is meant and what are the steps we are warning against. These steps include primarily plans for the production of binary or multiple-component chemical weapons. In other words, it is important to show restraint to make this year the year of the start of chemical disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/1447
 RELATED ISSUES

USSR: BULGARIAN PREMIER DISCUSSES ARMS ISSUES IN MOSCOW

Ryzhkov Speaks at Dinner

PM281421 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Excerpts] A dinner was given in the Great Kremlin Palace 27 April on behalf of the USSR Government in honor of G. Atanasov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, and his wife.

Officials accompanying the Bulgarian Council of Ministers chairman on his trip also attended the dinner.

The Soviet side was represented by Comrades N.I. Ryzhkov and his wife; G.A. Aliyev; Ye.k. Ligachev; N.V. Talyzin; and V.A. Medvedev; V.S. Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers; USSR ministers; chairmen of USSR state committees; and other officials.

A speech was delivered at the dinner by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Speech by Comrade N.I. Ryzhkov

There is no question in world politics, above all in the areas of ensuring the people's security and averting the threat of war, on which the Soviet Union and Bulgaria do not act jointly in the interests of maintaining and strengthening peace. Together with the other fraternal countries we make extensive use of the potential of the Warsaw Pact Organization and of bilateral contacts to coordinate our positions on current foreign policy problems and to work out joint initiatives and diplomatic steps. This close cooperation in the foreign policy sphere noticeably increases the effectiveness of our actions.

Thanks to their responsible and realistic approach to the problem of war and peace the socialist countries have won extensive recognition for their peace-loving proposals. A special place among these is occupied by the concept of a comprehensive international security system and the program for a nuclear-free world and the elimination of all types of mass destruction weaponry — a program put into practice by the Soviet proposals at Reykjavik and developed in subsequent speeches by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. These initiatives have been perceived worldwide as the embodiment of our new political thinking and have opened a fundamentally new chapter in the struggle to eliminate the threat of nuclear catastrophe and to ensure mankind's survival.

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The actual world situation requires that the United States and the other Western countries proceed in their policy on the basis of mankind's long-term interests, which have nothing to do with the dangerous course of nuclear deterrence, confrontation, and the use of force in international affairs.

Favorable opportunities for clearing the obstacles in the way of reducing the nuclear threat are offered by the recent Soviet proposals to eliminate medium-range and operational and tactical missiles and to work out "key provisions" for any future agreements on the questions of strategic offensive arms, ABM systems, and nuclear tests.

The holding of a meeting among the foreign ministers of the CSCE states and the adoption of a decision to start large-scale talks on radical reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces, and conventional arms would accord with the goals of real disarmament. We view the efforts to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans and the Bulgarian and Romanian initiative to create chemical weapons-free zones in this region to begin the general context of security on the continent.

As for the all-European process as a whole, we advocate its balanced advancement and the adoption at the concluding phase of the Vienna meeting of weighty accords across the entire spectrum of the Helsinki Final Act. The further development and deepening of the process of improving the situation in Europe will also be served by other initiatives by the socialist states, including Bulgaria's proposal to convene an ecological forum.

The jubilee year of Great October, which we have entered, is meant to be a year of decisive action for disarmament, detente, and the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. We are convinced that it will be marked by new efforts on the part of the fraternal socialist countries and all peace-loving forces in the struggle to assert a new philosophy in international relations and the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence.

In conclusion, N.I. Ryzhkov wished the BCP, its Central Committee headed by Comrade T. Zhivkov, the Bulgarian Government, and all the fraternal country's working people new successes in socialist construction. He spoke in favor of the indissoluble alliance and eternal friendship between the Soviet and Bulgarian peoples. [passage omitted]

Atanasov Views Issues

PM290925 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Excerpts] A dinner was given in the Great Kremlin Palace 27 April on behalf of the USSR Government in honor of G. Atanasov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, and his wife.

Officials accompanying the Bulgarian Council of Ministers chairman of his trip also attended the dinner.

The Soviet side was represented by Comrades N.I. Ryzhkov and his wife; G.A. Aliyev, Ye.K. Ligachev, N.V. Talzyn, and V.A. Medvedev; V.S. Murakhovskii, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; USSR ministers, chairmen of USSR state committees; and other officials.

A speech was delivered at the dinner by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. [passage omitted]
Comrade G. Atanasov's Speech

The international situation in which we are working is complex and tense. Reactionary imperialist circles in NATO, and above all the United States, are flagrantly disregarding mankind's aspirations and hopes for peace, intensifying the arms race, particularly with regard to nuclear arms, and striving to transfer it to space.

The preservation of peace and the saving of human civilization are a vitally important problem for all people. Thus our party and government wholly and fully support the active foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state aimed at easing international relations and creating an all-embracing system of international peace and security. We regard the program of nuclear disarmament before the end of the century proposed by Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev as a vivid example of the new political thinking and of a responsible approach to world problems in the nuclear missile age.

The Reykjavik meeting was a significant political event. Life shows that there can and must be no going back on the positions reached in Reykjavik. The new Soviet proposals -- to conclude a separate agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, to begin talks on the reduction and complete elimination of operational and tactical missiles, and to formulate the "key provisions" of agreements on strategic offensive arms, ABM, and nuclear tests -- are solid material from which reliable security can be built not only for the European peoples but also for the whole world.

In present-day conditions the survival of all countries and peoples is interrelated. Joint efforts are needed to ensure peace and international security, achieve disarmament, and create a world without nuclear and chemical weapons or violence. The Vienna meeting of CSCE states can make a significant contribution in this respect.

In the name of the noble goals of peace and mutual understanding among the peoples, the Bulgarian Government actively participates in implementing the Warsaw Pact states' joint peace initiatives. We shall continue to make efforts to turn the Balkans into a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons and a region of good-neighborliness, mutually beneficial cooperation, lasting peace and security.

Our conversations have been businesslike and fruitful and have touched on a broad range of questions. We have exchanged valuable experience and outlined urgent practical tasks in the spirit of our parties' congress decisions on the restructuring of social life and achieving qualitatively new growth.

Joint Communiqué

PM291757 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

["Joint Committee on the Official Friendly Visit to the USSR by G. Atanasov, BCP Central Committee Politburo member and chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers"--PRAVDA headline]

During their stay in the USSR, G. Atanasov and those accompanying him were given a cordial, hearty welcome.

M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received G. Atanasov, who conveyed greetings and best wishes from T. Zhivkov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian State Council. For his part M.S. Gorbachev conveyed cordial greetings and best wishes to T. Zhivkov. M.S. Gorbachev briefed the chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers on the realization of the 27th CPSU Congress and Central Committee January Plenum decisions aimed at accelerating the country's socioeconomic development and restructuring all aspects of life in Soviet society. G. Atanasov spoke about the course of socialist building in Bulgaria and the implementation of the strategic policy of the 13th BCP Congress of qualitatively new growth in all spheres of the country's social life. G. Atanasov pointed out that the BCP and the Bulgarian people actively support the CPSU's creative and consistent activity aimed at fulfilling the 27th CPSU Congress decisions and emphasized the high assessment they make of the guidelines and decisions of the historic CPSU Central Committee January Plenum. Questions of the state and further deepening of Soviet-Bulgarian relations were examined, as well as urgent problems of the contemporary international situation.

Talks were held between N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and G. Atanasov in a warm and friendly atmosphere, in a spirit of complete mutual understanding.

During the discussion of questions of the contemporary international situation the heads of government voiced grave concern at the actions of the United States, which, disregarding the realities of the nuclear age, refuses to embark on the path of curbing the arms race, preventing its spread into space, and ending nuclear tests. The U.S. SDI program poses a special threat to strategic stability and international security. The elaboration of projects like the "European defense initiative" also cannot fail to arouse concern.

In examining ways to resolve the fundamental question of the day — mankind's defense against nuclear catastrophe — the sides noted the historic significance of the program for the phased elimination of all nuclear arms and other means of mass destruction by the end of the century, which was advanced in the International Year of Peace in M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986.

Bulgaria fully supports this program, as well as subsequent Soviet Union foreign policy initiatives and proposals which are being pursued with great activeness, realism, and high responsibility. In this connection special emphasis was placed on the Soviet proposals to conclude agreements on medium-range missiles and also on operational and tactical missiles in Europe and to elaborate "key provisions" of agreements on strategic offensive arms, space, and also nuclear tests. Solving these questions would be a major step forward with a view to radical reductions and the subsequent elimination of all nuclear means and ensuring peaceful space above our planet.

Both sides once again draw the attention of the CSCE participant states to the fact that the realization of the Warsaw Pact countries' Budapest program, which proposes resolving questions of reducing armed forces and conventional arms in a package with tactical nuclear arms, would help to reduce military confrontation in Europe.

They consistently advocate the speediest elaboration of an international convention which will effectively ensure a total ban everywhere on the development and production of chemical weapons and the elimination of all their stocks in the very near future. The Bulgarian side hailed the Soviet Union's ending of chemical weapons production.
The sides noted the great significance of elaborating efficient verification measures, including on-site inspection.

The heads of government devoted serious attention to the state of affairs on the European Continent. They resolutely advocated continuing the all-European process. In this connection it was pointed out that the Vienna meeting of CSCE participant states' representatives can play an important role in strengthening detente in Europe by adopting a decision to supplement the Stockholm conference's mandate so that, in addition to the further development and strengthening of confidence- and security-building measures, it can also proceed to an examination of disarmament questions, including the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Soviet side noted Bulgaria's active role in strengthening security, stability, and mutual confidence in Europe. The Soviet Union wholly supports Bulgaria's efforts aimed at creating a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans and developing good-neighborliness, and strengthening peace in that region.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR: PRAVDA VIEWS LAST-WEST NUCLEAR AGE MISTRUST

PM160909 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

[M. Vasilyev article: "Main Path"]

[Text] The world's leaders, diplomats, politicians, and the world public are attentively studying the broad range of ideas and proposals in the disarmament sphere put forward by M. S. Gorbachev in Prague. The assessments, comments, and commentaries vary of course. But the predominant established fact among them is that the Soviet Union has once again taken a major step forward in the movement for a nuclear-free world. And this is the main path toward establishing relations of trust in the international arena, the significance of which was emphasized by the UN General Assembly when proclaiming 1986 to be Peace Year.

Indeed, throughout mankind's history trust has invariably held a prominent place in the human scale of values. Both in people's lives and in relations between nations. It also goes without saying that in the nuclear age, when the question is one of survival, the need for trust is increasing all the time.

All this is true. Yet the practice of international life demonstrates a clear lack of trust in international relations today. When we try to find an answer to the question of why this is happening and, consequently, to the question of how to establish trust and what to build it on, in order words, when we begin examining a seemingly generally accepted concept at close range, we discover quite a wide and difficult range of answers. They clearly show a diversity of approaches—political, ideological, and psychological.

Let us begin with the first questions—what is the basis of the lack of trust among states? Differences of ideology and systems, we are told. For example, U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger, marking the 40th anniversary of the "Truman Doctrine" recently, considered it necessary to state that he sees the cause of international tension in the "diametrically opposed Soviet and U.S. views on the system of government and human rights."

Let us try to look into this question. Let us turn to history. At the beginning of our century, as everyone knows, no country had a socialist system, the main European states were at different points and stages of the same—capitalist—formation. Furthermore, their rulers generally had quite close
family ties and seemed like one family. Probably hardly a month passed without
the German crowned head "Willi" exchanging messages expressing warmest
sympathies with his Russian counterpart "Nikki," and each of them in turn
with their English cousin—the king of England—or with Franz Josef, the
patriarch of the monarchs in those days. A touching idyll seemed to reign.
However, it did not prevent World War II from erupting in August 1914, a
war which was no accident but which was profoundly inevitable.

Let us go on. During World War II there was a comparatively high degree of
trust and mutual understanding among the countries of the anti-Hilfer coali-
tion, which belonged, as we all know, to different sociopolitical systems.
For the sake of saving mankind from the fascist plague they managed to set
aside many differences, differences of a fundamental nature, furthermore,
and to pool their efforts to achieve the common goal. Why is there such a
great shortage of trust among states now when an immeasurably greater danger
threatens the planet and when mankind's survival is the common task for all
members of the world community without exception?

Indeed, if you proceed from the postulate imposed on the world that the dif-
ference between the systems is the basis for the lack of trust, then the con-
cclusion will be inevitably pessimistic. Its logical consequence is a desire
to "destroy" the heretical system, to break it and impose one's own way of
thinking on it.

And yet even centuries ago, when the dispute centered on different interpre-
tations of the same faith—for example, between catholics and huguenots—the
attempts to enforce one interpretation meant tragedy for whole peoples and
cost thousands of lives. And now? The different systems have military-
strategic parity and the ability to destroy one another, and all mankind as
well, many times over. And they are both realities. What else remains—to
hope for victory in a nuclear war. If we are talking about the most fanatical
rightwing extremists, that is indeed the conclusion they are working toward.

And at the very least, even if the instinct for self-preservation prevents
people taking this madness to its logical conclusion, there is always skepti-
cism and a lack of belief in the possibility of cooperation between the two
systems. This, essentially, is the conclusion of former U.S. Secretary of
State Kissinger, whose view is that the "deadlock at the Reykjavik talks
reflects fundamental differences in the way that the two societies operate."

So the choice is either annihilation or, at best, deadlock. On the military-
strategic plane this is expressed in the concept of mutual deterrence, that
is, in that concentrated form of distrust in which the two systems hold
nuclear revolvers to each other's head.

Let us take another aspect. It is well known that major changes are taking
place in the Soviet Union and the socialist world in general, changes dictated
by external demands but by the needs of the system itself, one which is still
very young, in fact. Restructuring, which includes greater openness, criti-
cism, and democracy, is closely linked to the new approach to international
processes, an approach which is imbued with a clear awareness of the realities.
of the nuclear age. This also applies to the problem of mutual understanding and cooperation between the two systems.

The new atmosphere is welcomed by many people in the West: some with sincerity, others in the hope—albeit the vain hope—of discovering a trend toward the "convergence" of the systems. But there is another interesting feature: The rightwing capitalist camp is worried by our society's very democratization, which is enriching its potential. They would prefer stagnation, isolationism by the USSR, and conservatism in its domestic and foreign policy.

It is precisely when the Soviet Union is making obvious efforts to build bridges of mutual understanding and to achieve the mutual "opening" of our societies for the sake of greater trust that American reaction tries to "close" them. It is clearly no coincidence that rightwing ideologues have been trying so feverishly to create a "Rambo"-style atmosphere of chauvinism in the United States. And it surely no coincidence, either, that both Reykjavik and the U.S. Secretary of State's current visit to the USSR were preceded by a campaign of spy mania clearly designed to slam shut the door to dialogue? A scheme pursuing two goals at the same time—to arouse and intensify the mood of distrust toward the USSR within the United States itself and, simultaneously, to try to provoke our country to retaliate.

The nuclear age, however, demands that the arsenal of trust be increased and that the very approaches to this problem be changed. In principle it is wrong to put the question in these terms: first trust, then all the rest: disarmament, cooperation, and joint projects. Through common causes to the creation, strengthening, and development of trust. That is the rational way.

The most important matter now, of course, is to end the arms race and achieve disarmament.

Speaking in Prague, M. S. Gorbachev again stressed the USSR's readiness to look for mutually acceptable solutions on the whole range of nuclear disarmament questions. Strategic arms, medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, support for the nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe proposed by the CSSR and the GDR—on all these and indeed on a number of other important problems a desire to move forward and to really solve them has been shown.

There is another notable feature here. The attempt in the West to find in the Soviet nuclear disarmament program a secret design—a desire to safeguard an alleged superiority in conventional armaments—has become a long-standing and constantly replenished source of distrust in that program. But in Prague it was clearly stated that the USSR supports not only large-scale talks aimed at radically reducing armed forces and conventional armaments and tactical weapons in Europe but also the kind of reduction which would remove the inequality which has arisen between the sides in certain elements at the expense of the side which had the advantage. Priority measures are proposed connected with reducing the level of military confrontation, averting the threat of a surprise attack, and the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous types of
of offensive weapons from the zone of direct contact between the two military alliances.

Would this not create a fundamentally new climate in East-West relations?

Let us turn to another aspect. When the question of eliminating nuclear weapons became a practical possibility it was discovered that for the leadership of a number of NATO countries the almost perpetual preservation of those weapons was a symbol of faith.

Furthermore the peace that is being offered is an even more dangerous one in which the distrust factor will become even greater. This is inevitable if one side feverishly prepares the means to disarm the other side or to attack it with some completely new kind of weapon.

The time factor must also be mentioned. It is extremely important to take it into account if the partners want to trust one another. In the past military hardware took months or, at the very least, days to settle a conflict. The nuclear age cut that time to hours, while the nuclear missile age reduced it to minutes. However, space weapons operate in millionths of seconds. In other words, matters have reached the point where man will not even have time to work out what is happening let alone do anything to remedy the situation. What kind of trust is that?

Trust also presupposes a solicitous approach to international treaties in the security and arms limitation sphere. There are not many in number but they contain the basis of stability, which is so necessary in our day. This applies fully to the ABM Treaty. To ignore it or to interpret it in a way which nullifies it would mark the collapse of the basic infrastructure of trust.

That package customarily called "military confidence-building measures" is also expected to play an important role. The steps agreed in Stockholm include, as is well known, the reciprocal notification of maneuvers and troop movements and monitoring aimed at ensuring confidence in the absence of the threat of an attack.

Finally, there is one more aspect to the problem of trust—peaceful cooperation. The new conventions concluded within the IAEA on the use of atomic energy, the pooling of efforts to achieve thermonuclear fusion, concrete ideas for joint travel into the depths of space, collective measures on environmental protection and on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation—all these are elements of trust, its material components, so to speak.

There are other, quite recent, examples. Was the Delhi declaration on a non-nuclear world free of violence—a program statement by the USSR and India, two powers with different social systems—not a contribution to the establishment of a climate of trust in the world? And the recent international forum in Moscow with its unbiased approaches, its frankness, and its goodwill—is that not an example of the consolidation of mutual understanding, and a particularly important one, when foreign policy questions cease to be the preserve of the elected elite and when the broad international public take part in them?
What can be said in conclusion? The new thinking and the new policy are an organic part of mutual understanding. There can be no other way. Mankind has made great strides in scientific and technical progress whereas moral progress is lagging behind. Of course, it may be stated with some relief that the St Bartholomew's Day massacre was four centuries ago. But Auschwitz was just 40 years ago. Today, too, fanaticism, hatred for people of a different race, a different faith, and different convictions are claiming new victims. Mankind has the ability to destroy himself in the cradle of his own development now that he has created dangerous and suicidal toys. In these conditions the confidence factor is more important than ever. Nothing can be built without it. But it, in turn, cannot develop from nothing but can only be built on the basis of concrete deeds, words, and actions. As the well known Russell-Einstein appeal said, in the nuclear age it is necessary above all "to remember that you belong to the human race."

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS: HALPERIN REPORT 'NOT CONSISTENT' IN CONCLUSIONS

LD151346 Moscow TASS in English 1322 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Text] Washington, 15 Apr (TASS)--TASS correspondent Aleksandr Lavrentyev reports:

For several decades now, the United States' military doctrine has been based on a fallacious and extremely dangerous thesis of the possibility of fighting nuclear war and winning it. Director of the Center for National Security Studies Morton Halperin, prominent American expert on arms control, writes this in a research paper that was just brought out. The author writes that combat nuclear devices of any type cannot serve as an instrument for winning victory by any of the warring sides. In case nuclear arms are used, not only the adversary, but also the attacking side, entire civilisation on earth will perish. Nuclear war cannot be won, M. Halperin emphasizes.

Though this conclusion is quite obvious, the military-political leadership of the United States is working out strategic plans, relying on the possibility of being the first to use nuclear arms. A huge military machine of destruction has been created on the basis of this thesis. All services of the U.S. forces are equipped with nuclear arms and their use is envisaged on the same ground as that of conventional arms, which is fraught with catastrophe for humanity, M. Halperin writes.

Recognising huge danger posed to humanity by the use of nuclear arms, the author of the research is at the same time not consistent in his conclusions. He sees the removal of the threat of thermo-nuclear war, specifically, not on the road of a complete elimination of nuclear arms on earth but through a system of measures he proposed for lessenign the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. He believes that a "limited" number of nuclear warheads should remain in the U.S. arsenal not as a means of winning victory but as a "deterrent."

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TASS CLAIMS U.S. DEPLOYING NEUTRON WEAPONS IN FRG

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[Text] Bonn April 29 TASS -- Amid tight secrecy the U.S. Administration has been deploying neutron weapons of the latest type in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany for a long time now. This fact, which was kept secret from the public, was disclosed at a press conference given in Mainz by the Rheinland Pfalz organisation of the German Communist Party.

It said it had in possession information that one hundred neutron warheads for howitzers have already been delivered to the U.S. airforce base in Ramstein. The German Communist Party urged the Rheinland Pfalz Government to denounce the move to install the neutron weapons and demand that they be removed from the territory of that land.

Washington had already made attempts to force this barbarian weapon on its European NATO allies several years ago, but the powerful public movement prevented those ominous plans from being carried through.

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