Arms Control
CHINA

Analyses of Bush, Gorbachev Arms Initiatives ........................................ 1
U.S. Initiative Detailed [Huang Yong; Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION 14 Oct] . 1
Motivations Analyzed [Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION 14 Oct] .................. 2
Soviet Response Discussed [Zhu Chengjun; Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION 21 Oct] ........................................ 4
Ulterior Motives, 'Serious Differences' Alleged [Sa Ren; RENMIN RIBAO 29 Oct] .......... 5
Only Tactical Arms To Be Cut [Chen Xiong; JIEFANGJUN BAO 16 Oct] ..................... 6
Bush Aides Said To Differ on Response to Gorbachev [XINHUA 26 Oct] ........................ 7
South Korea Announces Nuclear-Free Stance [XINHUA 8 Nov] ................................. 7
Spokesman Reacts [REMIN RIBAO 11 Nov] ..................................................... 8

EAST ASIA

NORTH KOREA

U.S. Weapons Withdrawal Called 'Welcome Step' [KCNA 23 Oct] ............................. 9
South Condemned for Opposing Denuclearization [KCNA 24 Oct] ............................. 9
U.S. Rejection of Nuclear Test Ban Condemned [KCNA 26 Oct] .............................. 9
Efforts for Denuclearization of Peninsula Reviewed [Pongyang Radio 29 Oct] ............... 10
Southern Student Group Cited on U.S. Nuclear Pullout [KCNA 29 Oct] ...................... 12
U.S. Nuclear Proposal Called 'Camouflage' [KCNA 29 Oct] .................................... 13
South's 'Confidence-Building' Proposal Viewed [KCNA 4 Nov] ............................... 13

SOUTH KOREA

Seoul Urged To Exercise 'Nuclear Sovereignty' [HANGYORE SINFUN 15 Oct] ............. 14
Opposition Leader Kim Tae-chung Urges NFW [THE KOREA TIMES 22 Oct] ................. 15

NEW ZEALAND

Prime Minister Denies Weakening Antinuclear Law [AFP 4 Nov] ............................. 15

EAST EUROPE

BULGARIA

Officers Discuss CSCE Military Doctrine Seminar [G. Buchev; BULGARSKA ARMIYA 25 Oct] ... 17

POLAND

Deputy Foreign Minister: Soviet Coup Helped Troop Withdrawal [PAP 27 Oct] .............. 17

LATIN AMERICA

CUBA

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

ISREAL

Commentary Calls for Arrow Project's Reassessment [HA'ARETZ 31 Oct] ........................................ 21
Arrow Missile's Third Test Launch 'Failed' [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 3 Nov] ........................................ 22

PAKISTAN

Pakistan, India To Discuss Limiting Chemical Arms [Islamabad Radio 31 Oct] .............................. 22

SOVIET UNION

GENERAL

Karpov Meets French Official on Disarmament [TASS 22 Oct] ......................................................... 23
Chances for Ban on Fissile Materials Production Viewed [A. Sychev; IZVESTIYA 24 Oct] .............. 23
U.S. Thinking on Arms Reductions Viewed [G. Kostenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 31 Oct] ............... 24
Defense Minister Compares Bush, Gorbachev Initiatives [INTERFAX 6 Nov] ............................... 25

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Delays, Demands in Force Withdrawals From Baltics ................................................................. 26
Baltic Fleet Commander Comments [V. Yegorov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Oct] ............................ 26
Lithuania Demands 'Immediate Withdrawal' [Radio Vilnius 31 Oct] .............................................. 26
Further Report [TASS 3 Nov] ........................................................................................................ 26
Officers Note 'Sociodomatic' Problems [TASS 2 Nov] ..................................................................... 27
Further Report [Radio Vilnius 2 Nov] .............................................................................................. 27
Withdrawal From Estonia To Begin 3 Nov [TASS 1 Nov] .............................................................. 27
Airborne Troops Start To Leave [BALTFAK 6 Nov] .................................................................... 27
Dissatisfaction With Disposal of Military Assets in Germany [Hamburg DPA 22 Oct] .............. 28
Grinevsky Cited on CSBM, CFE Talks [PRAVDA 22 Oct] ............................................................... 28
Ladygin on CSCE Military Doctrine Seminar [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Oct] ........................... 28
U.S. Requests CSBM Inspection in Carpathia [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Oct] ........................... 30
CSBM Talks Said Entering 'Decisive Stage' [V. Smelov; TASS 6 Nov] .................................... 30

NUCLEAR TESTING

Journalists' Visit to Semipalatinsk Detailed [Russian TV 18 Oct] ...................................................... 30
Yeltsin Decree on Ending Tests [Radio Rossii 29 Oct] ................................................................. 30
Novaya Zemlya Test Site: Past, Prospects [I. Bentsa; IZVESTIYA 30 Oct] ........................................ 31
Future of Novaya Zemlya Test Site Viewed [V. Anusriev; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 5 Nov] ...... 33

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Scientist Criticizes Progress in Converting CW Plants [KURANTY 10 Oct] .................................... 33
Chemical Troops Commander: No Progress in CW Destruction [S. Petrov; IZVESTIYA 22 Oct] ...... 35

NAVAL ARMS LIMITATIONS

Soviet Admiral Urges Naval Arms Control Talks [Seoul YONHAP 5 Nov] ..................................... 36

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Troop Withdrawal From Mongolia Updated [S. Pravdin; Moscow Radio 25 Oct] .......................... 37
Far East Commander Attends Seminar in South Korea .............................................................. 38
To Speak on Asian Security [Seoul TONG-A ILBO 4 Nov] ....................................................... 38
Urges Area Troop Reduction [Seoul Radio 4 Nov] ....................................................................... 38
Discusses Easing Tensions  [Seoul YONHAP 4 Nov] ........................................... 38
Cites Regional Troop Reductions  [Seoul YONHAP 5 Nov] ........................................... 39
Talks With Defense Minister  [Seoul TONG-A ILBO 6 Nov] ........................................... 39
Kuril Troop Withdrawal To Start ‘This Year’  [Radio Rossiie 6 Nov] ........................................... 39
USSR General Views Korean, Regional Security  [Seoul TV 6 Nov] ........................................... 40

CENTER-REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Discussions of Ukraine’s Nuclear Weapons Policy ........................................... 40
‘Negative Reaction’ Abroad to First Draft  [V. Bogachev; TASS 23 Oct] ........................................... 40
Security Minister Reassures FRG  [Berlin ADN 29 Oct] ........................................... 41
Kravchuk: Missile Forces To Be Centrally Controlled  [Krasnaya Zvezda 2 Nov] ........................................... 41
Defense Minister Stressess Nuclear-Free Republic  [Russian TV 2 Nov] ........................................... 41
Commentary Views Western Reactions  [V. Mihayey; Izvestiya 25 Oct] ........................................... 42
Kazakh President on Control of Nuclear Arms ........................................... 43
No Republic Control of Weapons  [Izvestiya 30 Oct] ........................................... 43
Control Vested in General Staff  [Izvestiya 30 Oct] ........................................... 43
Defense Minister ‘Guarantees’ Control of ‘Nuclear Button’
[Ye. Shaposhnikov; Izvestiya 30 Oct] ........................................... 44
Gorbachev, Mitterand Meet in France ........................................... 44
Talks Previewed  [Yu. Kovalenko; Izvestiya 31 Oct] ........................................... 44
Gorbachev on Nuclear Arms ‘Guarantees’  [TASS 31 Oct] ........................................... 44
Gorbachev, Mitterrand Comment Further  [Paris TV 30 Oct] ........................................... 45
Russia’s Volkogonov Predicts ‘Single Command’  [TASS 6 Nov] ........................................... 46

WEST EUROPE

CYPRUS

NATO Decision on Nuclear Reductions Hailed  [Kharavyi 19 Oct] ........................................... 47

FRANCE

Three Nuclear-Missile Subs To Remain on Alert  [J. Isnard; LE MONDE 2 Oct] ........................................... 47
Defense Minister: Nuclear Testing To Continue  [LE MONDE 18 Oct] ........................................... 48
Defense Minister Sees No Need for Disarmament Measures  [Vienna DIE PRESSE 23 Oct] ........................................... 48
Reduction in Funds for Nuclear Weapons  [J. Isnard; LE MONDE 30 Oct] ........................................... 48

GERMANY

Arms Industry Pushes To Civilianize Production  [Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG 19 Oct] ........................................... 49
Bundestag Ratifies European Disarmament Treaty  [DPA 7 Nov] ........................................... 51

IRELAND

Bush Statement on Nuclear Arms Cuts Welcomed  [Irish Independent 30 Sep] ........................................... 51

NETHERLANDS

Defense Minister Foresees ‘Minimum Nuclear Deterrent’  [De Volkskrant 4 Oct] ........................................... 51
Analyses of Bush, Gorbachev Arms Initiatives

U.S. Initiative Detailed

HK21100332991 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 41, 14 Oct 91, pp 28-29

["Special dispatch" by Huang Yong (7806 3144) in Washington: "United States Makes Major Adjustment of Nuclear Strategy—Analyzing Bush's Nuclear Cutbacks Initiative"]

[Text] In a nationally televised speech on 27 September, U.S. President Bush announced a wide-ranging nuclear disarmament plan. This was the first time the United States has unilaterally taken nuclear disarmament action. U.S. officials pointed out that the plan was "oriented toward the Soviet Union," but at the same time it also indicated a "major change in the nuclear strategy that had been kept for more than 40 years." Therefore, the announcement of the plan immediately attracted attention inside and outside the United States.

Bush's nuclear disarmament plan was related to the three services, namely, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and included both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Regarding tactical nuclear weapons, the United States will withdraw all nuclear artillery shells and short-range land-based nuclear missiles from Europe and other parts of the world and will destroy them together with similar weapons deployed at home. Moreover, it will also dismantle short-range nuclear weapons (including "Tomahawk" cruise missiles which carry nuclear warheads) deployed on warships and land-based naval planes, and will destroy part of these weapons and seal up the remainder for safekeeping in storehouses. According to this plan, about 3,000 nuclear weapons will be destroyed or dismantled, accounting for 14 percent of the total quantity of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States.

In the aspect of strategic weapons, the United States will lift the alert status of strategic bombers and part of the intercontinental missiles that will be destroyed according to the U.S.-Soviet treaty on reducing strategic weapons, stop the program to develop the MX and Midgetman mobile intercontinental missiles, and strive to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on destroying land-based multi-warhead intercontinental missiles and on the deployment of weapons of the "Strategic Defense Initiative."

Part of Bush's nuclear disarmament plan has been and will be put into practice, but a larger part of the plan will be contingent on the reaction of the Soviet Union. In his televised speech, Bush demanded that the Soviet Union take reciprocal action in response to every disarmament measure of the United States. U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney said: If the Soviet Union does not respond to the call of the United States, the United States will retract part of the disarmament measures. "Some missiles will be reinstalled on warships, and the bombers will be returned to alert status."

Reportedly, Bush's idea about disarmament was derived from his "philosophical" dialogue with his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, on a series of such important issues as the world situation, the drastic changes in the Soviet Union, and the new world order. After that, Bush held several rounds of discussions on the concrete disarmament plan with Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The contents of their talks and the details of their discussions were not known to outsiders, but according to the public statements of Bush and his aides and the analyses of various news media, the formulation of the plan was related to the following factors and considerations:

First, they were worried that the Soviet nuclear weapons might be out of control. After 12 republics of the Soviet Union announced independence, the United States was concerned about the ability of the USSR central government to effectively control nuclear weapons. A large quantity of tactical nuclear weapons, such as short-range nuclear missiles, nuclear mines, and nuclear artillery shells, were deployed widely inside the territory of the Soviet Union. These weapons were not strictly managed. This deeply upset the United States. If such weapons were used in the nationality disputes and conflicts or fell into the hands of some hostile countries, the consequences would be unimaginable. The leaders of the USSR central government and the former union republics were also aware of the serious consequences should the nuclear weapons go beyond their control, and they told the West many times of the need to take necessary preventive measures. This time, the United States took the initiative in announcing nuclear disarmament and this was regarded as a gesture of giving a "face-saving opportunity" to the Soviet leaders, who would then be prompted to act correspondingly in order to remove the hidden peril related to the possibility of their nuclear weapons becoming out of control.

Second, the United States needed to grasp the opportune moment to adjust its military strategy. Bush said: "The plan I have announced is based on the new defense strategy I put forward one year ago." On 2 August last year, the same day the Gulf crisis broke out, Bush made public the outline of his "new defense strategy" and explicitly announced that "the danger of Soviet aggression against West Europe and the outbreak of a global war has become more remote than in any previous postwar period," so the U.S. defense strategy "must be more and more directed at the needs of regional emergencies." Bush adjusted his defense strategy mainly on the grounds of the full-scale retreat of the Soviet military force from overseas areas, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and the occurrence of regional crises like the Gulf war. According to this strategy, over the past year, the U.S. military has undergone major restructuring, including a partial withdrawal from Europe and the closing of some domestic bases. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a treaty on reducing strategic weapons. The drastic changes
inside the Soviet Union also led to the relaxation of U.S.-Soviet relations. Bush's nuclear disarmament plan was a step toward adjusting the U.S. nuclear strategy precisely under such a new situation. It has the following characteristics. 1) The United States lifted the 24-hour-alert status of its strategic bombers that had continued unbroken for 34 years, and withdrew most of the tactical nuclear weapons used to confront the Soviet Union's conventional weapons, which were superior in Europe, thus lowering the degree of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union and ruling out the possibility of the outbreak of a war in Europe in the near future. The United States, however, still kept certain means against the Soviet Union. Bush stressed that the United States "will maintain effective airborne nuclear capacity in Europe because this is of great importance for the security of NATO." Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also said that although the U.S. strategic bombers have stood down from the alert status, two-thirds of the U.S. nuclear submarines and hundreds of intercontinental missiles remain on alert and they can be used to handle any emergencies. 2) Due to the end of the MX and Midgetman mobile missile programs and the proposed destruction of all U.S. and Soviet land-based multi-warhead intercontinental missiles, the United States' three-pronged" nuclear deterrent force. 3) Restrained by the current economic difficulties, the United States will have to "streamline" its military buildup through the strategic adjustment. That is, it will cut down on the size of the military buildup, scrap outmoded equipment, and concentrate resources on developing weapons suited to the needs of the new military strategy. Most weapons to be scrapped in Bush's disarmament plan were those developed and produced in the 1950's and 1960's, which would be scrapped according to the original modernization program. While announcing the plan for reducing nuclear weapons, Bush also urged Congress to support the appropriations for the development of B-2 stealth bombers and the "Strategic Defensive Initiative" in order to safeguard the United States' status as the world's strongest military superpower.

Third, the United States needed to hold absolute superiority in the aspect of strategic weapons. Although the focus of U.S. military strategy has been shifted from tackling the Soviet Union's global challenge to tackling regional conflicts which may threaten U.S. interests, the strong military buildup of the Soviet Union is still upsetting the United States. The United States is worried that if there are changes in the situation, the Soviet Union will once again become a military superpower that can parallel the United States. Therefore, the United States will continue to try hard to weaken the Soviet military force. The U.S. proposal on destroying all land-based multi-warhead intercontinental missiles possessed by both sides and stopping modernizing both sides' mobile missiles was regarded as one "aimed at killing two birds with one stone." This would not only prevent the Soviet Union's intercontinental missiles from being controlled by extremists and leading to the danger of triggering a nuclear war, but would also radically weaken the Soviet Union's superiority in the aspect of land-based intercontinental missiles.

Fourth, the U.S. Government tried to ease up the domestic pressure from the demand for cutting down on the military budgets. After detente appeared in U.S.-Soviet relations, there was stronger demand inside the United States for cutting down on military budgets and shifting more resources to domestic problems. Although Bush's disarmament plan will not save any money in the near future, it is said that more than $20 billion can be saved in a few years.

Whether Bush's nuclear disarmament plan can be put into practice will be contingent on the attitude of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has put forward a corresponding disarmament scheme, and accepted most of the U.S. proposals. There remain some obvious differences on certain key issues, however. For example, the Soviet Union proposed to comprehensively dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons and reduce strategic weapons and ban underground nuclear tests while U.S. officials explicitly indicated that the United States would not make concessions on the issue of banning underground nuclear tests and reducing submarine-launched multi-warhead intercontinental missiles. This is because underground nuclear tests concern the upgrading of nuclear weapons and the United States has got the upper hand in the area of submarine-launched intercontinental missiles. To what degree nuclear disarmament will be carried out will still depend on the development of the relevant events.

After Bush announced his nuclear disarmament plan, it was welcomed by domestic and international opinion because nuclear disarmament is better than arms expansion. Many U.S. congressmen, however, pointed out that Bush's plan did not touch many weapons systems that the United States decided to develop at staggering costs in the last years of the Cold War, so some congressmen demanded that the production of such weapons be frozen so that more money will be saved for settling domestic problems. Public opinion in some countries held that since the United States and the Soviet Union possess over 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, they bear special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, so they are hoped to take actual disarmament action so that the world can really build a new order of peace and security.

**Motivations Analyzed**

*HK2110063891 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 41, 14 Oct 91 p 25*

[By Huai Chengbo (2037 2052 3134): "United States, Soviet Union Speed Up Pace of Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] U.S. President Bush announced a large-scale plan for reducing nuclear weapons during a televised speech on
27 September, and he urged the Soviet Union to take reciprocal action. On 5 October, Soviet President Gorbachev gave a televised speech and made an official seven-point reply to Bush’s proposal. The new nuclear disarmament proposals put forward by the United States and the Soviet Union were welcomed by various countries.

The United States and the Soviet Union signed the START treaty in July this year. After that, they lost no time in putting forth their respective plans for substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. This showed that both sides wished to speed up the process of nuclear disarmament.

For the United States, Bush’s plan was, first of all, a component of the U.S. plan for adjusting its nuclear strategy. In the several decades since the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union continued to take Europe as the main arena for their contention for world hegemony. In order to contain the Soviet Union and prevent it from “advancing westward” by relying on its conventional forces, which had overwhelming superiority, the United States and NATO deployed a large quantity of tactical nuclear weapons in some frontline countries. Along with the changes in the political situation of the East European countries and the Soviet Union in recent years, and especially with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the battlefield nuclear weapons deployed by the West have lost their “battlefield” targets. Moreover, the West European countries, mainly Germany, where such nuclear weapons were deployed, have more and more strongly demanded their withdrawal, and have been in discord with the United States on this issue. Obviously, by changing its containment strategy in Europe and withdrawing the short-range missiles, the United States can, first, remove the allies’ misgivings and, second, save more money for developing other “more useful” nuclear weapons. When announcing his plan, Bush said that the aim was to “ensure that we have necessary funds to adjust our (strategic) force,” that is, to go all out to develop the B-2 stealth bomber and the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars).

Second, by taking advantage of the political unrest in the Soviet Union, the United States may weaken Soviet military strength and consolidate its own superior nuclear position in the world by taking the initiative in nuclear disarmament. After the Soviet incident [shi bian 0057 6239], the United States felt that there were too many uncertainties in the future of the Soviet Union. If the central government fails to control the situation and various republics go independent, there may be “nuclear proliferation,” and nuclear weapons may even flow out of the Soviet Union. This will lead to no end of trouble in the future. Therefore, the United States regarded it as necessary to lose no time in completely destroying all tactical nuclear weapons which had the “strongest mobility” and were “the most liable to leave their control” and hoped to exchange its initiative for the Soviet Union’s reciprocal action, thus eliminating the hidden peril once and for all. In addition, the United States also thought that while facing a serious economic crisis before the advent of the cold season, the Soviet Union was anxious to get urgent assistance in huge quantities from the West, and this undoubtedly provided an opportune moment for the United States to put forward new demands and conditions on the issue of arms control. U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney openly declared that the Soviet Union’s action to reduce its own nuclear weapons as Bush demanded in his announcement is “a major precondition” for United States assistance to the Soviet Union. In addition, although Bush proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union hold talks on eliminating land-based multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, he did not mention anything about sea-based multiple-warhead missiles, as the United States possesses 5,400 such warheads and has the upper hand in this aspect. His proposal was only directed at the aspect of land-based multiple-warhead missiles, where the Soviet Union has superiority. TIME magazine of the United States said that as Washington is trying to keep the sea-based multiple-warhead missiles, it thus keeps a kind of superiority that will upset the Soviet Union.

Third, Bush’s plan was also a domestic political need. Since Bush came to power in 1989, he has recorded remarkable diplomatic achievements, and has a reputation as a “diplomatic president.” Relatively speaking, his performance in handling domestic affairs is less impressive. After the end of the East-West Cold War, the Bush administration still did not want to reduce the military budget by a big margin. According to the five-year military budget submitted by Cheney in 1990, U.S. military expenditure in the next five years will still be as high as $1.2 trillion. The United States is not far from its 1992 elections, and the Democratic Party was criticizing the Bush administration for not bringing “peace dividends” to the people and disregarding the people’s well-being. By proposing the destruction of short-range missiles, Bush could make the American people believe that his government was able to lower the military budget. As a matter of fact, Bush’s plan will not bring any substantial benefit to his country’s economy and his people’s well-being. Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said that Bush’s plan would only save $500 million from this year’s military budget of $291 billion. Bush even warned that the “peace dividends” he was seeking would not be measured in dollars. In the near future, “some measures may even cost more money.”

For the Soviet Union’s part, in order to shake off the increasingly serious economic crisis, it hoped to lessen the heavy burden of the nuclear arms race and also hoped to obtain assistance from the West. However, for the sake of its national interests, it will not completely follow Washington’s directive. In his counterproposal, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union will suspend nuclear tests for one year, and also suggested that
the United States and the Soviet Union hold another summit meeting. He also demanded that the United States completely destroy its Navy's tactical nuclear weapons according to the principle of reciprocity. This proposal undoubtedly put the ball in the U.S. court.

In their all-out arms race, the United States and the Soviet Union built more and more nuclear weapons, which seriously threatened the world's peace and security. More and more countries and peoples in the world have been demanding the complete abolition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. People welcomed the latest U.S. and Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals, and hoped that this would help in achieving the above-mentioned objective. It should be noticed that although the two countries' proposals were manifold, they still touched only a small part of the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Even if the two countries put their disarmament plans fully into practice, the nuclear weapons possessed by the two countries could still destroy each other and the world many times over. Therefore, the world's people will still have to wage prolonged and arduous struggle to strive for a nuclear-free world.

**Soviet Response Discussed**

HK2310094891 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 42, 21 Oct 91 pp 26-27

[Report by Zhu Chengjun (4555 2110 6511): "Why Does Soviet Union Respond Promptly to U.S. Nuclear Disarmament Proposal?"]

[Text] Moscow, 8 Oct—On the night of 5 October, Soviet President Gorbachev issued a statement through the Central Television Station announcing the Soviet Union's "corresponding measures" in response to U.S. President Bush's 27 September nuclear disarmament proposal.

These measures can be summed up in three parts:

On the question of tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union will destroy all nuclear shells, nuclear mines, and tactical nuclear warheads and dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons on warships and submarines. The Soviet Union also proposed that the United States destroy all its naval tactical nuclear weapons.

On the question of strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union will, like the United States, lift the alert status of heavy bombers and store its nuclear weapons in warehouses. It will stop the manufacture of improved short-range nuclear missiles to equip heavy bombers and the manufacture of small mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs]; it will not increase the number of launch pads for box-truck [xiang gui 1666 6510] ICBMs or modernize them; it will lift the alert status of 503 ICBMs; and apart from three nuclear submarines equipped with 44 missiles, another three nuclear submarines equipped with 48 missiles will be withdrawn from service. The Soviet Union will reduce strategic nuclear warheads by 5,000 within seven years, about 1,000 more than the number of strategic weapons to be reduced according to a strategic arms reduction treaty recently signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union proposed that after approval of the strategic arms treaty, talks should be held immediately on further reducing strategic weapons by a half of the total, adding that the treaty would be approved as soon as possible. The Soviet Union expressed its readiness to discuss the U.S. proposal on a nonnuclear antimissile defense system and decided to suspend nuclear testing for a year.

On troop reductions, the Soviet Union welcomed the U.S. program and is ready to reduce its troops by 700,000 in the coming years, 200,000 more troops than the number proposed by the United States. To discuss both sides' disarmament programs, Gorbachev is prepared to meet U.S. President Bush again.

It was only a week between Bush's new nuclear disarmament proposal and Gorbachev's "corresponding measures." This response was quite rapid. The scope of disarmament and some numbers for reduction proposed by the Soviet Union went beyond U.S. demands. There are a number of reasons why the Soviet Union did this.

First, tactical nuclear weapons are short-range weapons, generally within 200 km. As a matter of fact, they can be used within one's own country or an allied country. Therefore, in the past some people described these weapons as "military surplus products" in the cold war. The situation has now fundamentally changed following Soviet troop withdrawals from East European countries. The disposition of these weapons in Europe has become unnecessary. There was also controversy over the use of these weapons at sea. Some military theorists said this could lead to the "suicide" of naval vessels.

Viewed from the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons, it is difficult to strictly control them. The Soviet Union has about 15,000 to 20,000 tactical nuclear warheads deployed in different regions. It is difficult to ensure that these weapons will not fall into the hands of local leaders. At a time when there is political unrest in the Soviet Union and its ethnic contradictions are worsening, these weapons constitute a tremendous hidden danger, causing worry to the West. During a recent visit to Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State Baker stated on several occasions the U.S. concern over the destiny of nuclear arsenals on Soviet soil. It was against this background that Bush asked the Soviet Union to dismantle and destroy all land-based nuclear weapons, including the abovementioned nuclear shells and tactical nuclear warheads. Moscow also had a similar worry and wished to destroy these weapons to dispel misgivings. Both sides happened to hold the same views on this question.

The Soviet Union and the United States are both oversaturated with strategic nuclear weapons. According to the strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty signed not long ago, both sides will reduce only one-third of their
strategic nuclear weapons; there are still many for both countries to reduce. In addition, some people in the West are of the opinion that four nuclear republics may possibly arise in the Soviet Union: The Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Kazakh Republics. It is still not known whether Moscow can withdraw from service the strategic nuclear weapons deployed in the latter three republics. If it can, this will conform with Moscow’s intention to put nuclear buttons in its own hands.

Second, a huge expenditure is necessary to maintain a large amount of weapons, equipment, and troops. The Soviet Union is debt-ridden, seriously short of commodities, suffering an economic crisis, and is experiencing a continuous decline in production. Such being the case, it is naturally willing to carry out large-scale disarmament to solve its domestic problems with the money saved from this disarmament, apart from being able to ease people’s dissatisfaction with military overspending in recent years.

Lastly, Gorbachev’s position dropped after the August incident. This was quite unfavorable to his presidential position. Bush’s proposal has served as a good opportunity for him to turn this unfavorable situation around. At the beginning of his statement, Gorbachev explained that he took the “corresponding measures” after consulting with Russian President Yeltsin and leaders of other republics, suggesting that he still has the say in Soviet diplomatic and defense policies and is still controlling the Soviet political situation. He also mentioned holding another summit with Bush, so that the people in the country would pay attention to him.

One more point is noteworthy. Although both sides have made statements, there is still a gap between their statements and reality. For example, all tactical nuclear weapons in Europe fall into the category for elimination but the real situation is different. The U.S. Air Force alone preserved more than ten thousand tactical nuclear warheads. Both sides have promised to reduce their nuclear weapons but are not ready to stop the research and manufacture of new nuclear weapons. Moreover, they still hold differences on sea-based strategic weapons and halting nuclear tests. Therefore, future disarmament remains difficult to accomplish.

Ulterior Motives, ‘Serious Differences’ Alleged
HK3110011401 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 29 Oct 91 p 6

[“News analysis” by Sa Ren (5646 0088): “New U.S. Soviet Attitude Toward Nuclear Arms Reduction”]

[Text] Changes have recently occurred in the situation of nuclear disarmament of the United States and the Soviet Union. On 27 September, U.S. President Bush took the lead in unilaterally announcing his new nuclear disarmament initiative; on 5 October, Soviet President Gorbachev also announced that the Soviet Union would take seven “reciprocal steps” in response to Bush’s disarmament initiative. Both sides indicated that they would unilaterally destroy all land-based short-range nuclear weapons and dismantle the tactical nuclear weapons installed on warships, submarines, and other land-based naval airplanes. As for strategic nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union separately put forward proposals on reducing or restricting the development of such weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union are continuing consultations on each other’s nuclear disarmament proposals.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union had their own purpose and background when successively putting forward their proposals on reducing short-range nuclear armaments on a large scale. For the United States’ part, after the incident in the Soviet Union on 19 August, the United States most feared that the central government of the Soviet Union would lose effective control over the nuclear weapons scattered in various union republics, and that these weapons would thus be spread over a wider area. Therefore, the latest U.S. disarmament proposal was mainly aimed at destroying and dismantling short-range nuclear weapons which were scattered widely in large quantities and might be spread easily. The United States also tried to take advantage of the Soviet Union’s decline to further weaken the military strength of the Soviet Union through nuclear disarmament and tried to eliminate at the minimum cost the land-based multi-warhead intercontinental missiles and the land-based mobile intercontinental missiles of the Soviet Union which posed the greatest threats against the United States. At the same time, with the political changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the military threats of the Soviet Union against Europe had obviously abated, and the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe had lost their targets. It was already inevitable that such weapons would be removed and destroyed. Bush also needed to respond to the domestic pressure by announcing his nuclear disarmament proposal. In recent years, the U.S. economy slid into a recession, and the financial deficit in the 1991 fiscal year was expected to reach a record high of $280 billion. The general public at home generally demanded that the government reduce armaments and defense expenditure to shift the “peace dividends” to society. The Democrats also exerted greater pressure over the Bush administration by taking advantage of next year’s elections, and demanded a further reduction in nuclear armaments. Bush put forward his new disarmament proposal also in an attempt to prevent the Democratic Party from using this to attack his administration.

The Soviet Union positively responded to the U.S. proposal, mainly because it hoped that by reducing nuclear weapons and cutting down on military expenditure, the limited funds could be used for economic construction so that the domestic economic crisis could be eased. The Soviet Union’s disarmament action was aimed at seeking better relations with the West because this would make the Western nations unable to refuse to offer economic assistance on the pretext that the Soviet
Union continued to pay a high military bill. Through nuclear disarmament action, Gorbachev also hoped to strengthen the central government's control over nuclear weapons in all parts of the Soviet Union. Most tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan will be destroyed on the spot. Such weapons would not be transferred back to Russia. This also prevented the possible contradictions among various republics.

Although there are some common points between the nuclear disarmament proposals put forward by the United States and the Soviet Union, the two sides still had serious differences on many issues. The Soviet Union had superiority in terms of land-based multi-warhead missiles, so Bush urged the Soviet Union to "stop all plans for developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that carry more than one warhead and limit the modernization of intercontinental ballistic missiles to single-warhead missiles." The Soviet Union, however, did not directly respond to this proposal. On the other hand, the United States had superiority in terms of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union proposed that all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons be destroyed, but Bush only proposed that such weapons be dismantled completely rather than be destroyed completely. As for airborne tactical nuclear weapons, the United States planned to preserve such weapons in Europe, but the Soviet Union held that the use of airborne tactical nuclear weapons should be stopped according to the principle of mutual reciprocity. As for nuclear tests, the Soviet Union decided to unilaterally suspend nuclear tests for one year and also proposed that other nuclear powers take the same step, but Bush did not express his attitude on this point. In short, the United States wanted to knock down the Soviet superiority in terms of land-based nuclear weapons, while the Soviet Union wanted to set off the U.S. superiority in terms of sea-based and airborne weapons and to drive all U.S. nuclear weapons out of Europe. Both sides obviously still wanted to weaken each other to the maximum and preserve their own superiority. This could not but cast an ominous shadow on their future nuclear disarmament talks.

It should also be noticed that what the United States and the Soviet Union proposed to destroy were only outdated nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons that were not easy to bring under control. Both sides will still hold a prudent attitude on keeping the weapon systems that are important to them. Moreover, the United States did not give up efforts to develop sophisticated weapons after putting forward the nuclear disarmament proposal. The United States is still carrying on the Strategic Defense Initiative, keeping the B-52 bombers and the "Sea Wolf" submarines. Even if the United States and the Soviet Union conclude an agreement on their nuclear disarmament proposals this time, they will continue to be the world's largest nuclear powers and will still have to bear the responsibility for taking the lead in reducing nuclear weapons on a large scale.
intercontinental missiles and six nuclear-powered submarines from active service.

According to reports from foreign news agencies, the current U.S. and Soviet nuclear disarmament plans were apparently put forth of mutual need, each having its own intentions. The United States took the initiative in putting forth the proposal, obviously out of its consideration that following the drastic changes in the situation in the Soviet Union and East Europe, there was a need to readjust its nuclear strategy. The land-based tactical nuclear weapons originally deployed by the United States in Europe have lost their actual combat value because the Soviet threat has significantly waned and Europe is separated from the Soviet Union by 500-km of East European territory. The proposed destruction of such weapons will not adversely affect the United States’ own nuclear strength, but it can meet the wish of its European allies to dismantle the weapons. Just as the American newspapers pointed out: The nuclear weapons to be cut by the United States are the “outmoded” and “most useless” ones. U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said: “The cutting of some nuclear weapons will not weaken the U.S. Armed Forces’ guarding capability.”

The Soviet domestic situation is volatile and there is a danger of losing control over tactical nuclear weapons deployed in various republics. If they are concentrated and destroyed in time, this will not only serve as a response to the U.S. request but also meet the needs for the development of domestic events. In view of its superiority in land-based intercontinental missiles, the Soviet Union targeted their deployment mainly at the United States. In his proposal, Bush strongly demanded that the Soviet Union deeply cut and destroy intercontinental missiles of this type. Washington even openly suggested that this demand be regarded as “an important precondition” for the provision of economic aid to the Soviet Union. The United States will preserve its three-in-one strategic retaliative capability,” to “maintain its nuclear deterrent.” Japan’s MAINICHI SHIMBUN pointed out: The aim of the recent U.S. nuclear disarmament plan is to weaken the Soviet Union and “establish the superiority position of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons” by “seizing the historic opportunity.”

Bush Aides Said To Differ on Response to Gorbachev

[Text] Washington, October 25 (XINHUA)—Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft have differed on how the United States should respond the Soviet initiative on nuclear arms reduction, THE WASHINGTON POST reported today.

The two officials seem at odds over how far and how quickly the administration should move toward embracing new arms limitations beyond the broad unilateral measures announced by President George Bush, the paper said.

The dispute became evident late last week when Cheney blocked release of a draft White House announcement that would have accepted a Soviet proposal to declare an end to production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, THE POST quoted administration as saying.

The two of Bush’s top aids also differ on whether to pursue Gorbachev’s call for joint limitations on underground nuclear tests and for a U.S. declaration that nuclear arms will be used only in retaliation for nuclear attack.

Scowcroft is reportedly willing to negotiate on both, while Cheney and other senior administration officials say that the United States cannot compromise on either issues.

Bush unveiled a unilateral nuclear arms reduction initiative on September 27, and he called on the Soviet Union to match the initiative with its own cuts in nuclear stockpile. One week later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev responded with an initiative which not only endorses most of Bush’s proposals, but calls for further actions to reverse nuclear arms race.

The United States has yet to respond the Soviet initiative, and President Bush said that no fresh proposals would come up during his meeting with Gorbachev in Madrid next Tuesday on the eve of the peace conference on the Middle East.

South Korea Announces Nuclear-Free Stance

[Text] Pyongyang, November 8 (XINHUA)—South Korean President No Tae-u this morning announced South Korea’s stance on the proposal for making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

No Tae-u’s televised speech contained three major conditions. They were:

—South Korea would not produce, possess, stockpile, or use any nuclear weapons. Nuclear energy would be used only for peaceful purposes in South Korea.

—Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear facilities in South Korea would be examined by the
International Atomic Energy Agency and other world nuclear security organizations. And South Korea would not seek to own any facilities for nuclear fuel disposal or for nuclear enrichment.

—South Korea would contribute alongside the international community to an all-round destruction of large-scale killing and biochemical weapons.

In his address, No also called on both the North and South sides to consult at high level meetings on the issues of nuclear weapons and military affairs.

The spokesman for the U.S. State Department has reportedly expressed his welcome to No’s address.

Spokesman Reacts
CM1211115291 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
II Nov 91 p 1

["China Supports Setting Up Nuclear-Free Zone in Korean Peninsula"]

[Text] Beijing, November 9 (XINHUA)—A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today: “We hope that the South Korean leader’s statement of non-possession of nuclear weapons will be helpful to attaining the goal of a nuclear free zone in the Korean peninsula.”

The spokesman made the remarks when asked to comment on a TV speech of South Korean President No Tae-u on November 8 that South Korea will not possess nuclear weapons.

The spokesman noted that not long ago, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea put forward the proposal of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear free zone.

“China supports this proposal and all the practical steps which may help to realize it, for it will be conductive to achieving peace and stability in the Korean peninsula,” he said.
NORTH KOREA

U.S. Weapons Withdrawal Called ‘Welcome Step’
SK2310105591 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1009 GMT 23 Oct 91

["A Welcome Step"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang October 23 (KCNA)—The United States will withdraw all its nuclear weapons including air-dropping nuclear bombs from South Korea, according to WASHINGTON POST.

If it is true, this step of the United States is a welcome step for the denuclearization and peace of the Korean peninsula.

As already reported, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in statements of a Foreign Ministry spokesman released on September 28 and October 6, hailed the tactical nuclear arms reduction measures made public by the United States and the Soviet Union and demanded that the United States withdraw its nuclear weapons completely and totally, not partially, from the ground, sea and air of the Korean peninsula fraught with the greatest danger of a nuclear war.

If the United States carries into effect its step to withdraw all its nuclear weapons including air-delivered nuclear bombs, the most dangerous hotbed of a nuclear war will be removed on the globe and it will be very favourable to peace and security not only on the Korean peninsula but also in Asia and the rest of the world.

If the United States has the willingness to truly implement what it promised, it is better of the U.S. authorities to officially announce it, not only through the press.

Now that the United States said it would withdraw all its nuclear weapons from South Korea and the Soviet Union also made public nuclear arms reduction steps, if the North and the South of Korea agree to and declare the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as the DPRK proposed on July 30, the United States and other nuclear nations around the peninsula will find no impediment in guaranteeing its non-nuclear status by law. The United States must immediately carry into effect its step to completely withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

South Condemned for Opposing Denuclearization
SK2410074991 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0607 GMT 24 Oct 91

[“Shameful Treacherous Act of Nuclear Fanatics”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang October 24 (KCNA)—The South Korean authorities including the “defence minister” are these days opposing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and claiming that “the U.S. nuclear umbrella is still needed”, even denying the U.S. press report that the United States would withdraw all its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

This comes under fire in papers here today. Commenting on this, NODONG SINMUN brands this outburst of the South Korean authorities as one more open challenge to the entire fellow countrymen who want peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula and a disgraceful anti-national behaviour of nuclear fanatics.

We cannot but pay attention to the fact that their utterances coincided with the trip of the members of the South side to Pyongyang for the inter-Korean high-level talks. This, in fact, cannot be construed otherwise than an expression of the stand of the South Korean authorities that they have no intention to solve the questions of peace and reunification, though the North and the South have a dialogue.

As is widely known, elimination and reduction of nuclear weapons is being promoted between nuclear powers on the international scene now and steps are taken to withdraw nuclear weapons from other countries. It is an anachronistic folly to persistently oppose the denuclearisation and cry for “protection of nuclear umbrella”, not trying to wipe off the national disgrace by getting the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea.

Recently, the United States admitted that it had deployed nuclear missiles, nuclear shells and even nuclear bombs in South Korea.

The South Korean authorities should not call for “peace system” or “termination of cold war” only in words, but, though belatedly, should demand the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea and approach with sincerity our peace proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

If they shun the peace problem and put the fellow countrymen on the altar of nuclear war, failing to give up the stance of North-South confrontation, tailing behind the outside forces, our nation will never pardon such act.

MINJU CHOSON in a by-lined commentary warns that if the South Korean authorities continue to follow the road of North-South confrontation and tension against peace and reunification, they will face a stern judgement by the times and the nation.

U.S. Rejection of Nuclear Test Ban Condemned
SK2610053591 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0451 GMT 26 Oct 91

[“More Light Cast on True Color of Nuclear Maniac”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang October 26 (KCNA)—U.S. Secretary of Defence Cheney stated that the United States would take a stand against a total ban on nuclear testing and would not give up the nuclear pre-emptive strike strategy
and the spokesman for the U.S. State Department declared that the "star wars" program would continue to be promoted. Commenting on this, a NODONG SINMUN analyst today says: This shows that the U.S. is still clinging to nuclear arms buildup and nuclear war preparations.

By declaring that it opposes a total ban on nuclear testing and will continue it, the United States shows that it is filling its nuclear arsenal with new nuclear weapons and preparing a nuclear war.

And the announcement that the U.S. will not give up the nuclear pre-emptive strike strategy is tantamount to a declaration that it will continue to pursue its anti-communist, anti-progress military confrontation policy, maintain its strategy of deploying nuclear weapons in forward areas and trigger off a nuclear war any moment while engaging itself in nuclear threat and blackmail against the world progressive forces.

While advertising the withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, the United States openly declares that the South Korean puppets will remain under the "nuclear umbrella".

This means that it will persistently step up the policy of nuclear war against us; this is an open challenge to the Korean people and the world peaceloving people demanding the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

The U.S. should give up nuclear war preparations and pull its nuclear weapons and troops out of South Korea without delay.

Efforts for Denuclearization of Peninsula Reviewed
SK0211132951 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0007 GMT 29 Oct 91

[NODONG SINMUN 29 October “special article”: “It Is Our Consistent Position To Turn the Korean Peninsula Into a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone”]

[Text] The great leader Comrade Kim II-song has taught: Turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone is an urgent issue in maintaining and consolidating peace in Korea and guaranteeing peace in Asia and in the world.

The situation on the Korean peninsula is becoming more acute with each passing day, and peace is gravely threatened. More than 1,000 nuclear weapons are deployed in South Korea.

The U.S. imperialists built new large nuclear storage houses in South Korea and introduced nuclear delivery systems one after another. In addition, they frequently staged nuclear war exercises.

South Korea has been reduced to the most dangerous source of nuclear war in the world. This greatly worries our people and peaceloving people all over the world.

The Korean peninsula has been reduced to a site where the danger of nuclear war is greatest, and not because our people did not want peace and our efforts for peace were not sufficient. The Korean people love peace the most.

Our people ardently aspire to peace on the Korean peninsula and peaceful reunification of the nation. Reflecting this aspiration, on 10 June we made public the joint communique of political parties and public organizations in the DPRK. This communique contained important proposals for removing the growing danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, for withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, and for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

Following this, in a Foreign Ministry statement on 30 July, we again made a new proposal for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This new proposal stipulates agreement between the North and the South of Korea on establishing a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and a joint declaration; the legal guarantee of the position of the Korean peninsula as soon as the United States and nuclear weapon states surrounding our country reach an agreement on and declare denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; for non-nuclear states in Asia to support denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and to respect its position; and other issues in denuclearization.

During the recent North-South high-level talks, we stressed that the North and the South of Korea should adopt the declaration of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and present a draft declaration as an urgent proposal. This is another clear expression of our party and government's peace-loving position: making all efforts to prevent the danger of war on the Korean peninsula and to achieve peace.

Our party and government put forward an antinuclear and denuclearization policy long ago and consistently called for banning development, production, and storage of nuclear weapons and for their abolition. Since nuclear weapons were brought to the South of the Korean peninsula, we made all efforts to make them withdraw and prevent the danger of nuclear war.

In 1956, when the U.S. imperialists were accelerating nuclear armament in South Korea after the war, our government expressed its official position opposing the introduction of atomic weapons. On 7 April 1959 it warned that the U.S. imperialists systematically destroyed and infringed on the Korean armistice agreement and reduced South Korea to a new base of atomic weapons by bringing in atomic and guided weapons. Thus, we proposed establishing the peace zone free from nuclear weapons in Asia.

However, as a challenge to our peace proposal, the U.S. imperialists brought a large number of nuclear weapons into South Korea. In the mid-1970's they turned South
Korea into the largest armory of nuclear weapons, filled with 1,000-odd nuclear weapons.

Since then, the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets have staged a nuclear war exercise each year called Team Spirit. As the 1980's opened, the Reagan regime in the United States declared the Korean peninsula a proving ground for a showdown and kicked off the nuclear war commotion more openly.

As a result, preventing a new danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula emerged as an urgent issue, and its resolution should not be delayed.

Our Republic's Government signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on 12 December 1985. Our purpose in signing this treaty was to have U.S. nuclear weapons withdrawn from the Korean peninsula, to remove the nuclear threat to us, and, going one step further, turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

Then in 1986, the year of international peace, it solemnly announced at home and abroad a proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone. In this proposal the Republic's Government has made clear its firm position that it will prohibit the testing, production, storage, and introduction of nuclear weapons and that it will ban the construction of all manner of foreign military bases, including nuclear bases, and the passage of foreign nuclear weapons through our territory, territorial air space, and water.

At the same time, it demanded that the United States and the South Korean authorities respond. It made clear its position that if they demand negotiations with us on our proposal, it is willing to accept their proposal for negotiations at any time, regardless of their forms.

The following year we put forward a new proposal on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, calling on them to take practical measures to firmly guarantee its position. We have called on the U.S. imperialists to take practical measures: ceasing to introduce new nuclear weapons into South Korea; complete withdrawal of all the nuclear weapons they have already brought in; cancel operational plans associated with the use of nuclear weapons. We then stated that Japan, the first country to fall victim to nuclear catastrophe, not allow another country to build bases, transfer bases, and logistics bases on its territory from which to launch nuclear attacks against the Korean peninsula.

Clearly calling on all the nuclear powers to stay away from any kind of military act that could lead to nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and its neighboring areas and not to threaten the Korean peninsula with nuclear weapons, we insisted that the South Korean authorities withdraw all the foreign military bases, including nuclear weapons and nuclear bases built in the South; that they not introduce, store, or develop nuclear weapons in the future; and that they not allow foreign nuclear weapons to pass through their territory.

Our repeated proposals for converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone are supported and welcomed unanimously at home and abroad because they are the most reasonable and fair ones designed to ease tension in our country and contribute to mankind's peace.

Had the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean authorities been sincere about our peace proposal and responded to it affirmatively, the Korean peninsula would not have continued to be the most acute spot where nuclear war has become a real danger.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets are completely to blame that our proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone has not yet been realized. In not heeding our proposal, not only have the U.S. imperialists kept U.S. troops and nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea, but they have also accelerated the preparations for nuclear war.

Branding the Korean peninsula as the spot where the next round of feuds will flare up following the Persian Gulf war, the U.S. imperialists have worked out a 120-day nuclear war scenario premised on the use of nuclear weapons, while running riot in nuclear war exercises.

Followers of the U.S. imperialists' nuclear war policy, the South Korean puppets are about to arm the puppet army with nuclear weapons. The puppet military head, who is enchanted with nuclear weapons, went so far as to mention the outrageous idea of a surprise raid on the North.

What is ridiculous is that the U.S. imperialists and the puppets have recently started spreading false tales that we are developing nuclear weapons and noisily insisted that we alone should place ourselves under nuclear inspections.

In particular, the South Korean puppets, while avoiding talking about the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea at the fourth round of the North-South high-level talks, picked a fight with us, who are not engaged in nuclear development. This is preposterous, and it is a brazen act.

It is globally recognized that ours is a thoroughly non-nuclear state with not even one nuclear weapon.

The U.S. imperialists and the puppets have provoked a quarrel with us over the issue of nuclear weapons. This is nothing but sophistry designed to deceive and mock the public at home and abroad who are calling for the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons and troops from South Korea.

Not only does the United States claim to be peaceloving, it has also recently made clear its stand on dismantling tactical nuclear weapons. The United States should take practical measures to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, as a matter of course.
Since we enforce an antinuclear and non-nuclear policy, the United States has no justification for keeping nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Out of a lofty sense of responsibility for our people's survival and for world peace, we will patiently try to have U.S. troops and nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea and to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

**Southern Student Group Cited on U.S. Nuclear Pullout**

SK2910101591 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0957 GMT 29 Oct 91

[Text] Pyongyang October 29 (KCNA)—The National Council of Student Representatives of South Korea (Chondaehyop) made public a document on October 3 clarifying its stand toward the U.S. President Bush's announcement of the tactical nuclear arms reduction program, according to NEW KOREA TIMES, an overseas Koreans' newspaper published in Canada.

The document says it welcomes Bush's tactical nuclear arms reduction program "as it is partially conducive to the denuclearization of our motherland and peace policy."

"Chondaehyop renews its determination to fight to the end for the complete denuclearization of the motherland", the document declares, and continues:

Besides the tactical nuclear weapons, the nuclear bombs B-29 and B-61 which can be delivered by the F-16 and F-4 of the U.S. Air Force present in South Korea must be completely withdrawn and thus the Korean peninsula be practically turned into a nuclear-free zone.

Immediately declare your stand not to use nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula with the withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons.

In connection with the announcement of the withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula, Chondaehyop cannot dispel its misgivings that the nuclear deployment might be understated in the data about "The Possibility of the Possession of Tactical Nuclear Weapons by the U.S. Forces Present in South Korea" released by Pentagon. Chondaehyop, therefore, demands that the nuclear bases and the distribution of nuclear weapons in South Korea be made public at once.

Chondaehyop will form a "committee to inspect the withdrawal of nuclear weapons" together with opposition parties and various social strata to observe the pullout of the tactical weapons and demands that the inspection of the U.S. nuclear bases by the committee be fully guaranteed.

The U.S. forces in South Korea, the very cause of the increase of tension on the Korean peninsula, which strangle the right to existence of the nation, must immediately get out of South Korea, taking along their nuclear weapons.

**U.S. Said Blocking Denuclearization of Peninsula**

SK2910104191 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1014 GMT 29 Oct 91

["Turning Korean Peninsula Into Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone Is Our Consistent Stand"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang October 29 (KCNA)—The government of our Republic has made every effort to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, says NODONG SINMUN in a signed article today.

Recalling that after joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 the government of the DPRK solemnly declared at home and abroad that the Korean peninsula should be turned into a nuclear-free zone and put forward a new proposal demanding a practical step for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, the article says:

Our proposals to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free peace zone are unanimously welcomed and supported at home and abroad as they are the most reasonable and fair and aboveboard ones to remove a most dangerous hotbed of nuclear war in the world, relax tensions in our country and contribute to the human cause of peace.

Our proposals to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone have not yet been realized entirely because of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets.

The U.S. imperialists continue to keep their troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea and have further hastened nuclear war preparations, shunning our proposals to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone.

It is ridiculous that the U.S. imperialists and the puppets are crying for the unilateral "nuclear inspection" of the North, spreading the lie that the North is developing nuclear weapons.

Particularly, at the fourth round of the inter-Korean high-level talks the South Korean puppets, refusing to talk about the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, took issue with us who do not develop nuclear weapons. This is an impudent act.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets are taking issue with us over the nuclear weapons in a bid to deceive and fool public opinion at home and abroad demanding the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons and the U.S. troops from South Korea.

The United States itself said that it wants "peace" and took the stand for the removal of tactical nuclear
weapons some time ago. The United States should take a practical step to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

Now that we have pursued the anti-nuke policy, policy of denuclearisation, the United States has no ground to keep the nuclear weapons in South Korea, stresses the article.

U.S. Nuclear Proposal Called ‘Camouflage’
SK2910104991 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1023 GMT 29 Oct 91

[“Nuclear Arms Must Be Completely Removed”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang October 29 (KCNA)—U.S. President Bush recently announced that the United States would remove the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, but world public regards the announcement as a peace camouflage. The United States should look squarely at the current of the times and stop nuclear arms buildup.

A NODONG SINMUN analyst says this in a commentary today.

The U.S. Defence Information Centre, a U.S. civilian military research institute, branded the announcement by Bush as “window dressing”, saying that though the United States removes tactical nuclear weapons, there will remain 17,000 pieces of nuclear weapons easy to use and the tactical nuclear weapons will be redeployed without difficulty because they will be kept in arsenals and the means of launching them will remain.

The U.S. authorities stated that they will “maintain effective aerial nuclear capabilities” by developing air-launched tactical nuclear missiles together with the NATO states.

Though it is talking about the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, the United States has not yet made a detailed official statement and keeps mum about the means of delivering and launching nuclear weapons.

And it must not go unnoticed that the United States notified the South Korean puppets that South Korea will remain under the “nuclear umbrella” of the United States.

Not without reason is the world public opinion dubious of the real intention of the United States in announcing that it would reduce tactical nuclear weapons.

It is an unpardonable crime to threaten and blackmail other countries with nuclear weapons.

The dark clouds of nuclear war hanging over the head of mankind must be cleared off.

South’s ‘Confidence-Building’ Proposal Viewed
SK0411104691 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0956 GMT 4 Nov 91

[“South Side Must Not Lay Obstacle to Solution of Nonaggression Problem With ‘Confidence-Building First Doctrine’”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang November 4 (KCNA)—If the South side truly has interest and sincerity in preventing a war and achieving peace, it must not lay an obstacle in the way of agreement on nonaggression by resorting to the “confidence-building first doctrine,” stresses NODONG SINMUN in a by-lined article today.

By “confidence-building first” the South Korean authorities mean, in a nutshell, that “steps for the confidence-building guaranteeing nonaggression should be taken separately, since an agreement on nonaggression cannot be relied on, even if the North and the South reach it, the article says, and continues:

What matters here is that the South side artificially separates nonaggression and confidence-building and opposes them to each other.

These problems are not different. The declaration of nonaggression itself is the starting point of confidence-building and a most important guarantee for it.

When the sides promise nonaggression, they would guarantee to each other that there would be no threat of northward invasion nor threat of “southward invasion”. Then the distrust caused by it would be dispelled and confidence be created between the North and the South.

What matters next in the “confidence-building first doctrine” is that the South side says it cannot rely on an agreement on nonaggression, dismissing it as a “scrap of paper” before it is adopted.

This reveals the intention of the South Korean authorities not to abide by a document of agreement on nonaggression, though they sign it in the future.

If the South Korean authorities would not place confidence even in the agreement on nonaggression, an important thing related to the security of the nation, there would be nothing, in fact, to be agreed upon between the North and the South and the talks between the sides itself would be meaningless.

What matters also in the “confidence-building first doctrine” is that the “article of confidence-building” contains points such as “exchange of information” and “observation of exercises” which are not directly related to nonaggression nor can practically guarantee nonaggression.

To exchange “military information” while keeping the present armed forces and “observe each other’s exercises” while giving a free rein to massive war games cannot remove the possible danger of war. Such
"exchange of information" and "observation of exercises" have no more than a symbolic meaning at the present time when modern technologies have reached a high level.

Moreover, it is obvious that the South Korean authorities cannot exchange trustworthy "military information" with us under the condition that the United States holds the prerogative of the supreme command of the South Korean Army.

We clearly see the fictitious and unrealistic nature of the assertion about "exchange of information" in the fact that the South Korean authorities cannot utter a word about the nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.

It is needless to say that confidence cannot be built through the exchange of hollow "military information" while concealing such important military information as the presence of nuclear weapons.

The South side must withdraw its wrong assertions and respond with a positive attitude to an agreement on North-South nonaggression declaration.

SOUTH KOREA

Seoul Urged To Exercise 'Nuclear Sovereignty'
SK2310062291 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean 15 Oct 91 P2

[Editorial: "Discords on Nuclear Weapons on Korean Peninsula and Recovery of Nuclear Sovereignty: We Should Ponder the Nation's Destiny"]

[Text] The WASHINGTON POST reported on 12 October that the United States decided to withdraw land-based nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and to retain air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons for the time being and that it has already informed the ROK Government of this decision. When President Bush announced his policy of withdrawing short-range tactical nuclear weapons on 27 September he did not mention air-delivered nuclear weapons deployed in regions other than Europe. Accordingly, analysts predicted that air-delivered nuclear weapons deployed on the Korean peninsula would be retained for the time being. The WASHINGTON POST confirmed this prediction.

The government authorities, however, denied the report of the WASHINGTON POST. In light of the fact that North Korea has repeatedly insisted that unless U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea are withdrawn it will not allow international nuclear inspection, the issue of U.S. air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea will apparently become a heated controversy at home and abroad.

The biggest stumbling block in the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula is the global strategy of the United States. Experts conclude that the United States is trying not to diminish its efforts for arms expansion until such time as it can completely make the Soviet Union give in militarily. They also analyze that Bush's declaration for the reduction of nuclear weapons, as well, is aimed at weakening the Soviet Union's intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads and, thus, at maintaining nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. This can be proven by the U.S. refusal of Gorbachev's proposal which calls for the withdrawal of air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons, the total suspension of nuclear tests for one year, and the declaration renouncing preemptive nuclear strikes.

However, we should no longer allow the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula to be influenced by U.S. global strategy. The issue of sovereignty with regard to the issue of "nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula" should be discussed. Although the government says that it has taken the initiative in dealing with the issue of relations between the North and the South, including nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, reality seems to be different.

According to the interpellations by opposition lawmakers at the National Assembly sessions and according to foreign press reports as well, it has been learned that when President No Tae-u met President Bush twice, last June and September, the ROK Government did not have any prior consultations with the U.S. Government on President Bush's plan for withdrawing land-based nuclear weapons from South Korea and that, instead, our government was informed of only a small part of Bush's plan.

The government must not leave the "nuclear button," which will influence the destiny of the nation, to the government of another country, if it really realizes the dreadful danger of nuclear weapons which are capable of annihilating our nation. Therefore, an opposition lawmaker's remarks at the National Assembly session that "the fact that our government has been unable to exercise its influence on managing short-range tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea shows that it has neither the qualifications nor the ability to shoulder the responsibility for our people's survival and our national dignity and honor" deserves full support from our people.

The "nuclear discord on the Korean peninsula"—which has been created because of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and the danger of North Korea's nuclear development—has been further aggravated by North Korea's insistence on "the withdrawal of nuclear weapons first and the simultaneous inspections in the North and the South" and by South Korea's demands for "international pressure on North Korea to grant nuclear inspection." Furthermore, there is no sign that this discord will be solved in the near future.

However, the essence of the problem has been more clearly revealed. Now that the "fact" that U.S. nuclear weapons exist in South Korea has been revealed, the unilateral pressure on North Korea to grant international
inspections is nothing but the "logic of strength." This "logic of strength" involves a serious danger. Even though international pressure is imposed on North Korea to sign a nuclear safety agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to grant international inspection, if North Korea persistsently refuses it, what can our government do next? We cannot rule out the possibility of a "tragic incident" in the history of the nation.

Our government must recover nuclear sovereignty first in dealing with the nuclear issue, which is the starting point of arms control, if the final goal of its policy is to remove nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula, to make progress in the negotiations with the North for arms control, and, thus, to achieve "peaceful reunification." Our government must exercise its voice over the U.S. nuclear policy related to nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. The government's exercise of nuclear sovereignty should presuppose the deep self-reflection of the interests and destiny of the nation. The concrete practice of these interests and the destiny of the nation may find expression in "denuclearization of South Korea" and "nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula."

Opposition Leader Kim Tae-chung Urges NFZ
SK2210003791 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 22 Oct 91 p 2

[Text] Opposition leader Kim Tae-chung yesterday called for opening inter-Korean discussions on making the peninsula a nuclear-free zone [NFZ], pointing to the decision by the United States to withdraw all its nuclear weapons including airborne ones from the South.

During a session of the National Assembly Defense Committee, he said, "Now that the U.S. plans to withdraw all nuclear arms, including airborne nuclear ones from the South, North Korea cannot justify its refusal to open its alleged nuclear facilities to international inspection. The neither-confirm-nor-deny policy by the South should also be abandoned."

Initially, air-launched nuclear arms were not included on the list of such weapons to be withdrawn from South Korea.

The co-leader of the Democratic Party said, "A discussion to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone should be started in full during the fourth round of the inter-Korean prime ministers' meeting."

Kim want on, "In particular, South and North Korea should also discuss institutional devices against surprise attacks on the other during the premiers' talks."

The conference between the two Koreas' prime ministers will be held in Pyongyang from today to Friday.

Thirteen House standing panels were convened yesterday for preliminary deliberation on the 1992 budget.

In the Defense Committee, DP Rep. Chong Tae-chol grilled Defense Minister Yi Chong-ku on the "excessive" budgetary burden for the projected relocation of the U.S. military compound from Yongsan, Seoul, for which Korea is to foot the total bill of $1.7 billion.

Chong demanded the minister's opinion on the allegation that if the costs for the upkeep of U.S. troops in Korea as well as for the relocation is paid over the next five years, the amount will consume about 20 percent of the national defense budget."

He demanded that the 340 million won allocated for intelligence handling by the Defense Security Command next year should be cut, alleging that some funds could be diverted to surveillance of civilians.

During the preliminary deliberation of the 1992 budget which is to continue until Friday, the opposition party seeks to cut a total of 1.6 trillion won from the 33.55 trillion won proposed for next year's budget.

Rep. Kim Yong-to said that funds for projects promised by President No Tae-u during his presidential campaign takes up 46.3 percent of the Construction Ministry's total budget of 3.93 trillion won.

He said, "The government should not use highway construction and land development to further its presidential campaign."

NEW ZEALAND

Prime Minister Denies Weakening Antinuclear Law
BK0411094891 Hong Kong AFP in English 0930 GMT 4 Nov 91

[Text] Wellington, Nov 4 (AFP)—Prime Minister Jim Bolger on Monday denied claims made in a leaked U.S. intelligence report that he was trying to "weaken or skirt" New Zealand's anti-nuclear law.

The claim was made in a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) telex leaked Sunday to the NEW ZEALAND PRESS ASSOCIATION.

Legislation passed by the previous Labour government outlaws nuclear weapons and nuclear power from New Zealand. Bolger's party pledged before voted into power last that it would retain the law. But since U.S. President George Bush last month announced the removal of nuclear weapons from surface ships Bolger has called for New Zealand to be "as bold as Bush."

He set up a cabinet committee to review the nuclear power issue, a move the DIA cable reported was "part of a continuing effort by Bolger to weaken or skirt anti-nuclear laws that have strained U.S.-New Zealand relations."
Bolger, who returned here Monday from a lengthy global trip, said the suggestion that he was trying to skirt the anti-nuclear laws using the nuclear-propulsion committee was "nonsense."

"There's no way first of all you can skirt them (the laws) and if we are going to change them, then that has to be done in the New Zealand Parliament," he told a press conference. "We are obviously not trying to circumvent our legislation. We can't."

Asked to comment on the American interpretation in the telex, Bolger said: "If they are suggesting as I take it the document suggests that this is some surreptitious way that the New Zealand government is moving, well then that's wrong. What we've done is very upfront. There's no attempt at hiding or doing anything undercover."

Bolger also announced that there was nothing in the anti-nuclear laws to prevent British Royal Navy ships from visiting New Zealand ports.

The prime minister, who met his British counterpart in London recently, said John Major had told him that there were no difficulties with Royal Navy ships, which are not nuclear-powered, to stop them visiting New Zealand. "They would be welcome if they were in this part of the world and I anticipate one will come, but I do not know when," he said.

Britain, which has limited visits by its ships because of the anti-nuclear laws, is removing nuclear weapons from its surface ships and none of its surface vessels are nuclear-powered.
BULGARIA

Officers Discuss CSCE Military Doctrine Seminar
AU3010173991 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 25 Oct 91 pp 1, 3

[Report by Major Georgi Buchev: "The Balkans Worry Europe but There Is No Danger of War"]

[Excerpts] By opening the news conference on 24 October, Major General Stoimenov, head of the Ministry of Defense's press center, used the opportunity (the chief of General Staff's first meeting with journalists from the mass media) to present Colonel General Petrov. Born in 1938 in the village of Elenova in the Sofia Region, he graduated from the Veliko Turnovo military school and two academies. He has passed through all of the basic command posts in the Army, from platoon commander to the top of the General Staff. [passage omitted]

However reluctant some people are to recognize it, at present and for the near future, NATO is a guarantee of the European states' national security, and this is particularly important, bearing in mind the concern expressed at the Vienna Second Seminar on Military Doctrines that it can be difficult to safeguard one's national sovereignty with one's own troops, said Col. Gen. Petrov.

Concerning the volatile situation in Yugoslavia, our country repeats that under no circumstances will we exploit the difficulties of our western neighbor and, in addition, that Bulgaria does not see any specific danger posed by Yugoslavia.

Major General Vakavliev, deputy chief of General Staff, in contrast to some of the other participants, avoided the general conciliatory tone in his speech at the seminar and, in a substantiated and quite specific way, declared our criteria on the question of reasonable sufficiency of the armed forces in the context of our purely defensive military doctrine. This gave cause for this subject to be looked at in more detail at one of the following seminars.

The Bulgarian delegation at the Vienna seminar has conducted 14 dialogues with representatives of delegations from other countries—all of them our neighbors, and most of them the so-called West European states—and also with Deputy Commander of the American Armed Forces in Europe General McCarthy. At the talks that took place, described by Col. Gen. Petrov as exceptionally open, brave, and precise, Bulgaria received support about its worries concerning the presence of large military groups in Eastern Thrace (in other words, the Turkish First Army), the concentration of more than half of the Turkish military force (15 units) on just 3 percent of the Republic's territory, and the lack of any significant change in the military preparations of the Turkish Army. By expressing his opinion that the military is slower and lags behind the politicians, Gen. McCarthy shared his willingness to coordinate the positions. Individual NATO countries are contemplating reexamining their attitudes toward this question, and, in the statement of the Turkish representative, the idea was presented of a definite reorganization and a significant reduction in the armed forces in this region. The situation concerning the military concentration in the eastern Thrace region most likely will be discussed on a regional basis, with the idea of securing the same degree of safety for all of the Balkan countries. [passage omitted]

POLAND

Deputy Foreign Minister: Soviet Coup Helped Troop Withdrawal
LD2710092591 Warsaw PAP in English 0826 GMT 27 Oct 91

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 27—Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jerzy Makarczyk claims that the fiasco of Soviet coup d'etat last August helped to speed up agreement on Soviet troop withdrawal from Poland, initialled in Moscow on Saturday.

"Had it not been for the coup we would not have reached that far as we did," Makarczyk told newsmen at Warsaw's Okocie airport after his return from Moscow.

Under the treaty, all Soviet combat troops will leave Polish territory by November 1992 and back-up forces within another year.

According to Makarczyk the treaty can be signed after the signing of a financial protocol resolving the question of the property of the Soviet Army left in Poland and ecological losses caused by that Army in this country.

The Polish deputy foreign minister hopes the protocol can be agreed in Warsaw in November during another, 13th round of talks as, he believes, the initialling of the treaty has produced a real breakthrough in the negotiations.

The Polish side insists on the Soviet Union paying 70 million Swiss francs for the transit of Soviet units from Germany.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Treaty Discussed
PM041112691 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA
in Polish 28 Oct 91 pp 1-2

[Report by "SAS", TRYBUNA SLASKA's permanent correspondent in Moscow: "They Are Leaving: Treaty on Withdrawal of Soviet Army from Poland Initialled"]

[Text] The Polish-Soviet treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet Army troops from the Polish Republic's territory was initialled on Saturday in Moscow. Polish and Soviet vice ministers of foreign affairs, Jerzy Makarczyk and Yuriy Deryabin, signed the treaty at a ceremony at the mansion housing the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry, in
the presence of the ambassadors of the respective sides, S. Ciapcek and Y. Kashlev. The Polish side expressed the belief that the withdrawal of Soviet units from our country was the first step toward normalization of mutual relations, which will be ultimately sealed by the signing of the new treaty of cooperation and good-neighborly relations.

The treaty initialed on Saturday determines that all combat units of the Soviet Army will leave Poland by 15 November 1992. After that date, only a 6,000-strong logistics and control contingent will be used for technical servicing of troop transit from the former GDR. By the end of 1993, the number of Soviet officers and men is to drop to 2,000, and they will finally leave Poland at the same time as the troop transit from Germany to the USSR comes to an end. "These are the latest dates for us, and we are counting on the Soviet side’s not delaying matters until the very last day. Despite the fact that the agreement has not yet been finally signed, the act of initializing represents its acceptance, and we are hoping that the withdrawal of combat units will begin in the immediate future," Minister Makarczyk told us as he commented on the basic provisions of the agreement.

"We cannot disclose other articles of the agreement until the final signing," said Director J. Sulek of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both sides conceded that a number of property and finance issues still remain to be settled. They concern the property left on Poland’s territory and compensation for damage caused to our natural environment by the Soviet troops. "Negotiations in this respect are well advanced," the chairman of the Polish delegation stated.

During a meeting with Polish press correspondents accredited in Moscow, both Vice Minister Deryabin and Ambassador Kashlev referred to the disturbing items carried by Krasnaya Zvezda and Izvestiya. They cite statements by General Dubinin, the officer commanding Soviet troops in Poland, who announced that his combat and first echelon units would not leave our country until the end of 1992. "That report was a mistake made by Soviet journalists, while the interview with General Dubinin published in Izvestiya did not take place at all. The general himself intends to correct this in the next few days," head of protocol at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs told us.

The person at the center of the confusion, Gen. Dubinin, was to be present at the initializing of the treaty, but he left for Poland the day before. In the opinion of a number of members of the Polish delegation and of observers, his absence was, as it were, a confirmation that there was no smoke without fire.

All this goes to show that the substance of the talks is very difficult and awkward, especially for the Soviet side. At the same time, it confirms that, despite evident difficulties and obstacles, Polish diplomats managed to negotiate agreements on withdrawal and transit based on the principles of equal rights and sovereignty.
CUBA

Foreign Ministry Official on Tlatelolco Treaty
PA3110023991 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish
0000 GMT 30 Oct 91

[Interview on the Tlatelolco Treaty with Ambassador Jorge Morales by Barbara Bethancourt in Havana; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Bethancourt] Cuban authorities have recently announced their willingness to sign the Tlatelolco Treaty. This treaty sets out the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons once all Latin American nations comply with this legal document. This willingness was expressed in Fidel Castro's message at the Guadalajara summit in June. It was also expressed in the resolution on foreign policy approved in the recent Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba [PCC]; and even more recently, when Cuban President Fidel Castro participated in the Group of Three summit that was also held in Mexico, on Cozumel.

Today we are going to discuss all of this with Jorge Morales, Cuban Foreign Ministry ambassador and adviser on disarmament and nuclear issues [name and title as heard]. I want to thank Morales for meeting with me. I would like him briefly to explain to us—although the subject is very extensive—this Tlatelolco Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons that was drawn up 24 years ago.

[Morales] As you know, the treaty was drawn up on 14 February 1967. This treaty comes into effect in each nation individually, when it signs the treaty. The objective of the treaty is to banish nuclear weapons from Latin America—that is, to turn Latin America into a nuclear free area.

[Bethancourt] As a matter of fact, 24 years ago this would have been the first nuclear free area in the world.

[Morales] This would have made it the first nuclear free inhabited area, because there is an Antarctic treaty that has the same objective. This treaty would be the first to cover an inhabited area.

[Bethancourt] What nations initially—and in general what is the status—what Latin American nations have signed this treaty that was drawn up 24 years ago?

[Morales] To date, 26 Latin American nations have either signed and ratified or signed the treaty. In addition, there is a group of nations with special status. The treaty is in effect for those who have signed and ratified it; however, a group of nations has a particular status within the treaty. For example, Brazil and Chile have signed and ratified the treaty. Nevertheless, Article 28 offers the possibility that the treaty will not be in effect in a specific nation if that nation submits a statement indicating that the treaty will be in effect once all of the conditions provided in Article 28 are met.

[Bethancourt] What about Argentina?

[Morales] I am getting to that. There are other nations that have signed the treaty, but have not ratified it; that is the case with Argentina. There is also the case of Dominica, which signed the treaty in 1989. These two nations have taken a step forward in the treaty; they have signed, but they have not ratified it. Therefore, this removes them somewhat from the position of Brazil and Chile. There is now a group of nations with no relation whatsoever to the treaty. Although they are in the region, they have neither signed nor ratified the treaty. This is the case with Guyana, Belize, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis; and there is the case of Cuba. We are of course following these negotiations very closely, as there are indications that progress is being made. There are possibilities that this agreement will be accepted. This would open the door for the signing and ratifying or the entering into force of the treaty by these two nations [sentence as heard]. Regarding Chile, it has inferred that, once Argentina and Brazil take this step, it would also adopt this same position.

[Bethancourt] As far as Cuba is concerned, judging from what has been established in the [PCC] resolution on foreign policy, the same position is held. That is, when all of Latin America has signed this treaty, then there would be no problem for Cuba to sign the treaty too.

[Morales] We have made a statement in this regard; however, we have also pointed out that the difficulties or problems that have not allowed Cuba to cooperate in the treaty continue to exist.

[Bethancourt] I would like you to tell us why Cuba has not yet signed this treaty.

[Morales] There are aspects that are directly linked to the Cuban case as well as to the region. The three aspects linked to the Cuban case are: First, the aggressive U.S. policy toward Cuba, which has not ruled out the possibility of using any type of weapon, including nuclear weapons, to destroy the Cuban revolution. We have also taken into consideration that we should not waive our rights to possess the weapons that may be necessary for our defense. That is the first thing. The second is the existence of the naval base in Guantanamo, a naval base where—following U.S. policy—boats dock without making any declaration as to what weapons they are carrying. They could be carrying nuclear weapons. We do not know, and therefore we consider this as a violation to the treaty. There is also the problem of the blockade against Cuba. Those are the three aspects that we can say are directly linked to the Cuban case. The two other aspects that we consider important are the case of Puerto Rico, which has U.S. military bases in that nation that are also prepared in case of a nuclear war, as well as the [Panama] Canal Zone.

[Bethancourt] Morales, I would like to return to the Cuban case. As you have said, many of the conditions that did not allow us to sign treaty at the beginning still
prevail: the naval base is still there, the situation in Puerto Rico is the same, the U.S. blockade and aggression against our nation continue. Why then does Cuba now demonstrate at least its willingness to sign the treaty at some time?

[Morales] There is great interest in Latin America for the treaty to become effective, and the treaty cannot become effective for the total area unless all Latin American nations sign and ratify it. This has been the case since the treaty was drawn up in 1967. The treaty becomes effective in each nation individually. Nevertheless, in addition to that individual area in which the treaty comes into effect for each nation, there is a much broader area that is not affected until all nations in the region have signed and ratified the treaty. It is obvious that the position now adopted by Argentina, Brazil, and possibly Chile would only leave a very small number of nations without any nuclear activity [sentence as heard]. We believe that they will sign the treaty in the future. The Cuban case would be the only one left. We have always said that we respect the spirit of the treaty. Therefore, taking into consideration the situation of Latin America, taking into consideration our interest in integration, taking into account that there is an interest in Latin America for this treaty to become effective, it has been considered appropriate to offer this sample of Cuban interest in the integration of Latin America by resolving the problems that could block the treaty from going into effect. Consequently, we have officially stated that once all Latin American nations sign and ratify this treaty and once it comes into effect in these nations, Cuba would then be willing to take the corresponding steps in its obligations with the region regarding the treaty.

[Bethancourt] Then, can Cuba's willingness be considered as a sample or a contribution toward Latin American integration?

[Morales] That is the spirit of our position. We have already officially stated that the conditions for Cuba not signing or ratifying the treaty continue to prevail. Therefore, the only objective that has varied the Cuban position is the Latin American interest and our government decision to help this issue finally be resolved for the sake of Latin American unity.

[Bethancourt] Thank you, Morales, for your time and for the explanations you have given us.
ISREAL

Commentary Calls for Arrow Project's Reassessment

TA0111052691 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 Oct 91 p B1

[Re'even Pedatzur commentary: "End of the Nuclear Monopoly"]

[Text] One of the most important of Israel's recent strategic declarations has gone unnoticed in the shadow of the media brouhaha accompanying the Madrid conference. Appearing before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Defense Minister Moshe Arens stated that "the Middle East is marching toward the end of the nuclear weapons era." He noted that Israel would have to deploy in accordance with the new reality that will be created in the region, but this did not seem to excite his audience.

The Knesset members took no notice of the defense minister's statement, which may attest to the fact that they are unaware of the far-reaching implications inherent in the acquisition of nuclear arms by the Arab countries. The end of Israel's nuclear superiority in the Middle East will necessarily lead to sweeping changes in Israel's security policy and to the consolidation of a new and different military and political relationship between Israel and its neighbors. The failure to take notice of this development and to take the necessary action to deal with this new reality may yet prove a dangerous security mistake.

It is hard to predict the rules of the nuclear game that will be consolidated in the Middle East. The various geopolitical conditions, the level of intensity of the conflict in the region, and the large number of parties involved may suggest that the rules set at the end of the process will differ from those observed by the superpowers. At the same time, it is imperative that we attempt to assess them.

One critical aspect of the policy that Israel should consolidate became relevant and acute following Iraq's launching of ballistic missiles against Israel's home front. The need to provide an answer to the ballistic angle in our region is a prerequisite in the argument over the future of the Arrow system, the avowed purpose of which is to defend Israel from ballistic missile attacks.

The defense minister declared in a press interview that the Arrow constitutes a good answer to nuclear missiles, but this declaration calls for a thorough analysis, particularly because of the extreme importance attached to the Arrow's interception potential. After all, if it emerges that the Arrow cannot reasonably counter the nuclear missile threat, the decision to go ahead with its development may have to be reconsidered. In 10 or 20 years, the Arrow could be almost obsolete, not to mention the billions of dollars necessary to complete its development and acquisition. It is feared that by the time it is developed with the expenditure of vast resources, the Arrow system—on which Israel's active defense policy will be largely founded—will not counter the main threat, which is nuclear.

Clearly, when dealing with the nuclear threat in the Israeli context, it would be enough for one missile to penetrate our defense system and hit a target on Israeli soil for the price to be unbearable. Therefore, the fundamental decision assigning the Arrow to defend us also from nuclear missiles, which has already been made by Minister Arens, must be translated into a low penetration rate (that is, the number of missiles that break through the defense system and are not destroyed by it). In fact, in the nuclear context, one must talk about a hermetical seal against incoming missiles. This is a complex undertaking and hardly technologically feasible. A rate in excess of 1 percent is more than enough not to base Israel's defense policy against nuclear missiles on the Arrow system. Such a wager could be too risky.

There must be an intensive debate on the relevancy of the Arrow system vis-a-vis the expected future threats to the region, which were so decisively expounded by the defense minister. This is only one of the problems involved in the attempt to analyze the Arrow's potential to intercept nuclear missiles.

In order to neutralize the effect of the nuclear explosion that could occur when the Arrow intercepts a nuclear missile, one must plan the interception to take place within a defined and relatively small altitude range. This limitation makes the planning of the Arrow even more difficult and makes the system's chances of successfully creating a hermetic defense even more remote. In the professional literature it is usually assumed that the interception of a nuclear missile at an altitude of over 10 kilometers will not cause a destructive effect on the ground. In the interception of nuclear missiles, however, there is also a maximum altitude limitation. Due to the phenomenon of the electromagnetic pulse—which is one of the effects accompanying a nuclear explosion—the detonation of a nuclear missile at an altitude of over 40 kilometers could be devastating. An explosion at above this altitude creates an electromagnetic pulse that paralyzes all electronic systems on the ground, from military communications systems to telephone lines. Obviously, Israel will not be able to function militarily under war conditions if all its electrical and electronic systems are paralyzed.

It is clear from all this, and from other technical specifications too complicated to detail, that in a nuclear Middle East there may be no recourse other than to adopt a different policy that is not necessarily based on an active defense system like the Arrow. In the absence of other systems with a proven hermetic sealing capability against nuclear missiles, Israel will apparently have to step up its deterrence policy and perhaps base it on an open nuclear deterrence. Within the framework of such a deterrent posture, the launching of any kind of ballistic missile
toward Israel would serve as cause for a nuclear reaction because any such missile could conceivably be bearing a nuclear warhead and Israel cannot assume the inherent risk of basing its defense on attempts to intercept it.

The move toward overt nuclear deterrence is not an intrinsic Israeli interest, and it must try to postpone it for as long as possible. Under the conditions of a nuclear Middle East, however, there may be no alternative. We must therefore examine the investments still required to complete the Arrow system against the backdrop of anticipated developments in the nuclear field and against the defense minister's statements in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

**Arrow Missile's Third Test Launch 'Failed'**

*TA0311070191 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 3 Nov 91 p 16*

[Report by Arye Egozi]

[Excerpt] The third test launch of the Arrow antimissile missile has failed. The missile was launched Wednesday from a vessel anchored off a beach in central Israel, but due to a hitch the missile did not behave as expected.

Israel Aircraft Industries project managers still do not know the reason for the problem, which will cause yet another delay in the timetable.

Wednesday's test was conducted after delays caused by various mishaps. The fast missile left the launcher in the direction of another missile, which was supposed to simulate an enemy missile but immediately went out of control. The flow of data from the missile was also deficient.

Israeli sources said that the reasons for the mishap are still unclear. [passage omitted]

**PAKISTAN**

**Pakistan, India To Discuss Limiting Chemical Arms**

*BK3110155991 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 1500 GMT 31 Oct 91*

[Text] Pakistan and India have agreed to convene a meeting of experts to exchange views on a bilateral agreement to put restrictions on the production and use of chemical weapons. The agreement was reached at the fifth round of talks between the foreign secretaries of the two countries which ended in Islamabad today. They also agreed to consider issuing a joint communiqué on chemical weapons. The two sides further agreed to exchange coordination officers for nuclear installations and facilities before 1 January next year in view of the nonaggression pact between the two countries regarding each other's nuclear installations and facilities.

A statement was issued in Islamabad today which said that the two sides expressed satisfaction over the outcome of meetings between Shaharyar Khan and Muchkund Dubey on Wular Barrage and Sir Creek. They also held talks on the Siachen issue and agreed that the negotiations should be resumed soon. The sixth round of foreign secretary-level talks will be held in New Delhi early next year.
GENERAL

Karpov Meets French Official on Disarmament
LD2310181291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1540 GMT 22 Oct 91

[Text] Moscow, 22 Oct (TASS)—Disarmament consultations
in the framework of Soviet-French political dialogue
took place in the Soviet capital 21-22 October. USSR
Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov and F. Guelui,
head of the department for strategic problems and disarm-
ament at the French Foreign Ministry, participated.

As reported at the USSR Foreign Ministry information
directorate, a broad range of problems relating to arms
limitation and prospects for forming a new European
security system were discussed. F. Gueluis was briefed
on the USSR’s approaches to implementing recent initiatives
put forward by George Bush and Mikhail Gor-
bachev on reducing nuclear weapons.

Chances for Ban on Fissile Materials Production
Viewed
PM2410132791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Oct 91 Union Edition p 5

[A. Sychev report: “Will the Uranium Plants Stop
Work?”]

[Text] The U.S. weekly NEWSWEEK reported in its last
issue that, according to information received from a
high-ranking administration staffer, U.S. President
George Bush is preparing a radical new proposal to
reduce nuclear arsenals. According to the magazine’s
information, Bush intends to appeal for the establish-
ment of a permanent ban on the production of fission-
able nuclear materials (uranium and plutonium), which
are used in nuclear weapons, as well as the introduction
of new restrictions on nuclear tests.

On the basis of Bush’s proposals, NEWSWEEK con-
tinues, the United States could save billions of dollars by
closing down several obsolescent and unsafe nuclear
installations at which large-scale and costly purification
work already has to be carried out.

If the U.S. President were to adopt such a decision—
which, according to NEWSWEEK’s information, is to be
made public before the meeting of the U.S. and USSR
presidents scheduled for 29 October in Madrid, where
they will arrive for the opening of the peace conference
on the Near East—Washington would be taking a big
step toward the Soviet position expounded in Mikhail
Gorbachev’s 5 October statement.

Thus, Point 4 of the Soviet initiatives, in particular,
speaks of the Soviet Union’s introduction of “a one-year
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing”—which, with
the support of other nuclear powers, will open up “the
way to the speediest and full cessation of nuclear tests.”
In addition, as Gorbachev said, “we favor reaching
agreement with the United States on the controlled
cessation of production of all weapons-grade fissionable
materials.”

IZVESTIYA asked Yevgeniy Golovko, deputy chief of
the USSR Foreign Ministry Problems of Arms Limita-
tion and Disarmament Administration, to comment on
this report. Ye. Golovko recalled that the Soviet Union
is already implementing the previously announced pro-
gram to phase out all installations for the production of
weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. “We intend to
fulfill the program during the current decade,” he said.
“We are ready to hold talks with the United States on the
problem of verifying the cessation of production of the
nuclear filling.”

In principle the establishment of a ban on the production
of fissionable materials, Golovko continued, leads to
enhanced ecological safety and can be regarded as one
aspect of slowing down the nuclear arms race. The need
for and possibility of this step are accounted for by the
fact that nuclear arsenals are being reduced today and
additional materials for warheads are not needed.

“As for nuclear tests, of course we would prefer the
United States to follow our example and announce a
moratorium,” Golovko said. “But we will also welcome
the fact that they are prepared to limit their own pro-
gram (true, NEWSWEEK does not report whether it is a
question of quantitative parameters or yield, or both),
assuming Washington makes such a decision. Although
this is not a full cessation of testing by the U.S. side, it is
still a step in the right direction. We are ready to
continue talks on this problem. All the more so as in
1987 the United States and the USSR pledged to hold
talks on radical reductions in nuclear tests right down to
their total cessation. We would, on the whole, welcome
these steps by the U.S. Administration.”

German CDU Official Cited on Nuclear Arms
Policies
PM3010100491 Moscow KRAASNAYA ZVEZDA

[By Major E. Fedoseyev: “Ukrainian Delegations
Expected in Bonn”]

[Text] B. Wilz, chairman of the defense policy working
party of the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/
Christian Social Union] faction in the FRG Bundestag,
who is in our country to exchange information on
questions of security policy, gave a press conference
yesterday at the FRG Embassy in the USSR.

During his visit B. Wilz was given the opportunity to
meet with USSR Defense Minister Marshal of Aviation
Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov. During the talk, they discussed
questions of mutual interest, including the process of
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany. B. Wilz
noted with satisfaction that the withdrawal is proceeding
strictly on schedule.
At the same time he voiced the German side's concern over the present situation in the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces and the associated possibility of nuclear weapons being spread around the sovereign republics. The Ukraine's position is the subject of particular attention in Bonn. Ukrainian delegations from the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs are expected in the FRG next week, and the German side hopes that they will clarify their government's position.

B. Wilz then answered questions from Soviet and foreign journalists. In particular, at the request of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent, he commented on an interview in the magazine DER SPIEGEL with K. Naumann, general inspector of the Bundeswehr, who advocates keeping a certain quantity of nuclear weapons on German territory.

In this case, B. Wilz said, it is a question of air-launched nuclear weapons. But the German side provides only the delivery vehicles. The nuclear weapons themselves are under the control of the American side alone.

As for land-based nuclear weapons, B. Wilz reaffirmed Germany's total renunciation of the possession of these weapons. But the question of the siting of nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO countries is still under discussion, and the responsibility for decisions today rests with the NATO nuclear planning group.

U.S. Thinking on Arms Reductions Viewed
PM0411114791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Oct 91 Single Edition p 3

[G. Kostenko article: "Sensible and Useful Opinions—USSR and U.S. Mutual Initiatives in the Sphere of Nuclear Disarmament Are Discussed"]

[Text] It is almost a month since the new U.S. and USSR initiatives in the sphere of nuclear disarmament were revealed. Throughout this time there has been a lively discussion in the U.S. Congress, in scientific and social circles, and, of course, in the U.S. media both on G. Bush and M. Gorbachev's actual statements about these initiatives and on the consequences they are bound to entail. An evaluation of the overall picture and the basic positions in this discussion is undoubtedly of great interest.

Above all it is unanimously acknowledged that there has been an appreciable change in direction in the two great powers' efforts: Today, their common task is not simply to reduce nuclear danger but to eradicate it. Given the changes taking place in the world and in Europe in particular, even such extremely conservative experts as K. Adelman, for example, are no longer relegating the achievement of this aim to the realm of fantasy. At the same time, the U.S. press highlights not just the broad coincidence of each side's position but also the differences between them on several specific questions.

The general view is that positions coincide to the greatest degree on the question of eliminating tactical nuclear weapons. Today, Washington believes that on a practical level tactical nuclear forces have lost their former significance. From a purely military viewpoint, their functions can be executed fully by the new "smart" conventional arms systems. Nevertheless, there is an insistent proposal in conservative circles to seek out an opportunity for agreeing with the Soviet Union on "certain exceptions" to the ban on ground-launched tactical nuclear systems. In this case, a "guarantee reserve" of such systems located on U.S. territory would serve for the United States and its allies as an argument for preserving (in modified form) NATO's "flexible response" strategy.

The fact that air-launched tactical nuclear weapons are being maintained in a combat-ready state in Europe against the backdrop of the widely-publicized withdrawal and partial destruction of ground-launched and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons has not gone unnoticed by observers. Although it follows from press reports citing a Pentagon representative that the administration has not yet dismissed the more far-reaching Soviet idea of storing this category of nuclear munitions at central storage bases.

Nevertheless, the preservation—even if only in part—of such weapons (the press gives a current figure of between 900 and 1,300 U.S. nuclear aerial bombs located at bases in European countries—Belgium, Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey) is "justified" on two counts. First, these weapons may be necessary to U.S. troops in Europe as a traditional "nuclear umbrella." Second, some people believe that the complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe would mean that Britain and France would have to become more actively committed to the process of maintaining their own nuclear arsenals.

As for the U.S.-proposed option for reducing strategic arms via a ban on MIRV'd ICBM's, many specialists evaluate this as politically lame. This option clearly ignores understandable Soviet concerns about the concentration of the bulk of U.S. nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles launched from submarines and heavy bombers. In this case, the U.S. initiative would mainly be implemented at the expense of the Soviet side's arms and in addition would create tremendous difficulties for the latter on an economic and technical level. It is recognized that the Soviet proposals in this field are deeper and broader in scope than the U.S. proposals and that their implementation would increase stability and promote radical mutual reductions in the levels of offensive weapons.

Many press organs stress that it would be in both USSR and U.S. interests to delay modernization of both sides' nuclear forces. The cuts in military expenditure being implemented in these countries have already begun to have a restraining influence on these processes. Measures aimed at preventing so-called "invisible modernization" through the large-scale replacement of nuclear munitions by more up-to-date missiles and aircraft would also contribute to genuine restraint in the modernization of
forces. The Soviet Union's proposed moratorium on nuclear testing pursues precisely this aim.

It is recognized by literally everyone that the problem of controlling nuclear weapons and preventing their unsanctioned use has become an important aspect in the matter of limiting nuclear danger. U.S. proposals regarding cooperation in this sphere as well as in the matter of eliminating nuclear weapons open up a new and promising area in Soviet-U.S. cooperation. "We have much to talk about in the field of reducing the risk of a nuclear strike," Senator S. Nunn said. At the same time, it would be natural to formulate the question in such a way as to involve the other nuclear powers—Britain, France, China—in this cooperation.

There is widespread discussion on the problem of the pace of progress toward a nuclear-free world, which more often than not is seen as insufficient. The fact is that the anticipated destruction of 3,000 nuclear devices (basically already totally unnecessary) out of over 22,000 belonging to the United States—according to information from AP—does not constitute such a qualitative achievement.

The prospects for dialogue on joint efforts to guarantee protection against missile attack are viewed without particular optimism. Likewise, the proposal to create a nonnuclear ABM defense system based on the U.S. GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strike) project is evaluated in the press as far from acceptable to the Soviet side. Its implementation would require rescinding the existing ABM Treaty and developing space weapons, thus reducing the effectiveness of Soviet strategic offensive arms to a far greater extent than that of U.S. strategic offensive arms. The possibility of transferring state-of-the-art space-based ABM technology to other countries is considered unrealistic in practice.

In this connection, the view that it would be most rational to adopt a new approach to the problems of reciprocal guarantees for protection against missile attack is expressed. Here, the first step could be to define the character and parameters of possible threats to security from third countries at special consultations between Soviet and U.S. specialists. Later it would be possible to agree on consensus measures, including political, economic, and military measures, in the event of a possible attack.

There is also some degree of interest as to when the ideas—which are clearly sensible on the whole—will become elements of official Soviet-U.S. dialogue. The Madrid meeting between the USSR and U.S. Presidents is first-hand proof that such dialogue continues to widen and deepen.

U.S.-Soviet Global Stability Talks Previewed

OW3110174291 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1458 GMT 31 Oct 91

[""Diplomatic Panorama" report by Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshnev; transmitted via KYODO]
the idea of unified armed forces when "both the nuclear button and the operative command of troops will be in one hand". [passage omitted]

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Delays, Demands in Force Withdrawals From Baltics

Baltic Fleet Commander Comments
PM2110095791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Oct 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel A. Ranevskiy, Captain Second Rank V. Gromak, and Captain Second Rank V. Urban: "Troops in the Baltic: Will We Withdraw to Previously Prepared Borders?"]

[Excerpt] Despite the fact that the USSR Defense Ministry leadership has already repeatedly stated that the Soviet troops can be withdrawn from the Baltic states only after 1994, passions continue to seethe. The situation has become particularly aggravated in the military collectives since the statement by the Baltic Council that troops should be withdrawn from the capitals of the independent republics by 1 December.

How is the situation taking shape now? What is the forecast?

Commanders' Opinion

A deadline of 1 December has been called unrealistic by Lieutenant General V. Mironov, commander of the Baltic Military District. He also stressed that all questions connected with the withdrawal of the troops should be resolved in the process of interstate talks. But until they have begun we can expect new statements from our "old opponents."

Vice Admiral V. Yegorov, commander of the Baltic Fleet, agrees with this in principle. Here is what he said, in particular, to our correspondent:

"We cannot fail to respect the will of the Baltic states. But it is obvious that we must also consider something else: the interests of our state and the interests of the Armed Forces and the fleet in particular. And we have the right to count on understanding for these interests and for our problems. The fate of the fleet should obviously be decided within the framework of interstate agreements concluded on the basis of the principles of equality, respect for state sovereignty, mutual understanding, and mutual interest in preserving a broad perspective of vital relations.

"So far an agreement has been signed between the USSR Defense Ministry and the Estonian Republic Government on priority measures for the solution of questions connected with the presence of the contingent of USSR Armed Forces on the territory of the Estonian Republic. According to this agreement, by 3 November the deadline and procedure will have been established for the withdrawal of the motorized units, Air Force and air defense units, and military units redeployed from East Europe. It is clear from a statement by Estonian Government press secretary Sergej Chernov that as regards the Naval Forces the schedule will be worked out separately, since they are relatively autonomous compared with the other Armed Forces. The status of the USSR Armed Forces on the territory of the Estonian Republic will also be determined within a month." [passage omitted]

Lithuania Demands 'Immediate Withdrawal'
LD3110211491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 31 Oct 91

[Text] On 31 October the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania sent a note to the Soviet Union's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The note states that the most important task in the process of regulating relations between the Republic of Lithuania and the Soviet Union is the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet Army from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. This was unequivocally expressed in the 27 August resolution of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania as well as in the 25 October statement of the Baltic Council.

The note states that the residents of Lithuania have demanded more than once that the occupation of the Baltic states be stopped and the Soviet forces withdrawn. As long ago as October 1989, one and a half million signatures were collected in Lithuania demanding the Soviet withdrawal and were sent to the Soviet Government and the UN secretary general.

The stay of the Soviet Army in Lithuania has no juridical basis and is absolutely intolerable in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Lithuania. The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, expressing the will of its citizens, demands that the Army be withdrawn without delay. It expects that the Army withdrawal will help to establish good-neighborly relations between the two states.

Further Report
LD0311152391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1422 GMT 3 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius, 3 Nov (TASS)—It has been announced by Lithuanian Radio today that the Republic of Lithuania's Foreign Ministry has sent a note to the USSR Foreign Ministry. It states in particular that the process of regulating relations between the Lithuanian Republic and the USSR is an extremely important task, and that the key question here is the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Lithuania.
The document also underlines that the inhabitants of Lithuania have repeatedly demanded an end to the occupation of the Baltic countries and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of the republic, as their deployment there has absolutely no legal basis. “The government of the Republic of Lithuania, in expressing the will of its citizens, demands the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces, and hopes that this will help to create good-neighborly relations,” the note points out.

Officers Note ‘Sociodomestic’ Problems
LD0211023991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0035 GMT 2 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Biryukov]

[Text] Baltiysk (Kaliningrad Oblast), 2 Nov (TASS)—USSR Armed Forces subunits will not leave Baltic territory until normal sociodomestic conditions are created for them at the new places where they are stationed. Representatives of officers’ assemblies of military units and of workers collectives of Defense Ministry enterprises situated in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia stated this at a meeting with USSR and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) people’s deputies.

The appeal to the presidents of the country and of the RSFSR and to political leaders of the Baltic states says that the planned withdrawal of units of the Baltic Fleet, of land and border troops, and of antimissile defense subunits should be carried out only after these problems have been resolved and after a law on the status of the Russian-speaking population living in the Baltic republics has been adopted. The participants in the assembly elected a coordination council (koordinatsionny sovet) which intends to represent the interests of servicemen at the forthcoming talks on this question.

Further Report
LD0311112691 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Russian 1300 GMT 2 Nov 91

[Text] Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast—Until normal social and living conditions in the new areas of deployment are created, the units of the Soviet Armed Forces will not leave the Baltic territory. This has been stated at a meeting with the deputies of the USSR and the Russian Federation by representatives of the officers’ meetings, military units, and the workers’ collectives of the enterprises under the Ministry of Defense situated on the territories of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

In addition, an appeal to the presidents of the country and of Russia, and to political leaders in the Baltic countries states that the intended withdrawal of the Baltic Fleet units, land, and border troops, and the anti-aircraft defense units must take place only after resolving these problems and after the adoption of a law on the status of the Russian-speaking population residing in the Baltic Republics.

The participants in the meeting elected a coordinating council which intends to represent the interests of the military at the coming negotiations on this issue.

We wish to recall here that similar statements have been adopted by the officers of the Vilnius and Kaunas garrisons. At the same time Marshal Shaposhnikov, USSR defense minister, has categorically stated that the forces would be withdrawn and, according to an agreement, as we have already reported, the withdrawal of airborne troops from Estonia will start on 3 November.

Withdrawal From Estonia To Begin 3 Nov
LD0211071991 Moscow TASS in English 0807 GMT 1 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow November 1 TASS—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Estonia begins on November 3. Paratroop units will leave the cities of Vyu and Viljandi, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA newspaper reports today.

Lieutenant-General Bobryshev, chief of staff of the Baltic Military District, visited Vyu to sort out the dissolution and withdrawal of the battalion stationed there. “All work goes according to schedule,” he told the newspaper’s correspondent.

The Estonian Government, as is seen from the statement by its press secretary Chernov, insists that most Soviet troops will be home by the end of 1992.

Airborne Troops Start To Leave
OW0611203391 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1931 GMT 6 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Estonian newspaper “POSTIMEES” reports that on November 5th 16 combat vehicles of a Soviet airborne unit stationed in the village of Nuris near the town of Voru in the southern Estonia were dispatched by railroad back to the Soviet Union.

Some soldiers of the unit were demobilized, the rest joined other units of the Baltic Military District.

The Voru airborne force is one of the two units which Soviet Defense Minister Evgeniy Shaposhnikov pledged to withdraw from Estonia by November 3rd.

In an interview with BF [BALTFAX] Rubert Sinimegi, a spokesman for the Estonian State and Border Protection Ministry, expressed concern over the unsettled state of the Soviet Army units changing their location. As he put it: “Probably, in a month or two Russia may face an acute situation similar to that in 1917....”
Dissatisfaction With Disposal of Military Assets in Germany
LD2310001591 Hamburg DPA in German
1933 GMT 22 Oct 91

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Soviet Union is dissatisfied with the results so far in the attempt to auction off the assets of their Armed Forces still stationed in Germany. The construction of apartments for Soviet soldiers returning from Germany is also not yet satisfactory for Moscow. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn announced this this evening after a session of the joint commission for the return of Soviet troops was held in Berlin. This could “have negative repercussions on the well-ordered withdrawal of Soviet troops,” Moscow’s representative on the commission said.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also said the German side had referred to the fact that the liquidation of “fixed assets” was being carried out under market conditions and was only possible if the Soviet Union accepted appropriate prices. With respect to housing construction, the German side has completely fulfilled its commitments. In addition, there is no legal connection here with the withdrawal.

The commission agreed that up to now the withdrawal was on schedule. So far, 140,000 army personnel have returned. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also announced that the Soviet side had reported to the commission “the complete withdrawal of Soviet nuclear ammunition.” Moscow’s representatives also expressed their concern at the “increase in illegal acts” against Soviet military personnel and their families.

Grinevskiy Cited on CSBM, CFE Talks
LD2210104591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Oct 91 p 4

[Report by correspondent I. Melnikov: “‘All Animals Are Equal... How Orwell Is Being Quoted at Disarmament Talks’”]

[Excerpt] One more round of the Vienna talks—both those at which confidence-building measures [CSBM] are being worked out and those which are discussing ways of reducing conventional arms in Europe [CFE]—has come to an end.

The participants in the former talks at the end of the fall round were obliged to admit self-critically that their achievements are not commensurate with the recent disarmament initiatives put forward by the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union. The only hopeful point is that headway has been made in Vienna in creating a network of direct communications among the CSCE states. As for the main task—preparing a new package of “confidence-building measures” for the “Helsinki-2” meeting (it is scheduled for March 1992)—here there is still a lot to do.

But what happened at the latter talks? Oleg Grinevskiy, the head of the Soviet delegation, is convinced that there is headway on the main salient—in the elaboration of an agreement on the limitation of the numerical strength of personnel. Virtually all states submitted figures for the numerical strength of their armed forces and gave explanations for these figures. The coinciding elements in structures became clearer, as did existing differences.

Some things were clarified also in vexed issues. For instance, in the establishment of the rule of sufficiency. The opinion has strengthened in the Soviet delegation that the partners have given serious thought to the practical applicability of this idea. How to ensure that national limitation levels accord with the universally recognized principle of defense sufficiency? And how to ensure precisely that the formula of sufficiency for some does not result in overarmament for others. [passage omitted]

Ladygin on CSCE Military Doctrine Seminar
924P0006A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Oct 91 First edition p 3

[Interview with Lt. Gen. F. Ladygin, member of the Soviet delegation to the CSCE seminar in Vienna]

[Text] In the Austrian capital, a seminar has concluded on the military doctrines of the representative states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Immediately after the end of the seminar, its participant and member of the Soviet delegation Lt. Gen. F. Ladygin gave an interview for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What do you think, Fedor Ivanovich, can it be said that the recent forum was a new step on the way to strengthening trust among the states participating in the CSCE?

[Ladygin] I am convinced that the second seminar on military doctrines was indeed a new step in strengthening trust among the states in the CSCE process.

The seminar took place under the conditions of fundamental changes in the situation on the European continent and in the world as a whole. Its characteristic feature in comparison, let us say, with the first such measure, which took place almost 2 years ago in Vienna as well, was the noticeable convergence of the approaches of different countries to the assessment of the military-political situation in Europe, the nature of the potential threats to its security, and the prospects for the development of cooperation in the interests of strengthening peace and stability on the continent. The information that was shared by the participants in the seminar on questions of the evolution of the military doctrines of their countries and changes in the structure and preparation of the armed forces was complete, frank, and specific.
All of this was a consequence and a confirmation of the qualitatively new nature of the relationships between the participating states both in the political and in the military areas.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What, in the assessment of the participants in the seminar, is the primary threat to security in Europe at this time?

[Ladygin] Practically all of the participants in the seminar recognized that the main threat to security in Europe under the new conditions is crises and local conflicts on the basis of territorial, interethnic, religious, and other contradictions. In the opinion of representatives of a number of Western countries, crises and local conflicts beyond the borders of Europe also may have a negative impact on the stability and security of our continent.

A number of factors were named at the seminar and in the course of bilateral discussions as measures to strengthen stability and security—the further development of the CSCE process and the reduction of military potentials, more openness, and the strengthening and development of all-European structures for collective security, in particular an expansion of the competence and possibilities of the Conflict Prevention Center.

At the same time, representatives of many NATO countries and East European states came out in favor of preserving the North Atlantic Alliance as the “guarantor of stability and security in Europe” and strengthening the role of the EC and West European Union in conjunction with the CSCE process.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Fedor Ivanovich, I would like to hear from you what the reaction of the participants in the seminar was to the initiatives of the presidents of the USSR and United States in the nuclear arms area.

[Ladygin] These initiatives were highly valued by all the participants in the seminar. It was stressed that their implementation will lead to a dramatic reduction of the arsenal of nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe and will make a major new contribution to the process of the further stabilization of the military-political situation and strengthening of security in Europe and throughout the world. It was noted in particular that the reciprocal unilateral steps of the USSR and United States signify a qualitatively new nature of their mutual relations, including in the disarmament area.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It is well known that different views were expressed in the seminar. What new features in the strategic military thinking of the representatives of the West did you notice in particular?

[Ladygin] A full assessment of the changes would require an in-depth analysis of the materials of the seminar. Provisionally, for example, it can be said that the NATO countries are stressing the establishment and improvement of numerically relatively small but well-equipped rapid-reaction forces that must possess a high degree of combat effectiveness and readiness and mobility. They are intended for use on the European continent as well as beyond its borders in the event of crises and local conflicts that represent a threat to the security of Europe. There are also plans to raise the mobility and combat effectiveness of the so-called “basic forces” intended for combat operations in Europe as well as for the buildup of forces in the course of possible combat operations in other regions. More attention is being paid to reserves and possibilities for mobilization.

In the course of the seminar, the question was raised of the contradiction between the tendencies toward the development of armed forces and the disarmament process. The concern was expressed that along with the reductions of arms and armed forces their combat effectiveness and mobility were being raised and their structure and technical equipment were being improved, making possible the preservation or even increase of military potentials.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA are interested in how the participants in the seminar related to the information of the Soviet delegation on the reform of our armed forces.

[Ladygin] With great interest and attention. They expressed their firm support of the course of maintaining unified armed forces of a renewed union. They especially stressed the importance of keeping the nuclear forces under the strict command and control of the center. In particular, great interest was also shown in such matters as the transition to mixed principles for the manning of the armed forces, the reduction of the time of military service, the strengthening of the unified command of strategic nuclear forces, and the inclusion of strategic defensive forces in a single branch of service.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Fedor Ivanovich, is the Soviet delegation satisfied with the past seminar? What are the plans for the future?

[Ladygin] All of those participating in the seminar gave it high marks. The discussions and debates held at the official sessions as well as in the course of numerous bilateral meetings were characterized by frankness and constructiveness and by a lack of elements of confrontation.

There was unanimous recognition of the success of the forum and a common understanding of the necessity of continuing the practice of such seminars. They essentially agreed that it at future meetings it would be advisable to examine more specific questions of interest to all the participants.

In particular, the representatives of a number of countries proposed a more detailed examination of the problem of defensive sufficiency, the conversion of military production, and other matters.
U.S. Requests CSBM Inspection in Carpathia
PM3010145591 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda
in Russian 29 Oct 91 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report under the general heading "Official Chronicle"]


The U.S. request on the holding of an inspection has been granted. An inspection group comprising four representatives of the U.S. Armed Forces arrived in Lvov 27 October this year, and will conduct an inspection in the region in question 28-30 October this year.

CSBM Talks Said Entering 'Decisive Stage'
LD0611144891 Moscow TASS in English 1438 GMT 6 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna November 6 TASS—The current session of the negotiations on confidence-building measures and security [CSBM] in Europe ought to be a decisive stage in the elaboration of a new document on confidence-building measures and security on the continent, which is to be submitted to the forthcoming CSCE summit in Helsinki, scheduled for the spring of 1992. This conviction was expressed by many speakers, who took the floor at the plenary meeting of the 38-nation CSCE forum, held today in the Austrian capital.

A substantial foundation has already been laid for further progress. The contours of the future package of measures are becoming increasingly visible. They envisage various restrictions, exchanges of information on temporary deployment of non-regular military formations, expansion of military information, and status of the CSCE communications network. Agreement has already been reached on the last problem, while there is sufficient mutual understanding on other groups of problems, facilitating their complete solution.

The mentioned restrictions contribute most of all to the elaboration of a new set of confidence-building measures, actually envisaging a reform of the armed forces of member-states, primarily the compulsory reduction of their activities to comparatively low levels. So far this refers only to the ground forces, but it is not ruled out that this first step will be a sort of springboard and will eventually allow the restriction of the scope of military activities by other types of conventional armed forces—navies and aviation. As a matter of fact, the Soviet delegation has always advocated and continues to advocate such a restriction.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Journalists' Visit to Semipalatinsk Detailed
PM2310140791 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 18 Oct 91

[Report by correspondent G. Fadeyeva and cameraman D. Britikov from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Now another anniversary. Tomorrow it is two years since the last explosion was carried out at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range, in existence since 1947. This test site was closed down by Kazakh President Nazarbayev's 29 August decree. "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" antinuclear activists succeeded in getting authorization for Soviet and foreign journalists to visit the test site to study the environmental situation in Semipalatinsk Oblast. A "Vesti" film crew was among them.

[Fadeyeva] It was here in 1949 that our country's first nuclear mushroom cloud appeared, a sight with which we are so familiar from photographs of Hiroshima. But the total nuclear yield in Kazakhstan was 2,500 times higher than at Hiroshima. The USSR's first hydrogen bomb—a bomb developed with Academician Sakharov's guidance—was exploded on this very spot in 1952 to compare the size of the crater. Foreign correspondents had their own geiger counters. In some places their readings were 400 times above the norm. The test site covers an area of 16,000 square kilometers in direct proximity to more than a dozen population centers. So, livestock graze here and hay is mown here. We cannot provide documentary footage of this since cameramen were forbidden to film from the bus.

Why do the people living here mow this grass?

[M. Brodskiy, deputy chairman of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement] Where can they mow grass? On the moon? Where else can they mow? It's their land. They've endured these conditions here. The inhabitants have gotten used to it. And they don't even remember it any more. They only remember when something irremediable happens, when someone falls ill, when someone dies. No analysis is carried out here.

[Fadeyeva] "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" activists aim to get Kazakhstan, like Chernobyl, declared an environmental disaster area. Last year the government allocated money for compensation for the damage. Each victim received four-five rubles [figure as heard].

Yeltsin Decree on Ending Tests
LD2910120791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 29 Oct 91

[Text] We have received in our office an instruction from the president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] on ending tests of nuclear weapons at the Novaya Zemlya testing ground. We had
reported this news on the basis of summaries from various news agencies, but now I have it in front of me in full. The decree states:

In support of the initiative of U.S. President George Bush and USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, proceeding from our desire for a complete end to nuclear tests and considering numerous appeals from local authoritative bodies and from citizens of the Russian Federation, I hereby decree:

1. A one-year moratorium is to be introduced on conducting nuclear tests in the Russian Federation;

2. The Novaya Zemlya archipelago testing ground is no longer to be used for nuclear tests;

3. The RSFSR Council of Ministers, by 1 December 1991, is to propose provisional measures for utilizing the scientific and technical potential of the Novaya Zemlya testing ground; and

4. The RSFSR Council of Ministers is to ensure social welfare measures for servicemen made redundant following the cessation of operations at the testing ground.

The decree is dated 26 October 1991 and signed by RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin.

[ MOSCOW ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA’s First Edition in Russian on 30 October on its front page publishes the text of this decree. The ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA version is identical except it omits the first paragraph and begins with “In support of...”.

[ The third point of the decree in the version published by the paper reads:

[“3. The RSFSR Council of Ministers, by 1 December 1991, is to propose measures for utilizing the scientific and technical potential of the Novaya Zemlya testing ground and the specialists employed there for civic purposes; and”]

Novaya Zemlya Test Site: Past, Prospects
924P0015A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Oct 91 Union Edition p 7


[Text] Arkhangelsk—On instructions from President B. Yeltsin a ban for one year has been imposed on nuclear tests on the territory of Russia. M. Gorbachev has proclaimed a one-year moratorium on thermonuclear explosions. And what comes afterwards? What is the fate that awaits the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site and the Russian North?

Exactly one year ago the last—the 132d—nuclear explosion was heard on Novaya Zemlya. It has already become history. But today, alarming new facts are being presented: an accident aboard a nuclear submarine in the White Sea, nuclear graveyards around Novaya Zemlya, the archipelago that is the country’s only nuclear test site. Perhaps this is all too much for wounded Nature in the North?

The accident aboard the nuclear submarine occurred late in September during a training launch of a solid-fuel missile in the area where training launches are conducted. To judge from the official statements, none of the crew was injured and there was no accidental spillage into the sea. The chief of staff of the Belomorsk Flotilla, Admiral N. Pakhomov, claims that “no harm was done to people, the sea, or animals.”

There is no reason not to believe this almost ideal picture, although some lines (and quite significant ones) have not been filled in. Why, for example, did the public learn about what had happened only some days later, and not from official sources but almost by chance, through rumors?

“I personally learned about the accident only on 2 October, from the local newspapers,” the chief of the Arkhangelsk administration, P. Balakshin, told me. “I immediately contacted Admiral Chernavin, and he assured me that nothing serious had occurred.”

But a map of the burial sites on Novaya Zemlya was published recently. It was passed to journalists at a briefing in Moscow by USSR People’s Deputy A. Zolotkov.

The map shows all the gulfs and bays on the northern archipelago, and also the regions of the Kara Sea, where ships of the Murmansk Steamship Line have been dumping radioactive waste over the past two decades. This report literally stunned readers, since for many years the experts have been claiming that there are no nuclear burial sites in the northern seas. It turns out that this was untrue.

By studying the shipping documents the people’s deputy was able to reveal secret trips and the nature of the cargo. Some 11,000 containers with equipment from nuclear reactors, radioactive structures, concrete blocks, and other dangerous waste lie at the bottom of the sea and have perhaps already been eroded by the active sea water. The content of the containers was not vitrified or encased in concrete or bitumen before it was dumped...

Naturally, all of this was done in secret, behind the backs not only of ordinary Northerners, whose opinion the military has never considered, but also the local environmental organizations, and even the oblast leadership. The local authorities learned about the presence of nuclear burial sites around Novaya Zemlya only from the newspapers.

We involuntarily think of the last nuclear explosion that thundered across Novaya Zemlya exactly a year ago, and caused a great deal of noise. In Arkhangelsk they learned about it from a TASS report, even though on the day before, at a meeting with USSR people’s deputies from the northern territories with the leadership of the test
site, it had been agreed that the local authorities would be notified in advance of the time of the upcoming test. An attempt had been made by the people of Novaya Zemlya to communicate with neighboring regions, but the mechanism used to notify them was not working, and force of habit was stronger than the agreement, so that again the nuclear explosion was a surprise.

So what occurred aboard the nuclear submarine in the White Sea, and how safe is the radiation situation around the burial sites round Novaya Zemlya, and what is the program for further nuclear tests at the northern test site? For it was not a reserve, or backup site, as some representatives depicted it earlier.

In terms of total yield in all tests (87 in the atmosphere, three underwater, and 42 underground), the test site in the Arctic beats all world records. The most intensive periods of testing on Novaya Zemlya were in 1958 (26 explosions in the atmosphere and one underwater), and in 1961 and 1962 (24 and 36 tests respectively, all in the atmosphere). And the aggregate expressed in TNT equivalents from the fission alone exceeds 90 megatons.

No existing or former test site in the world has been subjected to such a colossal load. In 1961-1962, when the nuclear powers were engaged in a senseless race, a real nuclear bacchanalia got under way in the Arctic as one atmospheric test succeeded another. On 30 October 1961 the most powerful nuclear explosion, with a yield of 58 megatons, was set off above the archipelago. Seven of the most powerful explosions on Novaya Zemlya during that period were equal to the yields of all the other atmospheric tests conducted by all the other nuclear powers during the period 1945 through 1980...

These figures never appeared in the Soviet press. They have been generalized on the basis of many foreign sources by USSR People’s Deputy Aleksandr Yemelyanenkov and Candidate of Technical Sciences Vladimir Yakimets, adviser to the president of the “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” antinuclear movement. The conclusion that begs itself is this: The Northern archipelago and the neighboring territory has already been subjected to dangerous ecological risk, and a serious scientific research study should be made of it.

Last week I was at the test site in Semipalatinsk. At particular places, for example, at the site of the first thermonuclear or “Sakharov” explosion, the instruments showed a radiation background hundreds of times higher than the natural radiation background, even though in the opinion of the military it is quite safe. But what can be said about the northern archipelago, where the most powerful atmospheric tests were conducted?

Today, all eyes have been turned to Novaya Zemlya. The one-year moratorium proclaimed by USSR President M. Gorbachev and the ukase of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic President B. Yeltsin give grounds for hope that in the coming months there will be no explosions. But what then? What will be the military’s subsequent attitude toward the territory?

The head of the Arkhangelsk administration, P. Balakshin, has sent M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin a telegram which, in addition to the natural dissatisfaction with the latest events, contains a demand for a study of the situation and the transfer of relations between the territory and the military onto a firm legal footing. Preparations are now under way for a session of the oblast Council on the Ecology, where these issues will be voiced, it is suggested, even more sharply.

The traditional doggedness of our military and their desire to reach compromises only when they will not “forgo principles,” which has been used in the past but is no longer possible, is sometimes surprising.

At Semipalatinsk they moved to meet the public only when it became clear that under pressure from antinuclear sentiments the site would have to be closed down. This can also be expected on Novaya Zemlya if the military’s attitude toward the territory continues to remain the same. There are no anti-Army movements in the North, but having assumed (at least for the time being) the entire burden of nuclear testing, this previously quiet region is ready to take up the baton of stormy antinuclear actions. As in Semipalatinsk, they do not want to have to experience the nuclear fear, and they want to know the truth about the test site.

It is now extremely important to determine whether or not Russia wants to remain at the test site in order to maintain the country’s nuclear potential at the level needed for military parity. If the republic Supreme Soviet decides that it does, then it would be necessary immediately to work out and legitimize the legal relationship between the territory and the military, and the interests of the former should be considered unconditionally and absolutely, otherwise no one will tolerate the test site on his own territory.

It is also possible to understand the military, who ensure nuclear combat capability and now find themselves in an indeterminate kind of situation: On the one hand antinuclear sentiments are gathering strength and demands are heard to close down the test sites, while on the other there is a confirmed nuclear program that as military people they must pursue. This is why it would seem extremely necessary for the USSR Supreme Soviet to pass a law on nuclear testing, while on the basis of the Russian parliament, the legal status of the test site could be defined.

The Northerners are patient. This is also being confirmed now, when alarming facts are being reported from all sides. But everything has its limits, the more so when these facts are truly alarming. An antinuclear movement is gathering strength here and there is talk of the demilitarization of the northern seas, which are saturated with weapons and dangerous waste. Demands are being heard for an investigation by deputies of the causes and consequences of the accident aboard the submarine in the White Sea, with subsequent publication of all the figures in the press. The region is waking up...
Future of Novaya Zemlya Test Site Viewed
PM0611120991 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Nov 91 First Edition p 7

[Vladimir Anufriyev report: "On Banning Nuclear Tests on Novaya Zemlya"]

[Excerpts] There will be no nuclear tests at the Novaya Zemlya range in the Arctic archipelago for at least another year. That has been announced by the presidents of the USSR and Russia. There is information that the northern test range has been completely closed.

As your TASS correspondent was told at the Arkhangelsk Oblast Administration's Defense Industry Department, the official text of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] President Boris Yeltsin's 26 October order on the moratorium on nuclear explosions on the republic's territory has not been received yet. According to the available information, however, this document not only sets a one-year ban on testing but also directs that the range's activity be completely halted and that measures be elaborated to ensure the further use of its scientific and industrial potential and servicemen's social protection. [passage omitted]

Territorially Novaya Zemlya belongs to Arkhangelsk Oblast. Until now, however, this ownership has been purely formal. All the institutions of civilian power on the archipelago were closed in the mid-fifties, and since then the military have held boundless sway there. How zealously they treat the extremely vulnerable natural life of the Arctic can be judged from the sensational statistics published by Murmansk USSR People's Deputy A. Zolotkov.

It turns out that radioactive waste has been dumped in the sea off the archipelago for over 20 years. At least 11,000 containers full of nuclear reactor equipment, radioactive structures, and other hazardous "garbage" lies without secure containment in shallow waters. This barbaric practice was a secret not only from ordinary people in the north but also the oblast leadership.

The new oblast soviet decided to restore its jurisdiction over the Arctic islands, but it received a sharp rebuff from the USSR Defense Ministry General Staff authorized by its former chief, Moiseyev. There is no civilian population on Novaya Zemlya, consequently all decisions are made by the military command, and the creation of an oblast soviet will confuse the finely tuned mechanism of power structures.

Nevertheless, the oblast soviet has no intention of backing down. Its chairman, Yu. Guskov, repeatedly stressed that he will not tolerate the exclusion of such a vast and wealthy territory from the oblast's economy.

Everything connected with Novaya Zemlya is surrounded by a veil of secrecy. Nevertheless, your TASS correspondent has found out that Arkhangelsk geologists have detected deposits of copper running to millions of tonnes on the archipelago.

There is a current opinion that the northern test range is just a backup site, but that is not true. According to information cited by USSR People's Deputy A. Yemelyanenkov, the total yield of the 132 charges detonated there considerably exceeds the total yield of the 467 explosions at the Semipalatinsk range. Just seven of the 56 overground tests at Novaya Zemlya are comparable in yield to all the known explosions in the atmosphere by the remaining nuclear powers in the entire period of tests since 1945!

In 1961, a hydrogen bomb with a yield of 58.5 megatones, the most powerful hydrogen bomb in the history of tests, was detonated above Novaya Zemlya. Eyewitnesses testify to how grotesque the force of the explosion was. The shock wave shattered glass in houses at Dikson, 700 km from the range. The medical, biological, and genetic consequences of thermonuclear explosions in the atmosphere, specialists believe, will affect the region for the next 5,600 years.

The protest against the continuation of nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya is assuming increasingly well organized forms in northern Arkhangelsk Oblast. The oblast's leadership unambiguously said "no" to increasing tests in connection with the closure of the Semipalatinsk range. Under pressure from the "Novaya Zemlya-Nevada" nongovernmental organization, radiological monitoring of the territory of the Far North has been established, and installations at the range have been visited by representatives of the local authorities, the public, and the press.

"K Novoy Zemle," a new antinuclear movement, has scheduled its organizational conference for 17 November in Arkhangelsk. Its aim is to end nuclear weapon tests on Novaya Zemlya and worldwide. The new movement intends to unite all antinuclear forces in Russia.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Scientist Criticizes Progress in Converting CW Plants
924P00017A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 10 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by V. Mirzayanov, doctor of chemical sciences, under "Politics" rubric: "Inversion"]

[Text] Key workers of the military-industrial complex love to talk about conversion. It is fashionable subject. In fact, however, the huge monster continues to gobble up the economy. Chemists call this process something else—inversion.

When our press reports on the successes of enterprises of the military-industrial complex in conversion and about the great advantages that it promises us, this is often reminiscent of analogous reports in the recent past about successes in the century's construction projects. It is
good thing that no one then or now checked into this and it is hardly likely that anyone will. They simply will not allow it and that is all there is to it.

Who? That same elite of the military-industrial complex, which has by no means been rendered harmless. All-powerful directors with their loyal crews still rule in the direct sense of the word at the head of numerous enterprises and research institutes without control by anyone. So just as before, they take revenge for initiative and dissent.

Even today, the first, second, and third sections are headed by KGB officers and exercise continuous control over workers. The same barbed wire along the fence, entranceways with ensigns, special procurator's office, special police, special court, and center for listening in on telephone conversations with obedient trade union committees dependable ensure the unlimited power of directors, who with any attempt to show independence or dissent will always find the necessary kompromat for the moral destruction of the undesirable worker. And when they throw him out, the unfortunate person will not find any profitable work in the country and especially not abroad, for they will not let him go on account of his knowledge of secrets.

With the coming of B. Bakatin to the KGB, there was no change in the position of workers at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex and it hardly seems likely that there will be. I can assert this using the example of my own “mail box,” which was located practically in the center of Moscow and is a secret facility more for those naïve Muscovites who for decades did not suspect that is was killing them with real toxic substances and is still a deadly danger today. A for the West.... In connection with the organization of the first exhibition of abstractionist artists in the USSR in the fall of 1967 in the club “Friendship” that belonged to this “mail box”, the radio station BBC called the enterprise a factory of death.

In the sixth year of perestroika, when the convention on the banning of chemical weapons was practically ready and the United States and other countries had ceased to develop them, the press initiated a full-scale campaign for conversion and our director, V. Petrunin, declared at the end of 1990 that the “nature of capitalism had not changed, our potential enemy remains the same, and therefore it is our duty to continue to strengthen defensive might.”

I am not naïve enough to think that his opinion is an exception. No, those like him are a disciplined people who hang on every word of the authorities. That is a characteristic feature. It is said that at the former enterprise a certain semifiinished article just could not be obtained under his glorious guidance and he forced all the employees, including candidates of science, to synthesize it in laboratory retorts. Let the slaves work. Well, in a few months they obtained the quantity that the industrial facility should have produced in a day or two.

But the director was “on his horse.” Would anyone really look into how the “success” was achieved?

It is not surprising that he sought to be “on his horse” in Moscow as well. He imitated conversion in every way, said nice words about cost accounting and self-financing, and even organized training but he remembered the “beasty nature of capitalism” very well. Meanwhile, negotiations were under way in Geneva and a plant was being built near Chapayevsk for the destruction of chemical weapons (for which the state wasted more than 300 million rubles), which was ultimately closed for not meeting the basic safety requirements of people after mass demonstrations of the inhabitants of the city.

Not a single hair fell for this failure either from the head of our director or from the heads of his bosses. And for what? They had, after all, unwaveringly carried out a different but basic course of the military-industrial complex that was aimed at taming this same “beasty nature.” They were working to the utmost to develop a more perfect kind of chemical weapon and there were full-scale tests of it at an open test range in one of the most unfortunate regions ecologically.

Finally success was achieved and in April of this year the director and his chiefs received Lenin Prizes. And the heroes of the military-industrial complex are hardly bothered at all by the fact that more than 70,000 tons of dangerous chemical substances lie in depots, representing a huge danger. And the state is simply unable to finance their disposal because of its own poverty. So it is hardly likely that they will be disposed of in this century. There is, however, hope that perhaps the West will help.

The people of the military-industrial complex have now begun to assimilate the West intensively, not being ashamed of their own status as supersecret persons, for they know very well that a regime of secrecy is for slaves, to intimidate and make them obey. For this reason, they simply go on trips to the United States, England, the FRG, and other countries. This fact itself would be meaningless if we did not know the true face of the military-industrial complex and its representatives. No, it is not specialists who go to the West. They, as a rule, are not especially well trusted. It is the director and those close to him who go, people who are not much like specialists, even if one has a lot of imagination. Such persons go to negotiations in Geneva, attempting once again to put one over on their Western partners. I think, however, that they already know very well with whom they are dealing.

Today it was the director himself, who was a member of the bureau of the CPSU RK and a permanent member of the party committee, who left the party. This is to his advantage today. But it was literally just a month or two ago that he assembled the laboratory heads who had left the party and branded them as traitors. His order on a contract with the party committee, in which he obligated
himself to provide transportation, premises, and other things in exchange for educational work, sounded blatant and shameless.

Presenting himself as a true patriot, our director was prepared to resort to any falsification. Here is a typical instance that I myself encountered in 1988. At one of the plants then in operation, I discovered an emission of chemical substances into the atmosphere and sewage that exceeded the standard more than a hundredfold and that later accumulated near a densely populated region. The director prohibited me from reporting this to the higher authority.

One asks why we are once again deceiving the West. After all, the true power of the military-industrial complex is concentrated in its enterprises that do not want to convert, for this is not desired by their directors with their numerous cronies. Rather they are waiting for their hour and simply delaying things. Chemistry has a term— inversion. This is when one and the same substance, without changing its chemical formula, changes imperceptibly from one form to another. This phenomenon can be detected only with the help special instruments. But sometimes inversion may be reversible. So are we not dealing with something similar in our so-called conversion?

If this, fortunately, is not so, then one can more easily suppose that the delay with conversion is the prelude to the creeping privatization of enterprises of the military-industrial complex by its elite. One gets this idea from the fact that a few days ago the Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry drove eight brand-new Mercedes to the garage of our enterprise. Two of them were turned over to our director. And all of this happens when the country lacks the means to acquire food and medicine and the chemical industry itself is in a deep crisis because of a shortage of imported raw materials.

How long will we put up with this?

Chemical Troops Commander: No Progress in CW Destruction

PM2310091991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Oct 91 Union Edition p 4

[Text] On 1 June 1990 the presidents of the United States and the USSR signed the agreement on the total destruction of the two countries' chemical weapons [CW]. The commitments assumed by our state demand that we get such work under way before 31 December 1992. But to date there is not a single plant in the USSR for the destruction of combat toxins, and construction has not even been started... What are the reasons for this situation?

Colonel General S. Petrov, chief of the USSR Defense Ministry's Chemical Troops, answers our correspondent's questions.

"In my view," Stanislav Veniaminovich said, "the main reason is that the agreement signed in Washington almost 18 months ago still does not have juridical force. It has not been ratified by the country's Supreme Soviet and has not even been submitted to it for ratification. Although we drew up a state program for the destruction of chemical weapons together with other ministries and departments on the president's instructions and submitted it to Supreme Soviet commissions and committees and then, after additional work, also to the former Cabinet of Ministers, there is neither the money nor a decision to implement it."

[Litovkin] What sums are needed to implement this program? And for what term is it designed?

[Petrov] With regard to money—just over 5.4 billion rubles [R] at 1991 prices. But as for the term...

There are several options for the destruction of chemical weapons. One of them is to construct terminals for the transfer of mustard gas, lewisite, and their compounds in the areas where they are stored, from large capacities to specially developed technological transport containers which meet all international safety norms.

It is proposed to construct these terminals (without them it is hard to count on the safe processing of lewisite) in Udmuravia, where the main stocks of the substances I have mentioned are held, and in Saratov Oblast. This will take four or five years and R200 million. This will also go on the construction of sociocultural and domestic projects and engineering networks and on the development of the infrastructure in these areas.

With other options—for example, when reequipping or repurposing chemical enterprises in order to destroy toxins—it will take a year or two after the adoption of such a decision.

We already have everything ready—the state program weighs a total of 35 kg, planning and surveying examinations have been conducted, as has other research and development work, on which almost R100 million has been spent—but everything is still up in the air...

A state commission to choose and agree on the areas for such projects has not yet even been set up, there are no organizational staff structures that will implement the toxin destruction program... In my view, it is inadmissible to endlessly prolong the resolution of such problems.

[Litovkin] But the country has many other paramount problems today. The destruction of chemical weapons is far from being the chief among them.

[Petrov] Undoubtedly. But the failure of the agreement signed in Washington casts doubt on our country's readiness to honor its pledges. And not only in respect of chemical weapons. Confidence is easily lost and cannot be restored for any money.
[Litovkin] How do things stand with our partners' destruction of their chemical weapons?

[Petrov] The Americans constructed the first enterprise for the destruction of toxins by the method of direct incineration on Johnson Island in the Pacific. And they have already begun this work, although they have reportedly experienced some problems with safety there.

They are now constructing several installations in the continental part of the country, next to the places where chemical weapons are stored, and will, I believe, fulfill their pledges with regard to their destruction by 1998, just as envisaged. The chief point is that they have adopted national legislation on this question. This enables them to marshal their forces efficiently and to work without fuss or haste, observing all precautions.

Incidentally, the United States pays very great attention to work with the public and the population of those areas where installations for the destruction of toxins are being constructed. It even has, within the structure of the Department of Defense chemical disarmament committee, a special subdepartment which explains to people the full safety of the technological operations in installations for the destruction of such weapons, and eminent scientists are recruited for this purpose, moreover, from scientific establishments in those places where installations for the destruction of toxins are being created.

[Litovkin] The United States has repeatedly offered us assistance in constructing installations for the destruction of toxins on the basis of its own technology... Does it, perhaps, make sense to accept it? This will be less costly.

[Petrov] Unfortunately, not less costly. We have made a comprehensive analysis of these offers and concluded that it will not profit us to realize them. For both economic and technical reasons...

[Litovkin] One other financial question. Practically all stocks of chemical weapons are concentrated on Russian territory. It turns out that Russia alone must pay for their destruction.

[Petrov] In my view, it is unfair to put the question in this way. The stocks of combat toxins were created by the whole country on the basis of its scientific, industrial, and military potential. And the burden of the expenditure on destroying and utilizing them must, of course, be borne proportionally by all the sovereign republics.

[Litovkin] And the final point. The country is switching to new forms of economic management. Why do you not take on independent, nongovernmental organizations as partners in the destruction and utilization of toxins?

[Petrov] We are ready to cooperate with them and are open to any offers, both financial and economic, technical... The only point we must bear in mind is the juridical responsibility borne under international law by state structures for the safety and control of toxins as weapons of mass destruction.

There is enough work for everyone. We are prepared to share it. Provided there is real assistance and real action aimed at fulfilling our obligations.

NAVAL ARMS LIMITATIONS

Soviet Admiral Urges Naval Arms Control Talks
SK0511095291 Seoul YONHAP in English 0840 GMT 5 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 5, (YONHAP)—The Soviet Union wants to start discussions on the most simple naval confidence-building measures [CBM] with "all the states concerned," but Washington seems unwilling to enter such negotiations with Moscow, an international seminar on arms control was told Tuesday.

Retired Adm. Nikolay Amelko, consultant at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Scientific and Coordinating Center and candidate of naval sciences, said Moscow favored limitation of the fighting strength and structure of national navies to the requirement of defense sufficiency, and could start discussing naval issues at special consultations involving all the states concerned.

"...At the initial stage it seems to be appropriate to limit the discussions mainly to the issues of confidence-building and transparency measures," Amelko told the seminar on "The Change of Soviet Military Policy and the Two Koreas: Nuclear Issues and Arms Control."

The gathering, which closed Tuesday, was sponsored by Tanguk University's Center for American and Soviet Studies.

The confidence-building measures could involve notification of major exercises, massings and transfers of naval forces, and the presence of observers at naval exercises and maneuvers, he said.

They could also include limitation of the number and the scale of naval exercises and maneuvers and of the areas where they are conducted, and mutual contacts between navies, such as regular exchange visits of ships and naval planes, he said.

The Soviet expert said such first steps could be followed by an ad hoc consultative mechanism that could be used at the level of operational command of naval forces, a system of safeguards to ensure the security of international trade communications, and an arrangement between nuclear powers to declare the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard combat ships calling at foreign ports.

Unlike the Soviet Navy, the U.S. Navy's main purpose was not to defend, Amelko said.

"This difference...will somewhat complicate their reduction and achieving a balance of forces at sea...this difficulty could well be overcome through establishing equivalent criteria for comparison: through cutting allocations for building ships, submarines and planes, and,
possibly, through using components from other armed forces to offset the superiority of naval components,” he said.

Retired Adm. James Winnefeld of the Rand Corporation in Washington, D.C., predicted Washington would enter naval CBM negotiations with the Soviet Union “when it sees it in its interest to do so.”

“Every relevant echelon in the United States Government, starting with the President on down through the secretaries of state and defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made statements saying that naval arms control is not in the U.S. national interest...the United States has opted for the unilateral path to 'control' naval arms,” he said.

Winnefeld said the U.S. naval force would shrink to about three quarters its current size in the next five years and had gradually taken most tactical nuclear weapons off its ships over the last three years.

“With President Bush’s 27 September 1991 initiative, it now appears that the remainder will be removed,” he said.

To start naval CBM negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union should open a hotline or hotlines between regional military headquarters, issue general nonbinding policy statements on deployments and exercises, and launch exchanges of naval force data and visits between their staffs and ships, he said.

Observing that the era of arms control “is drawing to a close as economic concerns take top billing on the world’s agenda,” the retired admiral said the real arms control issue lies in nuclear nonproliferation in North Korea “not in limiting the operation of a decreasing number of U.S. and Soviet warships which are already in the process of off-loading their nuclear weapons.”

**ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES**

**Troop Withdrawal From Mongolia Updated**

*LD2710132391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1830 GMT 25 Oct 91*

[Text] We have received another letter from Reserve Major Stepan Ivanovich Chemernykh, a war veteran from Irkutsk, who wants to know how the Soviet troops' withdrawal from Mongolia is going. As you know, they were temporarily stationed there at the request of the Mongolian Government. Why is it taking so long to withdraw such a relatively small contingent of forces, our listener wonders. I have asked my colleague, Sergey Pravdin, to answer this question. Over to you.

[Pravdin] The second stage of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from neighboring Mongolia is now being implemented. I remind you that it is taking place under an agreement between the governments of the two countries. It is scheduled for completion during 1992. The contingent still there is indeed relatively small. About 27,000 officers and men, 436 tanks, 375 field guns and mortars, about 400 APCs, and roughly 5,500 other items of combat equipment have to be repatriated during the second stage.

There is a very simple explanation for the relatively long time that the withdrawal is taking. Experts have calculated that about 17,000 railway cars will be needed to transport all the equipment mentioned above, as well as the troops. Of course it would be possible to find these cars, even though rolling stock is almost always in short supply in our country these days. The command of Soviet forces in the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR] has stated that it is prepared to accelerate the withdrawal. But the point is that this would absorb almost the entire capacity of Mongolia's only railway line, which runs from the Soviet border to Ulaanbaatar and then on to China. This just cannot be done. After all, this one railway line carries both goods and passengers moving from our country to Mongolia and China, and the other way round. So, the schedule for the withdrawal of forces has been drawn up on the basis of existing realities. One can assume that it will be strictly adhered to, although there have been reports in the Mongolian press that the withdrawal is currently slightly ahead of schedule.

But quite a few difficulties are being encountered during the withdrawal. One example is the transfer of the remaining assets of military garrisons, including housing, to the Mongolian side. The Mongolians will only get about 7,000 well-appointed apartments as a result of the transfer of the 55 garrisons being handed over to the Mongolian side. All the other assets which remain must also be handled in a thrifty way. The provision of housing for the officers and men who return to our country is also a considerable problem, of course. After all, the housing situation in our country is almost as bad as in Mongolia.

Another aspect of Mongolian reality must also be considered. In the boundless and very sparsely populated steppe regions of Mongolia many of these garrisons acted as important centers of Mongolian infrastructure. The Soviet garrisons always had very close links with the local population. These links still exist in those regions where our garrisons remain, even though the domestic political situation in Mongolia has, of course, substantially changed of late. As you know, the presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia was a temporary arrangement. It was forced on us as a result of the tension that prevailed on the Sino-Soviet border at that time. Following the complete normalization of relations between the USSR and China, and between Mongolia and China, there is now no need to keep Soviet forces on the MPR's territory. As the Mongolian newspaper UNEN wrote recently, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the MPR will help strengthen Soviet-Mongolian, Sino-Soviet and, of course, Sino-Mongolian relations.
Far East Commander Attends Seminar in South Korea

To Speak on Asian Security
SK0411083191 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
4 Nov 91 p 1

[Text] Lieutenant General Novozhilov (52), commander of the Soviet Far East Military Command, arrived in Kimpo Airport at 1200 on 3 November for a visit to the ROK.

Lieutenant General Novozhilov will attend an international symposium to be held in the Seoul Inter-Continental Hotel for two days starting 4 November under the auspices of the Research Institute of U.S. and Soviet Affairs in Tungk University (Director Kim Yunam, professor of International Politics), with the theme, "Changes in Soviet Military Policy and the Nuclear Issue and Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula."

Commander Novozhilov will give a keynote speech at the symposium entitled, "The Soviet View on Security in the Asia-Pacific Region."

Urges Area Troop Reduction
SK0411090291 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0800 GMT 4 Nov 91

[Text] Novozhilov, commander of the Soviet Far East Military Command, revealed that the Soviet Union will continue reducing its armed forces in Northeast Asia, including the reduction of its armed forces in the Far East to 120,000 troops.

Commander Novozhilov attended an international symposium held today under the auspices of the Research Institute for U.S. and Soviet Affairs in Tungk University.

Commander Novozhilov stressed that the Soviet Union has cut its strategic missiles by 40 percent and fighters by 50 percent since 1988 to relax tensions in Northeast Asia and that its arms reduction will continue in the future, too.

Commander Novozhilov also stated that the Soviet Union will change its military service system into a professional army and will reorganize its military system so as to maintain 3 million troops.

Stressing that the United States and the Soviet Union do not want discord erupting on the Korean peninsula, Commander Novozhilov said that North and South Korea should reduce their armed forces deployed along the Military Demarcation Line and that foreign troops must be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula.

Pertaining to the Team Spirit exercise, Commander Novozhilov noted that the military training itself does not constitute any problem but that reduction of the scale of the exercise is desirable for creating trust in Northeast Asia.

In the meantime, Lazov [as transliterated], director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Far East Bureau, stressed that it is a basic Soviet position to call on North Korea to unconditionally accept nuclear inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, he revealed that the Soviet Union has no plan to apply military and political pressure on North Korea concerning the issue of nuclear inspection.

Discusses Easing Tensions
SK0411134891 Seoul YONHAP in English 1310 GMT 4 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 4 (YONHAP)—A visiting Soviet Army general recommended Monday that all foreign military bases and facilities be liquidated and foreign troops be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula to ease tensions.

Gen. Viktor I. Novozhilov, commander of the Soviet Army's Far Eastern District, made the remark in a two-day international seminar on the change of Soviet military policy and the two Koreas. The seminar, which closes Tuesday, is sponsored by the center for American and Soviet Studies of Tungk University.

In a keynote speech, Gen. Novozhilov called on the United States and the Soviet Union to discuss ways to relax tension on the Korean peninsula.

Saying that the prevention of danger in Korea can be a subject for bilateral or multilateral talks, he also proposed an international forum in which the Soviet Union, the United States, South and North Korea, Japan and other nations take part.

To stimulate the inter-Korean dialogue, he suggested talks between South and North Korea be arranged in a third country.

"The population of the Soviet Far East is sincerely concerned about the amelioration of the situation in the area and our people will approve any action in support of this process," he said.

He said the lack of information about the military potential in the Soviet Far East was a reason for rumors and exaggerations of the "Soviet military threat."

"We are taking measures to provide more information about our military build-up in that area," the general said.

He said the total number of servicemen in the Soviet armed forces would not exceed 3 million. "The recruiting would be based on the transition to the professional army in the near future," he added.
Cites Regional Troop Reductions
SK0511011591 Seoul YONHAP in English 0035 GMT
5 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 5 (YONHAP)—The Soviet Union has cut 200,000 troops from the Asian contingent of its army and navy, including 120,000 in the Far East, Gen. Viktor Novozhilov, commander of the Soviet Army’s Far Eastern Military District, told a seminar Monday.

“The army and the navy in the Asian part of the USSR have been reduced by 200,000 persons, including 120,000 persons in the Far East. Recently President Mikhail Gorbachev has declared the limitation of the troops on the Kuril Islands by 30 percent,” Novozhilov told a seminar on “The Change of Soviet Military Policy and the Two Koreas: Nuclear Issues and Arms Control.”

The two-day seminar sponsored by Tanguk University’s center for American and Soviet studies continues Tuesday.

“The Soviet defensive buildup, our armed forces now are in quite new and extremely important stage of the development... What will be the structure of our armed forces in the near future?”

“First of all it will be brought in correspondence with the principle of defense sufficiency. The number of armed forces types will be reduced. They will be classified as strategic deterrence forces, air force, navy and ground defense forces. We are going to cut the number of military districts, military departments and general army divisions.

“In all types of armed forces armies will be transformed into corps, divisions into brigades. The total number of servicemen will not exceed 3 million,” he said, speaking in English.

The Soviet state conversion program would turn 422 military factories and 100 non-military factories over to the manufacture of civilian products, with peaceful output scheduled to reach 65 percent by 1995, he added.

Talks With Defense Minister
SK0611100491 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
6 Nov 91 p 1

[Text] Novozhilov, commander of the Soviet Far East Military District who is on a visit to the ROK to attend an international seminar, made an unofficial visit and held talks with Defense Minister Yi Chong-ku on the morning of 6 November. Prior to this, Yong Yong-il, director of intelligence headquarters in the Joint Chiefs of Staff who is now visiting Moscow, paid a courtesy call on Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov on 4 November and held talks with him. Thus, reciprocal talks between the core military leaders of the two countries were held for the first time since diplomatic relations were established.

At 1100 on 6 November, Novozhilov, commander of the Soviet Far East Military District, called on Minister Yi at the Defense Ministry building and exchanged views on security in the Asian-Pacific region and on the military situation on the Korean peninsula.

It was learned that at the talks, Minister Yi explained that the northern policy, which the ROK has consistently implemented toward the Soviet Union and East European countries since 1988, and the ROK’s efforts to establish diplomatic relations with these countries were designed to realize durable peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and to achieve the reunification of North and South Korea at last.

To this, Commander Novozhilov reportedly said that the Soviet Union reduced its ground and naval forces deployed in East Asia to 200,000 troops and its armed forces in the Soviet Far East to 120,000 troops, thus actively leading the trend of global disarmament and detente.

It was also learned that Commander Novozhilov stressed that not only the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan but also North and South Korea should strive to end military tensions and the wasteful arms race by mutually observing military mobilization exercises.

The Soviet Union invited our side’s civilian experts, including Choe Pyong-kil, Yonsei University professor, and allowed them to observe naval training in the coastal sea off Vladivostok from 14 to 16 August.

On the other hand, Yong Yong-il, director of intelligence headquarters who is visiting the Soviet Union to attend a ceremony marking the opening of the military attaché office in our Embassy in the Soviet Union, on 4 November called on the Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov and exchanged views on matters of common interests in military security. However, details of the talks have not been revealed to date.

Kuril Troop Withdrawal To Start ‘This Year’
LD0611214291 Moscow Radio Rossiî Network in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Nov 91

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed on the islands of the Kuril ridge is to start already this year. This was stated by Colonel General Viktor Novozhilov, commander of the troops of the Far Eastern Military District, in an interview given to PRIAMURSKIYE VEDOMOSTI [MARITIME GAZETTE].

According to him, there is one division in the Kurils. The soldiers and officers from it will be sent to other garrisons in the okrug.
USSR General Views Korean, Regional Security
SK06111152891 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network
in Korean 1200 GMT 6 Nov 91

[Interview with Lieutenant General Viktor Novozhilov, commander of the Soviet Far East Military District, by KBS anchorman Pak Song-pom in Seoul—live; Novozhilov answers in Russian, with Korean subtitles provided on screen]

[Text] [Pak Song-pom] General Novozhilov, thank you very much for being with us. I will ask you question through an interpreter. General Novozhilov, what do you think of the military confrontation between North Korea and South Korea?

[Lieutenant General Novozhilov] I have a negative view of this situation. As one nation, Korea should make efforts to reduce the current state of confrontation. I think that the reduction of the North-South military forces, the participation of both countries' leaders in talks held in a third country, and the expansion of exchanges between both sides will help ease the confrontation.

[Pak] What kind of joint military exercises have the USSR and North Korea held, and what is their status?

[Novozhilov] Large-scale military exercises conducted by the USSR and North Korea, I think, have been partly aimed at gaining a political effect. In the middle of the 1980s, the USSR and North Korea conducted a joint maritime exercise. Since then, however, other kinds of military exercises involving the participation of both sides have not been conducted on land. As of now, both sides have not conducted such a military exercise; however, delegations from both sides, composed of six or 10 people, have exchanged visits to each country. In so doing, they have inspected each other's military activities and discussed theory. There has been no actual military exercise.

[Pak] Does the USSR approve North Korea's independent possession of nuclear weapons from the military standpoint?

[Novozhilov] The USSR proposed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and signed it. Of course, as commander of the Soviet Far East Military District, I oppose another country's possession of nuclear weapons near the Soviet boundary. I think that leaders of North and South Korea, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries in this region should take a specific step to prevent North Korea having nuclear weapons.

[Pak] It has been learned that the United States hopes for Japan's military strength to grow to maintain the military balance in the Far East. What do you think of this as commander of the Soviet Far East Military District?

[Novozhilov] Personally, I think that the United States will give Japan military assistance. If Japan is trying to be a strong military power, however, I will oppose this effort. I think that this matter should be decided at a reasonable level. We should ease tension and reduce the military forces in the Far East region. The United States and Japan should cooperate with one another to reach this goal.

[Pak] Would you like to tell us about the military exchanges and cooperation between the ROK and the USSR in the future?

[Novozhilov] I think that the cooperation, which was promoted this time, should be continued in the future. Defense Minister Yi Chong-ku, who I met today, also shares my opinion. If an ROK military delegation were to visit the Soviet Far East Military District, I would welcome this. In addition, I intend to willingly show them our military activities and exercises. The Korean peninsula is the central area of the Far East region. This cooperation, therefore, will be helpful in building confidence and easing tension.

[Pak Song-pom] General Novozhilov, thank you very much.

CENTER REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Discussions of Ukraine's Nuclear Weapons Policy

'Negative Reaction' Abroad to First Draft
LD2310230591 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1410 GMT 23 Oct 91

[Commentary by TASS military affairs observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] [No dateline as received] The passing by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet of the first readings of draft laws on the defense and the Armed Forces of the republic has produced a storm of negative reaction, literally throughout the entire world and is considered by specialists as an irresponsible step which poses a threat to the still fragile structure of military-political stability on our planet.

The laws provide, in particular, for the all-Union strategic forces, that is, nuclear armaments, deployed in the territory of the Ukraine to be transferred to the control of the republic's president. No references by the legislators in Kiev to the republic's "nuclear-free principles" and to the temporary character of the Ukraine's nuclear status can conceal the fact that this is a matter of an attempt to undermine the spirit and letter of the very important international treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The nonproliferation treaty, of which the Soviet Union is a signatory, prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them to nonnuclear states. The broadening of the "nuclear club" by even one new member could sharply weaken the barriers in the way of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, provide fresh impetus
for a gradual spread of means of mass destruction through all the continents and thereby considerably increase the risk of nuclear war.

The decision of the legislators in Kiev will doubtlessly have the most serious international consequences, "We do not want," the Los Angeles Times correspondent was told by official spokesmen of the United States Administration, "one nuclear power to disintegrate into three or four nuclear powers, and we are ready to put political and economic pressure on independent republics so that they do not strive to achieve control over the use of these armaments".

D. Howell, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Parliament's House of Commons, has called the decision of the Ukrainian legislators a "grave threat to peace", "This is an example of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the appearance of new nuclear powers, which horrifies all of us", he emphasized.

The statement in New York by USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister V. Petrovskiy that Soviet strategic forces will remain unified under a strictly centralized system of combat control which fully excludes the possibility of their unsanctioned use has been greeted with understanding in the West.

Indeed the stakes here are also high. Any harsh measure is justified in the cause of preventing the slightest chance of nuclear weapons being used by irresponsible groups or individuals, and obviously the Ukrainian parliamentarians should realize this.

Security Minister Reassures FRG
LD2910124191 Berlin ADN in German 1147 GMT 29 Oct 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Ukraine is making no claim to nuclear weapons of its own. This was revealed by Yevhen Marchuk, [Ukraine's] minister of state security and extraordinary situations at a meeting in Bonn with Bernd Wilz, defense policy spokesman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] Bundestag group.

A statement issued today says that the present 170 or so strategic nuclear weapons on Ukraine territory, 130 systems are to be removed in connection with the START Treaty. The remaining 40 systems will be withdrawn under Ukrainian plans over the next seven years due to obsolescence.

According to the minister of state, the republic estimates it requires five to seven years to develop independent Ukrainian forces of up to 420,000 men. All the measures needed for this would be settled in negotiations and relevant agreements with the central power. A legal basis and, finally, a state treaty are being sought for the supply of personnel to the Soviet forces and Ukraine's share in their financing, Marchuk said.

In the view of the CDU/CSU spokesman Wilz, the Ukrainian side, at the meeting in Bonn, had come out clearly against any confrontation with the central authorities, and had intimated that individual republics working independently could give rise to great damage.

Kravchuk: Missile Forces To Be Centrally Controlled
PM0311132691 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 2 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

["Direct Line" report by Colonel A. Polyakov from Kiev: "Leonid Kravchuk: Military-Strategic Forces Should Be Unified"]

[Excerpts] Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Kravchuk met with officers of the Kiev Garrison in the course of the election campaign for the post of republic president. [passage omitted]

On the question of the development of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and the Ukraine, he reaffirmed his position: The military-strategic forces of the former Union should remain unified, controlled by the Defense Ministry and the General Staff. They could comprise 700,000-800,000 men in the Ukraine. That includes the Strategic Missile Forces and part of the Navy and Air Force. In addition, in approximately three years' time the Ukraine proposes to have its own Army of 200,000-250,000 men, which would include subunits of the republic guard, border forces, and internal forces. [passage omitted]

Defense Minister Stresses Nuclear-Free Republic
LD0311162391 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Nov 91

[From the Vesti newscast]

[Excerpt] The second congress of the Union of Officers of the Ukraine has opened in Kiev. Over 700 delegates from military okrugs stationed in the Ukraine as well as the western group of forces, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Baltic Sea Fleet stood to receive the blessings of the priest of the Ukrainian autocephalous orthodox church and sang "Our father" and "God save our Ukraine".

Colonel-General Morozov, Ukrainian minister of defense, spoke at the congress. He stressed once again the intention of the Ukraine to remain nuclear-free and described the utterances on the nuclear aggressiveness of the republic as absurd provocations. The main danger for the Ukraine, according to General Morozov, lies in the growth of military might in the contiguous states and in bringing foreign troops to their territory. Morozov is concerned about the uncoordinated deployment of troops to areas outside the republic and he will work to hinder this. [passage omitted] [video shows officers in the congress hall, speakers]
Commentary Views Western Reactions
924P0010A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Oct 91 Union Edition p 1

[V. Mikheyev roundup: "The West Prefers To See the Ukraine Neutral and Nuclear-Free"]

[Text] The decision adopted on Tuesday by the Ukrainian parliament to place under its jurisdiction the USSR Armed Forces on its territory evoked an abundance of contradictory and, understandably, initially anxious comment in political circles of the West. Their predictions that the trend toward the disintegration of the Soviet Union would assume an irreversible nature and that among the trickiest problems of the peaceful severance of relations would be the fate of the single Union Army, Air Force and Navy, but particularly, the nuclear potential, have come to pass.

There was a response first and foremost from our main Western partners, with whom we have been conducting long and arduous negotiations on a reduction in Armed Forces and arms. Their reaction came forthwith—concern that an enlargement, even temporary, of the membership of the "nuclear club" would introduce uncertainty to the political dialogue in Europe and in relations with the North American superpower.

REUTERS quotes a statement from Richard Boucher, official spokesman of the U.S. State Department: "The plans to create a large-scale Ukrainian Army are contrary, it would seem, to the efforts of all countries of Europe and North America to reduce their Armed Forces and strengthen stability." He went on to observe: The United States "does not believe that the creation of large-scale independent Armies would correspond to constructive goals and is concerned at the economic effect which maintaining an Army of such proportions would have."

In turn, TASS transmits, David Howell, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the British Parliament's House of Commons, called this step "a serious threat to peace." In an interview with BBC radio he emphasized: "This is an example of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the appearance of new nuclear powers."

There is no overlooking the directly opposite viewpoint of Caspar Weinberger, former U.S. secretary of defense, who prefers that the nuclear weapons pass to the control of the republics to the continuation of "uncertain control" over them on the part of a weakening central leadership. This would accelerate, in his opinion, the conclusion of an agreement on an extensive and verifiable reduction in nuclear weapons. The former secretary declared: "It seems to me that the threat of war, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons all the more, would diminish considerably were the nuclear weapons to be in the hands of small regional groups, which are seeking their real independence and do not want war."

Today's responses contain more composed notes—a reason was the statement of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko to the effect that the Ukraine was intent on being a nuclear-free power. The independent state wishes here to participate on an equal basis in international negotiations on a reduction in and the destruction of nuclear arsenals. In accordance with the agreements between the USSR and the United States, 130 of the 176 strategic nuclear warheads will be eliminated on the territory of the Ukraine. A. Zlenko, REUTERS points out, did not adduce numerical information on the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the Ukraine.

Confirmation of this fundamental position came from two further sources. Vladimir Grinev, deputy head of the Ukrainian parliament, gave the assurance that "the Ukraine will not have its own nuclear arms. We will put ourselves under the joint command of the strategic forces. Nuclear weapons will not be nationalized." The publication in a number of organs of the press concerning the fact that the Ukraine was hatching plans to become the owner of a strategic nuclear arsenal were refuted by Pavel Mysnik, chairman of a subcommission of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Standing Commission for Defense and State Security.

A well-disposed response on the part of the West was soon forthcoming. "We welcome the Ukrainian parliament's renunciation of nuclear arms and its resolve to make the Ukraine free of nuclear weapons," a statement of the U.S. State Department says. The British Foreign Office announced that the British Government hoped that an independent Ukraine would take specific steps to accomplish the set task—the creation on its territory of a nuclear-free zone.

The West is expressing the hope that the Ukraine will abide by the commitments assumed in the past by the USSR in respect to international agreements and will also adhere to its own legislation. An important reminder in the statement of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry in this connection was the reference to the Declaration on State Sovereignty, which stresses the republic's intention to be in the future a neutral state and adhere to the three nonnuclear principles: not to accept, not to manufacture, and not to acquire nuclear weapons.

U.S. Spokesman Cited
924P00002A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
25 Oct 91 p 3

[Report by TASS correspondent A. Korolev: "Statement of the State Department Spokesman"]

[Text] Washington, 24 October—The United States has received positively the decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet regarding its intention to make the republic a nuclear-free zone. "We welcome the Ukrainian parliament's renunciation of nuclear arms and its resolve to make the Ukraine free of nuclear weapons," declared Richard Boucher, spokesman of the U.S. State Department.
He expressed concern here, however, in connection with the republic's plans to have its own armed forces. Obviously, the intention to create a strong Ukrainian army, the spokesman for the foreign policy department, observed, "runs counter to the efforts of all nations in Europe and North America for a reduction in armed forces and a strengthening of stability." According to him, the United States "does not believe that the creation of large independent armies would be in keeping with constructive purposes and is concerned at the economic effect which the upkeep of such armies would have."

Boucher once again expressed the hope that all republics in the USSR would "abide by the international commitments" of the Soviet Union.

Kazakh President on Control of Nuclear Arms

Stresses Single Nuclear Management
LD2810214991 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 2028 GMT 28 Oct 91

[By Chris Moncrieff, PRESS ASSOCIATION political editor]

[Excerpt] The president of Kazakhstan pledged to London today that they would not seek independent control over the Soviet republic's nuclear weapons.

"Kazakhstan is among the eight republics that signed the economic treaty," said President Nursultan Nazarbayev. "This treaty declared that there will be one management of the army and this includes nuclear missiles," he told a news conference. "A separated management of nuclear arms, I do not recognize at all," he added.

The president, an ally of the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, is on an official visit to Britain to drum up investment in his Central Asian republic. Throught an interpreter he said: "We have to transform our economy to a market economy as fast as possible." [passage omitted]

No Republic Control of Weapons
PM011100391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Oct 91 Union Edition p 5

[Correspondent A. Krivopalov report: "Kazakh President in Britain"]

[Excerpts] London—"Britain was given an opportunity this week to meet a Soviet leader who possesses two rare qualities: He knows what he wants, and how to get it."

That was the flattering opinion of the Kazakh president that THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, which is close to the government, gave on the day he flew into London.

During a conversation with journalists in the USSR Embassy, the president said that "previously the British did not know very much about Kazakhstan and its potential apart from the fact that it exists on the map."
[passage omitted]

As we know, the future of the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of what are now independent republics is arousing particular interest in the world (and Britain as well, needless to say). During his conversation with journalists N. Nazarbayev remarked: "I do not recognize individual republics' having control of nuclear weapons."

At the same time he said that Kazakhstan wants to keep abreast of things and take part in formulating the whole country's strategic foreign policy.

Control Vested in General Staff
PM0111100191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Oct 91 Union Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Nursultan Nazarbayev: Republic Defense Ministers and Not Moscow Must Control Nuclear Strategy"]

[Text] Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who is paying an official visit to London, stressed at a news conference in the Soviet Embassy, TASS reports, that the republics acquiring independence and sovereignty will not cause the nuclear forces stationed on their territory to be "separated" into national units or introduce "joint control." "Kazakhstan was among the eight republics that signed the Economic Treaty, which says that unified control of the Army and nuclear arms will be retained in the unified economic space," he said. "Kazakhstan has introduced the post of minister for defense questions; this minister will be involved in deciding all questions of military policy, so that I do not recognize republics' individual control of nuclear weapons. At the same time we want to be involved in formulating strategic questions pertaining to the country's military policy." "So Moscow will keep control over the country's nuclear strategy?" the question followed. "Not Moscow, but the General Staff, which will be made up of the republics' defense ministers," the president replied.

Consultant: 'Dual-Key' Arrangement Sought
LD3010222991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 2330 GMT 29 Oct 91

[Text] Kazakhstan will eliminate nuclear weapons on its territory within the framework of the USSR's treaty on reducing nuclear arms. This was stated by (Marat Kazhakhmedov), a consultant to the foreign policy committee of the republic's Supreme Soviet, as reported by STUDINFORM news agency.

While not laying claim to the right to possess nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan would still like to have a so-called dual key. The nuclear button could be in the center's hands, but the government of Kazakhstan would like to know how the weapons on its territory will be used. (Kazhakhmedov) stated that as soon as the USSR begins
fulfilling the treaties on reducing nuclear arms, Kazakhstan will support these initiatives completely.

Defense Minister 'Guarantees' Control of 'Nuclear Button'

PM2910182191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Oct 91 Union Edition p 4

[Interview with Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, USSR defense minister, conducted by S. Guk; date and place not given: "Nuclear Button Remains in Hands of Center—Declares Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, USSR Defense Minister"]

[Excerpts] The "great carve-up" taking place in the USSR has also affected the Armed Forces—virtually every republic is claiming its own "share." There is real panic in the West: Does the collapse of the USSR constitute a threat to international stability? I put the following question to USSR Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov. [passage omitted]

[Guk] Can you guarantee that nuclear weapons will never fall into the hands of irresponsible adventurers?

[Shaposhnikov] I can. First, we have the agreement of all republics that the USSR's international disarmament commitments must be implemented. There are no disagreements on this issue as regards either tactical or strategic arms. And I am also encouraged by the Ukrainian leaders' statement: Let nuclear weapons remain on their territory, they should have complete information about them, but the "nuclear button" will remain in the center's hands as before.

Gorbachev, Mitterrand Meet in France

Talks Previewed

PM31110132191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Oct 91 Union Edition p 5

[By correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "On the Eve of the Meeting in France"]

[Excerpts] Paris-Soustons—The meeting between F. Mitterrand and M.S. Gorbachev will begin the evening of 30 October at the French president's residence in the village of Lathe (Landes Department) in southwest France. [passage omitted]

The same evening the two presidents will give an interview on French "Antenne-2" television's late news. Following a working breakfast the meeting will end, as previously announced, on the morning of 31 October with a joint news conference, after which the Soviet president will fly to Moscow. [passage omitted]

It is believed in Paris that main attention in the talks between the two presidents should focus on European security problems. In particular, the presidents will examine the latest U.S. and Soviet initiatives in the disarmament sphere, as well as the French proposal to convene a conference of the heads of the four states with nuclear weapons in Europe. The aim of such a conference—both Moscow and Washington have already advocated convening it—would be to settle problems associated with the Soviet nuclear arsenals. [passage omitted]

A particular place in the talks will be taken by questions of NATO's future—ahead of the meeting of NATO leaders in Rome next week—and, in particular, the intensification of NATO's political role and the development of relations with the Soviet Union and its former Warsaw Pact partners. I recall that the United States and Germany recently proposed setting up a North Atlantic cooperation council with the participation of former Warsaw Pact members (the question of inviting the USSR to this new organ remains open for the time being).

Paris believes that the Soviet president will support this initiative. As for F. Mitterrand, he is taking a more cautious position and is insisting on wide-ranging preliminary consultations between East and West on this problem. France does not want to expand NATO's functions, believing that the alliance is striving to arrogate some of the CSCE's prerogatives. Paris is consequently proposing that the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European states be invited to the NATO foreign ministers' session to be held at the end of this year.

People here are not ruling out the possibility that the French president might "sound out" M.S. Gorbachev's attitude to the creation of a European defense system that would be part of the EC. [passage omitted]

Gorbachev on Nuclear Arms 'Guarantees'

LD3110224991 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1730 GMT 31 Oct 91

[By correspondents Sergey Batyrev, Aleksandr Krivvykh, and Yuriy Lopatin]

[Excerpts] Soustons (southwest France), 31 Oct (TASS)—Following the conclusion of the Soviet-French summit meeting held yesterday and today in Latche—the French president's estate—Mikhail Gorbachev and Francois Mitterrand organized a news conference for the French and international press. [passage omitted]

M.S. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand answered journalists' questions. [passage omitted] [passage omitted]

Question from the newspaper LIBERATION: In the light of the initiative of President Mitterrand, who suggested that a meeting should be held between the four powers that have nuclear weapons on the European continent, on what guarantees from the USSR president can one count, bearing in mind the centrifugal tendencies in the republics of the former Soviet Union on whose territory the nuclear weapons are located? [passage omitted on Mitterrand reply]

Gorbachev: I will answer the question about guarantees. The nuclear weapons are now under the control of Union
bodies and the country's president as far as strategic offensive weapons are concerned. You ask that question evidently drawing on the statements that have emerged at various times and have given rise to anxiety both in the Soviet Union and among you. I must say that it reflects certain realities of the current state of our society, although all the same members of the cast declared a few days later that they have no claims and understand what nuclear weapons, strategic offensive weapons, etc, are, and that everything must be under the control of the joint command of the Union and the president—as it will in the future Union too. So both today and in the long term, the question is solved if we are speaking about a responsible position. But all the rest is our realities, which indicate that, within the framework of the discussions taking place throughout the country, such statements also appear. They show that our democracy is still taking shape, and our new politicians who have emerged into the political arena have also still to be shaped. I must say this with total frankness. Nevertheless, there are no causes or grounds for anxiety. Their attempts in speeches to frighten both the Union and other countries are simply not serious. They amount to nonsensical political talk that must be seen as nothing more than that. What is more, such irresponsible statements must be condemned. [passage omitted]

Gorbachev, Mitterrand Comment Further
LD30102115591 Paris Antenne-2 Television
Network in French 1900 GMT 30 Oct 91

[Interview with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and French President Francois Mitterrand by journalists Christine Ockrent and George Bortoli at Mitterrand's private resident in Latche, Landes Department; Gorbachev speaks in Russian with superimposed French translation—live]

[Excerpts] [Ockrent] Despite the humidity here this evening in the Landes [department], the atmosphere here in Latche is warm. There is a fire burning in the fireplace, and the first round of talks between the two presidents late today focused on the Madrid conference of course, but also on the state of the Soviet Union. But we will surely be able to know more and interview both presidents at the same time. [passage omitted]

[Ockrent] Mr. President, you will hold talks on security and disarmament issues with Mr. Mitterrand this evening and tomorrow morning here in Latche. But how far can you ensure that your international commitments are being enforced when one knows that the republics where nuclear weapons are deployed also demand control of those?

[Gorbachev] In our country we are looking for new ways of life; the crisis through which we went was a crisis of the system. We abandon certain ways of life linked to totalitarianism to go toward new ways of life, democracy. We talked a lot about that—the fate of the Union, the powers of the Union and of the republics—and at the same time we talked about the role of various institutions, including the Armed Forces. In the framework of these talks, several opinions were expressed but nothing has been decided yet. I want to speak again about the extraordinary session where there was a declaration by several republics and various principles which are at the root of our activity have been stated: the Union agreement, common armed forces, a single common economic market, a single foreign policy.

So we rest on the constitution, on the decisions of the session and today the Armed Forces have a single command, all the rest are words, words concerning the reform to come which will be a basic reform. But if you take the latest declarations from the Ukraine, from Russia, from Kazakhstan you know that concerning the Armed Forces, concerning nuclear weapons, they all agree that the center should control those and the center will already be another center in the conditions of the new Union.

[Ockrent] But Mr. Yeltsin has just announced a one-year halt on nuclear tests in Russia....

[Gorbachev, interrupting] I believe that you are a well-informed person, but I must nevertheless remind you about the following: The declaration concerning nuclear tests also contains the declaration of the president of the USSR dated 5 October, a moratorium. So this is what we say. I believe that someone wants to give a certain character to this declaration which might indicate a certain competition, a certain opposition, and so on. Some do it, some want to pour acid on the situation, there are forces which are not interested in union between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. I believe that if both of us, Yeltsin and myself, were to give in to these passions, if we both had suspicions of the other, if we were to place all that above the people's and the government's interests, I believe that it would be unfair to us. It does not happen like that. In this sphere I have a position of principle. I will hold to what was agreed between all the leaders, including Comrade Yeltsin.

[Bortoli] Mr. President, many French people are worried because there are already armed conflicts inside the Soviet Union. There are, for instance, conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and they wonder whether things worse than what is going on in Yugoslavia will happen because there are nuclear arms, for instance, in the USSR. Do you share their worries?

[Mitterrand] I do not go that far, especially on the nuclear level. I think, in fact, that the center, as Mr. Gorbachev has just said, must exercise command. This is a worrying issue, not only for the French but for me too. This is why I immediately requested the meeting of the four powers owning nuclear forces on European soil in order not to discuss everything about disarmament, but to examine this situation and obtain the appropriate guarantees. Mr. Gorbachev, as a matter of fact, agreed right away, and I think that this discussion will be useful. However, I still believe that there is nevertheless a sense
of responsibility in the republics, and that there is a very strong one at the head of the Union, and that there cannot be any question of dispersing the centers of command in such a serious matter.

[Bortoli] If your proposal is taken up, will France and Europe, who are, one must say, absent from the Madrid conference, be more present in the construction of a new security?

[Mitterrand] You are mixing issues here.

[Bortoli] Well, France and Europe's role in this conference on the Middle East is not very clear, but it must be clearer when it is a question of European security.

[Mitterrand] France and Europe have not been, unfortunately, a part of this kind of debate for 30 or 40 years. It will be progress when we have reached this, I mean when Europe is recognized as a full partner. We are working on this and I hope that this will be the case between now and the end of the year when we will meet in the Netherlands. As for France, believe me, it was very useful during all the preparations for this conference. Historians will know this a little bit later. It is true that we have the ambition of intervening in international affairs whatever the level in question. As for security, France, being one of the countries which possesses nuclear weapons and being considered as such, we will undoubtedly talk about this on 8 November in Rome with Mr. Bush and Mr. Major. And our foreign ministers are already holding direct talks to talk about this, and if the need arises they will prepare for the talks with Mr. Gorbachev, about which I spoke a while ago.

Therefore, France has some presence—not enough for the Middle East and more than you think, on the level of security, this presence is total. We are one of the big responsible countries upon which all the rest depends. Of course, we do not have the nuclear arsenal which both the Soviet Union and the United States have, but we have enough to be a part in the general agreements.

[passage omitted]

Russia's Volkogonov Predicts 'Single Command'
LD0611145491 Moscow TASS in English 1445 GMT 6 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Roman Zadunaiskiy]

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS—"The signing of the inter-state economic agreement, as well as certain positive steps taken towards each other by the leaders of sovereign states, have kindled hopes that a defence alliance will also be concluded," Colonel-General Dmitry Volkogonov, the Russian president's defence counselor and people's deputy of the Russian Federation, told TASS.

He stressed the impermissibility of violating the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty. "All the sovereign republics, where nuclear weapons are deployed, must declare that they do not claim the status of nuclear powers," Volkogonov said. "The single command, headed by the USSR president, must keep all the nuclear weapons under single control," he stressed.

According to Volkogonov, favourable conditions have now appeared for new important initiatives to cardinally reduce the nuclear potential. "President Bush's and President Gorbachev's latest steps in this sphere may lay the beginning for a still more extensive reduction of nuclear weapons," Volkogonov said.
CYPRUS

NATO Decision on Nuclear Reductions Hailed
NC2010084591 Nicosia KHARAVYI in Greek
19 Oct 91 p 3

[From the "Our Views" column: "We Welcome NATO's Decision"]

[Text] Every logically thinking individual must rejoice at the recent NATO decision to drastically reduce its nuclear arsenal. The decision responds to the ecumenical demand for further reductions in weapons of mass destruction. Only a few days ago U.S. President George Bush announced his decision to unilaterally withdraw or destroy U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev responded by announcing new and additional measures to limit the Soviet arsenal.

These changes, leaps toward an era of peace, are certainly relevant to, in fact they are the fruit of, "new thinking," the end of confrontation and cold war, the improvement of USSR-U.S. relations, and large steps made towards disarmament. We welcome the NATO decision and expect other steps which will rid us of the nightmare of a nuclear holocaust.

FRANCE

Three Nuclear-Missile Subs To Remain on Alert
92ES0066A Paris LE MONDE in French 2 Oct 91
p 12

[Article by special correspondent Jacques Isnard: "France Will Maintain Three Strategic Submarines on Constant Operational Patrol"]

[Text] To date, despite the decline in East-West tension, France has not cut back or slackened the pace of operational patrolling with its strategic missile submarines. Just as the United States excluded undersea forces from its disarmament plan, so the French Defense Ministry has appended to its 1992 budget plans the request for a third new-generation Triomphant-class nuclear submarine to replace the dismantled Redoutable.

Aboard the Redoutable—On 6 October, in accordance with tradition, Redoutable will make her last voyage accompanied by the men who have commanded her during her 20 years in service. The Redoutable—France's first nuclear ballistic-missile submarine—will leave her base on Ile-Longue in the Brest and proceed to the port of Cherbourg where she was built. On board will be 17 of the 20 successive "pashas" who commanded her, in alternating teams of two, between January 1972 and February 1991, when she made her 58th and final patrol at sea.

For the last eight months, stripped of its megatons of M-20 missiles, Redoutable has served as an experimental submarine. Far from the oceanic zones it used to frequent when carrying out its deterrence mission, it has steered into the Atlantic and Mediterranean to help in development of the transmission, navigational and acoustic detection equipment that will arm her successors. At Cherbourg, beginning 7 October, the submarine will be disassembled—the Navy will try to recover some 20-40 million French francs [Fr] worth of its on-board equipment to add to stores of spare parts—while its reactor, its nuclear "boiler-room," and all its on-board generators will be scrapped or put in cold storage.

On Monday 30 September State Secretary for Defense Jacques Mellick invited 400 guests to the Ile-Longue submarine base, in preparation for that ceremony which—along with the departure of its current skipper, Commander Dominique Dupre La Tour (20 years in the submarine service, and 27,000 hours submerged), and the scheduled discharge of its crew in mid-December—will mark the end of a great adventure.

Third Triomphant

Standing beside a Redoutable which looked younger than her years (despite her 4,000 sea voyages, during which she circled the globe 16 times and went through four nuclear reactor cores), Mr. Mellick announced that "more than ever the submarine component is and will remain the linchpin of the deterrent force." He also said that France intends in 1992 to order a third so-called new-generation submarine to follow the Triomphant (the first of the series, now under construction at Cherbourg) and the Temeraire, which is on order. With a displacement of 14,000 tons (compared to 9,000 for Redoutable), the Triomphant, which will carry 16 multiple-warhead M-45 missiles, will have improved stealth characteristics: It will be quieter under water thanks to its construction and to internal equipment suspended on flexible springs to avoid sound propagation. According to current plans—which may be modified by the military programming bill now being prepared—the Triomphant, which counting its nuclear weapons will cost an estimated Fr20 billion, should be operational sometime after January 1995. The second in the series, the Temeraire, should be ready by July 1997. Mr. Mellick did not give out the name or date of entry into service of the third submarine, which he said is to be ordered in 1992.

Museum or Scrap?

Until the Triomphant goes into service, vice fleet admiral Francis Orsini, who commands the Strategic Oceanic Force (FOST) and the submarine service and who was with the Redoutable on its last night beneath the waves, will have to carry out his presidential mandate with just the five submarines still in operation, which are armed with the M-4 missile with its multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads.

The mandate has never been changed, despite the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. On orders from Mr.
Francois Mitterrand, first given in 1983, the FOST has been obliged to keep three submarines at sea at all times and another ready to get under way on three days' notice—a posture it still maintains. There are only four operational ensembles of M-4 missiles (16 in each set) to be divided among the five vessels. The one whose turn it is to be unarmed uses the time to undergo a major overhaul (approximate cost Fr800 million) at the Cherbourg naval yards.

Thus, on a schedule of 10 straight weeks on patrol followed by three weeks in port for necessary repairs, each of the five submarines currently in service in FOST will continue to make its appointed rounds, regular as clockwork, with the help of two 126-man crews that will take turns on board.

"Hidden in the depths of the oceans," said Mr. Mellick, "they help guarantee the preservation of peace—a peace which, despite the hopeful events of recent times, is perhaps more fragile than we European nations would like to think." Speaking in a more military vein, Admiral Orsini cited some statistics: "Now that the Redoutable and its M-20 missiles have gone out of service this year, and all the submarines have modern M-4 missiles, the Navy has 92 percent of France's strategic nuclear explosives."

When it docks at Cherbourg, after the cruise of its old "pashas," once it is disassembled and disarmed about mid-December and turned back to the admiral superintendent of the port, will the Redoutable be sold for scrap at a price that could not exceed about Fr20 million? That is the big question now. At the moment, two cities—Brest and Cherbourg—are wrangling over possession of it: They are prepared, at their own expense, to turn it into a museum. They have until Christmas to offer Redoutable as a gift to the public.

Defense Minister: Nuclear Testing To Continue
PM22101404091 Paris LE MONDE in French
18 Oct 91 p 12

[Unattributed report: "Mr. Joxe: 'France Will Carry Out Tests as Long as It Has Nuclear Weapons'""]

[Text] Speaking in the National Assembly on Wednesday 16 October in reply to a question on disarmament from Robert Montdargent, French Communist Party deputy for Val-d'Oise, Defense Minister Pierre Joxe said that France "will have to carry out tests for as long as it has nuclear weapons." "We will still participate in disarmament but never in conditions which would place France in an inferior position," he added. Mr. Joxe said he is "worried" by the state of Soviet Armed Forces, "not only by the volume and continuing modernization of their armaments," but also because "there is a nuclear security problem on which we do not have information which is sufficiently accurate to be reassuring."

Defense Minister Sees No Need for Disarmament Measures
AU21101404091 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
23 Oct 91 p 2

["K.R.O." report: "No Nuclear Disarmament in France"]

[Text] Vienna—French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe sees no need at this point for France to take disarmament measures in the nuclear area after the disarmament initiatives launched by the United States, the USSR, and NATO. France possesses only a few hundred warheads, whereas the superpowers will still have between 5,000 and 7,000 after the implementation of the START Treaty, Joxe stressed. The French defense minister paid a visit to his Austrian counterpart Werner Fasslabend in Vienna on Monday and Tuesday [21-22 October]. During his visit, Joxe also familiarized himself with the measures that have been taken in Burgenland province at the border to prevent illegal immigration. The possible purchase of French antiaircraft guided weapons was not discussed, Fasslabend stated.

Reduction in Funds for Nuclear Weapons
PM3110145091 Paris LE MONDE in French
30 Oct 91 p 14

[Jacques Isnard: "France Will Reduce Its Nuclear Investments"]

[Excerpt] Next year France will reduce the proportion of the funds it devotes to nuclear investment in the military sphere by more than 3 percent compared with 1991. This decision is part of the draft 1992 defense budget which will be submitted to the deputies on 13 November. According to Defense Minister Pierre Joxe it marks "a departure from the trend in previous years."

In 1991, France devoted no less than 42.9 billion francs (administration and equipment funds combined) to its nuclear forces, in other words 22.1 percent of the defense budget to 5.8 percent of its military personnel.

In the equipment sphere (research, tests, and mass production of equipment) this reduction in funds is around 3.28 percent for 1992.

Officially, this initiative is presented by the defense minister as the result of what he calls "the recomposition of the strategic situation in Europe." It relates to both the arsenal of strategic weapons—although the missile-launching nuclear submarines seem less concerned—and to the panoply of prestrategic weapons.

Essentially, this reduction in France's nuclear effort is linked to this summer's twofold decision to halt the S-45 long-range (6,000km) surface-to-surface strategic missile project and not to deploy the Hades medium-range (480km) prestrategic missiles.
At a Slower Pace

But it will also be noted that the draft 1992 budget includes a twofold reduction in the armed forces' subsidy to the Atomic Energy Commission and in the funds for the Nuclear Test Center Directorate in the Pacific. These two bodies are responsible for the development, testing, and mass production of nuclear weapons. The reduction in their funding can be explained by the decision to halt the S-45 and Hades programs, but it also heralds a reduction in the number of nuclear tests which would be reduced from six to four per year.

Mr. Joxe recently made a point of informing senators that "the strategic naval component (the missile-launching nuclear submarines and the program for a new M-5 sea-to-ground missile) will continue to benefit from a sustained effort in 1992." [passage omitted]

GERMANY

Arms Industry Pushes To Civilianize Production

92GE00554A Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 19 Oct p 7

[Article by Erwin Single: "Arms Industry Hit by Thaw: By Means of Massive Layoffs and Refuge in Cartels, German Arms Makers Seek to Escape the Battle for Weapons Sales"]

[Text] Juergen Schrempp, director of the firm Deutsche Aerospace [Dasa], has no easy job. An automobile mechanic by trade, he is responsible for filling the order books of the air and space subsidiary of the Daimler concern. When the automobile concern bought up the firms MBB [Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm], Dornier, MTU [Motoren-Turbinen-Union], and Telefunken Systemtechnik (TST) in 1988, the armament business appeared headed for big things. For Schrempp, the end of the Cold War in Europe could hardly have come at a more opportune time; instead of the anticipated profits, the books of the Daimler subsidiary now show a 43 percent gap in orders. The Dasa director has long since realized that the armament industry is facing lean years.

But the trembling goes on. Dasa (turnover of 12.5 billion German marks [DM], 48 percent of it for arms deals) must fear for the loss of its contract for the prestigious "Fighter 90" project. The Federal government is to decide next year on the fate of the German-English-Spanish-Italian attack aircraft, into the development of which it has already invested DM2.8 billion in tax revenues. Experts estimate that the cost of the "miraculous bird" to the German partner will be between DM50 and DM100 billion, 80 percent of which will be spent by Dasa. Yet even within the Union parties [Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU)], resistance is growing to the expensive plans of "Stoltenberg Airlines." If the Fighter 90 project crashes, circa 7,000 jobs at Dasa are threatened, approximately 5,000 of them just in the Tornado assembly plants in Manching and Augsburg.

One scenario of IG-Metall [metalworkers union] assumes that half of the total of about 400,000 jobs in the German arms industry are threatened by disarmament and lack of demand. The peace institute SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] in Stockholm has figured out that up to 500,000 of the approximately 1.5 million jobs in the western European armament industry are in jeopardy. At the Defense Ministry in Bonn, one now assumes that government military contracts will drop by a third over the medium term as a result of the Vienna disarmament agreements alone. The total value of these lost orders is allegedly DM4.7 billion. The western European armament industry even expects the cushion of NATO orders to shrink to half its present volume in a few years. To a large extent, the economic consequences of the disarmament process catch this branch of industry unprepared. As court purveyors to the Bundeswehr, German arms manufacturers had for years occupied comfortable monopolistic niches. Even the former undersecretary in the defense ministry, Manfred Timmermann (CDU), reasoned that "the German armament branch" consists for the most part of "oligopolistic suppliers with a diversified middle-class subcontracting industry."

The Bundeswehr bought eagerly: During the last five years, it spent about DM11.5 billion annually for equipment procurement, plus another DM5 billion for repairs and DM3 billion for research and development. And the Federal Government (Kohl's slogan: Promote peace with ever fewer weapons) saw to it that the armament industry was also able to profit from flourishing arms export deals: In 1990 alone, weapons and armament plants worth DM13 billion were sold abroad with Bonn's approval.

Now many enterprises are faced with a fight for their existence. The larger the enterprise, the greater the armament share of its production, and the more specialized its armament production, the more problematical conversion becomes. In Germany it is especially the manufacturers of conventional armament products such as tanks and artillery, the shipbuilding industry, and aircraft manufacturers, who are getting into a bind. Regionally, the anticipated crisis will above all impact on Bavaria and the north German coastal laender: Nearly one-third of all government defense contracts flowed into the white-and-blue free state [of Bavaria], and a good 10 percent of procurement expenditures have thus far gone to the northern laender.

"Close down and buy up more," thus the reaction of most of the defense plants to conversion, the IG-Metall criticizes. In point of fact, only few enterprises have made a serious effort to put their fatal dependence on arms production on a civilian footing by means of internal conversion programs. Instead, they would rather buy up firms with a civilian product line and sell
armament sectors that no longer appear profitable to the European armament giants currently engaged in a process of concentration. The best example for the crash-program strategy is cannon builder Rheinmetall (sales of DM2.97 billion, including DM1.2 billion for military hardware). Before Christmas, the firm's directorate in Ulmenstrasse in Duesseldorf decided to release 1,000 defense workers in one fell swoop, equaling one-third of the entire labor force, by 1993. Rheinmetall Director Raimund Gernershausen tersely defended the dismissals wave as necessary to reduce excessive capacities. However, this is no reason for the enterprise to get out of the defense business entirely. "We've been doing this for 100 years, why should we give it up now?" Gernershausen asks. With a war chest filled to the bursting point, other armament firms are bought up instead. To safeguard the monopoly that it enjoys in the artillery sector as court supplier to the ground forces, the cannon kings of the Krupp concern acquired the tank and naval supplier MÃ¼K-Systemgesellschaft. To reduce the armament share of its production to a third, Rheinmetall swallowed up the leading packaging machine producer Jagenberg, the carburetor firm Pierburg, and almost even a telephone firm.

In the armament branch, it is clear: The competition in the European armament marketplace will become even more intense; the marketing crisis is decimating the supplier ranks. The European armament giants are seeking relief in cartel-like cooperative ties. The reason: The trend is to highly intelligent weapons systems and electronic warfare; practically all major programs are already being farmed out on an all-European Community basis. The cooperation among firms is aimed not only at major European contracts but also at exports, however: By German law, international coproductions are not subject to export restrictions; the finished weapons, assembled in the partner country, can be sold in accordance with the laws prevailing there—even to potential military chieftains in crisis areas and in the "Third World." The export of conventional weapons, Germany is running far behind France and England—no wonder that the leading enterprises of these countries play a key role for the German partners. Siemens AG, for example, was able to double its armament business to just under DM2 billion after it had joined forces with the British multinational electronic firm Plessey. And Dasa, in first place in its concentration on cross-border trade, would just love to take the French supplier Matra under its wing and cooperate more closely with British Aerospace.

Almost exemplary for the new armament alliances is the helicopter holding company, "Eurocopter S.A.," of MBB and Aerospatiale. The French state-owned concern is the development motor of the planned four-nation attack helicopter NH-90, in which Dasa is also participating. Thanks to the merger, the two firms should claim almost three-fourths of the business between them; the German share of the costs (24 percent) alone amounts to an estimated DM7 to DM8 billion. MBB and Aerospatiale are also actively involved in the development of the antitank helicopter PAH-2. "Euromissile," a similar missile consortium of the two enterprises, has just finalized a deal with French competitor Thomson CSF: Thomson transfers the production of the surface-to-air missile VT1 to Euromissile, which in return will forego the development of the "Roland" successor RM5. The Roland weapons system has thus far been the sales leader at MBB in the defense technology sector.

The Diehl Group in Nurnberg had also tried to safeguard its armament empire by means of wild purchases. One after the other, smaller defense firms such as the Mauser weapons plant or the Bodenseewerke-Gerateetehnik were pocketed. The expected success failed to materialize. The 20-percent growth, to DM1.4 billion, in the military technology sector was registered by Diehl (turnover of DM2.9 billion) as the main contractor for international joint projects, for which a lot of additional purchases are necessary. The world's leading manufacturer of tracks and, along with Rheinmetall, the biggest supplier to the army has lately begun to withdraw again from the armament business: 1,000 of the approximately 15,000 armament workers are to be released; the munitions plant in Rattingen is to be closed. A variegated general store with automotive electrical equipment, switching systems, clocks, and even special-purpose vehicles for cleaning sewers and mail delivery are to insure growth in the future. But in the military technology sector, as well, there are always possibilities for a reversal: Diehl is heavily involved in the scrapping and demilitarization of military-technical equipment.

A far more pronounced swing was carried out by the tank-building firm Krauss-Maffei. For years, one of the prize products of the Bundeswehr, the Leopard 2 battle tank, rolled from the Hirschau assembly buildings in the northern part of Munich. The business in tanks has run its course. The contract runs out in 1992 with the final delivery of 40 tanks; there will not be a new Leopard. Already last year, the firm, which aside from tracked vehicles deals in surface-to-air missiles and military electronics, suffered a loss of 56 percent in armament orders. However, unlike almost any other German armament enterprise (sales by the concern: DM1.4 billion), the locomotive firm so rich in tradition has, by means of conversion programs, succeeded in lowering the military technology share of its sales, which was still 80 percent in 1983, to under 50 percent. In Hirschau, the thinking reverted at an early date to rail transport technology and machinery and systems building. Today, ICE [Intercity-Express] railcars and presses for making compact discs are the new worldbeaters, and a future growth sector is perceived in synthetics and automation technology. Despite this, Board Chairman Burkhard Wollschaeger was forced to announce consequences of the declining armament business in June: By means of a further "moderate cutback," the number of armament employees will be reduced by 100 to 1,000 by the end of 1991.
Bundestag Ratifies European Disarmament Treaty
LD0711094591 Hamburg DPA in German 0908 GMT
7 Nov 91

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Bundestag ratified the treaty on
Conventional Disarmament in Europe (CDE) today
with the votes of all parliamentary groups. The agree-
ment provides for a considerable reduction in the arsenal
in the West and East in order to make future full-scale
surprise attacks impossible. Over and above this, Ger-
many is committing itself to reducing the strength of the
Bundeswehr from 525,000 to 370,000 men by the end of
1994.

In the debate, speakers from all parliamentary groups
welcomed the agreement, which has been signed by 22
states, as a great step toward more security in Europe,
and which others have to follow. Faced with the huge
developments in the Soviet Union, the republics which
are seeking independence were called upon to take on all
the disarmament obligations. Helmut Schaefer (Free
Democratic Party), minister of state in the Foreign
Ministry, said that especially in view of the Soviet Union
it is urgently necessary to implement the treaty quickly.

IRELAND

Bush Statement on Nuclear Arms Cuts Welcomed
92WC0013 Dublin IRISH INDEPENDENT in English
30 Sep 91 p 8

[Editorial: “Welcome Cuts”]

[Text] The scale of the nuclear arms cuts announced by
President Bush caught everyone by surprise, as they were
meant to do. It has helped President Bush’s image
abroad, and in the United States itself the announcement
will not have done his standing with the electorate any
harm.

Obviously the Soviet Union was caught on the hop.
President Gorbachev’s first reaction was a cautious one,
and he had to make a telephone call to the American
President to clear up some details. Now, one of his
spokesmen is talking about a “commensurate” Soviet
reaction.

In other words the world is getting to be a far less
dangerous place, as far as threats from nuclear weapons
is concerned. The dividends of detente are starting to
come in, and we are grateful.

The Americans have always argued that they needed a
strong nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union. But a
much different Soviet Union has changed all that. And
American spending on defence can be cut substantially
over the coming years, leaving more money available for
other and more popular services.

The Soviet President is confronted with something of a
dilemma over President Bush’s move. There can be no
question about the Washington decision being welcome.

Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin can shunt more of their
defence spending into cash starved areas, and this will
benefit everyone.

But even though the Soviet Army suffered humiliation in
the attempted putsch it is still a powerful domestic force
to be reckoned with, likely to try to resist defence
spending and as a result likely to mount verbal opposi-
tion at least to reform programmes.

There can be no doubt about the response of the rest of
the world to President Bush’s news. With every step
along the road to disarmament the world need no longer
fear confrontation between the super powers. But let us
not become starry-eyed: other countries have nuclear
weapons and show no sign of giving them up.

NETHERLANDS

Defense Minister Foresees ‘Minimum Nuclear
Deterrent’
92EN0017A Amsterdam DE VOLSKRANT in Dutch
4 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by Wio Joustra: “Minister Ter Beek Remains
Cautious”]

[Text] The Hague—“What I foresee now is a movement
toward a mutually agreed minimum nuclear deterrent
between the United States and the Soviet Union. That is
an extraordinarily positive development but even in this
new situation the Netherlands will still continue to be a
part of the nuclear risk sharing, together with its NATO
allies.”

These were the words of Defense Minister Ter Beek on
Thursday [3 October] immediately after his return from
Iceland, where he had spent the last few days observing
Netherlands Orion crews at work. The Orion crews are
stationed at an American airbase.

The nuclear disarmament initiatives announced by Pres-
ident Bush last week in his historic television address
have given rise to great euphoria and hopes for a safer
world all over the world, but especially in the capitals of
the Western allies.

That is true of the Netherlands as well. Last Saturday in
the corridors of the PvdA [Labor Party] congress in
Nijmegen, Ter Beek was already able to announce that
the Netherlands would be able to eliminate no fewer
than three of its four NATO nuclear missions: the
nuclear artillery, the Army’s Lance rockets, and the
depth charges carried by the Navy’s Orion reconnais-
sance aircraft.

The nuclear warheads and charges of the Lance rockets
will be removed from the Netherlands (Havelte and ’t
Harde) and sent to the United States to be destroyed “as
fast as the technology permits.”
For Mr. Van Traa, Ter Beek's fellow PvdA member and Second Chamber foreign affairs specialist, the elimination of three nuclear missions was not sufficient, however. While the PvdA's coalition ally, the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal], wanted to wait for Moscow's counterproposals, Van Traa made no bones about what he wanted: The Netherlands' last remaining nuclear mission—the bombs carried by its F-16 fighters—must be put up for discussion as well. And—the PvdA's favorite topic—further cuts in the defense budget will have to be considered as well.

Ter Beek tempers his colleague's enthusiasm and his desire for cuts. "This isn't a purely technical question," he says. "It also involves the political factor of nuclear risk sharing and solidarity within the alliance. I'm open to discussion, but I consider this a discussion that's got to be conducted within NATO, because we're talking about the details of the alliance's mutual minimum deterrence.

"As for the nuclear mission of two of the Netherlands F-16 squadrons, it is clear that the bombs fall under the new NATO strategy of nuclear weapons as truly weapons of last resort, political weapons in other words. It is important to see how Moscow will respond concretely.

"I have no objection if people think the F-16 mission should come up for discussion, but it is getting way ahead of the game to say that mission simply ought to be eliminated as well. Furthermore, the successor to the F-16 bombs, the TASM (tactical air-to-surface missile, with a range of 500 kilometers), was originally scheduled to be introduced in the early 1990's. Now the decision has been put off until the end of the 1990's—at the earliest.

"Numbers of bombs will be on the agenda at the next session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) later this month in Sicily. I will not anticipate that discussion. Elimination of the bombs is not on the agenda. Only if it were, could the Netherlands be rid of its last nuclear mission."

And if the Soviet Union offers equally dramatic counterproposals? Ter Beek responds that "for the time being that is a hypothetical question but naturally I am looking forward eagerly to the Soviet Union's response." However, he considers it "very much the wrong time to bring the F-16 mission up for discussion," because the discussion must not focus solely on the Netherlands situation and the two Netherlands F-16 squadrons.

"I have always argued against that. The discussion has got to be in the context of the new NATO strategy: nuclear weapons truly as weapons of last resort and as part of a minimum deterrent to be mutually agreed on. Those two elements—they are what it's all about. That is how I view it."

As for further defense cuts, Ter Beek says he has always opposed narrowing the discussion of defense policy down just to the question, "How much are you going to spend?" Ter Beek says, "What I think is important is that the defense budget really be executable. All the developments in recent months confirm the correctness of the choices made in the budget."

But did he not describe the budget as a "guideline/parameter"? "I did, indeed, and we will in fact have to review the budget from time to time in light of developments and adjust it if necessary. We do not just turn our brains off and march straight ahead when we implement the budget. Current developments point toward a smaller, more mobile, more flexible military. But for me the guiding idea is still the qualitative linkage between reductions and restructuring. I will continue to hold to that course."