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WORLDWIDE REPORT
ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: Possibility for Agreement Exists With Effort
(Vitaliy Kobysh; Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 12 Feb 86) .............................................. 1

USSR: Initiative 'Shatters' Military Threat Thesis
(M. Kiryan; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 Jan 86) .......... 3

USSR: 'Special Mission' Awaits Europe in Initiative
(G. Dadyants; Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 13 Feb 86) .............................................. 7

IZVESTIYA Editorial Article Contrasts Soviet, U.S. Attitudes
(Moscow IZVESTIYA, 18 Feb 86) ........................... 10

USSR's 'Top Priority' Program on U.S.-USSR Relations
(Vladimir Posner, et al.; Moscow to North America, 17 Feb 86) .............................................. 13

USSR's 'Top Priority' Program on 'Splitting' of U.S., Europe
(Vladimir Posner, Radomir Bogdanov; Moscow to North America, 10 Feb 86) ................................... 18

Moscow TV's 'Studio 9' on Gorbachev Arms Proposal
(Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, et al.; Moscow Television Service, 25 Jan 86) ................................... 22

IZVESTIYA Editorial Article Examines Gorbachev Proposal
(Moscow IZVESTIYA, 20 Feb 86) ........................... 36
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'International Situation: Questions and Answers' Program 14 Feb</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 14 Feb 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR's Weekly 'International Observers Roundtable' 9 Feb 86</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Gennadiy Ivanovich Gerasimov, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 9 Feb 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorbachev Interview in L'HUMANITE</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorbachev Arms Proposal</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of the Union Address</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR's Weekly 'International Observers Roundtable' 16 Feb 86</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich Bovin, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 16 Feb 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Feb: PRAVDA Review of Week's International Events</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Vladimir Mikhaylov; Moscow PRAVDA, 9 Feb 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Feb: PRAVDA Review of Week's International Events</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Vladimir Bolshakov; Moscow PRAVDA, 16 Feb 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELATED ISSUES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR's Troyanovskiy Makes Statement at UN on Arms Race</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Moscow TASS, 13 Feb 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Writer on U.S. Naval Strategy for Nuclear War</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Valentin Falin; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 24 Jan 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZVESTIYA: Nonuse of Force Pact 'Sabotaged' by U.S., UK</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(V. Soldatov; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 18 Feb 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR's Admiral Amelko on Turning Indian Ocean Into Peace Zone</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N. Amelko; Moscow PRAVDA, 16 Dec 85)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR: Play on Missile Crisis Shows Wisdom, Compromise</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Moscow Television Service, 10 Feb 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'International Situation: Questions and Answers' Program 7 Feb</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sergey Pravdin, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 7 Feb 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorbachev Arms Proposal</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress at MBFR Talks</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS Pact</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow TV on Increased Military Spending in U.S.</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Aleksandr Zholtker; Moscow Television Service, 10 Feb 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USSR: French-West German Military Links Expanding
(V. Gusenkov; Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 15 Feb 86)...... 83

USSR Article on Coping With Electro-Magnetic Pulse Effects
(V. Lavrenyuk; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Aug 85)......... 86

USSR's Grachev Interviewed on Disarmament, Austrian Role
(Andrey Grachev Interview; Vienna VOLKSTIMME, 14 Feb 86).............................. 88

Gorbachev Introduction to Greek Edition of Works
(Mikhail Gorbachev; Athens RIZOSPASTIS, 16 Feb 86)....... 90

Briefs:
Netherlands-USSR Ministries on Disarmament 92
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: POSSIBILITY FOR AGREEMENT EXISTS WITH EFFORT

PM11555 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Feb 86 p 9

[Vitaliy Kobysh "Observer's Opinion": "The Challenge of the Era"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev's answers to questions from L'HUMANITE constitute another
in the whole series of documents of great political importance put forward by the
Soviet leadership in this particular period in the life of mankind.

The answers touch on a wide range of problems in both our domestic life and in inter-
national life. Profound and, at the same time, sharp and extremely frank judgments
were given on each of them. Everyone of the problems thus illuminated merits close
attention and detailed discussion. We are taking just one of them as the subject of
this column.

In his answers to L'HUMANITE's questions M.S. Gorbachev dwelt on the challenge thrown
down by the age and the need to answer it in a worthy fashion. That challenge, as the
CPSU Central Committee general secretary observed, is a dual one. On the one hand, it
is linked to the fact that Soviet society has entered a new stage in its history. On
the other, it flows from the unfortunate fact that human civilization has created
extremely efficient means of self-destruction. "For the worst to happen does not even
require unprecedented stupidity of criminality," M.S. Gorbachev stressed. "It is
enough to act as people have acted for millennia -- to rely on weapons and military
force and on occasion, use it in resolving international affairs. It is these millen-
nial traditions that we must now ruthlessly break and renounce for good."

What has been said may look to some people (bourgeois propaganda most often presents
things this way) like utopia, like a romantic dream. In reality, it is the only
possible formula for mankind's survival in our age. The impossibility [nevzmoznoost]
of nuclear war is, in fact, even recognized (in words, alas, not backed by actions)
by the U.S. Administration. Does this mean that the problem is no longer so acute and
that we will soon be embarking on something that has never been done before -- the
destruction of nuclear weapons together with the sharp reduction of all other types
of weapons and the shutdown of laboratories and enterprises working on the militari-
ization of space? No, it doesn't. One day it will come -- it cannot fail to come,
otherwise all of us people without exception will disappear -- but we are going to
have to fight for it desperately.

Yes, we are optimists and we believe in good sense -- in particular, we believe that
the proposals set out in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January statement will be assessed cor-
rectly by the U.S. side and we will eventually receive an appropriate answer to them.


But we are not lulling ourselves or painting rosy pictures. The age dictates, it is true, but that does not mean we are suddenly going to start reaching agreement with the Washington leaders about everything right away.

Let us ask two interconnected questions. What is the United States? And what does it mean to reach agreement with it? As to the United States: According to official statistics, this year the number of U.S. millionaires will reach 1 million. A million millionaires! A rich country? Yes, very. And a very poor country at the same time because, in addition to that marvelous million, there are 40 million people (U.S. trade union figures) living in the same country who vegetate in permanent poverty. The country's politics and its public opinion are naturally determined by that million who have plenty and who hold the power.

Can we reach agreement with that million on matters which concern good and evil, justice and honor? We have too different a way of looking at many important and serious things.

By way of a most recent example, I might cite the events occurring in Haiti, which are almost like a movie or a play in terms of drama and explosive expressiveness. Even before reading Graham Green's "The Comedians" we were aware of the baseness and the bloody bacchanalia being perpetrated on that island. We were also aware that the tyrant Duvalier clan with its Tonton Macoutes was able to torment the Haitians only because it enjoyed the protection of Washington. It used to be the same in Nicaragua, except that there the U.S. pocket puppet-bandits bore the Somoza family name.

Now Haiti's time has come, I can clearly see the books, films, and plays of the future describing in every detail how Duvalier was flown out by U.S. military transport to a refuge somewhere in France. Let us see what official Washington will now do in Haiti and how soon it will recover from the shock and horror and start to blame Marxists --- Soviet, Cuban, and yet others --- for everything that has happened.

Here is a vivid example of how we look at life in different ways. In our country, when they learned about what was happening in Haiti, people boiled over and burned with hatred. In the United States not only those with power, but those who just had plenty looked on the unhappy island with complete equanimity.

So, is there no hope of reaching an understanding? It depends. M.S. Gorbachev talked about it very simply, without unnecessary metaphors or uncritical [dezhurnyy] optimism, in his answers to L'HUMANITE. The possibility of reaching agreement exists. On the main, fundamental problem which has already been mentioned and on which we are still divided by a gulf. Without building any illusions, however, it is possible to imagine how both sides can strive -- not immediately, obviously, but by insisting and bargaining -- to overcome the gulf and fill it with a mutual understanding. The nuclear danger threatens both the 40 million U.S. paupers and the 1 million millionaires equally.

These are harsh words, but realistic and I hope they will be taken as such. Because it must be understood that M.S. Gorbachev's answers to the questions from L'HUMANITE continue in the most practical way to blaze the trail toward the kind of understanding outlined in the 15 January statement.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: INITIATIVE 'SHATTERS' MILITARY THREAT THESIS

PM051015 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 31 Jan 86 Second Edition pp 2-3

[Doctor of Military Sciences Lieutenant General M. Kiryan article under the rubric "Policy of Peace Versus Policy of War": "In the Interests of the Peoples' Security"]

[Text]: The package of major new foreign policy initiatives put forward in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and above all, the concrete program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere by the year 2000, aroused a tremendous response throughout the world. Soviet people, our friends abroad, and progressive mankind regard the statement as a very important, crucial document in the struggle of the CPSU and the Soviet State for a lasting, universal peace and as a vivid expression of the Soviet Union's readiness and determination to actively develop and strengthen the "spirit of Geneva." The Soviet Union, the USSR Supreme Soviet's appeal to the U.S. Congress notes, has for the first time in the history of the nuclear age put forward a detailed, concrete program, with precise calculations as to time, for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere.

The statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, confirms again and again that the course of peace and disarmament is the pivot of the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. This document of historic significance endows the party's programmatic tenets on its international policy with concrete content and fully accords with the draft new edition of the CPSU Program -- the party's main theoretical and political document.

The draft new edition of the CPSU Program expresses in its entirety the Soviet concept of establishing peace on earth and formulates clearly and specifically the fundamentals of the party's international policy. This document demonstrates our party's broad approach to international affairs and its ability to look reality in the face without prejudice, to assess events objectively, and to react flexibly to the demands of the moment.

This broad, realistic, considered approach is particularly necessary in conditions where a very dangerous trend has emerged in the policy of the major capitalist states. The practical actions of imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism, cast an increasingly clear light on the nature of this policy: social revenge on the basis of achieving military superiority over socialism, the suppression of progressive liberation movements by force, and the maintenance of international tension at a level permitting its initiators to justify in the public's eyes the creation of more and more new types of mass destruction weapons and the militarization of space.

The practical actions of imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism, cast an increasingly clear light on the nature of this policy: social revenge on the basis of achieving military superiority over socialism, the suppression of progressive liberation movements by force, and the maintenance of international tension at a level permitting its initiators to justify in the public's eyes the creation of more and more new types of mass destruction weapons and the militarization of space.
The Soviet Union resolutely opposes this policy and the attempts to forcibly halt and reverse the course of history. In relations with the capitalist countries the CPSU proceeds on the basis that the historical dispute between the two opposing social systems can and must be resolved by peaceful means. Our party firmly and consistently upholds the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. The policy of peaceful coexistence presupposes, first and foremost, the renunciation of war and the use of the threat of force as a means of resolving disputes and presupposes overcoming such disputes through talks.

With a view to ensuring lasting peace and security for the peoples, the CPSU and the Soviet State do everything necessary to break the vicious circle of the arms race and take every opportunity to bring about a change for the better in the course of international events.

The Soviet Union proposes a comprehensive package of measures to close all avenues of the arms race -- in space or on earth, for nuclear, chemical, or conventional weapons. Our proposals on this score are well known.

At the same time, the Soviet Union is adopting appropriate measures to ensure the reliable defense of socialist gains and strengthen the country's defense capability. Here too, there are specific warnings. Thus, the draft new edition of the CPSU Program points out: While the danger exists of imperialism unleashing aggression, military conflicts, and provocations of various kinds, unremitting attention must be devoted to strengthening the USSR's defense might and reinforcing its security. The CPSU, the document goes on to say, will make every effort to ensure that the USSR Armed Forces are at a level such as to exclude strategic superiority for the forces of imperialism.

The establishment of military-strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and the NATO bloc was an historic achievement for socialism. It consolidated the position of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, and all progressive forces and thwarted the hopes of imperialism's aggressive circles for securing victory in a world nuclear war. The preservation of this equilibrium, the draft new edition of the CPSU Program notes, is the major guarantee of ensuring peace and international security.

Our position on this question was set forth at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva: The Soviet Union is against changes in the strategic balance. The U.S. President was told quite clearly that the Soviet Union will find a reply to the U.S. Administration's attempts to obtain military superiority. It will be an effective response; quick enough and probably less costly than the U.S. program.

However, aggressive imperialist circles, especially U.S. circles, which are in the grip of a desire for world domination, are unwilling to reconcile themselves to military-strategic parity. Fabricating and exploiting the myths about a "Soviet military threat" and their own supposed laggardness in the military sphere, the U.S. Administration steps up efforts to attempt to achieve strategic superiority. Here the extension of the arms race to space is brought to the fore. The United States is embarking on the implementation of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), which in effect means the siting of strike weapons in space. It is consequently a question not of defense, but of the creation of conditions under which the United States, or so they think, would be able to attempt a first nuclear strike without fear of retaliation. It is a question of inserting an arms system into space which could give its possessors the illusion of invulnerability and be a motive encouraging the unleashing of aggression.
Hopes of invulnerability and impunity are, of course, unfounded. The possibility of creating an "absolutely impenetrable space shield" is precisely nil. Nonetheless, the work on these weapons in itself constitutes a threat to the existing military equilibrium and increases the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. That is why the Soviet Union and the world public actively oppose the space militarization plans.

With a view to attempting to take the heat out of the antimilitarist actions of the planet's peace-loving forces, the U.S. Administration is making desperate efforts to conceal from the peoples the true aims and nature of its SDI program, making out that strike weapons in space are designed to make nuclear arms unnecessary and that the elimination of nuclear weapons can be approached through the creation of qualitatively new arms and their deployment in space.

But building a policy on this calculation is an irremediable mistake. If strike weapons are placed in space, the nuclear arms race, far from being stopped, will develop with unprecedented force and proceed in the most dangerous directions.

The Soviet Union believes that the most radical solution to the problem is the total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere.

The world public now awaits a concrete response from the U.S. Administration to the Soviet Union's large-scale peace initiatives. But official Washington's initial reaction to them itself causes involuntary alarm. While welcoming the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and expressing the hope that the Soviet proposals are a useful next step in the nuclear arms reduction process, U.S. President R. Reagan completely avoids the question of fundamental importance -- that of preventing the creation [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of space strike arms. Nor does the U.S. President touch on this question at all in his statement in connection with the fourth round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms which has begun in Geneva.

Moreover, other official Washington spokesman, in particular Pentagon chief C. Weinberger, express themselves clearly and quite definitely on this problem. He stated frankly that there will be no shifts in the U.S. position on the SDI program. The United States will continue to implement SDI, U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz echoes him.

At the same time, the Soviet side has said extremely clearly that nuclear arms reduction is only possible given a mutual renunciation by the Soviet Union and the United States of the creation [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of space strike arms and that the creation of space strike weapons will eliminate hopes for nuclear arms reduction on earth. Conversely, preventing the arms race from spreading to space means removing the obstacle to deep nuclear arms reductions.

Putting a padlock on the resolution of the problem of space means not wanting to stop the arms race on earth. Not for nothing are the supporters of the nuclear arms race also zealous supporters of the "star wars" program. These are two sides of the same policy, a policy hostile to people's interests.

The imperialist adherents of this policy are far from understanding that mankind is at a crucial stage in the new space age. That it is time to renounce the Stone Age way of thinking, when the main task was to provide yourself with a bigger stick or a heavier stone. What is needed now are new approaches, a new way of political thinking,
a keener sense of responsibility for the people's fate. The Soviet Union's material and intellectual potential is sufficiently high to ensure the possibility of creating any weapons if we are forced to do so. But as M.S. Gorbachev's statement says, we are fully aware of our responsibility to present and future generations. It is our profound conviction that we must enter the third millennium not with the "star wars" program, but with large-scale projects for the peaceful exploration of space using all of mankind's forces.

The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to the siting of weapons in space. It also proceeds on the basis that it is impermissible to submit to the elemental forces of the nuclear race. This idea permeates the entire Soviet program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. In the context of the measures put forward, the Soviet Union has adopted an important decision and extended its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions for 3 months.

This moratorium has been in force since 6 August 1985. The U.S. ruling circles have had enough time to join it.

But official representatives did not take that step and have still not done so. Moreover U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger has stated: "We consider it important for us to continue tests according to plan" with a view to modernizing strategic arms. By testing more and more new nuclear devices, the U.S. side continues the pursuit of the impossible dream of military superiority. This is a futile and dangerous policy. A policy unworthy of the level of civilization which modern society has reached.

The Soviet Union's new large-scale peace initiatives are based on the principle of equal security for all. They are not detrimental to anyone's interests. They contain no attempts to outwit or beat the other side.

By proposing a concrete, phased plan for the reduction and ultimate total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere by the year 2000 and calling for the nonmilitarization of space, the elimination of chemical weapons, and the coordinated reduction of conventional arms and armed forces, the Soviet Union shatters the false thesis of the imperialist ideologists about the "Soviet military threat."

The Soviet Union has never set itself the goal of achieving military-strategic superiority. It has followed and follows today the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence, which is determined by the socialist social system and our morality and philosophy. The Soviet Union consistently advocates the renunciation of war as a means of resolving international questions and smooth, correct interstate relations based on true respect for international legal norms.

The Soviet proposals contain a just approach to present-day problems; they embrace all the means which make up the correlation of forces and they make it possible to take into account the volume of the nuclear threat which really exists for each side, regardless of how and from where the nuclear charges are delivered to their territory — by missile or plane, from the other side's own territory or that of its allies.

In its policy our party is guided by the fact that, however great the threat to peace created by the policy of aggressive circles of imperialism, world war is not a fatal inevitability. The CPSU is approaching its 27th congress with a concrete program for further progress toward communism and for the struggle for peace and international security. Preventing war and protecting mankind against catastrophe — it sees this as the historic mission of socialism and all the planet's progressive and peace-loving forces.
The old cities of Europe differ from each other. It is hard to draw parallels between the Grand Place in Brussels and the Place de la Concorde in Paris, between the Acropolis in Athens and the Kremlin in Moscow. But it is not for nothing that Budapest is called "little Paris," and Stockholm the "Venice of the north."

Europe — West and East — is not just a unified architectural and cultural ensemble. It is united by the hill of Waterloo and the fields of Borodino, by the ovens of Majdanek and the ruins of Oradour-sur-Glane, and by the memorials to war victims in Vologograd and near Verdun. Nowhere in the world are there so many mass graves as in Europe. European soil is soaked — in the full sense of the word — in the blood of its people.

Let us say right away that the ideological and political split is a natural phenomenon for Europe. For it was right here that first the Bastille and then, the Winter Palace were taken. It was here that the historic dispute between two sociopolitical formations — capitalism and socialism — began. But today's military confrontation has been imposed on Europe from outside.

Europe is now crammed — in the full sense of the word — with missiles with nuclear charges, each of which could wipe from the face of the earth an entire city with all of its ancient cathedrals, unique picture galleries, and the millions of people inhabiting it. The "security" presented to Western Europe by the United States means life on a powder keg to which the fuse has already been attached.

The United States has not only intimidated Western Europe with the imaginary "threat from the East." With the help of false, unscrupulous anti-Soviet propaganda it is trying to efface from the peoples' minds the memory of whom they owe their liberation from fascist barbarity to. This propaganda is successful. Many young people who live in Boulevard Stalingrad in Paris know nothing about Stalingrad. They judge the Russians by watching U.S. movies like "Red Dawn" on theater and television screens.

Why is a considerable part of the new Soviet peace initiatives advanced in M.S. Gorbachev's statement addressed directly to Europe? Because it is not just nuclear missiles that have been building up here over the past 20 years. Experience with peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation has also been building up in defiance of the missiles. At first glance it is paradoxical, for example, that the FRG — where
a large part of the missiles targeted on the Soviet Union are concentrated -- has become the USSR's top trading partner in the capitalist world. And France, where anti-Soviet hysteria is particularly strong, had a special relationship with the Soviet Union for many years and, by all accounts, is not averse to reviving it now.

I have visited many countries in Western and Eastern Europe, worked in France for several years, and met with ministers and with presidents and general directors of major West European industrial corporations. Of course, they were capitalists who do not recognize our ideals and, what is more, who doggedly struggle against them. But I have never heard a single anti-Soviet attack from the lips of a "businessman." This dirty work has been farmed out to the mass misinformation media working under U.S. licenses.

If we look more deeply, two trends with regard to the Soviet Union are now fighting each other in Western Europe, as in the years preceding World War II: The class instinct pushes the bourgeoisie toward zoological anti-Sovietism, while national interests push toward cooperation with the Soviet Union.

All the anti-Soviet scribbling in which the right-wing French press, which has been bought up en masse by Hersant, engages cannot hide the fact that it is only thanks to cooperation with the Soviet Union that France has been able to pursue a policy independent of the United States in the international arena. Let us recall that General de Gaulle made his historic visit to the Soviet Union in 1966 immediately after he withdrew France from NATO's military organization.

It is significant that, however hard people tried to frighten Europe with "Soviet tanks," which could supposedly take Paris with a single strike, it was precisely in Europe that the process of international detente began in the late sixties and early seventies. The Moscow treaty between the Soviet Union and the FRG, the "Principles of Cooperation Between the USSR and France," and a number of other documents signed during those years laid the foundations for the Final Act of the Helsinki CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. The "10 commandments" of European peace still serve as an example of new thinking, new political psychology, and a new approach to problems of international cooperation.

What must be done today to rid Europe of the fear of nuclear war and the mistrust being fanned among its peoples?

It is hard to say what Europeans fear most now -- the Soviet SS-20 missiles with which they have been intimidated or the U.S. Pershing-2's which have been imposed on them. The Soviet Union proposes ridding Europe of all nuclear missiles -- at the very first stage. It is precisely these missiles, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his replies to L'HUMANITE's questions, that seriously undermine European security. Do we not have a right to count on the realism and prudence of British and, of course, French policy in this question?

One of the favorite arguments of opponents of ridding the continent of nuclear weapons has always been the claim that Western Europe would then be left "defenseless" in the face of the, allegedly, "far superior" Soviet conventional armed forces. But the proposals advanced by M.S. Gorbachev also concern conventional arms -- their significant and balanced reduction under strict international control [kontrol]. Any other questions, gentlemen?

No, there are no more questions. What is needed is answers -- answers to the point.
The U.S. TIME magazine has been forced to state that the Soviet leader's proposals have been "drawn up so as to at once please many inhabitants of European countries who are alarmed at the nuclear missiles deployed on their territory or targeted on them." The Soviet plan, THE WASHINGTON POST acknowledges, "opens up the prospect of allaying Europe's nuclear anxieties."

In all probability, what is good for Europe is not very good for the United States. Having recovered from the initial shock, NEWSWEEK magazine tries to persuade Western Europe that the Soviet proposal is "fraught with deadly danger for it." It incites Britain and France, in particular, to refuse to accept the proposal for a "freeze" on their nuclear arsenals. In its cynicism NEWSWEEK goes so far as to say that the abandonment of nuclear weapons... "can bring Europe only total non-nuclear war." The same old story -- about how Soviet tanks will burst into Paris -- begins all over again.

It is not so simple, it turns out, to abandon the customary logic of confrontation, what the French call "esprit de clocher" -- looking at the world from one's own low bell tower.

The Soviet proposals give Europe a unique opportunity to become a continent of peace and international cooperation. What is more, as M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, a special mission -- the new building of detente -- could fall to Europe's lot.

There is no need to say what broad horizons of cooperation would in that case be opened up before all European peoples and before the two parts of Europe, which have always complemented each other not only in the cultural sphere, but also in the economic, scientific, and technical spheres.

The Soviet Union has concluded economic, scientific, and technical agreements with a number of West European countries for the period right through the next millennium. But has anyone in the West calculated what benefits the establishment of official relations and business contacts between the EEC and CEMA will bring to the European peoples? Neither the United States nor Japan possesses such strong economic, industrial, raw material, scientific, and technical potential as Europe could possess if all-European cooperation could be arranged.

In drawing up its plans for "star wars" today, the United States is thoughtlessly risking the fate of world civilization, whose cradle is Europe. It is essentially pushing Europe onto the path of self-destruction, turning it into a battlefield for a war which it will be unable to survive. It is the duty of all Europeans, despite the differences which exist among us, the different ideology, and the different views on basic human values, to save modern civilization from the catastrophe which threatens it. Today this, too, is Europe's special mission.
IZVESTIYA EDITORIAL ARTICLE CONTRASTS SOVIET, U.S. ATTITUDES

PM171635 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Editorial article: "Action Must Be Taken!"]

Just a few days remain before the opening of the 27th CPSU Congress whose decisions will lay the foundations for a qualitatively new stage in the development of Soviet society and the further comprehensive activation of the USSR's peace-loving policy. By a UN decision 1986 has been declared International Peace Year and is designed to be a year of struggle for peace, a year of serious discussions on the nature of peace and measures for strengthening it. It was at the beginning of this year that, for the first time in the history of the nuclear age, the Soviet Union put forward a broad, specific program of innovatory spirit for totally liberating mankind from nuclear weapons by the start of the third millennium. The coincidence of such major events is symbolic in its way -- the struggle for the consolidation of peace and for radical headway in the laborious business of disarmament is today receiving unprecedented political impetus.

It is possible to ensure lasting peace and man's survival under present conditions only with the complete elimination of the gigantic nuclear arsenals. This idea is obvious. But something else should also become obvious to all: The elimination of nuclear weapons is inconceivable with the militarization of space. That is why, M.S. Gorbachev has said, "The prevention of the transfer of the arms race into space is regarded by the Soviet Union as a fundamental condition for preserving mankind."

It would be an oversimplification to believe that Washington is only thinking of how to press the nuclear buttons as quickly as possible. But it would be even more of an oversimplification to think that it is not preparing to do this given suitable conditions. It is preparing -- and strenuously. All they have to do is ensure their impunity, the Pentagon strategists and their high-ranking political patrons believe: to ensure it not only by lengthening the nuclear sword, but also by deploying an antimissile shield over the United States. This must be done so that everything looks decorous: The United States is allegedly shifting to a strictly defensive strategy.

The Soviet Union rejects this dangerous concept for safeguarding security. It is the concept of an arms race, which has never yet ensured lasting peace. It is the concept of not only preserving, but also further rapidly building up high mountains of nuclear weapons and therefore, of intensifying the threat of nuclear annihilation.

The Soviet Union proceeds here from the premise that in the 21st century mankind must start off not from the "star wars" platform, but from the "star peace" platform combined
with the complete absence of nuclear weapons on earth. Our country also proceeds from the premise that immediate and radical measures are essential and that a coordinated, comprehensive program aimed at eliminating forever, within an historically brief period, the threat of nuclear death looming over mankind is necessary to prevent a world nuclear-space catastrophe.

The Soviet Union has put forward such a program. As early as this year it would be possible to begin its implementation in order to free the peoples from the fear of a nuclear catastrophe. If, of course, there is a desire, above all on the part of the United States, to do so; desire of a principled order — the readiness to coexist in a nuclear-free world, under a peaceful sky and space, to cooperate for the sake of progress on our planet, and to jointly ensure a reliable system of security for all.

The question of a military space is not a technical, but above all, a political question.

Some specialists across the ocean could spend a long time arguing about what percentage of the other side's warheads would penetrate the United States through the antimissile shield. But it is clear even now that, in any event, this "percentage" will be enough to destroy U.S. civilization. Others could discuss the function of this shield, attempting to ascertain how far it can be defensive. But it is clear even now that this shield, used in conjunction with the aggressor's sword and guided by his hand under the new conditions of the scientific-technical revolution, could be a weapon of unarming [obezoruzhivaniye]. Finally, one can argue about what degree of universal and national security there will be if the shield has two sides or, conversely, only one side and how effective a countermeasure will be to neutralize the space shield or how effective a counter-countermeasure will be. But there is scarcely any need for special proof that if the United States begins wide-scale ABM cover for its territory, the Soviet Union will take appropriate countermeasures. Something else is also clear: The strategic arms race will assume an unprecedented pace and dimension. Following the buildup of shields there will be a buildup of means to overcome them in order to retain the possibility of nuclear retribution; even if the U.S. side never has any need for this retribution, because war will never emanate from the Soviet Union.

The disputes will continue even further. But you should not believe that the truth will be revealed by the scientific research work being done in the United States in the field of space ABM defense. To expect such a "truth" means coming to terms in advance with the fact that the United States will start to deploy space strike armaments. That means acknowledging that the USSR's call for new military-political thinking cannot be supported because the avalanche-like process of military rivalry is allegedly insurmountable. No, our country opposes this assessment of the situation and resolutely advocates breaking down the "logic" of the arms race.

The Soviet Union believes that it is truly criminal to waste time under conditions when the pace of the arms race is outstripping that of talks. Time is now too precious and for that reason, the most favorable atmosphere possible must be created at disarmament talks. The adoption of the nuclear disarmament program proposed by the Soviet Union with its nuclear, and other aspects would make it possible to add to mankind's account the undoubted bonuses of the Soviet proposals: the establishment of clearly defined routes and guidelines, the fixing of concrete deadlines for reaching and implementing accords, and the attribution of direction and purposefulness to the talks. The adoption of this program would make the U.S. Administration's statements on its commitment to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons definitely sincere, instead of merely ostentatious.
The alternative to this rational approach is extraordinarily dangerous and there must be a special realization of this now that the world is on a dangerous nuclear and space brink. If the improvement and buildup of nuclear armaments alone in the seventies began threatening particularly forcefully to destabilize the strategic situation, the combination of these actions with the additional space element in the eighties will increase the danger of destabilization many times over. With the further development of that combination -- and that would be inevitable since the arms race process would become irreversible -- mankind would lose control of the solution to the problem of "to be or not to be." The U.S. desire for military superiority, which is a constant factor, could then be implemented more quickly and limitlessly. And that threatens catastrophe. The Soviet Union urges the renunciation of thinking in terms of military strength, which leads to catastrophe. Observable restraint in the military sphere is the best proof of the USSR's readiness to work toward nullifying all armaments.

When calling for radical disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union does not believe for a moment that U.S. agreement with the historic Soviet initiatives would cause the differences between our countries to disappear.

No, we are realists. The rivalry will remain in different spheres because the two sides belong to opposite sociopolitical systems. But this rivalry must not be permitted to develop into military confrontation at any stage. The systems' advantages must be demonstrated in peaceful spheres and only in peaceful spheres.

By all accounts such an approach has still not prevailed in Washington. The U.S. Administration's attitude to the new Soviet proposals is still not uniformly positive. There has still been no official response to these proposals. It is hard to say how thoroughly and from what viewpoint the Soviet initiatives are being studied across the ocean, but the process of this "study" has already gone on for an unseemly length of time. The world does not need subterfuges, pretexts, or propaganda statements on questions of peace and disarmament, it needs practical deeds. To achieve that, the leadership of all countries must rise above national egotism, tactical strife, and disputes and break with traditional ideas about the unshakable priority of building up military strength. In our age these ideas are tantamount to agreeing to national suicide. Peace and international and national security can only be ensured on the basis of political measures and by consistent and large-scale disarmament. Everyone must recognize that this is the axiom of the nuclear and space age. But even that is no longer enough. It is necessary to act energetically and purposefully so that survival prevails forever over the threat of annihilation.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR'S 'TOP PRIORITY' PROGRAM ON U.S.-USSR RELATIONS

LD172331 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 17 Feb 86

[The "Top Priority" program presented by Vladimir Posner with Dr Radomir Bogdanov and Dr Sergey Plekhanov from the United States of America and Canada Institute in Moscow]

[Text] [Posner] Today let's look at one of these issues that usually are discussed in times of strife and also in times of what would seem to be like better relations and that is -- it is almost like a reflex -- what's good for the Russians is bad for the Americans, what's good for the Americans is bad for the Russians. And certain people are now looking at the proposals that were formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev from that approach: If this is what the Russians want then it's not very good for the Americans.

[Bogdanov] I'm sorry Vladimir, did you put it in affirmative terms or as a question? Because I had this feeling that it might be taken both ways. What is your position about it?

[Posner] I don't want to give you my position. What I'm saying is that the position of the people in the States who say this is: What's good for the Russians is bad for the United States. Do we agree with that?

[Bogdanov] Ya. In other words it's a zero sum gain. That's very, very well known, you know, definition of that situation between USSR and United States, which is to my mind very wrong. By the way, we talk about now, about the new dimensions of the thinking in foreign policy matters and I believe that that's exactly what is new in our thinking; that is that there's no zero sum gain in the Soviet-American relations. I mean to say that in the nuclear era, or to be more precise in the nuclear cosmic era -- and I believe that should be used now, not nuclear but nuclear cosmic era -- there is no zero sum gain. There is nothing more dangerous than that in our relations.

[Posner] Now if we look at the recent message on the State of the Union that was delivered by President Reagan I think we have to say that there is still a very strong thread there of security through power, through force, through military might. And if you look at what the Pentagon has been asking for -- something like an 8 percent increase in the military budget -- again it's a repetition of this view. In other words, security through force. And going back to the initial statement about what's good for the Russians is bad for the United States, that would almost seem to be a reply to Mikhail Gorbachev's offer to do away with nuclear weapons by the year 2000 over a three stage period. How do you feel about all this, Dr. Plekhanov? What is your opinion?
[Plekhanov] Well I think that is a clear example of obsolete, dangerously obsolete, thinking and of some very, very misleading notions about the nature of Soviet-American relations. I think it is about time that both sides really thought seriously, and I know for sure that I've thought about it seriously and I would like it if both sides did that. About the question. Is it good for one side to see the other side weakened, damaged, undermined, (?)subverted. Can it be useful? What gain can it bring?

Unfortunately there is a very deeply ingrained tendency in American political thinking to assume almost unthinkingly and automatically that, well, you know, the Soviet Union is so bad that whatever is done to undermine and damage it must be good for the United States. But nobody really questions the basis of this assumption and the basis is very faulty. The assumption is wrong and it is based on some very misguided ideas about what communism is all about, what peaceful coexistence is all about. There have been mountains and mountains of lies amassed over the period of the cold war and unfortunately the short period of detente in 1970 was not enough in order that we, you know, reduce some of that backlog, which (?I was) thinking of. You know in the last few years we've seen a revival of cold war thinking and I think it's not incidental that the policy is made by those people whose thinking was formed precisely in the period of the cold war and they find it very difficult to get out of that straight jacket, to have a fresh look at what's going on in the world. They prefer to cling to the old notions and they are captives of the obsolete doctrine.

[Posner] Looking...look at the proposals once again. As you recall we offer to do away with all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and there are some people who say but in reality that's a very clever game because the Soviet Union has an enormous, enormous edge in conventional weapons so the whole idea of doing away with nuclear weapons is really a ploy through which the Soviet Union can then get a military advantage.

[Bogdanov] I would rather say that there is a ploy from the other side. I'm sorry for that, that word. You know why? You know why there is a ploy from the other side?

They take a part of Gorbachev's statement in which it is said that by the year 2000 no more nuclear arms and therefore they don't talk about the other, relating to that, proposals of very important nature. For instance they don't mention that in the same statement there is a very substantial part devoted to conventional forces. It is said in that statement that there is a real progress in Vienna talks, there is a real progress in Stockholm talks, dealing exactly with conventional problems. And we went very far suggesting that on-the-spot inspection, that some other inspection, be open for that in conventional field, number one. Number two: we are going as far as suggesting that we propose to pay very special attention to the so-called conventional arms, which are becoming not less dangerous than the nuclear arms. And we suggest banning all the dangerous conventional arms and we are open for discussions on the strength of conventional forces. But let me state for the record that people telling about the edge in conventional forces on the Soviet side they are not very fair people. I'm sorry to say they are not honest people.

You take the so-called central front. You know, central Europe -- the central front -- where the military forces -- NATO and Warsaw Pact -- are head to head. And if you are fair enough you will see that our central forces and NATO's central forces are almost equal. There is some differences with some categories but on the whole they're balanced.
And number three, the overall balance between Warsaw and NATO is almost the same. NATO has something like 5 million people and we have something like that, even less than NATO has. But you know to be more sophisticated, to be more, you know, smart in that, what they say now, they say OK the Soviet side may have really equal numbers of soldiers, equal numbers of this or that but, they say, they are very smart people, that in western, parts of the Soviet Union, in western military district, they have very big advantage over the NATO because they can mobilize their forces quicker than NATO do and things like that. I have no time to discuss this matter just point to that. You know they have just a chain of, you know, of things very falsified figures, very false, and I believe that, Vladimir, one of our meetings with our American listeners we should devote to that point by point discussion and try to explain to them that there is no truth in all that.

[Posner] But by all means.

[Bogdanov] By all means, you know. But that what you have mentioned, that's very important. So I feel that there is a very big fight around this stake. Sometimes, I should admit, it's very honest, you know, honest worry, honest question. Honest, you know, willingness to discuss. But sometimes, Vladimir, I'm sorry to say, you come across the same lies to the same distortion of the truth and I object to this very much.

[Posner] After November, the Geneva meeting, there was a lot of talk about the spirit of Geneva, a very wonderful thing, and yet as I acquainted myself with President Reagan's State of the Union message, there were certain thoughts and certain ways of expressing them which to me begged the question: Just how much attention is being paid to the spirit of Geneva? Allow me to quote the President. He said: We have devoted 5 years trying to narrow a dangerous gap born of illusion and neglect and we have made important gains. Yet the threat from Soviet forces, conventional and strategic, from the Soviet drive for domination, from the increase in espionage and state terror, remains great.

Now in view of Geneva and the meetings he had there how does this sound to you? How are we to look forward to the development of the spirit of Geneva and this spirit perhaps getting a little bit of bone and meat on it and becoming body? How do you feel about that, Dr Plekhanov?

[Plekhanov] Well I am sorry that the President made that statement. It is no different from what he has been saying all along. I think that it's clear that rhetoric like this is used in order to obtain a certain amount of federal expenditures for a continuing military program, the military buildup, the SDI, the nuclear rearmament, what have you. Actually this is the only way that one can hope to continue the military buildup, by invoking the specter of the great big Soviet threat. This is the function or role of the Soviet threat in American politics, in American government. So it's no surprise that he is talking about that. But, you know, obtaining money for military expenditures and maintaining this psychosis about the Soviet Union is one thing and dealing with the real world and with the real dangers that exist in that world is another. In Geneva President Reagan came perhaps the closest to facing the real world and I guess that there are people around him who are afraid now that maybe the President has seen too much of the real world and they are doing whatever they can to...

[Bogdanov interrupts] I think that is very important point you are bringing up on that matter.
[Plekhanov] They are just trying to pull him back into the old ideological shell in which he spent so much of his time. And, you know, therefore I think it is very important that the dialogue that was started in Geneva continue and, er, because that's one way that one can expect a more advanced thinking, and more realistic approach.

[Posner] Right, a final question to you on this issue. Let us imagine that indeed the Soviet threat -- I put that in quotes -- were to disappear, that reality would become obvious, that it would be seen that there is no need for this kind of huge military expenditures in the United States. Would that indeed be bad for somebody? In other words I am asking perhaps, indeed, what's good for the Soviet Union is bad for some parts of America?

[Bogdanov] Well I understand what you are aiming at Vladimir, you mean the so-called military-industrial complex. By the way, that definition was not produced by us. I just remind that to my American listeners.

[Posner] No, President Eisenhower, yes.

[Bogdanov] President Eisenhower, so we have nothing to do with that definition but somehow we accept it because we feel there is some truth in it. I do not belong to people who, you know, professes the theory of conspiracy, some military-industrial complex conspiracy, something like that, but of course when you spend on the so-called defense billions and billions, when the Reagan administration spends within several years over 1 trillion bucks on military defense...

[Plekhanov interrupts] ...1.2 trillion.

[Bogdanov] ...1.2 trillion, yes, yes Sergey, so of course you have a number of people interested in getting this money.

[Posner] Bread and butter issues, yes?

[Bogdanov] A bread and butter issue for them.


[Bogdanov] Even caviar, oh yes Vladimir, and a lot of caviar by the way, a lot of caviar. So of course they would be interested in that and they are not to my mind, they are not nationally-minded people because they are very...they are caring about the immediate interest and they don't make a conclusion what does it bring back to America in the sense of reducing American security. And to my mind, you know, that's the responsibility of the American ruling elite or whatever it be, you know, to control all that, because sometimes at this end we have an impression that military-industrial, and I would add to that academic complex, which is to my mind is not less dangerous than military-industrial because they supply academics, they supply all, you know, ideas how to use military weapons, nuclear weapons, you know, because it is not less dangerous than to produce them. So that is their business, you know, to control this. But as I told you at this end we have, sometimes we have, an impression that it's going out of control, becoming uncontrolled and I understand why. More billions, more trillions to spend, more, you know, unstable you make the whole business.

[Posner] All right, er, yes. Dr Plekhanov?
I would just add a few things on this point. I met a young journalist from Massachusetts the other day and he was all enthusiastic about what military spending is doing to the economy of New England. He said, well, you know, if you saw it you would be very impressed, all those high technology orders coming from the federal government, and so on and so forth. I understand the people who are helpless before the argument of those who are saying that, well, you know, guns are good for the American economy, they keep the jobs, they allow the corporations to get richer and so on, that's capitalism. But I think one should ask a question: Is a military program the only kind of high technology spending that is open to high technology corporations in the United States? Why can't we, and I mean the Soviet Union and the United States, think up joint projects of space exploration which would demand even more advanced kinds of technology and would provide millions of people with new jobs and corporations with new orders. Why can't all those high technology firms think about, if it doesn't matter to them on what to spend their money, if it's just profits, why can't it be used productively?

Well I think that you've thrown out a few thoughts for our listeners today, serious thoughts that should keep them busy for at least a week, so I want to thank both of you for participating in today's program. This is Vladimir Posner saying goodbye to the panel and to "Top Priority" until a week from today at the same time.
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR'S 'TOP PRIORITY' PROGRAM ON 'SPLITTING' OF U.S., EUROPE

LD101619 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 10 Feb 86

["Top Priority" roundtable discussion presented by Vladimir Posner, with Dr Radomir Bogdanov, deputy director of the United States and Canada Institute; and Dr Sergey Plekhanov, of the United States and Canada Institute]

[Text] [Posner] Hello everybody and welcome to Top Priority. On the panel with me today: Dr Radomir Bogdanov, Dr Sergey Plekhanov, both of the prestigious USA and Canada Studies Institute. Your host is Vladimir Posner. Today we'd like to look at an issue that is being discussed a lot in Europe and that is whether or not, and some people say definitely yes, the Soviet proposals as formulated in the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev are aimed at splitting Europe and the United States, making them part company as it were; whether this whole idea of phasing out nuclear weapons has many insidious sides to it, one of which is, again, making Europe and the United States butt heads and part company. Radomir?

[Bogdanov] When I hear all that, and you hear all that from different quarters you know, and people are very noisy about that, I have a very strange feeling, you know, that I would like to put it the other way around. People cry about us trying to divide USA and Western Europe. They mean something very different, you know, they are just trying to divide us from Western Europe, you know [laughter in background] and please, don't smile, don't smile, I mean it because there is very strange feelings now in America. It's a kind of a fear that there is some rapprochement, there is some, you know, easing of tension on European Continent. Mind you, I use the definition of European Continent because, you know, geography, you cannot try to talk just like that, and geography is very clearly stating that we, the Soviet Union and Western Europe, not only Western, I would put it like that rather, Europe as a whole, they are on the same continent. They are living very close to each other. At the same time you have a problem with the USA which is the distance, again geographical problems, something like 10, even more, 12,000 kilometers dividing us from USA. Isn't it natural that we are worried about our relations with Western Europe? For instance, isn't it unnatural that USA is worrying about their relations with Mexico, with Canada, with some other countries laying very nearby to the borders of the USA and we don't object it. No, we understand the reality, number one. Number two: Well, if I say that I am very happy that America is in Europe with their troops, with their bases, with their forward-based systems, you would not believe me.

[Posner] No, I would not. I would not, no.
[Bogdanov] I am not, of course, I am not happy and I would prefer America to stay out. But, I am political animal and [this] means first of all I am a realist, you know. That happened so that after the Second World War, that's by the way, one of the reality, one of the result of the Second World War, that the American troops stay in Europe and we take it as a fact of life. Then, as very practical people, we understand that the whole history of relations between Western Europe and USA is such that you want it, you like it or dislike it, you cannot divide them; you cannot divide, you cannot throw USA out of Western Europe just because you don't like it. You cannot do that because they're part of the same alliance, military alliance, NATO alliance. But, what is more important, they have common history, they have common cultural ties, they have many, many things in common. They are very different also, but they have more in common with USA than with us, and we admit that. So, when we are accused that we are trying, I'm always putting question what for? What for?

[Posner] Don't you think that every time there seems to be a movement toward an easing of tension, towards an improvement of relations, towards some kind of agreement in the area of arms control or arms reduction -- Geneva was one example of that kind of a spirit -- of a movement, but there have been times before. Always you get this sudden -- it's not sudden really, but the same thing crops up -- the statement that the Soviet Union is trying to divide United States and Europe. And this latest statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, where we clearly indicate how we would go about, with all the rest of the world, doing away with nuclear weapons, including those weapons that are now very much part of the European picture, the medium range missiles to begin with, then the tactical weapons and all the other nuclear weapons. We get this same reaction in Europe from some people; that this is an attempt, as it were, to make America and Europe enemies. Don't you think it's serving a certain purpose? It's kind of like, you know, I don't know if you've had this in your life before, but you sometimes think I've heard this before, I've heard this before, and you, don't you feel that this is?

[Plekhanov] Yes. It's been going on for 30 years, ever since the cold war began to melt in the mid-fifties the argument was used, and it's usually done in order to, in the first place, to scare the Europeans, saying well, you know, watch out! Watch out, the big bad Soviet Union is out to get you unless you have us Americans here protecting you from the big bad Soviet Union. Well, and it's always forgotten that the Soviet Union was not in favor of this sort of military division of Europe. When NATO was formed in 1949 the Soviet Union proposed, in fact offered, to join NATO. The Soviet Union was very active.

[Bogdanov] I am sure our many American listeners will be amazed at what they have heard from you, that we have suggested to join NATO.


[Bogdanov] That's a very interesting fact.

[Plekhanov] Ya. Another example: In 1952 the Soviet Government proposed that Germany be unified, be a single country, and it be neutral and demilitarized.

[Posner] This was when?

[Plekhanov] 1952. In 1955 we proposed a conference on European security and disarmament, [words indistinct] the start of the idea which then materialized into the Helsinki process and the Final Act, and so on, but it took us 20 years to have that
idea realized. The Soviet Union is interested in a peaceful Europe. We are not interested in a Europe which is divided into two armed blocs, and in fact to anyone with any kind of reason it must really be absurd to see Europe where nobody can realistically think up of a scenario of war between East and West.

[Posner] Over what?

[Plekhannov] Over recarving of frontiers, over, I mean it's really difficult to find a realistic, plausible scenario for a war in Europe, and still, this is a continent where the greatest number of most dangerous weapons in the world are amassed, it's absurd. There must be something there that has different, different explanations.

[Posner] Dr Bogdanov, did you want to say something?

[Bogdanov] You know I sometimes, I have a feeling like asking my American friends over there just to imagine for a while that 300,000 Soviet soldiers are in Mexico and in Canada with all their weaponry, tanks, guns, and things like that, staying for 40 years, surrounding America like that. What would be their feeling about their own security? How they would look at their own security problem? So I just would like to bring in just a bit of our feelings about that to my American friends (of mine). How did they feel on that, why they are so touchy on that problem though, (as they told me) they are realistic about that. But we prefer, as Sergey put it, we prefer to dismantle both military blocs. We understand that for (today) it's impossible, it's not feasible, you know, but what is feasible is must to reduce the level of military, you know, tension, of military, you know, confrontation in central Europe. That is very possible, but whenever we suggest it we always hear (what Sergey said). We always, again a couple of arguments you know, have been produced just to convince people over there, no, you cannot deal with the Soviet Union, it's very dangerous, it's things like that. [as heard]

[All agree on this point]

[Bogdanov] And you know you have the same problem, you know, a kind of very new dimension of thinking is very much necessary, adjusted to the realities of the nuclear, nuclear cosmic era, and I call my listeners, you know, just to think it over very seriously. If you reject all the time just out of hand whatever the other side says, then it's a vicious circle, you cannot break it. You may produce excellent, you know ([the] excellent proposals, but you cannot break this vicious circle. So, I believe that, Vladimir, the problem we are discussing is of very great importance. I have no solution, I have no solution. Of course, what I mean I have no solution, I don't know how to convince our American listeners.

[Posner, interrupting] and European listeners.

[Bogdanov] And European listeners as well, that we are in this situation, this situation, and it's a high time to find out solutions, commonly acceptable solutions. I don't know. I have no recipes. Maybe you have, maybe you have, Sergey, that there is only one thing which is clear for me, the problem is there on the table. [as heard]

[Plekhannov] Well, I think that some kind of a solution, we may be groping towards some kind of a solution. For instance, in the last few weeks there have been
positive signals from the Stockholm conference on security, on confidence building
measures, and from Vienna talks where the conventional arms balance is discussed.
Apparently, there are some changes for the better. Some ices are, sort of...

[Posner, interrupting] Melting?

[Plekhanov] Melting. Yes, that’s the word, melting. But of course it does not,
it only makes more necessary a new kind of approach to security and to the situation
in Europe, security in Europe. The fact is that both Western Europe and Eastern
Europe are part of the same continent and they cannot simply afford to continue
thinking about their security, each side of (them), in terms of one vis-a-vis the
other, one against the other. It's just ridiculous and it's very dangerous and
therefore, some new thinking is in order.

[Posner] Well, I'd like to invite our listeners both in Europe and the United States,
if they feel that this is an interesting subject, the whole issue of the division or,
shall we put it, the attempt -- put that in quotes -- of the Soviet Union to divide
Western Europe and the United States; the issue of security, I would like to invite
them to address their questions to us with their views on this subject because I feel
very strongly and I believe that both of you share that feeling that this is a key
issue that needs to be looked at very seriously. It is also an issue that touches on
the whole question of trust. I believe Dr Bogdanov said that in reality the people
who are talking about the Soviet attempt to divide, in reality are trying to divide
Western Europe and the Soviet Union.

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Ya, Ya, I mean it. I mean it.

[Posner] ... To drive wedges into those relationships. So I repeat, I would like to
invite our listeners to join in this conversation to share with us their views, their
concerns, and I'm sure that we'd be delighted to discuss that. And on that note let
me end this edition of "Top Priority." We'll be back a week from today at the same
time.

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"Studio 9" program, presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet television and radio; with Academician Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Nikolay Ivanovich Yefimov, first deputy chief editor of IZVESTIYA; and Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, political observer of IZVESTIYA -- videotaped at the Cultural Palace auditorium of the Vladimir Ilich Machinery Plant in Moscow; individuals asking questions from audience identified by captions

[Excerpts] [Zorin] Hello comrades. We meet for our regular discussion on current problems in world politics. Our discussion is not being held in Studio 9 of the Ostankino Television Center; we have come to the collective of workers of the renowned Vladimir Ilich plant in Moscow to answer your questions. We are sure you have many questions.

I shall begin by presenting participants in today's discussion, those who will answer your questions: Academician Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Nikolay Ivanovich Yefimov, first deputy chief editor of IZVESTIYA; and Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, political observer of IZVESTIYA. Well, together we shall answer your questions today.

Our meeting is taking place during highly important days, on the eve of the 27th congress. You know that our country has now come out with initiatives of great significance, unprecedented initiatives. Never before has a realistic program been advanced for eliminating all nuclear weapons on earth. There have been common appeals concerning this; there have been dreams about this; but there has never been a realistic and stage-by-stage program strictly limiting the time. It covers a period of 15 years at the end of which nuclear arsenals must be destroyed. The statement of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has outlined this most important program and it has aroused great interest in the world.

I think that in the course of today's discussion, we shall manage to deal with the various aspects of this problem. Now, I think we should proceed straight ahead with our business, and I want you to begin by asking your questions. Please go ahead.

[A.I. Romanov, senior foreman] The Soviet people, our working class, unanimously support the entirety of the new foreign political initiatives outlined in the statement of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary. This is our position, our direction. We know that the new historic initiatives of our
party have been met with great satisfaction by hundreds of millions of people in the world. What was the reaction to our proposals in the White House? What was the reaction of the leaders of the leading capitalist countries?

[Zorin] Well, Yevgeniy Maksimovich, answer this question.

[Primakov] I shall try to reply, comrades, but there is no simple answer. If you look at what is happening in this connection in Western Europe and Japan, I think there is more scope for speaking about a positive attitude than there is in the United States. In Western Europe, a number of leaders have already appealed to the United States -- actually, this was also done by the Japanese leadership -- to very carefully analyze and display a very constructive attitude to the proposals. First to speak in the United States was President Reagan who said that on the whole, he views the proposals constructively. He added that never before has a single statesman, and he actually said it, come out with such proposals for eliminating nuclear weapons. At the same time, and immediately after Reagan spoke, representatives of the State Department and the Pentagon, who on the whole began expressing doubts about the new spirit and the constructiveness of the proposals, started to advance their arguments against the proposals and specifically started to say that the United States will not give up its SDI; in other words, it will not give up preparations for nuclear... [Primakov pauses] "star wars," will not give up attempts to place strike weapons in space.

Others have said that the United States will not reply to our appeal for a moratorium on nuclear explosions, nuclear tests. I must say that it was possible to forecast such a reaction from the very beginning. I do not think our leadership has ever thought that this proposal would be some kind of magic wand with which it would be possible to immediately change the situation, that they would immediately, so to speak, stop to think the way they do and immediately take a totally different orientation in international politics. Nobody has ever thought this.

This is a very long affair, of course. It is a very long path to normalizing the international situation, a very long road. But I would like to quote an example about the SDI, the so-called "star wars."

According to available information, 1,500 corporations in the United States are already involved in this program. In this field, they obtain or will obtain tens of billions in profits. Some 26 billion has been allocated for this program for the 1984-89 period, a 5-year period. Naturally, these corporations will exert pressure on the government. They are the so-called military industrial complex which is manifesting itself in all its glory, so to speak. To think that under such conditions the U.S. leadership will immediately accept everything, take a completely different road, and give up what they have done in the past, I do not think any stake was ever placed on this as far I understand. Yet, it is perfectly clear that at the same time a favorable atmosphere for solving these problems is being created, and this atmosphere came into being with the Geneva meeting.

[V.N. Zhmotov, machinery repairman] Judging from everything, the SDI program is greatly complicating the problem of nuclear disarmament. I would like to know about U.S. public opinion on the proposal. It may not have been publicized there?
[Yefimov] You know, it is not possible to give a simple answer to this question. "It appears that there is not just one SDI program but several SDI programs in the United States. Reagan has one program; for him, the SDI program is a miracle. One of his biographers has even written that for U.S. President Reagan, the SDI program is almost the second coming of Christ. For U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the SDI program means something else. It is a wonderful opportunity, in his view, for wrecking all the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States which are being or could be held. For the military industrial complex, the SDI program means, what Yevgeniy Maksimovich has just said, huge profits, profits guaranteed for the coming 10, 20, 40, and 50 years. Finally, for the military, the SDI program means the possibility of inflicting the first strike on the Soviet Union. So this is one aspect, one position. Of course there are many Americans who understand perfectly well all the dangers of SDI. The tales we hear about SDI being only a protective shield, for only defense and nothing else, do not convince specialists most of all.

[A.V. Zorkin, engineer] Please tell me about the reaction of the PRC to the latest Soviet initiatives on nuclear disarmament?

[Bovin] Answering correspondents' questions, a representative of the PRC Foreign Ministry Press Department spoke on the issue of new disarmament proposals submitted by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. He said: [Bovin reads from a piece of paper] the disarmament proposals Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev submitted on the eve of the fourth round of Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks contain something new. We shall have to examine these proposals further. Currently, the Soviet Union and the United States remain far apart on positions in some important aspects of disarmament. Here is the last sentence: We wish that the Soviet Union and the United States will engage in serious talks and achieve progress.

Here is, formally speaking, the PRC reaction to Comrade Gorbachev's statement. If you expand it a little more, this is on the whole a positive reaction, and it indicates that if you take the whole range of international issues between us and the Chinese, there is a sufficient number of points of contact in world politics. Differing from the past, China now does not refuse to discuss disarmament problems. You know that China has announced that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. But in addition to this, in addition to the issues in which we and China in principle occupy similar positions, there is also a whole range of important political problems in which our positions continue to diverge. Our positions differ on problems such as the situation in Afghanistan, the situation in Cambodia and Vietnam, and a whole range of other problems. So this must also be taken into consideration when assessing Sino-Soviet relations, and despite these contradictions and complexities, we see that in the last few years -- and apparently you see it in our press -- that on the whole, there is a process. It is true that it is a slow and complex one, yet there is a process of normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, especially in the economic and cultural fields so far and less so in the political field. But on the whole, I repeat, this process continues. It is desired that it be quicker, but it is going on, continuing despite the fact -- it is possible to say here -- that there are still many sufficiently complicated and difficult problems.
The development and testing of new types of nuclear and laser weapons is being rapidly intensified in the United States. In their latest speeches, President Reagan and secretary of State Shultz, replying to the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, kept silent on the issue of space weapons. In this connection, I would like to know what is the relation between the nonmilitarization of space, which we firmly advocate and the proposals we submitted for the total destruction of nuclear weapons in the world.

Zorin] Nikolay Ivanovich, please.

[Yefimov] There is a most direct connection. In order to answer your question, I shall speak very briefly about the SDI although the SDI issue deserves an entire 'Studio 9' program. What is SDI? Imagine that above our heads, as they think, there are several hundred, almost a thousand space platforms suspended in orbit, and these platforms are saturated with missiles, electromagnetic guns, lasers, and hydrogen bombs which feed [nakachivat] these lasers. All this equipment is controlled by computers, and the computers, if anything should happen, will give orders within 400 seconds from the moment computers, not people, decide that something alarming has happened. This is one aspect.

The other aspect is that while creating its program for space strike weapons, the United States is simultaneously speeding up the development and modernization program, the creation of new and the modernization of old nuclear weapons. Thus, we cannot speak just about SDI. We must always speak about SDI together with the 22 programs for the creation of new nuclear weapons now underway.

We have already heard many times from Washington people saying that the SDI is purely defensive in nature. Now what are they saying: I will read a statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, in an interview with the French weekly L'EXPRESS. Here is what he said quite frankly: If a program of this sort is first developed by the Russians, an extremely dangerous situation will take shape in the world. The nuclear means of deterrence of the United States, Britain, and France would amount to nothing and nothing could hinder a successful first strike by the Russians.

The fact that insidious aims are always attributed to us in the West is now new, but let us dwell on these words. Now what if the opposite were to occur, if the United States creates this system first and deploys it in space? Then whose nuclear means, using Weinberger's words, will lose all meaning and amount to nothing? Who will then acquire the possibility of making the first strike? As you can see, the aim remains the same: military superiority and the possibility to attack the Soviet Union with impunity.

What is it then that currently bothers the United States, Washington? In creating this shield, of course they do not know how reliable it will be, how many missiles it will stop in case a retaliatory strike becomes necessary, and how many it will miss. You can imagine that with the current numbers of missiles on both sides, even if only 1 percent of those launched gets through, it would still be a catastrophe for the United States, not to mention a nuclear winter.

This is why they are seeking a way out of this stalemated position. This defensive shield, as they call it, needs some assistance, assistance in reducing the number of missiles that in case of retaliation will collide with their shield. How can this
number of missiles be reduced? Talks need to be held with the Soviet Union and a
reduction of our missiles must be achieved. The SDI remains, and say our missiles
will be halved, and so it will now be twice as easy for this defensive shield. There-
by the opportunity for an attack on the Soviet Union increases.

A question arises: How can this be? After all, did not the leaders of both states
agree in Geneva that the arms race in space cannot be permitted? They did agree;
it is a matter of record: the arms race in space cannot be permitted. But in comment-
ing on these seemingly very simple words the Americans are being crafty, cunning, and
it could even be said that they are being dishonest. This is why we are making a
quite categoric demand: if we are to conduct matters in a serious way and if we
seriously pose the question of eliminating nuclear arms and all carriers of
these arms, then let us hold honest talks and refrain from creating any
space shield.

[Primakov] Life links these two questions. We are not linking them artificially,
and here is why life links them; that is, because as has already been noted, not all
100 percent of the missiles -- and the Americans admit this -- will be liquidated even
if they succeed in establishing the SDI. Many scientists reject the possibility of
this success, but even if they succeed, a certain number of missiles will fly, and they
propose the SDI as some kind of instrument of deterrence. But this is not so, for if
the SDI is created, then each side will strive to increase the percentage of those
missiles that will nevertheless get through the SDI. And this will result in a head-
long arms race. This is what we are talking about.

[Zorin] You wanted to ask a question, please.

[Yu.V. Aleksandrov, fitter-assembler] What arguments against introducing a moratorium
on nuclear tests are being made in Washington?

[Yefimov] I would mention two arguments. The first is the favorite argument in
Washington and in the West in general. This argument says that underground nuclear
tests are very difficult to detect with the national means available. It is very easy
to confuse them with earthquakes, various movements of the earth's crust, and God knows
what. Therefore, on-site verification [proverka] is essential.

We are also interested in not being deceived by anyone if we agree to a moratorium.
We are also interested in reliable and effective control. We have always been con-
vinced, are convinced now, that the national means are quite sufficient to detect
everything. Nevertheless, we have proposed on-site inspection [inspektsiya].
So this favorite argument is no longer valid. Now a response is necessary.

The second argument: I would call the second argument the Weinberger argument. It is
as follows: The Russians have carried out such an enormous number of tests -- I am
citing Weinberger -- that they can permit themselves a moratorium. I am now citing
figures of the Swedish Institute of World Problems: As of the beginning of last year,
the United States had conducted 772 nuclear explosions and the Soviet Union 556. This
is 200 fewer. Therefore, this position is insincere of course.

Once more, the time for words has passed.
[Bovin] But they have a third argument, a more serious one. They simply say: We must test new weapons; that is all. We have this, that, and the other programs. They are all on the drawing board, and we cannot drop them. We must test these weapons. This, I would say, is their major argument. Besides, it is related to the "star wars" program because the X-ray laser — well, it may or may not be because much remains unclear — is charged with the aid of a thermonuclear explosion, not a large one. Now, these explosions are currently being perfected with underground tests at Nevada, and they must provide the intense X-rays for the laser. So there is this argument: We must conduct our tests because we have new programs. And it can be added: If the tests are not carried out then the reliability of what is already stockpiled lessens because according to all the rules, one must every now and then pull one or two warheads from the stockpile and explode them to test the condition of the current series.

So, you have these purely military reasons. But our logic in this is that, well, we have a similar situation; we also have our programs, and we also have weapons stockpiled that need periodic checks. But our proposal is that we, too, will not do this. However, unfortunately, so far they have not recognized this logic of reciprocity although generally, the pressure from all sides on the Americans is extremely great now, particularly when it comes to prohibiting weapons tests.

[M.I. Batova, laboratory chief] We have not conducted nuclear tests since August last year, and we have now announced a 3-month extension of the moratorium. In the meantime, the United States continues to conduct these tests. Could this put us at a disadvantage against the United States?

[Yefimov] Of course this danger exists. Of course our restraint is fraught with this danger, and we cannot display it forever.

[Primakov] Unilaterally.

[Yefimov] Yes, unilaterally. Nevertheless, comrades, the fact that we extended the moratorium is, I think, an example, a very powerful example, if you will, of a new thinking in politics. Of course, if we follow the logic of the arms race, then we must have an eye for an eye. They do something, we respond in kind. We have not responded in kind, and I think there is great wisdom in this and courage, if you will, and I repeat, a new thinking because the stakes in the struggle for peace are too great now. It could be that now, you understand, currently, when there is a chance to advance, albeit a small one, when there is finally a chance to get rid of nuclear weapons, then probably when compared to this chance, even if it is small, these dangers which really do exist because we have undertaken another moratorium, the opportunities that are contained in the gamble are probably stronger.

[Bovin] A safety factor still exists, so there can be a moratorium.

[Yefimov] We have thereby given the United States another opportunity to think, to weigh things, and if you will, to give its politicians a chance to gather courage. Courage is really needed to support a moratorium under U.S. conditions and to go against the military industrial complex. Everyone is waiting for a response. In the words of a poet, give me straight answers to accursed questions. The questions have been posed now by our moratorium.
Of course, it was not easy to adopt this decision, but it will also be difficult for Washington to reject our proposal. Nevertheless, if it does this, as some leading politicians are saying in Washington, then the political price Washington will have to pay for refusing to follow such an example will be extremely high.

N.B. Mayorova, new equipment bureau chief: Apparently, the "star wars" program demands colossal expenses. My question is: It is known that the debt of the developing countries to the capitalist countries amounts to several hundred billion dollars. What will happen to the economies of capitalist countries if the developing countries fail to pay their debts?

Zorin: Yevgeniy Maksimovich, this is an interesting question.

Primakov: Yes, it is an interesting question, but it seems to me that there will be no automatic crash of the capitalist economy, of course. We are talking about a hypothetical situation, a situation that can arise theoretically. I do not think that all these 100 debtor countries, and primarily the main debtors, will refuse to pay their debts. They are paying their debts, although it is very difficult. Currently, they are paying about $120 billion annually, including interest on the credit received. Of course, many banks would suffer in this hypothetical or theoretical situation in which they all refuse to pay. Banks usually receive subsidies from governments. But then, it will not be the banks that suffer most because they do not have their own funds. The investors will suffer, and that is an enormous number of people.

This is one aspect, but I would like to draw your attention to another aspect that is extremely important. It lies in the fact that in extracting itself from this situation, in attempting to adapt and adjust to it, the capitalist world and the developed capitalist countries want to extricate themselves at the expense of the periphery of the world capitalist economy, at the expense of the less developed and developing countries, the debtor countries themselves. They tie down these countries, force them to further integrate with their economic system, and so forth, and they lay the burden on their shoulders.

Zorin: Please proceed.

Kh.A. Kutsidi, engineer: Soon after the Geneva meeting, a number of prominent Washington officials started making contradictory statements which actually contradict the agreement at Geneva. Comrade Primakov has now mentioned the statements by some of these leaders. Will U.S. leaders now use the Geneva meeting as a shield and intensify the arms race and at the same time refer to the fact that there is an agreement?

Primakov: Well, this is serious question. You have raised a very serious question. It indicates that both the workers and other representatives of our society have certain anxieties about the fact that after Geneva, calls for increasing the arms race and so forth started to be heard in the United States at very high positions. What can be said in this connection.
Indeed, they might try to create a screen over the arms race. This is obvious. There are forces wanting to do this. But, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said in Geneva, we are not simpletons, we see this, and we shall do our utmost to prevent this screen. We will make use of really serious, political approaches to solve a whole range of problems.

Comrades, it must be stated most emphatically, it is in no way a matter of us ceding or losing any of our positions. This is not the case. We are not talking about this and it is absolutely not the aspect of the matter.

The point is that we are using the reserves we still have in our position, and which have not been used before. We have talked here about verification. Think about the tremendous reserve that has now been put to use in our policy, has been used by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Previously, the United States always said: We are not in favor of signing any agreements because the Soviet Union allegedly is a closed society, and it will not be possible to verify what happens in the future.

But now we tell them that we are ready for any kind of verification if we can sign an agreement with them. This is a definite philosophy of verification if we sign an agreement. If we do not sign an agreement, then there can be no verification at all because we cannot allow verification over the arms race; that would be elementary espionage. If you come with us to a common conclusion and sign an agreement with us, let us institute verification. We are interested in this matter no less than you, we tell them, because we were the ones who were suddenly attacked by Nazi Germany. We are interested even to a greater extent than you in definite and reliable verification.

The use of the reserve we have in our position, reserve not used before, has already led to really tremendous changes in public opinion. Let us see what the Americans will say now.

The statement says plainly that we are ready for practically any kind of verification, including site inspection in the ban on nuclear weapons. We have announced that in the destruction of chemical weapons, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement says, at a predetermined time we are ready to declare the locations of all the industrial complexes producing chemical weapons and proceed with the destruction of these capacities and stocks of chemical weapons; we will then allow obligatory bilateral site inspections. What will the American say now? We shall see. What will they say? In the past they said they could not go ahead because of lack of verification.

[S.A. Mitina, engineer] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement speaks about the need to eliminate chemical weapons. It is known that even the Nazis did not use them. Why is the issue so acute today.

[Zorin] Yevgeniy Maksimovich has already started answering this question a little. I shall continue. First of all, I want to say that this question has a long history. The issue of whether Nazi Germany would use chemical weapons was a very important issue in World War II. I would like to remind comrades, it is important now, that then, there were skeptics who said that it was not possible to prevent the use of chemical weapons, science had created this kind of weapon and they would be used without fail. We know that chemical weapons were not used on a large-scale during World War II and that even the Nazis did not dare to use them. They did not dare because a certain situation had been created in the world; they did not dare because they feared retaliation.
At any rate, from today's point of view, in our nuclear age, this is an important lesson of history which shows that wrong and harmful work is being done by those propaganda forces in the West which try to instill pessimism in people in connection with a ban on nuclear arms, alleging that this is not possible. Talking about the essence of your question, it has to be said that despite the fact that most countries signed the Geneva convention banning the use of chemical weapons, the danger exists. The Pentagon is not hiding its plans for using chemical weapons in war and is developing new types of chemical weapons. In particular, they are talking about binary chemical weapons, which is a new type of such weapons. We know that this is not just preparation. In the not distant past, Americans did use toxic substances in battle conditions. We remember Vietnam. Consequently it is an important problem which continues to worry the international community. One of the elements of the complex program outlined by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is the question of also eliminating chemical weapons, together with other types of mass destruction weapons. This is an important element of the complex program, and it is not just a simple appeal; it is just a good wish, but as it has already been said here, we are offering specific measures with specific verification.

This proposal has met with very great support and interest in the world, yet Washington has not stated any clear position in this connection. In the world, careful attention is being paid to what Washington's position will be on this important issue. And so, I beg you, please.

[R.V. Serova, engineer] Please tell us now to interpret the statements of Washington leaders when they speak about a nuclear war being impossible while they continue the arms race.

[Bovin] The point is that there is a kind of logic in the very military industrial complex. There is a logic in the development of U.S. military strategic thought.

At the theoretical level, at the level of scientific studies of the problem, Americans, like us, generally understand sufficiently well that it is not possible to win a nuclear war, that there can be no victors in it, that the one who begins first will perish second; that is all there is to it. It is understandable at the abstract level. But if you move to another level and see what U.S. generals say, they are still trying to invent some strategy that would enable them to solve the problem of squaring the circle, that would make it possible for them to find rational methods for conducting a nuclear war which in essence is an irrational phenomenon. And this inner contradiction, comrades, generally has an effect on the positions of our American partners.

Here is their assessment of our latest statement. Yes, they say, it is a very interesting statement, it must...[Bovin pauses] there are constructive elements, it must be studied carefully. But unfortunately, I see the matter differently. When the matter is about concrete things, the other aspect of their position comes into play, and they say specifically, we cannot ban the tests because of this or that reason; we cannot ban chemical weapons because of this or that reason; third, fourth, fifth. That is the contradictory position, agreement in some general principles and approval of the very approach. The Americans say we are also in favor of reducing and destroying nuclear weapons. But in addition to this kind of general statement, in every specific case this general agreement melts some concrete no, no, no, and no which we are tired of hearing.
The general distrust existing between us and the Americans is hindering agreement, and so we have a vicious circle. There is no confidence because the arms race is going on, and the arms race is continuing because there is no confidence. The statement made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is precisely directed at crushing this vicious circle with radical proposals and still finding a way out of the situation. But you must understand that only 50 percent depends on us formally speaking, and 50 percent depends on the Americans. Frankly speaking, I think — although it is that rare occasion on which I would like very much to be wrong — that while the current administration is in the White House in the United States, I can hardly see us agreeing on some major issues with the Americans. The factions of the American bourgeoisie now in power in the United States and whose interests are represented by Reagan will hardly agree to reducing or slowing the arms race because of their material interests. Naturally, we shall continue to implement our line because as it has been correctly said by my comrades, if there is even the slightest chance, it is the task of the politicians to use this chance. Even if there is no chance, it is the task of the politicians to create such a chance because the stakes are very high, very high. We are talking about the life and death of humanity. This is the problem, and here, in order to prevent such an end, we shall naturally spare neither efforts, funds, nor energy, and we shall do our utmost, and we shall even do the impossible in order to ensure a different outcome.

[Primakov] You know the difference between a pessimist and an optimist. They say that a pessimist is a well-informed optimist. Well, Aleksandr Yavgenyevich is a very well-informed man. Yet, I cannot fully agree with his pessimistic and one-sided assessment of what will happen. But of course, with the Americans it is a most difficult matter.

[Bovin] With the current administration, I say.

[Primakov] It is a most difficult matter to agree with the Americans in general, and with the current administration it may be even more difficult than with any other one. But at the same time, it is not as if we are attempting to just make use of the slightest chance. We are conducting a real policy with hope for actually achieving some kind of breakthrough; there will be some breakthrough.

[Zorin] I would also like to express an opinion somewhat different to Aleksandr Yevgenyevich's opinion. The matter of course is that a very big role is played by the circumstances outlined by Aleksandr Yevgenyevich. Both the interests of the military complex and the sentiments of the people who are in the Washington administration today are political realities, and we should not close our eyes to them.

Now, let us ask ourselves a question. Did our specialists, you, and I consider a Soviet-U.S. summit practicable or possible say 2 or 3 years ago? No, it looked...

[Primakov, interrupting] And with a positive outcome.

[Zorin] Yes, and with a positive outcome. It looked unrealistic. Nonetheless, the meeting in Geneva took place and had considerable results. In my opinion, this is because in politics, there are first of all both subjective and objective circumstances; and second, circumstances in the given concrete situation can outweigh the interests of even such powerful circles as the military industrial complex.
I am convinced that the leaders of the military industrial complex opposed the Geneva meeting. We know how at the last moment Weinberger attempted to put sticks in the spokes of this meeting by publishing, by allowing that letter, we can say frankly a provocative letter, to leak out. In the letter addressed to the President, he opposed any agreements with the Soviet Union.

Of course, any further advances in the cause of finding ways to agreement and points of contact with this administration will be very difficult. Of course a very acute struggle will be waged in Washington. We can see it now. They use one tone in the White House, a somewhat different tone in the State Department, and a completely different tone in the Department of Defense. An internal struggle is underway there, but it seems to me that those objective circumstances, the existing realities of today, present the opportunity for progress not only if the Washington administration is replaced; they also give us the opportunity to implement our program and to implement, to put forward, such large-scale programs with the assumption that they are both realistic and not necessarily only after a certain period of time.

[Bovin] I will be very happy if Valentin Sergeyevich's forecast is justified. I will be very happy if this occurs.

[Yefimov] Of course, it is pleasant to do business with an administration that is intelligent, that possesses a high sense of historic responsibility. It is pleasant. But where is the guarantee that the next administration, the 1988 version, will be better? It could be worse.

[Bovin] There is no guarantee, and that is the crux.

[Yefimov] It seems to me that we simply cannot permit ourselves to wait, and the historic experience of Soviet-U.S. relations indicates that we should not wait.

I think we should not count on the next administration being easier and simpler to deal with. It might be that way.

We and you, comrades — in fact, I wanted to look at the problem from a different angle — can rely only on ourselves. It is no coincidence that the new edition of the draft party program says that the fact that we have achieved strategic parity with the United States is an enormous achievement of our people. It is indeed enormous.

Diplomacy engages in its task. It can make some things better, other things worse. However, in the long run, our scientists, our engineers, and you the working class determine the nature of our relations. It is no coincidence that the Americans are now following with great concern how we are beginning the reconstruction of our economy and our life and how we are accelerating the social and economic development of our country. They are watching.

[G.K. Belov, laboratory chief] In recent months and even days, U.S. actions have heightened tensions around Libya, in southern Africa, and Latin America. Tell us please, what influence can this have on solving the problem of reducing and eliminating nuclear arms?

[Primakov] Well, you know that the question of regional conflicts of course is related to the problem of normalization of the international situation and confidence between states. There is no doubt that if acts of interference into the internal
affairs of other countries were stopped and if there was no support for antipopular regimes in a number of countries, this would lead to normalization and would generally promote the solution of problems relating to ending the arms race and those relating ultimately to the elimination of nuclear arms.

But at the same time, one question cannot be substituted with another. On the eve of the Geneva meeting, the Americans attempted to substitute these two questions, and during the talks in Geneva, they constantly tried to drag the question of regional conflicts to the fore and to place the question of arms reduction to the rear. At the time, Reagan came out with a very dubious formula that supposedly confidence between us does not exist because of these regional conflicts and not because of the arms race. But this formula is absolutely incorrect. At Soviet insistence, at the insistence of Comrade Gorbachev, the question of arms reduction was made the key issue. General attention was drawn to it, and all efforts in Geneva were concentrated on its solution. This was the main point. Generally, this major problem remains today, and the survival of human civilization depends on it.

Another thing I would like to say is that if questions of reducing arms were solved, this too would have a most radical influence on normalizing the international situation and would promote the elimination of very many conflict situations.

[V.P. Pashchenko, shop chief] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has often stressed the idea of the need for new thinking in world politics. Could you describe this in greater detail?

[Zorin] This question is very serious, and in fact, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in recent months raised the question several times of the need for new thinking among politicians and statesmen with whom great responsibility lies. Now, I would like to begin my reply to your question with a description of an episode that occurred 30 years ago.

It was the last interview given by one of the greatest scientists of our time — and not only of our time — by the author of the theory of relativity, Albert Einstein. A journalist visited the gravely ill Einstein and asked him the following question: At this stage in the development of mankind, at this stage in the development of man's spirit and man's knowledge, mankind has found itself capable of delving into the innermost secrets of nature, particularly into the secrets of the atomic nucleus. At the same stage of its intellectual development, this very mankind is incapable of protecting itself from the consequences of its own knowledge. How can this incongruity, this paradox be explained?

Einstein replied as follows: Do not construe my reply as a joke. I am saying this in all seriousness. The reply to your questions lies in the fact that the science of physics, despite all its complexities, is a considerably simpler matter than the science of politics. This is why mankind has advanced in it.

This was said 30 years ago. Since then for 30 years mankind has been living in the nuclear age under conditions where the hopelessness of such a lag, of such a gulf between people's scientific knowledge and political thinking, has become absolutely clear.
In his statement published the other day, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed that it was time to reject stone age thinking according to which the main concern was to find the biggest club or the heaviest stone. And really, who was threatened by this stone and club? The people in the neighboring cave. The atomic club threatens the existence of human civilization. Under these conditions it is naturally necessary to reject many political notions of mankind's history on which statesmen relied for many centuries.

It is necessary to learn to reason on the basis of existing political realities. It is necessary to learn to reason not only on the basis of narrowly understood national egoistical interests but to also understand that the interests of other countries should be taken into consideration, to seriously consider the interests of other countries. It is necessary to learn to conduct affairs in such a way as not to strive for superiority over another country, not to strive to outwit or deceive it. What was acceptable in past centuries is no longer applicable under conditions where the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe, of thermonuclear suicide, hangs over mankind. Completely new statesmen with new thinking, thinking that corresponds with the realities of our age, are essential.

It seems to me that the document that we have just read, Comrade Gorbachev's statement which contains major and unprecedented proposals, an entire program which, if it is adopted, will give mankind the opportunity to enter the next century having rid itself of the fear of a thermonuclear catastrophe, is the most vivid practical example of this kind of new thinking that corresponds with the realities of today.

This is an interesting issue, and I would like to say a few words. Previously people were killed, people perished, states fell, civilizations died, but there was always a guarantee of a future. Wars took place and maybe 100 people or a million died, but history did not end. The future was guaranteed. People always proceeded from this. It was possible to kill a man, but mankind was immortal. This, I would say, was an underlying premise of all our previous history.

Now we have approached and entered into a completely and fundamentally different age. Now the underlying principle of the situation, the situation that demands the new thinking about which Valentin Sergeyevich spoke, lies in the fact that mankind has acquired the technical means to possibly commit suicide. Therefore, we do not have a guaranteed future; now it has become necessary to fight for it.

And it is precisely the statement which we have discussed at such length here today that is a practical policy aimed at ensuring that we still have a future, that our children and grandchildren have a future, that mankind does not destroy itself in a thermonuclear catastrophe. This new political reasoning which we have been speaking about here is needed for that.

I would like to try to sum up this new political reasoning, about which Mikhail Sergeyevich spoke, in three points: The first point is the dialectic of the division of the world into two parts, the socialist and the capitalist parts which each develop in accordance with their own laws, and the existence of a unified world. This unity of the world is manifested today not only in the fact that everyone is interested in solving problems common to mankind such as the liquidation of hunger, the search for fundamentally new sources of energy, the struggle to preserve the environment, and so forth, and not only because each of these systems is linked economically with one another, but because the problem of survival is real for everyone, as has already been mentioned here. That is the first point.
The second point, it seems to me, is acknowledgement of the objective interests of all states and at the same time a search for fields where these interests coincide as well as actions directed toward ensuring that they do coincide somewhere. In this regard I think that what Comrade Gorbachev said in Geneva is of very great significance. Addressing the United States, he said that any restriction of your security is not only detrimental to you but is also not in our interests, not in the interests of the Soviet Union. This matter needs serious thought. This means that a large sphere exists, a sphere primarily involving security.

Of course we have contradictory, opposite interests. They have a capitalist world, we a socialist one. But in one sphere, the sphere of security, these contradictions must not be considered absolute. Some fields of coincidence must be sought, and actions must be undertaken which combine these often contradictory interests.

The third point was also emphasized by Comrade Gorbachev. He said, and this is also really an element of the new thinking, that under no circumstance can the objective processes occurring in various countries of the world -- objective social and economic and political processes -- all be viewed through a prism of Soviet-U.S. confrontation. When something occurs in Nicaragua, for example, or in the Middle East, the easiest thing to say is that it is the hand of Moscow which is attempting to install anti-American regimes. As a matter of fact they become anti-American as a result of U.S. support for the counterrevolution. This cannot all be viewed in this way. The objective reasons which lead to various changes should be seen. These are the three points I wanted to make.

[Zorin] Well, insofar as it is time to end our discussion, it remains for me to thank you for your very interesting questions, to thank our television viewers for their attention, and to thank you for taking part in this discussion and to express the hope... [changes thought] I understand that we did not reply to all the questions that interest you. Our television viewers write to us about their interest in many things. This is not our last edition of the Studio 9 program, so I would like to bid you farewell, until the next one. Thank you.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1263
It has been estimated that the quantity of nuclear weapons now stockpiled in the world is equivalent in conventional explosives to 3 metric tons for every inhabitant of our planet.

A threat to life itself has emerged. Nuclear war would mean the deaths of hundreds of millions of people and its consequences for the climate and the environment would be such a survival impossible. This makes the problem of disarmament unprecedentedly urgent and pressing.

Proceeding from this premise, at the very start of the year the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the Soviet Government made a decision on a number of major foreign policy actions of a principled nature. The main, the pivotal action among them was a concrete program, calculated to cover a precisely determined period of time, for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the world.

This is not the first time such a reference point has been erected. At the dawn of the nuclear age, in 1946, the Soviet Union declared the need for a ban on the production and use of atomic weapons. In the current Soviet proposals this task is placed on a practical, businesslike footing. There is no necessity to prove that its implementation accords with the aspirations of all peoples without exception and with the increasingly forceful demands of the overwhelming majority of UN member's governments. Not a single session of the UN General Assembly is held without delegations from different countries loudly raising their voices in favor of nuclear disarmament.

The cause of nuclear disarmament is not, however, advancing one inch because of the absence of practical steps in that direction. Progress is fiercely resisted in the top echelons of power in Washington and in NATO headquarters. All sorts of "technical" and other objections are put forward. What is more, the very nature of the problem is such as to raise many complex and difficult questions in terms of how to approach its solution.

The remarkable feature of the new Soviet proposals set out in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, lies in the fact that they take maximum account of the obstacles which have hitherto prevented nuclear
disarmament from really being implemented. Our country is proposing a concrete program to be implemented not in the remote, hazy future, but within the historically foreseeable future -- over the 15-year period remaining until the [start of the] 21st century.

Does this mean that the submission of detailed proposals of this kind, even more carefully substantiated from the Soviet viewpoint, will ensure their acceptance by those who have been resisting all such steps? It goes without saying that there can be no room for illusions about the ease of further efforts in this sphere. A major struggle lies ahead. It will be waged--by virtue of the very content of the new Soviet proposals—in more favorable conditions than before. All those who cherish the cause of curbing the nuclear arms race have a new peace "weapon" in their hands. That "weapon" is a clear and precise program of actions in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, which leaves no room for the various kinds of speculation or conjecture routinely employed by the West to portray the Soviet position in a distorted light and to try to pile up "doubts" and "objections" around measures designed to liberate mankind from the most terrible weapons ever to threaten our planet.

The questions of monitoring [kontrol] the observance of agreements that are reached, working out measures aimed at achieving a reduction in the level of arms while strictly observing the principle of equal and identical security that forms the basis of the military parity existing between the Soviet Union and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and the logical transition from simpler to more complex actions in curbing the arms race all give weight to the Soviet proposals, make them feasible and convincing, and promote the struggle for a fundamental improvement of the world situation.

Where and how should we start nuclear disarmament? Those are substantive questions. Life prompts the answer to them. The most important nuclear arsenals are held by the United States and our country, which cannot but maintain its own defensive shield in an appropriate condition in the face of the insane nuclear arms race overseas.

Consequently, it is these two countries that must set an example to the other nuclear powers in actions which would make it possible to turn the reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear arms into a real process.

That is why our country proposes, as a first step, that the Soviet Union and the United States agree to end all nuclear explosions.

In an interview with the Italian newspaper IL GIORNALE in mid-1984 President Reagan expressed the hope that a time would come "when nuclear weapons will be obsolete..." That will not happen by itself, much less when the United States expedites work to further "improve" these barbaric weapons. A total and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests would make it possible to bring us to the point that the U.S. leader termed the "obsolescence" of nuclear weapons. But even this would be inadequate since it would not remove the threat of a cataclysmic conflict using nuclear weapons.
The fundamental solution to the question lies in the final elimination of nuclear weapons. Governments, which must be depended upon to make the corresponding bold efforts, are equal to this task. It is true that there have been few cases in the history of military hardware when mutual decisions led to some weapon being removed from arsenals. But neither has there been a time in human history when mankind was threatened with the danger of universal annihilation!

The highest concentration of nuclear weapons is to be found on the territory of Europe. The Soviet Union and the United States can -- and must! -- set an example there by taking steps leading to ridding the continent of mass destruction weapons. This involves the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles -- both ballistic and cruise -- in the European zone. Their elimination, their physical destruction -- it is important to stress this since there are some unscrupulous "interpreters" of the Soviet proposals who try to cast aspersions on them, claiming that the Soviet Union will limit itself to transferring the missiles from Europe to its Asian region.

It is of course essential that the United States should commit itself to not siting its strategic and medium-range missiles in other countries and that Britain and France should not build up their own corresponding nuclear armaments. Our country is ready to take a bold step to advance the cause of disarmament by agreeing that British and French nuclear forces should not be reduced or counted during the initial stage despite the major reductions in nuclear missile arsenals being carried out by us.

Steps by the two states designed to halve the nuclear armaments capable of reaching each other's territory over a period of 5-8 years constitute an important integral part of this stage. This involves the elimination of both delivery vehicles and warheads so that each side retains no more than 6000 charges on its remaining delivery vehicles, that is to say, substantially fewer than is the case today.

This is the start of the nuclear disarmament program. A start which is impressive and based on maintaining the equilibrium, the parity achieved between the Soviet Union and the United States in the military sphere, but at much lower reciprocal levels. These reduced levels will be significant only under conditions whereby an arms race in outer space is inadmissible. What sense is there in seeking to reduce armaments on the earth, at sea, in the oceans, and in the atmosphere if outer space is going to be saturated with them!

The logic of disarmament requires that outer space should remain free of armaments. This is also demanded by the vital interests of all countries and governments. Any attempts by U.S. military circles to turn outer space into a sphere for the arms race will rebound on its own security interests. You do not have to be a military expert to work that out. The authors of the "star wars" plans are counting on having provided themselves with what they call "ramified defense" against missiles by the 21st century. The cost of such work is astounding. But if some people across the ocean are seriously thinking of rendering nuclear weapons "obsolete," then there is a straightforward way to achieve this that does not cost hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars: namely, nuclear disarmament.
The two subsequent stages of the Soviet program for the destruction of nuclear weapons are characterized by no less concreteness and breadth than the initial stage. The Soviet Union and the United States will continue the process of radically reducing their nuclear arsenals simultaneously with a ban on the creation [sozdaniye] of non-nuclear armaments based on novel physical principles which would make them approximate to means of mass destruction. Meanwhile, other nuclear powers will join this process so that, by the end of 1999, no nuclear weapons would be left on earth and they would never be revived.

The monitoring [kontrol] of the armaments being destroyed or reduced would be carried out by both national technical means and on-site inspection [inspektsiya na mestakh]. Our country is prepared to come to an arrangement on any [lyubyye] other additional monitoring measures [mery kontrolya].

Having, as their central core, the aim of nuclear disarmament, the new Soviet proposals provide for far-reaching steps in other spheres also, backed up by practical measures for monitoring [kontrol] and inspection [inspektsiya] where necessary.

Thus, it is a question of a broad program in the interests of all mankind. Even people who are very inexperienced in politics and military matters, and, still more so, governments, must realize that the alternative is self-destruction. Never before has civilization been faced with such a crucial choice. The total liquidation of nuclear weapons is a problem of significance for all mankind and it can and must be solved by the collective efforts of the entire world community.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1263
Hello comrades. I would like to begin today's program which, as always, comprises replies to your letters, with a theme which is touched upon in the majority of the correspondences to some extent or another. It is the question of the search for a peaceful future for our planet and to the Soviet Union's efforts that are directly linked to this, and precisely aimed at the attainment of this noble aim. In our news bulletins we regularly report on what a great and positive response the Soviet proposals set out in Comrade Gorbachev's statement of 15 January are receiving in the world. Your letters also contain support for them. At the same time, a number of radio listeners -- Sergy Mikhailovich Pirev from Novosibirsk, Comrade Rodinov from (?Ukhtomsk), and others -- justifiably ask: Why has the U.S. Administration so far given no specific reply to our new proposal? What is the motive for its silence? I asked political observer Nikolay Shishlin to reply to this and to certain other questions connected with this topic. Over to you, Nikolay Vladimirovich.

First, it must be noted that, naturally, the comprehensive plan for peace and disarmament which was put forward by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary in mid-January is a wide-ranging, all-embracing plan and it is, in itself, so many-sided that it requires some study. In this respect, the references which the U.S. Administration is making for the need to reflect upon and attentively analyze the set of Soviet proposals are justified to some extent. But I simultaneously understand the question why, nonetheless, there has not yet been a specific reply in the course of almost a month. On the one hand the United States, as if it already had prepared a reply, is now conducting consultations with various countries in Europe and Asia so that it can take its final shape. As you know, Nitze, the special assistant to the President and the secretary of state on disarmament, is in Europe for this purpose, and, in the same capacity, Washington's highly placed emissary Rowny is in Asia.

Well, naturally the results of the consultations will reveal the details, but the second feature characteristic of Washington's reflections today is that both political figures and the U.S. press in my opinion, excel more in questioning the Soviet initiatives that in working on any counter movements of their own for the sake of working out a reasonable compromise. Well, there are countless questions on this score, although the answer to many of them already has been given in the statement by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's recent interview to the French newspaper L'HUMANITE.
But what question in particular so they like to ask in the United States with regard to, say, the issue of halting nuclear tests? It must be stated that time is passing and not much remains until 31 March, the expiration date of the Soviet unilateral moratorium on conducting nuclear explosions. As before, the United States is excelling in all kinds of questions. They stated at the beginning that since it is possible to introduce a unilateral moratorium, than it ought to be a subject of talks. But the Soviet proposals which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made in mid-January speak of the Soviet Union's preparedness to enter urgently into talks with the United States and Great Britain on the question of halting all nuclear tests.

The United States also asks this question: What kind of verification will there be? The Soviet Union is, in essence, prepared to introduce comprehensive verification, even going as far as on-site verification. So, these questions in themselves are not just the consequence of an attempt to somehow delve into, to reflect upon, this comprehensive plan for peace and disarmament. In my opinion, these questions are more characteristic of an unpreparedness on the U.S. side to change the political landmarks and to switch over on a lasting basis to a quest to achieve an accord with the Soviet Union.

Washington in now stating that the reply being worked on, which already has essentially been prepared in some form, will be of a positive nature. An then, as a matter of fact, the world will see that the United States is prepared to follow the direction of a curtailment of the arms race on earth. Nonetheless, at the same time as it speaks of the positive nature of this forthcoming reply, there are still doubts when one considers both the U.S. military programs and its blind adherence to its "star wars" plans, which literally is manifested daily on all political levels. Thus I believe that our radio listeners' concern that the Americans are delaying in their response is a justified concern.

[Lavrentyev] Nikolay Vladimirovich, our radio listeners are interested to learn whether the political climate in the United States changed at all after Geneva.

[Shishlin] That is not an easy question, of course, since it is not a simple matter to measure the political climate, especially in the United States where it is subject to all kinds of short-term fluctuations. But somehow or other, if you soberly evaluate the situation, I believe certain changes of a favorable nature have been taking place within the United States' political climate since Geneva. Precisely since Geneva, since the summit meeting with the Soviet leader, President Reagan has been receiving very tolerable results in public opinion polls as a man who, in the eyes of Americans, seems to be acquiring a skill of communicating with the Soviet Union, the skill of conducting a dialogue with the Soviet leaders. I don't know on what the U.S. evaluations are based since, overall, it still must be said frankly that the Soviet-American dialogue is developing with difficulty and that, in this respect, 1986 will be a year of serious testing, a year of serious examination of the words and statements which have been made. However, words and statements will no longer be sufficient to reach and evaluation of the true state of both the political climate in the United States and of the degree of U.S. preparedness to reach a compromise with the Soviet Union.
In talking about the political climate in the United States. I would like to draw attention to a number of factors. The prominent U.S. senator, Kennedy, was in our country recently. He made an appearance on our central television. He met scientists and was received by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary. The frame of mind which Kennedy expressed is not just the frame of mind of this specific senator. It is the frame of mind of a quite influential part of the contemporary political elite in the United States, which believes that it is essential to overcome the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, to overcome the acute confrontation, and to attempt to find a solution for some of the quite complicated problems regarding the curtailment of the arms race. Incidentally, you probably noticed that the same Senator Kennedy is a convinced opponent of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that more than 400 representatives of U.S. business circles were in Moscow near the end of last year. This experience also is an indication of a certain change not only in the economic climate—it is unfortunately, quite persistently cold, in fact—between the Soviet Union and the United States. But it is an indication of the political mood, in general, in the United States.

I would not underestimate those steps, modest as they may be, which are being taken in developing cultural links between the USSR and the United States, in the enrichment and intensification of scientific exchanges, and sporting links. All of this is, of course, useful. All of this is working toward a change in the climate.

But, somehow or other, we must soberly take account of the fact that we are dealing with peripheral questions thus far. The central questions, questions of security, questions of the curtailment of the arms race on earth and the prevention of its transfer to space, are still blocked by the U.S. position. And, if you take a look at how they are trying to form the United States budget for the coming 1987 fiscal year, we once again see a growth in military expenditure, a growth in military programs all in the same sensitive directions, including in the direction of the implementation of the "star wars" plans. So, in replying to this question of changes in the U.S. political climate since Geneva, one must be quite cautious. There are some small shifts, some changes are taking place. But these small shifts and changes are not yet of a radical nature.

[Lavrentyev] And finally, the last question which worries very many people. What is to be expected from the new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting?

[Shishlin] First of all, we must take clear account of the fact that there is an accord on a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. A visit by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the United States is intended for 1986. And in 1987 the Soviet Union is prepared to receive here President Ronald Reagan of the United States. That is the first thing. There is indeed an accord.

The second thing — the time of the visit by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the United States has not yet been agreed upon. It is still the subject of diplomatic procedures, and the date of the visit has not been officially set. It is quite obvious that if there is no movement in the main aspects of world politics, if certain accords between the Soviet Union and the United States are not attained on the key problem of the curtailment of the arms race on earth and the prevention of its transfer to space, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said in his conversation with Senator Kennedy, the summit meeting itself becomes meaningless. This is a statement of the political realities which confront us in 1986. It is an expression of the degree of responsibility with
which the Soviet Union approaches both Soviet-U.S. relations as such and the summit meetings which ought to be the motor, the engine to help a smoothing-out of relations to progress, and with which it approaches the development of peaceful cooperation for the good of the Soviet and U.S. peoples and for the good of universal security.

[Lavrentyev] Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Pochuvalov of Perm enquires about the state of Soviet-Argentinian relations. What, he asks, did the recent visit to our country by Dante Caputo, Argentina's minister of foreign relations and worship, do for their development? By way of reply to this question, we present an interview granted by Dante Caputo to our correspondent Anselmo Sebtien:

[Begin recording in Spanish with superimposed Russian translation] The end of this visit to the Soviet Union is a moment at which to evaluate it, and this evaluation is most certainly a positive one. Our visit occurred in an atmosphere of exceptional hospitality and cordiality, says the Argentinian minister. Although differences exist between our countries as regards our sociopolitical systems, this cannot prevent us from maintaining fruitful contacts in various fields. Our visit is typical in that, in addition to the existing diplomatic and trade links, it has helped extend relations into the political sphere.

In this connection, Dante Caputo goes on, I would like to stress that political relations are being established on the basis of complete agreement on such important questions as disarmament, detente, and peace.

The peace plan set forth by Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15 January this year is seen by us as a highly positive one, the Argentinian minister of foreign relations stresses. We regard it as a step forward in the cause of ensuring peace and security for all peoples. For its part, Argentina is striving to make a contribution to this process. Jointly with five other states it has proposed an initiative calling for an end to the arms race and nuclear tests. So we and the Soviet Union are moving in the same direction in our approach to international problems.

/12858
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Gorbachev Interview in L'HUMANITE

[Sobolev] Hello there, comrades! On the international arena, our country proceeds from the assumption that foreign policies should be built upon realistic grounds, taking into account arrangement of forces, requirements of the time, interests of one's own people, other peoples and universal peace. That is why the Soviet Union has offered the world a radical and, at the same time, realistic alternative to nuclear war, which takes into account the interests of all peoples -- a program for tackling the problems that mankind faces. The changes in the international atmosphere which followed the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva assist our country in handling the task of elaborating new initiatives in a more resolute way. To realize the Soviet concept of security will, naturally, take a great deal of effort, labor, persistent struggle and breaking millenniums-old traditions. But the world simply cannot go on living and acting as it did; it is unthinkable to preserve human civilization while continuing the accelerating arms race and building up tension. These ideas are at present being adduced and commented upon throughout the world in discussing the replies of Comrade Gorbachev to the questions of L'HUMANITE.

[Volskiy] As well as his talk with editor Leroy.

[Gerasimov] In my view, we can discuss that part of the replies by Comrade Gorbachev that deal with the millenniums-old tradition, which should now be ruthlessly fought with and categorically denied. That is the tradition of relying on weapons and military force. Indeed, as Comrade Gorbachev stressed, it is impossible to live, or, in any case, to live long in the nuclear age having the mentality, habits and rules of behavior of the Stone Age. And such a sharp turn, as Mikhail Sergeyevich said, in international affairs, in the foreign policy vision and practice -- is it not a profoundly revolutionary task? In resolving this task we, the Soviet Union, see our greatest responsibility, our duty, in helping to handle this task.

Yes, of course, the new way of thinking is a very complicated task, and as early as in the fifties, the best intellects of our epoch -- Bertrand Russel, Albert Einstein -- called for it. At present this task has become especially relevant, because nuclear
Weapons have become increasingly dangerous, and now we are on the threshold of the plans for "star wars," which are going to entrust tackling of the issue of destinies of mankind to some kind of computers. I want to compare here the approach to this problem that the Soviet Union has with the approach of the United States. Recently, the President delivered his traditional State of the Union address, where he said that in order to preserve peace, the U.S. Armed Forces had to be reinforced. So, it was exactly then that the rich United States had to choose between guns and butter. The United States lives beyond its means, the President said, and that is why it is necessary to decide which expenditures must be cut: expenditures for social needs or those of the military. He has no doubts at all that it is necessary to cut expenditures for social needs, and that military spending should, on the contrary, be increased even further. What we have here is exactly an example of the old philosophy, of a purely egotistic approach to the problems of defense, if here we are going to talk about defense and not about the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism.

[Volskiy] That is, to ensure, or, in any case, to give the appearance of ensuring their security at the expense of other countries which are active in the international community.

Gorbachev Arms Proposal

[Gerasimov] It is interesting that if you take the aims of the Soviet program for nuclear disarmament and those, for example, of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative -- by which I mean the official aim of that initiative -- the aim is in fact the same: to do away with nuclear weapons. The U.S. approach, however, is a technical one. What they are saying is that we must create an anti-nuclear space shield which will protect us from nuclear weapons and thus will render them obsolete and powerless. This is certainly a crooked road to reach that end, even if it should be recognized, I repeat, that this means additional billions of dollars and that it is very doubtful from a technical point of view.

The Soviet Union offers an absolutely straight road -- that of gradual, step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons, which is simple and clear. Apparently, what is involved here is not the official purpose of the Strategic Defense Initiative. There is some kind of different design about it, a perfidious design of, as Comrade Gorbachev described it, this surrealistic plan of delivery from the nuclear threat. Most likely, this is not a plan of delivery from the nuclear threat, but a plan pursuing other ends: preparing an aggression, exerting pressure on the Soviet Union, achieving a technological lead over the Soviet Union by the United States -- these are apparently the real plans of these U.S. "star wars" projects.

But regarding them from the view point of their purpose, what we see here is an example of the two concepts of security: the U.S. concept of security, which rests upon American technical arrogance, focusing on technology -- and the Soviet concept of ensuring equal security for all by reducing armaments and promoting disarmament, including complete elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction.

[Sobolev] A sufficient amount of time has already elapsed since Comrade Gorbachev put forward the wide-scale Soviet program of complete nuclear and chemical disarmament. One can say that the forces approving of and supporting the Soviet program, which are even prepared to undertake practical action to realize it, as, for example, Dante Caputo, the Argentine minister of foreign relations, put it, has shaped itself. This front includes not only progressive public organizations, left parties and associations
of peace advocates, the Soviet disarmament program is being welcomed by practically all nonaligned countries headed by India, governments of neutral countries such as Austria, Finland and Sweden, for example, and even of a NATO member-country, that is Greece. It appears that it is about time that those immediately concerned with the Soviet proposals on disarmament should make themselves clear on the subject. However, there is no reply yet.

[Gerasimov] In any case, the Soviet program has certainly caused an abrupt change in international relations.

[Sobolev] Yes.

[Gerasimov] This was particularly mentioned by Senator Edward Kennedy, who visited Moscow recently. He put it this way: Lately, one often felt that we were living through a prolonged winter of our discontent in the field of arms control, and also in the field of other problems that divide us. Now, we feel as if the spring of hope is setting in at last.

[Sobolev] One can even say that the Soviet disarmament program is already working for the benefit of peace, for the benefit of improving international relations and resolving some kind of specific problems. Let us say, for instance, problems of confidence at the Stockholm conference, or the problems concerning reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments which are being discussed at the Vienna talks. All correspondents, all observers, who are present there, note that the atmosphere has changed for the better. Participants in these talks and forums are displaying a more realistic approach to discussion of the issues on the agenda there. As far as the United States is concerned, there was a brief mention that delegations have been sent off, headed by representatives of the President. Their purpose is ostensibly to coordinate the U.S. analysis of the statement by Comrade Gorbachev, and the analysis which is currently being made in Western Europe.

[Gerasimov] There is nothing wrong with that, if there would be a joint answer, should it be a good answer, supporting the Soviet proposals.

[Sobolev] Yes, but unfortunately, in an important governmental document of the United States, for example such as the President's State of the Union address, there is not a single word mentioning the Soviet disarmament program.

[Volskiy] Just a moment ago, when we were talking about the fact that the political atmosphere in the world was improving, one can see there are signs of an opposite process as well; that is, the forces intending to poison the international atmosphere have again become more active. Again, in a number of countries one can observe some increase in anti-Soviet phenomena.

Take France for example. We are in favor of good relations with France; our relations with France are good, and have traditionally been so. In France at the moment we observe a certain increasing wave of anti-Sovietism. Or take the United States: ABC, for instance, has decided to make a television series on what America would be like under Soviet occupation. A provocative venture, indeed, and a venture undertaken by the entertainment programs department.

[Sobolev] This series will appear day after day, and every evening Americans will see how nasty the Soviet people are.
[Volskiy] Well, there is entertainment and then there is entertainment. In the case at issue it is political hooliganism, because even if the Americans who watch this nonsense think it is entertainment, something will nevertheless remain in their minds to the effect that there is, it turns out, a certain probability that the United States will be occupied.

[Sobolev] Yes, and they will get the wrong impression about Soviet people.

[Gerasimov] One which was created long ago, and this is slung in to reinforce it.

[Volskiy] Now, of course, all these tendencies precisely in France and in the United States -- and one could obviously find examples in other countries, too -- show just how hard it is for common sense to find its way through in international relations.

State of the Union Address

[Gerasimov] In general, the State of the Union address which U.S. presidents deliver at the beginning of the year is quite an interesting, specifically American genre of political rhetoric.

Even though these messages are regular, and on the whole routine, those who write them strive at all times to adopt such a high tone, an exceptionally high tone, presenting the current moment as unique and unrepeatable. For example, this time the President announced that the United States had started to move, as though it had been standing still up to now. And if it has started moving in some particular sense, why right now? Reagan, after all, has been President for the last 5 years.

But anyway, no one takes this rhetoric seriously. One should nevertheless treat the address itself seriously, because, of course, behind the splendid phrases lie certain arguments which allow one to perceive the Americans' political intentions.

[Sobolev] It should be said that U.S. observers nevertheless regard such documents ironically, on the grounds that they are bound to contain official optimism. Gerald Ford once very nearly tried to say that the state of affairs in the country was bad, and he rapidly lost his presidential chair. Traditionally, therefore, every president always talks optimistically and only about the good things, trying to circumvent all difficulties, so to speak, all problems and unpleasant aspects of American life, of which there are more than enough.

[Volskiy] That's true. But one cannot pass over all the difficulties. One can, therefore, always trace behind this rhetoric certain topics of concern to Americans. Take the address in question. To summarize its contents briefly, one can do that literally in a few phrases: First, the United States is living beyond its means; the government spends more than the treasury receives. Second, in order to live within one's means, government expenditure must be cut. But military spending must in no way be cut: the Russians would take that as a manifestation of weakness, whereas they must believe the Americans to be strong.

[Sobolev] It is not just a matter of cutting spending, but of increasing expenditure.

[Volskiy] Yes, Reagan is calling for an additional increase in U.S. military spending.
[Sobolev] This is quite at variance with both the spirit of Geneva and, in general, with the current mood reigning in the world.

[Volskiy] In all, the old plan of guns instead of butter. Even wealthy America cannot have both at once. The President is making a clear choice here: he is opting for guns. What is more, the address makes no mention — the failure to mention this is particularly striking — of either the Soviet proposals on the program for eliminating nuclear weapons, or of the Soviet-U.S. Geneva accord to strive to prevent an arms race in space and to halt it on earth.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1263
Hello, esteemed comrade listeners! Exactly 1 month ago, on 16 January, the newspapers of the whole world — and that is no exaggeration — published a statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Radio and television broadcast the statement 1 day earlier, on the 15th, which was when it appeared. Now that a certain period of time has elapsed, it would be very worthwhile for us to take a look at the reaction throughout the world to the ideas contained in Comrade Gorbachev’s statement. First of all, however, I would like to remind you of what the Soviet proposals were essentially about. Briefly speaking, our country suggested that we reach the 21st century without nuclear and chemical weapons. Here I would also like to recall that the Soviet Union, as an example, a vivid example, of its political will, decided to extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until March 31 in the hope that the United States would join in with us. Those proposals, as you all know, are being widely discussed throughout the world at various government levels.

The idea of saving mankind from nuclear weapons and preventing the arms race from being extended into space is such a substantial one that it somehow overshadows other very important aspects of the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. These include the elimination of barbarous chemical weapons and, of course, the Soviet Union's readiness to substantially lower the level of so-called conventional weapons which, due to progress in military technology, are beginning to acquire the characteristics of mass destruction weapons. Here I am talking about conventional weapons in the very broadest sense of the word. But what you were saying about the questions being raised in the West regarding the statement by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary is quite right, and they are questions of a two-fold nature. On the one hand are the questions prompted by the desire to understand, to comprehend the Soviet position and define what it is; and on the other hand there are the questions that are put simply to complicate things unnecessarily; questions which, more than anything else, reflect the absence of any constructive ideas on the part of those who raise them. Take, for instance, the question of ending nuclear tests. When the Soviet Union stopped all its nuclear explosions and announced a unilateral moratorium, what the United States said was that the Soviet Union had already carried out its nuclear tests, and that the United States had a program which they had not yet completed.
Nikolay Vladimirovich, I would like to back up what you have been saying with the following example: Recently at the disarmament conference in Geneva, a speech was delivered by the Swedish representative, Ambassador Britt Theorin. Referring to information produced by the Swedish center for defense research, she said the center had calculated that from 1945 through 1985 more than 1,500 nuclear weapons tests had been carried out in the world. The precise figure was 1,567. The dismal leader in this competition, she said, was the United States, which carried out 801 explosions. According to the calculations by the Swedish center, the Soviet Union carried out 563 nuclear explosions; France, 135; Great Britain, 38; and China 29. I would like you to focus your attention, comrade listeners, on the figures for the United States and the Soviet Union: 801 and 563, respectively. This makes any talks about the United States somehow lagging behind completely groundless, and I would say that this is known by sober-minded people in the United States.

As an example, I would refer to an article in THE NEW YORK TIMES which says frankly that we have no excuse today for rejecting the new moratorium. The advantage of such a ban is evident: It would be the first concrete step in the process of arms control which could result in other moratoriums, and then a firm accord providing for inspections and other precautionary measures. It has to be said that the administration, however, has no desire to make any concessions at all in this matter: at least to date we have seen nothing positive from the United States in response to the Soviet initiative in putting a moratorium on nuclear explosions.

It would appear that the United States should be saying now: Well, yes, we have been carrying out tests, but the Soviet Union is not carrying out tests. So, it is time to come to an agreement. But no, a different argument is used: What about the question of monitoring: how do you verify? The Soviet Union says that it is essentially ready for all-embracing surveillance measures over the end of nuclear weapons tests, including on-site surveillance. The Soviet Union furthermore states its positive attitude toward the nonaligned countries' idea of extending the well-known 1963 treaty banning nuclear tests in the three media to include underground nuclear tests. But, on this, the United States maintains a stony silence. The United States says that what is needed are corresponding talks and corresponding accords.

The Soviet Union, in its statement back in January, says that it is ready to sit down immediately at the negotiating table together with the United States and Great Britain, but we are now in the middle of February and there still has been no reply from the United States and Great Britain to the proposal to embark on those talks. But the problem of nuclear tests itself, of course, has become a test of the West's political good will, because it is the kind of problem whose solution would immediately have an effect both on the political climate and the atmosphere at the talks on various levels and on various disarmament problems that are being held between us and the United States, and between the socialist and the Western countries.

The whole world is saying enough is enough. It is time something was done. Look how many proposals the Soviet Union has made. No, say the Americans, we are going to carry on. We need to test our nuclear weapons. They have already abandoned all their little demagogic statement about verification and are coming straight out with -- and these are no longer the generals, but the politicians -- straight out with the honest truth and saying: We need to test our new nuclear weapons. That is all there is to it, and we will carry out nuclear tests.
Yet we have heard numerous calls from the West for us—because we speak about our peaceloving intentions—to back them up with concrete action and make some sort of gesture. Many people in West, and I would call them deluded in good faith, used to say that if one of the great powers were to embark on unilateral disarmament, it would induce the other power to embark on the same path without fail. But, we assumed a very concrete pledge to end nuclear explosions, and we in actuality gave the Americans time not only for thought, but also to complete their series of tests. And what was the result?

I think Aleksandr Yevgenyevich once said that to test the United States, the sort of step one could take could be to agree to some U.S. ideas, or to part of those ideas, and propose them to the United States, whereupon the United States immediately turns its back on them.

Let us take Europe, and specifically medium-range missiles. Judging by what the U.S. press says, quoting the British and French press—a rather complicated maneuver—the Americans are saying this: We in fact would welcome your proposal to completely do away with the missiles with open arms, but it is our allies, you know, who do not want to.

Britain and France, as you know, comrades, are an indispensable element of our proposal. The second thing is that we are ready to remove all our SS-20 missiles from Europe in exchange for the Americans removing theirs, but on the condition that the Americans do not sell their allies new, modernized missile weaponry. What this means specifically is that the British intend to replace the Polaris missiles on their submarines with Trident missiles, which the United States is to supply. But the same thing, the United States says: Yes, in principle we are in favor of removing the missiles, but we still have to supply the new missiles, otherwise relations with our allies will be upset, and so on. In other words, what we have is that when it is a matter of general terms, they say: Yes, your proposal looks alright. We will have to think about it and discuss it. But as soon as you get down to concrete detail, then reservations immediately appear. Because it would not be right simply to say no, they take some sort of roundabout way; but then in the end the answer is no all the same, just as it is now, for example, in Europe.

I would say that, if one is speaking of the French and British positions, I get the impression that they are not absolutely identical. I have in mind the speech by French President Mitterrand, in which he answered questions from the Here and Now Clubs. In his speech there is a general appraisal of the situation. In particular, Mitterrand stressed that it must never be forgotten—and these are his words—that disarmament takes priority over armament for France.

Well, yes.

That is the general postulate, but here is what Mitterrand had to say specifically: In the final analysis, we would agree to take part in talks on disarmament, if, first, the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States are considerably reduced. I am not referring to any numbers, because it does not befit me to refer to any numbers. On this matter there is a clear-cut proposal by the Soviet Union, a proposal for a 50 percent reduction in the first stage. The second conditions was that conventional, chemical, and all the other types of weapons are taken into account at the same time as nuclear weapons. Incidentally, this also is contained in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement of 15 January.
[Bovin] I support such a stern and realistic view of life. It is very pleasant for me, of course, to hear what you have just read from Mr. Mitterrand's speech. But I nevertheless am convinced that if one goes on from these pleasant-sounding general declarations to specific deeds, things are not, I think, at all as pleasing as we would like. Indeed, the French will go on modernizing their nuclear forces, and I have the impression -- and this is being said quite clearly -- that at the present time there can be no question of a freeze. They are saying: Sometime, later, when there is this 50 percent, then we shall consider it. This means that they are automatically barring the way to removing Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles from Europe.

[Levin] Unfortunately, one cannot fail to agree with that.

[Bovin] No, indeed. Let me mention what Rogers, the commander in chief of NATO's forces in Europe said recently -- I think it was the day before yesterday...

[Levin, interrupting] Yes, it was in NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG.

[Bovin] He said: What is the discussion about? Europe needs Pershing missiles and Europe needs U.S. cruise missiles. He said: What disarmament can there be? What zero option can there be? Even what the United States itself was proposing at one time does not suit him.

[Levin] But he is well aware that when they made their proposals it was with dishonest intentions and not in order to reach agreement, but rather to create an impression.

[Bovin] He needs the missiles and that is all. He has said so distinctly. That is the real position that the politicians sometimes attempt to draw a veil over and to dress up in all kinds of words, while the general blurs out the truth, so to speak.

[Levin] But his own truth, which is altogether in the present-day world meeting with mounting resistance.

[Bovin] Unfortunately, however, it is not meeting with resistance in either the White House or the Pentagon.

[Levin] Yes, that is certainly so. But in this connection I would like to mention the position of China, which is also a nuclear power.

[Bovin] China's position is as follows, and, incidentally, is an interesting point. There are two special assistants to the President and the secretary of state on disarmament questions, namely the well-known Paul Nitze and Edward Rowny. Well, Nitze went to Europe and Rowny to Asia for consultations -- as it was put -- with allies and friends, precisely on the subject of the Soviet proposals. Rowny visited China in order to consult with China about the Soviet statement. Well, I have the impression that in general, he was not given a very warm welcome in Beijing. After all, the Chinese are opposed, for example, to the "star wars" program, to which the Americans are tenaciously clinging. The Chinese are in principle, so to speak, in favor of disarmament, at some time or other, at any rate. However, they more or less regard us and the Americans as being on a par. You disarm, they say, and then we will see. This is approximately their position, the Chinese reiterated during the talks in Beijing with Rowny. These talks were very brief, it is true, as he was only there for 1 day.
[Levin] Han Xu, China's ambassador to the United States, gave an interview to the Japanese ASAHI. The Washington correspondent of this important Japanese newspaper asked outright how China regards the Soviet proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapons before the end of the century, and -- going on to mention what you were saying about the equal responsibility of the Soviet Union and the United States, the Chinese ambassador said that, if the United States and the USSR really intend to eliminate nuclear armaments, they should first of all make reductions of 50 percent in their nuclear arsenals. Once it is convinced that this has been achieved, China, we reckon, will be able to sit down at the negotiating table to discuss a reduction in its own nuclear armaments.

[Bovin] Compared with the stand adopted several years ago under Mao Tse-tung, this is certainly some kind of improvement. Let us hope that this is what will happen.

[Levin] Yes, but for the moment...

[Bovin, interrupting] The important thing is for them to tell the United States that they should agree to a 50 percent disarmament! That is the problem.

[Levin] For the moment, nevertheless, we are quite right to note, and justifiably note, that the 15 January statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was not only addressed to the United States, it was addressed to the whole world. But at present it is evident...

[Bovin, interrupting] Nevertheless, it was, of course mainly addressed to the United States.

[Levin] And we are awaiting a response from the United States. But along with these questions that are being amassed by the United States, its political line, after all, is also continuing to instill very great alarm. Take just the recent U.S. actions, that is to say, its foreign policy.

[Shishlin] If one looks at the U.S. President's message on the administration's legislative initiatives for fiscal 1982, then there is once again the foundation of a program for building up medium-range nuclear arms, not to mention strategic arms, the production of MX missiles, the production of Midgetman missiles, and others. But there is a great deal at stake. In actual fact, in the fate of the whole process of smoothing out international relations is at stake. At stake is the fate of that task, which to me is the key task for 1986: the task of really reducing the level of military confrontation, the task of really overcoming those most painful, most complex problem areas which have an extremely bad effect on the whole world situation and on Soviet-U.S. relations in particular.

[Levin] If we are to talk, so to speak, of definite prospects, then what is at stake is the fate of mankind. So, of course, the situation in the world remains complicated and tense.

[Bovin] Well, someone said this: What is the difference in the world before Geneva and after Geneva? Before Geneva it was a world of confrontation, and now it is a world of confrontation with a dialogue. Well, that is also a good thing. Yes, a dialogue has begun between the United States and us and incidentally, it is continuing. Take the signing of the agreement on airplane flights. Some things will have to do with cultural exchanges and then there will be something else. These are all useful and
necessary things. Some things, of course, continue to move along slowly. But confrontation remains in questions of politics and principle and we, comrades, should see this clearly. We want to perceive the world not through the prism of some kind of illusory notions, but as it is per se. We will do everything to improve the situation and use the opportunities which exist. But, we must look at things realistically.

[Levin] Many complexities remain and of course this includes the issue that was raised in the 15 January declaration by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on the need for a new way of thinking.

[Shishlin] Definitely. And in this respect, it seems to me that the United States simply does not yet fully understand and maybe has not at all come to understand that the nuclear age does indeed require a new way of thinking. It really does require a breaking away from those usual norms of relationships and methods of solving all kinds of conflicts that have been used by countries, nations, and people throughout the thousands of years of mankind's history.

[Levin] This appeared very clearly, particularly in the speeches of Secretary of Defense Weinberger on the Pentagon draft budget for the next fiscal year. He just repeats the old thesis that only force can guarantee the security of the United States, although experience now very clearly shows that force undermines security and we have to renounce these ideas, ideas which are, generally speaking, from the Stone Age.

[Bovin] Well, for example, if you have read Western scientific literature, what is being written by learned men, English, American, French, they have been working on this problem for a long time. They think in a new way. They are analyzing all this in a new way now, taking account of the realities of the nuclear age. But on the level of the politicians and of official administrations, well, of course, hold-ups occur there because the new way of thinking basically requires a major psychological change, a major intellectual change. It is such a high barrier. Here in this case, the U.S. Administration is incapable of getting over this barrier, even though in American literature, in newspapers and magazines, on the level of journalists, you can find as many common-sense, considered, intelligent thoughts as you like coming precisely from the new realities. But on the level of government, unfortunately, we are not yet seeing this, or we perhaps see only the beginnings, so to speak, of this.

When Reagan says that war cannot be won, now that is indeed an element of the new thinking. But unfortunately he does not draw all the conclusions he should from this statement. That is where the problem lies. Things stop in mid-thought and he gets stuck somewhere in the stagnant, traditional, old ideas.

[Shishlin] The value of the Soviet statement and the value of the recent speeches which develop and clarify those ideas contained in the statement -- and these clarifications were made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev -- is precisely that the Soviet position considers not only the security interests of the Soviet Union but, to the same extent, the security interests of the United States and the security interests of other states. The sum of ideas that is contained in this statement has been formed from many points of view and the comparison of different points of view that were expressed throughout the last months of very intense political work, which was carried out in our mutual relations with different states, and first and foremost the socialist, nonaligned countries, and the developed capitalist states. In itself, this new approach to international relations will, of course, I understand, come up against the force of inertia, the force of habit and the force of traditional relations, but we have made the whole world speak of our ideas. A very full, impor-
tant, and vital political struggle around these ideas has gotten underway. Not only people on a governmental level invested with a certain political authority are getting involved in this struggle, but the peoples are getting involved in this struggle and this, of course, is extremely important.

[Levin] Our task is to make sure that these ideas, these elements of new thinking without which mankind is simply doomed, are implemented. Our policy, and all the efforts of our party and our state, are concentrated on this. But the struggle before us is, it cannot be denied, a dogged, complex political struggle. We will go our part of the way. There is no doubt about that. We demonstrate this not only in words but also in concrete actions. Not everything in the world depends on us, and our friends and allies who fully support us in this cause. As an example, I would like to refer to an interview which Comrade Jaruzelski, the leader of Poland, gave to Italian television. The point is that the Italian television correspondent asked the question directly: What do you think of the proposals of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev concerning disarmament? Here is Comrade Jaruzelski's reply:

I consider these proposals to be, first, very wise; second, very bold; and third, very honest. It is a good thing that these proposals have not shared the fate of other earlier advanced proposals, that they were not rejected out of hand, but are being analyzed by the Western partners. It is important that we should all watch out that the analysis of these proposals is not deftly sidetracked and that the initiative is not put in doubt in any way. That would be a great loss.

That is the assessment of Comrade Jaruzelski. That is how he assesses the West's reaction, and it is a very realistic assessment.

[Shishlin] The fate of the ideas advanced by the Soviet Union depends, of course, in certain measure on the way in which Soviet-U.S. relations will develop, but not just on Soviet-U.S. relations. In this regard, of course, Europe can and must play its part in the improvement of international relations. It seems to me to be significant that our dialogue, the Soviet Union's dialogue with the European countries, has perceptibly been intensifying over all these past months, and in this respect, 1986 promises to be a particularly abundant year insofar as Moscow will be receiving senior politicians from the Western European states, and of course, our statesmen will have the opportunity to hold talks with the West European countries. We can naturally expect that in this European voice the ideas that are being worked out and generated by the socialist countries acting jointly will of course resonate appreciably.

The positive trend toward strengthening the coordination of actions of the socialist states, actions, which emerged so manifestly last year, will undoubtedly be consolidated in 1986. It is a substantial factor.

[Levin] With that, comrades, we come to the end of our program today. All the best to you. Thank you for your attention.

/12858
CSO: 5200/1263
Events, even those of a week, sometimes have a deep roots in the past. Up until 6 August 1945, when the bomb dropped from an American aircraft wiped Hiroshima off the face of the earth, mankind thought itself immortal. Not even the most dreadful epidemics and wars deprived it of the chance of rebirth. Now the unimaginable had become possible. Fortunately, it is not just the techniques of destruction that are being developed. There are powerful forces in the world which are capable of giving mankind back its immortality. They way to this is mapped out by the program drawn up by the motherland of socialism to free the earth of weapons of mass destruction by the end of our century. The reality of this path is being realized in a difficult, complex struggle, as evidenced by many events in international life this week.

Ahead

The problem of mankind's survival in the nuclear age and of the need to abandon the mentality, habits, and rules of the stone age has once again been raised in all its magnitude in M.S. Gorbachev's recently published replies to L'HUMANITE's questions. Imbued with profound conviction as to the reality of ending the crazy arms race, these replies will undoubtedly contribute to the essential sharp turn so needed in international affairs. This is essentially a practical manifestation of the Soviet Union's immutable readiness to be worthy of the greatest responsibility and to help in every possible way to carry out this historic task. The USSR is once again demonstrating that for it there is no loftier mission than that of defending peace and curbing the forces of aggression and militarism in the name of the life of the present generation and future generations.

...The UK Labor Party's National Executive Committee issued a special statement entitled "Labor's Reply to M.S. Gorbachev's Disarmament Proposals." "We consider these proposals extremely important and weighty," the statement reads. "We welcome the call for full nuclear disarmament...However, we are concerned at the fact that these proposals will be threatened by research and development and the testing and deployment of systems within the framework of the 'Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. Therefore we confirm that we categorically oppose the 'star wars' program..

The position of J. Rau, the Social Democratic Party of Germany's candidate for the FRG chancellorship, is indicative of the sentiments of West European politicians, above all, those in the social democratic movement. After his recent visit to Moscow he set out across the ocean to familiarize himself with Washington's reaction to the Soviet peace
initiatives. On his arrival there J. Rau advocated the start of a new stage of the policy of detente. "Specific measures must be discussed," he declared, "at the second Soviet-U.S. summit meeting...Like other Europeans, we believe that space must not be a place for an arms buildup. We on earth have more than enough to do in the disarmament sphere."

Of course, it could be said that Labor is "still" not in power in London, nor the Social Democrats in Bonn. However, they detect quite clearly the sentiments of their countries' population. Following the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles and the adoption of the "star wars" program in the United States, the allergy to all kinds of "arms upgrading," whether on earth or in space, has spread to the majority of the population of Western Europe.

Disguise or...

A few days ago a scandal erupted in Bonn over a banquet in honor of a high-level guest from across the ocean. At the table in the U.S. ambassador's residence and in the presence of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State J. Whitehead, H. Teltschik, adviser to the chancellor, took the liberty of being unforgivably frank. He declared for all to hear that an agreement with the United States on FRG involvement in the U.S. "star wars" program was "on the point" of being ready.

Free Democrat Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher at once issued a statement: There will be no involvement in the "star wars" program without a general agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. But under pressure from F.-J. Strauss, leader of the extreme right-wing representing military concerns, Chancellor H. Kohl immediately disavowed his minister: "This is not the government's viewpoint."

Of course, it would be possible to depict the clash in the Bonn leadership merely as an argument over the question of what "dressing" to put on the plans to involve the country in the U.S. plans for the militarization of space when dishing them up to the FRG population, which has an antiwar disposition. Probably, for a certain section of the opposing groups, it really is a question of just choosing the best disguise. It is on these that the Pentagon counts.

A regrouping has occurred in FRG industry, and there has been a considerable increase in the size of military concerns and their influence in the country. Bonn is reacting more and more to pressure from the military-industrial complex. However, the lessons of the past, when some of the leaders of German firms had to sit in the dock as war criminals after 1945, have not been forgotten by everyone.

There are not that many concerns in the FRG that are entirely absorbed in the weapons trade. The majority have "grown two legs" -- one military and one civilian; for both eventualities of world development. At the same time, civilian production remains paramount for many. They know from their own experience that the escalation of the arms race and, even more, its transfer into space, will sharply exacerbate the situation in the world. Production cutbacks, rising unemployment posing a danger to stability, and the undermining of Western Europe's competitiveness will prove inevitable.

The recent Bonn conference of representatives of numerous West German peace champions' organizations confirmed that the struggle is continuing. "We demand," its participants declared, "that the FRG Government make a positive response to the new Soviet peace..."
Drugs Against Doubts

The bus which a few days previously had taken the astronauts to Challenger this time delivered a large wreath to a helicopter. The helicopter then flew over the ocean, and at precisely 1139, the exact minute that the spacecraft blew up, the wreath was dropped onto the water...

America is in mourning -- particularly those who know how difficult the path into space is. And, as always with hard losses, the thought -- "Were the sacrifices in vain?" -- nags at people's consciousness. While specialists are sorting through debris to find the possible technical causes of the disaster, many people in the United States -- and not only there -- are taking a critical second look at space concepts these days. The Challenger explosion has also shed light on the hidden, unpublicized side of the program to prepare for "star wars." "More and more specialists in various U.S. research establishments," THE NEW YORK TIMES has reported, "are expressing the opinion that the Challenger disaster has confirmed that the plans to deploy weapons systems in space are fraught with deadly danger for mankind. This tragedy has brought us back to the real world."

"Let us imagine that a spacecraft has blown up in orbit under conditions when arms systems have been deployed in space," R. Bowman, director of the Institute for the Study of Space Problems (United States), for example, argues. "The computers controlling the systems would react instantly to the explosion, and... Perhaps the Challenger disaster will make the initiators of the 'star wars' program realize the terrible danger to our planet's very existence and will push the administration into constructive talks with the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms. There is no place for weapons in space."

Washington is still maintaining a stubborn silence. One month will soon have elapsed. At the same time, the American press is reporting that the White House is planning a special campaign aimed at "convincing the public of the need to further build up the country's military potential." The Pentagon has disseminated the draft of its U.S. military budget for fiscal 1987. A new record -- $311.6 billion. The arms that the military-industrial complex wants to impose on the United States in just 1 year would undoubtedly be more than enough for all the country's national defence needs. And yet this is just an "addition" to the already existing huge nuclear potential.

To justify the unchecked accumulation of weapons there is the same old speculation on people's ardent desire to put an end to confrontation and to conclude an agreement on disarmament with the USSR.

"To act from a position of strength," C. Weinberger says, "is the only way to hold talks effectively..." As though it were possible to prevent fuel tanks from exploding by hosing them with gasoline. Playing with fire ends in flames. An almost 40-percent increase in military spending is planned over the next 5 years.

However, this program of madness is not being pushed through smoothly. "Today we are coming up against the serious task of achieving national concord in support of our efforts to restore America's defenses," U.S. Vice President G. Bush complained recently. The country has been split as a result of the devilish persistence with
which, contrary to reason and the national interest, mountains of weapons are being built up. A narcotic faith in "miracle weapons" is being injected in ever larger doses into a country where worship not of man but of technology is cultivated so strongly; as though these weapons, meaning SDI, could solve the problems of modern society.

The bulletin NATO REPORT records the exacerbation of disagreements among the NATO allies with regard to the response to Moscow. Western Europe fears Washington's adventurist course. Thus, the London conservative newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES believes that a decision by the U.S. President to "sacrifice an equitable arms agreement for the purpose of continuing the 'star wars' program" would be "a nightmare variant which would deprive Europeans of sleep."

These days Washington has sent its emissaries to Western Europe and Asia with instructions to allay anxieties.

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CSO: 5200/1263
You do not have to look back very far sometimes to sense the reality of the changes taking place in the international atmosphere. Both in the West and the East today people are talking about the possibility of restoring detente. Not with a sense of elation, but with a certain optimism. Its source is obvious. It lies in the whole package of large-scale USSR peace initiatives which the world press is calling the Soviet "comprehensive peace program." Our party is taking this program confidently toward its 27th congress. Its essence was expressed with the utmost clarity in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Mankind has been offered a realistic prospect of freeing our planet from nuclear and chemical weapons by the year 2000.

In reply to L'HUMANITE's question about whether new signs of the restoration of detente in international relations have been noticed since the Geneva summit, M.S. Gorbachev said:

"Yes, some signs are beginning to appear. And it is not only and not so much a question of individual shifts in the sphere of Soviet-U.S. relations: They are too limited, peripheral, and do not affect the fundamental questions. Instead a certain change in the political atmosphere is already being felt. And that has engendered in the peoples of many countries a hope and belief in the possibility of returning to detente, ending the insane arms race, and developing normal peaceful international cooperation. This is already something real and politically significant."

On the one hand the Soviet Union's dynamic and purposeful foreign policy is causing confusion in the ranks of the cold war supporters, and on the other it is forcing even convinced opponents of socialism to take a new look at what is happening in the world. At a recent plenum of the Communist Party of the United States of America Central Committee, the U.S. Communists' leader Gus Hall said that since the summit, changes had occurred in the leading U.S. political and monopolistic circles, which have been reflected in the Reagan administration. Those circles, G. Hall noted, remain anti-communist and anti-Soviet in outlook. But their assessment of the balance of world forces has changed. Now you can see a certain realism based on their assessment of the lack of success of the 8-year-old cold war policy.
Serious opposition to the arms race program and the militarization of space can also be seen in the U.S. Congress. For example, D. Fasell, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, urged the administration to respond positively to the Soviet leader's statement and, in particular, to support the USSR's proposal for a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. The House recently resumed the discussion of a resolution supporting a test ban treaty submitted by 208 congressmen last October.

Sober-minded Americans are sounding the alarm. They demand that the administration "not miss the opportunity," that it respond constructively to the Soviet proposals, and that it not complicate the entirely attainable accords on a mutual reduction of the nuclear arsenals by programming the arms race for decades to come. For example, Congressmen G. Brown and L. AuCoin recently demanded that spending on antisatellite weapons (ASAT) be excluded from the new budget. Representatives of the public organization Program for Peace and International Security have written in THE NEW YORK TIMES: "If our children's future is made dependent on an uncontrolled arms race and space weapons systems causing global instability, a terrible explosion may occur in which the whole world will burn."

The feelings of sober-minded Americans are echoed by many West Europeans' thoughts. H. Scheer, a leader to the Social Democratic Party of Germany's Bundestag faction, recently sharply criticized the Bonn Government's support for "star wars" and the continuation of nuclear tests. Commenting on the USSR's proposals, he said: "Instead of making use of this real opportunity to ban nuclear weapons tests, the FRG Government is doing the very opposite. Whoever approves of SDI must logically also block the banning of nuclear tests."

Is all this being taken into account in the White House during the formulation of a reply to the Soviet initiatives? The United States is now openly talking about an "intensified internal struggle on the important foreign and defense policy problems" which, as the PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER writes, is "vexing the upper echelons of the Reagan administration at a time when the President is facing the most serious political challenge from the USSR."

This struggle between the "hawks" and the "pragmatists" for influence over the President began back in the period of preparations for the summit meeting, as demonstrated by the "leak" to the press of the regrettable "Weinberger letter." It has now become more acute, particularly after the President expressed his gratitude to the Soviet leader for the new disarmament proposals.

These political battles within the Washington hierarchy explain to a considerable extent the reasons for the very long silence on the new Soviet initiatives — after all, it is today exactly 1 month since M.S. Gorbachev's statement was published in the press and there has still been no reply to it from across the ocean. The U.S. Administration explains this delay by saying that as a preliminary move Washington had decided to "consult with its allies and friends." For that reason in particular P. Nitze, the administration's main expert in the disarmament sphere, toured the West European countries. He visited Bonn, Paris, London, and Brussels, where he conducted a special session of the NATO Council. General Rowny, another expert, went on the same mission to Tokyo and... Beijing.

While Washington is preparing its answer, the U.S. press is in its own way "formulating" the content of that reply. If these commentaries are to be believed, Washington is
by no means burning with the desire to work at freeing the planet from nuclear weapons
together with the nonmilitarization of space. Washington regards SDI 'like the Hindu
"sacred cow" and is striving to impose this attitude on everyone. At the same time
it is trying to confuse the issue by hinting that the Soviet Union has become "more
flexible" in its approach to the problem of the nonmilitarization of space. However,
the USSR has made it clear that the implementation of the "star warre concept will
nullify the hopes of reducing nuclear armaments on earth.

Judging by articles in the U.S. press, people are not adverse to hedging with various
conditions the solution of the question of eliminating the USSR and U.S. medium-range
missiles in Europe. On the one hand their commentaries advise Britain and France not
to agree to freeze their nuclear forces during the elimination of the Soviet and U.S.
medium-range missiles in Europe. And on the other they demand the unilateral reduc-
tion of the corresponding Soviet weapons in Asia, which are a counterweight to the
U.S. nuclear potential existing there.

Is there really a blockage here — on a question on which there are "points of
contact," as noted in Geneva? This alarming thought is suggested, in particular, by
the latest revelations of U.S. General Rogers, commander in chief of NATO's armed
forces. "The destruction of medium-range weapons would mean," he stated, "that the
Pershing-2 and cruise missiles will disappear from Europe, in other words, the very
weapons linking European and U.S. security." How about that then!

So perhaps Washington's envoys who toured Western Europe and the Asian countries were
interested not so much in finding out their allies' opinion on the Soviet initiatives
as in imposing on them their own opinion of the whole package of Soviet disarmament
proposals?

Among the leaders of the West European countries and other states allied to the
United States, there is still no single opinion on the new Soviet initiatives. Both
there and across the ocean the struggle is underway between the supporters of accords
with the USSR leading to a nuclear-free 21st century and those who strive to perpet-
uate the cold war and the arms race. Nevertheless, in Europe, the cradle of detente,
the sensible ones prevail. This cannot be ignored in the White House. There have
been quite a few statements from there on the desire for peace. But practical
actions show that the inertia in U.S. political thinking has not been overcome.

Yes, the West is now facing another "moment of truth." It must give a clear answer
to the USSR's proposal: scrap all the weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and
chemical, in the world and enter a nuclear-free 21st century together. The very fate
of mankind and of civilization on earth depends on that answer. And the leaders of the
United States and other Western powers must answer first of all to their own peoples.
RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S TROYANOVS KIY MAKES STATEMENT AT UN ON ARMS RACE

LD130536 Moscow TASS in English 0528 GMT 13 Feb 86

["Statement by Soviet Ambassador to United Nations"--TASS headline]

[Text] New York, February 13 TASS -- In the complicated international situation today it is vital for the states and peoples of all countries to take vigorous action to radically lessen tension and bridle the unrestrained arms race, Oleg Troyanovskiy, permanent representative of the USSR to the United Nations, told a new conference here.

This is why, he said, the most pressing needs of the times, those of preventing a nuclear war, making certain that all nuclear powers follow the Soviet lead and renounce first use of nuclear weapons, starting consistently to reduce nuclear-missile arsenals and ultimately eliminating them altogether, will continue to be in the focus of attention of the U.N. General Assembly, especially its First Committee which is concerned with political and security issues, including disarmament.

In this connection the Soviet representative pointed out the high appraisal given by international community to the January 15 statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, setting forth proposals aimed at doing away with nuclear weapons on this planet completely by the year 2000. Representatives of most states accredited at the United Nations Organization, Troyanovskiy said, see these latest major initiatives taken by the USSR as further proof of its readiness actually to remove the nuclear danger overhanging humanity.

In the United Nations world public opinion has also hailed another Soviet gesture of good will, namely the extension by the USSR of its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear blasts, and expects the U.S. Administration to join it, the Soviet representative said. If the moratorium became mutual, this would help progress towards an agreement on a general and complete prohibition of nuclear test, he added, noting that the United Nations also has an important role to play in fulfilling this task.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET WRITER ON U.S. NAVAL STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR WAR

PM281015 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Part 2 of article by IZVESTIYA political observer Valentin Falin: "Back to the Stone Age"]

[Text] So, "stage one." In the report, this stage opens with the observation that some "international situation could grow into a global confrontation between the superpowers." By means of the flexible and resolute use of naval power throughout the world, we together with the allies' naval forces where appropriate -- will try to gain victory in the crisis, keep escalation under control, and by virtue of the global scope of our operations in itself, unequivocally declare the intention of not conceding to the Russians any region where we are not, and depriving them of the opportunity to determine the nature of combat operations to suit themselves." The chief of staff calls this concept "deterrence on the brink of war," combined with the readiness to cross that brink at any moment and commence operations throughout the globe.

Let us take a closer look at that concept of gaining "victory in a crisis," declaring any part of the world where there are no "Russians" to be a U.S. prize or sphere of influence, turning "deterrence" into a permanent balancing act between war and peace, and taking any dispute "to a global level." This is unprecedented. At least, American imperialism has not shown its teeth quite so openly, even during the period of nuclear monopoly.

How do they intend to cope, without overstraining themselves, with the task of "global control"? The defensive system of building and disposition of the Soviet Navy suits J. Watkins very well, especially the fact that the USSR has not acquired overseas bases, of which the United States has plenty. Rejecting the very idea of limiting the American fleets' "freedom" of operation, the admiral is trying out ideas on how to place lines of "forward basing and high mobility" around Soviet territorial waters. "The need for forward movement is clear," he states. "This is where the Soviet fleet will be, and this is where we must be ready to conduct combat operations." "The active forward movement of antisubmarine forces, both submarines and antisubmarine aircraft," we read in the report, "will force Soviet submarines to withdraw to defensive positions to protect submarines equipped with nuclear missiles. This at the same time robs the Russians of the opportunities to undertake in the early stages a massive attempt to cut our naval communications." Loading marines onto ships, "moving squadrons of forward-based ships in the direction of probable regions of hostilities," shipping "marine brigades by air to places where forward-based armaments are stockpiled," and "strengthening Norway," as well as ensuring the "prompt" forward deployment of aircraft carriers," attaching them to Japan, Norway, and Turkey, "will ensure the convenient sitting of forces for the fulfillment of the requirements of a unified command and for throwing back Soviet forces in the event of war."
All this, please note, is to be done in what is officially peacetime, and it is not known where -- in the Old World or the New -- a war will start, if it is fated to start at all. Distinctions are erased -- not only the watershed between sense and madness, but the distinctions between states, between water and land, between sky and earth.

"Forward deployment," the staff exhorts, "must be global and prompt. Deployment in the western Pacific directly increases the deterrent effect, including the prevention of attack in Europe, by making it clear that in the event of war the Russians will not be able to ignore a single region of the globe... Therefore even in the first stage, the naval strategy makes it possible to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union throughout the globe, and thereby facilitates the tasks of NATO's forces in Europe." And conversely, pressure in Europe should make it easier for the United States to implement its designs throughout the world.

"To influence the course of combat operations on land by limiting the redeployment of (Soviet) forces and the sending in of reinforcements and supplies through the direct use of carrier-borne aircraft and landing forces";

"To end the war on terms acceptable to us and our allies by resorting to such measures as the threat of a direct strike against the USSR's territory or a change in the correlation of nuclear forces." The U.S. Navy could influence this correlation by "destroying Soviet missile-carrying submarines and improving its own nuclear position by deploying aircraft carriers and ships equipped with Tomahawk missiles on the periphery of the USSR."

"In view of the Soviet Union's orientation toward the land," the chief of staff considers it "unlikely" that we will respond to "naval pressure" (?) with war across the whole spectrum. Although the strategy he puts forward is "a strategy not without risk," he would like to think that "the nuclear option for prolonging the war will be unattractive" to the Soviet side. In other words, that our pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons will operate even in the event of an American attack on Soviet nuclear forces by nonnuclear means.

We thank Watkins for the observation to the effect that the brinkmanship between nuclear and nonnuclear war in which the navy is to engage is only a component in the general national strategy. That is only natural. American militarism -- irrespective of categories of troops -- grows from one root and is inspired by one desire, that of achieving overwhelming military superiority at any price. That is impossible without breaking the nuclear parity. No problem! Deploy space strike weapons and bring first-strike missiles with a short flight time or concealed means of approach up close to the USSR's borders. That is in order to "neutralize" the Soviet land-based missile forces. The missile-carrying submarines would remain at large. The naval staff hurries to fill the breach. That is a true summary of the "naval strategy," which you will not find in the published text of the report.

It is high time to go back to the beginning. In a nuclear conflict there will be no winners -- the U.S. President repeats this on every occasion and passes off these words as a certificate of his "peaceability." That is, in a conflict in which nuclear means are used by both sides, practically simultaneously. But if they are used by one side, with a head start? It is clear from Watkins' report that Washington is not prepared to follow the USSR's example and make a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against countries which do not possess them or allow such weapons on their territory. The fact that others lack the opportunity to respond in kind is, for the Americans, an argument in favor of using their advantage.

If you take a closer look at Washington's "peaceability," it turns out to display other flaws too. While declaring nuclear war to be futile, the White House does not come out against war in the nuclear age, against armed violence and violence in general in inter-
state relations, or against threats of violence and all kinds of external pressure. Judging from the "star wars" doctrine, the "naval strategy," and now, too, the concept of "low-intensity military operations," this "omission" is no accident. The U.S. leadership would be satisfied if the exclusion of the threat of nuclear catastrophe, which the Americans themselves would certainly not survive, did not affect the possibility of Washington's using so-called conventional weapons with impunity. Moreover the administration is sounding out how far it can go here by carrying out "active operations" with nonnuclear means against the other side's nuclear forces and "thus improving its own nuclear position." So that is the common denominator between Reagan's "nuclear pacifism" and the "prenuclear adventurism" of Weinberger, Watkins, and others.

Attributing to the Soviet Union (the "Russians") the intention of attacking Europe is nothing but transferring to us the Americans' customary philosophy: If the United States would act in that way, why should other people behave differently? But alongside the fantasies, facts also arise -- Washington is turning its allies and fellow travelers into accomplices and hostages to highly dangerous doctrines. The U.S. Navy's plans are further confirmation of this.

"Stage two" -- "seizing the initiative." What this implies is not a response to real actions by the USSR, but the adoption by the West of measures minimizing our ability effectively to oppose threats created from outside.

Specifically, the U.S. Navy plans to embark on "the destruction of Soviet forces in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and other forward regions," and if necessary it will set about the "neutralization" of the Soviet Union's allies and will commence the penetration of Soviet territorial waters. As a result the path must open up "for exerting direct pressure on the Russians with a view to forcing them to end the war on our terms." A Jesuitical trick -- the United States will unleash a war so as to make the USSR end it on Washington's terms. That is how the demand for surrender sounds on the lips of Weinberger's subordinates. They hope to wage war only... until victory, although they foresee some difficulties.

"One of the most complex aspects of the second stage," the naval staff anticipates, "will be antiship operations." These are intended to prevent Soviet ships from reaching the open seas and to put out of action the maximum number of submarines, "including missile submarines." Naval operations must be combined with air operations, which would use both the U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers and the American allies' forces "on the north and south flanks of NATO or in Southeast Asia." It is planned to strengthen the potential of aircraft carrier formations with "strikes against land targets by nonnuclear Tomahawk missiles launched from submarines or surface ships." "The United States," the admiral stated, "cannot allow our enemy to proceed on the basis of the possibility of making attacks on our fleet with impunity from invulnerable refuges." This is a revised version of Washington's notorious claim, dreamed up in 1946-1947, to regard as an "encroachment on U.S. security" the acquisition by other countries of an arsenal for rendering American pressure harmless and rebuffing aggression.

"We cannot predict where the first shot will ring out..., but we can say almost for certain that the conflict will be associated with Europe," the admiral warns the NATO members, explaining at the same time why the Pershings and cruise missiles have been sent there. The Europeans' place is at the spearhead of American "deterrence," which turns the "age of peace" into the "age of violence," and it is high time they abandoned their dreams of detente. Neither they themselves nor their subordinates can be allowed to ease up in their concerns about war.

66
"Stage three" — the "transfer of combat operations to the enemy zone." "The tasks are similar to tasks in the earlier stages, but must be resolved more energetically as we strive to end the war on terms favorable to the United States and its allies," the report says in one place. And then the emphasis shifts to the destruction of Soviet missile-carrying submarines, in order, the admiral explains, to "reduce the probability of nuclear escalation by changing the nuclear balance in our favor."

More about nuclear parity later. For the moment, let us look at how the naval staff formulates U.S. objectives "in the conditions of global warfare." In the report they look like this:

"To deprive the Russians of the possibility of dictating the terms of war and to make it clear to them through global pressure that the conflict will not be brief and limited;

"To destroy the Soviet Navy; this goal is important in itself (!) and is a necessary step toward the implementation of our other goals";

The people at the top in Washington are certainly a strange class of people. They go to church punctiliously, receive communion, and regularly swear on the Bible. Not in order to take a look at the book of commandments for curiosity's sake. Thou shalt not kill, it is written there; do unto others as you would have them do unto you; do not lie. In order to understand how those others will see you, nothing could be simpler than to change the elements in the equation in places — to replace every mention in the staff report of the Soviet Union's Navy (the "Russians") with the U.S. Navy (the "Americans"), and ask yourself: Would "naval and air pressure," in the spirit of Watkins' concept, against American ships, bases, and territory be only a "crisis," a "combat operation," or war? They ask this secretly and they hint transparently that Washington would without delay press all the buttons and turn all the levers. The United States plans to repel even a hypothetical nonnuclear threat to its conventional arms with nuclear weapons. They seize on nuclear weapons in response not even to a threat to their arsenals, but to minor inconveniences arising for U.S. policy.

The American generals and admirals are not the first to think of the idea of "making war" with all conveniences. They have evidently confused the centuries. Mankind is preparing to enter the 21st century, but across the ocean the rulers and their heralds are absorbed in drawing up scenarios for a return to the stone age.

/8309
GSO: 5200/1260
New York -- At the recent session of the UN special committee on increasing the effectiveness of the principle of the nonuse of force in international relations, the task set by the 40th UN General Assembly session -- elaborating a draft declaration on the nonuse of force in international relations as an intermediate stage on the path to the elaboration of a world treaty on the nonuse of force in relations between states -- was not carried out.

The reason is as simple as the basic rules of arithmetic. For over 9 years now the Soviet Union and the other socialist states have been proposing that an agreement be reached on a draft declaration which would condemn and prohibit the use of force in relations between states. On the basis of the declaration it would then be possible to conclude a world treaty on the nonuse of force. The declaration is necessary, the socialist countries' representatives said, in order to reaffirm and further develop the principle of the nonuse of force in international relations in the conditions of the nuclear age, when the danger of the use of mass destruction weapons exists.

The declaration, which the UN General Assembly by an overwhelming vote instructed the special committee to draft, absolutely must prohibit the use of all weapons, nuclear and conventional, and the threat of their use. The adoption of the declaration would contribute to the improvement of the international situation and to the development of trust between countries and would reduce the danger of a nuclear conflict.

In the special committee, composed of representatives from 35 countries, only the United States and Britain categorically opposed the elaboration of a draft declaration. The tone of their spokesmen's speeches was calmer than in past years, but the substance of the objections was the same.

Why is the idea of the elaboration of a declaration "dangerous and unproductive" from their viewpoint? The U.S. and British spokesmen referred above all to the fact that the principle of the nonuse of force in international affairs is contained in the UN Charter, so there is no sense, apparently, in reiterating it. But this argument, it was pointed out in the debate, is groundless. FRG representative K. Bokalek said, for example, that "in West Germany's bilateral relations with its eastern neighbors and in multilateral relations, joint statements on the nonuse of force (in the settlement of disputes -- V. Soldatov) are an important factor." This pledge is contained in treaties concluded by the FRG with a number of socialist countries. Obviously it would not have been incorporated in the treaties if the countries signing them had not considered this principle important.
During the committee's sessions spokesmen for a number of countries have drawn attention to that fact that in recent years practically all important international documents have contained a provision on the nonuse of force in relations between states. This principle, in particular, is contained in the Helsinki Final Act.

It was also reflected in the Soviet-American joint statement on the results of the Geneva summit. Nuclear war, the document says, must never be unleashed; there cannot be any winners in a nuclear war. The statement stresses the importance of preventing any war between the Soviet Union and the United States — nuclear or conventional.

This commitment is important to relations between nuclear powers and no less vital for relations between large states and small countries. Today military force is most often used against small countries, the Greek representative on the committee V. Patronas stressed, and he stated that his country welcomes the efforts to "elaborate a draft declaration on the nonuse of force in international relations as soon as possible."

The United States and Britain are trying to nip these efforts in the bud. They are stubbornly trying to retain a free hand for violent action against nonaligned states. A declaration, not to mention a world treaty, on the nonuse of force in international relations would prevent the United States and its junior partner from using or threatening force and from using political and economic pressure against countries conducting an independent domestic and foreign policy.

In particular, a declaration and world treaty would prevent Washington from supplying the "contras" in Nicaragua and Savimbi's gangs in Angola with weapons. A declaration and world treaty would prevent the United States from sending aircraft carriers to the coast of Libya. Therefore, the United States and Britain deliberately sabotaged work on the elaboration of a declaration on the nonuse of force in international relations.

/8309
CSO: 5200/1260
The problem of turning the Indian Ocean into a peace zone is arising in all its magnitude in our day. The progressive peace-loving forces and the forces of militarism striving to dictate their will to the people have come face to face here in single combat.

Over 10 years ago the world community urged that an international conference on the Indian Ocean be held. The last UN General Assembly session resolved to convene a conference in the first half of 1986. Now the imperialist circles, above all the United States, have torpedoed the convening of a forum by that date. However, they could not make the interested countries abandon the idea of holding the conference completely. The struggle to convene the conference has a complicated history.

How Tension Has Been Fueled

On the threshold of the seventies the dangerous development of the situation in the Indian Ocean was only just beginning. A real opportunity existed then to halt the buildup of nonlittoral states' military presence there, region, to prevent the ocean's militarization, and to take a practical step to reduce the level of tension. That was how the majority of the region's littoral and continental countries thought and what the USSR and its allies believed.

The United States and its military bloc partners did not openly oppose the suggestion that had been put forward. However, beginning in February 1978 they essentially avoided further talks. The reason for this was that the Indian Ocean, which had not previously merited significant attention in America's global strategy, had begun attracting Washington's increasingly close attention.

"America's traditional strategic assessment of the Indian Ocean has changed... The Indian Ocean has been turned into a region capable of influencing fundamental changes in the global balance of forces... We must have the ability to
influence events in this zone; the capability to deploy our military might in our region is a most important element of that influence"—that was how U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean zone was interpreted by Admiral E. Zumwalt, former Navy chief of staff.

Back in the early seventies the United States began creating the material basis for a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean. Washington stepped up the pressure on the governments of states dependent on it. It forced them to enter into bilateral agreements enabling it to use those countries' ports and airfields in the Pentagon's interests. By the early eighties the Pentagon possessed 30 military bases on the territory of littoral states in the Indian Ocean; the construction of the main U.S. stronghold in the region—the naval and air force base on Diego Garcia Island adapted to provide backup for strategic components of the armed forces—was completed.

These actions were part of a general program for building up the U.S. fleet with a plan to increase its strength to 600 warships. The vast sum of $100 billion has been allocated for naval modernization and construction. A plan has been formulated and adopted concerning the U.S. naval presence in the main ocean and sea theaters which provides for active penetration into regions where large U.S. naval formations had previously been used extremely rarely. This applies to the Caribbean, the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the northwest Pacific, as well as the Indian Ocean.

Gambling on Blackmail

The present U.S. Administration's decision to expand the direct American military presence was an overt new challenge to the Indian Ocean states. Measures have been taken to ensure in an emergency the rapid quantitative and qualitative buildup of the U.S. naval grouping there by transferring ships from the Mediterranean and Pacific. Washington is continuing to take practical steps to create an operational 5th Fleet in the Indian Ocean, with the plan to increase its strength to 50 warships including aircraft carriers. This fleet, together with the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and the 7th Fleet in the Pacific, is designed to create a threat to the whole Eurasian continent from the south.

The U.S. striving to achieve global superiority on the seas and oceans is not only a method of blackmailing and intimidating those littoral states pursuing an independent foreign policy. It is also a new strategic threat from the south to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. It is common knowledge that many U.S. submarines have already been equipped with new Trident-1 missiles and the prospect is that from 1989 they will be replaced on "Ohio" class nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines with Trident-2 missiles, which have far greater combat potential, and this, of course, will sharply increase the danger for a considerable part of the USSR's territory and, indeed, for other countries.

The Pentagon assigns a special role in its military-strategic plans for the Indian Ocean to the "rapid deployment forces" formed in 1980 and now, according to U.S. press figures, comprising over 250,000 officers and men. To
provide backup for their combat activity 17 special store ships are stationed in the Indian Ocean carrying heavy arms, military hardware, and ammunition to sustain a Marine brigade's operations for 30 days.

In 1983 the Central Command (Centcom) was set up and was given control of the "rapid deployment forces," military bases on Diego Garcia and in Somalia, Kenya, and a number of other places, a multirole aircraft carrier group, and other facilities located in the approaches to the Persian Gulf. Possible military operations have been rehearsed during the Bright Star exercises. In terms of troop numbers Centcom is the second largest U.S. command and its sphere of operations includes 19 countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Washington is also striving to involve its NATO allies in the militarist preparations in the Indian Ocean. A Royal Navy grouping consisting of two or three destroyers, frigates, and auxiliary ships are already permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean, and an operational division of British ships including an aircraft carrier and escort ships also regularly put in there. A French naval division consisting of eight or nine warships is also permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean. FRG warships have regularly visited the Indian Ocean since 1980.

As for the Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean, our warships first appeared there only in the early seventies when the aims and tasks of the U.S. warships stationed there became clear. The composition and structure of a Soviet warship detachment, several times smaller in number, differ fundamentally from a U.S. grouping both in terms of class and purpose. The main feature distinguishing Soviet from U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean is invariably that they are not armed for actions against coastal targets. Soviet ships threaten no one, and their presence in the Indian Ocean is a necessary countermeasure dictated by the need to safeguard the USSR's security from the south. The level of the Soviet military presence has remained virtually unaltered for a number of years now.

Two Approaches to the Problem

Two approaches are clearly visible regarding the large and complex range of questions connected with creating a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. America's militarist course, aimed at securing military advantages for it, is countered by the policy and supporting real actions of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. They actively support all concrete steps by the world community aimed at reducing tension.

The well-known UN resolution on the Indian Ocean and the declaration contained in it included an appeal to the great powers to urgently begin consultations aimed at halting the further buildup of the military presence in this region, to remove all military bases, military installations, and military supply facilities, and to prevent the deployment of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons there.

The sharp intensification of the U.S. military presence could not fail to arouse concern among the Indian Ocean countries. On their initiative in 1974
the UN General Assembly session again raised the question of convening an international conference on the Indian Ocean. However, the very idea of taking steps toward creating a peace zone in the region aroused a negative reaction from the United States and some of its allies whereas the USSR expressed a readiness to take part in consultations on questions connected with preparing for the conference.

In 1979 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to convene an international conference on the Indian Ocean within 2 years in Colombo and instructed the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean to "carry out preparatory work for convening the conference including the examination of appropriate measures for implementing any international agreement which may eventually be reached to preserve the Indian Ocean as a peace zone." The Soviet Union voted for this resolution and declared its readiness to join the Special Committee. The United States, Britain, France, and a number of other Western powers abstained. Subsequently they, too joined the committee but, as time showed, only to so as slow down its work.

For Convening a Conference

The obstructionist activity of the United States and its allies could not fail to take its toll—no conference was held in 1981, 1983, or this year. The world community's decisions on this question were thus torpedoed. While hiding behind hypocritical words about "support" for the UN General Assembly resolution, Washington continued escalating its military presence in the Indian Ocean. Over $30 billion were spent on this alone between 1980 and 1985.

The attainment of practical positive results on fulfilling the UN decisions on a peace zone in the Indian Ocean depends to a large extent on the cohesion and purposefulness of the region's nonaligned countries. While condemning U.S. obstructionist activity in the Special Committee, some of them do not show due persistence in the attainment of the goal and speak pessimistically—here Washington's influence is felt—on the planned UN schedule for holding the international conference. However, the conference's opponents must not be allowed to gain the upper hand.

The declaration on the Indian Ocean as a peace zone adopted at the United Nations almost 15 years ago has not lost its topicality. It is necessary to campaign to accelerate its implementation.

Questions of improving the international atmosphere have always been at the center of the Soviet Union's attention. That is graphically demonstrated by our country's many peace initiatives and practical actions aimed at reducing the level of military tension both in the world as a whole and in individual regions. In an interview with the PRESS TRUST OF INDIA M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said when evaluating the prospects for achieving lasting peace and developing cooperation in Asia and, specially, in the Indian Ocean region: "As for the Soviet Union, it has always advocated and continues to advocate peace and security in Asia and equitable cooperation among the continent's states. This also applies fully to the Indian Ocean. We support the idea of turning this region into a peace zone...The USSR's
proposal, put forward during the 1982 Soviet-Indian summit, remains in force—
namely, that without waiting for a conference to be convened, all states whose
ships use the Indian Ocean refrain from taking steps liable to complicate the
situation in this region."

Thus the Soviet stance on the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a
peace zone was and remains clear and consistent. The USSR advocates that no
large naval formations be sent to the region, that no military exercises be
conducted there, and that nonlittoral states possessing military bases there
refrain from expanding or modernizing them.

The question of convening an international conference remains the key to the
struggle for a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. At the recent 40th UN General
Assembly session the Soviet Union reaffirmed its stance in favor of the imme-
diate convening of a conference.

Using crude blackmail the United States tried to kill off the very idea of
holding a conference. It did not succeed, however. The nonaligned countries,
with the socialist states' active support, insisted that the conference be
held in Colombo and that the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean complete
the preparatory work for it in 1986.

/8309
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USSR: PLAY ON MISSILE CRISIS SHOWS WISDOM, COMPROMISE

LDI01950 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Feb 86

[From the "Vreyma" newscast]

[Excerpts] A Moscow premiere. Our correspondent reports:

The audience is hurrying to a premiere at the Moscow Satire Theater. What awaits them today? [video shows poster listing other performances]

Today the audience will watch a political drama, a play telling about the 35th U.S. president, John Kennedy, about the Caribbean crisis, about October 1962. The author of the play "The Burden of Decision" is the writer Fedor Burlatskiy. He has written much about John Kennedy. [video shows interview with Burlatskiy in theater]

[Correspondent] Fedor Mikhaylovich, why did you turn to the genre of drama, how did this production come about, and how do you perceive this representation on stage?

[Burlatskiy] The Caribbean crisis was a time when both our countries — the United States and the Soviet Union — and the whole world truly stood at the brink of nuclear conflict. It seemed to me that the drama format happens to correspond best of all to a depiction and reflection of those passions, that pitch of passions, and experiences connected with this event. The method fits in, a method of reciprocal concession, compromise by both sides, seeking a solution connected with overcoming the escalation of the conflict.

[Correspondent] A quarter of a century has passed since the Caribbean crisis. Of course, much has changed; but we should not forget — and the play says this clearly — that at one of the most critical moments in history, the USSR and United States moved toward each other and preserved life on earth. The burden of decision engendered the highest level of responsibility and the highest level of wisdom.

[Correspondent] Senator Edward Kennedy came to one of these rehearsals at the theater. He showed an interest in this work by the Moscow Satire Theater. [video shows Kennedy and entourage entering the foyer]

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CSO: 5200/1260
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS' PROGRAM 7 FEB
LD071920 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 7 Feb 86

[International Situation: "Questions and Answers" program, conducted by
Sergey Pravdin, All-Union Radio foreign political commentator; with "international affairs journalist" Anatoliy Krasikov and A.V. Mikhaylov, USSR representative at the Vienna MBFR talks]

Gorbachev Arms Proposal

[Excerpts] [Pravdin] Our editorial office continues to receive letters whose authors declare their support for the new comprehensive peace proposals set out in the statement of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. They criticize the policy of the present Washington administration, aimed at continuing the arms race, transferring it into space, and raising world tension. On this subject we have letters from Comrades Volkov, in the town of Chekalin in Tula Oblast; Alekseyev, in Khabarovsk; Shcherbatenko, in the town of Andropov; Urbaniyazov, in Ashkhabad; Abaluyev, in Chita; Bogatyry, in the settlement of Drabov in Cherkassy Oblast; Feldman, in Moscow, and others. Comrade Gorbachev's statement continues to evoke the broadest response abroad too. I now want to turn to Anatoliy Andreyevich Krasikov, TASS deputy director general, who will talk about some aspects of the Soviet peace program and the world public's reaction to it. Please.

[Krasikov] It must be said that leftwing and democratic circles unreservedly support our program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, they immediately observed that the program stemmed directly from the general course of our country's policies, and from the spirit and letter of the documents that had been prepared for the forthcoming 27th CPSU Congress. Rightwingers and members of the far-right, on the contrary, do not want to hear about any kind of agreement with our country. There are also those who have not made up their minds, of course. Incidentally, opinions are divided among governments as well. The socialist states are with us, needless to say, since it is our common, coordinated policy. The young developing states have also, in the main, declared themselves in favor. Some, admittedly, remain silent. In the West too, many are inclined to support our ideas. Moreover, even those who openly take their cue from Washington are not saying no. They say that everything has to be weighed and studied, and only then can some final conclusion be drawn.
This week, Reagan sent two of his highly-placed officials abroad. Paul Nitze flew to Europe, and Edward Rowny to Asia. They have to consult with U.S. allies, even though within the Reagan administration itself opinions are also divided. If one believes THE NEW YORK TIMES, for instance, consideration is being given at the same time to three completely different versions of a reply to our proposals. On Tuesday, our foreign minister, Comrade Shevardnadze, spoke to the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, and told him directly: We hope that the U.S. side will not delay giving a reply to proposals which provide a way out of the nuclear impasse. And if, while there is still time, the United States joins in our extended moratorium on all nuclear explosions, a major step will have been taken toward accomplishing the task of nuclear disarmament. However -- and this must not be forgotten -- the new Soviet proposals are addressed not only to the official authorities of the United States and other Western states; they are addressed to all who cherish the cause of world peace, to all people of good will, to all peoples.

[Pravdin] You mentioned the moratorium on nuclear explosions, declared by the Soviet Union, but during this time the U.S. is continuing these explosions and improving their nuclear weapons. Some listeners ask: Is that not detrimental to our security?

[Krasikov] Last August, when the Soviet Union introduced a unilateral moratorium on all kinds of nuclear explosions, we proceeded from the wish to put an end to the creation [sozdaniye] of new, and the improvement [sovsemishenstvovanie] of existing, kinds of nuclear weapons. It goes without saying that the Government of the USSR did not have the slightest intention of leaving our country unarmed in the face of the constant build-up of armaments in the West. We wanted to demonstrate that we were prepared, in deed as well as in word, to erect a barrier across the path toward rearmament. And, of course, we expected that the United States and the other nuclear powers would follow our example.

Last year, the leaders of six states on different continents -- Argentina, Greece, Mexico, India, Tanzania and Sweden -- produced a joint appeal to us and to the United States. They called on us to agree on a mutual cessation of nuclear explosions. Recalling that appeal -- it was supported by the peace movement and broad sections of the public in all countries -- we found it possible to give the United States additional time. Why? So that they could think the matter over and join in our initiative. However, the U.S. stubbornly maintained that this was not enough, and that the USSR might deceive them. So we decided to go even further and suggested that we agree on some additional on-site monitoring measures so as to eliminate any possible doubts in the observance of the moratorium. Incidentally, we said we were in favor of establishing strict verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons, which, as our country believes, could be completely eliminated, just like nuclear weapons, by the year 2000.

[Pravdin] What about the "star wars" issue?

[Krasikov] Here, too, the position of the leaders of the six countries that I have already named, the position of the leaders of the Palme Commission, and our own fully coincide. In fact, on this issue the agreement is even broader than on the issue of stopping nuclear tests. Many Western powers, including France, for instance, have come out openly, indeed officially, against the use of space for military purposes. When Reagan was trying to justify his "star wars" project -- he calls it the Strategic Defense Initiative -- we heard quite a few reassuring words. Firstly, it was claimed to be a matter of purely defensive weapons, and, secondly, we were assured -- and they continue to assure us -- that the creation [sozdaniye] of military systems in space will be of great benefit to all mankind because, as they put it, it will make nuclear missile systems unnecessary. However, after the Soviet Union had put forward its program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, many people in the West began to ask: Why create [sozdat] expensive military systems in space if it is possible to get rid of nuclear weapons without them, moreover, in a far cheaper and more reliable way?
[Pravdin] How did the U.S. Government react to that question?

[Krasikov] It didn't. It pretended that no one had asked any such question. One after another, highly-placed U.S. officials declare that there can be no question of abandoning the Strategic Defense Initiative.

[Pravdin] Anatoliy Andreyevich, some of our listeners are enquiring whether the U.S. has started to have any nagging doubts on this question after the recent disaster with the Challenger space vessel.

[Krasikov] Well, how shall I put it? Doubts have appeared. I could cite the opinion of Grossman, a professor at New York State University, a well-known specialist on space problems. I have brought the relevant passage with me. I will read it: The Challenger disaster has shown the vast danger to mankind inherent in the "star wars" program put forward by the Reagan administration. The scientist continues: Representatives of the U.S. Government have frequently made statements, including statements to me personally, that the likelihood of any accident happening to a shuttle spacecraft is practically nil. However, from the example of the Challenger tragedy we have been convinced that this is not so, and that if anything similar happens during the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative then the consequences will be much more tragic.

[Pravdin] What can be said about the European aspect of our proposals?

[Krasikov] Commenting on the new Soviet initiatives, foreign observers pay particular attention to the proposals aimed at altering and improving the situation in Europe. There is detailed discussion of these initiatives taking place at several international forums. I refer primarily to the conference on confidence-building, security and disarmament measures which, as we know, is underway in Stockholm, and to the Vienna MBFR talks.

The program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in three stages by the year 2000, with the banning -- I stress, with the banning, of space strike weapons -- has struck the imagination of the West Europeans. It has struck them not just with the scale of the aims involved but with the fact that it gives Western Europe the opportunity to make an independent contribution to the cause of disarmament. How does this program differ from our previous proposals? If one is to speak of that part of it which is of direct concern to Europe, then the main difference is that we are agreeing to discuss the question of Britain's and France's nuclear missile weapons separately from the question of U.S. medium-range weapons. This takes into consideration the positions of the two West European nuclear powers which, as we know, have always categorically refused even to allow any reference to be made to their weapons, even in the sense of referring to their numbers because, they say, they do not have any representative weapons there.

Now, in accordance with the program set out by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev -- in the first stage, at the same time as the steep reduction, the halving, of the USSR's and U.S. strategic weapons -- the Soviet U.S. medium-range missiles in the European zone would be subjected to total elimination. Neither the British nor the French nuclear weapons would be put onto the Soviet-U.S. register, so to speak, at that stage.

[Pravdin] Some Western observers have made use of this circumstance to assert that the USSR was accepting Reagan's notorious Zero Option.

[Krasikov] In fact, everything is quite different. The U.S. Zero Option required us to eliminate medium-range missiles not only in the European part but also in the Asian part of the country, where they counter corresponding U.S. weapons.
However, we propose that the question of missiles in Asia should be discussed within the framework of a global solution involving all nuclear powers. We are not refusing to eliminate them, but let the other nuclear powers also eliminate their weapons of this type in Asia.

Further, Reagan's Zero Option proceeded from the basis that the nuclear missile weapons of the two NATO allies of the United States could be retained and improved and infinitum. However, we want the United States to undertake the obligation not to supply strategic missiles and medium-range missiles to other countries, and at the same time we want Britain and France to undertake not to increase their nuclear weapons. In accordance with our plan, the reduction of Britain's and France's nuclear arsenals would start in the second stage, and would begin with the elimination of tactical weapons. Then, in the final, third stage, simultaneously with the total elimination of the USSR's and U.S. nuclear arsenals, the nuclear weapons of all states that possess them would also be totally eliminated.

Well, of course, such a question cannot be decided without the participation of everyone concerned. And, by the way, even before this we were ready to discuss this with Britain and France, but these countries declared that they would not enter into discussions on these questions with us until the nuclear potential of the USSR and the United States had been subjected to a considerable reduction. Our new proposals remove this proviso, since we are proposing to halve our nuclear potential in the first stage. Under these conditions a refusal to enter into talks could come only from people who simply talk about disarmament, talk about their agreement to end the arms race, but who in reality are striving for just the opposite. I am sure that the value of the new Soviet initiatives, apart from anything else, lies precisely in the fact that from now on all nuclear powers, including the United States, Britain and France, must openly make the choice between peace and continuing the arms race.

Progress at MBFR Talks

[Pravdin] Our regular listeners from Moscow, Nikolay Mikhaylovich Devyatkin and the Rudnev family, and also Comrades Vlasenko from Sverdlovsk, Khachaturyan from Yerevan, Yevgeniya Yevgeniyevna Kiriyevskaya from Tula Oblast, ask how the Vienna MBFR talks are progressing, and about the peace proposals of the USSR and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact introduced at this forum. Esteemed comrades, Averyan Vladimirovich Mikhaylov, the USSR's representative at these talks, replies to your questions.

[Mikhaylov] Last February, the USSR and the countries of the Warsaw Pact proposed to their partners in the talks to seek an accord by which the USSR and the United States would partially reduce their armed forces, say by 20,000 for the USSR and 13,000 for the United States, together with their corresponding armaments and military equipment with a subsequent freezing of the level of the armed forces and armaments both of the NATO countries and the countries of the Warsaw Pact in this region. We also envisaged appropriate measures to monitor the fulfillment of such an agreement.

It must be said that the Western side remained silent for 10 months, giving as the reason for this that they were studying our proposal. Finally, on 5 December of last year, the Western side put forward their counterproposals on this question. The West, in principle, seemed to agree to the ideas that we put forward for an initial reduction of Soviet and U.S. troops in conjunction with no subsequent increase in the level of the armed forces of the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries in central Europe.

It would seem that the general direction of further talks and certain outlines for a possible accord are now coming into view.
I would say that this confirmed the appropriateness and constructive nature of the proposal made by the socialist countries last February. It has made it possible to overcome the impasse that our talks had reached. It is to be hoped that the appearance of coinciding elements in the present positions of the sides will make the further discussion of questions at our talks more purposeful and more meaningful, and will make the search for mutually acceptable solutions more realistic.

However, one cannot fail to make note of the fact that the Western proposals continue to be biased and unbalanced on a whole range of aspects and, I would say, are unrealistic and not in accord with the principle of not damaging the security of the sides — a principle which was agreed upon at the start of the talks.

Thus, the positions of the sides are still fairly far apart. Nonetheless, we believe that it is still possible to reach agreement in Vienna both on the essence of the initial agreement and on measures for adequate monitoring of its fulfillment. One thing, however, is required for this: Mutual display of political realism and readiness to seek compromise decisions which do not damage either of the sides. For our part we have displayed this readiness; now let our partners display it, too.

ANZUS Pact

[Pravdin] Our regular listeners, the Smyurdze family from Kaluga, ask us to tell them about New Zealand, and the reason for the current serious conflict between that country and the United States.

The Labor Party of New Zealand came to power in the country after the elections in July 1984. The leader of that party, Lange, is now prime minister. It was also after these elections that the conflict with the United States began, the problem our listeners are asking about. One of the points, indeed the main point, of the Labor Party's election program was the promise to ban foreign ships fitted with nuclear engines or carrying nuclear weapons from calling at New Zealand ports.

It must be said that Lange is by no means an enemy of the United States, as certain sections of the U.S. press try to present him. He has frequently stressed that the government he heads is simply striving to implement the promise he made to the electorates. However, Washington immediately regarded New Zealand's decision as an attempt to undermine U.S.-New Zealand relations and also the so-called Pacific Ocean security pact — ANZUS in abbreviated form — which includes Australia, as well as these two countries. This year ANZUS was to have marked its 25th anniversary, but one hears more funeral than celebratory music in Washington about this bloc. The point is that in spite of strong pressure from the United States — diplomatic, political, economic, and so forth — the Lange government has not altered its decision. Moreover, it has taken steps to include it in legislation. The appropriate bill has been introduced for parliamentary discussion. However, the United States has not given up its crude attempts to dictate its will to this independent country. A group of U.S. congressmen recently declared that it was necessary to end New Zealand's membership in the ANZUS bloc and to deprive it of the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella.

But this is not intimidating the New Zealanders: Two thirds of the population now live in towns and villages which have declared themselves to be nuclear-free zones. The bill drawn up by the Lange government envisages the declaration of a nuclear-free zone for all the country, its territorial waters and airspace. Thus, New Zealand is striving to make its contribution to the implementation of the treaty on declaring the southern part of the Pacific Ocean a nuclear-free zone. This document was signed last August by 13 states of this region, including New Zealand. As Prime Minister Lange stated recently in an interview with the U.S. newspaper NEWSDAY, New Zealand intends to dissociate itself from any nuclear strategy.
[Excerpt] Where do the huge sums of money pumped out of the U.S. taxpayer go? Primarily into military expenditure, which amounts -- taking into account only allocations to the Pentagon -- to 27 percent of the total federal budget. And in the United States military expenditure is incurred not only under Pentagon items but also, for example, by the Department of Energy. It supervises, in particular, the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Incidentally allocations for nuclear weapons are a very considerable item in the Pentagon's balance sheet.

This includes expenditure on manufacture of another 21 MX ICBMs with 10 nuclear warheads each, the construction of another 5 missile-carrying submarines, the purchase of another 200 aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and the development [razrabotka] of a new mobile midgetman ICBM. At the same time, major allocations are envisioned also for military space programs. They are to be increased in the next financial year by 75 percent to $6.5 billion. And in the 5-year period expenditure on the "star wars" projects is planned to reach $42 billion.

What is the result? Quite recently Washington was saying that implementation of the military space programs -- officially called the Strategic Defense Initiative -- makes nuclear weapons superfluous. Now, as we see, it is planned to build up both. Washington's recent statement that the US arms build-up is allegedly an answer to the actions of the Soviet Union does not stand criticism. An official report by the U.S. Chiefs of Staffs Committee sent to Congress in connection with the debates on the Budget admits not only nuclear parity between the United States and the USSR but also consistent fulfillment by the USSR of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, named SALT-II, signed in the summer of 1979 in Vienna but never ratified by the United States.

All these facts are much talked about and disputed in the United States not only in connection with the debates on the budget but also in connections with the broad response here to the new peace initiatives of the USSR set out in the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and confirmed in his answers to questions from L'HUMANITE.

For instance, the statements by Townsend Hoopes, former undersecretary of the Air Force and now chairman of the Consultative National Security Council, are noteworthy. The new Soviet proposals, he writes in NEWSDAY are an eloquent call to the U.S. President to assume his share of responsibility and look straight at the fact that national security can no longer be guaranteed unilaterally regardless of how much money is spend on the armed forces and on new technology.
Similar statements have been made in the United States especially after the disaster of the Challenger spacecraft. True, a session of the special presidential commission conducting an inquiry is still meeting behind closed doors. At the same time, reports have been leaked to THE WASHINGTON POST that NASA was under pressure to keep to a tight schedule of flights in reusable spacecraft, although, as has become known, recently there were four major explosions which caused casualties at the factories of the Norton company which makes the solid fuel boosters.

And here is the conclusion arrived at in an open letter published in THE NEW YORK TIMES by two United States scientists: The tragedy of the Challenger [sozdaniye] of an anti-missile defense system with space-based elements. The "star wars program would turn the United States into a spacecraft, making the existence of the entire population dependent on U.S. technology which, as we see, is definitely not fault-free.

Still more critical statements are being heard in the West European NATO allies of the United States. This is particularly noted by U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. It writes that the West Europeans are worried by the "star wars" programs.

Indeed, here are some reports from the FRG, for instance, visited recently by two United States envoys — Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Whitehead and the President's special envoy on disarmament problems Nitze. Both of them tried hard to influence both the government and the public of the FRG who have been more and more actively supporting the new peace initiatives of the Soviet Union. Now Washington's envoys, speaking in Bonn, have been vying with one another to assure the people that President Reagan is just on the point of answering the Soviet proposals.

But so far something different has been noted in the FRG. The HAMBURG SPIEGEL shows in this diagram that U.S. military expenditure — despite all the promises — has not gone down but on the contrary has increased. And to illustrate this the journal publishes another diagram showing the rise in profits of one of the major military firms of the United States, IBM, engaged in the manufacture of electronics for missile, space, and nuclear programs.

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The beginning of the year has been marked by a noticeable acceleration of military-political cooperation between Paris and Bonn. Foreign Minister H. -D. Genscher and other officials of the ruling coalition are vying with one another to make 1986 a year of "French-West German accord in the interests of European defense." The French side is also showing a readiness to discuss questions of "European defense" and to go from words to deeds in this sphere.

A range of military-political problems turned out to be the center of talks between President F. Mitterrand and Chancellor H. Kohl in Baden-Baden. After the meeting, major maneuvers by French and Bundeswehr forces for 1987 were announced with great pomp. Taking part in them will be 150,000 officers and men, including units of the interventionist French "Rapid Action Force." These maneuvers, according to French Defense Minister P. Quiles, will be the most important event for the two armies since the end of World War II.

Joint arms production is growing. The French corporations Dassault-Breguet and Aerospatiale, together with the West German corporations Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blom and Dornier, are producing antitank missiles and air defense systems.

The center of gravity, however, is being increasingly shifted to coordinating military policy and converging military doctrine. At the end of last year, the French president and FRG chancellor agreed to "unfreeze" the articles of the 1963 Elysee Treaty that concern defense and security problems. This subject matter had been "prohibited" for almost a quarter of a century. Now, within the framework of a bilateral commission, problems of "strategic coordination" are being actively discussed by politicians and military men.

What is behind this deliberately vague formulation? It is known that Bonn long ago sought pledges from Paris concerning the possible use of French nuclear weapons on West German territory. These are the Pluton tactical missile and the Hades missile, which is under construction, as well as the Mirage and Jaguar aircraft, with which France has equipped its Air Force. According to press reports, the French Government has agreed to hold consultations on these questions with the FRG. It is true that Paris immediately declared that agreement to hold consultations by no means meant agreement to FRG participation in adopting a decision on the use of nuclear weapons.
The right to use it, they said, remains as before the exclusive prerogative of France's supreme political and military leadership. A question arises in this connection: Will not French-West German consultations be a prelude to the admission that "France's vital interests" also extend to FRG territory? After all, there is only one step between this admission and the pledge to expand the French "nuclear umbrella" to the other side of the Rhine.

Both sides consider the time is particularly right to demonstrate "privileged" relations in the military sphere. There are also domestic political reasons for this. Parliamentary elections will soon be held in France. They are also on the horizon in the FRG. As foreign policy will play a significant role in pre-election skirmishes, both governments are interested in the French-West German team appearing harmonious. The main thing, it seems, is that a number of problems have accumulated in relations between Paris and Bonn in recent months. L'HUMANITE, mouthpiece of the French Communist Party, has noted that official speeches are less than ever a gauge of relations between the two countries.

What is the basis for such an opinion? The question of financing the French "Eureka" project remains a stumbling block between Bonn and Paris. It is presented in Paris as Western Europe's answer to the technological challenge from the United States and Japan. From the very beginning the initiators of "Eureka" have proceeded from the fact that the financial contribution of France and the FRG to its realization must be a determining factor. France has announced the apportionment of FFr1 billion.

The FRG did not, however, show enthusiasm for the project at a conference on "Eureka" held in Hannover. It was announced that Bonn was prepared to allot only DM180 million for its realization, which produced a painful reaction in French official circles. Summarizing the Federal Republic's position on this, the American CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR gloatingly noted that it is easier for the conservative H. Kohl to find a common language with M. Thatcher and R. Reagan than with F. Mitterrand.

The question of "Eureka's" connection with the development of the latest weapons systems also remains open. Officials in Paris like to stress that "Eureka" has nothing in common with the U.S. SDI. This, they say, is a purely a civilian project. However, reports have appeared recently about the development of space weapons systems, including powerful lasers, in France and the FRG. French and West German experts consider such directions of "Eureka" as the development of ultrafast computers and optical electronics as having a direct bearing on the military sphere.

The most tangible differences between France and the FRG remain their approach to U.S. "star wars" plans. On the whole, France is against the deployment of offensive weapons in space. President F. Mitterrand and other state figures have voiced disagreement with the "Strategic Defense Initiative." It is true, though, that in practice the Socialist government does not stand in the way of French firms searching for contracts within the SDI framework. The government has a positive attitude toward the participation of French companies in contracts connected with SDI. Defense Minister P. Quiles has stated. He recalled that from the "political and international viewpoint," France did not support the SDI, expressing the view that it is necessary to differentiate between the SDI and ongoing research. Such logic seems strange. Leaders of the major corporations Matra and Aerospatiale have declared their intention to take part in the SDI.

Bonn actively supports the SDI. The ruling coalition rushed to begin talks with the Americans about the conditions of the FRG's participation in "star wars."
This decision, although not a surprise for the French Government, was interpreted in Paris as confirmation of the FRG's alignment with Washington. In this connection Paris recalled that the Bonn Government struck a blow at France's proposal to create the Hermes space shuttle within the framework of the European Space Agency. The FRG approved this proposal in principle in 1984. But at the beginning of last year, pleading that the Hermes project was too expensive, the Federal Republic retracted its previous decision. Such treachery by its "privileged" ally irritated French Government circles. They reached the conclusion that in space matters, the FRG trusts the United States more than the plans of "space independent Europe."

All this indicates that France and the FRG have different views of Western Europe's place in the current interdependent world. Paris, which by no means questions the leading role of the United States in the Western camp, regards Western Europe as one of the "centers of power," -- by depending on its own economic potential and political influence -- to be able to more boldly defend its specific interests in the face of its mighty transoceanic ally. Bonn does not share this philosophy. It increasingly counts on Western Europe's direct entry into the global strategy of the United States. Does not the so-called "European defense initiative," which is being nurtured by FRG ruling circles, testify to this? It envisages the creation of an antimissile defense system in Western Europe — a kind of adjunct to the SDI.

A more widespread "argument" of the adherents of a "European defense" in France — there are many of them in the government and the opposition — is reduced to this assertion: Arresting the FRG's slide toward Washington can only be done by strengthening the French-West German military alliance. The thinking is that a convergence with the FRG in military-political questions would prompt it to support France's policies in Western Europe. This is, of course, a delusion. The Paris newspaper LE MONDE expresses itself quite definitely: The Bonn coalition will not make any decision that could create the impression that it is dissociating the FRG from the United States. The Rhine clearly does not intend to sacrifice its close ties with the United States for the sake of strategic cooperation with France.

Farsighted politicians in France are increasingly asking themselves the question: Will not the current attempts to draw the FRG into the orbit of military-political cooperation end up hurting French interests? Having enormous economic potential, the FRG is also becoming a leading military force in Western Europe. In the 1985 "white paper," FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner stated that the Bundeswehr is one of the best armies in the West. It is armed with all types of modern combat equipment, except nuclear weapons. With the deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles on its territory, the FRG has turned into a region unequalled in its saturation with conventional and nuclear missile weapons.

Bonn's participation in the "star wars" program opens the way to obtaining even more developed military technology. The French newspaper LIBERATION, which is close to the government, draws attention to precisely this aspect: Will not Bonn, in circumvention of existing prohibitions, get access to nuclear weapons? A reasonable question.

/8309
CSO: 5200/1260
A wall of fire and smoke arose in front of the attacking line of tanks. The "enemy" had set up a vast zone of fire barriers. For some time there remained an opportunity to negotiate it by using high speed and the gaps between the pockets of fire. However, the platoon leader Lt V. Iskhakov did not make the decision right away. His hesitation did not last too long, but time was lost nevertheless. Because of this, the "enemy" managed to bring up the reserves. What prevented the tankmen from finding the correct variant of actions? Of course, gaps in psychological preparation for battle. They had never encountered fire barrier zones before.

The degree of readiness for battle... It depends on many factors, including the level of psychological hardening. Where proper attention is given to it, personnel are ready for any situation changes on the battlefield.

At a recent exercise, certain hypothetical situations introduced by the tank battalion commander Capt V. Glagolev proved interesting to me.

The company commanded by Capt V. Bastow was carrying out a combat mission on broken terrain where command and control conditions were made difficult. At the moment the right-flank platoon was behind the mountain slope and, naturally, was not visible to the company commander, the battalion commander gave the input: "The company's radios have broken down."

Is such a situation possible in combat? Under conditions of using weapons of mass destruction it is a real possibility. During a nuclear blast, electromagnetic pulse can knock out radio communications equipment. So, one must be prepared for this.

Capt Glagolev was interested in how the company commander would communicate above all with the right-flank platoon. The crews of this platoon could not orient themselves on the commander's tank or align on him in the extended line.
The officers wasted no time looking for a solution. Platoon leader Lt I. Leydzinskiy marked his location with a signal flare. In response, a flare was sent up by Capt Bastov. They say the signal is received and understood. After a several-second pause, the company commander sent up another flare, this time angled toward the horizon, thereby indicating the direction of attack to the platoon. The company successfully attacked the "enemy" defended post in radio silence and accomplished the mission.

Everything proves to be simple and easy if officers and all personnel work with such hypothetical situations at all exercises. You see, in the final analysis, psychological hardening also involves the state of training and the internal readiness to operate under special conditions.

By way of illustration, many undertakings have originated in the battalion related to actions under conditions of the enemy using highly accurate weapons—modern reconnaissance strike complexes. Smoke screens, the simplest thermal and infra-red traps, setting up decoy areas... It is understood that in actual combat this all will be combined with protective measures conducted according to the senior commander's plan.

It goes without saying, in the process of searching, not every suggestion withstands the test of practice. Many are eliminated. But the value of creative initiative is not only in what remains for further improvement, but also in educating people in the spirit of constant readiness for actions under complex, critical combat situation conditions and in their moral and psychological hardening.

At another exercise I heard how Maj A. Golovachev talked interestingly about this. He is also a battalion commander.

"Hypothetical situations requiring quickness of wit and resourcefulness of personnel," the battalion commander reflected, "have a special value and develop people's capabilities. By way of illustration, it is known that the firing elevation of tanks is limited. Sometimes in a populated area it is necessary to hit a target located on a hill, but you cannot raise the gun. What is the solution? Most of the tank commanders and gunners found it. They drove onto a boulder or a heap of brick rubble and thereby increased the arc of fire considerably. There are quite a few such "details," sometimes of considerable importance to the outcome of a battle. Personnel must be schooled in them."

These are vital words. The degree of readiness for battle is determined not only by the knowledge of tactics, but also by the ability to solve problems by using keenness of wit, determination and boldness. But these qualities do not come about by themselves.

/8309
CSO: 5200/1260
RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S GRACHEV INTERVIEWED ON DISARMAMENT, AUSTRIAN ROLE

AU141146 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 14 Feb 86 p 3

["Exclusive Interview" given by Andrey Grachev, "department head in the CPSU Central Committee and head of a delegation of experts and military personnel that visited Austria during the past few days" to VOLKSSTIMME reporter Otto Janecek in Vienna]

[Text] Question: Do you think that the SDI program can be stopped in the United States at all? Quite a lot of business interests are involved. The military-industrial group hopes to rake in billions of dollars. There are large lobbies for SDI in the U.S. Congress.

Answer: You are right, there are many people in the United States who are interested in the SDI project. But these groups are very different. Let us take, for instance, Reagan himself. He considers himself the savior of the world or at least the savior of the United States. But I have got the impression that since the Geneva summit Reagan's conviction in this respect has been shaken a bit.

I believe the power of the arguments which were put forth by our General Secretary Gorbachev have also had an influence on Reagan. The arguments concerning armament in space, which are stated by our leadership, are very simple, but they are also very convincing. First of all, SDI will never be 100-percent impenetrable. And if only a hole of 10 percent for incoming missiles existed, this would be enough to destroy the United States. Even only 1 percent of the strategic missiles correspond to about 5,000 Hiroshima bombs. No country is able to survive anything like that, least of all the United States. Thus, this is a point of view with which one can influence the decisions in the United States -- and we are working in this direction.

Of course, the military-industrial group in the United States wants to make a profit, even at the cost of reducing their own security, because a destabilization of the strategic situation will also lead to a decrease in security for the United States. But we have already seen several times in the past that projects, even U.S. projects, have been stopped when they became obviously absurd. In this connection much depends on public opinion -- in the United States and abroad.

We also believe, that one day even the strategic thinkers in the United States will find out that they are working for a pure nonsense, for a nonsense that is contrary to their own interests and their own security. Our conclusion is: Nothing is irreversible. In order to prevent the world from sliding into an even more dangerous situation, it is, however, necessary to explain the absurdity of the SDI concept. For this purpose everything has to be used, including public opinion in the European countries.
Question: Do you think that the Challenger disaster could also influence public opinion in the United States?

Answer: Certainly. Because the Challenger disaster has made the problems in connection with SDI obvious. In a paradoxical way the Challenger disaster confirmed the argument that Gorbachev used in his discussion with Reagan in Geneva. Gorbachev said: Look, Mr President, just imagine a situation in which your SDI has already been deployed. It might happen that an asteroid crashes into one of your platforms, then the computers will react in the same way as if an attack had taken place. The computers will give the order to launch the missiles. And men would die because the computers decided in such a way.

Question: Austria is a neutral country. What can small, neutral countries contribute to the issue of disarmament?

Answer: I would say that in this time of enormous military potentials the role of the small countries and the neutral countries is paradoxically increasing. The increase of military potentials in fact reduces the security of the large countries. They are not faced with the problem of using their weapons, but with the problem of not having to use them. That means that more and more political power is transferred to the place where political initiatives are introduced, where there are political proposals, where a voice is raised. And I think that the political attitude of such countries as Austria is an important part of public opinion — all over the world.

You get a confirmation of this in the attitude of the small countries at the various international conferences, such as in Vienna or Stockholm or Geneva. Every time it is necessary to find a compromise between the opposing positions of East and West, the most important role is played by the small, neutral countries. And Austria, too, belongs to these countries.

I would put it this way: Although such countries as Austria are not nuclear powers themselves, they have another potential, a political one. They have many ways of influencing the situation in Europe and in the world. And they should use this potential to the utmost.
 RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV INTRODUCTION TO GREEK EDITION OF WORKS

NC161710 Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 16 Feb 86 p 5

"[Text" of introduction by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the Greek edition of his speeches and articles; "carried in advance" by RIZOSPASTIS"

[Text] In acceding to a request by the "Contemporary Era" publishing house to prepare a brief introduction to this selection, I was first of all guided by the fact that Soviet citizens have deep and strong feelings for Greece and its people. Thus, by addressing myself to the Greek reader, I have a chance to express these feelings to some degree.

I also hope this book will give you an opportunity to get a feel for life today in Soviet society, to make your own assessment of our way of life, our goals, our understanding of mankind's present and future, and our ideas on the key problem of our times. How to safeguard peace and avert the danger of a new war.

We are sincere toward the world and we speak frankly about our affairs. Our primary concern is a long-term one: to significantly accelerate our country's social and economic development, and to double our productive capacity by the year 2000. We have all the necessary means to achieve this: natural wealth, a strong economic base, and rich experience from our 70 years of socialist construction. We have a clear idea of the ground we will have to cover, including all the problems, difficulties, and obstacles we will have to overcome.

The totally peaceful and creative nature of our domestic duties and plans rules out any pursuit of military supremacy and expansion, which those who are seeking exactly this have been eager to accuse us of. For us, peace is peace for all -- this, in a few words, is our creed, which Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, bequeathed to us.

During the nuclear-space age, we should all be aware of the fact that it is impossible for anyone to achieve peace and security solely for himself, solely through his own efforts, without others -- and, what is more -- at the expense of others. There must be coordination between national interests and the interests of the entire world community. It is of exceptional significance to have every rational man be fully conscious of this, and to become aware of his own personal responsibility to avert the danger of war by decisively siding against war on earth or in space. The unbridled arms race, primarily the one involving nuclear arms, which militaristic circles in the West have imposed and which they are now trying to spread to space, has brought mankind to a dangerous point.
In an attempt to avoid a catastrophe, the Soviet Union has launched a series of coordinated and practical initiatives on all issues concerning a halt to the arms race and the achievement of disarmament. With the strength of a healthy idea, and by setting an example of self-restraint and self-restriction, we have been trying to stop the dangerous course of international developments and to create a safer course of events. Unfortunately, no agreement has been reached on the basic and vital problem of halting the arms race and preventing its expansion into space. Thus, it is of particular importance to have reason prevail so that people may learn the art of coexistence on our planet, which is so imperative.

The Soviet Union, which devotes all its strength to the defense of world peace, acknowledges the contributions of all who are guided by similar ideals.

In addition, the Soviet Union greatly appreciates Greece's peace-loving actions in the field of foreign policy and views them as a significant factor for the consolidation of peace in the Balkans, the Middle East, Europe, and the world at large. The cause of world peace would benefit from the conversion of the Balkans into a missile-free zone.

The Soviet Union wholeheartedly supports the demand of the people of the Mediterranean basin, who ask that it be transformed into a sea of peace and cooperation.

The peace-loving and constructive proposals made by Greece, Argentina, Mexico, Sweden, India, and Tanzania have struck a positive chord in the world, for they respond to the interests of safeguarding international security.

The peoples of our two countries are linked by a long friendship, the roots of which are centuries old. Our two peoples have been together in many struggles for freedom, and today -- despite our different social systems -- there are many things that bring us close to one another. The Soviet people's antirwar aims are in accord with the activities of the Greek antirwar movement and with the European public's increasing protests against the arms race, the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in Europe, and the militarization of space.

The experience gained from the development of Soviet-Greek relations proves that the framework of our cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, scientific, and other fields is increasing and becoming wider. We would like to see the unimpeded development of this process, which is very good, and the strengthening of understanding and cooperation between our two peoples.

I wish the readers of this book and the entire Greek people peace and prosperity.

Moscow, January 1986

Mikhail Gorbachev.

/8309
CSO: 5200/1260
NETHERLANDS—USSR MINISTRIES ON DISARMAMENT—The Hague, 7 Feb (TASS)—Consultations on questions of disarmament, that have recently been raised by the Soviet Union, have been held at the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands. The parties to the consultations were the Foreign Ministry's General Director for Political Matters A. Jacobovich de Seged, the USSR's Ambassador in the Netherlands A.I. Blatov, and special representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry S.B. Chetverikov. Meetings were also held at the foreign affairs commission of the second chamber of Netherlands' Parliament, the board of the Ruling Christian Democratic Appeal Party and The Hague International Relations Institute. Elucidated in detail in the course of the meeting was the content of the initiatives, put forward in the statement of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev on 15 January 1986. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0038 GMT 8 Feb 86] /8309

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