Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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WORLDWIDE REPORT
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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SHEVARDNADZE 10 NOVEMBER PRESS BRIEFING ON REYKJAVIK

TASS Account

PML21715 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Nov 86 First Edition pp 4, 5

[TASS report: "To Preserve What Was Achieved in Reykjavik. Press Conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Excerpts] A press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center 10 November.

A statement was read at the press conference by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister.

As you know, he said, we held talks with U.S. Secretary of State Mr Shultz in Vienna 5 and 6 November.

These talks were not the sole purpose of our trip to the Austrian capital. The Vienna meeting of CSCE member states opened there on 4 November. This is why, in our statement at Vienna airport the morning of 6 November, we paid attention mainly to that meeting. As for the results of the talks with the secretary of state, they were described briefly and in a most general form.

Now that time makes it possible to analyze more thoroughly and compare the sides' positions at the Vienna talks, we are presenting to you the facts and our understanding of them.

First of all a few words about the objective we had set ourselves. After the Reykjavik meeting public statements by U.S. representatives gave very loose accounts of what was said at the Hofdi House. Facts which were memorable for us were presented in such a broad range of distortions that a natural desire developed to ask our recent interlocutors about the causes of this amazing discordance.
The main point was a desire to assure ourselves that the U.S. side remains committed to the accords agreed between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Reagan. If it does, is it prepared to continue work from the level that was reached, both politically and in terms of positions.

This question became the focus of the talks. We asked it with an insistence we have never before shown in asking our interlocutors about anything else.

We were forced to do this because we perceived immediately: They are trying to revise all aspects of the mutual understanding reached in Reykjavik and to retreat to pre-Reykjavik positions. They are aiming at rewriting the results of the talks between our countries' top leaders. They are telling us to accept a completely new package of questions which were supposedly discussed and a list of problems agreed upon in Iceland which has been pruned beyond recognition.

An amazing collection of papers essentially canceling everything that the sides arrived at in Reykjavik was placed on the table before us. All the levels and sublevels, ceilings and subceilings, all the expert arithmetic which we thought had been abandoned in the Icelandic capital for all time, resurfaced in order to obscure it again.

But the most amazing feature of our partners' stance was the fact that the global solution that was found in Reykjavik to the central problem — the elimination of the entire USSR and U.S. nuclear arsenals, primarily those of strategic offensive weapons, over a 10-year period — was flatly denied. Clear statements by the two countries' leaders on this account were entangled in a net of technical casuistry. The mesh of this net is so fine that nothing resembling accord can be seen through it.

As a direct participant in the talks in the Icelandic capital, I remember well how agreement in principle was reached on the entire package of nuclear disarmament measures. Apart from one, namely the SDI question. I presume that my interlocutor in Vienna also remembers it. In any case, President Reagan believed that the remaining questions in the package had been agreed. Mentioning tests of space weapons outside the laboratory as the only divergence, he said, and I quote: "But it is now a matter of just one word," to which M.S. Gorbachev relied, and I quote again: "Agree to a ban on tests in space — and we will sign a document in 2 minutes."

This was the divergence that was insurmountable at that time, and we parted expressing disappointment.

But the package itself — I will call it the package of agreements — remained, and its main feature was the sides' agreement to eliminate "all nuclear devices," in other words any nuclear arms, over a 10-year period. Incidentally, the U.S. President specifically named what precisely must be eliminated. Probably no type of nuclear weapon was left out of that list of his. In order to clarify this question once and for all, I am forced once again to cite the President's real words. This is what he said: "I want to ask: Do we intend — and I think that this would be very good — that all nuclear explosive devices, including bombs, battlefields weapons, cruise missiles, submarine weapons, intermediate-range means, and so on, will have been eliminated by the end of the two 5-year periods? If we agree that all nuclear weapons will be eliminated by the end of the 10-year period, we can pass this understanding over to our delegations in Geneva for them to prepare a treaty which you can sign during your visit to the United States."
Within the framework of this general and most important pledge, the sides agreed on the sequence of practical steps leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. They agreed that strategic offensive nuclear weapons would be reduced by one-half in the first 5 years.

The general secretary handed the U.S. President a table of figures on the structure of USSR and U.S. strategic forces and proposed that all means, including Soviet heavy missiles, be reduced by 50 percent. The U.S. President fully agreed to this.

It was also agreed that all remaining strategic offensive nuclear weapons would be eliminated during the second 5-year period. Here the U.S. side wished to clarify just one aspect: Will ballistic offensive missiles be destroyed in this process? The answer was in the affirmative.

According medium-range missiles was the second element of the "package of agreements." Its formula looks like this: zero medium-range missiles in Europe, plus a freeze on numbers of shorter-range missiles present there, plus a start to talks on them, plus the reduction to 100 of warheads on Soviet missiles in the Asian part of the USSR, with the United States being entitled to the same number of warheads on medium-range missiles on its own territory. Every component of this equation was mentioned separately, and the U.S. side gave its agreement to each one without any reservations or comments.

The question of nuclear tests was also part of the package. We proposed: starting talks to formulate an accord on the complete termination of nuclear tests, and also discussing in the course of these talks interim solutions — the limitation of nuclear tests in terms of yield and numbers, and the 1974 and 1976 treaties.

Finally, the "strategic defense" problem. Here too important mutual understanding in principle was also reached that the sides would not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years. But this was where a barrier appeared. It was created by the U.S. side's unwillingness to limit work on this program, its desire to get us at all costs to agree to the elimination of the ABM Treaty after a 10-year period during which the United States would prepare to deploy a space weapons system.

I am reproducing the course of the discussion and the accords that were reached in order to show: The Reykjavik package was integral for the sides, except for the SDI question and, partially, nuclear tests. All the rest was agreed in Reykjavik.

M.S. Gorbachev said all this with the utmost clarity at the press conference in the Icelandic capital only 1 hour after the conclusion of the meeting. He also spoke of it in his subsequent statements.

Unfortunately, both Vienna and now in Moscow, it is necessary to recall what is common knowledge in order to accurately put on record the line from which we and our partners intend to advance.

What we were offered in Vienna can only be likened to political theater of the absurd, with just one refrain being repeated: Reykjavik may have happened, but it was very different from the way you think.
Talks must be returned to the ground of reality. We had prepared in advance the document "Key Provisions of Agreements Between the USSR and the United States in the Sphere of Nuclear Disarmament Subject to Further Preparation for Signature," and we put it on the table in conversation with the secretary of state.

That was a kind of draft "framework agreement" which, had it been agreed by the ministers, it was intended to submit for approval by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President. The Geneva delegations would thus have received a firm basis for elaborating the texts of specific agreements.

The document outlined the basic parameters of understandings along all four avenues of the nuclear and space complex.

As regards strategic offensive weapons, we proposed to take as basis the accord in principle reached in Reykjavik that over the course of 5 years, in other words by the end of 1991, the sides would reduce their strategic forces by 50 percent to an equal number of delivery vehicles and warheads.

In order to preserve the features of the structure of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces, all types of strategic offensive armaments, including, of course, Soviet heavy ICBM's, would be liable to reduction.

As for long-range sea-based nuclear cruise missiles, which are not part of the strategic triad, it is envisaged that a separate mutually acceptable decision will be found on limiting their deployment.

Over the next 5 years, by the end of 1996, the remaining 50 percent of all Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive armaments would be eliminated as agreed in Reykjavik. Accordingly the sides' readiness to work toward reaching an agreement on the total elimination of all types of nuclear weapons over a 10-year period was also reflected.

The formula on medium-range missiles was also based entirely on the accords in Reykjavik. Leaving aside the question of the British and French nuclear potentials, the sides would sign an agreement on the total elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. Talks would be quickly started on missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km, the level of which would be frozen.

At the same time, an accord would also enter into effect on reducing Soviet medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country to the level of 100 warheads, with the United States having the right to deploy 100 warheads on such missiles on its own territory.

In view of the need to rule out the possibility — in conditions of such deep nuclear weapon cuts — of one side securing military superiority and disrupting the balance, we confirmed the proposal on agreeing that for a period of 10 years the USSR and the United States would not exercise their right to withdraw from the unlimited-duration ABM Treaty and would strictly observe all its provisions.

We did not insist that all research under the SDI program stop. Moreover, research and tests would be permitted inside the laboratory. There would be a ban, however, on testing ABM space elements in space. Over the next few years the sides could find further mutually acceptable solutions in this sphere in the course of negotiations.
The Soviet delegation advocated beginning high-level talks in the immediate future to determine what work on antimissile weapons is permitted by the ABM Treaty and what is not. The U.S. side was not enthusiastic about this idea.

We also suggested finding mutually acceptable accords on banning antisatellite weapons. This is a very important provision. The development [razrabotka] of antisatellite weapons could open a broad channel for evading a ban on the creation [sozdaniye] of space antimissile weapon systems. So this channel should be closed.

Finally, the fourth sphere -- banning nuclear tests. The Soviet Union has been and remains a resolute and convinced advocate of their immediate and total cessation. But in view of the existing situation, we proposed the immediate start of full-scale bilateral talks which must lead us to a total ban on nuclear explosions.

This, in a nutshell, is the content of the draft working document which we submitted for consideration by the U.S. side in Vienna. It fully reproduces what was agreed by the two countries' leaders in the Icelandic capital.

But the U.S. side set itself a different aim: to replace the Reykjavik package with a Viennese package from which the fundamental, key accord has been removed and the others have been diluted with a multitude of provisions, conditions, and one-sided interpretations.

So two concepts, two diametrically opposite approaches clashed in Vienna.

The Soviet Union sought to create a basis for the practical implementation of the accords reached in Reykjavik.

The United States tried to enshrine positions leading to an erosion of the Reykjavik soil.

We saw the scale of the Vienna conversations with Mr Shultz as large and fundamentally significant. That is the only way discussions must take place at the level of the two great powers' foreign ministers. This applies also to nuclear disarmament topics and to other aspects of Soviet-American relations.

For example, humanitarian problems. Although Reykjavik rather than human rights was the main topic of the Vienna conversations, contrary to the impression given later by the secretary of state, it was we who raised the question of the need for serious discussion of the whole humanitarian theme. It was pointed out to the secretary of state that an all-embracing and at the same time concrete and practical approach is needed here. In many countries, including the United States, very important provisions of the international bill of human rights are not observed and fundamental legal documents regulating citizens' rights and personal freedoms have not been ratified and therefore are not binding.

Domestic legislation in the United States abounds in examples of laws which do not accord with the provisions of international treaties and conventions and it sanctions discrimination, segregation, and the persecution of citizens for their views and beliefs. The situation is extremely bad as regards safeguarding citizens' socioeconomic rights: to work, equal pay, housing, social security, free education and medical assistance, and such like.
We expressed the hope that the U.S. side would back the idea of holding an all-European humanitarian conference in Moscow at which all these questions could be discussed in a concrete, principled, and businesslike way.

But, again, we did not feel that the U.S. side was seriously interested.

The conclusion is sad: Although possessing powerful industrial technology, the U.S. leaders are reluctant to provide themselves with the "technology" of modern political thinking. The existing system is based on confrontation and the primacy of force. While going on about the Soviet Union's alleged violation of the principle of equality, they are trying to destroy parity in all spheres — whether in the sphere of security or in the discussion of human rights issues.

It is simply incredible that Washington will not realize that any parity in relations between the great powers must be matched by parity of responsibility in their part. If the United States wishes to and can establish this, if it observes in relations with us the principle of equality in everything, we will together give back to mankind th hope of a better future.

I believe that I have established quite good working contacts with the secretary of state. Despite the profound differences of opinion, we have managed to find mutually acceptable solutions at the negotiating table. But my impression in Vienna was that the secretary of state preferred to delegate his main task to the experts in his delegation. This may be one of the reasons why we failed to talk more productively.

We believe that leaders must assume direct responsibility for the solution of fundamental questions. If we really want to remain at the Reykjavik level, in order to go on to the main peak, we must preserve what has been achieved. While continuing the work in Geneva, where, incidentally, on 7 November we submitted new proposals based on the Reykjavik accords, we must also hold meetings and implement contacts at a different, higher level. We also spoke insistently about this in Vienna. Although we received no answer, we still do not rule out the possibility of such contacts.

We are prepared for them.

Then E.A. Shevardnadze answered journalists' questions.

Question: How, since Vienna, would you describe the situation in relations between the United States and the USSR?

Answer: In terms of the Reykjavik yardstick, the U.S. side definitely took a step back in Vienna. Has the situation become more complex? Yes, it has, because the U.S. Administration, as I said in my statement, is essentially going back on the mutual understanding that was reached in Reykjavik. This is the whole problem.

Question: Can you tell me, please, how you will maintain the dialogue with the United States following the meeting with the secretary of state?

Answer: As for contacts between statesmen, diplomats, and representatives of various Soviet and U.S. departments. They will continue. [paragraph continued]
At any rate — and I said this in Vienna — the Soviet Union is prepared to develop contacts and to discuss problems of mutual interest. The other day talks ended in Washington on the question of peaceful cooperation in space. I would say they were fruitful talks — quite a good basis was prepared for concluding an appropriate agreement.

There are also contacts at other levels. The Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms are continuing and there the Soviet delegation, on behalf of the Soviet Government, has submitted new proposals on the basis of the accords achieved in Reykjavik.

As for contacts at a higher level, this question was not discussed at the foreign ministers' Vienna meeting. Time will show how far the U.S. Administration is prepared to go also as regards contacts at a higher level.

Question: It will soon be a year since the Geneva meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan. What new elements, in your opinion, have emerged in Soviet-American relations over the past year?

Answer: I believe that the most important one is Reykjavik and the accords achieved there. In our view the meeting in the Icelandic capital was a milestone, an event of uncommon importance, and not just in Soviet-American relations. It was in Reykjavik that mutual understanding on the most important problems of nuclear disarmament was achieved. And thus, when speaking about the post-Geneva period, we have to bear in mind above all the results of the talks between M.S. Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan in Reykjavik. The whole task is now to prevent backtracking on what has been achieved.

Question: How is the situation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms shaping up?

Answer: It would certainly be premature to draw any final conclusions. Guided by the principles agreed on in Reykjavik, we have submitted for discussion far-reaching comprehensive proposals on problems of nuclear and space arms.

The U.S. delegation has submitted its proposals. And I must say that they have disappointed us. They have disappointed us because they do not match the level which we jointly reached at the meeting in Reykjavik. This applies to the main elements of the U.S. proposals. To illustrate this I will cite a specific example. The United States is proposing to eliminate only the sides' ballistic missiles, rather than all strategic offensive arms, during the second stage of the 10-year period. It is thus excluding strategic bombers from the well known triad. I think that even children in the elementary grades understand now what is at issue, and what the U.S. Administration is seeking by introducing such a proposal. The aim here is to achieve military superiority.

After all, it is well known that the USSR's defensive might is based primarily on ICBM's. As for bombers, the United States has considerably more of them — almost four times as many. Hence the logical conclusion: The United States wants to secure a strategic advantage for itself. If the U.S. position is subjected to a more detailed analysis it becomes obvious that the proposals submitted by the U.S. delegation are flawed to a considerable degree.

Question: What, in your view, is the reason for the U.S. attempts to revise the results of Reykjavik?
Answer: I believe that the reason is that the ideas and realities of a nuclear-free world are incompatible with the ideology and practice of imperialism, of those U.S. circles which essentially determine the policy conducted by the present administration of that country. I am referring to the military-industrial complex. This is certainly the whole secret.

Question: Recently, and that includes that post-Reykjavik period, there has been much talk of the prospects for nuclear disarmament being complicated by unsolved problems of conventional arms reduction. How can this problem be overcome?

Answer: This linkage is farfetched and artificial. The Soviet approach makes provision for the comprehensive resolution of disarmament problems. The nuclear disarmament program set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January this year is an entirely specific, concrete program for the phased elimination of nuclear arsenals by the end of the current century. The realistic nature of this program was confirmed in Reykjavik, where mutual understanding was achieved on the elimination of all nuclear arsenals.

The selfsame program makes provision for the elimination of chemical weapons and all other means of mass destruction. On the basis of M.S. Gorbachev's concept, the Soviet delegation has submitted fundamental proposals at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. We went even further. Speaking in the GDR, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee expressed himself in favor of a substantial reduction of conventional arms in Europe. Subsequently, the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries put forward an impressive program in Budapest. It is a question of reducing the total numerical strength of the two alliances' forces by 1 million men.

I repeat, our approach to disarmament problems is a comprehensive one. People in the West are saying now that before nuclear arms can be eliminated, the positions on chemical weapons and conventional arms have to be clearly defined. The Soviet Union clearly stated its position on this account long ago. Our proposals on all these issues are on the negotiating table at the appropriate talks.

Question: The presidential election campaign is about to open in the United States. Why should you not wait until Reagan leaves his post?

Answer: This is a tricky question. We do not regard President Reagan as someone with whom it is impossible to conduct negotiations. The Geneva meeting and the talks in the Icelandic capital indicate that it is possible to do business with the current President, although we do not like the fact that after Reykjavik Reagan and his entourage began to revise, as it were, what had been achieved. But that is another question.

A second point. It is well known at what pace arms are being improved and built up. No time must be lost, not a day, still less 2 years. For this reason we favor the most dynamic actions to facilitate mankind's progress toward a nuclear-free world.

Question: How do you assess the U.S. stance on the idea of discussing conventional arms reduction issues at Stockholm-2?

Answer: Questions pertaining to conventional arms in Europe must be resolved with the participation of all European states and the United States and Canada. Unquestionably the second stage of the Stockholm conference must be given the appropriate mandate so that the necessary decisions can be adopted there.
In order to accelerate this process, we have proposed that contacts be established between working groups of Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. We discussed this idea in Vienna with Shultz, Genscher, Raimond, Howe, and others. So far we have not received a definite answer from them. As for the Americans, it must be said that they did show great enthusiasm for our proposal.

Question: Could you please clarify the specific conditions for the next Soviet-American summit. Must the two sides agree on the package put forward in Reykjavik or would it be possible to achieve a modest arms control agreement?

Answer: The Reykjavik package and the principles on which we agreed must be the guide at the talks on nuclear and space arms. I believe that this is the most sensible approach and accords with the interests of all the states and all the world's people.

Other questions were also answered.

TV Coverage of Briefing

LD102323 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2025 GMT 10 Nov 86

[Special program replacing "The World Today"; USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze answers questions from Soviet and foreign journalists at 10 November press conference at USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow, following Shevardnadze's statement on his talks with U.S. Secretary of State Shultz--recorded]

[Text] [Reporter in English fading into Russian translation] Mike Taylor from DAILY WORLD, PEOPLE'S DAILY WORLD. How would you now characterize the relations between the USSR and the United States after what happened in Reykjavik? Do you consider it to be a step backward, that the situation has become much more complicated? In other words, how would you characterize it?

[Shevardnadze] Speaking about the positions of the United States, then indisputably, this is a step backward. Has the situation become more complicated after Reykjavik? Indisputably, it has become more complicated because the United States, the U.S. Administration, as I have already said in my statement, is in essence retreating from those, so to speak, positions, from that mutual understanding, which was reached in Reykjavik. Herein lies the tragedy.
[Reporter in Russian] A question from Japanese television. Tell us please how will you continue the dialogue with the United States. Will there be any kind of changes in your approach to the United States after Reykjavik, after the Reykjavik and Vienna meetings?

[Shevardnadze] Concerning contacts between statement, diplomats, representatives of various departments of the Soviet Union and the United States — they are presently taking place and they will continue. That is how we understand the present situation.

In any case I talked about this in Vienna and have stated here the readiness of the Soviet Union to continue contacts and discuss those problems which, so to speak, are of mutual interest.

I stress that contacts are going on. It was just recently that talks ended on problems relating to peaceful cooperation in space. I would say that these were meaningful talks and quite a good basis, so to speak, has been prepared for the conclusion of an appropriate agreement. Contacts are also going on at other levels as well. The Geneva talks are continuing. I have already said that the Soviet delegation has submitted proposals on behalf of the Soviet Government. They are based on those understandings that were achieved at Reykjavik. As for contacts on a higher level, this problem was not discussed at the Vienna foreign ministers meeting. Well, time will tell what the U.S. Administration is prepared to embark upon from the point of view of contacts at a higher level.

[Reporter] Korolev from the NOVOSTI press agency. Could you tell us how the situation is presently taking shape at the talks on nuclear and space armaments in Geneva?

[Shevardnadze] It is probably premature to make final conclusion. I have said that we have presented large-scale, comprehensive proposals for examination at the talks. I have said that we were guided by the principles that were established at the Reykjavik summit meeting but only as far as the Soviet proposals are concerned. The U.S. delegation submitted its proposals even earlier. And I have to say that these proposals disappointed us. They disappointed us because they do not correspond to the height that had already been achieved at the Reykjavik summit meeting.

Just one example: The United States presented a proposal in which during the second stage of the scrapping of strategic offensive weapons, only ballistic missiles, and therefore ballistic missiles on submarines, would be scrapped.

In their proposals they exclude strategic bombers from the triad, the famous triad. I think that even elementary classes now understand what is at issue here and what the U.S. Administration is aiming for by putting forward such a proposal. By putting forward this proposal, the United States wants to preserve their strategic advantage to the end of this century at any price, to ensure for themselves strategic advantage. I have given just one example. If a more detailed analysis were made, I think the conclusion could be drawn that the proposals put forward by the U.S. delegation are to a considerable extent faulty.

[Reporter from Spanish National Radio in Spanish, fading into Russian translation] Do you think that in the situation that has taken shape after Reykjavik and Vienna a summit meeting between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev is already unnecessary?

[Shevardnadze] You know, we have always considered and now consider that a summit meeting is necessary and the Reykjavik meeting confirmed that indeed it is only at that level that solution to the most important global problems can be undertaken. These are our positions now. But you know our approach: We are in favor of a meeting leading to results. Our approach remains in force.
[Reporter] Two questions which in general go together, namely, is it not necessary to separate the question of reducing and destroying medium-range missiles by removing it from the negotiations and resolving it separately?

[Shevardnadze] You know, I do not believe that our work, our joint work on the entire range, on the whole package of mutual understandings — as we say, of the accords in Reykjavik, as we call them — has been finished, that there is no future to it. Incidentally, you have probably noticed the fact that I said in my statement that we suggested to the secretary of state at the Vienna meeting that we embark on talks on the main problem that has become a stumbling block, so to speak, about which we have not found, have not reached mutual understanding. That is the question of what the United States means by adhering in principle to and not abandoning the ABM treaty over a period of 10 years, I emphasize that this is a fundamental issue; in other words, what we understand by permitting or prohibiting work on the Strategic Defense Initiative, on antimissile defense, here our views diverge in a most profound and serious way. That was why we offered to the Americans, to the United States, to the U.S. Administration to embark on talks on this issue and shed some light precisely on this issue. That is the first point.

The second point is whether separate solutions are possible, on strategic or medium-range missiles. I believe that had we allowed this prospect, we would be backing down from Reykjavik, from the Reykjavik accords. What in reality is the situation like after Reykjavik? A completely new situation is shaping up after Reykjavik. We have been believing so far and we continue to believe that we had reached understanding with the U.S. Administration to eliminate all nuclear arsenals, including strategic offensive weapons, by the end of this century, and that we had reached mutual understanding on the issue of medium-range missiles. This is a completely new situation. I said in my statement that we see the results of Reykjavik and the proposals of the Soviet Union at the Geneva talks as a package of accord, of mutual understanding on these, so to speak, global issues of the present times, in the progress of mankind toward a nonnuclear world. I think that to break that package would be unjustified and unreasonable.

[ABC correspondent in English fading into superimposed Russian translation] (Rogers) of ABC. If you really think that the U.S. elections were a referendum on SDI then why doesn't the Soviet Government wait for Reagan to leave office. After all, the election campaign starts up again soon in the United States. Why not wait a bit?

[Shevardnadze] We do not think that it is impossible to hold talks with President Reagan. The Geneva meeting and the talks in Iceland, in the Icelandic capital, show that one can do business, one can hold talks with President Reagan. That is the first thing, although we do not like the fact, and this has really disappointed us. The fact that since Reykjavik the President and his entourage have begun to revise everything that was achieved. But that is another matter.

The second aspect of this question is that the President and the current administration remain in office for another 2 years. (You) are well aware of the rate and accordingly the volume by which the mountains of arms are growing. We think there is no time to lose, not even a single day, not to mention 1 or 2 years. Therefore, we are in favor of the most dynamic actions, the most vigorous actions to promote the resolution of this global problem involving the movement of mankind toward a nuclear-free world.

[Announcer] Comrade Shevardnadze also replied to other questions from journalists.
Radio on Journalists' Questions

LD102025 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1742 GMT 10 Nov 86

[Question and answer portion of 10 November press conference given by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow—recorded]

[Text] [PRAVDA correspondent] PRAVDA newspaper, Nikolay Brarin. Recently, and also after the Reykjavik meeting, a lot has been said about the possibility of reducing various types of weapons. Tell me what is your opinion? How can this problem be dealt with?

[Shevardnadze] A clarification is needed here. There are some problems that are invented, artificially created. Let us take the Soviet position, the Soviet approach to the disarmament problems. Our approach consists of taking a comprehensive view toward solving all disarmament problems. For example, the program on nuclear disarmament is quite a specific and realistic program for liquidating nuclear arsenals by the end of this century as set forth in a statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January this year. The realistic character of this program was confirmed at the Reykjavik meeting when, essentially, a mutual understanding was achieved on the liquidation of all nuclear arsenals.

In that same program, mention was made of the need for the liquidation of chemical weapons and of all types of weapons of mass destruction. After that, Comrade Gorbachev's proposal was to be developed at the Geneva conference, at which the Soviet delegation made what I would call the fundamental proposals on liquidation of chemical weapons.

Then we went further. Comrade Gorbachev, speaking in the GDR, expounded on our concept of a sharp reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. Then this concept was expounded upon more concretely and in greater detail in the statement in Budapest -- the Budapest agreement by the leaders of the Warsaw Pact member countries. This program is also impressive. You probably remember these figures -- to reduce to 1 million -- that is to say at the start of the 1990s the overall number of troops and corresponding armaments, and so on.

That is, we have precisely a comprehensive approach to matters concerned with the solution of disarmament problems. Now certain Western leaders and politicians are stating that if one is to talk about the liquidation of particular types of nuclear weapons, one must certainly also state one's position on chemical weapons, conventional weapons and so on. I think we stated our position long ago. During the course of this year we have defined our position regarding nuclear arsenals, chemical weapons, and conventional weapons. All these proposals lie on the table of the corresponding talks.

[NAN correspondent speaking in English fading into superimposed Russian translation] NIGERIA NEWS AGENCY: Do you think the Reykjavik meeting played any part in the latest elections in the United States in their results?

[Shevardnadze] I would not like to start analyzing in detail the results of the U.S. elections. That is the internal affair of this state, the internal affair of the American people. They decide who to cast their votes for, for what policy. But I -- since you have raised this subject -- I think the elections, and I wouldn't be mistaken if I say that the elections in the United States have become a sort of referendum primarily about the question of, the problems of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Why is that? You know well that President Reagan personally led the election campaign of the Republican Party. The main argument, among others, was indeed, so to speak, subject A, the Strategic Defense Initiative.
If one is to judge from the results of the voting, despite the fact that only 37 percent — if I am not mistaken — of the adult population of the United States took part in the voting, if one is to judge from the results of the voting then one can say that the majority of the U.S. voters are not in favor of this program. Perhaps I am mistaken in making this evaluation but it did seem to me that this really was in some sense a referendum precisely on the problems of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

[ABC correspondent in English fading into superimposed Russian translation] Rogers of ABC. If you really think that the U.S. elections were a referendum on SDI then why doesn't the Soviet Government wait for Reagan to leave office. After all, the election campaign starts up again soon in the United States. Why not wait a bit?

[Shevardnadze] That is a mean question. [laughs] We do not think that it is impossible to hold talks with President Reagan. The Geneva meeting and the talks in Iceland, in the Icelandic capital, show that one can do business, one can hold talks with President Reagan. That is the first thing, although we do not like the fact, and this has really disappointed us, the fact that since Reykjavik the President and his entourage have begun to revise everything that was achieved. But that is another matter.

The second aspect of this question is that the President and the current administration remain in office for another 2 years. (?you) are well aware of the rate and accordingly the volume by which the mountains of arms are growing. We think that we must not lose time, not even a single day not to mention 1 or 2 years. Therefore, we are in favor of the most dynamic actions, the most vigorous actions to promote the resolution of this global problem involving the movement of mankind toward a nuclear free world.

[LE MONDE correspondent] Newspaper LE MONDE. At present, a summit conference of CEMA member countries' representatives is taking place in Moscow. In the West they believe that this conference is discussing two kinds of problems: first, Soviet criticism of the poor quality of industrial goods that are imported from various CEMA member countries; and the second problem — again from the Western point of view — is dissatisfaction on the part of some CEMA members over the excessive price of the oil they buy from the Soviet Union. I would like to know what your opinion is on this question, and regarding these problems.

[Shevardnadze] Yes, indeed, the leaders, the foremost leaders of the countries of the socialist community, not only the countries of the Warsaw Pact, are meeting in Moscow. Such meetings have recently certainly acquired a systematic character. They are brought about by the fact that fundamental problems concerning relations between our states are examined and resolved at these very important forums. An exchange of experience takes place, especially at the present stage when in our country and in other socialist countries there is a process of restructuring under way — restructuring of the mechanism of the national economy and restructuring of the mechanism of foreign economic cooperation. All these problems demand discussion and coordination. That is one side, one group of the questions which are probably being discussed and will be discussed at this meeting.

As for the second problem: When political leaders meet, the foremost leaders of their countries, they cannot help but discuss problems at the international level, problems of international cooperation. Questions of international cooperation and questions concerning the coordination, if you like, of our efforts in the international arena will certainly be discussed at the summit meeting of the countries of the socialist community.

[Announcer] Comrade Shevardnadze also answered other questions from correspondents.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: U.S. REACTION TO REYKJAVIK

'Attempt To Justify U.S. Obstructionism'

PML40831 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch under general heading "The Echo of Reykjavik: Seeing the Historical Perspective"]

[Text] Washington, 13 Oct -- All leading U.S. television companies are now turning time and again to events of the last 2 days in an attempt to understand what happened, why it was that the reported movement [povedenye] of the sides toward major agreements turned into bitter failure. At the end of the first day's exchange of opinions NBC-TV reported: "U.S. delegation members consider that M.S. Gorbachev is displaying a readiness for cooperation and wants to lead Soviet-U.S. relations along a more stable and more predictable course. The main stress is on arms control, and everyone appraised this as a good omen in terms of the possibility of reaching agreement."

The second day of discussions also began with a fairly optimistic appraisal of the prospects for accord. Every half-hour, interrupting their programs, the television companies "measured the pulse," offered their analysis, made forecasts. But the announcement that the meeting had failed in literally the last few hours caught them unawares. "Following long talks and what appeared to be the likelihood of progress at midday, now there is not even agreement to meet again," NBC's anchorman reported from Reykjavik.

Analyzing the events, all the mass news media without exception declare that the reason for the collapse of the talks is rooted in Washington's stubborn unwillingness to abandon the "star wars" program which, according to UPI, "cut the ground from under the final agreement." Reporting and citing in detail M.S. Gorbachev's statement at the press conference in Iceland's capital, the U.S. press, radio, and television admit the validity of the Soviet arguments and note the desire displayed by the Soviet Union for specific steps in the arms control sphere. It was no accident that the ABC correspondents covering the Reykjavik meeting voiced the opinion that "the Soviet Union emerged as the moral victor from the meeting." One of them stated that the tenor of the talks unambiguously showed that the sides could have achieved major reductions of strategic weapons and medium-range missiles and consolidation of the ABM Treaty if only President Reagan had made concessions on SDI. "For many people, including the U.S. European allies, responsibility for the meeting's failure lies with Reagan," a special news report by the television company said. THE WASHINGTON POST essentially admits that the U.S. Administration has on its mind what the U.S. military-industrial complex has on its mind. The newspaper writes: "Being a flourishing program of research and development, SDI enjoys powerful support from the creators of weapons."
Observers indicate that Reykjavik has now raised a question about the administration's entire approach toward arms control. "The President declared that arms upgrading is necessary before disarmament. Congress has given him everything he requested in terms of appropriations for new weapon systems, including SDI. But his theory failed to work here," ABC noted.

As if admitting the fairness of this conclusion, the President and his entourage launched a feverish attempt to justify the U.S. obstructionism. But the statements made by Reagan, Shultz, and White House Chief of Staff Regan were so contrary to well-known facts that they hardly made any great impression on anyone. Republican Senator R. Lugar was alone among the first to react to the news from Reykjavik in supporting the U.S. delegation's actions, finding nothing better than to praise the President for what he called avoiding the "Soviet trap." [paragraph continues]

"A sad day for mankind," was how Senator C. Pell described the collapse of the talks, noting: "Essentially we rejected a bird in the hand -- the reduction of strategic arms, for the sake of two in the sky -- SDI." "I deeply regret the inability to reach the accord which was only just round the corner," he said. President Reagan "made a mistake," Senator C. Mathias stated. "It is obvious that the administration is incapable of ensuring peace throughout the world," Representative T. Coelho declared. Senator S. Nunn predicted that the "star wars" program will be subject to greater criticism than ever before on Capitol Hill. "Many legislators share the USSR's arguments on SDI," ABC-TV added.

The same point was made in a conversation with your correspondent by Rear Admiral G. Larocque, retired, director of the prestigious Center for Defense Information. "I think," he said, "that M.S. Gorbachev's arguments are shared by many Americans. It was SDI that wrecked the talks, and this is tragic. Reagan preferred to reply more on defense against missiles than on reducing or even eliminating missiles. This is the essence of the problem. I am convinced that we must move in the direction of missile reductions. We are missing a real chance."

Commentaries in the U.S. mass news media are now dominated mainly by question marks. No one dares predict the future of Soviet-U.S. relations where, in THE WASHINGTON POST's opinion, "a period of uncertainty and tension lies ahead." But it seems that many Americans agree with the words of Senator Pell, who declared: "Let us hope that a reconsideration will convince the President to move toward the achievement of the historic accord which we almost achieved."
'Whitewashing' of U.S. Policy

LD241423 Moscow TASS in English 1408 GMT 24 Oct 86

["Washington in Pursuit of the Ghost"—TASS identifier]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshov comments:

The propaganda campaign, which was mounted in the United States with an eye to whitewashing the administration's non-constructive policy at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, is focussed on the defence of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) disgraced at Reykjavik.

In so doing, they in Washington are not avert [as received] to anything if only to conceal from the world public the true purpose of the American "Star Wars" programme. They certainly keep silent about those official documents of the Pentagon where all this is laid down, as one should say, plainly frankly.

Take, for instance, the defence directive for 1984-1988 which nobody refuted and abrogated. This document, which is fundamental for military construction, provides for developing space-based systems, including means to destroy Soviet satellites, and the crash effort to develop systems of the anti-missile defence of U.S. territory. The document projects the possibility of the United States breaking out of the ABM treaty. It expressly formulates one of the purposes of the "measures" of this kind when it says that military rivalry with the USSR should be channelled into new areas so as to make senseless all previous Soviet expenditures on defence and make all Soviet weapons obsolete.

The U.S. President himself confirmed those calculations on May 22, 1984, that is already after he proclaimed the SDI, by stating that they (Russians) would be unable to compete with the United States and would fail to withstand the contest in building up armaments.

Gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union and ensuring the United States' readiness for waging war so as to force the USSR within short terms to half combat operations on the United States' conditions have been announced as the principal tasks of the direct confrontation between the United States and the USSR, which was proclaimed by U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger in June 1981. [sentence as received]

As the afore-mentioned directive details it, the Pentagon is instructed to be prepared effectively to wage war with the use of space-based systems. The United States should not sign treaties which would be in the way of developing weapons systems in space adding power to the existing potential, since having opened new areas of military rivalry they can change the correlation of forces in the United States' favour.

Such are the "philosophy" and the directives to the executive branches which reflect the true policy and practice of the current U.S. administration. All this confirms anew the fact that SDI is the ingredient of the U.S. military doctrine whose essence is the drive for the ghost of military superiority.
In Washington they clearly forget history and do not take into account the simple truth that the Soviet Union will not sit back, that it will do everything to thwart the adventurist plans of the overseas figures.

This was already the case involving the attempt at "nuclear blackmail", in response to which the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear shield. The same took place when the United States tried to leave the Soviet country far behind as regards the power of the nuclear potential. This will be the case in any attempt to upset the military-strategic balance. Our country does not intend to copy the American SDI. The response to it will be asymmetric but by all means effective.

'Campaign To Revise Outcomes' Deplored

LD251528 Moscow TASS in English 1512 GMT 25 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 25 TASS -- We do not have the opportunity so far to say that we see a new approach to the negotiations in Geneva on the American side, the approach which would be determined by the outcomes of the Reykjavik meeting, by what was agreed there, said Viktor Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva.

Responding to journalists' questions at a briefing devoted to some aspects of the talks at Reykjavik held here today, he noted that the U.S. side possibly needs some time to grasp what took place on Reykjavik, draw conclusions and give respective directives to its delegation.

Let us wait and see, he said. But the campaign to revise the outcomes of the Reykjavik session, which is being carried out by the U.S. side, puts one on one's guard. It is alarming from the point of view of prospects for the talks in Geneva.

In any case, on behalf of the Soviet side I can say that the results of the talks at Reykjavik are in the arsenal of the Soviet delegation in Geneva, Viktor Karpov said furthermore. The Soviet delegation conducts the talks proceeding precisely from what was reached at Reykjavik.
Distortion of Picture Seen

LD251626 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1515 GMT 25 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, 25 Oct (TASS) — The further we move away in time from Reykjavik, the more openly the mass media of a right-wing persuasion and U.S. Administration figures distort the picture of what happened in the Icelandic capital, and strive retrospectively to adjust it, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh has stated. He spoke today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists which took place here.

There is concern, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said, at the fact that attempts are being made in the United States to give a completely false interpretation of the accords achieved. Whereas initially there was a fairly busy campaign there to appropriate proposals which did not belong to it, aimed at achieving a nuclear-free world, now there has begun a sort of disownment of the fact that these proposals were discussed and agreed upon at all.

The latest example of this is an official document published the other day prepared for the enlightenment of government officials, who are instructed to speak from positions distorting what really took place at the meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President.

In particular it is maintained in the U.S. Administration's document that in Reykjavik President Reagan merely noted the USSR's position about the fact that all strategic offensive weapons should be eliminated by the end of a 10-year period of cutting down on strategic weapons.

Supposedly the talks were mainly about the initial U.S. plan which envisaged that, in contrast to the first 5-year stage, when, at the proposal of the USSR, all three elements of the strategic triad of both sides would be subject to a reduction of 50 percent, in the second stage only ballistic missiles would be reduced. In maintaining this the United States would like to leave out heavy bombers with cruise missiles and other nuclear weapons on board.

In reality the matter was as follows: At the beginning of talks the U.S. side came out with the aforementioned proposal. However, after concrete arguments and reasoning put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in favor of a radical solution to the problem of strategic weapons, which would not put beyond limits the elimination of other dangerous types of nuclear weapons besides ballistic missiles, President Reagan agreed with such a formulation of the question. He said bluntly, and I quote: "Obviously we simply misunderstood you, but, if this is what you want — all right".

It is characteristic that in the course of the conversation President Reagan did not object to a broader approach either, having given to understand that he is not against having all nuclear explosive devices, including bombs, battlefields devices, cruise missiles, submarine weapons, intermediate-range weapons and so on scrapped by the end of the two 5-year periods. Moreover, the President said the following, and again I quote: "If we agree that by the end of the 10-year period all nuclear arms are to be scrapped, we can hand this accord over to our delegations in Geneva so that they can prepare a treaty which you will be able to sign during your visit to the United States".

It is the agreement of the U.S. side, registered in this statement by the President, with such a radical solution of the nuclear arms problem, proposed in the Soviet program of 15 January 1986, which made it possible to reach a mutually acceptable accord on offensive strategic arts in Reykjavik.
In discussing this problem the U.S. President, one can say, in the final reckoning manifested an essential sense of responsibility, A. Bessmertnykh stated. Unfortunately, this did not occur in the discussion of the SDI issue. However, that is another issue. The essence of it was fully revealed by Mikhail Gorbachev in his speeches to the Soviet people.

Now in Washington somebody is trying to step back from the positions on which accord was reached in Reykjavik between the top leaders of the USSR and the United States and also — deliberately or otherwise — to cast a shadow over the President. The document I have mentioned and other evidence of a similar type speak of the fact that forces have stirred up which do not like the accords reached in Reykjavik which open up the way to radical reductions in the United States' and the USSR's strategic arsenals and a nuclear-free world. That is indeed why efforts are being undertaken to confuse people. The final aim of those who are trying to place in the President's mouth words which he did not speak, and take back words which he uttered, is quite obvious — to halt the process in favor of nuclear disarmament which is gathering strength and which interests all the people in the world, the USSR deputy foreign minister emphasized.

Effect on Elections

LD081138 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 8 Nov 86

["Top Priority" program presented by Vladimir Pozner with Dr Radomir Bogdanov and Dr Sergey Plekhanov of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada]

[Excerpt] [Pozner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. This is Vladimir Pozner presenting "Top Priority". With me on the panel as usual are Doctors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of Moscow's USA and Canada Studies Institute, and although probably we'll look at this particular issue in greater deal in one of our next, in one of our future programs, I would like you to give at least a brief reaction to the midterm elections in the United States which saw undoubtedly a victory for the Democrats and what would have to be called a blow struck against the Administration. Dr Bogdanov?

[Bogdanov] Yes, my point is that, I would prefer to talk about that at length maybe some other time, maybe we will devote a special, you know, time to share our views with our American listeners over there, but my first reaction of course is, is of taking into account a very major fact, of the shift and change in the American public opinion. That's what I'm taking as a very serious, you know, sign on the American political scene. And I would like to let out a secret to our American listeners over there. Just one day before the elections we at our place gathered a group of very knowledgeable experts and we have made a blitz, if you like, a blitz analysis. What do we expect? And we have a rather, you know, division of opinions; myself and my friend Dr Plekhanov, we were on the side of people who believed in Democratic victory, not because we are (?telling) it now but really as a student of America, students of American political, you know, domestic politics, we were of very strong opinion that the Senate will be captured by Democrats.
[Pozner] OK. So your view is that these elections, without going in to further detail, these elections speak of an important change in the minds of the average American.

[Bogdanov] Let me put it like that: It's a major shift in the American public...

[Pozner, interrupting] OK, Dr Plekhanov, what would you say, as briefly as possible?

[Plekhanov] I think that this is a cyclical phenomenon. Usually the party in power, after 6 years in power, loses control of the U.S. Congress. Now, of course Republicans never actually gained control of the House of Representatives, but they did have control of the Senate for 6 years, and they've now lost it, which was very predictable. I think an important aspect of the election is that Mr Reagan chose to make Star Wars the issue in a number of important states, and as far as I know about the results, almost nowhere that worked. In fact it may have had the opposite effect. So, if, to the extent that a majority of American voters are on the negative side of that issue.

[Pozner] Well that's a very interesting point, that you draw that conclusion, when you consider that shortly after Reykjavik there were polls conducted, as you know, in the United States that seemed to indicate that up to three-quarters of the population supported SDI, and if you're right, Dr Plekhanov, then when you say that SDI was an issue and it was an issue, because clearly President Reagan made it an issue during the campaign, and if you're saying that not only did that issue not work but it backfired...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] May have backfired.

[Pozner]...may have backfired, then those polls were clearly not accurate, perhaps because of the way the questions were asked or for whatever other reasons.

[Bogdanov] Ah, you know, my point is that the questions, first of all the questions were wrong.


[Bogdanov] Yes, then the major problem was that the Americans, the American public opinion was not informed what the President has rejected [as heard].

[Pozner] In other words, they were not told what the Soviet offer was?

[Bogdanov] Exactly, they were not told what the Soviet offer was. And I'm sure, I'm absolutely positive, that if Americans knew what all, what has discussed in Reykjavik, what Gorbachev has thrown on the table, their answer would be very much different. That's my point.

[Pozner] Are you saying that they might have learned more between at the end of Reykjavik and the elections and that because of what they learned they were not so much supportive of SDI as they might have been? Is that what you're saying?
[Plekhovnov] Let me say a couple of words on that. I think that there was a negative reaction to the appearance of the President, of President Reagan, either not being really much to the point as to what went on in Reykjavik, not really very well informed or maybe forgetting what he had agreed to at the talks with Mr Gorbachev, or simply trying to cover something up. I think the maneuverings, the various versions which were put forward by the Administration in the weeks after Reykjavik, I think have made a negative impact on American public opinion. But the important thing is that the election was decided not so much by foreign policy but by economic, social issues; by personalities. I think we should not overestimate the impact of foreign policy issues on this election.

[Bogdanov] Sergey, let me disagree with you. You know, I agree with you basically that foreign policy issues were not on the core of the campaign. But the Administration and the President himself were trying to make foreign policy issues main issues of the campaign, and my impression was that they were trying to cover all their difficulties with economy, with the industrial growth rate and with everything, you know, by foreign policy issues. Trying to pose as big winners in the eyes of the electorate. In that sense I do not agree with you that they were not upfront. They were, but the electorate didn't accept the Administration's position.

[Pozner] Thank you, both of you. We've said that we will examine the elections in greater detail in another program. We've used up about half of our time already. [passage omitted]

Further on Election Results

LD071133 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 6 Nov 86

[Text] The results of the midterm elections in the United States, in which the Democrats retained their control of the House of Representatives and won a majority in the Senate, are widely discussed in the world (press). Nikolay Borin has asked the political observer Vladimir Posner (for an assessment of the Soviet) reaction to the election results:

[Posner] I'd say first of all that the Soviet reaction has been very cautious. There is a general feeling that evidently President Reagan has been dealt a serious blow. I have not yet heard any kind of majority opinion here as to the reasons for this, although there seems to be a general, I would say, understanding of a link at this point between the way the President tried to sell the Republican candidates on the idea of SDI and telling the voters that by voting for candidates who supported SDI they were (?voting for President Reagan). And that seems to have backfired. (?I think) the Soviet assessment has been one of great caution [words indistinct].

[Borin] (?So you) share the opinion of (?influential) [words indistinct] which ways that the Democrats are likely to use their new strength to (?support Reagan's Star Wars program).

[Posner] Again, I would [words indistinct]. I don't think that the Democrats are a party are against SDI. Among the Democrats you have your conservative element and you have your more liberal element; you have those who have been consistently against SDI and you have quite a strong segment that has been pro-SDI. [passage indistinct]

Gradually, as the American people have begun to learn that SDI was the major if not the only roadblock along the road to an historically important (?agreement) that would bring about nuclear disarmament [words indistinct].
Borin] [Words indistinct] by American polls after Reykjavik that supposedly three-quarters of the American population support SDI?

Posner] I have a strong feeling that that is not the case. My feeling is that the questions were asked in a way that brought about this kind of reaction. (I'm almost certain) people were asked if they thought that some kind of detente against nuclear missiles was a good thing, and of course most people would say yes. But had they been asked, [words indistinct] Reykjavik, had they been asked: Would you support limiting SDI to the confines of a laboratory for 10 years in exchange for the total abolition [words indistinct] of all Soviet and American offensive nuclear strategic weapons, I'm certain that more than 75 percent, 90 percent of the people would have said yes.

So, when we get back to the Democrats, the Democrats now in power are going to look to this [word indistinct], that is to say to the popular view, and in one way or another reflect that view, so I do think that President Reagan is going to run into more trouble with SDI than he has (before), but it would not be right to say the Democrats are [words indistinct], that would be a simplification.

Borin] Vladimir, do you think the Democrats really want to change the (?)course of United States foreign policy, or has American society become [words indistinct] imperial privileges?

Posner] That's an interesting question. I do think that America has become very conservative, there's no doubt about that. (If you look) over the past 10 years or so you'll see the pendulum swinging to the right and of course the fact that President Reagan was elected in 1980 and reelected in 1984 is a confirmation of that. On the other hand we cannot and should not forget where America comes from, it (?)started off from a very liberal beginning. [passage indistinct]

Now do the Democrats want to change the course of foreign policy? Some do. (?)Now this is not necessarily a (betther way). They may want to change it in a way that is not good (at all). But generally speaking I would say that the Democrats are less inclined to [word indistinct] a very aggressive foreign policy in the sense of intervention in Latin America [words indistinct], run counter to the very, very conservative, right-wing policies that we've seen coming out of the White House over the past (?)years. And again, as far as American society goes, while it is now quite conservative, I don't believe that we should write it off and say forget about America, [words indistinct]. I think it will come back.

Borin] Thank you, Vladimir Posner.

Posner] Thank you.

SDI, Elections

PM101222 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[T. Kolesnichenko article: "Sobering Up"]

[Text] In the U.S. political arena, silence has fallen, as if after a noisy carnival. [paragraph continues]
Portraits of candidates from the rival parties still smile out of the store windows and brash election slogans still cover the house fronts, but the slanting November rain is already washing them under the feet of passers-by, who trample them indifferently into the fall slush. Who needs yesterday's promises? People hardly believe them even before the elections, and they forget them the day after the votes have been counted...

However, the election results are being thoroughly discussed and evaluated. They have moved, so to speak, from the street booths to the computer laboratories and the "analysts'" offices, where the total sum of votes is broken down by states, districts, and counties in order once again to recreate the overall picture of the countrywide vote.

This will take not days, but weeks. But it is already clear that this year's elections to the U.S. Congress were an important milestone in the country's history. Their main peculiarity is that the Republicans' and Democrats' election campaign was not conducted solely or mainly around the traditional domestic problems. This time the struggle was focused on the administration's foreign policy, and above all the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). That is not surprising. The Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik was a "moment of truth" which showed who is who and what is what. Even the most political Americans wanted to know why a unique opportunity was wasted in Reykjavik, although the sides were on the threshold of adopting historic decisions in the disarmament sphere, and whether SDI, which was the stumbling block, was really worth renouncing the elimination of nuclear weapons, which threaten to destroy all mankind, including, of course, America itself.

This fact itself determined the Republicans' strategy for the elections. The task set was to use any available means (including outright deception and disinformation) to distort the meaning of the Reykjavik talks and depict the meeting as a "victory for the United States." This applied particularly to SDI, all the more so in that the Democrats, catching the voters' mood, opened precision fire against it. Then the U.S. President himself intervened in the election campaign. Like a real traveling salesman, he traveled around the country (more than 25,000 miles), visiting 23 states and delivering 54 speeches. In every speech the emphasis was on SDI.

It appears that SDI has two "faces." One is turned toward the outside world, above all the Soviet Union. We are assured that SDI is by no means a "Star Wars" program, nor the insertion of new weapons into space, nor, of course, a first-strike weapon. In general, what is so bad about destroying not people, but only ballistic missiles?

But then the President addresses an American audience, and everything falls into place. Now the dark face of the god of war shows through SDI's "defensive" mask. It is strategic might, America's "Invulnerability," its position of strength. But I will not make unsubstantiated remarks, let us hear the U.S. President himself.

This, for instance, is a quotation from his election speech in the city of Tampa (Florida): "Florida does not need a senator who doubts the need for SDI (meaning the Democratic Party candidate -- T.K.) -- an insurance policy in the sphere of security. A few days before I set off for this rally, the liberals in Congress tried to cut SDI appropriations as much as possible. While I was preparing for talks with the Russians, they were trying to eliminate one of the factors which was of prime importance in making (!) the Russians go to the talks... We have made great progress -- despite the fact that meanwhile the liberals were rebelling, wailing, and fighting us -- in the matter of renewing and restoring our military might... Permit me to add: Nothing gives me greater pride than the 2 million young men and women who serve in the U.S. Armed Forces. [paragraph continues]
And if we ever have to call on them to put their lives on the line for the sake of America, than they deserve to be provided with the best weapons and equipment that money can buy."

Forgive me this lengthy quotation, but in my view it is worth it, in order to hear from the President's own mouth, at last, that SDI is "the best weapon that money can buy." Especially since this phrase is a word for word repetition of what R. Reagan said earlier, at an election rally in Grand Forks (North Dakota). In general, R. Reagan's rhetoric on the subject of SDI does not sparkle with variety. Here is what he said in Baltimore (Maryland) on 15 October: "SDI is an insurance policy for America that the Russians will start observing the arms control accords they have agreed to. SDI was one of the main reasons which prompted the Russians to go to the summit meeting, and is one of the main reasons why they will go there again.

"SDI is the key to peace. Don't let the liberals in Congress give it up."

All these propagandist invocations, it seemed to the White House, were falling on well prepared ground. Public opinion polls carried out before Reykjavik showed that some 70 percent of Americans consider SDI a "good idea." Apart from "invulnerability." as has been instilled into the Americans, SDI will lead to an economic boom for America and will virtually eliminate unemployment. Even in the first days after Reykjavik support for SDI in similar polls was very weighty.

So why did a sobering-up tendency follow, why did the elections, which the President himself had practically turned into a referendum on his policy, and first and foremost on SDI, bring the Republicans defeat and put the Democrats in front? There are a number of reasons for this, it seems to me.

First, the "echo of Reykjavik" and above all Moscow's accurate and honest exposition of the facts about what happened at the talks in the Icelandic capital, reached America and revealed the full absurdity of Washington's propaganda campaign and its distorted logic. To the credit of many Americans, they did not believe the fairy tales that the "position of strength" expressed in SDI "led the Soviet Union to the talks and to concessions."

Second, practical Americans subsequently began to realize that their President had lost, substituting a chimera for the Soviet Union's real proposals on an unprecedented scale, proposals which, unlike SDI, would ensure universal security, including U.S. security. It was this that the Democrats mainly focused attention on. Their potential candidate for the 1988 presidential elections, Senator Hart, made a special statement. "'Star Wars. ' he said, "is now the main obstacle in the path of the most promising arms control agreement ever to have been proposed." He is echoed by THE NEW YORK TIMES, which traditionally supports the Democrats. In connection with SDI, it observes: "The administration's position is dictated by the pursuit of the illusion of possible superiority; it is provocative and is detrimental to America itself, since it leads to the acceleration of the arms race, the cost and danger of which are matched only by its futility."

It may be said that the voters finally saw, too, that the SDI program will not deliver them from their domestic problems, but will only aggravate these, exacerbate the state of the economy, and lower their living standard. Billions of dollars have been flung into the Pentagon's bottomless coffers on the pretext of "strengthening the country's security." But where is that security, has it really been achieved? Now the taxpayers are asked to spend, from their own pockets, not billions, but several trillion dollars on the development of SDI. [paragraph continues]
America is already in debt because of its fantastic budget deficit. So SDI is not an "insurance policy," but a "bankruptcy policy" (as the Democrats have shown), a path leading into an even deeper pit of debt.

Last, but perhaps most important: The Republicans hoped that the President's personal popularity (and this phenomenon exists and is still not fully understood) will make it possible, with his participation, to fool the voters, pass off black as white, and misrepresent the essence of the Reykjavik talks. But this did not happen. In an article "Charm and Facts," published on the eve of the elections, THE WASHINGTON POST, analyzing the President's election rhetoric, comes to the conclusion that he had not succeeded in convincing many voters of anything. "The President's political approach to the summit meeting in Iceland is more appropriate to a movie scenario which rejects the happy ending than to a situation where you are dealing with facts...

"But he knows, or in any case should know, that it is irresponsible to present the results of the summit meeting in a false light, guided by considerations of party advantage."

Even after the elections the same old songs have been heard from the White House. The President repeats that he will pursue a "position of strength" policy, that SDI is one of the main supports of the "bridge to a just peace." It is not impossible that the indoctrination of Americans over SDI will take on an even larger scale. The administration has evidently decided to keep right on. But is that what the Americans want?

By way of conclusion, let us quote R. Byrd, Democratic leader in the Senate. "The President saw the elections as a referendum on his policy, and the election results should be a warning to him." Those who have ears, let them hear!

U.S. Trying To 'Crawl Quietly Away'

LD092144 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 9 Nov 86

["International Observers Roundtable" program with political observers Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobys and Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, and All-Union Radio Commentator Viktor Nikolayevich Levin]

[Excerpt] [Shishlin] Now what is happening? The United States is actually trying, well, if not to pull out of what happened in Reykjavik, then somehow or other to crawl quietly away from it. But they will not succeed—it is impossible. Already it is impossible. What Reykjavik has done, essentially, is to mark the possibility of breaking through to a qualitatively different state of international relations; and indeed, it has ensured that that breakthrough will happen. The achievement of completely real results, the materialization of the accords that were outlined in Reykjavik, is a task for the future; but that objective has now been established in such a way that, well, no one can lose sight of it.
[Kobysh] It seems to me that recently, beginning with Geneva, mankind has been experiencing an absolutely, qualitatively new state; new processes are underway, and we have indeed arrived at a hitherto unexplored situation which is new and opens great vistas. If one were to sum up what happened in Geneva and in Reykjavik, two extraordinarily important, historically important, states emerge: in Geneva, the U.S. President, together with the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, agreed that nuclear war must not be waged; that no one can win such a war; and that nuclear rivalry is impossible. In Reykjavik, they actually got to the point of agreeing — and that agreement has practically been put on paper — that nuclear weapons can be destroyed. In other words, we are already talking about practical matters. Now, of course, they may slip out of that accord, they may befog the issue, but the agreement is there. It reflects the objective reality of today's world.

[Levin] Speaking at the reception for the 69th anniversary of the October Revolution, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said very clearly that now, since Reykjavik, a new situation has been created in international relations. The problems you have just been talking about, Vitaliy Ivanovich, reflect this. The struggle to abolish nuclear weapons has now been put on a qualitatively new, practical plane. On 15 January of this year, the Soviet Union put forward the idea of abolishing nuclear weapons by the year 2000; and at the time, many people said this was utopian. Yet at Reykjavik, agreement began to take shape on abolishing nuclear weapons in 10 years or even sooner.

So what I want to emphasize is that even the U.S. side no longer sees this as utopian, though the opposition on the U.S. side to realizing this concrete task is clearly in evidence. Here, of course, we come to a very interesting and very complex question: Why is the United States so keen to back-pedal? Why? The meetings that Comrade Shevardnadze had in Vienna with Shultz also showed that the United States is trying to retreat from Reykjavik. This question is by no means devoid of interest.

[Kobysh] But then again, Viktor Nikolayevich, as a generality, it unfortunately has to be said that none of this comes as a surprise. Of course, Reykjavik, in this dramatic nuclear-missile age, has for the first time shown and proved that it is possible to reach agreement irrespective of the fact that, say, the United States may have its own opinion of our ideology and our view of the world, and we may have our opinion of U.S. ideology and the U.S. outlook, and for that matter, on the way the Americans conduct themselves in international affairs. But then what happens? The next thing that happens is that the Americans, having declared Reykjavik to be a success, start backing out of it. Not only do they themselves go into reverse, offering their own versions of what happened in Reykjavik, though it is always possible to prove what really happened in Reykjavik; but they start applying brakes which, frankly, one might have assumed existed, but one hardly could have expected them to be activated so quickly.

What I have in mind in this instance is the position of the West Europeans. We have had the French foreign minister declare that the abolition of nuclear weapons — including, by the way, nuclear weapons in Europe — would call into question relations between the United States and its European allies.
[Kobysh] It is the same thing, the same thing.

[Shishlin] Allow me to quote what President Reagan said immediately after the elections, which the London FINANCIAL TIMES defined as follows: President Reagan has suffered his worst political defeat in the entire period since he came to power in 1981. So what did the President say immediately after the elections? The task now facing us is very simple. In order to complete the revolution we started so well, it is essential to realize a number of goals: We must make the United States more prosperous and more productive and our planet more peaceful. Well, isn't that splendid! He continued: We must preserve our military readiness, strive to develop and introduce new technologies, and this means SDI as well. In this way, the bridge leading to a genuine arms reduction and a just world — I am still quoting — stands on two supports: military readiness and the development of modern technologies such as SDI. There you have it!

[Levin] Yes, I am getting the impression that the White House administration is living in some sort of world of illusions. They have created for themselves a specific stereotype and are resolutely rejecting reality, rejecting the corruptions life makes to this stereotype. Indeed you are correct in saying, Vitaliy Ivanovich, that U.S. elections are a complicated thing. While we are on the subject of complexity, I think it would not be out of place to quote a remark made by such an eminent U.S. politician as NEW YORK TIMES observer Reston. He has given a very juicy description of the 1986 election: He says that the elections were a genuine disgrace as they turned into a battle of money bags and television advertisements and a display of dirty tricks. The moral aspect of the election is also indeed described in a very clear and precise fashion; but at the same time, of course, there is a political note as well. The fact that the electorate denied their trust to those who support SDI indicates that the reality of the United States is not what the White House imagines it to be. This, it seems to me, is an encouraging factor, a factor indicating that our accords in Reykjavik and the Soviet stance set forth in Reykjavik will win over public circles.

Even now we can say, with every justification we are saying that the West European governments -- Chancellor Kohl again -- have adopted a negative stance. As I read recently, the British have decided precisely at this juncture to arm themselves with yet another type of nuclear bomb, which does absolutely nothing to help resolve the problem. At the time, however, one must pay particular attention to the fact that delegations from the SED and the SPD have reached agreement on the creation of a nuclear-free zone between the socialist and capitalist countries, a 150-km deep zone along the GDR-FRG border, i.e. a real and concrete contribution.

[Kobysh] In general that is not so much an accord as an idea taken up from the late Palme directed not only towards the GDR and the FRG, but in addition toward Czechoslovakia where there is also a dividing line between the two...

[Levin, interrupting]...But the Czechs have already supported it.

[Kobysh]... blocs. Yes. As for the U.S. elections and how they fit into the overall international situation, it seems to me that the outcome of the U.S. elections, these intermediate elections, is a sort of sign of destiny for the specific political course that has been pursued for 6 years. There is no denying that President Reagan is fairly popular among the U.S. public — and this is confirmed by the results of public opinion polls — but Reagan's personal popularity is not the same as the popularity of the policy being pursued by the U.S. Administration.
[Sishlin] Freedom is made up of the freedom of every person. For us it is therefore the holiest of the holy, it is communism.

[Levin] Yes, and therefore at the Vienna conference we proposed to convene an all-European conference in order to discuss the entire complex of humanitarian problems and proposed Moscow as a place to hold such a conference. This idea was also put on the agenda. We introduced very far-reaching proposals — I have in mind the socialist community states — on limiting conventional weapons, the same conventional weapons over which there is now a great deal of speculation in the West, and a great deal of talk about the fact, as they say, that we are ready to cut back on nuclear weapons and even to eliminate nuclear weapons because we have an enormous superiority in conventional weapons. This is said by those who have had the proposals of the member states of the Warsaw Pact on a radical cut-back in weapons and armed forces in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, lying in front of them on the table since 11 June! We are proposing to cut back 100-150,000 in the first stage; and to cut back on another 25 percent by the 1990's; all in all the reductions will involve half a million people on each side. They are behaving as though these proposals do not exist! To this very day we have not received an official reply to these proposals!

[Kobysh] I think that we have the right to talk about, — to stop briefly on this note, because our time is limited — we are entitled to say that a turning-point has indeed really appeared. A very complicated struggle is underway and Vienna is also becoming an arena of struggle. But what aims are we pursuing in this struggle? The aims of peace, freedom, and peaceful cooperation. On the road, on the long and difficult road toward achieving these aims, several steps have been made, fundamentally important ones, which open up new horizons for affirming those radiant and noble ideas that were brought into the world for the first time by the Great October.

[Levin] On that note, we will end. Thank you esteemed listeners for your attention. All the best to you.

CSO: 52001159
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: OCTOBER, EARLY NOVEMBER POST-REYKJAVIK ASSESSMENT

More Than 'Negative Outcome' Seen

PM151431 Moscow KRUNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[A. Golts "Observer's Notes": "Time for Decisive Action"]

[Text] For 2 days -- 11 and 12 October -- we lived in expectation. And these are not just words. The word "Reykjavik" became a byword for hope of improving the international situation. It was heard on Moscow streets, in plant shops, in student auditoriums, on buses and suburban electric trains. I think this was the case in many other cities in the world. Millions upon millions of people throughout the world sincerely wished for the success of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan.

Those who believed that the Soviet representatives would display during the talks a truly innovatory approach to complex foreign policy problems were not disappointed. The USSR, the Czechoslovak newspaper RUDE PRAVO points out, displayed the maximum of political will in the search for an agreement with the United States.

It was our country that advanced the initiative for an extraordinary meeting of the two countries' top leaders. People in the USSR could not be apathetic to the fact that the important Soviet-American accords reached in Geneva almost a year ago were threatened with being wrecked and that the talks on nuclear and space arms had reached an impasse. It had become perfectly obvious that those talks needed new boosts and new directions. Only a summit meeting could provide them.

The Soviet side made very serious preparations for the talks at the Hofdi Villa. It drew up an entire package of major proposals whose realization would lead to a real breakthrough in all directions of the struggle to limit nuclear weapons and make it possible to really avert the threat of nuclear war and begin moving toward a nuclear-free world.

Thus, the question of reducing strategic arms has seemed insoluble for long years. American politicians have groundlessly accused the USSR of not wanting adequate reductions. But an agreement to reduce by 50 percent each of the components of both the Soviet and the American strategic triads was virtually elaborated in the Icelandic capital on the basis of the Soviet proposal. Ground-based strategic missiles (including the so-called heavy ones, which particularly frighten Washington), intercontinental submarine-launched missiles, and strategic bombers would be subject to a reduction by half.
Thanks to the constructive Soviet approach, the sides also got really close to solving the problem of medium-range missiles. A mutually acceptable draft was drawn up, proposing the total destruction of such missiles on the European continent. At the same time, it allowed the United States to have 100 warheads on its territory, and the Soviet Union to have 100 warheads on missiles deployed in Asia.

Those who have attentively followed the difficult talks on this question will at once notice that that draft embodied on the main points of what was once the U.S. Administration’s beloved creation, the "zero option." In taking it as the basis of a future agreement, our country paid a certain price [shla na opredelenyye izderzhki]. [paragraph continues]

For the entire nuclear potential of Britain and France was preserved totally intact. What is more, this potential, which is fully integrated into NATO strategic calculations, would continue to be built up and improved.

Of course, the USSR did not make these concessions at all as a result of its "weakness," as Washington sometimes tries to make out. On the contrary, awareness of our country’s might gives the Soviet leadership the possibility of acting effectively in the new historical situation. Today the primitive arithmetic of the nuclear balance, which frequently does not elucidate but obscures the crux of the matter, must be replaced by the higher mathematics of peaceful coexistence.

It goes without saying that on entering the crucial stage of reducing nuclear arms each side must be certain that the other is not secretly violating the agreement that has been reached. This is precisely why the USSR insists on very strict monitoring [kontrol]. The Americans had no objections here.

They emerged when the talk turned to another problem: a guarantee that neither side will strive for military superiority or prepare fundamentally new types of arms to that end. This is why the Soviet position provides for the strengthening of the mechanisms curbing the arms race — the ABM Treaty above all — for a mutual obligation by the USSR and the United States not to avail themselves for 10 years of their right to withdraw from the treaty, and for strict observance of all its provisions.

The Soviet Union realistically evaluates the situation and realizes how engrossed Washington is in its "Strategic Defense Initiative." Proceeding from this, the Soviet side did not object to laboratory tests within the SDI framework — so that Washington could finally ascertain the potential of that system. As we see, all the proposals were reasonable and constructive. The Soviet side had sufficient political will and political courage alike.

Unfortunately, precisely there very important qualities were lacking in the U.S. Administration, which proved incapable of rising to the level of the new political thinking. Washington got stuck, as it were, in its desire to test everything relating to SDI not only in the laboratories but also outside them, including in space. As Comrade M.S. Gorbachev said at the press conference, the U.S. President, clearly seeking to shift the blame, tired to accuse the Soviet side of wrecking the signing of very important agreements allegedly because of one word.

Of course, it is not a matter of a word. The point is that by agreeing to full-scale tests within the SDI framework the USSR would thereby agree also the Washington’s attempts to achieve military superiority and to open up a new channel of the arms race. Clearly, the Soviet Union cannot forego its security and that of its friends and allies.
As for the U.S. Administration's position, it is perfectly obvious that imperial ambitions and the interests of the military-industrial complex predominate over the interests of mankind. The events that have occurred attest that the U.S. leaders are so far not taking the path of a constructive policy but the path of political intrigue, on which they are reckoning on securing unilateral military advantages. Never until Reykjavik had our states been so close to signing very important agreements ensuring not the limitation, as had been the case previously, but the substantial reduction of nuclear arsenals. It was Washington's fault that this historic chance was not utilized.

I would not like to think so, but it seems that some people in the American leadership considered that the tasks of the Reykjavik meeting had been resolved on its very first day -- that is, when the Congress' House of Representatives, yielding to shameless pressure from the White House, agreed to fund further tests of nuclear weapons, the deployment of strategic arms that undermine the SALT II treaty, the production of binary chemical ammunition, and experiments within the framework of the "star wars" program. They put pressure on the congressmen, assuring them that, if they did not lift their restrictions on those militarist programs, the President, you see, would have nothing with which to "influence" the Russians. And is this not why, having come empty-handed to Reykjavik, the Americans proved unable to take advantage of the super-favorable opportunities created by the Soviet proposals?

But does this mean that the meeting had only a negative outcome? It would be wrong to think that. For the meeting showed that agreements which only yesterday seemed unreachable can, in principle, be reached. What was done in Reykjavik cannot be struck out. And this experience must do service in future contacts between the USSR and the United States. It is the Soviet Union's opinion that all is not yet lost. There is the possibility of building on what was achieved in Reykjavik to reach agreements which would make a summit meeting in Washington real and possible. America must ponder on the Soviet proposals.

The realities of the nuclear age cannot be brushed aside. For Hamlet's question "To be or not to be?" right now faces the planet in the literal and not the abstract-philosophical sense. And in order to "be" and guarantee mankind's existence, it is necessary to struggle to improve the international situation. Let us recall Shakespeare's lines: "Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, or to take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing end them?" Centuries have passed, and generations and historical situations have changed, but the nobility of the mind has always been tested by readiness to oppose evil without submitting to circumstances, even unfavorable ones. This evil today is nuclear war.

The CPSU Central Committee general secretary's press conference convinced everyone of the noble mind of our foreign policy. No, dejection is not characteristic of it, still less despair. For this policy is underpinned by the will of the majority of the planet's inhabitants. Today concern for the earth's fate has ceased to be the domain of governments and state leaders. It has become the concern of the peoples. Today the time for decisive action has arrived. Mankind will not let itself be led by those who impose on it an existence on the brink of the nuclear abyss. The Reykjavik meeting has shown that the forces of peace have a clear, realistic program which can and must be realized.
Correspondent Optimistic

PM151051 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Oct 86 p 2

[Report by special correspondent Fedor Burlatskiy: "Yet We Remain Optimistic"]

[Text] Reykjavik — Everyone or practically everyone who was in Reykjavik during the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan had the same or nearly the same feeling: first elation, a feeling that important decisions were not far off, and then a sharp decline in the mood, disappointment.

When we met with U.S. experts and journalists after the talks on the morning of 12 October, they were all but unanimous in saying or hinting that accords had been reached on such major matters as a 50 percent reduction in the whole triad of strategic armaments, the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, and agreement to talks on banning (first limiting) underground nuclear tests and reducing the nuclear potential in Asia.

But the afternoon talks flattened hopes of these agreements, which would have far greater significance for the disarmament process than SALT I and SALT II put together.

What was the reason for the breakdown? Why did the U.S. President go back on his word at the last moment? What ghost in that "haunted house," where the talks were being held, whispered the fateful "no" to him? Perhaps the part of the ghost was played by Mr Richard Perle -- I met him at the U.S. press center: Yet another handsome Hollywood movie hero; you would never suspect that his favorite part was that of a military-industrial complex hawk. Or perhaps the President had been seeking an excuse to wreck the talks from the outset?

No doubt our readers have already seen on television or read in the newspapers M.S. Gorbachev's Reykjavik press conference and know of our extraordinarily important new proposals and our readiness for compromise and mutual concessions in the interests of disarmament and of the drawing together of the two sides' positions, which promised so much. What boldness it needed and what sense of responsibility to our people and to the whole world in order to venture such proposals and risk such concessions! Finally, we learned of the last act in the drama: President Reagan's refusal to make concessions.

What were we thinking about as we left the auditorium after the press conference? We were thinking of course about the reasons for the breakdown. The President's beloved SDI, a "dream," as he himself calls it, the accursed invention of Edward Teller or some other evil genius -- was it the chief obstacle to the historic accords? Or was it something else, something more important and significant for the White House and the entire U.S. establishment?

Yes, of course, it was the "Star Wars" program first and foremost. There can be no doubt on that score. It is already an item in the national budget, orders for it have already been placed with the monopolies, and the President himself has repeatedly promised to fight for SDI to the last drop of blood -- fight against us and, if need be, against his own Congress, his allies, and world public opinion.
And yet... and yet, it is not just SDI. SDI is an element — probably not the most important — in Washington's overall strategy. It is a strategy to draw the Soviet Union into a new round of the arms race in space, on land, under ground, and under water. A fantastic race — both with regard to unimaginable types of weapons and from the viewpoint of expenditure on it.

I have the impression that the United States is even prepared to have some agreement that would lead to the elimination or reduction of chiefly obsolete models of weapons. But it does not want, at least at the moment, definitely does not want to stop the military competition with our country.

Why? Well, military monopolies' dividends are what springs to mind. But there are wider and more multifaceted plans and aims. [paragraph continues]

The first is to sprint ahead in terms of new types of armaments, on the basis of modern technological achievements and with the support of the NATO countries and Japan. Second, to hinder the implementation of our major economic plans, the solution of which would bring our country to the level of the modern technological revolution in all the chief areas of industrial development. The extremists in the U.S. President's entourage are doing their utmost to disrupt our economic reforms, pressure us, and limit our international influence as much as possible.

Need one say how unrealistic these expectations are? How immoral these aims are? How dangerous it is to play with nuclear and space fire? This is all axiomatic not only as far as we are concerned, but as far as world public opinion is concerned.

Not taking advantage of the opportunity to conclude an agreement! At a time when mankind, weary with nuclear terror, is yearning for decisions inspiring the hope that our children will be living in a different world and will be spared the demeaning sense of helplessness in the face of the inexorable approach of the biblical apocalypse. What irresponsibility! Yes, Mr Reagan surprised me, despite all I knew of him before. History had offered him the opportunity to sign a pardon for mankind. He squandered the opportunity.

And yet... and yet, I would not want to draw the curtain after these words and leave the reader in a somber frame of mind. Reykjavik not only taught a lesson, not only demonstrated anew how difficult it is to talk with the American side, how difficult it is to fight for substantial movement away from the nuclear abyss. This round of talks between the leaders of the two nuclear giants also demonstrated that the basis for an agreement still exists and the platform where all countries' interests meet or are close is widening, the positions on many important matters are becoming closer, and the idea of a great compromise for the sake of world peace is gathering strength. Please don't think that these words are merely formal optimism. No, they are the considered result of "the intellect's cold observations, and the heart's sorrowful remarks."

Just a couple of sketches on Reykjavik itself — if only to express a sense of gratitude to our exceedingly hospitable hosts. But I must say that the "local color" theme has been almost totally exhausted by many colleagues on the daily newspapers. I will just say that I very much liked the monument to the founder of Reykjavik, Ingolfur Arnarson, the face of a courageous fighter and selfless worker. But there was another monument I did not like one bit — the one to the envoy of the king of Denmark who
seized Iceland: He is depicted wearing a state official's frock coat and high boots, stony-faced and holding the same kind of scroll Rosencrantz and Guildenstern carried when they took Hamlet to England for execution. I very much liked the president's little house, considerably smaller than the cottages of members of the middle strata. But it seemed strange that one could approach it without having to show a pass and that there was no guard. I liked the fact that the head of state was the charming Vigdis Finnbogadottir, the world's first woman president. And although it grieved me that she did not greet M.S. Gorbachev at the airport, I appreciated the reason: It was the opening of the Althing — the world's oldest parliament — and her presence was obligatory.

I liked the fact that the winter in Reykjavik is relatively mild, despite its being the world's most northerly capital. But I did not like the frequent rain in the city whose name means "smoky inlet." I liked the thermal baths, although it seemed overly exotic to pass from a one pool at a temperature of zero to another at a temperature of plus 40 degrees.

I was in raptures over Holmfridur Karlsdottir — Miss World 1986 (the world's top beauty), an Icelander. But I was extremely upset by the fact that not I, but my friend, Gennadiy Gerasimov, was standing beside her in the photograph hanging in the press center.

Finally, I very much wanted to encounter the specter of a young woman who allegedly still walks in that cozy little house where the talks were held between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan. But unfortunately I did not have the opportunity to visit the house.

So let us return to the conclusion. The meeting in Reykjavik between the two leaders of the great powers was a sensation. No one expected it and no one foresaw it, none of the 3,000 correspondents and experts who gathered there from all over the world. Unfortunately it came to naught, although I would like to express this feeling that I have. I believe that in the future the naught could become something substantial. The great efforts by our country and its leadership were not in vain. The main work lies ahead. A new struggle. New initiatives. The involvement of new forces — in Europe and Asia, in Latin America and Africa — and new Soviet-American talks and meetings.

New Situation After Reykjavik

LD251755 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1500 GMT 25 Oct 86

[From the "168 Hours" program; interview with "leading Soviet journalists" Aleksandr Bovin by correspondent Jozsef Havel in Moscow; Bovin speaks in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation: date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Havel] How would you describe the meeting in Reykjavik? Was it half a success or half a failure, or a dramatic event? What is your view? These questions were asked in the IZVESTIYA editorial department and were addressed to Aleksandr Bovin, the leading Soviet journalist and opinion-maker. This is how Bovin replied:

[Bovin] I think that words like failure and success are too emotional. Politics prefers rationalism. I think we must say that an important, large, and promising meeting took place because, in essence, great progress was made in Reykjavik in the most important aspects of arms reduction. But all these things have been transferred to Geneva, to the experts' table, where they will begin where the Reykjavik was a very important stage on the road toward disarmament.

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[Havel] Everything I have spoken about was thwarted, unfortunately, by the rather hard and not at all constructive stance adopted by the United States. What we submitted in Reykjavik was no less than a package of proposals. Our logic is as follows: We are fighting to eliminate arms. They, the Americans, are endeavoring to replace weapons on earth with weapons in space. We see no sense to this. But the Americans, unfortunately, are attached to a different logic. Of course the pressure of the military-industrial complex also plays a part here; after all, orders amounting to billions are at stake. Another factor is that through the Star Wars program they are hoping to achieve strategic superiority. The weapons the Americans want to deploy in space are not defensive in nature, but serve offensive aims. They want to put us into a new arms race. We do not want this. Our logic is very simple. In reducing weapons on earth there is no need to scatter weapons all over space.

[Havel] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich: We are all aware that a new situation has arisen as a result of Reykjavik. How do you view this new situation, and what comes next? This is what the famous Soviet journalist said:

[Bovin] The new situation can, in my opinion, be summed up by saying that the positions of both sides have been quite clearly outlined. Never before had world public opinion been able to make a judgment so clearly and accurately about the Soviet and U.S. positions. After Reykjavik everything is on the negotiating table, and this precision and clarity of the stances may facilitate the coming negotiations. So in this sense too, a new situation arises. We have covered a significant distance in the formulation of the so-called outline agreements. Work is still to be done on the details, but the limits of these outlines and the parameters of agreements were in essence determined in Reykjavik.

[Havel] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich: And if the Americans carry on with the Star Wars program, what will happen? Bovin said the following in conclusion:

[Bovin] Nothing good will come of it. We will then have to do something ourselves. Our reply will not necessarily be some sort of a mirror image. If the Americans bring the Star Wars system into existence, it will make the international situation more complex. After Reykjavik, however, it can be seen quite clearly that a realistic possibility exists for agreement, and this real possibility is disturbed by only one thing: the U.S. Star Wars program. Paradoxically, a weapon that does not yet exist hinders the reduction of those already in existence. Hence, the biggest obstacle to disarmament is the Star Wars program. After Reykjavik, the goal was very clearly marked out. This is the goal we must endeavor to attain. We must awaken the world public and involve them in the struggle against the Star Wars program. In our opinion, it is not yet too late.
Ryzhkov: Feasible Step Forward

AU210949 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 16 Oct 86 pp 1, 2

[Interview given by USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolay Ryzhkov to Jerzy Majka, TRYBUNA LUDU chief editor: "The CPSU and PZPR Congresses Formulated Many Joint Programmatic Tasks to Accelerate Economic Development"—in Warsaw on 15 October]

[Excerpts] [Majka] How do you evaluate the prospects of an accord on the problems of preventing a nuclear catastrophe and space armaments, problems that are of paramount importance for all mankind? What can you say in this connection about the present state of Soviet-American relations?

[Ryzhkov] The entire world hoped that the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik would produce accord on the key issues of international security — halting the arms race, preventing armaments in space, and promoting disarmament. The results of the summit should have provided answers to these most vital issues. As you know, M. Gorbachev spoke on television yesterday [14 October] and not only told us about the true course of his talks with President Ronald Reagan, but also profoundly analyzed the positions of the two sides and disclosed the reasons why the U.S. side had desisted from the accord that was already showing up at the meeting.

It was a historic moment indeed. As M. Gorbachev said, we had presented an entire package of significant measures and if they had been accepted the foundations of a new epoch in mankind's history would have been created a — a nonnuclear epoch. What was at stake was not just to curb nuclear armaments, but to liquidate nuclear weapons as such within a brief period of time.

These were the prospects that made their appearance in Reykjavik, but they were not turned into reality only because the U.S. Administration was unable to assume a realistic position and to renounce stereotypes and illusions in its political reasoning.

Someone may say that a lack of accords in Reykjavik will set back the Soviet-American disarmament negotiations. I do not think this is the case. We cannot help taking into consideration the fact that the Reykjavik meeting served to streamline the road to curbing armaments. Objectively speaking, the meeting prepared a feasible step forward toward a real break through in this matter. That is why, echoing comrade Gorbachev's words, we do not wring our hands or slam the door, because we are sincerely convinced that it is necessary to make new efforts in order to create normal interstate relations in the nuclear era.

Why was Reykjavik at all possible? Primarily because the Soviet and American peoples — the peoples of the world — want peace and are aware of the fact that thermonuclear war will annihilate our civilization. [paragraph continues]
It is not all true that the Reykjavik meeting was accompanied by negative processes. It was accompanied by stimulating and positive processes, ones that operate in favor of peace and human progress. Such processes include the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests, the successes of the Stockholm conference, the Vienna Convention of the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy, progress in banning chemical weapons, the documents drawn up by the Harare Nonaligned Conference, and so on. Such processes boost hopes for mankind's safer future.

However, it is obvious that profound concern continues to grip the world. The tension in Soviet-American negotiations on curbing the arms race affects the relations between the two countries and inhibits their development. Certain U.S. circles try to erect new barriers along the road toward improving Soviet-American relations. Nor can we ignore the fact that some segments of the U.S. press continue to intensify anti-Soviet rhetoric in a tendentious way, to distort the USSR's true policy, and to falsify the data about the Soviet and American armaments.

However, more and more Americans are beginning to understand that there is only one solution for our two countries — coexistence — and that the nuclear threat is enormous, while the time in which to prevent this threat is not unlimited. A movement in favor of peace and improved American-Soviet relations continues to gain strength in the United States. This is the reason why we do not think that there are no prospects for improving Soviet-American relations, especially since we feel profound respect for the American people. The Soviet people and government are doing all they can to normalize Soviet-American relations on the principles of noninterference, mutual respect, and the comprehensive development of meaningful cooperation.

The USSR's stand in the mutual relations with the United States is precise and clear. This stand is based on the foreign policy directives that were worked out at the 27th CPSU Congress and presented by M. Gorbachev on 15 January and on the program for the phased liquidation of nuclear weapons by the end of this century under the conditions that guarantee the prevention of the arms race in space. I repeat that the Soviet side wants bold and resolute measures to halt military competition. The USSR continues to indicate the way in which the nuclear dilemma can be solved. It is not our fault that Reykjavik and the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space armaments have still not produced the hoped-for results and that the USSR's unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests has still not become a bilateral moratorium.

Responsibility is on the side of the U.S. militaristic circles and the industrial-armament complex because they continue to be against halting the death-bringing nuclear arms race and to expand armaments for the sake of their own selfish goals. However, they are not omnipotent and it is not they who will have the last word. It is the American people who should speak out.
Moscow 'Round Table' Summary

LD262107 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1230 GMT 26 Oct 86

[International Observers Roundtable" with moderator Boris Andrianov, all-
union radio foreign political commentator, Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member
of the collegium of the weekly, ZA RUBEZHOM, and Vadim Nikolayevich Nekrasov,
international observer of KOMMUNIST--recorded]

[Text] [Andrianov] Two weeks have now passed since the meeting in Reykjavik, but
attention to the results of the USSR-U.S. dialogue at summit level is increasing. The
result of the talks in the Icelandic capital has created a stir throughout the world.
On Soviet television this week, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed the conviction
that the full importance of the event has not yet sunk in; but, he said: We certainly
will become aware of it, if not now, then tomorrow we will comprehend the full
significance of Reykjavik, and pay due tribute both to what was achieved and acquired,
and to the lost opportunities and the losses. But already, there's no doubt that the
meeting in Iceland has encouraged all who desire a decisive change for the better. It
is gratifying, surely, that as a result of that meeting, we've been able to break
qualitatively new ground in the struggle against nuclear weapons. That is an enormous
achievement, and the first for many decades. Its main significance is that we now know
that the elimination of the nuclear threat is a realistic and possible objective.

[Volskiy] At the same time, of course, it would be wrong to shut our eyes to the fact
that Reykjavik has not only engendered hope, because the USSR-U.S. dialogue at the
summit level has also highlighted the difficulties on the path to a world without
nuclear weapons. This must be understood, otherwise it would be impossible to form a
correct assessment of the outcome of the meeting in Iceland. It has shown how great
are the forces opposing the trend toward disarmament. The talks in Reykjavik have
frightened, particularly, those circles that are associated with militarism and
arms-race profits. But meanwhile, we know they in fact also possess political power
and not only political. They are, above all, capable of exerting strong economic
pressure. In their hands is a vast propaganda machine. So it's not surprising that in
the camp of the opponents of detente and disarmament, feverish efforts are being made
to erect obstacles that will wreck the process initiated in the Icelandic capital.
From the outset, this is perfectly clear, a campaign has been mounted in the United
States with the object, I would say, of simply fooling ordinary people. They are being
shamelessly deceived by the random talk about Reykjavik, by the way the aims of the
USSR-U.S. summit-level meeting are being turned inside-out, and so on.

[Andrianov] Yet the Washington politicians had publicly promised to tell the truth
about what happened at the talks in the Icelandic capital. Here, for instance, is a
word-for-word excerpt from an interview given to the U.S. television company ABC by
Admiral John Poindecker, national security assistant to the President of the United
States. On the plane, during the return flight from Reykjavik he said publically: We
have decided to make a detailed official statement on the discussions in Reykjavik, in
order to give the American people the facts. And he added: We are convinced that if
the American people are in possession of the facts, then they will draw the right
conclusions. So you see, the Washington administration promised to acquaint the U.S.
public with the facts, in other words, with the true state of affairs. That was, of
course, a laudable promise; but has official Washington kept it? Let's turn to the
U.S. press and see what it has to say on the subject. Take THE NEW YORK TIMES, a
reputable paper by Western standards. It published on 20 October an article by Anthony
Lewis. Here's part of what he wrote.
I quote: It is absolutely disgusting to see the U.S. President returning from a meeting devoted to questions that could decide our fate, and think of it only from the viewpoint of political considerations, distorting the facts as he pleases. So the Washington politicians are stuffying the U.S. people with deliberate lies, instead of telling them the truth about Reykjavik.

[Nekrasov] Yes. In parts of the world where U.S. propaganda does not have a controlling monopoly, people are simply amazed at the unparalleled way in which Washington is distorting the course of the USSR-U.S. dialogue in the Icelandic capital. Both the official representatives of the U.S. Administration and propaganda in America are doing all they can to represent that meeting in a totally distorted form, dishing it up in a way that literally turns the facts on their heads. This is being done quite deliberately. There is considerable evidence for this assertion that is deliberate. It has been confirmed by none other that Patrick Buchanan, director of communications at the White House. According to him, the Washington administration has decided to mount a tremendous propaganda campaign aimed at giving the world the following version of the meeting in Reykjavik: The President of the United States, says the story, put forward very broad and far-reaching proposals on arms control, but the Soviet leader rejected them.

[Andrianov] In his appearance on Soviet television this week, Mikhail Gorbachev said on this subject that a busy campaign has begun in the United States in which proposals are being attributed to them that do not belong to them. The absurdity of this is so obvious that it is probably felt even by some people in Washington circles, who are, therefore, presumably trying to extricate themselves somehow from what must be a pretty embarrassing situation. In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to an article that appeared a week ago in THE WASHINGTON POST. It was published anonymously. It spoke of three stages after the meeting in Reykjavik. We can pass over the first two, and go straight to the third. At the third stage, then, says THE WASHINGTON POST, which has not yet arrived, we'll have to examine what, in reality, was proposed, and what was agreed to. The paper is of the opinion that this is not easy in view of the fact that fatigue at Reykjavik made full concentration impossible. So what conclusion do we reach, if we are to believe what THE WASHINGTON POST has written? It appears that the U.S. side became so tired in the course of the meeting as to be unable to sort out exactly what proposals had been put to it during the dialogue and what it had agreed to. A very strange explanation, to say the least; the more so as it concerns a major political event to which the attention of the whole international public was riveted. In this case I think there exists a very effective means of ridding the essence of such important negotiations of misinterpretation and, even more, of deliberate distortion, and that means is openness. It was this what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had in mind when he discussed the results of Reykjavik during a conversation he had with the Danish prime minister, Schlueter. Since the picture of the meeting which was held there is being distorted in an unprecedented fashion in the United States, the CPSU Central Committee general secretary expressed the view that it would be desirable that talks with the Americans should no longer be held strictly behind closed doors. Not only do they not want this way, but moreover they insist that the content of meetings should not be made public. Why? Could it be that they are frankly afraid of showing themselves in an unfavorable light in the eyes of the world public, including the U.S. public?

[Volskiy] Also, Boris Vasilievich, because in that event official Washington will find it very difficult to adopt a stance of -- as I would put it -- outright deception, which is what it's doing now after the meeting in Reykjavik.
[Andrianov] U.S. officials say over and over again that allegedly the difficulties in Reykjavik arose because the Soviet side put forward its proposals as a package. The reason for the difficulties that arose does not lie in this. Yes, of course, the proposals put on the negotiating table make up an inseparable individual whole. That's why they are called a package; they are constructive and they are the most radical arms reduction proposals in the whole history of Soviet-U.S. negotiations. Also, they take into account the interests of both sides. I will recall that the Soviet Union is proposing, first of all, to reduce by half all strategic arms without exception; second, to scrap totally Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, and to start negotiations immediately on missiles of this type in Asia, as well as on missiles of a range of less than a 1,000 km, and it is proposed to freeze their number immediately. Finally, third, it is proposed to consolidate the basis of anti-missile defense and begin full-scale negotiations on a total nuclear test ban. It is important to note that the Soviet proposals contained an unprecedented readiness for compromise and concessions on an equal footing. This whole package was handed to the President of the United States as early as the middle of the first conversation which took place in Reykjavik. In Washington at the moment they are coming down upon the third part of the package, asserting that allegedly it bears no relation to the first two proposals, but there's no logic in this. On the contrary, the logic is there in the approach of the Soviet side. Since it is the issue of scrapping nuclear weapons which is being resolved, it is essential to have a full guarantee against attempts to achieve military superiority via space. All the Soviet proposals put forward in Reykjavik are objectively connected with central strategic weapons systems. That is the essence of our single set of proposals, enclosed in an integral package. A part of this package, by the way, is made up by our concessions, and as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev warned in his speech, if there is no package, then there will be no concessions either. In Washington they assume they can separate our package of proposals and make use only of the Soviet Union's concessions. These are plainly not serious calculations for statesmen who are obliged to adopt responsible decisions, all the more so when they concern truly global international problems.

[Nekrasov] Well, comrades, I think that if today, 2 weeks after the Reykjavik meeting, we look at what is happening, at what accompanied this meeting itself, and at subsequent events — all this confirms the conclusion drawn by our party that the 27th congress on the fact that the struggle for peace will be a complex and stubborn one. As the possibility of mankind’s emergence from the deadlocks of confrontation appears more and more clearly and as all those social forces who advocate overcoming tension in international relations, thus advocating overcoming the prolonged feverish state of these relations, act more and more energetically, reactionary imperialist circles are showing increasingly more embittered resistance to positive trends: That is all those who are connected with the military-industrial complex and, in general, advocates of the notorious social revanchism.

[Volksiy] Yes, you have made an accurate remark about advocates of social revanchism who now, of course, have become more active.

[Nekrasov] I would likewise like to recall that in his address on television, the CPSU Central Committee general secretary quoted his own statement which he made in Reykjavik at the press conference. We do not consider the dialogue finished, he said then in Reykjavik, and we hope that on his return home, President Reagan will consult Congress and the U.S. people, and adopt decisions, the necessity for which ensues from what has been achieved in Reykjavik. Now, addressing our people on television, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev noted that something quite different is happening in the United States. What is it that is different?
In particular you, Boris Vasilyevich, talked about the propaganda campaign which has been unfolding by official Washington of late. But what is interesting is that the truth about Reykjavik, which the world knows, beyond the confines of the U.S. sphere of propaganda influence, this truth is so weighty and so strong that it is quite perceptibly leading the disinformation campaigns to failure and making the U.S. propaganda services feverish.

In a situation where one version replaces the other, which contradicts the first one in many respects, when one official or other contradicts in his statements what has been said by another official, when all this propaganda cocktail consisting of an easily discernable juggling of facts and falsifications comes down on millions of people, the truth, as Comrade Gorbachev noted, sinks into a haze of fabrications and fantasies.

[Andrianov] I would add that it is not merely a matter of propaganda: We are also witnessing actions aimed at introducing new complications into Soviet-U.S. relations. I am thinking here of Washington's decision to expel another 55 Soviet diplomatic workers from the United States of America, an action, if one can call such an uncivilized deed an action, which has been undertaken after the conclusion of a meeting of major significance for the entire development of international relations.

[Nekrasov] To give a political assessment of the present situation once could use the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who said that an extremely unattractive portrait is forming of an administration of a great country which is quick to carry out destructive and ruinous actions. We have mentioned certain superficial manifestations of this destructiveness, but considerably more serious and dangerous for the cause of peace — and consequently many times more difficult to overcome — is the destructiveness embedded in the heart of the Reagan administration's foreign military policy. I am thinking of its fundamental striving, so to speak, to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. This is unachievable but dangerous in its essence, which destabilizes international relations. It is precisely this approach of certain circles in the United States of America which characterizes their attitude toward the talks underway in Geneva. They regard it not as a forum for seeking accords, but as a screen for continuing the arms race. Clearly making themselves felt here are survivors of the mentality of a past era when, as the French researchers (Lellouche) wrote the other day, it was sufficient for the U.S. Government to begin talks in order to subsequently pursue its military affairs policy at its own discretion without coming across real interference from Congress or public opinion. Those days, of course, are now in the past, but they still continue to resort to similar methods.

[Volskiy] But all the same, Vadim Nikolayevich, it seems to me that the most important thing is the issue of extending the arms race into outer space. Here it is not a matter of propaganda campaigns, but of the innermost aspirations of reactionary imperialist circles, of their thirst for profits and power — in fact, for world domination.

[Nekrasov] As is apparent from the content of the Reykjavik meeting, from what has become known about it, Washington is continuing to cling to its Star Wars plans. You have correctly noted the two principal motives or, so to speak, driving forces behind U.S. policy: first the hope of breaking out into space with offensive weapons and thereby achieve military superiority; and on the other hand the military monopolies' striving to guarantee themselves superprofits for decades to come through the 12 figure sums to be allocated for the infamous Startegic Defense Initiative.
Our stance here is clear and unshakeable, for it is dictated by concern for the fundamental interests of our country, world socialism, and the whole of mankind. In his latest speech on television Mikhail Sergeyevich set out this stance as follows: Only political simpletons could opt for the elimination of nuclear weapons as a means of containing U.S. aggression while receiving a threat from space instead; there are no such simpletons in the Soviet leadership.

[Andrianov] Vadim Nikolayevich, you mentioned the haze of fabrications and fantasies currently enveloping America in the issue of the true outcome of the Reykjavik meeting and which is undoubtedly preventing a great many Americans from understanding the essence of what is happening. This is part of a more general problem, I have in mind the absence among the American people of true conceptions of what is happening in the Soviet Union and of the real content of Soviet foreign policy. As you will recall, this was mentioned without any beating about the bush in the speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who noted with good reason that, to all appearances, the United States is becoming an increasingly closed society.

[Nekrasov] Yes, and that, of course, bears witness to the difficulties being experienced by imperialism at the present stage. I would like to say however, that the U.S. political system has never been noted for its particular openness regarding information about the Soviet Union and socialism. Recently I came across the following words spoken by the U.S. observer Walter Lippmann 65 years ago, when the civil war was still on in our country. At that time Lippman wrote: The whole hysterical intolerance of our time is founded on the principle lie: the lie about Russia. Lies about Russia, he wrote, are the mother of all lies in U.S. policy". So you can see how deep-rooted this closedness, so to speak, is — this prejudice in relation to everything new that is happening in the world, this particular hatred and particularly malicious nonacceptance of real socialism, which is scoring more and more successes on the world scene. Now that the world public has come to see the Soviet Union as a country which honestly and steadfastly defends peace, our foes are resorting, as we can see, to any — and principally invented — pretexted in order to open fire against the growing international prestige of our motherland and of world socialism as a whole.

[Volskiy] In the light of all that we are talking about today, there is also this, which in my view it is important to note: that the inconceivable barriers — I am using the expression of Comrade Gorbachev — the inconceivable barriers which the opponents of Soviet-U.S. mutual understanding set about erecting years ago are spreading not only directly to that extremely important area. They are also spreading to regional conflicts. Judge for yourselves. It was precisely during the period of the Reykjavik meeting that Weinberger, the U.S. defense secretary, was sent to the other end of the world, to the Far East. He went there with intentions that were more than definite: above all, to block the Soviet Pacific Ocean peace initiative, put forward, as you recall, in Vladivostok at the end of July. The Pentagon chief is opposing our peace initiative with a build-up in U.S. military preparations in the Far East, which is now openly being declared a potential second front, or second theater of military operations, second after Europe, against the socialist community. It would even appear that the U.S. strategic priorities are starting to be displaced, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, from Europe to Asia. Suffice it to say, 70 percent of the ships of the U.S. Pacific 7th Fleet are already equipped with nuclear weapons, and many of them also have cruise missiles, which are capable of reaching their targets. Moreover, preparations are already being made to increase the number of ships in this 7th Fleet by another 10 percent, by the year 1990.
[Nekrasov] Dmitriy Antonovich, you talk of the number of vessels, but the Pentagon has an inordinately large number of military installations on land in the Asia-Pacific Ocean region. If I am not mistaken, there are about 350 of them there.

[Volskiy] It is not only a matter of the U.S. building up their own troops and military facilities in Asia and in the Pacific Ocean. Washington is rushing to link together a chain of military alliances there, which would stretch from Japan to Pakistan. Weinberger paid a visit there, to Islamabad, during his present trip to Asia. Moreover, he did not arrive empty-handed, but with a concrete plan to set up a U.S. airborne electronic reconnaissance system, AWACS, in Pakistan. In this way, they would like to keep a tight grip, as they say, on a considerable part of India, Iran, and, of course, Afghanistan. The offensive, or more precisely, the aggressive nature of such designs is obvious, especially if one takes account of the fact that a U.S. Central Command set up not so long ago, 3 and 1/2 years ago, is directly aimed at that region. After all, it is precisely the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, specially trained for wars in Asia and the Near East, which is at the disposal of that command. In these circumstances, the AWACS in Pakistan — and such a system already exists in Saudi Arabia — would not only expand the sphere of operations of the rapid deployment forces. They would take on an especially dangerous character, all the more so if one takes account of the fact that both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and even several regions of northeast India — where separatist tendencies are simmering, as you know — that the whole of that region is officially included in the sphere of influence of the U.S. Central Command.

[Nekrasov] This is the characteristic which in my opinion ought to be noted in that connection, Dmitriy Antonovich. Washington is starting to implement its new militarist plans with regard to Pakistan at the very moment when the Soviet Union has taken its important peaceful step in that region, I have in mind the withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan, where they have been part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops. I think that is no accidental coincidence.

[Volskiy] Yes, Indeed, Vadim Nikolayevich, one can detect the same tactic in the United States' actions here, as in the Pacific Ocean region. The U.S. militarists are trying to neutralize the great political, I should say psychological, influence of the Soviet peace initiatives, by deliberately fostering tension. We see the same thing now in the Near East. You know that recently the Soviet Union backed the well-known initiative for holding an international conference on a Near Eastern settlement. It proposed setting up a preparatory committee for holding it within the framework of the Security Council. Many countries supported that proposal, in particular France. Now a delaying, or more exactly an undermining, device is being brought into play. Shamir, who has replaced Peres in the post of prime minister of Israel, is declaring that the international conference on the Near East does not have any power to replace so-called direct talks, that is, separate deals in that region. The most important thing however, is that he, and the Israeli ruling circles as a whole, intend to undertake provocative actions in practice. On the one hand, a new military action in the Lebanon — troops have already been massed for it, in the appropriate places — that is on the one hand. On the other hand, a plan for setting up new military settlements on the West Bank of the River Jordan, occupied by Israel, has been promulgated. Each new settlement of this kind naturally makes a solution of the Near Eastern problems, and above all, the Palestinian problem, more difficult.
[Nekrasov] Since we have already started talking about a stepping-up of provocative actions I think one should mention not only Israel but also the racist regime of the Republic of South Africa. It is after all the Pretoria regime which is obviously striving now to make use of the tragic death of Samora Machel, the president of Mozambique, in order to intensify its intrigues against that country, and also other so-called Frontline States in Africa.

[Volskiy] All the reactionary, expansionist, pro-imperialist regimes and forces of the world are rushing to make use of the situation in international affairs which is being created by the destructive course of Washington. That intensifies the negative consequences of such a course. In particular, it threatens to exacerbate regional conflicts. This is one more reason why it is so urgently necessary to oppose this course of the militarists with the persistence and vigor of all rational people.

[Nekrasov] Under these circumstances, our party and Central Committee are boldly adopting new decisions; they are searching for, and finding, new approaches in the name of consolidating peace. As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev noted, at a meeting with a group of First Secretaries of Central Committees of the union republics and obkoms, the CPSU has enough political wisdom, historical experience and maturity in its assessment of the real processes of social life, for this.

[Andrianov] On that note, respected comrade listeners, we end our meeting at the roundtable. Thank you very much for your attention. Goodbye. I wish you all the best.

Palme Commission on Reykjavik, Security

LD261836 Moscow TASS in English 1604 GMT 26 Oct 86

[Text] Budapest October 26 TASS -- The Palme Disarmament and Security Commission ended its session in the Hungarian capital today.

Prominent political and public figures from various countries discussed a broad range of topical issues of international life, above all problems of European security and nuclear disarmament.

In the focus of attention were the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik and the latest Soviet peace initiatives.

The final document, adopted at the session, pointed out that no agreements were reached at the meeting primarily due to the U.S. stance on the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative.
USSR Envoy on Negotiations

AU101624 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 8 Nov 86 p 5

[Interview given by Vladimir Lomeyko, special envoy and head of the USSR expert delegation to the Vienna CSCE conference, to VOLKSSTIMME reporters Michael Graber and Erich Feichtinger in Vienna; date not given]

[Text] Question: Comrade Lomeyko, as special envoy you closely observed the two meetings between foreign ministers [of the USSR and the United States]. What do you think are the results of the two meetings?

Lomeyko: Well, I think all people in the Soviet Union, in Austria, and all over the world, were very anxious to know what would happen. We heard the statement by our Minister Shevardnadze. He spoke about a bitter aftertaste.

Question: What happened?

Lomeyko: An attempt was made to discuss all important questions within a few hours. Unfortunately, we have not made progress because the Americans want to retreat from the achievements of Reykjavik. They want to retreat from the agreements already made orally between Gorbachev and Reagan. But at the same time, they want to keep our concessions. You understand, this is no longer not only incorrect, this destroys the only possible basis. Only on this basis of balance, of parity for both sides — without disadvantage to anybody — is it possible to reach agreements.

Question: What is the Soviet position?

Lomeyko: What Mikhail Gorbachev said in Reykjavik is -- first -- the opinion of the entire leadership, of the entire Soviet Union. Second: we have not changed our position.

Question: What does it look like on the other side?

Lomeyko: There is no unified American position. What President Reagan said in Reykjavik, what he agreed on, was not generally approved but also met with objections on the part of many influential forces in America. Under the influence of these forces the president himself tried to correct his position quickly.

Question: What was the result?

Lomeyko: A mess. It is not easy to lay open the American position in itself, not to speak of considering it unified. If you have to deal with a partner who takes back his own words or interprets them differently, this also leaves a bitter taste, I think.

In addition, there is the attempt to make things that were agreed by both sides appear differently now — for instance, liquidating all intermediate-range missiles and halving the number of strategic nuclear weapons.

Question: There have been elections in the United States. The Democrats have the majority in the House and the Senate. Will this influence the position of the U.S. Administration?
Lomeyko: Of course such events play a role. To what extent this will have an effect on our talks and negotiations, is a difficult question.

Question: Why?

Lomeyko: In my personal opinion, in the United States there are not only the Republicans and the Democrats. Concerning the American-Soviet relations there are two other parties. First, you have the "Balance Party" which proceeds from the premise that the relations between the two powers can be solved only on the basis of equality and balance.

And then there is a party that is stronger at the moment, the "Supremacy Party". It includes all those forces that believe that all international questions must be solved through a policy of strength. The borders of these parties do not always coincide with the borders of the political parties. The interests of the military-industrial complex are stronger than the political sympathies.

Question: In the West there are forces that hope that the Soviet Union will change its opinion and its attitude concerning SDI. Is a compromise with regard to SDI conceivable?

Lomeyko: If this refers to our country's willingness to find ways toward acceptable agreements, then I say: We have been and are ready for compromise. We have already reached a compromise. But, unfortunately, this is often not revealed.

Question: Would you explain this in more detail, please?

Lomeyko: From the very start, SDI has been hoping for technological supremacy and hoping to create supremacy in the future with new weapons. This is absolutely clear. This is already the first reason why SDI weapons must be nipped in the bud. A state which is concerned about the fate of mankind must not follow the path of Star Wars.

But because President Reagan perhaps really believes in SDI, because it is his pet project, we said: Okay, it does not matter. Please, try to develop your ideas — but only in the laboratory. But: no tests and no expansion into space. However, the Americans do not want that. Which other compromises should we make?

Question: SDI also has other aspects.

Lomeyko: Yes. It is a path of immoral development. Money that is needed by everyone — in particular by the Third World for economic development — is wasted for the creation of new weapons. Weapons that will not make the world more stable but will make the situation more uncertain and will thus take us further toward the danger of war.

Question: Now the Soviet Union is facing a negotiating partner whom it is difficult to trust because he continuously changes his positions and presents results in a distorted way. How is it possible to make progress with such a partner?

Lomeyko: Yes, it is our tough fate that we have to deal with such a partner. But we cannot choose the partner. One has to live with those who exist in the world.

Question: To put it another way: We have the Geneva negotiations, which are deadlocked. We have the Vienna Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks, which have been idling for almost 13 years. [paragraph continues]
After Reykjavik, we have had to accept a deep disappointment. Now, after Vienna, we have a "bitter aftertaste." What is left for the Soviet Union to let itself be guided by?

Lomeyko: On the one hand, you are right in what you are saying. But, after Reykjavik it is not only disappointment that is left. There is also something else left: hope. Reykjavik showed the possibility of coming to an agreement that will make our world free of nuclear weapons. There was not only our standpoint but also the American President's willingness to accept it. Yes, SDI destroyed this possibility. But we have to cling to the feeling of hope, because the side that does not want any agreements wants to kill hope.

This is a very important psychological point. In spite of all the bitter aftertaste left by these talks we must always look for opportunities for contacts, for dialogue, and for agreements.

Question: Safeguarding world peace is a matter that should not only be settled by the United States and the USSR alone.

Lomeyko: Of course. There should not be the situation that only "two giants are fighting" on our planet. This is not our opinion. We think that our planet is a planet of the people, where each nation and each people has the right to participate in decision-making.

Question: But not all of them express their will clearly.

Lomeyko: Many Western politicians have the dangerous tendency to stand a bit aside and to say everything depends on the United States and the USSR. I think that in doing this they want to make their own position easier. Some Western politicians who do not agree with the American position prefer to stand aside and not to criticize. On the one hand, this is their right. But on the other, they must realize that they make it easier for the "Supremacy Party" to carry out its offensive.

Question: Now somebody can read these statements and say that Ambassador Lomeyko is again trying to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies.

Lomeyko: Oh yes, this infamous wedge theory has been thought up by politicians in order to make their life easier. We have repeatedly said that we do not want to drive a wedge between the allies. For one very simple reason: For us it is much easier to deal with a sensible, united will of the West instead of with different, even opposite opinions.

Question: The allies were actually more or less forced to accept the zero option for intermediate-range missiles.

Lomeyko: We tried to explain to them that this is unjust, then we accepted. Now the Americans say: Well, we are ready, but the Europeans do not want it. This is a game. Some years ago, Mr Rogers frankly said that it is very good that England and France have their own missiles because they thus make it more difficult for the Soviets to solve the questions.

[On the same page VOLKSTIMME carries the following boxed-in reported statements by Vladimir Lomeyko: "Lomeyko on the Vienna MBFR talks: It is not only important what we think. All participants, all European countries have to think about how it is possible to solve the problems more quickly and in a more concrete way. We are not against concluding smaller agreements there. Perhaps we could also try to reach them with a larger framework. [paragraph continues]
Stockholm did show that this was possible. Here one is again faced with the question whether the countries are willing to achieve progress, whether they really want agreements.

"Lomeyko on human rights: We believe man is the measure of all things. Security and justice are the guarantee for man's survival. That means the danger of war must be eliminated. Man must have a roof over his head and work, he must preserve his rights, and must be as free as possible. Now in the Soviet Union new regulations to ease the process of democratization were decided — also concerning leaving and entering the country. We are ready for cooperation in this field, too. And we also make our own decisions for this in our country, without waiting for others."

U.S. 'Retreat' From Reykjavik

PM071635 Moscow Izvestiya in Russian 8 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by special correspondent V. Matyveyev and N. Novikov under the rubric "Topics of the Day": "Two Approaches"]

[Text] Vienna — In the initial days of the Vienna meeting the most frequently mentioned name in the speeches of the statesmen who have come here is that of the Icelandic capital. What was discussed in Reykjavik has a direct bearing on the destiny of Europe too. It is a question of an inspiring prospect of a continent free from nuclear weapons.

USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz made speeches at the meeting, the one directly after the other. This fact emphasized even more sharply the positive and constructive nature of the Soviet approach to key items on the Vienna meeting agenda and, as a correspondent of a major London newspaper cautiously remarked in conversation with us, the "superficiality" of the U.S. position.

The State Department chief did not put forward a single new proposal, but categorically defended the thing that, as is known, wrecked the important accords that were taking shape in Reykjavik — the U.S. military program in space. The U.S. secretary of state embarked on a discourse on the issue of "human rights," making attacks on the USSR. [paragraph continues]
Even the right-wing Viennese paper KURIER saw this discourse as an effort to "muffle the dynamic USSR stance" in the disarmament sphere. A shrewd observation! The more difficult the Washington officials' position becomes in the eyes of the world public on problems of real steps in the disarmament sphere, the harder they try to cloud the issue in connection with the human rights problem.

The statement made by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze before leaving Vienna (see IZVESTIYA No 311) gives an idea of what the USSR delegation and the U.S. delegation brought with them to Vienna. The assessment was full and valid.

Shultz, in his statement at the press conference, on the one hand tried to give assurances that the United States remains faithful to what was said in Reykjavik. On the other hand, the State Department chief willy-nilly admitted that Washington is now backtracking on what the U.S. President agreed on in Reykjavik. Once again we have phrases about "sublimits," phrases to the effect that equal cuts must be allowed to occur, apparently, that the USSR "must" reduce its own arsenal of strategic land-based missiles by larger figures than the United States would be prepared to accept...

So Washington's official position is essentially a retreat from Reykjavik rather than a progression forward. No propaganda methods can conceal or obscure it.

'Same Old Baggage' From U.S.

LD071644 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1403 GMT 7 Nov 86

["USA Holding on to Old Positions"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Nov (TASS) -- TASS commentator Leonid Yuryev writes:

Having refused to accept the far-reaching Soviet proposals at Reykjavik which opened a real opportunity for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the U.S. Administration has demonstrated that it places the self-seeking interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex above the vital interests of the peoples of the whole world, including those of the U.S. people. The chaotic and clumsy White House attempts in the wake of Reykjavik to revise the results of the summit meeting and to distort the meaning of the accords reached there are a demonstration, and an unusually patent one, of the total capitulation by the U.S. "servants of the people" before the United States' mighty military-industrial complex, which sees any arms control proposal as an impermissible attack upon U.S. imperialism's old dream of world domination.

Attempting to rescue its somewhat tarnished reputation, Washington has taken the well-worn path of deceiving public opinion, and of diplomatic trickery. The latest propaganda campaign has been unleashed in the United States with an aim as mendacious as it is malignant; namely, to confuse the issue and to convince the U.S. public and the whole world that the main obstacle on the path to nuclear disarmament is not the U.S. ordnance-manufacturers and the government in Washington that waits upon them, but Moscow's mythical "intransigence" and "obstinacy."

The latest act of this unseemly campaign was played in Vienna, where there was a meeting of representatives of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
On the eve of the meeting, where there were to be parallel talks between USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, clearly prompted reports on Washington's "readiness" to discuss seriously and in a business-like manner all the issues related to the results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. It was stressed in particular that the secretary of state would bring a record number of experts in the field of foreign policy and arms control fields with him. In public statements the leading figures in the United States, speculating frankly on the people's thirst for a world without weapons, again and again gave assurances of the U.S. desire for progress in the matter of reducing nuclear weapons.

As events have shown, these assurances have turned out to be empty words. As has become clear from the speeches by Secretary of State George Shultz and his chief adviser Paul Nitze following the Vienna meetings on questions of monitoring armaments and on disarmament, the U.S. representatives arrived in Vienna with the same old baggage of one-sided proposals that essentially boil down to a demand for the USSR's unilateral disarmament. There is not even a hint of any shift in the U.S. old position.

Judge for yourselves. The U.S. side as before, has rejected the key fundamental element in the Soviet proposals at Reykjavik; specifically, the need to look at them in their entirety, for otherwise it would be a matter of concessions by one side only. This alone excludes the possibility of holding talks on separate aspects of disarmament. Aside from this, in their striving to "raise a fog" Washington's emissaries have once again made an attempt to drown the substance of the Soviet proposals in a sea of particulars, and to strike up a polemic around questions of comparatively secondary importance. And so it is that the U.S. secretary of state has once again dragged out the question of agreeing on the "levels" and "sublevels" of strategic weapons to become subject to reduction.

Ignoring the documentary evidence, he once again tried to demonstrate that that agreement was allegedly achieved in Reykjavik on the elimination of not all strategic nuclear weapons, but only of "ballistic missiles" over a 10-year period, which would give the United States a huge "start" in these types of weapons. He continued to insist on the "inviolable nature" of Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative," again talking about the "right" of the United States to denounce the unlimited Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of ABM systems and to embark upon the militarization of space.

In short, the U.S. representatives were ready for everything in Vienna, except the most important one: to have a serious and business-like discussion about the elimination of nuclear weapons. For realistic accords to be reached, it is not large retinues and plentiful wordy assurances that are needed, but responsible political decisions. The Soviet side has adopted that decision. It is now up to the United States.

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CSO: 5200/1157
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: BRIEFINGS OF FOREIGNERS ON REYKJAVIK

Swedish Communist Congress

LD081340 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0755 GMT 8 Nov 86

[Excerpt] Stockholm, 8 Nov (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Vukolov reports:

The essence of the changes taking place in the USSR is determined by two broad concepts: restructuring and acceleration, stated Arkady Volskiy, the head of the CPSU delegation, a member of the CPSU Central Committee and head of the CPSU Central Committee's Department of Machine-Building. He spoke here on Friday at the 28th congress of the Swedish Workers' Party (communists). There can be no acceleration without radical change in all spheres of life, without a fundamental restructuring of style and methods of work, and new approaches to the resolution of urgent problems. Restructuring is the only true path to acceleration.

Boldness and innovation, so characteristic today of the policy of restructuring and acceleration in the life of Soviet society, he went on, are just as characteristic of our course in foreign affairs. New political thinking is the basis on which the land of the Soviets now operates in the world arena. The Soviet Union has set forward a precise program for the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the end of the century.

The new political thinking, A. Volskiy stressed, made itself plainly apparent during the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik. Our country presented a package of initiatives at this meeting, and the implementation of these would make it possible to rid the world of the menace of a nuclear apocalypse as early as the coming decade, following the total elimination of nuclear weapons. At the present stage, a possible accord on the resolution of this central problem was wrecked by the U.S. side. The U.S. Administration proved incapable of renouncing old, outmoded modes of thought, and of sloughing off the chimera of breaking through to military superiority via the SDI program. Following Reykjavik, however, a qualitatively new situation has arisen, and the struggle for mankind's most basic right, the right to life, has risen to a new and higher level, opening up the possibility of a sharp turn in the development of international relations.

On the subject of relations between the USSR and Sweden, the rapporteur noted that the Soviet Union is guided by the premise that the most important factor in Soviet-Swedish relations is the long-term interest of the peoples of the two countries: to live in peace and goodneighborliness. [passage omitted]
Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister

LD142051 Moscow TASS in English 2025 GMT 14 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 14 TASS — Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR foreign minister, has received today Japan's Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Shinichi Yanai, who is currently in Moscow in connection with the holding of consultations between the foreign ministries of the two countries at the level of deputy foreign ministers.

Eduard Shevardnadze pointed out the pressing need for the efforts of all states in the interests of strengthening peace, nuclear disarmament and preventing a militarization of outer space, the importance of their broad interaction so as to strengthen the fundamentals of international security.

He pointed out that the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik had been a major milestone, the results of that meeting marking important advances in mankind's progress towards non-nuclear world, accord with the interests of all states, all peoples. The settlement of the most important problem of the present — nuclear disarmament has for the first time begun assuming a real shape. Yet, the stubborn wish of the U.S. side to sacrifice the elimination of nuclear weapons to the militaristic SDI programme, which is designed to ensure military superiority through the creation and placing of space strike weapons in near-earth space, is an obstacle on the way towards implementation of the agreement. The governments, which have decided to participate in that programme, should realize well their responsibility for the consequences for the destinies of the world and international security, which are involved in the militarisation of outer space. This, as was stressed, also concerns the Government of Japan.

The view was expressed of considerable potentialities for Soviet-Japanese cooperation in the context of a broad programme for strengthening peace and security in the Asian-Pacific region, which was put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok on July 28.

Eduard Shevardnadze reaffirmed the Soviet Union's policy of developing good neighbouring relations with Japan and stressed the importance of mutual efforts in that direction. A radical turn towards better in Soviet-Japanese relations would serve the best interests of both countries, the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and in the Asian-Pacific region as a whole. Concrete results can be achieved if the sides realistically appraise the situation, approach relations as a complex, rather than put forward any preliminary conditions and create artificial linkages in the development of some or other trends of mutually beneficial bilateral ties.

Shinichi Yanai said that the Japanese Government intends to broaden and raise the level of the dialogue with the Soviet Union. He set forth Japan's stand on some international issues and on questions pertaining to bilateral relations.
Lao People's Revolutionary Congress

PM181445 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "At the Fourth Lao People's Revolutionary Party Congress. Comrade G.A. Aliyev's Speech"]

[Excerpts] Vientiane, 14 Nov--G.A. Aliyev, head of the CPSU delegation to the Fourth Lao People's Revolutionary Party [LPRP] Congress, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has addressed the LPRP congress, where he was warmly greeted by those present. He said:

Our planet is now experiencing a most crucial period. Mankind now faces a choice — either to eradicate the views and approach of the past, when security was seen from the standpoint of strength, or to remain hostages of the arms race — in nuclear, chemical, and in the longer term other no less awesome armaments. The realities of the missile and space era demand new thinking and a high degree of responsibility for the fate of the world and of mankind.

The socialist states set an example of such thinking and practical actions. Our country, as you know, unilaterally terminated its nuclear explosions and has repeatedly extended its moratorium, which is still in force today. At the beginning of this year the USSR put forward a comprehensive disarmament plan whose central element is the phased elimination of nuclear weapons, and proposed that chemical weapons also be destroyed by the end of this century. The 27th CPSU Congress formulated the principled basis of an all-embracing system of international security. The proposal to create such a system of international security. The proposal to create such a system was submitted for the examination of the 41st UN General Assembly session by a group of socialist countries as the embodiment of their coordinated foreign policy line. In June this year the Warsaw Pact states put forward a major comprehensive program for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in central Europe. All these initiatives have found a broad response among the world public. All except for the U.S. Administration — bristling with imperial ambitions, it remains deaf to the aspirations of the peoples, including its own.

Finally, to interrupt the dangerous development of events and end the deadlock on the disarmament problem, the Soviet Union proposed the meeting in Reykjavik. We went to that meeting with an entire package of major, far-reaching proposals. Had they been accepted it would have been a tremendous step forward in the cause of disarmament and would have been a real obstacle to the threat of the nuclear war toward which mankind is being pushed by imperialism's aggressive and dangerous policy. Had they been accepted, a new, non-nuclear era in mankind's history would have begun.

You know how the U.S. side replied. In Reykjavik, to which the Americans went empty-handed, there was a graphic display of their side's lack of new thinking and, from certain circles, even a clear unwillingness to change any part of their stubborn commitment to the old and obsolete, a commitment worthy of better application. Some Americans are not averse to talking about peace, disarmament, and cooperation while at the same time doing their utmost to oppose arms reduction, continue to pursue the illusion of military superiority, and continue their attempts to act from a position of strength or to interfere in sovereign states' internal affairs.
We are under no illusion that the path to peace and to the curbing of the arms race will be simple or easy. However — and this was also confirmed by Reykjavik — the reaching of accords on the fundamental problem affecting the fate of all mankind is clearly possible. Our proposals in this sphere remain in force. It is now up to the U.S. side. As M.S. Gorbachev noted, mankind is capable of averting the terrible threat hanging over it. Now is the time for bold and responsible actions in the interests of the whole world. Now, at a qualitatively new stage in the international situation, it is more important than ever before to increase the efforts of the peoples of all countries and continents to achieve that goal!

The main problem now facing the peoples of the world — the problem of survival — is equally acute and urgent for Europe, Asia, and the other continents, too. As a result of the U.S. buildup of its armed forces in the Pacific region, that area is increasingly being turned into an arena of military and political confrontation. Under U.S. influence a "Washington-Tokyo-Seoul" militarized triangle is being formed which poses a threat to peace.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Asia and the Pacific are an integral part of its general peace-loving foreign policy. During a visit to Vladivostok, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, expressed concrete ideas on the possible form of the process of shaping international security in Asia and the Pacific, on the reduction of armed forces and armaments here, and on peaceful cooperation among all the countries of this region.

The efforts being undertaken by the LPDR in conjunction with the SRV and the PRK aimed at normalizing the situation in the region, seeking mutual understanding with the ASEAN countries, and transforming Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability, and cooperation are of great importance for creating a favorable atmosphere in the Asia and Pacific region.

These efforts are a fitting contribution to the cause of consolidating peace and security in Asia and, in conjunction with the well-known initiatives of the Soviet Union, Mongolia, and the DPRK and the constructive stance taken by India and a number of other countries, help to involve the vast Asia and Pacific region in the process of creating an all-embracing system of international security.

The ideas of peace received a wide response at the recent Eighth Conference of Nonaligned Countries' Heads of State and Government. The majority of Asian states now belong to the Nonaligned Movement. And it is logical that the countries building socialism should be in the front ranks of this movement's progressive wing.

The cause of consolidating stability in Asia and the Pacific would be promoted by the normalization of relations, based on constructive dialogue, between Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia and the PRC, which, as a great socialist country, largely determines the improvement of the political climate in this part of the world. It would seem obvious that there are and can be no insuperable obstacles on this path for states pursuing what are ultimately common goals in the struggle for the triumph of peace and socialism.

A contribution to the general struggle to avert the danger of war and reduce tension in the Asia and Pacific region will be made by the holding in Ulaanbaatar in summer 1987 of a consultative meeting of representatives of Asian and Pacific communist and workers parties, preparations for which are now underway.

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TASS, AFP REPORTS ON GROUP SESSIONS 9-12 OCTOBER

Medium-Range Nuclear Arms Group Meets

LD091320 Moscow TASS in English 1233 GMT 9 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva, 9 Oct (TASS)--The group on medium-range nuclear arms held a meeting here today within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms.

Nuclear-Space Arms Group

AU140943 Paris AFP in English 0938 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva, Oct 14 (AFP) -- The U.S.-Soviet talks on nuclear and space weapons have been adjourned a day until Wednesday at the Soviet Union's request, the Soviet mission at the United Nations said here on Tuesday. The delay was due to "technical problems" and did not signify in any way that the negotiations had been interrupted, the mission said. A spokesman at the U.S. mission confirmed that the United States had agreed to the Soviet request for the talks to be put back. The sixth round of negotiations opened here on September 18.

Space, Strategic Arms Groups

LD151245 Moscow TASS in English 1230 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva, 15 Oct (TASS) -- The group on space arms at Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons had a meeting here today.

The group on strategic arms also met today.

16 October Meeting on Medium-Range Arms

LD161511 Moscow TASS in English 1219 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva, 16 Oct (TASS) -- The group on medium-range nuclear weapons at Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms had a meeting here today.
Space Armaments Group

LD211225 Moscow TASS in English 1213 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva, 21 Oct (TASS)—The group on space armaments held a session here today within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments.

Strategic Arms Group

LD221234 Moscow TASS in English 1200 GMT 22 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva, 22 Oct (TASS)—A meeting of the strategic arms group was held here today within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1159
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ARMY PAPER ON 'INTERDEPENDENCE' OF SOVIET PROPOSALS

PM221319 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 22 Oct 86 Second Edition p 3

[Military observer V. Chernyshev "TASS Commentary for Krasnaya Zvezda": "Reykjavik and the Geneva Talks"]

[Text] The Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms have resumed in Geneva. Without any doubt, after the summit in Reykjavik the participants in the talks will have more work to do. During the preparations for the summit and in Reykjavik itself the USSR made it possible to remove the obstacles and stereotypes which had accumulated at the talks and formulated a bold new platform which increases the chances of ultimate success.

As the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee has declared, the Soviet Union is not withdrawing the proposals it introduced in Reykjavik. All this has created a qualitatively new situation and laid the groundwork for a possible step forward toward real progress, provided that the United States finally adopts realistic positions and abandons unrealistic dreams when making assessments.

It would seem that in the prevailing new conditions it is no longer possible to act in the old way. However, certain people in Washington have not the least intention of giving up their methods of which most people are sick to death. So for instance, despite the position that was clearly set out by the Soviet Union -- namely, that its proposals are of a comprehensive nature, that they are a package -- ranking representatives of the U.S. Administration have been holding forth daily about some kind of possibility to extract what is advantageous for Washington from this package and to abandon the rest.

Above all, clearly intent on reassuring angry and alarmed West Europe, for whom SDI blocked out the bright ray of light which appeared at the end of the nuclear missile tunnel, the Washington representatives are talking about the prospects of achieving a separate agreement on medium-range missiles. Such claims are totally unfounded.

The talks in Geneva will be conducted in all the areas -- space arms, strategic offensive arms, and medium-range means. In each of these areas a separate agreement may be drawn up. However, the decision to put them into effect must be a comprehensive one, taking into account all the elements of the nuclear problem.
The Soviet Union has every reason to adopt this approach. First, the USSR's territory, as distinct from U.S. territory, is exposed to a double threat — the threat from the U.S. strategic triad (ICBM's, SLEM's, and heavy bombers) and the threat from U.S. medium-range missiles and forward-based means deployed around the Soviet Union. The U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles deployed in Western Europe are essentially strategic means in respect of the Warsaw Pact countries.

In addition, the Soviet Union is threatened by 560 nuclear-equipped aircraft based on 14 U.S. aircraft carriers and hundreds of U.S. nuclear-equipped aircraft deployed in the immediate vicinity of the USSR's borders. The USSR has removed medium-range missiles from the strategic equation, but has simultaneously proposed a solution of the question of this class of weapons as part of the same package. While agreeing to a substantial reduction of its medium-range missiles in Asia and leaving the U.S. forward-based means aside for the time being, it envisages that the question of dismantling all the nuclear arms of the sides will be resolved at the next stage.

Second, the British and French nuclear potentials which are quite impressive and continue to be built up and improved form part of the Eurostrategic balance. When expressing readiness to completely leave aside the question of British and French nuclear weapons, the USSR acted on the assumption that the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe will take place in parallel with deep cuts in the strategic nuclear potentials of the USSR and the United States. And this linkage is extremely important because the British and French have promised on more than one occasion to join in the process of nuclear arms reduction and elimination at the point when the Soviet Union and the United States embark on the substantial reduction of their nuclear forces.

Third, when drastic cuts in nuclear arms — strategic offensive arms and medium-range arms — are made, it is necessary to provide a guarantee that neither side will seek to achieve military superiority during this time, that it will not create new means capable of undermining stability and parity. Such a guarantee would be provided by a tightening of the ABM Treaty which would ensure that over a period of 10 years — that is, the period of the reduction and elimination of nuclear arms, neither side would have the right to withdraw from the treaty or conduct research and tests under the SDI program beyond the laboratory stage.

Everything that has been said bears out the close objective interdependence of all the components of the Soviet package of proposals. This indicates that the Soviet Union has a clear idea of the ultimate goal and practical philosophy of disarmament. Regrettably, the United States still lacks either of these, which explains the statements about the possibility of extracting certain things from the Soviet package and using them to unilateral advantage.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1159
U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ARMY PAPER SCORES FRG'S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS, SDI ROLE

PM271606 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 21 Nov 86 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov: "Dreams of the Nuclear Button"]

[Text] Almost 4 years ago, when the present government came to power in Bonn, its head, Federal Chancellor H. Kohl, solemnly declared the aim of his policies to be "the creation of a world with fewer weapons." Now, on the threshold of the next Bundestag elections, it can be said: All these years the federal government has steered the FRG ship of state in completely the opposite direction. It was under the present government that U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles made their appearance on West German soil, contrary to the will of the majority of the country's population. It was this government that took the decision to involve the FRG in implementation of the U.S. "Star Wars" program. And the reference points used by FRG ruling circles became particularly apparent in their reaction to the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik. As is well known, the FRG Government supported Washington's position of blocking progress toward an agreement.

The extreme right-wing circles in the Federal Republic which set the tone in the ruling coalition have been frightened by the bold Soviet proposals which, if adopted, would guarantee the possibility of reducing and then totally eliminating nuclear weapons. The absence of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, the West German General H.-J. Mach has said, for example, would jeopardize the "strategy of flexible response" officially adopted by NATO. They would have nothing with which to "respond," you see, to the Warsaw Pact countries' alleged overwhelming superiority in conventional arms.

The utterly false thesis on the imaginary "Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional weapons" has been earnestly mulled over since Reykjavik by all those who cannot bear the thought of scrapping nuclear weapons. In this respect, adherents of the nuclear cudgel are not at all disturbed by the fact that objective research—in the West also—has used concrete figures to refute convincingly the militarists' conjectures by stating that there is approximate parity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO not only in nuclear arms but also in conventional weapons.
While frightening the man in the street with the nonexistent "threat from the East," supporters of the arms race assiduously hush up the numerous specific proposals made by the Soviet Union and other socialist community countries that are aimed at lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe. Some people in the West are now trying to pretend that there were no new initiatives put forward at this year's Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference in Budapest. But the jointly formulated detailed proposal to reduce conventional weapons and armed forces throughout Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals—was the crux of the Budapest meeting. The effect of these and other initiatives is also mentioned in the USSR Supreme Soviet appeal "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World." It stresses in particular: "The specific, large-scale proposals by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states on all these issues remain in force, and we await a response from the NATO countries."

However, there has not yet been any response to the constructive proposal envisaging a 25-percent reduction in both sides' armed forces over the next few years. A special NATO group allegedly set up for the purpose of "impairing greater dynamism to talks on nonnuclear forces" has been "studying" the socialist countries' initiatives for almost 6 months. This group has still to come up with a constructive proposal. And judging by the voices which have been growing ever louder since Reykjavik both in Bonn and other NATO capitals, one should hardly expect any real results from its work.

At a Christian Social Union [CSU] conference held in Munich at the end of October to discuss military policy issues, F.-J. Strauss, party chairman, and M. Woerner, the defense minister, opposed the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear missiles from Europe and categorically spoke in favor of further implementing the infamous U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" and of FRG participation in it. It should be pointed out that the matter is by no means limited to words alone. The progressive youth journal ROTK BLAETTER recently organized a press conference in Bonn during which it was reported that the right-wing conservative FRG Government—in close conjunction with the country's military industrial complex—has been coordinating a series of research projects for several years now which are geared to SDI. According to the journal, the Ministry of Research and Technology and the Defense Ministry have drawn up a special plan envisaging the involvement of a number of FRG scientific institutions in the SDI program. It is typical that, contrary to the agreement on FRG participation in SDI, this work is being financed by the state. And how often has it been said on the Rhine that participation in SDI is supposedly the private affair of a few firms!

There are also other facts attesting to the desire in Bonn at state level to take part in the SDI program. The plans, for example, to implement the so-called "European Defense Initiative," which is regarded as nothing other than an appendage to the American SDI. What is more, claims regarding the "defensive nature" of these twin programs fail to stand up to criticism. Highly noteworthy in this connection is a statement by FRG Defense Minister Woerner, who appealed from the pages of the U.S. journal for the creation [sozdaniye] of a West European missile defense capable of "destroying Soviet missiles on the ground before they are launched." Need one say more?
Certain circles in the FRG regard involvement in the "Strategic Defense Initiative" as an opportunity to overcome some sort of "inferiority complex" and turn the country into a great military power. These circles are also clearly agitated by the fact that they do not have access to the launch buttons of the nuclear missiles deployed on FRG territory. The ambition of these circles knows no bounds. Voicing their opinion, General Schnetz, former inspector of Bundeswehr ground forces, once said: "Whoever believes that the Bundeswehr is to be NATO's infantry or is to play the role of pawn on the Pact's chessboard fails to grasp reality..." As if in answer to these words, the present FRG defense minister now triumphantly says: "We have already regained some of our importance. The Bundeswehr is the strongest army in West Europe armed with conventional weapons..." And indeed, the powers-that-be on the Rhine have willingly and generously spent money on the country's militarization and continue to do so. And a considerable amount at that. Take, for example, the FRG state budget for next year. It envisages record military expenditure, in excess of DM51 billion. This is almost DM1.5 billion more than this year. And if one takes into account the resources essentially allocated for military purposes in other sections of the budget, the end result is that the FRG, as evidenced by the Western press, will spend approximately DM77 billion on militarization next year. This is your "world with fewer weapons."

To all appearances, the abundance of conventional weapons no longer satisfies some people on the Rhine. They have not given up their dangerous dreams of the nuclear button. This is shown, in particular, by a recent publication in DER SPIEGEL. It discusses the construction in Wackersdorf (Bavaria) of a large enterprise for the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. Citing specialist opinion, the journal shows that this enterprise could quite well be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

No considerations other than military ones justify the construction of this enterprise. This is the opinion of W. Roth, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] faction in the Bundestag. This is also discussed in a collection of articles on Bonn's nuclear plans recently published by West Germanfighters for peace. The authors of the collection draw attention to the fact that Bavarian Prime Minister F.-J. Strauss—an advocate of the construction of this nuclear enterprise in Wackersdorf—is also violently opposed to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been signed by the FRG. And Todenhoefer, a Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union expert in the Bundestag, has repeatedly spoken in favor of creating some "joint nuclear forces" in West Europe, evidently regarding this as another loophole leading to the infamous nuclear button.

DER SPIEGEL cites the opinion of the well known West German scientist, Professor K. Kummerer, who believes that, after it has been enriched, the plutonium to be produced at Wackersdorf will be perfectly suitable for military requirements. What is more, DER SPIEGEL points out, if the fast-neutron
nuclear reactor at Kalkar is brought into operation in the immediate future, "pure plutonium suitable for the production of nuclear weapons will be in abundance in the FRG." In other words, it cannot be ruled out that the infamous nuclear button could be in the hands of West German militarists in the foreseeable future.

Will peace be more lasting in Europe because of it? Is the course pursued by the country's right-wing conservative government, which is accumulating mountains of weapons contrary to its own statements, in the interests of security for the people of the FRG and all peoples in Europe? These are the questions being asked by everyone who remembers where the two world wars started.

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CSO: 5200/1157
NATO'S CARRINGTON: REYKJAVIK TO BE FOCUS OF DISCUSSIONS

AU101335 Paris AFP in English 1322 GMT 10 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Brussels, Dec 10 (AFP) — The Reykjavik summit created the possibility for "major new agreements" with the Soviet Union in arms control whose implications will be examined by NATO foreign ministers here Thursday and Friday, NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington said here Wednesday.

Lord Carrington told a press conference that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation foreign ministers would focus their attentions on the summit in Iceland, at which the United States and Soviet Union almost reached agreement on radical reductions in nuclear arsenals.

"The inter-relationship between nuclear and conventional arms control" will be at the centre of the NATO discussions, he said.

Reykjavik carried implications for the alliance which the ministers would "assess very carefully," he added.

Foreign ministers of the 16-member alliance will gather at the NATO headquarters for their twice yearly meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the alliance's top body.

Lord Carrington stressed the importance of achieving a balance in conventional weapons if nuclear weapons were to be reduced, and said the ministers would be examining ways of negotiating this with the Soviet Union.

A "high level task force" of NATO officials is to present the findings of a six-month study into the possibility for new negotiations on conventional arms to the ministers. [passage omitted]

Lord Carrington said that given the huge task involved in establishing the relative strengths of each side, the negotiations would be "extremely complicated and difficult." [passage omitted]

Questioned on the opposition British Labour Party's commitment to unilateral disarmament, Lord Carrington said all successes in bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table had been on the basis of "multi-lateral disarmament."

"There must be consultation" before any country took such a step, he said.

He warned that because "nuclear defense is defense on the cheap," building up conventional forces to replace nuclear weapons would be enormously expensive.

And in any case, he said, the total elimination of nuclear weapons was "inconceivable" in the foreseeable future.

/9274
CSO: 5240/025
SENIOR DEFENCE policy-makers in the Pentagon would be willing to agree to a disarmament deal with the Soviet Union that would abolish all ballistic missiles.

In their review on the Reykjavik negotiations they have decided that such an arrangement would maintain a stable balance of nuclear deterrence between the superpowers at a lower level of risk than their current armouries threaten.

All land-based ballistic missiles would be dismantled and submarines carrying their sea-launched equivalents, would be re-equipped with cruise missiles.

Aircraft equipped with nuclear-armed cruise missiles would also be permitted to the two sides.

Ballistic missile disarmament could have far-reaching consequences for the Strategic Defence Initiative. ("Star Wars"), and would call into question the future of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent.

Trident II, which would be one of the weapons to be dismantled, is the missile with which the Americans are to equip the new generation of British strategic submarines.

In the circumstances, the Americans might prove willing to provide the sea-launched version of the cruise missile to take Trident's place. This is an alternative for which Dr. Owen, leader of the SDP, has been arguing for some time.

Warning time would be longer

A desirable effect of the abolition of ballistic missiles would be to lengthen the warning time available to the two sides.

The time between missile launch in one continent to impact in another, would be no more than 40 minutes. This enhances the risk of retaliating to a false alarm and precludes almost all possibility of effective consultation between capitals once a launch is suspected.

The abolition of ballistic missiles would raise warning time from minutes to hours.
Enhanced anti-submarine measures could be instituted to keep sea-launched cruise missiles at a safer distance from national coastlines.

Abolition would require unprecedented agreement and co-operation between the superpowers.

Verification of the dismantling of some 2,000 launchers on each side would have to be absolute, requiring prolonged inspection by American experts on Russian territory and by Russians in America, and the right to visit suspect sites on challenge.

Such rights have never been conceded. The Americans, however, wield the means to bargain for them in their commitment to the Strategic Defence Initiative.

The SDI programme was conceived to counter the ballistic missile threat, but its continuation loses its urgency if the threat is diminished.

The United States might, therefore, make it a condition of total abandonment that the Soviet Union concede inspection of ballistic missile dismantling.

Dismantling of ballistic missiles would extend in Europe both to the Soviet SS 20 and American Pershing missiles, and thereby ease Western European fears about surprise attacks, without raising the spectre of being left defenceless. since cruise missiles could remain.

Abandoning Trident I without it being replaced by cruise missiles would leave France as the only European nuclear power.

In any case, the superpowers' abandonment of ballistic missiles would leave France and China in a unique position. Weak though those countries' nuclear forces are, it seems unlikely that the superpowers would not seek to force their abandonment of ballistic missiles also.

Pentagon officials conceded that a dismantling programme might not be completed before the end of the century.

It seems possible, nonetheless, that it might be one of the issues to be discussed between Mrs Thatcher and President Reagan at their meeting in Washington this week.
TBILISI: 'MISSED HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY' AT REYKJAVIK

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 21 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by Georgiy Tsetskhladze, ZARYA VOSTOKA political commentator, under the rubric "In the Wake of the Event: Facts and Commentary": "In Pursuit of the Illusion of Military Supremacy"]

[Text] The results of the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik at the center of world attention; an historic opportunity missed, the search for solutions continues; who it is that fears a new way of thinking.

The results of the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik and the speech by M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, over Soviet television remain at the center of world attention. And that is understandable: what could be more important to humanity today than questions of war and peace? The principal result of the meeting in Reykjavik is that the time has come for actions, for a choice: will civilization continue to exist on this planet, or will it not?

Many observers have emphasized that the Soviet platform of new proposals put forth at Reykjavik, proposals which are inseparable one from the other, make possible a stepped-up search for mutually acceptable solutions. "...Moreover, that which took place here in Iceland should be a powerful stimulus for all of us to feel that we must join in the common struggle to stabilize the international situation and seek ways to get out of dead-end situations," said M. S. Gorbachev, speaking at a press conference.

At Reykjavik the contrast between the two courses in world politics, those of the USSR and the United States, was prominently displayed.

Whereas the Soviet delegation put forward a major package of new, constructive proposals and graphically demonstrated its willingness to pursue reasonable compromises all the way, Washington destroyed the possibility of an accord and passed up a truly historic opportunity to eliminate the threat of nuclear war.

Reykjavik could have become a milestone on the road to lasting peace. And our country did everything possible toward that end and even, as the expression goes, "a little bit more."
The Soviet Union's position at the meeting in Reykjavik was honest and unambiguous and was based upon the principles of equality and equal security, taking into account both the two countries' interests and the interests of their allies and all the peoples of the world. The Soviet compromise proposals put forward in Iceland's capital were a concrete expression of a new approach to the main problems of the modern world, and an example of a new way of thinking.

One proposal was the reduction of strategic and offensive weapons by 50 percent over the first five years, with their subsequent complete elimination.

A second proposal was the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, in order to free our continent from the threat of nuclear catastrophe, and to subsequently get rid of the entire nuclear arsenal.

A third and final proposal which was an integral part of the Soviet package of proposals concerned the current ABM Treaty and a ban on nuclear testing. It is essential that we avoid anything which could undermine the balance during the disarmament process. Because as nuclear capabilities are reduced, it is essential that any opportunity to create a new type of weapon which would give military superiority to either side be excluded. The Soviet side proposed measures to strengthen the ABM Treaty, pledging both sides not to withdraw from it for 10 years, during which time the nuclear capabilities of both sides, the USSR and the United States, would be eliminated.

These were bold, unconventional proposals, aimed at freeing the nuclear disarmament process from its current deadlock and completely eliminating nuclear weapons by the end of this century, as was set forth in M. S. Gorbachev's statement from 15 January of this year.

Thus, it would seem that an agreement should have been reached.

There was only one small obstacle: the United States would have had to limit its passion for "star wars" to laboratory experiments for 10 years, agreeing not to carry them over into outer space. But the White House was not prepared to do so.

"Reagan's refusal to limit the development of the 'star wars' program," frankly admitted the NEW YORK TIMES, "was the main reason for the failure of the Reykjavik talks."

The possibility of concluding accords on the most burning issues of our times once again ran aground on the United States' unwillingness to renounce its pursuit of military superiority.

Yet everything could have turned out differently if the American president had demonstrated enough political will and understanding of his historical responsibility. Reagan was unable to begin to think in a new way, which is so vitally necessary if we are to find a solution to the super-complex problems of our nuclear age. History will judge the maturity of politicians, governments and entire societies on the basis of their capacity to overcome
old stereotypes and adapt to a new way of thinking. Alas, this did not happen with the American leadership. The fragile fabric of trust, woven with such labor, burst at every seam under the pressure of the chimeras which guide the U.S. President, not least of all the chimera of American nuclear superiority. An illusory yet dangerous idée fixe.

In three days the President will have to decide whether the 131st B-52 strategic bomber will be equipped with cruise missiles, i.e. whether the limits established by the SALT II Treaty will be violated. If the Administration does not take the appropriate measures to avoid violation of those limits, then the process of arms control will be dealt a mortal blow.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Administration continues its massive propaganda campaign, the objective of which is to impose on the world public its own interpretation of the summit meeting at Reykjavik, an interpretation which distorts the results of that meeting.

Thus, Reagan, speaking in Grand Forks, North Dakota, asserted that the meeting "marked real progress in our negotiations with the Soviet Union." At that same time he stated that "the only way to conduct peace negotiations is to conduct them from a position of strength." The head of the Administration was making yet another attempt to justify the U.S. Government's refusal to limit the realization of its current "star wars" plans. "SDI is purely defensive, purely peaceful technology," he claimed, adding that the Soviet Union supposedly has "no reason to fear SDI."

Needless to say, the Soviet Union is not "afraid of SDI." The "star wars" program threatens the United States, all the peoples of the world and world security equally as much.

We know that Americans are an intelligent, rational people, a practical and pragmatic people. It is they who should in the final analysis realize that we have one home, and one fate: either life, labor and human cares and joys, or... They should understand... I would very much like to hope so. Because one hand is not enough to keep the Earth in balance. The other hand is needed as well...

Unfortunately, not everyone in the United States thinks like this. And, most importantly, not everyone is acting that way.

Addressing Congress recently, well-known Republic Senator M. Hatfield publicly declared that there exist in the United States influential and powerful forces which "are prepared to destroy any agreement between the USSR and the United States."

The representatives of the firms which produce cruise missiles and nuclear warheads, obviously, were not very upset about the outcome of Reykjavik. They do not care about human lives; they will continue unwaveringly to supply the U.S. Government with space weapons and other deadly weapons. And they will not suffer any pangs of conscience about it.
As is well known, in the United States there exist and are active powerful factions which are present time are perhaps dominant, which do not want arms control and do not believe in it. They cannot accept a world in which people want to live in peace and security. Because the arms race is creating profits for them. And it serves as the platform for politics from a position of strength, even if it is an illusory platform.

Just as soon as compromise solutions worked out through neogtitiation or in the course of other political contacts land on the desks of the people in Washington who make political decisions, the guardians of the U.S. military-industrial complex' "higher interests" immediately intervene.

Listen to the assertions made by such apologists of the arms race as U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger and his aid R. Perle: "Washington should not in any manner whatsoever make any 'concessions' on the issue of a nuclear test ban or limitations on the 'star wars' program." Audible among the chorus of "hawks" in recent days have been the voices of such "Sovietologists" as Kissinger, former U.S. national security adviser and former U.S. secretary of state. Generally speaking, they propose that serious problems be "buried" under a heap of imaginary issues.

The nuclear tests in Nevada are intimately tied up with the implementation of the "star wars" program and the creation of new types of nuclear weapons.

Here is what the WASHINGTON POST writes: "The Reagan Administration is financing the largest U.S. nuclear weapons production program in the past 20 years, the objective of which is to destroy well-protected Soviet launch silos or to render Moscow's electronic equipment inoperative."

The United States is modernizing and expanding its enterprises which produce tritium, uranium and plutonium, the main components of nuclear warheads, bombs and artillery shells. Attempts are being made to get more and more new funding for the construction of super-modern laboratories which will study the possibilities of using the energy released by nuclear explosions to power particle beam weapons within the framework of SDI. Underground testing is being speeded up, with the objective of studying new types of nuclear warheads and missiles for the coming decade. Nuclear explosions thunder all over Nevada testing grounds: during our moratorium there have been 22 of them.

"The primary objective of the nuclear weapons testing which is being conducted by the United States," emphasized M. S. Gorbachev, "is the creation of fundamentally new types of weapons. What does that mean? It means that new nuclear warheads of greater power and accuracy are being developed. During these tests, space-based nuclear weapons are being developed: X-ray lasers using so-called nuclear excitation. Work is being done on the creation of a completely new type of weapon, capable of striking targets both on Earth and in space. Under these conditions it is a deception to state that a nuclear test ban would do nothing to help resolve the problem of nuclear disarmament."

Who said that SDI is intended for defensive purposes? Can such claims be accepted on faith? Why should one reject the idea that it is possible that space weapons would be used for offensive purposes just as soon as that become
technically feasible? Why can the Soviet Union not assume that the United States, concealed behind a "star shield" which would make our "deterrent" nuclear weapons useless, would not use its chance to make nuclear strikes without fear of retaliation?

There can be only one answer to these questions.

The creation of space weapons would sharply increase the risk of nuclear war and the threat to all states and peoples. In the nuclear/space age security can only be achieved for everyone, and only if weapons are kept out of outer space.

The way in which C. Hermu, France's former minister of defense, characterized SDI is interesting: "Reagan has linked SDI with a prospect which is surprising to Europeans. He has reported that the creation of defensive systems could make nuclear weapons -- I quote -- 'outmoded and useless'. Is there any politician who would not be opposed to the use of nuclear weapons? But I just do not know whether the goal set by President Reagan will ever be achieved. The Americans themselves admit that there is no guarantee that it will be. So what are they doing? They are continuing with active modernization of their own nuclear weapons: MX missiles, the B-1 bomber, Trident submarine-based missiles. This program extends through the year 2010."

Once, one of the "fathers" of nuclear weapons, George Kistyakovski, said: "There are only two paths: either nuclear war, or nuclear disarmament." How simple this is, yet how difficult at the same time. Mankind is on the wrong road, and what is at stake is your survival and mine...

The desire of the U.S. military-industrial complex to utilize scientific advances to create new weapons systems can only increase the danger of thermonuclear conflict; attempts to portray nuclear weapons in space as a panacea for the threat of nuclear war are a propaganda bluff.

Rather than search for ways of reaching agreements, Washington is pinning its hopes on a "policy of strength." In its arsenals are old formulas like, for example, "the road to disarmament passes only through the super-armament of America." It was with such ideas as these that the U.S. President's latest address was filled.

This is what Pentagon chief Weinberger says: "In those cases in which our national interests require that we send military units, we should never leave any doubts as to our resolve... When we send troops into combat, we should do so with only one goal: victory... That was what we did in Grenada."

It comes as no surprise that such an orthodox adherent of "neoglobalism" as conservative I. Kristol would recommend that the U.S. National Security Council be renamed the "American Imperial Council." As the saying goes, that speaks for itself...

With the risk-taking attitude typical of people who have no personal or national experience with bloody wars, such officials as these prefer to hold
mankind a nuclear hostage for the sake of preserving their illusory hopes and their very real profits. No question of a new way of thinking there! Listen to what Senator J. Biden has to say: "We are now under the threat of an unlimited nuclear arms race which, tragically, was created by ideologists who feel that such an arms race is in American interests."

On this point much can be explained by the fact that World War II was a trying time for America, yet not a national disaster, not a nationwide, unprecedented historic feat. "Should society experience horror, so that it will know what horror is?" This question by American writer William Styron was not addressed to the past; it is a warning about the present and the near future.

The results of Reykjavik bear witness to the main thing: the times in which we live urgently demand actions. Serious and resolute actions. This applies above all to the two great powers: the Soviet Union and the United States.

At the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva, almost one year ago, both sides acknowledged that there can be no winners in a nuclear war. Today it is time that we realized that there are no winners or losers in the cause of world peace. Everyone gains from a serious, responsible approach to the fates of all peoples and all of humanity.

It would be a fateful step to pass up this historic chance to find a fundamental solution to the questions of war and peace. We need to do everything possible to ensure that this chance is utilized. This is in the vital interests of the peoples of the USSR and the United States, the interests of all mankind.

The objective of our policy is clear: to create a world political climate in which all conflicts would be resolved through peaceful means. The concept of mutual security contributes to the attainment of this goal. That assumes deeper mutual understanding between the sides, gradual disarmament and a change in military strategies. As was demonstrated at Reykjavik.

It was President F. Roosevelt who said: "The only way to have a friend is to be a friend oneself." The Soviet Union is striving for that sort of relations. The time is coming when guarantees of peace must be of a permanent nature, protected by strict obligations. This is the sign of the times.

12825
CSO: 5200/87
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CANADA: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER CLARK ON CRUISE POLICY

Comments on Testing

Windsor THE SATURDAY WINDSOR STAR in English 22 Nov 86 p A8

[Text]

The world would be a better place if the United States agreed to abide by the SALT II arms treaty, says External Affairs Minister Joe Clark.

But he won't bar the United States from testing cruise missiles in Canada if the Americans press ahead with plans to break the limits set by the 1979 treaty for such weapons.

Liberal external affairs critic Don Johnston appealed to Clark Thursday to send a protest note to Washington after Pentagon officials served notice that the United States will formally exceed the cruise limits today.

When a B-52 bomber equipped to carry the missiles takes up its station at an air force base in Texas, it will become the 131st cruise-carrying bomber in American service — one more than allowed under the seven-year-old SALT II deal with the Soviets.

Clark told the Commons both he and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney have already made it clear they believe "the world would be better" if the arms pact were not violated.

But the minister saw red when New Democrat defence critic Derek Blackburn demanded that he "screw up his courage" and tell the United States and other NATO allies that Canada will bar future tests over Western Canada of U.S. cruise missiles.

Clark accused the NDP, which favors withdrawing from NATO, of trying to destroy Canada's role "in the defence of freedom."

"We regret the decision that has been taken by the United States with regard to the SALT II limits," said Clark.

"We have made that clear. But we have a commitment to NATO to test the air-launched cruise missiles, and we intend to keep our word."

The SALT II accord, although signed by former president Jimmy Carter, was never ratified by the U.S. Senate.

Discusses Shultz Meeting

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 28 Nov 86 p A5

[Text]

OTTAWA (CP) — External Affairs Minister Joe Clark sang the praises of arms control and NATO co-operation Friday, but was more discreet on the question of how hard he will press the United States to limit cruise missiles in any arms deal with the Soviet Union.

Following a day of consultations with U.S. State Secretary George Shultz, Clark told reporters he sees a "new momentum developing in the world on arms control" and characterized the recent Reykjavik summit as a potential breakthrough.

But he also said he and Shultz did not discuss "at any particular length" the question of Canada's position on cruise limits — a key issue left unsolved at Reykjavik.

American negotiators have been aiming at a deal that would eventually eliminate all long-range ballistic missiles but would leave both the United States and the Soviets with substantial numbers of manned bombers and cruise missiles.

Meanwhile Canada, as a partner in Norad, the North American defence alliance, is committed to upgrading its northern radar system — designed
precisely to guard against the threat of manned bombers and the low-flying cruise missiles they can carry.

Canadian disarmament advocates fear that eliminating ballistic missiles would merely divert the arms race to another channel, as both sides raced to develop better cruise technology.

At least one critic, John Lamb of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, has also suggested that a proliferation of cruise missiles would require a massive air defence buildup in the Arctic.

Shultz would not comment on such fears, other than to observe that "we will continue to need to be able to defend ourselves. If we have fewer ballistic missiles, then you have to look to other means."

Clark acknowledged that the U.S. arms proposals "have obvious implications for Canada, given our geography..."

But he ducked the question of whether Canada will press the Americans to include limits on the cruise and on manned bombers in a deal with the Soviets.

The question should be considered "with some urgency... some care and some frankness," he said. But he mentioned only the periodic meetings of NATO foreign ministers as a forum for such talks.

On a related point, Clark said he had pointed out to Shultz Canada's concern about American plans to abandon the SALT II arms agreement. But he did not press the point beyond saying he considers SALT to have a "very important symbolic significance."

The Reagan administration, having decided the agreement is outdated, has served notice it will exceed the limits allowed for cruise missiles under the 1979 accord.

On other issues, Shultz would offer no comment following the meeting with Clark on his role in controversial American arms sales to Iran.

In a briefing for American reporters earlier in the day, he had acknowledged he attended two high-level discussions of Iranian policy in December and January. He would not say, however, whether the arms issue was discussed.

Shultz is known to have opposed the sales, but it is not clear how regularly he was briefed on the matter and how vociferous his objections were.

Clark, for his part, reiterated past assurances that Ottawa never colluded with the Reagan administration in the secret sales.

The External Affairs Department did grant approval last year for the export of 2.7 million in helicopter parts to Iran — ostensibly for civilian use — but shipments have since been halted.

House of Commons Debate

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 2 Dec 86 p A3

[Article by Joel Ruimy]

[Text]

OTTAWA — Opposition MPs are playing into Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's hands by demanding that Canada cancel its cruise missile testing treaty with the United States, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark says.

Clark was speaking in the House of Commons yesterday after Liberal and New Democrat MPs asked the government to suspend the tests to protest the recent American violation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaty on nuclear weapons.

"One way to stop arms-control agreements would be for a prominent member of the Western alliance to turn its back on the alliance, to turn its back on Europe, to turn its back on the United States," Clark told the Commons. "That's what Mr. Gorbachev would like to see happen; that is not what this government would like to see happen."

The debate began when Don Johnston, Liberal external affairs critic, cited the recent American decision to deploy more air-launched cruise missiles than stipulated under the 1979 SALT II arms-control agreement with the Soviets.

"Could the Prime Minister advise the (United States) that Canada does not want to proceed with cruise missile trials until the American government respects its commitments arising out of SALT II?"
Cancel tests

Clark replied that Prime Minister Brian Mulroney recently wrote to U.S. President Ronald Reagan signifying that “Canada believes it was an error on the part of the Americans not to respect SALT II.”

Clark then took a shot at the Liberals for voting at a weekend policy convention to declare Canada a nuclear weapons-free zone, which he said amounted to a rejection of “Canada’s obligations insofar as the protection of Canada against some 300 Soviet subs in our waters” is concerned.

Pauline Jewett, New Democrat external affairs critic, asked Clark to “dissassociate ourselves from the breach of SALT II limits and cancel cruise missile tests (over Canada’s north).”

Clark replied that the opposition was saying that “other people should defend freedom, but we will only talk about freedom, and then we will back away from our obligations.”

‘Didn’t understand’

Meanwhile, Liberal defence critic Len Hopkins yesterday said in an interview that Liberal delegates who voted to declare Canada a nuclear weapons-free zone “didn’t understand what they were doing.”

Hopkins, who opposed the resolution during a convention debate Saturday when he exhorted the 2,650 delegates to “face reality,” said the proposal is not binding on the Liberals.

“It must not be construed as policy because the party has to deal with it yet,” he said.

Asked about members of the Liberal caucus who supported the resolution, he said, “That’s something they have to live with. I was consistent” on the resolution reaffirming Canada’s support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and on the resolution calling for a nuclear weapons-free zone.
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: AIDS VIRUS SAID TO 'DISAPPEAR' FROM PENTAGON LAB

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Nov 86 p 5

[Article by M. Knyazkov, New York TASS correspondent, under the rubric "Exposé": "Fever As a Weapon: Concerning the Disappearance of a Highly Dangerous Virus From a Pentagon Laboratory"]

[Text] It seems simply unthinkable that an entire army could just "wander" around loose in the world somewhere. An innumerable, invisible horde capable of conquering real armies despite all their tanks and missiles, capable of capturing cities and even entire countries. But facts are facts, writes a TASS correspondent in the United States for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

This terrible army disappeared from Fort Detrick, an American military base not far from Washington, DC, in the State of Maryland. Five years have passed since that time. But it is quite possible that it still lies conceals in a small container in a safe somewhere, just waiting for the right time.

But enough riddles. It was infectious viruses which disappeared. The U.S. Army Institute for Infectious Diseases located at that base is completely unable to account for 2,352 milliliters of a culture containing chikungunya virus, which occurs primarily in Africa and Asia.

This disease is not considered fatal, but it can put a human being out of commission for at least one week, if not longer. Exhausting headaches, stomach pains, high fever...

According to biologists, in each milliliter of the chikungunya culture there are over one billion viruses capable of causing the disease. Therefore the contents of the small container which disappeared from the Pentagon's bacteriological institute would be quite sufficient to send the entire world to bed.

It is interesting to note that this bacteriological "bomb" did not disappear just recently. Only now has it become known that 2,352 milliliters of the virus culture came up missing at Fort Detrick in September 1981. And that was revealed only because Neal Levitt, former senior scientist at the Institute
for Infectious Diseases, along with Jeremy Rifkin, president of the Washington-based Economic Trends Fund, brought suit against the U.S. Department of Defense, accusing the Pentagon of criminal negligence and unwillingness to conduct an investigation into the incident.

However, Dr. Levitt, who conducted experiments with the chikungunya virus at Fort Detrick, informed his commanding officer of the disappearance immediately after it occurred.

It is difficult to say how those at the Pentagon took this news. But it is likely that they were frightened. Not so much because of the catastrophe which could occur if the virus from the vanished container were to get loose and wander around the world, but rather because of the scandal which would undoubtedly be unleashed around the world, and because of what would happen to the program of preparations for bacteriological warfare which is currently being actively pursued by the U.S. military.

And Dr. Levitt's report would have quietly disappeared into the U.S. Army's archives, where it remains to this day.

But the scientist was still worried. He appealed to higher authorities, and was rebuffed. He went even higher and was turned down once again. Finally, Dr. Levitt decided to air the "dirty laundry" in public and turned to Senator Charles Matthias of Maryland.

Matthias was upset; after all, the virus had disappeared in his home state. A inquiry was rushed to the Pentagon requesting an explanation of what had actually happened and asking the Department of Defense what it intended to do about it.

The military thought long and hard about it. Until May of this year. Then, finally, the senator's office received a reply. "Checks," the department reported dryly, "have confirmed Dr. Levitt's assertion that no investigation was conducted in connection with the disappearance of the virus. However, the Administration has looked into this issue and has decided that an investigation would be inappropriate, since the virus was not biologically hazardous."

How was it "not hazardous"? In one of the Pentagon documents obtained by the Economic Trends Fund it is openly stated that chikungunya is "a disease of explosive potential both as a biological warfare weapon and as a natural threat." And Dr. Levitt, speaking with journalists, added:

"The quantity of viruses which disappeared is quite sufficient to infect the entire population of the world several times over."

It appears that, in its effort to avoid a scandal, the Pentagon has invented its own biological "laws," according to which even cholera bacteria become "harmless little bugs" when that suits American generals.

While the Pentagon has been attempting to get rid of the persistent senator with pseudoscientific "discoveries," journalists have dug up new and
disquieting information. A WASHINGTON POST correspondent got in contact with colonels G. Lapton and S. Peters, who work in the laboratories at Fort Detrick, and who stated that they never keep tabs on disease-causing viruses and hazardous substances, and that investigations are never conducted if they disappear.

That means that if a terrorist were able to penetrate the Pentagon's Infectious Diseases Institute nothing would prevent him from carrying out a deadly container in his briefcase.

The very thought of it makes chills run up one's spine. Of course, the possibility exists that the chikungunya viruses were simply destroyed and that fact forgotten. But what if they were not? What if a sinister "army" continues to wander around loose in the world, as is the case with the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)? In the opinion of French scientist J. Segal, that dangerous virus was created in the very same Fort Detrick labs and leaked out because Pentagon scientists "set it free" without waiting on research findings.

There is another question which is no less important: what actually takes places in the Army labs at Fort Detrick. Because there exists an international convention, concluded in 1972, which bans the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and poison weapons, and requires that they be destroyed. Representatives of the United States were signatories to this document. If that is the case, why were there viruses of chikungunya and other diseases at Fort Detrick?

Yes, work to create bacteriological weapons is forbidden. Yet in 1981 the U.S. budget allocated $15.1 million for the development of "biologics." Later this figure grew larger. In the 1982 fiscal year it was $21.6 million, in 1985, $50 million and, finally, in 1986, $66 million. In short, allocations on the shores of the Potomac for preparations for bacteriological warfare have increased by a factor of more than four over the past five years. According to a list published recently by the WALL STREET JOURNAL, a total of 34 major research centers and universities around the country are Pentagon contractors involved in this dangerous research.

Of course these activities are concealed behind assertions to the effect that these studies are "of a defensive nature," i.e. are not designed to create bacteriological weapons, but rather to find vaccines against them. However, according to the WALL STREET JOURNAL, "scientists opposed to the Army's program have stated that the boundaries between biological research of an offensive and defensive nature are so hazy that one could easily be concealed under the guise of the other."

That is why the voice of J. Rifkin rang out like an alarm in a Washington district court, demanding that the Pentagon's bacteriological experiments be halted.

"The U.S. Army," he said, "is conducting experiments with the most dangerous disease agents, including yellow fever, dengue fever, bubonic plague, Siberian plague, botulism, Rift Valley fever and Argentine fever, which causes
hemorrhaging. These disease-causing substances are just as dangerous as nuclear materials. They are capable of destroying thousands of people and all plants and animals over huge territories. However, in contrast to nuclear facilities, at which strict safety standards are in effect, such standards virtually do not exist at the facilities where bacteriological research is being conducted...

I called J. Rifkin soon after that appearance.

"Do you have any news about the chikungunya virus? Has it perhaps been found?"

"No. Not yet."

"So what happens now?"

"All one can do is be an optimist and believe that the viruses were actually destroyed. But no one can guarantee that. It is possible that their disappearance will remain a mystery, and we will have to get used to living with this time bomb."

"In any event," he added after a moment's pause, "the chikungunya virus is not the most terrible one. At the present time a true 'revolution' is in progress in the field of bacteriological warfare agents, a revolution of the sort which should be strangled in its cradle."

(Editor's note: Jeremy Rifkin, president of the American organization Economic Trends Fund, claims that the Pentagon is creating new types of bacteriological weapons, which is in violation of the United States' responsibilities under the international convention banning the development, production or stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and poison weapons and requiring that they be destroyed. That is why the international public has a right to ask the U.S. Administration what kind of experiments are being conducted with disease-causing viruses and bacteria at secret U.S. Department of Defense laboratories. We are awaiting an answer!)
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

PRAVDA CARTOON ON PENTAGON, AIDS CONNECTION

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Oct 86 p 5

1. AIDS is a serious disease for which no means of treatment has yet been found. In the opinion of certain Western scientists, the AIDS virus was created in Pentagon laboratories. (From newspapers)

2. The AIDS virus

3. Pentagon AIDeS

(drawing by D. Agayev)

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USSR DAILY ON U.S. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE EFFORT

PM301700 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Nov 86 First Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent M. Knyazkov article under the rubric "Taking Up the Theme": "In the Pentagon's Secret Laboratories: The Test Tube of the 'Evil Genius'"—first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Text] Recently SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA published an article by M. Knyazkov, TASS correspondent in New York, entitled "Using Fever as a Weapon," in which he described the latest disappearance of a deadly virus from a Pentagon laboratory. The article pointed out that the international public is entitled to ask the U.S. Administration what experiments involving pathogenic viruses and bacteria are being conducted in secret laboratories belonging to the U.S. Defense Department. And even though 2 weeks have now passed since that publication, there has been no reply at all from Washington officials. Perhaps there will be a reply to the second report?

New York—Washington was sheltering indoors from the humid August heat. But here, in the building of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, silent air conditioners continuously kept the air refreshingly cool: Nothing was to prevent congressmen from getting to the heart of the report from which had been brought to their attention. Especially since on that day they had been presented with some very interesting U.S. scientific discoveries which in the long term could develop into strategic advantages for the United States.

U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Douglas Feith was sitting at a table in front of the horseshoe-shaped desk where the members of the one of Congress' most secret committees were sitting. Feith's face shone with pride at the mission assigned to him: Finally he had in his hand material during the presentation of which the legislators simply could not nod off.

So Feith read his report, looking up from time to time.

"Astonishing progress has been achieved in the last 5-10 years in the biotechnology sphere, progress which has rendered commonplace such concepts as genetic engineering and manipulation of DNA molecules and antibodies and means something more than just new food products, drugs, and fertilizers. It also means new and improved biological arms..."
Three billion dollars have been spent in this sphere in the United States in the past 10 years. What has been achieved? Much, and at the same time, still not enough. "In this decade," the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR attests, "biologists have learned how to use instruments to manipulate genes. They have devised a method of altering certain bacteria belonging to some of the simplest organisms."

Let us turn our attention to this conclusion on the alteration of bacteria. Why this in particular? Because this holds the key to understanding the Pentagon's particular interest in genetic engineering.

"The fact is that via genetic engineering it is possible to create more than just 'designer' drugs," I was told in conversation with Jeremy Rifkin, president of the Washington public organization Foundation on Economic Trends, who for many years now has actively opposed the U.S. military department's biological programs. "It is possible, very quickly and efficiently furthermore, to create so-called 'designer' bacteriological armaments against which no means of defense has yet been found."

"For example?"

"Take anthrax viruses, a traditional weapon of bacteriological warfare, for example. Now antianthrax serum is used to combat this disease. Well, it is theoretically possible to make anthrax viruses immune to this serum. It is now possible to make safe bacteria deadly by implanting them with lethal genes. Furthermore, an organism which usually regards them as harmless will offer them virtually no resistance. It is also possible, finally, to increase the resistance of microbes to antibiotics."

It is possible to learn how to alter the genetic code of viruses quite quickly. But it takes years to develop means of combating them. In other words, it is difficult for defensive systems to keep pace with offensive biological arms developed by means of genetic engineering.

Mark (Kollett), a scientific staffer of the biotechnology corporation Molecular Genetics,... lives on the money which the Pentagon has allocated for the creation of new types of bacteriological weapons by means of genetic engineering. Based in the town of Minnetonka in Minnesota, Mark (Kollett) creates a rapidly multiplying Rift Valley fever bacterium for the U.S. Defense Department by implanting in it genes of the pathogen virus of this terrible disease, which itself cannot multiply as quickly.

The U.S. military department has already paid (Kollett) and Molecular Genetics 1.7 million dollars for this work.

Roughly the same work is being done by the "evil geniuses" at the University of Kansas. There, according to THE WALL STREET JOURNAL's figures, they are trying to improve the dengue fever virus "strain," the very one that the United States used against socialist Cuba in 1981. For 1986 alone the Pentagon
has allocated 42 million dollars for the implementation of 57 different projects in the sphere of molecular biology and genetic engineering. This is ten times higher than the figure spent 5 years ago. And in fiscal 1985, the Foundation on Economic Trends attests, the U.S. military department carried out at least 75 experiments in the genetic engineering sphere.

Washington has again worked itself up into a militarist fever. "We've got to get there! We've got to be first with the new weapons! Money! Money! Money...!"

In May this year the Congress was discussing the military budget. And at that very moment the members of the House Appropriations Committee "suddenly" received an extensive report from the Pentagon on the theme of preparation for bacteriological warfare, a report which particularly highlighted genetic engineering.

"The progress achieved in the biotechnology sphere," the generals whispered to the congressmen, "will make it possible to develop a wide range of new materials which can be used to wage war..."

Why was it at precisely that time that this work fell into the hands of the members of that committee? It is all very simple. The military department was worried that the axe of budget cuts might inadvertently fall on its genetic program.

That is how the path leads from long-term, highly promising science to the dreadful kingdom of nonexistence. The old stereotyped thinking in terms of confrontation is again pushing mankind toward destruction.

"Many people are aware of the horrors which nuclear weapons contain. But unfortunately they know nothing about the destructive potential of the microorganisms which can be created by means of genetic engineering," J. Rifkin says bitterly. "Nevertheless, these new 'designer' biological weapons will be no less dangerous. The possession of bacteriological weapons, against which there is no defense, is a great temptation. It places the 1972 convention on the banning of bacteriological weapons under serious threat. I am not exaggerating when I say that we are standing on the threshold of a dangerous race in bacteriological arms."

"And for that reason," he added, "it is necessary to take active measures to prevent it right now. What is needed is an international accord on a special code on work in the genetic engineering sphere. Otherwise, the outcome may be tragic."

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CSO: 5200/1160
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: U.S. CONTINUING NUCLEAR TESTING DESPITE PUBLIC OPINION

Moscow SOVIET YARODNYKH DEPUTATOV in Russian No 10, Oct 86 (signed to press 19 Sep 86) pp 108-111

[Article by V. Matveyev, IZVESTIYA political observer: "For the Triumph of Life"]

[Text] Since 1951, the state of Nevada has been the main proving grounds of the United States, the place where nuclear weapons are tested. There have been so many nuclear explosions there in the past three and a half decades that their number is now approaching 700. It is a sparsely populated state with fewer than 1 million inhabitants but next to it are California with 25 million people and Oregon and Arizona with 6 million. This a region of great seismic activity. In California, they still remember the San Francisco earthquake at the beginning of this century. Pahute Mesa, the section in the northeast corner of the Nevada testing site with an area of 450 square kilometers, where an especially large weapon of a megaton or more is being tested in deep shafts, is near Clark County. Lake Mead, located in this county, supplies Los Angeles with water. In the late 1960's, the attention of President Johnson turned to the seepage of radioactive ground water from the test site to the basin of nearby rivers and lakes.

In the spring of this year, the U.S. Government sent to Congress a request for $1.9 billion for the "improvement of the testing and research complex" in Nevada. The objective is to "have and improve the existing weapon and also to create a new weapon for the nuclear arms arsenal." They are putting up structures with concrete walls up to a meter and a half thick in an area of 22 acres within the boundaries of a "top-secret dangerous zone." The installations for nuclear blasts will be assembled there. It is expected that construction will be completed by 1990.

The term is indicative. At the Pentagon, they obviously are not thinking about putting an end to the testing of nuclear arms.

On 29 August, the WASHINGTON POST published an article by Frank Gaffney, deputy assistant secretary of defense of the United States for strategic and tactical nuclear forces [sic]. In the cynical manner of a rough soldier, the article sets forth the reasons why official Washington is sabotaging the cause of stopping nuclear tests. It directly points out that it is not at all a
matter of "difficulties of control." "Even if we could verify the observance of an agreement on the absolute prohibition of tests, this would not correspond to our (that is the Pentagon's--V. Matveyev) interests. A carefully developed program of nuclear tests is essential to guarantee the reliability, effectiveness and viability of nuclear arms," the author of the article wrote.

What epithets! The "viability" of that which threatens humanity with annihilation! The "effectiveness" of the most destructive weapons in the history of our planet!

The military circles on the other side of the ocean are praising the weapon of mass destruction as though it were a means of salvation. To listen to such "preachers," humanity would face the most dangerous threat if there were no explosions of nuclear devices and if this weapon did not exist.

Let us remember the recent past. For such speeches are virtually identical to the idle talk of American nuclear fanatics in the 1950's, when they rose up against the idea of a nuclear test ban. In the spring of 1958, when the Soviet Union first declared a unilateral termination of nuclear testing, Washington asserted that this was "propaganda," that tests are needed to develop a "clean bomb," that they are of no harm to the public, that their continuation is dictated by the necessity of work on a "defensive weapon," and that there are insurmountable difficulties with the control and verification of any achieved agreement....

At the beginning of that same year 1958, 9,235 scientists from 43 countries presented a petition to the United Nations calling for an end to nuclear tests. In the pages of the journal LIFE, two inveterate American atomic fanatics, Edward Teller and Albert Lattmer, tried to persuade hundreds of their colleagues that the realization of such an appeal would mean a "catastrophe for the free world." No more and no less. What sort of idea could the authors of this article have about "freedom" if this meant support of the most terrible weapon in the history of humanity!

We are not merely looking into the pages of history, as recent as it may be. Even now, E. Teller is fighting against any step in the direction of the complete termination of such--let us say--experiments. He and his kindred spirits did everything possible in the fall of 1963 to torpedo the ratification in Congress of the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty signed in August of that year for three areas: underwater, in the atmosphere and in space.

The achievement of such an agreement was the first great success for peace-loving forces in the postwar period. Our country's stubborn campaign yielded fruit. Our efforts in this struggle were in close concert with the movement of broad segments of the world public and with their campaign for the prohibition of nuclear tests.

Realizing the consequences of the unrestricted continuation of these tests and under the pressure of public opinion, including American public opinion, the government of President Kennedy decided to sign the mentioned agreement with our country. In a book that came out in the United States in 1972, three of
John Kennedy's advisors from the time when he was president describe the enthusiasm with which ordinary people in the country greeted this agreement. But a bitter struggle developed in Congress. On 24 September 1963, when the Senate approved the agreement after vigorous debates, President Kennedy left for the western part of the country. This is what the authors of the book write: "President Kennedy discovered that the audiences to whom he spoke in the West were much more enthusiastic about the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty than about the plans (of the White House—V. Matveyev) to provide for environmental protection." Up to that time, however, Kennedy had considered precisely the latter question to be the most popular. Seeing how matters stood, he made the stopping of nuclear explosions the main theme of his speeches and was greeted enthusiastically everywhere.

The example of the Soviet Union in the unilateral termination of such blasts at the end of the 1950's was a strong impulse for world public opinion to strengthen its fight in this vitally important area. And that is how matters stand today, when the struggle has begun to have the only area still untouched by the 1963 agreement—underground—also covered by an analogous ban. And the Soviet Union has already extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing several times, calling above all on the United States to follow this example.

Appearing on Soviet television on 18 August, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev declared that "having thoroughly and scrupulously weighed all the 'pros' and 'cons' and being guided by the responsibility for the fate of the world, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the Government of the Soviet Union made the decision to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear blasts until 1 January 1987."

In taking this step, we believe that the people of all countries, political groups, and international public opinion are correctly evaluating the lengthy silence at Soviet nuclear test sites. In the name of the Soviet people, M.S. Gorbachev appealed to the reason and dignity of the Americans not to miss another historic chance on the way to ending of the arms race.

Hanging in the balance is significantly more than just the prohibition of such tests. This is not an aim in itself but a most essential means for moving forward on the path of curbing the race of the most dangerous arms. In the course of the negotiations preceding the signing of the 1963 treaty, therefore, the Soviet Union insisted that the stopping of nuclear tests be complete, that is, that it also cover underground testing. Washington and London were then avoiding this under the pretext that there were supposedly technical "difficulties in controlling" such a ban.

But at the same time, competent scientists and specialists pointed out the groundlessness of such references. They now appear even more unconvincing and artificial. Speaking in Moscow on 14 July of this year at a meeting of representatives of an international forum of scientists for the ending of nuclear tests with M.S. Gorbachev, a professor of one of the most prestigious universities in the United States, Princeton's F. von Hippel, shared this experience of his. He related that he has a seismograph that graphically shows how an earthquake on Kamchatka was recorded in Norway several years ago.
This instrument also shows a recorded small nuclear blast that took place at the same time about 2,000 kilometers away from the instrument. "This," declared Prof Von Hippel, "indicates that with the help of such equipment one can locate even the most insignificant nuclear blasts."

Demonstrating full willingness not to have the question of control serve to hinder an agreement on the ending of nuclear tests, competent Soviet authorities agreed to the installation of American seismic equipment in the region of Semipalatinsk, where our nuclear tests were carried out. Cooperation in this matter between the USSR Academy of Scientists and the U.S. Committee for the Protection of Natural Resources was perceived most positively in many countries as evidence of the good will of the Soviet Union.

A resolution passed on 20 June of this year by the foreign affairs commissions of the Soviet Union and the Council of Nationalities at their joint meeting proposes the holding of regular meetings between Soviet and American parliamentarians for the exchange of opinions on matters relating to the observance of existing agreements as well as on the working out of new agreements. Considering the importance of the question of putting an end to nuclear tests, it could be discussed within the scope of such a dialogue.

In his answer to the message of the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania from August 7 of this year, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, declared that the Soviet Union is prepared to send Soviet experts to the meeting of experts of the six indicated countries with Soviet and American experts as proposed by these statesmen to discuss ways to ban nuclear tests and questions of control.

The fact that this is not the first time that the leaders of the mentioned countries of Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America are undertaking energetic steps to help achieve a comprehensive agreement on the complete cessation of nuclear tests indicates what a vital and urgent problem this matter has become, upon which the chances for real disarmament depend to such an immense degree.

Much is at stake. It is primarily a matter of stopping the channels for the development of new generations of nuclear weapons, including those intended for deployment in space. There are numerous indications by members of the current American administration saying that the underground nuclear blasts being carried out by the Pentagon are an important part of the program of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative," that is, the spread of the arms race to space. In a recent speech, Pentagon chief C. Weinberger acknowledged that one of the directions of this program is the study of the possibilities of destroying the enemy's missiles "with the help of nuclear energy." Member of the U.S. House of Representatives E. Markey characterized the testing of X-ray lasers "with nuclear pumping" being carried out by the Pentagon as one of the key elements of the "Star Wars" program.

At the same time that the repeatedly extended Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests is an organic part of the overall bold policy of initiative of our country aimed at progress in the matter of disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, the bitter resistance of U.S. militaristic circles to any
movement forward in this specific question is dictated by ambitious plans and intentions to achieve military superiority for long-range political objectives. Such is the confrontation of two lines, two courses in the international arena.

Soviet foreign policy is based on the understanding of the profound changes in the world denoting the increase in the consciousness and way of thinking that, in taking hold of larger and larger segments of the public in different countries, is becoming almost a kind of material force acting in the name of guaranteeing the peaceful fate of our planet. One cannot imagine such a destiny without radical measures in the area of disarmament.

In short, we do not merely believe in the reason of humanity but we are activating this reason through our own initiatives. This humane policy is being opposed by the actions of the state leaders of the United States and England, partners in the sordid business of continuing nuclear blasts. But what is happening in these countries in regard to the mood of the public? According to the latest data, the idea of the United States joining the Soviet moratorium is already supported by 56 percent of Americans. In England, 84 percent of those recently polled spoke out in favor of having their country reciprocate the unilateral moratorium of the USSR.

The peaceful action of the Soviet Union has met with approval in literally the entire world. Speaking on behalf of the Union of Italian Scientists for Disarmament at an international forum in Moscow, O.F. Lenchi pointed out that the Soviet moratorium has done much to create a new atmosphere. In this atmosphere, many public groups and people in the West are moving away from old positions. They are people who are imbued with the consciousness of their own responsibility to see that the world does not drift toward the "point of no return," to the fateful edge, but that it acts on behalf of its own self-preservation.

In the United States, the House of Representatives and the Senate spoke out in favor of ending nuclear testing. One hundred seventy five cities, counties and states in the country voted to ban nuclear tests. And this is despite strong pressure from the White House. And what do officials not do to frighten people! In so doing, to be sure, the propagandists of nuclear blasts simply cannot get their act together. Thus, it is asserted, for example, that the Soviet Union is ahead of the United States in its missile arsenal. And at the same time, in their attempts to justify the continuation of the explosions, the same people say that the Soviet Union's nuclear warheads are "simpler," not as well perfected as those of the United States. The latter, they say, needs to test and the USSR does not.

In its declaration on 19 August, that is, right after the television appearance of M.S. Gorbachev, the White House asserted: "The USSR carried out a significant modernization of its nuclear forces before announcing the moratorium..." But there is such an indicator as the number of nuclear tests carried out. The United States has performed substantially more of them than our country. Who, one asks, is striving to force the preparation for nuclear war? Who in the postwar period has repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons? Who has so far not wanted to make a commitment not to be the first
to use them? The ruling circles of the United States.

In this situation, even more action is required of all people of good will. "Our task is now to convince the American people and their representatives that a mutual Soviet-American ban of nuclear blasts corresponds to the interests of the United States, indeed of the citizens of all nations. We American physicians must convince our fellow citizens that in this question national patriotism and general humanism are part of one powerful current," states the telegram of Bernard Lown, cochairman of the movement "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War," to M.S. Gorbachev after his television appearance on 18 August.

In this connection, a serious responsibility is incumbent upon parliaments, where budget appropriations are confirmed, including in military categories. There is more and more talk within the walls of the U.S. Congress about the necessity of cutting the corresponding funds. Similar voices are being heard in the British House of Commons. In France, which is not stopping nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean, there is also a growing movement against such "experiments." For this reason, the main goal of the appeal made on 15 June at a well-attended meeting of the public at Vincennes Forest near Paris was the stopping of nuclear tests.

It is curious that official circles in Bonn reacted positively to the new extension of the unilateral nuclear moratorium by our country. F. Ruehe, deputy chairman of the parliamentary group of the ruling parties CDU/CSU in the Bundestag, appealed to the United States with the recommendation that it stop nuclear tests after the conclusion of the planned series of explosions. Although this may not be such a categorical demand, the very fact of this kind of an appeal is indicative of the mood in the FRG.

In the United States itself, Representative T. Downey, as president of the international organization "Parliamentarians for World Order," which includes legislators from 36 countries, welcomed the decision of the USSR and criticized the position of the Reagan administration. "The moratorium," he said, "is a wonderful basis for fruitful negotiations on questions of arms control."

Thus, a serious struggle lies ahead. It is developing in a situation in which our country's repeated extension of its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing has significantly strengthened the position of peace-loving forces internationally and forced the opponents of this step to take up a hopeless defense in the face of the increasingly loud and insistent demands in all countries for an end to these tests.

"A year without explosions," indicated M.S. Gorbachev in response to the questions of Zdenek Gorzheni, chief editor of the newspaper RUDE PRAVO, "is already a political and military reality." One side is demonstrating good will in an area affecting its vital security interests at the same time that the other is acting in the directly opposite manner. Nuclear blasts, says the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in the mentioned responses, are necessary for them, that is, the United States, not for deterrence (there is no one to deter; no one is planning to attack the United States) but for
the creation of a weapon intended for the waging of nuclear war.

Time is passing. Every day of the continuation of the arms race stimulated by the testing of the most destructive weapon consumes enormous material resources and increases the already serious threat to all humanity and to our entire planet.

The Soviet Union is not merely appealing to reason and to common sense but is supporting such appeals through new specific and far-reaching initiatives and proposals. The responses of M.S. Gorbachev to the questions of Zdenek Gorzheni include the proposal for the establishment of an international and supranational network for the control of the cessation of nuclear tests. This proposal, as everyone knows well, produced the fervent approval of international public opinion as well as of many statesmen and parliaments of different countries.

The question of the complete cessation of nuclear tests has a firm place in the agenda of world politics. It can and must be resolved in the name of the triumph of peaceful life on our planet and in the interests of all people on earth.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

KRAŞNAYA ZVEZDA QUOTES GAIL, OTHERS ON NUCLEAR TESTING

Moscow KRAŞNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Oct 86 p 2

[Article by A. Lyutyy under the rubric "Observations On an Issue": "Backwards Arguments"]

[Text] Robert Gail, the American physician who became famous around the world on account of his noble assistance to the victims of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station accident, said at a recent press conference in Las Vegas: "The radiation released as a result of the accident at Chernobyl was only one-tenth of the radiation which would result from the detonation of the smallest nuclear device. Also take into account the fact that [after Chernobyl] we were operating under optimum conditions. We had more than enough doctors, and hospitals were undamaged. But what would happen in the event of a nuclear war? Chernobyl once again refuted the claims of those who hope to survive a nuclear war." On the topic of nuclear testing, Gail bitterly joked that such testing "can be hazardous to one's health."

U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger was not present at that press conference. And probably not just because he is not an admirer of Gail's talent. Weinberger does not feel that U.S. nuclear testing is hazardous to his health. What is more, the secretary is firmly convinced that not only the physical, but also the political and moral health of the entire country will be significantly improved if the United States continues to conduct ever more powerful nuclear blasts one after the other beneath the nuclear testing grounds of Nevada. The Pentagon chief adheres to a clear-cut motto in his military-political strategy: "More, more and still more." More billions for the arms race, more new first-strike systems. Finally, more nuclear tests.

The longer the Soviet Union continues to abide by its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, the more powerful becomes the wave of public sentiments in the United States in favor of such a moratorium, and the more uncomfortable Weinberger becomes. He has poured out his emotions on this subject on more than one occasion. However, in recent days he has done so with particularly great frequency. Now Weinberger is aiming his darts of rage primarily at the Congress, which -- oh, heinous sin -- has dared to oppose the Administration's position on nuclear testing. As is well known, the Senate
has voted for the United States to conclude a nuclear test ban, and he House of Representatives has come out in favor of a ban as of 1 January 1987 of all nuclear tests more powerful than one kiloton.

To Weinberger this is tantamount to betrayal of national interests. In a letter which he sent to Congress a few days ago, the head of the Pentagon states that such bans "will undermine the reliability of our deterrent forces and will set back -- perhaps indefinitely -- our urgent efforts" to limit and reduce armaments.

This assertion by the U.S. Secretary of Defense is, to put it mildly, more than dubious. For is there any simpler way to achieve the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons than by simply halting testing and thereby making it impossible to perfect such weapons? However, it is precisely this to which the Pentagon is opposed. "Nuclear weapons testing," writes Weinberger openly to the Congress, "is of decisive importance in ensuring the safety and maintenance of our warheads and weapons systems." In other words, Weinberger and those who think as he does intend not to eliminate, but rather to preserve and expand nuclear arsenals. At the very least, the expressed desire to curb the arms race is not being backed up with concrete actions.

Another idea which does not hold up under examination is that the Soviet Union has conducted more nuclear tests, as a result of which the United States must now catch up. In a recently published report by a Washington organization -- the Center for Defense Information -- it was pointed out that as of August 1986 the United States had conducted 828 nuclear tests, and the Soviet Union only 604.

There is one other pseudo-argument: the assertion that a nuclear test ban cannot be effectively verified. Even President Nixon said that such a ban could be completely subject to "adequate verification," and since that time national means of control have been improved and become more reliable. "Virtually all nongovernmental seismographic experts," writes the NEW YORK TIMES, "are of the opinion that verification of compliance with this ban could be guaranteed." Substantial evidence of this was provided by the joint experiment conducted by Soviet and American seismologists in the area around Semipalatinsk. Scientists from the United States had the opportunity to monitor vibrations in the soil in the immediate vicinity of a Soviet nuclear testing ground. It is very indicative that, when the American seismologists invited their Soviet colleagues to come to the region of the Nevada testing grounds and take similar measurements, the State Department came up with a number of obviously fabricated conditions for the purpose of preventing the trip.

Recently statements to the effect that supposedly we must first reach an agreement on nuclear arms limitation and only then ban nuclear testing have been issued with ever greater frequency. This thesis was debunked in a recent conversation I had with William Fulbright, one of the best-known American politicians and former chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. "This argument is backwards," he said. "What could be more effective than a
nuclear test ban, which would first slow down and subsequently freeze the process by which nuclear arms are perfected? What better precondition could there be than that for subsequent reduction of nuclear arsenals?"

Washington is currently presenting other "backwards arguments." None of them are evidence of state wisdom or a desire to take constructive steps in the direction of ending the arms race; instead, they testify to a desire to speed up nuclear testing. "I am opposed to a comprehensive nuclear test ban, even if it were verifiable," once stated R. Perle, U.S. assistance secretary of defense. This is the gist of the position taken by many "hawks" in the administration who, unfortunately, have a great deal of weight in shaping the country's military and foreign policy.

Speaking before Congress a few days ago, well-known Republican Senator Hatfield stated that people like Perle "do not care what agreement is involved, since they do not want any sort of agreement whatsoever." Sincerely desiring success at the upcoming Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik, the senator said: "We cannot allow such officials to nullify Soviet-American cooperation."

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA: GERMANS PRAISE NOTION OF NON-NUCLEAR CORRIDOR

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Oct 86 p 1

[Article by B. Lysenko, IZVESTIYA correspondent in Berlin, under the rubric "Reports From Abroad": "GDR: What Will Official Bonn's Reply Be?"]

[Text] The working people of the GDR unanimously support "The Principles of Establishing a Nuclear-Free Corridor In Central Europe." These, as we have already reported, were approved by the Central Committee of the SED at the proposal of E. Honecker, SED general secretary, and by the SPD Presidium at the proposal of W. Brandt, SPD chairman, and H.-J. Vogel, SPD faction chairman in the West German Parliament.

The joint commission of the study group from both parties, working on the basis of recommendations by the Palme Commission, drew up the "Principles," which propose that a nuclear-free corridor be established in Central Europe -- in the territories of the FRG, GDR and CSSR -- extending to a distance of 150 kilometers from each side of the border. Thus, as proposed in a joint SED-SPD communique, it would be possible to create a wide nuclear-free zone in Central Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The SED and SPD have appealed to the governments of states with armed forces within the area of the proposed corridor to enter into immediate negotiations and take concrete actions. As is well known, the Soviet Union supports the recommendations of the Palme Commission.

The SED-SPD initiative aimed at creating a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe between the opposing military blocs can be considered as the first real contribution since Reykjavik to the struggle for a nuclear-free future for mankind by parties having differing political and ideological positions and operating in states with differing social systems.

Meanwhile, the citizens of the GDR are asking themselves: what will be the FRG Government's reaction to the proposed "Principles"? Their anxiousness is well-founded, since in June of last year the authorities in Bonn did not support an important joint SED-SPD plan concerning the creation in Europe of a zone free of chemical weapons.

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SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO NOTES 1 JANUARY MORATORIUM END

FL271913 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 1643 GMT 27 Nov 86

[Excerpts] Mexico City, 27 November (NOTIMEX)—Soviet Ambassador to Mexico Rostislav Sergeyev has said that the United States is the principal generator of world tension and is currently preparing laser and electromegation weapons that are more powerful and destructive than the nuclear bomb.

At a brief interview at the Mexico City Airport, Sergeyev said because of this situation, his country will terminate the moratorium and renew nuclear testing on 1 January 1987.

He also criticized Ronald Reagan for promoting a hypocritical international policy while the United States is the principal generator of world tension.

The USSR will not allow this, Sergeyev said. It is not possible to allow the strategic balance of power to be lost, he said, or to disrupt the arms balance since it must respond to the security of the people, its allies, and the protection of humanity.

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CSO: 3248/85
RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S LIGACHEV IN FINLAND DISCUSSES REYKJAVIK, CSCE, NFZ

Meets Prime Minister Sorsa

LD131550 Moscow TASS in English 1446 GMT 13 Nov 86

[Excerpts] Helsinki, 13 Nov (TASS)—Yegor Ligachev, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, met today Kalevi Sorsa, prime minister of Finland, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Finland.

During the talk they raised questions connected with the development of Soviet-Finnish cooperation in various spheres, as well as topical international problems.

Ligachev set forth the approach of the Soviet Union to disarmament problems, primarily those of nuclear disarmament, and emphasized that in the present-day conditions, when problems of warding off the threat of nuclear extermination and of the development of mutual understanding among nations affected each and everyone, the governments, parliaments and public circles of various countries could and should influence the development of events by their weighty words and deeds.

The sides expressed high appreciation of the striving of the consultative council of the Socialist International for disarmament headed by Kalevi Sorsa for promoting the consistent maintaining of a constructive dialogue, as well as talks between the East and the West in the interests of the discontinuation of the arms race and the improvement of the international situation.

The talk was attended by Vladimir Sobolev, ambassador of the USSR to Finland.

Ligachev, Sorsa Address Dinner

PM141134 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Nov 86 First Edition page 4

["CPSU Delegation in Finland" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] Helsinki, 13 Nov (PRAVDA)--The leadership of the Social Democratic Party of Finland gave a dinner, attended a CPSU delegation headed by Yegor Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
Party chairman Kalevi Sorsa made a speech at the dinner. He observed that the CPSU delegation's visit attested to the determination to strengthen traditional ties with the Finnish Social Democrats.

International tension and the continuation of the arms race mean danger for all peoples, Sorsa said. We believe, however, that a comprehensive security system can be built in the world, which was also declared at the CPSU congress. This system should be built not on nuclear armaments and the arms race, but on the mutual security of all peoples.

A fundamentally major step in this direction was made in the Icelandic capital a month ago, although the last obstacle in the way towards agreements has not as yet been overcome.

Efforts in this direction should be continued, however; in this, the CPSU and the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee receive the complete recognition and support of the Finnish Social Democrats.

Noting Finland's commitment to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen foreign policy line, Sorsa stressed the importance of strengthening stability in northern Europe. The proposals for establishing a nuclear-free zone in this region and other initiatives of Finland were directed at attaining this objective.

The speaker stressed the special importance of cooperation between communists and social democrats in the campaign for peace. We bear great responsibility, he said, for the future of all mankind. Our task is to struggle for the continuation of life on earth, for the eradication of wars and the threat of war, for the establishment of trust and cooperation among nations.

A reply speech was delivered by Yegor Ligachev, a member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He said that the voice of the Social Democratic Party of Finland and its leader of many years was carrying strong in international affairs today. It is being listened to in the Socialist International, as far as we know. It calls for nuclear disarmament, against the projection of the arms race into outer space, for a policy of cooperation and peaceful coexistence in Europe and all over the world, for an end to outside intervention in the affairs of sovereign countries and peoples and for a fair, political settlement of international disputes and conflicts. This position is close and understandable to us.

It is our conviction that the platform proposed by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik pushed struggle for nuclear disarmament to qualitatively new frontiers. A good deal now depends on the resolute actions of all the countries, peoples, governments, parties and public organizations and movements which really care for the fate of world peace.

This is how the Soviet Union understands its task today. We are not going to lose heart. Conversely, we are going to act even more perseveringly, forcefully, and consistently. The viewpoint of the leadership of our party is unambiguous: It will not give up its policy line for a lasting peace and for the removal of the nuclear threat facing the world.

Common concern for the destinies of peace is linked to our common care to make goodneighborliness and trust between the USSR and Finland even stronger and to make cooperation yield even greater benefits to our peoples.
Ligachev Meets With President Koivisto

LD131542 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT 13 Nov 86

[Excerpts] Helsinki, 13 Nov (TASS)—Member of the Political Bureau, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yegor Ligachev, who heads a CPSU delegation met with President of the Republic of Finland Mauno Koivisto today.

Yegor Ligachev conveyed to the head of the friendly Finnish state greetings and good wishes from the general secretary of CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev. Both sides expressed profound satisfaction with a fruitful development of the dialogue between the leaders of the USSR and Finland, the dialogue that is so much needed for the assurance of the steady development of Soviet-Finnish relations, for lending fresh impetus to it.

It was emphasized that now that a qualitatively new situation developed after Reykjavik and the struggle for nuclear disarmament reached higher ground, the importance of persistent efforts of all countries, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, of those belonging to the military-political alliances and those outside them, the importance of concerted actions is growing particularly in securing that a historic chance for a cardinal solution of the problems of war and peace should not be lost.

Pointing out that there is no return to a situation which preceded the Reykjavik meeting, President Mauno Koivisto declared that alongside considerable reduction in nuclear weapons an agreement on prevention of the spread of the arms race to outer space should be concluded.

Both sides are of the opinion that the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe and the implementation of confidence-building measures in the area and adjoining seas, the measures proposed by President Mauno Koivisto, would be an important contribution to consolidating peace. Having confirmed the Soviet Union's readiness to promote the implementation of these Finnish initiatives, Yegor Ligachev informed the president of Finland of the additional steps of the Soviet side aimed at consolidating stability in the north European region.

Ligachev on Kola, Baltic Measures

LD131901 Moscow TASS in English 1836 GMT 13 Nov 86

[All quotation marks as received]

[Text] Addressing a news conference here today, Yegor Ligachev, head of the CPSU delegation, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said:

"The meeting has been held in what is a difficult, contradictory and in some respects crucial period indeed. On the one hand, the situation remains complicated and tense and the threat of war has not subsided.

But, on the other, we see clearly that it is possible to reverse the march of events. There are forces, immense forces, that want to do this — want a lasting peace and mutually beneficial, goodneighbourly relations among nations."
The clash between the forces of peace and the forces of war is now becoming sharper than ever before, and the borders between them are not identical either with the territorial borders or with the borders between classes, religious and other groups.

What is the Soviet stand in this complicated and crucial period?

Its principal point of departure is that it is no longer possible to rely on weapons, let alone nuclear weapons, as a means of preserving peace and ensuring security. One should no longer believe that one can ensure one's security alone, the more so by weakening the security of other countries. One may no longer follow a policy disregarding the rightful interests of other countries and peoples".

It is our unflagging conviction that these conditions call not only for a new mentality but also for new practical action, for bold and energetic steps. This is, if you like, the philosophical and political bedrock of the far-reaching proposals made by the Soviet leadership, by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the world community.

We are convinced that our proposals are feasible and realistic. They are feasible and realistic because they meet the interests of all nations in general and every nation in particular.

The recent meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik has demonstrated convincingly that it is possible to make progress towards disarmament, most notably nuclear disarmament.

I would like to stress most emphatically that the progress in Reykjavik was achieved thanks to the bold initiatives of the Soviet Union and on the basis of its proposals.

When putting forward these proposals, we made a number of serious concessions and compromises. We took account of those problems about which the American side had been expressing special concern, in particular the problem of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Remember how the U.S. President called it a U.S. "window of vulnerability"? We took account of practically all considerations voiced in Western Europe both at state and at public levels. In particular, our proposals for eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe do not cover the nuclear missiles of Britain and France.

One point should be given a special mention. In the United States they now claim that the Soviet Union is intractable and wants to make the United States drop the Strategic Defense Initiative programme altogether. Yes, we would certainly like this initiative, just like any other similar initiative, never to materialize. This is because, contrary to contentions in Washington, SDI is a sword rather than a shield. SDI is not a defensive programme but first of all a programme for developing qualitatively new types of strategic offensive weapons based on new physical principles.

Yet we agreed to continued laboratory research into SDI. It is a serious concession. This is, however, being painstakingly hushed up in the U.S.

Notwithstanding all this, the United States is reluctant to abandon its plans to build a full-scale SDI system on any condition. This means that it is eager to upset the strategic military parity and gain military superiority over the Soviet Union so that to be able then to dictate its will to the world, as happened in the past.
In the United States they argue that accepting the Soviet proposals will weaken America's security. In reality, the result will be the opposite. Fenced off from other countries by two oceans, the United States once was beyond reach and could feel entirely secure. But it still kept developing one new kind of strategic weaponry after another. And as each of those was developed, we had to come up with an adequate response of our own. As a result, America's security shrunk each time like shagreen leather.

I can say with full certainty that if the United States nevertheless builds its Strategic Defense Initiative system, we shall provide an answer to it as well, and the U.S. vulnerability will increase even further. The Soviet leadership has made this point more than once.

Some people in the United States and also in Western Europe would like the Soviet Union to slam the door and fall for provocations of which the advocates for the cult of force are never short. But we continue to stand for resolving complicated international problems by way of talks. The proposals made by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik remain on the table. The platform proposed by the Soviet Union offers a historic chance to solve the problems of war and peace in a cardinal way.

The Soviet Union, however, is not going to confine itself to dialogue with the United States alone. The 27th Congress of the CPSU has described the European direction of Soviet foreign policy as one of the key aspects of the international activities of the Soviet state and stressed that Europe's future lies in peaceful cooperation among the countries of that continent.

You know our deep commitment to the process started by a conference of 35 countries here, in Helsinki. The vitality and promise of this process have been underlined by the results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe, with Finland having also made a tangible contribution to its success.

It is important to consolidate these positive results of Stockholm at the Vienna meeting which opened on November 4. It is important, without losing any time, to consider and take concrete decisions to reduce armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. The Warsaw Treaty member countries, as is known, suggested a detailed plan for such cuts last summer and called the NATO member countries to discuss them. There has been no response to that call, however, to this day.

After expressing satisfaction with the results of the visit by a CPSU delegation to Finland, Yegor Ligachev said that the Soviet leadership keeps the issues of relations with this country in the focus of its attention all the time.

Soviet-Finnish relations serve an example of how successful and fruitful relations can be between countries which have different social systems and different ideologies and are also different in size.

Vladimir Lenin stressed the need for complete trust in relations with Finland. It is known that outstanding Finnish statesman Urho Kekkonen regarded trust as the key to Finnish-Soviet relations. The foremost importance of such trust has also been repeatedly emphasized by President Mauno Koivisto.

There is every reason to continue taking Soviet-Finnish relations further along the path of friendship, goodneighbourliness and cooperation. A solid foundation for these relations has been furnished by the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which has been renewed through the start of the next millennium.
Political cooperation has also been developing in a spirit of trust and equal partnership. The guidesposts in this field have been set by contacts and meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and Mauno Koivisto and between other Soviet leaders and the president of your country. We are leaving with the strong impression that Mauno Koivisto shows much concern for developing Finnish-Soviet relations as a central link in Finland's foreign policy.

During our visit to Finland we discussed trade and economic cooperation — a most important area where the policy of goodneighborliness is embodied in practical, palpable deeds and the material basis of this policy is formed. The difficulties that have arisen and the imbalance in trade can and should be overcome by a vigorous effort of both sides. We are far from sharing the opinion that our relations, including those in the economic field, have "hit the ceiling".

We are positive that substantial further progress can be made in the coming years. Life itself is putting on the agenda issues that are much larger than balancing trade in this or another year. I mean such forms of economic relations as cooperation in production, science and technology, and joint ventures.

Yegor Ligachev said further:

While here, in Finland, it is appropriate to take up also an issue which is of concern to the Finnish, to the Scandinavians and naturally also to us — the issue of strengthening security and stability in the north of Europe. This is all the more justified as it is here that an important initiative, the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone, has been born.

It is with interest that we heard President Mauno Koivisto's considerations about confidence-building measures in northern Europe and limitations on naval activities there. We took note of the fact that this initiative has evoked keen and generally positive interest in Sweden, Norway and other Scandinavian countries.

The Soviet Union strongly supports the proposal for a nuclear-free north. Our position is well-known and I would only like to stress that it remains in effect in all its aspects.

I would also like to tell you that, carrying its position further, the Soviet Union has deemed it possible to take the following new steps:

First. We have already dismantled the launchers for medium-range missiles in the Kola Peninsula and the larger part of the launchers for such missiles in the rest of the territory of the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts and moved several battalions of operational-tactical missiles out of those districts for redeployment elsewhere. This is a concrete confirmation of the readiness earlier declared by the USSR to consider some measures, and substantial measures at that, to be taken in its own territory adjacent to the future nuclear-free zone.

Second. Reaffirming our backing for the idea of lending nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea in the framework of implementing the proposal for a nuclear-free north, we could, if the corresponding countries reach agreement on this issue, withdraw the ballistic-missile submarines from the complement of the Soviet Baltic Fleet.

Third. Supporting the idea of possible confidence-building measures in northern Europe and the adjoining North, Norwegian, Barents and Baltic Seas, the Soviet Union suggests
starting limiting the intensity of major military exercises in that region. Such exercises — from the level of 25,000 officers and men and upwards — oughtn't be held more often than once or twice in one or two years.

Fourth. We share the idea of drawing on the positive experience of the 1972 Soviet-U.S. agreement on measures to prevent incidents at sea and in air space over it, with a view to enhancing confidence-building measures in the naval field. As is known, the Soviet Union signed a similar agreement also with Britain in July 1986.

We proceed from the belief that these further steps we have taken will be positively seen by all those interested in a stronger peace in the north of Europe and, I shall say bluntly, we expect reciprocity.

In conclusion Yegor Ligachev expressed gratitude for the warm reception and attention given to the CPSU delegation in Finland and wished peace and prosperity to the friendly Finnish people.

Yegor Ligachev and Kalevi Sorsa then answered questions from attending Finnish and foreign correspondents.

Moscow on NFZ, Kola

LD142326 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 14 Nov 86

[Viktor Levin Commentary]

[Text] The people of northern countries are welcoming additional steps by the Soviet Union directed at strengthening stability in the region of northern Europe. Comrade Ligachev, who is in Helsinki at the moment, announced these measures. Here is a commentary on the latest news — Viktor Levin is at the microphone:

Actions recently undertaken by the Soviet Union promote stability in northern Europe and create broad prospects for establishing a nuclear-free zone in this region. This idea has already been on the agenda for a good 30 years, and the Soviet Union has always stressed its favorable attitude toward it. It has been noted many times that the USSR is not only sympathetic to the idea of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe but is also ready to assist its establishment. In particular, our country has expressed its readiness to pledge to respect the status of such a zone and to consider the question of several very substantial measures with regard to its own territory adjacent to the zone — measures which would strengthen the zone's nuclear-free status.

Now, not only are concrete terms being set out, the implementation of highly important measures has also been announced.

As Comrade Ligachev reported, the Soviet Union has already dismantled the medium-range missile launchers on the Kola Peninsula and a large proportion of the launchers on the remaining territory of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts and relocated a few divisions of operational tactical missiles from these districts. In addition, in the event the Baltic Sea is given nuclear-free status, the USSR will withdraw from its Baltic fleet the submarines which are equipped with ballistic missiles. Within the framework of strengthening the measures of confidence in northern Europe and the waters of the seas adjacent to it, the Soviet Union proposes to start placing restrictions on the intensity of major military exercises in this area. As to confidence-building
measures in the naval sphere, the Soviet Union also shares the idea of using the positive experience of the Soviet-American agreement on preventing incidents on the open sea and in the airspace above it. These are four concrete ideas; one of them is being put into action at present — I mean the one that involves dismantling missile launchers — while the other three are quite concrete and can be implemented by the Soviet Union without hesitation as soon as the other states support them.

Thus the Soviet Union once again vividly demonstrates the characteristics of its foreign policy: effectiveness, constructiveness, and dynamism. Not only do we talk about our adherence to the cause of peace and put forward bold, far-reaching proposals, such as the plan for nuclear arms liquidation, which are of an enormous mobilizing importance, but we also carry out practical actions. Let us recall the moratorium on nuclear explosions and the dismantling of the missile launchers on the Kola Peninsula. By taking these practical actions we are as of this moment getting nearer to the solution of the most acute problem facing mankind.

TASS Criticizes UPI on Kola

LD142039 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1928 GMT 14 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow, 14 November (TASS) — In a report from Helsinki, the UPI Agency briefly summarized the essence of the latest Soviet steps directed at strengthening stability and security in northern Europe, steps announced at a press conference by Yegor Ligachev, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

In particular, the agency quoted his comment on the fact that the Soviet Union has already dismantled medium-range missile-launching installations in the Kola Peninsula and a large part of the launching installations for such missiles in the remaining territory of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts.

These steps really are deserving of being reported by newspapers, radio stations, television stations, and above all news agencies — in the performance of their duty to society. However, UPI decided to do an additional "service" for society: It immediately quoted some or other "Finnish expert" with an English name and surname (Thomas Rice), who said that Soviet missiles had allegedly been dismantled 4 years ago now and replaced by more powerful missiles in other areas of the USSR, from where they can, it was claimed, strike more accurately at the northern areas.

TASS tasked its correspondents in Finland with seeking out the interviews, to establish the source of this information. Unfortunately, they were unable to do so, as there was no success in picking up his trail in Helsinki. But along the way the reason for the "Finnish expert's" foreign names emerged. His mother, who was born in Finland, had emigrated to the United States long ago. A few months ago, (Rice) compiled a "study" of Soviet armaments and armed forces on the Kola Peninsula, written to the standards that such "studies" are written to in across the Atlantic. This gave him the right to consider himself a "Finnish expert". Finnish?

But why worry about this expert? In the final analysis, it is not he that matters. UPI obviously wanted so much to confuse the issue, to force its readers to doubt the sincerity of the steps being taken by the Soviet Union, that it would use any other pretext that was offered.
Moscow Summarizes Ligachev Proposals

LD162103 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 16 Nov 86

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Boris Kalyagin]

[Text] Hello, comrades. A month has passed since Reykjavik. When one looks back it can be confidently said that the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting has led to serious changes in political life: new prospects have been opened up, new reference points have appeared. There are two trends which stand out clearly. One of these supposes consolidating everything positive that was achieved at Reykjavik, and creating a base for the practical implementation of the accords achieved there. This was the subject of discussion, inter alia, at the working meeting of the leaders of fraternal parties of the CEMA member socialist countries. Those taking part in that meeting underlined the need to increase joint efforts in the interests of the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons and reduce conventional ones and to strengthen peace and international security. Our country is endorsing these words with practical deeds. During this visit to Finland, Comrade Ligachev announced new steps by the Soviet Union aimed at lowering the level of military tension. We have dismantled launch installations for our medium-range missiles in the Kola Peninsula, as well as most of the launch installations for such missiles on the rest of the territory of the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts; and in addition several divisions of operational-tactical missiles have been transferred from those districts. And we are prepared for further steps too for the purpose of helping to make north Europe nuclear-free. These steps lead to a more favorable general atmosphere for halting the arms race.

But at the same time another trend has manifested itself: this is one of the rewriting of Reykjavik accords and extracting from the overall package of proposals and concessions just those which most suit the United States. This is the direction along which the U.S. administration is acting. The idea of creating a nuclear-free world is clearly not in the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex. Yet another nuclear explosion has just been carried out in the United States—the 23d since the USSR introduced its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Apparently sensing the vulnerability of its position, the White House is staking to enlist support from its allies.

On the heels of FRG Chancellor Kohol, next to visit the U.S. capital was British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. On the eve of her trip the Tory leader delivered a king of manifesto speech. [video shows Thatcher speaking]. This speech came over as a panegyric for the atomic bomb. Thatcher declared that it is precisely nuclear weapons which had for 40 years prevented not only nuclear war but conventional war too in Europe, and this, she said, is why our defense now depends and will continue to depend on nuclear weapons.

You will no doubt agree that an approach like that is hardly likely to make for the elimination of the nuclear threat. In justification of her position the British Prime Minister voices apprehensions—and indeed she does so in the name of the whole of West Europe—that in the event of agreement being reached between the USSR and the United States on scrapping U.S. and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles on the continent of Europe the Soviet Union would
supposedly then have an advantage over the NATO countries in tactical nuclear missiles and conventional weapons.

But these are false arguments. In the first place, they point to a lack of sincerity on the part of those who produce them. When we turned down Reagan's zero option we were reproached for unwillingness to reach agreement; yet now, when we have accepted that option, new objections have started to be levelled.

In the second place, we have indicated that we are aware of Western concern over missiles with a range of under 1,000 kilometers and that, in the event of an agreement being concluded on medium-range weapons, we are prepared to freeze their numbers at once and begin talks on what is to become of them. As for conventional weapons, the Warsaw Pact member states have already made specific proposals to the NATO member countries for major reductions of armed forces over the whole territory of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The above initiative could be examined within the framework of the present meeting on security and cooperation in Europe. At that meeting, the initial phase—in which foreign ministers had been taking part—is now over. They have made quite a good start on matters for their delegations to pick up. Even so, it would seem that those from across the Atlantic are trying to dodge discussion of the Soviet proposals, and as a pretext for this are dragging out the notorious subject of human rights observance. U.S. representatives allege that, given that—as they say—the USSR violates human rights, then arms control agreements with this country cannot provide a truly reliable guarantee of international security.

Unlike Washington, we do not want to turn the Vienna forum into an arena for squabbling and mutual recriminations. But of course this does not mean that there are not things we could tell the United States on questions concerning human rights. We are prepared for such a discussion at any forum, all the more so since life itself provides new facts day by day and hour by hour of the trampling of people's rights in free America.

Helsinki Report

LD131727 Helsinki International Service in Finnish 1600 GMT 13 Nov 86

[Text] President Mauno Koivisto has received an invitation to visit the Soviet Union. This was announced a moment ago by Yegor Ligachev, member of the CPSU Politburo, who is at present giving a news conference in Helsinki. The central theme of the talks (held) by Ligachev [words indistinct] has been trade between the two countries. Both sides have said that they are prepared to work to eliminate the problems of balance which have occurred in trade relations. Ligachev also briefed his hosts about the new Soviet proposals for promoting the security of northern Europe.

Now over to the news conference, here is Marja Nikkilä:

[Nikkilä] The news conference held by Yegor Ligachev, member of the CPSU Politburo, contained a piece of news. The Soviet leadership is announcing that, in order to support measures
aimed at promoting the security of northern Europe, the Soviet Union has dismantled the launching equipment for intermediate-range missiles in the Kola Peninsula, most of the launching equipment for such missiles situated elsewhere in the Leningrad and Baltic military districts, and has transferred some operational tactical missile divisions away from the areas of these military districts.

Ligachev confirmed the Soviet stance according to which the Soviet Union will remove the submarines equipped with ballistic missiles from the composition of the Soviet Baltic Fleet if a nuclear-weapons free zone is created in northern Europe.

He continued describing his package for northern Europe noting [as heard], confirming his support for the idea for possible confidence-building measures concerning northern Europe and the North Sea, Norwegian Sea, Barents Sea and Baltic Sea areas bordering northern Europe. The Soviet Union proposes that the intensity of big military exercises in this area should be restricted. Of such exercises with a total participation strength of from 25,000 men upwards only 1 or 2 at most should be held during 1 or 2 years.

The Soviet Union agreed, according to Ligachev, with the idea that in implementing confidence-building measures concerning naval activity, use should be made of the positive experiences derived from the USSR-U.S. treaty of 1972 on the prevention of incidents in the open sea and in the air.

Through these proposals the Soviet Union now wants to make its own additional contribution to the debate on northern security. Now it is again the turn of the NATO countries to respond, and it may be that the announcement about the dismantling of the launching equipment for intermediate-range missiles in Kola is not yet regarded by the NATO countries as a sufficient concession in order for the idea of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe to make progress on the basis of these proposals. In any case, it is a new Soviet opening.

Otherwise, the Finnish-Soviet discussions have passed successfully, according to both sides. Ligachev noted that President Koivisto continued Finland’s foreign policy line. He takes great care of the development of the Finnish-Soviet relations as a central link of Finland’s foreign policy, Ligachev said at the press conference, and said that Koivisto had been invited to visit the Soviet Union.

I end my report about Ligachev’s news conference here; Ilpo Ropponen will be here in a moment to tell you what new things there are to report about the trade and economic relations between Finland and the Soviet Union this time.

[Announcer] And we can go back straightaway, here you are Ilpo Ropponen:

[Ropponen] Just a moment ago this news conference of Yegor Ligachev and Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa ended. At this news conference the most important news item was the one that Marja Nikkiläe has already told you — the removal of these missiles from Kola and the Leningrad areas.

But this news conference also dealt with many other matters, including the economic relations between Finland and the Soviet
Union, (on which we) had already, in advance, expected some kind of discussion. Of these matters described now at the press conference [words indistinct]. Both Yegor Ligachev and Prime Minister Sorsa stressed the fact that the present difficulties in particular are momentary difficulties, due to the world economy, the fall in the price of oil especially; but on a longer-term basis they will not affect the trade between Finland and the Soviet Union. Ligachev in particular stressed the fact that when we seek new forms and new increasing cooperation in economic matters, the way to achieve it is through increasing production cooperation and the establishment of production enterprises, joint enterprises. This matter, which has recently (Increasingly) come strongly to the fore, was particularly stressed by Yegor Ligachev. 
In other words, no actual enterprises were [words indistinct] on this visit, but [words indistinct] increase in the economy were extensively discussed.

I conclude my report here from the news conference which ended a moment ago.

Helsinki Gives Sorsa Response

LD131817 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1700 GMT 13 Nov 86

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union states that is has removed intermediate-range missiles from the Kola Peninsula and partly from around Leningrad and the Baltic area. In addition the Soviet Union is prepared to take other new measures to strengthen security in the north of Europe. This was announced by Yegor Ligachev, the number two official of the CPSU, who is in Finland as a guest of the Social Democratic Party, at a news conference today. [passage omitted]

Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa said that the measures announced by Ligachev corresponded to the hopes expressed in the Nordic countries for a reduction of nuclear weapons in the surrounding areas and in the Baltic. He said that the Soviet measures were a unilateral encouraging gesture in a situation in which the Nordic countries have not yet reached the stage of implementing the plan for a nuclear weapons-free zone.

Ligachev's talks with the Finnish state leadership dealt also with Finnish-Soviet relations. According to Prime Minister Sorsa there are no political problems, and therefore the discussions concentrated on economic matters. Both Sorsa and Ligachev stressed that the problems can be eliminated.

Ligachev also conveyed the Soviet leaders' invitation to President Koivisto to visit the Soviet Union. The date will be set later.

Finnish CP Head on Kola

LD181604 Moscow TASS in English 1539 GMT 18 Nov 86

[Text] Helsinki, 18 Nov (TASS)—The Soviet peace initiatives for withdrawing medium-range missiles from the Kola Peninsula and the Leningrad region, which
were announced during the stay in Finland of the CPSU delegation led by Yegor Ligachev, member of the Political Bureau, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and also the readiness to take relevant measures for enhancing security in the Baltic Sea area are aimed at giving effect to the idea of setting up a nuclear-free zone in Nordic Europe and are of overriding importance from the point of view of consolidating peace, Jouko Kajanoja, general secretary of the Communist Party of Finland (United), told TASS.

In the West they now try to portray these unilateral proposals by the Soviet Union as all but a gesture whereas the case in point is the USSR's real and large-scale activity to preserve peace.

This is consistent with our aspirations since we are interested in stepping up efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons in the north of Europe, he stressed. This is the reason why the Finnish Communists support the Soviet initiatives and demand that official negotiations be opened on setting up such a zone.

The initiatives launched in Helsinki show that the Soviet Union carries on its peaceful policy. They are consonant with the drive by the peace campaigners in capitalist countries to strengthen security on the glove, Jouko Kajanoja said.

Sweden Shows 'Positive Interest'  

PM191137 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Sychev report: "Northern Europe: A Nuclear-free Zone Is Possible"]

[Text] Stockholm--The new Soviet initiatives on the problem of creating a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe, outlined in Helsinki by Ye. K. Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, have generated keen interest among the Swedish public.

The major newspapers have published detailed reports on the initiatives and carry initial assessments and commentaries. They note in particular that from the very beginning the Soviet Union has had a positive attitude toward the idea of proclaiming Northern Europe a nuclear-free zone, while the United States and other NATO countries have turned it down.

Sweden's conservative circles, by way of justifying their negative attitude toward the nuclear-free zone, have attempted to diminish the importance of the measures being taken by the USSR to dismantle launch installations for medium-range missiles in the Kola Peninsula and the majority of launch installations for such missiles in the remaining territory of the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts, and of other steps by the USSR.

The Swedish Government has shown positive interest in the Soviet initiatives. They make more specific ideas expressed earlier concerning measures also affecting Soviet territory adjacent to the North European region. According to
a statement, the Swedish Government will carefully study these pro-

"Public anxiety in connection with the buildup of the U.S. military presence in
the seas around Northern Europe is growing noticeably stronger," O. Brandström,
member of the Swedish National Committee for the Defense of Peace Executive Com-
mittee Board, said in an interview with your correspondent. "The proclamation
of nuclear-free status for Northern Europe would be an important step along the
path of improving the international situation, and not just in our region....
The development of this idea is today encountering serious difficulties, even
though certain progress has definitely been achieved; for example, a parlia-
mentary commission of North-European states has been formed and is working.

"The USSR's new proposals create favorable opportunities for success in the
struggle being waged by the majority of people in our region for the proclama-
tion of a nuclear-free zone. The USSR's actions are so substantial and weighty
that they demand a specific response from the governments of North European
countries. In terms of their resonance, importance, and decisiveness they
are comparable with the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests. They
demonstrate the new thinking of the Soviet Union, which aims at changing in
deeds rather than in words the dangerous course of events in the world and in
individual regions," my interlocutor said in conclusion.

G. Samer, an eminent activist of the Swedish antiwar movement, noted in a
conversation with me:

"The measures taken by the USSR are an exceptionally important step. The
United States and NATO have been impressing upon us for a long time that
nuclear-free zones are unrealistic. Yet here we have practical steps by the
USSR, taken, moreover, in respect of its own territory. Now even a blind
person can see the difference in the U.S. and USSR approaches to urgent prob-
lems of international security."

Moscow Hits Swedish Commentator

LD192216 Moscow International Service in Finnish 1530 GMT 19 Nov 86

[Text] Dear listeners. We continue our broadcast with a comment by our military
expert, Colonel Eduard Grigoryev. Concerning the reaction in response to the new
Soviet steps for consolidating stability in the north of Europe, our observer writes:

Nobody who is really interested in measures to increase the security of the northern
part of Europe could fail to give support to the Soviet Union, which has shown its
loyalty to the idea of establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone in the north of
Europe. But there have also been negative views in the Nordic countries. I shall deal
with only one of them.

I would like to refer to the statement of Vilhelm Agrell on Swedish radio. I am sure
that he did not even have enough time to consider thoroughly the announcement made by
Yegor Ligachev about the Soviet steps before he began to doubt them. According to his
assessment, this measure is not of great significance.
But how on earth could the fact be without significance that the Soviet Union has dismantled medium-range launchers on the threshold of its northern neighbors, on the Kola Peninsula, and a large part of these launchers from the area of its northeastern military districts? Perhaps much more important in his view was the recent NATO "Northern Wedding" exercise in the area.

If Mr Agrell had not been in such a hurry to brand the Soviet steps as inefficient, he would have been sure to pay attention to the following fact: the Soviet Union did not announce that it intended to replace old missiles with new ones, but the fact is that it has dismantled the launchers of its own medium-range missiles. They do not exist any longer on the Kola Peninsula, and there are hardly any in the area of the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts, either. From the same area several operational-tactical missile divisions have been withdrawn. Is this good or bad for the nuclear-free north?

Mr Agrell claims that the withdrawn missiles have been replaced with new ones, but in a different part of the country. But you may be excused for asking, what do the other areas of the country have to do with the north of Europe? Everyone knows that the Soviet Union has missiles in Siberia, but these are not intended for the north of Europe. In addition, it should not be forgotten that the Soviet Union is in favor of the withdrawal of all medium range missiles from Europe, but only if the United States acts correspondingly. We would not believe that Mr Agrell, who is a specialist on measures to safeguard peace, would not know all this.

But why is it necessary to mislead the listeners and to underestimate the importance of the Soviet initiatives? Whose interest is served by mistrust and hostility? Certainly not the good of the circles supporting a nuclear-free north, but above all of those who in every possible way want to prevent the implementation of the proposal.

Norwegian Commander on NFZ, Kola

LD181919 Moscow TASS in English 1848 GMT 18 Nov 86

The discussion of problems of establishing a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe is an integral part of the efforts to reduce the nuclear arsenals on the continent and a step towards the complete eradication of nuclear weapons.

Quite naturally, all who are interested in strengthening peace in northern Europe have positively assessed the USSR's latest initiatives announced in Helsinki by Yegor Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

They were, first of all, a concrete confirmation of the Soviet Union's readiness to consider substantial measures with regard to its own territory adjoining the would-be non-nuclear zone.

Secondly, they were a practical support for the idea of possible confidence-building measures in respect to the northern region and the adjacent seas.

There are, however, certain quarters in Scandinavia which did not like the Soviet initiatives. For instance, the commander-in-chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces, General Fredrik Bull-Hansen, tried to reduce their impact on public opinion in an interview with the newspaper AFTENPOSTEN.
He said he doubted that the USSR had really dismantled the medium-range missile launchers in the Kola Peninsula and a large part of such launchers in the rest of the territory of the Leningrad and the Baltic military districts.

What was happening in reality, the general claimed, was the replacement by the Soviet Union of the outdated SS-5 missiles with new SS-20's.

Does Bull-Hansen have a reliable source of information? Far from that. He merely repeats the obvious lie concocted by a certain Tomas Rais, a self-proclaimed "Finnish expert on Soviet arms in northern Europe."

Rais assumed the title on the strength of the fact that his mother was born in Finland (but long since left that country).

Why has the Norwegian general picked up the hoax? Is he not one of those who, in a bid to thwart the process of nuclear disarmament, started claiming after Reykjavik that nuclear weapons are a good thing?

The British newspaper OBSERVER meant precisely such generals, when it said that they felt more comfortable with nuclear arms, while the renunciation of nuclear arsenals was tantamount to the threats to strip them down to their underwear.

The commander-in-chief should recall the latest statement by Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland that the current Norwegian Government, like the previous ones, regarded the development of relations with the neighbouring Soviet Union as an important goal.

The general's lie can hardly correspond to the Norwegian Government's policy.

Communique on Ligachev Visit

PM171145 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

["Communique on the Talks Between CPSU and Finnish Social Democratic Party [SDP] Delegations"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpt] A delegation of the CPSU visited Finland 12-15 November 1986, at the invitation of the Executive Committee of the Finnish SDP. Talks were held between the CPSU and SDP delegations. [paragraph continues]

Taking part in them, on the CPSU's side, were: Yegor Ligachev, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (head of delegation), Karl Vaino, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, Anatoliy Gerasimov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Leningrad Gorkom, and Vitaliy Shapooshnikov, deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. On the SDP's side, taking part in the talks were: Kalevi Sorsa, chairman of the SDP and head of delegation, Erkki Liikanen, SDP secretary-general, Pirkko Tyolajarvi and Matti Ahde, deputy chairman of the party, Risto Tuominen, chairman of the SDP Council, Pertti Paasio, chairman of the SDP's Diet group, and Lauri Kangas, SDP secretary for international affairs.

During the talks, which passed in an atmosphere of comradely trust, there was a thorough exchange of opinions on the most topical problems of the international
situation, the workers' movement, and prospects for Soviet-Finnish relations. The delegations informed each other of the activities of their parties.

The CPSU representatives described the work under way in the Soviet Union to implement the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, which are aimed at speeding up the country's socioeconomic development and at further improving the welfare of the people. They also described the basic aims and directions of the foreign policy activity of the CPSU.

For its part the SDP of Finland reported on the party's activity to ensure economic development, employment, and social equality in Finland, as well as on its struggle for peace, disarmament, and international cooperation, particularly within the framework of the Socialist International.

The SDP delegation highly evaluated the large-scale peace initiatives proposed at the 27th CPSU Congress by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the program for the elimination of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000, and proposals to create a comprehensive system of international security.

The CPSU delegation stressed the SDP's constructive role in the struggle for peace, disarmament, and detente and in the implementation of Finland's foreign policy line.

As a result of discussions it was confirmed that the approaches of both parties to the key issues of contemporary development in the world, to the problems of war and peace, and to the ways of resolving them, basically coincide or are close to each other.

The representatives of the CPSU and the SDP expressed deep concern at the strengthening of the arms race, first and foremost the nuclear arms race, and at actions directed toward transferring this into space, and at the exacerbation of crisis situations in various parts of the globe. All of this as a whole is fraught with the threat of a new war, which would mean catastrophe for all of modern civilization.

The CPSU and the SDP agree that the realities of the nuclear and space age demand a new and bold political way of thinking, a renunciation of the use of force and the threat of force in international affairs, and a persistent search for ways of political settlement of disputed issues. [paragraph continues]

This means that in international affairs one must be guided not by national egoism, but by the principles of equal security for all peoples. Both delegations stressed that examination of the issues of disarmament must be comprehensive, including nuclear, space, chemical, and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, as well as conventional arms and armed forces. For this aim to be achieved decisive actions and the mutual cooperation of all states, large and small, are needed. At the same time the need was stressed for joint efforts to be increased in defense of peace by political parties, trade unions, and antiwar movements, and other public organizations and movements, regardless of their political orientation.

In this connection the sides noted the exceptionally important significance of the Soviet-U.S. meeting at summit level at Reykjavik which was a major political event that made it possible to bring the struggle against nuclear weapons up to qualitatively new frontiers. The SDP delegation gave a high appraisal of the constructive position adopted by the Soviet side at the Reykjavik meeting. Both delegations consider it essential to continue contacts and talks on the whole complex of nuclear and space weapons in order to go on to concrete measures for disarmament on earth, preventing the militarization of space, and ensuring reliable security and peaceful conditions for the socioeconomic development of all peoples.
The delegations gave a positive assessment to the results of the first stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe. The sides consider it important that at the meeting of representatives of the participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, concrete results should be achieved in the advancement of the Pan-European process in all directions as outlined in the Helsinki Final Act. The work to strengthen confidence and security and to reduce armed forces and armaments in Europe must be continued.

The sides noted the growing topicality of Finland's initiative on setting up a nonnuclear zone in the north of Europe, which is meeting with increasingly wide support from the peoples of this region. The SDP will continue efforts to put this initiative into practice. The CPSU delegation confirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to promote for its part the creation of favorable conditions for its achievement.

The sides expressed the view that President M. Koivisto's proposal on measures to strengthen trust in the military sphere as applied to northern Europe and the seas adjacent to it is a constructive contribution to resolving the task of strengthening stability in this region.

One important step on the road to freeing Europe of nuclear weapons would be the creation in its central part of a nuclear-free corridor in accordance with the well-known proposal of the Olaf Palme Commission and the joint initiative of the SED Party and the SFD.

They consider that regardless of the presence of ideological differences, cooperation between communists and social democrats assumes greater and greater significance in the struggle for peace, detente, and disarmament in the interests of the working people, for democracy and social progress. In this connection special attention was given to the ties between the CPSU and the Socialist International, which have developed further recently on disarmament questions.

Participants in the talks noted with satisfaction the positive development of relations between the CPSU and the SDP in the interests of the strengthening of friendly Soviet-Finnish relations, in the cause of struggle against the nuclear threat, and for peace and security of the peoples. The readiness of both parties was confirmed to be active in this direction in the future, in particular, to celebrate jointly the historically closely linked dates — the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the 70th anniversary of the independence of Finland.

Politburo on Ligachev Visit

PM241529 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Nov 86 First Edition p1

[Excerpts] At its 20 November session, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo discussed the results of the conference on questions of the introduction of the State Acceptance of Production in associations and at enterprises of industrial ministries, which was held at the CPSU Central Committee.

The results of the talks between a CPSU delegation and one from the Social Democratic Party of Finland, and of the meeting between Comrade Ligachev and Finnish President Koivisto, were considered at the Politburo session. It was stressed that the Soviet Union ascribes paramount significance to the strengthening of the relationship of
friendship and cooperation with neighboring Finland by all means. The certainty was expressed that the long years of experience, the mutual trust of the Soviet and Finnish peoples, and the congruence of their long-term interests make it possible to raise the relations of our countries to a still higher level and affirm once again the prospects that exist in the policy of peaceful coexistence and detente.

It was noted with satisfaction that the new steps by the Soviet Union aimed at strengthening security in the region of northern Europe, which were discussed at Helsinki, and the initiatives connected with turning this region into a nuclear-free zone are meeting with a positive international response.
RELATED ISSUES

USSR MEDIA ON UN FIRST COMMITTEE ARMS DEBATES

Petrovskiy on 15 January Proposals

PM221014 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Oct 86 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Sukhoy report: "The Roads To Disarmament"]

[Text] New York, 18 Oct--The general discussion continues in the UN General Assembly First Committee (political questions, including problems of disarmament and international security). In general it is marked by its concrete, constructive orientation toward the quest for real, effective ways to a nuclear-free world.

M. S. Gorbachev's meeting with the U.S. President in Reykjavik, it was noted in the speech by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V. F. Petrovskiy, showed clearly that new approaches and a new political philosophy are needed now, approaches which reject from the outset the centuries-old ideas of the permissibility and acceptability of bloody wars and conflicts. The load-bearing walls of the edifice of universal security must consist of all spheres of international relations: political, economic, military, and humanitarian.

On 15 January 1986 the Soviet Union put forward a comprehensive program for universal security through disarmament. The constructive potential of this program is tangibly embodied in the package of major Soviet proposals submitted at the Reykjavik meeting.

The priority avenues of multifaceted efforts, from the USSR's viewpoint, are:

The ending of nuclear tests. The simplest, clearest, most effective step toward curbing the arms race.

Nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of comprehensively verifiable accords on the radical reduction and total elimination of nuclear weapons. Embarking without delay on an exchange of opinions on these questions among all the nuclear powers in parallel with Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms.

The elaboration of multilateral agreements on lessening the danger of nuclear war. The USSR calls for the businesslike discussion of the proposal of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar on setting up a multilateral center for lessening the nuclear danger.
The prevention of an arms race in space. At the Geneva Disarmament Conference talks must at last begin on concluding an agreement or agreements on preventing an arms race in outer space.

Ridding the planet of arsenals of chemical death.

The imposition of a ban on the creation of nonnuclear arms based on new physical principles. In terms of destructive capability arms of this kind are approaching nuclear and other means of mass destruction.

The agreed reduction of conventional arms and armed forces.

The curbing of the arms race in the seas and oceans. It is necessary to begin talks in this connection with the participation of all the major naval powers and other interested states, and to embark on the elaboration of a multilateral accord on preventing incidents on the high seas and in the airspace above them.

To achieve an accord on a real reduction in the military spending of states, the USSR proposes the establishment of an international fund to grant aid to the developing countries. Part of the resources saved by the states belonging to military alliances would be contributed to the fund. The projects and programs of the international fund would be implemented, in particular, through UN channels. The Soviet Union is prepared to begin seeking agreement on the principles for transferring part of the funds freed in the disarmament process to provide aid to developing countries.

A proposal is submitted for examination by the international community that states should voluntarily renounce the utilization of the right to withdraw from arms limitation agreements and scrupulously observe the commitments adopted.

The Soviet delegation, V. F. Petrovskiy stated in conclusion, has come to the First Committee of the current exceptionally crucial UN General Assembly session prepared to cooperate, and hopes that the work of this authoritative organ will continue to proceed along the roads to disarmament and a safe world for everyone.

Call for Weapons Ban

LD110921 Moscow TASS in English 0653 GMT 11 Nov 86

[Text] New York, 11 Nov (TASS) -- The first committee of the UN General Assembly, following a proposal from a large group of socialist and nonaligned countries, called for a ban on the development and production of weapons of mass annihilation of new types and new systems of such weapons. A draft resolution approved by the overwhelming majority vote stresses the importance of preventing the use of scientific and technological progress for purposes which are at odds with the interests of mankind. The USA was alone in voting against that document.
U.S. Posture in Debates

PM181427 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[TASS report, "Twenty-one Noes to the Peoples. A World Without Nuclear Weapons; Who Is For and Who Against"]

[Text] New York, 13 Nov--At the proposal of 16 socialist and nonaligned countries, the UN General Assembly's First Committee has called on the USSR and United States, as the states with the largest nuclear arsenals, to show initiative and set an example together in curbing the nuclear arms race, refraining on a mutual basis from siting weapons in outer space. The coauthors of the draft resolution, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes, explained this appeal by saying that in the nuclear space age reliable security for all countries can be ensured only by political means, through the joint efforts of all states, and that the interests of peace necessitate a transition to the ending of the arms race and to disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field. With its large-scale proposals and concrete actions the Soviet Union confirms its readiness for such steps. The United States nevertheless voted against the draft resolution, yet again demonstrating its attitude toward disarmament questions.

The First Committee, which has already approved over 40 draft resolutions on disarmament questions, has focused its attention on precisely these questions. Through the efforts of the socialist states and many nonaligned and neutral countries, documents have been adopted calling for a halt to nuclear weapon tests and for the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions to develop into a multilateral one, which would be the prologue to creating a nuclear-free world, freezing nuclear arsenals, prohibiting chemical weapons and destroying stocks of them, and stepping up the efforts of all states, the United Nations, and mass movements in the struggle for peace and disarmament.

The position of the United States and a number of its closest partners, especially in the NATO bloc, can be characterized only as frankly obstructionist. Of the documents adopted by the First Committee, 28 draft resolutions were put to the vote. And the United States considered it possible to support only...three of them, which were on peripheral questions. In four cases it abstained, but it said "no" to 21 documents concerning the main avenues in curbing the nuclear threat, 7 times in complete isolation. Not once did the Soviet Union vote against and only twice did it abstain.

Commenting on the progress of the First Committee's work, USSR representative V, L, Israelyan told a TASS correspondent that consciousness of responsibility for the fate of peace and of the importance of curbing the threat of nuclear annihilation determines the position of the socialist states and the majority of nonaligned, neutral countries. An understanding of this danger also motivates the actions of a number of Western and even NATO countries, in particular Greece, and also the coauthors of a number of drafts like Australia and New Zealand. But the United States, frequently in complete isolation or with the support of a handful of NATO partners, refuses to support the formulation of concrete recommendations on disarmament in the United Nations. This
position clearly demonstrates that all its declarations on "understanding" the danger handing over mankind and the "desiring" to start out on the road of eliminating it are bogus. Moreover, it denies the special character of the nuclear threat, advancing the extremely dangerous thesis that nuclear arsenals are a "stabilizing" factor without which peace is apparently inconceivable.

Draft Resolution Adopted

LD172151 Moscow TASS in English 1728 GMT 17 Nov 86

[Text] New York, 17 Nov (TASS)—The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly urged all states to vigorously promote peaceful uses of outer space and to take urgent measures to prevent an arms race in space so as to promote the maintenance of peace and security. The draft resolution adopted by the first committee today urges the USSR and the USA to conduct in a constructive spirit the bilateral talks aimed at an early achievement of an agreement to prevent an arms race in space. The conference on disarmament has been recommended to discuss this matter as a priority issue. The document confirms the common interests of the entire humanity in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. As many as 130 countries voted for the draft resolution "the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space."

Only the United States abstained.

The draft resolution reflected the demands that sounded in the debates at the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly: To take urgent measures to cut short the sinister plans for "Star Wars," to ensure the conditions to enable humanity to usher in the 21st century being rid of nuclear weapons—on earth and in space. This call, said the USSR representative Viktor Israelyan, seems to be particularly topical in view of what has been and what could have been achieved at the Reykjavik meeting. The road to a nuclear-free world, to clear skies over humanity has been darkened by a huge shadow of looming arms race in space. We are capable, however, of preventing that shadow from becoming grim reality.

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CSO: 5200/1147
PRAVDA ON NORDIC NPZ, POST-REJKAVIK SITUATION, SALT II

PM181635 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

[Boris Kotov "International Review"]

[Excerpts] Entering the 70th Year

A CPSU delegation headed by Ye. K. Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has been in Finland in the last few days at the invitation of the Finnish Social Democratic Party [SSDP]. The most topical problems of the international situation and the workers movement and the prospects for Soviet-Finnish relations were discussed in the course of talks held with a SSDP delegation. The delegations briefed each other on their parties' activities and affirmed their reciprocal desire to continue to develop ties between the CPSU and the SSDP in the interest of strengthening friendly relations between our countries and of the struggle against the nuclear threat and for peace and security.

Speaking at a press conference in Helsinki 13 November, the head of the Soviet delegation dwelt on the question of consolidating security and stability in northern Europe. Having reminded those present that our country actively supports the proposal to create a nuclear-free north, he announced that, by way of augmenting and developing its position, the USSR has deemed it possible to take a number of new, specific, and weighty steps aimed at consolidating peaceful conditions in Europe's northern region. These steps include the already implemented dismantling of launch installations for medium-range missiles on the Kola Peninsula and of the majority of launch installations for such missiles in the remaining territory of the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts, and the redeployment away from these districts of several divisions of operational-tactical missiles. It is also a question of the USSR's readiness — provided agreement to allocate nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea is reached between the states concerned — to withdraw submarines armed with ballistic missiles from the Soviet Baltic Fleet. The USSR has further proposed to embark on limiting the intensity of major military exercises in northern Europe and its contiguous seas.

The world's news agencies, which immediately spread this important news, are now reporting numerous responses to it. Positive assessment of the USSR's new peace initiatives predominates in them. They are justly perceived by broad circles of the world public as a new demonstration of our country's good will and its desire to make a specific contribution to strengthening peace by means of practical deeds.
The results of the CPSU delegation’s visit to Finland graphically demonstrate how fruitful contacts between peoples can be if they are based on such democratic principles as reciprocal respect for sovereignty and independence, noninterference in one another’s internal affairs, equality, and honest partnership. This is particularly important at a time when the United States is not only ceasing but actually intensifying its attacks against these principles, against trust and cooperation in international relations.

Reykjavik: Two Approaches [subhead]

A striking example of how the U.S. Administration tramples the principles of civilized interstate contacts and honest partnership in international affairs is provided by its position of retreating from Soviet-U.S. accords on nuclear disarmament questions, a position which is dangerous for the fate of mankind. The month that has passed since the Reykjavik summit meeting has thrown a particularly strong light on this unseemly picture.

All this time, the diligent efforts by official Washington and its subservient propaganda machine in the West have released upon the world wave after wave of political speculations, of biased or even downright dishonest interpretations of the course and results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Iceland. Mountains of lies and disinformation have been heaped up — from attempts by the White House to "expropriate" the Soviet initiatives paving the way to a nuclear-free world right up to screams of delight about the USSR’s "pliancy" only when faced with the U.S. "position of strength." As if to confirm this, Washington announced the deployment of the new MX ICBM’s at combat stations and the U.S. intention to exceed even before the end of this year the nuclear arms level set by the SALT II Treaty.

These steps were criticized even in the U.S. Senate. "It would be laughable if," Senator R. Byrd declared, for example, "only a month after Reykjavik, we were to make a 180-degree turn and offer to increase the number of strategic weapons." There is, however, very little to laugh about here. All this evidently became necessary in order to poison Soviet-U.S. relations, to attempt to revise the results of Reykjavik, and to deprive the peoples of the newly emerged hope. One gets the impression that, having overcome their temporary embarrassment, the U.S. military-industrial complex bosses, the nuclear manufacturers, and their helpers in the military departments ("The shock of Reykjavik," Britain’s THE DAILY TELEGRAPH remarked, "shook even the Pentagon diehards") have decided to exact their revenge. They are making all-out efforts to tighten the militarist reins and force the "makers" of U.S. policy to turn back, abandoning to the mercy of fate the interests of their own people, of U.S. national security, and of universal peace.

The U.S. side’s desire to wreck the accords reached in Reykjavik and to retreat to its pre-Reykjavik positions also took a practical, material form in the last few days. At the 5-6 November talks in Vienna with the USSR foreign minister, the U.S. secretary of state staged a show, as it was mildly put, of veritable political theater of the absurd. He put on the table before his interlocutor an amazing collection of papers, essentially negating everything the sides achieved in Reykjavik.
The most striking part of all this was the fact that the global solution found in Iceland to the central problem—the liquidation of all USSR and U.S. nuclear arsenals, and primarily of strategic offensive weapons, over a 10-year period—was purely and simply disclaimed.

Thus, Vienna saw the clash of two concepts, of two diametrically opposed approaches, E.A. Shevardnadze noted at his 10 November press conference. The Soviet Union desired to create a basis for practical implementation of the accords reached in Reykjavik. The United States attempted to establish positions leading to erosion of the Reykjavik soil.

This fact had a direct effect also on the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons being held in Geneva. Despite the new proposals based on the Reykjavik accords and submitted there by the USSR 7 November, the sixth round of these talks which ended a few days ago failed to produce any practical results.

Caught Red-Handed [subhead]

Today, following an analysis of the post-Reykjavik situation, one cannot avoid the obvious conclusion: The myth about the "Soviet military threat" which people across the ocean have used in attempts to justify the sinister scheme of the "defensive" militarization of space is collapsing before the eyes of the world. Now it ought to be clear even to people in the West who are stupefied by propaganda manipulation that no military threat can originate from a country which, as the Soviet Union did in Iceland, proves by deeds its complete readiness for nuclear disarmament, its readiness for compromise and substantial concessions. Subject, of course, to reciprocity.

The opposite also applies. It is evident to any sober-minded person that the real threat to peace and the peoples' security stems from the militarist circles in the United States, which dictate to this great power a policy imbued with the ossified terminology of imperial and hegemonist thinking. This can be seen not just in Washington's obstructionist approach to nuclear disarmament problems. Evidence of it can also be seen in numerous events occurring in different parts of the world.

This can be seen not just in Washington's obstructionist approach to nuclear disarmament problems. Evidence of it can also be seen in numerous events occurring in different parts of the world.

The U.S. Administration was caught red-handed and for the whole world to see in the act of committing crude interference in Iran's internal affairs, using secret arms shipments to fan the already protracted and bloody Iran-Iraq conflict. The world public follows anxiously the intensive imperialist fueling of tension around independent Syria, which is falsely accused of complicity with some terrorists.

U.S. imperialism was also caught red-handed in Nicaragua, after taking interference in its internal affairs to the brink of armed aggression. Evidence of this is provided in particular by the Managua trial of the pilot of a U.S. aircraft which was shot down while delivering arms to gangs of counterrevolutionaries. It is highly indicative that the OAS session in Guatemala condemned the aggressive U.S. policy in Central America.
Yes, the shoots of realism that appeared to break through on the U.S. side in the Reykjavik days are again being trampled into the soil by the boots of militarist ambitions. Could it possibly be that the present White House incumbents intend to be remembered only for their policy of confrontation, military conflicts, illusory striving for military superiority, and sabotage of the disarmament cause?

A new situation has developed in international relations now, in the wake of Reykjavik. The peoples have seen for themselves the real prospect of and practical opportunity for creating a nuclear-free world. They are convinced: There is no turning back. And the way ahead, as M.S. Gorbachev noted, lies through the new political thinking, through awareness of the realities of the contemporary diversity in a contradictory and interconnected world.

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