History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy

1950 – 1952
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (second from the left), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, holds a meeting in the Pentagon. Left to right: General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, US Air Force; General of the Army Bradley; Lt. General Charles P. Cabell, Director, Joint Staff; General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, US Army; Major General Clyde D. Eddelman, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, US Army; Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations; Vice Admiral James Fife, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations); General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant, US Marine Corps; and Major General Walter W. Wensinger, Deputy Chief of Staff, US Marine Corps.

25 November
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy

Volume IV
1950 – 1952

Walter S. Poole

Office of Joint History
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, DC, 1998

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release; Distribution Unlimited
The Library of Congress has catalogued volume 5 as follows:

Watson, Robert J., 1920 –
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953 – 1954

(History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Robert J. Watson ; v. 5)
Includes index.
UA23.W366 1986 355.3'3042'0973 86-4621
Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized.

The series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations, in text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classified volume. Following review and declassification, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945-1952 and the Korean War, were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now being made available as official publications.

Volume IV describes JCS activities during 1951-1952 except for activities related to Korea which are covered in Volume III and activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. The outline for this volume was developed by Dr. Walter S. Poole under the guidance of Mr. Kenneth W. Condit. Dr. Poole performed the research and drafted the manuscript under the successive direction of Mr. Condit, Dr. Robert J. Watson, and Mr. James F. Schnabel. Some of Dr. Poole’s draft chapters were also reviewed by Mr. Vernon E. Davis, former Chief of the Histories Branch. Ultimately, Dr. Poole assumed full responsibility for the volume. Resource constraints have prevented revision to reflect recent scholarship.

This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not
Foreword

been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

Washington, DC  DAVID A. ARMSTRONG
May 1998       Director for Joint History
Preface

This volume describes the impact of the Korean War upon national security policies and programs. The Soviet Union's willingness to sanction overt aggression, in an area where Soviet security interests were only marginally involved, seemed to show that Moscow might indeed have a master plan for world domination. That helped force a fundamental change in the Truman administration's estimates of US security needs. The first six chapters describe the consequences for the US military establishment—the launching of rearmament and the pacing of the subsequent build-up. The last seven chapters outline the efforts made to create a collective security structure by galvanizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), beginning German rearmament, encouraging formation of a Middle East Command, protecting Taiwan, supporting France in Indochina, and concluding peace and security treaties with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.

As for organizational matters, readers familiar with the present-day operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will note that the activities described in this volume reflect a somewhat different organization and set of procedures. As organized under the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendment, the Joint Staff had three main components: The Joint Strategic Plans Group, the Joint Intelligence Group, and the Joint Logistics Plans Group. At an organizational level above the three Joint Staff Groups were three joint committees composed of Service representatives (such as the Joint Strategic Plans Committee overseeing the work of the Joint Strategic Plans Group). The Joint Chiefs of Staff normally assigned tasks to one of the committees, which in turn called on its corresponding Joint Staff Group for a report. The resulting paper was passed to the joint committee for reviews amendment and approval (or return with instructions for revision) before being submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These practices remained in effect until the implementation of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, when the Joint Staff assumed substantially its present form.

Many individuals besides those mentioned in the Foreword assisted in this volume's preparation. Mr. Sigmund W. Musinski and his colleagues in the JCS Records and Information Retrieval Branch aided the author on many occasions; so did the staff of the Modern Military Records Division, National Archives and Records Service. Mr. William A. Barbee and Mrs. Janet Lekang devoted many
Preface

hours to reviewing JCS documents for declassification and to coordinating declassification reviews with other agencies. Mrs. Janet W. Ball prepared the original manuscript. I also wish to thank Ms. Susan Carroll for preparing the Index and Ms. Penny Norman for performing the manifold tasks necessary to put the manuscript into publication form.

WALTER S. POOLE
# Contents

1. Rearmament versus Retrenchment (1950) .................................................. 1  
   Introduction: The Mid-Century World ...................................................... 1  
   A Plea for Rearmament: NSC 68 ................................................................. 3  
   A Rationale for Retrenchment: The FY 1951 Budget .................................. 10  
   The Battle in Balance: The FY 1952 Budget ............................................ 13  
   Recapitulation ............................................................................................ 18  

2. Rearmament Begun (1950) ........................................................................... 19  
   Motif ........................................................................................................... 19  
   Meeting the Korean Emergency: Force and Budget Increases ................... 20  
   Defining the Danger: NSC 73/4 ................................................................. 25  
   Galvanizing Rearmament: NSC 68/1 and 68/2 .......................................... 27  
   General Marshall Succeeds Louis Johnson ................................................. 32  
   Intermezzo .................................................................................................. 33  
   Crescendo: NSC 68/4 ................................................................................. 35  

3. Rearmament Sustained (1951) .................................................................... 41  
   “Time Is On Our Side…” ............................................................................ 41  
   Presentation of the FY 1952 Budget: Implementing NSC 68/4 .................... 42  
   Reviewing Rearmament: NSC 114/1 ............................................................ 46  
   Air Power Wins Primacy ............................................................................ 49  
   Formulating the FY 1953 Budget: NSC 114/2 .......................................... 53  
   Robert Lovett Replaces General Marshall ............................................... 54  

4. Rearmament Retarded (1952) ..................................................................... 57  
   Reducing the FY 1953 Budget ................................................................. 57  
   Dissonance: NSC 135/3 and the FY 1954 Budget ...................................... 61  
   Reprise: NSC 141 ....................................................................................... 66  
   Coda: NSC 142 ......................................................................................... 69
Contents

5. The Approach of Armageddon: Atomic Arsenal ............................................. 75
   Advent of the Nuclear Age ................................................................. 75
   Expansion of the Arsenal ................................................................. 76
   Custody and Stockpiling Controversies ......................................... 79

6. The Approach of Armageddon: Strategic Planning .................................. 83
   World War III: 1950–1952 ................................................................. 83
   The Atomic Offensive ................................................................. 84
   Bombers and Bases .................................................................. 86
   World War III: 1954 .................................................................. 88
   New Program for Planning ......................................................... 90

7. NATO in Alarm: 1950 ....................................................................... 93
   Origins of the Alliance ................................................................. 93
   The State of NATO in Mid-1950 .................................................. 95
   The Impact of Korea ................................................................. 96
   The Genesis of German Rearmament ...................................... 99
   September Stalemate ................................................................. 105
   The Pleven Plan .................................................................. 107
   The Brussels Solution ............................................................ 110

8. NATO in Expansion: 1951 ................................................................. 115
   The "Great Debate" .................................................................. 115
   The Establishment of SHAPE ..................................................... 117
   The Reorganization of NATO ...................................................... 118
   The Atlantic and Mediterranean Commands: Decisions Deferred .. 120
   Attenuation of the Medium Term Defense Plan .................... 125
   The Abortive Foreign Ministers’ Meeting ................................ 128
   The European Army and German Rearmament ...................... 132

9. NATO in Climax: 1951–1952 ................................................................ 137
   The Washington Foreign Ministers’ Meeting ......................... 137
   From Ottawa to Rome ............................................................. 139
   The Temporary Council Committee Report ......................... 142
   Atlantic Command Achieved .................................................... 145
   An Impending Crisis ............................................................... 147
   The Lisbon Meeting ................................................................. 149
10. NATO in Relapse: 1952 .................................................. 155
    The Faltering Force ........................................... 155
    The Annual Review .......................................... 156
    Debating the "Continental" Strategy ..................... 159
    The Mediterranean Command Solution .................... 160
    Franco and NATO ........................................... 164
    Erosion of the EDC ......................................... 166
    Retrospect .................................................. 168

11. The Middle East: "Recessional" ................................ 171
    The Ending of an Empire .................................. 171
    Egypt and the Middle East Command ...................... 171
    The Suez Complication .................................... 174
    Aid to Egypt? ............................................. 180
    The Iranian Imbroglio ..................................... 182
    The Shortcomings of Strategic Planning ................. 189
    Access to Oil ............................................. 193

12. The Far East: Nationalism, Communism, and Containment .... 197
    Asia Awakens .............................................. 197
    Taiwan: Sanctuary or Springboard? ....................... 199
    The Indochina Quagmire ................................ 210
    Insurgency in the Philippines ........................... 220

13. The Resurrection of Japan ..................................... 223
    The Decision to Prepare a Peace Treaty ................. 223
    Crisis in Korea .......................................... 228
    The ANZUS and Philippine Treaties ...................... 231
    The Path to San Francisco ................................ 233
    From Occupier to Ally .................................... 236
    The Genesis of Japanese Rearmament ..................... 238

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms .......................... 243
Principal Civilian and Military Officers .................... 245
Bibliographic Note ........................................... 249
Notes ......................................................... 251
Index .......................................................... 291
Contents

Map
Inner and Outer Defense Rings in Middle East 195

Tables
1. Revisions of FY 1951 Objectives 39
2. Revisions of FY 1952 Objectives 40
3. Revisions of FY 1952 Objectives during 1951 55
5. Deployment of Major Forces on 31 December 1952 72
6. Category Distribution of US Armed Forces and MDAP Program Costs 72
7. MDAP Status on 31 January 1953 73
8. Military Assistance Program Expenditures for NATO Nations 170
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy
1950 – 1952
Rearmament Versus Retrenchment (1950)

Introduction: The Mid-Century World

During 1945–1947, the Grand Alliance of World War II dissolved amid suspicion and recrimination. The Soviet Union established hegemony over Eastern Europe, made menacing gestures toward Turkey and Iran, and encouraged Communist parties to undermine Western European governments. Perceiving Premier Josef Stalin’s regime as aggressively expansionist, President Harry S. Truman promulgated a policy of “containment,” to be achieved by a combination of economic, military and political measures. NSC 20/4, approved by Mr. Truman in November 1948, asserted that “the gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet system.” Therefore, according to NSC 20/4, the United States must endeavor by all means short of war (1) to prevent further expansion of Soviet power, (2) to expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) to induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s control and influence, and (4) to compel the Kremlin to conform to generally accepted standards of international behavior.¹

At mid-century, the East-West balance eluded easy definition. Economically, US productive capacity was infinitely superior; the Soviet Union was only beginning to recover from the ravages of World War II. Militarily, the deterrent power of the US Strategic Air Command supposedly offset the imposing mass of the Red Army. However, when the Soviets exploded an atomic bomb in the autumn of 1949, the continuing effectiveness of that deterrent seemed doubtful. Politically, also, the situation was unstable. Creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had not freed the peoples of Western Europe from fear of Soviet domination. In the Far East, China was passing within the Communist orbit, and Southeast Asia appeared likely to follow.

Such was the world situation that confronted President Harry S. Truman in 1950. Since his sudden accession in 1945, President Truman had grown greatly in stature. Nonetheless, he lacked a commanding presence and was never to acquire
the personal popularity of either his predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, or his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Also, in the opinion of at least one historian, his capacity to render quick decisions occasionally seemed to mask a tendency toward ill-considered haste.2

Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, the man who at this time was President Truman's chief mentor in international affairs, had held his position since January 1949. He evoked high praise from fellow diplomats such as Ernest Bevin and Robert Schuman but aroused anger among a large body of congressional critics. Secretary Acheson’s four-year tenure was to leave a deep imprint upon US foreign policy.3

Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson was also a controversial figure. The President was pressing for “economy” in defense spending, and Mr. Johnson enforced this austerity program so zealously that Deputy Secretary Stephen T. Early wryly warned his chief that he would become known as “Secretary of Economy.” With increasing acerbity, columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop challenged Mr. Johnson’s claim that he was trimming “fat” from the military establishment without touching “muscle.” Within the Defense Department, moreover, numerous associates found the Secretary of Defense a difficult colleague.4

The principal military advisors of the President and the Secretary of Defense were the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1950, the following officers were serving on this body:

Chairman: General Omar N. Bradley
Chief of Staff, Army: General J. Lawton Collins
Chief of Staff, Air Force: General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Chief of Naval Operations: Admiral Forrest P. Sherman

All were men of large reputation. General Bradley had led II Corps in North Africa and Sicily, First Army in Normandy and 12th Army Group in France and Germany; forces under his command finally totalled forty-three divisions. In 1945, General Eisenhower had praised him as a soldier without peer: “His brains, selflessness, and outstanding ability as a battelie commander are unexcelled anywhere in the world today.” He succeeded General Eisenhower as Chief of Staff in February 1948 and was appointed JCS Chairman in August 1949. During the war, General Collins had led the 25th Infantry Division in the Southwest Pacific and VII Corps in Western Europe. General Bradley, under whom he served, appraised him as “one of the most outstanding field commanders in Europe” and “without doubt also the most aggressive.” General Vandenberg had commanded the IX Tactical Air Force, which furnished support for the soldiers of Generals Bradley and Collins during 1944-1945. Admiral Sherman had acted as Operations Deputy to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz in the Pacific and at the Pentagon; indeed, Secretary Johnson selected him at Admiral Nimitz’s suggestion. All in all, General George C. Marshall asserted in 1951, “I... doubt that this Government will ever be so fortunate as to have such a collection of experience at one time in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”5
The Joint Chiefs of Staff worked well together, but their individual contributions differed. General Bradley fulfilled the role of an impartial mediator among the Services, frequently reserving his opinions for the President and Secretary of Defense. General Collins was probably the most active JCS member, deeply influencing a wide range of decisions. Admiral Sherman was also a man of strong opinions; his successor, Admiral William M. Fechteler, was somewhat less outspoken. General Vandenberg devoted himself aggressively to the goal of Air Force expansion and played a less active role in other policy debates.

A Plea for Rearmament: NSC 68

As 1950 opened, the Truman administration was striving to assess the significance of two events that threatened to undermine the assumptions upon which its national security policies were based. The first was the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war, which culminated in the establishment of Mao Tse-tung's Chinese People's Republic on 1 October 1949. The second was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (USSR) unexpectedly rapid progress in atomic weaponry. US surveillance aircraft obtained proof of a Soviet atomic explosion in September 1949, and President Truman promptly publicized the discovery.

Consequently, on 5 January 1950, the National Security Council ordered the preparation of a report "assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States ... in relation to our actual and potential military power." Meanwhile, within the administration and among the scientific community, there began an intense debate regarding the desirability of taking a "quantum jump" by developing a hydrogen bomb. This would be a thermonuclear weapon, drawing its power from the fusion of hydrogen isotopes rather than from the fission of heavy nuclear elements (as did atomic weapons). A fusion reaction, once achieved, could release energy on a scale far surpassing that of fission weapons. The military benefits were obvious, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged the immediate initiation of research programs. But the cost would be enormous, the ultimate success uncertain, and the moral consequences frightening.

In order to weigh arguments for and against the thermonuclear project, President Truman created a Special Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) consisting of Secretary Johnson, Secretary Acheson, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Mr. David E. Lilienthal. After long and occasionally emotional discussions, the Committee concluded on 31 January 1950 that the AEC should determine the "technical feasibility" of a thermonuclear weapon, with the research effort's magnitude and tempo being jointly determined by the AEC and the Department of Defense. Concurrently, the Secretaries of State and Defense should undertake a comprehensive reassessment of US policy "in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union."
President Truman approved the Committee’s recommendations on the same day and publicly announced that the AEC would “continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or superbomb.” Simultaneously, in a secret letter, he directed Messrs. Acheson and Johnson to undertake the policy reappraisal recommended by the Special Committee. This order voided the NSC directive of 5 January.

On 3 February, Secretary Johnson directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to select officers who would collaborate with the State Department in preparing this policy reassessment. As a first step, he asked that “a joint analysis of the problem be made to determine the salient questions requiring answers and to establish the necessary assumptions on which the paper may best be developed.” Mr. Johnson’s Assistant for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, Major General James H. Burns (USA, Ret.), would furnish advice concerning the study’s “overall, politico-military aspects,” and stay fully informed of developments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to represent them in State-Defense collaboration. They specified, however, that this appointment did not involve any delegation of JCS authority.

Within the State Department, Secretary Acheson assigned similar responsibility to the Policy Planning Staff (PPS). Its Director, Mr. Paul H. Nitze, assumed the chairmanship of the interdepartmental study group that actually drafted the document. Membership included Messrs. Robert Tufts, John Davies, Robert Hooker, and Carlton Savage from the PPS, and General Burns and his deputy, Mr. Najeeb Halaby, from the Defense Department. Among the Joint Strategic Survey Council (JSSC) members, only Major General Truman H. Landon, USAF, actually attended the Study Group’s sessions; however, he consulted freely with his colleagues, Major General Ray T. Maddocks, USA, and Rear Admiral Thomas H. Robbins, USN. Mr. Robert LeBaron, Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the AEC, occasionally attended in his capacity as Secretary Johnson’s principal advisor on atomic energy. Finally, Messrs. James S. Lay and S. Everett Gleason furnished liaison with the NSC.

In the course of its work, the Study Group consulted such prominent private individuals as Mr. Robert A. Lovett, who had been Under Secretary of State during 1947–1949, and Drs. J. Robert Oppenheimer, James B. Conant, and Ernest O. Lawrence. Their comments proved penetrating and were included in the final draft.

The Study Group spent six weeks in preparing its report. Initially, General Landon and the JSSC tried to avoid challenging the “economy” program. They therefore introduced optimistic assumptions, compatible with current budget ceilings, concerning trends in US-USSR military strengths. The PPS, however, had been given free rein by Secretary Acheson in scrutinizing existing policies, and its members took a more somber view of the world situation. When the Study Group debated this difference of opinion, military members accepted the PPS interpretation and cast off budgetary impediments. Ultimately, the Group produced a report that described grave and growing dangers to national security and recommended policy changes that were certain to require major increases in defense spending. Although they had not been instructed to estimate costs, mem-
bers did engage in some preliminary discussions and informally agreed that the military budget should grow from $13 to $35 or even $50 billion.16

Although Secretary Acheson had stayed in close touch with the Study Group, Mr. Johnson had not maintained a similar rapport. Accordingly, in order to acquaint the Secretary with its work, the Study Group scheduled a State-Defense briefing for 1500 hours on 22 March. The Group wrote a two-page summary in anticipation, but Mr. Johnson was too busy to read it beforehand. Thus the Secretary remained unfamiliar with the substance of the report.17

As soon as the meeting began, Secretary Johnson declared that he disliked entering conferences without having had a chance to read the materials being discussed. He said that this was the fourth time the State Department had forced him into such a situation, and he wanted no more of it. Then he subsided, and Mr. Nitze began outlining the Study Group’s tentative conclusions. Suddenly, as Secretary Acheson remembered the scene, Mr. Johnson “lunged forward with a crash of chair legs on the floor and fist on the table, scaring me out of my shoes.” He refused to hear any of the conclusions. Instead, expanding upon the earlier theme, he charged the State Department with having already prepared a press release announcing interdepartmental agreement upon the need for increased defense spending. Messrs. Acheson and Nitze bluntly denied this, saying that they had written a cover story alleging that the meeting dwelt upon NATO affairs. On this discordant note, the fourteen-minute conference closed.18

If Secretary Johnson’s behavior seems surprising and even shocking, his reaction can be readily explained. He probably had anticipated nothing more than an exposition of the “necessary assumptions” and “salient questions” mentioned in his memorandum of 3 February to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Certainly, he was unprepared for recommendations that would require abandonment of the “economy” program. In any event, the Secretary’s actions left the Study Group temporarily adrift. Mr. Lay reported the incident to President Truman, who immediately telephoned Secretary Acheson, “expressing his outrage and telling [the Group] to carry on exactly as [it] had been doing.” 19

On 29 March, the Study Group circulated a semifinal report for comment. There were actually two documents involved: the report itself—a lengthy and detailed “State-Defense Staff Study”—and a condensed version entitled “Report to the President.” The first of these, which became NSC 68, proved so important that it deserves copious quotation. “The issues that face us are momentous,” read the introductory statement, “involving the fulfillment or destruction... of civilization itself... With conscience and resolution the Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions.” Across the globe, the “basic conflict” was that of freedom versus slavery. Soviet leaders saw the United States as the only threat to achievement of their fundamental design, “a world dominated by the will of the Kremlin.” Inevitably, despotism “regards as intolerable the long-continued existence of freedom in the world, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat for free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.”

In this battle, the Soviet Government possessed the several assets of (1) its disciplined population, (2) its “ideological pretensions” as the source of a new uni-
universal faith and a model society, and (3) its extraordinary tactical flexibility deriving
from "the utterly amoral and opportunistic conduct of Soviet policy." Indeed, "the capabilities of the Soviet world are being exploited to the full because the
Kremlin is inescapably militant." However, the Communist monolith was main-
tained by coercion rather than through natural cohesion. This was a critical
weakness, since "the Kremlin cannot relax the conditions of crises and mobiliza-
tion, for to do so would be to lose its dynamism where at the seeds of decay
within the Soviet system would begin to flourish and fructify."

The study affirmed that, while the Soviet threat remained similar to that de-
scribed by NSC 20/4, it had now acquired a new sense of immediacy. The United
States and its allies possessed potential superiority over the Soviet bloc in every
important field—economic, military, political and psychological. Nonetheless,
present trends in all these areas were either uncertain or unfavorable. By devot-
ing greater resources to military purposes, the USSR was widening the prepared-
ness gap over the Western Powers. Her forces-in-being numbered 175 divisions
(55 being either armored or mechanized), 18–20,000 aircraft and 250–300 sub-
marines. Should major war begin in 1950, Soviet and satellite forces could imme-
diately carry out the following campaigns:

a. Overrun Western Europe, with the possible exception of the Iberian and
Scandinavian peninsulas, and drive toward the oil-producing areas of the Middle
East.

b. Launch air attacks against the British Isles and air-sea attacks to interdict al-
lied lines of communication through the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

c. Launch atomic attacks against selected targets in North America and the
United Kingdom, perhaps denying the allies the use of British bases and render-
ing it impossible for allied forces to reenter the European continent.

According to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates, the USSR could pro-
duce 200 atomic bombs by mid-1954. At that time, the Soviet Union would pos-
sess the capacity to lay waste the British Isles, destroy the vital industrial and
communications centers of Western Europe, and deliver "devastating attacks" up-
on certain critical areas of North America.

The disparity in military strength-in-being between the Soviet bloc and the
Western Powers, already considerable, was growing wider. The USSR was devot-
ing approximately twice as large a percentage of its gross national product to
military purposes as the United States. Should war break out in the near future,
the Western Powers could launch "powerful air offensive operations" and pro-
vide "a reasonable measure of protection" to the Western Hemisphere, the West-
ern Pacific and essential lines of communication. However, they could not de-
defend "vital" military bases in the United Kingdom, the Middle East and the Far
East. Unless arms assistance to Western European nations was greatly expanded,
moreover, these countries could not effectively oppose Communist military
power even by 1960.

Under such circumstances, successful settlement of the Cold War through
diplomacy seemed most unlikely. Instead, negotiation should serve as "a means
of gaining [popular] support for a program of building strength....[A] settle-
Rearmament Versus Retrenchment (1950)

ment can only record the progress which the free world will have made in creating a political and economic system in the world so successful that the frustration of the Kremlin's design will be complete."

Four courses of action lay open to the United States. First, continuation of current policies and programs. Probably, this would entail a continuing relative decline in capabilities, forcing the United States gradually to withdraw from Europe and Asia. Agreements with the Soviet Union "would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States."

Second, isolation, or a decision to withdraw from US commitments in Europe and Asia and to concentrate on the defense of the Western Hemisphere and its approaches. Ultimately, this course of action would "condemn us [either] to capitulate or to fight alone and on the defensive, with drastically limited offensive and retaliatory capabilities in comparison with the Soviet Union."

Third, war. Presently, the United States could not quickly win a preventive war. Besides being morally repugnant, the appalling consequences of such a conflict would make infinitely more difficult the task of creating a satisfactory international order.

Fourth, "a rapid build-up of political, economic and military strength in the free world." This was the course recommended by the Study Group. It would require stronger military capabilities to serve as a shield under which the free world could develop "a successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union." The Study Group did not attempt to determine the necessary level of military preparedness but undertook to lay down some general guidance. US military forces must meet two "fundamental requirements"—support of foreign policy and protection against disaster. Specifically, the Study Group listed five minimum tasks (distilled from JCS strategic plans) to be carried out by military forces:

1. Defend the Western Hemisphere and other essential areas.
2. Protect the mobilization base.
3. Conduct offensive operations to destroy "vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity" and to impede the enemy's own offensives.
4. Protect necessary bases and lines of communication.
5. Provide aid to allied powers.

"In the broadest terms," said the Study Group, the United States and its allies must possess military forces that would be "superior for at least these tasks, both initially and throughout a war, to the forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet Union." They need not match the USSR "item for item."

Concerning political and economic aspects of the proposed effort, the Study Group spoke somewhat vaguely of a "closer association of the free countries" and, over the longer term, "a strengthened United Nations, or a successor organization, to which the world can look for the maintenance of peace and order in a system based on freedom and justice."

The Study Group recognized that its recommendations would require a "sharp increase" in expenditures for US forces and for military assistance and "some increase" in economic assistance. Moreover, the proposed course of action
will place heavy demands on our courage and intelligence; it will be costly; it will be dangerous. ... Budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake. ... The immediate goal of our efforts [must be] to postpone and avert the disastrous situation which, in light of the Soviet Union's probable fission bomb ... and possible thermonuclear bomb capability, might arise in 1954 on a continuation of our present programs. By acting promptly and vigorously in such a way that this date is, so to speak, pushed into the future, we would permit time for the process of accommodation, withdrawal and frustration to produce the necessary changes in the Soviet system. Time is short, however, and the risks of war attendant upon a decision to build up strength will steadily increase the longer we defer it.

In summary, the rapid buildup described above offered "the only means short of war which may eventually force the Kremlin ... to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance." The Study Group recommended that the President approve its conclusions and direct responsible agencies and Departments to prepare, for NSC consideration, appropriate programs and estimated costs.20

The Joint Chiefs of Staff received the Study Group report on 31 March, together with a JSSC endorsement. "There is no other practicable course," wrote the Committee, "that will assure the attainment of United States objectives." The JSSC drew attention to, and "strongly" supported, the warning against delaying a decision.21

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed. They resolved, in fact, to present their views "in person" to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC if necessary. Writing to Secretary Johnson on 5 April, they seconded the Study Group's findings and urged him to seek Presidential sanction for them. They suggested, however, the addition of a paragraph proposing "affirmative measures of economic, clandestine, and subversive, and psychological character to foment and support unrest and revolution in selected strategic satellite countries and Russian political divisions." Also, an interdepartmental agency with JCS representation should be assigned responsibility for implementing the actions recommended. Finally, in view of the subject's gravity, they urged that the entire "Staff Study," and not merely the summary "Report to the President," be supplied to President Truman.22

Secretary Johnson made no formal reply to their memorandum, but all JCS suggestions were incorporated in a final version sent to the Chief Executive on 7 April. Although this paper bore the title "Report to the President," it was actually the "Staff Study" slightly amended.23

Secretary Acheson endorsed the report. So, somewhat surprisingly, did Secretary Johnson. His recommendation, he related to the President, was based upon the favorable opinions rendered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and the Chairmen of the Munitions Board and the Military Liaison Committee to the AEC.24

Nonetheless, President Truman withheld his approval and, on 12 April, sent the report to the National Security Council for further study. He wanted specific information concerning its implications. "I am particularly anxious," he wrote,
"that the Council give me a clearer indication of the programs which are envisaged in the Report, including estimates of the probable cost of such programs." Consequently, he directed that not only NSC member agencies but also the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Budget Bureau, and the Council of Economic Advisers review it. Obviously, budgetary ceilings and economic considerations were prominent in the Chief Executive's mind. "I will not," he said, "buy a pig in a poke." The report, with the President's directions concerning it, was published on 14 April as NSC 68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security."25

On 20 April, the NSC created an Ad Hoc Committee to make the necessary analysis. Members included Mr. Lay, Mr. Nitze, Generals Bradley and Burns, and representatives of the Economic Cooperation Administration, Budget Bureau, Council of Economic Advisers, CIA, Treasury Department and National Security Resources Board. At the Committee's first meeting on 2 May, members resolved that every effort should be made to finish "rough general plans and estimates" by 1 August.26

During May, several preliminary estimates were submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee. The State Department proposed a total of $12.5 billion in US military assistance to the Western European members of NATO during fiscal years (FY) 1951 through 1955—an annual average of $2.5 billion, as compared with $1 billion that had been allotted for the purpose in the FY 1951 budget. The Department also recommended that those countries increase their defense expenditures from $4.5 billion in FY 1951 to $7.5 billion in FY 1955. Another paper by the State Department outlined a psychological "Campaign of Truth," requiring outlays for propaganda rising from $78 million in 1951 to $155 million yearly during 1953–1955. The National Security Resources Board, which had overall responsibility for coordinating civilian and military mobilization in time of war, outlined a civil defense program starting with $470 million in 1951 and rising to $3.6 billion by 1954, under the expectation that an atomic attack on vital US targets would become possible by 1 July 1954.27

Two agencies attempted to assess the assumptions and practicalities of NSC 68. The Council of Economic Advisers affirmed that "substantial new programs could be undertaken without serious threat to our standards of living, and without risking a transformation of the free character of our economy." Whether Congress and the public would accept such programs was another matter. There was a widespread belief that higher defense spending "must mean equivalently lowered living standards, higher taxes and a proliferation of controls." Although these apprehensions could be reduced by education and persuasion, they undoubtedly would "strongly influence both the magnitude and the character of new proposals that can be realistically put forward."28

The Bureau of the Budget (BOB) circulated a penetrating critique of NSC 68. Alone among government agencies, the Bureau claimed that NSC 68 oversimplified issues and grossly overemphasized military considerations in the Cold War. This attitude was not surprising, since BOB spokesmen had persuaded President Truman to place the $13 billion ceiling upon military spending.29 The Bureau
chose, however, to build its criticism of NSC 68 upon economic, social, and ideological—rather than fiscal—foundations:

The neat dichotomy between ‘slavery’ and ‘freedom’ is not a realistic description either of the situation today or of the alternatives as they appear to present themselves to large areas of the world. . . . Freedom as we know it is a highly developed concept, frequently of little meaning and less use in dealing with backward or disorganized peoples. . . . The most potent weapon of the Russians (outside of Eastern Europe) has been and is revolt against social and economic as well as political inequities. . . . The gravest error of NSC 68 is that it underplays the role of economic and social change as a factor in ‘the underlying conflict’. . . . In many countries today, for example, there is a simple test question: Is there no other way to attain thorough-going land reform except through Communist revolution? . . . A revealing commentary on NSC 68 is that it does not basically clarify or utilize the Chinese experience in the discussion of issues and risks, nor does it point toward a course of action which can effectively deal with probable repetitions of that experience in the future. . . . Only as we develop methods for capitalizing on the emerging social pressures can we beat the Russians at their most dangerous game and safely take advantage of a rising tide of nationalism.

The Budget Bureau acknowledged “the seriousness of the military situation” and “the case for increasing and re-orienting our military strength.” But it challenged the conclusion that the USSR was approaching military superiority, citing the US advantages in strategic air, naval and nuclear strength and the improving economic and military potential of allied powers. At all events, the Bureau argued, NSC 68 appeared “to point down the road of principal reliance on military force”—a solution that “can only grow in its demands over time, as well as scarcely fail to lose the cold war.”

The Department of Defense had the most important task and took the longest time in accomplishing it. On 25 May, Secretary Johnson directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to furnish, by 1 July, an initial estimate of US and allied forces required to meet the “general tasks and responsibilities” set forth in NSC 68. A more detailed, final estimate would follow on 1 August; this the Military Department would use in preparing specific programs. Simultaneously, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) would assess US economic capability for supporting increased expenditures. Finally, in mid-November, the Secretary of Defense would determine what efforts were feasible and desirable. Mr. Johnson stressed that these studies and estimates were not intended to interfere with formulation of the FY 1952 budget. Rather, they were to be fully integrated with and furnish added justification for FY 1952 requirements.

A Rationale for Retrenchment: The FY 1951 Budget

While the Executive Branch reviewed NSC 68, Congress debated the Defense Department’s FY 1951 budget. President Truman wanted approximately $13 billion—nearly 10 percent less than the FY 1950 funding level. The chart
below compares the FY 1950 and FY 1951 Service budgets, both of which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had termed too low:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1950 Congressional Authorizations</th>
<th>FY 1951 Administration Requests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$4,461,000,000</td>
<td>$4,018,384,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>4,183,400,000</td>
<td>3,881,432,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5,309,949,000</td>
<td>4,433,478,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$13,954,349,000</td>
<td>$12,333,294,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>677,000</td>
<td>630,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>461,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>417,000</td>
<td>416,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,594,000</td>
<td>1,507,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the FY 1951 program the Army would maintain 10 divisions, 12 separate regiments and 48 anti-aircraft artillery battalions; the Navy would deploy 652 ships including 238 major combatant vessels (i.e. destroyer escort or larger) and 6 Marine Corps battalion landing teams; the Air Force would operate 48 wings and 13 separate squadrons.22

When President Truman sent the FY 1951 budget to Congress on 9 January 1950, he indicated a need for $13.1 billion in obligational authority for all defense programs, stockpiling excepted. Of this sum, $12.3 billion was apportioned among the three Service Departments; the remaining $800 million was reserved for retired pay and various Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) activities. The President wanted only $12.8 billion in new obligational authority, however; the remainder consisted of appropriations and authorizations carried over from earlier years. He forecast that actual expenditures for FY 1951 would total $13.54 billion.23

From January to March, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees received administration testimony. Secretary Johnson contended that his austerity program was providing “significantly more powerful military forces within the same dollar requirements.” The Department was reducing unnecessary overhead and duplication and devoting a larger proportion of funds to combat units. He acknowledged that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt their needs were unfulfilled, but averred that they endorsed the administration’s program “because they recognize the importance to national security of the maintenance of a sound economy.”

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff dutifully expressed support of the Secretary, their words revealed undercurrents of anxiety. General Bradley affirmed that he was “in complete agreement” with the budget ceiling, because “we must not spend this country into economic collapse.” Forces in being were becoming sufficiently strong, he said, to avert any initial disaster and to strike a strong retaliatory blow. However, the Chairman also delivered a purely personal opinion that
moderate deficits were palatable and possibly even preferable: "It may be very marked economy to spend a little more now if thereby we can avoid a third [world] war." In like tones, General Collins called the budget "a sound and well-balanced program, as well as men of our human frailties can foresee the future." Nonetheless, he warned that "we cannot tighten our belts ... any further." Admiral Sherman and General Vandenberg sounded similar notes.34

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred out of loyalty rather than conviction. When Secretary Johnson first announced the Army budget ceiling for FY 1951, for example, General Collins told him, "This is the last cut in the Army that I will be able to accept." The Secretary "glared at me," General Collins recalled, "and I ... glared back. I feel certain that if the Korean War had not intervened, I would have been [either] relieved or forced to resign." Even so, the Army Chief of Staff felt duty-bound to "present and support" all budget items. With hindsight, however, General Bradley believed that his emphasis upon economic limitations had been improper: "Only the ... civilian advisers, including Congress, can make that estimate and that decision, and certainly our military recommendations ... should not be curbed in any way by economic assumptions."35

The FY 1951 defense budget was eventually increased, though not through JCS efforts. The impetus came from General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. Early in 1949, the former Chief of Staff had returned to the Pentagon as an unofficial advisor to the Secretary of Defense. He served as de facto JCS Chairman until General Bradley was formally appointed and so played a prominent role in formulating the FY 1951 budget.36 Unexpectedly, on 23 March, General Eisenhower (who had returned to his position as President of Columbia University) publicly revealed his "conviction" that the United States had "already disarmed to the extent—in some instances even beyond the extent—that I ... could possibly advise." At the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee's request, he gave testimony on 29 March. General Eisenhower averred that "we are fairly well on the ... proper line between economy and security," but gave his "guess" that as much as $500 million should be added to the military budget. These additional appropriations, he said, could provide protection for exposed Alaskan airfields, some modernization of Army equipment, reinforcement of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) efforts, and improvements of intelligence and industrial mobilization programs.37

Initially, the administration firmly resisted growing Congressional pressure for increased spending. At Key West, on 26 March, Secretary Johnson held two long conferences with President Truman and afterwards told reporters that the military budget was "sufficient to the moment." Four days later, Mr. Truman—"without contentiousness in his tone or demeanor"—informed correspondents that "no fundamental differences" existed between himself and General Eisenhower.

"In other words, you don't think this $13 billion endangers the country?" persisted a reporter.

"Not [in] the slightest," the President replied. "If I thought so, I would ask for more money."38
Rearmament Versus Retrenchment (1950)

A few weeks later, however, President Truman and Secretary Johnson retreated from this rigid position. The President read NSC 68 on or about 12 April, and its findings probably affected his attitude. On 18 April, Mr. Johnson received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff another alarming appraisal—a quarterly report on commitments versus capabilities, which he had requested in February.39

Several days later, the Secretary of Defense conferred with the Chief Executive and reportedly told associates afterwards “that his economy program was dead, and that he and the President had shaken hands on it.” Very probably, their discussion centered about NSC 68. There is, in fact, tangential evidence that the President was pondering a public statement that would reveal the perilous situation confronting the country.40

On 26 April, Mr. Johnson went before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee and requested an additional $300 million in contract authorizations for aircraft procurement (enough to modernize all 48 wings) and $50 million in appropriations for ASW operations. In justification, he said that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization now possessed, for the first time, a “fairly clear picture” of its collective military requirements.41 Furthermore, in a veiled reference to NSC 68, he commented that “we have... appraised recent events which make it entirely possible that [higher] appropriations... will be required in succeeding years, not only for our own military forces but also for the military aid programs.” He continued:

The events to which I allude include the Soviet atomic explosion, the fall of China, the serious situations in Southeast Asia, the break in diplomatic relations with Bulgaria..., the increased Soviet pressures in Germany, the recent attack on a naval aircraft in the Baltic, and the recent Soviet demands relative to Trieste.

None of this presents a happy prospect; but the war is not a happy circumstance. The only satisfaction that I can personally derive from the situation lies in the fact that our own Military Establishment is well on the road to becoming a stronger and more powerful organization, and one which, as circumstances require, can utilize increased appropriations in a manner which will provide substantially increased combat effectiveness....42

On 9 May, the House of Representatives voted to increase Department of Defense (DOD) obligatory authority by $383.125 million.43 Six weeks later, a Senate Appropriations subcommittee recommended further increases which would raise the total of new obligatory authority to nearly $15.6 billion.44 The "economy" drive was faltering but it was far from "dead."

The Battle in Balance: The FY 1952 Budget

While Congress was considering defense spending for FY 1951, the Executive Branch already was formulating a budget for FY 1952. To the JCS Budget Advisory Committee, the procedure used in preparing the FY 1951 budget had proved deeply dissatisfying.45 Although budget formulation began in March
1949, progress was impeded by JCS inability to agree on force requirements and by failure of higher authorities to furnish timely and adequate guidance. Therefore, the Budget Advisers proposed a new procedure for FY 1952. In brief, they asked (1) that the Secretary of Defense set forth authoritative guidelines in January 1950 and (2) that the JCS role in budgetary formulation be considerably enlarged, beginning with the promulgation of a strategic plan by 1 March 1950. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these recommendations and forwarded them to Secretary Johnson on 9 November 1949.

On 23 January 1950 Secretary Johnson circulated a budget schedule for FY 1952 that, while generally following JCS suggestions, did not assign the Joint Chiefs of Staff as prominent a part as they wished:

a. During January-February, the Secretary of Defense would furnish the Joint Chiefs of Staff with basic assumptions to be utilized in preparing a tentative budget. On the basis of these assumptions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would provide the Military Departments with strategic guidance, including the “size, composition and deployment of major forces.” The Departments would then develop and complete their own deployment and readiness plans by 1 April.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would review the Service plans and, by 1 June, transmit comments to the Secretary of Defense. The Departments would prepare tentative budgets by 1 July, following fiscal limitations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, and taking account of JCS criticisms. Then, during July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would review these Service budgets to ensure that they accorded with strategic plans.

c. Early in August, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) would review the Service budgets and the JCS judgments thereon. Final budget ceilings, reflecting Presidential decisions, would be announced by the Secretary on 15 August. The Services would then redraft their budgets, in final form, for submission to the Bureau of the Budget by 15 September.

Four weeks later, Mr. Johnson expounded “Basic Assumptions” governing formulation of the FY 1952 budget. First, armed forces would be maintained at approximately the levels planned for FY 1951. Second, more funds would be allocated to combat forces and less to the supporting establishment. Clearly, the Secretary planned to press forward with his economy program. These “Basic Assumptions” were the thunderheads; a storm broke soon afterwards.

On 1 March, Secretary Johnson sent the Services a “tentative planning budget ceiling” which allocated new obligational authority as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Obligational Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$3,948,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,827,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>4,389,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$12,164,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This was $169 million below the initial FY 1951 budget request of $12,333 billion. A sharp budgetary battle seemed inevitable, General Collins, for example, had declared that he would accept no further reductions—yet this ceiling would allow the Army $70 million less than in FY 1951.
Two weeks later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed upon force level guidelines. Each Service, they decided, would try to accomplish "initial wartime tasks" set forth in the joint emergency war plan, "in so far as these tasks could be carried out with the forces and support [available] under the directed dollar ceilings." The "changed" conditions in the world, particularly Soviet atomic capability and Communist conquests in Asia, would be assigned whatever weight seemed practicable within budgetary limitations. After assessing Service submissions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to recommend such increases as seemed "necessary and practicable." 52

On 1 April, the Services submitted deployment and readiness plans following the prescribed format. All argued forcefully for additional funding. The Army contended that an increase of $221.5 million was necessary simply to maintain existing forces. (In mid-month, General Collins actually decided to inactivate one occupation division in Japan during FY 1952.) Likewise, the Air Force reported that, unless it received $446 million more, the number of operating wings must be reduced from 48 to 42. If the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was granted an overriding priority, it would still be possible to "collapse" the Soviet Union's industrial economy and to retard effectively the Red Army's advance into Western Europe. However, resulting reductions in air defense capabilities would "entail risks beyond the maximum acceptable.... Finally, the Navy warned of growing obsolescence and proposed that shipbuilding and conversion funds be increased by $185 million. 53

Actually, an avenue for conveying Service objections to further economies had been provided (perhaps deliberately, perhaps inadvertently) by Mr. Johnson himself. In the budgetary guidelines issued on 22 February, the Secretary had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit quarterly reports appraising US capability to meet international commitments. In the first such report, which they presented to the Secretary on 18 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated many of the findings from NSC 68. They stated that available forces were "not strong enough to accomplish effectively" the primary tasks of either deterring Soviet aggression or averting disaster pending full mobilization of Allied war potential. It was "most important," therefore, that military assessments be based upon Soviet capabilities (which could be analyzed fairly accurately) rather than Soviet intentions (which could not be assessed with any certainty). Consequently, with a clear expectation that their proposals would exceed the limits laid down for the FY 1952 budget, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Mr. Johnson that they intended to recommend whatever force increases seemed appropriate. 54

On 20 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) (in collaboration with the Program and Budget Advisors (PBA)) to review the Service plans, assess risks imposed by budgetary ceilings, and inform the Operations Deputies of any increases considered necessary. 55 The JSPC promptly advised the Operations Deputies that forces permitted by the tentative FY 1952 budget ceiling "would be critically inadequate to meet the national security requirements of the United States." In a split report, the Committee then offered the alternative solutions shown below:
JCS and National Policy

Army
Army-Navy View—11 Divisions; 57 AAA Battalions
Air Force View—11 Divisions; 48 AAA Battalions

Navy
Army View—288 Major Combatant Vessels
Navy View—311 Major Combatant Vessels
Air Force View—291 Major Combatant Vessels

Air Force
Army View—58 Wings
Navy View—70 Wings
Air Force View—89 Wings

Considerable discussion ensued among the PBA, the Operations Deputies, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, on 26 May 1950, Admiral Davis submitted revised force goals to the Joint Chiefs of Staff "as a basis for discussion." These amounted to an acceptance of most of the increases being sought by the Services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1952 Requirement</th>
<th>1954 Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>640,000</td>
<td>770,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>591,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>484,000</td>
<td>568,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manpower Total (All Services)</strong></td>
<td>1,624,000</td>
<td>1,929,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Objectives for 1954 as well as 1952 were presented because as Admiral Davis observed, force levels attained in FY 1954 would derive largely from decisions taken during FY 1952.

Planners also had to assimilate the tasks levied by Secretary Johnson on 25 May in connection with NSC 68. Admiral Davis suggested that the JCS decision on 1952 and 1954 force levels be furnished to the JSPC and the PBA for guidance in preparing a response. Additionally, the 1954 figures should be integrated into the mid-range war plan, with an assumed D-day of 1 July 1954, that was then in preparation. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff took no formal action on Admiral Davis' recommendations, all this work went forward together.
Meantime, amid growing unease within the administration and among members of Congress, the Chief Executive remained determinedly optimistic. During his press conference on 4 May—eight days after Secretary Johnson asked for $350 million in supplemental appropriations—Mr. Truman spoke reassuring words:

Reporter: Do you plan a greatly increased defense budget for next year...because of the increasing international emergency?
President: The defense budget next year will be smaller than it is this year, and we are continually cutting it by economies. And we are not alarmed in any sense of the word.

Three weeks later, he repeated that "the ceiling has been placed" upon defense spending. Thus, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated expansion, the President and the Secretary of Defense upheld economy.

General Bradley discussed the initial Service submissions with Mr. Johnson and Comptroller W. J. McNeil. Subsequently, on 1 June, the Secretary announced several adjustments in the tentative FY 1952 ceilings. He assigned the Army an additional $40 million, obviating any necessity to eliminate an active division; he allowed the Navy another $25 million, and promised to consider raising ship-building and aircraft procurement funds; and he agreed to increase Air Force operating funds (while reducing major procurement) so that 48 wings could remain in Service. These concessions were symbolic rather than substantive; the revised FY 1952 ceilings remained lower than the FY 1951 requests.

Simultaneously, Mr. Johnson postponed until 1 August the deadline for JCS critiques of Service plans. Since the due date for NSC 68 requirements remained 1 July, the Secretary had in effect assigned priority to this project. On 20 June, the JSPC and the PBA presented the following recommendations for 1954: Army, 12 divisions, 95 AAA battalions; Navy, 324 major combatant vessels; Air Force, 69 wings. Admiral Sherman looked at these force objectives in the light of FY 1952 budget ceilings and judged them "unrealistically high from the standpoint of attainability by orderly expansion and prospective availability of funds." The Chief of Naval Operations considered it "of the utmost importance" that FY 1954 objectives be properly correlated with the FY 1952 budget. Accordingly, he submitted his own recommendations for 1954. They differed from the JSPC and the PBA in lowering AAA battalions to 71 and AF wings to 61 while raising the number of major combatant vessels to 328. He calculated the cost at $15.336 billion in 1954.

The outbreak of the Korean War disrupted planners' progress. Not until 3 July did the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree to the following statement of force objectives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1952</th>
<th>FY 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>655,000</td>
<td>770,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This was the last planning paper unaffected by consequences of the Korean War, and its goals (when compared with what soon followed) were certainly modest.\(^64\)

Like the Service budgets, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program was constricted by fiscal limitations. For FY 1950, Congress had appropriated $1.314 billion, $1 billion of which was allotted to Western Europe. In a special message on 1 June, the President asked for $1,222,500,000 in FY 1951. Again, $1 billion would be assigned to Western Europe; $147.5 million was sought for Greece, Turkey and Iran, while the remaining $75 million was assigned to “the general area of China.” These allotments were certainly insufficient. The Joint Strategic Plans Group, for example, estimated that implementation of an austere Medium Term Defense Plan for NATO would require annual MDAP expenditures of $5.7 billion. Obviously, then, commitments were outstripping capabilities—and no change appeared imminent.\(^65\)

Recapitulation

Plainly, the impact of NSC 68 was indecisive; “rearmament” had not ousted “retrenchment.” The rationale for continuing austerity had been powerfully challenged, but the issue had not yet been confronted by the National Security Council. Although the President and the Secretary of Defense had eased the FY 1951 ceiling, they remained committed to lower spending levels for FY 1952. As Secretary Acheson said afterwards, it is doubtful that an impressive expansion would ever have occurred, “had not the Russians been stupid enough to have instigated the attack against South Korea and opened the ‘Hate America’ campaign.”\(^66\)
Rearmament Begun (1950)

Motif

On the morning of 25 June, spearheads of the North Korean People’s Army suddenly smashed across the 38th parallel. South Korean forces, which lacked both tanks and aircraft, were unable to withstand the invasion. Since North Korea was a communist satellite, US leaders assumed that the Soviet Union had either instigated or acquiesced in this attack. During earlier crises—Iran, Greece, Czechoslovakia, and Berlin—the Communists had employed diplomatic pressure, political subversion, or guerrilla action. Now, for the first time, they were resorting to massive military aggression across established borders.

The North Korean invasion outraged President Truman. He remembered how “appeasement” had whetted the appetites of German and Japanese aggressors during the 1930s. As he later wrote:

I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. ... If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would [ultimately] mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war. It was also clear to me that the foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at stake. . . .

Therefore, by 30 June, he resolved upon a bold response. Under a cloak of UN resolutions, Mr. Truman committed US ground, sea and air forces to defend the Republic of Korea.¹

Thus the United States found itself fighting a limited war and facing the possibility of a wider conflict. Many military programs and policies suddenly became obsolete; a substantial increase in US military capabilities was obviously required. As General Bradley told the House Foreign Affairs Committee late in July:

It is . . . apparent that Communism is willing to use arms to gain its ends. This is a fundamental change, and it has forced a change in our estimate of the mili-
JCS and National Policy

tary needs of the United States. We have come to the only conclusion possible to a free people. We have had enough of aggression, and we have finally drawn the line across its path. ... The cost [of rearmament] will be heavy, but not as heavy as the war which, we are now convinced, would follow our failure to rearm.²

The attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was now absorbed by the effort to save South Korea, the problem of assessing how high the risk of general war had risen, and the questions of how far and how fast the defense establishment should be expanded.

Meeting the Korean Emergency: Force and Budget Increases

The size and condition of the US military establishment reflected several years of fiscal austerity. On 30 June 1950, US strength in being stood as follows:

**Army**
- Divisions: 10 (9 reduced)
- Regiments: 12 (11 reduced)
- AAA Battalions: 48 (38 reduced)
- Personnel: 591,487
- Budget Ceiling: 630,000

**Navy**
- Total, Major Combatant: 238
  - Vessels: 238
  - Large Carriers: 7
  - Light Carriers: 4
  - Escort Carriers: 4
  - Battleships: 1
  - Cruisers: 13
  - Destroyers: 136
  - Submarines: 73
- Marine Divisions: 2 (2 reduced)
- Personnel: 450,780
- Budget Ceiling: 461,000

**Air Force**
- Total Wings: 48
  - Strategic: 21
  - Air Defense: 12
  - Tactical: 9
  - Troop Carrier: 6
- Personnel: 411,277
- Budget Ceiling: 416,000³
There were also qualitative shortcomings, concentrated especially in the Army, which the Korean crisis laid bare. Army units were deficient in manpower and training, lacked modern equipment, and had become habituated to garrison routines in the United States and occupation duties in Germany and Japan. In the Far East Command, for example, all of Eighth Army's four divisions were understrength, having only two instead of three battalions per infantry regiment and two rather than three firing batteries for each artillery battalion. The first US unit sent to South Korea from Japan—a battalion task force—met the North Koreans at Osan on 5 July. The outnumbered US troops were soon outflanked and driven southward in disorder.

During the first days of July, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (Commander in Chief, Far East) called for reinforcements—a Marine regimental combat team (RCT) and an Army division. On 6 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the following Service augmentations, which Secretary Johnson and President Truman immediately approved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>New Ceiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>680,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy-Marine Corps</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>494,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>25,500</td>
<td>441,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>108,500</td>
<td>1,615,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These actions were aimed at bringing General MacArthur's forces to war strength and furnishing the Far East Command (FECOM) with a flow of replacements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that if combat continued and additional units were committed to the Far East, further increases must be sought. Two days later, in fact, President Truman directed that the 2d Infantry Division be dispatched to Korea.

On 9 July, CINCFE warned that chances of holding even the southernmost tip of Korea were becoming "increasingly problematical" and asked for a total of eight war-strength divisions:

I strongly urge that, in addition to those forces already requisitioned, an army of at least four divisions, with all component services, be dispatched to this area without delay, and by every means of transportation available.

The administration acted swiftly to expand military strength and to send General MacArthur what he wanted. On 11 July, Mr. Johnson told the Joint Chiefs of Staff to defer work upon FY 1952 estimates and to address instead the problem of revising FY 1951 requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff already had embarked upon this mission. On 13 July, they proposed further substantial force increases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>New Ceiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>60,500</td>
<td>740,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy-Marine Corps</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>523,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>25,500</td>
<td>467,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>1,730,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JCS and National Policy

These augmentations, they explained, would provide the necessary support for forces then in FECOM and restore depleted military capabilities elsewhere. Nonetheless, they reported, the outlook in Korea had grown critical; greatly inferior UN forces were falling back before a well-trained and well-equipped foe. If the Commander in Chief, Far East’s petition for more divisions was granted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw that yet another increase would be inescapable. Secretary Johnson accepted these higher ceilings on 14 July.8

Four days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a more carefully considered and comprehensive set of force requirements for FY 1951:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>834,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy-Marine Corps</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Division</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>717,818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>569,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Manpower   | 2,120,818|

Secretary Johnson immediately approved their recommendations.9

Meanwhile, the Korean lodestone continued to draw US forces. Eighth Army was still retreating, but the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), voiced confidence that it soon would stop the enemy advance. On 24 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General MacArthur’s urgent request for a full Marine division, which he wanted as the spearhead for an amphibious attack. Two weeks later, CINCFE also asked for the 3d Infantry Division, the only effective infantry unit remaining in the United States; President Truman approved its deployment on 10 August.

By then, mobilization of reservists was beginning. The General Reserve (originally consisting of five divisions) had been so depleted that only one division, the 82d Airborne, still possessed immediate combat potential. Additionally, the Reserve had been stripped of many essential support units and individual specialists. Thus, the Army’s capability to cope with emergencies outside of Korea was lost.

For several reasons, General Collins at first evinced extreme reluctance at recommending the activation of National Guard divisions. The economy and morale of affected areas would be severely upset; the divisions could not be used until they received considerably more training; and lack of shipping meant that their deployment would be delayed. Moreover, the Chinese Communists might
intervene later when the reservists' release date was near. Therefore, the Chief of Staff decided against acting precipitately.  

Initially, the Army recalled only individual reservists, either as replacements in Korea or as fillers for General Reserve units being dispatched to the Far East. Organized reserve units were untouched. Since many of those mobilized were World War II veterans, their recall provoked powerful protests from the press, the public and Congress. 

Finally, on 31 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended activation of four infantry divisions and two regimental combat teams from the Army National Guard and expansion of two Marine Divisions to full strength. General Collins wanted to activate a fifth National Guard division but finally accepted General Vandenberg's position that this was unnecessary, since mobilization of four divisions would restore the General Reserve to its pre-Korea strength. In mid-August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed federalization of 4 fighter-bomber wings, 1 light bomb and 2 fighter-bomber squadrons, and 2 troop carrier wings from the Air National Guard; these would furnish tactical air and troop carrier support for the additional RCTs and infantry divisions. Lastly, they asked for the addition of 1 battleship and 28 destroyers to the active fleet. Secretary Johnson and President Truman accepted all this advice. By 1 September, decisions had been made to call 258,000 Active and Inactive reservists to the colors. 

Concurrently, in Korea, the gravest enemy threat was met and mastered. Heavy reinforcements reached the front, so that United Nations (UN) forces in the Pusan perimeter outnumbered and outgunned the enemy. Two massive North Korean drives to breach UN defense lines along the Naktong River were hurled back. All the while, General MacArthur was readying a daring counter-stroke. "We shall land at Inchon," he predicted, "and I shall crush them."

September saw a dramatic reversal of fortune. On 15 September, Marines of Major General Edward M. Almond's X Corps stormed ashore at Inch'on. They routed the surprised defenders and pressed into Seoul, severing the enemy's supply lines. Simultaneously, Eighth Army surged out of the Pusan perimeter and drove northward, joining elements of X Corps on 26 September. The North Korean retreat quickly degenerated into a debacle; UN forces collected 130,000 prisoners. The Korean War seemed won. 

Despite these developments, further force increases were in the offing. The Secretary of Defense sought JCS recommendations for another FY 1951 supplemental and for the 1952 budget. On 22 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that the following Service strengths be achieved by 30 June 1951:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase Over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>18 July Authorization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23
### JCS and National Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>119,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>137,731</td>
<td>688,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>685,917</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,806,735</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Secretary of Defense and the President accepted these objectives as guidance for budgetary planning.\textsuperscript{13}

War in Korea and mobilization at home generated great monetary outlays, principally for procurement and construction. Very quickly, the original military budget requests for FY 1951 were overtaken by events. With combat intensifying and troop strength increasing, President Truman on 24 July sent Congress a supplemental request for new obligating authority apportioned as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$ 3,063,747,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>2,648,029,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>4,535,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>240,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,487,176,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of this aggregate, $3.344 billion was allotted to aircraft and $2.646 billion to armor, artillery, electronics and other major procurement. Eleven days later, the White House announced a second supplemental estimate of $1,155,930,000, from which $950 million would be devoted to accelerated production of naval aircraft. Legislation cleared Congress on 23 September and was signed by the President four days afterward. When force expansion continued, a third supplemental request on 1 December proved necessary:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$ 9,210,865,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>2,979,371,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>4,603,011,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>51,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$16,844,247,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Congressional action, which culminated with the President’s signature on 6 January, raised FY 1951 appropriations to $42,984,862,250.\textsuperscript{14}

Similarly, military assistance efforts were sharply increased. Passage of the original Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) request for $1.222 billion was completed on 26 July. Six days later, the President asked Congress to approve a supplemental appropriation of $4 billion to be distributed as follows:
Rearmament Begun (1950)

Title I (Western Europe) $3,504,000,000
Title II (Greece, Turkey, Iran) $193,000,000
Title III (Far East) $303,000,000

Congress quickly complied, and Mr. Truman signed the enabling legislation on 27 September. Since heavy competitive demands were developing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared—and the Secretary of Defense approved—a general priority system for military assistance:

First Priority: (a) UN forces in Korea; (b) other operational requirements when specifically determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (c) minimum US requirements for national security.

Second Priority: Approved foreign military aid programs, with long-term priority being in the general order of (a) NATO nations and (b) other countries.

Third Priority: Remainder of the materiel requirements of US Armed Forces.

Thus the short-range response to Communist aggression was well advanced. A long-term rearmament program, described below, also was under preparation.

Defining the Danger: NSC 73/4

The invasion of South Korea might be a harbinger of more sinister Soviet designs. On 28 June—even before US ground troops were committed to combat—President Truman directed the National Security Council to resurvey "all policies affecting the entire perimeter of the USSR." Within 72 hours, the NSC Staff submitted a preliminary paper, prepared with the assistance of State, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) representatives. According to this report, aggression in Korea did not demonstrate that the Kremlin wanted a general war. Instead, the Soviets were seeking to acquire strategic control over South Korea and confront the United States with the dilemma of either enduring a tremendous prestige defeat or embarking upon a "profitless and discreditable war of attrition." In either case, the Kremlin hoped that the outcome would be US withdrawal from the Asian scene. The Soviets would test Western firmness, especially in Germany and Austria, but would avoid employing their own forces. Probably, also, they would encourage Chinese Communist action against the offshore islands, Hong Kong, Macao, Tibet, Burma, Indochina—and possibly Korea.

Reviewing this report at Mr. Johnson's request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended many changes, their import being that NSC 73 had underestimated the probability of further aggression. They argued that the Korean War should not be seen as an isolated phenomenon but examined as part of an all-encompassing Soviet plan which might involve correlated actions elsewhere.
The USSR might gain considerably from a policy of initiation of piecemeal attacks against Yugoslavia, Iran, Greece, Turkey or other states around the Soviet periphery. Such piecemeal attacks could well progress to such a point as to encourage the attention of an important fraction of allied military forces in being without such attacks providing, separately or collectively, the spark necessary to bring about mobilization and regrouping of forces to meet a main attack. On balance, it is believed that a progressive series of piecemeal attacks from the periphery of the USSR should be taken as a warning that the Soviets may wish to initiate a third world war. 

On 29 July, the NSC Staff completed a revised report that opened with a most important admonition: "As the aggressor continues his policy of expansion, we must accept the possibility of local conflicts. . . . As a deterrent, our capabilities should be increased as rapidly as possible." NSC 73/1 included, for the first time, a full discussion of possible US responses to various Communist encroachments. Broadly speaking, the United States immediately should launch a political offensive (particularly in the UN), oppose aggression where feasible (but minimize military commitments in unimportant areas), and coordinate planning with selected allies.

After reviewing NSC 73/1, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested some sharper statements concerning growing Soviet military capabilities and the need to strengthen the power position of the noncommunist world. They believed that "the danger of Soviet resort to war, either deliberately or by accident, is now greatly increased." In these circumstances, the administration must decide whether to discard "purely passive, defensive measures" and begin "a political, economic and psychological offensive." These measures would fall into the following categories:

a. Efforts to unite all nations and peoples, regardless of ideologies, type of government, color or creed, who can and will contribute to the military opposition to the threat of the Kremlin.
b. Action to increase military strength of the United States and to apply the necessary pressure upon NATO and other allies to force a corresponding increase through their own efforts of their military capabilities and readiness.
c. Actions in the political, psychological, economic, and, in certain instances, the military fields directed toward gaining the initiative, thus putting the USSR on the defensive wherever possible.

Turning to specifics, they proposed new paragraphs that described the importance of Greece and the Dardanelles and outlined a response to any attack by East German para-military forces.

Two further revisions followed. NSC 73/2 and 73/3 partly, but not wholly, adopted JCS recommendations. In reviewing NSC 73/3, the JSSC tried to substitute a set of underlying principles in place of the detailed descriptions of possible US reactions to aggression. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected this recommendation. Instead, they resolved that General Bradley should orally request the NSC to approve three revisions:
Rearmament Begun (1950)

a. In view of the serious threat posed by East German para-military units, the United States should press for the early formation of adequate West German security forces.

b. The United States could not, as yet, rely upon the United Nations to serve as the sole instrumentality for safeguarding essential US security interests.

c. Prior to any commitment involving the use of US military forces, the Defense Department should be allowed to submit “a last-minute evaluation” of the decision.21

On 24 August, the National Security Council accepted these three amendments and adopted a final revision, NSC 73/4, as a “working guide.” This document stated that, while there was no conclusive evidence that the Kremlin intended to launch a global war, such a possibility “may have been increased by the Korean War.” Indeed, “even an immediate solution of the Korean crisis would not obviate this danger.” After all, without automatically initiating global war, the Soviets could send their own soldiers against Iran, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Pakistan or Finland. Also, the USSR might reap considerable gains by executing piecemeal attacks with satellite forces against states around the Soviet periphery. Additionally, intensified subversive and revolutionary activity could create major difficulties in Iran and Southeast Asia. The conclusion was clear: US and allied military readiness must be increased “as a matter of the utmost urgency”; political, economic and psychological warfare against the USSR should be intensified.22

The men who drafted NSC 68, working during February-March 1950, had cited 1954 as the time of maximum peril. In August, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) reviewed available evidence and decided that this date should be advanced. The JIC reasoned that the Kremlin was unlikely to make any major postponement in its program of attaining world domination. However, opportunities for extending Communist control through satellite aggression (without risking general war) would diminish as Western resistance increased. The Soviets would lose their present war production advantage by the end of 1951 and their capability to conquer Western Europe by 1954. In these circumstances, the “optimum period” for the USSR to precipitate conflict with the Western Powers would “commence in 1951 and culminate about 1953, provided present trends obtain.”

At a US-UK intelligence conference in September, JIC representatives repeated these arguments. British spokesmen, however, contended that the Kremlin would not risk a general conflict before 1955, owing to economic weaknesses and to deficiencies in air forces and anti-aircraft defenses. These differences defied resolution. For the US intelligence community, nonetheless, acceleration of the danger date symbolized a significant alteration in attitude.23

Galvanizing Rearmament: NSC 68/1 and 68/2

When the Korean War began, the rearmament program proposed in NSC 68 was still awaiting consideration by the National Security Council. An inter-
JCS and National Policy

departmental Ad Hoc Committee, acting under a self-imposed deadline of 1 August, was preparing plans and cost estimates. On 27 July, President Truman instructed the NSC to “attempt as best we can to project our plans and programs ahead for the next four or five years.” Saying that the Korean War had made this problem even more urgent, he asked the Council to complete its response to NSC 68 by 1 September.24

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 3 July, had approved FY 1954 objectives of 12 Army divisions, 324 major combatant vessels, 2 Marine divisions, and 69 Air Force wings. Two weeks later, they sent these figures, together with those for Western European countries, to Secretary Johnson. This was their estimate of the forces required to meet the “general tasks and responsibilities” set forth in NSC 68.25

Meanwhile, major organizational changes were improving the decision-making process. Senior State Department officials claimed that it was virtually impossible (except under extreme pressures and at the highest level) to obtain quick and clear-cut decisions from the Defense Department. This situation was especially acute, they asserted, in connection with NSC 68 and NSC 73. On 12 July, Secretary Johnson agreed that the channel of communication through General Burns should be retained only for certain urgent questions. Otherwise, matters would be handled through lateral working State-Defense relationships. One week later, President Truman decreed that the National Security Council would convene regularly every Thursday. Believing that large attendance was discouraging free discussion, however, the Chief Executive confined NSC attendance to eleven people (including Secretary Johnson and General Bradley). He further directed that State, Defense, JCS, CIA and NSRB each nominate one individual to serve as a member of a Senior NSC Staff Group. Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge became the JCS representative.26

During mid-August, the Ad Hoc Committee on NSC 68 circulated an interim report among its members. The military program, prepared by Major General Richard C. Lindsay, USAF (the Joint Staff’s Deputy Director for Strategic Plans) and subsequently “noted” by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, set forth the following objectives for FY 1954: 18–24 Army and Marine divisions; 340 major combatant vessels; 69 Air Force wings; and 2,620,000 personnel. But this buildup should be accomplished “with the utmost urgency,” because the risk of global war would grow during the next 2–3 years before potential became converted into actual power.

The Report tentatively tabulated obligations and expenditures (in billions) for all national security programs as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Obligations</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1951</td>
<td>$45.7</td>
<td>$25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1952</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1953</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1954</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1955</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nonetheless, these cost estimates probably were "too conservative," even though they approached 15 percent of the gross national product. If international tension continued to increase, national security programs might require 25 percent of the gross national product (GNP).28

When the Ad Hoc Committee convened to consider this document on 21 August, members seriously doubted that the military program was adequate to achieve the rapid buildup recommended in NSC 68. Also, several individuals questioned the precise meaning of the words "utmost urgency." The State Department apparently had suggested this phrase, taken from NSC 73/4. Accordingly, its representatives produced an explanatory paper declaring that present US strength was "grossly inadequate" to protect vital national interests. The Soviet Union and its satellites evidently were undertaking high-priority programs of airfield construction and stockpiling at advanced depots, "which make it appear probable that they are getting in a position to undertake operations in 1951 or 1952 involving a far more serious risk of war than aggression in Korea." Furthermore, according to the State Department, North Korean victories had shaken Allied faith in US military capabilities; restoration of their confidence and stimulation of a proportionate Allied effort was essential. In the final report (NSC 68/1), the phrase "utmost urgency" was retained; the explanatory paper described above was included, but its wording was softened to say that the Soviets would be "in an improved position to undertake operations" during 1951–1952.29

The Ad Hoc Committee and the NSC Senior Staff met on 22 August to consider the interim report. Confeerees agreed that the efforts described therein—and particularly the military program—were inadequate to fulfill the goals of NSC 68 "with sufficient speed." The two groups agreed that the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should restate military objectives, revise military programs accordingly, and reappraise cost estimates (emphasizing those for FYs 1951–1952). For these purposes, the President would be asked to extend the deadline until 15 September.30

Soon afterward, President Truman agreed to postpone presentation of the report. Simultaneously, Secretary Johnson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to define (1) the "basic tasks" that NSC 68 would levy upon the military establishment, (2) the force levels required to perform these tasks, and (3) the rate of buildup for those forces.31

As a response, the Services separately developed the following force objectives for FY 1954:

- **Army**: 18 Divisions; 1,400,000 personnel
- **Navy**: 395 major combatant vessels; 983,467 personnel
- **Air Force**: 130 wings; 2,037,500 personnel

In forwarding these figures to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the JSPC defined the "basic tasks" as follows: meeting treaty obligations; executing war plans; and repelling local acts of aggression. Forces for the first two tasks were fitted to the strategic concepts set forth in the NATO Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) and the US Joint Outline War Plan (JOWP) for 1 July 1954.32 Forces for the third
were fixed by the JSPC at four divisions, with suitable air and naval support, capable of being committed within thirty days.\textsuperscript{33}

The enormous size of the Air Force program—far exceeding anything hitherto proposed—made it an inevitable target of attack. During JCS discussions, General Bradley inclined toward the pre-Korea planning goal of 77 wings; Admiral Sherman and General Collins contemplated 90–100 wings. In the end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff compromised on 18 Army divisions, 397 major combatant vessels, 95 Air Force wings, and 3,211,000 personnel. They sent these figures to the Secretary on 1 September. Basic tasks, they said, were those set forth in NSC 68 itself, oriented toward the two broad missions of protecting against disaster and supporting US foreign policy.\textsuperscript{34} Thus they stressed general war tasks rather than requirements for repelling local aggression.

On 22 September, as already described, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded revised FY 1951–1952 recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. They added to these the FY 1954 recommendations derived from MTDP and JOWP requirements. Their complete figures read as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1951</th>
<th>FY 1952</th>
<th>FY 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,263,000</td>
<td>1,567,000</td>
<td>1,355,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Carriers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Carriers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Carriers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2½</td>
<td>2½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>855,549</td>
<td>869,638</td>
<td>866,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Wings</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Carrier</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>688,186</td>
<td>863,246</td>
<td>1,060,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manpower Total</strong></td>
<td>2,806,735</td>
<td>3,299,884</td>
<td>3,281,382\textsuperscript{35}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concurrently, the NSC Senior Staff and the Ad Hoc Committee together revised the Committee's interim report. Their new paper, disseminated on 21 September as NSC 68/1, incorporated the force and manpower objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 September. Proposed obligations and expenditures are shown below (in billions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
<th>Total, All National Security Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1951</td>
<td>$54.0</td>
<td>$69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1952</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1953</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1954</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1955</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even the ending of the Korean War should not appreciably affect these efforts. In summation, the Senior Staff suggested that President Truman be asked:

a. To accept the Conclusions of NSC 68 "as a statement of US policy to be followed over the next four or five years."
b. To approve NSC 68/1 "as a tentative basis for proceeding with the initiation of the programs described therein, with the understanding that there will be continuous review and revision. . . ."
c. To direct the NSC to submit an initial revision by 15 December 1950.36

When the Secretary of Defense solicited JCS comments and criticisms, General Vandenberg advised two alterations. First, he felt that the paper should stress "the essential limitations in the proposed military program—especially those pertaining to defense against air and unconventional attacks, the weaknesses of partial mobilization, and the dangers inherent in undue dissipation of forces in peripheral actions." (In effect, General Vandenberg was attempting to reopen the argument over massive Air Force expansion.) Second, he expressed still greater concern over what he considered a "basic weakness" in NSC 68/1. Although programs were directed toward a target date of 1954, the intelligence community had concluded that the most critical period would come two years earlier. Therefore, he thought that "wherever possible . . . we [should] bend every effort to telescope existing target dates in the direction of the 1952 date." The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected his second suggestion but accepted his first. They so advised the Secretary of Defense on 27 September, adding that otherwise NSC 68/1 was "generally consistent" with their previous studies and conclusions. On the following day, however, the NSC Staff met and resolved to retain the report's original language.37

On 29 September, the President presided over an important meeting at which the National Security Council adopted the Conclusions of NSC 68 as a statement of policy to be followed over the next four or five years, and agreed that the implementing programs will be put into effect as rapidly as feasible, with the understanding that the
specific nature and cost of these programs will be decided as they are more firmly developed.

The Council decided that NSC 68/1 needed further study, however, and requested a revised version by 15 November. NSC 68's “Conclusions” were then distributed as NSC 68/2. This paper reaffirmed the warnings of NSC 20/4, the original “containment” paper but contended that the danger had markedly increased. A “rapid and concerted build-up” of US and allied military strength was needed, in order to convince the USSR of “the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will.” This document, coupled with the Council's decision of 29 September, laid the foundation for a massive rearmament effort of indefinite duration.

General Marshall Succeeds Louis Johnson

On 12 September, the nation was startled to learn that President Truman had “accepted” the resignation of Louis Johnson. The circumstances surrounding Mr. Johnson's departure, concealed at the time, are now public knowledge.

Unquestionably, the Secretary of Defense had become a major political liability. President Truman promulgated the “economy” program, but Mr. Johnson embraced it with enthusiasm. “I want Joe Stalin to know,” the Secretary had declaimed late in 1949, “that if he starts something at four o'clock in the morning, the fighting power and strength of America will be on the job at five....” Like Marshal Leboeuf's boast in 1870 that the French army was ready “down to the last gaiter button,” these words returned to mock their speaker. The tales of defeat and retreat belied Mr. Johnson's claim that he had been trimming “fat” without touching “muscle.” As one historian has remarked, “It was way past five o'clock now and the United States was fighting back with a feather.”

On the afternoon of 11 September, the Chief Executive summoned the Secretary to the White House. A grim interview ensued. According to President Truman, “Lou came in full of pep and energy. He didn't know anything was wrong.” The President asked him to sit down and then said bluntly, “Lou, I've got to ask you to quit.” The Secretary was stunned; he leaned over in his chair and the President feared he might faint. When Mr. Johnson recovered his composure, he tried to persuade the President to reverse his decision. Mr. Truman refused but did release for public consumption a warm letter which intimated that the Secretary's departure was voluntary.” Nonetheless, Louis Johnson left the Pentagon a deeply discredited man.

President Truman never discussed his decision publicly. Privately, however, he provided one of his aides with a harsh explanation:
I've never had anyone let me down as badly as he did. I've known for months—ever since May—that I would have to fire him, but I just couldn't bring myself to do it.... The terrible thing about all this is that Johnson doesn't realize that he has done anything wrong. He just doesn't seem to realize what he has been doing to the whole government. I couldn't let it go on any longer.43

The President selected General of the Army George C. Marshall to be the new Secretary of Defense. During his tenure as Army Chief of Staff (1939–1945) and Secretary of State (1947–1949), General Marshall had earned from Mr. Truman a respect approaching reverence. In 1950, he was living in well-earned retirement at Leesburg, Virginia. The President contacted him by telephone at a remote country store. General Marshall unhesitatingly agreed to return to the Pentagon, stipulating only that his service should be limited to one year. For the post of Deputy Secretary of Defense, General Marshall selected Mr. Robert A. Lovett, an investment banker who previously had served him as Assistant Secretary of War for Air and Under Secretary of State. To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these were happy appointments. Secretary Marshall took office on 21 September and immediately improved strained State-Defense relations. The new climate was embodied in a “treaty” between Secretary Acheson and General Bradley to ban the phrases “from a political point of view” and “from a military point of view.” During the dark days of December 1950, the two Departments worked in a harmony scarcely conceivable during Mr. Johnson’s Secretaryship.44

General Marshall’s accession happened to coincide with General Bradley’s promotion to five-star rank. At the White House, on 22 September, President Truman pinned upon the Chairman’s khaki uniform the circlets and seals of a General of the Army. The ceremony was a personal triumph but a sartorial failure. Although he acted with “obvious pleasure,” Mr. Truman placed the constellations askew. A military aide later removed and realigned them, “straight as a squad of West Pointers.”45

Intermezzo

In Korea, the glow of victory was briefly flecked by the shadow of Chinese Communist intervention. After crossing the 38th parallel and seizing Pyongyang, UN forces advanced to occupy all of North Korea. Suddenly, during the last days of October, Chinese Communist forces assaulted US and Republic of Korea (ROK) units along the Chongchon River in the west and around the Changjin Reservoir in the east. Then the Chinese mysteriously withdrew, and General MacArthur readied a final sweep to the Yalu River.46

The prospect of an early end to the Korean War inspired a reappraisal of plans for the FY 1952 budget and for a third FY 1951 supplemental. Early in November, Deputy Secretary Lovett intimated that the Services probably would be required to “level off” at about 16 Army divisions, 76–78 air wings, and 980 naval vessels of all types—figures appreciably lower than the JCS objectives of 22 September.
JCS and National Policy

On 17 November he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the object was a realistic military budget...based on needs and not on imposed ceilings." He emphasized that:

(a) planned forces “should be within the realm of actual possibility both as to personnel and materiel";
(b) manpower increases should be correlated with weapons production, so that planned units would become battleworthy during FY 1952;
(c) stress should be laid upon the development of productive capacity, in order to permit expansion in case of war but to avoid unnecessary accumulation of obsolescent weapons; and
(d) fiscal estimates should be regarded as “an attempt to arrive at a form of national security which would meet our international commitments while at the same time permitting us to maintain a reasonable military posture over a period of years.”

Concurrently, President Truman postponed presentation of the NSC 68/1 revision until 15 December.47

On 19 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Marshall the following revised estimates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY1951</th>
<th>Change from 22 Sept</th>
<th>FY1952 and thereafter</th>
<th>Change from 22 Sept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,263,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,244,000</td>
<td>-323,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>322</td>
<td></td>
<td>340</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Division</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>850,027</td>
<td>-5,522</td>
<td>809,912</td>
<td>-59,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>651,095</td>
<td>-37,091</td>
<td>748,000</td>
<td>-115,246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that FY 1952 objectives might be reduced after further study but urged that FY 1951 requirements be approved immediately. They cautioned that lowered objectives would create greater risks, however, and stressed that budgetary actions taken during FYs 1951–1952 would deeply influence developments in later years. Secretary Marshall forwarded this memorandum to the National Security Council. Yet, despite the JCS warning, the NSC agreed on 22 November that the reduced FY 1951 military program was generally consistent with objectives expounded in NSC 68/1.48
Rearmament Begun (1950)

The pace of rearmament might be slightly attenuated, but its scope remained quite substantial. Administration spokesmen bluntly warned the country that a large, long-term effort was inescapable. Speaking to the Managing Editors' Association on 17 November, General Bradley revealed the "bruising and shocking fact" that Korean War needs had stripped the country of the strength needed to meet a general enemy attack. Consequently, he stressed that "nothing would put us in greater danger" than a partial demobilization after this conflict ended. Similarly, one week later, Secretary Marshall denounced the dangers of "pendulum" thinking:

The history of national defense in this country has been a succession of feasts and famines that have followed each other in demoralizing sequence.

For a nation that prides itself on its logic, business precocity and its practical sense, we have given the world quite an opposite impression of these qualities when it came to the matter of national defense. Speaking frankly, I fear that we have given a demonstration somewhat of emotional instability.46

Crescendo: NSC 68/4

Within a few days, the threat of complacency yielded place to the peril of general war. On 24 November, General MacArthur launched his "end-the-war" offensive. Four days later, 26 Chinese Communist divisions struck a stunning counterblow that drove UN forces from North Korea. Surprise was complete and losses were heavy. The 2nd Infantry Division marched into an ambush at Kunu-ri and was decimated; the 1st Marine Division was surrounded at the Changjin Reservoir and had to fight a bloody withdrawal action. By mid-December, Eighth Army had retired below the 38th parallel and was forming a defensive line north and east of Seoul; X Corps was contracting into Hungnam and Wonsan, preparing for evacuation.50

Some quotations from public and private sources suggest the tensions of these days. Time mourned "the worst defeat the U.S. had ever suffered." John Foster Dulles told Senator Arthur Vandenberg that the situation seemed "desperate, almost numbing"; he believed that US prestige and leadership had been "momentarily shattered." In his diary, President Truman wrote that "I have worked for peace for five years and six months and it looks like World War III is near."51

When State and Defense representatives conferred on 3 December, two questions dominated their discussion: Was the United States now at war with Communist China? Would she soon be at war with the Soviet Union? A National Intelligence Estimate, issued that same day, stated that Chinese intervention "was undertaken with the appreciation of the risk of general war between the United States and China and perhaps in expectation of such a development. It is highly improbable that the Chinese Communist regime would have accepted this risk without explicit assurance of effective Soviet support." Whether the USSR now intended to precipitate a global war was uncertain. Plainly, however, Soviet rulers had "resolved to pursue aggressively their world-wide attack on the power position of the United States and its allies, regardless of the possibility that global war may result . . ." Further aggression in Europe and Asia was considered likely, regardless of the outcome in Korea.52
JCS and National Policy

The defeat of UN armies in Korea and the emergence of Communist China as a formidable military power forced yet another reappraisal of rearmament planning. On 1 December, the President presented to Congress his third military supplemental request. This was based on the program prepared in November, prior to Chinese intervention. In an accompanying message, Mr. Truman commented that this was “not a war budget” but would allow “the fastest possible progress in increasing our strength.”

When Secretary Marshall and Deputy Secretary Lovett testified before a House Appropriations Subcommittee, Representative George Mahon asked why the administration was not seeking still more funds. General Marshall answered that “unless you are in [an all-out] war and everybody in the country…[has] their shoulders to the wheel, this is about as fast as you can efficiently digest these sums of money and these accretions of personnel….” The most important matter, he argued, was the development of production facilities—assembly lines, tools, dies and jigs. Similarly, Mr. Lovett stressed that current FY 1951 force goals (16 Army divisions, 322 major combatant vessels, and 68 Air Force wings—2,764,000 personnel) represented “an initial step in a planned four-year effort.” Obviously, reverses in Korea would require upward revisions—particularly as regards the Army. The final aim, he avowed, was creation of a defense establishment which could be preserved “over a substantial period of time without excessive strain, while providing the essential quality of a quick buildup from a sound base.”

Although the Armed Forces had grown by nearly 1 million men since 30 June, the United States was unready for general war. Within the General Reserve, for example, the 82d Airborne Division alone was combat-ready; the four National Guard divisions activated in September would not be fully trained until spring. Predictably, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed for expansion. On 6 December, as part of the revision of NSC 68/1 ordered by the Council on 29 September, they submitted to Secretary Marshall the recommendations shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1951</th>
<th>FY 1952</th>
<th>FY 1953</th>
<th>FY 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,261,000</td>
<td>1,348,000</td>
<td>1,348,000</td>
<td>1,353,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2½</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>842,073</td>
<td>862,000</td>
<td>878,000</td>
<td>887,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>971,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Manpower Total  —  —  —  3,211,000
These recommendations were identical with those submitted on 1 September 1950, which had been incorporated into NSC 68/1. In other words, the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned to the objectives they had proposed before the prospect of victory occasioned reductions. At the same time, they urged that FY 1954 objectives be attained "as soon as practicable and with a target date no later than 30 June 1952." This was, of course, precisely what General Vandenberg had suggested in September.55

In preparing NSC 68/3, the NSC Senior Staff approved the JCS force targets for FY 1954 and agreed that they should be accepted as objectives for FY 1952. This was a most significant step, plainly taken in response to the Korean crisis. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff also sought, without success, to include a statement that the administration should be prepared to progress even beyond FY 1954 goals). On 14 December, the President approved this report, slightly amended and re-designated NSC 68/4, "as a working guide for the purpose of making an immediate start." Its essential passages read as follows:

The aggression by the Chinese Communists in North Korea has created a new crisis and a situation of great danger. Our military buildup must be rapid because the period of greatest danger is directly before us. A greatly increased scale and tempo of effort is required to enable us to overcome our present military inadequacy. . . .

Present conditions make unacceptable the delay involved in the phasing of our military buildup over a four-year period. It is evident that the forces envisaged earlier for 1954 must be provided as an interim program as rapidly as practicable and with a target date no later than June 30, 1952. We must also proceed at once to establish a production and mobilization base that will permit a very rapid expansion to full mobilization.

Additionally, Mr. Truman ordered the Secretaries of State and Defense immediately to undertake a joint review of politico-military strategy "with a view to increasing and speeding up" all the national security programs outlined in NSC 68/3.56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately pressed for accelerated force increases. Since the Army needed eighteen divisions and possessed only fifteen,57 they recommended mobilization of two more National Guard divisions and creation of another Regular Army division by 30 June 1951. Further, they proposed that 15 fighter squadrons from the Air National Guard be federalized and incorporated into the Air Defense Command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also requested that three fighter squadrons be activated and used within the training system. Finally, they asked that one battleship and two attack carriers be added to the active fleet; these increases would allow augmentation of the Atlantic Fleet and permit continued rotation of forces in the Far East. Secretary Marshall authorized all these measures.58
Thus the Korean War's decisive impact upon US rearmament is incontestable. In their last pre-war study, approved on 3 July but unaffected by Korean war requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had set FY 1952 force objectives at 10 divisions, 281 major combatant vessels and 58 wings—and it was not certain whether the President would approve even this much.\textsuperscript{50} Now, the administration had approved NSC 68 and accepted FY 1952 goals of 18 divisions, 397 major combatant vessels and 95 wings.

On 11 December, the NSC debated the wisdom of proclaiming a national emergency. Secretary Marshall thought it “fairly certain” that Eighth Army could hold a defensive line in Korea. However, he felt the general situation remained “as dangerous as ever” and favored announcement that a national emergency existed. General Walter Bedell Smith (Director, CIA) remarked that the Soviets probably would not embark upon general war at once but simply ensure that their military superiority remained intact. The USSR probably would attempt to disrupt rearmament efforts by peace overtures, sabotage acts and local aggressions; if all these failed, Soviet leaders might then decide to launch an immediate attack against the West. After further deliberation, the NSC resolved that a declaration of national emergency was necessary.

Two days later, the President and his advisors canvassed congressional leaders. After the Chief Executive summarized intelligence reports, Secretary Acheson said there was “only one choice open to us, and that was the greatest possible buildup of our own military strength and that of our allies.” He could see “no other way to stop the Soviet drive for world domination.” General Marshall added that the Army was encountering difficulty in negotiating contracts because it lacked legal authority to require that military needs receive priority over civilian requirements. This, he avowed, “was really the crucial point of the whole program . . .” Republican Senators Robert Taft and Kenneth Wherry remained skeptical of the need for a declaration of national emergency, but other Congressmen were convinced.\textsuperscript{60}

On 15 December, the President proclaimed the existence of a national emergency and told the American people that “our homes, our nation, all the things we believe in, are in great danger.” Communist rulers, he asserted, “are now willing to push the world to the brink of general war [in order] to get what they want. This is the real meaning of the events that have taken place in Korea.” Mr. Truman announced that the armed forces would expand from 2.5 to nearly 3.5 million personnel as rapidly as possible. Within one year, he forecast, delivery of aircraft would increase 500 percent, output of electronic equipment 400 percent, and manufacture of combat vehicles 450 percent. The President then revealed plans to impose selective wage and price controls, create an Office of Defense Mobilization, and appoint a Federal Civilian Defense Administrator. In conclusion, the Chief Executive called upon his countrymen to stand steadfast in adversity:
Rearmament Begun (1950)

What the free nations have done in Korea is right, and men all over the world
know that it is right. Whatever temporary setbacks there may be, the right will
prevail in the end. . . .

No nation has ever had a greater responsibility than ours has at this moment.
We must remember that we are the leaders of the free world. . . .
The American people have always met danger with courage and determination.
I am confident we will do that now and, with God's help, we shall keep our
freedom. 85

Table 1
Revisions of FY 1951 Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JCS Memo of 18 July 50, Authorized 30 June 50</th>
<th>JCS Memo of 22 Sept 50, Approved by SecDef</th>
<th>JCS Memo of 19 Nov 50, Approved by SecDef and Pres</th>
<th>JCS Memo of 19 Nov 50, Approved by NSC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>630,000</td>
<td>834,000</td>
<td>1,263,000</td>
<td>1,263,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>461,000</td>
<td>717,818</td>
<td>855,549</td>
<td>850,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>416,000</td>
<td>569,000</td>
<td>688,186</td>
<td>651,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower Total</td>
<td>1,507,000</td>
<td>2,120,818</td>
<td>2,806,735</td>
<td>2,764,122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2
Revisions of FY 1952 Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JCS Memo of 22 Sept 50, Approved by SecDef and Pres</th>
<th>JCS Memo of 19 Nov 50, Approved by NSC</th>
<th>NSC 68/4 14 Dec 50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>655,000</td>
<td>1,567,000</td>
<td>1,244,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2½</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>869,638</td>
<td>809,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>863,246</td>
<td>748,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manpower Total</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3,299,884</td>
<td>2,801,912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rearmament Sustained (1951)

"Time Is On Our Side . . ."

The first two weeks of 1951 were among the most hazardous of the Cold War. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

The United States faces today one of the greatest dangers in its history. The Korean War could be the first phase of a global war between the United States and the USSR. No areas of agreement which might lessen or end this global struggle are apparent, except those based on appeasement of the Soviets.¹

At that time, their attention was riveted upon South Korea. The enemy had recaptured Seoul, and General MacArthur reported that early evacuation of Eighth Army appeared inevitable. In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff "tentatively" recommended imposition of a naval blockade upon Communist China and release of Chinese Nationalist forces for attacks against the mainland. Withdrawal from Korea, therefore, might become the prelude to a wider war.²

Providentially, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, (who took command of Eighth Army upon General Walker's death) rallied his dispirited soldiers and changed the course of the war. During 17-25 January, UN forces slowly began advancing northward again. With this welcome news in mind, State and Defense representatives opened extensive explorations of politico-military strategy, pursuant to President Truman's decision of 14 December.³

On 24 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed with Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, Ambassador at Large Philip E. Jessup and Mr. Paul Nitze (head of the Policy Planning Staff) the relationship of rearmament to the peril of general war. General Bradley and his JCS colleagues emphasized that the passage of time favored the "free world" because growing US strength would deter Communist adventurism. However, they also stressed that the massive appropriations and authorizations made for national defense could have little immediate impact upon US preparedness. General Collins commented that
JCS and National Policy

the Army would not feel the rearmament program's full effect for 18 months. General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, who was representing General Vandenberg, remarked that the Air Force was in a similar situation; strategic air power would not wholly mature until mid-1952. General Bradley put the matter rather pungently, saying that the United States might not lose a world war that began during the next two years but "we would have a hell of a time winning it." As Secretary Acheson stated publicly some months later, "The basic premise of our foreign policy is that time is on our side—if we make good use of it." Obviously, prudence and perseverance would be needed in equal measure.4

During February and March, the Korean situation continued to improve; UN forces liberated Seoul and reached the 38th parallel once more. Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned Secretary Marshall that the rearmament effort should not slacken:

In view of the disparity between our military strength and our global responsibilities, it is vital that the United States continue to develop its war potential and that the objectives of the current mobilization program be met. It would be dangerous to falter in our determination to obtain a satisfactory state of military and industrial preparedness.5

The British Chiefs of Staff entertained somewhat more sanguine opinions than their American opposites. They granted that the Soviets might become sufficiently alarmed by "the immense scale of American rearmament" and the projected rearming of West Germany to launch a world war before the Western Powers became sufficiently strong. Nonetheless, they contended that "the period of greatest danger" would not occur until "about the end of 1952," when the Soviet bloc would enjoy its greatest relative superiority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected this assessment and contended that the danger of world war, "either as a result of a deliberate Soviet decision to launch such a war or a result of the Soviet leaders taking local actions which threaten vital Western interests, exists now and will continue to exist through 1954."6 This, then, was the atmosphere in which the FY 1952 military budget took form.

Presentation of the FY 1952 Budget: Implementing NSC 68/4

In approving NSC 68/4, President Truman had authorized the activation by 30 June 1952 of 18 Army division, 397 major combat vessels, and 95 Air Force wings. Budget levels, however, were not settled so easily. At a meeting on 22 December 1950, Deputy Secretary Lovett and the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged their inability firmly to establish the amount of a fourth FY 1951 supplemental request. Some defense contracts had not been let, so the rate of military spending remained unsettled. Furthermore, legal restrictions hampered spending for shipbuilding, public works construction, and certain other items. They agreed that, when these uncertainties were removed, the Services could estimate program
costs for FYs 1951–1952. A recommendation for the FY 1951 supplemental should be submitted early in February; FY 1952 requests should follow about mid-month.7

On 3 January 1951, the Chief Executive advised the Secretary of Defense that he would place Service strengths at 3,211,000 personnel in his FY 1952 budget message. But here, too, figures were in flux. “It is probable,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned Secretary Marshall two days later, “that all Services will have to review their planned personnel strengths from time to time to reflect decisions which may be made on Selective Service, universal military training, recruiting, etcetera, and also the effect of combat operations on unavailables and replacement requirements.” They therefore recommended the following readjustments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>NSC 68/4 Ceiling</th>
<th>New Ceiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,353,000</td>
<td>1,416,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy-Marine Corps</td>
<td>887,000</td>
<td>985,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>971,000</td>
<td>1,061,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,211,000</td>
<td>3,462,205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President Truman promptly approved these increases. But, in his budget message of 15 January, the Chief Executive did not specify Service strengths and offered only a preliminary estimate of $60 billion in new obligational authority.8

Early in February, the Services reported that their fiscal requirements for the remainder of FY 1951 and for FY 1952 totalled $104 billion. There followed a series of reappraisals, of which Admiral Sherman has left this disgruntled description:

The FY 51 Fourth Supplemental Budget was revised and reviewed no fewer than four times. The FY 52 Budget was revised and reviewed three times. With only slight variation in degree, each of the budget revisions undertaken in the last twelve months [was carried out] on a ‘crash’ basis. In no case [was] more than three weeks...available for preparation of a complete budget...The time devoted to reviewing the FY 52 Budget exceeded the time allowed for its preparation.9

On 5 April, President Truman asked Congress to approve an additional $6,521,681,000 in new obligational authority for FY 1951; Congress ultimately appropriated $6,379,673,000.10 At last, on 30 April, the Chief Executive submitted his military budget for FY 1952. The new obligational authority sought for each Service read as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$20,798,846,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>15,071,444,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>19,784,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$55,654,290,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also, Mr. Truman asked for $4.5 billion to inaugurate a large military public works program.11
JCS and National Policy

However, FY 1952 manpower objectives did not stay firmly fixed. Early in April, General Collins appealed for another augmentation in Army strength. Far East commitments (six divisions in Korea, two in Japan) had consumed units scheduled for deployment to the European Theater if general war began. Consequently, there would exist in Western Europe “a dangerous void during a critical period.” In order to restore this reinforcement capability, General Collins wanted to activate three National Guard divisions and attain a strength of 21 divisions and 1,669,000 personnel during FY 1952. He proposed to finance this augmentation through a FY 1952 supplemental request.12

Admiral Sherman and General Vandenberg objected, largely on procedural grounds. They reasoned that, since further Navy and Air Force increases probably would prove necessary, a single FY 1952 supplemental for all three Services should be submitted at a later date. In rebuttal, General Collins remarked that the Army had committed a higher percentage of its forces to the Far East and could not extricate and redeploy them as readily as the other Services. Therefore, he repeated, “I strongly urge the immediate approval of my recommendation.”13

On 13 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred this subject to the JSPC. Answering two weeks later, the Committee advised that a single budget request, jointly prepared, would be more favorably received by Congress than a series of supplements. Accordingly, on 9 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the JSPC to reexamine Service requirements and prepare “a strategic basis” covering FY 1952 and FY 1953.14 The resulting recommendations, submitted by the JSPC on 28 May, ignited the deep disagreement described later in this chapter.

Although General Collins failed in his larger purpose, he succeeded in a smaller aim. He argued that an FY 1952 end-strength of 1,416,000 was too small to permit release of enlisted reservists, rotation from Korea, and preservation of the mobilization base needed to support activation of additional National Guard divisions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Army should be expanded to 1,552,000 personnel; President Truman approved this augmentation on 17 April.15

Before Congress could act upon FY 1952 budget requests, circumstances changed considerably. The ouster of General MacArthur, which occurred on 11 April, dramatically reaffirmed the administration’s determination to confine hostilities to Korea. This policy of limiting the war seemed to be succeeding. The Chinese Communists launched a series of massive offensives during April and May, but UN forces gave little ground, exacted staggering losses, and then successfully counter-attacked. By 30 May, General Ridgway concluded that the enemy had suffered “a severe major defeat”: he also calculated that the military situation now offered the United States “optimum advantages in support of its diplomatic negotiations.” During June, Eighth Army counter-attacked and established itself slightly above the 38th parallel along the KANSAS-WYOMING line. The Communists appeared willing to accept a stalemate. Overtures from the USSR led to the beginning of truce talks at Kaesong on 10 July.16

There seemed real danger that the mood of Congress might now harden against massive military spending. Testifying before the House Appropriations
Committee on 18 July, Secretary Marshall warned that it would be “most dis-
tressing” if the Soviets could induce “an attitude of relaxation, of a let-down in
our defense program on the part of the American people.” Reserve officers, he
said, were asking whether they were still expected to report for active duty; it
seemed to the Secretary “tragic that we should be so susceptible to [Commu-
nist] propaganda.” As General Bradley said before another forum, “It is time
that we chart our course by the distant stars and not by the lights of each pass-
ing ship.”

The dangers described by Secretary Marshall dissipated as the truce talks
began to be mired in recriminations. On 12 October, Congress completed passage of
a $56,939,568,030 defense appropriations bill, which the President signed six
days afterward. The Services received the following sums in new obligational
authority:

| Army          | $19,888,032,030 |
| Navy          | 15,820,235,000 |
| Air Force     | 20,642,785,000 |
| Total         | $56,351,052,030 |

Congress actually gave the Air Force more than the administration asked—a re-
sponse to debates and decisions described in the following section. The bill en-
compassing military construction and public works, signed by Mr. Truman on 11
November, raised this sum to $61,441,624 605.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program did suffer some slight reductions.
Preliminary planning, completed in December 1950, envisaged a request for
$6.597 billion in new obligational authority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed
that this ceiling be raised to $8.229 billion, but OSD pared this total to $6.857 bil-
lion by slashing programs for West Germany, Spain, Yugoslavia and Japan. The
Bureau of the Budget then imposed a final reduction to $6.250 billion and, on 24
May, the President presented this program to Congress. The Mutual Security Act
of 1951 combined, for the first time, military and economic assistance. Adminis-
tration requests and Congressional actions are compared below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requested, 24 May</th>
<th>Appropriated, 20 Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title I (Western Europe)</td>
<td>$5,240,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title II (Mediterranean, Middle East)</td>
<td>415,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title III (Far East)</td>
<td>555,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title IV (Latin America)</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$6,250,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Basically, then, Congress had agreed to fund nearly all the administration’s na-
tional security programs. If obstacles to rapid expansion appeared, they would
not be fiscal.
Reviewing Rearmament: NSC 114/1

The progress of rearmament seemed impressive. On 30 June 1951, Service strengths stood as follows:

**Army**
- Divisions: 18 (3 reduced)
- Regiments: 18 (10 reduced)
- AAA Battalions: 100 (60 reduced)
- Personnel: 1,529,902

**Navy**
- Total, Major Combatant Vessels: 342
- Large Carriers: 12
- Light Carriers: 5
- Escort Carriers: 10
- Battleships: 3 (2 reduced)
- Cruisers: 15
- Destroyers: 209
- Submarines: 88
- Marine Divisions: 2½
- Personnel: 924,770

**Air Force**
- Total Wings: 87
- Strategic: 28
- Air Defense: 20
- Tactical: 24
- Troop Carrier: 15
- Personnel: 788,381

Total Manpower: 3,243,053

The increases since June 1950 amounted to 8 divisions, 104 major combatant vessels, 39 wings, and nearly 1.8 million personnel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the US military posture was markedly improved but advised Secretary Marshall that it was "still far from adequate" to meet treaty commitments and accomplish foreign policy objectives. In fact, important aspects of the rearmament effort were distinctly disappointing. The Munitions Board already had estimated that at least 30 percent of the NSC 68/4 programs (especially those in the critical areas of aircraft, electronics, tank, and ammunition production) could not be completed by mid-1952. After examining reports from the Defense Department, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Bureau of the Budget, the NSC Senior Staff recommended to the National Security Council that two reports be written:
Rearmament Sustained (1951)

(1) A review of the status of the programs described in NSC 68/4, including an analysis of any difficulties which may be impeding or preventing their successful execution.
(2) Recommendations regarding any revisions or modifications of the policies and programs contained in NSC 68/4.

On 6 June, the NSC directed its Staff to prepare the review and recommendations.²⁵

Five weeks later, President Truman instructed governmental agencies to begin work upon FY 1953 estimates at the earliest possible date. The FY 1952 military budget had not been forwarded to Capitol Hill until 30 April, and some Congressmen were complaining that this delay left them insufficient time for review. Therefore, the Chief Executive insisted that FY 1953 defense programs be presented to Congress in January 1952 together with the rest of the budget. He then laid down detailed instructions:

In order to provide assumptions upon which budget planning can be initiated, it will be necessary that the first of these two reports [by the NSC Senior Staff], namely, the status of the present programs, be made available to me about August 1. To make this report most useful it should include tentative recommendations as to the desirability of reaffirming or modifying the approved target dates for readiness under the presently approved programs, without definitive consideration for the time being of the magnitude of these programs, in the light of the following factors:

1. Doubt as to whether we can achieve the buildup of our military forces, particularly the Air Force and naval air arm, to approved levels with modern equipment by the target date of June 30, 1952;

2. Serious question as to whether the MDAP program as previously planned for 1954 will actually be realized in sufficient time;

3. Experience which to date indicates that there may be some slippage against production rates which may further delay these programs;

4. Possibility of delay in the authorization of military public works with a resulting tendency to retard the achievement of our readiness objectives;

5. The possibility of an armistice in Korea which may adversely affect both congressional and public support for these programs unless steps are taken to forestall such possibilities;

6. The necessity of weighing all the above factors against the estimated status of the capabilities and intentions of the USSR and its satellites, particularly during the next twelve months.

In order that I may have the best possible basis for presentation of my program to the Congress in January, I will want to have the Council’s second report by October 1. This report should contain basic recommendations on which decisions can be made as to the nature, magnitude and timing of all government programs relating to the national security.²⁶

Mr. Lovett asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reappraise the assumptions and objectives described in NSC 68 and 68/4 and to prepare tentative recommenda-
tions regarding any alterations of target dates. Replying on 27 July, they told the Secretary of Defense that all policies and tasks remained valid. But, because "the general world situation has unquestionably worsened" since December 1950, some further force increases were necessary. Admittedly, many production targets would not be met by mid-1952. It remained "vital," nonetheless, that "maximum effort" be exerted to achieve the objectives of NSC 68/4 at "the earliest practicable date." 27

On 27 July, the Senior Staff circulated NSC 114, a status report on NSC 68/4 programs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Marshall that they agreed "fully" with its findings that the Western Powers "are already in a period of acute danger" and that NSC 68/4 programs ought to be "achieved at the earliest practicable date." After emendation, the National Security Council adopted this report ( redesignated NSC 114/1) on 8 August; Mr. Truman immediately approved its conclusions and directed their implementation by appropriate agencies.

NSC 114/1 claimed that NSC 68 actually had underestimated the seriousness of the world situation. Certainly, the Kremlin's willingness to risk global war had proven greater than foreseen. Since April 1950, also, the military strength of the Soviet bloc had probably undergone a greater absolute increase than that of the Western Powers. Even more ominously, the USSR probably would accumulate by mid-1953 the stockpile of 200 atomic bombs that, in NSC 68, had been forecast for mid-1954; the earliest date for a devastating attack upon the United States was correspondingly advanced. Should the Communists fail to disrupt Western rearmament by political and psychological means, "the danger of Soviet preventive action will become acute."

Despite this prospective danger, US military production was lagging. Difficulties derived chiefly from shortages of machine tools, design delays and engineering difficulties, and maldistribution of critical materials. Although regular Army units would be substantially modernized by mid-1952, the Service could not attain global combat-readiness until late 1953. Similarly, the Navy would not finish modernization and accumulation of war reserves until 1953–1954. Finally, the Air Force would achieve its 95-wing goal by mid-1952 but would not receive late-model aircraft until a good many months thereafter (fighter interceptors—December 1952; fighter bombers—March 1953; heavy bombers—June 1953; light and medium bombers—September 1953).

The conclusions of NSC 114/1 warrant extensive quotation:

54. ... It now appears that the United States and its allies are already in a period of acute danger which will continue until they achieve a position of strength adequate to support the objectives defined in NSC 68.

55. Review... indicates that, while there is variation among the several programs, the target date for the NSC 68/4 programs generally will not be met at the present pace and scale of effort... Moreover, without a great increase of pace and scale of political, economic and military effort on the part of all North Atlantic Treaty members, including the United States, the July 1954
goals of the NATO Medium Term Defense Plan will not be met. Finally, the information program and preparations for civil defense are not advancing as rapidly as necessary.

56. It is vital to our national security that the objectives of the NSC 68/4 programs be achieved at the earliest practicable date.... Substantial advancement of currently projected completion dates can and must be accomplished....

58. Pending further recommendations in the report to the President by the NSC on 1 October 1951, responsible departments and agencies should be directed to increase their efforts... in order to advance currently projected completion dates as far as feasible toward the target date of June 30, 1952....

Psychologically, NSC 114/1 marked the apex of the rearmament effort. Subsequently, the administration no less than the public began to exhibit "an attitude of relaxation."

Air Power Wins Primacy

While the administration was discussing NSC 114/1, the Joint Chiefs of Staff became embroiled in a controversy over force requirements. Responding to the JCS request of 9 May, mentioned earlier, the JSFC on 28 May presented its proposals for FYs 1952–1954. These are set forth below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>End FY 1952</th>
<th>End FY 1953</th>
<th>End FY 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>2½</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Wings</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>140²⁰</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the Services had lifted their goals, but the new Air Force requirements—raising tactical wings from 26 to 39, air defense wings from 20 to 31, and strategic wings from 34 to a formidable 70—were most startling. General Vandenberg initiated an intensive effort to persuade Congress and convince his JCS colleagues that this increase was necessary. When the Chief of Staff testified before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees on 28 May, as a witness in the MacArthur hearings, he used the opportunity to deliver a powerful plea for massive expansion:

The fact is that the United States is operating a shoestring air force in view of its global responsibilities....
In my opinion, the United States Air Force is the single potential that has kept the balance of power in our favor. It is the only thing that has, up to date, kept the Russians from deciding to go to war.

At present, he argued, the Air Force had only the mission of destroying the USSR's industrial plant. Soon, when the Soviets developed a long-range bomber force and a sizeable atomic stockpile, it would have the task of neutralizing enemy air power as well. All in all, he contended, "we are trying to operate a $20 million business with about $20 thousand."\(^{31}\)

Privately, General Vandenberg pressed his JCS colleagues for immediate authorization to build toward "an interim strength of 140 combat wings as a matter of priority." As further justification, he averred that the Air Force had been most affected by technological change. The Army possessed reserve divisions and the Navy maintained mothballed ships, but the advent of jet aircraft had rendered obsolete the Air Force inventory inherited from World War II. Advances were so rapid that even the F-80, the first operational jet produced during 1946–1948, was already obsolescent. And, because of the long lead-times involved in aircraft production (21–24 months for fighters, 30–36 months for heavy bombers), General Vandenberg insisted the requirements for FYs 1952–1954 must be determined concurrently. Air Force plans soon became public knowledge and attracted considerable Congressional sympathy.

Very quickly, these demands created a deep cleavage between General Vandenberg and his JCS colleagues. General Bradley was inclined to oppose expansion until reasons for further augmentation became unchallengeable. General Collins and Admiral Sherman did agree that some growth was necessary but felt that Air Force objectives were exorbitant. They believed the issue to be "of such nationwide importance, particularly in its impingement upon our national resources, that it will involve serious consideration by many agencies of the government." Pending such scrutiny, they advocated agreement upon the following requirements for 30 June 1952:

- **Army**—21 divisions; 18 regiments; 117 AAA battalions; 1,596,000 personnel
- **Navy**—408 major combatant vessels; 2½ Marine divisions; 1,113,031 personnel
- **Air Force**—102 wings; 1,193,000 personnel

These forces, they thought, represented "an approximate basis for a level-off for 1953 and 1954. . . ."\(^{32}\)

By July, General Vandenberg began phrasing his claims in more forceful terms:

If, in the event of war, we adequately blunt the Soviet air attack upon the United States, and, concurrently, we destroy the enemy's war sustaining resources, our ultimate military victory is assured. If, on the other hand, our production base is destroyed and that of the enemy is only partially crippled, our ultimate military defeat is most probable.

These, then, were the essential military missions—and only the Air Force could accomplish them. General Vandenberg even challenged the fundamental "bal-
ance force” concept, fearing that diversion of scarce resources to other Services could hinder the attainment of Air Force objectives (now cut to 138 combat wings). Confronted by this intransigence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found it impossible to achieve agreement on any point except that increases ought to be funded through supplemental requests rather than by inclusion in the regular FY 1952 budget. On 16 July, they so advised Secretary Marshall.

Six days later, personal tragedy intervened; in Naples, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman suffered a fatal heart attack. During his twenty-month tenure, the Chief of Naval Operations had healed the bitterness born of the B-36 controversy and earned the admiration of his peers. Tributes were many and moving; President Truman characterized him as a “great” man. As Admiral Sherman’s successor, the President nominated Admiral William M. Fechteler (Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic), who took office on 16 August 1951.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued striving after an agreement but, by mid-August, they had become entrapped in a circular argument. General Bradley, General Collins and Admiral D. B. Duncan (Acting CNO) pressed General Vandenberg to state only requirements which could be subsumed within the FY 1952 supplemental request. General Vandenberg demurred, saying that first he must learn whether the Secretary of Defense accepted an objective of 138 combat wings by FY 1954. His colleagues, in turn, would not endorse this final goal without knowing its yearly costs. On 9 August, General Bradley asked Mr. Lovett to join JCS discussions. The Deputy Secretary assured General Vandenberg that manpower and materiel resources were quite sufficient to support FY 1952 increases, and that Army and Navy augmentations would not impair Air Force plans. He estimated that expansion to 138 combat wings would require an additional $4.3 billion in FY 1952 and expenditure of $53 billion during FYs 1953–1954.

At last, General Vandenberg agreed to separate the FY 1952 supplemental from the FY 1953–1954 requests. General Collins and Admiral Duncan tentatively approved the Air Force goal of 138 combat wings; Admiral Duncan and General Vandenberg agreed to support General Collins’ request for the three additional divisions he had been seeking since April; General Collins and General Vandenberg endorsed modest increases for the Navy and Marine Corps. On 15 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Secretary of Defense to approve the following adjusted force levels for 30 June 1952:

**Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,552,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental</td>
<td>$85.9 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Navy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51
**JCS and National Policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>1,093,516</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental</td>
<td>$557.4 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Air Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Wings</th>
<th>&quot;possible expansion... to 138... by end FY 1954&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental</td>
<td>$4.3 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secretary Marshall proceeded cautiously. He allowed the Army three more divisions but no additional personnel. Likewise, he endorsed the Navy’s greater force goal while postponing a decision on personnel ceilings. As for the Air Force, he accepted the “principle” of increased combat strength but approved neither specific objectives nor exact costs. Moreover, he ruled that the existing Air Force ceiling of 1,061,000 personnel was sufficient, since it would allow a 250,000-man increase during the balance of FY 1952. President Truman approved these actions on 29 August.⁵⁷

Meanwhile, preparation of the FY 1953 budget was proceeding. On 9 August, Mr. Lovett ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit an estimate of forces needed during FY 1953 and an indication of requirements for FYs 1954–1957—in other words, “forces that could be maintained both manpower-wise and materiel-wise for so long as a period of tension may exist.”⁵⁸

The inter-Service battles were briefly refought. Ultimately, on 26 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested FY 1953 force levels which (if the world situation remained stable) also would suffice for FYs 1954–1957:

**Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>21 (5 at reduced strength)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>18 (2 at reduced strength)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>117 (44 at reduced strength)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,596,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Navy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Major Combatant Vessels</th>
<th>408 (13 at reduced strength)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large Carriers</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Carriers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Carriers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>4 (3 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>110 (10 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,098,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52
Rearmament Sustained (1951)

Air Force

Total Wings 143
Strategic 57
Air Defense 29
Tactical 40
Troop Carrier 17
Personnel 1,220,000
Total Manpower 3,914,400

On 8 October, Mr. Truman accepted these JCS figures for budgetary planning. Three days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the Secretary of Defense a supporting rationale. They repeated their requirements of 26 September and estimated attendant costs at $64 billion for FY 1953 and $52 billion in FY 1954. These forces, they calculated, could accomplish "on an austere basis" the five military tasks described in NSC 68. The strength thus described was too small for waging general war but, within the boundaries set by manpower and economic limitations, would provide "a basis for rapid expansion if war is forced on us."39

These debates and decisions may justly be termed momentous. Plainly, the Air Force had been granted priority; it was allowed to swell greatly while the other Services grew only slightly. During the balance of the decade, the Army shrank and the Navy remained relatively stable while the Air Force expanded (albeit at a slackened pace) to 137 wings by 1957. The "New Look" of the Eisenhower administration, and especially its emphasis upon "massive retaliation," was foreshadowed by choices made in the autumn of 1951.

Formulating the FY 1953 Budget: NSC 114/2

The second report requested in July by President Truman, dealing with the "nature, magnitude, and timing" of national security programs, was completed on 12 October and circulated as NSC 114/2. It offered the following forecast of global developments:

14. The United States and its allies, although they are far from [possessing] an adequate position of strength, have left behind them the danger of defeat by default. It must be clear to the Kremlin that we will resist any further encroachment on the area of the free world. . . . This course of action and the Kremlin's efforts to thwart it will necessarily lead, for a time at least, to a heightening of tensions. . . . During the next two or three years, therefore, as our strength grows, spreads out further from the center, and is established close to the Soviet Union and areas under its control, and as Soviet atomic resources approach possibly critical dimensions, we must give increasing weight to the possibility of war. . . .

15. It is improbable that in the coming period we can negotiate lasting settlements of any major issues with the Soviet Union on terms satisfactory to us. On the other hand, if our strategy is successful there will come a point at which some accommodation by the Soviet Union may begin. . . . It is possible, in other words,
JCS and National Policy

that the Kremlin as well as the West might see a net balance of advantage in reversing the present trends in the world situation.

NSC 114/2 incorporated the JCS statements of 26 September and 11 October, listing FY 1953 force objectives as 21 Army and 3 Marine divisions, 408 major combatant vessels, 143 wings, and 3,914,400 personnel. Cost estimates, although cut from JCS calculations, were enormous—$108 billion during FYs 1952–1953. These funds would permit production of approximately 34,000 aircraft, 25,000 tanks, 700,000 non-combatant vehicles, and 1,050,000 tons of new and converted shipping. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were seeking $50 billion to build US reserve stocks; similar requirements for NATO nations amounted to another $20 billion.40

On 18 October, President Truman ordered appropriate agencies and departments to prepare preliminary FY 1953 budget submissions. These would be based on programs described in NSC 114/2, but subject to:

a. Limitation of the military program to $45 billion, pending further consideration of the $50 billion requirement for additional reserve stocks.

b. Revision of economic and military assistance efforts in light of the recommendations of the NATO Temporary Council Committee (See Chapter 9).

c. Revision of the Civil Defense program in order to provide, as a matter of urgency, greater protection than presently programmed.

d. Further study of the economic, social and political implications of the programs as a whole.

Additionally, the NSC Senior Staff would reappraise relative military trends once again. The Soviets recently had exploded another atomic bomb, thereby raising new apprehensions on this most sensitive subject.41

Robert Lovett Replaces General Marshall

Secretary Marshall submitted his resignation on 1 September; the President announced his acceptance "with very great reluctance" twelve days later. The General had promised to serve for one year only. Having presided over the genesis of rearmament, he felt his work was done. Privately, also, the 70-year-old soldier confided fears that his powers were failing. Upon General Marshall’s recommendation, Mr. Lovett became Secretary of Defense; he continued an excellent relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conferring daily with General Bradley. As Deputy Secretary of Defense, President Truman chose the Chief of the Economic Cooperation administration, Mr. William C. Foster. This appointment accentuated both the increasing importance of MDAP and the interest in assessing more accurately the economic impact of rearmament efforts. As will appear, these became paramount problems in 1952.42
When General Marshall retired, rearmament efforts were well advanced. The Director of Defense Mobilization, Mr. Charles E. Wilson, reported that deliveries of military items between June 1950 and September 1951 totaled $14 billion, output having risen five-fold since the summer of 1950.43 Nonetheless, Mr. Wilson also acknowledged “some exasperating slippages” and predicted that the spending peak would not occur until July 1953. Thus there was substantial achievement but certainly not full satisfaction. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sketched similar conclusions, recommending that the National Security Council “take into account the improved military posture of the United States vis-à-vis the USSR in [making its] national policy decisions, without permitting, however, any relaxation of effort in continuing to improve that military posture....”44

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JCS Memo of 10 Jan 51, NSC 68/4 14 Dec 50</th>
<th>JCS Memo of 16 Apr 51, Approved by President</th>
<th>JCS Memo of 15 Aug 51, Revised by SecDef</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,353,000</td>
<td>1,416,000</td>
<td>1,552,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>887,000</td>
<td>985,205</td>
<td>1,093,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>971,000</td>
<td>1,061,000</td>
<td>1,061,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower Total</td>
<td>3,211,000</td>
<td>3,462,205</td>
<td>3,598,205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rearmament Retarded (1952)

Reducing the FY 1953 Budget

At the close of 1951, the siren song of "economy" again became audible. For several reasons, significant reductions in the military budget seemed desirable. First and foremost, global tensions had eased and general war no longer appeared imminent. In Korea, the truce talks at Panmunjom were proceeding—albeit at a glacial pace. Second, the small budgetary surplus of FY 1951 was being replaced by a large deficit in FY 1952; more massive military spending might gravely disrupt the nation's economy. Third, $38 billion from FY 1951–1952 military appropriations still remained unobligated as 1951 ended. Fourth, shortages of basic raw materials curtailed increases in arms output. Taken together, these factors dictated the administration's fiscal decisions.

By approving NSC 114/2, President Truman had accepted the following FY 1953 force goals: 21 Army and 3 Marine divisions; 408 major combatant vessels; 143 combat and troop carrier wings; and 3,914,000 personnel. At the same time, he had tentatively imposed a limit of $45 billion upon new obligatory authority.1 The incompatibility between force goals and fiscal objectives appeared as soon as budgeting began. Initial Service programs totalled $71 billion in new obligatory authority, with expenditures running to $73 billion. A "quick and informal check" with the Office of Defense Mobilization revealed that materiel shortages would render this expansion program infeasible. With only $45 billion, however, forces could be maintained at their current levels. After intensive review, Secretary Lovett succeeded in paring estimated new obligatory authority to approximately $51.5 billion and another $3.5 billion for military public works.2

Mr. Truman was determined to effect even greater economies—and there was only one way to do it. At a White House meeting on 28 December, the President announced his intention "to stretch out the build-up...because of material and fiscal considerations." Specifically, the Chief Executive ordered that expenditures
by the Defense Department should not exceed $44 billion in FY 1952 and $60 billion during 1953. In effect, Mr. Truman was abandoning hope of attaining in FY 1953 the force goals prescribed by NSC 114/2. This meant, of course, that the FY 1952 supplemental was dead. 3

Mr. Lovett recomputed budget requests and, on 3 January 1952, sent the Chief Executive his final FY 1953 submission. He proposed that new obligational authority for the Services be fixed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Obligational Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$14,300,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13,314,155,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>20,922,338,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$48,536,493,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another $3.5 billion would be needed for public works projects. Mr. Lovett also asked that an expenditure ceiling of $86.5 billion be set for the period 1 January 1952-30 June 1953. 4

The Joint Strategic Plans Group calculated that Presidential economizing would delay until 1956 the modernization of naval aviation and the attainment of a 143-wing Air Force. As for the Army, austerity would eliminate one armored division scheduled for activation, relegate a substantial portion of the General Reserve to training status, and considerably weaken mobilization potential. Indeed,

In the light of our commitments in the Far East, in Western Europe and elsewhere, this limited expenditure rate will imperil the national safety unless every circumstance turns out favorably. If the war in Korea should continue, if the conflict in Indochina should be intensified, or if conflict should break out elsewhere in the world prior to 1 July 1954, we shall be unable to fulfill our commitments to our Allies and to support even those troops now deployed overseas. The U.S. will be in the position of urging European nations to increase their military efforts while at the same time we decrease our own.

Accordingly, on 4 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Mr. Lovett that they considered “the general period of 1954” to be “the most dangerous for the security of the United States in the foreseeable future. Adoption of the reduced program postpones until 1956 our military capability to meet this threat.” If their view was seen by the President, it did not alter his thinking. 5

On 21 January, President Truman transmitted his budget message to Capitol Hill. He remarked to reporters, “This budget has been the biggest headache I have ever had. . . . I have never had as much difficulty getting the budget in shape.” The President requested $52.4 billion in new obligational authority for the Defense Department (public works included) and estimated expenditures at $51.2 billion. The manpower levels thus funded, shown below, represented a small retreat from NSC 114/2: 6
Rearmament Retarded (1952)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>New Obligational Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy-Marine Corps</td>
<td>1,079,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,061,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,690,605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Congress, the clamor for cutbacks everywhere resounded. A large deficit (estimated at $14 billion for FY 1953) was called economically unendurable, but a tax increase was deemed politically unacceptable. Accordingly, on 9 April, the House of Representatives voted (1) to reduce new obligational authority for FY 1953 to $46.207 billion and (2) to limit expenditures to $46 billion—$5 billion less than the President had proposed. Although Mr. Truman bitingly assailed this action, Republican Senator Robert A. Taft answered that fuller reliance on air power might make even a $20 billion subtraction possible.7

Testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee, administration leaders pleaded for revocation of the $46 billion spending ceiling. Secretary Lovett said that the House’s limitation would sacrifice 3,000 aircraft and 3,100 medium tanks. The active Army could not become fully equipped before 1954; the Air Force probably would not reach 143 wings until even later; and the production base, so painfully constructed, would disintegrate through reconversion and disuse. “We would . . .,” he declared, “be cutting off our right arm to save the cost of one sleeve of our coat.”

General Bradley likewise testified that House reductions might be “militarily disastrous”:

In the realm of national security, there is one precious commodity on sale today . . . “time.” Next year, and in succeeding years, the price will be higher and there will be less “time” we can purchase. If we are allowed any time for preparedness after the next 2 or 3 years, I think we will be lucky.

He revealed several reasons why the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered “the general period of 1954” to be “the most dangerous within the foreseeable future.” The Soviets had not only rebuilt and relocated their war industries but also acquired a stockpile of strategic materials. Indeed, their advantage in military strength (relative to that of the West) actually would continue to increase until 1954–1955. Moreover, much of the Soviet Union’s military equipment soon would fall prey to deterioration and obsolescence. Therefore, knowing that NATO planned to achieve “minimum needed readiness” by 1954, the Soviets might be tempted to launch a pre-emptive attack.8

Congress paid some heed to these pleas, deleting the spending ceiling and slightly increasing the amount of new obligational authority. On 10 July, President Truman signed an appropriations bill totaling $46,610,938,912. Comparison
of the original request with the final apportionment shows that (as in 1951) the Army suffered at the hands of Congress while the Air Force prospered:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration Request</th>
<th>Congressional Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$14,210,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$12,239,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13,204,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,815,059,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>20,705,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21,118,361,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$48,119,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$46,172,921,412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program endured an even harder passage. Throughout 1951, MDAP had suffered from low priorities and (in the JCS view) meager funding. On 16 January 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Lovett a somber forecast. In their judgment, FY 1952 MDAP achievements would fall short of objectives by "a significant amount"; Western European forces would be most affected. They ascribed this failure to the disparity between JCS recommendations ($8.2 billion) and Congressional dispositions ($5.4 billion). Therefore, if current estimates that the Fiscal Year 1953 Military Assistance Program will be of the same order as the Fiscal Year 1952 program [are correct], requirements of the NATO Medium Term Defense Plan will not be achieved by 1 July 1954, because the remaining materiel deficiency of approximately $20 billion will be infeasible of accomplishment in Fiscal Year 1954.  

President Truman already had awarded NATO units and US forces in Europe a supply priority subordinate only to the needs of Korea and Indochina. He refused, however, to increase MDAP funding above $5.4 billion. At Deputy Secretary Foster’s request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended allocations of this amount by title, country, and Service. They agreed upon everything save the allotment of NATO funds. General Bradley, General Collins, and Admiral Fechteler advocated a balanced expansion of all arms. General Vandenberg insisted that Air Force requirements should receive priority. The administration adopted the majority's viewpoint. For other areas, it accepted most JCS recommendations (the exceptions being Formosa and Indochina, which were awarded more). Thus there would be no famine for MDAP, but neither was a feast table being set.  

On 6 March, President Truman asked Congress for the following amounts of new obligatory authority:  

| Title I (Western Europe) | $4,070,000,000 |
| Title II (Near and Middle East) | 606,000,000 |
| Title III (Far East) | 611,000,000 |
| Title IV (Latin America) | 62,000,000 |
| Total | $5,349,000,000 |
Additionally, the administration wanted $1.819 billion in "defense support," for Western Europe (i.e., shipments of those raw materials and machinery that would facilitate the manufacture of military end-items). 12

Despite the administration's concessions to "economy," Congressional leaders freely predicted drastic reductions. They especially assailed the request for "defense support, calling it merely a cloak for continuing economic aid. A colloquy between Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Ambassador Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security, testifies to their displeasure:

Senator Connally: "Throwing our money away in a lot of these countries is weakening us and making Russia all the stronger, is that not true?"
Ambassador Harriman: ... I think it is adding to our strength."
Senator Connally: "The more money we give away, the stronger we get...?"

When Ambassador Harriman described the amount involved as "a small sum," Senator Connally exploded: "Do you call $7 billion a small sum?"

In both House and Senate, MDAP was heavily assailed. Finally, on 15 July, the President signed a truncated appropriations bill:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title I</td>
<td>$3,128,224,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title II</td>
<td>499,116,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title III</td>
<td>540,807,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title IV</td>
<td>51,685,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$4,219,834,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defense support for Western Europe was whittled to $1,282 433,000.13

Dissonance: NSC 135/3 and the FY 1954 Budget

Well before completion of the FY 1953 budget, Secretary Lovett had stressed the importance of rigid economy. On 9 November 1951, for example, he drew attention to necessity for continually reviewing our military expenditures with a view to obtaining the greatest return." He vested review powers in a Defense Management Committee (DMC), chaired by General Joseph T. McNarney. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, for their part, told Mr. Lovett that present budgeting practices contained "a great potential for management improvement." This studied phraseology scarcely conveyed the full degree of JCS discontent. During the past 15 months, they related, the Services had been compelled to calculate five different sets of Program Objectives and Budget Estimates. Since military personnel ceilings in the Washington area had been cut by five percent, the current workload was "approaching the breakdown point." Therefore, they asked that any proposals drafted by the DMC "be developed... with the minimum addi-
tional drain on personnel and be designed to streamline current procedures and allow sufficient time for their realistic evaluation."\textsuperscript{14}

Secretary Lovett issued his initial FY 1954 budget directive on 27 February 1952. He promised to provide guidelines by 15 March, so that the Military Departments could submit completed estimates on 2 September.\textsuperscript{15} (Actually, issuance of the guidelines was delayed until 7 April.) Meanwhile, on 11 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Mr. Lovett their recommendations for personnel ceilings and major combatant forces. What they described was a virtual plateau. The objectives of NSC 114/2, originally intended for fulfillment in FY 1953, would not be achieved until June 1954:

\begin{tabular}{lcc}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>\textit{Start FY 1954}</th>
<th>\textit{End FY 1954}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Army}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>20 (5 reduced)</td>
<td>21 (5 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>18 (5 reduced)</td>
<td>18 (5 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>112 (59 reduced)</td>
<td>117 (44 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,644,000</td>
<td>1,596,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Navy-Marine Corps}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>408 (13 reduced)</td>
<td>408 (13 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Carriers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Carriers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Carriers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>4 (3 reduced)</td>
<td>4 (3 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>110 (10 reduced)</td>
<td>110 (10 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,079,605</td>
<td>1,098,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Air Force}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Carrier</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,126,000</td>
<td>1,220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Total Manpower}</td>
<td>3,849,605</td>
<td>3,914,707</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again they remarked that economic constraints precluded the development of what they considered an adequate wartime force. If the world situation underwent any marked change, force levels and personnel ceilings must undergo reassessment.

Secretary Lovett approved the JCS recommendations for major combatant forces but insisted that they be achieved within the currently approved ceiling of 3,690,605 personnel. His budgetary philosophy, embodied in the guidelines that he circulated on 7 April, is stated below:
Rearmament Retarded (1952)

In the formulation of FY 1954 Department of Defense program plans and budget estimates, the primary objective shall be to maintain approved peacetime military forces in a high state of readiness and to continue to improve the mobilization potential of the armed forces. The severe strains which may be imposed upon [the national economy] must be fully recognized and more than ever before there must be a full awareness of the necessity for elimination of non-essential activities and a complete application of the basic principles of cost consciousness.16

President Truman intended to render his final FY 1954 program and budgetary determinations by 1 December. In order to allow time for a proper analysis, he instructed the Secretary of Defense to submit estimates to the Budget Bureau by 1 November. Also, to aid his decisions, the President asked the NSC to complete by 1 October (1) a review of presently approved national security programs, based upon a status report already in preparation, and (2) an assessment of the desirability of projecting these programs through FY 1954.17

In mid-August, Mr. Lovett sent the NSC a status report on military programs as of 30 June 1952. For perspective, these are contrasted with the strength available on 30 June 1950:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Forces in Being 30 June 1950</th>
<th>Forces in Being 30 June 1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>10 (9 reduced)</td>
<td>20 (5 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>12 (11 reduced)</td>
<td>18 (13 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>48 (38 reduced)</td>
<td>113 (68 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>591,487</td>
<td>1,594,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>400 (13 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Carriers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Carriers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Carriers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 (3 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>105 (10 reduced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>2 (2 reduced)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>450,780</td>
<td>1,053,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Carrier</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>411,277</td>
<td>973,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Manpower</td>
<td>1,453,544</td>
<td>3,621,487</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

63
JCS and National Policy

As a result of the Korean War, force levels and materiel procurement had increased dramatically. Since June 1950, a net inventory increase of about 3,000 jet aircraft had been recorded; tank production had risen to approximately 500 per month. Training, doctrine, and techniques all were greatly improved. In some ways, however, the war was impairing military readiness. Combat in Korea had been supported primarily by World War II stocks, which now were either exhausted or dangerously depleted. Continued hostilities also compelled strategic redeployment, impeded MDAP deliveries, and retarded development of the General Reserve. In sum, then, the width of rearmament was impressive but its depth was disappointing. If World War III began, the Services could execute most essential missions. But they could not sustain and expand these initial efforts, because necessary reserves were lacking.18

Pursuant to President Truman's order, the NSC Senior Staff reappraised the adequacy of national security programs.19 This task merged with their reassessment of relative US-USSR military trends which the President had requested in October 1951.20 On 15 August 1952, the Staff submitted NSC 135/1. In this paper, they concluded that the "basic purposes and policies" set forth in NSC 68 and related papers remained valid. The danger of direct attack upon the United States was growing, however, and probably would rise to "critical proportions" within a few years. The Staff members thought, therefore, that the United States ought to accelerate critical military production, re-examine allocations of resources to national security programs, show great willingness to commit either men or materiel when needed to support foreign policy goals, and increase efforts to promote internal stability in areas threatened by Communist subversion.21

Secretary Lovett requested JCS review and recommendations. Replying on 29 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed him of their general agreement but advised two alterations. First, in view of present and prospective Soviet threats, "the timing of the military buildup is of the greatest importance. Consequently, this "should be expedited to the extent feasible in the light of other compelling considerations [i.e., economic and fiscal]." Second, any decision encompassing employment of military forces should be rendered "only after careful consideration of circumstances existing at the time." Probably, they were pondering the perilous situations in Iran and Indochina; the danger of further dissipating strength in peripheral areas was obvious. Secretary Lovett passed these opinions to NSC members.22

The National Security Council convened on 3 September and remanded NSC 135/1 to its Senior Staff for further revision. One of its recommendations, however, was implemented immediately. The President ordered Secretary Acheson, Secretary Lovett, and Ambassador Harriman (the Director for Mutual Security) to prepare "materials necessary for a reexamination of the amounts and allocations of resources to various areas." Mr. Truman wanted them to determine:

(1) Whether a general increase in the level of free world forces and military programs is required to deal with the several threats;
(2) Whether the present allocation of resources as between US military forces and other free world forces is appropriate;
Rearmament Retarded (1952)

(3) Whether the present balance between military assistance and the various
types of economic assistance is appropriate; and
(4) Whether these allocations are in proper relationship (a) to the threats facing
the United States in Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East, (b) to the importance of these areas for US security, and (c) to United States commitments.

Their response, NSC 141, is described in the following section.23

The Staff submitted a revision of NSC 135/1 on 16 September. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff endorsed this version, which fully incorporated earlier JCS sug-
gestions. After slight amendment by the National Security Council, a final ver-
sion, NSC 135/3, was approved by President Truman on 25 September. This doc-
ument defined the “most immediate” danger as one that flowed from “a
progressive and cumulative loss of positions of importance,” which eventually
could reduce the United States to an “isolated and critically vulnerable” position.
Several “major causes of concern” required restudy and possible redirection of
efforts. Western European nations might prove unable to fulfill their NATO con-
tributions and honor their overseas commitments as well. Also, the indigenous
political and military strength of many countries along the Soviet periphery was
plainly inadequate.

Therefore,

over the next several years, with the accumulation of atomic and other mass de-
struction weapons, the developing situation may present a continuing and possibly improved opportunity for Soviet expansion by the techniques of political warfare and local aggression if the free world permits the fear and threat of general war to paralyze its reaction to such threats.

In these circumstances, the United States should (1) reexamine its allocation of
military and economic aid, (2) encourage and assist in the development of re-
gional and collective defense arrangements, (3) augment efforts to promote internal stability in critical areas, and (4) “be increasingly willing . . . to use its re-
sources as appropriate in cooperation with its allies, and to take collective military action against aggression.” (The possibility of unilateral US action, how-
ever, was not to be precluded.) In brief, then, the United States must focus more
attention upon the “Cold War” actually being waged by the Soviets and less
upon a general war that might never begin. Accepting these objectives and recog-
nizing the attendant risks, NSC 135/3 counselled the following courses of action:

a. Assure the acceleration of the production of selected military end-items
under present programs.
b. Place continued high emphasis upon selected scientific and technical pro-
grams in fields of military application.
c. Make such adjustments in our national security programs as may be found
necessary and feasible in the light of the reexamination called for . . . above.24

Thus, while the Chief Executive was striving to reduce spending, NSC 135/3 im-
plied that even greater efforts might prove necessary.
JCS and National Policy

In his final FY 1954 budget decision, President Truman chose "economy" over expansion. He promulgated FY 1954 objectives that postponed for another fiscal year the attainment of a 143-wing Air Force. The force structure projected for 30 June 1954 is shown below:

**Army**
- Divisions: 21 (5 reduced)
- Regiment: 18 (2 reduced)
- AAA Battalions: 117 (44 reduced)
- Personnel: 1,538,000

**Navy**
- Major Combatant Vessels: 408 (13 reduced)
- Marine Divisions: 3
- Personnel: 1,048,612

**Air Force**
- Wings: 133
- Strategic: 52
- Air Defense: 29
- Tactical: 35
- Troop Carrier: 17
- Personnel: 1,061,000

Total Manpower: 3,647,612

On 9 January 1953, in his last budget message, Mr. Truman requested the following amounts of new obligational authority:

- Army: $12,119,591,000
- Navy: 11,380,882,000
- Air Force: 16,788,011,000
- Total: $40,288,484,000

He estimated FY 1954 expenditures at $45.5 billion but predicted that spending would sink thereafter to an annual level of $35–40 billion.  

Reprise: NSC 141

Meanwhile, the "materials necessary for reexamination of the amounts and allocations of resources to various areas" were being prepared. A Steering Group under Messrs. Frank Nash (Defense), Paul Nitze (State), and Richard Bissell (Mutual Security administration) directed the drafting. On 14 October, Mr. Foster asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to analyze the apportionment of military re-
sources "with respect to our offensive striking power and general military reserve." Specifically, he solicited JCS judgments concerning:

b. Changes in emphasis of programs or allocations of resources needed to rectify any inadequacies noted.
c. Effect of prospective developments in new weapons and techniques toward enhancing our capabilities.26

The JSPC’s response, completed on 25 October, reopened an old argument. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps members thought no significant reallocations were necessary. The Air Force representative, however, sought a greater share of resources in order to ensure his Service’s effectiveness during the “critical initial period” of a general war. After reading this document, Admiral Fechteler and General Vandenberg agreed that Secretary Lovett was looking for a more comprehensive evaluation. The Operations Deputies then prepared a new paper that avoided specifics, abounded in generalities, and thus finessed inter-Service disputes to some extent. They assigned “greater emphasis” to those forces “which will be the first engaged with the enemy,” but tempered this statement with a recognition of the requirement for flexibility. Even so, the Air Force spokesman was not entirely satisfied. The Joint Chiefs of Staff finally settled matters by placing still higher (although not exclusive) emphasis upon forces in being.

The JCS memorandum, sent to Secretary Lovett on 10 November, claimed that the current allocation of resources for military purposes was “characterized by a calculated risk of considerable magnitude and by development of forces on an austerity basis.” Indeed, they forecast that strength would be “generally inadequate” to meet dangers forecast for the “very dangerous” period of 1954–1955. The Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that it was economically impossible to create and support two full forces—one wholly offensive and the other strictly defensive. Consequently, a “flexible, efficient and ready military force of all arms” must be maintained, endowing both offensive and defensive forces (insofar as possible) with a dual capability and thereby rendering “maximum service for minimum investment.”

After this introduction, they answered the Secretary’s three questions as follows:

a. Adequacy of programs to meet 1954–55 requirements—Due to deficiencies in the General Reserve and in offensive striking power, the degree of risk would be “acute” during the early stages of general war.
b. Changes in emphasis—Increased effort should center upon insuring the adequacy of forces in being, including an improved capability to counter local aggression. Specifically, the United States should:
   1. Accelerate current programs so as to achieve as soon as possible the force goals originally established for 1954.
   2. Reduce materiel shortages by increasing offshore procurement and by maintaining through FY 1955 the production base now planned for development during FY 1953.
3. Expand the Selective Service manpower pool.

4. Increase personnel levels for all the Services, thereby meeting the pipeline and rotation requirements for the Korean War and permitting timely deployment of ready forces in the event of global war.

c. Effect of prospective weapons developments—These were unlikely to allow any reduction in commitment of resources, since the Soviets would be matching US advances.27

On 7 January 1953, the Steering Group submitted its draft “Reexamination of US Programs for National Security.” Essentially, the Group’s report recommended larger continental and civil defense programs and greater military and economic aid for Middle and Far Eastern nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted several criticisms. First, they thought the Soviet atomic threat was exaggerated. If greater efforts in continental and civil defense did become necessary, these should not be financed at other programs’ expense. Second, they agreed that increased assistance to the Middle and Far East might diminish the danger of aggression but warned that such results would not justify reductions in US forces. Third, they stressed that MDAP allocations must be based upon recipients’ ability to use such materiel effectively. If the final report failed to reflect these opinions, they asked that their views be dispatched directly to the President.28

The Steering Group’s draft was sent to Secretaries Acheson and Lovett and Ambassador Harriman. After making changes to suit most JCS specifications, they presented NSC 141 to President Truman on 19 January—his last full day in office. In this report, they reasoned that reliance upon the threat of nuclear retaliation as a deterrent to local aggression must grow increasingly ineffective as the Soviet atomic stockpile increased. Therefore, mere continuation of present programs could not produce the necessary situations of strength. A “selective increase” in certain areas was necessary. First, “large additional resources” should be committed to continental and civil defense. At present, the Soviets probably could deliver as many as 65–85 percent of their atomic bombs on target; civil defense programs were no more than 10–15 percent effective. Second, “moderate” additional aid should be sent to the Middle East and “substantially larger” assistance to the Far East. These added efforts, however, should not impair progress in improving US forces. Existing programs for that purpose were deemed adequate, provided they suffered “no repeated downward adjustment or delay.”29

On 20 January, Dwight D. Eisenhower entered the White House. The new President had chided the Democrats for their past profligacy and promised to reexamine the balance between “security” and “solvency.” If the recommendations of NSC 141 were adopted, however, expansion rather than economy lay ahead.30
Coda: NSC 142

NSC 142, begun in December 1952 and completed on 10 February 1953, described in more detail the deficiencies of US defenses. As of 30 December 1952, the Services possessed the strengths shown below:

**Army**
- Divisions: 20 (6 reduced)
- Regiments: 18 (13 reduced)
- AAA Battalions: 113 (83 reduced)
- Personnel: 1,523,152

**Navy-Marine Corps**
- Total Major Combatant Vessels: 401 (13 reduced)
  - Large Carriers: 14
  - Light Carriers: 5
  - Escort Carriers: 10
  - Battleships: 4 (3 reduced)
  - Cruisers: 19
  - Destroyers: 246
  - Submarines: 103 (10 reduced)
  - Marine Divisions: 3
- Personnel: 1,031,698

**Air Force**
- Wings: 98
  - Strategic: 39
  - Air Defense: 21
  - Tactical: 23
  - Troop Carrier: 15
- Personnel: 957,603
- Total Manpower: 3,512,453

Between June 1950 and December 1952, arms output had risen from $400 million to $2.7 billion monthly. The surge in tank and aircraft deliveries is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-41 Light Tank</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-47, M-48 Medium Tanks</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>1,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-84 Fighter Bomber</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-86 Fighter Interceptor</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JCS and National Policy

The Office of Defense Mobilization believed that a further expansion (beginning in mid-1953) was entirely feasible, because materiel shortages had been largely overcome.

Even so, the Services still lacked ready reserves to counter further crises. Only one Army Division was immediately available for overseas deployment; in the event of general war, no more than 15 divisions could be supported in combat by D+180 and 19 divisions by D+360. Navy forces could execute D-Day tasks but lacked the strength to continue accomplishing all wartime missions. As for the Air Force, continental defense capability was “extremely limited” and tactical air power was inadequate. Also, strategic air strength was only a “fraction” of the figure thought necessary to ensure decisive results. The Strategic Air Command could deal the USSR a “severely damaging” blow and “probably” create the conditions leading to ultimate victory, but it could not degrade Soviet industry to the desired level.31

Nonetheless, despite growing dangers and gnawing deficiencies, the years 1950–1952 were marked by major achievements. South Korea had been successfully protected, the defenses of Western Europe were substantially strengthened, and the mobilization base was immensely broadened. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the principal aim of forestalling further military aggression had been achieved. Consider, in conclusion, an appraisal which they sent to Secretary Lovett on 22 October 1952:

[A review of the current world situation] suggests that the Western Powers have made considerable progress toward wresting the initiative from the USSR . . . in all areas around the Soviet periphery except the Middle East and Southeast Asia; that the area in which the Soviet Union can move ahead very much farther without risking an all-out war has grown relatively small; and that it is likely the “cold war” will continue on a reinforced scale.32
Table 4
Forces in Being, 1950–1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 50</th>
<th>30 Jun 51</th>
<th>30 Jun 52</th>
<th>31 Dec 52</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>10 (9R)</td>
<td>18 (3R)</td>
<td>20 (5R)</td>
<td>20 (6R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>7 (6R)</td>
<td>14 (2R)</td>
<td>16 (4R)</td>
<td>16 (4R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored</td>
<td>1 (1R)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (1R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne</td>
<td>2 (2R)</td>
<td>2 (1R)</td>
<td>2 (1R)</td>
<td>2 (1R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiments</td>
<td>12 (11R)</td>
<td>18 (10R)</td>
<td>18 (13R)</td>
<td>18 (13R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA Battalions</td>
<td>48 (38R)</td>
<td>100 (60R)</td>
<td>113 (68R)</td>
<td>113 (83R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>591,487</td>
<td>1,529,902</td>
<td>1,594,693</td>
<td>1,523,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Major Combatant Vessels</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>342 (2R)</td>
<td>400 (13R)</td>
<td>401 (13R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Carriers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Carriers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Carriers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (2R)</td>
<td>4 (3R)</td>
<td>4 (3R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>105 (10R)</td>
<td>1,523,103 (10R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>2 (2R)</td>
<td>2½</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>450,780</td>
<td>942,770</td>
<td>1,049,967</td>
<td>1,033,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Carriers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>411,277</td>
<td>788,381</td>
<td>983,261</td>
<td>957,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Manpower</td>
<td>1,453,544</td>
<td>3,261,053</td>
<td>3,627,921</td>
<td>3,514,453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: NSC 142
**Table 5**

Deployment of Major Forces on 31 December 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Force Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continental United States</td>
<td>7 Army divisions, 64 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska and Canada</td>
<td>2 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Fleet</td>
<td>5 carrier air groups, 1 Marine division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>5 Army division, 7 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Fleet</td>
<td>2 carrier air groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>5 carrier air groups, 1 Marine division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>8 Army divisions, 21 wings, 4 carrier air groups, and 1 Marine division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: NSC 142

**Table 6**

Category Distribution of US Armed Forces and MDAP Program Costs

(Millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Cost Category</th>
<th>FY 1950</th>
<th>FY 1951</th>
<th>FY 1952</th>
<th>FY 1953</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel Costs</td>
<td>4,558</td>
<td>8,352</td>
<td>10,834</td>
<td>10,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation &amp; Maintenance</td>
<td>3,749</td>
<td>11,103</td>
<td>12,958</td>
<td>10,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Procurement &amp; Production Costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Aircraft</td>
<td>2,568</td>
<td>22,843</td>
<td>29,194</td>
<td>19,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Ships &amp; Harbor Craft</td>
<td>(1,894)</td>
<td>(10,075)</td>
<td>(14,948)</td>
<td>(13,997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Other</td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(784)</td>
<td>(1,923)</td>
<td>(674)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Public Works</td>
<td>(629)</td>
<td>(11,984)</td>
<td>(12,323)</td>
<td>(5,277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Components</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>3,994</td>
<td>2,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; Development</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Mobilization</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>1,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment-Wide Activities</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total US Armed Forces</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>1,456</td>
<td>826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDAP Allocations to Defense</td>
<td>13,048</td>
<td>48,182</td>
<td>60,804</td>
<td>46,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total US Armed Forces &amp; MDAP Allocations</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>5,026</td>
<td>5,188</td>
<td>4,320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


72
Rearmament Retarded (1952)

Table 7
MDAP Status on 31 January 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Billions)</th>
<th>Funds Allocated</th>
<th>Funds Obligated</th>
<th>Funds Expended</th>
<th>Value Programmed</th>
<th>Value Shipped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title II</td>
<td>1.294</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>1.276</td>
<td>.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title III</td>
<td>1.651</td>
<td>1.366</td>
<td>.586</td>
<td>1.555</td>
<td>.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title IV</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$14.291</strong></td>
<td><strong>$11.910</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5.043</strong></td>
<td><strong>$13.963</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4.368</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major Items Shipped

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tonnage Shipped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks and Combat Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Approach of Armageddon: Atomic Arsenal

Advent of the Nuclear Age

In 1950, the US stockpile of nuclear weapons was relatively small and that of the USSR was certainly minute. No “balance of terror” dominated great-power relations; atomic apocalypse was a future peril rather than a present danger. As Dr. Vannevar Bush, wartime Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, wrote in 1949:

If all-out war came... at any time before our enemy had a considerable stock of atomic bombs, would it destroy civilization? It certainly would not...

Such a war would be a tough slugging match. Intricate techniques would enter, and some of them would be new, following from the trends of the last war. But it would be no affair of push-buttons....

Great fleets of bombers... could undoubtedly devastate the cities and the war potential of the enemy and its satellites, but it is highly doubtful if they could at once stop the march of great land armies.... Such a war would be a contest of the old form, with variations and new techniques of one sort or another. But, except for greater use of the atomic bomb, it would not differ much from the last struggle.

Nonetheless, great advances were in the offing. In the United States, the manufacture of nuclear components had progressed from a laboratory operation to a production line process; devastation by atomic weapons thereby became far less expensive than equivalent destruction with conventional explosives. Moreover, “fission” bombs might be supplanted by awesome “fusion” weapons and guided missiles soon would supplement artillery and aircraft. These developments deeply affected the whole spectrum of national security policy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff bore the responsibility of defining military needs for nuclear weapons. The channel of communication between them and the all-civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was the Military Liaison Committee
JCS and National Policy

(MLC) to the AEC, a body created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The MLC transmitted JCS requirements to the AEC and kept the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised of the Commission’s atomic weapons program.3

Expansion of the Arsenal

The USSR exploded its first atomic device in August 1949, four years earlier than US intelligence had thought probable. How could the United States keep a decisive lead in nuclear weaponry? Development of a thermonuclear or “super” bomb presented the most dramatic possibility. On 31 January 1950, President Truman directed the AEC to determine the technical feasibility of such a weapon. At the same time, he ordered a sweeping policy reappraisal that culminated in NSC 68.4

President Truman’s decision posed many problems. What priority should be assigned to the “superbomb” project, and what resources would be consumed by it? On 24 February, through a letter drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Johnson urged the Chief Executive to authorize the “immediate implementation of all-out development of hydrogen bombs and means for their production and delivery.” In other words, production facilities should be built without awaiting proof that a thermonuclear explosion was possible.5

The Special Committee of the NSC6 studied Secretary Johnson’s suggestion and, on 9 March, submitted a two-fold recommendation. First, the AEC should act to ensure the availability of necessary raw materials. Second, the AEC and the Defense Department jointly should appraise the adequacy of production facilities. President Truman promptly approved both proposals.

After careful examination, the AEC advised that practically all raw materials were available in ample supply. Tritium was the only exception; each superbomb, apparently, would require a substantial amount of this substance. The AEC and the Defense Department found that existing facilities at Hanford could produce enough tritium to permit a test of thermonuclear principles by the spring of 1951. The price of such production, however, would be a corresponding reduction in uranium and plutonium output. Hence a new tritium-producing facility, costing approximately $250 million, ought to be erected. After winning JCS concurrence, Secretary Johnson and the Acting AEC Chairman, Mr. Sumner T. Pike, proposed these measures to the President on 25 May; Mr. Truman approved them two weeks later. Five reactors were subsequently built along the Savannah River.7

Pursuant to the President’s order of 10 March, Secretary Johnson requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review their long-range requirements for fissionable material. By the time they finished, six months later, the Korean War had compounded the alarm aroused by the Soviet atomic explosion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted, by 1956, uranium and plutonium stockpiles that totaled far more than what they had recommended in 1949. As for weapons, they calculated that, by 1956, nearly twice the number thought necessary in 1949 would be needed: to destroy Soviet atomic capability; to conduct a strategic air offensive against the
The Approach of Armageddon: Atomic Arsenal

USSR; to support ground forces in Western Europe; for a general reserve; and to form a postwar stockpile. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted these computations and so advised the AEC.  

These new production requirements more than doubled those of present programs and would consume all uranium ore available through 1958. President Truman directed the Special Committee to determine what efforts were needed to increase fissionable material output during the immediate future. In response, the AEC and MLC staffs recommended construction of facilities costing $1.4 billion. With JCS endorsement, the Special Committee sent these proposals to the President, who accepted them on 9 October. Under this program, one gaseous-diffusion installation and three heavy-water reactors would become operational during 1953–1954.

As autumn advanced, several developments inspired the MLC to reassess production objectives yet again. Improved techniques, it appeared, could extend the upper limit of practicable yields far above that of the 20-kiloton Nagasaki bomb. The AEC was, in fact, perfecting a new and powerful family of fission weapons that would become available before 1956 and possibly as early as 1953. Accordingly, the MLC asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish weapons objectives for 1953 within various yield categories, so that the AEC could establish schedules for new production and stockpile conversions.

By spring of 1951, another expansion of uranium and plutonium output seemed necessary. Military requirements far exceeded available raw material; demands for fissionable materials were steadily increasing; rearmament programs competed for essential equipment; and thermonuclear research had progressed to the point of achieving a small-scale fusion reaction. Output was restricted, however, by plant capacity and available raw material.

A Defense/AEC Working Group carefully analyzed the possibilities for increasing production and finally recommended a program which would substantially expand uranium and plutonium production facilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed this program on 17 October 1951. Their action was bracketed by the second and third Soviet atomic explosions.

The broad issue of expansion was brought before the National Security Council. State, Defense and AEC prepared appraisals of the proposed program. Chairman Gordon Dean of the AEC advised that an even greater expansion was probably feasible but seemed "extremely difficult and expensive and out of all proportion to its gain." Since the proposed program would provide no greater output until after 1956, its justification must rest entirely on whether there actually was a need for larger output after that date. Once this need was verified, he declared, the AEC would approve the program.

Speaking for the Defense Department, Secretary Lovett reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were preparing weapons requirements based solely upon actual estimated needs and divorced entirely from considerations of ore supply and production capacity:

The President may well ask, . . . "How much is enough?" I do not believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could or would state categorically . . . that a stockpile of
JCS and National Policy

"X" number of atomic weapons would be sufficient conclusively to ensure the security of the US. The atomic weapons situation is a dynamic one, involving among other factors the size of the stockpile, the time phasing of new production facilities, the provision of adequate delivery vehicles, the ultimate usages planned for the weapons, and our best estimate of the developing Russian atomic weapon potential.

It is my opinion that we must err... on the side of too much rather than too little... Thus he, like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, endorsed the proposed program.

Secretary Acheson also approved the expansion and for basically similar reasons. His rationale ran as allows:

If a major war can be avoided up to [1956], an overwhelming US superiority in atomic weapons together with the over-all strength of the free world may then be an important deterrent to Soviet aggression, and a means of assuring victory should such aggression occur.\[11\]

President Truman rendered a decision on 16 January 1952, during a conference with the Special Committee. General Vandenberg, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also attended. In his presentation, Mr. Lovett remarked that technological advances had made tactical nuclear weapons possible and so changed the basic assumptions for military requirements. Chairman Dean commented that, if overriding priorities were granted, the plan appeared feasible. Speaking for the Office of Defense Mobilization, Mr. Wilson then warned of construction difficulties, especially in 1952–1953. After hearing all arguments, the Chief Executive asked whether anyone opposed undertaking the proposed program. No one spoke; Mr. Truman thereupon ordered the AEC, in collaboration with the Defense Department and the Office of Defense Mobilization, to develop an appropriate program. Subsequently, costs were estimated at $4.9 billion for construction and $700 million in annual operating expenses.\[12\]

Even without the fruits of this newly-approved program, which lay well in the future, the harvest from existing efforts was prodigious. Most noteworthy was the accelerating increase in the already sizeable national stockpile of atomic weapons. The yields of these weapons also grew considerably greater. During 1951, as the AEC anticipated, Mark 4 bombs were equipped with "pits" which increased their yield, and a much-improved Mark 6 weapon entered the stockpile.\[13\] Finally, the quest for a thermonuclear weapon culminated in a secret test conducted on 31 October 1952. A tremendous detonation measured at 10,400 kilotons obliterated the Pacific island of Elugelab.\[14\]

Much had been done and far more was promised. It was already plain that annual production for 1956 would well exceed the JCS objectives set forth in September 1950. Unsurprisingly, the MLC concluded late in 1952 that no further expansion in production facilities appeared necessary.\[15\]

In sum, the defense establishment would soon be able to meet every major need. The age of atomic plenty was dawning.
Custody and Stockpiling Controversies

Who should control this swelling arsenal? According to the Atomic Energy Act, weapons custody was vested in the AEC unless the Chief Executive directed their transfer to the armed forces. President Truman declined to do this, even during the 1948 Berlin crisis. Early in 1950, however, this decision was being reappraised; weapons had become standardized and military personnel now wielded the necessary maintenance expertise. In fact, an AEC staff study concluded—and the Joint Chiefs of Staff naturally concurred—that the Defense Department should assume (1) custody of nonnuclear components of atomic weapons and (2) responsibility for maintenance of nuclear components in the national stockpile. Apparently, higher authorities took no action.16

When the Korean War erupted, the complex question of overseas storage and custody assumed primary importance. Early in July, General Vandenberg recommended that one fighter and two medium bombardment wings be dispatched temporarily to the United Kingdom, in order to reinforce the B-29 wing already stationed there. Such action he said, would “materially increase” fighter defense capability in the British Isles and halve the time required to mount a strategic air offensive against the USSR. Additionally, he asked that some nonnuclear components for atomic weapons be stored in the United Kingdom. Overseas storage would greatly reduce the amount of airlift required to mount the strategic air offensive and, in light of burgeoning transport requirements for the Far East, this saving could assume considerable importance. At the urging of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Johnson, the President authorized all these actions.17

Additionally, the aircraft carrier Coral Sea had been fitted to carry atomic bombs. Two more, the Midway and the Franklin D. Roosevelt, were being similarly modified and would become operational during the autumn. Admiral Sherman wanted to seek Presidential authorization for storage of nonnuclear components in all these vessels. For the moment, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to make a far more modest request, which President Truman approved on 11 August.18

The next move was made during the spring of 1951. On 6 April, President Truman approved a JCS request to transfer a limited number of complete atomic weapons from AEC to military custody. Most probably, this decision flowed from fear of the approaching Communist offensive in Korea. Massive ground and air assaults upon UN forces might provoke counteraction against enemy bases in Manchuria and spread hostilities throughout the Far East.19

In November, Secretary Lovett precipitated a wide-ranging reappraisal. The time has come,” he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “to delineate clearly the responsibilities between the Department of Defense, which has primary interest in atomic weapons requirements, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which has primary responsibility for scientific development…. He asked them, therefore, to define “the exact nature and scope of DOD interest in the use of atomic weapons” and to describe the Defense Department’s responsibility in determining:
a. The requirements for atomic weapons.
b. The delivery methods to be utilized.
c. The military determinations of where and how such weapons will be employed.20

Answering on 11 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed that the “broad and far-reaching evolution of US military concepts” imposed by nuclear weaponry had permeated all aspects of military preparedness:

The acquisition by the United States of its foreign bases has been dictated largely by atomic weapon considerations. The atomic weapon now influences... the configuration of all aircraft which are to be capable of carrying the atomic weapon, the design and modification of aircraft carriers, the mission and equipment of guidance systems, bombing systems, and certain special types of artillery.

It was absolutely essential, therefore, that they possess full freedom to act with speed and precision during an emergency. Consequently, they could not agree to any other agency interposing itself between them and the President in submission to him of recommendations for a military course of action; nor could they agree to any other such agency having a voice in how, when and where such military operations are to be conducted.

Analyzing Secretary Lovett’s specific questions, they recommended that the Defense Department assume entire responsibility for defining weapons requirements, determining suitable delivery methods, recommending “where and how” to employ nuclear weapons, and assuring the physical security of storage sites. In conclusion, they condemned the existing system of divided custodial responsibilities as being inimical to swift operations and proper security and urged the creation of a reservoir of finished weapons completely under military custody.21

On 29 January 1952, President Truman reviewed those recommendations with Secretary Lovett. He then ordered the Special Committee to suggest appropriate actions. As will be seen, this reexamination resulted in a partial reversal of custody policy.22

Concurrently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed themselves to the advisability of forward storage of nuclear components. On 14 January 1952, Admiral Fechteler broached the subject of storing nuclear components aboard aircraft carriers. He contended that thirty hours lost in transfer time from continental storage sites to ships at sea could create an “unnecessary and unreasonable risk of failure,” forfeiting any possibility of surprise and allowing ample time for enemy countermeasures.23

General Vandenberg accepted the principle of forward storage. He opposed “blanket approval” for any storage aboard aircraft carriers, however, saying that this would be equivalent to stockage at “all bases from which US Air Forces with an atomic capability may be operating.” The Navy, he argued, must first be assigned specific tasks requiring the employment of weapons. He noted that the
number of atomic bombs was insufficient fully to accomplish three “top priority offensive tasks”:

a. Blunting the enemy’s atomic delivery capability.

b. Disrupting the USSR’s war-making capacity.

c. Retarding the Red Army’s advance.

The “utmost integration” in planning was therefore essential. Presenting his criticisms in circumspect phraseology, General Vandenberg observed that Admiral Fechteler’s intentions were “not clear.” Did the Navy plan to assume portions of the three tasks outlined above? Were there previously unmentioned naval targets which needed nuclear destruction? He acknowledged the Navy’s right to employ atomic weapons but argued that the small stockpile should not be distributed piecemeal “merely because a [Service] capability may have been generated.” In any event, General Vandenberg strongly believed that placement of precious components aboard one highly visible and very vulnerable aircraft carrier “would constitute an altogether unacceptable risk.”

These arguments failed to sway Admiral Fechteler. Were not aircraft carriers, he replied, more physically secure and less vulnerable to attack than air bases? Was not utilization of CVBs preferable to base rights arrangements that might sacrifice sovereignty and freedom of action? Admiral Fechteler wanted the Defense Department to press for forward storage of nuclear components “to the maximum extent compatible with security and political feasibility.” He did suggest, however, that they wait until the Joint Chiefs of Staff could complete plans for a comprehensive overseas storage program. On 5 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred the conflicting Navy and Air Force papers to the JSPC.

The Committee was unable to reconcile inter-Service divisions and returned a split report on 31 March. The Navy wanted immediate placement of nuclear components on aircraft carriers; the Army and Air Force favored immediate authorization for forward storage, with actual deployments being made only when war appeared imminent. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in turn, were unable to achieve an agreement. While the Chairman was away, they agreed to send Secretary Lovett a memorandum delineating their differences. When General Bradley returned, however, he persuaded his colleagues that he first should discuss the matter with Mr. Lovett. At this meeting, the Secretary said the time was not propitious for presenting this matter to the President. Mr. Truman, after all, was still awaiting the Special Committee’s recommendations concerning changes in weapons custody.

On 14 April, General Bradley reported this result to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Fechteler remarked that, although the outcome was regrettable, nothing further could be done. Generals Bradley and Vandenberg observed that the problem did not seem sufficiently pressing to warrant a formal recommendation. After this brief discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that their memorandum would be withdrawn.

In August, Mr. Lovett asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether nuclear components should now be sent to areas where nonnuclear components were already
stored. Admiral Fechteler still wanted immediate placement upon aircraft carriers, but Generals Collins and Vandenberg believed that the international situation did not justify any overseas deployments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff apprised Mr. Lovett of their differences, but the Secretary refrained from bringing this problem before the President, who had not yet received recommendations from the Special Committee.²⁷

In June 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to Secretary Lovett a plan for storing numerous nonnuclear components at many overseas locations. Such expansion, they calculated, was needed in order to permit prompt retaliation and to reduce logistic and resupply problems. But, when Acting Secretary Foster brought the matter before Mr. Acheson, the Secretary of State advised that simultaneous approaches to all these nations seemed undesirable and asked the Defense Department to ascribe relative importance and urgency to the several areas involved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a priority list but asked that all negotiations proceed as expeditiously as possible.²⁸

On 19 August, the Chief Executive examined this subject with Secretary Lovett and said that he was willing to place these components (1) aboard aircraft carriers, and (2) in countries that possessed political and economic stability and contained US forces adequate to assure local security. The President would not widen the area of risk any further, since he felt that the security of nonnuclear components ranked equally with that of fissionable material. He thought that, if the Services had correctly estimated transport and delivery capabilities, these amounts appeared adequate “for any plans known to him.” Necessarily, these remarks reordered the JCS priority list cited above.²⁹

One important decision remains to be recounted. Responding to the President’s directive of 29 January 1952, the Special Committee in August submitted certain “Agreed Concepts” regarding the custody and storage of atomic weapons. They proposed that the Defense Department assume responsibility (1) for weapons deployed overseas and (2) for as many within the United States as were needed to assure operational flexibility and military readiness. The AEC would be responsible for the remainder and would allow whatever access was necessary to further weapons development, surveillance and quality assurance. President Truman accepted this recommendation on 10 September.³⁰

There remained the question of how many weapons were needed to assure “operational flexibility and military readiness.” Secretary Lovett wanted the Defense Department to take control of the entire stockpile and shoulder all responsibility for storage, security, maintenance and modernization. In short, the AEC would be stripped of all authority in this area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully concurred, citing difficulties in dual management, risks incurred in release and transfer time, dangers to security, and burdens imposed upon planning and training activities. Nonetheless, Secretary Acheson and Mr. Dean persuaded Secretary Lovett that it was unwise to press for a major policy change during President Truman’s final days in office. Perforce, this most difficult problem was passed to the Eisenhower administration.³¹
The Approach of Armageddon:
Strategic Planning

World War III: 1950–1952

If global war began, what strategy would the United States pursue? The Joint Outline Emergency War Plan (JOEW), which the Joint Chiefs of Staff periodically revised to reflect changing force levels and overseas deployments, dealt with a US-USSR conflict commencing in the immediate future. The JOEW which they approved on 8 December 1949, code named OFFTACKLE, delineated a concept of operations that remained constant during 1950–1952. This plan, therefore, warrants description in some detail.1

According to OFFTACKLE, the United States would wage a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia and conduct a strategic defensive in the Far East. The armed forces' missions (later repeated in NSC 68) were as follows:

a. Provide a reasonable initial defense of the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas, particularly in Europe.
b. Protect a minimum mobilization base.
c. Conduct an air-sea offensive to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity and to impede enemy offensive operations.
d. Defend necessary base areas and lines of communication.
e. Provide aid to allied nations.

In the war's opening phase (D-Day to D+3 months), the USSR was expected to launch offensives in Western Europe and the Middle East, an aerial bombardment of the British Isles, campaigns with limited objectives in the Far East, air-sea offensives against allied lines of communications, and selective air attacks upon North America. Obviously, NATO's ground strength was too small for a successful defense of Western Europe. Necessarily, then, the allies would concede most of continental Europe and strive to secure the United Kingdom, protect the West Africa-Mediterranean littoral, and defend the Cairo-Suez area. Since Spain proba-
bly would elect to remain neutral at this stage, French Morocco should serve as
the initial assembly area for US forces.

The war's second phase, extending from D+3 to D+12 months, would largely
be shaped (1) by the outcome of the US strategic air and ASW campaigns and (2)
by whether the USSR invaded the Iberian peninsula and captured the Middle
East oil-producing areas. Many of the circumstances of 1942-1943 would be re-
created. The Allies would continue their strategic air offensive, build the United
Kingdom into a major base for all types of military operations, and begin to
project their power outward from the Western Mediterranean-North African
area. They might occupy Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and even Southern Italy.
Gradually, these operations would assume an offensive pattern aimed at creat-
ing conditions for reentry into Western Europe.

During phase three (D+12 to D+24 months), all these efforts would be intensi-
ified. In the fourth and final phase, allied forces would undertake "operations
necessary to bring about the capitulation of Soviet forces in Western Europe and
the establishment of law and order in that region..." Armies would be launched
up the Rhone valley and across the North German plain to isolate major enemy
forces in Western Europe and make an invasion of the USSR unnecessary. Quite
possibly, campaigns reminiscent of 1944-1945 would mark the culmination of
World War III.

Two years of rearmament, touched off by the Korean War, left little imprint
upon this basic strategy. Staff planners charged with revising OFFTACKLE noted
that the conflict consumed inventories, engaged major combatant forces, and
thus impaired deployment capabilities. More importantly, in light of heavy US
commitments, the scale of rearmament was insufficient either to eliminate logis-
tical deficiencies or to generate enough conventional forces to hold Western Eu-
roe against the Red Army. The 1952 JOEW P did go so far as to specify that some
sort of continental foothold—the Rhine-Jjssel line at most, the Pyrenees at least—
should be maintained. But, all in all, the military strength of the Western Powers
vis-à-vis that of the Soviet Bloc did not substantially change.

The Atomic Offensive

Since an atomic offensive constituted the capstone of US strategy, some app-
raisal of its impact upon the enemy was obviously essential. In May 1949, an
Ad Hoc Committee chaired by Lieutenant General H. R. Harmon, USAF, con-
cluded that a completely successful strategic air campaign would reduce Soviet
industrial capacity by 30-40 percent. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed this eva-
uation but instructed the Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG) to appraise
the prospects for actually executing such a successful attack. In February 1950,
WSEG advised that under the most favorable assumptions, 70-85 percent of the
craft sorted would succeed in attacking their intended targets and leave one-
half to two-thirds of them damaged beyond repair. Night operations, whether
massed or dispersed, would cost about one-third of the strike force. In massed
daylight raids, approximately one-half of the attacking aircraft would be expended. General Vandenberg accepted this assessment.

Thus the air offensive would clearly be costly to both sides. Indeed, WSEG believed that present logistical deficiencies and anticipated aircraft losses would preclude an offensive on the scale described in the JOEWP. OFFTACKLE contemplated the delivery of 292 atomic weapons and 17,610 tons of conventional bombs during the first three months of operations. Under current conditions, however, only the atomic offensive could be executed.4

On 1 December 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a target system for OFFTACKLE. This plan, JCS 2056, covered a wide variety of industries, including the following: petroleum refineries; electric power plants; aircraft, automotive and submarine factories; and synthetic ammonia plants. Successful attacks would provide an 85 percent probability of production stoppage and would thereby make the maximum contribution toward disrupting the vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, force new decisions [upon the enemy], and be immediate assistance in retarding the Soviet advances in Western Eurasia. The nature of the new decisions and the degree of retardation of the Soviet advances [were] unpredictable.5

Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff refined and restricted these target selections. JCS 2056/9, which they approved in February 1951, mentioned only three major systems: electric power industry; liquid fuel industry; and other war-related industries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Lieutenant General Curtis LeMay, Commanding General, Strategic Air Command (SAC), to appraise the plan.6

The concepts controlling JCS 2056/9 dated from World War II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the stockpile was still too small for SAC to strike one massive war-winning blow.7 Therefore, since the atomic offensive was conceived within the context of a protracted conventional conflict, the experience of 1939–1945 was highly relevant. The bombing campaigns of World War II revealed that the best way to ravage an enemy’s war-making capacity was to concentrate on the destruction of vital elements in his economy. Specifically, the US Strategic Bombing Survey’s findings showed (1) that a shortage of aviation gasoline led to the defeat of the German Air Force and (2) that an effective attack upon the electric utilities system would have collapsed the German war economy. These lessons were incorporated into JCS 2056/9. The Strategic Air Command would strike at population centers but only because they contained important industrial targets. The cities’ devastation would be a by-product of the campaign to cripple Soviet war-making capacity.8

General LeMay found little merit in JCS 2056/9, chiefly because visual pre-strike reconnaissance would be required for a disproportionately large number of targets. Moreover, many electric-power complexes were so isolated that navigators would have great difficulty guiding bombers to them. Also, the plants were so far removed from industrial centers that no “bonus damage” would accrue. General LeMay wished, instead, to substitute a more broadly based target system:
JCS and National Policy

a. Liquid fuels
b. Military, governmental and economic control points
c. Industrial capital

He commented that, since SAC’s operational planning and training activities were based on JCS 2056, alterations would consume so much time that the D-Day assumed in JCS 2056/9 would pass before they could take effect. Why not, then, simply defer changes until the USAF Directorate of Intelligence completed a new target list? Eventually, in July 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that General LeMay could continue to use JCS 2056 as the foundation for operational planning, pending later improvements.9

Why was SAC unable to deal the Soviet Union one irreparable blow? In January 1952, General Vandenberg cited some reasons for JCS pessimism:

It is our feeling that the Strategic Air Command has been and remains a powerful deterrent to aggression by the USSR. There are ways and means, however, of lessening the impact of the blow we have been and are now capable of delivering. The Soviet Union has been working to erect guards and take protective measures. As it takes these actions, the magnitude of our task grows. In light of this, I am convinced that the combat effectiveness of my forces from the standpoint of atomic warfare has tended to stand still, notwithstanding the gradual numerical increase in the size of the stockpile.

Several months later, General Collins circulated an Army Staff analysis of similar import. This study showed that, apart from liquid fuels, the Soviets possessed stockpiled reserves sufficient to wage general war for at least one year. Therefore, atomic attacks upon Soviet industry could not retard the Red Army’s advances into Western Europe. Should fuel production capacity be destroyed, however, the USSR would find it “virtually impossible” to conduct campaigns for prolonged periods. This was the enemy’s Achilles heel—but only a long war would expose it.10

Bombers and Bases

Nuclear striking power may be likened to a tripod, resting equally upon weapons, bombers and bases. The growth in SAC bomber strength10 is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31 Dec 49</th>
<th>31 Dec 50</th>
<th>31 Dec 51</th>
<th>31 Dec 52</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-29</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-50</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total All Types of SAC Aircraft 837 961 1,165 1,638
The B-36 heavy bomber alone had intercontinental capacity; the B-29, B-47, and B-50 medium bombers which formed the bulk of SAC would have to strike at the USSR from overseas sites. Accordingly, SAC bases blossomed into that encircling ring so bitterly denounced by Soviet propagandists.

At the outset of 1950, SAC airfields were located in Great Britain, Iceland, Newfoundland, Alaska, Guam and Okinawa; bases in Bermuda, the Azores, Libya and Saudi Arabia were used largely for air transport operations. Since SAC’s three bases in England could not contain the proposed wartime deployment of seven wings, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed in April 1950 that they would jointly improve four additional airfields for this purpose. Nonetheless, the British Isles seemed so vulnerable to atomic attack that other sites were sought. Concurrently, in fact, the Air Force was contemplating construction of bases in the Casablanca area.

The Korean War and its consequences greatly accelerated this expansion. During November-December 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that additional base rights be sought from Canada in Newfoundland and Labrador, from France in North Africa, from the United Kingdom in Libya, Cyprus and the British Isles, from Denmark in Greenland, from Portugal in the Azores, and from Turkey at Adana. All these projects were eventually brought to fruition, but sites in North Africa and Greenland were treated as especially urgent. Two airfields in Morocco went into operation by July 1951; Wheelus Air Base in Libya was greatly expanded; and runways at Thule, Greenland, became operational in November 1952.

A summary of the SAC Emergency War Plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 October 1951 demonstrates the central role that these bases played in strategic air operations. The initial strike would be launched on approximately D+6 days. Heavy bombers flying from Maine would drop 20 bombs in the Moscow-Gorky area and return to the United Kingdom. Simultaneously, medium bombers from Labrador would attack the Leningrad area with 12 weapons and reassemble at British bases. Meanwhile, medium bombers based in the British Isles would approach the USSR along the edge of the Mediterranean Sea and deliver 52 bombs in the industrial regions of the Volga and Donets Basin; they would return through Libyan and Egyptian airfields. More medium bombers flying from the Azores would drop 15 weapons in the Caucasus area and then stage through Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Concurrently, medium bombers from Guam would bring 15 bombs against Vladivostok and Irkutsk. Without doubt, then, overseas bases were an indispensable element in the strategic equation. General Vandenberg publicly testified that, if no overseas bases existed, SAC would have to attain “five or six times” its present strength in order to perform the same missions.
World War III: 1954

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in accordance with their statutory responsibilities, were working upon mid-range as well as short-range war plans. On 26 January 1950, they directed the JSPC to prepare a Joint Outline War Plan for a conflict commencing on 1 July 1953. This plan would provide strategic guidance for a new mobilization planning cycle scheduled to begin in January 1951. But two complications arose. First, drafting of the JOWP became entwined with preparation of NSC 68 and of the FY 1952 budget. So, at the suggestion of Admiral Davis, Director of the Joint Staff, the scope of the JOWP was widened to include budgetary, NATO, and MDAP guidance as well as strategic planning. Also, its effective date was changed to 1 July 1954, thereby coinciding with NSC 68. Second, the JSPC itself split over several points. The Navy member sought an acknowledgement that it was vital to retain Middle Eastern oil resources; the Air Force planner pressed for recognition of the atomic offensive's primary importance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff settled these differences through compromise phraseology that generally affirmed the importance of Navy and Air Force objectives. Planning then proceeded satisfactorily and, on 29 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved REAPER, the JOWP for 1 July 1954.

Compared to OFFTACKLE and its successors, REAPER contained two major conceptual changes. First, the Soviets' nuclear stockpile (perhaps 250 weapons) would be sufficient to inflict serious damage upon the United States and possibly to render the United Kingdom unusable as a base of operations. Second, the NATO powers should be sufficiently strong to implement a "forward strategy," defending "as far to the east as possible" and protecting the Rhine-Alps-Plave line as a minimum. Otherwise, the course of operations remained unchanged.

REAPER was rapidly overtaken by events; the decisions described in Chapters 2 and 3 established far more ambitious force goals. By October 1951, General Vandenberg became convinced that the JOWP no longer offered adequate strategic guidance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and asked the JSPC to determine whether revision or complete rewriting of REAPER was necessary.

The Committee became mired in many disputes, most of which may be traced to the familiar argument over Air Force primacy. On 28 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff scrutinized the situation and decided that these disagreements derived from "certain divergencies in the basic philosophies of the Services relative to priority of tasks... which cause recurring split views in reports concerned with war plans as well as others." They, therefore, directed the JSPC to compress basic Service disagreements within a single report "in the form of principles upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff can render decisions." The Committee finally completed this paper in May 1952. Planners observed that the problem of inter-Service disagreement would endure "as long as there are separate Services with differing opinions on the philosophy of war." At present, each Service firmly adhered to "unilateral doctrines and concepts which have not been reconciled by unification." OFFTACKLE, and NSC 68, had enunciated five fundamental military missions. Army and Navy members agreed that all these tasks merited equal priority:
The Approach of Armageddon: Strategic Planning

In the formulation of war plans, possible enemy courses of action and capabilities must be considered. Many of these may be alternatives, may vary as to timing, and give him complete flexibility. Each poses a critical threat which must be provided for.

The Air Force planner, however, assailed such “blind adherence” to an “unobtainable balance” among forces and missions:

until we possess unlimited resources and are able to provide adequately for all military tasks, we must evaluate our tasks in terms of their contribution to our fundamental obligation, and be prepared to accomplish the most essential before all others. . . . The principle of balanced forces is fundamentally sound only when it ensures a proper composition and magnitude of overall forces to counter the enemy threat. Any balance, the purpose of which is to balance one friendly Service against another, or one friendly component against one enemy component, is militarily unsound and economically infeasible.

Plainly, the most serious threat to US war-making capacity stemmed from a Soviet atomic attack. The USSR was similarly vulnerable to air action but immune to naval blockade and virtually impregnable against land invasion. Consequently, the Air Force awarded much greater emphasis to “the strategic objective of air neutralization” (i.e., progressive attrition of the enemy’s war-sustaining capability) and relegated ground forces to the secondary roles of retarding the Red Army’s advance in Western Europe and protecting essential air bases and lines of communication.23

General Collins attempted to accommodate Air Force opinions by proffering the following “broad priorities” as guidance for war planning:

a. Protection of the Western Hemisphere.
   b. Security of the NATO area.
   d. Destruction of Soviet war-supporting resources.
   e. Defense of other strategic areas.

The Army Chief of Staff emphasized that his list offered only an indication of relative importance and stressed that these priorities were not “successively exclusive”:

Allocations to tasks of lesser priority must be concurrent with those of higher priority, though the degree of completeness should generally be higher with the tasks of greater priority.

As an example, he noted the Korean War was consuming far more resources than its third-priority status seemingly would warrant.24

Admiral Feltcher was unsatisfied; he deeply believed that all basic military missions possessed equal and far-reaching importance. Failure to perform any one of these missions might shatter the entire war effort. The Chief of Naval Operations felt, furthermore, that wartime priorities would largely be determined
by enemy initiatives. Without knowledge of the adversary’s plans, he reasoned, any attempt to determine tasks in advance was exceedingly unwise. Did not the Korean War provide conclusive proof of this claim? Finally, Admiral Fechteler argued that the five missions proposed by General Collins were unduly defensive in nature and liable to delay the general offensive essential to ultimate victory. Thus, a two-sided split in the JSFC (Air Force vs. Army and Navy) had apparently expanded into a three-sided split among the Joint Chiefs of Staff.25

On 9 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the JSFC to determine whether the opinions of General Collins and Admiral Fechteler provided adequate guidance for the formulation of war plans. Two months later, the Committee returned a negative response. By that time, however, inauguration of a completely new planning procedure made further efforts unnecessary.26

New Program for Planning

By the middle of 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were moving to systematize the strategic planning process. Their decision to do so stemmed from a suggestion, submitted by Admiral Davis in December 1949, that the situation required something broader than the war and mobilization plans then existing. He recommended that the Joint Strategic Plans, Joint Logistics Plans, and Joint Intelligence Committees prepare a “co-ordinated program” that would embrace an emergency war plan, a plan for budget and mobilization guidance looking approximately two years ahead, and a long-range plan to guide development of the Services and of the research and development effort. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and issued the necessary instructions in January 1950.27

The results, delayed perhaps by demands of the Korean War, finally reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 June 1952. The rationale of the new planning program, expressed by the JSFC, ran as follows:

It is felt that joint planning procedures have been developed to a point where the number, type, purpose, scope and relationship of joint plans ... can be determined and that the processing of the plans can be accomplished in an appropriate planning cycle. If this is done, it will tend to eliminate piecemeal and crisis planning and will provide the greater portion of the JCS guidance needed by the Services, the unified commands, and by other agencies which properly look to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guidance.

Therefore, on 11 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to create a family of short-, medium-, and long-range plans, prepared annually and applicable in peace and war:

a. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan would guide the disposition, employment and support of existing forces during the coming fiscal year.

b. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan would elucidate strategic concepts and requirements for a war beginning three years after the plan’s issuance, and thus
The Approach of Armageddon: Strategic Planning

furnish the Services with a basis for their budget requests in the fiscal year immediately preceding this D-Day.

c. The Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE), an entirely new effort, would serve principally as a tool for research and development. Applicable to a five-year period beginning five years after the document's issuance, the JLRSE would forecast probable areas of conflict and describe the essential undertakings required.28

There remained the task of assimilating existing plans into the new procedure. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided (1) that the current JOEWP would continue in effect until 1 July 1953, when it would be superseded by the first JSCP and (2) that the first JSOP, for FY 1956, should be completed by 1 January 1953. REAPER would be reconsidered and revised only if a justification of FY 1955 force and budget recommendations became necessary.29

Unfortunately, promulgation of a completely fresh program failed to ameliorate inter-Service differences. Familiar quarrels resurfaced, and the new offspring became as vexatious as the old. Many more delays and difficulties lay in prospect.30
NATO in Alarm: 1950

Origins of the Alliance

Since 1945, an “Iron Curtain” had sundered Europe. While Eastern Europe fell under Soviet domination, Western Europe looked to the United States for protection. A Communist coup in Czechoslovakia spurred the first collective defense efforts. On 17 March 1948, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, Holland, Luxemburg and the United Kingdom signed a fifty-year Treaty of Brussels through which they pledged “all the... assistance in their power” to any attacked party. The organization thus created—the Western European Union (WEU)—later was largely absorbed by NATO. When Messrs. Ernest Bevin and Georges Bidault appealed to the United States to enter into political consultation and technical defense discussions, the Truman administration accepted the ultimate necessity of a military alliance with Western Europe. Thus the Vandenberg Resolution of 11 June 1948 endorsed “association of the United States... with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid....”

Under pressure of the Berlin Blockade, a North Atlantic Treaty was fashioned during the winter of 1948–1949. Participating powers included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Signed in Washington by representatives of twelve governments on 4 April 1949, and ratified by the US Senate on 21 July, this pact provided that “an armed attack against one or more of [the parties]... shall be considered an attack against them all.” The pact pledged, in response, “such action as [the alliance] deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” The treaty also established a North Atlantic Council of member states, “so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time” and empowered to create subsidiary bodies necessary to implement treaty terms. Under the complementary Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Congress provided $1 billion for NATO nations; first materiel shipments reached Europe in the spring of 1950.¹
NATO ORGANIZATION IN DECEMBER 1949
The State of NATO in Mid-1950

An organization has been established; a concept has been adopted; and a first approximation of forces required to defend the North Atlantic area has been made. Thus Secretary of Defense Johnson described the condition of the alliance in May 1950. Achievements were at once impressive and inadequate. The organizational structure created in September 1949 was functional but exceedingly cumbersome and diffuse. Five Regional Planning Groups submitted recommendations to a three-man Standing Group representing the US, UK and French Chiefs of Staff. The Standing Group reported to the Military Committee, composed of a Chief of Staff from each member country, which in turn laid proposals before the Defense Committee, formed of the Defense Ministers of each ally. Final authority resided in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Normally comprised of Foreign Ministers of member states, the NAC assembled several times yearly. A Council of Deputies, standing in permanent session in London, was established in May 1950 for the purpose of giving continuing attention to NAC concerns. As for higher military organization, Secretary Johnson detected during the Defense Committee’s April sessions “a current of feeling that we would have to establish a command organization, or at least a nucleus. . . .” However, the May NAC meeting did not address this issue.

Military planning was in an equally embryonic state. In January 1950, the NAC approved a broadly phrased “strategic concept” which assigned each ally’s forces to the task for which they seemed best suited. The United States would concentrate upon air-sea power, the United Kingdom upon controlling the maritime approaches to Northwestern Europe, and France upon ground and air defense of the continent. General Bradley publicly remarked that this “theory of national specialization” might necessitate the sacrifice of “a small bit of sovereignty.”

After integrating submissions from the Regional Planning Groups, the Standing Group prepared an ambitious four-year Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) which envisioned a defense of the Meuse-Ijssel River line “until effective assistance arrives.” Force objectives for 1954 were set at 90 ready and reserve divisions, 1,079 major combatant vessels, and 8,820 aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that a “radical revision downward” should be undertaken, replacing these force requirements with objectives that were economically feasible. Nonetheless, on 1 April, the Defense Committee approved the MTDP as a “first approximation” and invited member nations urgently to consider ways of expanding their military establishments. The Committee also called upon the Standing Group and the Regional Planning Groups to restudy requirements.

In mid-May, the NAC agreed that members’ resources were “sufficient, if properly coordinated and applied, to ensure the progressive and speedy development of adequate military defense” without impairing social and economic progress. In furtherance of this end, the Council endorsed the creation of “balanced collective forces,” replacing the present wasteful approach of individually balanced national forces. Uncertainty over economic and financial prospects pre-
vented the NAC from approving the Medium Term Defense Plan, but other developments bespoke a growing sense of unity and mutual trust. Mr. Robert Schuman proposed the establishment of a Franco-German Coal and Steel Pool, in which other Western European states might participate. Reporting from Paris, US Ambassador David Bruce appraised this plan as “the most imaginative and far-reaching approach that has been made for generations to the settlement of fundamental differences between France and Germany.” Thereafter, achievement of continental economic (and possibly political) federation became an overriding objective of French diplomacy.

Still, NATO’s military strength was much more potential than actual. The Allies mustered only 10 divisions in Western Germany; planners estimated that 18 divisions were needed to carry out a delaying action east of the Rhine, and 54 to defend the Rhine line itself. US combat units in Western Europe consisted of 1 infantry division, 3 armored cavalry regiments, and 2 fighter/bomber groups; reinforcements available from the United States and Canada numbered only 5 divisions, 3 separate regiments, and 11 air wings. The US Joint Outline Emergency War Plan spoke of withdrawing to the Pyrenees Mountains and establishing bases in North Africa and the United Kingdom.9

The Soviet Union, by contrast, deployed 22 divisions in satellite states alone, with more than 100 in reserve. Field Marshal Montgomery, acting in his capacity as Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee of the Western European Union, reported on 15 June 1950 that “as things stand today and in the foreseeable future, there would be scenes of appalling and indescribable confusion in Western Europe if we were ever attacked by the Russians.”10

The Impact of Korea

Ten days later, the Korean War erupted. The ensuing entanglement, to which six of the ten active US Army divisions were soon committed, did not alter fundamental administration priorities. As President Truman later wrote:

I had no intention of allowing our attention to be diverted from the unchanging aims and designs of Soviet policy. I knew that in our age, Europe, with its millions of skilled workmen, with its factories and transportation network, was still the key to world peace.11

Control of Western Europe remained the foremost prize in the Cold War, and US concern with the strengthening of NATO continued unabated.

The Communist assault upon South Korea precipitated reviews of strategic planning and reappraisals of force goals. Overt Soviet attack, once an improbable hypothesis, now seemed a menacing possibility; the gross imbalance between NATO’s means and ends required rapid rectification. Indeed, Western impotence created acute political and psychological problems among Europeans, generating
what State Department analysts termed a “fear and resignation psychosis” which threatened to erode the alliance’s “moral tissue.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff already were addressing this problem. On 13 July, they and the three Service Secretaries asked Mr. Johnson to affirm US readiness to bear a heavier burden—“conditional upon the other NATO nations doing their full share.” Six days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised US representatives to NATO agencies that they were drafting a plan for a global conflict commencing on 1 July 1954, coincident with the MTDP. Pending its approval, US officials were authorized to advise their European counterparts that:

- a. US planning concerns for 1954 included the successful defense of a maximum area of Western Europe.
- b. Military aid requirements adequate to support these concepts were being studied.
- c. The principle of balanced collective forces was being applied throughout.

Concurrently, General Bradley worked with NATO representatives to perfect the Medium Term Defense Plan. Their “first approximation” of NATO forces necessary to meet goals enumerated in NSC 68 yielded the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1954 Objective</th>
<th>Projected Available</th>
<th>Projected Deficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army (divisions)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy (major combatant vessels)</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force (wings)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

None of the allies doubted that drastic action was necessary. On 26 July, during an informal discussion among senior NATO officials, Field Marshal Montgomery declared that the two US divisions in Germany were the only combat-ready forces on the continent. In appraising other allied contingents, he dwelt particularly upon the inadequate training of French troops. There should be, the Field Marshal further asserted, a sweeping reorganization to streamline the NATO command. Rather emotionally, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny of France expressed his entire agreement.

Simultaneously, the Standing Group recommended that the NAC act to “convince [member] governments . . . that they should take immediate action to increase the total effective combat forces” planned for 1 July 1951. A resolution embodying this recommendation, which US Ambassador Charles M. Spofford brought before the Council of Deputies, was unanimously approved on 28 July. Each Deputy then undertook to report by 28 August the measures pledged by his government.

Thus the pace was quickening. When Secretary Johnson requested recommendations responsive to the Deputies’ resolution, the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned a forceful response:
JCS and National Policy

What is needed now is a firm commitment by each nation to take aggressive action to build the forces militarily required for the defense of the NATO area; to equip those forces effectively; and to ensure that they are effectively trained and provided with the necessary support to make them battleworthy.

To further enhance NATO's capabilities, they believed that Ambassador Spofford should ask the Council of Deputies to consider several possibilities:17

a. Accepting Sweden, West Germany and Spain as NATO members.
b. Including Austria in the protective interests of NATO.
c. Increasing Italy's military power.

The Service Secretaries sent Mr. Johnson an even more powerfully worded paper, which not only seconded these thoughts but also suggested that the allies consider waging "an aggressive war for peace."18 Secretary Johnson disapproved the proposals relating to Germany and Spain, preferring to refine agreed-upon actions rather than to introduce new subjects that lacked the Defense Committee's approval.19

The Deputies also had asked the Military Committee to estimate additional MTDP materiel requirements and thus erect the framework for a high-priority production program. Mr. Johnson ordered the Munitions Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take appropriate action "as a matter of priority." The JCS report revealed that enormous deficiencies existed: 3,191 artillery pieces; 8,008 tanks; 9,263 half-tracks; and approximately 6,000 aircraft. At that time, the administration was seeking $3.504 billion in supplemental MDAP funds for NATO countries. Speaking to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary Acheson submitted the following justification:20

I think... that this effort has got to be immense and that we just cannot waste any more time in going back and forth with plans. We have to settle on something, whether it is the best thing or not, and go ahead. . . .

On 18 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Johnson that the following overall US force increases were anticipated by 1 July 1951:

Army: 454,000 personnel; 5 infantry divisions; 1½ airborne divisions; 2 infantry regiments; 28 AAA battalions.

Navy: 292,992 personnel; 69 major combatant vessels; 1½ Marine divisions.

Air Force: 153,000 personnel; 14½ wings.

This was intended as the reply due the Deputies by 28 August.21

The allies' answers, submitted at the same time, indicated that they were ready to raise their rearmament levels. The French, for example, planned to create 15 new divisions during the next two years. The British intended to increase defense spending by about 40 percent. But they assigned these additional funds largely to procurement, and said they would keep troop strength stationary. US officials were far from satisfied and a long debate lay ahead.22
While force goals changed, defense plans did not. Late in July, Field Marshal Montgomery advised the WEU that available forces were totally incapable of defending the Rhine-Ijssel line and asked for a new directive. The WEU Chiefs of Staff became deeply divided over this request. The French demanded defense of the Rhine without thought of retirement; the Dutch and Belgians supported orderly withdrawal as the necessary alternative to annihilation; the British sought a compromise solution. Finally, on 5 September, the Ministers of Defense directed that WEU forces should stand fast on the Rhine-Ijssel line.23

During this debate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General Thomas T. Handy (Commander in Chief, European Command) that “for the immediate future, the defense plan for Western Europe should be based on the defense of successive positions as dictated by the responsible commander.” Commenting upon the Defense Ministers’ decision, General Handy advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that their action made proper planning impossible. He recommended that the WEU plan be accepted as encompassing only the first phase of defensive operations and suggested that the NATO Defense ministers be pressed to undertake realistic revisions.24 Replying on 10 January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the WEU scheme was militarily unsound but nonetheless suitable “as a basis for initiating operations in the event of an emergency.” The arguments for and against defending the Rhine-Ijssel line would long perplex NATO planners.25

The Genesis of German Rearmament

West Germany was NATO’s untapped resource. As President Truman observed, German participation could transform NATO’s task from “a rearguard action” into “a defense in depth.”26

On 2 May 1950—eight weeks prior to the Korean War’s outbreak—the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared themselves “firmly of the opinion that, from the military point of view, the appropriate and early rearming of Western Germany is of fundamental importance to the successful defense of Western Europe against the USSR.” Consequently, they considered that existing disarmament and demilitarization policies should be altered and that Germany be accorded “real and substantial opportunity to participate in Western European and North Atlantic regional arrangements.” Western European nations should be persuaded of the need to allow West Germany effectively to contribute to European security. In particular, France must “be persuaded to recognize that the USSR is a greater menace to [her] independence...than is Germany.”27 These conclusions, which Secretary Johnson considered to be “of particular significance,” were circulated for information and placed upon the NSC’s agenda.28

The invasion of South Korea rendered the rearmament issue much more urgent. The existence of a 50,000-man militarized “police” force in East Germany, for example, suggested possible repetition of satellite aggression.29 On 30 June—the day on which American ground forces were committed to combat in Korea—General Bradley told his JCS colleagues that, if they favored German rearma-
JCS and National Policy

...ment, they ought to prepare specific recommendations for submission to the President. “Personally,” he affirmed, “I feel that it is very unrealistic to continue to talk about building up the defenses of Western Europe without facing up to this subject of at least partially rearming Western Germany.³⁰

The State Department took issue with the JCS memorandum of 2 May. Its position paper, published on 3 July, stated that at the May NAC meeting German rearmament had been considered premature, even to the point where profitable discussions could not be conducted. In particular, the softening French attitude toward Germany might be entirely reversed by abrupt US action. Also, the Department believed that the coming 12–18 months would constitute a critical period in the creation of German opinion. The US High Commissioner for Germany, Mr. John J. McCloy, asserted—and the Department agreed—that a majority of Germans did not desire rearmament; liberal democratic elements would be particularly disillusioned if remilitarization was forced upon them by the allies. In her straitened economic and financial situation, moreover, the Federal Republic could hardly contribute more than the 22 percent of her budget now spent to support occupation forces. In sum, the State Department believed it premature for the United States “publicly to advocate or otherwise press for action in the question of the establishment of German armed forces.”³¹ At a meeting on 6 July, the NSC discussed the subject of German rearmament but deferred further action.³²

During July, however, Mr. Acheson underwent a “quick conversion.” In his recollection, “a steady stream of cables came from our missions in London, Paris and Bonn urging a greater participation by Germany in European defense.” Mr. McCloy, he recalled, delineated “the probability...that we would lose Germany...without hope of getting it back, if we did not find means for that country to fight in event of an emergency.” On 31 July, President Truman and Secretary Acheson reviewed the situation. According to Mr. Acheson,

The real question was not whether Germany should be brought into a general European defense system but whether this could be done without disrupting everything else we were doing and giving Germany the key position in the balancing of power in Europe... We went on to discuss some ways of merging Germany’s military contribution into a European Army or North Atlantic Army with an integrated command and, perhaps, supply. The latter could move German industry further into a European system already started by the Schuman Plan.

The President was enthusiastic about such an approach and authorized further study through NSC channels.³³

On 3 August, Secretaries Acheson and Johnson held a dinner discussion aboard the President’s yacht, Sequoia. The two men agreed that NATO’s present command organization appeared “absolutely hopeless” and that improvement was imperative. Mr. Acheson wanted the United States to take the lead by organizing a unified command and sending more troops to Europe. Mr. Johnson voiced general agreement but said that such proposals were “opposed by the General Staff”—and he personally was disturbed by the insistence upon immediate action. Secretary Acheson replied that, for the moment, he favored nothing more than the or-
ganization of a skeleton command staff. After this staff began functioning, perhaps in November or December, the allies could try to create a unified command. Next morning, Secretary Johnson put these proposals before General Bradley and found them agreeable.34

Unfortunately, State-Defense discussions at the working level founded upon a fundamental split over negotiating strategy. The Defense Department advocated a “one package” approach, under which the United States would neither commit additional forces to Europe nor activate a unified command until her NATO allies accepted German rearmament. Secretary Acheson agreed with the objective but thought the tactics “murderous.” “Once we established the unified command and had a planning center, the inevitable logic of mathematics would convince everyone that any plan without Germany was untenable.”35

What were the French and German attitudes? Chancellor Konrad Adenauer made no secret of his strategy:

My precondition for German participation in European defense was complete equality between Germany and the other European nations. . . . Rearmament might be the way to gaining full sovereignty for the Federal Republic. This made it the essential question of our political future. The Western Allies, especially France, had to . . . answer the question of which danger was the greater: the Russian threat or a German contribution to a European defense community.

Accordingly, on 17 August, Herr Adenauer urged the High Commissioners to authorize creation of a 150,000-man West German police force. Twelve days later, he further advised them that West Germany was prepared to participate in a European army, provided the occupation regime was replaced by a series of “contractual arrangements” between victors and vanquished.36

The French “answer” emerged more tortuously. Through notes sent to Washington on 5 and 17 August, the French Government indicated that greater exertions on its part depended upon (1) increased US financial aid, (2) larger ground force contributions from other NATO members and (3) adoption of a unified command. Concurrently, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (with West Germany participating) endorsed the immediate creation of a European Army.37

On 13 August, the New York Times quoted “NATO military experts” as saying that six divisions constituted the minimum US contribution to Western Europe’s defense. Coincidentally, on 14 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered submissions from Admiral Sherman and the JSFC which would offer the allies reassurances rather than reinforcements. General Collins criticized these solutions as too nebulous; he contemplated (1) organizing a three-division corps for possible deployment to Western Europe and (2) expanding the 3 armored cavalry regiments in West Germany to a strength of 1½ divisions. On 14 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the JSFC to prepare a fresh paper.

The Service Secretaries were more outspoken. Acting independently, they advised Mr. Johnson that “the presence of American soldiers and American planes in force is probably a pre-requisite to German rearmament . . . .” They contended, therefore, that commitment of 4 additional US divisions and 15 air wings over
the next 18 months "would contribute more to the European will to resist than a
great proportion of the additional military assistance we now envisage." 38

Spurred by the Europeans and goaded by the Pentagon, the State Department
developed a new stance. Its position paper, circulated on 16 August, claimed that
conditions might now be favorable for creating a truly effective European De-
fense Force, assimilating a direct contribution by Germany. Such an army would
be subject to strategic direction by the NATO Standing Group. A Chief of Staff to
the Supreme Allied Commander (COSAC) should be established immediately,
without awaiting resolution of other issues; he would be superseded in due
course by a Supreme Commander. German divisions would be integrated with
non-German forces in corps and higher units; the Federal Republic would be for-
bidden a general staff and allowed only a procurement and service agency with-
out command responsibilities. 39

Concurrently, General Bradley composed "Thoughts on Defense of Western
Europe," which seemed to differ significantly from those of the State Department
only in stressing European invitation rather than US initiative. 40

1. Forces must be increased to a point where they will be effective.
2. This is not possible without much greater effort on the part of all European
nations, including Germany.
3. There should be a Western European Planning Group "Cossac," i.e., a full
headquarters and staff....
6. However, the question of a commander is of lesser importance until there
are forces to command....
8. The extent of US participation must be determined after the Western Euro-
pean nations make a decision on a Cossac...and a commander and invite
our participation. 41

This paper probably was written in preparation for the JCS meeting on the fol-
lowing day.

On 18 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General Crittenden to place
before the Standing Group "the desirability of establishing in Europe at the earli-
est practicable time an organization...which would consist of the Chief of Staff
and his staff of certain NATO forces in Europe." In general, the Chief of Staff's
position would parallel that filled by COSSAC in 1943 prior to General Eisen-
hower's appointment as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces. Act-
ing Chief of Staff to an unknown Supreme Commander, Lieutenant General
Frederick Morgan of Great Britain had assembled a headquarters staff and con-
ducted preliminary planning for the cross-channel assault. The Standing Group
accepted this proposal on 8 September but deferred further action pending deci-
sions by the North Atlantic Council. 41

Evidently, State Department concessions still left the Joint Chiefs of Staff un-
satisfied. Accordingly, on 26 August, President Truman convened a conference to
resolve remaining State-Defense differences. After this meeting, as a means of
summarizing their discussions, the Chief Executive posed several questions to Secretaries Acheson and Johnson:

1. Are we prepared to commit additional US forces to the defense of Europe?
2. Are we prepared to support, and in what manner, the concept of a European Defense force, including German participation on other than a national basis?
3. Are we prepared to look forward to the eventuality of a Supreme Commander for the European Defense forces?
4. Are we prepared to support the immediate creation of a Combined Staff for such an eventual Supreme Commander? . . .
5. Are there any other ways through which we should attempt to invigorate NATO at this time?

Answers would define US positions in the forthcoming Foreign Ministers and NAC meetings. Resolution of West Germany’s contribution to the common defense was rendered especially urgent by East Germany’s growing military capability.  

Secretary Johnson sent these queries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 30 August, they answered the President’s questions affirmatively. They endorsed the idea of a European Defense Force but insisted that German ground units join NATO forces upon a national basis. In their judgment, “the greatest step that could be taken to invigorate NATO would be the controlled rearmament of Western Germany and the admission of Western Germany as a member in that organization.”  

As a response to the JCS request on 14 August, the JSPC submitted on 1 September “a forthright statement by the United States as to its intentions and capabilities . . .,” intended for NSC approval and subsequent use by Secretary Acheson before the North Atlantic Council. Approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sent to the Secretary of Defense on 8 September, this paper pledged that US forces in Europe would be increased, as expeditiously as possible, to 4 infantry divisions, the equivalent of 1½ armored divisions, 8 tactical air wings, and appropriate naval forces. European allies were expected to provide the balance of forces for initial defense; firm programs for their development constituted a prerequisite for the fulfillment of American commitments.  

This information also was incorporated in the final State-Defense letter to the President.

Secretary Acheson now asserted to the “one package” program, “convinced, that it was the necessary price for Pentagon acceptance of a united command.”  

Assistant Secretary of State George W. Perkins, Mr. Paul Nitze of the Policy Planning Staff, and Colonel Royden Beebe of OSD prepared a draft affirming that the questions of German participation, Combined Staff, and Supreme Commander “must be considered together . . .” At JCS urging, this paper was amended in several respects: to specify what US reinforcements were contemplated; to insist more forcefully upon corresponding allied force increases; to declare the al-
liance’s objective of ultimately ensuring Western Europe’s successful defense; and to stress the necessity for immediate initiation of German rearmament.47

On 8 September the Secretaries of State and Defense presented these revised conclusions and recommendations to the President:

We are agreed that additional US forces should be committed to the defense of Europe at the earliest feasible date in order that any doubts of American interest in the defense, rather than the liberation, of Europe will be removed. . . . We agree that the over-all strength of US forces in Europe should be about 4 infantry divisions and the equivalent of 1½ armored divisions, 8 tactical air groups and appropriate naval forces . . . . Firm programs for the development of [corresponding European] forces should represent a prerequisite for the fulfillment of the above commitments on the part of the United States. In view of the Korean situation, . . . it would be undesirable to announce publicly the tentative departure date of additional units to Europe. However, appropriate European representatives should be informed at the earliest practicable date of our intention to increase our strength in Europe, as outlined above . . . .

The creation if a European defense force within the North Atlantic Treaty framework seems to us to be the best means of obtaining the maximum contribution from European nations and to provide as well a framework in which German contributions of a significant nature could be realized. The objective should be the early creation of an integrated force adequate to ensure the successful defense of Western Europe, including Western Germany, against possible Soviet invasion, commanded by a Supreme Commander at the earliest suitable date . . . .

It is our present thinking that German units larger than the balanced ground Division should not initially be authorized . . . . [These forces] should be nationally generated and so integrated as not to impair their morale or effectiveness . . . .

We should proceed without delay with the formation of adequate West German units . . . during which time the appropriate framework for their integration into a European defense force both in peace and war can be developed . . . .

We recommend that an American National be appointed now as Chief of Staff and eventually as a Supreme Commander but only upon the request of the European nations and upon their assurance that they will provide sufficient forces including adequate German units, to constitute a command reasonably capable of fulfilling its responsibilities . . . .

If the above recommendations meet with your approval, . . . the Secretary of State should be authorized to undertake at the earliest possible date preliminary negotiations with the other governments involved . . . .

The President accepted these proposals on 11 September.48

Mr. Truman also publicly announced that, acting in the “sincere expectation that our efforts will be met by similar action on [our allies’] part,” he had approved “substantial increases in the strength of United States forces to be stationed in Western Europe . . . . The extent of these increases and the timing thereof will be worked out in close coordination with our North Atlantic Treaty partners.” The Chief Executive apparently judged that the stimulus to European morale would outweigh the loss of American negotiating leverage.49
September Stalemate

On 12 September, the Secretary of State journeyed to New York for the NAC meeting. He was accompanied by Rear Admiral Thomas M. Robbins of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, who Mr. Acheson believed had been assigned "to see that I never wandered from the straight-and-narrow 'one package' path. It was said that he neither slumbered nor slept."  

Years later, the Secretary described the ensuing discussions as NATO's "first real debate": "In May we had talked long and earnestly but about abstractions and phrases. In September we closed with facts and brutal comparison of aims and capabilities." For three days prior to the Council meetings, Mr. Acheson deliberated with the British and French Foreign Ministers. The Secretary said that the United States sought a "middle course" between an international force and a German national army. The "real issue," he asserted, was that the United States stood ready to join in the collective defense of Western Europe. But the administration would not act until the allies accepted German participation, without which a successful defense of the continent was deemed impossible. M. Schuman replied that Mr. Acheson's proposal still required formation of some purely German units and therefore was unacceptable to the French Government. Foreign Secretary Bevin expressed substantial agreement with the American position but urged immediate appointment of a Supreme Commander. Saying that such a step might unduly alarm public opinion, M. Schuman asked that the appropriate moment be selected by the Defense Committee. In response, Secretary Acheson accented the need to create immediate forces-in-being and asserted that a Chief of Staff might appropriately undertake this task.  

After a private meeting just before the inaugural NAC session on 15 September, Secretary Acheson cabled the President that, despite "immediately discouraging" results, "I think that we may be getting somewhere."  However, on the following day M. Schuman abruptly repeated that he saw no difference between German participation in a European defense force and re-creation of a German national army. The French Foreign Minister disapproved German rearmament, even in principle, until allied forces had been so strengthened that the French Government could bear its domestic consequences. Subsequently, M. Schuman submitted two safeguards for Council consideration; first, the integrated force must exist before German units could be assimilated into it; second, the Germans must draw military equipment from a common NATO pool. Canada, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom approved the US position; the rest remained noncommittal, awaiting further French reactions. A three-day recess was declared on 19 September, to allow Ministers to consult their governments and to permit Secretary Acheson to address the UN General Assembly.  

The Ministers' communiqué of 19 September offered promises rather than performance. On the most sensitive subject, they said only that "the re-creation of a German national army would not serve the best interests of Germany and Europe." They agreed, however, to "increase and reinforce their forces in Germany" and to "treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter
as an attack upon themselves.” Additionally, they sketched a “new relationship” with West Germany, in which the state of war would be terminated, the Occupation Statute amended, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs permitted, and many economic controls ended.54

When discussions resumed, the Defense ministers would be taking part along with the Foreign Secretaries. General Marshall had just been appointed Secretary of Defense. Having scant time to prepare himself for the NAC meeting, he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff informally to suggest initial measures leading to the ultimate objective of creating German divisional units. Their response read as follows:

1. We believe that we should now attempt to obtain an agreement at least as forward-looking as the British draft resolution, which it is understood reads as follows: Agrees on the need for an integrated defense force, under a Supreme Commander with an integrated staff; Accepts in principle the participation of German units, subject to certain safeguards; Designates the Defense Committee to work out the agreed conditions.

2. Although the possibility of obtaining agreement has probably been overestimated in recent months, our eventual objective must be to obtain a German contribution to a European defense force equivalent to about 10–15 divisions, with certain safeguards, including no aviation, limitations on armament production and no national German General Staff.

3. We believe you should advocate that the following minimum measures be taken immediately by the Western Powers:
   a. Immediate strengthening of the West German laender [provincial] police to a strength of 30,000 men.
   b. Improve the quality and strength of Labor Service Units, for possible future use as army cadres.
   c. Establish Sabotage Security Units, Civil Defense Organization, Guerrilla Warfare Organization and appropriate Engineer Units.

4. We further believe that, as NATO forces are equipped and deployed, these initial measures can be stepped up in order more quickly to achieve the eventual objective.55

Joined by Defense Ministers George C. Marshall, Jules Moch, and Emmanuel Shinwell, the Foreign Secretaries reassembled on 22 September. At first, the discussions moved slowly. Then Secretary Marshall bluntly warned M. Moch that Congress would refuse to fund European rearmament if the French remained obdurate. Ultimately, the Ministers approved those “minimum measures” mentioned above. The Council’s final communiqué, approved on 26 September, endorsed the early creation of “an integrated force adequate to deter aggression and ensure the defense of Western Europe, including Western Germany.” Additionally, a Supreme Commander would be appointed as soon as sufficient national forces had been committed to render this army “reasonably capable of fulfilling its responsibilities.” The Standing Group would determine requirements for the integrated force and would serve as the superior military body to which the Supreme Commander was responsible. Finally, the Defense Committee was directed to recommend to the Council as a matter of urgency:

a. The detailed measures necessary to establish the integrated force.
b. The powers to be exercised by the Supreme Commander.
c. The method and timing of national force contributions.
d. Changes and simplifications required in the military structure of NATO.
e. Specific recommendations regarding the method by which Germany could make its most useful contribution, "bearing in mind the unanimous conclusion of the Council that it would not serve the best interests of Europe or of Germany to bring into being a German national army or a German general staff."

The Council also approved appointment of a COSSAC "forthwith," but this decision foundered upon difficulties described subsequently.66

The Pleven Plan

The Defense Committee began grappling with the problems of military reorganization, force planning, and West German participation. The State and Defense Departments prepared position papers addressing each of these issues. Reorganization proposals approved by Secretaries Acheson and Marshall called for gradual elimination of regional planning groups, abolition of the Western European Union organization, and immediate creation of the offices of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and Commander in Chief, Allied Naval Forces Mediterranean.67

In September, the Secretary of Defense had requested JCS recommendations concerning the major force levels to be achieved by each country during each year.68 Their reply, which General Marshall endorsed on 23 October, read as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATO Present</th>
<th>NATO 1 July 51</th>
<th>NATO 1 July 54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army (divisions, ready and reserve)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4 Inf</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Armd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>10 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3½ Inf</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>¾ Armd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>6 Inf</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Armd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Abn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (all countries)</strong></td>
<td>29½</td>
<td>54½</td>
<td>96½</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Navy (major combatant vessels)** |         |                |                |
| UK                                | 91       | 94             | 162            |
| US                                | 141      | 222            | 338            |
| **Total (all countries)**         | 301      | 389            | 610            |
JCS and National Policy

Air Force (aeroplane, all types)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>1,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>3,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>2,547</td>
<td>4,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (all countries)</td>
<td>3,745</td>
<td>5,418</td>
<td>12,711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This paper also was transmitted to the US representative on the Standing Group, Vice Admiral Jerauld Wright, who presented it as the United States position for the forthcoming meeting.\(^{59}\)

Secretary Marshall also sought to mitigate the rigidity of the “one package” program. On 2 October, he requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to expound the concepts and practical measures necessary to create a European Defense Force. These opinions, the Secretary related, would form the basis of his argument before the Defense Committee during 28–31 October. Although the US position continued to be that of non-concurrence in any proposal that excluded a German contribution, he asked that details of the forces’ creation and command “be proposed in such a way as not to be contingent on German participation but adaptable to her inclusion.”\(^{60}\)

In answering Secretary Marshall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still defined West German participation as the keystone of NATO’s arch. Should the Defense Ministers deadlock, intermediate measures might be adopted with the “clear understanding” that these were preliminary steps toward the ultimate objective. If agreement still proved impossible, they declared themselves of the opinion that the US course of action for the conduct of a war against the USSR, including the magnitude and extent of the US contribution to the defense of Western Europe, should be re-examined by the United States.”\(^{61}\) This was striking language, foreshadowing that “agonizing reappraisal” threatened by Secretary Dulles in 1954.

In another memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also apprised Secretary Marshall of propositions that should be placed before the Defense Committee “only in the event of favorable resolution of the question of German participation.” These were: to designate a Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), at once; to issue a basic directive for SACEUR’s guidance; to provide funds and international staff necessary to create a unified headquarters; and to obtain commitments of additional forces for peacetime assignment and of units to be allotted upon mobilization.\(^{62}\)

By separate action, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did suggest that a Supreme Commander be selected immediately, without awaiting the appointment of a Chief of Staff. On 13 October, they informally advised Secretary Marshall that General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower should be appointed to this position; a formal recommendation followed seven days later. President Truman consulted General Eisenhower and found him agreeable.\(^{63}\)

Meanwhile, a State-Defense working group reexamined possible positions on German rearmament and reaffirmed the impracticality of committing US forces
to West Germany's defense without permitting the German population to participate therein. They sought a solution through safeguards that might mitigate French fears of revanchism: German divisions should not exceed one-fifth the total number of divisions in the integrated force; the Allies would retain general supervision of German officer recruitment; the Germans could exercise control only over administrative and logistical functions; certain prohibitions and limitations upon German industry would continue. Passing this paper to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 October, Secretary Marshall remarked upon the reappearance of "what I thought was an error in the original [US] presentation." The Working Group, he contended, had merely stated the conditions for German participation without specifying how these were to be achieved.\(^4\)

Final State-Defense position papers embodied JCS recommendations; the "one package" program stood unaltered. However, Secretary Acheson "extended" his Department's position much in the manner which General Marshall had intimated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

I...suggest that we leave open the possibility of a re-examination...If there is continued delay in securing agreement of the French government..., we will arrive rather quickly at a situation where we must, under our present position, delay our moves for support of the entire integrated force concept. When that moment arrives, it may be that delay...[will not] be in the best interests of the U.S. This would be particularly true if we were convinced by that time that the French government would be able, within a relatively short period of time, to agree to German participation in the force.\(^5\)

Americans did not appreciate the passionate opposition of Frenchmen to German rearmament. Conversing with Secretary Marshall and Mr. Lovett in early October, for example, Secretary Acheson anticipated that Premier Pleven's Cabinet would offer a "Schuman Plan" for military collaboration.\(^6\) Therefore, the administration was wholly unprepared for the French proposals that were presented soon afterward. Under the "Pleven Plan," as reported by Ambassador Bruce on 23 October and expounded by Defense Minister Moch four days later, a special force would be organized under a European Defense Minister; German recruits would constitute its manpower pool, with French cadres providing training and leadership. This army would grow to 100,000 men, the German contribution being confined to battalion-size units. As elements became effective, they would be placed under the Supreme Commander.\(^7\) In effect, the Plan contemplated "rearming the Germans without rearming Germany."

Conferring on 23 and 26 October, the US and UK Chiefs of Staff could find little merit in the Pleven Plan. General Bradley counseled Secretary Marshall that such an intermingling of Frenchmen and Germans, at whatever level proposed, was "entirely impractical." It would be difficult to supply such a mixed force and impossible to organize effective air-ground cooperation. Certainly, Germans would never play the part of mere cannon fodder. He felt, furthermore, that "this organization of a Minister of Defense of Europe cuts across practically all the
lines of NATO and, if adopted, would make NATO inoperable.” Secretary Acheson also adjudged the scheme “hopeless”; General Marshall professed inability to penetrate the plan’s “miasma.” Allied reactions were equally unfavorable. UK Defense Minister Emmanuel Shinwell privately denounced the proposal as “disgusting and nauseous, . . . military folly and political madness.” Indeed, he averred that the plan was consciously devised to be unacceptable, thereby offering a means of escape from France’s NATO obligations. In separate interviews with Secretary Marshall, the Netherlands and Portuguese Defense Ministers also affirmed their strong opposition.68

Meeting from 28–31 October, the Defense Committee approved 1954 force requirements for the Medium Term Defense Plan—49½ ready divisions (reserves excluded), 801 major combatant vessels and 9,212 aircraft—which closely corresponded to JCS recommendations.69 However, it became obvious that all Ministers save M. Moch opposed the Pleven Plan and equally apparent that no meeting of the minds was possible. Secretary Marshall scrupulously avoided either criticizing the Pleven Plan or pressing for the US proposal, in order to create a climate for compromise. Nonetheless, Secretary Acheson said later, M. Moch “deliberately distorted our motives and in effect accused us of a breach of faith” in relating the unified command to German rearmament. Adjourning without agreement, the Defense Ministers directed the Military Committee and the Council of Deputies to draft a Joint report.70

The Brussels Solution

The most pressing problem was that of adapting the French objective of eventual European federation to the American desire for immediate German rearmament. Ambassador Spofford prepared a two-phased plan. Basically, he proposed to separate short-term military arrangements from long-term discussions on political federation. Recruitment of Germans, and their organization into 5,000-man regimental combat teams, would commence without delay. Concurrently, European powers would convene to consider French proposals for development of common political institutions; these might develop sufficiently to support military forces suitable for integration within NATO. Thus German rearmament would be launched under strong tripartite or NATO controls but should reach fruition within the framework of a European army.

Discussing this plan on 16 November, State-Defense representatives agreed that division-sized German units would ultimately be essential and noted that Ambassador Spofford’s scheme did not clearly specify how the transition from regimental to divisional organization would occur. Nevertheless, they authorized the Ambassador to place his proposal before the Council. Mr. Spofford thereupon presented his plan and reported that it seemed to have some solvent effect upon French intransigence. As he subsequently told the State Department, the situation had become “tactically quite fluid.”71
The Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently accepted the Spofford Plan with some reservations. Reviewing recommendations by the Standing Group, for example, they listed the following requirements: the ultimate requirement for divisional German units must be unequivocally approved; such assent must not be contingent upon development of the French-sponsored European federation; and creation of bilingual units must be deemed unacceptable.72

An impasse seemed inescapable. During a State-Defense meeting on 1 December, all military members agreed that further NATO conferences would be futile unless agreement upon German participation was assured in advance. Secretary Marshall then contributed an “abrupt, authoritative statement that it was no use talking about divisions, integrated forces or commanders until we faced and solved the problem of whether we wished to moderate our present determined (one-package) stand.”73

At that point, Chinese intervention in Korea momentarily overturned every politico-military estimate. US plans for Europe inhibited US responses in Asia. General Bradley cautioned Senator Alexander Smith, for example, that if US bombers attacked Manchuria the Soviet Army probably would sweep to the English Channel. As Secretary Marshall said during an NSC discussion, “Our entire international position depended on strengthening Western Europe. We could not rush into measures for Korea and the Pacific that would cause such Russian reactions that our European allies would be scared away.”74

The Korean crisis precipitated an anxious meeting between President Truman and Prime Minister Clement Attlee. Position papers prepared for US use at this conference imparted an acute sense of urgency and alarm. Appraising the impact of Korea upon NATO defense preparations, the State Department said that no assurance could now be given regarding US reinforcements; the administration should only promise “to go ahead and do our best.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, appending a statement that “our military preparations must be increased and accelerated to the extent that both our obligations in the Far East and our military commitments under NATO can be realized.”75

The State Department also advised that, upon achievement of an agreement on German rearmament, the allies should immediately proceed to appoint a Supreme Commander and establish an integrated force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed but added several qualifications:

1. . . . No new U.S. military commitments of any nature, particularly to Indochina or to Europe, other than aid, should be made until the resolution of the emergency in Korea.

2. . . . If the early appointment of a Supreme Commander will materially assist in improving the European situation, [we] would be prepared to consider such an appointment when the NATO powers reached agreement on German rearmament.

3. . . . It is imperative to achieve a tangible measure of increased defense capabilities in Europe by, among other things, the early utilization of the German war potential and by increased effective forces in being . . . provided by the European powers.76
Commenting upon two related State Department papers, they also suggested amendments that would emphasize the example set by US rearmament and ask equivalent European efforts. The President and the Prime Minister debated NATO issues on 6 December. Mr. Truman urged “complete agreement on the European side so that we can go ahead and appoint the Supreme Commander.” Mr. Attlee replied that, although the Spofford Plan offered hope for progress, best results would be obtained by the immediate appointment of a Supreme Commander. Secretary Acheson then reported that the French Cabinet had tentatively approved Mr. Spofford’s proposal and probably would accept the JCS requirements regarding German participation. Nonetheless, Field Marshal Slim stated that Europeans could be stirred to action only by selection of a Supreme Commander. He pleaded also for the immediate dispatch to Europe of US divisions, which could complete their training in Germany. Secretary Marshall commented that the United States had intended to transport three divisions to Germany during 1951; the Korean crisis now rendered this step “very problematical.” Moreover, he emphatically opposed shipment of unready troops, recalling the poor impression made upon the French by untrained Americans in 1917. Thus what Field Marshal Slim termed the “vicious circle” seemed unbroken. The US-UK communiqué issued after the meeting, on 8 December, was ambiguously phrased:

We agreed that as soon as the plan now nearing completion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for an effective integrated force for the defense of Europe is approved, a Supreme Commander should be appointed. It is our joint desire that this appointment shall be made soon.

A combined session of the North Atlantic Council and Defense Committee was set for 18–19 December. By 7 December, a “somewhat indefinite but satisfactory agreement” on German rearmament by the Military Committee and the NAC Deputies appeared imminent; the Defense Department possessed “every assurance” that they would shortly approve a joint report embodying the Spofford Plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reluctantly accepted this solution, describing it as representing “the maximum concession they could make,” and insisting that plans for the size and employment of German units remain open to later revision. General Vandenberg actually disapproved this decision but abstained so that agreement could be achieved.

Secretary Marshall suggested that, after the Spofford solution had been approved, the US should announce its intention to increase American forces in Europe to 4 infantry divisions, the equivalent of 1½ armored divisions, 8 tactical air wings, and appropriate naval forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who earlier had favored such a statement, now opposed any listing of specific force levels in order to allow the administration “freedom of action in an emergency.” Firm programs for allied force development, they again asserted, should represent a prerequisite for the fulfillment of additional US commitments. Secretary Marshall incorporated these amendments in his memorandum to Mr. Acheson, noting that Presi-
dent Truman intended soon to announce the assignment to SACEUR of additional forces.\textsuperscript{80}

Accompanied by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace (representing General Marshall), Mr. Acheson arrived in Brussels on 18 December. In an atmosphere inflamed by fear of another world war, the allies at last approved German rearmament under terms acceptable to the United States. This agreement was embodied in a report submitted to the NAC by the Military Committee and the Council Deputies, which may be summarized as follows:

1. German participation would take the form of complete national formations, with necessary supporting arms and services. Although the division was thought to meet military requirements best, the RCT was declared acceptable “if this small unit is judged desirable for political or other reasons.”

2. Safeguards were specified to prevent development of either a German national army or a self-supporting war industry. In particular, Western Germany’s contribution should not exceed 20 percent of the forces allocated to the integrated force.

3. The European Defense Force was deemed an acceptable concept if its consummation did not delay German contribution to the defense of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{81}

The Council quickly approved this report. Furthermore, the Ministers authorized two simultaneous approaches to German participation: first, by the High Commissioners to discuss the Spofford Plan with Chancellor Adenauer; second, by a conference to consider creation of the French-sponsored European Defense Community. Completing these tasks, the NAC then (1) endorsed creation of an integrated defense force, (2) approved the Medium Term Defense Plan, and (3) created the office of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, petitioning President Truman to appoint General Eisenhower to this position. Mr. Truman designated General Eisenhower SACEUR on the following day, telling him that the NAC request represented “a pledge that Allied support of your efforts will be complete and unequivocal.”\textsuperscript{82}

With these actions, uncertainty ended and expansion began. As Ernest Bevin confided to a close friend:

It is given to few men to see their dreams fulfilled. Three times in the last year I know I have nearly died, but I kept myself alive because I wanted to see this North Atlantic Alliance properly launched. This has been done today.
NATO in Expansion: 1951

The “Great Debate”

In September 1950, to recapitulate, President Truman had announced his approval of “substantial increases” to US strength in Western Europe, contingent upon matching efforts by other NATO countries. Two months later, the US Seventh Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy, was activated in Germany. And on 19 December, the day when General Eisenhower’s appointment as SACEUR was announced, the President told newsmen that additional US forces, of a size still to be determined, would go to Europe.1

Predictably, the unprecedented decision to send considerable American forces abroad in peacetime aroused angry debate. As in the 1940–1941 controversy over aid to Great Britain, partisanship was obvious but party lines were not firmly drawn. Encouraged by Republican victories in the 1950 Congressional elections, Senator Robert A. Taft demanded a full “reexamination” of foreign policy. Following reverses in Korea, this chorus rose quickly toward a crescendo. Former President Herbert Hoover pleaded that this country’s energies be redirected toward preserving a “Western Hemisphere Gibraltar of Western Civilization.” Addressing a national audience, Mr. John Foster Dulles strongly endorsed the collective security concept but advocated greater reliance upon a “capacity to counterattack.” In a Senate speech on 5 January 1951, Senator Taft skillfully blended the themes expounded by Messrs. Hoover and Dulles, contrasting the costs and risks of land campaigning with the invulnerability of air-sea power. Senator Kenneth S. Wherry gave legislative substance to these dissents by introducing, on 8 January, the following proposal: “Resolved, that no ground forces . . . should be assigned to duty in the European area . . . pending the formulation of a policy with respect thereto by the Congress.”2 Conversely, President Truman contended that, as Commander in Chief, he possessed authority “to send troops anywhere in the world.” Regarding his responsibilities toward Congress, the Chief Executive remarked pithily at a press conference on 11 January, “I don’t ask their permission, I just consult them.”3
General Eisenhower, rather than President Truman, proved to be the administration’s most persuasive advocate. On 31 January, after a rapid tour of NATO capitals, the Supreme Commander advised the President that the allies agreed that a unified defense could be successfully organized. He also reported, however, that Western Europe’s poverty greatly magnified the difficulty of determining individual defense contributions. “These people believe in the cause,” General Eisenhower told Mr. Truman. “Now, they have got to believe in themselves. . . . The way we can give them that confidence is by sending equipment and . . . American units over there . . . .” So, simultaneously, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally recommended that one armored and three infantry divisions be deployed to Western Europe. Their proposal to transfer six air wings followed in April.4

On 1 February, General Eisenhower assured the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees that, with far fewer forces than the Soviets possessed, NATO could protect “rather significant portions” of Western Europe. In his judgment, forty divisions (ready and reserve) could offer effective resistance.5 This testimony quieted some Congressional opposition, by dispelling unwarranted fears that an infinitely larger allied force would be needed.

The hearings sought by Senator Wherry, which commenced on 15 February, further calmed Congressional unease. Secretary Marshall revealed that only four additional divisions would be dispatched to Europe. Arguing that “morale right now is the greatest factor, he said that the US force thus assembled (six division-equivalents) would constitute “a keystone” for NATO efforts.6

Subsequent administration witnesses stressed that the deterrent power of SAC alone was insufficient. Secretary Acheson stated that, because the present substantial lead in air power and in atomic weapons would inevitably diminish, the West should proceed under this protective shield to create balanced collective forces which would continue to deter aggression after the atomic advantage had eroded.7

Testifying individually, the Joint Chiefs of Staff affirmed that ground troops, as well as air and sea forces, were necessary to repel an invasion of Western Europe. General Collins avowed that Western Europe could be successfully defended if all nations contributed adequately to the common defense. The Army Chief of Staff acknowledged that the atom bomb constituted the greatest deterrent, but said that any general war “ultimately is very likely to be decided on the ground . . . supported by adequate air.” Similarly, General Vandenberg said that, without delaying ground forces, the Red Army could overrun Western Europe despite the great losses inflicted by strategic bombing.8

On 4 April, by a vote of 69–21, the Senate approved the dispatch of four divisions and endorsed the appointment of General Eisenhower. But that body also stated “the sense of the Senate” that no further ground forces should be deployed to Europe without prior Congressional consent. The Defense Department’s General Counsel advised that the resolution had no compulsory legal effect but did raise “questions of policy insofar as it records an expression of opinion on the part of the Senate.” The “Great Debate” thus ended in victory for the administration.9
On the day following the Senate vote, the Defense Department publicly designated the divisions destined for Europe and specified their estimated times of departure. The 4th Infantry Division's vanguard sailed from New York on 19 May; the 2nd Armored Division began shipment on 30 June; the 43rd and 28th Infantry Divisions (National Guard) commenced embarkation on 11 October and 12 November respectively. The last ground units reached Germany on 8 December, thereby completing the commitment. Air wings were deployed between June and October.\(^\text{10}\)

The Establishment of SHAPE

The "Great Debate" did not impede creation of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). Serving as Chief of Staff to SACEUR, Lieutenant General Alfred M. Gruenther installed a SHAPE planning group at the Hotel Astoria in Paris during January. Shortly afterwards, the French Government donated a site at Rocquencourt (in the Versailles area) on which headquarters buildings were quickly constructed.\(^\text{11}\) Field Marshal Montgomery assumed the office of Deputy Supreme Commander. His wartime differences with General Eisenhower were well-known, but what better way was there to revive public confidence than by recreating the victorious team of "Ike" and "Monty"?

General Eisenhower reported to the Standing Group but continued to communicate directly with Secretary Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 15 March, SACEUR submitted to the Standing Group "an initial and only partially complete" plan of organization and command, indicating that "psychological considerations" demanded its early publication. The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately concurred; the Standing Group announced its approval on 20 March. SACEUR's scheme established Northern, Central and Southern subordinate commands, the headquarters of which were later sited in Oslo, Fontainebleau and Naples. General Eisenhower felt compelled by political considerations initially to retain operational control of the crucial Central sector; he appointed General Juin, General Norstad and Vice Admiral Jaujard as his ground, air, and naval commanders respectively. Formal activation of SHAPE and of the Northern and Central Commands occurred on 2 April.\(^\text{12}\)

The strength available to SACEUR increased significantly during 1951. In April, General Eisenhower commanded 16 NATO divisions (in varying degrees of readiness) and fewer than 1,000 aircraft; by December, he could deploy 35 divisions (active and ready reserve) and nearly 3,000 aircraft. SHAPE and its several subordinate headquarters were functioning satisfactorily; autumn maneuvers had substantially improved cohesion and combat-readiness; airfield construction was well advanced, and communications facilities were being improved and extended. The nucleus of an international force now existed.\(^\text{13}\)
The Reorganization of NATO

During SHAPE’s formative period, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed major alterations in NATO’s organizational structure. Learning of a State-Defense proposal to shift the Standing Group from Washington and the Council of Deputies from London, and to place both bodies in Paris, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Marshall that such transfers would “subject SACEUR to direct political pressure which might well be detrimental to him militarily.” Additionally, the proximity of the Council of Deputies to SHAPE would lessen the military authority of the Standing Group, in which American influence was “more predominant.” General Eisenhower supported these conclusions. In addition to citing heightened security risks, shortages of accommodations, and diminution of the Standing Group’s authority, he averred that the existing distribution of major agencies among London, Paris and Washington served to sustain national leaders’ interest in the alliance. No relocations of NATO agencies occurred, although other important reorganizational measures were effected.

On 11 December 1950, the Canadian Government placed before the Council of Deputies a proposal that the Defense Committee and the Defense Financial and Economic Committee be absorbed within the North Atlantic Council. Thus governments would be represented in the NAC by their Foreign, Defense, and/or Finance Ministers as the occasion required. The Council of Deputies would remain in continuous session and act for member governments between NAC sessions. The Military Representatives Committee (on which all member nations were equally represented regardless of their military strength) would be redesignated as a new “Defense Committee,” composed of national chiefs of staff or their representatives. The existing Military Committee would be abolished.

Requested by Mr. Lovett to develop a Defense Department position, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acceded the Canadian proposals small praise and considerable censure. They agreed that the Defense Ministers’ inclusion in the NAC was “especially desirable,” as a means of ensuring that military matters would be accorded their proper importance. However, they did not believe that Council Deputies should represent their governments “except when the Governments concerned have indicated their approved position.” Additionally, they argued that the Canadian proposals would subordinate the Standing Group, in which the United States played a predominant part, “to the day-to-day control of a relatively weak and ineffective committee of representatives of national chiefs of staff.” Similarly, reconstitution of the Military Representatives Committee as the Defense Committee would reduce US military influence to that exercised by the smallest NATO nation. In sum, apart from minor alterations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended retention of the current functions, organization and relationships of the Military Committee, Standing Group and Military Representatives Committee.

On 24 February, Mr. Lovett advised Secretary Acheson that he preferred to postpone major adjustments. Should submission of a “positive proposal” before the Deputies prove necessary, however, he presented two propositions: the first, “Solution A,” postponed reorganization pending full installation and operating
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES
LONDON

MILITARY COMMITTEE

MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON

STANDING GROUP
WASHINGTON

COMMAND ORGANIZATION

DEFENCE PRODUCTION BOARD
LONDON

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC BOARD
PARIS

PLANNING BOARD FOR OCEAN SHIPPING
LONDON
WASHINGTON

NATO ORGANIZATION IN MAY 1951
experiences of SHAPE and subordinate commands; the second, "Solution B," essentially embodied the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During a conference on 5 March, the Acting Secretaries of State and Defense agreed upon several revisions to "Solution B." First, the Council should be composed primarily of Foreign and Defense Ministers; other Ministers would enter sessions only when the agenda so required. Second, no alterations in NATO's military structure ought to be undertaken at that time. Third, direct relations between the Deputies and the Standing Group must be maintained; no plan would be accepted that interposed the Military Representatives Committee.  

Reorganization proposals were thoroughly discussed by the Council Deputies. On 5 May, Ambassador Spofford announced that all governments had accepted the Canadian plan together with important modifications desired by the United States. Through this solution, the NAC absorbed the Defense Committee and thereby became the sole ministerial body in the organization, to be comprised of Foreign, Defense or Finance Ministers as circumstances dictated. The Council Deputies were elevated to the status of "a permanent working organization of the NAC," representing all Ministers in their government concerned with NATO affairs.

The Atlantic and Mediterranean Commands: Decisions Deferred

If SACEUR was to accomplish his mission of defending Western Europe, his lines of communications through the Atlantic and his right flank in the Mediterranean must remain secure. Unhappily, organization of commands for these two areas proved an elusive quest. Prospects for agreement, which appeared near as 1951 opened, continually receded as the year progressed.

During its December 1950 meeting, the Defense Committee decided that the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) should be appointed as soon as possible after selection of SACEUR. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thereupon recommended that Admiral William M. Fechteler (currently US Commander in Chief, Atlantic) assume this position; President Truman signed an undated letter confirming his appointment. On 19 February 1951, the Council Deputies provisionally nominated Admiral Fechteler for the post of SACLANT.

This plan was accepted by Clement Attlee; it was rejected by Winston Churchill. Speaking in the House of Commons on 22 February, the former Prime Minister bitterly assailed the Labor Government for thus surrendering Great Britain's historic naval primacy. Saying that he did not think his country "should have fallen so far into the walks of humility," Mr. Churchill inquired, "Was there no British admiral capable of discharging these functions?" Mr. Attlee promised to "reconsider" command solutions.

At a meeting in London on 3 March, General Eisenhowe, Admiral Sherman, and Admiral Robert B. Carney (US Commander in Chief, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean) reviewed the situation. SACEUR feared that the impact upon British public opinion of Admiral Fechteler's appointment was "so se-
rious as perhaps to precipitate a political upheaval and possible adverse public attitude toward NATO.” To offset this effect, General Eisenhower considered it “absolutely necessary” that the Royal Navy receive a position of importance in the Mediterranean command structure. (Historical precedents included the appointments of Field Marshals Alexander and Wilson as successive Supreme Allied Commanders, Mediterranean, during 1944–1945). Admiral Carney demurred, insisting that the United States assume leadership positions commensurate with its military and economic power. But Admiral Sherman agreed with SACEUR that British sensibilities must be soothed. He therefore intended to show the British Chiefs of Staff (BCS) the compromise proposals summarized below:

1. Reconsideration of Atlantic command arrangements, particularly to replace the title of Supreme Commander with that of “CINC.”
2. Appointment of Admiral Carney as Allied CINC of a Southern Region, responsible to SACEUR.
3. Designation of a British admiral as Allied Naval CINC, Mediterranean, responsible to Admiral Carney as required for the defense of Europe.

General Eisenhower agreed with this approach.21

After meeting on 5 March with the British Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Sherman advised his JCS colleagues that the compromise plan had foundered and the situation was developing into “a military problem having serious implications.” The British clearly hoped to control the northeast Atlantic region, limiting SACLANT primarily to allocation of forces. In Admiral Sherman’s judgment, this solution would so dilute SACLANT’s authority and freedom of action “as to make it questionable [whether] the US should accept the implied responsibilities without further qualification.” Moreover, the BCS now advocated appointment of a British “Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean” (SACMED) equal to SACEUR and responsible directly to the Standing Group; he believed this plan would disrupt SACEUR’s organizational scheme and create complications vis-à-vis the proposed Middle East Command.22 In these circumstances, Admiral Sherman recommended that final action on Admiral Fechteler’s appointment be deferred, in order to afford more time for US-UK discussions and to avoid the impression of insisting upon exclusively American assignments to NATO’s Supreme Commands.23

Immediately accepting this proposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended on 12 March that Admiral Fechteler’s nomination be held in abeyance while the Council of Deputies decided upon terms of reference for SACLANT. The administration agreed. Regarding the Mediterranean, Admiral Sherman summarized the current situation as follows:

Actually, I do not believe we [and the British] are very far apart...from a military point of view. We are poles apart with respect to titles and their political and economic implications in the Mediterranean.24

SACLANT’s appointment thus awaited resolution of Mediterranean command arrangements. On 15 March, SACEUR apprised the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that he envisaged establishment of a Southern European regional headquarters, commanded by Admiral Carney; the US Sixth Fleet would operate under Admiral Carney's direct control. They, in turn, placed this proposal within a new plan encompassing the entire Mediterranean—Middle East area. As transmitted to General Eisenhower on 21 March, it provided for:

a. Appointment of a British officer as Supreme Allied Commander Middle East (SACME) responsible to either the BCS or appropriate higher authority. An Allied Naval CINC Middle East would be subordinate to SACME; this officer would coordinate Mediterranean naval matters with Admiral Carney.

b. Appointment of a US officer as Allied CINC Southern Europe, under SACEUR, whose area of responsibility would include the Mediterranean, Greece, European Turkey, the Turkish Straits and the Aegean Sea littoral.25

The exigencies of British politics postponed NATO decisions. On 4 April, Field Marshal Slim and Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser confided to Admiral Wright a plan entailing a British SACMED with French and British sub-area commanders. A subordinate Naval CINC would command all Mediterranean naval forces. Citing political demands for a British supreme commander within NATO, Field Marshal Slim stated that this single concession by the United States would resolve the entire situation.26

On 16 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed Admiral Wright to lay before the Standing Group the proposals they had submitted to SACEUR on 21 March. But they apparently anticipated a British rejection. Two days later, therefore, they asked SACEUR to appraise a compromise akin to the British solution presented on 4 April. Under this plan, a British naval officer would be appointed Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean-Middle East (SACMED-ME). His immediate subordinate would be a US Naval CINC (presumably Admiral Carney), responsible to SACEUR for support of missions in Europe and to SACMED-ME for execution of other Mediterranean naval tasks.27

The ensuing weeks witnessed tortuous advance toward Anglo-American agreement. After a House of Commons debate on the Fechteler appointment, a Conservative motion censuring the Attlee government was defeated 291–280. Immediately afterwards, Defense Minister Shinwell privately assured Americans that this division "much exaggerated the degree of real opposition...." Therefore, he trusted it would now prove possible to remove the ban on announcement of Admiral Fechteler's appointment and rapidly to resolve negotiations relating to the Mediterranean command.28

At this point, the attitude adopted by General Eisenhower delayed further advances. On 23 April, SACEUR advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, while he found their proposition on 21 March acceptable, the "compromise" solution of 18 April could not satisfy his requirements. Much of the difficulty, he believed,
SACEUR agreed that Admiral Carney might assume additional duties on behalf of either SACMED or SACMED-ME, provided that his naval striking force was assigned chiefly to the accomplishment of SACEUR’s missions. Additionally, General Eisenhower believed Admiral Carney should be empowered to conduct consultative planning for coordination of Greek, Yugoslav, and Turkish forces.\(^{29}\)

In light of these adverse comments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that they could do nothing further. Accordingly, on 24 April, they recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the command problem be referred to the Military Committee “for reexamination as a whole.” Mr. Lovett sent this proposal to the State Department with his endorsement. Secretary Acheson disapproved. He claimed that, because Atlantic command arrangements were such a sensitive political issue in the United Kingdom, “a reexamination could not be publicly requested... without seriously embarrassing the British Government.” He suggested, therefore, that State-Defense representatives privately discuss these complications with British spokesmen. Acting Secretary Lovett accepted this approach on 12 May.\(^{30}\)

Admiral Sherman and General Vandenberg met Ambassador Franks and Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot, BCS representative in Washington, on 24 May. After the British had again presented their SACMED (or CINCMED) proposal, Admiral Sherman spoke as follows: “That would mean two naval officers... operating in the same waters, with the British CINC relying on Admiral Carney for ships when he had fighting to do. To me, that is an impossible way to fight. ... We must have a single naval commander in the Mediterranean area”—namely, Admiral Carney. Ambassador Franks conceded the strength of these criticisms, but added another argument: “We must consider the will of our people and I assure you that their feeling in this matter is deeper than words.”\(^{31}\)

Two major difficulties revolved around responsibilities of the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), (which the BCS wished to restrict) and actual command of the Mediterranean (which they insisted be unified under a British CINC). The BCS therefore proposed direct discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in order that their differences might be quickly composed.\(^{32}\) A conference between General Bradley and the BCS on 8 June seemed to augur early success. Admiral Fraser presented a modified proposal. A UK officer would be appointed Naval CINC Mediterranean, responsible to a British SACME. The US Sixth Fleet would remain under the command of Admiral Carney, who would maintain close liaison with the British CINC. General Bradley commented that this scheme of “joint functional control” in the Mediterranean closely paralleled his own thinking. Concerning SACLANT, General Bradley said that the United States hesitated to accept command responsibilities in view of continued British criticism; he then suggested formation of an organization for the Atlantic following the lines of dual control now proposed for the Mediterranean. Admiral Fraser answered that Americans were taking too seriously the opinions of “retired British admirals.” Moreover, he advised that the
intensity of Tory opposition made it “almost impossible” for the Labor government to renounce and renegotiate Atlantic Command arrangements.33

With the Standing Group’s concurrence, SACEUR announced on 18 June the appointment of Admiral Carney as CINCSOUTH. Admiral Carney also was designated initially as Commander of the Allied Naval Forces allocated to SACEUR in Southern Europe; in that capacity he would exercise control over the US Sixth Fleet. Until higher authority evolved a command system “for the Mediterranean as a whole,” Admiral Carney would coordinate his activities with those of friendly forces in adjacent areas.34

Resolution of the Mediterranean-Middle East command problem was complicated by the anticipated entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO. In September 1950, the NAC had offered only to associate these countries in a military planning agency encompassing the Mediterranean area. Full membership was withheld because the allies thought themselves too weak either to risk provocation or to provide protection. When that solution proved unsatisfactory to Greece and Turkey, Secretary Acheson recommended—and the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed—admission of both nations to full membership at the earliest practicable date. Approving this proposal on 14 April 1951, Secretary Marshall suggested that the State Department first prepare, through negotiations with the British and French, a formula for admission that would be acceptable to all the allies.35

In a meeting on 19 June with British spokesmen, State-JCS representatives tentatively approved (1) creation of a British SACME responsible to the Standing Group, as already agreed by General Bradley and the BCS, and (2) division of Mediterranean naval command between British and American officers, the former subordinate to SACME and the latter to SACEUR. Also, they agreed upon the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO; Greek forces would be placed under SACEUR, Turkish under SACME.36

Unhappily, subsequent Anglo-American negotiations generated confusion rather than clarification. The United Kingdom asked that Turkey’s admission to NATO be made contingent upon her agreement fully to participate in the proposed Middle East Command (MEC). The Joint Chiefs of Staff thereupon prepared a new proposal: SACME would supervise two subordinate area commands, seated in Turkey and the Levant; he would look to the NATO Standing Group for strategic direction pertaining to Turkey and to a Middle East Standing Group for guidance encompassing the Levant and Middle East. Thus British and Turkish desires would both be satisfied. In its turn, the State Department proposed that no additional prior conditions be attached to Turkey’s admission to NATO, and that the standing Group draft final plans for a Middle East Command structure after Turkey’s entry. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this approach.37

On 1 September, the British presented a three-part counter-proposal: first, disassociate advance resolution of the Middle East Command from the issue of Turkey’s admission to NATO; second, publish intentions of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to organize a Middle East Command; third, postpone public announcements regarding appointments of SACLANT and SACME.38 While this proposal was still under study, France created an additional complication. During discussion in the Standing Group, the French representative an-
nounced that his country's acceptance of the Middle East Command concept was conditional upon appointment of a French naval commander for the region bounded by Southern France, North Africa and Sardinia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Admiral Wright's recommendation that French naval responsibilities be appropriately recognized—but within the command structure of CINC-SOUTH. The Standing Group took no further action, awaiting a NAC meeting scheduled for mid-October.

Uncertainty over a Mediterranean solution impeded a decision concerning the Atlantic Command. On 13 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluding that the time had come to bring Admiral Fechteler's name before the Council of Deputies, recommended that appropriate instructions be issued to Ambassador Spofford. They were emboldened, no doubt, by Admiral Fraser's reassuring statements regarding British public opinion. General Marshall endorsed this proposal and so advised Secretary Acheson. Then the death of Admiral Sherman, and Admiral Fechteler's elevation to the post of Chief of Naval Operations, again changed the problem's complexion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff nominated Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, the new US CINCLANT, for the office of SACLANT. The State Department opposed any action, however, believing that the British insisted upon simultaneous announcements concerning SACLANT and SACME. Consummation of the Middle East Command, in turn, awaited admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO and agreement with Turkey concerning her participation in the MEC. A long debate lay ahead.

Attenuation of the Medium Term Defense Plan

Force expansion as well as command development faltered during 1951. The poverty of Western Europe, which General Eisenhower had accentuated in his January report to the President, blighted the Brussels program for rapid rearmament. Although Western Europe's index of industrial production had risen 45 percent above 1938 levels, its $597 per capita income contrasted cruelly with that of $2,143 in the United States. Sudden stockpiling efforts greatly increased the cost of raw materials. Indeed, in the twelve months following the Korean War's outbreak, the cost of living rose by 9–10 percent in the United States, Great Britain, Italy and Germany. In France, whose economy was further burdened by the Indochina conflict, the rate of inflation reached an appalling 20 percent and living standards actually were lowered. Consequently, M. Herve Alphand cautioned his colleagues in the Council of Deputies that defense estimates "had been rendered completely inaccurate by the rise in prices, to such an extent that...the very implementation of such programs might be imperilled." These economic difficulties dominated subsequent discussions and decisions.

Fulfillment of the Medium Term Defense Plan (DC 28) thus was menaced by a growing "gap" between available forces and projected requirements. At the Council Deputies' direction, the Standing Group requested detailed economic, financial, mobilization and production data from each ally; evaluation of this data
could make it possible to determine the minimum military contribution to be expected from each member. Anticipating that the Standing Group would not obtain the necessary forces through voluntary commitments, Admiral Wright also petitioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff to produce "a sound and constructive paper" addressing the problem of "filling the gap."44

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Admiral Wright that they did not desire to release to NATO information concerning total US mobilization potential and projected 1954 deployments and force goals. Therefore, they cited only "those [US] forces listed as contributions in DC 28 which were 'in being' on 1 January 1951": 6 Army divisions; 167 major combatant vessels; 1½ Marine divisions; and 787 aircraft. But, replying to a separate request for information by General Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs of Staff projected the following US deployments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As of 1 July 51</th>
<th>As of 1 July 52</th>
<th>As of 1 July 54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Active</td>
<td>Avail by M+30</td>
<td>Total Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf Divs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armd Divs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abn Div</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combatant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft, all types</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In dispatching this information to SACEUR, Deputy Secretary Lovett added that these forces were listed for planning purposes only and could not be considered irrevocably allocated to SHAPE.45

General Collins felt that Seventh Army was unbalanced and recommended that an additional armored division be deployed to Europe early in 1952. This reinforcement, he maintained, would offset allied deficiencies in armor and provide the US Seventh Army with a force of two army corps, each consisting of one armored and two infantry divisions. Such action, however, might well spark another "Great Debate." Therefore, at General Vandenberg's suggestion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deferred action until total US force requirements during FYs 1952-1954 had been determined. These issues were not settled until February 1952.46

Addressing NATO's force deficiencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Marshall on 28 May that a final position could not be derived purely from military considerations. But they did develop a tentative force list for 1954 and asked the International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC) to evaluate it:
NATO in Expansion: 1951

D-Day (1954)

Army (divisions)
DC 28 Requirements 49%
DC 28 Contributions 45%
Gap 4

Navy (major combatant vessels)
DC 28 Requirements 915
DC 28 Contributions 830
Gap 85

Air Force (aircraft, all types)
DC 28 Requirements 9,212
DC 28 Contributions 5,769
Gap 3,443

These figures also were forwarded to Admiral Wright "as guidance for planning purposes only." 47

The International Security Affairs Committee circulated its conclusions, upon which subsequent Cabinet-level discussions centered, on 20 June. Comparing costs of the Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) against estimates of European economic capacity, ISAC extrapolated a shortfall of approximately $25 billion. If continued at current rates during FY 1953-1954, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program would furnish only $12.5 billion. In order to make the Plan politically and economically tolerable, ISAC suggested the following solution: first, continue efforts to induce maximum allied contributions; second, adjust the MTDP so that expenditures might be reduced by $8-9 billion without sacrificing basic goals; third, expand US assistance to a scale perhaps 30 percent greater than presently programmed for FY 1952. In a separate study, the Committee concluded that France could bear, at most, only a token increase; that Italy should receive a smaller burden than that recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that projected assignments to Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom appeared reasonable. 48

State-Defense representatives debated these reports on 21 June. Secretary Marshall remarked that "a cut of five percent in the European standard of living meant the difference between white bread and black on the table, while in similar American homes such a cut would mean foregoing a radio or television." 49 General Bradley then commented that he was uncertain in his own mind "whether we should press the Europeans at this time to increase their commitments." Consequently, no specific agreements were achieved at this meeting. 50

Two days later, Secretary Marshall presented to the President a statement concerning force distributions and allocations. The JCS recommendations of 28 May were slightly altered, but the "gap" had grown no smaller:
JCS and National Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1954(D-Day)</th>
<th>1954(D+30)</th>
<th>1954(D+90)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC 28 Requirements</td>
<td>41½</td>
<td>51½</td>
<td>80½</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC 28 Commitments</td>
<td>41½</td>
<td>47½</td>
<td>69½</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

US obligations would amount to 13 divisions (6 in position, 7 to be deployed by D+90), 22 air wings, and 509 naval vessels of all types. On 25 June, Mr. Truman authorized presentation of this paper to the Standing Group.51

Mr. Cabot, ISAC's Director, suggested that Admiral Wright should soften the impact of this statement by acknowledging that non-military factors might legitimately lessen the commitments expected from particular countries. Secretary Marshall accepted this advice, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff passed to Admiral Wright on 30 July.52

Combining comments received from member countries, the Standing Group prepared a table of force requirements and circulated it among the Military Representatives Committee as MRC 5/2. Simultaneously, SACEUR submitted his own estimate to the Standing Group. SHAPE and MRC 5/2 divisional estimates for 1954 differed significantly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHAPE</th>
<th>MRC 5/2</th>
<th>SHAPE</th>
<th>MRC 5/2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requirements</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49½</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>78½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitments</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>46½</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>68½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General Eisenhower was convinced that the critical phase of hostilities would occur between D-Day and D+30 (rather than D-Day to D+90). Hence he emphasized early readiness and envisioned a strong defensive zone between the "Iron Curtain" and the Rhine River, anchored upon defense of Denmark in the north and upon the Italian Alps and the Italo-Yugoslav border in the south. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Admiral Wright that, if reconciliation of these papers proved impossible before October, both plans should be presented to the NAC in the hope that the Council would recognize SACEUR's estimates as more realistic.53

The Abortive Foreign Ministers' Meeting

The German question still dominated great-power diplomacy. Indeed, the decision for West German rearmament provoked the only direct negotiations conducted during 1950–1952 between the USSR and the Western Powers. Through a note of 3 November 1950, the Soviets demanded convening of a four-power conference to consider "the question of fulfillment of the [1945] Potsdam Agreement regarding the demilitarization of Germany." US officials felt certain
that the Soviet purposes were prevention of German rearmament and perpetuation of Western Europe's military weakness. But, as fears of imminent general war faded, preservation of a united front against such beguiling overtures became increasingly difficult.

Creation of an allied counter-strategy constituted a central theme of the talks between President Truman and Premier Rene Pleven, conducted during 29-30 January 1951. Position papers prepared for this meeting emphasized the necessity for unwavering determination and unity of purpose among the allies. The State Department suggested, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, that negotiations with the Soviets should aim:

a. To gain time for the buildup of strength in the West.
b. To exploit any propaganda advantage.
c. To convince the Soviets that the West is determined and confident. The three Western Powers should not anticipate any real settlements...but should continue to seek them.

Additionally, it was essential that the allies achieve agreement upon all issues confronting the four-power conference, in order to frustrate Soviet efforts either to divide the Western Powers or to forestall German rearmament.54

According to State Department analysts, the French suffered from severe psychological depression, fearing that NATO was unduly antagonizing the USSR at a time when its members lacked adequate means of self-protection. Acknowledging that existing deterrents were insufficient, the Department recommended that the President repeat to M. Pleven that the defense of Europe was the cornerstone of US strategy and reaffirm confidence in the ability of NATO nations successfully to build necessary strength upon existing bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested several substantive revisions. In their estimation, the combination of actual and potential military strength available to the alliance "is at present adequate to discourage, if not deter, aggression in Western Europe." The US objective must be to accelerate rearmament so that the Western world would be able to repel aggression after American atomic superiority became insufficient to deter the Soviet Union. Delay in German rearmament, they declared, could render Western Europe's conventional defenses inadequate at that time. Secretary Marshall passed this paper to the Secretary of State with his concurrence.55

The Truman-Pleven talks proved entirely satisfactory, revealing "a fundamental identity of views" between the two countries. M. Pleven spoke as follows:

Physically and morally exhausted Frenchmen must be convinced that every effort has been made...to try to talk to the Soviets. If talks are held and fail, as undoubtedly they will fail, then the French will give greater support to the rearmament program....

The two leaders then pledged to reject any Soviet proposals that would (1) prevent either Western Germany or a unified Germany from associating with the West and assisting its defense, (2) limit NATO's freedom of action in implementing the Brussels decisions concerning Germany, (3) necessitate withdrawal
of Allied Forces from Germany, or (4) create a neutral and demilitarized Germany. Subsequent developments would demonstrate that the unity so easily achieved in Washington was infinitely more difficult to maintain at Paris. At a State-JCS meeting, for example, Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup frankly voiced a hope that the United States could devise some formula that would require reduction of Soviet occupation forces without affecting US plans to increase Western strength. Similarly, Mr. Paul Nitze questioned Admiral E.T. Wooldridge of the Joint Staff regarding a proposal for balancing forces “which would be acceptable to us and disadvantageous to the Soviets and satellites.” Sending General Bradley a draft agenda on 2 March, Dr. Jessup declared that the United States could not afford to propose anything disadvantageous to itself, since there was always a “remotely possible” chance that the Soviets might accept it. Moreover, even if propositions were rejected by the Russians, “we become identified with these positions. This situation is particularly important in regard to German opinion.”

On 5 March, deputys of the four Foreign Ministers met in Paris to prepare an agenda for the Ministers themselves. The United States was represented by Philip Jessup, the United Kingdom by Ernest Davies, France by Alexandre Parodi, and the Soviet Union by Andrei Gromyko. Secretary Acheson averred that, while the agenda proposed by the allies was “neutral and uncolored,” that of the Soviets was “strongly slanted”:

The Allied Agenda
1. Examination of the causes of present international tensions in Europe and the means to secure a real and lasting improvement in relations.
2. Completion of the Austrian treaty.
3. Problems relating to the reestablishment of German unity and the preparation of the peace treaty.

The Soviet Agenda
1. Fulfillment of Potsdam Agreement on the demilitarization of Germany and the prohibition of its remilitarization.
2. Acceleration of conclusion of peace treaty with Germany and the withdrawal of occupation forces.
3. Improvement of the situation in Europe and the immediate passing over to the reduction of the armed forces of the four powers.

When the deputys debated these two agendas, Western unity began splintering. The French appeared ready to accept Soviet demands that the subject of German demilitarization comprise the first agenda item. On 17 March, M. Parodi circulated among his Western colleagues two alternative agendas: the first would list the issue of German demilitarization within the context of “Examination of the Causes of Present Tension”; the second would enumerate separately, as two different lists of subheadings under that item, subjects that the Western Powers and the Soviets desired to discuss. The State Department
opposed the first suggestion but stood ready to give the second serious consideration "as a last resort." 61

On 28 March, M. Gromyko declared himself willing to omit all reference to the Potsdam accords and to treat German demilitarization as the initial topic under "Causes of Present International Tensions" rather than as the first separate agenda item. Dr. Jessup reported that this represented "the first serious and formal break in the Russian position...." 62 Indeed, the Soviet suggestion seemed similar to M. Parodi's first alternative agenda.

The State Department now wished to employ, as the Western Power's counterproposal, the second Parodi formula, which separately enumerated Soviet and Western topics under "Causes of Present Tension." Answering Secretary Marshall's oral request for comment and recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly opposed this strategy:

If [such] a split agenda were accepted, the Council would either begin and end on the subject of the demilitarization of Germany with nothing accomplished or some form of demilitarization... would be accepted.... [We believe] that continuation of West Germany in the status of a demilitarized country jeopardizes the security of Western Europe and impairs the security of the United States. 63

Nevertheless, these objections went unheeded. 64 Secretary Acheson agreed with M. Schuman (who was then in Washington) that the deputies might consider introducing the Parodi proposal as a tactical maneuver. "Our hope," they said, "would be that in order to avoid the Parodi formula Gromyko may agree to improve his present draft."

Further flexibility might have reaped the Russians rich rewards. Before the Western negotiators could introduce the Parodi formula, however, M. Gromyko received new instructions from Moscow. Consequently, the Soviet diplomat proposed a provocative agenda item that Dr. Jessup thought M. Gromyko was "visibly loath to introduce":

Atlantic Treaty and creation of American military bases in England, Norway, Iceland and in other countries of Europe and the Near East.

The Western deputies thereupon advised their Foreign Ministers that, for the presents the Parodi proposals should be retained in reserve. 65

Nonetheless, domestic political considerations inclined the British and French toward concession and accommodation. In London, Aneurin Bevan resigned from the Labor and National Service Ministry in the Attlee government in protest against the extent of the rearmament program and the resulting retrenchment in social services. According to Secretary Acheson, Ernest Davies of the United Kingdom wished to accept a separate agenda item on German demilitarization. After conferring with US officials, Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison overruled him.66 In mid-April, however, Mr. Morrison advised Secretary Acheson that he was prepared to accept the Gromyko compromise proposal described earlier. 67 Ambassador Franks further commented that memories of the Anglo-French negotiating failures that had led to the disastrous 1939 Nazi-
JCS and National Policy

Soviet Pact accounted for this decision. The French Government, confronting an election scheduled for 17 June, felt similarly constrained to avoid disruption of the conference.

On 13 April, President Truman approved new instructions which authorized Ambassador Jessup to accept "Demilitarization of Germany" as the initial topic under Item 1 only if this were the last remaining obstacle to a complete and satisfactory agenda. Under no circumstances, however, would the United States allow the agenda to include NATO and American bases in Europe.

After consulting his colleagues in the Paris Embassy, Dr. Jessup conceived an ingenious "triple play" that swiftly won Western approval and effectively shifted the burden of obstruction to the Soviet side. On 2 May, the Western Deputies presented three alternative agendas, each of which deferred to Soviet desires in some degree. M. Gromyko rejected them all because they excluded discussion of NATO and American overseas bases. In Secretary Acheson's belief, the Deputy Foreign Minister thereby revealed himself as "an unreasonable bumpkin who had nothing to offer, wanted no meeting, and sought only to stave off all allied action...."  

The Western Powers had now won a considerable psychological advantage. After the Soviets rejected a fresh allied note proposing to discuss German demilitarization (as the first sub-item under "Causes of Tensions") provided that no mention was made of NATO, Dr. Jessup perceived an excellent moment for adjournment. If negotiations continued, he cabled the State Department, "the UK may start to wobble and the French are likely to favor avoiding the [adjournment] issue." Accordingly, at US urging, the Western deputies agreed to adjourn the conference sine die; adjournment was accomplished on 21 June. By maladroit diplomacy, the Soviets had forfeited promising possibilities of rupturing allied solidarity and impeding Germany rearmament.

The European Army and German Rearmament

The Brussels conference had authorized two sets of negotiations. In Bonn, Chancellor Adenauer discussed conditions of German rearmament with High Commissioners John J. McCloy (US), Ivone Kirkpatrick (UK), and Andre Francois-Poncet (France). In Paris, representatives of six nations—France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and (later) the Netherlands—confronted the complex task of creating a European Army.

US officials detected a lingering French desire to continue demilitarization and occupation. Therefore, in a position paper prepared for the Truman-Pleven conference of January 1951, the State Department recommended—and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed—that the Chief Executive should (1) declare emphatically that a unified neutralized Germany was unacceptable to the United States and (2) accentuate the importance of pressing negotiations to develop a new contractual relationship with Western Germany. A second State Department document addressed issues arising from the forthcoming European Army Conference in Paris.
The President should tell M. Pleven that its decisions, in order to be acceptable to the United States, must not delay the creation of effective German military strength, must be sound and practical from the military and political points of view, and must receive the full assent of other NATO nations. After German RCTs had been formed and trained, the administration would review the situation to determine whether they should be made into German divisions for the NATO integrated force or merged into the French-proposed European Army. . . .”

Unsuccessfully, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to append a bluntly worded warning:

If these conditions are not met, the US will have to insist on French adherence to the Brussels agreement on German rearmament. In this connection, public opinion in the US may demand that the rate of US buildup in Europe be dependent upon a satisfactory solution to this problem.

During the conference, Premier Pleven duly pledged that France “would continue to support the Brussels Plan…”

Meanwhile, Mr. McCloy advised Washington that the High Commissioners were contemplating recruitment of 100,000 Germans by the end of 1951. In an answering cable, the State and Defense Departments suggested a “stronger program” of 195,000 men (including organization of 12 RCTs), in accordance with “expanded NATO-wide efforts.” Accordingly, Mr. McCloy submitted further queries to Washington:

What should be the strength of German ground units created by the end of 1952? . . .

Could equipment for 50% of these forces be made available by 31 December 1951, and the remainder by 1 April 1952?

Should a balance be sought for the entire German ground force, or should units be restricted to a limited standard variety?

Replying to Secretary Marshall’s request for comment and recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that suitable 1952 planning objectives would entail 440,000 ground force personnel (furnishing 30 RCTs with appropriate support units), 10,000 naval personnel (for a mining and coast defense force), and 45,000 air force personnel (to man 30 fighter squadrons). Pending German acceptance and subsequent NATO approval, however, they considered it inappropriate to answer Mr. McCloy’s additional questions.

While these subjects were still under study, the British proposed and the Americans agreed that the question of German military strength for 1952 should be referred to the Standing Group, which in turn would instruct the High Commissioners through their respective governments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Admiral Wright to advocate, “for planning purposes,” a German contribution of 24 RCTs or brigade groups. Although the High Commissioners might disclose this figure to the Germans, “it should not be pressed on them until such time as they indicate that they wish to participate in the military defense of Western Europe.”
On 8 June, the High Commissioners submitted to their respective governments a summary of German demands. Some, such as creation of 10,000-man divisions and organization of a defense ministry, were “fundamental.” On others, the Commissioners believed, the Germans appeared amenable to compromise. In order to expedite analysis, Mr. Lovett suggested to Secretary Acheson that the Standing Group’s appraisals (together with governmental endorsements) be furnished to the High Commissioners by early August. Additionally, he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide their “current views on the size and composition of the West German armed forces, on the time-phasing of their activation, and on the priorities to be accorded the necessary US military assistance programs.” As their answer, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed a requirement for 24 German RTCs by the end of 1952. This task, they believed, should be accorded sufficiently high priority in MDAP programming to ensure rapid activation of German units after the necessary agreements had been achieved.

Obviously, progress in the European Army Conference at Paris and resolution of the rearmament negotiations at Bonn were intimately inter-related. German delegations presented essentially similar proposals before both forums; decisions were deferred until the French felt able to give assent at both Paris and Bonn. Meeting in Washington on 26 June with State and Defense representatives, Mr. McCloy adduced “strong evidence” that France would agree to creation of German divisions (including heavy armored formations) and to establishment of a defense ministry, provided German units were incorporated within a European army. Therefore, the High Commissioner argued that “the crux of the situation is the preservation of . . . a European army.” Strong US endorsement of this concept, he asserted, could considerably diminish remaining Franco-German differences.

JCS members, however, expressed serious skepticism about the European Army. General Collins remarked that there would be separate American, British and European armies, with cumbersome lines of communication and chains of command. He could not, therefore, endorse the European Army concept without careful consideration. After further discussions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that a solution might lie in acceptance of the principle of a European Army, subject to several reservations. First, the army would not necessarily be assigned a separate zone of action. Second, SACEUR should be free to deploy and assign units without regard to their European Army origin. Third, division-size German units could be assigned to American, British, or French sectors of command. Fourth, in the interim, formation of German units must proceed without further delay. Under this concept, also, uniform administrative standards should be developed and political agreements achieved so that the force might be confined to tasks of common defense rather than realization of national aspirations. General Eisenhower, who earlier had derided the European Army concept, advised Secretary Marshall that he thought the above approach “thoroughly sound” and declared that “we must all press for [its] earliest implementation.”

On 24 July, the Paris Conference published an interim report proposing establishment of a European Defense Community (EDC) endowed with supranational authority. A political framework akin to the Schuman Plan (consisting of a Commissariat, Council of Ministers, parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice)
was envisaged. Military forces of 20 divisions and approximately 1,800 front line aircraft were contemplated by the beginning of 1953; these units—would be trained, organized, and equipped according to a common pattern. French and German negotiators had not settled, however, upon the size of individual combat units and the level of their integration with those of other nationalities. 79

Ambassador Bruce already had advised the State Department that delay in defining a US position would be definitely harmful, because the Paris conference had achieved "sufficient paper agreement on many military issues...to interfere substantially with the adoption by NATO of any separate course of action."
80  So, in a 16 July State-Defense conference, Secretary Acheson asserted that it would be necessary to offer "real support" to the Paris Conference. At Secretary Marshall's request, Mr. Acheson then agreed to prepare a paper for the President's approval. 81

On 30 July, the Secretaries of State and Defense presented their combined conclusions and recommendations to the President:

It seems to us desirable that you should determine certain general principles which will guide US policy in bringing about most effectively and most rapidly German participation in the defense of Western Europe without arousing European antagonisms which would militate against continued European co-operation in the defense effort. ...

At present, the French and German demands conflict with each other and produce a stalemate. ... It is our conclusion that progress is to be found in simultaneous progress on three points:

1. Agreement on the creation of a European Defense Force which would serve under NATO.
2. A specific plan for raising German contingents at the earliest possible date; and
3. A political arrangement with Germany restoring substantial German sovereignty. ...

In regard to a European Defense Force [EDF]...., we would make known...that the US supports the concept and will be prepared to assist in its implementation and execution provided that certain conditions are met....

1. The concept of an EDF would include the evolution of such necessary administrative arrangements as would enable it to participate in the common defense of Europe, not simply...the support of individual national aspirations.
2. The EDF...[must] be disposed by SACEUR in accordance with military necessity.
3. The [creation]...of the necessary administrative structures and political arrangements would not be a condition precedent to the actual beginning of the German [military] contribution. ...
4. The administrative machinery for managing the EDF would be appropriately related to NATO.

In regard to raising German contingents..., a plan should be agreed which would provide for the earliest application on an interim basis of those aspects of an EDF plan which would permit the immediate recruitment and training of German soldiers under such safeguards as may be required....
In regard to the contractual arrangements with Germany..., we must move broadly and decisively in creating a new status for Germany... We expect to retain supreme authority in four fields only: (a) the right to station troops in Germany and to protect their security; (b) Berlin; (c) the unification of Germany and a subsequent peace settlement; (d) territorial questions... In keeping with its new status and its contribution to Western defense, Germany should be admitted as a full member of NATO.

President Truman approved this important memorandum on 2 August.82

With the Defense Department's concurrence, Mr. Acheson advised the French and British Foreign Secretaries of the administration's design for contractual arrangements, which he hoped might be consummated by October. The Allies' responses were equivocal. Although generally approving Secretary Acheson's definition of the contractual relationship, Foreign Secretary Morrison retained an attitude of aloofness, being unwilling to commit the United Kingdom to participation in the European Defense Community. M. Schuman stoutly maintained that implementation of any contractual arrangement must follow, and not precede, parliamentary ratification of the EDC treaty: "It is absolutely indispensable in my view that the first man recruited in Germany be able to put on a European uniform..."83 Further action awaited tripartite discussion by the Foreign Ministers, scheduled for mid-September. However, a course had now been clearly set toward fundamental changes in Western Germany's status; only the duration of this difficult journey remained in doubt.
NATO in Climax: 1951–1952

The Washington Foreign Ministers’ Meeting

Three tasks confronted NATO in the autumn of 1951: progress towards rearmament and reintegration of Western Germany; revision of requirements for the Medium Term Defense Plan; and disposition of the Atlantic and Mediterranean commands. Of these problems, the first was the most pressing—particularly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for whom immediate recruitment and training of German manpower constituted a central concern.

In preparation for a Foreign Ministers’ meeting, which would be held in Washington during the second week of September 1951, Mr. Lovett asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to analyze (1) the High Commissioners’ report on German participation in Western Defense and (2) the interim report of the European Army Conference.1 Replying on 7 September, they approved the strength and composition of German ground combat units (10 divisions) described by the High Commissioners; they adjudged the projected air components (30 fighter-bomber squadrons) adequate but thought the recommended naval strength possibly excessive. Pointing out that the European Army Conference had failed to settle upon a suitable scheme for creating German contingents, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that such a plan be developed under SACEUR’s direction. Any German contribution, they added, would constitute an additional commitment above and beyond the requirements of DC 28.2

In its position paper for the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, the State Department suggested that recruitment of Germans commence during March-May 1952; the first division could be activated in the spring of 1953. Through a memorandum to Secretary Lovett, the Joint Chiefs of Staff challenged this timetable. In their judgment, German recruitment should begin as soon as West Germany ratified the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty and not await action by all signatories. Mr. Lovett agreed, foreseeing that the European Army Conference might produce an “interim plan” that would not satisfy the need for speed.
Repeating JCS recommendations, he asked Secretary Acheson to seek Anglo-French agreement that SACEUR should "develop a specific plan to ensure an immediate German contribution." 3

The High Commissioners also had presented a report defining contractual arrangements which would replace the Occupation Statute. After informal interdepartmental consultations, the State Department set forth several principles that should govern the new relationship: (1) integration of Western Germany on a basis of equality; (2) retention by the allies of supreme authority within certain security fields; (3) establishment of political arrangements ensuring the Federal Republic's firm association with Western European defense; (4) approval of German rearmament within the framework of an international defense force; and (5) treatment of allied personnel according to NATO status of forces agreements. The Foreign Ministers should instruct the High Commissioners to revise their report in accordance with these precepts. After reviewing these recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for further clarification of allied financial relationships with the Federal Republic and of the allies' right to station forces in Germany. The Secretary transmitted these suggestions to Mr. Acheson. 4

Messrs. Acheson, Schuman and Morrison conferred in Washington from 10 to 14 September 1951. Their tasks were: to prepare instructions for the High Commissioners defining contractual arrangements; to discuss difficulties impeding consummation of the Mediterranean and Middle East commands; and to determine procedures by which to resolve burgeoning economic and financial troubles.

Confronting the last of these topics, Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Gaitskell described his country's deficits of $1.12 billion in foreign trade and $1 billion in dollar-sterling balances. Should these situations worsen, he said, the British would have to sacrifice defense spending in favor of export expansion. Also, Finance Minister Rene Mayer reported that Frenchmen were working a 45-hour week, experiencing serious shortages, and anticipating a $500-$600 million balance of payments deficit during 1952. Hence he felt that France "must establish a maximum degree of her defense effort beyond which she cannot go without uncontrolled inflation and social crisis." The Foreign Ministers thereupon approved a French proposal to seek appointment by the NAC of a high-level group which would assess the impact of these many difficulties, determine the extent of the "gap" between economic capabilities and military requirements, and propose measures for their reconciliation.

Concerning Mediterranean-Middle East command arrangement, M. Schuman initially contended that tone could not dissociate various phases of the problem...these were all related to admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO." Additionally, he desired appointment of a French admiral to the Western Mediterranean Command and designation of a French deputy to SACME. Assured by Messrs. Acheson and Morrison that French interests would be fully recognized, he finally agreed that admission of Greece and Turkey should be accorded first priority and that constitution of the various commands should be separately considered. 5
As for contractual arrangements with Western Germany, the Foreign Ministers approved and transmitted to the High Commissioners those principles endorsed earlier by the State and Defense Departments. However, they also confronted an earlier request by Dr. Adenauer that security guarantees be extended to the Federal Republic and commitments made to maintain allied forces in Western Germany. The Ministers were most reluctant to make such promises. Indeed, Mr. McCloy characterized the Chancellor’s proposal as “clearly an impossible one.” At Secretary Acheson’s urging, the Foreign Ministers tentatively agreed to reissue their September 1950 security declaration, adding a statement that the force of their pledge to defend the Federal Republic was not diminished by that country’s change of status.6

Secretary Lovett requested a JCS review of Dr. Adenauer’s request. Replying on 5 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted several objections. A declaration such as the Chancellor sought, that protection of Berlin and Western Germany “is a most important element of the security and peace of the free world,” would imply a sweeping commitment and might unduly inflate the Germans’ sense of self-importance. Accordingly, they advocated a softer statement that “integrity of the German Federal Republic and Berlin is important to the peace of the free world.” And they strongly recommended that this declaration be issued apart from the contractual arrangements. Otherwise, this announcement could assume the characteristics of a formal military commitment that might severely restrict the allies’ freedom of action. Mr. Lovett agreed with these recommendations and so informed Secretary Acheson.7

From Ottawa to Rome

When the North Atlantic Council assembled at Ottawa on 15 September 1951, Secretary Acheson relates that “the bloom was off NATO, the fears of a year before had faded as music wafted westward from the World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace in East Berlin.”6 Indeed, the conference generated only further discussion rather than final resolution of the issues debated in Washington.

The cardinal US objective was, of course, actual admission of Greece and Turkey. Reviewing the State Department’s proposed agenda, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned Secretary Lovett that “no issue should be injected into the discussions… which could result in jeopardizing or even postponing for any considerable period the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO.” They also asked for the addition of escape clauses which would permit the United States to avoid involvement in “minor, local, Mediterranean territorial conflicts.” On 18 September, Mr. Lovett passed their memorandum to Secretary Acheson with his concurrence.9

The Council did not agree to admit Greece and Turkey forthwith. Instead, the Ministers agreed only to recommend to member governments that NATO’s security interests would be best served by admission of these two countries.10 As for
the problem of preparing a military plan commensurate with politico-economic capabilities, the NAC created a Temporary Council Committee (TCC) on which all the allies were represented. According to Lord Ismay, "The TCC had to decide whether the military authorities were asking too much or whether the governments were offering too little." Creation of this committee proved to be the most noteworthy action taken at Ottawa.\textsuperscript{11}

The NAC still could not resolve the complexities of Mediterranean-Middle East command. After the Ministers had rejected a Standing Group recommendation and a French counter-proposal, Secretary Acheson suggested that General Bradley and Field Marshal Slim proceed to Paris and examine Western Mediterranean Command problems with SACEUR and the French Chiefs of Staff. A French officer would then join Field Marshal Slim and General Bradley; the three officers would journey to Athens and Ankara to discuss NATO-MEC command problems. Messrs. Morrison and Schuman approved this approach.\textsuperscript{12}

In Paris, General Bradley and Field Marshal Slim conferred with General Eisenhower, Admiral Carney, and General Charles Lecheres of the French Air Force. The three last-named officers introduced an agreement which General Bradley believed did not clearly follow the JCS requirement that there be only two major Mediterranean naval commands (US and UK). So he secured, instead, conferees' approval of a plan by which the French Western Mediterranean Naval Command, the US Sixth Fleet, and the Italian Naval Command all would report to Admiral Carney (CINCSOUTH). Announcement of this agreement was withheld at Field Marshal Slim's request.

Accompanied by General Lecheres, General Bradley and Field Marshal Slim arrived at Athens on 11 October. Greek leaders argued that, because their primary role lay in the Balkan Theater, they should serve under SACEUR rather than SACMED. The allied representatives agreed that Greece probably would constitute a separate command under Admiral Carney. Proceeding to Ankara, the three emissaries achieved general agreement with Turkish authorities (1) that Turkey should be integrated into NATO on a basis of full equality as early as possible, and (2) that Turkey would participate in a joint defense of the Middle East. Earlier, SACEUR had declared that he could neither supervise development of Turkish armed forces nor control Turkish tactical operations from Paris, 1500 miles from Ankara. Nonetheless, the Turks insisted that their country was "an integral and inseparable part of the Europe which is facing Russia" and sought association with SHAPE. Indeed, so strong was their aversion to being considered a Middle Eastern nation that the allied representatives tentatively agreed to re-title the MEC the "Eastern Mediterranean Command."\textsuperscript{13}

Despite these many meetings, impediments still seemed forbidding. The United States desired quickly to admit Greece and Turkey under acceptable command arrangements. Insisting upon appointment of a British SACMED-ME in return for an American SACLANT, the BCS proposed that an Eastern Mediterranean Command (encompassing Greece, Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East) be established under a British Supreme Commander. This was intolerable to Greece and Turkey, whose leaders still insisted that their forces serve under SACEUR. Moreover, several northern nations declined to ratify
Greek-Turkish accession to NATO until Mediterranean command arrangements had been completed. Adapting a State Department suggestion, Admiral Wright proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Greek-Turkish forces operating in the Southern Balkans, Turkish Straits and Aegean Sea serve under Admiral Carney while those defending the Caucasus be commanded by a British SACME.\textsuperscript{14}

Meeting with the BCS on 14 November, General Bradley put forth the following “purely tentative” proposals regarding the Mediterranean and Middle East: (1) formation, under SACEUR, of an Aegean Command (i.e., Greece and Turkey) under a British officer and of a Mediterranean Naval Command under an American; (2) creation of a Middle East Command, probably under a British officer, entirely outside the NATO organization.\textsuperscript{15} The BCS strongly disapproved this scheme. Maintaining that US and UK naval forces in the Mediterranean were approximately equal, Admiral Fraser stated that it was unacceptable, “either militarily or politically, that the United States should command the British Mediterranean Fleet.” General Bradley countered that the Sixth Fleet, although no larger in numbers, contained greater tonnage and superior offensive combat power. Continuing the conversation, Marshal of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Sir John Slessor commented that, while SACEUR’s authority would extend from the North Cape to the Caspian Sea, “there was nothing left for the British except the Middle East, which as now proposed was an extremely emaciated command…” Expanding this theme, Field Marshal Slim commented that Greece and Turkey were not likely to accept association in a British Aegean Command which contained no British forces. He therefore suggested that the Aegean Command be expanded to include the Middle East. Already Admiral Fraser had suggested a division of command, or at least of functions, by which the US Sixth Fleet would be primarily responsible for supporting SACEUR and the British Mediterranean Fleet for supporting the Aegean and Middle East Commands. General Bradley agreed that these modifications were “worthy of careful consideration.” In conclusion, conferees agreed that these subjects could not profitably be discussed by the NAC at Rome.\textsuperscript{16}

On 16 November, the French Chiefs of Staff generally endorsed the above agreement. So did SACEUR. On 19 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the following position: (1) CINCSOUTH (Admiral Carney) would control the US Sixth Fleet and other naval forces in the Western Mediterranean; (2) a new CINCEAST (a British officer) would control naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (presumably including the British Mediterranean Fleet as well as the navies of Greece and Turkey) and also the Greek and Turkish land forces. Both CINCSOUTH and CINCEAST would be responsible to SACEUR, but the relationship between CINCEAST and the proposed Middle East Command was unspecified.\textsuperscript{17} By this formula, the United Kingdom would receive a major NATO command without lessening SACEUR’s authority; the British and American fleets would remain under national control.

As previously agreed, Mediterranean-Middle East command problems were not discussed during the North Atlantic Council sessions of 24–28 November at Rome. The NAC simply requested that the Standing Group submit a definitive report to the next Council Meeting. Concurrently, however, Air Marshal Slessor and Generals Bradley and Lecheres conferred privately and agreed upon creation
of an MEC and an Aegean or Eastern Mediterranean Command, the two to be "closely linked."  

The Rome conference occupies an unhappy position, falling between the inception of Ottawa and the culmination of Lisbon. The proposed European Defense Community was discussed, but the NAC declined to endorse it; General Eisenhower’s fervent plea in its favor was outweighed by opposition from the Ministers of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (BENELUX). The meeting’s only achievement lay in approval by the Defense Committee of a report (MC 26/1) requiring the following major force goals to be achieved by mid-1954: 98 divisions (ready and reserve); 1,099 major combat vessels; and 9,212 aircraft. The Council deferred approval, awaiting the Temporary Council Committee’s conclusions. Reporting to the President on 1 December, Secretary Acheson acknowledged that “we are experiencing what the production people call slippage….The big problems remain unsolved and will require most energetic work for the next sixty days.”  

The Temporary Council Committee Report

Assembling in Paris during October, the TCC appointed Mr. Averell Harriman, M. Jean Monnet, and Sir Edwin Plowden—christened the “Three Wise Men”—to act as its Executive Board. Also, the Committee established an international staff drawn from NATO agencies and national delegations. Questionnaires solicited detailed military and economic information from member countries; replies were scrutinized by the Screening and Costing Staff (directed by General Joseph T. McNarney, USAF) which cooperated closely with national military representatives. Concurrently, the “Three Wise Men” consulted senior Ministers of member governments.

By 18 November, the TCC had completed eight of its nine European country hearings. Without exception, these nations proved willing to undertake planned defense programs—provided the United States furnished adequate military and economic aid. Early in December, the Screening and Costing Staff (SCS) submitted a preliminary statement that stipulated force goals somewhat lower than those in MC 26/1. Forecasting cumulative shortfalls in equipment production during 1952-1954 of $11.6 billion, the SCS stated that success was dependent upon immediate institution of austerity standards, increased allocation of US production, and structural reorganization within NATO. On 9 December, the Executive Bureau of the TCC approved this study for presentation to the full Committee.

The Committee cleared and circulated this Report on 18 December. Country comments were to be submitted by 15 January; these would be consolidated into a supplementary document, offering the NAC “a manageable paper on which to take decision.”

The TCC Report addressed three areas: force determination; financial and production deficiencies; organizational and procedural reforms. The Committee
concluded that NATO could achieve a “striking increase” in defensive strength during 1952, thereby furnishing a “greatly increased”—but not “adequate”—deterrent to aggression. Although MC 26/1 goals for 1954 would not be wholly achieved, “sound interim foundations” could be laid for later progress. The table below shows what the Committee wanted as “firm” objectives for 1952, “provisional” for 1953, and “planning” for 1954 and beyond. Forces-in-being and MC 26/1 objectives are cited for comparison:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army (divisions)</th>
<th>Forces in Being 1951</th>
<th>TCC 1952</th>
<th>TCC 1953</th>
<th>TCC 1954</th>
<th>MC 26/1 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36½</td>
<td>41½</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M+3</td>
<td>20½</td>
<td>31½</td>
<td>43½</td>
<td>53½</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M+30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54½</td>
<td>69½</td>
<td>86½</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy (major combatant vessels)</th>
<th>Forces 1951</th>
<th>TCC 1952</th>
<th>TCC 1953</th>
<th>TCC 1954</th>
<th>MC 26/1 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M+180</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>1,099</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force (aircraft, all types)</th>
<th>Forces 1951</th>
<th>TCC 1952</th>
<th>TCC 1953</th>
<th>TCC 1954</th>
<th>MC 26/1 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>2,907</td>
<td>4,203</td>
<td>7,005</td>
<td>9,965*</td>
<td>9,285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The TCC figure exceeds MC 26/1 because the Committee counted war reserves as immediately available.

In the Committee’s judgment, European rearmament programs would require budgetary increases from $8 billion in 1950 to $16 billion during 1953–1954. Expressing defense expenditures as percentages of gross national products, these augmentations were enumerated as follows (larger European countries only are listed):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Programs 1951–52</th>
<th>Existing Programs 1952–53</th>
<th>Existing Programs 1953–54</th>
<th>Recommended Programs 1951–52</th>
<th>Recommended Programs 1952–53</th>
<th>Recommended Programs 1953–54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite greater and more efficient national efforts (including German contributions), the TCC anticipated 1951–1954 equipment and financial deficits totalling $18.1 billion. Without awaiting NAC decisions, therefore, governments ought to
JCS and National Policy

develop priority systems, conclude firm arrangements for financing and construction of critical infrastructure elements, increase European equipment production, and accelerate North American end item deliveries.

Organizationally, the Committee discerned a clear need for a NATO Director-General, assisted by an international staff to collate information, prepare recommendations for the Council, and ensure execution of NAC decisions. Procedurally, it recommended institution of an “annual review” to furnish a “comprehensive and inter-related analysis” of defense requirements versus politico-economic capabilities; the first such effort should be completed by mid-October 1952.

In conclusion, the TCC recorded its “firm conviction” that, given prompt action and resolute adherence to these solutions, “the resources of the North Atlantic Community can be so organized as to provide a deterrent to would-be aggressors, an increasingly vigorous defense against aggression should it occur, and an environment of increasing security within which the aspirations of free peoples for peace and for human progress may flourish.”

Quickly, Mr. Truman took strong action to expedite MDAP deliveries. Early in January, at a White House meeting attended by General Eisenhower, the President ruled that “those who would have to fight first should get equipment first.” Since nearly $10 billion in military assistance funds remained unexpended, he suspected that the Services were dutifully contracting for MDAP deliveries but taking the end items for themselves whenever they wished. Therefore, he directed that SACEUR receive equipment “on the same parity band as US divisions.” NATO’s supply priority now was surpassed only by Korea and Indochina.

Reviewing the TCC Report at Secretary Lovett’s direction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented favorably upon many of its major aspects. They favored establishment of a NATO equipment priority system, provided that final determination as to distribution remained with US agencies. Although approving the annual review and “not opposing” reorganization of civilian agencies, they suggested that appointment of a coordinator and expediter for civilian agencies (rather than a Director-General) might suffice. In any case, such organizational changes should not prejudice the authorities and responsibilities possessed by the Military Committee and the Standing Group. Concerning force goals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the TCC’s “firm” 1952 and “provisional” 1953 objectives “should represent the buildup from which the 1954 MC 26/1 . . . goals can be achieved.”

Writing to Secretary Acheson, Mr. Lovett endorsed these opinions and also recommended that the Committee’s 1952–1953 objectives be accepted as the basis for commitment of US forces to NATO. On 22 January, the State Department assented.

The influence of the TCC Report was immense; its impact upon the later Lisbon Conference may well have been decisive. General Eisenhower thought the document a “truly monumental” achievement; Lord Ismay termed it “a wonderful emergency operation.” Indeed, much of NATO’s organizational edifice long rested upon foundations laid through the labors of the Temporary Council Committee.
Atlantic Command Achieved

NATO received a second stimulus in mid-January, when the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, was finally appointed. All the allies save Great Britain had now agreed to the appointment of US Admiral Lynde D. McCormick. When the Conservative Government assumed office, Prime Minister Churchill strongly pressed for revision of the arrangements approved by Clement Attlee. As Secretary Acheson observed, the “Former Naval Person” still lived in that time of glorious memory when Britannia ruled the waves. Conferring with Admiral Fechterler on 5 November, Mr. Churchill insisted that Atlantic Command plans constituted “a deep humiliation for the British Navy” and indicated that settlement could be achieved only through his coming conference with President Truman.  

In preparation for this meeting, the State-Defense Steering Group drafted a document to be presented “only if [the issue is] raised by Mr. Churchill.” The United States justified its position by reference to the magnitude of the submarine menace, which made mandatory the centralized control of anti-submarine warfare and convoy movement. Nazi Germany had deployed 57 submarines in 1939; the Soviets were now believed to possess 370 vessels of greatly superior capabilities. SACEUR’s success would depend upon the support rendered him by allied forces in the Atlantic, of which the United States furnished approximately 75 percent. Therefore, it was “imperative” that SACLANT occupy the same command level as SACEUR, “very important” that he be a US naval officer, and “highly desirable” that he be designated at an early date.

After reviewing this document, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to Secretary Lovett several revisions of “great importance.” In their judgment, the problem was of such gravity as to warrant its introduction by the President on his own initiative. Employing forceful language, the Chief Executive should emphasize the military necessity for unified command, concede British control westward from the British Isles to the 100-fathom curve, and conclude by asking for rapid resolution of this pressing problem. These were the tactics ultimately adopted.

Mr. Churchill and his entourage arrived in Washington on 6 January 1952. A discussion conducted that same day among the British and American Chiefs of Staff augured ill for the conference’s success. The First Sea Lord, Admiral Rodrick McGrigor, argued that division of responsibility at the 100-fathom curve constituted a fatal weakness because it would assign control of the ocean and inshore battles to different authorities—SACLANT and the First Sea Lord. Instead, he advocated reversion to the mid-Atlantic wartime “chop line,” contending that coordinating machinery could be established through the Chief of Naval Operations and the First Sea Lord. Apparently, this was the solution Mr. Churchill desired. General Bradley and Admiral Fechterler commented that, because there would be no unified command below the Standing Group, such an arrangement could not adequately protect SACEUR’s lines of communication. After further fruitless debate, General Bradley spoke bluntly of the necessity for prompt agreement. “People have come to me,” he said, “with inquiries as to what would be
JCS and National Policy

done after NATO blows up in the spring. A reasonable segment of the country is
talking about going back to isolationism.”32

The President, the Prime Minister and their advisors assembled in the White
House on 7 January. After Secretary Lovett had expounded the US position, Mr.
Churchill stated that he still considered SACLANT “utterly unnecessary” and
suggested creation of Eastern and Western Atlantic Commands assisted for plan-
ning purposes by an “Admiral of the Atlantic.” In summation, the Prime Minis-
ter declared that he had come “to ask for relief from a previous agreement.” Al-
though he would abide by the compact if compelled, upon return to London “he
would feel obliged to express his opposition…. ” Accepting Mr. Churchill’s re-
quest for further consideration, President Truman proposed that the session
stand adjourned.33

The climactic meeting occurred on 18 January, following the Prime Minister’s
return from a Canadian journey. The British Chiefs of Staff wrote a communique
that, in effect, ratified earlier NATO decisions. As the American conferees waited
in the Cabinet Room, their “badly shaken” British colleagues emerged to report
that Mr. Churchill had read the communiqué, torn it up, and marched into the
President’s office without a word. “Hurricane warnings along the Potomac!” ex-
claimed Admiral McGrigor.

President Truman opened the meeting by requesting the Prime Minister’s
comments. Mr. Churchill thereupon delivered what Secretary Acheson consid-
ered “the most eloquent and moving speech I have ever heard.” Years later, the
Secretary still could reconstruct many of the Prime Minister’s words:

> For centuries England had kept alight the flame of freedom, fighting every
tyrant who would have put it out, and carrying the flame over every sea to all
the continents…. Now, in the plenitude of our power, surely we could make
room for Britain to play her historic role “upon that western sea whose floor is
white with the bones of Englishmen”…. The awful burden of atomic power and
command was ours…. Must we still ask that Britain waive its historic place
upon that small and daily shrinking sea?

As this majestic oration neared its close, Ambassador Oliver Franks passed Mr.
Acheson a note: “Be very, very careful.” The Secretary then spoke cautiously and
circumspectly, saying conferees must weigh a distasteful decision against the
larger purposes of which all approved. Secretary Acheson, accompanied by Amb-
assador Franks, Admiral McGrigor, Mr. Lovett, Admiral Fechteler, and General
Bradley, then withdrew to consider a compromise:

As we closed the door, Bill Fechteler burst out, “How long are we going to
fool around with this damned talk?”

“Forget it, Bill,” said Lovett. “Dean has got something in mind; but what it is I
couldn’t guess.”

“I think it’s the answer,” contributed Franks.

Secretary Acheson thereupon presented a proposal which permitted the Prime
Minister to “maintain his own opinion” and at the same time “loyally further
any and all action for the common defense which the two governments had undertaken):

"I don’t get it, said Adm. Fechteler. “Does [Churchill] agree or doesn’t he? We’ve got to get that settled.”

“Bill,” said Gen. Bradley, “if you will just take it easy, I think the answer for your purposes is yes.”

While the dictated communiqué was being typed, a message from the President urged haste.

When conferees reassembled, Secretary Acheson read the following statement (carefully emphasizing the italicized words):

The President and the Prime Minister agreed...[to] recommend to NATO certain alterations in the arrangements designed to extend the United Kingdom home command to the 100 fathom line. They also agreed on the desirability of certain changes which would provide greater flexibility for the control of operations in the Eastern Atlantic. These changes...do not go the full way to meet the Prime Minister’s objections to the original arrangements. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister, while not withdrawing his objections, expressed his readiness to allow the appointment of a Supreme Commander to go forward in order that a command structure may be created and enabled to proceed with the necessary planning in the Atlantic area. He reserved the right to bring forward modifications for the consideration of NATO, if he so desired, at a later stage.

After an “interminable” minute, Churchill firmly accepted “every word” of the communiqué. The long debate thus ended in substantial victory for the United States. The principle of unified command in the Atlantic had been accepted, and the Prime Minister’s pride had been sufficiently assuaged. On 30 January, after approval by the NAC deputies, Admiral Lynde D. McCormick assumed the office of SACLANT at Norfolk.

An Impending Crisis

During January 1952, the intricate interrelationship between EDC and NATO, complicated by the question of German rearmament, grew increasingly unstable. From Paris, on 10 January, Ambassador Bruce sent the State Department a progress report on the European Army Conference. France, Germany, and Italy readily accepted supra-national institutions, he reported, while the BENELUX countries strongly opposed them. Ambassador Bruce believed, however, that combined Anglo-American persuasion might alter the BENELUX position. Several days before the Truman-Churchill talks began, General Eisenhower sent the President a letter in which he urged that the Prime Minister be pressed to issue “a ringing statement that would minimize British non-partici-
pation and emphasize British moral, political, and military support for the European Army.”

Despite American pleas, Mr. Churchill remained averse to EDC. In his mind, the Community seemed “a little too mixed up with federation,” and it emasculated “the national impulse” in fighting forces. Secretary Acheson recalled that, during the Truman-Churchill discussion, the Prime Minister pictured a bewildered French drill sergeant sweating over a platoon made up of a few Greeks, Italians, Germans, Turks, and Dutchmen, all in utter confusion over the simplest orders.

What he wanted, he would say, was a strong French army singing the ‘Marseillaise’, a strong German army singing ‘Die Wacht am Rhein’, a valiant British army thrilling to ‘God Save the King’. Like a bundle of faggots, each would gain strength from the rest until as a bundle they would be unbreakable.

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden patiently explained that divisions would be the smallest national formations, that Europeans were weary of petty nationalisms, and that recreation of a strong, spirited German army was precisely what France feared. Nevertheless, Mr. Acheson found that “each time the subject came up, we went back to the baffled drill sergeant.”

However, the Truman-Churchill talks did achieve substantial agreement on the issue of NATO reorganization. The State-Defense Steering Group had proposed that the President advocate US-UK acceptance of TCC recommendations. Reviewing this paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced apprehension lest Mr. Churchill employ this issue “as a vehicle for suggesting fundamental changes [in NATO’s] basic concept or in order to seek closer US-UK relationship…as a counterbalance to the tie between the UK and continental Western Europe….”

They suggested, therefore, that the President simply affirm US support for NATO and avoid mentioning its organizational weaknesses. Additionally, they reasserted their opposition to consolidation of civilian agencies in Paris. Their paper, however, exercised little influence upon subsequent proceedings.

In a session on 7 January, Foreign Secretary Eden advocated replacement of the Council of Deputies by a body in permanent session under a Director-General. Periodic meetings would be attended by Cabinet ministers; rotating chairmen would be elected yearly. Secretary Acheson commented that British and American ideas “were very close to each other.” Indeed, on the following day a working group reported agreement upon all aspects save location of NATO headquarters. While the Americans preferred Paris, the British insisted that London would be a most appropriate “Atlantic Capital.”

On 14 January, following State-Defense agreement, Ambassador Spofford introduced the following proposal before the NATO Council of Deputies “as a basis for discussion”:

1. Consolidation of NATO Headquarters—All agencies should be centrally located (preferably in Paris or environs), except for the Standing Group, which would remain in Washington.
2. Simplification of NATO Structure—The NAC should be the only formal civilian body; the Council of Deputies, DPB [Defense Production Board], and FEB [Financial and Economic Board] would be abolished and their functions transferred to the Council.

3. Adaptation of International Staff—Directed by a Secretary General, this body would be unified and strengthened so as to perform a major role in initiation, preparation, and execution of Council actions.

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff had wished, Mr. Spofford asked that NATO’s military structure remain unchanged for the present. Thus the path was prepared for final NAC decisions. Nonetheless, the paramount problem of NATO-EDC relationships grew still more troublesome. On 15 January, SACEUR advised the Standing Group that the Paris Conference had produced an adequate European Army plan. He also reported that all other alternatives for securing a German military contribution appeared “undesirable if not unacceptable.” General Eisenhower therefore thought that all NATO bodies should work for the early establishment of a European Defense Community. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Admiral Wright to endorse these conclusions.

While the Americans grew more insistent upon German rearmament, the French became more hesitant. At the end of January, M. Schuman sent Mr. Acheson a “disturbing” letter, in which the Secretary saw that “French fear of Germany was discernibly destroying French hope for the Defense Community.” On 2 February, Secretary Acheson answered that NATO could survive neither another failure nor another postponement. Therefore, the allies must resolve problems of West German defense budgets, arms limitations, and association with NATO prior to the Lisbon Conference. “Either we must guide the events we have set in motion . . . ,” he admonished Mr. Schuman, “or they will move themselves, we cannot tell where.”

The Lisbon Meeting

NATO now entered a climactic period. As Secretary Acheson afterwards analyzed this “crisis in the alliance”:

Issuance from the impasse depended entirely upon the United States. In February the French Cabinet was once again in trouble, and within it Schuman in deeper trouble. Adenauer could . . . not lead in Europe, though both McCloy and Bruce reported to me in January that he was the most stalwart supporter of the European Defense Community in Europe. Italy and the Northern European allies were deeply worried, fearing Franco-German domination if the community succeeded and German adventurism if it failed. British opinion, hostile toward Germany and apathetic toward Europe, received no lead from the Prime Minister.

Two parliamentary actions epitomized the allies’ dilemma. On 8 February 1952, the Federal Bundestag approved the European Army concept, 204–156, but also
passed resolutions designed to eliminate every vestige of legal, economic, and financial discrimination. Eight days later, the French National Assembly endorsed EDC, 327-287; it then recommended imposition of certain limitations and restrictions upon the Federal Republic and demanded that the US and UK give guarantees against German secession from the EDC and pledge to maintain military forces on the continent "for as long as seems necessary." 44

Convocation for the funeral of King George VI afforded a timely opportunity for consultations among Western leaders. When he met with Messrs. Eden, Churchill, and Schuman on 13 February, Secretary Acheson asserted that "the choice was between the EDC and a national German army, general staff, and all the rest." Moreover, he argued that Germany must be released from restrictions on rearmament and treated as a self-respecting ally. Predictably, M. Schuman sought an American guarantee against German secession from the EDC; the Secretary of State replied that this exceeded existing congressional authorization. Concerning security controls, Mr. Eden and M. Schuman demanded that aircraft and "heavy military equipment" be included in a self-denying declaration which the Federal Republic would issue. Chancellor Adenauer joined the meeting on 18 February and readily accepted the position of the EDC powers that certain war materials could not be produced in a multi-national "forward zone." For their part, Messrs. Eden and Schuman tentatively approved deletion of gun barrels, propellants, and civil aircraft from this schedule of prohibited products. 45

Determination of West Germany's financial contribution to European defense proved more difficult. Interlocking negotiations were proceeding, first, between Chancellor Adenauer and the High Commissioners on reduction of allied troop costs and, second, among EDC conferees on a common defense budget. During the Rome meeting of November 1951, the French reluctantly had accepted an American solution which (1) concluded a twelve-month interim financial arrangement for Germany and (2) postponed EDC budgetary formulation until the following year. At the request of Chancellor Adenauer and the High Commissioners, the TCC examined Germany's economic and financial capabilities. The Federal Republic suggested a defense contribution of 10.8 billion Deutsche marks (DM) for FY 1953; the Committee finally recommended a levy of DM 11.25 billion. At London, Secretary Acheson asked that DM 6.9 billion be apportioned to allied troop support and DM 4.4 billion credited toward Germany's EDC contributions. Messrs. Eden and Schuman endorsed this allotment. The Foreign Ministers also agreed that, in future years, German support of British and American forces would be determined by negotiation among the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the EDC. 46

On the eve of the Lisbon Conference, the Temporary Council Committee completed its final contribution. In a supplementary report, the TCC stated that member governments strongly supported its proposed principles, method of approach, and general plan of action. However, the Committee had recommended additional expenditures by European nations of $2.357 billion during 1951-1954; country replies indicated acceptance of only $1.162 billion. During 1952, the TCC concluded, timely delivery of MDAP end-items and the financial-economic impacts of higher defense expenditures would be the allies' principal causes of concern. 47
Within the American delegation, this report fueled a heated disagreement. Ambassador Harriman pressed General Bradley to agree that the forces recommended by the Committee on 18 December would furnish an adequate defense for Europe. General Bradley refused to do so. As their argument escalated, Secretary Acheson intervened to suggest they agree that increasing conventional and atomic forces "will constitute an important increased deterrent against aggression." General Bradley and Mr. Harriman accepted this statement, which (after further revision), was included in the Council’s 24 February communiqué.48

Secretary Acheson considered the Lisbon Conference, which lasted from 20–25 February, to be "the supreme gamble upon which we would stake our whole prestige, skill, and power";49 its achievements should therefore be accounted his greatest success. On 22 February, the NAC adopted a vital resolution—which had been rejected at Rome—approving establishment of the European Army and recommending reciprocal security arrangements between NATO and EDC. West Germany thus would be firmly and formally associated with the North Atlantic Alliance. On the following day, the Council accepted (with minor modifications) those parts of the TCC Report pertaining to military objectives. These are shown in the table.50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army (divisions)</th>
<th>1952 (Firm Commitments)</th>
<th>1953 (Provisional Goals)</th>
<th>1954 (Planning Goals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>M+30</td>
<td>M-Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5½</td>
<td>12½</td>
<td>5½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11½</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4½</td>
<td>6½</td>
<td>4½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>5½</td>
<td>7½</td>
<td>5½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (all countries)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>53½</td>
<td>36½</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy (major combat vessels)</th>
<th>1952 (Firm Commitments)</th>
<th>1953 (Provisional Goals)</th>
<th>1954 (Planning Goals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>M+180</td>
<td>M-Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (all countries)</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force (aircraft, all types)</th>
<th>1952 (Firm Commitments)</th>
<th>1953 (Provisional Goals)</th>
<th>1954 (Planning Goals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>M-Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>1218</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>1158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1516</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>1515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (all countries)</td>
<td>4067</td>
<td>7005</td>
<td>9965</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Council also adopted TCC review procedures as a permanent feature of NATO planning. Force goals, projected over a three-year period, would be subjected to an annual review which would balance requirements of military commanders against financial and industrial capacities of member nations. Finally, Secretary Lovett negotiated approval of an “infrastructure” financing agreement totaling $426.6 million, of which the US would pay 42 percent.51

On 24 February, Foreign Secretary Eden informed Mr. Acheson that the British would accept placement of NATO headquarters in Paris. The Secretary of State thereupon agreed to support a British choice as Secretary General.52 On the following morning, the Council approved the TCC’s organization proposals. The Council of Deputies, the Defense Production Board and the Financial and Economic Board were dissolved; civilian agencies were centralized in Paris; a unified international secretariat was created. Finally, the NAC was placed in continuous session through appointment of permanent representatives.53

Until the Conference’s final hours, problems of Franco-German military finances eluded solution. Premier Edgar Faure proposed to exceed TCC recommendations by increasing France’s military budget from 10 to 12 percent of her gross national product, thereby making it possible to furnish 12 divisions and 27 air squadrons for NATO-EDC service. By 25 February, negotiators agreed that the resulting French budgetary gap should be filled, first, by increased American aid (including considerable offshore procurement) and, second, by greater German contributions for allied troop support. Relying principally upon “midnight weariness,” Secretary Acheson won assents to these arrangements from Messrs. Eden and Schuman. The Secretary of State then dispatched a private message to Herr Adenauer, “explaining that it was now or never so far as German participation in [European] defense was concerned.” The Chancellor accepted with alacrity the Council’s recommendation, thereby raising the Federal Republic’s defense contribution to DM 11.25 billion and rendering it comparable to those of allied nations.54

“We have something pretty close to a grand slam,” Mr. Acheson exultantly cabled the President. As he recounted afterwards, “We seemed...to be fairly started toward a more united and stronger Europe and an integrated Atlantic defense system. The world that lay before us shone with hope.”55
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
CHAIRMAN: CHANGES ANNUALLY
VICE - CHAIRMAN: THE SECRETARY GENERAL

MILITARY COMMITTEE
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE
STANDING GROUP

SECRETARY GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL STAFF/SECRETARIAT

STANDING GROUP LIASON OFFICE

COUNCIL COMMITTEES

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC

CANADA - U.S REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP

CHANNEL COMMITTEE
CHANNEL COMMANDS

NATO ORGANIZATION AFTER FEBRUARY 1952
NATO in Relapse: 1952

The Faltering Force

The bright resolves made by the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon in February 1952 soon became clouded as Western Europe buckled under the burdens of rearmament. Industrial production declined and the trade “dollar gap” widened. American aid failed to fill the ever-growing gulf between military plans and economic performance. In February, President Truman felt compelled to transfer $478 million in FY 1952 MDAP appropriations from military to economic assistance. However, FY 1953 outlays for MDAP did not increase, amounting to only $3.1 billion in military assistance and $1.2 billion in defense support. More significantly, total MDAP shipments through 31 January 1953 reached only $3.2 billion of the $11.2 billion allocated; contracts for offshore procurement totaled barely $750 million.

So, as months passed, the allies fell into “fretful contemplation of their weaknesses, their commitments and the dispositions of their exasperating yokefellows.” A loss of momentum became apparent in every aspect of NATO’s activities. As will be seen, force goals were lessened; imperfect command structures were adopted; and the striving for European unity became a dream deferred.

The departure of General Eisenhower on 30 April and his replacement by General Matthew B. Ridgway further contributed to this changing climate. The famous soldier who had served as Western Europe’s goad and conscience now entered upon a bitter and perhaps, to Europeans, bewildering Presidential campaign. Moreover, General Ridgway lacked not only his predecessor’s global stature but also (some observers believed) his political acumen and commitment to allied unity. In Field Marshal Montgomery’s opinion, for example,

Ridgway didn’t fit into the [SHAPE] set-up….He surrounded himself with an all-American personal staff….The crusading spirit disappeared. There was the sensation, difficult to describe, of a machine which was running down.
The Annual Review

At Lisbon, the NAC had resolved regularly to repeat the TCC exercise of reconciling defense requirements with financial and economic capabilities. The 1952 Annual Review, therefore, would delineate objectives which were "firm" for 1953, "provisional" for 1954 and "planning" for 1955. Activity would begin in June with country submissions to the Standing Group and culminate during October-November with final NAC approval.3

On 31 March, Acting Secretary Foster informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that 1952 objectives approved at Lisbon would constitute the basis for military assistance programming and commitment of American strength to NATO. He asked them to recommend, as a basis for the US position in the Annual Review, 1953-1955 force goals for each NATO nation.4 Answering on 20 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth a requirement for 126% ready and reserve divisions, 1,081 major combatant vessels and 11,179 aircraft by 1955. However, they predicted that a mere continuation of MDAP at 1953 levels during 1954-1955 would not meet NATO's growing materiel needs. Therefore, they insisted that the United States make "absolutely clear to all concerned" that an acceptance of greater 1953-1955 force goals would not imply agreement also to furnish increased amounts of armaments. Mr. Foster forwarded this memorandum to Secretary Acheson for use in preparation of a US position.5

In reply, Mr. Acheson on 19 June sent Secretary Lovett a careful analysis which had been coordinated among State, Defense, Treasury, Budget, and Mutual Security representatives. Its conclusions cast grave doubt upon the wisdom of utilizing the JCS proposals in NATO discussions. On the basis of expected European production and probable US assistance, cumulative equipment deficits could be predicted amounting to $1.2 billion in 1952 and increasing to $12.9 billion by 1955. Consequently, the "basic issue" was whether or not to approve aims which were unattainable unless the United States drastically increased her assistance or European countries immediately undertook "a state of virtually full mobilization." Three considerations militated strongly against an endorsement of such aims: first, insistence upon goals clearly exceeding present capabilities could be construed as an implied American pledge to fill the equipment gap; second, aspirations so far beyond the allies' reach might "discourage realistic negotiation and planning"; third, analysis of such ambitious targets could delay completion of the Annual Review. Before the Standing Group and North Atlantic Council, therefore, US spokesmen should commend the 1953 Lisbon goals. However, they also should express serious reservations concerning any larger 1954-1955 objectives, advise that these be circulated only as guidance for "the general direction and character" of the NATO buildup, and caution that the United States could not assure necessary equipment deliveries. In conclusion it was proposed that the Defense Department study NATO equipment standards in relation to available industrial and financial resources.6
Secretary Lovett passed this paper to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In so doing, he remarked that funds probably would be insufficient to increase both numbers of forces and war reserves of equipment. He asked them to explore the relative merits of limiting either the forces or the reserves. Meanwhile, Acting Secretary Foster advised Mr. Acheson on 10 July that the recommended State position would be upheld by General Bradley before the Standing Group. Also, he promised to prepare force-level proposals for presentation in the Annual Review.7

Addressing the matter of war reserves, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Lovett they preferred to reduce reserve stocks so that the number of new combat-ready units could be increased. In this manner, they believed, maximum participation could be obtained from the allies and psychological momentum maintained. Furthermore, they asserted that substantial reductions in 1954 force goals could render “questionable” the prospects for successful defense of the North Atlantic area.8

In August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff answered that part of Lord Ismay’s Annual Review questionnaire concerning forces available as of 30 June 1952. When he transmitted this request, Mr. Foster had cautioned that “lack of [prompt] performance by the US in this respect could seriously jeopardize the attainment of [US] objectives in NATO.” The JCS response clearly revealed that 1952 Lisbon objectives pertaining to the United States would be fulfilled. The following US forces would be placed under NATO command.9

\[
\begin{array}{lcc}
\text{Army (divisions)} & \text{M-Day} & \text{M+30} \\
 & 5 & 6 \\
\text{Navy (major combatant vessels)} & \text{D-Day} & \text{D+180} \\
 & 267 & 413 \\
\text{Air Force (aircraft, all types)} & \text{639} & 1,005 \\
\end{array}
\]

However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again deferred deployment to the European Command (EUCOM) of a second armored division. General Eisenhower said that such a reinforcement would be “of major importance to the success of a Rhine defense....” General Collins thought this requirement so urgent that he recommended the transfer take place “at an early date” after Korean hostilities ended. The Joint Chiefs of Staff so advised the Secretary of Defense on 8 February but subsequently accepted Mr. Lovett’s advice to withhold a formal recommendation until Korean hostilities ended and one armored division could better be spared from the General Reserve. Other developments later intervened, however, and EUCOM did not receive another armored division until 1956.10

In order to prepare a Department of Defense (DOD) position for the Annual Review, an ad hoc committee was formed under the Chairmanship of Brigadier General Donald P. Booth, USAF. The committee’s members were drawn from OSD, the Joint Staff and each of the Services; their task of preparing “realistic” force-level recommendations closely resembled that of the TCC. A final report was presented on 25 September. Although concluding that the goals stated
JCS and National Policy

therein were militarily unsafe, committee members still considered that they approximated the best strength attainable within NATO's financial-economic capabilities. Certainly, the retreat contemplated from objectives approved at Rome and at Lisbon was considerable:11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Divisions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M+30</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Major combatant vessels)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M+180</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Aircraft, all types)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>4,067</td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>7,055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reviewing the Booth Report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that its recommendations, which already exceeded the "desired calculated risk," were the smallest that could be adopted without "seriously jeopardizing" successful defense of the North Atlantic region. In their judgment, force requirements stated at Rome (in MC 26/1) still represented the best basis for balanced expansion. Mr. Lovett transmitted the Committee Report and JCS comments to Secretary Acheson on 16 October. Although concurring in JCS conclusions, he added that their opinion regarding the attainment of MC 26/1 force objectives in 1953-1954 would have to be further reviewed during the following year. On 3 December, the Booth Report was approved as the initial American negotiating position for the Annual Review.12

When the North Atlantic Council assembled at Paris on 15 December, the NAC noted "with satisfaction" that 1952 objectives had been largely achieved.13 For the future, the Council directed that emphasis in expansion be placed upon quality rather than quantity and upon support elements rather than combat units. More clearly indicative of allied attitudes, however, was the NAC’s decision to reduce SACEUR’s “fourth slice” infrastructure request from $473 to $218 million. Action on the Annual Review was not completed until April 1953. Although the Council then fully restored infrastructure funds, it approved 1953-1954 force objectives that were approximately 15 percent less than the Lisbon goals.14
Debating the “Continental” Strategy

In January 1951, General Eisenhower gave the US Cabinet his preliminary “strategic conception” that a force of 50–60 divisions, supported by strong air and naval forces in the North Sea and the Mediterranean, could defend Western Europe. “Then,” he argued, “if the Russians tried to move ahead in the center, I’d hit them awfully hard from both flanks. I think if we built the kind of [50–60 division] army I want, the center will hold and they’ll have to pull back.” In his first annual report, published on 2 April 1952, General Eisenhower described his forces as able to “give a vigorous account of themselves” but still “disappointingly far from sufficient for a determined defense.” Nonetheless, he conceived of Western Europe as “an ultimate stronghold” flanked by the two “defended regions” of Italy and Denmark-Norway.15

During a meeting with the NAC in October 1952, Standing Group representatives considered three possible courses of action: first, concentrate NATO’s entire military effort upon Central Europe; second, withdraw to defense of peripheral areas; third, maintain peripheral bases and return to Western Europe when sufficient forces were amassed. The Standing Group defended the first solution because it was the only course politically acceptable to continental countries and because the cost of providing a second infrastructure, in peripheral regions, would be economically prohibitive. Such a “Continental Strategy” entailed defense of Germany “as far to the east as possible” of Denmark and Norway, of Italy and Greece “as far to the north and east as possible,” and of the Turkish Straits.16

Thus, as in 1950, economic and political factors dominated military planning. At SHAPE, General Eisenhower had plans prepared only for a final defense of the Rhine-Ijssel line and actually forbade discussion of further withdrawals, feeling that political reverberations would far outweigh any military benefits. As in 1950, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff refused to accept the Rhine-Ijssel as NATO’s last line of defense. On 14 November 1951, they approved a plan submitted by General Thomas T. Handy which contemplated possible US retreat to the Pyrenees and evacuation to the United Kingdom via Cotentin-Cherbourg. This scheme was coordinated with SACEUR “on a NOFORN basis.” Subsequently, the US Joint Outline Emergency War Plan, approved in September 1952, incorporated provisions for withdrawal not only from the Rhine to the Pyrenees but also from advanced positions in Northern Europe. In Northern Europe, initial defense should be on the Jutland Peninsula; withdrawal, if necessary, to Stavanger and Trondheim in Norway. In the South, where a small force should be able to stay on the Alps-Piave line, retreating troops should try to hold as much of southern Italy as possible. These plans clearly conflicted with the “Continental Strategy.”17

The allies also divided over the question of whether nuclear weapons supplanted or merely complemented conventional capabilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pictured a protracted conflict closely resembling World War II, but the British Chiefs of Staff believed that an atomic attack would leave the USSR too
devastated to continue waging full-scale war. In July 1952, Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor presented two strategic alternatives to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. First, NATO might superimpose atomic strategy upon “a modernized conception of the 1914/18 war,” thereby requiring 98 divisions and 10,000 aircraft. This solution the BCS considered to be “an economic impossibility, a logistic nightmare and a strategic nonsense.” Second, the allies could rely primarily upon “atomic air power,” and correspondingly reduce conventional force levels. Marshal Slessor defended this strategy as “strategically sound and economically practicable,” affording “the best hope of preventing war.” General Bradley challenged his conclusions, commenting that sufficient atomic weapons would not be available for tactical use before 1955. Moreover, he doubted that atomic attacks would quickly destroy Soviet war-making capacity:

General Bradley: “I believe . . . it would be a terrific blow against the Soviets, but we are not all convinced it would be decisive. . . . You recall how Germany carried on in spite of the terrific bombing she received.”

Marshal Slessor: “I don’t see how Russia could survive.”

General Bradley: “But consider modern defensive measures . . .”

Before a NAC meeting on 22 September, General Bradley again remarked that “considerable wishful thinking was apparent” regarding the impact of atomic weapons. Through a statement approved by the White House, he advised the Council that growing atomic capabilities would not lower conventional force requirements “below the maximum obtainable within the next two years.”

Thus, during 1950–1952, strategic dilemmas remained unresolved. When war perils receded, the allies’ will to sacrifice economic recovery in favor of military expansion became seriously enfeebled. As a result, proper correlation of means and ends proved increasingly difficult.

The Mediterranean Command Solution

The attempt to devise a suitable arrangement for NATO’s southern flank remained the Alliance’s most perplexing command problem. Longest in gestation, the solution also was the least satisfactory. Arising from British insistence upon Mediterranean command responsibilities independent of SACEUR, this problem was complicated in late 1951 by the approaching accession to NATO of Greece and Turkey. The UK sought appointment of a single British officer who would control both a NATO Eastern (or Aegean) Command and the Middle East Command. By contrast, the United States opposed integration of NATO with MEC and advocated appointment of a British officer as CINCEAST under SACEUR. Further to complicate matters, Greece and Turkey wished to place their forces under the USCINSOUTH (Admiral Carney) rather than a British CINCEAST.
Albeit for differing reasons, Greece, Turkey and Great Britain all opposed the US position. Accordingly, on 28 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Joint Staff to analyze two fresh alternatives:

a. Establishment of Greek and Turkish Land Forces Commanders reporting directly to CINCSOUTH.
b. Creation of an Eastern Command, encompassing Greek and Turkish forces, under a USAF officer directly responsible to SACEUR.

Replying on 3 January 1952, the Joint Strategic Plans Group appraised either solution as acceptable. General Eisenhower said that he now preferred, as an initial arrangement, simply extending CINCSOUTH’s area of responsibility to the eastward. He envisioned Italian, Greek and Turkish land sector commanders and a British Allied Naval Commander, all under Admiral Carney, supervising French, Italian, Greek and Turkish subordinates. However, SACEUR strongly criticized Greek-Turkish aversion to appointment of a British officer as CINCEAST: “I question the propriety of their position and the weight that is accorded to it. If such feelings are so dominant it raises serious doubt as to the true strength of the structure we are building.”

Admiral Fechteler then prepared a plan which he hoped would win the approval of all parties. A UK CINC Allied Naval Forces, Mediterranean, and a US Commander, Naval Striking Forces, Mediterranean (i.e., US Sixth Fleet), would both serve directly under CINCSOUTH. Also subordinate to Admiral Carney would be a CINC, Allied Air Forces, and the Commanders of Allied Land Forces in Italy, Greece and Turkey. On 28 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this proposition and ordered that it be introduced before the Standing Group.

On 1 February, the British representative also placed before that body a proposal to establish an overall Mediterranean Naval Command directly under the Standing Group, allowing CINCSOUTH to retain command of Greek-Turkish ground forces and of the Naval Striking Force (i.e., US Sixth Fleet). The United Kingdom thus reverted to an extreme opinion, evidently spurning the painful progress made toward agreement. Very probably, Mr. Churchill’s surrender of Atlantic Command to the Americans strengthened his determination to preserve British primacy in this area. At all events, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adjudged the British plan “militarily unsound and probably politically unacceptable.” Accordingly, they approved Admiral Wright’s suggestions, first, that Greek-Turkish land and air forces immediately be integrated within Admiral Carney’s command and, second, that the Mediterranean naval organization and the relation between NATO and MEC be deferred until a later date.

At Lisbon, the North Atlantic Council followed this plan of action. Greece and Turkey were admitted to full membership on 18 February; their ground and air forces were then assigned to Admiral Carney’s command.

What was to be done about Mediterranean command? Writing to the First Sea Lord late in February, General Eisenhower said he would accept “almost any kind of arrangement that naval authorities believed would work,” including appointment of a CINCMED, provided only that SACEUR kept direct control of the
carrier striking force. Since success depended largely upon "the selfless, intelligent co-operation of the commanders concerned," he felt arrangements should "not try to be too specific in foreseeing every possible problem."

General Eisenhower hoped Admiral Louis Mountbatten would receive the post of CINCMED. However, Admiral Carney advised Admiral Fechteler that Mediterranean nations would "stiffly resist" service under a British officer who was not directly subordinate to CINCSOUTH. French and Italian naval commands responsible to Admiral Carney already existed; the responsibility for protecting lines of communication to Greece and Turkey required extension of CINCSOUTH's authority to the Eastern Mediterranean as well. Nonetheless, Admiral Carney described appointment of a UK naval commander responsible to SACEUR as technically feasible (although decidedly undesirable), provided the carrier task force remained under CINCSOUTH's control. Apparently, these exchanges only strengthened Admiral Fechteler's convictions. On 25 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed support of his scheme for a US or UK CINC, Allied Naval Forces, and a US Commander, Allied Carrier Task Forces, subordinate to CINCSOUTH.

At General Bradley's suggestion, Admiral Fechteler traveled to Europe to confer with French, Italian and British Chiefs of Naval Staff. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) met first with General Eisenhower, who said again that "he was not concerned with titles, as long as good workable arrangements could be obtained and all concerned were agreeable." Nowhere else did Admiral Fechteler find such a disinterested and magnanimous spirit. Vice Admiral Noomy declared that he could not accept arrangements which "encircled" France by placing British naval commanders on her western as well as southern and northern flanks. Vice Admiral Ferreri of Italy stated emphatically that he preferred the status quo. For the United Kingdom, Admiral McGrigor pronounced it "completely unacceptable" that the CINC, Allied Naval Forces, should be subordinate to CINCSOUTH, "a land authority who has no responsibility either for the Middle East campaign or for the lines of communication feeding it [and] passing ... into the Indian Ocean." This difference in emphasis (Continental Europe vs. Middle East) was made plain during a CNO-BCS meeting on 5 May. Admiral Fechteler observed that, if the allies lost the Mediterranean, "we would not have been hurt too much"; Field Marshal Slimanswered that control of the Mediterranean was more important to the British than naval support of SACEUR.

In sum, both parties agreed that a naval command should be created for the entire Mediterranean; the United States asked that this officer serve under CINCSOUTH while the United Kingdom insisted that he report directly to the Standing Group. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired a NATO subordinate command confined to the Mediterranean, the BCS conceived of an independent theater embracing the Middle East as well.

A new cycle of debate commenced in mid-June when General Ridgway, the new SACEUR, proposed that operational control of Greek, Turkish and Italian armies be vested in a US Army officer who would be designated Commander, Allied Land Forces, Southeastern Europe (COMLANDSOUTHEAST), under CINCSOUTH. General Collins condemned this solution on several grounds: first,
a false impression would be fostered that the United States planned major force commitments to the area; second, an attack from Bulgaria would quickly split Greece and Turkey, depriving COMLANDSOUTHEAST of effective command control; third, Greece and Italy, with Yugoslavia, actually formed a separate strategic entity apart from Turkey. In his view, a US officer should be appointed Deputy to CINCSOUTH in order to coordinate Italian, Greek and Turkish armies, which would actually remain under national commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff overrode these objections, informing Admiral Davis of the Standing Group that SACEUR’s arrangements, “while not entirely satisfactory from a military point of view,” were nonetheless acceptable.27

The British Chiefs of Staff assailed General Ridgway’s proposal to establish a command of such “vast dimensions” as “inconsistent, quite unworkable and liable to involve us in disaster should war come.” Instead, they advocated establishment of a new Southeastern Command, comprising Greece-Turkey alone and responsible to SACEUR rather than CINCSOUTH. If the United States accepted this scheme, the United Kingdom would in turn agree that CINCMED be subordinate to SACEUR rather than directly responsible to the Standing Group. Additionally, the BCS stipulated that CINCMED must be a British officer, must command all Allied Mediterranean naval forces, and must undertake “certain responsibilities” toward the proposed Middle East Command.28

This British concession over the status of CINCMED betokened a more flexible attitude that made further progress possible. On 9 July, the Standing Group approved establishment of COMLANDSOUTHEAST as recommended by General Ridgway. The British Chiefs of Staff accepted this arrangement, asking only that it be regarded as a “partial and interim solution” which would be reviewed when consummation of Mediterranean-Middle East command arrangements became imminent.29 COMLANDSOUTHEAST was activated in August, with headquarters at Izmir in Asiatic Turkey and an advance post in Salonika. Lieutenant General Willard Wyman, USA, was appointed to this office; he had recently commanded the Greek battalion and the Turkish brigade as CG, IX Corps in Korea.30

During autumn, NAC members exhorted the Standing Group quickly to conclude Mediterranean command arrangements. The “Annual Review” then was mired in many difficulties; it seemed likely that settlement of the Mediterranean command could revitalize sagging spirits. This thought dominated the Standing Group and was probably instrumental in producing a solution that its members considered to be “the best possible compromise.” This long-awaited agreement—which enumerated only broad principles and relegated specific details to the commanders concerned—was achieved at a conference on 19–20 November, in which General Bradley and Admiral Fechteker represented the United States. Under SACEUR, a British CINC, Allied Forces, Mediterranean (CINCAFMED) would be responsible for the security of seaborne lines of communication. However, the French, Italian, Greek and Turkish naval forces under CINCAFMED remained responsible to their respective governments for assorted tasks of a “national character.” The striking force of the US Sixth Fleet (amphibious and support ships as well as carriers) would remain under Admiral Carney’s control.
JCS and National Policy

The relationship between CINCFMED and the Commander, Sixth Fleet, remained undefined. Subsequently, Mr. Churchill could only tell the House of Commons: "I expect they will help each other." Nonetheless, this plan was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 November and by the North Atlantic Council on 16 December. At Malta, Admiral Mountbatten assumed command as CINCFMED in March 1953.31

Some time later, Admiral Carney advised his US superiors that although CINCFMED's appointment had muddied the waters rather than cleared them, "to date there are no questions we have not been able to work out."32

Franco and NATO

Before returning to German rearmament, it is illuminating to survey the analogous problems posed by Spanish association with NATO. Spain was strategically valuable, but General Francisco Franco’s neo-Fascist regime was thoroughly despised throughout western Europe. President Truman, also, made no secret of his aversion to the Franco dictatorship. How could an alliance dedicated to “democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” embrace an admirer of Adolf Hitler? Military needs sharply conflicted with moral and political considerations.33

To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this issue was exceedingly simple and straightforward. Since the allies could not successfully defend France and the Low Countries against Soviet attack, Spain might well become the last US bastion in continental Europe. Atomic weapons probably would make another OVERLORD impossible. However, if the Pyrenees mountains were held by the allies, extended enemy lines of communication could be interdicted and strength assembled for an overland counterattack. On 3 May 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that, as a matter of “paramount importance,” steps should be taken (either through bilateral agreement or by membership in NATO) to assure that Spain would become an ally in the event of war. Secretary Johnson circulated their views for NSC consideration.34

On 3 July, in the wake of the Korean intervention, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again requested NSC action “as a matter of urgency.” The State Department vigorously objected, on grounds that such a course would certainly anger the allies and possibly imply that the United States planned to abandon Western Europe in event of war. The National Security Council met on 6 July and deferred decision.35

On 14 August, Mr. Johnson announced his agreement with JCS views. The Service Secretaries heartily concurred:

That European or American sentiment would condone assistance to the vicious dictatorship of the Left as represented by Tito in Yugoslavia...and at the same time express shock and dismay at the very thought of aid to a dictatorship
of the Right as represented by Franco in Spain ... is indicative of the confusion that emotion and sentiment can impose on reason.

Four days later, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reversed themselves and recommended that further action be postponed until German rearmament was resolved. Apparently, two concurrent controversies within NATO were too many and the German issue was infinitely more important.36

In mid-December, with German rearmament supposedly settled, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reintroduced the Spanish question. After softening their initial submission because Messrs. Acheson and Lovett thought its language too strident, they forwarded the following conclusion to General Marshall on 12 January 1951:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that ... the time has come for the United States to take the lead in uniting all nations and peoples, regardless of ideologies, type of government, color or creed, who can and will contribute to the military opposition to the threat of the Kremlin. ...

Therefore, they urged that the United States seek (1) Spain's entry into NATO, (2) association of NATO military agencies with their Spanish counterparts, and (3) political arrangements permitting US-Spanish military conversations.37

However, the administration agreed only to permit the sale of military equipment and attempt to acquire naval and air base facilities. When Admiral Sherman journeyed to Madrid in July, President Truman authorized him to discuss only anchorage, overflight and aircraft staging rights. After conversing with Generalissimo Franco, the CNO sent word that these rights could be obtained at the price of "considerable military and economic aid."38

Like the tale of NATO after Lisbon, the remainder of the Spanish story proved anti-climactic. Military urgencies became mired in political and economic quicksands. A Joint Military Survey Team worked in Spain from August to October 1951. After analyzing the Team's report, the JSPG calculated the cost of US military requirements (including airfields adequate to support a wartime deployment of 10 wings, mostly medium bombers) at $404 million. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to negotiate forthwith for this full program but finally accepted the State Department's suggestion initially to seek only a necessary minimum.

Congress had appropriated $100 million for economic and military aid to Spain during FY 1952. Unfortunately these monies could not be spent to finance base construction, and the Spanish Government would not permit the proposed use of counterpart funds for this purpose.39 The Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), believed the Spanish would sign an adequate base rights agreement if they were assured of a $440 million military equipment program extending over 4-5 years. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed for early decisions, but these were passed to the new administration.40

Bilateral Defense, Economic Aid and Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements were finally signed in September 1953; these served as surrogates for actual Spanish association with NATO. The Eisenhower administration informally
promised $465 million in aid during the next four years; the Spanish agreed that 60 percent of the counterpart pesetas could be used to defray local expenses of the base construction program. Four bases, built at a leisurely pace, finally became operational in 1957.31

Erosion of the EDC

The Soviet Union, apparently alarmed by the Lisbon conference’s success, launched a sudden diplomatic overture. Through identical notes delivered to the American, British and French Ambassadors on 10 March 1952, the Soviet Union proposed the rapid conclusion of a German peace treaty on the basis of reunification, neutralization and limited rearmament. “Democratic rights” would be guaranteed, all former Nazis (except war criminals) fully rehabilitated and economic restrictions ended. The frontiers of Germany would be those established by the Potsdam Conference” (i.e., the Oder-Neisse River line).42

To Secretary Acheson, the Soviet proposal seemed only a “spoling operation intended to check and dissipate the momentum . . . brought about by three years of colossal effort.” In preparing the allied response, Anthony Eden rendered the largest contribution by proposing that their answer concentrate upon the vague Soviet suggestion for “the earliest formation of an all-German government.” Delivered on 26 March, the three powers’ reply stated that formation of a government through free elections must precede peace treaty negotiations. Appealing to German opinion, the allies also denied that the Potsdam frontiers were “definitive.” Furthermore, they condemned rearmament coupled with neutralization as inconsistent with present plans for German participation in “a purely defensive European community.” The Soviets insisted upon immediate four-power negotiations; the allies demanded that a freely-chosen all-German government participate in this process. Continuing through May, further exchanges simply repeated these oppositions.43

Did the Soviet note constitute an important diplomatic initiative or was it simply a shrewd psychological stroke? Although some scholars have suggested that Western suspicions possibly were exaggerated, contemporary observers harbored no such thoughts. At that moment, East-West negotiation was in disrepute; the Deputy Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Paris, the Austrian Treaty talks, and the Korean armistice discussions all seemed to demonstrate that this was a bruising and barren course. At no time during the March-May exchanges, for instance, did the State Department formally solicit an opinion from the Department of Defense. Certainly this fact is illustrative of Secretary Acheson’s belief that shadow rather than substance was involved.

Thus the allies proceeded toward their goal of West German rearmament within the framework of the European Defense Community. Here again, however, the exhilaration inspired by Lisbon was short-lived. Indeed, by early April Mr. Acheson concluded that lack of progress toward the EDC Treaty and the contractual arrangements (or “Peace Contract”) with Germany was gravely imperil-
ing all his plans. Because the US Congress would adjourn on 3 July, the Peace
Contract would have to reach the Senate by mid-May in order to assure its ratifi-
cation during 1952. Delay until January 1953, Secretary Acheson believed, would
jeopardize “the entire Western policy with regard to the common defense and
with regard to Germany.” Therefore, he advised NATO Foreign Ministers that
“there is no alternative but to set for ourselves a definite date for signing the con-
tractuals and the EDC Treaty…”45

On 9 May, representatives of seven nations initialed the EDC Treaty. Lord
Ismay then asked the Standing Group to determine whether the treaty’s military
aspects accorded with the Brussels and Lisbon decisions. Replying to Vice Admi-
ral Davis’ request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the document seemed “as
realistic and as feasible as possible considering the many divergent interests in-
volved and the highly political nature of the problem.” Mr. Lovett, in turn, in-
formed Secretary Acheson that he approved the treaty and agreed that NATO
should extend a security guarantee to the EDC.46

A crisis arose when, on 22 May, the French Cabinet resolved that their ap-
proval of the contractual arrangements was conditional upon extension of a US-
UK guarantee against German secession from the EDC. Secretary Acheson there-
upon departed for Bonn to perform what he considered the most critical mission
of his Secretaryship. During 23–26 May, Messrs. Acheson, Eden and Schuman
conferred continuously among themselves and with the High Commissioners.
President Truman had concluded that his expiring administration could not at-
tempt to ease French fears through a formal treaty. However, the Chief Executive
did endorse the following tripartite declaration suggested by Ambassador Philip
Jessup: If “any action from whatever quarter” threatened the unity and integrity
of the EDC, the United States, United Kingdom and France would consider this
“a threat to their own security” and consult among themselves and with their al-
lies in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. With minor modi-
fications, the French Government accepted this solution.47

The contractual arrangements and accompanying documents were signed at
Bonn on 26 May. The Federal Republic thereby received full authority over its in-
ternal and external affairs, circumscribed only by rights retained by the Three
Powers relating to: “(a) the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the pro-
tection of their security, (b) Berlin, and (c) Germany as a whole, including the
unification of Germany and a peace settlement.” Certain emergency powers, to
be invoked in case of external attack or internal subversion, also were withheld
by the allies. Thus the Occupation Statute was abrogated and the High Commiss-
ioner replaced by Ambassadors of the Three Powers. In his final report, Mr. Mc-
Cloy aptly summarized the evolution of this “peace contract”: “The final conven-
tions bear little resemblance to those which were originally proposed, and the
differences are primarily due…to Allied recognition that in the new relationship
the Federal Republic was justified in demanding full equality.”48

The treaty constituting the European Defense Community was signed at Paris
on 27 May. As France originally had proposed, the Community would possess
common institutions, common armed forces and a common budget. As Western
Germany wished, military integration would occur at army corps level; the basic
national unit would be the infantry division. By separate protocol, NATO extended security guarantees to the EDC. Following Ambassador Jessup’s formula, the Three Powers also pledged to prevent future German secession from the Community. As these ceremonies ended, Secretary Acheson spoke exuberantly: “We have seen the beginning of the realization of an ancient dream—the unity of the free peoples of Western Europe.”

On 1 July, the US Senate ratified the Peace Contract by 77–5 and the NATO protocol by 72–5. Shortly thereafter, on 10 August, the European Coal and Steel Community—the outgrowth of the Schuman Plan, and the political counterpart of the proposed European Defense Community—was formally inaugurated in Luxembourg. But, at this point, the push for European unity began petering out. In France, revulsion against EDC rapidly assumed menacing proportions. Elder statesman Edouard Herriot, President of the National Assembly, assailed the EDC Treaty as contrary to the French Constitution, inimical to French interests and unduly advantageous to Germany. Like Herbert Hoover’s address of December 1950, this speech sparked a “Feat Debate” throughout France. Premier Antoine Pinay finally chose not to lay the treaty before the Assembly, seeking instead revisions which would render it more palatable to French opinion.

In Germany, Dr. Adenauer also was unable to muster sufficient support. Committed to reunification, the Social Democrats inevitably opposed a treaty which perpetuated Germany’s division. They therefore claimed that a two-thirds majority was necessary for ratification in the legislature’s lower chamber, the Bundestag. Moreover, the Bundesrat (the upper chamber, which the Christian Democratic coalition did not control) claimed the treaty decision fell within its jurisdiction also. President Theodor Heuss thereupon asked the Federal Constitutional Court for an advisory opinion. During 3–5 December, the Bundestag tentatively approved the treaty and protocols by votes averaging 218–164—well short of a two-thirds majority. Anticipating an unfavorable court ruling, Chancellor Adenauer postponed final action and persuaded President Heuss to withdraw his application. When 1952 ended, there was not yet a single West German soldier in uniform. Decay of the EDC concept, which culminated in the treaty’s rejection by the French National Assembly in 1954, already was clearly discernible.

Retrospect

At its close, the Truman administration could survey formidable achievements and significant failures in Western Europe. The spread of Soviet power and influence had been halted; the United States had established a large and permanent military presence; European self-confidence was swelling. The alliance had not only created an integrated defense force but had also coordinated military, economic and financial planning processes through the unique mechanism of the Annual Review. The prospect of a truly interdependent Atlantic Union beckoned brightly.
However, unquenched French suspicions of German revanchism finally destroyed the European Defense Community. For this failure, the ceaseless US pressure for German rearmament must be deemed partly responsible. And, because of EDC's long death agonies, operational German army and air force units—without which the Joint Chiefs of Staff adjudged a successful defense of the continent impossible—did not appear until 1957. By then a massive arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons helped to offset NATO's conventional deficiencies.

As peace endured and prosperity returned, American influence progressively diminished. During the next decade, European integration would proceed through the Common Market rather than under NATO.

### Table 8

**Military Assistance Program**  
**Expenditures for NATO Nations**  
*(Millions)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1950</th>
<th>FY 1951</th>
<th>FY 1952</th>
<th>FY 1953</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium–Luxembourg</td>
<td>$3.6</td>
<td>$60.1</td>
<td>$110.4</td>
<td>$364.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>346.2</td>
<td>485.5</td>
<td>1,107.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>121.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>416.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>100.5</td>
<td>193.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>123.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>151.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>121.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$66.9</td>
<td>$791.5</td>
<td>$1,096.6</td>
<td>$2,751.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Middle East: "Recessional"

The Ending of an Empire

In varying degrees, three factors dominated Middle Eastern developments during 1950–1952: Arab-Israeli tension; East-West conflict; and decay of British power and prestige. Although intermittent border clashes continued, the Arab-Israeli struggle was temporarily muted after the armistices of 1949. Meanwhile, Cold War tensions markedly increased. As NATO's strength grew, military needs for Middle Eastern oil greatly expanded and the defenses of Western Europe and the Middle East inevitably grew interdependent. Outwardly, British power and prestige were still predominant. In 1950, she possessed treaties with and bases in Egypt, Iraq and Jordan; the United States enjoyed base rights only at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. But, increasingly beset by rising nationalism in Egypt and Iran, the United Kingdom strove to enlist US support in preserving her bases and investments. Through the Middle East Command, the British also sought to place Anglo-Arab military collaboration upon a permanent basis. This chapter's theme, then, is chiefly one of stubborn but ultimately unsuccessful rear-guard actions conducted by the embattled British. Hesitantly, the United States attempted to assume portions of a burden which the United Kingdom could no longer bear.

Egypt and the Middle East Command

British planners envisioned a joint defense of the Middle East by the United Kingdom and the Arab States. NSC 65/3, approved by President Truman on 19 May 1950, affirmed that US security interests required a military strengthening of Middle Eastern countries by friendly sources. The United States would issue export licenses for arms shipments to the Arab States and Israel, confined to whatever was deemed necessary "to help [Middle Eastern] states maintain internal order and provide for legitimate defense, bearing in mind the undesirability
of increasing the instability and uneasiness in the Arab-Israeli area.” Nonetheless, major responsibility in this sphere would rest with the United Kingdom. The British Chiefs of Staff, who were seeking to cement an Anglo-Egyptian military partnership, planned to expand greatly the Egyptian Army with British equipment. This effort was explicitly endorsed in NSC 65/3.3

In May, also, the US, UK, and French Foreign Ministers issued a Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East. Critical segments read as follows:

1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab States and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces...
2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state...
3. . . . The three Governments, should they find that any of these States was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

Over the coming years, this Declaration remained influential but finally proved wholly ineffectual.4

The last months of 1950 witnessed a resurgence of the chronic anti-British agitation in Egypt and Iraq. Under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the United Kingdom was entitled to maintain 10,000 soldiers and 400 pilots (with supporting personnel) in the Suez Canal zone until both parties agreed that the Egyptian Army could defend the area by itself. This agreement, and the colonial status that it implied, had become anathema to Egyptian public opinion. The goals of Premier Nahas Pasha and his Wafd Party were contained in a well-worn formula: “Immediate and complete evacuation of British forces from Egypt and the Sudan, and unification of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown.” In his speech from the throne, read on 16 November 1950, King Farouk announced that the 1936 treaty and the 1899 Sudan agreement would be “abrogated.”5 Immediately thereafter, Premier Nuri Al-Said of Iraq declared the 20-year-old Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to be “outdated and incompatible with current world developments.”6

In these circumstances, Secretary Acheson concluded that “more affirmative United States action” was required to safeguard vital security interests in the Middle East. Writing to General Marshall on 27 January 1951, he advised that accelerating political deterioration in the area rendered it “questionable whether the United States can continue to count on the support of many Middle Eastern countries.” The Secretary favored neither commitment of US combat forces nor involvement in a regional security pact. He advocated, instead, coordination of American, British and indigenous efforts under a concept of cooperative regional defense, with the United States providing assistance while the United Kingdom retained primary military responsibility. Accordingly, Secretary Acheson asked for State-JCS discussion of two suggestions. First, the United States might offer training missions and token arms shipments to the Arab States and
The Middle East: "Recessional"

Israel. Second, the United States might discuss with the United Kingdom the establishment of either combined or separate military missions to coordinate regional defense efforts.7

A State-JCS discussion on 30 January disclosed differences of opinion. Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee stressed the need for a "regional effort" under US-UK sponsorship. He believed that a modest military aid program, involving a maximum of $10 million and administered by very small advisory missions, would be useful as a "small insurance payment." But the Joint Chiefs of Staff doubted the wisdom of making even so small a commitment and disagreed among themselves about the advisability of cooperation with the British. General Collins thought that the United States should stay on the "periphery" and compel the British to accept the Middle Eastern responsibilities. Admiral Sherman, on the other hand, pointed out that the United States already had attained "a certain position of leadership." By bringing in the British, he feared, "we will not better their position and we will lose the position we have." In the end, conferees agreed that the State Department should prepare a paper for submission to the NSC.8

The State Department's draft NSC paper embodied Mr. Acheson's suggestions of 27 January. Very soon afterward, the US Ambassadors to all Middle Eastern nations met in an extraordinary conclave at Istanbul. Assistant Secretary McGhee chaired this gathering; Admiral Carney and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter represented the Defense Department. In their report, the conferees agreed that no attempt should presently be made to organize a regional security pact. However, they urged that the United States publicly announce its willingness, in association with the United Kingdom, to assist Middle Eastern states in strengthening their defense capabilities. After the United States and United Kingdom had apportioned regional responsibilities, mobilization of resources and coordination of planning could proceed through aid programs and staff discussions.9

These two reports served as the genesis of NSC 47/4, which was written to supplement but not supplant existing policy papers. After a meeting on 12 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to Secretary Marshall only minor alterations. Two days later, the National Security Council adopted NSC 47/4, adding several small State and JCS amendments. On 17 March, President Truman approved this revision as NSC 47/5. According to this paper, the United States would attempt to reverse recent adverse trends by endeavoring to establish the concept of regional defense cooperation. Toward this end, the United States and United Kingdom should obtain the military rights that they considered necessary. Also, they should initiate a limited arms supply program and provide early deliveries of token quantities of equipment.10

When US and UK representatives met in the Pentagon on 24 May to discuss NATO command problems, British spokesmen seized the opportunity to advocate establishment of a Middle East Command (MEC) and appointment of a UK officer as Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East (SACME). The Americans approached this concept more cautiously. Assistant Secretary McGhee, for example, thought the Middle East States would be "most unlikely" to enter MEC
"during the Cold War," but believed it might prove possible to engender a "cooperative relationship" for military planning and assistance. He suggested that, prior to any public announcement, Arab ambassadors be approached and their governments’ reactions ascertained. This scheme left the British unsatisfied. When General Bradley conferred with the BCS on 8 June, Field Marshal Slim remarked that the Command Organization "must be something very much more definite than the United States has so far proposed." 11

The British won the day. A US-UK meeting on 19 June produced "tentative agreement" to establish an Allied Middle East Command, responsible to the NATO Standing Group, and to appoint a British officer as SACME. There would also be Australian, New Zealand, South African, and Turkish representation. Numerous revisions and redraftings followed. At last, on 8 September, Mr. McGhee gained assent from a US-UK Working Group to the following timetable:

1. When the concurrence of Turkey and the Commonwealth countries has been obtained, approach the King of Egypt concerning the feasibility of MEC. In light of King Farouk’s advice, approach the Egyptian Government.
2. At an appropriate time, inform Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia of the general terms of the MEC plan.
3. As soon as consultations with Egypt have progressed to a point where public announcement would not prejudice the negotiations, a statement regarding the Command Structure should be issued.

The conferees also contemplated placement of SACME and his headquarters in Egypt; Great Britain would cede her Suez bases to Egypt, which would in turn place them under SACME’s control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed these agreements on 10 September. According to Secretary Acheson’s recollection, the Defense Department accepted this plan because it would continue Great Britain’s primary responsibility for defense of the Middle East; the State Department concurred because it could discern "no practicable alternative"; the United Kingdom approved because creation of MEC should allow British forces to stay in Suez without incurring the odium of “occupation.” 12

The Suez Complication

In the judgment of the British Government, Egypt constituted "the key strategic area of the Middle East"; continued operation of the Suez base complex was currently “indispensable.” 13 Unfortunately, Egypt’s cooperation in any Middle East Command was becoming increasingly unlikely. In April of 1951, London offered—and Cairo refused—phased withdrawal from Suez (with reentry rights), to be completed in 1956.

The State Department feared that British obduracy might generate such hostility and instability that the benefits of the Suez bases might be neutralized. 14 Indeed, during the summer, Iran’s defiance of Great Britain further inflamed Egyptian passions; British bases at Suez were as clear a mark of colonial status as
British oil refineries at Abadam. On 15 August, the British Government asked for US support "both as regards working out one more line of approach to the Egyptians and, if that fails, in resisting attempts to dislodge us, whether they be made in the Security Council of the UN or elsewhere." Mr. Acheson thereupon apprised Secretary Marshall that, in his belief, Anglo-Egyptian discussions had reached "an impasse with dangerous potentialities." The pressure of public opinion, he wrote, might compel the Egyptian Government unilaterally to abrogate the 1936 Treaty. Accordingly, Secretary Acheson asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reassess (1) the relative strategic importance of present British facilities and troop strengths and (2) the conditions for maintenance and terms of reentry that would allow "immediate use of the bases" upon outbreak of hostilities. Warned by the BCS that matters in Egypt "may come to a head very soon," General Bradley already had directed the Joint Staff to examine this problem.\footnote{15}

Answering Secretary Marshall's request for recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed earlier statements by defining access to Suez Canal facilities as being "of extreme importance to the preservation of peace and security in the Middle East..." They believed that the United States should support the United Kingdom politically in preserving her rights (1) to maintain strategic facilities in such conditions as to allow their quick and effective utilization and (2) to reenter and make full use of these bases when necessary. Noting that British forces in Egypt now numbered 34,400 men, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remarked that levels stipulated by the 1936 Treaty were "obviously insufficient for emergency or war purposes." They were unwilling to offer "gratuitously concrete suggestions" to the British but did set forth several negotiating possibilities (e.g., reduction of ancillary personnel, organization of combined Anglo-Egyptian garrisons) which might be discussed if the United Kingdom did solicit US advice. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that military action by the British against the Egyptians would be "highly detrimental" to US military interests in the Middle East. Only after world opinion had been mobilized in the United Nations, they indicated, should the US extend political support for "such defensive action...as may be required" if Egypt unilaterally abrogated the 1936 Treaty. On 4 September, Acting Secretary Lovett transmitted this memorandum to Mr. Acheson with his concurrence.\footnote{16}

On 22 August, the State Department circulated a position paper prepared for use at a forthcoming Washington Foreign Ministers' meeting. This document paralleled JCS recommendations regarding the importance of continued use of Suez facilities. Within that framework, however, the United Kingdom should be encouraged to advance "new and imaginative" proposals, possibly establishing full Egyptian military equality through the Middle East Command. With minor reservations, the Defense Department accepted this paper.\footnote{17}

In US-UK working-level discussions conducted during 6-8 September, British representatives strongly defended their position. A UK official said that solutions must lie in Egyptian acceptance of (1) the concept of the Middle East Command and (2) the right of the Sudanese to decide for themselves whether they wanted a union with Egypt. In his opinion, establishment of the MEC and internationalization of the Suez bases would afford the opportunity for a fresh negotiating
approach. Assistant Secretary McGhee commented that these thoughts were sound but insufficiently inclusive in scope. However, his efforts to extract further concessions from the British proved unavailing. Conferees finally adopted a timetable for presenting MEC proposals to Egypt and recommended that an international commission supervise the development of a constitutional government in the Sudan.18

As Secretary Acheson had foreseen, “dangerous potentialities” soon were realized. Not until 6 October did Foreign Secretary Morrison inform the Egyptian Government that he would shortly submit new defense proposals. Two days later, Nahas Pasha asked his Parliament to abrogate the 1936 Treaty and to entitle Farouk “King of Egypt and the Sudan”; these measures were unanimously approved one week afterward. Nevertheless, on 13 October, the United States, United Kingdom, France and Turkey formally offered Egypt equal partnership in an Allied Middle East Command. General Bradley, Field Marshal Slim, and General Leclerc were then in Ankara, ready to proceed to Cairo if the winds seemed favorable. However, Nahas Pasha quickly rejected the four-power proposal.19

The play now had ended, as events were to show, but the ever-hopeful actors continued to perform. The Western Powers declined to accept Egypt’s initial refusal as a conclusive rejection. Since the MEC concept had become public knowledge, Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews proposed to Mr. Lovett that the sponsoring powers proclaim openly at an early date the basic political philosophy and principles of the Command “with a view to developing pro-MEC sentiments in the Arab States and Israel.” Reviewing Mr. Matthews’ draft declaration, Admiral Fechteler reasoned that further announcements would be “untimely” because Turkey would not join the MEC until she had formally been admitted into NATO. While generally approving the State Department’s effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted a portion of Admiral Fechteler’s argument by remarking that creation of the MEC “would be most difficult under current conditions in the Middle East, and that considerable departure from original concepts may have to be made.” On 3 November, Acting Secretary of Defense William C. Foster concurred in these conclusions and forwarded them to Mr. Acheson.20

After further consultation and revision, the United States, United Kingdom, France and Turkey issued a public statement of principles on 10 November. Significant segments of this Declaration are quoted below:21

5. The task of the Middle East Command at the outset will be primarily one of planning and providing the Middle East States on their request with assistance in the form of advice and training. . . .

6. The Supreme Allied Commander Middle East will command forces placed at his disposal. . . . However, the placing of forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East in peacetime is not a prerequisite for joining in the common effort for the defense of the Middle East. . . .

7. . . . All states joining in this enterprise will be individually associated with the Command on the basis of equality through a Middle East Defense Liaison Organization. . . .
11. The sponsoring states . . . do not regard the initial form in which the Middle East Command will be organized as unchangeable . . .

This declaration had no discernible effect. Indeed, Anglo-Egyptian relations rapidly worsened. Foreign Secretary Morrison already had apprised Mr. Acheson of the "plain fact" that the British intended to stay in Suez:

If the Egyptians agree to participate in the MEC well and good, and the base would become an Allied base. But if there is no agreement we still intend to hold the base so that it may be available for use by the Allies. And it is in this sense that I think we may regard ourselves as agents acting on behalf of the free world when we say that we intend to stay in Egypt at whatever cost and ask for the support and encouragement of the US Government in our stand.22

Within the Suez Canal zone, guerrilla and terrorist incidents multiplied; the British substantially reinforced their garrisons. In December, the Egyptian Government recalled its Ambassador from London.23 For its part, the US publicly denounced Egypt’s abrogation of the 1936 Treaty24 and privately assured the British Government of Washington’s full diplomatic support for measures necessary to protect the Suez bases and prevent closure of the Canal. By the year’s end, the State Department believed that the British were becoming more amenable to concession and compromise, "but a push is required." The State Department suggested that, when President Truman conferred with Sir Winston Churchill (who was once again Prime Minister), the Chief Executive should propose a "package deal" by which the United States, United Kingdom, France and Turkey would recognize Farouk as "King of Sudan" if Egypt guaranteed eventual Sudanese self-determination and accepted the Four-Power MEC proposals.25

The President and the Prime Minister discussed Anglo-Egyptian problems on 5 and 9 January 1952. Mr. Churchill asked that "token" US, French and Turkish forces be sent to Suez. Such a proof of solidarity, he said, "should bring the difficulties with Egypt very quickly to an end." When Secretary Acheson later broached the "package deal" as a possible future overture, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden answered that he would rather alter the MEC proposal than forsake the Sudanese. In conclusion, the two Chiefs of State agreed further to explore all aspects of the US proposal.26

Diplomatic efforts suddenly were submerged by military actions. On 19 January, heavy fighting erupted around Ismailia; British soldiers finally routed Egyptian auxiliary police, 64 of whom lost their lives. On 25 January, Mr. Eden asked for full American support in whatever military efforts might prove necessary.27 Secretary Acheson replied that the United States would act only to protect and evacuate American nationals and advised that any military occupation would be incompatible with this policy. However, the Ismailia incident inspired massive rioting in Cairo during 26 January. On this "Black Saturday," 26 people (17 of them Europeans) were killed and 552 injured; 700 buildings, many of them foreign-owned, were burned. King Farouk finally ordered the Egyptian Army to restore order. The US Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, later reported that only Farouk’s intervention had averted a Communist coup.28
Might the United States now furnish overt military support to the British? Late in 1951, the United Kingdom had asked that US Navy personnel be assigned to assist in moving ships through the Suez Canal. The administration then had deemed such action politically undesirable. After “Black Saturday,” however, the State Department reversed its position for two reasons: first, a show of solidarity by the Canal’s principal users might be the best guarantee of its continued efficient operation; second, such a gesture to the British might make them more flexible on the Sudanese question. Consequently, the Secretary advocated commitment of one or two LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank) and not more than 250 personnel for marshaling and mooring of Canal traffic. Reviewing this recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Mr. Lovett that American assistance was unnecessary and unjustified. As an overt action in support of British military operations, they argued, this would generate hostility and possibly military reprisal by the Egyptians. Further, it would indicate willingness to accept “the general principle of a US military commitment toward the Middle East.” The JCS views prevailed; the United States sent neither men nor ships to the Suez.

Nonetheless, the Truman administration advanced steadily toward acceptance of greater involvement in the Middle East. On 24 April 1952, President Truman approved NSC 129/1, which defined US regional policy as follows:

4. Currently, the danger in this area is the security of the free world arises not so much from the threat of direct Soviet military attack as from acute instability, anti-Western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism which could lead to a situation in which regimes oriented toward the Soviet Union come to power.

6. The United States should take an increased share of responsibility toward the area.

7. With respect to the Middle East Command, the United States should:
   a. Continue its efforts to establish the command.
   d. . . . Be prepared to reinforce political and psychological pressures in the area by assigning US token forces in a Middle East defense arrangement if US willingness to take this action is seen to be the key to the establishment of such an arrangement and to the settlement of the dispute between the UK and Egypt.

8. The United States should seek to create an atmosphere which will facilitate obtaining base rights where required within the area, and upon the threat of and during general hostilities, the right to operate forces in the territories of the various nations of the area.

In reviewing an earlier draft of this paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had asked that it be altered in several significant ways. First, they felt that token forces might “do more harm than good,” unless the United States stood ready to send whatever reinforcements might later be required. Given the continuation of a “highly fluid international situation” and probable US unwillingness to maintain major forces in the Middle East, such a commitment seemed “militarily inadvisable.” Second, they suggested that it would be wiser to encourage Turkey, with its stable pro-Western government, to assume “primary leadership” among Middle Eastern nations. Neither proposal, however, won NSC approval.
Although Anglo-Egyptian tensions prevented progress toward MEC, the United States and United Kingdom remained firmly committed to the concept. On 29 December 1951, Secretary Acheson wrote Mr. Lovett that, despite Egypt's attitude, he believed early establishment of MEC headquarters (probably in Cyprus) would exercise a "favorable and profound" political impact. Consequently, he hoped that the headquarters could be created during March-April, with US, UK, French, Turkish and possibly Commonwealth staff officers in residence. Soon afterward, the BCS also informed General Bradley that they felt there must be "no further delay in taking the first steps" to erect the MEC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff generally supported these suggestions, provided they neither hindered Turkey's admission to NATO nor encouraged integration of the MEC with NATO.32

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff also wished, a State-Defense Working Group examined possible problems arising from creation of MEC. As an organization confined to planning, liaison and advisory functions, MEC would be "a military structure without a political foundation." Ultimately, members reported that their "most difficult" problem concerned composition of the projected Middle East Steering Group. They tentatively advocated membership for the United States, United Kingdom, France and Turkey but predicted that the Arabs would resent exclusion even while refusing to accept substantial obligations. Upon reading this report, General Collins commented that the United States was pursuing conflicting objectives—attainment of Arab cooperation versus preservation of eroding British power and prestige. At all hazards, he argued, the Western Powers must avoid aggravating the Arabs' sense of "colonial and inferior" treatment. Consequently, General Collins suggested the following course of action: (1) invite indigenous states to form a Middle East Defense Council; (2) simultaneously establish an Allied Planning Group, Eastern Mediterranean; (3) finally merge these two organizations to form the Middle East Command.33

These views had now to be meshed with British wishes. Earlier, the United Kingdom had pressed for a London conference of the Seven Sponsoring Powers of the MEC (United Kingdom, United States, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa), but then won postponement in the expectation that Egypt might adopt a better attitude. In June, London lost hope, asked again for an early meeting, and sent Washington a detailed organizational scheme. The "Middle East Command" became "Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO)," in the hope that this title would be psychologically more palatable to the Arabs. Faithful to the November Declaration,34 the British proposed first to create a "planning, coordinating and liaison organization" which would eventually evolve into "a full-fledged Defense Organization." All Arab States would be invited to London, but only those offering "substantial assets" would be accorded charter membership in MEDO. Even if all Arabs stayed away, however, the Organization would simply be established without them.35

Within the US Government, the State Department disputed this presentation on several points. First, the Arab States should be admitted to MEDO without qualification; if all abstained, the wisdom of establishing the Organization seemed questionable. Second, any "Middle East Steering Group" should be "an
ad hoc arrangement,” rather than a duplication of the NATO Standing Group as the British wished. Third, there should be “thorough diplomatic preparation through a four-power approach to the Arab States” before invitations were issued to a London Conference. The Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized the first and last of these statements, saying that the area’s importance was such that “defense arrangements must proceed regardless of whether the Arab States elect to participate at this time.” The State and Defense Departments agreed that further movement toward MEDO should await assessment of reactions from the Sponsoring Powers and the Arab States. Meeting with Mr. Eden on 26–27 June, Secretary Acheson won his assent to this general method of approach. After the Seven Sponsors had achieved agreement among themselves, an approach would be made to the Arab States “to sound out their willingness to join that organization. . . .”36

Aid to Egypt?

Over the coming weeks, the United States and United Kingdom sought—without success—to agree upon an initial negotiating position. Then the “July Revolution,” in which King Farouk was expelled by a Committee of Free Officers ostensibly led by General Mohammed Naguib, suddenly broke the Anglo-Egyptian impasse. Abandoning the “Nile Valley Unity” formula, General Naguib accepted the principle of Sudanese self-determination. More importantly, in mid-September his representatives secretly told Ambassador Caffery that Egypt would join MEDO if granted military and economic assistance. Later, however, he stipulated that, before Egypt entered the Organization, the Sudanese question must be fully resolved and Great Britain must set a deadline for complete withdrawal from the Suez Canal.37

Seeking to exploit these opportunities, the State Department urged the United Kingdom to formulate fresh negotiating proposals and invited the Defense Department jointly to explore the problems involved in preparing a military aid program for Egypt. In an “interim” reply on 3 December, Deputy Secretary Foster asked Secretary Acheson first to provide a political judgment concerning the desirability for grant and reimbursable aid to Egypt. As the State Department desired, however, the Office of Military Assistance did direct the Departments of the Army and Air Force to select approximately $10 million worth of equipment which could quickly be made available for shipment. Mr. Foster requested a JCS judgment as to whether such assistance was warranted.38

Responding to Mr. Foster’s letter of 3 December, Secretary Acheson stated that military assistance constituted “an essential element” in efforts to settle the Suez Canal dispute and win Egyptian adherence to MEDO. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, advised Secretary Lovett that such a program entailed “serious disadvantages” from a purely military standpoint. In their estimation, present MDAP commitments approached and possibly exceeded US capabilities. Consequently, funds would have to be diverted from such crucial recipients as Greece and Turkey in order to supply Egypt, a country which currently could defend

180
neither herself nor her neighbors. Additionally, provision of grant aid “almost certainly” would (1) constitute an implied commitment to further assistance and (2) generate similar demands from other Middle Eastern states. Nonetheless, they would support diversion to Egypt of $10 million in MDAP funds subject to two stipulations: first, the State Department should formally affirm that this action was “politically essential”; second, Egypt must pay for equipment received to the fullest extent possible. On 29 December, Deputy Secretary Foster endorsed these conclusions and forwarded them to Mr. Acheson.38

Meanwhile, the State Department was reconnoitering a different avenue toward Arab-Western cooperation. The Department considered that military aid constituted the “most effective tool” through which to achieve US political objectives in the area. By FY 1954, the volume of US arms production might be such as to permit significant allocations to the Middle East. Certainly, MDO’s ability to attract Arab members would depend largely upon the benefits anticipated by participants. Furthermore, in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, inept leaders recently had been replaced by more promising ones. In light of all these factors, the State Department recommended provision of $100 million in grant military assistance to states of the Middle East. On 5 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to the “urgent behest” of State Department representatives that Congressional authorization for such a program should now be sought. Early in 1953, the Eisenhower administration decided to proceed with this program; Congress eventually appropriated $30 million.40 Thus, since 1950, the United States had progressed from acknowledgement of British pre-eminence toward interest in regional defense cooperation, then to willingness to participate in a Middle East Command, and finally to direct provision of military assistance.

In the Truman administration’s last weeks, a fresh approach to Egypt was being organized. Meeting in London from 31 December until 7 January 1953, Anglo-American representatives did agree upon a strategy for conducting Suez and MDO negotiations.41 However, the British Government strongly opposed delivery of $10 million worth of US military equipment before defense discussions began. The BCS believed that, because guerrilla warfare might well be renewed if these talks failed, such deliveries would constitute “an unjustified gamble with the lives of British soldiers and airmen.”42 Also, they evidently wished to confine the United States to economic aid, reserving military assistance to Egypt as a United Kingdom prerogative.43

President Truman struck a middling stance. After a lengthy discussion with Messrs. Acheson and Harriman on 7 January, the Chief Executive disapproved grant military aid “at this time” but authorized reimbursable military assistance within the limits of Egyptian financial capabilities. He also concluded that the United States should not enter “extensively” into jet aircraft sales without further consideration.44 Mr. Truman thus passed to his successor a policy that was in a delicate stage of transition.

An Anglo-Egyptian agreement on Suez finally was consummated in October 1954: Great Britain agreed to evacuate her Suez bases within twenty months; Egypt allowed continuous maintenance work upon the base facilities by British
civilian technicians and acknowledged the United Kingdom’s right of reentry in wartime. Unfortunately, deepening of the Arab-Israeli conflict destroyed Western hopes for close and continuing military cooperation with Egypt. When Great Britain’s “recessional” became complete, the Soviet Union supplanted her as the dominant foreign influence in Egypt.

In retrospect, it appears unlikely that the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, could have become Great Britain’s immediate heir. During 1950–1952, the Middle East Command was the vehicle chosen to facilitate Arab-Western cooperation. This MEC concept failed because it lacked a firm foundation of political agreement. While the West was immersed in Cold War, the Arab States (led by Egypt) still considered themselves at war with Israel—a nation to which the United States was strongly bound through ties of policy and sentiment. By ranging herself on the Arabs’ side, the Soviet Union later established that community of interest which the Western Powers had never built. Only among the “northern tier” of states, less obsessed by Israel and more fearful of Soviet dominance, could the United States organize an anti-Communist alliance. Elsewhere, the waning of Western influence continued.

The Iranian Imbroglio

Oil-rich Iran, bordering upon the USSR, was the vortex of an early Cold War confrontation. Like the Turks, the Iranians feared and distrusted their powerful neighbor. In 1946, Communists established an autonomous government in the northern province of Azerbaijan, which Soviet soldiers continued to occupy in violation of wartime agreements. President Truman saw this as aggressive Soviet expansionism and discerned a real danger of war.45

Under strong pressure, Premier Stalin finally withdrew his forces and the separatist regime collapsed. However, the specter of renewed Soviet intervention (for which provisions of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty provided a legal pretext) would color all subsequent events and decisions.

In 1950, Iran’s position was still precarious. After surveying the endemic economic distress and political ineptitude, the State Department reasoned that “prompt and vigorous action” by the Iranian Government was needed to prevent the country from becoming “an easy prey for Communism.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the West was faced with “an incipient China.”46

During 1951, another and more complex emergency arose. Secretary Acheson subsequently described its setting as follows:

Throughout the Middle East lay rare tinder for anti-Western propaganda: a Moslem culture and history, bitter Arab nationalism galloped by Jewish immigration under British protection and with massive American financial support, the remnants of a colonial status, and a sense of grievance that a vast natural resource was being extracted by foreigners under arrangements thought unfair. . . . This tinder could be, and was, lighted everywhere; it flared up first in Iran.47
Two further pieces of “tinder” finally ignited this fire. First, in Saudi Arabia, the Arabian-American Oil Company accepted an arrangement which gave the government fully 50 percent of its profits. Second, the Shah failed to obtain from the United States major financial aid for Iranian economic development. The Majlis (or Parliament) then pressed for a radical revision of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s concession, which currently gave the Iranian Government only 25–30 percent of net profits. Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh’s National Front demanded outright nationalization of the industry; Premier Ali Razmara replied that lack of native technical and marketing expertise made this impractical. Unhappily, Anglo-Iranian’s obduracy strengthened Mossadegh and weakened Razmara.48

During March, while this feud still was embryonic, the Truman administration first attempted to define its position. Adapting a State Department study, the NSC Staff drafted and circulated a policy paper for the Council’s consideration. According to this statement, Iran’s absorption within the Communist orbit would damage oil-dependent Western European economies, impair US prestige, and “seriously weaken, if not destroy” resolution among adjacent Middle Eastern countries. For these reasons, the United States should take “all feasible steps” to ensure that Iran escaped Soviet domination. Although the initiative for any military action in support of Iran rested with Great Britain, the United States and United Kingdom jointly should “give early consideration to measures designed to strengthen the general area.” Also, the United States should (1) strengthen its current assistance programs (especially economic aid) as much as possible and (2) press the British to “effect an early and equitable settlement” of the oil dispute.49

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Marshall that they considered NSC 107 acceptable as “an interim working guide.” However, they asked that this policy paper be reviewed as soon as the situation had clarified. When the National Security Council discussed NSC 107 on 21 March, the Service Secretaries recommended that it be rejected in toto. In their opinion, the courses of action designed to meet either internal subversion or external aggression “are safe innocuous statements of generalities which do not indicate anything except watchful waiting…If we cannot do anything we should say so. If we can take concrete steps in either contingency we should so state.” Overruling these objections, the Council adopted NSC 107; President Truman approved it on 24 March.50

The tempo of events suddenly accelerated. General Razmara was assassinated on 7 March; Dr. Mossadegh assumed the Premiership, and nationalization was promulgated on 2 May. Thereafter, the focal point of crisis centered upon the remarkable person of Mohammed Mossadegh. Let Secretary Acheson’s phrases portray him:

He was small and frail with not a shred of hair on his billiard-ball head; a thin face protruded into a long beak of a nose flanked by two bright shoe-button eyes….He was a great actor and a great gambler. Speaking in the Majlis, he would rant, weep real tears, and fall in a faint at the climactic moment….This unique character truly sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind.

Fiercely nationalistic, Mossadegh was also anti-Communist. Tardily, Secretary Acheson became aware that the Premier was “essentially a rich, reactionary, feudal-minded Persian inspired by a fanatical hatred of the British.”51 The menace
lay not in Mossadegh himself but in the danger that continual chaos might allow the Communist-controlled Tudeh Party to seize control of the central government. Iran now insisted upon recognition of her sovereign right of nationalization; Great Britain feared that such acknowledgement could jeopardize all her overseas investments. As Dr. Mossadegh roused popular emotions to a fever pitch, Washington urged London graciously to grant what it could no longer withhold. When the British instead reinforced its Middle Eastern garrisons and dispatched warships to Abadan (the site of Anglo-Iranian's refinery), a wide Anglo-American cleavage appeared. On 17 May, Secretary Acheson advised Ambassador Franks that the United States could support use of force only if one of the following events occurred: (1) Iranian Government invitation; (2) Soviet military intervention; (3) a Communist coup in Teheran; or (4) evacuation of endangered British nationals.\(^5\)

Since the inadequacies of NSC 107 now were manifest, the NSC Staff circulated a revised policy paper on 6 June. The immediate situation in Iran, according to this statement, made that country's loss to the free world through internal Communist uprising "a distinct possibility." The United States should therefore (1) continue to extend political support, primarily to the Shah as the only source of continuity of leadership; (2) accelerate and expand military, economic and technical assistance; and (3) attempt an early settlement of the oil controversy, recognizing both the rights of sovereign states and the importance of international contractual relationships. Considerable attention was devoted to contingency planning. Because of US commitments elsewhere, the United Kingdom would be responsible for the initiative in military support of Iran in case of Communist aggression. However, entry of British troops without Iranian consent could only be justified if necessary to save the lives of British subjects. Under any other circumstances, intervention would sunder the free world, create chaos in Iran, and possibly cause Teheran to request Soviet assistance. Should the United Kingdom resort to military action against US advice, therefore, "the situation would be so critical that the position of the United States would have to be determined in the light of the situation at that time."\(^5\)

Although the Joint Strategic Survey Committee adjudged NSC 107/1 acceptable as written, Admiral Sherman felt the paper failed to reflect (1) growing petroleum needs of NATO nations, (2) declining British ability to provide military power and political leadership in the Middle East, and (3) increasing US capabilities and requirements in that area. He recommended several revisions along these lines, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted only one, which stated that "increasing US influence in the Middle East" should be a governing factor in the continuing policy review. After approving other editorial modifications, they transmitted comments to Mr. Lovett on 19 June. Eight days later, the National Security Council slightly amended this paper and then adopted it as NSC 107/2; the final paper incorporated Admiral Sherman's addition. On 28 June, President Truman accorded NSC 107/2 his approval.\(^5\)

Meanwhile, matters grew steadily worse. Attempting to adjudicate the controversy, the International Court of Justice recommended reversion to the status quo ante and joint British-Iranian operation of the oil industry; Dr. Mossadegh
categorically rejected this ruling. Iran and the United Kingdom seemed on the brink of hostilities; it was understood in Washington that the BCS had recommended, and the Attlee government rejected, military intervention. At this point, President Truman dispatched Ambassador Averell Harriman to London and then to Teheran to urge resumption of negotiations. Neither side would make major concessions and, after initial progress, the talks collapsed later in August.56

In preparation for the Washington Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in September, the State Department drafted a strongly worded position paper. Maintenance of Iran as “an independent country aligned with the free world” was defined as the primary and overriding objective of administration policy toward that country. The United States could not support employment of British troops in connection with the oil controversy, except for the purpose of evacuating endangered nationals. Although a coordinated US-UK policy was “most desirable,” it would be difficult to achieve or maintain if the British were to “revert to their traditional tactics” by either threatening or actually employing economic sanctions and military force: “These we cannot support…”

When the Foreign Ministers met, they found little common ground. Mr. Morrison expounded what Secretary Acheson thought “oddly heterodox socialist doctrine”—namely, that the terrible precedent of confiscating private property without justification required a strong response. Mr. Acheson adhered to the position paper and answered that “keeping cool” might do more to open paths toward a settlement.57

Unhappily, the Anglo-Iranian controversy escalated further in the following weeks. Iran seized the Abadan refinery and expelled British technicians. Since the Iranians lacked technical skills needed to operate the refinery, Abadan ceased operation and Iran lost its chief source of income. The British, meanwhile, reinforced their Persian Gulf squadron to 14 warships and filed a condemning resolution in the Security Council. In October, Dr. Mossadeq arrived in New York to plead his country’s case before the United Nations. Thinking that the opportunity for an offer of “good offices” might arise, Secretary Lovett felt it would be “of the greatest importance” to possess an estimate of the increase in Soviet military potential that would occur if Iran and her oil fell under Communist control. He therefore directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly to survey this question.

Replying on 10 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted the following consequences:

Economic—Probable eventual loss of all Middle Eastern oil, creating a possibly intolerable deficiency in oil resources.

Political—Major threat of Communist domination during peacetime of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and India.

Military—Prior development by the USSR of bases, facilities and stockpiles, greatly increasing the chances of Soviet success in operations against the Middle East and/or Pakistan-India.

If the Soviet Union achieved control of Iran during peacetime, they contended, her power position “would be so improved that, in all probability, an increase in
the level of the military establishments of the Western World would be required." Under such circumstances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be compelled "immediately to reexamine their global strategy..." Therefore, from a strictly military standpoint, preservation of Iran's orientation toward the United States and protection of the United Kingdom's general position in the Middle East "now transcend in importance the desirability of supporting British oil interests in Iran." 58

The administration did offer its "good offices" during Dr. Mossadegh's visit—but achieved nothing. When Winston Churchill succeeded Clement Attlee on 25 October, British distaste for Mossadegh did not abate. Early in November, Secretary Acheson gave Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden the substance of the JCS memorandum of 10 October. The BCS promptly challenged several JCS conclusions, saying that Soviet petroleum production already was sufficient for both civilian and military requirements, that importation of Iranian oil would exceed Soviet transport capacity, and that refineries and transport would be highly vulnerable to air attack. 59 In further Acheson-Eden discussions, the Secretary of State argued that, if Dr. Mossadegh was not financially supported, Iran would fall into chaos and communism. The Foreign Secretary retorted that the Iranian economy was too primitive and too flexible to collapse and contended that non-Communist alternatives to Mossadegh could be found. 60

Although Mr. Eden's judgment ultimately proved accurate, at this moment US officials felt he was unduly optimistic. A Truman-Churchill meeting was arranged for January 1952. In a position paper for this conference, an interdepartmental Steering Group advised that, "unless some basis can be found in the very near future for a solution of the oil controversy, the interests of the United States and the Western world may require the extension of a limited amount of assistance to Iran." Mr. Lovett requested JCS opinions. On 2 January 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that the "military urgency" of the situation, with its "explosive implications," was such that the US position should be expressed "in more concrete terms." Precision of expression, they believed, would avoid possible pre-commitment to courses of action not encompassed within NSC 107/2. In particular, US opposition to the use of force by Great Britain should be plainly stated. On 11 January, Deputy Secretary Foster forwarded this memorandum to Mr. Acheson with his concurrence. 61

On 5 January 1952, the two Chiefs of State and their principal advisors conferred aboard the Presidential yacht Williamsburg. According to Secretary Acheson, Mr. Churchill voiced displeasure with his predecessors, "who had scuttled and run from Abadan when a splutter of musketry would have ended the matter." As the Prime Minister later put it, close US-UK cooperation in the Middle East could "divide the difficulties by ten." Secretary Acheson likened the United States and United Kingdom to "a couple locked in a warm embrace in a rowboat about to go over Niagara Falls. It was high time to break the embrace and take to the oars." This greatly amused the Prime Minister but did not alter his attitude. The British firmly believed that, sooner or later, Mossadegh would be compelled to accept an arrangement satisfactory to them. 62

The United States continued to furnish Iran with a marginal amount of economic aid. The World Bank attempted to negotiate an oil settlement but finally
failed. Iran itself remained relatively quiescent until July 1952, when the Shah tried to appoint a new Premier. At once, riots convulsed Teheran; supported by street mobs, Mossadegh remained supreme. Alarmed by these events, the United States pressed the United Kingdom to accept "simple, temporary, and easily understood proposals to get oil flowing to the British and funds flowing to Iran without prejudice to the bargaining position of either side." On 30 August, President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill jointly proposed that, if Iran agreed to refer all claims and counter-claims to the International Court of Justice, Anglo-Iranian would pay for and market oil stored at Abadan, the United Kingdom would relax export restrictions, and the United States would make an immediate grant of $10 million to the Iranian Government. The Premier spurned this offer, presented extreme counter-proposals, and finally severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on 22 October.\textsuperscript{63}

As a corollary to its diplomatic efforts, the State Department asked what military courses of action would be feasible in the event of a successful Communist coup. The Deputy Secretary of Defense requested a response from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 5 September, they replied that appropriate plans were under preparation. However, they noted that, since current global commitments precluded dispatch of substantial US forces, intervention would require "political decisions of great import." This being so, they recommended that an all-encompassing review of the situation be undertaken.\textsuperscript{64}

On 31 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted "tentative conclusions" concerning feasible military responses to rebellion or invasion. Unless current deployments were to be upset, they said, an appeal by Teheran for direct assistance could only be answered by (1) conducting a show of force by periodic aircraft flights over key centers and (2) providing the loyal Iranian Army with logistical support. They then described various conditions under which US forces might be committed under conditions short of war. If overt Communist aggression occurred, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that "the resultant situation would be not unlike that [which] we face in Korea." Mr. Lovett passed this paper to Secretary Acheson and to the Director of Central Intelligence.\textsuperscript{65}

In their memorandum of 5 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the view that NSC 107/2 had been overtaken by events. Accepting this conclusion, the NSC Staff now reexamined NSC 107/2. The senior Defense Member, Mr. Frank Nash, proposed two major modifications. First, the United States should offer to extend "substantial immediate economic assistance" if Iran provided reasonable assurances of satisfactory compensation to Anglo-Iranian. Essentially, this repeated the joint proposal of 30 August. Second, in light of "the failure of British policy," declining UK capabilities, and increasing American strength and influence, the United States should take action necessary to prevent Iran from falling to communism, even if this involves acting independently of the UK and the risk of damaging our close relations with the UK." Concomitantly, the United States also should be prepared to take the military initiative in support of Iran. The State Department submitted a much milder revision, softening the first of Mr. Nash's proposals and discarding the second. After lengthy discussions, the
JCS and National Policy

NSC Staff approved this State Department submission (now designated NSC 136) as "a short-term policy." 66

The Staff debate reflected opposing views of the respective Department heads. While NSC 136 was under preparation, the Secretaries of State and Defense debated the efficacy of continued close US-UK cooperation. Writing to Mr. Acheson on 24 October, Secretary Lovett contended that the rupture of diplomatic relations between London and Teheran "has brought us to the end of the road we have been travelling." Because British policy had failed, the United States must chart a new course:

The strategic necessities of the situation, in my opinion, require that we accept our responsibilities and act promptly and, if necessary, independently of the British in an effort to save Iran.... [This] will involve the provision of immediate economic assistance, and measures to help Iran start up her oil industry and secure markets for her oil. It will also involve additional political, economic and probably military commitments. ...The actions now open to us to save Iran may appear painful, costly and dangerous, but they involve, in my judgment, only a small fraction of the money, material, manpower and anguish that will have to be expended to hold Iran by military action or to hold the remainder of the Middle East if Iran should be seized and consolidated by the Communists. 67

On 4 November, Secretary Acheson answered that the objective of US policy "must, be to save Iran without unnecessarily damaging our relations with the United Kingdom." In the past, he said, the State Department had pressed the British not because their position was "necessarily unreasonable" but because "we have been more sensitive than they to the wider dangers inherent in the Iranian situation." The British believed that extensive concessions on their part had only encouraged Mossadegh to become increasingly unreasonable. In these circumstances, Mr. Acheson argued that unilateral and uncoordinated action could inflict "deep and lasting harm upon the Anglo-American alliance." 68

Submitted to the National Security Council on 6 November, NSC 136 generally reflected Secretary Acheson's philosophy. Replying to Mr. Lovett's request for comment and recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed addition of the following admonition: "If for overriding political reasons it is found necessary for the United States to provide military forces in this area, implementation will require either a substantial augmentation of over-all US forces or a reduction of present US military commitments elsewhere." Meeting on 19 November, the National Security Council "noted" the JCS views and then, with slight amendments, adopted NSC 136. On the following day, President Truman directed its implementation under the coordination of Secretary Acheson. Crucial paragraphs of this paper read as follows:

3. It is now estimated that Communist forces probably will not gain control of the Iranian Government during 1953. Nevertheless, ...if present trends continue unchecked, Iran could be effectively lost to the free world before an actual take-over of the Iranian Government....

4. In light of the present situation the United States should adopt and pursue the following policies:
The Middle East: “Recessional”

a. Continue to assist in every practicable way to effect an early and equitable liquidation of the oil controversy.

b. Be prepared to take the necessary measures to help Iran start up her oil industry and to secure markets for her oil.

c. Be prepared to provide prompt United States budgetary aid to Iran.

In carrying out the above, the United States should (1) maintain full consultation with the UK, (2) avoid unnecessarily sacrificing legitimate UK interests or unnecessarily impairing US-UK relations, (3) not permit the UK to veto any US actions which the United States considers essential.

During November-December, the Truman administration mounted its final diplomatic offensive. On 7 November, the President accepted Secretary Acheson’s plan to advance the Iranian Government up to $100 million against future oil deliveries. Also, he approved a voluntary program under which US oil companies, either alone or in conjunction with Anglo-Iranian, would purchase and market Iranian oil. If Dr. Mossadegh agreed to arbitrate compensation, therefore, the United States immediately would extend assistance and oil shipments would resume. Negotiations with London and Teheran were still continuing when President Eisenhower took office.

Catharsis came during the summer of 1953. While Dr. Mossadegh increased his personal control of the government, economic decay eroded his base of political support. Thus, as the Premier’s power rose to a pyramid, it slowly diminished toward a point. After coup and counter-coup, Mossadegh was deposed and imprisoned; the Shah and the Army ruled the country. The United States immediately extended economic assistance. A new concession agreement, dividing profits on a 50-50 basis between an international oil consortium and the Iranian Government, was signed in August 1954. British influence had been eclipsed but the Soviets could show no gain. Iran was now firmly in the Western camp, but “as the Iron Duke said of Waterloo, it was ‘a damned near thing’.”

The Shortcomings of Strategic Planning

A constant dilemma beset Anglo-American planning efforts. Here, too, the “recessional” theme was evident. The British considered the Middle East a vital area but thought themselves able to protect only a small portion of it. The United States refused to commit forces to the region’s defense, yet exhorted the British greatly to expand their planned defensive perimeter. These differences were delineated during a meeting between the US and UK Chiefs of Staff on 23 October 1950, at which world-wide strategic issues were surveyed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized the British plan to defend only the Lebanon-Jordan line (the “Inner Ring” on the map) because it would neither protect Turkey nor shield the oil-producing Persian Gulf areas. In their estimation, a more forward position along southeastern Turkey, the Iranian mountain passes and the Persian Gulf (the
"Outer Ring" on the map) should be the basis for medium-term planning. They also believed that delaying action by small British forces, positioned in Iraq prior to D-Day, "probably" would permit the buildup necessary to hold this line. Finally, they noted that, contrary to current war plans, the British envisaged possible deployment of some US ground and air forces to the Middle East. The consequent US-UK differences were clearly reflected in the colloquy below: 72

Admiral Fraser: "I think we put more importance on the Middle East than you do."

General Bradley: "No, we just feel we cannot defend Europe and the Middle East at the same time—we could still win a war despite loss of the Middle East, which would not be true of Europe."

Air Marshal Salislor: "... We feel that we cannot defend the Outer Ring."

General Bradley: "We were hoping that you could, particularly if demolitions were successful in delaying and... if we could effect some support by strategic air."

Nonetheless, the JCS-BCS meetings of 23 and 26 October achieved important understandings. First, conferees agreed that, in wartime, the Middle East was "of importance second only to Western Europe." Describing the region as a strategic responsibility of the British Commonwealth, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they would be unable to commit forces to the Middle East during the first two years of war. For their part, the BCS expressed a hope that "developing circumstances" might alter this position. Second, the US and UK Chiefs of Staff instructed their representatives (Admiral Carney and his British opposite) to review jointly present and projected capabilities for defense of the "Outer Ring." 73

These representatives met at Malta and submitted their report on 13 March 1951. Assessing allied capabilities during 1951-1955, they agreed that effective protection of vital areas (Suez, Turkey and the major oil fields) required defense of the Outer Ring. However, they also acknowledged that present forces—particularly tactical air components—were wholly inadequate for such a task. Deficiencies for the Outer Ring's defense were projected as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>1951-1952</th>
<th>1953-1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D+180</td>
<td>6½</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>1951-1953</th>
<th>1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D+180</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accordingly, defense of the Lebanon-Jordan line alone was currently feasible. For the future, however, the principals agreed that development of a defensive line sited along the Outer Ring should be their goal. And, at that time, allied forces should be positioned so as to assist Turkey and Iran at the outset of war. After
reviewing this Combined Study, the JSPC reported that it essentially agreed with current US war plans. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thereupon advised the BCS that the document provided reference material “that will be valuable in the development of future plans.”

Might certain oil-producing areas on the Persian Gulf be defended in isolation? The Combined Study stated that this was an attainable goal, but only if other possible short-term objectives were sacrificed. In July, the Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), submitted a detailed study of forces required for this purpose. On 8 December, Acting Secretary of Defense Foster asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to estimate the feasibility of holding the Bahrain-Qatar-Saudi Arabia area. Lengthy inter-Service disagreements followed; while the Navy was hopeful, Army and Air Force Staff planners were far less optimistic. Finally, on 5 February 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that the following forces could protect that region “for a limited period of time to permit continued supply of some portion of the oil...”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>D-Day</th>
<th>D+90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>½-¾</td>
<td>3(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA Battalions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweepers and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Vessels</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Wings</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within existing force levels, however, such deployments would require reductions elsewhere which would create “unacceptable risks.” Therefore, they felt that this commitment could be undertaken by the US only after “appropriate increases in overall force levels and support resources.”

Fundamental Anglo-American differences remained unresolved. The Malta conference had recommended development of the Outer Ring. However, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, such a defense would require 15 divisions and 1,350 aircraft by D+180. Even for the Inner Ring, shortfalls of approximately 5 divisions and 750 aircraft were forecast by D+270. Inevitably, therefore, British planners still deemed defense of this Inner Ring (possibly coupled with a portion of the oil-producing areas) to be the only possible strategy. Conversely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still insisted that allied interests would best be served by measures designed to protect, “as a minimum, substantial areas in Turkey and a portion of the Persian Gulf oil-producing area.”

It was necessary to correlate US aspirations with British capabilities. On 21 May 1952, Mr. Paul Nitze (Director, State Department Policy Planning Staff) wrote the Director, Joint Staff, that, if the Communists continued to encounter rebuffs in Western Europe and the Far East, they might well shift their “primary pressure” to the fragile Middle East. British strength, he believed, was probably insufficient even to protect “the shortest line of defense east of the Suez Canal.” Accordingly, Mr. Nitze requested (for use in State-Defense discussions) opinions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon the importance, in relation to other areas of
the world, of (1) significantly strengthening Middle East defenses and (2) employing US assistance and influence to achieve this objective.78

For possible use in the conversations suggested by Mr. Nitze, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth the following goals:

1. Continue efforts to increase the defense capability of Turkey as “first priority,” and of Iran, “as vigorously as circumstances permit.”

2. Influence Australia, New Zealand and South Africa to make “timely and effective” force commitments.

3. To the extent higher priority programs permit, assist Pakistan, Israel and the Arab States in developing defense capabilities and influence them to make base facilities available to the Allies.

Also, they invoked familiar precautions. Despite the Middle East’s importance, no US forces should be deployed specifically for its defense. Although development of indigenous forces was crucial, present US ability to provide Middle Eastern countries with military assistance was “extremely limited.”79

The State Department pressed for more specific information. On 15 August, Deputy Under Secretary Matthews wrote Mr. Lovett that he thought the time had come to reassess the “Inner Ring” concept and determine whether a “forward defense” could be undertaken. As a foundation for future State-Defense discussions, he asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare a preliminary study of (1) forces required for this task and (2) cost of their equipage.80

Among the Joint Chiefs of Staff a sharp division of opinion developed. General Collins considered that air attacks and demolitions would prevent either the Soviet Union or the Western Powers from obtaining refined oil products during the first 18–24 months of war. Consequently, it would be useless to divert forces to the oil-producing areas from regions of higher priority. Admiral Fechteler challenged these conclusions, remarking that the defender’s task was much simpler than that of the aggressor, provided the defenders were in position prior to D-Day and possessed sufficient equipment. In fact, he believed detailed study would demonstrate that the efforts necessary to hold important areas of the Middle East were possible “under many, and possibly all, conceivable situations.” In October 1952, these conflicting memoranda were referred to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for further study, which was not completed until October 1953. In October 1952, the BCS proposed a joint “Administrative reconnaissance” of the Bahrain area; this task also was not finished until the following year. These many problems precluded definitive answers to Mr. Matthews’ earlier queries. On 28 October, Mr. Lovett transmitted the JCS comment that, in its present state, Anglo-American planning was “informative” but not “conclusive”; a better estimate would become available when the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) for 1956 was completed early in 1953.81

Fulfilling Mr. Acheson’s subsequent request for a statement of defense requirements and capabilities, General Bradley orally briefed Deputy Secretary
Foster on 18 November. Successful defense of the Outer Ring, said the Chairman, would require 19 divisions and 1,200 combat aircraft; present allied strength stood at 12 D-Day divisions and (by D+120) 250 aircraft. Under the most optimistic conditions, the D-Day deficit would be reduced to one division and 580 aircraft by 1955. Thus the dilemmas of Middle East defense remained unsolved. Indeed, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally approved and adopted the “Outer Ring” concept in 1954, they also acknowledged that such a forward defense still was infeasible.

**Access to Oil**

During December 1950, as the likelihood of global war began growing much greater, the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed the problem of wartime petroleum availability. Their preliminary estimate of oil requirements for a conflict commencing in 1954 showed a “serious shortage” in production and refining capacity. They therefore renewed a 1948 proposal that a National Petroleum Policy (NPP) be developed, in order to assure fulfillment of essential civilian and military requirements. President Truman agreed and ordered the Director of Defense Mobilization to undertake the task.

Subsequent studies confirmed this preliminary JCS prediction. Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman, in his new capacity as Petroleum Administrator for Defense, advised that 9 percent of wartime requirements during 1952–1957 must come from Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then counseled Secretary Lovett that, although protection of those oil fields ought to be an integral part of US policy and planning, the forces necessary for a successful defense were simply not available. They urged that work upon an NPP be expedited, so that US dependence upon Middle East oil might be minimized.

In November 1951, the NSC Staff circulated an interim report on progress toward an NPP. They advised that, in a major war beginning during mid-1952, petroleum needs during the first six months of fighting must be filled by (1) holding Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia, or (2) rapidly imposing drastic domestic rationing, stockpiling, increasing crude oil production above efficient levels, and reducing loss from enemy action. But they also believed that, if supply and demand could be brought into reasonable balance during the first six months, “the problems thereafter can be solved.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in these conclusions. On 13 December, President Truman accepted the report’s interim recommendations for measures to increase domestic petroleum production and storage capacity.

Twelve months later, Mr. Chapman circulated a bluntly worded assessment of petroleum supply and demand:

*Foreign oil—from Venezuela and from the Middle East—is indispensable to [US and allied] security. It is needed now, to maintain the economy of the free world,
and to enable it to mobilize to resist aggression; it is not merely a requirement for the future.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff added their agreement and emphasized that Communist control over Middle East oil would “seriously jeopardize” US security interests:

... these oil resources now are indispensable to the economy of Europe and ... in the future they may become indispensable to even the peacetime economy of the United States. If these resources were to be subtracted from those now available to the free world, it would greatly diminish our current advantage, while to add these reserves to those of the Soviet would be to transfer a very substantial advantage to the major enemy of the free world.
The Middle East: "Recessional"
The Far East: Nationalism, Communism and Containment

Asia Awakens

Throughout Asia, by 1950, rampant nationalism had become the ruling passion. The Philippines won their freedom in 1946, India and Pakistan in 1947, Burma in 1948, and Indonesia in 1949. The order imposed by European imperialism was washed away by a flood of nationalist fervor. From the US standpoint, this was a potentially dangerous development:

Everywhere is weakness—weakness varying greatly in kind and degree from country to country; administrative and technical weakness, military weakness, economic weakness and, most serious of all from our point of view, ideological weakness.1

At mid-century, communism seemed to be the wave of the future for the Far East. Asian nationalism was anti-foreign, anti-white and anti-capitalist; communism in China seemed to embody the revolution of rising expectations.

During 1949, the Chinese civil war ended in victory for the Communists; the Nationalists (supported by US arms and money) were driven completely from the mainland. In Peking, on 1 October, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the establishment of the Chinese People’s Republic (CPR). Ideologically, the orientation of this regime was obvious; it issued bitter anti-American declarations, imprisoned US consular officials, and seized certain American properties in Peking. Thus provoked, the US Government withdrew all official personnel from mainland China on 14 January 1950. One month later, the USSR and the CPR concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid pledging that, if one party was “subjected to attack by Japan or any state allied with her,” the other would “immediately render military or other aid with all means at its disposal.” To all appearances, the forging of this Moscow-Peking bond marked a momentous shift in the global balance of power.2
JCS and National Policy

Quite naturally, the Nationalists’ overthrow stunned many Americans. Who, they asked, had lost China? Through a “white paper,” issued on 5 August 1949, Secretary Acheson gave the administration’s answer:

A realistic appraisal of conditions in China, past and present, leads to the conclusion that the only alternative open to the United States was full-scale intervention in behalf of a Government which had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people. . . .

The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not.3

Mr. Acheson’s argument was anathema to a swelling body of critics. Speaking for many conservative Republicans, Senator William Knowland and Representative Walter Judd prepared lengthy and passionate rebuttals of this “whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy . . .” Charges of Communist conspiracy and subversion within the government gained ever wider public credence; the bonds of Congressional bipartisanship were broken beyond repair. Domestically, the China issue became a focal point for many frustrations.4

What could now be done? NSC 48/2, approved by President Truman on 30 December 1949, applied the doctrine of “containment” (albeit quite cautiously) to the Far East. The United States would seek to strengthen “selected non-Communist nations in Asia” and to reduce “the preponderant power and influence of the USSR . . .”5 Speaking before the National Press Club on 12 January 1950, Secretary Acheson revealed the rationale behind this policy. In his estimation, nationalism had become “the common idea and the common pattern” throughout the Far East. All Asia had been moved by a revulsion against unending misery and foreign domination. While Chiang Kai-shek ignored this surging tide, Mao Tsetung mounted the wave and rode it to power. Under these conditions, “the single most significant . . . fact in the relation of any foreign power with Asia” lay in the Soviet Union’s apparent efforts to annex China’s four northern provinces.6 Quite possibly, nationalism and communism would come into conflict. Obviously, the United States should do nothing to deflect the “righteous anger . . . which must develop” among the Chinese people.

For the Far East as a whole, Mr. Acheson delineated the following defense perimeter considered vital to US interests: Aleutians-Japan-Ryukyus-Philippines. However, the Secretary emphasized that the US Government could not supply a regime with determination and popular loyalty; assistance could only be effective when it was “the missing component which, if put into the rest of the picture, will spell success.”

Onrushing events deflected and finally destroyed any immediate hope of producing a policy that would foster Sino-Soviet fissures. Increasingly, the goal of catering to nationalist aspirations conflicted with the objective of containing Communist expansion. The spring of 1950 was indeed a critical time in Asia. The
Nationalists awaited a Communist assault upon Taiwan; the French faltered before the Viet Minh in Indochina; the Philippine Government seemed unable to master the Hukbalahap insurgency.

**Taiwan: Sanctuary or Springboard?**

When Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan late in 1949, his early expulsion from that last refuge seemed likely. On 19 October, the CIA predicted that the island probably would fall before the end of 1950 and averred that only full-scale US military intervention could avert a Communist conquest. Two months later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff challenged these conclusions, telling Secretary Johnson that circumstances had arisen that “cast serious doubts upon the full validity of the [CIA] estimate.” Already, at General Collins’ instigation, they had advised Mr. Johnson that a “modest, well-directed and closely supervised” aid program would serve US security interests and had proposed to him that the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), immediately undertake to survey the nature and extent of necessary assistance.8

Chiang’s Congressional supporters had added a $75 million appropriation for “the general area of China” to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Should the Nationalists receive some of these funds? Secretaries Acheson and Johnson argued their cases before the NSC on 29 December. Mr. Johnson offered the JCS recommendations, but Mr. Acheson warned against “toying with this mousetrap,” believing the Nationalist Government was morally bankrupt and wholly incapable of utilizing US aid effectively. President Truman sided with Secretary Acheson and ruled against military aid for the Nationalists in the immediate future. According to NSC 48/2, the United States would continue to recognize the Nationalist Government for the present and attempt to deny Formosa to the Communists through diplomatic and economic means. Also, $75 million allotted to “the general area of China” would be programmed for expenditure “as a matter of urgency.” But, President Truman remarked, whether the program would be implemented “depends on circumstances.”9

Mr. Acheson later testified that this NSC debate “was not a matter of bitter or heated controversy within the administration.” Very quickly, passion was supplied by Republican critics. On 3 January 1950, Senators William F. Knowland and Robert A. Taft published and praised former President Herbert Hoover’s plea that the US Navy be ordered to protect Taiwan. Simultaneously, the United Press published a confidential State Department memorandum instructing attachés to counter the “false impressions” either that Taiwan possessed “special military significance” or that its loss would damage US strategic interests. This further inflamed Chiang’s partisans. According to Mr. Acheson, President Truman then decided that “he must speak at once, and speak in so crisp and brutally frank a manner as to end further propaganda and speculation.” On 5 January, the White House released a four-paragraph statement that the United States (1) would not pursue a course “which will lead to involvement in the civil
conflict in China,” (2) did not seek military bases on Formosa “at this time,” and (3) would not provide either military aid or advice to the Nationalists. At a press conference, Secretary Acheson asserted that Chiang’s men lacked “a will to resist and a purpose for resistance”—and no aid program could supply these ingredients. When the critics’ clamor continued, Secretary Johnson and General Bradley met privately with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 26 January and declared themselves opposed to US occupation of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{10}

In mid-April, two Chinese Communist divisions invaded and swiftly conquered Hainan Island. Through a memorandum sent to Secretary Johnson on 2 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to reopen the issue of aid to Taiwan. They pointed out that Soviet airplanes and landing craft, accompanied by many advisers, recently had arrived in China. The Chinese Communists, in turn, were increasing support to the Viet Minh in Indochina. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that the United States and USSR were, “to all intents and purposes, engaged in war—except for armed conflict.” Since Soviet “domination” over mainland China was “virtually complete,” continued successful resistance by the Nationalists would serve the military interests of the United States. Again, therefore, they recommended that a survey mission be sent to Taiwan. But the administration rejected this recommendation and did nothing except expedite the shipment of weapons already sold to the Nationalists (tanks and jet aircraft excepted).\textsuperscript{11}

On 9 June, Major General James H. Burns (Assistant to the Secretary for Foreign Military Affairs) urged upon Mr. Johnson his view that Taiwan should be denied to the Chinese Communists, by US military forces if necessary. He also asked for JCS opinions. General Vandenberg opposed any such commitment and even suggested that four-power neutralization of Formosa was preferable to provision of US military assistance. Admiral Sherman and General Collins also objected to any use of US forces but favored the furnishing of equipment. On 15 June, General Burns brought his proposal before Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Mr. Paul Nitze (Director, State Department Policy Planning Staff). They would advocate nothing more than (1) placing the Taiwan problem before the United Nations (UN) and (2) dispatching to Taipei a flag or general officer capable of advising the Nationalists. Secretary Acheson supported his advisers, so the situation stood unchanged.\textsuperscript{12}

From Tokyo, meanwhile, General Douglas MacArthur dispatched a stern warning to Washington. On 29 May, he reported that Soviet jets were being introduced into the Chinese Communist Air Force. CINCFE termed Taiwan an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” capable of accommodating 10-20 air wings. Operating from Formosa, enemy aircraft could neutralize Okinawa and Northern Luzon, sever shipping lanes, and isolate Japan from supporting bases.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore, he believed the island’s fall would “drastically” increase the Soviet threat to US military positions and require reevaluation of FECOM and JCS emergency war plans.\textsuperscript{14} General Bradley and Secretary Johnson visited Japan during 17-23 June. They received from General MacArthur a paper repeating that the loss of Formosa would be “a disaster of utmost importance to the United States” and strongly urging that a survey mission be dispatched without delay.\textsuperscript{15}

When the North Korean invasion began on 25 June, one of General Bradley’s first thoughts was for Taiwan. Already, he had prepared a draft “Memorandum
for the President" recommending that a military survey mission visit the island. Addressing his JCS colleagues, the Chairman now commented that "if Korea falls, we may want to recommend even stronger action in the case of Formosa in order to offset the effect of the fall of South Korea on the rest of Asia."  

At 1945 on 25 June, the President assembled his principal advisers at Blair House to discuss the Korean crisis. Mr. Johnson asked General Bradley to read the MacArthur memorandum, brought back from Tokyo, which the Secretary thought "brilliant." After dinner, Secretary Acheson offered three recommendations, the last of which entailed sending the Seventh Fleet north from the Philippines to prevent any attack by Communist China upon Taiwan and vice versa. Mr. Truman agreed to issue the orders.  

The same men met next evening. Mr. Acheson proposed that US air and naval units provide support to South Korean forces and that the Seventh Fleet neutralize the Taiwan Strait. President Truman approved and publicly announced his decisions on the morning of 27 June:

... the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to US forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done.  

Thus the administration abandoned its policy of aloofness and intervened in the Chinese civil war. A contemporary appraisal of this "remarkable decision" still seems apt:

At one stroke, the United States, on grounds of military necessity, had abandoned the policy of non-intervention in China's civil war. ... By the ineluctable logic of events, the US would find itself compelled to oppose the Chinese Communists even on matters where it had thus far remained uncommitted. ... In view of later [developments], it seems unquestionable that the US incurred considerable political disadvantages by its decision unilaterally to underwrite the Nationalist position on Formosa. Future historians may be able to determine whether or not these disadvantages were overbalanced by the increased security [accruing to] our military forces in the Pacific.

The final verdict is not yet certain. However, the administration would not countenance Nationalist participation in the Korean War. At 1630 on 29 June, Ambassador Wellington Koo left with Mr. Livingston Merchant of the State Department an aide-memoire offering ground troops for use in Korea. In the evening, Secretary Acheson went to the White House bearing Chiang Kai-shek's message. Hours earlier, the NSC had authorized US air-sea action above the 38th parallel and dispatch of Army units to protect Pusan. Several countries of the British Commonwealth had volunteered to contribute air and naval units; President Truman directed that all such offers were to be accepted. Wishing to enlist as many UN members as possible, the President said he was "inclined to accept" Chiang's offer also. Mr. Acheson com-
mented that the Nationalists’ military effectiveness was dubious and added that it would seem “a little inconsistent” to send US forces to protect Taiwan while the island’s “natural defenders” were being moved to Korea.21

A decision was rendered on 30 June. At 0500, the President approved commitment of one US RCT to combat in Korea and called a conference for 0830 to consider dispatch of two divisions. In this later meeting, Mr. Truman asked whether “it would not be worthwhile” to accept Chiang’s offer. Secretary Acheson said the Nationalists’ arrival in Korea might provoke intervention by Peking;22 the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that the Nationalists lacked both modern equipment and means of transportation. Reluctantly, the President accepted their advice. He then gave General MacArthur full authority to send ground forces to South Korea.23

Later that day, the Nationalist Minister delivered a second aide-memoire offering 33,000 men for service in Korea, available within five days and armed with “the best equipment at China’s disposal.” On 1 July, Ambassador Koo received a tactful rejection expressing “deep appreciation” but stressing “the threat of invasion of Taiwan...repeated in the last day or so by [Communist] spokesmen...”24

During the summer, the administration acted to strengthen Taiwan’s defenses but still shunned direct involvement in the civil war. In mid-July, Taipei claimed to have proof that an invasion was imminent and asserted that bombing of airfields and troop concentrations on the mainland was justified. Secretary Acheson immediately sent word that the United States could not agree. When Mr. Truman saw these cables, he resorted to the strongest language in the diplomatic lexicon. The President told Secretary Acheson to send word that the United States would regard an attack on the mainland as “an unfriendly act.”25

A State-Defense debate culminated in reaffirmation of this decision. The Chinese Communists were credited with the capability of transporting 200,000 men across the Formosa Strait in as many as 4,000 craft. Given the size of this armada, the relatively short distance involved, and the Seventh Fleet’s commitment in Korea, a danger that many invaders might reach the island was manifest. Admiral Sherman argued, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, that this “unfortunate position could best be altered by allowing the Nationalists to lay coastal mine fields and to bomb amphibious concentrations as they developed. Endorsing their recommendations, Secretary Johnson proposed that they be presented to the President as soon as possible. Mr. Acheson agreed to mining operations but strongly opposed preemptive bombing. Such attacks, he believed, would certainly renew Nationalist-Communist hostilities, would probably create major difficulties in the UN, and might provoke Chinese intervention in Korea or Indochina. In sum, “it seems to me that we should take considerable military risks rather than place ourselves in the role of an aggressor...unless there are overwhelming considerations of national security involved.”

The NSC debated this issue on 3 August and deferred action pending further State-Defense discussion. At Mr. Johnson’s direction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had prepared a message authorizing CINCPFE to permit the Nationalists to take military countermeasures if an assault seemed imminent. Mr. Truman rejected this
recommendation, however, and told Secretary Johnson instead to draft instructions stating that the President alone could authorize preventive actions against the mainland: "The most vital national interest requires that no actions of ours precipitate general war or give excuse to others to do so."26

This invasion threat had caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to urge again, on 27 July, that Nationalist military capabilities be assessed and materiel deficiencies corrected as quickly as possible. When the NSC met that same day, President Truman approved this recommendation. The Nationalists immediately received permission to purchase tanks and jet aircraft. One week later, Secretary Johnson ruled that they were qualified for grant military assistance.27

General MacArthur, meanwhile, had made known his intention to inspect Taiwan as soon as conditions in Korea permitted. During 31 July–1 August, CINCFE visited the island, held cordial conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and decided that, although the Nationalist forces contained "real potential," a "definite and substantial improvement" in training and equipment was required.28

A FECOM survey team, led by Major General Alonzo P. Fox, studied every aspect of Chiang's defense establishment during 5–26 August. After examining the resulting "Fox Report," MDAP officials computed that Taiwan's needs totaled $271 million. CINCFE reported that the most urgent task was replenishment of ammunition stocks. Consequently, on 14 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that munitions worth $9.7 million be shipped under a priority "above all military assistance programs other than those in direct support of operations in Korea." Delivery was completed during November; no other equipment was programmed for shipment during 1950.29

In its public statements, the administration stressed that US intervention in Taiwan was a temporary measure, prompted purely by Communist aggression in Korea. Witness, for example, the assurances given by President Truman in his message to Congress of 19 July:

...the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa. The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to the political questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in hostilities... and that all questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.30

On 25 August, when Peking demanded that the Security Council take action to remove "all the US armed invading forces from Taiwan," Ambassador Warren Austin answered by inviting a full UN investigation of the Taiwan problem. At this most inopportune moment, General MacArthur sent a sonorous message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), assailing "the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeat in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia." President Truman promptly ordered the General to withdraw his message. CINCFE complied.31

At a press conference on 31 August, the President pointedly remarked that "of course, it will not be necessary to keep the 7th Fleet in the Formosa Strait if the Korean thing is settled. That is a flank protection on our part for the United
Nations forces.” Nonetheless, international repercussions from the VFW affair quickened the State Department’s search for ways to demonstrate the good faith of the United States. In August, the Department drafted a proposal that would place the subject of Taiwan’s status before the UN and assign an international commission to investigate and report. Thus the question could be removed from current contention and the United States would be relieved of the embarrassments inherent in its sole responsibility for the neutralization policy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Johnson that the United States should resist any solution that “might enhance the military position of the USSR in the Far East.” Appointment of a UN commission, which could hardly avoid considering annexion of Taiwan by the Chinese Communists, might well be the first step towards such enhancement. On 11 September, Secretary Johnson forwarded these comments to Mr. Acheson with his general concurrence. Acting Secretary of State Webb answered that, while he was inclined to agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “no single government can guarantee the procedures that might be adopted…. Our purpose must be to meet the issue of Formosa and seek to have it settled on terms agreeable to the United States.”

Speaking before the General Assembly on 20 September, Secretary Acheson suggested an international solution that would answer the legitimate interests of “all concerned and interested parties” but would require them meanwhile to abjure the use of force. He asked that the Formosa question be added to the General Assembly’s agenda. Subsequently, the US and UK delegations agreed upon a resolution embodying this approach. The United Nations would assume responsibility for the neutralization policy. Pending completion of the work of the UN commission, belligerent acts between the mainland and the island would cease. On 11 November, Mr. Acheson transmitted this draft to General Marshall, who had superseded Louis Johnson two months earlier.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff protested that adoption of the neutralization principle would restrict future US freedom of action and “considerably improve” the Communists’ strategic position by releasing some of their defensive forces “for buildup elsewhere.” Acting Secretary Lovett strongly recommended to Mr. Acheson that the draft paper be amended accordingly. Then, on 28 November, Communist China began its massive intervention in Korea. The administration promptly laid aside the neutralization proposal.

General MacArthur insisted that an “entirely new war” had begun. He recalled Chiang’s offer of 33,000 troops and reported that these troops represented “the only source of potential trained reinforcement available for early commitment.” CINCFE predicted that Chiang undoubtedly could provide a much larger force and proposed to negotiate directly with the Nationalist Government. This message reached Washington at 0247 on 29 November. During a State-Defense meeting which lasted from 1000 to 1247, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the following answer: “The subject covered in the referenced dispatch is being considered. Because use of troops from Formosa would probably bring Formosa into the war, consideration is primarily in connection with other measures that might have to be taken in the event that the war spreads outside of Korea.” Secretary Marshall struck out this second sentence but appended a warning that “our
position of leadership is being most seriously compromised in the United Nations. The utmost care will be necessary to avoid disruption of the essential Allied line-up in that organization. "Secretary Acheson added further admonitions and alterations: "We should have to consider the possibility that it would... leave us isolated [in the UN]. It may be wholly unacceptable to the Commonwealth countries to have their forces employed with Nationalist Chinese. It might extend hostilities to Formosa and other areas." As rewritten by Mr. Acheson, this message was approved by the President and dispatched at 1936.36

On 30 December, CINCFE repeated his plea for Nationalist reinforcements. As part of a broader plan for crippling Communist China's warmaking capacity, he proposed to "release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action (possibly leading to counter-invasion) against vulnerable areas of the Chinese Mainland." The JSSC reported that it appeared "extremely doubtful" that Nationalist reinforcements could turn the tide in Korea. Although Admiral Sherman wanted to "remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces," his JCS colleagues felt otherwise. Their reply to CINCFE, approved by the President and sent on 9 January 1951, stated that "favorable action cannot be taken... in view of improbability of [Nationalists'] decisive effort on the Korean outcome and their probable greater usefulness elsewhere."37

General MacArthur's melancholy reply, received the next morning, profoundly discouraged Washington policymakers. CINCFE warned that, if he received no reinforcements and was forbidden to take countermeasures against Communist China itself, the UN position in Korea "eventually" would become untenable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted by tentatively agreeing upon courses of action that, if implemented, undoubtedly would widen the war. Their proposals relating to Taiwan and the Nationalist Government are listed below:38

Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.

Send a military training mission and increase MDAP to Chinese Nationalists on Formosa.

Furnish now all practicable covert aid to effective Nationalist guerrilla forces in China.

The NSC placed these proposals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on their agenda for 17 January 1951. But, by that time, conditions in Korea had improved. On the same day the NSC discussion was scheduled to take place, General Collins reported from Tokyo that Eighth Army was "in good shape and improving daily" under its new commander, General Ridgway; the Chinese seemed to be suffering from supply shortages and failing morale. This heartening message reached General Bradley at about 0800 and was read by President Truman soon afterwards. Later that day, the NSC took the following actions:39

Requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a detailed study of Nationalist forces on Formosa, for their possible use against the mainland.

Requested the State Department to prepare a study of the effect upon China and other Asian countries of continued US support of Chiang Kai-shek.
JCS and National Policy

On 27 January, the JSPC advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Nationalists' effectiveness in offensive operations "will be in direct proportion to the aid and guidance given by the United States." Indeed, without continued US naval protection, Taiwan probably would fall within a year. Nonetheless, the Committee concluded that the combined results of all offensive actions then under NSC consideration "in time may well: deny all of China south of the Yellow River to Communism; … disrupt the economy in the remainder of China; banish the threat of aggression in other parts of Asia; … and do much to counter the myth of Communist invincibility throughout the world." 40

On 29 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively approved this paper (subject to receipt of CINCFE's evaluation) and presented it to a State-JCS conference on 6 February. In this meeting, Admiral Sherman commented that the report had been written when withdrawal to the old Pusan perimeter seemed imminent; conditions in Korea now were "different and far happier." At this time, said the CNO, "all our actions are based on the premise that we should do nothing to spread the war outside of Korea. . . ." "In other words," Ambassador Jessup inquired, "you are recommending nothing specific now?" General Bradley, General Collins, and Admiral Sherman all affirmed that this was correct. 41

Subsequently, the JSPC revised its report to incorporate CINCFE's comments, which were conservative in tone. Basically, General MacArthur recommended that Nationalist forces be austerely equipped but trained for offensive action. As finally approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and forwarded to Secretary Marshall on 16 March, the report seconded this cautionary note struck by CINCFE:

The Chinese Nationalists are not capable of continued overt activities at this time without direct US military support. Even with US air and naval support, the ultimate success of military operations on the mainland is questionable. It follows that Chinese Nationalist forces should be equipped by MDAP along somewhat austere standards, but trained for eventual employment on the mainland.

Secretary Marshall passed this paper to the NSC, for members' information and the Senior Staff's use. 42

Assistance to Taiwan was greatly expanded during 1951. On 29 December 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that $71.2 million be made available from MDAP funds during FY 1951 and that a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) be sent to the island. Five weeks later, they suggested an allotment of $237.7 million during FY 1952. In both instances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested a supply priority equal to that accorded NATO nations. The Congressionally-approved programs for FYs 1951-1952 amounted to ($ millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1951</th>
<th>FY 1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>85.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>91.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>185.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

206
But shipments did not reach sizeable proportions until FY 1953.\textsuperscript{43}

In March 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the MAAG be dispatched forthwith. Secretary Marshall approved; MAAG Formosa was established in May, with Major General William C. Chase, USA, as its Chief. During his initial inspection, General Chase found that Chiang’s troops were woefully deficient in virtually every category. In short, he reported, “the Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces are not, at this time, an effective modern fighting force.” General Collins visited Taiwan in November and formed an identical impression.\textsuperscript{44}

Confinement of hostilities within Korea continued to be the primary aim of US Far Eastern policy. On 24 February, CINCFE requested authority (in the event of Chinese Communist air-sea attacks against Taiwan) immediately to retaliate against mainland targets. The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared an answer stating that no objections would be interposed to Nationalist counterattacks. However, subject to “the right of immediate self-defense,” JCS approval would be required before any retaliatory action was undertaken by US forces. Another sentence was added at the request of Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk: “It is not contemplated that retaliation would follow in case of Chinese Communist attacks upon US or Chinese Nationalist reconnaissance aircraft…” This reply was approved by President Truman and dispatched on 28 February.\textsuperscript{45}

Meanwhile, the Joint Intelligence Committee was studying the potentialities of mainland guerrilla activity. The Committee estimated that dissident forces numbered 600,000–650,000 men. Of this number, “perhaps 300,000 profess association with the Nationalist Government, but . . . actual control and direction of operations is almost non-existent.” Quite conceivably, however, intensification of guerrilla activity eventually could entangle “very large numbers” of Communist troops in Central and South China. On 2 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted these conclusions and directed the JSPC to collaborate with other agencies in defining whatever requirements were necessary to sustain guerrilla movements.

The CIA initiated efforts to support anti-Communist guerrillas operating in the central and southern provinces. On 31 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Marshall that “the importance and potential effectiveness of the program are such as to justify a supply priority immediately below that of operations in Korea”—even for such scarce items as communications equipment and parachute gear. In October, Acting Secretary Foster approved provision of military assistance to the CIA project. However, high hopes were rapidly deflated. The CIA found only 165,000 guerrillas, practically none of them under Chiang’s control. Further, Nationalist officers proved unwilling to risk their guerrilla assets in action and unable to adapt themselves to the demands of partisan warfare. Covert assistance continued in 1952 but without any increase in resources committed.\textsuperscript{46}

During 1951, the mold of China policy hardened into a pattern that was to persist for twenty years. By removing General MacArthur, the President drove political temperatures to the flash point. Outraged, conservative Republicans rallied around the fallen General. In his memoirs, Mr. Truman bitingly recalled those men “who thought a British Prime Minister was never to be trusted but Chiang Kai-shek could do no wrong.” Certainly, General MacArthur now spared no effort in accenting Taiwan’s value. Speaking to Congressional inquisi-
JCS and National Policy

tors, he asserted that “we practically lose the Pacific Ocean if we give up or lose Formosa”:

I believe that you might invite a third world war, if you allow that great breach in our lines. I believe the immediate effect of that would be the collapse of the Philippines and Japan...

Secretary Marshall and General Bradley refuted this apocalyptic assessment but agreed that the island would have “great strategic value” in enemy hands and acknowledged that its loss would be “a highly dangerous business…”47

Actually, by this time, administration pronouncements and Congressional rhetoric were equally militant. Contrast, for example, those assessments of the Nationalist and Communist regimes delivered by Secretary Acheson during 1949–1950 with these words spoken by Assistant Secretary Rusk in May 1951:

The Peking regime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. . . . It is not Chinese. It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations. . . . We recognize the National Government of the Republic of China . . . [because] we believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control.

A similar intransigence suffused the recommendations of NSC 48/5, approved by the President on 17 May 1951:

8. While continuing to recognize the National Government as the legal government of China, the United States, with respect to Communist China, should now: . . .

b. Expand and intensify, by all available means, efforts to develop nonCommunist leadership and to influence the leaders and people in China to oppose the present Peking regime and to seek its reorganization or replacement.

c. Foster and support anti-Communist Chinese elements both outside and within China with a view to developing and expanding resistance in China to the Peking regime’s control, particularly in South China.

d. Stimulate differences between the Peking and Moscow regimes and create cleavages within the Peking regime itself by every practical means. . . .

11. With respect to Formosa, the United States should:

a. Continue, as long as required by United States security interests, the mission presently assigned to the 7th Fleet.

b. Encourage political changes in the Nationalist regime which would increase its prestige and influence in China proper.

c. Provide military and economic assistance to increase the potential of the Chinese forces on Formosa. . . .48
The United States was not merely aiming to stop further Communist conquests, but striving by every means short of war to overthrow the Chinese Communist government.

After truce talks began in Korea during July 1951, the administration undertook no further initiatives regarding Taiwan. Appeals from the field evoked only reaffirmations of earlier decisions. Early in 1952, CINCFE asked for authority (1) to place early-warning radar on the off-shore islands, (2) to base US airplanes and antiaircraft units on Formosa, (3) to deploy major air and naval reinforcements to FECOM, and (4) to prestock atomic weapons within the theater. With President Truman's approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected all these recommendations, and also refused the Generalissimo's request to organize a Combined Staff for joint defense planning. On 27 May, CINCFE (by this time, General Mark W. Clark) urged that the Nationalists be asked to offer two divisions for Korean service. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now favored preparatory steps; the State Department vigorously opposed them. The problem remained under constant review, but ultimately nothing was done.

Meanwhile, a comprehensive policy reassessment had begun. Writing to Secretary Lovett on 11 December 1951, CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith stressed that Nationalist forces constituted a "waning asset" that would have to be strengthened and utilized "within the immediate future, if we are to get any benefit from them." Specifically, he suggested that these units might be "rotated to Korea" and used in "temporary thrusts onto the mainland." General Smith also commented that the corrupt Kuomintang clung jealously to power, still hoping to recapture control of China "as a by-product of US victory in World War III." Obviously, a thoroughgoing political reform of Chiang's regime was essential.

Answering Mr. Lovett's request for comment and recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that a two-division force for offensive operations should be equipped "with due regard for other commitments, budgeting and funding limitations." (But, by placing Taiwan's MDAP priority below that of Korea, Indochina, and the NATO nations, they precluded rapid attainment of this objective.) As for covert activities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed enlarging them to an extent that would either call for overt US participation or run the risk of disclosing US support. Obviously, under these limitations, large-scale guerrilla operations were impossible. They also agreed that political changes might enhance military effectiveness but urged that these be pressed with caution, in order to avoid impairing the prestige of the Nationalist Government. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff counseled adherence to the following principles "for the foreseeable future": take necessary measures to deny Taiwan to a hostile power; support a friendly regime on Formosa and develop its military potential; take unilateral action, if necessary, to ensure the island's continued availability as a base for possible US military operations; and continue the Seventh Fleet's protective mission until the Nationalists became capable of defending Formosa. On 22 March 1952, Acting Secretary Foster forwarded this memorandum to the NSC and recommended that the Council review existing policies pertaining to "Formosa, the Chinese Nationalist Government, and other anti-Communist Chinese forces."
JCS and National Policy

The NSC discussed this report on 2 April and decided that (following preliminary State-Defense-CIA discussions) a paper should be prepared for the Council's consideration. When these ground-breaking talks took place, two questions were paramount: Should the Seventh Fleet's mission be changed in order to permit the Nationalists to attack the mainland? Should the United States assign a definite offensive mission to Chiang's forces? On the first question, the State Department was steadfastly negative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented that they wished no changes now but might recommend some if the Chinese Communists extended hostilities beyond their present limits. Consequently, they wished the Seventh Fleet's mission to remain under continuous review. On the second question, the CIA thought that assignment of an offensive mission was essential to maintain Nationalist morale. The State Department disagreed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff struck a middling stance, agreeing that the Nationalists needed a mission but denying that they should be given the means for building a major offensive capability. Thus, with the State Department holding fast to existing policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff not pressing for change, the status quo remained secure. On 29 April, the NSC Senior Staff ordered a steering committee to prepare a report, but this paper was not completed during 1952.54

Mr. Truman had made Taiwan a sanctuary; President Eisenhower gave it the appearance of a springboard. Republicans had angrily assailed the Democratic administration for its refusal to "unleash" Chiang. Accordingly, on 2 February 1953, the Seventh Fleet received orders to cease shielding Communist China from Nationalist assaults. Simultaneously, however, Chiang promised not to undertake any "significant attacks" without consulting the United States. Shortly afterward, CINCPAC received authority to (1) base patrol and reconnaissance aircraft on Formosa, (2) prepare facilities necessary to support combat aircraft, and (3) broach the subject of establishing combined command during an emergency.55 Finally, in 1954, the two governments concluded a mutual defense treaty. Thus Washington and Taipei became firmly wedded for the next two decades.

The Indochina Quagmire

Since 1946, France had been fighting in Indochina to restore the supremacy she lost during World War II.56 The spirit of nationalism, loosed by the Japanese conquest, was steadily sapping the structure of French colonialism. By 1949, the Communist-led Viet Minh held sway in much of the countryside; French Union forces were generally confined to Saigon, Hanoi and Haiphong.

Facing military stalemate and foreseeing the consequences of Communist victory in China, the French attempted to create a government capable of winning popular support away from Ho Chi Minh. On 8 March 1949, President Auriol and Prince Bao Dai concluded a "compromise agreement," in which France "recognized the independence of Vietnam within the French Union." But these Elysee Agreements were never put into practice, and Bao Dai became little more
than a figurehead. French pride still smarted from the humiliations of 1940–1944; possible loss of Indochina presented an intolerable affront to her great-power pretensions. If Southeast Asia was surrendered to a nationalist uprising, might not loss of North Africa soon follow? Former Premier Paul Ramadier spoke for many of his countrymen: “We will hold on everywhere, in Indochina as in Madagascar. Our empire will not be taken away from us, because we represent might and also right.” Her hopes were high and her will remained strong, but her means were weak and her goals fatally flawed.57

The US decision to help France hold Indochina was taken during the spring of 1950. NSC 48/2 had proposed that $75 million allocated to “the general area of China” be programmed and expended “as soon as practicable.” Secretary Johnson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit recommendations; answering on 20 January, they proposed that $15 million of this money be allocated to Indochina. “Without taking a position,” Mr. Johnson passed this paper to Secretary Acheson. When the State Department did not immediately reply, General Burns reminded Deputy Under Secretary Rusk that “the planning of a 1951 Military Assistance Program is approaching a critical state…. We are, therefore, awaiting further word from you.”58

The French, also, were pressing for swift decisions. On 16 February, Ambassador Henri Bonnet delivered to the State Department an aide-memoire urging the United States to make a public affirmation of solidarity and to grant immediate military and economic aid. In Paris, on 22 February, M. Alexandre Parodi warned Ambassador David Bruce that, unless the United States inaugurated a program of long-term assistance, France might be forced to withdraw from Indochina. Five days later, the State Department completed and circulated NSC 64, a draft document of major importance. After surveying the growing strength of the Viet Minh, the possibility of overt Chinese intervention, and the continuing French political failures, NSC 64 offered the following conclusions:

10. … Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.

11. The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard.

12. Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defense should prepare as a matter of priority all practicable measures designed to protect US security interests in Indochina.

Sending these proposals to General Burns, Mr. Rusk asked that a military assessment be made “as a matter of the greatest urgency.” Secretary Johnson, in turn, instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to analyze (1) the strategic importance of Southeast Asia, (2) the kind of steps needed to forestall further Communist encroachment, together with an estimate of their cost, and (3) the organizational structure required to execute necessary measures.59
While this task was in train, the Secretaries of State and Defense approved the JCS recommendation that $15 million be allotted to Indochina. They then informed Mr. Truman that

the choice confronting the United States is [either] to support the French in Indochina or to face the extension of Communism over the remainder of the continental area of Southeast Asia and possibly farther westward. We would then be obligated [either] to make staggering investments in that part of Southeast Asia remaining outside of Communist domination or to withdraw to a much-contracted Pacific line of defense.

This is the earliest exposition of the famous “domino theory.” President Truman approved the $15 million allotment on 10 March; Mr. Johnson directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare proposals for an Indochina aid program.60

On 10 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Johnson the strategic assessment he had requested a month earlier, accompanied by recommendations regarding a military assistance program. Concurring in the conclusions of NSC 64, they said that Southeast Asia was of “critical strategic importance” because (1) it contained a major source of “certain strategic materials,” (2) it constituted “a cross-roads of communications” and (3) it served as “a vital segment in the line of containment of Communism…. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported early extension of military assistance—albeit under carefully controlled conditions and fully integrated with economic and political programs. They well appreciated that US insistence upon Vietnamese independence and phased French withdrawal might markedly improve prospects of success. However, conditions were so unstable and deterioration was so rapid that “the urgent need for at least an initial increment of military and economic aid is psychologically overriding.” Emergency allocation of $15 million on this basis would not prejudice later policy developments. Lastly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated (1) immediate establishment of a small US military aid group in Indochina and (2) creation of an inter-departmental Southeast Asia Aid Committee responsible for development of an area assistance program. Promptly and properly done, they believed these efforts could generate success that, in turn, “might lead to the gaining of the initiative…in that general area.” On 14 April, Secretary Johnson endorsed these opinions and transmitted them to Secretary Acheson; they were also circulated among NSC members. Ten days later, President Truman approved the conclusions in NSC 64 and directed their implementation.61

On 8 May, after conferring with M. Schuman, Secretary Acheson gave a public pledge that military equipment and economic aid would be forthcoming. In response, the French Foreign Minister announced removal of all restrictions on diplomatic representation for the Associated States (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), promised that more autonomy would be granted when feasible, and predicted that “a happy ending will be achieved.” A swift beginning of US aid shipments was thus assured. Early in June, a Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee (SEAAPC) was created; Mr. Rusk and General Burns represented their respective Departments. Simultaneously, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to Secretary Johnson that an additional $16 million be appropriated for equipment, supplies
and training. They further advised that, among all Asian assistance programs, Indochina should be accorded first priority.  

Taken together, these developments decisively committed the United States to sustain France in Indochina. Writing long afterwards, Dean Acheson acknowledged that US policy constituted little more than "a muddled hodgepodge, directed neither toward edging the French out of an effort to re-establish their colonial role... nor helping them hard enough to [restore] it." He judged, however, that simply removing the colonial power would not have benefited US interests. Therefore, "I could not think then or later of a better course."  

When the Korean conflict put a new complexion on the Cold War, a great-power alignment already had congealed in Southeast Asia. While revealing the intervention of US forces in Korea, President Truman on 27 June also announced that he had directed acceleration of Military Assistance Program (MAP) shipments to Indochina and dispatch of a military mission thither. Three days later, 8 C-47s laden with spare parts landed in Saigon; the first load of infantry equipment arrived on 10 August. In mid-July, a State-Defense Survey Mission appointed by the SEAAPC also reached Saigon. After a three-week inspection tour, members agreed that "unless some agreed political solution can be found, the French will, in time, find themselves eliminated from the scene." Further, the Mission found the existing military aid program inadequate and brought back a list of urgent French requests. According to intelligence reports, the threat of Chinese Communist intervention hung heavily over Indochina. Consequently, on 6 September, Mr. Johnson instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as an emergency measure, to prepare a supplementary aid program and recommend a shipment priority.  

Meantime, the French military position was drastically deteriorating. On 25 August, the Joint Intelligence Committee forecast that the Viet Minh soon would begin "a large-scale effort to seize complete control in Indochina." This was the backdrop for the September Foreign Ministers' Conference. In its position paper, the State Department stressed the importance of liberally implementing the 1949 Elysee Agreements and speedily forming new national (i.e., native) armies. Unsatisfied, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said the US position should "take cognizance... that urgent and drastic action is required by the French if they are to avoid military defeat..." Because of the Korean crisis, however, they cautioned that no US forces could be committed to Indochina. Apparently, Mr. Acheson did not press the French to carry out drastic political reforms. Since he was seeking French approval of German rearmament, the Secretary probably wished to minimize differences over Indochina. But, when M. Schuman asked for US tactical air support, the Secretary rejected his request.  

During September-October, disaster befell French arms; six battalions were destroyed in battles along the northeastern frontier. The French abandoned all their border posts, thereby opening completely, supply lines from Communist China to the Viet Minh.  

On 12 October, Defense Minister Moch pressed General Marshall for a firm schedule of aid and especially for quick delivery of 30 B-26 bombers. Overruling JCS advice, Secretaries Acheson and Marshall ordered immediate programming of 21 aircraft and inclusion of the remaining 9 in the FY 1951 aid program. On 18
October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff answered Secretary Johnson's September request by recommending that $133 million worth of equipment be provided under a priority equal to that for Taiwan. This program was approved five days later: 43,400 measurement tons were shipped by the year's end. As Mr. John Ohly (Acting Director, MDAP) sagely warned Secretary Acheson, a situation was developing in which "our responsibilities tend to supplant rather than complement those of the French... These situations have a way of snowballing." The Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently felt the stakes in Indochina were great enough to warrant such a risk. The JSCC prepared a paper analyzing the possibility that "initial, limited, minor commitments of United States military support... might result in further piecemeal commitments... which could lead to an involvement similar to that in Korea." The Committee suggested that promulgation of bold political reforms and formation of new national armies by the French were the best ways of minimizing these risks. After examining their report, General Collins proposed a broader analysis:

I believe that the loss of Indochina would be such a blow to the US strategic position in the Cold War that its loss is unacceptable, if we can possibly avoid it. We must, therefore, explore all practicable measures to include even the use of US armed forces, if the situation can be saved in no other way.

Victory seemed imminent in Korea; he undoubtedly thought forces there soon would be freed for employment elsewhere.

On 11 October, the SEAACP completed a policy statement drafted for NSC consideration. Its major recommendations were that the United States should financially assist the formation of a National Army for Indochina and "continue to press the French" to grant greater self-government to the Associated States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to defer judgment, while awaiting further field reports. They did comment quickly and forcefully, however, upon one aspect of the SEAACP report. A Defense member of SEAACP reported that, while Defense representatives had pressed for "a strong, hard-hitting policy [to wring] political and economic concessions from the French," State participants had "flatly refused" to agree. On 27 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Marshall that "certain steps must be taken now if Indochina is to be preserved from Communism:

a. It would appear imperative to ensure for the Government of Indochina the popular support of the people... A program, therefore, is required which will look to the early autonomy of Indochina...

b. A provision should be placed on the increases of the US Military Aid to Indochina which requires the French immediately to organize national armies of the Associated States of Indochina.

In a prescient passage, they predicted that, unless these measures were taken, the French never could achieve a favorable military solution. The report of Brigadier General Francis G. Brink, USA (Chief, US MAAG), arrived on 4 November. Optimistically, General Brink argued that recent reverses
had been awarded an "unduly exaggerated military importance" and predicted that the French would be shocked into better battlefield performance. Perhaps in light of these conclusions, the JSSC argued against committing US combat forces to Indochina. The Committee contended that such involvement might well lead to war with Communist China and thence to a global conflict—in which case the United States did not plan to defend Indochina. Since the long-term solution lay in "sweeping political and economic concessions," pressure upon France to initiate radical reforms was certainly preferable to expenditure of US blood and treasure.72

This paper formed the basis of a JCS memorandum sent to Secretary Marshall on 28 November. Its vital sentence read as follows: "The United States should take action, as a matter of urgency, by all practicable means short of the actual employment of United States military forces, to deny Indochina to Communism." In return for increased military assistance, the United States "should obtain assurances from the French Government" that (1) a program for eventual self-government would be published and its implementation initiated at once, (2) national armies would be organized as a matter of urgency, and (3) France would send emergency reinforcements to Indochina. This memorandum was circulated among NSC members on 21 December but was never approved by the Council. By then, Chinese intervention in Korea had wholly changed prospects throughout Asia.73

January 1951 was a time of crisis in Indochina. Communist propaganda promised "Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi" in time for Vietnam's "Tet" holiday; CINCPAC prepared plans for supporting a possible evacuation from Haiphong. In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Indochina receive a supply priority above all other military assistance programs.74

The French now were led by General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. Like General Ridgway in Korea, General de Lattre quickly infused his soldiers with fresh confidence. The battle of Vinh Yen, fought between 13–17 January, cost the Viet Minh 6,000 dead and 500 prisoners; US equipment, especially napalm, was used with devastating effect. Twice more, in March and June, General Giap tried to smash the Tonkin delta defenses with his Viet Minh and was defeated.75

President Truman and Premier Pleven conferred on 29–30 January. The French had granted greater autonomy through the Pau Conventions and had begun to organize a Vietnamese National Army. Although both measures later proved ineffectual, the State Department concluded that "nationalist aspirations" now had been answered and no further French concessions were necessary. M. Pleven pledged that France would continue her fight; Mr. Truman thereupon promised to expedite increased deliveries of aid materiel. However, the President rejected the Premier's proposal to establish a US-UK-French consultative body for coordination of Far Eastern policies. Also, the Chief Executive "held out no hope" that the US would directly subsidize the new National Army.76

In September 1951, the occasion of General de Lattre's visit to Washington generated noteworthy changes in JCS attitudes. After debating possible positions, they concluded that current policy had become outmoded and recommended to Secretary Marshall that a review be undertaken by the NSC. For use
in their talks with General de Lattre, they also approved for their own use a paper containing two important policy statements. First, “It would be in the US security interests to take military action short of the actual employment of ground forces [emphasis added] in Indochina to prevent the fall of that country to Communism.” The scope for air-naval action could thus be extended beyond merely aiding an evacuation from Tonkin. Second, if Communist China overtly intervened, responses “might include” (1) air-sea blockade, (2) action against “selected targets” in China, and (3) “possible participation” of Nationalist troops, “all without commitment of US ground forces in China or Indochina.” This was obviously written with an eye upon Korea, where truce talks had been in progress since July. Conclusion of an armistice there could release strong Communist Chinese forces for use in Indochina. Nine months later, these JCS suggestions were incorporated into NSC 124/2.77

In the actual conversations, General Collins assured General de Lattre that still lagging MDAF deliveries would be accelerated. Subsequently, monthly unloadings at Saigon rose from an average of 4,100 long tons during July to 25–30,000 during November-December.78 This time, US aid was poorly used. Impressed by the success of “meat-grinder” tactics in Korea, General de Lattre invaded the Hòa Bính area west of Hanoi with hopes of disrupting enemy supply lines and provoking a set-piece battle. Instead, attrition bloodied both sides almost equally; the Hanoi-Hòa Bính road became “one vast Calvary” for the French. After visiting Indochina in November, General Collins concluded that “this is largely a General de Lattre show ... If anything should happen to him, there could well be a collapse in Indochina.” The master showman died of cancer in January 1952; his successor, General Raoul Salan, evacuated the entire Hòa Bính salient during February.79

During 1952, the administration debated a further deepening of US involvement in Indochina. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciated that Korea and Indochina were “but, two manifestations of the same ideological conflict,” yet feared that closer cooperation with France might lead toward establishment of a combined command. The specter of Chinese Communist intervention loomed ever larger; although the Joint Intelligence Committee deemed it unlikely, the French seemed increasingly obsessed by this danger. During the winter of 1951–1952, the US Government was discussing with its allies a statement (to be issued upon the signing of an armistice at Panmunjom) warning Peking that renewal of aggression would unleash a reaction not necessarily confined to Korea. Consequently, when the US, UK and French Chiefs of Staff conferred at Washington on 11 January 1952, their attention centered upon the possibility of issuing a similar warning against aggression in Southeast Asia. They appointed a Five-Power Ad Hoc Committee80 to analyze collective military capabilities and recommend specific retaliatory measures against Communist China. This group achieved nothing—“except for clarification of basic differences.” British and French members opposed bombing and blockade of China and argued that military measures should be confined to the area attacked.
According to the US representative, the French wished to forestall any diversion of forces from Indochina while the British were determined to avoid provocation of Moscow and Peking.81

US policy was being clarified through other channels, however. The NSC Staff began this process on 13 February by circulating NSC 124. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after reviewing it, concluded that acceptance of its proposed courses of action would require “the making of a single basic decision”; namely, “whether or not the United States would be willing to take military action which would, in effect, constitute war against Communist China.” If so, this willingness would have to be assessed in terms of (1) the added cost in men, money, and materiel and (2) the adverse impact upon allied nations. However, if China itself was not attacked, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that local defense of Indochina stood no reasonable chance of success. Therefore, unless Anglo-French assent could be assured, this policy statement should provide for the possibility of unilateral US action in Southeast Asia.82

The National Security Council, meeting on 5 March, returned NSC 124 to the Staff for reconsideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to analyze possible allied military responses and requirements. Answering on 8 April, they described several scenarios but stated that, with presently available forces, “there is no satisfactory post-aggression military solution that can save Southeast Asia....” Substantially increased and accelerated US materiel assistance would be a prerequisite of successful defense. However, until the French could control the Tonkin delta and offer the population some hope of successful resistance even against Chinese attack, “no real anti-Communist military progress can be expected in all of Southeast Asia.”83

In its response to the NSC directive, the State Department proposed basically to continue present political courses of action. The Service Secretaries attacked the State Department’s position as “an expression of a sit-tight philosophy without definitive goals...which results in more and more dollars being poured into an uninspired program of wait-and-see.” They suggested that an expanded MAAG might undertake to train and equip a national army—after the French had publicly declared their intention to withdraw from Indochina by a specified time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made the same criticism in milder language and suggested the same remedy. Additionally, they asserted that employment of US air and naval forces alone (without ground troops) might deter Communist China rather than provoke her intervention.84

In Paris, on 27 May, Secretary Acheson discussed with French leaders a possible expansion of the National Army (through US funding) and issuance of a tripartite warning to Peking. He found the French resentful of “United States intervention” and unwilling to explain in detail their policies and prospects. The meeting thus achieved nothing.85

NSC 124/1, completed and circulated on 19 June, fully incorporated JCS criticisms of the initial draft. After the National Security Council added minor State and Defense amendments, President Truman approved NSC 124/2 on 25 June. This document described Southeast Asia’s strategic importance in the following words:
2. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and initially endanger in the long term, United States security interests.

   a. The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to Communist control... would have critical psychological, political, and economic consequences. In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with Communism by the remaining countries of the group. Furthermore, an alignment with Communism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India and, in the longer term of the Middle East (with the possible exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey), would in all probability progressively follow. Such widespread alignment would endanger the security and stability of Europe....

   d. The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to Communism.

3. It is therefore imperative that an overt attack on Southeast Asia by the Chinese Communists be vigorously opposed....

4. The danger of an overt military attack...is less probable than continued Communist efforts to achieve domination through subversion....

9. In the absence of large-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina, the United States should:

   a. Provide increased aid on a high priority basis for the French Union forces without relieving French authorities of their basic military responsibility for the defense of the Associated States....

   b. In view of the immediate urgency of the situation..., make the plans necessary to carry out the courses of action indicated in paragraph 10 below.

   c. In the event that information and circumstances point to the conclusion that France is no longer prepared to carry the burden in Indochina,... oppose a French withdrawal and consult with the French and British concerning further measures to be taken to safeguard the area from Communist domination.

10. In the event that... Chinese Communist forces (including volunteers) have overtly intervened... or are covertly participating to such an extent as to jeopardize retention of the Tonkin Delta area by French Union forces, the United States should... carry out the following minimum courses of military action, either under the auspices of the UN or in conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and any other friendly governments:

    (1) A resolute defense of Indochina itself to which the United States would provide such air and naval assistance as might be practicable.

    (2) Interdiction of Chinese Communist communication lines including those in China.

    (3) The United States would expect to provide the major forces for task (2) above; but would expect the UK and France to provide at least token forces thereafter and to render such other assistance as is normal between allies....
12. If... the United States determines jointly with the UK and France that expanded military action against Communist China is rendered necessary by the situation, the United States should take air and naval action in conjunction with at least France and the UK against all suitable military targets in China, avoiding insofar as practicable those targets in areas near the boundaries of the USSR in order not to increase the risk of direct Soviet involvement.

13. In the event the concurrence of the United Kingdom and France... is not obtained, the United States should consider taking unilateral action.86

A new five-power Military Representative Conference met from 7–17 October.87 Under its terms of reference, members were to assume that the allies had agreed to act against Communist China in the event of further aggression and that China had been warned of this fact. The US member sought to obtain sanction for those courses of action specified in NSC 124/2. In fact, conferees did agree that “a combination of all coerce measures,” including a full sea blockade and general air interdiction against China, offered “the best prospect” of halting aggression. But the US representative stressed that this agreement had been forced by the terms of reference; the British and French displayed the same fears described by Admiral Davis in February. After reviewing this report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Lovett that further meetings would serve no useful purpose unless jointly-agreed political guidance was provided.88

As 1952 ended, the outlook in Indochina was ominous. The Viet Minh were sweeping across the top of the Indochinese peninsula, operating in the T'ai highland where French heavy equipment was useless. General Salan countered through Operation LORRAINE, thrusting 30,000 men 100 miles into Communist territory. This failed either to divert General Giap or to capture major supply depots—and French units were badly mauled in ambushes during their withdrawal.89

France herself had become weary of “la sale guerre.” More and more, opponents emphasized the never-ending drain in money and manpower and argued that Germany could recapture military dominance if France remained weak in Europe. Pierre Mendes-France led the swelling faction pleading for peace with Ho Chi Minh.

The United States now was bearing nearly 40 percent of the war’s cost. In February 1952, at the Lisbon Conference, the administration agreed to subsidize the French budget through “offshore procurement” totaling $200 million, chiefly for end-items used in Indochina. Monthly MDAP shipments averaged 21,300 measurement tons; the value of deliveries between June 1950 and December 1952 totaled $334.7 million.90 When the North Atlantic Council met at Paris in December, M. Schuman pleaded for still more help. Exasperated, Secretary Acheson answered that “we were thoroughly dissatisfied with the information we had been given.... He wanted aid; we wanted information. The next move was up to him.”91

During the following months, the French did cooperate sufficiently. President Eisenhower dispatched a new military mission in June 1953 and significantly in-
creased US assistance. The result was the “Navarre Plan,” which led to a French debacle at Dien Bien Phu. Even then, the War for Indochina was not over; the 1954 Geneva Conference brought only a truce to that tired and tortured land.

**Insurgency in the Philippines**

In the spring of 1950, the Philippine Islands seemed sorely troubled. Popular revulsion against the corrupt and repressive Quirino government was widespread; the Hukbalahap insurgency was expanding; economic problems were accumulating. The US Government took alarm. During April, Secretary Johnson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess the internal security situation and recommend measures necessary to protect US security interests. Additionally, the Secretary of State suggested to Mr. Johnson that Air Police at Clark Field might be substantially strengthened to guard against possible guerrilla raids.92

On 23 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Johnson that the Philippine Government’s strength had “seriously declined” in recent months and predicted that this deterioration would continue at an accelerating rate. Unless constructive steps were begun immediately, these trends could cause “early collapse” of any pro-American government and “inevitably result” in installation of a pro-Communist regime. Quite possibly, this estimate was exaggerated. Early in June, the CIA issued a more conservative conclusion that, if the current decline in governmental stability continued “for as much as ten years, pro-Communist forces might be able to seize power.” Similarly, in August, Major General Leland H. Hobbs, USA (Chief, Military Advisory Group), wrote General Bradley that tales of “chaotic conditions” had been overdrawn. However, while the degree of fever was debatable, the fact of sickness was indisputable.93

On 27 June, President Truman ordered that US forces in the Philippines be strengthened and delivery of military assistance accelerated. Mr. Johnson discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff some possible strengthening of the Marine contingent at Subic Bay and of the Air Police at Clark Field. Also, he requested their recommendations regarding other appropriate measures. On 6 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the Secretary a lengthy memorandum. From the Soviet standpoint, they reasoned, “the Philippine islands could be the key to... control of the Far East.” Therefore, it was “imperative” that the Philippines’ security be assured. External danger appeared relatively remote; the sole internal threat stemmed from Huk guerrilla operations. This movement was animated mainly by long-standing agrarian grievances and partly from “a preference for guerrilla life” acquired by some Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Leadership lay in the hands of “disciplined Communists,” who “undoubtedly” hoped to overthrow the Republic. The Huks mustered 10-15,000 lightly-armed men; the government deployed 33,000 relatively well-armed men supported by the civil police. In these circumstances, military measures offered only a temporary palliative; the true solution lay in adoption of proper political and social remedies. Certainly, dispatch of substantial US reinforcements would be widely interpreted
as imperialist intervention. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that Secretary Johnson:

a. Urge upon the NSC the necessity for prompt and positive political and economic action to arrest and reverse the current political deterioration in the Philippines.

c. Advise the NSC that direct US military intervention in the Philippines would be justifiable, from the strategic point of view, only if there remained no other means of preventing Communist seizure of the islands.

Following President Truman’s instructions, the NSC Staff already was drafting a position paper on the Philippines. Secretary Johnson endorsed the JCS memorandum; at his request, it was shown to NSC Members and then referred to the Staff. On 6 November, the NSC Staff Study was completed and circulated for comments. After reviewing this document, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated addition of one sentence: “Be prepared to commit United States forces, if necessary, to prevent Communist control of the Philippines.” On 9 November, the NSC adopted a policy statement that incorporated this JCS recommendation. Four courses of action were set forth:

a. Use all appropriate measures to ensure that the Philippine Government effects political, financial, economic and agricultural reforms.

b. Provide such military guidance and assistance as may be deemed advisable by the United States and acceptable to the Philippine Government.

c. Extend, under US supervision and control, appropriate economic assistance in the degree corresponding to progress made toward creating the essential conditions of internal stability.

d. Continue to assume responsibility for the external defense of the Islands and be prepared to commit US forces, if necessary, to prevent Communist control of the Philippines.

Already, action had begun across a broad front. An economic survey mission led by Mr. Daniel W. Bell recommended many measures for economic improvement. In November, Mr. William C. Foster, Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and President Quirino signed an agreement whereby the President pledged to seek from the Philippine Congress (1) minimum wage legislation, (2) increased taxation to balance the budget, and (3) a resolution endorsing the Bell Report. These steps were accomplished by April 1951; the ECA made available $15 million in FY 1951 and $32 million in FY 1952.

During April 1950, the Philippine Government activated ten battalion combat teams (BCTs), for a total of sixteen. Ramon Magsaysay, who was appointed Secretary of National Defense on 1 September, gradually revived élan and aggressiveness throughout the armed forces. In October, however, General Hobbs protested that the current MDAP was thoroughly inadequate, leaving BCTs “practically immobile” and “seriously short of key combat equipment.” At the urging of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, $9.3 million was diverted to the Philippine aid
program. Nonetheless, global requirements forbade any acceleration of lagging vehicle deliveries. In mid-1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff raised the Philippines' military assistance priority. Even so, only 27 percent of the equipment programmed during FYs 1950–1951 was delivered by 31 December 1951.97

In December 1950 and again in March 1951, Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo pleaded with General Marshall for a $50 million subsidy, so that the Philippine Government could organize 10 additional BCTs (for a total of 26). These funds would cover soldiers' pay, clothing, and construction costs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said that such help, serving chiefly to restore financial stability, should be granted through either the ECA or the Treasury Department. Unsatisfied, Secretary Marshall returned their memorandum with the request "that we review the matter and, if at all possible, furnish some immediate assistance...." Ultimately, they recommended that $10 million be furnished from MDAP funds. President Truman approved this action on 9 May 1951.98

By this time, the worst danger was past. Directed by Magsaysay, Operation SABRE and its sequels broke the Huks into small bands and forced them on the defensive. At American urging, President Quirino considerably improved the caliber of his administration. Most important, the by-elections of November 1951 were honestly conducted and generally free from violence—in happy contrast to those of 1949. The Huks, who had urged a popular boycott of the election, were deeply discredited by its successful outcome. Early in 1952, Under Secretary of State Webb submitted a sanguine assessment to the NSC:

> US influence and guidance have been quietly asserted to a greater degree than at any time since the independence of the Philippines. The policies followed so far have been remarkably successful. The internal security situation has improved, the confidence of the Filipino people in democratic government has been restored, and a feeling of optimism toward the future is apparent.99

The vital ingredient of vigorous and popular native leadership—absent in Nationalist China and French Indochina—was found in the Philippines.
The Resurrection of Japan

The Decision to Prepare a Peace Treaty

As Germany was the workshop of Europe, so Japan was the factory of Asia. Inevitably, after the Communist conquest of China, Occupied Japan became the bastion of US power and influence in the Far East. Although he acted as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General of the Army Douglas MacArthur actually answered only to the US Government. An eleven-nation Far Eastern Commission was charged with policy formulation and with reviewing SCAP’s directives, but the United States possessed a veto power within the Commission.\textsuperscript{1} The occupation force of four divisions and four air wings also was American. Japan was, in effect, a US protectorate. Yet, as that country slowly recovered her well-being and self-confidence, American tutelage became superfluous and even counterproductive. How, then, could Japan be restored to full freedom but remain firmly fastened within the Western orbit? This was the challenge that confronted the Truman administration.

For many months, US policymakers remained deeply divided. While the State Department desired the quick conclusion of a conciliatory peace, the Joint Chiefs of Staff staunchly opposed an early settlement. “From the military point of view,” they declared in December 1949, an acceptable treaty must include both the USSR and the “de facto Government of China” as signatories. However, they also defined “minimum” military needs as follows: (1) the United States alone would possess post-treaty military forces and base rights in Japan; and (2) the United States must secure “exclusive long-term strategic control” of the Ryukyu Islands. Since the Soviets obviously would never sign such a settlement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated (and Secretary Johnson agreed) that treaty negotiations seemed “premature.” In sum, Mr. Acheson believed that they would not exchange the security of occupation for the hazards of a settlement.\textsuperscript{2}

General MacArthur stood with the State Department. The Supreme Commander contended that Japan, having wholly complied with surrender terms, now was entitled to reinstatement as a fully sovereign nation. Concerning security
questions, he suggested that the Soviet Union might accede to a permanently non-aligned Japan; the post-treaty US force would then be limited to 30–35,000 men, completely lacking offensive capabilities and present only to prevent aggression by guaranteeing US intervention in case of attack. Speaking to Ambassador William Sebald in mid-January 1950, General MacArthur bluntly said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be overruled so that preparations for a peace conference could begin “within six weeks.”

A conference on 27 February 1950, attended by Assistant Secretary Rusk, General Burns, Admiral Davis, and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, aggravated the State-Defense split. Mr. Rusk sought early action on a treaty and argued that conclusion of a “Pacific Pact” would facilitate the peacemaking process. Writing to the Operations Deputies afterwards, Admiral Davis decried “the manifold evils of . . . pactomania” and castigated the State Department’s position:

They used the same false assumption they have used for a number of months, that we should have a treaty now because we could not occupy Japan “indefinitely.” I believe . . . we can well resist peace treaty action now without taking the position that we think there should never be a treaty.

Moreover, the State Department wished to postpone base rights negotiations until the peace settlement was accomplished. Again, Admiral Davis dismissed this “simon pure double-talk about the necessity for not antagonizing the Japanese.” In his estimation, the postponement strategy “could hardly be better devised to reduce the possibility of our actually obtaining needed base rights.”

Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees attempted to reconcile State-Defense differences. Writing to Secretary Johnson, he proposed that (after the Soviet Union had refused to participate) the United States and other friendly states should conclude a treaty terminating the state of war and granting diplomatic privileges to Japan but reserving residual powers to the Supreme Commander. This solution, he argued, would allow the United States to cope with either invasion or subversion and yet accord the Japanese “what they desire most—the right to run their international affairs.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Johnson that this proposal was “militarily unacceptable.” In their estimation, implementation of the Voorhees plan would (1) require the United States to assume indefinite occupation costs and military commitments and (2) degrade the status and authority of US forces in Japan at a time when preservation of maximum stability was “mandatory.” In sum, the solution would force loss of military advantage without furnishing commensurate political gain. Nonetheless, if political considerations were compelling, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved initiation of negotiations—provided that the security requirements defined in December 1949 were fully honored.

Meanwhile, the President was attempting to overcome the long State-Defense impasse. On 20 February, Mr. Truman reviewed various ideas with Secretary Acheson and then requested preparation of an NSC paper. Mr. Acheson felt that his difficulties with the Defense Department were “only a part of the larger problem of Louis Johnson.” He thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff would “cheerfully
accept defeat but dreaded the prospect of a public clash with Secretary Johnson over allegations that the settlement appeased Japanese aggressors and neglected essential US defense requirements. Secretary Acheson delegated the task of treaty preparation to Mr. John Foster Dulles, designating him Foreign Policy Advisor on 6 April and assigning him this specific duty on 18 May. In the 1944 and 1948 Presidential campaigns, Mr. Dulles had served as Governor Thomas E. Dewey's principal counselor in foreign affairs. The administration's Far Eastern Policy was laboring under increasingly bitter Republican attacks. By selecting a man of Dulles' stature, Mr. Acheson hoped to revive "bipartisanship" in Asian affairs.7

At a State-Defense meeting on 24 April, Secretary Acheson argued that Japanese restiveness and Soviet aggressiveness made progress toward a treaty mandatory. General Vandenberg said that he still considered a treaty premature "for at least the next six months." But, if the State Department detected a rapid political deterioration in Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have to reassess the situation at once." Secretary Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was "a fair statement." For his part, Mr. Acheson pledged to say nothing to the press and to discuss this subject tentatively and generally with the British alone during the forthcoming Tripartite Foreign Ministers' Meeting.8

On 5 May, the State Department circulated a "Basis for Discussion...Without Commitment" to be utilized by Secretary Acheson in talks with Foreign Secretary Bevin. The paper stipulated that, pending a policy reassessment after Secretary Johnson's visit to Tokyo in June, the United States should oppose convocation of a peace conference. The question of whether to proceed toward a treaty without participation by the USSR and Communist China could also be considered again at a later time. When concluded, a settlement should restore full sovereignty to Japan and retain only minimal control machinery necessary to ensure execution of the treaty. Although rearmament would be neither authorized nor prohibited, the Japanese would be allowed to maintain a police force and a coast guard. Security arrangements might consist of either a collective compact between Japan and the Allied Powers or a continuation of SCAP's authority to deal with extreme emergencies. General Bradley was unimpressed with this paper. "If [it] is considered in its entirety," he wrote Admiral Davis, "it may not do too much harm. If parts are lifted out, it might be very bad."9

Secretaries Acheson and Bevin discussed the treaty on 10 May. The Foreign Secretary said that lack of information concerning US intentions placed him in a difficult position vis-à-vis Commonwealth countries; India and Pakistan particularly were pressing for action. Additionally, British commercial interests were seeking an early settlement. Mr. Acheson answered that the settlement must include security arrangements to prevent aggression against Japan as well as to prohibit resurgence of Japanese militarism. Consequently, the United States confronted a "dilemma"; if Communist China and the USSR were included in the peacemaking process, they might thwart the attainment of US security objectives; if they were excluded, the Soviets might be provoked into drastic action. He hoped, however, that forthcoming discussions in Tokyo among General Bradley, Secretary Johnson and General MacArthur would make further progress possible.10
JCS and National Policy

An article by James Reston, published in* The New York Times* on 12 May, ably described the State-Defense cleavage. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that, so long as US forces occupied Japan, communism could not dominate the Far East and the Soviets would be deterred from aggression in Europe and the Middle East by fear of a two-front war. In rebuttal, the State Department contended that rising resentment at prolonged occupation might rouse the Japanese to reject any treaty allowing the Western powers to retain bases in their islands.11

During a press conference on 18 May, President Truman remarked that treaty negotiations would begin “when the time is propitious . . ., and I hope that won’t be too far off.” Secretary Acheson sent Mr. Dulles to Japan on 17 June—simultaneously with, but apart from, Mr. Johnson and General Bradley. This separation probably was fortunate. Ambassador Sebald relates that, at his first Tokyo briefing, Secretary Johnson launched a “harangue,” attacking “the State Department crowd” in terms that Mr. Sebald thought “shocking.” In particular, the Secretary castigated Mr. Dulles as an “impractical” man, imbued with a “religious, moralistic and pacifistic attitude.”12

General MacArthur lent eloquent support to “the State Department crowd.” He declared it was “a fundamental error to do nothing pending assurance that we could accomplish all.” The United States should call a conference at once, draft a “just and proper treaty,” and then invite all countries concerned to ratify the resulting peace formula. Thereby, he declared, “Japan and all of Asia would witness the resurgence of our moral leadership and renewal of our initiative in the conduct of Asian affairs.” Regarding security arrangements, he said the effectiveness of an imposed collective security arrangement would be sapped by “the bitterness and resentment which would thereafter dominate the Japanese mind.” Alternatively, indefinite prolongation of SCAP’s powers would be viewed as a “betrayal” by many Japanese. General MacArthur still saw “ultimate political neutrality” for Japan as the ideal end. For the present, however, he proposed that the treaty include a reservation that “points” in Japan would remain occupied “until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.” The language employed was that of the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, but the meaning of “irresponsible militarism” had been altered to embrace dangers to Japan as well as from it. This was, in fact, the formula finally adopted in 1951. Having heard the Supreme Commander, Secretary Johnson and General Bradley departed Japan on 23 June. Mr. Dulles was still in Tokyo, however, when the North Korean invasion began.13

As with Germany, the Korean War quickly and drastically altered US policy toward Japan. Between July and September, all four US occupation divisions were committed to combat; Japan thus became undefended save by air and sea power. Secretary Acheson told the Cabinet of rising fears among Japanese and warned of possible agitation for a neutralized and undefended Japan.14 In this atmosphere of crisis, major State-Defense differences soon were submerged. In mid-July, General Bradley told Ambassador Philip Jessup that he thought the two Departments could produce a comprehensive peace plan for discussion with other countries. Simultaneously, President Truman encouraged Secretary Acheson to produce such a plan.15
On 1 August, Secretary Acheson sent the Defense Department draft treaty provisions entitled “International Peace and Security”; these had been developed by Mr. Dulles for possible incorporation within the peace treaty. Mr. Johnson requested JCS opinions, without prejudice to the question of whether the time was yet ripe for treaty negotiations. Replying on 22 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Johnson that any peace treaty must meet the following requirements:

a. It must not become effective until after favorable resolution of the present US military situation in Korea.

b. It must assure that Japan is denied to the USSR.

c. It must provide that, initially, Japan will be garrisoned by forces acceptable to the US under a US military command....

d. It must not contain any prohibition, direct or implicit, now or in the future, of Japan’s inalienable right to self defense....

The Resurrection of Japan

For the immediate future, they felt that military occupation must be continued. However, in light of the “portentous events” of the past two months, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now withdrew their objections to a treaty concluded without participation by the USSR and Communist China. This was the vital concession that made State-Defense agreement possible. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected Mr. Dulles’ draft security provisions, which, they felt, placed excessive reliance upon the dependable United Nations.16

Although Secretary Johnson extended no formal approval, he evidently endorsed these recommendations. Additionally, Mr. Dulles assured him that the requirements of both General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were being incorporated within treaty drafts. So, ending his opposition, Mr. Johnson authorized Major General Carter Magruder to discuss remaining differences with Mr. John Allison of the State Department.17

On 4 September, General Magruder and Mr. Allison completed a proposed “Memorandum for the President.” If approved, this paper would furnish Secretary Acheson with a basis for discussion at the approaching Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New York. The memorandum specified that the United States would proceed with “preliminary negotiations” for a peace treaty, incorporating JCS security requirements. After the approval of friendly powers had been won, Mr. Dulles would discuss treaty arrangements with General MacArthur and Japanese leaders. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Johnson, and Secretary Acheson all endorsed this document; President Truman approved it on 8 September as NSC 60/1.18

At the Wake Island conference on 15 October, General MacArthur urged the President to press forward with a peace treaty even if the USSR and Communist China refused to attend the conference. He gave the State Department’s draft
lavish praise: "After friction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff it has been polished until it shines like a diamond." 19

Following Secretary Acheson's preliminary soundings, Mr. Dulles undertook fuller explorations with nations represented on the Far Eastern Commission. By November, the United States was able to circulate to these governments a statement of principles. First, Japan would recognize Korea's independence, accept US administration (as UN trustee) of the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands, and accept the great powers' decision concerning the status of Formosa, the Pescadores, South Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. Second, US-Japanese cooperation would continue "pending satisfactory alternative security arrangements." Third, all parties would waive reparations claims. The peace settlement's main features had been chiseled but much finishing work was still required.

Crisis in Korea

China's massive intervention in Korea forced an acceleration of the treaty-making process. There was now a grave danger of general war, and Japan lay virtually unprotected. In these circumstances, the State Department drafted a three-part program, which Secretary Acheson described in a letter to General Marshall dated 13 December. The program would consist of: first, a "basic strategic decision" to commit substantial air and sea forces to defense of the offshore island chain; second, a "basic economic decision" by the US to assure Japan's independence of Communist-controlled mainland areas; and third, dispatch to Japan of a Presidential mission (led by Mr. Dulles) to explore and ascertain the terms of both a peace settlement and a bilateral security arrangement. Secretary Acheson inquired whether the Defense Department would object to:

1. Seeking an early conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan without awaiting a favorable outcome of the situation in Korea.
2. Discussing the peace settlement with the assumption that the United States intends to commit substantial armed forces to the defense of the island chain . . .
3. Leaving the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands under Japanese sovereignty, subject to the provisions of the contemplated military security agreement . . .
4. Exploring at this time a possible Pacific Pact . . . 21

The Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted this query to General MacArthur on 18 December. Replying ten days later, CINCFE again recommended that the United States proceed to call a peace conference "at once, and act either alone or in concert fully to restore Japan's sovereignty. However, he termed it "unthinkable" to surrender control of the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands, thereby "transforming strength to weakness without the slightest moral or legal reason for so doing."
Apprised also of Mr. Dulles' approaching visit, CINCFE said that its effects "cannot be otherwise than beneficial." 22

In Korea, Eighth Army was again retreating and conceivably might be expelled entirely. Under these conditions, the JSSC argued strongly for postponement of peace negotiations. Indeed, during a State-Defense meeting on 3 January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that treaty work be suspended until conditions in Korea were clarified. Mr. Dulles replied that such a suspension could so shake Japanese confidence that no treaty would then be possible. He wished, instead, to act quickly and force the Japanese firmly to align themselves with the United States. Conferees finally agreed (1) that the peace treaty should not be "concluded" until after the outcome in Korea was certain and (2) that it should not come into force without a simultaneous agreement regarding US base rights. Further, the State Department would abandon its proposal that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands return to Japanese sovereignty. Finally, participants agreed that General MacArthur should be asked whether Mr. Dulles ought to visit Japan at this critical time. 23

Simultaneously, British intelligence reported that 12 Soviet divisions were moving from Siberia to the island of Sakhalin. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCFE that, in view of publicity linking West Germany with Japanese rearmament, "there is a possibility that a visit now might precipitate Soviet counter-reactions, perhaps against defenseless Hokkaido." If such reactions seemed at all likely, it would be "highly desirable" to place some US troops on Hokkaido prior to Mr. Dulles' arrival in Japan. Two questions were posed: How serious was the threat against Hokkaido? How should this influence the timing of Mr. Dulles' visit? On 4 January, CINCFE answered that he saw no indication of special Soviet preparations to invade Hokkaido. Since an invasion would undoubtedly precipitate general war, General MacArthur did not believe that the Soviets would base such a momentous decision merely upon a visit by Mr. Dulles. 24

Thus the Dulles visit was not delayed. On 8 January, Secretary Acheson, General Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved terms of reference for his mission stating that the United States should work toward a treaty "without awaiting a favorable outcome of the military situation in Korea." The purpose of this settlement was to assure Japan's adherence to the free world coalition. Although Mr. Dulles was forbidden to make any "final commitments," he was authorized to state that it was US policy (1) to commit substantial forces to defense of the island chain, (2) to encourage development of Japanese self-defense capabilities and (3) to promote a regional mutual assistance arrangement among Pacific nations. President Truman approved this paper on 10 January. 25

Between 22 January and 10 February, the Dulles Mission exhaustively canvassed Japanese opinion. The principles approved in September were found to be generally acceptable; indeed, the Japanese strongly opposed the post-treaty presence of any non-US forces. But discussion of a bilateral security treaty was complicated by the Japanese constitution's anti-war clause and by popular anti-
militarism. Consequently, it seemed wisest to confine any such treaty to generalities and relegate specifics to an administrative agreement, which could be approved by President Truman and Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida alone. Additionally, US representatives won informal agreement that UN forces could continue to use Japan as a base of operations for the Korean War. In sum, Mission members found that the proposed settlement “will be gratefully received by the Japanese and will do much to foster a lasting friendship between Japan and the United States.”

During these weeks, CINCFE was seeking major ground reinforcements for Japan. On 18 December 1950, General MacArthur strongly urged that four National Guard divisions immediately be deployed to FECOM. Such action, he argued, would furnish “a powerful counterbalance to agitation aimed at discrediting the United States as Japan’s natural protecting power during the existing Far Eastern crisis.” Four days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff answered that, pending continued consideration of courses of action in Korea, no additional divisions would be dispatched to the Far East.

The outcome in Korea still was uncertain. On 9 January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCFE that, if the front could be held with forces presently available, two partly-trained National Guard divisions could be deployed to garrison Japan. If not, this duty would devolve upon troops evacuated from Korea. Happily, General Ridgway revitalized the Eighth Army and ended its retreat. Generals Collins and Vandenberg conferred with CINCFE in Tokyo on 15 January. General MacArthur then declared that the Eighth Army could remain in Korea indefinitely. However, he refused—with some emotion—also to assume responsibility for the risk of leaving Japan defenseless.

General Collins returned from Tokyo convinced that “action must be taken” to protect Japan “as soon as practicable.” Accordingly, on 29 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that a two-division reinforcement be sent to FECOM. They also asked that any announcement follow, and not precede, press releases regarding troop shipment to Europe. Apparently, they wished the White House to announce the European movement about 1 March and then, while this was being publicly debated, to transfer two divisions to Japan with as little attendant publicity as possible.

After discussion with Secretaries Marshall and Acheson on 6 February, Mr. Truman decided (1) that the two divisions should be sent to Japan, (2) that the announcement concerning troops for Europe should precede that regarding Japan, and (3) that such notices should await Congressional action upon the Wherry Resolution. Then, on 23 February, the President suddenly and inexplicably ordered execution of the two-division troop movement. The 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions reached Japan in April; the former was stationed in northern Honshu, the latter in Hokkaido.

By these actions, the United States dramatically reaffirmed its role as Japan’s protector. Continuing crisis in Korea failed to impede progress toward a peace settlement.
The ANZUS and Philippine Treaties

Upon leaving Tokyo in mid-February 1951, Mr. Dulles visited Manila, Canberra, and Wellington. For Filipinos, Australians and New Zealanders, memories of Japanese attacks were far more vivid than fears of Communist aggression. These three nations opposed a liberal peace, doubted the death of Japanese militarism and looked upon the United States as their protector. So Mr. Dulles found that special security treaties with the United States would be their price for support of the peace settlement.

After assessing Mr. Dulles' findings, Secretary Acheson decided to abandon his original objective of one all-encompassing Pacific Pact in favor of a series of security arrangements. Japan could not act as a true partner, sharing in "self-help and mutual aid"—and the Philippine, Australian and New Zealand Governments refused to accept her as their ally. Additionally, the United Kingdom adamantly opposed a Pacific Pact, resenting its exclusion from this area and believing that circumscription of Western strategic interests to the island chain would enhance the likelihood of an attack upon Hong Kong and Malaya. The British had no objection, however, to (1) a tripartite arrangement among Australia, New Zealand and the United States, and (2) a similar, simultaneous pact between the United States and the Philippines. Within the US Government, finally, the State Department felt that a Pacific Pact might be misconstrued as implying a guarantee of European colonial possessions, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff feared such an organization might intrude into NATO and Organization of American States (OAS) activities. These several considerations led Secretary Acheson to draft a Presidential statement advocating separate security arrangements between the United States and (1) Japan, (2) the Philippines, and (3) Australia and New Zealand, respectively.

While in Canberra, Mr. Dulles already had negotiated a tripartite pact among the United States, Australia and New Zealand. He delivered this draft treaty to Secretary Acheson on 6 March; General Marshall sent it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff one week later. On 5 April, Mr. Acheson passed his draft Presidential statement to Secretary Marshall and requested that DOD reply "as a matter of urgency." Since the Japanese peace treaty was a sensitive issue in the Australian elections set for 28 April, he deemed it "important that we should be able to indicate a willingness, at least in principle, to make a security arrangement..." 33

Secretary Marshall asked for a JCS appraisal of the State Department drafts. The JSSC still preferred a single regional pact, believing this solution involved the smallest increase in US obligations. General Collins commented that, while a Pacific Pact was certainly preferable, approval of a trilateral arrangement appeared necessary in order to win Australian support for a peace settlement permitting Japanese rearmament. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this argument. On 11 April, they asked—and Secretary Marshall agreed—that the proposed Presidential statement include the following opinions. First, a series of security arrangements was acceptable, but these should remain as few as possible.
Second, since existing US-Philippines arrangements were satisfactory, preparation of a new security pact would entail "serious disadvantages" for the United States. Third, a trilateral treaty with Australia and New Zealand should be made "as a simple understanding or public declaration rather than by a formal pact." If a treaty was thought necessary, its articles should make no mention of "military plans, planning or organization therefor."

Mr. Dulles thereupon redrafted the Presidential statement to reflect JCS recommendations. "In my opinion," he warned Secretary Acheson, "the whole program for Pacific peace...will be in danger unless we can move quickly along these lines." The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense immediately approved this draft statement, which the White House released on 18 April. Pertinent passages are quoted below:

...The whole world [already] knows that the United States recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly...

The possibilities of [a tripartite] arrangement were fully explored by Mr. Dulles at Canberra, Australia, and Wellington, New Zealand...

The series of arrangements and dispositions outlined above...constitute natural initial steps in the consolidation of peace in [the Pacific] area...34

In light of the JCS strictures of 11 April, further negotiations with the Australian and New Zealand Governments were conducted and a new treaty text was written. Articles were amended to eliminate references to "subsidiary bodies," "planning" and "closest possible relations"; Article VIII merely authorized the Australia, New Zealand, and United States (ANZUS) Council to maintain a "consultative relationship" with other states and organizations. The Council itself would not engage in military planning but would remain a "single and compact body" composed of high-level officials. The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged this text acceptable. After further refinements, the treaty was published on 12 July and signed at San Francisco on 1 September.35

The Filipinos insisted upon a separate security arrangement, saying that the ANZUS and US-Japanese treaties represented discrimination against them. The United States agreed to a separate arrangement. In exchange, the Philippine Government abandoned its demand for $8 billion in war reparations from Japan and accepted the proposed peace settlement. On 2 August, Secretary Acheson sent a draft treaty to Secretary Lovett. The State Department accepted two JCS revisions. The first of these deleted a portion of Article II which might be interpreted to mean that "mutual aid" could continue indefinitely. The second added in Article III a reference to "external armed attack," so that, in case of internal uprisings, no US action would be required. Thus amended, the pact was made public on 16 August and signed in Washington two weeks later.36

Although Australia and New Zealand clearly desired development of a planning organization, nothing ever matured beyond an embryonic state. Mr. Dulles evidently had implied to the Australian Foreign Minister that an informal
planning relationship would exist. Indeed, the State Department wanted a Military Committee attached to the Council. However, Secretary Acheson relates that the Joint Chiefs of Staff “broke into such a sustained tantrum of negation that I took it upon myself to withdraw the proposal.” They feared that the allies would thus gain equal stature in the planning process, and so might force disproportionately heavy US military commitments in the Pacific area. Therefore, they advocated only assignment of individual officers to the Council on an ad hoc basis.37

The Council conferred in Hawaii from 4–7 August 1952. Since the two allies suffered from a paucity of knowledge, Secretary Acheson decided that “instead of starving the Australians and New Zealanders, we would give them indigestion.” Thus stated, they agreed that it would suffice to accredit “appropriate military officers” to the Council; Admiral Arthur W. Radford (CINCPAC) was designated US representative. Although the State Department expressed hope that the “frankness and mutuality of interest” nurtured at Honolulu could be maintained, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their opposition to any organization devoted to combined regional planning. The “appropriate military officers” met at Honolulu during 22–25 September and agreed to develop strategic estimates and contingency plans for Southeast Asia. These tasks merged with undertakings described in the previous chapter. In brief, ANZUS did not emerge into independent existence.38

The Path to San Francisco

Utilizing the documents discussed with the Japanese in January-February, Mr. Dulles completed and circulated in mid-March the drafts of a peace treaty, a security pact, and a supplementary administrative agreement regulating in detail the post-occupation status of US forces. Secretary Marshall asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to analyze these documents. The JSSC recommended, as a reply, that the peace treaty should not take effect until the Korean War ended. But, at General Collins’ suggestion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff substituted a more pliable provision that “the date of its coming into effect must be determined in the light of the world situation generally and specifically the situation in the Far East.” So, answering Secretary Marshall on 17 April, they termed the peace treaty and security pact acceptable—provided that the two took effect simultaneously.39

On 11 April, the President’s dismissal of General MacArthur cast a sudden pall over the peace treaty. Mr. Dulles undertook a third journey to Japan, after receiving assurances that the administration’s policies remained unaltered. The main objectives of this mission, which continued from 16–23 April, were to reassure the Japanese (1) that US policies stood unchanged, and (2) that the new Supreme Commander, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, shared his predecessor’s zeal for a just and prompt peace. The DOD representative reported that, all in all, this mission was “relatively successful.” General MacArthur’s accomplishments withstood the whirlwind of his departure.40

With Japanese-American concord assured, allied consent had now to be achieved. Mr. Acheson relates that the Attlee government slowly advanced “from
obscenity to cooperation.” In March 1951, the British Chiefs of Staff agreed that the US proposals for a settlement were militarily satisfactory, provided the peace treaty was accompanied by a US-Japanese security pact. However, they also wished to (1) exploit Japan’s economic dependence upon the allies “to a limited extent” and (2) secure Japan’s agreement to build neither strategic bombers nor major naval vessels. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the British suggestions and told Secretary Marshall that the proposed restrictions seemed unwise. Indeed, they argued that efforts to exploit Japan’s economic dependence might ultimately “force [her] into Soviet hegemony.”

During April, the British Government circulated a lengthy draft which contained a “war guilt” clause, perpetuated certain economic controls (e.g., shipbuilding), and pressed detailed claims to property and damages. Reconciliation with the US approach was a protracted process. By 3 May, a US-UK Working Group had completed a joint text which still contained many disagreements. Mr. Dulles then brought his own draft to London and persuaded the British to forgo all economic restrictions, financial reparations, and rearmament limitations. Additionally, the United Kingdom abandoned demands that Communist China be invited to the peace conference. With much reluctance, the Attlee cabinet approved all these agreements on 21 June 1951.

Proceeding to Paris, Mr. Dulles confronted three French demands: (1) $2 billion in reparations from Japan; (2) a commercial agreement protecting French interests in Indochina; and (3) invitation of the Associated States of Indochina to the peace conference. The French later surrendered their first requirement and deferred the second for bilateral negotiation; the United States eventually agreed to Indochinese attendance.41

On 26 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave Secretary Marshall a lengthy critique of the new US-UK draft treaty. Their reservations were numerous. First, the peace treaty must not be regarded as effective for any signatory until it had been ratified by the United States. Through this device, implementation could be indefinitely postponed if Korean hostilities continued. Second, if the treaty did take effect before the Korean War ended, provision for continued US use of Japan was militarily essential. Third, the Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty must come into force simultaneously. Fourth, occupation forces must be clearly distinguished from those troops which would remain in accordance with the bilateral security treaty. Therefore, the appropriate article should be altered from “All armed forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn...” to “All forces of occupation of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn...” Fifth, Communist China must not be allowed to sign this treaty, as she might thereby establish claims to sovereignty over Formosa and reparations against Japan. Sixth, pending establishment of a UN strategic trusteeship, the United States must retain “absolute” control of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands.42

Passing this paper to Mr. Acheson, Secretary Marshall asked for confirmation of his “understanding” that Communist China would not be permitted to sign the treaty. Regarding the JCS request that the pact should not take effect prior to US ratification, he recognized that “it may not be practicable to give the United States such unlimited control over the actions of its sovereign allies.” He asked,
nonetheless, that this problem be brought before the President. Secretary Acheson confirmed that Communist China would be barred from the conference and accepted all JCS recommendations save that relating to timing of the treaty's implementation. The present text allowed a period of nine months during which US concurrence would be required before the treaty could take effect. Since allied acceptance of this phrasing had been obtained only with extreme difficulty, Secretary Acheson felt certain that any attempt to win a perpetual veto would fail. Soon afterward, General Bradley and Secretary Acheson presented opposing viewpoints before President Truman. Representing General Marshall, Deputy Secretary Lovett reported his chief's opinion that State Department advice should be "pretty nearly controlling." The President thereupon supported Secretary Acheson, and the treaty's text stood unchanged.\textsuperscript{43}

The culmination was now close at hand. On 3 July, the State Department forwarded a revised peace treaty for DOD review and comment; this document was also circulated among the Allied Powers and was published on 12 July. The Joint Chiefs of Staff counseled two changes. First, the draft should have some provision for preventing signature by Communist China. Second, it should ensure that the bilateral security pact would become effective simultaneously with the peace treaty. Acting Secretary Lovett endorsed both requests; Mr. Acheson returned assurances that they would be honored.\textsuperscript{44}

Simultaneously, Mr. Dulles sent Secretary Marshall a tentative text of the security treaty, which granted to the United States a right to base land, sea and air forces in and about Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged the draft unacceptable on two grounds. First, it failed to allow US use of Japan as a base for offensive operations—not only in Korea but also, if necessary, against Communist China and the Soviet Union, with or without UN authorization. Second, it lacked a requirement that Japan continue to serve as a supporting base for UN forces in Korea. The CIA also suggested that, in order to forestall possible Soviet obstructionism, publication of the security treaty should be postponed until after the peace conference ended. The State Department acceded to all JCS and CIA advice.\textsuperscript{45}

Co-sponsored by the US and UK Governments, the draft treaty was formally circulated among the Allied Powers on 20 July. Concurrently, the US Government invited fifty states to attend a Conference for Conclusion and Signature of a Treaty of Peace. In Secretary Acheson's recollection, "Never was so good a peace treaty so little loved by so many of its participants...." Nonetheless, only three nations declined to attend. Burma was embittered by the prohibition on reparations; India and Yugoslavia decided that their presence would sully the sanctity of "nonalignment." Surprisingly, the Soviet Union accepted its invitation and dispatched a delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.\textsuperscript{46}

On 29 August, Secretary Acheson advised President Truman that the coming weeks would be characterized by "sharply increased international tension." Since Japan's future alignment was "second in importance perhaps only to Germany," a successful settlement would constitute "a tremendous step toward changing by peaceful means the present power situation in the world in favor of the United States and its Allies." Consequently, the Soviets might employ the following "shock tactics": (1) introduce a draft treaty framed specifically to attract
Asian and Japanese opinion; (2) establish a direct connection between the peace treaty and the Korean War, and use the latter as a bargaining element with respect to the former; or (3) launch a major offensive in Korea, hoping its success would intimidate other powers. If any of these things happened, the US delegation should tolerate no diversions but simply press forward and win approval of the treaty as written. Certainly, any lack of resolution “could shatter the free world majority and permanently lose Japan.” President Truman promptly approved these principles, which served as a directive to the US delegation.

The Peace Conference opened on 4 August; a final treaty text was disseminated nine days later. At San Francisco, US strategy demanded immediate adoption of stringent procedural rules, which severely limited debate and allowed no presentation of textual modifications. Thus, when Mr. Gromyko proposed that an invitation be issued to Communist China, Secretary Acheson (serving as Conference President) declared his motion out of order because only Rules of Procedure were under consideration. Communist delegates then offered several procedural amendments; in a dramatic denouement, Secretary Acheson escorted Stefan Wierblowski from the podium when the Pole overstayed his allotted time. After sundry Communist stratagems had been defeated, the restrictive rules were adopted by vote of 48–3.

The US delegation was frankly astonished at its triumph and could only conjecture that “Gromyko was either caught off balance by the speed of developments or clearly was not trying to make a major and determined fight.” On the morning of 8 September, the Peace Treaty was signed by all participants save Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR. Six hours later, the United States and Japan unveiled and signed the Security Treaty; by its terms, the United States alone among foreign powers could maintain military bases in Japan. Seldom in the postwar era did US diplomacy win so sweeping a victory.

Secretary Acheson spoke of the settlement as “a true act of reconciliation”; Mr. Dulles saw it as “a step toward breaking the vicious cycle of war-victory-peace-war.” By comparison with the Versailles Treaty (to which Mr. Dulles often alluded), this appraisal was certainly correct. The victors undoubtedly showed unprecedented generosity to the vanquished. However, US goals were shaped by Cold War considerations. Abandoning any hope for neutralization, the United States chose to enlist Japan as a partner in this conflict. This US-Japanese alliance became the foundation stone of American policy in the Far East.

From Occupier to Ally

Ratification of the peace settlement was months distant. Should Japan, nonetheless, now be treated as a sovereign nation? The State Department so desired; the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently disagreed. Two issues illustrate this cleavage: conclusion of the Administrative Agreement; and disposition of Okinawa.

The bare bones of the security treaty needed the full flesh of an administrative agreement. A draft agreement appeared in July; the Joint Chiefs of Staff found
so many faults that they recommended a complete revision. State, Service, CINCFE, and Treasury representatives spent four months writing a new agreement. In mid-November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted their draft. So did Secretary Lovett. This document was built around two basic principles: first, CINCFE should be accorded the freedom of action necessary to perform his operational mission; second, the agreement must come into force concurrently with the peace and security treaties. The State Department disapproved only those proposed articles pertaining to "Criminal Jurisdiction" and "Collective Defense Measures." In working-level discussions, the Defense Department finally agreed not to exempt US personnel from Japanese criminal jurisdiction; the State Department ultimately accepted a completely separate agreement covering collective defense measures.\textsuperscript{51}

A State-Defense mission, led by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk, reached Japan on 28 January 1952. In this group, Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl Johnson and Brigadier General A. L. Hamblen represented the Defense Department. The center of controversy was the draft of Article XXII. Rewritten at the insistence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this article would grant to the United States (in event of hostilities or imminent threat thereof) the rights (1) to act unilaterally in order to protect its forces in Japan and (2) to establish, by agreement with Japan, a Combined Command and designate a Commander. US negotiators soon realized that these demands could destroy the Yoshida government. "If we succeed in [gaining] inclusion of our principle...," Mr. Johnson advised, "we may lose our cause...." At first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that these provisions be preserved. On 19 February, Mr. Rusk reported that he had weakened Article XXII to require only that "the Governments of Japan and of the US may consult and prepare the necessary measures, including combined command...." Even so, Premier Yoshida strongly protested. Consequently, Mr. Rusk saw no hope for greater gains "unless we are prepared to use threats and pressures which, if backed up, would be disastrous to US-Japanese relations." Mr. Johnson submitted a simpler wording, stating that the two governments "should immediately consult together with a view to taking necessary joint measures for the defense of that area." The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred Mr. Rusk's formula but accepted Mr. Johnson's version. This latter language was therefore written into Article XXIV of the Administrative Agreement, which was signed at Tokyo on 28 February and entered into force two months later.\textsuperscript{52} On 28 April, also, the peace treaty entered into force and the occupation ended. At the same hour, the Security Pact became effective.\textsuperscript{53} But time showed the State-Defense debate over "combined command" to have been superfluous. Although US officials later approached Japanese authorities, no agreements were achieved.

The second State-Defense difference concerned Okinawa. The Peace Treaty had awarded administering authority to the United States, with Japan retaining residual sovereignty. In October 1951, CINCFE concluded that the Ryukyus could safely be restored to Japanese political control after the occupation ended. Otherwise, he predicted that Okinawa would become an increasing irritant, eroding mutual confidence and friendship between the US and Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved this recommendation, still feeling that US security interests
would be “seriously jeopardized” if this “strategically vital” link in the island chain was lost. The issue then lay dormant until, at a State-JCS meeting on 2 April 1952, a State Department representative suggested that the United States should now signify its intention to return the Bonins and Ryukyus, possibly retaining only Okinawa under UN trusteeship. Meeting in mid-July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that, in light of Japan’s possible entry into the United Nations, no trusteeship proposal should be entertained “at this time.” On 15 August, they recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the status quo not be changed until such time as the Far Eastern situation “becomes stabilized in a way favorable to United States security interests.” Mr. Foster forwarded these conclusions to Secretary Acheson with his full concurrence.  

The US Civil Administrator for the Ryukyus reported that the population of the northern Amami Group (culturally, ethnically, and economically closer to the mainlanders) overwhelmingly preferred to live under Japanese sovereignty. In October 1952, General Clark suggested that, if the JCS position could not be completely maintained, these islands might be returned at a time when doing so would reap the most advantageous political results. The Amamis did revert to Japanese sovereignty in August 1953. However, Okinawa remained under US control and bedeviled Japanese-American relations for two decades.

The Genesis of Japanese Rearmament

According to their 1947 Constitution, “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation.” The Constitution also decreed that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” This lofty idealism quickly was eroded by Cold War realities. By denuding the country of US combat forces, the Korean War compelled some measure of rearmament.

Rearmament began unobtrusively when, on 8 July 1950, General MacArthur authorized the Japanese Government to expand the National Police from 30,000 to 75,000 men and the Maritime Safety Patrol from 8,000 to 16,000 men. Several days later, with SCAP’s approval, the Government established a 75,000-man National Police Reserve.

Although the Japanese National Police Reserve (JNPR) began as an internal security force, it quickly became an army in all but name. The JNPR was to be divided into four divisions, each responsible for a particular district of Japan. On 13 November 1950, in connection with FY 1951 budget planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a program to provide US equipment for these four divisions.

Chinese intervention in Korea accelerated the JNPR’s evolution. On 3 January 1951, CINCFE reported an “urgent need” to organize and outfit, on a priority “co-equal” to Korean War requirements, the four divisions mentioned above with armament roughly equivalent to that authorized for standard US infantry divisions. General Collins concurred but felt the decision should first be discussed with Secretary Acheson and President Truman. Accordingly, on 9 February, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary Marshall (1) to seek Presidential approval of CINCFE’s request and (2) to authorize the Department of the Army to include in its FY 1952 budget provision for funds to equip six additional JNPR divisions. Thus they were looking toward a ten-division army.\textsuperscript{59}

General Marshall praised this JCS paper and sent it to Secretary Acheson together with a “Memorandum for the President,” proposing (1) that heavy armament for four divisions be dispatched immediately (since the threat of Soviet attack would become particularly acute in early May) and (2) that planning begin for a program to equip six additional divisions.\textsuperscript{60} The State Department strongly objected, feeling that such steps could seriously jeopardize international support for the approaching peace settlement. In particular, a unilateral US decision fully to arm four JNPR divisions, in violation of decisions of the Far Eastern Commission, might well “lead to a break-up of the Commission with prejudice to our relations with even our best friends and largely isolate the United States in its policy toward Japan.” Indeed, if the Soviets should then launch a localized attack against Japan on the pretext that the Far East Commission disarmament decisions had been violated, “we would probably encounter great difficulty in obtaining support in much of Europe and Asia for counteraction against the USSR.” Therefore, while agreeing that equipment should be shipped immediately and planning for further expansion should commence, Acting Secretary Webb asked that no armaments actually be released to the Japanese without specific agreement of the State Department.\textsuperscript{61}

Apprised of these developments, CINCFE proposed to defer training with heavy equipment until adequate stocks became available and a decision was made actually to issue these weapons to JNPR divisions. Since the bulk of this equipment could not reach Japan until 60 days after shipment had been authorized, no immediate decision concerning release was necessary. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the State Department’s suggestions. Writing to Secretary Marshall on 28 March, they recommended that he obtain Presidential sanction (1) for establishment of a Special FECOM Reserve to serve as a stockpile for the four JNPR divisions and (2) for the Department of the Army to begin planning and budgeting for materiel sufficient to equip 10 divisions by 1 July 1952. Secretaries Marshall and Acheson supported these suggestions; Mr. Truman approved them on 3 May.\textsuperscript{62}

Hardly had the San Francisco Conference ended when General Collins reopened the issue of releasing heavy armaments to the JNPR. General Ridgway had recently reemphasized the danger to Japan posed by Soviet military strength. Since no US reinforcements were available, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended on 14 September that the JNPR’s combat capability be developed as rapidly as possible through removal of restrictions upon releasing heavy equipment. Mr. Lovett concurred, but Secretary Acheson again rebuffed the DOD request, saying that immediate release would violate the Far East Commission commitments, could endanger prompt treaty ratification by allied powers, and might even (in the opinion of Foreign Ministers Morrison and Schuman) inadvertently precipitate a global conflict. Instead, Secretary Acheson proposed—and the Defense Department agreed—that JNPR personnel could be brought to US bases
for training with heavy equipment. During November, necessary negotiations with friendly member nations of the Far East Commission were undertaken and their approval was obtained. On 5 December, Acting Secretary Foster directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take actions necessary to initiate JNPR training programs.

During 1952, the JNPR (renamed the National Security Corps) was increased to a strength of 110,000 men. CINCFE, now General Clark, wanted the Corps equipped with heavy weapons as promptly as possible. Accordingly, on 12 July, he advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, as long as the Corps was confined to light weapons, "it cannot be regarded as a bona fide defense force." In current circumstances, "a few weeks or months saved in readying the [Corps] for combat may be decisive in the successful defense of Japan." He, therefore, requested authority to lend equipment at the earliest opportunity. Concurring in General Clark's recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff "strongly" urged the Secretary of Defense to seek Presidential approval. Since the occupation now had ended and the Far East Commission had been dissolved, the State Department saw no diplomatic obstacles. On 4 August, Mr. Truman authorized the loan of heavy equipment "as a matter of military necessity."

Embryonic naval forces also were being organized. On 23 July 1950, CINCFE proposed that 40 patrol craft from the US reserve fleet be released to the Japanese Government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff deferred their decision. On 14 March 1951, Admiral Sherman suggested a new policy, authorizing SCAP to provide "appropriate armament" for the coastal security force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, and General Marshall transmitted their proposal to Secretary Acheson. Answering on 20 July, Mr. Acheson stated that many of the diplomatic objections against release of heavy armament were applied also to loans of patrol vessels. Instead, he proposed—and the Department of Defense accepted—an interim policy statement (effective between signature and ratification of the peace treaty) that the Supreme Commander was "authorized to establish a Japanese-manned coastal security force. . . . under SCAP operational control, to be operated in waters contiguous to the Japanese islands." President Truman approved this policy statement on 29 August. During November 1951, approval of friendly Far East Commission powers for creation of a coastal defense force was obtained. In April 1952, Premier Yoshida formally requested the loan of US vessels; special legislation was enacted by Congress in July. Under the resulting Charter Party Agreement, which took effect in December, Japan received 18 1,500-ton patrol frigates and 50 250-ton large support landing ships.

Creation of an air force was still more protracted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplated organization of two squadrons by 30 June 1954 and eventual expansion to a strength of 27 squadrons. On 3 October 1952, they solicited CINCFE's opinion on the desirability of initiating informal negotiations with the Japanese Government. Replying on 31 October, General Clark stated that "the most immediate and greatest" danger to Japan's security lay in the Communist air threat. CINCFE described various politico-economic obstacles but declared that he desired to approach the Prime Minister as soon as possible. Negotiating instructions were not dispatched until 10 March 1953, however, and two more months
elapsed before Ambassador Allison and General Clark judged it propitious to approach Premier Yoshida. Even then, CINCFE found the Japanese Government's attitude "weak and evasive." 67

The Joint Chiefs of Staff established planning objectives of 10 army divisions, a compact coastal defense force, and 27 air squadrons. 68 During 1950–1952, Japan's progress toward these goals was modest—and the pace hardly improved during 1953–1954. 69 Profound pacifism and anti-militarism dominated popular emotions; Premier Yoshida dismissed major rearmament as "an idea verging on idiocy." 70 Thus the United States continued to bear the chief burden; militarily, Japan remained more a protectorate than a true partner.
# List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, and United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Antisubmarine Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCS</td>
<td>British Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Battalion Combat Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENELUX</td>
<td>Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOB</td>
<td>Bureau of the Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCAFMED</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCFE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCNELM</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSOUTH</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMLANDSOUTHEAST</td>
<td>Commander, Allied Land Forces, Southeastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSSAC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Chinese People's Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Deutsche Marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMC</td>
<td>Defense Management Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPB</td>
<td>Defense Production Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Co-operation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>Financial and Economic Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FECOM</td>
<td>Far East Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAC</td>
<td>International Security Affairs Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLRSE</td>
<td>Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNPR</td>
<td>Japanese National Police Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOEWP</td>
<td>Joint Outline Emergency War Plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### JCS and National Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JOWP</td>
<td>Joint Outline War Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSJC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Plans Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSSC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Survey Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAG</td>
<td>Joint United States Military Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing Ship, Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDAP</td>
<td>Mutual Defense Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Middle East Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDO</td>
<td>Middle East Defense Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Military Liaison Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTDP</td>
<td>Medium Term Defense Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>National Petroleum Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSRB</td>
<td>National Security Resources Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>Program and Budget Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>Policy Planning Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCT</td>
<td>Regimental Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACME</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACMED</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACMED-ME</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean-Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCS</td>
<td>Screening and Costing Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAAPC</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Temporary Council Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VFW</td>
<td>Veterans of Foreign Wars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSEG</td>
<td>Weapons System Evaluation Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief
Harry S. Truman 12 Apr 45–20 Jan 53

Secretary of State
Dean G. Acheson 21 Jan 49–20 Jan 53

Secretary of Defense
Louis A. Johnson 28 Mar 49–19 Sep 50
George C. Marshall 21 Sep 50–12 Sep 51
Robert A. Lovett 17 Sep 51–20 Jan 53

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Stephen T. Early 02 May 49–30 Sep 50
Robert A. Lovett 04 Oct 50–16 Sep 51
William C. Foster 24 Sep 51–20 Jan 53

Secretary of the Army
Gordon Gray 20 Jun 49–11 Apr 50
Frank Pace, Jr. 12 Apr 50–20 Jan 53

Secretary of the Navy
Francis P. Mathews 25 May 49–30 Jul 51
Dan A. Kimball 31 Jul 51–20 Jan 53

Secretary of the Air Force
W. Stuart Symington 18 Sep 47–24 Apr 50
Thomas K. Finletter 24 Apr 50–20 Jan 53

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley 15 Aug 49–14 Aug 53

Chief of Staff, US Army
General J. Lawton Collins 16 Aug 49–14 Aug 53

Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman 02 Nov 49–22 Jul 51
Admiral William M. Fechteler 16 Aug 51–16 Aug 53

Chief of Staff, US Air Force
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg 30 Apr 48–30 Jun 53
JCS and National Policy

Commandant, US Marine Corps
General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. 28 Jun 52–31 Dec 55

Director, Joint Staff
Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, USN 20 Sep 49–01 Nov 51
Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell, USAF 02 Nov 51–23 Apr 53

Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 15 Aug 45–11 Apr 51
General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA 11 Apr 51–28 Apr 52

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Korea
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 10 Jul 50–11 Apr 51
General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA 11 Apr 51–09 May 52
General Mark W. Clark, USA 09 May 52–05 Oct 53

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower 19 Dec 50–30 May 52
General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA 30 May 52–11 Jul 53

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, USN 30 Jan 52–12 Apr 54

Commander in Chief, Alaska
Lieutenant General Nathan F. Twining, USAF 17 Oct 47–01 Jul 50
Lieutenant General William E. Kepner, USAF 01 Jul 50–01 Mar 53

Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Admiral William H. P. Blandy, USN 01 Dec 47–01 Feb 50
Admiral William M. Fechteler, USN 01 Feb 50–15 Aug 51
Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, USN 15 Aug 51–12 Apr 54

Commander in Chief, Caribbean
Lieutenant General William H. H. Morris, Jr., USA 01 Oct 49–01 Apr 52
Lieutenant General Horace L. McBride, USA 01 Apr 52–15 Jun 54

Commander in Chief, Europe
General Thomas T. Handy, USA 23 Aug 49–01 Aug 52
General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA 01 Aug 52–11 Jul 53

Commander in Chief, Far East
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 01 Jan 47–11 Apr 51
General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA 11 Apr 51–09 May 52
General Mark W. Clark, USA 09 May 52–05 Oct 53

Commander in Chief, Pacific
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN 30 Apr 49–10 Jul 53
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945

Commanding General, Strategic Air Command
General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF 19 Oct 48–01 Jul 57

Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
Admiral Robert L. Connolly, USN 23 Sep 46–01 Nov 50
Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN 01 Nov 50–14 Jun 52
Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN 14 Jun 52–19 Mar 54
Bibliographic Note

This history is based primarily on the official documents contained in the master records files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other sources include the records maintained in the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by agencies of the Joint Staff. Research also extended to certain records of the Services. The volumes published by the Department of State in the Foreign Relations series were invaluable in illuminating diplomatic aspects of national security policy; some of these had not been published at the time this volume went to press and are cited in galley-proof form.

During the period of this volume the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were organized under a case file system that had been in continuous use since 1942. This system is identified by the prefix CCS (for Combined Chiefs of Staff) attached to each file folder title. Within each footnote, the file location is the last element given. When several documents are cited, all those contained in a single footnote "sentence," closed by a period, are to be found in the records file given at the end of the sentence. "Same file," rather than "Ibid.," is used for repeated, successive references to the same file.

Some documents are cited without a file reference. These include types that are widely distributed and that may be located without reference to the JCS files, such as Records of NSC Actions. Documents of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its predecessor, the Western European Union (WEU), are normally procured through the NATO subregistry system. The research for this volume, however, disclosed that some of the important early documents of WEU and NATO are apparently no longer in existence.
Chapter 1. Rearmament Versus Retrenchment (1950)


2. See Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, pp. 8–10. Mr. Truman’s account of his years in office can be found in *Year of Decisions* (1955) and *Years of Trial and Hope* (1956).

3. Mr. Acheson’s memoir, *Present at the Creation* (1969), offers an invaluable account of these years.

4. GA Omar N. Bradley, 4 May 71, and GEN J. Lawton Collins, 7 Aug 72, interviews by Walter S. Poole. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, *The Reporter’s Trade* (1958), pp. 73–74, 142–150. Mr. Johnson had been Assistant Secretary of War during 1937–1940 and also served as Treasurer of the Democratic Party during the 1948 election campaign.


6. These are the author’s impressions; GEN Collins confirmed those concerning his colleagues. GEN Collins, 7 Aug 72, interview by Walter S. Poole, JCS Hist Div files.


8. (TS) NSC Action No. 270, 5 Jan 50.


10. Ibid., pp. 292–299.


17. Hammond, “NSC 68,” pp. 322–323. According to Hammond, RADM Arthur C. Davis (Director, Joint Staff) told GEN Bradley that he thought the State Department had been “railroading” its views through the Study Group. If GEN Bradley conveyed this impression to Mr. Johnson, it could account for the intensity of the Secretary’s reaction to the report.


21. (TS) JCS 2101/1, 31 Mar 50, same file.
22. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Re-examination of Strategic Objectives and Plans," 5 Apr 50 (der from JCS 2101/1), same file, sec 2. (TS) Dec On JCS 2101/1, 5 Apr 50, same file, sec 1.

23. Report to the President by the Secretaries of State and Defense, 7 Apr 50, Encl 2 to NSC 68, 14 Apr 50, FRUS, 1950, Vol I, pp. 235-292. Typical of the "slight amendments" was the substitution of "substantial" for "sharp" increases in military expenditures and military assistance programs.


25. Ltr, Pres to Exec Secy, NSC, 12 Apr 50, Encl 2 to NSC 68, NSC 68: "Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council . . . .", 14 Apr 50; FRUS, 1950, Vol I, pp. 234-235.

26. NSC Action No. 289 b, 20 Apr 50. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to Ad Hoc Committee on NSC 68, "Initial Questions Confronting the Committee," 28 Apr 50; Memo, ExecSecy to CJCS et al., "First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on NSC 68," 2 May 50; FRUS: 1950, Vol I, pp. 293-298. In his memoirs, Secretary Acheson claims that NSC 68 was "discussed with the President in the National Security Council on 25 April and became national policy . . . . Present at the Creation," p. 374. This is an egregious error. As the next chapter relates, Mr. Truman did not endorse the conclusions of NSC 68 until 29 September. Unhappily, numerous historians have repeated Mr. Acheson's mistaken recollection that the President "approved" NCS 68 at this time. See Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power, p. 508, and Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (1972), p. 160.


31. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 25 May 50, Encl to JCS 2101/7, same file. The original draft of this memo was written by Comptroller W. J. McNeill. See Memo, W. J. McNeill to JCS, 3 May 50, Encl to (TS) DM-351-50 to JCS, 3 May 50, same file.

32. Formulation of the FY 1950 and FY 1951 budgets is described in Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947-1949, Chs. 7 and 8. The FY 1951 figures given above are drawn from Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 81st Cong, 2nd sess, pp. 45, 84. FY 1950 figures are taken from Ibid., pp. 197, 293, 1313, 1769. Through 1950, Air Force objectives were stated in terms of "groups." Then, early in 1951, the term "wing" was introduced. For simplicity, "wing" has been used throughout this volume.

33. Public Papers, Truman, 1950, pp. 61-63. Total obligatory authority for all defense purposes, including stockpiling, came to $13.673 billion, of which $873 million was available from prior years.


39. See below, p. 15.


41. The NATO Medium Term Defense Plan is described in Ch. 7.


43. NY Times, 19 May 50, p. 1. To the $350 million requested by the administration, the House added $24 million to anti-tank research and development efforts and $9.125 million to Army-Navy hospital programs.

44. NY Times, 21 Jun 50, p. 54.

45. The Budget Advisory Committee (later known as the Program and Budget Advisors), originally appointed in 1948, consisted of three senior officers designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist them in reviewing and revising Service budget submissions.

46. The formulation of the 1951 budget is described in Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947-1949, Ch. 8, and, much more briefly, in H. hearings, DOD Appropriations for 1951, pp.
43–44 (testimony of Secretary Johnson). Originally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services assumed that approximately $14 billion would be available; they were nearing an agreement on the division of that amount when President Truman suddenly lowered the ceiling to $13 billion. This was probably uppermost in Budget Advisory Committee members’ minds when they complained that guidance had not been "timely."

47. (U) JCS 1800/57, 19 Oct 49, CCS 370 8(19–45) sec 20.
49. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 23 Jan 50, Encl to JCS 1300/67, 25 Jan 50, same file, sec 21.
50. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 22 Feb 50, Encl to JCS 1800/70, same file, sec 21.
51. Memos (3), SecDef to Svc Secys, "Dollar Ceiling on New Obligating Authority for FY 1952," 1 Mar 50, Encl to JCS 1800/72, 3 Mar 50, same file, sec 22.
52. (U) JCS 1800/75, 16 Mar 50, same file, sec 22. The emergency war plan then in effect is described in Ch. 6.
55. (U) JCS 1800/84, 21 Apr 50; (U) SM–874–50 to JSCS, 26 Apr 50; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 22.
56. (TS) JCS 1800/85, 28 Apr 50, same file, sec 23. (U) JCS 1800/86, 4 May 50, same file, sec 24. The Services submitted only recommended increases; the totals given above have been computed by applying the proposed increases to existing forces.
57. This discussion is attested by (U) Memo, LG I. H. Edwards, USAF, to other OpsDeps members, 11 May 50, and (U) Memo, MG Smith (AF Member, JCS FBA) to Secy JCS, 18 May 50, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 24.
58. (TS) DM–353 to JCS, 26 May 50, App to JCS 1844/78, 9 Jun 50, CCS 381 (1–26–50) sec 2; copy also in CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 24.
59. (TS) DM–356 to JCS, 1 Jun 50, Encl to JCS 1844/78, 9 Jun 50, CCS 381 (1–26–50) sec 2. For the mid-range war plan, see Ch. 6.
61. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Preliminary Budget Estimates for 1952," 1 Jun 50, w/encls, (S) Memos (3), SecDef to Svc Secs, same date (Encl and Apps to JCS 1800/89, 2 Jun 50), CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 24.
64. (U) SM–1410–50 to PBA, 4 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1800/94, 5 Jul 50, same file, sec 25. The 1954 objectives were transmitted to Secretary Johnson two weeks later but soon were overtaken by events. See Ch. 2.
65. (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., "North Atlantic Treaty Planning," 30 Jan 50, Encl to JCS 2099, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 33. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Basis for MDAP for FY 1951, 19 May 50 (der from JCS 2099/6), same file, sec 38. (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, same subject, 8 Jun 50, Encl to JCS 2099/18; (TS) ISC 876/121, 1 Jun 50; same file, sec 39. Public Papers: Truman, 1950, pp. 445–449.
66. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 374. An instructive comparison with NSC 68 is provided by the Gaither Report, which was completed in November 1957 during the alarm aroused by Sputnik. The Gaither Panel recommended expenditure of an additional $44 billion during 1959–1963, but President Eisenhower added only $2.8 billion to the FY 1958–1959 military budgets. Nothing like the Korean War occurred to illustrate the dangers of inaction and to mobilize public alarm. See JCS Hist Div, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1957–1960, pp. 19–25.

Chapter 2. Rerarmament Began (1950)

1. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 333. The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Korean War is treated in a separate volume of this series, James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: The Korean War, Parts 1 and 2. Chapter 1 describes the background to the North Korean invasion, including the UN's tutelary role in South Korea; Chapter 2 portrays the actual attack and the initial US response. See also James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (1972), Chapter 4.


4. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 42–46, 52–57. Four divisions were stationed in Japan, one in Germany, and five in the United States.

5. When the war began, General MacArthur was "wearing two hats": he was US Commander in Chief, Far East, and Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, for the Japanese occupation. On 10 July, at the request of the United Nations, President Truman handed him a third hat: Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. LTG Walton H. Walker (Commanding General, Eighth Army) controlled all US, UN, and South Korean forces fighting in Korea.

6. Schnabel and Watson, The Korean War, Pt. 1 Ch. 4. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, Chapter 5. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Impact of Korean Situation Upon FY 1951 Program," 6 July 50 (der from JCS 1950/96). (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 6 Jul 50. Encl to JCS 1950/97, 12 Jul 50; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 25. According to Service submissions, the added spaces would be utilized principally for the following purposes: Army—33,000 to bring FECOM units to wartime strength, 1,500 to replace two AAA battalions being sent to FECOM, 4,000 for organization of one Replacement Training Division, and 10,000 for fillers and replacements; Navy—9,000 to augment ships in the Western Pacific, 4,000 for ship reactivations, and 6,000 to increase Marine forces; Air Force—19,000 to bring the Far East Air Force to war strength.

7. (U) Msg, CINCCE 5754070 to JCS, 9 Jul 50. CM IN 11043, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 23.

8. Memo, SecDef to JCS, 11 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1800/102, 19 Jul 50, same file, sec 26. SM 14775 to ACoS, G–3 et al., 10 Jul 50; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Personnel Requirements in Support of Current Operations in the Far East (Second Increment)," 13 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1800/99), same file, sec 25. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 14 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1800/100, 15 Jul 50, same file, sec 26. Most of the newly authorized spaces would be used as follows: Army—13,500 to fill units requested by CINCCE, 17,000 to replace units being sent to FECOM, 10,000 to activate one training center, and 10,000 for additional fillers and replacements; Navy—19,500 to expand amphibious capabilities of the Pacific Fleet, and 6,000 to bring 1st Marine Division to peacetime strength; Air Force—9,000 to deploy 2 Medium Bomb wings and one Troop Carrier wing to FEAF, 2,500 to activate one Light Bomb wing, and 3,500 to organize a B–29 training school.

9. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "FY 1951 Force Requirements," 18 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1800/101); (C) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 9 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1800/104. 31 Jul 50, same file, sec 26. For a comparison with pre-war objectives, see Table I, on page 39. By PL 655, 3 Aug 50, Congress removed all restrictions on military manpower.


Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Increased Augmentation of the Army (Above 834,000)," 31 Jul 50 (der from JCS 12147/3). Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 10 Aug 50; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Federalization of Certain Air National Guard Units," 18 Aug 50 (der from JCS 2147/7); Memo, SecDef to JCS, 22 Aug 50; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Augmentation of Naval Forces," 21 Aug 50 (der from JCS 2147/5); Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 25 Aug 50; CCS 320.2 (7–28–50) sec 1. The four National Guard divisions ordered into Service on 1 September were the 28th, 40th, 43d and 45th.

12. Schnabel and Watson, The Korean War, Pt. 1 Ch. 5; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 139–176.

13. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 13 Sep 50, App to JCS 1800/113, 14 Sep 50, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 26. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Recommendations Regarding the Third Supplemental FY 1951 and FY 1952 Budget Requests," 22 Sep 50 (der from JCS 1800/118), same file, sec 27. (TS) NSC Action No. 361, 29 Sep 50, JCS recommendations for FY 1952, and also those for FY 1954 which they submitted at the same time, are listed on p. 30.


16. (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Supplies and Equipment for MDAP," 18 Aug 50, Encl to JCS 2099/42, 22 Aug 50, CCS 092 (6–22–46) sec 42. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 27 Oct 50 (der from JCS 2099/52). (TS) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., same subj, 7 Nov 50; same file, sec 45. MDAP was not considered part of the military budget.


18. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 1 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1924/12; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 8 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1924/14); CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 45.
19. (TS) NSC 73/1, same subj, 29 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1924/22, 31 Jul 50, same file, sec 47.
20. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “NSC 73/1,” 3 Augs 50 (der from JCS 1924/23), CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 45. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force suggested that the United States ask the Security Council to establish small UN forces for employment along the frontiers of “soft spot” countries which appealed for protection. They also proposed that the defense of Japan, Okinawa, Formosa and the Philippines be placed under a UN legal umbrella. Apparently, Secretary John-son did not put these proposals before the NSC. FRUS: 1950, Vol I, pp. 353–357.
27. Because of the long lead-time involved in production of military hardware, obligations (i.e., contract authorizations) would outstrip expenditures (i.e., procurement) for about two years; then the situation would reverse itself.
32. Development of the JOWP is described in Ch. 6, that of the MTDP in Ch. 7.
34. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Force Requirements Under NSC 68,” 1 Sep 50 (der from JCS 2101/15), same file. Basic tasks in NSC 68 are described on p. 7.
35. (U) Memos JCS to SecDef, “Recommendations Concerning the Third FY 1951 Supplemental and FY 1952 Budget Requests, 22 Sep 50 (der from JCS 1800/118), CCS 370 (8–19–49) sec 27. In mid-1954, assuming there was no major war, major forces would be deployed in the following manner: United States—10 Army divisions, 43% wings; Alaska and Canada—3% wings; Atlantic—6 large and 3 light carriers, 1 Marine division; Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean—2 large carriers; Europe—4 Army divisions, 35 wings; Pacific—2 large and 6 light carriers, 1 Marine division; Far East—1 Marine and 4 Army divisions, 2 large carriers, 12% wings. (U) SM 2504–50 to JCS. 10 Oct 50, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 6.
37. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., “NSC 68/1,” 23 Sep 50, Encl to JCS 2101/19, same date; (U) Memo, CSF to SecDef, “US Objectives and Programs for National Security,” n.d. [ca. 26 Sep 50]; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj., 27 Sep 50 (der from JCS 2101/20); (TS) “Record of meeting of the Senior NSC Staff on 28 September 1950,” CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 6.
40. NY Times, 13 Sep 50, p. 1.
41. Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade (1956), pp. 135, 174. On 30 August, the Veterans of Foreign Wars demanded the ousters of Secretaries Acheson and Johnson, condemning “those disastrous and capricious policies . . . which have brought our nation’s defenses to their present shameful and inadequate condition.” NY Times, 31 Aug 50, pp. 6–7. For a defense of the economy program by Mr. Johnson, see Hearings, The Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1951, subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 81st Cong, 2d Sess, pp. 4-6.
Notes to Pages 33–39

43. Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman*, p. 480. Secretary Acheson thought that Mr. Johnson's anti-Acheson intrigues with Republican legislators had obliged the President to dismiss him: *Present at the Creation*, p. 441.


47. (U) JCS 1800/127, 8 Nov 50, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 28. (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, 17 Nov 50, Enc to JCS 1800/131, 8 Nov 50, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 29. Mr. Lovett was replying to a JCS memorandum of 13 November in which they stated that they were reducing FY 1951 objectives in response to his oral guidance. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Revised Program Objectives for FY 1951," 13 Nov 50 (der from JCS 1800/130), same file, sec 28. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 14 Nov 50, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 7.


52. (TS) "Soviet Intentions in the Current Situation," 3 Dec 50, Enc to JCS 1924/45, same date, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 53. See also (TS) "Soviet Objectives in the Current Situation," 3 Dec 50, Enc B to JCS 1924/46, same date and file. This document defined Soviet aims as follows: to expel UN forces from Korea; to frustrate West German rearmament; to destroy working unity among the Western Powers; to undermine the dominant Western position in Japan; to establish Communist hegemony in Southeast Asia; to secure recognition of Communist China as the fifth major world power; and to minimize US-UK influence in the Near and Middle East. The former paper is summarized in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 473–474, the latter in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 420.


54. *Hearings, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1950*, subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 81st Cong, 2d sess, p. 18, p. 21. Probably, however, the US was better prepared in 1950 than it had been in 1941. See *FRUS*: 1950, Vol I, p. 487.


57. There were 10 regular and 4 National Guard divisions. The Constabulary in West Germany constituted another division-equivalent.

58. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Augmentation of the Army by Three Divisions," 13 Dec 50 (der from JCS 2147/19); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Augmentation of the Air Force," 13 Dec 50 (der from JCS 2147/29); (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Augmentation of the Air Force and of the Army, 13 Dec 50, Enc to JCS 2147/21, same date; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Build-on of Forces," 22 Dec 50 (der from JCS 2147/22); N/H to JCS 2147/22, 2 Jan 51; CCS 320/2 (7–28–50) sec 1. On 1 March, 6 more ANG fighter squadrons were federalized and assigned to Air Defense Command.

59. See Chapter 1, p. 17.


Chapter 3. Rearrangement Sustained (1951)


9. (U) JCS 1800/155, 13 Jul 51, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 37.


11. Public Papers: Truman, 1951, pp. 254–257. In this message, the President put FY 1952 force objectives at 18 Army and 2½ Marine divisions, 1,162 ships of all types, 95 Air Force wings, and about 3.5 million personnel. Service budget figures are drawn from Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1952, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 82d Cong. 1st sess, Pt. 2, p. 2; Pt. 3, p. 6; and Pt. 4, p. 23.


13. (U) JCS 2147/29, 7 Apr 51; JCS 2147/30, 13 Apr 51; (U) JCS 2147/31, 13 Apr 51; same file.


15. (U) JCS 1800/144, 16 Apr 51; (S) Memo, SecDef to Pres, 17 Apr 51, App to JCS 1800/145; (S) Memo, SecDef to SecArmy, 20 Apr 51, Encl to JCS 1800/145; same file, sec 31.


18. Quoted by Assistant Secretary of State Rusk in Dept of State Bulletin, 19 Nov 51, p. 821.


20. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted $250 million to establish a West German air force (see Chapter 8); this was disallowed. JCS requests for Spain ($300 million) and Yugoslavia ($160 million) were reduced but not eliminated; more information may be found in Chapter 10. As for Japan, the administration decided to fund its rearrangement through Service budgets rather than MDAP (see Chapter 13).


23. For Service strengths as of 30 June 1950, see Chapter 2, p. 20.


27. (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, 13 Jul 51, Encl to JCS 2101/40, same file. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Review of the Policies and Programs in NSC 68/4," 27 Jul 51 (dr from JCS 2101/41), same file, sec 11.
29. The Committee included FY 1954 objectives in order to correlate its force goals with those of the MTD and the JOWP.
30. (U) JCS 1800/147, 28 May 51, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 31. This Air Force tabulation omits transport and troop carrier wings previously included.
32. (U) JCS 1800/194, 8 Jun 51; (U) SM–1453–1 to JCS, 12 Jun 51; (U) SM–1491–1 to JCS, 15 Jun 51; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 32.
33. (U) JCS 1800/153, 13 Jul 51; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Augmentation or Adjustment of End FY 1952 forces," 16 Jul 51 (dr from JCS 1800/154); CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 32.
34. The B–36 controversy of 1949 is described in Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947–1949, Ch. 10.
36. (U) JCS 1800/158, 15 Aug 51; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef Interim Force Requirements for FY 1952 to Support Objectives of NSC 68/4," 15 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 1800/159, same date; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 33. General Vandenberg intended to apportion his 138 wings as follows: 12 heavy and 33 medium bomb wings to destroy Soviet atomic capability and war-sustaining resources; 14 strategic reconnaissance and 10 fighter escort wings to support the bombardment force; 20% fighter interceptor wings to defend the United States against atomic attack; 6% fighter interceptor wings to defend overseas SAC bases; 7 medium bomb, 2 light bomb, 9% fighter bomber, 6 day fighter, and 2 tactical reconnaissance wings for defense of Western Europe; 4 fighter interceptor, 1 light bomb, 3 fighter bomber, and 1 tactical reconnaissance wing for defense of the Far East; 2 light bomber, 26% fighter bomber, and 2 tactical reconnaissance wings for joint training in the United States. (U) JCS 1800/164, 6 Sep 51, same file, sec 34.
37. (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, 14 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 1800/160, 22 Aug 51; (TS) N/H to JCS 1800/160, 31 Aug 51; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 33.
38. (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, 9 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 2101/47, 10 Aug 51; (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, 20 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 2101/49, same date; CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 13. (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to CIC, same subj, 31 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 1800/163, 5 Sep 51; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 33.
39. Service programs were presented in the following papers: (U) SM–2839–51 to JCS, 21 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 1800/162, 1 Sep 51; (U) Memo, CSA to ICS, 27 Aug 51; (TS) Memo, CSAP to JCS, 28 Aug 51; CNO to JCS, 30 Aug 51; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 33. (U) JCS 1800/164, 6 Sep 51; (U) JCS 1800/166, 7 Sep 51, same file, sec 34. (U) JCS 1800/167, 10 Sep 51; (U) JCS 1800/168, 12 Sep 51, same file, sec 35. Mr. Lovett’s role in reconciling JCS differences may be inferred from the following documents: (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, 15 Sep 51, Encl B to SM–2252–51 to JCS, 17 Sep 51; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Force Levels for 1953 and Beyond," 18 Sep 51 (dr from SM–2252–51 to JCS); (TS) SM–2261–51 to JCS, 18 Sep 51; same file, sec 35. Final decisions were described in the following papers: (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Forces Required for National Security," 26 Sep 51, Att to JCS 1800/171, 1 Oct 51; (TS) N/H to JCS 1800/171, 12 Oct 51; same file, sec 35. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 11 Oct 51 (dr from JCS 2101/52), CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 14. (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, 15 Oct 51, Encl to JCS 1800/174, 16 Oct 51, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 36.
Chapter 4. Rearmament Retarded (1952)

1. Chapter 3, p. 54.
3. The President’s decision is described in (S) Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 3 Jan 52, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 37. See also H. Hearings, DOD Appropriations for 1953, pp. 89, 144.
4. (S) Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 3 Jan 52, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 37.
5. (U) DM–4–52 to JCS, 4 Jan 52; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Implications of a Reduction in the Proposed Military Budget for FY 1953,” 4 Jan 52 (der from JCS 1800/183), CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 37. In his letter of 3 January, the SecDef stated that the forthcoming JCS statement would be forwarded to the President.
7. NY Times, 22 Jan 52, p. 1; 4 Apr 52, p. 12; 10 Apr 52, p. 1; 19 Apr 52, p. 1; 29 Apr 52, p. 17.
11. (TS) Ltr, Pres to SecDef, 9 Jan 52, App to JCS 2099/152, 17 Jan 52; (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, 21 Jan 52, Encl to JCS 2099/167, 22 Jan 52; same file, sec 66. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Preparation of FY 1953 Budget Estimates, Military Portion of Mutual Security Program,” 1 Feb 52 (der from JCS 2099/169) same file, sec 67. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 13 Mar 52, Encl to JCS 2099/180, 17 Mar 52, same file, sec 70.
14. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 9 Nov 51, Encl to JCS 1800/176, 16 Nov 51, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 36. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Review of Military Expenditures,” 20 Dec 51 (der from JCS Secretary 1800/181), same file, sec 37. Secretary Johnson had created the DMC as an instrument for executing the “economy” program.
15. The Secretary’s budget directive is summarized briefly in (U) Encl B to JCS 1800/184, 6 Mar 52, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 38.
16. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Budget for FY 1954,” 11 Mar 52 (der from JCS 1800/185); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 38. Simultaneously, the Chief Executive asked for summary descriptions of current Departmental programs. On 22 March, Secretary Lovett’s office circulated a draft report that showed some small changes from the JCS memorandum of eleven days earlier (e.g., 110 instead of 112 AAA battalions, 68 rather than 99 of which would be at reduced strength). After a review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed once again that fiscal limitations would postpone until 1956 the creation of capabilities intended for 1954. This comment was contained in the final report, NSC 114/3, which was forwarded to the President on 5 June. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 22 Mar 52, Encl to JCS 2101/37, 24 Mar 52, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 15. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “United States Program for National Security,” 1 Apr 52, (der from JCS 2101/59), same file, sec 16. (TS) NSC 114/3, 5 Jun 52, same file, BP pt 4.
Chapter 5. The Approach of Armageddon: Atomic Arsenal


2. In an “atomic” bomb, the “fission” process could be started with either uranium or plutonium. Either substance could be used as a super-explosive, unleashing (as in the Nagasaki bomb) energy equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT. The uranium or plutonium exploded spontaneously if a “critical mass” was assembled, but there was a limit to the amount of explosive in one weapon. Theoretically, the “hydrogen” bomb had no such limitation. In the “fusion” process, the nuclear properties of deuterium and tritium were exploited. Reaction would be initiated by heating materials to such a temperature that nuclear energy was released in an amount sufficient to continue the reaction with explosive violence.

3. (U) SM-2958-51 to CSA, CNO and CSAF, 10 Dec 51 (der from JCS 2108/9), CCS 471.6 (8-15-45) sec 26.

4. The events leading to this decision are fully described in Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1947–1949, Ch. 15. For the evolution of NSC 68, see Chapter 1 of this volume.
Notes to Pages 76–80


6. Its membership consisted of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the AEC.

7. (TS-PD) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 17 May 50, w/encl, Draft Lt, ActgChm AEC and SecDef to Pres, Encl and Att to JCS 1745/24, 17 May 50; (TS-RD) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Tritium Production Program,” 22 May 50 (der from JCS 1745/25); CCS 471.6 (12–14–49) sec 1A. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 416–417, 430, 552–553.

8. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 10 Mar 50, Encl to JCS 1823/23, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 18A. (TS-RD) JCS 1823/29, 3 Aug 50; (TS) SM–2188–50 to Chn, MLC 12 Sep 50 (der from JCS 1823/29), same file, sec 19A.


11. (TS-RD) Memo, Chn MLC to JCS, 28 Sep 51, Encl to JCS 1823/64, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 24. (TS-RD) SM–2496–51 to Chn, MLC, 17 Oct 51 (der from JCS 1823/66), same file, sec 24A.


15. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 590–593.


17. (C) Memo, Chn, MLC to DepSecDef, 22 Mar 50, App to JCS 1991/3; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Surveillance and Custody of Atomic Weapons,” 7 Apr 50 (der from JCS 1991/4); CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 18A. The “non-nuclear component” includes the bomb casing, the electrical and mechanical assembly, and the high-explosive charge; the “nuclear component” is the capsule containing fissionable material.

18. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 521–522. (S) JCS 1906/18, 7 Jul 50; (TS) JCS 1906/19, 10 Jul 50; CCS 381 (2–8–43) sec 19. (TS-RD) JCS 1991/7, 10 Jul 50; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Storage of Non-Nuclear Components. . . in the United Kingdom,” 10 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1991/7); (TS-RD) Memo, SecDef to Pres, 11 Jul 50; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 12 Jul 50; CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 19. In November, these two bombardment wings returned to the United States. (S) JCS 1906/29, 26 Oct 50; (TS) N/Hs of JCS 1906/29, 26 and 31 Oct 50; (TS) Lt, SecState to SecDef, 13 Nov 50, App to JCS 1906/32; CCS 381 (2–8–43) sec 19. Thereafter, SAC units periodically flew to British bases for roation training.


20. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 538–539. JCS records contain no account of this decision, but the train of events is described in other sources. Late in March, the Far East Command received an intelligence report that the USSR was planning large-scale intervention in Korea towards the end of April and was willing to risk general war to ensure a communist victory there. On 4 April Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, after conferring with President Truman, told Congress that large numbers of troops, Russian as well as Chinese, were massing in Manchuria. On 5 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted an order authorizing immediate retaliation against Manchuria in the event of a major Communist air attack; the President tentatively approved it but, in the confusion attendant upon General MacArthur’s removal, it was never sent. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (1967), p. 122. NY Times, 5 Apr 51, p. 1. (U) Memo for Record by JCS, “Events in connection with range of command in Far East,” 23 Apr 51, CCS 013.26 (4–20–51). (U) Memo for Record by CNO, dt3d 29 Jan 51 (with supplementary entries through 11 Apr 51). Copy in files of JCS Hist Div.

21. (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 3 Nov 51, Encl to JCS 2215, CCS 471.6 (11–3–51) sec 1.
Chapter 6. The Approach of Armageddon: Strategic Planning

1. The preparation of OFFTACKLE and its predecessors is described in Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1947–1949, Ch. 9.

2. (U) JCS 1944/46, 8 Nov 49, and Dec on, 8 Dec 49, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 41.

3. (TS) JCS 1844/88, 30 Sep 50, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 50. (TS) JCS 1844/89, 27 Apr 51, same file, BP pt 4A. (U) JCS 1844/98, 12 Sep 51, same file, sec 55. (TS) JCS 1844/126, 2 Jul 52, same file, BP pt 6. In general war, Army divisions would redeploy from the Far East to Europe; some Navy forces would shift from the Pacific to the Atlantic.


5. (TS-RD) JCS 2056, 31 Aug 49, and Dec on, 24 Oct 49; (TS) JCS 2056/3, 23 Nov 49, and Dec on, 1 Dec 49, CCS 373.11 (12–14–48) sec 1.

6. (TS) JCS 2056/9, 30 Nov 50, and Dec on, 26 Feb 51; CCS 373.11 (12–14–48) sec 3.

7. General Bradley’s statement to this effect is quoted in Ch 10, p. 160.


9. (TS-RD) JCS 2056/14, 3 May 51; (TS-RD) JCS 2056/16, 18 Jun 51, and Dec on, 16 Jul 51; CCS 373.11 (12–14–48) sec 4. General Vandenberg did submit a new target plan in October 1951; it was intensively discussed but never approved.


11. Hq, SAC, “The Development of Strategic Air Command: 1946–1971,” pp. 13, 17, 22, 28. The number of B-29s declined in 1950 because several groups were diverted from SAC to the Far East Air Force.

Notes to Pages 87–96

15. Libya was then a UN trusteeship, divided between Great Britain and France.
18. They did not, however, produce a long-range war plan. An outline plan for a war beginning on 1 July 1957 was drafted in December 1949 but withdrawn from consideration in December 1951. (TS) JCS 1920/5, 19 Dec 49; (TS) N/H of JCS 1920/5, 13 Feb 51; CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) BP pt 3.
20. The NATO Medium Term Defense Plan, mentioned in Chapter 7, so specified. In May, General Collins circulated a study claiming that the Rhine-Ijssel line might be held if the defenders were aided by guerrilla activities and intensive air interdiction of Soviet supply lines. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, Encl to Memo, LTC K.L. Ware to JCS, 2 Jun 50; (U) JCS 1844/74, 6 Jun 50; same file, sec 1.
22. (U) JCS 2143/20, 18 Dec 51; (U) SM–3141–51 to JSFC, 29 Dec 51, same file, sec 15.
23. (TS) JCS 2143/21, 22 May 51, CCS 381 (1–26–50) sec 16.
25. (U) JCS 2143/23, 26 Jun 52, same file, sec 17.
26. (U) SM–1640–52 to JSFC, 9 Jul 52; (U) JCS 2143/24, 4 Sep 52; same file, sec 17.
27. JCS 2089, 2 Dec 49, and Dec On, 7 Jan 50; (U) SM–453–50 to JSFC, JIPC, and JIC, 9 Jan 50; CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 1.
28. (U) JCS 2089/3, 6 Jun 52, p. 28, and Dec On, 11 Jul 52; (U) JCS Policy Memo 84, 14 Jul 52; CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec 3.

Chapter 7. NATO in Alarm: 1950

2. (S) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 May 50, Encl to JCS 1686/187, 10 May 50, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 46.
3. See diagram on page 94. In 1950, the United States was represented on the Council of Deputies by AMB Charles M. Spofford, on the Military Committee by GEN Bradley and on the Standing Group by LTG Willis Crittenberger, later succeeded by ADM Jerald Wright.
4. (S) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 May 50, Encl to JCS 1686/187, 10 May 50, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 46.
Notes to Pages 96–101

“Minutes of Meeting Between U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Lord Tedder…,” 5 Oct 49, Encl to SM-2659-49 to JSPC, CCS 381 (11-15-18) sec 2.
11. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 380.
13. (U) Memo, JCS and SecArmy, SecNav, and SecAF to SecDef, 13 Jul 50. Encl to JCS 2099/32, CCS 092 (6-22-46) sec 41. Also in FRUS: 1950, Vol III, pp. 133-134.
14. (U) SM-1567-50 to JCS Representative in Europe (JCSRE), 19 Jul 50, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 51.
17. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 17 Aug 50, Encl to JCS 2073/57, 16 Aug 50, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 54.
18. (TS) Memo, SecArmy, SecNA, and SecAF to SecDef, 17 Aug 50, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 55. See also NY Times, 26 Aug 50, p. 1; 1 Sep 50, p. 4.
20. (TS) Msg, London 15 to SecState, 27 Jul 50, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 41. (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 9 Aug 50, Encl to JCS 2099/37, 10 Aug 50; (U) SM-1882-50 to US Rep to SG, 11 Aug 50 (der from JCS 2099/37); (U) SM-1882-50 to US Rep to SG, 11 Aug 50 (der from JCS 2099/36); same file, sec 42. Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations for 1951, subcom of the S. Com on Approps, 81st Cong, 1st sess, p. 278.
23. (TS) JCS 2073/59, 24 Aug 50, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec 55. (TS) JCS 2073/94, 22 Nov 50, same file, sec 63. See also Beaufre, NATO and Europe, pp. 26-27.
24. (TS) Msgs, JCS 89656 to CINCEUR et al., 24 Aug 50 (der from Encl A to JCS 2073/59), same file, sec 55. (TS) JCS 2073/94, 22 Nov 50, same file, sec 63.
25. (U) SM-80-51 to JCSRE, 10 Jan 51 (der from JCS 2073/106), same file, sec 66. In November, the JCS established a Commander in Chief, US Air Forces, Europe, at the same level as the Army and Navy commands, CINCEUR and CINCNELM. Thus there were three separate Service commands for the European area.
26. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 253.
27. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Protest to Soviet Government Concerning East German Militarized Police,” 2 May 50 (der from JCS 2124), CCS 092 Germany (5-5-49) sec 1.
28. (TS) NSC 71, “US Policy Toward Germany,” 8 Jun 50, same file, sec 2. On 6 June, when GEN Bradley was testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on MDAP, Rep. Jacob Javits (R, NY) asked the Chairman whether he favored German rearmament. GEN Bradley answered as follows: “From a strictly military point of view I think we must all admit that the security of Western Europe would be strengthened…[But] there are political questions that enter into it…It must be decided on a higher level and with all the angles considered.” Hearings, To Amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, H. Com on Foreign Affairs, 81st Cong, 1st sess, pp. 54-55.
29. In August, CINCEUR submitted his estimate that while East German forces could alone capture West Berlin, they could not successfully attack West Germany. (TS) Msg, WAR 88588 to CINCEUR, 12 Aug 50; (TS) Msg, CINCEUR to CSA, 25 Aug 50, Tab A to JCS 1907/55; CCS 381 (11-15-48) sec 2.
30. (U) Memo, CJCS to DJJS, “Rearming Western Germany,” 30 Jun 50, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 2.
31. (TS) NSC 71/1, “View of the Dept of State on the Rearmament of Western Germany,” 3 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 2124/6, 6 Jul 50, same file.
32. (TS) NSC Action No. 315, 6 Jul 50.
264
38. NY Times, 13 Aug 50, p. 21. (U) JCS 2073/41, 12 Jul 50, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 50; (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, “Deployment of US Forces,” 31 Jul 50; (U) N/H to JCS 2073/41 and 50, 14 Aug 50, same file, sec 50; (TS) Memo, SecArmy, SecNav and SecAF to SecDef, 17 Aug 50, same file, sec 55.


44. Above, p. 101.

45. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “US Participation in the Defense of Western Europe,” 8 Sep 50 (der from JCS 2073/61), CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–45) sec 54.

46. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 440.


49. Public Papers, Truman, 1950, p. 626. This announcement was issued on 9 September.

50. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 442.


55. (TS) Msg, USecState to Mr. McCoy, 29 Sep 50, CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 4. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 21 Sep 50, CCS 091 Germany (1950).


58. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 11 Sep 50, Enc to JCS 2073/67, same file, sec 57.

59. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proposed Increases In Military Forces Readily Available by 1 Jul 51 for NATO Area,” 17 Oct 50 (der from JCS 2073/81); (U) SM–2597–50 to VADM Wright, 18 Oct 50; (U) N/H of JCS 2073/81, 25 Oct 50; CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 60.

60. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 2 Oct 50, Enc to JCS 2073/76, 3 Oct 50, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 59.


62. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Integrated Forces in Europe,” 13 Oct 50, (der from JCS 2073/80), CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 60. SACEUR’s anticipated missions and responsibilities were fully delineated in (U) SM–2565–50 to VADM Wright, 14 Oct 50 (der from JCS 1868/205), same file.


64. (T) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Integrated Forces in Europe,” 11 Oct 50, same file, sec 60.


Notes to Pages 103-116


69. Although DC 28 apparently has been destroyed, data may be derived from (U) JCS 2073/157, "Forces for the MTDP," 28 May 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 82. No German divisions were included in DC 28 totals.


72. (U) SM–2941–50 to VADM Wright, 29 Nov 50 (der from JCS 2073/95), CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 63.

73. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 473.

74. Memo for Record by Gen. H. A. Smith, 12 Dec 50, H. Alexander Smith Papers (Princeton University), Box 100, Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 419.

75. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Effect of Far East Upon Western European Defense Preparation," 4 Dec 50 (der from JCS 2073/97), CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 63. Secretary Marshall concurred in all such changes cited here and below.

76. (TS) Memo, JCS, to SecDef, "European Defense Arrangements Including German Participation," 5 Dec 50 (der from Dec On JCS 2124/29), CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 6.

77. (TS) JCS 2073/98, 4 Dec 50, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 63. (TS) JCS 2177, 4 Dec 50, CCS 337 (12–3–50).


80. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Contribution of Germany to Western European Defense," 5 Dec 50, Encl to JCS 2073/99, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 64. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 15 Dec 50 (der from JCS 2073/103), same file, sec 65. (TS) Memo, SecDef to SecState, 16 Dec 50, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 6.


82. USDE/1 Min–1, 18 Dec 50, Ltr, Pres to SACEUR, 19 Dec 50; FRUS: 1950, Vol III, pp. 585–595, 604–605. GEN Eisenhower was assigned, to the extent necessary to accomplish his mission, command of US Army and Air Forces Europe, and US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Thus a full-fledged unified command came into being, with EUCOM (designated USAREUR), NELM, and USAFE becoming component commands under the new US European Command. On 1 August 1952, SACEUR (then GEN Matthew B. Ridgway) assumed the additional office of US Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR).

83. Ismay, NATO, p. 37.

Chapter 8. NATO in Expansion: 1951


4. "Meeting of General Eisenhower with the President and the Cabinet... January 31, 1951," George Elsey Papers, Truman Library. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Transfer of Three Infantry Divisions and One Armored Division to EUCOM," 29 Jan 51 (der from JCS 2147/25); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Transfer of Tactical Air Groups to Europe," 4 Apr 51 (der from JCS 2147/27); CCS 381 (2–8–43) sec 20.
6. Ibid., pp. 40, 42, 45.
7. Ibid., pp. 79–80. See p. 129 below for the JCS paper from which Mr. Acheson's arguments apparently were derived.
10. Controversy was briefly rekindled in July, when Secretary Marshall informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that the United States would deploy 400,000 men (later refined by GEN Collins to 344,000) to Europe by 1953. In their February testimony, GENs Marshall and Bradley had estimated totals of perhaps 200,000 men. On 9 August, the House of Representatives defeated, 131–84, a bid by Rep. Frederick Coudert to bar funds for additional forces dispatched without prior approval.
13. Ismay, *NATO*, p. 102. By contrast, the Red Army deployed 103 divisions in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR. Humorists likened NATO to the Venus de Milo—all SHAPE and no arms. As Joyce and Gabriel Kolko remark (*Limits of Power*, p. 665), "The year 1951 therefore remained inconclusive for NATO; its relative weakness compared with Russian power remained approximately the same as before Korea." However, the allies did not contemplate successful defense of Western Europe prior to completion of the MTDP in 1954. (TS) JIC 558/3, "Intelligence for the Guidance of the Standing Group and SHAPE," 20 Feb 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 71.
14. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Movement of NATO and Related US Agencies, London to Paris," 20 Feb 51 (der from JCS 1685/229), CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 70. Service flimflams indicate that GENs Collins and Vandenberg initially opposed the relocation while ADM Sherman approved it. (C) Memo, DepSecDef to C. E. Wilson, 27 Feb 51, Encl to JCS 1685/224, 1 Mar 51, same file, sec 72.
15. For a summary of the functions and responsibilities of existing Committees, see Chapter 7, pp. 94–95 and the accompanying diagram.
16. (S) Memo, DepSecDef to JCS and Svc Secys, "Reorganization of NATO," 6 Feb 51, Encl to JCS 1685/224, 6 Feb 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 70. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 22 Feb 51 (der from JCS 1685/228), same file.
17. (TS) Memo, Actg SecDef to SecState, 24 Feb 51, Encl to JCS 1685/232, 26 Feb 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 71. (TS) Ltr, DepSecDef to ActgSecState, 7 Mar 51, Encl to JCS 1685/239, 9 Mar 51, same file, sec 73.
19. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Appointment of SAACLANT and Definition of his Responsibilities," 22 Dec 50 (der from JCS 2023/104), CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 63.
22. A full discussion of the Middle East Command is contained in Chapter 11.
23. (U) Msg, CNO to JCS, 061126Z Mar 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 72.
26. (U) Msg, VADM Wright to CJS, 041327Z Apr 51, same file, sec 75.
27. (U) Msg, JCS 88948 to SACEUR, 18 Apr 51 (der from JCS 1685/252), CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 78.
28. (U) Ltr, BJSM to CJS, 20 Apr 51, same file.
29. (U) Msg, SACEUR to JCS, 231720Z Apr 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 78. On 12 May, Field Marshal Montgomery told correspondent C. L. Sulzberger that he and General Eisen-
however agreed there should be separate Supreme Commanders for the Mediterranean and Middle East, each directly responsible to the Standing Group. Sulzberger thought Montgomery "obviously" wanted the SACME post for himself. C.L. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles (1969), p. 615.

30. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Command Arrangements Within NATO," 24 Apr 51 (der from JCS 1868/258), CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 79. (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to SecState, 26 Apr 51, same file. (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 9 May 51, Encl 5 B to JCS 1868/262, 15 May 51, same file, sec 81. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecDef to SecState, 12 May 51, Encl to JCS 1868/262, same file.


32. (TS) Ltr, BJSF to CJCS, 31 May 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 83.


34. (U) Msg, SACEUR to SecStg Grp, 15 Jun 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 84.


38. (TS) Memo, COL Kreps to JCS, "Greece, Turkey and the MEC, Change in British Position," 7 Sep 51, Encl to JCS 1868/290, 11 Sep 51, same file, sec 93.

39. (TS) SM–2242–51 to VADM Wright, 14 Sep 51 (der from JCS 1868/294), same file.


41. (TS) Memo, CPT Matter to VCNO, 23 Aug 51, same file, sec 90. See Chapters 9 and 10 for subsequent developments.

42. Of course, demands of the Indochina War sharply impinged upon French contributions to NATO; the continual drain of officers and NCOs depleted the training base and so prevented more rapid expansion of French forces. See, for example, (TS) Msg, SACEUR to JCS, 171546/Z Mar 51; (TS) Msg, DA 66339 to SACEUR, 20 Mar 51; CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 74.


46. (U) JCS 2147/33, 31 May 51; (U) JCS 2147/35, 11 Jul 51; CCS 381 (2–8–43) sec 20. Force and budget problems are examined in Chapters 3 and 4.

47. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Forces for the Medium Term Defense Plan," 28 May 51 (der from JCS 2073/157); CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 82. ISAC was organized in December 1950 in order to correlate economic and military assistance programs. ISAC included representatives of the State and Defense Departments, ECA, ODM, and Bureau of the Budget; its Director was Mr. Thomas D. Cabot of the State Department. See (U) "Memo of Understanding…," 19 Dec 50. App to JCS Info Memo 765, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 47.


49. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 559.

50. (TS) Memo, COL Dunn to MG Lindsay, "ISAC D–4/7a," 22 Jun 51, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 84. Acheson erroneously relates that "we [agreed upon]… a stretch-out of the program to achieve by mid-1954 what we had hoped to accomplish by mid-1952." Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 559.
Notes to Pages 128–133

51. (TS) "US Forces in Defense of Western Europe, 23 Jun 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 84. Prospective German forces were not included in these totals.

52. (TS) Memo, Dir, ISAC to SecDef, 26 Jun 51; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 26 June 51, Encl to JCS 2073/168, same date; same file. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Closing the Gap ...", 28 Jul 51 (der from JCS 2073/176); (TS) SM–1832–51 to VADM Wright, 30 Jul 51 (der from JCS 2073/176); same file, sec 86.

53. (U) SM–2217–51 to VADM Wright, "Closing the Gap ...", 12 Sep 51 (der from JCS 2073/201), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 93.

54. (S) Pleven D–4/2, "Objectives to be Attained by the Three Powers During the Proposed Four Power Conference," 24 Jan 51, Encl to JCS 2116/39, 25 Jan 51; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 26 Jan 51 (der from JCS 2116/40); CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 6.

55. (S) Pleven D–3/2, "Means at the Disposal of the Western Powers to Discourage ... Aggression in Europe ...", 24 Jan 51, Encl to JCS 2073/112, 25 Jan 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 67. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 26 Jan 51 (der from JCS 2073/115); (TS) Memo, SecDef to SecState, 27 Jan 51; same file. Similar sentiments may be seen in the following: (TS) Pleven D–3/3 "Strategic Delay Inherent in the Analysis ...", 25 Jan 51, Encl to JCS 2083/113, same date; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 26 Jan 51; (TS) Pleven D–3/4, "Size and Schedule of Increase of U.S. Forces ...", 24 Jan 51; all in CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 67.


57. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 554.


60. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 554–555. Available records do not indicate that the JCS were requested to review proposed allied agendas.

61. (S) Encl to JCS 2116/48, 27 Mar 51, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 6. JCS comments were superseded by those cited below in JCS 2116/49.


64. Although JCS comments were not formally presented to the State Department until 31 March, it seems probable that their recommendations were transmitted telephonically two days earlier. (TS) N/H of JCS 2116/49, 2 Apr 51, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 6.


67. See above, pp. 130–131.


70. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 555. For tests of the three agendas, see Dept of State Bulletin, 21 May 51, pp. 803–805.


72. (S) Pleven D–4/1a, "Probable Intentions of the USSR Regarding German Rearmament," 25 Jan 51, Encl to JCS 2124/36, same date; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 26 Jan 51 (der from JCS 2124/38); (S) Pleven D–2/1, "Integrated Forces and European Army," 23 Jan 51, Encl to JCS 2124/37, 25 Jan 51; CCS 092 Germany (5–14–49) sec 6. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 24 Jan 51 (der from JCS 2124/39); (TS) JCS 2185/3, 27 Feb 51; CCS 337 (1–19–51) sec 1.

73. (TS) Msg, DA 81312 to SHAPE et al., 17 Jan 51, Encl to JCS 2124/40, 15 Feb 51, CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 6. (TS) Msg, Mr. McClay to SecState, 18 Jan 51, App to JCS 2124/33, 23 Jan 51, same file.

74. (TS) Memo, COL Kreps to JCS, 22 Jan 51; CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 6. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "German Participation in European Defense Arrangements," 28 Feb 51 (der from JCS 2124/40), same file.

269
Chapter 9. NATO in Climax: 1951–1952

1. (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, 16 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 2124/55, 17 Aug 51, CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 9. These reports are summarized in Ch. 8, pp. 134–135.

2. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “German Participation in European Defense Arrangements,” 7 Sep 51 (der from Encl to JCS 2124/59), same file, sec 10. For DC 28 requirements, see Ch. 7, pp. 97–98.

3. (S) WFM T–4/2a, “European Defense Force and the Question of a German Contribution to Defense,” 8 Sep 51, Encl B to JCS 2124/64, 11 Sep 51, CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 10. (S) Memo JCS to SecDef, same subj. 12 Sep 51 (der from JCS 2124/64); (TS) Ltr, ActgSecDef to SecState, 12 Sep 51, same file, sec 11.

4. (TS) Ltr, DeplSecState to DepSecDef, 15 Aug 51, App to JCS 2124/56; 21 Aug 51; (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to SecArmy, 18 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 2124/56; same file, sec 9. (S) WFM T–5, “WFM Mtgs: Draft Instructions from the Three Foreign Ministers to the Allied High Commission,” 29 Aug 51, App to JCS 2124/58, 1 Sep 51; (S) Memo, Asst SecArmy JCS, 30 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 2124/58; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Contractual Relationships with Germany,” 7 Sep 51 (der from JCS 2124/61); CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 10. (S) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 10 Sep 51, Encl to JCS 2124/65, 15 Sep 51, same file, sec 11.

5. (TS) JCS 2116/67, 24 Sep 51, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 7. See also Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 560.


7. (S) Ltr, H.A. Byroade to SecDef, 19 Sep 51, App to JCS 2124/67, 21 Sep 51, CCS 092 Germany (5–4–49) sec 11. (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Security Guarantees for the Federal Republic of Germany, 21 Sep 51, Encl to JCS 2124/67; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 5 Oct 51 (der from JCS 2124/68); (S) N/H of JCS 2124/68, 19 Oct 51, same file.

8. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 569.
9. (TS) OSD Memo of Conversation, “Next Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” 28 Jul 51, CCS 029 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 88. (S) OTT D-5/3a, “...Resolution and Protocol for the Admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO,” 7 Sep 51, Encl to JCS 1868/292, 13 Sep 51; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “North Atlantic Treaty Council Preparations, Ottawa, 1951 ...” 14 Sep 51 (der from JCS 1868/293); same file, sec 93. (S) CCS 1868/295, 19 Sep 51, same file, sec 94.

10. (TS) Ltr, SecArmy to SecDef, 22 Sep 51, Encl to JCS 2116/68, CCS 337 (4–19–50) sec 7.

12. (TS) Apps A and B to JCS 1868/296, 26 Sep 51, CCS 029 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 95.


15. A Four-Power Declaration on the MEC had been published on 10 November. See Chapter 11, p. 176.
16. (U) JCS 1868/316. 11 Nov 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 105. (TS) BCS Minutes, “Meeting Between Gen Bradley and the BCS in London on 14 Nov 51,” same file, sec 109. A shorter version is reproduced as Annex A to (TS) JCS 1868/327, 11 Dec 51, same file, sec 110. In contrast to the cordiality of the June meeting, the tone of this conference often appears querulous and combative. Indeed, GEN Bradley afterwards advised his colleagues that “the British are too much influenced by a requirement for British command and prestige.” (TS) Msg, USARMA Paris FRA 379 to DEPTAR for JCS, 15 Nov 51, DA IN 19329, same file, sec 106.
17. (TS) “General Bradley’s Discussion with the French Chiefs of Staff at 1600 Thursday, 16 November 1951,” filed under date 3 Dec 51, same file, sec 109. (TS) Msg, USLO SHAPE ALO 495 to JCS, 16 Nov 51, DA IN 19721, same file, sec 106. (TS) Msg, ALUSNA Rome to JCS, 1717212 Nov 51, DA IN 258; (U) JCS 1868/318, 18 Nov 51 and Dec On, 19 Nov 51; (U) Msg, JCS 87431 to CJC, 19 Nov 51 (der from Encl to JCS 1868/318); CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 107.
18. (TS) Memo, CJC to SecDef and SecState, “Middle East Command and Place of Turkey and Greece in the NATO Command Set-Up,” 22 Nov 51, JCS 092.2 (NATO) (Nov 1951). (TS) “Summary of Agreements ... on 27 Nov 51,” Encl to JCS 1868/326, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 110. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Middle East Command and Its Relationship to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 4 Dec 51, Encl to JCS 1868/327, same file. The final settlement of Mediterranean-Middle East command question is described in Ch. 10.
20. Ismay, NATO, pp. 44–45.
21. (TS) Msg. TCC Paris (COL G.A. Lincoln) to SecDef, HAR 138, DA IN 532, 18 Nov 51, CCS 092.2 (NATO) (Nov 51).
22. (U) Msg, USDEL TCC Paris to SecDef, HAR 146, 3 Dec 51, DA IN 5801; (U) Msg, USLO SHAPE to JCS, ALO 525, 5 Dec 51, DA IN 6729; (U) Msg, USDEL TCC to SecDef, 10 Dec 51, DA IN 8371; CCS 092.2 (NATO) (Dec 51).
23. (U) Msg, USDEL, TCC to SecDef, 18 Dec 51, DA IN 1064, JCS 092.2 (NATO) (Dec 51).
25. (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 21 Dec 51, Encl to JCS 2099/155, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 65. (TS) Memo, Pres to SecDef, 9 Jan 52, App to JCS 2099/162, same file, sec 66. During 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently had recommended against altering the supply priorities approved in November 1950. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Supplies and Equipment for the MDA?” 12 Oct 51, (der from JCS 2099/127); (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Priorities and Allocations,” 16 Oct 51 (der from JCS 2099/132); same file sec 59.
Notes to Pages 144–150

27. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 15 Jan 52, Encl to JCS 2073/286, 17 Jan 52, same file, sec 117. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 30 Jan 52, Encl to JCS 2073/302, 31 Jan 52; same file, sec 121. Definitive guidance by the JCS accepting “firm,” “provisional” and “planning” goals for 1952–1954, is contained in (TS) SM–288–52 to VADM Wright, “Military Comments on the NATO TCC Report,” 29 Jan 52 (der from JCS 2073/296), same file, sec 119.

28. Ismay, NATO, p. 47.

29. (S) Memo, CNO to JCS, “Memo of Conversations Held by the Chief of Naval Operations . . . with Mr. Churchill,” 16 Nov 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 106.


31. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 2 Jan 52 (der from JCS 1868/334), CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 113.


35. SACLANT, unlike SACEUR, had no forces that were permanently assigned to him. Rather, in peacetime, units were placed at his disposal periodically for combined training. (U) Memo, SecDef to Pres, 28 Jan 52, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 120. (U) Ltr, Pres to ADM McCormick, 29 Jan 52, App to JCS 1868/349, 31 Jan 52, same file, sec 121. In February 1952, a British admiral was appointed Allied Commander-in-Chief, Channel Command, embracing the English Channel and much of the North Sea. He reported to a Channel Committee on which Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom were represented.


38. Informally, the British were urging re-creation of the wartime US–UK Combined Chiefs of Staff. The State and Defense Departments opposed such a step. See (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Nature of the US–UK Relationship (TCT–D–2/1b), dated 28 December 1951,” 2 Jan 52 (der from JCS 2221/2), CCS 337 (7–22–48) sec 4.

39. (C) TCT D–6/3b, “Reorganization of NATO,” 28 Dec 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 112. (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 2 Jan 52 (der from JCS 1868/333), same file, sec 113.


41. (S) Msg, State Unnumbered Circular to Certain Posts, 12 Jan 52, DA IN 1132, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 117. (S) Ltr, ASD/ISA to DJS et al., 14 Jan 52, same file. (C) Memo, VADA Wright to JCS, “Reorganization of NATO,” 25 Jan 52, Encl to JCS 1868/348, same file, sec 120. (C) SM–391–52 to VADM Wright, 6 Feb 52 (der from JCS 1868/353), same file, sec 123.

42. (U) JCS 2073/287, 18 Jan 52; (TS) SM–210–52 to VADM Wright, 21 Jan 52 (der from JCS 2073/287), same file, sec 118.


Chapter 10. NATO in Relapse: 1952


4. (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, 31 Mar 52, Encl to JCS 2073/329, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 133.

5. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “NATO Force Goals for 1953, ’54 and ’55,” 20 May 52 (der from JCS 2073/352), 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 146. Post-Lisbon documents include projected contributions from Greece, Turkey and Western Germany in NATO totals and thus considerably exceed those previously cited. (S) Ltr, ActgSecDef to SecState, 25 May 52, same file, sec 147.

6. (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 19 Jun 52, Ann to JCS 2073/372, 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 152.

7. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to JCS, 20 Jun 52, Encl to JCS 2073/372, same file, (TS) Ltr, ActgSecDef to SecState, 10 Jul 52, Encl to JCS 2073/383, same file, sec 158.


9. (C) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS et al., “NATO Annual Review Questionnaire,” 25 Jul 52, Encl to JCS 2073/390, 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 161. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 25 Aug 52 (der from JCS 2073/393), same file, sec 163.

10. (U) JCS 2147/60, 5 Feb 52; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Deployment of Additional Armored Division to EUCOM,” 8 Feb 52 (der from JCS 2147/60); (U) Memo, CJCS to DJS, 18 Mar 52; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 16 Apr 52 (der from JCS 2147/66); CCS 381 (2–8–43) sec 21.

11. (TS) Memo, BG Booth to SecDef, “Rept of the Ad Hoc . . . Committee,” 25 Sep 52, App to JCS 2073/427, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 175. The actual report may be found in same file, BP pt 17–. A Greek-Turkish forces are excluded from Booth Committee totals above.

12. (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS et al., 26 Sep 52, Encl to JCS 2073/427, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 175. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 8 Oct 52 (der from JCS 2073/437), same file, sec 177. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 16 Oct 52, Encl to JCS 2073/447, same file, sec 180. (TS) SM–2478–52 to VADM A.C. Davis, same subj, 3 Dec 52 (der from JCS 2073/470), same file, sec 186.

13. As the Booth Report indicated, 4-Day army and navy goals were fulfilled. However, shortfalls existed in aircraft (3,661 versus 4,067) and reserve divisions (43 versus 51%).

craft. Allied Command Europe then contained 48% divisions (68 by D-30) and 3,800 aircraft. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, vol V, 83d Cong. 1st sess., pp. 408–411.


16. (TS) Msg, AMB Draper to SecState, 31 Oct 52, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 182. See also Beaufort, NATO and Europe, pp. 49–51.


18. (TS) Rpt by the UK Chiefs of Staff, "Defense Policy and Global Strategy," 9 Jul 52; (TS) "Meeting of the JCS with Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor on 29 July 1952...," Encl to SM–1832–52 to JCS, 11 Aug 52; (TS) "Record of Meetings Between the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff...," Encl to SM–1913–52 to JCS, 11 Aug 52; CJCS 091 England (1952). In support of General Bradley's view, see (TS) JCS 1953/11, 26 May 52, CCS 373 (10–23–48) sec 7. JCS attitudes are discussed more fully in Chapter 6.


22. (U) JCS 1868/345, 28 Jan 52; (U) SM–275–52 to VADM Wright, same subj and date; CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 118.

23. (TS) Memo, VADM Wright to JCS, 1 Feb 52, Encl D to JCS 1868/352, same file, sec 122. (TS) Memo, VADM Wright to JCS, 3 Feb 52, Encl A to JCS 1868/352, same file, sec 122. (U) SM–369–52 to VADM Wright, "NATO Command Organization on the Mediterranean-Middle East Area," 5 Feb 52 (der from JCS 1868/354), same file, sec 123.

24. During World War II, Admiral Mountbatten had been Chief of Combined Operations (1942–1943) and Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia (1943–1945).


26. (TS) Ltr, ADM McGregor to CNO, 2 May 52; (TS) "Memo of Conversation Between the CNO and the BCS," 5 May 52; (TS) Memo, CNO to JCS, "Naval Command in the Mediterranean," 23 May 52; same file, sec 148. These last two sources provide separate US and UK accounts of the CNO-BCS meeting on 5 May.

27. (U) JCS 1868/388, 20 Jun 52, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 152. SACEUR's proposal, which has been destroyed, is derived from this document. (U) SM–1514–52 to VADM Davis, 24 Jun 52 (der from Dec On JCS 1868/388), same file.

28. (TS) Ltr, BJSM to CJCS, 23 Jun 52, same file, sec 152.

29. (TS) Memo, VADM Davis to JCS, 9 Jul 52, Encl to JCS 1868/396, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 157.

30. Since Northeast Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece formed a geographic continuum, the attitude of Yugoslavia was obviously critical. During 1950–1952, Marshal Tito seemed to be drawing steadily closer to the West. Yugoslavia secretly requested US military assistance in January 1951; small materiel shipments were sent in the summer, and a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed in November. The US, UK and French Governments then authorized GEN Thomas T. Handy


35. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “NSC Matters Requiring Urgent Action . . .” 3 July 50; (TS) NSC 72/1, 3 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1821/11, 6 Jul 50; (TS) Memo, MG Leven Allen to JCS, “United States Policy Toward Spain,” 8 Jul 50; Encl to JCS 1821/12, 10 Jul 50; CCS 092 Spain (4–19–46) sec 2. NSC 72/1 is in FRUS: 1950, Vol III, pp. 1570–1572.


39. Local currency “counterpart” accounts are generated in foreign countries as a result of dollar grant aid; these special accounts are employed for mutually agreeable purposes.

40. (TS) DM–8–52 to JCS, “Report of the JMST to Spain,” 8 Jan 52; (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, 8 Feb 52, Encl to JCS 1821/70; CCS 092 Spain (4–19–46) sec 9. (TS) Memo, SecState to SecDef, 11 Feb 52, App to JCS 1821/72; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Use of $100,000,000 . . .” 15 Feb 52 (der from JCS 1821/71); (U) Memo JCS to SecDef, “Military Assistance to Spain,” 3 Mar 52 (der from JCS 1821/73); same file, sec 10. (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, 5 Apr 52, Encl to JCS 1821/77, same file, sec 11. (TS) Rpt, Chief, JUSMAG to CSAF, “Special Report on Spanish Negotiations,” 20 Aug 52, App to JCS 1821/85; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 10 Nov 52 (der from JCS 1821/86); same file, sec 12.


45. (S) Msg, SecState to McCloy et al., 11 Apr 52, CCS 092 Germany (3–4–49) sec 12.


47. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 641–645.


Chapter 11. The Middle East: "Recessional"

1. As employed here, the term "Middle East" denotes that portion of the world extending eastward from Egypt and Turkey through Iran.

2. The importance of Middle East oil is analyzed on pages 193–194.


5. Since 1899, the Sudan had been controlled through an Anglo-Egyptian condominium. Cairo cited plausible historical, ethnic, and cultural reasons for union under the Egyptian crown, but her strongest argument was strategic—the upper reaches of the Nile should not be controlled by another nation. London insisted that Sudanese should enjoy the right of self-determination.


12. (TS) SM–1370–51 to JCS, 20 Jun 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–49) sec 42. (TS) "Proposed Timetable for Approach to Turkey and Egypt," 8 Sep 51, App E to JCS 2105/12, CCS 337 (2–20–50) sec 2. (TS) "Proposals to Egypt . . . ." 8 Sep 51, App D to JCS 2105/12, same file. (TS) Memo, ASD/ISA to DJS, 10 Sep 51, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–49) sec 93. A handwritten note attached to the last paper reads, "The JCS have bought this as written . . . ."; this is the only evidence of JCS concurrence.


14. (TS) Msg, SecState to Cairo, 4 May 51, Encl to Memo, SecDef to JCS, 8 May 51, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 54.


16. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 23 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 2105/9, 23 Aug 51; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Importance of the British Military Position in Egypt," 29 Aug 51 (der from JCS 2105/10); (TS) Ltr, ActgSecDef to SecState, 4 Sep 51; CCS 337 (2–20–50) sec 2.

17. (TS) WFM B–2/1a, "Egypt," 22 Aug 51, Encl B to JCS 2105/10, 25 Aug 51; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Egypt," 29 Aug 51 (der from JCS 2105/10); (TS) Ltr, ActgSecDef to SecState, 4 Sep 51; same file.

18. (TS) Apps to JCS 2105/12, "US-UK Bilateral Conversations on Egypt (6–8 Sep 51)," 13 Sep 51, CCS 337 (2–20–50) sec 2.


20. (TS) Memo, DepUSecState to SecDef, 31 Oct 51, Encl B to JCS 1868/310, 1 Nov 51; (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, "Middle East Command," 2 Nov 51; (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, same subj, 2 Nov 51; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 2 Nov 51 (der from JCS 1868/310); (TS) N/H of JCS 1868/310, 6 Nov 51; CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 102.


22. (TS) Ltr, For Sec Morrison to SecState, 12 Oct 51, Encl to Memo, Asst SecState McGhee to SecDef, 13 Oct 51, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 59.
25. (S) TCT D-4/36, “Egypt,” 26 Dec 51, Encl to JCS 2105/17, 26 Dec 51, CCS 337 (2–20–50) sec 3. Since it addressed an essentially political subject, the Defense Department offered no comments upon this position paper. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Egypt,” 28 Dec 51 (der from JCS 2105/18). (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 2 Jan 52; same file.
27. According to a plan transmitted earlier by the BCS to General Bradley, the British intended to deploy five infantry brigades in certain quarters of Alexandria and Cairo. (TS) Ltr, BJSM to CJCS, “Plans for Operations in Egypt,” 17 Jan 52, CCS 337 (2–20–50) sec 3.
28. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 565–566. (TS) Msg, Cairo 1341 to SecState, 15 Feb 52, Ann A to JCS 2105/24, 29 Feb 52, same file, sec 4. Subsequently, the Egyptian Government requested US aid in equipping three mobile police divisions. Although the State Department approved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found the request militarily unjustifiable. (TS) Ltr, DepUSecState to SecDef, 23 Feb 52, App to JCS 2105/24, 29 Feb 52; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Reimbursable Aid for Egypt,” 7 Mar 52 (der from JCS 2105/26); same file.
29. (S) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 20 Feb 52, App to JCS 2105/23, 27 Feb 52; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “British Request for US Naval Assistance...,” 5 Mar 52 (der from JCS 2105/25); CCS 337 (2–20–50) sec 4.
30. (U) NSC 129/1, 24 Apr 52, Encl B to JCS 1684/69, 3 May 52, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) sec 14.
31. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 15 Apr 52 (der from JCS 1684/68); same file. This JCS suggestion foreshadowed the Eisenhower administration’s decision to reorient collective security efforts toward the so-called “Northern tier” consisting of Turkey and neighboring states.
32. (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 29 Dec 51, App to JCS 1686/336, 8 Jan 52, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 116. (TS) Ltr, BJSM to CJCS, 31 Jan 52, Encl to JCS 1686/351, 4 Feb 52, same file, sec 112. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Organization and Establishment of the MEC,” 5 Feb 52 (der from JCS 1686/346); same file, sec 123. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 11 Feb 52, same file, sec 124.
34. See pp. 176–177.
37. See (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 21 Nov 52, App A to JCS 2105/30, 4 Dec 52, CCS 337 (2–20–50) sec 5. (S) Msg, Cairo 1167 to SecState, 10 Nov 52, same file.
38. (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 21 Nov 52, App A to JCS 2105/30; (S) Ltr, DepSecDef to SecState, 3 Dec 52, App B to JCS 2105/30; (S) Ltr, DepSecDef to JCS, “Military Aid for Egypt,” 5 Dec 52, Encl to JCS 2105/30, 4 Dec 52; same file. According to Mr. Acheson (*Present at the Creation*, p. 567), further planning for aid to Egypt was delayed because the Defense Department insisted upon prior preparation of “an approved strategic plan and force requirements for the area.” Pentagon obstructionism, he asserts, “made one want to shake the Joint Chiefs of Staff until their ribbons fell off.” His description of the DOD position is not substantiated by JCS records.
41. For a fuller account of these agreements, see Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1953–1954*, pp. 327–328.
43. See (S) Msg, Cairo 1352 to SecState, 3 Dec 52, same file, sec 5.

277
45. Feis, From Trust to Terror, pp. 82-83.
47. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 500.
49. (TS) NSC 107, 14 Mar 51, App to JCS 1714/16, 15 Mar 51, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 2. The Joint Intelligence Committee reported that, under current circumstances, "it is not considered probable" that the Soviets could achieve total domination of Iran without overt use of their armed forces. However, "it is becoming increasingly evident" that they might win control of northern segments through economic and political pressure, possibly accompanied by subversive activities. The JCS noted these conclusions on 9 March. (TS) Rpt, JIC to JCS, "Intelligence Estimates on the Situation in Iran," 1 Mar 51, Encl to JCS 1924/51, 1 Mar 51, same file.
50. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Position of the United States with Respect to Iran," 19 Mar 51 (der from JCS 1714/17 same file. (TS) NSC Action No. 451, 14 Mar 51. (TS) N/H of JCS 1714/16, 28 Mar 51, same file. As the JCS wished, Mr. Truman ordered the State Department to submit monthly progress reports until conditions were further clarified.
51. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 503-504.
52. Ibid., p. 506.
53. (TS) NSC 107/1, 6 Jun 51, App to JCS 1714/20, 7 Jun 51, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 3.
54. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 7 Jun 51, Encl to JCS 1714/20, 7 Jun 51; (TS) JCS 1714/22, 16 Jun 51; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Iran," 19 Jun 51 (der from Dec On JCS 1714/21); (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, same subj, 28 Jun 51, Encl to JCS 1714/23, 2 Jul 51; CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 3.
56. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 507-509.
57. (TS) WFM B-2/2a, "Iran," 22 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 1714/25, 24 Aug 51; (TS) WFM B-2/2b, "Iran," 24 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 1714/27, 29 Aug 51; CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 4. For DOD concurrence, see (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Iran," 29 Aug 51 (der from JCS 1714/26); (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 4 Sep 51, same file. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 510.
58. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 8 Oct 51, Encl to JCS 1714/28, 8 Oct 51; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Anglo-Iranian Problem," 10 Oct 51 (der from Dec On JCS 1714/29); CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 4. Although this memorandum was submitted to the NSC, records do not indicate whether it was actually considered by the Council. (TS) N/H of JCS 1714/29, 23 Oct 51, same file.
61. (TS) TCT D-4/46, "Iran," 30 Dec 51, Encl B to JCS 1714/35, 31 Dec 51; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Iran," 2 Jan 52 (der from Dec On JCS 1714/35); (TS) N/H of JCS 1714/35, 16 Jan 52; CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 5. This JCS memorandum was transmitted informally prior to the Truman-Churchill talks.
64. (TS) Memo, DepLSecDef to JCS, 28 Aug 52, Encl to JCS 1714/40, 29 Aug 52; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Iran," 5 Sep 52 (der from JCS 1714/41); CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 6.
65. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Iran," 31 Oct 52 (der from JCS 1714/42); (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 10 Nov 52; CCS 092 Iran (4-3-48) sec 7.
66. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to Senior NSC Staff, "The Position of the US With Respect to Iran," 1 Oct 52; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to Senior NSC Staff, same subj, 7 Oct 52; same file, sec 6. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to Senior NSC Staff, same subj, 5 Nov 52, same file, sec 7.
67. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 24 Oct 52, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 7.
68. (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 4 Nov 52, App to JCS 1714/44, 12 Nov 52, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 7. However, it should be noted that Present at the Creation is liberally sprinkled with pungent criticisms of British obtusity.
69. (TS) NSC 136, 6 Nov 52, Encl B to JCS 1714/43, 23 Oct 52; CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 7. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "NSC 136—The Present Situation in Iran," 18 Nov 52 (der from JCS 1714/45), same file (adapted from a somewhat stronger memo by GEN Collins). (TS) N/H of JCS 1714/43, 5 Dec 52, same file. (TS) NSC Action No. 680, 19 Nov 52.
Notes to Pages 189–198

70. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 681-685.

71. Ibid., p. 685.


75. (U) JCS 1887/24, 9 Jan 51, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 3. (TS) Memo, ActgSec Def to JCS, “Feasibility of Holding the Bahrein-Qatar-Saudi Arabia Area,” 8 Dec 51, Encl to JCS 1887/30, 10 Dec 51, same file, sec 6. (U) JCS 1887/36, 21 Jan 52, same file, sec 7. (U) Memo, JCS to Sec Def, same subj, 8 Feb 52 (der from JCS 1887/38), same file, sec 8.

76. In 1952, the BCS planned to deploy 1 British division, 2 Arab Legion Brigades, and 2 Iraqi Divisions to the Iraq-Iran border upon the outbreak of war. These units would be reinforced by 2 British Divisions by D+180 and by 6 Commonwealth Divisions by D+360. Available aircraft would rise from 192 on D-Day to 294 by D+180. (TS) Ltr, BJSM to JCS, 22 Dec 52, JCS 091 England (1952).

77. (U) Memo, JCS to Sec Def, “Commonwealth Capabilities and Intentions in the Middle East,” 28 Dec 51, (der from JCS 1887/33), CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 6. (S) Ltr, Sec Def to SecState 2 Jan 52, same file, sec 7.

78. (TS) Memo, Mr. Nitzte to DJS, 21 May 52, Encl A to JCS 1887/50, 11 Jun 52, same file, sec 10.


80. (TS) Ltr, DepUSecState to Sec Def, 15 Aug 52, App to JCS 1887/52, 29 Aug 52, same file, sec 11.

81. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Availabiliy of Middle East Oil in Time of War,” 4 Sep 52, Encl to JCS 1741/67, 6 Sep 52; (U) Memo CNO to JCS, “Middle East,” 15 Sep 52, Encl to JCS 1887/55, 16 Sep 52; (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, “Availability of Middle East Oil in time of War,” 16 Sep 52, Encl to JCS 1741/68, 17 Sep 52; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec 11. (U) SM-2443-52 to JSFC, 17 Oct 52; (TS) Ltr, BJSM to JCS, “Defense of the Bahrein Oil Area in Isolation,” 30 Oct 52, Encl A to JCS 1887/57, 10 Oct 52; (U) Memo, JCS to Sec Def, “Middle East,” 17 Oct 52 (der from JCS 1887/36); (TS) Ltr, Sec Def to SecState, 28 Oct 52, Encl to JCS 1887/58, 30 Oct 52; same file, sec 12. For JSFC conclusions, see Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954, pp. 336-338.


83. (TS) SM-3035-50 to Chm, Munitions Board, “National Petroleum Program,” 13 Dec 50 (der from JCS 1741/40); (TS) Memo, JCS to Sec Def, same subj and date (der from JCS 1741/40); CCS 463.7 (9-6-49) sec 17. (TS) Memo, Sec Def to Exec Secy, NSC, 27 Nov 50, Ann to App B to JCS 1741/44, 7 Mar 51; (U) NSC 97, 28 Dec 50, FRUS: 1950, Vol I.; pp. 489-492.

84. (TS) Memo, Sec Def to CJCS and Chm, Munitions Board, 13 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 1741/54, 14 Aug 51, same file, sec 19. (U) Memo, JCS to Sec Def, “World-Wide Demand and Supply of Petroleum in Event of Major War,” 8 Nov 51 (der from JCS 1741/59); CCS 463.7 (9-6-49) sec 20.

85. (TS) NSC 97/1, 27 Nov 51, pp. 2-3, Encl to JCS 1741/60, 30 Nov 51; (U) Memo, JCS to Sec Def, “A National Petroleum Program,” 11 Dec 51 (der from JCS 1741/61); (TS) Memo, Exec Secy to NSC, same subj, 12 Dec 51; same file, sec 21. (TS) NSC 97/2, 13 Dec 51, Encl to JCS 1741/65, 20 Dec 51, same file, sec 22.

86. (C) NSC 138, 8 Dec 52, pp. 44-45, Encl B to JCS 1741/70, 12 Dec 52; (U) JCS 1741/71, 13 Dec 52, and Dec On, 15 Dec 52; (U) Memo, Dep Secy to Sec Def, “National Problems Concerning Free World Petroleum Demands and Potential Supplies,” 16 Dec 52; same file, sec 24.

Chapter 12. The Far East: Nationalism, Communism and Containment

1. (TS) Ann 8 to NSC 68/1, 21 Sep 50, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) BP pt 1.


3. Dept of State, United States Relations With China (1949), pp. xiv-xvi.


6. In response to a strong Soviet protest, the State Department explained that the Secretary was referring to developments that indicated extensive Soviet economic penetration of the northern provinces and might foreshadow an intention to establish political control. Recently, in return for a $300 million credit, the CPR had granted to the USSR extensive (but temporary) port, railway, and mineral rights in Manchuria. Dept of State Bulletin, 6 Feb 50, pp. 218–219.

7. Dept of State Bulletin, 23 Jan 50, pp. 111–118. Mr. Acheson’s exclusion of South Korea from this defense perimeter became the subject of partisan controversy after the Korean War began in June.


14. (U) Msg, CLNCFE C 56410 to JCS, 29 May 50, CM IN 4359, CCS 337 Pacific Area (5–1–50). During an interview with a British journalist in 1949, General MacArthur had excluded Taiwan from the US defense perimeter (NY Times, 2 Mar 49, p. 22). This message, then, represented a total reversal of opinion.


17. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 334. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 406. The events leading up to US intervention in Korea are treated in James F. Schmabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: The Korean War, Pt. 1 Ch. 2.

18. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 337. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 404. Available records do not confirm Secretary Johnson’s later allegation that Mr. Acheson’s attitude toward Taiwan changed between the first and second Blair House meetings.


22. The Secretary obviously suspected the Generalissimo’s motives in making this troop offer. In March, for example, he had warned the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “everyone who has talked with [Chiang] comes back with one thought, and that is that he believes World War III is absolutely inevitable, that the United States will have to go back and conquer China, and that he will come riding in on our coat tails.” S. Hearings, The World Situation, pp. 275–276.
23. Meeting at 1630, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to put their recommendation in writing and advised Secretary Johnson that “if such an offer is made by the Generalissimo it [should] not be accepted at present.” (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proffer of Aid by Foreign Governments,” 30 Jun 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 22.


25. (S) Msg, State to Taipeh, 14 Jul 50; (U) Msg, CINCPAC C 57970 to DA for JCS and State, 16 Jul 50, CM IN 12899; CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 4. (S) Memo, Pres to SecState, 18 Jul 50, Army files, G-3 091 China, Sec II, Case 27. The Seventh Fleet was temporarily withdrawn from Korean waters in order to sweep the Formosa Straits. However, the Joint Intelligence Committee considered an invasion improbable under current conditions. (TS) Msg, JCS 87061 to CINCPAC, 25 Jul 50; (TS) Msg, CINCPAC CX 58732 to DEPTAR for JCS, 26 Jul 50, CM IN 15682; (TS) JCS 1924/24, 1 Aug 50; CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 5.

26. (U) JCS 1966/35, 27 Jul 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 28 Jul 50, (der from JCS 1565/36); (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 29 Jul 50; (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 31 Jul 50; FRUS: 1950, Vol VI, pp. 401-404. (TS) NSC Action No. 329, 3 Aug 59. (TS) Memo, MG Leven Allen to JCS, 3 Aug 50; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Defense of Formosa,” 3 Aug 50 (der from JCS 1966/38); CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 5. (TS) Msg, SecDef to CINCPAC, WAR 88014, 4 Aug 50, Encl B to JCS 1966/51, same file, sec 7.


28. (U) Msg, CINCPAC C 58994 to JCS, 29 Jul 50, CM IN 16830. CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 4. JCS approval is recorded in (U) Msg, JCS 87492 to CINCPAC, 29 Jul 50, same file. It is therefore difficult to understand Secretary Acheson’s later statement that Washington was “startled” by word of General MacArthur’s visit. Present at the Creation, p. 422. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC C 59569 to DEPTAR for JCS, 7 Aug 50, CM IN 19388, same file, sec 5.


31. This episode, and its corrosive effect upon the Truman-MacArthur relationship, is described in Schnabel and Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: The Korean War, Pt 1 Ch 8.


34. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Formosa,” 8 Sep 50; Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 11 Sep 50; CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 6. Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 13 Sep 50, FRUS: 1950, Vol VI, p. 487.


36. (U) Msg, CINCPAC C 50021 to DEPTAR for JCS, 29 Nov 50, CM IN 15333; (U) Msg, JCS 97594 to CINCPAC, 29 Nov 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 40. The same file contains successive drafts by JCS, SecDef and SecState. Mr. Acheson wrote “leave us isolated”; the typist mistook this for “have us isolated.”

37. (U) Msg, CINCPAC C 52391 to DA for JCS, 30 Dec 50, CM IN 5452, CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) sec 1. (TS) JCS 2118/7, 5 Jan 51, same file, sec 2. (TS) JCS 2118/5, 5 Jan 51, same file, sec 1. (TS) JCS 2118/8, 8 Jan 51, same file, sec 2. (TS) Msg, JCS 80680 to CINCPAC, 9 Jan 51, same file. In the original draft (DM–G–51 to JCS, 5 Jan 51), this passage reads “decisive effect” rather than “decisive effort.” For a fuller account, see Schnabel and Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: The Korean War, Pt 1 Ch 8.
Notes to Pages 205–210

38. Msg, CINCUNC C 53167 to DA, 10 Jan 51, DA IN 8796. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea,” 12 Jan 51 (der from JCS 2118/10); CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 2.
42. (TS) Msg, CINCFC C 56199 to DA for JCS, 23 Feb 51, DA IN 3904, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 4. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea—Anti-Communist Chinese,” 16 Mar 51 (der from JCS 2118/17). (TS) Memo, Exec Secy to NSC, “US Action to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression,” 21 Mar 51; same file, sec 5. It is interesting to note that General MacArthur told Senators in May that the “slightest use” of Nationalist troops “would have saved me thousands of lives—even a threat of that.” S. Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East, p. 22.
45. (U) Msg, CINCFC C 56246 to DA for JCS, 24 Feb 51, DA IN 4226; (U) Msg, JCS 84458 to CINCFC, 28 Feb 51; CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 4. Notes upon a draft of the JCS message document Mr. Rusks role. In April, CINCFC (then General Ridgway) was permitted to pre-stock aircraft fuel and ammunition on Taiwan—but not to base US forces there. (U) Msg, CINCFC C 59866 to DA for JCS, 17 Apr 51, DA IN 775; (U) Msg, JCS 88558 to CINCFC, 14 Apr 51; CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 8.
47. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 410. S. Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 53, 117, 616, 682.
49. (TS) Memos, CINCFC to DEPTAR, 30 Jan 52, App to JCS 2149/61, 8 Feb 52, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 11. (TS) Memos, JCS 903685 to CINCFC, 15 Mar 52 (der from JCS 2147/64), same file, sec 13. On 15 March, responsibility for Taiwan’s defense shifted from CINCFC to CINC PAC (Admiral Arthur W. Radford). Admiral Radford reported CINCFC’s requests and, in October, Admiral Feltz urged a major modification of the directive. This was not done during 1952. (U) JCS 2147/68, 17 May 52, CCS 381 Formosa (11–28–50) sec 15. (U) JCS 1259/251, 8 Oct 51, CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 33.
51. For a full exposition of the renewed debate over possible use of Nationalist divisions in Korea, see Schnabel and Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: The Korean War, Pl. 2, Ch. 5.
52. (TS) Ltr, Dir, CIA to SecDef, 11 Dec 51, App to JCS 2118/30, 5 Jan 52, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 10.
55. (TS) History of the Formosa Situation, pp. 135–140.
56. As used here, the term “Indochina” embraces Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.


58. NSC 48/2, 30 Dec 49, Encl B to JCS 1992/8, 5 Jan 50, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 3. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Program of Assistance to the General Area of China,” 10 Jan 50, Encl to SM–75–50, 11 Jan 50; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 20 Jan 50 (der from JCS 1721/43); (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 1 Feb 50, Encl to JCS 1721/44, 2 Feb 50; (TS) Ltr, General Burns to DepUSecState, 13 Feb 50, Encl to JCS 1721/45, 15 Feb 50; CCS 452 China (4–23–45) sec 7, pt 7.


61. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia,” 10 Apr 50 (der from JCS 1992/11); CCS 092 Asia, (6–25–48) sec 3. (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 14 Apr 50; (U) NSC Action No. 288, 18 Apr 50; FRUS: 1950, Vol VI, pp. 780–787.


63. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 673.


66. Bernard Fall calls this “their greatest colonial defeat since Montcalm had died at Quebec . . . . For the French, the Indochina War was lost then and there.” The Two Vietnams (1967), p. 111. At this time, French Union forces totaled 340,000 men, while the Viet Minh numbered approximately 92,500 regulars and perhaps 130,000 irregulars.

67. A measurement ton is a unit of volume equal to 40 cubic feet.


73. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Possible Future Action in Indochina,” 28 Nov 50 (der from JCS 1992/36), same file, sec 8. The JCS approved this paper on 27 November, when they were still uncertain of Chinese intervention. (U) NSC 64/1, 21 Dec 50, FRUS: 1950, Vol VI, pp. 945–951.


76. (TS) Eleven D-1/-1, "Indochina," 24 Jan 51, Encl to JCS 1992/50, 25 Jan 51; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Aid to Indochina," 26 Jan 51 (der from JCS 1992/51); CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 10. Within the framework of interstate controls, the Pau Agreements allowed Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia each to have its own customs, foreign trade, immigration, postal and communications systems. Later, in drafting specific conventions, the French demonstrated an inclination to withdraw in practice what they had granted in principle. However, the US did not renew pressure for further concessions. (TS) NSC 105, "Results of the Conversations Between the President and the French Prime Minister," 23 Feb 51, Encl to JCS 2185/3, 27 Feb 51, CCS 337 (1–19–51) sec 1.


83. (U) NSC Action No. 614, 5 Mar 52. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 17 Mar 52, Encl to JCS 1992/144, 19 Mar 52, same file, sec 26. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj. 8 Apr 52 (der from JCS 1992/146), same file, sec 28.

84. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 4 Apr 52, Encl to JCS 1992/148, 5 Apr 52; (TS) Ltr, Sec Secy to SecDef, 8 Apr 52, App to JCS 1992/152, 18 Apr 52; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Department of State Draft Paper on Indochina," 18 Apr 52 (der from JCS 1992/151), CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 28.


87. The five powers were the United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand.


Chapter 13. The Resurrection of Japan

1. Far Eastern Commission members were the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines.


4. (TS) Dam-319-50 to Ops Deps, 1 Mar 50, CCS 335.14 (1-10-50).


6. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 431. NSC 60/1, which evolved from State-Defense discussions described subsequently, emerged as the response to this request.
Notes to Pages 225–229


8. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 431. FRUS: 1950, Vol VI, pp. 1175–1182. The nature of Mr. Acheson’s pledge is derived from (TS) Memo, DF to CJCS, 8 May 50, CCS 388.1 Japan (9–1–47) sec 2, and (TS) Lttr, SecDef to SecState, 12 May 50, CCS 092.2 Japanese Peace Treaty (1950).

9. (TS) “Basis for Discussion—Concerning a Peace Treaty With Japan Without Commitment by the US,” 5 May 50, FRUS: 1950, Vol VI, pp. 1189–1191. This State Dept draft had been revised by MG Burns of OSD but was not seen by Secretary Johnson. (TS) Memo, MG Burns to DJS, 8 May 50, (TS) Memo, CJCS to DJS, 8 May 50, CCS 388.1 Japan (9–1–47) sec 2.


11. James Reston “Lack of Accord in US Bars Tokyo Pact as London Topic,” Att to (C) Memo, SecDef to SecState, 12 May 50, CCS 092.2 Japanese Peace Treaty (1950). Mr. Johnson privately attested to the article’s accuracy and asserted that the State Department had violated the agreement of 24 April.


13. (U) “Memo on the Peace Treaty Problem,” sgd MacArthur 14 Jun 50, FRUS: 1950, Vol VI, pp. 1213–1221. For an account of Mr. Dulles’ trip, see Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, pp. 253–258. Speculation that the prospect of a peace treaty may have provoked the North Korean attack is offered in Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (1960), pp. 34–36. Mr. Dulles’ similar appraisal is given in Dept of State Bulletin, 10 Jul 50, p. 50. For Secretary Acheson’s more skeptical judgment, see Present at the Creation, pp. 429–430.

14. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 434. AMB Sebald says, “Outwardly the Korean conflict made little change, except to increase the sense of apprehension which was almost endemic in that period.” Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, p. 190.


16. (TS) Lttr, SecState to SecDef, 1 Aug 50, App to JCS 1380/88, 9 Aug 50; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 8 Aug 50, Encl to JCS 1380/88, same date; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proposed Japanese Peace Treaty,” 22 Aug 50 (der from JCS 1380/89); CCS 388.1 Japan (9–1–47) sec 2. Also printed in FRUS: 1950, Vol VI, pp. 1278–1282.

17. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 434.

18. Ibid., pp. 434–435. (U) Memo, COL Kreps to JCS et al., “Proposed Japanese Peace Treaty,” 6 Sep 50, Encl to JCS 1380/90, 7 Sep 50; (U) “Memo for the President,” 7 Sep 50, FRUS: 1950, Vol VI, pp. 1293–1296; (U) N/Hs of 1380/90, 7 and 23 Sep 50, CCS 388.1 Japan (9–1–47) sec 2. NSC Action No. 358, 8 Sep 50. Coincidentally, NSC 82 (concerning the strengthening of NATO and German rearmament) was approved three days later, the German-Japanese parallels are striking indeed. NSC 82 is described in Ch. 7, p. 104.


27. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 51550 to DA for JCS, 18 Dec 50, CM IN 1671; (U) Msg, JCS 99616 to CINCFE, 22 Dec 50. At a State-Defense meeting on 19 December, Secretary Marshall observed that an attack on Japan . . . would disclose a degree of vulnerability which would surprise the American people, and the resulting shock would produce a very serious situation. FRUS: 1950, Vol VII, p. 1571.
30. (U) Memo, CJCS to DJS, “Additional Divisions to Europe and Japan,” 8 Feb 51, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 3. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 23 Feb 51, same file, sec 4. In December, these divisions were sent to Korea, exchanging places with the 24th Inf and 1st Cav Divs. For the Wherry Resolution, see Ch. 8, p. 116.
31. For many years, Australians annually commemorated the American victory at the Battle of the Coral Sea in 1942.
32. (U) “Draft Memo for the President,” FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 183–189. (S) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 6 Apr 51, App to JCS 2180/9, 6 Apr 51; (S) “Public Statement to be Made by the President,” Ann to JCS 2180/9, same date; CCS 092 Japan (12–20–50) sec 2. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 540–541, 688.
33. (S) Ltr, Dulles to P.C. Sperner, 18 Feb 51, App A to JCS 2190, 14 Mar 51; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 13 Mar 51, Encl to JCS 2190, same date; CCS 381 (2–18–51) sec 1. (S) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 5 Apr 51, App to JCS 2180/8, 5 Apr 51, CCS 092 Japan (12–20–50) sec 2.
34. JCS reservations are outlined in FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 183, 187–188, 192–201. (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 5 Apr 51, Encl to JCS 2180/8, 5 Apr 51; (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Japanese Peace Treaty,” 6 Apr 51, Encl to JCS 2180/9, 6 Apr 51; (U) JCS 2180/10, 7 Apr 51; (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Security Arrangements Between the US and Pacific Island Nations,” 9 Apr 51; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 11 Apr 51, der from Dec On JCS 2180/12; (S) Memo, J.F. Dulles to SecState, 13 Apr 51, App to JCS 2180/13, 13 Apr 51; (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proposed Japanese Peace Treaty,” 13 Apr 51 (der from JCS 2180/13); (S) N/H of JCS 2180/13, 16 Apr 51; CCS 092 Japan (12–20–50) sec 2.
36. (U) Ltr, J. F. Dulles to SecDef, 27 Jun 51, FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 220–222; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Draft Treaty . . . ,” 9 Jul 51 (der from JCS 2190/2); (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 20 Jul 51, Encl to JCS 2190/3, 23 Jul 51; CCS 381 (2–18–51) sec 1. Printed in FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 226–228. For the final text, see Dept of State Bulletin, 23 Jul 51, pp. 140–149. The treaty was ratified by the Senate on 20 March and entered into force on 29 April 1952.
37. (S) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 2 Aug 51, FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 232–236. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “US-Philippine Treaty of Alliance,” 8 Aug 51 (der from JCS 1519/74); CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands (11–7–43) sec 16. Printed in FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 238–241, 241–242. The pact was ratified by the US Senate on 20 March and by the Philippine Senate on 12 May 1952. The operative articles in the ANZUS and Philippine treaties were identical, affirming that each party "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." The corresponding clause of the North Atlantic Treaty, which had aroused considerable Senatorial opposition, explicitly authorized "such action as [each party] deems necessary including the use of armed force." For the treaty text, see Dept of State Bulletin, 27 Aug 51, p. 335.
38. JCS objections are set forth in FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 194–201, 210–211; (S) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 9 Apr 52, App to JCS 2190/7, 10 Apr 52, CCS 381 (2–18–51) sec 1. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 637; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Participation on the Council . . . . ," 25 Apr 52 (der from JCS 2190/8); (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 25 Jul 52, Encl to JCS 2190/13, 26 Jul 52; (TS) "Negotiating Paper," App to JCS 2190/13; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Machinery in Regard to the ANZUS Council," 30 Jul 52 (der from JCS 2190/13); (TS) Ltr, DepSecDef to SecState, 31 Jul 52, CCS 381 (2–18–51) sec 2.
39. (5) "Provisional Memorandum," 8 Feb 51, App to JCS 2180/4, 20 Feb 51; (5) "Agreement Between the USA and Japan for Collective Self-Defense . . .," App to JCS 2180/4, same date; (5) "Addendum to Agreement . . .," App to JCS 2180/1, same date; (5) "Provisional Draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty," Attt to Memo, K.T. Young to COL Bayer, 14 Mar 51; CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 1. In a public address on 1 Mar, Mr. Dulles spoke of Japan’s ‘free choice.’ AsstSec Rusk subsequently explained to an OSD official that ‘this phrase is somewhat euphemistic. Japan has a free choice as long as the choice is the right one, to put it bluntly.’ (U) Memo, K.T. Young to COL Carter, ‘Dulles’ Speech . . . on 1 Mar 51,’ 1 Mar 51, CIC 091 Japan (1951). (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 4 Apr 51, Encl to JCS 2180/7, 5 Apr 51, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec 2. (U) JCS 2181/11, 9 Apr 51; (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, ‘Japanese Peace Treaty,’ 9 Apr 51; Memo, JCS to SecDef, ‘Japanese Peace Treaty,’ 17 Apr 51; (der from JCS 2180/11); same file. GEN Marshall forwarded this memo, but reserved his opinion. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 19 Apr 51, FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 989–993. The administrative agreement is described on pp. 236–237.


50. The bilateral treaty addressed only generalities. An administrative agreement seemed the best way to settle specifics. In this manner, Japanese political opposition and the restrictive phrases of the Japanese Constitution could be circumvented. See (S) App to JCS 2180/4, 15 Feb 51, CCS 092 Japan (12–12–50) sec 1.

Notes to Pages 237–240

52. (S) Memo, SecDef to SecState, 18 Jan 52; (TS) Msg, Rusk to SecState, 080730Z Feb 52; (S) Msg, Earl Johnson to Frank Nash, 101555Z Feb 52; CCS 092 Japan (12–12–50) sec 10. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proposed Changes to the Draft Administrative Agreements . . .” 11 Feb 52 (der from JCS 2180/60), same file. Msg. AsstSec Rusk to SecState, 191601Z Feb 52, Encl D to JCS 2180/63, 20 Feb 52, same file, sec 11. (S) Msg, Earl Johnson to Frank Nash, 191600Z Feb 52, Encl B to JCS 2180/63, same date; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef “Status of Negotiations On Article 22 . . .” 20 Feb 52 (der from JCS 2180/63), same file. (S) Memo, AsstSecArmy to SecDef, “US-Japanese Administrative Agreement,” 4 Mar 52, App B to JCS 2180/65, 1 Apr 52, same file, sec 12. For text of the Administrative Agreement, see Dept of State Bulletin, 10 Mar 52, pp. 382–388. For a summary account of the negotiations, see Shigeru Yoshida, Memoirs (1962), pp. 269–275.


55. (TS) JCS 1380/143, 10 Jul 52, same file, sec 30. (TS) Msg, DA 920110 to CINCFE, 3 Oct 52; (TS) Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 150225Z Oct 52, same file, sec 31.

56. For preparations before the Korean War, see Yoshida, Memoirs, p. 192. For a general survey of rearmament problems, see Ibid., pp. 182–195.

57. NY Times, 8 Jul 50, p. 1, II Jul 50, p. 6. These were internal security measures and thus well within SCAF’s authority.


59. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 52610 to DA, 3 Jan 51, DA IN 6352; (U) JCS 1380/97; 29 Jan 51; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “NPR!” 9 Feb 51 (der from JCS 1380/97); CCS 383.21 Japan (3–13–45) sec 24. Printed in FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 884–885.

60. “Heavy armament” was defined as tanks, artillery, recoilless rifles and heavy mortars. At this moment, the heaviest weapon available to the JNPR was the 81-mm mortar.

61. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 15 Feb 51, Encl to JCS 1380/100, 19 Feb 51, CCS 383.21 Japan (3–13–45) sec 24. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 1 Mar 51, FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 888–890.

62. (TS) Msg, DA 85078 to CINCFE, 7 Mar 51; (TS) Msg, CINCFE to DA, 160447Z Mar 51; Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Heavy Armament for the NPR!” 28 Mar 51 (der from JCS 1380/103); same file. (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 20 Apr 51, FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 1001–1003. (TS) N/H of JCS 1380/106, 3 May 51; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 10 May 51, Encl to JCS 1380/107, 14 May 51, same file, sec 25. See also NIE–19–20 Apr 51, FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 1349–1350.

63. (U) JCS 1380/118, 13 Sep 51; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Release of Heavy Armament to the JNPR,” 14 Sep 51 (der from JCS 1380/118); (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 19 Sep 51; (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 28 Sep 51, App to JCS 1380/120, 6 Oct 51; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 29 Oct 51 (der from JCS 1380/121), CCS 383.21 Japan (3–13–45) sec 26. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecState to ActgSecDef, 29 Nov 51, App to JCS 1380/130, 7 Dec 51; (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, 5 Dec 51, Encl to JCS 1380/130, same file, sec 27. The JCS memo of 14 Sep 51 is printed in FRUS: 1951, Vol VI, Pt I, pp. 1349–1350.

64. (U) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 120722Z Jul 52, CCS 383.21 Japan (3–13–45) sec 30. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Release of Heavy Armament to the JNPR,” 21 Jul 52 (der from JCS 1380/146), same file, sec 31. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 29 Jul 52; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 4 Aug 52, Encl to JCS 1380/147, 5 Aug 52; same file. Since statutory authority for this transfer was lacking, the President invoked his power as Commander in Chief.

65. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Japanese Maritime Police,” 21 Sep 50, Encl to JCS 1380/92, 22 Sep 50; (U) N/H of JCS 1380/92, 30 Oct 50; same file, sec 23. (U) Msg, JCS 82846 to CINCFE, 7 Feb 51 (der from JCS 1380/99); (TS) JCS 1380/102, 14 Mar 51, same file, sec 24. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Armimg of Japanese-Manned Ships,” 13 Apr 51 (der from JCS 1380/102); (TS) N/H of JCS 1380/102, 27 Apr 51, CCS 383.21 Japan (3–13–45) sec 24. (TS) Memo, SecState to SecDef, 20 Jul 51, Encl to JCS 1380/115, 30 Jul 51, same file, sec 26. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 22 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 1380/116, 15 Aug 51; (TS) Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 28 Aug 51, Encl to JCS 1380/117, 28 Aug 51; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 4 Sep 51; same file. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecState to ActgSecDef, 29 Nov 51, App to JCS 1380/130, 7 Dec 51; (TS) Memo, ActgSecDef to JCS, 5 Dec 51, Encl to JCS 1380/130, same file, sec 27. Yoshida, Memoirs, pp. 187–188.
Notes to Pages 240–241

67. JCS 1380/150, 10 Sep 52; (U) Msg, JCS 920166 to CINCPAC, 3 Oct 52. Encl to Dec On JCS 1380/150, 10 Sep 52; (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 310829Z Oct 52; same file, sec 31. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Japanese Defense Forces,” Jan 53 (der from JCS 1380/155), same file, sec 32. (U) Msgs, CINCPAC to DA for JCS, CX 63528, 7 Jul 52, DA IN 284872, CX 63843, 20 Jul 53, DA IN 289082, same file, sec 34.
Index

Acheson, Dean G.: 2, 18, 33, 68
and allocation of military resources: 64
and atomic weapons: 3–4, 78, 82
and China: 198, 199–200, 201, 205
and containment of Communist expansion: 198
and EDC: 147–48, 149, 166–68
and Far East security pacts: 231–33
and forces for European defense: 116
and Germany: 139
and Indochina: 211, 213–14, 217, 219
and the Middle East: 172–73, 174–75, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183–84, 185, 186, 188, 189, 192–93
and military preparedness: 4–5, 8
and NATO forces command structure: 123, 140, 142, 145, 146–47
and rearmament: 38, 42, 98
and Spain: 165
and Taiwan: 201, 202, 205, 208
and the USSR: 130–32, 166
Ad Hoc Committee on NSC 68: 28, 29, 31
Adenauer, Konrad: 101, 113, 132, 139, 149, 152, 168
Aegean Sea: 122, 140–41
Air Defense Command: 37
Air defenses, US: 15, 50, 70
Air Force, US
and air defenses: 50
and atomic weapons: 79, 80–82, 88
Chief of Staff: 2. See also Vandenberg, General Hoyt S.
expansion: 30, 31, 37, 49–51, 53, 58, 59, 66, 67
FY 1950 budget: 11
FY 1951 budget: 11, 24
FY 1952 budget: 14, 15, 17, 43, 44, 45, 50
FY 1953 budget: 50, 51, 58, 59, 60
FY 1954 budget: 50, 51, 66
mission: 50
personnel: 11, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29, 30, 34, 37, 39, 40, 43, 46, 50, 52, 55, 55, 59, 62, 63, 66, 69, 71, 98
and rearmament: 41–42, 47, 48
and strategic planning: 88–89
units: 11, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 46, 49, 50, 52–53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 63, 66, 69, 71, 72, 98, 126, 128
Air National Guard: 23, 37
Aircraft
bombers, SAC: 86–87
British: 108, 151
French: 108, 151
for German forces: 150, 151
for Indochina: 213–14
Italian: 151
of NATO forces: 117, 142, 151
NATO requirements: 95, 98, 108, 126–27, 151, 156
procurement of: 13, 17, 24, 46, 48, 50, 54, 59, 64, 69, 73
projected losses in JOEW: 84–85
sales: 181
for Taiwan: 200, 203
US for NATO use: 108, 151
Airfields
construction of: 29, 117
in Middle Eastern countries: 165–66
SAC: 87
Alaska: 87
Aleutian Islands: 198
Allied Commander in Chief Eastern Mediterranean (CINCEAST): 141, 160, 161
Allied Middle East Command: 174, 176
Allied Naval Commander in Chief Mediterranean (NAV CINC MED): 123
Allied Naval Commander in Chief Middle East: 122
Allied Planning Group, Eastern Mediterranean: 179
Allison, John: 227, 240–41
Almond, MC Edward M., USA: 23
Alphand, Hervo: 125
Al-Said, Nuri: 172
Alsop, Joseph: 2
Alsop, Stewart: 2
Ammunition
production: 46
for Taiwan: 203
Index

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936: 172, 175, 176, 177
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company: 183, 184–85, 187, 189
Antisubmarine warfare (ASW): 12, 13, 84, 145
ANZUS Council: 232
Arab-Israeli problems: 171–72, 178, 181, 182
Arabian-American Oil Company: 182–83
Army, Egyptian: 172, 177
Army, French: 97, 107
Army, Iranian: 187
Army, US
and atomic weapons: 81–82
budgets. See by year below.
Chief of Staff. See also Collins, General J.
Lawton.
FY 1950 budget: 11
FY 1951 budget: 11, 12, 24
FY 1952 budget: 14, 15, 17, 43, 44, 45, 239
FY 1953 budget: 58, 59, 60
FY 1954 budget: 66
personnel: 11, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 30, 34,
36, 39, 40, 43, 44, 46, 50, 51, 52, 55, 59, 62, 63,
66, 69, 71, 78
and rearmament: 41–42, 48
and strategic planning: 88–89
Army, US (units): 11, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29,
30, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52,
54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 63, 66, 69, 71, 72, 98,
126–27, 128
armies
Seventh: 115, 126
Eighth: 21, 22, 23, 35, 38, 41, 44, 229, 230
Corps, X: 23, 35
divisions
2nd Armored: 117
2nd Infantry: 21, 35
3rd Infantry: 22
4th Infantry: 117
28th Infantry (National Guard): 117
43rd Infantry (National Guard): 117
82nd Airborne: 22, 36
Army General Reserve: 22–23, 36, 157
Army National Guard: 23, 37, 44
Atomic Energy Act of 1946: 75–76, 79
Atomic Energy Commission: 3–4, 77, 78, 79, 82
Military Liaison Committee to the: 4, 8, 75–77, 78
and nuclear weapons: 76
Atomic warfare: 84–86, 88, 89, 116, 159–60
Atomic weapons
custody of: 79–82
development of: 76
production of: 76–78, 80–81
raw materials for: 76–77
storage abroad: 79–82
storage on ships: 79, 80–81
and strategic planning: 75–82, 84–86
and US air defenses: 50
USSR possession of: 1, 3, 6, 9, 48, 50, 53, 54, 68,
75, 76–77, 78, 88, 89
Attlee, Clement: 111, 112, 120, 122, 145, 185, 186,
233–34
Auriol, Vincent: 210–11
Austin, Warren: 203
Australia: 174, 179, 192, 231–33
Austria: 98, 130
Azerbaijan: 182
Azores: 87
Bahrein: 191, 192, 195
Balkans: 140–41
Bao Dai, Emperor of Vietnam: 210–11
Base rights
on Formosa: 199–200
in Japan: 224, 226, 229, 235, 236
in the Middle East: 165–66, 178, 192
Beebe, Col. Royden, USAF: 103
Belgium: 93, 99, 127, 132, 143, 147
Bell, Daniel W.: 221
Bermuda: 87
Bevan, Aneurin: 131
Bevin, Ernest: 2, 93, 105, 113, 225
Bidault, Georges: 93
Bissell, Richard: 66–67
Bonin Islands: 228, 229, 234, 238
Bonnet, Henri: 211
Bradley, General of the Army Omar N., USA: 2–3, 9, 11–12, 17, 19–20, 26–27, 28, 33, 34, 205
and Air Force expansion: 30, 50, 51
and atomic weapons: 81
and China: 200–201
and German rearmament: 99–100, 102, 109–10, 130
and Japan: 225, 226, 235
and MDAP: 60
and the Middle East: 175, 176, 190, 192–93
and military budgets: 59
and NATO: 95, 97, 101, 102, 103, 109–10, 111, 127, 157
and NATO force requirements: 151
and NATO forces command structure: 124,
140, 141–42, 145–46, 147, 162, 163, 174
and rearmament: 35, 41–42, 45
and strategic planning: 160
and Taiwan: 206, 208
Brink, BG Francis G., USA: 214–15
Bruce, David: 96, 109, 135, 147, 149, 211
Budget process: 13–14, 61–63, 91
Budgets, military
FY 1950: 10–11, 18
FY 1951: 10–14, 18, 21–22, 28, 31, 57
FY 1951 supplements: 23–24, 33, 36, 42–43
FY 1952: 10, 13–18, 23–24, 28, 31, 33–34, 42–45,
47, 57, 88
FY 1952 supplements: 44, 51, 58
FY 1953: 25, 31, 44, 47, 52–54, 57–61
FY 1955: 28, 31

292
Bureau of the Budget: 9-10, 14, 45, 63
Burma: 25, 197, 211, 235
Burns, MG James H., USA (Ret.): 4, 9, 28, 200, 211, 212-13, 224
Bush, Vannevar: 75

Cabot, Thomas D.: 128
Caffery, Jefferson: 177, 180
Cambodia: 212
Canada: 87, 93, 96, 105, 118, 120
Carney, ADM Robert B., USN: 120-22, 123, 124, 140-41, 160, 161, 162, 163-64, 173, 190
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 6, 9, 25, 28, 199, 207, 209, 210, 220, 235
Chapman, Oscar: 195
Chase, MG William C., USA: 207
Chiang Kai-shek: 198, 199-200, 201-02, 203, 204, 206, 207-08, 209, 210
Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSASSAC): 102, 107, 108
Chief of Staff, British: 42, 95, 99-10, 121, 122, 123, 124, 140, 141, 145, 146, 159-60, 162, 163, 172, 174, 175, 179, 181, 185, 186, 189-90, 191, 216-17, 233-34
Chief of Staff, French: 95, 140, 141, 162, 216-17
Chief of Staff, Italian: 162
Chief of Staff, Western European Union: 99
China: 18, 197-98, 199-200, 201
China, Communist: 1, 3, 22-23, 25, 198-210
and Indochina: 211, 213, 215, 216, 217-19
and Japan: 223, 225, 227-28, 234-35, 236
and the Korean War: 53-34, 35-36, 37, 41, 111, 215, 228
and the USSR: 197, 200, 208
China, Nationalist: 41, 60, 197, 198-210, 228
China, People's Republic of: See China, Communist.
Chinese Communist Forces: 200
Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces: 200-201, 203, 206, 207
Civil defense: 48-49, 54, 68
Clark, General Mark W., USA: 209, 238, 240-41
Cold War: 6-7, 9-10, 41-42, 65, 70, 96, 173-74, 182, 210, 214, 236, 238
Collins, GEN J. Lawton, USA: 2-3, 12, 14, 15
and Air Force expansion: 30, 50, 51
and atomic weapons: 82
and China: 199, 200
and European Army: 134
and Far East security pacts: 231
and force levels: 44
and Indochina: 214, 216
and Japan: 233, 238-39
and Korean War: 22, 23, 205, 230
and MDA: 60
and the Middle East: 173, 179, 192
and military preparedness: 41-42
and NATO: 101, 126
and NATO forces command structure: 162-63
and strategic planning: 86, 89, 90, 116
and Taiwan: 206, 207
Commander, Allied Carrier Task Forces: 162
Commander, Allied Land Forces, Southeastern Europe: 162-63
Commander, Naval Striking Forces, Mediterranean: 161-62
Commander in Chief, Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe: 161
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean (CINCAF MED): 163-64
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH): 122, 123, 124, 125, 140
Commander in Chief, Allied Naval Forces, Mediterranean: 107, 121, 161, 162
Commander in Chief Mediterranean (CINCMED): 161-62, 163
Communism
in China: 197-99
containment of: 198-99, 212
and Indochina: 212
and the Philippines: 220-21
Connally, John: 4
Connolly, Tom: 61
Construction
military: 45
public works: 42, 43, 45, 47, 57, 58
"Containment" policy: 1, 197, 198-99, 211-12
Council of Economic Advisors: 9
Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly of the: 101
Crittenberger, GEN Willis D., USA: 102
Cyprus: 87
Czechoslovakia: 93, 236

Dardanelles: 26
Davies, Ernest: 130, 131
Davies, John: 4
Davis, ADM Arthur C., USN: 16, 88, 90, 167, 219, 224, 225
DC 28: 125-28, 137
de Lattre de Tassigny, General Jean, French Army: 97, 215-16
Dean, Gordon: 77, 78, 82
Defense/Atomic Energy Commission Working Group: 77
Defense Management Committee (DMC): 61-62
Defense spending
effect on national security: 2, 4-5, 7-8, 12, 15-16, 20, 61-66
European countries: 143-44, 150, 152
German: 150
level of: 4-5, 9, 14

293
Index

Denmark: 87, 93, 128, 159
Department of Defense: 2
  and budget process: 14, 61-63
  and estimates of military requirements: 10, 157
  and Far East security pacts: 231-32, 237
  and forces for NATO: 157-58
  and German rearmament: 101, 102-03, 107, 133
  and Indochina: 211, 214, 217
  and Japan: 224-26, 227, 229, 235, 231-34, 237-40
  and the Middle East: 174, 175, 180
  and NATO forces command organization: 101, 107
  and nuclear weapons: 3, 77, 79-82
  relations with the Department of State: 28, 33, 102-03, 202-03, 224-26, 228, 229, 237-38
  and Taiwan: 210
Department of State
  and China: 199-200, 206
  and Far East security pacts: 231-33, 236-38
  and German rearmament: 100-101, 102-03, 107, 129, 132-36, 137-38
  and Indochina: 211, 213, 214, 217
  and Japan: 223-28, 229, 235, 236-38, 239
  and the Middle East: 172-73, 174, 175, 176-78, 179-81, 182, 183, 185, 187-88, 192
  and military aid proposals: 9
  and NATO: 96-97, 102-03, 107, 111
  and NATO forces command structure: 123-25
Policy Planning Staff: 4
  relations with DOD: 5, 28, 33, 102-03, 202-03, 224-26, 228, 229, 237-38
  and Spain: 164-65
  and Taiwan: 199-200, 204-05, 209, 210
  and the USSR: 129-32
Department of the Treasury: 9, 236-37
Dewey, Thomas E.: 225
"Domino theory": 212
Duncan, ADM D. B., USN: 51

Early, Stephen T.: 2
Economic aid
  allocations of: 64-65, 165
  appropriations for: 45, 165
  and Congress: 61, 165
  for Indochina: 211, 217
  for the Middle East: 180, 181, 182-83, 184, 186-87, 188-89
  for NATO countries: 152, 155
  and NATO Temporary Council Committee: 54, 142
  need for increases in: 7-8, 68
  for the Philippine Islands: 220-21
  for Spain: 165-66
  for Taiwan: 208
Economic Cooperation Administration: 9, 221, 222
Eddy, LTG Manton S., USA: 115
Eden, Anthony: 148, 150, 152, 166, 167, 177, 180, 186
Egypt: 87, 171-81
Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D.: 1-2, 68, 142
  and EDC: 147-48, 149
  and forces for NATO: 157
  and Indochina: 219
  and military budgets: 12
  and NATO: 108, 116
  and NATO forces command structure: 161-62
  as SACEUR: 113, 115, 117, 118, 121, 125, 126, 128, 134, 144, 155
  and SACLANT: 120-21
  and SACMED/SACMED-ME: 122-23, 140
  and strategic planning: 159
  and Taiwan: 210
Eisenhower administration
  and Air Force: 53
  and atomic weapons: 82
  and the Middle East: 181
  and Spain: 165-66
Elliot, Air Chief Marshal William, RAF: 123
Equipment
  for European forces: 116, 142, 143-44, 156-57
  for German forces: 133, 150
  for Indochina: 212-14, 215
  and Japan: 238-39, 240
  for the Middle East: 173, 180-81
  for the Philippine Islands: 221
  procurement of: 24, 156
  shortages: 156-57
  for Spain: 165
  for Taiwan: 200, 203, 206
European Army: 101, 110, 147-48, 149-50, 151
European Army Conference: 132-33, 134, 137-38, 147
European Coal and Steel Community: 168
European Command: 99, 157
European Defense Community (EDC): 113, 134-36, 142, 147-52, 166-68, 169
European Defense Force
  German participation in: 102, 104, 108, 109-10, 111, 132-36
  JCS and: 103, 104, 108, 109
  proposals for: 102, 113
Far East Command: 21-22, 239
  strength: 21, 230
  survey team to Taiwan: 203
Far East Commission: 223, 228, 239-40
Farouk, King of Egypt: 172, 174, 176, 177, 180
Faure, Edgar: 152
Fechtel, ADM William M., USN: 3, 51, 60, 67, 120-21, 122, 125, 145, 146, 147, 193
  and atomic weapons: 80-82
  and MEC: 176
  and NATO forces command structure: 161, 162, 163
  and strategic planning: 89-90
Federal Civil Defense Administration: 38
Finland: 27
Finletter, Thomas: 173
Five-Power Ad Hoc Committee: 216
Fleets
Atlantic: 37–38
British Mediterranean: 141
US Sixth: 122, 123, 124, 140, 141, 161–62,
163–64
US Seventh: 201, 202, 203–04, 208, 209, 210
Force requirements
determination of: 13–14, 15
and foreign policy objectives: 46
Middle East: 190, 191, 192–93
NATO: 95, 96–99, 126–28, 142–43, 144, 151–52,
155, 157–58, 160
US: 13–14, 15–16, 17–18, 21, 22, 29, 37, 54, 55,
57–58, 66, 67, 126–27, 128
Foreign ministers
British. See Bevin, Ernest.
French. See Schuman, Robert.
meetings: 103, 105, 128–32, 137–39, 175, 185,
225, 227
Soviet. See Gromyko, Andrei.
Formosa. See Taiwan.
Formosa Strait: 202, 203
Foster, William C.: 54, 60, 221, 238, 240
and atomic weapons: 82
and the Middle East: 176, 180–81, 186, 191,
192–93
and military aid: 156
and military requirements: 66–67
and NATO requirements: 156–57
and Taiwan: 207, 209
Fox, MG Alonzo P., USA: 203
France: 87, 93
defense expenditures: 143, 150, 152
defense plans: 99
economy: 125, 127, 138
and EDC: 147–49, 150, 167–68
and European Army: 132–36, 147–49
and European economic federation: 96, 110–11
and German rearmament: 100, 101, 105, 106,
109–10, 112, 137–38, 149
and Indochina: 125, 210–19
and Japan: 234
and the Middle East: 172, 176, 177, 179
military force levels: 107–08
and NATO forces command structure: 124–25,
140, 161
and NATO headquarters: 117
and NATO membership: 124–25
public opinion: 168
and rearmament: 98, 131–32
relations with West Germany: 96
and the USSR: 129–32
Franco, General Francisco, Spain: 164–66
Franco-German Coal and Steel Pool: 96
Francois-Poncet, Andre: 132
Franks, Oliver: 123, 131–32, 146, 184
Fraser, Admiral Bruce, UK: 122, 123–24, 125, 141,
190
Gaitskell, Hugh: 138
George VI, King of the United Kingdom: 150
Germany: 25
demilitarization of: 130–32
peace treaty with: 166
reunification of: 130, 132–33, 136, 166, 167, 168
USSR and: 166
Germany, Democratic Republic of (East Germany): 26, 27, 95, 103, 130
Germany, Federal Republic of (West Germany):
27
air forces: 133, 137
defense of: 159
defense spending: 150, 152
economy: 125
and EDC: 147–49, 167–68
naval forces: 133, 137
“peace contract” with: 167–68
police force: 101, 106
proposed for NATO membership: 98
public opinion: 100, 130, 166
rearmament of: 42, 99–104, 105, 106, 107,
108–10, 111, 112–13, 128–26, 137, 147,
149–50, 166–68, 169
security forces: 27, 133
security guarantees for: 139
stationing of troops in: 167
support of British and US forces: 150
US military aid to: 45
US military forces in: 115, 117, 138, 150
Giap, General Vo Nguyen, Vietnam: 215, 219
Gleason, S. Everett: 4
Greece: 18, 25, 26, 27, 122, 123, 124, 125, 138,
139–41, 148, 159, 160–64, 180
Greenland: 87
Gromyko, Andrei: 130, 131, 132, 235, 236
Grunenthal, LTG Alfred M., USA: 117
Guam: 87
Hainan Island: 200
Halaby, Najeeb: 4
Hamblen, BG A. L., USA: 237
Handy, GEN Thomas T., USA: 99, 159
Harmon, LTG H. R., USAF: 84
Harriman, Averell: 61, 64, 68, 142, 151, 181, 185
Herriot, Edouard: 168
Heuss, Theodor: 168
High Commissioners for Germany: 100, 101, 113,
132, 133–34, 157–39, 150, 167
Ho Chi Minh: 210–11, 215, 219
Hobbs, MG Leland H., USA: 220, 221
Holland: 93, 148
Hooker, Robert: 4
Hoover, Herbert: 115, 168, 199
Index

Iceland: 87, 93, 131
India: 185, 197, 218, 225, 235
Indochina: 25, 60, 64, 144, 199, 200, 202, 210–19, 234
Indonesia: 195, 197, 218
International Court of Justice: 184–85, 187
International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC): 126–27, 128
Iran: 1, 18, 25, 26, 27, 64, 171, 174, 182–89, 190–91
Iraq: 171, 172, 174, 185, 190, 192
Ismay, Gen. Hastings: 140, 144, 157, 167
Israel: 171–73, 176, 181–82, 192
Italy: 93, 98, 105, 125, 127, 128, 132, 143, 147, 148, 149, 159, 161, 163

Japan: 197, 218, 223–41
defense of: 198, 200, 226, 228, 229, 230, 238–41
Korean War and: 226, 228–30, 234, 235–36, 238
occupation forces for: 15, 223, 224, 226, 227, 231, 233, 234, 237
rearmament: 229, 231–32, 234, 238–41
US military aid to: 45
Japanese National Police Reserve (JNPR): 238–41
Jaujard, Vice Admiral Robert, France: 117
JCS 2056: 85–86
JCS 2056/9: 85–86
Jessup, Philip E.: 41, 130, 131, 132, 167–68, 206, 226
Johnson, Earl: 237
Johnson, Louis A.: 2, 3–4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12–13, 14, 15, 17, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 32–33
and atomic weapons: 76, 79
and China: 199–200, 201
and German rearmament: 100
and Indochina: 211, 212–14
and Japan: 223, 224–25, 226, 227
and NATO: 95, 97–98, 99, 100–101, 103, 164–65
and the Philippine Islands: 220–21
and Taiwan: 202–03, 204
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
and Air Force expansion: 30, 50–51
and atomic weapons: 75–83
Budget Advisory Committee: 13–14, 15–16, 17
and China: 199, 200–201, 207
composition: 2–3
and ED C: 149, 166–68
and Eisenhower: 117
and European Army: 134
evaluation of threat from USSR: 26, 55, 185–86
and Far East security pact: 231–33, 236–38
and force requirements: 49, 50–53, 156, 190, 191
and forces for European defense: 116, 156
and forces for NATO: 126, 156, 157–58
and Indochina: 211–14, 215–16, 217–18, 219
and inter-service disagreements: 88–90, 91
and Japan: 223–30, 233–41
and the Korean War: 20, 21–23, 111, 228–30
and the Middle East: 172–73, 175, 176, 178, 179–81, 182, 183, 184, 185–86, 187, 188, 189–90, 191–93
and military preparedness: 64, 67–68, 70
and military requirements: 28, 47–48, 66–67
and NATO organization: 118, 120, 139
and NSC 73/4: 26, 28
and petroleum availability: 193–94
and the Philippine Islands: 220–21
Program Advisory Committee: 15–16, 17
and SACEUR: 118
and Spain: 164–66
and the Spofford Plan: 111
and strategic planning: 75–82, 83–91, 159–60, 211–12
and Taiwan: 200–201, 202–03, 204–06, 207, 209, 210
and the USSR: 129, 131, 185–86, 187
Joint emergency war plans: 15
Joint Intelligence Committee: 27, 90, 207, 213, 216
Joint Logistics Plans Committee: 90
Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate: 91
Joint Military Survey Team for Spain: 165
Joint Outline Emergency War Plan (JOEW): 83, 90, 91, 96, 159
OFFTACKLE: 83–85, 88
Joint Outline War Plan: 29–30, 88–90, 191
REAPER: 88, 91
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan: 90, 91
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan: 91, 192
Joint Strategic Plans Group: 18, 58, 161, 165
Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC): 4, 8, 26, 105, 184, 205, 214–15, 229, 231, 233
Jordan: 171, 174, 189, 190–91
Judd, Walter: 198
Juin, General Alphonse, France: 117

Kirkpatrick, Ivone: 132
Knowland, William F.: 198, 199
Koo, Wellington: 201, 202
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of: 33, 35, 37
Index

Korea, Republic of: 19–20, 25, 33, 144
Korean War
and Communist China: 33–34, 35–36, 37, 41, 44, 111, 202, 204, 205, 215, 226, 238–39
and defense of Western Europe: 96–99, 111, 112
effects on budget planning: 17–18, 24, 28, 31, 33–35, 36, 37–38, 44, 47, 57, 64
effects on economy: 125
and Indochina: 213, 214
and military preparedness: 19–20, 21, 22, 27, 35, 68
mobilization for: 22–23, 24, 37–38, 39
and rearmament: 41–42, 87, 99–100, 125
and strategic planning: 89–90
and Taiwan: 200–202, 203–04, 205, 207, 209
and the USSR: 35–36, 38, 41, 44, 111

Labrador: 87
Laos: 212
Latin America: 45, 60, 61
Lawrence, Ernest O.: 4
Lay, James S.: 4, 5, 9
Lebanon: 181, 189, 190–91
LeBaron, Robert: 4
Lacheres, General Charles, French Air Force: 140, 141–42, 176
Libya: 87
Lilienthal, David E.: 3
Lindsay, Maj. Gen. Richard C., USAF: 28
Lisbon Conference: 144, 149–52, 156, 158, 161, 166, 167, 219
Lovett, Robert A.: 4, 33–34, 36, 42, 54–55, 63, 70
and Air Force expansion: 51
and atomic weapons: 77–78, 79–82
and budget requests: 47–48, 52, 57, 58, 59, 61–62
and EDC: 167
and Far East security pacts: 232, 237
and German rearmament: 134, 137–38
and Germany: 139
and Indochina: 219
and Japan: 235, 237, 239
and the Middle East: 175, 176, 178, 180, 186, 188
and military preparedness: 67, 68
and national security: 63, 64
and NATO: 109, 118, 120, 123, 126, 144, 145, 146, 152, 156–57, 158
and Spain: 165
and Taiwan: 204, 209–10
Luxemburg: 93, 132, 147

McCloy, John J.: 100, 132, 133, 134, 138, 149, 167
McCormick, ADM Lynde D., USN: 125, 145, 147
McGhee, George C.: 173–74, 175–76
McGrigor, ADM Roderick, British Navy: 145, 146, 162
McNary, Gen. Joseph T., USAF: 61, 142
McNeil, W. J.: 17
Maddocks, MG Ray T., USA: 4
Magruder, MG Carter, USA: 227
Magsaysay, Ramon: 221, 222
Mahon, George: 36
Mao Tse-tung: 197, 198
Marine Corps, US
budgets: 59
1st Division: 35
personnel: 20, 21, 22, 43, 59
units: 11, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, 30, 34, 36, 39, 40, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 57, 62, 63, 66, 69, 71, 72, 98, 126
Marshall, General of the Army George C., USA:
2, 32–33, 34, 35, 54–55, 106
and China: 204–05
and Eisenhower: 117
and Far East security pacts: 231, 233
and force levels: 37–38, 43, 46, 52
and forces for Europe: 116, 126–27
and German rearmament: 109–10, 135
and Indochina: 213–14, 215–16
JCS and: 118
and the Middle East: 173, 174–75
and military budgets: 36, 43, 44–45, 51, 52
and NATO forces command structure: 124, 125
and the Philippine Islands: 221–22
and rearmament: 42, 48
and Taiwan: 204–05, 206, 207, 208
Matthews, H. Freeman: 41, 176, 192
Mayer, Rene: 138
MC 26/1: 142–43, 145, 158
Mediterranean Sea: 121, 123, 124, 140–42, 162
Mendes-France, Pierre: 219
Merchant, Livingston: 201
Middle East: 139–42, 171–96
defense of: 83–84, 88
US aid to: 45, 60, 61, 68
and the USSR: 84
Middle East Defense Council: 179
Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO):
179–80, 181
Middle East Steering Group: 179–80
Mid-range war plan: 16, 88–90
Military aid
allocations of: 170, 211
appropriations for: 18, 25

297
Index

for Far East: 45, 60, 61, 68
and German rearmament: 106, 134
to Indochina: 211–14, 215, 216, 217, 218
to Middle Eastern countries: 172–73, 180–81, 184, 192
to NATO countries: 9, 18, 25, 97, 106, 127, 142, 144, 155, 170
and NATO Temporary Council Committee: 54
need for increases in: 7–8, 9, 13, 24–25, 68
for the Philippine Islands: 220–22
priority system for allocating: 25
for Spain: 165–66
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)
Formosa: 206–07
Military Assistance Program
and Indochina: 211–14
and the Philippine Islands: 221
Military capabilities
of allies: 26, 65
of East Germany: 103
of Middle Eastern countries: 173, 192
of Nationalist China: 200–201, 203, 206, 207
of NATO members: 98, 99, 111, 129
of UK in the Middle East: 189–93
US: 15, 19–20, 22, 26, 29, 58, 64, 70
USSR: 15, 26, 29, 47, 48, 64, 65, 70, 84–86
Military intelligence: 27, 31, 38, 229
Military personnel
Air Force: 11, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29, 30, 34,
39–40, 43, 46, 52, 53, 55, 59, 62, 63, 69, 71, 98
Army: 11, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 34, 39–40,
43, 44, 46, 51, 52, 55, 59, 62, 63, 69, 71, 98
Marine Corps: 20, 21, 22, 24, 43, 59
Navy: 11, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29, 30, 34, 39, 40, 43,
46, 52, 55, 59, 62, 63, 69, 71, 98
projections of needs for: 11, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 29, 30, 34, 36–37, 39–40, 43, 44, 49, 50,
51–53, 54, 57, 62
Military preparedness
definition of: 7
effects of austerity program on: 2, 4–5, 7–8, 12,
15–16, 20, 61–66
and Korean War: 19–20, 21, 64
and rearmament program: 41–42, 47, 48, 59
USSR: 59
Mobilization: 22–23, 24, 37, 42, 44, 53, 58, 63, 70,
83
NATO: 108
planning for: 88, 90, 126
Moch, Jules: 106, 109, 110, 213–14
Monnet, Jean: 142
Montgomery, Field Marshal the Viscount
Bernard L., British Army: 96, 97, 99, 117, 155
Morocco, French: 83–84, 87
Morrison, Herbert: 131, 136, 138, 140, 176, 177,
185, 230–40
Mossadeq, Mohammed: 183–85, 186–87, 188, 189
Mountbatten, Admiral Louis, British Navy: 162,
164
MRC 5/2: 128
Munitions Board: 8, 46, 98
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949: 199
Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP): 54
allocations of funds: 18, 24–25, 45, 60–61,
64–65, 68, 72, 73
appropriations for: 60, 199
budget requests for: 18, 24–25, 45, 47
and Germany: 134
and Indochina: 216, 219
JCS guidance for: 88, 134, 180–81, 209
and the Korean War: 64
and the Middle East: 180–81
and NATO countries: 93, 98, 127, 144, 150, 155,
156
and the Philippine Islands: 222
and Taiwan: 203, 206, 209
Mutual Security Act of 1951: 45

Naguib, General Mohammed, Egyptian Army: 180
National emergency: 38
National Guard: 22–23, 36, 117, 230
National Intelligence Estimates: 35
National Petroleum Policy: 193
National Security Council (NSC)
and China: 199
evaluations of threat from USSR: 25–27, 53–54
and German rearmament: 99, 100
and Indochina: 211, 212, 214, 215–16, 217–18
and Japan: 224–25
and the Korean War: 201–02
and the Middle East: 173, 178, 183, 184, 187–89
and military preparedness: 8–10
and nuclear weapons: 3–4, 76, 77
and petroleum policy: 195
Senior Staff Group: 28, 29, 31, 37, 46–47, 48, 54,
64, 210
and Spain: 164–65
Staff: 25, 26, 31, 183, 184, 187, 217, 221
and Taiwan: 202–03, 205–06, 208, 209–10
and US support for NATO: 103
National Security Resources Board: 9, 25, 28
Nationalism
in Asia: 197, 198–99, 210–11, 215
in the Middle East: 171, 178, 182–84
role in US foreign policy: 10
USSR and: 10
Nationalist Chinese forces: 41
Naval aviation: 58
Navy, US
and atomic weapons on ships: 79, 80–81
Chief of Naval Operations: 2, 51, 125, 145; See
also Fechler, Admiral William M.; Sherman, Admiral Forrest P.
facilities: 165–66
FY 1950 budget: 11
FY 1951 budget: 11, 24
FY 1952 budget: 14, 15, 17, 43, 44, 45
FY 1953 budget: 58–59, 60
FY 1954 budget: 66
personnel: 11, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29, 30, 34, 36, 39, 40, 43, 46, 50, 52, 55, 59, 62, 63, 66, 69, 71, 78
and rearrangement: 47, 48
ships: 11, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34
36, 37–38, 39, 40, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57
62, 63, 66, 69, 71, 72, 79, 80–82, 98, 126–27, 128
and strategic planning: 88–89
Netherlands: 93, 99, 105, 110, 127, 132, 147
New York Times: 101, 226
New Zealand: 174, 179, 192, 231–33
Newfoundland: 87
Nimitz, Fleet Admiral Chester W., USN: 2
Nitze, Paul H.: 4, 5, 9, 41, 66–67, 103, 130, 191–92, 200
Norstad, Gen. Lauris, USAF: 117
North Africa: 87, 96
North Atlantic Council: 93, 112, 118, 124, 128, 138, 141, 142, 144, 149, 151, 158, 163–64
meetings: 105–07, 112–13, 125, 139–40, 142, 152, 156, 161
and military planning: 95
organizational structure: 95, 118–20
US and: 103, 105–07
North Atlantic Treaty: 93, 167
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 1
allied forces for: 103, 104
and balanced collective forces: 95, 97
command organization: 100–101, 103–04, 145–06–07
Council of Deputies: 95, 97, 98, 110, 113, 118, 120, 121, 125, 148–49, 152
Defense Committee: 95, 106–07, 110, 112, 118, 120, 142
Defense Financial and Economic Committee: 118
and defense planning: 99
Defense Production Board: 152
and EDC: 147–49, 151, 167–68
Financial and Economic Board: 152
German membership in: 103, 136, 151
JCS and: 88, 99, 102–04
and Korean War: 111
and MEC: 179
membership: 98, 103, 124, 136, 138, 139, 161, 176, 179
military aid to members: 9, 18, 25, 97
Military Committee: 95, 113, 118, 123, 144
military preparedness of members: 26, 83–84, 88, 97
military requirements: 13, 95–99
and military strength: 96
organizational structure: 118–20, 142, 144, 148–49, 152, 153
and Spain: 164–66
Temporary Council Committee: 54, 139–40, 142–44, 148, 150, 151–52, 156
and Turkey: 176, 179
US forces for: 101–02, 103–04
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
forces
air forces: 107, 158
aircraft: 117, 142, 143, 151, 156, 157, 158
army divisions: 107, 112–13, 143, 151, 156, 157, 158
Atlantic Command: 120, 121, 123, 125, 137, 145–47, 161
British: 107–08, 151, 162
Central Command: 117
composition of: 107–08, 112–13, 117, 151
Eastern Mediterranean Command: 140–42
european Defense Force: 135–36
French: 107, 108, 151, 162, 163
German: 107, 133, 134–36, 157, 151
Greek: 162–63
Italian: 151, 162–63
Mediterranean Command: 120, 121–22, 137, 138, 140, 160–64
and Middle East Command: 121, 124–25, 138, 140, 141–42, 160–64, 173
Navy: 107, 143, 151, 156, 157, 158, 160–64
Northern Command: 117
requirements: 110, 112–13, 126–28, 143, 151, 156, 158
SACEUR. See Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
SHAPE. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Powers in Europe.
Western Mediterranean Command: 140
North Korean People’s Army: 19, 21, 23
Norway: 93, 105, 131, 159
NSC 20/4: 1, 6, 32
Index

NSC 47/4: 171
NSC 47/5: 173
NSC 48/2: 198, 199, 211
NSC 48/5: 208
NSC 60/1: 227
NSC 64: 211, 212
NSC 65/3: 171-72
NSC 68: 3, 5, 8-10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 27-28, 29, 30, 38, 47-48, 53, 64, 76, 83, 88, 97
NSC 68/1: 27, 29, 31-32, 34, 36, 37
NSC 68/2: 27, 32
NSC 68/3: 37
NSC 68/4: 35-39, 42-43, 46-49
NSC 73/4: 25-27, 28-29
NSC 107: 183, 184
NSC 107/1: 184
NSC 107/2: 184, 186, 187
NSC 114: 48
NSC 114/1: 46-49
NSC 114/2: 53-54, 57-58, 62
NSC 124/2: 216, 217-19
NSC 129/1: 178
NSC 135/1: 64, 65
NSC 135/3: 61, 65
NSC 136: 187-88
NSC 141: 61, 66-68
NSC 142: 69
Nuclear weapons: 3-4, 76-82. See also Atomic weapons.

Office of Defense Mobilization: 38, 57, 69, 78, 195
Office of Military Assistance: 180
Office of the Secretary of Defense: 157
   budget: 24
   and MDAP: 45
Ohly, John: 214
Oil resources: 84-88, 182-90, 191
   availability of: 195-96
   nationalization of: 183-85
Okinawa: 87, 236, 237-38
Oppenheimer, J. Robert: 4

Pace, Frank: 113
Pakistan: 27, 185, 192, 197, 225
Parodi, Alexandre: 130, 131, 211
Pasha, Nahas: 172, 176
Pau Conventions: 213
Perkins, George W.: 103
Persian Gulf: 189, 191
Petroleum. See Oil resources.
   Philippine Islands: 197, 198-99, 220-22, 231-33
Pike, Sumner T.: 76
Pinay, Antoine: 168
Pleven, Rene: 109, 120-30, 132-33, 215
Pleven Plan: 107-10
Powdren, Edwin: 142
Poland: 236
Portugal: 87, 93, 110

Potsdam Agreement: 128-29, 130, 131, 166, 226
Propaganda
   Communist: 45
   US: 9
Psychological warfare: 27
Public opinion
   British: 120-21, 125, 149
   French: 168
   German: 100, 130, 166
   Japanese: 229-30, 241
   US: 133
Public works construction (military): 42, 43, 45, 47, 57, 58

Qatar: 191, 195
Quirino, Elpidio: 221, 222

Radford, ADM Arthur W., USN: 233
Ramadier, Paul: 211
Razmara, Ali: 183
Rearmament
   Europe: 125-28, 129, 131-32, 142-44, 155
   US: 3-10, 19-39, 41-55, 64, 129
Research and development: 90, 91
Reserve Forces: 22-23, 64, 67, 70
Reserve stocks: 54, 157
Reston, James: 226
Ridgway, LTG Matthew B., USA: 41, 44, 155, 162-63, 205, 230, 233, 239
Robbins, RADM Thomas H., USN: 4, 105
Romulo, Carlos: 221-22
Rusk, Dean: 200, 207, 208, 211, 212-13, 224, 237
Ryukyu Islands: 198, 223, 227, 228, 229, 234, 237-38

Salan, General Raoul, French Army: 216, 219
Saudi Arabia: 87, 171, 174, 182-83, 185, 191, 195
Savage, Carlton: 4
Schuman, Robert: 2, 96, 105, 131, 136, 138, 140, 149, 150, 152, 167, 212, 213, 219, 239-40
Schuman Plan: 100, 109, 134-35, 168
Sebald, William: 224, 226
Secretary of Defense: 3, 14, 37, 54, 106. See also
   Johnson, Louis A.; Lovett, Robert A.;
   Marshall, George C.
Secretary of State: 3, 37. See also Acheson, Dean C.
Selective Service System: 67-68
Sherman, ADM Forrest P., USN: 2-3, 12, 17, 43, 51, 125, 165
   and Air Force expansion: 30, 50
   and atomic weapons: 79
   and China: 200
   and Japan: 240
   and the Middle East: 173, 184
   and military budgets: 44
   and NATO: 101
Index

and NATO forces command structure: 123
and SACLANT: 120–21
and Taiwan: 202, 205, 206
Shinwell, Emmanuel: 106, 110, 122
Shipbuilding
funding for: 15, 17
spending for: 42
tons created: 54
Ships
atomic weapons on: 79, 80–82
for Japan: 240
NATO requirements: 95, 107, 142, 151, 156
Slessor, Air Marshal John, RAF: 141–42, 160, 190
Slim, Field Marshal William J., British: 112, 122, 140, 141, 162, 174, 176
Smith, Alexander: 111
Smith, GEN Walter Bedell, USA (ret.): 38, 209
South Africa, Union of: 174, 179, 192
Southeast Asia: 27
Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee (SEAPAC): 212–13, 214
Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921: 182
Spain: 45, 83–84, 98, 164–66
Spofford, Charles M.: 97, 98, 110, 111, 120, 125, 148–49
Spofford Plan: 110–11, 112, 113
Stalin, Josef: 1, 32, 182
State–Defense Steering Group: 145, 148
Strategic planning: 83–91
for air offensives: 70, 76–77, 79, 84–86, 88
and ANZUS Pact: 231–33
and budget planning: 14
for defense of Europe: 159–60
and Indochina: 211–12, 217–18
and the Middle East: 175, 189–93
for NATO: 96–99, 123
Sudan: 172, 175–76, 177–78, 180
Suez Canal: 83–84, 172, 174, 175, 177–78, 180, 181, 190, 191
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT): 107, 120, 121, 125, 145
nationality of: 120, 121, 123–24, 140, 145–46, 147
organization: 121
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR): 105, 106–07, 108, 109, 111, 112–13, 120, 126, 141
Aegean Command: 141–42, 160
and CINCMED: 163
and CINCSOUTH: 124, 141
and Eastern Command: 161
and EDC: 149
Eisenhower appointed: 113, 115
and European Army: 134, 135
and force estimates: 128
funding for: 158
and German rearmament: 137–38
and Greek forces: 140–41
and MEC: 161–62
Mediterranean Naval Command: 141
and SACLANT: 145
and SACMED/SACMED-ME: 122–23, 124, 140–42, 160–64
and strategic planning: 159–60
supplies for: 144
and Turkish forces: 140–41
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED): 121–23
and Greek forces: 140
nationality of: 122
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean-Middle East (SACMED-ME): 122–23, 124
nationality of: 140, 160–64
Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East (SACMED): 121, 124, 175
and Greece: 140–41
and Turkey: 140–41
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SACAP): 223, 224, 225, 226, 238, 240
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE): 117, 118, 120, 126, 128, 140, 155, 159
Sweden: 98
Syria: 181
Taft, Robert A.: 38, 59, 115, 199
Taiwan: 41, 60, 197, 198–210, 228
Taiwan Strait: 201
Tanks
production of: 46, 54, 59, 64, 69, 73
requirements for: 98
for Taiwan: 200, 203
Thailand: 211
Tibet: 25
Time magazine: 35
Training: 64
Air Force: 37
Army: 21
deficiencies: 21
of French troops: 97
for German troops: 109, 137
for National Guard: 22–23, 36, 58
for Nationalist Chinese forces: 206
of NATO forces: 97–98
Treaty of Brussels: 93
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid (USSR–China): 197
Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East: 172
Truman, Harry S.: 1–2, 3, 32–33, 35, 51, 54
and atomic weapons: 3–4, 76–78, 79, 80, 81–82
and Attlee: 111, 112
and China: 198–99, 201, 204, 207
and Churchill: 145–48, 177, 186–87

301
## Index

and containment of Communist expansion: 1, 198-99  
and EDC: 167  
and force levels: 43, 44, 52-53, 57  
and German rearmament: 99, 100, 102-03, 104, 129, 132-33, 135-36  
and Indochina: 212, 218, 213-17  
and the Korean War: 19, 21, 22, 23, 41, 96, 201-02  
and the Middle East: 171-72, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184-86, 187, 188-89  
and military aid: 18, 24-25, 60, 61, 155  
and military budgets: 2, 8-9, 10-11, 12-13, 16-17, 24, 42-43, 47, 57-58, 59, 60, 63, 66  
and military preparedness: 8-9, 64-65, 68  
and NATO forces command structure: 145-47  
and petroleum policy: 195  
and the Philippine Islands: 220-21, 222  
and Pleven: 129-30, 132-33, 215  
and rearmament: 28, 29, 31-32, 34, 36, 38-39, 42, 48, 64  
and Spain: 164, 165  
and Taiwan: 201-04, 205, 207-08, 210  
and threat of aggression by USSR: 25, 53  
and US forces for European defense: 113, 115  
Truman administration: 168-69  
and budget effects on military preparedness: 16-17, 59  
and China: 198, 199, 200, 201, 204  
and EDC: 167  
and Far East security pacts: 232  
and formation of NATO: 93  
and German rearmament: 105, 133  
and Indochina: 216, 219  
and Japan: 225, 233  
and the Korean War: 21-22, 36, 44, 111, 204, 209  
and MDAP: 60-61  
and the Middle East: 177-78, 181, 183, 185, 186, 189  
and military budgets: 57  
and NATO: 109, 111, 116  
and rearmament: 3, 11, 35, 36, 37, 38, 49  
and Spain: 165  
and Taiwan: 201, 202, 203, 208, 209, 210  
and USSR: 26, 130  
Tufts, Robert: 4  
Turkey: 1, 18, 25, 26, 27, 87, 122, 123, 124, 125, 138, 139-41, 148, 160-64, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 189-92  
Turkish Straits: 122, 140-41, 159  
Twining, Gen. Nathan F., USAF: 41-42  
assessments of threat to US: 25-27, 35-36, 38, 41-42, 53-54, 68, 78  
and atomic warfare: 84-87, 159-60  
and atomic weapons: 1, 3, 6, 9, 48, 50, 53, 54, 68, 75, 76-77, 78, 88, 89  
and China: 197, 200, 204, 208  
and EDC: 166  
expansionist policies: 1, 26, 65, 182, 183, 184, 198-99, 226  
and German rearmament: 128-29, 130-32  
and Iran: 182, 183, 185-86, 188-89  
and Japan: 223-24, 225, 226, 227-28, 235-36, 239  
and the Korean War: 19, 27, 35-36, 44, 111  
and the Middle East: 192, 195-96  
military strength: 6, 55, 59, 96  
and NATO: 59, 111, 130-32  
need for US air defenses against: 50  
and the Philippine Islands: 220  
plans for war against: 79, 80-81, 83-91  
and US foreign policy: 32, 44-45  
United Kingdom  
airfields: 87  
assessment of Soviet threat: 27  
and atomic weapons: 79  
defense expenditures: 143  
defense of: 83-84, 96  
defense plans: 99  
economy: 125, 138  
and EDC: 147-49, 167-68  
and European Army: 152-36  
and Far East security pacts: 231  
and German rearmament: 105, 106, 131-32, 133, 137-38  
and Indochina: 215, 216-17, 218-19  
and Japan: 225, 233-34, 235  
and the Middle East: 171-82, 183-93  
military force levels: 107-08  
and NATO: 93, 152  
and NATO forces: 112, 127  
and NATO forces command structure: 120-25, 145-47, 160-64, 173-74  
and NATO membership: 124-25  
public opinion: 120-21, 125, 149  
and rearmament: 98, 131-32  
relations with the US: 172-93  
and Soviet threat: 88, 229  
and Taiwan: 205  
US bases in: 96, 131  
and USSR: 130-32  
United Nations (UN): 172, 185  
and China: 200, 202, 203-05  
and Japan: 227, 235  
and the Korean War: 19  
role in US foreign policy: 7, 19, 26, 27  
United Press: 199  
US Congress: 166  
and China: 198, 199  
and expansion of the Air Force: 49-50
Index

and FY 1951 budget: 10–12, 24, 43
and FY 1952 budget: 16–17, 43, 44–45, 47
and FY 1953 budget: 47, 59, 61
US House of Representatives: 13
Appropriations Committee: 11, 36, 44–45
Foreign Affairs Committee: 19–20
and FY 1953 budget: 59, 61
US Senate: 13, 61, 93, 116, 167–68
Appropriations Committee: 11–12, 13, 59, 98
Armed Services Committee: 49–50, 116
Foreign Relations Committee: 49–50, 116, 200
MacArthur hearings: 49–50
US Strategic Air Command (SAC): 1, 15, 70,
85–87, 116
US Strategic Bombing Survey: 85

Vandenberg, Arthur: 35
Vandenberg, Gen. Hoyt S., USAF: 2–3, 12, 31,
37
and atomic weapons: 78, 79, 80–82
and China: 200
and expansion of the Air Force: 31, 37, 49–51,
67
and force levels: 44
and Japan: 225
and the Korean War: 23, 230
and MDAP: 60
and military budgets: 44

and NATO: 112, 126
and NATO forces command structure: 123
and strategic planning: 84–85, 86, 87, 88, 116
Vandenberg Resolution: 93
Veterans of Foreign Wars: 203–04
Viet Minh: 200, 210, 211, 213, 215, 219
Vietnam: 210–11, 212
Voorhees, Tracy: 224

Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG):
84–85
Webb, James E.: 204, 222, 239
Western European Union (WEU): 93, 96
Chiefs of Staff: 99
defense plans: 99
US and: 107
Wheelus Air Base, Libya: 87
Wherry, Kenneth S.: 38, 115, 116, 230
Werblowski, Stefan: 236
Wilson, Charles E.: 54–55, 78
Wooldridge, RADM E. T.: 28, 130
World Bank: 186
Wright, VADM Jerald, USN: 108, 122, 125–26,
127, 128, 133, 140–41, 149, 161
Wyman, LTG Willard, USA: 163

Yoshida, Shigeru: 230, 237, 240–41
Yugoslavia: 26, 27, 45, 123, 128, 163, 235