East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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SWEDISH VISITOR FINDS ANTI-SOVIET PICTURES IN ART MUSEUM

Western Eurocommunists Also Ridiculed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Jan 85 p 21

[Article by Disa Hastad: "The Shocking Truth From Tirana"]

[Text] Tirana, December--"If you're lucky, you'll get into the art museum," said my friend, a member of the Sweden-Albania Friendship Group.

He knew that you do not always get around in that country so easily.

But luck was with me and I went to the picture gallery in Tirana, recently in the news for having purchased some Western works of art, including a Rembrandt and a Tizian, whose authenticity is not altogether beyond doubt. This section was closed though (most of the pictures were on a road exhibit, it was said). But we had come to see the Albanian section anyway.

Albanian socialist realism is not so good. And, to judge from the result, some major art talents do not seem to be languishing away in the strait jacket, either.

But small pearls can be seen. The section on satire, for example, is as amusing and as wicked as one expects it to be, since Albania is a country that bears a grudge against most other governments.

Here is a painting of Eurocommunists depicted as a collection of howling dogs which have eaten bones. There is a large series of anti-Soviet drawings--one, for instance, with the title "The Soviet Diplomats Return Home." The diplomats are dogs too--this time with a large shoe print on their backs and the kennel where they are headed has KGB painted over the entrance.

A drawing of Karl Marx tells us that this thinker expressed himself on Albania too, declaring that the Albanians are a brave people on the water's edge.
The best of all, however, is the section of historical painting, a flourishing genre in Albania. Here one can see genre pictures such as "Enver Hoxha Proclaims the Republic," but the high point is on the second floor, a monumental work titled "1960 Meeting in Moscow."

It was at this meeting that Enver Hoxha in front of the assembled world communists did not condemn China, thus breaking communist unity. The picture shows Enver Hoxha lecturing the frightened party comrades gathered there. We see how they sit: from the left, Mikoyan, described in Hoxha's memoirs as an extremely unpleasant type; Khrushchev, clinching his fist; Suslov, the party ideologue, looking very pensive; Brezhnev, listening attentively; Ulbricht, the seasoned GDR leader; and someone who might be Gromulka of Poland. Kadar seems troubled, and Spain's empassioned Dolores Ibarruri looks scornfully at the speaker.

The artist's name is Zef and he painted the picture in 1985

Hoxha Lecturing Soviet Leaders

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 25 Jan 85 p 22

[Text] The break between the USSR and Albania has attracted more artists than just Zef Shoshi, whose picture "1960 Meeting in Moscow" we showed the first of last week.

Now a reader sends in the following work by the Albanian Guri Makhi, likewise called "1960 Meeting in Moscow," painted in 1961 and reproduced in 1977 by Paletten. Here too we see Enver Hoxha lecturing the Soviet comrades Brezhnev, Khrushchev and Suslov--above whom we see a glimpse of Mikoyan--to the extreme left.

But there are several Albanians in the picture as well. To Hoxha's left is Haxhi Lleshi and at his right is Mehmet Sheshu. The first was president and the latter was head of government at that time. They have in fact been purged since then. Sheshu is said to have committed suicide and was then "exposed" as a spy for most of the well-known secret services.

So this picture is not on display at the picture gallery in Tirana. Two Chinese are seen at Sheshu's side: possibly Peng Zhen and Deng Xiaoping, who were both in Moscow at the time. It was of course the Soviet condemnation of the Chinese that provoked Albania's counter-reaction.

Our correspondent also points out that there are two different artistic styles that come together in this picture: socialist realism for the Albanians and a kind of distorted semicubistic style depicting the Russians. One should also notice that the light comes from the Albanian side. Their documents are arranged very orderly, whereas disorder prevails in the shadowy world of the Russian side. The artist seems to have something against bald men. The Soviet delegation and their revisionist East European henchmen are painfully thin-haired. Poor Mikoyan is hanging his head. Khrushchev prefers to button up his
collar. Thus, as the DAGENS NYHETER reader writes, the artist has ably employed contrasting elements: large--small, dark--light, order--chaos. And there is one more association: the accused who becomes the prosecutor--it brings to mind Dimitrov at the Reichstag trial in Berlin in 1933.

[Albania Committee Board of Trustees gratefully accepts.]
Enver Hoxha, knightly guardian of light, dresses down the unfaithful dogs. Left to right: Mikoyan, Khrushchev, Suslov, Ulbricht, Brezhnev, painted by Zef Shoshi.
(When are we going to see at the National Museum the genre picture *Moderate Coalition Party Deposes Ynge Holmberg*?)
An Albanian Work.

9992
CSO: 3650/135
GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS SOUR RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 18 Mar 85 p 12

[Article by Victor Meier datelined Belgrade 17 Mar 85: "Challenge to Ankara--Bulgaria Combines the Policy of Changing Its Turkish Population's Names With Affronts to Turkey and Islam"]

[Text] Seldom in recent years has a document from the Balkans revealed so much about true political motivations as the recent speech of Bulgarian Central Committee Secretary Stanisev in Bulgaria about changing "Turkish-Arab" names. The speech was obviously not intended for foreign ears. It appeared in the local paper PIKINSKO DELO which is published in Blagoyevgrad in the Bulgarian part of Macedonia, a corner of Bulgaria with different ethnic sensitivities. Sofia correspondents for the Yugoslav press--who follow this paper regularly--discovered the speech and reported it to Belgrade where it was prominently published in all Yugoslav newspapers. Initial perplexed responses have been received from Turkey.

The Bulgarian central committee secretary admitted officially for the first time that there had been a general effort in Bulgaria to change all "Turkish-Arab" names toward the end of 1984 and the beginning of this year. He stated that this action occurred "spontaneously and everywhere," like an avalanche throughout the country, and that it had taken 2 or 3 months but "only a few days in many localities." According to Stanisev, the results of this process are "known to everybody." This appears to indicate that most of the name changes have been carried out. Stanisev commented on the "wise and farsighted historic choice" that these people made thereby; on their realization that this decision was in "accord with the interests of the Bulgarian nation and its working class" and that they "had been reborn" and created the conditions for a happy future for themselves and their children.

The hard-line against Turkey and its justification were particularly surprising. It seems that Ankara had suggested negotiations to Bulgaria about the reunification of families and limited emigration. Turkey had already suggested roughly 1,500 names, as so-called "hardship cases," for emigration. Now Stanisev announced: "There are no negotiations with Turkey and there will be none, for no part of the Bulgarian people belongs to another nation." One cannot, therefore, talk about "assimilation." This means that Bulgaria
now—in contrast to its previous position—denies the Turkish ethnicity of the roughly 700,000 Turks living in its territory despite the fact that these people speak Turkish, consider Turkish as their mother tongue and have always considered themselves as Turks. According to Stanisev, "the national consciousness" of these people had only been "obscured" by centuries of Turkish conquest. The Bulgarian official characterized the refusal even to discuss the problem with Ankara unequivocally as the "firm and permanent position of Bulgaria, its party and government" and stated that Bulgaria had no intention of treating its citizens as "bargaining chips."

Turkey's response to Bulgaria's position is difficult to predict. While Ankara has never expressed great concern for minorities, and has responded to Bulgaria’s domestic policy with some restraint, the Turkish government is now being faced with an entirely new Bulgarian position which is deliberately confrontational and a fundamental departure from its previous position. It is hardly an exaggeration if one regards this situation as a provisional suspension of multilateral Balkan cooperation for some time to come. Former Greek President Karamanlis—who, while still prime minister, has tried since 1974 to ease bilateral problems in the Balkans through a deliberate, careful and realistic policy of multilateral cooperation—finds his efforts in shambles. The extent to which Bulgaria can count on the support of the Soviet Union for its Ankara stance is still in doubt. The long time that has elapsed from the beginning of the campaign to Stanisev's current speech suggests that Moscow has apparently no objections to Sofia's anti-Turkish position.

This is really difficult to understand since the government in Ankara has now been placed in a position to mobilize to its advantage not only domestic national feelings but also domestic and worldwide religious sentiments. A statement by new Muslim dignitaries, disseminated by all Bulgarian embassies abroad, accused the Turkish Foreign Ministry of complaining to embassies of the Islamic world about the position of Muslims in Bulgaria; the statement claims that Turkey has no right to do this. It also denies that Bulgaria has placed any obstacles into the path of Islamic religion. Two of the new muftis who signed the statement already used their "proper" Christian-Bulgarian names; one of them used the name of Saint George and the other the name of the prophet Elias. "Islam is a world religion," stated the muftis, "and each Muslim has the right to use his national name."

The statement of Bulgarian Central Committee Secretary Stanisev, moreover, contains a surprising abuse of Islam. It maintains that the 100,000 to 200,000 Pomaks—Bulgarians of the Islamic faith who also live in southern Bulgaria—were particularly happy about the name change and that it was "a historical fact" that they had become Muslims by force and that they now had the opportunity "to rid themselves of Islamic fanaticism."

The Yugoslav magazine DANAS carries an eyewitness report from the affected
regions which tells of confrontations and numerous arrests. The report relates that the Turks in Bulgaria are embittered not only by Bulgarian authorities but also by Turkey which has done nothing to help them. Bulgarian sources, in justifying their conduct, claimed that the Turks in Bulgaria had openly advocated "secession" and had wanted to form "their own republic" within Bulgaria.

12628

CSO: 2300/335
HISTORIAN DEFENDS 'REVISIONISTS' OF FIFTIES

Defense Presented

Budapest ELET ES IRODALOM in Hungarian 25 Jan 85 pp 3-4

[Article by Gyorgy Litvan: "Who Made the Fifties What They Were?"]

[Text] I consider it a heartening and wholesome phenomenon that in movies, literature, memoirs and political commentary we are more and more often and with greater emphasis on demanding explanations evoking the so-called fifties, which today—and this is also encouraging—are less frequently dubbed the "era of the personality cult."

I do not completely understand, however, especially in the case of writers, why they only, or almost only, keep on evoking that which will remain disgraceful forever. Because it was shameful to commit or endure, if not in the same manner? Why not also that which we and they could be proud of? I am thinking of the historical fact—at one time well-known but today forgotten for the most part, or at least wrapped in obscurity—that shortly after the death of Stalin the Hungarian writers were among the first to take up the struggle against the senseless and barbaric acts of that time; and together with several journalists at first and then with more and more intellectuals, as a larger and more prestigious group, they continued the struggle for 3 full years in defiance of very strong pressure and frequent reprisals.

Of course, not every Hungarian writer took part in this perilous battle, especially at the outset. There were quite a number who "saw" the fifties "through," i.e., out of cowardice, stupidity or—such was also the case—true conviction they supported Rakosi from beginning to end. Moreover, there are many who were at first far removed from the politics of that time and who—precisely because they were outsiders, nonparty members or in an endangered position—kept themselves aloof from the freedom struggle (it appeared to be communist infighting at the start) which began as the Hungarian writer's insistence on truthfulness and which, also thanks to other forces, of course, finally led to Rakosi's forced resignation.

The political structure at that time was such that first and foremost the party members, the communist writers, could participate in debates and appearances with a slight chance of making themselves heard and with some hope of avoiding being silenced immediately. Thus, to the best of my recollection, in the autumn
of 1953 the Nyirseg diary of Peter Kuczka and a few poems by Lajos Konya launched the movement which within a year, a year and a half, captivated the majority of the then communist authors in the writers' association: Dery and Zelk, Benjamin and Tamas Aczel, Karinthy and Devecseri, Sandor Erdei, Gyula Hay, Laszlo Nagy and others. In 1955, together with about 60 other communist artists and intellectuals, they signed the celebrated "writers' memorandum" (addressed to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party) which lodged a staid but explicit protest against the sectarian/dogmatic cultural policy and called for the return of Bartok, Madach and Laszlo Nemeth, among others, to Hungarian culture.

Would it not be reasonable and useful if someone from among the participants who are still alive (and living in this country) finally wrote the history of this memorandum and that of the "workers' party meeting" which Rakosi—in order to intimidate the writers—convened, with the exquisite tact characteristic of him, in the Ironworkers' Hall, which had also served as the scene of the Rajk trial? Or do they still experience this as a blemish to be concealed in their biography? And why? Should not those who helped to prolong the Rakosi regime and the "fifties" rather be the ones to feel ashamed today?

Perhaps two somewhat contradictory explanations present themselves for the previous question and the bashful reluctance to brag.

One is that, as is generally known, the reform movement launched by the writers did not stop with Rakosi's downfall, and several writer participants in this movement later landed in jail for their activity in 1956. But if the Dery of 1956-57 could compromise his earlier self, that of 1954-55, for example, how can Benjamin, let us say, compromise his poetry of that time, the shocking poem written for Sandor Haraszti which found a place in his collected works only much later?

The second reason for this strange silence may be that, up until 1953-54, a significant share—not every single one but a strong majority—of the communist writers fighting against Rakosi had been staunch adherents and ardent supporters of Rakosi and the leadership represented by him. So today, with good reason, it would not be tasteful and appropriate to render an account only of the story's other side, the one more pleasant for them.

And so the absurdity may take place, more and more frequently in fact, that not only is the conscious activity of this generation of writers and other intellectuals—who came on the scene around 1945 and who, alongside their serious and later even participatory crimes, deserve lasting credit for the revival and upswing of Hungarian literature, esthetics, historiography, economics, etc. (perhaps it will be enough for me to mention the names of Sandor Lukacsy, Ferenc Karinthy, Gyorgy Kurtag, Peter Hanak, Janos Kornai)—against the mentality and leadership of Rakosi condemned to oblivion but responsibility for the abuses and atrocities of the 1950s is placed directly on their shoulders, or it is first and foremost they who are called to account for them.

I am not imagining things. In the 22 June 1984 issue of ELET ES IRODALOM, Bela Abody, who has written on this topic for many years, recalls the circumstances at the Budapest faculty of philosophy in the 1950s. He candidly writes that the
"true peacetime Rakosists disguised as revisionists" were those "who at that time did everything to see to it that the inevitably bad conditions needlessly declined even further."

It is also observable in other writers and artists who for some reason seek self-justification that, when writing about those times, neither the figures who remained Stalinists nor the public lackeys who day and night served the prevailing authorities with unprincipled zeal cross their minds, even occasionally, as negative examples but rather--goodness knows why--nearly always the revisionists who were executed, imprisoned or bypassed (but no longer living today) or who, as another solution, have lived in exile since 1956.

Let there be no misunderstanding: I am not trying to attain immunity for, or a closed hunting season on, a one-time species of political animal which is dying out. On the contrary, in the interest of mutual enlightenment, I would like it to be depicted more realistically.

After all, the most important question is, of course: what can the following generations learn from those years and these destinies? And besides, their opinion and their verdict will in all likelihood weigh the heaviest in the subsequent historical judgment and literary depiction of this vicissitudinous generation.

This is why my friends and I received with nearly breathless interest the news that a young writer, frequently mentioned nowadays and said to be not only talented but also astute, had written a play about the role of a one-time group or clique of writers in the 1950s known by the nickname of "the young gentlemen." The members of this group, in part direct descendants of the luminaries of the Nyugat generation, embodied the earlier "Rakosist" and then "revisionist" intellectual type under discussion, not in the form of the Greek tragedies of fate mentioned just a moment ago but characteristically in their own way. They joined the Communist Party after 1945, and with youthful eagerness they flung themselves into the new literary life, where they felt completely at home and where, quickly asserting themselves through their self-confidence, their political inexperience, their exploitability, their glibness and their almost inborn artistic instinct, they undoubtedly inflicted many wounds on their praiseworthy but more cumbersome or more defenseless writer colleagues. There were those among them who also assumed a leading literary-political role and, despite all their natural human goodness and readiness to help, they "officially" participated in the ignominious "purging"--determined and directed by others--of the writers' association. They "awoke," after 1953, somewhat later than their colleagues who knew the situation of the people and the country better, who had a rural background or, for example, experience in the social democratic labor movement, and this is why for a short time Reval was also able to play them off against the incipient unruliness of the latter. But starting in 1954, they, too, joined the growing literary front against Rakosi, and they did not let themselves be diverted from it either by enticements or by threats. Not out of heroism, I believe. They had simply found their way home.

That, in a nutshell, is the story of this group, whose identity even a fig leaf hardly covers in Gyorgy Spiro's drama "The Garden." Today, too, I consider the
choice of topic excellent. On the other hand, I consider the literary execution—to be more precise, the human and political authenticity of the portrayal—entirely unsuccessful, because it only illustrates what kinds of prejudices and misconceptions adhere to the topic even in the sphere of young people who do not live so far from this world of negative heroes. And what ignorance, uninformedness!

But is it permitted to call a literary work to account for historical or political authenticity? Setting aside here a generalizing decision on the question, I am convinced that it is indeed permitted if the work itself has such a directly political and personal bent and is of such slight literary inspiration as this one, and if the author himself ties the portrayal to unmistakable figures and the plot to historical events, uninterchangeable dates.

The disappointment is not caused by the fact that the play's verdict is condemnatory. It might be undeservedly harsh, but if it had weighed the genuine dichotomy and two-mindedness, it would have given food for thought and encouraged debate. This way, however, it is plainly deceptive and naively oversimplified. It portrays the 1950s with the schematism of the 1950s. The normal figures, namely, surrounding the deranged poet who lounges in the garden are cynical careerists, in their public and private lives alike perfectly irresponsible and debauched. This portrayal is erroneous, like the characterization of the types and individuals which serve as models, and insipid, like the explanation of the era's atrocities and bizarre features.

Not cynicism but fanaticism, blinkered, self-generating and unquestioning faith, forced identification, self-violation, and relinquishment or rather exchange of their previous moral, spiritual and critical standards were characteristics of these writers and this communist intellectual type in the "iron age" before 1953. What was sectarianism—organizationally more developed—in the communists who grew up in the underground movement seemed especially contrived and forced in them.

As an explanation for the era, however, cynicism is unsuitable because there were and are cynics in every epoch, in eras of faith and transformation as well, but at such times they can assume the least determinative role.

Nevertheless, cynicism has an important function in the play. It takes place, namely, in the days of the 1954 party congress, at the time Rakosi and Imre Nagy were jockeying for position, and it tries to seize the moment in which the play-boys who had been Rakosi's backers up until then were switching over to and joining up with Imre Nagy. Its protagonists intend to accomplish the switchover through the coolheadedly planned exploitation of their newly released and rehabilitated friend.

In reality, these rehabilitated persons were more likely to sit around in the waiting rooms of physicians than in the antechamber of power. (There, too, only after the congress!) They are glad to be alive, a few of their loyal friends start a conversation with them. Rakosi's power was in fact still unimpaired. The author forgets that after 1954—both in numerical sequence and in Hungarian history—comes 1955, not 1956: Rakosi's final great consolidation, revocation of the March resolution, the "new period," self-criticism, expulsions, dismissals, confiscation of newspapers, prohibition of playhouse premieres, several arrests,
and the "lynching party" for the malcontent writers. And he forgets or does not know that his play's uninhibited protagonists, who are game for anything, did not respond to this renewed cold snap with another change of opinion, self-criticism or denunciations--for which Jozsef Darvas set a good example in his article about the "overbidders" written at the end of 1954--but rather all of them signed the already mentioned writers' memorandum, which was tantamount to open rebellion against a Rakosi regime that was not proving to be precisely ephemeral. Cynical careerists are not accustomed to behaving this way. Nor is this the way they behaved after 1956: withdrawing from the public role to work, to literature, realizing that among their earlier mistakes the misjudgment of their own makeup and mission in life was one of the most serious.

So I think that Spiro errs when he sees in the eagerness to jockey for positions the primary motive for this stratum in precisely those years (1954-57), although there was at that time the sense of shame and consciousness of guilt due to the role previously assumed and played, the moral shock over the show trials and the crimes committed against the entire nation, and the anger and revulsion derived from having been deceived. If I remember correctly, this became the moral and emotional basis of the often mentioned revisionism. (Its thought content was so heterogeneous and moved on such a broad scale that its analysis here would lead too far astray.) But if some now want only those who "confess" to account for the past, this would be as if I viewed consciousness of guilt as more dangerous than crimes, and becoming sober as worse than getting drunk.

All this, of course, does not serve as proof that exclusively noble impulses animated and propelled this intellectual type or stratum--us. It is indisputable that in the enthusiasm and noble conquering spirit of the 1940s self-assertion also played a part alongside self-sacrifice. There is no doubt that when--after youth's lonely search for ways and means and, in the case of many of us, the descent into hell which accompanied the Jewish experience--we enjoyed the good taste of belonging somewhere and the warmth of collectivity, at the same time we also felt and enjoyed for a while at least the rapture of participating in a strong and growing power.

Then came the nadir, those few years when there was scarcely a set up for the "committed" intellectual, when only an exceptionally benevolent temperament, unsuppressed taste, powerlessness, luck or a release or arrest which ensued at the proper moment saved many from committing truly pernicious deeds. Spiro's protagonists, together with many about whom it is not customary to mention this, then write their works which are loathsomely laudatory or--what is even worse--which call for vigilance, and their esthetic dissertations (which today strike us as distinctly parodic) conceived in the spirit of Zhdanov, and they become involved in ugly clique conflicts with other writers' association groups, no less mutinous, who nevertheless perceive other things from reality. At this point they earn Jozsef Revai's praise of dubious value: "More welcome to us is a former bourgeois intellectual who triumphs over his bourgeois heritage than a former social democrat or factional worker or déclassé petty bourgeois who did not overcome it." Because a social democrat or a Eotvos college past is, of course, both a "minus" and "something to be overcome."

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This endeavor and process of "overcoming" should be written about thoroughly some day. It is unfortunate that Spiro did not attempt this but rather, like Abody, sought an answer to the question which can never be answered: who were the ones who made the "inevitably bad conditions" even worse. Only unproductive gossip and mutual pointing of fingers can come out of this. The true question to which the writer, the historian, the sociologist, the psychologist and the political scientist must seek an answer runs largely like this: what kind of era, what kind of system was it which was able to turn so many decent and indeed outstanding human beings of high moral and intellectual standards into monsters—temporarily or definitively and irreparably?

That is what we really became for a shorter or longer period of time, to a lesser or a greater degree, in accordance with each person's makeup, temperament and—last but not least—the amount of power at his disposal. Not "everyone," as the true cynics—with a view to concealing their own responsibility—like to put it, but many people. And not in the same way, not to the same degree, though we have no unit of measurement to gauge this; not by the same means, either, since within the four or five chief life patterns there were nearly as many variations as persons. For this reason alone it is senseless to generalize, to make summary judgments: if there are patterns, the responsibility is not collective but individual, and I dare to hope that the otherworldly or historical evaluation will also make allowance for the subsequent years. Because it could then turn out that even some direct supporter of Rakosi was finally able to find the road of human and intellectual resurrection, while more than one victim, true or false martyr, and supercilious critic from the 1950s could prove afterwards that he was not so insensitive to the temptations of power—if he was exposed to such.

Instead of slow and leisurely measurement and mutual incrimination, it is wiser and more useful if the participants candidly try to come to terms with their own past and responsibility. Only in this way can the lessons for today and tomorrow be summarized from many and various experiences.

And yet the younger generations must formulate these for themselves, firmly, impartially, without regard for individuals, the way Peter Nadas did at the end of "A Family Story," and the way Andras Tokaji and Janos M. Rainer disclosed and brought to life—from documents—the musical and literary controversies of the 1950s with genuine empathy and the clear-sightedness of posterity.

If they succeeded, others will also succeed.

Editor Comments

Budapest ELET ES IRODALOM in Hungarian 25 Jan 85 p 4

[Editorial by Imre Bata: "The Editor's Meditation"]

[Text] The title of Gyorgy Litvan's commentary on history is a rhetorical question, i.e., it does not ask a question in order to get an answer. He knows better than I how impossible it is to say who made the fifties what they were. Though I would have an obvious answer: fear made the fifties what they were. But in its own abstract conceptuality, fear as motivation for a historical
process is only a metaphor. Metaphors can be both three-dimensional and attractive; yet they do not account for complicated events, historical processes, all the more so since they can be wrapped in a beneficent fog.

And it is also inadequate to say it is fear.

Because one cannot speak of the 1950s only as if they were years lost in the fog of the past and as if--out of this fog--they reveal, chameleonlike, a different form to everyone. After all, there are contemporary sources, and there are witnesses to what happened. Recently we could read Sandor Fekete's book "The Teenager's Dream," the diary of Peter Veres appeared in recent months, and in 1981 RTV-Minerva published the series of debates which were heard on Hungarian radio; the debates were led by Miklos Beladi. Two debates in that volume conjure up the cultural conditions and atmosphere of the 1950s. These sources bear witness, as it were, to the fact that not only fear made the fifties what they were but also, at least as much, the courageous resolve to transform the world, i.e., revolutionary intrepidity. A newer metaphor, which is exactly the opposite of the other one. If, however, we characterize an era with two opposing metaphors, the result is also clear: we have created a myth whose cover is the general truth that it occurred in the blood and agony of society's metamorphosis and new formation. There may be among us those who are the most authentic witnesses to the past; yet they do not judge it opportune to give testimony. I am speaking about the survivors of the show trials among whom, in all likelihood, there are those who are writing or perhaps have already written their memoirs.

My contemporaries, of course, are impatient.

I would like to know what is still impossible to know. The accident crosses my mind. There are as many descriptions as people who saw it: he who caused it would also say something different, but he is already dead, and I wonder what the person who was run over and killed would say? And yet the accident is only an analogy. It is possible to speak about history in analogies; this is still not history itself.

For all these reasons it is very essential that someone like Gyorgy Litvan, as a witness to and in a certain sense a victim of the accident, speak out. Because it is possible that he was standing on the platform of the speeding truck, but as a result of the collision he was hurled onto the street pavement. Others, like the Bela Abody he quotes, only saw the accident; the younger playwright, Gyorgy Spiro, heard about it and pictured it to himself. The playwright's imagination is activated not just by hearsay but to a much greater degree by sentiment. Let us note that at the end of the 1970s and start of the 1980s this sentiment is a reality: indignation over how this accident could have happened. Abody, whom Litvan quotes indignantly, in all probability remembers what plunged the historical enterprise into extreme danger. His memory is also motivated by sentiment! In the turmoil of 1956, he saw those who--to his knowledge--had waved the flag on the truck's platform at the start of the decade and rously cheered. The trouble is that we are all affected by this accident!

It is essential that the suffering witness speak out, but sentiment—anger—is not a good adviser. Yet it provides a good argument for zeal! This is why we
can consider Gyorgy Litvan's writing important: its passionate insistence that we see the process more sensitively. He calls upon our collective memory to see the short period between 1953 and 1956 in its complexity, as its events show it to be. I myself would add that we must see that which led to the 1953 turning point as more complex. For example, it is worthwhile to distinguish sharply between the crisis of 1948 and the tragic series of events in 1949. Because the initiatives of 1948, motivated by the events of 1948, led to the haunted atmosphere of 1950, 1951 and 1952. These 3 years were a time of incredible polarization, a time in which the political left and right met their destiny. Because I myself am a living witness to the fact that he who belonged neither here nor there felt only the general atmospheric pressure and experienced the homeland and the affair as more and more forsaken. If prison awaited the communist and the class alien alike, was it not inevitable that the traditional categories of politics would become confused? In 1948 it was still clear who belonged where. In 1953 there was nothing so uncertain as precisely this question of who belonged to which party. The leftists compromised the progressives, and those on the left imbued with the spirit of class struggle discredited the class mentality.

In such a situation, that young group of intellectuals about which Gyorgy Litvan supportively speaks was naturally dragged from one extreme to the other. But not overnight. This is why Litvan is also sensitive to the years after 1953. History, however, was not and never will be sentimental. And if this is now the subject of discussion, I wonder who among the contemporaries could judge reliably and with adequate ethical basis the generational group's path? We must acknowledge, not the spectators to the accident, but those who are its suffering survivors. It is just that they do not pass sentence so easily. The above-mentioned sources bear witness to this. But the plain fact also attests that those communists who meanwhile became historical personalities look back--with greater tolerance than all of us do--at that era which nearly devoured them.
NEW FAMILY ASSISTANCE MEASURES

Family Assistance Needs, Measures

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 12 Jan 85 p 5

[Roundtable discussion: "About Family Welfare"]

[Excerpts] Family services and family welfare are most often used as synonyms. Yet the meaning of the latter is broader: in addition to providing the assistance that families coping with various problems need, it includes also a thorough knowledge of the root causes of the problems and the demand to resolve them. The many disorders of family life--spreading deviant behavior, high divorce rate and low birthrate--are prompting coordinated family-welfare activity, the outlines of which already are taking shape, but many question marks still remain. The timely tasks, and the conditions for effective family-welfare activity were the subject of a roundtable discussion by the following: Dr Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy, director of the MTA [Hungarian Academy of Science] Research Institute of Sociology; Dr Otto Csiky, deputy president of the Supreme Court; Dr Ferenc Petrik, deputy minister of justice; Mrs Tamas Szegedi, chief of the Social Policy Main Department of the Ministry of Health; Eva Vincze, counselor of the State Office of Wages and Labor Affairs; and Katalin Szoghy, representing our editorial office.

Causes, Possibilities

NEPSZABADSAG: Usually many different causes are cited in the debates on the functional disorders of family life, and what one person regards as a cause may seem an effect to another. In the wake of the sociological research results on families, are we now able to reconstruct from the family problems, which as a rule are lumped together, the chain of causes and effects, some sort of ranking of the problems that could reliably determine the priorities of the practical tasks?

Dr L. Cseh-Szombathy: The differences in the importance of the problems can serve as a guide for practical work. The most serious of our problems at present is the declining birthrate, and the related state and social tasks are well
known from the resolution on population policy that the Council of Ministers adopted a few months ago. Another serious problem that gives family welfare much to do is the disorder in the child-rearing and socializing function of the family, in the wake of which various forms of deviant behavior are spreading and cases of social maladjustment are on the rise. I would list in third place the high degree of family instability, the fact that a third of all marriages can be expected to end in divorce. Here the prospects for intervention are the least favorable, and therefore we can expect breakups also in the future. This is a serious drawback for every member of the family, but the disorders may perhaps be settled later, and the children could be raised without any socialization problems.

Dr F. Petrik: I disagree with the contention that the instability of marriages is a fact we have to live with and must even accept as practically normal. We must take cognizance of the breakup of the large-family structure and the significant changes in society. These are the facts most often blamed for the crisis of the institution of marriage. But it is not normal that a third of all marriages should end in divorce. The instability of the institution of marriage, in my opinion, stems more from consciousness-related causes, and they are by no means unalterable.

A significant proportion of the problems stems, I believe, from our somewhat romantic ideal of marriage. Men enter into marriage under the illusion that the women—in addition to being gainfully employed—will also run the household and care for the child, i.e., that the women will create a peaceful and comfortable home. The women on their part believe that their husbands will share the household chores and all the problems of raising the children, giving them every assistance to continue their careers without interruptions. They fail to take into consideration the burdens that necessarily still accompany family life, especially the raising of children, and also that they often have to subordinate their personal ambitions to the interests of their families. The fond expectations usually are not realized, because neither the women nor the men are able to fully cope with the double burden of responsibilities at home and on their jobs, and the futile pursuit of illusions often ends in divorce.

Dr L. Cseh-Szombathy: Training to handle conflicts is lacking not only in family life but, regrettably, in our entire educational system as well. This too certainly plays a role in that, for some time, a third of all marriages have been ending in divorce. However, this does not alter the fact that family welfare has very limited means and opportunities at its disposal to help salvage marriages. It is very difficult to persuade people to seek outside help to solve their most intimate problems. This usually happens only when the problems have already reached serious proportions, and there is little hope of restoring the initial harmony between husband and wife.

Focus on Proper Sharing of Family Obligations

NEPSZABADSAG: From the preceding it is nevertheless obvious that stable marriages are the most important condition for families to fulfill their social function. And since even today the creation of harmonious family life and
caring for the children are primarily the tasks of women, probably far fewer marriages would break up if women were given more help to reconcile their duties on the job and at home.

Dr L. Cseh-Szombathy: There is indeed need of more help to enable women to perform their duties at home as perfectly as possible. Women need more time to devote to their families. This is a problem difficult to solve, because our wage system is built on the assumption of two wage earners per family. The introduction of child-care allowances has been an important milestone in raising the social status of motherhood. But the family income drops even so after the birth of a child, and this compels many fathers to seek a second source of income, which means that they are carrying a double burden. And if the wife decides to take advantage of the day nursery and kindergarten, and to continue in her job, then she is the one who is carrying a double burden. Perhaps the family model based on 1.5 wage earners would be the best solution, if women could find part-time jobs and work \( \frac{1}{2} \) hours per day.

E. Vincze: In my opinion, this solution would not be feasible for a very wide circle of women. In part because many areas--education, health care or the textile industry, for example--need women working full time. And in part because many women, especially among the better-educated ones--rightfully insist on equal opportunity with men to make use of their knowledge and skills. Of course, part-time job opportunities can and should be increased for those who want them. At present, only 3 percent of the gainfully employed are working part time. The reasons why this proportion is not rising are organizational, financial, and related to attitudes and manpower management. Full-time employment is regarded as customary and normal almost everywhere. As of 1 January of this year, however, employers will have an economic incentive to employ part-time workers and homeworkers, because then they can claim substantial tax benefits. Hopefully, this will improve the situation.

Mrs T. Szegedi: But this also requires raising the social status of the work that women do at home. An essential feature of the resolution on population policy is that the raising of children receive also financial recognition. In the case of babies under 1 year of age, the child-care allowance will be replaced in the future by family-care pay that is job-related and more generous. Later on, the circle of beneficiaries will be broadened gradually.

For Coordination of Efforts

NEPSZABADSAG: I think we may say that the measures of a financial nature stemming from the resolution on population policy--in addition to the ones we have already mentioned, primarily the ones aimed at improving the chances of young couples to obtain housing, and at offsetting the financial drawbacks of raising large families--are intended to strengthen the institution of marriage. According to the resolution, institutional assistance must be provided also for the prevention of family problems and conflicts. This will be the task of a network of family-welfare centers.

But family services are being provided on an experimental basis also now at many places: educational counseling services and centers, several clinics, the College of Health Care, and institutes for children and youths. Very many
voluntary organizations also have embraced this cause, and their number is growing constantly. How can the activity of all these organizations be coordinated, to prevent dissipation of effort? Is there some organization in charge of comprehensive family welfare?

Mrs T. Szegedi: Family welfare now exists primarily as an approach. Its own system of instruments and organizational framework are just developing. It is undoubtedly difficult to combine what exists with what is now emerging, for we encounter differences of opinion even on the essence and methods of family services.

Dr F. Petrik: At present there are very many organizations concerned with family welfare. Most ministries—the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Culture and Education, the Ministry of the Interior, the Council Affairs Office of the Council of Ministers, and the State Office of Wages and Labor Affairs—have tasks relating to family welfare, but I could mention also the Supreme Court or the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office. The resolution on population policy that the Council of Ministers has adopted sums up the tasks in very many areas, and their unified coordination certainly would be warranted. The many organizations concerned with family welfare are able to function effectively only if they employ the same approach and avoid duplication and overlapping. The organization of child and youth welfare, for example, should be integrated into the planned family-welfare network.

NEPSZABADSAG: It has been mentioned here that there is complicated interaction among the problems of family life. In this context, the requirement is often voiced these days that the so-called departmental approach must be abandoned. In itself, this is a sound principle. But in the case of the PPF National Family-Welfare Council, for example, this principle has been applied to practice in such a way that there is not one civil servant on the council, so as to emphasize the council's voluntary nature. Should a distinction be made between the state's tasks and the voluntary organizations' tasks in family welfare?

E. Vincze: I think that such views can produce unwarranted pessimism. We are trying specifically to solve the problems jointly, in cooperation with the voluntary organizations. According to the resolution on population policy, the family-welfare centers are to operate in cooperation with the family-welfare councils of the PPF.

Mrs T. Szegedi: As of 1 March, 10 to 12 family-welfare centers will start to operate on an experimental basis. According to the work schedule of the resolution on population policy, gradual establishment of an integrated family-welfare network is the responsibility primarily of the Ministry of Health, but several other ministries, various state agencies and voluntary organizations are involved in the preparations. The task is a continuous one, and of course it will take time to develop the possible forms of cooperation with the agencies and organizations concerned.

NEPSZABADSAG: The idea is that the family-welfare centers will not only help to resolve the conflicts of families coping with disorderly behavior, but will also see to it that the provisions in kind and in cash are better geared to the
families' specific needs. All this presupposes that the activity of the family-welfare centers will not consist merely of referring their clients to the specialized family services, and that comprehensively trained specialists will be managing the centers' activity.

Mrs T. Szegedi: The objective that we have set for ourselves in the first phase is merely the more harmonious operation and closer coordination of the existing organizations and networks. This is what we need to go beyond merely treating the symptoms, to see the whole instead of only a part, to replace social-policy activity directed toward the individual members of the family, with activity that is family-centered also in its approach. At present we have--although fairly few--welfare organizers, welfare workers, sociologists, teachers for the mentally retarded, and psychologists we can count on. All this is a difficult task for the Ministry of Health, which even now is performing only partial tasks. The ensuring of the initial and subsequent conditions is, last but not least, also a question of money, and the Ministry of Finance will decide what allocations are necessary.

Dr F. Petrik: Success will depend on what will be the scope and authority of the new organization. In its operation it will have to use also instruments of power, and thus the competence and jurisdiction of the orphans' court and regular courts also may change. The Ministry of Justice has already offered to transfer certain cases in which the courts now have jurisdiction. For example, the family-welfare centers could be given authority to disburse state advances against child maintenance payments. The new organization cannot be viable without decision-making authority, and parallel activities are causing confusion.

Dr L. Cseh-Szombathy: In itself the fact that everything will be in one place, and we will have a better overview of the problems and what is to be done, will be a qualitative change. But only if there are experts able to grasp the whole picture. I believe it is very urgent to start professional training, if we do not want some shadow organization to emerge. Significant results can be expected only if a sufficient number of suitable experts can be made available through several forms of training, including postgraduate and full-time study. We cannot entrust this activity solely to voluntary organizations, but they can be of help in finding people for the slots to be filled.

By Legal Means

NEPSZABADSAG: Obviously the law of domestic relations, the modernization of which is on the agenda, cannot play the decisive role in the solution of family problems, but its possibilities are by no means negligible. How do the efforts to reform the law of domestic relations fit into the comprehensive program of family welfare?

Dr F. Petrik: So far as the proposed changes are concerned, I think we have made it unmistakably clear on many occasions that we do not consider stricter divorce laws a feasible solution, because a petition for divorce cannot and should not be denied when marriages have broken down beyond any hope of reconciliation. But we are striving, for example, to eliminate the perfunctory
elements from the reconciliation proceedings, because experience shows that informal attempts at reconciliation are more effective. And we would like to make the hearing of divorce cases somewhat more professional: the objective is to assign such cases to wise judges with suitable life experience. It has also been suggested that some kind of counseling, a sort of crisis intervention, be attached to the divorce proceedings. Here the primary objective is the welfare of the family, but of the family members: to achieve that if the husband and wife are getting divorced, they should do so in a way that will cause the least shock to each other, and especially to their children.

It is proper that disputes between divorced parents should be decided with due consideration for family welfare. At present, however, family-welfare considerations are weighed cumulatively in favor of one parent, placing this parent in a privileged situation. Thus it is understandable that the apartment should go to the parent who has been awarded custody of the child. But when the value of the apartment has to be appraised so as to determine what compensation the other parent should receive, is it warranted to weigh this family-welfare consideration once again? Equitable sharing of the burden between former spouses must be ensured even after divorce, and this applies to child support as well.

Dr O. Csiky: An important basic principle for the courts is that the child must not find itself in a substantially worse situation after divorce, as compared to the situation in which the child lived before divorce. This principle will remain in force, but the following must be emphasized: it is illusory to expect that the financial situation after divorce can remain the same as before. We must reckon with the fact that very often both parents are worse off financially after their divorce.

Incidentally, for the deputy presidents of the Budapest Court and mogye courts we recently held a conference on the practice of the courts in divorce cases, at which we called attention to several important questions. For example, that even now the courts have the means at their disposal to preserve the marriages that can still be saved, but these means are not being utilized adequately. Thus the general experience is that the period of separation before filing for divorce is becoming shorter and shorter, and very often the spouses go to court already after their first argument. Yet the period of separation is an important test to determine whether or not the breakdown of the marriage is irreparable. Thus when both parents are requesting custody of the child, the period of separation has been short, and the conflict between the parents is not a serious one, it will be expedient to resort somewhat more frequently to denying the petition for divorce. It is not right that the parties immediately equate a marriage conflict with divorce.

Dr L. Cseh-Szombathy: I would say that all conflicts are not alike, and that the courts, primarily by shaping the spouses' views, can do much against letting the conflicts escalate and get out of hand.

NEPSZABADSAG: Perhaps the main lesson we can draw from our discussion is that there are tasks for entire society to ensure that its smallest unit, the family, will be better able to fulfill its mission; and that we can expect favorable changes only if we act with responsibility and knowingly support one another's activity. Thank you for your participation.
Social Security Law Amended

Budapest MAGYAR KOZLONY in Hungarian No 2, 17 Jan 85 pp 21-22


[Text] Section 1
The following provisions replace Sections 15 and 16 of Law No 11/1975 (hereinafter: Social Security Law):

Section 15
1. The insured is entitled to the following sickness and maternity benefits: sick pay, maternity allowance, child-care pay, and maternity grant. A death grant is payable when the insured dies.
2. A maternity grant is payable when a dependent of the insured gives birth. And a death grant is payable when a dependent dies.
3. The Council of Ministers will issue detailed regulations on child-care pay.

Section 16
1. If the same insurance coverage provides both sick pay or workmen's compensation and a maternity allowance, only one of these benefits may be claimed. A maternity grant and a death grant may be claimed only on the basis of one entitlement.
2. The claimant may choose among the benefits when he or she is entitled simultaneously to child-care pay, sick pay, workmen's compensation, a maternity allowance and a child-care allowance.

Section 2
The following provisions replace Sections 18 and 19 of the Social Security Law:

Section 18
The following are unable to work:

a. The person who is unable to perform his work because of sickness;
b. The woman who is unable to perform her work because of pregnancy or childbirth and is not entitled to a maternity allowance;
c. The mother who is breast-feeding her hospitalized child less than 1 year old;
d. The mother or, if the sole parent, the father who is nursing a sick child less than 1 year old;
e. The parent who is nursing a sick child from 1 to 10 years old.

Section 19
1. Sick pay is due for the duration of the inability to work, but may not exceed:

a. Two years for each episode of tuberculosis;
b. The child's first birthday when breast-feeding or nursing a child less than 1 year old;
c. When nursing a child from 1 to 3 years old, 84 calendar days per child and year;
d. When nursing a child from 3 to 6 years old, 42 calendar days per child and year, but 84 calendar days for a sole parent;
e. When nursing a child from 6 to 10 years old, 14 calendar days per child and year, but 28 calendar days for a sole parent.
2. The person who was insured without interruption for less than one year before his inability to work arose, or for less than two years before an episode of tuberculosis, may receive only sick pay commensurate with his period of uninterrupted insurance coverage. However, the following persons are entitled to sick pay regardless of their period of uninterrupted insurance coverage:
   a. The person who becomes unable to work before reaching the age of 18, and
   b. The person who obtains insurance coverage within 180 days after completing his studies, and whose insurance coverage continues without interruption up to his inability to work.
3. If the insured already received sick pay within 1 year of the first day of his new inability to work, or within 2 years of a new episode of tuberculosis, the previous period over which he received sick pay must be included in the maximum period over which sick pay may be paid on the basis of the new inability to work.

Section 3
The following provision replaces Section 22 of the Social Security Law:
Section 22
1. The amount of sick pay must be determined on the basis of the average daily pay before the inability to work arose.
2. The Council of Ministers sets the rate of sick pay. However, the amount of sick pay may not be less than 65 percent of the average daily pay, or less than 75 percent in case of a longer period of uninterrupted insurance coverage.
3. The Council of Ministers
   a. May specify the maximum average daily pay that can be taken into consideration when determining the amount of sick pay;
   b. May set the sick pay for certain groups of insured also as a fixed amount.

Section 4
1. This law decree, except its Sections 1 and 2, becomes effective the day of its promulgation; its provisions apply as of 1 January 1985. Simultaneously, Section 25, Paragraph 3, Item b, of the Social Security Law will be rescinded.
2. Section 1 of this law decree will become effective 1 March 1985; and Section 2, 1 September 1985.

Pal Losonczi, chairman
Imre Katona, secretary
of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic

Child-Care Allowance Changes

Budapest MAGYAR KOZLONY in Hungarian No 2, 17 Jan 85 p 31


[Text] Section 1
The following provisions replace Section 1, Paragraph 1, Items a and c, of Decree of the Council of Ministers No 10/1982 (16 Apr) on Child-Care Allowance (hereinafter: the Decree):
(The mother or, as sole parent, the father is entitled to a child-care allowance until the child completes its third year—or its sixth year if the child is chronically ill or seriously handicapped—if for a total of 270 days within the two years directly preceding the child's birth the mother, respectively the father)
  a. Was employed in a job where the hours worked amounted on average to at least half of the statutory workweek;
  c. Was a member of an industrial cooperative where her, respectively his, hours worked amounted on average to at least half of the statutory workweek.

Section 2
The following Section 1/A is added to the Deeree:

Section 1/A
If the mother or, as sole parent, the father is a full-time student of a higher educational institution, she or he is entitled to a child-care allowance if the child was born at a time when the mother, respectively the father, was a full-time student. If the child was born within 180 days after the status of full-time student ceased, a child-care allowance may be claimed even if eligibility pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3, cannot be established.

Section 3
The following provision replaces Section 6, Paragraph 2, second sentence, of the Deeree:
On average for the year, however, the work performed as an employee (or cooperative member) may not exceed half of the statutory workweek.

Section 4
1. The following provision replaces Section 7, Paragraph 1, of the Deeree:
   1. The claimant's employer—or the higher educational institution, if the claimant is a student of the institution—establishes the claimant's eligibility for a child-care allowance.

   2. The following provisions is added to Section 7, Paragraph 2, of the Deeree:
The court will decide legal disputes between the higher educational institution and the student over eligibility for a child-care allowance.

Section 5
The following provision replaces Section 8, Paragraph 1, of the Deeree:

1. The minister of health—acting in agreement with the minister of agriculture and food, the minister of culture and education, the minister of finance, the chairman of the State Office of Wages and Labor Affairs, the head of the National Chief Directorate of Social Security, the chairman of the National Planning Office, the KISZ Central Committee and the Central Council of Trade Unions—is hereby authorized to set the amount of the child-care allowance and to issue detailed regulations on the conditions for eligibility and its establishment.

Section 6
1. This decree becomes effective the day of its promulgation, and its provisions apply as of 1 January 1985. The provisions of this decree must be
applied also to those full-time students of higher educational institutions who have been awarded child-care allowances on the principle of equity.

2. The person who receives child-care pay is entitled to receive a child-care allowance when the child-care pay ceases.

Gyorgy Lazar, chairman
of the Council of Ministers

Social Security Provisions Amended

Budapest MAGYAR KOZLONY in Hungarian No 2, 17 Jan 85 pp 32-35


[Text] On the basis of authority granted me by the Council of Ministers, and in agreement with the ministers and heads of the common-interest organs concerned, I hereby amend as follows SZOT [Central Council of Trade Unions] Regulation No 3/1975 (14 Jun)--hereinafter: the Regulation--that implements Law No II/1975 and Decree of the Council of Ministers No 17/1975 (14 Jun) on Social Security, and also SZOT Regulation No 2/1982 (26 Apr) that implements Decree of the Council of Ministers No 10/1982 (16 Apr) on Child-Care Allowance:

Section 1
The following provision replaces Section 4 of the Regulation:

Section 4
The provisions governing the insurance coverage of employed workers apply in like manner also to persons serving a sentence of corrective and educative labor or hard labor. When a member of a cooperative serves his sentence of corrective and educative labor in the cooperative, the provisions pertaining to cooperative members apply in like manner. The pay of persons serving a sentence of corrective and educative labor is their wages less the reduction specified in the sentence.

Section 2
The following Item e is added to Section 9, Paragraph 2, of the Regulation:
(The following are to be regarded as sole parents:)

e. The parent whose spouse is serving a sentence of corrective and educative hard labor.

Section 3
The following Section 14/A is added to the Regulation:

Section 14/A
If the insured worker changed employers during the normative period specified in Section 28, respectively Section 14, of the Regulation, his sick pay must be determined on the basis of his earnings--including profit sharing and bonuses--during the normative period, from the employer for whom he worked when his inability to work arose. This provision applies in like manner also to the insured whose inability to work arises after his insurance coverage has ceased.
Section 4
The following provision replaces the Regulation's Section 15, Paragraph 1, as amended by Section 5 of SZOT Regulation No 1/1981 (14 Nov):

1. If the insured did not have any income on the basis of which his average daily pay could be determined either in the calendar year directly preceding the first day of his inability to work or in the year when his inability to work arose, then as the calendar daily average it is necessary to take the amount that the insured would have earned on average per calendar day, without profit sharing and bonuses, had he worked in the calendar year preceding the first day of his inability to work.

The employer, in agreement with the common-interest organ (the trade-union organ at the workplace, the cooperative committee, etc.), certifies this amount for the insured, on the basis of the calendar daily average pay of workers in jobs identical with, or similar to, the job the insured held on the first day of his inability to work.

Section 5
The following provision replaces the Regulation's Section 20/C that was added by Section 10 of SZOT Regulation No 1/1981 (14 Nov):

Section 20/C
The homeworker, part-time worker, farmworker, domestic servant, casual laborer, agent, and the person serving a sentence of corrective and educative hard labor is entitled to sick pay for every day of the calendar week, with the exception of Sunday.

Section 6
The following provisions replace the Regulation's Section 24/A that was added by Section 13 of SZOT Regulation No 5/1976 (18 Dec):

Section 24/A

1. To compute the average daily pay that is the basis of the maternity allowance, the pay that may be taken into consideration for the normative period must be divided by the divisor obtained pursuant to Section 16 of the Regulation. This provision applies in like manner also to determining the calendar daily average of yearend profit sharing, bonuses, premiums and commissions.

2. If the insured received sick pay and is eligible for a maternity allowance when her sick pay ends, the amount of the maternity allowance must be determined with due consideration for the calendar daily average pay that was computed pursuant to Paragraph 1 and served as the basis for determining her sick pay. This provision is applicable also when the insured becomes eligible for a maternity allowance not immediately when her sick pay ends, but in the same calendar year in which she received her first sick pay.

3. The maternity allowance is payable for each calendar day; and in case of the persons enumerated in Section 20/C, for the days specified thereunder.

Section 7
The following Sections 24B-24E are added to the Regulation:
Section 24/B
Also the adoptive parent, step-parent or foster parent is entitled to child-care pay. The conditions for eligibility must be met when the child is adopted, or when the step-parent or foster parent accepts custody of the child.

Section 24/C
The provisions of Section 9 apply in like manner also to establishing eligibility for child-care pay, except that a sole parent is also the father whose wife (or common-law wife) is certified by the competent physician as unable for medical reasons to take care of her child.

Section 24/D
If in establishing eligibility for child-care pay it becomes necessary to combine the time spent in employment (or as a member of an industrial cooperative) with the time spent as a member of an agricultural cooperative, every day of work in joint farming must be regarded as the equivalent of 3 days of employment (or membership in an industrial cooperative).

Section 24/E
From the viewpoint of establishing eligibility for child-care pay of a member of an agricultural cooperative, it is necessary to take into consideration the workdays determined pursuant to the Regulation's Section 34 as days of work in joint farming, and also the days worked as an employee, member of an industrial cooperative or homeworker covered by social security, prior to joining the agricultural cooperative.

Section 8
The following provision replaces Section 28 of the Regulation:

Section 28
From the viewpoint of eligibility for child-care pay, the same persons must be regarded as sole parents as in the case of eligibility for sick pay and maternity benefits, except that the Regulation's Section 9, Paragraph 2, Items b and e, and Paragraph 6, are not applicable.

Section 9
The following Section 37/C is added to the Regulation:

Section 37/C
The family allowance for a child placed in a fee-charging boarding school, dormitory, resident nursery or children's home may not exceed the fee paid by the parent.

Section 10
The following provision replaces Section 38, Paragraph 1, of the Regulation:

1. When the child lives in the household of cohabitating spouses and both spouses would be entitled to claim a family allowance, the family allowance is paid on the basis of the husband's entitlement. But the family allowance is paid on the basis of the wife's entitlement if the husband is not entitled to claim a family allowance, has not been providing support for at least two months, is serving a sentence of corrective and educative hard labor, or if the wife is entitled to a larger family allowance.
Section 11
The following Section 94/A is added to the Regulation:
Section 94/A
Also the accident that a person suffers while serving, or in conjunction with serving, a sentence of corrective and educative hard labor is an industrial accident.

Section 12
The following provision replaces Section 95/A that was added to the Regulation by Section 15 of SZOT Regulation No 5/1982 (13 Dec):
Section 95/A
The workmen's compensation of the casual laborer, farmworker, domestic servant, or a person serving a sentence of corrective and educative hard labor is 120 forints a day.

Section 13
The following provision replaces Section 96 that was added to the Regulation by Section 14 of SZOT Regulation No 4/1983 (20 Dec):
Section 96
The workmen's compensation for a member of an agricultural cooperative must be determined as an amount per month, with due consideration for his average earnings less retirement pension contribution as the basis of workmen's compensation, computed without invoking Section 80, Paragraph 5, and Section 81 of the Regulation. If workmen's compensation is payable for a part of a month, the amount per day is one-thirtieth of the monthly amount.

Section 14
The following provision replaces Section 96/A that was added to the Regulation by Section 15 of SZOT Regulation No 1/1981 (14 Nov):
Section 96/A
When the workmen's compensation awarded a member of an agricultural cooperative the first time has run out and he subsequently again becomes unable to work as a result of the same industrial accident, his workmen's compensation must be determined in accordance with the rules for computing workmen's compensation, on the basis of his average monthly earnings less retirement pension contribution in the year directly preceding the first day of his new inability to work, if this is to his advantage.

Section 15
The following provision is inserted as Section 108, Paragraph 2, of the Regulation, and the present numbering of Paragraphs 2-4 is changed to Paragraphs 3-5:
2. When of the cohabitating spouses (or common-law couple) the father claims sick pay to nurse a sick child more than 1 year old, he must report his claim to the social security disbursing office at the mother's place of employment or, in the absence of such an office, to the social security directorate (or its branch office) on whose territory the mother's employer has his headquarters (or plant).

Section 16
The following provision is inserted as Section 110, Paragraph 4, of the Regulation, and the present numbering of Paragraphs 4-5 is changed to Paragraphs 5-6:
4. Child-care pay is disbursed each month for the preceding month of entitlement
   a. At the disbursement office when the wages (salaries) are paid,
   b. At the social security directorate (or its branch office) on the
      5th day following the month of entitlement.

Section 17
The following Paragraph 6 is added to Section 183 of the Regulation:
6. The employer of a person serving a sentence of corrective and educative
   hard labor, respectively the penal institution, is obliged to compute
   and remit the social security and retirement pension contributions on
   the person's entire pay, without the reductions ordered by the court.

Section 18
The following provisions replace Section 200/B that was added to the Regulation
by Section 8 of SZOT Regulation No 1/1983 (6 Apr) and amended by Section 26 of
SZOT Regulation No 4/1983 (20 Dec):
Section 200/B
1. The person who engages in supplementary activity as a private artisan
   or private merchant is obliged to pay an accident insurance contribu-
   tion from the first day of the month in which his artisan's license or
   merchant's license was issued, until the last day of the month in which
   he surrenders his license, its revocation becomes final, or the court
   sentence barring him from activity as a private artisan or private mer-
   chant becomes final.
2. If the private artisan or private merchant engages in supplementary
   activity and simultaneously belongs to a work association or special-
   ized cooperative group, he must pay an accident insurance contribution
   of 250 forints a month.
3. The person who engages in supplementary activity as a private artisan
   or private merchant is not obliged to pay an accident insurance contribu-
   tion for the calendar month throughout which he is unable to work,
   receives a child-care allowance, performs military service, is in cus-
   tody pending trial, is serving a prison sentence, or is held in close
   confinement.
4. At her request, the private artisan or private merchant engaging in
   supplementary activity must be exempted from paying her accident insu-
   rance contribution, from the first day of the month in which she
   gave birth to a child, through the last day of the fourth month after
   childbirth.
5. If the person engaging in supplementary activity as a private artisan
   or private merchant dies, the obligation to pay an accident insurance
   contribution ends the last day of the month preceding his death.
6. The person engaging in supplementary activity as a private artisan or
   private merchant is entitled to accident benefits if he suffers an in-
   dustrial accident at a time during which he is obliged to pay an acci-
   dent insurance contribution.

Section 19
The following provisions replace Paragraph 1 of Section 242, added to the Regu-
lation by Section 56 of SZOT Regulation No 5/1982 (13 Dec):
1. On the basis of the summary account for each calendar month, the employers obliged to maintain social security file cards must report on them:
   a. The base of the social security contribution, the amount of social security contribution, and the amount of retirement pension contribution;
   b. At a specialized cooperative, the amount of social security contribution paid by the members, and the amount of the cooperative's social security contribution or increased contribution;
   c. The amount of social security contribution that the enterprise work association pays for its members engaging in supplementary activity.

Section 20
Paragraph 5 of Section 247/A, which has been added to the Regulation by Section 40 of SZOT Regulation No 1/1981 (14 Nov), is hereby replaced and a Paragraph 6 is added, as follows:
5. The enterprise work association is not obliged to report on its members the data mentioned in Paragraph 1, Item d, and in Paragraph 2, or to submit a summary statement.
6. By 30 September of each year, the work association or specialized industrial cooperative group is obliged to report to the common-interest organ of its private-artisan or private-merchant member the taxable income that such a member derived the preceding year in conjunction with membership in the work association or cooperative group.

Section 21
The following Paragraph 8 is added to Section 252 of the Regulation:
8. The person receiving child-care pay must inform the disbursing organ within 3 days if he goes to work, starts a gainful activity that requires an official license, goes abroad, or if the child leaves his household (or custody).

Section 22
The following provision replaces Item a of Supplement 2 that was added to the Regulation by Section 71 of SZOT Regulation No 5/1982 (13 Dec):
(Jobs in which retired persons may be employed without any curtailment of their pensions:)
   a. Kindergarten teachers, teachers of primary or secondary schools, and nurses in child-care institutions;

Section 23
The following provision replaces Section 3, Paragraph 1, of SZOT Regulation No 2/1982 (26 Apr):
1. A child-care allowance cannot be paid in case of employment pursuant to Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the Regulation if the worker’s hours on average for the year exceed half of the statutory workweek.

Section 24
1. This decree—except its Sections 7, 15, 16 and 21—becomes effective the day of its promulgation, and its provisions apply as of 1 January 1985.
Simultaneously, Paragraph 2 of Section 19, Section 22 and Section 37/A of the Regulation are rescinded.

2. Sections 7, 16 and 21 of this decree will become effective 1 March 1985; and Section 15, 1 September 1985. Section 9/A of the Regulation will be rescinded as of 1 September 1985.

3. Sections 13 and 14 of this decree apply to inability to work that arises after 31 December 1984.

4. For the insured who was awarded a maternity allowance on the basis of the regulations that were in force on 31 December 1984 and
   a. Starts immediately to receive child-care pay when her maternity allowance runs out, the average daily pay on which her maternity allowance is based must be converted to the calendar daily average pay pursuant to Section 6;
   b. Does not immediately claim child-care pay when her maternity allowance runs out, the average pay on which child-care pay is based must be calculated in accordance with the regulations that are in force at the time when the amount of child-care pay is being determined.

Dr Judit Csehak, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers

1014
CSO: 2500/257
HABITS, BEHAVIOR, TREATMENT OF YOUTHS

Lack of Democratic Practice

Budapest MAGYAR IFJUSAG in Hungarian 23 Nov 84 p 5

[Article by "szesztak": "With Whom Should We Create a Democracy?"]

[Text] Let us use schools, for instance, as the subject of our examinations. I recently read that school could be life's most exciting experimental workshop since it can mold without costing money. For instance, it could try out democracy. Excuse me. This does not mean either that the teacher is an idiot or that I recommend the election of Lujza Kiss as KISZ secretary because she is the principal's favorite. These are indeed the two manifestations we encounter most frequently. When I visit my girlfriend, her two highschool student daughters are banned from the room:—Do not say anything about school because Agi will report everything. And if they find out that you told it to her, you will have no peace. Is the situation this bad? Oh yes, possibly even worse. There is a glaring injustice...I grab my pen and am ready to report it...I ask for the name and address. Next day daddy comes to visit me and looks me in the eye: My dear lady, forget about what my daughter (son) had told you. The kid wants to continue her/his studies. You do understand, don't you?—I don't—I reply because they cannot fail her/him, they will merely lower by one the grades of the two subjects required for admission. It is up to us then to prove that there was revenge.

In recent years, two students failed gymnastics (apparently you cannot get a failing grade in subjects tied to inborn skills). It just happened that both were KISZ secretaries, both were elected by the membership and both were elected in opposition to the faculty's recommendations. Unfortunately, both had to be replaced because failed students cannot be members of the school KISZ committee.

The teacher in charge of one of the construction camps not only failed in letting the camp council exercise democracy but—it is said—he completely ignored them. At one of the conferences, however, he bragged about the kind of democratic camp he had set up. Well, at a subsequent conference, he was mentioned as a good example. Unfortunately, several of the camp
members were present and indignantly refuted the untrue statement. The subsequent investigation in the high school was not aimed at elucidating the role of the teacher but at searching for the individuals who got the poor soul into trouble. Characteristically, they did not even by chance punish the one who had spoken up but the one who—they believed—had spoken up because, in the summer he had gotten into a row with the teacher of the camp. This is twisted logic. The reputation of the school is the foremost consideration.

Something else. What kind of climate can be present in a high school where I want to talk to someone, request permission from the principal, he grants it because he cannot suddenly find an excuse to reject me, and an hour later he calls informing me that comrade X from the council's education section will not permit colleague Y to make a statement. You do understand! The teacher responsible for 200 students is under guardianship from the moment he/she steps down from the teacher's platform. Adult individuals can also be manipulated in such a manner that they are only willing to speak if I report their story under an assumed name, with the place changed and the environment distorted. About what? For instance, even topics like what he/she eats at home on Sunday. Because, according to the principal, even this is a "statement". What are the schools hiding so anxiously? Their reputation? The something? The big nothing? I accost five people on the street and within a minute they can rank for me all of the gymnasiums of the city. Is a coverup possible at all?

This year, a conflict camp was organized in Tata where the high school students were subjected to house regulations so strenuous as if they had been written for serfs in the Middle Ages. And the high school students raised "in the democratic spirit" acknowledged without a sound the humiliating regulations. Some people, somewhere, have gotten the students well used to them.

How should democracy be introduced? Not by having the teacher orate about freedom from his platform while he dreads his autocratic principal and the neurotic climate of the teachers' lounge. This is what should be changed instead of findings ways to banish the reporter from the schools.

Of course, I also have good examples. A few! And the reason is not that I only know a few of the schools.

Unmannerly Youth

Budapest ELET ES IRODALOM in Hungarian 7 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Laszlo Domonkos: "Europe in the Kitchen"]

[Text] The young university instructor bursts into the friendly get-together: although we expected her, we really did not expect it to happen like this. Kati's face is tormented with deep bluish-black rings under
her eyes, the lines of her face are unusually deep, her movements are that of a tired old person—even though she arrived just from social work. She was the supervisor—counselor of about 200 future Hungarian physicians during a week-long autumn work project in the vineyards.

What Kati relates appear to be alarming rumors recalling perhaps the worst examples and illustrations of the widely spread anti-youth outbursts of the 1960's. A hysterical girl attempting suicide during the night, a youth with alcohol intoxication. A village turned upside down. Accommodations turned into a brothel for a week: visually unmistakable signs of gross overindulgence in alcohol in the toilettes, amorous trysts in broad daylight in cars, in the fields, astounded farmer wives nearly stunned from outrage. Trampled harvest and, as their logical consequence, incredibly low work productivity with total daily production amounting to 6-7 cases. And other things. The enormous weight of responsibility and the forehead-splitting pressure of powerlessness. To discipline people over 20? A few names, the most glaring ones—dear God, what those could have been doing:—reported to the rector. Will they be expelled? Nonsense... This you should report!

I would report it if Kati herself would not start to explain. It was not only these university students she had spent a week with. As I look at her face I recall that her appearance merely reflects the forceful effect of what she had said in a breathless tone, but I rather not comment. Because they are the exaggerated, immediate generalizations—are n't they? Because, in spite of all, there is always wheat among the cockle. (Would it not be better the other way around?) Because these few are perhaps not so few, who could decide indeed whether these barbarian misfits represent the majority. And after all and nevertheless, and otherwise, on the one hand and on the other, whichever way, from a certain standpoint, if by chance and notwithstanding. An old Hoft monologue flashes through my mind. It went somewhat like: If someone steals, defrauds, swindles, commits any kind of scandal, is that automatically a news item? Those who work from sunup to Santa Claus, those, why is there no news report about them? Why would there be a report about them?—I recall the angelic puzzlement enacted by the well-known face. They must be paid accordingly and that is all. News report...

Kati is not paid accordingly—I have known it for a long time. Although she is both a scientist and teacher, she often goes to the institute on holidays as well, for weeks on end, one can only reach her for a few words on the phone—"You know, this is that kind of work." That it is. And those are that kind of students.

I am listening to the song by Miklos Varga entitled "Europe." It has long been my opinion that in the case of the so-called light music, even within the framework of the genre, the texts are worth something only if they do not attempt to produce a content filled with pseudo-depths through repugnant, tasteless pretense and painful, slave-like work. The text under discussion is perhaps that certain redeeming exception.
which proves the rule. Because, in accordance with the "pop-music majesty" of the tune, they sing—although certainly not in a literary, but rather— in an appealingly intellectual approach about Europe, the proud woman "whose face reflects your face." The song is a popular hit-tune these days. I think even university students listen to it while doing social work, luxuriating somewhere on the Hungarian prairie.

Our being Europeans has been a criterium and a measuring rod for a thousand years. The organization of next year's European Cultural Platform in Budapest is of extraordinary significance presumably (also) because it is precisely the Europe of culture which will meet in Hungary. This is the most difficult in the whole thing; I want to believe that it should only have happened this way—both the demands and accomplishments of our artists justified exclusively this symbolic act. We could thus think that the Europe of culture is an artistic-creative category. Albeit...

Trying to reach daylight on the escalators from the undercrossings of the Metro in Pest, it is totally unthinkable that a few individuals, "possessing" some extremely peculiar concepts of autonomy (irrespective of age), would not always proceed, with stubborn self-assurance, against the flow of traffic demonstrating that, in spite of all, they will proceed upward on the left side and will go down spreading through the entire width of the escalator. They can be the first to get on a bus because they are convinced that...I don't know what they are convinced of except for their own magnificence. At the two ends of Europe, let's say in London and Moscow, we know that such behavior would be unthinkable. The right side of the steps is meant exclusively for those moving gradually. At the bus stops, without any constraint, people would line up spontaneously in the order of their arrival—even though British individualism is known as one of the prevailing major cliches of European culture. Although we can mumble "Balkan" to ourselves about the masses "dishing it out" with hateful exasperation and the strong irony of Pest, nevertheless, I have a strong suspicion that this manner of dealing with the problem is not only dangerously superficial, it is also completely erroneous attitude. And not just because of the expression used.

A workshop at the car servicing enterprise. Lunch time. A good looking boy with long hair cuts himself a thick slice of bread and butter and, with his mouth full and with obvious relish, he is explaining his amorous escapades to the others recalling precise naturalistic details. The others are listening almost glumly with the eternal dignity and calm evaluation of experts. At the time of my fast-distancing youth, somewhere in the primal fog, when I once made similar attempts at a street corner of the outer city to prove my manliness to the others, an older laborer addressed the following sentence to me: "A man does not talk about these things, young fellow." It's echo is still in my ear. Should I be glad, what a lucky bloke I am?
Europe is a beautiful, proud woman—says the song. Although not overly original, the picture can actually be accepted without reservations. Around us, however, this creature is relegated to the kitchen every day. Not into a tastefully decorated, shining-sparkling, spacious room equipped with exhaust fan, automatic household appliances and a rustic dining room set, but into a small and stinky, dark and vulgarly disgusting kitchen, into the kitchen of huge, out-dated outer-city apartment complexes and into the kitchen of formerly shared rentals run down through constant bickering; with uncombed, sticky hair, with the revolting remnants of nail polish on her broken nails, and with a shapelessly deformed, deathly tired body. For a long time now, we should have born testimony of our European heritage not through poems, novels, paintings, compositions, buildings or even the wrapping of wafer biscuits.

Kati is bewildered. She is in a vice between her own situation and her belief in the possibility to civilize man while the circles under he eyes are becoming deeper, and the lines on her face and the gray in her hair are increasing further. In the village, the women can give thanks to the god of universities for being left in peace until next autumn. The sportive and funny boys and girls, getting out of Volvos and VW Golfs, occasionally recall in the beer joint near Reininghaus what good players they were during work this year. After all, the bold man rapidly gets over the escalator, the underground passage and the bus stop, and in the car service station we should pay attention to our car—anyway, we don't have to go so far as to listen to well-seasoned and detailed naughty stories. "Why are there no newspaper reports about them?" And let us not care about the others; the four-wheeled predators of our highways, the destructive spirits at our work places whose incompatibility is only exceeded by their unbridled pushing ahead, the "consumers" humbly standing in line in front of greediness, those who always know how to avoid responsibility through demagogic blustering, anyone but ourselves? The beautiful, proud woman—I picture her a creature with long black hair, exquisitely large brown eyes and strong hands built for work—meanwhile collapses on a shaky kitchen stool and drops the butt of her cigarette on the zigzagging stones of the kitchen floor.
NEW BOOK ON NATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEWED

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 26 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by R.S.: "War and the System of National Defense"]

[Text] The readers of the Ministry of National Defense Publishing House have received an interesting book by Col Zdzislaw Golab. This publication concerns some matters of essential importance to the overall system of national defense. The NATO states and the United States in particular have announced a strategy of direct confrontation against the socialist system, and in view of this the publication of this book is very timely. Among other things, the NATO strategy foresees deep preemptive nuclear strikes against the rear areas of the Warsaw Pact states, which compels one to feel anxious for the future of the world. The prospects of a nuclear world war have been made much closer by the powerful weaponry of the United States and its allies and Reagan's "Star Wars" concept. For that reason, it has become especially important for the socialist states to ready their defenses and to strengthen their national and coalitional systems of defense. This book is dedicated to these problems and their political, economic and military aspects.

One of the values of this book is that it introduces examples from ancient and modern wars which make it possible for us to investigate and understand the complicated mechanisms governing the laws of war and the work that nations must undertake to prepare their defense systems. Analyzing the aggressive character of the political and military doctrine of imperialism and various doctrines that have been called for from 1945 until now (such as mass strikes, flexible reaction, realistic deterrence, armed intervention, direct confrontation, etc.), we can examine the changes that have occurred in the political, military, technological and economic views of the NATO states.

War and peace are the main problems of our times. The author has substantiated this with many examples: "World War I lasted 4 years. About 10 million people lost their lives and another 20 million became invalids. The material destruction has been estimated at a total of 260 billion dollars.

"World War II lasted 6 years. More than 50 million people were killed, 17 million of whom died in the fighting, while more than 2 million became invalids. Material losses amounted to 4 trillion dollars.
"An eventual third world war could cause much greater destruction. According to some calculations, there would be about a 50-percent loss of material and cultural values. Some feel that the first missile and rocket strike alone would kill about 700-800 million people, with a subsequent disruption of social life and radioactive contamination of the atmosphere and surface of almost the entire earth. All of human life would be faced with extinction."

These are the horrors of war that are opposed by the defensive doctrine of socialism, which has been expressed numerous times in the political declarations of the Warsaw Pact states and by the defensive system established during World War II by our state on the basis of the political and strategic concepts of the Polish left wing. Quoting the classic Marxists, the author states that this defense has a class-related character. Its effectiveness depends to a large degree on the political and economic order of the state, the level of its industrial development and production, and on public ownership of the means of production. Therefore, in waging a just war, the state (coalition) has especially favorable conditions in which to defend itself.

Resolving the problems of an armed defense and both political and economic defensive readiness and using examples of different solutions (employed in the East and West), the author has taken documentation to present the tasks and military preparations that must be realized by the political and state apparatus and troops of the domestic and foreign fronts for civil defense (evacuation and protection of civilian populations) and to provide domestic security and public order.

Presenting and substantiating the types of threats posed by imperialism, the author keenly evaluates the character of an eventual war by saying that "an eventual nuclear war would be one between two different social and political systems and would be more political in nature than all previous wars: a class conflict between two coalitions and an intercontinental war for the survival of one of these two systems."

On the basis of the political and military premises of the social defensive doctrine, much space in this book was devoted to the basic elements of a socialist state's defense. Making use of combinations and examples from past wars and different states, he shows the different principles by which economics influences the defensive power of a state, how an economy is prepared for war and the organization and the tasks undertaken by the political and state leadership as well as by operational commanders in bringing about a high moral and political level of society and the troops. A chapter on the management of coalitional war is of special interest.

On the basis of the experiences of local wars and especially the preparation, execution and defense against a first strike, the author uses the most characteristic examples from World War II, the Vietnam War and the 1956, 1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars as well as recent actions in Lebanon (Syria) to present a whole series of specific military solutions, including those
applicable to combat on Polish territory. Of special interest are his conclusions on the mass use of aviation, radiolocation and air defense (including rocket systems as used in Egypt, Syria and Vietnam).

Col Golab's book should not be read just once. The ideas presented within it demand thought and thorough study and, above all, everyone interested in defense matters will find in this work substantial and useful information and something new for his particular line of service. Considering the importance of the discussed problems and their present relevance, this book makes an important contribution to the analysis of fundamental contemporary problems that are decisive to the fate of the world.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY, STATE EXAMINED

Bucharest VIITORUL SOCIAL in Romanian Nov-Dec 84 pp 504-510

[Article by Aristide Cioaba: "The Relationship Between Party and State in the Political System of Socialist Romanian During the Current Stage"]

[Text] In the report presented by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to the 13th Congress of the PCR [Romanian Communist Party], a political and theoretical document of special significance for guiding the activities of the entire people, the theses regarding the role of the party and the socialist state during the current stage of development of Romania and in the country's future advance toward communism receive the benefit of substantial new clarifications. On the basis of a very profound scientific analysis, the party secretary general points out that "improvement in the activities of the state of revolutionary worker democracy, development of the system of democratic worker organisms in various sectors, will lead to continuing increase in active participation by the masses of the people in management of the state and of all economic and social life and to ever broader democratization of our society. But active participation by the masses of the people in management of the state, development of revolutionary worker democracy, by no means presupposes rejection or reduction of unified conduct of state activities".

Both under socialism and in modern societies in general, the twofold complex of party and state represents the principal axis of power relationships in the political system. As the political institution of prime rank of any society divided into social classes, the state is before all else indispensable to the class (or classes) which play(s) the leading role in society. However, it cannot be a neutral phenomenon or one devoid of interest to other classes and social groups, whether they have the ambition of coming into power or not. The fundamental reason for this is that, unlike other organizations of a class character (parties, trade unions, pressure groups, etc), the state, as we know, concentrates and represents political power in society, its legal acts being binding upon the entire mass of individuals of a given society, although the content of the respective acts embodies in particular the interests and will of the leading (dominant) class.
At the same time, material expression of the will of a class in power relationships depends to the greatest extent also on the degree and forms of political organization of the classes and the ratio of power among them. Starting with the bourgeois system in particular, the degree and forms of organization have been characterized by the development and activity of political parties as active and necessary exponents of classes of society. From this time forward the party-state relationship asserted itself as a specific method of exercising the power of a particular class as domination over society in its entirety, directed systematically toward realization of the objectives which expressed the fundamental interests of the leading class, defined as such by parties and converted by means of the state to the general will of society. It may thus be said that in the modern era there is no state policy unless one has been elaborated primarily by political parties. This is due to the fact that the political systems of modern societies have been devised and act for reasons determined on the basis of institutional separation and functional specialization of their structural components, the political parties asserting themselves within their framework as factors in rendering conscious and coherent expression of the class will, of the goals cherished by different groups of society.

It is clear that for each type of society in the modern era party-state relationships bear the unmistakable stamp of the respective class order and of the particular features of national history and the historic mission of the leading class. The experience of establishment of our socialist political system, of improvement in its organization and operation, is also instructive from this standpoint. Under this system, the dialectical party-state relationships act as a factor shaping socialist construction, being constantly defined and redefined as a function of the changes brought about by the new tasks facing the party and state in the highly dynamic process of creating socialism. These relationships have experienced continuous and significant development over the 4 decades since the victory of the revolution of social and national, antifascist and anti-imperialist, liberation.

During the first stage of socialist construction, while the party was fashioning the new socialist state, party-state relationships bore the imprint of the difficult historical conditions of the initial phase of the new system. Owing to still inadequate experience, to the fact that the political system itself solidified gradually, being compelled to face difficulties and contradictions inherent in its beginning period, and because of the tasks required, imposed by solution of the many complex problems facing the working class and its party, the relationships between party and state in certain circumstances fluctuated between two opposite tendencies, that of union, sometimes to the point of substitution, of the party and state on the plane of practical action, and that of separation, going so far in certain respects as conduct of parallel activities and overlapping activities by party and by state organs. It was a matter of insufficient delimitation of the specific role and methods of activity of each of the two political institutions. The consequences of engagement of inadequately defined relationships between party and state had an effect in one way or another on performance of the role of the state and on the nature of party work, entailing either a tendency toward decline in the
responsibility of the state organs or a certain form of bureaucratization of the activities of party organs. This danger has been pointed out on a number of occasions by the leadership of our party, by party secretary general Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, who has stressed the need for understanding and realizing the role of the party as a political ideological role rather than as an administrative one.

Starting with the 9th party congress, and especially with preparation of the program of the PCR, important clarifications of a theoretical and practical nature have been introduced which have permitted substantiation of a scientific conception of the role of the party and state and of the relationship between them. In the light of this innovative conception of our party and of the practice in which it has been embodied, it appears to be abundantly obvious that there is no scientific foundation whatever to certain bourgeois theories and other viewpoints which seek, crudely or in more refined fashion, to deny the democratic character of our political system, on the basis precisely of a distorted representation of the relationships between party and state.

We know that major confusion, elevated by some to the rank of a principle, has long prevailed among bourgeois theoreticians and even among Western marxist researchers, in connection with the problem of party and state relationships in socialist political systems. They hold that in systems of this kind the party is in effect merged with the state. To use the words recently uttered by British political scientist Thomas Lowit, the socialist political system is in reality identical to a "polymorphous party system," this meaning that the state and the other components of the system are nothing but "other facets" of one and the same institution, the party, which the latter allegedly activates in a variety of forms. Despite the conceptual and methodological innovation to which the author in question resorts in his attempt at analysis of the socialist political system, his conclusions are not essentially different from the older, and equally erroneous, theses and evaluations, erring precisely in their non-dialectical and extremely simplistic manner of treating such a complex, profoundly dialectical, and dynamic phenomenon as is that of party and state relationships in a system which, owing to the revolutionary changes effected throughout its existence, has at the same time instituted a new logic of development and manifestation of the interrelations of the major political institutions.

Under the current Romanian political system, the dialectical party and state relationships are characterized by several essential parameters, three of which will be discussed briefly in what follows.

First of all, it must be stressed that the relationships between party and state are institutionalized relationships, their definitive characteristic being determined by the principle enshrined in the Romanian constitution that "in the Socialist Republic of Romania the leading political force of all society is the Romanian Communist Party." The political relationships between party and state and between the party and the non-governmental components of the political organization of society are based on this principle, which operates at the level of the political system in its entirety.
Consequently, theoretical delimitation and resolution from the theoretical viewpoint of the mutual influence between the roles assigned both to the party and to the state in the unified system of our socialist democracy assume particular importance. This is precisely the direction in which has been oriented the laborious theoretical, political, and organizational activity conducted by the party and its secretary general over the last 20 years. This work has led to elaboration of a scientific theory of the leading role of the party and of the role of the state in organization and unified conduct of socioeconomic activities, the measures for improving the ways and means of performing these roles being placed on a firm foundation. It has thus been observed that the management of society and the state by the party, as well as management of socioeconomic activities by the state and practical realization of the general political objectives set by the party, are interdependent aspects of the same unified, dialectical process of political management of socialist society. The fact that the party performs the role of leading political force does not exhaust its potential and does not presuppose that it engages in all kinds of activity required by the social leadership function and, as has been noted by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, need not lead to monopoly of all political activity and of leadership of society, which are accomplished in practice through the political system as a whole. As is known, leadership by the party involves primarily the general political aspect, determination of the content and direction of general activities, that is, strategy and tactics established on the basis of thorough study of the concretely historical conditions, national and international, and at the same time union and mobilization of the workers in the activity of implementing the general political line. At the same time, the state has an essential role in the direct, planned management of the activities of society, in developing the content of the general objectives defined by the party through democratic consultation with the masses.

Advancement of the party from the viewpoint of its role and functions as vital center of the entire social system has permitted even greater clarification of its relationships with the other components of the system, and the state above all. Acting as a "center coordinating all spheres of economic and social life", the party involves and integrates the state and the other constituent structures of the political organization of society in organic operation. Party and state relationships are thus defined in the direction of relative specialization of roles and methods of activity, on the basis of the same sociopolitical foundation and the same strategic objectives. This specialization, determined by the factors which brought about the division of political roles at the level of the system, is accompanied by another related tendency, that is, unification of the organizational principles of the party and state and by a single ideological orientation of the entire political system. The specialization of roles is accompanied, as a matter of fact, by basing the organization and operation of the party and state on the principles of democratic centralism, collective leadership and work, integration into the life of society, etc, since the political system as such is subordinated to the same ideal, to the same major political goals, and is guided by the same political values and norms.
As is to be gathered from the writings of the party secretary general, the objective requirement of enhancing the leading role of the party does not diminish and does not conflict with or contradict enhancement of the role of the socialist state throughout the period of construction of the new system. What changes in the course of this process is not the raison d'être of the two political institutions, which is represented by conscious guidance and organization of the revolutionary changes which will lead under full-fledged communism to the creation of a classless society, but rather their essence, their social nature, the qualitative level at which the role of each is performed.

As the energizing factor and leading political force of the state, the party ensures improvement in the quality and the sociopolitical efficiency of state activities, of its ability to organize socioeconomic construction in an organic coordination of the requirements of science with democratic participation by the workers. Increase in the role of the state should not be conceived as a process of extending the nationalization of the life of society, but rather as continuing amplification of participation by the masses, by citizens, in all the activities of the state. The responsibilities for the party and the state deriving from exercise by the party of its leading role in society and in the state lie precisely in causing the development of the state to conform to these guidelines.

Another major parameter of party and state relationships is linked to the qualitative changes that have taken place at the level of the state as a result of continuous democratization of the latter. In this connection we believe it to be necessary to make a more circumstantial examination of the problem of whether the workers' democratic state can still be evaluated and defined from the viewpoint of its role as an instrument in the exercise of power and management of society. The definition of the state as an instrument of a class, of the power of a class, was at one time generally associated with political domination of the class involved. Inasmuch as in our society the state has ceased to be an instrument of class domination, becoming an authentic representative of the power of the entire people, it appears to be improper to continue to use the concept of instrument to characterize the sociopolitical role of the state. Now that the state has been increasingly integrated into a very broad array of organisms and forms of direct participation by the masses in exercise of state power, it may no longer be considered to be exclusively an organism or an instrument of exercise of power in the name of the working class and the people. While deriving the benefit of close cooperation of its organs at all levels with the masses, the state today, together with the party, plays an important role in stimulating and energizing the creative activities of the people, and not merely that of administering these activities in the name of the people. The state no longer figures as an element superimposed on society, as an instrument whereby the power of the people is exercised in the name of the people, but rather as an organism which exercises the sovereign power of the people together with the people, under the guidance of the working class.

Considering the state to be an instrument is no longer suitable for the reason that credit might thus be given to the idea that the state is an
organism manipulated from the positions of a particular class and from a command post situated outside it. This could evoke the image of a state reduced to its dimension of technical apparatus to which executive tasks only are to be assigned, and at the same time would generate, especially at the lower levels of state organization, a tendency for it to manifest itself as a supervised organism always anticipating "orders" from the party organs. The state would thus be devoid of responsible action and initiative in organization and conduct of the process of implementing party policy. We believe that this is precisely the mindset opposed by the party secretary general in the new concept under which he views the dialectical party-state relationship. Going beyond the concept of a state as an instrument in the hands of the party in creation of socialism, Comrade Nicolae Ceaucescu defines the state of workers' democracy as being "the supreme representative of owners and producers, the organizer of the common life of the entire people, the entire nation". Hence the state is not merely an instrument employed to organize the life of society, but is also an active and responsible organizer of social life. It follows that the relationships between party and state cannot be of the nature of hierarchical subordination of the state to the party. Just as leadership of society by the party is not expressed in subordination of the state to the party, management of the state by the party does not presuppose relationships of subordination. In that they represent the supreme power in society, the state and its legislative and executive organs do not constitute an entity inferior to the party. The party-state relationship may thus be formulated in the following terms. Just as the party program represents a guidebook to all activities in society in general and in the state in particular, so the laws of the state and decisions made in conformity to law are absolutely mandatory for society in general and for the party in particular. "Any violation of the laws of the country is incompatible with the status of party member", stresses Comrade Nicolae Ceaucescu.

Since the roles of the party and the state are clearly distinguishable and not interchangeable, but complementary and interdependent, the logical conclusion which the secretary general of the party has drawn from our political practice, elevating it to the rank of principle governing party and state relationships, is that of incompatibility of substitution of the party and party organs for the state and state organs. This is of extremely great importance, it being known that no system can operate at the optimum so long as relationships capable of harmonizing and of ensuring connection and expression of the active contribution of each part to the movement of the whole do not exist between its component parts. It permits improvement in the operation of the political system, which can make use of its superiority, not by excluding one element or another, and especially not the state, from the normal cycle of the whole, but by eliminating the dysfunctions and contradictions which might affect increase in the extent of integration and dynamism of the political system, as a result of the possibility given to each subsystem to exercise its functions and powers in accordance with the requirements of the role which it plays within the framework of the system.

Lastly, a third definitive characteristic of the sphere of party and state relationships is represented by the objective regular tendency toward interweaving of party and state activities. This interweaving is due above
all to factors of an objective nature, such as general application of socialist production relationships, the emphasis placed on the process of social homogenization, the increase in the trust and cooperation between classes in pursuing and satisfying common general interests, etc. The interweaving of party and state activities is at the same time required by the laws of operation of the superstructure. There is a general process of interweaving party and state activities generated by the position of the party and state subsystems in the political system and by the complementary nature of their roles in the system. The greater the degree of unification of the objectives to which party and state activities are subordinated, the greater is the need for unified conduct and interweaving of party and state activities and the more effective is the state. In order for the interweaving of party and state activities to assume the most suitable forms permitting concentration of specific activities for simultaneous action with no mutual loss of responsibility and confusion of roles, this process must be consciously controlled and directed by the party, the vital center of the entire system.

The wide experience, culminating in the results which have validated the solutions proposed by the party and its secretary general, is apparent on this plane as well. One type of solution aims at strengthening the links between party and state within the framework of the existing organizational structures and forms and has been given concrete expression chiefly in plurality of party and state functions, from the local to the central level, and in the principle of rotation of party and state cadres.

Solutions of a second type have necessitated creation of new and original political organizational structures within the framework of our political system, such as organs of a twofold party and state nature, and, in a certain respect, worker self-management organs.

These new structures incorporate into an organic whole features and functions (or elements of functions) performed jointly by party and state, ones associated especially with the process of specific implementation of significant aspects of the social management instrument (prognosis and planning, organization, control) or unified performance of complex tasks in areas of the greatest importance, such as socialist education of the masses, coordination of scientific development, coordination of the activities of the people's councils, etc.

All these forms of interweaving party and state activities signify above all that "the party deals with the problems of its leading role in the state from more avowedly committed positions, by virtue of the fact that it is a party of government", but at the same time mark the direction of participation by the party and state, as well as by the other social organisms, in the entire systemic cycle, from study of actual conditions and determination of the requirements of social development and harmonization of the interests of the social classes and categories in the policy elaborated to evaluation of the impact of decisions adopted on the social system and preparation of organizational, institutional, measures for continuing improvement in the functioning of the political system.
The institution of these forms and organisms for interweaving party, state, and public activities, specification of their place and responsibilities in the general system of management of our society, and the theoretical and practical theses relating to characterization of the dialectical relationships between party and state are contributing to improvement in our political system and to elimination of phenomena of duplication of effort and overlapping, in keeping with the objective requirements of increase in the efficiency and quality of performance of political leadership of society.

FOOTNOTES


2. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Romania pe drumul construirii societatii multilateral dezvolatate" [Romania on the Way To Building a Comprehensively Developed Socialist Society], Vol 17, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1979, p 298.

3. "Programul Partidului Comunist Roman de faurire a societatii socialiste multilateral dezvolatate si de inaintare a Romaniei spre comunism" [The Program of the Romanian Communist Party for Creating a Comprehensively Developed Socialist Society and Advancing Romania Toward Communism], Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1975, p 115.


5. Ibid., p 41.

6. This refers to holding of party and state offices by the same person: the first secretary of the district (or municipal) party committee and chairman of the district (municipal) people's committee; secretary of the commune party committee and chairman of the commune people's council; secretaries of district party committees and deputy chairmen of district people's councils; etc.

7. The Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development (created in 1973 and currently operating as an economic parliament); the Council of Socioeconomic Organization (1972); the Central Council of Worker Control of Economic and Social Activities (1972); the National Council for Science and Technology (1973); the Council of Socialist Culture and Education (1971); the Committee for People's Councils' Problems (1973); the Defense Council (1969); the Central Party and State Commission on Area Planning and Urban and Rural Locality Development (1974); etc.

8. See "Rolul Partidului Comunist Roman in sistemul politic al Republicii Socialiste Romania" [The Role of the Romanian Communist Party in the
political system of the Socialist Republic of Romania], in the book
"Sistemul politic al Republicii Socialiste Romania" [The Political Sys-
tem of the Socialist Republic of Romania], coordinated by Ioan Ceterchi,
Ovidiu Trasnea, and Constantin Vlad, Editura Politica, 1979, p 32.

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SYMPOSIUM WITH ISRAELIS HELD IN BUCHAREST

Bucharest ANALE DE ISTORIE in Romanian No 6, Nov-Dec 84 pp 87-94

[Article by Aurica Simion on a "Romanian-Israeli Scientific Symposium," held in Bucharest on 11-13 June 1984]

[Text] In accordance with the cooperation agreement signed in the fall of 1982 by Ion Popescu-Puturi, director of the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies of the RCP Central Committee, and Yitzhaq Arad, chairman of the board of the Yad Vashem Institute, a second Romanian-Israeli symposium was held in Bucharest on 11-13 June 1984 on the topic: "The Jews in Transylvania in the Period Between the Two World Wars and the Holocaust."

For Romania the discussion was attended by: Ion Popescu-Puturi, director of the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies of the RCP Central Committee; Dr. Livia Dandara, scientific researcher; Dr. Ion Calafeteanu, scientific researcher, and Dr. Aurica Simion, chief scientific researcher.

The Israeli delegation was comprised of: University Professor Dr. Israel Gutman, scientific director of the Yad Vashem Institute; Dr. Jean Ancel, scientific researcher at the Yad Vashem Institute, and Yad Vashem associate Professor Efraim Ofir.

University Professor Dr. Israel Gutman presented a paper entitled "The Condition of the Romanian Jews in Nazi Conquered or Dominated Europe." Showing that in World War II Jewish communities were torn away from countries in which they had lived for hundreds of years and millions of people killed, Professor Gutman stressed that "We have no right to and cannot ignore and erase these realities. It is not only their blood that compels us to it, but also the danger of reborn nazism and fascism. That is why we must educate ourselves and the new generations to know and understand the past, and must inoculate them against hatred of other people and against ideologies that cultivate hatred and war."

Professor Israel Gutman stated that the fate of the Jews was immediately decided by the type of occupation government set up by the Nazis in the various countries, which was determined, on the one hand, by the place the Nazis assigned to various nations in the racial hierarchy and, on the other hand, by political calculations. Thus, the Scandinavian nations; seen as "blood relations" to the Germans, enjoyed a more moderate occupation regime. The same happened in France: although it did not have a high racial status according to Nazi ideology, France of the Vichy regime enjoyed relative independence for a time, due to political considerations. In countries with a moderate occupation regime and in satellites like Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, the important factor was the attitude adopted by the local authorities toward the Nazi
policy in the Jewish question, and their willingness to deliver the Jews. To their misfortune, Professor Gutman continued, the Jews lived in compact masses in countries whose occupied people were not important to Nazi Germany either as racial, or as political and military factors. Thus, in Poland, which had millions of Jews, the Poles had neither influence nor opinion on the decisions concerning the Jews.

Referring to Romania, Professor Gutman said that the antisemitic laws adopted under the Goga-Cuza regime and under Antonescu "were more than a little influenced by foreign fascist pressures and by the desire to please the Nazis." However, these discriminatory measures and persecutions were seriously compounded by the Romanian reactionaries, the Iron Guard gangs, and the Romanian leaders of the time. Thus, thousands of Jews were killed in the Bucharest pogrom of January 1941 and the pogrom in Iasi in June 1941. It is to be assumed that the Nazis initiated and instigated those tragic events, but one cannot ignore the fact that local antisemitic elements were actively involved.

Discussing the Nazi plans to deport Jews to the extermination camps in Poland, Professor Israel Gutman said that those met with "energetic opposition on the part of the Romanian people and authorities, including the government and dictator Ion Antonescu... Their refusal to deliver the Jews intensified in time, and it was that resistance that saved the majority of Romanian Jews from the Nazi 'final solution...' Often, we Jewish and non-Jewish researchers in the west come back to the question of how to interpret Romania's determined and consistent refusal to deliver the Jews to the Nazis. To me it seems that that was not merely the consequence of opportunistic positions and changes on the front, but, to a large, and partly decisive degree, the result of the differences of positions and views that existed between Nazi Germany and Antonescu's Romania on the question of the Jews. Antonescu often declared his antisemitism, and so did his ministers. However, this antisemitism was rooted in national or religious hatred or opposition, and not in racial beliefs or convictions. In the final analysis, even that regime, under Antonescu's dictatorship, was not willing to participate in the assassinations called for by the 'final solution.'"

Another factor that contributed to the salvation of the Romanian Jews was—in Professor Gutman's opinion—that "while in some conquered and dependent European countries the Jews had no access to the authorities, and could not alert them and complain, in Romania one of the Jewish leaders remained in contact with the heads of the regime and with the dictator [Antonescu] himself, and those contacts had a considerable impact on the fate of the Romanian Jews in critical situations."

To that is added the fact that Antonescu managed to remove his iron-guardist partners from the government. "I believe that if Horia Sima and his gang had remained in the government or as a potential contender for the power in Romania," the author continued, "the same situation would have been created as in Hungary in October 1944, when Szalaszy came to power and Horthy became a figurehead. Had that happened, the Romanian people would have suffered considerably more than they did in those terrible times, but the Jews would have been the first victims of the Nazis."

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At the conclusion of his paper, Professor Israel Gutman emphasized that at the end of the war, "the Jews left alive in Poland and other liberated areas, who were trying to make their way to Palestine, began to move toward the south, passing through countries and towns where large and organized communities used to live. They did not find any Jews, or only a few mourning and broken ones. On their way to a new homeland they arrived in Bucharest, and there, finally, they found a lively and active community, similar in many ways to the communities that had existed before the war."

In the paper entitled "The Antonescu Regime and the Salvation of the Jews in Southern Transylvania (fall of 1942)," Dr. Jean Ancel stated that Antonescu began his ruling "imbued by traditional antisemitic beliefs, which regarded Jews as primarily an economic threat that had to be gradually removed to make room for Romanian elements. However, his intellectual baggage lacked the German racist ideas, totally opposed to the western civilization, the product of which both Antonescu and his non-iron-guardist entourage considered themselves." Along the same line, Dr. Jean Ancel noted that Antonescu's statements clearly expressed the fact that Romania's alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy was imposed by security considerations, after the events of summer 1940, and did not contain "assurances as to a community of concepts and ideology with Nazi Germany, with the principles that governed its future plans, and particularly, with its ideas concerning the superiority of certain races and the inferiority of others, with everything resulting from such concepts." The measures adopted against the Jews were based on that concept, which was opposed to the anti-Jewish solutions supported by the iron-guardists and directly borrowed from the Nazi arsenal. After the removal of the iron-guardists from the government, the author added, "Romania went through the years of national-socialist and fascist supremacy in Europe without its own fascist or Nazi party, and without any organization that had as aim the extermination of the Jewish people for being an inferior and dangerous race that had to be eliminated in order to heal the body and soul of the "Aryan" people. For that reason, the fate of the Romanian Jewry greatly depended on the extent to which the Antonescu dictatorial regime agreed to yield to Nazi pressures or to go along with them."

At the end of April 1941, Dr. Jean Ancel continued, Hauptsturmfuehrer Gustav Richter, specialist in "Jewish problems," arrived in Romania, specially dispatched by the Reich Security Bureau, Department IV B 4, which was headed by Adolf Eichman; that was when the "threat of a new plan, unknown till then to the Romanian dictatorship, the 'final solution,'" appeared. For several months, Richter worked out in greatest secrecy a specific plan for deporting the Romanian Jews to the Nazi extermination camps in Poland. According to the German documents found at Yad Vashem, the deportation of the Romanian Jews was to begin on 10 September 1942.

Dr. Jean Ancel stated that, in view of the antisemitic past of the Antonescu government—the antisemitic laws and the measures taken under them; the shooting of thousands of Jews during the military operations of the summer of 1941 in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, and the deportation of tens of thousands of other Bessarabian and Bukovinian Jews to Transnistria—the Nazis never doubted that Antonescu would "cooperate" in the implementation of the "final solution" plan to the Romanian Jewry. German documents show that in January 1942, Mihai Antonescu even gave his agreement to removing the Jews from the
areas indicated by the Germans, but no document to that effect was found with the signature of the Romanian deputy premier.

The author then highlighted the fact that, as early as September-December 1941, long before the beginning of the implementation of this plan, "Antonescu was pursuing a double policy on the Jewish question." At the beginning of November 1941, he publicly declared that "as long as I live, nothing and no one will stop me from carrying out the purification work." At the same time, however, he gave assurances to Fielderman that "the Jews of Transylvania and the Old Kingdom will not be deported." In the wake of German pressures, in the summer of 1942 the Romanian government agreed to establish ghettos throughout Romania—as an indispensable stage before deportation—and set the date of 16 June for that purpose. "On the eve of the implementation of the order," Dr. Jean Ancel specified, "without offering any explanation, the government informed the chairman of the Jewish Central, Dr. Gingham, that it has decided to postpone the plan. That was one example of the Romanians' double play in their relations with the Nazis, on the very eve of the beginning of deportations from Romania... The Germans continued to apply pressure and the Romanians adopted the old tactics of temporizing and stalling, not answering German notes, or sending answers that had nothing to do with the questions."

According to Dr. Jean Ancel, an important contribution to saving the Romanian Jews from extermination was made by converging interventions with Antonescu by representatives of the "bourgeois-democratic opposition," of business circles, the church, the royal palace, and even by members of the government. Thus, the author stated that, as soon as the German plan to deport the Jews was made known, the Jewish leadership (the Jewish Assembly) led by Chief Rabbi Dr. Alexandru Safran began energetic endeavors to obtain the support of the opposition circles against the deportations. "The success of the campaign exceeded the expectations, and it would seem that, for the first time under the Antonescu regime, large Romanian circles—political, economic, cultural, and religious—united to protest the intention of the government... The Jewish Assembly decided to establish contacts with Maniu and Bratianu in order to secure their protection against the deportations. Iuliu Maniu was at first unmoved, but after seeing a group of Jews locked in a courtyard in Bucharest prior to being deported to Transylvania, with tears in his eyes he told his Jewish aide Aureliu Weiss that he will not allow such barbarity to stain the name of the Romanian people."

The chairmen of the Chambers of Commerce of southern Transylvania sent a protest to the government about the deportation of the Jews, stating that it would considerably affect Romanian commerce and industry, and the Romanian artisans and small businesses in Ardeal and Banat because the Jewish businesses would be seized by the Germans. Another protest, inspired by Fielderman, was sent by the Ardeal Romanians—intellectuals, tradesmen, industrialists, and artisans—to the Ministry of the Interior. "Whatever we think of the Jews," the protest signatories stated, "we are Christians, we have ourselves suffered under Hungarian domination, we know how much our people suffer today under the same domination, and we shudder to think that citizens of a state may, for no fault of their own, be divested of all their property and chased away from the country in which they were born and in which the bones of their parents, grandparents, and great grandparents have been laying for centuries."
Similar interventions with Marshal Antonescu came from the leader of the P.N.I.-C.I.C. Bratianu, from Professor Dragos Protopopescu, and others. However, Dr. Jean Ancel stressed, "The Jewish circles had their greatest surprise from the behavior of the highest prelates of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Jewish Assembly hoped that Chief Rabbi Safran may obtain a cancellation of the deportations by appealing to the heads of the Romanian church. Aware of the close ties between Balan, the bishop of Transylvania, and Ion Antonescu, Safran sent word to Balan that he would like to meet with him. To his surprise, 'this antisemite,' as Safran described him, 'responded to my personal request and came from Sibiu, where he had his seat, to Bucharest to meet me. The meeting took place in the presence of General Vaitolianu, his brother-in-law, and was dramatic. After a few hours, Bishop Balan informed me that he had prevailed upon Marshal Antonescu to rescind the decision on the deportation of the Jews of Transylvania.'" In his turn, Patriarch Nicodim warned Antonescu that unless the brutal treatment of the Jews was stopped, he would resign in protest.

Another intervention in favor of the Jews was made by the royal house. "The Queen Mother," the author stated, "learned from her physician, Dr. Gomoni, about the continuing deportations to Transnistria and about preparations for general deportations and warned King Michael that unless he intervened, he would go down in history as 'Michael the Terrible.' The king called Mihai Antonescu and asked him to cancel the deportation of the philologist Barbu Lazareanu, and all the deportations from Romania."

Along the same line, Dr. Jean Ancel noted in his paper "several facts that risk being forgotten," namely the interventions made through Maria Antonescu and through members of the government. "The last to intervene directly with the marshal to preempt the second deportation order on 10 October, was the police minister, the feared Piyk Vasiliiu. In Jewish circles he was known as a terrible antisemite, but the German espionage reported that he had a Jewish mistress and maintained contacts with Jewish leaders, being 'corrupt.'" These interventions with Marshal Antonescu by representatives of internal circles, compounded by those of the governments of neutral countries and even of countries with which Romania was at war—such as the U.S. government—reinforced the decision of the Romanian government to resist the pressures from Berlin and not to deliver the Jews to the Nazis for extermination. "The day on which the trains were scheduled to start out, the Jews were not on them," Dr. Jean Ancel concluded.

Summing up, Dr. Jean Ancel stated in his paper: "Nazi Germany was mistaken in thinking that Romanian antisemitism was identical to German antisemitism. Romanian antisemitism was based on economic, religious, and cultural considerations, but was free of the German racist ideas, which viewed the Jews as "subhumans" that had to be exterminated. The problem of the deportations of the Jews from Transylvania and Banat may be seen as a first serious clash between the plans of the Nazi government and the determination of a small people. If we consider Stalingrad as a decisive event in the history of World War II, as the beginning of the end of Nazi domination in Europe, then the refusal of the Romanian government to deliver its Jews may be considered as one of the great acts of resistance in Europe, at a time when Germany was at the peak of its power, when the allied forces had lost all bridge-heads in Europe and North Africa, and when no one knew how the war would end."
"At those serious times for the fate of a Jewish community, the Jewish leadership in Romania managed to rally the broadest circles of secular and religious intellectuals of the Romanian nation for a cause that could only bring trouble on Romania, pitting it against the biggest European power of the time. The Romanians were well aware of the fate of their neighbors. The merit of the Jewish leadership is that they succeeded in turning their own problem into a Romanian national problem, alerting the government to the fact that by accepting the German plans it was renouncing whatever independence the country still had."

After the occupation of Hungary by the Nazis on 19 March 1944 and the adoption of the first measures in preparation for the deportation and extermination of the Jews, Professor Efraim Ofir highlighted in his paper on "Actions to Rescue the Jews from Northern Transylvania and Hungary Through Romania, 19 March-23 August 1944," that people, especially young members of the Zionist (halutz) movement, began seeking ways of escape from northern Transylvania and Hungary toward Romania. For that purpose, they used particularly towns in the vicinity of the border imposed on Romania under the Vienna dicta: Arad, Turda, Beius, Teius, Tinca, Timisoara, Sighisoara, and so forth. Efraim Ofir put the number of Jews that found refuge in Romania to between 6,000 and 7,000; among them, about 5,000 crossed the border at Arad, and about 1,500 at Turda.

In his paper, the Israeli researcher made a competent analysis of the factors that permitted these Jews to cross into Romania within a few months only, and focused his attention on the Turda crossing point, the second in importance in his opinion. "The Turda case," Efraim Ofir opined, "constitutes a model of organization characteristic of rescue missions at the Romanian border. In 1940, the small town of Turda had about 30,000 inhabitants and comprised, aside from Romanians, Hungarians, Saxoms, Schwabians, and Jews. The Jewish community had 800 people—250 families.

"The relations between the Romanians and the Jewish community had been good before the war. For example: Jewish refugees from Austria and Czechoslovakia used to cross through Turda after the Anschluss, and the community provided them with food, shelter, and a little money. In the fall of 1939, the leader and the secretary of the Jewish community were summoned to the security services and told to stop receiving the refugees and to deliver them to the police. The very same day, the secretary of the community, Arnold Finkelstein, returned to the security officer, who was a decent person according to him, and explained to him that the Jewish community cannot remain indifferent and deliver to the police the refugees that had been saved from Nazi persecutions. The officer let himself be persuaded and said: 'I have done my duty and have apprised you of the new orders, because the law is the law. Please act carefully and discreetly so as not to involve me and yourselves in complications that my superiors wish to avoid.' And indeed, the aid to the refugees continued under cover until the division of Transylvania and until Antonescu's ascent to power."

In August 1943, Arie Hirsch (Adler), the secretary of the Zionist-socialist youth organization "Habonim," moved to Turda. According to his own disclosures, found at Yad Vashem, he had come there "because of poor health and in order to evade forced labor." He continued his clandestine activities among
the Jewish youth of the town, despite the fact that the authorities were looking for him as a deserter. Thanks to the endeavors of the Jewish community secretary, who had friends both at the police and at the security services, "the Turda security reported that he was not in the town, although his activities had not escaped notice."

A few days after the occupation of Hungary, Efraim Ofir added, a refugee arrived from Cluj and asked Arie to organize the border crossing of the Jews. After hesitations due to his illegal status, he decided to accept, and to that end he appealed to the peasants of the villages of Feleacu and Aiton, near Turda, who had contacts across the border, to help transfer the fugitive Jews to Romania.

The operation was neither easy nor free of danger, because the arrival of the refugees often became genuine "events," known to and commented upon by the whole town. At the same time, a Nazi organization of the local Germans, led by a certain Kraus, was also active in Turda, and he was bringing pressure to bear on the local authorities to enforce the law and to deliver the Jews to the Horthyst authorities. Realizing the complexity of the situation, Arie Hirsch again appealed for help to Arnold Finkelstein and his friends among the Romanian police and security. "Finkelstein," Efraim Ofir said, "understood that the operation cannot be completed without the aid of the police and the security. He met with his friends in those bodies, explained to them the situation and the fact that he cannot remain indifferent to the fate of his brothers across the border, and solicited their assistance. Although some of them were ready to help, it was agreed that it would be preferrable for them to know as little as possible, and for Finkelstein and his friends to do their job as carefully as possible, so as not to come to the attention of undesirable elements who could implicate all of them and lead to failure. Should the refugees fall into the hand of the police, the latter would try to permit their escape, and should that fail, would transfer them to the Alba Iulia court. Only if there was no other option would the refugees be sent back across the border."

Once on Romanian territory, the Jewish refugees had to be transferred as quickly as possible to Bucharest, where their traces could be more easily lost. "The problem of transferring the refugees from Transylvania was easier," Efraim Ofir added, "because they spoke Romanian and so they could be given permits and money and sent off by themselves. More difficult and dangerous was the problem of transferring the refugees from Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, who had to be accompanied by a Romanian-speaking 'guide.' Thus, all sorts of people—soldiers, railway workers, and train conductors—were mobilized to escort the Jews to Bucharest under all sorts of pretexts: some were sent as invalids to treatment (to the Human Love Hospital), others as witnesses to various trials, to forced labor, etc. In Bucharest they were expected by members of the halutzi [Zionist] movement, who hid them in apartments and secret houses in the capital."

The paper presented by Efraim Ofir emphasized the fact that the rescue of the Jews who found refuge in Romania was possible because "the Romanian population was not hostile to the Jews. The Romanian peasants, who in the past had been persecuted by the Hungarians, had understanding for the Jews and felt hostile toward the Hungarian authorities. That is the only explanation to the fact
that a rescue operation of such proportions could be carried out in such a small town as Turda without the knowledge of the population; similarly, it is inconceivable that so many people (police and security officers and troops, railway workers, etc.) should have helped the Jews solely for "bribes." Along this line, the Israeli researcher also mentioned several specific cases of Jews rescued by Romansians from various social strata. Thus, Dr. R. Marton, former deputy in the Romanian parliament, was smuggled across the border in the trunk of the car of a Romanian diplomat serving in Cluj. In another case, a Romanian peasant from the Apuseni Mountains hid a family of Jews "because they had a soul from God," after which he walked 120 km. to ask the "pope of the Jews" to give him food for them because "he was a poor peasant and had run out of food." After 8 days, this peasant brought them across the border into Romania hid in a cart loaded with barrels.

Efraim Ofir's paper also provided interesting information concerning the decree issued by Marshal Antonescu on 16 May 1944, under which he introduced the death penalty for Jews that crossed illegally into Romania, and especially concerning the influence of this decree on the rescue of Jews from northern Transylvania. German documents show that the decree was issued in the wake of Richter's insistent interventions with the minister of justice. "Perhaps Antonescu was afraid that if he angers the Germans they may occupy Romania, but that is difficult to prove," Efraim Ofir said. The Israeli researcher noted that shortly after the decree was publicly announced, and following the interventions of Jewish leaders with Romanian authorities, it was repealed, not officially, but through word passed to police and security bodies in the border area. "I think that Antonescu's decree did not have a great impact," Efraim Ofir concluded. "First, because the rounding up of Transylvanian Jews in ghettos ended on 10 May, after which escape was extremely dangerous and only few still hoped to escape. On the other hand, it was soon cancelled, and news of that fact was sent by clandestine organizations through contact men to both Transylvania, the ghettos, and to Budapest. Rezo Rozenberger twice crossed the border illegally at Oradea Mare to urge the Jews to flee to Romania, where there was no danger for them."

In her paper entitled "The Jewish Population in the Context of Transylvania's Integration in the Economic, Social, Political, and Cultural Life of Romania (1919-1940)," Dr. Livia Dandara referred to the status of Romanian citizen de jure won by the Jews after the great unification of 1918 simply by recording on nationality lists. Enjoying the same rights as the Romanians and other co-inhabiting nationalities, the Romanian Jews actively participated in the country's political, economic, and cultural life; they had their own political parties which allied themselves to Romanian parties in parliamentary elections and sent deputies and senators to Romania's legislative bodies; Jewish students were free to enroll in both state schools of all levels in Romanian, Hungarian, or Yiddish and in private or religious schools; brilliant men of science and culture came from among those students, whose first language was either Romanian or Yiddish.

The paper highlighted the opposition of many democratic politicians and men of culture to extremist and chauvinist organizations and, at the same time, the adherence of the Jewish population to the struggle waged by millions of Romansians against aggressive and revisionist Nazism, for defending Romania's national independence and sovereignty and its territorial integrity.
The paper presented by Aurica Simion on the topic "The Horthyst Occupation Regime in the North-West Part of Romania; Policies Toward Non-Hungarian and Non-German Populations," highlighted the contents of the social-political regime promoted by the Horthyst government after the occupation of the north-west part of Romania which essentially aimed at ensuring Hungarian domination over the other nationalities by altering the demographic ratio in that area.

In the 4 years of occupation, following the theory implemented by the Horthysts, 217,942 Romanians were forced to abandon their property and move to Romania; due to this exodus and to assassinations and deportations, the Romanian population in the territories occupied by the Horthysits dropped by 16.6 percent.

Concerning the Jews, the Horthysts pursued a policy aimed at limiting and excluding them from the positions they held in economic and social life and replacing them with local or imported Hungarians. After the occupation of Hungary in March 1944, the Nazis, in close cooperation with the Horthysts, began carrying out the "final solution," deporting the Jews to extermination camps. Of the 151,125 Jews registered by the Hungarian authorities in 1941 in the occupied Romanian territories, the paper stated, over 130,000 were deported, and only those who were in labor groups and a few "exempted" categories escaped; also, over 100,000 Jews were killed in extermination camps.

In the paper entitled "The Position of the Romanian Authorities Toward the Jews in Northern Transylvania (March–August 1944)," Dr. Ion Calafeteanu referred to the attention given by the Romanian government to the evolution of the antisemitic policy practiced by the Horthyst government, totally opposed to the policy of the Antonescu regime toward the Jewish population, and extensively featured informations sent by the Romanian Legation in Budapest to Bucharest concerning the events in that country and the measures adopted against the Jews in the occupied Romanian territories. The paper presented the gradual Romanian reaction to the tragic developments in the territories wrested from Romania following the Vienna diktat: at the beginning, it offered support and protection to Jews holding Romanian citizenship, while in the last stages it tried to help all the Jews that appealed for assistance, by instructing the Romanian Legation in Budapest and the consulates in Cluj and Oradea to issue transit visas to Jews of Hungarian or other citizenship.

The symposium discussions proceeded in a relaxed atmosphere of respect for the views of the participants and for historical truth. The general tenor was one of mutual complementation of ideas on the basis of archive documents in Romania or at Yad Vashem, with a view to outlining the most faithful image possible of the events under discussion.

At the final session, the head of the Romanian delegation, Ion Popescu-Puturi expressed the view that the papers presented by the two delegations have expanded the scope of knowledge of the Jewish question—one of the great and complex issues created by World War II. For the first time in history, the complete destruction of a nation was pursued then on racial grounds. All the dregs of human society were brought to the surface for that purpose. Finally, however, the forces of darkness were defeated, but the price paid was enormous. Invaluable treasures of civilization were destroyed and tens of millions of people died.
The fate of Europe, Ion Popescu-Puturi added, depended to a large extent on the big powers. And they did not oppose fascism resolutely enough, and sought to reach agreement with Hitler at the expense of the small countries.

As for Romania, it is known that Antonescu came to power after the territorial bleeding of the country had begun. The Romanian army never was in sympathy with the Germans. Antonescu himself was an Anglophile. The alliance with the Reich was brought about precisely by the desire to stop this territorial bleeding, and in no way by any community of interests and convictions. That explains the duplicity of Antonescu's policy in his relations with the Hitlerites—noted by the Israeli historians at the symposium—which contributed to the salvation of the Romanian Jews.

In his turn, the head of the delegation of Yad Vashem historians, Professor Dr. Israel Gutman, stated that "the Jewish problem is more complex than it may appear at first sight. The approach that treats historical events in white and black is usually inaccurate. When the Jews went to Churchill and Roosevelt and described their plight, the latter answered that the best thing to do is to allow them to lead the world to victory, because victory against Nazi Germany will also be a victory for the Jews. To that, the Jewish representatives replied that the victory will come, but the Jews will no longer be alive then. That was the tragedy of the Jewry."

Professor Gutman expressed profound thanks to the institute leadership for the reception extended to the Israeli delegation in Romania. "Without understanding the language, we have felt your warmth. I want to thank you for what we have learned here. We have seen the place of the Jews in the history of the Romanian people. I think that our cooperation will continue and will expand. I hope we will reach a point where we can exchange material and publish it jointly. This nation," Professor Dr. Israel Gutman said in concluding his address, "has offered a model of cooperation, especially with us, at the most trying times. The Jewish people will never forget that, after the war, Romania was left with the largest Jewish community in Europe."

The delegations agreed to continue the relations between the two institutes and to expand the range of topics for discussion, and at the same time, to diversify these relations through new forms of cooperation.

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BILANDZIC BOOK DISCUSSES CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT OF YUGOSLAVIA

Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 85 pp 8-10, 43-45

[Interview with Dr Dusan Bilandzic, professor teaching the political system and the theory and practice of self-management in the School of Political Science at Zagreb University, by Dragan Tanasic: "The True Beginning of the Crisis"; date and place not specified]

[Text] One of the reasons that the situation today is more difficult than previous ones is that in the previous crises we always had a concentrated social energy and the sufficient size of the critical mass of that energy to manage to break the blockade. Today, however, that is lacking. Low wages and an outflow of the national resources cannot accomplish a way out of the crisis, but it can be done only through efficient production, and that requires both courage and intelligence. Dr Dusan Bilandzic is a professor teaching the political system and the theory and practice of self-management in the School of Political Science at Zagreb University. He has published a sizable number of papers and books in that field, the best known of which is "Historija SFRY--glavni procesi" [History of the SFRY--The Main Processes], which sold out 3 months after its publication. In this interview Professor Bilandzic explains the beginnings of the constitutional crisis in the mid-sixties and the political struggles over the concept of Yugoslavia's future development.

[Question] I think it is best for us to begin with your book "Historija SFRY--glavni procesi," since it examined in detail the first situations of crisis in our country. The book is a unique and ambitious undertaking such as we have not otherwise had. Without entering into an assessment, which it has already had, I would like to ask you how you personally look upon that work of yours at today's distance? Would you perhaps have written somewhat differently today?

[Answer] My book was criticized on the grounds that in it I concern myself too much with relations at the top level of Yugoslavia, and that the history of the masses is not much in evidence, if it might be so put.... That critical observation is certainly valid....
[Question] So, it is the truth that the main currents in our country, at least at that time, were decisively influenced by forums, not to say individuals....

[Answer] Well, that is by and large true. That is, a revolutionary movement, which for 20 years lived in the context of police terror, and later carried out the revolution, had to have internal relations which made it possible for it to operate in accordance with the principles of being completely outside the law. By the nature of things that gave great power to the levels of leadership. And in the postwar period that supreme command of the revolution did manage social processes for a long time, it evaluated the overall historical situation and made the decisions when a process was to be initiated and when it was to be shut off, often without consulting what is referred to as the base.

At the same time I would like to emphasize that that was in fact justified, the overall historical circumstances dictated that style of leadership. Just imagine, for instance, that in 1948 the top political leadership had allowed an altogether free discussion like a plebiscite on relations with the Soviet Union. In view of the previous indoctrination and the international encirclement, there could have been a split in what until that time had been a monolithic block in a place where that split would inevitably have threatened successful defense against Stalin's attack on Yugoslavia.

[Question] How long did the period of that kind of leadership last?

[Answer] I think the first 20 years or so of postwar development. Later things changed quite a bit, and that style of government and management of society and social processes was flagging a bit, there were many reasons why it could not continue on that way.

In any case, as to the question of whether I would have written differently.... You know, even though my book sold out in 3 months, I immediately stopped new editions because I am working on changes and additions. But I think that even today I would not alter a single major judgment about social relations and processes. I would probably just put a different color on certain processes, if I may put it that way.

[Question] Give us an example?

[Answer] Well, I would probably say something more about deformations in the postwar period, those which happened in rural areas, related to the collectivization, since the book merely observes that the CPY began collectivization in rural areas and that it began to lead to resistance on the part of the peasantry to the policy of the party. I did not elaborate in any detail.

Second, for example, I did not sufficiently substantiate the position of jurisprudence in that time: to what extent it was an instrument of the executive power, and the executive power, as you know, operated in the manner of a revolutionary dictatorship. There is also a need for detailed presentation of the reasons why the top political leadership judged in 1954 that self-management
in Yugoslavia was a process that had been basically completed, that the bureaucracy had lost the historical battle against self-management, and that therefore it should hold back in the social reform which began in 1949. After all, our first and greatest social reform after the war was the reform which began in 1949 and ended in 1954. This was an attempt and the first breakthrough in conception and in practical politics to get out of the statist structure.

[Question] In the discussion of Miric's book "Sistem i kriza" [The System and the Crisis] you said to those attending the meeting: "I will impart to you a piece of information about a discussion in the early sixties which was strictly confidential, and even today has the status of strict confidentiality. That information might be used to attack Tito, Kardelj and Bakaric, but it might also be used for a grand eulogy concerning their historical wisdom."
What discussion was that, and what was it about?

[Answer] I must make a correction both in your question and in my statement in Zagreb. At the time, in what I might say was the heat of the moment, I said that it was strictly confidential. However, that is not what it was about, there is not any document whatsoever. Rather it concerns several meetings of the top Yugoslav leadership which were not strictly confidential in the sense that this is usually understood, but rather those meetings of the Executive Committee, as is still the case today, were relatively exclusive, and they can be revealed only after a certain period of time has passed.

[Question] You said in Zagreb: "The headiness of the success of Yugoslavia's social development had led to certain things which had begun to disturb the sensitive minds, especially Tito and Kardelj," and you emphasized at the same time that that optimistic vision was based on fundamental facts. Why then should it have disturbed anyone?

[Answer] It was true that a bloc of revolutionary forces headed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had carried out a triumphant revolution and that those forces, carried away with that triumphal success of the revolution, had renewed the country in record time by European standards. Then there came the successful defense of the revolution against attempts to threaten it first from the West, here I am referring to the borders, the emigre community outside, and the like, and then there followed the still more epochal victory of the communist movement over Stalinism. For the first time in the history of the world communist movement a national party, in this case, the CPY, had created an alternative to state socialism, that is, to state capitalism, as it was termed at that time at the 6th congress. After all, as you know, the Soviet Union was judged not to be a socialist country, but a state-capitalist country. And that powerfully, mightily increased the self-confidence of that revolutionary bloc of ours. Then came what we refer to as the Yugoslav economic miracle, that period when Yugoslavia from 1952 to the mid-sixties, along with Japan, had the highest growth rate of industrial output in the world. The first phase of industrialization in fact was carried out in that period.

[Question] Do you think that it was optimally carried out?
[Answer] Well, it was carried out with the methods of primitive accumulation. But it should be borne in mind that one of the motives of the revolution was to open up large room to the development of the physical and productive forces which the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had not managed to do. That industrialization had created a new working class, created a technical intelligentsia which we had almost not had at all. At the same time deagrarianization was carried out, and a million people moved from agriculture to industry and the cities. All of that together opens up a view to the future and creates an optimistic vision such as we had not experienced up to that time.

[Question] I will repeat my question: Why should such spectacular results have disturbed anyone?

[Answer] No, we are not talking about those reasons yet. At the beginning of the sixties there began within the bloc of the forces of the revolution what was actually a barely noticeable differentiation, barely incipient, over the issue of whether that social system which had achieved such splendid success should be retained as it was, or whether the conditions had matured for it to begin to be transformed in the direction of the realization of self-management, first of all in economic terms, and then in political terms as well. That is, the results had been spectacular, but at the same time there was already the 1958 Program of the League of Communists, and even before that a conception of self-management shaped especially at the 6th congress, that is, an ideology which was suggesting that the system should be changed. Even in the top political leadership a thesis was developing to the effect that we were coming historically closer to the moment when the performances of the system of that time would begin to fall off and die out and there was a need to change the system so as to facilitate still greater development. That was the reason, I repeat, why a differentiation came about within the top Yugoslav leadership. One part of that leadership felt that Yugoslavia had not emerged from the statist-Stalinist planning model.

[Question] Who were those who represented that belief?

[Answer] Well, for instance, the most pronounced was Kardelj, Bakaric and Mlentije Popovic, and Mijalko Todorovic and Tempo thought similarly, or almost identically.... To be sure, there were some differences among them, but the view that they held in common, Plavi and Tempo and all the others, for example, was an absolute decidedness to the effect that centralistic planning had to be abandoned, since regardless of all the changes made since 1949 and up to the 1965 economic reform, almost all accumulation had been in the hands of the state. That is why they were warning that the government was not developing the productive forces in the right way, it was not undertaking development of the economy from an optimum viewpoint, it was not giving consideration to productivity, but was obsessed with what today we call investomania.

[Question] Was that kind of thinking also influenced by the fact that at the beginning of 1961 we had a lull, a drop in output, which is in fact why the mini reform was adopted?
[Answer] If today you read the documents from that time, you will see, for example, that Milentije Popovic in that famous address of his, at that time he was, I think, the general secretary of the Federal Committee of the Socialist Alliance, was presenting the conception of this vision: in the domain of the economic system we have to put an end to the elements of state socialism, which lay in the fact that the government determined the proportion of distribution of the national income into accumulation, government expenditure and social service expenditure, and that economic organization should be liberated so as to take all of the accumulation into their hands. In short, that collectives should be completely free in division of the newly created value into the fund of personal incomes and the fund of accumulation. Milentije Popovic said that the laws which the Assembly adopted in 1961 related to the mini reform represented a revolutionary act equivalent to the decision to introduce self-management in 1950. He said that it definitively did away with two categories on which state socialism and capitalism had existed: profit and government profit. A large room to maneuver was opened up in that way for the independent initiative of work collectives, which only then were liberated from statism, to develop an unprecedented creative initiative and to develop the physical and productive forces.

At the same time, there was a thesis in the Central Trade Union Council that if we had achieved a rate of industrial growth of 10 or even 14 percent, that we could raise that rate even further with a new reform. However, before that reform even took effect, as you yourself said, in the spring of 1961, the Yugoslav economy fell to a growth rate of 4 percent. That was a third of what it had been earlier.

[Question] But it dropped because of certain other reasons, as far as I know....

[Answer] Absolutely, it dropped in part because the Yugoslav economy was at that time left without any sort of additional imported resources, those inflows of nonrepayable credits from the West had been cut off. And it was now living exclusively on the national accumulation. So, that drop in industrial production created a great alarm at the top, and then that reform, in 1962, was annulled.

[Question] In view of what you have said so far about that chorus that was demanding in unison that a barrier be erected to the strengthening of the state and in particular that its decisionmaking on the surplus value of labor be prevented, why, then, in the 1963 Constitution was the power of the Chamber of Producers in the Federal Assembly to decide on the federal budget already being restricted. The 1974 Constitution completely abolished that chamber. Wasn't that an act that actually definitively facilitated the domination of politics and moved the role of the producers to the margin, whereby emancipatory flows which could logically have developed only if the producer could also decide on the distribution of the newly created income were frustrated?

[Answer] You know, this can be understood only if you realize that the federal supreme command over the economy, which was anchored in the Federal Executive Council, was allocating the national income, was carrying out the
distribution among branches and groupings, and it was even determining the specific investment projects, while the Federal Assembly had almost no influence on that at all. It more or less accepted that without any sort of discussion. So, at that time we could have had in the Federal Assembly any chamber you like, let it be a Chamber of Producers, or without it, the supreme command of government in the Federal Executive Council was making the decisions on everything.

[Question] But wasn't there an awareness at that moment that this was actually an extremely statist form of behavior which the sociologists analyzing that period have defined with the phrase: "Theory was traveling on the road, but practice was cutting through the woods"?

[Answer] On the contrary. Those individuals whom we have mentioned were exceedingly aware that that was statism. And more than that. They explicitly emphasized that this was the statist model both of accumulation and allocation and that it did not square with the ideological conception of the development of society in Yugoslavia along the lines of socialist self-management. That was the absolute conviction of that group.

[Question] So what or who prevented them from putting an end to the statist forms of operation?

[Answer] Another group which did not accept that conception and which was not part of the economic supreme command, but was located at other points in society, specifically in the central apparatus of the party, in internal affairs, while in other institutions it was actually passive.

[Question] You are referring to Tempo's statement about the talks with Rankovic?

[Answer] Yes, that is exactly what I was thinking of. Tempo said, as you recall, that when he went to see Rankovic and when they asked him what he thought about the economic units and asked for the party to become involved in that discussion, he answered: "Those issues have not been sufficiently cleared up, and the party should not enter into matters which have not been cleared up." That group of people, I would like to emphasize, should not be regarded as a faction in the organizational sense. But it believed in its bones, though nowhere did it spell it out publicly, that nothing should be changed in the system. So, that could have been the reason why the preparations were not made.

[Question] But the people who held that belief and that Comintern way of thinking were moved off the political scene at the Brioni Plenum....

[Answer] Let us get this straight, I have already said that this was not a group, but there were such people in other institutions as well. I will confirm this by telling you something which will perhaps surprise the public. Vladimir Bakaric, one of the leading protagonists of the view that the economic system had to be altered radically, said that he had immense difficulties persuading the Central Committee of the Croatian party to undertake the
economic reform. Why? Because in the Central Committee of the Croatian party there was a mentality, some people say a syndrome, a very hard mindset to the effect that socialism meant a centralized organization of society. Abandonment of that system, as they saw it, led to uncertainty. The top leadership of most of the collectives, especially the large ones, was also of that way of thinking. They had an almost panicky fear of the market mechanism. Accustomed during the 20 years that the government structure had been furnishing them capital, that is, fixed and current capital, provided them with a market, in short, covered all the risks which meant that it would also pay for all their possible failures, they offered immense resistance to changes of any kind. And if I dare to be so harsh, I could tell you that compared to the thinking of those middle-level personnel, that group of top-level politicians which was demanding changes in the system was in the absolute minority. That is why through all of 1963 and 1964 there was an effort to reaffirm the ideas of the 6th congress by pushing away and overcoming that statist outlook as the preparations were made for the 8th congress. The latter congress signified degovernmentalization of the economic system. I think that only the immense prestige and authority of the leader of the revolution were able to break down the resistance to changes in the economic system.

[Question] I think that we have cleared up to some extent that type of problem which was disturbing the top political leadership. You defined the other in the following words: "Even a 1959 directive of the Executive Committee of the LCY Central Committee had a warning about assimilation of ethnic minorities. The thesis emerged in that connection that the end of the nationality had come, that an ideological campaign should be undertaken to create a Yugoslav nationality." Who advocated such a thesis?

[Answer] When I said that the social system had achieved spectacular results in the economy, and when Yugoslavia broke away from its Balkan humbleness and rose up "in the sky toward the clouds," people began to be aware that the nationality question had been settled once and for all and that the republics were beginning to be disturbed by a wholesome development of that kind, Kardelj argued with the advocates of those ideas in his preface to "Slovenacko nacionalno pitanje" [The Slovenian Nationality Question], in 1957 and expounded the view quite clearly and decidedly that that idea actually contained the idea of hegemony based on the powerful state, and that it could result in disruptions among the nationalities of Yugoslavia. However, Kardelj's position did not have any particular response, that is, it was not particularly noted.

[Question] You say that the 1963 Constitution was based on two entities: on the Federation and on the enterprise. If that is so, how is it then that the republics could chop away and block the effort of the Federal Executive Council?

[Answer] Here is how: At that time the commune system was already functioning, every party director from 1955 up to the mid-sixties (read, say, the documents of the 7th congress, the speeches and articles from that time) constantly warned that localism and particularism were the principal political deviation in Yugoslavia. And it consisted of a fever on the part of the local
bodies of leaders, a fanatical pressure of every Yugoslav city and town to build some little factories of its own after completion of the phase of what was referred to as key capital construction. So, these local bodies of leaders were expending all their efforts to obtain at least seed money from the federal investment fund in order to build some fairly large project of their own in their own commune. That kind of massive initiative spoiled the conception which the federal supreme economic command had for building the economic structure in Yugoslavia. That is one thing.

Second, in the early sixties, when a historical period in Yugoslavia was coming to an end, the republic centers began to display two tendencies. On the one hand, each one was fighting to get the largest possible share of the federal budget, that is, from the Federation. And that also blocked the effort of the federal authorities. Another form of resistance lay in the fact that the republican bodies of leaders were manifesting a desire to take over for themselves a number of decisions which had previously been made by the Federation.

[Question] Can you illustrate that with some example?

[Answer] The leading man of one republic, he was in fact Jako Blazevic, said in a meeting of the Federation: "We consent that out of the total capital which we are investing in the federal fund that 80 percent be returned to us. Let those 20 percent remain in the Federation, but that which comes back to us let the Federation leave it to us to determine what we will build according to our own situation, our own needs and our own plan, and let it stay out of that."

[Question] It did not occur to the bodies of republic leadership that that would degenerate into autarky and duplication of capacities within Yugoslavia?

[Answer] We can only speculate about whether they thought of that or not. The bad thing and what is now obvious is that they did not take that into account.

[Question] Now let us concern ourselves with your assertion that the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo had been practically eliminated at that time. To whose advantage and how, if the republics were not recognized as social entities?

[Answer] As far as that is concerned, it is a completely erroneous thesis that the provinces were placed in a subordinate position at that time because they were provinces. Not for a minute. That was the same position in which the republics and the provinces, and the communes and also the enterprises had been placed, since that was a centralized system which had its own logic of operation. Accordingly, no special policy was conducted toward the provinces because they were provinces, but rather all sociopolitical organizations from the Federation on down were equally treated in that regard. That is why I would not say that there was any special discrimination, but rather that the Federation was centralized as a whole.
[Question] Does that then mean that KOMUNIST did not accurately interpret what you said in the discussion in Zagreb?

[Answer] You know, we have to derive things from the system. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the republics at that time were independent, and the provinces were not. Neither was independent. The entire policy from 1945 up to the mid-sixties was neither pro-Serb, nor pro-Croat, nor pro-Slovene, nor pro-Macedonian, but it was a globally centralized--don't say "centralistic"--system.

[Question] But this was somehow interpreted in the public, you see, especially at the Brioni Plenum, that up until that time a policy had been conducted favorable to Serbia.

[Answer] I think that is an oversimplification. In the final analysis the 4th plenum did take note that there had been deformations.

[Question] I am interested in your opinion as to whether the 4th plenum furnished an accurate interpretation of the true state of affairs. I am not referring to the role of the police at that time, but to relations in the Federation.

[Answer] Well, during one period of time, it is hard to say when it began and when it ended, it was stated at the 4th plenum and immediately after it in all the documents that the Serbian leadership had decidedly adopted the thesis that the policy in Kosovo had certain deformations with respect to the Albanian population.

[Question] You know, professor, that only thorough research work can penetrate such phenomena as the ethnic awakening of a nationality.

[Answer] As far as that goes, the fathers, if I may so put it, of the Yugoslav Federation had a single conception, a vision which goes beyond the limits of Yugoslavia. On several occasions the question was raised in the top Yugoslav leadership: what sort of policy to conduct toward the ethnic minorities within the country and what sort of policy toward ethnic minorities in neighboring countries. In the late fifties a vision was shaped which was probably predicated upon these theses: first, both our own borders and the borders of Europe are definitively established. Yugoslavia dare not conduct a policy based on allusions to any sort of changing of borders.

If that is so, and it is, we have to conduct a policy in which the Yugoslav Federation is so organized within that any nationality, should it want to enter that formation in the future, could enter it without any fear that its identity would be threatened. It was decided at the same time that the ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia should be afforded the possibility of communication toward neighboring countries where their parent nation is located. Only in that way, it was felt, would Yugoslavia obtain in return the opportunity for the nationalities of Yugoslavia to communicate with their own ethnic minorities in neighboring countries. And it was also believed that over a lengthy period of time a situation would come about in which national borders would be
more or less technical lines which everyone would cross when and how he pleased. That, then, is a vision, perhaps it even contained certain elements of what remained of that Balkan Federation or confederation. In short, there was a desire to make the borders in the Balkans bridges to all nationalities in order to create the most stable situation in this geopolitical space.

[Question] That is certainly a vision of things placed in the context of civilization. However, there was no discussion of the Serbian ethnic minority, say, in Hungary or Romania.

[Answer] There was one meeting led by Kardelj in which that was discussed, but the emphasis was on the position of the Macedonian nationality in Bulgaria and Greece, the Slovene and Croat minorities in Austria, and relations between Albania and Yugoslavia. The emphasis was put on these other nationalities, mainly because Albania and Bulgaria were conducting a far more nationalistic policy than their predecessors—the bourgeois governments. That is why our hope of "establishing bridges" proved to be illusory and did not yield the anticipated results. In actuality this was a more or less one-sided bridge-building effort.

[Question] How, then, are we to understand your statement that at the 7th congress or some other meeting Tempo said that relations between Serbia and Montenegro could be treated as a case of annexation? Tempo was a revolutionary, an intellectual and a lawyer and he certainly knew what the word "annexation" meant.

[Answer] You know, Tempo did not say that. Rather, in what we might call the course pursued until that time of maintaining and strengthening the centralized system, there was an effort toward a certain unification in the sense of a firmer linkage, if we can so put it, between Serbia and Montenegro.

[Question] Are you referring here to that statement by the Central Committees of Serbia and Montenegro about economic and cultural cooperation?

[Answer] Exactly. And then certain politicians put a rather serious coloring on that....

[Question] Which politicians?

[Answer] Well, there were several of them who spoke about that. Even Rankovic spoke that way.

[Question] About annexation?

[Answer] It was another politician who said that, I would not like to reveal that now, there is no point in arousing any animosity at this point. The top leadership debated that and concluded that in the Yugoslav Federation no republic could build a policy of special relations with any other republic by-passing the Federation.
Yet those elements are honored even by international law, and special, what is referred to as "privileged treatment," is given to such states or nationalities.

Not only that, but in the late sixties encouragement would be given, precisely by the top federal political leadership, to the effect that many problems in Yugoslavia could be resolved by direct agreements among individual republics. In other words, legality, not legitimacy, would later be given to communications between the individual republics. It was even said that if two or more republics had special economic and cultural interests, not only could they arrive at agreement to resolve social problems, but it was even desirable.

Since we are already talking about specific relations and the status of the individual federal units, I would like to hear your opinion about why both the party and the state were instituted later in Serbia than in the other republics, and the establishment of the state has not been completed.... The party rank and file, for example, can demand that an extraordinary congress be convened in all the other republics, if it finds it opportune, this can be done even by about 80,000 members of the League of Communists in Kosovo or 120,000 in Vojvodina, I do not know exactly how many there are, without consulting any other league. Yet the 680,000 members of the League of Communists in Serbia cannot do this unless Vojvodina and Kosovo, that is, their leadership bodies, concur. This was related by Stole Jankovic at the 35th Meeting of the Serbian LC Central Committee in 1981, after the disorders broke out in Kosovo.

I also heard that. I carefully read the discussion of that meeting, and I wondered whether that was really the case. But first I would like to say this: never throughout the postwar development was there actually an initiative for an extraordinary congress in practice, not even a reference to one. Nowhere and on no occasion.

Why are the present endeavors of the Serbian leadership to organize the operation of both the government and party bodies as in the other republics arousing suspicion and an avalanche of charges of unitarianism and centralism.

That, you know, is that mentality of ours and a syndrome. If an initiative is taken, say in Serbia, then certain other communities put the question: And what is hidden behind that? But if any other republic persistently demands that some other initiative be taken, then in Serbia they ask what those people are after in Zagreb or Ljubljana or Skopje or Sarajevo?

Who were the advocates of the ideas about rejuvenating the leadership in the sixties?

Rankovic was at that time the chief of personnel, but that was actually resolved upon in unison at the top. The decision to begin rejuvenation of personnel was adopted immediately, and that change brought a very young age group into the orbit of politics in all the republics. At the beginning Tito, of course, supported the rejuvenation of the leadership in Yugoslavia,
believing that this was the decent and generous thing to do and that it was in
the interest of social development. However, a segment of that young genera-
tion entering the high forums radicalized the thesis of the need to remove the
old personnel even where perhaps certain people should not have been removed.

[Question] What ideas crystallized in the context of the political struggles
at that time?

[Answer] The forces polarized over the nationality question and over the di-
rection of development of the economic and political system was to take.
Put simply, it looked like this: one current advocated an economic system
based on full operation of the law of market value and commodity production,
similar to the systems in the modern Western countries, except based on social-
ized means of production, that is, without the bourgeoisie. The other current,
which was represented above all by our principal leaders of the revolution,
felt that creating a market economy that would function on a market for capi-
tal, labor and everything else, inevitably led to creation of a new social
stratum of technomanagers. Once they got the economic power, it was believed,
you would take over social development as a whole and would thereby threaten
the development of self-management. Bakaric was to say at the Congress of
Self-Managers: "They tell us that we achieved progress with the economic re-
form. And I say that progress was in the direction of the capital relation.
So, that is the difference."

[Question] Was that fear that the technomanagers would take over the reason
why the top political leadership negotiated a change of direction and actually
did away with the 1963 Constitution?

[Answer] I have said that one of the motives was the belief that without com-
modity production, without developing market relations, it was not possible to
create an efficient economic system, nor was it possible to build self-manage-
ment autonomy for enterprises in Yugoslavia. Accordingly, it was felt that
the economic system had to be altered rather radically.

[Question] And the political system?

[Answer] The thesis was uttered in no uncertain terms, especially in Kar-
delj's detailed report, that the position of the Executive Committee of the
LCY Central Committee, which had only changed its name, but had continued to
operate as the Politburo, was the bottleneck in Yugoslavia's entire system.
Kardelj said that the political structure of Yugoslav society was set up in
such a way that all the most important decisions were made by the Executive
Committee, and therefore the federal government was in actuality not a govern-
ment, but some kind of executive arm of the Politburo and that the government
did not dare to act independently, but sought the blessing of the Politburo
for every decision, nor was the Federal Assembly a federal parliament. That
is why we have to make certain changes: for example, so that the federal gov-
ernment can propose to the Federal Assembly a certain development policy, and
so that the Federal Assembly without the blessing of the Politburo can refuse
to accept the government's conception and can name another government. And
the other way around: so that the government can openly say to the Assembly:
"We are not in a position to do what you are asking of us." And to submit their resignation. The same applies to the Socialist Alliance, to the republics and all the sociopolitical bodies.

Later, in 1966, he was to say this: We cannot work things out by carrying out certain small coups d'état from time to time and changing bodies of leaders so as to guarantee the operation of the system. Unless, he said, we work out the problem of the political system, in the masses and in the public we will be facing a tendency toward a multiparty system, since even the Socialist Alliance is not playing the role it ought to play as an open democratic organization. To conclude: he resolutely advocated changes in the political system.

[Question] One theoretician has recently said that Tito's political instinct failed him at that time, since he did not sense where these constitutional changes would take us. What do you think of that observation?

[Answer] In the mid-sixties there was agreement as to conception on the reform of the Federation and the reform of the market mechanism for the conduct of economic activity. However, because of the initial deviations in the first years of commodity production, in the minds of the leaders this began to take shape as a danger of the capital relation, so that the channel for development of commodity production was in large part blocked off, while this other channel—the reform of the Federation—was taken to the end.

As for the question of Tito, I have a somewhat different approach to the entire matter. In his writings Miric has used me as a witness to the effect that Tito's physical strength began to weaken in the mid-sixties, that is, at the time when the constitution was adopted, so that he was not able, if it can be put that way, to follow in all respects the shaping of the conception and the implementation of the constitution itself. But I would like to emphasize is that the basic course adopted in the constitution was Tito. In what sense? Along with others he devised that course long ago, in the mid-sixties. So, if we want to clear everything up, then we have to say that the constitutional changes were not influenced by a mass movement, as has often been said. Why do we emphasize that? Because the public has come to believe that since the constitutional changes, that is, the 1971 amendments (and 1974 only confirmed 1971), occurred at the same time as the climax of the mass movement. The thesis has accordingly been fostered that the mass movement exerted pressure toward enactment of that kind of constitution. That is not historically correct, since 5 or even 6 years earlier the platform, that is, the basic course for reform of the Federation, had already been agreed.

[Question] I am interested in why Tito, Karđelj and the others did not use their authority to prevent that separation of Yugoslavia after the 1974 Constitution?

[Answer] Tito issued warnings, but he did not have enough power to prevent the investomania and those deviations which occurred in the mid-seventies, when all the structures in Yugoslavia began frantically to take additional capital from abroad, hoping overnight to develop to the level of the European countries and in that way to strengthen their legitimacy within their own
communities. As for Kardelj, in the last years of his life he spoke about this with great sadness. When they would consult him about many things concerning economic development, he would answer: "Please, I have told you a dozen times that things are going wrong in development policy. Don't come to ask for any more of my advice if you are not going to take it." With respect to the reform of the Federation, however, he was completely convinced that after the leaders of the revolution left the scene that would be the greatest stabilizer of relations among the nationalities of Yugoslavia. That was his deepest belief.

[Question] You have seen that in the last issue of our newspaper we raised the topic of who after the departure of Tito, Kardelj, Bakaric, Milentije Popovic and similar figures, who possessed certain charismatic attributes, could today conceptualize the future?

[Answer] The supreme command of the revolution which as a practical matter led this country since 1941, or, if you like, even earlier, was an organic product of a monolithic revolutionary political bloc. That bloc was very massive, very strong and relatively monolithic at its highest point. This was a supreme command, a political leadership that is basically inimitable.

In my opinion, it is unthinkable that a center of that kind would take shape now, with almost unlimited power, in the political and legal sense. All human power is limited at the present time. Consequently, the power of the government and the power of the State Presidency are also limited by a number of power relations within the country and by the international situation.

You see, even that top political leadership was not omnipotent, as is often thought. On occasion, following decisions, it was known to retreat under the pressure of the balance of power. For example, it did not succeed in taking a firmer, stronger and more lasting posture in carrying out the economic reform. Or again, it was not sufficiently successful after adoption of the 1974 Constitution and the Law on Associated Labor in compelling a mass of operatives, from a few hundred thousand people in positions of leadership, to attempt to carry out that conception consistently with so that it would be seen to what extent it actually was in line with reality, and to what extent it was not, but rather it itself departed here and there from its own conception.

[Question] Do you feel that the heirs who lack the aura of the historical figures, precisely because they are less assuming, will be able to assimilate more easily the creative energy of others and thereby adopt more optimum programs?

[Answer] Opportunities are opened for better and for worse with the departure of that supreme command of the revolution. I think that it is more difficult to arrive at decisions, but I think that in a way they will be more appropriate to the new times. So, let us not put either a plus sign or a minus sign in front of them, but rather let us say that they will be more in harmony with the relations in society, and perhaps also with needs. I think that reality and experience will compel bodies of leaders to take a position concerning particular social problems and that the joint policy will be defined
through conclusion of agreements, whether it takes a long time or a short time to reach.

[Question] Many people feel that our present crisis is more complicated than any since the war. What do you feel about that?

[Answer] Well, it probably is. Today we have many outstanding problems, such as the economic system, changes in the political system, the foreign exchange system, relations between the advanced and the underdeveloped, and then there are also the debt, unemployment, the drop in the standard of living, and so on. No agreement has been reached as yet for many of these problems. That is why the future holds for us a serious test, and only when agreements on them are reached that applied to the long range will we then be able to say that we have emerged from the post-Tito period in the sense of commencing a new phase of development.

I personally do not believe in any large and spectacular changes. Following Tito's death, in 1981, I even wrote an editorial in NASE TEME in which I said that we had entered a period of slow changes in which a pragmatism which need not always be a bad thing would be more evident.

One of the reasons that the situation today is more difficult than previous ones is that in the previous crises we always had a concentrated social energy and the sufficient size of the critical mass of that energy to manage to break the blockade. I therefore am afraid that the transition, to use motoring language, threatens to brake the engine in shifting from first to fourth speed. In any case the way out of the crisis and the inclusion in modern currents of civilization cannot be accomplished by means of low wages and an outflow of the national wealth, but rather through high technology and efficient production. And that requires both courage and intelligence.