Arms Control

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New Options in U.S. Security Strategy Viewed
HK0209130088 Beijing REMIN RIBAO in Chinese
2 Sep 88 p 6

["Newsletter from America" by REMIN RIBAO
reporters Jing Xianfa (2529 2009 3127) and Cang Lide
(0221 4539 1795): “U.S. Security Strategy Faces New
Options”]

[Text] Washington, 31 Aug—In recent days, impressive
changes have emerged one after another in the interna-
tional situation: The United States and the Soviet
Union have signed the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union has started
withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan, and there has
been a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, which has been
going on for 8 years; Angola, Cuba, and South Africa
have reached a cease-fire agreement in principle, and
there is also a gradual trend toward relaxation in other
regional conflicts. The global trend of “hot spots turning
cold” represents a new situation emerging for the first
time since World War II. At present, both the govern-
ment and the public in the United States are conducting
a heated debate on this new world pattern. These report-
ers recently interviewed in Washington a number of
veteran experts in strategic studies. Although they dif-
fered in their viewpoints, their basic view was: The post-
war era in which the United States and the Soviet
Union contend for hegemony by means of nuclear weap-
ons and conventional wars is over for the time being
and the U.S. security strategy is facing new options.

A primary factor causing the United States to make new
options is that U.S.-Soviet relations have gradually move
toward relaxation after a long period of confrontation.
The emergence of this relaxation is chiefly due to the
readjustments and concessions in the Soviet foreign
policy under the impetus of the Soviet “new thinking.”
Since the INF Treaty was signed, especially since the
Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, the
momentum of relaxation has accelerated, evoking strong
repercussions in U.S. public opinion. In the eyes of the
American public, the Soviet Union is still the No. 1
enemy. However, given the considerably long trend of
relaxation, the Soviet threat to U.S. security has dropped
significantly. According to the latest national poll con-
ducted jointly by the Democratic and Republican par-
ties, 59 percent of the people hold that the greatest threat
to U.S. security is economic competition from Japan and
other trading countries, while only 31 percent of the
people hold that the Soviet Union still poses the greatest
threat. After ending his recent 9-nation tour in the Asia
and Pacific region, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz
stated that the days of the superpowers were over and
that “the world today is no longer dominated by one or
two superpowers.” The recent report of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington,
which plays an important consultant role to the U.S.
Government, holds: The days of the cold war are over;
dealing with regional economic and military challenges
and terrorist activities will inevitably become the central
objective of U.S. future diplomacy.

The marked changes in economic relations between the
United States and its allies have fundamentally acceler-
ated the formation of this concept. The post-war U.S.
policy of rebuilding Western Europe and Japan which
was aimed at “curbing communism,” has not only
resulted in a multipolar situation in the Western world
but also created competitors for the United States. A
recent OECD report disclosed: “In the 1960’s and
1970’s, Japan’s actual productivity was four times that of
the United States and the average productivity of several
other major Western industrial countries was also 100
percent higher than that of the United States. In the
mid-1980’s, after the United States turned from the
greatest creditor nation to the greatest debtor nation, the
U.S. position as leader of the Western economy became
even shakier. If the United States cannot raise its pro-
ductivity speedily, its national security and world status
will inevitably be seriously affected. (Sandburg), an
economic strategist serving on President Johnson’s
Council of Economic Advisers, said: The days of
“artillery plus butter” are over and for the first time in
history the United States is facing a situation of choosing
“either artillery or butter.”

In recent years, U.S. interest is also increasingly subject
to the challenge of regional powers, terrorism, and inter-
national drug trafficking activities. In defiance of the
U.S. ban, some countries have broken the U.S. monop-
opoly by vyving with one another to sell modern weapons.
Various terrorist activities aimed at the United States
have mulled, and will continue to make, the United States
pay a high price; the U.S. measures against drugs not
only cost a lot of manpower and financial power but will
probably worsen U.S. relations with the “backyard”
countries in Latin America. What has caused the United
States a greater headache is that when the United States
tried to take “extraordinary actions” against the chal-
lenge of what it calls the “gray zone,” some Western
allies repeatedly refused to cooperate by “singing a
different tune.” For example, France refused to permit
U.S. bombers raiding Libya to fly over its territorial air
space.

In the face of these new changing factors, what options
does the United States have for its new pattern of
national security?

In the ongoing heated debate, many senior politicians
and strategic study experts, including former presiden-
tial national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and
former Defense Secretary Harold Brown, stick to their
own views. Some of the concepts meriting attention are
as follows:

—Change the traditional concept of being the “world’s
police” by allowing the allies to assume more defense
responsibilities on regional security issues; when the
regional conflict does not threaten U.S. security inter-
est, the United States should not dispatch troops to
intervene;
But in the mid-1970's when conflicts in the region increased, most of the oil-rich Mideast countries, usually with a limited weapons production capability, began to purchase munitions from various arms manufacturers, it said.

It quoted statistics by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that put the Mideast's military expenditure in 1972 at more than 7.5 billion dollars, twice that of Latin America and almost three times that of the South Asian subcontinent.

Since the early 1980's, Mideast's military expenditure has increased to become the greatest in the world, it said.

According to preliminary estimates of the yearly report recently published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Mideast countries remain major purchasers of world's munitions in 1987 with Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel importing munitions worth 12 billion dollars, 30 percent of the world's total munitions trade.

Saudi Arabia and Britain signed an arms contract worth 12 billion dollars on August 7 of this year.

The biweekly pointed out that many of the world's top-level conventional weapons have appeared on Mideast's arms market, such as the U.S.-Made F-15 and F-16 fighters, the E-3A and E-2C early warning planes, M-60 tanks, and the "Maverick" and "Stinger" missiles. The Soviet Union also has made available the MiG-23, -25 and -29 fighters, S-20 bombers, T-72 tanks and SAM series missiles. France is selling Mirage fighters, AMX-30 tankers, Exocet missiles, SAL missile carriers, while Britain is selling the Hurricane fighters and a wide range of military hardware.

At present about 40 countries export munitions to the Mideast with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France leading the pack.

"Since the end of the Second World War, these four countries account for three-quarters of the Mideast's total arms imports," the magazine said.

Most war planes, tanks, large bore cannons and various kinds of missiles which were used in the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the Iran-Iraq war are from these four countries, it said.

According to a report by AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, it said, in 1987 these four countries sold arms worth 29.2 billion dollars, 83 percent of the world's total arms trade value, and it went mainly to the Mideast.

In May of this year THE NEW YORK TIMES disclosed a secret report submitted to the Congress by the United States State Department which says that the total weapons sale value this year will reach 15 billion dollars, 3.3 billion dollars more than last year.
The magazine said since the 1980's began, especially after the breakout of the Iran-Iraq war, changes have taken place in the sources from which Mideast countries obtain weapons.

"In the past, the United States and Western countries sold arms to Israel, while the Soviet Union sold mainly to Arab countries," it pointed out. Now, the magazine said, both the United States and the Soviet Union sell arms to Iran and Iraq.

It quoted the U.S. WALL STREET JOURNAL as saying that 75 percent of Iraq's weapons are from the Soviet Union and East Europe, while the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT claims that the Soviet Union has also allowed its allies in Eastern Europe and the Mideast to provide various types of guns, ammunition and spare parts to Iran.

According to foreign agencies, it said, while claiming neutrality towards the Iran-Iraq war, the United States sold a large amount of arms to Iraq, then in 1986's "Irangate" incident, the U.S. also used Tow and Hawk missiles worth 30 million dollars to exchange for U.S. hostages held by Iran.

YOUTH AFRICA [JEUNE AFRIQUE] magazine has disclosed that Israel is the prime source of Iran's weapons, it said.

According to the biweekly, what merits attention is that some Third World countries have also entered the international arms market.

"In 1980, Brazil exported munitions worth 500 million dollars, in 1983 the export value had climbed to two billion dollars. In January of this year, Brazil sold 1000 tanks to Saudi Arabia and in June, it made a deal for weapons worth two billion dollars with Libya," it said.
HONG KONG

Necessity, Difficulty of Buying Advanced Missiles
HK1309010788 Hong Kong HONGKONG STANDARD
in English 13 Sep 88 p 6

[By Tammy Tam]

[Text] China wants to buy advanced missiles from the United States and the Soviet Union to boost its national defence, a Chinese arms dealer's representative said yesterday.

Mr Ji Shungyi, secretary of the president of China Great Wall Industry Corp, said a the same time China would continue its weapons sales to third countries under strict regulations.

Mr Ji's firm deals in the import and export of weapons and other precision machinery.

Mr Ji was among a ten-man delegation to Britain's Farnborough Airshow to prepare for the Aviation Expo/China'89. They will stay in Hong Kong for three days.

"China wants to buy Soviet and U.S. missiles because their technologies on the field are quite advanced," Mr Ji said.

He admitted it was not a simple question, for the purchase of such high-tech weapons was a very sensitive political issue.

"The United States and the Soviet Union are not very willing to export their high-tech arms to China, so although we do want to import some foreign weapons, there is not much we can do at present," Mr Ji added.

Early this month when U.S. Defence Minister Frank Carlucci visited China, his Chinese counterpart Qin Jiwei expressed his country's desire for the transfer of more U.S. military technology.

On ties with the Soviet Union, Mr Ji said the relationship had been improving over the past few years. But arms trade was another question.

Mr Ji said his firm faced difficulties in the import of advanced weapons.

Quoting Minister Qin, he said arms sales to Third World countries would continue as China was still a poor nation.

Mr Ji said facts, on recent reports of missile sales, had been distorted. Moreover, China's ability for missile production was still limited.

Most of China's arms buyers are from the Middle East. Western experts believe China now ranks fourth in arms sales to the Third World.

Chinese weapons are believed to be cheaper than those produced in the West.
INTRABLOC

Hungarian-USSR Maneuvers Scheduled
LD0209205488 Budapest MTI in English
1655 GMT 2 Sep 88

[Text] Budapest, September 2 (MTI)—In accordance with the training plan of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty, the units of the Hungarian People's Army and the designated staffs and troops of the Soviet Army are to hold joint military manoeuvres in Hungary, on the military training grounds north of Lake Balaton from October 15 to 20. The manoeuvres will be aimed at improving command and cooperation.

In keeping with the Stockholm document, Hungary informed through diplomatic channels the participating states in the CSCE process and simultaneously invited military observers since the number of troops would surpass 17,000 in some manoeuvres.

The military exercise will be commanded by Lieutenant General Yuriy Vodolazov, first deputy of the commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group temporarily stationed in Hungary. His Hungarian deputy will be Brigadier General Antal Annus, high-level commander.

Kessler, Warsaw Pact Generals Hold Talks
LD0809141088 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1324 GMT 8 Sep 88

[Text] Berlin, 8 Sep (ADN)—Army General Heinz Kessler, GDR defense minister and member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee; Army General Anatolly Gribkov, chief of staff of the joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states; and Army General Ivan Treytk, deputy commander in chief of the joint Armed Forces and commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces, held an exchange of views on the current military-political situation and the defense tasks of the allied armies in Berlin on Thursday.

The first disarmament successes could not be overlooked, the two sides said. At the same time, the present NATO autumn maneuvers and the efforts by certain circles to compensate for the intermediate-range missiles due to be destroyed would not be conducive to the further course of detente.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSSR Officials Issue Statements on Disarmament Proposal

Delegate Offers Proposal in Geneva
LD2508192388 Prague CTK in English
1805 GMT 25 Aug 88

[Text] Prague (CTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak delegate to the disarmament conference here Milos Vejvoda today pointed out the [word indistinct] in the whole course of the duration of the conference participants failed to set up a working committee to discuss the issue of a nuclear test ban.

Milos Vejvoda submitted as an official document of the conference a Czechoslovak draft mandate which is of a compromise character and could facilitate the opening of talks as a first step leading to a general nuclear weapons test ban.

In another part of his address, Vejvoda referred to talks and a ban on chemical weapons. He stressed the aim is a total ban on chemical weapons, their complete destruction and ruling out of their production in the future, also in the civilian chemical production. All participating countries in general agree with this idea but reality is [word indistinct], he said and mentioned some proposals presented recently which could lead to the elimination of chemical weapons of some states on the one hand but on the other would allow other countries to continue their production. Some countries which so far do not own chemical weapons could start producing them. This approach runs counter to elementary logic and to the aims of a future convention, Milos Vejvoda said.

Spokesman on Compromise Proposal
AU2908160888 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
27 Aug 88 p 3

[Unattributed report: "How To Arrive at an Agreement in Geneva: Spokesman for the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Our Proposal"]

[Text] As has already been reported, the head of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference spoke at its session on Thursday [25 August], and submitted a draft mandate which would facilitate opening talks as the first step to the universal ban on tests of nuclear weapons. In this connection RUDE PRAVO asked Dusan Rovenisky, spokesman for the CSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what the essence of our proposal is and what the response to it has been.

As is known, a complex situation has arisen at the deliberations of the Geneva Disarmament Conference on precisely the issue of the talks on the universal ban of tests of nuclear weapons. Contradictory views exist. Thus it was obvious that the situation requires a solution which would make it possible to act constructively and flexibly. Therefore, our Czechoslovak delegation came forward with a compromise proposal. The essence of it is that we propose setting up a work committee which would discuss the structure and the extent of the future agreement on a universal and total ban of tests of nuclear weapons. In this it would always take into consideration the proposals to date. This would enable progress to be made, and the talks could get out of their present difficult situation.
A number of delegations at the Geneva Disarmament Conference responded positively to our initiative. We have the full support of the socialist countries. Japan, Canada, Senegal, Sweden, and some other countries responded positively too.

Comparison of CSSR Delegate’s Geneva Speech

[Text] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 26 August on page 1 carries a 280-word CTK Geneva dispatch, entitled “Czechoslovak Proposal,” on Czechoslovak delegate Milos Vevoda’s speech at the 25 August plenary session of the conference on disarmament. This item has been compared with the CTK English version published in the 30 August East Europe Daily Report, page 1, and found to be identical, which permits the following fills:

Paragraph one, sentence one reads in PRAVDA: pointed out the fact that in the whole (supplying indistinct words);

Paragraph three, sentence three reads in PRAVDA: but reality is different, he said and (supplying indistinct word).

CSSR Observers View Military Exercises in FRG
LD0609174788 Prague CTK in English
1639 GMT 6 Sep 88

[Text] Prague Sept 6—Joint military exercises of the United States, West Germany, Canada, France, and Denmark “certain challenge 88” started on the West German territory today and will last till September 26, West German authorities announced.

In accord with the Stockholm Conference document on confidence and security building measures and disarmament in Europe, Czechoslovak observers will participate in the exercise.

U.S. Disarmament Official Rowny Visits Prague

Rowny Meets Army General Brychta
LD0709165188 Prague CTK in English
1521 GMT 7 Sep 88

[Text] Prague Sept 7 (CTK)—Special U.S. presidential adviser for questions of disarmament Edward L. Lowny met here today with First Deputy Chief of the Czechoslovak Army General Staff Lieutenant-General Jiri Brychta.

The two officials exchanged views on the military and political aspects of disarmament talks, in particular the talks on halving strategic offensive weapons and possible talks on conventional forces and armament of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries.

They discussed the military part of the Czechoslovak proposal for establishing a zone of confidence and cooperation along the line dividing Warsaw Treaty and NATO states.

Rowny Meets With Journalists
LD0709210488 Prague CTK in English
2025 GMT 7 Sep 88

[Text] Prague Sept 7 (CTK)—The presidential campaign in the United States and the forthcoming change in the White House do not influence the pace of the Geneva Soviet-American discussions on strategic and space weapons, U.S. special presidential adviser Edward Rowny told journalists before departure here today.

Edward Rowny paid a three-day visit to Czechoslovakia.

The United States is interested in the conclusion of the treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, he said, adding that the treaty is not expected to be concluded during the mandate of President Reagan, i.e., till the end of January.

The United States considers the INF a success and will strive for a reduction of the strategic and conventional weapons, he said. Dealing with the space armament, Edward Rowny defended the absurd idea of the U.S. Government that the Strategic Defence Initiative program (SDI) is not in contrast with the disarmament efforts. He repeated the U.S. allegations that the Soviet Union violates the 1972 ABM Treaty and rejected the Soviet Union’s demand for its original interpretation. According to Rowny the United States does not violate it.

Dealing with the Czechoslovak initiative proposing a zone of cooperation along the Warsaw Treaty and NATO borderline the U.S. presidential adviser stressed that it is a good idea from a country with a strategic position because it is aimed at higher security in the future, and added that this item can be discussed on the level of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.

Observers To Attend Military Exercises in FRG
LD0709181288 Prague CTK in English
1605 GMT 7 Sep 88

[Text] Prague Sept 7 (CTK)—Czechoslovak observers will participate on September 8-13, 1988 in military exercises of West German, American, French, and Canadian troops in FRG code-named Landesverteidigung.

The exercises are held in September 2 to 13.

The Czechoslovak observers will participate in the manoeuvres in harmony with the Stockholm Conference document on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe.
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Message Sent To Perez de Cuellar on Disarmament
AU1908134588 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 18 Aug 88 p 5

[Text] New York (ADN)—In a letter to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, the GDR has explained its point of view on questions of regional disarmament, especially in Europe. In the letter, which was presented to UN headquarters in New York on Wednesday [17 August], the GDR reports in detail on the events of the International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones which took place in Berlin in June.

Referring to the latest international developments in the sector of security and disarmament policy, the GDR's initiatives concerning the creation of a nuclear weapons-free corridor and a chemical weapons-free zone in central Europe are explained. The proposals of the Warsaw Pact states are pointed out.

HUNGARY

Varkonyi Addresses Disarmament Delegations
LD2908220688 Budapest MTI in English 1948 GMT 29 Aug 88

[Text] Budapest, August 29 (MTI)—Politicians, high-ranking military leaders and researchers of five Warsaw Treaty and five NATO member states are to start a conference on conventional disarmament in Europe in Budapest on Tuesday [30 Aug].

The organizers, the Hungarian Institute for Foreign Affairs and the New York-based Institute for East-West Security Studies, have invited representatives of Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union as well as Britain, France, the FRG, Italy and the United States to the Hungarian capital.

The two-day conference is to discuss behind closed doors the state, structure and location of armed forces and weaponry in Europe, the ways of eliminating the danger of surprise attacks, and changes in military doctrines.

Monday evening Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi gave a dinner in honour of the participants.

In his welcome address Peter Varkonyi stressed that the senior experts in disarmament were meeting in a period of promising improvements in East-West relations and Soviet-American ties which are to no small extent due to the realization that war is inconceivable and the major global problems can only be settled in cooperation, with respect for one another's interests.

As a major manifestation of the new way of foreign policy thinking, the Warsaw Treaty member states emphasized already in the mid-1980s that conventional disarmament would become a decisive component of arms limitation in Europe. This [words indistinct] by the Budapest appeal in 1986 which was creatively further developed in the Berlin and Warsaw sessions of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee.

Peter Varkonyi expressed the conviction that the issue of the balance and reduction of conventional forces in Europe cannot be approached solely from military aspects. We need a concept that integrates disarmament, together with the enforcement of economic, political, cultural and human rights, into the system of international relations, he said. By now appropriate frameworks have been created for this process in Europe. The same principles can and should be asserted on global scale.

Peter Varkonyi emphasized that Hungary has profound interest in any kind of disarmament but first of all in the reduction of armed forces and weaponry in Europe. We hold that Hungary, due to its geographical location and political situation, would be an appropriate site for testing disarmament measures that could later be applied on the whole continent. These measures could refer to both the Hungarian People's Army and the foreign forces stationed on our territory. This is dictated not only by broader political considerations but also by our fundamental domestic policy and economic interest, Peter Varkonyi said.

Disarmament Discussed at Roundtable in Budapest

NATO, Warsaw Pact Experts Convene Conference
LD3008194188 Budapest MTI in English 1648 GMT 30 Aug 88

[Text] Budapest, August 30 (MTI)—Peter Hardi, director of the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Institute, summarized the first day of the Budapest conference of leading disarmament experts of five Warsaw Treaty and five NATO member states, in an interview with MTI. He said that a constructive dialogue has come about between experts. The first contributions indicate that the talks related to conventional disarmament require an even more complex approach than the debates on the restriction of nuclear weapons. The world, therefore, has to prepare for a long series of negotiations in this issue. The firm political determination mainly of the concerned decision-makers, ruling politicians and military leaders, is needed for successful dialogue.

The general opinion is that so far only the level of political declarations has been reached in issues of conventional forces and weapons. Analyzing the complex theme package, it already seems certain that the questions should be placed on the agenda of talks in several phases, that certain priorities have to be designated as starting points, at the same time not excluding any issues of detail from the sphere of discussions. The participants also agree, Peter Hardi said, that the central
regions of Europe will be the venues for the first steps of conventional disarmament. It is, however, as yet not clear where the borders of the concerned areas will be fixed.

Roundtable Ends
LD3109212588 Budapest MTT in English
1850 GMT 31 Aug 88

[Text] Budapest, August 31 (MTT)—A two-day international roundtable, at which leading experts of five Warsaw Treaty and five NATO countries discussed an extensive sphere of issues related to the goals of European conventional disarmament, its current state and probable development, ended on Wednesday in Budapest.

As the closing event of the conference, held behind closed doors, an international press conference was given by participants.

Hungarian State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry Gyula Horn discussed the themes in which approximately the same views emerged during the two days among the participants, who attended as private persons.

That the theme of disarmament of conventional weapons and military forces has become a central issue was the most important point, he said. Genuine progress in this field has become vitally important, as the existing situation is extremely dangerous, both the Warsaw Treaty and NATO have military forces which are capable of unexpected attacks against the other side. He added that the East-West relation is burdened with military elements and factors, and major progress cannot be achieved in any one area of relations without pushing these factors to the background.

The state secretary said there are major asymmetries and inequalities in the structure and composition of the military forces, and progress towards the considerable reduction of conventional means cannot be expected without the elimination and reduction of disproportions. He held it important that the sphere of vital issues to be clarified emerged in the debate. These, he said, include the precise and authentic establishment of the military forces possessed by the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. He emphatically stressed the necessity of the exchange of military data and of authentic verification. He pointed out that publicity is indispensable in the military field.

The state secretary said that major differences in views also surfaced. For instance, the extent to which certain services within the conventional forces can be qualified as of an attacking or a defensive nature should be clarified, as is the case which forces should be included in the reduction. In conclusion Gyula Horn said that the debates were extremely heated, but participants strove to respect one another's opinions. He held it important that the various views and conceptions clashed, serving special lessons for all participants, needed by both the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, irrespective of the issue discussed, he said.

Following, participants answered questions. With respect to the American F-16 fighters that are to be deployed to Italy from Spain, Vladimir Shustov, director of the Research and Coordination Centre of the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union, recalled the former proposals of the Soviet Union which recommended the appropriate reduction in the number of Soviet airplanes, in the interest of solving the problem. However, no positive reply was not given by the West. Helmut Sonnefeldt, director of the American Brookings Institute, stressed that the role of the Air Force is a part of the extremely complex range of issues of conventional disarmament. Therefore, the affair of the F-16 planes cannot be separated from the general connections.

THE NEW YORK TIMES correspondent asked if the possibility of withdrawing the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary was raised at the conference. In his answer Gyula Horn said that it was formulated within the entire sphere of problems of disarmament and connection with European disarmament, and that the withdrawal of foreign troops is an organic part of these processes. Without such action the reduction of military tension cannot be conceived. The question of Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary can be placed on the agenda in this context.

Vladimir Shustov, discussing the possibilities of eliminating the asymmetries apparent in armed forces and weapons, said that future talks will mainly be held on this theme. The Soviet Union is ready to solve this issue, and strives to ease European military opposition. He voiced the hope that the Western side will show a similarly constructive approach with respect to the asymmetries that exist to its advantage, and which is a causes of anxiety for the Soviet Union.

USSR's Falin, U.S. Expert on Troop Levels
LD0509014088 Budapest MTT in English
1806 GMT 4 Sep 88

[Text] Budapest, September 4 (MTT)—Sunday evening the “Week” political magazine of Hungarian Television aired interviews with a Soviet, an American and a Hungarian participants in this week's expert conference held in Budapest on European conventional weapons and military forces.

In Western Europe approximately 400,000 foreign soldiers are stationed in foreign land, and this figure is about of the same order in Eastern Europe too, said Soviet expert Valentin Falin. He pointed out that the Warsaw Treaty proposes NATO to agree on how many should remain but “unfortunately, we have received no answer to this question either,” he added.
In connection with the Hungarian proposal that Hungary could be the testing ground for the pullout of foreign troops, Falin said, in reply to a question:

"We are familiar with the Hungarian initiatives. That such initiatives have become possible indicates that highly interesting positive changes are under way in the socialist community. This goes to show that now the principles of equality and common responsibility have come to prevail, without faltering the faces of the individual members of the socialist community."

"I personally welcome the Hungarian proposal and believe that Hungary, with its vast intellectual potential, is capable of further contributions to solving the problems of European security."

According to U.S. expert Helmuth Sonnenfeldt, the fact that a whole range of Soviet proposals have been left unanswered by the West so far "is true in technical terms, because NATO with its sovereign members is a far less mobile organization than the Warsaw Treaty." At the same time he said "it is actually the Soviets who are starting to react" to the years-long Western pressure to deal with the issue of military data, the problems of verification and the question of military asymmetries.

Regarding Hungary's possible role as a testing ground for the reduction of conventional armaments, Sonnenfeldt said that the Soviets "could easily cut by half" their forces here, "they have ample room for taking unilateral moves, all the more as in his view the West "is permanently making such gestures." He said "there is not much sense in waiting for mutual or allegedly mutual steps. If the troops stationed here have attained their aim, if today they cost too much for the Russians, the Soviet Union and Hungary could settle their issue without special difficulty through bilateral decision."

Gyula Horn, under-secretary of state for the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who also attended the conference as an expert, pointed out that what happened was not so much the rapprochement of positions as the clarification of issues that need to be thoroughly studied. He mentioned among the latter themes the perils of the conventional armament process, the necessity to halt it, the same degree of responsibility held in the field by NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and the abolition of asymmetries in the area of armaments.

In his reply Gyula Horn separated the issue of Hungary becoming a testing ground for European armed forces reduction and foreign troop withdrawals. He said the first issue, that is Hungary's inclusion in the first, middle zone of military force reduction, was raised in connection with several themes, and there was the agreement that it would be certainly logical and justified. This phase could see a considerable 25 per cent reduction in armaments, which would also mean the further limitation of military activities and exercises. Gyula Horn said that, all factors considered, this would cut the annual total military expenditure of the Warsaw Treaty by about 60,000-80,000 million dollars.

Gyula Horn did not share the view of Sonnenfeldt that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary is exclusively a matter of Soviet-Hungarian relations. He said one should start from the fact "that the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary or other East European countries is the same anachronism as the presence of American forces in Western Europe. This is a remnant of the Second World War and everybody would benefit from this being eliminated. However, the only relevant circumstance that this whole affair has to be settled within the framework of a comprehensive, that is conventional disarmament. So this is not only a Hungarian-Soviet affair, but also a matter of trends in European power relations."

**ROMANIA**

Romanian Addresses Geneva Disarmament Conference

AU2608131988 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1142 GMT 26 Aug 88

["Romanian Address to the Plenum of the Conference on Disarmament—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Geneva, AGERPRES, 26/08/1988—Taking the floor during the plenary meeting of the conference on disarmament in Geneva the Romanian chief delegate stressed that as the international situation continues to be complex and contradictory, the arms race goes on and the danger of a nuclear war still threatens mankind, even more sustained efforts should be made by all states, in all debating and negotiating bodies, so that tangible steps and effective measures of disarmament, nuclear in the first place, be taken. In that context it was shown that the cuts stipulated in the treaty on the elimination of shorter and intermediate-range missiles were just a first step and, although they account for a tangible result in the Soviet-American negotiations on space nuclear weapons, they do not affect the existing military potential. Stress was laid on the great responsibility of the USSR and the USA in disarmament, the importance of the conclusion, already this year, of an accord on a 50-percent cut in strategic arms by the two big nuclear powers, and in future of new disarmament measures and agreements. In consideration of the fact that negotiations are not a substitute for actions taken with the participation of the other states emphasis was placed on the particular importance of manysided efforts, of debates and negotiations in multilateral negotiating bodies among which the Geneva conference plays a particular role and has special responsibilities.
Sharing the concern voiced by other delegations over the continuation of nuclear tests, the Romanian representative declared for an as soon as possible passage to a thorough analysis and complete negotiations on the drafting and conclusion of a treaty on a general ban on nuclear tests.

Support was also expressed to the proposal of six non-aligned countries on the amendment of the provisions of the Moscow treaty of 1963 banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water by extending this ban on underground tests as well so that all nuclear tests be banned. The Romanian representative spoke for effective measures regarding the renunciation of outer space militarization ensuring its use for peaceful purposes exclusively. It was shown that palpable measures for the reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons should be paralleled by the banning and elimination of all arms of mass destruction, chemical weapons included. Tangible proposals were advanced regarding the content of the draft convention on the banning and elimination of chemical weapons so that the future regulation should ensure the attainment of its fundamental goals without affecting, in any way, the progress of every country’s peaceful chemical industry, international cooperation in this domain.
SOVIET UNION

E. Pacific Region: From Arms Race to Universal Security
18010414 Moscow POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 7, Jul 88 (signed to press 12 Apr 88) pp 93-100

[Article by Yu. Lebedev under rubric "Realities of the Contemporary World": "The Pacific Asiatic Region: From Arms Race to Universal Security"]

[Text] The Pacific Asiatic region (ATR) is a vast area of the planet, the cradle of ancient civilizations of yesterday and a concentration of almost two-thirds of humanity today. This part of the globe, washed by the waters of the Pacific and Indian oceans, stretches out from the Urals and the Middle East to the western shores of two Americas in the east and the silent Antarctic to the south. The political interests of such large states as the USSR, the U.S., the PRC, Japan, India and Canada come into contact and are interwoven in the ATR. Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, KNDR [Korean People's Democratic Republic], South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Burma, New Zealand and others are located here. The share of the region in the world economy grows with each year. It generates more than half of the world's industrial production and almost one-third of the world's trade turnover.

Taking the aforementioned into account, the U.S. administration is trying to find a more effective means of protecting the notorious American "vital interests" in this region. Rich sources of strategic raw materials, cheap labor, fast turnover of investment capital and a high rate of profit engender a special interest in the ATR among many American political figures and economists. In 1986 alone the direct capital investments of U.S. monopolies in this region of the globe reached 33 billion dollars, and the volume of trade turnover constituted 187 billion dollars, that is, 35 percent more than with Western Europe. According to the calculations of specialists, by the 1990's the ATR will surpass Western Europe in GNP and will have a significant influence on international economic relations and on power arrangements in the world as a whole.

The ATR—A Zone of Politico-Military Instability and Confrontation

Asia and the area of the Pacific Ocean is a colossal socio-political expanse with a tremendous number of problems, both those that were inherited from the colonial past and those that arise from the contradictions of contemporary social development; problems that are very special, having a specific character, and problems that are similar to those that arise in many other areas of the world. It is here that there continually emerge large and small hotbeds of dangerous tension, clashes and "small wars" that affect the international situation as a whole. It is enough to say that in the second half of the 20th century of the more than 250 military conflicts that poisoned the world's atmosphere 240 broke out in countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean basin. It was here that a nuclear tragedy took place. This is the alarming context in which each state located in this region formulates its line in international relations.

There is still a virtual absence in the ATR not only of a mechanism for international inspection over militarization but even any kind of an effective system of negotiations concerning its creation.

In the development of one or another specific aspect of ensuring security in the region, it is necessary to take into account the position of a large number of parties. And calculation of the military balance is extremely difficult. In addition, a significant geographic and political potential exists in the region for changes that frequently give rise to conflicts, whose level varies from potential to "hot," and whose scale varies from internal to regional.

In many countries of the region, serious unresolved problems of a social, economic, national, religious and other makeup continue to exist; violent methods of usurping and maintaining authority predominate, and sometimes hotbeds of armed opposition to the government are preserved for years, which from time to time leads to very dramatic events. This kind of turn in internal political development, as is known, creates a favorable soil for interstate conflicts. In short, the ways and methods of ensuring regional security in Asia cannot be the same as in Europe.

Owing to the cited reasons, it can be asserted that the process of ensuring security in the Pacific Asiatic region in all likelihood will be more difficult than on the European continent where, by the way, far from all basic problems have been resolved. It is not accidental that some say that there are so many conflict situations of a subregional level in the ATR that it will not be possible in the forseeable future to work up a document like the Final Act on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Others refer to the fact that in Asia many national states are just being formed and that therefore political regimes in a number of countries, lacking self-confidence, are seeking the support of powerful states located on other continents.

Let us assume this to be true. But this, in turn, attaches even greater urgency and importance to the task of ensuring security in the ATR, especially considering that in recent years its role in international relations has increased significantly and that the state of affairs emerging here has an ever more tangible effect on the global politico-military situation. Any highly explosive situation in the region can easily expand beyond the limits of a local conflict and create serious problems for the maintenance of universal peace.

The Soviet Union, which has its own very extensive land borders in Asia and which is one of the most important coastal states of the Pacific Ocean (more than 75 percent
of 22.4 million kilometers of territory is located in Asia) is extremely concerned that the Pacific Asiatic region not become a zone of tension and an arena for military confrontation. Therefore, the policy of the USSR is directed at an improvement of relations with all countries of the ATR, a relaxation of tensions and a search for a peaceful solution to controversial problems. The Soviet Union formulates its approach to complex issues and intricate conflicts in the region in the context of ideas for the creation of a comprehensive system of international security proposed at the 27th CPSU Congress.

Other objectives in the ATR are being pursued by imperialist forces, most of all by the U.S., which is attempting to create an "eastern front" against socialism. The policy of the U.S. is directed at the further deformation of the regional correlation of forces, intensification of military, including nuclear, confrontation, the aggravation of conflict situations, and the conduct of an obstructionist line on questions of their peaceful settlement. According to the conception of the present administration of the U.S., their political and economic interests, security and a stable situation in the region, and also the trust of their allies in the U.S., must rely on military power, whose embodiment is the presence in the ATR of American armed forces that are now deployed practically along the entire perimeter of the Pacific Ocean, including in the immediate proximity of USSR borders—at so-called "forward lines." The establishment here of powerful naval and air forces forms a system of U.S. military bases in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

The second-largest grouping numerically of American armed forces outside the country (after western Europe) is deployed in the Pacific Asiatic region. Two of six unified commands of the U.S. operate in this region—the Pacific Command (PACOM) and the Central Command (CENTCOM). The first (with headquarters on the Hawaiian Islands) was created in 1947. Its sphere of responsibility includes the Pacific Ocean and territories situated along its shores, i.e. approximately half of the surface of the globe. PACOM includes two of four U.S. fleets—the 7th Fleet, which is deployed mainly in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean, and the 3d Fleet (based on the western shore of the country), which is intended for conducting operations in the eastern part of the Pacific Ocean. CENTCOM was organized in 1983 and is intended mainly for the conduct of operations in the area of the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. The CENTCOM zone encompasses 19 Asiatic, Middle Eastern and African states. The U.S. nuclear arsenal in the ATR numbers thousands of different combat warheads. Hundreds of military installations, including command and control centers for nuclear weapons systems, are deployed here.

Militarization of the ATR

The process of militarization of the Pacific Asiatic region is being whipped up by the neoglobalist ambitions of Washington which is attempting to create a second line of military confrontation here to supplement the one in Europe. This is indicated in particular by the USIA release of the book "U.S. Military Outposts in the Pacific Ocean." The book observes that the zone of operations of the U.S. command in the area of the Pacific and Indian oceans includes territory from the Pacific shores of North and South America to the eastern coast of Africa, and from the Arctic to the Antarctic. Almost 190 combat ships (including nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines—PLARBR SSBNS, and aircraft carriers), about 280 tanks and 560 field artillery pieces (including more than 260 nuclear-capable pieces), more than 1,200 combat aircraft (of which almost half are nuclear weapons carriers), and four divisions (two infantry and two marine) are deployed in the area.

Exaggerating the myth about the "Soviet military threat" and in justification of the need to defend "vital interests," the U.S. is continuing to build up the Pacific Asiatic aggressive force. It is strengthening the military potential of partners, and it is developing an infrastructure for the deployment of troops in forward areas for the purpose of achieving an advantageous correlation of forces. Washington clearly is nurturing plans to create a broad political-military coalition of states in the region under its control and to transform it into a distinctive far eastern equivalent to NATO. The U.S. bloc strategy in the ATR is being built both on the basis of bilateral agreements and on the basis of existing military alliances and exclusive regional force groupings. Moreover, Washington is paying particular attention to the creation of a "Washington-Tokyo-Seoul" triple alliance.

U.S. cooperation with Japan is being developed on a legal and treaty basis, whose most important component is the "Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security" signed in 1960. According to it, the parties pledged jointly to repel aggression in the event of an armed attack on Japan, including an attack on those American installations which are deployed on its territory. The treaty virtually transformed Japan into a bridgehead for the armed forces of the U.S. in the Far East and into a participant in any armed conflicts which could be unleashed by the transoceanic ally in this region.

The development of plans for combined operations and rehearsing them in the course of combined operational training of the armed forces and the coordination of programs of military construction are being implemented on the basis of the document "Basic Principles of Japanese-American Cooperation in the Area of Defense" signed in 1978. An important feature of U.S. and Japanese military cooperation is the move of the parties to the development of specific plans for the cooperation of the armed forces at all echelons of command and control—strategic, operational and tactical.

The U.S. administration is undertaking considerable efforts to broaden and consolidate the American military presence on the Japanese islands. According to information from the so-called "White Book on Questions of
Defense," which lays out the official views of the Japanese leadership on questions of policy in the military sphere, there are now almost 50,000 American servicemen in Japan. This is the largest grouping of U.S. forces of those deployed in Asiatic states.

The U.S. armed forces utilize almost 120 military installations and bases in Japan, including about 10 airfields, up to 20 training ranges, and more than 25 weapons and military equipment depots, including nuclear weapons repositories. The largest military naval bases are Yokosuka and Sasebo. They became a permanent base for surface ships and submarines of the 7th Fleet, also including those that have nuclear weapons on board. The newspaper AKAKHATA gave the name "nuclear spear" to one of the largest U.S. Air Force airfields at Misawa, which is situated in the north of the Japanese Honshu Island. Not long ago two squadrons of F-16 fighterbombers of the USAF were deployed to this base. As is known, these aircraft are capable of carrying nuclear weapons on board. As a result, Misawa became practically the most important installation in the nuclear strategy of the U.S. in the Far East.

American submarine observation posts and hydroacoustic reconnaissance systems operate actively in Japan (in Shimokita and on the islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa) in support of U.S. submarine operations. Electronic reconnaissance posts are deployed on the territory of the country, and a chain of radionavigation stations of the "Omega" system has been set up to assist SSBN, surface ship and aircraft position-finding. It is planned to set up an over-the-horizon reconnaissance radar with an operational range of 3,000 km on one of the islands of the Ryukyu archipelago.

American strategy in the ATR today is inconceivable without the active assistance and direct participation of Japan. The so-called self-defense forces, which in their tasks, structure and character of armaments virtually have been transformed today into a powerful modern cadre army, already number almost 270,000 servicemen. It should also be emphasized that almost half of the personnel are officers and noncommissioned officers. This is an important fact, because it indicates the great mobilization capabilities of Japan: in a short period, according to Western press reports, Japan can place up to 1.5 million men under arms. At the present time the Japanese Army has more than 400 combat aircraft, about 1,000 tanks and more than 160 combat ships in its inventory. In aggregate combat power, the self-defense forces occupy sixth place in the capitalist world and first place in Asia. They are equal in the number of divisions to the FRG bundeswehr, and they are slightly smaller than Great Britain in the size of ground forces. Japan became the fifth official participant in the American SDI program which, undoubtedly, will substantially increase its role in the nuclear strategy of Washington and make it an accomplice in the realization of American plans to transform space into an arms race arena.

Familiarization with the program for the militaristic preparation of Japan, expected in the period 1986-1989, on behalf of which the "one-percent ceiling" on military expenditures established in 1976 was broken, indicates that the administration has laid stress on a sharp buildup of the naval and air forces of the country. Completion of this program will enable the Japanese armed forces, in the opinion of foreign specialists, to begin the fulfillment of responsibilities given by Washington in 1981 to take a 1,000-mile zone from the shores of the Japanese archipelago under its own military control.

An odious decision was made at a joint meeting in 1982 of the Japanese-American consultative committee on security questions: to begin the development of plans for combined combat operations of the armed forces of Japan and the U.S. in the event that an emergency situation arises in the Far East.

The role of South Korea is growing in the strategic military balance of forces in the region. Its territory today is one of the important bridgeheads of the armed forces of the U.S. The U.S. has 40 large bases and military installations in South Korea that are deployed at Seoul, Pusan, Osan, Taegu and Kwangju, and in camps along the demilitarized zone and other areas. There are 40,000 American servicemen in the U.S. armed forces in that country. In addition, American forces have about 130 tanks, more than 120 field artillery pieces (including about 80 nuclear-capable 155-mm and 203.2-mm howitzers) and mortars, and 110 combat aircraft (more than 80 of these are nuclear weapons carriers). Ships of the 7th Fleet with nuclear weapons on board regularly stop in at the South Korean ports of Pusan and Chinkhe.

Even during the Korean war leading U.S. political and military figures considered the possibility of employing weapons of mass destruction against the KNDPR [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] and the PRC. Plans for a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula exist even now. This is not the first year that the delivery of nuclear strikes on the territory of the KNDPR was practiced in the course of wide-scale American-Korean maneuvers. To supplement the already existing U.S. nuclear arsenal in South Korea, American military command authorities are studying the possibility of deploying their own ground-based cruise missiles in the southern part of the country. Deployment of the tactical operational "Lance" missile in South Korea has been started.

At the present time, the South Korean Army has more than 20 divisions that are maintained at a high level of combat readiness. The rehearsal of practical cooperation of groupings of U.S. and South Korean armed forces is implemented at combined exercises, the largest of which are the strategic operational maneuvers of the "Team Spirit" type. For example, in 1987 more 250,000 persons, 1,200 aircraft and helicopters and about 70 combat ships and auxiliary ships took part in them.
The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), formed in 1967, is assigned a special role in the Pacific Asiatic policy of the U.S. At its inception this organization proclaimed its principal aim to be cooperation in the economic and cultural development of its members. The advantageous strategic position of the countries of ASEAN in the area of the straits, where the waters of the Pacific and Indian oceans merge, turned them into objects for wooing by American neoglobalists. Their cherished goal is to endow the countries of one of the main subregions of the ATR with the attributes of a military alliance.

The system of involving the ASEAN countries in military preparations is directed at ensuring reliable control in the future over Southeast Asia (SEA) as a whole and to strengthen the U.S. strategic military position there. Within the framework of military cooperation, the volume of American deliveries of armaments to countries of the subregion doubled just for the period 1981-1983, reaching $3 billion, and by 1990 it will increase to $6 billion. The spheres of military cooperation are training of specialists, providing assistance in improving elements of the infrastructure, coordinating the activity of intelligence organs, and holding regular meetings of representatives of the political and military leadership, and others.

U.S. relations with ASEAN countries are secured in official documents. Thus, the Philippines are tied to the U.S. in a number of treaties and agreements (concerning military bases—1947, concerning mutual defense—1951, concerning mutual assistance—1953, and others). A large contingent of American troops (more than 15,000 persons) and more than 30 military bases are deployed on the territory of this country. In accordance with the “Plan for Combined Defense,” the Philippines are committed in the event of necessity to grant American command authorities virtually unlimited rights for expanding their military potential on Philippine territory. In response to assurances from Washington concerning an increase in economic and military aid in 1984-1989, the Philippine government agreed to extend the period of lease of their military bases—the fulcrum of nuclear “neoglobalism” of the U.S. in Asia. The question mostly concerns the Subik Bay naval base and Clark Field air base—the largest bases in the U.S.

The political and military cooperation of the U.S. and Thailand is expanding, and support for the Khmer counterrevolutionaries in Kampuchea is being carried out from territory in Thailand. The partnership with Thailand is based on previously arrived at agreements about economic, technical and military cooperation. Since 1979 the effect of the bilateral understanding has been practically renewed, according to which the U.S. Air Force, conducting flights in the areas of the Pacific and Indian oceans, is permitted to make landings at Utapao, Takli and Donmuong air bases, and also calls of U.S. combat ships are permitted at the Satthip naval base. In accordance with a “Memorandum of Mutual Understanding,” signed in 1935, and an agreement of 1987, provision is made for the construction and deployment of American weapons, military equipment and technical material systems depots on the territory of Thailand.

Indonesia is closely tied to the U.S. in the military sphere. At the present time, the reequipping of the Indonesian armed forces and modernization of the infrastructure is being implemented with the assistance of Americans. The U.S. received permission for U.S. Navy ships to enter the internal waters of Indonesia (without advance notification) when moving through the straits of Lombok, Makassar and Sunda, and also permission for flights of strategic aviation through the air space of the country and the intermediate landings of military aircraft at the Madiun and Jakarta airfields. American combat equipment constitutes the basis of Indonesian armaments. The U.S. also provides assistance in the training of military personnel.

Malaysia is also not left without attention. It is a dynamic and multinational country. The U.S. is interested here first of all in the use of the Lumut naval base and the Kuantan air base in their own interests.

The military cooperation of the U.S. with Singapore is based on the broadening of production of weapons and military equipment. This process encompasses all of the ASEAN countries, but it is developing most intensively in Singapore, whose military products are exported to many states of the region and even beyond its borders. The air bases of the country are used by the Americans for intermediate landings of their aircraft, and the ships regularly call at Singapore for repairs and resupply. During combined maneuvers, combat tasks for the defense of the straits zone are rehearsed.

The U.S. views the important strategic position held by the islands of Micronesia as its own rear area. In recent years, new links have appeared in the chain of bases here created by the Pentagon. Nuclear and chemical weapons depots and a base for the training of “Green Berets” have been deployed on Babeltuan Island. Munitions depots have also been set up and long range communications stations have been deployed on the Marshall Islands. The construction of air force and naval bases is being conducted on the islands of Taiwan and Saipan. Facilities are being erected on Kwajalein that are included in the SDI program.

The U.S. is also building up its military presence in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean. A decision has already been made to establish a large joint air force and naval base on the island of Adak (Aleutian Islands).

The U.S. has entangled Australia and New Zealand with politico-military responsibilities. As far back as 1951, they were drawn into the ANZUS bloc created under the aegis of the U.S.
The Americans utilize the military bases on Australian territory within the framework of their own nuclear strategy. Their nuclear weapons-carrying B-52 bombers have the right to land at Australian airfields (in the northern part of the country), when they conduct flights from the base on the island of Guam to the base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. leases territory in the center of Australia for the Pine Gap base. The Pentagon has deployed a military technical station there, which, via artificial Earth satellites, supports the communications of American submarines and surface ships located in the Pacific and Indian oceans, with a command and control center, and it collects information transmitted by reconnaissance satellites.

At the present time, negotiations are being held on granting U.S. armed forces new bases in the central and western part of the Australian state of New South Wales in the area of the cities of Orange and Bathurst. Simultaneously, plans are being worked on for the transfer of the American naval base from Christchurch (New Zealand) to the Australian port of Hobart. This step is a result of a law passed in 1986 by the parliament of New Zealand which prohibits calls at the country's ports of U.S. ships that have nuclear weapons on board.

**Programs for Ensuring Peace and Security in the ATR**

Resolution of the problem of the survival of humanity in the nuclear missile age and the assurance of not only regional but universal peace depends to a great degree on the state of affairs in the Pacific Asiatic region with all of the diversity of its countries—large and small, socialist and capitalist, those that are nonaligned and those that participate in military blocs. The process of militarization in the region is not only not stopping, it is accelerating dangerously, transforming the ATR into an arena of instability and confrontation, into a breeding ground for armed conflicts.

However, along with all of the negative phenomena that have been considered above, it is impossible not to see that forces are being activated in the ATR that are striving to set up a barrier on the road against nuclear weapons that are “creeping” into the region and that demand that people be assured a secure future. The Soviet Union, an Asiatic and Pacific state, is actively contributing to this process.

The program proposed by M. S. Gorbachev in his speech in Vladivostok in July 1986, and which was developed further in an interview by the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA on 21 July 1987, is a positive application of new thinking to the problems of the ATR. This program envisions: elimination of regional hotbeds of tension through political settlement; cessation of the nuclear arms race; reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons; establishment of nuclear-free zones; elimination of military bases on foreign territory; establishment of equal and mutually beneficial economic cooperation between all countries of the region; strengthening measures for trust in the military sphere, and preparation for the convocation of an all-Asian conference in the future for joint quests for constructive resolutions.

The consistent course of the Soviet leadership on a step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons in the world has contributed in many ways to the fact that the southern part of the Pacific Ocean has been declared a nuclear-free zone; the idea for the same kind of a zone in Southeast Asia is making headway, and demands are growing to free the Korean peninsula of nuclear weapons. The People's Republic of China is speaking out more actively on the problem of disarmament.

On the initiative of the Soviet Union, all RSD [intermediate range missiles] and OTR [close support missiles] in the Asiatic part of our country will be destroyed. In doing this, the USSR is not linking this step to the question of a U.S. nuclear presence in South Korea, the Philippines, and the island of Diego Garcia, with the hope that this presence will not grow there. Moreover, the Soviet Union has expressed a readiness not to increase the number of missile-carrying aircraft in the Asiatic part of the country, if the U.S. will refrain from deploying additional nuclear systems in Asia that can reach USSR territory.

Taking into account European experience that is applicable to the ATR, our country favors reducing military activity in the region, making air and naval lines of communication and international straits secure, starting talks on reducing the activity of military fleets in the Pacific Ocean, limiting antisubmarine rivalry, and limiting the scale of naval exercises and maneuvers in the Pacific and Indian oceans and adjacent seas. The Soviet Union attaches great significance to a ban on nuclear tests in the region, to a reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Asia to the limits of reasonable sufficiency, and to a step-by-step reduction of military confrontation embodied in a bloc policy to a minimum.

The Soviet Union proposes coming to an agreement on a step-by-step reduction in the armed forces of South Korea and the KNDR to 100,000 persons on each side, with the subsequent withdrawal of all American troops from the Korean peninsula. It supports normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations and national reconciliation in Afghanistan, cessation of the fratricidal Iran-Iraq war, and the withdrawal of all military ships from the Persian Gulf that do not belong to the countries of that subregion.

The way to security in the ATR, naturally, will not be easy and short. The main obstacle is that the ruling circles of the U.S. and Japan still find themselves in the grip of militaristic thinking. The present political-military and economic situation in the region suits them. For it is easier to dictate their will, right down to armed conflicts,
in an atmosphere of hostility between individual countries or groups of countries, and to justify the massed U.S. military presence in Asia and the Pacific Ocean area.

Looking to Washington and checking their actions with the instructions of the transoceanic partner, Japanese ruling circles express a sceptical attitude toward the Soviet peaceful initiative, and they come out against the attempts of countries of the region to create a nuclear-free zone and to lower the level of military confrontation. And this is a country that has itself experienced the horror of nuclear weapons and in words fights for their destruction!

Now, as never before, it is important to mobilize the potential for common sense that exists in the world, and it exists in the ATR. The positive trends in the region, with all the diversity and contradictions in the picture, are indicated, for example, by such signs as the increased yearning to get rid of nuclear weapons, which found expression in the Rarotonga Treaty that declared the southern part of the Pacific Ocean a nuclear-free zone, and by the critical speeches in Australia and New Zealand against French nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean. A search is under way in Asia for a mechanism which could help ease tensions. It is no accident that it was here that the “fifth principle of peaceful coexistence” (“pancha shila”) and the “10 principles of Bandung” were born. In essence, the ideological and political fundamentals of the nonalignment movement were laid in Asia.

The process of a critical rethinking of the idea of military partnership with the U.S., which is difficult for ASEAN countries, is gaining strength. Membership in the SEATO bloc, which fell apart, ground up by mutual contradictions, was an instructive experience for some countries of the association. It seems that it convinced, if not all, then many in ASEAN that to permit the Pentagon on its own territory is like, as the well-known saying goes, “allowing a tiger to come into the house.” There should be no doubt that the ASEAN states can do a lot to maintain a climate of peace and good neighborliness in Asia. Under these conditions, they can always rely on the understanding of the Soviet Union—a neighbor on the continent. The peculiarities of world outlook and the political and cultural distinctiveness of the countries of the ATR can prompt measures issuing from them, understandable and acceptable to all and that are not ordinary, for the resolution of cardinal problems of the largest region of the planet. The idea of conducting an all-Asian conference for a common search for constructive solutions proposed by M. S. Gorbachev represents a working hypothesis.

It will be necessary to overcome old thinking, prejudices and suspicions to ensure firm peace and security in the Pacific Asiatic region, for there is no other way.

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SOVIET UNION

Soviet Team Completes FRG Inspection
LD0909210188 Moscow TASS in English
1542 GMT 9 Sep 88

[“Soviet Specialists Complete Military Inspection in FRG”—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow September 9 TASS—As has been officially announced here, a team of Soviet military inspectors completed today the inspection of a declared area in the FRG’s territory.

The inspection was held on the basis of the corresponding provisions of the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe.

Kashlev on Prospects for Conventional Arms Talks
PM0909104788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 88
Second Edition p 7

[Interview with Ambassador Yu. B. Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna NATO-Warsaw Pact talks, by own correspondent B. Dubrovin, under the rubric “Our Interview”: “Real Basis. Ambassador Yu.B. Kashlev, Head of Soviet Delegation at Vienna Meeting, Answers PRAVDA Correspondent’s Questions”—first four paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] Vienna, Sep—Consultations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries on preparing a mandate for new talks on armed forces and conventional arms in Europe have resumed in Vienna after a short break. The consultations began last year at the initiative of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee and are being conducted within the framework of the all-European Vienna meeting, which is also being held here.

This is a difficult matter—not only because of the geographical, all-European scale, but also because of the complexity of the subject of the future talks, the objectively existing differences in force and arms structure, and the asymmetries and imbalances which it is planned to eliminate in order to move on to major cuts and radical reductions in the level of military confrontation on the continent.

Important elements of the mandate have already been agreed during the consultations: on the aims of future talks, their participants (these will be the 23 countries making up the Warsaw Pact and NATO), the control and exchange of data, the procedure and organizational conditions for the talks, the obligatory international nature of future agreements, and so forth. In general, a large part of the mandate has already been agreed.
B. Dubrovin, PRAVDA correspondent in Austria, asked Ambassador Yu. B. Kashev, head of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna meeting, to answer a few questions.

[Dubrovin] What specific problems are currently at the center of the consultations, and is there a spirit of constructiveness in the work?

[Kashev] In the next few weeks we will have to find compromises on two as yet unresolved issues. Namely—what specific troops and arms will be subject to cuts, and the precise area to be covered by the talks.

In August the Warsaw Pact countries took a constructive step in proposing an extensive formula for the subject of the talks—a formula which, in our opinion, takes the two sides' concerns fully into account. It stated that the subject of the talks would be the sides' conventional armed forces, including conventional arms and hardware deployed on land within their territories in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. No arms would be excluded from the talks because they might have other capabilities besides conventional ones (we are referring here to dual-purpose weapons, that is). Such arms and hardware would not be placed in a separate category, and the existence of additional capabilities would not constitute grounds for changing the subject of the talks.

The NATO countries insist that it be laid down here that nuclear weapons will not be a subject covered at the talks, along with naval forces and chemical weapons. For our part, we propose stipulating that the talks not cover fighter aircraft, as a purely defensive type of arms. They are not part of a surprise-attack potential and cannot have a negative influence on the security of states in Europe. Their exclusion thereby does not contravene the already agreed aims of the talks, in which the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries are giving priority to the "elimination of offensive potentials for surprise attacks."

As for the claims about the complexity of dividing up aircraft into strike aircraft and fighter aircraft, this question could, if so wished, be resolved at the talks themselves.

At the same time, the subject of the talks must absolutely include all tactical (frontline) strike aircraft, which are to be covered first and foremost as a component in a surprise-attack potential along with tanks and artillery.

[Dubrovin] When can we expect the talks themselves to start?

[Kashev] The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries recognize the importance of starting talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries as soon as possible. The draft mandate records a decision in principle to hold them next year. Incidentally, the talks should start at the same time and be held in parallel with the talks on expanding confidence- and security-building measures, in which all 35 CSCE countries will participate. Our Vienna meeting should be finished before then, since both sets of talks are part and parcel of its decisions.

The program for armed forces and conventional arms reduction in Europe put forward by the socialist countries at the recent Political Consultative Committee Conference in Warsaw creates a good basis for switching to practical talks on troop and conventional arms cuts from the Atlantic to the Urals, and for further strengthening confidence and security in Europe.

PRAVDA on Pershing Destruction at Longhorn
PM1209141988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
10 Sep 88 Second Edition p 5
[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch under the rubric "At the Scene": "Thus Is History Made"]

[Text] Karnack, Texas, 9 Sep—People carrying banners were visible standing right up against the barbed-wire fence even on the approach to the Longhorn munitions plant in the tiny hamlet of Karnack. One banner read in Russian: "Welcome, Peace, and Friendship!" That was how the morning of 8 September in this remote Texan town began for three Soviet journalists.

After obtaining our special press passes, we set off in a bus deep into the installation. The grandstands were already full and television people were busy setting up camera positions. Everyone was looking either at their watches or at the patch of land that had been cleared of trees not far away. It was there that the two Pershing-II and Pershing-IIIA first stages were to be destroyed. The United States would thereby embark on the practical implementation of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, joining the Soviet Union, which has already taken such a step....

We were shown the dark green cylinders shortly before the destruction procedure. Contained in a special steel and concrete structure, they made a gloomy impression. These dealers of death, now shackled, made the blood run cold. "I am glad to witness the first in a series of historic and important steps in the direction of peace and the improvement of relations with the USSR. We have been preparing for this for 75 days," Lieutenant Colonel A. Germaine, chief of the plant, said....

With the arrival of U.S. Vice President G. Bush, preparations began for the destruction of the missile stages using the static firing method. In ordinary language this means that the missile engines burn off their fuel. The Pershing-II engine was fired at exactly 1000 in the morning on a command from the control panel. A tongue of flame leapt out, shaking the ground with a roar that could be heard all around. A short silence fell, broken by
applause, 62 seconds later. At 1015 it was the turn of the Pershing-1A stage, and again the ground shook from the roaring flame. It was all over 45 seconds later.

Or rather, it was all just beginning—our two countries have now embarked on the path not of limiting but of actually destroying terrible weapons. The happiness of those who were assembled when a mini-transporter took the burned-out Pershing-2 casing to the scrapping device and a powerful press turned it into a heap of broken metal, was a sight to behold...

I asked General R. Lajoie, director of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, whether he—as a military man who has devoted his life to the service of arms—was sorry to see them destroyed. "No, I'm not," the general replied. "My reaction was purely positive."

General F. Partlou, who represented the Joint Chiefs at the talks on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, said that he felt optimistic about a further agreement. "This is the main task, and our representatives in Geneva together with their Soviet colleagues are working hard on a strategic arms reduction treaty," he said. "I think that it will ultimately be possible. In my opinion, arms control provides hope for establishing arms levels which will correspond to the task of ensuring a more peaceful future for all mankind...."

There were many such statements. Probably only Vice President Bush's remarks struck a clearly discordant note. Answering a journalist's question in passing, the Republican presidential hopeful denied that his trip to the plant was linked to the election campaign. "It is about international peace. This is a great day," he said. However, in his speech Bush constantly stressed the long-discredited, bankrupt principle of talks from a "position of strength."

Before leaving the plant we talked with N. Shebalin, deputy chief of the USSR National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, who was one of the 12 Soviet inspectors attending the missile stage destruction. He noted that both sides had approached the task of implementing the agreement very responsibly.

Thus, through the joint efforts of the partners a start has been made in the most important task of ridding people of the fear of nuclear war. "This is a giant step toward peace. I hope that someday we will open a history book and the first page will be entitled 'Worldwide Peace.' Perhaps this first page is being written right now," K. Piaz, representative of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, said in his farewell to us. Fine words.

U.S., Soviet Differences on ABM Treaty Viewed
PM1209140988 Moscow KRAESNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sep 88 Second Edition p 5

[Lieutenant General V. Starodubov "International Notes": "What Will Happen to the ABM Treaty?"]

[Text] Over the last few days of August talks were held in Geneva between Soviet and U.S. representatives on the latest (quinquennial) examination of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of antimissile defense systems (the ABM Treaty).

Whereas in 1977 and 1982 at the conclusion of similar talks, the sides unanimously reaffirmed their adherence to the goals and tasks of the ABM Treaty, this time they issued different statements. One of them, the Soviet statement, was aimed, as before, at the retention and unswerving observance of the treaty; the other statement, that of the United States, was essentially aimed at acquiring the "right" to continue activity in the ABM field that goes beyond the treaty framework, and at justifying its destructive line at the strategic arms limitation talks.

What caused such a radical change in the U.S. side's attitude toward this fundamental document in the process of curbing the arms race?

First and foremost, we should cite the adoption by the current U.S. Administration in 1983 of the "Star Wars" program, otherwise called the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). As is well known, this initiative supplemented the "comprehensive strategic program" announced by the U.S. President in October 1981, which envisaged giving all types of U.S. strategic offensive arms the capability to be used in a "devastating" first strike. Both programs are being implemented.

In order to remove the obstacles to building up strategic offensive arms, the United States finally abandoned its commitments under the SALT II Treaty in late 1986. Now it is the turn of the ABM Treaty, which has been hampering the implementation of the SDI program. Incidentally, the United States had interpreted its commitments under this document very freely even prior to this.

Back in 1975 the Soviet side was forced to raise the issue of the deployment in the United States at the Otis, Massachusetts and Beale, California bases of the large new "Pave Paws" phased-array radars, whose characteristics are virtually identical to those of the U.S. "Par" ABM radar installed at the Grand Forks base. Disregarding the Soviet side's concern, the United States has begun to build another two such radar sites on its territory.

However, the matter has not ended here. In late 1986-early 1987 the Americans finished construction and added to the existing stations a "Pave Paws" radar outside the United States—in the village of Thule (Greenland). The deployment of this radar was by no means a covert violation of the ABM Treaty, which authorizes the construction of "large phased-array radars" only in areas especially stipulated by agreed statement "F" and to be more precise: along the periphery of its own territory (oriented outward), at agreed testing ranges, or in the authorized limited ABM deployment area.
The thesis used as a justification that a new radar has not been deployed in Thule but only an old one that has been modernized is not for the specialists. It does not hold water either from the juridical or from the factual viewpoints.

First, hardly anyone would take seriously an attempt to pass off as modernization the complete replacement of five old radars with the parabolic antennae of one new “large phased-array radar.” This is like claiming that a 100-horsepower engine is the modernization of 100 horses.

Second, the very fact that the “modernization” thesis has been used as a justification attests instead to an intention to divert public attention from the crux of the violation. It is a matter of indifference for lawyers as to the description given to the appearance of a large phased-array radar in a region where, according to the terms of the ABM Treaty, there should be no such station. The fact that the new large phased-array radar appeared there is important. This fact indicates a violation.

The Americans have now begun to build yet another large phased-array radar, this time at Fylingdales (Britain). Yet another clause of the treaty will appear on the list of violations in connection with previously deployed large radars. With its omnidirectional illumination, the station at Fylingdales will be oriented toward the USSR’s territory and this is prohibited under the treaty.

Agreed Statement “F,” as is well known, makes exceptions for radars that are deployed “to track objects in outer space” or “as national technical means of verification”—deployment areas are not limited for such stations. However, this does not apply to the new radars at Thule or Fylingdales—they are officially proclaimed stations for early warning of missile attacks.

Everything that has been said concerning the U.S. side’s activity in the sphere of large radar is not merely a pro forma violation of the spirit or letter of the treaty. The suspicion arises that the United States has already begun to create an ABM base for the defense of the country’s territory banned under an article of the first treaty. If these actions are compared with the SDI program, they would rank precisely among the first phase in the creation of large-scale ABM—its surface echelon.

Washington is faced with a dilemma: whether to observe the ABM Treaty or to abandon its plans to create large-scale ABM for the country. Incidentally, these are not our conclusions—the U.S. side has said this frankly on many occasions at various levels. This dilemma was indisputably also reflected in the course of the talks on the examination of the ABM Treaty.

It is easy to realize that the question of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty (or of switching to a “broad interpretation” of it, which is virtually equivalent to withdrawing from the treaty) is not so simple. The United States would hardly acquire political credit for this. That is why the administration, while making its plans, is not averse to presenting the Soviet side as the guilty party with regard to this development of events.

Of what does the USSR stand accused? The main charge is the construction of a large phased-array radar in the Krasnoyarsk area. In some cases, when the “Star Wars” program is being justified, people say that the USSR is allegedly implementing its own SDI. In other cases, for instance at the Geneva talks, people stress the fact of its complete “violation”—they say that a radar for warning of missile attacks is deployed in a region that is not on the periphery of the country and is not oriented outside its territory as provided for by the treaty. All this would be well-founded if the radar under construction was a warning station. However, it is a station monitoring space, and this fundamentally changes things—such stations are not limited by the treaty, as has already been mentioned.

The purpose of the U.S. position at the talks to examine the ABM Treaty becomes increasingly clear if it is correlated with the attitude toward the claims made by the Soviet side.

The statement made by the U.S. delegation 1 September this year and the U.S. President’s yearly reports published previously for the Congress not only do not investigate the appropriate violations but do not even mention the complaints that the Soviet side has made over a number of years. The question arises—does the Congress know about U.S. violations at all?

The Soviet side has advocated continuing efforts to seek principled solutions that would remove the sides’ complaints against each another, including by the proposed radical solutions. These efforts could also be continued at the next session of the Soviet-U.S. Standing Consultative Commission and in the course of the upcoming meeting between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state.

The ABM Treaty must be retained.

Progress Noted at Geneva Strategic Arms Talks
PM1209134788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Sep 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: “Documents Being Discussed”]

[Text] Geneva, 10 Sep—In the course of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space arms, work was carried out over the past week in the strategic offensive arms group on updating the joint draft documents (a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive
arms, a memorandum of understanding on data, an inspection protocol, a conversion or elimination protocol) with regard to the progress made in certain spheres.

It should be pointed out that, as a result of the proposals made by the Soviet side during the current round, tangible progress has been made in agreeing on questions relating to an inspection protocol. Progress has also been made in work to eliminate the parentheses in the conversion or elimination protocol. Questions of the verification of ICBM mobile launchers and of restrictions on long-range air-launched cruise missiles and heavy bombers are still at the stage of active study.

The Soviet side has made constructive new proposals aimed at agreeing on definitions of SLBM's and their launchers.

U.S. Charges on Krasnoyarsk Station Denied
OW1309043688 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 11 Sep 88

[From the "Siberian Tour" program]

[Text] During the Geneva meeting between the United States and the USSR on the validity of the ABM limitation treaty, the U.S. delegation asserted that, as long as the radar station near Krasnoyarsk is not dismantled, an agreement on strategic and space weapons is impossible. Despite Soviet explanations that the task of the station is to track objects in space and to control space (communications), the United States insisted on its position.

U.S. experts, who visited the station in September last year, were convinced by the Soviet explanation. These experts concluded that: At this point, we are convinced that the station does not violate the ABM limitation treaty. There is also very little possibility that the station in Krasnoyarsk will be used as a radar site. To this, we must add that construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar station is still incomplete.

During talks between General Secretary Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz, Gorbachev stated that the USSR would unilaterally freeze all operations at the Krasnoyarsk station. The Soviet delegation to the Geneva meeting also indicated the USSR's willingness to dismantle the station's facilities. However, the USSR insisted on the condition that there must be an agreement on observing the ABM limitation treaty signed in 1972.

At this time, when the Soviet Union is in the process of destroying its long- and short-range IRBM's, operations to dismantle RSD-10's, known as SS-20's in the West, have started near Chita city, in the southern part of eastern Siberia in late August.

P-2's From Waldheide Depart Ramstein AFB for United States
LD1209155488 Moscow TASS in English 1522 GMT 12 Sep 88

[Text] Bonn September 12 TASS—The first batch of U.S. intermediate-range Pershing-2's, which was withdrawn from the American missile base Waldheide outside Heilbronn September 1, today left the territory of West Germany altogether.

The disassembled missiles, including first and second stages and guidance and control systems, were dispatched from the U.S. air base Ramstein by a military transport plane to the United States where they are to be destroyed at special facilities in Texas and Colorado.

The nuclear-tipped Pershing-2's and cruises yet remaining in this country are to be withdrawn from their bases and eliminated within the next three years.

Verification Commission Meets in Geneva
LD1209143388 Moscow TASS in English 1422 GMT 12 Sep 88

[Text] Geneva September 12 TASS—The Soviet-American special verification commission formed under the INF Treaty opened its second meeting here today.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Ost Cited on Pershings’ Removal; Soviets Observe
LD0109123088 Hamburg DPA in German
1111 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Addition to item published in 1 September West Europe DAILY REPORT, page 2, headlined “9 Pershing-2 Missiles Removed From Waldheide”]

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost assessed the withdrawal of the first Pershing-2 missiles as an important event in post-war history. The systematic abolition of a whole category of weapons, which is happening for the first time, is a significant date for the Federal Government and all citizens, Ost said in Bonn. The Federal Government’s policy under Chancellor Helmut Kohl has thereby led to tangible and specific results. Ost gave an assurance that Kohl would persistently continue to follow “this successful path.” Peace policy, which simultaneously maintains security interests, however, will only be successful if both sides disarm.

Members of the Soviet military mission in the Federal Republic personally convinced themselves of the transfer of the missile launchers to Frankfurt. To protests from members of the U.S. Army, a car belonging to the Soviet military mission in Frankfurt drove up to the gate of the repair base; from the car, one of the occupants photographed the empty transporter, which had shortly before arrived empty. When the U.S. soldiers shouted to the Soviets to leave, the car drove off. Members of military missions of the East and the West are forbidden to remain in the vicinity of military establishments.

SPD Congress Rejects Modernization of Missiles
AU0209154488 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Sep 88 pp 1-2

[“C.G.” article: “SPD Supports Unilateral Disarmament Steps by the West at Its Party Congress”]

[Excerpts] Muenster, 1 September— On Thursday [1 September], the SPD at its party congress in Muenster rejected low-altitude flights, demanded a ban on air shows, supported a freeze if not a reduction in arms spending, and called for additional zero options with regard to nuclear disarmament. In the afternoon, the delegates elected a new party executive committee. Chairman Vogel was reelected to his office by an overwhelming majority; only 4 out of the 431 delegates who cast their votes, voted “no.” Deputy Chairman Lafortaine was reelected by a clearly smaller majority; a total of 116 delegates voted against him. Deputy Chairman Rau was also confirmed in his office. Herta Daeubler-Gmelin was elected to the newly created, additional post of deputy chairman.

In the debate on foreign policy, the SPD rejected any modernization of short-range missiles. Honorary SPD Chairman Brandt described NATO’s search for an overall concept as betraying its incompetence. The Western alliance and West Europe lack a leading force “with enough authority to make the alliance unanimously adopt a convincing line,” Brandt said. He warned against attempts to let Soviet party chief Gorbachev “run his head into a wall” in the sphere of overall European security, based on the assumption that he is bound to fail. European responsibility demands making detente and cooperation so fruitful that it will result in better prospects for peaceful development in other parts of the world as well. [passage omitted]

The main foreign policy resolution of the party congress describes the overcoming of the doctrine of deterrence and a European peace regulation as goals of an SPD plan for common security for the East and West. The congress unanimously adopted a motion which says: “The SPD rejects the so-called modernization of existing missiles and any rearming with nuclear missiles as a substitute for the Lance, cruise, and other missiles designed to restore the military options eliminated by the INF Treaty.” The SPD calls for opening negotiations soon aimed at scrapping nuclear short-range missiles, to be held simultaneously with the negotiations on conventional stability in Europe. The goals are further zero options for battlefield weapons, short-range missiles, new air-based intermediate and short-range weapons, and bombs. According to the views of the SPD, battlefield weapons should be reduced in interim steps, and the West could unilaterally start with such reductions. In substantiating this motion, the SPD’s foreign policy expert, Voigt, pointed out that nuclear disarmament in Europe must not be delayed until the end of the conventional negotiations. The SPD is wondering whether the chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, Dregger, who had taken the same position, will stick to it.

Contrary to the stance of the United States, the SPD demands that the air forces also be included in the conventional negotiations from the beginning. To achieve the equal ceilings for Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in Europe desired by the West, the SPD calls for cutting current forces of the Western alliance by half, and for an even larger reduction of “offensive weapons systems” and a restriction of deployments that would allow “concentrations capable of attack.” [passage omitted]
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