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JAPAN

Takeshita To Attend UN Disarmament Session

52600035 Tokyo KYODO in English
0510 GMT 14 Feb 88

[Text] Tokyo, 14 Feb (KYODO)—Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita is expected to visit New York in early June to deliver a speech at a United Nations special session on disarmament to open in late May, Foreign Ministry sources said Sunday.

The ministry is currently planning Takeshita's itinerary and his speech to be delivered at the UN session on arms reduction, the first in 6 years.

The prime minister's New York visit for the third UN special session, will precede his attendance at the Toronto summit of Western industrially advanced nations opening on 19 June, they said.

While at the UN special session, Takeshita hopes to meet a number of leaders of other countries, including Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the sources said.

According to Soviet diplomatic sources in Tokyo, however, it may be difficult for Gorbachev to leave Moscow in early June.

In that event, Takeshita is expected to hold talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in New York on Japan-Soviet relations.

The UN special session on disarmament will be held between 31 May and 25 June with each top leader addressing the body during the first 2 weeks.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

NATO's Arms Plans, U.S. Report Criticized

LD242247a Prague CTK in English
2150 GMT 24 Feb 88

[Text] Prague Feb 24 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman today criticized new arms plans of the North Atlantic alliance, saying the pact apparently sought new weapons systems to compensate for missiles lost under the December Soviet-U.S. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

In an interview with CTK, the spokesman, Dusan Rovensky, also said a report by a panel of U.S. military experts issued last month ran counter to positive international developments, and expressed concern about plans to move closer to the borders of the socialist community U.S. fighters due to be withdrawn from Spain.

Rovensky named a joint French-British missile project, U.S. plans to fit 150 B-52 bombers with cruise missiles and a call by the NATO supreme European commander, General John Galvin, on the alliance to upgrade its Lance missile as clear examples of NATO's intention to make up for the loss of the INF rockets.

"One could mention other similar examples, and it cannot but be seen as an effort to compensate by new weapons systems for the loss of the two classes of nuclear missiles that will be eliminated following the ratification of the Soviet-American treaty," he said.

But he said NATO governments differed on whether to seek replacements for the missiles, "and even some influential circles now conclude it is necessary to take advantage of the favourable atmosphere created after the Washington summit."

Rovensky said goodwill was essential for the arms reduction process to continue and added the Soviet pledge to withdraw from Czechoslovakia its Shorter-Range missiles even before the INF Treaty takes effect was "an exemplary act helping in a major way to improve the international atmosphere."

Asked to comment on "discriminate deterrence", a Pentagon report released in January by a panel of prominent U.S. military specialists and outlining possible new trends in U.S. nuclear missile strategy, Rovensky said: "It contains ideas that run counter to the promising international developments."

He added the study's rejection of a total nuclear and chemical ban was "particularly alarming."

The spokesman welcomed Spain's decision to withdraw from its territory the 72 U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers but said U.S. plans to move the planes to Italy was a reason for concern.

He stressed that the jets, if stationed in the country, would in fact be 2,000 km closer to the borders of the socialist community.

"Such developments lead to suspicion that NATO is looking for any possibility to replace the missiles due to be liquidated with other destructive systems," he said.

CSSR Foreign Minister Chnoupek: Missile Withdrawal Act of Goodwill

PM261159 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Feb 88 Second Edition p 5

["Our Interview" with CSSR Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek by unnamed "our correspondent" under the general heading "Last Post"; date and place not given]

[Text] "Soviet missiles appeared on CSSR territory with the agreement of our government as a response to U.S. actions. This was in the interests both of our own security and the security of other Warsaw Pact countries. The siting in West Europe of Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles has increased the dangerous potential of a NATO first strike.

"The conclusion of the Treaty on the Elimination of Soviet and U.S. Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles has created the possibility of withdrawing Soviet operational and tactical missiles from our territory. They have fulfilled their task....

"Regarding the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from our territory as an act of good will on the Soviet Union's part, its aim, undoubtedly, is to improve the international atmosphere. In addition, this is further proof of the USSR's willingness to honestly and consistently fulfill its commitments stemming from the treaties signed, even to fulfill them ahead of schedule. Now it is important that the process of ratification in the U.S. Senate is completed successfully.

"The withdrawal of nuclear missile weapons and their subsequent elimination together with other Soviet and U.S. intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is a very significant event. It is a specific contribution to the cause of peace, a significant step in the implementation of a bold program to rid the planet of nuclear weapons before the end of the present century. M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 proposal was welcomed by the world's peace-loving forces as the most reliable guarantee of mankind's survival. This program, which we consider to be historic, meets with our complete support.

"It is symbolic that the beginning of the withdrawal of operational and tactical missiles comes at a time when we are celebrating the 40th anniversary of the February victory of the Czechoslovak working people. The Czechoslovak public sincerely welcomes this and expresses the conviction that other important treaties in the sphere of disarmament will be reached which would rid mankind from the burden of heavy arms.

"The signing of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missile weapons has created a more favorable atmosphere in international relations which is essential to utilize for further dialogue in the disarmament sphere. This concerns, above all, the halving of arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons and the banning of chemical weapons. Other urgent questions also remain to be resolved—reducing the level of conventional arms and banning underground nuclear tests.... "

Jakes' Call for Trust Along 'Contact Line' Viewed

AU020853 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 27 Feb 88 p 1

[Editorial: In Favor of a Zone of Trust, Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness"]

[Text] The idea of a common European home has received yet another significant boost: In his speech on the 40th anniversary of Victorious February, Milos Jakes, CPCZ Central Committee general secretary, voiced a proposal to gradually establish a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line of contact [linie dotyku] between the Warsaw Pact and NATO states.

What are the motives behind this new Czechoslovak foreign-political initiative?

The initiative is motivated by the interest of the Czechoslovak (but not only the Czechoslovak) people in making Europe, which had been overrun by so many destructive wars in the past, become a worldwide example of a lastingly peaceful home—of good-neighborliness, of relations in which a neighbor, in his endeavors in the international field, also incorporates the justified, serious interests of all other inhabitants of their common home.

The idea of a common European home is not new; however, it has also not yet matured. It is an innovative idea, no doubt about that; and all states and all peoples whom it primarily concerns have the right and the duty to contribute their share to its elaboration.

Even today, the states of the European Continent are interlinked by numerous and multilateral ties, by common economic and political interests, by historical and cultural traditions; in addition, today they are faced by general-human problems which concern every one of them indiscriminately. Moreover, these problems can be resolved solely by joint effort. To use a simile, in Europe everybody is everybody's neighbor.

Quite understandably, the security problem is of paramount significance here. Security is the foundation stone, and only on this stone can the common European home be firmly based. The road toward security leads via the disarmament process, developed by specific steps, agreements, and treaties, that means by practical measures which would gradually, but most speedily, cut down the existing level of tension and confrontation (which must be understood today as a legacy of the past, as the product of "cold war," of prejudices and misunderstandings, as the product of all those old things which led to a situation in Europe which satisfied no sober- and rational-minded thinking person who really cares for the national and collective interests and needs of the European peoples).

Undoubtedly, the region called the heart of Europe, the region where we live, is of particular importance: Because it is here that the borders lie, the line of contact between the two most powerful military-political groupings in the world—NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Numerous military arsenals have become accumulated on both sides of this border, the region is literally oversaturated with arms. It is more important than ever to undertake precisely here the steps that are so very necessary in order to change this unacceptable situation.

The problem of European security, like the entire issue of war and peace, requires a completely new approach from all states, which are increasingly realizing how urgent and unpostponable the task of easing security [uvolnovani bezpecnosti] in Europe has become. It is necessary to proceed from the knowledge that the security of every state and nation depends on how secure the others are.

The socialist states appeal to their partners in Europe to transform into a practical policy the knowledge that efforts to gain unilateral military advantages represent a natural threat to their neighbor, while simultaneously lowering the level of their own security; in other words, they impair those basic interests which every state is striving to safeguard.

Socialist Czechoslovakia proceeds from the conviction that a dialogue represents creative activity. It fulfills its purpose and mission at the precise moment when proposals and incentives are submitted on how to settle conflicts, develop common and unifying affairs, and firmly anchor them in international life. That has also given birth to the idea of gradually creating a zone of trust and cooperation, of good-neighborly relations precisely along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO states.

It is true that a just peace and security cannot be ensured by military measures alone—that is why our proposal concerns political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian issues. However, without practical military measures it is scarcely possible to even consider expanding and deepening the political dialogue.

The Czechoslovak initiative is therefore primarily aimed at gradually creating a kind of "diluted" zone, freed of the most dangerous offensive weapons. This would rapidly and substantially lower the level of military confrontation and deepen the atmosphere of trust, since the development of a political dialogue and the limitation of offensive arms systems are interconnected.

The Czechoslovak initiative shows a certain continuity. It is closely linked with (and follows up) the joint GDR-CSSR proposals to create zones free of nuclear and chemical arms along the line of contact between NATO and Warsaw Pact states. Our initiative and these proposals can be viewed as one, for they contain points of contact which can be linked; in fact, the proposal presented by Comrade Milos Jakes counts on the energetic participation of the states it concerns. Serious suggestions and useful ideas can be jointly discussed and embodied in the proposal.

The first Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of two classes of nuclear arms plays a significant role, in a way accelerating the driving force of the security process in Europe (the continent which is actually primarily concerned). The treaty is a complex of international documents involving nine states which had signed the CSCE Final Act. The process of eliminating nuclear arms also begins in Europe. The treaty is thus one of the focal points of current European policy.

A most realistic step was taken in this direction on Thursday [25 February] when the withdrawal of Soviet operational-tactical missiles from the CSSR and GDR began. The socialist states have thus made a gesture of good will, even before the Soviet-American treaty became ratified and valid and they became duty-bound to fulfill it. This well-considered and exemplary act of good will and responsibility convincingly proves how seriously the socialist states approach the first Soviet-American treaty.

The conclusion of the treaty itself and its ratification in the U.S. Congress and USSR Supreme Soviet help to create a healthier international political climate in Europe, which the Soviet Union, CSSR, and GDR want to help expand and deepen. We accepted Soviet nuclear missiles on our territory as an inevitable part of our collective defense, knowing that it is essential to maintain the military-strategic balance which was so threateningly disrupted by the American first-strike nuclear missiles deployed to the west of our borders. The Washington treaty has solved one of Europe's vital security interests—it rids the continent of intermediary- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. Our own country in particular will be rid of a direct nuclear threat: the Pershing 1A missiles deployed in Bavaria and targeted on Czechoslovak territory (even if the threat from other nuclear arms included in NATO equipment continues).

In this context we are justly alarmed by Western Europe not even considering the speediest possible renunciation of nuclear arms; on the contrary, it is thinking of military augmentation or, as it says, of "compensating for the loss of American nuclear missiles." The number of projects to modernize nuclear devices and produce new ones is increasing. The political representatives of Western Europe are obviously incapable of abandoning the illusion that nuclear arms "defend peace." They even claim that this is the "secant" [secna] component of West European security. It is becoming obvious that this stereotype, ossified, way of thinking whose consequences are extremely dangerous, way of thinking is hampering nuclear disarmament the most. The United States and its West European allies acknowledge only the smaller, less important part of the truth that there are far too many nuclear weapons and that it is therefore possible to cut down their numbers. But they refuse to grasp the basic, decisive truth that nuclear arms are an instrument of mankind's collective **suicide** [published in boldface]. A nuclear-free world is a "vision" and "utopia" for them, not an accessible reality—and the tenor of statements by some prominent representatives of West European governments seems to indicate that they are almost afraid of a world without nuclear arms.

We believe that many things can be overcome in a frank and sincere dialogue. Gradual steps toward consolidating European security could become a convincing argument, even for those in the West who have no faith, who doubt this. The Czechoslovak initiative is a step in this direction, a call for a mutually beneficial act—to build a common home of European security. We cannot build it alone, we need partners, good neighbors, on both sides of Europe.

Questions on Soviet Missiles Answered

AU292052 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 27 Feb 88 p 7

[Stanislav Stibor article in the "In Response to Readers' Questions" column: "On Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Missiles." Passages in boldface as published]

[Text] **Readers have been turning to the editorial office with a number of questions in connection with the commenced withdrawal of Soviet OTR-22 operational-tactical missiles with nuclear warheads from CSSR territory. The questions concern not only the Soviet missile base, but also the equipment of the Czechoslovak People's Army with missiles, problems concerning the organization and the safety of the missiles' transport, and the like. Some readers even claim to have seen missiles similar to those they have now seen on television or on press photographs in other parts of the republic.**

First of all, let us draw attention to the fact that there is only **one** base for Soviet nuclear missiles in Czechoslovakia—in Hranice na Morave, which is also mentioned in the appropriate section of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles of 8 December 1987.

As has been reported previously, 39 Soviet OTR-22 (SS-12) operational-tactical missiles were deployed on our territory in 1983, to which also belong mobile launchers, 24 of which were in Hranice. **There have never been, and are not, any nuclear missiles on the territory of Czechoslovakia, except for the area of Hranice na Morave.** Following the withdrawal of Soviet missiles

from Hranice, the CSSR will again be a country without nuclear missiles as **our Army, in harmony with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, has never possessed nuclear devices.**

If our readers claim to have seen a similar missile in other localities of the Republic, this is because the OTR-22 missile complexes closely resemble mobile operational-tactical missiles with conventional (non-nuclear) warheads, which are part of our Army's equipment. They also have an eight-wheel undercarriage and the cabin and the mask of the vehicle are quite similar [to those of the OTR-22]. These missiles can be seen during transfers to various exercises but they could also be seen during the last military parades on Prague's Letna Plain and in Bratislava in 1985. Members of our rocket troops are well-trained in their operation, but no firing of live ammunition from this weapon takes place in our country.

As to the problem of the transport of the Soviet missile technology from Hranice to the USSR, it can be said that the mobile OTR-22 missile complex consists of the launching equipment, the carrier (that is, the missile itself), and the nuclear warhead. These three components are shipped separately. It was the launching equipment that was being loaded in Hranice na Morave on Thursday [25 February]. The shipment of carriers in special containers will follow next. Special and extraordinary provisions have been taken to ensure the safety of the transport of nuclear warheads.

The withdrawal of nuclear missiles from the CSSR will last until mid-March. Until then it will be necessary to transfer not only the aforementioned individual parts of the missile complexes, but also other technical safety and control devices.

CSSR Envoy at Vienna Talks on Jakes Proposal

LD291438 Prague CTK in English
1350 GMT 29 Feb 88

[Text] Vienna Feb 29 (CTK correspondent)—The Czechoslovak proposal for creating zones of confidence, cooperation and good neighbourly relations on the dividing line between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states, submitted by General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Milos Jakes, was put forward here Monday before the two alliances' representatives by head of the Czechoslovak delegation Frantisek Dolezel.

Warsaw Treaty and NATO representatives from 23 countries are meeting here to prepare future negotiations on disarmament in Europe within the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Frantisek Dolezel stressed that Milos Jakes' proposal is in close connection with the issues which are to be on the agenda of the follow-up talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armament in Europe.

Their aim will be to reduce the danger of military confrontation, to avert the threat of an unexpected attack, and strengthen confidence and security in Europe, the Czechoslovak official said, expressing hope that the countries involved will adopt a constructive attitude towards this initiative.

Jakes Initiates New Disarmament Plan

'Zone of Confidence' Plan Submitted to Talks

LD031458 Prague CTK in English
1235 GMT 3 Mar 88

[Text] Vienna March 3 (CTK correspondent)—The proposal of Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary Milos Jakes for the establishment of a zone of confidence, cooperation and good neighbourly relations along the line dividing Warsaw Treaty and NATO states was submitted today to the Vienna talks on disarmament in Central Europe.

Head of the Czechoslovak delegation to the talks Ludek Handl informed the participants in the talks of the main ideas of the proposal, stressing that Czechoslovakia supports a comprehensive approach in the military, political, economic, ecological and humanitarian spheres. In the military sphere it proposes a gradual establishment of a "diluted" zone in which the level of military confrontation would be reduced. As regards the other fields, the proposal regards them as occasions for developing a political dialogue and all round mutually advantageous cooperation, removing obstacles and solving surviving problems.

Spokesman of the Czechoslovak delegation Jozef Sestak dealt with certain military aspects of the proposal at a news conference. He said the proposal included the withdrawal of the most dangerous kinds of offensive weapons from the zone, of the solution of the question of nuclear infrastructure, and added that the measures are aimed at reducing the military confrontation, averting the threat of a surprise attack and strengthening confidence.

Polish Official Supports Plan

LD032333 Warsaw PAP in English
1914 GMT 3 Mar 88

[Text] Warsaw, March 3—Acting minister of foreign affairs, Vice-Minister Henryk Jaroszek received on Thursday the ambassador of Czechoslovakia to Poland, who handed over the text of Czechoslovakia's proposal on the establishment of a zone of confidence and cooperation on the borderline between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states. The initiative was forwarded by General Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Milos Jakes in Prague last Feb. 24.

Jaroszek assured the ambassador of the Polish side's support for the initiative and stressed that Poland considered it a significant contribution to the peace proposals of the Warsaw Treaty member states.

The two sides stated that both current Czechoslovak initiative and the Jaruzelski Plan were important elements of the foreign policy pursued by both states and of the joint activities of the Warsaw Treaty for the creation of the conditions for lasting security in Europe.

NATO Summit Retains 'Soviet Threat' Cliche

LD042014 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 4 Mar 88

[Text] The following commentary written by Vladimir Baumelis devoted to the NATO summit meeting in Brussels:

NATO has not stepped out of its own shadow. This is how one could characterize briefly the results of the 2-day session of the highest NATO political representatives in Brussels, a shadow which, due to NATO member-states, is still laying over their relations with the socialist countries and over the problems existing within the alliance itself. The positive attitude by the participants in the meeting to the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the elimination of medium -and shorter-range missiles and their support for the agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons are the only things one can assess positively. The Warsaw Pact states will understandably also examine thoroughly the final documents adopted at the meeting in Brussels, which include, among other things, an outline of NATO policy in the sphere of arms control and disarmament.

Overall, however, one has to say that the NATO meeting has steered clear of what would be needed to be done on its side in order to bring about a real breakthrough in relations between the East and the West. It has stayed far behind the new creative attitudes, which would help, to a growing degree, to strengthen peaceful relations in Europe in such a way as stressed in the letter sent by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek to the UN secretary general, in which he explained to him at length the essense of the new Czechoslovak peace initiative. I believe that those voices in the FRG have not strayed too far from the truth which described the documents adopted in Brussels as verbose papers, documents revealing NATO's perplexness, which is now having to face the new peace policy of the Warsaw Pact states.

The fact is that along with the peace rhetoric NATO's final documents also contain old, considerably hackneyed cliches about a Soviet military threat, particularly in the sphere of conventional weapons. In this connection NATO has proposed that the Warsaw pact member state substantially reduce the numerical strength of tanks and guns. Western media themselves have described such calls as mere propaganda aimed primarily at blunting protests of the West European peace movement. This is logical; the fact is that the NATO states have not proposed any counter value for the possible reduction of the said weapons system on the Warsaw Pact states' side. In other words, they are demanding a reduction from the East alone. And in those areas of conventional weapons where the West today possessed a marked superiority, and there are not a small number of them—for instance in strike aircraft, the number of helicopter gunships and naval vessels—everything should remain as it is.

Nothing of substance has changed in NATO'S attitude to the problem of reducing nuclear arms. It has however been confirmed that in their nuclear policy certain different attitudes persist, especially the question of the manner of nuclear armament. The fact is that the final documents have in practice totally avoided the question of a possible modernization of tactical nuclear weapons by indicating that this issue will be tackled later. Although some political observers have described this fact as positive, in my view one needs to assess it realistically: The fact that the West has thereby not given up nuclear weapons at all. The meeting in Brussels has thus accomodated only some NATO member countries, in particular the FRG, which are under strong internal political pressure in this area, and above all the Western alliance does not apparently want to add oil to the flames before the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Goetting Addresses Presidium on Disarmament

AU261425 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 23 Feb 88 p 3

["From the speech" of Gerald Goetting, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union, at a session of the Main Executive Committee Presidium in Berlin on 22 February: "With Joint Responsibility for a World With Fewer and Fewer Weapons"]

[Excerpts] Since Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the agreement on the elimination of the Soviet and U.S. intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Washington, two and a half months have gone by. What we noted at that time in our first assessments has been confirmed over this past period: The results of the summit between the CPSU Central Committee secretary and the U.S. President are of a truly historic nature. The summit opened up a totally new chapter in the history of the struggle of peace-loving mankind for disarmament and detente.

A change for the better is now starting after years of increasing confrontation, a steadily accelerating arms race, and rising tensions. [passage omitted]

When the agreement on the INF Treaty was signed last December, a sigh of relief rippled through the world. All people who have been advocating a halt to the arms race

for years—Marxists, Christians, peace activists of any political, ideological, or religious movement—feel encouraged and justified in having new hopes. In many respects, tensions and distrust in East-West relations are giving way to detente and new trust. A changed political climate in the world is beginning to make gradual progress and in some cases it has had a promising effect on the efforts to eliminate hotbeds of crisis and settle conflicts.

The precondition for the conclusion of the Washington treaty was—and this is the most important lesson for the future—recognizing the realities of today's world: a world in which all peoples increasingly depend on each other and have to rely on each other. Mankind is faced with an inescapable alternative: Either the peoples will perish in a nuclear inferno, or the states learn to live together peacefully, in spite of their differences. This is the main issue of our time.

It was possible to sign the Washington agreement—and this is another important lesson from its conclusion—because good will on both sides, understanding for the other's legitimate interests, and joint efforts for acceptable compromises won over old-established cliches.

Just like all the citizens of our state, every one of us, dear friends, has made his contribution to bringing about the results of the Washington summit. With its specific means and possibilities, the GDR has actively contributed to defusing international contradictions, to radically reducing military confrontation, and to creating security by means of disarmament. It has energetically accepted its joint responsibility for peace in order to overcome conflicts and to establish a balance of interests between states with different social systems and alliance memberships. Let us recall:

—More than 5 years ago, when NATO started to deploy nuclear intermediate-range missiles in five West European member countries and the temperature in the international atmosphere seemed to have fallen to zero, it was Erich Honecker who gave new stimuli to the struggle for security and detente with his appeal "Struggle for Peace—Now More Than Ever!"

—Our republic, together with other states and social forces, promoted the international discussion on ways toward military and political stability on our continent with specific proposals, such as those for a nuclear-free corridor and a chemical-weapon-free zone in the heart of Europe.

—Our country will do everything in its power to implement the Washington treaty and to pave the way for further agreements. The most recent convincing proof of this is the agreement with the Soviet party and state leadership to withdraw earlier than planned the nuclear shorter- and intermediate-range missiles that are deployed on GDR territory. As is known, preparations for this have already been started, even though the treaty between the USSR and the United States has not yet been ratified and implemented.

—We Christian Democrats actively support the International Meeting for Nuclear-Free Zones, which will take place under the auspices of Erich Honecker in Berlin on 20-22 June 1988. We are convinced that the appeal of the National Committee for its preparation will meet with a vivid response and agreement from Christian-Democratic politicians and people from churches and religious communities in our country and on all continents. [passage omitted]

Class differences, and thus also ideological differences in opinion, cannot be removed by means of discussion; but it is necessary and possible to deal with each other in such a way that the general human interests of peace and security are not endangered and that solving our current global problems is promoted.

Doing everything to make peace more secure is also the most important thing in shaping the relations between the two German states. The supreme principle must be: Never again war, but only peace from German soil! The nature of bilateral relations between the GDR and the FRG has an essential influence on the situation in Europe. Both German states can make a particularly important contribution to further consolidating peace on our continent. All opportunities for this must be exploited. This is the meaning of the proposals made by Erich Honecker in his letter to Chancellor Kohl on 16 December 1987.

It is and remains our principle: No arms buildup, but disarmament! We do not succumb to the illusion that this principle can be implemented only in the struggle against those interested in armamen. The Washington treaty removes the intermediate-range missiles, but not the military-industrial complex, which continues to count on nuclear deterrence, military superiority, and the policy of strength.

The socialist states, on the other hand, adhere to the belief that the disarmament measures that have already been agreed must not be compensated by new armament in other fields, but must be continued with new initiatives. The ideal of socialism continues to be to establish a nuclear-free world and security without violence for all. This goal unites all peace forces—Marxists, Christians, and bourgeois pacifists—in short, all who are concerned about peace on earth.

We in the GDR have always been guided by this principle in the coexistence of all humanist forces. Especially in our country, we have had decades of experiences in the growing and maturing of this cooperation. It is based on the firm foundations of the socialist social conditions, which are the joint work of the members of all classes and strata and the representatives of different ideologies and denominations. Together we have accomplished our

achievements: our peace state, the high results of the economic and social policy, the values of socialist culture, and our country's foreign policy successes. Marxists and Christians and all citizens of our state are interested in safeguarding these achievements, in preserving peace, and in increasing public welfare. [passage omitted]

The attitude of the social forces and state organs has always been determined by the striving for having relations with the churches characterized in all fields by impartiality, openness, and trust. The work of all forces of the National Front has always aimed at winning over more and more Christian citizens to work for our state's consistent peace policy and to commit themselves in joint work for the welfare of the people. This is alliance policy in action, this is a specific contribution to the steadily deepening political-moral unity of our people. [passage omitted]

To actively participate in shaping social life is one of man's basic rights that can be unrestrictedly implemented only by socialism. On the other hand, socialist society is doing everything so that the individuality of its members can fully develop.

Our Constitution guarantees more than 40 basic rights and these are implemented in social practice—from the free development of man, respect for his dignity, respect for and protection of his personality, and equality regardless of nationality, race, ideology, or religious denomination to freedom of conscience and religion. Freedom of religion must not be confused with attempts to question basic principles of our society or basic characteristics of our state's policy.

How the much-quoted human rights are implemented in nonsocialist countries is felt by, for instance, those Christian figures in the FRG who are prohibited from exercising their profession or are imprisoned because they have been actively working for peace and disarmament. They come up hard against the limits of the so-called "freedom for others to think differently" that is mentioned so often by some people over there.

Furthermore, the attempt to contrast social and individual human rights is impossible in principle. The right to work, for instance, is indisputably a human right of a socioeconomic character; but mass unemployment and "new poverty" have deep effects on the personal sphere of the people affected. For a homeless person the individual right to freedom of movement is an illusion in any case, as is the individual right to access to cultural assets for an illiterate person. The supreme human right, the right to peace, is both a social and an individual right; as is known, human rights can be exercised only by the living.

Humanist Forces Receive Strong Support From Socialism [subhead]

Secure peace needs strong socialism. This insight has repeatedly proved true over the 7 decades since the establishment of the world's first socialist state and over the almost 4 decades since the founding of the GDR. Since the establishment of socialism as a social system, and as the working people's will to peace and progress personified as a state, the hopes for peace of all humanist forces on earth have received strong support. [passage omitted]

Disarmament Opponents Criticized

AU011841 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 27-28 Feb 88 p 2

[T.M. commentary: "The Withdrawal of Missiles"]

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet intermediate-range missiles of the lower range spectrum (OTR-22) from GDR territory has started. As announced by Erich Honecker on 24 January, the withdrawal has begun earlier than originally planned, which means that it is taking place before the ratification of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles (500 to 5,000 km). This is a historic moment for which we have long worked and struggled!

When NATO started to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe in 1983, the Warsaw Pact states had to counterarm in the interest of their security. Many feared at the time that the prospects for disarmament were therefore obstructed. Our party replied with the call: Now more than ever before! Millions in our country answered with higher achievements in strengthening socialism: My place of work is my battle station for peace!

Our party, the people and the Government of the GDR made an active contribution to the coming about of the treaty in Washington. Now we are already acting in its spirit. This has caused great pleasure and deep satisfaction among GDR citizens. And in addition to that the early withdrawal of missiles agreed upon between the Soviet Union, the GDR, and the CSSR is an example that has met with respect all over the world.

This also applies to the United States: White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater spoke of a good sign. And this applies to the FRG as well: Alfred Dregger, chairman of the CDU-CSU Bundestag group, assessed the GDR step positively.

And now, precisely at this moment, when the other side should follow the good example, the DPA news agency carries the call of high NATO officials "to keep the remaining minimum arsenal of nuclear weapons efficient." And the report continues: "In addition, new weapons with a range of over 500 km (!) are required which can assume the tasks of the intermediate-range missiles eliminated by the INF treaty."

This is a dangerous program. It is directly opposed to the start of real nuclear disarmament, which was brought about by both sides through the active support of their partners.

This must not be allowed to happen. As far as we are concerned, we will do everything so that disarmament will continue. The nuclear devilry of all ranges must disappear. Conventional armed forces and weapons must be reduced to the level of nonaggression capability. Chemical weapons must be banned. In view of the resistance of those who want to "add" what has been already eliminated after great efforts through negotiations, we reaffirm: Now more than ever before!

CSSR Call for Zone of Trust Supported

LD292230 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1722 GMT 29 Feb 88

[Text] Berlin 29 Feb (ADN)—The GDR supports the CSSR's proposal, submitted by Milos Jakes, the general secretary of the CPCZ, for the creation of a zone of trust, cooperation, and goodneighborly relations along the dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. It is a further welcome initiative by a Warsaw Pact member directed toward the consolidation of peace, stability, and trust in Europe, the GDR Foreign Minister spokesman, Ambassador Wolfgang Meyer, said.

Following the signing of the INF treaty, it was not a matter of taking further steps to lessen confrontation and increase security in this extremely sensitive geographical region. The initiative of the CSSR, which in the field of military detente matched the well-known and internationally highly regarded proposals of the GDR and the CSSR for the creation of nuclear and chemical weapons free zones in central Europe, took account of this.

On the basis of its integrated nature, which in addition to the military aspects also embraced political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian aspects, it would, if implemented, also provide an important impetus for the continuation of the CSCE process and for the creation of a worldwide comprehensive system of international peace and security.

POLAND

Polish Officer Discusses INF Implications

LD031724 Warsaw PAP in English 1419 GMT 3 Mar 88

[Text] Warsaw, 3 March: PAP's reporter interviewed representative of the Polish Army's General Staff Col Dr Tadeusz Cepak on the impact of the treaty liquidating intermediate and shorter ranged missiles in Europe on Poland's security. The colonel said inter alia:

Following the many-year efforts, stopped has been the dangerous or outright fatal syndrome of action and counteraction which brought on to stockpiling upwards of 50 thousand nuclear warheads since 1945.

In the category of actual dangers, one cannot oversee what is represented by the nuclear potential which is not covered by the treaty, that is the strategic offensive weapons, all the elements of the developed strategic triad of the U.S. for Poland, for the Warsaw Treaty states, these are the American, French and British missiles and strategic air force, kept up in a high degree of preparedness for action. We are anxious over the overwhelming preponderance of the NATO naval forces equipped with the Tomahawks which can be launched from submarines and surface ships, submarine-carried ballistic missiles, over carrier air force [as received] representing a big fighting potential.

A separate source of these dangers results from the NATO's large numerical preponderance of the short-ranged striking air force over the Warsaw Treaty's forces. Moreover the West would like to preserve the tactical nuclear weapons and clamours for compensating these missiles which have not been dismantled yet.

One of the more modest variants of the U.S. "Plan for the United Strategic Operations" envisaged launching more than 7,000 nuclear weapons to destroy upwards of 8,700 nuclear, military installations, as well command posts and industrial and economic centres on the Soviet territory. In so doing, it was assumed that the assault on the strategic targets in the Soviet Union might entail loss of from 25 to 34 million human lives.

Another variant envisaged a rocket attack on 1,500 similar installations in Poland. If the intermediate missiles disappear then their role will be taken over by strategic weapons, the naval and tactical air forces. So, the sources of the real threat will not cease to exist.

Asked whether there is a chance to completely free humankind from these weapons, Col Cepak said:

Such an intention and readiness are provided, among other things, by the Gorbachev plan of 1986. Ridding mankind of these weapons will not be easy, but it becomes necessary for all reasons.

As for Poland, even if a reduction of the U.S. missiles will cut the aforesaid number of installations down to 750, then each of our voivodships will continue having an average of 15 installations which will be still endangered.

The declaration by Western politicians that war should be eliminated from the practice of inter-state relations, that peace pillars of European security should be built up, that the level of military confrontation should be brought down and that offensive components of war potential should be eliminated, will remain but illusive words if there is not actual effort and political will in the main West European states to renounce nuclear weapons and strategy of deterrence. The NATO summit meeting upholds this strategy. More, some of the states revive the dreams of a nuclear might.

France and Britain resist everything that could limit and stem the modernization of their nuclear forces today.

The polling of the FRG's economic might and the Bundeswehr with France's growing nuclear potential creates a West European military superpower. And the recently formulated postulates by a group of American politicians to augment the atom role of France and Britain in the so-called defence of Atlantic alliance are nothing else but an attempt to step up the threat. All of that will be undermining the security foundations and increasing the sense of uncertainty, being contrary to the common striving for European security and order and inconsistent with the requirements for building structures of mutual confidence.

The sense of one's own security must be based on the realities by us, Col. Cepak concluded.

Commentary on NFZ Proposal for Northern Europe

52001055 Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 12, Dec 87 pp 82-86

[Article by Andrey Anatolyev and Yevgeniy Nadezhdin under the rubric "Commentary": "Northern Europe—An Invitation to a Dialogue"]

[Text] A new word has been added in recent months to international political parlance—Murmansk. Because it is from the city of Murmansk that the Soviet Union called for dialogue on the problems confronting the northern parts of the world. The concept of the evolution of Soviet foreign policy with regard to the North was set forth by Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech made on October 1 this year in this capital city of the Soviet polar area. Thus, yet another step was made to give effect to new political thinking. It has shown that our country is definitely interested in achieving progress in disarmament and detente in that part of the world, and in cooperation in many fields.

On the surface of it, Northern Europe, Scandinavia, is in most favourable conditions in terms of military-political stability, as compared with other regions of the world. Among the NATO countries, Denmark and Norway, which have unilaterally announced their intention to have no foreign military bases and nuclear arms on their territory in peacetime, occupy a special place. Iceland, too, considers that no foreign nuclear warheads should be stationed on its territory. Sweden is neutral, and Finland is known for playing a constructive part in world politics as a country which does not participate in any military blocs.

The realistic foreign policy pursued by Scandinavian countries and their considerable contribution to positive international developments show they are interested in stable peace, detente and cooperation. Of late, the leaders of these countries have spoken in favour of the speediest conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement on medium-and shorter-range missiles in Europe, tangible progress towards a 50-per cent cut in strategic offensive arms, elimination of chemical weapons, and a ban on nuclear testing. The seeds of US Star Wars have not sprouted on these countries' soil. And Washington's actions to give effect to its global ambitions in various parts of the world have been responded to with disillusion there.

All this, plus the absence of nuclear arms and large foreign military bases in Northern Europe (if we do not count the US military facility in Keflavik), creates fairly good conditions for establishing a zone of genuine peace and effective interaction in Northern Europe.

But is the sky really so clear over Scandinavia? Not quite. There are reasons for concern, and fairly grave ones at that.

The military-political situation in the North Atlantic, conditioned by the strategic position of that region, is developing in quite a reverse direction. As is known, at present NATO strategists are probing into a possibility of "making up" for the changes in the balance of strength in Europe, the balance which, they assert, will be upset after the elimination of medium-and shorter-range missiles, since the Warsaw Treaty countries allegedly have a "superiority" in conventional weapons and armed forces. As regards Northern Europe, such compensation could include the use of sea- and air-based cruise missiles from the North Atlantic, constant patrolling of the northern seas by the naval forces of the United States or other NATO countries, the building in Norway of coastal facilities for the US Navy, and improvement of the tracking systems keeping watch over Soviet submarines. Naturally, such plans of building up US and NATO military activity in the region which is of great strategic significance to the Soviet Union cannot but evoke concern in our country. All this reminds one of communicating vessels—a lowering of the military confrontation level in one area automatically leads to raising this level in another area. The proposals formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev in his Murmansk speech are aimed exactly at changing this pattern.

Indeed, the opportunities for progress, opened up at the Soviet-American disarmament talks, can bring about a chain reaction. By pulling one link it would be possible to pull out other links of the chain.

The Murmansk initiatives are linked directly with the understanding on medium- and shorter-range missiles, and with the proposals to reduce conventional weapons and armed forces in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. If progress is achieved here, the nuclear threat must be prevented from being concentrated in Northern Europe. This relationship accounts for the timing of the announcement of the new Soviet proposals.

The main thing is that a constructive dialogue should begin already now, and that a way should be paved for positive processes leading to disarmament and detente in Northern Europe. The subject of the dialogue, its forms, and the participants taking part may be agreed upon at meetings of the countries concerned. This question was raised already during the talks held in Moscow between Mikhail Gorbachev and Mauno Koivisto, President of Finland. These problems will evidently be focussed on at the forthcoming talks with political leaders of other Scandinavian countries. The Soviet Union is prepared to conduct simultaneously bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

In the area of disarmament the Soviet Union's goal is to achieve a radical lowering of the military confrontation level in the region. To that end, it has proposed that all the countries concerned should start talks on limiting and reducing military activity in the North. Such talks could cover at the first stage two specific questions

associated with creating a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe and extending confidence-building measures to the seas adjacent to this region.

The idea of a nuclear-free zone has been widely debated in various quarters of the European north for almost three decades now. And all these years the Soviet Union has backed up the idea, suggesting a series of measures to carry it out. In particular, the Soviet Union announced its preparedness:

— to act as a guarantor of such zone, no matter if other nuclear powers follow its example or not;

— to discuss with each state concerned, or a group of such states, all problems involved in creating such a zone including possible substantial measures regarding Soviet territory;

— and if such a zone is created, to withdraw from the Soviet Baltic Fleet the submarines armed with ballistic missiles (later the Soviet side specified that reference was to 6 submarines with 18 ballistic missiles on board);

— to effect a series of additional measures to provide favourable conditions for making progress in creating a nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union has already dismantled unilaterally the launching sites for medium-range missiles on the Kola Peninsula and the greater part of the launching sites for such missiles in the rest of the territory of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts; it moved from these district to other areas several battalions of shorter-range missiles and limited military exercises in the areas close to the borders of Scandinavian countries.

The Soviet Union intends, in future as well, to display a flexible and constructive approach to this issue. Thus, it was stressed in Murmansk that the USSR is prepared to discuss this problem on a bilateral or multilateral basis, and that it would be for the states which would join the nuclear-free zone to decide on the most appropriate way of formalising Soviet guarantees—by multilateral or bilateral agreements, by a government statement or in some other way. Simultaneously, it was made clear to the states concerned, that following the signing of the US-Soviet agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe, additional possibilities will emerge for military detente in the region.

As regards extending confidence-building measures to naval activity in the seas adjacent to Scandinavia, this idea has been debated in the countries of the region since recently and has already won quite a few supporters. Mauno Koivisto, President of Finland, Johan Jorgen Holst, Minister for Defence of Norway, Knut Frudenlund, former Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other politicians in the countries of the region spoke about specific details of such measures.

The main point of the idea is to lower the level of naval military activity in these areas, increase mutual knowledge of information about this activity, and diminish the threat of unprovoked incidents. The Soviet Union first supported such measures in November 1986. In Murmansk, this initiative was further developed and the meaning put into it by the Soviet side was specified. The USSR has proposed that the Warsaw Treaty and NATO should start consultations on reducing military activity and limiting the scope of actions by their navies and air forces in the Baltic, North and Norwegian seas and the Sea of Greenland, and on extending confidence-building measures to that area. Among such measures, in the opinion of the Soviet side, could be the signing of accords on limiting rivalry in anti-submarine weapons, notification of large naval and air-force exercises, invitation of observers of all states participating in the European process to large-scale naval and air-force exercises. This, it was emphasized in Murmansk, could be the first step on the path of extending confidence-building measures to the whole of the Arctic.

It was suggested that the countries concerned should discuss the question of banning naval activities in mutually agreed zones of international straits and in general along the routes of intensive sea traffic. To that end, it was suggested that a meeting of representatives of these countries could possibly be convened in Leningrad. During such consultations the sides could consider also additional measures on ensuring greater stability and reducing military activity in the North Atlantic. The Soviet Union is prepared to discuss any relevant proposals.

Broad opportunities can be opened up by establishing cooperation in the Arctic, this treasure house of minerals, primarily oil and gas. That region has vast amounts of fish, furs and other resources required by man. And it is of unique value for scientific research. The Arctic is an important area for navigation, and the short cut from Europe to the Far East and the Pacific lies right there. At the same time, the Arctic biosphere is an intricate and delicately balanced natural mechanism most sensitive to antropogenic influence.

International cooperation in the Arctic would not only be beneficial to all participants. The need for such cooperation is required by the magnitude of the problems confronting them. Severe climate, the lack of required infrastructure and remoteness of the region suggest that in order to obtain the desired results it would be most expedient to pool material, financial, technological, scientific and other resources, and to share know-how and other knowledge. This is one of the aims of the Murmansk initiatives. It was proposed, in part, to elaborate a general concept for a rational development of the northern region as well as to draw up a unified energy programme for Northern Europe in order to promote cooperation in off-shore oil and gas extraction and in exploration for and use of other resources.

The USSR has proposed that a conference be held in Murmansk in 1988 at which Arctic states would consider ways of coordinating research in the area and setting up a joint Arctic research council. Particular attention should be paid to questions bearing on the interests of the indigenous population of the North, on studying its ethnic specifics and promoting cultural ties among northern nationalities.

Up till now the Soviet Union preferred mainly bilateral cooperation in Arctic research. We have a programme of scientific exchanges in this sphere with Canada. An agreement on exploration of the Arctic together with Norway is in the pipeline. Coordinated actions of all Arctic states in this field will make it possible, in the opinion of the USSR, to place this work on a permanent basis.

To protect the environment in the North, the USSR considers it expedient to spread the practice of joint measures on marine environment protection, being carried out by a commission of seven coastal states in the Baltic Sea, to the entire oceanic and sea area of the North, jointly to devise a comprehensive plan of environmental protection in the North and to agree on instituting a system of control over the conditions of the environment and radiation safety in the region.

The Soviet Union has announced that it is ready, depending on the progress in normalising international relations, to open the Northern Sea Route for foreign ships, which would be led along the route by Soviet icebreakers.

There can be no rapid progress in these matters, which is only natural. One should not forget that the North European states, even though they have a good deal in common in ethnic and historical terms, are heterogeneous, and their foreign policies somewhat differ, too.

Nonetheless, the situation in the world is such that Northern Europe today is most sensitive to positive tendencies in international developments. This is evidenced by the social climate in these countries and the active debate going on there on ways of ensuring greater military-political stability and reducing military activity in the region. This is seen from the work being done by North European MPs on the problem of creating a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe, from the constructive initiatives, emerging in the Political quarters of Scandinavia, which are aimed at lowering the level of military confrontatio there. This is seen also from the concern displayed by the North Europeans over NATO's plans to make up for an elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles from Europe by increasing military activity in the North Atlantic.

No wonder then, that the Murmansk programme was regarded in the North European countries as a contribution to easing the tensions in Northern Europe, as a basis for a dialogue on the long urgent problems confronting the region. Some statements, however, show scepticism and caution. Our proposals on the nuclear-free zone and confidence-building measures in naval and air-force spheres have been responded to with restraint, especially in the North European NATO member countries. Some referred to the excessively broad scope of the tasks set, which would require their detailed study and coordination in NATO.

Well, the Soviet Union does not say it has answers to all problems in the region, nor does it claim to have invented a panacea, and it is far from intending to split the Atlantic alliance. The main purpose of the proposals is to pave the way for a constructive dialogue. It is for the North Europeans themselves to decide which way the dialogue would develop and what directions are the best for creating a zone of genuine peace and fruitful cooperation in the region.

The history of the Arctic and Polar regions has plenty of dramatic instances of man's struggle for survival in the severe climate there. This climate and other dangers brought people together, creating a special atmosphere of a brotherhood of men, of their dependence on each other, and mutual assistance, with man's life given priority to all values. The Arctic revealed the best in man—his high morality and humanism, and ability for self-sacrifice.

The progress of civilisation has made it possible to explore and develop these severe regions and use their resources for the benefit of man. But this progress has resulted also in the invention and stockpiling of lethal weapons by far exceeding the power of the Polar elements. Exorcism by Scandinavian trolls, these mythical beings living in caves on hills and known to be invulnerable, and sometimes very nasty, can do nothing against them. The nuclear monster with thousands of heads (warheads, in fact) can devour all life on earth within minutes. But it can be defeated through the joint efforts of all states, by the common political will and reason displayed by all members of the world community.

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EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Book Review: Legal Aspects on a Nordic NWF Zone

52002442 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 10 Jan 88 p 5

[Review by Klaus Tornudd of book "Legal Aspects on a Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone," edited by K.J. Lang and Allan Rosas, Finnish Lawyers Association Publishing House, 1987, 165 pages]

[Text] The debate over the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free [NWF] zone in the Nordic region has been abundantly supplied with new material during the 1980's, especially through the government reports that have been issued in various Nordic countries. A joint Nordic study is in full swing, and in due time it will result in a report to the Nordic governments. Its completion can be expected perhaps in 1989. For their part, Nordic MP's have worked out certain joint guidelines for such a zone. Added to that are all the analyses and studies done by individual researchers and commentators. The subject is a fertile one, and contained within it are a good many other problems.

During the 1980's, there have been two Nordic legal seminars where an NWF zone was the main topic. The first was held in Oslo in 1982, while the second, held in Helsinki in 1984, was sponsored by the Finnish Lawyers Peace Committee and included participants from a few non-Nordic countries as well. The material from both seminars has been published. The material from the Helsinki seminar is available in a small English-language volume edited by K.J. Lang and Allan Rosas and published this year by the Lawyers Association Publishing House.

The volume contains four essays whose length and wealth of detail vary considerably, along with a few shorter contributions.

To begin with, we should mention the long essay by Allan Rosas, which is intended to provide a legal survey of the situation as it stands today: the current status of nuclear weapons in the Nordic region. To a large extent, this becomes a question of general rules in international law and their applicability or validity in the Nordic region. The Nordic countries have, of course, signed the relevant international conventions governing the use and possession of nuclear weapons, particularly the nonproliferation treaty. In that connection, the author reviews the nuclear weapon policies of the individual Nordic countries in detail and concludes by showing that the deployment in the Nordic region of nuclear weapons belonging to a nuclear power is permissible under the current nonproliferaton rules. The first real legal obstacle, applying not only to possession but also to importation under all circumstances, is part of the new Nuclear Energy Law that will take effect in Finland on 1 March 1988.

Here the author touches on the public debate which took place in 1983 and gave rise to the expression "soothsayers" in a statement by President Koivisto. On that occasion, the prediction was that Finland's freedom from nuclear weapons might not be respected by our partner in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, the Soviet Union, during a hypothetical crisis situation. With the new law, a legal obstacle is added to Finland's intention, already clearly expressed, not to allow nuclear weapons on Finland's territory under any circumstances.

The author also brings up a few questions that are dealt with in other essays in the volume. In earlier publications, Rosas had already sided with those jurists who claim that the use of nuclear weapons—or at any rate the first use of such weapons—can be regarded as a violation of current international law. The same topic is dealt with in the book by both Soviet authors (Boris Klimenko and Tair Tairov) and the American jurist Simeon Sahaydachny. In part, the legal derivation of that ban dates back to the Hague Regulations of 1907, with their rule—drawn up by Marten, the Russian expert on international law—that belligerent parties shall observe "the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." Similar sentences can be found in other legal sources—for example, the 1977 Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Reference can also be made to several resolutions by the UN General Assembly concerning nuclear weapons, although those resolutions have no legally binding force. The answer to all that is, of course, that a literal interpretation of the traditional rules on humanity in wartime would presumably rule out not only the use of nuclear weapons but also many other kinds of warfare that have been witnessed, to his horror, by 20th century man.

Naturally enough, issues concerned with the Law of the Sea also take up a good deal of space in the book. The general rules governing innocent passage in territorial waters and the special rules for passage through the Danish sounds and the Aland Sea are described in detail by Rosas and other authors. Here we can also mention the contribution by the American writer Sahaydachny, who in fact does not analyze the zone problem at all but puts forward arguments concerning the illegality of nuclear weapons and the need to pay attention to the arms race at sea.

At the end of his lengthy essay, Rosas repeats his earlier thoughts about the possibility of establishing a Nordic zone by stages—for example, by moving from a political declaration to a legally binding arrangement or by putting the zone into effect in the various participating states at different times at their own discretion. So far, both those approaches have been rejected by the governments concerned, but of course, that does not prevent those proposals from being brought up again and debated.

As a whole, and thanks chiefly to Rosas' exhaustive essay, the volume obviously constitutes a useful contribution to the slowly growing body of literature on the zone issue. It does not try to provide just an unbiased analysis of the problems. Most of the authors take a stand that is quite clear, and no opponents of the zone project are included. Many political difficulties and problems are ignored completely, but the detailed presentation of legally based arguments is especially welcome all the same.

11798

FRG's Chancellor Kohl Comments on NATO Summit

LD031246 Hamburg DPA in German 1136 GMT 3 Mar 88

[Text] Brussels (DPA)—The joint rejection of early and separate decisions on the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons was stressed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl at his final news conference in Brussels today. There had been agreement that "no isolated decision is due" and that an overall concept would be awaited, the chancellor said.

Kohl stressed the "quite unusually friendly atmosphere" of the [NATO summit] conference, at which the discussions had been convincing on an individual level. In response to questions about the significance of the form of words used in the communique, that weapons would have to be kept at the "latest level," and whether this did not mean the same thing as "modernization," the chancellor referred [words indistinct] stationed short-range nuclear missiles.

In conclusion, the chancellor referred to the presence of French President Francois Mitterrand, who has resumed political involvement in NATO. As a result, the European desire to build its own strong pillar of the alliance in Europe was made clearly visible. The main theme of the discussion was also seen by Kohl as being the call to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to give proof of genuine relaxation, internally and externally.

FRG's Egon Bahr Criticizes NATO Summit Results

DW061105 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 5 Mar 88 p 2

[Article by "UB.": "SPD: Bonn Failed to Reach Its Goal in Brussels"]

[Text] Bonn, 4 March—The SPD which for many months has tried to reach a new security policy consensus, on Friday dissociated itself more clearly than the day before from statements made by the Federal Government expressing satisfaction with the results of the NATO summit in Brussels. Presidium member Egon Bahr said that the Government's hopes to start negotiations before the end of this year on conventional stability in Europe were now frustrated. NATO did not do its homework, he said, neither regarding the overall disarmament concept nor regarding the conditions for a conventional disarmament mandate. The Brussels results contained the "total illusion" that the Warsaw Pact could be asked to carry out unilateral reductions, Bahr said. That was "politically and psychologically impossible," he stressed.

Bahr said, the coalition seemed to have become very modest to be satisfied with the Brussels results. There could be no talk about the often-quoted overall concept that the Federal chancellor had urged. Obviously Kohl achieved a postponement of modernization, but the issue proper was not resolved, he said. The SPD hoped that the coalition would insist on its position that modernization was out of the question as long as there was no overall disarmament concept. That was one fo the essential points where the coalition and oppositions reached agreement prior to the Brussels meeting, Bahr said. The SPD did not intend to move away from that position. Mrs Thatcher was right to say that decisions on new weapons systems had to be made many years before they were introduced, Bahr said, commenting on the SPD's position. Possibly the U.S. Congress would make available funds for such weapons this year and ask the Germans next year at the latest whether they were ready to deploy such weapons systems, he said. It was an illusion to believe that a decision could be delayed until 1995. In addition, he considered the term "modernization" a delusion of the public. It was not the modernization of an old system, but the development of a new system, Bahr said. Switching over from an old Volkswagen to a new Mercedes car also could not be called modernization, Bahr said.

FRG's Kohl Interviewed on Brussels Summit

DW061340 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG in German 6 Mar 88 pp 18-19

[Interview with Chancellor Helmut Kohl by Wolfgang Kenntemich; date and place not given]

[Text] BILD AM SONNTAG: Following the Brussels summit, how rapidly will disarmament be continued?

Kohl: The Brussels summit has given an important impetus in three respects:

First, all allies have unanimously urged the U.S. Senate to ratify the INF agreement (scrapping all intermediate-range missiles) as soon as possible and without any amendments.

Second, all allies have expressed the expectation that negotiations on a START treaty under which the superpowers would halve their strategic weapons should be concluded before the end of this year.

Third, the allies have decided on guidelines for the current Vienna negotiations on conventional stability from the Atlantic to the Urals. It is in the allies' interests that the Vienna negotiations become real disarmement talks before the end of this year.

BILD AM SONNTAG: The Soviets have started withdrawing their intermediate-range missiles from the GDR—a move that appeals to the public. When will the Americans start doing that here?

Kohl: Once the INF treaty is ratified, both parties to the agreement would check on site the weapons specified in advance in a period of no more than 3 months. Immediately after that, they would start destroying—not just removing—all intermediate-range missiles according to an agreed-upon schedule.

That means that the U.S. missiles deployed in our country would be removed to the United States and scrapped, beginning not later than 4 months after the treaty became effective.

By the way, what the Soviet Union now removes from the GDR and the CSSR are weapons it had deployed in addition to the SS-20's. However, large quantities of SCUD missiles with ranges of less than 500 km remain in the GDR and the CSSR. They are a reason for our alliance to be greatly concerned because the Warsaw Pact is massively superior in that respect. I regret that there has been no response to my repeated appeals to General Secretary Gorbachev to send a signal of good will by reducing that threat.

BILD AM SONNTAG: Would we possibly have to counterarm [nachruesten]?

Kohl: In order to achieve further verifiable disarmament steps, in particular for chemical and conventional weapons, our alliance cannot renounce keeping its weapons effective as necessary and up to date. But nobody in the West is considering a "new counterarmament" [nachruestung]. Any decisions that may become necessary in the future would in any case take into account the progress that has been achieved in counterarmament.

BILD AM SONNTAG: Will you meet Kremlin chief Gorbachev soon to push Soviet conventional disarmament?

Kohl: When and where General Secretary Gorbachev and I will meet, will be decided in the second half of this year. But I can say now that I do not intend to "push" anything. We are and remain serious discussion and negotiation partners. I anticipate some progress in conventional disarmament not least because I also think that the Soviet Union is interested in reducing the burdens on its economy, caused by conventional armament.

BILD AM SONNTAG: The outside world praises your foreign policy successes, whereas your own country criticizes your work and style of government....

Kohl: Despite all the criticism, the successes of my government are recognized by our citizens. I cannot expect general applause before the important tasks are solved. We are about to make important changes for our country's future, such as the comprehensive tax reform, the limitation of health-care costs, the structural reform of the pension system, and the reorganization of post and telecommunications. Of course, there is criticism and there are proposals for change and discussions. But that is totally normal for such far-reaching reforms. I am predicting that these reforms will be viewed by our citizens as successes achieved by the Federal Government, once the Bundestag has adopted them.

BILD AM SONNTAG: Even CDU presidium members say that the coalition climate is bad. Could the Government's projects be too ambitious?

Kohl: No. The public tends to interpret discussions as quarrels or even "rows." But the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition has proved its efficiency on many occasions. It has done an outstanding job. Some colleagues in the Government and in the Bundestag groups work extremely hard. There are no ready patent solutions to the most complicated problems. We have to work and struggle for such solutions. We have to consider in particular the great changes in our population. For example, in 1950 there were 2 and 1/2 times as many people under 15 as people over 65. Today both age groups are about the same size. The number of the more than 80 year-olds has risen to more than 2 million in the same period. The government's current account shows that cooperation of the coalition headed by me has led to good results. That is the most important thing.

BILD AM SONNTAG: When do you intend to change your cabinet? Who will become the new defense minister?

Kohl: The change of government is not of current interest for the moment. I intend to decide in May on a successor for Defense Minister Manfred Woerner who will leave the Defense Ministry and go to Brussels as NATO Secretary General.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Officials Differ on NATO Modernization Issue

DW071117 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 7 Mar 88 p 5

[Article by "FY": "'Abolish Short-Range Weapons Also'"]

[Text] Bonn, 6 Mar—The reaction in Bonn of coalition and opposition representatives to the Brussels NATO summit meeting reflects deep disappointment—

although for different reasons. Within the CDU, the most important coalition party, serious basic differences have arisen. While Chancellor Kohl has repeatedly emphasized that a third zero solution for nuclear short-range weapons is as out of the question as a nuclear weapons-free zone or even denuclearization in Europe, Chairman of CDU/CSU Group Dregger said the opposite over Radio Free Berlin.

He said that if the Soviet Union's conventional superiority is dismantled, nuclear deterrence could "perhaps disappear completely." In addition, he asked the world powers not only to halve their strategic nuclear weapons, but also to disarm to a level "equal to the amount the two European nuclear powers—France and Britain— currently have together." Dregger also emphasized that for him the "concept of a firewall" ["brandmauerkonzept"] is unacceptable. It is, therefore, out of the question to replace those nuclear weapons that were eliminated through the double zero solution by additional missiles with a range of less than 500 km. On the contrary, disarmament must also occur under a 500 km range. "There exists identity of interests between the two states in Germany. Whether they are Eastern or Western short-range missiles—they always reach just from Germany to Germany. Naturally we also feel responsible for our compatriots in Berlin and in the GDR."

CDU Deputy Todenhoefer, the former disarmament policy spokesman of his group, expressed open disappointment with the summit meeting. It missed the historical chance to support clearly the urgently necessary modernization of conventional and nuclear weapons. A complete disarmament concept was also not submitted. It was barely perceptible under the mountain of words. There was no particular statement about the necessity to modernize those nuclear weapons with which the Soviets can be hit from West Europe. Merely disarmament, without a solution to the causes of tension, cannot safeguard peace. Disarmament must not be an end in itself.

The SPD's expert on Germany and security policies, Bahr, also reacted critically. Some matters were stipulated in Brussels, but the general concept urged by the Federal Government was not accepted. As to the problem of modernizing nuclear short-range missiles, the federal chancellor has achieved only a delay. Bahr hopes the Federal Government will follow up on its intention to decide on modernization within the framework of a general concept. Bahr agrees with Mrs Thatcher that decisions on new nuclear weapons must be made 7 years before their introduction. If new weapons systems are to be introduced in 1995, the U.S. Senate must make the necessary financial means for their development available next year at the latest—better this year. The idea that such a decision could be put off until 1995 is an illusion. In saying that , Bahr reacted to a statement Friday by Minister Woerner who said that at present there is no "need for modernization".

The Peace Movement Coordination Commission stated that the Brussels result supports the opinion "that only the continued action of the people will help implement the hope for further disarmament steps in Europe." The government chiefs had frankly stated for the first time that even if the Warsaw Pact were to disarm, and if a conventional balance were achieved, field combat nuclear weapons would still remain necessary for NATO. U.S. experts informed the participants at the summit meeting that the necessary armament after the double zero solution would lead to more short-range missiles than there were before. A total of 1,900 air-based cruise missiles and 600 ground-based missiles with a range of up to 500 km "are to be introduced into West Europe by the mid-nineties".

Government Spokesman Restates Arms, Disarmament Policy

LD071748 Hamburg DPA in German 1633 GMT 7 Mar 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The overall security and disarmament concept placed in review by the [NATO] alliance must, in the opinion of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, be ready "at the latest in a year." Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost gave this time frame in Bonn today when speaking to the press. Progress in disarmament and arms control in all areas should be brought continually into the analysis. Ost, whose statement was in reply to various assessments made of the recent NATO summit in Brussels, also made it clear—citing the chancellor—that the Federal Government does not regard an effective deterrence as credible in the future without nuclear systems. In the case of intermediate-range missiles with ranges up to 500 km, equal upper limits remain the negotiating aim. The Federal Government does not want another zero solution or a nuclear weapons-free zone and is not striving for the denuclearization of Europe.

Government spokesman Ost warned strongly against the impression of a deadline in deciding the questions of the modernization of individual weapon systems. The talks with the United States and in the alliance have resulted in isolated decisions on the modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe not being on the agenda at present.

GREECE

Agreement's Repercussions on National Politics

52002434 Athens TO VIMA in Greek 13 Dec 87 p 24

[Article by Mikh. Dimitriou]

[Text] The agreement between Reagan and Gorbachev on disarmament appears to have momentous repercussions on Greek political life. Such repercussions are associated not only with the agreement itself and its implementation, but also with the new relations between

the two superpowers. A series of questions is emerging from the historic event of 8 December in Washington that appears to have given the coup de grace to all kinds of easy dogmatisms:

1. How can the slogan "Americans murderers of people" that had often filled the streets and walls of Athens ever be convincing again?

2. How can anyone seriously dispute the honesty and political courage of Soviet leader Mikh. Gorbachev on subjects of international peace and detente?

3. How, one wonders, can one justify certain local peace movements when they demonstrate only against the presence of "Pershing" and "Cruise" missiles in Europe, differentiating between the "bad" (American) and the "good" (Soviet) nuclear missiles?

Thus it is that we can now note that the historic Reagan-Gorbachev agreement leads to an end of not only easy ideological-political dogmatism but also of politicking. It should be noted that from this aspect Greek political parties—all without exception—have hailed in an extremely responsible manner the agreement and its hopes, without any petty calculations or petty interests. Last Tuesday, all political parties proved by their statements and communiques, that they can show and that they possess a high degree of political responsibility and seriousness. Furthermore, this is an encouraging sign.

What additional conclusions will emerge and what repercussions will this agreement and its perspectives have on Greek political affairs and on our national issues?

If everything takes the desired course it is clear that the importance and role of the so-called conventional weapons and of the "conventional defense" countries such as Greece and Turkey, which are considered to be in NATO'S northeastern flank, will be upgraded. Some estimate that the role of Turkey will be more important. Others dispute this and argue that the two neighboring countries will have the same strategic value in the area, as an "allied twosome" (like in the past). This issue, as we shall see later, also depends on some more general developments in Europe, about which today one can only guess.

On the other hand, some specialists believe that there is no doubt about the upgrading of the role and importance (for the United States) of the American bases in Greece and especially those for electronic surveillance (Nea Makri, Gournes). From this point of view, the maneuvers of the Greek Government related to the renewal of the agreement under specific terms and conditions, are facilitated.

Some specialists believe that in the long-term the role of the American bases in Greece will be downgraded if the disarmament agreements are broadened. This is even more likely to happen if the United States intends to withdraw militarily from Western Europe within the framework of either a broader disarmament effort or of a new type of isolationism (as in the first decades of the century) which appears to be gaining ground in the United States after the extended economic crisis.

The foreign policy program of Mr. Michael Dukakis and other Democratic candidates strongly emphasizes the idea of economic recovery of the United States, based on ending its world hegemony. In the context of such development (which is strengthened by the possibility that Europe might play its own autonomous role) it is considered certain the decrease in the importance and role not only of the American bases in Turkey but also of the country itself as a "strategic knot" and "policeman in the Middle East" will be accentuated. The detente and the decrease in the role of the United States (?????) in our area weakens Turkey even more.

The agreement and the possible developments it implies, lead to a question to which no categorical answer can be given. What are by now the margins of "maneuvering" for the small countries of each "coalition" after the agreements and the direct "communication channels" among the Superpowers? How much easier can the "multidimensional" Greek foreign policy in the West, NATO and EEC be? The assessments of the specialists vary. Some believe that as tension between East and West is relaxed, the farther in other words, we are getting from the climate of the "cold war" and the logic of "coalitions," the dangers for the smaller countries are rather increasing, meaning that the superpowers would be easily able with mutual complicity to regulate the fortunes of the countries under their influence, as happened in Yalta.

As these same specialists point out, the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting may not have ended up in a kind of "new Yalta," but it clearly gives the impression (as for example in the review of common policies towards the problems of the Third World) that the two leaders continue to be characterized by the strong concept of "bipolarity." And that they are facing the crucial international problems within this context.

There is, however, a reply. According to those estimates, the tensions between East-West during the first years after Yalta led to local wars and clashes in third world countries only. Moreover as the experience of recent years has shown, the relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers gives, on the contrary, greater margins of autonomy to the countries of each bloc. There is no need for strong cohesion to face the opposing danger and bloc.

These specialists combine this conviction with the estimate that the United States and the Soviet Union are in the process of liberalizing their relations with the countries under their influence, at least in Europe.

Another parameter of the agreement and of the visits by Mr Gorbachev to the United States, Great Britain and West Germany is, no doubt, that the official visit by the Soviet leader to Greece, will not have the political importance it would have had had it taken place on 8 December, when it would have been the first official visit by Mr Gorbachev to a NATO country, such as Mr A. Papandreou's first visit to Poland was.

In relation to the "Movement of the Six" of which Mr Papandreou is a member, one could stress that their positions and initiatives are being justified to a considerable extent, but that, following the agreement, the prospects for some kind of decisive role between the two superpowers are limited even further.

In relation to some of the policies and positions of Greek political parties it could be said that as an additional consequence of the agreement is that if it is true that Mr. Gorbachev appears to have taken the decisive concessions in order to achieve an agreement, and at the same time, the Soviet Union—especially after the danger by the missiles of both sides has been equalized—cannot appear to hold the monopoly of peace and detente. All the more so if it is taken into consideration that there was a marked compromise on the part of the Soviets vis-a-vis of the final American positions which were inflexible and not subject to compromise. The 8 December agreement reveals a spirit of good will on both sides, which does not lack for perspicacious persons (be it only those who simply combine detente with the need for economic development in both the United States and the Soviet Union) as well as reactionaries and dogmatics.

As a result, the agreement also teaches us that dogmatism and reaction are not so much a question of ideology as they are a question of mentality. As proof, Mr Gorbachev agreed to confer with —and with good hope for producing results— only with certain conservative Western leaders (Reagan, Thatcher) who are considered in Greece as the ultimate representatives of reaction.

8193/08309

SWEDEN

Peace Organization Chief Critical of 'Six-Nation Group'

52002443 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Jan 88 p 5

[Guest commentary by Lars Angstrom: 'Where Is the New Thinking?; Six-Nation Group Becoming Inoffensive Discussion Club, Says Swedish Peace and Arbitration Federation'; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] There are signs from within the six-nation group that it is more interested in writing appeals and initiatives directed at the mass media than in specific proposals about how the work of disarmament in the world is to be promoted. The six-nation initiative risks turning into an inoffensive discussion club, writes Lars Angstrom, the chairman of the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Federation.

Today, at a meeting in Stockholm, the leaders of Mexico, Argentina, Greece, India, Tanzania and Sweden will issue a statement on the nuclear arms race and the issue of peace. The so-called six-nation initiative is getting together.

The group of statesmen met for the first time in 1984. At that time, a more or less cold war was raging. A new generation of nuclear weapons was about to be deployed in Europe. Reagan termed the Soviet Union the evil empire and disarmament negotiations were at a total impasse. Given that situation, an entirely new force was called for to break the stalemate, put together new initiatives, and demonstrate energy.

Today things are different. The superpowers are talking to each other. The first agreement on nuclear weapons disarmament has been signed and there is an entirely different international climate. The question can be asked, does the six-nation initiative still have a function to fill?

The answer is an unhesitating "yes." The build-up of nuclear weapons has not been stopped in any way; on the contrary, the build-up has increased. Within the various negotiating bodies, dialogue does not automatically mean either a willingness to disarm or new ideas.

Consequently, it is more important than ever to call for certain things from the heads of the six nations meeting in Stockholm and not just to applaud the show.

There are signs from within the six-nation group that it is increasingly withdrawing from constructive thinking and specific proposals about what specific things can help promote the work of disarmament in the world. Instead, there is the risk it can develop into the writing of appeals and initiatives directed at the mass media which are non-binding. In the absence of new thinking, it risks returning to old ruts. The most important item on the agenda is the issue of which country will be the scene of the initiatives the next time around. The six-nation initiative risks becoming an inoffensive discussion club.

This would be a most unfortunate development. I believe there are a number of areas to which these heads of government should be able to make important contributions in the world's disarmament process and in attempts to influence the superpowers.

I shall give three examples:

The major nuclear weapons build-up in the world is now taking place primarily on the world's seas. Opinions and protests can be avoided there and, without verification,

the build-up can continue. Yet both Soviet and American vessels depend on being able to put in at harbors all around the world for both political and practical reasons. They then refuse to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board.

The six-nation initiative should work in international fora so the nuclear powers abandon their secrecy policies and themselves call for openness when fleets pay visits.

The six-nation initiative should also be able to finance a center which would observe the nuclear powers' ocean maneuvers and build-ups of nuclear weapons at sea. In this context, already existing satellite technology (such as Sweden's) can be applied to advantage.

Today there is already a strong, growing international sentiment in favor of such a policy.

A second area, one in which several of the countries in the initiative have experienced domestic problems themselves, is the arms business. The world's arms industry grows ever stronger and achieves an ever greater influence over countries' defense policies. Through various cooperative projects, the industry is removing itself from verification and national legislation.

The activity of the arms industry increases the militarization of the Third World and obstructs development. What with the superpowers' increased military involvement and presence in the Third World, including an increased naval presence, this means that regional conflicts risk turning into superpower conflicts. Here, by extension, lie the biggest risks of a nuclear war.

On the subject of the arms business, the six-nation initiative could make major efforts beginning with inventorying and publicizing all arms traffic. This is work which can be done by the United Nations, but which could be expedited by a specific initiative from the six-nation group.

A third area is verification of the superpowers' armaments and compliance with various agreements. Today the most advanced satellites see objects as small as a centimeter in size.

Why not jointly acquire a satellite and make all information accessible to whomever wanted to use it?

As a second step, when the opportunities for verifying disarmament agreements with modern technology have been demonstrated, the group can try to get the United Nations to run or take over a comparable project on a larger scale. This could be expedited by an energetic effort by the six-nation group.

These projects cost money, though a fraction of what the six states spend on military armaments. It also takes guts to oppose the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of their vessels. But the six-continent initiative had the guts previously when it demonstrated that it was possible to verify test explosions and Reagan's argument that this was not possible crumbled ignominiously.

Only if it is assumed that the six-nation initiative produces new thinking, brings forth specific, practical proposals which it is then ready to execute can the initiative come to play a positive and significant role in the international effort for peace and disarmament in the future. If the initiative deteriorates into a vapid mass media show, then it no longer has any function to fill.

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