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EAST EUROPE

BULGARIA

Bulgaria Announces 'Maritsa 89' Army Exercise
AU2211193488 Sofia BTA in English 1843 GMT 22 Nov 88

["Maritsa Military Exercise in 1989"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, November 22 (BTA)—Bulgaria has circulated through diplomatic channels a schedule of its military activities subject to prior notification under the European Security and Cooperation Agreement signed in Stockholm in 1986. The only manoeuvre involving more than 13,000 men, 300 tanks or 200 aircraft take-offs which the Bulgarian People's Army intends to hold in 1989 is an exercise codenamed “Maritsa’89”, engaging one mechanised infantry division and one tank brigade, undermanned, totalling approximately 13,000 men. The six-day command-post military exercise, due to take place in the second half of August 1989, is designed to practice staff-and-troop management and interaction in the field.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Observers To Attend Swiss Military Exercise
LD2011031588 Prague CTK in English 1707 GMT 19 Nov 88

[Text] Prague Nov 19 (CTK)—Czechoslovak observers will be present at the Swiss troops joint exercises codenamed Feuerborn, due November 20-24, in harmony with the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, it was announced here today.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Werner, Galvin Statements on Arms Criticized
AU2511193388 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 24 Nov 88 p 2

["He." editorial: "Thought Patterns of NATO"]

[Text] Last week’s session of the “North Atlantic Assembly” shows that the NATO leaders are sticking to their old thought patterns. There was no response to the proposals of the Warsaw Pact states on disarmament, confidence-building, and peace—and there was still no sign of NATO’s own security concept, the lack of which has been publicly deplored by the partners themselves for years.

Already on the 1st day, U.S. General Galvin, NATO’s commander in chief, made his views quite clear to the parliamentarians from the 16 alliance states: sticking to the “policy of strength” and to the strategy of “deterrence,” the core of which is, as is known, the first use of nuclear weapons.

NATO Secretary General Woerner followed suit. In the “current situation” nuclear weapons “continue (!) to be indispensable”—and therefore, of course, also their “modernization,” which in reality is only another word for reequipping, or, even more precisely, counterarming. In this connection, it is a characteristic aspect that the “modernization” of nuclear and conventional weapons is also taken into consideration with ever greater intensity by the FRG Government. The “justification” again is the outdated legend of the alleged threat from the East, particularly because of its “oppressing superiority” in armed forces and conventional armaments.

However, NATO is in a dilemma particularly as regards this point. What about the proposal we have put on the table to reduce just these armed forces between the Atlantic and the Urals to the level of being incapable of launching an attack—by eliminating asymmetries and by taking into account equality and equal security on both sides? And also to get rid of the devilish nuclear equipment with ranges under 500 km? Is this the “threat” that one has to “deter”?

Many people in the West do not take that eyewash quite seriously anymore. In the FRG, for instance, 94 percent of the people do not believe in a threat; 79 percent want to get rid of all nuclear weapons in Europe; 68 percent are against the “modernization” intended by the NATO planners (and which is already being carried out secretly).

Logically, in Hamburg numerous NATO parliamentarians were against the theories and practices of the Werners and Galvins—for instance, CDU Deputy Biehle, who asked how one intends to explain to the citizens why “every week the Warsaw Pact presents a new disarmament proposal” but that the West does not respond to it. However, such reservations were voted down and motions to amend the resolution were rejected. This is deplorable because in this way the progress of disarmament is being blocked.

On the other hand, the above-mentioned “doubts of the public in modernization and in nuclear deterrence itself” are increasing so drastically that it was impossible to proceed without mentioning them in the resolution with the above-quoted words. Obviously, one needs the intensified struggle of the peoples so that reason and realism gain a breakthrough in the alliance, the consistent continuation of our socialist peace and disarmament policy, of course, and, not least, the intensification of political dialogue.

GDR Army Officers To Inspect FRG Manoeuvres
LD281102588 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0935 GMT 28 Nov 88

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—A group of officers of the National People’s Army led by Colonel Klaus Haase, travelled to the FRG for an inspection on Monday morning. It is to inspect operations by Bundeswehr troops at an exercise in the Bremen, Uelzen, Brunswick and Osnabrueck regions.
According to the stipulations of the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the GDR government on Saturday submitted to the FRG a request for an inspection. This was granted within a 24-hour period.

**SED-SPD Joint Security Policy Group Meets**

**Policy Objectives Clarified**

*LD2311112188 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1628 GMT 22 Nov 88*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The SED-SPD joint working group on security policy issues in Europe continued its work in Berlin today under the chairmanship of Hermann Axen, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee, and Egon Bahr, chairman of the Subcommittee for Disarmament and Arms Control in the German Bundestag and member of the SPD Presidium.

The joint working group believes that now that a start has been made to nuclear disarmament, the disarmament process should be continued dynamically. The group reaffirms its demands for a start to separate negotiations on reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons having a range below that of the intermediate-range missiles in the agreement and for an early start to negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe. It emphasizes that measures for even more far-reaching nuclear disarmament must not be postponed until the questions of conventional disarmament have been clarified.

The working group rejects all attempts to compensate for or to circumvent the agreement on intermediate-range weapons through so-called modernization and thus endanger further-reaching disarmament steps.

Particularly important for peace and world security are the halving of the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States with strict observance of the ABM Treaty, a complete halt to nuclear tests and a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

The joint working group underscores its conviction that the initiatives of the two German states would promote the process of disarmament and detente and that they accord with their responsibility. It reaffirms its three initiatives: the establishment of a chemical weapons-free zone, of a nuclear weapons-free corridor, and a zone of trust and security in central Europe. In light of the stagnation at the Geneva negotiations concerning a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, the joint working group strongly recommends that the proposal for chemical weapons-free zone in Europe be accorded added urgency.

The working group welcomes the even more precise definitions proposed in the statement by the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact states on confidence and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe for the reduction of confrontation and mistrust, the overcoming of deterrence, and the development of dialogue and cooperation.

During its eighth meeting, the working group continued its discussion of questions concerning nonoffensive capability and the achievement of the lowest possible level of conventional arms through disarmament and the mutual elimination of existing imbalances.

The working group agreed to continue its work in Bonn in the spring of 1989.

**Kessler, Bahr Press Conference**

*LD23111121988 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1705 GMT 22 Nov 88*

[Press conference by GDR Defense Minister General Heinz Kessler, member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee, and Egon Bahr, chairman of the Bundestag Subcommittee for Disarmament and Arms Control and member of the SPD Presidium; in East Berlin, 22 November; questions asked by unidentified correspondents—recorded]

[Text] In Berlin today, there was an informative talk between Army General Heinz Kessler, GDR minister for national defense and member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee, and the members of the SED-SPD joint working group, who are concerning themselves with questions of security policy in Europe. The GDR defense minister explained the content of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact participant states, the fundamental views of the GDR Army leadership on disarmament and detente in Europe, and the development of military-political relations between the GDR and the FRG. He stated to the press in conclusion:

[Begin recording] [Kessler] It was a very fruitful, useful talk. The topic was how best to contribute jointly to the securing of peace and to the taking of effective disarmament measures. We dealt with the whole spectrum presently being debated at the Vienna negotiations in that we included in the main topic—that of conventional disarmament—everything that should be included. Mr Bahr and I agreed that both sides must make their respective contributions and, to be sure, will make them. This will also be more or less the main thrust of the discussion—as I hope it will be in any case—with the FRG defense minister.

[Bahr] I expressed to Minister Kessler my great satisfaction that after the 18 years of talks I have had in and with the GDR, the time is now ripe. It is also necessary to speak objectively with the GDR defense minister. In fact, I will have something to report to Mr Scholz concerning this talk and I will want to report this. It is no
secret that I believe it to be important and necessary that a meeting between the two defense ministers take place soon. They have much to discuss with each other, for it is beyond doubt that the two German states have quite unique tasks to perform in order to take the process of European stability and conventional disarmament to a lower level.

[Kessler] We discussed all questions, and actually there is a unified view on the fact that it is not sensible or expedient to compensate for a process already in motion by means of another measure.

[Bahr] I believe it is unarguable; the idea of compensation means the death of disarmament as a whole. If you compensate for everything you get rid of, you do not get rid of it after all, do you?

(Correspondent) May we ask Mr. Axen [words indistinct]?

[axen] Yes, it says in today's press release, which already has been published, that the talks passed in a very constructive, objective atmosphere, that they are a step forward because we have come to know each other; we can understand each other because we can mark out the areas of questions, the complexes of ideas in military disarmament. Many [word indistinct] are already asking themselves now how we can clarify the further steps, the necessity for further steps. We thought that this meeting of the working groups' eighth session, particularly the informative talk Defense Minister Comrade Heinz Kessler had with the working group, was extraordinarily constructive and that it pointed the way toward the future.

Kessler Meets SED-SPD Group

AU251103488 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 23 Nov 88 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] East Berlin (ADN)—An informative talk was held in Berlin on Tuesday [22 November] between Army General Heinz Kessler, GDR minister of national defense and member of the SED Central Committee Politburo, and members of the joint SED-SPD working group that deals with questions concerning security policy in Europe.

The GDR defense minister explained the content of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine and the fundamental views of the GDR Army leadership on disarmament and detente in Europe, and spoke about the development of military-political relations between the GDR and FRG.

Egon Bahr [chairman of the Subcommittee for Disarmament and Arms Control in the FRG Bundestag and member of the SPD Presidium], head of the SPD delegation, elaborated on his party's views on desirable negotiations on conventional and nuclear stability in Europe. In this connection, an exchange of experiences on the role of the two German states was held.

During the meeting, which proceeded in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere, Defense Minister Heinz Kessler answered questions of members of the working group.

After the talk, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo Hermann Axen, Heinz Kessler, and Egon Bahr answered questions of the international press. Asked about the responsibility of the two German states for the disarmament process, Heinz Kessler stated: Mr. Bahr and I agreed that both sides must and will make corresponding contributions, and I hope this will also be the main topic of talks with the FRG defense minister. [passage omitted]

HUNGARY

Gyula Horn Discusses NATO Talk on Defenses

Interviewed by Budapest Radio Program

LD2011101488 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1500 GMT 19 Nov 88

[From the "168 Hours" program]

[Text] [Announcer] Hungary is prepared to make public data regarding its military budget and its armed forces in the European disarmament process which is to be realized in the future. Gyula Horn, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, caused great attention with this declaration at the NATO parliament, if only because it was the first time in the existence of the organisation that an official representative of one of the WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] member states was invited to its General Assembly. This development was called 'historic' by the Western press. In his speech, the state secretary mentioned that in the past 4 decades, the economic orientation of the East, including Hungary, had become one-sided, the European connecting links which had evolved historically, and which were characteristic of the period before the second world war, had broken.

The rearranging started principally in the second half of the eighties.

How can the mutual dependence, European stability be maintained? And, what effect does this have on the internal relations in individual countries, principally on their economic circumstances? These questions have particular significance when we heard this week, that the deputy chairman of the National Planning Office spoke at one of the National Assembly committees about the regrouping of the defense and internal affairs budgets. On the basis of the report, the budgets of both portfolios would increase by 6 billion forints each.

In the following interview, Gyula Horn answers questions from Jozsef Laszlo. We apologize in advance for the poor quality of the recording.
[Laszlo] You were the first East European politician who was able to speak at the NATO General Assembly. Among other things, you said it is an anachronism that foreign troops are stationed in various European countries. This declaration of yours aroused rather a great deal of attention, to put it mildly. The Western European press took this up. You also said that various forces, both in the NATO countries and in the WTO countries, are to a certain extent interested in confrontation. What did you mean by this?

[Horn] I would like to emphasize for the sake of precision that this did not feature in the address, but following the address, there were questions and answers for over 2 hours. During this time one of the representatives asked when the Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Hungary. Well, in connection with this, I emphasized that it was my conviction that the fact that foreign troops are present in Europe is a remnant of World War II. Precisely for this, we regard this as a kind of anachronism at a time, amid circumstances where the objective factor of being dependent on each other, mutual dependence, has come into being. The situation which has developed must in all events be changed. But we will begin the work in December this year, or at the beginning of next year, at the European Disarmament Conference. So, we will get down to working out and laying down the details of the concrete disarmament measures. This must also definitely touch on the question of foreign troops stationed abroad. So, in this European disarmament process, we should get around to both withdrawing Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, and withdrawing of U.S. troops from Western Europe. So, the answer is complete in this way.

[Laszlo] This, therefore, means there is an end to the war, to those conditions which developed 43 years ago?

[Horn] Now, the European states and countries have become so much stronger that they can guarantee the European territorial status quo which has developed, with their own armies, national defense forces.

It is my conviction that the time will come for the withdrawal of troops stationed abroad, and this would in no way weaken European military relations. On the contrary, for the creation of a joint European home it would be beneficial from the political point of view and from every other point of view.

[Laszlo] Going back to the previous question, not just within NATO, but also within the WTO, there are forces which are interested to a certain extent in confrontation? So does this mean that in our countries, too, there is a kind of military industrial complex, a kind of lobby like this?

[Horn] No, it does not mean this at all. As the new thinking started, however, and mainly the practical realization of this, in the framework of this, in the Soviet standpoint, in the Soviet professional and political press, it also comes increasingly to the surface that very many things must be changed in our military policy. For, our conception in connection with the whole army, defense forces and so on, in many respects, too, is still the remnant of the Stalinist way of thinking, system.

Also, I consider it a natural phenomenon that whoever serves in the Army, particularly in leading positions, does have determined existential interests; in the sense that naturally there are very serious requirements regarding the army, also within the WTO. For the satisfying of these requirements, a great deal of money, and investment means are needed. Obviously, those who have to take care of maintaining the level of the armed forces are carrying out a difficult struggle to ensure the material means necessary for this.

It is not a question of those who deal with arms manufacture pocketing great profits, making profits, but in its existence, in the development program connected with the whole sphere, concrete human interests do appear. I consider extremely worthy of attention the thinking which has just come out in the Soviet Union, of how the whole army could be reorganized in a new way, including, therefore, also that a very significant reduction be carried through in the numbers in the army, its armaments and so on. This can be compared to the Yugoslav or Swiss model, that the emphasis be on the organization of a people's defense, and that the numbers, weight of professional soldiers, the professional army, be significantly, considerably reduced.

If we want to keep step with the NATO modernization programs, we without doubt need to place emphasis on quality. This development cannot be envisioned either, without (additional) investments. However how can a people's economy struggling with serious lack of capital, lack of investment means, be it the Soviet Union, or Hungary, bear further and further expenditures? So, it is my conviction that qualitative development, too, can only be ensured if in other military areas, that is, primarily in the quantitative area, we carry out a significant reduction.

[Laszlo] In Hamburg you also said that the failure of Gorbachev's reforms would lead to dictatorship or chaos in Hungary. How did you mean this?

[Horn] Well, once again, I was not quoted precisely by the press. For there was a question as to whether there was any kind of mutual effect (?of) the changes, restructuring underway in Hungary and the Soviet Union. I said there was a very close mutual effect. The tensions accumulating in society, and within this primarily in the economy, show that the necessity for a radical restructuring has become a question of vital importance. Not everyone agrees with this, all the more not because they are not capable of change, but because these changes touch the existential interests of very many people, (?mainly) those working in various apparatuses. If it is
not managed to bring success to the Gorbachev restructuring, rebuilding, then what variant is offered us? The tensions would continue to exist, what is more, they will increase further. This must be quieted down in some way, and so on. It could happen that in the face of this, a very hard line in the interests of, so to speak, putting to rights, or making order, would arise.

[Lazslo] But there are examples from the near past, and not too distant areas, that this kind of method does not lead to success. More precisely, it results in one thing, that a country can lose 5, 6 years.

[Horn] Or that it can lose its perspective.

Horn's 'Candid Appearance' Viewed
AVI1711140188 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 17 Nov 88 p 2

[Uwe Bahnsson commentary: "Hungary Wants To Break the Wall"]

[Text] Hungary's Deputy Foreign Minister Gyula Horn, the first high-ranking representative of an East Bloc country ever to attend a NATO meeting, staged a candid appearance before the North Atlantic assembly in Hamburg. He certainly prepared himself well prior to his departure, and for this reason we Germans are well advised to take careful notice of what he announced. It is true that Horn did not essentially deviate from the line that has been adopted by the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, which includes measures to strengthen cooperation between the blocs and to reduce military factors in interstate relations within a "solid framework." However, the guest also adopted tones that made everybody listen attentively.

This applies to the statement that the presence of foreign armies in European countries constitutes an "anachronism;" to the admission that there had also been "advocates of confrontation" on the Eastern side (whereas communist propaganda always detected such activities only in the West); and to the remark that the human rights record of a state determines its relations with other states. When submitting the proposal to create a basis on an all-European scale for joint activities against human rights violations, the state secretary from Budapest may have had in mind the fate of ethnic Hungarians in Romania. He must understand, however, that we Germans find this idea interesting in connection with our fellow citizens on the other side of the Wall and behind barbed wire.

The Germans always were and still are in favor of "breaking through the walls of the bloc system." However, shots are being fired—by an alliance partner of the Hungarians—at those who try to surmount this wall. This constitutes a major obstacle to progress in the direction suggested by the Hungarian official to the NATO parliamentarians. The other stumbling block was mentioned by NATO Commander-in-Chief Galvin in

the assembly's Military Committee: So far, the Soviets have not reduced their military potential. They produce weapons at a level that corresponds to that of 1985 when Gorbachev assumed power—a total of 280 battle tanks per month. The diplomat, however, displayed a readiness for a differentiated analysis on the part of the Eastern side.

YUGOSLAVIA

Defense Secretary Kadijevic Presents Budget
LD2711065288 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1056 GMT 24 Nov 88

[Text] Belgrade, 24 (TANJUG)—Consolidating the country's defense and security capability is and will remain for a long time a condition for peaceful development. Yugoslavia has opted for all-people's defense and the social self-protection concept on a lasting basis. Its efficiency has been proven, said Colonel General Valjko Kadijevic, federal secretary of national defense, explaining the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) budget for 1989 during today's session of the Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly.

Stressing the general developments in international relations, particularly regarding the superpowers and military-political blocs, which basically speaking constitutes a positive trend, Kadijevic said:

Much more effort and time will be required, stressed Kadijevic, to ensure universal detente and security in the world, particularly when you bear in mind the fact that an increasing number of countries are improving, manufacturing, or—at least insofar as technical and technological possibilities are concerned—are capable of producing nuclear weapons.

"Although the USSR has formulated a 'defense sufficiency' doctrine, which implies quantitative and qualitative restrictions on armed forces which do not allow either side to win a possible war, the existence of the 'competition doctrine' on which the United States is insisting has the effect of continuing the arms race. At the same time, there is the tendency to compensate for any reduction in nuclear or any other type of weapons by developing new weapon systems whereby an adequate parity in the ratio of forces is not only secured, but the degree of armaments is raised to a qualitatively higher level," said Kadijevic.

"Recent events in our country have been carefully monitored in the world, Kadijevic went on to say. Most countries express an interest in Yugoslavia's stability. In some neighboring and other countries different assessments are made of the possible course of our internal situation. It cannot be ignored that sudden developments are possible in the international military-political situation which could radically change our strategic position. For this reason, we must above all establish a
close link between our country’s security and our internal situation, and also with the development of the military-political factor nearer home and farther afield.”

Referring to the situation in Yugoslavia, the federal secretary of national defense stressed: The current social crisis and the possibility of that crisis getting worse has a multiple negative effect on the defense capability of our society with a trend toward growing danger to our country’s integrity. The inefficient functioning of the political and legal system also has an impact, among other things, on the weakening of the moral strength of society and the Armed Forces. The economic and structural crisis in our country undermines the material foundations of all-people’s defense and social self-protection foundations; it limits technical equipment and modernization of the Armed Forces, and has a negative impact on the defense and self-protection awareness of our population and of the members of the Armed Forces.

The attacks on the YPA, said Kadijevic, are primarily armed at destroying Yugoslavia and its federal and socialist system. An attempt is being made to change its role, status, and character as established by the SFRY Constitution as well as its status and role as laid down by the all-people’s defense concept. This is why these attacks are stepped up without interruption and carried out on a continuous basis through: psychological-propaganda pressure and other public and secret attacks by the forces of external and internal enemies through attempts to discredit its officers; dissemination of defeatism and discouraging military careers; encouragement of national homogeneity within the Armed Forces; support for illegal group work in the YPA based on nationalistic and separatist positions; and the pursuit of the cruelest forms of subversive activity—terrorism, sabotage, and working as an agent of foreign intelligence services. A complacent and tolerant attitude by individual institutions of our political and legal system also suits the attacks on the YPA.

The conviction of YPA members is that they are doing an honorable and socially responsible task requiring effort, sacrifices, and also deprivation of many personal and family pleasures. This conviction as drastically and daily in conflict with unscrupulous insults to their personal and institutional dignity, insinuations, and malicious suspicions. This fills them with dismay.

The decisions of the 17th session of the LCY Central Committee, their consistent elaboration and concretization within the framework of the three reforms, and also their vigorous implementation signify a correct and democratic way out of the crisis. This is why perhaps there is asserted opposition to the elaboration and implementation of these decisions for this very reason.

We must vigorously eliminate opposition whether it is in the political or in the economic sphere. Efficient functioning of the state at all levels of its existence, institutions, and legal system is the essential condition for this to be done in accordance with the norms of democratic society. The existing state in this sphere must be overcome very quickly and decisively because there is a threat that the reforms can be jeopardized in the very beginning, stressed Kadijevic.

Referring to the negative consequences of the adjustments to the current YPA medium-term development plan, Veljko Kadijevic said:

It is common knowledge that the sources actually set aside to finance the Army were considerably down on what had been planned because the basis had been reduced because of the drop of national income in real terms. Furthermore, the resources have not been secured in accordance with the planned percentage at which they were set aside. The result is that their share in 1986 was 4.98 percent and in 1987 4.52 percent of national income. Besides, the delays in the availability of the resources reduced their value in real terms.

In these unfavorable conditions of getting our financial resources we were forced, among other things, to carry out specific changes in our plans and programs:

First, as you know, the SFRY Presidency has adopted the decision about a 13 percent reduction in the numerical size of our Armed Forces and the implementation of this decision is underway.

Second, we carried out a restructuring of specific aspects of our expenditure to the advantage of technical modernization.

Third, despite that, we were forced to give up some technical modernization programs, while we had to whittle down others and extend the deadlines of their implementation.

The next important consequence of the reduction of resources to finance the YPA, said Kadijevic, is the decline in the standard of living of YPA members. Although we tried to coordinate it with the established standard of life policy in our society, I must say that the personal income of military personnel on active service and of civilian personnel serving in the YPA has for 2 years already been registering a drop which is bigger than the drop of personal income in the economy. It is estimated that this year’s fall of personal income in real terms by YPA members will be about 17 percent which is the biggest fall in income registered so far. The decelerated rate of housing construction also has an unfavorable impact on the standard of living. Because of the general restrictions with regard to the size of personal income and also of the wish to secure minimum existence wages for the youngest officers, a payment system exists now whose main characteristic is the 3:1 differential between the highest and lowest personal income in the YPA.
I would particularly like to point out the unfavorable consequences to which our military industry is exposed. The changed conditions of business operations in the country and the developments on the world market had a direct impact on the difficulties in this branch of the economy, which employs about 77,000 workers. Its material position is deteriorating although the results it has attained are above the average results of the Yugoslav economy.

The most acute problems are tied mainly to the inadequate use of capacities and a drop in production. The current capacities of the military industry were built on the basis of the SFry Armed Forces development plans and programs when 6.17 percent of the national income was set aside to finance the YPA, subsequently reduced to 5.8 and 5.20 percent, and on the basis of the assessment of export opportunities which was to involve an average of 30 percent of available capacities. However, the reduction of resources to finance the YPA and in the armaments and military equipment manufacturing industry over a period of many years is jeopardizing the employment of a significant segment of the military industry capacities.

In order to overcome the current difficulties, we are tackling the development projections of every specialized manufacturing basic organization of associated labor up to 2000. We will take a number of measures, ranging from restructuring the production (in keeping with the long-term plan of the development of Armed Forces) to putting a section of production capacities on ice.

Speaking on the development of all-people’s defense and Armed Forces development, Veljko Kadijevic stressed that the all-people’s defense concept objectives and tasks in preserving the security of the country remain the same. However, the weight must be placed on consolidating the function of deterrence from aggression because this is the most rational and in contemporary conditions the most realistic aspect of defense. No doubt the deterrence function must not be to the detriment of other functions because if there is a need to react with one of the remaining three functions, especially if what we are facing is an aggression with a radical objective, there will be no time or opportunity to compensate for what was not done in peacetime. In order to successfully implement the deterrence function, two essential conditions have to be ensured: overall stability in the country and a corresponding readiness, degree of organization, and equipment of the Armed Forces, especially of the YPA, to efficiently resist modern military doctrines, both from the point of view of preventive activity and in conditions of a possible aggression against our country. Moral-political strength, readiness, and resolve of the overall Army system to resolutely resist every aggressor alone are not enough to fulfill this function; the YPA must also be adequately equipped from the technical point of view too.

We will channel further development and improvement of our Armed Forces, especially of the YPA, primarily into the following:

Maintenance and consolidation of the moral-Political unity of all members of the Armed Forces on the program of keeping and developing the achievements of the Yugoslav socialist revolution, and especially of Yugoslav socialist patriotism and revolutionary thought and Josip Broz Tito’s achievement;

Further theoretical and practical development and updating military doctrine and military skills in keeping with our requirements and possibilities; updating doctrines and the material and technical needs of modern armies; devising timely and adequate answers to all these challenges. As far as possible, we have to compensate for some shortcomings in the domain of the material-technical factor of the armed struggle and of the war as a whole by improving our military doctrine;

An improvement of the organizational information structure of the units so that the overall organizational structure of the Armed Forces can become even more adaptable in the conditions and the demand of the successful conduct of all forms of armed struggle, especially the combined one;

An improvement of the system of bringing the Armed Forces up to cadre strength, updating military training and promotion of military schooling;

Modernization of the leadership and command system, both in the organizational and in the functional meaning of the word, especially in those segments which ensure even greater unity, links, and maximum use of all available resources;

An improvement of military organization in keeping with the demands required by contemporary social attainments—ranging from information to the social awareness of the young generation.

Explaining the resources to finance the YPA in 1989, Veljko Kadijevic pointed out, among other things, that the fact that the planned volume of resources in 1988 had not been secure, and that the federal budget concept for 1989, which is based on an unrealistic assessment of the nominal economic aggregates, is already now creating a great deal of problems in planning and financing the YPA. Next year these problems may become even more prominent if the high rate of inflation persists.

The most secure portion of the resources this year, he went on to say, which will probably be higher after the actual national income has been finally worked out, amounts to 862 billion dinars. It is clear that to secure the nominal value of these resources next year will result in these resources being realistically reduced taking into account the rate of inflation. We are bringing forward these debts into 1989 under two headings. The first of
the debts which have matured, but which have not yet been paid out, is over 400 billion dinars, whereas the others are the debts which by agreement have been brought forward into next year. It can be inferred from this that at least approximately 50 percent of the debts carried forward should be secured at the beginning of next year, as proposed by the federal draft budget for 1989.

The proposed extent of resources to finance the YPA in 1989 amounting to 14,809.5 billion dinars has been determined, to quote Kadijevic, on the basis of the accepted 5 percent reduction in the value of the resources to finance the YPA as per the Yugoslav social plan, that is to say, by fixing their size in such a way that it represents 4.94 percent of national income.

It is also based on the assessment of the value of the national income with a 78 percent inflation rate and its current 60 percent rate of growth over the year, that is to say with an overall 133 percent rate of inflation. [transmission interrupted, additional tanjug takes not received]
Soviet Ambassador on Conventional Talks in Vienna
18010116 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 88 p 7

[Article by B. Dubrovin under the rubric: "Our Interview": "A Realistic Basis": "Soviet Delegation Head Ambassador Yu.B. Kashlev Answers Questions Put by PRAVDA Correspondent"]

[Text] After a brief interruption, there has been a reintroduction in Vienna of consultations between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO relative to preparing a mandate for new talks on armed forces and conventional armament in Europe. The consultations were started last year on the initiative of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee and are being conducted within the framework of the general European Vienna Conference in progress here.

This is no simple matter, due not only to the geographic—general European—scale, but also to the complexity of the subject matter proper of the future talks; to real differences in structure of troops and armaments; asymmetries and unbalances listed on the agenda to be liquidated to enable effecting major reductions and radical decreases in level of military confrontation on the continent.

It has already been possible in the time of the consultations to reach agreement on important elements of the mandate: goals of the future talks; the participants (23 countries, members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO); management and exchange of information; procedures and organizational conditions of the talks; mandatory international nature of future agreements, etc. In general, agreement has already been reached for a large part of the mandate.

Following is an interview held by the PRAVDA correspondent in Austria with the head of the USSR delegation at the Vienna Conference, Ambassador Yu.V. Kashlev.

Question: What specific questions are under discussion in the consultations? Is the effort being conducted in a constructive spirit?

[Kashlev] Within the next few weeks we are to find mutually acceptable solutions to two as yet unsettled problems: exactly which troops and armaments are to be reduced, and the precise area involved.

In August the Warsaw Pact nations took a constructive step forward, in that we offered a detailed formulation of the subject of the talks which in our opinion affords complete consideration of the concerns harbored by both sides. This formulation states that the subject of the talks will be the conventional armed forces of the participants, including conventional armaments and equipment situated on land in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. In this connection, there will be no exclusions of weapons which possess capabilities in addition to the conventional (in other words, dual-purpose weapons). Armaments and other equipment of this kind will not be placed into another category, and the existence of additional capabilities will not constitute a basis for changing the subject of the talks.

The NATO countries insist that it be made a matter of record that nuclear weapons will not be the subject of discussion in these talks, the same as naval forces and chemical weapons. We on our part submit that it be made a matter of record to exclude from the talks fighter aircraft, as a purely defensive type of armament. It does not contribute to potential for surprise attack and cannot render a negative influence on security of nations in Europe. Its exclusion is not at variance with the already agreed-upon goals of the talks, whereby the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries list as their first priority the elimination of offensive potential for surprise attack.

Relative to opinions expressed on the difficulty of dividing aircraft into attack and fighter categories, this question if desired may be resolved in the talks proper.

At the same time, the subjects of the talks must include all tactical (frontal) attack aviation, which should be considered primarily as a component of surprise attack potential along with tanks and artillery.

Question: When may we expect the talks to begin?

[Kashlev] The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries realize the importance of initiating the talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO nations as soon as possible. The draft mandate includes a decision to hold them as early as this year. Incidentally, they should start and be held along with the talks on Confidence and Security Building Measures, in which all 35 countries that are participants in the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] will participate. Our Vienna Conference should be completed by then, since both sets of talks are a component part of its decisions.

The program for reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe advanced by the socialist countries in the recent Political Consultative Committee conference in Warsaw creates a healthy basis for taking up practical talks on troop and armament reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals and furthers strengthening of confidence and security in Europe.

Sakharov Calls for Unilateral Cut in Soviet Military ManPower
18010146 Moscow LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 19 Oct 88 p 4

[Article by V. Pogrebenkov: "How Long Should a Soldier Serve?"]

[Text] Academician A. Sakharov, speaking at a conference of the Pugwash Movement in Dagomys, proposed that there be unilateral reductions in the term of service in
the Soviet Armed Forces, and in their numerical strength, of approximately 50 percent. His reasoning for his proposal was that at present there is not a single state that would threaten the USSR with attack. Such a reduction, in the opinion of the academician, would have colossal international importance.

The ideas of academician A. Sakharov on changes in the Soviet military structure have been met with interest both in the USSR and abroad. There have been various reactions to his proposal in our country. And this is entirely natural. I think that competent experts from the USSR Ministry of Defense should set forth the official viewpoint on this matter. Without replacing them, I would like to express my own personal opinions on this question.

Let us begin with the main point. Does the United States plan to attack the USSR? I think not. I am equally sure that the Soviet Union does not have aggressive intentions, either with respect to the U. S., or with respect to any other country.

Consequently, is there no threat? Hardly. The reality is such that both countries possess multi-million man groupings of forces, equipped with thousands of nuclear missiles. And these missiles potentially represent a tremendous danger. This is one of the paradoxes. While acknowledging the fatal consequences of war, from a political and military standpoint, both sides continue to maintain armed forces capable not only of defensive actions, but also of carrying out major offensive operations. This is true although the new Soviet military doctrine promulgated in 1987, as well as the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Organization states, propose a shift to the principle of solely defensive sufficiency.

Apparently, one of the reasons for this paradox is that the army is manned and equipped, as a rule, according to the principle, not of intelligent sufficiency, as much as that of necessary surplus. Such is the psychology of national security: to ensure it a surplus is preferred to a shortage. Therefore, on each side, as a result of the chain reaction of the arms race, a “surplus” developed—everything that has been accumulated above the norm of intelligent defensive sufficiency. It is this “surplus” (and it may constitute a very significant percentage, and should be established by experts, taking into account the military capability of the opposing side) that it is truly necessary to reduce.

But what can be expected if such a reduction is carried out on a unilateral basis? Might the advantages include an undoubted moral gain in the eyes of the peace loving foreign communities, and a favorable propaganda position for pressure on the other side? And the shortcomings? These include the disruption of the parity recognized by both sides, with all of its “surpluses,” disequilibria and asymmetries in weapons and numbers of personnel. It should also be recalled, obviously, that the unilateral reduction in our armed forces in the early 1960s by 1.2 million men was not supported and did not result in adequate actions from the West. Therefore, the safest path to disarmament is bilateral. That is, a path by which parity is not disrupted, and fears and feelings of vulnerability do not arise on either side.

In my view, a reduction in the numerical strength of the armed forces can be accompanied by two changes in length of service: either by an increase, or a decrease. In the first case problems of an economic and demographic nature arise. Therefore, for the army and navy to switch to three and four-year terms of service respectively is inexpedient.

In the opinion of specialists, reducing both terms of service and numerical strength simultaneously may sharply undermine the combat effectiveness of the armed forces. Let us also acknowledge honestly another fact. The constantly growing complexity of weapons and equipment, as well as poor pre-military training, still do not allow our draftees to serve “for themselves and for the other fellow.”

The most realistic path is to reduce the numerical strength of the armed forces, while preserving the former terms of service for the next few years. Apropos of this, it would be interesting to learn: What is the situation with respect to terms of service in the NATO armies?

Let us recall that the overwhelming majority of NATO armies are voluntary. This means that a soldier finishes his initial contract for three or four years of service, and then can extend it. Is it conceivable to imagine that we would have, say, a tank driver, who perfects his professional skill over the course of 4-6 years? Further, the average age of a NATO soldier of 23-24 years is higher than ours. If you take in their armies the noncommissioned officer corps, and this is the backbone of any army, with an average age of 26-28 years, they have an average of 8-10 years of service.

It is, of course, unsuitable for us to copy the NATO armies. But, it is worthwhile to think seriously about academician A. Sakharov’s proposal. This is especially true following the 19th Party Conference, when the specific task was assigned: while preserving high combat effectiveness, shift to qualitative principles of manning the Soviet Armed Forces.

Sukhoy on Problems, Prospects of SDI Program
52000057 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Nov 88 p 4

[Report by PRAVDA special correspondent V. Sukhoy: “Secrets of the Laser Gun: Once More About the Star Wars Program”]

“The golden era of the boom for the U.S. military scientific elite, who work on the secret development and testing of new types of nuclear weapons, is ending along with the era of President Reagan.” This is what William Brod, science correspondent for the NEW YORK TIMES, believes.
One should hardly agree unconditionally with this theory. The fact remains, however, that many military programs of the Reagan Administration are already "spinning their wheels." Their future does not look as bright today as it did even 2 or 3 years ago. Why is this happening? Much becomes clear when we carefully analyze the situation which has developed with the main military program of the past 5 years, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Several things have drawn heightened attention to it of late. A special report by the Test and Evaluation Office of the U.S. Congress disrupted the ordinary course of things. The report, published at the end of April of this year, was destined to be the first sign of a process of reassessing priorities. The conclusion drawn by the scientists who prepared the vast, 900-page document was absolutely unequivocal: SDI in the form in which it is viewed by the current administration "will not be built in the foreseeable future." Statements by proponents of the Star Wars program to the effect that certain of its components could be deployed in space in the mid-90s were assessed in the report as "acts of faith" and not scientifically based assumptions.

The scientists who prepared the report worked on it 2 years. They saw a large amount of secret material and heard the opinions of both the proponents and the opponents of SDI. Despite 5 years of intensive research, at a cost of around 12 billion dollars, the report states, "many questions remain unanswered. The main one is whether SDI is capable of becoming a reliable space shield which will protect the population of the USA against all nuclear missile disasters. It is the scientists' viewpoint that there is no analogous system in the USA which could function autonomously in open space and completely monitor all of the latest components of antimissile defenses. If we assume for the moment that it will actually be built, the authors of the report believe, "the probability of its being disabled is so great and the consequences would be so catastrophic that we do not even want to think about it."

For a long time the Pentagon prevented publication of the report by the Test and Evaluation Office, and when its arguments were refuted, it still insisted on classifying three chapters of the document, claiming that they contained "defense information important to national security." The newspaper WASHINGTON POST believes that these chapters discuss effective countermeasures which could be taken by the Soviet Union for neutralizing SDI components.

U.S. Defense Secretary F. Carlucci reacted strangely to the document's appearance, stating that "it is premature to call SDI a nonfunctional system. One does not say 10 years before a helicopter has been built that it is inevitably doomed to crash...."

Then came the scandal surrounding the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore, California. This summer, at the insistence of Democratic Congressmen George Brown (California) and Edward Markey (Massachusetts), letters sent by E. Teller, "father of the hydrogen bomb," to high administration officials were declassified. These letters contained information about the development of a nuclear-activated X-ray laser. This information painted a distorted picture, to put it mildly, of the situation. Why did it suddenly become necessary to declassify Teller's letters? What events led up to this?

It all began in December 1983. At that time Roy Woodruff, 42-year-old director of nuclear weapons development at the Livermore laboratory, completely by chance saw a letter which Teller had sent to the President's Scientific Advisor G. Keyworth. The letter stated that "Group O," headed at that time by Lowell Wood, an admirer of Teller, had completed the research on an X-ray laser and was ready to move to the next phase: experimental design. Woodruff knew that this was not entirely correct. He therefore demanded that laboratory director R. Watzel disavow Teller's statements. Watzel refused, claiming that "no one is taking Teller seriously."

The situation was repeated in December 1984. On the same day Teller wrote letters to P. Nitze, special weapons-control advisor for the State Department, and R. McFarlane, the President's national security assistant. Livermore's honorary vice-president stated that the "Superexcalibur," an X-ray laser developed at the laboratory, was capable of generating 100,000 death-dealing rays simultaneously, which "could destroy all Soviet missiles in an instant." Teller also requested that "no agreements be made with the Soviet Union which could undermine the laboratory's future work in this field." Woodruff once again objected vigorously to such statements, but once again he was ignored.

R. Woodruff was offended and hurt. He went to Washington and managed to get a meeting with Nitze. During the meeting he announced that "an X-ray laser is certainly not impossible, but it is improbable." Underground testing of the "Superexcalibur," code-named "Cottage," was conducted at a testing ground in Nevada in March 1985. The tests revealed so many problems that it was out of the question to speak of success. Nonetheless, in the fall of that year E. Teller provided President Reagan with a deliberately exaggerated evaluation of the test results and got an additional 100 million dollars allocated for testing under the X-ray laser program.

This was too much for Woodruff, and he retired as director of nuclear weapons development in October 1985. In his request for retirement, he unequivocally stated as the reason for his departure "the impossibility of accepting the fact that for almost 2 years the highest levels of the administration have been misled with respect to the technological capabilities of the X-ray laser."

This was followed by a dynamic chain of events, which ultimately led to the publication of E. Teller's letters whose contents had evoked such distaste in R. Woodruff. It became clear to a great many people, if not to all,
that the “success” achieved in the development of the X-ray laser frequently had nothing in common with reality. Livermore Laboratory’s reputation suffered greatly. Those in charge were forced officially to announce that a minimum of 5 years and around a billion dollars would be needed to learn whether the X-ray laser could be used for military purposes.

And what about Teller? Here are two of his statements following the hearings in Congress. “I can accept blame only for being overly optimistic.” “I am saddened that the great scientific discovery of the X-ray laser has become an object of censure. Instead of praising its merits and discussing the possibilities for its military application, everyone is talking about its imperfections.”

And so, the apostle of Star Wars, as Teller is referred to, did not repent of anything. In fact, G. Brown, member of the House of Representatives from the state of California, said, “...neither the Congress nor the scientific community is inclined to trust Teller. President Reagan has a completely different regard for him. Whatever he says is accepted by the White House chief as the embodiment of wisdom.” “The wisdom,” he added, “turned out to be politically motivated exaggeration and scientific unscrupulousness.”

The whole history of the X-ray laser did nothing to increase the popularity of SDI. Congress is now even more cautious about the unstratified optimism of the proponents of Star Wars. The legislators first cut almost 10 billion dollars from planned allocations for the SDI program over the next 5 years. They then took the next logical step, reducing from 4.9 to 4.1 billion dollars the SDI budget for fiscal year 1989 (which began on 1 October of this year).

The scepticism of the congressmen has to some degree been transmitted to the military. The Pentagon’s Technical Advisory Group spoke out against plans for placing into space hundreds of satellites armed with special missiles and laser guns. It was supported by U.S. Defense Secretary F. Carlucci, who informed the administration that he favors a more modest plan for developing a reliable system of land-based missiles as a first phase.

This knocked the props out from under Lieutenant General J. Abrahamson, director of the SDI Office. It was he who had from the day he was appointed to the post zealously fought for the placing of “armed satellites” into near-earth orbit. The news, which was literally left hanging in the air, was announced at the end of September. J. Abrahamson, whose name was firmly linked to SDI, retired. J. Abrahamson wrote the following in a letter to the U.S. Defense Secretary: “The new administration will undoubtedly have other ideas and approaches to SDI, and it was therefore not difficult for me to conclude that it would be better for me to leave and give the new directors of the program the opportunity to enrich it with original concepts and unusual directions.”

“General Abrahamson,” John Pike, a leading member of the Federation of American Scientists, commented on the occasion of the SDI director’s retirement, “was such a zealous champion of the Strategic Defense Initiative in the form in which it was conceived at the very beginning that it would be extremely difficult for him to head the program, which he regards as turning into a pathetic shadow of the grand concept which President Reagan introduced on 23 March 1983.”

Naturally, all of these events can be assessed as evidence that the USA’s most important strategic program is coming to naught and simply waiting for the end. There is every basis for assuming that the Strategic Defense Initiative will continue over the next 5-10 years to be an important factor in the domestic and foreign policy of the United States and a significant element in American-Soviet relations. This is because, from all indications, some people in the USA do not intend to give up on the very tempting idea of building a global antimissile shield capable of accomplishing all strategic military missions at once.

At the same time, a certain sobering-up process is clearly taking place in assessments of the SDI’s capabilities, and the Americans are changing their attitude toward the Star Wars program. While quite recently many people simply took the popular President at his word, today the public is demanding convincing evidence, reliable confirmation and successful progress for certain of the latest scientific and technological studies. Pure optimism is no longer enough.

The nation’s largest scientific military centers are becoming the subject of national debate. Nuclear scientists, who always enjoyed great privileges and whose work was concealed by a screen of secrecy since the beginning of the nuclear era, are now forced to testify at hearings in Congress and in state legislative bodies. While military laboratories previously took over all the achievements of civilian science with extraordinary ease—and this seemed only natural—the situation is now changing. For example, the California legislature recently passed legislation establishing a group of public observers to monitor the activities of the two military laboratories under the jurisdiction of California University: Livermore and Los Alamos. The group is to be given access to all secret documents and see to it that “the scientific research conducted at the laboratories is technologically important and promising not just for the military but also for civilian industries, and that information on the results is unvarying accurate and truthful.”

Naturally, many federal departments, including the Pentagon and the Energy Department, are opposing the open discussion of military science matters. They are particularly vehemently against the publication of material on the status of work being conducted on the most important SDI components. Many people believe that they are guided by the fear that the public will see such highly publicized programs in a very unfavorable light. This has
been pointed out more than once by scientists from the Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories R. Kidder, A. Latter, Hugh De Witt, L. Morgan and (Ch. Archamba), and L. (Mascheroni). Their main accusation—one of the most serious which a scientist can make—is that, according to them, the truth about what is being developed at the largest scientific research centers of the USA is frequently sacrificed to political expediency. And there is no denying the fact that these people know the real situation....

11499

History of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Program
18010151 Moscow EKHO PLANETY in Russian No 24, Sep 88 pp 26-31

[TASS report from Xinhua, and from the PRC newspaper RENMIN RIBAO, by Grigory Arslanov and Sergey Frolikin: "Project 596"]

[Text] "The ancient spirits of Lop Nor have awakened. Not to look at caravans crossing the sands of Central Asia, however, but to laugh diabolically at the mushroom-shaped cloud over the Takla Maklan desert. The tinkling of bells attached to the necks of camels, which in ancient times carried bundles of swords and chain mail, have now been replaced by the metallic clanking of the tracks on heavy cross-country vehicles delivering the components of something new—nuclear weapons." (From the book "Cloud Over China" by W. Rayan and S. Summerlin)

Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and other Chinese leaders arrived at the People's Congress Building on 16 October 1964. A grand musical show with the title "Dongfang Hong" (The East Is Red) was performed that evening. The theme song began with the words: "The East is red, the sun has risen, and Mao Zedong has appeared in China...." That performance, which glorified the "Great Helmsman," had a cast of 3,000. Zhou Enlai, one of the deputy chairmen of the CCP Central Committee and premier of the PRC State Council, addressed the audience and the performers. "At 03:00 today," he said, "an atomic bomb was exploded in one of our nation's western regions. The first nuclear test was successful." The auditorium applauded....

Not until several years later did the world learn that the testing ground for the nuclear weapon was in the area of Lake Lop Nor in the western part of China, in what is now the Sinkiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region. The famous Italian traveller Marco Polo traveled through that Godforsaken region in ancient times, back in the 13th Century, on his way to China. N.M. Przhevalskiy also studied the mysterious Lop Nor.

The development of China's first atomic bomb and the names of its creators were carefully concealed, however. According to the American journalists who wrote the book "Cloud Over China," the U.S. CIA had for a long time carefully observed the unusual activity in the area of Lake Lop Nor by means of U-2 intelligence aircraft and spy-satellites. They had photographed the tower of metal structures, growing by the day, and the transportation lines being built there, and detected the "breath" of the enterprises preparing the enriched uranium. All of this indicated that feverish preparations were underway on the ground for an atomic explosion, and the only thing the intelligence could not reveal was when.

Mao Zedong used to like to repeat the saying that the atom was a "paper tiger." But was Chairman Mao sincere? Were his words not merely a cunning trick bordering on hypocrisy? After all, the plans for the nuclear project were conceived back in 1949. At that time Chiang Kai-shek's forces were still being battled in the southern part of China....

This year, which marks the 90th anniversary of the birth of Zhou Enlai, People's China's first premier, articles on his life have stated that he "was the main person around whom were united the scientists, engineers and technicians working to develop the nuclear weapon." The memoirs of Liu Jie, former minister of the Second Machine-Building Ministry, which dealt with atomic energy, have been published for the first time in connection with the anniversary. He maintains that it was Zhou Enlai who, following the establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949, arranged for the allocation of foreign currency for the acquisition abroad of equipment, instruments, scientific and technical literature pertaining in any way to the releasing of the atom's energy.

Liu Jie's memoirs contain facts unknown up to now. He reports, for example, that in 1954 Chinese geologists discovered rich deposits of uranium ore in the southern part of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. This was immediately reported to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. At the premier's instruction a special department was set up in the State Council for overseeing the exploitation and extraction of the uranium ore and the development of scientific research and scientific and technological work on nuclear fission. On 14 January 1955 Zhou Enlai summoned for a talk Li Siguang, vice president of the PRC Academy of Sciences, who was in charge of uranium exploration, and Qian Sangiang, director of the Physics Institute. Liu Jie was present, as was Bo Yibo, chairman of the State Committee for Construction at that time. The premier enquired in detail about the state of affairs in the area of atomic technology and the preparation of enriched uranium, and asked about the principles involved in the use of atomic energy and the development of an atomic bomb. That same evening Zhou Enlai wrote a note to Mao Zedong containing the following: "Chairman, this afternoon I talked with Li Siguang and Qian Sangiang. Comrades Bo Yibo and Liu Jie were present. The discussion lasted a fairly long time. Li Siguang developed a
toothache, and he left early. The discussion will therefore not be continued this evening. I am now sending the pertinent documents to higher authorities for their perusal. It would be a good thing if you could talk with Li Siguang and Qian Sangiang tomorrow after 15:00. Peng Zhen, Peng Dehuai, Deng Xiaoping, Li Fuchun, Bo Yibo, Liu Jie... could be there in addition to the members of the Secretariat (CCP Central Committee). Chairman, please let me know when you wake up in the morning. I could come an hour ahead of time and report on the talks which I have had today. Tomorrow instruments and drawings could be brought for a graphic presentation for the talk with you.—Zhou Enlai, evening of 14 January”

The following day, Liu Jie recalls, Mao Zedong convened an expanded session of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee. The “strategic decision” which laid the foundation for the development of China’s nuclear industry was adopted at the session.

A “supervisory group” was set up during the first half of 1955, which included Deputy Premier Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, chairman of the State Planning Committee, and Marshal Nie Rongzen. The group began compiling a long-range, 12-year plan for the development of Chinese science. Priority was given to branches related to nuclear power engineering. At that same time, before the plan was given final approval, the PRC Academy of Sciences received personal instructions from Zhou Enlai to print training literature for “supervisory cadre workers and the broad masses” on atomic matters. Beginning in 1955, nuclear physics departments were opened at Beijing University and other higher educational institutions. Several hundred upper-class students were transferred to those departments, and more than 100 Chinese students studying in the USSR and the socialist nations of Eastern Europe were switched to those fields.

It should be noted that the Soviet Union was extensively developing cooperation with many foreign nations, primarily the socialist nations, in the peaceful use of atomic energy and sharing its knowledge and experience with them. The Chinese People’s Republic was no exception. An agreement between the USSR and the CPR signed in April of 1955 called for providing China with assistance in the development of research in nuclear physics and the use of nuclear energy in the national economy. A nuclear reactor with a thermal capacity of up to 10,000 kilowatts was built in China under this agreement. Heavy water was used as the moderator in the reactor. A cyclotron was also delivered and placed into operation. All of the special materials, the uranium, the heavy water and numerous kinds of equipment installed at the Chinese scientific research center were Soviet-produced. Cadres of Chinese specialists studied and underwent practical training at Soviet higher educational institutions and scientific research organizations, including the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubno.

Presenting a report on the first five-year plan in July 1955 at a session of the National People’s Congress, Li Fuchun said the following: “In order to further the development of research into the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the Soviet Union has at its own initiative offered our nation scientific, technological and production assistance and has signed an agreement with our nation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.... The government and the people of China express their sincere gratitude for the assistance coming from the Soviet Union and the people’s democratic nations, particularly for the great, constant, all-around and selfless assistance provided by the USSR.”

Unfortunately, there was no place in Liu Jie’s memoirs for an objective assessment of Soviet-Chinese cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, nor for assurances that China could feel totally secure beneath the “nuclear umbrella” of the Soviet Union. However, a subjective assessment by the author of the memoirs contains the following: “Zhou Enlai,” Liu Jie writes, “took advantage of the altered international situation and, seizing a favorable moment, strove in a planned manner, step by step, for Soviet assistance in the field of atomic technology. This enabled us relatively rapidly to master it and to gain time to some degree. Zhou Enlai at the same time stated that China must possess equipment making it possible to turn it into a nuclear power on its own.”

With respect to events relating to the break in Soviet-Chinese cooperation at the end of the 50s, including cooperation in the area of nuclear technology, the Chinese press presents specific facts in a one-sided manner. It ordinarily makes banal assertions to the effect, for example, that the Soviet Union “severed the agreements and recalled its specialists from China, placing the nation in a difficult situation.” Not a single such article gives an honest answer to the questions: Why was the USSR forced to take this step? In what kind of situation did Soviet specialists in the PRC find themselves at that time? What internal political events were unfolding in China at that time? Liu Jie writes in his memoirs that all of the Soviet specialists working in the Second Machine-Building Ministry departed for the homeland in August 1960. The fact should be mentioned that a drastic deterioration of the treatment of Soviet specialists by the cadre workers of Chinese enterprises, ministries and departments began as early as the second half of 1958. The slogan “Combat Blind Faith in Foreign Know-How” proclaimed that year by the CCP was essentially directed against the use of Soviet know-how and Soviet specialists, and toward the rejection of strict adherence to standards and the specifications contained in technical and technological documents.

Nonetheless, implementation of the strictly classified plan, code-named “596,” for the development of a nuclear weapon continued—now, however, the fact is stressed in China today, “relying on our own capabilities.”

According to the newspaper GUANGMIN RIBAO, a military subunit arrived on a secret mission in an uninhabited area near Lake Lop Nor. It was commanded by
General Zhang Yurouyou, a Chinese army veteran who especially distinguished himself during the civil war and took part in the war in Korea (1950-1953). Back in mid-1958 he had been urgently summoned to Beijing from the Shenyang Military District. General Chen Geng, deputy CPR minister of defense at that time, spoke with him and informed him confidentially of what Mao Zedong had said at a meeting of the Military Council of the CCP Central Committee. This is what the chairman had said: "We have to start doing something to develop atomic and hydrogen bombs. It is perfectly possible. I believe, that complete success will take 10 years." Following that discussion, at the recommendation of Marshal Nie Rongzhen, one of those in charge of Project 596, Zhang Yurouyou was appointed chief of the future atomic proving ground.

Prospecting had revealed an area suitable from the standpoint of terrain and geological structure. A total of 100,000 military construction workers arrived in the area of Lop Nor in March of 1959 and set to work.

But let us return to Liu Jie's memoirs. He tells us that in August 1962 he entered the CCP Central Committee with a recommendation that the first atomic bomb be exploded in 1964-1965. He did not receive an immediate answer. On 3 November Mao Zedong wrote in his own hand on the minister's proposal: "Very good. Do just that. Assist with this work in every possible way."

...It was the end of 1963. Work on the development of the atomic bomb was nearing completion. The testing procedure was defined at a regular session of a special commission headed by Zhou Enlai. It was decided that the test would be conducted on the ground. Instructions were simultaneously issued to continue preparations for subsequent explosions in the atmosphere and underground.

Hundreds of scientists and engineers, thousands of skilled workers and technicians worked at the center for the development of Project 596. This was a sort of scientific-technical and production association consisting of representatives of 26 ministries and state committees, the Academy of Sciences, 900 enterprises and scientific research institutes, higher educational institutions from 20 provinces and cities under central jurisdiction—Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin—and large autonomous regions. Experiments were conducted in the field, at a hastily erected tent city lost in the desert but closely guarded. Its inhabitants were scientists representing various generations. Project 596 was carried out by Chinese physicists with a world reputation. Most of the leading theoreticians who worked on the first atomic bomb had received training in the USA or in the nations of Western Europe, however, and returned to China on the eve of or following the proclamation of the CPR. Some of them had studied in the Soviet Union.

Both the Chinese and the foreign press named physicists with a world reputation among those who worked directly on Project 596: Qian Sanqiang, Wang Gangchang, Peng Xuanwu, Guo Yonghui, Zhu Guan. Those who worked on the project also included Chemist Jiang Shengze, physicists of the middle and young generations Wang Chengshu and Deng Jixian, who earned a doctor's degree at an American university in the city of Lafayette, Zhou Guangshao, who studied in the USSR and subsequently became a vice president of the CPR Academy of Sciences.

Liu Jie's memoirs report that an adequate quantity of uranium for producing an atomic bomb had been acquired by the end of 1963. Work at the center was proceeding at an outstripping pace, but Beijing continued to push the scientists. On 14 October 1964, after receiving a favorable weather report, Zhou Enlai issued instructions for the nuclear device to be hauled to the explosion site. The next day Zhou Enlai telephoned Liu Jie, who was in Beijing and maintaining contact with the party Central Committee and with the premier personally. Preparations for the explosion were directed at the site by Colonel General Zhang Aiping (former CPR minister of defense, currently member of the Standing Committee of the Central Council of the Chinese Communist Party).

"What can come out of the test?" Zhou Enlai asked.

"There are three possibilities," Liu Jie answered. "Either everything will be in order or some error will be detected, or else it will all end in complete failure. The probability of the first outcome is the greatest, however."

"You must take every possible precaution," the premier ordered.

It was 16 October 1964. The hands of clocks in Beijing were approaching 15:00. This was the time designated for the explosion....

"After 15:00 I heard excited voices on the telephone," Liu Jie writes. "Zhang Aiping informed me of the explosion. I immediately reported the joyous news to Zhou Enlai. After informing Mao Zedong, the premier conveyed the latter's instructions: 'Check everything and ascertain whether it was truly an atomic explosion.' I passed Chairman Mao's instructions on to the testing ground. Zhang Aiping informed me that a mushroom-shaped cloud had formed following the explosion. Mao Zedong then issued new instructions: 'Continue verification and observation."

In Beijing it was decided not to rush but to publish the official statement only after thorough verification. The reaction was carefully followed abroad. A Japanese news agency report was the first to reach Beijing. Tokyo reported that "a nuclear explosion has possibly been conducted in the western region of China." Some time went by, and American radio stations reported the explosion of the atomic bomb. A government communique was issued in the Chinese capital that evening, 7 hours after the explosion....
A second atomic explosion was carried out in China on 14 May 1965. Work was simultaneously begun on the comprehensive testing of missiles and nuclear warheads. This work was conducted by departments under the jurisdiction of the Committee for Defense Science, Technology and Defense Industry headed by Marshal Nie Rongzhen. The first missile carrying a nuclear warhead was successfully launched on 27 October 1966, and a hydrogen bomb was exploded in the atmosphere on 17 June 1967.

In the meantime, the anthem "The East Is Red" was being sung more and more loudly in China, and the little red books of Mao's quotations were raised higher and higher above the people's heads. At the 6th Plenum of the CCP in June 1981, the decade from May 1966 to October 1976 would be called "the years of chaos" which brought the Communist Party of China, the state and the Chinese people "the most serious failures and losses since the founding of the CPR." All of this would come later. At that time "the years of chaos" were called the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," when many party and state workers were defamed and subjected to outrages. The atomic industry was also caught up in the wave of the "struggle using force." Liu Jie was relieved of his job.

"The struggle," he recalls, "was conducted at scientific research institutions of our system and at the enterprises. There was a danger that weapons production would be halted. Zhou Enlai made telephone calls and sent telegrams demanding that there be no disruptions of the work. Twice, he sent his representatives to the center for the development of nuclear weapons in the northwestern part of China, where the situation was approaching the point of armed conflict...."

According to large-character posters, the Red Guard wall press at that time, the most dramatic events, fraught with the danger of unforeseen consequences, developed in the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region, where China's main nuclear facilities were located. The authors of large-character posters and leaflets posted in Beijing complained about the fact that General Wang Enmao, first secretary of the Sinkiang-Uigur party committee, had ordered Red Guard members who had come from Beijing "to exchange experience" to be beaten, arrested and driven out of Sinkiang. Wang Enmao rejected a proposal by the group for "Cultural Revolution" affairs under the CCP Central Committee (it was headed by Cheng Boda, and his first deputy was Mao's wife Jiang Qing) to come to Beijing "for talks." Only after receiving assurances of his personal safety issued by Premier Zhou Enlai did he arrive in Beijing, and the explosive conflict about to flare up was resolved "by peaceful means."

Apparently even those closest to Mao Zedong understood the importance of continuing work in the nuclear field, linking far-reaching plans to it, and they therefore preferred to protect the nuclear physicists from the raging Hongweiibng.

"...The decade of chaos" passed. New leaders came to Zhongnanhai, the residence of the Chinese leadership.

Who Made the Bomb

Liu Jie: served as deputy minister of geology following the founding of the CPR; later appointed minister of the Second Machine-Building Ministry, which dealt with matters of nuclear energy; one of those in charge of Project 596; removed from ministerial post and investigated during "Cultural Revolution"; following rehabilitation in 1978 headed party committee in Hengnan Province for several years and was first political commissar of Hengnan Military District; currently member of State Council of CCP.

Li Siguang: professor at Beijing University during years 1928-1935; studied for lengthy period at Birmingham University in Great Britain, where he defended his doctor's dissertation; Zhou Enlai played large role in his return to China in May 1950; elected foreign member of USSR Academy of Sciences in 1958; awarded Gold Medal imeni A.P. Karpinskiy for scientific works in field of geology; as vice president of CPR Academy of Sciences directed prospecting for uranium ore; served as minister of geology for many years; died in 1971 at age of 84.

Nie Rongzhen: born in 1899; studied natural sciences in youth in France and later in Belgium; was in Moscow in mid-20s, where he received military education; returned to China and took active part in revolutionary movement, becoming military cadre; reached rank of marshal; headed State Committee for Defense Science and Technology; was one of those in charge of Project 596.

Qian Sanjiang: studied physics at Paris University, worked under supervision of Joliot-Curie team, received prize from French Academy of Sciences for research in gamma- and alpha-radiation; directed Physics Institute of China's Academy of Sciences.

Wang Ganchang: graduated from Berlin University in 1934; worked at California University in USA in 1947-1948; returned to homeland on eve of China's liberation; served as deputy director of Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubno.

Peng Xianwu: studied at Edinburgh; became prominent scientist in field of theoretical physics; returned to China and educated a galaxy of talented scientists.

Guo Yonghua: specialist in field of mechanics, studied in USA; became professor at Beijing University after returning to homeland.

Zhu Guanyu: nuclear scientist, studied in USA, was professor at Beijing University.
China's Nuclear Arsenal

The American magazine INSIGHT has published an article on the CPR's nuclear strategy. It states that after China tested its first atomic bomb, launched a ballistic missile and exploded its first hydrogen bomb, it continued to stress the development of nuclear weapons. According to U.S. CIA data, China spent more than half of its funds allocated for military scientific research and experimental design work on its nuclear weapons program between 1965 and 1979.

The magazine cites a statement from the new book "China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition in the Framework of Evolution" by Chong Pinling, assistant director of the Department for Forecasting Chinese Policy at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington. "Based on my research," he writes, "it appears that from the very beginning China had a comprehensive plan for producing all the components simultaneously in order later to combine them and build a nuclear weapon of restraint. At least from the beginning of the mid-50s China's government attached great importance to the development of nuclear weapons." The author reports that China has more than 200 units of nuclear weapons and has produced four types of land-based nuclear missiles: medium-range, intermediate-range, limited-range and full-range intercontinental ballistic missiles. "It is even now quietly developing enhanced-range intercontinental ballistic missiles," Chong Pinling asserts. In addition to the land-based missiles China has an arsenal of bombers and recently produced a ballistic missile for submarines.

INSIGHT states that most observers in fact say that despite successes in the field of nuclear weapons the CPR still lags far behind the United States and the Soviet Union. "They obviously have real problems with the production of nuclear-powered submarines and their ability to launch ballistic missiles at sea," states D. Shambaugh, junior scientific associate at Washington's Woodrow Wilson International Science Center. In his opinion, submarines are the weakest component of China's nuclear forces. With respect to its land-based missiles, most of them are relatively primitive liquid-fuel missiles. The medium-range CSS-1 ballistic missile, for example, uses short-storage liquid fuel. "These missiles have to be constantly refueled," says P. Godwin of the National Military College. China has produced the solid-fuel CSS-NX-3 missile, however, which can be launched from a nuclear-powered submarine or possibly from a land-based mobile launcher.

Although Beijing's ballistic missiles are many years behind American and Soviet missiles with respect to accuracy, P. Godwin believes the fact that the Chinese space program "can place payloads into geosynchronous orbit indicates that their ability to destroy targets accurately has been improved, at least theoretically." Possessing Western technology, Chong Pinling states, "the Chinese are taking it and using it to develop their own military technology."

"Beijing's nuclear arsenal is intended strictly for defensive purposes," is the opinion held by D. Shambaugh. "These are weapons of restraint," he says. "I believe the Chinese when they say they have proclaimed a doctrine of refusing to be the first to employ nuclear weapons. They have also signed an agreement on turning the southern part of the Pacific Ocean into a nuclear-free zone. The Chinese are not troublemakers."

Description of NATO Officers' Presence at Exercises Under CDE Accord
18010126 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Oct 88 p 3


[Text] Dear editors. Lately the newspapers, radio and television more and more often report the presence of foreign military observers at military exercises. In accordance with provisions of the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, representatives of 26 states also were invited to an exercise held on the territory of Belorussia in the latter half of September. What did their work consist of? How were the relations with our servicemen? And in general, who are these foreign military observers?

I believe these questions are of interest not just to me.

The photographers implored:

"Move away! Step aside!"

The photo was worth it. American Maj Gen H. Taylor squatted down at the breastwork and struck up a conversation with our machinegunner through his Russian-speaking assistant. Jr Sgt P. Kravovskiy did not forget his job in the meantime: a guest was a guest, but he did not lose sight of his sector of fire. By the way, this did not interfere with the dialogue in the least.

"Where was I born? Near Lvov. How long have I served? One and a half years. And how do you like the company position?"

"It's good," acknowledged the general with a smile, but very seriously. "I am especially impressed that you prepared it so quickly."

"When it's necessary, it's necessary," remarked Pavel tellingly.

Taylor inquired whether or not Kravovskiy had had previous contact with American generals.

SOVIET UNION
"No," responded Pavel. "And how about you with Soviet soldiers?"

"Also no."

The general drew an Army emblem from the bottomless pocket of his field uniform.

"This is for you as a memento."

"Thank you," said Krayovskiy. "Well, since that is the case..."

And he also dug into his pocket.

"This is a view of my city," he said, handing the general a postcard.

Meanwhile one of the foreigners went up to a tank at a combat position and ran his finger over the inside surface of the barrel.

"When did you clean it last?" he asked the crew commander.

"After firing."

"Do you think this is enough to ensure the gun fires well?"

"Our gun doesn't miss!" Jr Sgt V. Kiselev assured him. Privately with his comrades he remarked:

"A serious man... Do you think fouling is on his mind? He determined the type of gun—rifled or smoothbore."

After visiting another "point" the observers were again taking their seats in the "Ikaruses," which were provocatively bright for a training area. But seemingly remembering something at the last minute, Maj Gen Taylor made a beeline back to the North Battalion Commander Maj S. Vladimirov. The day before at the battalion KNP [command and observation post] Vladimirov briefed the foreigners on the tactical situation and patiently answered their questions. At that time Taylor literally did not take his eyes from the battalion commander's face, which was fatigued and because of this seemed too stern. He asked something and immediately received a laconic reply...

Now the American shook the major's hand with feeling:

"Come see me in the States! You will be a guest!"

This probably could have been taken as a pretty gesture had there not been sincere emotion in the major general's voice.

"Believe me, I know what it is to command a battalion."

"Okay!" nodded Vladimirov with understanding.

According to the interpreters Taylor later admitted: "I would like to have such a battalion commander."

Intuition did not let the general down. The battalion commanded by Maj Vladimirov was on the South axis of the main attack, delayed the South advance and inflicted substantial damage on the opposing side. That day Swiss representative Col H.-J. Jubersachs admitted to us: "The exercise is interesting and leaves a good impression of troop operations." That was the very same reaction of many of his colleagues. It is apropos, however, to quote one more statement here: that of our officer, Gds Capt Ye. Osminin, who provided communications for the observation site. He was skeptical of the western specialists' assessments:

"Their main impressions remain in the notebooks..."

But details of what was occurring were recorded not just in notebooks. On the very first day the observers raised the question of using photographic and recording equipment. Permission was given and now they were working and leaving no doubt as to the quality of their professional training. They had a stopwatch and dictaphone in one hand, camera in the other, and binoculars—I just want to say it—in the third. Although some of them plugged their ears and even closed their eyes to the roar of attack aircraft sweeping overhead and powerful explosions, they still saw a great deal.

The "battle" was in full swing when Col V. Verbraaken from Belgium inquired about the personnel's degree of training. He and the other observers were informed that soldiers of different periods of service were among the attackers and naturally the level of their training was not the same.

The colonel was fully satisfied by the answer, but what generated the question?

"I was struck by the fact that not all soldiers are moving over the battlefield and selecting positions correctly," explained Verbraaken. "Over there you see one has hit the dirt at a road intersection. He would be immediately killed in a real battle. I say this as a former infantry brigade commander."

The Belgian officer's remark convinced us once more that the foreign observers did not miss a single detail. This fact perhaps forced us to realize more deeply the full complexity of the position of the field training exercise organizers, who along with accomplishing operational training missions were concerned with the demonstration aspect of the activity. The situation is not a simple one and honestly speaking is typical of many tactical exercises regardless of the presence of foreigners.

Thinking of the possible assessment of their work, some commanders strive for external effect of operations and in this desire often come into contradiction with common sense. An individual soldier's training fades into the
background for them. And so it was in battle drills prior
to this exercise that a variant was seriously practiced
where attackers moved into the assault at full height in a
faultless skirmish line. The commander who was
tempted by the open window-dressing in the field hardly
failed to understand that such a "picture" is a far cry
from actual battle, but the fact is, one wishes to make an
impression... Only the intervention of a general who
arrived from Moscow returned everything to regulation
requirements. But so much time was lost!

"A chronic disease," Gds Lt Col A. Pavlovskiy later
confided in us. His subordinates were advancing right
near the observation tower. "We pay much attention to
the soldier's individual training as the basis of subunit
combat effectiveness. Nevertheless it is the first to suffer
when we are assigned unscheduled and often short-term
[konyunkturnyye] missions."

It is not difficult to understand what the officer had in
mind. Where were we to get the time necessary for
training each soldier if almost entire hectares in the
exercise area were turfed and kilometers of little sand
borders and board curbs were made along field and
forest roads? The functional purpose of these and similar
attributes is doubtful, but we have become accustomed
to their appearance where the arrival of higher-ups is
expected. In the presence of foreigners, however, it was
in truth awkward to contemplate such luxuriant decor in
a training area.

Even unadorned, our Army has much that generates
genuine admiration in foreign guests. Powerful equip-
ment, modern armament and, most important, the peo-
ple. As we repeatedly saw, the foreigners did not conceal
their heightened interest in them.

The airborne personnel's faces were ablaze. They either
had not managed to cool off after the recent battle or it
was from embarrassment.

"Are you embarrassed?" the exercise director asked the
soldiers. "Since you invited observers to dinner, call
them to the table!"

After having operated so daringly in the North rear, now
they moved somehow timidly toward the people in
unaccustomed military uniforms. Gds Pvt Gennadiy
Shiyyanov and Gds Pvt Viktor Chernookiy went up to
U.S. representatives Maj Gen Taylor and Maj R. Worth.
They greeted them and introduced themselves. A con-
versation was struck up while the cook filled the mess
tins at the field kitchen. Who was born where? Who were
their parents? What did the insignia on the uniforms
mean? Later, pointing to a mess tent, Viktor addressed
the American officer:

"Let's go in there, Comrade Major."

Worth's brows rose. Viktor also realized his inadvert-
ence. What could he do? He was accustomed to seeing a
comrade in everyone with whom he came in contact...

"How does the American youth regard the Soviet youth?
And how does it regard us soldiers?" the airborne soldier
inquired of Worth.

The Ranger pondered. The pause dragged out.

"They probably regard you just as you regard them,"
responded Worth, choosing his words carefully.

A somewhat stiff gray-haired gentleman, UK repre-
sentative Brigadier Gen W. Beetles, was the center of
attention at one of the tables during dinner. A great deal
was discussed: restructuring; the Russian freezing
weather; how a soldier who is disciplined and has initia-
tive is a good soldier. They argued over what system for
manning the army is better: universal military obliga-
tion, as we have, or for hire as they have. There were
agreements on some things and differences on others.

Beetles remarked that the Belorussian landscape was
very similar to that of Oxfordshire and Hampshire,
counties dear to his heart ("I sometimes feel as if I am at
home!"). He mentioned his daughters. We who had seen
the general in other situations when he was pestering the
exercise director with far from sentimental questions
and remarks and was accepting far from everything on
faith, automatically recalled a phrase he had tossed out
the day before: "It is well that the arrows of your South
and North people are not aimed in another direction."

A television reporter interrupted the conversation:

"Mister Brigadier General! Both you and we have the
concept of a probable enemy."

It seemed Beetles was somewhat offended. What can you
do? We had seen each other for too long only in the
image of an enemy on scary posters, so the comment of
the colleague from television could not be called inap-
propriate.

"A general like any other general," the soldiers said
among themselves in the meantime after saying goodbye
to Beetles. And Jr Sgt Kravovskiy's words about the
Americans surfaced in memory: people like any other
people.

How is one to take this reaction? When something
similar is said by a student after visiting an international
youth camp or by a tourist on returning from distant
journeys, that is one thing. But a soldier with a weapon
in his hands... You will agree that this has its nuances,
and they are not just psychological. One has occasion to
hear different opinions today when the talk turns to how
the new political thinking is being perceived in the
attitudes of diplomats, politicians, publicists and the
military.
Meetings, dialogues... Addressing the airborne personnel, Maj Gen Taylor says:

"On landing from the helicopters near the observation tower, one can say that you came down like a bolt from the blue on the head of an American general. And now you are sitting at the same table with him. Doesn't this embarrass you?"

"If the American general merely plans to dine with us, what is bad in that?" responded Gds Pvt Shiyanov.

"Yevgeniy!"

"Hans?!"

Col Melyanenkov and Maj Gen Unterdoerfel of the GDR Nationale Volksarmee were entangled in an embrace and peppering each other with questions about their wives and children. It turns out that they have known each other since those years when Melyanenkov served in the GSFG.

An observer from the Federal Republic of Germany standing nearby looked at them with unconcealed curiosity. What was on his face? Surprise? Perplexity? Or perhaps the desire to understand something very important for him, although not at all from the sphere of military secrets.

It is no secret that we often take the words "brotherhood in arms" as depicted on posters: soldiers of seven armies stand shoulder to shoulder under a constellation of flags of Warsaw Pact member countries. Working in an exercise next to observers representing allied states and armies forces one to get a feeling for our inner kinship, commonality of thinking and oneness in destiny somehow in a new way, more clearly and perhaps more visibly.

After inspecting the command and observation post of a South tank company one of the Polish officers drew one of our people aside and a discussion began between them on specific "tankers'" problems. In a few minutes they already were on familiar terms.

Someone possibly will feel a doubt: Aren't we showing too much? Aren't we being excessively open?

"Everything demonstrated here is no longer a secret for anyone," said the deputy exercise director.

Lt Col A. Pavlovskiy is of the following opinion:

"We are showing what we not only can but must show. Let them see that we are threatening no one but are doing our soldier's job quietly and openly within the framework of existing international agreements."

The exercise was coming to an end and we were returning to Minsk. Forests on both sides of the highway were flaming in their fall attire. If the counties of which Beetles spoke resembled these marvelous places, there obviously is one more reason to reflect that we all live on the same planet and together are responsible for its fate.

The driver turned on the radio. A report about another exercise, "Autumn Forge-88" in Western Europe, was broadcast following a variety program. The Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] correspondent reported that among others there were Soviet military observers present.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Bonn Denies Short-Range Missile Modernization Plans
AU0512134688 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1200 GMT 5 Dec 88

[Excerpt] Reports in British papers, according to which Chancellor Helmut Kohl signalled Bonn's readiness to establish a timetable for the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles to the British head of government, Margaret Thatcher, during the EC summit in Rhodes, have drawn a harsh denial this morning on the part of the Bonn Government. Government spokesman Ost stated this morning that these reports are clearly not correct. Kohl did not discuss the modernization issue with Mrs Thatcher, he pointed out. In Bonn's view, there is no need for action on this issue at the moment. [passage omitted]

SPD Member Bahr on New Kremlin Defense Strategy
AU0112115088 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 1 Dec 88 p 5

[“rmc” report: “Bahr: Kremlin Strategy Will be Changed Over to Defense; SPD Confers on Its Relationship With the Bundeswehr”]

[Text] According to statements by high-ranking Soviet officials, the USSR wants to change its military doctrine of strategic attack capability to one of defense only and cut back on the production of tanks. This was reported yesterday by SPD Presidium member Bahr at a conference of the SPD Bundestag Group with Bundeswehr soldiers. According to Bahr, Gareyev, Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff, also stated at a meeting between Soviet and FRG officers at the Bonn Friedrich Ebert Foundation that the USSR has dissolved units that were designed for rapidly advancing on the enemy's territory. Moreover, SS-23 missiles (range: 400 km) will be withdrawn from the GDR and destroyed. Bahr called this significant and demanded that NATO must not introduce new similar missiles.

At the conference, the Social Democrats rejected prolongation of military service from 15 to 18 months. Their military expert, Horn, said that the present “jam” of 400,000 draftees makes the planned prolongation unnecessary.

Chairman Vogel talked to the 250 participants about the Defense Ministry's “insufficient planning” for the nineties. It will not be possible then to maintain the peacetime strength of 495,000 because of smaller age-groups and the lack of financial resources.

In the discussion, soldiers questioned the SPD representatives about the purpose of the SPD congress' decision not to hold any more public swearing-in ceremonies. Horst Ehmke answered: The SPD is in favor of such ceremonies but new modes have to found for them.

Kohl Seen Stalling on Missile Modernization
36200026 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 17 Oct 88 pp 28-29

[Text] Those in Bonn are going counter to American wishes: They want to delay a decision on rearmament as long as possible.

Helmut Kohl took a great deal of time. Over a period of 1 and ½ hours, the Chancellor chatted with Soviet journalists in the small cabinet room last Wednesday about his upcoming visit to Moscow.

Kohl assured them he was going to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the Kremlin full of good will, and that he was quite prepared to open “a new chapter” in relations with the Eastern superpower.

Nevertheless, when the Soviet guests wanted to learn what his government's position was with regard to the modernization of the atomic short-range missiles in the FRG, the Chancellor's cheerfulness subsided: he said this topic was “not current.” Saying “yes” to a new round of atomic rearmament, Kohl knew, would endanger the success he hoped for from his Kremlin visit, a “no,” on the other hand, would anger the Western allies.

Bonn's Christian Liberals have, therefore, been trying for months to delay the decision to modernize those atomic weapons that are still allowed in Europe, namely those that have a range of up to 500 km. With one eye on the Bundestag elections in November 1990, Kohl said that he saw no need to reach a decision before 1991.

Some allies and Manfred Woerner, secretary general of NATO, view the situation differently. Great Britain's prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, wanted a decision on a successor to the obsolete “Lancer” rockets as long ago as the spring. The Americans wanted a clear decision before their Presidential campaign heated up. The question of rearmament should be decided at the fall meeting of the Nuclear Planning Commission at the end of next week in Schvenuesingen.

The West Germans, however, supported by the Italians and some of the smaller NATO states, balked. They maintained that first the Western alliance should work out a “total plan” for its future strategy, that a decision to modernize now would be the wrong signal at the wrong time, and that the alliance could wait for this total plan. For the time being, an “interim report” should be prepared.
John Galvin, supreme NATO commander, prepared a study in conjunction with the decision in the fall, ("Nuclear Weapons Requirement Study 88") about the need for atomic weapons in Europe. He wanted to make the procurement of a successor to Lance and the introduction of new airborne defensive weapons palatable to the European NATO partners by the withdrawal of thousands of nuclear artillery shells.

In the meantime, the NATO generals have come to the realization that it would probably be better to leave this decision to the new man in the White House. In any case, the Christian Liberals in Bonn will not have to fear any pressure from Washington or Brussels until next spring.

William Taft, the U.S. deputy secretary of defense, neglected to touch upon this ticklish subject with Rupert Scholz, the (West German) defense minister, when they met 2 weeks ago Friday. However, 2 days earlier in Brussels, when he visited NATO headquarters, the modernization of nuclear weapons had played an important role. In the area of conventional forces, in the area of cooperation with regard to arms-related matters—"more must be done everywhere," Taft said.

If Ronald Reagan's vice president should be elected, he wants to confer with the heads of the Allies' governments "very soon." Negotiations involving short-range nuclear weapons systems would, according to Bush's security advisor, Gen Brent Scowcroft, "take place, if at all, only after the successful conclusion of negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons."

Under a Democratic President Michael Dukakis, too, the people in Bonn would still be forced to make an unpopular decision. Representative Lee Hamilton, named by Dukakis as a possible Secretary of State, wants to solve the question of modernization "within the next few months." In a letter written at the end of September, Hamilton stressed that it was the task of governments "to educate" public opinion to see the necessity of a nuclear deterrent.

Genscher and his disarmament diplomats see another educative task: they want to convince the partners of the alliance that there is still time to arrive at a consensus on the modernization issue, and that it is even possible that the entire issue could become a moot point. After all, the Lance rockets deployed in the Federal Republic will still be ready for use until 1995 at the very least. On top of that, the arms reduction experts say that the Vienna negotiations concerning conventional disarmament between the Atlantic and the Urals might bring intermediate results as early as next year.

If the Warsaw Pact should indeed take the first step by reducing its numerical superiority in tanks, artillery, and troops, NATO would no longer be compelled to offset Eastern superiority with nuclear weapons. At that juncture, a signal to rearm would really be the wrong signal to send.

At the FDP party convention in Wiesbaden, Genscher had his opposition position spelled out for him: "Decisions concerning individual weapons systems," it was said in a party convention platform plank that was formulated by arms reduction experts, "cannot be made in isolation."

While Genscher secretly hopes to achieve a zero option for short range atomic weapons through his delaying tactics with NATO, Kohl wants to keep a later "option" for modernization open. If no progress is made in the negotiations in Vienna by the turn of the year 1991-92, it would still be early enough to decide upon the deployment of new atomic devices in NATO.

Kohl will hardly be able to convince his host Gorbachev next week with such noncommittal phrases as those he offered the Soviet journalists. The Soviets want clarity, because in the debate on modernization within NATO, as Moscow's ambassador to Bonn, Juli Kwiwinski put it, the Federal Republic plays "the key role."

ITALY

Andreotti Considers 'Renunciation' of F-16 Deal
AU0212103688 Rome ANSA in English 1016 GMT 2 Dec 88

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, Dec 2—Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti on Thursday agreed to take into consideration a proposal, presented in the Senate by Communist Giuseppe Boffa and Piero Pieralli, together with Antonio Giolitti of the Independent Left, to work towards a disarmament accord which would make the transfer of American F-16 fighter bombers to Italy unnecessary.

In effect, the Senate proposal called on the government to commit itself to follow "every possible initiative leading to negotiations directly or through NATO, with Warsaw Pact nations in order to reach accords, already suggested by (Soviet leader Mikhail) Gorbachev, as well as other authoritative Soviet and Hungarian figures, for an arms reduction for the part of the transfer to Crotone of the F-16 fighter-bombers presently deployed in Torreion, Spain."

The document goes on to state that the next three years, before the 1991 deadline for the aircraft to leave Spain, be used to reach such an accord.

Italy offered to host the American F-16 aircraft after Washington and Madrid failed to reach an accord to keep them in Spain. Rome's move, in line with its NATO commitments, was justified for the need to defend NATO's southern flank and avoid NATO from making a unilateral disarmament move.
SWEDEN

TECH TRANSFER: Sweden Reports Sale of 'Robot 15' Missiles to Yugoslavia
LD2611154488 Stockholm International Service in Swedish 1030 GMT 26 Nov 88

[Text] Sweden has been selling the advanced 'Robot 15' surface missile amid great secrecy to Yugoslavia, according to today's SVENSKA DAGBLADET newspaper. The Saab Missile Company signed a contract worth several hundred million kronor with the Yugoslav state, informed sources told the paper. The first missiles are said to have been delivered the summer before last, but neither the Defense Materiel Administration nor Saab Missile were willing to confirm the deal. Haakan Ganget, deputy director of Saab Missile's parent company, Saab Combitech, told the paper that he was sworn to total secrecy on the matter.
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