Arms Control

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WEST EUROPE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Germans See Chemical Weapons Ban Unlikely Within Next Year

[FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 15 Sep]
INTRABLOC

SOVIET, GDR MILITARY EXERCISE BEGINS

FIRST PHASE INITIATED
LD1710140088 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1244 GMT 17 Oct 88

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The announced joint troop exercise by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) and the National People's Army (NVA) of the GDR began on Monday according to plan. Since the early hours of the morning the participating troops and staffs of the two fraternal armies have been transferring to the Wittstock, Gardelegen, Magdeburg, Zehdenick, and Feldberg regions. They are moving into concentration points and beginning to consolidate their positions and organize their defense.

A total of up to 17,700 members of the two fraternal armies are taking part in the exercise. The aim is to perfect the level of training in conducting defensive actions and improve cooperation between the troops. The director is Major-General Aleksey Mityukhin commander of one army of the GSFG.

In accordance with the Stockholm conference document, observers from all CSCE states were invited by the GDR Government. According to available information, 33 representatives of 17 signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act are expected on Wednesday in the exercise area.

MANEUVERS CONTINUE
LD2010110888 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1011 GMT 20 Oct 88

[Text] Magdeburg (ADN)—The joint exercise by the group of Soviet forces in Germany and the National People's Army entered its second phase today.

The troops and staffs today began practicing defensive combat operations. In accordance with the Stockholm document on confidence-building measures and security and disarmament in Europe, 33 observers from 17 CSCE states viewed events at the training center in Wittstock. Earlier, deputy commander of the exercise, Major General (Anatoliy Korteskiy), explained the situation to them. In the course of the day the foreign military personnel will have the opportunity to talk with Soviet soldiers and will see operations by the “northerners” and the “southerners.”

PACT DEFENSE MINISTERS SESSION HELD IN PRAGUE

VACLAVIK DISCUSSES MEETING
LD1810155488 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1400 GMT 18 Oct 88

[Text] A session of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee is in session in our capital for the 2d day.

Army General Milian Vaclavik, minister of national defense, told journalists that the agenda dealt mainly with the course of actions by member countries with regard to disarmament programs. Those present also discussed some political aspects with regard to the results attained at the session of the Vienna follow-up meeting, and also with regard to the overall military political situation in the world.

JAKES RECEIVES PARTICIPANTS
LD1810104188 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 19 Oct 88

[Text] In Prague today, Comrade Milos Jakes received the participants in an ordinary session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states. He praised the committee's attention to fulfillment of the conclusions of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting in Warsaw in July. He stressed the vital importance of the cooperation of the allied armies in safeguarding the defense of the Warsaw Pact states and in protecting the results of their peoples' creative peaceful work.

Comrade Jakes briefed the guests on the conclusions of the 10th CPCZ Central Committee session on the restructuring of the economy and the democratization of political and social life in Czechoslovakia.

PACT SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT IN BUCHAREST
AU1810204088 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 2004 GMT 18 Oct 88

[“Session of Special Commission on Disarmament of States Participant in Warsaw Treaty”—AGERPRES headline]


In light of the documents of the Warsaw meeting of the Consultative Political Committee the participants looked into questions related to the future negotiations on reducing the armed forces and the conventional arms as well as into the measures to strengthen confidence and security in Europe. They also discussed other questions related to the actions which should contribute to intensifying the efforts for disarmament.

For Romania participating in the session was Constantin Oancea, deputy minister of foreign affairs. The session proceeded in a comradely working atmosphere, in a spirit of mutual understanding and constructive collaboration.
The deputy ministers of foreign affairs also exchanged views on organizing actions along the line of the Warsaw Treaty over the interval to the next meeting of the Consultative Political Committee, to be held in Bucharest.

The chief delegates met Aurel Duma, minister secretary of state, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Hungary’s Gyula Horn Delivers Disarmament Speech at UN
LD1910221488 Budapest MTI in English
1716 GMT 19 Oct 88

[Text] New York, October 19 (MTI)—Gyula Horn, Hungarian state secretary for foreign affairs, contributed to the main political and disarmament committee of the UN General Assembly on Wednesday.

Mr. Horn stated that the far-reaching changes which had started in international relations reflected a gradual recognition of the interdependence of states. Simultaneously, the United Nations was playing a growing role in strengthening international security, promoting disarmament and the peaceful settlement of local conflicts, and in establishing appropriate systems of verification. A further political and organizational renewal in the United Nations would be made easier if there were the opportunity for forecasting the emergence of international conflicts and for preventing them by drawing the attention of the community of nations to them and coordinating the preventive measures.

The state secretary emphasized that the current, palpable upswing in the work of multilateral forums reflected an improvement in international relations, and strengthened the favourable tendencies. Constructive relations between the great powers and an advance in bilateral disarmament talks could greatly promote the successful work of the international disarmament forums. Mr. Horn expressed the hope that, by preserving political commitment and showing increasing readiness for compromises, strategic offensive weapons could be reduced as soon as possible.

The state secretary emphasized that the greatest achievement of the 3rd UN Disarmament session was that it had provided the opportunity for the member states to confront one another’s views whilst maintaining their differing priorities. The ideas for making the mechanism of disarmament more efficient should be examined by the special session. A comprehensive study should be made on the role of the United Nations in supervising the implementation of the agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. Also in need of examination was the role the world organization could play in registering and summing up the national military programmes and directions of development, and guaranteeing appropriate publicity.

Mr. Horn spoke about the major items on the agenda of the international disarmament forums. He welcomed the joint US-Soviet efforts to ban nuclear tests.

To impose a ban on radiological weapons and, closely connected to that, on attacks upon peaceful nuclear projects was indispensable for nuclear security. Unfortunately, despite pressing appeals, little advance had been made in the talks on these topics.

Discussing the agreement being worked out to ban nuclear weapons, Mr. Horn said he welcomed the agreement which had been reached on verification. Hungary was examining ways of direct participation in the practice of verification. It would be good if this practice were enforced in international cooperation from the very beginning.

The state secretary underlined that the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments could play a decisive role in making sure that the security of states was guaranteed by political, economic and human elements rather than human factors. It was a good sign that both the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO had become aware that a further increase in armed forces and armaments, beside the huge economic burdens, hindered political efforts aimed at reducing international tensions. It had become a pressing necessity to decrease the material and technical basis of military opposition radically and to stabilize power relations on a lower level.

The Hungarian Government advocated that disarmament talks be launched as soon as possible after the successful conclusion of the Vienna follow-up conference, and that the participants make tangible progress in strengthening security in Europe within a given time. A stable system of security should be created, based on the mutual offensive incapability of the opposing forces. Hungary had a fundamental interest in making radical and concrete steps to decrease armed forces and armaments, in the framework of pan-European disarmament.

Mr. Horn welcomed the invigoration of multilateral inter-state dialogue on all important elements of international relations. A complex approach to security had been proposed by the socialist countries in the establishing of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. Mr. Horn expressed the hope that a fruitful and open debate would be held on this initiative in the UN General Assembly. Dialogue would be successful if multilateral agreements were concluded on the partial fields, new forms of international political and economic cooperation established, and genuine relations developed between the different integrations. The sources of tension still characterizing human rights and humanitarian issues should be eliminated. In the latter field, the world organization could become an institution constantly monitoring and controlling respect for human
rights. In the current situation, all member states should make efforts to ensure the UN forums and agencies become active participants in such multilateral cooperation.

Karpov Denies Unilateral Soviet Troop Withdrawal

AU2010111388 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 19 Oct 88 pp 1, 2

[MTI report: "Karpov Denies Troop Withdrawal Plan"]

[Text] In an interview with the French daily LE FIGARO, the leading Soviet disarmament expert Viktor Karpov described Soviet concepts for the reduction of conventional arms. Viktor Karpov denied Western rumors that the Soviet Union was preparing a unilateral withdrawal of its troops from Hungary.

Viktor Karpov said in his interview that the Soviet side envisages a three-stage reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. In the first stage, the countries in Europe would provide information about the national and foreign military forces stationed on their territory, including their weapons. According to the Soviet view, this stage could last 1 to 2 years.

The second stage would have to be prepared during this time, in which the two military blocs would reduce their armed forces and arms by 500,000 troops each. In the third stage, the Warsaw Pact and NATO would further reduce their armed forces to a level in which neither of them would be able to launch a surprise attack or conduct offensive military operations against the other.

The Soviet Union has already proposed to the 35 countries participating in the CSCE conference that they establish a risk-control center in Europe to assist this plan.

"I will not conceal the fact that our proposal has not been received favorably in Paris," Karpov added. "There is no such thing as a unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops, as the Western press claims we intend to do in Hungary. The future negotiations will also deal with our troops stationed in Hungary."

Bloc Military Exercises Continue

Military Inspection in Hungary

LD2010100488 Budapest MTI in English 2041 GMT 19 Oct 88

[Text] Budapest, October 19 (MTI)—The foreign military observers who are in Hungary to inspect a joint Hungarian-Soviet exercise, continued their work on Wednesday [19 October]. In the morning, they visited Soviet armoured and artillery units, and an ambulance battalion. In the afternoon, they inspected the entrainment of the units of the Szombathegy brigade of the Hungarian People's Army at Hajmasker railway station.

Since the number of troops involved in the exercise have now gone below 17,000, the observers from 18 countries ended their activity with this action.

The commanders of the Hungarian People's Army and of the exercise provided the conditions for the observers' work in keeping with the Stockholm document.

Hungarian Exercise Ends

LD2110022788 Budapest MTI in English 1607 GMT 20 Oct 88

[Text] Budapest, October 20 (MTI)—The joint military exercise which has been taking place in Hungary, involving units of the Hungarian People's Army and the appointed staffs and troops of the Soviet Army, ended on Thursday [20 October]. The units which participated have begun returning to their garrisons. The exercise involved 16,500 Soviet and 300 Hungarian troops, with 321 tanks, 222 artillery units of 100 mm and larger calibre, 26 helicopters and several aircraft. This was the first time foreign observers had attended a military exercise in Hungary. 36 observers from 18 countries arrived here on the basis of the document approved at the Stockholm Conference on Security and Confidence-Building.

GDR Maneuvers Observed

LD1910193188 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1626 GMT 19 Oct 88

[Text] Magdeburg (ADN)—The joint troop exercises by the group of Soviet forces in Germany (GSFG) and the GDR National People's Army (NVA) continued today in the Wittstock, Gardelegen, Magdeburg, Zehdenick, and Feldberg regions. Under the direction of Major General Alexsey Mityukhin, commander of an army of the GSFG, 17,700 members of the 2 fraternal armies are taking part. They are equipped with 578 tanks, 537 launchers for anti-tank guided missiles on armored vehicles, 208 artillery pieces of a calibre of 100-mm or larger, 34 multiple rocket launchers, and 41 helicopters. Fewer than 200 aircraft sorties are envisaged.

The troops are moving into their concentration areas and starting bases according to plan, establishing their positions, and actively preparing for the test at the end of the training year.

In accordance with the final document of the Helsinki CSCE, 33 representatives from 17 CSCE signatory countries arrived in Magdeburg today to observe the exercise. They come from Bulgaria, the FRG, the CSSR, Denmark, Finland, France, Britain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Canada, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, Hungary, and the United States.

On behalf of the GDR Government and of Defense Minister Army General Heinz Kessler, they were welcomed by Major General Rudolf Magnitzke, [name as received] deputy chief of the NVA Main Staff. In his
speech he said that the observers' presence is an expression of the effectiveness of the Stockholm document. Their presence is a contribution by the governments of the CSCE states to flesh out the process that was set in motion. The GDR is actively working to see that, on the basis of the strict implementation of the Stockholm document by all signatory states, further accords for the consolidation of confidence and security are achieved without delay.

From the GDR's point of view, this requires a reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The proposals and initiatives for this proposed by the Warsaw Pact states, including the GDR, are well-known.

He expressed the certainty that over the next few days, as has been the case with previous exercises on GDR territory, there will be many opportunities to exchange views in frank and trustful talks on the preservation of peace and the continuation of the process of confidence-building and disarmament in a spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding. The maneuver observers will be able to see how the members of the two armies have implemented the joint defense doctrine of the Warsaw Pact in their training, Major General Magnitzke said.

The deputy director of the exercise, Major General Anatoliy Koretskiy, then gave a briefing on the objective, starting position, and stages of the exercise, using maps and diagrams.

Observers Comment

LD2210183388 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1623 GMT 22 Oct 88

[Text] Magdeburg (ADN)—On the Joint Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and NVA troop exercises foreign observers of the maneuver told GDR journalists:

Colonel Simon Palmisano (Austria): Our observer activity corresponded to the guidelines of the Stockholm document. The mere fact that it has now become routine for military forces from the various alliances and neutral and nonaligned countries to meet is a suitable factor to create confidence. That, I believe, is the most important aspect. I am my country's representative at the Vienna negotiations. The findings gained here will no doubt influence Austria's position at these negotiations. In this sense the observation of this exercise was also extremely useful.

Lieutenant Colonel Wietse Bijlsma (Netherlands): Every observation is a step forward. I consider it significant that here colleagues from the East and West as well as neutral countries are talking to one another. We have the opportunity for many talks, and such talks always foster confidence. This exercise promotes the ideas initiated in Stockholm.

Major General Richard Swinburn (Great Britain): Working conditions were excellent. I am the commander of a British division in the FRG. If one discusses matters which are of common interest, then this will result in confidence. My work as an observer has given me a much better understanding of the worth of the Stockholm document. I believe we should continue to make further progress in the direction now adopted.

GDR Enters 'Combat' Phase

LD2210182288 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0958 GMT 22 Oct 88

[Text] Magdeburg (ADN)—The joint troop exercises of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the National People's Army on GDR territory will enter its decisive phase today with combat operations. Representatives of 17 CSCE signatory states will again be watching the action from various observation sites in the Magdeburg training centre. As part of their work they will visit a mortar battery, speak with Soviet soldiers and attend the movement of the first exercise units back to their garrisons in the late afternoon.

This evening the international military representatives will be seen off in Magdeburg on behalf of the GDR Government and the minister of national defense.

SDI After Abrahamson's Resignation Discussed

AU2510153588 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 22-23 Oct 88 p 2

["...ng" commentary: "The SDI Boss Leaves—So What?"]

[Text] James A. Abrahamson, head of the SDI space armament program, has announced his resignation. The Air Force lieutenant general intends to leave on 31 January 1989. However, there is no reason for speculations that the entire project might vanish along with the man at the helm. Quite the contrary.

Recently the U.S. Congress approved the 1989 military budget with $300 billion. A new version of this specific budget was necessary because the President had vetoed the old one in August. This blocked the intention of the parliamentarians to cut back financial means for SDI. The current, revised Pentagon budget includes $4.1 billion for the continuation of the space armament program.

The lack of a date for the conclusion of the treaty on halving the strategic nuclear potentials of the USSR and the United States is also related to SDI. Since 12 July, when the representatives of the two superpowers started their current round of negotiations in Geneva, there has been certain progress on specific issues. However, nothing has been achieved with regard to an agreement on the observance of the ABM Treaty in its form of 1972. As is known, this agreement prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of space-based antimissile systems.
Instead of again expressing support for this obligation, which has been accepted by both sides, and freeing the way toward the 50-per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, which is expected by the whole world, Washington has been stalling.

As if this were not enough, the United States has accused the Soviet Union of violating the ABM Treaty. The excuse used for this was a radar station near Krasnovarsk, which is under construction and will serve to monitor satellite. The USSR reacted with the offer to turn the disputed object into a center of peaceful cooperation for the peaceful use of space. The U.S. response to this offer was negative.

In light of all these events, so far there are no grounds for the assumption that SDI itself will be given up when its boss leaves. This is corroborated by the fact that the Pentagon has already appointed a successor.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

‘Autumn Forge’ NATO Maneuvers Criticized
AU1810181888 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 17 Oct 88 p 2

[“W.M.” commentary: “Lack of Capability for Peace”]

[Text] The series of the “Autumn Forge” NATO maneuvers, which started in August, will continue until the end of November. According to official indications, a total of 250,000 soldiers will be deployed during 20 maneuvers between the Polar Circle and the Mediterranean. The actual figures, however, are expected to be considerably higher.

This concentration of military strength along the dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is considered out of place by the international public, to put it mildly. At a time when further steps of disarmament and confidence building are under discussion, such a massive demonstration of military force certainly no sign of goodwill. DIE WELT, which is always the first to flex its muscles, stated that “Autumn Forge” should serve as a “deterrent.” This anachronistic flexing of muscles has indeed a deterring effect—but in a different way than intended by the central organ of those who are opposed to disarmament. It shows that NATO is still far from taking steps that are really required for peace and the security of its member states.

The proposal for the creation of a zone of confidence and security in central Europe, which was presented to the public by the joint SPD-SED working group in July this year, contains the suggestion that maneuvers involving more than 40,000 soldiers and a series of maneuvers should no longer take place. It is important to convince both sides that, in spite of the existing potentials, there is no danger of a surprise attack. “Autumn Forge” is the exact opposite, a demonstration of the capability of a surprise attack.

However, security cannot be achieved today by means of such martial threatening gestures or an increased arms buildup, but only jointly on the basis of agreements between the Warsaw Pact and NATO on the radical dismantling of weapons and, in harmony with the reduction of military confrontation to the level of mutual inability to attack, by building confidence. The spark over the NATO “Autumn Forge,” however, is not conducive to building confidence at all. It is yet another manifestation of the lack of capability for peace.

NATO Accused of Obstructing Disarmament
AU2410210888 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 21 Oct 88 p 2

[“He” commentary: “Who Is Slowing Down Disarmament?”]

[Text] The Committee of Foreign Ministers from the Warsaw Pact states convened in Prague at the beginning of the week. The talks there focused on the implementation of the peace and disarmament initiatives that were presented by the Political Consultative Committee in July 1988. The same topic was discussed at the meeting of the special disarmament commission of our countries in Budapest. The main points of emphasis were the current state of the Vienna consultations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO on a mandate for negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, suggested by us, and other confidence-building measures in Europe.

In short: We keep on the ball now that disarmament has been initiated with the INF Treaty. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of the other side. On the contrary, people there are raising their voices, saying that this is already too much. They do not want to give up the arms race.

NATO Secretary General Woerner, for example, makes it easy for himself. He simply distorted matters and wrote: As far as conventional armed forces and weapons are concerned, the Warsaw Pact “has not submitted a single proposal (!).”

At the same time, Deputy U.S. Defense Secretary Taft called on the NATO allies to “increase defense expenditure.” The “reason” he gives is again the hackneyed lie about the threat, the alleged necessity of “deterrence.” By the way, Taft receives support from his chief in the Pentagon, Carlucci. He told the Zurich paper WELTWOCHE: In some cases, “a reduction of weapons can only be achieved by deploying weapons.”

Unfortunately, such absurd theories are drawing positive responses from the FRG Defense Ministry. According to
the ARD television magazine “Panorama,” efforts are being made by top officials in the defense ministry to “compensate for the reduction of intermediate-range missiles by deploying nuclear weapons that could reach Soviet territory.” This means “compensation” and modernization, instead of disarmament. And then NATO Secretary General Woerner comes and lets the cat completely out of the bag. First of all, preconditions have to be created before further disarmament steps can be taken: The East “must introduce a policy that is based on Western values.”

It is clear what he means. However, it is also clear that such a strong attempt at political blackmail has nothing in common with reason and realism, and is doomed to failure. We stick to our view: Disarmament must continue, confrontation must be reduced. Today, peace can no longer be achieved through arms buildup against each other, but it must be jointly agreed on the basis of equality and equal security.

HUNGARY

Observers Begin Exercise Inspection in Hungary

LD1910013488 Budapest MTI in English
2333 GMT 18 Oct 88

[Text] Budapest, October 18 (MTI)—The foreign observers who arrived in Hungary last Saturday (15 October) to inspect a military exercise in the region north of Lake Balaton, started work on Tuesday. First they heard a report by Lieutenant General Yuriy Vodolazov, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Southern Army Group temporarily stationed in Hungary and commander of the exercise, and his deputy, Brigadier General Antal Annus. They learnt that, as stated in the prior notification sent to the 32 European countries, Canada and the United States of America, the Tuesday and Wednesday manoeuvres would involve 500 troops of the Hungarian People's Army, 16,500 troops of the Soviet Army (a motorized infantry division and an armoured division of reduced staff), 321 tanks, 222 artillery units of 100 mm and larger calibre, and 26 helicopters supporting the land forces. The exercise is aimed at practising defensive struggle, and improving the training of Hungarian and Soviet troops.

After the briefing, the observers visited a Hungarian battalion, inspected military equipment and talked to the soldiers. In the afternoon, they reviewed the activity of Soviet units, and met both commanders and troops.

In keeping with the Stockholm document, the Hungarian People's Army and the commanders of the exercise guaranteed all conditions for the work of the observers, and made it possible for them to use their own telescopes and, outside the command posts and armoured vehicles, their cameras and dictaphones.

YUGOSLAVIA

UN Activities, Speakers Highlighted

SFRY Envoy on Disarmament

LD210032888 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2225 GMT 20 Oct 88

[Text] United Nations, October 20 (TANJUG)—Comprehensive and total disarmament, as a widely accepted goal, is unachievable without the engagement of all countries, the head of the Yugoslav mission to the U.N. Ambassador Dragoslav Pejic, told the General Assembly’s Political Committee.

Pejic put forward Yugoslavia's stand that the process of disarmament cannot be carried out without the participation of the best-armed countries, but that it should not stop there.

He said that the United Nations was the right place for all negotiations on the topic.

Pejic said that the 43rd General Assembly session was progressing in a positive atmosphere, and added that the open negotiations between the super powers contributed the most to this, primarily talks on disarmament and the elimination of a whole category of nuclear weapons.

Pejic said that concern was caused by the fact that the world's alarming economic problems were not within these favourable trends.

He pointed out that stability in the world was unattainable without resolving the question of development.

Pejic set out Yugoslavia's stand that a deep relationship exists between disarmament and development, the two key problems of the modern world.

CSSR Calls For Chemical Ban

LD210103288 Prague CTK in English
0909 GMT 21 Oct 88

[Text] New York Oct 21 (CTK correspondent)—The need for a maximum reduction of the risk of military confrontation in the area where the two biggest military political groupings have a common border was stressed by Czechoslovak permanent representative in the U.N., Ambassador Evzen Zapotocky, in the Political and Security Committee of the 43rd U.N. General Assembly session.

He said that Czechoslovakia, together with its allies, has proposed the withdrawal of the most dangerous weapons from the NATO-Warsaw Treaty borderline. This is also one of the most important measures forming the contents of the military political aspects of Czechoslovakia's comprehensive initiative to create a zone of confidence, cooperation and good neighbourly relations on the borderline between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.
The Czechoslovak representative said that the working out of an agreement on an all-round ban and destruction of chemical weapons at the Geneva conference on disarmament is in the fore-front of the international community's attention. He stated that Czechoslovakia, not possessing or producing chemical arms, is preparing further steps by which it wants to concretely help to shed light on the problems of control. He also spoke about the joint proposal of the Governments of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic addressed to the West German Government to create a chemical-free zone in Central Europe.

Evzen Zapotocky underlined the importance of a difficult and complex problem—environmental protection, stating that the arms race represents a great threat for the environment, as was stressed in a document adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty at its Warsaw session in July.

The questions of reducing the strength of armed forces and conventional armament in Europe also deserve exceptional attention, the Czechoslovak representative stated.
INDIA

Galbraith, Singh Concepts on Nuclear-Free Zone Similar
52500004 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English
11 Sep 88 pp 1, 9

[Article by Dilip Mukerjee: "Bilateral Curbs on N-bomb Won’t Work"]

[Text] China is a part of the South Asian nuclear problem, and must, therefore, be a part of the solution.

Making this clear-cut formulation, a report prepared for the U.S. senate’s foreign relations committee recognises that the proposals made by Islamabad, and endorsed by Washington, for a solution on a bilateral basis between India and Pakistan have no validity.

Pakistan has suggested a series of bilateral non-proliferation steps, including joint adherence to the NPT or mutual inspection of all nuclear facilities.

While attractive from a U.S. point of view, these proposals are non-starters in New Delhi because they do not take account of Indian concerns about China.

This assessment, made by Mr Peter Galbraith, distinguishes this report from the many others drawn up under American official or private auspices on the Indo-Pakistan nuclear arguments.

The author is a member of the committee’s staff working on behalf its Democrat members. The report, released last month, has just become available in New Delhi.

Recalling the move made last winter by the senators, Mr Daniel Moynihan and Mr John Glenn, to balance the U.S. effort to restrain Pakistan’s nuclear programme with a U.S. veto on loans from the World Bank and other similar sources to ensure India’s observance of some non-proliferation conditions, the report implies this bid to equate the two countries is flawed.

India has retained its nuclear option as a potential counter to the Chinese weapon. (Given India’s conventional advantage, it would be unnecessary to develop nuclear weapons to confront a non-nuclear Pakistan).

A regional approach to nuclear proliferation may be the most constructive to deal with the threat. But the question is: What defines the region. Any regional approach that does not take account of China’s nuclear arsenal is certain to fail with New Delhi.

Discussing the three-tier action plan for nuclear disarmament but forward by the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, to the U.N. special session in June this year, Mr Galbraith says, “India is now willing to approach the problem of nuclear proliferation simultaneously with superpower arms reductions, rather than subsequent to such arrangements... India now seems willing to live with arrangements that do not provide for parity with the Chinese.”

The plan Mr Gandhi outlined to the U.N. calls upon the first-tier nuclear nations, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, to agree on gradual reductions in their arsenals with the goal of liquidating it completely by the year 2010.

Once 50 per cent cuts have been made, as envisaged in the negotiations now taking place between the two, the second-tier nations—Britain, China and France—should join the process by agreeing to freeze their weapons inventory, while the non-nuclear nations constituting the third tier—India among them—would make their contribution by renouncing nuclear weapons.

As Mr Galbraith notes, this is the first concrete Indian response to Pakistan’s bilateral proposals. He says the response “seems to merit further exploration,” even though it raises problems for the U.S.—because it would ban the development of new technologies like space-based defences against nuclear missiles on which Mr Reagan has set his heart.

As one way of arresting proliferation, Mr Galbraith argues that a “greater South Asia nuclear weapon-free zone” might be acceptable to New Delhi if it prohibits the deployment of these weapons in India, Pakistan, Tibet and adjacent areas of China, and in parts of the Indian Ocean.

His concept is similar to the one advanced by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, director of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

In relation to China, it would reduce the risk to India and also the likelihood of South Asia becoming a victim of a nuclear war among any of the nuclear weapon states.

But China’s small ICBM (inter-continental ballistic missiles) force could still target India and most plausible basing models for China’s intermediate range missiles would leave parts of India in range.

India would, however, gain in return for trading its unexercised clear option an arrangement which prevents Pakistan from acquiring an arsenal and limits superpower nuclear presence in the vicinity of the subcontinent.

As Mr Galbraith recognises, at a minimum India would likely want to be sure that strategic weapons (i.e. nuclear missile submarines and nuclear-armed strategic bombers) were not deployed in the Indian Ocean.

He concedes, however, that it may be difficult to persuade China to accept major restraints on the deployment of its nuclear forces in exchange for nuclear abstinence in South Asia because India is peripheral to
China's security concerns. Although he has not taken note of it, Peking has already made it clear that it will not agree to any reduction in its own arsenal even if the superpowers cut theirs by 50 per cent. In a statement in early April, Mr Wu Xueqian (then foreign minister, and now a vice premier) said that halving the arsenals would not eliminate the danger of nuclear blackmail.

When Mr Galbraith was in New Delhi last February, he made a proposal to Mr Gandhi for an Indo-Pakistan agreement on placing one each of their unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under international supervision (as in the case of the Tarapur and Karachi power plants). He raised the idea in Islamabad with the then minister of state for foreign affairs, Mr Zain Noorani. India's response was lukewarm Mr Gandhi agreed that the idea was worthy of further exploration. But Pakistan was far more supportive.

Mr Galbraith said if Kahuta, Pakistan's only source of unguarded fissile material, was covered by the arrangement, it would severely limit the country's nuclear ambitions. Regardless of what Indian facility Pakistan wanted controlled on a reciprocal basis. India would still retain access to bomb-making material from other sources which are outside the arrangements. Under this proposal, India would not have to sacrifice the nuclear weapons option which it feels it must maintain as a possible counter to China's nuclear arsenal.

Pakistan, he notes, is said to be building a second enrichment plant. Besides, there would be no ban on its use of the weapons grade material it has already accumulated.

He argues that Moscow should use its influence with India on the nuclear issue in line with the clear Soviet recognition of the importance of non-proliferation. While deploring the Soviet leasing of a nuclear-powered submarine to India (which violates the U.S. concept of denying nuclear technology to countries not subscribing to the NPT), Mr Galbraith acknowledges Mr Gorbachev's strong personal commitment to preventing the spread of this weapons.

The report says: according to a retired Indian senior diplomat, Mr Gorbachev discussed the possibilities of (superpower) cooperations in South Asia at length with Prime Minister Thatcher during his 1985 visit to Britain.

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Nonnuclear Zones: Important Factor of European Security
18010401b Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE
OBOZRENIYE in Russian
No 5, May 88 (signed to press 5 May 88) pp 9-12

[Article by Col V. Alekseyev, candidate of military sciences]

[Text] A nonnuclear zone, according to the definition accepted in international legal practice, is a territory free of tests, production, stationing, storage and transit of nuclear weapons as well as territory within which and against which the use of nuclear weapons is excluded. Hence it follows that nonnuclear states parties to the zone pledge not to produce, acquire or allow stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories and nuclear states pledge not to disturb the nonnuclear status of countries included in the zone and reject the threat and use of nuclear weapons against them. In order for nonnuclear zones to be such in fact, agreements on them must provide for effective, complete and reliable verification of compliance with the obligations undertaken.

A majority of UN member states constantly come out in favor of forming nonnuclear zones, and they regularly adopt corresponding resolutions at annual General Assembly sessions. The movement for such zones now has a solid international legal basis and takes in all regions of the world. Thus the fact of 23 Latin American countries belonging to a nonnuclear zone is formalized in the 1967 Treaty for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty). The movement for creating a nonnuclear zone in the South Pacific led to practical results. In August 1985 a session of the South Pacific Forum decided to form such a zone (the Rarotonga Treaty).

Projects for creating zones free of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia, on the Korean Peninsula and in the South Pacific remain far from realization (chiefly due to opposition of the United States and its allies). The principal obstacle in the Near East to implementing the idea of a nonnuclear zone is Israel's position. In Africa plans for creating such a zone did not reach the stage of practical realization chiefly because of the policy of the Republic of South Africa, its desire to possess nuclear weapons, and the cooperation of a number of western powers with this state in the nuclear area.

The idea of nonnuclear territories on the European continent has its history. Back in 1956 the Soviet Union proposed to create such a zone in Central Europe, in 1959 it proposed one in the Balkans, and in 1963 it proposed to declare the entire region of the Mediterranean a zone free of nuclear weapons. But each time these plans remained unrealized by virtue of the negative position of NATO countries, and the United States above all, which saw them as a threat to their power politics.

The Communique of a conference of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact member states adopted in Berlin in May 1987 emphasized: “Warsaw Pact member states attach great significance to steps to relax military confrontation and strengthen security in individual regions of Europe, and to the creation of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans and in the central and northern part of the continent. They affirm their resolve to achieve realization of proposals on this score advanced by the GDR and CSSR, Socialist Republic of Romania and People's Republic of Bulgaria.

“With respect to proposals of the GDR and CSSR for a nonnuclear corridor 300 km wide along the line of contact of the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO (150 km in each direction), all nuclear weapons—nuclear munitions including mines, operational-tactical and tactical missiles, atomic artillery, airborne platforms of tactical strike aviation as well as surface-to-air missile systems capable of employing nuclear weapons—would be removed from it on a mutual basis.”

Northern Europe is de facto a nonnuclear zone. All countries of this region—Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden and Finland—have undertaken not to create [sozdavat] nuclear weapons under the Nonproliferation Treaty. Norway, Denmark and Iceland (NATO members) additionally pledged not to station nuclear weapons on their territories in peacetime. Foreign observers consider this an important but half-way decision. The fact is that NATO partners consider the prospect of nonstationing of nuclear weapons in these countries in case of military crises unacceptable. This is why the bloc leadership is trying to draw the states included in the North Atlantic Alliance into its nuclear strategy, which in reality contradicts the nonnuclear status of Norway, Denmark and Iceland.

It is no secret that Norway takes part in NATO's nuclear planning and establishment of the bloc's infrastructure including for the use of nuclear weapons, according to foreign specialists' assessments. No fewer than 20 Norwegian airfields are being used by air forces of NATO countries in peacetime. An agreement on unhindered landing of U.S. aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons has been concluded in case of a “crisis situation.” American submarines with nuclear weapons aboard freely enter Norwegian naval bases. Under Washington's pressure the Norwegian government signed an agreement in 1980 on stockpiling American heavy armaments and various military gear on its territory.

NATO strategists set aside a key role for Denmark in plans to seal off the Baltic Strait zone linking Continental Europe with Scandinavia. In case of a military crisis it is planned to move up to 40,000 servicemen and at least 200 combat aircraft here from the United States and Great Britain.
Keflavik, on the territory of Iceland, has Europe's largest base where over 3,000 American servicemen and F-15 aircraft are stationed. In the assessment of western experts, there also can be nuclear weapon stores there. In any case they are there for certain during the transit of troops and military cargoes by the American Air Force and Navy. It is common knowledge that the official U.S. position on this score is not to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons at its military installations. This means that Iceland, Denmark and Norway cannot give guarantees that their territories are not used for the transit of nuclear weapons even in peacetime.

Western specialists assess the strategic significance of Northern Europe highly: in this region it is planned to win a "decisive victory" in antisubmarine warfare and "shut up" the Soviet Navy in seas washing Scandinavia. It is not for nothing that some bloc leaders believe that if a war in Europe is not won on the northern flank it will be lost entirely. Such lines are made the basis of further integration of countries in NATO's nuclear infrastructure. Militarization of this part of the world is assuming a threatening character. One cannot help but be alarmed by reports that in attempting to get around the INF Treaty the North Atlantic Alliance is seeking methods of "compensating" for the loss of Pershings and ground-launched cruise missiles specifically on the northern axis by deploying sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles in the North Atlantic, which signifies an additional threat to all countries of the region. Military activity of the United States and NATO is increasing in areas immediately adjoining the Soviet Arctic.

In this situation the nonnuclear status of this region's countries can be lost even in peacetime. This is why the peoples of Northern Europe are striving more and more persistently for international legal formalization of their not yet guaranteed nonnuclear status. In fully sharing these anxieties, the Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that it is ready to pledge not to employ nuclear weapons and not threaten their use against states of Northern Europe which will become parties to a nonnuclear zone, i.e., reject the production, acquisition and stationing of weapons on their territories. Such a guarantee could be formalized by concluding an agreement between the USSR and each of the countries parties to the zone or on a multilateral basis. Comrade M. S. Gorbachev emphasized in his speech in Murmansk in October 1987: "We could go rather far, and particularly remove submarines armed with ballistic missiles from the Soviet Baltic Fleet."

It is common knowledge that previously the Soviet Union dismantled intermediate-range missile launchers on the Kola Peninsula and a large number of launchers for such missiles on the remaining territory of Leningrad and Baltic military districts on a unilateral basis as a good will gesture. Many operational-tactical missiles were redeployed out of these districts. The conduct of military exercises is restricted in areas near the borders of Scandinavian countries. Moreover, the Soviet Union proposes to begin consultations between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO on a reduction in military activities and a limitation on the scale of activity of navies and air forces in water areas of the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland seas as well as the extension of confidence-building measures to them. Social-democratic and communist parties and many trade union, public and political figures of countries of Northern Europe are speaking out in favor of the urgent establishment of a nonnuclear zone here. Their motto is: "A nonnuclear zone today, tomorrow will be too late."

But the U.S. position with respect to nonnuclear zones, including in Northern Europe, bears a sharply negative character. Western propaganda tirelessly repeats over and over again that this is a "dangerous illusion," "false security," that only NATO is capable of assuring the security of this region against the "threat from the East."

The idea of creating nonnuclear zones enjoys broad support in the Balkans and in many Mediterranean countries. At meetings representatives of governments of Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania have repeatedly declared the urgent practical need for implementing this idea. A nonnuclear zone could neutralize the danger that a center of military and political tension might arise between East and West over continuing U.S. nuclear preparations on the bloc's southern flank in the area where armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization come in contact. We will note that the Pentagon already has an entire network of its air and naval bases there and other military installations in Italy, Turkey, Greece and Spain which service submarines, aircraft carriers, and aircraft of tactical and strategic aviation armed with nuclear weapons.

Establishment of a nonnuclear zone in the Balkans could contribute to a growth of mutual confidence of states of this region and implementation of the idea of transforming the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and cooperation. The Soviet Union repeatedly stated that it favors the removal of warships carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean, renunciation of the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of nonnuclear Mediterranean countries, and pledges by nuclear powers not to employ nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country. During a visit to Yugoslavia in March 1988 Comrade M. S. Gorbachev said: "It has been repeatedly stated on our part, and I would like to confirm, that the Soviet Union is wholly for developing cooperation in the Balkans. We support the latest initiatives of Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece aimed at lowering military activity here; we favor the removal of all foreign troops and military bases from the Peninsula; and we will give all necessary guarantees should it be decided to establish a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans."

Nevertheless, U.S. militaristic circles are taking vigorous actions with the aim of placing a moratorium on the process of forward progress of the project for establishing
a nonnuclear zone in the Balkans, assuming that a course toward aggravation of international relations in Europe will have a "disciplining" effect on NATO allies. But this course demonstrates a boomerang effect—the more nuclear weapons stationed on the European continent, the stronger the desire to avoid the fate of "nuclear hostages" which Washington has prepared for its NATO partners.

It is common knowledge that Central Europe, where major groupings of NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces are in contact, holds a special place in the matter of strengthening peace and stability on the continent. It is here in the most densely populated region of Europe that the arsenal of arms (including nuclear weapons) largest in devastating force is located. Its presence is feared not only in supporters of disarmament, but also in far-sighted politicians and some military figures in the West. The real threat that tactical nuclear weapons (attack aircraft, missiles, nuclear artillery) can be put to use in an early stage of an armed conflict exists, and any crossing of the "nuclear threshold" is fraught with the prospect of escalation in use of these weapons. We will note that even after elimination of American intermediate and lesser range missiles the U.S. nuclear arsenals in Europe will include at least 4,000 nuclear devices for aerial bombs, warheads, and heavy-caliber artillery projectiles. We will add to this around 400 nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France.

And although some in the West try to assert that the very mechanism of setting in motion "battlefield" nuclear weapons allegedly strengthens the "deterrence" policy and consequently strengthens security, in fact tactical nuclear weapons were transformed long ago into one of the principal weapons of warfare and a material basis for argumentation over the possibility and expediency of conducting a "limited" nuclear war. Thus the high likelihood of a clash of West and East in Central Europe objectively predetermines the need for establishing a unique nonnuclear corridor here.

The foreign policy initiative which the Polish People's Republic advanced in May 1987 and which is a component part of the pan-European process begun in Helsinki is of fundamentally great importance in this regard. A feature of the conceptual approach of the Polish People's Republic and of practical steps of its diplomacy is that in seeking a solution to complex problems it places emphasis on achieving partial agreements on a regional basis which can and must become the catalyst of a universal process. Its proposals are widely known: about freeing Central Europe of nuclear weapons, as set forth in the "Rapacki Plan" (1957), as well as for freezing nuclear arms on territories of the Polish People's Republic, CSSR, GDR and FRG, as set forth in the "Gomulka Plan" (1963). They were not implemented exclusively through the fault of western powers.

The new Polish initiative, called the "Jaruzelski Plan," is a comprehensive plan for reducing arms and armed forces and building confidence in Central Europe, the first step along the path of establishing nonnuclear zones on the continent.

Why does this plan involve a limitation both of nuclear and conventional arms? Nuclear weapons and operational-tactical missiles with conventional filling (radius of action around 500 km) predominate in the quantitative sense in military potentials stockpiled in this zone. A simultaneous reduction of both nuclear and conventional potentials is explained by the fact that to a considerable extent one and the same means can be used dually, i.e., for delivering an attack by conventional and nuclear weapons. The Polish People's Republic proposed such steps on condition that they create guarantees of equal security of parties in Central Europe. This idea should dispel the fears of some western states concerning preservation of unbalanced conventional potentials after the possible elimination of nuclear weapons. It is important that the most powerful conventional weapons also be eliminated simultaneously with elimination of nuclear weapons. That decision correspondingly reduces the capability of the sides for offensive actions, thus strengthening states' mutual feeling of confidence and security.

As M. S. Gorbachev noted in the article "Reality and Guarantees of a Safe World," this idea is the initial project for a possible new arrangement of life in our common planetary home. In other words, it is a pass to the future, where the security of all is a guarantee of the security of each one.


6904

Maj Gen Yevstafev Compares British, Soviet Inspections of Chemical Facilities

18010453 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jul 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Baberdin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Shikhany: Proving Ground of Trust"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Upon invitation of the Soviet government, a British delegation, including military experts, diplomats, scientists and reporters, recently visited the chemical troops unit (chast) and military installation at Shikhany, located in the steppe on the right bank of the Volga, 150 kilometers from Saratov. This visit is in response to one made in May of this year by Soviet military experts and diplomats to the British military installation at Porton-Down where chemical weapons activities are conducted.

We are at Sheremetyevo Airport. Our group (Soviet and British journalists) is invited to embark. We just have time to get seated comfortably on the plane when we
hear the announcement: “Our Tu-134 aircraft is making a special flight from Moscow to Bagay-Baranovka. We will be in the air one hour and twenty minutes for the 840-km journey.” After a powerful surge on the runway, the aircraft sharply gains altitude...

Bagay-Baranovka is the airport in the vicinity of the Shikhany military installation. This is the third day now a delegation of representatives from Great Britain has been working there. Headed by Mrs. T. Solesby, ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the delegation includes Brigadier General U. Bittles, military attaché to Great Britain’s embassy in Moscow, Doctor G. Pearson, head of the military chemical installation at Porton-Down, prominent military chemical experts and diplomats.

Scheduled activities fill the visit to the Soviet military facility to the limit. They include obtaining extensive information on the structure and orientation of the installation, gaining familiarization with its technological laboratories and listening to presentations by Soviet personnel on problems related to chemical weapons. Scheduled for the following day is a demonstration of chemical weapons systems and mobile units for destroying chemical ammunition. This will be followed by familiarization with means and methods of personnel and equipment decontamination. There will then be a fly-over of the site and inspection of any areas requested by British representatives...

It turned out, however, that literally from the first day forward, from the very first steps our guests took at the proving ground, the working schedule was completely disrupted and revised. The British experts were interested in everything, not just chemical weapons. They even requested to take a look at the motor pool and repair shops. Questions and questions... Soviet officers listened patiently to them and tried to provide exhaustive answers to the extent possible. It was not a simple matter, however, to satisfy all the demands of the guests, their inquiries being so extensive.

“You know,” comments Major General I. Yevstafev, representative of Soviet chemical troops, “our first demonstration day lasted well beyond midnight.” Neither the abundant flow of information nor the awful, intense heat of the Volga steppe tired our guests. Even in the shade thermometers showed temperatures rising above the 30-degree mark and at several points during the demonstration guests had to don special outfits and equipment—protective masks and suits.

“I counted more than 300 questions from the British experts at that point,” Maj Gen Yevstafev continues. “For the sake of comparison, when we visited Porton-Down, we agreed to limit our questions during the first days of the orientation to 60. But here we deliberately went out of our way to satisfy the curiosity of our colleagues from the British Isles to the extent possible. We must strengthen and expand the balance of trust.”

“Still another aspect of the demonstration should be emphasized,” Lieutenant General A. Kuntsevich, deputy chief of chemical troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense and academician, joined in the conversation. “We expanded the visit program through good will. At the Porton-Down facility we were given the opportunity to select any part of the installation for inspection. Here at Shikhany we afforded our guests the right to designate 10 sites for inspection after overflying the entire area. Essentially, we played out in miniature a methodology for conducting an inspection on demand. This was a valuable experience which I hope will allow us to resolve a number of technical issues during the process of discussing and drawing up documents for a future convention on banning chemical weapons.”

A question to Kuntsevich: “What aim was being pursued in showing the chemical troops training unit?”

“At Porton-Down we were shown certain combat training segments personnel undergo in a chemical defense subunit, also some of the combat procedures performed by a chemical defense specialist alone and by the crew of a combat vehicle. We went further than that and decided to show the entire set of elements involved in the combat training of chemical troops and their operations as seen against a realistic tactical background. Hundreds of items of military equipment were put into operation, as were dozens of decontamination units.”

Why was this done? In order to graphically demonstrate the complexity of the problem of protecting military personnel from chemical weapons. To show things on a realistic scale sufficient for the politicians, diplomats and experts conducting negotiations in Geneva. This was a demonstration of troop operations—but what if all this were directed against a civilian population lacking such highly prepared and organized structure? We want to mention again that chemical weapons are truly weapons of mass destruction against people and they must be outlawed.

“The inspection of the Shikhany military installation is over,” stated ambassador and representative of the Soviet Union in Geneva Yu. Nazarkin in a briefing, “but we are not saying farewell to the British delegation, for we are to meet again in Geneva on 6 July for the next round of talks on banning chemical weapons.”

9768

Nuclear Testing Limits Proposed
18010144 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM No 41, 7-13 Oct 88 p.1

[Unsigned article; “A New Point of Reference”]

[Excerpts] A breakthrough in the solution of this problem was achieved in the course of the meeting of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR E. A. Shevardnadze and the Secretary of State of the U.S.A. George Schultz
in Washington in September of 1987 when an understanding on the beginning of full scale talks in stages on the limitation and in the final analysis cessation of nuclear tests was agreed to. The discussions opened in Geneva by the 9th of November. In correspondence with the mutual announcements on the beginning of full scale talks the sides as a first step must agree to effective measures of verification which will allow for the ratification of the treaty on the limitation of underground tests of nuclear weapons of 1974 and the treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes of 1976. They must then move on to the working out of further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing on the path to the final goal—a complete cessation on nuclear testing as part of an effective arms control process.

Thanks to the persistent efforts of the sides at the talks in less than a year's time a solid material basis which guarantees the rapid movement towards the proposed goals has been constructed. The joint experiment on verification for the limitation of nuclear testing was successfully conducted at the test sites in Nevada and in the region of Semipalatinsk. It demonstrated the unprecedented degree of cooperation and openness in one of the most sensitive areas militarily, proving the effectiveness of the means of verification which the sides possess.

Now the task of completing an agreement on a new protocol to the 1976 treaty, and after an analysis of the results of the joint experiment, of agreeing on a verification protocol for the 1974 treaty in a short time stands before the two countries' delegations in Geneva. This will allow the governments to give the treaties over for ratification and to move on at last to the solution of the main task of the talks—the achievement of a complete cessation of nuclear testing. The establishment of intermediate limitations which are at the same time radical in character, on the yield and number of tests of the sides, is one of the methods of moving forward to this goal. As an immediate practical measure in this direction the Soviet Union is ready to reach an understanding with the USA on the limitation of the yield of underground nuclear tests to one kiloton and the frequency of testing of nuclear weapons to two or three times per year.

The prospects taking shape for real movement towards the goal of limiting tests make all the more important the support of the efforts of the two nuclear powers from the side of the world community, although it is worth emphasizing that an overwhelming majority in the UN, as the results of the General Assembly Session show, and all the anti-war movements are insisting on the swift prohibition of nuclear explosions. The numerous proposals introduced by the Soviet Union for examination at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament could become the practical basis for the solution of the problem.

The beginning of the elimination of nuclear weapons, which makes the continuation of testing and improvement senseless, must become a watershed, a new point of reference in the efforts of all countries to remove nuclear explosions from the life of the planet. The solution of this problem will become a deposit towards the irreversibility of the process of disarmament.

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INF Missile Officers' Redeployment Discussed
PM2110143088 Moscow KRAŠNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Oct 88 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel General V. Mikhalkin, chief of the Ground Forces Missile Forces and Artillery, by Maj S. Popov under the rubric “Interview on a Topical Theme”: “After the Explosions at Saryozek: Missiles for Scrap. But What About the Missile Men's Future?”—date, place of interview not stated; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] In accordance with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, the first explosions have been heard in the areas where the missiles are being eliminated. But where and how will the people who controlled these weapons continue their service? At the request of the editorial office, Colonel General V. Mikhalkin, chief of the Ground Forces Missile Forces and Artillery, told us about this.

[Popov] Vladimir Mikhaylovich! First, the main point that concerns many of KRAŠNAYA ZVEZDA's readers: Will all the officers serving in the missile units whose weapons are due for elimination remain in service?

[Mikhalkin] Yes, we are trying to maintain in full the personnel of these units—after all, they are officers with a high standard of professional training. Moreover, even the few men who, for various reasons, expressed a desire to be discharged into the reserve before the expiration of their term of service have in fact remained in service. They are valuable specialists and good officers, and we managed to convince them of the need to continue to serve.

[Popov] Is there any justification for comparing the present moment in the Army's life with the reduction of the Armed Forces that took place in the late fifties and early sixties?

[Mikhalkin] Despite the outward similarity in the situations, there is a fundamental difference here. Today the question of the future service of each officer and ensign is being resolved on an individual basis. In those days, and I say this from my personal observations, the principle: “Every third man to leave the service” was implemented more or less mechanically. Many talented commanding officers, political workers, military engineers, and technicians were forced to leave the Army. And at the same time those who remained were sometimes far from the best. In my view conclusions have been drawn from the lessons of the past. Today the Ground Forces cadre directorate, the districts' cadre organs, and our directorate's cadre group, headed by Colonel V. Novoselov, are working responsibly and in coordination. This work is far from simple.
[Popov] What is being offered to the officers?

[Mikhalkin] We are talking about the specialists who controlled the shorter-range missiles. These missiles will no longer exist. But missile complexes with a range of up to 500 km remain. We are sending some of the officers to these units and subunits. Others will continue to serve in the tube and rocket artillery. Naturally, I am talking about commanding officers. As for the political workers, truck drivers, communications operators, in other words, officers who are not “tied” by their speciality specifically to the missile forces—some of these are being sent to other categories of troops and even other branches of the Armed Forces.

[Popov] Is it easy for a missile man to transfer to the classical artillery, if I can put it like that?

[Mikhalkin] A certain amount of professional and psychological restructuring is necessary. But in our educational institutions, and especially the military academy, officers are trained to serve in both missile and artillery units. We try correspondingly to alternate their service in the troops. I myself, for instance, commanded an artillery regiment, then served in command posts in the missile forces, and then in the artillery again. And that is a common phenomenon.

Nonetheless all the missile officers who have had to change the nature of their service have been retrained. They will improve in the process of systematic commander training.

[Popov] What problems have emerged in the course of resolving cadre questions?

[Mikhalkin] Enough, of course. They emerged from the time of the withdrawal from GDR and CSSR territory of the missile units that were stationed there in December 1983. They were to return to their former stations, where the housing stock and the training base had formerly been mothballed. But... It transpired that in the military districts, these camps were already being used to some degree. The commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces had to intervene. Things were put right very quickly.

But most of the problems are human problems. People feel hurt, disappointed. But these problems are not at all associated with the elimination of a whole class of arms. We military men have the same thoughts and feelings as the whole people. It is a matter of people’s personal lives.

Among the missile forces command personnel (depending on the missile complex that is in the unit’s armory) there are differences in the official category, where salaries are the same. This is what happens. An officer has, for instance, been in a post classified as “captain,” he has coped with it successfully, and in his new place he is offered a post classified one step lower. There is no material loss to him, but his prestige is affected. In some cases, as I have already mentioned, people have gone so far as to request a discharge into the reserves. In such situations reproaches and lectures are pointless. Sensitivity, humanity, and good advice from your seniors are much more important.

[Popov] How does the picture look in general as regards the redeployment of officers?

[Mikhalkin] I will take as an example one unit that has returned to the territory of the Baltic Military District. Two-thirds of the officers are continuing their careers in that district. Eleven men, among them Major V. Lomakin and Captains V. Polovinkin, S. Mironov, and Kh. Gaynulin, have entered higher posts. Lieutenant Colonel A. Chashin, Major A. Savinkin, and Captains N. Nazipov, and V. Kvasovka have become students at the military academy. All the others have taken equivalent posts. Four commanders were appointed to posts with lower official classifications. In all cases this was with their official consent. It is a question of very young officers who have their entire career ahead of them. How have the officers sent to other districts been used? One was promoted, and one was appointed to a lower-ranking post. The others are serving in posts equal to their former positions.

We also seek where possible to take the officers’ personal requests into account. Lieutenant Colonel A. Yedunov, who has an apartment in Kaliningrad, was sent to the oblast military commissariat. Lieutenant Colonel V. Granovskyi and a number of other officers were sent to artillery units, at their own wish....

[Popov] The newspaper TRUD recently published a letter from the wife of a missile officer about the difficult living conditions at her husband’s new place of service....

[Mikhalkin] Of course difficulties of this kind exist. They are characteristic of the Armed Forces in general. It would be nice if an officer could receive, together with his appointment to his new post, the keys to a new apartment. But alas.... That is not likely to happen in the near future. We have sometimes had to billet families who did not have apartments in barracks, training blocks, and hotels refitted as hostels. The premises are divided into rooms and equipped with furniture. The conditions are acceptable, but you cannot call it luxury.

[Popov] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, could you clarify the situation specifically involving Senior Lieutenant Sh. Khayrov, whose wife complained about domestic troubles?

[Mikhalkin] First, one point: It is not Senior Lieutenant, but Captain Khayrov. This conscientious officer received the higher military rank in accordance with the post he now holds. At the garrison to which Khayrov and his unit returned after their withdrawal from GDR territory and where his family were provided with two rooms, there was no post with the official rank of “captain.” An equivalent was found in another unit, where the housing situation is indeed critical.
In general, much, in my view, depends on attentiveness toward the missile men in the districts to which they were sent to continue their service. And here not everything is being resolved fairly. At one garrison, for instance, they built an apartment block specially for these officers, and have begun to build another. But the district promptly took some of the apartments for its own needs. It is hard to accept that.

[Popov] One last question. Has the missile men’s prestige suffered, in your view, as a result of the elimination of two types of missile arms?

[Mikhalkin] I think the competition for entries to our military academies acts as a kind of barometer here. This year it remains approximately the same as it was before.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Germans See Chemical Weapons Ban Unlikely Within Next Year
52002401 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Sep 88 p 5

[Article by wy: "Disarmament Conference Ends Session"]

[Text] Geneva, 14 Sep—Once again there was little to show—at least to outsiders—when on Friday the representatives of 40 nations, among them the two German ones, to the Geneva disarmament conference ended their session for this year. They might at least have emerged from the shadow of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation negotiations if the conclusion of an agreement about an extensive ban on chemical weapons had come within their reach. The hopes expressed before the end of last year are gone. In their work on a draft treaty the negotiators advanced only by small steps on individual points. The prospects appear limited that, for example, reference to Iraqi forces using chemical warfare agents which affect the civilian population as well could accelerate the progress of the Geneva negotiations.

Demands in that direction have been raised, to be sure. Others, however, according to the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Burns, see themselves confirmed in their opinion that chemical weapons are needed for deterrence and retaliation, as long as an absolutely effective, verifiable, and extensive agreement banning the production and possession of chemical weapons does not exist. The more the experts working on it move forward on individual points, the more difficult it gets to put the "watertight" texts into wording that would satisfy the advocates of deterrence. The latter refer, among other things, to the fact that since the passing of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which outlaws the use of chemical weapons, there have only been violations when only one party to the conflict was in possession of such weapons, but not the opponent.

Further, only a limited number of experts and an insufficient secretariat infrastructure are available for the negotiations in Geneva. In addition, some of the participating states seem to be in less of a hurry, due to a different view of the world situation as well as to various strategic considerations and security requirements, than others to conclude a chemical weapons agreement. From Washington, new initiatives and impulses are not expected before the presidential election; until now, the Soviet Union and its allies have reacted, although increasingly more flexibly, rather than made their own proposals. Even so, some Geneva delegates, among them the Germans, expressed the opinion that despite all the difficulties an agreement could be completed and signed in 12 months, if the political will for it was there. The subcommittee responsible for the negotiations is to resume its work as early as November, while the plenum of the Geneva disarmament conference will not meet again until February 1989.

Individual proposals for bridging the time until the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban by introducing measures to prevent the spreading of such weapons and their use have been met with some skepticism. They range from an exhortation to all states to subject the export of chemicals suitable for the production of chemical weapons, or their production facilities, to rigorous controls and conditions for the purchasers, all the way to proposals for working out a non-proliferation treaty according to the model of the nuclear ban. But they have not yet found the response which would allow for the conclusion that there is general readiness to take concrete action.
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