NATO ENLARGEMENT - AN EVALUATION OF THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

A MONOGRAPH
BY
Lieutenant Colonel Mark R. Gilmore
Field Artillery

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**Authors:** LTC Mark R. Gilmore

**Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es):**
School of Advanced Military Studies
Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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Lieutenant Colonel Mark R. Gilmore

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Approved by:

Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS

Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree Program

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ABSTRACT


This monograph evaluates the security implications for the European continent as NATO enlarges its membership to include former eastern bloc countries. Specifically, it addresses whether NATO enlargement will enhance or jeopardize European security.

The evaluation is structured to address the research question by first examining the changed European security environment. This is followed with an analysis of the enlargement process and the most prominent issues raised in the enlargement debate. The evaluation concludes with a discussion of Russia's response to enlargement.

Research for the paper revealed a wide variety of published material on the subject, as well as an extremely diversified range of opinion. The fundamental changes in Europe following the end of the Cold War led NATO to adopt a new Alliance Strategic Concept. This new Strategic Concept addresses the changed risks and challenges facing the Alliance as well as NATO's preparation to accept missions on its periphery if members' common interests are involved.

NATO reaffirmed its commitment to Article 10 of the 1949 Washington Treaty which allows other nations to become members. As a result of the security vacuum created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, central and eastern European countries have sought membership in NATO. NATO's response was its Partnership for Peace initiative in 1994, followed by extending invitations for membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic at the July 1997 Madrid Summit in the first of what may become several rounds of enlargement.

Critics of enlargement focus on concerns of embroiling NATO in regional ethnic conflicts, of being too costly for the U.S., and of antagonizing Russia and derailing Moscow's democratic and free market reforms. Supporters offer that the successes of NATO during the Cold War can be shared with central and eastern European countries, in essence extending a proven security umbrella further east, and in the process provide a stabilizing influence to prevent the renationalization and rearmament of national militaries. The study concludes that though NATO enlargement is not without risk, if managed properly it will enhance security on the European continent.
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INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War was a watershed event for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Both the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and breakup of the Soviet Union removed NATO's principal reason for its original founding, leading to a significant amount of scrutiny from both within and outside the organization. The initial euphoria which accompanied the removal of the Berlin Wall, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the rise of democratically elected governments in many of the former eastern bloc countries was short-lived as other threats to regional and world peace arose.¹

The post-Cold War era has been anything but peaceful. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been attempting to redefine its strategic priorities and develop supporting policies, the Gulf War and the violent breakup of Yugoslavia, as well as internal strife in and on the periphery of many former eastern bloc countries has provided ample proof of a world order, though changed, which is still dangerous. In this setting NATO set out to solve its identity crisis and in the process developed a new strategic concept.

NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Rome in November 1991 adopted a new strategic concept for the Alliance, as well as announcing changes in its force structure.² Outlined in detail in the 1995 edition of the NATO Handbook, the Alliance's Strategic Concept sets out to define the fundamental changes to the strategic environment brought about by the end of
the Cold War, the new threats which the Alliance must be prepared for, and the fundamental tasks of the Alliance in meeting these threats.\(^3\) Of note is the broadening of the Alliance’s mission to include not only that of safeguarding the home territory of member nations as has been the case since its inception, but the recognition of diverse and multi-directional threats that could pose a threat to the common security of Alliance members which may lie outside Alliance boundaries.\(^4\)

Concurrent with NATO’s review of its strategic priorities, many alliance members reasoned that with the removal of the principal threat to western Europe, defense budgets could be reduced. This “alliance” downsizing, at least in terms of resource expenditure, coincided with requests by former eastern bloc countries for membership in NATO. Beginning with Romania in January 1994 and followed by twenty-six others, nations of central and eastern Europe joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative that was designed to “expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe,” and “play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.”\(^5\)

NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed in January 1994 that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries.\(^6\) This was followed by an Alliance study on the enlargement process, completed in September 1995, which defined the purpose, principles, and obligations of NATO enlargement.\(^7\) In July 1997 NATO member nations met in Madrid to decide which nations would initially be offered membership in the Alliance. As a result, invitations for NATO membership were offered to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.\(^8\)
Given that NATO Heads of State and Government have decided to invite former eastern bloc countries into the Alliance, this paper evaluates the potential impact NATO enlargement may have on the emerging security architecture on the European continent. The significance to European security is obvious. If the enlargement of NATO creates security concerns beyond those currently generated by the status quo, the gains achieved with the ending of the Cold War may be in jeopardy. Conversely, if NATO does not open its membership to countries of the former eastern bloc, those nations they may be forced to seek security guarantees elsewhere, creating new dividing lines and possibly a new Cold War.

This analysis of the security implications of NATO enlargement starts with the historical background leading up to the enlargement process, followed by an examination of current and potential security issues facing the European continent as we head into the next millennium. The proposed process of enlarging NATO and the key concerns it has generated are discussed, followed by an analysis of the Russian reaction to the process and the viability of enlarging NATO beyond its current membership.
BACKGROUND

On 4 April 1949 in Washington DC the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Initial signatories to the treaty included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1952 Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982.\(^9\) The principal motivating force behind the treaty were the post World War II expansionist policies of the USSR and the continued strengthening of Soviet armed forces.\(^10\) Faced with smaller armed forces resulting from the rapid demobilization following World War II, and with the threat posed by the Soviet Union, European nations felt a collective security arrangement was the only viable alternative to individual military defensive preparations that very few countries could afford.

The Alliance offers security to member nations through mutual commitment and cooperation, regardless of the individual member nation’s size and ability to contribute to the collective security arrangement. The Alliance performs five fundamental security related tasks for member nations as identified in the 1995 NATO Handbook:

- It provides an indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes. It seeks to create an environment in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

- In accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it serves as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues affecting the vital interests of its members, including developments which might pose risks to their security. It facilitates coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.\(^11\)
• It provides deterrence and defense against any form of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

• It preserves a strategic balance within Europe.\textsuperscript{12}

Though these tasks remained unchanged for the Alliance, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union eliminated the threat of a massive military confrontation. The changed strategic environment led to a new Strategic Concept introduced and agreed to by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome in November 1991.\textsuperscript{13}

NATO's new Strategic Concept recognizes the importance of balancing political, economic, social and environmental considerations with the issue of collective defense to facilitate security.\textsuperscript{14} The opportunity to take advantage of the new world order to emphasize the achievement of long-standing objectives through political means was emphasized in the Strategic Concept.

While the political aspect of the Alliance has gained prominence over its collective defense requirements since 1989, the new Strategic Concept recognizes the military element as remaining crucial to security. The Strategic Concept identifies four fundamental principles:

• The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose.

• Security is indivisible. An attack on one member of the Alliance is an attack upon all. The presence of North American forces in and committed to Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America.

• NATO's security policy is based on collective defense, including an integrated military structure as well as relevant cooperation and coordination agreements.
• The maintenance of an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe will be required for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{15}

The disappearance of a monolithic threat and the rise of regional conflicts such as the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 have forced NATO to adapt to a strategic environment vastly different from the one when it was first conceived. The conflict in Bosnia provides one example of a new threat to NATO. Though not on NATO territory, the potential for spilling over and igniting a larger conflict is precisely the threat NATO felt obligated to respond to when it assumed the mission of implementing the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995. National militaries that are now smaller due to force reductions following the end of the Cold War are now being confronted with missions not considered before. Peacekeeping and crisis response missions require flexible forces that are both mobile and properly trained and equipped for such operations. Emphasis on multinational force structures has achieved a priority in the Alliance, with interoperability of paramount importance.

The dramatic changes to the European political landscape over the last decade has led to different security requirements for Alliance members. NATO member nations realized the fundamental changes to the political situation in Europe and resolved to shape the future of NATO over the next several years. At four Summit Meetings, London in 1990, Rome in 1991, Brussels in 1994 and Madrid in 1997, NATO Heads of State and Government met to forge the future of the Alliance. Decisions reached included the issuance of the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, a new Alliance Strategic
Concept, and in Brussels an invitation to participants in the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC)\textsuperscript{16} and other Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE)\textsuperscript{17} states to join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative.\textsuperscript{18}

At the July 1997 Summit Meeting held in Madrid, Spain NATO Heads of State
and Government agreed to issue invitations to three countries to join NATO in April
1999. The countries extended invitations were Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
In NATO Secretary General Javier Solana's speech at the conclusion of the NATO
Summit Meeting on 8 July he stated his expectation that other countries will be invited to
join in future years.\textsuperscript{19}

No longer is the debate over whether NATO should enlarge, but one over the
issues of when and how. Though all sixteen member nations must ratify the accession
protocol, this does not appear to be an obstacle in the current political atmosphere within
the Alliance.\textsuperscript{20}

Both proponents and opponents of NATO enlargement have the same concern as
the keystone of their differing positions - security. Supporters speak of engagement to
ensure strong mutual support across the full spectrum of elements that contribute to
security and stability. They see a larger Alliance as one that can spread its stabilizing
influence over a wider area than before, acting as a political appetite suppressant for any
member nation harboring its own expansionist tendencies, as well as acting as a buffer
against an outside state with hegemonic intentions. U.S. opponents of enlargement speak
of the inevitability of an enlarged American role in Europe vice the "Europeanization" of
NATO that supporters argue.\textsuperscript{21} Opponents claim that a viable NATO requires American
participation and leadership, and will only increase the burden on U.S. forces and taxpayers as we shoulder an ever increasing workload.

Finally, one of the more compelling arguments against enlarging NATO deals with the reaction of Russia. Russia has expressed a wariness of an enlarged NATO, questioning even the need for its continued existence. Critics warn that enlarging NATO could prompt a counter-response from Russia which could eventually threaten European security, thus negating any benefits of the enlargement process should it prompt such a reaction from Moscow. Regardless of what form the emerging European security structure takes, it is generally accepted Russia will be a play a role. How the Alliance handles the Russian response will in large part determine the success or failure of enlarging the Alliance.
POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN SECURITY

"When political observers talk about European security they invariably refer to the challenges Western Europe faces on its peripheries from a renationalized Russia, conflicts in the Balkans, and Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa. Rarely do they imagine that the greatest dangers to the new Europe may come from within, that the kind of stability Europe has enjoyed since World War II could be merely a passing chapter in history, not a transcendence of history."23

European security is at the center of all discussions involving NATO. Arguments for and against enlargement, indeed those which even question the need for NATO’s continued existence, invariably focus on the impact and role NATO will have on European security in the post-Cold War era. It is within the context of the many possible variations for a post-Cold War security structure that this chapter examines an enlarged NATO’s role. America’s role, both in Europe in general and in NATO specifically is key to this discussion.

Present U.S. administration policies promote engagement on the European continent vice isolationism. Both current and former U.S. government officials openly describe the United States as a European power.24 Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed his belief in a required United States involvement on the continent as a prerequisite for European coherence.25 In his inauguration address in January 1997 President Bill Clinton clearly stated his interpretation of America’s past global accomplishments by crediting the United States as having “saved the world from tyranny
in two world wars and a long cold war,” and described his vision of America’s future role with statements such as “the world’s greatest democracy will lead a whole world of democracies.”\textsuperscript{26} The role of America as leader of the free world is one the current administration appears eager to accept and promote.

Similarly, any discussion of NATO’s future must include the role of the United States. The late Manfred Worner, former Secretary General of NATO, spoke in September 1990 during a speech given at a conference sponsored by the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels of the continuing importance of the United States to European security and NATO, without which neither could be maintained.\textsuperscript{27} NATO’s new strategic concept unveiled during the 1991 Rome Summit stipulated as one of the five fundamental security tasks of the Alliance, listed in the previous chapter, that of “To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests.....,” further indicating the continuing need for active American participation.\textsuperscript{28}

From a historical perspective Europe is faced with many of the same security challenges found on the continent over the past two hundred years. Development of a new security structure in the aftermath of the Cold War is taking place amidst an environment fundamentally changed with the disappearance of the monolithic threat and the emergence of newly formed democracies and independent states. While taken in isolation this would appear to signal a favorable long term outcome for security and stability, there has also been a rise in latent nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and economic instability as former eastern bloc countries try to recover from inefficient
economic policies and practices that are a legacy of the former Soviet empire. As new security structures are designed and implemented, they will be developed against a backdrop of Europe’s history which is replete with failed alliances, balance of power politics, armament buildups, authoritarian governments, economic competition and protectionism, and exploitative imperialism, all of which many have attributed to causing previous conflict on the continent.\textsuperscript{29} Architects of the emerging security structures are faced with solving the same security dilemma their predecessors faced in 1815, 1918, and 1945: preventing a recurrence of the war just won.

Before evaluating security issues in today’s changed political and strategic environment in Europe, an attempt must be made to identify what caused the unprecedented stability in Europe after World War II. Steven Philip Kramer, Professor of History at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, and Irene Kyriakopoulos, Professor of Economics at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, in their study titled \textit{Trouble in Paradise? Europe in the 21st Century}, list six major factors responsible for the stability. Those factors were:

- A powerful external threat, the USSR, which unwittingly fostered European cooperation and cohesion.

- The United States, a willing and indispensable ally that guaranteed West European security.

- Economic prosperity.

- The success of a welfare state cum mixed economy, which brought to term the political and social polarization that characterized the interwar era and facilitated the consolidation and universalization of democracy all over Western Europe.
• The existence of a divided Germany and a Federal Republic that chose to tie itself to western institutions.

• Franco-German cooperation, which led to ever widening and deepening European integration that made unthinkable the prospect of renewed conflict among the states of Western Europe.³⁰

The above factors which contributed to the post-war stability experienced in Europe may not stand the test of time in the post-Cold War era. Gone, at least in the near term, is the threat posed by the now defunct Soviet Union and the possibility of a massive conflict covering the whole of Europe. The monolithic threat posed by the former Soviet Union and its allies unified western nations who were historical enemies under a common cause. At the very minimum these factors, which provided Alliance cohesion in the past, will face serious challenges to their resiliency in the future.³¹

To determine how best to respond to the new security challenges facing Europe, the most probable causes of instability must be identified before the appropriateness of any security architecture can be ascertained. Only then can NATO’s role be evaluated in terms of whether the proposed enlargement will enhance Europe’s security posture or detract from it.

European Alliance members face both internal and external challenges. Europe faces the prospect of flagging cooperation among its member states since the principal reason for that cooperation has disappeared. Long standing economic issues related to the welfare state remain largely unresolved, placing political leaders in many western European countries in precarious positions. This leads some to question the ability of the European Union (EU) to provide the stability it was designed for.³² Countries
preoccupied with internal problems are finding it increasingly difficult to cooperate among themselves, inhibiting EU efforts to expand into other areas that might benefit from regional homogenization.  

The decline of the nation-state provides additional fodder for instability, even among long established nation-states. One view is as countries globalize or regionalize their economic practices, either as a result of evolving trade practices associated with improved transportation and cooperation to satisfy mutual needs, or as a result of the efforts of an organization such as the EU that was designed specifically for that purpose, there is an erosion of the dependence of a nation's populace on its government. Combine this with large immigrant populations found across western Europe, and the result is further sources of instability. The advantages provided by a structure such as the EU may counter the destabilizing effects of the erosion of the nation-state. Though the individual nation-state may suffer a loss of autonomy, the successful assimilation of many peoples under a collective umbrella of a structure such as the EU may prove effective at countering the negative aspects of a breakdown in the individual nation-state by providing a collective European identity in its place.

Europe faces new security challenges unlike any seen in the past. Aging populations will place additional strains on many European countries as increasing demands are placed on social support structures, exacerbating the already difficult situation in the welfare states. Declining resources with a corresponding increase in competition for those resources and other global issues such as damage to the
environment and a change in disease patterns will challenge all nations on a global basis.\textsuperscript{37}

For Europe as a whole and NATO specifically one of the more challenging threats to security will be on its periphery. It is indisputable that adding member nations to NATO will increase its geographical size, pushing NATO's external boundaries into contact with more countries than at present.\textsuperscript{38} Several of these new boundary countries face both internal and external strife for reasons previously identified, not the least of which is the violent breakup of artificial states such as occurred in the Former Yugoslavia.

Additional threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the disruption in the distribution of key resources.\textsuperscript{39} As NATO shifts its emphasis from defending against threats to its home territory outward toward protecting common interests, the Alliance will be forced to adapt its structures and policies to counter these threats.\textsuperscript{40}

It is important to note that efforts to provide for a collective defense in Europe include options other than NATO. For many years there have been efforts by several European countries to form their own security organization. France has been especially vocal in advocating a reduced American role on the continent in favor of an all-European security structure.\textsuperscript{41} The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) initiative grew out of not only France's desire for a smaller American role following the demise of the Soviet Union, but European concerns of a possible unilateral American pullout from Europe.\textsuperscript{42} Concerns over a future resurgent Russia provided additional fuel for the ESDI
effort.\textsuperscript{43} This has led to today's situation where the Western European Union (WEU) is prepared to coordinate the efforts of an all-European military force to conduct humanitarian, peacekeeping, and crisis management operations as demonstrated during three small-scale operations conducted in the former Yugoslavia, as well as contingency planning for possible intervention in the Great Lakes region of Africa.\textsuperscript{44}

U.S. response toward a separate European security structure was initially cool, but warmed considerably during President Clinton's administration.\textsuperscript{45} The U.S. and its NATO allies endorsed the ESDI concept at the NATO summit in January 1994.\textsuperscript{46} Key U.S. concerns remain on how to integrate separate European defense efforts with those of the Alliance. The U.S. position is that they be complementary, not duplicative, and independent WEU operations be taken only after consultation with the North Atlantic Council (NAC).\textsuperscript{47} Though this is not meant to imply the Alliance has veto authority over the WEU, the partnership between NATO and the WEU that U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher referred to during the 1993 North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting is one in which NATO was clearly the senior partner of the two.\textsuperscript{48}

With a fundamental change to the risks and challenges facing Europe, NATO member nations recognized the need to adapt as evidenced in the London Declaration signed by NATO Heads of State in July of 1990.\textsuperscript{49} It is the manner of change and the role of NATO in the European security architecture which has elicited much debate.

Michael Mandelbaum, professor of American Foreign policy at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, in his book the \textit{Dawn of Peace in Europe} identifies three possible forms NATO could take. One is
maintaining NATO with its current members and mission; the second is to maintain NATO with its current members but expand its mission to include out-of-area disputes; and third is to enlarge NATO’s membership but retain its Cold War mission.\textsuperscript{50} Arguments for and against enlargement center on Mandelbaum’s second option of maintaining NATO’s current membership with an expanded mission versus one he does not specifically address in his book, but is the option which appears most likely - that of both an expanded membership roster and mission.

The other two options addressed by Mandelbaum, both of which retain NATO’s Cold War mission, are currently not part of the debate. Few attempt to offer credible arguments for maintaining NATO’s Cold War mission, regardless of the form NATO takes. U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) has suggested the need for NATO to look outside its boundaries for missions to justify its continued existence by stating “out of area or out of business.”\textsuperscript{51} NATO’s acceptance of the mission to implement the Dayton Peace Accords acknowledges a need to look beyond being solely prepared to respond to attacks on home territories, but able to respond to conflicts outside the Alliance that affect common security.\textsuperscript{52} It has even been suggested that failure in Bosnia would seriously jeopardize the future viability of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{53} Some are of the view that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Alliance to extricate itself from Bosnia under an aura of having failed to implement a lasting peace without being branded as an Alliance no longer relevant.

NATO enlargement will have a direct impact on European security. Proponents of enlargement cite numerous benefits. NATO’s 1995 \textit{Study on NATO Enlargement}
perhaps provides the best summary of what supporters of NATO enlargement believe will be the contribution to European security. In Chapter 1 the study lists seven contributions that enlargement will make in enhancing stability and security for all countries in the Alliance. These seven are:

- Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military;
- Fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building which characterize relations among current Allies;
- Promoting good-neighborly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non-members of NATO;
- Emphasizing common defense and extending its benefits and increasing transparency in defense planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defense policies;
- Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values and thereby curbing the countervailing tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines;
- Strengthening the Alliance’s ability to contribute to European and international security, including through peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions;
- Strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic partnership.  

In summation, NATO’s proponents hope that enlargement will contribute to European security by extending to the east that which proved successful in the west. 

Democracy, stability, and free market economies are what central and eastern European countries need to reduce their vulnerability to the problems of the past. It is hoped that engagement, inclusiveness, and a feeling of being accepted by the west will provide these
countries the necessary foundation for stability, with NATO membership for those that want it and qualify as a means to further solidify the institutions of pan-European security.
NATO ENLARGEMENT: THE PROCESS & ISSUES

Critics of NATO enlargement have accused the Alliance of a haphazard approach to the process. Ill-conceived and hurried, their basic premise is the Alliance is on a headlong rush toward an end that could, in the words of George F. Kennan, “be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.” U.S. Senators Daniel Moynihan (D-NY) and John Warner (R-VA) have both suggested that enlarging NATO is akin to forming an “iron ring” around Russia. Senator Moynihan further claims that “we have no idea what we’re getting into,” while Senator Warner warned of more Vietnams and Somalias.

In actuality, discussions on enlarging NATO began soon after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Former Warsaw Pact countries claimed early on of a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. They saw NATO as the organization that could provide the security they needed, while at the same time assist their transformation into democratic states. Within the United States the Congress has endorsed NATO enlargement every year since 1994. In fact, congressional hearings and consultations on enlarging NATO outnumber those devoted toward the original Washington Treaty that founded NATO.

Enlarging the Alliance is not a new phenomenon. The 1949 Washington Treaty made provisions for adding new members in Article 10 which reads:

“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the
United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession."^{62}

Some critics fail to recognize is that NATO has enlarged on three previous occasions. In 1952 Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.^{63} An argument could be made that NATO enlarged again in October of 1990 when the German Democratic Republic was reunified with the former Federal Republic of Germany and became entitled to the security guarantees of the Washington treaty.^{64}

NATO reaffirmed its commitment to enlargement at its January 1994 Brussels Summit by stating in its Declaration of the Heads of State and Government that "the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries."^{65} Though the first round of enlargement involves only the three countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, NATO leaders have voiced their support of continuing enlargement beyond the initial three invitees to include other nations as they meet the requisite criteria.

NATO released its study on enlargement in September 1995. In this study NATO defines the criteria that aspiring member countries must meet before gaining entry into the Alliance. In general there are five criteria encompassing both political and military aspects. These five are:

- Implementation of democratic reforms and ideals.
- Establishment of a free market economy.
- Establishment of appropriate democratic and civilian control of national military forces.
• Commit to military reforms that will allow for interoperability with other NATO forces.

• Demonstrate a commitment to and respect for OSCE norms, to include resolving ethnic disputes and resolution of external territorial disputes, as well as any long-standing irredentist claims in a peaceful manner.\(^6^6\)

Points of divergence in the argument over enlarging NATO cover a variety of areas. Those mentioned most often are:

• Promotion of democratic reform and ideals among aspiring members to NATO. The issue - bringing in those who don’t need it while leaving out those who do.

• Creation of a new dividing line in Europe.

• Antagonizing Russia.

• Embroiling NATO in both the internal and external disputes of potential member nations.

• Equitable distribution of the costs of enlargement.

Potential member nations are taking the necessary steps for reforms, though some nations have made more progress in certain areas than others. From a military perspective NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative has been effective in not only providing a means to establish greater cooperation and understanding, but it has made significant progress in assisting potential member countries prepare to meet the interoperability requirement for membership.\(^6^7\)
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has stated that "a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe where wars simply do not happen."68 By implication she appears to be proposing that the adoption of democratic reforms will promote stability and reduce the chance of conflict.

One of the most vocal critics of NATO enlargement, Michael Mandelbaum, would not disagree with her on this point, but instead offers a counterpoint on the issue of promoting democratic reform through NATO enlargement. Mandelbaum suggests that the nations being offered membership in the first round are the ones who need it the least, and those nations still struggling with their reforms would be more likely to succeed if they were members of NATO early in the reform process.69

Inclusion of countries not yet meeting the established requirements for membership in NATO could threaten Alliance cohesion and security in a time of crisis. Once afforded full membership a nation receives security guarantees under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.70 A country with a government still struggling with democratic reforms could be a liability when consensus and force contributions were required by the Alliance to respond to a common security threat.

Membership by itself will do little to promote democratic reform, but the requirement for reform prior to being admitted into the Alliance will.71 Countries not invited to join initially, and those who may never become members, will not be conducting their reforms in isolation. Europe’s evolving security architecture provides many venues for cooperation and assistance designed to promote reform. Institutions such as the EU, WEU, OSCE, and NATO’s PfP and North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC) all offer assistance to Europe’s countries, regardless if they become members of NATO.\textsuperscript{72}

A second contentious issue is the assertion that enlarging NATO will create a new dividing line in Europe.\textsuperscript{73} Unless NATO admits all European countries into its ranks, there will exist a line delineating those in and those out of the Alliance. A dividing line in terms of members versus non-members of NATO is unavoidable, and not enlarging NATO will not alter this fact. If NATO is not enlarged this line is merely defined in its current position.

From a security perspective the impact of having a dividing line in Europe must be evaluated on the basis of how it comes into existence and the function it performs. If it is constructed as a line between belligerents it presents an entirely different set of concerns than one between non-belligerents.

Perception and substance matter. With the end of the Cold War the dividing line, wherever it might be, could be perceived by those countries on the outside looking in as a line dividing first and second class citizens.\textsuperscript{74} This could result in either the renationalization and rearment of the militaries of these countries at the expense of conducting necessary economic reforms, or force them into looking elsewhere to satisfy their security needs if NATO was the only institution for them to turn to as they conduct their reforms.\textsuperscript{75}

Yet NATO’s commitment to an undivided Europe may seem to be contradictory since it is doubtful, even in the long-term, that all European countries will join NATO.\textsuperscript{76} Actually, the division of Europe from the Cold War will be done away with not by just
the enlargement of NATO, but by the creation of a much larger security architecture of
which NATO is one part.\textsuperscript{77} In an attempt to place NATO enlargement in the context of a
larger European security architecture, NATO Foreign Ministers issued a communiqué at
the conclusion of their December 1994 meeting stating:

- The enlargement of NATO will complement the enlargement of the European
  Union, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to
  extending security and stability to the new democracies in the East.
- Enlargement should strengthen the effectiveness of the Alliance, contribute to
  stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area, and support our
  objective of maintaining an undivided Europe.
- Enlargement should be seen in the context of reinforcing cooperative
  structures of security which can extend to countries throughout the whole of
  Europe.
- Having just overcome the division of Europe, we have no desire to see the
  emergence of new lines of partition.
- A cooperative European security architecture requires the active participation
  of Russia.\textsuperscript{78}

It is clear that NATO views itself as part of a much larger picture, and when discussing
the division of Europe it is not who is or is not in the Alliance that matters, but who is
actively integrated into the overarching security architecture for Europe.

Concerns of embroiling NATO in both the internal and external disputes of
potential member nations is another point of debate. The rise in latent nationalism and
ethnic tensions, especially in many of the artificial nation-states created during the Cold
War, and its potential to undermine stability has not gone unnoticed by NATO’s
leaders.\textsuperscript{79} It is precisely the acknowledgment of these potential threats that NATO
developed the criteria for membership that they did, including the peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes prior to being allowed into the Alliance. This has already proven an
effective tool for motivating aspiring members to peacefully resolve their disputes with neighboring countries as demonstrated by the German-Polish Treaty of May 1991.\textsuperscript{80} Romania provides another example of the pervasive willingness among prospective members to settle long-standing territorial disputes as evidenced by treaties with both Hungary and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{81}

Membership in NATO provides no guarantees of stability, though a case can be made that it can mitigate disputes even among member nations, preventing the outbreak of open hostilities. The continuing tensions in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey is a case in point.\textsuperscript{82} The acceptance of the mission in Bosnia has in some measure charted NATO’s course for the future by inserting the resolution of out-of-area disputes into its mission menu. It makes infinitely more sense to integrate central and eastern European nations into NATO once they meet the stringent entrance criteria then to face possible crisis management intervention later on. Inclusion will prove more stabilizing than exclusion.\textsuperscript{83}

Costs of enlargement provides yet another subject of debate, and this is one of the key issues of concern in the U.S. Congress.\textsuperscript{84} Their concern primarily revolves around the ability and desire for current and new members to pay their share of the costs. This led to an attempt by the members of the U.S. Senate when ratifying the enlargement treaty on April 30, 1998 to pass an amendment requiring a cap on the U.S. share of the costs of enlargement to 25 percent, which by a vote of 76-24 failed.\textsuperscript{85}

How much enlargement will cost is a contentious issue, primarily because it has been difficult to define. Four studies have been conducted, all with vastly different
results. The one conducted by the Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost for enlargement will be in the range of $61 billion to $125 billion. A Rand Corporation study estimated the cost at $30 to $52 billion, while a Pentagon study offered a $27 billion to $35 billion estimate. The final study conducted by the Alliance itself presents the lowest cost estimate of the four at $1.5 billion.

A principal discrepancy among the studies, and one the authors of each readily admit to, is the threat basis in which to conduct the study. The Congressional Budget Office looked at a wide range of scenarios to include having to defend prospective members from a resurgent Russia. The other studies assumed a less gloomy scenario with both the Rand and Pentagon studies focusing not on waging war on Russia but avoiding it. The NATO study took a different approach than the others, focusing instead on the cost to the NATO commonly funded programs.

With U.S. Senate ratification of the enlargement treaty and defeat of the amendment which attempted to cap U.S. costs of enlargement at twenty-five percent of the total NATO common budget, the issue of cost is no longer relevant. However, the issue of burdensharing may become a contentious one in the future should member nations not pay what others consider to be their fair share of the bill. In the final analysis, the costs associated with NATO enlargement will only be what member nations are willing to contribute.
THE RUSSIAN REACTION

"The possibility that NATO may unite with some of Moscow's former Warsaw Pact allies or some of the former republics of the Soviet Union only means, from our perspective, that the Russian urban, administrative, and industrial heartland will be within the combat radius of even tactical aircraft."93

Russian reaction to NATO's planned enlargement has been the single most prevalent subject in the enlargement debate. In the view of some, NATO's switch from the term 'expansion' to the less inflammatory term of 'enlargement' demonstrates an acknowledgment of Russian concerns. Critics suggest that NATO enlargement will isolate Moscow, destabilizing Russia in the process.

Russia has been and will continue to be involved in matters of European security.94 The country's sheer size and geographic location make this inevitable. Russia's stake in what happens on the continent is in the nation's vital interests, and it is certain Moscow remembers the times over the last two centuries when the country suffered the ravages of war brought on either by invasion or internal forces.95 Her nuclear arsenal remains the second largest in the world behind that of the United States.96 Despite significant reductions in conventional forces, Russia maintains a force structure larger than any continental power.97

Following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia was beset with the daunting task of shifting to a free market economy and implementing democratic reforms. As Russia struggles with these changes there are concerns of
government stability amidst the possibility of democracy failing to the benefit of nationalists or communists. It is against this backdrop of potential instability and uncertainty that NATO enlargement will take place.

Initial Russian reaction to the perseverance of NATO following the end of the Cold War was to question its continuing need to exist. They argue that if Russia offers no credible military threat, at least in the near-term, then there is no reason for an alliance with a defensive mission. If NATO does not plan on attacking Russia, the Alliance’s function must then be one of deterrence, implying it will be used to coerce or blackmail Russia into acting as the west desires. Russian nationalists further contend that NATO’s procurement and training programs indicate not a preparation for another war with Saddam Hussein, but for a large conventional war that must only be directed at containing Russia.

Russia has accepted that NATO will continue to exist, at least in the near-term, but maintains the position that further cuts should be made in Alliance force structure and former members of the Warsaw Pact should remain unaligned. In this way Russia is able to maintain a buffer zone against possible external aggression. If NATO is viewed as a threat, now or in the future, an enlarged NATO could remove the buffer states and put Moscow in the “combat radius of NATO tactical aircraft.”
Russia recognizes the military capability of NATO and acknowledges NATO’s three to one numerical superiority in conventional forces. The initial round of NATO enlargement will raise that ratio to four to one, and should further nations join beyond the initial three the Russian numerical disadvantage will grow even larger. Numbers alone do not adequately paint the disparity picture between NATO and Russian conventional forces. Low morale, undermanned units, equipment falling in disrepair, and inadequate training due to fiscal constraints exacerbates Russia’s military dilemma. The disastrous performance by Russian forces in Chechnya illustrates that Russia must contend with not only a quantitative shortfall vis-à-vis NATO, but a qualitative one as well.

The possible inclusion of the Baltic countries in a future enlargement round may provoke the most hostile response if present day rhetoric out of Moscow continues. While the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic has been accepted by Russia as a fait accompli, Russian officials have been very vocal in voicing their strong opposition to Baltic membership in the Alliance. Russia’s 1993 military doctrine explicitly states that NATO enlargement that includes countries on its borders, such as the Baltics, threatens vital Russian interests. This hostile response is driven by several factors. One is the belief that Russian involvement on the Baltic littoral is within their historical sphere of influence. Second is Moscow’s accepted responsibility to protect the rights of the ethnic Russian minorities living inside these countries. Russia has attempted to dictate the conditions for citizenship for Russians living in the Baltics, and in the process usurp the sovereign right of those countries to determine their own citizenship criteria.
Though it will be many years, if ever, before the Baltic states are ready for NATO membership, they clearly seek to join the Alliance. The signing of the U.S.-Baltic Charter of Partnership on January 16, 1998 recognizing the role of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in providing security and stability in Europe was the first step toward achieving that goal. How Russia responds to this possibility remains to be seen, but Russian fears of losing access to the Baltic Sea, an event that had severe military and economic repercussions in the past, will be difficult to overcome.

A Russian response to NATO enlargement could take several forms. Leon Goure in his article “NATO Expansion and Russia: How Will Their Relations Change?,” identifies four areas that provide Russia with options. They are:

- Organizing countervailing alliances to NATO;
- Altering the arms control regime;
- Military responses;
- Foreign policy mischief-making.

Within Russia there have been attempts to organize the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into a military alliance to act as a counterweight to NATO. Russia’s expectation is that the CIS would be an equal partner to NATO in the European security architecture with each responsible for stability on its part of the continent. The reluctance of CIS members, with the possible exception of Belarus, to participate makes this possibility an unlikely one. Even if Moscow was able to find more CIS members willing to cooperate, the military capability of non-Russian CIS members is inadequate in their present condition to provide a credible offset to the combined forces in NATO.
Other alliance possibilities are with Iran, Iraq, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and with European countries excluded from NATO. The economic and political costs that would be associated with an alliance with Iran and Iraq would not offset the potential gains. A strategic partnership with the PRC has been proposed as a counterbalance to U.S. global hegemony, but even as relations between these two counties improve both have declared that their relationship would not develop into a military alliance. The difficulties in forming an effective military alliance have, for the foreseeable future, made this an viable option for Russia. 117

Concern over the status of arms control agreements has been voiced both in Russia and NATO. Much publicity has been recently directed at Russia’s failure to ratify the START II Treaty. The Russian Duma’s failure to ratify the treaty is claimed to be a response to NATO’s plan to enlarge. 118 Though the treaty was not submitted to the Duma for ratification until the summer of 1995, opposition leaders within the Duma spoke against ratification soon after the treaty was signed, well before the debate over NATO enlargement became an issue. The Duma’s failure to ratify the START II Treaty is more an issue of opposition members in the Duma using it as a tool to oppose President Yeltsin, who publicly supports its ratification, than as a specific response to NATO’s plan to enlarge. 119

Another issue dealing with arms control agreements addresses Russian attempts to revise the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Moscow has been unhappy with this treaty since the breakup of the Soviet Union. In their view, due to the massive change in the strategic situation in Europe, adhering to the conditions of the treaty would
place Russia in an unacceptable position vice the old Soviet Union with whom the treaty was negotiated. Although not precipitated by NATO's plan to enlarge, calls for CFE Treaty revision are being used in the debate over enlargement.

Russia could respond to the issue of NATO enlargement by enhancing its military capability. While Russia's potential for future development of her armed forces is significant based on resources, near-term improvement in her conventional force capability is hampered by reduced defense spending, both in procurement of new weapons systems and in maintenance of stocks on hand. Should Russia elect to improve its ability to deter or defend against outside aggression, whether as a response to NATO enlargement or simply as a means to improve on its ability to play on the world scene, it is more likely that it will improve its nuclear weapons capability. Russian perception that their nuclear arsenal is all that remains that qualifies them for "great power" status has already made them less cooperative.

Other nuclear options could include targeting new countries that join NATO and adopting a preemptive strike strategy as a deterrent. The latter would require additional military spending to correct the deteriorated condition of Russia's intelligence and early warning systems in order to become a viable option.

In spite of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the obvious economic and political problems Russia is confronted with, Russian leaders adamantly insist that their country remains a great power. Even given their limitations based on the turmoil Russia is presently experiencing, Russian leaders, most notably Foreign Minister Evgeniy Primakov, have been able to initiate what western leaders have described as mischief-
making on the world scene.\textsuperscript{127} Their perception and resentment of being placed in a subordinate position relative to the U.S. as a world player fuels Russian attempts to establish ties with countries viewed by the west as destabilizing.\textsuperscript{128} Recent Russian foreign policy has been to openly criticize the U.S. position on a number of issues such as trade embargoes against Iraq, Serbia, and Libya, as well as the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf, while at the same time ignoring western concerns over Chechnya and Russian weapons sales to countries in unstable regions.\textsuperscript{129} This provides a clear indicator of Russia's intent to conduct an independent foreign policy intent on countering, and in the end diminishing, U.S. influence throughout the globe. While this behavior preceded the debate over NATO enlargement, as is the case with Duma ratification of the START II Treaty it may very well be exacerbated by Russian concerns of a larger NATO.

Attempting to allay Russian concerns over enlarging the Alliance, NATO and Russia signed the \textit{Founding Act on Mutual relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation} in Paris on May 27, 1997.\textsuperscript{130} This act "defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia."\textsuperscript{131} The NATO-Russia Founding Act creates the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) designed to provide a forum for consultations, cooperation, and consensus building. Specifically, the PJC will:

- hold regular consultations on a broad range of political or security related matters;
- based on these consultations, develop joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel;
• once consensus has been reached, make joint decisions, if appropriate, and take joint action on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{132}

NATO leaders have openly stated that the NATO-Russia Founding Act in no way weakens the Alliance or overshadows any member nation in favor of Russia.\textsuperscript{133} NATO’s position is this agreement gives neither NATO or Russia veto authority over the other’s actions.\textsuperscript{134} There have been indications, though, that different interpretations of the document exist.\textsuperscript{135} Henry Kissinger’s interpretation of the document disagrees with that of the NATO leadership, and agrees with President Yeltsin’s belief that the document is more binding than NATO claims. To date no serious dispute has arisen over the terms of the Founding Act, and only time will determine if this issue becomes a contentious one.

How Russia responds to NATO enlargement remains to be seen. In the near-term there are no realistic options available to Russia to prevent the first round of new members from joining the Alliance.\textsuperscript{136} There are some in Russia who have proposed that enlargement will in fact hurt NATO by creating unbearable political and economic strains which could ultimately lead to the abandonment of the policy and a lessening of U.S. influence on the continent. General Aleksandr Lebed stated in January 1997 during a visit to Germany that he believes the Alliance will not enlarge beyond the initial three countries of the first round due to the “internal tensions” which will afflict the alliance.\textsuperscript{137} Regardless of whether NATO enlargement goes beyond the initial three nations and continues its eastward movement, the Alliance will have to contend with Russian concerns every step of the way, providing reassurances of the Alliance’s defensive intentions through engagement and cooperation.
CONCLUSION

The end of the Cold War brought about a fundamental change in the strategic environment on the European continent and forced a change in its security architecture.\textsuperscript{138} With NATO linked inextricably to the security of western Europe, Alliance leaders were faced with the challenge of adapting the organization to the new security environment. They responded by directing it on a path that will take it out-of-area as it responds to member nations’ common interests, as well as taking its membership roster eastward.

Supporters of enlargement hope that by enlarging the Alliance the security umbrella enjoyed by western Europeans will extend to central and eastern European countries previously under the Soviet sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{139} Detractors state that rather than contributing to stability, enlargement will derail Russia’s democratic reforms by fueling nationalists claims that the west is a threat to Russia, and at the same time positioning the Alliance in a region that is too unstable to do anything but threaten Alliance cohesion by embroiling it in matters not of its concern.\textsuperscript{140}

Determining whether enlarging NATO threatens European security rather than enhancing it does not lend itself to a simple answer. The issues involved are sufficiently complex, and the future sufficiently unclear that risks are associated with either course of action.

Many of the issues associated with enlargement have been examined in this paper. It is within the context of these issues that the basic research question of this monograph, that of assessing the security implications of NATO enlargement and whether it would
contribute to or detract from European security, reveals that enlarging the Alliance, if executed with care, will enhance the security structure of Europe. Conversely, if it is not done in a manner which ensures that the criteria for membership are met, or done without concern for the integration of all European countries into the security structure on the continent, it could, as many critics claim, mean the end of the Alliance as a viable pillar in the European security structure.

NATO has assumed the mission of being prepared to conduct out-of-area missions if a threat to the common security of the Alliance is at stake. Operations in Bosnia are an example of what future missions may look like, and the relative success enjoyed thus far by the NATO led force is proof that if willing to commit troops and resources, NATO can be successful in conducting military operations out-of-area.

The Alliance brought to the operation a significant military capability that is arguably the catalyst for both stopping the violence and maintaining the relative peace enjoyed since implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Commitment to responding to such disputes incurs risk. NATO’s reputation as the most successful military alliance hangs in the balance, and mission failure could conceivably weaken the confidence of both member and nonmember nations, endangering NATO’s ability to perform its core mission of defending the Alliance.

Alliance requirements for membership are notable in that they attempt to lay the foundation for ensuring prospective members are prepared to be an asset to the Alliance instead of a liability. Aspiring members must be held to these standards since they foster the creation of a stable environment. The promotion of democracy, a free market
economy, and peaceful settlement of outstanding territorial disputes with neighboring countries have yielded positive results with prospective members taking these steps to gain acceptance into NATO.\textsuperscript{141}

In the security vacuum created by the end of the Cold War many central and eastern European nations sought membership in NATO to provide for their own security amongst the collective security of the Alliance. Enlarging NATO to include these countries not only preempts the renationalization and rearmament of their militaries, thus preventing a recurrence of the balance of power politics which failed Europe miserably in the past, but allows them to focus more of their limited resources on rebuilding their economies.\textsuperscript{142} Furthermore, these nations' leaders have asked for membership and enlarging the Alliance will buttress their support among their own constituents.\textsuperscript{143}

And then there is the issue of Russia. There is little doubt as to where Moscow stands on the issue of NATO enlargement. Though the average Russian cares little about NATO enlargement, it has been a source of much debate within the government, the spectrum of which varies from resigned acceptance to predictions of global catastrophe.\textsuperscript{144} Russian concerns cannot be ignored.\textsuperscript{145} Her strategic location and economic and military potential make this an unwise choice. Nor is it a time when NATO must conduct itself as the Cold War victor and treat Russia as the vanquished.\textsuperscript{146} The NATO-Russia Founding Act clearly demonstrates the Alliance's intent to involve Russia in matters of European security, recognizing that Moscow is a player. Yet with the uncertainty tied to Russia's future the Alliance can ill afford to wait for Russia's transformation into a democratic state with a free and open market economy, or for
Moscow’s blessing. NATO’s course of engaging Russia while being determined to not allow her to dictate who can and cannot join the Alliance is the most prudent one.\textsuperscript{147} In the words of U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, by expanding the area of Europe where wars do not happen, NATO enlargement will provide for a healthy Europe. A healthy Europe can provide the direction and assistance to Russia to ensure its successful transition to democracy and internal stability.\textsuperscript{148}

NATO is not the security panacea for the whole European continent. It is unlikely all European nations will become members of NATO. NATO is but one aspect of a European security structure that includes the EU and OSCE.\textsuperscript{149} It is in concert with these other institutions that an enlarged NATO will provide the foundation for a stable and secure environment on the continent. Enlarging the Alliance will allow the EU, a relatively young organization by comparison, the chance to develop and mature.\textsuperscript{150} In concert, these two organizations will help provide the basis for a stable Europe.
ENDNOTES

1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook*, The Office of Information and Press, NATO, 1995, p. 21. This book offers the most comprehensive collection of data on the Alliance, to include providing a detailed historical accounting of key events in the Alliance’s history. Published most recently in 1995, it is due for reprinting soon to take into account the significant changes which have occurred over the last three years, most notably NATO enlargement. See also NATO’s *NATO at a Glance* booklet published in 1996.

2 Ibid., pp. 40-42.

3 Ibid., pp. 235-248.


5 Ibid., p. 265.


8 NATO Summit Meeting, verbatim speech by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, Madrid, Spain, 8 July 1997.


10 Ibid., p. 20.


13 Ibid., p. 235.

14 Ibid., p. 41. Pages 40-42 is a short synopsis of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. See Appendix IX (pp. 235-248), same source for the complete text.
Ibid.


18 *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government*, pp. 4-5.


28 NATO Handbook, p. 239.


30 Kramer & Kyriakopoulos, p. 2.

31 Ibid., p. 2.


33 Kramer & Kyriakopoulos, p. 3.

34 Ibid., pp. 39-40.


36 Ibid., p. 41.


38 NATO countries currently share common borders with sixteen non-NATO countries. With the addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic this number will rise to twenty one, including the isolated section of Russia on the Baltic of Kaliningrad.


46 Barry, p. 63.

47 Carpenter, p. 133.

48 Ibid.


51 Carpenter, p. 7.

52 While assigned to NATO's Southern Region headquarters from 1991-1994 the author actively participated in the planning for NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During this time he had numerous discussions with staff officers at the headquarters in Naples, as well as with officers on the staff of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPe). The consensus among those who the author discussed this subject was that the overriding reason for NATO's willingness to accept a mission in Bosnia was to provide justification for NATO's continuing existence.


Ibid.


Ibid., p. 21.


*Study on NATO Enlargement*. Chapter 5, *What are the Implications of Membership for New Members, Including Their Rights and Obligations, and What Do They Need to Do to Prepare for Membership?*, p. 2.


Albright & Mandelbaum, p. 58.

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*Study on NATO Enlargement*. Chapter 2, *How to Ensure That Enlargement Contributes to the Stability and Security of the Entire Euro-Atlantic Area, as Part of a*
Broad European Security Architecture, and Supports the Objective of an Undivided Europe, p. 2.


75 Carpenter, p. 13.


77 Morrison, p. 67.

78 Ibid.


80 Simon, pp. 206-207.

81 Ene, p. 3.


88 Perlmutter & Carpenter, p. 3.

89 Ibid.

90 Solana, p. 13.

91 Senate ratification of the treaty on May 1, 1998 and defeat of the proposed amendment to cap the U.S. share of expenditures at 25 percent has removed what was considered to be the last major stumbling block to full membership in NATO for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999.

92 Perlmutter & Carpenter, p. 5.


95 Ibid.

96 Arbatov, p. 3.

97 Ibid.


100 Ibid., p. 73.

101 Ibid.

102 Arbatov, p. 10.
Russia uses the term ‘expansion,’ clearly demonstrating their perception of NATO enlargement as something more sinister than NATO claims.

Blank, p. 1.

Ibid., p. 10.


Blank, p. 7.


Blank & Goure, p. 57.

Haglund & Kortunov, p. 80.

Blank & Goure, p. 57.

Ibid., p. 59.


Blank & Goure, pp. 59-60.

Haglund & Kortunov, p. 79.
121 Blank & Goure, p. 61.


123 Blank & Goure, p. 63.


125 Blank & Goure, p. 63.

126 Arbatov, p. 3.

127 Blank & Goure, p. 64.

128 Ibid., p. 65.

129 Blank & Goure, p. 65.


136 Nation & McFaul, p 27.
137 Blank & Goure, p. 67.


139 Albright & Mandelbaum, p. 58.


141 Ene, p. 2.

142 Ibid.

143 Morrison, p. 30.


145 Hunter, p. 15.

146 Nation, p. .

147 Roth & Lugar, p. 14.

148 Kugler, p. 16.


150 Blank & Cambone, p. 10.
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