NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.


Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.
CHINA REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SOUTHEAST ASIA/PACIFIC

XINHUA Carries Report on Philippine Situation
(XINHUA, 23 Feb 86) ............................................. 1

Western Leaders Comment on Philippines
(XINHUA, 25 Feb 86) ............................................. 2

Beijing Radio Summarizes Events in Philippines
(Beijing International Service, 26 Feb 86) ................. 4

Briefs
Marcos' Denunciation of 'Imperialists'
Spokesman on Aquino Government 5 5

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Report on Deng Xiaoping's Role in Anticorruption Drive
(Bernard Degioanni; AFP, 10 Mar 86) ....................... 6

Deng Xiaoping Appears on Television 6 Mar
(AFP, 6 Mar 86) ................................................. 8

Nationwide Audit Uncovers Mismanagement of Educational Fund
(Shen Shu; ZHONGGUO FAZHI BAO, 4 Nov 85) ............. 9

Audience Responds to Plays, Films on PRC TV
(XINHUA, 7 Mar 86) ............................................. 11

-a-
Dramatized History of Socialism Well Received  
(XINHUA, 7 Mar 86) ........................................ 13

Honored Women Speak of Professional Achievements  
(XINHUA, 7 Mar 86) ........................................ 14

Evaluation of China's 1982 Census Summarized  
(Li Chengrui; RENKOU YANJIU, No 6, 29 Nov 85) ............. 15

Data on Servicemen in 1982 Census Published  
(RENKOU YANJIU, No 6, 29 Nov 85) .......................... 20

Population Age Composition, Sex Ratios Analyzed  
(Liu Zheng; RENKOU YANJIU, No 6, 29 Nov 85) .............. 22

China's Population Sex Ratio Analyzed  
(Yang Shiquan; RENKOU YANJIU, No 5, 29 Sep 85) .......... 28

Sampling Survey of 1982 First-Marriage Fertility Reported  
(Zhao Xuan; RENKOU YU JINGJI, No 4, 25 Aug 85) .......... 34

Philosophical Analysis of News Reporting  
(Zhou Xuan; NINGXIA DAXUE XUEBAO, No 4, Dec 85) ....... 48

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

SOUTHWEST REGION

Sichuan CPC Group Discusses Rural Party Consolidation Work  
(SICHUAN RIBAO, 29 Nov 85) ............................... 55

Discipline Inspection Work in Yunnan Province Planned  
(Song Xiaolin; YUNNAN RIBAO, 6 Nov 85) ..................... 57

Improvement of Yunnan's Government, Party Work Style Directed  
(YUNNAN RIBAO, 13 Dec 85) .................................... 60

NORTH REGION

Beijing Develops Vocational, Technical Education  
(Sa Zhaoxiang; ZHONGGUO JIAOYU BAO, 29 Oct 85) ........... 63

Problems for Aged in One-Child Families Analyzed  
(Bian Yanmao; TIANJIN SHEHUI KEXUE, No 5, 15 Oct 85) .... 65

NORTHEAST REGION

Heilongjiang Officials Exchange Work Experiences at Meeting  
(HEILONGJIANG RIBAO, 17 Nov 85) .......................... 72
Implementation of Policy on Intellectuals Urged
(HEILONGJIANG RIBAO, 10 Dec 85) ....................... 75

Harbin Supply Cooperative Begins 'Self-Correction' Campaign
(Hu Qinghuo; HEILONGJIANG RIBAO, 17 Dec 85) .......... 77

University Students Encouraged to Shoulder Historical Tasks
(Tian Dan; SHENYANG RIBAO, 29 Nov 85) ................. 79

LIAONING Studies Spirit of Circulars
(LIAONING RIBAO, 12 Dec 85) ............................. 81

Liaoning's Regulations on Prohibition of Gambling Published
(LIAONING RIBAO, 13 Dec 85) .............................. 82

Ningxia Expands Roles of Minority Nationality Cadres
(He Zhaoquo; NINGXIA RIBAO, 18 Nov 85) ................ 85

Ningxia's Minority Nationality Education Discussed
(He Zhaoquo; NINGXIA RIBAO, 28 Nov 85) ................. 87

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

Fujian Military Deputy Commander Visits Xiyang Island
(FUJIAN RIBAO, 4 Feb 86) .................................. 89

Nanjing Military Leaders' Festival Greetings
(Jiangsu Provincial Service, 31 Jan 86) ..................... 90

Qinghai Circular on Transferring Control of PAFD
(Qinghai Provincial Service, 13 Feb 86) ................... 91

Zhejiang Governor Xue Ju on Militia Work
(ZHEJIANG RIBAO, 7 Feb 86) .............................. 93

Reform of PLA's Logistics Discussed
(Cheng Fang-kuang; CHUNG-KUNG YEN-CHIU, No 1, 15 Jan 86) 95

Briefs
Retired Cadres Praised .................................. 108

TAIWAN

Officials Urged To Cooperate With Press
(Editorial; CHINA POST, 5 Feb 86) ......................... 109

Briefs
Saudi Oil Minister Visits Taiwan .......................... 110
XINHUA CARRIES REPORT ON PHILIPPINE SITUATION

OW230355 Beijing XINHUA in English 0238 GMT 23 Feb 86

[Text] Manila, February 23 (XINHUA)--Thousands of people have gathered since midnight outside Camp Aguinaldo here, the site of the Philippine Defence Ministry, to express their support for Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Acting Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos who have broken with the government of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos.

The crowds of people, estimated at 10,000 by witnesses, surrounded the Defence Ministry by 01:30 A.M., some in family groups and many holding candles or flashlights. They crammed the street outside the camp gates. Many more people are still going there.

The camp was seized yesterday by Enrile and Ramos.

The crowds were responding to a call by the archbishop of Manila, Cardinal Sin, who earlier asked in a radio statement that the people heed Enrile's appeal for food and expressions of support.

Sin said the Philippine people had expressed their preference for peaceful change in the recent presidential elections. He appealed for a just and peaceful resolution to the present crisis.

Later, in another he thanked the people for their support of "my friends, Minister Enrile and General Ramos." [sentence as received]

According to radio "veritas" ("truth"), Mrs Aquino is now in hiding after she attended a mass rally in Cebu, following reports saying that Marcos is planning to arrest her.

In a press conference, Enrile said that he had learned of orders to arrest opposition leaders and members of a military reform movement. He said the orders must have come from Marcos.

Opposition leader Hombre Adaza, who accompanied Mrs Aquino on her trip to Cebu, said in a press conference that plans have been made for Mrs Aquino's safety. She has now cancelled a planned trip to Davao in the southern Philippine Island of Mindanao.
WESTERN LEADERS COMMENT ON PHILIPPINES

OW251841 Beijing XINHUA in English 1551 GMT 25 Feb 86

[Text] Beijing, February 25 (XINHUA)--Government leaders and officials of some West European countries and the United States have urged Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos to respect the will of the Philippine people, according to reports reaching here today.

Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joseph Clark said Monday that President Marcos should resign so that a government commanding "the respect of the people of the Philippines" could be formed.

However, he noted that Canada "would not presume to dictate" who should head a new government. He also advised Canadians to avoid traveling to the Philippines "if at all possible."

The Spanish Government said in a statement published yesterday that the only possible solution in the situation in the Philippines was "to respect the popular will" of the Philippine people. It also expressed its hope for "the fraternal people of the Philippines to find a peaceful and democratic solution to the current political crisis."

The British Foreign Ministry made it clear yesterday that the recent development of situation in the Philippines reflects the Philippine people's strong indignation at fraud in the elections and a pressing demand for the restoration of democracy.

Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans Van Den Broek said Monday that this government was concerned about the tense situation in the Philippines, saying that it is "very inappropriate" now for Netherlands to send a delegation to attend Marcos' inauguration ceremony or telegram a message of congratulations to Marcos' government.

A spokesman of the Swedish Foreign Ministry claimed yesterday that the Marcos' government should take responsibility for the turmoil in the country and that the respect of the will of the Philippine people is prerequisite to the peaceful settlement of the problems facing the country.
In Washington, the White House Monday warned Marcos and his loyal troops against any violence and called for a "peaceful transition to a new government." On the same day, President Ronald Reagan said he would cut off military aid to the Philippines if Marcos' forces used violence against the rebels and civilians.

On Saturday, former Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Deputy Armed Force Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos broke with Marcos and holed themselves up with loyal soldiers in a military compound in the outskirts of Manila.

/8918
CSO: 4000/189
BEIJING RADIO SUMMARIZES EVENTS IN PHILIPPINES

HK261758 Beijing International Service in Tagalog 1130 GMT 26 Feb 86

[Text] Here is a summary of events in the Philippines yesterday which yours truly will read:

In the morning, Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel were proclaimed president and vice president, respectively, based on a document called the people's resolution signed by some 100 members of parliament. After the inauguration, Aquino announced the establishment of a new government. She appointed Salvador Laurel as prime minister-designate, Juan Ponce Enrile as defense minister, and Fidel Ramos chief of staff and also promoted him to full general from lieutenant general.

Aquino also announced the creation of eight special committees to take charge of major government departments as follows: foreign affairs, justice, finance, education, social affairs, central bank, local government affairs, and labor.

In Washington, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz announced the resignation of President Marcos and the U.S. recognition of the new Philippine Government headed by Corazon Aquino.

Shultz said the U.S. President, Ronald Reagan, was pleased with Marcos' peaceful handover of power to the new Philippine Government. He also declared the admiration of the U.S. for Mrs Aquino for her commitment to nonviolence. He added that, as in the past, the United States will continue to extend cooperation and assistance to Mrs Aquino in resolving problems of economic development and national security.

At about 10:45 last night, it was announced over the television that Marcos had left the Philippines from Clark Air Base and that Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos had entered Malacanang Palace.

Many people swarmed the streets in jubilation to celebrate the victory.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State George Shultz announced that the United States will grant asylum to Former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family, and General Fabian Ver. According to reports, Marcos and his family have arrived in Guam from Clark Air Base.

/8918
CSO: 4211/35
SOUTHEAST ASIA/PACIFIC

BRIEFS

MARCOS' DENUNCIATION OF 'IMperialists'--In Manila, Philippine President Marcos condemned what he called modern day imperialists for interfering with domestic affairs in the Philippines connected with the presidential elections of 7 February. This was contained in the press release of Malacanang. In the statement, Marcos reiterated his determination to defend the country's interests against all foreign forces which violates the United Nations charter and international law. [Text] [Beijing International Service in Tagalog 1130 GMT 22 Feb 86 HK] /8918

SPOKESMAN ON AQUINO GOVERNMENT--A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that the Chinese Government congratulates the establishment of a new government in the Philippines. The spokesman said: China and the Philippines are friendly neighbors. The Chinese Government welcomes the new government of the Republic of the Philippines formed by Mrs Corazon Aquino. He added: We hope the friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries and the traditional friendship between the two peoples will continue to develop. [Text] [Beijing International Service in Tagalog 1130 GMT 26 Feb 86] /8309

CSO: 4211/32
REPORT ON DENG XIAOPING'S ROLE IN ANTICORRUPTION DRIVE

HK101036 Hong Kong AFP in English 1013 GMT 10 Mar 86

[Article: by Bernard Degioanni]

[Text] Beijing, March 10 (AFP)--Top Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping has three times involved himself personally in a campaign against corruption in high places launched more than 2 months ago, highly reliable sources said here on Monday.

Mr Deng's involvement shows the 81-year-old leader is in full charge of the campaign against corruption among senior officials and their offspring, the sources said.

They said on one occasion Mr Deng had personally approved the execution of three men, two the sons of high-ranking officials of the eastern city of Shanghai, convicted of raping some 20 women.

All three were executed on February 19 after an appeals court had rejected their appeals.

The sources said Mr Deng had even gone to Shanghai himself, although they could not say whether he had done so before, during or after the trial of the three.

The trio were originally condemned to death February 1 after a trial in which three other men--also sons of senior officials--were jailed for between 3 to 20 years for rape sexual abuse [as received] either during dance parties or when the young women came seeking jobs.

The source said the purpose of Mr Deng's trip was to show his determination to stamp out corruption in a city known for its reticence in applying a programme of wide-ranging economic reforms, launched by Mr Deng in 1979.

Some Chinese leaders have criticised the breadth of the programme on the grounds that the reforms have provoked the growth of corruption.

A reliable source said that on another occasion Mr Deng had acted as "arbitrator" when a child of a "prominent person in the state apparatus" had been implicated in a corruption case.
The source could not say whether or not Mr Deng had decided in favour of the suspect.

Highly reliable sources have said at least five sons, daughters, sons-in-law or daughters-in-law of Chinese leaders were currently under investigation and that some had been arrested.

Diplomats here reckon their names will not be disclosed.

Chinese President Li Xiannian, asked on Saturday about the anti-corruption campaign, replied that it was continuing "smoothly" and that "some people implicated in this kind of affair were out of favour."

On yet another occasion, Mr Deng called for no quarter to be given in the fight against "unhealthy tendencies" within the Chinese Communist Party, the government and the Army, party General Secretary Hu Yaobang revealed.

Mr Deng was speaking on January 17 at a meeting of the party Politburo's Standing Committee, of which he is one of the five members.

/9599
CSO: 4000/191
NATIONAL AFFAIRS

DENG XIAOPING APPEARS ON TELEVISION 6 MAR

HK061426 Hong Kong AFP in English 1410 GMT 6 Mar 86

[Text] Beijing, March 6 (AFP)--China's top leader Deng Xiaoping was shown on Chinese television Thursday planting trees as part of an annual forestation campaign in an apparent bid to squelch reports of a recent ailment.

Mr Deng, who appeared with other state leaders near Beijing in two short film clips, looked healthy and spirited as he poured a bucket of water on a newly-planted tree in what has become a yearly ritual for China's top leaders.

Analysts said the clips seemed to be intended to stem recent speculation on Mr Deng's health, which was fueled by a Hong Kong China-watching magazine report this week that he had complained of a kidney ailment in mid-December.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Yuzhen dismissed the report on Wednesday as "sheer speculation." Mr Deng was last shown on Chinese television on February 8 celebrating the spring festival in southwestern Sichuan Province.

/9599
CSO: 4000/191
NATIONAL AFFAIRS

NATIONWIDE AUDIT UNCOVERS MISMANAGEMENT OF EDUCATIONAL FUND

Beijing Zhongguo Fazhi Bao in Chinese 4 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by staff reporter Shen Shu [3088 2562]: "Educational Funds in Some Areas Mismanaged; Phenomena of Graft and Embezzlement Comparatively Widespread"]

[Text] This year, auditing departments throughout the country's 21 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government conducted an audit of educational funds, discovering that problems of graft and embezzlement of educational funds in these areas are particularly glaring, and that false entries for the payment and transfer of funds were relatively serious. In addition, some units kept no financial records, their management was chaotic, and utilization results were lacking. At present, these problems have already attracted the attention of local party and government leaders who are now beginning to find a solution.

According to statistics, Liaoning Province altogether found 9.5 million yuan of its educational funds in violation of financial discipline, among which 5.4 million yuan was grafted and embezzled, representing 56.8 percent of the total sum in violation of financial discipline. Problems with graft and embezzlement existed in varying degrees within all 46 city and county level education bureaus that were audited. Shaanxi Province discovered 5,528,000 yuan in grafted and embezzled educational funds, 4,204,000 yuan of which was embezzled by the departments responsible for education to build houses and purchase automobiles. In 1984, the masses of Jiangzhang Town, Fufeng County, Shaanxi Province pooled together 121,000 yuan to set up a school, but the town government embezzled 82,000 yuan to purchase automobiles, set up a trade warehouse, and made loans to specialized households. A school in Shang County, Shangluo Prefecture embezzled 52,000 yuan of special funds allocated to them by higher authorities for the renovation of dilapidated buildings and built a dormitory for its staff and workers. Besides, phenomena such as the embezzlement of teacher subsidies and student stipends at schools run by the local people still exist in a few units.

In Liaoning and Shaanxi Provinces, auditing departments also discovered that false entries for the payment and transfer of funds accounted for approximately one third of the total sum in violation of financial discipline. Chang'an County under direct jurisdiction of Xian City made 638,000 yuan in false
entries for payouts, comprising 55 percent of the sum in violation of financial discipline. This money was transferred to subordinate units where it formed a "petty cash box," and was spent arbitrarily. This included funds transferred to the County Education Bureau and its subordinate units, which spent 500,000 yuan on constructing offices and residential buildings, purchasing jeeps, and subsidizing administrative expenses. In 1982, the teaching and research section of a certain school in Baoji City used foreign exchange to purchase electronic teaching equipment valued at 230,000 yuan. It also failed to establish an account in kind for a long time, managed the affair chaotically, and reduced utilization results.

Various localities are at present firmly investigating and dealing with the above problems exposed through the audits. Additionally, education departments in various localities have already taken general measures to strengthen fiscal management. Some have conducted short-term training for financial and accounting personnel, while others have taken on internal auditing personnel.

13188/6662
CSO: 4005/304
AUDIENCE RESPONDS TO PLAYS, FILMS ON PRC TV

OW070340 Beijing XINHUA in English 0255 GMT 7 Mar 86

["News Analysis: What Do Audiences See in Recent TV Plays and Films?"--XINHUA headline]


Since then, both the central and Taiyuan stations have been inundated with thousands of letters of praise for the series.

People who missed the series continue to implore the central and local television stations to play it again.

And the novel of the same name, on which the mini-series was based, has become the best seller in many Chinese bookstores.

The acclaim for "A New Star" follows shortly on the warm reception the domestic press here found for several feature films--"A Fascinating Bank," "Our Ex-Serviceman," "Wild Mountain," and "The Tramp and The Swan."

It has rarely happened before: so many films or TV shows garnering such praise within just 1 or 2 months. Why now?

What has happened is that these works, of which "A New Star" is typical, in the minds of many Chinese truthfully reflect China's rural reform, boldly expose its contradictions, and sharply analyze social maladies. And yet at the same time they offer admirable characters who have performed well in difficult situations.

"A New Star" tells the story of Li Xiangnan, a young official who carries out arduous reforms in a backward county. In the course of his work, Li meets resistance from groups and officials against the reform. But he does not compromise, and in the end, Li wins the support of the local people and of the provincial authorities.
Many viewers say the series mirrors an overall sense of the country's rural reform, with its difficulties and its accomplishments, while "A Fascinating Band," "Our Ex-Serviceman," "Wild Mountain," and "The Tramp and the Swan" probe such subjects as what peasants do after they become richer, how peasants might take the road of common prosperity, and how economic reform can change people's mental attitudes and the ways they relate to each other.

The rural reform—which links income to output and encourages individual enterprise after basic social obligations are fulfilled—is only a part of China's economic reform drive, which involves all aspects of the country. Yet people throughout China care about rural reform because it will have a considerable impact on living conditions everywhere. So when works such as "A New Star" depict struggles in the drive, it is no surprise that they generate strong responses, responses such as those sent to the TV stations:

--A peasant in Lichang County in north China's Hebei Province said people in his village love "A New Star" so much they want to give it an award—and at their own expense.

--A middle-aged worker at a tire factory in Beijing said for him and others "A New Star" asked, "In what direction should China go?" As a result, he said, workers in his factory had begun asking, "In what direction should our tire factory go?" He said his co-workers felt Li Xiangnan and his reform work set an important example for them to follow.

A young salesman in the Beijing Foreign Trade Bureau said he highly appreciated "A New Star." "It embodied my ideal of social reform," he said.

These comments show that works such as "A New Star" can have positive social effects.

In a recent interview, Zhang Guangnian, vice-chairman of the Chinese Writers' Association, said, "Not all audiences prefer works that seem to offer escape from the real world. On the contrary, works that articulate the people's aspirations can arouse strong social responses."

And this might be the core of today's audience psychology.
DRAMATIZED HISTORY OF SOCIALISM WELL RECEIVED

OW071238 Beijing XINHUA in English 1135 GMT 7 Mar 86

[Text] Guangzhou, March 7 (XINHUA)--A dramatized history of socialism by two young writers has aroused great interest among local readers here since its publication earlier this year.

"The book is welcomed not only by students of liberal arts but also by science students," said a local bookstore manager.

The first volume of the book, entitled "SOCIALISM IN THE PAST 400 YEARS," was published by the Guangdong People's Publishing House in February.

It covers the development of socialist ideology, the theory of scientific socialism, and the history of the international communist movement.

It narrates in literary style how socialism has progressed from utopian to scientific socialism, from theory to practice and from a single to multiple patterns to win victory first in Russia and then in many other countries.

The authors, Yu Youjun and Li Yuanjiang, both 33, are researchers on socialism of long standing.

Yu began to conceive the book in 1979 when some young people showed doubts about socialism after the 10-year turmoil of the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1976).

In preparation he spent 5 years reading all available Marxist classics.

His friend Li, then a college student, shared his idea of writing a dramatized history of socialism so that it would appeal to young people. Their plan received support from the publishing house and the work began in 1983.

/9599
CSO: 4000/191
HONORED WOMEN SPEAK OF PROFESSIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS

OW071927 Beijing XINHUA in English 1913 GMT 7 Mar 86

[Text] Beijing, March 7 (XINHUA)--Over 1,000 women gathered here today to hear 18 honored colleagues speak of their achievements.

Organized by the All-China Women's Federation in connection with the International Women's Day tomorrow, the meeting was held in the auditorium of China's largest political advisory body, the People's Political Consultative Conference.

One of the speakers was Liu Yuzhen, a scientific worker who successfully extracted a medicine from ginseng stems and leaves to treat coronary heart disease, nerve disorders, and diseases occurring among postmenopausal women.

The medicine has been proved effective in clinical tests on more than 1,000 people by more than 10 large hospitals in the country, she said. It won second class prize for scientific research results in 1981 from the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Fisheries.

Together with her husband, Liu devised a production process to extract the medicine, which is now mass-produced. As deputy director of a ginseng farm in northeast China's Jilin Province, Liu has studied ginseng for 16 years and has written 25 research papers on the herb and its uses. "I hope my work will help the farm double its earnings," she said.

Lu Huiqun, a bus conductor from south China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, discussed her friendly style of work. "I've tried to be civilized with the passengers," she said. "And they've responded to it."

She memorized her city's bus routes and tourist attractions for the convenience of passengers and was nicknamed the "living map." She said she spoke in the Mandarin as well as the local dialect and also learned the sign language of the deaf-mutes to offer better service.

"Who says that bus conductors can only count coins? We too have our ideals, which is to make our passengers feel at home and to help build our socialist spiritual civilization," she said.

Fourteen other acclaimed women will speak at different places in Beijing over the next 2 days.

/9599
CSO: 4000/191
EVALUATION OF CHINA'S 1982 CENSUS SUMMARIZED

Beijing RENKOU YANJIU [POPULATION RESEARCH] in Chinese No 6, 29 Nov 85 pp 1-5

[Article by Li Chengrui [2621 2052 3843]: "Evaluation of China's 1982 Census by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population at Its Meeting in Florence, and the Issues Raised by It"]

[Excerpts] Summarizing the seminar on "China's 1982 Census," at the 20th meeting of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Comrade Li Chengrui's article is helpful in informing us of foreign scholars' high evaluation of our 1982 census and their questions on our population data through the years. The author suggests that China's population experts and statisticians exert a joint effort, study together, exchange information, and continuously improve China's population research. In view of its importance, the article is published in this issue. We welcome comments for the purpose of discussion.

1. Overall Evaluation of the 1982 Census and Birth Rate Sample Survey

These are the following features in the evaluation of China's 1982 census by delegates to the 20th meeting of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population!

(1) The overall evaluation is both highly favorable and very appropriate.

(2) The evaluation was reached after a certain process. When we published the total figures computed by hand in October 1982, foreign scholars generally withheld judgment, and some thought or suspected that we had copied the figures from residence records. After publishing at the end of 1983, 10 percent of the data calculated by computer, some people made preliminary assessments at the international symposium held in Beijing in March 1984. In the main they praised the scale of the census and the speed of the computer work, and some scholars found the quality of the data superior, but there was no time to make careful studies of the information. The present evaluation is the conclusion reached after more than a year of earnest study.
(3) Mainly on the basis of demographic theories and by means of mathematical computations and electronic computers, they made a series of stringent examinations on the consistency of the various data published by China, including the 1982 census data, its harmony with those of 1953 and 1964, population data through the years, and the 0.1 percent birth rate survey.

(4) Many people assessed the procedures and methods of census taking and the birth rate sample survey. L. Friedman wrote a special paper on the organizational characteristics and quality control of China's census, expressed his views on the error rates, and refuted the criticism that the census figures had been copied from residence records. In her paper, Judith Banister criticized the suspicion that the consistency of the age and sex distributions in China's three censuses was a result of artificial revisions. Carroll criticized the view that the census figures had been copied from residence records and the 0.1 percent birth rate survey compiled from census forms. He declared: "The various investigations were independent. Their consistency is due to their authenticity and integrity, not the result of copying."

2. Problems in China's Population Data

In terms of China's census figures, especially the regular statistics over the years, foreign scholars posed a number of questions, mainly in the following four areas:

(1) Discrepancies in figures

Discrepancies between population figures according to age distribution and total figures in China's three censuses presented difficulties in analyzing China's population data.

The 1953 census gave no age distribution data on 15.16 million persons, or 2.6 percent of the total population.

The 1964 census gave no age distribution data on 4.88 million persons, or 0.7 percent of the total population.

The 1982 census gave no age distribution data on 4.24 million persons, or 0.4 percent of the total population.

In regard to the groups with no age distribution data, those in the 1953 and 1964 censuses consisted of soldiers on active service and others of unknown age, and those in the 1982 census were all servicemen. Though their percentages among the total population were small, they mainly belonged in the age groups of young people and those in their prime. The absence of data on them made it impossible to understand correctly the age distribution of China's population and difficult to make analyses and forecasts.

To utilize China's population data, foreign scholars had to make their own adjustments. Questioning the adjustments made by America's Carroll, Kols declared: "We feel that the adjustments should be made by Chinese experts." In her summary statement, seminar chairperson Ms Kang-sai-pu-xun [phonetic] said: "We strongly hope that China will publish the missing age distribution figures--at least in the next census."
(2) Birth, death, and natural growth rates

(a) The scholars found that the birth and death rates obtained in the 1982 census were reliable or basically reliable, but that there were discrepancies between the natural growth rate by subtracting the death rate from the birth rate and the total population growth rate through the years as found in the "China Statistical Yearbook—1984" published by the State Statistical Bureau. The discrepancies cannot be explained by international migration, because China's international migration is insignificant.

(b) On the basis of the 0.1 percent birth rate sample survey made in 1982 by the State Family Planning Commission, scholars like Carroll, Banister, and Kols derived the number of birth through the years by multiplying the birth rates according to age groups by the number of women of childbearing age of the various years in the retroactive surveys since 1940 estimated from the age and sex distributions in the three censuses. They then derived the number of deaths by subtracting the surviving population from the number of births of the corresponding years. Banister adjusted the number of the surviving population of some years among those recorded in the "China Statistical Yearbook." Checking the results against the birth and death rates through the years recorded in the "China Statistical Yearbook—1984," they derived the unreported numbers for the birth and death rates through the years. The highest year of unreported births was 20 percent, and that of deaths 40 percent. The "China Statistical Yearbook" shows the 1960 death rate as 2.543 percent, but it was estimated as 4.46 percent by Banister, 4 percent by Kols, and 3.88 percent by Carroll. In "Several Suggestions To Facilitate the Analysis of China's Population Data," Kols wrote: "We suggest that our Chinese colleagues make scientific adjustments of the data and indicate the methods used in making such adjustments."

My answer to the foregoing issues is: In regard to China's birth and death rates in the past 3 decades or more, except the census figures for 1953, 1964, and 1982, the information for all remaining years was from regular residence records, and their reliability is naturally lower than the census data. As for how much lower, we may make tests and verifications or indirect estimates by diverse methods and conduct comparative studies of the results. In making indirect estimates, we must give attention to the degree of reliability of the data on which the estimates are based, and take into consideration the fact that China's population changes consisted of fairly large fluctuations, rather than steady growth. (Note: Some foreign scholars based their estimates of the number of women of childbearing age on a steady rate of growth.)

(3) Sex ratios of newborns and infants

According to the census, the 1981 newborn sex ratio was 108 (108 male births to 100 female births). In regard thereto, Banister wrote: "If China's actual newborn sex ratio was 106, then at least 230,000 female births were unreported in 1981." She then continued: "Of the death rate of 3.55 percent per 1,000 live births shown in the population table this time, the proportion of male infant deaths was slightly higher than female infant deaths. If the problem of female infanticide described in China's news media produced a significant impact on statistics, it was basically not reflected in the life tables of the 1982 census. It suggests that some families failed to report the births and deaths of the victims to census takers."
In "The Rapid Changes in China's Population," Carroll wrote: "In the newborn sex ratios recorded in the large-scale birth rate survey (the 0.1 percent birth rate sample survey), the female births per 100 among the first and second births in the rural population is similar to the norm throughout the world, but the ratio of 112 male births to 100 female births for the third and subsequent births is higher than the norm. Among the sex ratios of urban births, the ratio for first births is somewhat high (exceeding 108), and it becomes even higher (about 118) for subsequent births among a relatively small number (257) of births. According to past experience, the ratio of male and female births drops slightly with the number of births... The survey did not indicate the possible link of female births subsequent to the first birth with the drowning of female newborns (most regrettable) widely reported in China's newspapers."

UN population expert You Yongzhong declared at the meeting: The newborn sex ratio of China's population is relatively high, and the same situation is found among the Chinese in Taiwan and Hong Kong and those of Chinese descent in Singapore. Therefore, we must take another look before passing judgment."

In answering this question, I reiterated the points in my article on "The Reliability of China's 1982 Census": There are two possible reasons for the slightly higher newborn sex ratio shown in the latest census as compared to most countries in the world. One is biological: the sexes of infants often vary according to nationality and region, and certain possible peculiarities in China's newborn sex ratio await further study. The other is social: the practice of drowning female infants left by history is still found in individual areas, and the statistics on female births are incomplete. In regard to the problem of drowning female newborns, China is in the course of solving it by means of persuasion, education, and law enforcement. Generally speaking, an investigation of an infant death is always more difficult than an investigation of an adult death, and its reliability is somewhat lower. However, compared with survey data of the past, the results of the latest census have a higher reliability and are close to reality. We must make further investigations and verifications in the future.

(4) Urban population

In regard to urban population (constituting 20.9 percent of total population) shown in the 1982 census, foreign scholars did not express any dissent. The questions raised by them mainly concern the scope of urban population figures through the years.

(a) For a time, the proportion of published figures on the urban population was very low. The "China Statistical Yearbook" shows the urban population at the end of 1981 as 13.9 percent of the total, but it suddenly increased to 20.9 percent in the 1982 census, a discrepancy which is hard to explain. I gave the following explanation: In the 18 years from 1964 to 1981, the agricultural population in areas under urban jurisdiction was considered as part of the rural population and not included in the urban population. In 1982, provisions prior to 1964 were reinstated: all the population in areas under urban jurisdiction is computed (excluding suburban counties, but including the townships in such counties). This point is clarified in the "China Statistical Yearbook's" explanation of norms, and the figures since the founding of the nation have been readjusted according to the above-mentioned range in the "China Statistical Yearbook—1984."
(b) For the urban population, the number of towns showed significant changes. There were over 6,000 towns in the 1953 census, while the 1982 census listed only 2,664. The figures are not comparable.

(c) The sizes of China's suburbs are not clearly defined.

American demographer, Sidney Goldstein, felt that the issue of China's urban population should, similar to birth control work, be made an important subject for study. Banister indicated that she supports the holding of an urban population symposium in China. Nevertheless, all the foreign scholars feel that we must first clarify the scope of China's urban population in order to proceed with the studies.
DATA ON SERVICEMEN IN 1982 CENSUS PUBLISHED

Beijing RENKOU YANJIU [POPULATION RESEARCH] in Chinese No 6, 29 Nov 85 p 6

[Article: "Data on Servicemen in 1982 Census Published by the Census Office and the Department of Population Statistics, State Statistical Bureau, State Council"]

[Text] China's 1982 census produced overall and accurate data, but the omission of information on servicemen among the material previously published aroused the concern of population experts inside and outside the country. The following are statistics on servicemen published by the Census Office and the Department of Population Statistics of the State Statistical Bureau, State Council. Comrade Liu Zheng's [0491 6927] article is also published here for our readers' reference.

Age Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年(1)</th>
<th>人(2) 数</th>
<th>其中: 女性(3)</th>
<th>年(1)</th>
<th>人(2) 数</th>
<th>其中: 女性(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(4) 总计</td>
<td>4,238,210</td>
<td>108,820</td>
<td>40—44岁</td>
<td>52,798</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) 19岁以下</td>
<td>631,314</td>
<td>15,288</td>
<td>45—49岁</td>
<td>51,618</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20—24岁</td>
<td>2,485,024</td>
<td>64,231</td>
<td>50—54岁</td>
<td>40,611</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25—29岁</td>
<td>579,009</td>
<td>15,135</td>
<td>55—59岁</td>
<td>37,802</td>
<td>908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30—34岁</td>
<td>229,008</td>
<td>6,104</td>
<td>60岁及以上(6)</td>
<td>24,865</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35—39岁</td>
<td>106,161</td>
<td>2,834</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
1. Age
2. Number of Persons
3. Number of Women Included
4. Total
5. Age 19 and Under
6. Age 60 and Over
### Nationality Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>民族 (1)</th>
<th>人数 (2)</th>
<th>民族 (1)</th>
<th>人数 (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3) 总计</td>
<td>4,238,210</td>
<td>(14) 满族</td>
<td>5,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) 汉族</td>
<td>4,176,287</td>
<td>(15) 侗族</td>
<td>1,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) 蒙古族</td>
<td>5,224</td>
<td>(16) 瑶族</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) 回族</td>
<td>7,670</td>
<td>(17) 白族</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) 藏族</td>
<td>3,967</td>
<td>(18) 土家族</td>
<td>1,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) 回族</td>
<td>5,702</td>
<td>(19) 哈尼族</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) 苗族</td>
<td>5,480</td>
<td>(20) 哈萨克族</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) 彝族</td>
<td>3,803</td>
<td>(21) 傣族</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) 壮族</td>
<td>9,956</td>
<td>(22) 黎族</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) 布依族</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>(23) 其他民族</td>
<td>2,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) 朝鲜族</td>
<td>2,569</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
1. Nationality
2. Number of Persons
3. Total
4. Han
5. Mongolian
6. Hui
7. Zang
8. Uyghur
9. Miao
10. Yi
11. Zhuang
12. Bouyei
13. Chaoxian
14. Man
15. Dong
16. Yao
17. Bai
18. Tujia
19. Hani
20. Kazak
21. Dai
22. Li
23. Others

### Educational Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>文化程度 (1)</th>
<th>人数 (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3) 总计</td>
<td>4,238,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) 大学毕业</td>
<td>147,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) 大学肄业</td>
<td>34,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) 高中</td>
<td>1,864,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) 初中</td>
<td>2,104,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) 小学</td>
<td>88,257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
1. Level of Education
2. Number of Persons
3. Total
4. College Graduates
5. College Attendance
6. Senior Middle School
7. Junior Middle School
8. Elementary School

**Note:** All three tables are 1982 figures.

6080/12232
CSO: 4005/438
NATIONAL AFFAIRS

POPULATION AGE COMPOSITION, SEX RATIOS ANALYZED

Beijing RENKOU YANJIU [POPULATION RESEARCH] in Chinese No 6, 29 Nov 85 pp 7-10

[Article by Liu Zheng [0491 6927], Population Research Institute, China People's University: "Age Composition and Sex Ratios of 1982 Population (Including Changes after Adding Data on Service men)"]

[Text] Demographers in various countries of the world generally acknowledge that China's 1982 census achieved overall and accurate population totals and data by age and sex. Nevertheless, the omission of statistics on servicemen in the previously published data aroused the concern of many foreign scholars, and they calculated the age data of servicemen by various methods. Here we must mention American demographer Carroll's estimate. He estimates the age distribution of the 108,820 servicewomen as follows: age 19--20 percent; age 20--60 percent; age 21--20 percent. On the assumption of a 107.9 sex ratio, he adjusted the number of males age 16-22 and distributed the 4.1 million servicemen among them. French demographer Kols suggested that "Chinese demographers make the adjustments themselves," because they are most familiar with the subject.

Direct and reliable data for studying China's population by age and sex and the statistics on the five age groups of the 4,238,000 servicemen and women in the 1982 census published by the Census Office and the Department of Population Statistics, State Statistical Bureau, State Council, are of tremendous practical significance. As shown by the published data, the age distribution of the 1.08 million servicemen is as follows: age 19 and under--14.05 percent; age 20-24--59.02 percent; age 25-29--13.91 percent; and age 30 and over--3.02 percent. Obviously, Carroll's estimate is inaccurate. The data on servicemen by age and sex published by the Chinese government are extremely important and most valuable in studying the age composition and sex ratios of China's population. They also stop foreign scholars from making conjectures of all kinds.

Based on the data on servicemen by age and sex in the 1982 census, we can adjust the male and female age data of the 5-year groups. As persons age 19 and under and age 60 and over are the two end groups, we have to make certain assumptions when making the adjustments. We assume that servicemen in age group 19 and under are concentrated in age group 15-19, and those in age group 60 and over in age group 60-64, in view of the fact that few soldiers are under age 15 or over age 65. In the absence of precise information, it is
appropriate to include them in the corresponding 5-year age groups. Meanwhile, as the number of servicemen under age 15 and over age 65 is minimal, their impact on the population age composition and sex ratios is very small, and any error should not be significant. When servicemen are included in their corresponding age groups in line with the above principle, the changes in the number of persons in the 5-year age groups, from group 15-19 to group 60-64, are shown in Table 1.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年龄组</th>
<th>未加入现役军人数</th>
<th>加入现役军人数</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>125,366,844</td>
<td>63,804,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>74,368,502</td>
<td>37,880,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>92,668,882</td>
<td>47,746,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>72,958,237</td>
<td>37,930,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>54,221,829</td>
<td>28,585,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>48,437,943</td>
<td>25,827,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>47,935,351</td>
<td>25,073,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>38,815,553</td>
<td>21,326,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>33,904,327</td>
<td>17,493,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>27,363,201</td>
<td>13,709,397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>总计</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>男</td>
<td>94,433</td>
<td>9,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>女</td>
<td>11,003</td>
<td>10,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-14</td>
<td>13,129</td>
<td>13,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>12,487</td>
<td>12,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>7,497</td>
<td>7,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>9,220</td>
<td>9,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>7,267</td>
<td>7,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>5,401</td>
<td>5,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>4,824</td>
<td>4,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>4,729</td>
<td>4,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>4,065</td>
<td>4,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>3,762</td>
<td>3,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>2,7256</td>
<td>2,7168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>2,1177</td>
<td>2,1088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70+</td>
<td>2,7906</td>
<td>2,7789</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
1. 年龄 | 4. 性别
2. 总数 | 5. 男
3. 未加入现役军人数 | 6. 女

Compared with the corresponding 1964 age data, the survival rate curve for age group 20-24 (age 2-6 in 1964) in the 1982 age data prior to adjustment deviates significantly toward the low side. The deviation is corrected after the 1982 age data are adjusted.

After servicemen by age groups are included, the changes in the population age composition are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年龄</th>
<th>未加入现役军人数</th>
<th>加入现役军人数</th>
<th>未加入现役军人数</th>
<th>加入现役军人数</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>总计</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>男</td>
<td>94,433</td>
<td>9,389</td>
<td>9,5063</td>
<td>9,4307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>女</td>
<td>11,003</td>
<td>10,840</td>
<td>11,0671</td>
<td>10,9791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-14</td>
<td>13,129</td>
<td>13,047</td>
<td>13,1053</td>
<td>13,0607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>12,487</td>
<td>12,459</td>
<td>12,4826</td>
<td>12,4237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>7,497</td>
<td>7,227</td>
<td>7,5514</td>
<td>7,5500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>9,220</td>
<td>9,230</td>
<td>9,2061</td>
<td>9,3010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>7,267</td>
<td>7,295</td>
<td>7,3611</td>
<td>7,3455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>5,401</td>
<td>5,388</td>
<td>5,5437</td>
<td>5,5196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>4,824</td>
<td>4,899</td>
<td>5,0124</td>
<td>4,9824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>4,729</td>
<td>4,707</td>
<td>4,8659</td>
<td>4,8369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>4,065</td>
<td>4,056</td>
<td>4,1782</td>
<td>4,1526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>3,762</td>
<td>3,658</td>
<td>3,9350</td>
<td>3,9470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>2,7256</td>
<td>2,7168</td>
<td>2,6606</td>
<td>2,6441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>2,1177</td>
<td>2,1088</td>
<td>1,9741</td>
<td>1,9584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70+</td>
<td>2,7906</td>
<td>2,7789</td>
<td>0,0001</td>
<td>0,0001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
1. 年龄 | 5. 性别
2. 未加入现役军人数 | 6. 未加入现役军人数
3. 加入现役军人数 | 7. 加入现役军人数
4. 鉴别

23
It can be seen in Table 2 that changes to various degrees occur in the composition of the population age groups. (1) The proportions of age groups 15-19, 20-24, and 25-29 increase to different degrees. Among them, the change in proportion of age group 20-24 is more pronounced, increasing from the 7.4073 percent of the total population to 7.6227 percent [7.9227 percent in the table]; that of age group 15-19 increases from 12.4878 percent to 12.4979 percent; and that of age group 25-29 increased from 9.2203 percent to 9.239 percent. (2) In terms of the percentage of the male and female populations among the total male and female populations, respectively, the proportions for age groups 15-19, 20-24, and 25-29 all show increases, and the increase in age group 20-24 is more pronounced, because the proportion of this age group is the largest among servicemen. (3) The number of persons in all age groups other than the above three age groups and their proportions decreases correspondingly. (4) As a whole, except for age group 20-24, the changes in composition of all groups are very insignificant because the proportion of the 4,238 million soldiers among the 1 billion population is very small, and it is impossible for it to produce any major difference in the age composition.

In terms of the proportions of male and female populations among the totals, Table 3 shows the changes after including servicemen.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) 年龄别</th>
<th>(2) 女性占总人口的百分比</th>
<th>(3) 女性占总人口的百分比</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>未加入军人人口数</td>
<td>加入军人人口数</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) 总 计</td>
<td>(5) 51.9269</td>
<td>(6) 51.5207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>4.8793</td>
<td>4.8588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9</td>
<td>5.6804</td>
<td>5.6505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 14</td>
<td>6.7537</td>
<td>6.7289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>4.7560</td>
<td>4.7019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>4.7782</td>
<td>4.7845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 34</td>
<td>5.3783</td>
<td>5.3845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 39</td>
<td>5.8455</td>
<td>5.8437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>5.1727</td>
<td>5.1670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>4.9795</td>
<td>4.9620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 54</td>
<td>5.1465</td>
<td>5.1394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 - 59</td>
<td>4.7426</td>
<td>4.7389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - 64</td>
<td>1.3586</td>
<td>1.3428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 - 69</td>
<td>1.0133</td>
<td>1.0099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70+</td>
<td>1.1652</td>
<td>1.1603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
1. Age
2. % of Male in Total Population
3. % of Female in Total Population
4. Total
5. Excluding Servicemen
6. Including Servicemen
7. Age Unknown

From the information in Table 3, we can see that, after adjustment, there are increases in the proportions of male age groups 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, and 30-34 from 6.3556 percent, 3.7732 percent, 4.756 percent, and 3.782 percent to 6.39 percent, 3.9975 percent, 4.7919 percent, and 3.7845 percent, respectively. The increase in age group 20-24 is largest. All other male age groups and all
female age groups show slight decreases after adjustment. In terms of female age groups 15-19, 20-24, and 25-29, why is it that, after adding servicewomen, the proportions still decrease slightly, instead of increasing slightly as when their proportions among the total female population are computed? It is because of the following reason: when servicewomen are added to the three female age groups (15-19, 20-24, and 25-29), their proportions among the total female population necessarily increase slightly, while the proportions of all other female age groups necessarily decrease slightly. However, in terms of the proportions of the various male and female age groups among the total population, the increases in the proportions of the four male age groups result in the decreases of all other male and all female age groups.

As shown in Diagram 1, when the age pyramid of the proportions after adjustment of the various male and female age groups among the total population is compared with the original pyramid, except for age group 20-24, the changes are insignificant.

Diagram 1

![Age Pyramid Diagram]

Key:
1. Age 70 and Over
2. Male
3. Female

Note: Solid lines represent age composition prior to adjustment. Dotted lines represent age composition after adjustment.

After adding servicemen by age groups, the proportions of children, adults, and the aged change correspondingly. As the entire military population is added to groups from age 15 to 64, the proportions of these age groups rise, while those of groups from age 0 to 14 and age 65 and over fall. See Table 4.
Table 4. Changes in Proportions of Various Age Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>10–14岁</th>
<th>15–24岁</th>
<th>55–64岁</th>
<th>65岁及以上 (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>加入军队人数</td>
<td>35,453</td>
<td>61,498</td>
<td>4,9084</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>未加入军队人数</td>
<td>35,593</td>
<td>61,498</td>
<td>4,9857</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
1. Age 65 and Over
2. Excluding Servicemen
3. Including Servicemen

Commensurate with the changes in population proportions, the proportions of welfare recipients also change. Their total number drops from 62.6069 percent to 62.1799 percent, and the number of young children and aged drops from 54.6255 percent and 7.9814 percent to 54.2529 percent and 7.927 percent, respectively.

The addition of the 4,238,000 servicemen by age and sex to the various age groups necessarily results in changes in sex ratios, mainly in the total population and in the age groups from age 15 to 64. All other age groups remain unchanged. Table 5 shows the sex ratios before and after adding servicemen.

Table 5. Changes in Sex Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)年龄组</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>0–4</th>
<th>5–9</th>
<th>10–14</th>
<th>15–19</th>
<th>20–24</th>
<th>25–29</th>
<th>30–34</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>不包括军队人数</td>
<td>105.45</td>
<td>107.14</td>
<td>106.18</td>
<td>106.04</td>
<td>103.64</td>
<td>103.83</td>
<td>106.53</td>
<td>106.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>包括军队人数</td>
<td>106.27</td>
<td>107.14</td>
<td>106.18</td>
<td>106.04</td>
<td>101.62</td>
<td>110.27</td>
<td>107.76</td>
<td>108.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)年龄组</td>
<td>35–49</td>
<td>40–44</td>
<td>45–49</td>
<td>50–54</td>
<td>55–59</td>
<td>60–64</td>
<td>65–69</td>
<td>70以上 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>不包括军队人数</td>
<td>111.31</td>
<td>114.23</td>
<td>112.28</td>
<td>111.63</td>
<td>106.67</td>
<td>106.41</td>
<td>91.74</td>
<td>71.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>包括军队人数</td>
<td>111.73</td>
<td>114.23</td>
<td>112.28</td>
<td>111.63</td>
<td>106.67</td>
<td>106.41</td>
<td>91.74</td>
<td>71.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
1. Age Group
2. Total Population
3. Excluding Servicemen
4. Including Servicemen
5. Age 70 and Over

The sex ratio of the total population after adjustment rises from 105.45 to 106.27, and the sex ratios of age groups from age 15 to 64 all show increases, with the largest occurring in age group 20–24, from 103.83 to 110.27. The sex ratios of age groups under age 15 and over age 64 remain unchanged. The increase in sex ratios after adding servicemen occurs because the overwhelming majority of servicemen is male, constituting 97.43 percent of the total. See Diagram 2.

Diagram 2

Key:
1. Sex Ratios
When the nationalities of servicemen are considered in computing the total population, the changes are very small, with the proportion of the Han nationality rising from 93.3 percent to 93.32 percent and that of minorities dropping from 6.7 percent to 6.68 percent. The reason for the slight changes is because the Han nationality constitutes 98.54 percent of all servicemen, which is a higher proportion than in the total population, while minority servicemen constitute 1.46 percent, which is a lower proportion than in the total population.

In terms of educational level, among the 4,238,210 soldiers on active service, the overwhelming majority is at the junior and senior middle school levels: The junior middle school level 49.66 percent, almost half, and the senior middle school level 43.99 percent, also a large proportion, totaling 93.65 percent; the elementary school level 2.08 percent; and the college level 4.27 percent. There is no illiteracy. Thus, with the addition of servicemen to the total population composition by educational levels, the number of persons at the middle school level per 10,000 rises somewhat. See Table 6.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>244,728,650</td>
<td>248,993,449</td>
<td>2,437.4</td>
<td>2,568.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
1. Number of Persons of Middle School (Junior and Senior) Level
2. Number of Persons of Middle School Level per 10,000
3. Excluding Servicemen
4. Including Servicemen

In terms of population statistics and consensus in the future, servicemen should be included when publishing the age and sex data of the total population. It will be preferable to publishing them separately.

6080/12232
CSO: 4005/438
CHINA'S POPULATION SEX RATIO ANALYZED

Beijing RENKOU YANJIU [POPULATION RESEARCH] in Chinese No 5, 29 Sep 85 pp 13-15

[Article by Yang Shiquan [2799 1102 3123]: "A Discussion of Our Country's Population Sex Ratio"]

[Text] The population sex ratio (the number of males in the population for every 100 females) is widely considered to be an important problem because it is related to a whole series of problems involving social planning, economic development, and medical research such as love and marriage, the tendency of the population to reproduce itself, the structure of industry, and health policies. RENKOUXUE [POPULATION STUDIES] had an article in its second number of 1985 entitled "The Current Imbalance in China's Sex Ratio: Its Causes and the Appropriate Response." The article states that China's population sex ratio is already imbalanced and that now and in the near future 5.72 to 9.33 percent of the males will not be able to find spouses and that the sex ratio has risen steadily in the last several years (in the 13 counties and cities of Hubel Province's Jingzhou Region as of 1 July 1982, the sex ratio of 4 year olds was 104.1; of 3 year olds 104.6; of 2 year olds 105.1; and of 1 year olds 106.2). The author believes that more and more of these tots will be unable to find lifelong mates. The imbalance in the overall population sex ratio is a most serious social problem which deserves close attention. The basic cause for the imbalance in the population sex ratio is the cherishing of the ideal that males should be prized and females belittled. This ideology has not been rooted out since liberation. In the population born in the 32 years since liberation the number of males born has always exceeded the number of females born except for the period from 30 June 1961 to 1 July 1963. The article concludes with concrete measures to solve the sex ratio imbalance problem. This article briefly analyzes China's sex ratio imbalance.

The sex ratio is imbalanced at every stage of human life—conception, birth, reproduction, and sickness unto death. The sex ratio at conception is between 110 and 170 and is usually about 120\(^1\); the sex ratio at birth (the second sex ratio) is between 103 and 107 and usually about 106 in most countries; the sex ratio in the marriageable years (the third sex ratio) is about 100; and at 85 the sex ratio is 62. Differences in male and female death rates, age cohort death rates, and average life expectancy are more males than females at conception and at birth, the two are balanced in the marriageable years, and later females outnumber males. The sex ratio is a biological
difference which is influenced by biological factors combined with socio-economic, cultural, health, and environmental variables.

I. Overall Population Sex Ratio

The overall sex ratio is the final result of the sex ratio of infants at birth, the survival rates of males and females in each age cohort, and socioeconomic factors such as war, immigration, and important socioeconomic transformations. In 1978 the world population sex ratio was 101.3, the upper and lower limits of the different continents were 91.8 and 105.6. China's population sex ratio is similar to that of the world population (see Table 1). According to the sample of births among 1 million Chinese based on the 1982 Census, the population sex ratio was 102.8, while the sex ratio according to the Third General Census of the population put the sex ratio at 106.3. Since 1960 the sex ratio has oscillated around 105 (see Table 2). Sex ratios from 96-106 are considered within the balanced range.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sex Ratio</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sex Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>106.3</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>107.4</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>106.5</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>112.4</td>
<td>E. Germany</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>106.7</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>87.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2. Chinese Population Sex Ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex ratio</td>
<td>108.2</td>
<td>107.9</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>105.3</td>
<td>105.0</td>
<td>105.3</td>
<td>105.3</td>
<td>106.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table 1.

II. Sex Ratio at Birth

The sex ratio at birth is directly related to the birth rate, to birth order, and to the youthfulness of the mother. The sex ratio at birth is determined primarily by biology. Under constant conditions it is stable. The sex ratio at birth according to the 1982 Chinese birth rate sample was 107.8 with the upper and lower limits for the various regions between 104.1 and 108.6. In 1981 among the 20,689,704 infants born alive the sex ratio was 108.4 with the upper and lower limits for the various provinces and municipalities between 101.3 and 112.5. These figures are slightly higher than the normal sex ratio at birth of 106. The provinces and regions with the highest sex ratios at birth are the culturally and economically relatively developed areas along the seacoast and on the central plain while the less developed provinces and
regions in the northern and northwestern sections of China have the lowest sex ratios at birth.\(^4\)

The sex ratio at birth and birth order are closely related. The Chinese national sex ratio in 1982 was 105.3 among first-born children, while second-, third-, and fourth-born children had population sex ratios of 107.2, 113.1, and 115.5. In Jiangsu Province, Haimen County, of the 35,449 infants born in 1979, 1980, and 1983 the sex ratio among the first-, second-, third-, and fourth-born children were 108, 116, 133, and 150.\(^5\) Encouraging every couple to have just one child will favor a balanced sex ratio.

III. Sex Ratio by Age Cohort

The sex ratio of the population between 0 and 39 oscillates between 101 and 107, later descending from 107 at age 40 to 42 at age 90. The sex ratio of the population in the 20-24 cohort when many marry is essentially balanced at 101. (See Table 3) According to data collected from the 1982 Census the sex ratio of the 20-24 age cohort in Hebei, Henan, and Jiangsu oscillated between 99.7 and 103.26.\(^6\) The Jiangsu Province census material indicates that the sex population ratio for the age cohorts under 20 gradually declines from unbalanced to balanced.\(^7\) As age rises, the proportion of surviving females increases and the sex ratio declines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age cohort</th>
<th>0-</th>
<th>5-</th>
<th>10-</th>
<th>15-</th>
<th>20-</th>
<th>25-</th>
<th>30-</th>
<th>35-</th>
<th>40-</th>
<th>45-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex ratio</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table 1.

IV. Death Rate

There is a clear sex differential in death rates. Males have a higher death rate than females due to masculine heredity, basal metabolism, occupational activities, and hazards as well as the daring and aggressive nature of the male. In 1982 the sex ratio of mortalities was 112.06, except for 98.15 in Guizhou Province, while the 28 other provinces, municipalities, and regions all averaged over 100. The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region has the highest death sex ratio at 139.99. The proportion of provinces, municipalities, and regions distributed by their death sex ratios is shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Distribution of the Death Sex Ratio in China's Provinces, Municipalities, and Regions in 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex Ratio</th>
<th>&lt;100</th>
<th>100-109</th>
<th>110-119</th>
<th>120-129</th>
<th>&gt;=130</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Areas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>31.03</td>
<td>41.38</td>
<td>20.69</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from information in "Important Figures From the Third Chinese Census," National Statistical Bureau.
Among deaths for all cohorts of the Chinese population, in the city as well as the countryside, the male rate exceeds the female rate. The death rate curves for the city and the countryside are similar. The sex ratio of infants (children under 1 year old) is relatively high and is lowest in early childhood (age 1-4). A second peak appears in the sex ratio between 5 and 14 years old while it gradually declines as the death rate gradually increases. After age 75 the sex ratio declines. (See Table 5)

Table 5. 1982 Urban and Rural Death Sex Ratio by Age Cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>0-</th>
<th>1-4</th>
<th>5-14</th>
<th>15-24</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>124.81</td>
<td>106.90</td>
<td>143.26</td>
<td>107.44</td>
<td>116.65</td>
<td>129.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>113.25</td>
<td>104.86</td>
<td>125.92</td>
<td>108.43</td>
<td>118.81</td>
<td>132.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Cohort</td>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>65-74</td>
<td>≥75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>126.01</td>
<td>142.12</td>
<td>143.20</td>
<td>122.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>143.91</td>
<td>154.48</td>
<td>152.89</td>
<td>132.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from data in the 1982 Chinese Health Statistics Yearbook.

V. Sex Ratio of Principal Causes of Death

This reflects differences in the way the male and female organic systems respond to a given dosage of a pathogen. In the cities and rural areas of the entire country, except for deaths from heart disease, mental illness, diseases of the blood and the blood-producing system, and endocrinal and metabolic disorders, males have a higher death rate than females. Urban death rates (taking the female death rate as 100 and comparing the ratio of the male death rate to the female rate as the death ratio) are highest among infants at 166.82, then 160.75 among those dying of communicable diseases, malignant tumors 147.77, and digestive disorders 130.09, with the lowest ratios for endocrinal and metabolic disorders at 64.89. In the countryside the male/female death rate ratio is highest for malignant tumors at 146.28, contagious diseases at 140.12, digestive disorders at 133.85, and infant mortality at 120.86. In the countryside as in the city the lowest ratio was for endocrinal and metabolic disorders at 83.33. (See Table 6)

Table 6. Sex Ratios for the Principal Causes of Death in Urban and Rural Areas in 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal Cause</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heart disease</td>
<td>89.06</td>
<td>98.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arteriosclerosis</td>
<td>102.99</td>
<td>104.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malignant tumor</td>
<td>147.77</td>
<td>146.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiratory illness</td>
<td>109.58</td>
<td>110.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagious illness</td>
<td>160.75</td>
<td>140.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digestive</td>
<td>130.09</td>
<td>133.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table continued on following page]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal Cause</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urological</td>
<td>107.83</td>
<td>116.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant illness</td>
<td>166.82</td>
<td>120.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental illness</td>
<td>83.60</td>
<td>91.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood disorder</td>
<td>88.56</td>
<td>88.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endocrinal, metabolic illness</td>
<td>64.89</td>
<td>83.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table 5.

VI. Conclusion

1) China's overall population sex ratio and age cohort sex ratio falls within the normal distribution of the sex ratio of the entire world. The sex ratio of China's infants is slightly higher than for the world as a whole but it falls essentially within the normal range. After birth, due to differences in the male and female death rates the sex ratio gradually declines from an excess of males at birth to a balance between males and females in the marriageable years and then in later years it tends to a new imbalance in which females outnumber males. This is an ecological rule which does not affect marriage; the difference in age between men and women at first marriage further brings the number of potential spouses into better balance. 2) The drowning of female infants reflects a feudal consciousness which is directly related to the stage of economic and cultural development. In the 35 years since liberation the ideological consciousness and the moral concepts of our people have risen and the influence of feudal culture is being steadily eliminated. The cultural and economic background of the geographical distribution of the sex ratios of China's infants does not support the hypothesis of a direct correlation between valuing males and belittling females and the drowning of female infants and high sex ratios. 3) The sex ratio of China's population is basically balanced; it will not cause a disharmony in the number of men and women of marriageable age in the coming years. 4) Protecting the rights of women and female infants is our legal and moral obligation. Except for scientific or eugenic purposes we must forbid any unit or person from testing to determine the sex of a fetus. 5) The causes of the tendency of the sex ratio of China's infants to be high and the rise in the sex ratio with birth order should be further investigated.

FOOTNOTES


12369/6091
CSO: 4005/397
NATIONAL AFFAIRS

SAMPLING SURVEY OF 1982 FIRST-MARRIAGE FERTILITY REPORTED

Beijing RENKOU YU JINGJI [POPULATION AND ECONOMY] in Chinese No 4, 25 Aug 85 pp 27-34


[Text] During the summer of 1983 the National Family Planning Commission in the 28 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions of the entire country (except for Taiwan and Tibet) organized and carried out the first "Sampling From the Survey of the Fertility of Women in Their First Marriage in 1982." The survey results show that although family planning work throughout the country has already achieved much, its development remains uneven. Future family planning work must be strengthened and carried out according to the peculiarities of each region. Here are the results of that sampling survey:

I. Survey Summary

This survey used 815 sampling points from the 1982 one/thousandth fertility sampling survey. These sampling points were selected according to the address codes from the Third General Census of the Chinese population using the stratified, systematic, and integral group sampling methods, taking the production brigade for the unit in the country and the neighborhood committee in the city and selecting randomly among equidistant points.

The survey's end point was midnight, 31 December 1982. Of the total population at the sampling points, 1,018,050 were sampled, a sampling ratio of 0.1009 percent (see Table 1). The sample included 250,989 women in the reproductive-age range of 15-49 years composing 2.465 percent of the sampled population, essentially the same as the 24.77 percent proportion of women of reproductive age in the 1981 General Census (Footnote 1).

In the base sample there were 874,416 rural people or 85.89 percent of the total, of whom 209,601 or 23.97 percent were women of reproductive age. The urban population of 143,634 or 14.11 percent of the base sample had 41,388 women of reproductive age or 28.81 percent of the sampled urban population. Thus the proportion of women of reproductive age in the cities was 5 percent higher than in the countryside; for every 100 urbanites there were 5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>North China</th>
<th>Manchuria</th>
<th>East China</th>
<th>South-Central</th>
<th>Southwest</th>
<th>Northwest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample Population</td>
<td>1,018,050</td>
<td>116,296</td>
<td>92,480</td>
<td>298,556</td>
<td>274,817</td>
<td>162,497</td>
<td>73,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1,009,279,847</td>
<td>115,364,804</td>
<td>91,307,869</td>
<td>296,563,179</td>
<td>274,433,153</td>
<td>161,803,373</td>
<td>69,807,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling Ratio (Percent)</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>1.007</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>1.004</td>
<td>1.052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excluding Taiwan and Tibet*
additional women of reproductive age. The effect of these apparently unimportant phenomena on urban and rural marital fertility is explained below.

According to the 1983 National Statistical Yearbook, the 1983 increase in the population should have been 14.69 million (at the beginning of 1982 the total Chinese population was 1,000,720,000; at the year's close 1,015,410,000), a net rate of increase of 1.457 percent. According to this survey the total Chinese population increased by 14,310,000 (Footnote 2), a net increase of 1.428 percent. If we consider the entire country as a closed system the total population error is just 380,000 and the error in the net rate of increase is just 0.029 percent of 1.99 percent of the actual value. Thus the survey is reliable.

II. Fertility of Women in Their First Marriage

In analyzing the one/thousandth population sample fertility survey, we pointed out that in the 9 years from 1971-79 the average first-marriage rate for the entire country was just 0.734 and it was estimated that the peak in first marriages beginning in 1980 would continue for about 5 years. This survey shows that in 1982 the peak in first marriages continued as the total first-marriage rate reached 1.063. This is the first characteristic of the female first-marriage situation.

The survey shows that of the 8.82 million women throughout China who married for the first time in 1982, 7.18 million were rural women and 1.64 million were urban women (see Table 2).

Table 2. Reproductive-Age Women Marrying for the First Time in 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Women of Reproductive Age</td>
<td>250,989</td>
<td>41,388</td>
<td>209,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Women Marrying for the First Time</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>1,657</td>
<td>7,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban and Rural Proportions (Percent)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall First-Marriage Rate (per 1,000)</td>
<td>35.46</td>
<td>40.04</td>
<td>34.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1982 overall first-marriage rate in China was 3.55 percent, 3.46 percent in the countryside, and 4.00 percent in the city. Clearly, the first-marriage rate of urban women is higher than that of rural women.
Another aspect of this is that the proportion of women of reproductive age in the urban population is 5 percent greater than the proportion of women of reproductive age in the rural population. Thus, although there are more women marrying for the first time in the cities, the "speed" at which they get married is no greater than it is in the countryside. In order to examine this point we must examine the effects of the population age structure on the total first-marriage rate (see Table 3). From Table 3 we can see that in 1982 the total Chinese first-marriage rate was 1.063--1.061 in the countryside and 1.059 in the city. The similarities in these figures demonstrate clearly that although the proportion of women in the urban population is higher their "speed" of entering their first marriage is no higher than that of women in the countryside. This is the second characteristic of the female first-marriage situation.

Table 3. First-Marriage Rate for Reproductive-Age Women Marrying for the First Time in 1982 by Age Cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>Total China</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>Total China</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.0633</td>
<td>1.0592</td>
<td>1.0610</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>0.0077</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.0114</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.0129</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.0251</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
<td>0.0291</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>0.0024</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.0517</td>
<td>0.0067</td>
<td>0.0600</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.1238</td>
<td>0.0182</td>
<td>0.1430</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.1589</td>
<td>0.0596</td>
<td>0.1819</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.1642</td>
<td>0.0860</td>
<td>0.1849</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.1493</td>
<td>0.1371</td>
<td>0.1526</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.1342</td>
<td>0.2065</td>
<td>0.1168</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.1039</td>
<td>0.1832</td>
<td>0.0865</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.0628</td>
<td>0.1366</td>
<td>0.0454</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.0314</td>
<td>0.0797</td>
<td>0.0208</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.0172</td>
<td>0.0515</td>
<td>0.0098</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.0089</td>
<td>0.0338</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.0051</td>
<td>0.0184</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
<td>0.0156</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

China consists of urban and rural components; thus, ordinary rules would hold that the figures for the entire nation should fall somewhere between the urban and the rural figures. However, as we can see from Table 3, the overall Chinese first-marriage rate exceeds the overall first-marriage rates for both the city and the countryside. In fact, although the figure for the Chinese age-differentiated first-marriage rate is the weighted average of the urban and rural age-differentiated first-marriage rates, the overall first-marriage
rate is the sum of the first-marriage rates for each age. In sum, the weighted relations broke down (thereby eliminating the influence of the population structure) and the overall Chinese rate is not the weighted average of the urban and rural rates; the overall Chinese first-marriage rate need not fall between the urban and rural rates. Likewise the peak in the overall Chinese age of first marriage is lower than both the urban and the rural average age because the age cohorts involved are not equal.

In 1982 the peak age of female first marriages was 22 in the entire country and in the countryside while it was 24 in the city. The age of rural women at first marriage peaks at 22, 1 year earlier than the 23 recommended by the state, while the age at first marriage or urban women peaks at 24, 1 year later than the age recommended by the state. This is the third characteristic of the age of men at first marriage in 1982.

Figures for the number of women marrying for the first time by age cohort (see Table 4) show that in 1982 throughout China 117,400 women at age 19 or under married for the first time, for an early marriage rate of 13.3 percent. Of these, 1,156,000 or 16.1 percent of rural women married early while just 18,000 or 1.1 percent of urban women married early. Among the 4,326,000 women or 49.0 percent throughout China who married late, there were 2,915,000 rural women, for an urban late marriage rate of 40.6 percent, and 1,412,000 rural women, for an urban late marriage rate of 85.9 percent. Compared with 1981 the total Chinese early-marriage rate declined 3.5 percent, dropping 4.9 percent in the countryside and 0.9 percent in the city. The late-marriage rate declined 1.9 percent while rising 6.9 percent in the city and falling 2.3 percent in the countryside.

In 1982 the average age at first marriage rose slightly, returning to its 1980 level. (See Table 5.)

Table 5. Average Age at First Marriage for Women in Their Reproductive Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>23.05</td>
<td>25.19</td>
<td>22.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>22.82</td>
<td>24.71</td>
<td>22.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>23.04</td>
<td>25.38</td>
<td>22.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relevant data on age at marriage in the city and the countryside (see Table 6) and a simple analysis of age at first marriage in China's six major regions (see Table 7) provides us with the following three points worth noting on women of reproductive age marrying for the first time in 1982.
Table 4. Number of Women of Reproductive Age Marrying for the First Time in 1982 by Age Cohort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>Total China</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>Total China</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8900</td>
<td>1657</td>
<td>7243</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>1089</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>1153</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>1018</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. Proportions of Urban and Rural Women in Their Reproductive Years Marrying for the First Time in 1981-82 Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early-Marriage Rate (Percent)</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late-Marriage Rate (Percent)</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak Age for First Marriage</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-Marriage Median Age</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at Which 90 Percent of Women Have Married</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. There is a great difference in ages at first marriage among women. In the countryside late-marriage education work should aim at a wide audience and be strengthened while in the city this work should concentrate on the minority who have requested early marriage.

2. The overall first-marriage rate in the south-central region has reached 1.125 while the overall early-marriage rate has risen to 3.55 percent. This indicates that the first-born child fertility rate in the south-central region during 1982 and 1983 was higher than in other regions.

3. Late-marriage education work has been done better in North China and in Manchuria where the late-marriage rate is 53 percent or more and the early-marriage rate declined to about 9 percent. The average age at first marriage in these two regions is 23.3 years or older while the median age at first marriage is 23. The late-marriage rates in the southwest and the northwest are relatively low at 40 percent or lower while the early marriage rate is 18 percent or higher. The average age at first marriage in these two regions is younger than 22.5 while the median age at first marriage is 21.

The differences in the first-marriage indices in these six great regions provide reference data for family planning work in every area.

III. Fertility

The survey shows that fertility was under better control in 1982 than it had been in 1981.
Table 7. Comparison of First-Marriage Status Among Women of Reproductive Age in China's Six Major Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North China</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>East China</th>
<th>South-Central</th>
<th>Southwest</th>
<th>Northwest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall First-Marriage Rate</strong></td>
<td>1.0837</td>
<td>0.9208</td>
<td>1.0822</td>
<td>1.1246</td>
<td>1.0225</td>
<td>1.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First-Marriage Rate (Percent)</strong></td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early-Marriage Rate (Percent)</strong></td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Late-Marriage Rate (Percent)</strong></td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First-Marriage Peak Age</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Age at First Marriage</strong></td>
<td>23.55</td>
<td>23.32</td>
<td>23.38</td>
<td>22.98</td>
<td>22.45</td>
<td>21.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median Age at First Marriage</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age at Which 90 Percent Have Married for the First Time</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First, fertility declined from 2.128 percent in 1981 to 1.999 percent in 1982. Urban fertility rose 0.101 percent from 1.450 percent in 1981 to 1.551 percent in 1982. Rural fertility dropped 0.171 percent from 2.243 percent in 1981 to 2.072 percent in 1982. The recovery of urban fertility is the necessary outcome of three factors: 1) Differences in the population structure show that for every 100 inhabitants there are 5 more women of reproductive age in the urban population than in the rural population. This is the primary cause of the rise in urban fertility. 2) When comparing the marital structure of the urban and rural populations, unmarried women of reproductive age compose 36.01 percent of the urban population while they make up 30.53 percent of the rural population. This naturally causes the number of first marriages of urban women to increase and can make urban fertility rise. 3) Finally, although urban fertility is rising, the rate of first-born children and overall first-child fertility is higher than the corresponding rural indices. Thus family planning work in the city is still more successful than in the countryside.

Second, comparing the birth order structure (Footnote 3), the rate of first births rose from 46.6 percent in 1981 to 51.6 percent in 1982 while the rate of third or later births declined from 28.1 percent to 24.2 percent. The decline in the rate of third or later births shows that the number of third or later children declined from 5.9 million in 1981 to 4.84 million in 1982. Thus 1.06 million fewer children were born in 1982 than in 1981. The trend in the city and in the countryside is consistent with the national trend. (See Table 8.)

Table 8. 1981-82 Newborn Infant Birth Order Structure (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total China</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Live-Birth Order</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-Birth Rate</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-Birth Rate</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple-Birth Rate</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order by Surviving Children</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42
It should be noted that the urban first-child rate has already reached 93.4 percent, while the second-child rate and the third or later child rate are both 5.8 percent. A great effort must be invested in consolidating what has been achieved and in continuing to improve.

For women in the fertile ages during the 3 peak years 1980 through 1982 there is no fundamental inconsistency in the median fertile age, the average fertile age, and the average age during which 90 percent of the children are born. (See Table 9.) If we consider that during these 3 years the late-marriage rate of women of reproductive age declined 3.8 percent (52.8 percent-50.9 percent-49.0 percent), much was achieved in fertility control during 1982.

Table 9. China: Overall Age of Fertility, 1980-82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peak Fertile Age</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Fertile Age</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fertile Age</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at Which 90 Percent of Children Were Born</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compared with overall fertility in 1981, the greater drop was in the countryside, falling from 9.48 percent to 8.59 percent. Thus, although urban fertility rose from 5.02 percent to 5.33 percent, overall Chinese fertility declined steeply from 8.71 percent to 8.05 percent. We must also keep in mind that overall rural fertility is 60 percent higher.

During 1981-82, fertility by age cohort (see Table 10) showed a downward tendency.
Table 10. Fertility by Age Cohort, 1981-82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.6301</td>
<td>2.4803</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.0690</td>
<td>0.0611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.0580</td>
<td>0.0534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.0438</td>
<td>0.0417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.0066</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.0404</td>
<td>0.0329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.0183</td>
<td>0.0137</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.0304</td>
<td>0.0311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.0486</td>
<td>0.0321</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.0286</td>
<td>0.0271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.0794</td>
<td>0.0764</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.0301</td>
<td>0.0252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.1305</td>
<td>0.1343</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.0238</td>
<td>0.0182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.1847</td>
<td>0.1724</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.0189</td>
<td>0.0213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.2325</td>
<td>0.2228</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.0159</td>
<td>0.0139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.2816</td>
<td>0.2595</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.0132</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.3014</td>
<td>0.2719</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.0104</td>
<td>0.0074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.2545</td>
<td>0.2508</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.0063</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.2129</td>
<td>0.2094</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
<td>0.0045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.1713</td>
<td>0.1608</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.1266</td>
<td>0.1335</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.0017</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.1019</td>
<td>0.1006</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.0794</td>
<td>0.0782</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the 1981 and 1982 rates of fertility by age cohort, one gets the distinct impression that except for a few age cohorts, 1982 fertility is lower than that of 1981 for most age cohorts. Differences in the fertility of nearly every age cohort, and especially those age cohorts in the most fertile years between ages 22 and 28, exceeds 0.03. This demonstrates that family planning work has reached and is reaching effectively women in their peak reproductive years. Thus the overall 1982 fertility rate was 2.48, a decline of 0.15 compared to the overall 1981 fertility rate of 2.63. This is an important accomplishment.

The table below compares urban and rural fertility by age cohort. (See Table 11.)
Table 11. Comparative Fertility of Urban and Rural Women, 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural/Urban Ratio</th>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Rural/Urban Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.7143</td>
<td>1.4052</td>
<td>1.3091</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.0692</td>
<td>0.0195</td>
<td>0.0497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.0593</td>
<td>0.0211</td>
<td>0.0382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.0472</td>
<td>0.0118</td>
<td>0.0354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.0033</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.0377</td>
<td>0.0045</td>
<td>0.0322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.0158</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.0146</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.0356</td>
<td>0.0048</td>
<td>0.0308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.0378</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.0368</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.0312</td>
<td>0.0039</td>
<td>0.0273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.0880</td>
<td>0.0127</td>
<td>0.0753</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.0295</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.1584</td>
<td>0.0307</td>
<td>0.1277</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.0210</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
<td>0.0182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.1999</td>
<td>0.0679</td>
<td>0.1320</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.0254</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.0242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.2592</td>
<td>0.0843</td>
<td>0.1749</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.0167</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.0155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.2812</td>
<td>0.1693</td>
<td>0.1119</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.2868</td>
<td>0.2036</td>
<td>0.0832</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.0093</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.2571</td>
<td>0.2242</td>
<td>0.0329</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.2107</td>
<td>0.2030</td>
<td>0.0077</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.0056</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.1658</td>
<td>0.1378</td>
<td>0.0280</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.1414</td>
<td>0.0913</td>
<td>0.0501</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.1077</td>
<td>0.0612</td>
<td>0.0465</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.0023</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.0848</td>
<td>0.0434</td>
<td>0.0414</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that rural fertility exceeds urban fertility in every age cohort. These differences are great in both the upper and the lower reproductive-age ranges. About the peak fertile years the rural rate is far higher than the urban rate. The rural peak fertility rate at age 25 of 0.2868 is 0.0626 higher than the urban peak fertility rate at age 26 of 0.2242. The cumulative result is an overall rural fertility rate of 2.7143 and an overall urban fertility rate of just 1.4052.

The sex ratio of newborn infants is an important anthropological index. This survey shows that the 1982 overall Chinese newborn sex ratio, 107.6, did not differ significantly from the 107.8 ratio in 1981 and remains within the normal range. The 1982 rural newborn infant sex ratio, 108.7, also did not differ significantly from 107.6 in 1981. However, the urban newborn sex ratio declined abruptly and very evidently from 109.6 in 1981 to 98.7 in 1982. The 1982 fertility data shown below from the six major Chinese regions analyzed below shows this. (See Table 12.)

On the basis of comparisons of 12 items on fertility in the 6 major regions of China the major differences are as follows:
Table 12. Comparison of Fertility in China's Six Major Areas in 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North China</th>
<th>Manchuria</th>
<th>East China</th>
<th>South-Central China</th>
<th>Southwest China</th>
<th>Northwest China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women of Reproductive Age (Percent)</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Births</td>
<td>2,463</td>
<td>1,744</td>
<td>5,380</td>
<td>5,964</td>
<td>3,034</td>
<td>1,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth Rate (Percent)</td>
<td>21.36</td>
<td>18.97</td>
<td>18.14</td>
<td>21.87</td>
<td>18.79</td>
<td>22.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Births</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>3,101</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-Birth Rate</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Third or Later Births</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Third or Later Births</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Fertility (Percent)</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Fertility (Per 1,000)</td>
<td>2.2577</td>
<td>1.8734</td>
<td>2.1473</td>
<td>2.9753</td>
<td>2.7367</td>
<td>2.9391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall First-Birth Fertility</td>
<td>1.2073</td>
<td>1.3146</td>
<td>1.2321</td>
<td>1.2555</td>
<td>1.2917</td>
<td>1.1432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third or Later Birth Fertility</td>
<td>0.5228</td>
<td>0.2151</td>
<td>0.4206</td>
<td>0.9491</td>
<td>0.8665</td>
<td>1.1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Peak Fertility</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fertile Age</td>
<td>26.85</td>
<td>25.74</td>
<td>26.26</td>
<td>27.04</td>
<td>27.46</td>
<td>26.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age at First Birth</td>
<td>25.06</td>
<td>24.85</td>
<td>24.71</td>
<td>24.50</td>
<td>24.28</td>
<td>23.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at Which 90 Percent of Children Were Born</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newborn-Infant Sex Ratio</td>
<td>112.7</td>
<td>100.5</td>
<td>110.6</td>
<td>106.9</td>
<td>107.5</td>
<td>100.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Comparing the birth order rates among newborn infants, the first-born birth rate is highest in Manchuria at 72 percent. In the Northwest and in South-Central China it is lower at 45 percent or below. Manchuria has the lowest rate for births of third and successive children at below 10 percent. The southwest and northwest are higher at 31 percent and above.

2. Overall fertility is lower in Manchuria and in East China at below 7.2 percent. In the south-central region it is higher at 9.4 percent or above.

3. Overall fertility in Manchuria has already declined below the borderline reproductive level (an overall fertility rate of 2.1) to 1.87. Fertility in the five other major regions is still above the borderline reproductive level. The south-central region at 2.98 has the highest fertility. At this fertility rate the average woman would, from the time she enters the reproductive years, bear an average of three children.

Differences in fertility among the six major regions in 1982 were very great. In some areas the speed of population growth has been effectively controlled. In some areas, and especially in densely populated areas, fertility is still rather high. Therefore the entire country must establish pragmatic regional plans for population growth and treat each area according to its peculiarities in order to reduce the present imbalance in the fertility level and carry out the goal of controlling China's population at the 1.2 billion level by the end of this century.

FOOTNOTES

1. The 1981 figures used in this report are also from the one/thousandth population fertility sampling survey.

2. In order to make reading easier the estimated figures for the countryside and the city are all converted according to the national sample while the actual data are displayed in the tables.

3. This survey used two methods to record the birth order structure, first according to the order of live births (called the birth order rate) and then according to the order of children currently alive (called the child order rate). The birth order recording method used in this article is the order of live births.

12,369/9599
CSO: 4005/308
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF NEWS REPORTING

Yinchuan NINGXIA DAXUE XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF NINGXIA UNIVERSITY] in Chinese No 4 Dec 85 pp 28-32, 40

[Article by Zhou Xuan [0719 2467]: "Some Factors Regarding the Essential Inaccuracy of News"]

[Text] Regarding the question of the truthfulness of news, journalist circles in China have long talked about "apparent truth" and "essential truth." This despite the fact that this phrasing was used distortedly by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," has been distortedly defined by others, and has played a negative or even harmful role. But I have believed that the original significance of these phrases is scientific, and that they stand on their own. This is because, speaking from the view of materialist dialectics, any objective reality is a unity of essence and appearance, and news that is a reflection of objective reality ought to strive to reflect accurately both the appearance of reality and the essence of reality.

Inaccuracies of appearance are easily seen, and the adverse effects caused by them are very clear, something that has been often discussed. Essential inaccuracies are not that easily noticed and the adverse effects caused by them are below the surface, and consequently are dangerous. I focus below on a discussion of this problem.

If we ignore the subjective component where a perpetrator consciously creates false news on behalf of certain persons, what other factors can easily lead to essential inaccuracies in news? I have listed some below.

I. To mislead by appearance.

The following two conditions exist whether for natural phenomena, social phenomena, or for products of imagination; one is that the phenomena are in direct harmony with the essential. For example, the thunder and lightning that is brought on by the sudden mixing of negative and positive electricity; shortages and unmarketability of certain products due to violation of economic laws; the brave struggle with unhealthy tendencies by Communist Party members as they defend party principles, etc. The other situation is where a certain phenomenon is not in harmony with the essential, and is even diametrically opposed. This kind of phenomenon is called false appearance. What is called
"Warmhearted thieves, the rude who are outwardly respectful, and those with the appearance of honesty and sincerity who are actually insincere" are examples of this sort of phenomena. News is a reflection of objective existence, but things existing objectively are by no means certain to be real things because false appearances are the same as true appearances, and also have a kind of objective existence. For example, there are normally people at the entrances to units equipped with brooms who are charged with sweeping up the courtyards. Possibly, the majority are there for the purpose of public hygiene, serving the people in this manner. But it is also possible they do it because of a kind of working habit. And it is also possible that they do it to get rid of an internal depression. We must not exclude the possibility that it is to show themselves for their own purposes. If our report is nothing but "a good worker" or "a good cadre" in the style of Lei Feng or some other good model, then this will easily lead to actual misrepresentation.

We have used this example because if a false appearance can be willfully determined by a person's subjectivity, then that is especially wrong. False appearances are created by various conditions existing in reality, they are a provision of reality, and are an aspect and a link. As Lenin said, "False appearances (things in false appearances) are reflections of essence in the self." (Footnote 1) (Lenin: "Philosophical Notes," p 138) This then demands of us that, one, we look at false appearances correctly and, two, we not be misled by them. At the same time, it also tells us that we can see the essential through the false. Because false appearances are united with the essential, and are determined by the essential, they are simply a mirror image of the essential, or we could say, they are the essential turned on its head. Are not those who feign enthusiasm while working for individual purposes manifestations of one aspect of the essence of being timid and overcautious and of the essence of being sly and crafty?

II. A confusion in consciousness of causality.

Materialist dialectics holds that what is indicated in the scope of cause and effect is a kind of sequential and mutually binding relation between objects or phenomena, such that any object or phenomenon has its cause and effect. There is first a cause that is a phenomenon that then brings on certain other phenomena. The effect is last, and is a phenomenon generated by the function of cause. The relation between cause and effect is quite complex, and can easily lead to confusion in consciousness. Therefore, there are many things that cause inaccuracies in the news and situations of all sorts appear, the majority of which are the following:

First, seeing two successive phenomena actually having no causal relation as having a causal relation. In general, any two phenomenon having a causal relation are certain to be temporally successive; the cause precedes and the effect follows. But it is definitely not true that all successive phenomena have causal relations. For example, the new product of an enterprise in test production goes into full production at the beginning of the year, while the profit level for that quarter is improved over that of the same period in the previous year. Then, some newspapers will report the improvement in profit levels for the quarter as being the effect of trial and full production of the new product at the beginning of the year.
Actually, there was no causal relation between the two phenomena. Anyone with some knowledge of economics and enterprise operations knows that because expenses for the trial production of new products are high and prices are high, to which is added the fact that users are not familiar with the product, sales are therefore difficult. In general, after going into full production no profit can be realized for a certain period of time. Quite obviously, reports like that mentioned above have forced together two things that happened in succession and had the appearance of having a causal relation. The reports were not true, either from the view of appearance or from the essence.

Second, is to report one effect from many causes as being from only one cause. We know that the same phenomenon is the result of many causes working together. Throughout the world you could hardly find any phenomenon that has been caused by a single cause. An abundant agricultural harvest in one county will have been affected by nature, by favorable geographic position, by the support of people .... Continued profits by a factory cannot be divorced from such factors as the ability and efficiency of the managers, the technical and educational quality of the staff, and the ideological work of the party committee, and it is related as well to the favorable conditions of convenience of transportation and a reasonable price for resources and the breadth of markets. But some of our reports look only for one cause and set aside all others, this to agree with documents sent down from superiors and to suit the biased publicity focus of a particular moment. It is just like when increasing production or harvests, when the authorities stress ideology and politics it is said to be ideology and politics "showing their power"; when it is time to stress economic responsibility systems, this is said to be "a great achievement of the responsibility systems"; when stressing the educational and technical level of the staff, it is then said that this "is a result of enhancing the education and technical training of the staff." Perhaps all of these things were done, and perhaps they are not actually false, but it is certain that not every effort can truly function in the increase of production and yield. These "articles on demand" are fundamentally not truthful, and the propaganda effects can only be negative.

That I speak in this way is certainly not to advocate that in the reporting of every fact each cause must be sought, but rather that we must try as hard as we can to avoid prejudice, and that when we are stressing a particular cause we must not ignore and even deny the existence of other causes. We want to pay particular attention to situations where there are many causes and only one effect, where the function of the causes on the effect cannot be the same for each cause. There is always a primary cause and secondary ones, as well as direct causes and indirect causes. Our reports ought to embody these distinctions. We should proceed from reality and not simply go on from propaganda from above, and we should practically write most about those causes that serve to determine results.

Third, is where we pay insufficient attention to phenomena that work together causally, and prejudicially emphasize one aspect at the expense of another. For example, the emergence of a new technology or new technique on the industrial front usually brings developments in production, while the applications of new technologies or techniques will undoubtedly become causes for the further development of production. The two are mutually stimulating
and mutually causal. But in some of our reports, in order to show the power of new technologies and new techniques, the background materials make it look as if production before the advent of the new technology or technique was a mess. This sort of report both lacks depth and does not accord with reality.

Fourth, is to take cause for effect or effect for cause. For example, for a certain length of time illegal and criminal activities are rampant, which causes unrest among the people and strict measures by the judicial authorities. In this, the former is the cause and the latter the effect. Also, farmers are not willing to raise hogs because the planned price for live hogs is unreasonable. The former is the cause, the latter the effect. Within this scope, cause and effect are self-determining, are reciprocating, and cannot be both cause and effect, much less can they be reversed. If we say that the wildness of the criminal element is the effect of strict punishment by the judicial authorities, that is "a cornered beast getting desperate," and if we say that the planned price of live hogs is unreasonable is because farmers are not willing to raise hogs, that would be to turn around the relations of cause and effect and the conclusions therefrom will of course be nonsense. Actually, this sort of situation is not common, but the result can be very serious, and we should be forewarned.

III. Confusion of primary aspects with secondary aspects and of necessity with chance.

Any social or natural phenomenon as well as any human thought is an entity of multiple contradictions. Both among the multiple contradictions and also their various aspects there is always inequality, and there are always primary and secondary aspects, necessity and chance, principle contradictions and secondary contradictions, primary aspects to contradictions and secondary aspects ....... And each aspect of each category or contradiction is always a combination of the mutually distinct and reciprocal with the difficult to place. This easily leads to misunderstandings on our parts, which confuses us and treats secondary aspects as primary, and the coincidental as the necessary. Or it can be just the opposite. Therefore, this leads to essential inaccuracies in our reports.

Primary aspects and secondary aspects are two different directions in the developments of things. The fundamental direction in the development of a thing that is determined by the essence is called primary, whereas that direction that is determined by what is non-essential is called secondary. Confusing the dividing line between the primary and the secondary allows reports to create essential errors easily in an overall view. For example, from the viewpoint of the national situation as a whole, the effectiveness of the municipal economic system restructuring has been outstanding, which is a primary aspect. Of course, there are also some problems, from which have appeared secondary functions, or secondary aspects. If our news units go to great lengths to concentrate the reporting of these problems and secondary functions, one would find nothing false by reading these reports as independently as possible, but looking at them overall they tend to give people the impression that the "reform has failed." Another example is that when profits for industries throughout the province are declining, if the provincial papers continue to gather and publish news of great increases in
profits for the minority of the provincial and city industries, this will create an overall tendency to feel that "profits for industries throughout the province are greatly rising." Do these two kinds of conditions constitute "essential inaccuracies?" I believe they do.

Let us look again at two other relations between things—the relations of necessity and chance. By necessity we mean relations and tendencies that in the process of the development of things are in accordance with rules, cannot be avoided, and are imperative. By chance we mean relations that in the development of things can either happen or not, or that can happen in one way or in another way. To confuse the distinction between these two types of relations can often lead to essential inaccuracies in reports at the microcosmic level. Take for example an enterprise, the operational direction and methods of which have determined that its products will not find a market, that price compensation and goods and materials compensation cannot be realized, where there are losses annually, where the debts are piling up, then the basic tendency is toward bankruptcy and there is no way out. But from the point of view of the results from the monthly accounting of this enterprise, there is some gain among the losses, where perhaps the amount of profits for a 2-month period was rather good. This chance occurrence is due to profits from a particular period, and apart from the determination of the tendency toward bankruptcy, there were also effects from other factors. If the chance gains from particular months are selected for reporting, it will give people the impression of "prosperity" for this enterprise. In the sense of appearance, the gains of the particular months are truthful, but from the view of overall tendencies for the whole factory this would lead to an essential inaccuracy.

Lenin once said something very incisive: "In the aspect of social phenomena, there is no method more common nor unreliable than to pick out randomly some particular facts and juggle some examples. Setting out general examples is hardly worthwhile, but this has no significance or has an entirely opposite effect because in actual historical conditions each thing has its own situation. If facts are summarized as a whole and if facts are handled in terms of the relations between them, then facts are not just 'things that speak louder than words,' but are also things that are irrefutable. If they are not summarized as a whole, and when facts are not grasped according to the relations between them, but rather are fragmented and chosen at random, then facts are just a game, and a disjointed one at that." The actual situation is just like this. Inches are just so long, and feet just so short. Any individual and any organization, no matter how advanced or how backward, has its good points and its bad. If the strong points are put together for a report, something that is backward can still give an impression of advancement; if shortcomings are gathered together for a report, then even something advanced can look backward. There is the saying, "If blame is to be laid, any charge can be levied." If efforts are to be glorified, cannot also "any charge be levied?" If this is so, how can we speak of truth and objectivity?

IV. Distortions of the essential.

We know that the essence of things is not randomly determined by people, nor is it what people are accustomed to knowing through actual experience. It is internal relations fixed within things themselves. If some "sage" could
formulate the essential at will, then "essential truthfulness" will have lost its definitive and scientific qualities. For example, the cultural revolution was originally an internal disorder, an unprecedented catastrophe, but our news could only sing the lofty tune of "things are great and getting better," for otherwise there could not have been "essential truth" because "the continuing revolution under the condition of the proletariat dictatorship" was not easy to doubt. The "great leap forward" was after all a great mistake, but all our reports could do was "send up satellites" day in and day out, otherwise it would have been "distorting the essence of things" because it had been acknowledged as "one of the three red flags." A person's family background has no necessary relation to his own essence, but under the long term "leftist" influence, it was customary to lump the two together. When those born as workers or as poor farmers committed mistakes, we always said that they were "born good, had proper roots, and were essentially good." When those of bad family backgrounds made mistakes it was "their natures coming out." In this sense, how can we talk of "essential truthfulness?"

In addition to this, our understanding of essential hierarchical and multiple natures is insufficient and this leads easily to errors in reports. The essence of things is definitely not unitary, for there are first level essentials, second level essentials, and even limitless essentials. Take for example outstanding individuals, with their strategy, their courage and insight, their character, their working spirit, etc., all of which are particular levels of their essence. This is to say that as long as our reports truthfully reflect a level that exists, that can be considered "essential truthfulness." We cannot demand that a report must touch upon each level in the essence of a thing. At the same time, we cannot use a single "essence" in our minds to "unify" everything, for otherwise our reports will tend to exhibit the depressing aspect of "a thousand pieces all alike," which loses essential truthfulness.

As far as news is concerned, "essential truthfulness" is certainly not a principle that exists everywhere.

To understand this problem, we must first make clear in theory the particular characteristics of essence and appearance.

First of all, essence is determined by the fundamental contradictions of things, where before the fundamental contradictions have been resolved there is relative stability, and where appearance then is in motion and changing. Because appearance has these characteristics, it requires that after something happens, reporters and communications personnel immediately come to grips with it in order to transmit it as quickly as possible to the reader (audience). This is also a provision of the nature of news itself. News is the reporting of things that have happened recently. 'New' is one of the essential internal factors. The interest of the reader is to a great degree in this word 'new.' 'New' and 'fast' mean that in many situations we do not have the time to make clear the essence of facts. For example, a fierce fire has reduced several million yuan worth of state property to ashes. Was this fire natural? Was it started from carelessness? Or was it set by scoundrels? All we can do is await investigation. If we wait until all this is made clear before we report it, new news will have become old news.
Second, essence is a general abstract thing that is a part of appearances of the same kind, and appearances are rich, alive, and are things having form and specificity. What the objects for the transmission of news are most interested in are just these facts that are rich, lively, having form, and particular. How is it that this has come about? What is the essence that lies hidden in things? The extent of concern never reaches facts (appearances) themselves. Moreover, essence is definitely not a world apart from appearance, and for the majority of readers the essence can be recognized from the facts (appearances) in our reports. Therefore, for a certain portion of news, as long as the facts are presented those facts need not be explained and the demands of the readers (audience) can still be realized.

Third, essence is a rather hidden thing residing deep within things, something that cannot be seen or felt with the senses, and only by relying on theory and thinking can it be dealt with. Obviously, to go from sensory understanding of the appearance of facts to theoretical understanding of the essence of facts requires either a long or short process. Understanding essence is much more difficult than understanding appearance. Requiring that reporters or communications personnel very quickly grasp the essence of things is not practical. Moreover, this kind of demand is in opposition to effectiveness in time.

Because the characteristics described above exist in the essential and in appearances, this special form of reflection for news that is essential truthfulness need not be a principle that exists everywhere. To demand that all news have both "apparent truthfulness" and at the same time also have "essential truthfulness" is not theoretically tenable, and in actual practice is both unnecessary and hard to do.

In summing what we have discussed above, a conclusion would be that where we must simultaneously prepare news that is "apparently truthful" and "essentially truthful" is only for a small portion of news, chiefly the two following kinds: one, the so-called "non-event news" or "interpretive news" where timeliness is not a strong requirement, where procedures are rather complex, and where to not explicate the essence would be insufficient explanation. For example, the rise and fall of an enterprise, the maturing and destruction of talent, great changes in a remote and backward place, etc. The other kind is the news where although timeliness is a strong requirement, the essence is rather clear and where the essence is the same as the appearances. As for example the rise and fall of commodity prices, new contributions by outstanding individuals, etc. The majority of news, chiefly that we call "event news," requires only preparation of "apparent truthfulness." "Apparent truthfulness" is the common underlying principle of proletariat news, but all news should respect this principle. But the use of "essential truth" is limited to a certain scope, and when compared to "apparent truth" it is a requirement of a higher plane.

12586
CS0: 4005/439
SICHUAN CPC GROUP DISCUSSES RURAL PARTY CONSOLIDATION WORK

Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 29 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] On the evening of 28 November, the Sichuan Provincial CPC Committee's Party Consolidation Work Guidance Group held a province-wide telephone conference in order to carry out the circular of the CPC Central Committee's Party Consolidation Work Guidance Group, whose subject is the planning of rural party consolidation work. The conference specifically arranged for consolidation work among Sichuan's grass-roots party units below the county level.

Participating in last night's conference were the secretaries of the party committees of every prefecture, city, autonomous prefecture and county, as well as their deputy secretaries in charge of party consolidation work, members of party consolidation work guidance groups, directors and deputy directors of party consolidation offices and responsible comrades from relevant province-level departments. Comrade Feng Zhenwu [7458 2182 0124], a member of the Provincial Party Committee's Party Consolidation Work Guidance Group, presided over the conference. The Committee's Vice Chairman, Comrade Wang Nengdian [3769 5174 0368], read out the group's suggestions for the launching of consolidation work among the grass-roots party units below the county level (his full text is published elsewhere).

Comrade Nie Ronggui [5119 2837 6311], Deputy Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee and Deputy Leader of its Party Consolidation Work Guidance Group spoke about how to carry out both the spirit of the CPC Central Committee's Party Consolidation Work Guidance Group and the suggestions for Sichuan itself. He also addressed the issue of how to do party consolidation work well. He said that according to the plan of the Central Committee's Party Consolidation Work Guidance Group, the suggestions for Sichuan's grass-roots party consolidation have already been discussed and approved by the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee. Hence he asked every prefecture, city, autonomous prefecture and county party committee to earnestly study and carry out those suggestions in the light of local conditions.

Comrade Nie Ronggui said that Sichuan's grass-roots party consolidation work must continue to be done on the basis of party consolidation at the prefectural and county levels. Since the last CPC congress, much party consolidation work has been done on those levels everywhere with a certain
success, but some problems have yet to be properly solved. It is necessary to resolutely carry out the series of directives from the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on the checking of unhealthy tendencies. Starting with the leadership, each level must shoulder its full responsibility and solve all problems with the party work style one by one. Units that have not solved their principal problems can neither announce the conclusion of party consolidation nor launch grass-roots party consolidation.

He said that grass-roots party consolidation below the county level must proceed in a planned way, as well as by stages and in groups and that experiments must be done first. Proper preparation is essential: there must be no headlong rush into this work. Every locality has to have a concrete plan in advance, organize its forces well and prepare good material for study. Every locality must also do an investigation to identify the very few leading groups that are manifestly unable to take on the task of party consolidation. Such groups are to be reorganized. After the start of grass-roots party consolidation, educational work among party members must be emphasized. Quality must be ensured; no one can merely go through the motions. In the process of party consolidation, every locality has to pay attention to some important policy issues and propose realistic ways of handling them. Many problems at the grass roots are directly related to the work of our leading organs. When guiding grass-roots party consolidation and solving grass-roots problems of all kinds, the province, the prefectures, the cities, the autonomous prefectures and the counties have to earnestly sum up their own experiences and lessons and conscientiously improve the work of the leading organs.

Lastly, Comrade Nie Ronggui emphasized that grass-roots party consolidation is a wide-ranging, enormous and decentralized task done under complex circumstances. Party committees at all levels must enhance their leadership. The provinces, the cities, the prefectures and the autonomous prefectures have to send cadres down to help in this work. Secretaries of county party committees have to stress party consolidation personally. Party consolidation work groups must grow stronger. This winter and this coming spring, the number of meetings at the provincial and prefectural levels must be reduced to a minimum. The main leading cadres in county party committees must leave their counties as infrequently as possible, concentrate their efforts on doing party consolidation work well and guarantee the accomplishment of party consolidation and economic tasks.
DISCIPLINE INSPECTION WORK IN YUNNAN PROVINCE PLANNED

Kunming YUNNAN RIBAO in Chinese 6 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by staff reporter Song Xiaolin [1345 2556 2651]: "Strive To Bring About a Fundamental Change for the Better in the Party's Style of Work and General Mood of Society; Provincial Discipline Inspection Commission Work Conference Meets; Luo Yuntong Plans Next Phase of Discipline Inspection Work"]

[Text] A meeting of Yunnan Provincial Discipline Inspection Work Conference was held yesterday afternoon in Kunming. Luo Yuntong [5012 6663 6639], deputy secretary of the Provincial Discipline Inspection Commission, was entrusted by that body to plan the province-wide discipline inspection work for this winter and next spring.

The principal task of this session of the provincial discipline inspection work conference is to organize responsible discipline inspection commission personnel at various levels to conscientiously study the documents of the National Conference of Party Delegates, get a clear understanding of the situation, unify perceptions, and further strengthen the building of socialist spiritual civilization and the party's work style. For over 10 days, the comrades attending the conference have sat in on meetings of the provincial CPC committee and county secretariat, listened to important speeches by responsible provincial CPC committee comrades, and on the basis of studying the spirit of the National Conference of Party Delegates, held discussions on how to accomplish Yunnan's discipline inspection work. Everyone believes that this conference has served to deepen the awareness of the importance of the party's discipline inspection work in the near era, bring about a relatively unanimous view on the present state of the party's work style throughout the province, strengthen the enforcement of party discipline, restore confidence in the party's work style, and heighten the sense of urgency and responsibility. Everyone also contributed many constructive ideas and suggestions on how to hereafter work towards bringing about a fundamental turn for the better in the party's work style and general mood of society.

Comrade Luo Yuntong commented at yesterday's meeting that along with China's commitment to carrying out the policy of opening to the outside world and invigorating the domestic economy, some decadent bourgeoisie influences can
also invade the party's interior, making our struggle especially intense. Our discipline inspection cadres at all levels must gain a sober awareness of this, and can never lower their guard.

Under the leadership of the party committee, we must wage a resolute struggle against unhealthy tendencies and behavior which violates the law and disrupts discipline within the party, and guarantee the smooth progress of reform and the building of the four modernizations. In addition, with regard to the province-wide discipline inspection work for this winter and next spring, Luo Yuntong set forth five requirements:

1. Study in earnest and abide by the documents of the National Conference of Party Delegates, and employ the spirit of the National Conference of Party Delegates to unify the thoughts and actions of all discipline inspection cadres.

2. Earnestly conduct a major inspection of the party's work style, focusing the inspection on the problems of building a socialist spiritual civilization, and the party's work style and discipline. Let self-inspections serve as the primary means, to be supplemented by higher-level party committee inspections; pay attention to your own main problems and actual circumstances in conducting inspections, and do not talk in generalities; stress action—in particular, the problems of leading cadres at all levels must be seriously investigated and dealt with.

3. Assign responsibility at various levels, investigate and deal with large and serious cases. The provincial committee takes a very serious view of this problem; we must define the task, determine the leadership, and prescribe time limits for those most harmful cases involving the most odious of circumstances to be handled and grasped, processing one case after another and refusing to be soft-hearted under any circumstances. From now on, party committees at various levels must earnestly sum up the experiences and lessons of each case they handle, and teach both cadres and the masses to observe discipline and uphold the law.

4. Conscientiously clean up and rectify all types of "companies" and "centers." And through this clean-up and rectification, protect what is lawful, ban what is unlawful, strike a blow against serious law breakers and criminals, and ensure that the reform of the economic structure proceeds normally. The scope of this work is vast, the amount great, and it is an important policy issue; discipline inspection commissions must actively coordinate with the party committees in order to grasp this work.

5. Sum up in earnest the favorable experiences gained in promoting an emphasis on the party's work style. The work of discipline inspection commissions must seek to uphold good and suppress evil; do not merely investigate and deal with cases of disciplinary infractions, but vigorously publicize and promote those party members whose strong party spirit and honest and upright ways make them advanced models.
Comrade Luo Yuntong closed by saying that to accomplish this work, it must be combined with the work of party rectification and reform; teaching of the party spirit must be carried out; discipline must be rigorously enforced; the self-construction work of discipline inspection commissions at various levels must be successfully completed; and making investigations and studies must be strengthened. In short, discipline inspection cadres at all levels must maintain political unanimity with the CPC Central Committee, seek truth from facts, meet with resistance head-on, work hard to usher in a new phase of discipline inspection work, allow the party and the people to rest assured and be satisfied, and make contributions to the building of two civilizations.

Comrade Chen Bò [7115 2330] of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission also spoke at yesterday's meeting.

13188/6662
CSO: 4005/304
SOUTHWEST REGION

IMPROVEMENT OF YUNNAN'S GOVERNMENT, PARTY WORK STYLE DIRECTED

Kunming YUNNAN RIBAO in Chinese 13 Dec 85 pp 1, 4

[Text] The General Offices of both the Yunnan Provincial CPC Committee and the Yunnan Provincial Government recently issued a circular that requires party and government organs at all levels to earnestly implement a circular issued by the General Offices of both the CPC Central Committee and the State Council. The latter circular concerns the solution of a few serious problems with the current work style in those organs. The point is to conscientiously improve the organs' work style and to eradicate all forms of corruption.

The former circular requires party and government organs at all levels to follow the directives of the Central Committee and the State Council and—in accordance with the requirements of the circular issued by those two bodies' General Offices—to solve the following problems completely:

1. Party committees at all levels must take very seriously and handle earnestly the solution to the grave problems now besetting party and government organs. The central government's circular fully affirms the main trends in party and government organs at all levels since party consolidation and sharply points out some grave problems with those organs. Moreover, it demands that six problems be solved completely during the winter and this coming spring. All this tallies completely with the reality in Yunnan, and so we must study that circular. We will unify thought and consciousness and resolutely implement the circular. We certainly have to note soberly that the following things do occur to varying degrees in Yunnan's party and government organs and that some are still fairly serious: frantic engagement in the purchase of imported cars; the dispatch of too many personnel abroad under all pretexts; the squandering of public funds on tourism everywhere and on entertainment and gifts for others; the exploitation of authority to be in business for profit; the earning of improper income, even to the point of fraud, extortion, speculation, swindling and other unhealthy tendencies. Although such problems affect a minority of units and personnel, they are still harming the party's and the government's prestige among the masses, corrupting the party's work style and the general mood of society and impeding the smooth progress of reform and the four modernizations. The gravity and perniciousness of these problems must be adequately recognized and absolutely cannot be treated lightly. We must resolutely and earnestly solve the problems affecting the organs' work style; we absolutely cannot turn a deaf
ear to the central government's directive and persist in our old ways. For us, implementation of the central government's circular has to become an important part of the implementation of the spirit of both the national party congress and the conference of the secretaries of Yunnan's county party committees. We must conscientiously check unhealthy tendencies and eradicate all forms of corruption.

2. We must combine initiative by the leadership with surveillance by the masses in order to investigate and take care of the problems affecting the organs' work style. Party organizations everywhere must immediately transmit the entire central government circular to all of their working personnel, organize them for purposes of realistic study and discussion and mobilize everybody to expose unhealthy tendencies within the organs. Leading cadres have to set a personal example, study the documents well, conduct conscientious investigations, take the initiative in transforming work style and exemplarily implement the series of directives from the Central Committee and the State Council on the checking of unhealthy tendencies.

All this is the key to rectifying the organs' work style. Everybody from the Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Government down to the leading cadres of every department in every locality must maintain strict discipline, beginning with himself or herself, and set an example in the establishment of a fine work style for the organs. Before the Spring Festival, the Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Government's party organizations, along with the party committees and party organizations of every department in every locality, must have a conference on party activities, in which they will tackle the main problems in accordance with the requirements of the central government's circular and with the masses' suggestions. They will conduct investigations item by item and earnestly launch criticism and self-criticism. Moreover, they will announce the investigations' circumstances and the suggestions for handling them to all of their own organs' working personnel and accept the masses' criticism and supervision. The records of these conferences on party activities will be sent to party committees at higher levels.

3. We must resolutely check unhealthy tendencies and maintain party and government discipline. Whenever an investigation turns up any kind of unhealthy tendency, it must be disposed earnestly of. After our subordinate units report the elimination of unhealthy tendencies, they must be subject to planned spot checks and key investigations. Given serious circumstances, whoever exerts odious influence among the masses will be severely punished in accordance with the relevant policies and regulations. Whoever should be punished in the party and the government will be punished. Whoever should be punished by law by the state's political and legal organs will be so punished with no leniency whatsoever. Those who conceal facts, resort to deception or otherwise impede investigation and resolution will get heavier punishment, and, moreover, the leaders' responsibility will be investigated and affixed. Those who persist in major unhealthy tendencies after study and apparent purification will receive additional punishment. In the process of rectifying the organs' work style, we must take care to sum up and apply typical examples of good and bad behavior, become closely involved in instruction about party
spirit, discipline and work style and conscientiously intensify ideological and political work.

4. We have to enhance our leadership and clarify our responsibilities. The Provincial Party Committee has decided that Comrades Li Shuji [2621 2885 1015], Liu Shusheng [0491 2885 3932] and Jin Renging [6855 0086 1987] are responsible for this work. The party committees and organizations of every department in every locality must directly lead and be directly responsible for investigating and solving work style problems in the party and government organs in their own areas and systems as well as in the organs of their own departments. They must also charge leading comrades with responsibility for crack work groups to which cadres with strong party spirit and correct party work style will be assigned. Disciplinary, political and legal committees and organ party committees at all levels, along with auditing, industrial and commercial, financial and other departments—under the leadership of the party committees and the government—must make the solution of the few serious problems with current organ work style a top priority and must strive for that solution conscientiously. They must dare to uphold principle and knock heads. Once they discover a problem, they have to tackle it until it is solved.

5. We must do research and propose measures for improvement, and we must establish feasible rules and regulations. The problems facing us exist in the following areas among others: the ordering, purchase and use of cars; the composition, examination and approval of groups that go abroad; the control of and arrangements for personnel who go abroad to visit or study; the expenditures for conferences; and the use of administrative funds. Based on the investigation and solution of these problems, we must do item-by-item studies and draw up measures for improvement and establish a system of strong control so that the broad masses of cadres, the masses themselves and the relevant departments can supervise and plug loopholes.

6. The investigation and disposal of organs' unhealthy tendencies by every departments at the prefectural, autonomous prefectural, city and provincial levels must be specially reported at one time to the Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Government before the Spring Festival. In the spirit of seeking truth from facts, the reports must reflect reality, contain specific facts and the necessary statistics, describe results and offer measures for improvement. They must not deal in generalities.

12570
CSO: 4005/395
BEIJING DEVELOPS VOCATIONAL, TECHNICAL EDUCATION

Beijing ZHONGGUO JIAOYU BAO in Chinese 29 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by staff reporter Sa Zhaoxiang [5646 0340 3276]: "Vocational and Technical School Enrollment Exceeds Ordinary Senior Middle School Enrollment; Of 12,000-plus Students Trained in Vocational Senior Middle Schools During Last 5 Years, Over 90 Percent Currently Employed"]

[Text] Since 1980, Beijing Municipality has taken effective measures to convert a portion of its ordinary senior middle schools into vocational senior middle schools, while simultaneously restoring and expanding polytechnic and secondary technical schools. Up until now, the number of vocational senior middle schools throughout the municipality's towns and villages has expanded to 178. Add to this the number of polytechnic and secondary technical schools, this year's student enrollment in vocational and technical schools throughout the municipality has already reached 40,000, surpassing that of ordinary senior middle schools.

According to findings, over the past 5 years, four classes of over 12,000 students have already graduated from Beijing Municipality vocational senior middle schools, and over 90 percent of them are employed by various units. By the time they assume their posts, their professional mentality is solid, their adaptability great, and they are warmly received. Particularly in those service industries which face critical personnel shortages, employment units stake out the entire student body before they even graduate.

When setting up vocational senior middle schools, Beijing Municipality determines that the scale of these schools and their specialized curriculum should center on the needs of economic construction and society. To solve the problem of the severe lack of preschool teachers, 17 middle schools in the entire municipality offer courses on preschool education and child-care. To alleviate the masses' "difficulties in making clothes," 11 middle schools offer courses on clothes making. In light of the increasing popularity of home appliances, 9 middle schools offer courses on appliance maintenance. This year, some vocational schools have added new courses on 24 professions including auditing, cosmetology, film making, etc.

The vocational technical education of Beijing Municipality is conducted on a multi-level, multi-standard basis. Now, in addition to 4-year polytechnic
schools which train primarily middle level skilled workers, and three- and
two-year vocational senior middle schools which train middle level skilled
workers and primary level management personnel, there are short-term training
courses of a year's length or less for training skilled workers in less com-
plicated industrial professions, as well as specialized courses for develop-
ing urgently needed business skills. There are vocational senior middle
schools that are co-managed by the education department and the vocational
department, and schools that are managed independently by either department.
These forms of running vocational education have guaranteed educational fund-
ing and employment for graduates. Since 1980, the Beijing Municipality Fi-
nance Bureau and relevant departments allocated over 9.9 million yuan in
funds for the education department to self-manage vocational education; in
1984, the Municipal Finance Bureau began listing vocational education ex-
penses in its budget. This year, Dongcheng and Xicheng Districts each alloca-
ted 200,000 yuan to improve the conditions of running technical education
for workers and staff. The Municipal Statistics Bureau allocated 430,000
yuan for a school of statistics and planning by Middle School No 199. The
Municipal Commodity Price Bureau allocated 1.2 million yuan for a commodity
price school operated by Middle School No 74; the Municipal Printing Corpora-
tion invested 400,000 yuan for a printing school operated by Middle School
No 58, and so on.

At present, Beijing Municipality already has 1,250 instructors for its voca-
tional education specialty classes, among which 770 are full-time instructors.
The municipality is also transforming a section of Beijing Normal University
into a base which specializes in developing qualified vocational technical
instructors.

13188/6662
CS0: 4005/304
PROBLEMS FOR AGED IN ONE-CHILD FAMILIES ANALYZED

Tianjin TIANJIN SHEHUI KEXUE [SOCIAL SCIENCES IN TIANJIN] in Chinese No 5, 15 Oct 85 pp.47-52

[Article by Bian Yanmao [6708 3601 2638]: "Increase in One-child Families and Future Family Living Problems for the Elderly"]

[Excerpt] The lives of the elderly can be divided into the three basic aspects of personal life, family life, and social life. The vast majority of China's elderly spend their last years with their families, so studying and solving the problems the elderly have in family life are very important. The Chinese government's policy since the late seventies of encouraging couples to have just one child has made the number of one-child families increase rapidly. Recently, interesting macroscopic research has been done on the problems for the elderly this could cause but little work has yet been done to integrate microscopic and macroscopic analyses. This article is intended to be a preliminary exploration of this problem, taking Tianjin Municipality as the case study to integrate the microscopic and macroscopic approaches.

I

According to the statistics in 1979, fewer than 100,000 or 6 percent of the families in Tianjin Municipality had just 1 child; by 1983 these figures had risen to 460,000 or 24 percent of all the families in Tianjin Municipality. Considering that over the next 15 years the flexible birth policy will affect a small minority, preliminary predictions are that by 1990 the number of one-child families in the municipality will exceed 50 percent of the total and by 1995 will pass 70 percent. The growing popularity and rapid increase in the number of one-child households are drawing attention from many quarters. In 1983, under the guidance of the famed sociologist Wu Zelin [0702 3419 7207], I undertook a 1-year survey of more than 1,000 one-child families and other families in the urban and rural areas of Tianjin Municipality. I summarize the results below:

1. Family type. Family type is an overall expression of family structure, size, and organization. Using this "overall expression," I divide the families into these types: 1) families which are residentially and economically completely independent; 2) families living with parents or neighbors but economically independent; and 3) families living together with parents
and economically making up a large family. The results of the survey of every family type in the urban and rural areas of Tianjin Municipality are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban one-child families (%)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other urban families (%)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural one-child families (%)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other rural families (%)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the table above we can see that in the urban and rural areas of the Tianjin Municipality, Type 1 encompasses the great majority of families and should be considered the developmental trend of the family type. Type 2 has the fewest families; this can be explained by taking Type 2 as a short-lived transitional form between the Type 1 and Type 3 households. Type 3 with three generations under one roof, is still significant, comprising between one-fourth and one-fifth the total number of families. Close examination of Type 3 families during the survey showed that the existence of this type of family is usually closely related to the solution of feeding, care, and other living problems of the elderly. This inspired us to consider together the change in the family type, the increase in the number of one-child families, and the living problems of the elderly.

2. Family economics. Comparing families with one child and other families in the cities and towns where able-bodied people generally find work and in the rural areas where people generally participate in production and household income is stable and sure, the per-capita income in one-child families is higher and more stable since there are fewer people in the family. Thus per-capita spending is also high and stable and the amount of money spent on raising the child increases greatly. Results calculated in the 1983 survey of family spending on raising children show: for raising a child from birth to 10 years of age a one-child family spends 4,280 yuan, 29 percent more than other families and 31 percent above the 1979 adjusted national average. Rural one-child families spent 1,392 yuan, 10 percent more than other families and 80 percent above the 1979 adjusted national average.

3. Desire for children and preference for sex of child. There are still a contradiction and a gap between reproductive behavior and the desire for children. Survey results show that 75 percent of all parents think that one boy and one girl are ideal; 20 percent believe one child is best no matter whether it is a boy or a girl; under 1 percent believe it is better not to have children (one father and four mothers); and 4 percent want three or more children. The tradition of valuing males and belittling females is connected to the idea of "raising a boy for a secure old age." However, when the survey of urban couples of reproductive age asked, "From the standpoint of being supported when you are old, how many boys and girls do you want?" 6 percent wanted one boy and one girl; 11 percent wanted one child regardless of sex; 6 percent wanted just one boy; 12 percent wanted just one girl; and 4 percent wanted no children. These statistics show that in the city, even when the problem of support in old age is raised, not only are boys and girls equally
valued but the proportion of couples desiring girls was higher. This shows that the change in the degree of dependence of elderly people on their children for their family life warrants close attention.

4. Importance attached to and expectations placed on raising children. Parents of daughters who are only children place unusual stress on raising and educating their daughters which is clearly distinct from the situation of a daughter in a family with several children. This great progressive trend is changing the way children are raised in China's urban and rural areas. This stress on and strengthening of the raising of children, although they have some unbalanced aspects as the child grows up, as for example in knowledge but neglects the nurturing of virtue and character and can give the only child some disharmonious characteristics, strengthen the socialization of this generation of only children and provide them with the material and spiritual conditions for healthy growth. The results of surveys show that the average achievements of only children in language, mobility, courtesy, and learning not only exceed those of their contemporaries in families with more than one child. Moreover, the expectations of parents of only children are different from those of parents with more than one child. The parents of only children, when discussing their goal in raising a child, say they want to "raise a talent" (60 percent), while the parents of more than one child want to raise "a person who obeys the rules and develops naturally" (80 percent). When considering the future occupation of their only child, 95 percent of the parents do not want or actually oppose their child leaving them to join the army or go to the interior to study or work.

5. Special family structure and family relations. Sociologists call the mother, father, and children of families the "fundamental family triangle" and state that this is the structural basis for the existence and stable development of the family, otherwise known as the nuclear family. Equipped with this concept, we see that the fundamental triangle of the family with an only child is a "pure" triangle structure because it has just three points and three sides. This determines the structure of the one-child family. The first characteristic of the one-child family is that no member is dispensable; if one member is missing the triangle and the family no longer exists. The second is that members cannot be substituted in the same way as one child can substitute for another in families with more than one child. The third characteristic is no choice—the child is the random product of one birth and therefore the duties of son and of daughter are borne by one person. The special family status and the effects of the one-child family together with the Chinese values of stressing children and the family are making the relationship between parents and children more of a child-centered relationship.

II

What effect will the basic characteristics and changes in the one-child family described above have on the family living problems elderly people will confront in the future? I believe that within the next 10-25 years elderly people will face the four following challenges growing out of changes in family life:
1. The challenge of family dissolution and reorganization. The nature of family organization is understood differently in different countries and among different peoples, cultures, and points of view. Three views are the most common ones. The first hold that the commodity economy, the scientific and technological revolution, and the development of modernization have changed ties between family members from being close to loose. The second view states that relations between husbands and wives and between parents and children become weaker as family problems develop and the family loses its traditional meaning. The third view is that once the children become adults and move away or get married and start a new family, the couple either singly or together keep the "empty nest" or the "empty bed." Here I will proceed using the third point of view. "Family reorganization" means that a new element enters the family, which makes the family organize itself anew. In Western countries the dissolution and reorganization of families are extremely common social phenomena. This is not true in China. Due to socioeconomic conditions and the tradition of having many children as well as the long-established practice of the family taking care of the elderly when children marry and especially when the son takes a wife, they continue to live together with the old couple, creating the very common phenomenon of the original family expanding into an extended family. Thus, people generally are accustomed to and prefer this kind of family reorganization and find the dissolution and reorganization of families strange and undesirable. This preference can be accommodated in society with families that have many sons and daughters. However, in a society in which only children are common the situation is very different. More than 95 percent of the couples entering their reproductive years between 1980 and 2000 will establish one-child households. The survey indicates that the oldest of the children among one-child families is about 10 years old. If the average age at marriage is 25 (current figures for Tianjin Municipality are 27 for males and 25 for females), then these only children beginning in the year 2000 will enter one after another in the marriageable population. This will make marriages between only children common from then until after the year 2025. Thus about half of the parents of only children will face the challenge of family dissolution! Between 1975 and 2000 an average of 1 million couples a year will get married and have children. This will mean that between 2000 and 2025 in the entire municipality about 1 million families will face this challenge of family dissolution. Why say that this kind of family dissolution is a challenge? First of all, because it changes rapidly the family living situation. In families with several children the process of children marrying and leaving the family occurs in steps. This cushions the blow on family living, which does not change suddenly, and the parents find it easier to adapt or adjust. When on only child leaves the family to marry, it is the first time and the last time and thus is a sudden blow to family living, making it harder for the parents to adapt or adjust. Second, it ends the family's history as a fundamental family triangle. The object of the parent's love and effort has been taken away by the departing child.

2. The challenge of the family's material livelihood. The problem of the family living for the elderly can be abstractly divided into the three categories of economic support, care for their everyday lives, and spiritual support. These three interrelated questions form on overall problem which is
separated only for analytical simplicity. People ordinarily only pay attention to the problem of economic support and even equate this question with the problem of family living for the elderly. This is incomplete. The challenge of the family's material livelihood discussed here refers to both economic support and care for their everyday lives. From microscopic analysis we find not only that in the city economic support is not a problem but that the parents of an only child in their old age can aid financially their married child. In the rural areas economic support is a problem and in 20 years it will still be a challenge in relatively backward areas and villages. Where the household responsibility system of linking remuneration to output is widely practiced and one-child families are popular and growing, the problem of how to support the elderly is a current problem and is a strategic planning problem for overall plans covering the next 50 to 100 years. The research of Comrade Li Zongxian [7812 1350 3759] into peasant old age pensions in the suburbs of Tianjin shows that villages with an average per-capita income of over 200 yuan have the collective economic conditions to implement a retirement system. According to 1980 statistics, 202 villages (26.4 percent) give an average of 17 yuan a month to elderly retirees. This is a good system set up by the people. Whether they live in the city or in the country, this problem of caring for the family material livelihood of the elderly will be a challenge facing the parents of only children whose family dissolves and is reorganized when they are old and feeble. Care for the daily lives of the elderly is related to their material livelihood. A person needs the help and company of their children in their daily lives. In many daily activities connected to clothing, eating, and housing and social activities with relatives, friends, and neighbors, if help and companionship cannot be obtained from a spouse, then one must obtain this help from one's own children. This is especially true of elderly widows and widowers. Second, the help of children with family chores is needed. The survey shows that elderly people have many family chores that must be done by children. Third, the elderly desperately need their children's care when they are sick. Our country promotes the idea that "the elderly shall have medical care" by strengthening medical and sanitation work in order to provide the elderly with conveniences and guarantees; however, when the elderly become sick, it is only through the constant care of their children that they can be freed from cares and pass their last years in tranquility.

3. The challenge of the family's spiritual life. The challenge of the family's spiritual life is serious not only for an elderly person whose family is dissolving but also for the elderly person whose family is dissolving and being reorganized. Here are listed some of the spiritual problems of the elderly after their families have dissolved: 1) Psychological costs. After their child has married and left home the parent will pay a serious psychological cost. This psychological cost is principally expressed by the abrupt ending of life together beginning with the pain and joy of the child's birth, difficulties and patience in raising the child, strictness and high expectations in the child's education, worries and selflessness in caring for the child when he or she is ill, and the harmony and joy of leisure activities. All these psychological satisfactions and psychological costs (which can also be considered a form of satisfaction) from constant contact with the child are gone and replaced by a kind of spiritual pressure.
2) Loneliness and depression. Once the child is gone, the family dissolves and life changes at first, giving the parents a sense of loneliness in their family life, and then they fall into a indefinable depression. During infancy and childhood the lives of the parents revolved around the child, most spending was for the child's benefit, their emotions were focused on the child, and their lives were spent satisfying the child as the parents got satisfaction as parents from revolting about the child. Once the child leaves (has in the sociological sense split off from family relations to have a relationship as a kind of relative) loneliness and depression come to the lives of these elderly people. Loneliness and depression appear after the elderly couple cannot adjust to leaving their only son or daughter as they become more lonely as their opportunities to see their only son or daughter decrease. 3) Loss of interest in entertainment. When the elderly leave their social occupational system their leisure time greatly increases. The desire for entertainment grows steadily less important because entertainment becomes lively through the companionship of the child whom they were able to enjoy as "family happiness." However, since the child after marrying and leaving home is busy at work the opportunities of the elderly to have this kind of joy become fewer. As this kind of family enjoyment becomes less and less common they can only enjoy the television screen. Therefore, many of the elderly expand the range of activities they enjoy to gardening, raising birds, visiting parks, shadowboxing, weaving, playing poker, etc. Some elderly people have no hobbies and have nothing to do so they seek out their friends in the neighborhood with whom they can chat, gossip, and pass the time. 4) Limited field of vision. For the lives of the elderly to be meaningful and lively they should be in contact with youths and middle-aged people in the middle of their active lives and with growing youths and children in order to expand their field of intellectual vision, raise their level of consciousness, and keep in the forefront of progress. Children are an excellent bridge between the elderly and every area of society. Once the family has dissolved, once contact between the elderly and their children becomes less frequent, and once the time to exchange ideas becomes less, this affects and sometimes even cuts off the transmission of all kinds of social information through middle aged persons and youths (children) to the elderly. This makes many old people narrow-minded and closed to new information. 5) The problem of the "emotional safety valve." People are emotional animals; emotional needs are among the fundamental human needs and are also among the fundamental needs of the elderly. The elderly need to share their feelings with other people and to let off their emotions; they need especially to share their emotions with their children and to let off their emotions with them. However, since their children are not with them, the elderly cannot satisfy this need in a timely manner, or since they cannot satisfy this need at all, they lose the "emotional safety valve" for adjusting their psychology. Thus many old people suffer from the psychological disorders of the elderly. There are many problems in the spiritual lives; these are just a few examples. Since many of the problems the elderly have are due to lack of contact with their children the new problem arises of the elderly couple competing for the attention of their child. This is a change worth paying attention to.
4. The challenge of changing the values of the family and of the children. The challenges listed above in the end come down to changing the present and especially traditional family values and the values of children. Furthermore, the problem of the dissolution and reorganization of the family and the problem of family material livelihood and spiritual life for the parents of only children when they are old, and whether or not it will become a present challenge, and the seriousness of the challenge will, except for contemporary socioeconomic conditions, depend very largely on the family values of the these elderly people and how the values of the young have changed. It will depend on how thoroughly they meet the challenge of changing current and especially traditional family values and the values of the young. The most important characteristic of traditional family values is the stress on the family. The family is the basis for each individual's existence--the life of the individual depends on it. The family is more important than the individual. Compared with the individualism of the West, the "ideology of me first," Eastern civilization makes people stress the family. Since the level of socialization of human services in our country is relatively low, urban and rural families fulfill many social functions and the family satisfies many of the people's basic needs. Thus the influence of traditional family values and children's values on the present values of families and of children is very profound. Economic and social revolution, the development and practice of modernization, and the reform of lifestyles and ideology will strongly attack those elements in the traditional values of families and of children which are not suitable to social progress. We shall need to establish new values suitable to social progress. This historic task will be the responsibility of the middle aged and youth of the present, the young, the children, and the generation about to be born, that is, on the parents of the children born before the close of this century and the children themselves. This section of the population will experience a long period of China's social and economic reform; the reality of the reforms will make them open to new ideologies, new values, and new lifestyles; make them set aside the traditional values of stressing the family and children; and choose the new values of stressing society and stressing the individual. Moreover, this section of the population will all live in a one-child family and belong to the category of the "one-child family population" and all will have received the distinct influence of that type of family. One important influence is this: as parents they will face a particular objective situation of family dissolution and reorganization which will require them to take a realistic attitude; as children their lives and the lives of most of their contemporaries will be that of the one-child family; their lives and the socioeconomic reality about them will be those of the 2000's; and thus they may very well choose to have a small family and tend to have a new type of family values and of values as children. However, changes in values require a certain socioeconomic basis and require certain sociocultural conditions. This is also a painful process. Once the values of a generation have been formed it is difficult to change them. The parents of only children will confront this challenge when they enter the ranks of the elderly.
HEILONGJIANG OFFICIALS EXCHANGE WORK EXPERIENCES AT MEETING

Harbin HEILONGJIANG RIBAO in Chinese 17 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by staff reporter: "Chairmen of Heilongjiang's Municipal- and County-level People's Congress Standing Committees Hold Symposium To Exchange Work Experience and Enhance Functioning of Regional State Power Apparatus; Provincial Party Committee Deputy Secretary and Governor Hou Jie Stresses: Government of All Levels Must Conscientiously Submit to Supervision of Its People's Congress and Its Standing Committee"]

[Text] The 4-day symposium for provincewide municipal- and county-level people's congress standing committee was concluded on the 15th of this month. The symposium proposed to strengthen the performance of the people's congress committees by following the directions of the spirit of the party plenary session and to strive to enhance the functioning of the regional state power apparatus.

Hou Jie [0186 2212], provincial committee deputy secretary and provincial governor, attended the meeting and delivered a speech. He stressed that governments of every level must be responsible to their respective people's congresses and their standing committees and consciously accept their supervision. He indicated that certain government officials currently do not have a sufficient understanding of democracy, the law, and the "state" concept. They are only concerned with executing the party lines and policies while ignoring the functioning of the law. These officials are not accustomed to responding to the state power apparatus' demands and reporting to it, and they are not accustomed to using the democratic and "state" method in their work. They do not take the initiative in bringing to the people's congress standing committee those serious issues that should be discussed at its meetings, and they do not study conscientiously and execute thoroughly the decisions and resolutions endorsed by their standing committees. This is unacceptable.

There are three requisite conditions for government agencies in submitting to the supervision of their state power apparatus:

1. To take the positive initiative in reporting to the people's congress and its standing committee on work done and work in progress. Any issue that must, according to the constitution or the law and regulation, be presented to the people's congress and its standing committee for consideration and decision. The government agency must present them on its own initiative and on its own accord.
2. To study, organize, and implement conscientiously any local regulations, rulings, and decisions passed by the people's congress and its standing committee and to present timely reports on the state of their execution.

3. To hear attentively and process any criticisms, opinions, and suggestions presented by the people's representatives, to place all the government agencies under the supervision of the people's representatives and the people represented, and to tighten incessantly the bond between the government and the people.

In concluding the symposium, Chen Yuanzhi [7115 0337 4160], vice chairman of the provincial people's congress standing committee, pointed out that the Congress indicated that "it is imperative that we further advance socialist democracy, solidify the socialist legal system, and strengthen legal education to ensure and support the construction of our socialist material and spiritual civilization" and that all levels of regional people's congress standing committees, by striving to exercise their powers given under law, should mobilize the masses to implement conscientiously and thoroughly the said plan. He also pointed out that the Party Congress has endorsed the propositions concerning the Seventh 5-year Plan, and our province and all its cities and counties are also going to discuss and decide on their respective regional Seventh 5-year Plan projects during their people's congress sessions next year.

We have to apply ourselves fully to the global and strategic major event of the Seventh 5-year Plan and to strengthen our economic policy decisions from a global perspective. As soon as the Seventh 5-year Plan is ratified, the people's congresses of all levels must act on their resolutions to urge their respective governments to get down to work; meanwhile they must also hear debriefings, present opinions, and recommendations or make resolutions and decisions to reform and help create a sound and healthy economic environment and to enhance a constant, stable, and balanced economic growth for the citizenry of our province.

We also have to coordinate our regional legislation to center around reform and economic development. Regional legislation is the extension of state legislation, and we must speed up our progress in this aspect. Meanwhile, we must also strengthen our legal education and enhance the development of our spiritual civilization. We also stressed that people's congress committees at all levels must do a good job at supervising to ensure the unhampered progress of reform and economic development. In the course of implementing the Seventh 5-year Plan, the regional people's congress committee must rely on people's representatives to improve the supervision work in the following three areas:

1. Government legal supervision. Point out in time the problems to the units that are slack in legal conformity and make constructive suggestions for amendment; all violators of laws, regulations, and resolutions of the people's congress, whoever they may be, must be admonished and, if necessary, punished as prescribed by law. If any decisions or directives issued by the government of the same level as the people's congress are found to contradict the constitution or the law, the people's congress committee must make decisions accordingly to change or cancel the offending rules. The people's congress committee
should also closely supervise the "two courts" to ensure the strengthened investigation and judgment of economic cases and to prosecute any and all criminal offenders who cause serious harm to the socialist economic and social order and endanger people's rights. All ugly and evil phenomena that pose a serious threat to the purity of our social customs are to be stopped and prohibited. The problems of "not abiding by law, not enforcing the law, not prosecuting lawbreakers, and not striking hard enough" must be soundly resolved.

2. Government work supervision. Carefully and attentively listen to the work appraisal reports of the government and the "two courts," get a good handle on the issues that have the masses' general concern and strong interest, take hold of the cases that typify the trend of opportunist exploitation of the current tide of reform and of evildoing in the loopholes of change, and support the concerned government agencies in exercising their duties and powers. When necessary, the people's congress committee may form special teams to investigate and to urge the government and the "two courts" to pursue solutions seriously and reprimand wrongdoing firmly. Criminals guilty of grave transgressions and delinquency must be punished harshly by law. If, due to incompetent work, bureaucratic officialism, or operational errors, the government, the "two courts," or any of its agencies incurs serious damage to the people, the people's congress committee may lawfully initiate an inquisition into the case.

3. Government personnel supervision. Any government worker who seriously abuses his responsibility, violates the law, disrupts the discipline, and perverts his power to a grave degree, especially those who have an adverse influence among the masses, by law should be censured and divested once the accusation is proven to be true.

Provincial people's congress standing committee vice chairmen Lu Guang [7627 0342], Wang Jinling [3769 6855 7117], Wang Pili [3769 0012 4409], Wang Zhaozhi [3769 5128 3112], Wang Jun [3769 6511], Zhao Zhenhua [6392 2182 5478], and Zhang Ruoxian [1728 5387 0341] were among the attendees at the symposium. Vice Governor He Shoulun [0149 7445 0243] and comrades in charge of the various bureaus and departments directly under the office of the provincial government were also present at the symposium.

13213
CSO: 4005/434
IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY ON INTELLECTUALS URGED

Harbin HEILONGJIANG RIBAO in Chinese 10 Dec 85 p 1

[Commentary: "Implement Policy on Intellectuals with a Sense of Urgency"]

[Text] Recently the provincial CPC committee demanded explicitly that the vast majority of localities and units basically fulfill their responsibility, inherited from history, for implementing the policy on intellectuals before the end of the year so that intellectual work can be put on a sound footing.

The "Summary of the Enlarged Conference of the CPC Central Committee Policy Implementation Group" of 1984 put forward a clear demand, "The policy must basically be implemented before the 13th National Party Congress convenes." The demand was reiterated by the CPC Central Committee at the national working conferences on the implementation of the policy on intellectuals held in Guangdong and Heilongjiang. We must implement the policy to the letter by the deadline the party has given us -- before the 13th National Party Congress.

An objective look at the way we have been implementing the policy on intellectuals suggests that it is entirely possible for us to complete basically the work before the year is out. Since the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee, particularly last year's provincial conference on intellectual work and this year's national working conference on the implementation of intellectual policy, party committees at all levels in the province have labored long and hard and have much to show for their painstaking work. At present, a majority of localities and systems have fulfilled their intellectual tasks inherited from history; those which have not done so are few and far between. Thus the way is paved for basically completing the task before the end of 1985.

Many conditions favor that outcome, but since numerous difficulties remain, we must neither be blindly optimistic nor slacken off in the slightest degree. Heilongjiang has not inherited from history many policies and tasks on intellectuals, but what they lack in quantity they make up for in difficulty. Some cases are very complicated, straddling regions, sectors and even provinces. We must be determined and exert ourselves to take practical and effective measures.
First, we must heighten our understanding and intensify our sense of urgency. Party committees at all levels must shortly study the implementation of the policy on intellectuals in earnest to examine whether or not they are really committed to completing their tasks as scheduled, whether the truth of the matter is clearly understood and whether measures and methods are actually being carried out. Units which have completed the task inherited from history must conduct a "review" to see if there are gaps in their work which must be made good. Second, we must set aside some resources to strengthen organs which implement the policy. All localities and units must transfer cadres from the departments concerned to organize a special task force to tackle the job. Third, implementation must follow a responsibility system. The provincial authorities have made clear our responsibility for the implementation of the policy on intellectuals. We must go about it in accordance with the principle of division of labor. The leaders must personally attend to the more involved cases and try to solve them on the spot there and then. In handling issues which border on policy matters, we must take realities as our point of departure and seek bold, creative solutions on our own initiative. Fourth, we must carry out thoroughgoing and painstaking ideological and political work. As a result of the influences of the "leftist" line, particularly during the 10 years of turmoil, many intellectuals were wrongly accused. Not only did they suffer physically and financially, but even more serious, they were oppressed and scarred spiritually. Their losses and adversity cannot be compensated with money alone. What they need most is psychological well-being. Organizations at all levels, therefore, should engage them in frank, sincere conversations and transmit to them the warmth of the party.

Only so much remains of 1985, and it can be counted in days and hours, not months. Time and tide waits for no man; our task demands immediate attention. Party organizations at all levels and comrades involved in this work must seize every minute, every second and work intensely but efficiently to contribute further to the completion of this historic mission.

12581
CSO: 4005/480
HARBIN SUPPLY COOPERATIVE BEGINS 'SELF-CORRECTION' CAMPAIGN

Harbin HEILONGJIANG RIBAO in Chinese 17 Dec 85 p 1

[Article by Hu Qinghuo [5170 1987 0735]: "Cooperative Leaders Set an Example through 'Self-Correction'"

[Text] Recently the CPC committee of the Harbin supply and marketing cooperative launched a "self-correction" education campaign among party members throughout the cooperative system and has achieved good results.

As a result of the earlier phase of party rectification and the "four haves" education, party members in the cooperative have enhanced their party spirit and notably improved the party style. However, such problems as unhealthy trends, lax discipline and lack of touch with the grassroots still remain, prompting the CPC committee to decide on a "self-correction" campaign inside the party as a way to consolidate and further the achievements of party rectification.

As part of the campaign, leading cadres at all levels in the cooperative courageously expose their own shortcomings and take the lead to correct all manner of unhealthy trends, thereby setting an example for the masses. All companies, including those in native produce, means of production and fruit, are conducting the campaign extensively. Taking into account their specific conditions, they focus on overcoming bureaucratism and the pursuit of personal interests through abuse of public office. Their leading cadres take the lead in avoiding perfunctoriness and empty talk and conscientiously correct themselves ahead of the masses. In the past, most leading cadres ensconced themselves at the top and heard reports, while few actually delved into realities and rolled up their sleeves to do practical things. Since the "self-correction" education campaign went under way, party committee leaders often go down to the grassroots units and help solve actual problems in work. Mu Futing [1970 4395 0080], deputy secretary of the CPC committee of the Harbin supply and marketing cooperative, along with Liu Mingshun [0491 2494 7311], deputy chairman of the supervisory board, and Lu Fangfu [0712 5364 3940], who is in charge of the federation of outskirts cooperatives, successively visited 10 sales departments belonging to such cooperatives as Dongfeng, Huoping, Xinfu and Wangfang, and helped work out ways to expand procurement and sales and invigorate the market in the peak season. Zhang Yanpeng [0112 1750 7720], manager of the municipal fruit company, went without
rest for weeks to study in depth various wholesale fruit departments and consulted with grassroots cadres how to ensure fruit supply during the New Year and spring festival period.

During the "self-correction" campaign, the unit emphasized self-investigation and let the masses be the watchdog. Problems which the public found most objectionable were the first to be corrected, and in the open. For example, some companies' leading cadres used to be ferried to and from work and frequently used company transportation for private purposes, provoking complaints from the masses. After the "self-correction" campaign was launched, leading cadres of all companies, with the exception of those who are in ill health or under special circumstances, commute by public transportation, like other workers. By setting an example and making strict demands on themselves, leaders have produced a positive effect on the rank-and-file so that party members throughout the system conscientiously correct all kinds of unhealthy trends through self-correctional activities. The workers in some units originally wanted to set aside some public funds to subsidize the purchase of non-staple food on special holidays. Now they have given up the demand. In the past, many workers in the system borrowed from the government, often failing to pay back for long periods. Following the "self-correction" campaign, leaders and party members were the first to work out loan repayment schedules. By late November, workers had repaid 80 percent of their debts.

The educational campaign is still under way at present.

12581
CSO: 4005/480
NORTHEAST REGION

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ENCOURAGED TO SHOULDER HISTORICAL TASKS

Shenyang SHENYANG RIBAO in Chinese 29 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by staff reporter Tian Dan [3944 0030]: "Municipal Party Committee Leader Speaks with Shenyang Industrial University Faculty and Students on Situations and Traditions; University Students of the 1980's Must Shoulder Historical Tasks"]

[Text] On the 27th of this month, Li Changchun [2621 7022 2504], Shenyang municipal party committee secretary, spoke to the faculty and students of Shenyang Industrial University on situations and traditions. He urged the students to exalt the glorious revolutionary spirit of "9 December" by shouldering the historical task and dedicating their talents and abilities to the third upward transformation of their motherland in this century.

During Comrade Li's talk with the faculty and the students, he attentively answered all the questions raised by the audience. He analyzed the current favorable situation from the aspects of politics, economics, and the people's actual standard of living; he then pointed out that the reason why certain people are unable to see clearly the current good state of things involves the question of how to perceive the present situation correctly.

To perceive the present situation correctly, at this point we have to smash three old concepts and establish a new sense of responsibility. First we have to smash the mental confines of "leftism." The present favorable situation evolved from the result of our good riddance of the "leftist" thinking. When confronting a problem, some people often habitually approach it from a "leftist" point of view, either consciously or unconsciously, and are thus unable to understand certain current policies. For instance, people who are used to "equalitarianism" and being "overly poor" would consider allowing a certain area or a certain group of people to get rich before other areas and other people as engaging in polarization. Some people do not quite understand certain aspects of the current economic reform and blame it for bringing in the problems of the current vogue of iniquitous behavior. They therefore deduce that "no reform" is better than reform.

Second, we have to break the constraints of traditional concepts. For a long time we have been operating in a stiffened economic pattern, and there has been a very serious habitual influence of small-scale production, for example,
fixed pricing is deemed to be highly desirable, while it actually violates economic principles. Third, we have to burst out of the mental straitjacket of metaphysics. We have to learn to look at things through the perspective of dialectical materialism, to be able to see the essence of things, to be able to see the big picture, and to see things from a progressive point of view. Meanwhile, in perceiving the present situation, there is also the question of strengthening our sense of responsibility as masters of our nation. The reform we are currently engaged in is an undertaking shared by millions of our fellow countrymen, not just by a few people. We should assume our composure as our own masters, bravely and boldly get down to working for reform, and thus construct the socialism that is fit for China.

When Li Changchun talked about the historic tasks of university students, he said that in the new era of socialist modernization, the historical duty of university students is to follow the party's leadership, stand at the front line of the times, "learn tirelessly in spite of hardship, and determine to become a pillar of society," to become the new "four haves" generation, and to make one's own contribution to the prosperity of the nation and the affluence of the people. It is now the crucial period for China's third upward transformation in this century following the 1911 Revolution and the founding of the People's Republic of China. University students of this time must shoulder the great historical mission. Therefore, they must become an elite group that possesses "morality, knowledge, talent, and education." Morality means to have ideals and discipline and to know who it is we study and work for. "Knowledge" means to have foresight and wisdom, to take hold of the essence of things, and to establish a dialectical materialistic perspective. "Talent" means to have the ability to contribute to the "four modernizations." "Education" means to have the knowledge, the solid professional know-how, and the basic theoretical learning. University students of our time must advance the glorious tradition of the "9 December" Movement, give "patriotism" a new content, contribute one's own efforts to construct the "four modernizations," and rejuvenate China.

Comrade Li Changchun also exchanged opinions with the faculty and the students on such issues as the educational system reform and the practical implementation of the "intellectuals" policy.

13213
CSO: 4005/434
LIAONING STUDIES SPIRIT OF CIRCULARS

Shenyang LIAONING RIBAO in Chinese 12 Dec 85 p 1

[Text] After the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council issued a circular addressing certain serious problems currently affecting the way organizations operate, units and organizations directly under the provincial CPC committee have mobilized party members and cadres to study it in earnest and are implementing it firmly in accordance with the provincial CPC committee's plan.

On 4 December, the provincial CPC committee called a meeting of secretaries from all units and party organizations (party committees) directly under it to draw up plans for the transmission and implementation of the Central Committee circular. It demanded that leading organizations and cadres take the lead in studying and honoring the spirit of the "circular" conscientiously and that all units consider its study and implementation essential to the improvement of the party style and include it in their agendas. The leading party group of the standing committee of the provincial People's Congress convened a meeting to study further the spirit of the "circular" and made plans for its implementation in light of the organization's specific circumstances. The leading party group of the provincial Science and Technology Commission successively convened two enlarged meetings and discussed the study and implementation of the circular. Top leading comrades on the provincial Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference gave a mobilization talk at a mass meeting. As demanded by the provincial CPC committee's plan, the party committees of organizations directly under it selected over 20 cadres and divided them into 7 groups, each led by a CPC committee secretary, to supervise and examine the units in their study and implementation of the "circular." Most units have now combined the two approaches -- from top to bottom and from bottom to top -- to seriously examine and correct all kinds of unhealthy trends, conscientiously improve the organizational style and firmly eliminate each and every sign of decadence.
LIAONING'S REGULATIONS ON PROHIBITION OF GAMBLING PUBLISHED

Shenyang LIAONING RIBAO in Chinese 13 Dec 85 pp 1, 3

[Text] The "Provisional Regulations of the Province of Liaoning on the Prohibition of Gambling," drawn up in accordance with the constitution, criminal code and public security control and penal regulations of the PRC and in light of the province's specific conditions, have been approved by the 17th session of the Standing Committee of the 6th Liaoning Provincial People's Congress. The "regulations" state explicitly, "All profit-motivated activities which involve the use of money as a stake for gain or loss constitute gambling. Gambling in any form violates the law. Individuals engaging in gambling criminal activities will be subject to criminal proceedings."

The "regulations" consist of 16 articles.

(For full text of "regulations," see P 3.)

Provisional Regulations of the Province of Liaoning on the Prohibition of Gambling

(Approved by the 17th Session of the Standing Committee of the 6th Liaoning Provincial People's Congress on 2 December 1985)

Article 1 The Regulations hereunder are formulated in accordance with the constitution, criminal code and public security control and penal regulations of the People's Republic of China and in light of the province's specific conditions with a view to protecting social law and order and cultivating a sound social tone.

Article 2 All profit-motivated activities which involve the use of property as a stake for gain or loss constitute gambling. Gambling in any form violates the law and shall be prohibited and dealt with in accordance with the regulations.

Article 3 All stakes and gambling paraphernalia shall be confiscated. Efforts shall be made to recover all properties acquired through gambling.
An individual who knowingly facilitates the gambling activities of another person by providing him with transportation shall be punished in accordance with Article 7, Section 3 of the regulations.

Article 4 Debts incurred in the course of gambling or loans borrowed from other gamblers in a place of gambling shall be declared null and void. Loan payments extorted illegally shall be confiscated.

Article 5 Petty gamblers who fail to reform despite education shall be warned or fined 30 yuan or less.

Article 6 An individual shall be administratively detained or fined between 30 and 200 yuan, or both, for committing any one of the following:
1. gambling with a substantial amount of property;
2. gambling in public;
3. gambling from place to place on a minor scale;
4. keeping watch or providing illegal protection for gamblers.

Article 7 An individual shall be administratively detained for education-through-labor or fined between 100 and 500 yuan, or both, for committing any one of the following:
1. gambling repeatedly despite education;
2. gambling from place to place on a major scale;
3. providing premises for gambling or otherwise facilitating it;
4. inducing, cajoling or compelling others to gamble;
5. making or selling gambling paraphernalia illegally;
6. obstructing and interfering with the effort to prohibit gambling, but stopping short of violent resistance or intimidation.

Article 8 Criminal proceedings shall be initiated against an individual under the criminal code for committing any one of the following:
1. assembling a group of individuals for gambling purposes, or being a professional gambler, with a view to making profits;
2. abetting others to gamble;
3. passing on gambling methods;
4. obstructing state workers, with violence or intimidation, from carrying out their duty to prohibit gambling in accordance with the law.

Where the case is relatively minor, the individual concerned shall not be criminally prosecuted but shall be punished under Article 7 of the regulations.

Article 9 Sentences for other crimes committed in the course of gambling shall be carried out concurrently.

Article 10 Workers of the state and leaders of urban and rural grassroots organizations who engage in gambling shall be punished severely in accordance with the law.

Article 11 Whoever confesses, reports or exposes gambling activities on his own volition shall have his sentence reduced or be granted immunity. Individuals who render meritorious services may be rewarded as appropriate.
Article 12 Any citizen who discovers gambling activities shall have the authority to prevent and report them to public security and judicial organizations.

A citizen who reports or exposes gambling activities shall be commended and rewarded.

Whoever retaliates against a citizen who reports and exposes gambling activities shall be severely punished in accordance with the law.

Article 13 Organizations, enterprises, institutions and village or neighborhood grassroots units shall strictly prohibit gambling activities. Leaders and individuals in charge who are aware of gambling in their units or jurisdictions but fail to prevent them shall be held responsible.

Article 14 Besides being held criminally liable, gamblers shall be dealt with in accordance with the criminal procedural law of the PRC. Individuals sentenced to education through labor shall be dealt with in accordance with State Council supplementary regulations on education through labor. Individuals to be warned, administratively detained or fined shall be dealt with in accordance with procedures stipulated in the public security control and penal regulations of the PRC.

Article 15 Fines and confiscated properties shall be accompanied by fine or confiscation certificates issued by the municipal or county (district) public security bureau (branch bureau) and turned over to the national treasury. Funds required by public security agencies to cover the costs of enforcing the prohibition on gambling and to use as rewards shall be provided in accordance with relevant government regulations.

Article 16 The regulations shall go into effect on the date of its proclamation.

12581
CSO: 4005/487
NINGXIA EXPANDS ROLES OF MINORITY NATIONALITY CADRES

Yinchuan NINGXIA RIBAO in Chinese 18 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by staff reporter He Zhaoguo (0149 0340 0948): "Make Minority Nationalities Masters of Their Own Homes, Manage Autonomous Rights for Local Nationalities"]

[Text] Over the past several years, Ningsha Autonomous Region's CPC committees at various levels have achieved great successes in the work to cultivate and select minority nationality cadres. A large group of minority nationality cadres are playing an active role in leadership departments at various levels and on all fronts, making minority nationalities the masters of their own homes, and managing the autonomous rights in the day to day affairs of local nationalities.

Since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, and especially after 1980, when the autonomous regional CPC committee rendered the "Resolution on Carry out the Spirit of the CPC Central Committee Directive on Xizang Work, and the Work of Strengthening Minority Nationalities," the region's party committees at various levels have devised general plans to cultivate and select cadres: adopted special measures such as priority employment, priority promotion, priority selection and dispatch for schooling; cultivated and selected a large group of Hui nationality and indigenous cadres. This brings into full play the close ties between the local nationality cadres and the masses, and takes advantage of those cadres' intimate knowledge of the history, the present states, habits, customs, psychological makeup, thoughts, feelings, and needs of the local nationality peoples. By the end of 1984, there were over 17,000 minority nationality cadres in the entire autonomous region, comprising 14.94 percent of the total number of cadres. Over 16,000 or 14.1 percent, were Hui nationality cadres. The number of Hui nationality scientific and technical cadres also increased from the mere 7 to 8 percent of the past to 12.59 percent. Although the proportion of Hui nationality cadres throughout the region is at present still lower than the proportion of local nationality population, the organs of political power at various levels have made a tremendous effort to carry out the nationalization process of cadres. Hui nationality cadres comprise 41 percent of the leadership groups in the autonomous regional party committee, the regional people's congress, the regional people's government, and the regional people's political consultative conference. And in the seven cities and counties
where the Hui nationality lives in compact communities--Jingyuan, Haiyuan, Xiji, Guyuan, Tongxin, Wuzhong, and Lingwu--Hui nationality cadres make up 60.6 percent of the government leadership groups, and hold all the mayoral and country magistrate positions. The ratio of Hui nationality cadres to all department and office-level cadres directly subordinate to the autonomous region has increased from the 1979 level of 19 percent to 26.9 percent today. In order to solve the past problem of a low ratio of minority nationality cadres, for three consecutive years beginning in 1980, the speciality quota was increased by 800 billets and filled with Hui nationality cadres. Continuing in accordance with the needs to make the cadre ranks younger in average age, more revolutionary, better educated, and professionally more competent, the entire autonomous region should every year, in planned phases and increments, select and send a group of minority nationality cadres to various types of institutions of higher learning or party schools at various levels to study political theory and all kinds of specialized knowledge. In order to expand constantly the source of minority nationality cadres, universities and polytechnic schools lower the admission standards of minority nationality students. In various prefectures, cities and counties, key middle schools offer senior middle school courses for minority nationalities. Ningxia University and Guyan Junior Teachers College offer courses for minority nationalities. This helps numerous minority nationality cadres, in general and qualified scientific and technical and administrative and management cadres in particular to develop.

13188/6662
CSO: 4005/304
NORTHWEST REGION

NINGXIA'S MINORITY NATIONALITY EDUCATION DISCUSSED

Yinchuan NINGXIA RIBAO in Chinese 28 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by He Zhaoguo [0149 0340 0948]: "Minority Nationality Education in Ningxia Is Flourishing: Special Policies and Measures Have Been Adopted to Raise the Hui's Educational and Scientific Levels"]

[Text] In the past few years at all levels, Ningxia's party committees and people's government have adopted special policies and measures to develop nationality education and have greatly accelerated the flourishing development of education in nationality areas.

In areas where Hui live in compact communities, 74 secondary and elementary boarding schools have been built or rebuilt for them. In the mountainous areas of southern Ningxia, each elementary school pupil receives three yuan annually for books. Institutions of higher learning require appropriately lower scores for the admission of minority nationality candidates and enroll the best of them. Some key secondary schools offer senior middle school classes for nationality students. Every year, Ningxia University and Guyuan Normal Junior College hold two preparatory courses for nationality students. Investment in education in nationality areas has increased year after year. Quite a few cities and counties have made the development of nationality education the order of the day. Tongxin County has made 1985 the "Year of Education" and has insisted that "both legs walk." Besides spending half (700,000 yuan) of local revenue on education, it has also mobilized society to raise funds for running schools. Since last year, according to statistics, the county's townships and villages have raised 45,332 yuan. Jingyuan County spent 230,000 yuan in subsidies for nationality areas and in local revenue to build a multipurpose dormitory for the Jingyuan Hui Middle School and spent another 10,000 yuan to recruit teachers. With 70,000 yuan in subsidies for nationality areas Xiji County bought educational equipment for its Hui secondary and elementary schools. Since 1981, Wuzhong City's high-level government departments, as well as city and local financial departments, have been allocating regular education funds to Hui secondary and elementary schools. In addition, the city has specially earmarked 1.236 million yuan for those schools during the same period. Wuzhong's Dongfeng Township, where Hui live in compact communities, used to have outmoded school buildings and inferior educational conditions. In July 1984, the masses raised 196,000 yuan to erect two multi-storied buildings for that township's Hui secondary and
elementary schools. The buildings have 2,400 square meters of floor space and can accommodate 30 classes. Wuzhong and Tongxin have also established 'Associations for the Advancement of Hui Education' in order to mobilize society to raise money for nationality education.

Because special policies and measures have been adopted everywhere to develop nationality education, the proportion of Hui in the general student population is gradually rising. Ningxia now has more than 700 Hui students in its institutions of higher learning, more than 30,000 in its secondary schools and more than 160,000 in its elementary schools. In Pangwan Village in Xiji County's Majian Township, only 8 percent of Hui school-age children were in school in 1982; that figure was 80 percent in 1984. In Tongxin County in 1981, 73 percent of Hui school-age children were in school; this year that figure has reached 86.6 percent. In Wuzhong City, 59.4 percent of the elementary school students are Hui, although the Hui constitute a smaller percentage of the city's population.

12570
CSO: 4005/395
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

FUJIAN MILITARY DEPUTY COMMANDER VISITS XIYANG ISLAND

OW180951 Fuzhou FUJIAN RIBAO in Chinese 4 Feb 86 p 1

[Excerpts] On 2 February, Governor Hu Ping and Fujian Provincial Military Command Deputy Commander Shi Rongji visited Xiyang Island, which lies 25 nautical miles off the coast, by submarine chaser to extend their greetings to commanders and fighters of the army, naval, and armed police units guarding the island and the fishermen there.

Governor Hu Ping and his entourage arrived on Xiyang Island after a 2-hour trip. Riding an open military truck, they visited the barracks where the PLA units were stationed. Being winter, it was very cold on the island, but a warm atmosphere prevailed at the forum although only cups of tea were offered. After extending his greetings to the armymen and people on the island, Governor Hu Ping listened to the views of the PLA units stationed on the island concerning government work, repeatedly thanking them for the tremendous contribution they made to building this coastal island and speaking highly of the achievements made in developing socialist spiritual civilization through the joint efforts of the armymen and the civilians. Governor Hu Ping made detailed inquiries about the living conditions of the armymen and the people and about the situation in production on the island. He expressed his determination to help the armymen and people solve their problems in livelihood and production.

The people praised the relations between armymen and the people on Xiyang Island by saying: "There is only one battalion of soldiers guarding the island, but they and the people are building the island as if they belong to the same family." Governor Hu Ping said: "The armymen and people on the island are as close as fish and water; together they are scoring tremendous achievements. This island is a gate of the motherland. Many families here have relatives in Taiwan. Your responsibility is a heavy one. In addition to carrying out military construction and civilian production, you must also carry out social work and join efforts in bringing an end to the situation of separation between Taiwan and the mainland as soon as possible. The young chief of Haidaoxiang township expressed his determination to bring the coastal island's role into full play, to vigorously develop a diversified economy, and to build the island into a truly civilized one where armymen and people work with one heart and one mind.

On 3 February, Governor Hu Ping visited a certain naval base in Fujian. He visited a naval hospital to see the patients there.

/8918
CSO: 4005/500
NANJING MILITARY LEADERS' FESTIVAL GREETINGS

[Text] Leading comrades and organs of the Nanjing Military Region simplified and revolutionized the two-support activities on the eve of the Spring Festival. In activities to support the government, cherish the people, support the army and give preferential treatment to military families, they refrained from giving and attending banquets and from handing out or taking gifts. They visited local party and government leaders and offices and called on old comrades who had retreated to the second or third line, and chatted about their close military friendship over a cup of fragrant tea.

Upon the approaching of the Spring Festival, the Nanjing Military Region issued a circular to all subordinate units and made a proposal to Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, and Jiangxi provinces and Shanghai City, where the region's units are stationed, urging that both the military and local party and government organizations just host a cup of tea to replace dinner invitations and gift exchanges during the two-support activities on the eve of the Spring Festival in order to establish army-government and army-people relations in a new style.

Beginning on 21 January, Xiang Shouzhi, commander, Fu Kuiqing, political commissar, and other leading comrades of the Nanjing Military Region successively led greeting groups to call on the Fujian Provincial Party and government leaders; members of the Central Advisory Commission, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, and the CPPCC National Committee who were staying in Nanjing and Fujian; and old comrades above the corps level who had retreated to the second and third line. The military region also sent special representatives to visit those old comrades who had worked in the Nanjing Military Region but lived in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenyang. Only jasmine tea was consumed during all these visits and calls.

The Jiangsu Provincial People's Government asked all localities to respond to the Nanjing Military Region's proposal and do away with banquets and gifts during the two-support activities.

/8918
CSO: 4005/500
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

QINGHAI CIRCULAR ON TRANSFERRING CONTROL OF PAFD

HK210219 Xining Qinghai Provincial Service in Mandarin 2330 GMT 13 Feb 86

[Text] Recently the Provincial CPC Committee, the Provincial Government and
the Provincial Military District issued a joint circular on carrying out
ideological and political work properly before People's Armed Forces Departments
are shifted to the jurisdiction of local authorities.

The circular read: The CPC Central Committee and its Military Commission have
decided to shift county-level armed forces departments to the jurisdiction of
local authorities. This is an important strategic policy decision made by
them to modernize the army under the new situation in accordance with the
overall economic situation in our country. This is of great importance to the
reform of the People's Armed Forces system, to the country's economic construc-
tion, and to modernization and construction of the army.

In order to do ideological and political work in a down-to-earth manner before
the shift, the circular demanded that CPC committees, governments, military
subdistricts and People's Armed Forces Departments at all levels properly carry
out the following three tasks:

1. They must earnestly study the relevant documents, fully understand the
importance of shifting People's Armed Forces Departments to the jurisdiction
of local authorities, and unify their ideology in line with the strategic
policy decisions of the CPC Central Committee and its Military Commission.
Army and local authorities must join hands to make the shift a success, focusing
on the guiding thought of shifting all People's Armed Forces Departments
to the jurisdiction of local authorities and transferring all cadres of People's
Armed Forces Departments to local civilian work.

2. They must conduct education on People's Armed Forces cadres in communist
ideas and teach them to take into consideration the overall situation, to put
state interest firmly above all, and to dedicate themselves to the cause of
the People's Armed Forces. In the meantime, they must properly carry out
ideological and political work among wives and children of People's Armed Forces
cadres and encourage the cadres to love Qinghai and take root in Qinghai.

3. They must pay attention to the immediate interest of People's Armed Forces
cadres and help them solve their troubles back at home so as to promote the
smooth progress of the shift.
Local CPC committees and governments must treat the transferred People's Armed Forces cadres just as they treat local cadres in such areas as wages, welfare, the household registration of their family members, and the education of their children.

The circular demanded that leaders of governments and people's armed forces departments in all localities always maintain good order in their work and life; avoid ideological confusion; continue their efforts; maintain a good style; and fulfill the transfer task with the best spiritual status.

/8918
CSO: 4005/500
ZHEJIANG GOVERNOR XUE JU ON MILITIA WORK

OWI81335 Hangzhou ZHEJIANG RIBAO in Chinese 7 Feb 86 p 1

[Text] On 6 February the Provincial People's Armed Forces Commission called its first meeting since readjustment to study the implementation of relevant documents of the central organs, the spirit of the all-army work conference, and the spirit of the work conference of the Nanjing Military Region on militia and reserve service work. The meeting also aimed to study ways to do a good job in militia and reserve service work in the new period so as to adapt to the changing strategic situation and step up the reserve force buildup. Xu Ju, governor and head of the Provincial People's Armed Forces Commission, presided over and spoke at the meeting.

Comrade Xue Ju pointed out: Provincial work on the militia and the reserve service has made constant progress in the course of readjustment and reform; good experiences have been learned and good methods found. For 2 years running, an accident-free record of militia weapons management has been maintained. Fresh advances have also been made in joint cooperation among the armed forces, the police, and the people as well as in setting up youth hostels for the militia. Militiamen have also played a significant role in building the two civilizations. He set forth ways for doing a good job in militia and reserve service work during the new period. First, we should seriously study and profoundly understand the spirit of the relevant documents of the central organs. Militia and reserve service work should yield to and serve the overall situation in national economic construction. Readjustment and reform of militia work should not only meet the needs of economic construction, but also serve to make the reserve force more powerful and combat ready. We should guard against and overcome such fuzzy notions as "the less militiamen, the better; it's better not to do militia work" and "reduction means weakening." Our province is situated on China's southeast coast. We must not slacken our vigilance. Second, we should combine education on popularizing legal knowledge with military service registration, strengthen propaganda work on the "Military Service Law" and the "Regulations on Conscription Work," educate citizens to voluntarily fulfill military service obligations; and raise the quality of conscripts. Third, militia work should be combined with production and construction, with the training of specialized personnel for local and military work, and with maintaining social order. The quality of militiamen should be constantly raised by having them fulfill duties. We should strive to maintain as small an army as possible in peace time while building an ample reserve force for when war comes. Fourth, we should do a really good job in management work
for militia weapons safety. Steps should be taken to increase safety. We should strive to lessen the masses' burden. Unauthorized use of military installations and military premises is forbidden.

Comrade Xue Ju also stressed: People's Armed Forces commissions at all levels should seriously observe the spirit of the relevant documents of the central organs to iron out relations among leading bodies, improve work efficiency, and manage well the local work on People's Armed Forces. The transfer of work by the People's Armed Forces Department is a major event. We should really do a good job in transfer work. We should not slacken our ideological concentration, and should not slacken our work and our work enthusiasm. We should ensure that no problems crop up during the transfer work.

Li Qing, commander of the provincial military district, also spoke at the meeting. He said: The need for a stepped-up reserve force buildup becomes all the more important with the streamlining of our regular forces. The focus of militia work should be switched from paying attention to quantity to paying attention to quality. Militia training should stress the main targeted objectives and raise training quality. He called on units under the provincial military district to take the lead in studying the implementation of the spirit of the relevant documents of the central organs, to actively act as advisers to local party committees of all levels, and to voluntarily submit themselves to the overall situation in economic construction. He also called on them to adapt themselves to strategic changes, to do a good job in militia and reserve service work, and to build a strong reserve force that is both good at construction and fighting.

/8918
CSO: 4005/500
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

REFORM OF PLA'S LOGISTICS DISCUSSED

Taipei CHUNG-KUNG YEN-CHIU [STUDIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM] in Chinese Vol 20 No 1, 15 Jan 86 pp 103-109

[Article by Cheng Fang-kuang [6774 2455 3171]: "Reform of Logistics Work in the Chinese Communist Army"]

[Text] Logistics is an indispensable component part of armed forces building and victory in war. Since its setback in the 1979 war against Vietnam, the Chinese communist army has carried out self-criticism and discovered that logistics supply work is the key to deciding victory or defeat in modern warfare, and thus has stressed that the building of "modernized, regularized" armed forces logistics to meet the needs of a future war is an extremely urgent task, and it has constantly strengthened relevant reform measures. This article is an exploration for reference of the changes in recent years of the ideological line in the communist army's logistics work, as well as the situation in the reform of logistics work.

I. Guiding Ideology and Direction of Logistics Work in the Communist Army

A. Contradictions Between Two Ideological Lines

For a long time the guiding ideology of the communist army's logistics work was always the pattern of the principle of the ninth article of Mao Zedong's "Ten Major Military Principles," namely, "Replenish ourselves by capturing all of the enemy's weapons and a large part of his personnel. The source of our army's manpower and materiel is mainly on the frontline."

In the fifties, after the communist army received a bitter lesson in modern warfare during the Korean War, to a considerable degree it recognized and attached importance to logistics support work. In December 1953, when summing up the experiences of the Korean War at the CPC's "conference of the party's high-level cadres in the national military system," Peng Dehuai [1756 1795 2037] pointed out the goal of building: "We must raise logistics work to the higher stage of commanding battle, organizing supply, and insuring victory in war." Following Lin Biao's seizure of power, he called this idea formalism and negated it. After the Deng Xiaoping faction came to power, under the slogans of national defense modernization" and "practice is the sole criterion
for testing truth," there was a reevaluation of the line on building the army in Mao Zedong's military thinking. Based on the laws of the inevitable development of the characteristics of modern warfare, the guiding principle that "the source of manpower and materiel is mainly on the frontline" was negated. It was pointed out that this form of logistics was only suitable for the guerrilla warfare during the "millet plus rifles" period, and it is a backward, outmoded idea of logistics that cannot meet the needs of modern warfare. Peng Dehuai's idea put forward in the past of bringing logistics into the battle was reaffirmed. However, this ideological concept is not yet widely accepted by the communist army's cadres, thereby creating a difference and contradiction between the two lines.

B. Goal and Policy of Logistics Work

At the beginning of 1980, when summing up the experiences and lessons of the February 1979 war against Vietnam, the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee confessed that the inability of logistics support work to meet the demands of modern warfare was one of the reasons for the setback in the war situation. Therefore, in addition to the demand that the communist army must "attach importance to understanding and getting a good grip on logistics," there was more focus on the defects existing in the army's logistics work. Reform policies and plans of a corresponding nature were made with the guiding goal of logistics building, and their key points are summed up as follows:

1. Speeding up the modernization of logistics: It was demanded that the forces and the professionalism of leaders of logistics departments be enriched and enhanced; focusing on the needs of modern warfare, it was demanded that the logistics system and the means of supply be boldly reformed; and it was demanded that logistics education and training and logistics scientific research work be intensified, and that attention be paid to studying the logistics experiences of foreign armies.

2. Enhancing the national deployment of logistics: When stressing the deploying of logistics, full consideration must be given to making the forms of combat and the missions of combat tally with each other. Attention must be paid to order of importance and urgency, concentrating the main logistics forces on the support of the main direction of operations while taking into account the secondary direction of operations, and providing suitable and effective logistics support.

3. Enhancing correct logistics command: It was stressed that in wartime there must be correct command of logistics, so as to make logistics work in coordination with all service arms in order to give play to all of the logistics support forces. Logistics should provide commanders with the optimum basis for making decisions in battles and campaigns. A logistics commander must fully understand the operational plan and firmly carry out the commander's operational plan in order to command logistics correctly.

4. Setting up an independent communications system for logistics: So that the commander in his command not be out of line with his logistics, it was demanded that an independent communication system be set up for logistics in order to insure unobstructed liaison with his logistics.
C. Guiding Logistics Building Toward Becoming Part of Combat

Because of the serious antagonistic contradictions existing in the communist army's ideological line for logistics, coupled with the low-grade quality of the command cadres at all levels, and their being quite ignorant of the guiding policy on understanding logistic reform, the work of reform has been impeded. According to what was revealed in the 25 December 1981 issue of the Chinese communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO [LIBERATION ARMY DAILY-LAD]: "The understanding by some commanders of logistics work to a certain degree is still at the stage of getting supplies from the enemy on the spot during the guerrilla warfare period. They think that logistics work is nothing more than simply receiving, dispatching, and storing, and they don't make it an important component part of the combat forces. A considerable number of the cadres do not have much knowledge of modern warfare and of specialized skills; there exists a very big gap between them the demand for making logistics part of combat, which requires a proficient knowledge of war and science and combat experience. Because of the disruption and sabotage by Lin Biao and the 'gang of four,' there exist many weak links in the defense, communications, and equipment of logistics, and there are even certain aspects in the logistics system that do not meet the demands of modern warfare." Obviously, there are numerous difficulties in the communist army's logistics building, and for two years' time it has been at a standstill, unable to move forward.

In 1981, the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC," passed by the Sixth Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee, pointed out: "The People's Liberation Army must strengthen military training, political work, logistics work, and military scientific research; further improve its combat effectiveness; and gradually be built into a powerful modernized revolutionary army." Logistics work was formally elevated to an important position in strategic construction. Under the premise of this policy, the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, with the general goal of building a modern and regular army, called for the building of a "combat logistics" force that could win battles and could insure victory in war.

According to the Chinese communists' own admission: "There exists a phenomenon in the logistics work of our army in which there is a lot of business about routine affairs and an insufficient grasp of strategic construction. There is very little research by logistics leaders on the organization and implementation of logistics support work. In peacetime, logistics personnel only know about the simple work of receiving and dispatching; once they have to send materiel forward, take it back, or transfer it under field conditions, they are in a muddle. Repair fendui and medical support units are not accustomed to the rush-repair and first-aid treatment under field conditions. Logistics personnel in some battalions and companies can only handle company life, and do not have the least idea of how to begin camouflage and deployment of logistics in wartime." For this reason, the Chinese communists in 8 October 1981, through an article published in LAD entitled "Thinking About the Logistics of Tomorrow—On Logistics Work," pointed out: "In modern warfare, because of the use of advanced technological equipment, such as aircraft, guided missiles, nuclear weapons, electronics, and armor, not only has the unexpectedness and destructiveness of war been
heightened, but also war possesses the characteristics of it being difficult to separate front from rear, there being rapid changes, and there being redoubled consumption. All of these things greatly increase the dependence on logistics support of the units' operational actions. From now on, the CPC demands that the logistics departments of the army, in accordance with the policy of the "two adaptibilities," effectively set up logistics to make it part of combat. The 'two adaptibilities' are: first, they must adapt to the demands of modern warfare, make good preparations in the early stage, improve the capability for fast reaction, and insure supply in a future war; and second, they must adapt to the demands of a modernized regularized army, elevating logistics work to the higher stage of commanding battle, organizing supplies, and insuring victory in war.\textsuperscript{2} However, because of the restrictions of objective conditions, not many big results have yet been produced.

II. Investigations To Find Out the Real Situation in the Early Stage of Reform

At the beginning of 1981, the high-level logistics leadership departments of the communist army widely reviewed and discussed the question of logistics work's coordination with the units in operational actions. They initiated in succession big inspections of logistics work throughout the army and organized joint investigations, and separately "tried to find out the real situation" in each big system of logistics. Based on the investigation materials, they held many logistics work conferences, and, in accordance with the guiding principle of modernizing logistics and making it part of combat, drew up plans for implementation and measures for reform. The relevant circumstances are discussed separately below:

A. A Big Joint Inspection of "Border and Coastal Defenses"

At the beginning of February 1982, the General Logistics Department of the communist army, in accordance with the directive of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to "get deeply involved in reality, investigate and study, and solve new problems," jointly with the cadres of logistics departments of each large military region as well as of the Navy and Air Force formed 10 investigation teams composed of more than 230 persons. The teams made an 8-month investigation of all the army's divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, squads, and points on border defense, as well as big and small fortified islands. The purpose of the investigation was to understand the actual situation in the units' basic-level building in order to find where the cruxes of the problems are and provide them as references for formulating reform measures. This investigation discovered that there existed among the units more than 5,000 defects and problems. In particular, the barracks, water-supply, lighting, communication and transportation, medical treatment and hygiene were extremely simple, crude, and backward, and were fundamentally out of line with the requirements for the modernization drive. After the reports of the investigation teams were approved by the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, in addition to the funds from the budget of the General Logistics Department a special fund from income of 650 million yuan was allocated and provided to the units for solving the problems. A construction plan with a 3-year limit was set, requiring that the work of improvement be completed by that time. In August of the same year,
the General Logistics Department of the communist army, based on the results of the investigation, held an "all-PLA forum on logistics work." The forum summarized the problems existing in the units as "the logistics system is in disorder and lacks unity," "there are many points and long lines where troops are stationed, and supply is difficult," "the quality of the cadres' management capability is inferior," "the standard of the military supplies industry is low," and "there is not yet a unified plan for science and technology." Obviously, the problems existing in the units of the communist army are extremely serious.

B. Big Inspection of All "Warehouses" in the Army

The warehouse is an important facility in an army's logistics support system, and an important hub for logistics supply. In modern warfare, it has already become the first target of attack or defense by the two belligerents. Therefore, whether the distribution and management of the construction of warehouses are appropriate is often one of the factors affecting success or failure in war. Taking a lesson from this fact, the communist army, beginning in the middle of October 1982 and lasting until the end of April in the next year, had more than 400 cadres taken out of the General Logistics Department and the leadership organization of all branches and arms of the service to form 11 joint investigation teams, which separately went to warehouses in all areas. They carried out an investigation focused on the questions of the building of leading groups; the professional management; the materiel storage; and the distribution, design, construction, safety, security, forms of management of warehouses, as well as their defense measures. After the investigation work was finished, the communist army summed up the experiences in "building, managing, and using" warehouses; found the problems existing in warehouses in specific areas; and drew up a comprehensive plan for putting them in order. On 2 October 1983, the communist army's General Logistics Department held an "all-army logistics work conference" in Beiping. At the conference, Hong Xuezhi [3163 1331 2535] made a report on "strengthening the building of warehouses in an army, raising the level of materiel management, and ushering in a new situation in warehouse work." He stressed that, to build warehouses well, the most important point is to insist on the guiding ideology of "building for use," and to insist on handling affairs in accordance with the capital construction procedures, and in site selection, design, and construction to give careful consideration to how to meet the demand for managing materiel well. The key demands made by this conference were:

1. The need to raise warehouse work, which has the good management of materiel as its center, to a new level of modernization and regularization that meets the demands of modern warfare.

2. The need to learn well the relevant sciences and technologies and the knowledge about management, and to set up various kinds of management systems and personal responsibility systems.

3. The need to strengthen ideological and political work focused on the characteristics of warehouse work.
4. The need to adapt vigorously new technologies and new crafts to raise the level of scientific management and to achieve gradually the mechanization of warehouse operations and the automation of warehouse management.

5. The need to step up the building of warehouses into combat-capable entities focused on the characteristics of modern three-dimensional warfare.

C. Big Inspection of "Financial Affairs" in the Army

In the communist army's work of managing its financial affairs, there have all along been the serious defects of "the enforcement of rules and regulations not being strict, the duties not being clear, the management not being good, and there being loss and waste." Based on this situation, the communist army, beginning in February 1982, drew out more than 40,000 cadres to form more than 7,000 inspection teams to inspect the financial affairs of units at the regiment level and above in order to understand the situation with respect to the distribution, management, and use of military expenditures in units at all levels. Based on what their investigations discovered, there was among the communist army's cadres a relatively serious situation of "graft, squandering, and arbitrary use" of funds and of overstocking of materiel. There also existed many cases of violation of financial and economic discipline, such as recklessly building housing, wasting energy resources, spending public funds for private purposes, and overspending in budgets. All of these things had seriously affected the progress of the modernization of the army. In July 1983, the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee issued a circular notice on "the question of strengthening the work of managing financial affairs and materiel and appropriately handling property, and strictly forbidding behavior that violates law and discipline," calling on the entire army to enforce the rules strictly. Subsequently, the General Logistics Department of the communist army, focusing on this question, held an "all-army logistics work conference," which reviewed, discussed, and summed up the defects in the logistics system as well as the problem of how to get deeply involved in carrying out reforms. When making a speech at the conference on the unhealthy tendencies in logistics finance and economy, Yang Shangkun [2799 1424 2492], vice chairman of the Military Commission, pointed out: "For our army to achieve national defense modernization, we must first, through investigation and study, understand the logistics system at all levels, clearly investigate the materiel storage and financial expenditures of all units, strictly enforce financial and economic discipline, and appropriately handle the problems in the management of financial affairs." Obviously, the long-standing abuses in the communist army's financial and economic management are extremely serious, and are in urgent need of rectification and reform.

III. The Reform Situation in the Past 4 Years

After finishing the "big inspection of the army's border and coastal defenses," the Chinese communists, beginning on 18 November 1982, held a 10-day "all-army logistics work conference" in Beijing. This conference was the first important all-army conference after the "12th Congress" of the CPC. The conference focused on studying how to usher in comprehensively a new situation
in logistics work and build a logistics system suitable for a "modernized, regularized" army. The reform system in recent years is as follows:

A. Training Work

1. To replace its weapons and equipment, a certain army of the "Shenyang Military Region," starting in 1982, has sent nearly 20 young cadres separately to units such as the National Defense Science and Technology University in Changsha, the Computer Technology Research Institute in Shanghai, and the Engineering and Mechanics Research Institute in Harbin to study computers, electronics, and other sciences and technologies. Also, in consultation with the Ship Engineering Research Institute and the Industrial University in Harbin, this army started study classes in computer specialties, and in May 1984 set up an "all-army closed-circuit television teaching network."3

2. In "Beijing Military Region," in order to change past phenomena in training in which no one managed it, plans were not implemented, sides were not insured, and there were no standards for checking and accepting results, a certain artillery regiment, from 5 to 7 July 1984, held at its site a meeting to exchange experiences in "building basic-level logistics into a combat-capable entity," and the conference reviewed and discussed the work of training reform.4

3. In "Nanjing Military Region," to improve the fast-reaction capability of logistics support in wartime, the logistics department of a certain division combined the questions of "combined arms operations command" and "logistics support" into one topic and drilled in it. After 4 months of training and study, the leading cadres of this department became able to make operational decisions based on the higher-level plan, the operational mission, and the terrain conditions. The logistics staff officers and assistants are able to handle the drafting and transmission to lower levels of operational orders, the coordination plans, and logistics support directives. In October, the army to which the division belongs passed on its new practice in reforming logistics training.5

4. In the "Ji'an Military Subdistrict in Jiangxi," the logistics training of local units in the past made primary such basic topics as receiving and dispatching, making charts and filling out forms, and the training was unable to meet the demands of a future war. To change this defect, the military subdistrict, beginning in 1984, did research focused on the present situation, put forward a reform plan, cut back nine old basic training topics, and added new topics in emergency support and fast-reaction support in wartime. And it formulated the training content based on the characteristics of the local units' logistic support.6

5. In the former "Wuhan Military Region," in order to reform the training content of its organizations, the logistics department of a certain army increased its study and explorations of logistics support theory in emergency expansion of its establishment, fast reaction, strategic movement, the overcoming of the natural obstacle of the Huanghe River, the predetermination of the war zone terrain, communications, as well as logistics support in the
recent regional wars abroad. To insure implementation of these topics, the department organized the starting of polytechnic correspondence school education in the military region.\textsuperscript{7}

6. In "Chengdu Military Region," in order to improve the units' fast-reaction capability for night logistics support under conditions of nuclear warfare, the logistics office of a certain regiment carried out a series of explorations and drills on 20 problems of fast reaction and coordinated support focusing on the separate links of battles of attack and defense at night, battles of mobile deep thrusts by units, gobi and beachhead operations, attacks on groups of tanks, and antiairborne operations; as well as taking cover and assembling, starting a march, and assaulting and counterattacking after suffering an enemy nuclear attack.\textsuperscript{8}

7. In the "Lanzhou Military Region," on 25 July 1985 a certain division held an on-the-spot study meeting on logistics night training. Noting that in the past in communications command there were the defects that the equipment was completely backward, the procedures were overelaborate, and the communications command was very unsuitable for the demands of modern warfare, it innovated a multifunctional "comprehensive command station" suitable for field operations, and trained with it.\textsuperscript{9}

B. Warehouse Management

1. In "Shenyang Military Region," a certain warehouse applied computer, laser, and infrared ray technologies to the automated management of warehouses. It is said that the warehouse has successfully developed a humid temperature telemeter and an automatic door-closing alarm.\textsuperscript{10}

2. In the "Shanghai Garrison District," a certain ammunition warehouse has begun to use microcomputers for warehouse building management, and has begun to mechanize its materiel conveyance and to automate its ammunition repair.\textsuperscript{11}

C. POL Management

1. In the "Beijing Military Region," a certain POL depot of the Logistics Department has jointly developed with Qinghua University and the No 6 Research Institute of the Ministry of Electronics Industry a "POL depot electronic computer control and management system," which is used for receiving and dispatching operations, estimation, and account statistics in depot work, thereby initially achieving automated management.\textsuperscript{12}

2. In the "Nanjing Military Region," the POL Department of the Logistics Department has the first "underwater oil pipeline" in the waters of the lower reaches of the Huaihe River. An "assault boat" pulled a steel cable across the river bottom of the more than 800-meter-wide river. The oil pipeline was laid in only 2 hours 40 minutes.\textsuperscript{13}

3. In the "Anhui Provincial Military District," the Logistics Department, in reforming the system of POL supply, stipulated:
a. Supplying the units with POL will be changed to direct supply of parity price POL from local petroleum companies.

b. Before POL arrives in the units from the provincial petroleum company, the POL of local petroleum companies may be used to supply the units.

c. A joint circular notice that localities are going to supply POL will be issued by the provincial petroleum company and the military region to all petroleum companies at the county level and above.\textsuperscript{14}

4. In the "Fuzhou Military Region," a certain POL depot of the Logistics Department at the beginning of 1985 completed the building of an "electronic center control room," thereby achieving in POL management "remote control, telemetry, and remote inquiry" and "transport mechanization."\textsuperscript{15}

5. In the "Chengdu Military Region," a POL depot has installed a "microcomputer control system," thereby initially accomplishing the automation of receiving POL, dispatching POL, pouring POL into tanks, and managing accounts.\textsuperscript{16}

6. The laying of an oil pipeline from Golmud to Lasa in Xizang was recently completed, ending the past situation in which a certain motor vehicle regiment had to transport oil all year round, consuming time and effort.

D. Capital Construction

1. In capital construction, a system of investment partly in kind and partly in cash and a system of inviting bids for contracts are gradually being put into practice.

2. For the capital construction investment needed for building, rebuilding, and expanding factories, horse farms, and farms, loans have replaced allocations.

3. All institutions that can be managed as enterprises, like barracks design units, project construction units, and organization maintenance units, and guest houses, are managed as enterprises.

4. For all things that can be managed with responsibility for task completion, like public sundry fees, water and electricity fees, and vehicle kilometer quotas, there is management with responsibility for task completion; the savings revert to the person charged with the task, and overspending is not made up.

5. The proportion of in-kind supply and funds supply has been readjusted by increasing as much as possible the funds supply. For all goods that a unit can purchase nearby, funds can be supplied, so that the unit may itself select and purchase the best.

6. The existing housing system has been reformed. Consideration is first given to rent subsidies, while gradually effecting the transition to making housing a commodity and part of society.
7. The existing cumbersome and wasteful system of giving subsidies for bedding and clothing has been changed, and, based on the individual wishes, a method that combines in-kind and funds supply has been put into practice (for example, the giving of vouchers).

E. "Streamlining and Reorganization"

To match the reform of the army system, the communist army has decided on the large-scale reduction of the administrative levels of logistics units, the removal or joining together of organizations, and the lowering of grades in the units. It has decided on the reduction by a large number of logistics cadres, and on the reduction by a large number of administrative and career personnel, in order to reduce the army's social burden. In accordance with a decision of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, the number of personnel in the communists army's logistics system will be reduced by 50 percent. This reduction will include organizations, factories, hospitals, academies and schools under the General Logistics Department, and logistics organizations and personnel in all the military regions and units. For example, after the merging of the original large military regions of Nanjing and Fuzhou, in the organizations in the Logistics Department of the Nanjing Military Region, the number of working personnel at present has been much reduced in comparison with the number in the original Logistics Department of Nanjing Military Region.17

F. Establishment of "General Logistics Department Base Command Post"

On 18 October 1985, the Chinese communists set up a "General Logistics Department Base Command Post" in Wuhan, Hubei, unifying the leadership and management of the entire army's strategic rear area warehouses. They also set up in the strategic places of Guiyang, Xi'an, and Nenjiang regional "base command posts." Then a three-level storage and supply management system was formally set up: strategic (General Logistics Department system), campaign (large military region system), and tactical (unit system). Its main mission is to require the good management at all times of strategic stored materiel and to be responsible for supplying some units; in wartime it is to provide rear strategic support for each war zone.18

IV. Opinions From Research and Analysis

A. There is a lack of ideas and a theoretical basis for modernized logistics: For a long time, under the heavy fetters of the "leftist" ideology, in the communist army there has widely existed a deviation in the understanding of logistics work management, namely, that it is a work concerning eating, drinking, relieving nature, and sleeping, which when once seen anyone "understands" it and when once done anyone "masters" it. This concept has made it very difficult for all work of logistics building to move forward vigorously. In addition, with regard to the reform of logistics management, it has been discovered that among logistics cadres there exist the idea and practice of "getting a grip on logistics when a war begins and forgetting about logistics when the war is over." In training there exists the phenomenon of "speaking is important, doing is secondary, and there is no need
to get busy." Proceeding to the next step, they adversely affect the reform measures formulated for logistics work in the communist army, so that they are unable to be thoroughly put into practice and implemented.

According to the public admission of Hong Xuezhi, director of the General Logistics Department of the communist army: "In the past few years, our army in some fields of logistics has made many experiments in reform, but from the macroscopic view, up to now it basically still stops at the stage of the traditional practices of the past. It cannot yet thoroughly change the supply system of self-sufficiency in which plots are carved out and closed for sale, construction is duplicated, as well as the idea of 'small but complete and big but complete.' It cannot change the management method of 'eating out of one big pot' and the work patterns of handicraft industry. From the big inspection of financial affairs and barracks throughout the army, and the investigation of border and coastal defenses and of warehouses throughout the army, one can see, on the one hand, that in national defense funds are not abundant and, on the other hand, that funds and materiel are not used properly and that losses and waste are fairly serious. In particular, after money is changed into materiel, there is sometimes a complete loss of control. Tracing the reasons, we find that the most fundamental point is that there are no clear ideas and theories about modernized logistics to act as a guide, and in the work there exists blindness and doing as one pleases. ...This is called 'a blind man riding a horse,' and is an abnormal state that is very unsuitable for the demands on logistics of army building and modernized warfare." From this it is obvious that the communist army's logistics ideas and logistics theory are unable to break the fetters of traditional concepts, and that reform can only be a case of "curing the head when the head is sick, and curing the feet when the feet are sick," and that it is difficult to make a major breakthrough. There is a very large gap and contradiction between what are declared successes in the "construction of modernized logistics" and the actual situation.

B. Reform which consists of "writing superficial articles" is unworthy of the name of reform: To change the problems existing in its structuring of logistics, the communist army has not only formulated many measures for reform, but also has set up many systems of personal responsibility, in an attempt to promote effective reforms in the structuring. However, according to what the Chinese communists' LAD has revealed: "Because the cadres of our army are afraid to take responsibility, they do not dare to expose the problems existing in management, and they create a work style of resorting to deception and of reporting only the good news and not the bad. Some units look as if they have a need to make reforms. However, when it comes to taking action, they really do not have the will to seek the truth, and even, in the name of reform, 'write superficial articles' and 'make flower stands.' Some units always, as far as the things that an outsider can see, make efforts, but actually they only announce the setting up of a 'team' or the running of a 'class,' and one doesn't see specific activities. Some units stealthily substitute one thing for another by taking things that happened several years before into the present, and counting them as examples of successes in reform. Some units 'put on shoes and hat,' and play up small changes in work methods and systems formulations as major breakthroughs. Some persons do not inquire about the actual situation in their own units, but bring in the practices of
others, change them into phrases that are pleasant to listen to, and declare that they are their own ideas for blazing new trails. And so on and so forth. All of this sounds moving and looks bustling, but is of no help or benefit to initiating actual work or ushering in a new situation. Some things that are done are flashy and without substance and even sham. They are the same old things in a new guise, and in essence are the same old stuff. This way of making reform is unworthy of the name, and very possibly will have the effect of damaging the prestige of reform.20 On 26 May 1985, in an article in RENMIN HIBAO entitled "Pursuing Undeserved Reputation, Not Seeking Truth, and Making Boasts," the Chinese communists pointed out: "At present there are many cadres who do not earnestly conduct investigation and study, do not conscientiously explore new approaches for reform, do not study modern science and technology, and do not assiduously study knowledge about advanced administration and management. They do not discover new problems and solve new problems, but rather practice false skills, 'arrange flower stands,' and even make boasts." This shows that the problems in the work of reforming the structuring of the communist army's logistics have piled up, and that the prospects for the reform are not optimistic.

C. The lack of talented persons hampers reform. The communist army's "General Political Department" is now vigorously advocating the study of the application of microcomputer and electronic computer automation techniques in an attempt to improve the "capability of logistics for fast support." But the highest ultimate attainment of fast reaction first involves the correct use of computerized consultative science and technology. According to what the communist army has declared, at present the logistics departments at all levels are applying this technology to the professional work of logistics, at the division and the regiment level, in command, military supply, warehouse, POL, and financial affairs. However, based on a complaint in LAD by Jin Xiaoliang [6855 2556 0081], a staff officer in the headquarters of the Chinese communists' "Chengdu Military Region," in recent years many units in the communist army have started the study and application of microcomputers, but there exist problems. A rather prominent problem is that many units lack talented persons in the speciality of microcomputer study and application. For example, in 1983 this military region distributed a microcomputer that cost 200,000 yuan (renminbi). Because no one knew how to use it, it had to be stored in a warehouse. For another computer, which was introduced from abroad, there was also no one who knew how to use it and it had to be consigned to limbo.21 This proves that in the Chinese communists' army there is a lack of scientific and technological talents. In the so-called building of automated logistics with fast reaction, this is a case of increasing machines without gaining any advantage at all and of waste and loss. The performance of the small number of microcomputers that has been successfully developed and set up is below normal international standards. Therefore, the logistics program that the communist army boasts about is only the models explored by experimental units and experimental-point units. Substantial success in reform is a matter worth leaving for future consideration.
FOOTNOTES

1. LAD, 8 October 1981.
2. LAD, 25 August 1983.
5. LAD, 7 November 1984.
7. LAD, 3 April 1984.
18. LAD, 19 October 1985.
20  LAD, 26 December 1984.

9727
CSO: 4005/432
RETIRED CADRES PRAISED—The provincial military district held a New Year's forum on the afternoon of 28 January, which was attended by old cadres who had retired from the frontline. Wang Baotian, Shen Shanwen, (Shen Zhongxiang), and other leading comrades of the provincial military district attended the forum. After extending New Year's greetings to the old comrades, Commander Wang Baotain briefed them on the progress in the reduction-in-strength reorganization and in the militia and reserve service work achieved by the provincial military district through party rectification. He also briefed them on the tasks for 1986. He praised the old cadres for their positive contributions to party rectification as well as their work in other fields last year and encouraged them to continue to work for a fundamental improvement in party style and militia and reserve service work of the provincial military district in the coming new year. He also wished them happiness, good health, and longevity in their remaining years. The leading comrades of the military district also listened to the old comrades' opinions and suggestions for improving party style and achieving a breakthrough in the work in all fields of the provincial military district. [Text] [Nanchang Jiangxi Provincial Service in Mandarin 1100 GMT 30 Jan 86 OW] /8918

CSO: 4005/500
OFFICIALS URGED TO COOPERATE WITH PRESS

OW100600 Taipei CHINA POST in English 5 Feb 86 p 4

[Editorial: "The Importance of Communication"]

[Text] Premier Yu Kuo-hwa answered 16 questions from 41 local reporters and foreign correspondents in a press conference held on February 3. Important issues such as the ROC's [Republic of China] official position on the Asian Development Bank, government policy toward mainland China, and rising crime and unemployment rates were all candidly answered by the premier.

This year-end press conference was broadcast live by one local television network. According to various news reports, the general reaction to this press conference is a favorable one. The mass-circulation CHINA TIMES notes in its editorial of February 4: "Premier Yu, before assuming his present post, had mainly managed financial and economic affairs. As a result, he was much more distant and lacked sufficient experience with other matters and the public. Yet a premier must manage a much broader spectrum of issues. A year and a half later, Premier Yu has become more adroit and relaxed in answering reporters' questions, though he has never been nor has he ever intended to be an eloquent and charismatic person."

Premier Yu has expressed his determination on various occasions to make public policies in accordance with the public will, and pointed out the importance of the press in bringing together the government and the public. According to the cabinet's reaction to public criticism, we can fairly say that the premier has kept his word in the last one and a half years.

However, if we scrutinize the relation between the press and the government, we still find the communication between the two inadequate. Thus the function of linking the government and the public through the press has not been brought into full play. This has mainly been caused by some public officials who are unwilling to meet the press and are unwilling to provide complete information to reporters. If reporters are unable to write full stories, the public has no way to understand government policies. And we know that a lack of communication easily leads to misunderstanding.

Owing to their educational and professional backgrounds, most reporters here can understand the government's difficulties. As long as the government is willing to be open with the reporters, they will take national interest into consideration in their reports.

We like to use Premier Yu's year-end press conference as an opportunity to urge all government officials to increase their communication with the press, whether in public press conferences, or in private interviews.
SAUDI OIL MINISTER VISITS TAIWAN--Taipei, Feb 23 (CNA)--Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani departed Sunday with his entourage after a short visit. He arrived here Saturday. The Republic of China has progressed in various fields over past years, Yamani said before his departure. He said he was deeply impressed with the development here although his visit was brief and that he enjoyed the hospitality of the Chinese Government and the people. He said he hopes to come here again in the near future. Yamani was seen off at CKS International Airport by Saudi Ambassador Az'ad 'abd al-Aziz al-Zuhayr and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Text] [Taipei CNA in English 0234 GMT 24 Feb 86 OW] /8918

CSO: 4000/190