ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

SDI, SPACE ARMS

Moscow: White House at Odds With Congress Over ABM Pact
(Vitaliy Gan; PRAVDA, various dates) ....................... 1

SDI Report to Congres
House Cut in Defense Fund

TASS: White House 'Secret' Arm Report Issued
(Igor Ignatyev; TASS International Service, 21 May 87) .. 3

TASS Assails Pentagon Report on ABM Treaty Interpretation
(TASS, 22 May 87) ............................................. 5

TASS: U.S. Using Stark Incident To Militarize Space
(TASS, 24 May 87) ............................................. 7

USSR Journal Discusses West European SDI Stance
(G. Vorontsov; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE
OTNOSHENIYA, No 3, Mar 87) ............................. 8

USSR Journal on Japan's Role in SDI
(S. Chugrov; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE
OTNOSHENIYA, No 3, Mar 87) ............................. 21

Moscow: Japanese Participation in SDI
(Vitaliy Ilyashenko; Moscow Television Service, 25 May 87) 32

Japan Agreement on SDI
Japan-U.S. Space Station

- a -
Briefs

TASS: U.S. SDI Test
Moscow: Radar Violates Treaty

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR's Vorontsov on SDI-Strategic Offensive Arms Link
(Yuliy Vorontsov; ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME, 19 May 87) .............. 34

USSR's Gerasimov on Soviet-U.S. Ties, INF, SDI
(Prague Television Service, 21 May 87) ........................... 36

USSR Military Writers on Zero Option, SDI, Treaty Possibility
(Vladimir Chernyshev, Vasily Morozov Interview;
Prague Domestic Service, 22 May 87) ............................. 45

PRAVDA: Joint Statement by Delhi Six on INF, Testing, SDI
(PRAVDA, 23 May 87) .................................................. 51

Shevardnadze Letter to UN Head on Nuclear-Free World, SDI
(TASS, 25 May 87) ..................................................... 52

USSR Journal on Prospects for Arms Control
(V. Avakov; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE
OTNOSHENIYA, Mar 87) ............................................. 55

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

IZVESTIYA Editor 'Skeptical About U.S. Position'
(THE JAPAN TIMES, 3 Apr 87) ........................................ 74

Soviet Attache: NATO Pressuring Turkey on Nuclear Deployment
(Aleksandr Ivanov; Moscow in Turkish to Turkey, 25 Feb 87) 75

Turkish Commentary Examines Soviet Arms Control
(Coskun Kirca; HURRIYET, 12 Mar 87) .............................. 76

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR Army Paper: White Sands Nonnuclear Test Explosion Aims
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 May 87) .................................. 78

RELATED ISSUES

Soviet Journal Surveys Work of 41st UN General Assembly Session
(Vsevolod Oleandrov, Andrey Kozyrev; INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, No 4, Apr 87) ............................................. 79

PRAVDA: Deputy Foreign Ministers Discuss Bloc Initiatives
(Various sources, various dates) ................................. 88

- b -
CPSU's Solomentsev Attends 12th KKE Congress in Athens
(Various sources, various dates) ......................... 90

CPSU Greetings ........................................... 90
Florakis Speech Opens Congress, by V. Potapov, A. Tkachuk 91
Solomentsev KKE Congress Speech .......................... 92
Solomentsev Interview on Mediterranean, Mikhail Solomentsev Interview 95
Solomentsev-Papandreou Meeting ................................ 96
Papandreou Interview on Meeting ............................ 96

CPSU Secretary Dolgikh's Visit to DPRK
(Various sources, various dates) .......................... 97
Addresses Reception ........................................ 97
Meets With Kim Il-song ..................................... 98
PRAVDA Reviews Activities .................................. 99
Speaks on Asian Security .................................... 99
TV Carries Dolgikh Remarks .................................. 100
Speech at Sariwon Rally ...................................... 101

Moscow Views Status of Indian Ocean Peace Zone Effort
(Yu. Vinogradov; ZA RUBEZHOM, No 19, 8-14 May 87) ....... 103

/9987
MOSCOW: WHITE HOUSE AT ODDS WITH CONGRESS OVER ABM PACT

SDI Report to Congress

PM271305 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 May Second Edition p 5

["Commentator's Column" by Vitaliy Gan: "Tug-of-War"]

[Text] Washington -- The White House has sent Congress a two-part report prepared by the State Department legal department. In it the administration tries to convince legislators that the United States is free to interpret the 1972 ABM Treaty as it sees fit.

The summary of one part of the report, prepared under the direction of State Department legal adviser A. Sofaer, says that the "process of ratification of the treaty does not restrict the President to a narrow interpretation of it from the legal standpoint." This conclusion is drawn on the basis of a study of transcripts of discussions during the talks and Senate hearings. At the end of 1985 Sofaer had already published an "analysis" confirming the administration's "right" to a "broad interpretation." But his juggling with the facts and falsifications were swiftly exposed at the time. Sofaer dissociated himself from the "study," blaming the errors on "young inexperienced collaborators."

And now we have a new attempt to justify a "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty opening the way for full-scale SDI testing. It is highly significant that this attempt has been made at a time of sharpening confrontation between Congress and the administration on arms control issues.

Despite the threats repeated almost daily by President Reagan that he will veto the legislators' demands, the Democrat-controlled Congress has already adopted a series of measures designed to slow down the arms race. Thus the House of Representatives approved by an overwhelming majority an amendment effectively freezing SDI expenditure at the present level of $3.1 billion while the Pentagon is pressing for appropriations of $5.7 billion. Moreover, the House has approved a proposal banning the financing of actions which breach the "narrow" or original interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The Senate Armed Services Committee has endorsed a similar resolution.

All these initiatives are capable of thwarting the Pentagon's cherished dream of embarking on an early, "phased" deployment of SDI. This has seriously alarmed the White House. The administration, judging by the threats of presidential veto and the State Department report, is getting ready to "lean on" Congress again.
While it is still too early to judge what the results of this "tug-of-war" will be, it is already clear that the White House's clash with Congress is evidence of Americans' disillusionment with the administration's militarist course and their desire to check official Washington's belligerent ambitions.

House Cut in Defense Fund

PM221409 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 May 87 Second Edition p 5

["Commentator's Column" by Vitaliy Gan: "Signs of Common Sense"]

[Text] Washington -- The U.S. House of Representatives has approved the Pentagon's draft budget, which is considerably at variance with the government's request. By 239 votes to 177 congressmen voted to allocate the Defense Department $289 billion in the next fiscal year as against the $312 billion envisaged by the administration. This is a considerable blow to the White House's prestige.

The press is making it plain that the vote represents an "outright challenge to Reagan's actions in the arms control sphere." There is justification for such a conclusion. Besides cutting $23 billion from the appropriations requested the congressmen also added a number of amendments to the draft law aimed at curbing the Pentagon's appetite.

For example, a provision has been ratified which confirms the original interpretation of the ABM Treaty and, consequently, prohibits the deployment of the SDI system in space. The very request for $5.7 billion for work to implement the "Star Wars" program was cut to $3.1 billion. It is also planned to refuse funds for the deployment of armaments which exceed the framework of the Soviet-U.S. SALT II treaty. This amendment also demands the dismantling of those systems which have exceeded the set limits. Furthermore, the congressmen voted to impose a 1-year moratorium on the testing of nuclear devices with a yield of more than 1 kiloton on condition that the USSR shows similar restraint. The ban on ASAT antisatellite system tests, in force since 1985, was also confirmed.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon is continuing to make demands. It is clear from the military department's secret report, which ultimately reached Congress, that the military is insisting on testing four space-based systems, which represents a gross violation of the ABM Treaty.

The draft military budget is being passed to the Senate for examination. The situation that has arisen in the Senate also indicates that the administration's policy is finding increasing resistance there. For example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has adopted a resolution demanding that the administration abide strictly by the ABM Treaty's provision.

All this, of course, does not make it possible to speak of an abrupt turnaround on Capital Hill. But at the same time, it does provide evidence that there is an ever-increasing recognition there of the need for more realistic approaches.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1511
TASS: WHITE HOUSE 'SECRET' ARM REPORT ISSUED

LD211002 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0300 GMT 21 May 87

[By TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev]

[Text] Washington, 21 May (TASS) — The White House has sent its latest report to Capitol Hill aimed at torpedoing the Soviet-U.S. treaty limiting antimissile defense systems, which remains the cornerstone of the strategic arms limitation process.

In a secret report officially handed to Congress on Wednesday, the Pentagon gives a detailed description of the work and trials in the "Star Wars" program that the United States will be able to carry out, applying a so-called "broad" interpretation to the treaty, which was signed in 1972. As is clear from U.S. press reports, the main task of the recommendations it contains is to speed up implementation of the program of space militarization. According to information obtained by THE NEW YORK TIMES, the Pentagon is, for example, proposing to stage four trials of space-based systems in violation of the ABM Treaty. The United States, the report says, must either go over immediately to a new interpretation of the agreement of renounce it altogether at some stage.

A special statement made by the White House in connection with the handing of the Pentagon report to Congress says that, alongside other "research" for the Administration, it is supposed to "secure the basis for making a decision" on changing the structure and direction of work in the "Star Wars" program, in accordance with a "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Asserting that SDI is allegedly "important for the future of the security of the United States and its allies", the White House called upon Congress "to avoid steps that could undermine" this program.

The administration has made this call in a situation where, as the weekly CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY puts it, the most important debates of the 1980's on military issues are getting under way on Capitol Hill. On the very same day Congress was presented with the Pentagon report, the supporters of the "Star Wars" program prevented the start of discussion in the Senate of the bill on the U.S. military budget for fiscal 1988 for the third successive time. The aim of the parliamentary obstruction tactics employed by the Republican senators is to get the amendments requiring that the administration strictly observe the ABM Treaty excluded from the bill. As Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, on whose initiative this amendment was brought, said the U.S. Congress will not allow President Reagan to use SDI funds for a unilateral renunciation of the traditional interpretation of the treaty.
On Wednesday the Democrats, who introduced this amendment to the bill, were just one vote short of stopping the obstruction set up by the Republicans. R. Byrd, the leader of the Democratic majority in the Senate, said that in the next few days another vote will be held in order to proceed to discussion of the military budget. But R. Dole, the leader of the Republican minority, warned that President Reagan will nonetheless veto the bill unless the amendment requiring that the ABM Treaty be observed is removed from it.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1511
TASS ASSAILS PENTAGON REPORT ON ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION

LD220440 Moscow TASS in English 0016 GMT 22 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS -- Follows commentary by Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS military news analyst:

The White House has made another step towards torpedoing the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, which is without time-limit, by sending to Congress the Pentagon's report containing recommendations to speed up sharply the implementation of the SDI programme and to this end either go over to a "broad interpretation" of the said treaty, or give it up altogether some time later.

What does that move imply? In the first place that the U.S. Administration is determined to carry on the policy of impairing the international-legal regime, of knocking key links out of it. Washington, which earlier renounced the interim agreement SALT-I and the SALT-II treaty, is now trying to destroy the ABM Treaty, which is one of the fundamentals on which Soviet-American relations are built.

Second, the current American leadership is out to renounce the signature put by the United States under the ABM Treaty fifteen years ago, and go back on its own commitment to prevent arms race in outer space which is placed on record in the Geneva statement on the Soviet-American summit meeting in November 1985.

Third, the White House is clearly set not only to revive soon, but also to raise to an even higher level the perennial competition between the "shield" and "sword", which is particularly dangerous in this nuclear space age. Since the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972 was an expression of great political wisdom of both the USSR and the USA, recognition by them of the objective fact that the renunciation of national anti-ballistic missile systems is the most reasonable and effective method of defence from a nuclear-missile attack.

Fourth, the U.S. leadership is out to break the most important barrier in the way of the weapons race, to destroy the hopes of the peoples for the possible deep cuts in the strategic offensive weapons with the aim of their total destruction in the future. They in Washington should realise that without the ABM Treaty there will be no treaties on strategic offensive forces and that after the destruction of the treaty the nuclear missile race will assume a new dimension — an arms race in outer space will be added to it.
As far as the essence of the so-called "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty is concerned, the total irrelevance of the revision of interpretation of the treaty has been convincingly proved not only by the Soviet Union, but also by American experts who took part in hammering out the treaty, as well as the prominent disarmament experts in U.S. Congress. It is apt to recall at least one fact which is evidence of the total unfoundedness of the U.S. Administration's attempts at "linking" SDI with the ABM Treaty. Since first spokesmen for the U.S. leadership wished to "prove" that the treaty had allegedly become "outdated". [sentence as received] When it became clear that this gimmick won't work, since the laws of logic underlying the treaty are without any term of limitation and the progress of science and technology is graphic proof of the need for strengthening its regime, they undertook to misconstrue the basic provisions of that important document.

All this is evidence that the current U.S. Administration, eager to meet every wish of the military-industrial complex is capable of abandoning any treaties and agreements, renouncing its own international commitments and disregarding the opinion of U.S. Congress.

It is high time for some people in Washington to realise that without a strict observance of the treaties, the more so such an important treaty as that on ABM there is no way to ensure international order and basic stability.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1511
TASS: U.S. USING STARK INCIDENT TO MILITARIZE SPACE

LD240900 Moscow TASS in English 0753 GMT 24 May 87

[Text] Washington May 24 TASS -- The Pentagon has cynically decided to avail itself of the tragic death of 37 American seamen in the Persian Gulf to further its space militarization effort.

The attack on the USS Stark, a WASHINGTON POST correspondent was told at the North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Space Command in Colorado Springs, "underscores the need for a space-based radar system to spot 'smart' weapons such as the Exocet missile that hit the U.S. ship in the Persian Gulf".

Gen. John Piotrowski, who heads these commands, said "the time has come to put radars in space to keep constant watch over the Persian Gulf and other hot spots".

He called for a surveillance network of 12 to 15 radar satellites which, according to his estimates, would cost six billion to ten billion dollars.

/9738
CSO: 5200/5111
USSR JOURNAL DISCUSSES WEST EUROPEAN SDI STANCE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 87 (signed to press 12 Feb 87) pp 41-48

[Article by G. Vorontsov: "West Europe and the SDI"]

[Text] The progressive development of space research and technology is expanding the possibilities for the conquest of space, including its use for military purposes. It is with good reason that the problem of the nonmilitarization of outer space has moved to the forefront of international debate on military-political issues.

The course of events has now led to the decisive line by overstepping which space may be made an arena of an unchecked and extraordinarily dangerous development of events and a fundamentally new and exceptionally dangerous destabilizing factor capable of radically changing the strategic situation introduced to the intricate balance of armed forces and arms. Under these conditions truly general significance is attached to this solution or the other or lack of a solution of the problem of the nonmilitarization of outer space. No less important also is the fact that the militarization of space is capable of stimulating increasingly new twists of the arms race spiral in other spheres. On the other hand, solution of the problem of the nonmilitarization of space could lead to considerable improvements in the sphere of disarmament, nuclear primarily.

This was manifested particularly graphically in the course of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan in Reykjavik. Never before in the history of Soviet-American relations had the USSR put forward such radical arms reduction proposals. Far-reaching and interconnected, they constitute a package based on the program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 announced in the 15 January 1986 statement of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

As is known, there was a promising rapprochement of positions in a number of areas thanks to the efforts of the Soviet side as a result of difficult struggle and sharp disputes. Considerable reductions in and the subsequent elimination of strategic offensive arms were agreed. An understanding was also
reached on the complete elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and a radical reduction in this class of missiles in Asia. The main obstacle in the way of the fruitful completion of the meeting was the United States' position on the question of the SDI, owing to which a unique opportunity—to deliver mankind from the nuclear threat—was let slip. "We see the main danger of SDI," M.S. Gorbachev pointed out in a speech on Soviet television on 22 October 1986, "precisely in the transfer of the arms race to a new sphere and an endeavor to break out with offensive weapons into space and thus achieve military superiority."

Together with the well-known principal function of the SDI—the creation of preponderant military-strategic positions for the United States—there are other dimensions of the program also. They proceed from the domestic policy considerations of circles of American imperialism which exert a decisive influence on the administration's activity. At the same time they also reflect specific features of the international situation. The aspects of the "star wars" program which are concentrated in the channel of Washington's relations with its NATO allies are of considerable interest.

I

The intricate complex of interaction and contradictions between the United States and its allies along the entire spectrum of issues connected with the SDI has in recent years occupied an important place in the sphere of Atlantic relations. Not only this aspect or the other of the SDI program itself but also a whole number of problems of a strategic, political, economic and technological nature have come to the fore in the course of the wide-ranging discussion of the "star wars" concept. "It is difficult to imagine a more alienating issue for NATO," the prominent American expert G. Smith once declared in the course of hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1).

Washington's noticeable stimulation of efforts to tie its allies in this form or the other to realization of the "star wars" program pursues a number of goals. From the military-political viewpoint the United States, pushing forward its initiative and tempting the West Europeans with its strategic and technological benefits, is oriented toward the more effective realization of a traditional goal: "uniting the West" in the face of the USSR and its allies under its aegis. It was with good reason that in the well-known speech (March 1983) President R. Reagan pointed to the need to build a "space shield" which would be capable of intercepting and destroying strategic ballistic missiles before they reach not only "our own territory" but also "the territory of our allies" (2).

The cohesion of the "Atlantic community" on the basis of the SDI would undoubtedly be of political importance for Washington and would have an undoubted propaganda effect. It would make it possible to impart respectability in the eyes of world public opinion to the odious plans for the militarization of space, which are openly condemned by the majority of the population of our planet. The international community's attitude toward this question may be judged from the results of the voting of recent UN General
Assembly sessions. Thus at the 41st Session a resolution on preventing an arms race in outer space won the approval of an absolute majority. Only the United States refused to support it.

Considerable significance is also attached to the incorporation of additional forces and resources capable of alleviating Washington's material burden. It is clearly counting on pumping technology and intellectual potential from the West European states. The allies' participation in American developments, Washington strategists intend, should strengthen their attachment to the United States, mainly in the form of one-sided dependence. It, in turn, is capable of being converted into a strengthening of the United States' political leadership. The development of far-reaching processes in spheres highly sensitive for the West European countries such as national security, military planning and doctrines and determination of the role of the West European countries in the system of security and their place in the sphere of East-West relations may be assumed within the framework of this evaluation of the most general nature.

In the opinion of the authoritative American scientists S. Drell, P. Farley and D. Holloway--authors of a well-known report on the problems of SDI published by Stanford University--skepticism predominates in the West Europeans' evaluation of the "star wars" concept. Realization of the SDI, they fear, could lead to a strengthening of the mood in the United States in support of a "nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union". In this case Europe would be the highly probable theater of a nuclear war, and the American side, what is more, would adopt the decision on a possible nuclear attack "without them (the allies) having a right of veto or, possibly, a vote even." Thus, the authors sum up, "the revival of the prospect of the deployment of antiaircraft weapons would produce for West Europe not reassurance but uncertainty and, possibly, greater dangers" (3).

The United States would undoubtedly remain the winning side here. There would be primarily a strengthening of its positions in the set of Atlantic relations, and new opportunities for a power approach and outright diktat would be revealed. Further, the best models of West European achievements in the progressive fields of S&T progress (electronics, space technology, fundamental research connected with the SDI and others) would migrate across the ocean. The same applies to the financing by West European states and firms of various projects within the framework of realization of the "star wars" concept.

Such are Washington's calculations and plans. However, they are encountering very serious obstacles. The Atlantic allies have not proven as obedient to the will and instructions of the senior partner as the R. Reagan administration anticipated. And it is no wonder since Washington's egotistic interests show so clearly through the diplomatic phraseology of the West's "common interests" that they could not have failed to have been seen. And the proclamation of the "strategic defense initiative" itself was made without any consultations with the allies, to whom attempts were made subsequently, it suddenly being remembered, to show that this was being done in their interests. "The Europeans," THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote, "have been critical since the time when President Reagan announced his space wars program without having consulted
them. The plans for the flight testing of space-based weapons systems going far beyond the 'research' framework which the administration says it is conducting—testing capable of rendering an arms race in space irreversible—are causing particular concern" (4).

Under these conditions, particularly at the initial stage of promotion of the SDI, even Washington's most loyal partners deemed it necessary to express doubts as to the expediency of the United States' attempts to militarize space and associate the allies with fulfillment of the "strategic defense initiative". As a whole, a critical response was characteristic of the representatives of the majority of NATO countries, particularly in the initial period.

The American plans for the militarization of space were opposed by France. Anxious voices in connection with the prospects of the transfer of the arms race to space were also heard in Italy and other states. Even such a very close ally of the United States as Great Britain spoke out repeatedly on the danger of a destabilization of the international situation and an intensification of the arms race in the event of an acceleration of the SDI. Considerable concern was also expressed by the FRG Government. Judging by press comment, the country's ruling circles were disturbed by the possibility of an arms race in an entirely new sphere capable of strategically disuniting the United States and its allies. According to West German Defense Minister M. Woerner, realization of the SDI "would ultimately lead not to stabilization but the directly opposite result" (5).

The communists and other forces of the left are sharply criticizing the project. The "star wars" program was condemned in a resolution of the 14th EC Socialist Parties' Union Congress in April 1985, in which the heads of government of Spain, F. Gonzalez, Italy, B. Craxi, and Portugal, M. Soares, and L. Jospin, first secretary of the French Socialist Party, participated, inter alia.

Undoubtedly, the concern, anxiety and critical attitude toward the "star wars" propounded by the United States reflect the predominant mood in the broadest circles of the West European community. However, it would be wrong upon an analysis of the current situation to underestimate other views also. Devotees of the SDI were found in the West European countries too. There are many of them in circles of the military-industrial complex, the highest echelon of NATO services and reactionary politicians, journalists and scientists. They are actively championing their positions, endeavoring to incline the corresponding governments in support of the American initiative. Thus the North Atlantic Assembly, which consists of representatives of the parliaments of NATO countries, declared, referring to the "growing military potential" of the USSR, that "there is every reason to continue the American research," and "the Atlantic alliance should not lag behind in these spheres..." (6).

Speaking in support of the SDI, representatives of the said circles are making active use of a number of arguments worked up by the American side. These are ideas connected with agitation for the creation of a "space shield," praise for the "humaneness" of space-based weapons, which are allegedly of a defensive nature and will ultimately make nuclear weapons unnecessary, and so
forth. Propositions set forth repeatedly by U.S. officials, including the President, are reiterated to this extent or the other. They are contained in concentrated form in Washington's official publication "The President's Strategic Defense Initiative" (7).

Other arguments are adduced also. They are based not only on the above-mentioned general aspects but primarily on a number of other considerations connected with the specific features of West Europe's location and its relations with the United States. A considerable proportion thereof is concentrated on aspects of an economic and also technological nature. "If the West Europeans do not participate in the SDI plans...," Prof K. Haffner, who urges participation in the SDI, observes in the West German weekly DIE WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, "this could have far-reaching consequences for them: the transition from semi-automatic to automatic machines accomplished by the Americans in isolation and their breaking of the technological 'sound barrier' will lead to a change in the correlation of the potential of novelties and products between the United States and (West) Europe to the disadvantage of the Europeans."

Thus a dramatic picture of a sharp increase in the technology gap between the Old World and the United States is painted. And he is talking, what is more, not so much about the military sphere as the purely civilian sectors of the economy. In the opinion of the "star wars" supporters, the SDI is capable of stimulating progress along the entire spectrum of modern technological fields. As the American journal ARMS CONTROL TODAY asserts, "throughout history the European allies have paid admiring tribute to American technical genius, and they continue to support the SDI research program, although they are troubled by Americans' virtually religious faith in technology" (8). Without involving ourselves in criticism of such views here, we would note merely that "technological considerations" are, perhaps, the most prevalent and frequently used part of the arguments in support of realization of the SDI.

Another part of the arguments is of a political-strategic nature and is connected with the specific features of mutual relations in NATO, the military machine of this alliance and its doctrine and strategy. At the center thereof is the problem of the credibility of the American guarantees. The supporters of "star wars" emphasize constantly that implementation of the SDI will do away with the United States' vulnerability to "nuclear attack" which emerged in the 1950's. This vulnerability had always engendered doubts in the NATO allies that Washington would consent to use nuclear weapons in the event of a war on the continent, disregarding the risk of a Soviet retaliatory strike against American territory. Advocates of West Europe's participation in the creation of antimissile defenses with space-based components also assert that even the protection solely of the United States' strategic nuclear forces would raise appreciably the credibility of its NATO commitments providing on Washington's part for first use of operational-tactical nuclear weapons, forward-based and medium-range missiles and then intercontinental strategic forces.

Calling for the creation of a "space shield," the French experts A. Kramiste and M. Geneste demand the opening of a space "umbrella over all the Atlantic
states". NATO's concept of "deterrence" would lose nothing from this, allegedly, and the security of the corresponding countries would allegedly be increased (9).

The Transatlantic "star wars" supporters actively insist on the need for the allies' participation in the implementation of Washington's plans. There has been a marked increase recently, what is more, in the tendency to prompt the West Europeans to create their own ABM system. An article by the American expert D. Yost in the journal POLITIQUE ETRANGERE is evoking considerable interest in this connection. The author specially analyzes the position of the West European countries in respect of SDI issues, criticizes the arguments of the circles which are opposed and brings the readers to the idea of the necessity ultimately for the development of West European states' ABM. D. Yost believes that realization of the SDI is capable of stimulating the development of military integration in West Europe which would on the basis of American technology create its own ABM system. And all these measures should be implemented within the NATO framework, what is more (10). According to data of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, the so-called "European Defense Initiative" pursues the goal of the creation of a defense merely of military facilities (11).

The coalition of supporters of "star wars" in West Europe which has become active recently is opposed by a powerful movement incorporating the most diverse strata of the population. They include prominent statesmen and fighters for peace, youth and women's organizations, scientists and military men, representatives of business circles and clergy. Within the framework of the SDI debate its critics have put forward a whole number of arguments convincingly revealing the aggressive nature of the "star wars" strategy and its military-political content and technological singularities. These arguments of a general nature are in principle similar to the positions of the American opponents of "star wars" (12). The ranks of the critics (as, incidentally, of the heralds of a "space shield" also) are by no means homogeneous. Whereas the communists, circles of the left, the progressive public and realistic public figures and politicians and experts advocate in principle the prevention of an arms race in space and consider the SDI a venture which is undoubtedly dangerous for the cause of peace, other critics, mainly close to ruling and conservative circles and the military and business establishment, argue somewhat differently. They proceed from their own concepts of the security of the corresponding countries, which do not always and in all things concur with the American interpretation.

A certain section of SDI critics believes that the creation of a "space shield" is capable merely of deforming the principle of the "indivisibility of the defense" of NATO, as it is formulated in official documents. "A discrepancy between the defense interests of the United States and West Europe" is, as the British GUARDIAN observed, possible in this connection (13). The Americans would to an increasing extent be oriented toward selfish interests concentrated in "Fortress America" and would to an increasingly great extent display an inclination to cast the allies to the whim of fate (14). It is for this reason that West Europe is far more interested than the United States in a strengthening of the terms of the ABM Treaty and the development of the process of extensive arms limitation.
Even the arguments of the "star wars" supporters who assert that the SDI would stimulate S&T progress in all areas and spheres of the West European economy are being seriously questioned. It is clear that even were a space-based defense system somehow to push forward S&T progress, this would be at the high price of the creation of a new class of exceptionally dangerous weapons. An interview with H. Riesenhuber, minister for research and technology of the FRG, in which he investigates in detail the possible consequences of a militarization of space, is highly interesting. Answering one question, he openly stated: "The SDI program should not be justified by possibilities of use of the results of the research for civilian purposes. It should be justified by the policy of allied relations and strategic considerations" (15).

The minister's opinion is confirmed by the newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, which reported at the end of December 1986 on the postponement of negotiations on Europeans' participation in the work of a permanent orbital space station. According to American information, the newspaper writes, the postponement of the start of the negotiations was directly connected with the U.S. Defense Secretary's demand that this space station be used for military purposes also. According to the same information, the Pentagon intends incorporating in the contract a secret article which would deprive the West European allies of the possibility of rejecting the United States' plans. "The Americans are interested primarily in using it within the framework of the research pertaining to realization of the SDI," the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU observes (16). Such examples are convincing testimony that the interests of the United States are far removed from concerns for the progress of West European technology in the civilian spheres.

The arguments being expressed particularly frequently in Britain and France concerning the possible fate of the so-called independent nuclear forces of these countries, which by the mid-1990's will incorporate approximately 1,200 warheads (17), have a very telling ring for the West Europeans. If, as some people in the West believe, the United States and the USSR deploy broad-based ABM systems, this could result for Britain and France, it is believed, in a devaluation of their own nuclear forces and increased dependence on the United States.

The turbulent debate in political and public circles is undoubtedly exerting the corresponding influence on determination of the policy of West European states' governments. Although their positions in respect of SDI have been adjusted repeatedly, it is possible to speak as a whole about the predominance of caution and a clear reluctance to agree immediately to concessions to the United States and automatically express solidarity with it. This was manifested particularly distinctly at the initial stage of promotion of the project.

A considerable role was performed by revelations heard in the United States from the mouths both of representatives of the administration themselves and circles very close to it. Truly, it is hard to believe officials advertising the SDI as a means of deliverance from nuclear weapons and wars when it was they who at one time were speaking of the need to achieve superiority to the
USSR, the possibility not only of fighting but also winning a nuclear war and so forth. But in parallel with these statements came the "confessions" of such figures as K. Gray and K. Payne proving the "acceptable loss" of tens of millions of lives, painting scenarios of future wars and extolling the SDI as a means of securing victory.

Under such conditions U.S. pressure on the European allies intensified. It has been manifested in the most diverse forms. Promises of fruits of S&T progress have been combined with crude pressure, and hints at significant orders being obtained, with calls for a display of "Atlantic discipline". Numerous visits of officials, sessions of NATO bodies and various seminars and colloquiums of both a bilateral and Atlantic nature have served this purpose.

The picture of the West European states' official attitude toward the SDI has now been quite clearly determined. A considerable number of the partners has adopted a restrained-critical attitude toward the "star wars" program, and only a few have agreed to take the plunge and cooperate at government level. France, Norway, Greece, Denmark and Canada have opposed participation in the preparations for "star wars".

As far as France is concerned, Paris has put forward the Eureka project (18), which is intended to unite West European states' efforts in the sphere of the latest technology, space research included. While highlighting the purely civilian focus of the project, its supporters are at the same time endeavoring not to counterpose Eureka to the SDI for a number of reasons, including that of not exacerbating relations with the United States. Nonetheless, the mere fact of the promotion of this project at a time when the White House has made the question of pushing through the SDI program at all costs of paramount importance testified that Eureka was being offered to the public as an alternative to the American project. According to FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher, the Eureka project is designed to "ensure and strengthen Europe's economic and technological competitiveness" (speech in the Bundestag of 8 November 1985).

A number of steps had been taken as of the fall of 1985 to advance the French project. The second meeting of ministers of the participating countries was held in Hannover in November 1985. It approved the concept of the Eureka program and a declaration on its principles and also submitted the first specific plans. Agreement was reached in the course of the meeting on the creation of a secretariat to administer the program.

The general understanding was revealed during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Paris in 1985 that space should be closed to strike weapons. Speaking in Moscow in July 1986, F. Mitterrand declared: "France also keeps an attentive eye on questions concerning space. It attests that its use for military purposes is already a reality, but it would seem to it to be of essential importance to avoid any new arms race. It is better to give the search for peace every chance than to cross one further threshold in endless escalation."

The United States meanwhile has continued to put pressure on its allies, seeking the association if only of some of them with the SDI. It has been reflected particularly tangibly in determination of the position of the United
States' leading NATO partners, primarily Great Britain and the FRG. The class interests of imperialism and "Atlantic community" in the main areas of rivalry with the East obviously played an important part in the ultimate formulation of their position. The pressure of the national military-industrial complexes which have taken shape in Great Britain and the FRG and the influence of reactionary politicians and generals were of considerable significance also.

The first country to join in the SDI officially was Great Britain. The defense secretaries of the two countries signed the corresponding agreement in November 1985. It speaks of the participation of British industrial companies and universities in the development of "star wars" projects. In accordance with the latter, the companies will work in 18 areas of research, having as yet concluded contracts, however, only for $2 million, which constitutes less than 4 percent of the budget resources to be spent on SDI in the 1987 fiscal year (19). According to press reports, the activity of the companies and research centers involved in the military-space program will be coordinated within the framework of a special department of Great Britain's Defence Ministry.

It should be noted that even in the ruling circles of the states which support Washington the picture is by no means unambiguous. The situation in the FRG, where heated arguments have flared up not only between the opposition and the ruling parties but also within the government majority, may serve as a graphic example of the acute struggle surrounding these questions. H. (Telchik), the FRG chancellor's foreign policy adviser, visited the United States in September 1985 at the head of a delegation of scientists and industrialists. The report which appeared as a result of the visit demanded the FRG's speediest association with the SDI inasmuch as it was precisely thus that it would allegedly be possible to derive the maximum economic, political and military benefit. However, the report's conclusions were criticized in the Foreign Ministry.

According to press reports, sections of the foreign policy department made a highly skeptical assessment of the possible benefits from participation in the SDI and considered the economic hopes illusory. In the course of the discussion which developed H.-D. Genacher proposed that the chancellor not conclude an intergovernmental agreement but confine himself to a less binding exchange of letters. But this position was not supported by CSU Chairman F.-J. Strauss. A decision in principle was adopted as a result of a meeting between the latter and Chancellor H. Kohl. They agreed on Bonn's participation in the SDI in the form of an intergovernmental agreement.

On 27 March 1986 M. Bangemann, minister for economics of the FRG, who was in the United States, and C. Weinberger signed the appropriate agreements in Washington. One of them regulates West German firms' activity in the sphere of SDI research, the other, "an improvement in general technology exchange". In April the Cologne newspaper EXPRESS published the full texts of the two agreements. It transpired that the United States, as the documents plainly indicate, reserves the right to decide which results of research within the SDI framework may be passed on to its West German partners, and which not. In addition, the agreements contain no obligations of the United States but merely its 'declarations of intent'. Bonn is essentially according the United
States the right of unlimited control over the actions of those of its firms which are to participate in the SDI research. Finally, both agreements and the "accompanying letters" supplementing them speak of plans for new restrictions in the list of West German commodities exported to the socialist countries. As K. Voigt, foreign policy expert of the SPD's Bundestag faction, emphasized, the FRG is thereby making itself even more dependent on American trade policy.

The third major West European country to associate itself with the SDI in the wake of Great Britain and the FRG was Italy. Initially Italian ruling circles had adopted a wait-and-see position. Serious debate on this issue developed in the country. Washington put increasing pressure on Rome, attempting to win it over to its side. It was no accident that Italy was the first West European country which Vice President G. Bush, who appealed to the allies to join actively in the "star wars" program, visited in June 1985. According to press reports, the greatest interest had been evoked across the Atlantic by Italian firms which had achieved notable results in the creation of laser and space technology, satellites, infrared sensors and special construction materials and lubricants and also in radar.

Step by step the government gave in to the United States' pressure. In March 1986 a special interministerial committee led by B. Craxi, the head of the government, sanctioned the participation of Italian companies in the SDI, and the official signing of a "Memorandum of Understanding" regulating the terms of the country's participation in "star wars" took place in September. Fearing the considerable objections of opponents, the Italian Government did not even submit this question for parliamentary debate. Nor were members of parliament familiarized with the full text of the memorandum, the secret nature of the agreement being invoked.

Italy's association with the SDI ties the country, which already had American nuclear cruise missiles on its soil, even closer to Washington's militarist plans. As far as the hopes for technological and financial dividends are concerned, they have proven highly transparent. The visit to Rome in November 1986 of Gen J. Abrahamson and his talks with Defense Minister G. Spadolini testify to this. This is what the weekly EUROPEO had to say about them in an article symbolically entitled "Space Umbrella' Leaking Over Europe": "Abrahamson brought bad news. The long-awaited shower of gold for Italian firms, which are hoping to take part in the research on the creation of a space shield, will not happen."

Washington is undoubtedly expressing a feeling of satisfaction with the agreements signed with a number of NATO allies. However, it is also having to reckon with the fact that a mood in support of a renunciation of participation in the SDI prevails among the West European public. Having run into opposition, the United States is hoping to fill the breach in allied solidarity at least partially by establishing direct contacts with industrial firms and research centers. Such a path, initially, in any event, suits the United States. For example, the Dutch Government, which declared that it would not join in the "space defense" program, at the same time did not prohibit its private companies from cooperating in realization of individual aspects of the program.
In consenting to this form of participation or the other in a number of SDI projects certain West European political circles are frequently harboring illusions concerning the fact that it is a question merely of research. However, it is difficult to imagine that the United States is investing billion-dollar sums and expending tremendous efforts, in the political sphere included, merely to confine itself to the research phase. In conversation with a correspondent of the journal LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR the prominent American physicist R. Garvin emphasized that the $26 billion allocated for the next 5 years itself testifies that the United States is planning not only research but also the deployment of a broad-based ABM system (20).

"What kind of peaceful future, what kind of strategic stability will we be able to speak of," M.S. Gorbachev said at a meeting with a delegation of the Nobel Prize Winners Congress on 13 November 1985, "if in addition to the missiles which already exist deep in silos and the ocean depths one more deadly threat--from space--looms above? Imagine in this case the world in 10-20 years time. Everywhere--from the bounds of the atmosphere at an altitude of 100 km to geostationary orbits--waves of various types of strike weapons will be flying over the heads of all people on our planet."

An important aspect of the question is that even if a war does not begin, realization of antimissile defenses with space-based components is capable of causing a sharp deterioration in the political climate in the world and destabilizing the international situation. Nor could this fail to be reflected in the conditions for safeguarding the West European states' national security. Even NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, delivering a lecture at Cambridge University, doubted the possibility of the creation of a "strategic defense system" which "would meet the goals of maintaining a balance of forces and not signify an aspiration to superiority" (21).

Discussing a strengthening of the United States' security by means of the SDI, American strategists hope to effect this at the expense of the security not only of its rivals but also its friends. In fact, it is difficult to imagine realization of the formula of the "indivisibility of the defense" of NATO if the leading country of the North Atlantic alliance--the United States--will, as distinct from its bloc partners, be covered by a "space shield". As the expert C. Peebles, who is well known in the West, wrote in his book "Battle for Space," new types of space weapons, particularly lasers, "will appreciably influence international relations and nuclear strategy" (22).

Reactionary circles of the United States together with NATO militarists are not averse to nudging West Europe toward a stimulation of its own efforts in the space arms race. According to THE WASHINGTON POST, "U.S. military and industrial circles have begun on the quiet to encourage West Europe to give thought to a variety of President Reagan's strategic defense initiative for protection against medium-range missiles" (23). A "special coalition" headed by the Republican D. Hunter, which has presented the idea of propagandizing in West Europe together with the SDI a West European "defense system" based on U.S. information and technology, has been set up for this.

A realistic alternative to the "star wars" concept and an alternative to the growth of the nuclear threat for the whole world is the Soviet program of a
nuclear-free world. Formulated in the 15 January 1986 statement of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, it was developed in the package of Soviet proposals at the meeting in Reykjavik. The USSR's position, which is based on the principles of equality and equal security, was a graphic expression of new thinking in the nuclear age. The future of mankind is linked not with plans for "star wars" but with the "star peace" concept, which is contained in the program of the use of space for peaceful purposes proposed by the Soviet Union. The efforts of the most diverse countries in the exploration and conquest of space could be unified by a world space organization. There are truly inexhaustible opportunities for this.

The circles in West Europe which support active participation in realization of the SDI are assuming a grave responsibility. The specifics of the current situation are such that if the U.S. military-industrial complex succeeds in the full-scale development of the corresponding efforts and involving its allies therein, no negotiations will be of any help. The danger of such a development exists.

A strengthening of national security needs to be sought on the path of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of an all-embracing system of international security precluding any wars--both nuclear and conventional.

FOOTNOTES


5. Ibid., 14 April 1984.


10. See D. Yost, "Les inquietudes europeennes face aux systems de defense anti-missiles" (POLITIQUE ETRANGERE No 2, 1984, pp 394, 396).

12. See M. Bundy, G. Kennan, R. McNamara, G. Smith, "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1985).


15. DER SPIEGEL, 9 September 1985, p 28.


18. Eureka—European Research Coordination Agency.


20. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 4 January 1985, p 33.


COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

8850
CSO: 1816/7
USSR JOURNAL ON JAPAN'S ROLE IN SDI

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 87 (signed to press 12 Feb 87) pp 49-55

[Article by S. Chugrov: "Japan's Role in the United States' Military-Space Plans"]

[Text] The possible military-strategic and international-political consequences of the plan proposed by Washington for the creation of a global antimissile system with space-based components has affected the interests of the United States' allies both from the viewpoint of the stability of the balance in the world and purely regional aspects of the problem. Advocates of the "strategic defense initiative" solemnly assert that a "space umbrella," were it to be created, would "cover" the territory of states allied with Washington in West Europe and Asia. "Inasmuch as the security of the United States is inseparably connected with the security of our friends and allies, the SDI program will be geared not only to the development of technology with defensive potential against ICBM's and SLBM's. We will also study and simultaneously develop technologies effective against shorter-range ballistic missiles," the annual report of the Pentagon chief to the U.S. Congress said (1).

London, Bonn, Rome and Tel Aviv agreed to participate in varying form in realization of the SDI research program. Following this, Washington's main attention was directed toward the official association with the program of its Far East ally--Tokyo.

On 9 September 1986, following a session of the Japanese Government, M. Gotoda, general secretary of the cabinet, presented an official statement on Japan's decision to associate itself with realization of the "strategic defense initiative". The statement pointed out that Japan, "adhering to the position of a peaceful state, insistently seeks to ensure by way of a significant reduction in nuclear missiles the establishment of more stable East-West relations and on this basis the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons." It is a question of participation at a certain stage not only of private firms but also government organizations in specific research projects, "which will be developed and confirmed by the United States".
This decision did not as such mean automatic association with the SDI program inasmuch as it provided for "consultations with the U.S. Administration on essential specific measures for the purpose of ensuring conditions conducive to Japan's participation in the SDI" (a series of such negotiations was held at the end of last year and the start of this). But at the same time it is of fundamental significance and clearly and unambiguously expresses the government's foreign policy platform.

How was this position formulated, what is its actual content, with what is it fraught for the country?

For 18 months following the "official birth" of the SDI Tokyo remained aloof from Washington's allies' discussion of "star wars". This was explained primarily by the fact that, as distinct from the NATO countries, which conduct regular consultations on strateic arms problems, Japan, as a rule, does not participate in such negotiations. Nonetheless, the possibility of the country's association with the "President's initiative" was actively discussed in the Japanese press.

Concern for the fate of arms control in the event of the deployment of space-based weapons in near-Earth orbit shows through in the first press comments on President R. Reagan's "star" speech of 23 March 1983. Assessing the "star wars" program, the TOKYO SHIMBUN, for example, observed: "It has to be stated that an aspiration to disarmament is not perceived therein." The newspaper also expressed concern at the state of U.S.-USSR relations: "Aside from everything else, we would like to hear from President Reagan what steps he intends taking to extricate American-Soviet relations from deadlock" (2). Coinciding with these expressions was NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN's conjecture that the threat to Japan on the part of the USSR had been considerably exaggerated (3). The military-political consequences of attempts to realize the "star wars" plans were pointed out also. "The Soviet Union will believe that the United States, possessing strategic defenses, has the exclusive possibility of carrying out a nuclear attack," ASAHI wrote. "The Soviet side will either build up offensive power to destroy the enemy's defensive potential or endeavor to create a similar defensive potential.... If one side reinforces the shield, the other sharpens the sword" (4).

The position of the official authorities, who confined themselves to statements of a general nature in support of the idea of preventing the militarization of near-Earth space, contrasted with the press' extensive discussion of the problem. Prime Minister Y. Nakasone declared on 25 January 1985, for example, addressing the Japanese Parliament: "Our country has repeatedly and for various reasons actively emphasized the importance of disarmament, nuclear primarily. For this reason we welcome the mutual will of the United States and the USSR to conduct new negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms and to prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in space. We are sure that negotiations which set as their goal a halt ultimately to the race in nuclear arms on Earth and in space are a fundamental principle of an easing of international tension" (5).
Against the background of such solemn declarations Tokyo's real attitude toward specific aspects of SDI began to acquire visible contours. The second stage of the formation of the official position on this problem (start of 1985–start of 1986) was characterized by the fact that a search for a general conceptual platform of participation in the SDI came to replace the indecisiveness and meditation. At the January (1985) meeting of Reagan and Nakasone in Los Angeles the U.S. President officially proposed to Japan technical cooperation within the "strategic defense initiative" framework. The prime minister than gave the President a kind of "new year's gift," expressing "understanding" apropos American research in the sphere of antimissile defenses with space-based components. He observed, however, that speaking about Tokyo's "participation" therein was premature inasmuch as his country did not at that time have sufficient information on this question.

Ya. Nakasone made it understood that Tokyo was prepared in principle to supply across the ocean the necessary technology and could "respond positively" to the United States' possible requests for specialists to be sent there to study the prospects of cooperation within the framework of the research program. Answering members of parliament's questions at the end of January 1985, then Foreign Minister S. Abe asserted that the "strategic defense initiative" was not contrary to the tasks of the use of near-Earth space for peaceful purposes.

The subsequent "SDI calendar" testifies to Washington's increased pressure on the Japanese leadership for it to adopt an official decision on association with R&D within the framework of the "star wars" program. On 27 March 1985 U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger sent a message to S. Abe which emphatically appealed to Japan to join in the American plans. The appeal was accompanied by a demand for a reply to the "invitation" within 2 months. Later, however, Washington withdrew this insulting ultimatum-type demand.

An agreement was signed in the spring of 1985 between the American NASA and the Japanese National Space Research Agency on cooperation in the creation of an orbital station, which is assigned the role of "space headquarters" and repair-engineering base for military satellites.

In April 1985 the participants in a Tokyo meeting of conservative politicians, representatives of big business, economists and political scientists from the United States, Japan, West Europe and Canada supported the speediest enlistment of the United States' allies in the "star wars" program. The final report of the meeting contains a direct demand for Japan and West Europe to put their scientific and technological potential at the Pentagon's disposal immediately. An author of the "Tokyo report," M. Mishihara, professor at the Japanese National Defense Academy, supported in an interview with the Kyodo Tsushin Agency the creation of a system of the tripartite military, diplomatic and economic cooperation of the United States, West Europe and Japan.

Tokyo's official position was made specific at a meeting of the Japanese prime minister and the FRG chancellor prior to the Bonn meeting of the heads of the seven biggest capitalist countries in May 1985. Reaching a common opinion concerning the expediency of R&D in respect of the "star wars" program, the leaders of Japan and West Germany approved in general form five principles
which are to determine the terms of participation therein. They include the United States' renunciation of the use of the SDI to acquire one-sided superiority to the Soviet Union; the creation of a "strategic defense" system merely as a component of the "factors of deterrence" complex; proclamation of the purpose of the SDI a significant reduction in offensive nuclear forces; scientific research to be conducted without it going beyond the framework of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty; and Washington's undertaking prior to deployment of an antimissile system with space-based components to consult with its allies and the USSR.

These principles actually represent consolidated wording contained in various speeches of R. Reagan. They give rise to a mass of questions. How, for example, could a program for the creation of space-based weapons not pursue the goals of gaining one-sided advantages over the USSR if it is aimed at putting the United States in an exclusively advantageous position for delivering a first strike? Could the adopted space-based strike weapons secure a radical reduction in offensive nuclear forces if, as acknowledged by Japanese experts themselves, the natural reaction of the side not possessing a "space shield" has to be a buildup of strategic weapons to neutralize the SDI?

At the end of August 1985 Lt Gen J. Abrahamson, leader of the SDI Organization, declared that the allies should be familiarized with the "advantages of the strategic defense initiative" by way of a bilateral exchange of delegations of experts.

In April 1985 even a group of American specialists was demanding in the Japanese Foreign Ministry that Tokyo contribute to implementation of the program. In October 1985 and at the start of the following year the United States was visited by Japanese delegations at Foreign Ministry, National Defense Agency, International Trade and Industry and other department section chiefs. Arrangements were arrived at with the Pentagon concerning the fact that the Trans-Pacific ally would be supplied with the technology for the production of missile guidance systems. The Japanese press assessed the results of the negotiations as a transition to practical association of the country's S&T potential with realization of the "strategic defense initiative" (6). The third stage of Japan's introduction to the SDI had begun. The sides embarked on a quest for a specific "association formula".

A third delegation of Japanese officials, experts and business representatives consisting of 55 persons was in the United States from 31 March through 8 April 1986. A report dispatched to the government notes "the likelihood of the extensive impact of Japan's participation in research within the SDI framework on an improvement in the country's corresponding technological standards".

A confidential discussion of the problem of Japan's association with the SDI took place during the Tokyo meeting of the "seven" at the start of May 1986. The White House spokesman noted at a press conference merely "progress" on this issue, refusing to communicate the specific results of the conversations between Reagan and Nakasone.

The decision on association with the American plans for the militarization of space "matured" in zigzag fashion and inconsistently inasmuch as the
authorities were forced to operate with an eye to public opinion. While declaring "understanding" in respect of the SDI program, the leaders of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) for a long period of time occupied a temporizing position and employed their traditional tactics of procrastination and avoidance of specific commitments. The decision-making deadline was deferred repeatedly: they wished to time it to coincide with the session of parliament, with Weinberger's visit to Japan, with the Tokyo meeting of the "seven". The Japanese Government ventured to formulate its position only following its success at the parliamentary elections in July 1986, when the ruling party noticeably squeezed out its political rivals. A policy of full-scale association with the "strategic defense initiative" was adopted.

The cabinet decision which followed on 9 September 1986 was merely an outward divide between phases of the country's association with the SDI, initiating a new stage—that of "coordinating details". It is to culminate in the spring of this year, as the Japanese press predicts, in the conclusion of the corresponding intergovernmental agreement with the R. Reagan administration following settlement of the questions of ownership of the results of the joint research and so-called "secrecy guarantees" (7).

II

The history of the country's involvement in the SDI has a "background" also, reflecting the essence of the process.

A specific feature of the situation is that Washington, endeavoring to conclude a special governmental agreement, had long since established direct contacts with Japanese firms. This form of cooperation suited the "clients" to a certain extent. The government research institutes under the auspices of the National Defense Agency are engaged in studies mainly in the conventional arms field. The bulk of the progressive technology necessary for implementation of the "star wars" program, on the other hand, is in the hands of private corporations. These include Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba, Fujitsu and others.

This situation is to a considerable extent satisfactory to the LDP also, making it possible to avoid an open confrontation with the opposition. Dragging out the signing of an official government agreement, the Japanese authorities preferred cooperation with the United States at the private level. Back in June 1985 a Foreign Ministry spokesman declared in parliament that the cabinet "does not intend imposing restrictions" on Japanese business' association with realization of the SDI.

Japan's position is thus in conflict with the principle of the refusal to export arms and their components formerly proclaimed by the country's government. However, a loophole was found here also. In January 1983, that is, 2 months before the "strategic defense initiative" was proclaimed a "national goal" of the United States, Japan signed with it a bilateral agreement officially granting Washington, "as an exception," access to military-engineering novelties which it developed. And it turned out that a considerable proportion of the technologies in which the Pentagon is interested is connected in one way or another with the plans for the militarization of space.
Under these conditions Tokyo's consent to associate with the SDI is obviously of special importance to the U.S. Administration. It is significant that it was announced on the threshold of the fall American congressional elections, at which the Republicans hoped to strengthen their positions. The final determination of Japan's position in respect of "star wars" in the eyes of its trans-Pacific ally was an official demonstration of membership of the Western camp and firmness of its foreign policy.

Washington is not concealing its interest in advanced Japanese technology, which could be used to create assault space-based weapons. What is of the greatest interest to the Pentagon? In May 1985 General Abrahamson named for the first time three specific spheres: computer technology with hardware and software, electronic-optical equipment and technology and also lasers.

The military-engineering consultations showed that the American side is attracted primarily by optical data disks which use laser beams to record a large volume of information, optical-fiber data transmission systems, LCD's and also the achievements of Japanese S&T in the sphere of very large integrated circuits and heat-resistant materials.

The focus of the Pentagon's interests is perfectly understandable: American scientists and engineers are faced with the task of designing a computer system for processing giant blocks of data under extreme conditions. The United States intends creating new resources for transmitting orders from the Earth to space and "coordinating the operation" of spy satellites and so-called "killer satellites" equipped with laser and beam weapons. In other words, Japan's latest technological achievements, American strategists intend, are to lay the foundation of the "nerve system" of the future American antimissile-space complex, that is, of the battle management, communications, observation and warning subsystem.

Step by step, with the tacit blessing of the authorities, Japanese firms "quietly" joined in the SDI. It follows from publications of the American and Japanese press that certain components of space-based weapons designed in Japan have long been undergoing tests in American laboratories. Among them we may mention the Sharp firm's deflecting shield and the Kyocera company's special industrial ceramics used, inter alia, in the integrated circuits of the on-board computers of multiple-use spacecraft. The American branch of the Hitachi (kindzoku) corporation has since 1983 been cooperating with secret laboratories at Los Alamos, supplying magnetic blocks--the main component of beam weapons. Several Japanese firms have joined international consortia conducting studies within the framework of the "star wars" program. Specifically, the Mitsubishi (dzyukoge) engineering concern will together with its American partners and the West German Telefunken undertake the modernization of the Patriot air defense complexes for the purpose of creating tactical missile intercept systems.

Instances of the cooperation of Osaka University's Laser Research Center and the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, which is working on the creation of an X-ray laser, have had particular repercussions. "The laser device of the greatest power used in research within the framework of the SDI program is the
Nova-type laser, work on which the Livermore Laboratory's scientists completed in April 1985," the bulletin KHEYVA TSUSHIN, which is published in Osaka, writes. "They used as the prototype a laser created in the Osaka University Research Center, which prior to this had been considered one of the most powerful in the world.... The nodes for a nuclear-pumped laser which were developed in the Osaka laboratories are already being used by the Americans in the design of laser and beam weapons capable of destroying ICBM's from space" (8).

The problem of Japanese scientists' participation in the development of a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser is of fundamental significance for Japan inasmuch as it has, as is known, proclaimed three nonnuclear principles—not to manufacture nuclear weapons, not to possess them and not to import them onto its territory.

In this connection Japanese Government circles emphasize that the SDI program provides for the creation of the most diverse military-engineering systems without the use of nuclear power, and for this reason Japan, they say, may conduct studies without violating its nonnuclear principles. In addition, they extend, Tokyo officials observe, only to the territory of the country and do not limit Japanese research within the framework of the American program.

Addressing a session of the Budget Commission of the lower chamber of parliament in November 1986, Ya, Nakasone declared that "in nuclear weapons the energy of the explosion is used directly to kill and destroy; as far, however, as the use of a nuclear explosion as a source of energy in the SDI program is concerned, in this case we are dealing with the indirect use of the energy of nuclear fission" (9). This interpretation of the effect of a nuclear explosion essentially excludes the X-ray laser from the nuclear weapons category, and this does not withstand serious criticism. A nuclear explosion in space is in flagrant contradiction to the rules of international law, specifically, the 1963 Treaty Banning Tests of Nuclear Weapons in Three Media and the 1967 Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. There are also contradictions concerning Japan's commitments pertaining to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968).

Association with the SDI also reduces to a scrap of paper the resolution of the Japanese Parliament passed in 1969 concerning the peaceful conquest and use of outer space. "...The legal interpretation of the parliamentary document should essentially be ascertained in parliament," an official statement on Japan's decision to associate with the SDI observes. "Nonetheless, the government believes that the inclusion of our country in SDI research is not in contradiction with the said resolution." Thus without involving itself in explanations, the government essentially cancelled out an important document, taking one further step toward participation in Washington's global nuclear strategy aimed at transferring the arms race to space.

III

Washington's allies' reaction to Reykjavik proved, as is known, dissimilar, particularly at the start. As far as the Japanese leadership is concerned, it immediately came out with a positive evaluation of the platform of the
American side. Nakasone expressed "understanding of President Reagan's decision". The prime minister emphasized: "I well understand that in defense of most important national interests he did not yield one centimeter. Japan acts the same."

Nakasone reflected in this pronouncement the principles of the country's ruling elite, which interprets national interests from the viewpoint of the Japanese-American "security treaty". Within the framework of this logic participation in the SDI is Japan's direct duty. But it follows from this that a number of principles proclaimed earlier by the government and hitherto considered the quintessence of the country's foreign policy do not reflect national interests.

Also totally unconnected from the viewpoint of military-political realities were the statements made after Reykjavik by Foreign Minister T. Kuranari that Japan hopes for the subsequent "achievement of accords in nuclear disarmament and arms control" and simultaneously "supports the position of the United States" on the problem of SDI. This support is acquiring perfectly tangible forms. The decision was made to render the Japanese firms which will participate in the "stars wars" program not only technical but also financial assistance. NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN observed that this step was in the way of being "flanking support for the position of Washington, which at the Reykjavik meeting expressed the intention to move forward at any price research pertaining to the strategic defense initiative." In the course of questions in parliament in the fall of 1986 the members of the cabinet actually employed American vocabulary, presenting a defense of the SDI and speaking about an aspiration with its help "to contribute to an acceleration of the disarmament process".

What is the attraction of the "star wars" program for Japanese politicians prepared to trespass nonnuclear principles, parliamentary resolutions and government declarations." In order to answer this question it needs to be recalled that the country's new constitution adopted following the smashing of the Japanese military machine contains a provision concerning the renunciation of war as a means of solving conflicts. Official military doctrine bans the creation of offensive arms. The very word "defense" has become firmly rooted in the consciousness of a people which well remembers the horrors of war, including the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the majority of which has a critical attitude toward military preparations.

For this reason Japan's ruling circles are giving the appearance of taking seriously the concept of the "purely defensive" nature of the plans for the creation of a global antimissile-space-based system. The manipulation of terms conceals a complex interweave of economic and political goals. In associating itself with the SDI Tokyo is evidently hoping to make one further spurt ahead in the "dual-purpose" high technology sphere and satisfy the requests of concerns endeavoring to reach new markets and at the same time assist its Trans-Pacific ally, thereby smoothing over somewhat the trade and financial contradictions. And the possibility of stimulating the military-engineering areas of R&D without coming into conflict with the section of society which still harbors illusions concerning the true meaning of the word "defense" in the vocabulary of certain Tokyo politicians is appearing, what is more.
Reiterating after President Reagan the words about an aspiration "to deliver the world from nuclear war," the Japanese ruling elite considers the American invitation a convenient opportunity to register the country with the club of possessors of arms of the "post-nuclear era". Such ambitions were born in the influential lobby of politicians and a number of business representatives who are dissatisfied with the discrepancy between Japan's powerful economic potential and its insufficient, in their opinion, military potential. They see the SDI program as an opportunity to use the achievements accumulated over many years in the technology sphere. This flywheel is now running idle, they believe, and it should be cranked up to full speed for a "strengthening of the country's defenses".

But will participation in the "star wars" program consolidate Japan's positions? Responsibility for escapades has, as numerous examples from history testify, to be borne by all their participants.

This is understood by many politicians within the ruling party also. The plans to associate the country with the "strategic defense initiative" are criticized by former prime ministers T. Miki and Z. Suzuki, who discern in them, inter alia, Washington's endeavor to monopolize the fruit of joint S&T efforts. Having become chairman of the LDP Executive Council, S. Abe advocates a restrained approach.

Also seriously concerned is a section of Japan's business circles, which believes that the United States intends organizing a "technology drain" to undermine the country's positions in the S&T rivalry. For example, Japan's Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren)--the country's leading association of big capital--has advocated national firms having the opportunity to use the results of SDI research in their own interests.

A number of Japanese political scientists (S. Ienaga, S. Sawada, S. Yoshikawa and others) are calling in question the strategic expediency of the American program. Specifically, they believe that its realization would sharply destabilize the strategic balance, spur a race in offensive types of nuclear weapons and damage the arms limitation and reduction process. Many people also see it as an attempt by the United States to strengthen its political positions within the framework of the American-Japanese alliance.

Specialists observe that the "star wars" program is unsafe for Japan. The version of the use of an X-ray laser fired in the event of military need into near-Earth orbit from a submarine is adduced as an example. "As far as the areas of deployment of such submarines are concerned," KHEYVA TSUSHIN writes, "they could hypothetically be the waters not only of the East Mediterranean or the North Sea but of the Sea of Japan also" (10). The potential danger for the country of such a version of escalation of conflict is not doubted by Japanese scientists.

Skepticism is on the increase among experts in respect of the plans to create antimissile defenses with space-based components. According to the Kyodo Tsushin Agency, a poll conducted in November 1986 among members of Japan's physics community showed that only 10 percent of those polled supports the
"star wars" program. Almost 80 percent opposed it, and more than 70 percent declared that they would respond with a refusal to an offer to participate in the corresponding scientific studies. As a whole, approximately 10,000 scientists, the agency observes, signed a statement protesting the country's involvement in realization of the "strategic defense initiative".

To sum up their arguments, the reasoning goes as follows. In the event of nuclear war, Japanese specialists believe, the country would be threatened primarily not by strategic but operational-tactical types of weapons. The approach time for them is so negligible that the very possibility of the effective activation of a "space defense" system is questionable. Intercept missiles would have to operate under conditions of a critical time shortage. The high concentration of the population and production capacity on the Japanese islands, the experts note, makes problematical the limitation of damage given any version of an antimissile "shield"—both defense of individual military facilities and the entire territory. As a result the conclusion is that an antimissile-space-based system optimized for the United States would be far less suitable for Japan owing to its geostrategic position.

Granted all the impressiveness of these arguments, the essence of the question lies elsewhere. In reality the United States intends involving Tokyo and its other allies in the realization of plans aimed at breaking up the strategic parity, an unchecked arms race and acquiring the capacity for a nuclear first strike in the hope of impunity.

Increasingly broad strata of Japanese society recognize that the alternative to the creation of space-based assault arms must be "star peace" and states' equal cooperation in the peaceful conquest of space. The leading opposition parties and social organizations are insistently demanding renunciation of participation in the American program. In response to the questionnaire concerning political parties' attitude toward the SDI distributed last July by activists of the antinuclear movement Japan's socialists emphasized that the plans of the White House not only do not correspond to the interests of the preservation of peace but, on the contrary, increase the danger of the chance outbreak of nuclear war and will lead to a new stage of the arms race. The Japanese Communist Party sharply criticized the U.S. Administration's plans, noting the threat to the cause of peace on the part of new military projects contrary to the people's interests. The country's third biggest opposition party—the Komeito—also opposed Japan's participation in the programs for the militarization of space. One of its members of parliament, N. Wada, emphasized that the American plans will lead merely to a dangerous exacerbation of tension.

It was observed at M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with a delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party that "Japan's role on the world scene could grow on the basis of its contribution to the peaceful solution of urgent international problems and the establishment of peaceful cooperation with all countries and peoples and not on the path of the country's militarization and its ever increasing incorporation in the military plans of the United States."
A positive response by Tokyo to the concept put forward by the Soviet Union of an all-embracing system of international security and its own constructive proposals would contribute both to the country's enhanced authority in the world and the conversion of its policy into a permanent factor impeding the growth of confrontational trends in the Asia-Pacific region.

Not Japan's association with the creation of space-based weapons but its practical participation in the realization of a consistent program of measures aimed at building a nuclear-free and nonviolent world could be a cardinal solution of the problem of stabilization of the situation in Asia and the Pacific. Tokyo's position is of considerable significance for confidence-building in the region and for the affirmation of new principles in the life of the world community generally.

FOOTNOTES


2. TOKYO SHIMBUN, 25 March 1983.

3. NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 28 March 1983.

4. See ASAHI, 28 March 1983.


7. See NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 4 January 1987.

8. KHEYVA TSUSHIN, 18 December 1985, p 12.


COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

8850
CS0: 1816/7
MOSCOW: JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN SDI

Japan Agreement on SDI

OW261128 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1135 GMT 25 May 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Vitaliy Ilyashenko]

[Text] News has been received from Tokyo: At the end of June, Japan and the United States will sign an agreement on the country's participation in the U.S. SDI program, writes THE JAPAN TIMES, citing government sources.

The final round of talks on the condition of Japanese governmental and private participation in the SDI program will be held in Washington in early June. The draft agreement worked out at that meeting will then be ratified by Nakasone's cabinet. Thus, Japan will become the fifth country to sign an agreement with the United States on the SDI. Earlier, similar documents were signed by the FRG, U.K., Israel and Italy. According to the press, the United States has secured an agreement under which all the technical research in which Japan participates will become the property of the Pentagon.

Japan-U.S. Space Station

OW260515 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1135 GMT 25 May 87

[From "The World Today" program, presented by Vitaliy Ilyashenko]

[Text] Washington proposed a new project agreement for Japan for possible participation in the U.S. space station which, according to plan, is to be assembled in orbit in the 1990's. The ASAHI SHIMBUN reported today that this document opens the way to the utilization of the station for military purposes. Tomorrow, the paper reports, scheduled consultations about the conditions for Tokyo's participation in the creation of the station begins. During these talks, it is expected that Tokyo will, yet again, speak out against the militarization of this project. Currently, the United States is insisting that the Pentagon should have access to the use of the station.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1511
BRIEFS

TASS: U.S. SDI TEST—Washington, 22 May (TASS)—Another test has been conducted in the U.S. within the framework of the "StarWars" program. A spokesman of the Pentagon reported Thursday night that it had been carried out at the White Sands military test site, New Mexico. During the test a superfast rocket hit in the flight a Lance Tactical missile. It is the second such test conducted in the U.S. It is noteworthy that along with active tests within the framework of the "StarWars" program the Reagan Administration is in a hurry to prepare a legal basis for its full-scale implementation. Thus, the U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger sent a letter to the Senate of U.S. Congress in which he again urged to accept a so-called "broad interpretation" of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, whose traditional interpretation bans the testing and deployment of ABM systems in outer space. Washington intends to use the "broad interpretation" for destroying the main content of the treaty and paving the way for the militarization of space. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0617 GMT 22 May 87 LD] /9738

MOSCOW: RADAR VIOLATES TREATY—Washington, 12 May—The United States has completed the creation of the network of Pave Paws large phased-array radar stations, which can be employed for purposes of the antimissile defense of U.S. territory. According to a report in DEFENSE NEWS, a newspaper close to military-industrial circles, the fourth Pave Paws-type radar station became operational "ahead of schedule" at the El Dorado airbase (Texas). Pave Paws systems have also been deployed at Beale (California), Robins (Georgia), and Cape Cod (Massachusetts) AFB's. As DEFENSE NEWS points out, this radar system "tracks intercontinental ballistic missiles, and also accumulates information about more than 6,000 satellites." In flagrant contravention of the ABM Treaty, which forbids the construction of large phased-array radar stations outside the boundaries of national territory, the United States is constructing a powerful new radar station at the air base near Thule in Greenland. The creation of this radar station is being carried out under the guise of "modernizing" old stations. The construction of a second such station is planned for the Flyingdales Moor area of Britain. [TASS report: "Contrary to ABM Treaty"] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 87 First Edition p 3 PM] /9738

CSO: 5200/1511
U.S. - USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S VORON'TSOV ON SDI-STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LINK

AU211307 Sofia ZEIMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 19 May 87 pp 1, 4

["Conversation with Yuli Vrontsov, leader of the Soviet delegation at the negotiations in Geneva," conducted by Spartak Beglov, NOVOSTI political observer: 
"Nonmilitarization of Space and Nuclear Disarmament -- Inseparably Linked Problems"]

[Text] Geneva, 18 May (correspondent's report for ZEIMEDELSKO ZNAME) -- The nonmilitarization of space and the reduction of strategic offensive weapons are two problems that cannot be separated from one another, stressed Yuli Vrontsov, leader of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva, in our conversation.

On 5 May the Soviet delegation put forward a proposal at the negotiations that "key positions for agreements" on this issue should be agreed. The Soviet draft document envisages that the two sides should reduce their strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent over a 5-year period, so that at the end of this period each of them would possess no more than 1,600 strategic weapons of the "triad" (land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear weapon carriers) carrying a maximum of 6,000 nuclear warheads. This decision must be adopted together with an agreement in principle to strengthen the regime of the ABM Treaty, which envisages mutually binding the two sides not to renounce the treaty for a period of 10 years and to strictly observe the treaty.

Bearing in mind the crucial importance of the problems of nondeployment of weapons in outer space and of observing the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union considers that it is also necessary to make the provision that, if under the terms of the agreement for reduction of strategic offensive weapons either of the sides should decide to begin the practical creation [suzdavane] of a space ABM system, then the other side will have the right to consider itself released from observing the obligation to reduce its strategic offensive weapons.

On 8 May the U.S delegation submitted in Geneva its own draft agreement on strategic offensive weapons. President Reagan's declaration in this connection points out that the 50-percent reduction of these weapons the United States proposed as before contains the proposal concerning "sublimits." At the same time the President stated that the United States will not find acceptable any kind of measures that restrict Washington's efforts connected with the implementation of the SDI program.

It follows from this that the two fundamental obstacles to reaching an agreement on strategic offensive weapons have still not been eliminated.
Let us start with the first of these obstacles, which is the issue of "sublimits." The U.S. representatives connected with the Geneva negotiations have more than once let it be understood that in this manner they would like to radically alter the essence of the Soviet "trial." For example, it is well known that the Soviet defensive potential is based on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), whereas the United States is relying on developing missiles with multiple warheads launched from submarines, as well as variously based cruise missiles, including cruise missiles mounted on heavy bombers (the USSR has only 160 bombers, whereas the United States has 518). The "sublimit" the United States proposes for the Soviet ICBM's, namely, 1,650 warheads, would in fact make it impossible for the USSR to deploy the mobile missiles of this class that are designed to replace the previous generation of heavy missiles. The U.S. reference to their readiness to "make compensation to the USSR for the higher sublimit of their own heavy bombers" is a primitive trick. In actual fact this is nothing other than a gross encroachment on the historically created structure of the Soviet defensive potential with the aim of making it necessary to reform this structure, with all the additional efforts and vast expenditure that inevitably arise from this.

"Their chief aim," Yu. Vorontsov informed me, "is to attempt to impose such changes in the structure of the Soviet potential as to correspond to the future SDI program." With the present numbers of warheads possessed by the two sides, no form of SDI will have any effect. However, the United States seems to think that they will be able to create an SDI for 6,000 warheads, that is, to acquire a "space shield" for making a first strike with impunity. We will not assist them in this work.

The Soviet proposals concerning preserving the regime of the ABM Treaty provide for agreement to be reached on a list of installations that will be permitted or forbidden to be deployed in outer space in the course of scientific research activities in the field of the space ABM system. What does one have in mind here? Systems exist that are already in operation in near-earth orbit: observation and warning satellites, that is, so-called warning sensor systems. But any system that might be capable of attacking, shooting down, or destroying must not be permitted under any circumstances, the leader of the Soviet delegation emphasized.

Can it be expected that the agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe, if it becomes a reality, will exert a favorable effect on the other great problems of nuclear disarmament? Yes, the elimination of medium-range missiles is a good incentive for reducing strategic weapons. It is an important component of the entire Soviet program for eliminating nuclear weapons in stages up to the year 2000. Yu. Vorontsov pointed out. "The process of dismantling and eliminating the medium-range missiles would provide good practical experience. Let us take, for example, working out measures for verifying the fulfillment of the agreement. In our proposals on this issue we are going even further than the United States," stressed the leader of the Soviet delegation, "more specifically, in the field of verification of the enterprises in which medium-range missiles are produced. According to the U.S. proposal the inspectors will be sent only to the gates of the enterprises. We propose that they should also be granted access inside the enterprises."

"Physical elimination, physical destruction of the missiles — this is what we are calling for so firmly and decisively at the negotiations with the United States underlined Yu. Vorontsov. "We would like to see the missiles being eliminated, and the other side too would like to see that the missiles are eliminated, dismantled, and destroyed before the eyes of everyone. This will be a good start toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons on earth."

/9738
CSO: 5200/1512
USSR'S GERASIMOV ON SOVIET-U.S. TIES, INF, SDI

LD212317 Prague Television Service in Czech 1900 GMT 21 May 87

[Special roundtable program with Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hosted by unidentified presenter with questions posed by unidentified television news editors in the Prague television studio; Gerasimov answers news editors' question in Russian fading into superimposed Czech translation; date not given; live or recorded—no video available]

[Excerpts] [Presenter] Good evening. I would like to welcome to the studio Gennadiy Gerasimov, a man whose face is certainly well-known to you from news conferences in Moscow for accredited foreign journalists and for representatives of the Soviet media. Let me add that Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been in Czechoslovakia several times. He also accompanied Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during his recent visit to Czechoslovakia as one of his advisers.

Comrade Gerasimov is responding to an invitation from Czechoslovak television, and he is ready to answer questions that interest you and that you, the viewers, have asked in letters to our television news editorial office. These questions are, above all, those concerning Soviet-U.S. relations and the problems of disarmament.

Because of the open foreign policy of the USSR, our general public is acquainted with the content of the latest proposals put forward by the Soviet side in Geneva. However, not everything is clear with regard to the U.S. stance. Could you, Comrade Gerasimov, describe how the USSR assesses the response of the United States on questions concerning medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe?

[Gerasimov] Talks on these topics are under way in Geneva. We, however, cannot consider the U.S. position to be fully defined, as the United States refers to the stances of its allies. It would seem that on this occasion the United States would want to really achieve an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, as we agreed at the summit in Reykjavik. In Reykjavik it was agreed that the USSR would keep 100 warheads in Asia, and 100 would be left in the United States, in that part of its territory from which they could not reach our territory. This agreement has been attained, and now the talks are going on.
At a recent session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group held in Stavanger, Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense, joined the rest of their allies in demanding the global elimination of medium-range missiles. This is one clash [rozpor].

There are, however, other contradictions among the U.S. allies. For example, Helmut Kohl, West German chancellor, said a few days ago that not only medium-range and operational and tactical missiles are to be eliminated — with which we agree — but also all missiles with a range between zero and 100 km. That is, he wants to make a better idea into an enemy of a good one.

We are not against it. We want to see all nuclear weapons removed from the battlefields, but if we mix them all together now to one big heap, we will take a long time to sort them out. The result will be chaos. Everything has been mixed together in the house of the allies and now they point out that it is not necessary to hurry, but to study everything carefully — to see that there is no trap. But actually, this is the zero option that they proposed in 1981.

[Presenter] A proposal from 1981. The Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles corresponds, in a certain way, to the U.S. zero option. The viewers often ask, why is the USSR coming out with this proposal now, and, metaphorically speaking, actually returning the ball to the U.S. court?

[Gerasimov] When the United States and NATO brought Pershings and cruise missiles to Europe, they allegedly did so to balance the situation because, supposedly, the USSR had new SS-20 missiles. We, however, have had missiles in Europe for a long time — for many years. They were, however, replaced by new weapons. They were recently replaced by missiles the West calls SS-20's. Then they proposed to us the zero option. We did not accept it at the time, but we accept it now.

The question is, where does the difference lie? The difference lies in the fact that we now have a new leadership, and we are looking for ways to free the world of nuclear weapons.

A year ago, on 15 January, Mikhail Gorbachev put forward a program for eliminating nuclear weapons. In Reykjavik, President Reagan also said that he wished the world were free of nuclear weapons. It seems that our stances are in harmony. We are saying, correctly: When you introduced your medium-range missiles in response to ours, let us remove them together.

They say, however: But you also have operational and tactical missiles, and you have more of them. So, we say: Good, we will remove them, too. So, in effect, we rob them of their arguments.

Kohl and Thatcher say that the USSR agreed to talks on eliminating missiles because they were hard and decisive. If we did not deploy the missiles, then there would be no talks. But they have said nothing so far on operational and tactical missiles. They did not say that they want to further build up their stock of arms. And we say: Why do it? So what matters is not their display of decisiveness, but rather, it is our seeking ways to achieve a nonnuclear Europe and world. We seek these ways very actively, and perhaps we did not do this before. We call this active foreign policy, and it could also be called restructuring in the sphere of foreign policy.
[Editor, in Slovak] After Reykjavik the Soviet Union took out -- selected some questions -- from the so-called disarmament package. I am thinking of the Soviet approach to British and French missiles. What led the Soviet Union to change its stand on these?

[Gerasimov] Again it was looking for ways -- naturally we understand that this is a certain backing down on our party, but I think that if we do it, then the West should meet us halfway and look for a compromise. What is more, we now have such huge arsenals, that is the Soviet Union and the United States, that this certain imbalance, in certain systems, does not change the overall picture of nuclear parity.

[Editor] I would like to return to the question of the FRG, which you have already spoken about. We are witnesses to an evaluation full of contradictions of the Soviet proposals by official German representatives, representatives of the FRG, as far as the chancellor and the minister of foreign affairs are concerned. In the FRG weapons are even credited with being able to play some sort of constructive role in politics. One can speak about a certain cooling of relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG. How then, in this context, does the Soviet Union see the policy of the FRG?

[Gerasimov] As far as relations with the FRG on the liquidation of medium-range missiles in Europe are concerned, then naturally much depends on the FRG, because the Pershing-2s are sited on German territory. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl said that by 7 May, when there was a debate on foreign policy in the Bundestag, he would outline his position; but he did not fulfill his promise. When he spoke there he said that he was giving only a temporary reply, and it certainly was a temporary reply. There was talk of operational and tactical missiles; there was a complaint there, which he have not yet spoken about, that, allegedly, we have more conventional weapons -- that is, the Warsaw Pact countries -- but an interesting situation arose recently, when, as I have already said, Helmut Kohl said: Let us destroy everything. My first reaction was, why not! We can agree, but when we start talks about everything then it will be a new package of proposals. Recently we extended our package of proposals, but the West continues to extend it. It is putting in not only missiles from zero to 1,000 km, but also conventional weapons -- that is, everything together. This again will mean killing the whole initiative. So I think it would be better to start on medium-range missiles. Here we are in agreement with the United States, and we need agreement from the allies, and then we can take operational and tactical missiles. We can have talks about this jointly or independently.

We are not against liquidating short-range missiles, tactical ones as mentioned by Kohl, and we are not against reducing the number of conventional weapons in Europe, as we proposed a year ago in Budapest at the session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee member states. We are proposing a reduction by a quarter. There are also chemical weapons. We are willing to liquidate them, and the talks on an agreement have already made considerable progress, so that we already have ready answers to all objections, and that is why the West now does not know what else to come up with. Many commentators are already writing that in 1981, when the West proposed the zero option, it proposed it for propaganda reasons and not seriously, because it was hoping that the Soviet Union's answer would be no. The Soviet Union really did say no, and now it has replied yes. It appears now that they were bluffing, and now they are quickly trying to think what to do.

The picture, however, is not clear. There are also signs that the Reagan administration still wants an agreement.
[Editor] You spoke, Comrade Gerasimov, about contradictions in the standpoints of Western Europe on Euromissiles and on nuclear disarmament as a whole. The same situation, as the U.S. press writes, exists in the United States. There, politicians are also divided into those in favor, or even against, Euromissiles. What is more, the Irangate affair comes into play, and this is being manipulated and some politicians have had their positions strengthened or weakened in this context. Do you think that this situation is manifesting itself in a more marked way during the Geneva talks, and is it at all possible to say which opinion, which approach, will carry more weight in the United States in the end?

[Gerasimov] It is difficult to forecast this at the moment. There are many factors here, but one internal political factor is that President Reagan's position has weakened. He was very popular for many reasons, in particular thanks to television. He knows how to speak on television very well. Many people say that this is in fact the main reason, and not his domestic or foreign policy. But now the Irangate scandal is very useful for his political opponents, the Democrats. They do not want to end it quickly but want to draw it out as long as possible, right up to the elections, to gain an advantage. They would not like the President to resign now. A strong person, the vice president, would then take office, and it would be more difficult to fight against him.

So now President Reagan's position has weakened and maybe, precisely because of this -- and many commentators say this -- he wants a foreign political success. What is the possible one? Precisely this agreement we are very close to now.

In principle we have agreed on liquidation -- the talks are about details. They are important, but still details, details of control. Many say that we will not agree with it, but we do agree, so there you are.

Some people try to convince us that control is not possible, Weinberger for example, the defense secretary. He appears to be against this because on his way to Norway, to Oslo, he spoke with journalists and said that the Russians cannot be trusted -- that is an old story -- that medium-range missiles are mobile, that they can hide them somewhere in taxis or anything that moves. I said at the meeting that Weinberger does not know us, he does not know our lives, that often it's hard to fit a passenger into a taxi, let alone a medium-range missile -- but such arguments do come up, and they show conflicts within the U.S. Administration itself. Those who formerly spoke in favor of detente, Nixon, Kissinger are now against, and the so-called black angel, for example [name indistinct] who was constantly for arming, is now in favor of this agreement, so many things have become mixed up there. It is difficult to forecast what will be next, but because the U.S. Administration nevertheless wants to achieve its end, and its period in office will be over soon, it wants to achieve success at the end of its period in office, I think that the U.S. Administration will proceed in the direction of agreement and so it will invite Mikhail Gorbachev to the United States, and enter into this agreement there, which we can now agree on.

Then there was a second question at the Geneva talks, as far as key standpoints are concerned, and this concerned strategic weapons and antimissile weapons. Our draft document -- the U.S. proposal for a 50 percent reduction in the number of these weapons.
[Presenter] I would like to return to the issue of medium-range missiles. This issue is of fundamental importance. Whether or not the draft of this agreement will be prepared -- or its administrative part -- is the decisive factor for the next meeting of Comrade Gorbachev and President Reagan [words indistinct].

[Gerasimov] It could be put this way. But, first, this treaty will be the first one concerning real reduction of armaments, as we put it -- the United States terms it the supervision [kontrola] of disarmament. I do not like this expression: What is necessary is to reduce the stockpile of weapons, and this will be the first agreement on reduction. Perhaps this is the reason so many are against this agreement. These are people who are, in principle, against any agreement with the USSR because they are afraid that it will be the first step, which will be followed by the second, and the third. It will be a pebble that will start an avalanche of nuclear disarmament. If such a treaty could be attained and could be concluded, then it will be a reason for which to go to the United States. Comrade Gorbachev said that he would like to go there, but he is a statesman, he has a lot to do, and he cannot go there as a tourist. He is already acquainted with Reagan, he met him twice -- why should he get acquainted with him for a third time? Therefore it is necessary to go only when a political result will be attained. We have made conditions: One is an agreement on medium-range missiles, and the second one is a certain mutual understanding in the key stances, on first strike missiles and on Star Wars.

[Editor] I would like to go back to what you said about the control of observance of the treaty on Euromissiles. Let us imagine that this treaty is already concluded, signed, ratified.

It is nice to imagine this. How would the concrete elimination of the missiles then continue? This is a question we often receive here from our viewers, and that often occurs in discussions. Is there any concrete plan regarding the elimination, the disassembling of Euromissiles?

[Gerasimov] It is a technical question we have been asked in the past -- what elimination means. It was never translated exactly, and they worried that the USSR would hide its missiles. But no, we speak about elimination. Perhaps we shall buy rusty equipment in Brno, automated rusty machinery that would grind it all. I do not know. (But elimination is elimination.) There is, however, another question: 82 warheads in West Germany. It is also an interesting issue that could become an obstacle. We say: You must eliminate them, these are U.S. warheads. The answer is that they are on German missiles. Yes Germans bought them, but the FRG pledged in 1955 not to have nuclear weapons and therefore we have to take this into consideration, because France and Britain have their own nuclear weapons, and there are weapons in the FRG that belong to the United States. Now we hear that these warheads should remain, which is another obstacle.

[Editor] You have mentioned Caspar Weinberger, U.S. defense secretary, who is one of the most well-known opponents of this treaty on medium-range missiles. He is one of the great supporters of the so-called Star Wars plans. Recently the U.S. press published four Weinberger proposals that were sent to the government. Implementation of these proposals would mean that Star Wars would actually be realized in 1996 -- that is in a very short time. I would be interested, and our viewers too, what answer does the USSR want to give to these U.S. actions?
[Gerasimov] The Star War plans are rather problematic. No one is now sure -- including General Abrahamson, who is responsible for this program -- when they will be able to deploy something. So far research is continuing. Tests of individual components are starting. This is, however, rather an extensive program, which some people have compared to 10 Manhattan projects -- that is to the project to create the atom bomb. The technical problems in creating antimissile defenses are 10 times bigger than were the problems of creating the first nuclear weapons. So far, then, all this is still hanging in the air. Apart from this, the U.S. Congress has now cut the budget, compared to the sum requested by the administration. Congress itself doubts whether it is worthwhile making use of it.

We want to draw attention to the fact that we are not following this path. Some people accuse us of creating a similar type of defense, however we draw attention to the fact that we are not following this path. We would, however, have to carry out countermeasures, which would be much cheaper. Our scientists have come to the conclusion that it would cost only 5 percent of the expense the United States wants to spend to neutralize those space weapons.

However we are very actively against Star Wars, because they mean to take the arms race into space and then our world would be much more dangerous than now. All those systems would be flying over our heads, and they could be activated by a mere faultly computer. For example, before we started to record this program we had problems due to a mere change of wires -- although this studio is very well equipped. Systems are created by people, people are not perfect and consequently technology cannot be perfect either and might break down, and this could result in an enormous catastrophe.

In addition the question of who is to press the nuclear button is transferred from a leading political official to a computer: For if those systems were to be flying over our heads and assumed that a missile had been launched somewhere, then a decision would be made within several seconds. Thus a decision will not be made by a man but by a computer -- which naturally can make a mistake -- and therefore we point out that there is this danger in Star Wars. The system is very expensive, and in addition it will not save the United States. Our countermeasures will be much cheaper. There is still this danger of a technical accident.

[Editor] Could you nonetheless specify what the Soviet countermeasures will be?

[Gerasimov] Let me put it like this: If an antimissile defense is to be acceptable -- and they say they want to protect the whole territory of the country -- it must be 100 percent; it must be dense, because in contrast to air defense, one missile is enough to destroy the target, a whole city. A further missile will destroy a further target, and there are now very many missiles. In the last war, when air defense [3-second transmission break] when it was only 10 percent effective, that is to say that 10 percent of the aircraft were shot down. Then it was assumed that the target could not be bombarded, because the bombs were small, they had a small destructive force, and at the same time the aircraft crews were lost. So when the troops lost a bomber, they considered it ineffective.

Antimissile defense has to be very effective here. No one is saying that it will be 100 percent -- not even General Abrahamson says that [16-second transmission break] for example a further acceleration; for example there is talk of hitting a missile at the moment of launch. Now it takes, let's say 1 minute. I don't know for sure, but what if we speed up the launch with a stronger motor and then the launch will take, for
example, 20 seconds? Those are technical measures that are much cheaper and completely possible. In addition, a considerable part of the antimissile defense will be in space. It is enough to put antisatellite weapons up there — which we want to ban — and blow them up, four antisatellite systems; and then an electromagnetic pulse will be produced which will disrupt the whole guidance system.

These are all variants of counteraction. There has always existed competition and rivalry between the sword and the shield, between the tank and the antitank weapon, just like the sword and the shield. Now, unfortunately, the shield will always have too many holes in it and the sword can always be sharpened.

[Editor] I have a question on a different subject: The West is very attentively analyzing and following what is happening today in the Soviet Union. When it understood that following the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum the situation was fundamentally changing and efforts were being made to attain rapid economic and social development in that country, all of a sudden there was a certain degree of concern and, it could be said, a fight against restructuring. Why is the West afraid of restructuring?

[Gerasimov] There are also many views here about their attitude to our restructuring. Now everything has indeed (become clear). We have great differences of opinion with Margaret Thatcher on fundamental questions. She is in favor of nuclear weapons, she considers them a good thing, and we consider them an evil. Jacques Chirac is also in favor of nuclear deterrence. He thinks that people are crazy, that they will always fight. There is a French saying that fear of the gendarme is the basis of all wisdom, and therefore nuclear deterrence, in his view, will restrain us from attacking poor old France, even though we, of course, do not have any such aggressive plans.

As far as their attitude to restructuring is concerned, they are both political opponents of ours. But they support restructuring, they say that it is a good thing that the Soviet Union is moving in the kind of direction that will support our peace-loving nature. But there are opponents here, such as the unfortunate Weinberger who is of the opinion that the Soviet Union will increase its power and will strengthen itself. That means that its military power will also increase and it will be a more dangerous enemy, and therefore it is a bad thing and restructuring must be halted.

So, there are two different philosophies here, and we, of course, want the philosophy of coexistence to gain the upper hand, a philosophy according to which we have a joint interest in preserving peace. We are different, we can have our arguments, but we have a common philosophy about the preservation of peace. Others believe that confrontation will be unending, and therefore they think that the strengthening of the Soviet Union is a worse state of affairs for the West. In other words, the better it is for us, the worse it will be for you, and so on. But we think that the better it is for us, the better it will be for everyone, because we do not want a deep economic crisis in the West. We want countries to develop more or less in a normal way.

The Brazilian ambassador invited Mikhail Gorbachev to visit Brazil. There are also invitations to other Latin American countries with which we have not had contacts at summit level up to now. Comrade Shevardnadze, on the other hand, visited countries of East Asia, and that is also a region we gave little attention. So, restructuring is taking place. The press and information departments were joined to make the Information Directorate. Then we began to appear more on television with our standpoints and views.

There was talk here also of our ambassadors who directly and personally deal with important missions and pass our views to the leading officials of other states. Our contacts with all countries have developed very widely.

42
[Editor] As we know, there is a lot of talk and writing today in the Soviet Union about the new stage in the development of relations between the socialist states, that in essence it is a matter of the restructuring of these relations. Can you be more specific about this fundamental issue?

[Gerasimov] We believe that as socialist countries on the international scene we must act together, but at the same time we must respect one another, and we say that everyone should present his own initiatives, that we must think about them together. Such initiatives do exist, for example last year at the session of the General Assembly a joint initiative was implemented on the conception of comprehensive security, and just recently Poland presented an enterprising plan, the Jaruzelski plan. Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and the German Social Democratic Party had a very good idea about a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe. We also supported that. In other words, we want to say that our countries, the Warsaw Pact countries, must think together about how to ensure peace in our region of Europe.

As for our general relations, they must be completely even, without any exceptions, and this is a matter for journalists. There is talk of how we report about our country. Somehow we have become accustomed to always writing in the same tone, in favorable tones, I would say, but at the same time we do have problems. So it is not a matter of these problems being untouchable — on the contrary, they must be spoken about, in a tactful way, but spoken about so that they are dealt with to the benefit of all the participating countries and parties.

We also have problems in CEMA, and these must be positively criticized and solutions must be sought. For example, recently the Soviet newspaper TRUD published an article about the export of Czechoslovak footwear to the Soviet Union. Czechoslovak shoes had, at one time, great prestige in the Soviet Union. I remember that I used to buy such shoes myself as a student, and I was unable to wear them out. Now there is a different attitude toward Czechoslovak shoes — this must be spoken about. Perhaps it is the Soviet side that is to blame because of its specifications or its orders, or perhaps it is the Czechoslovak side. We do not want to insult anyone. We have to think about ensuring that your shoes retain their reputation and that we are supplied with good shoes, but we find that this is not the case. I think that articles like this when, for example, two Soviet journalists and their Czechoslovak colleague are involved, such articles help us a great deal. This genre did not exist in the past or hardly used to exist and I think that it is a further feature of restructuring.

[Editor] Comrade Gerasimov, time is unfortunately running out although there are still a whole number of questions on the table, particularly in the area of regional problems; viewers often ask us about developments in Afghanistan, the state of Soviet-Chinese relations, the latest developments in the Persian Gulf — but of course as I have said, time is running out, so I would like to conclude by putting a kind of personal question to you: What event in the past year have you been glad to report to journalists at news conferences in Moscow, and what event would you like to be able to report to them in the coming period?

[Gerasimov] Both the past and the future, you mean? I haven't been working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a very long time, not even a year yet, but in that time, I would say that the event in the past that has given me particular pleasure was when I was in New York with the minister at the General Assembly; after that we went to Washington to meet leading U.S. officials. They were difficult talks; there were a number of secondary issues — the issues of those spies, and so forth, and then all of a
sudden the U.S. Administration replied positively to our proposal for a summit. That was really a very nice moment when we all felt pleased that a meeting was going to take place in Reykjavik; we said that it was not a summit as such, but instead a preparatory meeting.

That meeting took place, and it produced definite results. On the one hand it did not produce what we had been hoping for on the matter of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative and the fixed idea or attempt by the President to achieve that antimissile shield. But on the other hand, definite accords were reached, and they are now talking on the basis of those accords in Geneva. For example, now we are discussing the matter of medium-range missiles, that is, something that originated at Reykjavik. That, then, produced positive emotions for me.

As regards the future, I would hope very much that Reykjavik continues, that we reach an agreement on eradicating medium-range missiles, that we agree on a nuclear-free Europe, and finally that we agree too on operational strategic weapons [operativni strategicke zbrane] and leave aside any plans for Star Wars.

That is the program, and I don't think it is only a fantasy, because world public opinion generally speaking does not believe in the Soviet threat; it believes that the threat comes from nuclear weapons, and therefore I think we can look to the future with optimism.

[Presenter] Comrade Gerasimov, allow me, on behalf of the journalists here in the studio and on behalf of the television viewers, to thank you for your open and sincere replies. I hope we will have the opportunity to meet once again in the studio of Czechoslovak television in Prague for another roundtable. For now, it is good-bye till the next roundtable.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1512
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR MILITARY WRITERS ON ZERO OPTION, SDI, TREATY POSSIBILITY

LD221633 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1425 GMT 22 May 87

[Interview with TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev and Soviet military commentator Vasilyi Morozov from the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY by unidentified presenter on the "People and the World" program; Soviet commentators speak in Russian, fading into superimposed Czech translation; date and place not given — recorded]

[Text] Two important Soviet commentators, experts on the issues of disarmament and Soviet-U.S. relations, visited Czechoslovakia recently. We have made use of their presence and in this program we will acquaint you with their views on the most important problems of our times, the tackling of which is in the interest of all humankind.

You will hear TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev and APN military commentator Vasilyi Morozov.

[Presenter] The year 1987 is rightly described as a year in which significant progress could be made in disarmament talks. After the latest Soviet and U.S. proposals, the course of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons is awaited with special interest.

Vladimir Chernyshev answers the questions of whether there is a real hope to conclude specific disarmament agreements:

[Chernyshev] After a whole series of initiatives on the part of the USSR, in particular putting forward stimulating proposals on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe, it is clear to the entire world that an agreement on these issues could be concluded in Geneva very soon. Unfortunately, recently some events took place in the United States and in some Western European capitals that show that dreams do not always come true. Therefore, I would not dare say that some progress could be expected at the Geneva talks in the near future.

[Presenter] Why do you think this?

[Chernyshev] In the beginning, when Washington became acquainted with the Soviet initiatives, it said yes, the zero option is the U.S. proposal from 1981 and is, naturally, acceptable to the United States. However, on 5 May, in connection with the beginning of the eighth round of the Geneva talks, President Reagan issued a written appeal that contained a number of points raising concerns.
What is the point causing the most concern? If we take into consideration that the standpoints of the two sides have the most in common in regard to the medium-range missiles issue it is obvious that this issue should be tackled first. The President, however, changed the priorities. In his guidelines to the U.S. delegation he told it to demand in Geneva above all agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent. He put the issue of medium-range missiles down to second place. Unfortunately, in the area of strategic offensive weapons, which is closely related to the problem of how to prevent the militarization of outer space, the standpoints of the two sides diverge widely. Therefore, we can hardly expect a solution to all these problems in the nearest future. It would have been possible to come to an agreement on the issue of medium-range missiles quite quickly. The change of priorities, however, creates doubts as to whether Washington wishes to come to an agreement on medium-range missiles in the nearest future.

[Presenter] The standpoint of the U.S. side, then, contains a number of disconcerting points. You spoke about the fact that the U.S. delegation in Geneva put forward a new proposal for an agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent. This proposal means that the U.S. side does not respect the agreements that were arrived at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik. What is your opinion?

[Chernyshev] First, in Reykjavik it was agreed that during the course of 5 years the number of strategic offensive weapons will be reduced by 50 percent. Now the U.S. side, instead of 5 years is proposing 7, thus prolonging the set deadline.

As far as the agreement on the complete liquidation of strategic offensive weapons which was also discussed in Reykjavik is concerned -- and a period was also being stated of 10 years -- nothing at all is being said on this subject from the U.S. side. In Washington they are announcing that they would be willing to consider only the question of the destruction of ballistic missiles but not the liquidation of all strategic offensive weapons. According to the open admission of Pentagon representatives, this means that the United States would like to return to the fifties when they had a great advantage over the Soviet Union.

If we note the concrete figures, their strategic Air Force, which would under such conditions of reduction remain preserved for the United States, would be almost four times larger than the Soviet strategic Air Force.

[Presenter] Differences also exist in the question of the liquidation of nuclear missiles in Europe. The United States does not want to agree to the Soviet proposal on the so-called second zero option, according to which Soviet operational and tactical missiles in Europe should be completely eliminated. They only propose that the number of Soviet missiles should be reduced, which would give the U.S. side the ability to install this type of weapon in Europe. It would no longer be a matter eliminating nuclear weapons, but on the contrary, a possibility for the United States to introduce a new type of nuclear weapons into Europe. How they actually envisages this modernization is a question for Vladimir Chernyshev.

[Chernyshev] They just want to reconstruct their own weapons. So, for example, they want to reconstruct the ballistic Pershing-2 missiles into operational and tactical shorter-range missiles. They do not even want to eliminate cruise missiles but instead intend to either change the nuclear warheads for conventional ones, or move these missiles to military ships. This means that here the U.S. side is deviating from what had been agreed to in Reykjavik. It does not wish to destroy its own medium-range missiles but to turn them into a different class of weapons. This also gives us concern and gives rise to the suspicion of whether those in Washington really want the zero option.
[Presenter] Conventional weapons: This is a favorite specter of the West, which they have been using for a number of years to impede the development toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Everyday there is a possibility that Soviet peace proposals might be accepted there appears on the stage again and again the alleged Soviet superiority in this kind of arms. What should one visualize under this term? Perhaps we all will recall that this division of arms appeared in the fifties when nuclear and other types of weapons, described collectively as weapons of mass destruction, began to make their mark on the armories of armed forces. Since then the term conventional weapons has begun to be used in contrast with nuclear, chemical, biological, and other types of weapons. Let's look, however, at the real situation on both sides.

Vasily Morozov, a military commentator of the Soviet NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY, a holder of the USSR State Prize, has this to say:

[Morozov] The facts say that there now exists an approximate balance in conventional weapons between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO states. This is confirmed in particular by the annual reports of the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, issued over a number of years, including 1986. We will find a very interesting statement, which I will permit myself to cite: The overall balance of forces equipped with conventional weapons has been up to now such as to make an attack in a general sense a very risky enterprise for any side, because no side has at its disposal a sufficiently distinctive strength that would guarantee it a victory. But the preceding statement is after all the main criterium for judging the correlation between the forces of the two sides.

In one of the 1986 publications of the Brookings Institution from the United States, it is said directly that the correlation in conventional weapons is not only in a close proximity to parity but that it is even advantageous to the West.

[Presenter] There is therefore no specter. When we take into account not an arbitrarily singled out, partial but on the contrary, a comprehensive assessment, we can only reach one conclusion: The combat capability of the NATO countries is approximately equal to the combat capabilities of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces. But the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are not content with this state of affairs. Let us only recall the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact member states' Political Consultative Committee. It took place in the city on the Danube on 10 and 11 June last year. From the meeting there emerged a proposal to broaden the question of the reduction of the number of the armed forces and arms in central Europe to cover the large area between the Atlantic and the Ural. This would mean to limit the number of troops on both sides by almost 1 million men. This proposal was directed to the city that lies only several dozens of kilometers away from Budapest against the current of the Danube, to Vienna, where talks on the reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe are taking place. But a year has almost gone by and there has been no reply. We have once again asked Vasily Morozov to assess these talks:

[Morozov] What could one say in this instance? These talks have been dragging on for the past 14 years and Sleeping Beauty is still asleep. Our partners in the talks have been erecting a great many obstacles that either complicate the possibility of reaching a solution or make it impossible. We can state that in the West they either are falsifying specific figures or are concealing them. For instance, the NATO and Warsaw Pact states possess approximately the same number of armed forces. This has been confirmed by the well-known figure Paul Nitze, the special adviser to the U.S. President and secretary of state on arms problems, who declared on this subject: As
regards the numerical state of the armed forces, this is not an area in which the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact states enjoy superiority. The number of troops on the NATO side is approximately the same as on the Warsaw Pact side. And the Pentagon publication Soviet Military Power of which six issues have already been published, says: The numerical strength of the NATO Armed Forces amounts to between 5 and 6 million men and of the Warsaw Pact 4.9 million. Where is the superiority here? These are concrete facts.

[Presenter] But let us return to the problem we spoke about at the beginning. Talks are also taking place in Geneva. It appears that the Soviet–U.S. talks in the area of eliminating medium-range missiles have made the most progress. The U.S. attitude is still evasive.

While here, for a change, they insist on the alleged Soviet advantage in operational and tactical missiles, most recently they have started hiding behind their West European allies. They say that first they must agree with the withdrawal of medium-range missiles. This standpoint is all the more interesting because on many other questions the United States has not even remembered to consider West Europe. Let us recall, for example, the unilateral U.S. decision on the plan for the militarization of space, or the economic limitation on the imports of European agricultural products. Let us return to the question of medium-range missiles at the Geneva talks. We asked Vasily Morozov what concrete figures tell us.

[Morozov] First, the United States now has 640 aircraft carrying medium-range nuclear weapons — that is, exceeding the distance of 1,000 km — on the European Continent. Included in this are 400 F-111, F-4, and F-16 jet bombers which are capable of making a nuclear strike anywhere on the territories of European socialist countries and on a considerable part of the territory of the Soviet Union. This is one figure. Apart from this, in order to undertake military operations in the sphere of NATO influence, the United States has two naval fleets, one in the Mediterranean Sea and one in the Atlantic Ocean, the 6th and 2d respectively, which have among them seven multiple use aircraft carriers. About 300 nuclear weapon deck launchers are sited on these aircraft. This is an undeniable fact.

[Presenter] Vasily Morozov went on to evaluate the technical parameters of these means. The action radius allows these vessels to make strikes deep into the territory of the Soviet Union. Apart from this, Tomahawk nuclear missiles with a 2,600 km range are gradually being added to the armory of the surface vessels and nuclear submarines of both these fleets. Thus, the commander in chief of NATO in Europe has at his disposal several hundred battle warheads on strategic missiles sited on U.S. submarines. Let us, however, once again turn to Vasily Morozov.

[Morozov] Second, in the Armed Forces of the European NATO states — I am thinking of states such as the FRG, Italy, Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands — there exist over 200 aircraft carrying nuclear weapons of the tactical strike air force. In the FRG there are 72 launch ramps for Pershing-1A nuclear ballistic missiles with a range of 740 km, over 100 launch ramps of which a part is in the armory of the U.S. ground forces in Europe with a range up to 130 km. [sentence as heard] This is the second point.

Third, the U.S. ground forces in Europe, as well as the European NATO states have at their disposal over 2,000 nuclear artillery 203.0 and 155 mm shells. The range of these weapons is up to 30 km. For U.S. forces stationed in Europe, and for the forces of their European allies, the United States concentrate over 7,000 nuclear weapons on the territory of Western Europe, and they have set up more than 150 storage sites for such weapons.
Another factor that must be taken into account is the fact that French and British nuclear means are also sited in Europe. The British standpoint on the question of medium-range missiles is nuclear. Formally, Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government has expressed itself in favor of a possible agreement on these weapons. On the other hand, it makes its agreement subordinate to other conditions, such as the installation of other weapons if medium-range missiles are withdrawn. As the influential British daily FINANCIAL TIMES wrote recently, it seems to be considerably irrational and politically difficult to agree to proposals for a treaty on the removal of one sort of weapon by replacing it with others. What is the true military strength of Britain?

Great Britain has four nuclear submarines, each one armed with 16 launchers for Polaris A3T ballistic missiles. Each of these missiles has six battle warheads and a range of up to 4,000 km. Great Britain also has about 200 tactical aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. It is also known that MIRV nuclear warheads are being developed for ballistic missiles fired from the Trident II submarines, which should be made available by the United States at the beginning of the nineties, is continuing. Four new submarines the British are building should be equipped with these missiles, which have 10 nuclear warheads each and each will have 16 launchers.

In contrast, the French standpoint toward the Soviet proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles from Europe is clear. The country of the Gallic cockerel does not agree with their withdrawal. The political representatives of this country are prisoners of the old doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which they say reliably defends France and Western Europe from the Soviet threat. As we have already seen from concrete facts, however, there is no such threat. Both military groups have the same military strength and the Soviet Union is simply trying to reduce the growing spiral of senseless arming. Proof of the negative stand by France was the recent visit by Premier Chirac to Moscow. In connection with this visit, the paper LES ECHOS said that with regard to the fact that the presidential elections will only be taking place in a year's time, France has enough time and can take time to think. What is it they want to wait for in Paris? France has almost 3 million unemployed and the billions of francs being spent on arms continue to grow.

The French Army has in its arsenal six submarines, which means a total of 96 launchers. These submarines are armed with either M20 ballistic missiles, with a range of about 4,500 km, or with M4 missiles, with a range of slightly more than 3,500 km. They have MIRV warheads, however. Each such missile has six warheads. France also has at its disposal 18 silos for S3 ballistic missiles with a range of over 3,500 km. It has 30 Mirage 4A strategic bombers, which carry nuclear weapons having a range of 4,000 km. It has over 70 aircraft carrying nuclear weapons of the tactical strike air force with a range of over 1,000 km. It has launch ramps for Pluton operational and tactical missiles with a range of over 120 km. We will also mention the fact that in France they have strategic missiles with S4 ground stations in the development stage, whose range is already greater than 5,000 km, and apart from this, missiles launched from the sea whose range is up to 6,000 km. Both missiles are equipped with multiple warheads. For ground forces they are developing a (?GD) operation and tactical missile with a range of over 350 km.

Overall, around 4,000 nuclear weapons are currently held in readiness by NATO. These facts are perhaps a telling testimony that there does not exist any threat to Europe by the remaining weapons in Soviet hands because on its side, too, there is an enormous force capable of destroying civilization many times over, not only on the old continent but in the entire world.
The question of the demilitarization of space, of Star Wars or President Reagan's so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, is of utmost importance. In this regard, Washington does not intend to adhere to what was agreed in Reykjavik, that is, that both sides would pledge themselves to observe for the duration of 10 years the ABM Treaty and not to violate it.

The United States would like to revise the ABM Treaty and has proposed that it would pledge itself to observe the treaty only for a shortened period, that is for 7 years. After the lapse of this period, each side would have the right to develop its own space strike weapon systems.

Thus, a situation has been created in which the Soviet Union has been asked to share in the dilution of the ABM Treaty, whose duration would be limited to 7 years. Afterward, the entire world would find itself facing the prospect of a threat from space strike weapons. It is quite natural that such a situation does not satisfy the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is pushing energetically for the demilitarization of space. In its proposals in Geneva it has come somewhat closer in order to accommodate the U.S. side. It has proposed, for instance, to examine the question of what systems or their components could be transported into space within the framework of research and tests. The aim of the Soviet Union is to convince the United States of the irrationality of building a system of anti missile defense in space. This attempt to also take into account Washington's endeavors has not met with understanding. Washington desires by all means to plan and secure in space the deployment of those weapons that would in the end lead the world to a nuclear catastrophe.

A number of articles have appeared in the West saying that President Reagan wishes to conclude a disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union before he leaves the White House. We asked Vladimir Chernyshev to air his view of such speculations.

[Chernyshev] Yes, this is true. There have appeared a number of articles in the West reporting that the President would now wish to enter history as a peacemaker and that he would therefore wish to conclude an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. To answer such a question is of course not simple. Why? Because the President, as we remember well, has spoken a great deal during his tenure in the White House about the necessity to put an end to the "evil empire". He has given lectures about his anticommunist ideas and declared crusading campaigns, all of which can be difficult to put in harmony with practical steps in the direction about which there is so much talk now. It is of course possible that the President would truly like to acquire fame as a peacemaker but here another question arises, whether those circles that brought him to power, which brought him to power on the wave of anticommunism, will permit him to do so; whether they will allow him to become a peacemaker.

[Presenter] Despite all this, there is a lot of talk now about the possibility of a new summit. Are there reasons to be optimistic in this area, Comrade Chernyshev?

[Chernyshev] No doubt certain reasons exist. In my view the achievement of an agreement on medium-range missiles would be enough for the leading representatives of both states to meet and sign this agreement. At the same time however, as we have already said, certain doubts arise as to whether Washington truly wants to prepare such agreements for signature. A whole number of obstacles are piling up. Priorities are changing at talks; we have spoken about that. That is why, in my opinion, if we are to make a conclusion it appears that we can hope that the meeting in Washington can take place, and during this year. But mutual movement is necessary for this, movement by both sides. The Soviet Union has already gone a large part of the way, I would say considerably greater than the United States. Now it is Washington's turn.
PRAVDA: JOINT STATEMENT BY DELHI SIX ON INF, TESTING, SDI

PM260821 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 May 87 Second Edition p 5

"Joint Statement by Leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden on 22 May 1987"

[Text] Three years ago, on May 22, 1984, we demanded that the danger of nuclear catastrophe should not jeopardize the survival of humanity. Today we come out with a call not to jeopardize the possibility of setting the beginning to the process of nuclear disarmament.

Since the time we came out with our first call, we welcomed the resumption of the dialogue on nuclear and space arms. During the Geneva summit in November 1985 President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev declared that "nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought." Reykjavik showed clearly that far-reaching agreements in measures for nuclear disarmament can be achieved given political will.

Talks on the questions of disarmament are at the decisive stage now. There is a real opportunity to reach agreement on at least one major direction. It seems that the breakthrough in the question of nuclear arms in Europe is near.

An agreement on the elimination of intermediate range nuclear forces from Europe would be of substantial importance and would make it possible to overcome a serious psychological barrier since such an agreement would for the first time lead to mutual withdrawal and destruction of nuclear means currently in the combat arsenal. Therefore we insistently urge the United States and the Soviet Union to conduct the present talks in such a way as to conclude them successfully within 1987.

But agreements on intermediate-range nuclear forces would be just an initial step on the road to our common goal -- the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere. In the Delhi Declaration and the Mexico City Declaration we have demanded two important measures: The termination of all nuclear weapon tests and the prevention of an arms race in space. We confirm the cardinal importance of these measures.

In Mexico City we have made a concrete proposal on verification of the termination of nuclear testing. This proposal remains valid.

Fear and distrust have been an obstacle to progress in disarmament too long. Weapons and fear sustain each other. The time has come to break off that vicious circle and lay down the foundations of a more secure world. The present momentum should not be lost.

We urge President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to be equal to this task to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of nuclear catastrophe.
SHEVARDNADZE LETTER TO UN HEAD ON NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD, SDI

LD251245 Moscow TASS in English 1228 GMT 25 May 87

[Text] Moscow, 25 May (TASS)--Follows the full text of a letter sent by the
Soviet foreign minister to the UN secretary general concerning the UN General
Assembly's forthcoming 3rd special session on disarmament:

Dear Mr Secretary-General,

The unanimous decision by the U.N. General Assembly to convene the Third Special
Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament in 1988 has been welcomed with
satisfaction in the Soviet Union.

The third special session will be prepared and held at a critical, crucial moment in
world affairs.

On the one hand, the awareness of the catastrophic nature of nuclear war has been
growing and the idea of delivering mankind from the ruinous systems of mass destruction
has been gaining ever stronger support.

The Soviet Union, as a nuclear power, has been applying every effort for a practical
realization of a concept for a demilitarized, democratic and non-violent world.

The January 15, 1986 program for security through disarmament, Reykjavik and the
following Soviet initiatives have given a new dimension to the problem of curtailing
military arsenals and made it possible to draw the outlines of a nuclear-free future.

On the other hand, the arms race has been rapidly gaining in speed and the "Star Wars"
plans are threatening to carry it into new areas and lend it an added scope.

Civilization is at a nuclear and space crossroads where it will have to make what will
apparently be the most serious choice in its history -- to be or not to be.

The Soviet Union is convinced that international relations ought to be rebuilt along
the lines of forging a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

The most important routes to this goal, in our opinion, are those of eliminating
nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, preventing an arms race in outer
space, and confining the military potentials of states to the limit of reasonable
sufficiency.
Developing the complex of military-political parameters of such a system presupposes a broad approach to disarmament as a package of inter-related measures for limiting and reducing arms, strengthening trust, adjusting mechanisms for verification, and switching the funds being released over to peaceful development purposes.

The extensive democratic dialogue getting under way on the foundations of security for all will make it possible to work out the more efficient ways of remodelling international relations in keeping with the aspirations of all peoples and concentrate on building a really humane and demilitarized world.

A big contribution to promoting this dialogue and concretizing it in the military-political field should be made by the U.N. General Assembly's Third Special Session on Disarmament.

It is important that from the very beginning it should be seen as an extraordinary event both for the nature of placing issues and for the new phase in efforts by the world community to stop the arms race and proceed from declarations to creating a favorable international environment for attaining really tangible results at talks on limiting and reducing arms. [sentence as received]

The issue of ways and means of changing over to a nuclear-free world will undoubtedly be in the focus of attention at the session. The statement of January 15, 1986, suggested specific phases for nuclear disarmament. They effectively constitute the pivot of the comprehensive program for disarmament to be considered by the session.

While singling out the problem of destroying nuclear weapons, we at the same [time] believe that the destruction of nuclear arms should be accompanied by the prohibition and limitation of the other kinds of weapons of mass annihilation, conventional arms and military activities, which are important separate ways of building comprehensive security in the military field.

The aim of the international community in the final analysis is general and complete disarmament, a commitment to which should be reaffirmed at the special session with fresh vigor.

Taking the relay baton from the previous two special sessions devoted to disarmament, the third special session is called upon to highlight the pressing tasks of disarmament for today and tomorrow.

The session will make it possible to project the basic provisions of the final document of the first special session on disarmament, which has formed the historic basis for a multilateral approach in this field, onto the perspective of achieving a nuclear-free world and dovetail them organically with the needs of forging comprehensive security.

In practical terms, the session could solve issues connected with increasing the efficiency of multilateral mechanisms, singling out in the process the role of the United Nations.

The time has come for the United Nations to feel themselves an integral entity adjusting the equilibrium of general security not with the force of arms but with reason and morals.
The United Nations should actively facilitate all phases for reducing military potentials and become a guarantor of states' security, especially in the post-nuclear situation, and a regulator for maintaining the equilibrium at the level of reasonable sufficiency, with a permanent trend for the latter's decline.

As for the agenda for the forthcoming special session, the Soviet Union believes that it should be geared to achieve real progress in limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament and to using the U.N. potential in the field ever more actively.

It is important that dialogue at the session be purposeful and crowned with the adoption of a substantive, even if a brief, final document which would, along with setting guidelines for a nuclear-free and safe world, also chart specific routes towards it, including the fostering of an adequate political atmosphere based on trust, mutual understanding, public candor, openness and predictability in international affairs.

The session will reflect an exceptionally important period mankind is living through. What will be the hopes, plans and accomplishments with which mankind will enter the third millennium? There is not so much time left to all of us to usher in a new historical era.

We propose declaring the '90s a decade for building a nuclear-free and non-violent world.

We count on the session providing a forum for constructive and productive efforts by the world community to curtail the arms race, for bold decisions acceptable to all and for a creative quest for common ground in the positions of all groups of states.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we intend actively to facilitate its success.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1512
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR JOURNAL ON PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL

Moscow MIHOVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 87 (signed to press 12 Feb 87) pp 114-125

[Article by V. Avakov: "Arms Control: Reality and Prospects"]

[Text] Problems of arms control occupy a central place in Soviet-American relations. Confrontation in the military sphere is the most dangerous section of the entire system of relations between the two biggest world powers. Not only the security of the United States, the USSR and their allies but of the international community as a whole depends on the state of affairs in this sphere. As the interdependence of the world grows, there is an increase also in the degree of the impact of the military rivalry of the two countries on the problem of war and peace in its global formulation. It is not fortuitous, therefore, that questions connected with the race in arms, their limitation and control over them are illustrated extensively in the American press--both in the periodical and that which it is customary to call the "academic" press. The latter is distinguished primarily by the thoroughgoing nature of the material. This evaluation is applicable as a whole both to articles calling for arms control and justifying--directly or indirectly--Washington's continued buildup of military power.

Such journals as FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN POLICY, ORBIS, DAEDALUS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY and a number of others stand out among organs of the American academic press. The most authoritative of them, perhaps, is the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS, which is issued five times a year by the New York Council on Foreign Relations. The monthly ARMS CONTROL TODAY, which specializes directly in questions connected with arms control, has attracted attention by its articles in recent years. It is published by the Arms Control Association, an independent nongovernment organization made up of prominent American specialists in the military sphere which was formed in 1971. Chairman of the association is G. Smith, formerly leader of the American delegation at the SALT I negotiations, and members of the board of directors include such well-known figures as R. McNamara, P. Warnke, M. Shulman, Adm N. Gaylor, S. Kinney, M. Goldberg, T. Hughes and D. Yankelovich.

The majority of American journals publishing material on international topics adheres to the long-established tradition of not identifying themselves and
the organizations financing them with the authors' ideas and concepts, which, publishers and editors believe, should serve as testimony to their impartiality. "The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS," the journal's editors caution the readers in every issue, "do not represent a unity of viewpoints. We do not expect readers of the issue to agree with everything to which they are introduced inasmuch as some of our authors emphatically disagree with others, but we firmly believe that, not admitting merely someone's whims, FOREIGN AFFAIRS may do more to inform American public opinion by making available its pages for the expression of disparate ideas than identifying itself with any one school." Indeed, if one wishes, one may find a broad spectrum of political views and contrary opinions in the same journal. However, one circumstance should be noted for the sake of objectivity. Despite all the conceptual, factual and other differences between the authors of various articles, it is an "American" view of things as a whole. Not to mention the fact that the appearance in the above-mentioned journals of material of Soviet authors is an exceptionally rare phenomenon, their readers manifestly experience a lack of information about the Soviet Union and its foreign policy initiatives and actions. The United States' academic journals, in no way different in this respect from organs of the periodical press, in fact passed by in silence, for example, such an important aspect of the arms control problem as the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing.

The year of 1986 was largely pivotal in the Soviet Union's struggle for an improvement in the international climate, a halt to the arms race and for disarmament. The specific and realistic program for the elimination of nuclear weapons before the end of the century presented on 15 January by M.S. Gorbachev, the concept of an all-embracing system of international security formulated by the 27th CPSU Congress and other peace-loving initiatives reflected the shoots of the new political thinking which had taken shape in the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership's practical readiness to achieve solutions of complex problems in the sphere of the military confrontation of the two great powers. The bold steps of the Soviet Union are constantly running into the obdurate, preserved stereotypes of thinking characteristic of the U.S. Administration. The position occupied by the United States in Reykjavik caused particular disappointment.

The militarist fever which has gripped the R. Reagan administration is impeding progress along the path of disarmament. This is causing serious concern not only in international circles but also among a large number of American politicians, congressmen and scholars. This has been shown unambiguously by the first session of the 100th U.S. Congress, which opened on 6 January 1987. Three bills have been introduced in the House conflicting in one way or another with the plans of the R. Reagan administration. One provides for preservation of the ban on the testing of antisatellite weapons, another for a return to compliance with the SALT II Treaty and the third demands a limitation of the yield of nuclear explosions conducted by the United States. Although all these initiatives were approved back in the fall of 1986, succumbing to pressure on the part of the White House, which called on the legislators to demonstrate unity with the administration on the eve of Reykjavik, the House of Representatives nonetheless decided to wait a little before passing them. The return to them right at the start of the year showed, first, that arms control will be given priority attention by American
congressmen and, second, that there are definite differences on this question between the executive and legislature in the United States. Serious doubts concerning the soundness of the administration's policy on arms control issues are being voiced in the country's academic circles also.

It is significant that the majority of specialists on this question, excluding representatives of the administration and its machinery, places the blame for the continued deadlock in the business of real disarmament mainly on the White House and the policy of Washington itself, which is incapable of responding adequately and realistically to the challenge thrown down by nuclear-space reality. This conclusion suggests itself as a result of familiarization with the main material published in the leading American journals in 1986.

Having Strayed From the Right Path

In the sphere of arms control the Americans have strayed from the right path and are taking the wrong road—such, essentially, is the main conclusion of Harvard University professor T. Shelling, who had published in FOREIGN AFFAIRS the article "What Went Wrong With Arms Control?" (1). The central question to which the author attempts to find an answer is the interconnection of the development of the strategic situation in the world and arms control, the interconnection between them and ways of maintaining a secure peace. Painting a relatively idyllic picture of modern reality, he fails to discern reasons for concern: "I see no reason to believe... that the danger of nuclear war today has become more ominous than for a number of years past." Mankind has lived with nuclear weapons for more than 40 years, but without nuclear war, and this fact alone "refutes any assertion that nuclear war is inevitable." In addition, "deterrence," which has to this point protected mankind, continues to function. Despite all the rhetoric, he continues, "no one seriously believes that each side's capacity for delivering a retaliatory strike following a nuclear attack on it is or could prove to be as much in question as to render preferable for it a preventive strike in some conceivable crisis."

So peace is guaranteed, at least. This does not mean that he, Shelling, is opposed to arms control in principle. But in its present form this process has, he believes, a flawed inner logic making negotiations between the USSR and the United States at best fruitless, at worst, "furthering the arms race." "It is difficult to rid oneself of the impression that the planned deployment of 50 MX missiles was an undertaking imposed by a doctrine according to which the end justifies the means, and the end, furthermore, is something called arms control, and the means, a demonstration that the United States experiences no lack of will to compete with the Soviets or overtake them in each weapons category."

The author divides the strategic arms era into two periods: from the end of the 1950's through the start of the 1970's and from the start of the 1970's through the present. The first stage culminated in the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972 and was characterized by the fact that the development of strategic thought and the strategic forces themselves and the interests of arms control did not contradict one another but developed in a common channel and, as it transpired, there was room for compromise. At the start of 1957
serious thought was given for the first time in the United States to the vulnerability of its retaliatory forces to surprise attack. According to Shelling, American strategic aviation, totally unprotected, was concentrated at several bases and represented a good target for Soviet bombers. The launch of a satellite in the Soviet Union made the situation even more dramatic. It was considered so critical that the Eisenhower administration adopted the decision to maintain the country's air force in a state of limited combat readiness: a certain proportion thereof was permanently airborne.

Under these conditions Washington experts concluded that "the central problem of the strategic forces was their vulnerability to surprise attack." An urgent reequipping of the strategic forces began in the United States. In 1957 the Boeing Corporation embarked on the development of second-generation missiles—the Minuteman solid-fuel three-stage ICBM—which shortly after replaced the Atlas liquid-fuel missiles. Simultaneously the U.S. Navy embarked on the creation of a sea-based nuclear missile system: development of the Polaris SLBM's began. Essentially the American military took advantage of the "missile gap" campaign which it had inspired and circulated the proposition concerning the vulnerability of the United States' air bases for an acceleration of its strategic programs and a breakthrough in the main areas of strategic competition with the Soviet Union. In Shelling's interpretation Washington's actions appear as follows: "So at this stage the vulnerability problem was temporarily removed by unilateral actions without any arms control."

The further development of strategic thought in the United States convinced the ruling circles of the preferability of a situation wherein the security of the sides' strategic forces was provided for. The idea of "strategic stability" began to supersede the "employable nuclear superiority" principle. But military equipment continued to be upgraded. The appearance of antimissile defense systems (ABM) and systems of individually targeted separating warheads (MIRV-type reentry vehicles) put the question of the security of the United States and the Soviet Union on a new plane. However, the sides were able, as Shelling acknowledges, to find a fitting answer to the problems which had arisen. He calls the negotiations between Washington and Moscow in this period and their results, particularly the SALT I and ABM treaties, "an intellectual achievement embodied in policy." At the same time, however, he considers them "not only the culmination but also the end point of successful arms control."

Everything that has taken place since 1972 Shelling characterizes as an accumulation of errors and miscalculations. In addition, he regards the fact that the USSR and the United States have complied with the SALT II Treaty (the article was written prior to the R. Reagan administration's decision to violate the treaty—V.A.) without its ratification as evidence that the sides are "subconsciously" proceeding in the channel of arms control, "without recognizing" at times even the fact that the very logic of military confrontation imposes on them serious mutual restrictions not requiring any treaty commitments.

Shelling sees as the main miscalculation in arms control policy since 1972, which has been pursued by changing administrations, the Reagan administration included (prior to proclamation of the "strategic defense initiative"), the
fact that there has been an unwarranted shift of emphasis from the nature of weapons to their quantitative indicators. While publicly presenting proposals concerning a reduction in offensive arms, the Carter and Reagan administrations simultaneously implemented programs for a quantitative increase therein. Such an essential point as the specifics of the structures of the sides' strategic forces has been lost sight of here. Washington has essentially pursued two mutually exclusive goals: "achieving ultimately a reduction in the number by way of the control of arms" and at the same time, on the other hand, contending with the enemy in respect of each specific system. Such an approach, which the author calls "control for control's sake, and not for the sake of peace and trust," suffers, he believes, from an absence of logic. Shelling writes in this connection: "It is possible that the administration, which has no genuine interest in arms limitation, sees such control... as the best platform for advocacy of the arms race."

Nor does Shelling consider a way out of the situation the SDI, whose technical feasibility he seriously doubts. He is in principle opposed to unilateral actions, preferring mutual "deterrence" as a bilateral guarantee of the preservation of peace in the world. "A prudent abstinence from aggressive actions based on a recognition that the world is too small for nuclear war is a healthier basis for peace than unilateral attempts to create defenses.... Much of what we call civilization depends on mutual vulnerability."

In conclusion Shelling compares the modern world with people standing on the roadside, past whom huge trucks, dumpers and trailers are rushing at great speed. Attempting to slip through between them would be tantamount to condemning oneself to certain death. The one thing the author overlooks are the situations recorded by statistics of people becoming casualties on precisely such roads as a result of an accident or the malicious intent of others. Were something similar to happen with nuclear war, no statistics would record this. Shelling sums up: 40 years without war is the "best argument in support of deterrence." Such a philosophy was aptly characterized by Academician G.A. Arbatov: "This is the logic of an elderly person who has lived for 70 years and not died once and concludes on this basis that he will live for the next 70." While criticizing Washington officials for the groundlessness of their approach to the arms control problem Shelling himself offers nothing constructive, remaining within the sphere of the same "deterrence" concept and simultaneously in the positions of a kind of naive fatalism.

From the Past--Into the Past

If American journals do not identify with the authors, the latter, in turn, adhere to a similar rule in respect of the institutions which they represent. However, such a rule hardly extends to articles by representatives of the administration, whatever reservations accompany them. At least, it is hard recognizing the article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS of Defense Secretary C. Weinberger as the expression of the position of a private individual. His views expounded in the article "U.S. Defense Strategy" (2) reflect not only the personal viewpoint of the chief of the Pentagon but also the main postulates of the country's military policy, in whose formation the defense secretary participates most directly.
The Reagan administration assumed office with the firm intention of restoring to the United States its lost military power, C. Weinberger writes. The Republicans inherited from their predecessors outmoded concepts formed quarter of a century ago such as "nuclear deterrence," "expanded deterrence," "escalation control," "strategic stability," "offensive superiority," "limited wars," "escalation levels" and others. The 1950's, when these concepts appeared, were characterized, he said, by the United States' nuclear leadership and its military superiority. However, the USSR was able to match the position and became a "military superpower," which caused a qualitative change in the situation. Under the new conditions it was necessary to ponder the question: "Can the ideas formed in the era of American military superiority correspond with equal reason to the conditions of parity?" In order to make up for what had been let slip the Reagan administration engaged in concentrated efforts in two areas: a buildup of military strength and a rethinking of the conceptual principles of its use. "Now, 5 years later," the article says, "we have made considerable progress both in strengthening our armed forces and in modernization of our military strategy and policy."

Having abandoned the old concepts, the administration, Weinberger claims, attained a new level of strategic thinking. However, if we attempt to trace this evolution graphically, a kind of closed circle results formed, metaphorically speaking, by the "Weinberger measure". "Our strategy is simple," he writes. "We are endeavoring to prevent war by maintaining the armed forces at the proper level and demonstrating the resolve to use them, if necessary, such as to persuade our rivals that the price of any attempt to undermine our vital interests is far higher than the benefits which they might derive. The name of this strategy is deterrence." So, abandoning the "deterrence" of the 1950's, the defense secretary is calling for the "deterrence" of the 1980's.

"Deterrence" in the new interpretation should, Weinberger believes, meet four conditions:

survivability (the United States armed forces must be able to "survive" a preventive attack by a rival, preserving considerable "power of retaliation" in order to be able to deliver such a retaliatory strike as a result of which the enemy's losses would outweigh any gain);

plausibility (the United States' likely response must be such as a rival might imagine it);

clarity, unambiguousness (a rival must be clearly aware that which of his actions specifically will be deterred and what is forbidden him);

security (the risk of a mistake as a result of an accident, unsanctioned actions and the incorrect interpretation of actions of the other side must be reduced to a minimum).

Fulfillment of the above conditions pertains more to the organizational aspect of matters. Three interconnected conceptual ideas are advanced in addition to them which can alone make the modernized "deterrence" effective. First, the
defense secretary appeals against resting content with demands for military balance—the United States must be stronger than the Soviet Union since "preparations for deterring an attack only by way of building up forces which would suffice for our deterrence in a similar situation could prove insufficient for deterring the Soviets." Although Weinberger refers to some "persuasive evidence," he cannot adduce factual reasons for such a conclusion. Second, it is a question of the degree of risk which the United States can and must take; this is essentially a hidden appeal for the "globalization" of American overseas commitments. Weinberger appeals for an unabashed approach if in some situation or other it might seem to some people that the United States lacks sufficient reserves of power to assume additional commitments in some part of the world or the other. He proposes balancing the "American commitments—American power" equation not by a reduction in the first but by way of a buildup of military strength. And, finally, the last, third, component of "deterrence"—its multiple nature incorporating defense, escalation and retaliation. At all three levels, the author shows, the United States should have superiority in order to guarantee unacceptable losses for an enemy. In other words, all the "innovations" proposed by Weinberger are only repetitions of former calls for the United States' military superiority to the USSR.

The defense secretary puts down to the credit of the Reagan administration the fact that it has developed new approaches to the United States' military policy, which represent "an attempt to respond to the most important changes which have occurred in the strategic situation since the 1960's." They include such components as the SDI and "reliable nuclear deterrence," principles of the use of military force and "reliable deterrence by conventional means," the strategy of a reduction in arms and control of them and "contending strategies".

Weinberger is the most consistent (after the President himself) supporter of the "strategic defense initiative," and for this reason it is perfectly natural that he not only justifies it but advertises it in every possible way as a panacea for all troubles. Since nuclear deterrence is essential today, it is necessary to strive to make it reliable, the secretary asserts. But inasmuch as it continues to represent a threat it is necessary to look for an alternative. And the Reagan administration has found it—the SDI. The leader of the U.S. war department advances quite original arguments in support of the "star wars" program: "The Soviet spurt ahead, the Soviet breach (of the ABM Treaty—V.A.) and the perfectly realistic probability that American science and technology will realize what to many now seems an impossible dream."

What is understood by the "Soviet spurt" and the "Soviet breach"? In the first case it is a question, it transpires, of work to upgrade the antimissile defense system (authorized by the ABM Treaty, incidentally). In addition, Weinberger ascribes to the Soviet Union the development of its own strategic defense systems: "The Soviets are not only ahead of us today in the development and deployment of strategic defense systems but they have invested huge resources in this technology, and in various fields, what is more, and our SDI research program would be justified were it for no other reason even than to provide prudent insurance against a Soviet breakthrough." As far as
the "Soviet breach" is concerned, Weinberger categorically asserts that the Soviet Union will break with the ABM Treaty if at some point it considers that this would be to its "advantage".

While the SDI, in the opinion of the defense secretary, is to cater for nuclear deterrence, the principles of the use of the armed forces which he formulated are intended for the same deterrence, but with the use of conventional weapons. These principles are essentially nothing other than the parameters of "crisis response" policy and an attempt by high-flown phraseology to camouflage Washington's interventionist course. These are they:

the United States should use its armed forces if its "vital interests" or such of its allies are affected;

if the United States decides to employ its armed forces, they must be used on a large scale and receive the appropriate support in order to guarantee victory;

before making a decision on the use of the armed forces, the United States must clearly determine its political and military goals;

the size and purposes of the armed forces, as, equally, their composition and deployment, must constantly be a subject of reassessment depending on the development of the conflict in which they are involved;

before using these forces overseas, the U.S. Government must obtain proof that such an action would have the support of the public;

recourse should be had to the employment of the armed forces only in an extreme case, when diplomatic, political, economic and other means have been tried.

The enumerated principles may be taken to a certain extent as a kind of "code of courtly behavior" of the American armed forces outside of the country. However, the experience of recent years testifies to the reverse. The United States' operations against Grenada, Lebanon and Libya pertained to the time of leadership of the military department precisely of Weinberger--and they do not tie in with such a "code" at all. And one further quite typical point, which the author stipulates in connection with the problem of the use of the armed forces: "We must not succumb to the temptation to define the perimeter of our vital interests.... Judgments concerning our vital interests will depend on each specific situation...." Thus Washington would like to reserve for itself the right to interfere in the affairs of other peoples in any spot on the globe, even one most remote from its territory.

Weinberger's wordy arguments concerning the administration's approach to the problem of arms control could be expressed in the simple formula: "negotiations from a position of strength". "By strengthening the armed forces of the United States and acquiring new arms and simultaneously negotiating with the Soviets," he writes, "we are shaping in them motives for the conclusion of agreements, which would correspond to our interests." The desire to "outdo" the Soviet Union, as if it were a question of a children's game, is
at the basis of his calls for the more active use of so-called "contending strategies". The United States, the boss of the Pentagon believes, should approach with the highest degree of selectivity the development of new weapons systems and their deployment in order to force the USSR into such retaliatory action as would be the most burdensome for it.

The author of the article constantly endeavors to demonstrate something innovative distinguishing the military strategy of the present administration from the policy of previous ones. However, its entire content persuades us of the reverse: the credo of preceding administrations--reliance on strength--remains the same for the R. Reagan team also. And the sentence with which Weinberger concludes his article ("American military power is a prerequisite of peace. Strength is the payment for peace") is taken from the past also.

Five Myths

The Reagan administration's approach to the arms control problem is based not only on old tenets but false premises, which was shown convincingly by Democratic Senator J. Biden in a speech in the National Press Club in Washington. It was reproduced in the October issue of the journal ARMS CONTROL TODAY (3). According to him, elimination of the gap between the policy being pursued by the White House and the majority of the American people's support for the control of nuclear weapons requires of representatives of the administration considerable political resourcefulness. But they are displaying it mainly by propagandizing myths creating a smokescreen for abandonment of a policy of arms control.

The first myth consists of the assertion that on the eve of the Reagan administration's assumption of office the United States lagged significantly behind the Soviet Union in the military respect. For arms control, the "new faces" in Washington declared, it is necessary first to undertake a concentrated buildup of military power. "But in actual fact the assertion of relative military superiority (of the USSR--V.A.) was manifestly fallacious from the very outset," Biden observes, "and gained substance only thanks to its constant reiteration by the President and the defense secretary. An analysis of the United States' present strategic arsenal consisting of the same triad (ICBM's, SLMB's and long-range bombers), the components of which were already deployed or being prepared for deployment when Reagan was elected president, serves to show the falsity of such assertions."

The second myth that is being propagandized, which is without both proof and logic, is the claim that the buildup of strategic power which is being undertaken, including the preparations for "star wars," "has brought the Kremlin back to the negotiating table." But the Soviet Union, the senator emphasizes, "remained at the negotiating table ever since the two great powers began discussing limits to strategic systems." The result was the arms control system which operates today--a system which was being attacked by the President and his advisers long before they assumed office. "The Soviet Union," Biden writes, "needs arms control not for the reason of the so-called Reagan buildup of military power or the implausible threat of the creation of a consummate strategic defense but rather for reasons which are long-standing and which are similar to our considerations. Whatever the differences between
the two great powers--and they are vast--the leaders in Moscow have no less an economic and strategic interest than us in the achievement of some degree of predictability in respect of the enemy's forces. And they share with us a profound interest in mutual deterrent factors strengthening nuclear stability by way of a lessening of the threat of nuclear war."

If the buildup of American military power had indeed prompted anyone to sit down at the negotiating table, "it was only the Reagan government itself, which is using the negotiations to justify the expenditure on such imaginary trump cards as the MX missiles." In order to assuage the justified public concern the administration had to adopt at the negotiations a position which had at least a "semblance of plausibility". And this gave rise to the third myth: the U.S. Government "was putting forward serious proposals". The conclusion suggested itself from this "automatically," as it were, that any lack of progress at the talks could be attributed to the Soviet side. "However," Biden observes, "if the proposals of the U.S. Government are analyzed--both at the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles and at the SALT negotiations encompassing long-range systems--they are manifestly not serious."

The irony, the senator believes, is that the American initiatives contain elements directly contrary to the basic interests and doctrines of the United States. In the event of their realization, the SALT proposals presented by the administration would mean an actual acceleration of the fitting of missiles with multiple warheads instead of their removal, which is essential for consolidating nuclear stability. Even more illogical was the proposal concerning the prohibition of mobile missiles, which would undermine its own efforts to escape the vulnerability of the ICBM's with the aid of the new Midgetman missiles. Criticizing the proponents of the policy of a nuclear arms buildup, the senator directly names the addressees: "This last curiosity (the proposal concerning a ban on mobile missiles--V.A.) was the result of a vicious alliance continually undermining arms control under the present administration--an alliance between those in the Pentagon who deal with strategic weapon targeting and are obsessed with preserving the capability of keeping all Soviet missiles in their sights and the opponents of arms control in the administration, whom proposals unacceptable to the United States could only gladden. The outcome was a number of proposals incapable of serving as a basis for negotiations and simultaneously, however paradoxical, incompatible with American concepts of deterrence and nuclear stability--even were they to be accepted by the Soviet Union."

Although the "serious bargaining" myth did its duty for the government (in the sense that it "explained" the absence of progress for 6 years), Washington required a fourth myth--accusations of "massive Soviet violations". Now, when the Reagan administration has brushed aside SALT II, there is complete clarity here: it is the United States which is violating the treaty commitments. But even before White House representatives were unable to adduce any in any way convincing arguments in support of such assertions. "The 'massive' Soviet violations myth," the senator acknowledges, "is designed to conceal the fact that the numerical SALT sublimits restricting the deployment of missiles with multiple warheads and cruise missile-firing bombers are being observed in full by both sides, and there can be no convincing charges of Soviet violations
here either." It is indicative that it was Biden together with Republican Senator B. Cohen who submitted a bill which not only calls for but also demands the United States' continued compliance with the basic sublimits of the SALT II Treaty as long as they are observed by the Soviet Union. Further inducement to this step was, as the senator himself declared, the fact that the United States was confronted as a result of the actions of the Reagan administration with a "historic loss of responsibility for American strategic policy."

Biden terms the most notable the administration's fifth myth: "star wars," the idea of which is "by nature and fundamentally deceitful." First, a strategic defense system will not do away with the dependence on retaliatory strike forces. In the same way "star wars" will not deliver the United States from "nuclear dependence". Nuclear explosives are needed even for defensive technology--mainly for the X-ray laser. Nor will they, contrary to the assumptions, dispense with arms control. Even in theory no defensive system would be able to work without some limitations on an enemy's offensive systems, but such limitations are attainable only with negotiations. As far as the technical aspect is concerned, "the irrefutable and widely recognized truth is that an all-embracing system of protection of the population will not work."

The years of the Reagan administration's term in office, the senator asserts, show that in the short term the world is capable of surviving without progress in the sphere of the control of nuclear weapons. Reagan's supporters have scored, according to Biden, certain successes in propaganda of their myths, but have been unable to alter the realities of the nuclear age, among which he puts the following factors:

the Soviet Armed Forces, like the American, will in the foreseeable future also be capable of inflicting a devastating strike of colossal power;

the basic equation of mutual nuclear deterrence, which was recognized many years ago, cannot be changed even by the dreams of the President;

genuine reductions in nuclear arsenals will not occur other than on the basis of an agreement reached with the help of negotiations, which must unfailingly be connected with an accord concerning defensive systems;

arms control represents an effective means and main source of hopes for a consolidation of nuclear stability and a lessening of the danger of war;

arms control cannot be achieved by bluff and compulsion--it is possible only given a serious readiness for negotiations.

SDI--Illusion of Reaganism

No military program in the United States has caused such disputes (and skeptical assessments, more often than not) than the "strategic defense initiative". The opinion exists that in the form in which it was proclaimed by the head of the White House on 23 March 1983 only two persons believe in it--or, at least, declare that they believe in it: the President himself and the

65
defense secretary. The rest of those connected with the SDI program acknowledge that a "flawless defense" may be created, if this is possible at all, only in the distant future—and even then it will hardly solve the problem which engendered it (4). The SDI remains a subject of debate, dispute and passions. American journals reflect the most diverse aspects thereof. Despite the contradictory evaluations, increasingly great force is attached to the conclusion (shared by far from everyone, of course) that politically the SDI has already done tangible damage to U.S. interests. The arguments for this are that the SDI has introduced confusion to the national debate on American nuclear strategy; threatens strategic deterrence by undermining the ABM Treaty; is leading under the conditions of the budget deficit to an increase in and the incorrect allocation of defense spending; siphoning off the best creative resources at a time when the civilian sector is in acute need thereof for enhancing competitiveness on world markets; weakening the North Atlantic alliance by giving rise to serious doubts among West Europeans in connection with U.S. commitments in the sphere of "collective defense"; pushing the Soviet Union onto a path disadvantageous to the United States, prompting it to stimulate defense R&D and simultaneously revealing a prospect of the appearance of bigger Soviet missile forces capable of penetrating any American defensive system; and creating a serious obstacle to arms control.

Former U.S. Defense Secretary H. Brown, who had earlier been head of the Livermore Laboratory, wrote in FOREIGN AFFAIRS in the course of the debate on the technical feasibility of the SDI. In the article "Is SDI Technically Feasible?" (5) he reaches quite disappointing conclusions for the authors of the SDI: "The immediate prospects of defense against ballistic missiles are in general well known. From the technical viewpoint expenditure thereon may be justified in the case of the protection of certain categories of the strategic forces of retaliation. However, its capacity in respect of protection of the population against a retaliatory strike would appear unlikely before the year 2010 and after. A forecast for the more distant future from the viewpoint of the advantage of defense over offense is even less certain. Nonetheless, it is highly doubtful that the argument will be settled in favor of defense in connection with certain fundamental problems of the geometry, geography and physics of offensive countermeasures...." Some other former U.S. defense secretaries, R. McNamana and J. Schlesinger, for example, also consider the SDI technically baseless.

Also among the critics of the President's "defense initiative" is the above-mentioned G. Smith. He set forth his views in the article "Star Wars is Still the Problem" in the journal ARMS CONTROL TODAY (6). Why are the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States at a standstill? "The main reason for this hopeless situation," he writes, "is that the Reagan administration is attempting simultaneously to achieve two mutually exclusive goals: control, in conjunction with the Soviet Union, of strategic arms and the creation of a strategic defensive system against it. If the United States insists on pursuing this schizophrenic policy, we will not achieve arms control agreements, which the President calls his highest priority...."

At the same time, however, Smith shares the opinion of the defenders of the SDI, who assert that the "defense initiative" has increased the Soviet Union's interest in the fruitfulness of the Soviet-American disarmament negotiations.
The USSR, he believes, regards the SDI as an attempt by the United States to restore its strategic superiority. He adduces in support a statement by Weinberger: "If we can create a system which is effective and makes their (Soviet—V.A.) missiles powerless, we will have returned to the situation we were in when, for example, we were the sole nuclear power." For this reason, Smith believes, the USSR is perfectly justified in considering the SDI "a menacing step in acquisition of the capacity for disarming the Soviet arsenal and forcing Moscow to capitulate." The author calls for the SDI, without it being put on the back burner, to be included on the agenda of the Soviet-American negotiations, it being used as a lever of pressure on the USSR. The United States must clearly define its own reference points here: should it aspire to create a strategic defense system or seek serious reductions in strategic offensive arms? "This dilemma," Smith writes, "is particularly painful for the administration, which recognizes that its plan to eliminate nuclear weapons is impracticable without Soviet participation, while the SDI program is itself blocking cooperation with the USSR in the business of arms control." The author questions the administration's claim that the Soviet Union has forged ahead in the sphere of antimissile defense systems, believing that such statements do not reflect the actual state of affairs and are geared to winning additional military appropriations from Congress.

Smith writes about the polarization of the community and, in particular, academic circles to which the "strategic defense initiative" concept has led. On the one hand it is intriguing, as it were, in its "majestic" and "large-scale" nature, which is attracting various firms and individual scientists. For example, more than 3,000 applications for participation in the SDI programs have already been submitted. But at the same time many scientists recognize that its implementation could have disastrous consequences for strategic stability. Some 3,300 American scientists signed an appeal demanding an end to the financing of the "dangerous program" (58 percent being representatives of the professorial-lecturer staff of 14 of the most authoritative physics faculties).

As Smith believes, a partial defensive system or systems, whose effectiveness from the military-strategic viewpoint is considered dubious, are technically conceivable and possible. The creation of a system by one side would entail the appearance of a similar one in the other. At the same time, however, controlling the contest in the sphere of defensive systems would become increasingly complex. An argument frequently adduced in support of the deployment of a partial strategic defense system are possible terrorist actions or unsanctioned missile firings. But terrorists would be more likely to resort to the "parcel" bomb, against which both full-scale and partial defensive systems are equally ineffective. More complex, the author believes, is "the problem of unsanctioned, accidental firings.... But increasing the attention paid to safe storage (of nuclear missiles—V.A.) would be highly useful."

According to Smith, the Reagan administration's military policy abounds in paradox. Strategic defense systems are declared by it to be desirable, but the administration harbors fears in respect of the USSR's efforts in this field. If the United States succeeds in creating such a system first, this will be wonderful. If the Soviet Union is successful, the consequences will be
catastrophic. Arms reduction is a good thing, but it is first necessary to rearm. "Star wars" are designed to put an end to nuclear weapons, but a key component thereof are the same nuclear weapons—nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers. The sole intelligent alternative to Washington's illusory attempts to achieve with the aid of SDI superiority to the Soviet Union is, Smith believes, a search by the two powers for a solution of the "nuclear dilemma on the paths of the consistent conclusion of a series of arms control agreements."

The Attack on SALT II: Unwarranted Undermining of the Control System

On 27 May 1986 R. Reagan announced his intention to no longer comply with the limits provided for by the SALT II Treaty. The President's decision was sharply criticized by the most diverse circles both in the United States itself and overseas. Congress passed a special resolution condemning the administration's plans. The United States' allies sent messages to Washington expressing concern. The Soviet Union delivered a serious warning. However, the U.S. Administration did not renounce its plans. Having accepted for the Air Force the 131st and 132d B-52 bomber, at the end of 1986 the Reagan administration went over the limits of the SALT II Treaty.

The White House is attempting to portray the treaty itself as ineffective in "deterring the buildup of Soviet strategic systems." The old method essentially has once again been put to use: diverting attention away from its own efforts to achieve strategic superiority. Accelerated work is under way in the United States on building up its nuclear potential (the deployment of the new MX ICBM, the Trident 2 SLM and the B-1B heavy bombers, the creation of the Midgetman new type of mobile ICBM and the mass deployment of long-range cruise missiles).

The assertions of government representatives concerning the imaginary Soviet violations are, in the opinion of many American experts, built on sand and do not withstand criticism. This is the conclusion also reached by R. Earle in the article "America is Cheating Itself" (7) in the fall issue of the journal FOREIGN POLICY. Earle's is a very competent opinion: it was he who since 1978 headed the American delegation at the SALT II negotiations, and in 1980-1981, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. "A careful acquaintance with the facts," he writes, "indicates that, ignoring the history of the negotiations, attempting to reach the worst common denominator in an administration torn by disagreements or acting with premeditation, top figures of the Reagan administration and the President himself have turned the problem of compliance (with SALT II--V.A.) into a kind of monster which never had a right to exist. In addition, as the facts attest, a serious question arises: are the Soviets in violation (of the treaty--V.A.)?" In Earle's opinion, could there have been any violations, they would have had practically no military significance, and all problems with such supposed violations should have been tackled with the help of the existing standing Soviet-American Consultative Commission. However, from the very outset a negative approach to the commission evolved in the Reagan administration. It is significant that this opinion is shared by many American specialists. Specifically, C. Maynes, editor of FOREIGN POLICY, wrote in the article "Lost Opportunities" (8) carried by the FOREIGN AFFAIRS journal that, as distinct from its predecessors, "the Reagan administration has always preferred more to reap benefits on the domestic policy scene--even
at a price of undermining arms control—than to seek diplomatic successes at negotiations with the Soviets in connection with deliberate or unintentional violations. This is the first administration since the start of the SALT process which has endeavored to solve the problems of compliance with the treaty in such a spirit as to have brought the negotiations to a complete standstill."

Examining the administration's "charges" against the Soviet Union, Earle attempts at the same time to also answer such questions as: was it possible to have foreseen all these problems of "noncompliance" earlier and to have prevented them by way of the adoption of more strictly recorded commitments and how to avoid such problems in the event of the conclusion of future agreements?

From the start of the SALT II negotiations in November 1972 right up to the signing of the treaty in June 1979 both sides, Earle recalls, submitted numerous proposals concerning new ICBM's. The key problem was that of limiting the number and types of new ICBM's and defining the very concept of ICBM. Questions of permissible improvements of the existing systems were connected with the latter. The complex negotiations culminated in a compromise, in accordance with which the sides acquired the right to "test and deploy one new type of light ICBM". It was in accordance with this decision that the Soviet Union built one light ICBM, called in the West the SS-24. This was a step in response to the creation and deployment in the United States of the new MX missile. Also in compliance with the provisions of the SALT II Treaty the Soviet Union modernized a missile which had been made part of its armament 15 years previously. It was replaced by a missile which came to be called in the West the SS-25. Earle acknowledges that the appearance as part of the USSR's armament of the new SS-24 and the modernized SS-25 missiles are not contrary to the terms of the treaty. He recommends that those who are questioning the Soviet Union's compliance with the rules of missile modernization appeal to the Standing Consultative Commission.

The arguments of the author of the article also question other accusations of the Reagan administration apropos the Soviet Union's "violations" of the SALT II Treaty. "The violations of the treaty ascribed to the Soviets should be seen in the general context of its compliance with it," Earle writes. "It is a good situation in this sphere as a whole. And although Moscow has not made the cuts necessary in the event of the treaty being ratified, it has dismantled and destroyed 281 ICBM launchers, 245 SLBM launchers and 14 nuclear-powered missile-firing submarines in compliance with the limits on ballistic missile launchers stipulated by the SALT II Treaty. In addition, the Soviets have complied with a number of other prohibitions also... including the ban on the construction of ICBM launch silos."

By its reluctance to take into consideration the experience of negotiations the Reagan administration is damaging itself, Earle concludes. And its speculative campaign in connection with imaginary Soviet violations could do irreparable damage to the entire arms control process and American-Soviet relations.
The present administration's withdrawal from the SALT II Treaty has engendered in American scientific Harvard University's Center for International Relations, for example, attempt to look forward to the time when Reagan will have put aside his powers as U.S. President. "It is now customary," the author writes in FOREIGN AFFAIRS in the article "Farewell to Arms Control?" (9), "to say that it will be difficult for the next president, Republican or Democrat, to follow Ronald Reagan. In two respects, however, it will be easier for his successor to achieve some arms reduction agreement.... He will probably be more flexible in questions concerning the scale and pace of the research program; spared rhetoric in respect of deep cuts, a successor will evidently satisfy himself that important political benefits may be won at more modest and attainable levels than those which President Reagan originally mapped out."

However, ultimately, Nye believes, the incapacity for reaching a new arms control agreement will bequeath a difficult political legacy. Secondary military problems of compliance with the agreements will perform a central political role and impede the achievement of new agreements and their ratification. The basis for SALT will be conclusively undermined. Not only the existing limits on offensive and defensive missiles but also many measures increasing opportunities for observation and improving liaison could be consigned to oblivion. Although none of this means that there will not be so-called "unofficial and operational arms control," it also will evidently be weakened. The undermining of SALT will, possibly, entail more significant strategic costs than skeptics think.

Reykjavik: Contours of a Nuclear-Free World

The bold and large-scale program of nuclear disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union at the Reykjavik meeting revealed new vistas of lasting peace. For the first time mankind really moved onto the direct path leading to the safeguarding of general security. Displaying a sincere aspiration to the achievement of an accord, the Soviet side submitted new compromise proposals which took fully into account the points causing concern for the United States and made possible agreement on such most important issues as a reduction in and subsequently the complete elimination of strategic offensive arms and the destruction of medium-range missiles in Europe.

Implementation of the Soviet proposals afforded an opportunity for an abrupt turning point in the development of international relations, removal of the nuclear threat and the development of the peaceful cooperation of all members of the world community. Unfortunately, it was not possible to embody the agreement which had practically been achieved on the said questions in binding arrangements. The sole reason for this was the Reagan administration's reluctance to create the conditions for their realization by via of a strengthening of the ABM process and the adoption of the corresponding commitments identical for both sides. Washington preferred SDI to nuclear disarmament.

The meeting in Reykjavik revealed much. Specifically, it also threw light on the fact that the U.S. President was not prepared and not free to adopt bold
decisions corresponding to the interests of mankind and the American people themselves. Analyzing the reasons for R. Reagan's stubborn refusal to discuss questions of strengthening of the ABM process, M. Mandelbaum (associate of the Council on Foreign Relations) and S. Talbott (head of TIME magazine's Washington bureau) wrote in the article "Reykjavik and Beyond" in the last issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS (10) that "the President was not prepared for looking definitively and in detail into the exceptionally important and incredibly difficult question of the future interaction between the SDI and the ABM Treaty." But it was not only a question of the President's unpreparedness. The authors claim that the American leader was essentially bound by political obligations to circles of the right. As the article observed, "Reagan was feeling pressure on the part of the right. Had he given even the appearance of accepting Gorbachev's proposal, he would have been vulnerable to charges that he had consented in Reykjavik to what he had managed to avoid in Geneva a year earlier: compromise on SDI. Conservative congressmen and observers were warning him on the eve of the meeting not to consent to such compromise; after Reykjavik they congratulated him on not having done this."

The authors of the article recognize that the meeting in the Icelandic capital was largely different from how Washington imagined it. Reagan regarded it as a "final base camp" en route to a summit in Washington. However, "the agenda was far more extensive, and the questions discussed, far more important than those which the Americans had intended studying at the proposed summit (which it was planned holding in Washington--V.A.)."

While expressing disappointment at the results of the meeting Mandelbaum and Talbott at the same time share the viewpoint of those who believe that an important step forward was taken in Reykjavik toward a better understanding of the problems of disarmament. Contrary to all the settled ideas about negotiating tactics and cautious diplomacy, the leaders of the two countries devoted themselves to the most difficult problem dividing them--how to limit and reduce the tremendous stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The subject of their negotiations was "one of the oldest, most thankless and least productive topics of the nuclear age--general and complete nuclear disarmament."

Mandelbaum and Talbott write that throughout 1986 the impression had taken shape in the U.S. Administration that the Soviet Union might consent to a separate agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe. For this reason many officials in the Reagan government proposed that this question be the "crux of the program" in Reykjavik. However, unexpectedly for Reagan the Soviet leader proposed "an all-embracing agreement on arms control extending to medium-range missiles, strategic offensive arms, SDI and other problems such as, for example, nuclear testing."

The U.S. President's adherence to the "star wars" program predetermined, as is known, the results of the meeting. "Gorbachev proposed a version," the authors of the article observe, "which had been expected by many specialists in the arms control field in the administration and outside and which some of them supported. For many months they had discussed the possibility of a 'grand compromise,' in accordance with the terms of which the United States would consent to appreciable limitations on the SDI program in exchange for just as
appreciable reductions in Soviet strategic forces." By its proposals the USSR demonstrated once again a readiness for radical solutions. However, the path toward compromise was blocked by the United States.

Despite the fact that the achievement of agreements had been thwarted by the American side, forces of the right in the United States were not slow to criticize the President in connection with the fundamental understandings arrived at in the course of the negotiations in Reykjavik. Military figures and certain leaders of Congress reproached the administration for the fact that in having consented to the destruction over a 10-year period of ballistic missiles it could thereby have undermined its proclaimed "strategic modernization" program. The future of the new-generation American missiles--the MX, Midgetman and D-5--could have been in doubt. In this connection Mandelbaum and Talbott mention complaints expressed by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in connection with the fact that they were not even consulted at the time of the decision-making in Reykjavik.

Not least with the purpose of lessening this criticism, evidently, the American participants in the meeting in the Icelandic capital attempted immediately following it to distort the true picture of what had happened. The authors point to the contradictory pronouncements of American officials, confusion and discrepancies in the distinctive accounts of Reykjavik presented by representatives of the administration.

Despite the ambiguous and, for the most part, disappointing results of the meeting, Mandelbaum and Talbott believe that the future nonetheless belongs to arms control. "The potential agreement which was outlined in Reykjavik," they write, "will more than likely raise the ceilings determined by the 1979 SALT II Treaty. But the grand compromise, if it can be achieved, will hardly signify an entirely new approach to strategic arms control. Just the reverse, it will have borne out not only SALT I but also SALT II, having linked limitations on strategic defenses with ceilings on strategic offensive forces."

The year of 1986--the International Year of Peace--showed how complex the struggle for disarmament is. The exchange of opinions in Reykjavik between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan enabled both sides to extend their understanding of most important problems of world politics, bilateral relations and an end to the arms race. But the architectural plan of a nuclear-free world proposed by the Soviet Union was not supported by the American side. It was dissatisfied not with its architecture but its purpose: the R. Reagan administration cannot conceive of a world without nuclear weapons and "star wars". But disarmament and the security of mankind are not a utopia. This is also understood in the United States itself by those who are capable of realistically evaluating the dramatic dilemma of the nuclear age. Many articles of American scientific journals testify to this.

FOOTNOTES


4. See R. McNamara, "Blundering Into Disaster: First Century of the Nuclear Age" (MEMO No 12, 1986).

5. Harold Brown, "Is SDI Technically Feasible?" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol 64, No 3).


7. Ralph Earle, "America is Cheating Itself" (FOREIGN POLICY, Fall, 1986).

8. Charles W. Maynes, "Lost Opportunities" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol 64, No 3).

9. Joseph S. Nye, "Farewell to Arms Control?" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Fall 1986).


COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

8850
CSO: 1816/7
IZVESTIYA EDITOR 'SKEPTICAL ABOUT U.S. POSITION'

Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 3 Apr 87 p 3

[Text]

Visiting Editor in Chief
Ivan D. Laptev of the Soviet
government newspaper Izvestia
Wednesday said he was
skeptical about the U.S. position
on the recent Soviet
medium-range nuclear-missile
reduction proposal.

"The Soviet Union sincerely
hopes for a fruitful result in
the Soviet-U.S. negotiations
on intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) reduction, but
Moscow is concerned because
Washington is putting forth
one fresh problem after
another," Laptev said in an
e exclusive interview with
Kyodo News Service here.

He criticized the United
States for trying to link prin-
cipal issues with peripheral
ones.

Laptev was referring to
U.S. interest in including
short-range missiles in talks
on the total removal of INF
missiles from Europe.

The INF proposal was
made by Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev on Feb.
26. Gorbachev called upon the
U.S. to seek an accord on the
abolition of INF missiles from
Europe by separating the
U.S.-planned Strategic De-
fense Initiative (SDI) project
and other related issues in the
Geneva disarmament nego-
tiations.

Should the two countries
conclude a pact on the issue,
the Soviet Union would soon
remove short-range missiles
now deployed in East Ger-
many and Czechoslovakia,
Laptev said.

Moscow would also be
ready to start negotiations on
other short-range missiles, he
said.

In explaining why Moscow
separates short-range mis-
soles in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia from those in
other areas, Laptev said that
because the U.S. has airborne
nuclear bombs and cruise
missiles, making such a dis-
tinction is necessary if one is
to achieve parity between
Soviet and U.S. forces.

Laptev said he was optimis-
tic regarding the future of
Japan-Soviet relations,
saying that chances are good
for development of diplomat-
ic, cultural, scientific and eco-
nomic relations between the
two counties.

But he did not comment on
when Soviet Party General
Secretary Gorbachev might
make an official visit to
Japan.

Laptev said the timing of a
Japan visit is now under re-
view, adding that the exact
date of a visit is a question to
be solved between the leaders
of both countries.

Laptev, 52, previously
worked at the Soviet Party
newspaper Pravda between
1978 and 1984 before he was
appointed Editor in Chief of
Izvestia. He is here as a guest
of the Foreign Ministry.
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET ATTACHE: NATO PRESSURING TURKEY ON NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENT

LD272217 Moscow in Turkish to Turkey 1400 GMT 25 Feb 87

[Report by Aleksandr Ivanov]

[Text] The latest issue of the HAFTAYA BAKIS [Sunday supplement of MILLYET] has published a statement by Yuriy Babushkin, the naval attache of the Soviet Embassy in Turkey.

A correspondent of the periodical asked Babushkin: What is your comment regarding the claims by certain Western sources that the 25 Soviet divisions in the Transcaucasus Military Okrug constitute a danger to Turkey?

Yuriy Babushkin replied: Soviet Armed Forces, including the Armed Forces in the Transcaucasus, constitute no threat to any foreign country. All claims by Western sources to the effect that there is a threat of war from the Soviet Union are entirely without foundation. Our long-standing goal is to transform our Transcaucasus frontier into one of peace and friendship—this is our wish. Strengthening of good-neighborly relations with all our neighbors is in keeping with our vital interests."

As emphasized by Yuriy Babushkin, Soviet Armed Forces are solely for defensive goals.

Asked by the correspondent which of the NATO bases in Turkey are dangerous to the Soviet Union, Yuriy Babushkin answered: According to statements by NATO representatives, nuclear weapons are being stockpiled on Turkish territory. In addition, there are means of delivery for these weapons. Certain NATO circles are exerting pressure on Turkey to force it to agree to deploy new kinds of nuclear weapons on Turkish territory. Under the circumstances it is not possible for the Soviet Union not to be concerned. This concern has been voiced in an article entitled "Turkey and NATO" in the 28 January 1987 issue of PRAVDA.

On a question by the correspondent on his comments on the development of the military relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey in recent years, Yuriy Babushkin replied: These contacts are useful. Both sides express this view. The development of these contacts will help in the strengthening of mutual trust and good-neighborly relations.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1506

75
TURKISH COMMENTARY EXAMINES SOVIET ARMS CONTROL

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 12 MAR 87 p 13

[Commentary by Coskun Kirca]

[Text] The Soviets have an old tactic. After rejecting Western proposals for years on end they suddenly decide to accept it, causes a commotion worldwide, and of course, turning the whole thing into a plus for themselves. It is not Gorbachev who invented this tactic. The Soviets have always deployed it in their relations with the West, and to their propaganda advantage.

This is not because the Soviets are more astute. No, the reason is the overriding concern of the Western public to maintain peace, and while doing so tending to forget that peace is deserved only when one is adequately prepared for war.

None the less, during recent exchanges involving the INF and what amounts to an acceptance of American proposals, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR had occasion to realize that Westerners are now more seasoned against such tactics as compared to before. However, Western governments still have a job ahead of them to ensure that hopes aroused by Gorbachev are kept within reasonable bounds.

An instance of the Soviet tactic came up a few days ago at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. For years the banning of chemical weapons has been a topic of discussion at this conference where a draft agreement is under negotiation. In fact using chemical weapons in war has already been banned under international law. So the draft agreement, rather than reiterating the existing ban, is aimed at the destruction of existing weapons and prevention of further production. So, in order to reach an agreement of this kind there has to be an overall consensus with regard to methods of verification. But for years there hasn't been any progress over the draft agreement. The main reason being that the Soviet Union has always accused Western countries, U.S. in particular, with
possessing chemical weapons while consistently denying that it produces and stockpiles these weapons itself.

And now the 'great event' we are witnessing in Geneva is the admission, for the first time, by the Soviet representative that USSR also possesses chemical weapons after all. This is undoubtedly a significant, indeed highly significant, step. But the West doesn't owe the Soviets a debt of gratitude for finally admitting to this simple fact.

This development, if it was due to a realization on Kremlin's part that no amount of Soviet tactics will make the West oblivious to the fact that disarmament is predicated upon an overall balance of power, may be considered a hopeful sign. At a time when agreement on the INF seems to be close at hand we should be careful that Western Europe (Turkey included) not fall victim to overwhelming Soviet superiority in battlefield and tactical weapons. And this largely depends upon both NATO and the Warsaw Pact remaining true to that realization.

12466
CSO: 5200/2523
NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR ARMY PAPER: WHITE SANDS NONNUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSION AIMS

PM261021 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Largest-Ever Nonnuclear Explosion"]

[Text] New York, 16 May -- The largest-ever nonnuclear explosion, code-named "Misty Picture," was conducted on Thursday [14 May] at the U.S. White Sands missile test range in New Mexico. Some 4,685 tonnes of a compound of potassium nitrate and petroleum were detonated in a giant plexiglass cupola. This is equivalent to the explosion of an 8-kilotonne nuclear device.

As reported by Tom Kennedy, representative of the Defense Department nuclear weapons agency, the aim of the test conducted jointly by the agency and specialists from Britain, Canada, Norway, and Sweden was to check out the combined effect of the blast wave and thermal radiation on military hardware, bunkers, specially constructed houses, and the environment.

A total of almost 170 experiments were carried out during the test. In particular, two A-7 fighter-bombers, with which the U.S. Navy is equipped, were checked for their ability to withstand the destructive impact of the explosion. Examples of foreign military equipment, including Soviet, were also tested.

A minute after the explosion 24 rockets were fired into the giant dust cloud thrown up by the explosion so as to study this dust cloud. Observations were also carried out by high-speed cameras and pressure-sensors. According to Kennedy, military specialists will gather in 2 months' time to analyze the preliminary results of the experiment.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1508
The 41st Session of the UN General Assembly saw vigorous efforts made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to secure the acceptance of new political thinking in the practice of international relations, and to lay the foundations for a comprehensive system of international security.

The ideas for building a secure world by political means put forward by the 27th Congress of the CPSU and the priorities of eliminating nuclear weapons and preventing the arms race in outer space outlined by Mikhail Gorbachev’s statement of January 15, 1986, have had a considerable impact on the world community and have influenced the debates at the UN and the General Assembly resolutions. Contributing to the same effect were the foreign policy initiatives of the socialist countries and concrete Soviet actions, such as the repeated extension of its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions.

A powerful impetus to the work of the session was given in Reykjavik where discussion of the disarmament question was raised to a new level and the perspective of practical struggle for a nuclear-free world was broadened.

The debates were keynoted by the call for positive changes in the world, for transition from words to deeds, and for UN resolutions meeting the historical challenges of the nuclear-space era. This was the spirit in which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries proceeded during the Assembly session. In his speech, Eduard Shevardnadze, the head of the Soviet delegation, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, set forth the Soviet Union’s creative, bold and innovatory approach to world problems, and called on the United Nations “to adopt a scale of values in which practical actions would take priority”. He reaffirmed the determination of the Soviet leadership to continue to use every opportunity for a constructive dialogue, for advance on arms limitation and reduction, for the settlement of regional conflicts, and the development of international cooperation in every important area.
The latest session of the UN General Assembly had a very full agenda, covering as it did 140 points dealing with disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons, the settlement of conflict situations in various parts of the world, the struggle against colonialism, apartheid and international terrorism. It discussed economic security of the states, humanitarian, financial and international legal problems.

Naturally, the joint proposal of the socialist countries on creating a comprehensive system of international security set out in their letter to the UN Secretary-General of August 1986 occupied a central place in the UN debates.

The initiative of the socialist countries proceeded from the premise that international security is indivisible and can only be universal, equal for all and covering the military, as well as political, economic and humanitarian fields of international relations.

The idea of comprehensive international security naturally attracted the attention of a large number of states and of the world public, and stimulated the UN debate on problems of the security of states in the light of the present situation in the world.

This was reflected in the positive response to the idea that came from many non-aligned countries before the UN General Assembly session set to work. During the session the question of a comprehensive international security system became in effect one of the most significant political subjects and a focus of heated debate. The USA and other Western powers tried to hinder its discussion at the UN from the outset when the agenda of the session was being fixed. These attempts, however, were foiled by the socialist countries which accepted the British delegation's proposal that the aim of a comprehensive system should be "international peace and security." As a result, a decision was adopted that the agenda of the session include the point On the Establishment of a Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security which was put before the First (Political and Security) Committee and not before the Sixth (Legal) Committee as some Western powers had insisted.

The subject of universal security, which covers all the key areas of international cooperation, quickly went beyond the framework of a single committee and loomed large in the general political discussion and in the debates on other items on the session's agenda.

Explaining the essence of their proposal, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries stressed that it aims to give a new character to international relations, that it is not directed at confrontation, but proceeds from the political philosophy that rejects the perception of other countries and peoples as enemies, and is aware that for all their contradictions and differences the peoples of the Earth today are partners and allies in the struggle for the survival and progress of the human race.

A comprehensive international security system, stated the socialist countries, aims to create a world in which there would be neither nuclear nor military space club of select powers, a humane world in which the peoples would freely choose their own independent road of development, a world in which the interdependence of states would be expressed in mutual understanding and confidence, where equitable economic and humanitarian ties would be promoted, and efforts in tackling global problems would be pooled.

In creating the system of comprehensive international security the socialist countries had in view not to start from scratch. It was to be a continuation of the work started at the time of founding the UN and drafting its Charter which proclaims that the main aim of the UN is to rid the future generations of the calamities of war. Throughout postwar
history the peaceloving states have tried to specify the tasks and principles of the UN in bilateral and multilateral documents, the resolutions of the Security Council and resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly.

As early as 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration, proposed by the socialist countries, on the Strengthening of International Security, which reflected the conviction that consolidated international security, disarmament and economic development are all closely intertwined and, thus, any progress made towards attaining any of these goals is progress made towards attainment of all these goals. The interconnection of the problems has been more acutely felt in recent years, stimulating political thought towards developing the concept of international security.

The 8th Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Harare in 1986 issued a declaration which read in part that "the accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, constitutes a threat to the continued survival of mankind. It has therefore become imperative that states abandon the dangerous goal of unilateral security through armament and embrace the objective of common security through disarmament".

The same goal inspired the efforts of the leaders of six states from four continents who have repeatedly warned that security based on sophisticated technology is fragile and unreliable, and have persistently called for a new concept of universal security without nuclear weapons.

Some valuable ideas are contained in the report “Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament” prepared by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues chaired by Olof Palme, who died tragically. The Commission speaks of the need to replace the widespread concept of nuclear deterrence, allegedly a guarantee of peace and international stability, by a new approach to ensuring genuine security for everyone in this world.

While giving credit to the currents of modern political thought that preceded the proposal on a comprehensive international security system, the socialist countries have stressed that their proposal is not the ultimate cut-and-dried formula. On the contrary, they called on other states to engage in an open and broad dialogue, to compare views and come together to develop new fundamental ideas for a future comprehensive security system which would involve all the world’s states.

The debates on international security at the First Committee showed that most non-aligned as well as neutral states were interested in extending the discussion on the concrete areas of strengthening peace and security, notably in the military, political and economic areas.

At the session the non-aligned countries have actively advocated the ideas of the Harare Declaration calling for an end to the arms race, in the first place the nuclear arms race, for a just settlement in the Middle East, Southern Africa and Central America. They tried to use the UN to counter the aggressive policies of Israel, South Africa and the USA in these regions, to promote international security, and solve the Third World’s economic development problems. Although the interest of the developing countries in the humanitarian aspects of international security was not as great, some major non-aligned countries (India, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Tanzania, Indonesia, and Nigeria) as well as Mexico, approved the initiative of the socialist countries and spoke in favour of more democratic international relations and a greater UN role in the maintenance of international security, the settlement of conflicts and in economic development.
A powerful impetus to the debate on a comprehensive international security system contributing to a positive attitude by the non-aligned states came from the Delhi Declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi on November 27, 1986. The approach of the socialist and non-aligned countries to disarmament, security, the settlement of conflicts and democratisation of international relations coincided objectively on many basic matters. This provided the basis for close cooperation between their delegations on most items on the agenda of the General Assembly session.

At the same time the joint initiative of the socialist countries throughout the session has met with stubborn opposition on the part of the USA and other Western countries. President Reagan's speech was vivid proof of that. Imbued with the spirit of confrontation and containing attacks on the Soviet Union and non-aligned countries, it invoked a negative reaction and irritated many delegations, including some West European allies of the USA. Throughout the 41st Session of the General Assembly, the USA followed arrogant tactics and attempted to impose its demands on the international community. Having failed to come up with viable arguments against a comprehensive international security system it claimed that the concept proposed by the socialist countries could undermine the UN Charter and the collective security system it envisaged.

This far-fetched and false argument which was echoed by some pro-Western developing countries—Singapore, Liberia, Cameroon—was convincingly refuted in the speeches of the Soviet and other socialist delegates who stressed that their own joint initiative was based entirely on the UN Charter and was aimed at realising its goals and principles in the nuclear-space age.

The draft resolution proposed by the socialist countries appealed to the nations to concentrate efforts on providing equal security for all, and in all spheres of international relations, and to contribute to the elaboration of the main principles of a comprehensive international security system which it suggested be discussed further at the 42nd Session of the General Assembly. The sponsors took into account some amendments to the draft suggested by the delegations of Pakistan and some West European countries, which stressed the role of the UN. As a result, provisions were added to the draft revealing the comprehensive character of the concept of universal international security covering critically important and interconnected areas of disarmament, the settlement of crises and conflicts, economic development, and cooperation in the humanitarian field.

The flexible and constructive approach of the socialist states during the session debates won more supporters for their initiative. By an impressive majority of 102 against 2 (the USA and France), the General Assembly approved the draft resolution of the socialist countries laying down the guidelines for the formation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security, stressing the UN's role in the solution of this task. The draft provides for continued discussion of this issue at the 42nd session of the General Assembly.

In contrast to previous years, the debates on arms limitation at the latest UN General Assembly session took place against the background of a real new perspective of a turn towards ending the arms race and implementing disarmament, of a start towards a nuclear-free world.
The fact that Reykjavik revealed the existence of a real opportunity for the USSR and the USA reaching historic agreements on drastic cuts and the elimination of nuclear weapons, was welcomed at the session as the first major positive step towards putting nuclear disarmament on a practical plane. "The enormous significance of Reykjavik," declared Jayantha Dhanapala, the Sri Lankan ambassador, "is the mutual acceptance by the two superpowers of the fact that nuclear weapons can be eliminated through phased and verifiable reductions. We finally glimpse a vision of a civilised world where security is ensured through disarmament arrangements and not through the fear and intimidation caused by a relentless escalation of the nuclear arms race. The achievement of that vision is our collective responsibility as equal nations striving for a better world."

"...Reykjavik," stressed the Belgian ambassador, Edmonde Dever, "will come to be seen as an important stage in the disarmament process, the ultimate aim of which is gradually to free the world from the spectre of war, be it conventional or nuclear."

Practically all groups of states spoke in favour of continued efforts based on the achievements made in the Icelandic capital. This was reflected in the resolution adopted on the initiative of a large group of non-aligned states and backed by 140 countries. Only the United States and twelve of its allies abstained. The mandate of the international community is unequivocal: the resolution makes an urgent appeal to the USSR and the USA to pursue bilateral talks with the utmost determination to achieve agreements on concrete effective measures of ending the nuclear arms race, radical cuts of their nuclear arsenals, nuclear disarmament, and prevention of the arms race in outer space.

Preventing the arms race in outer space was a key issue on the session's agenda. The fact that American Star Wars plans became the main obstacle to agreement on drastic cuts in nuclear weapons, which was recognised in one way or another by many delegates, lent a particular intensity to the discussion.

India, Nigeria, Australia, and many other countries situated on different continents and pursuing different policies, vigorously criticised the concept of "strategic defence" noting that shifting the arms race to outer space would pose another threat to international security and erect barriers in every area of disarmament that would be difficult to overcome.

The Venezuelan Foreign Minister, S. Consalvi said: "We object to any attempt to militarise outer space, which some seek to present as a panacea and the definitive course for the future elimination of the nuclear threat; but which in fact is nothing more than a new attempt to escape from the political and ethical dilemmas of our time with ever more advanced, complex, illusory, and costly technological formulas."

It is significant that even the closest allies of the USA were among the 154 countries that voted for the resolution on preventing the arms race in outer space, jointly drawn up by a group of socialist, non-aligned and Western countries, with the USA the only abstaining country.

The majority of the non-aligned, neutral and some Western countries spoke directly in favour of preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty of 1972 and linking this task with the whole nuclear disarmament issue. The Austrian Foreign Minister P. Jankowiitch stressed that "deep cuts should be made in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons. Development of new types of such weapons should be discouraged. Therefore Austria considers the ABM Treaty, for instance, as a pivotal element in the existing system of arms control treaties."

The international community welcomed the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions. Besides, two resolutions adopted at the session urge
the need to make it a bilateral (Soviet-American) and subsequently a
multilateral moratorium.

The USA replied in the negative. The session adopted five resolu-
tions on nuclear tests and, significantly, the USA was left alone in voting
on one of them, while on the other four it had only Britain and France
on its side. The negative USA line was to all intents and purposes rejec-
ted and criticised by the international community. "The unilateral Soviet
moratorium," declared Ambassador M. Theorin of Sweden, "has been a
positive step. It is regrettable that the United States has chosen to con-
tinue nuclear testing."

The Assembly resolutely demanded an early start of talks on all
these aspects of the problem, including adequate verification measures,
to draw up a treaty to ban all nuclear tests everywhere and by all powers.
The UN resolutions clearly declared that the attitude of states to the
renunciation of nuclear tests was a litmus paper showing where they
really stood on the disarmament issue.

The General Assembly broadly supported the resolutions on prevent-
ing nuclear war and ending the nuclear arms race proposed by Argentina,
India, Mexico and other countries. The resolutions appealed to the Con-
ference on Disarmament to start negotiations on these matters as a top
priority. Only the USA and its closest allies voted against the resolu-
tions, while some of its NATO partners (Denmark, Greece and Spain) as
well as Japan voted against the USA.

An important new element was the session's approval by consensus of
the resolution (41/59F), proposed by the PRC, which stresses, for the
first time, that the ultimate aim of nuclear disarmament is the total eli-
mination of nuclear weapons and that all the nuclear powers bear re-
sponsibility for implementing this process. Most delegates made it clear
that nuclear disarmament should not be a matter for an exclusive group
of "nuclear club" members. The nuclear weapon is fraught with deadly
menace for all countries, therefore all the states are entitled to take part
in discussing measures to eliminate it, and have the right to demand that
the nuclear powers pursue a more responsible policy.

The advances at the negotiations to ban chemical weapons as part of
the Conference on Disarmament "lent a more constructive character to a
thorough consideration of this problem at the General Assembly, and led
to the adoption of several useful resolutions reflecting the will of the
majority of UN member states to finalise a convention banning chemical
weapons within the shortest time possible. The USA actions in developing
a new variety of chemical weapons (binary weapons) lend special rele-
vance to the appeal of the resolution proposed by the USSR and other
socialist countries to all the states to conduct the negotiations honestly
and to refrain from any actions that could impede the prohibition of che-
mental weapons, in particular to refrain from the manufacture of new
types of these arms and from deploying chemical weapons on the terri-
tories of other states.

A new development in the debates on disarmament at the 41st Session
was the advancing of the problem of armed forces and conventional arma-
ments reductions to the status of priority problems. Several useful reso-
lutions have been adopted on this question. Much of the credit for this
must go to the successful conclusion of the first stage of the Stockholm
Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarma-
ment in Europe, which the Assembly unanimously welcomed.

The complex of measures to reduce armed forces and conventional
armaments in Europe proposed by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in
Budapest in 1986 met with a positive response at the UN.
Almost all countries, especially the developing ones, displayed interest in the problem of rechanneling the resources consumed by the arms race towards peaceful needs, including development aid. The session decided to hold an international conference on the interconnection between disarmament and development in the summer of 1987. It has also been decided to call a third special UN General Assembly session on disarmament in 1988.

The Assembly passed about 70 important decisions on cutting and eliminating nuclear weapons, banning and destroying chemical weapons, limiting conventional weapons, on beginning talks on disarmament on the seas and oceans, on releasing resources for economic development through disarmament.

In the discussion of these major issues there was a broad united front including the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and a group of non-aligned countries. Also active in the same direction were the neutral states and some positive actions were undertaken by Greece, Australia, New Zealand, as well as Denmark and Spain.

In contrast to this line on disarmament issues was the behaviour of the USA which backed less than a half of the UN resolutions. Even some West European countries preferred to dissociate themselves from this approach. As a result, the voting on 15 resolutions dealing with disarmament left the USA alone or in the company of one or two of its closest allies.

Questions related to the political aspects of the comprehensive system of international security figured prominently at the session along with disarmament problems.

For many years the NATO countries have opposed drafting a world treaty on the non-use of force. In this connection the delegations of the socialist countries led by the USSR called for an early break in the deadlock created by NATO on the issue of making the principle of non-use of force more effective. At the initiative of the socialist countries, backed by the non-aligned countries, the General Assembly decided by consensus to assign the UN special committee on the non-use of force with the task of completing the draft declaration on increasing the effectiveness of the principle of the non-use of force, to be submitted to the 42nd Session.

While debating on the International Year of Peace the USA and other Western countries attempted to curtail the programme of the Year, to dismantle the voluntary fund, dissolve its secretariat and have this issue stricken off the UN agenda. However, the socialist and non-aligned countries managed to secure the adoption of a resolution that leaves this issue within the UN’s purview and includes it in the agenda for its next session.

Regional conflicts were the focus of heated debates at the Assembly. The USA and its allies found themselves under fire for aiding and abetting Israel and South Africa, as well as counter-revolutionary mercenaries in various regions of the world.

In the debates on the Middle East, the General Assembly supported the Soviet proposal to set up a preparatory committee for an international conference on the Middle East.

The debates on the situation in Central America revealed mounting concern among a large group of states over the threat of violent US action with regard to Nicaragua, their desire to protect Central America from Washington’s interference and seek political settlement in the region by the Latin Americans themselves with the help of the Contadora
and Lima groups. The Assembly adopted, by 94 votes against 3 (the USA, El Salvador, Israel), the Nicaraguan-sponsored resolution supporting the decision of the International Court of Justice which condemned US actions against Nicaragua.

The adoption of a resolution condemning US aggression against Libya was another setback for Washington.

Brazil’s initiative aimed at creating a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic highlighted the contrast between the imperial policy of the USA in that region and the desire of the Latin American countries to protect it against external interference and militarisation. This initiative was actively backed by the socialist, non-aligned and even many Western states. The US delegation was the only one to vote against.

The resolutions on decolonisation and apartheid reaffirmed all the previous basic principles of the UN supportive of the national liberation movements in southern Africa, condemned Washington’s policy of “constructive engagement” with Pretoria and “linkage” of the Namibian settlement to the questions of Cuban troops in Angola, as well as Pretoria’s aid to UNITA bands in Angola. The Assembly’s resolutions criticise South Africa, the USA, Britain and Israel by name and appeals to the Security Council to introduce comprehensive sanctions against South Africa in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The USA and its closest allies found themselves in total isolation while voting on most resolutions aimed at eliminating colonialism and apartheid.

France suffered a tangible setback having failed to prevent the General Assembly from including its “overseas territory” of New Caledonia in the list of territories covered by the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

The debates on the so-called Afghan issue again demonstrated that the USA and other NATO countries are deliberately fomenting a slanderous propaganda campaign against the USSR and the DRA in a bid to prevent a settlement of the situation over Afghanistan through the UN Secretary-General’s personal representative. During the session they trotted out the usual allegations of human rights violations in Afghanistan. Although they managed to secure the adoption of anti-Afghan resolutions, it was clear that many states—non-aligned and even some Western countries—viewed with understanding the steps of the Soviet Union and the DRA aimed at an early political settlement, the withdrawal of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan and the policy of national reconciliation pursued by the country’s government.

The debates in the UN on international economic issues brought into strong relief such outstanding problems as the foreign indebtedness of the developing countries, the artificial barriers to trade and economic exchanges, the functioning of the monetary system, etc. The Soviet delegation to the session explained the Soviet concept of international economic security and its non-confrontational character which met the interests of all countries. The resolution adopted by the Assembly consolidates this line of the UN’s activities as part of the initiative of the socialist countries to create a comprehensive international security system. Some of the resolutions adopted are clearly directed against economic colonialism.

The humanitarian issues were the subject of acute debates. In contrast to the attempts of the USA and some of its allies to use the human rights issue to fuel confrontation and fruitless polemic, the socialist countries sought a serious unbiassed conversation on ways to ensure universal acceptance of the basic human rights and freedoms. An overwhelm-
The majority of states shared the constructive approach of adherence to international pacts on human rights and other agreements providing an international legal basis for the social and political freedoms of the individual. At the same time the session highlighted the "double standard" policy of the USA, which was the only country to vote against the resolution on strengthening international cooperation on human rights adopted by 154 votes. The USA exposed its own human rights record by refusing to vote for the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on housing the homeless and protecting immigrant workers (by 134 and 148 votes respectively).

The Soviet delegation submitted a memorandum on the Development of International Law setting forth the Soviet concept of the role of international law in the nuclear-space age and aimed at laying the legal groundwork for a comprehensive international security system.

The session also adopted useful resolutions on speeding the drafting of an international convention to combat the use of mercenaries, on drafting a code of crimes against peace and the security of mankind, and on the need to take measures to protect diplomatic and consular missions against acts of violence, including a ban on the activities of terrorist groups. Many delegations resolutely condemned the arbitrary and ungrounded actions of the US administration in cutting the staff of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR missions at the UN as a crude violation of US commitments to the UN.

In 1986 the UN was faced with a financial crisis caused by Washington's refusal to pay its full dues to the UN budget. These arbitrary actions were severely criticised even by the US NATO allies, not to speak of the majority of other states. Measures have been jointly worked out to economise UN resources. Having provoked this crisis, the USA however failed to achieve its political goals: it failed to paralyse or divert the UN activities from its key tasks of eliminating the threat of war, strengthening international security, just as it failed to blunt the anti-imperialist, anti-militarist and anti-colonial edge of UN resolutions.

The recently completed session in New York highlighted the clash of two approaches to the UN, its role in international affairs, reflecting the world-wide confrontation between a new mode of political thinking oriented on the solution of the tasks facing mankind through political means and joint efforts of the international community, and the militaristic egocentric approach of the imperialist circles, notably the USA. The discussion at the session made it clear that Washington's policy is in a state of deep crisis, based as it is on adherence to imperial ambitions and claims to military superiority and the use of force in international affairs. Speaker after speaker at the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly stressed that in the present-day world there is no sensible alternative to agreeing the positions and interests of all the states, to resolving the outstanding problems on a multilateral basis with due respect to the norms of international law and morality.

The UN General Assembly's debates on the key problems of our time have expressed the hopes, the aspiration and the will of the overwhelming majority of states to transform the world as early as possible in line with the principles of universal security, democratisation of international relations, and to rid mankind of the threat of nuclear war.

COPYRIGHT: Obshchestvo "Znaniye", 1986
English Translation Copyright: Progress Publishers 1987
/9317
CSO: 5200/1504
87
PRAVDA: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSS BLOC INITIATIVES

13 May Conference

PM141507 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 May 87 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Conference in Moscow"]

[Text] A conference of deputy foreign ministers from the Belorussian SSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the CSSR was held in Moscow 13 May to examine questions concerning joint initiatives by the socialist countries at the United Nations on the creation of an all-embracing system of international peace and security.

The conference was held in a businesslike-comradely atmosphere.

A press briefing was held following the conclusion of the conference.

Petrovskiy Addresses Conference

LDL32046 Moscow TASS in English 1710 GMT 13 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS — A conference of deputy ministers of foreign affairs of Belorussia, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR, the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia was held here today. It studied questions connected with the joint initiative of socialist countries in the United Nations Organisation on the creation of an all-embracing system of international peace and security.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Vladimir Petrovskiy addressed a press conference after the meeting.

Participants in the meeting, he said, noted with satisfaction that the question of a comprehensive system of international peace and security is not only on the agenda of the forthcoming 42nd session of the U.S. General Assembly but already has become the subject of discussions and consultations between states. The current exchange of opinions is focused on the main idea of a new political thinking, namely on how to ensure security in all spheres of international relations through political means and efforts of everyone. Much importance is attached to the question of replacing nuclear deterrent with a political and legal one, of setting up a worldwide security mechanism in a non-violent, demilitarized world and of turning the U.S. into an effective political mechanism which will help prevent wars.
All this is evidence of the timeliness and importance of this initiative, V. Petrovskiy continued. The world community rejects nuclear war and violence in general and believes that the arms race is depriving humanity of a possibility to arrest the sliding down to a nuclear catastrophe.

It understands that in the present-day conditions there is only one way to guaranteed security, a political way, and that the security of each of the countries is unthinkable without equal security for all. It is natural that the concept of all-embracing, universal security, like all the new notions, is coming up against stubborn resistance on the part of those who are accustomed to think in categories of military might and power pressure.

In these conditions it is especially important today that the broadest circles of international public come to fully realize the urgency of the task of creating all the necessary conditions for the survival of humanity, for the building of a nuclear-free world.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1507
CPSU'S SOLOMEN'TSEV ATTENDS 12TH KKE CONGRESS IN ATHENS

CPSU Greetings

PM121547 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 87 Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee greetings message to 12th Greek Communist Party Congress]

[Text] To the 12th Greek Communist Party [KKE] Congress

Dear Comrades!

The CPSU Central Committee ardently greets the 12th Congress of the fraternal KKE and wishes its delegates fruitful work.

Your congress has assembled at a complex period of history. Time persistently demands new approaches to the use of all existing opportunities for curbing the forces of reaction and war. [paragraph continues]

However great the threat to peace, it can and must be averted. Mankind is now faced with the task of preventing a nuclear catastrophe and saving civilization and life itself on earth, which have been jeopardized by the rash, aggressive, militarist course of imperialist circles in the United States and NATO.

The CPSU, true to Leninist foreign policy principles, persistently and consistently strives to solve the key problems of the day — building a nuclear-free world, stopping the arms race, creating a reliable and comprehensive international security system, and removing violence from relations among states. The essence of the necessary breakthrough in the life of the world community lies, in our view, in the molding and dissemination of new thinking that accords with the realities of today's nuclear-missile, space, and computer age, and of a new policy aimed at the genuine humanization of international relations.

Soviet Communists make a high assessment of the great contribution made by Greek Communists to the European peoples' antiwar movement and of their consistent struggle to create a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, remove U.S. military bases from Greek soil, withdraw the country from NATO, and defend fundamental national interests.

We express confidence that the congress' decisions will be an important landmark on the path of further rallying all left-wing, democratic, and patriotic forces in the broad front of the struggle to implement profound democratic changes in Greece and ensure the country's peaceful future.

90
Expressing invariable solidarity with the KKE, the CPSU wishes Greek Communists great successes in their selfless activity for the good of the Greek people and for the sake of the triumph of the ideas of peace and socialism.

May the indissoluble friendship between the CPSU and the KKE and between the Soviet and Greek peoples flourish and grow stronger!

The CPSU Central Committee

Florakis Speech Opens Congress

PM141059 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Potapov and TASS correspondent A. Tkachuk dispatch: "Communist Party of Greece Congress Opens"]

[Text] Athens, 12 May — The 12th Communist Party of Greece [KKE] Congress opened today at Party House in the capital's working class district of Perissos. More than 1,000 delegates and representatives of approximately 80 foreign communist and workers parties and national liberation movements are taking part in the congress' work. The CPSU delegation, headed by by M.S. Solomentsev, member of the Politburo and chairman of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee, was greeted by the assembly with tumultuous applause.

The text of the KKE Central Committee report, which provides a detailed analysis of the world situation, was distributed to congress delegates today. As we stand on the threshold of the 21st century, the report says, the Communists' struggle to bring about a world free of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction and to preserve civilization is becoming all-embracing. Our peace struggle, it goes on to say, is inextricably bound to the struggle for changes in the direction of socialism.

The report says that the development of common European cooperation among all countries — from the Atlantic to the Urals — is the pivotal factor of KKE policy toward Europe. In the KKE's opinion, the Balkans could become a model for peaceful coexistence, good-neighborliness, and equal, mutually beneficial cooperation in all spheres. The Balkans' transformation into a nuclear-free zone would mark an important step in that direction. Greek Communists advocate the immediate elimination of all centers of tension in the Mediterranean through talks. They consider that Greece must resolutely resist any attempt to regard the Cyprus question as a question of relations within NATO or those of Greece and Turkey. It is an international problem. It is only by means of really extensive international support and the convening of a UN-sponsored international conference that a way out of the deadlock can be found and an integrated, unified, independent Cyprus free of foreign troops or bases created.

The opening speech, which initiated the congress' discussion of the report, was delivered by KKE Central Committee General Secretary K. Florakis. He noted that the KKE's activity is inextricably linked first and foremost with ideas of peace and a peaceful future for Greece. We are increasingly convinced that socialism and peace are indivisible, that peace is the route to socialism and socialism strengthens peace. This is the source of the Greek Communists' full support for Comrade Gorbachev's well-known proposals, proposals recognizing the need to open a new chapter in detente,
peace, cooperation, relaxation of tension, and arms reduction in the world. We, K. Florakis continued, attach great significance above all to achieving an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe, which could mark a fine start along the path to disarmament. Such a shift toward detente, he observed, also would make a valuable contribution to easing tension in the Near and Middle East region, tension evidenced in particular by the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations bound up with U.S. neoglobalist aspirations in the eastern Mediterranean.

Communists, the KKE leader went on to say, are campaigning for the removal of American and NATO bases from Greek territory and the country's withdrawal from NATO. They advocate the simultaneous disbandment of the military blocs and the establishment of a system of collective security and support efforts to create a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe and to turn the Balkans into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons and the Mediterranean into a zone of peace.

This year, the Greek Communists' leader observed, the Great October Socialist Revolution is 70 years old. The changes of revolutionary character and restructuring in all spheres of social and economic life being implemented in the Soviet Union are arousing universal interest in the world. Of course, different circles interpret these changes differently. Communists and progressive forces consider that what is happening in the Soviet Union is of great significance, enriches revolutionary theory and practice, and widens the prospects for the struggle for socialism.

Our party, K. Florakis said, adopts a consistently internationalist stance on relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries, fraternal parties, and national liberation movements. We will resolutely defend such internationalism, which has nothing to do with blind imitation, plagiarism, or mediocre uniformity, but is bound up with active class solidarity, equality, and creative exchange. We will do so because it is our party's strength. It is essential for the communist movement.

Today, K. Florakis concluded, we must resolutely promote a broad political unification of the left. Drawing strength from its rich traditions, confident of its ability, and buttressed by its existing potential and achievements, the KKE can and must be a genuine exponent of everything that is new in line with the requirements of our epoch to achieve the revolutionary renewal of our society.

After the KKE Central Committee general secretary's address, representatives of different Greek political parties greeted the congress.

Solomentsev KKE Congress Speech

PM161435 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[Dispatch by unnamed own correspondent and TASS correspondent: "Soviet Delegation Head's Speech at 12th Greek Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] Athens, 13 May -- M.S. Solomentsev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee, and head of the Soviet delegation, has addressed the 12th Greek Communist Party [KKE] Congress, which is continuing here.
In his speech he pointed out that Soviet and Greek Communists are linked by truly fraternal relations which are deeply rooted in the traditions of friendship between the two peoples and are underpinned by ideological and political unity and by common assessments of world development. He greeted the delegates to the 12th KKE Congress and conveyed to them and to all Greek Communists and working people warm greetings from the CPSU Central Committee and wishes for the successful and fruitful work of the congress.

Your party forum, the CPSU delegation head said, has met at a complex and exceptionally crucial time in the history of mankind. The militarist course of aggressive U.S. and NATO circles has increased immeasurably the danger of a nuclear catastrophe. The fate of peace and of the very future of civilization is at stake. The modern world is faced with the need to be aware of this chief reality of the nuclear missile age and of the whole dramatic nature of the situation which has come about.

The old order of things, under which national security was founded on the priority of military-technical means and on the policy of force, must give way to an all-embracing system of international security subsuming all spheres of international life — military, political, economic, and humanitarian. This is why the question of the need for new political thinking in our nuclear and space age has now arisen so acutely. The times insistently demand that all participants in international relations take urgent measures to avert the threat of a nuclear cataclysm hanging over mankind. There is no more important task today than the universal struggle against the threat of nuclear self-destruction, for the curbing of the arms race, and for disarmament. Our party and our people not only realize this but also take an active part in this struggle.

The new approach to international affairs also is making headway in the West, but this is still just the beginning. Old stereotypes are still strong in the capitalist world and leave their negative mark on the broad spectrum of social life and on the foreign policy of Western states. The more widespread the realization becomes in the world that it is no longer possible today to build one's own security at the expense of the security of others and that international politics cannot be determined by the interests of a single power, albeit a strong one, or of a group of powers, or by their military force, the more deeply the new political thinking will take root in the life of the world community, in practical politics.

The international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, For the Survival of Humanity," held in Moscow last February, convincingly demonstrated that forces wanting lasting peace and mutually advantageous, good-neighborly relations among the peoples are growing and strengthening on all continents. It is important now to fully realize the tremendous potential of these peace-loving forces. [paragraph continues]

The CPSU delegation head emphasized that special responsibility for the future of peace lies with Communists, who today are progressive fighters not only for the working people's fundamental interests, but also for the salvation of life itself on earth.

True to the Leninist foreign policy principles, which enjoyed further development in the decisions of the 27th congress and the Central Committee January (1987) Plenum, our party is doing everything in its power to improve the international situation, and the arms race on earth and keep it out of space, totally eliminate nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction before the end of our century, and create an all-embracing system of international security.
With a sense of profound responsibility for the fate of peace, the CPSU seeks mutually acceptable solutions to an entire package of questions of nuclear disarmament, whose fundamental problem remains the radical reduction of strategic offensive arms.

As is known, the speaker continued, agreement was reached at the joint Soviet-U.S. talks held in Moscow in April this year to accelerate work on realizing the principled accord on medium-range missiles in Europe. In particular, the Soviet side emphasized its desire to draw up the necessary agreements within a compressed timeframe and displayed readiness to constructively resolve the question of operational and tactical missiles. But this, of course, rules out the U.S. "arms upgrading" proposed by some people in the West or the "reequipping" of U.S. medium-range missiles instead of their elimination.

The Soviet leadership proposed to the U.S. Administration that a start be made right now on the elaboration of "key provisions" on further talks regarding strategic offensive arms, the ABM Treaty setup, and nuclear tests. A definitive accord on these key provisions could be reached during a top-level meeting. Then they could become the basis for the USSR and the United States to prepare legally binding agreements on all these questions.

During the talks we saw for ourselves once again how difficult it is to reach agreement with U.S. politicians. We have to constantly demonstrate the need to observe the balance of interests and explain that what we understand by this is scrupulous regard for the partner's military-strategic security, the principle of equality applied to all parameters of arms at all stages of their reduction, and the rejection of attempts to give orders in foreign policy, to impose one's own views and, even more, one's own methods, and to regard other countries and entire regions of the world as one's own private domain: The U.S. political lexicon presents all this as the defense of "the United States' vital interests."

Whether a solution can be found in the very near future to major disarmament questions, primarily with regard to medium-range and reduced-range missiles, and whether the situation in Soviet-U.S. relations and in international affairs can be changed for the better will depend on what conclusions are drawn from our new proposals by the U.S. Administration and its NATO allies, particularly the West European nuclear powers.

I would like to emphasize, the CPSU delegation head went on to say, that under the present conditions responsibility for solving the problem of nuclear disarmament lies not only with the states which possess nuclear weapons, but with all other countries, whether large or small. They can all make their own contribution to the common efforts to save human civilization from destruction. In this regard it must be said that we attach great significance to the proposals of Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece to create a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans, and we value highly Greece's active participation in the movement for nuclear disarmament within the framework of the "initiative of six countries" of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Communists are making a tremendous contribution to the Greek people's antiwar, anti-imperialist struggle.

Your congress has reaffirmed that the KKE advocates achieving very broad unity of action among all the country's antiwar organizations and groups and merging them into a powerful force capable of barring the path of the forces of reaction and war. The KKE's patriotic and, at the same time, international stance has the support of broad sections of the people and contributes to the steady growth of its prestige. We for our part wish you all, comrades, great successes in your noble work!
Solomentsev Interview on Mediterranean

NC181637 Athens KIRIATIKOS RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 17 May 87 pp 15-17

[Interview with Mikhail Solomentsev, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee, by unidentified KIRIATIKOS RIZOSPASTIS correspondent, in Athens; date not given]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Correspondent] The Mediterranean is considered to be one of the hotbeds of tension in the world. This is obvious from the recent sudden exacerbation of Greek-Turkish relations and the perpetuation of the Cyprus problem. What is the Soviet position on the Cyprus problem and the attainment of stable peace in the area?

[Solomentsev] I agree with your viewpoint that the Mediterranean currently constitutes one of the hotbeds of tension in the modern world. The events that are unfolding here convincingly testify to the fact that the main cause of instability in the Mediterranean is the U.S. military presence. Washington follows a policy of undisguised pressure on regimes that it does not like. Soviet policy aims at converting the Mediterranean from an area of military and political confrontation into a zone of stable peace and cooperation. Specifically, the USSR has repeatedly stated that it does not consider it necessary to keep its fleet in the Mediterranean. However, we are compelled to do so because the U.S. fleet is here, carrying nuclear weapons that threaten the security of the USSR and its allies.

As is well known, the USSR has put forth a complex of proposals that will rectify the military and political situation in the area.

We also support proposals from other countries on the issue of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, especially the Cypriot proposal that the parliamentary committees of the Mediterranean countries should hold a conference to promote the idea of a Mediterranean free of nuclear weapons, bases, and foreign troops.

Undoubtedly, measures of a general nature are needed to guarantee stable peace, security, and cooperation. We need to develop relations in the cultural, commercial, economic, and human relations fields, and throughout civilization in general, and to find a solution for military and political problems. All these matters could be discussed in a broad conference similar to the CSCE. Other interested countries also could participate, along with the Mediterranean countries.

We are seriously concerned by the absence of positive steps for the solution of the Cyprus problem. In practice, the perpetuation of the problem serves to strengthen the partition of the island. As is well known, the USSR supports UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's mission to find a solution for the Cyprus problem based on UN resolutions. At the same time, the USSR believes that without a solution of the international aspects of this problem, no one can rely on the permanence of any settlement. It is precisely for this reason that the USSR has advanced the idea of a representative conference on Cyprus, within the UN framework.

The necessity of taking practical steps to revive the procedure for a solution of the Cyprus problem is becoming increasingly evident. Measures must be taken to attract the participation of the UN Security Council permanent members and other interested countries in a constructive dialogue. I think this amounts to fulfilling a common duty to retain Cyprus as an independent, unitary, territorially integral, and nonaligned state.
Solomentsev-Papandreou Meeting

LD141642 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT 14 May 87

[Excerpt] Athens, 14 May (TASS)--A meeting between Mikhail Solomentsev, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Party Control Commission at the CPSU Central Committee, and Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou took place here today.

Mikhail Solomentsev conveyed to the head of the Greek Government a personal message from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The meeting, which passed in a warm and friendly atmosphere, was focused on the problems of further expanding relations between the Soviet Union and Greece and other international issues, those of nuclear disarmament in the first place. Both sides expressed the wish to step up efforts aimed against the arms race and at promoting peace in Europe and in the world.

Papandreou Interview on Meeting

LD142331 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 14 May 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Immediately after the conversation [with Solomentsev], Andreas Papandreou gave an interview to our correspondent. [video shows Papandreou talking to unidentified correspondent]

[Begin Papandreou recording in Greek, fading into Russian translation] I consider this really warm and cordial message most important for Soviet-Greek relations. It also gives a profound analysis of the problems of the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on ridding Europe of medium-range missiles and the difficulties at the Geneva talks. I must note that the proposals advanced by the CPSU Central Committee's general secretary coincide absolutely with our position on these issues.

It is a pity that despite the fact that the zero option proposed earlier by the United States and the West is fully accepted by Mr Gorbachev, there are still difficulties. In our view, however, these can and must be overcome, as herein lies the only opportunity of concluding an initial agreement that would open up the way for further measures toward reducing nuclear weapons. I must say that I have been deeply impressed by Mr Gorbachev's message and propose to send a letter to him in reply in the next few days. [end recording]

/9738
CSO: 5200/1507
CPSU SECRETARY DOLGIKH'S VISIT TO DPRK

Addresses Reception

PM141225 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 87 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "In Delegation's Honor"]

[Text] A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by V.I. Dolgikh, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, is in Pyongyang on an official friendly visit.

The DPRK Central People's Committee held a reception 11 May in the Soviet delegation's honor.

Welcoming the Soviet guests, Chong Chun-ki expressed certainty the delegation's visit will serve to consolidate cooperation between the supreme organs of power of the two countries and the intensification of the traditional Soviet-Korean friendship. The Korean people, he noted, fully support the USSR's peace proposals aimed at preventing the militarization of space, totally eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of this century, and turning the Asian and Pacific region into a nuclear-free zone of peace and cooperation. These initiatives accord with the DPRK's efforts and its struggle for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the creation of a nuclear-free peace zone on the Korean peninsula.

On behalf of the delegation, V.I. Dolgikh, expressed the profound feeling of international friendship and fraternity which the Soviet people have for the heroic Korean people and described the revolutionary restructuring of all aspects of life now under way in the USSR at the CPSU's initiative. He noted this course has become the vital concern of the entire Soviet people and has generated an unprecedented upsurge in their labor and political activeness.

The CPSU and the Soviet Government, Dolgikh said, are firmly convinced that the current priority in world politics should be saving human civilization from a nuclear catastrophe.

The Soviet Union is making persistent efforts to strengthen peace and security in Asia. Processes are taking place here which affect the USSR's position and the interests of its friends and allies. Taking this into consideration we have suggested implementing a comprehensive approach toward problems of Asian security, whose essence is to pool the efforts of all Asian states irrespective of the differences in their social systems for the sake of safeguarding peace and stability and setting up their broad cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual advantage.
The Soviet Union welcomes the DPRK's initiatives to normalize the situation on the Korean peninsula, including the proposal to turn it into a nuclear-free zone, which fully accords with the spirit of the times, V.I. Dolgikh stressed.

The reception was attended by Pak Song-chol, member of the Workers Party of Korea Political Bureau and vice president of the DPRK, and by other officials.

Meets With Kim Il-song

LD141805 Moscow TASS in English 1645 GMT 14 May 87

[Text] Pyongyang May 14 TASS — General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, president of the DPRK Kim Il-song met today with a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet on an official friendly visit here. The delegation is led by alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet Vladimir Dolgikh.

The head of the Soviet delegation handed over a personal message of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev to the leader of the DPRK and presented him with the Order of Lenin. The order was awarded to him for outstanding merits in the development of fraternal friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the USSR and the DPRK, for a great contribution to strengthening the cause of peace and socialism.

Kim Il-song expressed cordial gratitude for a high award and voiced the confidence that friendship between the peoples of the USSR and the DPRK will remain unbreakable.

The conversation ensued during which the sides exchanged opinions on questions of bilateral relations and international problems.

The meeting passed in an atmosphere of friendship and cordiality.

On the same day Vladimir Dolgikh held a reception in connection with the conclusion of the delegation's visit to the DPRK. Speaking at the reception, he noted that a dynamic development of Soviet-Korean relations suits the vital interests of the two peoples and promotes the strengthening of the positions and prestige of world socialism, a greater interaction of fraternal socialist states.

The vigorous support expressed in the DPRK for Mikhail Gorbachev's program of complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, for other Soviet initiatives aimed at a radical improvement of the political climate in the world is highly appreciated in the Soviet Union, he said.

We solidarize with the Korean people in its just struggle for a peaceful democratic unification of the motherland, the head of the Soviet delegation said.
PRAVDA Reviews Activities

PM131551 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "In the DPRK"]

[Excerpts] Pyongyang, 12 May—Today the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by V.I. Dolgikh, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and deputy of the Supreme Soviet, visited Mangyondae and then one of the republic's leading enterprises—the Taean Heavy Machine Building combine.

On the same day the delegation returned to Pyongyang, where talks were held between the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by V.I. Dolgikh and a delegation of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly led by Chong Chun-ki, candidate member of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee Politburo and vice premier of the DPRK Administration Council.

V.I. Dolgikh talked about the revolutionary changes taking place in the USSR and the Soviet people's active support for the CPSU's course aimed at restructuring every area of the country's life, the essence of this process being to make fuller use of socialism's advantages and accelerate its development. Noting the importance of the program to totally eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of the century on the condition that there is no militarization of space—the program contained in the 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee—he dwelt in detail on the efforts being made by the USSR to these ends in the Asian and Pacific aspects of its foreign policy. These efforts are aimed at achieving broad cooperation between all countries and finding a peaceful solution to present problems. He stated the USSR's invariable solidarity with the DPRK's proposals aimed at resolving these tasks on the Korean peninsula. On behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Dolgikh invited the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly delegation to pay an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union.

Chong Chun-ki stressed the great significance of the 1986 meetings and talks between Comrade M.S. Gorbachev and Comrade Kim Il-song for the successful development of Soviet-Korean relations, wishing the Soviet people future success in their implementation of the 27th CPSU Congress decisions. The WPK and the Korean people, he said, fully support the CPSU's efforts to ensure peace in Europe, Asia, and throughout the world and are grateful for its solidarity with the DPRK's course aimed at reducing tension in Korea and bringing about the country's peaceful unification, a course whose implementation is being impeded by the aggressive intrigues of the United States and its partners in the Far East.

Speaks on Asian Security

LD131110 Moscow TASS in English 1017 GMT 13 May 87

[Text] Pyongyang May 13 TASS — Vladimir Dolgikh, a member of the Political Bureau and a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee [title as received] has said that achieving a lasting peace and cooperation in such a vast and densely populated region as Asia and the Pacific will be a tangible contribution to creating a comprehensive system of international security.
He was speaking at a rally hailing Korean-Soviet friendship in Sariwon-si, administrative center of Hwanghae-pukto Province.

Dolgikh, who is also an MP, is in this country at the head of a delegation from the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of the USSR.

He said that as a major Asian-Pacific power, the Soviet Union was seeking to further the peace-making process in the region in every way.

This goal was served by the idea of taking an all-round approach to the issue of Asian security, which had been voiced by Mikhail Gorbachev, he continued.

It was based on the deep conviction that despite all the complexity and contradictoriness of the existing situation, it was still possible to find mutually acceptable solutions to burning issues and work out ways of settling disagreements and conflicts if every country concerned demonstrated good will and unprejudicedness in a spirit of new political thinking, Dolgikh said.

He stressed that the search for ways of enhancing security and advancing cooperation among all nations in the Asian-Pacific region must not be allowed to drag on for too long.

"We think very highly of a proposal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone of peace and press actively for its realization," the leader of the Soviet parliamentary delegation said.

"Its implementation will improve the situation in the peninsula to a serious extent and constitute a substantial contribution to Asian security," he explained.

"The Soviet Union vigorously backs efforts by the DPRK to secure the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, the reunification of the homeland on a peaceful and democratic basis without outside interference, and constructive dialogue between north and south," Dolgikh said further.

"We regard Pyongyang's proposal for renouncing large-scale military exercises in the peninsula, holding military-political talks and a meeting between the prime ministers, and reviving north-south economic and interparliamentary contacts as being of high international significance.

"In our view, this is a right way to lowering tension in the region," Dolgikh added.

**TV Carries Dolgikh Remarks**

LD140241 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 13 May 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by Comrade Dolgikh, which is in the DPRK on an official friendly visit, today toured Hwanghae-pukto Province, where it visited the Hwanghae metallurgical association. Our special correspondent reports:
[Begin recording] [Correspondent V. Tsvetov] Concerning efforts by the Soviet Union to achieve the total elimination, by the 21st century, of nuclear weapons on earth and the role in this that the Soviet integrated approach to problems of ensuring security in Asia plays, Comrade Dolgikh said:

[Dolgikh] We make the highest assessment of and actively advocate implementation of the proposals of the DPRK on transforming the Korean peninsula into a peaceful, nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union actively supports the DPRK's efforts, which aim at the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and unification of the homeland on a peaceful, democratic basis without outside interference and at setting up a constructive dialogue between North and South. We see Pyongyang's proposal for renouncing major military exercises on the peninsula, for holding military and political talks and meetings between North and South as being of international significance. This, in our view, is the right road to reducing tension on the peninsula.

Speech at Sariwon Rally

PM161411 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 May 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Friendship Rally"]

[Excerpts] Pyongyang, 13 May--The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by V.I. Dolgikh, candidate member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which is on an official friendly visit to the DPRK, today made a trip to Hwanghae-pukto Province. The guests visited the "Hwanghae" Metallurgical Association, where they viewed the enterprise's production facilities.

A Korean-Soviet friendship rally was held in the province's administrative center, Sariwon. Addressing the rally, Kim Hyong-chong, chairman of the province Administrative and Economic Guidance Committee, declared: People in the DPRK know well the efforts being made by the CPSU and the USSR in the name of peace in Europe, in Asia, and throughout the world, and actively support the USSR's peace initiatives. The Korean people value the relations of traditional friendship with the Soviet people and are pleased to have Soviet people as reliable allies. Our people will make every effort to further develop Soviet-Korean relations.

V.I. Dolgikh addressed the rally. He conveyed to the DPRK working people fraternal greetings and best wishes from the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the entire Soviet people.

Throughout their history our party and the Soviet state have indefatigably championed the cause of peace, freedom, and the peoples' independence. The development and strengthening of socialism are very closely linked with the destinies of peace and international security, with preventing thermonuclear conflict, and with the problem of mankind's survival.
The CPSU firmly adheres to positions of new political thinking in international affairs and attaches paramount significance to shaping and asserting it. The USSR resolutely advocates the total elimination of nuclear weapons on our planet by the beginning of the 21st century. We strive consistently to ensure that all peoples and states live a full, healthy life under conditions of peace and multifaceted cooperation. The interests of purging the globe of means of mass destruction dictate the Soviet Union's proposals to conclude agreements in the very near future on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles and also operational and tactical missiles in Europe.

The establishment of lasting peace and cooperation in such a vast and populous region as Asia and the Pacific zone would make a significant contribution to the creation of an all-embracing system of international security. [paragraph continues]

Being a major Asian and Pacific power, the Soviet Union seeks to promote in every possible way the development of the peacemaking process in this region.

This is the aim of the idea advanced by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev of a comprehensive approach to problems of ensuring Asian security. It is founded on the profound conviction that, for all the complex and contradictory nature of the present situation, it is possible to find mutually acceptable solutions to the acute questions that exist and to elaborate methods of surmounting disagreements and settling conflicts if every interested state displays good will and lack of prejudice in the spirit of the new political thinking. It must be emphasized here that the search for ways to strengthen security and organize peaceful cooperation among all countries in the Asia and Pacific region cannot be allowed to drag on for a long time.

We very highly value and actively advocate the realization of the DPRK proposal to turn the Korean Peninsula into a peaceful, nuclear-free zone. The implementation of this idea would seriously improve the situation on the peninsula and make a substantial contribution to the cause of Asian security.

The Soviet Union actively supports the DPRK's efforts aimed at withdrawing the U.S. troops from South Korea, uniting the motherland on a peaceful democratic basis without external interference, and setting up a constructive North-South dialogue. We regard as of great international importance Pyongyang's proposals to renounce large-scale military exercises on the peninsula, to hold military-political talks and a meeting of prime ministers, and to resume North-South economic and interparliamentary contacts. In our view, this is the right way to reduce tension on the peninsula.

Pursuing a Leninist foreign policy, the Soviet Union will continue to cooperate closely with the DPRK in the struggle for the triumph of a world without weapons or wars on the planet.

In conclusion V.I. Dolgikh wished the DPRK working people new achievements in building a socialist Korea.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1507
MOSCOW VIEWS STATUS OF INDIAN OCEAN PEACE ZONE EFFORT

PM201509 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 19, 8-14 May (Signed to Press 7 May 87) p 10

[Article by Yu. Vinogradov, USSR deputy representative on the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean: "On the Path Toward a Conference in Colombo"; first paragraph is ZA RUBEZHOM introduction]

[Text] The preparation of working documents at the spring session of the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean, which ended recently, signifies an important step toward convening a conference on the Indian Ocean in Colombo. The struggle to turn the Asia region into a zone of peace is thus acquiring increasingly specific content, despite U.S. efforts on any pretext to block the committee's decisions and to strengthen its own military-strategic positions in this vast region.

The question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace recently has become one of the major international problems. The emergence of a dangerous source of tension in this region affects dozens of countries and huge masses of people. The permanent presence in the Indian Ocean of a large formation of U.S. warships — including aircraft carriers, missile cruisers, and amphibious assault forces — and the ramified network of U.S. bases, the "conquest" of the Indian Ocean zone by U.S. missile-carrying submarines and strategic bombers, Pakistan's rearmament, the attempts to prevent national reconciliation in Afghanistan, Washington's imperial ambitions in declaring vast stretches of the Indian Ocean to be a zone of its "vitally important interests" on the pretext of ensuring security of the sea-lanes — all this arouses legitimate anxiety in the countries of the region and beyond. It must be clear that in our nuclear missile era it is hardly possible to secure anything by military force, including the security of the sea-lanes.

"The Chairman's Seven Points" [subhead]

The Soviet Union considers the Indian Ocean problem to be a political one and that it must be solved by political means. In this its position completely coincides with the position of the nonaligned countries, on whose initiative — primarily Sri Lanka but also India, Tanzania, and other nonaligned Indian Ocean countries — the UN General Assembly adopted in December 1971 the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.
We must give credit to the political foresight of this idea's initiators, who, guessing the unfavorable development of events in this region, called on the great powers in the Declaration to hold consultations with the Indian Ocean's littoral states with a view to halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean, to eliminate all bases and military installations in this region, and to not site nuclear and other forms of mass destruction weapons here. The Declaration also indicated the inadmissibility of warships and aircraft using the Indian Ocean to threaten or use force against the littoral states.

The adoption of the Declaration was, in essence a recognition of the necessity to ensure collective security in the vast Indian Ocean region, not by creating military alliances, but on the basis of the collective efforts of interested states. In other words, this idea has become a part of the concept of Asian security and came from the Asian states themselves.

In 1972, the UN General Assembly created a Special Committee on the Indian Ocean as its subsidiary organ for the purpose of implementing the Declaration and instructed it to study the consequences of the proposal to create a peace zone in the Indian Ocean and to propose practical measures in this respect.

Thus, from the very outset the Special Committee was conceived as a UN organ aimed at the specific implementation of the idea of setting up a peace zone. Now this has acquired special significance, inasmuch as recent years have witnessed attempts by opponents of a peace zone to undermine the committee's mandate, to distract it from the solution of the fundamental questions of setting up the zone, and indeed to bury both the committee and the very idea of a peace zone.

Two years later the General Assembly posed the question of calling an international conference on the Indian Ocean and instructed the Special Committee to set about preparing it. There immediately appeared fundamental divergences on this important question between the socialist and nonaligned countries on the one hand and the Western powers on the other. The United States and some of its allies reacted negatively to the proposal to convene a conference, seeing it as an obstacle to the implementation of their plan for a "strategic takeover," that is, putting it simply, the militarization of the Indian Ocean.

For its part, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to take part in consultations on questions of preparing a conference.

Despite the overtly negative line of the opponents of a conference and a peace zone — and they are in the minority — the nonaligned counties with the support of the socialist countries on the Special Committee systematically saturated its work with specific proposals and documents. The fact is that a peace zone is to be set up anew: In the history of diplomacy there is no analogy that could be followed. The supporters of the zone are moving along an untrodden path. So the nonaligned countries, in an attempt to find some kind of structural framework and to avoid a chaotic unproductive discussion, secured the adoption by the committee of a program for discussion of the issues essential to the creation of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. Submitted in the form of a quite logical list of questions, this program includes: 1 — the zone's geographical limits; 2 — the foreign military presence; 3 — nuclear weapons; 4 — security; 5 — the peaceful settlement of disputes; 6 — the use of the Indian Ocean by foreign vessels and aircraft; 7 — other questions. This program, entitled "The Chairman's Seven Points," is to this day the basis on which an international legal document designed to regulate the status of the peace zone is being formulated.
Subsequently the group of nonaligned countries introduced the "Fundamentals for the Agenda" of a conference -- a document which no conference can do without. Its key provision is to formulate "the ways and means and program of action for the purpose of implementing the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace."

In accordance with the General Assembly's instruction, the committee examined in detail such documents as the agenda and procedural rules, determined the composition of the participants and the level of representation, and is conducting a businesslike discussion of the appropriate framework of a draft international agreement.

The opponents of the peace zone have attempted in every possible way to block the discussion of questions of essentials, and five times already have wrecked the deadlines established by the General Assembly for convening a conference, citing the thesis -- taken out of context from the UN resolution on the Indian Ocean -- on the necessity of "taking into consideration the political climate and the security climate." Moreover, the U.S. delegation in particular maintained that the unresolved Afghan problem does not permit the convening of a conference and insisted on discussing the so-called "Afghan question" in the committee.

But nobody, the nonaligned countries' delegations stressed, charged the committee with discussing Afghan affairs, and as for a "Political climate not permitting the opening of a conference," it somehow did not prevent U.S. representatives and some other opponents of the peace zone taking part in the international conference on the economic aspects of the Indian Ocean, which took place in January in Colombo. A double standard can obviously be seen here.

In view of the failure of the "frontal attack" on the committee made by the U.S. representative in isolation at the July session last year when he proposed (and was forced to withdraw his proposal) disbanding the committee altogether (!), this year at the Special Committee's spring session (March-April) the U.S. delegation "renewed" its position. Repeating his threadbare thesis that the Afghanistan problem "is an obstacle on the path to Colombo," but realizing that prospects for an Afghan settlement are acquiring real outlines, the U.S. representative put forward a new "argument": "The continuing bloody confrontation between Iran and Iraq," it stated, "is making a genuine peace zone unattainable in the foreseeable future (!)" Thus he revealed that the United States already is looking for new pretexts to wreck the conference.

The proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the Indian Parliament 27 November last year during his official friendly visit to that country, gave a powerful boost to the idea of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean.

The new Soviet initiatives on the Indian Ocean aim to set in motion the business of easing military tension in this region. They are moving in the same direction as the concept of a peace zone put forward by the nonaligned countries and are giving concrete expression to a series of aspects of this problem. When we talk about agreements, guarantees of secure sea-lanes as well as guarantees of the littoral countries' sovereignty over their natural resources, we are not thinking in abstract categories. We propose drawing up such agreements during negotiations by interested states using Indian Ocean waters. Such agreements also can be included in an international legal document regulating the status of the Indian Ocean peace zone. Of course, we are not
against talks on these questions being conducted within the framework of an international conference on the Indian Ocean. When putting forward these concrete proposals we also took into account the fact that a number of countries have expressed concern about the possible threat to navigation, particularly in the Persian Gulf zone, and also the corresponding international straits.

Advocating the assurance of military-political stability in the Indian Ocean region, the Soviet side has expressed its readiness to begin talks on a substantial reduction in both the number and activity of the naval forces in this region with the United States and other nonlittoral states whose warships are permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean.

How did the United States reply to this? Their powerful naval grouping in the Indian Ocean, which relies on a ramified base infrastructure, numbers 28 units, including a multipurpose attack aircraft carrier. [paragraph continues]

In addition, during the work of the committee's spring session, at the end of March, UPI — citing official sources — reported that the leadership of U.S. naval forces had decided to maintain attack aircraft carrier formations in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis. Informing Congress of this, the agency indicates, Admiral William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that in order to fulfill such a task it was essential to increase the number of aircraft carriers to 15, in which regard the U.S. Navy required the allocation of the resources to build two new attack aircraft carriers. Moreover, the admiral acknowledged that the aircraft carriers would be patrolling the Indian Ocean region throughout the 1990's. Such are the positions of the Indian Ocean peace zone's opponents on the Special Committee.

The Main Result of the Spring Session [subhead]

At the Special Committee's above-mentioned spring session, the Soviet delegation, responding to a request from the Indian delegation and a number of other countries, explained in more detail our proposals on confidence-building measures applicable to the Indian Ocean. It is a question of both quantitative and qualitative limitations in relation to the nonlittoral states' warships, airborne assault forces, and warplanes in the Indian Ocean down to safe, mutually agreed limits that remain to be defined. Ships, submarines, and other carriers of nuclear weapons must, of course, be withdrawn from the Indian Ocean region. Maneuvers, particularly large-scale maneuvers, wherever they might be conducted, can lead to heightened tension. Thus it is essential to introduce definite limitations on maneuvers conducted by the nonlittoral states. In particular, confidence-building measures, such as the timely notification of large-scale maneuvers, the invitation of observers, and so forth, ought to be examined. There should also be agreement on limiting the number of annual large-scale naval exercises and maneuvers, and the warships and aircraft taking part in them.

By way of guaranteeing the security of the sealanes, there should be a ban on any naval maneuvers or exercises in international straits and the regions adjacent to them, the confines of which would be subject to agreement.

The question of nuclear weapons is particularly sensitive for the countries of the region. Taking this into consideration, the Soviet delegation, citing the nuclear provisions of the Declaration, stated that the USSR has no nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean and is ready to undertake not to place such weapons in the Indian Ocean and in the countries of this region if all the nuclear powers adopt a similar
undertaking and if the Indian Ocean's littoral and mainland states undertake not to offer their territories for the siting of nuclear weapons. It is the USSR's opinion that states which do not possess nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory have the absolute right to reliable international legal guarantees of their security, and guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against them.

The main result of the Special Committee's spring session was that the group of nonaligned countries introduced the long-awaited document "Stages of the United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean." According to this document, it is intended that at the first stage the delegation heads issue political statements on the peace zone and adopt a final document containing the principles, tasks, machinery, and action program in terms of realizing the aims of the peace zone. At the second stage it is intended to discuss and formulate an international agreement with provisions for the creation of a peace zone, and at the third — the signing of such an agreement with binding provisions.

Thus, all the conference working documents which the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean — acting as the conference's preparatory committee — had to submit on the instruction of the General Assembly have been prepared.

A new and very important step on the road to Colombo has been taken. The formation of a peace zone in this region would not only secure the normalization of the situation and the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, but would promote the solution of a wider problem — transforming the whole of Asia into a zone of peace and cooperation, which could be achieved by the Asian states' united efforts on the basis of an all-embracing approach through talks and consultations at the bilateral, regional, and subsequently, pan-Asian levels.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1507

END