THE NATIONAL GUARD AND WMD HOMELAND DEFENSE

A MONOGRAPH
BY
Lieutenant Colonel Melvin G. Spiese
United States Marine Corps

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 97-98

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4
**Title and Subtitle**
The National Guard and WMD Homeland Defense

**Author(s)**
Lt Col M.G. Spiess, USMC

**Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)**
School of Advanced Military Studies
Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

**Sponsoring / Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)**
Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

**Supplementary Notes**

**Distribution / Availability Statement**
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

**Subject Terms**

**Security Classification**
- OF REPORT: UNCLASSIFIED
- OF THIS PAGE: UNCLASSIFIED
- OF ABSTRACT: UNCLASSIFIED

**Limitation of Abstract**
UNLIMITED
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Lieutenant Colonel Melvin G. Spiese

Title of Monograph: The National Guard and WMD Homeland Defense

Approved by:

William J. Gregor, Ph.D. Monograph Director

COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 21st Day of May 1998
ABSTRACT

The National Guard and WMD Homeland Defense, by Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Spiese, USMC, 45 pages.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose a new and significant threat to American security. The nation does not presently possess the ability to adequately deal with this threat. Congress has tasked DoD to develop capabilities to deal with this threat. In particular, DoD has undertaken programs to train those who will initially respond to a WMD attack (preparedness), and to form units with technical WMD skills to assist in a larger federal relief effort (response).

DoD’s present concept for preparedness and response is not adequate to provide a long-term, comprehensive defense. The preparedness program is narrow in focus and ignores necessary refresher training. Response is fundamentally the addition of small technical units added to the current disaster relief (DR) structure. DR is an ad hoc organizational response neither dedicated nor time sensitive to the incident. The DR structure is composed of units dispersed throughout DoD components and commands, and responsible to different authorities.

The National Guard can, if properly structured, provide genuine WMD homeland defense. Its inherent strengths and characteristics make it the force of choice for this mission. Its integration at the state level offer a model for civil-military interagency cooperation, and its infrastructure is an ideal base to establish a comprehensive defense throughout the nation.

The National Guard should be tasked with the WMD homeland defense mission. It should reorganize its excess 8 combat divisions and 3 separate combat units into Homeland Defense Divisions. Combat forces should convert to combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) units, with emphasis on WMD. As well as meeting the WMD threat, this change in capability will meet identified Army CS/CSS shortfalls. Divisions should be organized to coincide with FEMA’s regions and be responsible for all military support operations within their regions.

WMD homeland defense is a strategic opportunity for the National Guard. The security of the nation and its ability to respond to disasters, natural and manmade, will be enhanced by the National Guard’s return to its roots with a legitimate and comprehensive homeland defense. National Guard relevance and utility well into the next century may depend on how it responds to this opportunity.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background and Argument for Change</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities, Organization and Strategic</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role for the National Guard in WMD Homeland Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstacles to Change and Conclusions</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

The world has changed dramatically for the United States' Armed Forces. The threat upon which United States defense policy was founded in 1945 no longer exists, and no similar threat is expected to rise between now and 2015. The demise of the Soviet Union as a peer competitor of the United States has forced a reorientation of the Department of Defense, and has shifted post-Cold War military strategy toward regional conflicts. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, American conventional military power is unmatched, and short of recklessness on the part of a regional power, the U.S. will not likely be challenged in the foreseeable future.

Despite the absence of a direct military threat, American security is not guaranteed. Enmity towards the United States remains. Adversaries will probably avoid direct confrontation with the U.S., but they still will pursue their stated goals by circumventing U.S. strength and exploiting vulnerabilities. Their actions may confront us in ways that cannot be matched in kind. In addition to military threats to U.S. security, there may be situational threats to important aspects of the American economy and social life. The global increase in illicit activities and the availability of highly destructive technologies, which easily bypass traditional defensive measures, present new threats to the nation.

The Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Panel identified a host of threats to America: information warfare, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and international crime, including trafficking in arms, strategic materials and drugs.
Additionally, the Defense Science Board (DSB) observed in its 1997 study of transnational threats, a proclivity by terrorists towards greater acts of violence. The ease by which illicit drugs, illegal immigrants, and other illegal goods move through America’s borders provide stark examples of vulnerability to non-traditional threats.

Concern for new non-traditional threats is widespread and senior policy pronouncements recognize the importance of these threats to national security. The President states in his National Security Strategy report:

“...the dangers we face are unprecedented in their complexity...terrorism, drugs, organized crime and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global concerns and transcend national borders...”

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated this concern in the National Military Strategy:

“...the security environment we face includes threats to our country and our interests that are not “war” in the classical sense, and yet may call for military forces. Terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, illegal drug trafficking and other threats at home... require the use of military forces...”

There is an acknowledged problem, but there are also difficulties in addressing the threat.

Non-traditional threats are not strictly military in nature; to the extent they are not, they will confound traditional military approaches, and challenge tradition and culture regarding domestic use of the Armed Forces. Defense against these non-traditional threats is inherently complex, and requires the coordination of government agencies at all levels, consistent with appropriate authorities and capabilities. This new security environment suggests greater domestic use of the military.
Because the new threats to U.S. security are domestic, the National Military Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, National Defense Panel (NDP), and Defense Science Board identified homeland defense as a major mission area. It was not clear what is meant by the term “homeland defense”, and DoD has not published a coherent vision of its role in it. To date, there has not been a comprehensive strategic approach, from either a policy or action perspective, for homeland defense.

Policy pronouncements have been broad, and guidance vague. Government actions have been driven by particular events or recognition of specific threats. Further complicating this issue are calls for greater access to, and use of, military capabilities in a variety of different roles.\(^8\) It has become politically expedient to task DoD to address a number of these issues while the search for a new post-Cold War strategy is ongoing.

It is easy to understand why, in the absence of a coherent threat, Congress and the President look to the Armed Forces for help. The Armed Forces possess a broad range of resources and capabilities that can be applied to homeland defense. However, domestic use of the military is the most sensitive area regarding the relationship between the Armed Forces and the citizenry it is sworn to defend. Expanding the domestic role of the military can have far-ranging ramifications, and must be done with great sensitivity to Constitutional concerns. Defining appropriate domestic roles for the military to counter non-traditional threats within U.S. borders must include due consideration of long standing policies and statutes, and the American political tradition and culture.

Policy pronouncements about non-traditional threats leave much yet undefined. They have, nonetheless, identified three broad categories of threat: information attack,
transnational crime, and weapons of mass destruction. The effects of these threats are quite different, but meeting them requires similar categories of defensive action: prevention, preemption, and response. A sound assessment of these threats can at least identify which government institutions have a major role in meeting the threat and can serve to guide the development of a coherent approach to homeland defense.

Among the three major threats, information attack is the most technical and narrow in scope. The report of the President’s Commission on Critical Information Protection (Marsh Commission) determined the nation is not prepared to deal with this threat in an integrated, comprehensive manner. The Commission recognized system owner/operator responsibility, but called for the U.S. Government to take the lead in system protection, and to establish a partnership with the private sector to assist in the protection of critical systems throughout the nation. Although the NDP stated the National Guard must be prepared to defend information infrastructure, neither the NDP nor the Commission identified specific tasks for the military. Safeguarding information systems is necessary, and DoD will likely be on the cutting edge. DoD can share information on threats and preventative measures, and help develop appropriate technologies for information defense. DoD also possesses some unique capabilities that can be used to assist targets of an information attack. Nevertheless, the nature of information attack, in its technical complexity and the manner in which it will be conducted, will limit military involvement and it should not be an area for expanded domestic military involvement.
Congress and the public are very troubled by the transformation of criminal activities from a local to a global concern. Congress granted exemptions to the Posse Comitatus Act to facilitate military support to law enforcement agencies in counter drug operations.\textsuperscript{11} Expanded use of the military in a law enforcement role, however, runs counter to American culture and requires more than just a change of law. Moreover, employment of the military in police-like functions, in the absence of a declared national emergency, would be a tacit admission of the failure of civil institutions and authority. There is nothing to lead one to believe the military can achieve better success than civil law enforcement agencies. Military assistance to law enforcement agencies should remain unchanged: i.e. support in emergency situations in which law enforcement agencies are either overwhelmed or lack specific capabilities for a particular event. Nothing in the nature of transnational criminal activities makes those activities a logical focus for the Department of Defense.

In contrast to information attack and international crime, weapons of mass destruction have an undeniable military connection. Congress published the following finding in the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization Act:

"The potential for the national security of the United States to be threatened by nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological terrorism must be taken seriously. ... the threat to the citizens of the United States by (such) weapons delivered by unconventional means is significant and growing."\textsuperscript{12}

Senator Richard Lugar firmly believes such an attack is immanent: "Americans have every reason to expect a nuclear, biological or chemical attack before the decade is over".\textsuperscript{13}
Whether or not Senator Lugar is correct, any WMD attack may exceed the nation’s current ability to respond. Congress found a “lack of adequate planning and countermeasures to address the threat of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical terrorism.” Preparation for, and effective response to, a WMD attack requires a commitment of resources before an attack occurs. Although disaster response is essentially a civil responsibility involving many levels of government, only DoD can practically field and maintain the capabilities required to mitigate the consequences of a WMD attack. Accordingly, Congress designated DoD as the lead agency for developing domestic preparedness and response, and directed establishment of rapid response capabilities for detection, neutralization, containment and disposal of WMD. The NDP identified domestic preparedness and managing the consequences of WMD as an area where DoD should expand its activities regarding homeland defense.

Although public policy fully recognizes the threat of WMD and the need to design an effective response, doing so will not be easy. The WMD threat is complex. Its magnitude requires a variety of governmental actions to prevent and limit the scope and consequences of any incident. Existing federal, state, civil and military agencies and organizations have capabilities relevant to meeting the threat, but the structure and authority of these organizations were established to meet other public service needs. Appropriate organization is necessary to bring to bear all the resources needed to effectively deal with WMD. Designing DoD’s role requires an assessment of organizations and capabilities, and that assessment must address institutional and operational obstacles to effective policy.
Preparedness and response to WMD is analogous to missions encompassed under military support to civil authorities (MSCA), already codified in statute and policy. DoD is tasked to provide emergency assistance when civil capabilities are overwhelmed.\textsuperscript{16} Response to WMD must be consistent with the concepts and responsibilities established for other domestic emergencies.\textsuperscript{17} DoD has begun efforts in this direction, but these efforts have been limited to date and are not commensurate with the threat. DoD is building its capability on standing organizations and structure, and is making only limited organizational changes in technical areas. This approach will probably not produce the capability to meet both the needs and public expectations for an effective response to a WMD event.

By policy and tradition, the National Guard is the cornerstone of military support to civil authorities. DoD Directive 3025.1 designates the National Guard as the primary DoD agency for disaster relief, and the 1993 Bottom Up Review characterizes the Guard as the first line of defense in domestic emergencies and threats to domestic tranquility.\textsuperscript{18} MSCA closely parallels responsibilities assigned to the National Guard by the states. In those missions, the Guard is usually integrated into state emergency management plans. Not surprisingly, the NDP and DSB recommended assignment of consequence management (CQM) responsibilities to National Guard units.\textsuperscript{19} Ostensibly, a properly organized DoD commitment to WMD, founded on the National Guard, could provide the needed capabilities in this mission area, while also increasing the Guard’s utility to the nation, Army and states. Properly preparing the National Guard to meet the requirements
created by the WMD threat may also provide benefits to the active forces by reducing the number of domestic contingencies they will be expected to prepare for.

This paper, by exploring the requirements of an effective WMD homeland defense, will identify the capabilities needed in the National Guard; the organizational difficulties that must be addressed; and will explore statutory and regulatory changes that will have to occur to make effective preparation and consequence management possible. Done properly, the National Guard will return to its traditional role of homeland defense in a manner that is relevant to the threats the U.S. faces today.
II. BACKGROUND AND AN ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE

Setting the stage for WMD homeland defense- disaster relief

Local and state authorities have responsibility for emergency management within their jurisdiction. Their resources and capabilities are generally limited and can easily be overwhelmed by either the severity of the emergency, such as was the case during the 1993 bombing the Murrah Federal Building, or by the extent of a disaster, as was the case in Hurricane Andrew. The federal government, principally through the Stafford Emergency Assistance Act, stands ready to provide assistance when catastrophe overwhelms state capabilities.20

Federal assistance requires presidential authorization, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for coordinating the federal response, to include military support provided to civil authorities.21 Organized geographically in ten regions throughout the U.S., FEMA possesses no resources of its own. FEMA has published a federal response plan (FRP), and identified 12 emergency support functions (ESF) essential to providing effective assistance. FEMA does provide the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) staffs and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) during a federal relief operation. Further, FEMA provides planning and coordinates and controls federal assets employed in support of state authorities.22 DoD possesses significant resources for providing such assistance and figures prominently in the 12 ESFs and FRP.23 Of all federal agencies considered and tasked within the FRP, only DoD and the Department of Agriculture are included in each of the 12 ESFs. From a practical
perspective, though, only DoD has the resources and capabilities to lend credible support in each of the ESFs.

Military support can be provided on two levels. As a state owned resource, State Governors have unimpeded access to the National Guard forces within their states for use as they deem necessary. When circumstances exceed resident National Guard capabilities, federal reserve and active forces can be brought to bear through presidential authorization. Under such action, federal military forces report to a designated Federal Coordinating Officer, not the governor or local officials. State National Guard forces may also be federalized through presidential authorization, thus becoming a federal, not state asset. Accordingly, State and Territorial Governors lose their authority over the National Guard when it is federalized.

Within DoD, the National Guard has been designated as the primary agency for disaster relief and emergency assistance.24 In 1993, at the beginning of the new presidential administration, the Bottom Up Review (BUR), identified the need for military forces, particularly the National Guard, to support civil authorities during domestic crisis.25 The BUR further identified the Guard as the first line of defense in domestic emergencies and threats to domestic tranquillity.26 In its role as the militia, the National Guard is tasked with providing trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise directed by state law.27

From a practical perspective, however, actual use of National Guard units does not meet stated expectations. A 1993 study by RAND Corporation of National Guard state and federal missions found Guard forces employed in supplemental roles, rather
than being the primary responder in state emergencies. National Guard units within many states were often unable to provide required capabilities thus, were assigned labor intensive, rather than military skill-related, missions and tasks.28 Moreover, RAND found capabilities for state missions were generally incidental to the force at large.29 The National Academy for Public Assistance made similar findings in a 1997 report on the role of the National Guard in emergency preparedness and response, and noted that state missions were performed on the margin.30 This is partly the consequence of organizing the National Guard into combat units, with their primary utility being mobilization and employment in the event of general war.

Response to emergency management and disaster relief, despite pre-planning, is reactive. Emergencies and disasters are typically “come as you are” events, providing no time for significant adjustments in training or capabilities. Utility for those providing assistance is based upon capabilities, and as a consequence, the National Guard is often unable to provide needed assistance, resulting in its assignment of low skill labor intensive tasks. In such a situation, the state must call on the federal government, through FEMA, to provide expeditious assistance. FEMA has access to a much broader array of federal civil and military capabilities for support in state emergencies. Under the present circumstances, the National Guard is unable to provide the capabilities to adequately and comprehensively meet the threat posed by WMD to the U.S. homeland.

**Requirements for Consequence Management**

A WMD incident can cover a limitless set of scenarios encompassing radiological dispersal, nuclear detonation, or the release of chemical or biological agents. The
complexity and technical nature of the attack, intensity and extent of damage, residual risk, and psychological ramifications will quickly overwhelm local authorities. These difficulties neither relieve local authorities from their responsibility to respond, nor their duty to manage recovery efforts. Thus, without adequate capabilities state and local officials are likely to add political disaster to the effects of a WMD attack.

The seriousness of a WMD attack will make timely response vital. Not only must the preliminary identification of an incident be fast and accurate, but there must also be a swift response to contain the effects and relieve the suffering. It is likely a WMD incident will quickly break many civil systems, such as medical treatment, transportation, fire and rescue, and undermine public order. WMD attacks may force large scale evacuations, adding to the complexity of the problem, and may contaminate water, food, the air, and large tracts of land. Suffering will probably be intensive and extensive, and some attacks will have long term physical and psychological effects. The resultant wide spread fear and psychological difficulties associated with the physical damage and injuries will have significant impact on the nature and extent of a response. Accordingly, managing the consequences of a WMD attack is likely to be a complex and massive operation.

Controlling the extent of a WMD attack depends heavily upon the quality of the initial assessment and response. Immediate response must assess the nature and extent of the incident. The initial assessment must determine the latent risk, damage, potential for expansion, and number and type of causalities. Those assessments serve to identify the order and type of capabilities required immediately. Initial actions will be directed
toward limiting the damage, containing the effects, neutralizing the threat, and ameliorating the suffering. Wide spread contamination or blast effects will create large areas that cannot be transited or inhabited. Those areas will need to be isolated and the resident populations evacuated. The evacuation will produce a homeless population needing all the essentials of life. Search and rescue will be required to locate casualties and victims. Immediate personnel decontamination, and mass casualty handling and evacuation will be required to deal with casualties. Other tasks of significant magnitude include point and area decontamination and cleanup, and establishment of essential services. Recent disaster relief operations, like that of Hurricane Andrew, provide examples of the scale and variety of services needed. The magnitude of effort necessary to provide the military portion of the response will be massive. Moreover, coordinating the numerous federal and state agencies who provide additional capabilities and services make these operations large and complicated.

Military forces are normally used to meet immediate needs and usually military forces are used for a short period. The military support mission is gradually transferred to civil authorities for execution of long term recovery. Transfer occurs only after civil capabilities are mobilized and able to handle the situation. Public expectations and both real and perceived risks weigh heavily on the decision to reduce or withdraw military support. The public's current fear of hazardous material suggests termination of military support and presence may be very difficult. Even minor spills of common chemicals, such as swimming pool cleaning agent, result in full scale cleanup. Public reaction to the movement of outdated chemical munitions and napalm bombs, all in inert states, from
storage sites to locations for subsequent neutralization and destruction, indicates large scale public ignorance about such items; at times this fear approaches hysteria. Thus, the transfer of responsibility from the military to civilian agencies after a WMD attack will be a tough political decision, and DoD’s role in consequence management quite possibly will be greater than presently anticipated or desired.

Because of the magnitude of the consequences associated with WMD, preparing a proper homeland defense requires sound planning, and the establishment of a viable organization to provide those capabilities. Consequence management (CQM) is skill and resource intensive, even outside of the “hot zone”, and require units possessing particular capabilities. General purpose combat forces offer limited utility in such circumstances and in most cases will be able to provide only manpower. Organization and structure are critical for ensuring essential capabilities are accessible and responsive when an incident occurs. A well-designed organization can achieve both effective and efficient command and control of those capabilities needed for a comprehensive response. Defining the military role in WMD homeland defense requires an appraisal of current organizations and their relevant support capabilities within the Armed Forces. Although WMD attack poses a major domestic threat, it is also a threat to military forces, installations, and allies outside of the U.S. Providing assistance to Theater Commanders and allied nations must also be considered in defining DoD’s role with WMD homeland defense.

The National Guard, as it is currently organized, possesses no particular capabilities that make it an appropriate choice as the foundation of a DoD organization dedicated to WMD homeland defense. This fact calls into question pronouncements and
recommendations about Guard involvement in WMD homeland defense. Without commensurate actions to provide the applicable resources, the Guard is no better than any other emergency organization available in a disaster. The utility of the National Guard in consequence management must be based on specific capabilities and predicated upon DoD direction that it is consistent with the existing precepts of military support to civil authorities. As such, the National Guard is presently operating on the margins. This must change if the National Guard is to become the focus of DoD’s involvement in WMD homeland defense.

Present DoD initiatives

DoD’s first real attempt to deal with WMD homeland defense occurred during the 1996 Olympiad in Atlanta. Concern for terrorists armed with WMD had been increasing since the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building. Accordingly, DoD directed U.S. Atlantic Command to establish a Response Task Force (RTF) to assist local and state authorities in the event of a significant disaster. The RTF headquarters was formed out of U.S. Army Forces Command. Specialized units of the Army and Marine Corps, trained to deal with the consequences of chemical or biological incidents, were positioned in the Atlanta area.\(^32\) Congress was similarly interested in addressing the terrorist WMD threat resulting in action on their part.

Congress, through the Weapons of Mass destruction Act, directed DoD to establish a rapid response team to assist federal, state and local agencies with the detection, neutralization, containment and disposal of WMD. That statute also assigned
DoD as the lead government agency for both preparedness and response to WMD attack. As a result of Congressional action, DoD has undertaken a number of initiatives to address specific direction established in law. The Army Chemical Biological Defense Command is establishing a Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team, and Forces Command has directed each of the two Continental U.S. Armies to establish RTFs in their geographic regions. DoD has established a program to conduct CQM-related training for civil agencies that will be the first to respond to a WMD incident, in 120 cities nationwide. More significantly, DoD has begun to form units and develop specific capabilities to respond to a WMD incident.

The principle guidance for a coordinated action is encompassed in the "DoD plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks using Weapons of Mass Destruction" (NG/RC Integration Plan). This plan used the U.S. Government Interagency CONPLAN for Combating Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (November 10, 1997 Draft) to identify appropriate DoD tasks, and grouped them to correspond with the emergency support functions in the FEMA Federal Response Plan. After consultation with the Services, the DoD plan identified capabilities needed to respond to a WMD incident, and identified those capabilities that were lacking. The plan sought to address those shortfalls, in part, by specifying the use of the National Guard and reserve units to fill gaps.

The NG/RC Integration Plan identifies a number of National Guard and Reserve Component actions. The National Guard Bureau will establish ten Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) elements: 22 member teams to provide early assessment,
detection and technical advice in a WMD incident. A Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office is being established to provide a variety of functions related to the employment of Reserve Component forces in a WMD response.

The Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office will direct WMD-related training and doctrine for reserve and Guard units. It will also identify assets and capabilities needed in a particular incident, and integrate and coordinate appropriate reserve and Guard units to provide them. Funding has also been made available to provide CQM-related training to some National Guard and reserve units for security, medical and logistic support. Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance and patient decontamination are the only two functions specifically designated to Reserve Component units. These units, and others needed to meet situational requirements, are expected to be federalized and assigned to one of the two designated RTFs at the time of activation of a federal response to a WMD incident.

The response plan further states that each Army National Guard and Reserve chemical company must establish a platoon-size element for NBC reconnaissance. The same Army units, along with Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Medical patient Decontamination Teams are also required to establish platoon-size elements for patient decontamination. The plan also identifies additional requirements expected in the larger response for a WMD incident: Security, mass care (shelter, food, emergency first aid bulk distribution of emergency relief items), engineering support and transportation (ground, fixed wing and rotary wing). Units are not identified and specific consequence management-related training for these latter units is not directed. Additionally, some
necessary functions for effective CQM have not been specifically addressed in the plan, most noticeably mass casualty decontamination, care, handling and evacuation.

The current approach is not comprehensive and does not provide for the timely, effective response needed to meet the WMD threat. The capabilities being developed are of very limited scope. These current initiatives, with limited exceptions in technical areas, are being developed within existing organizations. The preponderance of a response will be based on providing military units in a manner similar to any disaster relief effort, rather than a manner recognizing the unique nature of the WMD threat. Although vital and necessary, the capabilities being developed are on the margins of the larger consequence management effort. Response to a large scale WMD attack will demand more than the addition of these few newly established units to the present ad hoc disaster relief organization. These are sound first steps, but they are hardly revolutionary changes commensurate with the threat, and fall short of the recommendations of the NDP and DSB. WMD defense requires a rapid, well-planned, and comprehensive response. It is possible to build a viable WMD homeland defense capability upon what has already been done, but the nature of the WMD threat requires far greater capabilities.

**Argument for change**

If the recommendations of the NDP and DSB are to become a reality, significant changes to the present concept are required. The unique requirements posed by the threat of WMD attack require the creation of an organization integrated into the civil emergency
management system, trained and positioned to ensure adequate civil preparedness, and able to efficiently respond to these incidents.

The actions proposed by DoD to date are disjointed. The structure for WMD response is ill-defined and the responsibilities are split between the active force and both Reserve Components. The programs are controlled and managed through several offices within DoD and standing commands. The technical capabilities being developed within the active forces and National Guard are subordinate to different authorities. The employment of Reserve Components is based on identifying capabilities and units during the incident assessment at the time of attack, and done by a DoD-level integration office with no authority over the units involved. Active forces are expected to make up shortfalls in capabilities determined during this assessment. This is generally acceptable for natural disasters which are usually not as time critical as a WMD event. The absence of an established organization confuses responsibility, authority and accountability, and can have significant impact in responding to a time critical WMD event.

An organization needs to be established that has the authority and responsibility to meet the threat of WMD, and has under its direction the units that will respond. The requirements to prepare local agencies and first responders, ensure planning is done, and develop capabilities to execute a timely and effective response can be met with the right organization. The National Guard, with its inherent qualities and characteristics, can easily establish an extensive and comprehensive WMD homeland defense throughout the nation. Homeland defense built on the National Guard can be fully integrated into all
appropriate civil agencies, uniquely responsive to situational requirements, and meet the expectations of the public.

There are additional factors which come into play during a national mobilization that can complicate and debilitate homeland defense. Consequence management, as it is articulated today, relies heavily upon low density, high skill technical units, and other supporting that will be in great demand. Competition for these limited resources will exhaust available units and rob DoD of important capabilities necessary to meet both homeland defense and military operations. This is particularly serious in the most threatening of scenarios, two near-simultaneous major theater wars, while also dealing with asymmetric threats at home.

DoD has the most to gain by adjusting the structure of the National Guard to provide a capability-based WMD homeland defense. This will offer a number of significant advantages to the Armed Forces with strategic and operational implications. WMD is not strictly a matter of homeland defense. Geographic theater commands face similar threats to military forces and critical allies in their areas of responsibility. They must, however, compete for the limited WMD resources currently available within DoD. A comprehensive WMD defense capability established in the National Guard can meet their requirements without placing the homeland at risk.

Changes to National Guard structure that provide a comprehensive WMD homeland defense will have additional benefits to the Army at large. Since 1989, total Army structure has been reduced by 35%, while deployments have increased by 300%. With few exceptions, the increased tempo of operations is a result of non-warfighting
missions. Additionally, the numerous studies identifying significant shortfalls in combat
support and combat service support (CS/CSS) structure in the total force can no longer be
ignored in a zero sum gain fiscal environment.\textsuperscript{38} Current National Security Strategy and
National Military Strategy emphasize operations other than war (OOTW): operations
which require CS/CSS capabilities. Units designed to provide support in response to a
WMD attack will possess significant CS/CSS capabilities. By creating those units, the
Army will also start to reduce the current shortfalls in CS/CSS, increase capabilities to
meet OOTW mission requirements, and can reduce operations tempo due to increased
deployments.

The National Guard, organized, trained and equipped for WMD homeland
defense, will be more useful and better able to meet the needs of the Army, Theater
Commands, and national military strategy. It would meet the WMD threat directly with
both preparedness and response. A National Guard with these expanded capabilities can
also relieve some of the increasing burden being placed on a smaller Army, and provides
greater utility across the spectrum of needs for state and territorial governors.
III. CAPABILITIES, ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGIC ROLE FOR THE
NATIONAL GUARD IN WMD HOMELAND DEFENSE

Capabilities required for WMD Homeland Defense

Congress has identified WMD homeland defense as a twofold enterprise: preparedness and response. Preparedness is defined as ensuring those who are the first to respond to a WMD incident are adequately trained for initial actions. Response encompasses all the necessary capabilities to fully and effectively manage the consequences of a WMD attack.

Preparedness, as defined by DoD, is oriented on state and local agencies and authorities who initially respond to, and manage the consequences of a WMD incident. The Congress has tasked DoD as the lead agency in preparedness because the expertise to meet this requirement currently resides only in DoD. The Army’s Chemical Biological Defense is tasked to conduct first responder training in 120 cities nationwide. The intent of this program is to “train the trainers”, establishing a base within civil agencies to maintain the level of expertise necessary for the initial response internally.

DoD is also developing capabilities to assist in response to a WMD attack. These are capabilities that civil agencies cannot reasonably nor practically develop or maintain at any level. Current DoD guidance makes military support to civil authorities the foundation of consequence management. The 12 emergency support functions identified by FEMA in its Federal Response Plan are the basis for military support to civil
authorities. RAND corporation identified the following as desired capabilities in a 1993 study of Army roles in disaster relief: 40

- **Special Skills**
  - Transportation (Helicopters, off-road vehicles)
  - Urban search and rescue
  - Mobile hospitals
  - Surveillance and reconnaissance
  - Radiation monitoring
  - Situation assessment
  - Damage assessment
- **Communications**
  - Equipment and trained personnel
- **Organized forces**
  - Equipment and disciplined personnel

Both the 12 ESFs and these additional capabilities for disaster relief are applicable to consequence management.

DoD's NG/RC Plan listed the following critical:

- Tailored and timely federal response to augment state and local responders.
- Specialized equipment and coordinated training.
- Capability to deal with a large number of victims.
- Adequate medical supplies and pharmaceuticals: available and stockpiled.
- Baseline information of capability at federal state and local levels.
- Better planning interface among federal, state, and local authorities.
- Prioritization of transportation infrastructure for rapid movement of time-sensitive response resources.
- Timely and accurate emergency information.
- Electronic information management and communications capability.
- Manage stringent Public Safety measures.
- Finalize federal response plan Terrorism Incident Annex.

These concerns were originally presented in the February 1997 report to the President from the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group and the August 1997 Strategic Plan from the Senior Interagency Coordinating Group. The NG/RC Integration Plan identified four additional areas of concerns specifically related to DoD's developing WMD initiatives: 41.
• Current NLD program targets 120 cities- 11 states and 4 territories are not included in this program.
• Federal assets are not well dispersed geographically.
• Military personnel require additional equipment and training to reach adequate response capability.
• The reserve Component has some statutory limitations that impede response decisions.

These concerns present the core of the problem in developing a comprehensive WMD homeland defense, and must be addressed in discerning and developing DoD’s role.

Consequence management is much greater than the limited enhancements to disaster relief presently underway. It appears that the establishment of the CBRRT and RAID elements, and specified WMD medical and NBC reconnaissance training for designated National Guard and reserve units, provide the WMD-related peculiarities of disaster relief. These current initiatives are insufficient, and fall short in many of the aforementioned areas of concern. Collectively, with present disaster relief assistance, they do not provide a comprehensive, long term solution for WMD homeland defense.

The first responder training program is an extremely large effort, but it is effectively a one time action. The program is limited to 120 cities. It is improbable that civil agencies who do not have WMD-related missions as primary duties will be able to maintain a necessary level of proficiency. The initial training of first responders envisioned in the program must be conducted throughout the country. Follow-on refresher training must then be established and conducted by those with expertise to maintain proficiency, standardization, and currency of skills at that level. It is not practical to try to sustain these skills by relying on state and local agencies. A sustained training program is far too great a task for active forces to be a permanent solution.
Comprehensive preparedness requires a different approach than that presently being pursued by DoD.

The response to WMD attack currently envisioned by DoD is ill-defined, disjointed, and complicated. Although disaster relief provides a sound base, and the developing capabilities fill a noticeable void, the quantity of units and current structure are inadequate. DoD’s present response is pieced together from capabilities that are not part of a formal organization, nor habitually associated with a responsible headquarters. The present structure is hamstrung with bureaucratic and organizational complications within DoD, and its link to civil agencies is similarly disjointed. Further, competition for resources during national mobilization will exceed the capacity of the most technical of these units, as well as many others identified to provide large-scale, skill-based support and assistance. The requirements of both homeland defense and theater commands cannot be met within present and planned capabilities and organizations being developed by DoD to meet the WMD threat.

An effective and efficient WMD homeland defense requires an established structure with all the necessary authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities needed to begin comprehensive actions upon the occurrence of a WMD incident. Additionally, there must be sufficient capabilities to ensure the requirements of both the nation and theater commands are met.

Nothing proposed to date will comprehensively meet the genuine requirements of preparedness and response directed by Congress, nor the public expectations associated with the WMD threat. The NDP and DSB recognized the complexity and magnitude of
effort involved in an effective and comprehensive solution for WMD homeland defense. Their recommendation to task the National Guard with this mission recognizes the Guard's potential to deal with the complex requirements and obstacles associated with providing an effective solution. Those recommendations, and National Guard and DoD efforts to date are not sufficient.

The National Guard’s traditional structure has evolved into a community based, regionally organized posture throughout the nation. It is integrally linked to state and local civil authorities and emergency management systems, and has been a model of civil-military inter-agency cooperation and structure. The National Guard can provide comprehensive WMD homeland defense throughout the nation, but will require major structural adjustments to ensure possesses the necessary organization, authorities, and capabilities.

Organization and Structure for WMD Homeland Defense

Statute prohibits designing military forces exclusively for domestic use. The reality of the threat posed by WMD, and the expectations of Congress and the public, though, require a reorientation and adjustment within DoD. An appropriately designed organization can provide extensive national security for homeland defense and meet larger world-wide needs of Army and theater commands. It should address threats posed by WMD and make up identified CS/CSS shortfalls in overall Army capabilities. A comprehensive homeland defense structure should build upon current initiatives to the
maximum degree feasible, but not avoid revolutionary changes that can better meet the needs of national security strategy.

The expansion of technical capabilities in the active forces encompassed in the U.S. Army Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team and U.S. Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force is conceptually sound, and meets immediate national needs. The improved capabilities of these units, and residual effects expected to be incorporated into the Armed Forces at large, are also necessary for military operations in any nuclear, biological or chemical environment. These units, however, are designed to meet only small scale contingencies and cannot meet larger national security requirements posed by the WMD threat. Similarly, the establishment of the Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection elements provide a vital and needed capability. The limit of ten elements nationwide, and residence in the National Guard, however, impede responsiveness and require federal action for response outside of the state to which assigned.

The National Guard should be the force of choice for a comprehensive WMD homeland defense. It is positioned throughout the country in about 3,000 communities and maintains an infrastructure of over 16,000 facilities. The National Guard is integrated into state emergency management systems providing familiarity with state and local authorities, and detailed and coordinated planning. With the appropriate capabilities, the Guard can provide preparedness training ensuring the readiness of first responders and initial response managers, and it can serve as the base for a rapid, coordinated and comprehensive response to a WMD incident. The National Guard,
reorganized to provide comprehensive WMD homeland defense, also offers increased utility across the spectrum of domestic needs as recommended by RAND and NAPA.⁴²

The National Guard’s current eight combat divisions and three separate combat groups provide the manpower and structural base for a WMD homeland defense organization. None of these combat formations are written into any war plans, including the most dangerous two major theater wars scenario, making them reasonably available for reorganization.⁴³ Re-designation as Homeland Defense Divisions, a capability shift to combat support and combat service support units, and alignment to coincide with FEMA regions, provides the capabilities and organization needed to comprehensively meet the WMD threat. The Homeland Defense Division will be responsible for the preparedness of first responders, and planning for, and responding to a WMD incident within its geographic region. Incorporation under a national Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) will allow inter-state support without federal involvement. The Homeland Defense Division will be responsible for coordination between subordinate units, and states, in accordance with the EMAC, and establish liaison with the regional FEMA headquarters.

Division capabilities should coincide with those identified in the FEMA Federal Response Plan, the DoD NG/RC Integration Plan and RAND disaster relief study. Brigades and battalions should be structured around CS/CSS units essential for WMD homeland defense and other domestic support missions. Greater emphasis can then be placed on WMD-related requirements throughout the division, such as mass
contaminated casualty treatment, handling and evacuation; large scale decontamination; and provision of vital services in an urban NBC environment.

Units will be assigned and distributed along the force structure lines commensurate with those of the current divisions and separate combat units. As it is not possible for each state to have all of the capabilities within each division; however, each state will have those capabilities determined to be essential for immediate actions in a WMD incident. Remaining capabilities will be distributed within the division’s region to provide balance for a response to a WMD attack, and rapid cross-state support and reinforcement. CS/CSS skills lend themselves to platoon-level and below proficiency and employment. This facilitates dispersal throughout the division, and enables effective employment without dependency on higher headquarters. Higher level formations, such as companies, battalions and brigades, will build upon these dispersed platoons as situations or taskings develop. As such, capabilities can be widely dispersed in states and regions, ensuring reasonable coverage and response to emergencies.

WMD homeland defense will be multi-level and cover all aspects of disaster relief requirements. The State Area Command (STARC) will maintain its current authority and responsibility over assigned National Guard forces within the states. The STARC will coordinate and conduct first responder training and other actions envisioned for WMD preparedness, as well as developing state plans for WMD consequence management. STARCs will continue to provide command and control over state Guard units employed internally, and provide the State Coordinating Officer to accept forces being provided from the associated Homeland Defense Division to support state managed emergencies.
STARCs will exercise command and control over RAID elements; however, the RAIDs will provide simultaneous reports to their division headquarters to expedite mobilization of its units.

At the next higher level, Homeland Defense Divisions will be responsible for regional planning support to each STARC and the FEMA regional headquarters. Liaison officers and command and control links will be provided to each STARC and the FEMA headquarters. Under the provisions of the EMAC, the division will initiate actions and execute plans based on initial reports from the RAIDs, beginning the initial response to a WMD incident before federal assistance can be organized. The homeland defense division will provide the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)\textsuperscript{44} and provide command and control over all military support flowing in from outside the region, Reserve and Active Component forces alike. The DCO is normally a federally assigned military officer. The shift to assigning the DCO from the Homeland Defense Division will ensure better support to those local and state governments being provided federal military assistance in an emergency.

The Division Commander will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense for managing DoD support in a federal response. By using the homeland division and its headquarters in that role, those responsible for military support will be familiar with all agencies in the region, have visibility and access to all division and incoming federal resources, and will be intimate with emergency plans. The division will be responsible for coordinating and employing its resources to support states within in its region during
state emergencies. This new command and control arrangement ensures responsiveness, thoroughness, continuity and familiarity as emergency situations develop.

The division will also be responsible for coordinating missions assigned to its units from federal authorities. This would include forming task forces with headquarters elements for missions outside of its region, including overseas deployments. Once established, Homeland Defense Divisions can assume even greater internal security responsibilities such as those established in the Continuity Of Operations and the Critical Asset Assurance Programs.45

The key to the Homeland Defense Division is the National Guard's familiarity and habitual association with civil agencies and resident infrastructure. They can ensure mutual support and full integration of Guard resources with state and local civil authorities, and between each STARC and the FEMA headquarters in the region. The division can also provide extensive and detailed planning and preparation, and a rapid, comprehensive response to a WMD attack.

National Guard Homeland Defense Divisions will address all of the concerns and shortfalls identified in the NG/RC Integration Plan. This is a revolutionary change and will meet WMD consequence management response requirements, general domestic support needs, and provide comprehensive support to national military strategy.

The current DoD plan for response to a WMD attack has distinctly limited capabilities and requires significant bureaucratic actions for activation. National Guard Homeland Defense Divisions can provide comprehensive WMD defense; enable a tiered, flexible response for any domestic emergency; or provide a mobilization base for task
organized, packaged CS/CSS capabilities to meet Army deployment requirements. The combination of the proposed restructuring of this new National Guard division and the Guard’s inherent characteristics and strengths offers a solution that is far superior to any concept presented today for response to WMD. The National Guard is uniquely positioned to meet the most pressing needs of national defense with a legitimate return to its roots of defending the homeland.

Implications of WMD Homeland Defense on the National Guard’s Strategic Role

The concepts for homeland defense presented in this paper and in the cited references are in conflict with the current structure and orientation of the National Guard. Internal contradictions within the National Guard also exist, as an increased need to address WMD and general support domestic requirements collide with an organization predominantly designed to fight conventional major theater wars outside of the United States.

The National Guard is a state militia-based organization, structured and primarily funded by the federal government, to meet requirements as a reserve component of the Army and Air Force. Accordingly, this federal mission has primacy in determining organization, capabilities, resourcing, training, and employment. Any considerations for adjustments to National Guard capabilities and organization must properly be consistent with federal mission requirements.

The National Guard is designated by law to be the primary combat reserve for the Army and Air Force, as a result of the Dick Act of 1903. In pursuit of that end, the
Army National Guard now possesses nearly all the combat units in the Army’s reserve structure, with the Army Reserve (USAR) currently possessing only combat support and combat service support units. Despite its unchallenged primacy as the Army’s combat reserve, a series of studies and assessments conducted or directed by Congress and DoD during the 1990’s have found serious flaws in the Army National Guard structure. The Army National Guard maintains a Cold War structure founded on a World War II model. These studies and assessments conclude, in the main, that the Army National Guard has not addressed itself to post-Cold War realities. In particular, the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that in view of the need to change in the face of the realities in the post-Cold War world, "...one reserve component [the Army National Guard] has not sufficiently adapted to new challenges..."\(^{47}\)

The Army National Guard currently maintains 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades (ERB), 8 combat divisions, and 3 separate combat units (consisting of 2 separate brigades and a scout group) in its combat structure. The 1993 Bottom Up Review reaffirmed the National Guard as the primary combat reserve of the Army. It indicated the Guard’s 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades met the requirement for combat reserve, although it was silent on the issue of valid requirements for the eight combat divisions. The BUR further identified the need for military forces, particularly the National Guard, to support civil authorities in domestic emergencies. It addressed the (then) remaining 22 brigade structure as being maintained at a low state of readiness for domestic use in support of civil authorities.\(^{48}\)
In 1995, the Commission On Roles and Missions (CORM) found the Army’s Reserve Component combat structure exceeded the requirements of the National Military Strategy’s two Major Regional Conflict baseline. Specifically, the CORM stated the National Guard’s eight combat divisions were excess and should be converted to CS/CSS units to meet identified shortfalls in Army deployable support. The Commission further found that even after meeting CS/CSS shortfalls with National Guard combat structure, there would still be excess combat structure that should be eliminated.\textsuperscript{49}

In May 1992, the Director of the Army National Guard attempted to establish Humanitarian Support Units in recognition of a growing reliance by civil authorities on military support, particularly for disaster relief. These units were to be organized within existing structure and specifically designed to meet increasing domestic support requirements. Despite the Director’s view and the BUR’s later call for greater emphasis on CS/CSS units and domestic support, the National Guard aggressively pursued expansion of already excess combat capability at the expense of these other identified needs. Nearly all remaining combat structure of the USAR was transferred to the National Guard, with Guard CS/CSS capabilities migrating to the reserves as a result of the Army’s 1993 Offsight Agreement.\textsuperscript{50} This agreement was done in the wake of great Gulf War tension between the active force, Army Reserve and National Guard, and resulted in the present 15 ERB, 8 division and 3 separate unit structure.

The National Guard’s expansion of its combat structure is particularly interesting in view of the experience of National Guard and Army Reserve units mobilized and deployed for the Gulf War. Reserve CS/CSS units were in great demand. They were
mobilized and deployed early in the conflict, and figured significantly in the Army’s successful build up to, and execution of, combat operations. National Guard combat brigades, however, were a contentious issue. Although two were mobilized and sent to the National Training Center for pre-deployment training, these brigades were not deployed or employed as envisioned by Army war plans.

The Offsight Agreement effectively terminated any move to improve capabilities which could be used to meet state and domestic missions on the part of the National Guard. Conversely, the Army Reserve took advantage of the capability shift and rising expectation of an increased domestic military support role. The USAR, a federal resource, has adjusted their U.S. based organization to coincide with the 10 FEMA regions and assigned liaison officers to each FEMA regional headquarters.

Numerous GAO and RAND studies have cited and supported with their own analysis, the CORM’s findings and its call for force sizing and shaping in accordance with validated requirements. These studies continually address the contradiction between Army National Guard structure and validated requirements in established national security and military strategy.51

A 1995 RAND study of National Guard state and federal missions found similar flaws and contradictions in Army National Guard structure. Their assessment of all established war plans found even fewer validated requirements for combat structure than the BUR and CORM. RAND found less than 10 Enhanced Readiness Brigades were identified in plans to meet wartime needs. Their study challenged the Army’s concept that the remaining combat structure was a strategic reserve and deterrent hedge, stating
that no analytical basis existed for any such requirement. The picture of the Guard structure thus presented is that of the Cold War. There appears to be little regard in the Headquarters of the National Guard for the repeatedly identified validated missions with higher national importance.

The Army conducted a study on redesign of National Guard Divisions in 1996. The General Officers Working Group conducting the study made the following recommendations:

- Convert two National Guard combat divisions and six combat brigades to CS/CSS units.
- Maintain six combat divisions, minus three combat brigades.
- Create two new combat divisions composed of active duty administrative headquarters and three enhanced brigades each.

The study estimated the conversion would take 10-29 years, and cost $2.8 billion. Even with these much needed changes, GAO still found unvalidated combat structure remained.

Division redesign notwithstanding, evidence abounds calling for a significant reassessment and restructuring of the National Guard. Excess combat structure offer little utility to the Army, states and the nation. NAPA and RAND found the Guard was often marginalized in its traditional state role by maintaining capabilities of limited usefulness in significant emergencies, while at the same time those units are all but ignored by theater and national defense planners. The National Guard may, to a large degree, be on its way to a practical irrelevance.

Homeland Defense Divisions built around CS/CSS units can meet state needs and address Army capability shortfalls. CS/CSS skill requirements lend themselves to small
unit proficiency and employment, which is consistent with Army Reserve Component training strategy. This ensures units called upon to respond to emergencies are prepared to perform their missions, while also meeting Army mobilization and deployment criteria. Thus, the National Guard will be of great utility across the spectrum of missions and conflict. Homeland Defense Divisions will provide effective and comprehensive regional emergency response to WMD and other disasters within the U.S. They can also provide task organized packaged capabilities under a deployable headquarters element to meet Army component and theater command contingency and warfighting requirements. Additionally, division headquarters can provide standing Rear Area Operations Centers for Army echelons above division, which is a current National Guard requirement. A restructured National Guard can be the Army’s primary combat reserve, and simultaneously return to its traditional roots by providing relevant homeland defense

WMD homeland defense is presenting the National Guard with a strategic opportunity to guarantee its value to their states, the Army, and the nation. A legitimate homeland defense capability, added to the National Guard’s enhanced brigades primacy as the Army’s combat reserve, ensures relevance for the entire Guard and solidifies their role as “America’s Army, in the first line of defense”.

37
IV OBSTACLES TO CHANGE AND CONCLUSIONS

Obstacles to Change

The concepts presented in this paper, and the recommendations put forth in the references by RAND, GAO, and NAPA, face a number of obstacles to implementation. Competing interests, conflicting agendas and politics all weigh heavily on how DoD is dealing with WMD. The same is true for any matter involving the National Guard, particularly those pertaining to mission, structure, capabilities, and resourcing. Emotions run deep between the active Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard regarding these issues. Seemingly, each issue is tied to history and tradition, and many interpretations thereof, and many have resulted in years of political battling. Nothing presented in this paper will come easy.

The threat presented by WMD has spurred significant competition within DoD. There has been much posturing among the Services and components as WMD preparedness and response presents opportunities for funding and mission expansion, along with validation of additional utility to the nation. This takes on significance as DoD faces a future of level funding in its most optimistic projections. Everyone currently involved in WMD will likely resist the ascendancy of any one particular component or organization over all others.

Within the Army, a transition of that National Guard combat structure in excess of the 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades to CS/CSS could be misconstrued as diluting the National Guard as the Army’s primary combat reserve. Although there is nothing
presented in this paper which would alter that role, any move from combat units may be considered a step backwards by many in the National Guard. There is much prestige associated with combat units, even though those in excess of the enhanced brigades face serious problems in funding, manning, equipping, training and employment, and cannot always meet the most critical state emergency management needs. A change to CS/CSS units, despite the realities facing the non-enhanced brigade combat structure, and the necessity for a comprehensive WMD homeland defense, as well as state needs and public expectations, may be thwarted from within the National Guard.

Regional mutual support compacts under a national EMAC will be a challenge to implement. Differing state emergency management systems, their views of the National Guard, and their own internal organization will present problems as National Guard units are pulled together under regional headquarters to conduct regional missions. Although sound in concept to facilitate mutual support of neighboring states and access to additional capabilities, it will be difficult to ensure any new structure will enable a seamless transition from state to state.

Conclusions

WMD attack is a valid threat, the consequences of which currently exceed the nation’s ability to respond. Addressing the requirements created by the threat of WMD is complex and the consequences of an incident are potentially staggering. Thus, preparing a comprehensive defense requires governments at all levels to commit significant resources to preparedness and response. Most of the solutions to the present state of
unpreparedness are too conservative and based on outmoded thinking. Current efforts to provide for homeland defense fill only short term needs.

Current efforts to develop limited technical are dispersed throughout the military components, and under disparate authorities. The other extensive capabilities needed to deal with the WMD threat are similarly organized. Although this approach addresses some immediate shortfalls in the nations defenses, this present solution is an impediment to the development of a comprehensive and extensive response to meet this threat over the long run. Additionally, competition between various agencies for access to, and control of, these limited resources during a national mobilization will produce confusion and delay, while leaving significant portions of the United States or major military commands at risk. To properly provide the effective, comprehensive WMD homeland defense expected by the American public, there must be significant changes made to current organizations and plans, as well as the reallocation of resources committed to this purpose.

The National Guard, despite DoD pronouncements, does not now have the ability to assume this mission in the manner required. Beyond the RAID elements, the skills and capabilities most needed in a WMD attack are simply not in the structure in sufficient quantity, and those available are not organized in a manner that will ensure adequate national coverage. Utility is based on capability; it is capability that will matter in WMD homeland defense. At present, the National Guard is only marginal useful for WMD homeland defense.
That said, the National Guard is the right organization to assume this mission by both tradition and design. Positioned in communities throughout the nation and holding a natural affiliation with state and local agencies and authorities, the National Guard provides a sound foundation for genuine defense against WMD. The 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades and National Guard’s role as the Army’s primary combat reserve are well protected by statute, policy and war plans. Thus, the national Guard will have the longevity and structure to successfully develop the needed skills and organization. DoD and the National Guard must, however, commit themselves to a fundamental restructuring of those combat forces that are not needed in existing war plans and are continuously identified by Congress and DoD as excess. Moreover, traditional state needs and Army component and theater commands are much better served by the addition of CS/CSS capabilities, rather than poorly resourced general line combat units.

The National Guard’s prominence in homeland defense against non-traditional threats should then rise within DoD and the nation. This prominence should be welcomed in a period of budget reductions. Prominence, however, will ultimately be predicated upon legitimate utility, not tradition. The National Guard should once again focus on homeland defense rather than national mobilization for general war, and should both insist upon it, and facilitate such action. The security of the nation and its ability to respond to disasters, natural and manmade, will be enhanced by developing the National Guard’s ability to provide homeland defense. Moreover, National Guard relevance and utility well into the next century may depend on how it responds to this opportunity.
V RECOMMENDATIONS

First, there should be no change in the National Guard’s role as the Army’s primary reserve. This should be done by maintaining the Enhanced Readiness Brigades, including reorganization that may occur with division redesign.

DoD should specifically task the National Guard with the WMD homeland defense mission. This should include both preparedness of first responders and civil authorities, and response to WMD attack.

The Army National Guard should reorganize the 8 combat divisions and 3 separate combat units into Homeland Defense Divisions. Divisions should be organized regionally to coincide with FEMA’s 10 regions. A national Emergency Management Assistance Compact should be established, oriented along the Homeland Divisions and FEMA regions, to facilitate division support to states during emergencies.

Associated combat forces should be converted to CS/CSS units. Units should be distributed to states within the divisions region in sections and platoons, ensuring each state has immediate access to those capabilities deemed vital to initial response. Higher level organization should provide balanced coverage within the division’s region in a manner which facilitates mobilization and mutual support.

Homeland Defense Divisions should be the primary agency responsible for military support to civil authorities within their regions. Divisions should, through provisions in the EMAC, manage assistance and support within their region during state emergencies. The division should provide the Defense Coordinating Officer and be responsible for all military support within its region in any domestic support operation.
Homeland Defense Divisions should also coordinate all federal taskings to units under their authority. The division should be responsible for mobilization, and if necessary, organize task forces, including headquarters elements, for out of region missions.
ENDNOTES

1 Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (May 1997), sect. II, pp. 3-4
2 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (NMS) (October 1997), Executive Summary, pp. 4-5
5 NDP, pg. 26
6 The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (NSS) (May 1997), pg. i
7 NMS, Executive Summary, pp. 4-5
8 Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) for the U.S. Congress and Federal Emergency Management Administration, The Role of the National Guard in Emergency Preparedness and Response, January 1997, pg. ix, 3; Schrader, John Y., RAND Corporation, "The Army’s Role in Domestic Disaster Relief Support", (RAND DR) An Assessment of Policy Choices, 1993, pg. iii, ix; Brehm, Philip A. & Gray, Wilbur E., Alternative Missions for the Army, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College
9 Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), October 1997, Chap. 1&3
10 NDP, pg. 55
11 10 United States Code (USC), Sect. 371-378 modified 18 USC, Sect. 1385. The latter is known as the Posse Comitatus Act which prohibits the Army and Air Force from enforcing civil criminal law.
12 14 USC, Sect. 1402 (11), (13), September 23, 1996
14 14 USC Sect. 1402 (19), September 23, 1996
15 NDP pg. 55
16 Public Law 93-288, as amended, known as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act, is the basis for federal government support in disaster relief.
18 Department of Defense, Bottom Up Review (BUR), 1993, pg. 91
19 NDP pg. 55
20 Stafford Act
21 ibid.
23 ibid., pg. 14
24 DoD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), January 15, 1993. MSCA designates the National Guard as the primary DoD agency for disaster relief.
25 Brown, Roger A; Fedorochoko, William, Jr.; Schank, John F., RAND Corporation, Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard (RAND NG), pp. 4 & 8. Cited for their interpretation of the BUR report; statements on the pages cited indicate an acknowledgment of the BUR of the necessity for military support, particularly the National Guard, to respond to domestic emergencies.
26 BUR pg. 91
27 Publication, Army National Guard, Roles, Missions and Operations, undated
28 RAND NG pp. 37, 65
29 ibid., pg. 25
30 NAPA pp. 39, 82
31 Personal experience of the author: a ten gallon spill of pool cleaner from a small trailer in Tampa, FL, in 1997, resulted in the shut down of a major expressway for several hours, and clean up by the fire department personnel in full hazardous material suites. These same chemicals allow for swimming after a short period after introduction in a pool.
32 Seiple, Chris "Consequence Management: Domestic Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction"
Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, PA Autumn 1997
33 14 USC Sect 1414
34 RC Integration, pg. v, vi
35 ibid., Chap 4, 5
36 ibid., Chap. 4
37 Department of the Army, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1997, pg. ix
38 General Accounting Office (GAO), Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces
Accordingly (Validate Requirements), March 14, 1996; GAO “DoD Reserve Components” (RC), Issues
Pertaining to Readiness, March 21, 1996; GAO “Army National Guard” (ARNG), Planned Conversions
Are a Positive Step, but Unvalidated Combat Forces Remain, January 29, 1997; RAND NG
39 RC Integration, pg. v
40 RAND NG, pg. xi
41 RC Integration, pp. 7-8
42 RAND NG & NAPA
43 GAO Validate Requirements, pg. 3
44 DoDD 3025.1, the DCO is required under DoD directives to coordinate all DoD support
45 DoDD 3020.26 Continuity Of Operations, Policy and Planning, May 26,1995; DoDD 5160.4, Critical
Asset Assurance Program, January 20, 1998. Both programs concern security of critical functions during
mobilization or increased defense conditions.
46 32 Statute 775
47 GAO DoD RC, pg. 1
48 BUR pp. 91-95
49 Department of Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions, 1995, Chap. 2
50 Peay, Binford The Active/Reserve Offsite Agreement, Army Magazine, November, 1994, pp. 45-49
51 GAO Validate Requirements; GAO RC; RAND DR
52 GAO Validate Requirements, pg. 3
53 GAO NG
54 GAO NG, pg. 2
55 NAPA pp. 27, 98; RAND DR, pg. 37
56 GAO RC, pg. 7
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Publications


The White House, A National Security for a New Century (May 1997)


The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (October 1997)

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Undated)


Department of Defense, Bottom Up Review (1993)

Department of Defense Directive 2000.12, DoD Combating Terrorism Program (September, 15, 1996)


Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (January 15, 1993)

Department of Defense Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (February 4, 1994)

Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (February 18, 1997)


Public Law 104-201 Title XIV “Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction”

Public Law 93-288, as amended Title XIV “The Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act”

10 United States Code, Sect. 371-378 modified 18 USC, Sect. 1385


Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (October 1997)


Department of the Army, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1997* (Undated)

The National Guard Bureau, *Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau Fiscal year 1996* (Undated)

The Director, Army National Guard, *Army National Guard Posture Statement Fiscal year 1997* (Undated)

The Director, Army National Guard, *Army National Guard Vision 2010* (Undated)

Publication, Army National Guard, *Roles, Missions and Operations*, (Undated)


Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *The National Guard: Defend the Nation and States* (April 1993)

General Accounting Office *Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces Accordingly* (March 14, 1996)
General Accounting Office “DoD Reserve Components” Issues Pertaining to Readiness (March 21, 1996)

General Accounting Office “Army National Guard” Planned Conversions Are a Positive Step, but Unvalidated Combat Forces Remain (January 29, 1997)


Miscellaneous

Anonymous, President’s FY98 Budget Includes $1 Million to Study Implementation of the ARNG Division Redesign, March 1997 UMI-ProQuest Direct. Online. <October 18, 1997>

Brehm, Philip A., Restructuring The Army: The Road To A Total Force, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle, PA (February 21, 1992)

Brehm, Philip A. & Gray, Wilbur E., Alternative Missions for the Army, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle, PA (Undated)

Brown, Roger A.; Fedoroch, William Jr.; Schrank, John F., Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard, RAND Corporation 1995

Henely, Ronald R., Expanded Emergency Management Roles and the Mission for the National Guard, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA March 2, 1997


Majauskas, Richard R., Can the Army Expand Its Role in the Domestic Counterdrug Fight, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA June 1, 1992


Navaras, William, A Force In Transition, National Guard April 1997 UMI-ProQuest Direct. Online. <October 18, 1997>


Philbin, Edward J., *If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it*, National Guard February 1997 UMI-ProQuest Direct, Online. <October 18, 1997>

Pickering, Isaac D., *Enhancing the Strategic Roles of the National Guard in Domestic Support Operations*, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA March 2, 1997


*The Atlanta Constitution*, 1 November, 1995

Thomas, Dutch, LTC, ARNG, Liaison to MCSA/DOMS, Army Ops, National Guard Readiness Center: Various telephone and e-mail conversations (October 1997-May 1998)

Wakeman, James H., COL, ARNG; Riggs, Edward M., MAJ, ARNG, Visit to Missouri STARC, Jefferson City, MO (January 27, 1998)