USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1749

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TASK OF RAISING LEVEL OF POLITICAL TRAINING OUTLINED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 82 (signed to press 4 Oct 82) pp 3-8

[Editorial: "To Raise the Level of Political Training"]

[Text] With a high political and labor upsurge, the Soviet people are moving towards a significant event in our nation's history, the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. The workers of the Soviet nation have achieved new successes in carrying out the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the USSR Food Program adopted by the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. They are struggling actively to further raise the economic and defense might of the motherland and are making a worthy contribution to the strengthening of universal peace. All of this vividly and convincingly manifests their high ideological level, their activist position in life which are the fruit of the constant concern of our party and its Central Committee for the effectiveness of the communist indoctrination of the masses.

The aims of the party in the area of the communist indoctrination of the Soviet people are also crucial for the ideological and political indoctrination in the Soviet Armed Forces. Ideological work in the Army and Navy helps the men to master the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and to be permeated with a feeling of high responsibility for carrying out the duty of defending the sacred frontiers of the fatherland. The studying of Marxism-Leninism arms the servicemen with a profound understanding of the party's domestic and foreign policy and with the ability to defend the principles of communist ideology, to see the error of bourgeois propaganda and to assess all phenomena of social life from scientific positions.

The past training year was very fruitful in the Marxist-Leninist training of the officers, in the political studies of the warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"], as well as in the system of political exercises for the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers and the network of party education. The ideological and theoretical level of the exercises rose as did their influence on the shaping of an activist position in life among the men. The further thorough studying of the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and the speeches by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the November (1981) and May (1982) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the 17th Trade Union Congress and the 19th Komsomol Congress raised the practical focus of political training, party studies, economic education and Komsomol political education and raised the personal
responsibility of the Soviet military for carrying out the tasks posed by the party in the area of increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces for carrying out the military and political training plans and for strengthening military discipline and organization.

The political bodies and party organizations have done a great deal to improve political and party studies and to bring them into strict conformity with the demands of the CPSU Central Committee as set forward in the decrees "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" and "On Further Improving Party Studies in Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress" and by the instructions of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The leadership, the party, soviet and economic leaders, scientific workers and instructors from higher institutions of learning are taking an active part in conducting the exercises. In all the forms of political studies, active methods of organizing the exercises are being consistently introduced, in particular special problem studies, and the physical plant is continuing to be improved.

For example, in the units where Officers V. Sokolov and N. Nikonov serve, the commanders, the political workers and the party organizations pay constant attention to the political studies of the personnel. The questions of improving its quality and effectiveness are examined systematically at sessions of the party bureaus and Komsomol committees as well as at the party and Komsomol meetings. The questions of the theoretical and procedural training of the group leaders and their assistants are constantly kept in view. In these units they regularly hold consultations for students on urgent theoretical problems and Lenin's works, and concern is shown constantly for supplying the lectures and seminars with visual aids, utilizing propaganda equipment and closely linking the studied problems with the life and combat training of the men. All of this has made it possible to raise the political studies of the personnel to a higher ideological and procedural level and to increase their effectiveness. It is no accident that during the final exercises the men of these units showed profound political knowledge and high results in military training. There are many such examples in the districts, groups of forces and fleets.

At the same time, the ideological-theoretical and procedural level of political studies does not everywhere meet the demands of life. The manifestations of formalism and routine still have not been completely eliminated. Political studies do not always effectively influence the carrying out of the tasks of military and moral indoctrination or the developing among the personnel a feeling of implacability against violations of the standards of communist morality. In a number of units and on certain ships political studies are carried out in isolation from the tasks of military training and the strengthening of military discipline and proper order in the troops. In the exercises there is often a lack of a lively exchange of opinions, urgent problems of military training are not analyzed, the mood of the men is superficially studied and at times there is a laxness in informing the personnel on the major events in the life of the nation and abroad. In Marxist-Leninist training they have still done little to introduce the problem method of holding the exercises and this provides a more profound study of social phenomena and a close tie with life.
The political bodies and party organizations at times do not show a differentiated approach to determining the basic methods for holding exercises with the soldiers and sergeants. The Marxism-Leninism universities and party schools do not always effectively train propagandists for working in the system of political training, economic education and Komsomol studies or in the agitation-propaganda groups and collectives.

Prior to the start of the new training year, it is essential in a most careful, exacting and self-critical manner to analyze the state of affairs in the Marxist-Leninist education of the personnel. The task is to carefully study the results achieved in the political studies of all categories of servicemen, workers and white collar personnel, to generalize and disseminate advanced experience and see to it that in the new training year each exercise is even more fruitful and has an effective influence on the indoctrination of the students. In the units and on the ships all conditions exist for this.

In each element of political studies it is essential again and again to assess their effectiveness. Does the ideological level of the studies in every way meet the growing demands of the party? Has the quality improved? To what degree have they carried out the training plans? How firmly have the students assimilated the obtained knowledge? How is this knowledge reflected in the practical affairs of the servicemen? All these questions must be exactly and thoroughly discussed in the party, Komsomol and trade union organizations and at meetings and seminars of the propagandists prior to the start of the training year.

Considering that the quality and results of all forms of studies depend primarily upon the theoretical and procedural level of the propaganda personnel, the political bodies and party organizations must make a decisive change toward developing their practical skills of the Leninist art of political propaganda and the ability to convince the students, to conduct polemics in a skilled manner, to consider public opinion and to organically link the studying of theory with the practical tasks of the units and ships. The party Central Committee has drawn attention to the need for regular primary briefing of the propaganda personnel and of their constant readiness to decisively oppose bourgeois propaganda with our party viewpoint.

In the coming year, political training for all categories of the personnel will be carried out using the existing subject and training plans. In line with the adoption of important party and state documents and the necessity of further strengthening military and moral indoctrination, certain changes are being made in the content of individual plans and the procedure for studying the subjects. The preparations for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and its celebrating undoubtedly will have a beneficial impact on the content of political studies in all their forms and they will help to further strengthen their link with life and to indoctrinate in the Army and Navy personnel ideological conviction and a feeling of pride for our socialist motherland.

The new training year in the system of political training, party and economic education and Komsomol political education will start with exercises on the subject "An Unbreakable Union of Free Republics." In the new year, as before,
chief attention will be focused on a thorough study of Marxist-Leninist theory, the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress and the works of L. I. Brezhnev. The subjects envisaged in the plans for the Marxist-Leninist training of officers for the new training year are the conclusion of a 2-year training program and provide a logical transition to a subsequent thorough study of the materials of the 26th Party Congress.

In the new training year, the officers studying under the first training plan will study the subject plan "The Army Under the Conditions of a Developed Socialist Society." In the process of the exercises they will examine the place and role of the army in the political system of developed socialism, the principles of its organizational development, the activities of the CPSU in the area of raising the combat readiness of the Armed Forces as well as the practical aspects of further improving the military and moral indoctrination of the personnel in light of the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense.

The attention of the command and political leadership will be focused on the problems of further strengthening the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces in light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. The central place in the studies for this category of officers and generals will be held by a thorough analysis and study of the questions involved in strengthening the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces, improving managerial activities, mastering the Leninist style of work as well as the problems of increasing the role of party-political work and strengthening its impact on all aspects of troop life and activities.

The holding of a theoretical conference on the subject "The Further Development of Lenin's Ideas on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland in the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress" on the level of the unit, ship, formation, facility and military VUZ will be a logical conclusion to the studying of the 1983 programs.

In the process of the Marxist-Leninist officer training, it is essential to constantly employ the special-problem and other active methods for conducting the exercises. More attention must be paid to the independent work of the officers in studying the works of V. I. Lenin, the documents of the CPSU and the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and the other party leaders. We must continue to improve the practice of holding final exercises after each training period with the assigning of grades.

In the political studies for warrant officers, reenlisted personnel and female personnel, after studying the introductory section, a study must be started on the first section of CPSU history "The Communist Party--The Inspirer and Leader of the October Revolution and the Organizer of the Construction of Socialism in Our Nation." In this form of study, it is essential to more constantly increase the quality of the lectures and seminars. It is essential to achieve high results from independent work in studying the recommended literature.

In the political training for soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers a new section of the training plan is to be introduced on "Communist Morality and Military Duty." The personnel will examine the moral bases of the military oath and regulations, the traits of the moral make-up of a Soviet soldier and
the ethics of relationships in the military collective; after this the section of the training plan "Our Goal is Communism" will be studied. The political exercises should broaden the political viewpoint of the soldier and teach him to see the historical importance of his military service. It is essential to work steadily so that the obtained knowledge in the men is turned into lasting communist convictions and an activist position in life and so that each man profoundly understands the need of exemplary execution of patriotic and international duty and the greatest possible rise in vigilance and combat readiness and the strengthening of military discipline.

In line with the fact that the training plans, in being worked out and introduced on the basis of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Party Studies in Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress" and the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee "On Further Improving Economic Education and Indoctrination of the Workers," are designed, as a rule, for 2 years, in the 1982-1983 academic year, we must continue and conclude the study of the subjects determined by these plans. The main task is to develop in the students a scientific ideology, high political awareness, communist conviction, an activist position in life and a responsible attitude toward carrying out one's service duties.

For the communists and nonparty aktiv from the workers and white collar personnel, the training plans are to be supplemented with the following subjects: in the schools for the party-economic aktiv, the theoretical and methodological seminars, the schools for scientific communism, the economic seminars and schools for applied economics: "The Problems of Improving the Effectiveness of Labor and Moral Discipline, the Strengthening of Labor Discipline in Production Collectives"; in the young communist schools, the political schools, the schools for the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the schools for communist labor, in the system of Komsomol political education and in the mass forms of party propaganda: "On the Personal Example Set by Young Communists and Komsomol Members in Fulfiling the Production Plans, in Observing the Standards of Communist Morality and in Strengthening Labor Discipline."

It is essential to consider that the system of party studies is designed primarily for the CPSU members. If in small party organizations it is not possible to set up individual groups of communists, then this must be done on the garrison level. In the Marxism-Leninism universities, chief attention should be paid by the political bodies and party organizations to broadening the propaganda faculties and improving the training of the volunteer propagandists. Here the task comes down to making these forms of study assist in systematically increasing the theoretical and procedural level of the propagandist aktiv.

In accord with the new structure, the economic education for Army and Navy workers and white collar personnel will be carried out in the communist labor schools, the schools for applied economics and in economic seminars. The students of the schools and seminars should master well the ways for improving production efficiency, accelerating scientific-technical and social progress, economy and thriftiness, the introduction of advanced experience, they should take an active part in production management and should learn to live and work in a Leninist and communist manner.
In the communist labor schools, for the 1982-1983 academic year, it is recommended that one of the training courses be studied (by choice): "The USSR Food Program" (a new course); "Thriftiness--A Communist Trait"; "Scientific-Technical Progress and Economics." As practice in recent years has shown, the basic contingent of students in these schools is comprised of workers, however, other workers can also study in them. In the schools of applied economics, one of the following courses will be studied: "The USSR Food Program," "Economic Economics," and "Scientific-Technical Progress and Production Efficiency." Using this form of study to supplement their knowledge are predominantly foremen, brigade leaders, the heads of shifts and sections and other specialists and leaders from enterprise subdivisions.

The economic seminars will discuss such pertinent problems as "The Economic Mechanism of the Agroindustrial Complex," "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on Economy and Thriftiness," and "Ways for Accelerating Scientific and Technical Progress." Characteristic for the work of the seminars will be the elaboration of abstracts and the preparation of practical proposals with the subsequent collective discussion of them at the exercises. These seminars are to be organized for specialists and leaders who are independently studying economic theory and the questions of economic policy and management practices at enterprises, scientific research institutes and directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

It is essential to adopt specific measures to improve the organization and content of Komsomol political education and to increase its effectiveness and theoretical level. It is important to strengthen the role of political studies for Komsomol members and youth from the workers and white collar personnel in carrying out the ideas of the 26th CPSU Congress on forming a generation which is politically active, knowledgeable, industrious and able to work and which is always ready to defend its motherland.

Also requiring constant concern and improvement are the mass forms of party propaganda such as the people's universities, circles, sociopolitical readings, lecture series and film lectures. These should become true Leninist universities for millions.

In the new training year, the exercises in the area of political studies will be provided with the necessary literature, teaching and visual aids. In preparing and conducting the exercises it is advisable to utilize the collection "Propaganda materialov XXVI s'yezda KPSS na politzanyatiyakh" [Propagandizing the Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress at Political Exercises] which was recently published by Voyenizdat. It is also important to skillfully use the theoretical and procedural articles published in the military and other periodicals. The political bodies and propagandists must show concern for promptly acquiring the recently published albums and employ them better.

A rise in the quality and effectiveness of political training for the personnel to a significant degree is determined by the level of leadership over this important area of work. The military councils, the political bodies and party organizations must systematically analyze the contents and results of political training, party and economic education as well as Komsomol political studies. It is essential to regularly review in the political bodies and party...
organizations the questions of Marxist-Leninist education and to hear reports
by the propagandists on their work and by the communists on the rise in their
ideological and theoretical level. Here the improving of the political know-
ledge of the men must be viewed in close relation to the growth of their polit-
ical skill and to the strengthening of discipline and organization.

In searching for ways to further improve political studies, it is important to
have all communists pay close attention to the party report-election meetings
being held. They must effectively analyze how things stand in this area,
literally in each subunit, and disclose the existing reserves for improving
the ideological conditioning of the men and for setting up profound and pur-
poseful propagandizing of Marxist-Leninist theory and the materials of the
26th CPSU Congress.

The coming training year places increased demands on the military councils, the
commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations and on
each propagandist in further explaining the content and historical significance
of the decisions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the
provisions of the USSR Food Program for the period up to 1990, in thoroughly
showing its role in improving the well-being of the Soviet people, in strength-
ening the nation's defense potential as well as the contribution which should
be made to this question by the Armed Forces. It is essential to more fully
utilize the experience of the preparations for the 60th anniversary of the for-
mation of the USSR and the documents of the party Central Committee devoted to
this jubilee for improving patriotic and international indoctrination of the
personnel, for their ideological conditioning in the interests of strengthening
friendship, military comradeship, for uniting the multinational troop collec-
tives and for raising the combat readiness of the units, ships and formations.

To raise the organization and quality of political studies to a level of the
requirements of the party Central Committee and to see to it that these studies,
in using the words of V. I. Lenin, teach the people "to act as communism actu-
ally requires" are a task of great importance for the political bodies, the
party, trade union and Komsomol organizations in the Army and Navy.

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LENINIST PRINCIPLES OF ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 82 (signed to press 4 Oct 82) pp 29-39

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col A. Babakov: "Leninist Principles in the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces"; the article is published under the heading "For Exercises in the System for Officer Marxist-Leninist Training"]

[Text] The birth and development of the Soviet Armed Forces and their heroic history are inseparably linked to the name of V. I. Lenin. It was precisely Lenin, in establishing the principles for the teachings about the defense of the socialist fatherland against the imperialist threat, who disclosed the particular features of the new type of army, who defined its social nature and purpose and who showed the sources of its strength and invincibility and fundamental difference from the capitalist armies.

The founder of our party and state is also largely responsible for the scientific elaboration of the organizational development principles of the Soviet military organization which at present are the determining basis in resolving the questions related to further improving the Armed Forces of a developed socialist country.

Marxism-Leninism views the defense of the socialist fatherland as a historically inevitable task in the struggle for the creation and strengthening of the new society. This task arises objectively because of the uneven development of capitalism during the period of imperialism and due to the possibility of the victory of a socialist revolution in one country.

With the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the defense of socialist victories became an immediate practical matter. Confronted with the imperialist aggressors and the domestic counterrevolution, the victorious proletariat had to create and did create its own military organization capable of defending the victories of the working people. The genius of the great Lenin

The article is recommended for use in studying the subject "Principles in the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces--The Embodying of Lenin's Ideas on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland."
showed the party and the Soviet people the way to organize the defense of the Soviet republic and to build a new, socialist type of army.

What is meant by the Leninist principles in the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces? These are scientifically based and practically tested fundamental conclusions and concepts from which derives the political and military leadership of the state in the area of military organizational development. Three types of principles are distinguished: sociopolitical, organizational and training and indoctrination. They are all dialectically interrelated. The most important of them were first formulated by V. I. Lenin chiefly in the works on the eve of the October Revolution and during the period of the intervention and Civil War.

The Leninist principles in the organizational development and training of the revolutionary army were further developed in the party documents. Their strength and vitality were brilliantly confirmed in the abrupt changes in the historical development of the Soviet state and assumed international significance.

V. I. Lenin considered sociopolitical principles to be the main and determining ones. In undergoing certain changes, these have played a leading role in all stages of the Armed Forces organizational development and reflect the natural ties and relationships between society and the army, the unity of general party and military policy, state and defense development, the peace-loving nature and international content of Soviet activities on the international scene.

The essence, content and particular features of the sociopolitical principles are determined by the nature of the socialist social system, by its economic, sociopolitical and spiritual bases, that is, by those fundamental factors which have a determining impact on the organizational development and training of the USSR Armed Forces. These are: the socialist economic system and the planned organization of production based on advanced scientific and technical achievement; the Soviet social and state system and the unbreakable alliance of workers, peasants and intelligentsia, the friendship of Soviet peoples; the high culture and education of the people and the Marxist-Leninist ideology prevailing in the country.

The underlying basis and leading sociopolitical principle in our military-organizational development was considered by V. I. Lenin to be the leadership of the Communist Party. Party leadership over the Armed Forces is of a political nature and is the main source of their might. This is carried out in accord with the policy and ideology of the CPSU, within the limits of the USSR Constitution and on the basis of the laws and legal standards operating in the Soviet state.

Relying on Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology, the CPSU has outlined the most dependable paths for the development and improvement of the Army and Navy and has set out the general prospects of their organizational development, meeting the fundamental interests of the Soviet people.

The direct realization of the tasks involved in the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces is entrusted to the leadership of the state and
military administrative bodies. The principles elaborated by Lenin for the recruitment, indoctrination and placement of command and political personnel have been unswervingly carried out. The CPSU directs the party political work conducted in the troops to successfully carry out the tasks confronting the Armed Forces.

The party sees the main goal in, by a coordinated complex of economic, socio-political, military-technical, indoctrinational and specifically military measures, achieving a level of defense might in the Soviet state and combat readiness of its Armed Forces which would exclude the possibility for any aggressor to start a war against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist commonwealth by surprise and with impunity.

V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party theoretically established and practically realized the class principle in the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. In contrast to the class nature of the armies in the imperialist states which are employed in the interests of the exploiters, our army was founded as a weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as an expression of the will of the workers and peasants freed from the suppression of capitalism and as a weapon in the struggle for their interests. "Our army is a class one directed against the bourgeoisie," pointed out V. I. Lenin (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 43, p 230).

The party has decisively and firmly carried out the Leninist principle of a strict class approach in the organizational development of the Armed Forces. This has been manifested primarily in the method of manning the Army and Navy where nonworking, exploiting elements were not permitted and, on the contrary, the worker group among the servicemen was strengthened and reinforced. Precisely the communist workers were that force which united the Army and Navy ranks and introduced the spirit of class self-awareness and the party's ideas and policy into the masses of soldiers.

The class principle was also expressed in the recruitment, placement and indoctrination of the leading military personnel from among the workers and poorest peasantry as well as in the consistent carrying out of ideological-political and military indoctrination of the soldiers and commanders by the party.

Under the conditions of mature socialism, the USSR Armed Forces, in being the beloved offspring of the Soviet people, have maintained their class essence and focus. They serve as a powerful counterweight to the aggressive forces of imperialism and guarantee the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

The principle of the unshakable unity of the army and people, as established by V. I. Lenin, has also been steadily carried out in the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Its essence was expressed in the words of V. I. Lenin that the worker soviets create "an armed forces of workers and peasants and this force is not separate from the people, as was the force of the old standing army, but rather is most closely tied to them...." (PSS, Vol 34, p 304).

The Soviet Army from the moment of its founding has been the embodiment of the unity of army and people and in this it differs fundamentally from the bourgeois
armies which are against the workers. The ways and means for strengthening this unity are diverse. During the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, the army's tie with the masses of people was expressed, on the one hand, in the heroic efforts of the rear workers to provide the army with everything necessary and, on the other, in the love and dedication of the Soviet soldiers to their people, in their struggle against the motherland's enemies and the help to the public in rebuilding the destroyed national economy.

In our times, the unbreakable link between the army and people is manifested in the active participation of the personnel from the subunits, units and ships in the sociopolitical life of the nation and in the aid of the military in carrying out many important national economic tasks. Close contacts constantly exist and are being developed between the military collectives, the party, soviet and social organizations as well as the labor collective.

The Army and Navy are a school of life and a school for the indoctrination and training of the youth. Each year, under Komsomol assignment and by organized recruitment, thousands of military discharged into the reserves who have received a specialty in the Armed Forces travel to the nation's shock construction projects. At present, when the grandiose Food Program has been adopted, the young people who have served in the Army and Navy are confronted with new prospects for active involvement in the creative labor of the Soviet people.

In military organizational development the Communist Party has also carried out the Leninist principle of friendship among peoples and proletarian, socialist internationalism. This has largely determined the level of combat might in the Soviet Armed Forces during all the stages of their development.

In a mature socialist society, the USSR Armed Forces are organized and develop on the basis of unbreakable friendship and fraternal cooperation among all the Soviet peoples. Their internal life reflects the most important facets of the Soviet way of life and the great humanism of international relations which have become firmly established in the nation. All of this strengthens the military collectives and makes them monolithic and solid.

The principle of internationalism has been embodied in the military-political cooperation of the fraternal socialist countries. Within the Warsaw Pact, joint measures are worked out and implemented to coordinate economic, political, diplomatic and defense efforts, and views are coordinated on the problems of war and peace, the principles of organizational development in the socialist armies, the forms and methods of their training and indoctrination and the carrying out of their international tasks. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR emphasized that the socialist commonwealth possesses everything necessary to defend its historic revolutionary victories.

Thus, the sociopolitical principles maximally and completely consider the real, concrete historical conditions of the nation's development and the balance of socioclass forces on the world scene. On this basis, the demands are shaped for the technical and mobilizational preparation of the USSR Armed Forces, for military art, the forms and methods of troop training and indoctrination.
The organizational principles reflect the patterns in the development and functioning of the Armed Forces themselves as a special state body, the ways and means for maintaining the necessary level of their combat capability and readiness and the conformity of the structure and organization of the Army and Navy to the demands of modern warfare. These were also formulated by V. I. Lenin who pointed out that in an armed struggle "the upper hand is gained by the side with the greatest equipment, organization and discipline..." (PSS, Vol 36, p 116).

In carrying out the organizational principles in the development of the USSR Armed Forces, complete consideration has been given to the capabilities and development level of the national economy, the state of its transport network, scientific and technical progress, the size and composition of the population, geographic position, logistical support for the armies of the probable enemies, the contents of their military doctrines and other factors.

Due to these principles, a scientifically sound solution is provided to the question of the outfitting of the Army and Navy with modern weapons, the improvement of their organizational structure and control system, the harmonious development of the Armed Services and branches of troops, special troops and services. These serve as the guidelines in organizing the manning and placement of the troops, their logistical support, the creation of reserves and mobilization supplies, the training of the personnel, their instruction and indoctrination and the maintaining of the combat readiness of the subunits, units and ships.

The organizational principles for the development of the Soviet Armed Forces are implemented on the basis of the requirements of the laws of social, natural and technical sciences, including military science, as well as the needs and conclusions of practice. In closely and constantly coordinating economic strategy and military-technical policy, the CPSU directs main efforts at economic construction and raising the prosperity of the people, but at the same time creates conditions for the development and improving of the material base of Soviet defense and for the technical equipping of the Army and Navy. "...In the economic area," commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "the foundation is established for solving social problems, for strengthening national defense capability, a foundation for an active foreign policy" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 31).

A key problem in the organizational development of the Armed Forces is their outfitting with weapons and equipment. At present, it has become a natural phenomenon to have increased fire power and effectiveness of the weapons, an increase in the types of military equipment, the rapid replacing of weapons with their simultaneous greater complexity and cost, an exacerbation of the rivalry between offensive and defensive weapons systems, the search for optimum ways to utilize them and so forth. The economy, science and technology in the USSR are presently on a level which makes it possible to create any types of weapons which NATO and the United States would care to wager in proclaiming a policy of achieving military superiority in the world.

The improvement in military equipment and weapons and the changes engendered by this in the nature and methods of combat operations as well as the
development of military-scientific knowledge have constantly influenced the structure of the troops. The Soviet Army and Navy are organized according to the principle of the harmonious and proportional development of all their component elements. Optimum forms have been elaborated and maintained in organizing the Armed Services, the branches of troops and naval forces, in corresponding to the demands of modern warfare, to the level of military technical progress, to the quantity and quality of weapons as well as to the nation's economic capabilities. Consideration is also given to the need to constantly improve the structural elements of the Army and Navy as caused by the differentiation and specialization occurring within them. This has made it possible to work out the most effective methods and means for the strategic and operational-tactical employment of the Armed Forces, for organizing cooperation, for the study of modern weapons and military equipment by the personnel and so forth. With the appearance of weapons of mass destruction, fundamental changes have occurred in the ratio between the Armed Services and naval forces as well as in the determining of their role, place and proportional amount in the state's military organization. This has been reflected in the creation of new Armed Services and branches of troops. In particular, such services have appeared at the Strategic Rocket Troops and the Air Defense Troops. The necessity of ensuring the viability of the nation under the conditions of a possible aggression has entailed the creation of Civil Defense which has become an important part in the system of state-wide measures carried out in peacetime and wartime to defend the USSR.

In following Lenin's instructions on considering historical conditions in policy, the party and government have organized the Armed Forces according to the principle of a professional, regular army. Under present-day conditions, where there is a real danger of the NATO nations starting a war of both a universal as well as local scale, and with the multivariant use of their armies, when military equipment has become complex and expensive, the presence of our regular Armed Forces capable of dealing an immediate rebuff to the aggressor has assumed a crucial role. Derived from this principle is the USSR Law "Governing Universal Military Service" adopted in 1967. The USSR Constitution legally establishes that military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is an honorable duty of the Soviet citizen.

In the organizational development of the Army and Navy, the principle of centralism is employed as this makes it possible to exercise unified control over the troops. The leading military bodies are fully responsible for the state and effectiveness of measures in the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. Centralism is combined with the presence and strengthening of collective control bodies such as the military councils in the higher operational-strategic levels of the Army and Navy. Such a system, according to the definition of V. I. Lenin, comprises the strongest aspect in the organizational development of the troops as here all the formations are subordinate to the central military-political bodies, to the supreme command and to the appropriate commanders.

An enormous role is played by the principle of one-man leadership and this is carried out on a party basis. V. I. Lenin gave great importance to this principle due to the fact that it ensured the strictest unity of will, purposefulness of actions, organization and discipline for large masses of people.
One-man command achieves its goal and brings success because the exactingness of commanders and chiefs is combined with their active involvement in the indoctrination of the personnel and in party-political work while their power is combined with the responsibility of the military collectives for carrying out the tasks of military and political training.

The strengthening of one-man command is inseparable from the maintaining of high military discipline. In operating as a most important social standard of conduct among servicemen, this is characterized by a clear subordination and regulation of relationships between them and serves as an indicator of their organization, unity and ability to carry out the posed tasks. Soviet military discipline is strong because it is based upon political awareness and communist morality of all the personnel and on its socioclass homogeneity and is ably maintained by a combination of persuasive and compulsive measures.

The appearance of new weapons has brought to the forefront the principle of constant combat readiness in the Armed Forces. They should now be in a state which ensures the rapid carrying out of strategic tasks to defeat the aggressor if it encroaches on the USSR and its allies. This is not only a major principle, but also the main criterion for the effectiveness of the organizational development and training of the Army and Navy.

The legacy of V. I. Lenin that the maintaining of army combat readiness is the primary obligation has now been given a new content. All the Armed Services and branches of troops are equally prepared to repel aggression and to start combat operations immediately and virtually simultaneously. This is established by the precise organization of the entire personnel training system, by the creative application of the laws of military science and military art, by the constant improving of field, air and sea skills and by the shaping of high moral-combat qualities in the personnel.

Under present-day conditions, the importance of Lenin's ideas on the leading role of man, the soldier and the masses of people in achieving victory has increased further. In the theory and practice of army and navy organizational development and training, one can clearly trace two trends: on the one hand, the improving of the weapons of the personnel in the aim of achieving the greatest effectiveness and convenience in combat employment, and, on the other, the developing in the servicemen of firm knowledge and skills, creative operational-tactical thinking and independence in carrying out practical tasks. The quantitative and qualitative growth of the military equipment and the enormous destructive force of the weapons have led to a greater role for the military and political training of the personnel.

In accord with the recommendations of V. I. Lenin, in the Soviet Armed Forces an ordered system of military instruction and political indoctrination has developed historically and presently exists. Even the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress emphasized the importance of turning the army into a center of "general education and political indoctrination" "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh...", [The CPSU in Resolutions...], Vol 2, p 63). Here one understands the constantly controlled and directed process of the effect of the commanders and political workers, the staffs, the political bodies and party organizations on the awareness and conduct of the men in the aim of developing
their high political, professional and moral-psychological qualities as well as
the intellectual and physical abilities needed by the armed defenders of the
motherland.

The training and indoctrination of personnel are organized on the consistent
application of the corresponding principles, that is: to teach the troops
what is essential for achieving victory in war; to develop communist ideologi-
cal loyalty and awareness of the men; to observe a unity of training and in-
doctrination; to combine the individual training of the servicemen with the
training of the subunits, units and ships and so forth. These principles have
been formulated as a component part of military science, that is, the theory of
training and indoctrination.

The content of training and the forms and methods of preparing the troops are
determined by the nature of modern warfare and its demands. Consideration of
these presupposes the broad holding of various exercises and maneuvers as well
as systematic command and staff training. Primary attention is paid to carry-
ing out the demands of the regulations and instructions by all servicemen and
any sort of oversimplification and weaknesses in combat training is decisively
eliminated. The personnel is trained in the skillful use of complex equipment
and weapons, in the mastery of various procedures of combat as well as inter-
changeability in the squads, teams and crews.

There are a greater role and importance for the communist focus and purpose in
indoctrinating the personnel. All of this requires the concentrating of chief
attention on developing a Marxist-Leninist ideology in the servicemen, their
conscious execution of their military duty and the maintaining of high disci-
pline and organization. The system of political training is also being im-
proved. As is known, it includes the Marxist-Leninist training of officers,
political studies for warrant officers ["praporschik" and "michman"], politi-
cal exercises for privates and NCO, lecture propaganda, cultural-educational
measures and other forms of ideological indoctrination aimed at raising the
awareness of the men. Great importance is paid to indoctrinating the service-
men in the revolutionary, military and labor traditions.

Training and indoctrination are organized on the principle of a close unity and
interdependence. This is achieved by the fact that their content is constantly
linked to the practical tasks being carried out by the troops. Great impor-
tance is paid to ensuring continuity and successiveness in the training and in-
doctrination process. This is achieved by the entire way of life, training and
routine of the men and by the constant involvement of the commanders, the politi-
cal bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations in solving the questions of
military and political training.

The commanders, staffs and political bodies are the leading and organizing
force in the instruction and indoctrination of the personnel. The carrying out
of the great and complex tasks confronting the Armed Forces under present-day
conditions obliges the officer personnel to constantly develop and improve the
Leninist style in their work. This is essential in order to creatively and
skillfully apply in practice the principles for the organizational development
and training of the Army and Navy and for firmly controlling the troops.
In this regard, the role of military science has grown as this theoretically establishes and indicates to the military personnel the practical ways for solving urgent problems in the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. In recent years, military theory has taken large steps ahead. Its present structure, subject and component parts have been formed. The impact of the military technical revolution on the nature of modern warfare, the conditions of its occurrence and duration, the role of sociopolitical and moral-psychological factors in military operations have been more profoundly studied. The ways for further developing all the Armed Services and branches of troops have been defined. Theoretical concepts and practical recommendations have been advanced on the major questions of military art and so forth.

In working out military policy and in implementing the principles for the organizational development and training of the Army and Navy, the Communist Party and the Soviet government have realistically assessed the complexity and intensity of the international situation and the aggressive aspirations of the United States and NATO. The new rise in the arms race in the leading capitalist nations of the West aimed at creating even more advanced types of weapons of mass destruction and the plans to deploy new medium-range missiles in Europe entail a serious danger. In various regions of the world, centers of acute military conflict have arisen due to the fault of imperialism. Under the cover of the myth of the "Soviet military threat," the strike force of the armies in the nations comprising the aggressive blocs has been increased.

As is known, the USSR does not seek military superiority and is not endeavoring to disrupt the presently existing approximate equilibrium among the military forces in the world. But it cannot look indifferently at the intrigues of the NATO militarists and is forced to carry out its own measures in the area of the organizational development of the Army and Navy and their preparation for a decisive rebuff of any aggressor.

The embodiment of Lenin's principles for the organizational development and training of the Soviet Armed Forces conforms to the most just and humane goals of social progress, that is, to the building of communism and the establishing of lasting peace in the world. The experience of military organizational development in the USSR is of enormous significance and is studied and widely employed in the fraternal socialist states and in nations where the peoples are struggling for their national and social liberation.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party and with the support of the entire Soviet people, the combat might and combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces are constantly growing. In following the immortal ideas of Lenin, the CPSU in the future will do everything so that the USSR Armed Forces worthily carry out their sacred duty of defending the great victories of socialism.

Recommendations for a Seminar Exercise

A seminar exercise on the subject "The Army in the Political System of Developed Socialism" should help the officers more profoundly understand the place of a state's military organization among the other sociopolitical institutions of society. It will make it possible to thoroughly examine the role of the army in defending the victories of socialism, its class essence, nature, basic traits
and functions. The seminar provides an opportunity to analyze the development patterns of the new type of military organization and to more fully understand the tasks in the area of further strengthening the unity of the people and the army and the sociopolitical solidarity of the Soviet Armed Forces personnel and each collective.

For a discussion it is recommended that the following questions be brought up:
1. The place of the army in the political system of mature socialism, its class essence, nature and basic traits. 2. Development patterns in the army of a socialist state of all the people. 3. The strengthening of the unity of the army and people under the conditions of developed socialism.

It is advisable to start the seminar with the hearing of an abstract on "The 26th CPSU Congress on the Social Role of the Army in a Developed Socialist Society." Here it is essential to show the increased importance of the Soviet Armed Forces in carrying out the tasks of defending the revolutionary victories of our people, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the socialist state and the entire world socialist commonwealth. It is particularly important to bring out the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces in forming communist traits among the personnel.

In discussing the first question it is methodologically important, on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about the base and superstructure, to examine the place of the army in a society's political system. This will make it possible to understand the essence of an army and its social nature. The army, Marxism-Leninism defines, is a part of the political superstructure, a state body and through it enters the political system of a society.

A socialist army arises as a weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Its class essence consists in the fact that it is the military organization of the working class and the workers and is designed to defend their interests and revolutionary victories. As a result of the fundamental changes in the course of building the new society, with the complete and final victory of socialism and the achieving of mature forms by it, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat has been turned into a state of all the people. As a state body, the army has also become of all the people and has assumed new qualitative traits which are inherent to a higher stage of its development.

For a mature socialist society, within which there are no opposing social forces, class and national antagonisms, there is no inner need to maintain an army. Only the objective necessity of ensuring the secure defense of the victories of socialism against the imperialist aggressors and their henchmen forces our people to have strong Armed Forces and to outfit them with first-rate military equipment and weapons.

In the exercise it is important to emphasize that the Soviet Armed Forces are a historically new type of military organization which fundamentally differs from the armies of the imperialist states. The regular bourgeois armies have always been an antipopular force. Under imperialism, their reactionary essence is particularly apparent. They act as a weapon of monopolistic capital and are designed to defend the economic and political rule of the exploiters, the coercion of the financial oligarchy and for suppressing the struggle of the masses
of people aimed at eliminating social and national suppression. In the definition of V. I. Lenin, a bourgeois army, regardless in what form it operates, "is a weapon of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat" (PSS, Vol 30, p 135).

A socialist army differs from the military organizations of exploiting states not only in its social nature, purpose and functions, but also in the essence of the organizational and developmental principles. In the seminar it is essential to bring out Lenin's principles for the organizational development of a socialist army. These reflect the laws, patterns and basic trends in the organizational development of the new military organization while the adopted classification makes it possible to bring out various aspects of this process. It is essential to bear in mind the following groups of principles: socio-political, organizational, training and indoctrination.

The sociopolitical traits of the Soviet Armed Forces were formed in the process of their founding and development. Among them we would put first of all the strong sociopolitical unity of the personnel. All the Soviet military are representatives of friendly classes and social groups in our society. They are united by common socioclass interests, a common scientific, dialectical materialistic ideology and communist morality. Over 90 percent of the military are communists and Komsomol members. The unbreakable sociopolitical solidarity of the Soviet military determines their aware attitude toward the carrying out of their patriotic and international duty.

Under the conditions of developed socialism, such a remarkable trait of the Soviet Armed Forces as fraternal friendship among the men from different nationalities is manifested with particular vividness. In the Army and Navy collectives, the sons of all the fraternal peoples live and serve side by side and carry out responsible tasks in defending the socialist motherland, the USSR. "Our army," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is also a special army in the sense that it is a school of internationalism, a school for indoctrinating the feelings of fraternity, solidarity and mutual respect among all the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union. Our Armed Forces are a unified close family, the living embodiment of socialist internationalism" ("Leninskim kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 4, p 61).

In taking up the second question, it is essential to bear in mind a number of theoretical and methodological features. In terms of their formulation, certain patterns can coincide with principles. This is not accidental as patterns precede principles. Patterns are objective and primary while principles are secondary, in representing the patterns reflected in conscience. They are formulated by people for direct practical activity.

The improving of the Armed Forces has been subordinate to the action of several groups of patterns determining their development as a particular military organization, sociopolitical institution and so forth. In analyzing the question, it is essential to focus attention on the sociopolitical patterns which determine the nature of the socialist army as a new type military organization.

Among the sociopolitical patterns one must first of all describe the leadership of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party as this is the source of the strengths and might of the socialist military organization. The party gives a
planned and scientifically sound nature to the activities of the Soviet people and all the state and social organizations in the area of strengthening national defense and the combat might of the Army and Navy. In being guided by Marxist-Leninist theory, the CPSU has elaborated a military policy and has scientifically solved the entire complex range of problems related to the development of military affairs and the improving of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In the exercise it is essential to thoroughly disclose the basic areas of CPSU military policy under present-day conditions and the party's practical activities to carry this out. It is essential to emphasize that, in carrying out diverse tasks in the defense area and the development of the army, the party relies here on military personnel who are totally dedicated to the cause of communism and on an extensive system of political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations which conduct active ideological and organizational work in the Army and Navy. It is also important to thoroughly disclose the increased role played by the CPSU in military organizational development and in leadership over the Armed Forces.

A leading pattern in the development of the socialist army is the turning of it from the body of a dictatorship of the proletariat into a body of a state of all the people. In the seminar it is essential to thoroughly examine the common fundamental traits and certain distinguishing features in the army of a state of all the people during the period of mature socialism from an army in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. In describing the army at the new stage of development, it is important to emphasize its class essence and class focus which now are directed exclusively against the external enemies of socialism.

Under the conditions of mature socialism, a particular feature of the army is the development and change in its basic functions. This is a question of the historical purpose of the socialist military organization. All armies of exploiting states have fulfilled and do fulfill two unvaried social functions: they serve as the most important means in the hands of the ruling class for suppressing the workers within the nation and for carrying out its interests on the international scene, in enslaving the peoples of other states.

The tasks and functions for the socialist state's army are diametrically the opposite. In the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, the armed forces also perform two functions--internal and external--but the social content of them is completely different than in bourgeois armies. The internal function of the Soviet state's army after crushing the resistance of the overthrown exploiting classes has gradually terminated and there remains only the external function of the armed defense of socialist victories against attack by the imperialist aggressors and their supporters.

Under the conditions of mature socialism, a continuous improvement in the qualities of the personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces is natural. The sociopolitical and moral qualities, the ideological loyalty and awareness of the Soviet military have been constantly rising. A general indicator of these is the successful carrying out by the men of the evermore complex tasks of military and political training and the increased combat readiness of the Army and Navy.
The overall and military-technical culture of the Soviet military has been constantly growing and their interest has risen in a scientific understanding of the essence of the processes and phenomena occurring in our society and in the world.

One of the sociopolitical patterns in the development of the socialist armies has been the strengthening and development of their combat alliance. The task of the international defense of the victories of socialism have increased and become more complex in line with the growing aggressiveness of imperialism. At present, the Soviet Armed Forces are carrying out their duty of defending the revolutionary victories shoulder to shoulder with the armies of the other Warsaw Pact countries. Their military skills are being improved in a close alliance, the unbreakable friendship of the brothers in arms and internationalist soldiers has grown stronger and developed and the glorious military traditions born in the battles against the common enemy have been added to. In the seminar it is essential to disclose the essence of the defensive alliance of the socialist states and to bring out the fundamental distinction of the Warsaw Pact from NATO and the other imperialist military-political groupings and the focus of Warsaw Pact activities on preventing a new world war.

In discussing the content of the third question, it is essential to proceed from the fact that the unity of the Army and the people is also a sociopolitical pattern in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces as well as a constant and inexhaustible source of their might and invincibility. The Soviet people provide their army with everything necessary including first-rate equipment and weapons and all types of supplies. Ever-better recruits are arriving in the army ranks. At present, almost 100 percent of the men have an education of at least 8 grades and 80 percent of them have a higher and complete secondary education.

Under the conditions of mature socialism, new opportunities arise for a further strengthening and deepening of the unity between army and people. In the sociopolitical area this means a broadening of the army's social base on a foundation of the deepening solidarity of all classes and social groups in society, of the nations and nationalities within the united historical community named the Soviet people. In the economic area this is the further merging of the two forms of public ownership and an increase in the proportional amount of public property which ensures the material basis for the ties between the army and the people. In the spiritual area this is a rise in the communist awareness of the Soviet people who view the defense of the victories of socialism as a sacred patriotic and international duty and as a constitutional obligation for all citizens.

The unity of the army and the people is now manifested, on the one hand, in the growing concern of the people for the Armed Forces and, on the other, in the secure defense by the army of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people against any aggressive encroachments and in the army's carrying out of evermore responsible tasks of national defense. For more than 37 years, the Soviet people have lived under peaceful conditions and have peacefully been carrying out creative tasks. The personnel of our Armed Forces have responded to the concern and affection from the workers by unstinting service, by new accomplishments in military and political training and by the development of the socialist competition.
In addition to carrying out their basic duty, the military help carry out diverse national economic tasks. Thus, the railroad troops have taken an active part in the construction of the Baykal-Amur Mainline. The personnel of the motor vehicle subunits each year participate in harvesting in Kazakhstan, Western Siberia and other regions of the nation. The military construction workers erect housing, administrative buildings and sports facilities. The troop units in all the socialist nations are the first to come to aid in floods, fire, earthquakes and other natural disasters.

In training highly skilled specialists, the army thus at the same time prepares personnel for the national economy. Upon being discharged into the reserves, the military go to shock projects, they do well in peacetime labor and set an example of high patriotism and civicness.

Of great significance is the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. During the period of undergoing military service, there is an intense process of shaping the personality of the citizen-soldier. The very conditions of Soviet military service characteristic for an army of mature socialism (the powerful military-technical base, effective party political work, highly skilled officer personnel and so forth) make the indoctrinational process particularly effective.

The servicemen take an active part in the nation's sociopolitical and cultural life. The worthiest of them are elected to the soviets, to the central and local party bodies. Army representatives have carried out great work in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the public. Thus, the unity of the army and the people is a great advantage of socialism and an inexhaustible source of might for its military organization. In carrying out the legacy of V. I. Lenin, the CPSU has paid unflagging attention to uniting the army and people.

In the seminar exercise it is essential to provide thorough criticism of the views of bourgeois ideologists, reformists and revisionists who have distorted the essence, social nature, significance and functions of the socialist army and who endeavor to undermine the confidence of foreign workers in the Soviet Armed Forces as an instrument for preventing a new world war and as a bulwark of universal peace.

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CSO: 1801/097
PEOPLE'S CONTROLLERS IN GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 82 (signed to press 4 Oct 82) pp 50-54

[Article by Maj Gen V. Glushchets, deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Continuous Control"]

[Text] During the time since the 26th Party Congress and the adopting of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Further Improve the Work of the People's Control Bodies and to Strengthen Party Leadership Over Them in Line with the Adoption of the Law Governing People's Control in the USSR," the level of work of the people's control committees, groups and posts in the GSVG [Group of Soviet Forces in Germany] has noticeably increased the the effectiveness of the checks carried out has risen. The range of questions which are the concern of the public scouts has significantly broadened.

With all the diversity of the forms and methods of control, the check remains the most widespread and tested in the activities of the committees, group and posts. Precisely it combines an analysis of documents with a profound and thorough study of the state of affairs on the spot. Various types of checks are employed including mass, selective and comprehensive. In recent years, we have conducted more and more massed checks involving a large number of servicemen, workers and employees of the Soviet Army. Such checks make it possible not only to detect shortcomings, but also to ascertain their causes, to see, as they say, the root of the shortcomings and take effective measures to eliminate them.

This year alone, the people's control committee of the GSVG and the public scouts of the formations and units checked how the demands of the CPSU Central Committee were being carried out for strengthening the struggle against the theft of socialist property and for observing economy. They also studied how the armored and motor vehicle equipment is being stored and kept, how its operation and repairs have been organized, what is the state and content of the training facilities, as well as the effectiveness of their use in the interests of improving the quality of military and political training.

In the course of selective checks, there has been a profound analysis of how the proposals, requests and complaints of the servicemen, workers and employees have been examined, how visitors have been received, how the trade rules have been observed and whether valuable materials have been protected; whether the
ideas of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on these questions have been implemented with sufficient effectiveness, whether the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense have been carried out everywhere for strengthening the struggle for savings and the rational use of raw product, fuel, energy and other material resources.

The GSVG People's Control Committee not only took a direct part in the preparation and conduct of these checks, but also thoroughly analyzed them and generalized the results. From the results of the checks, the commander-in-chief of the GSVG during the current year issued several orders and directives to the troops while the results of the raids conducted by the people's controllers to combat abuses and theft of materials and money were examined at a session of the group military council.

As is known, the groups and posts are the organizational basis for the system of people's control bodies. We have basically secured the constant functioning of these important elements of people's control as well as great responsibility for a majority of the public scouts for carrying out the duties entrusted to them.

There are many examples of purposeful and effective work by the people's control groups and posts. For example, take the group where Maj V. Yerlashov is a member. This group has focused its efforts on such questions which directly determine combat readiness. As a rule, the checks were of a comprehensive nature. Thus, the course of maintaining the armored equipment in the fleet service day was checked by the controllers together with specialists from the technical service. It was established that in certain subunits the work schedule had not been observed, the crews lacked assignment plans and material support for the servicing of the equipment had not been organized sufficiently. The people's controllers and specialists reported on the results of the checks to the commander. Moreover, they voiced their own ideas on how to improve equipment maintenance. The commander adopted the appropriate measures. The party organization increased the demands placed on the communists who were to blame for violating the work schedule and for the oversights in material supply for equipment servicing. All of this bore fruit. The effectiveness of the fleet servicing days increased noticeably. The quality of preparing the equipment for operation also became higher.

The comprehensive checks carried out by the public scouts have become a system in the formation where Officer V. Zayakin serves. Here in all the units, for example, the quality of fueling the tanks, infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers and motor vehicles was checked. It turned out that there was not enough fuel in some tanks. The fleet lacked proper order, individual drivers were undisciplined and often fueled the vehicles not at fueling points, but rather from the fuel tanks of vehicles parked in the fleet. Here also there were unplanned engine starts. From the results of the check measures were adopted which would strengthen the security of the parking areas, which would establish proper order in them, save fuel and lubricants and maintain the equipment in constant combat readiness.

Another time the people's controllers from the group where Maj V. Kostyunnin is a member, along with the specialists, organized mass raids to check the operation of motor vehicle equipment. Here they studied the procedure for the
leaving and returning of the vehicles to the parking area, they analyzed the work of the technical inspection points and checked the quality of technical maintenance, the availability of spare parts and tools for the drivers and their knowledge of the driving rules. The detected shortcomings were eliminated and proper order established in the operation of motor transport.

The people's control group led by Officer N. Korsakov received an alert about disorders in the battery system. The check carried out by the controllers showed that due to the fault of specialists in the charging station, the batteries were stored in violation of the instruction's requirements. Because of this, the commander issued an order. The guilty persons were punished. But the unit did not limit itself to this. The party committee at its session heard a statement by communist A. Kazarin who was responsible for the system described here. The discussion held at the party committee became an apt lesson for the communists who had been negligent of their official duties.

The public scouts have a tangible impact upon many aspects of combat readiness. As a rule, they do not limit themselves to just those questions which are outlined by the check program. In showing initiative, they take measures to eliminate other detected shortcomings which are of concern to the work specialty of the scouts. For example, the people's control group (which includes Officer R. Akmanov) during the period of preparing and conducting tactical exercises focused attention not only upon a careful preparation of the equipment and weapons, but also on the questions of logistical support and medical services for the personnel and explaining to the servicemen the safety measures and laws on responsibility for the loss of weapons and ammunition and the damaging of military equipment. This provided an opportunity to do a great deal to prevent forced halts of the equipment, accidents and breakdowns. Undoubtedly the public scouts are largely responsible for the fact that the men of the unit successfully carried out the training tasks in the exercises.

The people's control bodies have also worked effectively during the period of converting the equipment and transport to seasonal operations as well as during the period of rebuilding the vehicles. For example, this year in all the formations and units, in the form of a public review, a check was carried out on the course of this work. It was carried out in many units in an organized and highly effective manner. The results of the check were widely discussed in all the collectives. The public scouts participated in the work of driver and repairman meetings. They informed the participants of these meetings of the results of the checks and gave advice aimed at eliminating the detected shortcomings in the operation of the vehicles, in their upkeep and repairs.

In orienting the groups and posts at providing constant control over the safekeeping of the equipment, we see to it that the proportional amount of checks on all types of weapons is over 35 percent of the various checks. This has told positively on the maintaining of equipment and weapons in constant combat readiness.

The commanders, political bodies and party organizations are concerned that the people's control groups and posts do not overlook the questions of improving the training facilities and their rational and effective use. For example, the political section where Officer S. Posokhov serves, prior to the start of
the summer training period, conducted a seminar for the chairman of the people's control groups where they examined the forms and methods of work for the public scouts in monitoring the development and effective use of the training facilities. At the seminar recommendations and instructions were given by the formation deputy commander, the chief of the political section and the service chiefs. The chairman of the people's control groups exchanged work experience and discussed the program of the checks considering the specific features of the units.

An important area in the activities of the people's control bodies is constant concern for the daily routine of the servicemen, their housing conditions and food. In carrying out this task, the people's control groups, together with the members of the internal auditing commissions and administrative workers, systematically checked the availability of food, clothing and other types of supplies for the personnel, the work of the soldier messes and tearooms, the trade points and consumer service centers. For example, take the people's control group which is led by Officer V. Snitko. It has set up a special section which monitors the material supply and daily routine of the personnel. The section members frequently visit the store, the mess, tearoom, club and library of the unit, they carefully go into their work, discover shortcomings and secure their elimination.

Recently, the public scouts have begun to provide more specific aid to the commanders and administrative workers in seeking out and utilizing internal reserves for the further development of the kitchen farms so that the group's troops make a definite contribution to carrying out the USSR Food Program. Thus, in the units where Officers I. Babakov, I. Pisarenko, Yu. Brodskiy and B. Sayarnyy serve, they have obtained 25 kg of meat per man fed. Here over 5 months the personnel has been supplied with meat from the kitchen farms. Behind this stands a lot of work of the public scouts who constantly inspect how the kitchen farms are functioning and how their work is being improved.

The questions of saving materiel and thriftiness are also constantly in the view of the people's control bodies of the GSVG. The activities of the public scouts have particularly increased in this area after the promulgation of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Strengthening the Work of Saving and Rationally Utilizing Raw Product, Fuel, Energy and Other Material Resources." I will give an example. Maj V. Kachkin heads a people's control group at an aviation motor enterprise. The public scouts conduct many checks together with the internal auditing commissions. All the group's members are active propagandists. They give reports to the personnel, they hold talks and point to possible ways for saving materiel and money. A competition for savings has developed between the enterprise's shops and subunits, the results of the competition are regularly summed up and the winner is presented with a pennant for "Collective of Thrifty." The people's controllers wage a constant struggle against those who spoil raw products and materials or allow frequent stoppages of the transport. As a result, the losses and unproductive expenditures, waste and theft at the enterprise have been minimized. The total economic effect for all the services last year was over 100,000 rubles. There are many such facts.
The political directorate and the people's control committee of the GSVG constantly focused the public scouts on not just setting an example in the campaign for savings and thriftiness, but achieve a real savings in materiel and money, fuel and electric power and combat mismanagement, waste, as well as prevent losses and embezzlement of public property.

Last year, with the active participation of the people's controllers, the group's troops saved many thousands of tons of fuel and lubricants and a significant amount of clothing and the instances of the irrational expenditure of materiel and money were reduced.

Our experience shows that the people's control bodies fully disclose their strength and capabilities only with constant attention paid to them by the commanders, political bodies and party organizations. In being concerned with strengthening party leadership over the people's control bodies, the military council, the political directorate, the commanders and the political bodies systematically examine and resolve various questions related to their activities and endeavor primarily to improve their qualitative composition.

Concern is constantly shown for selecting active and principled persons, primarily communists and Komsomol members and highly skilled specialists as members of the committees, groups and posts. At present, the party stratum in the people's control bodies of the GSVG is 58 percent and Komsomol members are around 30 percent.

Practice shows how important it is to teach the public scouts the ability to effectively exercise control. For example, seminars and assemblies for the chairman of the committees and groups and the leaders of the posts have proven effective. Here they discuss the urgent questions of organizing the checks. The people's controller schools set up under the officer clubs have also proven effective. The political directorate has published a leaflet to help the public scouts. We also give great importance to training the controllers directly on the spot. Thus, recently in the unit where Maj M. Drozd serves, we checked how rationally they utilized the facilities allocated to support the combat training of the personnel. We realized that the people's control group had already been concerned with this question 6 months previously. Here was a good opportunity to see what had been done over the time since. We acquainted the control activists with the check plan and drew their attention to what documents should be followed here and what forms and methods should be employed. In involving the public scouts of the unit in studying individual questions, using their own experience and their own actions, we taught them both work practices as well as a fundamental approach to assessing the shortcomings.

Another time, in checking out warnings about abuses of official position by Officer V. But and certain other comrades, the group committee showed the people's control activists how work must be organized, how to approach the ascertaining of reasons which gave rise to deviations from the requirements of military life, what proposals should thereby be made for a decision by superior chiefs and how to prevent violations of the laws and the demands of orders and directives.
Life has confirmed that the joint checks carried out are rather effective. They make it possible to develop among the members of the people's control group and posts a sense of high responsibility for the assigned job as well as generalize advanced experience.

I would like to emphasize that for the successful work of the public scouts, it is very important to have prompt support for their initiative by the commanders, political bodies, party committees and bureaus. Precisely this is done in our leading troop collectives. For example, the commander and political workers of unit X employ every opportunity to support those comrades whose creative searches and proposals are aimed at raising combat readiness. They personally contact the chairman and members of the people's control group and respond effectively to the results of the checks. In this unit, they make it a practice to systematically discuss the questions raised by the group at meetings and conferences. The party bureau where one of the members of Maj V. Degtyarev regularly invites the public scouts to its meetings in order to hear their ideas on the work, to note what has been achieved, to analyze shortcomings and to give the necessary recommendations. All of this contributes to a situation where the people's controllers not only disclose shortcomings, but also carry out extensive work to prevent them.

Unfortunately, they proceed in this manner far from everywhere. In the trade and service enterprise where Officer N. Michkayev is the chief, the people's controllers, in checking the observance of Soviet trade rules, the storage of commodities and their sales, repeatedly discovered shortages and reported their conclusions and proposals, but the leaders here did not adopt the necessary measures. This led to shortages, losses and embezzlement of materials and money and to extra costs in the trade and consumer services for the personnel. Control is a most important part of organizational work. This is precisely how V. I. Lenin viewed it and how the CPSU Central Committee views it. For this reason, we urge the commanders and political bodies to constantly improve the organizational activities of the committees, groups and posts and teach the controllers to boldly bring out shortcomings.

In speaking about the positive which exists in the work of our people's controllers and in the leadership of their activities, we must also mention the oversights in this area. At times the checks are not always sound and effective. In a number of places, the people's controllers are not concerned about preventing various violations of the established procedures. Of course, not only the controllers are to blame for this. Individual commanders, political bodies and party organizations merit a serious rebuke as they do not sufficiently direct their work and do not deal strictly with those comrades who have a dulled sense of responsibility for carrying out the job assigned them. It is quite understandable that an inattentive attitude toward the daily concerns of the public scouts does not help to develop their activity and does not serve the cause of instilling high party principles in them.

It must be recognized also that the GSVG Political Directorate is still not doing everything to ensure constant and effective control or for instilling such qualities as initiative, professionalism, principledness and a feeling of high responsibility in the commanders, the political workers and the leaders of the people's control group and posts. Thus, the Officers K. Khronusov, A. Khachaturov, V. Skvortsov, A. Sipatyy and many others proved to be good organizers.
during their work in the people's control bodies. But their experience has still not been properly studied and disseminated. At present, the political directorate and the group people's control committee have begun to be more concerned with the results of the checks and raids and the work done by the best public scouts is brought to the attention of both the leaders and all the personnel. We are also taking measures so that the results of the checks be discussed more frequently and specifically in the political bodies and party organizations as well as depicted in leaflets, photoreports, radio news and satirical newspapers. It has become a rule that the people's control groups and posts report regularly on their activities to the collectives which selected them. All of this will help to increase the activities of the public scouts and raise their contribution to the combat readiness of the units and subunits.

In speaking at the 17th Trade Union Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "...It is essential to make control, particularly in the spheres directly tied to the daily needs of people, more effective, informal and impartial." Proceeding from these instructions, the GSVG Political Directorate and Military Council are endeavoring in a more profound and specific manner to discuss the questions related to the activities of the people's controllers and to deal strictly with persons guilty of all sorts of abuses, mismanagement, negligence, unconscientiousness as well as violations of the requirements of the regulations, instructions and orders.

In the demand of the 26th CPSU Congress that not a single violation and not a single instance of abuses, wastefulness of undiscipline be overlooked by the sharp eye of the people's controllers, we see one of those important tasks the implementation of which requires the sparing of neither forces nor time.

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CSO: 1801/097
RESULTS OF 'UNIFIED POLITICAL DAY' REVIEWED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 82 (signed to press 4 Oct 82) pp 59-64

[Article by Maj Gen G. Stefanovskiy: "The Unified Political Day: Findings, Reserves"]

[Text] The Unified Political Day has become a permanent part of our army life. It has become an organic part of the ideological and political indoctrination and its most active and effective form. Over the time since the publishing of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979, this form has gained broad acceptance and constant admission in the troops and fleets. It is actively employed in carrying out one of the most important practical tasks of explaining the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and for mobilizing the personnel to carry out the tasks of strengthening the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Let us recall that the 26th Party Congress demanded the reorganization of many areas and spheres of ideological work in order to make its contents more pertinent and the forms conform to the needs and demands of the Soviet people. This demand is very important and responsible. It impels us to constantly analyze the effectiveness of the content, forms and methods of ideological indoctrination activities, including the effectiveness of the Unified Political Days. It is generally recognized that the Unified Political Day has become one of the forms of direct, vital communication between the leadership and the personnel. It continues the good Leninist tradition of strengthening the ties between the communist leaders and the people and for directly informing the masses of the urgent problems in domestic and international life and on questions of concern.

For us, V. I. Lenin has always been and remains an example of active involvement in oral political propaganda and agitation. With all the complexity and intensity of the moment, he found time to speak to the workers and the Red Armymen, he studied their moods and aspirations and demanded this from all leaders. He repeatedly emphasized that the living word is also a deed and important means for mobilizing the masses to carry out party decisions. "Personal influence and talking at meetings is terribly important in politics," taught Lenin.
The spoken word and a lively talk with people have been and remain a dependable party weapon effective both in peacetime and under combat conditions. Many participants of the Great Patriotic War recall that the more complex the situation was on the front and the more crucial the combat tasks set for the troop collectives, the more actively the leaders of all ranks went into the masses of soldiers and the more effectively oral explanatory work was carried out in the trenches and dugouts. "A majority of our political section members, political leaders, Komsomol organizers and agitators," wrote Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in "Malaya Zemlya," "were able to find the correct tone and had authority among the soldiers and it was important that the men knew that at a difficult moment the person who urged them to hold on would be next to them...."

The speeches by the leadership to subordinates in the course of the Unified Political Days add a profound content to this form of work. In meeting with the commander or chief, the men have an opportunity, as they say, at first hand to learn about what is of most interest and concern to them. In turn, the leader himself, in meeting with the personnel, obtains direct information on the requests and needs and on the true state of service, life and routine of subordinates. It is equally important that here there be a broad simultaneous coverage of the personnel by political action and the propaganda measures assume a more mass nature.

A year or so ago, we could speak about the first practical steps in holding the Unified Political Days in the troops and fleets and about the first findings in the forms and methods of this work. Now we already have an opportunity to analyze definite positive experience and to note the able and most effective approach to organizing the question, initiative and creativity as well as point to the reserves and oversights which negatively influence both the spoken propaganda and agitation and as a whole the ideological and political indoctrination in the formations, units and ships.

What makes the Unified Political Day attractive, interesting and significant? Why in some units and formations is this day awaited with great impatience by both the servicemen as well as the members of their families while in others it is held formally, boringly and uninterestingly and does not leave any trace either in the memory or heart of a person? What does the more than 3-year experience of holding the political days teach us and what problems has it posed requiring both analysis and decisions?

We would like to start our observations with the idea that the Unified Political Days achieve the greatest effect with careful preparations by the speakers. This is the main condition for success. It would be possible to give many examples of the able preparation and holding of the political days. For example, in the formation where Officer V. Shutyy is the political worker, in preparing for a political day devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the political section long before the established dates determined the persons to speak, it drew particular attention to the organizing of an instructional exercise involving the leaders of the local party and soviet bodies, it armed the officers with rich reference material and also provided information on the state of affairs in the subunits in the area of training, discipline and the carrying out of the socialist obligations; it also provided procedural recommendations.
The overall intensification of ideological and political work in the units and the carrying out of a number of measures disclosing the historic significance of the coming jubilee helped to increase the effectiveness of the Unified Political Day. In particular, Lenin readings and lessons were held on "Lenin's Teachings on the Nationality Question and Their Development Today," talks in front of the USSR map on "Our Motherland on the Path to Communism," as well as "The Strength of a Soldier is Doubled by Strong Friendship," the morning meetings on "Men on Leave Relate," and a literary artistic evening on "An Unbreakable Union of Free Republics." These were conducted in the companies and equal subunits where with the aid of the unit library and club workers, special exhibits of political and artistic literature, photographic exhibits and stands were set up, reflecting the flourishing of the Soviet republics and the service of their representatives.

On the designated day, the leaders appointed by the political section arrived in the subunits and prior to this they had been acquainted with the course of combat training, with the life and routine of the troop collectives, they had spoken with many soldiers, sergeants and officers and during the hours of mass political work had conducted talks on the established subject and answered the numerous questions of the listeners. The early informing of the men about the forthcoming political day, the preparing of questions by them and their preliminary analysis contributed significantly to an apt and frank discussion. For this in a number of the subunits and units they set out special boxes or urns with the inscription "For Questions." It is essential to add that on this day the leadership in all the units had organized and conducted appointments for servicemen and the members of their families on personal questions. Such careful preparation ensured the holding of the Unified Political Day on a good level, with undoubted benefit for indoctrinating the men.

It is important to emphasize that the work of the officers, in particular the representatives of the formation political sections, not be restricted to the holding of the mentioned measures. The questions, proposals and requests of the men, both those which could be resolved on the spot and those requiring a certain amount of time, were generalized and a decision was taken on each of them with the subsequent informing of the personnel about the adopted measures. It is no accident that in this formation the men know that there is always a response to their alert and that each question will be answered.

I have spoken in detail about the organization of one of the political days in the formation. It is interesting that here as well political days have been conducted with great benefit on such subjects as: "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Aggressive Essence of Imperialism and the Need for High Vigilance and Combat Readiness," "To Study Communism, to Build and Defend Communism," "In a United, Friendly Family," "The USSR Food Program--A Vivid Example of Concern for the Soviet Man" and so forth. Similar experience to one or another degree is also characteristic for many other units, ships and formations in the Army and Navy.

However, in some places they have still not fully understood the ideas and goals of this vital, effective, interesting and useful form of ideological indoctrination. In some formations, on the one hand, one can observe a desire to saturate the Unified Political Day with all sorts of meetings, conferences and
instruction sessions on various questions and, on the other, to employ this name for the holding of ordinary political information sessions. As a result, no feedback is formed, that is, there is no vital contact between the leaders and the men. There can scarcely be any challenge over this question as either extreme, to put it mildly, does not help to raise the effectiveness and quality of indoctrinational work.

At times one can also observe poor preparation of the propagandists for speaking, the sticking to a previously prepared text and a remoteness of their talk from the interests and tasks which are of vital concern presently for the listeners. Life has convinced us that the speeches will not be effective by those propagandists who forget the warning of V. I. Lenin: "...It is impossible to speak in the same manner at a plant meeting and in a Cossack village, at a student meeting and in a peasant hut...."

In some places they have not gotten over such shortcomings as the desire to broaden the audience, that is, to organize speeches by leading comrades to the entire personnel of the unit and sometimes even the garrison. For the present, speeches by senior comrades and chiefs in the staffs and directorates of the formations, military districts, groups of forces and fleets have still not become regular. In a number of formations, the information moving from the bottom upwards and the questions asked by the servicemen are not always generalized and used in further work.

The presence of such oversights significantly reduces the indoctrinational effect of the political days on the personnel and shows that a form which is in and of itself good can lose its vital strength. At one time, we were persuaded of this in becoming acquainted with the state of mass political work in the formations where Officers V. Dmitriyenko and A. Gornizov served. Here behind the general phrases and the number of speeches, one could not see a vital tie with the men or the mutual enriching with information. This, in our view, has become one of the reasons for the poor results of individual subunits in combat training.

The reorganization of many areas and spheres of political work with the masses consists in increased attention by all our personnel to the main, strategic task posed by the congress, that is, to work with man and concern for him. Only the precise choice of the focus and subject and consideration of the particular and specific features of the troop collective help the communist leaders in finding strong ties of contact and mutual understanding with the men and to see to it that the living word reaches the mind and heart of each man, that it brings a powerful ideological and moral charge, that it strengthens troop morale and challenges and raises them to specific deeds. We feel that in line with this idea it is apt to recall one of the statements of M. I. Kalinin: "...In military history, there have been no military leaders who established world fame for themselves who were not beloved by their troops. This means that the world-famous military leaders were not only masters of strategy and tactics. No, they knew the way to the hearts of their soldiers and their army. They were the masters of high troop morale and were able to instill a strong belief in them in the soldier's soul."
The Unified Political Day provides the leader with an excellent opportunity to have a direct indoctrinal impact on subordinates. This is significantly aided by correctly choosing the scale of the audience. Experience teaches us that within a Unified Political Day the leaders of all ranks should talk to the soldiers and sergeants in a company and equal subunits while a talk on the unit scale should be held with the officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], workers and employees and family members of the servicemen (with whom, unfortunately, meetings are still very rarely held). Under such a condition, as a rule, the best contact is achieved with listeners.

There is no need to prove the dependence of success for any oral statement, and the Unified Political Day as a whole, upon the preparedness to talk with the men, the ability to satisfy their interests and evoke a frank exchange of opinions. The person who speaks to the audience is the pacing generator and central figure in the Unified Political Day.

The troops and fleets have gained great experience and employ diverse forms of teaching the arts of oral statements to the personnel as well as the ability to interest them and arouse a frank, confidential talk. Thus, in the formation where Officer A. Gorbachev serves, the political section regularly conducts preliminary and complete instruction sections and exercises for the speakers to broaden their theoretical viewpoint and improve procedural skills. Usually, these are held 10-15 days before the talks and this provides an opportunity to better think out the received recommendations and to prepare more carefully for meeting with the personnel of a specific troop collective. Here, along with the instructing of the speakers, lectures are given on psychology and pedagogics, advice is provided on the questions of orator skills and the experience of previous meetings is analyzed.

It is important to emphasize that in the designated formation, the party bureau and the primary party organization of the directorate have taken an active stance in the training of the communists for speaking to the personnel. In the first place, they enrich them with objective information on the state of affairs in training, on the life and routine in the subunits and the mood of the personnel. Secondly, they make as a matter of special concern the personal training of those party members who do not have sufficient experience and organize for them help from the best trained and recognized propagandists in the collective.

In a majority of the formations, brief procedural recommendations and reference materials are prepared for each subject, but this certainly does not free anyone from independent work which is the basic form of preparing for the political day. This does not come easily to everyone. On the other hand, there are more and more of those leaders who, in supplementing the material obtained in the political day, read a great deal and make notes and comments which can be used in answering the questions of the listeners. As a rule, such communist officers come fully armed to the meetings, they speak freely, they conduct a lively and interesting narration and are able to both persuade people and listen to them.

At the same time, certain leaders instead of persuasiveness of the talk and authoritativeness employ general arguments and not the best retelling of
information already known by the personnel. At times they forget the folk wisdom that other people can be enriched only if a person himself possesses this richness. In the given instance it is a richness of primarily one's own knowledge and not the borrowed thoughts and observations of others. With such a state of affairs one can scarcely count on enriching the knowledge of the listeners, on the sincerity of the talk or on the frankness of the men. The path to their hearts lies through individual forms of work on all levels, through regular meetings with subordinates and through help for them in obtaining the correct and persuasive answers to questions of concern to them. Even individual instances of conceit and superciliousness which were aptly named "swaggering" by V. I. Lenin caused serious harm to indoctrination and do not strengthen the authority of the leader himself.

One cannot help but mention one other oversight in the organizing of the Unified Political Days and which has begun to be seen in some places recently. It is a question that individual leaders of the formations and unit take a more and more infrequent part in the political days and often entrust the opportunity to speak to the soldier or sailor collective to inferior workers who often do not have either the proper experience, the information or the skills of participating in ideological measures.

The overcoming of such shortcomings and hence the increased effectiveness of the Unified Political Day depend largely upon the level of work with the leadership and upon the principledness and strict demands shown by the political bodies and party organizations for the communists, regardless of the position they hold. If there is such party demands then there are also results. For example, in the formation where Officer P. Astapov serves, they are more and more widely using such promising forms of work as individual colloquiums, the hearing and discussing of reports by the communists in the political section, in the sessions of the party committees and bureaus on their broadening of their political viewpoint and personal participation in agitation and propaganda work. There are more and more such examples.

However, on this level far from all the reserves are still being utilized. Individual work and personal exactingness at times grow weaker as the communist moves up in service status and this contradicts the demands of the CPSU By-Laws on the equal obligations of communists regardless of the positions held.

In the course of the political day, precisely thorough analysis and an objective, party assessment of the meetings held serve to improve the quality and authority of the speeches and talks by the commanders and chiefs. Of course, not everything goes well for everyone immediately and there can be shortcomings. But a senior chief, a political section or party bureau should know both the successes as well as the shortcomings of the communists in agitation and propaganda work in order to support the positive, to promptly suggest and help in analyzing the reasons for oversights and to provide professional advice. For this the commander, the chief of a political section in a division and other experienced workers from the political bodies of the formations, districts, groups of forces and fleets should not only themselves give speeches and heart-to-heart talks in the companies (batteries), but also regularly attend the speeches of other leaders, listen to them, assess the content and
methods, point out the positive and give specific advice on eliminating shortcomings. Unfortunately, such a proven form for increasing the effectiveness of the propaganda and indoctrinational work of the leading personnel is extremely rarely employed. We feel that an objective and not a routine depiction of agitation and propaganda activities in the service certifications and party recommendations would be a good incentive for improving the quality of these activities by the leaders.

An important condition for increasing the effectiveness of the Unified Political Days is an improving in the procedural skills of their immediate organizers, that is, the commanders and chiefs of the political sections in the formations, and the arming of them with advanced and practically tested experience in this work. For these purposes, in a number of formations, for example, the leadership is invited to hear the speeches of the best prepared and experienced propagandists to the men, with a subsequent analysis of these speeches. On this level the exchange of positive experience between the very originators of it is very beneficial as is the broader demonstrating of progressive methods in the district and fleet press and advice from the skilled lecturers and propagandists.

One other condition for increasing the effectiveness of the Unified Political Days, that is, the overcoming of routine and monotony in organizing the speeches in the companies and equal subunits. The problem is that in a number of formations, there has been a tendency to assign certain leaders to the same subunits, for example, the chief of staff to a commandant company, the chief of the rocket troops and artillery to a headquarters battery, the chief of the engineer service to a combat engineer subunit and so forth. And they try to speak only in these subunits. Clearly because of the professional features in the training and service of the officers, frequently the range of questions for discussion is narrowed and interest in them on the part of the personnel gradually dies.

We feel that this must be taken into account. It is advisable to change not only the subjects, but also the persons speaking on them, selecting the most competent speakers. As is known, the very appearance of a new person for the collective already causes a certain interest, without even mentioning the content of the speech. A diversity of forms and methods for presenting the information helps to increase the interest in it and its more profound assimilation by the listeners. These forms and methods can include the combining of speeches with the showing of filmstrips, slides and film fragments or the presenting of schemes and diagrams on one or another subject or problem.

Thus, experience convinces us that the Unified Political Day, if it is well organized and conducted on a high ideological and procedural level, is one of the dependable instruments for the influence of the commanders, political bodies and party organizations on the personnel. To be in the thick of the men, to know their moods and needs and by an ardent, challenging word to lead them to carry out difficult tasks—what can be more important for any rank of leader!

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CSO: 1801/097
OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION OF FULFILLING MILITARY DUTY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 82 (signed to press 4 Oct 82) pp 70-76

[Article by Lt Col K. Pashikin: "To Consciously and Unstintingly Carry Out Military Duty"]

[Text] The study of this subject is of great indoctrinational significance. It should help the students in more profoundly understanding the sociopolitical essence of Soviet military duty, its moral content, and to recognize the need for the conscious and unstinting fulfillment of it as a major trait in the moral make-up of the motherland's defender. The exercise should help to develop in the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers a high feeling of personal responsibility for carrying out the demands of the military oath and regulations, daily service duties as well as observing moral standards.

Six hours are allocated for studying the subject. Of these, 2 hours should be assigned for a lecture, 2 for the independent work of the students and 2 hours for a discussion.

In the lecture, it is recommended that the following questions be taken up:
1. The sociopolitical essence and moral content of Soviet military duty.
2. Ideological conviction and ardent patriotism--major traits in the moral make-up of a Soviet soldier.

In the brief introduction it is essential to remind the students that on 7 October of the current year, exactly 5 years have passed since the adoption of the new USSR Constitution by the Extraordinary Seventh Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Ninth Sitting. The Constitution is a concentrated expression of the most essential changes in the economic, social and spiritual life of Soviet society and the profound democracy of the state of all the people. The Constitution has reflected the greatest victories of the Soviet people and has reinforced in legislation a new mark on the path to communism, the building of developed socialism.

* Material for political exercises on the subject "Conscious and Unstinting Fulfillment of Military Duty--A Most Important Trait in the Moral Make-Up of the Soviet Soldier."
It is important to point out that the USSR Constitution, having embodied Lenin's ideas on the defense of the socialist fatherland, has raised to a new height the national attention and respect for universal military service. The provisions of our Basic Law have emphasized the historic importance of a constant readiness to defend the fatherland courageously and ably, and they have legally reinforced the attitude existing in our society toward national defense and toward service in the Armed Forces as a cause of all the people.

Our Armed Forces are a secure guard for the creative labor of the Soviet people and a bulwark of universal peace. Their entire heroic history is convincing proof of loyalty to their high calling. The intrepid fighters of the revolution and the heroes of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars unstintingly carried out their sacred duty to the socialist fatherland, they spared neither blood nor life itself and fought against the enemies. Their feats and glorious traditions serve as an inexhaustible source of inspiration for today's Soviet military, the worthy inheritors of the older generation's military glory. "At present, now standing in the ranks of the defenders of the motherland," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "are the sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. They have not experienced the severe hardship which befell their fathers and grandfathers. But they are loyal to the heroic traditions of our army and our people" ("Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 66).

The best moral traits of our military are manifested in the conscious and unstinting fulfillment of military duty. The demands of military duty in a concise form have been formulated in the military oath and regulations. These demands are largely the same as the principles of the moral code of a builder of communism and this is an unique moral compass against which the Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy check their deeds and action.

1. The Sociopolitical Essence and Moral Content of Soviet Military Duty

A description of the first question should start by explaining to the students what military duty is. Military duty is a serviceman's moral and legal duty for the armed defense of his nation. It is essential to point out that depending upon the social essence and purpose of one or another army as well as upon the nature of the sociopolitical system, the content of military duty can vary.

The armed forces of a socialist state ensure the national independence, freedom and security of their nation, they guard the creative labor of the people and are the most important factor in preserving peace throughout the world. For this reason the fulfilling of military duty in the socialist fatherland is truly a noble, elevated and heroic deed. This is the high and honorable duty of the Soviet military stemming from the objective needs to defend the socialist fatherland. This has been legally reinforced by the USSR Constitution where it states that the defense of the socialist fatherland is the sacred duty of each USSR citizen and that military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is an honorable obligation for the Soviet citizens. In these provisions our of Basic Law one can see primarily the unity of the legal and moral aspects of Soviet military duty.
Military duty is understood differently in the capitalist states, where the armed forces are a weapon for suppressing the revolutionary actions of the masses of people and where they help carry out the aggressive foreign policy course of the ruling classes. Here the concept of military duty has a distorted nature and a false content. How is this expressed?

Primarily in the fact that, in defending an exploiting system and waging aggressive, predatory wars, the armies of imperialist states thereby carry out a reactionary mission. Often they are also employed to suppress the resistance of the working masses within their own countries. Under these conditions both the moral and the legal aspects of military duty are unjust. For this reason the appeals of bourgeois ideologists to army personnel to dedicate themselves to the "soldier's duty" do not have a real basis. The imperialists are endeavoring to conceal the political essence of aggressive war and its reactionary nature and to blunt the class awareness of the masses of soldiers. A correct understanding by the army of the political goals of aggressive wars is dangerous for imperialism. Thus it happens that the less aware a soldier is in an imperialist army the more reliable he is as a defender of the capitalist system.

Characteristic in this regard is a comment by V. I. Lenin. "A Prussian monarch in the 18th Century," he wrote, "said something wise: 'If our soldiers understood why we are fighting then we could not wage a single war.' The old Prussian monarch was not a stupid man" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 38, p 50). For this reason, in preparing for an aggressive war, the imperialists in every possible way endeavor to establish a moral aspect for military service in their armies. In order to force the representatives of the working masses to fight for an unjust cause and for the alien interests of the exploiters, in these armies there is intense ideological pressure and the anesthetizing of the personnel in a spirit of anticommunism and racial superiority. As a rule, the actions of the soldiers in such armies, particularly in wartime, are accompanied by cruelty against the peaceful population and involve plunder and pillage.

Thus, the propagandist should lead the students to the conclusion that Soviet military duty, in its goals and content, is directly opposite to military duty in the armed forces of the imperialist states.

Furthermore, it is essential to point out that the essence of Soviet military duty is expressed in the constant readiness of the men to come to the defense of our people's peaceful labor and to deal a decisive rebuff to any aggressor who dares encroach on the freedom and independence of the motherland and the victories of socialism. The experience of the past and the course of contemporary world development confirm the timeliness of Lenin's conclusion that we should accompany our steps toward peace by an intensification of all our military preparations. The Soviet military are sacredly carrying out this Leninist legacy and by their daily military service are successfully implementing the complex tasks of maintaining the troops and naval forces in constant combat readiness.
In describing combat readiness, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, in a report at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries pointed out that this is the main indicator for the qualitative state of the troops and naval forces. This brings together the results of the diverse activities by the commanders and political workers, the staffs, the political bodies and party organizations and all the personnel of the Armed Forces and their capacity to fulfill their basic purpose of securely defending the socialist victories and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and ensure the security of our nation, its friends and allies.

The significance of constant combat readiness has risen even more in our times where the development of nuclear missile weapons and other powerful means of destruction has created a real danger of their surprise employment by the aggressor. Hence, it is the duty of the soldier and sailor to always be on guard and ready to act decisively and ably in any situation. This applies to each military specialist, regardless of the location of the subunit, unit or ship.

In continuing his lecture, the propagandist should point out that military duty is a strong imperative motive in the life and activities of a soldier or sailor. It embodies not only a constitutional legal force, but also has a moral basis, a personal profound conviction on the part of the serviceman in the historic justness of his struggle for the cause of communism and an understanding of the need to defend revolutionary victories. The conscientious fulfillment of duties by the Soviet military derives largely from their moral drives, from dedication to the ideals of communism, from Soviet patriotism and a clearly felt need to securely defend the socialist fatherland.

A highly developed sense of duty causes among the Soviet military a profound interest in military affairs and a desire to master combat skills and it mobilizes them to energetic activities. It gives their actions purposefulness and increases a readiness to surmount any difficulties and make any sacrifices for the sake of the motherland.

The carrying out of military duty for a defender of the motherland is obligatory and is reinforced by a special legal act, the taking of the military oath. In making his solemn vow, each soldier or sailor assumes a personal obligation to defend the motherland courageously and ably, with dignity and honor, sparing neither his blood nor life itself for achieving complete victory over the enemies. The violating of the oath is viewed as the severest crime against the people.

The military oath as well as the military regulations in their essence represent unique laws of military life. At the same time, they clearly express the moral content of military duty. Certainly the legal normative provisions of the oath and regulations embody high, noble moral demands on the Soviet military, that is: to be honest, just and brave, to value military comradeship, to help a comrade in word and deed, to restrain him from unworthy actions, to steadfastly endure all the hardships and deprivations of military service, until one's last breath to be loyal to one's people, to the Soviet motherland and to the Soviet government.
It is not hard to note that these demands are largely the same as the principles in the moral code of a builder of communism such as honesty and justice, collectivism and comradely mutual aid, a high awareness of social duty, dedication to the cause of communism and love for the socialist motherland. The moral and legal aspects of the demands of the military oath and regulations in a manner complement each other. The legal standards are substantially reinforced by their great moral strength.

The moral content of military duty is most vividly apparent in military discipline. V. I. Lenin, in commenting on the moral value of discipline and self-discipline of the workers, emphasized that "morality is all in this united, solid discipline..." (PSS, Vol 41, p 313). The moral attributes of the Soviet military are seen in a concentrated form precisely in discipline. A soldier or sailor with high moral tempering conscientiously carries out his service duties. A feeling of aware military duty suggests to him the need for the un-failing and precise observance of order and rules established by the laws, regulations and instructions.

"Military discipline," emphasized the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "is primarily a political or moral category. Its foundation is based upon the ideological conviction of the men and the spiritual maturity of the collective." Under present-day conditions, when the importance of military discipline has risen particularly, it is important for a soldier or sailor not only to understand an order, but also to feel it in his heart, to perceive it as his own motive and to invest all his strength and inspiration into carrying it out. In a disciplined and highly moral soldier not a single action is performed against his self-awareness and the fulfillment of duty is reinforced by the commands of his conscience.

In continuing the lecture, the propagandist should point out that our army in engagements against numerous enemies has defended the liberty and independence of the motherland and has protected the historic victories of the Soviet people. The Soviet military carried out an unprecedented international feat having liberated many European peoples from the Nazi invaders. In recalling the feats of our soldiers and commanders and in reflecting on the great liberation mission of our army in the last year, one turns in one's thoughts to the heroes themselves, living and fallen, the nobility and courage of which have been so faithfully and accurately recorded in the famous monument in Treptow Park in Berlin. And in our days the mission of the Soviet Armed Forces is highly humane and moral, that is, to defend the motherland, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the historic victories of socialism and to remove the threat of nuclear war from mankind. All people of good will in the world see in the Soviet Armed Forces a dependable bulwark of peace and social progress.

We are threatening no one, pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. Talks about the so-called "Soviet threat" is an obvious fabrication by the opponents of detente and nothing more. We are improving our defenses with one sole aim of securely protecting the victories of Great October and firmly defending the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, our friends and allies. The honorable nature of military service and the moral aspect of Soviet military duty are clearly apparent in this high and noble mission of our Armed Forces and the personnel of the Army and Navy.
Under present-day conditions, the military duty of the defenders of the motherland is merged with their international obligations to ensure the security of world socialism. The Soviet Armed Forces in a combat alliance with the other fraternal Warsaw Pact armies, are securely defending the revolutionary victories of the peoples in the socialist states against the imperialist aggressors. In joint exercises and maneuvers military skills are improved and the unbreakable friendship of the brothers in arms and internationalist soldiers is strengthened and developed.

In concluding the first question, the exercise leader should draw the students' attention to the need of consciously carrying out service duties, to be implacable against anything amoral or alien and to subordinate one's actions and deeds to the interests of the common cause, to the interests of the military collective. Here it is essential to stress that there can be no deviations from the standards of our morality and the demands of the military oath and regulations. Each instruction or order by a commander must be conscientiously carried out out of an inner awareness of military duty.

2. Ideological Conviction and Ardent Patriotism--Important Traits in the Moral Make-Up of a Soviet Soldier

In beginning to give the second question, it must be pointed out that high communist ideological loyalty and the ardent Soviet patriotism of the motherland's defenders lie at the basis of the conscientious and unstinting fulfillment of Soviet military duty. "We love the Motherland as if she was a bride, and care for her as if she was [our] mother..." These remarkable words of the well-known song very precisely express the feelings which each Soviet man feels for his fatherland.

History has repeatedly shown that the patriotism of the Soviet man is a supreme test. It is expressed in concrete deeds and actions, in daily, conscientious labor for the good of the motherland and in a readiness to defend it. "A feeling for the motherland," wrote Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs], "was very strongly developed in all of us. A fine feeling! It is nourished, of course, not only by a contemplation of our land's beauty. As they say, it is essential to sink roots into it and when a person toils on it, raises grain, establishes a city, builds a new road or digs a trench on this land in defending it, then he will fully understand what is the motherland."

The spiritually revolutionary Soviet patriotism has given rise and does give rise to unprecedented heroism which became the most important factor in our victories over numerous enemies. Life has clearly confirmed that an army which has been recruited from the people, in believing profoundly in the justness of its cause and in being led by a communist party is invincible. In noting this particular feature of our army, V. I. Lenin said: "...Each worker and peasant who has taken up arms knows why he is going and consciously sheds his blood for the sake of the triumph of justice and socialism" (PSS, Vol 41, p 121).

The mass heroism of the soldiers who fought during the years of the Civil War for the Soviet motherland can be eloquently seen from the fact that over 300 troops formations, units and ships received the honorary Red Banner. Almost 15,000 of the active participants in the Civil War were awarded the Red Banner while 22 military chiefs received an honorary revolutionary weapon.
One should then point out that the wholehearted dedication to the socialist motherland was particularly apparent among our military during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The soldiers, sailors, sergeants, petty officers and officers, in carrying out their military duty, mercilessly routed the Nazi invaders on the land, at sea and in the air. In critical situations, when the combat situation demanded, they sacrificed themselves and did not spare their lives for achieving victory over the enemies. With their chest they blocked the fire-breathing embrasures of enemy pillboxes, with strings of grenades they threw themselves under the Nazi tanks, they made mid-air rams, they called in fire on themselves and blew themselves up with the last grenade.... "I die, but I do not give up! Farewell, motherland" was the inscription made by one of the unknown heroic defenders on the wall of the Brest Fortress and which best describes the great spirit, loyalty to military duty and ardent patriotism of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War as well as their disdain for death.

Aleksandr Matrosov, Yuriy Smirnov, Viktor Talalikhin, Nikolay Castello and Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya.... Many other names come after their names and their feats. The names of more than 300 imitators of Matrosov are already known. Around 500 Soviet aces rammed the enemy in air combat and 327 crews directed their hit, burning aircraft toward enemy troop accumulations. In preferring death to captivity, more than 200 Soviet soldiers blew themselves up and surrounding Nazis using grenades.

In July 1943, at Kursk, Hero of the Soviet Union, Sr Lt Aleksandr Gorovets, committed an immortal feat. A group of Soviet fighters after carrying out a combat mission was returning to its base. One of the most experienced pilots, communist A. Gorovets, was flying in the rear. In approaching the front line, he noticed a small group of Nazi bombers which were carrying a fatal bombload toward the positions of our troops. The pilot wanted to immediately report on this to the command, but the unforeseen had happened, his radio had failed.

What should he do? The answer was suggested by a feeling of military duty, an ardent love for the motherland and a burning hate for the enemy. Gorovets turned and dove on one of the enemy. A fierce air battle started between one Soviet fighter and a large group of Nazi aircraft. In continuously attacking the enemy, the Soviet pilot shot down one enemy aircraft after another. Nine Nazi vultures were destroyed.

Such a feat could be performed only by a person who combined an ardent patriotic feeling with excellent military skills and high moral-volitional qualities.

The heroes of Malaya Zemlya covered themselves with undying glory. During a harsh, stormy night in February 1943, the landing detachment headed by Maj Tsezar' Kunikov fought its way through an enemy curtain of fire and landed on the western edge of Novorossiysk, capturing a small, but important, beachhead. Before this the landing troops had vowed: "In going into battle, we vow to the motherland that we will fight boldly and purposefully, sparing neither our lives for the sake of victory over the enemy. We give up our will, our forces and our blood, drop by drop, for the happiness of our people, for you, our strongly beloved motherland...."
The chief of the political section of the 18th Army, L. I. Brezhnev, who was a direct participant in those events has written in his book "Vospominaniya" (the chapter "Malaya Zemlya"): "In returning in my thoughts to those stormy days and in recalling the harsh vow, I always experience a spiritual excitement and pride. History knows many heroic feats by individual soldiers, but only in our great nation, only the Soviet people who are led by our great party have shown that they are capable of mass heroism."

In the course of the lecture it is important to emphasize that the representatives of all the nationalities of the USSR fought wholeheartedly for the motherland. In Soviet patriotism, the national pride of a person fuses with his high personal responsibility for the fate of our entire great country. "During the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War," states the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR, "the fraternal peoples, shoulder to shoulder, came to the defense of the motherland, they showed mass heroism and unbreakable will for victory, they routed the Nazi invaders and saved peoples of the world from enslavement and destruction." As an example it would be possible to give the immortal feat of 28 soldiers of the multinational 316th Rifle Division of Gen I. V. Panfilov which was subsequently changed into a guards unit. Headed by the intrepid political leader, Vasily Klochkov, the heroes held out steadily at Dubosekovo siding against the pressure of enemy tanks and infantry pushing toward Moscow. The Russian Ivan Shadrin, the Ukrainian Grigoriy Petrenko, the Kazakh Narsutbay Yembulator, the Kirghiz Duyshenkul Shopokov and other loyal sons of the fatherland courageously received death on the battlefield but did not let the Nazi tanks pass.

The 2-month defense of the Pavlov House has gone down as a vivid page in the chronicle of the heroic Battle of Stalingrad. Under the command of the Russian Sgt Pavlov, the Ukrainians Glushcheko and Demchenko, the Georgians Mosiashvili and Stepanoshvili, the Tatars Romazanov and Shkuratov, the Kazakh Murzayev, the Uzbek Turgunov, the Tajik Turdyev, the Abkhazian Sukba and other soldiers defended themselves stubbornly. This small garrison embodied the great friendship and fraternity of peoples from all our multinational country.

The communists led the way in the hottest spots where the success of battle was determined. By their ideological and military steadfastness and unity they instilled in the hearts of the men a firm belief in victory and by their ardent party word and personal example led the men forward. In the most crucial moments, when particular decisiveness and mobilizing activeness were required, there sounded over the battle formations the brief, shot-like cry: "Communists, forward!" Almost three-quarters of the Heroes of the Soviet Union are glorious representatives of the Leninist party.

The party's ranks on the front were filled out with the best fighters who had distinguished themselves in battles. As a rule, the largest number of applications to join the party occurred in the most intense periods of combat operations. This expressed the patriotism of the Soviet people, their love for the Communist Party and support for its policy. "I want to enter battle as a communist," they wrote in their applications, desiring to be in the front ranks of the motherland's defenders. Regardless of the high casualties in battle, the number of communists in the Red Army grew constantly. While by the end of 1941
there were 1.3 million communists in the army, during the concluding period of the war the number of communists in the Army and Navy exceeded 3 million. One out of every four soldiers was a CPSU member of candidate member.

The Lenin Komsomol was the party's combat assistant in these difficult times. Suffice it to say that 3,500 Komsomol members received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for courage manifested on the front and in the enemy rear.

The flames of the Great Patriotic War raged for 1,418 days. And each day new names of heroes and new feats were born. Each day was a vivid chronicle of heroic feats, immortal glory, greatness of spirit and loyalty to sacred duty. The prophetic words of V. I. Lenin were confirmed that never would a people be vanquished where the workers and peasants in their majority knew, felt and saw that they were defending their own Soviet power, worker power. (See PSS, Vol 38, p 315.) A profound conviction of the justness of the war's aims and an awareness of the need to give up one's strength, and if need be, one's life for the motherland were a strong source of the great moral-political spirit of our people.

Our enemies could never understand precisely this. One of the Nazi leaders, Hermann Goering in the Nuremburg Trial admitted: "As the course of the war showed, we did not know about a great deal and could not even suspect about a great deal. Not even the most active undercover agents could have disclosed the true military potential of the Soviets. I am not speaking about the size of the Red Army or about the number of Soviet cannons, aircraft or tanks. I am not speaking about the might or mobility of industry. This we also knew. I am speaking about people. We did not know and did not understand the Soviet Russians...and this was fatal for us...."

All true enough. This eloquent confession could well be remembered by those who in our times are hatching rabid plans to test our strength and are preparing a new world war.

Certain falsifiers in the West have endeavored to depict the heroism of the Soviet people during the war years as a result of fear of the commissars and commanders. A false notion of the congenital fanaticism of the Russians has been bandied about. These falsifiers of history do not understand that the mass heroism of the Soviet military is based on high ideological conviction, ardent love for the motherland and a conscious subordination of personal interests to the interests of the people. No imperialist army has or can have a soldier with such an ideology, with such an understanding of his patriotic duty. For the soldiers in the imperialist armies, military service is primarily a source of its enrichment. Money is the main idol of the professional mercenaries.

This is eloquently shown, for example, from the poster urging the American youth to join the army: "Young yankee! The world is an American planet! Choose what is most to your liking: the tropical island of Guam or snowy Iceland, the Philippines or West Germany, Britain or Greece. Devote yourself to a military profession as it will provide you with an interesting job, an adventure-filled life, and travel in the company of friends. And all of this will not cost you a single cent. On the contrary, the army will even pay you good money...."
The Communist Party has steadily seen to it that belief in the rightness of its cause and dedication to communist ideals are a profound conviction of each Soviet man. "By all its activities and purposeful ideological work," states the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR, "the party indoctrinates the workers in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism and a proud feeling of belonging to the united, great Soviet motherland."

In vain are the attempts by our enemies to debase the souls of the Soviet young men and women, to turn them into egoists and Philistines or to extinguish the flame of Soviet patriotism in their hearts. In vain do they hope that in an hour of severe testing we will not have any new Matrosovs, Smirnovs, Talalikhins, Kosmodem'yanskayas and Koshevoys.... The composition of the regiments and divisions has changed, the ranks of the veterans have thinned, but the heroism of past years lives on in the hearts and deeds of the young defenders of the motherland. The sons and grandsons of the fathers who saved the earth from the fascist filth are serving their fatherland with the same dedication, with the same valor and faithfulness to military duty.

Here are just a few examples of the unstinting fulfillment of military duty in the course of daily training. A helicopter was landing on the deck of an ASW cruiser in a stormy sea. The ship was tossing in the heavy chop. The right wheel broke off from the impact in landing and as a result a fire broke out on the helicopter. The watch fireman, Sn Ivan Pavlyuchenko was the closest of all to the damaged helicopter. It took him just a few seconds to make a decision. He did not think either of himself or his life. The helicopter crew was in danger. At that critical moment only he could help the aviators. The helicopter was burning, spinning over the deck and scattering sparks with the blades. The soldier rushed to the fire extinguishing system and succeeded in turning it on. But the flame-engulfed aircraft suddenly descended on him.... For courage and valor shown in the performance of military duty, by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Sn Ivan Pavlyuchenko was posthumously awarded the Red Star.

The Komsomol member, Pvt Roini Churkovidze also performed a heroic feat in carrying out his service duties. He knew that he was risking his life. He knew that a criminal hiding in a plate-layer's cabin which the men were to take was armed. The soldier saw his commander, Lt Col Yu. Ryzhkov, run up first to the criminal's hiding place. Realizing that the officer was in danger, without thinking, he rushed to his aid. Shielding the officer with his body, he pulled open the door. And shots rang out.... For courage and valor shown in apprehending a particularly dangerous criminal, Pvt Churkovidze was posthumously awarded the medal "For Valor."

What caused Sn I. Pavlyuchenko to go into the flames or Pvt R. Churkovidze to take the bandit's bullets? We find the answer to this question again in a readiness to consciously and unstintingly carry out one's sacred military duty, disdaining the mortal danger.

Thus, persons who at times are unnoticed in ordinary life at a critical moment become intrepid heroes. Their feat is like a vivid burst which suddenly illuminates what for a long time had been gathering in a person. A feat is
impossible without the moral preparation for it, without the tempering of
color and the improving of military skills, without precise calculation,
high discipline and tenacity. All of this is achieved by intense military
service.

Of course, a feat is the most vivid expression of loyalty to the motherland
and faithfulness to military duty. But these qualities in the soldiers and
sailors are also fully apparent in their daily, routine deeds and in their
struggle for the title of outstanding subunits, units and ships, for increas-
ing the ranks of outstanding men in military and political training, class
specialists and rated athletes. The ardent patriotism of the Soviet military,
their finest traits and moral qualities were vividly disclosed during the year
of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. In participating in a
socialist competition under the motto: "Secure Defense for the Peaceful Labor
of the Soviet People!" the men of the Army and Navy achieved new heights in
military service, they learned to hit the targets with the first shots, rounds
and missile launches, they mastered related specialties and achieved complete
interchangeability in the teams, crews and so forth.

The propagandist proceeds correctly if by using specific examples he will show
what successes have been achieved by the personnel of the subunit, unit and ship
in the socialist competition during the jubilee year. It is essential to name
the outstanding men in training, to tell about their accomplishments in service
and to urge the listeners to be the equal of the best men. It is essential to
emphasize that the successes of the pacesetters in the competition are based on
their high awareness and patriotic desire to honorably carry out their sacred
military duty to the motherland.

In conclusion, it is essential to recall that the USSR, along with the frater-
nal socialist nations is fighting actively and steadily for the peace and secur-
ity of peoples. However, the United States and the other NATO nations are en-
deavoring to alter the existing military-strategic equilibrium in their favor
and achieve military superiority over the USSR and the socialist nations. The
interests of the motherland's security demand the flawless execution of mili-
tary duty from all Army and Navy personnel.

During the hours of independent study, the students should study the works of
V. I. Lenin "On the National Pride of the Great Russians" (PSS, Vol 26, pp 106-
110); "The Main Task of Our Days" (PSS, Vol 36, pp 78-82); "The Tasks of the
Youth Unions" (PSS, Vol 41, pp 298-318); the CPSU Program (Politizdat, 1976,
pp 116-122); the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Report of the CPSU Central
Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area
of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 63-64, 66);
the speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 19th Komsomol Congress (KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 12, 1982, pp 5-10); the reports of the USSR Minister of
Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate
of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yegishv., at the 6th All-Army
Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH
SIL, No 11, 1982, pp 7-21).

In the talk with the students it is advisable to discuss the following ques-
tions: 1. What is military duty, what is its essence? 2. What is the moral
content of Soviet military duty? 3. What is the fundamental difference of military duty in the Soviet Armed Forces and in the armies of the imperialist states? 4. What is said about military duty in the USSR Constitution, the military oath and regulations? 5. Wherein lie the humaneness and morality of the historic mission of the Soviet Armed Forces? 6. What examples do you know of the unstinting fulfillment by the Soviet military of their sacred duty? 7. What does it mean to carry out military duty conscientiously and unstintingly under present-day conditions?

Literature for Propagandists


5. "Programma KPSS" [CPSU Program], Part II, Section V.


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BOOK REVIEW: 'MAN IN MODERN WARFARE'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 82 (signed to press 4 Oct 82) pp 85-88


[Text] The strengthening of the moral-political and psychological conditioning of servicemen is one of the main areas for increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The monograph "Chelovek v sovremennoy voyne" published by Voyenizdat is devoted to an elucidation of this question. The authors of this monograph stand at the very sources of an extended analysis of the problem. In a number of other previously published works on this subject, its theoretical and practical questions have been examined. The new monograph is a depiction of the present level in the development of the theory and practice of moral-political and psychological training of the Soviet military.

Proceeding from the Leninist thesis that in any war victory is ultimately determined by the morale of those masses which shed their blood on the battlefield, the authors have thoroughly analyzed the spiritual factor and have determined the theoretically and practically important notions of the essence, contents, functions and particular features of its manifestation in the course of modern combat operations.

The spiritual factor, as is pointed out in the monograph, is a fluid category. The changes in it depend upon a number of factors. In addition to the determining ones such as the socioeconomic, political and ideological, the morale factor is largely influenced by the successes or defeats of the troops, coalitions in the war, by the combat experience, by the quality of the equipment and weapons, by the maturity of the command and by the capacity to withstand the ideological and psychological subversion of the enemy. The main thing in the morale factor is the specific political content and class aims of the belligerents. In the historic clash of the two world systems, socialism has an indisputable moral-political superiority over capitalism.
The desire of the reactionary imperialist circles for increasing the means and weapons of mass destruction has created the real threat of their employment. The use of such weapons has led to the appearance of fundamentally new aspects in the nature of the moral-psychological effect of a combat situation on human conscience and will. In the event of making nuclear missile strikes, a difficulty controlled mass reaction can arise and this ultimately will tell on the combat capability of an army and on the carrying out of combat missions by the troops.

How to avoid a moral-psychological blow to the personnel? How to maintain the combat capability of the units and ensure the successful carrying out of the tasks involved in defending the socialist fatherland? To solve these questions means to create one of the main prerequisites for achieving victory.

In theoretically establishing the possibilities for solving such problems, the monograph's authors proceed from the Marxist-Leninist concept of social and individual conscience as the central object of moral-political and psychological training. In relying on the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and documents of the CPSU, the authors have analyzed in detail the essence, structure and development patterns of social and individual conscience. They have thoroughly examined the various forms of its appearance: political awareness, legal, moral and aesthetic. Such a methodological position is of great importance for practice as it determines the need for a differentiated and comprehensive approach to the moral-political and psychological training of the Soviet military.

The book then goes on to take up one of the leading concepts in Soviet psychological science, the principle of the unity of conscience and activity. The methodological importance for troop practices of the thesis that the external and internal activities of a man operate in a unity has been convincingly shown. Consequently, if carefully thought out and purposeful combat and political training and the entire system of training and indoctrination for the personnel are the basic factors in the development of the moral-political and military qualities, then any effective changes in this involves a change in the personal qualities of the men which determine the success in carrying out combat tasks.

The reviewed work in a clearer manner than in the previously published similar works defines the essence of moral-political and psychological training. In the opinion of the authors, this consists "in the purposeful shaping of the moral-political and psychological strength of the personnel and its constant readiness to endure the harshest testing of modern warfare and not to lose the will for struggle and victory." In this definition one should note three ideas.

In the first place, the purposefulness of the formation or shaping. This is not the development of qualities generally, but rather their improvement for the sake of the most rapid achieving of a certain goal: "I am ready to defend the motherland with weapons in hand" and "I am aware of the difficulties of the coming struggle and am ready to endure them." Such a moral-psychological set of the soldier's personality can be formed only on the basis of a purposeful indoctrinational process. The authors make this idea a key one.
Secondly, such a definition emphasizes the unity and continuity of two aspects of training: the moral-political and the psychological. The personality of a soldier is indivisible and unseparable and consequently such characteristics of his as resistance to the effect of combat factors and an understanding of the need to act decisively and confidently in combat are also unified and indivisible.

Thirdly, moral-political and psychological training is a continuous process. Its measures are included in the system of military and political training. Moreover, each exercise, each drill and each indoctrination measure should carry a specific focus in the interests of forming the moral-political and military qualities which ensure success in modern combat.

The authors have achieved a good deal by a clear definition of the essence of moral-political and psychological training. They have isolated its subject, they have outlined the content, and they have set out the directions of combat tempering as well as the particular features of political and military indoctrination and the training of personnel in the course of troop exercises and maneuvers.

The research and generalizing of advanced experience in the "Zapad-81" [West-81] exercises have confirmed the soundness of the authors' concept. They convincingly show that the leading commanders and political workers have done great work on this level. The goals were formulated of making certain that the personnel understood the purpose and necessity of acting boldly, actively, decisively and ably in the exercise; a series of difficult situations was to be thought out and incorporated in the system of military and political training and the overcoming of these difficulties would necessitate the mobilizing of the moral forces of the personnel. Optimum forms and methods of political indoctrination were outlined and implemented and these mobilized the moral forces at the necessary time and in the necessary direction. Such a unity of theory and practice for moral-political and psychological training, as reflected in the book, increases the weightiness of the reviewed monograph.

In emphasizing the unity and inseparability of the troop training and indoctrination process, the authors as the crucial idea point to the purposeful forming of a Marxist-Leninist ideology, communist ideological loyalty and conviction and political awareness which are the foundation for high moral-political and combat qualities. The ideology of the Soviet military is the fundamental basis for confident actions under any conditions of a combat situation. An assessment of what is happening from the positions of communist ideology compels the personnel to act in the interests of achieving the higher goals of our socialist society.

The authors set out the principles the implementation of which ensures an ideological focus to moral-political and psychological training. They examine in detail those such as the forming of political awareness, the unity of ideological and psychological effects and the maximum use of scientific achievements. The first principle expresses the class and political aim of the moral-political and psychological training. The second designates the practical approach to solving the problem. The third creates the prerequisites for the broad and profound use of scientific achievements in this matter.
Special commentary is needed for the question concerning the types of moral-political and psychological training. Obviously, in referring to the fact that in previously published works this question was examined in sufficient detail, the authors have essentially not taken up the given problem. But in the troops, it continues to be debated. In actuality, can one speak about moral-political and psychological training for carrying out a specific combat task or is this process incorporated in the general system of personnel training and indoctrination?

Troop experience and research have answered the posed question unambiguously: it is both justified and advisable to establish this as a relatively independent type of special moral-political and psychological training to carry out a complex combat training task. In the opinion of leading officers, the key questions of this sort should be: help in the personnel's elucidation of the forthcoming difficulties and the way to overcome them; the creation of difficult situations close in terms of psychological characteristics to the conditions of the forthcoming mission; the eliminating of negative mental states and the development of positive ones. Such an approach creates the prerequisite for the further development of troop training and indoctrination theory and practices and sets out the ways for actively introducing the specific procedures, forms and methods of moral-political and psychological tempering of the personnel into actual combat and political training.

One should note the section of the reviewed work which deals with an analysis of the process of forming correct notions in the men of modern warfare. The authors have rightly pointed out that the achieving of these goals in peacetime requires both the elaboration of a theory as well as great practical efforts by the commanders, political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations.

In the interest of carrying out the designated task, the book has incorporated materials on the particular features of the conduct of large masses of people under the conditions of natural disasters. It is convincingly shown that a sudden change in the situation causes a momentary rise in the tension of large groups of people and often develops into uncontrollable conduct, into panic. This happens because of the unpreparedness for an unexpected deterioration of the surrounding situation and from an ignorance of the causes and consequences of its change.

Incomparably more resistance to the effect of dangerous factors of natural disasters were inevitably the troop subunits which are characterized by precise organization, confident control and high moral-political and psychological preparedness for actions under such a situation. Consequently, the authors emphasize, the system of moral-political and psychological conditioning which has come into being in the leading units and formations includes a basis for actively mobilizing the moral forces of the personnel for bold and decisive actions under the conditions of modern combat.

More than one-half of the book's chapters (7 out of 12) is devoted to a review of the basic areas of moral-political and psychological training. The formation of a communist ideology has been established as the most important of
these and this is a logical continuation of the initial positions on the
ideological core of the moral-political and psychological stability of the
personnel and their constant readiness for actions under the conditions of
modern warfare.

Interesting to read are the chapters on the unity of military collectives and
on the indoctrinating of high discipline. Running through these chapters is
the notion that the military collective in peacetime prepares to carry out a
real combat mission. Consequently, both the structure and level of forming
the collective's psychology as well as the nature of the relationships between
the men should ensure high readiness, discipline and combat solidarity of the
subunit or unit.

How can this objective requirement of combat readiness be achieved? The work's
authors, in relying on rich factual material and the extensive generalization
of modern achievements in the area of military theory and practice, propose
ways for improving the moral-political and psychological stability of the
personnel. The effective involvement of the servicemen in active combat train-
ing and sociopolitical activities is viewed as the basic one. Here the central
idea is that in recognizing the necessity for joint activities and in carrying
out a mission along with comrades, the soldier becomes convinced of the
strength of collective actions. In the course of combat and political train-
ing, friendship, troop comradeship and mutual aid are developed and these are
the basis of the strong cohesiveness of the subunits.

In the chapters concerning the solidarity of the collectives and the indoctrin-
ating of discipline in the personnel, the point of the inseparability of these
processes is constantly made. One cannot help but agree with the authors.
Discipline is an awareness of a need to act in strict accord with the require-
ments of the military regulations and the standards of communist morality.
Discipline is at the same time both the sum of the requirements of the regula-
tions as well as the standard of relationships between the servicemen. The
moral climate of a collective is inevitably manifested in the level of the per-
sonnel's discipline. Such an interpretation of the relationship between the
collective's cohesiveness and the discipline in it provides a rationality for
the procedures, means and forms of political indoctrination recommended by the
authors. The personal example of the commander, the authority of the aktiv,
consistent and energetic nature of daily operations -- these and other com-
ponents of the indoctrination process form the high moral-political and psycho-
logical preparedness of the troop collectives.

In our view, there are also flaws in the chapters concerning the collective and
discipline and full of important information for the officers. They do not
have a sufficiently acute focus or a sufficiently profound analysis of the con-
duct of the troop collectives in a combat situation.

The 10th chapter examines the question of developing a readiness for heroic ac-
tions in the Soviet military. "Military heroism," the authors point out, "re-
quires from the soldier courage, steadfastness and a readiness for self-
sacrifice." These moral-political qualities, the book emphasizes, are formed
in peacetime, in the course of military and political training. For further
improving such work, the authors have selected a variation which is rather productive on the methodological level, that is, a scientific analysis of the reserves which are contained in the very practice of political and military indoctrination.

However, in the 10th chapter there is also an opportunity for improving both the content and forms of presenting the material. The experience of the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations in the area of propagandizing heroics as a system requires a more complete generalization.

A special word must be said about the concluding chapter. It in a way projects all that has been previously said into a practical light. Here reserves are disclosed for improving the moral-political and psychological conditioning of the men and which can be found in bringing the daily training conditions as close as possible to real combat. Such a principle in the approach to giving theoretical material merits approval. However, with a closer reading of the section, the feeling arises that the authors employed this procedure previously. In actuality from the first to the last chapter, the questions of the practices of combat and political training have been intertwined into a fabric of arguments, thereby connecting the theoretical conclusions to a concrete analysis of the activities carried out by the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations in the area of the moral-political and psychological training of the personnel.

In our view, the chapter would appear as a logical conclusion of the monograph under the condition that it incorporated the materials from special research and an examination of the process of creating a system of models for psychologically complex situations in the exercises and combat drills. The experience of the leading officers and the conclusions drawn by military scientists show that in the process of combat training the creation of situations of surprise, ambiguity of situation and increased psychological difficulties helps to turn each exercise into real schooling in moral-political and psychological training.

As a whole, the monograph merits high praise. It will be of interest to the military reader and represents a new, very substantial contribution to the theory and practice of one of the most important problems in raising the combat readiness of the troops, that is, the moral-political and psychological training of the personnel for decisive and active operations to defend the victories of socialism.

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OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON ETHICS IN INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 82 (signed to press 4 Nov 82) pp 73-79

[Unattributed article: "Spiritual Culture and Ethical Relations of Soviet Military"]

[Text] Exercises on the given subject are aimed at a more profound understanding by each man of the essence of culture and ethical relationships among servicemen and their role and significance in carrying out his civic and military duty.

Six hours are allocated for studying the subject. It is advisable to allocate this time in the following manner: 2 hours for the lecture, 2 hours for the independent study and 2 hours for a discussion.

In the course of the lecture, it is recommended that the following questions be examined: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the essence and purpose of socialist culture. 2. The spiritual make-up and ethical relationships among servicemen. 3. To carry the high title of armed defender of the motherland with dignity and honor.

In the brief introductory word, it is essential to emphasize that V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party have always paid great attention to the development of culture and to increasing the cultural level of the Soviet people and the Army and Navy personnel. At present, when our state, the USSR is on the threshold of its 60th anniversary, the grandiose successes of the Soviet people in cultural construction are particularly apparent. "Socialism," states the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR," "has been able to solve the problem of truly historic significance: to provide the achievements of culture to many millions of working people and to open all the sources of knowledge for each person, regardless of his social status and nationality. The nation has created broad opportunities for revealing talents and gifts, for the flourishing of the cultures of all nations and

* Material for political exercises on the subject "Spiritual Culture and Ethical Relationships of Servicemen. To Value the Honor and Dignity of the Defender of the Socialist Motherland."

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nationalities and for the creative activities of the masses in the area of science and art."

Under present-day conditions, the role and importance of culture are ever-increasing. Certainly to an enormous degree the cultural growth of the Soviet people determines the increase in the productive forces, progress in technology and the organization of production, increased social activeness of the workers, the development of the democratic principles of self-government, and the communist reorganization of everyday life. "Without a high cultural level, without education, social awareness and the inner maturity of people," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "communism is impossible just as it is impossible without the appropriate material and technical base" ("Leninskim kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 3, p 278).

I. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Essence and Purpose of Socialist Culture

In the broadest sense, the concept of culture means everything that has been created by man in the process of material and spiritual production, in contrast to what has been given by nature itself. In the literal sense of the word, "culture" means raising, development and improvement. Culture is ordinarily divided into material and spiritual.

Material culture encompasses the entire sphere of material activities and their results (the implements of labor, housing, daily necessities, clothing, the means of transportation, communications and so forth).

Spiritual culture encompasses the sphere of awareness, spiritual production (cognition, morality, indoctrination and education, including law, philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, science, art, literature and other areas of human spiritual activities). The content of spiritual culture is extraordinarily diverse. In commenting on this, M. I. Kalinin said: "The concept of culture is very broad --from the washing of one's face to the latest heights of human thought."

Socialist culture at present is the highest stage in the spiritual development of people. A historic accomplishment of V. I. Lenin has been that he worked out and established a truly scientific theory of socialist culture, he disclosed the sources for the genesis and basic patterns in its development, he defined the place and significance of culture in socialist management and in military organizational development and showed the fundamental distinction of socialist culture from bourgeois culture.

V. I. Lenin taught that proletarian socialist culture is the natural result of the social and spiritual progress of mankind. It has embodied and does embody all the finest and the advanced from what the human genius and the creativity of the masses of people have developed, in repudiating the reactionary culture of the exploiting classes. "...From each national culture we," wrote V. I. Lenin, "have taken only its democratic and its socialist elements, and we take them only and unconditionally in opposition to bourgeois culture..." (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 24, p 121).

V. I. Lenin labeled as "complete rubbish" the attempts of the so-called "proletarians" to create a certain new, purely proletarian culture which had nothing
in common with the culture of the past. On the contrary, he demanded "the turning of the entire sum of the very rich store of culture, knowledge and technology which capitalism has acquired and is historically inevitably necessary for us--the turning of all of this from an implement of capitalism into an implement of socialism" (PSS, Vol 36, p 382).

Socialist culture is fundamentally different from bourgeois culture in terms of its content and goals and in terms of the role which it plays in the life of society. In terms of its social essence and ideological content, socialist culture is a truly popular culture. Its highest aim is to serve the people and to produce well-rounded and harmoniously developed individuals. "Previously the entire human mind, all its genius created merely," pointed out V. I. Lenin, "in order to provide some with all the goods of technology and culture while others would be deprived of the most essential, education and development. At present, all the miracles of technology and all the victories of culture are becoming to all the people and from now on the human mind and genius will never be turned into means of violence and into means of exploitation" (PSS, Vol 35, p 289). This prediction of Lenin's has been fully confirmed.

Socialism has opened up for the workers broad access to knowledge and to the riches of spiritual culture. All the spiritual values created by society and all the material and other means for propagating culture belong to the working masses. The workers, the peasants, the intelligentsia, the representatives of all the nations and nationalities of our country, the people of different generations and sexes have an equal right to obtain an education, to participate in cultural life and to develop their talents and abilities. In prerevolutionary Russia, around three-quarters of the adult population was illiterate. While at that time 239,000 persons had a higher and secondary (complete and incomplete) education, in 1981 the figure was 149 million. At the beginning of 1982, in our country more than 100 million persons were involved in all types of instruction. In the USSR, there are over 1.4 million scientific workers.

"In the life span of one generation," commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "the Soviet nation fully and once and for all has escaped from the heavy yoke of illiteracy. The workers have become active participants in cultural life and the creators of spiritual values. From the depths of the people, there has emerged a new socialist intelligentsia which has brought glory to the motherland in its outstanding achievements in science and technology, literature and art. The meeting which the finest minds of mankind dreamed about, the historic meeting of labor and culture has come about. In the history of our nation, in the history of all world culture, this was a turning point of enormous significance" ("Leninskim kursom," Vol 6, p 580).

Through the concern of the CPSU, an extensive network of cultural and educational institutions has been set up in the Army and Navy. In the subunits there are Lenin rooms, TV sets, slide projecting equipment, musical instruments, newspapers and magazines. In the troop units there are clubs, libraries, technical propaganda equipment and so forth. In the garrisons there are officer clubs, Marxism-Leninism universities and museums of combat glory. In the districts, fleets and groups of forces there are officer clubs, song and dance ensembles, orchestras, theaters, sports clubs, folk theaters and museums for the history of the district (fleet).
In ideological-political, military and aesthetic indoctrination a major role is played by the central cultural-educational institutions and creative collectives such as: the Orders of the October Revolution and Red Star Central Club of the Soviet Army imeni M. V. Frunze, the Twice Red Banner and Order of the Red Star Academy Song and Dance Ensemble of the Soviet Army imeni A. V. Aleksandrov, the Order of the Labor Red Banner Central Academy of the Soviet Army, the Order of the Red Star Military Artists Studio imeni M. B. Grekov, the Order of the Red Star Central Museum of the USSR Armed Forces and others.

Socialism has put an end to the dividing of culture into "higher" for the elite and "inferior" for the working masses. Culture in developed socialism is the same for all the classes and social groups. We do not have any privileged schools, private theaters and movie houses, movie studios, picture galleries, clubs and salons. Socialist culture is of all the people, not only in content. All the best is available for all. This, in particular, has been set down in the USSR Constitution: "The state is concerned for the safekeeping, adding to and broad use of spiritual values for the moral and aesthetic indoctrination of the Soviet people and for increasing their cultural level."

Socialist culture is profoundly popular not only in its social focus, but also because the people themselves are its sole and authentic creator whether they are workers, peasants or intelligentsia. Here it is important to emphasize that cultural values are created not only people of mental labor, by cultural, scientific and artistic figures, but also by millions of simple workers employed in the sphere of material production, by persons not professionally engaged in science, art and so forth.

The unprecedented growth of invention and rationalization as well as amateur artistic activities shows the development of the creative activeness of the workers. In 1981, over 16 million persons participated in all the amateur artistic collectives of the club institutions within the system of the USSR Ministry of Culture and in the cultural-educational institutions of the trade unions and kolkhozes.

Distinguishing features of socialist culture are its class and party nature. While the leaders of bourgeois culture endeavor to depict culture as the expression of a general national spirit and to play down its class nature, the Marxist-Leninists say directly that socialist culture expresses the fundamental interests of the workers and serves to establish communist ideals. The party element in socialist culture presupposes an irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois and revisionistic ideology, nationalism, Zionism, the vestiges of the past in the conscience and conduct of people. It is particularly important to have this in mind under present-day conditions when the ideological clash of the two systems has increased and imperialist propaganda has become more refined.

Marxism-Leninism is the ideological basis of socialist culture. It arms the cultural figures with a truly scientific methodology making it possible to correctly assess what has been achieved and to see the prospects of development and to knowledgeably carry out creative tasks; it helps determine one's place in the overall system of the creators of a new society.
In contradistinction to bourgeois culture which serves as a weapon to divide
the peoples, to suppress one nation by another and reduce its cultural uniqueness, socialist culture in its essence, in its very nature is profoundly international. It carries the ideas of the fraternal unity of the peoples of our nation, the international solidarity of the workers in all countries in their struggle against any forms of suppression, for peace, democracy, socialism, for the physical and spiritual emancipation of the individual.

"In the rich ground of mature socialism, the united international culture of
the Soviet people grows and becomes stronger and this serves all the worker and expresses their common ideals," states the Decree of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR." "It embodies all that is generally recognized in the achievements and unique traditions of the national cultures. Socialist in its content, diverse in its national forms and international in its spirit and nature, Soviet culture is a great force for the ideological and moral unification of the nations and nationali-
ties of the USSR."

The internationalism of the Soviet people's culture is also manifested in bi-
lingualism, that is, the simultaneous mastery of Russian and a national lan-
guage. Russian which has been voluntarily chosen as the language of inter-
national intercourse has become truly a second mother tongue for all the peo-
pies of our country. This was well put by the prominent Soviet poet Rasul
Gamzatov: "In my heart I am the son of a mountaineer, but I'm accustomed to consider this great language as my mother tongue."

Socialist culture is characterized also by a new, higher type of human relations-
ships, by the establishing of the standards and principles of communist moral-
ity in the awareness and conduct of people. A most profound respect for the human individual lies at the basis of these. In Soviet society a new cultural and moral climate has been established on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the uniform socialist way of life. The principle of the moral code of a builder of communism "one man is another man's friend, comrade and brother," reflects the true nature of relationships between people in a socialist society.

The 26th CPSU Congress gave great attention to the development of the artistic culture of society, literature and art, to raising their role in the communist indoctrination of the workers. The congress decreed: "To develop socialist culture and art, to raise their role in shaping a Marxist-Leninist ideology and in more fully satisfying the diverse spiritual needs of the Soviet people" ("Materialy XXVI s"yzda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 182).

The congress obliged the literary and artistic figures and the creative intelli-
gentsia to create works worthy of our heroic people, of high ideological intensity and great artistic force. To live for the interests of the people, to share their happiness and grief, to confirm the truth of life, our humanistic ideals and to be an active participant in communist construction—this manifests the true popular and party approach to art.

The program outlined by the 26th CPSU Congress for the development of culture, literature and art is being successfully carried out and is having a positive impact on all spheres of communist construction and primarily on shaping the
spiritual make-up of the Soviet man, the builder and defender of the new society.

2. The Spiritual Make-Up and Ethical Relationships of the Soviet Military

The personnel of the Army and Navy are the very flesh and blood of the Soviet people. For this reason, it is quite natural that their spiritual make-up is to a significant degree a reflection of the best spiritual qualities of the Soviet people. "Soviet man," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "is a conscientious worker, a person of high political culture, a patriot and an internationalist. He has been indoctrinated by the party, by the heroic history of the nation and by our entire way of life. He lives the full-blooded life of the creator of a new world" ("Materialy XXVI s"yeyza KPSS," p 63). All these traits are also inherent to the personnel of our Army and Navy.

The spiritual make-up of the Soviet soldier is characterized primarily by a high degree of education, intellectual development and a constant desire to improve his cultural level and diversify his interests. While in 1939 only 12 percent of the servicemen had a higher and secondary education, at present virtually 100 percent of the men have a higher, secondary and incomplete secondary education. Almost 80 percent of the inductees arrive for military service with one or another specialty. Almost one-half of the officer positions in the Army and Navy are held by engineers and technicians. The words of V. I. Lenin that without science it is impossible to build a modern army are as timely as ever. The scientific and technical revolution has also engulfed the area of military affairs. Modern military equipment and weapons are the embodiment of the most recent scientific and technical achievements.

This has made serious changes in all areas of military affairs and in the organization of the troops, the forms and methods of combat operations, and has placed increased demands upon the training of the personnel. The Soviet military have successfully mastered the military equipment and weapons assigned to them. They control very complex combat machines, missile complexes and radio-electronic systems, they control atomic submarines and supersonic aircraft, and they have mastered the methods of the combat employment of diverse other military equipment. At the recent "Shchit-82" [Shield-82] Exercises held on Bulgarian territory, the Soviet soldiers proved to be knowledgeable and able masters of military affairs. Many of them were commended by the leader of the exercises, the Bulgarian Minister of National Defense, Army Gen D. Dzhurov.

The most important traits in the spiritual make-up of the Soviet military are love for one's socialist motherland and the countries of the socialist commonwealth, hate for the imperialist aggressors, loyalty to military duty, the military oath and military comradeship, discipline and organization, high vigilance and combat readiness. In speaking at the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said about the Soviet military: "They have not undergone the severe testing which befell their fathers and grandfathers. But they are loyal to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. And each time that the interests of national security and the defense of peace require, when it is essential to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier appears before
the world as a selfless and courageous patriot, an internationalist ready to surmount any difficulties" ("Materialy XXVI s"yedda KPSS," p 66). Many Soviet military personnel have received high governmental decorations for the unstinting fulfillment of their international duty.

A component part of the spiritual make-up of the Soviet soldier is his aesthetic culture, that is, the ability to understand and correctly value the beautiful in nature, in society and in art, everywhere and in everything to act according to the laws of beauty. It is particularly important to understand art. It enriches a man with knowledge, it helps to shape ideology, it establishes high moral and aesthetic ideals and acts as an important means of contact between people.

It frequently happens that a soldier or sailor, not understanding, for example, classical music, ceases to listen to it, feeling that this "is not for him." Certainly the works of musical art are in principle available to each person. It is merely a matter of making the necessary effort and forcing oneself to listen again and again to the works and then they will disclose their charm and enchantment.

The reverse also happens. Some feel that if they do not understand something in art, then it is bad. These comrades should recall the words of the outstanding Soviet film director A. Dovzhenko who said: "Viewer, if you do not understand something, don't think that you are confronted with something incomprehensible or bad. Look for the reason of miscomprehension in yourself. Possibly you simply do not know how to think."

One of the central structural elements in the spiritual make-up of the Soviet soldier is the moral maturity of an individual manifested in an activist position in life and ethical relationships. Ethical relationships presuppose that the moral values elaborated in Soviet society as principles in the moral code of a builder of communism, the standards and rules regulating the conduct of Soviet people have become the flesh and blood of the Soviet military and are a component part of their convictions, way of life and at the same time a program for their further improvement. Ethical relationships among the servicemen mean the strict observance by them of the entire aggregate of moral and proper standards and rules of conduct.

The conduct of the Soviet military is characterized by sincerity, mutual respect and a harmonious combination of personal interests and collective interests. Precisely this circumstance gave A. S. Makarenko the right to say: "...Each person who spends time in the ranks of the Red Army emerges from there a new person, not only with new military knowledge and new political knowledge, but also with a new character, with new manners and a new type of conduct" (A. S. Makarenko, "Soch." [Works], Vol 6, p 216).

Ethical relationships require seeing the individual in each person, regardless of his rank and service position and respect for his dignity and honor. Under the conditions of military service this is manifested primarily in the strict observance of the disciplinary requirements by each serviceman. Discipline is an important element in the culture of society and a means for organizing any purposeful activity of people and mobilizing them to carry out the tasks.
confronting them. "Without strong discipline," said the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal D. F. Ustinov, at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, "there is no military readiness.... But if the role of discipline has always been great in the past, at present it has risen immeasurably. In the age of nuclear weapons, with the enormous scope, dynamism and complexity of military operations and with the unprecedented significance of the moral factor, the slightest disobedience of the requirements of military discipline can lead to the most grievous consequences. This is why at present even individual manifestations of laxness and a lack of discipline are completely unacceptable."

The ethical relationships of servicemen are inconceivable without collectivism, comradely mutual aid and a helping hand. The military regulations oblige the servicemen to value troop comradeship, to help comrades in word and deed, to restrain them from unworthy actions and, in sparing not even one's life, to help them out of danger.

Unfortunately, soldiers and sailors are encountered who belittle the personal dignity of their comrades, who achieve privileges not provided by the military regulations and use insulting words and epithets in their conduct with fellow servicemen. Such instances must be decisively stopped for they run contrary to the very spirit of our social system and to the nature of social relationships and they disrupt the moral atmosphere in the troop collective.

Ethical relationships among servicemen exclude foul language and impoliteness in relations with one another. The outstanding Soviet pedagogue A. S. Makarenko pointed out that swearing is "an unembellished, petty, poor and cheap abomination, an indication of the most savage, primitive culture."

Characteristic of ethical relationships among servicemen are implacability against the persons fond of drink. Even individual instances of drunkenness tell in a most negative manner on the combat readiness of the units, ships and subunits. This is the main thing. But the very fact that a person in uniform smells of alcohol evokes condemnation among those around and harms the honor and authority of the army.

The ethical relationships of servicemen are manifested not only in their relations with one another, but also to other people, particularly away from the unit or ship such as in dances, theaters, parks, when visiting and so forth. Soldiers and sailors are encountered who behave properly while on duty, but as soon as they are outside of control and beyond the gate, they change completely. They endeavor to "cheer themselves up" with alcohol, they violate the uniform regulations and use foul language. These are isolated instances, but precisely they are noted. This is understandable as a person in uniform is always in view and attention particularly is drawn to his conduct, for a serviceman in the eyes of the workers is a model of uprightness, politeness and attention to others. "In a single glance at our Red Armyman and commander both enemies and friends should feel," wrote M. V. Frunze, "that here there is a solid, organized and united force which by its every deed, every word and step shows the presence of strong revolutionary will and inner tempering" (M. V. Frunze, "Izbr. proizv." [Selected Works], Vol 2, p 243). Smartness, sprightliness and irreproachable
bearing are the indications of inner organization and discipline in a man of a socialist army.

The shaping of the noble spiritual make-up of the Soviet military and ethical relationships is aided by our socialist way of life, by all the organization of service in the Army and Navy and by that great indoctrinational work which is carried out with the men of the Armed Forces. "The young men arrive in the military family without having any schooling in life," said L. I. Brezhnev. "But they return from the army as people who have undergone schooling in restraint and discipline and who have received technical and professional knowledge as well as political training" ("Leninskim kursom," Vol 5, p 535).

3. To Bear the High Title of an Armed Defender of the Motherland with Dignity and Honor

The noble political and moral qualities of the Soviet military, their patriotism and internationalism, their profound respect for working people, collectivism and comradeship are manifested in the flawless carrying out of their military duty.

To be an armed defender of the world's first socialist state is a high honor and the Soviet military do everything to be worthy of this honor. The entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces is visible proof of this. During the fairy years of the Civil War, in the battles against the Japanese samurais and the White Finns as well as in the mortal clash with German Naziism, our military covered themselves in undying glory and showed unprecedented courage and mass heroism.

Suffice it to say that just during the years of the Great Patriotic War, over 11,000 men were awarded the honorable title of Hero of the Soviet Union while over 7 million received orders and medals. Heroism was of a mass nature. Here is just one example. At dawn on 16 March 1944, an assault detachment under the command of Sr Lt K. F. O1'shanskiy landed in the region of the town of Nikolayev and captured a bridgehead. For almost 2 days of fighting, the handful of brave men drove off 18 attacks, they killed 700 Nazis, destroyed several tanks and honorably carried out the tasks set for them by the command. All 68 assault troops were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

This year, all progressive mankind is celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad. Now, some 40 years later, the feat of the group of guardsmen headed by Sgt Ya. F. Pavlov is a symbol of courage. For 58 days they defended a house in the center of Stalingrad. This group destroyed as many Nazis as were lost in capturing certain large cities in the Western countries.

The active participant in the Great Patriotic War, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his book "Malaya Zemlya" has written about such people: "What knights of spirit! What understated but ineradicable love for the motherland, what a thirst to defend it, in thinking not at all about their own life."
The most profound source of courage and heroism in the Soviet military and of irreproachable execution of military duty resides in a profound awareness by each soldier and sailor of his personal responsibility for defending his motherland, its development and flourishing, for defending the victories of socialism. Our people, said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a speech at a meeting of the Soviet Army and Navy Leadership in the Kremlin, love their Armed Forces and are confident in their constant readiness to defend their socialist motherland. They value the courage and self-sacrifice in carrying out their military duty.

In daily military routine, in fighting for high combat readiness, in joint labor to build the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] and in harvesting, in providing international aid to peoples fighting for their liberty and independence—everywhere the Soviet military have proven to be people of high moral culture, true humanists for whom, as the words of the well-known song say, in the world there is nothing higher than the happiness of the motherland.

Here are just several facts. Gasoline was being pumped at a railroad station. Sr Lt Kremenetskiy, in inspecting the execution of the assignment, breathed in a large dose of gasoline vapors, he lost consciousness and fell into the tank car. Pvt Poroshkin rushed to help him. He lowered himself into the tank car to pull out the commander, but himself lost consciousness. The arriving rescue team lifted both men out of the tank car, but were unable to save Poroshkin. In rescuing the commander from danger, Poroshkin had sacrificed his own life. His feat was commended by a high decoration, the Order of the Red Star.

The following happened in the city of Magadan. A group of seniors from one of the schools was going on a skiing trip. However, it became lost in a snowstorm which had started. The children, particularly the girls, began to freeze for they were lightly dressed. Under these conditions, Pvt Vladimir Soldatenko who was accompanying the group gave the girls all his warm clothing, including gloves, boots, and a coat which he cut up into pieces so as to warm their feet. A search party found the children and they were rescued. But they did not succeed in rescuing Pvt Soldatenko for he, in being concerned about the others, had sustained too great frostbite. The soldier sacrificed his life for the sake of others. His name has been immortalized in the name of one of the streets in the city of Magadan.

The instance which will be described below happened quite recently. The sub-unit under the command of the communist, Maj L. Svechkov, after successfully carrying out combat training tasks was on its way back from special tactical exercises. Close to one of the population points, the men spotted a forest fire. The fire at any time could jump across to the houses standing nearby.

Under the leadership of the Officers V. Solonovich and L. Svechkov, the men began to fight the fire. Shoulder to shoulder with the local residents, Sr Lt V. Bochinskly, WO ["praporshchik"] V. Krotov, Pysts A. Gaponov, A. Yagodin, V. Povaybo and others courageously fought the raging fire. By their efforts the fire was out. The inhabitants of the village warmly thanked the men for the aid provided.
Of course, the examples given above show the conduct of servicemen under exceptional conditions. But one must always remember one's military rank. The Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces demand that the servicemen constantly set an example of high culture, humility and restraint, that they strictly observe the demands of communist morality and behave with dignity in public places and on the street. A smart, circumspect soldier or sailor causes affection and respect among the Soviet citizens. Conversely, a sloppy, improperly dressed one causes nothing but the condemnation of the citizens.

"A serviceman...," state the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, "should value the honor and military glory of the USSR Armed Forces, his unit and the honor of his military rank." Each soldier and sailor should remember this.

Army lessons remain for all one's life. Army-tempered persons fear no difficulties and are capable of any jobs. They can always be recognized from their uprightness and conduct, from their particular organization, and from their attitude to life and the matter at hand. They can be encountered on a VUZ chair, where drilling rigs are digging into rock, in the law-and-order service and in a plant shop, behind a desk or at the controls of a tractor.... They may be either in the Tyumen oil area, in the Nonchernozem Zone requiring able, considerate hands or at the BAM. They are always in the front ranks of the fighters on the labor front.

In speaking at the 19th Komsomol Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev mentioned the necessity for young people "to learn implacability against even the slightest deviations from our social standards. To undergo schooling in army service, and to learn to master modern weapons and military equipment so as to always be ready to defend the motherland. Finally, from one's youth it is essential to learn to be persons who are cultivated, organized, who are able to value one's own and others' time, to respect the elderly--in a word, persons who are well brought up, kind, orderly and true citizens of a developed socialist society.

In completing the material on the subject, it is essential to reemphasize that the culture of developed socialism is the presently highest achievement in mankind's spiritual progress. This has been put into the service of the working people, the cause of peace and progress, the cause of building communism. Socialist culture makes it possible to more profoundly understand and judge the phenomena of social life and to correctly determine one's place in the construction of the new society and its armed defense. Culture has an enormous impact upon shaping the spiritual world of the Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy. An inseparable element in the culture of the Soviet military is their moral maturity and ethical relationships which make it possible for them to more successfully carry out their military duty.

During the hours of independent study, it is recommended that the students study the works of V. I. Lenin "On Proletarian Culture" (PSS, Vol 41, pp 336-337); "The Tasks of the Youth Unions" (PSS, Vol 41, pp 298-318); the USSR Constitution (Basic Law) (Articles 25-27, 45-47); the section of the Report of
Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS," pp 60-64); the speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 19th Komsomol Congress (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 12, 1982); the speech by the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yefishev, at the 19th Komsomol Congress (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 May 1982).

It is advisable to use the sheets of visual aids for political exercises "The 26th CPSU Congress on the Strengthening of USSR Defense" (Voyenizdat, 1981). In the free time it is possible to conduct excursions and cultural trips for the men to theaters, museums, as well as organized meetings with cultural and artistic leaders.

In the course of the discussion with the students, it is advisable to take up the following questions: 1. How did V. I. Lenin describe the essence and importance of socialist culture? 2. What is the fundamental distinction of socialist culture from bourgeois culture? 3. Why is socialist culture truly popular? 4. Why have the role and importance of the culture of Soviet people risen under present-day conditions? 5. What are the most important traits in the spiritual make-up of the Soviet military? 6. How are ethical relationships among servicemen manifested? 7. What is the role played by ethical relationships in uniting the troop collectives? 8. What obligations are placed on the soldier or sailor by the high title of a defender of the motherland?

Literature for Propagandists


5. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) SSSR" [The USSR Constitution (Basic Law)], Chapters 3, 5, 7.


7. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS," pp 60-64.


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GROUND FORCES

VICILANCE INDOCTRINATION IN BORDER MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 82 (signed to press 4 Oct 82) pp 40-44

[Article by Maj M. Maksimov, deputy regimental commander for political affairs: "In Developing a Feeling of Vigilance"]

[Text] Twice a year the new recruits arrive in the regiment. Ordinarily this event causes many problems. We always prepare ahead of time for it. Along with concern for a warm welcome, the organizing of routine and the setting up of training for the new men, we try not to overlook the questions of primary importance, that is, the ideological indoctrination of the men and the developing from the very outset of unflagging political and military vigilance in them. Here an entire range of organizational and political indoctrinal measures are subordinate to this. At a meeting for the commanders and political workers, a party committee session and a seminar of the Komsomol activists, the procedure is clarified for meeting the new recruits, for familiarizing them with the life and tradition of the regiment. The subjects of the first lectures, the evenings and other measures are determined as well as the executors and the dates for carrying out the plans.

Such increased attention to the new recruits is explained by a desire to shape them up as rapidly as possible and to bring them into the military family and by the fact that the regiment's personnel carries out its duties under the specific conditions of a border military district.

At the same time, I want to say frankly that this important area of party political work has not always been in the view of our political organization. Of course, the lectures and talks which show to the men the importance and essence of vigilance as a component part of combat readiness were organized and conducted by us regularly. I would even dare assert that much was done as once the commissars at a regimental party meeting were inclined to make such a conclusion not without a feeling of satisfaction.

But the mood changed when Maj V. Sinchurin, a delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress, took the floor and reminded us that we were obliged to indoctrinate a feeling of vigilance and a feeling of the closeness of the frontier more actively and systematically. That is, to form an involved complex of emotional, volitional and realized conduct of the men and the ability not to let down
under any circumstances and to be in a state of moral and psychological mobilization.

Communist Sinchurin was supported by others who spoke in the debates. We reached the conclusion that in the decree of the party meeting the thesis that "much had been done" had to be replaced by another "there is very much to be done." Probably then, in reflecting seriously over a difficult problem, the party members made a start in reorganizing work in this crucial area of indoctrinating the men.

In particular, here is what we paid attention to. In talks between themselves and with us, the commanders and the political workers, the young soldiers often said not without surprise: "Here everyone asserts that the frontier is nearby and there is a special atmosphere, but we do not feel this for some reason...." They obviously were expecting that the "Assembly" signal would ring virtually every 30 minutes in the regiment. But instead of this they were confronted with a regular training and military life ["uchebno-boyevaya zhizn"]. Reveille, studies, training, work and taps are carried out precisely according to schedule.

Clearly, out of miscomprehension the new men were falsely interpreting their impressions. The established order of life in the unit, the atmosphere of professionalism and organization, the firm procedures for standing duty still were not perceived by them as essential conditions for high vigilance. It was a question of explaining and not weakening this work subsequently. But we did not always proceed in this manner. Was this not the source of the instances of the violating of military discipline, the facts of the blunting of vigilance, particularly in the tactical exercises and in the course of firings and driving?

At the same time, in the regiment there were numerous examples of a profound understanding and specific manifestation of high vigilance. For example, there was the driver, Pvt. R. Zulinov who during service twice distinguished himself on partol. Once, in defending the installation assigned to him, the soldier apprehended a violator, showing quick response, decisiveness and boldness. The second time he was able to prevent an attack on the post and he apprehended and disarmed five criminals. For this soldier Zulinov was commended by a brief leave. The travel documents were presented to the outstanding man directly on the drill field, immediately after reading the order. However, we, the communists and the party committee members were then concerned by the mood in a certain portion of the men. In the talks natural in such an instance about how their fellow serviceman, a guy from Kirghizia, initially apprehended one and then five armed criminals, one could also spot clearly undesirable notes. In the eyes of certain fellow servicemen, Pvt. R. Zulinov had merely been lucky.

These are generally rather familiar views. They arise, as a rule, in an instance when something in the indoctrinational process had begun to weaken. We were unanimous in this at a meeting of the regiment's officers and at a party committee session. And we set for ourselves the goal of uprooting the false stereotype of thinking without fail and paying proper due to the courageous and self-sacrificing actions of Pvt Zulinov and our other vigilant soldiers.
We then began reflecting anew over the question of whether our daily party work was properly helping to create an atmosphere in the collective so that each man was profoundly aware that he was performing the task of securely defending the peaceful labor of the people under the specific conditions of the border region. Probably we were not doing this fully. Consequently, we had to reorganize our indoctrinational activities. We began to carry out only ideological indoctrination in the regiment with this aim. We have already created a definite system which includes a number of areas, primarily the indoctrination of vigilance directly in the process of military service using the examples of the exemplary service of soldiers and sergeants.

This task began to be more clearly apparent in the activities of the party committee and the regiment's ideological aktiv. An enlarged session was held for the agitation-propaganda group under the party committee. The basic directions and measures were discussed for improving the indoctrination of vigilance and a special lecture was worked up on the subject "Service in Our District and the Necessity of Showing a Heightened Feeling for the Nearness of the Frontier."

Upon the initiative of the Komsomol committee secretary, Sr Lt G. Romanov, the Komsomol activists in the foyer of the soldiers' club set up a large photographic stand for "There is Always Room in Life for aFeat" devoted to the courageous action of the sentry, Pvt R. Zulinov. In all the companies and batteries, wall newspapers and combat leaflets were issued and the political information reporters and platoon agitators held talks. Members of the agitation and propaganda group as well as party and Komsomol activists were sent out to the subunits. The content of their talks to the men certainly went beyond the limits of one fact, even such a noteworthy one in the unit's life. Subsequently, the checks on the standing of guard duty showed that the men began to carry out their duties more strictly at the posts.

The indoctrination of a special feeling such as a feeling of vigilance should be carried out with great persuasiveness and emotionality of the forms, methods and means of ideological work. Let me give an example. In carrying out a party committee decision, the unit propagandist, Capt G. Geta, prepared a lecture. What was it about? First of all, the communist reminded the listeners that it was only several kilometers to the state border of the USSR with the neighboring country. Don't be deceived by the quiet, he said to the listeners, don't believe the seeming tranquility. And in proof of his words, he gave instances of provocations and incidents on the border. After this, even more pertinent were Lenin's admonishments to be constantly on guard and that in the army military vigilance and military discipline brought to the greatest heights are essential.

An affect is also achieved by the fact that the lecturer skillfully weaves the most characteristic and convincing examples into the fabric of his story. He gives the names of the heroes who fell in the struggle for the motherland.

Having attended such a lecture, one is convinced that it makes a great impression on the young soldiers. Hence in the future by using various methods of an ideological indoctrination nature it is essential to heighten this impression so that day by day pride grows for their beloved motherland as well as a responsibility for securely defending its state interests.
One of the main component parts in this work consists also in the fact that we regularly inform the personnel of the subunits about the complexity of the international situation and the increased military danger from imperialism. For this purpose, we use the best forces of the volunteer ideological aktiv from the unit as well as lecturers from the local party raykom and the "Znaniye" [Knowledge] society. We try to have every training measure permeated with the idea of the need to remember and constantly carry out the admonishment of V. I. Lenin and the party of always being on guard, in constant combat readiness and showing the greatest vigilance. The ways for improving the indoctrination of vigilance among the personnel are regularly taken up at the party and Komsomol meetings, at theoretical colloquiaums with the officers, at seminars for the leaders of the political exercise groups and in the course of instructing the political information reporters and agitators.

But all of this is not enough. At the party meeting mentioned at the beginning, a proposal was made to use various forms for indoctrinating vigilance in a more frequent and broader manner and under the various conditions of the personnel's activities.

Thus, for the commanders and the communists of our party organization it became a practice to conduct political indoctrination measures devoted to vigilance questions directly in the course of combat training. For example, an exercise in weapons training was underway. The platoon or company commander or one of the party or Komsomol activists without fail reminded the men that their high vigilance means accurate shooting from the firearms, mastery of equipment and initiative in "combat"....

Or take the following form which we employed recently. According to the plan for party political work, for the period of a tactical exercise initially there was to be an excursion to the unit's room of combat glory. The communist Ye. Lesnikov told the men about the feat of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Capt V. Shmakov, and that the right to fire for the hero had been firmly kept in the competition by the two best gunners, Pfcs A. Kiykov and A. Uza.

Then there was a trip to the area of the forthcoming exercise and a meeting with the border troops from the adjacent outpost. The soldiers and sergeants were acquainted with the situation on the frontier and with the particular features of carrying out the difficult task of defending the sacred frontiers of the motherland. They saw for themselves that the service of the border troops presupposed primarily unflagging vigilance and a readiness at any moment to boldly and decisively act in order to thwart the plans of the border crossers. On behalf of the unit's men, the secretary of the subunit's Komsomol bureau, WO ["praporshchik"] A. Razdabyeda thanked the border troops and assured them that the regiment's personnel would study hard and defend and protect the motherland as vigilantly as they did.

The necessity of constantly maintaining the men's feeling of the proximity of the frontier during field actions was discussed at the party and Komsomol meetings and in instructing the aktiv. The day before the trip, the personnel met with the father of our serviceman and participant in the Great Patriotic War V. Ya. Ivantsov. The veteran's story evoked particular interest also
because Fedor Yakovlevich [Ivantsov] had participated in the defeat of militaristic Japan in the memorable August of 1945.

Characteristically, the commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol activists in the talks with personnel devoted a great deal of attention to the traditions of the men of our districts and to the particular features of the military-political situation in the given area. They emphasized the need to act in the exercise as if in real battle. For example, the communists V. Sinchurin, O. Yatsenko, V. Skripnik and others were able to find the needed, expressive words.

In the field, the work with newspaper materials was well organized. The delegate to the 19th Komsomol Congress, Officer G. Romanov, spoke with the men about the contents of the PRAVDA article which was titled "Caught Red Handed" and had the subtitle "The CIA in the Service of the Opponents of Detente." The communist links the story about the work methods of American intelligence and its constant attempts to secure secret data on the USSR and its defense potential with the tasks of the personnel and reminded the men of the need to always be ready to thwart any enemy intrigues.

Somewhat later the communist E. Barankevich, the commander of the motorized rifle battalion, told in detail about the results of this work, when at a session of the party committee his statement was heard on the involvement of the officers in the ideological and political indoctrination of subordinates.

In a short period of time Barankevich and other communists had acquired many interesting observations. It turned out that with the correct and creative organization of party political work, the concept of vigilance under field conditions assumed a specific, almost tangible nature for the men. This was particularly so if before setting to the field the soldiers and sergeants were reminded: "Bear in mind that the situation in the border area requires from you not only special knowledge and skills but also vigilance, circumspection and boldness...." The conditions as close as possible to combat reality made it possible to more convincingly explain to the men why close to the border it was particularly essential to be careful of radio traffic and their conduct in population points, to be restrained in talking with local inhabitants and neat, that is, not to leave behind any traces of presence.

In the party committee we studied, generalized and disseminated the experience of the commander, the party and Komsomol organizations in this battalion among all the other regiment's subunits. Of course, we in no way lessened our attention to the long established forms and methods of indoctrinating vigilance and we raised these questions in the party and Komsomol meetings, in the course of instructing the activists, giving lectures, holding talks and so forth. For example, we had an interesting special evening on "Vigilance--Our Weapon" and the regiment's propagandist invited members of the agitation and propaganda group to organize this. In the evening we used tape recordings and various visual materials and a documentary film was shown.

The unit's Komsomol committee very effectively held a demonstration evening for the secretaries of the Komsomol organizations. It was called "You Serve
in the Border Area." A recording of the speeches of V. I. Lenin, an informative report on the need to ensure secure defense of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and to indoctrinate the soldiers and sergeants in a spirit of Lenin's legacy, speeches by reciters and the attractive decorating of the room where the evening was held—all of this evoked interest among the Komsomol members and most importantly provided them with new knowledge and experience.

We still feel that far from all opportunities have been utilized in indoctrinating vigilance in the men. The regiment's commanders, political workers and communists are seeking out the most effective forms for influencing the awareness of the men. We will work steadily so that each soldier, sergeant, warrant officer and officer realizes that he is personally responsible for the security of his motherland. We will endeavor to constantly carry out this idea in all forms of ideological, political, military and moral indoctrination. The frontier is nearby and consequently the regiment's personnel should do everything within their power to be ready at any moment to decisively rebuff those who are trying to encroach on its inviolability.

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CSO: 1801/097
GROUND FORCES

INTERNATIONAL TROOP INDOCTRINATION IN SOUTHERN GROUP OF FORCES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 82 (signed to press 4 Nov 82) pp 39-44

[Article by Maj A. Andriyuk: "A Feeling of Military Fraternity"; the spellings of the Hungarian proper names are approximate]

[Text] Now the training year was over. It occupied a special place in the life of the Armed Forces. Certainly this was the year of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. All the deeds and thoughts of the motherland's defenders were directed at fully and effectively carrying out the plans and programs for military the political training as well as the obligations in the competition under the motto "Secure Defense for the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet people!"

The men serving abroad have constantly endeavored to follow this noble motto. The motorized rifle regiment X from the Southern Group of Forces [YuGV] has held its place among the right flankers of the competition. It would not be an exaggeration to point out that an important component in the regiment's successes has been its strong friendship and professional cooperation with its brothers in arms, the men of the Hungarian People's Army [HPA].

...The regiment was preparing for tactical exercises. The equipment and weapons were carefully inspected. The commanders again and again "played through" mentally and on maps the possible variations for the coming march and "combat." The political workers, the party and Komsomol activists endeavored to create among the men a high combat mood and to focus them on precise and confident actions. The combat training tasks were to be carried out jointly with subunits of the HPA. Hence, the success of the matter was determined not only by the personal combat qualities of the Soviet military and the teamwork of the platoons, battalions and the regiment as a whole, but also by a sense of comradeship which arises among people who in their mind and heart are aware of their fraternity in arms and their unity in goals and tasks.

During the period of preparing for the exercises, extensive party political work was carried out in the regiment. The communists and Komsomol members in their meetings discussed the tasks of effectively preparing for and successfully carrying out the exercise. A general assembly of the personnel was held with the agenda "To Carry High the Honor and Dignity of the Soviet Soldier Abroad."
The activities of the non-T/O propagandists became more effective. The members of the agitation and propaganda group Officers S. Yevas, I. Galyan and V. Osmonovskiy gave lectures and reports in the subunits on the subjects: "The 26th CPSU Congress on the Military-Political Situation in the World. The Tasks of the Personnel in Raising Vigilance and Combat Readiness," "The Warsaw Pact--A Secure Shield of Socialism," and "The Successes of Hungary in Building a Developed Socialist Society." During this time Lenin readings were actively carried out in the troop collectives on "V. I. Lenin on the Armed Defense of the Socialist Fatherland" and a contest "What Do You Know About Hungary and the Men of the HPA?" An evening of international friendship "In a Single Battle Formation" long remained in the memory of the motorized rifle troops and men from the HPA were invited to this. The comrades in arms held an interesting talk about life and combat training and the carrying out of the honorable duty of defenders of the victories of socialism.

Prior to the exercises, great attention was given to the training of the platoon agitators and the editors of the wall newspapers and combat leaflets. Seminars, instructional exercises and meetings were conducted for them, and the experience of the best activists in the previous exercises was studied. Of great importance for improving the international indoctrination of the men was the exchange of experience among the party and Komsomol activists of the two fraternal armies. Speaking at the meetings held were the Soviet officers Maj I. Chernyshenko, Sr Lt O. Onipko as well as WO ["praporshchik"] V. Sharov. Telling about their work were the comrades in arms, Sgt N. Tsukan and Pvt S. Barabash. Our soldiers and officers listened with interest to the comments of the HPA Lt Col J. Horvath, Capt A. Kermedi, Sr Lt J. Cendes and Pvt J. Kileman and J. Szeman.

The participants of the meeting met in the combat glory room of the Soviet Union and looked at fragments from the documentary film "Malaya Zemlya" which showed party political work being carried out in a combat situation. Hungarian comrades became familiar with the field sets of visual agitation and an exhibit of propaganda equipment. On the same day, Soviet soldiers showed their combat friends wall newspapers, combat leaflets and the contents of the files of the agitators and Komsomol group organizers, in a word all that helps the activists in effectively carrying out good agitation work both directly in the camp and under field conditions.

On the eve of the exercises, there was also an exchange of experience among the commanders of the companies, platoons and squads and men from the various specialties. They told each other how they were mastering the military equipment and weapons, utilizing their combat capabilities under various conditions, what difficulties were being encountered and how these were overcome in the course of carrying out the combat training tasks. Hungarian comrades showed great interest in the achievements of their combat friends and adopted much of this. The Soviet military proceeded analogously making notes in their notebooks and pads in the course of the meetings.

The creating of a high political rise and combat activity, the strengthening and development of fraternal friendship between the men of the two armies were also aided of the holding of joint meetings directly prior to the start of the exercises, by reciprocal appeal letters and by the adopting of obligation
decisions which expressed the ardent patriotic and international feelings of the men, their desire and readiness to successfully carry out the combat training tasks.

After such a joint meeting, the motorized rifle troops began the march to the designated concentration area. In the moving column, conditions for conducting political indoctrination with the men are certainly limited. But still, in using the slightest opportunity, the non-T/O propagandists Officers A. Korniyenko and I. Galyan, the agitators Sgt S. Bogotov, Jr Sgt V. Shpurik, Pvt G. Lipkan and others spoke with the men and endeavored to make each of them aware of the importance and significance of the joint tactical exercises with the HPA subunits.

The subunit had scarcely arrived in the designated area when the motorized rifle troops began to camouflage the military equipment and carry out engineer work. When time was available, the non-T/O propagandists conducted a political hour on the subject "The 26th CPSU Congress on Strengthening the Defense Capability of the Soviet State." Sr Lt N. Nechiporenko, in revealing the questions of the subject, made skillful use of the provisions from the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress and the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR" which emphasize the consistency of our party's Leninist course of the greatest possible strengthening of the socialist commonwealth.

The political indoctrination carried out on the eve and during the first stages of the exercises helped to create a high combat mood in the collectives. In the company, commanded by Sr Lt N. Nechiporenko, the men checked their weapons and military equipment and repeated their duties. Analogous preparatory work was carried out also in the motorized rifle subunit of the HPA under the command of Lt D. Radi. The officer explained to the men the importance of the forthcoming actions in ensuring the success of the joint exercises and emphasized the importance of strengthening the combat alliance of the brothers in arms.

...Then following the command, the combat vehicles were in the battle line. The Soviet and Hungarian troops acted precisely and in an organized manner. High tactical and firing skills were demonstrated by the subordinates of Sr Lts N. Nechiporenko and N. Veshnyakov, Lt V. Kokhanov and HPA Lts D. Radi and I. Mogor. The generals and officers observing the actions of the Soviet and Hungarian troops gave a high grade to the combat skills of the motorized rifle troops and pointed out their increased skill, teamwork and the ability to cooperate in carrying out complex tactical tasks.

The given joint exercise of the Soviet and Hungarian troops is only an episode showing the fraternal friendship due to which the defense might of the socialist commonwealth nations increases year by year. In the UGV, constant attention is paid to further strengthening the combat alliance of the two socialist nations and to increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of the units and subunits. This is understandable. Under conditions where the aggressive forces of imperialism again and again have intensified the arms race and initiated military conflicts in various regions, including close to the frontiers.
of the socialist states, as never before unity among the forces of the fraternal armies is essential. V.I. Lenin taught: "...In being confronted with the enormous front of imperialist powers, we, the fighters against imperialism, are an alliance which requires close military solidarity.... We say that a unity of military forces is essential and a departure from this unity is unacceptable."

Of exceptionally important significance in the strengthening of the combat alliance is active international indoctrination of the men as carried out by the commanders, political workers and Komsomol activists. They constantly keep in mind this extremely important sphere of ideological activity, being guided by those instructions and recommendations on indoctrinating the broad masses in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism as set forward in the documents of the 26th Party Congress, in the Decrees of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" and "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR," as well as in the speeches of the CPSU and Soviet state leaders.

By means of propaganda and agitation, the ideological fighters endeavor to make the soldiers serving on the territory of the fraternal nation profoundly aware of the important idea contained in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR": "With the greatest fullness the relationships between states inherent to the nature of socialism are embodied in the socialist commonwealth. This embodies a new, socialist type of international relations among sovereign, equal states united by a commonness of fundamental interests and goals by their Marxist-Leninist ideology and strengthened by ties of comradely solidarity, mutual aid and all-round cooperation." The decree also pointed out that CEMA and the Warsaw Pact help to successfully carry out all the tasks confronting the fraternal nations. The Warsaw Pact, the propagandists emphasize in their talks, serves as a secure shield of socialism and it successfully opposes the pernicious plans of the imperialist warmongers. And to strengthen our fraternity in arms in every possible way means to more successfully defend peace in the world and the bright future of the peoples.

In the troop collectives a definite system of international indoctrination has come into being. Above all, this involves the propagandizing of Marxist-Leninist teachings about proletarian internationalism as the ideology of fraternity and class solidarity among the workers of all nations and the historical experience of the international policy of the CPSU and the MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party) and the other communist and workers parties. Propaganda is also carried out by the commanders and political workers, by the members of the agitation and propaganda collectives and groups and by the workers of the cultural and educational institutions. In the political studies system for all categories of servicemen, Lenin's teachings on the nationality question are studied and these have been reflected in many documents and works of our party's prominent leaders.

At present, this work is based upon a profound explanation to the men of Lenin's ideas about internationalism, the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation
of the USSR" which outline the ways for strengthening the friendship of peoples in our country and all-round cooperation with the workers and military of the fraternal nations. In informative lectures, reports and talks, the non-T/O propagandists make the personnel aware of the history of the struggle by the workers in the socialist commonwealth nations for socialism. In using various forms of political indoctrination, the fighters of the ideological front tell the men about the growing political, economic and military unity, about the successes of the socialist states in building a new society and in strengthening the defense capability of the Warsaw Pact nations. Fraternal friendship is also strengthened in the course of joint exercises, the exchanging of experience and the joint celebrating of important dates in the life of both countries.

An important area of international indoctrination is the propagandizing of the feats of the Soviet military in liberating Hungary from the Nazis and the traditions of joint struggle against the common enemy. As is known, at the end of 1944 and the start of 1945, fierce battles were being waged here. More than 140,000 Soviet soldiers gave up their most precious thing, their lives, in the battles against the Nazi invaders on Hungarian territory. This is not being forgotten! In the towns and villages of the reborn nation, monuments have been set up perpetuating the feat of the Soviet soldiers. Each year on Victory Day on 9 May, on the Day of Hungary's Liberation from Naziism on 4 April and on the days of folk holidays, the Soviet military along with the Hungarian workers lay wreaths and bouquets of flowers on these monuments. Active propagandists of the military traditions of the Soviet internationalist soldiers are the Museum for the History of the UGV and the combat glory rooms. The special evenings conducted in them clearly disclose the international mission of the liberator Soviet Army and show the sources of the combat alliance in providing a secure defense for the victories of socialism.

Using the means of oral propaganda, visual agitation, the press and local radio, the activities of the communist parties and governments in the socialist countries aimed at strengthening the socialist commonwealth in the political, economic, social and military areas are explained to the men and the successes and advantages of socialism and socialist integration are propagandized. In conducting, for example, a political information session, our political workers and non-T/O propagandists tell not only about the achievements with which the Soviet people are celebrating the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR but also about the course of the socialist competition in honor of this noteworthy date in Hungary. This competition has involved broad stratas of the workers and one of its slogans is "Soviet Orders Ahead of Time!"

Using spare time in the political exercises with the soldiers and serenets, they studied the subject "The Successes of the Hungarian People in Building Developed Socialism. The Way of Life, Mores and Customs of the Hungarian People." On this same subject, 4-hour seminars and colloquiums were conducted with the officers and warrant officers as well as in the party education system. A series of lectures was organized on the friendship of the Soviet peoples and socialist internationalism in the officer clubs.

In each Lenin room, along with the stand "The Campaign Record of the Unit," a stand has been set up "Know the Nation in Which You Serve." Here they have
provided statistical data on the successes of Hungary in building developed socialism. In the subunits they have organized contests, special evenings and mornings on "Brothers in arms--Brothers in Arms" and "Friendship Strengthened in Battles."

The unit clubs and libraries have organized book and illustration exhibits on Hungary and the HPA, there is a selection of newspaper and magazine materials, and reader conferences and literary evenings are organized. Poetry, music and dances of the fraternal nation are included in the amateur concert programs. The combat cooperation evenings are particularly interesting and informative. Let us describe one of them.

...In the joint tactical exercises, the men of the HPA, the tank commander Sgt Pol Magyar, Jr Sgt Imre Mitroi, the driver Sgt Tibor Botos and other specialists performed excellently. They were protected against an "enemy" air attack by the Soviet antiaircraft gunners. Among them were Sgt I. Kokorin, Jr Sgt Yu. Morgunov and Pvt V. Boguslov and V. Artyushkin. After the intense day of combat training, everyone assembled in the soldier club. In the friendly meeting, our soldiers told their Hungarian comrades about the combat traditions of their unit and how in their multinational subunit there is a struggle to effectively carry out the socialist obligations assumed in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. In competing under the motto "A Secure Defense for the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People!" the antiaircraft troops day in and day out strengthen discipline and organization and increase vigilance and combat readiness. An atmosphere of friendship and mutual aid reigns in the battery.

The Hungarian tankmen also spoke at the meeting. The HPA Lt Col Jozef Szekeres extended to the Soviet soldiers a combat greeting and wishes for new successes in military and political training and in broadening and strengthening fraternal friendship among the men of the two fraternal armies. Maj Tibor Tereckel told the antiaircraft troops about the traditions of the HPA and of the regulations under which the Hungarian military serve and train. The visitors also acquainted our men with how the Hungarian tank troops study military skills, how their socialist competition is organized and what tasks they are carrying out at the given stage of combat training.

In the meeting, the men from the two fraternal armies, as a sign of friendship, exchanged souvenirs, they took a look at the exhibit of Hungarian and Soviet literature and viewed a number of film strips on the international friendship of the peoples of the socialist nations and the armed defenders of the victories of socialism. At the end of the evening there was an amateur artistic concert in which both the hosts and guests participated.

Similar measures are also organized in the other units of the group. They are particularly effective during a period of joint exercises. Prior to the start of such exercises and after them, as a rule, meetings and inspections of the equipment and weapons are held and these involve the generals and officers from the staff and political directorate of the UGV as well as comrades from the leadership of the HPA. In a majority of the garrisons, a good tradition has been established of organizing ceremonies jointly with the Hungarian military and in the course of these the officers and soldiers unanimously express their readiness at any moment to come to the defense of the victories of socialism.
In using diverse forms and methods of ideological work in the international indoctrination of the men, the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists consider what impression on this process is made by the exacerbation of the ideological struggle on the world scene and by the stronger attempts of our class enemies to drive a wedge into the commonwealth of socialist nations and their armies. Our opponents are counting that a certain portion of the military, and certainly these are basically young people who as yet do not have great experience in life and a firm class viewpoint, will be hooked by bourgeois propaganda. Consequently, at present, the importance of a well-organized and purposeful approach to patriotic and international indoctrination of the men is growing.

Practice shows that success in international indoctrination, like all ideological and political indoctrination, is determined primarily by the theoretical and procedural training of the indoctrinators themselves. The group has definite experience in this. Thus, assemblies are held for the officers arriving in the units and during these they study the particular features of organizing political indoctrination in the subunits under the conditions of overseas service and they are given useful recommendations. The questions of improving international indoctrination are discussed without fail at the regularly held political worker and propagandist days and in the assemblies and meetings of the party and Komsomol organization secretaries. In addition, in each company and battery non-T/O instructors are assigned from the officers and they are provided with necessary materials on the history and culture of the Hungarian people and they are acquainted with the work methods of strengthening friendship with the men of the fraternal army.

However, the effectiveness of the work done by the ideological aktiv in the international indoctrination of the personnel to a significant degree depends upon how the political workers and party organizations direct the efforts of the propagandists in the required direction and how effectively their activities are led in this area. The 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries emphasized the importance of indoctrinating the Soviet military in a spirit of combat friendship with the armies of the fraternal socialist countries. We feel that a dependable way for carrying out this task is to be found in correctly assessing what has been achieved, in seeking out existing reserves and in implementing still unutilized opportunities for strengthening international indoctrination.

...In a good frame of mind our brothers in class and brothers in arm are preparing to celebrate the glorious holiday of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. Their unbreakable alliance helps to successfully carry out the historic purpose of the socialist armies, that is, to defend peace in the world and to securely protect the creative labor of our peoples.

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CSO: 1801/112
AIR DEFENSE FORCES

IMPORTANCE OF EVALUATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 82 (signed to press 4 Nov 82) pp 57-62

[Article by Col G. Kryakvin: "In Order That a Grade Educates"]

[Text] The 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR is being greeted in a good frame of mind by the men of the Guards Antiaircraft Missile Unit where the communist, Officer N. Red’ko, serves. In struggling to carry out the high socialist obligations, the personnel have focused all their deeds and thoughts on further raising the combat readiness of the crews and subunits, at carrying out the complex and responsible tasks of defending the air frontiers of the motherland in an exemplary manner and along with the other units of the Air Defense Troops, making a worthy contribution to carrying out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the recommendations of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries.

In speaking at the forum of the Army and Navy communists, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, emphasized that "In the work of the party organizations the basic emphasis must be put on ideological, political and military indoctrination of the servicemen and on developing in them a heightened sense of responsibility for national security and the defense of socialism." In carrying out this demand, the men of the units completed the training year with high results. In considering the quality of the missile launches as one of the main indicators for their military skill, the combat crews at the final inspection exercise accurately hit all the targets. The result was an overall excellent grade. Particularly distinguishing itself was the subunit under the command of Guards Maj Ye. Lobintsev. The personnel of this antiaircraft missile battalion demonstrated good combat skills and mastery of the assigned weapons.

The unit also carried out other inspection exercises on the same high level. The guardsmen showed that they can keep their word.

The commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations and all the personnel in the unit have invested much effort into achieving the weighty end results. Organizational and indoctrinational work was carried out in many areas. Here in the plan for the moral-political and psychological tempering of the personnel particular attention is paid to alert duty. For this is the carrying out of a combat task and the most responsible type of
activity in peacetime for the Air Defense Troops. Its standing involves the operating of modern equipment and actions under complex and dynamic situations and under conditions of a great stress on moral and physical forces.

The command and party organization, in endeavoring to raise the indoctrination- al role of alert duty higher, have seen to it that each serviceman shows a sense of responsibility for the area assigned to him and the evaluating of the military service of the men is approached objectively and exactingly.

The evaluation for alert duty, as is known, is given by the crew chief and is formed from several components. Here they consider the training level of one or another specialist, his attitude toward the job, discipline and his ability to act according to signals and commands. Consequently, being an unique indicator for the degree of preparedness for combat both of the individual man and of the crew as a whole, the evaluation has a definite impact upon indoctrinating the personnel. If its effect on the serviceman's personality is viewed more widely, then it must be pointed out that this is multifaceted. For example, a grade can carry an emotional charge, a charge of excitement, and can touch the minds and feelings of the men and their will. It encourages a man to improve combat skills and to carry out duties in alert duty in an exemplary manner and develops in the men of the crews collectivist qualities and a desire to make a maximum contribution to the common cause. For this reason, an evaluation is used actively by the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations of a unit for developing high moral-political and psychological qualities in the servicemen.

Among the guardsmen, noteworthy experience has been acquired in this area. Considering that the evaluation for alert duty has a mobilizing and indoctrina- tional force when it is employed in the process of a daily ideological influence on the men, the commander and his deputy for political affairs plan and conduct the training of the subunit officers, the party and Komsomol organization secretaries in practical work centered around the results of military service. The questions related to the given problem are systematically brought up for discussion at service meetings, theoretical conferences, instructor-procedural exercises and seminars. In working directly in the subunit and crew, the com- mander, the political worker or the party bureau member analyzes how the evaluation for alert duty is being utilized for indoctrinational purposes and provides practical aid to the officers and communists on the spot. This produces positive results. A majority of the officers objectively assess the activities of their subordinates and ably utilize the indicators achieved by them in alert duty to indoctrinate in the men a high sense of responsibility for carrying out the combat tasks. In particular, the commander of the antiaircraft missile battalion, Guards Maj V. Shabaldin, merits a good word in this regard.

The military collective headed by him is on duty close to the USSR state fron- tier. On each alert duty, the guardsmen demonstrate the ability to endure great moral and physical stresses and to ably employ the weapons and military equipment. They are constantly improving their skills of destroying the air enemy. Each duty is a new step by the men in increasing military skill and moral maturity. Of course, here a role is played by the solemn ritual of going on duty and this is an effective form for indoctrinating deep patriotic feel- ings in the men and above all a feeling of personal involvement in defending the
motherland's air frontiers. During the ritual the commander's order for going on alert duty is read out.

All the men actively compete for the better, exemplary execution of the combat task, investing knowledge, strength and energy into the question assigned to each of them. It is very important that the commander, the political worker and the other officers daily profoundly analyze and compare the results of their military service, the successes and failures and establish the pacesetters, the best crews and squads. The soldiers and sergeants who have received outstanding evaluations for alert duty are commended by the commander. They also practice such forms of encouraging military endeavor as the presentation of certificates, the dispatching of letters to parents and the honoring of the outstanding men. All of this helps to develop in the servicemen a profound understanding of their duty, it is an incentive in their military and moral improvement and strengthens discipline.

In widely utilizing various forms and methods of a political influence on the men, the communist officers instill in the battalion's personnel an acute sense of responsibility for carrying out the combat mission as well as an awareness that military service is as essential for our society as is the labor of the worker, kolkhoz member or member of the intelligentsia and that this labor is a matter of honor and valor for it ensures the motherland's security.

The commander, the political worker and the communists constantly explain to the personnel the reality of the military threat and unmask the aggressive policy of the United States and the other member of the NATO bloc. Each crew specialist from the present-day military-political situation constantly draws his own conclusion of the need to show unflagging vigilance and to stand duty only excellently. The talks of the activists about the specific means of air attack by the probable enemy and the capabilities of our weapons to destroy them add to the serviceman's sense of responsibility and confidence in himself.

As a rule, along with explanatory work, in the battalion they also carry out a process of further improving the tactical skills of the missile troops. All the training measures related to preparing the antiaircraft missile complex to carry out the combat task are held under conditions of maximum closeness to actual combat and with the gradual complicating of them. At the same time, they publicize the activities of those men who receive a high evaluation for their actions on alert duty and have commendations for this. Thus, recently the entire battalion personnel was told of Guards Jr Sgt Ye. Smirnov who, in being on alert duty, showed high military skill and efficiency and demonstrated a profound knowledge of the equipment and the ability to operate it under various situations.

Such publicizing of the outstanding missile troops is usually carried out together with the explaining of the real military threat coming from imperialism. The actual working out of different variations of "combat" by the personnel and testing the ability of the crew members to take over for each other are a logical continuation of this.

The morale of the battalion's personnel is strengthened in the course of political studies which are one of the central elements in the ideological and
moral-psychological conditioning of the servicemen. Here, any measure, be it a lecture, a talk or a seminar on political training, is closely tied to the practical activities of the missile troops which require from each of them will power, courage, efficiency and the unswerving observance of the instructions and regulations. The evaluation for alert duty is an indicator of the soldier's actual ideological and combat maturity. This is widely used by the leaders of the political exercise group. Thus, in conducting an exercise on the subject "Always Be Ready to Defend the Peaceful, Creative Labor of the Soviet People, the Cause of Peace and Socialism," the leader of the political exercise group, Guards Capt Zholobkov explained how Pvt Starostin carried out his military duty in defending the motherland's air frontiers. In profoundly knowing his job, in precisely observing the requirements of the regulations and documents governing alert duty and in showing responsibility, the officer emphasized, this guardsman has received only excellent evaluations for alert duty. The propagandist went on to give another example characterizing the actions of the student in the group, Guards Pvt Sulaymanov, who had received a low grade for alert duty. The guardsman's captain explained in detail the reasons for the reduced grade for this man and suggested on what he must concentrate in standing alert duty. Both the positive and negative examples given in the political exercise had an indoctrinational effect.

The evaluation for alert duty is actively employed by the battalion's communists in all the propaganda and mass agitation work. In the lectures, talks and political information sessions they bring up how the men are carrying out their duty to defend the motherland's skies and what moral-political and psychological qualities they must possess. This undoubtedly has a positive impact on the personnel. This already was pointed out, the grade for alert duty is given not only to the individual man, but to the entire combat crew, too. Hence, it is an unique incentive to further unite the troop collective, it raises its responsibility to carry out the combat task and helps to strengthen friendship and troop comradeship. The desire of the entire crew to obtain a high number of points for alert duty encourages the experienced soldiers and sergeants to help the novices in mastering the complex equipment and to pass on their knowledge to them. For this reason, in giving a grade for duty to one or another man, the crew chief determines the contribution of each man to the subunit's success and instills in the men a pride for their collective. Such an approach to the question unites the personnel and mobilizes them to successfully carry out the combat mission.

The indoctrinational process described here is carried out with the direct, effective involvement of the communists and Komsomol activists. In considering the circumstance that the troop collective is a multinational one, they thoroughly disclose the particular role of friendship between the men of different nationalities in operating the antiaircraft missile complex and in working out the combat training tasks and standards.

The many years of experience of this and other subunits persuade one that the evaluation for alert duty is an important means for indoctrinating the service men. The great attention which is paid to this by the battalion party organization headed by Guards Maj Yu. Murashov is completely natural. In the work style of the activists one can clearly note such concerns as ensuring the example set by the communists in carrying out service duties on alert duty,
propagandizing advanced methods for assessing the knowledge and skill of the missile troops, as well as generalizing and disseminating advanced experience. In the subunits, they see to it that the communist officers so assigned objectively approach the evaluating of their subordinates' actions. The party organization deals strictly with those CPSU members who embellish the true state of affairs thereby setting a bad example for the remainder.

The questions related to the use of the evaluation as a means of indoctrination are systematically raised at party meetings. Thus, at a meeting with the agenda "On the Work of the Communists in the Area of Indoctrinating Vigilance in Light of Present-Day Demands" and in the report and debates, they brought up how the evaluation is employed as a means for developing high moral-political and psychological qualities in the personnel. There was sharp criticism for the shortcomings which still, unfortunately, exist. In particular, the comrades pointed them out to Guards Sr Lt N. Pavlyuchenko who did not always promptly give the results of standing alert duty and did not use moral incentives in indoctrinating his subordinates. The criticism did the officer good. Pavlyuchenko drew the correct conclusions from it. The party meeting was an incentive in improving his work and the work of other communists.

In carrying out the decree, the party organization held a colloquium for the communist officers on the methods for giving grades. Seminars were also held for the party and Komsomol aktiv and here they discussed the questions of utilizing the evaluation for indoctrination purposes, and the attention of everyone was drawn to the photonewspaper "They Stand Alert Duty Excellently." In the Lenin room and at the battalion's command post they have put up portraits of the men who received outstanding grades for alert duty. The party organization has generalized and issued to all officers the experience of the CPSU member, Guards Capt V. Sirotkin. What is affirmative in his activities? The battery commander has profoundly and objectively analyzed the actions of each subordinate specialist, he deals strictly with oversights and does everything so that the evaluation for alert duty plays an indoctrination role. If it turns out that an evaluation has been reduced for a specialist because of insufficient preparation, then V. Sirotkin intensifies individual indoctrination work with him. In the event that the shortcomings are characteristic for an entire launch crew, he holds additional exercises and drills on the platoon or battery level. It must be said frankly that the advanced experience of Guards Capt Sirotkin helped the officers, particularly the young ones, more clearly understand the importance of the grade and more fully utilize its indoctrinal role in daily practice.

In mobilizing the personnel to carry out a combat task in an excellent manner, the party organization has supported the initiative of the Komsomol members in the battalion "Stand Alert Duty Only Excellently." Under the recommendation of the communist, increased demands were placed on those who had low indicators or made mistakes in performing their duties. The party organization also recommended that the Komsomol activists in the battalion and their leader, the communist A. Kiselev, make it a practice to more widely hear reports by Komsomol members at the bureau sessions. The increased social exactingness has had a beneficial effect on the Komsomol members, it has mobilized them to zealous service and has increased their responsibility for the job. This was the case when the Komsomol member, Guards Pvt Tkach, having received a low grade for
alert duty, reported to his comrades in the organization. The activists thor-
roughly analyzed the reasons for this result, they criticized Tkach and demand-
ed that he fundamentally change his attitude toward carrying out his duties.
This talk, the objectivity and principledness of the Komsomol activists played
a positive role. Now, Guards Pvt Tkach whom they helped recognize his error in
a prompt and comradely manner has completely eliminated his shortcomings.

The well-coordinated work of the commander, the political worker and party or-
ganization in this battalion has helped to improve the military deeds of the
men. In terms of the results of the socialist competition, the battalion is
one of the leaders in the unit. The men vigilantly guard the air frontiers of
the fatherland and excellently stand alert duty.

Several months ago a different situation existed in another subunit. In carry-
ing out an inspection, the unit staff officers discovered that certain perame-
ters of the antiaircraft missile complex were on the edge of the acceptable.
In analyzing the reasons for the occurrence, the conclusion was drawn that
individual communists from this military collective had embellished the true
state of affairs and had given grades which were higher than the merit. As a
result, the personnel had lowered its responsibility for servicing the materiel
and for maintaining it in a high degree of combat readiness. The unit commander
and then the party activists dealt strictly with the CPSU members, Guards Maj
Yu. Basanyuk and Guards Maj A. Stroilov for their errors. This was a good les-
son for them as well as for other communists in the subunit. Each man under-
stood the harm caused to the indoctrination of the personnel by letting up on
individual work, exaggerating the state of affairs and, in particular, increas-
ing the grades. They began to show more principledness and objectivity.

A shortcoming in the work of certain communists is the fact that they have not
learned to employ a grade in such an important question as the strengthening of
military discipline. In announcing the results of the standing of alert duty,
these commanders do not always point out how one or another serviceman observed
the moral standards of conduct and fulfilled the demands of the oath and mili-
tary regulations, the rules for standing alert duty. The unit's communists
see one of the unused reserves in this. And here there is something to think
about for the commander, the political worker and the party members. Primarily
in the area of teaching each officer to effectively use the indoctrinational
force of a grade.

It must be said that in summing up the results of military and political train-
ing and the fulfillment of the socialist obligations over the past training
year, much has been done in this regard in the unit. With all categories of
the personnel and primarily with the officers, there has been an exacting anal-
ysis of the practice of organizational and political indoctrination work to
ensure the high quality of alert duty and to maintain vigilance and combat
readiness. In the training-procedural assemblies with the commanders and po-
itical workers, they have examined in detail the advanced experience of in-
doctrinational work aimed at creating in the troop collectives an atmosphere of
concern for the best examples of military service, an objective and at the same
time principled approach to evaluating the achieved results, implacability for
shortcomings and attempts to varnish over the true state of affairs. The unit
political section has generalized and propagated the experience of the
commander, the deputy for political affairs and the party organization in the antiaircraft missile battalion headed by Guards Maj V. Shabaldin. The advanced commanders of the combat crews were given an opportunity to speak to the officers and to share their methods and procedures for training and indoctrinating the missile troops in alert duty.

What else needs to be emphasized? In the unit described here, they are far from absolutizing the grade. They merely see in it one of the elements of the indoctrinational process which must be heeded. The commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists, in realizing well that a grade demands a maximum of objectivity, thoroughness, accuracy, promptness and a fixed periodicity, do everything so that this element be secure and strong.

Life itself has demanded that the officers constantly indoctrinate all the personnel in a conscious attitude to overcoming the real difficulties of combat training and alert duty, in bearing in mind the permanent truth that the more difficult it is in training, the easier it is in combat. They must pay constant attention to establishing in the conscience of each serviceman a clear realization that he is carrying out a responsible assignment to defend the socialist victories of the Soviet people. Practice shows that it is essential in every possible manner to raise the authority of the evaluation and improve the procedural skills of the officer personnel in utilizing this. This work must be carried out comprehensively and purposefully, involving in it the commanders and a broad circle of the party and Komsomol aktiv. Then the grade will become a good indoctrinator and an important moral incentive in the personnel's struggle for high combat readiness of the units and subunits.

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CSO: 1801/112
COMMAND TRAINING FOR JUNIOR NAVAL OFFICERS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 82 (signed to press 4 Oct 82) pp 45-49

[Article by Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Capt 1st Rank O. Tomashko: "To Aid Actively in the Development of the Lieutenants"]

[Text] From the results of an inspection, a senior chief concluded that there were a number of major oversights by the commander of the ship subunit, Sr Lt L. Login, in his work with subordinates. This conclusion caused obvious perplexity in the young officer who had recently been promoted.

"I can't figure it out," he said shrugging his shoulders in talking with us, "why such a conclusion was made. Certainly my attitude toward the job has not changed. I spend just as much time as before with the men and I seek out and find the time to talk with individual seamen...."

"Say, how many seamen are there in the group you commanded before arriving here?" said one of the members of the inspection.

"Of course there were fewer than here."

"Precisely how many?"

"Four-fold."

"There you are: 4-fold!" said the questioner summing up. "Just think what this means for you as an indoctrinator. You say that you are working 'no less than before' but now the old measure is no longer applicable."

As it turned out, the inspectors, having carefully analyzed the situation, concluded that the senior lieutenant, having become the commander of a combat department, did not make any noticeable step forward in his forms of work with subordinates and in organizing cooperation with them. In being assigned to a new position, he psychologically did not change and moreover continued to think as before by the standards of a group commander. And sometimes even with the standards of an officer candidate. This was how he approached the job. But the commander of a combat department has a completely different scale of work. His subordinates are no longer seamen and petty officers, but rather officers who, it may happen, are both older and have greater experience
in life. All of this, certainly, requires thinking in other categories and the following of different methods. But the senior lieutenant did not consider this. And he did not receive the corresponding instructions and aid on time. As a result, there were failings in the work and unforeseen disappointments.

Somewhat earlier, incidentally, on this ship another officer had been in a similar situation. Something similar had been noted last year, too....

Need it be said that the development of a young commander and the mastery of a new position for each officer is an untrod path? Here no one is guaranteed against mistakes. Obviously, each person would agree to such an assertion. But how should one understand the fact that rather often a young officer develops by trial and error and does not take up the time-tested experience of senior comrades. Why does this happen? Is this not because much in his development as a commander is not always considered by superiors? And above all, this is the psychology of the young officer's age and the psychological features of his growth as an official who has been entrusted with the command of men and to interact with them. Or, possibly, because in the flow of routine certain commanders rather quickly overlook the recent graduate of a military school? Probably here both factors are present. The reason in any event is not just one.

Let us examine more carefully the instance which happened with Sr Lt N. Login. An outstanding man constantly in his officer candidate years, he endeavored, as they say, to be on top of things also on the ship. Within the allocated time he passed the exams for independent command of the subunit. From the very outset he showed good technical training. This was sufficient so that the appropriate opinion about him was gained by the ship's commander and his immediate chief. Because of this, very quickly control over the development of N. Login as a commander, it might be said, was reduced to a minimum. Certainly, promptly granted independence is a great matter. However, this also presupposes both aid, supervision and daily influence by superiors. An influence without which a young officer finds it difficult if not impossible to overcome the difficulties encountered on his path. There is much proof for this.

"After graduating from school, it took more than a year for me to get on my feet. And not because I did not know the equipment. Here everything was comparatively good. I was unable and did not know how to work with subordinates, although I had been taught this...."

"It took more than 1 month after my appointment to the position of group commander before I internally felt ready to work at full strength and gained confidence in myself. I had much to do independently...."

"In the unit much had been done for our development as a commander. But I still did not receive the main thing, that is, a good explanation of how to work with the personnel or advice how to behave in one or another situation or how to proceed...."

These are the replies by certain young officers on the initial period of their post-graduation service. They are answers in which much does not concur.
However, there is a common feature. It, this common feature, shows that after being appointed to a position, work with the school graduates is sometimes organized in a one-sided manner, that is, the emphasis is put on their mastery of the details of operating the equipment and materiel while the particular features of leading the personnel are viewed superficially or completely overlooked. Such omissions lead to the most undesirable consequences for, as was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, in his report at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, the effective functioning of military collectives depends largely upon the preparedness of the officers to work with the personnel and upon the ability to consider their personal qualities, to firmly and ably lead the collectives which are subordinate to them in service.

The report of the USSR minister of defense particularly emphasized the idea that the specific features of troop control under a modern complex situation makes it obligatory for any rank of military leader to have the ability to accurately feel changes in the collective's psychology, to promptly spot and support initiative and to mobilize the will and energy of the men to successfully carry out all service tasks. This means that an officer should acquire such a capacity and such an ability from his very first independent steps. From the first, most responsible ones for his development in the role of the organizer of the training and indoctrination of subordinates! How can he be helped in this? Who to a certain degree determines successful advancement toward the goals in spite of the difficulties related to the mastery by yesterday's school graduate of the skills and abilities for the leader of the military collective assigned to him?

Certainly, this is for the senior commanders and political workers who are wise in experience and have mastered all the fine points of working with people. Their recommendations and advice for each person entering an officer position can be grouped in the following manner:

1) The study of the collective of subordinates is best started by analyzing the evaluation characteristics which can be obtained from the most diverse officials in the units. Here a matter of particular attention is the style of relationship in the subunit, the attitude toward the members of the aktiv and the availability of all types of supplies for the personnel.

2) The study of individual servicemen and talks with them.

3) Work with the junior commanders.

4) The recruitment and placement of the aktiv.

5) The work in maintaining proper relationships and establishing a normal psychological climate in the subunit.

Let us bring this to a close. The limits of the given article do not make it possible to bring out in detail the content of the recommendations and advice on each of the areas (incidentally, this has not been the aim here). We would merely emphasize one idea: experienced indoctrinator officers help the young
lieutenants learn first of all how they should act in one or another situation, what to do, and how to specifically organize the activities of subordinates for successfully carrying out the service task.

In one of the leading units, where Maj. M. Kroytor serves, the instructive experience of working with the young lieutenants has been generalized. In order to help them in their rapid and effective development, there the commander, his deputy for political affairs, the party organization and the subunit commanders specially plan their work. Lecture series and talks are given to help those who have recently taken over a subunit. Many specific questions of their cooperation with subordinates and other fellow servicemen are under the close attention of the command. Let us repeat, under close attention, for in the leading unit they are perfectly aware that the incorporation of a young officer in a military collective, from the viewpoint of establishing professional ties, is a very difficult process.

It is generally recognized that the moment a school graduate arrives in a unit or ship marks the start of a qualitatively new stage in his service biography. Certainly they say a great deal about this to the lieutenant, however they do not always emphasize the idea that the given moment marks primarily the inclusion of the new arrival in a complex system of relationships in the military collective. As a group commander or, for example, as a platoon commander, he enters into close contact with the subordinate personnel and at the same time with others equal in rank and position, that is, "along the horizontal" as well as "along the vertical" with chiefs and superiors.

In carrying out various service affairs and in cooperating with fellow servicemen, an officer at the same time remains an unique individual, a person with his inherent good and bad qualities, with his feelings and aspirations, needs and inclinations, with his ideas and plans. He may like some one or some thing in the unit, and may also find some thing or some one not to his liking. Because of this, his relations are selective and he will show sympathy for some and desire to establish an even closer contact with them, while with others he will be restrained and with still others indifferent.

Certainly too, in relation to the young officer, the officials around him through a certain reticence of official ties will also show some sympathy and antipathy. How else could it be? Sooner or later all of this begins to be felt in professional relationships and in the nature of the official ties. It is a good thing if we see that the personal relations, in being superimposed on the professional, official ones, supplement them on a positive level. Much is gained from this.

But what if this positive harmony of official and personal relations is not observed, if the lieutenant is unable to establish a strong contact with subordinates or simply does not give proper attention to this? In this instance can we speak about a lack of emotional well-being in the relationships of the officer with the surrounding persons or can we point to the need to take effective measures in order to normalize the contacts and ties between the officials? Experience suggests that the sooner this is done the better. Being unable to correctly establish relations with service comrades, a young officer, as a rule,
for a long time experiences a feeling of difficulty in resolving everyday tasks. He acts without the proper impact and without that zeal which is inherent to persons if they have found themselves and their place in a collective.

Practice shows that commanders and political workers, in organizing various measures with the young officers, endeavor to do everything possible so that, in using the language of sociologists, the period of their social psychological adaptation in the subunit is short and painless. Here a great deal depends upon considering the individual features of people and this, in the conclusion of many working officers and military researchers, is an indispensable condition for attaining the desired results. But there are also aspects which, so to speak, are general and are manifested outside of a dependence upon various personal qualities and unfortunately these are not always taken into account.

Each of the young officers is a peer of his subordinates. In essence, he is also very close to them in his psychology. Consequently, all the traits and qualities inherent to youth are found in him. Precisely because of these psychological features, characteristic for many military school graduates is a desire to show their best to the fellow servicemen, commanders and particularly to subordinates.

This desire, you will agree, is very praiseworthy. Yet the problem is that a desire to stand out against the general background sometimes involves deeds which are not quite logical. Certain young officers, for example, in desiring to establish themselves more rapidly, do not always heed the advice of more experienced comrades and superiors. They often act, as they say, at their own peril and risk. And here they make mistakes. At times, very substantial ones. With good reason the basic task for the commanders and political workers in the given instance is the need for a guiding hand for such officers in order to help them avoid major errors.

In certain subunits and units where such work has been studied, we noted one important, in our view, feature. The senior officers above all endeavored to persuade their young fellow servicemen that personal initiative should be reinforced by experience. And this must be acquired. Consequently, for this they must study. There is nothing wrong with turning for advice and aid to any fellow serviceman. Even to subordinates and younger persons. This in no way impedes the establishing of the lieutenant's authority. But a mistake made once or twice or a rash step inevitably has a negative effect.

Furthermore, in carrying out certain specific tasks it is possible and obviously necessary to first seek advice from one's subordinates and to learn how they intend to achieve better results. Experience shows that the accustoming of the soldiers or sailors to such a talk makes them subsequently more active and efficient and encourages them to struggle for even higher indicators. Inevitably things benefit from this as they did, for example, in the subunits under the command of Lts S. Smirnov and K. Zayats. Recently in the course of exercises their subordinates demonstrated high skill and particularly precise cooperation. In the view of the unit commander, this was a consequence of a heightened sense of responsibility on the part of each specialist for ensuring overall success. In the analysis he particularly pointed out the enterprising
actions of the named young officers who prior to carrying out the combat training task along with the subordinates, analyzed all the possibilities for increasing the results of their actions according to the received inputs. Here certain flaws were detected in the special training of individual men, the ways for eliminating them were set and increased obligations were planned in the servicing of combat equipment. This targeting was also a crucial prerequisite for the overall success achieved in the course of the exercise. In turn, Lts S. Smirnov and K. Zayats drew very valuable conclusions for themselves on the benefit of a specific, professional talk with their subordinates.

Many readers will obviously agree that a goodly percentage of young officers, regardless of their already-existing experience in life, at times are too straightforward in assessing people around and are not able or at times do not want to delve into the essence of what had happened or objectively consider all the factors which determined various actions by subordinates.

Once, at a party meeting of a motorized rifle battalion which I happened to attend, three times the name of Lt Yu. Stepanov was mentioned. But generally there was one reason for this. Stepanov, obviously wanting to appear exacting to all his subordinates, made no concessions even for young soldiers whose [lack of]experience objectively did not allow them to keep pace with more experienced men.

Time and again they explained to the young commander that it would be wise to revise such practice. Only the lieutenant did not consider this and did not heed the reasonable advice. As a result, a flaw invisible to outside eyes developed in relations between him and the soldiers. Later on this told most directly on the successes of the entire subunit.

For example, was Lt I. Kozyr' correct in reprimanding Pvt V. Kolesnikov for an entire year at every opportunity merely because the private had once made a mistake in exercises? The soldier was to blame. That is understandable. For this he was punished. But one should not constantly recall what had happened after V. Kolesnikov himself had become much more careful.

Incidentally, certain other lieutenants also have not avoided such mistakes. Thus, the communists had to specially discuss the file of actions among the young commanders at a party meeting.

In speaking about the development of lieutenants, it is obviously important to point up one strictly psychological detail. In the first months of being in a unit or on a ship, a abrupt break in old habits and style of conduct is observed among a majority of yesterday's school graduates. In using scientific language, there has been a destruction of the previous dynamic stereotypes. At the same time, habits related to the new service position and to the new social role are worked out. In such a period it is important to be particularly attentive and sensitive to the process of incorporating the young officer in the collective and to the moment of his most active assimilation of the traditions and views extant in the subunit. All of this over time should tell without fail in the specific deeds of one or another lieutenant.
In the life situations of the young officers there is much that is repetitive or, so to speak, typical. Of these manifestations, the following are the most important and of practical significance.

A young subunit commander very often endeavors to do everything himself. He as yet does not know his subordinates well and is not confident of them and for this reason is often inclined on many matters to take over even for his first assistants; the junior commanders.

Without possessing the proper pedagogical skills, during the first period of service he often endeavors to a certain degree artificially to accelerate the process of the development of his subordinates and to force the acquisition and reinforcing of their practical work skills on the equipment. But this is not done so simply. Hurry, as is known, has always been and remains incompatible with the quality of carrying out combat tasks.

The experience of life leads one to the conclusion that in certain officers the first, even insignificant successes in service affairs give rise to a completely unfounded complacency. Conversely, failures, as a rule, become the primary cause for a fear of independent actions and a lack of confidence in one's own forces and in the forces and capabilities of subordinates. In such instances romantic elation and a high emotional pitch are replaced by confusion, disorganization and, worst of all, disappointment.

Thus, it is a question of the thoughts of the young officers, their inner mood of their, let us to a certain degree adhere to psychological-pedagogical terminology, feeling of inner comfort or discomfort in one or another officer or troop collective. And this largely depends upon their surroundings and primarily upon all superiors in age and service experience. That is, upon each of us. Upon our aid to younger servicemen in officer shoulderboards, upon our help in their every undertaking and, finally, upon our attention and warmth shown in the process of cooperating with them.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize the obvious fact that the subunits, ships and units are receiving from the schools officers whose only common feature is their uniform. These are different people. For each of them we must find a specific approach and work out our method of action. For this, we must certainly have a profound knowledge of each young officer and we must study his needs, interests, character and inclination. Having made this study, we must patiently and attentively lead the young fellow serviceman along the difficult path of life which we most often call "our military service." Life convinces us that one of the guarantees for success in all indoctrination work lies in this daily support and in this supervising of the development of the future well-rounded commander or political worker.

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CSO: 1801/097
TRAINING COMMANDERS FOR NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 83 p 2

[Article by Vice Adm M. Iskanderov, candidate of military sciences: "Nuclear-Powered Combatant: Scope of Missions being Accomplished"]

[Text] Military science precisely delineates the component parts of military art, each of which is characterized by the operation of its own forces and missions. As a tactical unit, the ship traditionally was called upon to accomplish tactical missions in naval warfare. Nevertheless now and then military history presented examples of unusually effective actions at sea by individual pennants.

When the Soviet submarine S-13 moved into an attack against the German liner "Wilhelm Gustlow" with a displacement of 24,484 tons on the dark winter night of 30 January 1945 on approaches to Danzig Bay, her commander, Capt 3d Rank A. Marinesko could not even begin to imagine that the result of his attack would be so telling for the Wehrmacht. Of the 10,000 fascists killed (counting the transport "Steuben" sunk 10 days later by the S-13), some 3,700 were qualified submarine specialists. The German submarine fleet lost over 80 trained crews which it keenly needed. The unusually large loss enraged Hitler, who ordered the execution of the commander of the convoy escorting the sunken vessels, and he declared Capt 3d Rank Marinesko a personal enemy of Germany. Hitler's Reich was in deep mourning for three days.

The S-13 had conventional torpedoes aboard. The commander's expertise and successful hits (the "Wilhelm Gustlow" was blow up by three torpedoes at once) and the strategic value of the "cargo" together produced a victory of such rare effect. Today the operational-strategic result of combat actions by a lone ship no longer is a random accident, but the natural result of the revolution in military affairs. The fact is that today the term "submarine" also means nuclear-powered submarine combatants with missile weaponry--genuine underwater missile bases. Only one thing remains unchanged with this sharp qualitative change in combatants: As before, a relatively small combat collective headed by the ship's commanding officer controls them and employs the weapons.

The commander as before must accomplish missions generally of a tactical nature. The struggle for concealed operation, avoidance of a meeting with individual targets or detachments of "enemy" combatants, and the torpedo and missile attacks--all this essentially fits within the framework of classical tactics,
with the exception of the result. The missile might of a modern nuclear-powered submarine is several orders higher than always has been inherent in a single ship. Nevertheless there is a serious mistake in the supposition that a strategic result arises of itself by virtue of the specific nature of the weapons, and that the commander with the crew performs relatively simple, customary actions traditionally inherent of all warships.

The commander of a modern missile-carrying submarine must possess an operational-strategic scale of thinking and maturity. His responsibility for the ship and weapons and for success in performing the mission has such a large scale of readings based on the end result of actions that it is essentially a responsibility of state importance.

This responsibility does not arise of itself. For example, a person cannot taken from another sphere of endeavor and appointed commander of a nuclear-powered ship not only because he is not ready for this position in a purely professional, psychological sense, but also because an officer understands the specifics of his service with practical experience. It is practice that is the best indoctrinator of necessary qualities in the modern commander. Therefore it has to correspond to the demand of the times and to demands placed on it at the level of missions now being accomplished by warships.

The experience in indoctrinating officers of Capt 1st Rank V. Zhuravlev, one of the best commanders of nuclear-powered ships in the Northern Fleet, is interesting in this respect. He tries to take note of command traits and abilities right in the young officers and later he works a very great deal individually with these officers. As a result they rapidly develop professionally and receive authorization for command of a ship long before the question arises of their assignment as commanders. That is to say after vigorously mastering the purely practical, technical and tactical aspects of control of a nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarine, they subsequently learn that command maturity and wisdom which they will need in the position of commander. They learn that operational-strategic accent which responsibility for formidable weapons places on the work of officers who command nuclear-powered ships.

This is acquired in the practice of daily combat training, which must adequately simulate a situation of real naval warfare. It is often not the technical fine points of performing individual actions inherent only to nuclear-powered ships that are of great importance for indoctrinal influence on a commander. This also can be learned ashore in the classrooms and on simulators. More important is the overall psychological atmosphere, giving weight to all factors of opposition to the ship, and creation of conditions for a full manifestation of officers' personal qualities in situations requiring a really complex, high, contemporary level of work in making decisions and implementing them.

When a report comes to the fleet staff about performance of missile firings by submarines, the difference in grades at times indicates only a different level of technical execution of firing exercises. If a grade is lowered that means the crew overlooked something somewhere, fulfilled instructions and directions inaccurately or showed technological ignorance. It is more complicated, however, to judge the most important element—the tactical aspect of the
performance of a firing exercise. It was only the background against which the ship functioned, as they say. But it is the background that teaches and tests and indoctrinates. Today it is the quintessence of combat training and most often its most costly part, the most complicated and capricious in organization and the most necessary for real training of a commander.

Unfortunately there still are officers, and at a high level at that, who do not understand deeply enough the importance of the factor of commanders' psychological training, who take a formal approach to certain aspects of their training, who pursue high grades while not always pondering their true weight and significance.

The following incident occurred in the past training year. A submarine commanded by an experienced submariner detected a lone "enemy" surface combatant during an exercise. Such an encounter presented no particular danger for the nuclear-powered submarine. Relying on this, the commander began to avoid detection using a stereotyped, straightforward method already well understood by everyone. After executing the chosen maneuver without particular reflection he considerably reduced the range of further choice of his actions, but the "enemy" showed determination and inventiveness in searching for the target and soon detected the nuclear-powered submarine. The help which arrived at the immediate request of the surface ship personnel "grabbed" the submarine solidly. The simple situation was lost. It can be said that a small surface combatant managed to knock out an entire submarine missile base, and only because the latter's commander lacked scope at the moment of decisionmaking; he lost the keenness of responsibility for his ship; and forgot that his failure was not simply the failure of one tactical unit, but a missile strike which did not take place.

Some time later this same ship again put to sea for missile firing. The target was hit accurately, but still the outstanding grade here bears a hint of conditionality. If a commander is not capable of overcoming "enemy" opposition successfully each time, can his ship be considered a truly reliable tactical unit? The fact is that the chief component of an outstanding grade, especially that of a missile-armed submarine, is reliability. It is not for nothing that the crew's grade is lowered if the missile hits the target with a large deviation whether or not the deviation was dependent on the ship's personnel. The seamen have a good understanding of the justice of such severity: In actual combat there must be no reasons for nonfulfillment of an assigned mission.

All the other activities of the nuclear-powered ship commander at sea demand the very same just grading severity, since his every tactical step in the final account has a practical projection of enormously greater scope. To teach a commander to understand this, to teach him to be guided by the deep-seated content of accomplishment of every phase of a mission performed at sea means to indoctrinate him in conformity with modern demands of naval warfare.

Experience shows that some young ship commanders at times make insufficient use of modern control means at their disposal: electronic computers and automated control systems. "But why?" they ask with sincere surprise, "The assigned mission can be accomplished more simply." But more simply is not always better. And when the commander of a nuclear-powered ship prefers to accomplish missions
which in his opinion require no electronic assistance by eye, this means that he has not yet sensed the entire complexity of his position or the true tasks of his training and has not gained an ability to anticipate the actual combat situation typical of his ship's actions and live it during combat training, which of course is not devoid of conditionalities. But it is specifically in the ability not to pay attention to these conditionalities and to demand the very utmost of himself and the crew wherein lies the wisdom of the nuclear-powered ship commander and the guarantee of his real reliability.

The role of senior commanders in developing and indoctrinating these specific command qualities is a great one. Personal example in sea deployments and in critiques, consistency of demands, constant concern for developing the proper style of thinking and conduct of subordinates, and their steady psychological orientation on actions under actual combat conditions is the medium in which the nuclear-powered ship commander must grow. Any indulgences for any secondary reasons cannot occur if the real purposes for training the crews of nuclear-powered ships are constantly made the fundamental principle.

In practice combat the commander of a nuclear-powered ship, sensing with great precision and accuracy the tactical aspect of his actions, constantly has to see their influence on large-scale events and properly correlate the accomplishment of particular missions with that chief mission in the performance of which he is an important component. The time of practice combat and an operation now often becomes of the same order, as do the results at times. It was not by chance that the presence and concrete participation of commanders of individual ships along with force commanders became natural long ago in the elaboration and preliminary play-through on charts of exercises of any scale. The demand of the times, dictated by the development of warfare, stands behind this.

At one time a single battle or engagement decided the outcome of war. Take for example the Ice Slaughter, the Battle of Poltava and even the Battle of Borodino. Days and hours summed up the result of a struggle of armies and states. The further development of weapons and military science, however, led to a significant change in the temporal, spatial character of military actions. Past world wars are evidence of this. The appearance of nuclear weapons and present-day development of their delivery means again immeasurably raised the significance of an action, although for ships it still largely retains the previous purely tactical features. A lack of understanding of this contradictory unity for the present-day commander is no less important a deficiency than the inability to make practical use of his entrusted equipment and weapons. A precise, aware impression of one's true role at sea is a most important component of the combat effectiveness of the ship under his command.
STRATEGIC ROCKETS FORCES

ARMY GENERAL TOSVIBKO ON ROCKETS, ARTILLERY FORCES

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 21, Nov 82 (signed to press 13 Oct 82) pp 1-3

[Article by General of the Army V. F. Tolubko, commander-in-chief, Strategic Rocket Forces; USSR deputy minister of defense and Hero of Socialist Labor: "In Constant Battle Awareness"]

[Text] In an atmosphere of enormous political and work enthusiasm, the Soviet people are carrying out the historic plans advanced by the 26th Congress of the CPSU. The country is successfully accomplishing the tasks of the second year of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period. Securely guarding the peaceful, creative labors of the Soviet people, the members of their armed forces are working tirelessly to improve their military skills and continuously studying the science of how to win against a strong, technically well-equipped enemy.

Together with all peaceloving forces, the Soviet Union is continuously and tirelessly carrying on a struggle against the danger of war, to prevent a ruinous nuclear war. Consistently pursuing its Leninist peace strategy, as formulated in the Peace Program for the 1980's adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress, the CPSU and Soviet Government are bearing in mind the fact that we have recently seen an increase in the tension in the international situation and a growing danger of war. These are the results primarily of greater aggressiveness in imperialist policy, particularly in the policy of American imperialism. Under pressure from the U.S. the NATO countries have entered upon a new, unprecedentedly sharp turn in the arms race spiral. Military expenditures are increasing. The Pentagon budget for 1983 is 263 billion dollars, while over the course of the next five years this figure will reach the unheard-of amount of 1.6 trillion dollars, which at current prices is 6 times greater than U.S. military expenditures for the entire Second World War.

The aggressive nature of American imperialism is particularly clearly reflected in the Pentagon's military-strategic conceptions of "limited nuclear", "protracted conventional", "small-scale" and now recently "protracted nuclear" wars, which are based upon the U.S. wager on a surprise "pre-emptive" attack on the USSR and other countries of the socialist commonwealth. In an attempt to justify its preparations for war, imperialism accompanies them with unbridled anti-Soviet and antisocialist campaigns as well as the blatant lie about a "Soviet military threat."

In a situation which has seen the threat of war from the reactionary forces of imperialism grow, the USSR and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth are doing
everything to maintain their collective defense, a defense corresponding to the fundamental interests of the fraternal peoples and the hopes of all mankind, at the appropriate level. In carrying out the grandiose tasks involved in the building of communism, the CPSU and the Soviet Government have devoted and continue to devote unwavering attention to the task of strengthening the defensive strength of our motherland.

Because it has been the will of the party, and through the efforts of Soviet scientists and engineers, the Soviet people as a whole, our country has been able to solve the problems associated with the development of nuclear weapons as well as of means of delivering nuclear warheads to their targets. Provision of the Soviet Armed Forces with nuclear missiles has increased their fighting strength to an incomparable degree and led to major changes in the organizational structure of the armed forces. Nuclear missiles have in fact had a decisive impact upon the organization of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The creation of a new service of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, was announced at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in January 1960. Over the course of the 22 years of their existence the Rocket Forces have evolved into a reliable shield for our motherland. They now have in their inventory the most modern complexes with intercontinental and medium-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads of enormous destructive power to targets with great reliability and accuracy and of delivering inevitable strikes against an aggressor wherever he is.

The Strategic Rocket Forces constitute an important component of the Soviet Armed Forces. Their distinguishing characteristic consists in the fact that even in peacetime they remain in a continuous state of readiness for immediate operational employment and that they perform a task of particular importance to the state, and that is that they stand continuously in operational readiness as a guarantee of the security of the sacred frontiers of our motherland as well as those of the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

The Ground Forces, too, the largest service of the Armed Forces in terms of numbers and the most diverse and versatile with respect to fighting strength, have undergone fundamental change. The postwar period has seen them increase both their firepower and striking power immeasurably. Operational-tactical and tactical missiles constitute the Ground Forces' primary striking force.

Our Air Defense Forces have been upgraded as well. They have been provided with powerful antiaircraft missile complexes with a variety of systems, supersonic all-weather fighter-interceptors, modern radar installations and other equipment.

The Air Force has increased its combat capabilities and striking power as well. Its inventory includes supersonic jet aircraft armed with missiles, cannons and modern radio-electronic equipment.

The Navy has also become a formidable force. It possesses nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines and modern surface ships of a variety of classes armed with missiles and homing torpedoes and equipped with the most advanced navigation, control and communication systems. Missile-carrying naval aircraft constitute another important means of destroying an enemy. The navy of the Land of Soviets as a great naval power has now made its appearance on the vast world ocean, which is an important factor in stabilizing situations in different parts of the world as well as in deterring aggressive schemes of imperialist states.
The Soviet Armed Forces' great striking and firepower is made possible by the first-rate weapons and equipment developed and manufactured by the selfless labors of the Soviet people.

The primary strength of the Soviet Armed Forces, however, is the Soviet fighting man, an ardent patriot of his motherland. Evaluating the role of the human being in war, L. I. Brezhnev has pointed out that "...no matter how technically well-equipped an army may be, the human being who has mastered his weapons and equipment to perfection remains the primary, the decisive element in war. This is particularly important today, in the nuclear-missile age, when human beings who have mastered their weapons and equipment and are well-tempered both morally and physically, boundlessly devoted to their motherland, their party and their people, will be what determines the winners and losers in war."

Members of the Soviet armed forces are effectively accomplishing the tasks the party and government have set them, and those are to stand a reliable guard over the peaceful labors of the Soviet people; to remain vigilant from one hour to the next and, demonstrating initiative and creativity, to strive their utmost to increase the combat readiness of our armed forces in every possible way.

The Strategic Rocket Forces are forces which are continually in a state of combat readiness. Combat readiness for subunits (podrazdeleniye), units (chast') and formations (soyedinenyi) of the Rocket Forces is determined by their ability at any moment on orders from the Supreme High Command to deliver a crushing retaliatory nuclear missile attack against an enemy within established periods of time and with the desired reliability of destruction of enemy targets under any conditions.

The ultimate method of maintaining a continuously high level of combat readiness within the Strategic Rocket Forces is to have personnel perform their duties in a condition of operational readiness. The essential feature of this method consists in the fact that personnel manning missile launchers, control centers and other subunits remain continuously at their posts ready immediately and under any conditions to perform the operational tasks assigned them. Only people of boundless devotion to their socialist fatherland, steadfast ideologically and morally and physically well-tempered will be capable of continuously maintaining this high level of alertness and discipline. Our soldiers, NCO's and officers are precisely this kind of person. The combat readiness demonstrated by the subunits and units of our Rocket Forces is measured not by the hour, but rather by the minute and the second. The high combat readiness of the Strategic Rocket Forces is both the shield reliably protecting the peaceful, creative labors of the Soviet people and the punishing sword which will inevitably fall upon the heads of any aggressors so brazen as to make attempts against the achievements of socialism.

The book by Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, "Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma" [We Serve the Motherland and the Cause of Communism], deals penetratingly with the subject of the methods employed to maintain high troop combat readiness. Combat readiness appears here as the ultimate demonstration of military mastery and skill.

Success in achieving continuous improvement in the combat readiness of our Armed Forces depends directly upon the extent to which personnel have mastered the use of their weapons and equipment and upon their ability to wage war under present-day conditions.
All military personnel must strive persistently to master the knowledge required to enable them to win out over a powerful enemy, undertake a thorough study of an enemy and oppose him with more effective weapons and combat operational methods. No matter what his operational responsibilities, each and every fighting man should always be moved by asking himself whether he would be able at any given instant to execute an operational order without any delays. Great vigilance, intensive effort and consistent improvement in the effort to increase the combat readiness of the armed forces is the most important obligation of each defender of the motherland.

Raising the level of the combat readiness of our armed forces will depend to a decisive extent upon the moral, political and fighting qualities of their personnel and upon the level of their military discipline.

It is toward the development in armed forces personnel of a deep political consciousness, the moral uplift of the Soviet fighting man, raising the level of his culture, enriching his spiritual world and intensifying his patriotic and internationalist indoctrination that are directed the efforts of the political organs, party and Komsomol organizations and all party political work carried on within the Rocket Forces. The Soviet missileman is being indoctrinated in the spirit of high political vigilance and continuous combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate and decisive rebuff to any aggressor.

Having to live life as prescribed by Soviet Armed Forces Regulations constitutes one of the most important aspects of this education. Hour by hour, military service is honing away, as it were, at the edges of the personality of the Soviet fighting man. He develops in the process such high political and moral qualities as devotion to the socialist motherland, the CPSU and the Soviet people, integrity, truthfulness, vigilance, effectiveness and decisiveness in action and desire to and the habit of carrying out orders quickly and punctually, that is, all those qualities which make a man militarily well-disciplined and a true patriot.

On 19 November our country will formally celebrate a national holiday—Rocket Forces and Artillery Day. Rocket troops and artillerymen traditionally salute their day with high performance ratings in accomplishing their assigned missions; improving military skills, organization and discipline and in demonstrating vigilance in performance of their military duties. In the forefront of this effort are, as always, to be found our communists and Komsomol members.

Subunits and units are bringing to a close their socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR under the slogan "A Reliable Defense for the Peaceful Labors of the Soviet People." Personnel of the unit commanded by Colonel I. Shelestov, initiators of socialist competition within the Rocket Forces, provide examples of self-sacrificing efforts to improve military skills and fulfill socialist obligations.

Completely fulfilling their socialist obligations and providing exemplary models of military duty performance have also been officers Yu. Bol'shelapov, F. Romazanov, V. Ryshkovskiy and V. Shvyrev; Warrant Officers S. Vitushkin; Senior Sergeant M. Pitukhin; Sergeants A. Davydov and A. Nefedov; Senior Sergeant S. Shushpanov; PFC V. Skibchik; Privates A. Goryachev, A. Guzik and A. Kukhoved and many others.
Inspired by the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, our missilemen are deeply conscious of their personal responsibility for the security of the socialist motherland and are doing everything necessary to increase combat readiness, raise vigilance and improve military knowledge and skills.

In readying themselves to render a fitting salute to the glorious 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, Soviet fighting men are seeing their constitutional duty to lie in standing a vigilant and reliable guard over the peaceful labors of the multinational Soviet people and the achievements of socialism and in maintaining themselves in readiness to deal a crushing rebuff to any aggressor.

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STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

MISSILE TROOPS COMBAT TRAINING SURVEYED

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 21, Nov 82 (signed to press 13 Oct 82) pp 11-14

[Article by special SOVETSKIY VOIN correspondents Colonels N. Stasenko and N. Chevel'cha and I. Kurashov (photographer): "The Rigorous Rocket Forces Service"]

[Text] They lead a special kind of life. Outwardly, their cares and joys, the extent of their military duties and the amount of mental effort they must expend, their very sensations and perceptions of nature and the world around them, these things they will have in common with all of us. But this is only outwardly. The nature of the missileman's service, his continuous dealings with strategic matters and association with those on continuous operational duty and his heightened sense of personal responsibility for the fate of mankind and the future of our beautiful planet give his existence a unique color and fill it with deeper content and meaning.

Most characteristic of the missileman is his ability to make an instantaneous transition from peace and tranquility to a state of maximum output and efficiency, of unwavering resolution in the execution of his global missions, the ultimate objective of which is severe and merciless retaliation against any encroaching upon our motherland or disturbing the peace of the world.

The Metronome Marks the Time

"Tick... Tock... Tick... Tock...."

The time goes relentless by. The metronome's measured rhythm is in synch with your heartbeat.

"Aggressor ballistic missiles have been launched in our direction. It is possible that some of them have penetrated through.... Your decision, Guards Lieutenant Klygo!"

Vladimir Nikolayevich Shmyrev, master of military applications, knits his whitish brows and presses the button on his stopwatch: "Time!"

Igor' Klygo, a tall blond, glances quickly at his team leader, Captain Sergey Madazimov and, catching a barely perceptible nod, positions his fingers on the switches on his instrument panel like a pianist at a keyboard. He is at his most attentive and composed.
"The explosion of an 'enemy' ballistic missile has damaged your control instrumentation...."

"Tick... Tock... Tick... Tock..."

The metronome continues to mark the fleeting instants. The instructor has created some extreme conditions. A maze of pitfalls in tactics, equipment, the terrible weapons, control and communication instruments.... Everything that in this particular situation is unimportant, that is, everything that does not present an obstacle to the launching of the missile, has to be brushed aside calmly and confidently and then everything which can interfere with the launch must analyzed just as coolly and quickly and ways found to remedy malfunctions as quickly as possible....

The guards major hears the officer's response with satisfaction and switches off his stopwatch at the instant the hand was about to jump past the minute mark. An excellent norm! It wasn't all that long ago that this new school graduate just coming to the guards unit would take a lot more time in a situation like this....

The length of time it had taken this businesslike, inquisitive young man, who had brought a diploma with "distinction" and solid professional knowledge with him, to become accustomed to this situation proved to be much shorter than that it took, for example, his old classmate, Guards Lieutenant Sergey Golik, whose diploma was a much more modest affair. Both lieutenants had, it is true, now developed an equal practical mastery of the use of their weapons and equipment, but the potential capabilities of Igor' Klygo, an expert in physics and mathematics with a "distinction" on his record, were much to be preferred.

Guards Major Shmyrev had long since noticed this relationship, as we could call it, as it was reflected in practical performance, and every time he meets students in the military schools he insistently advises them: "Study, my friends, learn as much as you can! Your knowledge of theory will be oh so useful to you when you sit at the missile control consoles. Study!"

As he observes the precise movements of Igor' Klygo's fingers, the guards major shifts his gaze from time to time over to Sergey Golik, who is flawlessly duplicating the movements his colleague makes. What a transformation he has seen in these young men! Only a year or so ago a lot of people had their doubts that Sergey had found his calling in the Rocket Forces. He had the character of hot wax. You could make anything you wanted out of him.... He didn't have the voice of a commander or any hardness to his gaze. No sooner would he get a free minute than he would have his nose in a book. He always has a little book of poetry sticking out of his pocket. A lyric poet, in other words.

It was perhaps Sergey's love of literature that so attracted Vladimir Nikolayevich. "We'll make a missileman out of Golik yet! And what a missileman to boot!" he would assure his commanders as he hustled his charge off for another session in the operational instruction facility. And now look at your new missileman, if you will! He'll give anybody odds....

"That's it!" the signal sounds to conclude this period of training.

The guards major takes both his number two's by the elbow and, ushering the two by now fairly tired young men toward the door, inquires in his best conspiratorial voice:
"So, which one of the missileman's character traits is most important? What are we, after all—physicists or lyric poets?"
"Physicists, of course," Igor' Klygo shoots back without hesitation.
"A physicist without soul can't be a missileman," Sergey Golik immediately parries.

...Guards Major Shmyrev has in jest somehow derived a "formula" to describe the essential nature of a missileman. "A missileman is physicist plus lyric poet plus patriot raised to the twelfth power."
"Why to the twelfth power?" one of the lieutenants asks.
"Because the thirteenth is the devil's dozen!"
At that they all had a good laugh.

The remarkable personal relationships within the group of missilemen.... Here the guards major has just been tough and strict with his subordinates during the training session. But now he's just well-respected, sympathetic Vladimir Nikolayevich, a man with a smile that lights up his inner goodheartedness. But once they sit down at their consoles, it all starts all over again.

Family Celebration
The chief of the political department was reprimanding somebody over the telephone in an imposing voice:
"If every cup is going to come at so high a price, it's not going to be too long before we lose all our political officers. Just think: he pulled a tendon in the final soccer match.... And now you want a qualified massager-physician for every team? Instead of a political officer, what is this? You have to be more careful. More careful, I say!"

Yevgeniy Nikolayevich hangs up and with a sly smile says to us:
"It's only injuries that we don't seem to get enough of. You might say we have a Komsomol youth group here. There's enough energy here for five groups. We serve together and we're also associates and friends with one another. On duty we're superiors and subordinates, but off duty we're members of one big family. We've gotten something started here...." He rummages around a little in his desk and pulls out a big bulky photograph album in a red binding. "Here, have a look...." And he hands us the album.

"...Somehow central television broadcast one time a story about the celebration the workers' families were having at one of the country's major industrial enterprises. Families where the good traditions of respect for one's mother and father, for one another, for family honor and pride in one's work are strong. Everybody liked the program, and it gave rise to the idea that we should start a tradition of our own, the tradition of a missileman's family celebration with the theme 'A strong family is a strong power.' The village soviet of people's deputies supported the idea, and pretty soon it spread beyond the confines of the post and became, so to speak, a mass-scale affair.

"From early in the morning the base was filled with music which warmed people and put them in a good mood. Then along toward 11 o'clock or so the musical programs which had been requested by the families of the best service personnel, who were now at the center of the attention of the entire collective, were interrupted momentarily by a broadcast relayed from a registry office where a wedding ceremony was being performed.
"Then a little while later there began an amateur musical concert. Right out there in the open. Nor do the children find the occasion boring. Entertaining clowns meet them in a 'fairytale forest clearing' artfully designed by talented local designers, with towers and forests, the 33 knights, Baba Yaga, goblins and other fairytale characters familiar to everyone since childhood.

"This use of our national folk heritage has come off right well here. The carved towers out on the children's playground as well as in areas the grown-ups use for recreation, the skillfully-done lettering around a tree, are confirming, as it were, the strength and solidity of the roots we have in our native soil, roots going back into the distant past and filling us with confidence and giving us peace of mind for the future of our motherland. No small detail in our program of education for missile-men and their families! Reinforced by a real awareness of that awful force, frozen in tranquil, resolute waiting for its hour to come, a force subject to its masters, this what would appear simple esthetic-historical detail plays its role. The organizers of this family celebration have skillfully woven the historic past together with the present and have demonstrated the continuity of our traditions. Even the rich displays organized by expert seamstresses, the elaborate knitting and the children's work and the culinary offerings, even these aspects of the celebration serve to conjure up our national traditions.

"An effective and purposeful content has been given to this capacious form. To the accompaniment of stormy applause, the chief of the political department addressed words of greeting to the most honored missileman families and spoke to celebration participants about the services rendered by their fathers and working mothers, about the children.... In a special decree the military council approved the guardsmen's initiative and recommended that their idea be adopted in other units."

Now after such a detailed description of this family celebration it will perhaps be more understandable why the chief of the political department becomes uneasy at the thought of the "fate" of his assistants, the ones we began this story with. It's not difficult to see that the political workers, communists and Komsomol members constitute the very soul of all efforts made to solidify the ranks of these missilemen, the restless organizers and the tightly wound inner spring that keeps the whole enormous mechanism in operation. It has been as a result of their efforts that this Guards unit has been transformed into a single strong, harmonious family where each is for all and all are for each!

...That evening, when we were counting on being able to talk to some of the missile-men, the alarm sounded calling the men to assemble. There's no place for any show of disappointment around here, though. Service! The rigorous service with the rocket forces above all.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 11. Guards Captain Boris Biryukov, operations team leader, communist, on operational duty.

3. p 12. When the alarm sounds the crew take up their positions.


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LOGISTICS CHIEF KURKOTKIN ON IMPROVING LIVING CONDITIONS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 82 (signed to press 4 Oct 82) pp 21-28

[Article by Army Gen S. Kurkotkin, USSR deputy minister of defense and chief of the war services of the USSR Armed Forces: "Concern and Attention for Troop Routine"]

[Text] Over the entire history of our state, the Communist Party and the Soviet government have always shown and are showing constant concern for the well-being and happiness of the people and for creating for them the broadest opportunities for creative labor, study, recreation and the personal application of their capabilities. This concern is clearly reflected in the USSR Constitution, the party program and the other major state and party documents. In giving the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee at the 26th Party Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "The starting point of the party, political approach to the economy has been and is the unwavering program demand of everything for the sake of man, everything for the good of man." The entire organization of troop routine in the Armed Forces has been carried out from the standpoint of these party demands. Concern for the defenders of the motherland is an objective pattern in Soviet military organizational development.

Troop routine has its specific features. It is completely subordinate to the task of strengthening the defense readiness and capability of the Army and Navy. The USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, at the All- Army Conference for Improving Troop Routine focused attention on the fact that the ensuring of high combat readiness in the units and ships and the level of troop discipline and organization of the personnel are directly linked to satisfying the material and everyday needs of the men. The barracks, messes, the sports and cultural-service facilities play a major role in determining the mood of the men and their attitude toward service duties.

It can be asserted that a majority of the troop facilities conform fully to modern training, cultural and aesthetic needs. Our military compounds in many instances have been rebuilt and have everything necessary for the life, training and recreation of the soldiers and sailors. Gradually the old concept of a "barracks" has been given a new content reflecting the positive changes in the Armed Forces. Striking changes have occurred, of course, not only in the external appearance of the soldier's home. In recent years, the appearance of
our soldier himself has also significantly improved. His table fare has become richer and more varied.

Let us turn to the facts for substantiation. Let us begin, perhaps, with the food service. The pace and pitch of combat training, the mastery of complex modern equipment and the increased physical and nervous-psychological stresses in military service have required a particular attitude toward improving the diet of the servicemen. In recent years, the party and government have done a good deal in this area. The presently existing rations in terms of assortment and the quantity of food products comprising them make it possible to complete-replace the energy expenditures of the servicemen.

Along with improving the diet of the servicemen under stationary conditions, measures are being taken to provide them with balanced food products in exercises and maneuvers as well as during long sea cruises. For this purpose special products are being developed and supplied to the troops including groats which do not require long cooking, canned meats and vegetables, food concentrates, freeze-dried meat, fish and dairy products, canned and frozen dinners, nonspoiling bread and much else. This makes it possible to supply the troops and naval forces with special dry rations and food products having low weight and volume, but high nutritional and energy value and keeping well under and conditions. At present, work is being done to further improve the taste qualities of the new food products, to raise their nutritional value and to increase storage life.

The physical plant of the food service is also being developed. New soldier messes are being built and the old ones reconstructed. This work is being carried out particularly well in the Leningrad, Carpathian, Belorussian and Central Asian Military Districts. Here model messes appeared earlier than in other places and which were the equal of the nation's best public dining enterprises in terms of equipment and aesthetic design. At present, such messes have begun to appear everywhere in the troops. No one is now surprised by six-place tables, "melalit" dishes and tastefully designed dining rooms. This contributes both to the aesthetic indoctrination of the men and to instilling high culture in them.

Significant changes have also occurred in the technical equipping of the messes. Just during the years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan the troops received more than 77,000 units of production equipment, 36,000 units of refrigeration equipment and various utensil and kitchen supplies valued at 67 million rubles. By the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan we intend to increase the delivery of new, more productive models of this equipment and supplies by an average of 20-25 percent.

The military agricultural enterprises are helping in qualitatively improving the diet of the servicemen, diversifying the soldier's mess and obtaining a significant addition to the standard ration. Over the years since the March (1965) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the military councils of the districts and fleets, the commanders and the political workers have done great work to develop and strengthen the agricultural enterprises. Over this period, 42 new sovkhozes, 84 subsidiary farms and hundreds of kitchen and
galley farms have been organized. Grain production on them has risen by 2.6-fold, by 1.5-fold for potatoes and vegetables, by 1.4-fold for milk, by 1.8-fold for meat and by 5-fold for eggs.

It must be said that many kitchen and galley farms are playing an evermore noticeable role in improving the diet of the men. In showing creativity and initiative, the leading military collectives even now are annually producing more than 10 kg of additional meat for the diet of each man. Certain units are providing a half-year or even full-year supply of meat, milk, eggs and other food products for the personnel. Such results are being steadily achieved by the military units where Officers I. Skripkin, V. Chemovskiy, M. Danyutin, V. Ravlin and others serve. The kitchen farm for which WO ["praporshchik"] V. Fedyay is responsible is managed ably and very effectively. Here each man receives an additional more than 20 kg of meat over the year.

It is pleasing to note that many troop collectives are keeping pace with the pacesetters. The decisions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee have also caused a particular surge of forces among them. We would like to mention this particularly. Because the Food Program adopted at the plenum is a program for increasing the prosperity of the Soviet people and strengthening the might of the motherland. The entire nation, including the Army and Navy personnel, the specialists of the rear services, the workers and employees of the military sovkhозes, are taking an active part in successfully carrying it out. In accord with the instructions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee for the 11th Five-Year Plan the USSR ministry of defense has worked out a plan for the economic and social development of the military agricultural enterprises, the kitchen and galley farms, the enterprises and institutions. It envisages a 1.5-fold increase in the production of agricultural product by the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan in comparison with the achieved annual average level in the Tenth Five-Year Plan. Particular attention is paid to the farms located in the regions of the Far East, Extreme North, Transbaykal, Siberia and Central Asia.

Thus, in the agricultural enterprises of the Far East, along with the further development of livestock and poultry raising, there is to be an increase in the output of potatoes and vegetables in order to significantly reduce their deliveries to the remote garrisons from the central regions of the nation. Measures are also being taken to improve the storage and quality of agricultural products. In particular, there are plans to build storage facilities as well as centers for the processing and pickling of vegetables directly on the military sovkhозes.

The agricultural enterprises located in Central Asia will increase the production of early vegetable crops, primarily onions, for delivery to the troops serving in the regions of the Extreme North as well as the Far East. In the districts, groups of forces and fleets, specific measures are being taken to increase meat and milk production on the basis of intense fattening of the animals and increasing their productiveness, converting egg production to a commercial method and increasing the yield of cereals, potatoes, vegetables and feed crops.
For successfully carrying out the set tasks, there are plans to increase the fixed capital of the military agricultural enterprises by 1.5-fold. The energy capacity of the military sovkhozes will rise by 1.6-fold.

Great attention will be given to the training and advanced training of the leadership and agricultural specialists. A training center is to be created on the basis of the military sovkhoz of the Central Food Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

As we can see, there is much to be done. For this reason the communists of the rear services in a concerned and professional manner are examining the practical tasks stemming from the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Food Program. They are focusing attention on the questions of economy and thriftiness and the safekeeping of valuable materials and agricultural products. The decisions of the party meetings are focusing the communists and all the personnel on improving the quality and efficiency of labor.

We have basically been discussing the improvement in the diet of the servicemen. But our Soviet soldiers should be not only well and sufficiently fed, but also well clothed. Constant concern has also been shown for this. Suffice it to say that beginning in this year the servicemen in regular service will be issued a number of clothing items at an increased rate. From March 1981, full payment for the cost of special-made uniforms was introduced for officer personnel, warrant officers and reenlisted servicemen. All of this is a new manifestation of party and government attention to the men of the Army and Navy.

The uniform service is continuing to improve the quality of clothing. We have basically completed the testing of new field uniforms which meet the modern requirements. These have been approved in the troops and judged more convenient for actions under the various climatic regions of the nation. The new field uniform will be standard for all servicemen from the soldier to the general.

For the tank troops in the near future, special clothing will appear with electric heating. As testing has shown, this creates normal conditions for the actions of the crews under low-temperature conditions.

During the current year, a new greatcoat/cloak is being developed for the generals and officers. During the summer it will be worn as a cloak and during the spring and autumn with a removable lining of artificial fur. Textiles with a rational combination of synthetic and natural fibers will be more widely used for general-purpose uniforms and special clothing.

Extensive work has also been done to improve military footwear. Industry is already producing warm boots made from synthetic felt; in terms of warmth properties they are the equal of the natural felt boots. During the summer of the current year, testing was completed on soldiers' boots made from artificial leather on the basis of a cotton-lavsan kersey and these can be worn for up to a year. In 1983, industry should begin producing this new material. Testing will soon be started on military footwear with certain parts made from titanium syntan leather. Thus, chemical raw materials will be more and more widely
employed for producing leather which still remains the most valuable material. New styles of officer boots and halfboots have been worked out including light models (for summer).

In carrying out the recommendations of the All-Army Conference on Improving Troop Routine, the military districts and fleets have done a good deal to create well-equipped service centers, storerooms for the keeping of the property of the subunits and personal effects of the servicemen as well as drying rooms in the units. The soldier (sailor) service centers have begun to play an ever-larger role. They provide a range of services for the men and make it possible to quickly serve entire subunits simultaneously. The organizing of these centers has been well carried out in the Carpathian and Baltic Military Districts.

Bath and laundry services hold a special place in the routine of the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers. For this purpose the military districts and fleets have been building and reconstructing the bath and laundry enterprises and equipping them with more productive equipment. During the Tenth Five-Year Plan capacity of the laundries almost doubled.

Recently a new mobile shop for the repair of clothing was put into service. At present, a new mobile laundry is undergoing testing and its calculated productivity is 50 percent higher than the existing ones. Dry cleaning is also being tested. From now on it will not have a steam boiler. The heating of the fluids is to be carried out by electric power and this significantly simplifies dry cleaning services. Moreover, this has higher productivity and requires fewer service personnel.

In the Army and Navy, protecting the health of the Soviet military is a matter of particular concern. This represents a system of measures to improve the diet, the living and working conditions as well as the medical services for the personnel. These tasks are carried out by the joint efforts of the commanders, the political bodies, the party organizations and the services for material-service and medical support. However, the medical service plays the basic role in protecting and strengthening the health of the personnel.

At present, completely definite positive changes have occurred in the work of the military medical service. Its physical plant has been significantly improved. Scores of new medical stations and sickbays have been built in place of the old ones. In many of them the necessary conditions have been created for the complete examination and treatment of patients and well equipped laboratories and offices for functional diagnosis and physical therapy have been set up and are at work. Out-patient services for the servicemen have become more organized. The effectiveness of preventive work has increased.

The measures carried out have helped to further improve the health of the servicemen. The general morbidity rate in the Armed Forces over the last 5 years has declined by 17.5 percent, work losses by 7 percent, and health discharges by 31 percent. In terms of the results achieved in the military medical service, the Transcaucasian, Belorussian, Kiev and Baltic Military Districts, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Baltic Fleet must be considered the best.
Recently there has been a significant rise in the level of work of the military hospitals. Examination and treatment of patients in many of them have been carried out on modern medical achievements. Highly effective methods for examining and treating the patients are being more and more widely used involving modern medical equipment and recent achievements in medical science.

In the Army and Navy, measures are constantly being carried out to strengthen the physical plant, to broaden the bed capacity of the military sanitariums and to improve the quality and effectiveness of treatment and rest for the generals, admirals, officers, warrant officers and employees of the Soviet Army and the members of their families. Over the last 5 years alone, 30 bedroom and 10 treatment buildings, 5 clubs and summer movie theaters, 6 beach installations and a number of other projects have been built or reconstructed.

Major measures in further developing sanatorium and resort facilities in the Armed Forces are to be carried out in accord with the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU of 7 January 1982 "On Measures to Further Improve Sanatorium and Resort Treatment and Rest for Workers and to Develop Trade Union Health Resorts" and the instructions of the USSR minister of defense. In particular, by 1990, the number of beds in sanitariums and vacation facilities should increase by almost 30 percent.

In recent years, the districts and fleets have done significant work to further develop military trade. The retail commodity turnover plan in 1981 was fulfilled ahead of time, on 22 December. In comparison with the previous year, its growth was 8 percent and for the sales of such items as clothing, footwear, knitwear, furniture and so forth, the figures were even higher.

Much has been done to improve public dining and the volume of commodity turnover here in just 1981 rose by 30 million rubles. In the troop units there has been a noticeable increase in the number of soldier and sailor teareums and many of them have been well designed and provided with modern equipment. They have begun producing more semiprepared, fully cooked and confectionary products.

As we can see, the great and diverse work carried out in the Army and Navy to improve troop routine conforms to the spirit of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and to party policy aimed at the greatest possible rise in the standard of living of the Soviet people. The given examples make it possible to gain a notion of all the diverse work which is being carried out in the Armed Forces to improve the conditions for the labor, training and cultivated rest of the servicemen. However, life moves forward and the demands on troop routine grow. Of course, these must be considered. All the more as there are still unused reserves and opportunities.

First of all, we would like to say a word about the billeting of the personnel. Far from everything as yet has been done in this question. Unfortunately, not every military compound has a full range of essential buildings and structures and not all the personnel is quartered in light, warm and well-built barracks. The most serious attention must also be paid to the questions concerning the supply of housing for officers, warrant officers and Soviet Army employees. As is known, each year more and more serviceman families receive comfortable
apartments, but in a number of places difficulties still remain. The apart-
ments are not always provided first to those who have a particularly acute
need for them. In a number of garrisons the living conditions for young offi-
cers and warrant officers living in dormitories leave much to be desired.

The review-contests and inspections held have made it possible also to see un-
solved questions in the food service. It must be stated that the soldier and
sailor messes do not everywhere meet today's demands either in terms of tech-
nical equipment or aesthetic design. And from this follows shortcomings also
in the level of food services. At times the quality of the dishes also suf-
fers. In the given instance it is undoubtedly a question not of the food
products, but rather the skill of the cooks. Unfortunately, not all of them
prepare food on the level which is required. The reason is that in certain
cook schools the students are often diverted from their training to outside
jobs. The skills of working under stationary conditions and in the field are
not properly instilled in them. They have little knowledge of food techniques.
All of this cannot help but cause alarm.

There is also concern over how bath and laundry services have been organized
in some places. In a number of troop units in the Transbaykal, Far Eastern and
Central Asian Military Districts, facts have been discovered of violating the
wash schedules for the personnel and this shows the nonfulfillment by individu-
al officials of the requirements of the Internal Service Regulations of the
USSR Armed Forces. We must say frankly that on this question there cannot be
any "mitigating" circumstances. In the event of missing a bath day in a unit,
it is essential to make an investigation and hold the guilty parties strictly
responsible under disciplinary procedures.

There are also complaints against the medical service. The sanitation inspec-
tion of the state of the territory of the military compounds as well as food
and water supply facilities has not reached the established requirements every-
where. Because of this, one of the main tasks for the medical service is the
strengthening of sanitation inspection over all aspects of the life of the
personnel. It is essential to constantly show principledness and exactness
and to eliminate any, even the most insignificant shortcomings in the material
services for the servicemen.

Not everything is going smoothly either for the military trade workers. The
development of the physical plant still lags behind the growth of commodity
turnover. Thus, the military trade organizations of the Northern Fleet and
Belorussian Military District as a whole have only 60-65 percent of the re-
quired capacity for storing potatoes, vegetables and fruits; for the Leningrad
and Central Asian Military Districts, the figures are 70-80 percent. If one
takes each military trade organization individually, there are still many gar-
risons where there is no storage capacity whatsoever.

In talking about the negative phenomena, one cannot help but mention that at
times certain leaders do not pay proper importance to organizing troop routine
under field conditions. Such instances are rare, but they still are encounter-
ed. And they cannot be passed over. Under field conditions, the actions of
the men involve many additional difficulties. The commanders, the political
workers, the officers of the rear services, the party and Komsomol organizations
must actively combat these difficulties and do everything necessary to ensure successful actions of each serviceman in the field.

We are fully capable of rectifying the committed errors and eliminating all sorts of problems if we set to work together and involve the Army and Navy community in this. The daily routine of the troops, its organization and the living conditions of the men are a concern not only of the rear workers.

In a word, when it is a question of creating the necessary material and technical conditions for the soldiers, officer candidates or officer, a maximum concern must be shown in order to bring the serviceman everything due him by the state and to do this both in terms of quantity and quality. This is not only an administrative-supply question, but primarily a party one. The slightest shortcomings, oversights and particularly abuses in this sphere should encounter the most decisive rebuff and the sharpest condemnation primarily among the Army and Navy communists.

In solving the questions of troop services, it is important to have a good understanding of the goal for the sake of which we carry out all this work. For us, this goal is the ensuring of high combat readiness of the personnel. Everything that contributes to the achieving of this goal must be fully utilized.

Concern for improving troop routine is most closely tied to the thrifty and proper consumption of materials and money. In the districts and fleets, there is a steady struggle to save bread, to economize on fuel and lubricants, electric power, uniforms and medical supplies, solid fuel and so forth. For example, in 1980, in the Armed Forces merely by seeking out reserves ensuring the rational consumption of materiel, many millions of rubles were saved in the rear services. In 1980, this made it possible to free thousands of various types of railroad cars for hauling materiel and saving many thousands of tons of diesel and aviation fuel and heating mazut above the limit. In the repair enterprises of the uniform service, many thousands of diverse items were manufactured and put into planned supply. In 1981-1982, the savings were good for the rear services. Of course, this is far from the limit.

We have many remarkable people who show a thrifty attitude to everything the motherland gives us. For example, at the dump where Officer M. Kabanov is the chief, great attention is paid to reducing natural fuel losses. Upon the initiative of the communists, the men assumed a socialist obligation to reduce losses by 10-12 percent in relation to the standard. To the collective's honor, this has been done.

Unfortunately, this is not the case everywhere. In individual units, the opportunities for savings are not fully utilized. The equipment at times is stored in violation of the rules, there are instances of operating broken down machines, the container and pallet methods of storing supplies has been little introduced and proper attention is not given to mechanizing loading work. In the competition for savings and thriftiness at times there is a lack of publicity and comparison of the results, the savings are not calculated everywhere and the moral and material factors are little utilized to encourage the pace-setters.
The struggle for savings and thriftiness requires constant attention by the commanders, political workers, the chiefs of services, the party and Komsomol organizations. Certainly shortcomings are observed precisely where the leadership has not been demanding upon itself and subordinates, where indoctrination work has been poorly organized and party concern for improving economic activities is lacking.

Experience shows that a rise in the effectiveness of economic work must be achieved comprehensively, considering the economic demands of socialist management and scientific-technical progress. Effective indoctrination work with the personnel plays a major role in achieving success.

As is known, with the present enormous scale of the production and consumption of materials, savings expressed even in fractions of a percent bring many millions of rubles of benefit for the national economy. For this reason the struggle against mismanagement, waste and excesses is not a brief campaign, but rather one of the major areas of daily activity.

In our days, there is a timely ring to the appeal of V. I. Lenin to account for money scrupulously and conscientiously, to manage economically, to observe strictest labor discipline and to exercise strict accounting and control. The basic content of economic work consists of this. For this reason our party gives great significance to the creative possibilities of the collectives in the effective, able and economic use of material and monetary resources.

With good reason we closely link the questions of improving troop routine with the problems of the greatest possible savings of materials and money. Each saved ruble inevitably serves to improve the living conditions of the personnel. For this reason, to think about reserves for savings means to talk about a further improvement in troop routine.

The range of work in organizing troop routine, as we see, is broad. We should frankly say that the party and Komsomol organizations in this area should be the beacons and in every possible way should show that activity which, as was emphasized at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, presupposes the prompt posing and constant solving of the timely questions of training and indoctrinating the personnel, strengthening military discipline and maintaining high combat readiness. It is a vital concern for the communists to be the pioneers in all initiatives in organizing troop routine. Precisely the party organizations should, as no one else, show a responsive attitude toward the buds of new ideas and in every possible way should support initiative on the questions of routine services. Certainly a distinguishing feature of troop routine is the fact that it is created by the hands of the servicemen themselves. Hence it is essential in every possible way to support the innovators and rationalizers who help create comfort and coziness in the barracks, soldier clubs and officer dormitories and help provide amenities for our military compounds.

By what forms of party political work can this be achieved? We feel that here there cannot be any pat answers for all cases of life. One thing is clear that in this vital matter we cannot tolerate formalism, indifference or a reticence.
on the part of individual officials to be concerned with the organization of troop routine seriously and on a level of today's requirements. In such instances the guilty parties must be dealt with severely, from party positions.

The work of routine services for the personnel must be judged from practical results. For this reason, each commander or chief should be critical of himself and subordinates and not remain on the level achieved. This is a dependable way to avoid mistakes and oversights which, unfortunately, still are found.

Concern for improving troop routine is a matter of great importance. To carry out this task skillfully and with party principledness means to be truly concerned for strengthening the combat might of our glorious Armed Forces.

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CSO: 1801/097
LOGISTICAL SERVICE AND SPECIAL TROOPS

HOUSING CONSTRUCTION FOR MILITARY DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 82 (signed to press 4 Nov 82) pp 28-33

[Interview with Mar Engr Trps N. F. Shestopalov, USSR deputy minister of defense for construction and troop billeting: "A Nation of New Settlers"]

[Text] To build housing with a total area of 530 million m^2 during the 11th Five-Year Plan and to ensure its primary construction to provide housing for workers at newly organized enterprises, newly developed areas and in rural localities--this is the task posed by the party. The editors have turned to Mar Engr Trps N. F. Shestopalov, USSR deputy minister for construction and troop billeting, with a request to tell how these great plans are being carried out as well as to answer a number of questions.

[Question] The 26th CPSU Congress viewed housing construction as a major socioeconomic question. What are the most important particular features in solving this problem in our nation over the years of Soviet power?

[Answer] As is known, the availability of housing, its quality and amenities to a large degree determine the health, work efficiency and life expectancy of the Soviet people as well as the development and strengthening of the socialist family. This is why the CPSU views the housing question as a most important component part in raising the well-being of our people and pays constant attention to it.

Over the years of Soviet power, the USSR has built housing with a total (effective) area of over 3.6 billion m^2. Also remarkable is the figure that at present the entire urban housing space of our nation exceeds 2.2 billion m^2. As a comparison, we might say that this space in Russia in 1913 was just 180 million m^2. Housing construction has assumed particularly broad scope in the last 15-20 years. While for example, during all the prewar years some 409 million m^2 of total housing area were completed, during the last three five-year plans the figure was 1,605,000,000 m^2. As a result, more than 160 million of our nation's citizens have moved into new housing. Around 80 percent of the city dwellers in the USSR now live in separate apartments. The urban socialized housing space is now characterized by a high level of amenities.
Thus, almost nine-tenths of all the housing area in the nation is supplied with water, 87 percent with sewage, 86 percent with central heating and 79 percent of the housing is supplied with gas.

The value of the fixed capital in the housing system is 339 billion rubles or almost one-fifth of the value of the nation's total fixed capital.

For the first time in world practice the right to housing was raised in the USSR to a constitutional principle. This right, as is stated in Article 44 of the USSR Basic Law, is ensured by the development and safekeeping of the state and social available housing, by assisting cooperative and individual housing construction, by the just allocation under public control of the living space available as the construction program is carried out for well-equipped residences as well as by the low apartment rent and utilities. In the USSR, apartment rent is no more than 4 percent of the average earnings of employees while in the capitalist nations it is from 25 to 40 percent. Apartment rent in our nation has not changed since 1928. And this is regardless of the fact that year by year the designing of housing under construction is improved and its comfort is raised.

In the USSR the profession of construction worker has special prestige. To erect plant buildings, housing, palaces of culture and sports facilities for the people—what noble labor this is!

[Question] What is characteristic of the housing construction program in the 11th Five-Year Plan and for the period up to 1990?

[Answer] Life moves forward and the demand for housing does not remain fixed. It grows. This is natural. The 1926 census showed that at that time 26.3 million persons lived in our cities, or 18 percent of the entire Soviet population. At present, more than 170 million persons are urban residents, or almost two-thirds of the entire nation's population. In other words: the urban population over this time has increased by approximately 144 million persons. This requires an even broader scope of housing construction. The 26th CPSU Congress has set the task of further consistently improving the housing conditions for the workers, raising the comfort of housing and the level of its amenities and broadening the network of youth dormitories at enterprises and organizations. These tasks comprise a most important section of the party's social program.

[Question] Please tell us about housing construction in the Army and Navy. What new has appeared here in the building of housing and cultural and service buildings?

[Answer] An important component part of capital construction in the Soviet Armed Forces has been the constant rise and most complete satisfying of the cultural and consumer needs and the improving of housing conditions for the servicemen. We must particularly emphasize that the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government have shown constant concern in resolving these questions and have provided significant help to us. In the Tenth Five-Year Plan, the volume of capital construction in the Army and Navy, in particular housing
construction, as in the nation as a whole, rose. This made it possible be-
cause of new construction to substantially add to the housing of the USSR Min-
istry of Defense. Many servicemen, workers and white collar personnel moved
into well-built apartments.

Particular attention has been paid to the rational planned structure of housing
construction and the comprehensive development of the microrayons, settlements
and camps. In the plans for housing and for cultural and consumer projects,
architectural and design ideas and utility systems are being employed which
will bring about a further rise in the level of construction industrialization
as well as a reduction in the expenditures of labor, material, fuel and energy
resources.

At present, designs have been worked out for an experimental 9-story large-
panel residential building with improved layout. Construction of several of
these buildings has already been commenced. Still the situation with the sup-
ply of housing for the servicemen, workers and white collar personnel of the
Soviet Army and Navy is rather tight. In truth, we have succeeded in stabil-
izing the number of persons requiring housing and it has ceased growing. But
there is the disconcerting fact that last year the housing construction plans
for certain districts and fleets were unfulfilled. This has largely been the
result of underestimating such an important factor as construction using the
direct labor method. Other officials still lack initiative and independence.

An effort must be made so that the architectural appearance of the buildings is
a pleasure to behold. This will make it possible to significantly improve the
external appearance of our military camps. Models of new barracks, messes,
staffs, first-aid stations and other buildings of varying capacity have been
designed, and fundamentally new series of military clubs, sports and training
buildings have been worked out. These designs were presented at the All-Army
Conference for improving troop routine in December 1979.

In speaking at this conference, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F.
Ustinov, pointed to the need for improving the quality of housing and barracks
construction in every possible way up to the level of the demands of not only
today, but also tomorrow. A decision was adopted to rapidly design and build
experimental military compounds using new standard plans instead of the old
ones to check out the new layouts under real conditions. Such a compound has
become a model complex of troop buildings, embodying all the latest achieve-
ments of engineer thought in the construction area. The plans envisage a
single-level placement of the personnel in the barracks sleeping areas, single-
shift meals in the messes, the use of new equipment and troop furniture,
greater expressiveness in the interiors, the better architectural appearance
of the buildings and so forth. The creation of the new standard plans has made
it possible to replace the obsolete ones, to significantly improve the condi-
tions for the living, training, labor and routine of the personnel and ensure
a possibility for comprehensive development of the military compounds.

[Question] What successes have the military construction workers achieved in
the new five-year plan?
The results of last year show that the military construction workers, inspired by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, have enthusiastically commenced the 11th Five-Year Plan and have basically met the plan quotas; here many collectives have overfulfilled the assumed socialistic obligations.

The military construction workers of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District have initiated a competition during the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan. The high political and labor upsurge of the military construction workers made it possible for them to successfully complete the 1981 plan. The initiators of the competition did good work and they not only fulfilled the plan for all the indicators, but many projects were completed ahead of time and with good quality. This was largely aided by the fact that at the district's construction projects the brigade contract has been widely introduced. At the district and fleet projects, there are presently at work 78 self-financing brigades (in 1980, there were 49 of them). They have carried out around 40 percent of the entire volume of construction-installation work and they built more than 97 percent of the housing.

Great production successes have been achieved by the military construction workers of the Red Banner, Odessa, Kiev, Far Eastern and Central Asian Military Districts, the Northern Fleet as well as the construction organizations led by Officers V. Arnauta, V. Denisov, V. Moyseyenko, O. Isupov and P. Fedchenko.

The workers of the military construction projects and the building industry enterprises are constantly struggling to carry out the taut plans and socialistic obligations for the second year of the five-year plan. This can be seen from the results of the 9 months of 1982. The military construction workers successfully met the plan quotas. All the planned projects were completed on time and ahead of time and these increased the combat readiness of the troops. The quotas were overfulfilled for putting fixed capital into operation. This means that the return on labor increased and its end results improved.

Our leading collectives have been awarded the challenge Red Banners of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee as well as the challenge Red Banners of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Central Committee for the Trade Union of Workers in Construction and the Building Materials Industry.

Certainly we are not complacent with what we have achieved and are critically approaching the assessment of our labor. This is in no way accidental, for we, unfortunately, do have collectives which are "bringing up the rear" in the socialistic competition. For example, the capacity and reserves are not being sufficiently fully utilized in the construction administrations of the Northern Caucasus and Transbaykal Military Districts and in the organizations which are directed by comrades V. Bozhko, V. Koyenman and V. Moysyuk. Here they have been able to achieve the unconditional fulfillment of the production plans for certain indicators or reduce the volume of incomplete construction. The main reasons for the lag are shortcomings and oversights in the organization of work, a low level of engineer preparation for production, the inefficient use of machinery, equipment, material and financial resources and high working time losses.
[Question] How are the tasks of operating and maintaining the housing being carried out?

[Answer] Let me reemphasize that enormous housing space has been created by the efforts of the party and people in our nation. It is very important to protect this truly national wealth carefully and ably and this is just as important as new construction.

The USSR Ministry of Defense during the years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan carried out work involved with improving the upkeep and operation of the barracks and housing facilities. The state has made available enormous amounts of money making it possible to carry out a significant amount of repairs and increase the reliability of the housing and utility equipment. The material-technical and production facilities at the repair organizations have been strengthened.

In the 11th Five-Year Plan we must achieve an even better utilization and upkeep on housing projects. It has been decided to increase the money for the operation and repair of housing. Plan quotas for 1982-1985 have been set for the military districts and fleets for major and routine repairs on the housing.

Measures are being taken to more fully equip the housing operation and construction repair organizations with machinery, equipment, instruments and mechanical tools. This undoubtedly creates good conditions for the activities of the commanders, the political bodies, the party organizations and the workers of the billeting operation service aimed at the skillful operation and maintenance of the barracks and housing space. Participation in the review competition "Exemplary Routine for Each Garrison" as well as the generalizing and dissemination of advanced experience in this important state matter—everything should be aimed at creating good conditions for the training, labor and routine of the Army and Navy personnel.

It is particularly important to carry out this work concretely and systematically on the spot, waging a decisive struggle against laxness and mismanagement in the maintenance of housing and in the expenditure of the building materials and money allocated for repair work. To struggle for savings and thriftiness is a duty of each serviceman.

[Question] As you have pointed out, in the military construction units, in building housing, a good deal of advanced experience has been acquired. Can you tell us about this experience and about the masters of this honorable profession of a military construction worker?

[Answer] In carrying out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee as well as the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense, the leaders of the military construction projects, the political bodies, the party, trade union and Komsomol organizations have done a good deal to generalize the experience of the best construction workers and provide this to all the collectives.

We should note the organizing of construction work in the Odessa Military District where they have taken to building "standard" housing. We must say
outright that this is not an easy matter. It was preceded by the creation of a so-called "standard apartment" at all the projects. Having acquired experience, here they went farther. Now in each UNR [work superintendent administration] they are already building a "standard" building. Certainly this has required a higher level in the organization of labor, the mechanizing of work and the supplying of the project with everything necessary. The leaders of the construction administration and the political section have approved the useful initiative of the right-flankers of the competition and they have improved the training of specialists of taking up the good initiative. Here they have also organized a school for advanced experience.

The comprehensive work method has made it possible for the construction workers to make better use of their capabilities. While one brigade is erecting the walls of the 8th story, finishers are working on the 1st, plasterers on the 4th and 5th, and carpenters on the 3d. Excess operations have been excluded from the production cycle. Ready-made sets of equipment for the apartments are delivered to the project. The administration for production-technological preassembled supply which has been organized in the district is in charge of this. Here they are also struggling for a high quality of construction and installation work. The mutual inspection method is being introduced. Moral and material incentives for the labor pacerseters have been well organized. And there are many of them. Among the right-flankers are P. Ivanenko; A. Tikhon, V. Zuyka, G. Gamaylo and A. Polyakov.

In the military construction units, a large detachment of specialists in construction jobs has arisen. Widely known are the names of our production innovators and brigade leaders who work using the Zlobin method, M. Maksimov, I. Savotikov and N. Sasim.

The winner of the USSR State Prize and Order of the Honor Badge, N. Sasim, for several years now has successfully directed a brigade and has unwaveringly fulfilled the plans and socialist obligations. The following facts also show the high professional mastery of the expert construction worker and all the members of the labor collective. In the concluding year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, the brigade of N. Sasim shortened the time for constructing the projects and putting them into operation with high quality indicators by 77 days. The average fulfillment of the output rates here is 16.4.5 percent while the annual output per brigade member is 40,000 rubles. The savings from reducing the calculated cost of the work has exceeded 22,000 rubles.

The collective is also working unstintingly in the second year of the 11th Five-Year Plan. It has completely fulfilled the socialist obligations and has shortened the housing construction times by almost one-quarter in comparison with the standards. The 5-day production quota is fulfilled by the brigade in 4 days. In this collective they have produced such experienced construction workers as P. Bernat, L. Klimashevskiy, B. Krutikhin and V. Kalinovskiy. All the piece workers have mastered two or three related specialties and are rightly called true masters of their job. The brigade has achieved interchangeability and this makes it possible for the collective to independently carry out the entire range of work at the construction projects, from laying the foundation to finishing off the building.
A good reputation has been won by the brigade leader, I. Osin, Hero of Socialist Labor and Honored RSFSR Construction Worker. The collective which he leads has inevitably been ahead of schedule and is in the vanguard of the socialist competition. The brigade fulfilled the quotas of the last three five-year plans. The collective is working well also in the second year of the 11th Five-Year Plan. Here not a single output rate is fulfilled below 120 percent. Careful planning of the work, a precise rhythm, reliability and durability of the product and strong labor discipline--this is the signature of the installation workers in this brigade.

The military construction worker Pvt. A. Aloyan is greatly respected among his fellow servicemen. From the very first days of service he has proven to be a disciplined and industrious soldier. Pvt. A. Aloyan has mastered the specialties of a plasterer and painter. He is a shockworker of communist labor.

A year ago, V. Davydov by an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet for labor valor shown in harvesting was awarded the Order of the Honor Badge. He learned of this joyous event while on army service. Now the military construction worker Jr Srg V. Davydov, is a brigade leader of concrete and cement workers and an outstanding man in military construction.

Many good words could be said also about the brigade of painters headed by the holder of the Order of Labor Valor Third Degree, N. Dashkova. For more than 30 years, Nina Mikhaylovna has worked on military construction projects. Over this time, she has trained many first-rate specialists and serves as a model for others in work. Her brigade fulfilled the quota for the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan by the 64th anniversary of the October Revolution. Nina Mikhaylovna is working excellently in 1982, too. She has been awarded the insignia "Outstanding Person in Military Construction" and the diploma "Master and Golden Hands."

The Communist Party highly values the labor of the military construction workers. Over the years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan alone, more than 1,500 military construction workers received orders and medals. Our units have 4 Heroes of the Soviet Union, 8 Heroes of Socialist Labor, around 1,000 Honored Construction Workers of the RSFSR and other Union republics, 13 winners of the USSR State Prize and 17 of the Lenin Komsomol Prize.

In the military construction units, a socialist competition has developed widely to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR under the motto "To Work Effectively and with High Quality, to Strictly Observe Thriftiness." The military construction workers of the Odessa Military District were the initiators of this campaign in 1982.

The efforts of all the personnel are aimed at successfully carrying out the plan for the second year of the 11th Five-Year Plan, at promptly completing the nearly finished projects and raising the effectiveness and quality of construction. The commanders, the political bodies, the party, trade union and Komsomol organizations are carrying out great work aimed at better utilizing the reserves, at saving material and technical resources and at strengthening military and labor discipline. Everyone has the same desire, by shock labor to
celebrate the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and to make a
worthy contribution to strengthening the economic and defense might of the
nation and to raising the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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CSO: 1801/112
SOVIET NAVAL VISIT TO ANGOLA REPORTED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 82 (signed to press 4 Oct 82) pp 77-80

[Article by Col Yu. Moshkov: "Views of Angola"]

[Text] Recently a detachment of Soviet Navy ships made an official friendly visit to the capital of the People's Republic of Angola, the city of Luanda. Below the comments of a military journal about this visit are published.

From the sea, Luanda is unusually beautiful. On the flat shore of a broad bay, along the quay bordered by a line of royal palms there stretch, as if on parade, the precise parallelepipeds of glass and concrete buildings interspersed with their low associates built by the Portuguese in the last century or even before and at the beginning of the present one. This coastal area which is known here as the lower town is separated from the upper town by a steep terrace of several-score meters in height. Its red-yellow color contrasts to the dark gray, blue, pink and white structures and the lush greenery of the trees and shrubs.

In the upper city, on May First Square, is the administrative center of Luanda. Here not far from the building of the Central Committee of the MPLA-PT (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola--Labor Party) and the Angolan government, an original monument has been set up: an armored personnel carrier of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) is ramming an armored vehicle of the South African racists. This monument is a symbol of the victory of the Angolan people over the foreign interventionists.

One of the capital's parks has been named after V. I. Lenin and his bust has been set up there. Running from the town's center to the international airport is the Avenue of the 60th Anniversary of the October Revolution.

Off to the left, on the outskirts of Luanda, one can clearly see the Petrangol Oil Refinery on a steep plateau. Last year, saboteurs from South Africa tried to destroy it. They succeeded in knocking out several shops which now have almost been fully rebuilt. Off to the right, the upper town ends abruptly in an almost vertical rocky cape on which rises the fortress of Sao Miguel which was built in the 16th Century.
Stretching several kilometers into the ocean is a narrow spit of an island connected by a causeway with the lower town. Here is the recreational zone with a small hotel and cottages. The island securely protects the bay against the ocean winds. For this reason, its mirror-like surface of light emerald color is disturbed only by the ships entering and leaving port and the quick launches scurrying back and forth. The port is always "crowded" with vessels of the maritime fleet flying flags of scores of countries, including many of our own, Soviet ships.

Luanda, the population of which is around 800,000 persons, is the largest industrial center in the nation. The city has up to 60 enterprises. The largest of them are electrical engineering, the oil refinery, a metallurgical and car assembly plant and a textile mill.

...The official friendly visit by the detachment of the USSR Naval ships evoked great interest among the capital's inhabitants. Hundreds of people visited the ships.

The flagship of the detachment, the ASW cruiser "Moskva" was visited by the member of the Politburo of the MPLA-PT Central Committee, the Angolan Minister of Defense Pedro Maria Tonha, by members and candidate members of the Politburo, by the leaders of the Ministry of Defense, the general staff and the national political administration of the FAPLA. In speaking to the Soviet sailors, the Angolan minister of defense pointed out that the Angolan people for long years had waged a heroic struggle for their freedom against colonialism and suppression until victory was achieved. In this struggle, he said, we always relied on the aid and support of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth. The Angolan people have chosen the path pointed out by the great Lenin, the path leading to socialism. And we are confident that his victorious banner will fly over our country. The visit by the detachment of Soviet naval vessels, stated P. M. Tonha, will help to further strengthen friendship and cooperation between the USSR Armed Forces and the FAPLA, between the Soviet and Angolan peoples.

Our sailors were also visited by representatives from the trade union association, the National Union of Angolan Workers, by youth and women's organizations, the league of friendship and solidarity with the peoples of foreign countries, the Angola--USSR Soviety and FAPLA soldiers. They were all impressed by the smart bearing of our sailors, petty officers, warrant officers ["michman"] and officers, their courtesy and by the exemplary order on the ships.

During the days of the visit, the Soviet sailors made excursions to local visits, they walked along the quay and photographed themselves as a souvenir. They were warmly greeted by the capital's residents. The ubiquitous boys, flashing toothless grins, volunteered as guides and receiving a Soviet button from the sailors immediately fastened it on.

Enormously successful was the concert given by the amateur vocal-instrumental ensemble of our sailors in the capital's largest Karl Marx Movie Theater. Around 2,000 spectators applauded loudly for the performances by musicians, singers and dancers. This concert brigade performed also in other places,
including in the Luanda military hospital for soldiers of the FAPLA wounded in battles against the South African interventionists and bandits of the counter-revolutionary groupings.

The Soviet sailors were interested to learn of the military history of the FAPLA which was organized on the basis of the first guerrilla combat detachments of the MPLA, a revolutionary organization founded in December 1956. In February 1961, armed revolt started against the Portuguese colonialists. Fierce battles raged for many years against the enslavers. The patriots succeeded in liberating an extensive territory of the nation. On 1 August 1974, in the area of Caripanda (Moxico Province) at the site where the national hero of Angola, the commander of the guerrilla detachments Jose Mendes de Carvalho (Ojiya Enda) had been killed, the MPLA leadership proclaimed the founding of a regular army. Since then, 1 August has annually been celebrated as FAPLA Day.

One of the major testings for the young Angolan army was the battles in October-November 1975 in the area of Quifangondo, on the approaches to Luanda, when foreign interventionists were pushing toward the capital. The engagement which local military comrades have named a "little Stalingrad" ended with the defeat of the enemy.

On 11 November of the same year, the formation of the People's Republic of Angola was declared. The leader of the MPLA, Antonio Angostinho Neto, became its first president. He died in September 1979 and at present a mausoleum is being built in Luanda for this outstanding fighter for the liberation of the nation, the leader of the Angolan people and well-known African poet.

International imperialism, primarily American, and the South African racists cannot tolerate the fact that the Angolan people have chosen a socialist path of development. They have not halted the undeclared war against Angola and want to destabilize the situation in the nation and cause economic chaos.

In August 1981, with direct U.S. support, South African troops numbering over 40,000 men invaded the southern provinces of Angola from Namibia. The FAPLA soldiers decisively rebuffed the invasion of the racists and did not allow them to penetrate deeply to the north.

But the militaristic provocations against the people's republic have not ended. According to data recently released by the Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, over the 7 months of the current year more than 350 reconnaissance flights by South African aviation over Angolan territory have been recorded. Over this same period, 15 bombing raids were undertaken against economic and military installations, more than 20 airborne landing operations involving helicopters as well as several artillery shellings and infantry raids.

In July of the current year, a new invasion of Angola by the South African troops started. The racists threw in many forces including four motorized infantry brigades and formations manned by mercenaries.

The South African bourgeois propaganda is endeavoring to create the impression that the current exacerbation of the situation in the south of Africa has been
caused by the "uncompromisingness" of Angola over the Namibian question. Angola is being demanded to "link" the achieving of Namibian independence with the withdrawal from Angola of the Cuban troops which are stationed here with the agreement between the governments of the two countries to provide aid in defending its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

As has been pointed out in a joint Angolan-Cuban announcement, confronted with the dangerous plans to link the granting of Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops, the Angolan and Cuban governments reaffirm that the presence of these troops caused by the constant aggressions of the South African Racist-Fascist Regime which is in a close alliance with the United States is within the competence of the two sovereign states and, consequently, has no relation to the Namibian problem.

The situation in Angola is also complicated by the fact that counterrevolutionary organizations are active in the nation. The largest of them is the so-called National Union for the Complete Independence of Angola (UNITA). This bandit grouping is headed by the CIA puppet and agent Jonas Savimbi. The aim of UNITA is to overthrow the people's government of Angola and form a "independent black socialist republic," but actually it seeks to establish a reactionary dictatorship of a pro-Western orientation. The UNITA forces are wrecking havoc in the south and southeast of the nation.

On the northern frontiers of Angola, Washington has armed another bandit grouping which calls itself the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). Its leader, Holden Roberto, was recruited by the U.S. CIA in 1959.

Along with its allies, the United States is endeavoring to unite the UNITA and FNLA so that they could work in an united front.

Thus, there is a broad conspiracy of imperialism against people's Angola and the aim of this is to prevent the development of the nation along the path of progressive changes, to force it out of the group of states which have proclaimed an antiimperialist policy in the south of Africa and to prevent the development of liberation movements in the southern part of this continent.

Naturally, the young republic must be constantly concerned with strengthening the nation's defense capability. The Angolan Army is fighting both against foreign interventionists and the internal counterrevolution.

The leadership over national defense is provided by the Politburo of the MPLA-PT Central Committee. The party chairman and Angolan president Jose Eduardo dos Santos is, according to the constitution, the supreme commander-in-chief of the FAPLA.

In Angola, great attention is being paid to the training of skilled military personnel. Training centers have been organized for training specialists from among the rank and file and there are courses for training navy ship crews, sergeant schools and an officer school.

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The military-political school founded in Luanda in 1976 is concerned with the training of political workers. It is named after the national hero of Angola, Commandant Zhika, the political commissar who for more than 10 years participated in the guerrilla struggle against the Portuguese colonialists and was killed in battle in June 1975.

Along with the political workers from the detachment of Soviet naval ships, we were able to visit this school. The deputy chief of the National Political Administration of the FAPLA, Capt Beta, the school's chief, Capt Mario Lopes Teixeira and the chief of the school's political section, 1st Lt Manoel Tiago, acquainted us with the organization of the training process and showed us the classrooms and barracks for the officer candidates. There are two chairs in the school: social sciences and military science. The officer candidates study Marxist-Leninist theory, party political work, the principles of military indoctrination and the military experience of the Soviet Armed Forces. On the military chair the training of political workers has been differentiated for the various branches of troops: ground, naval, aviation and air defense. The training facilities are still not very rich, but they are constantly being renewed and upgraded. The period of instruction is 2 years and in 1983 they intend to convert to a 3-year program. The school draws its students from the soldiers of the FAPLA as well as civilian youths who are members of the MPLA-PT or the youth organization. There have already been several graduating classes of officers and they, as a rule, are appointed company political workers. Many of them have already been promoted and work in battalions and brigades.

We were told that several-score officer candidates from the second year, while on tours of duty in the troops, had participated in battles against the South African mercenaries and had proven to be courageous and steadfast soldiers.

We liked the precise military order in the school. But we were particularly impressed by a meeting with the personnel in the international friendship hall which had been specially created here. There was also a delegation of Cuban military at the meeting. One should have seen the enthusiasm with which those assembled in the hall greeted the comments of the Soviet and Cuban officers and how warmly and fraternally they welcomed their military friends. The Angolan military who spoke at the meeting said that they had always felt the support and aid of the USSR and Cuba and were fully determined to defend the victories of the revolution and ensure conditions for building the foundations of socialism in their nation.

In talks with the Soviet guests, the Angolan comrades did not conceal the difficulties which their nation was experiencing in the economy, in managing production, and in supplying the urban population with food, industrial goods and housing. Certainly just 7 years have passed since the creation of the people's republic and the difficult inheritance of the colonial past is naturally felt.

The economy was severely harmed by the departure from Angola of 350,000 Portuguese specialists, including engineers and technicians, skilled workers, electricians, teachers and economists. As Angolan comrades related, even the bookkeeping records and the technical documents of the enterprises were removed.
The nation acutely feels the shortage of not only specialists, but even simply literate people. For a state of the socialist orientation which is carrying out revolutionary-democratic changes the aim of which is to create the material, scientific-technical, sociopolitical and cultural prerequisites for a future transition to socialism, it is essential to do everything from scratch: to create a state sector in industry, to organize agricultural cooperatives and state farms in agriculture, to plan the economy, to manage it, to manage and indoctrinate people.

But the main cause of difficulties is that the Angolan people are forced to constantly defend their sovereignty against South African aggression and the intrigues of the counterrevolutionary groupings. It is a question not only of the direct destruction of national economic installations and the communications system. A significant portion of the working population has been diverted from productive labor. Large amounts of money are spent for defense needs from the state budget.

In terms of its natural resources, Angola is one of the richest countries in Africa. It is sometimes called a "treasure chest." Here there are large reserves of oil, copper, iron, manganese, uranium ores, gold and other minerals. Diamonds are mined and 75-80 percent of them are an excellent raw material for jewelry. There is every opportunity for the development of agriculture, particularly as 85 percent of the population lives in the countryside. However, the share of agricultural production in gross national product is only around one-fifth. The basic crop is coffee. There are rice and cotton plantations which do not require irrigation.

The men of the FAPLA approve and actively support the policy of the MPLA-PT, the first congress of which was held in December of 1977. The membership of delegates to this congress was characteristic. Almost one-half of them had participated in the armed struggle for the liberation of the nation, one out of every five had engaged in active subversive activities and one out of every three had spent time in prisons and concentration camps of the Portuguese colonialists.

In December 1980, there was an extraordinary congress of the MPLA-PT. The congress decisions were aimed primarily at further raising the party's leading role in directing the state, the economy and society. This is viewed as the basic prerequisite and crucial factor for the nation's development along the path of a socialist orientation.

The congress outlined the basic directions and goals in the sociopolitical development of Angola for the period up to 1985. As the chief economic task, the party proposed accelerating the economic development rates and increasing production efficiency as well as ensuring the living conditions of the Angolan people. Here particular attention was given to organizing the operation of state and cooperative enterprises in order to ensure a predominance of the socialist sector in the economy.

The MPLA-PT considers a rise in agriculture as an important factor for economic growth and improving the living conditions of the people at the present stage,
as to a significant degree this determines the solving of the food program and the development of the food and light industries and exports. For this reason a policy has been set of improving the social organization of labor and the production process in the countryside, the planned strengthening of commercial ties between city and countryside as well as the providing of help in organizing and operating the associations and cooperatives of the peasantry as the main form at present for the further socioeconomic changes in the countryside.

The MPLA-PT is carrying out extensive work in reshaping the psychology of the workers. The colonial administration strongly influenced the ideology of the working people in the direction required by it, in endeavoring to divide them and create an African worker aristocracy. The party is indoctrinating in the workers a feeling of being the true masters of the nation. The aims of indoctrinating a new man are conscientious labor, the ability and readiness to put social interests first and an awareness of the leading role of the working class in society.

Loyal to its international duty, the Soviet Union has always been on the side of fighting Angola. In the difficult time when the Angolan people, under the leadership of the MPLA, were waging an unstinting struggle for liberation from colonial domination, friendship between our peoples was established and strengthened. With the formation of the People's Republic of Angola, relations of true fraternity were established between it and the USSR. In October 1976, in Moscow a Soviet-Angolan Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation was signed. Soviet specialists provided aid to Angola in reorganizing the financial and banking system and in developing the power system, including the compiling of a plan for the electrification of the nation, in creating a state oil company, compiling a geological map of Angola and so forth. With the aid of Soviet specialists and workers, the ship repair yard and dock in the town of Lobitu were rebuilt, as well as destroyed bridges on the nation's rivers.

"We, the Soviet people," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "sincerely want to see people's Angola an independent, strong and flourishing state and we want for the Angolan people new victories in strengthening the independence of their nation and in building a free life!"

In January of the current year, a Soviet-Angolan program for economic and technical cooperation was signed in Moscow as well as a trade program for 1981-1985 and for the long run up to 1990.

In August of this year, there was a visit by a CPSU delegation to Angola. In a joint press release, the delegations of the CPSU and MPLA-PT pointed out that the relations of fraternal friendship, solidarity and cooperation which unite our parties and peoples are being consistently developed and deepened on a basis of the common Marxist-Leninist ideology and principles of proletarian internationalism which guide the CPSU and the MPLA-PT.

...A fiery red sun was sinking behind the horizon. But for several minutes more, the waters of the bay and the ships standing in the roadsteads of Luanda, the city and the skies were colored an amazingly delicate purple which is unusual for a northerner. Then this color gradually dissolved in the haze and
the tropical night cloaked the earth in a black bright-starred shroud. A truly enchanting sight!

And tomorrow the morning dawn would announce the start of a new day. Another day in the life of the young republic, the first nation in Southwest Africa which had set out on a path of socialist orientation.

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CSO: 1801/097
PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON 'SOVIET MILITARY THREAT', NATO

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 82 (signed to press 4 Nov 82) pp 80-84

[Article by Col Yu. Yerashov: "The Big Lie of NATO"]

[Text] In carrying out its aggressive, adventuristic policy, world imperialism has placed particular hope on NATO. Precisely the North Atlantic bloc presently is performing the role of a collective warmonger. This chief aggressive imperialist bloc is focused primarily on preparing a nuclear missile war against the USSR and the other nations in the socialist commonwealth as well as suppressing the national liberation movement of peoples and perpetuating by force of arms the capitalist system in the NATO member states themselves.

In the North Atlantic bloc, even under peacetime conditions, a strong military machine has been created in the form of the Joint Armed Forces. According to information in the London Institute for Strategic Studies, in 1981, the total number of personnel in the armed forces of the NATO member states reached 5,658,000 men. As a total there were 89 divisions of ground forces, over 17,000 tanks, more than 11,500 combat aircraft and helicopters and 1,840 ships of the basic classes. A significant part of the regular troops and military equipment had been assigned as part of the NATO Joint Armed Forces and the supreme command of these is in the hands of American generals.

The U.S. ruling circles, with the aid of the North Atlantic bloc, in essence have established control over the allied armies and have turned Western Europe into a hostage of their adventuristic nuclear missile strategy. They are keeping here the most powerful grouping of general-purpose forces deployed overseas and this numbers 336,000 men equipped with the most modern offensive weapons and military equipment. It is armed with more than 7,000 nuclear warheads.

Enormous amounts are being channeled by the NATO members into militaristic preparations. In 1981, their military budgets reached 282 billion dollars. This is 2.7-fold more than in 1971 and 15-fold more than in 1949, the first year of the bloc's existence.

But the NATO rulers have not limited themselves to just material preparations for a nuclear missile war. As was pointed out in the foreign press, "Washington considers it essential to rearm the West not only militarily, but also morally." There has been a sharp increase in the ideological influencing of
the population and troop personnel in the bloc's countries in a militaristic, anticomunist and anti-Soviet spirit. Subversive propaganda actions have been undertaken on an unprecedented scale against the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth. Imperialism, as was emphasized by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, has actually changed over to psychological warfare against the USSR and the other socialist nations. In disseminating lies about our social system and the international policy of the Soviet state, the imperialist reaction has endeavored to justify the arms race unleashed by the United States and the NATO bloc. Washington has outrightly proclaimed a new "crusade" against communism.

The basic content in the domestic and external propaganda disseminated by the NATO ideological centers is the big lie, that is, refined attempts to depict the modern world in a distorted mirror. This lie includes a whole series of myths of bourgeois propaganda skillfully introduced into the minds of people according to a unified and carefully-thought-out "brainwashing plan." The conductor of the NATO ideological subversives is the main American agency for foreign political propaganda, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) which for the last several years has been named the International Communications Agency (ICA).

The myth of the "Soviet military threat" is the core of the big NATO lie. This myth was born by bourgeois propaganda not yesterday, but rather has existed as long as real socialism and in terms of its class purpose serves as a propaganda cover for the anti-Soviet military campaigns of imperialism. NATO propaganda has not ceased fabricating ever-new falsities concocted simultaneously both on primitive and refined anti-Sovietism and anticommunism. "The main motive of the supporters of the arms race," commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is the establishing of the so-called Soviet threat. This motive is used both when it is essential to push through a higher military budget, curtailing expenses on social needs, when new types of lethal weapons are to be developed and when they endeavor to justify the military activities of NATO. Of course, in actuality, there is no Soviet threat either for the East or for the West. All of this is a monstrous lie from start to finish."

The Pentagon pamphlet "Soviet Military Might" with a foreword by the Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger published last year in the United States can serve as an example of the anti-Soviet propaganda concoctions. The pamphlet was translated into German, French and other languages and has become a "desk aid" in the NATO political and military circles. It contains many facts and commentaries on them concerning the fighting strength, structure and groupings of the Soviet Armed Forces, their weapons and other information which, in the words of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, "fill in the vacuum in the knowledge of the wide public about Soviet military might." The Pentagon fraud decries the "lag" of the United States and NATO behind the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in the military area and the appearance of "windows of vulnerability" in the American military machine. However, with all the general abundance of information in the pamphlet, the eye is struck by the fact that not even brief information is given on the armed forces of the United States and NATO. This is no accident. If this had been given, then each reader would see for himself that between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO an approximate equilibrium existed in the military area and that there was no
"threat to the strategic interests of the West" or a "challenge" to the United States from the USSR.

"If one bases oneself on hard facts and there are no other grounds for an objective assessment of the balance of forces," commented the USSR Minister of Defense, Gen S. U. D. F. Ustinov, "then it must be admitted that whether one takes strategic nuclear weapons or medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe or conventional armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact—in all instances there is an approximate equality between the sides. No 'Soviet superiority' exists."

Nevertheless, the NATO leaders continue to fan the hysteria about the "Soviet threat." And making most noise about this is the official printed organ of the North Atlantic bloc, the journal NATO REVIEW. In issue after issue, it publishes materials falsifying the real balance of forces. Thus, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Joint NATO Armed Forces in Europe, the American Gen B. Rogers, in his review article on the subject of the "growing threat to NATO security" writes: "The inexorable growth and modernization of Soviet military might have led to an ever-increasing unfavorable balance of forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In my opinion, NATO has already been left behind, or will soon be left behind, in all types of armed forces needed for implementing its strategy: both in the area of strategic and operational nuclear forces and conventional forces.... The coming period, particularly the first half of the 1980's, will be very critical."

The American Commander-in-Chief is echoed by the Secretary General of NATO, J. Luns. In writing in the NATO REVIEW, he without any substantiation accuses the USSR of "naval expansion" and that the Soviet nation is supposedly endeavoring to use the navy to "influence the balance of forces in any region both in peacetime and in wartime" in the aim of "establishing world domination." "The ensuring of our security and freedom," concludes Luns, "demands that we even now respond decisively to the challenge thrown down by the USSR on the seas." It is not difficult to understand that by the "response to the challenge" the author means accelerating aggressive NATO military preparations, including in the world's ocean.

As a rule, the anti-Soviet ravings of the NATO members are combined with rabid attacks on detente. In the view of the NATO propagandists, detente is not the overcoming of military tension and not a path to peace and mutually advantageous cooperation among the states of the two opposing social systems, but rather a "communist trap" into which the West would supposedly fall out of its "excessive credulity." The NATO REVIEW, for example, has asserted that while the West has been talking about arms limitation for the sake of detente, "the East has unceasingly increased its strategic and operational nuclear forces, it has modernized the ground forces and achieved a sensational increase in seapower."

It is perfectly obvious that by such lines of argument, the NATO propaganda, as they say, is endeavoring to throw cold water on things. In concluding in 1979 with the USSR a strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT-2), the United States recognized an approximate equilibrium in the quantity and quality of strategic nuclear weapons of the two powers. However soon thereafter, Washington began to voice completely unfounded "accusations" against the USSR.
The essence of the question is primarily that the Soviet Union has not endeavored and is not endeavoring to achieve military superiority and feels that approximate equality is sufficient for defense needs. Moreover, the maintaining of a military strategic equilibrium under the existing conditions ensures an implementation of the principle of equality and equal security of the sides and objectively serves to maintain peace in the world. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev with great definiteness pointed out: "The Soviet Union does not threaten anyone and does not intend to attack anyone. Our military doctrine has a defensive nature. It excludes preventive wars and the concept of a 'first strike.'

"The Soviet nation has unswervingly demonstrated in practice its firm adherence to the cause of peace and has come forward with important and constructive peaceful initiatives aimed at improving the international situation, including reducing the military confrontation in Europe and for strengthening confidence and friendship between peoples. These noble aims are also served by the Peace Program for the 1980's worked out by the 26th CPSU Congress and welcomed with fervent approval by the peace-loving community of the entire world. The entire content of the Soviet Peace Program is permeated with concern to lead mankind away from the threat of a nuclear war and to preserve peace in the world. The foreign policy actions outlined by the supreme forum of the Leninist party for the 1980's have been supplemented by new important peace initiatives of the USSR. The Soviet Union has decided to impose a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European USSR. At the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, the Soviet Union unilaterally declared its decision not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons. The world community with full justification has called this decision historic. If the other nuclear powers would follow the example of the USSR, then in practice this would be tantamount to banning the use of nuclear weapons and generally eliminating the threat of a nuclear war.

"The peoples of the entire world respect and highly regard the peaceableness and good will shown by the Soviet state. Only the NATO rulers turn a deaf ear to the voice of reason and continue in various voices to proclaim the 'Soviet military threat'."

An inseparable component part in the big lie of NATO is the myth of the "defensive nature" of the North Atlantic bloc. In the Bonn Declaration of the NATO Council Session held in June 1982 for the heads of state, it was hypocritically asserted that the Atlantic Alliance for a quarter of a century now had "served as a guarantee of peace" and "remained a necessary weapon for restraining aggression by a strong defense and by strengthening peace through constructive dialogue." But these are only words, while practical deeds show something else. The North Atlantic bloc has been and remains a weapon of aggression and predatory wars. The wagering on military force which has been raised by Washington to a rank of state policy in resolving international problems has predetermined the nature and focus of military organizational development not only in the United States itself, but also in NATO where American imperialism is accustomed to having things its way. Here the main task has been set of disrupting the existing military parity between the United States and the USSR, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and to achieve American military superiority primarily in nuclear missile weapons.
Among the militaristic actions of the NATO strategists one must put in first place in terms of its dangerous consequences the nuclear missile rearming of the bloc on the basis of the decision of the December (1979) Session of the NATO Council. In accord with this decision, in a number of the Western European countries, starting in 1983, 572 American medium-range nuclear missiles were to be deployed, including 108 Pershing-2 missiles and 464 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Although the NATO military has called these missiles a "weapon for a theater of war," in actuality they are strategic ones since their range is, respectively, 2,500 and 2,000 km and they are capable of reaching vitally important objectives on the territory of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states. In the event of deploying the "Euromissiles" in Western Europe, the NATO members would have a more than 1.5-fold superiority over the Warsaw Pact nations in terms of the number of medium-range delivery systems and in terms of nuclear warheads this advantage would increase even more.

In endeavoring to achieve nuclear superiority and at the same time to confuse the international community about its true intentions, Washington has endeavored to achieve unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union by imposing the notorious "zero option." In November 1981, the United States announced its readiness to give up the deployment of the "Euromissiles" in Western Europe, but only under the condition that the USSR would destroy all its medium-range missiles. The NATO Council hastened to style this White House proposal which would be clearly unacceptable to the USSR as "historic," and announced full support for the "broad and constructive program which President Reagan had proposed in the aim of establishing peace on a sound basis."

The matter comes down not merely to increasing NATO nuclear weapons. The doctrine of their employment is also undergoing a dangerous transformation. Although the medium-range missiles have been given the name "European" they will remain a component part of the U.S. military arsenal and American generals will control them. In the new U.S. "nuclear strategy" the emphasis has been put on a further "reduction in the nuclear threshold," that is, on employing weapons of mass destruction from the very outset of military operations. The idea has been established of the feasibility of an extended or long nuclear war and the "right" of NATO to make a surprise pre-emptive strike against the military installations of the socialist states has been announced. In others words, the initiating of a preventive nuclear war is considered a normal phenomenon by the creators of this criminal strategy.

The Pentagon strategists plan to make the massed nuclear strike in such a manner as to minimize the possibility of a retaliatory strike against the United States. Precisely with the aid of the "Euromissiles," the overseas imperialists count on unleashing a nuclear conflict on the European continent in the hope that they will be able to sit it out overseas. As for Western Europe, it can be turned into a victim for the sake of the selfish interests of American imperialism.

The nuclear missile rearming of NATO has in fact turned the Western European countries into the "nuclear hostages" of the United States and this is incompatible with the fundamental national interests of the European states. This truth is becoming evermore apparent for the broad community, regardless of all the tricks of the NATO propaganda machine.
It should be recalled that the NATO decision for nuclear missile rearmament in the Western press has been termed "dual," since, in seeking its approval, the United States has assured its partners that simultaneously Soviet-American talks will be undertaken on nuclear weapons control. If one speaks about NATO nuclear rearmament, this question has actually been put on a realistic basis. Extensive work is underway involving the production and deployment of the medium-range American missiles in the designated area. The military leadership of the bloc has announced that it is looking to the future "with optimism," and is hopeful that the "Euromissiles" will be at their launching positions by the end of 1983.

As for the Soviet-American talks, these have been sabotaged in every possible way by the American side. Washington has blocked the implementation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2) which could become an important measure in checking the arms race. Due to the position of the United States and its allies, the Vienna talks on a mutual reduction in armed forces and weapons in Central Europe have been stalemated. The militaristic circles of American imperialism are doing everything possible to poison the international atmosphere. Even the course of the Soviet-American talks presently underway in Geneva on the limiting of nuclear weapons (both strategic and medium-range) shows that the United States is actually more interested in turning Western Europe into a launching pad for the new American missiles than in achieving mutually acceptable agreements on a principle of equality and equal security. Washington will go no farther than its "zero option."

The general course of military organizational development in the United States and NATO is also very far removed from defensive goals as this has been characterized by a constant rise in the military budgets, by the developing of new weapons programs and by the intensification of aggressive military preparations in the zone of the North Atlantic bloc and beyond it. In the coming 5 years, up to 1986, the military expenditures of the United States for the Pentagon alone will exceed 1.5 trillion dollars. Enormous amounts are to go primarily for increasing the strategic offensive forces and for creating a nuclear first-strike potential. These include the new Trident missile submarines, the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, the multipurpose Shuttle spacecraft and air-, sea- and land-based cruise missiles. The production and stockpiling of neutron and also chemical weapons are being accelerated.

American imperialism is putting ever-increasing pressure on its NATO allies for them to increase their military expenditures. Over the last decade (1971-1980), the share of the Western European nations in the general NATO arms race has risen from 26 percent to 41 percent, or from 27.9 to 107.5 billion dollars. At present, Washington is pushing for its NATO partners to assume up to 50 percent of the bloc's military expenditures.

The statement made at the Bonn Session of broadening the NATO "zone of action" beyond the limits of the North Atlantic also is indicative of the growing aggressiveness of the North Atlantic bloc. The session urged the NATO partners to undertake steps outside the bloc's sphere of influence which "could make a substantial contribution to ensuring the security of the West." By such "steps" they clearly mean the recent colonialist actions Great Britain against
Argentina and the operations of the American naval armada in the Persian Gulf.

It must be said that in the West, the myth of the "Pacific mission" of NATO still holds sway over many people who have been deceived by bourgeois propaganda. However, the effect of this myth is constantly weakening as is eloquently seen by the unprecedented rise in the antiwar and antimissile movement in Western Europe involving millions of people who differ in their political and religious views and their social and class position. They are decisively against the imperialist plans of turning Europe into an arena of a new war which threatens the death of civilization.

Imperialist propaganda constantly depicts the North Atlantic bloc as the defender of "liberty" and "human rights." The same journal NATO REVIEW has proclaimed: "Human rights and their defense form the mortar which holds together the very edifice of the Atlantic Alliance." This is one other myth comprising the big lie of NATO. It has been fully refuted by the practical deeds of the imperialist military alliance which not only violates the elementary freedoms and rights of millions of simple people, but also intends, in preparing for a devastating war, to deprive them of the right to life. This myth has been used particularly widely by the NATO leaders in their subversive activities against the Warsaw Pact states in the aim of "the disintegration of socialism from within." These destructive and perfidious activities have been particularly apparent vis-a-vis Poland.

When, in the course of the familiar events in Poland the extremists from Solidarity and other counterrevolutionaries with the aid of a strike terror destroyed the economy, when the nation was beset by a wave of anarchy and crime, NATO propaganda proclaimed the process of the "democratization" of Poland and the affirming of its "desire for national uniqueness." The response of NATO was completely different to the sovereign decision of the Polish people to put their house in order by introducing martial law in December 1981. NATO propaganda raised a hue and cry about the "violating of human rights" in Poland while the U.S. ruling circles and their Atlantic partners, as was pointed out by the First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee W. Jaruselski, declared a "propaganda and economic war" on Poland.

The time of Polish-language broadcasts on the Western radio stations increased significantly. The U.S. CIA Radio Free Europe broadcast almost around-the-clock to Poland. After the declaration of martial law in Poland, the amount of Voice of America broadcasts for Polish listeners doubled. The Polish program was broadened by the English BBC. Radio France International resumed broadcasts in Polish. All the subversive "voices" have inundated the Poles in cloudy waters of slander and misinformation and urge the extremist elements in Poland to strengthen resistance to the authorities and to impede in every possible way any step aimed at normalizing the situation in the nation. In essence, a united anti-Polish ideological front has formed between the forces of the external and internal counterrevolution.

But the hopes of the NATO strategists and ideological subversives of splitting Poland away from its true friends and dependable allies are in vain. The plans of the imperialist reaction to "erode" the socialist commonwealth are unattainable.
The ideological "crusade" which has been proclaimed by the present U.S. administration against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and the subversive Operation Truth which has been worked out upon the personal instructions of the boss of the White House for falsifying Soviet foreign policy and discrediting the strengthening and broadening movement of peace supporters show that the NATO rulers are endeavoring to further follow the adventuristic course of fanning the anticomunist and anti-Soviet hysteria and increasing international tension. This is a dangerous and hopeless course!

"During its 65 years of existence, Soviet power has known many 'crusaders' and it is well known how their crusades have ended," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "Confident of the rightness of our cause and of the invincibility of the ideas of scientific socialism which have been confirmed by the entire course of historical development, we have waged and will wage an uncompromising offensive struggle against anticomunism and anti-Sovietism. We are in favor of conducting the ideological dispute with the aid or arguments and not evil insinuation and militant rhetoric and that it not be accompanied by slander and falsification of the facts."

As for the attempts of world imperialism behind the screen of the big lie to achieve military strategic superiority over socialism, such attempts are doomed to inevitable failure. The invincible defense might of the states in the socialist commonwealth and the constant combat readiness of the men of the USSR Armed Forces and the fraternal Warsaw Pact armies are a dependable guarantee for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and their socialist allies.

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