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Joint Doctrine for Military Deception

31 May 1996
PREFACE

1. Scope

Military deception operations are conducted by the commanders of combatant commands and subordinate joint forces in support of overall campaign objectives. This publication provides fundamental guidance and principles for the planning and execution of military deception at the combatant command and/or subordinate joint force level.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WALTER KROSS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

• Discusses Fundamental Principles of Military Deception
• Covers Military Deception and Command and Control Warfare
• Explains Roles, Coordination, and Training
• Outlines the Military Deception Planning Process
• Covers Military Deception Planning and the Joint Planning Process

General

Military deception is applicable at each level of war and across the range of military operations. Military deception is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Military deception can be employed during all phases of military operations. Joint force commanders (JFCs) use military deception to accomplish their missions by attaining surprise, security, mass, and economy of force. Six principles of military deception provide guidance for planning and executing deception operations. These principles include focus, objective, centralized control, security, timeliness, and integration. Military deception efforts should be coordinated with civil affairs (CA) and with those psychological operations (PSYOP) activities that support CA to ensure that deception does not inadvertently undermine the relationships with civilian population or with host-nation military authorities. Deception operations that have activities potentially visible to the media or the public should be coordinated with the appropriate public affairs officers to identify any potential problems.
Executive Summary

Military Deception and Command and Control Warfare

Command and control warfare (C2W) is the integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control (C2) capabilities while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. Military deception conducted in support of joint operations seeks to influence adversary military commanders and to degrade their C2 capabilities. Intelligence and counterintelligence are critical to deception during the planning, execution, and termination phases of every deception operation. Military PSYOP is a systematic process of conveying tailored messages to a selected audience. OPSEC is the process for denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting the generally unclassified evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities. EW is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack an adversary. Physical destruction can support deception by shaping an adversary’s intelligence collection capability through destroying or nullifying selected intelligence systems or sites.

Roles, Coordination, and Training

Military deception and its supporting actions must be coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting staffs. Commanders, operational planners, military deception planners and other planners must coordinate their actions and plans to ensure unity of the overall mission. The JFC is responsible for providing guidance concerning the dissemination of deception-related information. Deception planners develop need-to-know criteria that permit necessary coordination while limiting the number of individuals with knowledge of the deception. Joint force commanders should ensure that their staffs and units receive training in deception. Staff training can be accomplished during command post exercises, war games, and conceptual exercises during the preparatory and execution periods of field exercises or routine forward deployments. Deception planners must possess fertile imaginations and the ability to be creative while using and understanding each component of deception and C2W capabilities.
Executive Summary

Military Deception Planning Process

Deception planning is an interactive process that requires continual reexamination of its objectives, target, stories, and means throughout the planning and execution phases. Deception planners must be prepared to respond to the dynamics of the situation and of their own headquarters and they cannot solely rely on diagrams and flow charts. At each stage of planning, the deception planners must carefully consider the risks involved versus the possible benefits of the deception. Determining factors include deception failure, exposure of means or feedback channels, and unintended effects. Mission analysis, guidance, staff deception estimates, commander’s deception estimates and plan development (including completing the story, identifying the means, developing the event schedule, identifying feedback channels, and developing the termination concept) are all important steps in the military deception process. A sixth step of reviewing and approving the completed deception plan is overseen by the commander as part of the normal operation plan review and approval process.

Military Deception Planning and the Joint Planning Processes

The need to conduct adequate coordination during deception planning must be balanced against the need to maintain the secrecy required for effective deception operations. Deliberate planning involves the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process, normally used during peacetime to develop operation plans and operation plans in concept format. Crisis action planning is used during time-sensitive situations to rapidly develop plans and orders. A campaign plan describes how tactical, operational, and strategic actions are connected in time, space, and purpose. Campaign plans are normally not created until the Execution Planning Phase of crisis action planning.
Executive Summary

CONCLUSION

Military deception is used to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations and is employed during all phases of military operations. Military deception is done in conjunction with the overall command and control warfare effort. Commanders, operational planners, and military deception planners must work together to ensure unity of the overall mission. The military deception planning process is prepared by following six steps of mission analysis, guidance, staff deception estimates, commander's deception estimates, plan development, and review and approval. Deception planning must also be an integral part of the joint planning process.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL

"I make the enemy see my strengths as weaknesses and my weaknesses as strengths while I cause his strengths to become weaknesses and discover where he is not strong . . . I conceal my tracks so that none can discern them; I keep silence so that none can hear me."

Sun Tzu
The Art of War, c. 500 BC

1. Policy

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction 3211.01A, “Joint Military Deception,” provides joint policy guidance for military deception. Reference should be made to that document for information concerning responsibilities relating to military deception and for specific procedures and restrictions relating to military deceptions planned and conducted in support of joint operations.

2. Definition

Military deception is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are shown in Figure I-1.

3. Applicability

a. Military deception is applicable at each level of war and across the range of military operations.

b. Military deception can be employed during all phases of military operations.

- Prehostilities Phase: Deceptions conducted during the prehostilities phase of military operations are intended to increase the potential for successful defense against anticipated adversary actions or to increase the potential for the successful initiation of offensive action. The prehostilities phase starts with the notification to commanders to ready forces for military operations (e.g., recall of personnel; fueling units; loading of weapons; improving materiel readiness; mission-related exercises and rehearsals; and deployments, build-ups, and
disposition of forces and sustainment resources). Deceptions during this phase may be used to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces.

- **Lodgment, Decisive Combat and Stabilization, and Follow-Through Phases:** These phases of military operations start when forces move to execute assigned missions and end when the objectives of the operation are achieved. Deceptions in these phases may be used to mislead the adversary as to the time and location of the introduction of forces into the theater of operations, the location of the main effort, and the command's operational objectives.

- **Posthostilities and Redeployment Phase:** The posthostilities and redeployment phase starts when forces redeploy or withdraw or consolidate control over an area. It may merge with the prehostilities period of the next military operation. Deceptions may be conducted to support redeployment or withdrawal operations, to protect sensitive operational capabilities from being revealed, and to establish favorable conditions for subsequent military operations.

4. **Deception and the Principles of War**

   Military deception is a tool to be used by joint force commanders (JFCs) to assist them in accomplishing their missions. Military deception assists a commander in attaining surprise, security, mass, and economy of force. Military deception supports military operations by causing adversaries to misallocate resources in time, place, quantity, or effectiveness.

5. **Principles of Military Deception**

   Just as the principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of military operations, six principles of military deception (see Figure 1-2) provide guidance for planning and executing deception operations.
the deception are portraying the same story and are not in conflict with other operational objectives. Execution of the deception may, however, be decentralized so long as all participating organizations are adhering to a single plan.

d. **Security.** Knowledge of a force’s intent to deceive and the execution of that intent must be denied to adversaries. Successful deception operations require strict security. Need-to-know criteria must be applied to each deception operation and to each aspect of that operation. Along with an active operations security (OPSEC) effort to deny critical information about both actual and deception activities, knowledge of deception plans and orders must be carefully protected.

e. **Timeliness.** A deception operation requires careful timing. Sufficient time must be provided for its portrayal; for the adversary’s intelligence system to collect, analyze, and report; for the adversary decision maker to react; and for the friendly intelligence system to detect the action resulting from the adversary decision maker’s decision.

f. **Integration.** Each deception must be fully integrated with the basic operation that it is supporting. The development of the deception concept must occur as part of the development of the commander’s concept of operations. Deception planning should occur simultaneously with operation planning.

6. **Coordination with Civil and Public Affairs**

a. **Civil Affairs**

- Civil Affairs (CA) operations are conducted as part of the overall US political, military, economic, and informational effort and may occur before, during, or subsequent to other military operations. CA operations are conducted to gain maximum support for
Chapter I

US forces from the civilian population. CA contributes to the success of military operations and projects a favorable US image throughout the operational area.

- **Military deception efforts should be coordinated** with CA and with those psychological operations (PSYOP) activities that support CA to ensure that deception does not inadvertently undermine the relationships with the civilian population or with host-nation military authorities. Additionally, failure to consider CA could result in the compromise of deception plans.

b. Public Affairs

- **Deception operations** will not intentionally target or mislead the US public, the US Congress, or the US news media. **Misinforming the media** about military capabilities and intentions in ways that influence US decision makers and public opinion is **contrary to Department of Defense policy**.

- **Deception operations** that have activities potentially visible to the media or the public should be coordinated with the appropriate public affairs officers to **identify any potential problems**. Coordination will reduce the chance that public affairs officers will inadvertently reveal information that could undermine ongoing or planned deception operations.

**OPERATION BODYGUARD**

The use of deception preceding and throughout the invasion of Normandy were in fact a combination of deception operations intended to deceive Germany regarding where the actual location of the invasion would occur. In this regard, the primary intent was to deceive regarding one’s intentions, although certainly the use of deception regarding capabilities was employed as well. The overall deception strategy for a number of cover and deception operations for the invasion of Normandy was code-named “BODYGUARD.”

The intent of BODYGUARD was twofold. First, it would cause Hitler to disperse his forces throughout Europe so that he would have insufficient strength to defeat the amphibious assault on Normandy. Second, it would delay Hitler’s response to the actual invasion by confusing and suppressing German signals intelligence (SIGINT) and administrative systems. In order to achieve these objectives bodyguard would fabricate an extremely credible war plan which would ultimately mislead Hitler regarding the time and place of the invasion. Certainly an overall war plan could not simply be handed over to the Germans, but would have to be leaked in small and subtle ways if was to be believed. BODYGUARD consisted of 36 subordinate plans and associated strategies that were ultimately designed to convince the Germans that the allies would continue a peripheral strategy and would be unable to attempt a cross channel attack prior to July 1944.

The primary operational deception plan for BODYGUARD was “OPERATION FORTITUDE,” which was the most ambitious of the deception operations in WWII. This broad plan, covering deception operations in the European theater, had three formally defined objectives.
These objectives were: to cause the Wehrmacht (German intelligence) to make faulty strategic dispositions in north-west Europe before NEPTUNE (Normandy invasion) by military threats against Norway; to deceive the enemy as to the target date and the target area of NEPTUNE; and to induce (the enemy to make) faulty tactical dispositions during and after NEPTUNE by threats against Pas de Calais.

To accomplish these objectives, FORTITUDE was divided into two parts. FORTITUDE NORTH was aimed at Norway and other Scandinavian countries and was designed to tie down twenty-seven German divisions by leading the Germans to expect a joint British, Russian and American invasion. FORTITUDE SOUTH was aimed at projecting an invasion force towards Pas de Calais while also convincing the Germans that Normandy was only a diversion.

SOURCE: John C. Scorby Jr.  
*Operational Deception: Historical Retrospect and Future Utility*  
Naval War College, 1993
CHAPTER II
MILITARY DECEPTION AND COMMAND AND
CONTROL WARFARE

"Though fraud [deception] in other activities be detestable, in the management
of war it is laudable and glorious, and he who overcomes an enemy by fraud
is as much to be praised as he who does so by force."

Niccolo Machiavelli
Discourses, 1517

1. Command and Control
Warfare (C2W)

a. C2W is the integrated use of OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare
(EPW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence to deny information
to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control (C2) capabilities while
protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. The synergistic application of
the five C2W tools magnifies their combat power. This synergism is the essence of
C2W.

b. While the objective of C2W in many situations may be to “decapitate the enemy’s
command structure from its body of combat forces” (CJCS memorandum of policy [MOP]
30, “Command and Control Warfare”), this is not always the case. There will be situations
where it is more advantageous to leave adversary commanders, who are known to be
vulnerable to being influenced by deception operations, in complete control of their forces.
In these situations, deception may be the main thrust of the C2W operation, while
the other C2W tools would be used to control the adversary commander’s ability to see the
battlefield.

2. Military Deception as an
Element of C2W

Military deception as an element of C2W should focus on causing the adversary
commander to incorrectly estimate the

situation in the operational area with respect to friendly force dispositions, capabilities,
vulnerabilities, and intentions. It may only be necessary for a deception to cause the
adversary commander to hesitate in making decisions during a critical time in the
operations in order for a deception to “succeed.”

a. Military Deception in C2-attack. The
adversary commander is the target for
military deception in support of C2-attack.
Some of the military deception goals of C2-
attack should be to instigate the following:

• Cause the adversary commander to
  employ forces (including intelligence) in
  ways that are advantageous to the joint
  force.

• Cause the adversary to reveal strengths,
  dispositions, and future intentions.

• Overload the adversary’s intelligence
  and analysis capability to create
  confusion over friendly intentions to
  achieve surprise.

• Condition the adversary to particular
  patterns of friendly behavior that can be
  exploited at a time chosen by the joint
  force.

• Cause the adversary to waste combat
  power with inappropriate or delayed
  actions.
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b. Military Deception in C2-protect. Military deception can help protect the joint force from adversary C2-attack efforts. Deception that misleads an adversary commander about friendly C2 capabilities and/or limitations contributes to C2-protect. An adversary commander who is deceived about friendly C2 capabilities and limitations may be more likely to misallocate resources in an effort to attack or exploit friendly C2 systems.

- Intelligence and counterintelligence are critical to deception during the planning, execution, and termination phases of every deception operation. Intelligence and counterintelligence perform the following essential functions for deception planners.

  - Identify adversary decision makers and assess the vulnerability of the decision makers to deception.

3. Deception’s Relationship to Intelligence and the Other C2W Tools

As part of the C2W warfighting strategy, military deception conducted in support of joint operations seeks to influence adversary military commanders and to degrade their C2 capabilities. When supporting joint operations, military deception is done in conjunction with the overall C2W effort. It reinforces and is reinforced by the execution of other C2W tools. (See Figure II-1.)

a. Deception and Intelligence

  - Determine the adversary’s perceptions of friendly capabilities and possible courses of action.

  - Provide estimates of adversary actions under differing scenarios and war game possible outcomes with the deception planner.

  - Establish and monitor feedback channels to evaluate success of the deception operation through observation of the adversary’s reaction.

  - Identify adversary information gathering capabilities and communication
systems to determine the best deception conduits.

- Penetrate adversary OPSEC measures and deceptions in support of C2-protect.

- Deception planners must keep intelligence analysts aware of ongoing deception operations. The analysts must look for feedback about the operation and consider the impact, both intended and unintended, of those operations as they seek to identify possible future adversary courses of action.

b. Deception and PSYOP

- Similar to military deception, military PSYOP is a systematic process of conveying tailored messages to a selected foreign audience. It promotes particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors that can augment US efforts to achieve specific objectives. PSYOP normally targets groups while deception targets specific individuals. An individual targeted by deception may also be part of a PSYOP target group.
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- **Groups** that might be suitable for targeting by PSYOP in support of deception operations **include** adversary command groups, planning staffs, specific factions within staffs, nonmilitary interest groups who can influence military policies and decisions, and intelligence systems analysts.

- Through the skillful use of associated truths, **PSYOP can magnify the effects of and reinforce the deception plan.** Dedicated PSYOP dissemination assets can discretely convey intended information to selected target audiences through appropriate "key communicator" backchannel networks.

- **PSYOP actions convey information** not only to the intended target audiences but also to **foreign intelligence systems.** Therefore, **PSYOP objectives and actions must be consistent** with the other C2W objectives and actions.

- Additionally, some deception actions will not only convey information to the deception target but also to the PSYOP audience. This provides the **opportunity for mutual support** if deception and PSYOP are carefully coordinated.

c. **Deception and Operations Security**

- **OPSEC is the process for denying adversaries information** about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting the generally unclassified evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities. This unclassified evidence (called OPSEC indicators) is created by friendly detectable actions or is available in open-source information.

- **OPSEC measures** are those actions that organizations take to control their OPSEC indicators. This is done to deny critical information to an adversary. **Critical information** is that information an adversary requires to counter friendly operations.

- **OPSEC and deception** have much in common. Both require the management of indicators. **OPSEC seeks to limit an adversary's ability to detect or derive useful information** from observing friendly activities. Deception seeks to create or increase the likelihood of detection of certain indicators in order to cause an adversary to derive an incorrect conclusion.

- **Deception can be used to directly support OPSEC.** Cover stories provide plausible explanations for activities that cannot be hidden. False vehicle or aircraft markings disguise the deployment of specific forces. Major deception operations create numerous false indicators, making it more difficult for adversary intelligence analysts to identify the real indicators that OPSEC is seeking to control.

- **The OPSEC process supports deception.** The OPSEC process identifies the key questions about friendly capabilities and intentions to which adversary commanders need answers in order to effectively prepare to counteract friendly operations. The process also identifies the critical information that answers many of those questions. Deception planners set out to provide another set of answers to those questions—answers that provide the adversary with plausible information that induces certain desired actions.

- **An OPSEC analysis** of a planned activity or operation will identify potential OPSEC vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities may be useful to deception planners as possible conduits
Military Deception and Command and Control Warfare

for passing deceptive information to an adversary.

- Deception actions often need their own OPSEC protection. The existence of a deception operation in and of itself may convey OPSEC indicators that reveal to the opposing commander the actual friendly intentions. An OPSEC analysis of the planned deception is needed to protect against just such an inadvertent or unintentional outcome.

d. Deception and EW

- EW is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.

- Deception, in conjunction with OPSEC, supports EW operations by being used to protect the development, acquisition, and deployment of sensitive EW capabilities. Deception can also be used to support the employment of EW units and systems.

- In turn, EW can be used to support deception. Electromagnetic deception is a form of electronic attack and a technical means of deception. EW can be used in support of feints, demonstrations, and displays. The positioning of a majority of a command's EW systems in a particular area can be used to create an indicator of the command's intended main effort. The disruption of an adversary's intelligence and command communications capabilities can facilitate the insertion of deceptive information. EW attacks on intelligence collection and radar systems can be used to shape and control the adversary's ability to see certain activities.

- EW planning should be closely coordinated with deception and intelligence planners to ensure that EW does not disrupt any adversary C2 systems that are being used as deception conduits or that are providing intelligence feedback.

e. Deception and Physical Destruction

- The relationship of deception and physical destruction is very similar to that of deception and EW. Deception, used in conjunction with OPSEC, can be used to protect the development, acquisition, and deployment of physical destruction systems. It can mislead an adversary as to the true capabilities and purpose of a weapon system.

- Physical destruction can support deception by shaping an adversary's intelligence collection capability through destroying or nullifying selected intelligence systems or sites. Attacks can be used to mask the main effort from the adversary.

4. C2W Planning and Deception

a. The organizational structure to plan and coordinate C2W should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate a variety of planning and operational circumstances. To be successful, C2W should be an integral part of all joint military operations. This requires extensive planning and coordination among many elements of the joint headquarters, component staffs, and other US Government departments and agencies to ensure that C2W operations are fully integrated with other portions of operation and campaign plans.

b. How the staff is organized to plan and coordinate C2W is the joint force commander’s prerogative. Since joint force
commanders are supported by staffs with diverse structure, scope of responsibilities, and supporting infrastructure, there is no single “correct” way to organize personnel to plan and execute C2W.

c. The principal types of joint staffs that may be involved in C2W planning are the combatant command staffs, subordinate unified command staffs, and the joint task force staffs. The circumstances in which these types of staffs conduct C2W planning may affect the optimal organization required to carry out their duties.

d. Joint force staffs already have organizations (staff elements and/or components) that are tasked to manage the elements of C2W. The JFC should establish mechanisms to effectively coordinate the efforts of these organizations to build and execute a synergistic C2W plan that supports the commander’s mission and concept of operations. There are a number of ways for the JFC to organize the staff to ensure that C2W efforts are fully coordinated. Some of the staff organization options for C2W include the following.

- **Conduct C2W planning** during existing daily planning meetings, such as the Operations Planning Group used on some staffs. This is done to ensure macro-level synchronization of the elements of C2W. After macro-level synchronization is accomplished, detailed coordination could be conducted directly between affected staff elements and components.

- **Form a C2W cell of select representatives** from each of the staff elements and components responsible for the five elements of C2W, other staff representatives as required, and supporting agency augments. This cell would conduct brainstorming to successfully merge the five elements of C2W into a synergistic plan. The cell would be a coordinating body and rely on the staff elements and/or components that are represented in the C2W cell to carry out the detailed support necessary to plan and execute C2W.

THE 5th WIRELESS GROUP - ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

During the period just prior to the allied invasion of German-held territory at Normandy, a special electronic unit, the 5th Wireless Group, was formed to help with the deception plan for the invasion. By this point in the war the Germans had no air cover available for aerial reconnaissance and were relying completely on wireless transmissions. The 5th Wireless Group utilized a newly developed transmitter which allowed a group of people to effectively simulate an entire network of people taking part in exercises.

Before writing the scripts for transmission, 5th Wireless Group observed genuine exercises, both land and amphibious, taking place in Yorkshire and off the coast of Scotland. Scripts were then prepared, rehearsed, and “performed” using troops stationed in the area to record the exercises. Great care was taken in ensuring authenticity including, interestingly enough, taking care that it was not “too perfect.” In real conversation, script writers noticed, there were phrases missed, requests for repetition, conversations overlapping, etc. Every attempt was made to make the exercises seem genuine, even if it meant adding a little confusion.

These exercises were an integral part of FORTITUDE SOUTH, the operation designed to convince the German command of the invasion from the Pas de Calais. Once the deception was completed and the invasion of Normandy proven successful, 5th Wireless Group was also deployed to Europe to assist in deception regarding troop movements. It continued to serve as an important factor in deception until the defeat of the German forces.

SOURCE: Martin Young and Robbie Stamp
Trojan Horses: Deception Operations in the Second World War
CHAPTER III
ROLES, COORDINATION, AND TRAINING

"In his movements the general should act like a good wrestler; he should feint in one direction to try to deceive his adversary and then make good use of the opportunities he finds, and in this way he will overpower the enemy".

The Emperor Maurice
The Strategikon, c. 600 AD

1. Roles

a. Commanders. JFCs make military deception an integral part of their planning. They assign C2W and military deception objectives, direct coordination among subordinate, supporting, and component commanders, and redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of the overall effort.

b. Operational Planners. Operational planners oversee C2W and deception planning. They incorporate C2-attack and C2-protect concepts (including deception) into operations estimates. They recommend C2W courses of action to commanders for consideration. They supervise the planning and execution of deceptions.

c. Military Deception Planners. Deception planners take the JFC's guidance and develop it into a detailed deception plan. They integrate the deception plan with the basic operation plan and with the other C2W tools. Deception planners ensure that their command's deception capabilities are used to the fullest extent possible.

d. Other Planners. All joint staff planners, not just the deception planners, consider using military deception when they develop their courses of action. Additionally, they support deception planning by providing subject matter expertise.

2. Coordination

"Success in war is obtained by anticipating the plans of the enemy, and by diverting his attention from our own designs."

Francesco Guicciardini
1483-1540

a. Military deception and its supporting actions must be coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting staffs.

b. Within a joint staff, coordination is required between the deception and C2W planners on the operations staff and the planners and analysts in the intelligence staff (see Figure III-1). Also, within the constraints of the need-to-know criteria, deception planners may need to coordinate with other staff elements such as logistics and/or command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems.

c. Despite coordination requirements, knowledge of information relating to planned and ongoing deception operations must be restricted to only those personnel who meet the strictly defined need-to-know criteria.

• The JFC is responsible for providing guidance concerning the dissemination of deception-related information. During multinational operations, the JFC must
be particularly sensitive to information requirements and concerns of the non-US members.

- During planning, deception planners develop need-to-know criteria that permit necessary coordination while limiting the number of individuals with knowledge of the deception. Only a few individuals require access to the entire deception plan. Others require only knowledge of limited portions of the plan. The need-to-know criteria should address these different levels of required access.

d. Deception operations can benefit from normally occurring activity provided that the

Care must be taken that normally occurring activity fits the deception story; deception and OPSEC planners must take these activities into account in their planning.
Roles, Coordination, and Training

activity fits the deception story. Conversely, actual operations have the potential to create OPSEC indicators that pose a threat to the effectiveness of deception operations. These real indicators may conflict with the deception story. Deception and OPSEC planners will have to coordinate with organizations that create these indicators to limit potential adverse effects or to maximize their deception potential.

e. In some situations, a joint force may lack the capability to convey certain types of deceptive information to the adversary. Other organizations, however, may have the required capability. PSYOP organizations can discretely convey tailored messages to selected target audiences through appropriate "key communicators" backchannel networks. Deception planners should conduct the coordination required to obtain the necessary support from those organizations and to integrate, coordinate, and deconflict deception and actual operations.

f. Deception planners should be supported by assigned liaison officers from intelligence and counterintelligence organizations. The liaison officers will provide all-source estimates upon which to base plans and realtime all-source feedback about the effectiveness of deception actions.

PLANNED DECEPTION - BATTLE OF ALAMEIN

General Charles Richardson, a member of General Montgomery's staff given responsibility for planning deception before the Battle of El Alamein, considered several factors in executing the operation.

Richardson's first priority was to create a deception to convince General Rommel that the attack would be coming from the south; secondly, that it would occur later than the actual target date. To that end, Richardson put together a plan of concealment and deception. In order to create the illusion of a southern attack, "spoof" assembly areas were put together in rear areas, while preparations in the forward area such as petrol and ammunition dumps were camouflaged. Petrol, which was provided in tins of two feet by ten inches square, was brought up at night and arranged to resemble fire trenches rather than lying on the ground in a dump as usual.

Water pipelines played a major role in clouding the time factor. Richardson knew that the enemy would be watching such construction and using it as a judge for when work would be completed; in order to use this observation to their advantage, the camouflage crew used empty petrol tins to create the effect of a pipeline gradually being completed. To enemy surveillance cameras it appeared that construction on the water pipelines would not be completed until ten days after D-Day.

Other deception plans were being carried out simultaneously. A dummy petrol, food and ammunition dump was placed in the rear in the south in order to bolster Rommel's impression of a southern attack; meanwhile, ammunition dumps at the front were enlarged and camouflaged. Legitimate armored formations were moved to the front at night, where they were concealed from detection by sunshields. They were replaced by dummy formations. Dummy artillery units placed in the south not only served in the initial deception but, when they were discovered to be shams during the battle, were promptly replaced with genuine artillery and mounted a surprise counterattack.
In addition to the planned deception, the RAF kept the Luftwaffe’s Technical Reconnaissance from gaining a clear picture of the ground operations. The German command was so completely fooled by the deceptions that General Rommel was away when the battle started. It was several days before reinforcements could be moved up from the northern sector.

SOURCE: Martin Young and Robbie Stamp
Trojan Horses: Deception Operations in the Second World War

3. Training

Joint force commanders should ensure that their staffs and units receive training in deception. Additionally, joint operational and deception planners should receive appropriate deception training. Staff training can be accomplished during command post exercises, war games, and conceptual exercises during the preparatory and execution periods of field exercises or routine forward deployments. Seminars, briefings, and other such activities can also be used for training both individuals and staffs. Unit training can be conducted during exercises.

a. Joint Force Commanders and Staffs. To effectively plan and execute military deceptions, commanders and their staffs should understand the following.

- The role of military deception in C2W.
- Deception’s value as a force multiplier and as a cost effective tool for achieving operational objectives.
- What is required to plan and execute effective deception.
- The policies that govern the use of deception.

b. Joint Operational Planners. Those assigned as operational planners should understand the following.

- Understand each component’s deception and other C2W capabilities.
- Be intimately familiar with their command’s assigned missions and operational area.
- Understand the concepts of centers of gravity, calculated risk, initiative, security, and surprise.
- Understand friendly and adversary intelligence systems and how they function.
Roles, Coordination, and Training

- **Possess technical understandings** of intelligence sensors, the platforms on which they deploy, their reporting capabilities, and associated processing methodologies.

- **Understand the psychological and cultural factors** that might influence the adversary's planning and decision making.

- **Understand potential** adversaries' planning and decision making processes (both formal and informal).

- **Understand the specialized C2W devices** and weapon systems that are available to support the deception.
CHAPTER IV
MILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS

"To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds."

Mao Tse-Tung
On Protracted War, 1938

1. Deception Planning

a. As with all joint planning, deception planning is an iterative process that requires continual reexamination of its objectives, target, stories, and means throughout the planning and execution phases. Although diagrams of planning processes are useful in aiding the understanding of the relationship of the individual elements of the process, it must be remembered that processes are seldom as linear as diagrams or flow charts may imply. Deception planners must be prepared to respond to the dynamics of the situation and of their own headquarters.


c. A key factor that must be considered during deception planning is risk. At each stage of deception planning, the deception planners must carefully consider the risks involved with using deception. The overriding consideration in risk analysis is the comparison between the risk taken and the possible benefits of the deception. Major determining factors include the following.

- Deception Failure. Deceptions may fail for many reasons. It is possible that the target will not receive the story, not believe the story, be unable to act, be indecisive even if the story is believed, act in unforeseen ways, or may discover the deception. The failure or exposure of the deception can significantly affect the friendly commander’s operational activities. For this reason, a commander must understand the risks associated with basing the success of any operation on the anticipated success of a deception.

- Exposure of Means or Feedback Channels. Even if a deception is successful, the deception means or feedback channels that were used may be compromised. The risk of compromise of sensitive means and feedback channels must be carefully weighed against the perceived benefits of a deception operation.

- Unintended Effects. Third parties (e.g., neutral or friendly forces not read into the deception) may receive and act on deception information intended for the deception target. Deception planners must ensure that they are knowledgeable about friendly operational planning at the joint and multinational force level and at the component level in order to minimize the risk to third parties.
DECEPTION OPERATIONS PLAN IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Throughout the planning process [during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM], CINCCECENT emphasized the need for a comprehensive plan to deceive Iraqi forces regarding Coalition intentions and to conceal the Coalition scheme of maneuver. The deception plan was intended to convince Iraq that the Coalition main attack would be directly into Kuwait, supported by an amphibious assault. The plan also sought to divert Iraqi forces from the Coalition main attack and to fix Iraqi forces in eastern Kuwait and along the Kuwaiti coast.

Among the activities planned to support the deception were Navy feints and demonstrations in the northern Persian Gulf, Marine landing exercises along the Gulf and Omnani coast, positioning of a large amphibious task force in the Gulf, and air refueling and training activity surges that desensitized the Iraqis to the real pre-attack buildup. The absence of air attacks on some western targets was also to contribute to the impression that the Coalition main attack would come from the vicinity of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border and from the sea. This impression was to be reinforced by USMC and Joint Forces East operations south of Kuwait to fix Iraqi divisions along Kuwait's southern border. Raids and some SOF activities were expected to contribute to Saddam Hussein's confusion as the most likely location for the main attack.

SOURCE: Final Report to Congress Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992

2. The Deception Planning Process

See Figure IV-1.

a. Step 1: Deception Mission Analysis. Deception mission analysis is conducted as part of the overall mission analysis that is done by a JFC following receipt of a new mission. The JFC, assisted by the staff, studies all available information about the mission, the proposed operational area, and the potential adversaries. During the analysis, the JFC considers how deception can support the accomplishment of the mission. Deception may not be applicable to every situation, but it must be considered, especially at the operational level. Even in situations where operational or tactical deceptions are inappropriate, there will normally be a role for military deception in support of OPSEC.

b. Step 2: Deception Planning Guidance. After completion of the mission analysis, the commander issues planning guidance to the staff. In addition to other guidance, the commander states the deception objective for the operation. The commander may go on to provide additional guidance concerning specific deception COAs that the staff should address when preparing estimates.

c. Step 3: Staff Deception Estimate

- The deception estimate is conducted as part of the operations estimate. Working with the operational planners, the other C2W planners, and intelligence analysts, the deception planners gather and analyze information relating to the adversary. They identify the key decision makers and study all available information relating to their backgrounds and psychological profiles. They consider the adversary's C2 system and decision making process. They study its intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. They identify any
preconceptions that the adversary leadership may have about friendly intentions and capabilities. With the intelligence analysts, the deception planners seek to identify any COAs that the adversary may have adopted or has under consideration.

- Intelligence analysts from the Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate play a critical role in developing the deception estimate.
  
  • They identify the current possible (and, when justified by the evidence, probable) adversary COAs and the adversary’s rationale for taking those actions.
  
  • Analysts help the deception planners understand how the adversary decision makers, their staffs, and trusted advisors perceive friendly capabilities and intentions and how the adversary is likely to react to the deception.
  
  • They explain how the adversary processes, filters, ascribes meaning to, and uses information.

General Eisenhower’s thorough analysis of the German High Command was a crucial element of the deception planned in support of the Normandy Invasion.
Chapter IV

- On the basis of the information developed during the initial estimate process, the deception planners, working directly with the operation planners and the other C2W planners, develop several deception COAs. The proposed deception COAs must each be capable of accomplishing the commander's deception objective. They must be integrated with the operational COAs that are being developed.

- A deception COA will restate the deception objective and identify the proposed deception target and the desired perception. It will outline the deception story that would be used to create the desired perception and identify, in general terms, possible deception means.

- In many cases, actual COAs developed by the operational planners will provide the basis for deception COAs. Using COAs developed by operational planners helps to ensure that the deception COAs will be feasible and practical military options. Additionally, the proposed deception COAs should seek to promote actions that the adversary is already conducting or is believed to be considering.

- The strengths and weaknesses of each of the proposed deception COAs are analyzed. Some of the major considerations are feasibility, impact on actual operations, and security. How the deception COAs support the overall C2W concept of operations is also considered. Planners preparing logistics, personnel, and intelligence estimates must also determine if the concepts they are examining can support the proposed deception COAs and to determine the potential impact of the deceptions on their ability to support the operational mission.

- In the final phase of the estimate process, the operational planners consider deception during their comparison of the proposed friendly operational COAs. The ability of deception along with the other C2W tools to support a particular friendly COA should be one of the factors considered when determining which proposed COA should be recommended for adoption by the JFC.

d. Step 4: Commander's Deception Estimate

- Using the staff estimates as a basis, the JFC conducts an estimate. The JFC selects an operational COA for development into an operation plan or order and issues any necessary additional guidance. At the same time, the JFC selects the supporting deception COA.

- The JFC's decision becomes the basis for the development of the selected deception COA into a complete plan or order. As in the other steps in the process, the deception planners work very closely with other planners to ensure that the deception plan and the operational plan are mutually supporting.

- The component deception planners, if not already participating, should be brought into the planning process at this point to ensure that their units can support the plan.

e. Step 5: Deception Plan Development. Developing a complete deception plan is the most time-consuming part of the planning process. There are five major actions in this step: complete the story, identify the means, develop the event schedule, identify feedback channels, and develop the termination concept.
Military Deception Planning Process

- **Complete the Deception Story**

  During the estimate, an outline deception story was developed. That outline now needs to be transformed into a fully developed story. The **deception planners must identify all the actions** that the adversary's intelligence system would expect to see if friendly forces were actually executing the deception story. The deception planners will **require the assistance** of operational, logistics, and C4 systems planners to ensure that all normal activities are identified.

- **A key element to be considered in developing the deception story is time.** The deception planners must determine **how much time is available to present the deception story** and estimate how long will be required for the deception target to make the decision to **take the desired action**. The available time may determine the scope and depth of the story. The following **time related issues** should be analyzed during the development of the deception story: (1) **Time of Maximum Disadvantage.** When is the adversary’s action (or inaction) required: tomorrow, next week, or next month? The scope of the deception operation may be limited by the amount of time available for its planning and execution. (2) **The Deception Target.** Is the target cautious or bold? Will the target react to initial indicators, or will the target demand extensive confirmation through other intelligence sources before reaching a decision? How long does it normally take the target to make a decision? (3) **Opposing Force Execution.** Once the decision is made, how long will the target need to formulate and issue an order? How long will it take the adversary to perform the desired action? For example, if the deception objective is the movement of an enemy squadron to some distant point, time must be allowed for the deception target to issue the movement order and for the squadron to receive and execute the order. (4) **Intelligence Processing.** How much time should be allowed for the adversary's detection and collection systems to collect, analyze, and provide the deception target the false intelligence created by the deception? This will vary depending on the target’s level of command. (5) **Execution of the Deception Tasks.** When must displays, demonstrations, feints, and other actions begin to be observable by the adversary's intelligence system? How long should each last?

- **Identify the Deception Means.** Once the story is fully developed, the deception planners identify the means that will be used to portray the story. This action requires a detailed understanding of the adversary's intelligence system and of friendly force operations.

- **Determine Adversary’s Detection and Collection Capabilities.** The first action in means selection is determining the adversary’s detection and collection capabilities. (1) Adversary detection and collection systems **vary greatly** in their capabilities. The intelligence staff can provide multidiscipline counterintelligence products that will identify a particular adversary’s capabilities. (2) Most intelligence collection **systems include** at a minimum human intelligence, open-source intelligence, and some signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. More sophisticated systems will include aerial and satellite reconnaissance as well as extensive SIGINT capabilities. (3) Each adversary must be studied to determine its **particular collection capabilities.** If possible, a determination should also be made as to which intelligence capability
the deception target most relies upon for information during decision making.

**Identify Indicators.** The second action in means selection is to determine the specific indicators that are associated with the activities needed to portray the deception story. The collection of indicators associated with a particular unit or activity is commonly referred to as a unit profile. The profile is more than just a listing of equipment. The operational patterns (where, when, and how normal activities occur) associated with a unit or activities are also part of a profile. (1) **This action requires detailed knowledge of friendly operations.** If, for example, the plan calls for the electronic portrayal of a carrier task force, the deception planners must know what emitters are normally associated with that element. (2) If the main command post of an Army heavy maneuver brigade is to be portrayed electronically and visually, then the planner will need to know not only what communications systems are found in the command post but also how many vehicles and of what types, how many tents, and where and in what pattern the vehicles and tents are normally located. (3) **Units of similar sizes can have very different profiles.** Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and Army mechanized brigades have different profiles because of different equipment and communications systems. A logistics brigade's profile differs from both not only because of equipment differences but also because of where and how it normally operates on the battlefield. (4) **Indicator and profile information should be available from the component deception planners.** An additional source is OPSEC program officers. They are also concerned about indicator and unit profiles. (5) To facilitate planning, joint deception planners, working with component planners and OPSEC program officers, should **develop friendly unit indicator and profile data bases.**

**Compare Capabilities to Indicators.** The next action is to compare the adversary’s intelligence collection capabilities to the appropriate indicators. Those indicators that cannot be collected by the adversary will not require portrayal. If it is known that the adversary places a higher value on information received from certain intelligence sources than from others, then those indicators that can be collected by the valued sources should be emphasized.

**Select Means.** Using the results of the previous actions in this step, deception planners now select the specific means that will be used to portray the deception story. (1) **In essence, the selection of deception means is the opposite of selecting OPSEC measures.** While the goal of OPSEC is normally to reduce the adversary’s ability to see certain indicators, deception normally seeks to increase the visibility of selected indicators. Both seek to manage what indicators are being seen by the adversary. OPSEC and deception planners must work closely to ensure coordinated indicator management. (2) During means selection, **coordination is also required** with the EW, PSYOP, and targeting planners to ensure unity of effort. If the deception story depends on the use of certain means, then the EW and targeting planners need to know not to target for destruction or disruption the particular adversary intelligence system that will collect against those means. For example, if the portrayal of the deception story is dependent upon false communications, then attacks on the adversary’s SIGINT system must be
carefully coordinated with the deception planners. Similarly, PSYOP themes must be coordinated with the deception story to ensure that they are sending the same message to the deception target.

- **Develop the Deception Event Schedule**

  - In this action, the deception means are developed into deception events. This requires identifying when specific means will be employed. The objective is to ensure that the deception target’s perceptions are influenced in time for the desired action (the deception objective) to be completed at the most operationally advantageous time.

  - The deception planners, in coordination with the operational planners and the other C2W planners, develop detailed execution schedules for the means that were identified in the previous action. The schedule identifies what is to occur, when it is to take place, where it is to occur, and who is to execute it.

  - **Factors** to be considered during scheduling include: (1) The timing of actual friendly activities; (2) The time required for friendly forces to conduct the deception activity; (3) Where a particular activity fits in the normal sequence of events for the type operation being portrayed; (4) The time required for the adversary intelligence system to collect, analyze, and report on the activity; (5) The time required for the deception target to make the desired decision and order the desired action; (6) The time required for desired action to be executed.

  - Events may be grouped to portray deception actions such as feints and demonstrations.

  - The deception event schedule is published as part of the deception plan. Figure IV-2 is an example.

- **Identify the Deception Feedback Channels**

  - Deception planners require two major types of feedback about their operations. Operational feedback identifies what deception information is reaching the deception target. Analytical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID#</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Date-time to Initiate</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Simulate preparation for movement south.</td>
<td>131500</td>
<td>1. Establish traffic control points.</td>
<td>HQ 2nd Division</td>
<td>Initiate counter surveillance measures to prevent enemy visual photo recon of national route.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Install radio nets.

3. Pass scripted message traffic per scenario.

Figure IV-2. Deception Event Schedule
feedback identifies what actions the target is taking because of that information.

- All-source intelligence and counterintelligence about the adversary’s intelligence interests and activities provide indications of the receipt of deception information.

- Observations by friendly intelligence provide information about changes in the adversary’s dispositions and actions. Those dispositions are normally the key determinant of the success of the deception. Once operations commence, the adversary’s reactions to friendly initiatives are indicators of whether the deception story is still being believed by the deception target.

- Deception planners must coordinate with the intelligence planners to ensure that the intelligence needs of deception are reflected in the command’s priority intelligence requirements. Additionally, deception planners should work with the appropriate intelligence analysts to make them aware of the type of information that is being sought. Reporting channels should be established between the analysts and deception planners to facilitate the rapid passage of feedback information.

- Deception planners must also coordinate with EW and targeting planners to ensure that critical sources of deception feedback information are not targeted.

f. Step 6: Deception Plan Review and Approval

- The commander reviews and approves the completed deception plan as part of the normal operation plan review and approval process. The need-to-know criteria remain in effect, however, and only a limited number of personnel will participate in the deception plan review and approval process.

Chapter IV
Military Deception Planning Process

- CJCS Instruction 3211.01A, "Joint Military Deception," provides the procedures for obtaining higher level approval of deception plans. All joint deception planners must be familiar with the procedures in this instruction to ensure that their plans are properly reviewed.
CHAPTER V
MILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING AND THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESSES

"Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow..."

Lieutenant General Thomas 'Stonewall' Jackson, 1862

1. Integration

Deception planning, as part of the C2W planning process, is an integral part of the joint planning processes. It is part of effective operational planning and should not be attempted as an "add on" to the existing planning processes.

2. Planning Considerations


b. The need to conduct adequate coordination during deception planning must be balanced against the need to maintain the secrecy required for effective deception operations. Strict need-to-know criteria should be established and used to determine which individuals should be allowed to participate in deception planning. The criteria may specify separate levels of access to facilitate coordination, allowing more individuals access to the less sensitive aspects of the deception plan.

The need to conduct adequate coordination during deception must be balanced against the need to maintain secrecy.
3. Deception Planning and the Joint Planning Processes

a. The Deliberate Planning Process. Deliberate planning is the Joint Operation and Execution System (JOPES) process, used normally during peacetime to develop operation plans and operation plans in concept format. Deception planning relates to the JOPES deliberate planning process as shown in Figure V-1.

b. The Crisis Action Planning Process. Crisis action planning is used during time-sensitive situations to rapidly develop plans and orders. Deception planning relates to the JOPES crisis action planning process as shown in Figure V-2.

c. The Campaign Planning Process

A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose. Within a campaign, major operations consist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a campaign and usually decide the course of the campaign.

- Campaign plans are normally not created until the Execution Planning Phase (Phase V) of crisis action planning. However, the campaign planning process begins during crisis action planning, when the supported commander develops the course of action recommendation for the national command authorities (NCA) (Phase III). After the COA is approved by the NCA (Phase IV), the supported commander provides specific guidance to the staff. That COA becomes the basis for the development of a operation order (Phase V). Deception planning implementation is similar to crisis action planning, as shown in Figure V-2.
DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

Phase I
Initiation

Phase II
Concept

Step 1
Mission Analysis
Deception Mission Analysis

Step 2
Planning Guidance
Deception Planning Guidance

Step 3
Staff Estimates
Staff Deception Estimate

Step 4
Commander's Estimate
Commander's Deception Estimate

Step 5
Commander's Concept

Step 6
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Concept Review

Phase III
Plan Development
Deception Plan Development

Phase IV
Plan Review
Deception Plan Review and Approval

Phase V
Supporting Plans

Figure V-1. Deliberate Planning Process
Figure V-2. Crisis Action and/or Campaign Planning Process
APPENDIX A
EXPLANATION OF MILITARY DECEPTION TERMINOLOGY

1. Deception Terms

Knowledge of military deception terminology is necessary for understanding the deception planning process. The following paragraphs explain the key terms used in the Chapter IV, “Military Deception Planning Process,” discussion of the planning process.

a. Deception Objective

- The deception objective is the desired result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and/or location.

- Military deception planners must distinguish between the JFC’s operational objective and the deception objective. The JFC’s operational objective is what the JFC wants achieved as the result of friendly force operations. The deception objective is the action(s) (or inaction) that the JFC wants the adversary to take.

- A deception objective is always stated in terms of specific actions, such as “have the adversary move its reserve force from Point A to Point B prior to H-Hour.”

- A statement such as “have the adversary think that we will make our main attack on its left flank” is not a deception objective. It is a desired perception (see below). Having the adversary decision maker think a certain way is important only as a step toward getting that decision maker to make the decision that will result in the desired action that is the deception objective. Thoughts without action are of little military value.

b. Deception Target

- The deception target is the adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective.

- Each situation must be analyzed to identify the adversary commander who has the authority to take the desired action. For example, if the deception objective is to move an enemy reserve division from its current position to a position more favorable to intended friendly operations, then the deception target would be the enemy corps or army commander. Subordinate commanders do not normally have the authority to direct their own positioning. They must be directed to do so by their commanders.

- The adversary’s intelligence system is normally not the deception target. It is a conduit that is used to get deceptive information to the target.

c. Desired Perception

- The desired perception is what the deception target must believe in order for it to make the decision required to achieve the deception objective.

- Deception operations seek to identify and then create or reinforce those perceptions that will lead the deception target to make certain decisions.

- Determining the desired perception is difficult. It requires understanding the target’s historical, cultural, and personal background. Generally:
Appendix A

- It is much easier, and historically more effective, to reinforce an existing belief than to establish a new one; and

- The target must believe that it is in its best interest to take the action required by the deception objective.

d. Deception Story

- The deception story is a scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception.

- A deception story identifies those friendly actions, both real and simulated, that when observed by the deception target will lead it to develop the desired perception.

- The story normally takes the form of a concept of operation statement: “We will portray that we are preparing to attack the enemy’s left flank in 3 days with two armored divisions reinforced by a MAGTF.” The story does not address the means that will be used to portray the outlined actions.

- The story must be believable, verifiable, consistent, and executable.

- Believable. The story must correspond to the deception target's perceptions of the friendly force’s mission, intentions, and capabilities. Notional plans or forces that grossly distort actual friendly capabilities will likely be discounted. Stories that closely copy past and already exposed deception operations may not be believed.

- Verifiable. The adversary must be able to verify the veracity of the story through multiple channels. The story must, therefore, take into account all of the adversary’s intelligence sources.

The story must be made available through all or many of those sources. “Windfall” or single-source inputs that would provide the entire story, should be avoided. Multiple conduits should be used, with each providing the target a small piece of the deception story. The deception target should perceive that verification of the story has required full use of its intelligence collection and analysis resources.

- Consistent. Deception stories should be consistent with the deception target's understanding of actual friendly doctrine, historical force employment, campaign strategy, battlefield tactics, and the current operational situation. This calls for the deception element to have as complete a picture as possible of the deception target’s level of knowledge and belief in these areas. The deception story must be consistent with related activities that condition the target to patterns of friendly activity.

- Executable. As with any course of action, the course of action that forms the deception story must be within the capabilities of the friendly force as the deception target perceives them. The target must believe that the friendly force has the capability to execute the operations that are being portrayed by the deception story.

c. Deception Means

- Deception means are the methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. There are three categories of deception means: physical, technical, and administrative. (See Glossary)

- Deception means are used to portray the deception story. They are used to create
**Explanations of Military Deception Terminology**

A complete adversary intelligence picture that supports all aspects of the deception story. Means are tailored to the adversary’s intelligence collection capabilities.

- Whether or not the deception target relies upon any particular intelligence source should be considered when selecting means. If the target is known to trust one intelligence source over all others, then means should be selected to exploit that trust.

- **Physical means** include displays of troop movements and concentration, feints and demonstrations by maneuver units, false logistic activity, and false headquarters. **Technical means** include false communications nets, false radar emissions, and the use of smoke and other obscurants. **Administrative means** include the staged compromise or loss of classified documents.

- Successful deceptions use the **various means in combination** to present the adversary’s intelligence system with what appears to be a complete picture of friendly activities and intentions. For example, a friendly intent to conduct an attack at a particular time and location could be portrayed by demonstrations conducted by combat units (physical), false radio traffic (technical), and the deliberate loss of portions of the operation order (administrative).

f. **Deception Courses of Action**

- Deception COAs are the schemes developed during the estimate process in sufficient detail to permit decision making. At a minimum, a deception COA will identify the deception objective, target, desired perception, story, and, in general terms, means. It answers the questions: who, what, where, when, how, and why.

- Deception COAs are developed by the deception planners, working closely with the intelligence, operations, and other C2W planners, simultaneous with the development of the actual operational COAs.

- In many cases, the deception COAs will be based on operational COAs that were developed by the operations planners to ensure that the deception stories meet the criteria listed in the preceding paragraph.

**g. Deception Events**

- **The deception event** is a deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a deception operation.

- For example, a deception means is the passing of false messages over radio nets. A deception event identifies what unit would pass the desired message, when the unit would broadcast the message, and from where. Deception events are developed during the deception planning process.

**h. Deception Action**

- **A deception action** is a collection of related deception events that form a major component of a deception operation.

- A deception action is a combination of related deception events that are used to portray a main element of a deception story. The four major types of deception actions are feints, demonstrations, displays, and ruses. (See Glossary)
Appendix A

2. **Relationship of the Deception Terms**

The deception operation conducted in support of Operation DESERT STORM provides an example of how the deception terms relate to each other.

a. Commander in Chief, US Central Command's (USCENTCOM's) **deception objective** was to “use operational deception to fix or divert Republican Guard and other heavy units away from the main effort.” The **deception target** was the Iraqi senior military leadership. The **desired perception** was that “the Coalition would attack frontally through Kuwait.”

b. Various **deception COAs** were considered. The **deception story** for the course of action approved by USCENTCOM portrayed the main ground attack as occurring in the Wadi al-Batin area. That attack would be supported by a Marine amphibious assault on the Kuwaiti coast.

c. As the deception COA was developed into a deception plan, it was determined that all three categories of **deception means** would be used to portray the story. **Specific means** such as using electronic and physical decoys to portray notional unit locations and publicizing the preparations and training for amphibious operations were selected.

d. The execution of the selected means was coordinated to ensure a **consistent and logical portrayal**. Assigned specific times and locations for execution, the means were included in the deception plan as **deception events**. Some events were used in combination to create **deception actions** such as the 1st Cavalry Division's feints and demonstrations in the Wadi al-Batin area during the 30 days before the start of the ground operation.
APPENDIX B
SUGGESTED BACKGROUND READINGS

1. Deception planning is a creative process that requires imagination and creativity on the part of its practitioners. Additionally, deception plans must be carefully tailored for each situation. For these reasons, this publication has not provided a list of possible deception schemes or otherwise attempted to suggest potential deception courses of actions for particular situations.

2. Deception planners and others can benefit, however, from the experiences of earlier deception operations and from the theoretical work being done by academicians on the topics of deception and surprise.

3. The following is a selected bibliography of books and periodicals that deal with the subject of deception.


k. Master of Deception by David Mure (William Kimber, 1980).


m. Pastel: Deception in the Invasion of Japan by Dr. Thomas M. Huber (Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988).


o. The War Magician by David Fisher (Coward-McMann, 1983).


APPENDIX C
REFERENCES

The development of Joint Pub 3-58 is based upon the following primary references.

1. CJCSI 3211.01A, 15 June 1994, “Joint Military Deception.”
3. CJCS MOP 6, 3 March 1993, “Electronic Warfare.”
4. CJCS MOP 30, 8 March 1993, “Command and Control Warfare.”
APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-58, 6 June 1994, "Joint Doctrine for Military Deception."

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J33//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

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Appendix D

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, “Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

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Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center
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700 Robbins Avenue
Bldg 1, Customer Service
Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics Base
Albany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.
# GLOSSARY
## PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2W</td>
<td>command and control warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and computers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>EW</td>
<td>electronic warfare</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>memorandum of policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>signals intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCINCCENT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Central Command</td>
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PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control warfare. The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare is an application of information warfare in military operations and is a subset of information warfare. Command and control warfare applies across the range of military operations and all levels of conflict. Also called C2W. C2W is both offensive and defensive: a. C2-attack -- Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system. b. C2-protect -- Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy the friendly C2 system. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception action. A collection of related deception events that form a major component of a deception operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception concept. The deception course of action forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review as part of the CINC’s Strategic Concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception course of action. A deception scheme developed during the estimate process in sufficient detail to permit decision making. At a minimum, a deception course of action will identify the deception objective, the deception target, the desired perception, the deception story, and tentative deception means. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception event. A deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a deception operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception means. Methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. There are three categories of deception means:

a. physical means. Activities and resources used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power. (Examples: military operations, including exercises, reconnaissance, training activities, and movement of forces; the use of dummy equipment and devices; tactics; bases, logistic actions, stockpiles, and repair activity; and test and evaluation activities).
Glossary

display. In military deception, a static portrayal of an activity, force, or equipment intended to deceive the adversary's visual observation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electromagnetic deception. The deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to convey misleading information to an enemy or to enemy electromagnetic-dependent weapons, thereby degrading or neutralizing the enemy's combat capability. Among the types of electromagnetic deception are: a. manipulative electromagnetic deception—Actions to eliminate revealing, or convey misleading, electromagnetic telltale indicators that may be used by hostile forces. b. simulative electromagnetic deception—Actions to simulate friendly, notional, or actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces. c. imitative electromagnetic deception—The introduction of electromagnetic energy into enemy systems that imitates enemy emissions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack—That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their

b. technical means. Military material resources and their associated operating techniques used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power through the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of energy; the emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors; and the emission or suppression of nuclear particles.

c. administrative means. Resources, methods, and techniques to convey or deny oral, pictorial, documentary, or other physical evidence to a foreign power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception objective. The desired result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and/or location. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception story. A scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception. (Joint Pub 1-02)

defection target. The adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

demonstration. 1. An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. See also amphibious demonstration; diversion; diversionary attack. (DOD) 2. In military deception, a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought made to deceive an adversary. It is similar to a feint but no actual contact with the adversary is intended. (Joint Pub 1-02)

desired perception. In military deception, what the deception target must believe for it to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)
primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams), or antiradiation weapons. b. electronic protection—That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP. c. electronic warfare support—That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both communications intelligence (COMINT), and electronics intelligence (ELINT). (Joint Pub 1-02)

**feint.** In military deception, an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**military deception.** Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are:

a. strategic military deception. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator’s strategic military objectives, policies, and operations.

b. operational military deception. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations.

c. tactical military deception. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements.

d. Service military deception. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of Service to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems.

e. military deception in support of OPSEC. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

a. Identify those actions that can be
observed by adversary intelligence systems.
b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**public affairs.** Those public information and community relations activities directed toward the general public by the various elements of the Department of Defense. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**ruse.** In military deception, a trick of war designed to deceive the adversary, usually involving the deliberate exposure of false information to the adversary's intelligence collection system. (Joint Pub 1-02)
Glossary

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All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Pub 3-08 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 Project Proposal**
- Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 coordinates requirement with Services and CINCS
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2 Program Directive**
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCS
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (J5) Directorate

**STEP #3 Two Drafts**
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the Pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4 CJCS Approval**
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff retains responsibility for pub, makes requested changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCS
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

**STEP #5 Assessments/Revision**
- The CINCS receive the pub and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7 will solicit a written report from the constituent commands and Services on the utility and quality of each pub and the need for any urgent changes or earlier than scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each pub is revised