Arms Control
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JPRS-TAC-88-043

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29 NOVEMBER 1988

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Arms Dealers "Disappointed" With Chinese
Market
OW/1711125988 Tokyo KYODO in English 1210 GMT 17 Nov 88

[Text] Beijing, Nov. 17 KYODO—Western arms suppliers who only two years ago hoped China's military modernization program would lead to an export bonanza now say they are disappointed with the Chinese
market.

Representatives and observers of Western companies attending the Asiadex 88 Military Exhibition in Beijing this week say they expect few sales will result from the show.

Many of the Western companies who attended China's first arms show held in 1986 have not turned up for this year's exhibition, say those who have come.

Only a handful of American companies are at the exhibition this year, and even the stronger European presence is down on two years ago.

"For many companies it is not worth paying the cost of attending when they know there is little chance of any major contracts," said one Western observer.

Companies at the show cite China's severe shortage of foreign exchange and the restricted military budget as the main reasons for the lack of major purchase orders.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is believed to have an enormous requirement for modern equipment to replace its aging weapons, often based on Soviet models of the 1950s and 1960s, but the Chinese Government has given the military low priority in budget allocations.

The PLA has even been forced into manufacturing and trading telecommunications and motorcycles to boost its finances.

According to Western arms specialists, financial difficulties are not the only ones facing companies trying to sell military goods in China. Some cite China's difficulty in absorbing advanced Western technology, uncertain planning and even extreme secretiveness as major obstacles to be overcome.

According to one European supplier who requested anonymity, the Chinese buyers often do not fully understand the equipment they buy and are frequently plagued with operational difficulties after the equipment has been installed despite its having proved effective with other users.

Sales to China require larger than usual backup in advice and spares, and uncertain planning procedures can disrupt and delay projects, he said.

In one extreme case Britain's Rolls-Royce sold its Spey engines to China in 1975 to power the planned B-7 ground-attack aircraft, only to see the project cancelled even though the engines had already been purchased.

The project was revived again in the 1980s and the aircraft is now due to fly for the first time this month.

One company which sold naval electronics to China says the equipment is still sitting in the dock one year after delivery because the ships in which it is to be installed have not been finished.

The manufacturers also say their job is made more difficult by the extreme secrecy which surrounds China's military.

The naval electronics exporter said that in other countries the manufacturer will normally know what technology his equipment will be matched with, but in China this is often not revealed, making it difficult for the seller to guarantee the equipment will work properly after installation.

The difficulty of penetrating the Chinese market and the small rewards mean that fewer defense manufacturers will make a major effort to sell to China, said one defense industry observer.

Many will maintain a minimal presence and hope for better times in the future, he said.

Beijing Military Exhibition Opens

New Missiles Displayed at Beijing Exhibition
HK2111035788 Hong Kong HSIN WAN PAO in Chinese 18 Nov 88 pp 3, 4

["Special article" by contributing reporter Wen Po (2429 3134): "China's Missiles of a New Type on Display in Beijing"]

[Text] At the Second Beijing International Defense Technology Exhibition which opened on 15 November, businessmen from China and abroad were attracted by the large numbers of tactical missiles, particularly the six new types of missiles which reached the advanced world levels of the 1980's and which were displayed in kind.

The Rapidly Developing Missile Technology

The China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation under the Ministry of Aviation and Aeronautics Industry is responsible for the exports of China's missiles. Divided into the two categories of antiship missile and air defense missile, the six new types of missiles include: The C-301 model supersonic antiship missile, a highly effective weapon to attack large ships on the sea surface. The "Chinese Flying Fish" C-802 model missile is a weapon to attack destroyers, corvettes, and landing ships. The new type of HQ-2B ground-to-air
missile that can be carried in trucks is a highly mobile all weather, all directional, and airspace missile. The “Flying Mongoose” FM-80 model ground-to-air missile is a weapon used to protect important facilities. The M1 and M1-B unmanned rocket is a weapon to attack ground forces. It can also fire shrapnel and multiple warheads.

In addition, the China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation also displayed 12 other types of missiles and 54 kinds of auxiliary high-tech products.

After the founding of the PRC, China's missile technology started from scratch and underwent a developing course of imitating, independent research, and seeking cooperation with foreign partners.

In the early 1960's China produced its 56-km range SV-1 model ship-to-ship missile by imitating the Soviet Union's "Deep River" [Ming He 0388 3109] model and made an initial success in this field. Later China relied on its own efforts to develop the HY-2 missile which could hit the target at the range of 105 km. The HY-2A, HY-2B, and HY-2G series of missiles which equipped the army were all produced on the basis of the HY-2 model. This HY-2 model missile is called "silkworm" by the Americans.

From the end of the 1970's to the mid 1980's, China again developed some new types of missiles which included C-801, C-802, and C-301.

China's “Flying Fish Missile”

The appearance of the C-801 antiship missile looked very much like France's “Flying Fish” missile. However, the personnel in the international defense circles believed that the functions of the C-801 outstripped those of the “Flying Fish” and approached those of MM-38, MM-39, and MM-40. Hence, they simply called it the “Chinese Flying Fish.” Based on the C-801, China developed another model C-802 of which the range of fire reached 128 km, an increase of over 100 percent. With modern ground equipment and advanced turbojet engine as its motive power, this missile can match the "Harpoon" of the United States.

The two types of antiship supersonic missiles displayed at the exhibition include: The C-101 and C-301, the speed of both exceeds sound by 200 percent. It is noteworthy that this type of missile has not yet been produced by other countries. Hence, China is in the lead in this regard.

China's missile technology has developed from the unitary ship-to-ship missile in the early days to the multifunctional missile that can be launched from the ship, the air, and the shore. China's ground-to-ground missile technology has also developed somewhat.

Seeking International Cooperation

Viewed from the technological level, the first generation of China's tactical missiles has matured and the second generation has reached the international levels of the 1980's. Now China is further tackling key technological problems to perfect the missiles of the second generation. In light of the needs of the Chinese Army, it has been reported that the new model HN ground-to-air missile of the second generation will be finalized very soon. Italy's ASPIDE missile technology will be introduced and applied to a medium and low altitude missiles. After its successful production, it will be installed on the China-made advanced fighters.

Many countries expressed their interest in the HQ-2B supersonic ground-to-air missiles which could be carried by armored cars. A person of a relevant department disclosed that cooperation will be carried out with the United States in this regard.

Following its founding in 1980, the China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation extensively established business contacts with dozens of countries and regions.

China's missiles have been displayed on numerous occasions in Farnborough, Paris, and Singapore. At the first Beijing International Defense Technology Exhibition held in 1986, China displayed three types of sea defense missiles, one kind of M series ground-to-ground missile, and three kinds of ground-to-air missiles. At the current exhibition, China adopted a prudent attitude and no longer introduced its M series missiles.

Viewed practically, China's missile export is insignificant compared with the military powers. The spokesman for the China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation said that China is selling missiles for the purpose of enhancing the normal defense of some countries. China will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

Drawing the Attention of Foreign Businessmen

Foreign businessmen showed great interest in and paid close attention to China's missiles displayed at the current exhibition. Businessmen and delegations from more than 20 countries including the Third World and the West came to watch the exhibition, ask for quotations, and hold trade talks. The person of a relevant department is optimistic about the results of the current exhibition.

Military Chiefs Tour Exhibition

OW1811155788 Beijing XINHUA in English
1430 GMT 18 Nov 88

[Text] Beijing, November 18 (XINHUA)—Almost all China's top brass showed up today at the "Asiandex 88" arms exhibition here to demonstrate their commitment to the country's modernization of its defense industry.
When Defense Minister Qin Jiwei and hundreds of other army officers appeared at the China International Exhibition Center here this afternoon, their glittering uniforms and epaulets attracted everybody's attention, adding another highlight to the six-day event which opened last Tuesday.

At the Chinese pavilion, Qin Jiwei and eight other generals feasted their adept eyes on China-made weaponry, which included missiles, aircraft, tanks and cannons. He conveyed his thanks to domestic manufacturers on behalf of the country's military.

Intrigued by a missile made by the North Industrial Corporation, General Li Desheng, political commissar of China's Defense University, even put the weapon to his shoulder to aim it.

General Zhang Zhen, president of the Defense University, and his old wartime friends surrounded a sand table featuring various electronic equipment, probably discussing how to arm his students with the latest wonder weapons.

Pointing to the 13 missile exhibits, some of which have already won sales contracts from foreign purchasers, former Defense Minister Geng Biao told Chinese producers that their missiles are competitive in the world market with a technology edge and lower prices.

The enthusiastic visitors also toured foreign pavilions, carefully asking exhibitors about the functions and prices of their products.

According to the organizers of the exhibition, 113 arms producers from 13 countries and regions are attending the event, which will also feature a series of technical seminars.

Yan Jiei, vice-chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, and Zhou Peiyun, vice-chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, were also present at the show today.

4 Guided-Missile Frigates Sold to Thailand
HK1911013588 Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST in English 19 Nov 88 p 7

[By Seth Faison in Beijing]

[Text] Chinese officials yesterday confirmed the sale of four guided-missile frigates to Thailand, the latest in a series of arms deals and growing military co-operation between the two countries.

The 110-metre vessels were ordered by Thailand from the China State Shipbuilding Corporation.

Models of the frigates were on display at the corporation's booth at Beijing six-day international arms exhibition, Asiantex, which closes tomorrow.

The value of the deal was not disclosed, but a Chinese official, Mr Chen Yong, said it would be about 30 percent below the international market price, in part because of China's close relations with Thailand.

The move welcomed by the United States, another firm Thai ally, has at the same time alarmed Southeast Asian countries worried about the expansion of Chinese military influence in the region.

The stockpile and other military issues are expected to be high on the agenda when Thai army chief General Chavalit Yongchaiyut visits Beijing next week.

Military co-operation in opposing the Vietnam-backed regime in Kampuchea was also discussed at length during a recent visit to Thailand by Chinese premier Li Peng.

Arms Fair Gives Impetus to Defense Industry
HK2111015688 Beijing CHINA DAILY (BUSINESS WEEKLY SUPPLEMENT) in English 21 Nov 88 p 1

[By staff reporter Xie Songxin]

[Text] Last week's arms fair at Beijing's International Exhibition Centre should have given fresh impetus to China's defence industry, which is fighting for its peacetime survival.

Foreign military officers and arms dealers are already negotiating and arranging further contact with Chinese manufacturers after getting a close look at the nation's arms industry at the Asian Defence Technology Exhibition (Asiantex Beijing'88) which was scheduled to end on Sunday, November 20.

To attract potential buyers, eight Chinese firms exhibited their newly-developed weapons, including missiles, in over 3,300 square metres of floor space. Some of the weapons were being shown in public for the first time.

China's weapons are generally cheaper and easier to operate than those produced elsewhere. However, central government policy could hold back arms exports.

China will only sell arms to strengthen the importer's national defence capabilities or safeguard regional peace and stability.

"We have never sold, and never will sell, arms to countries engaged in regional conflict," said Li Gong, an official of the Xinshidai Corporation, the co-sponsor of Asiantex.

Wu Huanhua, vice-president of China North Industries Corporation (Norinco), the country's largest arms firm, said: "When a profitable export plan contradicts government principles, we don't hesitate to back out."


However, he added that China could not guarantee that its weapons would never reach improper and unintended destinations because international arms dealers were so profit-orientated.

A limited amount of orders from the People's Liberation Army—which has been cut back by 1 million men—and a shortage of hard currency have meant a reduction in military assistance. Now the Chinese ordnance industry has to rely on arms sales abroad, said Wu.

He added that half Norinco's 170 plants and 700,000 workers were producing civilian products because of insufficient military orders.

And Li said: "Civilian production will play a major part in China's ordnance industry in the future. "But we have to maintain some facilities for arms production in case of war.""

Wu said: "Although our technology is not always as advanced as that in some Western countries, it is still good enough for us to go into the export market."

Shi Guoyan, a senior engineer with the China Great Wall Corporation, said: "Our research used to depend on funds allocated by the government. But since the government cut off the money supply we have had to export our satellite launching services to earn enough money to go on."

China began to sell arms when it adopted a policy of opening to the outside world. However, its sales figures are slight compared with the big Western powers.

Wu said that Norinco's development was the result of the transition from military assistance to arms sales.

Although government officials will not disclose the destinations for Chinese arms shipments, Wu said Norinco's arms were destined for Third World countries with friendly relations with China.

Norinco exports conventional weapons—guns, artillery, munitions and military vehicles.

"The technical level of some of our conventional arms matches the output from most foreign countries, and our after-sales service is very good," Wu said.

Besides selling arms, China is also prepared to export technology overseas.

"We are willing to co-operate with friendly countries to help them build up their own independent defence industry," Wu said. "China does not simply pursue profits."

China's defence industry had always been self-reliant and intended to stay that way, he added.

But "this policy does not rule out co-operation with Western countries," Wu continued, adding that Norinco had already co-operated with the United States, France and Britain.

For example, the corporation is working with a French company on the production of an armoured car. The French will supply the armament technology and the Chinese will manufacture the car. A prototype was on show at Asiantex.
Poland's representative noted with satisfaction that the joint plan of the socialist countries expressed in the PCC documents covered a number of elements contained in the Polish plan of reducing armaments and increasing confidence in central Europe, commonly known as the Jaruzelski Plan.

Jaroszek pointed to the fact that in its present form the plan, despite the fact that it concerns the European region, due to the political importance of central Europe and the amassing of an enormous arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons in it had in reality a wider significance, even a universal one.

“The Jaruzelski plan is an original, Polish contribution bringing closer the realization of the joint initiative of the socialist states concerning the shaping of a universal system of peace and international security. It also is evidence that Poland is an active and important partner in the disarmament dialogue,” he concluded.

CSSR Takes Part in Debate
LD0411092688 Prague CTK in English
1959 GMT 3 Nov 88

This proposal is based on a combination of measures of military and non-military character, he stressed, and pointed out also the joint proposal of Czechoslovakia and the GDR for the creation of a Central European chemical-free zone. This idea is in full harmony with the effort for a quick conclusion of a world treaty on the ban on and liquidation of these weapons, Pavlovsky said.

CSSR Addresses Disarmament at CSCE Plenary Session
LD0411032188 Prague CTK in English
1621 GMT 3 Nov 88

[Text] Vienna Nov 3 (CTK Correspondent)—The significance of the recent session of the Warsaw Treaty foreign ministers was stressed here today by Ludek Handl, head of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Vienna discussions on the reduction of armed forces and armament in Central Europe.
The session confirmed the preparedness of the member states to do everything for a real turn in the world politics towards the strengthening of peace, disarmament and development and cooperation, he said.

In connection with the discussions here he pointed out the necessity to draw a lesson from the current course of the negotiations for the future discussions on conventional disarmament in the whole of Europe and underlined that both sides consider the Vienna discussions useful.

A lesson should be drawn from the current discussions in spite of the fact that the obstacles were too big this time to make it possible to achieve an agreement, Ludek Handl said, and expressed concern over some signals indicating the possibility of some tactical and methodological procedures being repeated, regardless of the theories drawn from the Vienna discussions. How should the theories on the need for a deep asymmetrical reduction only on the side of the Warsaw Treaty and mere cosmetic adjustments on the NATO side as a sine qua non condition be explained otherwise, the Czechoslovak representative asked.

The unwillingness of the West to admit asymmetry on its side is well known and arouses concern, he stressed.

Colonel General Petr Mamchur conveyed cordial greetings from Soviet Marshal Viktor Kulikov, supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, which Army General Heinz Kessler reciprocated in the same way.

Taking part in the meeting were Colonel General Joachim Goldbach, deputy minister of national defense and chief of technology and weaponry, and Colonel General Vladimir Meretskov, representative of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces Supreme Commander in the GDR's National People's Army.

**Army Experts Assess Security Issues, CSCE**

AU1611120288 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 12 Nov 88 p 6

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Jiri Brychta, first deputy chief of general staff of the Czechoslovak People's Army, and Colonel Vladimir Mohyla, representing the Czechoslovak People's Army at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna, by Stanislav Stibor: "Where Should One Start?"]

[Excerpts] How should the problems that have accumulated in the sphere of military security be resolved, particularly in Europe? What hope is there that the Vienna meeting of countries that signed the Helsinki Final Act will achieve progress in issues that are so important for mankind? We put these questions to prominent Czechoslovak military experts—Lieutenant General Jiri Brychta, first deputy chief of the general staff of the Czechoslovak People's Army (CSLA), and Colonel Vladimir Mohyla, CSLA representative at the Vienna follow-up meeting.

[Stibor] Where should one start in speedily solving the problems that have accumulated, and what basis could future negotiations on confidence-building and security measures and on disarmament in Europe have?

[Brychta] [Passage omitted] Security must be understood comprehensively. It must include both military, ecological, economic, and social aspects. This is how security is being considered at the sessions.

[Mohyla] Every negotiating forum is based on a mandate, i.e. on a kind of program that determines the sequence and content of issues, and also on the methods and mechanism of negotiations. The 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have been working a mandate on disarmament in meetings since February 1987; other issues are being considered by the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna. From the viewpoint of broader negotiations, the prerequisites for the disarmament process could be created in negotiations on the military doctrines of the two military groupings.

[Brychta] It is appropriate to again recall that mutual security must be based on a lower level of military confrontation, on a gradual (and in the final stage total)
elimination of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass annihilation. Other military potentials should be limited to a level sufficient for defense.

[Stibor] Does this mean that the views on common security are not yet fully crystallized?

[Brychta] This mainly applies to the West, which has so far failed to respond comprehensively to the call for a comparison of military doctrines and for the adoption of appropriate conclusions for negotiations. Also, it has not responded to proposals on the comprehensive system of international security and the well-known “common European home” concept, made at the Warsaw session of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee. [passage omitted]

[Stibor] What is the real prospect of reopening the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and on Disarmament in Europe already this year, as laid down in the recent Budapest statement of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers?

[Brychta] [passage omitted] The present problem is that even if the Stockholm conference should reopen, it would proceed in two definite, specific, parallel forums of negotiations: One would be dealing with confidence-building and security measures, with the participation of 35 countries; the other with issues of conventional disarmament throughout Europe, with the states rallied in the NATO and Warsaw Pact military-political groupings of 16 and 7 states respectively. [passage omitted] The current problem is that the West, under pressure from certain countries (and, I would say, particularly the United States), has begun to emphatically insist that the negotiations of the 23 should basically be totally autonomous. This could mean that the 12 neutral and nonaligned countries, which have always played a positive role, could never join the European disarmament process. However, it is these states that feel the need most, and they approach the issue in this spirit. It would be quite logical for them to participate, since disarmament should take place on the basis of the Madrid mandate in the zone reaching from the Atlantic to the Urals—in fact, throughout Europe.

[Stibor] What is the West’s main reason for adopting this stand?

[Mohyla] No doubt there are several reasons. I personally believe that the main one is the West’s fear that the disarmament process could fall under the scrutiny of all European countries. In fact, it has become usual for the individual follow-up meetings to jointly evaluate the results and set new tasks. In the present situation the militarist Western circles find it impossible to “swallow” the fact that they would have to render account for the commitments they have adopted, which would in fact mean a complete “green light” for the disarmament process.

[Stibor] Is this the main reason why the Vienna follow-up meeting (which was to have wound up its work by working out the mandate by the middle of this year) has still not ended?

[Brychta] It is. At least, this is true in the sphere of military security (which will be part of the final document of the Vienna follow-up meeting) and of work on the mandate for future negotiations on conventional disarmament. However, this also applies to other significant issues, to those of the so-called first basket, but also of the second and third baskets—to economic and humanitarian issues. Neither the negotiations at the Vienna follow-up meeting, nor the discussions can be concluded until balanced results are achieved in all three baskets together, and in each of them separately. Specifically, balanced results in the military sphere mean solving the interrelations between the two forums of negotiations (on confidence-building and security measures with the participation of 35 countries and of the Group of 23 states), fixing the temporary nature of the two negotiating forums, creating prerequisites for continuing them in the sphere of strengthening confidence, and adopting qualitatively new measures.

[Stibor] Are there any other reasons?

[Mohyla] There are several, and some of them have already been mentioned here. The main ones lie in the rather complicated problems under discussion at the follow-up meeting and at the consultations of the Group of 23 states. Let us at least recall that more than 150 proposals have been submitted at the follow-up meeting alone. It is also none too easy to formulate a mandate that would fix the main orientation of conventional disarmament throughout Europe for a longer period. The NATO countries have not brought a comprehensive concept to the negotiations—for quite some time they have been searching (and in fact are still searching) for a compromise primarily among themselves. This is not speeding up the actual negotiations, either. The period preceding the U.S. elections and the fact that the old U.S. Administration was incapable of pushing through the idea of an accelerated conclusion of negotiations has also had a negative impact. And last, but not least, certain Western countries are showing a tendency to imbue the negotiations with an atmosphere that would permit them to acquire unilateral advantages in one of the spheres under negotiation.

[Stibor] What can you say of the CSSR’s role at the negotiations?

[Brychta] The process of all-European negotiations is characterized by the fact that 35 sovereign states are involved. And it is immaterial whether these states are large or small. This represents an opportunity for the CSSR, situated on the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO states, and is also the reason
why we are so active in our approach to all negotiations. We trust that the Czechoslovak initiative to create a zone of confidence and good-neighborly relations will play an irreplaceable role here.

[Stibor] We thank you for the interview.

Convention on Ban of Chemical Weapons Urged
AU1611120588 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 15 Nov 88 p 2

["ng"-signed commentary: "Ready for Disarmament"]

[Text] Ready for operation after 1988. This statement refers to the first stage of expansion of an unusual chemical works that is under construction near Kuibyshev on the Volga steppe. Chemical weapons will be transformed into innocuous acids and salts there. It has been conceived as a pilot project for factories where Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons can be destroyed within the period that will be stipulated by an international convention on the complete banning of chemical weapons.

The 40-state Geneva disarmament conference has been working on such a convention since the beginning of the seventies. A first draft was presented in March 1972 by the socialist countries that are represented there, including the GDR. Further proposals have been presented by the nonaligned states, and by Japan, Great Britain, and the United States.

All these efforts are directed toward banning the use of chemical weapons—banned by international law since 1925—their production, and their storage, and toward destroying the stockpiles that have been created. As a result, the outlines of a multilateral agreement have become visible. This year's summer session of the Geneva disarmament conference, however, ended without the desired result: The United States had started the production of a new generation of chemical weapons—binary weapons. In addition, chemical concerns in the United States have rejected international control. At the end of August, U.S. Ambassador Kampelmann finally described a complete ban on chemical weapons as useless, because in his view it is not verifiable.

Despite this, the Warsaw Pact countries unwaveringly stick to their goal, which is the conclusion of a convention on the complete banning of chemical weapons and the scrapping of the stockpiles. As a practical step on the path toward this aim, they advocate a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe, which has long been proposed by the SED and CPCZ together with the SPD.

The planned start-up of the works on the Volga steppe, where chemical weapons will be destroyed, represents a step in the same direction. It demonstrates that socialism, with its peace program and peace policy, not only presses for disarmament, but that it is also ready to take practical steps.

Albania

Albanian Envoy Gives UN Address on Disarmament
AU2510144188 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 19 Oct 88 p 4

[ATA report on 18 October speech by Muhamet Kapllani, deputy foreign minister of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, at the debate on disarmament in the first commission of the UN General Assembly: "The Arms Race Continues Because the Hegemonic Policy of the Superpowers Relies on Force"]

[Text] Muhamet Kapllani, deputy foreign minister of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, addressed on 18 October the debate on disarmament taking place in the first commission of the UN General Assembly. He said, among other things:

If the world has not experienced genuine disarmament, this is not because of the lack of will and efforts on the part of the peoples and of democratic and sovereign states. The arms race continues primarily because it has not been possible to curb the ambitions of the superpowers, whose policy relies on force and aims at imposing their hegemony and dikttat over others.

The past decade represents one of the most burdened periods in the arms race, a period during which expenditure on arms has tripled and all kinds of new weapons have been introduced. From the land, the seas, and the air, advances are being made toward militarizing space. The dynamic of the arms race currently manifests itself in the bitter reality of the accumulation of a nuclear arsenal of over 60,000 warheads, 97 percent of which belong to the United States and the Soviet Union.

After pointing out that there is no room for euphoria concerning the Soviet-American INF Treaty on "Euro-missiles," Kapllani went on to say: The pacific rhetoric used unsparingly by the United States and the Soviet Union cannot conceal the fact that this new agreement, like all previous ones, is related primarily to their political, economic, military, and even electoral interests. The two superpowers are now pretending to save the world from the nuclear threat and disaster. The question must be put properly: Who is threatening the world with a nuclear holocaust, who possesses all the nuclear weapons, and who pursues a policy leading to such a goal? Facts show that it is the United States and the Soviet Union which possess the overwhelming quantity of all types of weapons, including nuclear ones, and which have proved that they place their own hegemonic interests above all else, thus threatening peace and international security.

Albania, the Albanian delegate went on to say, does not participate in any military bloc or alliance that could directly or indirectly involve it in a policy of hostility.
toward any other country. Albania has signed no agreement that could be interpreted as violating the interests of any other country. We will continue to adhere loyally to this principled and resolute stand of our foreign policy, which has been worked out by our socialist state and the great and unforgettable leader of the Albanian people, Enver Hoxha, because in this way we defend the country's freedom and independence, carrying out at the same time our obligation toward the neighboring peoples and countries, the Balkans, Europe, and beyond.

He went on to stress that the spirit of military and political confrontation in Europe represents a typical negative phenomenon that is exploited by the superpowers primarily to impose and preserve their tutelage over all political, military, and other activities on this continent. The same applies to other regions. Therefore, the more removed that the negative factors arising from the presence, rivalry, and the arms race of the superpowers are, the better it would be for the fruitful and equal cooperation of the peoples, peace, and genuine international security.

After also mentioning the severe consequences of conventional disarmament and the arms trade, the Albanian representative dwelt on regional conflicts. He stressed that the fact that these centers of conflict are kept alive or extinguished in accordance with the ups and downs of Soviet-American relations, gives us the right to suspect that they might incite new disasters at the expense of the peoples at some future date. It is therefore essential that a solution to these regional problems must originate primarily and directly from the states concerned.

In conclusion, Muhamet Kaplani stated: It is obvious that in order to initiate a genuine process of disarmament, what is required is the political will. This must be demonstrated primarily by those who are involved in this feverish arms race. However, judging from the international situation, the contradictions, and centers of conflict in various parts of the world, which are essentially a consequence of the policies of the superpowers, we can harbor no illusions that disarmament will come from their goodwill. This is why the world is still far removed from the genuine aspirations of sovereign peoples and states to live in freedom and independence, and free from the anxiety of war and nuclear destruction.

Superpower Navies in Mediterranean Deplored
AU0711153488 Tirana ZERI I POPULIT in Albanian 2 Nov 88 p 4

[Arben Karapici article: "The Mediterranean Cannot Be Guarded by the Superpowers' Gunboats"]

[Text] There has been more and more talk recently about turning the Mediterranean from a region of the superpowers' military confrontation into a zone of peace and cooperation. This has long been an aspiration, as old as it is legitimate, for the Mediterranean peoples and countries who have more than once shown their concern by drawing attention to the danger posed by the continued concentration of the superpowers' military fleets in the Mediterranean basin. However, it is calculation on a grand scale for the superpowers, in the name of these aspirations, to present plans and programs for increasing this military and naval presence, which has turned the Mediterranean into one of the most militarized of the seas. The Soviet "operational plan for the defense of the Mediterranean," recently given such great publicity by Moscow, is also of such content and character.

Of course, the first question that arises after all the commotion about these Soviet plans to turn the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and cooperation is that of who is threatening the Mediterranean and from whom the region should be defended. The proposers of this plan do not in any way raise this reasonable question. On the contrary, the "Soviet operational defense plan" for the Mediterranean neglects the principal and only factors of Mediterranean defense, the Mediterranean peoples and countries themselves.

Since it lacks proper military bases, the Soviet Union is more than ever concerned with raising its voice in favor of the so-called defense of the Mediterranean, under Moscow's wing. The "operational plan" also expresses these hegemonic interests, according to which the Soviet fleet is the guarantor of peace and stability in the Mediterranean region. "It is not only problems of military security that determine Soviet interests in the Mediterranean," PRAVDA wrote recently. "Our sea routes to every part of the world have passed through the Mediterranean since ancient times," Moscow's spokesman stresses, "and our standpoint considers the broadest balance of interests, implying, first of all, a balance with American interests in the area." It is in accordance with this military balance that the Soviet Union has modernized its naval forces and shown their strength in the Mediterranean region, especially at points where they have succeeded in establishing a presence [fikoshej] such as off the Moroccan and Tunisian coasts, near Cape Passero in Sicily, and off the Gulf of Manfredonia in the Adriatic.

The Soviet operational plan for Mediterranean defense appears on the scene at a time when both the Soviet Union and the United States of America are constantly strengthening their fleets, not only in the Mediterranean, but in all other strategically important regions in the world. Under the guise of defending the Mediterranean, the superpowers try to conceal the harsh reality of the presence of their warships that patrol the waters of this region like behemoths, and have created dangerous situations for Mediterranean peoples and countries on more than one occasion. By publicizing the defensive character of the Soviet operational plan for the Mediterranean, Moscow seeks to distract the attention of the peoples of this region from the dangers posed to them by the superpowers' growing naval and military presence. In this plan, the Soviet Union also sets conditions guaranteeing the superpowers positions of arbitration in this
area. In discussing the Mediterranean, Soviet propaganda media openly state that "its defense cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the great powers," which primarily implies American-Soviet military cooperation.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States of America are Mediterranean countries; the Mediterranean does not belong to them, and they have no business there. It is precisely this unjustifiable presence that increases tension and creates great dangers for the freedom and independence of the peoples of this region. Many past and present events show that the military fleets and troops of one superpower or another, stationed in the Mediterranean basin, support the policies of hegemony and domination pursued by the USSR and the U.S.A. in the Mediterranean, as in other regions of the world. Under such conditions, can we talk of the real defense of the Mediterranean without eliminating the fundamental reason for tension and danger, which is the two superpowers?

All Mediterranean countries and peoples aspire and struggle for the real transformation of the Mediterranean into a region of peace and cooperation. The Mediterranean region could truly be such an area of genuine security only if peace were not threatened by the presence of American and Soviet fleets. The Mediterranean cannot be guarded by the superpowers' gunboats; the free and independent defense and development of the countries of the Mediterranean, as of all European countries, can only be ensured by breaking the political and military chains of Washington and Moscow.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

U.S. INF Delegation Ends Inspections in GDR
LD311119488 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1622 GMT 31 Oct 88

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—The U.S. INF inspectors who have been in the GDR since 30 October today ended their inspections. During its stay in the GDR the group inspected former Soviet Army bases on the basis of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which was signed 8 December 1987. In Weissenfels (Halle Bezirk), and in Jena-Forst (Gera Bezirk) they checked the complete withdrawal of OTR-23 (SS-23) missiles and could see for themselves that there are no longer any Soviet OTR-23 type missiles stationed in the installations.

The GDR has fulfilled its obligations to aid the United States during inspections on its territory in accordance with the agreement between the GDR, USSR, and the CSSR in connection with the INF Treaty.

The U.S. inspection group was seen off at Leipzig-Schkeuditz Airport by representatives from the GDR Foreign and Defense Ministries and from the Moscow Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, which is attached to the Soviet Forces based in the GDR. [passage omitted]

Editorial Demands Chemical Weapons Ban
AU0311120188 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 31 Oct 88 p 2

["HE" editorial: "Away With Chemical Weapons!"]

[Text] France has invited all interested countries to participate in an international conference to be held early in January 1989, at which the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons could be corroborated. This proposal by President Mitterrand was immediately welcomed by the GDR, in particular because such a conference can be helpful in getting nearer to a more far-reaching goal—a chemical weapons ban.

Such a ban is known to represent an important component of the peace and disarmament proposals submitted by the Warsaw Pact member countries. But western governments, too, including the FRG, have committed themselves against the devilish chemical stuff.

In fact, the representatives of 40 countries in Geneva have for a long time been negotiating a convention on the destruction of chemical weapons and a ban on their development, production, storage, proliferation, and use. Most of the problems have been solved. There was justified hope that the convention would be signed before the end of 1988.

However, at this very moment, the U.S. chief negotiator, Ambassador Max Kampelman, made an appearance and announced that the whole thing is useless, and a ban is bound to fail because of verification problems. The NATO leadership hastily adopted the same position.

In view of this state of affairs, we are anxious to recall the proposal submitted by the GDR and the CSSR and addressed to the FRG Government, to create a chemical weapons-free zone in central Europe. First, this would be a concrete step on the path to a global ban. Second, those sections of the convention, which have already been agreed upon in Geneva, including in particular verification, could be tested in practice. GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer said before the 43d UN General Assembly: "An exchange of data on chemicals which would be affected by a convention, as well as model inspections in enterprises of the chemical industry would be conducive to the conclusion of an agreement. The GDR has made available relevant data; other countries are called upon to do so, too."

Hopefully these countries react positively and do not fall for Kampelman's "arguments." In the final analysis, is it not the obstinacy of a certain clique of generals and the
profit interests of big companies, that is behind the
destructive U.S. attitude—those companies which in the
fall of 1987 started production of new, so-called binary
chemical weapons?

Should the forces of peace, common sense, and realism
not succeed in restraining the arms fanatics, and in
liberating mankind from the threat of such horrible
weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical
weapons?

NATO Secretary General Criticized for Attitude
AU111165988 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 10 Nov 88 p 2

["W.M."
commentary: "Recommendations of an
Expert"]

[Text] Even as NATO secretary general, the former FRG
Defense Minister Woerner continues his lifework, which
is to incessantly conjure up the horror picture of the
threat from the East. He accuses all who think differen
ty of "dangerously misjudging" the situation. The arms
potential of the Warsaw Pact "has not decreased by the
slightest extent," he claims. "The Soviet Union con
continues to invest in military equipment without interrup
tion, without making any reduction."

Real experts see things differently. William A. Arkin,
head of the program for national security at the Washi
ington Institute for Political Studies, bases his analysis of
the situation on the Warsaw Pact military doctrine,
which is "aimed at military equality and equal security
for all," as he points out. He mentions the fact that the
Soviet Union suspended its nuclear tests for 19 months
on a unilateral basis as evidence of this. Despite the
cautious attitude in the West, all signs hint that there is
no development within the Soviet Armed Forces that is
not in agreement with official USSR statements.

Arkin stresses that essential changes have taken place in
the Soviet arms production and provides numerous
details to prove this. According to information from CIA
circles, Soviet military expenditure is declining. This was
also admitted by U.S. Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Crowe during the visit to the United States by his
counterpart Akhromeyev.

On the basis of all these changes, Arkin draws the
conclusion that the United States should take advantage
of the Soviet willingness to negotiate mutually advanta
geous solutions. The new President of the United States
himself should make constructive proposals and not only
react to proposals, he suggests.

The NATO secretary general would be well-advised to
bear in mind this recommendation from Washington.
However, he first would have to step down from the
propaganda platform and face the facts. He should try to
find out what really serves the security interests of the
NATO states.

HUNGARY

Hungary's Gyula Horn Addresses North Atlantic
Assembly
LD1511133588 Budapest MTI in English
1152 GMT 15 Nov 88

[Text] Hamburg, November 15 (MTI)—Gyula Horn,
state secretary of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,
adressed the session of the North Atlantic Assembly in
Hamburg on Tuesday. This was the first time in the
history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that
the Western military alliance invited an official represen
tative of a member state of the Warsaw Treaty to the
conference of the Assembly. A delegation of parlia
mentarians of the North Atlantic Assembly visited Hungary
this spring, and it was following the visit that they
requested Gyula Horn to hold a lecture in the body's
political committee under the title 'Creating European
Security and Cooperation'.

Among others [as received], Gyula Horn noted: We still
cannot talk about the irreversibility of the European
security and cooperation process, in spite of the favour
able international developments that have taken place in
the past period. Over the past some 15 years, the abyss
between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty further widened
conventionally and with respect to the military develop
ment programmes. While the Western alliance placed
emphasis on qualitative components, East Europe con
tinues to keep quantitative factors in view. The material
technical basis of reciprocal confidence has further
weakened, and—on both sides—this strengthened the
positions of those who believe in confrontation. A prom
ising development in the unfavourable process is the
confidence building agreement reached in Stockholm in
the autumn of 1986.

Mr Horn termed the coming into being of reciprocal
dependency between the states as an objective circum
stance which makes the states of Europe interested in
safeguarding the stability of one another. He evaluated,
and welcomed, the agreement between the CMEA and
the EEC, and the consultations between the NATO and
Warsaw Treaty member states to be the enlivening of
political contacts and dialogue within Europe.

Mr Horn took the stand that it is necessary to reduce
conventional weapons and armed forces to a level which
exclusively serves defence goals by eliminating the attack
capability. He said: Hungary is ready to make public the
data of its military budget and armed forces, in the
process of disarmament.

Mr Horn called for the states to ensure the free practice
of human rights in all places. Respect for the fundamen
tal political, economic and social rights, the develop
ment of humanitarian relations is a determining criteria of
the democratisation of the state in question, irrespective of the
social system, he said.
No single country can leave out of consideration its obligations accepted in international contracts, the recommendations of the U.N. Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and other international documents. Consequently, the conduct of the individual states attested in the field of human rights considerably influences their relations to other states, the cause of detente and cooperation. The position of the Hungarian People's Republic is that the international institutional frameworks that serve to enforce human rights should be further strengthened. A European-scale signalling and controlling system should be set up and the possibility of a joint stand created against those who violate human rights. A task of key importance is to further enrich and strengthen the Helsinki Final Act in this sense, said Hungarian State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry Gyula Horn, in his contribution at the North Atlantic Assembly.

Hungarian Delegate Comments on Arms Talks
LD1711234888 Budapest MTI in English
2227 GMT 17 Nov 88

[Text] Vienna, November 17 (MTI)—Hungary looks to the planned European-scale talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons with great hopes and expectations, said Hungarian Ambassador Janis Nagy on Thursday in Vienna, at the session of the central European arms reduction talks.

Mr Nagy, who is heading the Hungarian delegation to the Vienna conference, noted that the central European talks that have been in progress with the participation of 19 countries for more than 15 years have been very useful in many respects. However, they are now at a deadlock, as the efforts of the Eastern and Western sides attending the talks have not been successfully coordinated. Therefore, the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Treaty member states made two years ago, and the Brussels statement of the NATO foreign ministers, both took a stand for a more promising solution and for disarmament talks to be held in a European context.

The ambassador stressed that Hungary, together with the other European countries, is interested in these talks yielding results as early as possible. It expects that Hungary will be directly concerned in the measures of the first agreement to be reached there, and the country will do everything possible to implement the obligations that fall on it. The related increase in Hungarian activity and commitment coincides with the country's obligations accepted in the Warsaw Treaty, and its autonomy within this alliance and in the European disarmament process.

Mr Nagy promised the support of the Hungarian Government to all proposals of a constructive spirit which can bring about the reaching of agreements at the future, wider negotiation forum, particularly any agreement referring to Hungarian territory and the armed forces stationed there.

The Hungarian position is that the confidence-building effect of certain unilateral measures cannot be doubted if they are taken in the framework of a multi-sided disarmament process. It is in this spirit that Hungary conceives the reduction of its own forces and armaments, similarly to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in its area, Mr Nagy stressed. In conclusion, he voiced his hope that the Western countries will make efforts sincerely to promote the creation of conditions that will make possible the implementation of these goals.

ROMANIA

Romanian Speaks at UN on International Security
AU2610194088 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1919 GMT 26 Oct 88

["Romanian Representative's Address to the UN General Assembly Political and Security Committee"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] United Nations (AGERPRES) 26/10/1988—Within the general debates in the UN General Assembly Political and Security Committee, Romania's permanent representative to the United Nations presented his country's proposals on the main issues related to disarmament and the establishment of peace and international security.

Referring to the current international situation, the Romanian representative showed that although in comparison to the previous session some steps were made towards nuclear disarmament and the negotiated settlement of litigious problems, the world situation remains complex and grave. A radical and decisive change has not yet been made towards peace and security, towards strengthening mutual confidence, observance of equality among states, of their independence and sovereignty.

The address emphasized President Nicolae Ceausescu's appreciation that the fundamental question of our epoch is the achievement and defence of the supreme right of peoples, of mankind to life, to peace and to a free and dignified existence. In those conditions, all the efforts should be made primarily for translating into fact the Soviet-American treaty on the liquidation of medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles and for concluding, as soon as possible, the treaty on the fifty-percent reduction of the nuclear strategic weapons of the USA and the USSR, as well as for adopting any other disarmament measures conducive to the complete elimination of the nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, to the prevention of outer space militarization, to the radical reduction of conventional weapons under a strict international control.

The Romanian representative presented the proposals of Romania, of President Nicolae Ceausescu on the main disarmament questions in the UN debates, emphasizing, among others, the necessity that the world organization should finalize and adopt a global programme of nuclear
and general disarmament which should take into consideration the proposals made by all states during the recent UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, on banning all nuclear tests and stopping the improvement of such arms, on reducing the states' military budgets, through unilateral measures and mutual example included, for the halting of the arms race and the utilization of the such-saved sums for the socioeconomic development of the states, of developing countries first and foremost.

Romania's representative presented his country's proposals in favor of passing to a substantial reduction of conventional arms and troops, emphasizing the necessity of beginning—still this year—the negotiations for conventional disarmament in Europe, the continent where the greatest part of the arms are concentrated seriously threatening the world peace and security. The necessity was emphasized that all states should participate in the disarmament negotiations, they being vitally interested in eliminating the danger of destroying mankind. In the context, stress was laid on the imperative of growing the UN role and its involvement, by intensifying the activity of the organization's mechanisms of negotiations, in finding solutions to the major issues of peace and disarmament confronting contemporary mankind.
Chief of Chemical Troops Interviewed
18010143 Moscow AGITATOR ARMY I FLOTA in
Russian No 19, 26 Sep 88 pp 30-31

[Interview with Col Gen V. K. Pikalov, Chief of Chemical Troops, under rubric “Interview at Our Request”: “Porton-Down and Shikhany”]

[Text] In May of this year, a Soviet delegation became acquainted with Great Britain’s center for chemical defense at Porton-Down near Salisbury. On a 29 June to 4 July 1988 return visit, a delegation of Great Britain got acquainted with the Soviet military facility of Shikhany. The editorial office received quite a few questions from readers concerning these events. Col Gen V. K. Pikalov, chief of chemical troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense, replies to some of them.

[Question] What main questions were resolved in the course of work of the Soviet and British experts on chemical weapons at the Shikhany military facility?

[Pikalov] Progress along the path of developing a convention on banning chemical weapons has two aspects: a political one and a technical one. The main feature of a political resolution of the problem, undoubtedly, is the achievement of mutual trust. It is for this purpose that the gates of military installations and training grounds are being opened. The technical aspect is first and foremost monitoring the fulfillment of state obligations to observe the provisions of the convention. The system of international monitoring includes systematic verifications by request.

Verifications are implemented by means of periodic on-site inspections and continuous surveillance with the help of technical devices. They will be conducted at enterprises and installations that are announced officially after the convention goes into effect.

An inquiry will be conducted in the event that any state suspects that another party is violating the convention. Inspectors will be given the opportunity to visit the facility in question in no later than within 48 hours. This is an inspection by request.

[Question] What relations were established between our experts and the British experts during the joint work?

[Pikalov] According to the comments of our experts who worked in Porton-Down, relations on the part of the representatives of ministries and departments of Great Britain were benevolent. The meeting had a business-like character. Considering that the organization of the visit to the Porton-Down chemical center, as well as the Shikhany military facility afterwards, was an act of goodwill on the part of the USSR and Great Britain, the Soviet delegation did not make any additional demands. Nineteen reports with demonstrations of equipment and weapons models, whose main orientation was tied to problems of monitoring and destruction of chemical weapons, were presented to the British delegation during the display in Shikhany. The representatives of Great Britain asked more than 300 questions, to which exhaustive answers were given by employees of the Shikhany military facility and Soviet experts.

[Question] Was any difference observed in the organization of work of specialists in Porton-Down and in Shikhany?

[Pikalov] The Soviet delegation accepted the proposed program in full, and it adhered strictly to the plan of work in Porton-Down. The British delegation, however, began its work with a requirement concerning a program change, proposing to move up a helicopter flight over the Shikhany facility by a day earlier. The Soviet side agreed with this proposal. During the overflight of the facility area, the delegation of Great Britain selected 10 points for an additional visit, and this opportunity was granted. One half hour before the designated time of takeoff from the facility, the British experts literally demanded to be allowed the opportunity to get acquainted with yet another, an eleventh, area in the facility. And this request was satisfied. For comparison, it is necessary to note that the Soviet delegation visited only one area of its own selection in Port-Down.

[Question] Did any unexpected situation arise during the British delegation’s visit to the Shikhany facility?

[Pikalov] On the whole, the visit of the delegation of Great Britain to the Shikhany military facility was of a tough nature, as if it were an on-site inspection by request, and not an act of goodwill on our part.

I repeat, the act of goodwill on the Soviet side in such a display of a military chemical facility to achieve a deeper mutual understanding and an acceleration of the process of chemical disarmament was viewed by the delegation of Great Britain from the position of a strict inspection by request without the right of refusal. But similar inspections will be possible only after the convention on the ban against chemical weapons is signed and goes into effect. It is quite understandable that the tendentious approach of the British experts bewildered us and gave rise to some disappointment.
The chronology of nuclear disarmament that has begun, as Mikhail Gorbachev points out, calls for reflections on the rules of the new social intercourse that will sooner or later triumph on Earth. Thoughts about it are stimulated by events which coincide quite understandably with the beginning of a new, non-nuclear chronology.

One of these events was the Soviet-US summit in Moscow.

Then came the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament.

And there was the preparation of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

By bringing the problem into sharper focus, the logical link-up of these events showed the historical connection between the processes of renewal going on in our country and the present state of international affairs.

The mutual conditioning of these events, which fell on the spring and summer of 1988, is evident. We are in the presence of a law-governed trend and not a mere coincidence.

The Moscow summit formally put into effect the Soviet-US Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and considerably advanced the drafting of important agreements on a whole set of disarmament problems in whose solution the world community has a vital stake.

It was not accidental, therefore, that its representatives at the Third Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, after speaking highly of the Moscow summit, concentrated on the new realities and disarmament tasks arising with the ratification of the INF Treaty.

In the same context the CPSU CC report presented by Mikhail Gorbachev to the 19th party conference confirmed the irreversibility of the perestroika process and contributed to the foreign policy strategy of the Soviet Union evolved by the 27th Party Congress.

To advance in this direction, the only one that is possible today, we need to know and take into account the motive forces of and the factors and prerequisites for progress as well as their sources.

New Thinking, Perestroika and the World

It is new political thinking that is paving the way for disarmament. The awakening of scientific thought to the discrepancy between traditional views and present-day realities led to a system of fundamental philosophical, moral and political principles as we embarked on our perestroika. It was perestroika that provided new political thinking with incentives and a proving ground and
gave it ample access to the outside world. Born of the necessity for internal renewal, new thinking became a working instrument of perestroika in international affairs as well.

At present the coming of new thinking into its own in our foreign policy is an objective, law-governed process. It was long ago that an ancient wiseman, speaking of reason, said that "it is terrible unless it serves man". Yet not until the close of this century did a sound, worldwide organisation of social being, characterised by an absence of the congenital disease of self-destruction, come to be seen as an absolute necessity. Having looked at itself through the fence of nuclear missiles, humanity realised for the first time that, all distinctions notwithstanding, it is a single whole aspiring to preserve all its common and unifying elements. For the first time ever, a centuries-long trend—the operation of centrifugal forces leading to disunity—began to give way to a centripetal trend. This trend is still very far from prevailing in the life of humanity but it has already come out clearly enough.

This puts the new role of universal values, described by Mikhail Gorbachev as the centrepiece of new thinking, in an entirely different light.

"Their significance," Mikhail Gorbachev has said, "was pointed out by both Marx and Lenin. Nor were they merely general considerations derived from the humanist principle of their teachings. Stressing the importance of the internationalisation processes going on in the world, our great teachers revealed the objective basis of universal values, dialectically associating them with social class values. All this is now becoming a pivotal line of political practice. This demand on politics is due to both negative and positive developments of today: growing unprecedented dangers to the very existence of humankind and, on the other hand, the increasing role of the people and the general democratic factor in internal and world politics."

The above definition is a precise formula implying that by giving priority to universal values and subordinating social class guidelines to them, global internationalisation predetermines the main line of political practice.

It is by no means easy to accept this formula, to overcome the inertia of the old lingering in us. We are advancing to new thinking after our consciousness and our very souls have learnt the grim lessons of the past. We call our perestroika a revolutionary phenomenon, that is, one breaking with the old. In foreign policy, new thinking also involves renunciation of all that is obsolete and a reappraisal of what was done for decades, which was considered right.

A further basic characteristic of new political thinking is courageous and straightforward self-criticism which relieves us of the deadening burden of outdated dogmas. This courage is not reckless, for we owe it primarily to the thought inspiring it. The most graphic example of this was furnished by Mikhail Gorbachev's report to the 19th party conference, by its foreign policy section, which points to the dogmatism and subjectivism that marked our foreign policy, to our lagging behind fundamental changes in the world, to the factors responsible for our involvement in the arms race.

Naturally, this courage necessitates an adequate response wherever it is striving to vindicate a new view on the world.

New political thinking views humanity and the world as a multicoloured and multifaced yet single whole indivisible primarily as to security. And security itself has numerous facets: military, political, economic, humanitarian, cultural, ecological.

Any state which accepts the idea that the world is an integral whole will come to realise sooner or later that it cannot uphold and guarantee its interests outside the context of global, universal objectives.

For without attaining these objectives together with all other nations, no nation can safeguard its future against dangers threatening the whole world.

Indeed, a nation's security will be fictitious, whatever the level of armaments, as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Every state will be threatened with the degradation of its physical conditions until effective worldwide ecological cooperation is organised.

International security will be unstable and unreliable as long as countries are burdened with backbreaking debts undermining their economies and as long as there is no just economic order assuring every one of them a sufficiently high quality of life and an adequate level of prosperity corresponding to modern progress in science and technology.

Not one of the problems facing nations and the whole world community can be solved, which means that universal security cannot be dependably safeguarded, as long as nations reject common humanist values and common respect for human rights.

The logical connection between these links today is such that should one of them fall out, the whole chain could fall apart. This should be kept in mind at all times if age-long habits and traditions are not to result in a burden of narrowly conceived national interests dangerous to humanity.

The history of civilisation has nearly always been characterised by efforts to overcome fanaticism, intolerance and worship of one's own exclusiveness. There is no antagonism between the universal and the national, nor must there be any. As for unity of the world, it does not
imply uniformity. The world can be durable only if every people and every country is recognised to be free to make its social and political choice.

New political thinking proves its worth in struggle against the old. Fundamentalism in today's world takes on many forms. Its most widespread form, which finds expression in quite a few attempts to impose one's own standards and concepts of organisation of national, political and social life on other countries, is probably especially dangerous.

This kind of fundamentalism is the chief opponent of new political thinking. Confrontation between them goes beyond national boundaries. And while inside the country concerned the dispute is settled by national means, elsewhere it is only international institutions that can settle it.

None but the international community can pass judgement on standards of international being. Any other approach results in sapping the pillars of social intercourse, generates arbitrary practices and tends to nullify human rights.

Such is the starting point of our reflections on our country's place in the world today. Like any other country, ours would like to live in as favourable an international environment as possible. This certainly would be consonant with both our interests and everyone else's primarily the interests of our allies and friends, with whom we are bound by political, legal and moral obligations.

Our principal concern is to help safeguard peace, do away as far as possible with the risk of involvement in armed conflicts and keep our armed forces and military expenditures to an optimum low. No one should doubt that we will never forgo either our own security or that of our friends and allies.

Key in this respect is the problem of survival, which has been posed by nuclear arms and cannot be solved unless they are destroyed.

It is from the point of view of our national security that we cannot agree to the existence and preservation of weapons of total destruction, against which there is no defence.

In this case the coincidence of national and universal interests is particularly obvious. It is only together that every people and humanity as a whole can survive. Or they can perish together. This postulate is universal. No one in the nuclear world—neither the great powers nor countries lacking nuclear capability—has full or even limited guarantees of security.

We may presume with a fair degree of certainty that every sensible person on Earth is aware of the threat of death posed by nuclear weapons to humanity.

Inevitably, the question arises: Why is it that people whose high level of intelligence is beyond doubt have not yet come to the only reasonable decision leading to the elimination of this weapon of universal suicide?

The phenomenon has a record of its own. The nuclear weapon, which first appeared in only one country, supplied that country with the means to guarantee absolute security and enable it to win military superiority. And as this weapon could be used at the time, it was actually used against Japan.

We must be particularly precise on this point. That weapon was used both against Japan and against the Soviet Union, against ideas, trends and phenomena associated with it, against socialist countries generally. The explosion of the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an action in no way necessitated by the military strategic situation of the time, was a demonstration meant for us of US superiority in high military technology, an attempt to chart the postwar course of world development according to the concepts of the then US President and under his direction.

The demonstration almost succeeded but not quite. An act of atomic blackmail which sacrificed thousands of innocent lives to an utterly immoral idea, it had at least two global consequences that distorted the face and life of humanity for decades to come.

First, without either striking fear into our hearts or causing panic among us, it gave rise to an aspiration to create the means of atomic self-defence, an adequate nuclear arsenal. In other words, the first blasts of US atom bombs blew up strategic stability and gave the first impetus to the nuclear arms race.

Second, those blasts marked the beginning of the cold war and preceded the infamous Fulton speech.

The emergence of nuclear arms simulated a situation fit for any means of warfare. In 1945, the development of the atom bomb required the utmost concentration of scientific thought, the most advanced technology and immense material resources. At that time there was only one country that proved equal to coping with so formidable a project. However, it took only a few years for several countries to catch up with that nation. Not that other countries would have been unable to develop nuclear arsenals: they were simply wise enough to realise that nuclear weapons, if proliferated, would hasten the destruction of humanity.

The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expressed the collective recognition of the need to get rid of nuclear arms. Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty explicitly bound the signatories to work for that.
Nevertheless, two decades later the stockpile of these weapons has grown tenfold, with possibly more countries possessing them.

At the same time, however, there was a growing awareness of the unacceptability of nuclear weapons as an instrument of politics, let alone a means of warfare.

April 1985, which marked the emergence of perestroika predetermined the start of nuclear disarmament, the road to which had seemed to be hopelessly blocked, for a few months later the Soviet-US summit at Geneva recognised the impermissibility of nuclear war—a long-awaited move.

There followed Mikhail Gorbachev’s Statement of January 15, 1986, which marked a new and clear-cut stage in the philosophical comprehension of the imperatives of the nuclear and space age and in efforts to bring about a transition to a nuclear-free world.

Reykjavik drew together philosophy and practice at an unexpectedly quick pace, and in Washington the two countries signed the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which came into force at the Moscow summit several months later.

Forty-odd years separate the first use of nuclear weapons and the first act of their physical elimination. Those years saw their stockpiling and sophistication as well as an accumulation and streamlining of ideas that have now taken shape as the doctrine of a nuclear-free and non-violent world. The doctrine is at work already, building stations, so to speak, on the road to nuclear disarmament.

Feasible is a still larger station on the road to a nuclear-free world. We may expect it to soon receive a trainload of half the strategic offensive weapons owned by the Soviet Union and United States and singed out for elimination.

Nevertheless, it would be premature to say that this process is durable, let alone irreversible. The doctrine of a nuclear-free world is regrettably still opposed by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which is at work for its part. In light of the treaty on the elimination of nuclear weapons now in force, there is something more than history to back the doctrine.

At present it is from the standpoint of current practice that we must answer the question why certain politicians regard a weapon undoubtedly suicidal for humanity as something sacred and hence inviolable.

The Doctrine of “Nuclear Unrestraint”

All that the most vehement condemnation of nuclear weapons does is to surround them with an atmosphere of emotional tension. Yet emotions cannot end the existence of something for which there is a real need.

Nuclear weapons are neither a toy nor a hobby. Countries spend enormous sums to obtain them and preserve them, realising that these weapons also imperil their owners.

It follows that since nuclear weapons exist even though the absolute majority of people take a markedly negative view of them, they perform a necessary function or such a function is wrongly ascribed to them.

What can this function be?

Nobody has ever argued in earnest that nuclear weapons can be used for strictly defensive purposes. If an attacker knows that he is risking a nuclear retaliation and yet goes ahead, it must be because he is prepared to counter-strike. Consequently, the end result will be either the destruction of both or the surrender of the side which showed prudence.

What about war according to a “non-nuclear scenario”? Such a war is seen as not leading to mutual annihilation.

Could this be why nuclear weapons seem a deterrent?

Indeed, those who advocate the preservation of nuclear weapons claim that these have been instrumental in preventing a third world war for over forty years now.

We believe, however, that nuclear weapons served as a deterrent at one level only, by providing the nuclear powers with what Mikhail Gorbachev has called “safeguard” and allowing them to be unrestrained towards countries lacking such weapons. In other words, nuclear weapons objectively encourage the use of arbitrary and unlawful methods by members of the nuclear club, now as in the past. Thereby they encourage recourse to similar practices on the part of non-nuclear countries, which want to safeguard themselves against nuclear blackmail and are therefore set on securing nuclear arms.

Had nuclear weapons really been a deterrent they would logically have curved the race in conventional arms. Actually the reverse happened. Realising that nuclear war is out of the question, for it cannot be won, countries built up their conventional armed forces because they regarded “conventional war” as permissible even in the presence of the nuclear deterrent.

The arms race which has been going on throughout the past forty-odd years is material and not merely theoretical evidence that nuclear weapons have never performed a deterring function. Incidentally, “deterrence”
The integrity of the world connotes integrity of its security. This position is at the root of the idea of setting up a comprehensive system of international peace and security relying on the UN and respecting every provision of the UN Charter.

The Soviet leadership’s concepts of how the system could function are set out in Mikhail Gorbachev’s article “Reality and Guarantees of a Safe World”.

I wish to stress that we are not formulating a rigid framework but merely stating our views on possible forms of organising international relations and on ways and means of safeguarding the security of nations in the context of disarmament and the transition to a nuclear-free world.

There is no need to invent any code of international conduct, for it exists already. It is the UN Charter.

There also exist basic institutions and mechanisms established in conformity with the Charter to maintain peace and international security.

The balance of fear brought about thanks to nuclear arms—or so we are told—must give way to a balance of confidence. More than four decades on, the following passage from the UN Charter, which says nations can “practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours” and unite their strength “to maintain international peace and security”, has not lost but gained in creative force; it has become classical.

Today’s world is more and more like a gigantic megalopolis. It is increasingly difficult to run its economy, make the everyday life of its population easier and harmonise the interests of its diverse sections. However, we know by experience that even the biggest cities can cope with their problems.

Analogies are fraught with distortion but in this case comparison may not be out of place. Yes, every big city has to wrestle with crime and sharp contradictions but then nobody tries to solve the problem of personal security by turning his home into a fortress or his car into a tank.

Townsmen rely on the municipal authorities in charge of law and order.

It is with good reason that the UN Charter expects nations to build their collective life on wise principles and to respect the rules and standards of social intercourse worked out in common and acceptable to all.

We must remember that numerous things in today’s world are regulated at the international level. Take traffic, for instance. It may be right-side or left-side but the rules and signs ensuring safety are common and universal as far as the main points are concerned.

UN: Urbi et Orbi

Some countries look on nuclear weapons as the equivalent and a symbol of greatness. These weapons turn the heads of even sober-minded politicians. The result is an addiction to owning and keeping nuclear weapons that is anything but easy to overcome.

This is particularly difficult in the sphere of national security, which always leaves room for chauvinists and where common sense is under suspicion. Too many people yield to the temptation of reaping applause and making political capital by extolling strength. Too many go by the principle that might is right. Yet the nuclear and space age has made the need for responsible thinking greater than ever. Such thinking is necessary not only for the proper handling of computerised weapons but for managing with minimum quantities of arms and for realising the limitations of military strength and the effects of its use.

A mutually acceptable solution can be found provided the security of a country is never placed above that of other countries and negotiations are conducted with a view to seeking and establishing a balance of interests.

itself has been built up without restraint and has already assumed such monstrous proportions that there is a nuclear weapon for nearly every modern tank or infantry platoon.

Truly, something must be wrong with this kind of deterrence.

There is not a single Soviet-US treaty or agreement reducing the danger of a war using conventional arms. Nor is there any agreement on limiting or reducing conventional armaments. But we have signed over a score of treaties, agreements and protocols safeguarding us in one way or another against the outbreak of a nuclear war. We have even opened centres for a reduction of the nuclear danger.

Moscow and Washington are plainly far from imagining that the two countries could suddenly start an exchange of tommygun fire. Yet they consider a nuclear strike perfectly possible.

So where does the danger lie? And what must deterrence be used against?

It is time to revise concepts born of the cold war years’ atmosphere of fear, distrust and hostility.

Nuclear deterrence is a frozen legacy of that political “Ice Age”.

The time has come to admit the only real function of nuclear weapons is to endanger the survival of humanity.
By the same token, progress towards a safe world can and must follow common international rules. We have a code of such rules, the UN Charter, as I have noted. The process of real disarmament which has begun provides real prerequisites for the statutory principles of peace and security to be respected by all and everywhere, especially since state-to-state activity tends more and more to be regulated according to international law.

We often fail to realise how very strong this trend is. A multitude of conventions, pacts, agreements, international standards channel a multitude of wills in a common direction.

In the case of the participating states of the European process, for instance, there already exist serious restrictions on military activity. The scale and frequency of troop exercises and manoeuvres are regulated, troop movements are effected according to definite rules, an increasing number of military facilities are put under control and inspected.

The Soviet Union and United States cannot, say, launch a ballistic missile for practice within their national territory any longer without notifying the other side beforehand.

Shaping up in point of fact is a system of international legal “deterrence” with regard to the military activity of countries, and a set of confidence-building measures covering both geographical areas and individual military activities is taking root and growing in scope.

Never before has there been anything like the present system of “fire prevention” in the sphere of security. It is no longer a political declaration but a new physical reality. The level attained by technology makes it possible to gain a sufficiently accurate and clear idea of the material means of war preparations and warfare. The composition of the armed forces of nations, the size of their arsenals and their fighting capacity are known in detail.

These data can be collected by using national means. True, not all countries command such means as yet. Nothing stands, however, in the way of establishing within the UN or under its aegis an international observation and control agency that could supply every government with the information it needed, doing so on a regular basis or upon request.

The concept of such an agency does not limit its function to supervising compliance with disarmament agreements. The agency would also concern itself with regional conflicts, watch developments in various regions and sound the alarm where the situation deteriorated and tension mounted.

The Soviet Union submitted the idea of such an agency to the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament and considered that by establishing the agency we could simplify control and make it more effective while at the same time reducing costs. As for the agency’s mandate, it would reflect the world community’s consensus on the objects, scale and depth of control.

We feel that the revolutionary changes coming about in our notions of openness in the military field still surpass our ability to fully appreciate them. It would have been hard to imagine such a thing even, say, five years ago; indeed, nowadays states exchange information on their armed forces, and the information is subject to verification. On-site inspection covers the most sensitive facilities; a new category being introduced is inspection on suspicion at short notice and without the right to refuse such inspection; permanent observation and control posts are being set up at arms production facilities. Control and verification measures under the INF Treaty, for one, will involve 1,200 people, and 400 mutual inspections are to be conducted. Throughout these thirteen years inspectors’ teams will stay at Soviet and American missile plants.

The word “incredible” dies on one’s lips at the sight of Soviet and American inspectors’ teams arriving at facilities marked for inspection. The current process of taking “nuclear kitchens” off the security list might well be given the same title as the popular Soviet TV programme “Obvious If Incredible”, except that it is soon to become an everyday occurrence and a largely routine matter.

New rules and standards are being introduced into humanity’s work schedule. We must memorise and get used to them.

What is needed primarily is to revise in common military doctrines and strategies of nations.

We propose starting what may be called discussions on fundamental philosophical problems of security which should lead both to a better understanding of one another’s intentions and to actual changes in the structures and distribution of armed forces.

We also propose putting at the centre of the discussions the new military strategic categories of sufficiency and non-offensive defence.

Entirely new realities have emerged behind the confrontational facade of East-West relations that came into being in the 1950s. We have come a long way by setting up a network of stabilisers that greatly reduce the likelihood of unexpected upheavals.

The Soviet-US Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is not merely a commitment to destroy a definite number of missiles. It is a new type of institution unprecedented in international relations. It establishes for thirteen years, or up to the end of this millennium, a definite regime in Soviet-US relations, thereby transforming their quality.
Our next goals are an agreement on a 50-per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons, accords on nuclear weapons testing, beginning of the talks on reducing conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe, a convention on banning chemical weapons.

It is the afore-mentioned and not nuclear arms that we see as a real means of containment, a real guarantee of our own and universal security, a real barrier to war.

And this is what led the CPSU CC to draw the conclusion and tell the Soviet people that the threat of a war involving major powers has diminished, the world situation has gained in stability and the prospect of curbing the arms race is more real than before.

I can now answer the question of how security is to be safeguarded in a nuclear-free world. It will be safeguarded by agreements on arms cuts, by bringing the pattern and distribution of armed forces into line with the requirements of a defensive doctrine and a non-aggressive doctrine and a non-offensive strategy, by strict and permanent control over compliance with obligations, by extending the range of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, by openness in military activity, by UN institutions and mechanisms.

It Is Necessary and, Above All, Possible

The Soviet Union submitted to the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament a number of ideas supplementing the components of the new foreign policy concept which our country has evolved and is putting into practice. They are as follows:

—The phased elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000;

—A comprehensive security system;

—A common European and universal home;

—Defensive sufficiency and non-offensive strategy;

—National reconciliation and regional security;

—Discontinuance on a reciprocal basis of the presence of foreign troops and bases on the territories of other countries.

The proposals submitted to the disarmament forum could, in our opinion, become the components of a new disarmament platform for the years after the beginning of the physical elimination of nuclear weapons.

This platform is being designed and built by the efforts of many countries. It was by no means as a tribute to rhetoric or a gesture intended to impress the audience that the UN Secretary General and representatives of a number of countries were invited to attend one of the early procedures of physical elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. We see this as, among other things, recognition by the world community of the need to end the nuclear arms race and as its collective contribution to this truly great achievement of political wisdom.

In setting out to implement Lenin's formula “disarmament is an ideal of socialism”, the Soviet Union associates it with what it regards as universal values of overriding significance to it.

This is why we consider it so relevant to perfect the concept of disarmament so as to make it as integral and as common for all as the interdependent and interconnected world in the making.

Within the bounds of this global problem we will have to accomplish together and simultaneously two interconnected strategic tasks:

One, promoting the disarmament process in breadth and depth without slowing down the pace achieved.

Two, building security at a new qualitative level, making our own security and that of others, individual and universal security, without dividing it into mutually exclusive kinds: security for ourselves and security for all other countries.

This is necessary. Moreover, it is now possible. The Soviet leadership is firmly convinced of the possibility of safeguarding security by non-nuclear means.

This can be done on the principle of sufficiency.

The idea was conceived some time ago but only now can it be considered in practical terms, for world developments have already brought about a frame of mind and a psychological and political mood for steadily reducing arsenals, which should be sufficient for defence but not for attack.

What was unthinkable in the cold war climate is feasible in this period of global "thaw"—the result of a rise in temperature in the main, decisive layers of the international atmosphere.

Practically all speakers at the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly welcomed this long-awaited development even though they warned that the disarmament process is accompanied by an escalating arms race and a trend towards proliferation of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union shares this anxiety of its partners and is willing to cooperate with them in devising restrictive mechanisms. However, the very fact that the processes of disarmament and armament are following a parallel course is evidence of a turning point in an age-long trend,
for never before was there any question of a competition between the two principles; countries simply armed themselves, leaving it to philosophers to reflect on disarmament.

However, philosophers were not so very far from the truth when they called for disarmament. What was far from it was psychological and political readiness for it. Now that it is emerging at long last, we cannot help being amazed at the prophetic power of many ideas about disarmament, in particular the one expressed by Immanuel Kant in his treatise "Towards Everlasting Peace" as an imperative of destiny imposing concord among people through discord, even against their will.

The INF Treaty is an instance of such concord.

Further expressions of it are numerous other accords that we feel certain will be signed before long.

These security bricks in the edifice of a nuclear-free world are no longer a figment of the imagination or wishful thinking. They exist, and many of them have already been laid at the foundation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The task is, as I have said, not only to eliminate nuclear weapons but parallel with it to build this new edifice for the future world and preferably even faster.

It is particularly important to open at long last talks on conventional armaments in Europe, for the disarmament chain stops short of them at the moment. Yet the chain must be unbroken, must lead us farther, to talks on limiting and reducing naval armaments.

A fundamental formula for the mandate of European talks covering the area between the Atlantic and the Urals has practically been found, and the remaining details could be settled before very long. However, it is also necessary to come to terms on the whole package of problems under discussion at the European conference in Vienna, where everything hinges on whether the participating states can bring themselves to show realism and lay down what can now be acceptable to all countries without exception. On the issue of mandate, the Soviet Union has shown readiness to cooperate and is entitled to expect other countries as well to proceed in the interest of promoting the European process.

Specifically, we propose beginning a reduction of conventional armaments by removing present imbalances and asymmetries on the basis of reciprocal exchange of data. One would think that there is a lot of such data going round of the world. But it does not come from governments, and this robs it of the necessary legal force and of validity as proof. We insist therefore on exchanging official data through official channels.

This could be done even before talks got off to a start, as Mikhail Gorbachev proposed at the Moscow summit. It is proposed that as soon as talks begin, on-site inspections be conducted to verify initial data so as to eliminate differences in assessment. At this stage we could decide on ways of ending imbalances and asymmetries by setting out to do this, and on the ways of reducing armed forces and armaments under the most rigorous control.

The second stage of the talks would be concerned with a reduction in armed forces by roughly 500,000 men on either side.

The third stage would see further cuts in armed forces and armaments: the armed forces of both sides would be lent a defensive character and their offensive core would be dismantled.

We would be agreeable at every stage of the talks to a reciprocal reduction in all offensive weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, strike aircraft and tanks.

Simultaneously the two sides could discuss steps to disengage the WTO and NATO armed forces and create corridors and zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons. Socialist countries have advanced most interesting ideas to this end, such as the proposals of the GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, the Jaruzelski Plan or the Jakes Plan.

Until recently traditional disarmament thinking was confined within the geographical boundaries of Europe, as if Europe had been the only area of deployment of nuclear missiles and conventional forces and the only address of international security.

Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking in Vladivostok in July 1986, pointed to a wider area of security interests—Asia and the Pacific—and put forward concrete ideas aimed at achieving greater stability in that vast region.

Our interest in what goes on in the region is not abstract. A sizable part of it belongs to the Soviet Union. We welcome the dynamic progress made by many Asian countries and their increasing role in the world but we are concerned about the rapid growth of military activity in the region. There is a danger now of a drastic escalation of the arms race due to the regional one. This is all the more dangerous because there are many trouble spots of local origin in the region, with its complicated and hence explosive heritage.

Three trends are coming to the fore from the point of view of regional and global security. Mikhail Gorbachev stressed them in his programme speeches in Vladivostok, Murmansk and Belgrade.

One, an increasing foreign naval presence in the coastal waters of Asian, North European and Mediterranean countries.
Two, the involvement of a wide spectrum of non-nuclear countries in nuclear strategy through the use of and visits to their ports by foreign warships carrying nuclear weapons.

Three, foreign military presence in general—whatever the form—and the existence of foreign military bases in particular.

As matters stand, many countries do not even know that there are nuclear weapons deployed on their soil, especially when ships of nuclear powers call at their ports on their way elsewhere so to speak or are anchored there.

There is a lot of discussion at diverse disarmament forums on openness in military affairs, on the need to know exactly where, say, a motorised infantry or airborne battalion is stationed or where it is being transferred to. Inspectors seem to be ready even to look into army kitchens to make sure they are cooking the right kind of food. But what kind of “food” is likely to be dished up to a country which considers itself non-nuclear yet is made to admit a ship carrying dozens of nuclear warheads?

The people of a non-nuclear country have a right to know that from such-and-such a day on they will for such-and-such a period of time be a potential target for a retaliatory nuclear strike.

The proposal for the nuclear powers to declare that their ships visiting foreign ports are carrying nuclear weapons—a proposal submitted by the Soviet Union to the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly—is not merely a call for openness and flexibility but a component of the control and verification system, of measures ensuring confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear countries.

It is from this angle that we are also advocating measures for confidence in the naval sphere and for safety on sea routes as well as the formation of a UN naval force.

In analysing world development trends and pointing out the substantial progress made in international relations and the appearance of encouraging prospects, we cannot but worry about a certain circumstance.

All that has been done to date to strengthen world peace and security could be nullified should plans for space weapons development be realised. The testing of the first space gun would push the world back to where it found itself following the Hiroshima blast. A new and completely uncontrollable arms race would start, and no one would be able this time to guarantee that the world would once again have forty years to realise the dangerous futility of that race.

Destiny has been kind to people for four decades but it may turn its back on them if they go on trying its patience.

This is something to be considered by all who see in Star Wars a rational instrument of politics or pin selfish hopes upon them.

We are very close now to the threshold of a safe world and are possibly crossing it already, and it would be tragic for us to have to turn back instead of pushing on.

What makes us confident that we are at the threshold of major changes for the better and that a nuclear-free, non-violent world is within reach?

A layer of fertile soil has formed on our war-ravaged planet. It is still thin and erodible. But those whose hearts were seared by the war have recovered and those who were blinded by it have regained their eyesight and can see the beauty of life and the fruitlessness of war.

“There can be no doubt,” Russian poet Alexander Pushkin wrote, “that in time people will awaken to the ridiculous brutality of war...” What a man of genius foresaw in the past is now clear to millions.

The world community is growing; it is transforming its views, habits and concepts and becoming wiser, more tolerant and more merciful.

It is all like what happens to individuals.

Humankind has outgrown its complicated adolescence, its period of pugnacity, recklessness, instability and the complexes typical of the transitional age, and is aware now of the effects of its actions, aware of its great responsibility for the preservation of life on Earth.

Not all people attain maturity at one and the same time. This also holds true of new thinking. It will take time for it to prevail everywhere. But we have no doubt that it will prevail no matter what.

The road to a new humanism taken by mankind leads to a nuclear-free, non-violent world, a world of cooperation and concord.

Footnotes

1. The Soviet Foreign Ministry held a conference under the title “The 19th All-Union Party Conference, Foreign Policy and Soviet Diplomacy”.

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Bessmertnykh on 'Progress' in Arms Talks
18120016 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 41, Oct 88 pp 17-18

[Article by Evgeny Andrianov]

[Text] The "hard nuts" at Soviet-American Talks, the future of soviet-U.S. relations, and the United Nations' role in the life of the world community are the main points of the talk our correspondent had in New York with Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh.

The speeches of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and President Reagan of the United States set the tone for the 43rd session of the U.S. General Assembly.

Despite all the shades of difference in the Soviet and American approaches to international affairs, for the first time in recent years the representatives of the biggest superpowers have given equally positive assessments of the role of the U.S. in solving the problems of the world community.

Eduard Shevardnadze spoke of the new world calendar. 1988 was marked by such events as the Soviet-American INF treaty, the Geneva accord on a political settlement around Afghanistan, the first act of nuclear missiles destruction, and the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war. All those, the Soviet minister noted, were changes stemming from reason. He spoke of the need to exclude ideological differences and their pressurizing effect from foreign policy and diplomacy. That forms the philosophical basis for the radical changes proposed by Moscow today for our common home—the earth. The achievements of 1988 give hope for the implementation of such Soviet initiatives as safe environmental regime on a world scale, the setting up of a world space organization, the drafting of terms of reference for negotiations on restricting the world armaments market and others.

The Soviet and American representatives were also in complete agreement on another point: they both noted the positive effect of Soviet-American relations on present-day processes in the world community.

Shortly before the opening of the session, Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz completed another round of talks in Washington. Taking advantage of the fact that the principal participants in these talks had flown from Washington to New York for the session, I met Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh, who has been an invariable participant in the Soviet-American dialogue.

What had the meeting produced for our future relations with the United States, and consequently for the world community?

To begin with, he replied, we did not see it as a sort of farewell. We have a firm concept of how to conduct affairs with the U.S. at the present stage. In the past the run-up to the presidential elections and the elections themselves doomed our relations to a certain passivity. From both sides—the American and ours.

It was considered that a time when Americans were pondering on the future of their leadership was not appropriate for diplomatic activity. This time our views underwent what I regard as a very correct transformation. This stemmed from the fact that relations between the two countries had advanced to a new level.

In the present circumstances, after four summits and 29 meetings of foreign ministers, we felt it would not make sense to create a pause in our contacts with the American leadership. So the task could now be formulated as follows: to work with the present administration right to the end, if it is prepared to do the same. And it has shown such preparedness. Therefore we shall work with the Reagan administration for as long as intensively as it wants to itself.

The talks in Washington took place within the framework of this concept: several rounds of intensive talks with George Shultz totaling 10-12 hours of pure negotiating time. There were also meetings with President Reagan and Vice-President George Bush. Experts worked hard on arms limitation, humanitarian issues, bilateral matters and regional problems.

And what did all this work produce?

First of all it consolidated continuity: we carried on along the lines clearly delineated by our leaders at the Moscow summit. Certain aims had been set before the two foreign ministries and the experts of the two countries, and we tried to attain them. That is the first thing.

Secondly, we specifically went through all outstanding problems. In the field of security this meant that we discussed the situation first of all at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments, and not only from the point of view of their present status, but also that of further progress at these talks.

In this field we did achieve something. I don't want to exaggerate—there was no qualitative breakthrough. Nor did we expect one. But we made progress on concrete negotiating points. This applies first of all to the limitation of air-based cruise missiles and heavy bombers, as well as defining the questions connected with control over future restrictions on mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles. We had some serious discussion of such "hard nuts" as talks on ABM and sea-based cruise missiles. But, unfortunately, on these two questions little progress was made. Nevertheless, such a discussion does give us something. I think it offered the Americans another opportunity to see the limits within which they will have to act in this field, whether they want to or not.
As for the ABM treaty, we had an interesting discussion on the Krasnoyarsk radar station. Mikhail Gorbachev’s latest initiative undoubtedly opened up a new possibility for removing this irritant from the agenda of our negotiations.

We must give the Americans their due—they did not reject the Soviet proposal out of hand.

But there were quite a number of outright rejections in the press.

In the press, yes. But we talked directly to those who make policy and felt that there really is an interest.

Frankly speaking, there is no unanimity in the administration on this matter. Some cling to the old positions, which in the past perhaps did give Washington certain propaganda points, but there are also others who favor removing this question. And Mikhail Gorbachev’s initiative offers such an opportunity. That is why the Secretary of State George Shultz and a number of experts believe, as the American side puts it, that a direction has been set and that it could offer a way out.

We believe that a way out has already been found. We have invited the Americans to take part in international center for the peaceful use of outer space which would be set up on the basis of the Krasnoyarsk station, and we hope that they will take part in the project. But its setting up does not depend on American participation or non-participation. The center must be founded. We are inviting scientists from different countries. But of course it would be desirable for both world space powers to take part in its work.

But why has the Krasnoyarsk station been such an irritant? After all, a group of American Congressmen and experts visited it more than a year ago and their visit showed clearly that the station could not operate in the military range...

The American press and certain representatives of the administration deliberately kept harping on this irritant in order to hold back negotiations when they felt they were advancing too fast. Or possibly because they wanted to ensure certain departures from the ABM treaty, which would be inevitable were the United States to develop and deploy military space systems. I think they needed Krasnoyarsk as a pretext either for violating the ABM treaty, or for pulling out of it, or for replacing it with something else.

But we so prize that treaty as a document of exceptional importance for future strategic stability that we are prepared to remove the cause of American concern, even if it isn’t quite sincere. Because whether that concern is sincere or not is known only to those who express it, while the ordinary reader or viewer might believe that it is indeed very serious. So for the sake of those who do not know the truth of the matter we have decided to eliminate this “pretext”.

What other questions were discussed?

Chemical weapons. We put forward a number of interesting suggestions. And there seems to be quite a promising prospect for the conclusion of a convention on the total and general prohibition of chemical weapons.

We also discussed conventional armaments, the entire complex of problems connected with the Vienna talks on the CSCE and European security. We did not manage to come to a final agreement on the subject of the future talks on reducing conventional armaments and troops from the Atlantic to the Urals, but the chances of reaching such an agreement are better than before.

Well, of course we discussed regional problems, with particular emphasis on Afghanistan. The situation there is giving rise to anxiety, since the Geneva accords are being openly violated by Pakistan. Pakistan is an American ally, and the United States is one of the guarantors of the Geneva accords. The discussion was very frank, firm and unequivocal. I think the U.S. and Pakistan will realize that patience has its limits.

Bilateral relations were considered chiefly in a working group. There, too, prospects are promising, with opportunities opening up for new agreements. We appreciate these opportunities. But what makes us wary is that some problems remain unresolved. For instance, our embassy’s status in Washington, our representation in New York, and especially working conditions for Soviet journalists. The U.S. discriminatory stance is cause for serious concern.

Thank you for backing us. My next question is, what do you think of President Reagan’s U.N. speech, perhaps the last political speech of the present U.S. President?

I thought it a normal speech, the kind that should be made from that rostrum.

What I found interesting for myself, as a person who works on Soviet-American relations, was—and I think we should appreciate this—his assessment of the role of Soviet-American relations in international instability and in ensuring a normal course of world affairs in the future.

In some ways the speech reminded me of that made by President Nixon in the U.N. in the 1970s, when he also spoke of Soviet-American relations.

I think it worth noting that the President, perhaps for the first time during his years in office, or even the first time for many years, spoke positively of the significance of the United nations. That echoes the views of the Soviet leadership.
The speech was not without the usual stereotypes. One could hear the familiar cliches with regard to Cuba and Nicaragua. They did little to enhance his speech. But perhaps they were designed for a different audience, because I don't think those present at the General Assembly meeting received them with enthusiasm.

What does Soviet diplomacy expect from the current General Assembly session? Especially since the special summer session on disarmament did not end in the way many had expected...

I think the present session of the General Assembly will promote detente—excuse me using a word which some people consider outmoded—and confidence that the U.S. really is coming to play the role not merely of a forum used for purposes both noble and otherwise by representatives of different countries, but as an organization actively promoting positive processes in the world.

It seems to me than by its actions and discussions the session will crystallize the real need for a world security system—military, economic, ecological and humanitarian. To use a popular word, one can now feel a consensus on this.

The most important thing that the 43rd session of the General Assembly can produce is a wider field of mutual understanding between different countries. We cannot live as we lived in the past. One can't think exclusively of purely national egoistical interests, overlooking truly universal problems.

I don't know whether this is realized by the representatives of many countries, but signs of the new way of thinking initiated by the Soviet Union are evident.

So I am optimistic. I see positive prospects for the session. Bilateral interests are becoming more closely intertwined with multilateral interests, and bilateral diplomacy with multilateral diplomacy and they are having an increasingly harmonious influence on the general direction of world politics.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Genscher Discusses Disarmament, NATO Agenda
LD0611140088 Hamburg DPA in German
1232 GMT 6 Nov 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher is pressing for a Western conventional disarmament concept. At the forthcoming NATO foreign ministers meeting at the beginning of December in Brussels this issue must be “at the top of the agenda,” Genscher said in an interview with NORDWEST-ZEITUNG (Monday's edition).

The west wants to achieve equilibrium at a significantly lower level by means of “asymmetric disarmament” and, furthermore, to eliminate the capability for surprise attack and territorial offensive on both sides, Genscher said. This would call for greater disarmament steps from the Soviet Union than from the West, and also [words indistinct].

He, however, has no doubt that the conceptual rapprochement of the East toward Western ideas in the conventional disarmament sphere is serious.

At the same time, Genscher again warned against wanting to compensate for current disarmament efforts in one sphere by means of new armament in another area. This would create new instability and would set off a new arms race. As an example, Genscher referred to the nuclear medium-range missiles. If there is a desire to compensate here, in areas where this is not yet forbidden, the “first nuclear disarmament agreement in history would be undermined. There is no question of this,” the foreign minister said. Rather, it is necessary to include all nuclear weapons in disarmament. He is convinced of the Soviet leadership's desire for a peaceful development of the situation in Europe and for disarmament and arms control. With Gorbachev's policy there “at last” is a chance for a European order of peace which the West has been proposing time and again since the end of the sixties.
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