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HK2408081388 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
21 Aug 88 p 6

["Roundup" by Zhang Liang (1728 0081); "A Knot Which Is Difficult To Untie—U.S.-Soviet Controversy Over the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty"]

[Text] U.S. and Soviet representatives will meet in Geneva on 24 August to discuss the serious differences between the sides over the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The meeting is attracting worldwide attention because it is concerned with whether or not the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to break the deadlock over the question of reducing strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent.

The controversy between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is of long-standing and became heated again recently. Seizing on the building of a radar station in Krasnoyarsk, the United States accused the Soviet Union of violating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and demanded that it dismantle the radar system unconditionally and without delay. To strike a counterblow at U.S. "propaganda warfare," the Soviet Union criticized the United States for building powerful radar stations on its own territory, and in Greenland and England, in violation of the treaty. On the other hand it tried hard to provide an explanation for building the Krasnoyarsk radar station, saying that its mission was only to track space objects and that construction ceased as early as October 1987. The Soviet Union also pointed out that if an agreement can be reached between the two countries on observing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, it will completely dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station and place it under surveillance. Although the United States said this proposal was a "positive step" by the Soviet Union, it held that the radar station should be dismantled immediately and unconditionally because its building was a violation of the treaty. Both sides are still arguing over this matter.

The U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was signed in 1972, together with a joint declaration which was treated as an appendix to the treaty. The main provision of the treaty is that both the United States and the Soviet Union can deploy no more than two anti-ballistic missile systems—in their capital areas and one other place near its continental missile base. In 1974 they signed a protocol on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which stipulated that each of them would give up one of the areas for deploying the anti-ballistic missile system, and which demanded that neither side would "trial-produce, experiment, or deploy any anti-ballistic missile systems or parts of such systems using the sea, the air, space, or motor vehicles as a base."

For the first 10 years after the signing of the treaty there were no great disputes about its interpretation, but since 1983, when President Reagan put forward the Strategic Defense Initiative, or the "Star Wars" program, there has been increasingly heated controversy. This has focused on the following two questions: Interpretation of the treaty in a "broad sense" or a "narrow sense;" and whether or not to relate observing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to other arms control questions. The essence of the controversy is how to deal with the question of strategic defense systems. In other words, the United States insists that it should carry out its "Star Wars" program, but the Soviet Union insists that the United States should give up or strictly restrict this program.

As early as 1985, in order to carry out its "Star Wars" program in an unrestricted way, the United States proposed interpreting the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in a "broad sense," holding that the treaty does not prohibit the development and experiments with new anti-ballistic missile systems which are "based on other physical principles" such as laser, particle bunches, and other directional weapons, merely demanding that discussions be held on the question of restricting such weapons. Based on this understanding the Reagan administration declared that the U.S. "Star Wars" program does not violate the treaty. However the Soviet Union insists that the treaty should be interpreted in a "narrow sense," holding that anti-ballistic missile systems "based on other physical principles" refers only to fixed and land-based systems. It also proposed that the study of other forms of anti-ballistic missile systems should be carried out only within "laboratories." Any developments and experiments with such systems exceeding this restricted range should be considered as violations of the treaty. Thus, it holds that the United States is violating the treaty by carrying out its "Star Wars" program.

In the United States there is also controversy over interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Quite a few congressmen, six former defense secretaries, and many others have raised objections to the Reagan administration’s "broad sense" interpretation of the treaty. A report issued by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee even held that what the Reagan administration had done was an "open abuse of the power granted by the Constitution such as has never seen during the past 200 years."

Since the U.S.-Soviet Geneva disarmament talks were restored in 1985, the two countries have been arguing endlessly over the question of whether or not to relate observing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with arms control. After the signing of the INF Treaty in Washington by Reagan and Gorbachev on 8 December last year, the focus of U.S.-Soviet talks on arms control shifted to the reduction by 50 percent of offensive strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has insisted that strict observation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is an indispensable part of the effort to reduce strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent, but the United States has insisted that the two should not be linked together and separate agreements should be signed on both issues.
At present, although the United States and the Soviet Union have both agreed to continue to observe the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, because they have different interpretations of it there are also great differences in their respective stands. The U.S. and Soviet representatives will meet soon in Geneva to discuss this question, but we still doubt whether or not any progress can be achieved so that this great obstacle to the arms control talks can be removed.
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Disarmament Discussed in Bern With Swiss Experts
LD1708153388 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0721 GMT 17 Aug 88

[Text] Bern, 17 Aug (ADN)—Talks between disarmament experts from the GDR and Switzerland took place on Tuesday at the Federal Foreign Affairs Department in Bern. During their exchange of views the two sides stressed the need for increased efforts to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals and bring about conventional disarmament. The partners in the talks advocated an increase in multilateral disarmament efforts. They agreed to work for an accelerated conclusion to the negotiations on a ban on and destruction of chemical weapons. They discussed in detail possible solutions to current questions regarding the creation of an effective, trust-promoting control system, particularly with regard to the nonproduction of chemical weapons. They agreed to cooperate further in this area.

Both sides see an important contribution to the consolidation of European security and cooperation in a rapid start to negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and in the start of the second stage of the conference on confidence and security measures.

Saarland's Lafontaine, Honecker Discuss Disarmament
LD1808174088 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1252 GMT 18 Aug 88

[Text] Berlin, 18 Aug (ADN)—Erich Honecker, SED Central Committee general secretary and GDR Council of State chairman, and Oskar Lafontaine, prime minister of Saarland and SPD deputy national chairman, met for a talk at the Hubertusstock hunting lodge on the Werrbellinsee on Thursday. Prime Minister Lafontaine is in the GDR at Erich Honecker's invitation.

The several-hour-long constructive talk took place in an open atmosphere. The topics were the current international situation, the current state and future prospects for relations between the two German states, and further possibilities for bilateral cooperation between the GDR and Saarland.

Erich Honecker and Oskar Lafontaine welcomed the implementation of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles as a real disarmament measure. It was now important to continue the process of disarmament and to make it irreversible through further disarmament steps in nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons.

The two politicians advocated a 50-percent reduction in Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive weapons under adherence to the ABM Treaty, a general and complete ban on chemical weapons and a drastic reduction in military expenditure.

A speedy implementation of these disarmament steps is in the interests of peace and in the interests of the two German states. The two sides stressed that the resources released through disarmament should be used for economic, social, and ecological development.

Oskar Lafontaine and Erich Honecker said that the achieved and achievable advances in disarmament must not be nullified by new arms steps. Both sides rejected plans to "compensate," by stockpiling and modernizing other arms, for the intermediate-range missiles eliminated.

Rather, the favorable development of international relations must be strengthened and stabilized through further steps of disarmament, security, and confidence-building.

Erich Honecker explained the comprehensive and realistic program submitted by the Warsaw Treaty members to continue disarmament in all spheres and to raise European and international security. These proposals increase the chance to prevent a war, end the arms race, and place disarmament, instead of arming, on the agenda of world history, said Erich Honecker.

The GDR's declared goal was and remains a nuclear and biochemical weapons-free and disarmed Europe. For this reason, it is working constructively and jointly with its allies to ensure that the drafting of a mandate in Vienna on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe is concluded and that prospects arise for resuming the CSCE conference. At the same time, it was in the GDR's special interest that nuclear disarmament in Europe be extended to other spheres without delay.

Oskar Lafontaine spoke in support of a more conducive response by the Atlantic defense alliance, which should react with proposals that promote the continuation of the disarmament process. Joint security and ecological partnership are an opportunity to develop East-West cooperation in Europe. The SPD will make its contribution to reducing the military threat in Europe and creating a more secure peace.

Erich Honecker and Oskar Lafontaine agreed that today the need and the possibility existed for freeing central Europe from all weapons of mass destruction and for achieving progress in conventional disarmament. In the interests of raising the security of all European people and states, they spoke out in favor of a speedy start to separate negotiations to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The goal was further zero options in tactical nuclear weapons. As agreed under Article 5 of
the Basic Treaty, the two German states should seize the initiative to ensure, in line with their common responsibility, that never again will war emanate from German soil, but only peace.

In this connection, the two sides praised the political initiatives developed jointly by the SPD and SED for raising security and for confidence-building. Above all, the talk on the joint SPD-SED paper, "The Battle of the Ideologies and Joint Security," must be continued and expanded. As a joint political action, this paper was an expression of the policy of peaceful competition and nonviolent dispute, over and above all ideological differences and to mutual benefit and advantage. In particular, the joint proposal for the creation of a nuclear weapons-free corridor in central Europe was increasingly proving to be an attainable interim step for reducing nuclear weapons in Europe. The implementation of that proposal, linked with the withdrawal or reduction of the most dangerous types of conventional arms, would strengthen European security and remove the capability for aggression.

Erich Honecker agreed with Oskar Lafontaine's statement that the two parties' proposal for a "zone of confidence and security in central Europe" was a milestone on the path to overcoming any thinking in categories of military confrontation and deterrence. The governments of the two German states should work for its realization with all their might. The two politicians welcomed the start of official relations between the EC and CEMA as contributing to improving relations between European states.

Erich Honecker said that as the staging of the Berlin International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones had demonstrated, the GDR would continue to leave nothing untied to advance the peace-promoting dialogue. The GDR would continue to work with consistency and perception in making a concrete contribution to stability, predictability, and trust on the line of contact between the two alliances.

Prime Minister Lafontaine expressed the Saarland's interest in advancing the normalization of relations between the two German states through further intensive dialogue, as this is the case in the recent past.

In view of international developments, the sides see good possibilities for expanding relations between the GDR and FRG on the basis of the joint communiqué of 8 September 1987 and the concluded treaties.

A precondition for this was, however, that the two German states, as agreed on, are guided in their relations by the demands of peaceful coexistence, recognition of realities, respect for sovereignty, and consideration for mutual interests. Questions concerning respect for citizenship, the Elbe frontier, and the Salzgitter Central Registry must for this reason be resolved quickly and jointly.

The two sides underlined their demand for the long-overdue introduction of official relations between the GDR People's Chamber and the German Bundestag.

Oskar Lafontaine expressed satisfaction with the fact that relations between the Saarland and the GDR are continuing to develop in a dynamic and stable manner. The cooperation between the Saarland and the GDR in the economy, science, health service, culture, and sports was an expression of the desire and efforts by the two sides to strengthen peace and cooperation in Europe through trust and working together.

Oskar Lafontaine and Erich Honecker agreed on a series of measures to continue the path of cooperation between the GDR and the Saarland.

Individually, the following were agreed on:

—A coproduction by GDR television and Saarland television;
—An exchange of directors of the two television concerns;
—The staging of an exhibition on the Saarland in the GDR and in the Saarland.

The two politicians agreed to continue their exchange of views.

The meeting was also attended by: Frank-Joachim Herrmann, SED Central Committee member, state secretary and head of the Chancellery of the State Council chairman; and Gunter Rettner, SED Central Committee candidate member and departmental head in the SED Central Committee.

The Saarland Prime Minister was accompanied by Norbert Engel, deputy regional SPD chairman of the Saarland and former president of the Saarland Chamber of Labor, and Secretary of State Hans-Arthur Weber.

HUNGARY

Soviet General Lobov Interviewed During Visit to Hungary
AU0109111088 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 31 Aug 88 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Vladimir Lobov, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by Csaba Poor in Budapest: "We Should Deal With the Issue of Arms Limitation Prudently"; date not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Colonel General Vladimir Lobov arrived in Budapest to participate in the international roundtable conference on conventional disarmament, but he spent the day before the conference working. Following his visits to the Ministry of Defense and the headquarters of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary, he asked him to answer our questions.
[Poor] What expectations did you bring here to Budapest, and, in your view, can such an exchange of views bring concrete results?

[Lobov] This conference provides opportunities for clarifying a considerable number of problems concerning arms reduction, disarmament, and the current state and structure of the armed forces and their armaments. Such a conference could contribute to discovering the existing asymmetry and disproportion and could also show the way to eliminate these phenomena.

I regard it as an extremely important task to discuss the military doctrines. For our part, we have repeatedly declared that the Soviet military doctrine is an exclusively defensive one. Its goal is not only to guarantee our country's security, but also to prevent any war and any form of armed conflict.

Finding ways of verifying armaments, armed forces, and their possible limitations is a decisively important issue. Interesting ideas and useful proposals could emerge here on the issue of eliminating surprise attacks too. We should find a way to eliminate the material bases for a surprise attack. Of course, arms limitation would be the easiest way to achieve this goal because, the smaller the number of arms, the less the danger of an outbreak of war.

[ Poor] Can this roundtable conference accelerate the activity of the MBFR talks in Vienna and the exchange of views between the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO member countries?

[Lobov] Of course, this meeting will not solve all the problems overnight and cannot work out the mandate of future talks on conventional disarmament between Warsaw Pact and NATO member countries. This is not the aim of this meeting. However, it is precisely the informal nature of this meeting that can contribute to the emergence of various opportunities for solutions. The fact that there are not only professional military men among the participants in this conference is very useful, because people who are dealing with the issues on the agenda of this meeting in their work on a daily basis, tend to think a little in stereotypes. Thus, it is worth listening to the positions of a broad circle of experts.

[ Poor] Prior to this conference, you held talks with Lt. General Jozsef Pacsek, chief of the General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army and deputy minister of defense, and also paid a visit to the headquarters of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary. What did you discuss at these meetings?

[Lobov] First of all, we discussed the current conference and its subject. In the case of Lt General Pacsek, we have known each other for a long time, we think in the same way, and we have been working together in the framework of the Warsaw Pact for a long time. We have agreed now that it is in the interest of both our countries' armed forces to solve the problems on the agenda of this conference as soon as possible because, just as all our people, we soldiers are living with these problems. Therefore, we also discussed primarily these issues with the commanders of the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary.

[ Poor] The lack of clarity concerning the issue of verification is also one of the most serious obstacles in the area of conventional disarmament. The Soviet Union has offered to mutually and simultaneously publish data concerning its armed forces. However, we are still waiting for a positive answer. Would it be a great risk for the Warsaw Pact to unilaterally publish certain data? Given the current stage of development of the intelligence services, there can hardly be any significant difference between the information we might supply and the real facts....

[Lobov] Why, then, is NATO reluctant to publish its own data? Simply because the current disproportion in the balance of forces is precisely to their advantage. If they laid their cards on the table now, it would show that they possess greater armed forces, although they keep claiming that the Soviet Union has an advantage. How would they face public opinion then?

[ Poor] But it is the Warsaw Pact that always comes up with initiatives. This process should start on the basis of reciprocity and equality. We are talking here not only about material aspects but also about moral ones. If we lay our cards on the table, they should do the same.

You think that, if we publish certain data, then NATO would not follow our example?

[Lobov] Look, if they had wanted to, they would have already done that, and would have accepted our proposals. We are ready to mutually and simultaneously publish relevant data on the Warsaw Pact armies and the NATO armed forces and then compare them.

[ Poor] What is the situation with the withdrawal of troops stationed abroad? The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed its readiness in respect to this matter. Is it not possible that certain unilateral steps would also be expedient in this respect? Let us take Hungary's case, for example: The withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary would probably not represent a great strategic loss; at the same time, however, from a political viewpoint, such a move would greatly increase the international prestige of the Soviet Union....

[Lobov] The Soviet Union has not only clearly expressed its readiness in respect to this matter but has also proved it in practice. For example, we withdrew 1,000 tanks and 20,000 soldiers from the GDR in 1980. This move remained without a response from the other side. Why should we repeat this now? Unilateral measures only lead to a situation in which the aforementioned asymmetry is even more to our detriment.
Let us take the example of the 72 U.S. fighter bombers that must be withdrawn from Spain. Why do they not deploy them on U.S. territory? Why must these planes be deployed in Italy? We have even offered to reduce our air forces on this continent by a similar number of planes if these F-16 planes are withdrawn from Europe. They have not accepted this offer. Thus, we must deal with this issue with utmost care in order to minimize the danger of a surprise attack.

[Poor] The Western press often carries reports on alleged differences of views between the Soviet political and military leadership, particularly on the disarmament issue. What is your opinion about these claims?

[Lobov] All I can say about this is that the Western press has a predilection for presenting wishful thinking as reality, thinking they would like to see in reality. There is full consensus in the Soviet Union. From privates up to the generals, the entire Soviet Army supports the party’s political efforts and strives to contribute to the implementation of these efforts with all its power. I think that my presence at this roundtable conference also proves this.
Soviet Team Arrives for Comiso Inspection
LD2408095588 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0900 GMT 24 Aug 88

[Text] Rome, 24 Aug (TASS)—A group of Soviet military inspectors arrives here today. They will examine the NATO nuclear missile base in Comiso, Sicily. The 112 “cruise missiles” with a range of 2,400 km stationed there are to be eliminated in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

A statement by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with the Soviet inspectors’ arrival says these inspections are an important aspect of the Soviet-U.S. treaty. “Each is evidence of progress toward eliminating a whole class of nuclear missiles,” the statement stresses.

The Soviet military inspectors will be given an opportunity to examine the base in Comiso and to define more precisely the number of missile systems and other military equipment that is to be eliminated. On their trip to Comiso, where the Soviet inspectors will travel today from Rome aboard a U.S. military aircraft, they will be accompanied by U.S. and Italian representatives.

After completing the inspection, which will last 24 hours and may be extended for another 8 hours if required, the Soviet representatives will draw up a final document to be signed by U.S. military authorities as well.

Soviet-U.S. ABM Talks Begin in Geneva
LD2408151888 Moscow TASS in English 1454 GMT 24 Aug 88

[Text] Geneva August 24 TASS—Delegations from the Soviet Union and the United States began here today a regular review of the treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile defences, held every five years.

The Soviet delegation is headed by Viktor Karpov, department head and member of the Collegium of the USSR Foreign Ministry, and the American delegation is led by William Burns, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Heads of Delegations Meet
LD2408211888 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 24 Aug 88

[Text] A meeting of Soviet and U.S. representatives to review the functioning of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of antimissile defense systems began today.

[Correspondent V. Dmitriyev] Representatives of the two sides meet every 5 years to review how the treaty is functioning. The present meeting follows two others which took place in 1977 and 1982.

The first meeting of the heads of delegations and technical experts has just taken place. The talks are being held behind closed doors. The Soviet side has come out in favor of observing all provisions of the document, and remains in favor of this. It remains not only committed to these provisions but is seeking to make the treaty more effective and vigorous.

Difficulties in preserving the regime of the ABM Treaty arose after the United States adopted and began to implement the all-embracing strategic program for the 1980’s which envisions the accelerated development of new weapons systems. The specific steps within the framework of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative aimed at the militarization of space are also connected with this. Moreover, this directly contradicts the ABM Treaty. Objective observers and international experts regard the deployment by the Pentagon of major radar installations and the testing of mobile antimissile missiles and other military equipment in the same context.

The Americans are trying to free their hands by stating that it is possible to create and to test any devices needed for antimissile defense in space. It is clear that attempts to redefine the nature of the document, which over the past 16 years has proven its vital force, cannot contribute to progress at the talks being held in Geneva on a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive weapons.

Need for Strict Observance
LD2408110988 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 24 Aug 88

[Text] A meeting of Soviet and U.S. representatives begins in Geneva today. They will discuss the Soviet-U.S. working treaty on limiting ABM systems. Here is our correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev:

[Dmitriyev] This important document, which put a solid barrier across the path of the arms race, especially of strategic offensive arms, went into force in 1972. Since then representatives of both states have met every 5 years to discuss and to evaluate how the tenets of the treaty are being implemented. A mechanism for consultations has been set up, particularly in the standing consultative commission.

Soviet and U.S. diplomats and experts have held relevant talks twice, in 1977 and 1982, and now here is another meeting. As is known, problems arose in preserving the ABM Treaty procedure after the United States adopted and began to implement a comprehensive strategic program in the eighties that envisages the rapid development of new arms systems. The so-called Strategic Defense Initiative is connected with this. The U.S. side continues to stick to the freedom of action principle, the so-called broad or extended interpretation of the ABM Treaty, claiming that it is permissible to design and to test any equipment essential for antiballistic missile defense in space; that is, offensive or defensive. At the same time, the document itself provides an unambiguous answer on that question: Effective steps
for limiting antiballistic defense measures would be an important factor in curbing the strategic offensive arms race and would reduce the danger of nuclear war breaking out.

Attempts to redefine the nature of the document, which has proved its vitalness, cannot contribute to progress in the talks being held in Geneva on a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive weapons. The achievement of a corresponding agreement, as has been stressed many times by Soviet representatives here in Geneva, is indissolubly linked with how strictly the ABM Treaty is observed, for it has vital importance with regard to strengthening strategic stability and international security.

The Soviet delegation expects a constructive approach from the U.S. representatives and a search for mutually acceptable solutions. The Soviet delegation stresses the need for the current meeting to confirm the common devotion of the two sides to the goals and tenets of the ABM Treaty.

Call for Naval, Air Measures at Stockholm Talks
PM3008111288 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 34, 21 Aug 88 p 5

[Interview with Soviet Stockholm CSCE delegation member Major General Viktor Tatarnikov by Vladimir Nazarenko: “It Is Time To Count Aircraft And Warships”]

[Text] The Vienna meeting of 35 states—participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—is discussing the resumption of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building and Disarmament in Europe.

Soviet delegation member Major-General Viktor Tatarnikov spoke with “MN” correspondent Vladimir Nazarenko.

MN: What new confidence-building measures should be considered at the next session of the Stockholm conference?

V.T.: Confidence-building measures related to the military activities of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO land forces in Europe are being efficiently implemented. The activities of the ground-based formations have become, within certain limits, open, verifiable, and, consequently, more predictable.

But naval activities and independent air force exercises, unfortunately, remain major “blank” spots in the process of confidence-building measures and security. In fact, the navy and the air force dispose an unprecedented striking force with a vast range and high accuracy. The military activities of naval and air forces are potentially highly dangerous given preparations for delivering surprise attacks. By means of these forces the NATO states exerted military pressure on other countries, blackmailed and intimidated them, and in some cases, bombed them. Remember Libya.

Therefore the Warsaw Treaty countries and some other European states believe that it is time to monitor naval and air force activities in Europe and in the seas and oceans adjoining it, and make this activity open and predictable. I think this work should be started at the next session of the Stockholm conference.

MN: What specific confidence-building measures would this involve?

V.T.: Measures similar to those for military activities on land: to include major air force and navy war games in the annual plans of notified military activities, notification on independent naval and air force exercises and other actions exceeding certain thresholds. Naval and air force activities at sea and in the air space adjoining Europe and the landing of major troops should also be monitored. The plan should include a compulsory notification on troop and military hardware transports to Europe by sea and by air. Finally, the conference should consider the banning of naval exercises in the areas of intensive navigation and fishing; limiting naval forces, especially anti-submarine forces, in areas of international importance. It could also discuss other measures dealing with the activity of naval and air forces, including strict control, right up to inspection without the right of refusal. The spreading of these and other measures to naval and air force activities would be a timely and quite logical step, especially given Western appeals for predictable, verifiable and open approach to military sphere.

MN: For a number of years the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries have repeatedly proposed considering this problem in the framework of the European forum. Initiatives were made at the highest levels by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok, in Murmansk and Belgrade, and by Nikolay Ryzhkov in Sweden. Were these appeals and statements acted on?

V.T.: Addressing the Polish Sejm recently Gorbachev proposed withdrawing Soviet aircraft from forward-based areas in Eastern Europe, on the condition that NATO not deploy 72 American F-16 fighter-bombers in Italy. The West was actually offered a “zero option”—and flatly rejected it.

Another example. On July 25, 1988, the Soviet Government, striving to solve, as soon as possible, the problem of confidence-building measures at sea, announced it would be conducting naval exercises with the Baltic Fleet on September 6-8, 1988. A total of 32 warships, aircraft and helicopters will participate. Military observers from the GDR, Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland—the states directly concerned with the military and strategic situation in the Baltic—were invited. This new practical
step in the history of naval activity is unprecedented, removing the veil of secrecy from the USSR naval activity. Similar steps by NATO would be very apropos.

We are hoping for reciprocity.

U.S. Brings Violation Charges to ABM Talks
LD250816288 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 25 Aug 88

[Excerpts] Soviet and American representatives in Geneva are discussing compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. The first plenary session is on Thursday. [passage omitted]

The American delegation brought to Geneva a packet of charges to accuse the Soviet Union of breaching the treaty. Are there grounds for that? Yury Solton explains:

The Americans' major charge is the construction of a Soviet radar near the city of Krasnoyarsk. This is alleged to be a missile attack warning facility. But that is a pure invention. The Krasnoyarsk radar is designed to trace objects in space, so it's outside the ABM Treaty's terms. American congressmen were able to see this for themselves as they had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with that facility. Besides, full data with technical characteristics on the radar has been officially given to the American side. [passage omitted]

If you remember, there had been no special problems with observing the ABM Treaty before the Strategic Defense Initiative was proclaimed in March 1983. Problems appeared when the Pentagon got down to putting the SDI—or Star Wars—program into practice. And this project provides for placing an antiballistic missile into space. The American Department of Defense has officially recommended either a new broader interpretation of the treaty which distorts its essence or the total renunciation of the accord.

When General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan met in Washington last December they agreed in principle that a 50-percent reduction in Soviet and American strategic offensive arms now being discussed was possible only if the ABM Treaty was observed within a certain term as it was signed in 1972. Now the Americans are looking for pretexts to get around this understanding. That is the only interpretation of the far-fetched charges against the USSR. Further nuclear arms reductions are being put at risk for the sake of SDI.

U.S. To Withdraw First Pershings From FRG
LD2508113288 Moscow TASS in English
1127 GMT 25 Aug 88

[Text] Bonn August TASS—The United States is planning to start the withdrawal of first Pershing-II intermediate-range nuclear missiles from West Germany from September 2 this year under the Soviet-American INF Treaty, the West German newspaper HEILBRONNER STIMME said today.

The newspaper specifies that the first nine missile units assigned to the Fourth Battalion, Ninth Brigade of the field artillery of the U.S. Armed Forces are going to be withdrawn from the Heilbronn Base.

A public dismantlement of the Pershing-II missile launchers is scheduled to be held at the Pershing missiles technical service centre in Hausen, Frankfurt am Main.

INF Treaty, Asia-Pacific Security Linked
OW2908194188 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 25 Aug 88

[Uisky] commentary: "Destruction of Missiles"

[Text] Dear listeners: Now let us take a look at an urgent international issue. The first batch of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has been destroyed in accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty. (Uisky), a Soviet journalist on international affairs, writes in this connection:

It should be noted that this treaty not only covers Europe but extends to the Asia-Pacific region as well, as proposed by the Soviet Union. Last year our country put forward this proposal in view of the wishes of a number of Asian countries. Now we are seeing the tangible results of this proposal.

This is the first time in history that mass destruction weapons have been destroyed. Had these weapons been used, they would have caused irreparable damage to the cause of security in Europe, Asia, and all other parts of the world. The historical significance of this fact for the world is inestimable.

We would like to point out that this event is of special significance for the Asia-Pacific region. In that region there has been a continuous aggravation of military danger, and the main reason for this is no secret: More and more nuclear weapons have been stockpiled on warships of the U.S. 7th Fleet and on military bases.

At the same time, the struggle for security in the Asia-Pacific region has been surging ahead. It can be said that the Rarotonga Treaty declaring the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone is the first result of this struggle. Significantly, the two big nuclear powers in Asia, the Soviet Union and China, have signed an additional protocol to the treaty. The big Western nuclear powers, however, have refused to follow this example. The destruction of the first batch of nuclear missiles under the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty actually started the process of nuclear disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region. Let us recall the process leading to the signing of this treaty. In his Vladivostok speech 2 years ago, Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, put forward a general program for the strengthening of security and the development of cooperation in Asia and the Pacific [words indistinct].
The beginning of destruction of intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles can be viewed as a real and specific step toward the building of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world. This step, we hope, will not be the last one.

All this shows that Asians now feel safer than before. This is not only because intermediate- and shorter-range missiles have been destroyed in the Asia-Pacific region but because, significantly, Western Asia has freed itself from the threat of U.S. missiles deployed in Europe that could reach the Persian Gulf. More importantly, it proves that weapons can be destroyed as well as manufactured.

We would like to repeat here that the weapons destroyed are mass destruction weapons. This means that offensive strategic weapons, which constitute the greatest threat to peace, are by no means untouchable and that they also can eventually be destroyed. Moreover, it is possible to considerably reduce such weapons at the present stage. As people know, the Soviet Union and the United States are holding talks on a 50-percent reduction of these most dangerous weapons. We are making every possible effort to achieve success in these talks.

As for the Asia-Pacific region, a considerable number of strategic nuclear weapons are concentrated, the success of the talks will mean a big new step away from military danger. Meanwhile, the atmosphere brought about under the impact of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty is also conducive to solving regional conflicts.

Many regional conflicts have occurred in the Asia-Pacific region. This is evident from the Geneva agreement to mediate the Afghan problem, the launching of the talks on the Cambodian issue, and the efforts to bring the Iran-Iraq war to an end.

Of course, the people of the countries concerned are benefiting most from the mediation of regional conflicts. Other Asians, including many Chinese people living near areas affected by regional conflicts, long for their elimination. In this regard, it is important to take mutual benefit and the principle of compromise into consideration. It was this principle which contributed to the signing of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty.

It goes without saying that implementation of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty plays a positive role in the Asia-Pacific region. This treaty has given a stimulus to making still greater achievements in safeguarding security in the Asia-Pacific region. All countries in the Asia-Pacific region and their people must make further efforts to strengthen, not weaken, this stimulus.

**Strategic, Space Weapons Talks Continue**

*LD2608194788 Moscow TASS in English 1858 GMT 26 Aug 88*

[Text] Geneva August 26 TASS--Discussions continued this week in both groups—on strategic offensive arms and space weapons within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

In the space weapons group, the sides exchanged opinions in connection with the new proposals tabled earlier by the Soviet side and aimed at agreeing on a protocol to a future agreement on the observance of, and non-withdrawal from, the ABM Treaty. However, as concerns the preparation of the draft agreement proper, no headway has so far been registered here. The reason for this situation, as before, is that the American side continues to insist on tabling "additions" to the Washington agreement, aimed at changing that agreement in the spirit of a "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Within the framework of the strategic offensive arms group the participants discussed the recently tabled new Soviet proposals concerning the protocol on inspections. Discussion was also continued of the proposals of the USSR delegation on the protocol on re-conversion or elimination. Some headway has been registered on some formulations in the protocols mentioned. The Soviet side favours an all-round revitalisation of the work on this component of the activity of the delegations.

The American side has tabled a number of new formulations to the draft treaty on 50-percent cuts in strategic nuclear arms and to protocols related to it. These proposals are being studied by the Soviet side.

Work continued on the implementation of the Moscow agreements on questions of limitations on large-range air-based cruise missiles and heavy bombers. In this field also the Soviet side follows the line of working out effective restrictions on these strategic nuclear arms and ensuring effective control over their observance.

The USSR delegation also favours the earliest implementation of the Moscow agreement in the matter of control over the mobile ICBM launchers. Specific formulations on this score were tabled by the Soviet side at the beginning of this current round. However, so far no constructive reaction has come to these Soviet proposals from the American side.

**Soviet Team Inspects Comiso Missile Base**

*LD2608114588 Moscow TASS in English 1102 GMT 26 Aug 88*

[Text] Rome August 26 TASS—TASS correspondent Aleksandr Goloyayev reports:

A team of Soviet inspectors today arrived at a nuclear missile base in Comiso, Sicily, where 112 cruise missiles are deployed. Its task is to check whether the number of missiles, launchers and other systems stationed at the base corresponds to the quantity which was stated by the American side during the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The inspection will last for 24 hours and can be extended, if need be, to another eight hours.
As the team of Soviet inspectors began their work at Comiso, the Italian democratically-minded public asks what will be with the base following the destruction of the missiles. Its future is far from being indifferent to the residents of Comiso, who want to turn this nuclear powder keg into a peace facility.

Communist Salvatore Zago, a mayor of the city, draws attention to the need to build a civilian airport there. This will help develop tourism and the economy of the area, he stresses. There are other projects as well: Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, for one, backed up the idea of a group of scientists to create an international laser technology center at the base.

At the same time, definite quarters deem it necessary to preserve the base in Comiso as the military facility. At a meeting with the group of newsmen who toured the base in the run-up to the visit of Soviet inspectors there a representative of the Italian military authorities maintained that after the missiles are destroyed it would continue to be under the authority of the Defence Ministry.

**Head of Delegation Comments**

*LD2808170588 Moscow TASS in English 1616 GMT 28 Aug 88*

[Text] Rome August 28 TASS—TASS correspondent Aleksey Golyaev reports:

"Nuclear missiles should never appear in Italy's blue sky, and our group did its best to ensure it," G. Komogortsev, head of a Soviet inspection group, has told TASS. The group ended the examination of a nuclear missile base in Comiso, Sicily, where 112 cruise missiles due to be eliminated in accordance with the Soviet-American INF Treaty are deployed. "The number of missiles, launching installations and other facilities deployed in the Comiso base conforms to the amount declared by the American side," the head of the Soviet group said.

The inspection group left for home today. A send-off ceremony was held at the airport. During the ceremony a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy pointed out the importance of the mission of the Soviet inspection group on verifying the initial data of the INF Treaty, as well as the constructive cooperation of the Italian, American and Soviet sides. "It is a good beginning of the joint work in Italy for putting into practice the INF Treaty. I am sure that it promotes the consolidation of world peace and security," he said.

"The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles has entered a stage of practical realization. Peaceful explosions can be heard these days on Soviet territory which announce to peoples of the world that those armaments are being eliminated", the head of the Soviet inspection group said. He pointed out a high professional level of training of Italian and American specialists who had helped the Soviet inspection group to fulfil the tasks set before it. G. Komogortsev thanked representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Ministry of Italy, as well as the American escort group for their assistance and support. He said that this kind of cooperation was in line with the aspirations of all the nations, with the interests of the consolidation of world peace and security.

The head of the American escort group pointed out in his speech that the mission of Soviet inspectors in Italy opened up a new page in the history of international relations. He said that the phase of the verification of initial data of the INF Treaty had been completed and its practical implementation was about to be started. In his opinion, the Soviet inspection mission, the same as similar missions on Soviet territory, promoted the development of mutual understanding and trust. He specially pointed out a high professional level of training of Soviet inspectors and said that they had demonstrated exemplary work for this kind of inspections.

According to the Soviet-American treaty, the length of inspections that last 24 hours could be extended, if necessary, by another eight hours. The Soviet inspection group found it possible to complete its mission at the Comiso base in 24 hours.

**INF Missiles Eliminated Through Launching**

*LD2608141088 Moscow TASS in English 1341 GMT 26 Aug 88*

[Text] Moscow August 26 TASS—The elimination of Soviet RSD-10 intermediate-range missiles by means of launching began in the area of Chita, Siberia, on August 23.

Intermediate-range missiles are eliminated in the Soviet Union using three methods: by explosive demolition, by cutting and by means of launching.

The first two techniques have already been tested in the elimination of shorter-range missiles. Now the third method was applied.

The launches were watched by a group of U.S. inspectors. The American experts thoroughly fulfilled all verification procedures and confirmed the types of the missiles subject to elimination.

At the time of launches, the American inspectors and Soviet officers took up positions in an observation post situated two kilometres from the launchers and missiles at the ready among pine and fir-trees of the Siberian Taiga.

A mobile command post manned by a unit headed by Maj. Vladimir Petrov was deployed nearby.
Following the launch command, a powerful explosion thunderted over the forest as the ignition charge went off. The missile poised for a moment in mid-air and then, shattering the environs, soared into the sky.

A few seconds later, all that was left of the giant rocket was a mere trail of smoke.

The observers, both Soviet and American, clapped their hands in agreement, mindful of the fact that they had witnessed a truly historic event.

Paper Responds to Opposition to Disarmament
PM2908140598 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda
in Russian 26 Aug 88 First Edition p 3

[Krasnaya Zvezda] observer Manki Ponomarev answers reader's letter under the rubric "Reader Answered by International Observer": "We Must Not Think in the Old Way"—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction and reader's letter

[Text] Among many others, the mail brought to the editorial office included a letter from G. M. Alekseyeva in Khabarovsk. She writes, in particular:

"I am categorically opposed to disarmament. I believe that we are making a fatal mistake by eliminating some of our missiles. The Americans are in no hurry to destroy their own. They are only carrying out inspections. We too are carrying out inspections, but where is the sense in all this? If there has to be disarmament, it should be carried out solely on the basis of a missile for a missile. It seems that America is simply deceiving us, feeding us with promises and inspections, and we are just sitting back and letting everything happen. Where is our sense of responsibility to the country, the people, and future generations?"

To be honest, Galina Mikhailovna, your letter surprised me. No, not by its sharp tone—we receive a considerable number of angry letters on various problems, including international ones. What did seem strange was your rejection of the idea of disarmament and what appeared to me to be rather excessively peremptory, categorical judgments on very serious issues.

My first reaction upon reading your letter was to reply to you personally and try to explain why I feel you are wrong. But on mature reflection I decided to conduct the discussion in the newspaper. This is because, judging by the editorial mail, your views are shared to varying degrees by other readers of ours. Your letter, however, expresses these views particularly clearly.

So, Galina Mikhailovna, where are you right and where, to all appearances, are you profoundly mistaken? You are right with regard to the concern for the future of your country and people which runs through every line of your letter. This is an understandable, natural feeling for any Soviet person to have. You are also right, of course, to say that international problems and the problems of security and disarmament must be approached with a very great sense of responsibility. Any complacency or attempts to indulge in wishful thinking are intolerable in this respect.

But beyond that. Beyond that your arguments are no longer based on the hard facts of reality but on the shaky ground of conjecture and delusion.

You are worried that the Soviet Union has to destroy more intermediate- and shorter-range missiles than the United States? But the whole point is that we have more of them. When the treaty was signed, the Soviet Union had 826 intermediate-range missiles and 926 shorter-range missiles, while the United States had 689 and 170 respectively. If we were to take the course you suggest—a missile for a missile—we would end up with all the U.S. missiles destroyed and us still with a fair number of them. Clearly, the United States would never have agreed to this approach and so the cause of nuclear disarmament would have remained frozen at a standstill.

Anyway, it is not a question of which side destroys more missiles—we or the Americans. The main thing is that, as a result of implementing the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, in a matter of 3 years all—and I emphasize all—intermediate- and shorter-range missiles will have been destroyed on both sides. There will be none left either in the Soviet Union or in the United States. So in this we will be equal. Not a missile for a missile, but a zero for a zero.

You are confused that we have already begun to destroy our missiles while the Americans have not? Yes, it is true that the first four Soviet shorter-range missiles (OTR-22) were blown up in Saryozek on 1 August. But all in all some 70 Soviet missiles have been destroyed so far, including dummy missiles, as well as approximately 40 launch installations. But Washington has announced that the practical elimination of U.S. missiles will begin 8 September. This time difference is explained in exactly the same way—the Soviet Union has more missiles to be eliminated than the United States and so more time is required for the elimination process.

So you think the Americans are deceiving us by reducing everything to inspections? But the whole system of inspections has been developed precisely in order to prevent any deception and prevent either side from breaching any of the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. We have no less of an interest than the Americans in the strict verification stipulated by the treaty.

Yes, U.S. inspectors have visited several Soviet operational missile bases, auxiliary missile installations, missile elimination sites, launch installations, and auxiliary equipment and monitored the nonproduction of missiles at Soviet manufacturing plants. But Soviet inspectors are doing exactly the same. They have visited U.S. missile
bases in a number of West European countries and other installations on U.S. territory—in particular, the Hercules plant in Utah where they make the components for Pershing-2 missiles. The inspectors' work will continue for many years yet. We must be sure that the signed treaty is being strictly observed and that no one is gaining any advantages.

So this is how the matter stands regarding Soviet and U.S. missiles. I would like to stress once again that on-site inspection is not deception in place of disarmament but verification to ensure that there can be no such deception. Remember, even Reagan had to learn the Russian proverb "Trust, but verify." Note—a Russian proverb, not an American one.

But it was not your misconceptions regarding the questions of missile elimination and verification that compelled me to answer you, Galina Mikhaylovsna, through this newspaper. Everything I have said above has already been said in the greatest detail in our press and so anyone who wishes to establish the truth will not find it very hard to do. But what did alarm me was something else: your rejection of the idea of disarmament and the strong reproaches of irresponsibility and complacency.

No, in our age, with mankind's very existence under threat, we can no longer live on top of mountains of weapons. This does not increase security—it reduces it. Contradictions between states and the problems that arise between them cannot be solved by military means—their use is fraught with destruction. International contradictions and problems can and must be solved differently—by political means. This is the essence of the new political thinking that has guided the Soviet Union in recent years in its actions in the international arena.

There is no other reasonable choice, no other reasonable alternative. Either the assertion of the new political thinking, the elimination of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons—for which the Soviet Union is striving—and the creation of a comprehensive international security system, or the real threat of the destruction of all life on our planet. Some of the bellicose slogans—I can describe them as nothing else—contained in your letter can under no circumstances be justified.

The new political thinking and the new, essentially defensive Soviet military doctrine are a real manifestation of a great sense of responsibility for the fate of our people and the fate of peace. No, it is not complacency that prevails in the Soviet Armed Forces but a sober understanding of the situation and a desire to fully satisfy the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference requirement that all defense building in our country be oriented toward qualitative parameters—with regard to equipment, military science, and the composition of the Armed Forces. This requirement is law for our Army and Navy and for all military servicemen, who have a deep sense of responsibility for our future and the future of all peoples on earth.

Delegations Arrive for Nuclear Test Talks
LD2708151288 Moscow TASS in English 1309 GMT 27 Aug 88

[Text] Geneva August 27 TASS—The USSR delegation arrived here today to take part in the next, third, round of the Soviet-American full-scale negotiations on limiting and ultimately halting nuclear tests.

Igor Palenykh, head of the Soviet delegation, said at the airport that the current round of the talks should become a watershed one in dialogue between the USSR and the United States on this important problem of nuclear disarmament.

He noted a successful implementation of the first part of the joint experiment to monitor nuclear testing and said that an atmosphere of businesslike and constructive cooperation, which was established between the sides, enabled them to hope for a successful advancement towards the principal goal recorded in the mandate of the talks—total cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The U.S. delegation arrived in Geneva on the same day. Its chief negotiator Paul Robinson positively evaluated the joint work of Soviet and American experts in monitoring nuclear tests and assured that the U.S. delegation would strive to look for approaches to outstanding problems in a constructive spirit.

Three SS-20 Missiles Destroyed in Explosions
LD2808151588 Moscow TASS in English 1424 GMT 28 Aug 88

[Excerpt] Kapustin Yar (Astrakhan region) August 28 TASS—TASS correspondent Vladimir Isachenkov reports:

RSD-10 missiles known in the West as SS-20 missiles will be eliminated at the same place where they were tested, at the Kapustin Yar test site, 90 km south-east of Volgograd. Three out of some 600 missiles due to be eliminated in Kapustin Yar were blown up today in the presence of a group of U.N. representatives, as well as Soviet and foreign journalists.

Kapustin Yar is the oldest missile test site in the USSR. R-1, the first Soviet ballistic missile, was launched there in September of 1947. Now 75 per cent of all the RSD-10 missiles are to be eliminated there by the method of explosion, while the remaining 25 per cent will be eliminated by the method of launching at test sites in the area of Chita and Kansk. Two launches were staged already on August 25.
"I started my service at the Kapustin Yar test site in the rank of a lieutenant. I took part in the preparation of the first test launches of RSD-10 missiles. Of course, it is not easy to destroy with my own hands these sophisticated missiles. However, the elimination of intermediate-range missiles is the first step to real disarmament", said Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Galchenko, head of the missile elimination base. [passage omitted]

Details, Future Plans Noted
LD2808194588 Moscow TASS in English
1729 GMT 28 Aug 88

[Text] Kapustin Yar (Astrakhan region) August 28 TASS—TASS correspondent Vladimir Isachenkov reports:

RSD-10 missiles known in the West as SS-20 missiles will be eliminated at the same place where they were tested, at the Kapustin YAR test site, 90 km south-east of Volgograd. Three out of over 600 missiles due to be eliminated in Kapustin Yar were blown up today in the presence of a group of U.N. representatives, as well as Soviet and foreign journalists.

Kapustin Yar is the oldest missile test site in the USSR. R-1, the first Soviet ballistic missile, was launched there in September of 1947. Now 75 per cent of all the RSD-10 missiles are to be eliminated there by the method of explosion, while the remaining 25 per cent will be eliminated by the method of launching at test sites in the area of Chita and Kansk. Two launches were staged already on August 25. Apart from it, specialists started the elimination of liquid-propellant missiles R-12 (SS-4) in the Lesnaya populated locality, 30 km away from Baranovichi, Belarus, on August 8. The elimination of auxiliary equipment, RSD-10 launching installations, started on the same day near the town of Sarno, the Ukraine. [Moscow TASS in English at 1157 GMT on 27 August, in a report on the upcoming explosion of missiles at Kapustin Yar, adds: "It will be recalled that a missile in the container rather than the entire RSD-10 missile complex called in the West as SS-20 is liquidated at Kapustin Yar. Two other elements of the missile complex—a self-propelled launcher and a transport facility are 'disarmed' at the base of destruction in Sarno, 300 kilometers west of Kiev, Ukraine. These elements are not liquidated since they still can serve people. For instance, the Odessa heavy crane production amalgamation plans to organise in partnership with the West German concern, Lipherr-Verzahnotechnik, a quantity production of automatic cranes with a load-lifting capacity of 120 tonnes on the basis of self-propelled launchers.

["RSD-10 is fitted out with solid-propellant engine rather than liquid-propellant. As the extraction of the solid propellant is a complex and dangerous process, the explosion method was chosen for liquidation."]

RSD-10 is a two-stage 16.49-metre-long missile. Its first stage weighs 26.63 tons and the second stage—8.63 tons. Its design is as follows: Thin-walled cylinders with a diameter of 1.79 metres (the first stage) and 1.47 metres (the second stage) with solid fuel pressed into it. It is the fuel that accounts for a major part of the missile's weight.

Starting from September, during the coming three years, on the 15th and 30th of each month missiles will be eliminated in Kapustin Yar by batches, each batch consisting of three missiles. An explosion leaves a crater with a depth of 15-18 m and a diameter of some 45 m. The remnants of the exploded missile fully burn down in 35 seconds. After that bulldozers fill in the crater and prepare it for the next explosion.

The TNT equivalent of the explosion is some 90 tons. A series of experiments was conducted with a view to ensuring the complete elimination of missiles, without any remnants, and a method of placement of missiles was worked out. 259 ecological control posts were created around the RSD-10 missile elimination base at a distance ranging from 6 to 80 km. Specialists of the USSR Weather Service Committee, the USSR Ministry of Public Health and the USSR Academy of Sciences are also taking part in this work. The missiles are brought here with their nuclear warheads off.

Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Galchenko, head of the missile elimination base, recalled that one RSD-10 missile was exploded in Kapustin Yar last July. This was done after the arrival at the test site of a group of American inspectors who demanded the dismantling of one of the missiles for them to be able to check the dimensions of its stages. After this was done the missile was taken to a test ground and was blown up, because it was dangerous to keep it in a dismantled state.

The first Soviet shorter-range missiles, OTR-22, were eliminated at the Saryozeug test site, Kazakhstan, on August 1. According to the INF Treaty, the Soviet side will eliminate 826 intermediate-range and 926 short-range missiles. The American side will eliminate 689 intermediate-range and 170 shorter-range missiles. The fulfillment of commitments under the INF Treaty goes together with unprecedented control measures. According to a plan, by September 1, this year, Soviet experts were to examine 26 installations in the U.S. and Western Europe, while American specialists were to inspect 133 points on the territory of the USSR, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. In the future each of the sides will permit inspectors to visit the areas of the destruction of missiles and to stage as many inspections as it will be necessary for getting convinced that all the armaments covered by the INF Treaty are fully destroyed.

News Conference on SS-20's, INF Treaty
LD2908184588 Moscow TASS in English
1735 GMT 29 Aug 88

[Text] Volgograd August 26 TASS—By TASS special correspondent Vladimir Isachenkov:

Experience gained during the realization of the Soviet-American INF Treaty will play a positive role as the
disarmament process makes further headway, a Soviet deputy foreign minister said today.

Viktor Komplektov was speaking at a news conference here following the destruction of three RSD-10 missiles, which are known in the West as SS-20's, by explosion on a testing range at Kapustin Yar outside Volgograd Sunday.

"Just recently, few people believed in the possibility of nuclear disarmament. Today, delivering the world from weapons of mass annihilation is becoming a quite realistic task which can and must be fulfilled, if we are to abide by new political thinking," Komplektov said.

"The issues of halving Soviet and American strategic nuclear arsenals with strict adherence to the ABM Treaty, signing as soon as possible a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, putting an end to nuclear testing and reducing armed forces and conventional arms are moving to the phase of practical solutions," the Soviet diplomat added.

He said the INF Treaty had been made possible by extensive support from the entire world community, in particular nations taking part in the disarmament conference in Geneva.

Its representatives led by conference Secretary-General Miljan Komatina yesterday visited the Kapustin Yar testing range to watch the missile elimination procedure.

Lieutenant-General Igor Sergeyev, first deputy chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, told the news conference that a total of 22 intermediate-range missiles, including 13 RSD-10's, and 56 shorter-range ones had been destroyed in this country by today.

Solid-fuel RSD-10's are eliminated by exploding and launching, while liquid-fuel R-12 and R-14 shorter-range missiles go to remelting furnaces after being ridden of their fuel.

Speaking at the same news conference, Colonel Stanislav Shemyakin, Soviet deputy representative to the Soviet-American Special Verification Commission, announced the completion of so-called baseline inspections under the INF Treaty, which provides for unprecedented measures to monitor its fulfillment.

The inspections have been conducted to check the whereabouts, number and classes of missiles subject to elimination.

U.S. inspectors have been to 117 facilities in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, while their Soviet colleagues have visited 31 facilities in the United States and West European countries.

"The sides have voiced no complaints about any deviations from the treaty or its violations," Colonel Shemyakin said.

U.S. Inspectors View Explosions
LD2908132188 Moscow TASS in English
1145 GMT 29 Aug 88

[Text] Kapustin Yar (Astrakhan region) August 29
TASS—TASS correspondents report:

A fiery ball over the Volga steppe heralded yesterday the beginning of destruction of Soviet RSD-10 missiles, to be demolished here by explosion, were blown up at the Kapustin Yar range, approximately 100 kilometres southeast of Volgograd. The missile destruction operation was viewed by a big group of U.N. representatives, headed by Miljan Komatina, general secretary of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, staff members of foreign diplomatic missions in Mowcow, as well as Soviet and foreign journalists.

"Missile destruction seemed fantastic yet until recently", journalists were told by Miljan Komatina. "Following the conclusion of the world's first agreement on elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons, the prospects of further development of the disarmament process are now favourable as never before. What we witnessed today evinces practical solution of the invariable question at negotiations on disarmament—mutual confidence, verification of compliance with obligations under concluded agreements, openness".

The missile demolition operation was viewed by American inspectors headed by Brigadier-General Roland Lajoie, director of the on-site inspection directorate of the U.S. Defence Department. He said that the work was excellently organized and testified that the Soviet Army men complied with tall demands of the American side and answered all questions. After the explosion, two inspectors viewed the crater (about 20 metres deep and over 40 metres in diameter) and reaffirmed that the missiles had been fully destroyed.

Psychologically, it is a difficult job to explode missiles which took such a big effort to make. This is the opinion, for instance, of Colonel Yevgeniy Solovyev who joined the army service at the test range as a 20-year-old lieutenant. But the missile explosion work is important, since it will help reduce the risk of a nuclear war, he said.

Journalists were interested in ecological consequences of explosions at Kapustin Yar. Three bunches of missiles are to be destroyed over a period of three years twice every month (on the 15th and 30th), starting from September, with every bunch to have three missiles. TASS correspondents have been told by Vladimir Brzilov, a representative of the State Hydrometeorological Committee of the USSR, that, according to scientists, the norms of admissible limit of concentration of harmful substances would not be exceeded. The fall-out of
combustion products in the Kapustin Yar area will be much less than the relevant concentration at any major industrial city. "Our task is to keep an eye over the explosions, to take air and soil samples, and give recommendations on the most favourable conditions for explosions depending on weather conditions. About 300 control points were established in Kapustin Yar area for the purpose", Brazilov said.

U.S. Arms Officials Address News Conference

LD3008214088 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 30 Aug 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A news conference organized by the USSR National Center for Reducing the Nuclear Danger was held in Moscow today.

[Correspondent V. Lobachenko] This meeting with journalists was devoted to a most important subject, the beginning of the practical implementation of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. It was conducted by Americans whose activity is linked with monitoring implementation of this treaty. Brigadier General Roland Lajoie is a director of the U.S. on-site inspection agency, and Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Kelly is head of the U.S. inspection group. They both noted the Soviet side's precise observance of all tenets of the treaty. All problems that arise are being settled by representatives of the two armies in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation.

[Begin recording] [Kelly, speaking in Russian] A task was set which, in my view, we have fulfilled. The most important point in the fulfillment of this task is, I think, the friendly attitude, professionalism, and knowledge of your officer corps. We worked out and developed with them a single method for carrying out inspections. They displayed a high degree of professionalism and capability in all aspects.

[Lajoie, speaking in English with superimposed Russian translation] As director of the agency responsible for monitoring the Soviet-U.S. treaty, I would like to say that our side is perfectly satisfied with the positive beginning of this treaty's implementation.

[Unidentified speaker in English with superimposed Russian translation] The Soviet Union invited representatives of the public from various countries to the missile destruction at Saryozek and Kapustin Yar. Do you intend to act in the same way with regard to the destruction of U.S. missiles in Longhorn?

[Lajoie] Yes, on 8 September we have invited U.S. press representatives to our base at Longhorn. They will witness the first destruction of the U.S. Pershing missiles, which will be carried out by means of continuous firing. This is a less spectacular way than the Soviet explosion of the missiles, but just as effective. I fully support the tasks and aims of the Soviet-U.S. treaty. Since its inception, there has been a systematic elimination of mass destruction weapons for the first time in the world. [end recording]

Reception 'Beyond Expectations'

LD3008162988 Moscow TASS in English
1606 GMT 30 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow August 30 TASS—The USSR and the USA have successfully completed a series of inspections at military facilities, during which they checked on sites of deployment, numbers and classes of missiles to be destroyed in line with the INF Treaty. Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, director of the on-site inspection agency of the U.S. Defence Department, described the work of American inspectors at a news conference held here today.

The brigadier general said that the reception accorded to them at Soviet military facilities had been beyond all their expectations. The two sides worked in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding. Roland Lajoie went on to say. His inspectors met at missile bases openness which staggered them, he added.

General Lajoie noted that he did not see in future any serious difficulties with respect to verification at the stage of missile destruction. American inspectors were present at their elimination. The USSR has destroyed 22 intermediate-range missiles and over 50 shorter-range missiles. The USA will start liquidating missiles on September 8.

In the opinion of Lajoie, in case the USA and the USSR reach an agreement on a 50-per-cent cut in strategic offensive weapons, the process of verification will be more difficult. However, these complicated problems can be resolved, he pointed out.

Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Kelly, another participant in the news conference, participated in 15 inspections in a period between July 1, when verifications of initial data started, and up to this day. He pointed to high professionalism of Soviet Army men. The two sides, he noted, found common language on all outstanding questions and worked out common methods of verifications.

U.S. Detonates Underground Nuclear Device

LD3108072488 Moscow TASS in English
0709 GMT 31 Aug 88

[Text] Washington August 31 TASS—The United States detonated an underground nuclear device at the Nevada test site on Tuesday.

The U.S. Department of Energy announced that the detonation was aimed at testing military hardware. The yield of the nuclear explosive device was not reported.
ABM Review Meeting Concludes in Geneva
LD3108121788 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1226 GMT 31 Aug 88


The sides discussed the state of the operation of the treaty. Advocating the consolidation of the treaty, they also drew attention to the need to resolve questions related to its implementation that cause concern for one or the other side.

The sides did not elaborate any joint documents. Each of them will publish their own appropriate statement on the results of the discussion.

'Substantial Progress' at Nuclear Test Talks
LD3108191888 Moscow TASS in English 1914 GMT 31 Aug 88

[Text] Geneva August 31 TASS—The delegations to the Soviet-American full-scale talks on the elimination and ultimate cessation of nuclear testing held here today the first plenary session of the new round.

The head of the Soviet delegation, Igor Palenykh, set out the Soviet side’s assessment of the path traversed and made remarks concerning further advancement towards the solution of the task of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear weapon tests.

He pointed to substantial progress in the course of the talks and in implementing the first stage of the joint Soviet-American verification experiment.

He emphasised that the task of completing the coordination of a new protocol to the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was a top-priority task for the near future.

Simultaneously, the Soviet side expressed the readiness to continue at a fast pace the coordination of improved verification measures and the elaboration of a corresponding protocol to the Soviet-American 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests.

The success of the first stage of the joint experiment at Nevada test site on August 17 and the forthcoming second stage in Semipalatinsk on September 14 would make it possible to shape the final decision on the mechanism of verifying the restrictions on the nuclear tests under these treaties, complete the drafting of the corresponding protocol to the 1974 treaty and ratify these treaties.

SOVIET UNION

The head of the Soviet delegation pointed out that it was important to keep the momentum that characterised the previous round of the talks so as to complete already this year work on agreeing upon the improved mechanism of verifying compliance with the 1974 and 1976 treaties and turn without delay to elaborating further restrictions on nuclear tests moving towards the final objective, that of their final termination.

Nine P-2's Depart Heilbronn Area for U.S.
LD0109173188 Moscow TASS in English 1645 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Heilbronn (FRG) September 1 TASS—The removal of Pershing 2 missiles that are subject to elimination under the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty began at the U.S. Waldhede military base near Heilbronn today.

To the cheers of members of the anti-war movement who gathered there, a convoy of nine rocket launchers rolled out of the gate of the base, heading for the technical centre in the city of Hausen where they are to be destroyed.

Twelve transporters carrying missile motors, Pershing 2 control and guidance systems left the territory of the base half an hour later. This cargo will go to the United States and will be destroyed at specially equipped plants.

U.S. Statement on Krasnoyarsk 'Groundless' Obstacle in ABM Talks
LD0109164388 Moscow TASS in English 1614 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS—TASS news analyst Valeriy Vavilov writes:

An attempt to accuse the Soviet Union of violating international commitments was made again at the current meeting of representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva. The meeting had been called with a view to reviewing compliance with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

The U.S. delegation circulated a statement emphasizing that “the continuing existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar makes it impossible any future arms agreements in the S.T.A.R.T. or defense or space areas”.

In this connection Phyllis Oakley, spokeswoman of the U.S. Department of State, said the Krasnoyarsk radar constituted “a significant violation” of the central element of the ABM Treaty and therefore it should be dismantled without delay and without any preconditions.
How should one view such unfounded and groundless contentions by the U.S. side? Why did they surface at a time when ways became visible for a practical improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations in main directions which determine the destiny of mankind?

Such a stand of Washington is viewed by authoritative Soviet military and political circles only as a demarche by certain influential American circles that seek to hinder this positive process in any way. The Krasnoyarsk radar has been chosen only as a pretext, as a way to torpedo the Geneva talks. The Soviet Union is known to have already made big compromises including those concerning the Krasnoyarsk radar. Representatives of the U.S. Senate visited the site. A U.S. spokesman confirmed in U.S. Congress that the USSR was fulfilling its obligations under the ABM Treaty.

At present the Soviet Union is prepared for an inspection: It is ready to allow American specialists to visit the radar station: Let them sit there as much as they like and monitor, although Washington, previously, too, already saw that the radar by its technical characteristics—frequencies and directivity—did not contradict the terms of the ABM Treaty.

The argument as to the unlawfulness of its location—in the centre of Siberia, and not near borders, at the periphery, is ridiculous. But this does not change the essence of the matter: Its location is accounted for only by the convenience of means of communications the network of which in that part of the Soviet Union is not particularly developed.

The readiness of the Soviet Union for a compromise, right up to the mothballing of the radar, by no means removes our concern over Washington’s violations of the ABM Treaty. These are the treaty’s “broad interpretation” which is being intensively propagated, the pushing through of a program for the development of exotic weapons, the deployment of big phased-array radars outside U.S. territory—in Britain, in the area of Fylingdales, and in Thule (Greenland)—and further development of the “Star Wars” program.

Issues concerning SDI, ABM, and military programs are now being widely debated in the United States. Individual aspects of these are put forward as trump cards in the speeches made by the country’s presidential nominees. But is it worthwhile to turn situation-determined interests of the election campaign into a stumbling block in Soviet-American relations? It is precisely these relations that the destiny of mankind, the destiny of civilisation depends upon.

Soviet Statement at ABM Talks Defends Stand on Radars
PM0209905688 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Sep 88
Second Edition p 6

["Statement of the USSR Delegation on the Results of the Review of the Operation of the ABM Treaty"]

[Text] In accordance with the provisions of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems, talks were held in Geneva 24-31 August 1988 between representatives of the USSR and the United States to review the treaty after another 5 years of its operation.

The Soviet side proceeded on the basis that the review should lead to the strengthening of the ABM Treaty, which is of key significance for ensuring further progress in the disarmament sphere and strengthening strategic stability and international security. The preservation and strengthening of this treaty is the common concern of its participants—the USSR and the United States.

The USSR delegation conducted all the discussions in a nonconfrontational spirit, with the aim of seeking mutually acceptable decisions both as regards the political reaffirmation of the sides' commitment to the objectives and tasks of the treaty, and as regards the quest for concrete technical decisions that could lead to the removal of mutual concerns in unclear situations that have arisen in the exchange of opinions between the sides.

The Soviet delegation sought to ensure that the reaffirmation of commitment to the treaty and the agreed outlines concerning ways of eliminating the two sides' concerns would be reflected in a joint statement or communiqué, which would be published as a result of the review of the treaty's operation. Unfortunately, this proved impossible because of the American side's reluctance to give practical consideration to the Soviet side's concerns and its desire to reduce the entire review of the operation of the ABM Treaty to the acceptance by the Soviet side of the American demand for the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar station, which does not yet exist.

On the basis of the results of the discussion, the American side published a unilateral statement which gives an unobjective assessment of the existing situation.

The present statement by the USSR delegation sets forth the facts that give a true picture of the situation as regards compliance with the ABM Treaty and the nature of the discussions that took place.

On the question of the radar station under construction in the Krasnoyarsk region, the Soviet side once again confirmed that this station is intended for the tracking of space objects and does not come under the ABM Treaty.
restrictions. Despite this, the United States continues to attribute missile attack warning functions to it. These American claims are based not on facts, but on assumptions and subjective evaluations.

In order to show goodwill and in the attempt to remove the concern that had arisen on the part of the United States, we expressed readiness to dismantle the equipment of this station in a way that would be verifiable and would cause the United States no doubts, if an accord were reached on compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972.

The American side also expressed concern in connection with the relocation of individual components of radar stations known in the United States as “Pawn Shop” and “Flat Twin” from the Sary-Shagan testing range to the Gomel region, which the American side regards, without foundation, as the start of the deployment of ABM radar stations.

On the basis of the facts we cited and a visit by U.S. official representatives to the Gomel region, the American side saw for itself that in fact the individual components of the “Flat Twin” radar station and the “Pawn Shop” truck are being used in the region in question in order to set up measurement testing grounds for the testing and tuning of mirror antennas that are used widely in the country’s national economy. These operations are in no way contrary to the ABM Treaty.

At the same time we stated that in the context of removing the two sides’ concerns over questions of compliance with the ABM Treaty, the Soviet side would be prepared for a radical solution to the question of the individual remaining components of the “Flat Twin” radar station and the “Pawn Shop” truck to which the American side refers.

The American side once again raised the question that the Soviet Union could be preparing an ABM defense system for its territory. Here the assertions cited earlier were enumerated, assertions to which the Soviet side had supplied the necessary replies. Neither any one of the questions raised individually nor all of them together provide grounds for the expression of such concern by the United States.

The Soviet side also submitted a number of constructive proposals which, in the event of their implementation, would promote the resolution of other questions raised on both sides, namely:

— to draw up an accord to the effect that the sides would inform each other beforehand about plans for the construction of large phased-array radar stations and indicate their purpose;

— to agree on features making it possible to distinguish ABM radar stations from other radar stations;

— to draw up procedures for the dismantling or destruction of ABM radar stations on testing ranges;

— to permit Soviet representatives to visit the American radar station in Greenland and the construction of a launch site for “balloon rockets” on Shemya Island, to enable the Soviet Union to study on the basis of factual material U.S. actions which, according to the information available, it assesses either as a violation of the treaty (the Greenland radar station) or as a situation causing concern (the Shemya Island construction site).

Unfortunately our proposals did not meet with a positive response from the American side. Contrary to the true state of affairs, it continues to issue unfounded denials or to claim that it does not see that serious Soviet concerns exist with regard to U.S. compliance with treaty commitments. The American side did not respond to some of our proposals, and its answers on the other questions cannot be deemed satisfactory.

Nor did the American side show willingness to take any steps to rectify the violations of the ABM Treaty which it has committed.

Since 1975 the Soviet side has been expressing concern over the U.S. deployment of large phased-array radar stations of the “Pave Paws” type on U.S. territory and elsewhere. The essence of our concern is that these large radar stations have parameters sufficient to carry out the tasks of ABM radar stations. In conjunction with the radar station at the Grand Forks base, these stations could provide a radar base for an ABM defense of U.S. territory, which is incompatible with the provisions of Article 1 of the ABM Treaty prohibiting the creation of a base for ABM defense of the country’s territory.

Particular concern is caused the Soviet side by the U.S. violation of the ABM Treaty in the deployment of a new “Pave Paws” large phased-array radar station in Greenland after the treaty came into force, and the construction of a similar radar station in Britain. Under the ABM Treaty, the deployment of large phased-array radar stations having a potential exceeding 3 million watts is strictly regulated, taking into account the purpose of such radar stations. Missile attack warning radar stations with the above characteristics are permitted to be deployed only on the periphery of the national territory, oriented toward the outside.

The American large phased-array radar station at Thule (Greenland) has a potential considerably in excess of 3 million watts. The Thule region does not constitute a position on the perimeter of U.S. national territory. The American side itself has indicated that the radar station at Thule is intended for missile attack warning. Consequently the deployment of a large phased-array radar station in the Thule region is a violation of the ABM Treaty.
The construction that has begun of a similar radar station at Fylingdales (Britain) is a similar violation.

The Soviet side also expressed other concerns with regard to U.S. compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

Seeking to find solutions to the specific issues that have arisen, the Soviet side demonstrated in practice its readiness to eliminate the two sides' concerns. Naturally, the quest for solutions should take place on a reciprocal basis and should not distract attention from the most important thing—the sides' reaffirmation of their commitment to the objectives and provisions of the ABM Treaty.

Through no fault of ours, it proved impossible to achieve positive solutions to the questions examined at the talks. However, the Soviet side believes that joint efforts with the aim of seeking fundamental solutions could be continued, and we will work toward this. In particular, a mechanism established by the treaty exists for the examination of concerns expressed by the sides—the Standing Consultative Commission. The next session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva in the fall of this year should be used specifically for this work, including work in accordance with instructions that could be given to the Standing Consultative Commission as a result of the forthcoming meeting between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Genscher Against Rush To Modernize Missiles
AU2208134888 Bonn DIE WELT in German
22 Aug 88 p 8

["U. R."] article: "Genscher Sees No Time Pressure in Modernizing Short-Range Missiles"

[Text] After the summer recess, in the course of this fall, the Security Council will again deal with the issue concerning the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles. However, it is not likely that the Council will deviate from its position outlined this spring in connection with a conventional disarmament concept, according to which there is no need to decide anything at the moment, but according to which, in the Government's view, the Western defense alliance must reserve for itself the "option" of modernization.

In an interview given over the weekend, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher emphasized various positions of the government on this issue. However, he failed to mention that, in Bonn's view, the modernization option does exist. On the contrary, he pointed out that nuclear weapons with a range of below 500 km "are of the least importance in deterring wars."

The Chancellor's Office stressed that Genscher did not say anything that contradicted the government's position. The chancellor has already emphasized that in this sphere—just as in the conventional sphere—ceilings must be agreed on. According to the Chancellor's Office, it was also clear that the government is not under pressure to act. Yesterday [21 August] Genscher told WELT AM SONNTAG: "Within the framework of the overall concept, it must be decided what will happen with the short-range missiles. We are under no time pressure whatsoever." The foreign minister stressed that the short-range missiles would be put out of action "in 1995 at the earliest."

The FDP politician incorporated into his arguments against modernization the "philosophy" of the NATO dual-track decision and of the INF Treaty against the scrapping of intermediate-range missiles [as published]. This agreement has brought more, and not less security to Europe. Therefore, "no fresh armament efforts are required to compensate for a security deficit."

Whereas Bonn would like to have the role of the short-range missiles defined in connection with conventional stability, and rejects isolated decisions on the modernization of individual weapons systems, NATO pursues a different direction. Europe's NATO Commander in Chief Galvin, recently said that he "pursues" modernization. This concerns 88 NATO Lance missiles, which have a range of slightly more than 100 km. Galvin spoke in favor of the production of "surface-to-surface missiles with a longer range, maybe up to 450 km." The parts that are missing in the protective wall of NATO after the implementation of the INF Treaty must be replaced, he pointed out. The FRG Government, however, rejects the idea "to compensate for the elimination of intermediate-range missiles by increasing short-range weapons."

Genscher commented in a rather disparaging manner on the significance of Galvin's order to analyze the structure of the short-range arsenal. "The preparation of analyses lies within the responsibility of the military." He contrasted this with the political decision on the role of these missiles within an overall concept.

Paper Names 2 September for Missiles Withdrawal
LD2408194988 Hamburg DPA in German
1904 GMT 24 Aug 88

[Text] Heilbronn (DPA)—According to the HEILBRONNER STIMME newspaper, the first battery of nuclear intermediate-range missiles will be withdrawn from the U.S. Pershing base at Waltheide in Heilbronn on 2 September. It concerns nine missiles from the 4th battalion of the 9th U.S. Field Artillery Brigade.

The newspaper writes that, according to their sources a "public demonstration" is planned by the U.S. Army for the middle of October in the Frankfurt suburb of Hausen. The destruction of the missile carriers will be carried out in what has until now been used as the Pershing repair center there.

The newspaper continues that, in contrast to the original plan, the Americans did not want the withdrawal of the first missiles from Heilbronn to be accompanied by a great public display of pomp. Federal Defense Minister Rupert Scholz, who wanted to attend, will be prevented from doing so by other engagements.

This was conveyed to DPA in an edited version.

Scholz Says NATO Nuclear Artillery Cuts Possible
LD2508111588 Hamburg DPA in German
0833 GMT 25 Aug 88

[Excerpts] Bonn, DPA—Federal Defense Minister Rupert Scholz (CDU) regards a further withdrawal of nuclear warheads for artillery from Western Europe as possible. At the annual meeting of the Clausewitz Society at the Bundeswehr University in Hamburg, Scholz said today that nuclear weapons in Europe "must be limited to the absolutely essential minimum number." In order for the alliance strategy of flexible response to remain effective, the minimum quantity, range, and composition of nuclear weapons of the alliance in and for Europe must be established anew, taking account of the threat and the security of the alliance.

"These weapons must ensure a credible deterrence, which includes their modernization," Scholz emphasized. In Western Europe there are still 4,600 nuclear
warheads stored. NATO has in recent years unilaterally withdrawn 2,400 warheads from Europe. This means that the alliance has reduced its nuclear potential in Europe by a third and removed four times as many warheads as is now occurring within the framework of the INF Treaty, Scholz said. The Soviet Union has until now replied to these steps with a massive modernization of its short-range nuclear missiles. [passage omitted]

Scholz said that in nuclear potential the Warsaw Pact in Europe has a superiority of three to one. According to Scholz, the NATO overall concept for disarmament, which is currently being prepared by the alliance, should not and will not establish a new security policy course of the Western alliance. Rather, proven and established concepts and objectives should be brought together in a logical overall concept for the future perspectives of an alliance strategy.

According to Scholz, the realities are not yet suitable for an entry into partnership with the Soviet Union on questions of security. However, Scholz once again offered Moscow his support for a concept of mutual security. What is needed is the readiness to afford an equal measure of reciprocal security. "Until today we have not seen any restriction of the Soviet military armaments programs, although the Soviet Union already possesses an overwhelming superiority in the conventional area."
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