Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161
NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.


Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.
WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR Notes Increasing Canadian Opposition to SDI
(V. Svetlanov; Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM, No 4, Jan 86) .......... 1

French Report on Space Arms Signalled
(Paris LE MONDE, 12 Feb 86) ................................ 6

Options for French Space Defense Reviewed
(Jean-Yves Leloup, Pierre Cazalas; Paris DEFENSE
NATIONALE, Feb 86) ........................................ 8

FRG's Genscher on Type of Agreement Being Sought on SDI
(Hamburg DPA, 13 Mar 86) .................................... 14

FRG Talks Continue With U.S. on SDI Agreement
(Various sources, various dates) ............................. 15

Government Spokesman Comments ............................. 15
Genscher on 'Restrictive' Element,
Hans-Dietrich Genscher Interview ............................. 15
Bonn Talks Begin ............................................. 15

FRG's Kohl To Discuss SDI Agreement With Weinberger
(Bonn DIE WELT, 19 Mar 86) ................................. 17

FRG's Kohl, Weinberger Talk, Agree on SDI Program
(Hamburg DPA, 19 Mar 86) .................................. 18

FRG's Bangemann on SDI Discussion With Honecker
(Mainz ZDF Television Network, 17 Mar 86) ............... 19

FRG Reportage on SDI Talks, Bundestag Debate
(Various sources, various dates) .......................... 20

Bangemann To Sign Agreement ............................... 20
Press Commentary ........................................... 20
SPD Rejects European SDI ................................... 21

-a-
Minimal Civil Technology Spinoff From SDI for FRG
(Wolfgang Hoffmann; Hamburg DIE ZEIT, 10 Jan 86) ........... 22

Japan: Existing Laws Adequate To Protect SDI Secrets
(Tokyo KYODO, 15 Mar 86) .................................... 28

Briefs
SDI Challenges French Technology .................................. 29

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS Cites McGovern Remarks on Gorbachev Report
(Moscow TASS, 1 Mar 86) ........................................... 30

PRAVDA Views U.S. Attitudes on Peace Issues
(G. Vasilyev; Moscow PRAVDA, 10 Mar 86) ...................... 31

TASS: U.S. 'Bent on Scrapping' Remaining Arms Accords
(Moscow TASS, 7 Mar 86) ........................................... 36

IZVESTIYA on Europe's Role in Gorbachev's Proposal
(V. Kuznetsov; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 14 Feb 86) ................. 38

USSR's Lomeyko, Others Condemn UK Rejection of Soviet Initiative
(Various sources, various dates) .................................... 41

Rejection Not 'Definite', by A. Maslennikov ........................ 41
Krivopalov Reports UK View, by A. Krivopalov .................... 43
Lomeyko Addresses Newsmen .......................................... 44

TASS Observer on UK Rejection of Gorbachev's New Year Proposal
(Vladimir Chernyshev; Moscow TASS International
Service, 11 Mar 86) ............................................. 45

USSR's Yakovlev Holds News Conference at Party Congress
(Aleksandr Yakovlev; Moscow in English to North
America, 25 Feb 86) ............................................... 47

USSR's Korniienko, Akhromeiev Hold 28 Feb News Conference
(Various sources, 28 Feb 86) ...................................... 48

Reagan, USSR Arms Proposals ....................................... 48
Missiles in Asia 'More Complex' Issue ............................ 51
Nonuse-of-Force Pact Supported .................................... 51

USSR's Arbatov Views CPSU Congress Stand on Disarmament
(G. A. Arbatov; Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 11 Mar 86) .. 53

Hungary's Istvan Sarlos Supports Gorbachev Statement
(Istvan Sarlos; Moscow PRAVDA, 18 Feb 86) .................... 57

Two Soviet Books on Geneva Summit Published
(M. Ozerov; Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 14 Feb 86) ........ 60
PRAVDA Raps Adelman Remarks in ACDA Brochure
(T. Anatolyev; Moscow PRAVDA, 8 Mar 86) ................. 62

ACDA Claims of Soviet Arms Violations Assailed
(Yu. Viktorov; Moscow PRAVDA, 18 Mar 86) ................. 63

FRG's Kohl Advises Reagan on Response to Gorbachev
(Hamburg DPA, 19 Feb 86) ........................................ 66

Disarmament Official Ends Moscow Talks
(Hamburg DPA, 12 Mar 86) ........................................ 67

Netherlands Official Sees Progress at MBFR Talks
(D. H. Zandee; Amsterdam DE VOLSKRANT, 19 Feb 86) .... 68

USSR's Arbatov on Security, Summit Prospects
(Georgiy Arbatov Interview; Madrid EL PAIS, 2 Mar 86) ... 71

Karpov Reiterates USSR Geneva Positions
(Budapest Television Service, 9 Mar 86) .................... 73

INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Western 'Flank' Nations Oppose Movement of Soviet Troops
(Stein Savik; Oslo AFTENPOSTEN, 7 Mar 86) ............... 75
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR NOTES INCREASING CANADIAN OPPOSITION TO SDI

Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 4, Jan 86 p 11

[Article by V. Svetlanov, under "For Peace in Space" rubric: "Canadians Against 'Star Wars'"; capitalized passages published boldface]

[Text] THE ATTEMPTS OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION TO INVOLVE CANADA IN ITS DANGEROUS PLANS TO ESCALATE THE ARMS RACE AND MILITARIZE SPACE ARE PROVOKING STRONG PROTESTS FROM CANADIAN PEACE ADVOCATES. THESE CANADIANS DEMAND THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT STEER A COURSE DETERMINED BY ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS AND DIRECTED AT THE ATTAINMENT OF WORLDWIDE SECURITY.

Today an ever-increasing number of Canadians, from diverse strata of society, link the future of their nation, not with unconditional support of Washington, but with pursuit by Ottawa of an independent foreign policy furthering its own national interests and the attainment of worldwide peace. The peace-loving public of Canada is demanding a ban on nuclear tests, a freeze on nuclear weapons, the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals, prevention of space militarization, termination of tests of American cruise missiles on Canadian territory, transformation of the country into a nuclear-free zone and the conversion of military industry towards manufacturing products for peaceful purposes.

85 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IN FAVOR OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE

There are many indications of the depth of the antiwar sentiments. According to a public opinion poll, 85 percent of Canadians support a nuclear weapons freeze; 62 percent favor Canada's making greater efforts in the interests of disarmament and lessening international tensions. In the opinion of approximately 70 percent of the population, Ottawa should pursue an independent foreign policy, even if this produces friction in relations with Washington.

In recent years, hundreds of Canadian cities have held referenda during municipal elections. In these referenda, 70 to 80 percent of the voters came out in favor of equally balanced nuclear disarmament. Increasing numbers of cities and regions are declaring themselves nuclear-free zones. Included in their number are the major centers of the nation -- Toronto, Vancouver and
Winnipeg. The province of Manitoba, which is equal in territory to the combined areas of the European nations of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, has declared itself a nuclear-free zone.

The extensive platform of the Canadian peace advocates has allowed them to engage in a number of actions which are nationwide in scope. The most major measure, organized by the antiwar movement in 1984 was the "Peace Caravan." This laid the foundation for coordinating the activities of the numerous antiwar organizations and groups with the trade union movement. The campaign, during which 430,000 signatures were collected, had as its slogans -- the abolition American cruise missile tests on Canadian territory, transformation of Canada into a nuclear-free zone, and redirection of the resources in the military budget to meeting the social needs of the population. In the spring and fall of 1985, in Toronto, Ottawa, Vancouver, Winnipeg and other cities of the nation, peace marches in which tens of thousands of people participated was held.

THE REAL BASES FOR DISARMAMENT

The increasing participation of trade unions in the struggle for peace has particular significance, since this entails a substantial increase in the authority and influence of the antiwar movement. Sentiments in favor of more active participation by the organized workers movement were expressed by the head of the Canadian autoworkers' union, R. White. He made a speech which sharply criticized the program of preparing for "star wars," referring to the US administration's efforts to get Canada to participate in its implementation on the grounds that it would create more jobs as "shameful." "This program," R. White declared, "makes no sense for Canada, either economically or politically. Our nation must pursue an independent foreign policy." In the name of the 120,000 members of the Canadian autoworkers' union, R. White declared that his union supports the struggle against space militarization.

Soviet peace initiatives put forward by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, were evaluated highly in political, social and scientific circles of Canada. Peace advocates see in these initiatives a real means to ease the international situation, and a pathway to peace without war and nuclear weapons. In research performed by the Canadian Institute on Problems of International Peace and Security, it is stated that the proposal of the Soviet Union to decrease US and USSR nuclear weapons which have the capability of reaching each other's territory by 50 percent "is a realistic and desirable goal of the Geneva talks on arms control."

At the same time that antiwar actions are growing, there has been a striving to achieve unity in the struggle for peace and to overcome organizational factionalism among the numerous antiwar organizations, movements and groups (which number about a thousand in Canada.)

The landmark conference of the Canadian Peace Alliance, which was convened in November 1985, became an important landmark on this road [to peace]. Representatives of more than 240 organizations and movements, including the nation's largest trade union association, the Canadian Workers Congress, with
about 2 million members, created a nationwide antiwar coalition, with the mission of coordinating the activities of the antiwar forces and facilitating joint actions. A document headed "Statement on Unity", adopted by the Alliance, contains an extensive platform for involving the population of the country in the struggle against the nuclear threat, and in favor of pursuit by Canada of an independent foreign policy.

The executive director of the Canadian Congress for the Defense of Peace, G. Flowers assessed the significance of this step as follows: "We are satisfied with the results of the conference. Nearly unanimous support was given to the "Statement on Unity," which reflected a number of peace proposals put forward by the Soviet Union at various times -- a nuclear weapons freeze, demilitarization of space, a nuclear test ban, creation of nuclear-free zones, and dissolution of military blocs. The conference as a whole defined the direction in which the antiwar movement in Canada will develop. And this means that the unity of the actions of the peace advocate organizations will have a great influence on the foreign policy of the nation." The slogan "Defending peace is everyone's business," which was suggested by the Canadian Congress for the Defense of Peace, will truly become a nationwide demand.

"BACK DOOR" OPERATION

The realistic politicians of Canada, belonging to various political parties, believe that it is no longer possible to ignore the extensive antiwar sentiments of the Canadian public. In many respects, as the American newspaper NEWSDAY acknowledges, it is precisely this pressure exerted by the influential antiwar movement, the opposition trade unions and other social action organizations, and the Liberal and New Democratic parties, which has forced the conservative government to declare its refusal to participate in research under the American "strategic defense initiative" program. "After careful and detailed considerations," declared Prime Minister B. Mulroney, "the Canadian government has come to the conclusion that national policy and priorities do not permit Canada to participate at the governmental level in research studies for the 'strategic defense initiative.'"

However, this declaration did not satisfy the majority of the population of Canada which repudiates SDI and considers that its existence leads to escalation of the arms race. The fact is that the government's declaration contains an ambiguity which allows the position taken by Canada to be interpreted in two ways. "Although Canada does not intend to participate in SDI research at the governmental level, private companies and institutes interested in participating will be free to do so." The Canadian Prime Minister reiterated that, in his opinion, the US is acting wisely in conducting research for the "star wars" program.

E. Nilsen, the Canadian minister of national defense, offered his own explanations. In a letter to his counterpart in Washington, C. Weinberger, he expressed the viewpoint that the research performed by the US within the framework of SDI, does accord with the Anti-missile Defense System Limitation Treaty. He added that companies participating in the "star wars" program may expect the tax advantages, government subsidies and guaranteed loans accorded
to other firms, scientific laboratories and universities working on military orders.

Although Washington did not manage to secure Ottawa's political support for SDI, which was its primary goal, the ambiguous position [adopted by] the conservative government has satisfied Canada's southern neighbor.

The reaction within Canada was very different. In a special statement the General Secretary of the Communist Party, U. Kashtan emphasized: "Social pressure forced Prime Minister Mulrooney to refuse to participate directly in the American 'star wars' program. This, however, does not mean that the government will not participate. It will participate indirectly, via various private companies. This is just what the United States government wants at present. This back door operation will involve Canada in the 'star wars' program with all the serious consequence it entails."

Commenting on the government decision not to undertake any official commitments with regard to SDI, the Ottawa newspaper CITIZEN wrote that the "prime minister considered it to be unwise to get mixed up in a 'situation' which is beyond our control and in which the Canada government does not call the tune." However, he faces new decisions which may also be beyond Canada's control and which have the potential for involving the country in the implementation of the "strategic defense initiative."

A NEW ROLE FOR NORAD?

We are referring, first of all, to the American-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) agreement which will come up for renewal in March of 1986. This agreement plays an ever increasing role in American plans to militarize space. In March 1985 an agreement was reached between the two nations concerning the modernization of the radar network in the northern territories of Canada at a cost of 1.5 billion dollars, 40 percent of which will be paid by Canadian taxpayers.

Information has leaked to the press to the effect that the Pentagon is trying to get the Canadian ministry of national defense to participate in the development [razrabotka] of "long-term plans" associated with the deployment of wide-range antimissile systems with space based components. The newspaper GLOBE AND MAIL noted in an editorial that the "USA is using NORAD to involve Canada in 'star wars' and that such planning may be implemented through the North American Aerospace Defense Command."

In the hearings currently being held in Canada, representatives of antiwar organizations, eminent experts and scientists who repudiate American plans to militarize space have pointed out the danger that NORAD will be transformed into a component of the space offensive forces. A resolution has been introduced in the standing committee of the House of Commons on international affairs and national defense, which is holding these hearings, stipulating that the text of the US-Canadian NORAD agreement must include the point that this system will not be used in the implementation of antimissile defense. A similar proposal was withdrawn from the agreement in 1981, the last time it was extended.
The New Democratic party has come out firmly against the renewal of the NORAD agreement. P. Jewett and D. Blackburn, members of Parliament from this party, expressed anxiety that if Canada remains in NORAD, she will be drawn into USA nuclear missile policy and involved in the American "star wars" program.

The debates going on in Canada on the issue of renewal of the NORAD agreement range far beyond the boundaries of this topic. They are concerned with the broader context of the role assigned to Canada in the strategic military plans of the US.

In this regard the Ottawa newspaper CITIZEN emphasized that the US Air Force, linked with NORAD, may be used to heat up the arms race and to eliminate the sole arms control agreement currently in effect -- the Antimissile Defense Treaty. One must also remember the possibility that at some point, following the course demarcated by Reagan, the Americans will want to use Canadian territory for antimissile basing...

In a book published in Canada by Professor R. Malcolmson "Nuclear deception: How we have been misled since [the time of] Hiroshima" the conclusion is drawn that: "In the nuclear age, national security must be based on the assurance of universal security: this can be attained only through efforts undertaken in concert with other states and not in opposition to them."

This can not be disputed. "Today the issue is extremely critical and clearcut: we must rise above narrow interests, and acknowledge the collective responsibility of all states in the face of the danger lying in wait for the community of man on the threshold of the third millenium," declared General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev.

9285
CSO:5200/1266
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRENCH REPORT ON SPACE ARMS SIGNALLED

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Feb 86 p 11

[Text] It would seem unrealistic to expect a deployment of a spaceborne
ABM defense on a sufficient scale to be reasonably effective, by one of
the superpowers, before the year 2010. However, in view of the evolution
of the techniques involved, France must maintain her efforts to ensure the
penetration capability of her nuclear forces.

This is the conclusion drawn from its work by the Space Arms Studies Com-
mission, which was instituted within the Ministry of Defense in 1984 and
which has just submitted a summary report to the minister, Mr Paul Quiles.
Some unclassified elements of this summary report have been communicated
to the press.

This Commission, headed by Mr Jean-Francois Delpech, who also heads the
CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], includes experts from the
Defense Ministry, the General Secretariat of National Defense, the AEC
[Atomic Energy Commission], the CNES [National Space Studies Center], the
Institute of Fundamental Electronics, the Physics Laboratory of the Ecole

On his recent visit to the CGE at Marcoussis, Mr Quiles announced the
forthcoming publication of this report which he likened to a White Paper
on Space.

The authors of the report conclude that, if it is to be effective against
the ascent phase of incoming missiles, a spaceborne defense system cannot
be based on conventional self-guided systems and must actually make use
of "exotic" weapons, such as directed-energy--laser or particle beam--
weapons, with decidedly higher performance capabilities because of their
speed-of-light characteristic.

Among these weapons, the Commission finds in favor of continuous lasers
operating in the near infrared and delivering several tens of megawatts
throughout a period of some 100 seconds.
As for the other directed-energy weapons, such as ground-based or space-borne pulsed lasers, particle beams, or X-lasers, however, forecasts as to a possible operational deployment date appear to the Commission to be far more uncertain. The Commission concludes that only the chemically pumped continuous-wave laser will have been sufficiently developed over the coming decades to justify a planned deployment by the year 2010, that is, within a quarter of a century.1)

On the other hand, the Commission considers that future ballistic missiles can be quite easily protected against the effects of continuous-wave lasers. This appears to be less certain, in the Commission's view, with regard to protection against pulsed lasers.

With regard to the current American effort stemming from the SDI launched by President Reagan, the Commission finds that, contrary to the popular "Star Wars" myth, space-based directed-energy weapons represent only a relatively modest fraction of the Federal budget.

"The SDIO budget," write the authors of the report, "is devoted for the most part to activities whose industrial fallout far exceeds space-based defense: Radars, sensors, data processing, ground-based weapons, systems design, energy sources.

"We are faced again with a situation that closely resembles the one that prevailed during the mid-1960's," add the French experts, "in which fast-increasing credits are being devoted principally to the "hard" sciences--namely, physics, materials, data processing, electronics, optronics and mechanics. The consequences of this new departure with respect to super-intelligent conventional weapons, space technologies, aeronautics, and also most certainly, high-technology products for the civil and general consumer sectors, must be taken into account."

1) Lasers can be divided into two classes. Those that emit light in a continuous beam, whose power is equal, after deducting losses, to those the laser receives from the outside [as published]. And those called "pulsed lasers," which store the energy they receive for a certain period of time, then emit a very short and very powerful pulse.
OPTIONS FOR FRENCH SPACE DEFENSE REVIEWED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Feb 86 pp 133-140

[Article by Jean-Yves Leloup, chief engineer of armament and head of GROUPES [Strategic Studies and Planning Group] and Pierre Cazalas: "French Space Defense Options"; first paragraph is DEFENSE NATIONALE introduction]

[Text] The use of space giving rise as it does to analyses and the taking of positions, we have considered it to be of compelling interest to publish this article, a reproduction of the address made by the chief engineer of armament, and head of the GROUPES, Mr Leloup, on the occasion of the "Space" symposium organized by the Alumni Association of the ENA [National School of Administration].

The possible uses of space for military purposes are many. To be convinced of this, one need only note the use being made of it, or the use being contemplated for it, by the Russians and the Americans. As for the options available to France, these derive directly from the orientations of her defense policy. I shall examine them one by one from three standpoints: The strategic and military, the technological and industrial, and the international.

Strategic and Military Aspects

In these domains, France's options identify with the means necessary to carry out high-prioritized missions of our defense: The maintenance of our nuclear deterrent and of our crisis-management capability. These missions were referred to recently by the minister of defense, and consist of:

--Ensuring that we have the space resources (satellites and associated ground infrastructures) needed to observe and monitor, and to communicate, by means of spaceborne facilities;

--Taking the steps necessary to preserve our forces, particularly our nuclear forces, against all forms of threat resulting from an increased militarization of space, and against antiballistic missile weapons in particular.
First, let us examine our space program. Observation and surveillance satellites contribute to the evaluation of strategic equilibriums and to the monitoring of compliance with the arms limitation agreements (the ABM treaty, for example). They diminish the advantage a potential aggressor might derive from surprise, by providing the defender with priceless early warning time. Their uncontested right of passage makes it possible to compensate to some extent for the fundamental strategic dissymmetry that exists between the Western nations and the countries of the East, closed as are the latter to verifications and to the free circulation of information. These satellites, together with telecommunication satellites, comprise instruments of early warning and of real-time crisis-management.

The development of space resources is therefore properly a concern from the standpoint of France's security and stability. Such resources will enable us to observe what is occurring on the surface of the earth and to transmit over long distances without going through numerous relay points, comprising, in this respect, privileged tools for the preservation of our independence of decision. Their stabilizing power makes of them instruments of confidence in our international relations and in the exercise of our policy of solidarity.

For all these reasons, the launching of the respective programs is targeted for 1986. These will include an observation and surveillance satellite, baptized "Helios," and a space telecommunications system (Syracuse 2) designed to take over from Syracuse 1, which is already partly in service, by the early 1990's.

We must nevertheless take note that compared to this peaceful military use of space we are planning, the ambitions that others are entertaining for its use are far more unbounded. Thus, its increased militarization in the domain of antiballistic and antisatellite missiles, such as that which the two superpowers appear to be planning, could threaten world security and stability. The existence of ABM space weapons could render more difficult the reaching of arms control agreements, in that the presence of these weapons would encourage the proliferation of offensive nuclear weapons in order to maintain the latter's effectiveness. This would impart new impetus to the arms race.

These space weapons can be destabilizing, in that their possession could tempt the holder to carry out a first strike, considering that, in view of their ambivalence, such weapons would, on the one hand, facilitate the strike by destroying or neutralizing a large part of the defender's means of surveillance, communications and defense (satellites, AWACS planes, ABM in-flight interceptors) and would, on the other hand, diminish the effects of a response by the defender.

Should this lead to the neutralizing of the nuclear deterrent, war could not fail to recover its validity as a recourse, with the surfacing of imbalances owing to the differences between the conventional and chemical arsenals of the forces in place, which is specifically the case in Europe to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact forces.
What should be our response to these threats? It is not to be found in the realm of space; France cannot think in terms of undertaking an American-style SDI-type operation, aimed at the realization of antiballistic systems, be it on a national scale or in cooperation with the United States or the European countries. It would be vain to seek a defense—at unbounded cost for doubtful effectiveness—against the Soviet ballistic threat, while remaining totally exposed to the terrestrial, airborne, nuclear (short-range), conventional and chemical threats.

An initial response consists of denouncing these potentially dangerous courses of action and calling upon the parties concerned to negotiate strict limitations in the ABM and antisatellite domains. This is what France did in June 1984 at the Geneva conference. But that is not enough. The putting at issue again of the ABM treaty signed between the United States and the USSR, at its expiry, cannot be excluded today. This treaty, it will be recalled, prohibits all deployment of ABM systems, with the exception of a system consisting of 100 interceptor missiles and their associated radars and launchers, located on the ground and fixed, for the protection of one site (the capital or an ICBM site). This treaty also prohibits the development and testing of any and all space-based antiballistic systems.

Our response must therefore also include the adapting of our French strategic nuclear forces to the threat, which, considering its inherent technical and economic constraints, cannot evolve other than slowly. This adaptation of our forces poses no technical difficulties, particularly in view of the vast potential for improvement of ballistic missiles and the permanent tactical advantages a strategic strike enjoys with respect to defense. The cost of this adaptation will be marginal as compared with that of antiballistic expenditures, and will be within our capability.

Thus, for the intermediate term—that is, between now and the year 2000—the Soviet defense against ballistic missiles will, in all likelihood, continue to be based on terminal defense systems consisting of land-based interceptor missiles. A likely development, however, would be a substantial increase in the number of these interceptors beyond the limit set by the 1972 ABM treaty.

For France, the response to the resultant threat from this scenario to the penetrative capacity of her missiles consists of equipping herself with nuclear warheads having the appropriate characteristics, multiplying their number, and, if necessary, equipping them with devices to enhance their power of penetration. The recent putting into service of the first M4 multiple-warhead, miniaturized and hardened missiles, and that of other M4 missiles equipped with warheads having still greater penetrating power in years to come, are in line with this approach. The study of a new generation of warheads, virtually invisible to enemy radars, has just been decided; these warheads could be in service by the middle of the coming
coming decade. Moreover, very sophisticated devices to enhance penetration are currently under development. Our country already has, and will have for a long time to come, sufficient deterrent power.

For the longer term, the question is whether the USSR will possess an antiballistic shield with a space component; that is, satellites armed with antimissile weapons, supplementing terminal defense systems. Such a shield is a very difficult thing to actualize, for reasons involving the technical feasibility and, to an even greater extent, the economic feasibility of such a project. The laws of space mechanics, the fact that the earth turns, make it necessary to put into low earth orbit a large quantity of satellites carrying antiballistic weapons, to ensure that the space system will have the permanence necessary to a defense of this type; otherwise, a ballistic strike could take advantage of the holes in the spaceborne defensive network. Current estimates based on optimistic assumptions come to several thousand tons of weapons in orbit around the earth to intercept a relatively few missiles of the present generation. Such a system could not be put in service for another 30 years; a cost of $1,000 billion is sometimes referred to as the cost of a similar American system.

But nuclear forces can evolve, be they American, Soviet or French. Numerous solutions to the problem of penetrating a hypothetical spaceborne defense system are presently under study by the Ministry of Defense. These solutions can be said to include the use of ballistic missiles of new design, highly hardened, and of specific aids to penetration; the possibilities of destruction of blinding of the ABM orbital platforms; and even the use of cruise missiles, assuming they can also be made almost invisible to enemy radars. An increased space surveillance capability will therefore become necessary from the standpoint of following the evolution of these spaceborne defenses and enabling the timely taking of the appropriate decisive steps. As of now, it appears that these solutions could be made operational at a cost well below that of a spaceborne defense system.

As far into the future as analysis can take us, therefore, it appears that space cannot put nuclear deterrence at issue again. For the two superpowers, however, a limited, partially effective ABM defense could nevertheless be of interest from the standpoint of justifying their research and development efforts: In the event of a nuclear conflict, hypothetically speaking, such a system could interdict or at least diminish the effectiveness of certain limited antiforces nuclear strike options the enemy might have.

This is not France's defense policy; Our deterrent strategy is designed precisely to avoid war by threatening a massive response—in support of our conventional forces—that would inflict intolerable damage on the aggressor. Space, on the contrary, for our country, represents a means of supplementing and enhancing this deterrent strategy through use of the capabilities cited above: The spaceborne observation and telecommunications capabilities it offers.
Technological and Industrial Aspects

To the extent that the American financial effort can be sustained, the SDI cannot fail to contribute to the technological development of the United States in a number of domains, especially optronics, radars and lidars, energy beams (lasers and particles), data processing (artificial intelligence), and telecommunications, microelectronics and space logistics. This effort will have important fallouts beyond its direct purpose, especially in the high-technology industries in the military domain—conventional weapons (intelligent weapons, antimissile missiles), aeronautics, military space (observation and telecommunications)—and, to a lesser degree perhaps, in the civil domain.

Europe has rapidly taken cognizance of the risk resulting from it for the competitiveness of its industries. The Eureka program and the launching of a number of new programs by the ESA [European Space Agency] provide the Old Continent with a response to this challenge.

With Eureka, a program geared to civil aims, Europe can develop the technologies whose mastery is indispensable to preserving its standing in the world of tomorrow. In this respect, it bears a certain resemblance to the SDI, but a resemblance that is strictly limited to the technological aspect, in that the SDI is first and foremost a political and strategic project geared to military ends, whereas Eureka is a civil program; they can therefore neither be viewed as comparable, nor as counter to each other, nor as exclusive of each other.

In the French military domain, a stepped-up research and development effort is under way: This year, around 12 percent of the defense budget (25 percent of the credits under Title V)—that is, FR 18 billion—is being devoted to this effort; it will also contribute to the enhancement of the know-how and hence the competitiveness of our industries. In forthcoming years, the military space programs referred to above will further enhance our capabilities in the leading-edge technologies.

International Aspect

The SDI and the offer of cooperation made by the United States to its allies have brought forth another risk: That of a loss of a certain degree of autonomy in Europe, particularly in the steering of its research and development and of its leading-edge industries, through the processes of subcontractorship and the brain drain. The European civil programs (Eureka and those of the ESA) respond to this concern as well, through the development of a civilian European cooperation.

In the armaments domain, does not the response to this other challenge consist of reinforcing European military technological cooperation, despite the difficulties being encountered? Ground-to-air defense against planes and short-range ballistic missiles, which, equipped with conventional warheads, will become more and more accurate and effective, could prove to be a field of cooperation worthy of Europe's defense and technological ambitions.
But for such a cooperative venture to be sufficiently attractive to our partners, particularly in the realm of space, we must prove our competence and our intent through a purely national indicative activity.

Conclusion

Space, for France, far from representing an alternative to nuclear deterrence, can prove to be, in the future, an increasingly effective complement of the latter, as are her conventional forces on the whole.

The use of space will thus contribute to enhancing our country's world role and responsibilities; this use has a peaceful aim. But it involves several conditions: A long-term viewpoint, steadfast continuity of the effort, and suitable structures.

The Defense Ministry's long-term view is based on studies of future possibilities and strategic analyses requiring a very sizable research effort.

Continuity of the effort is assured by the existence of a multi-year military space plan that concretizes the Ministry's long-term view. For the short and intermediate terms, this plan provides for major efforts particularly in the domains of telecommunications and observation.

And with regard to structures, the recent creation of a space studies group within the Ministry of Defense will provide enlightened guidance to the minister in his choices and decisions.

9399
CSO: 5200/2633
FRG'S GENSCHER ON TYPE OF AGREEMENT BEING SOUGHT ON SDI

LD131153 Hamburg DPA in German 1031 GMT 13 Mar 86

[Excerpts] Bonn, 13 Mar (DPA) -- In the current negotiations with Washington on participation in the SDI research program, the Federal Government is "under no circumstances" interested in a military agreement, Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said. At stake is not state participation by the FRG in the U.S. SDI program, but the improvement of the framework conditions for the reciprocal transfer of scientific and technological knowledge, Genscher emphasized in a Deutschlandfunk interview. This could also be seen in the fact that the federal economics minister and not the defence minister is holding the talks.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2659
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG TALKS CONTINUE WITH U.S. ON SDI AGREEMENT

Government Spokesman Comments

LD141503 Hamburg DPA in German 1229 GMT 14 Mar 86

[Excerpt] Bonn, 14 Mar (DPA) -- The negotiations of the Bonn government delegation in Washington on improving the exchange of technology and the participation of German enterprises in the U.S. space research program, SDI, are "on the right track," according to the Bonn government spokesman Norbert Schaefer. The delegation will return to Bonn on Sunday, Schaefer announced on Friday to the press. The Federal Government hopes that the envisaged timescale to conclude the negotiations -- Bonn has repeatedly spoken of Easter -- can be maintained.

Genscher on 'Restrictive' Element

DW171100 Cologne ARD Television Network in German 2130 GMT 14 Mar 86

["Excerpt" of interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by correspondent Sven Kuntze in Bonn, date not given, from the "Bericht aus Bonn" program -- recorded]

[Text] [Kuntze] There is a definite time schedule for the SDI negotiations. The signing is scheduled for next week. Do you consider that timing expedient?

[Genscher] We are of course in favor of speedy negotiations and the fastest possible conclusion of the negotiations. However, experience teaches that one should never publicly put oneself under the pressure of time. Of course, the negotiations are not easy because we have to improve the legal position of German companies and research institutes which will contract for orders under the SDI program.

They will not be very extensive orders. We are not interested in state participation by the Federal Republic and even less in the use of public funds or a military agreement. What is important for us is that we must be absolutely certain that the participation of German companies and research institutes is in keeping with the ABM treaty, that is, its restrictive, its restrained interpretation [restriktive, zurueckhaltende auslegung] as the NATO council decided last fall.

Bonn Talks Begin

LD171507 Hamburg DPA in German 1131 GMT 17 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 17 Mar (DPA) -- The talks on technological cooperation between the Federal Republic and the United States as well as on German participation in the
U.S. research program for a space-based missile defense system (SDI) are being continued this week in Bonn. As the Federal Ministry of Economics said today, in reply to questioning, Richard Perle, an assistant secretary in the U.S. Defense Department and one of the two U.S. negotiators, will meet Lorenz Schomurus, director of the Foreign Trade Department in the Federal Ministry of Economics, in Bonn. It was left open as to whether Martin Bangemann (FDP), federal economics minister and German negotiation leader, would be involved in the talks again.

On the talks led by Schomurus last week in Washington, the Ministry of Economics said that progress had been made in both areas. The German delegation, which had met with foreign, defense and trade officials, returned to Bonn on Sunday.

The Federal Economics Minister stressed that it was striving for a speedy conclusion of a treaty. According to the present state of negotiations, two agreements were emerging, of which one would regulate the participation of German firms in the planned missile defense system.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2659
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG'S KOHL TO DISCUSS SDI AGREEMENT WITH WEINBERGER

DW191005 Bonn DIE WELT in German 19 Mar 86 p 1

[Report by "GBA": "'SDI Agreement Ready To Be Concluded'"]

[Text] Bonn -- According to Chancellor Kohl, negotiations with the United States on an SDI framework agreement are to be "immediately concluded." Economics Minister Bangemann will fly on Monday to Washington for final negotiations. He himself will have an "intensive talk" with U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger today in Bonn, said the chancellor yesterday to the CDU/CSU fraction.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2659
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG'S KOHL, WEINBERGER TALK, AGREE ON SDI PROGRAM

LD191816 Hamburg DPA in German 1640 GMT 19 Mar 86

[Excerpts] Grafenwoehr, 19 Mar (DPA) -- Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger reached agreement today on the accords on a research program for a space-based missile defense system (SDI) and technology transfer. Details of the almost 2-hour talks, in which Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner also took part, were not given. Both sides were very satisfied with the results, however. Kohl said that the texts would be revised during the next few days. Federal Economics Minister Martin Bangemann will be flying to Washington next week and will probably sign both accords there.

The talks took place on the sidelines of a visit to troops at West Europe's largest troop training area in Grafenwoehr in the Upper Palatinate. The two sides spoke for more than an hour longer than originally scheduled in the program. Replying to questions from journalists, the federal chancellor said that the results of his talk with Weinberger matched the four criteria on SDI that he had stated in the Bundestag. As agreed by the cabinet, Bangemann had done the negotiating and would also sign both accords for the Federal Government. Kohl said nothing about the inclusion of Berlin.

Foreign policy spokesman of the FDP parliamentary group, Helmut Schaefer, has warned meanwhile against circumventing in the SDI negotiations the "clear and unmistakeable attitude of the Federal Government." The aim of the negotiations must be a civilian agreement which takes into account the interests of German firms and not a military agreement, which would be purely NATO's preserve. The FDP thus believes that there should not be any secret clauses, which could only contribute to public unrest.

At a press conference in a hangar at Grafenwoehr Air Base Kohl stressed that genuine detente and disarmament are only possible by the Federal Republic and the United States standing closely shoulder to shoulder. The 250,000 or more U.S. soldiers in the Federal Republic would also guarantee and defend our freedom and peace too. The cooperation in Grafenwoehr is a living example of partnership and friendship. Kohl said that he was impressed with the high standard of training and the equipment of the soldiers of the Bundeswehr and the U.S. Army.

Weinberger and Woerner are to take part in the meeting of their NATO nuclear planning group in Wuerzburg tomorrow.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2659

18
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG'S BANGEMANN ON SDI DISCUSSION WITH HONECKER

DW181325 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 2045 GMT 17 Mar 86

["Excerpts" of remarks by Economics Minister Martin Bangemann at his press conference in East Berlin following his talk with GDR State Council Chairman Erich Honecker on 17 March; from the "Heute-Journal" program -- recorded]

[Excerpt] What I stressed was that in our view, in the view of the Federal Government, no decision on the application of SDI can be linked with the research phase, but that such decisions must instead be made in the alliance -- in the Atlantic alliance for us and, I assume, surely for the GDR in its alliance -- although that was not discussed in detail.

I said that it was important for us because the consequences of strategic disarmament policy which will put the results of research into application are considerable, as you know. But that is not the point now. I explained what we are doing, and also why the economics minister is conducting the negotiations. It demonstrates that as far as we are concerned the economic issues of technology transfer play the major role, whereas disarmament or alliance policy linked with the application of research results do not.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2659
FRG REPORTAGE ON SDI TALKS, BUNDESTAG DEBATE

Bangemann To Sign Agreement

LD211253 Hamburg DPA in German 1200 GMT 21 Mar 86

[Excerpt] Bonn, 21 Mar (DPA) -- The Federal Government expects the planned government agreements with the United States on an improvement in technology exchange and participation by German firms in the SDI research program to be signed in Washington next week. This was stated to the press by government spokesman Friedhelm Ost today after a ministerial discussion with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Federal Economics Minister Martin Bangemann (FDP) will visit Washington on Monday [24 March] as chief negotiator, in order to settle outstanding questions with his U.S. colleagues.

Kohl reached principled agreement on the accords on Wednesday [19 March] with U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger on the sidelines of the meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Wuerzburg. Ost said the Federal Government assessed the course of the negotiations and the existing results as an important success, which fully reflects German interests. They will be able to achieve the negotiating goals as laid down by the federal cabinet on 18 December in a fair balance of interests with the U.S. administration.

Ost did not give details of the content of the agreements. However, he gave the assurance it could be assumed that the issue of including Berlin in both agreements would be satisfactorily settled. Ost also left open the question of what form the agreements would take. The content would determine the form.

Apart from Bangemann, the ministerial talks with Kohl were attended by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU), and head of the Chancellor's Office Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU). The FDP has voiced displeasure about Kohl going it alone with Weinberger: They are not happy with Kohl for going over the head of Bangemann, who had been assigned the task of heading the negotiations by the cabinet, FDP circles said today.

Press Commentary

DW201100 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 20 Mar 86

[From the press review]

[Text] One of today's editorial issues is the talk between Chancellor Kohl and Secretary of Defense Weinberger on SDI.
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE writes: Progress in disarmament is closely connected to verification. The constant demand for fewer weapons is — as absurd as it may sound — not without risks. The bigger the stockpiles, the smaller the significance of a breach of treaty that might not have been detected in time. The more disarmament, the more impermissible the lead of one side could become, and the greater the temptation to torpedo an agreement quietly. The current customary permissible verification means will not suffice in the long run.

MANNHEIMER MORGEN notes: Europe and thus the FRG are, figuratively speaking, located in the middle of a potential battlefield. Regardless of whether it has decided in favor of one side or the other, the FRG will always be the first to be involved. Therefore, it is most difficult for the Federal Government to decide on participation in the U.S. defense program. The Federal Government must, above all, be interested in disarmament so as to decrease the danger of a military conflict between the giants.

BADISCHE ZEITUNG of Freiburg has the following to say about the chancellor's meeting with Weinberger: Helmut Kohl likes to demonstrate harmony, especially with the allies, and most especially with our American friends. U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger's visit to the Grafenwoehr military training grounds again offered such an opportunity and a chance to discuss the tiresome SDI issue. Prior to the discussion there was talk about a crisis in Bonn-Washington negotiations on German participation in SDI. Thereafter, however, there was talk of agreement. Kohl, Weinberger, and the spirit of Grafenwoehr have obviously achieved what seemed unachievable in many earlier negotiations. The question remains as to who has given in. Somebody must have withdrawn from his former positions for the sake of agreement, notes the newspaper.

BRAUNSCHWEIGER ZEITUNG maintains: If Kohl and Weinberger have really agreed on a research program and technology transfer treaties, it would be good news for German industry, and it would suit the Federal Government well, demonstrating its ability to act and achieve agreement. Naturally, it remains to be seen whether the disputed issues have really been resolved. The actual reason for the toughness of the negotiations was the fact that the government coalition was undecided about its approach to a nuclear weapons-free age created by SDI. However, Europeans and Bonn will not be able to dodge the main question forever, whether to cooperate with SDI or to set up its own defense, without a U.S. protective guarantee, against an East bloc that is highly superior in conventional weapons.

SPD Rejects European SDI

DW190918 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 1900 GMT 18 Mar 86

[Text] The SPD, while advocating the modernization of air defense, rejects a European variant of the U.S.-contemplated SDI system of defense against strategic nuclear missiles. This emerges from a draft of the SPD security commission, which will be submitted in August to the party congress in Nuremberg. The draft further says that the threat from nuclear short-range missiles cannot be eliminated by defense systems but solely through political agreements with the Soviet Union.
MINIMAL CIVIL TECHNOLOGY SPINOFF FROM SDI FOR FRG

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 10 Jan. 86 pp 16, 17

[Article by Wolfgang Hoffmann: "War Is Not the Father. On SDI: Military Research Brings Only Minimal Civilian Uses"]

[Text] Nearly 10 years ago, the secretary-general of the United Nations emphasized in a report the view to be taken of civilian uses of military research: "It is actually remarkable how many inventions of great civilian significance have absolutely nothing or very little to do with military research and development."

Once again, however, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl knows better. In the Bonn daily DIE WELT, the chancellor sounded the bell for the latest round of German debate on participation in the American Star Wars with the headline: "SDI Gives a Big Push to New Technologies."

Helmut Kohl will once again be faced with a lack of evidence. His own minister for research and technology, Heinz Riesenhuber, shattered many high-flying illusions when he soberly decided that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) cannot be justified in terms of research policy.

Opinions and controversies such as this are in the meantime piling up, and they have served to liven up the fundamental debate on whether military research and development have spinoff effects, or derived uses for civilian technology. The "Council on Economic Priorities" in New York, a first-class address in the United States, only a few weeks ago in a very thorough, 215-page study raised suspicions that the spinoffs of the Star Wars plan will turn out to be extremely scant. The extent of commercial applications of the technological developments necessary for SDI could be small, since only a relatively small number of new technologies have to be developed for SDI. With SDI, it is much more a matter of refining existing technologies in order to get more out of them, the report said.

Nor did the hearing of SDI experts in the German Bundestag provide much illumination on the question of how important the military program might be for the civilian sector of the West German economy and industry. The 15 experts invited to Bonn were unable to find a common denominator. One part of the experts, who were divided into two camps, did indeed talk a great deal
about "a last-call mood" and "pushes to technology" and did not neglect fears that the Germans would not recover technologically if they broke off from the American strategic plans. In general, however, these gloomy predictions had no substance. The remarks of most of the experts amounted to the unverified assertion that "the participation of German firms is an indication of competitiveness."

Only one expert was able to provide more concrete evidence to the representatives of the German Bundestag that SDI could also have civilian uses. Günter Hoff, a scientist from Erlangen and executive chairman of the Scientific and Medical Institute of the University of Tuebingen, nevertheless based his theory only on the past. Hoff's retrospective on the history of war: "The outstanding technological breakthroughs during the First World War were ammonia syntheses, which enabled Germany to conduct a long-term war without a supply of Chile saltpeter. This was the essential step on the road to great chemistry." Ammonia--and saltpeter before it--were necessary for the production of explosives.

Hoff attributes similar successes and consecutive effects to the development of military airplane motors and of hydrocarbon synthesis, which is necessary for rocket propulsion. Hoff was also able to produce examples from his own military research at Dornier: The basis for the kidney stone splitter that has in the meantime been adopted in medicine was provided by his own military research efforts, he said.

However, such military achievements for civilian purposes are contrasted with other examples. For example, Professor Juergen Schneider of Goettingen believes firmly that today there is an intensification in the trend of "developments from the civilian realm being used by the military rather than the other way around." As an example, he mentioned the use of microchips from the Japanese entertainment industry for developments in arms technology. Schneider: "Moreover, the first nuclear driven X-ray laser was not invented under the premises of military use." The Goettingen scientist from the Institute for Geology and Dynamics of the Lithosphere continues: "According to all findings, direct support of civilian research and development, meaning the direct investment of money and motivation, does more for the development of a national economy than does the laborious, expensive and questionable detour via arms research."

This is also the conclusion that can be drawn from the results of a study commissioned by Minister for Research and Technology Heinz Riesenhuber to the Industrial Installations Operations Company (IABG) in Ottobrunn, near Munich, a state-owned firm that does not exactly have a reputation for being of a fixed ideological bent. The state-owned company does a great deal of work for the Ministry of Defense in Bonn and prepares military studies. The researchers in Munich looked through the relevant scientific literature, searching for evidence of spinoffs from military research. What they found, however, has to lead to a sceptical assessment of the spinoff theory, instead of being adopted as an argument in favor of an arms program costing billions of marks.
The IABG considers it an irrefutable fact that, for example, a significant military-civilian technology transfer has taken place in aviation technology. It is true that specific requirements must also be kept in mind which are rather similar for both military and civilian applications. As an example: "An airplane must be able to fly, and it must be maneuverable, regardless of for what purposes it will be later used." Something similar is true for space satellites as well.

The situation is entirely different in many other areas where a military-civilian transfer is to be expected. One example of this is naval technology. The researchers in Ottobrunn found it at any rate remarkable that they could not provide evidence of "technology transfer in those areas of naval technology that are as specialized as submarine technology and aircraft carrier technology." In advanced production technologies as well, which according to the IABG were "early on a matter of concern to the military in the United States," there are "apparently no spinoffs" that can be ascertained. "On the whole, it can be assumed that the endeavors at technology transfer in the area of production technology have had a very slight impact." Similarly, in a very broad civilian technology sector such as, for example, conservation, only a very minimal transfer from military developments can be determined.

It instead appears that military programs work against civilian goals such as these. "The result of military primacy is that environmental aspects are largely not taken into consideration in the area of developing technologies and products." This is not least of all because "lower emissions in many military systems can be achieved only at the expense of a reduction in performance."

Furthermore, the study also shatters one myth about transfer that has stubbornly persisted in the FRG: The classic--because it is especially handy--example of the positive civilian use of space research is the Teflon pan, to which supposedly no food sticks. In fact, the substance Teflon was not invented for space flight, but rather much earlier, when flights to the moon and star wars were still science fiction. Teflon was developed in 1938 by the Du Pont Company.

Although the Ottobrunn study conveys scepticism, neither supporters nor opponents of the theory of military-civilian technology transfer will be able to find in it unambiguous proof for their positions. The respective facts were researched with too much differentiation for that. Nevertheless, the study does essentially confirm one insight expressed by political scientist Hans Guenter Brauch of the AG Peace Research and European Security Policy at the Institute for Political Science of the University of Stuttgart. Brauch believes that the significance of the spinoff effect is frequently greatly overestimated. He noticed in this that the significance of spinoff is emphasized most of all by groups that are also most of all interested in a high research and development budget for the military. If these groups were to employ enough cleverness in dissecting the Ottobrunn study, they would clearly find examples from which workable arguments for the plausibility of military-civilian transfer could be derived.
Consequently, in his work for the Bundestag hearing, Brauch did not get involved very much in the controversy surrounding spinoff effects. He aimed at the advocates of military research in general, and SDI fans in particular. His theory: "If you take the United States, Japan and the FRG and compare expenditures for military research and development, increases in productivity, economic growth and the share of top technology on the world market since the 1960s, then one ascertains that the country with the highest expenditures for military research and development showed the smallest rise in productivity and growth rate." This was the United States.

This is surprising at first glance, and it comes across as naive speculation. However, Brauch is not using conjecture, but instead provides the facts that show that Baden-Württemberg Minister President Lothar Spaeth must have been wrong when he prophesized the consequences of German non-participation in SDI: "Western Europe will, within 10 or 15 years, become technologically irrelevant and lapse into the second or third ranks. After a phase of presumably greater and yet ultimately fruitless efforts, a destabilizing economic structure would ensue, which for its part would have to lead to political and social disruptions."

The opposite of what Spaeth thinks could become reality. Specifically, if the United States puts SDI into effect, it would have to reckon with a further destabilization of its economy. This at any rate follows from the work of a commission set up by U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1983 to shed light on the United States' competitive position. The findings of the commission, under the leadership of John A. Young, president of the technologically significant Hewlett Packard Company in Palo Alto, California, in its study completed at the beginning of 1985 should give the Americans something to think about.

The diagnosis in short: "Our ability to compete on the world market is dwindling... Our growth in productivity since 1960 has been miserable... The growth in productivity in the United States lags far behind that of our foreign competitors... The leading role of the United States in world trade is in a process of decline... Even our top position in the area of high technology is dwindling."

Examples from the study: "The United States has slipped in market share in 7 out of 10 sectors of the sunrise industries--new technologies. In the area of electronics there was a deficit in the total trade balance, and in our bilateral electronics trade with Japan, our deficit nearly exceeds that in the automobile sector."

The Young report also addresses indirectly the question of military-civilian technology transfer. It states: "The United States is currently spending more on research and development than Japan, France and Germany combined. Thus, in terms of the percentage of gross national product, the United States currently devotes more money to research and development than any of our competitors... Approximately half of our research and development expenditures is allotted to the federal government, which spends the largest part of this--approximately two-thirds--on defense and space programs. And in these two areas, any commercial spillover is not the main goal. If one looks at civilian research and development expenditures in the United States, we are at
a disadvantage with respect to both the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan."

An even clearer picture was provided by a study published at the beginning of 1985 by the "Center for Defense Information": "Immense expenditures for military research have only been of modest use to civilian industry. Only a few significant commercial technologies have resulted from military research." Moreover, the authors of this study fear that the United States will lose its lead in commercial technologies over its competitors on the world market.

For the United States, with its high budget for military research, this is more proof of what the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) determined as early as 1966: "The direct transfer of products and technologies developed for military and space purposes to the civilian sector (is) very small."

This certainly comes as no surprise. The SIPRI Institute estimates that military products are on the average 20 times as research intensive as civilian goods. A comparison of the relevant expenditures for arms research between 1955 and 1971 in the United States, the FRG and Japan brings Stuttgart scientist Brauch to the conclusion: "In the same period, the FRG experienced its economic miracle, and Japan, by supporting civilian research, was able to displace the United States and compete in a number of technological areas, such as in consumer electronics and increasingly in the area of office technology and computer technology. The Japanese success was not achieved by way of military research."

Brauch also points out something that is of increasing concern to Minister for Research and Technology Riesenhuber in Bonn: the fact that the enormous funding available for arms research draws away civilian research personnel, which cannot be recruited in any number. Brauch in fact believes that "the American economic problems in the 1970s were in part the result of the departure of qualified scientists from civilian into military research."

This is now a threat to the FRG, in fact regardless of whether or not Bonn participates in SDI. Ever since Defense Minister Manfred Woerner disproportionately raised expenditures for arms research, a migration of qualified researchers into the new buildup of capacities for arms research should be feared. Because there is less fiscal accountability and less questioning of usefulness in military research, many of them see their big chance there to freely pursue their own favorite areas.

It is true that the minister of defense was unable to spend the significantly increased research funding for 1985 in its entirety, but this is only a sign that the reorientation of research personnel is not possible overnight. However, once word has gotten around that the technological games of the military impose fewer financial restrictions on researchers than is the case with the tight funding for civilian research, the minister of defense should have no problem getting the money in people's hands.

In view of the disadvantages—which can hardly be overlooked—to be expected from an expansion of arms research, physicist Hans-Peter Duerr of the Werner
Heisenberg Institute for Physics in Munich urges level-headedness. Duerr, a student under hydrogen bomb inventor and SDI protagonist Edward Teller: "In view of the perpetually limited material and intellectual resources, useful and meaningful plans should always be approached and supported directly, not pushed indirectly through "spinoffs" of useless and senseless projects."

12271
CSO: 5200/2609
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPAN: EXISTING LAWS ADEQUATE TO PROTECT SDI SECRETS

OW151249 Tokyo KYODO in English 1232 GMT 15 Mar 86

[Text] Tokyo, March 15 KYODO -- The government will use existing laws to protect secrets involving the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) if Japan decides to participate in research on the project, proposed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan, government officials said Saturday. They said the United States and Japan plan to begin working out the framework for Japan's participation in the space-based antimissile program, known as the "star wars" project.

The government is reportedly planning to allow Japanese private enterprises to participate in joint U.S.-Japanese research on the project. The United States has expressed concern over a possible leakage of secrets in case of participation by Japanese companies.

The officials said the government plans to use the existing Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDA) and related arrangements to protect the secrets. The government believes that Japan's participation in joint research in SDI project will help strengthen the security of the West as a whole and underline the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, according to the officials. They said there is little possibility that a new secrets protection law could be enacted in the present political situation.

SDI involves the development of new weapons systems by use of the most advanced technology. U.S. officials have made it known that the Reagan administration will impose strict obligations on Japanese partners to prevent the leakage of secret information. The U.S. position was relayed to two SDI study missions sent by Japan to the United States, last September and in January.

In his recent meeting in Washington with Yoshikatsu Takeiri, chairman of Japan's Komeito, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger praised Japan's efforts to prevent the leakage of secrets to the Eastern bloc and said he was not aware of any incident involving a flow of Western secrets to the Soviet Union via Japan. MDA and related documents designed to prevent the leakage of secrets have hitherto been used in relation to production of U.S.-development weapons in Japan under license agreements. Leaking secrets is punishable by up to 10 years in prison.

The government plans to send a joint official-private mission to the United States later this month to continue study on Japan's participation in the SDI project.

/6091
CSO: 5260/056
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

SDI CHALLENGES FRENCH TECHNOLOGY--"For France, the American Strategic Defense Initiative is not a military threat. It is first and foremost a technological and industrial challenge capable of putting our independence of decision at issue in due time," writes Mr Charles Hernu, former minister of defense, in the editorial of LA LETTRE DU GERMES, the initial issue of the magazine published by the GERMES [Military and Strategic Analyses and Studies Group], which he heads. "With SDI, the United States has launched a formidable challenge, an even more considerable one than the conquest of the Moon, that is going to mobilize not only industry but also universities and research centers, and administrations (...). All the technologies involved in the SDI form part of the data processing and microelectronics revolution. The stakes in the SDI are therefore not solely military; they are technological, and the Americans can be depended on to see therein the opportunity to recover a scientific and technical leadership that the Japanese have been trying to wrest from them for years," Mr Hernu concludes. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Feb 86 p 11] 9399

CSO: 5200/2633
TASS CITES MCGOVERN REMARKS ON GORBACHEV REPORT

LDG10941 Moscow TASS in English 0804 GMT 1 Mar 86

[Text] Washington, March 1 TASS -- Prominent U.S. politician George McGovern has said that the Soviet Union's position on arms limitation is sensible and consistent and that this has been borne out once again by the speech delivered at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The former senator and Democratic presidential hopeful also said in a TASS interview that the measures to reduce nuclear arms and defuse military tension proposed in Mikhail Gorbachev's report met the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States as well as all other countries.

McGovern singled out as being particularly important the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear blasts and its readiness, expressed by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, for dramatic cuts in the strategic nuclear systems of both sides and for the scrapping of the U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles on station in the European zone.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1297
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

PRAVDA VIEWS U.S. ATTITUDES ON PEACE ISSUES

PM111150 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Mar 86 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent G. Vasilyev report: "When the Curtain Was Raised"]

[Text] Washington-New York, March -- It is as though a thick, impenetrable curtain was raised, and Americans saw a rare sight -- the streets of Moscow, the faces of Soviet people, the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. They heard in English translation excerpts from the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th party congress, delivered by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

These were unusual days for millions of U.S. citizens, who are starved of information about the Soviet Union. True, there was no shortage of anti-Soviet fantasies, cliches, or attempts to interpret facts to suit bourgeois propaganda. Despite all these distortions, however, the truths that Americans learned during the days of the congress about the Soviet people's life, about our plans for socioeconomic development, and about Moscow's peace initiatives made a deep impression here and forces people to think, to compare, and to contrast.

Indeed, there was plenty to compare. Events unfolded as if following a script specially designed to show everyone who it is that really desires peace and displays realism and a sense of responsibility, and who it is that, while holding forth about "peaceful intentions," steps up material preparations for war and continues to pursue the elusive specter of strategic superiority. The world was faced with two philosophies of international relations and two programs for practical actions -- the Soviet program of peaceful coexistence between the two systems with equal security for the sides under conditions of a reduction in the level of military confrontation, and the U.S. program of "peace through strength," of "peace" surrounded by growing mountains of destructive weapons.

The first reports about the CPSU Central Committee Political Report started arriving in the United States from Moscow on Tuesday, 23 February. Commenting on its foreign policy sections, observers admitted that the Soviet Union is consistently marching along the path it has elaborated, the path of peace and security for everyone, and returned time and again to the historic program for the total elimination of mass destruction weapons by the end of the present century and to the USSR's other peace proposals.

On the next day -- 26 February -- Americans watching their television sets heard U.S. President R. Reagan's address on military and foreign policy questions. The
speech struck a note sharply discordant not only with what the Soviet Union is calling for, but also with post-Geneva sentiments in the United States itself. The President demanded the prevention of any slowdown at all in the pace of the U.S. military buildup. He presented as the greatest achievement of his administration the fact that the years when the right-wing Republicans have been in power have seen the start of production of new weapon systems like the MX and Trident missiles and the B-1B and Stealth bombers and the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West Europe. Reagan repeated the bogus argument that has been actively used recently by advocates of the military-industrial complex: The buildup of U.S. military muscle, he claimed, is necessary for success in the Soviet-U.S. arms limitation talks. "Strength," the President declared, "is the most persuasive argument we have to convince our adversaries to negotiate seriously."

Local commentators hastened to explain that Reagan's address on national television was addressed primarily to the domestic audience, and that its main purpose was to exert pressure on Congress, which has recently displayed growing reluctance to approve in full the U.S. military budget requested by the administration for fiscal 1987. But neither the contents of the address nor the timing of its delivery left any doubt that this was at the same time a kind of "reply to Moscow," a reaction to growing pressure from the public, which demands from Washington constructive steps in response to the Soviet peace initiatives. All those who hoped for changes for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations could not but have experienced a feeling of profound disappointment with the U.S. President's address, couched in the vein of confrontational rhetoric. This feeling was particularly strong, since only a few days earlier the newspapers had reported the "U.S. reply" to the Soviet proposals of 15 January this year. Judging by what the newspapers wrote, the positive elements of this reply are lost among all kinds of reservations, "provisos," and "conditions" that block the solution of specific disarmament questions.

The world waited almost 1 and 1/2 months to hear what the United States would say to the Soviet peace proposals. The press reported differences of opinion within the Washington corridors of power and a "painful quest" for a balanced answer that would calm the public's anxiety and would not prevent the implementation of military programs. Thus, it saw the light of day and was submitted at the negotiating table in Geneva.

Times in America are, however, different from what they were 5-6 years ago. Even though the incumbent administration is still the same and its policy has essentially undergone few changes, the mood in the country today is significantly different from that which predominated here in the initial period of political frosts and heated anticommunist speeches. The Americans' readiness to support the sharply anti-Soviet course and to vote for high military expenditure has noticeably diminished. A desire for changes and for a switch to calmer, more reasonable, and more realistic principles is clearly noticeable in the country's social climate.

On the very same day when President Reagan delivered his above-mentioned speech on television, the U.S. House of Representatives was the scene of sharp debates, extremely typical of the present stage. Despite desperate resistance from the most loyal backers of the White House's course, the legislators passed by 268 votes to 148 a resolution calling on the U.S. President to immediately resume talks with the Soviet Union for the purpose of concluding a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The resolution also calls on the President to
submit for ratification by the Senate the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, which were signed by the United States earlier but have still not been approved by the supreme legislative body. Congressmen Fascell, Downey, and Coughlin delivered very sharp speeches, testifying that many legislators do not share the basic postulates of the administration's strong-arm, confrontational policy.

"A threat to our very existence increasingly hangs over us," Congressman Studds exclaimed. "But this is not only a threat stemming from our rivals' weapons, it is also a threat stemming from the arms we ourselves are creating... The theory that new types of weapons and new technological breakthroughs will make the world secure and stable is one of the false gods of the nuclear age." And THE WASHINGTON POST remarked immediately that this significant step was taken by Congress the day after a call echoed again from Moscow, from the CPSU congress rostrum, asking the U.S. leadership to follow the Soviet Union's example and to join the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

Life is a strict teacher, and only those who are incapable of drawing conclusions from the past fail to learn its lessons. Despite all the programs for America's rearmament, which have already cost the country 1 trillion dollars, in the opinion of all objective observers the United States has gained neither security nor military superiority over the Soviet Union. Political and economic pressure on the socialist countries and the attempts to exhaust them out by means of the arms race have failed to produce the results expected by those who hate socialism.

The mountains of arms have produced no political dividends for Washington, but have imposed a heavy burden on the country's economy, increasing the federal budget deficit to dangerous dimensions and resulting in the curtailment and elimination of social programs. Americans are practical people by nature. If something fails to work, they will try a different solution. The congressional debate on the requested new military budget totaling 320 billion dollars (an 11-percent increase compared with the previous year) and the unwillingness of many legislators, both Democrats and Republicans, to march in step with the administration are just one manifestation of this desire for changes and quest for alternatives.

Despite the apparently monolithic nature of Washington's foreign policy facade, the actual range of opinions and moods in the country is markedly broader and more diverse. Quite a few influential people here -- politicians, public figures, businessmen, labor union leaders, clergymen, and spokesmen of the scientific world -- are worried by the threat of a nuclear apocalypse. They are aware of the vital need to curb and reverse the race to the abyss. So far as they are concerned the Soviet proposals represent a good basis for the achievement of reasonable accords.

Senator Gary Hart is well known to us from numerous television reports in 1984, when he contested the Democratic Party nomination for U.S. President. He is boyish, with thick dark brown hair that is beginning to gray, and quick in his movements. Small lights summoning the legislators to another vote lit up constantly on the large clock in his office, but the senator did not wish to interrupt our conversation. Because, as he himself said, he believes that Soviet-U.S. relations are of decisive significance not only for the peoples of our two countries but also for the whole world. Under conditions when mountains of arms have been stockpiled, threatening
the annihilation of all mankind, G. Hart developed his thought, the United States and the USSR bear not only a political but also a moral responsibility for the fate of peace.

The senator described the USSR's peace initiatives outlined in the Political Report to the 27th CPSU Congress as extremely positive and dictated by good will and the desire to achieve specific results.

A certain contradictoriness can also be discerned in the senator's statements. On the whole, however, the conversation with the legislator, considered to be one of the Capitol Hill's experts on military-strategic issues, gave the impression that one was face to face with a thinking man, a politician aware of the realities of our age. G. Hart said with great alarm that, unless the brakes are applied today, the locomotive of the arms race, and of the nuclear missile and space arms race in particular, could finally get out of control.

"I totally agree," he said "with General Secretary Gorbachev that there can be no security for one great power to the detriment of another's security, that new political thinking is required in our age."

The White House, the lawn of the presidential mansion, and Pennsylvania Avenue with its speeding cars can be seen from the window of the office where Paul Warnke sits at his desk. Only a few hundred meters separate the offices of the Clifford and Warnke Law Firm from the "first house of the country."

Yet the political distance separating the former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. delegation at the SALT-II talks from the Reagan administration's course is much greater. Warnke believes that the policy of strength of the Republican administration, which has derailed the arms limitation talks, is detrimental to the country's vital interests. It is based on false premises that doom it to failure.

"As a participant in Soviet-U.S. talks," he said, "I can say most definitely that any attempt to deal with the Soviet Union 'from a position of strength' is a hopeless task. History has shown that arms limitation accords can be achieved only when this is in the interests of both sides and intensifies both sides' feeling of security."

Whence this divergence of views on Washington's foreign policy? Why did the age of "frosts" arrive after a period when the two countries managed to reach important accords? In Warnke's opinion, the point is that in recent times the upper hand in Washington has been gained by people captivated by images of the "Wild West" as depicted in Western movies -- walk into the saloon with pistols at your side, slam a fist on the table, and issue an ultimatum.

On parting, P. Warnke handed me the latest bulletin issued by the Committee for National Security, an organization he heads. Outlining the main provisions of the Soviet plan to free the world from nuclear weapons, the authors of the publication call on the U.S. Government not to miss this unique opportunity. "The United States and the USSR are at a crossroads," the bulletin says. "...We are faced with opportunities for deep cuts in both sides' nuclear arsenals and for prevention of an arms race in space..."
"Unfortunately," Warnke said, "many people's awareness lags behind the changing realities. Some of our people live in the past, when America, cut off by two oceans, was considerably stronger than everyone it came into conflict with, when it was able to dictate its will to others. That time is gone forever. And the sooner everyone realizes this, the better...."
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS: U.S. 'BENT ON SCRAPPING' REMAINING ARMS ACCORDS

LD071714 Moscow TASS in English 1707 GMT 7 Mar 86

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Fred Ikle, the U.S. under secretary of defence for policy, at a moment of frankness, admitted that the present administration intends to abide by arms control treaties as long as they do not stand in the Pentagon's way in implementing its programmes of war preparations.

By derailing the nearly-completed comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and refusing to ratify the agreement limiting underground explosions and the treaty on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, Washington sought to gain freedom of action for conducting the tests of nuclear warheads for MX missiles, Trident-2 and other arms systems.

American leaders describe the Soviet-American SALT-2 treaty, signed but not ratified, as essentially faulty because they are currently deploying, specifically, two new ICBM's -- MX and Midgetman, and are increasing the number of MIRV'ed missiles beyond the limits fixed by the treaty.

The United States thwarted talks on anti-satellite weapons and flatly refuses to resume them because the Pentagon has decided to deploy in outer space strike weaponry systems. For the same reasons, the U.S. Administration refused to follow the Soviet Union's example and announce a moratorium on anti-satellite testing.

Using invented pretexts or giving no explanations whatsoever, the U.S. Administration unilaterally broke off the talks on limiting military activity in the Indian Ocean, on arms trading, and on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. It is clear to all, however, that Washington's action are explained by the U.S. unwillingness to erect any barriers in the way of the arms race.

The American "star wars" plans jeopardize the 1972 treaty limiting antiballistic-missile defences, so far operating. The plans of large-scale deployment of American strike armaments in outer space and anti-missile systems on earth violate practically all clauses of the major Soviet-American agreement.

Washington seems to be bent on scrapping the remaining accords aimed to diminish the risk of nuclear war, and ending the entire process of limiting and reducing armaments. Experts joke grimly that the problem of compliance with arms control accords will shortly be resolved since, through U.S. fault, there will be no accords left that should be complied with.
The reputation of the United States as a reliable partner in negotiations, as an honest party to the arms control accords already reached dropped to an extremely low level during the past five years.

It seems that some in Washington simply fear the possibility of a long-term thaw in Soviet-American relations and the world situation in general, that has emerged lately.

One would like to hope that the U.S. Administration will ultimately come to the conclusion that in the present-day conditions, a foundation stronger than weapons ought to be built under inter-state relations.

/9365
CS0: 5200/1297
IZVESTIYA ON EUROPE'S ROLE IN GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL

PM171039 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Feb 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Dispatch by own correspondent V. Kuznetsov: "Europe Can Set an Example; Soviet Peace Initiatives Are the Path to the Continent's Liberation From Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Geneva--The Soviet Union's new proposals aimed at liberating our planet from the nuclear threat have attracted widespread attention from the governments of the European states and the continent's public. I am talking with George Cox, a representative of the campaign for world disarmament, who is in Geneva. "U.S. first-strike missiles," G. Cox says, "have become veritable Trojan horses. They not only do not strengthen security in Western Europe: The Pershings and cruise missiles have become a factor of distrust, of Europe's division, a factor in undermining European détente. The mountains of missiles do not create security, do not give a sense of relief. On the contrary, they reduce the threshold by transgressing which it is possible to burn in a nuclear conflagration. Judge for yourself: Western Europe is a densely populated region where there are over 400 large cities. Scientists have calculated that in the event of a nuclear conflict half the continent's population would be annihilated immediately while the remaining half would die later from burns, fires, and other consequences of the nuclear cataclysm.

The Soviet proposals could be rapidly implemented with a constructive approach to them on the part of the participants in the talks and with the manifestation of the political will on the part of the Reagan administration, George Cox said in conclusion.

In Geneva, where the Soviet-U.S. talks are taking place, you can feel particularly keenly the powerful anxiety for Europe's destiny. One of the central places is occupied by the question of medium-range missiles in the European zone.

The program advanced by the Soviet Union for the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world has, as is well known, the most direct bearing on Europe too.

At the very first stage of this program the USSR suggests undertaking a step of exceptional importance--agreeing on the abolition of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in the European zone.
By this new and bold approach, the Soviet side is graphically displaying its desire to fulfill the accord reached during the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva and to accelerate the talks on nuclear and space armaments.

Fundamental importance attaches to the involvement of other states possessing nuclear weapons in the nuclear disarmament program. Naturally, the first step in reducing their nuclear armaments capable of reaching each other's territory should be taken by the United States and the USSR as the states with the largest nuclear arsenals and bearing special responsibility for maintaining peace. That is why the Soviet program stipulates that within the framework of its first stage a decision is reached and implemented on eliminating the medium-range missiles of the USSR and the United States in the European zone—both ballistic and cruise missiles—as a first step on the path of liberating Europe from nuclear weapons.

But even on this plane Britain and France, in resolving the question of eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, should undertake not to build up their own corresponding nuclear arms.

A U.S. understanding in connection with the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe not to supply its missiles—strategic or medium-range—to other countries would serve the aims of closing possible channels for circumventing future accords. After all, if the USSR and the United States were to begin to move along the path of reducing their nuclear arsenals, while Britain and France, which are the United States' NATO allies, were to continue to advance in the opposite direction, the whole process of eliminating nuclear weapons would be jeopardized.

[PM171041] I am talking with General (Kostas Kostentinides) (retired), member of the Greek committee for international detente and peace, who has come to Geneva to meet with UN representatives within the framework of International Peace Year:

"As a military man I understand that our continent is overloaded with nuclear weapons and it is perfectly reasonable to begin by eliminating the medium-range missiles of the USSR and the United States in Europe. The United States must stop the deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles in West Europe while the other NATO nuclear powers—Britain and France—must not increase their nuclear arsenals. It is from this 'launchpad' that Europe can enter a peaceful 21st century, setting an example to other continents."

A clear and unambiguous assessment. The Soviet Union's proposals leave no place for subterfuge. The USSR appeals to the United States, Britain, and France, to all West European countries, to take advantage of this unique opportunity and to take effective steps to liberate Europe from nuclear weapons.

This appeal requires a clear and honest response. Of course, it is above all Washington which must give this response. So far people there are thinking and waiting. But it is by the nature of the U.S. Administration's response
to the new Soviet proposal that the peoples will judge whether it is really concerned to normalize the situation in Europe or whether it continues to view Europe only as a hostage of its dangerous nuclear strategy.

Of course, movement along the path of nuclear disarmament is no simple matter. Those who are acquiring billions in profits from continuing the nuclear arms race are seeking to impede this process. It is no accident that some West European press organs are seeking to generate hostility and distrust toward the new Soviet initiatives.

The Soviet Union's actions in resolving disarmament problems in the world and in Europe in particular accord with all peoples' hopes and aspirations. There can be no indifferent and disinterested people in this noble and humane matter which accords with the principles of the UN Charter. Only by joint efforts, with an understanding of the responsibility of one and all for the destiny of the planet in the nuclear age, through vigorous activity to liberate earth from lethal weapons, is it possible and necessary to ensure a world without wars and weapons for our children and grandchildren.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1297
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR'S LOMEYKO, OTHERS CONDEMN UK REJECTION OF SOVIET INITIATIVE

Rejection Not 'Definite'

PML71621 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Mar 86 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Maslennikov report: "Ignoring the Dictates of Reason"]

[Text] London, 12 Mar -- Reports appeared in the press here yesterday that the M. Thatcher government has rejected the 15 January Soviet disarmament proposals offered to it. It considers "unacceptable" the Soviet Union's proposal to Britain and France not to build up their own corresponding nuclear arms given the complete elimination of the USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. London states that the question of limiting Britain's nuclear forces can only be discussed after the completion of the Soviet-U.S. nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva. Just as in U.S. President Reagan's reply to the Soviet proposals, questions of nuclear disarmament are linked in the British letter with the patently far-fetched "need for a leveling of the balance in conventional armaments" as well as the broadening of the discussion on regional, bilateral, and other problems.

Speaking in Parliament, Labour Party leader N. Kinnock accused the Thatcher government of setting out to complicate the elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons in Eastern and Western Europe. "The prime minister's refusal to go halfway toward trying to introduce a mutually binding freeze on nuclear arsenals," Labour shadow defense spokesman D. Davies said in support of his leader, "demonstrates the hypocritical nature of the government's repeated statements that it is committed to multilateral nuclear disarmament."

The attempts made by the prime minister and other cabinet members to try in some way to justify this negative stance made no impression either on Labour Party members or indeed on representatives of other opposition parties. The Tory government, Liberal Party spokesman J. Wallace stated, is "obsessed" with the idea of modernizing Britain's nuclear forces with the U.S. Trident missiles system, and this is "becoming a serious obstacle in the way of talks on achieving real disarmament in Geneva."

"In dismissing a Soviet proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons on earth in 15 years," P. Johns, chairman of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, said, "Thatcher has set herself against all those who are working to reduce nuclear arsenals in Europe. The provocative plan to boost the destructive power of Britain's nuclear forces by buying Trident is now one of the main barriers to the establishment of arms control. With the exception of the Conservative government itself, everyone is agreed that this

41
plan should be cancelled." Instead of taking advantage of the Soviet proposals for the systematic reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, a statement published here by the British peace assembly says, the British Government has announced its intention to continue the arms race buildup.

Many commentators here are noting the Western ruling circles' insincerity in their approach to the whole range of disarmament problems. "Honesty is a quality which is clearly lacking in the recent replies (of the West -- A.M. note) to the Soviet nuclear moratorium," notes D. Adamson, diplomatic correspondent of Britain's DAILY TELEGRAPH.

The unpopularity of the British Government's stance is so obvious that even those press organs which usually actively support Tory policy have had to dissociate themselves from it. "It is questionable that Britain should have repeated the U.S. counter proposals word for word," THE TIMES writes.

In other words, the negative stance taken on the Soviet peace program by the Thatcher government in no way reflects the prevailing mood today either in Britain itself or in the West as a whole. And for that reason it cannot be considered definitive. Many Western political and social figures are speaking and writing to that effect now.

"The Thatcher government's reply to the Soviet proposals," G. MacLennan, general secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain, said when addressing press representatives, "will cause anger and dismay to millions of people in Britain from all walks of life and many shades of religious and political outlook. This anger needs to be turned into determination and action to force a change in British policy. The Thatcher response shows that the British Government has no independent policy at all but is merely following the U.S. line."

"The Soviet program for ridding the world of nuclear and other types of mass-destruction weapons; the well-known British politician and MP A. Benn said in conversation with me, "inspired a ray of hope among the broad masses of the British and other peoples of Western Europe. And this is a factor which will have an increasing influence on the situation in Western countries. Whatever position the governments of those countries adopt," A. Benn stressed, "they cannot totally ignore the peoples' will."
[Text] London -- People here learned with great interest of the content of the reply from M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the joint message from the leaders of six countries. The USSR's decision not to carry out nuclear explosions even after 31 March -- until the first nuclear explosion in the United States -- is interpreted here as a new manifestation of good will on Moscow's part.

The British cannot fail to make comparisons. The Soviet Union's constructive, flexible position highlights the weakness, unconvincingness, and set nature of the Tory government's viewpoint on the disarmament problem. This was manifested yet again during the recent polemics in Westminster.

These polemics erupted unexpectedly recently when, during parliamentary question time, it became known that the program for Britain's nuclear missile rearmament, known as Trident 2, will cost far more than supposed even very recently. The British taxpayers will have to cough up over 500 million pounds sterling more.

Answering acute criticism in the House of Commons from opposition representatives accusing the government of virtually abandoning multilateral efforts in halting the nuclear arms race, the head of the British Government made the following statement: "Unless deterrent means are updated, they will cease to be a deterrent." As is well known, no one and nothing threatens Britain, at least from the East. But, leaving aside the question of who the British deterrent means are aimed against, it must be noted that it is obviously impossible to understand this formulation of the prime minister's as anything other than an undertaking to continue to build up nuclear armaments.

The Soviet program to eliminate nuclear weapons requires businesslike discussion. London, however, has replied to Moscow's proposal to act together to prevent a nuclear catastrophe without even consulting with Parliament.

All political echelons of the opposition are considering the 15 January Soviet statement. Sober-minded Conservatives have also been obliged to study this very important document. It is well known how the Labour Party leadership has treated it. D. Healy, foreign secretary in the Labour "shadow Cabinet," has stated in particular that the West must take advantage of M.S. Gorbachev's constructive proposals in the disarmament sphere.

The leadership of the Conservatives asserts that it is speaking for the entire British people and expressing their will. But many people in the British Isles believe that official London is acting counter to widespread sentiments.

The fact that all recent public opinion polls bear witness to the decline in M. Thatcher's personal popularity is usually explained in the country's "big press" by
the Tory government's setbacks in domestic policy. But the dissatisfaction with the one-sided foreign policy course wholly oriented toward Washington to the detriment of British national interests and independence must obviously be taken into account here as well.

It is Whitehall's deeds, not its words, which compel us to think about how the fresh spring wind of change which has animated international relations and given rise to great hopes in the world seem to be counterindicated to it. Surely the pernicious climate of "cold war" and military-political confrontation is not most dear to the Toires' hearts.

Lomeyko Addresses Newsmen

LD181719 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT 18 Mar 86

[Text] Moscow March 18 TASS -- Attempts are continuing in the West at presenting in a distorted light the essence of the Soviet initiatives, said Vladimir Lomeyko, head of the press department of the USSR Foreign Ministry. He was addressing Soviet and foreign newsmen at the Press Center of the USSR Foreign Ministry today. Thus, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told Parliament that the Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles allegedly imply that a certain number of missiles will be moved in the Far East, and these missiles, as she claimed, can certainly be sent back.

Meanwhile the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev of January 15 this year explicitly says that we favour a total elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in the European zone -- both ballistic and cruise missiles as the first step of ridding Europe of nuclear weapons.

Trying to complicate the reaching of an agreement, London artificially draws here also questions of the military balance in Asia, a practical resolution of which is provided for by the Soviet programme at the corresponding stage, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said.

Thus, the obstacle to progress is not the Soviet stand, but the West's obvious reluctance to take the path of nuclear disarmament. A fresh proof of this has been the speech by the British prime minister.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1297
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS OBSERVER ON UK REJECTION OF GORBACHEV'S NEW YEAR PROPOSAL

LD11557 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1449 GMT 11 Mar 86

[Commentary by TASS military observer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Mar (TASS) -- As the PRESS ASSOCIATION hurried to report, Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain has given her response to the Soviet proposals of 1 January. According to THE FINANCIAL TIMES, the British prime minister rejected the key points of the USSR's proposals on nuclear arms control relating to the British nuclear forces. Officials have let it be known, the newspaper writes, that the British Government does not approve of any plan envisaging a freeze in the program for the buildup of Great Britain's nuclear armaments, and that nuclear weapons are essential "in the foreseeable future" as a factor of mutual restraint.

Quite recently the prime minister of Great Britain was fighting for the removal from Europe of Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles and, alongside several other West European leaders, she called for this problem not to be linked with strategic weapons and space. But now that the USSR has clearly expressed a willingness to act in precisely such a way and to totally eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in the European zone on a reciprocal basis, official London has completely lost its sham "enthusiasm." The realism and fairness of the Soviet plan have clearly not been to the taste of the London advocates of nuclear weapons.

What is going on? When you ask yourself this question, you cannot help recalling that it was precisely M. Thatcher who last year loudly repeated from the rostrum the not unfamiliar words of W. Churchill: "First and foremost take steps so as not to let nuclear weapons out of your grasp until you are certain and more than certain that you have in your hands other means of preserving peace." And the present prime minister is "taking steps," "not letting" nuclear weapons "out of her grasp."

And moreover, she was the first among the West European leaders to hitch her country to the U.S. "Star Wars" program in order to have involvement in space strike weapons and to participate in the development of this "means of preserving peace," as it is understood in Washington. One can hardly suppose that London does not realize that both Britain's refusal to make what contribution it can to the cause of reducing Soviet and U.S. medium-range missile in the European zone, and the continuation of the "Star Wars" program, are a barrier to activating the nuclear and space weapons talks in Geneva. What then is the worth of Mrs Thatcher's declarations, having stated once that these talks "hold hope for guaranteeing peace worldwide"?
How can the prime minister be concerned for the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Europe if in February 1985, addressing the U.S. Congress, she took enormous credit for the very fact that Great Britain was the first country to deploy the new U.S. cruise missiles on its territory and "set an example to the other" West European NATO countries? And now again she has complete foundation for "boasting" over the fact that she is following obediently in the wake of the adventurist and militarist policy of those U.S. circles which are against measures to stabilize the international situation and remove the threat of nuclear disaster. It is a question of yet another manifestation of the rejection of Great Britain's national interests, a rejection which made itself felt recently in the Westland helicopter company affair, where Mrs. Thatcher gave preference to a pro-U.S. rather than a European approach.

The Tory government in no way wishes to abandon its own nuclear ambitions. It is not enough for the government that, owing to the military policy of the Thatcher cabinet, Great Britain has virtually been transformed into a "powder keg," the fuse of which stretches to the White House in Washington. Calculating in terms of per capita of population, the country now spends more than any West European NATO member on military needs, and its military budget, taking inflation into account, has been growing uneasingly now for 7 years.

The prime minister has again confirmed that her government remains firmly devoted to plans for equipping the British submarine fleet with Trident, a most advanced nuclear missile system. As is known, this will cost British taxpayers an astronomical sum — in the region of 11 billion pounds. In this the Tory cabinet has ignored the opinion of the majority of Britons, who, as the results of public opinion polls have shown, are against this program and think that Trident missiles are nothing other than a nuclear first-strike weapon. As the British paper THE OBSERVER wrote, the acquisition of these missiles "significantly exceeds" even those requirements which Great Britain established for itself, having armed itself with the doctrine of "nuclear restraint." Such marked growth of the country's nuclear potential, THE FINANCIAL TIMES stressed, cannot be justified by any talk about "defense interests".

Thatcher's "answer" to the Soviet proposals, her decision not to stop the quantitative buildup of her corresponding nuclear arms, if a Soviet-U.S. accord is reached on the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in the European zone, and her confirmation of plans for a concentrated buildup of so-called British "independent nuclear restraint forces" cast doubt upon the sincerity of the British leadership's statements about adherence to the cause of peace and arms reduction. Giving an interview to the newspaper LA REPUBBLICA last year, Mrs. Thatcher said: "Europe is going resolutely forward, but I, following the example of schoolteachers, would write in the exercise-books of pupils, from time to time: 'You could have done better.'" Evidently, the world community can write on the British prime minister's "answer," with every reason: "You could not have done worse."

/8309
CSO: 5200/1288
USSR'S YAKOVLEV HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE AT PARTY CONGRESS

LD260132 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 25 Feb 86

[Announcer-read report on news conference conducted by USSR Propaganda Department Chief Aleksandr Yakovlev at the Press Center in Moscow on 25 February]

[Excerpts] At the end of the 1st day of the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress, Soviet and foreign journalists have gathered for a news conference at the press center. The news conference was devoted to the main points of the political report by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The audience was addressed by the head of the Propaganda Department at the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee, Aleksandr Yakovlev.

The stress in the political report is laid on substantiating three principled ideas profoundly and comprehensively. The first is on the need to realize that the nation is going through a turning point in its development. The second is on the concept of speeding up social and economic development as the party's strategy for the near future, and finally the third is on the importance of comprehending the nuclear age realities, and more important, the practical conclusions that each state and nation should draw in these conditions when the world has approached the point that should make all people stop and think.

Concerning the international problems set in the political report, Aleksandr Yakovlev focused on the fact that the integral Soviet concept of the world situation with the definition of its key problems had in fact been outlined at the Congress. It is very important that the analysis of the state of these problems is combined with the presentation of clear-cut concrete proposals on their solution. The chief problem is that of averting a nuclear war. It is obvious that humanity would not survive a third world war. This is precisely why the Soviet Union has been bringing up the problem of stopping the nuclear arms race and the problem of achieving nuclear disarmament so acutely and persistently. Humanity simply must comprehend in full its responsibility, and prevent its destiny from being put at the discretion of computers for a solution.

The Soviet Union is well aware that the world has approached a dangerous line. But at the same time it is convinced that objective conditions exist for normal relations of peace between states with different social systems. One can say that if the acuteness and danger of the situation that make it historically imperative that the nuclear arms race be halted and nuclear disarmament be achieved.

At the news conference, Aleksandr Yakovlev answered questions. The question asked by a representative of the American ABC television network was this:

[Begin recording] [Reporter] General Secretary Gorbachev seemed to put two preconditions on the next summit meeting with President Reagan. Is he saying that there cannot now be a summit meeting unless there is an agreement on Euromissiles and unless there's an agreement on ending all nuclear tests, or was that a device to put pressure on the United States for Geneva? Have you set preconditions on another summit meeting?

[Yakovlev] I don't think you've taken the heart of the problem correctly. No preconditions are spoken of in the report. Secondly, the point is the following: Geneva was a good thing and this is admitted by all, but it would probably not be worth repeating once and the same thing. The world is expecting from these two countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, something different at this stage, it is expecting practical steps. In Geneva it was a get-acquainted session, but is it worth holding another session of this kind? The report says we would not like to have more repetitious and fruitless conversations; we hope for concrete understanding. The report suggests the most realistic of the possible practical moves — to scrap medium-range missiles in Europe and to ban nuclear explosions. On this score, we believe agreement would be reached; a decision of this kind would prove a great relief for the whole world, great indeed. It would ease our progress. Time was when the Western press carried many articles with the conclusion that if the Soviets agreed to the notorious zero option it would be wonderful. Well, we agree. Then why is the Western press keeping silent? [end recording]

Those were the main points of a news conference that took place at the press center immediately after the delivery of the political report to the 27th Congress by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR'S KORNIYENKO, AKHROMEYEV HOLD 28 FEB NEWS CONFERENCE

Reagan, USSR Arms Proposals

LD281726 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1415 GMT 28 Feb 86

[News conference by USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgiy Korniyenko and Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeiev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and first deputy minister of defense; participants introduced by Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee; at the press center of the 27th CPSU Congress in Moscow on 28 February; recorded]

[Text] [Korniyenko] In the Political Report by the CPSU Central Committee, delivered at the Congress by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, as well as in the course of discussion of the report -- as you can see -- much of the discussion is devoted to questions of the foreign policy activity of our party and the Soviet state.

From the report and the speeches, it should be clear to all that the cornerstone of all this activity is Lenin's tenet, reaffirmed in the new edition of the program, that the historic dispute between the two opposing systems into which the world is divided must and can be resolved by peaceful competition and not by the path of war.

Accordingly, the main goal of the CPSU's foreign policy continues to be that of guaranteeing the opportunity for the Soviet people to work in conditions of durable peace. But we depart from this premise: Durable peace is needed by all peoples, not only the Soviet people. In our view, peace is an essential condition for social progress as a whole; and furthermore, today it is a question of the survival of the human race.

Now, at a time when mankind already has in its power the means for self-destruction, the Soviet Union sees as the number-one problem to stop material preparations for nuclear war, reverse the arms race on earth and prevent one in space, and by the end of this century completely eliminate nuclear weapons everywhere.

Unfortunately, as has already been said at the congress, the reply from the U.S. side that came a few days ago to the nuclear disarmament program proposed by the Soviet Union can in no way be considered constructive. Quite the contrary: It testifies to the fact that the U.S. leadership intends to go further along the path of whipping up the arms race on earth and extending it into space, and in striving to ensure military superiority for itself.

Evidently in order to leave no one in any doubt about this, President Reagan made a statement on 26 February which was entirely devoted to singing the praises of force.
as the most convincing argument, in his words, which the United States has at its disposal. However, it should be clear to everyone that the Soviet Union will not permit the United States to violate the military strategic balance in its favor, just as it does not strive to violate it in its own, the Soviet, favor. It should also be clear that the unceasing increase in the level of military confrontation is not at all a path to peace, as President Reagan assures us. In conditions of an increase in military arsenals even the presence of parity, as was said in the report to the congress, at best ensures equal danger but in no way equal security.

As early as before the war and then in the postwar period, the Soviet Union showed a preference for ideas of collective security. But today, it is our deep conviction that this is not simply preferable but is the only possible way of ensuring lasting peace.

It is precisely this which defines our party raising the question of creating an all-encompassing system of international security, the bases of which -- in the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres -- were set out in the Political Report.

These bases, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said, could become the starting point and a kind of framework for a direct systematic dialogue between the leaders of the countries of the world community, both a bilateral and multilateral dialogue. It is in this context that the idea is put forward that the leaders of the five states which are permanent members of the Security Council should hold a roundtable discussion of what must be done to maintain and strengthen peace.


[Mnatsakanov] I would like to ask you to return to the latest appearance of the U.S. President on national television. What he said was apparently a sort of reaction or response to all that is being said at the congress of Soviet Communists about peace, disarmament, and international security. Couldn't you go into a little more detail on this matter?

[Zamyatin] Reagan's speech shows that in its statements the United States is now continuing the course which it has formerly pursued, where the stress is placed on military force as the method of solving existing questions. Yes, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said in the Political Report of the party's Central Committee that the U.S. proposals are being studied, taking account of the additional elucidations which the U.S. delegation has given in Geneva. But in general, even now, comparing Reagan's two latest speeches, it may be said that the U.S. response is not constructive. It is one-sided in nature, and in effect runs directly counter to the proposals made by the Soviet Union in the 15 January statement of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

While confirming his adherence to the goal of liquidating nuclear arms, Reagan in both his speeches gives no clear and concrete program to achieve this goal; on the contrary, he hedges it with numerous provisos, conditions, and the possibility of resolving the negotiations only from a position of strength. In the U.S. proposals there is no solution to the fundamental question of preventing an arms race in space. Under various pretexts Reagan is declaring the U.S. "star wars" program inviolable and therefore, he says, restrictions on the development [razrobotka] of space strike weapons should not be included in the agreements. Consequently, Reagan's new so-called proposals once again bank on military superiority.
If we take another aspect — strategic nuclear weapons — the U.S. proposals reproduce without alteration the old U.S. proposal, on which the Soviet Union has already expressed its view. If such a proposal were to be implemented, the United States would obtain a superiority over the Soviet Union of more than double the number of nuclear charges. In addition, we would have had to break up our strategic nuclear forces and construct them anew according to the U.S. pattern; the Soviet Union's answer to this has also already been given officially, in our statements and in the Soviet Press.

Concerning medium-range missiles, we are being offered the so-called zero option, which was earlier rejected by the Soviet Union. Why was it rejected? Because its implementation would give the U.S. side the opportunity of preserving that which they would like to preserve in their proposals; and, in essence, so to speak, they depart from the proposals made by the Soviet Union. What, after all, is the difference between the new zero option and the previous zero options proposed by Reagan? The U.S. side is now simply proposing to extend it for 3 years, but its substance is the same — to achieve advantages for the United States, including in Europe.

Let us take an acute issue which could be resolved now, and where military, scientific, and technical specialists confirm that a solution could be achieved literally, so to speak, in a few days: the issue of banning nuclear weapons tests. In the official answer, the United States officially stated that it takes a negative stance, claiming that as long as nuclear weapons are a restraining element the United States must continue testing. There is no possible way of interpreting such an answer other than as Washington's striving to continue the arms race. Moreover, the question of security is being linked — and artificially too — to the resolution of regional conflicts and other issues that have nothing to do with ending the arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons, as established by the Soviet Union.

[Akhromeyev] If we are to speak of the speech by President Reagan, in which he touches on specific aspects in the military field, I would like to add the following to what Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin has said. The President, in his speech of 26 February, continues to try to intimidate his own people and the world public with the, quote Soviet military threat, unquote. In particular, he stated in his speech that in the period 1970–1975 the Soviet Union supposedly spent $500 billion more on its defense than the United States.

I was compelled to do some arithmetic, and I worked out that in the 15 years from 1970 to 1985 the United States spent on military matters $1.989 trillion — virtually $2 trillion. If we add to this, as the President says, $500 billion, we find that over those 15 years the USSR spent $2.5 trillion on defense. If we convert this into rubles, we get 2 trillion rubles. And if one takes the entire Soviet budget for those 15 years and totals it up our budget came to 4 trillion rubles. These are widely known figures. It transpires, as the President says, that we spent 50 percent of our budget for those 15 years on military requirements. [as heard] But that is absurd, for in 1942 and 1943, in the very harshest period of the Second World War, we were spending such sums on our military requirements. In peacetime no state can spend so much. This is a dishonest [nedobrosostvennny] calculation, but the point is that it is a different approach to international security. The Soviet Union, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said at the Congress, makes provision for radical reductions in armaments to limits of reasonable sufficiency, with the aim of strengthening the stability of international security.
But the approach expressed by the President in his speech is a different one. It is the approach of a continued arms race. Their military-industrial machine still has no intention of slowing down.

[Announcer] The participants in the news conference proceeded to reply to other questions for correspondents.

Missiles in Asia 'More Complex' Issue

LD281330 Moscow TASS in English 1325 GMT 28 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 28 TASS--The problem of medium-range missiles in the European zone, despite its complexities, is easier to resolve than the problem of analogous missiles in the East, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, stressed at a news conference at the press centre of the 27th CPSU Congress here today. It is easier because confronting each other in the European zone are medium-range systems of the USSR and the United States. Similar systems of Great Britain and France are also positioned there.

In the East, the issue is more complex. The United States maintains up to seven aircraft-carryers in the Pacific zone. Roughly speaking, there are 350 nuclear weapons carriers with a range of up to 1,500 km which threaten Soviet territory. These are the U.S. strategic aircraft based on Guam, these are American systems deployed in Japan, South Korea.

We hear nothing from the United States on this score, Marshal Akhromeyev said, but the demand for the solution of this problem simultaneously with the problem of the European zone. We agree, but let us decide what to do with your systems positioned in the Far East. So far, there has been no response to that from the American side.

LD281346 Moscow TASS in English 1340 GMT 28 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 28 TASS -- The Soviet Union sees recognition of the security interests of all states, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other as an immutable principle, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, said at a news conference at the press center of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union today.

"We call for signing of an agreement to renounce the use of force and threats to use force, and regard as inadmissible the actions of any state or a group of states aimed at gaining unilateral military advantages. It has been reiterated from the rostrum of the 27th Congress that wisdom consists in pressing for equal security rather than showing concern exclusively for oneself, the more so at the expense of the other side."
The United States abides by a different policy. Washington's official doctrine is based on retaliation, on intimidation and this makes for the arms race and serves to vindicate the course of seeking military superiority. This doctrine undermines the security of states and actually makes the whole world into a nuclear hostage.

One should not bank on force, as some people do in the United States, said Georgiy Korniyenko, first deputy foreign minister of the USSR. This is why the key objective of Soviet foreign policy, as has been strikingly confirmed at the 27th Congress of the CPSU, is to achieve success in the field of disarmament.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1297
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR'S ARBATOV VIEWS CPSU CONGRESS STAND ON DISARMAMENT

PM111449 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Mar 86 p 3

[Remarks by Academician G.A. Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States of America and Canada, to "our correspondent" A. Baranov under the rubric "It Is Not Too Late!": "The World Is Too Fragile for Wars"—date, place not given]

[Text] [Arbatov] The main feature of the Soviet Union's new peace proposals is certainly their unprecedented scale, complexity, and extremely concrete nature. Postwar history records many different initiatives and "packages" of proposals touching on particular aspects of the disarmament problem. But today we are dealing with a document of a fundamentally new nature — an integral, detailed concept of ensuring international security. Some aspects of it were formulated by M.S. Gorbachev in his speech to French parliamentarians in October of last year and in subsequent speeches, particularly during the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva.

M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement contains proposals as a result of which these major ideas have, so to speak, acquired new flesh and become a program for mankind's liberation from the threats inherent in the existence and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction.

Now, at the congress, the Soviet concept of international security has been presented to the world in detailed form. Let me remind you of its main provisions.

First, there is the conclusion that the security problem is essentially a political problem, and it is futile to attempt to resolve it by military-technical means. Not the arms race, but disarmament strengthens security.

There is also the awareness that in our age security cannot be achieved at the expense or to the detriment of others, that it can only be mutual (if we are talking about USSR-U.S. relations) or universal — if we have in mind the international situation as a whole. Security today can only be security for all.

It is also obvious that although militarism is manifested more than ever before in U.S. policy, that policy does not accord with the United States' real national interest, not to mention the fact that the world is much bigger than the United States and cannot be reduced to it alone. It follows from this that the potential for peace is very great, even if you include the West in the reckoning.
Lastly, there is the need to realize that the world is very complex and is in the process of change; that nobody can freeze that process and fix the "status quo" forever; and that in the world arena the legitimate interests, both political and economic, of many states intersect and must be taken carefully into account, or else there will be no genuine security.

To sum all this up, there is the conclusion that the modern world has become too small and fragile for wars and strong-arm policies. It is necessary to break decisively and irreversibly with the way of thinking and acting which has for centuries been based on the acceptability and permissibility of wars and armed conflicts.

It is hardly necessary to mention the decisive significance which the task of putting an end to the arms race acquires in this connection.

That is the conceptual basis of the new Soviet proposals. Their main point, as is well known, is the program for phased nuclear disarmament, which it is proposed to complete by the end of this century. This all-embracing plan made a tremendous impression on the world public and, without exaggeration, has given rise to prolonged embarrassment in the governments of a number of states, above all the U.S. Administration. As American observers note, the USSR's initiatives put many Western politicians on the "defensive," since they were clearly unprepared for this turn of events.

A rather odd situation has arisen. Broad public opinion (including public opinion in the United States and Western Europe) supported the idea, the proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons. But many of those whom Western sociology calls "leaders" ["lidiery"] (this means not only the leadership circles in this or that country, but public figures and politicians in general, experts, those who play a direct part in forming public opinion, and so forth) adopted a negative stance.

It seems to me that the Soviet proposals appear too radical for some of them. To some extent that is understandable. People are so accustomed to nuclear weapons and the foreign policy ideas arising from the existence of these weapons that they apparently cannot break out of the vicious circle, reorient themselves, and see that a decisive break with old ideas and a new way of thinking are necessary for survival, for the creation of really firm guarantees of peace. In response to the doubts expressed by such people, in his interview for the French Communists' newspaper L'HUMANITE, when asked whether a world without weapons, a world without wars is possible at all, M.S. Gorbachev said: "I would like to answer that question with another question: Is it conceivable to preserve human civilization by continuing the constantly accelerating arms race, whipping up tension, and balancing ever closer, so to speak, to the brink of war?" In other words, detente and the elimination of mass destruction weapons are not only the most desirable, but the only realistic ways of preserving "mir" [Russian word meaning "peace" or "the world"] in both senses -- both as the opposite of war and as the planet on which people live. Here other questions also suggest themselves.

If everyone (up to and including the U.S. President) agrees in principle that a nuclear war must not be waged and cannot be won, then how, one wonders, can the continuing nuclear arms race be justified?

It is far from easy for the United States to answer these questions, as was again shown in President Reagan's message to Comrade M.S. Gorbachev on the eve of the congress.
The message was a strange combination of verbal assurances in support of certain ideas contained in the 15 January statement (including the idea of the need for the total elimination of nuclear arms) and numerous stipulations and unrealistic proposals — a combination which only intensifies the doubts as to the present administration's willingness to take even the first step toward ending the arms race.

The strength of the Soviet proposals lies precisely in the fact that they present in United States and NATO with a dilemma: Either join in the good-neighborly quest for paths to disarmament, or expose yourself in the people's eyes and demonstrate that all your talk about the desire to save mankind from the threat of nuclear confrontation is mere hypocrisy. Of course, they try to avoid this choice under cover of all kinds of farfetched arguments and pretexts.

One of these is that the West cannot remain "nuclear-naked" (that is what they call it!), since the Soviet Union, they say, has superiority in conventional arms.

But M.S. Gorbachev has already said repeatedly that this argument is essentially incorrect — the USSR has no such superiority. The Soviet disarmament program offers an opportunity for a sharp reduction in the level of conventional arms, too. This was stressed once again in the Political Report at the 27th CPSU Congress. It is all the more important to take this opportunity, because today these types of arms, or at least some of them, are approaching nuclear weapons in terms of destructive power.

Of course, we do not regard the 15 January statement as some kind of ultimatum, but as a basis for talks. However, as has already been agreed (and again confirmed in Geneva), this means talks with a specific, clear, unambiguous aim: to prevent an arms race in space and stop it on earth. We try to use all available means of persuasion and the force of example in this direction. To this end the USSR has taken certain important unilateral steps — for instance, the reduction in the number of medium-range missiles in the European part of the country, or the imposition of a moratorium on nuclear explosions, including those used for the resolution of national economic tasks.

I would like to note another aspect, too — the consistency with which the Soviet Union tries to clear away the obstacles to an agreement. One example of this is our position on the question of monitoring, of the verification of the agreements which have been concluded or are under discussion. "Disarmament without verification is impossible, but verification without disarmament is pointless" — that is how Comrade M.S. Gorbachev defined the USSR's position on this question. And this position was reflected in concrete Soviet proposals on many questions, including the question of ending nuclear tests. This took away a favorite trump card from those of our opponents who have tried for a long time to speculate on this problem by depicting the USSR's position as an obstacle to the attainment of agreement.

Of course, the Soviet leadership is aware that all the problems raised in our proposals cannot be resolved at once. At the same time, as was noted in the Political Report at the 27th CPSU Congress, on a number of questions (in particular, the banning of all nuclear tests and medium-range weapons in Europe) a solution could be found rapidly — before the new Soviet-American summit meeting which is planned for this year. That meeting will be pointless unless it leads to the resolution of some relatively major problems associated with the most important matter in relations between the two.
countries — ensuring international security, lessening the threat of war, and limiting arms.

A serious debate is now taking place in the West, and that includes political circles and the broad public in the United States, too. A struggle lies ahead, in the course of which the polarization will be stepped up between the mighty forces of the military-industrial complex, militarist forces, and extreme right-wing politicians on the one hand, and on the other those sober-minded political and public circles which understand U.S. national interests differently, or, to put it more simply, correctly. This is no easy struggle. Those who advocate the arms race and "cold war" hold firm positions in the present U.S. Administration and in Congress. Another very substantial factor on their side is the force of many years of traditions which place the "right of the strong" above other arguments in the resolution of international questions. However, more and more people are realizing that continuing to follow these "traditions" today means subjecting all mankind to the threat of nuclear self-destruction.

Nuclear war is equally unacceptable to all the peoples. Moreover, it is obvious now that the arms race is also becoming unacceptable. Capitalism hoped, by imposing military rivalry on us, to undermine socialism's economic potential.

Now it is becoming clear that even for the richest Western countries — I mean the United States — the present military spending is an unjustifiable luxury which results in a state debt on a fantastic scale, in excess of $2 trillion. Subsequent administrations and subsequent generations of American taxpayers have to pay for the present crazy extravagance. But not only them. The existing financial and economic machinery forces other states — including the poorest — to pay for this extravagance on America's part (through high interest rates and the excessively high dollar rate).

Along with the economic problems which are the direct consequence of the arms race, the present U.S. course also gives rise to political problems. They include the growth of political disagreements between the United States and its allies, including disagreements over the "star wars" question. Many West Europeans are afraid that once it has protected itself with a "space shield" (in whose impenetrability, it is true, hardly anyone except President Reagan believes, not even many members of his administration), the United States will act in a more unbridled way in various parts of the world, including Europe, and might not withstand the temptation to risk even a nuclear clash.

The attention of millions of people is today fixed on the 27th CPSU Congress materials, in which there is a resolute appeal to prevent nuclear catastrophe and do everything possible to preserve the future for mankind.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1297
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

HUNGARY'S ISTVAN SARLOS SUPPORTS GORBACHEV STATEMENT

PM181436 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 86 First Edition p 4

[Article by Istvan Sarlos, member of the MSZMP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Hungarian State Assembly: "New Hope"]

[Text] Budapest, February--Mankind needs peace in order to live in tranquillity and create. And the strengthening of peace requires an understanding of its problems both on the part of leaders and all citizens in countries with different social systems. As far as leaders are concerned, this understanding can be expressed in readiness for talks and initiatives and proposals leading to agreed solutions. Only those who see their partners in talks as equals can conduct talks successfully and conclude long-term agreements.

Today, when the future of all the peoples is determined by mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, whether mankind reaches the end of our century free from nuclear weapons or is extinguished by their threatening burden depends mainly on these two great powers.

I am convinced that these two powers are today answering this question--if one bears in mind their actions and intentions--in different ways. The proposals put forward in recent months by the Soviet Union, which logically grew into M.S. Gorbachev's wideranging statement, are specific and clear. They are generalized in a phased program for achieving lasting peace: stopping the nuclear arms race and then totally eliminating mass destruction weapons.

This action requires the direct and indirect interest of governments. In its words the United States approves the ending of the arms race and even agrees with the principle that "there can be no winners in a nuclear war," but it invariably puts forward its own special conditions. This time, for instance, it is claiming the right to create [sozdat] its own so-called "space shield" system. But an earth without weapons and a militarized space are an irreconcilable contradiction! Whoever holds sway in space will want to dictate matters on earth too. And if some people have no desire to keep space peaceful, that means there is no desire to end the arms race on our planet.

The peoples thirst for peace, and that is why their demand that governments should not act according to the well-known formula "if you want peace prepare for war" is legitimate. People of goodwill proclaim another principle instead:
If you want peace, prepare for peace. Prepare by a desire for talks, for disarmament, for the development of science and technology to benefit people, and for mutual aid and prosperity on all continents.

These lofty goals are posed in the new comprehensive Soviet peace program. People of goodwill realize that all the efforts of the CPSU and the Soviet Government are aimed at ensuring the further improvement of the Soviet people's living conditions. A breakthrough for the better is needed in the international arena too, Moscow confidently proclaims. It is expected and demanded by the Soviet people and all the peoples.

Along with the plans to accelerate peaceful building which will be adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress, the agenda features measures in the sphere of international policy which may serve as a program of actions for each people.

It is well known that good prerequisites are just one step—albeit an important one—along the road to agreement. In order to achieve it, a sober approach, identity of words and deeds, and—the main thing—a sense of immense responsibility to all mankind are also needed.

[PM181438] Hungarian working people know that the weight of the new Soviet proposals is augmented by the measures which have been unilaterally taken by the USSR. I am referring to the extension for another 3 months of the moratorium on all nuclear explosions. The proposals for multilateral and strict verification [kontrol] of disarmament are also important. I will also note the USSR's resolve to ensure that the talks with the United States in Geneva are accelerated and engender real accords that are important in practice.

The range of Soviet initiatives is based on the interests of all the peoples, and that is why they are aimed not only at eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons but propose that conventional arms and armed forces also be subject to agreed solutions. All this means that a positive response to the USSR's proposals and subsequent practice would create the possibility of mankind greeting the 21st century and the 3rd millennium under peaceful skies and space and without weapons and violence.

In today's world, divided and burdened with many centers of military danger, one feels the urgent need for the "Geneva spirit" to have a favorable influence on international relations and talks. In our era, when human reason makes it possible to know the secrets of the universe and use the results obtained to raise living standards on earth, not only wars but even relatively small-scale armed conflicts must be stopped, and terrorism and the danger of war itself must be eliminated.

The Soviet leader's statement was impressive and specific. The socialist countries immediately stated their approval and support for the aims formulated in it and the ways of achieving them. A number of states made known their readiness to follow the principles contained in the statement. Certain governments of countries playing an important role in the international arena are still studying the Soviet program but have already made statements to the effect that they consider it important, although they
disagree with it on the space question. We hope that the peoples of these countries will react more vigorously to this divergence between words about peace and actions and, in accordance with their vital interests, will demand that their governments take steps to ensure the genuine and comprehensive destruction of nuclear weapons and establish initiatives which would promote economic and cultural cooperation among peoples and peaceful competition.

It is good that the statement said that when it is a question of maintaining peace and saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war, there can be no bystanders or nonparticipants. It is a matter for each and everyone. And the contribution of each state—large or small, socialist or capitalist—is important. The contribution of each responsible political party, each social organization, and each person is important.

In Hungary the people, party, and government are in complete agreement with the Soviet initiatives. We welcome and approve them. Hungary pledges to participate in their implementation. In line with our socialist policy and practice and adhering to the decisions of the 13th MSZMP Congress, we state this outright and present our agreed position at all international bilateral and multilateral talks and meetings.

Almost 2 decades ago, when the struggle for detente was starting, people spoke of the birth of new hope. That was the start of an unfortunately short period typified by dialogue, rapprochement, and peaceful declarations of goodwill. But at the time it was not possible to silence those who gamble on division and hostility, that is, the supporters of confrontation who strive for hegemony. Then as now, those forces are trying at all costs to secure a military advantage over the USSR and the socialist community.

The aim of the range of Soviet initiatives is to justify mankind's hopes and rule out once and for all the possibility of resolving international questions by force of arms. Thanks to its material and intellectual potential, the statement says, the Soviet Union has the possibility to create any weapons if so forced.

Today we are making the 38th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid between Hungary and the USSR. This treaty serves the cause of peace and our advance along the path of progress. We realize the entire weight of responsibility to present and future generations. Our socialist world withstands all tests, even if forced to take up arms. Yes, we will withstand any test, but we prefer peaceful competition. And we do this in the recognition of our invulnerability and correctness.

We still have a great deal more to do in order to ensure a good life for the peoples of our community. Under conditions of peace and security we will be able to fully apply our spiritual and material forces to boosting production and developing culture and building. The Hungarian people, like the peoples of other countries, have amassed a great deal of intellectual energy and creative inspiration. These forces must be sensibly and well organized and used highly fruitfully for the good of humanity.
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TWO SOVIET BOOKS ON GENEVA SUMMIT PUBLISHED

PM81115 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Feb 86 First Edition p 5

[M. Ozerov article: "Geneva: The Way it Was, or Some Lessons of Recent History"; first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] "The Geneva meeting was undoubtedly the chief international event of late. Have any works appeared that analyze that even in detail?" --G. Logachev, Irkutsk.

Geneva... When we pronounce this word now, it is probably not the geographical but the political association that comes to mind more frequently. Nothing surprising: The November summit meeting attracted the world's attention. And it continues to do so. The "spirit of Geneva," "The Geneva accords"--these terms are encountered literally every day in the newspapers of very different countries.

You ponder many things when you analyze the lessons of Geneva. You ponder, inter alia, the fact that our "propaganda machine" undoubtedly worked successfully then. Compared with the more than 1,000-strong army of transatlantic "specialists," there were not that many Soviet experts and journalists, but, as those days confirmed, it is certainly not a question of numbers. Our scientists, public figures, and correspondents acted energetically, efficiently, and confidently.

The summit talks are over, but the momentum gathered seems not to be diminishing. This is confirmed by two books which have just been published. I will at once say that they are serious, profound studies of the Geneva meeting and the further development of events.

The book by PRAVDA journalists V. Bolshakov, Ye. Grigoryev, and T. Kolesnichenko is called "Geneva: The Way it Was" [Zheneva: Kak eto Bylo] ("International Relations" Publishing House, Moscow). We have before us a vivid and well-reasoned account combining analytical data with personal observations and accurately noted details. The authors' conclusion is fair: "The Geneva meeting opens up opportunities for the normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations and the general improvement of the international situation. The accords reached in Geneva could have a long-term positive impact on the course of world development, if they are manifested in concrete deeds."
Yes, the meeting has had a weighty political outcome. But another result is also important—the psychological result. It has become clear to the world that it is necessary to study the great science of living together. The leaders of the two powers agreed that there must not be nuclear war and that it is impossible to win it. But, if this is so, why continue piling up mountains of arms? What is more, following normal human logic, is it not worthwhile to finally take the only correct path of trust, cooperation, and mutual understanding?

Geneva did not just raise these questions. It also gave a perfectly definite answer to them. What is it? It is that it is necessary to cast off—without delay—the fetters of the old thinking. The author of the second book—Doctor of Philosophical Sciences F. Burlatskiy, publicist and scientist—focuses attention on this lesson of the Geneva meeting. He too was one of us who had occasion to work in Switzerland during those November days and, as he himself writes, felt "the breath of a new wind in international public opinion."

F. Burlatskiy chose as one of the epigraphs to the book "Geneva: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" [Zheneva: Vchera, Segodnya, Zavtra] ("Mysl" Publishing House, Moscow) the words of the American poet J. Lowell: "History knows of no instance where an appeal to a people's reason has not led ultimately to success." "In the old days," the authors writes, "it used to be said that the first principle of political wisdom is to rid yourself of foolhardiness. Nuclear war is foolhardy, from whichever side you look at it—from the West or the East. And its rejection is the initial precondition for joint political action."

...Two books on the same subject. Is this necessary? In this instance—undoubtedly. And it is not just a question of readers' tremendous interest in the event, as evidenced, in particular, by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's mail. The books complement each other, creating a clear, whole picture of what happened in Geneva 19 through 21 November.

But in some ways they are as alike as two peas, as it were. I mean their optimism. Reflecting on the summit meeting, on our state's policy, on the Statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, (it, too, is discussed, and such prompt work, of course, cannot fail to gladden us!), and on people's sentiments in various parts of the world, the authors voice the hope that the "spirit of Geneva" will triumph on our planet.

/7358
CSO: 5200/290
PRAVDA RAPS ADELMAN REMARKS IN ACDA BROCHURE

PM11330 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Mar 86 Second Edition p 5

[T. Anatolyev "Rejoinder": "Why the Repetition?"]

[Text] The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has published with enviable haste a brochure containing the Washington administration's jarring fabrications about so-called "Soviet violations of arms control agreements."

Why, one asks? Why repeat a lie when everyone knows that even if a lie is repeated many times that still does not make it true. But the authors of the libelous brochure do not count on that. They have another, extremely specific goal: to cast aspersions on the broad range of major new Soviet proposals aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons and ensuring reliable international security, and to call into question the very possibility of ending the arms race and ensuring disarmament.

K. Adelman, director of the agency, states outright in the foreword to this "publication" that certain "Soviet treaty violations...threaten the future viability of the arms control process." He went so far as to say that "this is actually a dangerous form of unilateral disarmament under the cover of bilateral arms control."

You see how simple everything is. For the United States any new agreements with the USSR in the arms limitation and reductions sphere would essentially mean "unilateral disarmament," so they are not worth talking about. We will say bluntly that Mr Adelman's thinking is simplistic if he supposes that this excuse for logic could justify to the public Washington's reluctance to provide a constructive response to the Soviet initiatives.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1297
ACDA CLAIMS OF SOVIET ARMS VIOLATIONS ASSAILED

PM171656 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Mar 86 First Edition p 4

[Yu. Viktorov article: "At Variance With the Geneva Accords"]

[Text] In the United States — for the umpteenth time — a propaganda clamor has been unleashed to "indict" the Soviet Union for alleged "violations" of treaty commitments. This time the initiator of this campaign is the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which has disseminated a report on instances of alleged noncompliance by the Soviet Union with arms limitation agreements. The agency's new propaganda opus, as the agency itself acknowledges, raises no "new" questions on this well-worn theme. It merely repeats the content of three well-known presidential reports to the U.S. Congress on this topic published in 1984 and 1985.

All these "indictments" were repeatedly and convincingly rebutted by the Soviet Union. Taking this into account, it might have been possible to disregard the U.S. Administration's hackneyed theses. But their danger lies in the fact that they are being used to deceive the public, extract money from the Congress to crank up the arms race, and justify the administration's intention to disregard existing agreements. For the question that is being posed at precisely this time is: Will the U.S. Congress agree to fund multibillion-dollar Pentagon programs, including the "star wars" program? It is also well known that in less than 2 months the U.S. President will have to make a decision on whether to continue to observe the limitations stipulated in the SALT II Treaty on the number of MIRVed strategic ballistic missiles. The objective in publishing the report becomes obvious from this. It is to prepare the American and foreign public for the U.S. "countermeasures" that the administration is currently formulating, about which agency director Adelman has spoken frankly at various briefings.

What are they attempting to accuse the Soviet Union of? Even the report itself describes most of the so-called "violations" as "probable," "possible in the future," or "unclear" because of "a shortage of facts." This in itself testifies to the unscrupulousness of the authors, who have not balked at offering the public such unsubstantiated material. As for some other "facts" served up in the report under the rubric "violations," there is not a grain of truth in them.

Here is a sample of this unsavory output. There is continuing speculation in the United States on the Soviet radar station under construction in the Krasnoyarsk region. Various functions are ascribed to it -- it is either an early warning station or an ABM station. However neither version corresponds to reality. This radar station is designed for tracking space objects and monitoring outer space and therefore has nothing to do with the ABM treaty.
Also groundless is the story being spread by Washington that, in addition to the one new type of ICBM authorized by the SALT II Treaty, a second new type is being created [sozdayetsya] in the USSR. In practice this is how they are attempting to depict the modernized missile known as the RS-12M, whose characteristics are completely in accordance with the provisions of the SALT II Treaty.

The U.S. complaints that the USSR encrypts telemetric information received from the missile during tests, which is supposedly necessary for verification [kontrol] under the SALT II Treaty, cannot stand up to close examination. The USSR does not encrypt such information. With a view to resolving this question, we asked the United States to specify the parameters which, in its opinion, ought not to be encrypted. The U.S. side refused to do this, which confirms yet again how farfetched its complaints are.

Another totally farfetched claim is the one that the Soviet Union has supposedly exceeded the quantitative level of strategic delivery vehicles existing at the time the SALT II Treaty was signed. It was declared at the signing of the treaty that the USSR had 2,504 strategic delivery vehicles. This quantity has not increased by a single unit. The sublevels set for MIRVed missiles and for heavy bombers carrying long-range "air-to-surface" cruise missiles are also being rigorously observed.

Displaying a constructive approach toward relations with the United States, the Soviet Union has already supplied exhaustive clarifications on these and on all other issues raised by the U.S. side. These clarifications were supplied both at the specially established Soviet-U.S. Permanent Consultative Commission, and through diplomatic channels. The invalidity of the U.S. side's claims was fully proved. It is, however, evident that certain forces in the United States are unwilling to come to terms with this. By spreading deliberate slander, they are striving to play down everything new and positive that emerged in Soviet-U.S. relations as a result of the Geneva summit meeting and, as in the past, are seeking ways to attain military superiority over the USSR by cranking up the arms race, which is contrary to existing agreements in the arms limitation sphere.

The United States — particularly under the incumbent administration — is trying to place itself above international law and custom and to implement a policy whose correctness and fairness are measured only in terms of U.S. judgments and, ultimately, in terms of strength. In light of all this, it is not the United States but the USSR that is fully justified in feeling anxious about the other side's failure to fulfill the commitments it has adopted.

Take for instance the starting of work on the "star wars" program, which is aimed ultimately at the creation [sozdaniye] of a U.S. territorial ABM system. This is indeed totally contrary to the 1972 ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration. Actions by the United States such as the deployment of large radar stations with parameters close to those of ABM radar stations on its own territory and beyond its borders also do not accord with this treaty's provisions. The treaty is seriously threatened by work in the sphere of mobile ABM radar stations, MIRV's for antimissile missiles, tests of antimissile missiles created [sozdannyy] on the basis of ICBM's, and so on.

Take another example. After signing in 1979 the SALT II Treaty, which establishes a balance between USSR and U.S. strategic forces, the U.S. side refused to ratify it. While demagogically stating its intention to comply with the provisions of the treaty,
the U.S. Administration in practice steered a course toward changing in its own favor the prevailing approximate balance of strategic forces. The deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in certain West European countries is aimed at this. This is also shown by the U.S. activity in implementing its numerous strategic programs. Some of these are now beginning not to fit within the bounds of the existing accords. This U.S. line is having an adverse influence on the course of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms, which is by no means conducive to implementing the accord on accelerating those talks which was reached at summit level.

Other facts testifying to the U.S. side's disdainful attitude toward observing its own juridical and political commitments could also be cited. However, what has already been said shows that the thrust of the U.S. Administration's actions is to conceal its own efforts to undermine and erode the existing system of agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction beneath a screen of statements and reports regarding imagined "Soviet" violations of treaty provisions. The method is not new.

"All parties must fully comply with the agreements they conclude" — this thesis contained in the U.S. agency's report should be addressed primarily to the current U.S. Administration. It is hard to imagine that the U.S. side does not realize what consequences arise from its steps contravening the existing accords. This line tends to disorganize normal relations between states. It in no way accords with the U.S. leaders' statements regarding their desire to organize constructive relations with the Soviet Union.

Nor is it an accident that the campaign to accuse the USSR of "violating" its commitments is being resumed now, when the United States has failed to come up with a constructive answer to the large-scale Soviet initiatives in the sphere of disarmament and security. The forces that are making colossal profits out of the production of more and more new types of weapons are trying to question the feasibility of the USSR's proposals and its readiness to fulfill existing and future accords.

The 27th CPSU Congress stated that the desire for military superiority objectively cannot yield any political gain for anyone. The Soviet Union proceeds precisely on the basis of this truth. Therefore it cannot have any incentives to abandon or violate accords formulated on the basis of equality and identical security.

In accordance with its Constitution, the Soviet Union bases its relations with other countries on conscientious fulfillment of the commitments arising from the generally recognized principles and norms of international law and from the international treaties conclude by the USSR. This principle is one of the fundamental principles in the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union. And it is strictly observed.

Taking into account the great importance for the cause of peace of Soviet-U.S. agreements in the sphere of limiting and reducing strategic arms and other treaty documents aimed at strengthening the peoples' security, we are entitled to expect the U.S. side not merely in words but in deeds to conscientiously fulfill the commitments it has assumed.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1297
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG'S KOHL ADVISES REAGAN ON RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV

LD191233 Hamburg DPA in German 1205 GMT 19 Feb 86

[Text] Bonn, 19 Feb (DPA) -- Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has submitted to U.S President Ronald Reagan Bonn's thoughts on a response to the disarmament proposal made by Kremlin chief Mikhail Gorbachev. It was heard in government circles today that the Americans are in possession of the German ideas in both spoken and written form. It was emphasized at the same time that the Federal Government would welcome Reagan's responding to the Moscow proposal before the CPSU congress. Details of the German recommendation which Kohl submitted to Reagan by letter were not given.

Meanwhile, Volker Ruehe, deputy CDU/CSU floor leader, after his return from talks in Washington, has again advocated a global zero option for medium-range missiles, which should be sought via intermediate stages. All Soviet systems which could threaten Europe would have to be included in a European zero option solution. Ruehe also advocates the dismantling of short-range missiles, so that no threat would arise on another country's territory.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2660
DISARMAMENT OFFICIAL ENDS MOSCOW TALKS

LD121555 Hamburg DPA in German 1519 GMT 12 Mar 86

[Text] Moscow, 12 Mar (DPA) — Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, Bonn's disarmament representative, today concluded his 2 days of consultations on arms control policy issues in Moscow. According to diplomatic circles, "all issues concerning disarmament and arms control which are of topical importance" were discussed in the "useful" talks. The talks were characterized on both sides by as an attempt to work out positions where there was agreement and to clarify positions on which there were differing views.

Ruth's partners in the talks were Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov and Ambassador Vladimir Petrovskiy, chief of the International Organizations Department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. During the discussion, which is to be continued, the "internal connection" between the bilateral U.S.-USSR Geneva negotiations, and the multilateral negotiations in Vienna (MBFR) and Stockholm was made clear.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2660
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

NETHERLANDS OFFICIAL SEES PROGRESS AT MBFR TALKS

Amsterdam DE VOLSKRANT in Dutch 19 Feb 86 p 13

[Commentary by Drs. D.H. Zandee: "Progress in Central European Troop Talks"; first paragraph is DE VOLSKRANT introduction]

[Text] The negotiations between East and West on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe, the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, have been under way for over 12 years now, but without any results. Suddenly, however, things seem to be moving, writes Dick Zandee of the Army staff's planning section. He explains how the cat-and-mouse game might be brought to an end.

Most of the attention paid to arms control developments still goes to the Geneva talks on nuclear arms and preventing an arms war in space. Nonetheless, in recent weeks a striking number of optimistic reports have appeared on another negotiating forum, the MBFR talks in Vienna, where they are discussing mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe.

For over 12 years, East and West have been talking about reductions in conventional forces in an area that includes the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries on the West and the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on the East. No wonder that the abbreviation MBFR has been said to stand for Most Bizarre Form of Ritual.

Optimism

Since the submission of the latest Western proposals for an MBFR Interim Agreement on 5 December, the chances for a breakthrough in the Vienna talks seem to have increased considerably. That is due in the first place to the concessions the West has made on the problem of data. The NATO countries have dropped their demand that agreement be reached on the actual strength of the forces in the MBFR area before the two sides begin to make reductions.

Probably of even greater importance is the fact that the "dialog of the deaf" into which the Vienna talks had degenerated seems to have come to an end. For years East and West played a game of cat and mouse, where first one side and then the other would submit proposals, without real negotiations.

With its new proposals the West has responded to the East's so-called two-stage agreement approach. In the first stage only the United States and the Soviet
Union carry out limited reductions—the West proposes 5,000 American and 11,500 Soviet troops—after which all forces in the reduction area are subject to a "no increase commitment." In the second stage, further reductions are to lead to a mutual ceiling of 900,000 troops in land and air forces, of which a maximum of 700,000 in land forces.

Reactions

The first reactions from the East to the Western proposals are promising. On 6 February the Warsaw Pact countries submitted "counterproposals." The East agrees to the limited initial reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union but wants to increase the American reduction to 6,500. Further, the East has made it known that it accepts the establishment of three or four permanent observation points (so-called Exit/Entry Points—EEP's).

From these posts observers from the East and West could verify the withdrawal of troops and at the same time check on troops being brought back into the treaty area (for instance during troop rotations). This is, by the way, not a new concession by the East. It agreed to the establishment of EEP's in 1983.

The West, however, feels that more extensive verification measures are necessary. The latest NATO proposal provides for a system of 30 inspections a year on each other's territory, besides the establishment of permanent observation posts. These inspections would serve to establish whether the troop strength figures the two sides would be obliged to exchange after the initial American and Soviet reductions are accurate.

The East views such a form of verification as "legalized espionage." The verification problem could for this reason block a first-stage agreement for a long time yet. Nonetheless, East and West appear to be closer to one another than ever before in the Vienna talks. What happens at the second Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting later this year will no doubt have a big impact on the arms control talks.

All in all the MBFR discussions are at a decisive stage. It would be a credit to our Netherlands policy if it now gave more thought to helping the Vienna talks succeed.

Out-of-date Concept?

If a limited first-stage MBFR agreement is signed, it will certainly give positive momentum to continued negotiations for a second-stage treaty. The question arises whether the West should pursue the same final goal here as in 1973, when the MBFR talks started. Military-operational considerations lead to certain objections to an agreement that ties both sides to a ceiling of 700,000 land forces troops in the treaty area.

First of all, this approach in terms of troop reductions conceals the growth in combat strength of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. This appears not so much in increased numbers of troops as in the quantitative growth and qualitative improvement in arms. The Warsaw Pact already has a clear numerical superiority

69
over NATO in Central Europe in the most important categories of arms. In addition, the West has lost its technological advantage in conventional arms.

In modern warfare numbers of weapons and the technological quality of the systems are much more decisive than the numbers of men in the armed forces. In this connection, West German Bundestag member Jürgen Todenhöfer recently argued for a different approach to the MBFR talks. The negotiations should no longer be about reductions in troops but rather about limiting what he called "battle-deciding major equipment" (such as tanks and artillery).

In the Second Chamber of Parliament too there have recently been thoughts about limiting conventional arms. During the discussion of the defense budget at the beginning of February, the Van den Bergh motion was adopted, calling on the government to promote talks between East and West on controlling the conventional arms race, whether parallel to or as part of the MBFR talks.

Again, the difficulty with arms reductions in the MBFR framework is that the West is clearly at a disadvantage here. The United States will require considerably more time than the Soviet Union to bring the equipment once withdrawn back to the treaty area in case of armed conflict. At the same time that will call for additional sea and airlift capacity, which will give rise to tremendous costs.

Advantage

The geographic disparity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO gives the East an advantage. Todenhöfer points out that even after a second-stage MBFR treaty the Soviet Union would not need to modify its military-strategic goals in case of an attack on Western Europe. The great superiority in conventional armaments would remain untouched with a reduced troop ceiling. Thus Todenhöfer comes to the conclusion that the West's goal of equal troop ceilings in the MBFR region would not lead to more stability in the European security situation. On the contrary it would result in a grave weakening of the alliance's defenses.

It is no wonder that one should hear such a critical opinion of the West's ultimate goal in the MBFR talks, in West Germany. An armed conflict between East and West in Europe will be decided on West German territory. It is in the interests of the Federal Republic that an attack by the Warsaw Pact should be stopped as close to the East-West boundary as possible. Thus a reduction in the West's defense capability should be accompanied by a substantial reduction in the East's offensive potential.

12593
CSO: 5200/2646
U.S.--USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR'S ARBATOV ON SECURITY, SUMMIT PROSPECTS

PMO61211 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 2 Mar 86 p 9

[Interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute, by Marilo Ruiz de Elvira in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow -- Question: What message did Mikhail Gorbachev intend to convey in his policy report to the CPSU congress?

Answer: The message -- though addressed to two different audiences -- is that we cannot continue as at present, that we must change the way we think and behave. For our people this means that we must change, change our social relations, and the way we work within the party and government. For the outside world it means that we have reached a point of no return. If we continue to behave as we have behaved for years, the result will be frightening.

Question: What is the conclusion?

Answer: That despite all the difficulties and problems, we live in the same world, are extremely interdependent, and are in danger. In fact we face many dangers and we can only tackle them if we unite. So, like it or not, we must work together. We can do nothing on our own, and neither can the North Americans or the Europeans.

Question: What are these dangers?

Answer: The danger of war, the arms race, the possibility of the world's irreparable split between rich and poor nations, and the despair of the developing countries, whose situation is worsening daily.

Question: How can a greater degree of security be attained?

Answer: Gorbachev has formulated a new concept of security. Security cannot be built by means of weapons, military organizations, or military technological methods. It would be a miracle. Nowadays security is a political problem that can only be solved by political means. Otherwise the result will be that we will have more weapons and less security.

Question: But the United States cannot be blamed entirely for the cold war. Has the USSR not made mistakes too?
Answer: Nobody is perfect, of course, and if history gave us the chance to live again undoubtedly we would act differently, do other things... but that is a luxury that history does not grant us. It is time not to concentrate on who is more or less to blame but to decide what must be done now. Lenin said on a certain occasion that there are different kinds of mistakes.

If someone says two plus two equals five it is a mistake, but if someone says two plus two equals a candlestick, it is obviously a different kind of mistake. What I mean by this is that the United States deliberately strayed from the path of detente, of honoring agreements.

Question: What are the prospects for the next summit?

Answer: I can add nothing to what Gorbachev has already said -- that he does not believe in the usefulness of empty conversations.

Question: Does that mean that their first meeting in Geneva last November was empty?

Answer: No, definitely not. That meeting had a different significance. It was important and necessary; it reopened the dialogue at the top level after 6 years and also laid the foundations for future tasks first and foremost, arms control, as well as averting a nuclear war and not seeking military superiority. But this cannot be the nature of the next summit. We do not want to participate in something that cannot be useful. Consider Reagan's insistence that Congress finance his disproportionate military budget, adding that it will serve to improve relations with the USSR.

Question: Reagan avers that pressure helps.

Answer: We have been listening to that same old story for 40 years. All it does is accelerate the arms race. You know something? Reagan's latest speech was obscene, indecent, I would say -- there is such a difference in each side's approach to the problem and intellectual standards. Gorbachev tries to put forward a new view of the world, seeks new ways of tackling the problems, while Reagan merely repeats what we have been hearing for years and leads nowhere. Progress in U.S.-Soviet relations has never occurred when a situation of coercion has existed, only when there has been some kind of parity. Whoever says otherwise is lying. The U.S. president is lying. It is historically untrue. Washington has never reached an accord from a position of superiority. We have never lost a war to the United States -- not even a battle. So Reagan's assertions are a real attempt to mislead the U.S. people and Congress.

Question: On which aspects will progress be easier?

Answer: Gorbachev has mentioned them and he was very realistic. He chose those of our plane that present the fewest difficulties -- to ban nuclear tests and to eliminate the Euromissiles. On the former issue, we seem to agree with one of the branches of the U.S. Government -- Congress. I really believe that this is an objective shared by most North American citizens. As for medium-range missiles, the USSR has made some very major concessions. I believe we have gone more than halfway. Now it is up to the United States to respond.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1297
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

KARPOV REITERATES USSR GENEVA POSITIONS

LD092137 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1800 GMT 9 Mar 86

[From the "The Week" program]

[Text] [Announcer] The new style of Soviet leadership is demonstrated by the meeting held in Budapest on Friday [7 March]. At this meeting Viktor Karpo, ambassador in charge of the Soviet delegation in Geneva, informed the deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries armaments, whose latest round has just ended. It has been accepted practice for some time for the NATO allies of the United States to be informed directly and regularly by the Americans on developments at the Geneva talks. As for the Warsaw Pact, it was a breakthrough of some sort when last November Mikhail Gorbachev, on his way home from his meeting with President Reagan in Geneva, stopped in Prague to tell the leaders of the allied countries everything concerning Geneva that he regarded as important and that we should all know about. Viktor Karpo's consultation in Budapest is a sign that this sort of informative meeting will become a more regular feature.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified interviewer] Comrade Karpo, you have come to Hungary to brief the deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries concerning developments at the Geneva negotiations. Would you tell us what this meeting means to you?

[Karpov in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation] It means a great deal to me. As you know, I have been leading negotiations with the Americans on the questions of nuclear weapons and space weapons for several years. I have come here now to inform the deputy foreign ministers about what is happening in Geneva, about the current state of negotiations. I can say that what I heard today from my colleagues from the socialist countries in a great encouragement for me. They expressed agreement with Soviet policy and conveyed that they understood the Soviet standpoint at the negotiations. In my opinion this is very useful and will help us a lot in the next round of negotiations.

[Interviewer] Viktor Pavlovich, you are obviously aware that television viewers here, as in many other countries of the world, receive regular information on developments at the Geneva talks, about the issues discussed there. We know that the representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United States meet once, twice, perhaps three times a week. However, we know very little about what happens at these sessions, what sort of atmosphere characterizes these meetings. Will you tell us something about this?
[Karpov] You know, the fact that we meet the U.S. delegation at least three times a week demonstrates that the Soviet side approaches the issues in an objective spirit. On the other hand, we do not always find an objective approach, objective conduct, on the American side. However, I must tell you that despite the fact that so far we have not been able to achieve concrete results, that we have not been able to sign any agreement, that we have not even got as far as working out some sort of draft agreement, that we have not done so as yet, despite all these facts, we regard everything that we have done so far as very important. We attribute considerable importance to the fact that the American side understands that what is needed is not merely to negotiate but also to reach agreement. They know that there is a need for agreement on the reduction and elimination of weapons. This was stressed at the party congress by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. I can tell you now that we are taking this as our point of departure in our negotiations with the Americans. In this connection I think it is very important that the other side also attributes importance to reaching agreement.

[Interviewer] How do the different subjects discussed at Geneva affect each other? What I have in mind is how far progress in one area influences the solution of other issues. In general, now, at the end of the present round, how do you evaluate the prospects of the Geneva negotiations?

[Karpov] The most important problem, naturally, remains the prevention of (a race) in the militarization of space. This is the most important problem. On this issue we have not yet succeeded in reaching a mutual understanding with the U.S. side. The United States is continuing its efforts to realize the Strategic Defense Initiative. It wishes to put new weapons systems in space. Well, in our view, and we are convinced about this, this is unacceptable from the point of view of creating stability. We have told this to the U.S. side quite unambiguously. This would only serve the total undermining of security, and this applies to the United States as well. Thus, the question for us is not how to start the race for the militarization of space. We oppose this and the U.S. side understands this. After all, our position on this is quite unambiguous. The question for us is how we could, by reaching agreement with the United States, prevent the race for the militarization of space and make a start on a reduction of nuclear weapons. We are most willing to do this. For example, we have suggested to the American side that we should reduce by half those nuclear weapons which threaten the territories of the two countries. There are negotiations under way on this. These are our proposals. I cannot say that the U.S. side has shown itself ready to solve this question. Nevertheless, on the basis of our conviction we hope that sooner or later they will accept our position. [end recording]
INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

WESTERN 'FLANK' NATIONS OPPOSE MOVEMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Mar 86 p 8

[Article by Stein Savik: "Norwegian Demand: No Transfer of Soviet Troops to Kola Peninsula"]

[Text] Vienna, 6 March--Norway and other Western "flank countries" at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna insist that their interests must not be damaged by the reduction of conventional forces in Central Europe. Norway, for example, wants guarantees that the Soviet troops which are withdrawn from the reduction area will not be stationed on the Kola Peninsula.

At the MBFR meeting on Thursday, it was Norway's ambassador in Vienna, Knut Hedemann, who spoke on behalf of the so-called indirect participants, i.e., the five NATO countries which lie outside Central Europe. In addition to Norway, it concerns Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Despite this formal status, these countries have been involved in the formulation of NATO standpoints during the nearly 13 years the MBFR talks have lasted.

Outlook of 'Flank Countries'

The Western "flank countries" want a protocol that protects their interests to be included in the agreement on the reduction of forces in Central Europe, an agreement which is being negotiated in Vienna. One of the points in the protocol will be that Soviet forces from the reduction area shall not be placed in the vicinity of "flank countries." Measures to inspire trust are another important point in the protocol proposal which Ambassador Hedemann clarified.

It is proposed that advance warning and observation of troop movements be employed not only in Central Europe but also in regions of significance to the "flank countries." The latter are willing, for their part, to undertake corresponding commitments. Moreover, the "indirect participants" want to be on the advisory committee from East and West which will monitor the cutback in forces.

Elucidation

The Norwegian contribution was part of the elucidation and elaboration of the Western agreement proposal that was submitted in December of last year. After the concessions which the NATO countries made in their proposal, the MBFR talks
finally seemed to enter a more promising phase. A certain optimism was created when the Soviet delegation, despite its reservations, hinted for the first time that an agreement was possible.

Quelled Optimism

But in the meantime the optimism has been quelled again. A proposal made by the Soviet Union on 20 February contained no concessions and was in fact more rigid on some points, according to Western delegation circles. The proposal in its entirety was branded a disappointment. And after additional explanations by the Soviets, NATO negotiators say that the distance between standpoints is, in part, very great. It is regarded as a positive sign, however, that a comprehensive exchange of views is taking place and that activity at the marathon talks is now greater than it has been in a long time.

12327

CSO: 5200/2650