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[Article by Lt Gen N. Shlyaga, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: “A Dependable Guard of the Socialist Fatherland”]

[Text] In the intense creative pace of perestroyka and the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society we currently hear the rhythm of the revolutionary, military and labor traditions of our people. Traditions, in being the treasurehouse of the historical memory of people and an alloy of their social experience and spiritual culture, link together the past, the present and the future. Each page of the 72-year biography of the Soviet Armed Forces breathes precisely with these traditions.

Their biography began from those heroic days of October. The victorious state of the workers and peasants immediately had to resolve two basic and interrelated functions: the creative one of building socialism and the defensive one of protecting it by military and other means. In contrast to any other state of those times, and not only those, for our nation which was at one of the poles of the opposing social systems of the world which had split into two, the question of defending the socialist fatherland gained particular significance and largely determined our domestic and foreign policy.

It could not be otherwise. In less than 30 years after their birth, the Armed Forces were forced to spend around 10 years in fierce engagements and combat campaigns. And the last of the wars which was waged against us by the Nazi Wehrmacht, the weapon of the most reactionary forces of imperialism, has had no equal in world history in terms of its scale and ferocity, the human and material losses. Even the Nazis considered that in this war it was a question not merely of a military conflict between individual states but rather a gigantic battle between peoples in the course of which one system, one ideology, namely fascism, was to be victorious while the other system, the other ideology of socialism and Marxism-Leninism were to be mercilessly destroyed.

Nothing will obscure the greatness of the victory of our people and their Armed Forces the 5th anniversary of this victory we will soon be celebrating. Precisely the army and the Soviet people were able to defend their freedom and independence, maintain the nation as a sovereign state, protect the victories of socialism, and at the same time save world civilization.

The vital force of the new revolutionary army and the main source of its victories were in the fact that in terms of its nature and sociopolitical essence, its structure and goals and principles of command and control, it conformed fully to the nature of the socialist social and state system, and embodied the unity of class, nationality and international interests of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, the nations and peoples inhabiting the Soviet nation. For the first time in history an army was organized and improved designed not for the suppression of the masses but for the defense of their interests, not for seizing foreign territory but for defending the socialist victories of the people against aggressors, not for initiating wars between states but rather for ensuring their peaceful coexistence.

The entire world has been shaken by the fate of the Vietnamese village Songmi, where just one American company simply executed around 500 peaceful inhabitants, burned up the houses and destroyed the livestock and plantings. Nothing of such a sort has ever been or could be committed by our army due to its nature and character as an army of the people, an army of the socialist countries.

Our enemies are endeavoring to speculate on the introduction of the limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan after the imploring and repeated requests for aid by the legitimate government of the republic in defense of the April Revolution. The Soviet government has openly provided a moral and political assessment for this act for all the world to see. But, when in that nation, our army was not pursuing any neocolonialist goals or egoistic interests. Moreover, the Soviet military built and restored the schools, lycees, nurseries and homes, hospitals and mosques, irrigation networks and wells which had been destroyed by the mujahideen.

At present, when our troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan, the world has again seen that they are not to blame for the fact that blood has been shed and is being shed in this country.

At present, the new political thinking has also led to new approaches in international relations. In the practical sense, these approaches mean collaboration and interaction, reliance on political means in ensuring security, the deideologization of international relations and a recognition of the universal nature of human rights and an international standard in the humanitarian sphere.

All of this has noticeably reduced international tension and for the first time in all our nation’s history has made it possible for us to strengthen security not by building up military might and defense expenditures but rather by an intensive political dialogue.

At the same time, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces have not forgotten that the policy of a “direct confrontation” of the United States with the USSR on a global and regional scale, in viewing a maximum weakening of the positions of socialism in our country by any means, including its elimination by the use of military force, is not yet something of the past. A 1986 U.S. Army Field Manual directly stated that the policy of deterrents does not exclude the use of nuclear weapons first by the American troops in the aim of “defending” America’s vitally important national interests. The United States, in essence, has not abandoned a single military technical
program. Having assumed the obligation not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons, our nation cannot forget its defense and should prepare the Armed Forces for repelling aggression both in a nuclear and a conventional war. It is a different question that the might and security of the Soviet state today and in the future will depend upon a reasonable combination of military potential, economic dynamism and an inevitable priority for improving the living conditions of the people. Previously, this linkage was not always considered.

The press has already announced the total amount of our defense expenditures which in 1990 will be around 71 million rubles or 8.2 percent less than last year.

In line with the carrying out of the Treaty on Medium-and Lesser-Range Missiles and the unilateral cutback in troops, their numbers have been reduced in the Armed Forces as well as the quantity of the basic types of weapons. Conversion is being carried out consistently and envisages a significant increase, up to 60 percent by 1995, in the output of civilian products in the total product range of the defense industry.

Having adopted the new military doctrine in which not only the military political content but also the military technical has a defensive nature, the highest goal is to prevent war and we, in essence, from 1985-1986 have entered a new stage of military organizational development. This stage involves not the mass introduction of nuclear missile weapons but rather the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense.

The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Defense Council which are responsible for military organizational development have not only posed the task of having a modern, strong and reliable army manned on a multinational, extraterritorial basis but have also outlined the ways which we should follow and these are the qualitative parameters both in relation to equipment and military science as well as the personnel of the Armed Forces. This fundamental political tenet determines the content and direction of the work being done by the command and political cadres, the party organizations and all the Army and Navy personnel in ensuring a level of training and combat readiness of the Armed Forces which meets the demands of the times.

It is generally known, and no one is concealing this, that during the years preceding perestroika, many unresolved problems had built up in the Armed Forces and there were serious shortcomings in the organization of combat and political training. The deterioration of military discipline, the increased number of emergencies with equipment and weapons, the improper conduct of a portion of the soldiers and officers and serious oversights in the standing of alert duty could not help but have a negative impact on the authority of the Army and Navy. Unfortunately, in the work style of many political bodies there also appeared numerous elements of formalism, conservatism and inertia, complacency and indifference. Authoritarian, strong-arm methods began to prevail in their activities. We have still not gotten rid of a number of these shortcomings even now. Nevertheless, perestroika in the Army and Navy is picking up its pace. The stereotypes are collapsing and many old tenets of military theory and practice are being revised.

In accord with the provisions of a defensive military doctrine, strategy, operational art and tactics are undergoing substantial changes, and the structure and groupings of army and navy command are being improved. Significant changes are being incorporated in the system for training officer personnel and the level of work with them is rising. A solid legislative base is being put beneath all this work which can be compared with a military reform and this base provides the following: in the first place, priority for military and political training over other types of daily activities of the troops and naval forces in peacetime and, secondly, greater social benefits for all categories of servicemen, particularly the regular ones. Individual enforceable enactments have already been worked out and are in effect while others are in the final stage of preparation.

Party political work is beginning to assume new approaches and among these are democratization of leadership by the political bodies over the party organizations, the practice of reports and an assessing of their activities at party conferences, and setting up under the political bodies, party committees and bureus on a volunteer basis commissions and groups on urgent questions. The structure of the leading Komsomol bodies is being democratized and a new social institution is being formed, the officer meetings, with permanently operating certification commissions with the involvement of representatives of the party and Komsomol organizations and the officer community.

At present, under the conditions of a new analysis of the functions and role of the CPSU in the current stage of perestroika, the question of the place of the party bodies in the Army and Navy is being actively debated. In these debates some have raised the issue of the advisability of these bodies. I am confident that such an approach has no valid grounds. The Army and Navy political bodies in being established together with the genesis of the Red Army and Navy for directing the party collectives and organizing party political work have proven to be militant bodies of the party and which provide a constant party influence on all aspects of the life and activities of the troops and naval forces, a rise in their combat readiness, a strengthening of military discipline and the political and moral state of the personnel.

It is another matter that along with perestroika in the Armed Forces, the political bodies should also be reorganized and more actively freed of the dead weight which has accumulated in their activities. It should be a question of an optimum combining of the functions of the leading party and administrative-political body in a single unit.
In order to most effectively change the activities of the Army and Navy political bodies to political methods of leadership, we have set out to organize their inner life and leading activities on democratic bases. It is a question of restoring and strengthening an atmosphere of openness, glasnost, a free expression of opinions and a broad and unforced discussion of all urgent questions of policy and practical activities as well as conscious discipline and personal responsibility. The political bodies are basing their relations on principles of political trust with such social organizations as the Komsomol, the trade unions as well as the informal associations.

Important measures have been adopted by us recently to democratize the activities of the leading Komsomol bodies and increase the activeness of the primary Komsomol organizations. In the recently held Komsomol conferences under the political bodies, elective Komsomol leadership bodies have been organized and these are the councils of the Komsomol organizations.

We are working on an organizational restructuring of the Armed Forces trade unions, and it is a question of establishing a single trade union of the Armed Forces which would aptly and effectively defend the interests of the military employees.

In the army, as throughout the nation, active work has begun related to the elections to the republic and local soviets. Judging from everything, the army will be worthyly represented among the deputy corps of the nation. We have a rather representative corps of USSR people's deputies with 82 servicemen. At the recently held sessions of the deputy group from the Armed Forces, there was an interesting exchange of opinions on perestroika in the Army and Navy.

We are putting the work with the representatives of the informal associations in a special area. The rapid politicization of the masses has led to a situation where at present tens of thousands of informal groups and associations are operating in the nation. It is essential to emphasize that among their active participants there are many young persons, many of whom are filling out the ranks of the Armed Forces. For this reason, it is important to use the entire arsenal of educational and legal means for influencing them so as to attract all the active and creative forces to carry out the tasks confronting the troop collectives and localize those who are not inclined to honestly serve the motherland.

At present, under the GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy], for the first time we have set up and have actively operating a Center for Sociopsychological Research and we are placing great hopes on this for studying various processes occurring in the troop collectives and issuing recommendations for work with specific categories of men.

The CPSU Central Committee has also supported our proposals for restoring the military departments in the mass information media, for creating a military-patriotic writers studio, broadening the exchange and publishing in the languages of the Union republics and foreign languages the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN and the Komsomol-youth appendix to it "Combat Comrade," a full-length video tape as well as the weekly appendix to the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA entitled "Son of the Fatherland."

Perestroika in the Army and Navy and the measures being taken by the military councils, the commanders and the political bodies to deepen it are helping to establish in the troop collectives a new political and moral situation, a moral-psychological atmosphere and the appropriate ideological climate. Let me say directly that in the ebullience of passions and emotions and in the heat of the political struggle which reign in society, the Army and Navy have shifted neither to the right nor to the left nor have they permitted antisocialist manifestations.

Being the most mobile and disciplined instrument of the state, the military have often been where it is most difficult for our people. Here was Chernobyl. Here was Armenia and Azerbaijan. Here was the BAM [Baikal-Amur Mainline], the building of roads in the Nonchernozem area and help in harvesting. And as long as the nation needs their aid, the men will not stand on the sideline, as we have been criticized for doing.

Of course, we must bear responsibility for the existing shortcomings. A number of commanders and staffs, political bodies and party organizations on the spot have not defined with sufficient clarity their place in perestroika, and have not completely understood how it should be carried out in a division, regiment or on a ship. There have been instances of a nonobjective assessment of the state of affairs, low exactness, bureaucratic methods of work, oversimplification in combat training.

In speaking about the army, it is scarcely advisable or justified to put it outside society or outside its problems. Perestroika in the Armed Forces is being carried out in the same time limits as in all our society. And in the army party organizations there have been as many built-up problems and unsolved questions as in any party organization of an Union republic, kray or oblast. Everything that has occurred in the nation including the violations of legality, tyranny, the repressions of the 1930s, the difficult years of the war and the joy of victory, the stagnation in the 1970s and 1980s—all of this has not bypassed the Army and Navy.

At present, we are encountering a real contradiction. On the one hand, the role of man and the level of his defense awareness under the conditions of implementing a new defensive doctrine has greatly increased and, on the other, the very conditions under which defense awareness is being shaped, let us say it directly, do not always correspond to the tenets of the party concerning the priority of quality parameters.

What do I have in mind here? Actually, at present, the army is calling up young fellows who have already had
definite schooling in democracy. They are relaxed, bold in judgments and deeds and socially active. At the same time, many inductees are infected by pacifism and a portion of them does not see the social importance of serving in the army. An analysis of the spring call-up has shown that many of the inductees have police records, they have served time, some of them do not have one of the parents and individuals are orphans. A significant number of the inductees is already familiar with alcohol and drugs and by video with the harsh morals of prostitution. The intellectual potential of the young soldiers has declined as of the spring of this year we are not calling up the students and have discharged those 170,000 which were called up earlier. Negative attitudes have also grown stronger among the officers as well as among the reserve officers, often as a protest against the incorrect attitude toward the army.

Unfortunately, the army has not escaped the problems of interethnic relations which have been exacerbated in a number of regions of our country, particularly in the republics of the Baltic and Transcaucasia, in certain regions of Moldavia and in the Central Asian Republics. Analysis indicates that a definite portion of the inductees has "experience" in participating in various unsanctioned meetings, demonstrations, fights and other illegal actions on an ethnic basis. Many of them have suffered as a result of the actions of extremist groupings. All of this tells on the activities of the military collectives.

There have been growing attempts for an effective influence by members of different informal associations and extremist elements on the consciousness of the servicemen. Some have a direct assignment from their leaders to conduct antiarmy agitation among fellow servicemen and spread nationally-inclined leaflets and literature.

Evermore marked is the desire of a number of inductees from individual regions of the nation to avoid service in the Army and particularly in the Navy. Alarming is the fact of absences without leave by the servicemen.

There is an obvious discrepancy between the well-known rise in the national self-awareness of the induction youth and the level of its internationalist education. According to data of sociological research conducted by GlavPUR, approximately one-fifth of the regular servicemen has participated in nationality movements before induction into the army. A portion of the soldiers grew up in families where there was a significant amount of nationalist vestiges and others in families where the observance of nationality traditions and rites was given, possibly, excessive importance. The primacy of the national and even the nationalist to the detriment of the international in the family upbringing of the induction youth has led to the grouping of regular servicemen in nationality microgroups. Because of this, conflict situations frequently arise in the troop collectives. National-compatriot formations in the subunits and units often put themselves in a privileged position in relation to other servicemen and endeavor to impose their conditions on the entire military collective.

Recently, the contradiction has been exacerbated between the quality characteristics of the young recruits and the requirements of military service. Thus, at present, one out of every ten young men has never worked or studied before induction to active military service. For the given category of young people, the preparatory period for service runs from three months to a year and more. Moreover, many inductees have a poor knowledge of Russian or are completely ignorant of it. Much effort, patience, pedagogical ability, sensitivity and tact and tenacity must be employed to make real soldiers from these fellows. They must be reeducated, tempered in army life and then given, as they say, their pass to life.

The exacerbating of interethnic relations in the nation has not caught the army party organizations by surprise. The problem is that the very nature of a multinational army has given rise to an ordered system of international education of the personnel. A new impetus in this work was provided by the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference which posed for us the task of making the Armed Forces a school of international education.

In the political bodies from the GlavPUR down to the division, commissions on interethnic relations have been established and under the party committees and bureaus of the units there are groups. A department of interethnic relations has been organized at the Center for Research on Social and Psychological Problems Under GlavPUR, and this department is charged with their scientific study under the conditions of military activity.

Changes have been made in instructing officer personnel in the work practices in multinational troop collectives. The manner of the troops and the organizing of military and political training have been given the necessary adjustments. The men of all nationalities are being more consistently involved in sociopolitical work. At present, the national composition of the party and Komsomol aktiv as a whole reflects the composition of the party and Komsomol organizations and the multinational troop collectives.

The work being carried out by units of the multinational troop collectives has produced results. It can be said with confidence that in their majority, relations between men of different nationalities are good. Research indicates that, as a rule, the very conditions of military service, joint military activities and the unity of goals and tasks objectively contribute to the uniting of the multinational Army and Navy collectives and to the strengthening of friendship and military comradeship. In this manner the educational opportunities of the troop collectives are realized.

The present requires the organizing of the military patriotic education of the younger generation on a new, highly competent basis. All the more as the youth at present has a particularly strong interest in the history of
the socialist fatherland and there is a growing desire to analyze the path traveled by the nation and to understand for what their fathers and grandfathers lived and how the heroic and tragic was combined in life.

Undoubtedly, the role of the army in this matter is exceptionally great, for due to its particular features and purpose it has always been for the youth a school of maturing and education, giving the youth a feeling of civil responsibility for the defense of the motherland. And at present, the commanders, the political bodies and party organizations are doing the maximum possible to acquaint the young soldiers with the revolutionary, military and labor traditions of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces and to shape in them the qualities of patriots and internationalists. But we cannot help but say here that the combat capability and discipline of the army are a national concern. And such concepts sacred to each person as military duty, honor and patriotism should not be subjected to inflation. They must be filled with the spirit of perestroyka. The military patriotic education of the youth must be viewed as a most important task of both the army, the local party and Soviet bodies and our veterans.

The current year is the 120th anniversary of the birthday of V.I. Lenin and the 45th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The celebrating of these dear jubilee dates for all of us should become a moment of truth for all generations of Soviet people and a moment of our historical memory and our fraternity.

The next 28th CPSU Congress will be a major political event in the life of the party and nation and in essence a political testing of perestroyka. In preparing for this event, the commanders, the political bodies, the party organizations and all the Army and Navy communists see their main task in making our Armed Forces modern, strong and reliable so that under any conditions they are capable of defending the creative labor of our people. There should be nothing else, as we see it, as this is the guarantee of our security and our well-being.


Appeal Of All-Union Veterans’ Council To CC On Draft Platform

90UM0397A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 13, 26-Mar-01 Apr 90 p 4

[“Text” of Appeal Of All-Union Veterans’ Council To Central Committee on Draft Platform]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th Party Congress has been met with great interest by the older generations. It can serve as the basis for a broad discussion in the party and society.

A sincere concern about the fate of perestroyka, the party and the country, motivates us to express our support for the policy of renewal of the life of society and to directly and honestly speak out about our uneasiness with many negative processes taking place today. First of all, we are talking about the lowering of living standards of the workers, especially pensioners. Discipline is weakening, crime is increasing, the prestige of the authorities is falling and the influence of the party on society has weakened. Throughout the entire history of our country we have not witnessed such a sudden aggravation in international relations and a rapid increase in crime. A moral deterioration is occurring. In our view, the Central Committee platform does not contain a convincing analysis and explanation of the causes of the growth of these crisis phenomena and does not give an assuring prognosis for overcoming them.

In the CPSU Central Committee platform a new concept of humane, democratic socialism is proposed and there is a list of the values which the party will arm itself with and those which it rejects. In our view, this is not enough. To fill the theoretical vacuum which has arisen recently we must arm communists with concise ideological reference points for the socialist renewal of society. We strongly condemn those who deny the enormous significance of the ideological-theoretical legacy of Marxism-Leninism. We equally categorically reject the latter-day liquidators regarding the crisis of communist ideology. It must be openly recognized that there are forces operating in the country who oppose socialism. They are attempting to take power. In our view, party committees, including the CPSU Central Committee, could expend greater efforts to explain to people the true goals of these forces and the potential consequences of their actions. Veterans see their duty in intensifying their participation in such work.

While noting the importance of the theses set forth in the platform regarding the danger of both an idealization of the past and an attempt to erase everything truly great and valuable in our historical legacy, veterans strongly protest the numerous statements in the press, radio and television programs in which the older generation is portrayed as a passive force of perestroyka. We welcome the thesis in the draft platform which states that in perestroyka “the spiritual strength and courage of the older generations are with us, their selflessness on behalf of the Motherland, the sacred memory of the sacrifices which they bore during the times of cruel ordeals.”

We have been following the development of events in the Baltic States with concern and pain. Many of us fought in battles across that land and lost tens of thousands of comrades in liberating it from fascism. We cannot regard the possible collapse of the federation with calm and believe that the decision of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet to introduce a bourgeois constitution in Lithuania is illegal. We approve the resolution of the special third Congress of USSR People’s Deputies regarding the decisions of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The platform, in our view, encompasses the fundamental social-economic problems. Their resolution will allow us to provide adequate living and work conditions for
Soviet people. Perestroika will be victorious if a socialist economy is victorious. And that is why veterans and all workers are so troubled over the lingering slippage of the economy, the growth of shortages of goods in stores and the increase in dissatisfaction of the workers with their own labor.

The real need right now is to shorten the transition period, satisfy the urgent needs of the people and do it faster, better and not in words but in deeds.

The older generation is horrified by the picture of the purposeful looting of the country by "shadow figures" and false cooperative owners. It is impossible to tolerate any longer the helplessness of the authorities in face of this plundering which has had a devastating effect on the country.

The economic policy of the CPSU devotes attention to the improvement of the situation of invalids, war and labor veterans. The same concern is needed by veterans of the Armed Forces, soldiers-internationalists and their families. Veterans support measures to avoid the loss of social benefits which have been earned, to prevent a weakening of the key mechanisms which protect pensioners and all workers with the transition to a planned, market economy and new property relations. We confirm our demand that the new law on pensions takes into account the pressing needs of pensioners and especially war veterans and workers in the rear who helped guarantee victory over the enemy.

We express our positive attitude towards the party line on the step by step development of a socialist democracy as a necessary guarantee of the restructuring of society.

At the same time the older generation cannot help but be concerned that at times our democracy begins to resemble anarchy. The forces of public instability and disruption of law and order cannot be allowed to throw aside all restraint behind the shield of noble slogans about democracy and glasnost. The people are tired of loud meetings. The height of political irresponsibility are calls for the destruction of constitutional structures, for civil disobedience and for reprisals against communists.

Veterans believe that in connection with the 45th anniversary of the resounding defeat of fascism, it is completely appropriate both in the platform and at the party congress to once again emphasize the fact that the Soviet country suffered the heaviest losses imaginable in the war and played the decisive role in saving mankind from fascist slavery. That gives us the right to declare our decisive protest of the efforts of the reactionary forces to revise the results of the Second World War and through methods of pressure politics to force the reunification of Germany. We demand that the government obtain firm guarantees of the inviolability of post-war borders and the inadmissibility of a new threat of war emerging from German lands.

Veterans support the platform's thesis about the country's defense. However, we note with concern and strongly condemn the continuous attacks on the Soviet Armed Forces in the mass media. The government and society as a whole are obligated to free the army from accusations of "habits of occupation" and "great-power chauvinism." In the same way it is obligated to provide for the social and legal defense of military personnel, their families, mothers and children wherever they might be.

The older generation lived its entire life with the party; fought in the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War and after many years of working with all our might, turned the country into a great power. We are certain that our experience and knowledge are needed now as well.

We support the line towards a fundamental renewal of the party and its democratization. But in order to proceed steadily along a path which will preserve the party and its leading political role, the CPSU cannot lose the political initiative and lag behind in the democratization of its way of life in the ideological and organizational-personnel renewal process.

It is necessary to raise the communists' level of responsibility. The fact that there are quite a few people in the party who carry their party membership cards for the sake of personal gain and mercenary goals is puzzling. The party must rid itself once and for all of these kinds of people.

We note that the draft platform gives a basis for overcoming the difficulties of perestroika and for the restoration of the party's authority. But for this it must preserve political leadership and not give up the initiative into the hands of the opposition, it must determine accurately who is who and consolidate all the healthy forces in order to find an exit from the crisis.

Veterans have stood and will stand firmly for the socialist renewal of society.

Approved at the plenum of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces.

**First Session Of Veterans' Commission Held**

90UM0397B Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 13, 26 Mar-01 Apr p 3

[Report of the first veterans' commission under the chairmanship of Colonel General I.S. Mednikov, retired: "Commission Session"]

[Text] The first session of the commission on work with veterans of the Armed Forces took place in the All-Union Council of Veterans. Tasks were examined which originated in the resolutions of the board of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the presidium of the All-Union Council on measures to give greater priority to working with veterans of the Armed Forces and improving the material-welfare conditions of their lives.
A plan of work was discussed. Priority goals were determined: providing a social umbrella for veterans of the Armed Forces, searching for solutions to the housing problem.

An exchange of opinions took place on ways to perfect the structure of the All-Union Organization of Veterans and the Soviet Committee of War Veterans and their commissions for work with veterans of the Armed Forces. The commission expressed concern regarding negative tendencies leading to dissension in the veterans movement.

The session was conducted by General Colonel I.S. Mednikov, retired, chairman of the commission. Also participating in the work of the commission were army Generals E.F. Ivanovskiy and P.I. Kravchenko, deputy chairman of the All-Union Council.

Military Components Discuss Role, Work of Party Organizations

Party Authority Examined
90UM0541A Moscow KRAJSAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

Roundtable discussion, published under the heading “The Precongress Tribune: Party and Perestroyka,” written up by Lt Col I. Kosenko, KRAJSAYA ZVEZDA correspondent from the Western Group of Forces: “Who Is the Master in the Party Home?”

Text: The power of the party masses.... This does not sound very usual, although much is being said about democratization, glasnost, a pluralism of opinions and collectivism. But, as is emphasized in the draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee, precisely the power of the party masses should be the basis of the deepest democratization in the party. How is this provision viewed in the primary organizations, how do the communists themselves see this, and do they consider it realistic under the very specific, army conditions? The communists of tank regiment X had a roundtable discussion of these and other urgent problems of internal party life.

Maj G. Ishingaliyev, party committee member: Honestly speaking, I fear that as an important, fundamental provision of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee it may not turn out to be a good phrase. Why? In order for it to work it must have a mechanism, there must be the drive belts. In my view, the draft still does not have the “blueprints” for such a mechanism as a whole, and there are merely the outlines of its individual parts. For instance, broadening the right of the primary party organizations and increasing their independence....

Maj A. Vinogradov, secretary of the directorate party organization: Excuse me, but I feel that this does mean a great deal. It is a different question with the existing structure of the army party organizations and political bodies and with the current regulating of relations between them and the command, these rights, this independence can be constantly undermined and warped by service and administrative power.

Maj G. Ishingaliyev: I can give many examples when interesting innovations of the party committee and fundamental decisions died precisely for this reason. Here is a situation for instance: they have not yet investigated the infrraction of a communist, but a measure of party reprimand has already been ordered “from above.”

Maj A. Vinogradov: What I think is that the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee and the new CPSU Bylaws must strengthen the protective barriers which would exclude such phenomena in the party as the suppression of criticism, let alone persecution for it. Up to now, they have been very tentative. I, for example, recall with shame and pain a meeting involving the personal trial of the regiment’s chief of staff Lt Col N. Yashchenko. Seemingly here it was, democracy, with the opportunity to actually employ party power. But the measures were adopted when they no longer should have been. The discussion was cautious and the criticism of officials was tentative. The men realized the conditions and knew what a principled, just word could do to them.

Only now are we beginning to really be aware of how seriously the official partitions between the communists have attacked party authority.

Sr Lt G. Zakirov, tank company commander: I am among the category of the rank-and-file communists. I have some commander authority, but as for party authority.... For me as yet, this concept is very abstract. I recall, we learned that one of the fellow servicemen was to be promoted. They had not checked it out. The officer in all manner was not worthy. He had a mass of reprimands. They mentioned this in the party meetings. But how did it all end? A general arrived, he applied his power where need be and the negligent comrade was promoted. Such is democratization and the influence of the primary organization.

Maj A. Bazhanov, battalion chief of staff: This again shows that the power of the party masses should not merely be declared in the Platform and Bylaws but also have real mechanisms for its support.

G. Zakirov: First of all, it is essential to revise the Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy and which are greatly out of date. If the CPSU is a self-managing organization, as is stated in the draft Program, then the primary organization should also live according to this principle. Such is the opinion of a majority of our communists.

Maj G. Ishingaliyev: I want to continue this question. Let us take the relations on the levels “party committee—inferior party organization” and “party body—primary organization.” Here so many deformations and administrative additions have formed that a thorough restructuring is required. And it is no accident that one can hear
that in some places the party bodies have been turned into appendages of the administrative system.

Then the draft Program says nothing about the political bodies. And in the draft Bylaws, there is just a mention of them. What will they be like? This is a very pertinent question.

Maj A. Vinogradov: I would not overly dramatize the situation. But it is a fact that much must be changed. In my view, the Platform must reflect the necessity of structural changes. It is certainly no secret that the company party organizations do almost no work at all. It is time to abandon the purely formal party organizations on the spot and merge them into a single regimental one.

Maj G. Ishingaliyev: After the 19th All-Union Party Conference, there has been a discussion of splitting the functions in the work of the party bodies and disengaging from economic activity. But how can we do this under our conditions? What are we worth as communists if we divorce ourselves from the vital problems which concern the people? This is also a question of the authority of the party and our primary organizations.

Maj A. Bazhanov: The party committee and the political body must defend the interests of the people. By what methods is another question?

Maj A. Vinogradov: Without any doubt it can be very difficult and at times it is impossible to separate the purely official and party spheres of activity. But this must be done. Take the recent meeting of the staff communists. It was attended by an officer from a superior body. When Lt Col Skripnik reminded him of the regulations, he promised to “speak seriously” with him. But after the meeting, we all had to remain at a service meeting....

A minor detail? But they still depress the feeling of the dignity of the party members.

Or take something else. There was a report-election party meeting of the regiment. Everything was done on a democratic basis. And the membership of the party committee was also chosen in a spirit of democracy. But then the secretary suddenly set a narrow group of persons and this was done under the pressure of the representative of the party body. How should one understand this?

Maj A. Bazhanov: So Zakirov considers himself a “rank-and-file communist.” But let us reflect where does this category fit? There is not a word about it either in the Program or the CPSU Bylaws. It has been engendered by the distorted practice where the party is stratified into the “leadership top” and “executive bottom.” This is not an exaggeration. It is with pain in my heart that I have watched the policeman turn away visitors from the door of the raykoms or obkoms merely for the fact that “no one had ordered a pass for them.” At the same time, if we follow Lenin’s example, it is precisely the party upper reaches which should be the executors of the will of the inferior ones. This fundamental idea should run both through the Platform and through the party Bylaws.

It is a pity that for now no one has investigated what is happening Mondays on our drilling field. The violators of discipline are formed up together with their commanders, starting with the battalion commander and ending with the tank commander. The senior chief then gives a dressing down. Then comes the “method of reeducation” by drill training. I will not even mention that a mass of service time is wasted and that the men are removed from important undertakings. Their dignity is belittled the authority and vital ties between commanders and subordinates are destroyed. And all of this goes on in front of the regiment: before the very political worker and the party committee members.... Is it no wonder that we have ceased believing....

Maj A. Vinogradov: Without decisive changes in the relationships which have been established, without a reassessment of the well-known established formulas, we will not achieve any progress in party work. It seems to me that it is important to understand who is who in our party system and how we can raise the professional and moral authority of the CPSU. And this also means the strength of party influence on the life and service of the men. It is only important that each of us does not sit idle but acts. No matter how difficult this might be.

I ideological Work Behind Times

90UM0541B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Usoltsev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent from the Far Eastern Military District: “If There Is a Position”]

[Text] “Storms have even uprooted trees but the people remain,” said one communist.

“But if a tree has shallow roots, then it can be knocked over by a fresh wind,” was the rejoinder.

Such an exchange occurred between communists in the separate signals training battalion X in a report-election meeting.

Much was spoken about at it. Both good and bad. Both the setbacks and the changes for the better. And the changes in the collective are noticeable as the professional skill of the personnel has risen and military discipline has grown stronger. While several years ago the battalion moved from a three to a puny four, at present it is almost up to a general excellent grade.

Only the communists have not hurried in shifting this assessment, as often happens, to the activities of the party organizations.

“This is what I think,” said, for example, the Training Platoon Commander Capt Yu. Bulavin. “Imagine for a minute that there is no party organization in some
subunit. Would everyone feel this? Would this be upsetting? Let us give some thought together on how to give vital strength to our party collective...."

They supported him. And indeed so, the participants of the report-election meetings reasoned, it is impossible to judge a party organization and its military merely from the results of service and combat training. It is a professional duty to do one's job well. But are all communists presently active in defending the socialist ideal?

And in fact, the political storms which are raging through the nation, the differences of opinion on the future of the party and its program provisions and bylaws rules, the malicious attacks on the social and moral victories of socialism and which can be heard not only in spontaneous street meetings, but also on the TV screens and read in the newspapers, also do not bypass the troop collectives. It is no secret that certain comrades have become confused in this situation and often cannot distinguish constructive criticism from destructive criticism aimed exclusively at splitting party unity.

Take this battalion. The party organization as a whole is strong. But one cannot help but notice a certain confusion in the minds. For example, a young comrade is repeating after the newly appeared prophets the thesis that supposedly socialism has outlawed itself and that the nation can escape from the economic difficulties only by bourgeois development....

This is a consequence of the fact that ideological work in the battalion and the level of its organization have lagged markedly behind the times. And here the communists have correctly placed the blame primarily before the party bureau and the political workers.

And so there was this "botanical skirmish" as it was jokingly christened in the battalion. But we must truly be concerned about roots.

Uzbek Military Commissar on Army Restructuring

90UM0652A SELSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 May 90 p 3

[Maj Gen V. N. Makhmudov interviewed: "The Army and Perestroika"]

[Text] Military Commissar of the Uzbek SSR Maj Gen V. N. Makhmudov responds to questions from a UzTAG correspondent.

[Question] Vladimir Nasyrovich, perestroymka has embraced all aspects of life of the Soviet people. To what degree has it affected the activities of the military commissariats?

[Makhmudov] The military commissariats of the republic have felt in full all the changes occurring in our life today. The degree of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR "On proposals of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR to amend and supplement the USSR Law

'On compulsory military service," adopted by the 1st session of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR on 31 March 1990, notes that the current USSR Law "On compulsory military service" and other legislative acts are outmoded. They do not allow for the sociopolitical changes occurring in the country or fully provide for due observance of rights of the service members and their social protection. The amendments to the USSR Law on compulsory military service adopted at the first Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR granted a deferment from the draft for students of daytime departments of higher academic institutions until completion of their studies.

The increase in the social activity of the Soviet people, including youth, has vitally influenced the draft contingent. Today before they are drafted many young men have participated in the work of various informal groups and associations. In our work we have to allow for the fact that interethnic relations in the country have worsened, and that anti-Army sentiments have appeared in some regions. Under these conditions the military commissariats of the republic are seeking new forms in their work.

First of all I would like to mention the vital expansion of glasnost. Since last year it is no longer a secret where we are sending our draftees for their service. Parents and draftees are told the number of the command, and what type of transport the draftees will use to go to which built-up area. This has made it possible to substantially reduce tension at the oblast assembly areas.

A direct line between the military commissariat and the oblasts and rayons of the republic has become traditional.

We have made a proposal to party and Soviet organs and the republic government on the question of improving the work of rayon and oblast draft commissions, namely that the deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Council of People's Deputies (gorrayobispolkom), who might be able to effectively take steps and decide questions related to the conduct of the draft, be the deputy chairman of the draft commission, rather than a member of the executive committee as it was before.

[Question] Vladimir Nasyrovich, where are our draftees serving today?

[Makhmudov] The geography of the draft is the whole country, from the Baltics to the Far East, from the harsh Arctic to the southern borders of the Motherland. Our representatives serve in all the combat arms of the Soviet Army, border, and internal troops, in all the fleets, outside the Motherland in the groups of forces, and also in the construction troops. Republic military commissariats and parents receive thousands of grateful comments and letters about the conscientious service of Uzbeks.

Senior seaman-torpedoist Murat Utegenov from Karakalpakiya, Guards Pvt. mechanic-driver Batyr Makhkamov from Tashkent, Pvt. Aybek Kurambayev
from Shavat, Pvt. Rakhim Soliyev from the sovkhoz imeni Khamiza of the Andizhan oblast, Pvt. tank mechanic-driver Atkham Zhalilov from Fergana, Pvt. driver Ikram Masharipov of the “Leningrad” kolkhoz of the Khorezm oblast, Pvt. BMP mechanic-driver Bakhtier Kunishchev from the city of Angren, cadet Gilyus Shamsutdinov from Dzhizak, Pvt. Dzhamshid Babakulov and Rustam Dzhumayev from the village of Komsomolbad of the Surkhandar oblast, Pvt. Maksud Ibragimov from Khiva, and many others, worthily represent the republic in their units.

[Question] Is it true that many Uzbek draftees are serving in construction units?

[Makhmudov] Those young men who for health reasons cannot serve in combat and special units, because of the increased load there during exercises, marches, service activities etc. go to construction units. From the results of 1989, 70 percent of draftees from Uzbekistan were sent to combat and special units, and 27 percent to construction units (in 1988 37.2 percent).

[Question] How many young men serve within the borders of the republic?

[Makhmudov] The realities of today’s life are such that the Armed Forces of the USSR are structured on multi-ethnic, extraterritorial principles. Today around 13 percent of the draftees remain in the republic. Since last year married draftees have remained within the borders of the Turkestan Military District.

[Question] Many parents of service members drafted into the Soviet Army from the republic are concerned at incidents of deaths of soldiers during their service period. What can you say on this matter?

[Makhmudov] The problem of the deaths of service members while accomplishing their constitutional duty during service does exist and concerns all of us.

This is testified to by statistical figures and individual incidents. Analysis done in the last two years on incidents of death of Uzbek soldiers indicates that there has been no marked increase. At the same time, serious deficiencies are evident in our work to prepare the young men for service in the Army, and in military-patriotic education. Judge for yourself: almost every fifth of the deaths were from illnesses which were not diagnosed in time in the draftees by health care organs and medical commissions of the rayon military commissariats. Is this not formalism in work? The same number have died as a result of suicide. These are generally the physically weak and sick, young men who are not morally and psychologically hardened. Nine percent of the soldiers died in accidents and mishaps due to inept driving of motor vehicles. All these make up around half of all those who died. The conclusion comes to mind that through quality preparation for Army service it is possible to halve the number of deaths of our draftees. Overall in the last two years, 598 service members drafted from Uzbekistan have died of various causes.

As the military commissar I have decided, after every incident of death of a service member, to direct inquiries to the military councils of the districts and garrison procuracies to establish the true causes of death of the service member and inform his family and loved ones, so that there will be no unnecessary interpretations, conjectures, and rumors.

[Question] But surely people are dying not only because of unreadiness for service...

[Makhmudov] Yes, unfortunately it also happens that soldiers die during exercises, due to personal irresponsibility in handling weapons and equipment, and as a result of failure to observe safety precautions in construction, farm, and other tasks. Some soldiers died as a result of hooliganism, fights, and harassment during so-called “hazing.”

[Question] Resolute measures are required to put an end to these outrages!

[Makhmudov] Yes, and they are being carried out. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, the Council of Ministers, and the military commissariat of the republic are closely following the question of preparing young men for Army service. In November 1989 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan studied and analyzed the causes of deaths of Uzbek soldiers. Letters describing cases of the most unsatisfactory provision of food and housing to soldiers, and deaths as a result of fighting, harassment and “hazing” were sent to the Central Committee, CPSU, the USSR Minister of Defense, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and at the request of the people’s deputies from Uzbekistan, to M. S. Gorbachev personally. Last year commissions of party and Soviet organs and representatives of the public from the republic travelled more than sixty times to service locations of our representatives to study the state of affairs on the scene, and to provide practical assistance to commanders in educating their subordinates. The commissions included parents of soldiers. They visited in the Far Eastern, Volga-Ural, Transbaykal, and Leningrad Military Districts and the Black Sea Fleet. Important decisions were made as a result of the work of the commissions, due adherence to regulations was established in the units, those guilty of harassment and exceeding their authority etc. were held to criminal liability, and certain commanders who had committed serious errors to strengthen military discipline were relieved of their positions.

Party and Soviet organs and military commissariats of the Fergana oblast are working most actively in this area. Their representatives have visited various military units of the Soviet Army more than twenty times.

[Question] But doesn’t it turn out that these visits are in the nature of fire-fighting actions. Are there no examples of good continuous sponsorship ties?
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[Maikhmodov] There are. This work began actively last year when the Central Committee, Communist Party of Uzbekistan decided to assign the Control Commission, ASSR and oblasts of the republic to those military districts where our draftees serve. In just December of 1989 and January and February of this year, representatives of party and Soviet organs and social organizations, along with officials of the oblast military commissariats and parents of soldiers visited the Kiev, Far Eastern, Northern Caucasus, Carpathian, Belorussian, Transbaykal, Moscow, Volga-Ural, and Leningrad Military Districts. During these visits they were given an opportunity to see the real life, leisure, and combat training of Uzbek soldiers. The unit commands were given vital assistance in patriotic and international education of the soldiers and sergeants. Representatives of Uzbekistan brought the soldiers gifts of books in the Uzbek language, national games, and souvenirs. Creative collectives of artists of the republic visited the Kiev and Far Eastern Military Districts.

At present we have gone to the government of the republic with a proposal to send representatives of party, Soviet, Komsomol organs and parents as part of the troop trains and draftee detachments. What do we have in mind here? First of all, work will be done with the draftees on the way to their service locations which will exert an influence on behavior and discipline of the draftees en route. Second, upon arrival in the units, our representatives will see with their own eyes how the draftees are met, how they are accommodated, how they are absorbed in the unit. They will meet with service members drafted from the republic and find out the conditions of their service, how they live, and how the training process is organized, and hold meetings with the unit command; they will bring them orders, gifts, souvenirs from their home region, literature in their native language, records, cassettes, musical instruments etc. We believe that only benefit will come from this measure, both to the draftees and service members performing their service and to the parents whose children are just being sent for service or are already serving, because they will know where their children will serve and what their conditions of service are like.

[Question] Vladimir Nasyrovich, we know that some service members, unable to bear the hardships and deprivations of military service, go AWOL from their units...

[Maikhmodov] Unfortunately we have also had to encounter this phenomenon recently. What can be said on this matter? AWOL is a most flagrant violation of the military oath, a military crime. The individual who commits it should bear criminal responsibility for this in accordance with the law. This was what General of the Army D. T. Yazov said on this matter in his response to an IZVESTIYA correspondent. I would especially like to stress that it is not the job of military commissariats to transfer service members from one military unit to another. If a unit has not created conditions for normal service, if there are negative phenomena and "hazing" there, then service members and their parents should send complaints about this up the chain of command, i.e. to the higher command of the Soviet Army and Navy.

[Question] Vladimir Nasyrovich, what problems of training youth for service are of greatest concern to you at present?

[Maikhmodov] There are many problems. We are concerned by the general educational level of our draftees, their poor knowledge of the Russian language. About 25 percent of the draftees have a poor grasp of it. For this reason the process of teaching Army specialties to service members, and their mastery of combat equipment take too long. After passage of the law making Uzbek the official state language, leaders of some organizations and academic institutions began to send draftee files to the raion military commissariats in the Uzbek language, but after all, these files will go with the draftees all over the country.

The physical training of the young men still remains weak. For example, in the Samarkand oblast, not everyone could meet the standards for the GTO [Prepared for Labor and Defense] test in one of the tested groups of draftees. In connection with the transition to cost accountability, we also found that certain organizations of the "Znaniye" society are beginning to require payment for their lectures and talks with draftees on military-patriotic subjects. The conscription areas and assembly points do not fully meet requirements. There are still not sufficient training facilities for quality conduct of initial military training.

There are many problems, but we are striving to resolve all of them in close coordination with party and Soviet organs.

[Question] What are the characteristic features of the spring draft of this year?

[Maikhmodov] The spring draft coincides with an important turning point in perestroyka, when the composition of republic and local councils is being renewed, preparations are under way for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, and the Komsomol is being transformed.

Important draft laws on national defense and procedures for the conduct of military service are before the USSR Supreme Soviet for consideration. But for now the draft will be conducted in accordance with the current Law of the USSR "On compulsory military service."

[Question] In conclusion, what would you wish for future soldiers?

[Maikhmodov] The Army is the child of the people and the state, stands guard over our Motherland, and protects the peaceful labor of our people. Therefore the attitude toward it, toward manning it with replacements, should be a matter of state importance. I would like to wish for parents and future soldiers that the boys prepare...
for military service ahead of time. Good general educational training, knowledge of the Russian language, strong physical condition, moral readiness for the difficulties of Army life, the capacity to stay calm in a difficult situation, and knowledge of rudimentary safety precautions are guarantees that service will go well, without disruptions. These qualities should be developed long before the draft. Then after entering the Army ranks, the youth will more quickly become a true soldier, capable of defending the Motherland and standing up for his dignity.

I would like to add that a decree was passed at the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR, as I said. It sets forth proposals: to send draftees of Uzbekistan to military construction units for peacetime service only on the territory of the republic or the Turkestan Military District; to grant guaranteed annual leave to compulsory service members; to create a Suvorov Military School on the territory of the Uzbek SSR, with the requirement that 70-80 percent of its enrolment be youth of native ethnic groups.

Our people's deputies of the USSR and people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR met with the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. T. Yazov, and conveyed the content of this decree to the leadership of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Many proposals put forth in the decree are finding support and I believe they will be realized.

Capt Notes Need for Change in Structure of Political Bodies

90UM0643A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIA in Russian 24 May 90 p 2

[Article by Captain A. Riskin, entitled: "Even the Fighting Man Needs Protection...".]

[Text] In the draft of the CPSU Central Committee 28th Party Session Platform there is a paragraph on defense and military reform, true, quite vague and loaded with general phrases. At the same time, in my view, this question demands serious discussion in light of the fact that announcements in the press are calling more and more frequently for the need to begin the process of so-called depoliticizing the army. The seed, as they say, has been sown upon the soil and has already begun to sprout. It is not by accident, for example, that voices calling for the liquidation of political organs and for primary party organizers dishanding themselves are heard more and more distinctly in a number of army and navy party organizations. The trend is disturbing.

Let me state up front: I stand for the preservation of political structures in our Armed Forces. There is much to confirm my conviction of the fact that enemies of the army are quite actively engaging in the liquidation of both the political organs as well as the party organizations. The assertions of the leaders of the Baltic popular fronts that depoliticization increases the combat readiness of the troops look unfounded. In the programs of these organizations is also the demand to liquidate party and political structures in the Armed Forces.

Even allies of the army advocate liquidating political organs for a volunteer hiring principle for bringing up troop strength, based on the fact that says political workers are not necessary in a professional army, "forgetting" that structures analogous to our political organs are found in practically every army of the West regardless of how they are made up. In the FRG Navy, for example, this structure is called "internal leadership", and in the English Navy—"service training", in the American—"information services and public relations". The list can go on.

There is the viewpoint that the need to liquidate political organs is spelled out in the 6th Article of the USSR Constitution with the declaration of the principle of multiple parties. But, first of all, the presence of new parties in a number of regions in the country still does not mean that the principle of multiple parties has become a reality. Secondly, particularly now, in my view, measures should be undertaken to strengthen the political organs, not in number, of course, but by imbuing them with greater flexibility and by increasing the effectiveness of their work. It is indeed no secret that the army now needs to be consolidated. A single structure capable of fulfilling this role are the political organs. Naturally they will operate in close contact with the primary party organizers.

The depolitization of the army is a step whose consequences are not hard to envision. So long as there is a state there will be a state policy which should be followed, and there will be the army. Sometimes, by the way, speaking about the depoliticization of the army, they again refer to the experience of a number of countries where servicemen, do not participate, as it were, in political life, including in elections. On the outside, such a situation looks very appealing. Except for a small "but". Such a system is only possible in a legal state where social and legal guarantees are extended to all citizens in the society. We are only beginning to build such a society. And, it would seem to me, not at all successfully. As an example, let me recall preceding convocation of the last session of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR where openly discriminatory laws were adopted with regards to servicemen. And similar law-making is still going on.

Now people in uniform serving in the Baltic territories find themselves in a difficult situation. It is no longer a question of picketers with placards or mass information media being infected with an "anti-army syndrome" virus. It is a matter of attempting to attach a certain "legal" basis to these negative occurrences. I will not recall expressions of the type "occupation troops", "USSR aggression", etc., but servicemen should not have to fear their future and their eroded social status.

We have to recognize that we have lost the first round in the fight for our rights, largely the fault of political
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It was also decided that in the future, on the recommendation of informal associations, they will provide groups of four persons for joint activities to check the facility. The principle is this—the militia monitors the military, and the public monitors the militia.

Thus, the once secret military facility of monstrous size is placed under the protection of the Mukachevo militia. Such is the decision of the will of the people which, although with great difficulty and great delay, has nonetheless begun to be realized.

Veteran Castigates 'Return to Capitalism'
90UM0643B Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 24, 11-17 Jun 90 p 5

[Article by D. Kalantarov, chairman of the Veterans' Council of the "Foton" Manufacturing Association, member of the CPSU since 1943, entitled: "Not Backwards, but Forward"].

[Text] Tashkent. Frequently now under the banner of perestroyka they call upon us to go backwards—to bourgeois democracy and capitalism. The created liberal democratic party in its platform has called for the legalization of private ownership and the de-ideologization of all state institutes. This is indeed nothing but a return to capitalism! No, we will only go forward along a Leninist path.

There are people in the Party today who are driving matters to schism, creating various factions and groups, denying the Soviet people's socialist choice. Can they remain members of the CPSU any longer? They cannot and should not! The factionaries must be delimited once and for all from a principle political standpoint.

The pathways to members of the CPSU are the goals and ideals of a humane, democratic socialism, and we will defend and stand up for them, strenghten the unity of the Party, expand inner-party democracy, and the rule of the masses of people.

Lt Gen Boyko Exhorts USSR Leaders to Defend Armed Forces
90UM06984 Moscow KRASTAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jun 90 First Edition p 2

[Speech by Lieutenant-General N. Boyko, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Air Defense Forces, (from the shorthand record of the congress): "The Army is a Part of the People and Serves Them"]

[Text] We are publishing the text of the speech by Lieutenant-General N. Boyko, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Air Defense Forces, at the Congress of Russia's Communists.

Respected comrade delegates: everything which is occurring in the society, the nation and the party is also affecting the army. The army is a part of the people and
serves them, and it is impossible to isolate it from the state’s political life. We army Communists await the 28th Party Congress with un concealed excitement. We shall submit our views and assessments at the congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. We link to our plans for the development of the society, the party and the Armed Forces. Each of us has had an opportunity to familiarize himself with the drafts of the CPSU Central Committee Platform and the CPSU Charter, and with other platforms. And although the documents put forth are far from perfect, they nonetheless have an exceptionally positive role to play. One cannot fail to notice first of all their orientation toward profound democratization of the CPSU and the republican communist parties. I want to say the following with respect to this. Supporting the opinion of my comrades in the delegation representing the Air Defense Forces at our congress, I want to state firmly that we support the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee and want a party which is out front. We should not adapt to the situation but rapidly overcome it. Certain forces are attempting to divert us away from the socialist choice, and they will succeed if the CPSU ends up last in the multiparty ranks.

In the second place, the Army Communists want the Russian Communist Party to be a part of the CPSU. We can see that those who would like to substitute fruitless debate for productive work by the party organizations in our very difficult situation have an interest in dragging out its organizational formalization today. We have a Supreme Soviet and a government of the RSFSR, and other republic structures are being formed, and the party must enter into this process organically and without delay.

In the third place, the power of the party masses is perhaps the most touchy subject in the life of the CPSU. Why are voices speaking out against democratic centralism? Because for many it is associated with a monopoly on power by the minority. This accounts for the perception.

Today we need a different unity in the party. Not universal “approval” but a unity in which everyone has the right to express and defend his point of view. We cannot eliminate discipline, however, i.e., the duty to fulfill decisions adopted by the majority. Only with this kind of relations can the party be preserved as a powerful organization and perform its vanguard role.

One other thing: the development of elective party organs. I believe that membership in them should not depend upon the Communist’s position, his professional qualities or his support for the restructuring. Why are the Communists, as people are saying here today, losing faith that the present Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee can lead the party out of the crisis? Because a category of leaders has developed here who are sometimes indifferent as to what position they are recommended for: the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers, the Central Committee. And we have this to show for it. I would not want this to happen in the elections of directing organs for the Russian Communist Party.

I want to single out the army’s problems.

The Army, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces are living through a difficult period of military reform today, which will result in the renewal of the Armed Forces. This is a very fundamental matter of defense development, and its accomplishment must be a matter of all the people, a matter of the organs of soviet power and the government. Unfortunately, one does not yet sense this, and balance is particularly lacking in the decisions on conversion, in the shaping of military-patriotic feelings and an attitude of respect for the homeland’s defenders.

We communists of the armed forces are also greatly concerned by the spread of the “antiarmy syndrome” in the country. Certain mass media are particularly zealous in this area. One frequently sees a purely competitive approach. What is this? Sensationalism, competitiveness, an attempt to appear super-radical? I believe it is more than this. Defamation of the army has become the object of an irresponsible political game for certain forces. We could see this here today.

Judge for yourselves. It is now difficult to surprise people by exposing Stalinism, and it is more difficult to reveal “blank spots” from the period of stagnation. Perhaps we now need to reveal “blank spots” from recent years of the restructuring and say who is for the renewal of socialism and who is for dismantling socialism, using the West’s formula.

The army subject is here to stay, though. (Applause). The army’s problems extend directly into almost every cell of our society and affect the interests of every Soviet person to one degree or another.

We are not against criticism if it is constructive. We are against airing army problems on television, however. We are against antiarmy propaganda. This is not done in a single civilized nation in the world. We are already feeling this “help,” if I may say so. It is now very difficult to conduct the military draft. We risk having a shortage of specialists in the army as a result. So is it not time to begin thinking about who benefits from this? What are the objectives of this stream of slander against the army?

Alarm has been expressed more than once from this speaker’s platform about the situation developing around the military formations in a number of Union republics: picketing, the blockading of facilities vitally important to the nation’s defense in the Baltic area, the Ukraine and the Transcaucasia, demands for closing down operational sites and vacating territory in certain areas of Moldavia.

Wherever I have been among the troops, people everywhere ask just when Soviet laws are going to start being applied in the Soviet Union. (Applause).

It is time for the country’s leadership to stop taking the position of observer and to come resolutely to the
defense of the Armed Forces and give new meaning to the proposition that "the Army and the people are one."

The passage of a special resolution on the military question at the 28th CPSU Congress could be the starting-point.

The army is living through a difficult time also in social matters. It needs specific support and care. The small amounts allocated for improving the officers' situation are not solving the problem. We are not succeeding in halting the flood of officers electing to leave the Armed Forces. There are not just hundreds but thousands of them now. It is inadmissible to view this process complacently today.

The situation with respect to the removal of forces from the East European nations and Mongolia is also becoming more difficult. It has entailed a growth in the numbers of people without apartments and the unemployed, which has overloaded the army's already meager facilities for providing social, cultural and personal services.

The Ministry of Defense is doing everything possible. We cannot get by without specific assistance locally from soviet organs and various ministries and departments, however. If the resolution of the army's problems is dragged out, we can expect a drop, starting this year, in the number of young people entering military schools. This involves the future of our Armed Forces, and all of us have to be concerned about it.

We military men are accused of exaggerating. Let us look the truth in the eye. The reality of the times is such that we must draw the proper conclusions from what is happening right now in Eastern Europe and in the world, and not build dangerous illusions.

We need political assessments of the events taking place. After all, the United States of America and NATO have not abandoned a single one of their military programs designed to achieve superiority over the USSR. They are doing everything possible to preserve the elements of their military might. More than that, they are forcing the outfitting of their armies with the latest weapons and combat equipment.

We can frankly say that the United States of America has bolstered its positions in recent years. It is unashamedly interfering in the affairs of other states, our state as well. I am, therefore, in favor of a reduction of the Armed Forces, but only a prudent and absolutely reciprocal reduction which leaves us with an adequate defense. I believe the time has not yet arrived for us to run ahead of the train, because it is always more difficult to turn back.

The last thing is the political organs. Some people in the party and in the country are fairly vigorously shaping public opinion with calls for eliminating them in the army. Life itself, our state's 70-year history and the experience of all other armies have demonstrated that this is unfeasible. We need to study each specific matter, and particularly this one, thoroughly and determine precisely who benefits from it, for whose sake it is being proposed.

I am convinced that the political organs have not outlived their usefulness. They are fundamentally altering their style and methods and are now mastering political methods of leadership. Furthermore, they are needed now as never before. It is the political organs and party organizations which are strengthening sole command, unifying the army ranks and striving for organization and discipline and for the responsible fulfillment of each person's military duty.

People have gone and continue to go to the political organs in the hope that they will be heard and their problems will be solved.

With respect to cancelling the party membership of army Communists, our conviction is firm. This must not be done. To leave the army without Communists would be to throw open its doors to other forces and weaken its combat strength. The creeping counterrevolution is waiting for this.

I would like to say in conclusion that as long as the world is militarized and fraught with danger, until the danger of war has been eliminated, we need a strong and combat-ready Armed Forces. As military people, we try to work hard and with a sense of responsibility. As Communists, we have considered and still consider ourselves to be the combat detachment of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thank you for your attention. (Applause).

**Future of Latvian Army Assessed**

90UN2296A Riga BALTYSKOYE VREMYA

*in Russian* No 24, 25 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with Yanis Baskers, deputy chairman of the Association of Latvian Riflemen, by Tatjana Andrianova: "What Path Will the Latvian Army Take?"]

[Text] Janis Baskers, deputy chairman of the Association of Latvian Riflemen, shares several views concerning the question asked in the title.

[Andrianova] Mr Baskers, how do you think the relations between the Latvian Republic and the USSR Armed Forces will be constructed at this stage?

[Baskers] Everything will depend upon how the political situation in Eastern Europe, including the Baltic republics, develops in the future. For example, if the Soviet troops are withdrawn from the countries of the former socialist camp and are deployed on our territory, we shall prove to be, in a way, hostages. The situation would not be dangerous in the event that we already had the status of a neutral state.

Much depends upon the relations that we shall have with the neighboring Soviet state: friendly or hostile. In the event of concluding bilateral treaties with the USSR with
regard to arms reduction, the transitional period will still last some definite period of time. Hungary and Czechoslovakia are also giving a year or a year and a half for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. We will gradually become rid of nuclear and chemical weapons and the troops intended for aggressive actions will be withdrawn. It is necessary to strive for a situation in which the internal troops and the civil defense units, and the naval and ground border troops, are transferred to the Republic's jurisdiction. Proceeding from the broadly advertised Soviet defensive doctrine, we have the right to refuse the services of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[Andrianova] Let's be optimists and assume that the USSR government will carry out a reasonable policy. In that instance, what path will the Latvian Army take?

[Baskers] As a result of the transitional period we can arrive at where we began in 1939: a limited contingent of Soviet troops at bases and garrisons, and then the demilitarization and gradual withdrawal of the troops.

We will need only border troops—naval and ground—and protection of the air space, combined with a system of controlling the civil air fleet. And also a ceremonial subdivision to serve during official ceremonies.

[Andrianova] Will the Republic be able to train military cadres at a sufficiently high professional level?

[Baskers] I think so. I feel that it is desirable to open a general educational institution that will combine the instruction of the contingent of the internal services (police, customs service) and the border troops.

[Andrianova] Who will be the instructors at that educational institution?

[Baskers] We have specialists. For example, those having work experience at the current military departments. We can also bring in instructors from the civilian higher educational institutions. Finally, we have the opportunity to invite foreign specialists to provide instruction and to direct our students to instruction abroad.

[Andrianova] What do you think about using the intellectual potential of the instructor staff at the military schools currently existing in Latvia?

[Baskers] Professional knowledge and experience are valued in any state.

[Andrianova] Why do you think that the International Front, the CPSU, and the army are acting in a single bloc today?

[Baskers] Well, the first two organizations constantly repeat that the army is their support. But the army is also nonhomogeneous in its attitude toward what is happening. I know officers who speak awkwardly about the 15 May events in front of the building housing the Presidium of the Republic's Supreme Soviet. Not everyone adheres to such aggressive views as those of, say, Colonel A.F. Kolbin, the former inspirer of the 15 May riots.

[Andrianova] Do you think that the army in Army should be professional?

[Baskers] For the time being, our state cannot afford a professional army. In my opinion, the officer complement must be cadre, but the middle level (that is, the noncommissioned officers) can work temporarily, on the basis of contracts, and, for the time being, it is still necessary to preserve the system of inducting young people. With the sole difference that they will perform their military service in their home republic, and normal, decent conditions will be created for them.

Estonian Objections to Troop Movement Cited
90UM0731A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Semenyaka, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Commission Checked the Roads"]

[Text] The Estonian government has come out with another announcement. The reason for this one is information that (I quote) "the border of the republic along the Pskov-Riga highway was crossed by a column of airborne combat vehicles (28 tanks and 15 motor vehicles)."

The government reported that "there was no agreement with representatives of the servicemen," and that the movement of the column was not coordinated with anyone, including the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs. In addition, the government expressed its concern that such an amount of military equipment, moving at great speed, created a "dangerous situation" on the roads and caused material damage, "including substantial damage to the road surface."

The content of the announcement, and even the fact of its appearance, naturally, aroused the concern of the local population, and even alarm among individual citizens—they began the "quick evacuation of children."

Naturally, the local media did not fail to report on this. And republic television, in its reporting, at first showed closeups of a T-72 moving in a target gunnery range (conveniently film was found), and afterwards there was narration about "a column of airborne combat vehicles."

The authors of the topic were not disturbed by the fact that they, to put it mildly, were careless in their work. Because even a person who is just slightly informed knows: The Airborne Troops do not have the T-72 in its inventory, but have airborne combat vehicles (BMD).

Now about the damage to the road surface. I would remind you that the pressure of BMD tracks on a square centimeter of surface is the same as that of a motor vehicle with a cargo capacity of three tons, and this is 0.5
of a kilogram. Naturally, the BMD cannot cause “substantial” damage to the highway. But in order not to make unsubstantiated assertions, I stopped off in Pyarnuskiy Uyezd. I stood on that same road over which the column traveled. There were no traces, let alone dents and destruction.

I meet with R. Kygel, chairman of the uyezd soviet. He says:

“I did not give information on any kind of destruction to roads on uyezd territory. Traffic moved and is moving continuously. Lieutenant General P. Chaus, chief of staff of the Baltic Military District, arrived in the region in question. His trip was planned—the summer training period began for the troops of the district. I asked him to comment on some of the statements in the announcement:

“As for the coordination of the movement of the column, up until now questions like this have not come up,” he said. “Indeed, there was no need—an airborne assault battalion was conducting a march. The appropriate service directed traffic. There were no tanks in the column, and there could not have been.”

On 9 July, at the request of the military themselves, a commission inquired into the roads of the uyezd. Besides military people, the commission had representatives of the uyezd construction administration, road inspection of the state motor vehicle inspection, and local organs of authority and the sovkhaz. They came to the conclusion: No real damage was done to the road surface, and the Pyarnuskiy Uyezd Ispolkom has no claims against the Airborne Troops. This finding was written up in an appropriate act.

The announcement of the government of the republic expresses “a firm protest against such actions of the military.” It is not out of place to ask: And what about the mythical tanks, “the dangerous situation” on the roads, and the “substantial” material damage?
USSR, Hungary in Stalemate Over Soviet Troop Withdrawal Terms
90UMO716A Moscow 1ZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by V. Litovkin: “Disagreements Not Overcome”]

[Excerpt] Twenty-six military camps, transferred by the group command to the Hungarian side, stand with windows darkened. Five hundred and fifty-six buildings, 317 of them built just recently with Ministry of Defense funds, are empty, decaying, in some places quietly being pulled apart or falling into disrepair.

No one has lived for a half year now in most of the abandoned apartments. Our country receives no compensation for their cost, no reimbursement in money or construction materials, which are in such short supply now at the new garrisoning points.

Two hundred and sixty trains with gasoline, kerosine, diesel fuel, other petroleum oils and lubricants, and military property, which the Hungarian side promised to buy from the Soviet military or help them to sell, stand frozen on sidings, scattered among storehouses, warehouses, and storage tanks. By mutual agreement these trains are not included in the troop withdrawal schedules. But there have also been no payments made for them. And it is not known when, by whom, or at what price we will be paid for all this property. Or will they pay? Perhaps it will have to be returned home; our country is having a hard time with petroleum oils and lubricants. We urgently need them ourselves. And there are more than a hundred thousand tons of such goods.

The military airfield at Debrecen drowses in an uncustomed half-slumber, the first of six such abandoned by our aviators. In terms of international classification it is one of the best in Europe. Two airstrips with monolithic pavement, not counting taxiways, length 2,500 meters, width 40 and 60 meters, which may be used by aircraft of any type. Next to them are flight lines for centralized aircraft maintenance, with reinforced concrete hangars and large underground fuel storage tanks, as well as technical maintenance buildings, living quarters, a school...

The total cost of the property incorporated in metal, brick, and concrete is more than 65 million transferable rubles. And if you consider that the airfield is literally at the very center of a wonderful tourist and resort area of Hungary, the Hortobagy Pusta, that it lies on the route from Western European capitals to India, Japan, and Malaysia, and that the residences are tomorrow’s hotels, than the value immediately increases several times over.

Our country has still not received a kopeck for it. And it is not clear if it will. Just as for the other airfields—Tekel, which is in Budapest proper, and Kiskunlachszaz, Szarmelek, Kunmadaras, Kaloche, and another seven others. They are a little lower in class, but capable of receiving and maintaining helicopters and light planes.

We do not know what will happen to the 150-person sanatorium at Balatonfured with a hectare of excellent Balaton beach, or to the 500-bed hospital in the capital region of Rakoshpatot, equipped with the latest diagnostic and treatment facilities, which could fully accommodate a European center of modern medical technology with the participation of the leading specialists of our country and the world, and perhaps also a complex of Soviet institutions in Budapest. By the most approximate and clearly reduced calculations, the cost of all the Soviet installations is 2.5 billion transferable rubles. And it is not impossible that we will not receive a red cent for them.

Why? Because Hungarian representatives participating in the negotiations insist that all payments be made only after the withdrawal of all troops, on the basis of the total balance, when costs and their financial claims are combined. This was announced at a meeting with the commanding general of the Southern Group of Forces, Col Gen M. Burdakov, by the chairman of a parliamentary commission of the State Assembly of Hungary Miklos Vaszharkhey.

I happened to be present at that meeting of leaders of the Group of Forces and experts visiting from Moscow, representing the Soviet embassy in the Hungarian Republic, with deputies of the Hungarian Parliament. The talk was pointed. Our partners presented many claims to us. Serious ones, such as the harm done to the environment of the republic, and unconvincing ones: that Soviet soldiers allegedly were selling weapons to the populace. Of course the parliamentarians did not cite a single specific fact to confirm their claim. But the detail is significant, reflecting, it seems to me, the attitude toward our troops.

This whole talk, as other impressions from trips through the republic, leads me to believe that they do not want to pay us and will do everything to reduce the payments to a minimum.

M. Burdakov told me, “The inter-government agreement ‘On the legal status of Soviet troops temporarily located on the territory of the Hungarian People’s Republic,’ dated 27 May 1957 and 1 April 1958, and the March agreement of this year say that we will transfer all installations to the Hungarian Army in their technical condition on the day of transfer, with allowance for their further utilization. Our partners understand this provision in their own way. If they do not want some facility, they demand that we tear it down, haul it away, and recultivate the land. They are supposed to reimburse us in forints for our construction expenses. But again, pointing out that by Hungarian law everything constructed on republic land belongs to it, they avoid a decision on the payment question. We cannot submit to attempts at such overt pressure or acknowledge the priority of Hungarian laws over international ones.”
Matvey Prokopievich continues. "The 1990 agreement has a special clause which says: 'Property, finances, and other economic questions related to the troop withdrawal not settled by the agreements in force will be settled by special understandings. The sides will take steps for the most rapid attainment of such understandings, bearing in mind that these questions are supposed to be decided before conclusion of the Soviet troop withdrawal.' But we still have not reached such understandings. For some reason neither the Soviet side nor the Hungarian government is in a hurry to conclude them. And time will not wait. I was forced to order that storehouses, prefab barracks, and other installations be dismantled and that all this equipment and construction materials be transported home, to new garrisoning points. And apparently I will be forced to put the camps, now without our families, under the guard of soldiers and officers remaining there. If the matter of payment of compensation for each installation individually continues to be dragged out, I will be forced to halt the withdrawal. Otherwise the people whom we are sending back to the Union without adequate housing will not understand me or the Group leadership. Nor will they understand our government."

Where is the solution to this situation? I believe it lies in creating a standing intergovernmental commission, which should be headed on both sides not by representatives of a particular department, but at a minimum by Deputy Prime Ministers, in order that all questions be resolved quickly, effectively, at the state level, and with mutual benefit to both sides and both peoples. Also, after proclaiming the transition to the market, to a controllable market economy, it is finally time to get away from ideological dogmas, to learn to trade in what belongs to us according to market laws, using not only persuasion, but also economic levers in the process.

Our army is leaving Hungary today, but we still have to live as neighbors, respecting one another and cooperating tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, and for many years to come. We cannot cloud the future with today's largely petty misunderstandings.

Before departure from Hungary I visited a Soviet tank regiment located in the village of Polgardy. The deputy unit commander, alumnus of the Hungarian Military Academy imeni M. Zrinyi, Maj. V. Belous told me: "We were starting to remove the tin roof from the combat equipment storage parks when the chairman of the local Soviet Dyula Gubish came up and said, "Don't tear down the bays Vasily. I'll give you the brick and the tin, everything for a technical maintenance point. The combines and tractors at our goskhoz are under the open sky..."

"I took a chance," the major says. "I stopped the dismantling, but I began to worry, what if the local bureaucrats or worse yet the public put a spoke in his wheel, and ours too?"

Spokes in the wheels, just as the red light that some would like to put in front of the departing military trains, will never be a sign of state wisdom.
Pension Draft Law, Related Issues Discussed
90UM03884 Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 12, 19-25 Mar 90 p 12

[Article by Ye. Azarova, candidate of legal sciences: “Unrealized Hopes”]

[Text] The Draft of the new pension law was conceived as a triumph of social justice. The veterans have placed great hopes on it for improving their life. But are these hopes to be realized?

They Remain Outside
The Draft envisages a gap between the minimum and maximum pensions of five and more fold. Here the minimum pension does not reach the minimum standard of living, while the maximum is to be set on a level which substantially exceeds the rational consumer budget.

According to the Draft, the pension minimum equals the minimum wage. It is essential to observe the proportions between these two amounts. However, due to the fact that the minimum wage has been frozen at a level of 70 rubles for 22 years, at present this amount does not correspond to the minimum wage. Nor is anything changed by the proposed rise in the minimum wage to 80 rubles in the 13th Five-Year Plan. At present, it is impossible to live on such money even with the meagerest needs.

Previous experience has shown that even when the minimum wage was not directly linked to the minimum pension and covered around three million workers, the necessary decisions were not taken. There are even greater grounds for doubt for a regular rise in the minimum wage, if this were to involve an automatic rise in scores of millions of pensions.

Hence, it is urgently essential to strengthen the social protection for poorly-off pensioners. We must not allow the new pension law to leave them below the line of poverty. For this reason, I propose that Article 17 of the Draft be supplemented with a provision of approximately the following content: the pension of a non-working pensioner cannot be below the minimum wage considering the territorial differences in the cost of living.

It is essential to restrict the maximum amount of the pension and prevent its more rapid growth in comparison with the minimum. The Draft allows the possibility of setting a pension totaling 362 rubles with a minimum of 70 rubles and 414 rubles with a minimum of 80 rubles. It establishes a mechanism whereby each increase in the minimum pension by 10 rubles will be accompanied by a rise in the maximum by more than 50.

The government report points out that a total of 280 rubles corresponds to a rational consumer budget and this we should approach in 1993. But if this is the case, a maximum pension of 414 rubles by this period is inflated and does not correspond to the existing economic and financial capabilities of society. In this context it would be fairer and more valid to accept the proposal of M.L. Zakharov in an alternative draft of setting the maximum amount of the pension on a level of triple the minimum.

As was pointed out in the government report, the basic old-age pension rate is to rise up to 55 percent of earnings instead of the current 50 percent. Things are presented as if up to the present in all instances the pension has been set at 50 percent of earnings. However, in 1956, when the State Pension Law was adopted, the 50-percent rate was the least. This applied only to earnings which exceeded the minimal by more than three-fold and with a smaller amount the rate was higher and approached 100 percent. The setting of a uniform base rate in the Draft for all pensioners, including the lowly-paid, is taking several steps back in comparison with the 1956 rules. The lowly-paid employees are also negatively affected by the limiting of the pensions to 75 percent of the earnings from which the pension is calculated.

In line with this, I propose that the rate for setting the basic amount of the pension be increased at least to 65 percent with earnings that do not exceed double the minimum as well as stipulate that with such earnings the rule for limiting the pension to 75 percent should not apply.

Since not only the basic amount of the pension but also its increase for the length of labor employment depend upon earnings, each additional year above those required for the granting of a pension also brings a substantially greater increase for the highly-paid employee than for the lowly-paid. It would seem more just and hence preferable in increasing a pension for extended length of employment to reduce the role of individual earnings and increase the role of the duration of labor activity. This could be achieved by providing for an increase in the pension for each year of employment above the required period of labor not by one percent of the minimum earnings of the employee but rather by a definite amount uniform for all pensioners, for example, by three percent of the minimum pension.

The question of an annual increase in pensions (Article 122 of the Draft) has been incorrectly settled. Such a rise is provided at at least two percent of earnings. This again assumes a faster absolute growth for the higher pensions. Thus, with earnings of 50-70 rubles, a pension will increase by 1-1.4 of a ruble but with higher earnings, by 11 rubles a month. That is, each year a large increase will be received by the less needy pensioners and the gap between the low and high pensions will increase with every year. We cannot agree with this. Article 122 must be fundamentally changed.

The Older the Poorer?
According to the Draft, the amount of the pension depends chiefly upon the individual earnings. Since
nominal earnings are constantly rising but official or real earnings and their relationship to the minimal are lacking, persons with objectively the same labor contributions receive a smaller pension the earlier it was set. For example, the pension for a teacher or physician who is retiring now will be substantially higher than the pension of a worker of the same profession and skill but who reached pension age 15-20 years ago. At the same time, according to the data, for example, of the USSR People’s Deputy, Doctor of Economic Sciences A. Zhuravlev, one 1985 ruble equals 56 kopecks of 1961, and at present it is estimated at 20-25 kopecks. This means that the purchasing power of the same nominal earnings in 1961 was four-fold more than at present and in 1985, approximately double.

The absence in the Draft of a mechanism for adapting earnings to present-day conditions leads to a situation where the “old” pensions are, as a rule, on the minimum level or close to it. What sort of social justice is this? The pensioners have also drawn attention to this as this is an insult to the persons who created industry, who defended the motherland against fascism, who forgot the victory in the rear and rebuilt the war-devastated economy. In the new law they are basically left with nothing. The legislators are aware that these people will not strike like the miners did and will not come out on the streets with posters and slogans such as “We Want Social Justice in Our Lifetimes!”

It is possible to avoid the devaluing of the labor contribution to the national economy by the older generation by adjusting their individual nominal earnings in relation to present-day wages. At one time, economic science proposed, in my view, a very successful method for such an adjustment using the introduction of an individual coefficient which would show the ratio of the earnings of an employee who was to retire on a pension with average wages in the national economy at the same period. With such a coefficient it would be possible to easily adapt the earnings of long-retired persons to the present-day wage level.

Women Stand to Lose

Regardless of the slogans about equality, actually the work of women is paid substantially lower than that of men (65-70 percent of the latter). In addition, in retiring at an earlier age and having a longer life expectancy, women are longer on a pension than are males as an average. For this reason, it is the women who first of all feel the impact of those shortcomings in the Draft which were mentioned above. In receiving a pension for lower earnings and in comprising the basic share of those who receive a pension for a long period of time, the weaker sex forms a contingent of poorly-off elderly persons. Consideration of the above-stated proposals would help to improve their situation.

The Draft encourages a longer employment for women in the national economy in comparison with the current legislation, as it provides for the setting of a maximum possible pension with 40 years work experience. In order to receive this by pension age, a women would have to begin working at the age of 15 (and for a woman with a large family at 10). Such a position by the legislators runs contrary to current public opinion which is to give women more opportunities to pay attention to the family and to the children, and to give her the right to choose between employment in the national economy and the carrying out of family duties.

In this context there is an interesting proposal to consider an increase in pensions for women considering the number of children they have.

Also unjust in terms of women is the “tacit” elimination of pensions for the number of years worked for educational and public health employees. These are traditional female spheres for us. According to the data of the Central Committee for Trade Unions of Educational, Higher Education and Scientific Institution Employees, sociological studies conducted in 1988 established that 35 percent of the teachers physically were unable to work in the school. Many teachers consider exhausting the work at a 1.5 rate and which they are unable to refuse as with such a workload their earnings come close to the national average. Primary disability for nervous and mental illnesses in pedagogical personnel is 1.5-fold higher than the average for the national economy. Around 40 percent of the teachers have organic or functional deviations in their speech apparatus and this is directly linked to straining the voice during work. The teacher community and the sectorial trade unions have insisted on maintaining the given type of pension and have repeatedly made these demands to the AUCCUT. However, these have not been taken into account. The government report does not contain any explanations as to the reasons why the rights have been lifted to a pension for the number of years worked for employees in such mass female professions. Depriving teachers and physicians who have worked all their life in their specialty of an opportunity to retire for the number of years served (significantly less than for old age) with a loss of professional capacity for work is unjust not only for them but also for the children and adults whom they teach and treat.

So This Is the “Ceiling”!

The rules for paying old-age pensions to working pensioners as envisaged in the Draft could hardly be considered as scientifically sound, consistent and socially just. For certain categories of working pensioners, pensions are to be paid fully, regardless of the amount of the earnings received. Others are unable to receive a single kopeck of a pension during a period of employment. Here they have proceeded not out of any logic of the law itself, but rather from considerations of the need to use the labor of pensioners in certain types of jobs as well as from the limited nature of financial means. Here it is considered advisable to encourage physical labor chiefly. Only upon the insistence of the people’s deputies did the category of pensioners who receive a pension without
considering their earnings come to include as well middle-level medical personnel, teachers and physicians in rural localities.

The category of pensioners who do not require incentives for labor activity include all white collar personnel, except those mentioned above, including cultural and scientific workers, engineers, technicians, faculty personnel and others. Precisely under conditions of perestroika, when intellectual and spiritual experience of the older generations is particularly essential, this is actually judged to be unnecessary and not encouraged.

The establishing of substantial advantages in paying old-age pensions for individual employee categories does not conform, in our view, with Article 34 of the USSR Constitution concerning the equal rights of citizens in all areas of economic, political, social and cultural life, regardless of the type and nature of employment.

Of course, the eliminating of the “ceilings” does require additional financial expenses. However, if one estimates the national income created just by veterans after they have reached pension age and that portion of it which is spent on paying pensions to both working and non-working pensioners, then probably expenditures would be comparable with income. It can be said boldly that actually the persons in the senior age groups feed themselves.

The establishing of equal conditions for paying pensions to all pensioners would prevent social tension among the veterans and would make it possible to utilize their labor potential in the national economy in a fuller and optimum manner.

Lawyers have numerous comments also on other articles of the proposed draft. Within a single article it is impossible to bring up everything. I know that the USSR Supreme Soviet has received numerous letters, proposals and different approaches. It is important that everything valuable be heard by the USSR people’s deputies as they are to adopt the Law “Governing Pension Support for Citizens in the USSR.” Let each deputy, before he pushes his voting button, ask himself again: Whose interests is the new law guarding—either the strong and the rich or those who need protection and help more than the others?

MVD Command Of Disciplinary Units Rejected

90UM0413A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed report on reaction of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff to a proposal regarding MVD command of disciplinary units: “Dictated by Special Conditions”]

[Text] On 1 February of this year a letter from Lt. Col. V. Antonov, who proposed forming disciplinary units with MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] officers, was published under this headline.

As was reported to the editorial staff by General Major Yu. Kudinov, interim directorate chief of the General Staff, the matter in question was examined in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Solving the problem in this manner was judged to be inadvisable. A disciplinary battalion is a military unit in which the convicts remain soldiers. A variety of methods are utilized for their rehabilitation, among which are purposeful combat and political training which takes into consideration the special characteristics of military service. The officers who graduate from the MVD institutes have not mastered the basics of these methods to a sufficient degree. At the present time a new statute is being prepared on the disciplinary battalion and the question about filling the positions of squad commanders and deputy platoon commanders with reenlisted men or with warrant officers is being considered. Simultaneously in training units of the Leningrad and Far East military districts a specially designed and purposeful training program is underway to prepare sergeants for the disciplinary units. After experience is accumulated, the results will be examined and a corresponding decision made.

Obituary: Lt Gen P.V. Guryev

90UM0413B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 First Edition p 4


[Text] After a serious and lengthy illness Lieutenant General (Ret) Pavel Vasilyevich Gurev, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, passed away. He dedicated his entire conscious life to selfless service to the Motherland and the cause of the Communist Party of which he was a member since 1942.

P.V. Guryev was born 18 May 1918 in the city of Saratov into the family of a worker. He had been in the ranks of the Armed Forces since 1938 where his career progressed from cadet to General Lieutenant. During the years of the Great Patriotic War he was in the regular army. In complex combat conditions he demonstrated personal bravery and courage.

After the war P.V. Guryev graduated from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. He successfully commanded a regiment and a division, was first deputy commander of an army and deputy troop commander of a military district. From 1969 to 1978 he was directorate chief in the Main Directorate for Combat Preparedness of Ground Forces.

In all positions P.V. Guryev demonstrated exceptional diligence and competence. A high level of responsibility
for assignments and a concerned attitude towards people earned him prestige and the respect of his peers and commanders.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state highly valued the services of P.V. Guryev. He was decorated with two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Kutuzov Third Class, the Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy, two Orders of the Patriotic War First Class, two Orders of the Red Star, the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces Third Class as well as numerous medals. He was also decorated with a number of medals of foreign states.

A fond memory of Pavel Vasilyevich Guryev will remain in our hearts forever.

Belorussia: Improvements In Benefits For Veterans, Invalids
90UM0685A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 26 May 90 pp 1, 4

[Commentary by T. F. Krutovtsova: "Behind the Lines of the Decree"]

[Text] The government of the republic has adopted two decrees, one on additional measures to improve living conditions of war and labor veterans, and one on priority measures to improve the social services of invalids. At the request of the department of information of the BSSR Council of Ministers, the republic Minister of Social Welfare T. F. Krutovtsova comments on both decrees

Repaying Our Debts to Veterans

Today the republic has 293,300 participants of the Great Patriotic War (65,300 of them invalids) and 94,200 families of fallen soldiers. There are 21,300 soldiers who did their international duty (532 invalids) and 779 families of fallen service members.

In a supplement to the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers "On measures in connection with the celebration of the 45th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War," the Council of Ministers of the republic has adopted "its own" decree, in which it provides for a number of benefits to veterans of war and labor, and marks out the resolution of urgent social problems in the life of this category of citizens.

In 1990-1992 plans are to open up 11 boarding houses with 2,510 places for the aged and invalids, two hospitals for invalids of the Patriotic War at Mogilev and in the village of Yurtskevo in the Orshanskiy rayon, to build special 180-unit apartment houses for single aged citizens with a number of social and consumer services at Gomel, Grodno, and Mogilev, and to prepare an additional 150 places at the "Berezina" sanatorium for invalids of the Great Patriotic War.

The decree obliges the obispolkom [oblast executive committee], the Minsk gorispolkom [municipal executive committee], the ministries and departments of the BSSR and the leaders of enterprises and organizations, with participation of committees of trade unions and labor collectives, in 1990 to provide a separate apartment or handicapped housing to all war invalids and families of fallen service members and those of equal status registered up to 1 January 1988, and in 1990-1992, to citizens of these categories registered up to 1 January 1990. Provision is made in 1990-1992 to provide separate well-appointed housing to single participants of the war living in communal apartments.

This year there are also plans to implement requests of invalids of the war for installation of telephones. Other participants of the war will be satisfied no later than 1993. There are plans to resolve the problem of providing telephones to small populated areas with twenty homes or more, and those with ten homes or more before 1995.

Fifteen thousand single invalids of the Patriotic War, class I and II, and those living with a spouse are to be released from payment for their housing. In addition extra housing space (up to 15 square meters) will be paid for at a single rate.

The decree provides for organizing the assignment of participants of the Great Patriotic War and persons awarded orders and medals of the USSR for selfless labor and irreproachable rear service during the Great Patriotic War to order departments for monthly provision of foodstuffs, and also provides for expansion of the network of specialized stores (sections, departments) for sale of clothing and shoes to pensioners with allowance for their requests and needs.

The right is granted to sell automobiles of other brands to war invalids who so desire with allowance for the cost of the "Zaporozhets" automobile due them free of charge.

Given the due medical certification, the obispolkoms and Minsk gorispolkom are also allowed to issue the "Zaporozhets" automobile free of charge to invalids of the Great Patriotic War class I and II who are not allowed to drive an automobile, if the driving can be done by a relative living with him in the same populated area in the service of the invalid.

Invalids of the Patriotic War class I who for medical reasons do not have the right to a free "Zaporozhets" will acquire the right to receive monetary compensation of expenditures for transport service in the amount of 400 rubles a year.

Wives and relatives of service members who died from wounds, injuries, or disfigurement in defense of the USSR or in the execution of other duties of military service or as a consequence of illnesses associated with their time at the front are given the right to priority admission to housing construction cooperatives and
cooperatives for construction and operation of open
carking lots or garages for the storage of transport equip-
ment; priority service by transport agencies, technical
maintenance and repair of transport equipment belonging
to them, service at ateliers, shops, reception points, and
other consumer service enterprises; priority acquisition of
tickets at theater box offices, movies, and concert organi-
izations, railroad and bus terminals, airports, and river
ports.

The children of service members who died in performance
of their international duty who have not reached the age of
16 (for students—18) are granted a 50 percent discount
from the cost of medicines obtained by doctor’s prescrip-
tion.

The calculated monetary spending limits for food at
boarding houses for the aged and invalids will be raised,
making it possible to improve the diet of 16,300 persons.

The benefits provided for by the decree are granted as of
1 July 1990.

More Attention to Invalids

Despite the measures taken to improve the social services
and material condition of invalids in the republic, for
many of them the problems of employment, medical and
social-labor rehabilitation, obtaining education and
learning a specialty, and creating suitable living and leisure
conditions remain unsolved.

The ministries and departments and the executive com-
mittees of local Councils of People’s Deputies are issued a
number of instructions. For coordination of actions of
various ministries and departments and social organiza-
tions of the republic in providing comprehensive assist-
ance to invalids, the BSSR Council of Ministers has
created a coordinating council for problems of invalids,
and a draft is being prepared of a republic integrated
program on the problems of invalids.

It is recommended that the executive committees of
local Councils of Peoples Deputies provide assistance to
societies of invalids in resolving questions of siting of
construction units and their inclusion in a program of
contract work, and also release of enterprises and or-
ganizations of societies from percentage involvement in
the development of communal farms and capacities of
the construction and construction materials industry.

In 1991-1995 plans are to construct housing and produc-
tion complexes in each oblast and in the city of Minsk with
the necessary conditions for life and labor activity of
invalids, with designation of limits of contract work and
material technical resources for these purposes. During the
design, construction, and reconstruction of units for
housing and civic purposes and transport and pedestrian
communications in cities and other populated areas, to
ensure the creation of the necessary accessories and
devices for the blind and invalids using special carriages.
In the thirteenth five year plan construction will be started
on a physical therapy complex for invalids in Minsk.

Already this year a number of enterprises of ministries
and departments of the republic will be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the Belorussian Society of Invalids.

The Decree establishes a number of benefits for enter-
prises, institutions, and organizations of societies of inva-
dils, the blind, and deaf to provide material and technical
support, and tax relief for owners of transport equipment,
and grants the right independently to establish the number
of regular workers of the societies, and from 1 Jun 1990,
also the prices for wares produced by subordinate enter-
prises.

The ministries and departments of the BSSR and the
executive committees of local Councils of People’s Depu-
ties have been told to establish a quota for the employment
of invalids (regardless of the reason for their handicap)
within the limits of 5 percent of the total number of blue
and white collar workers of each branch, department, construc-
tion site, and organization. Enterprises and organi-
zations are released from payment for labor resources
affecting the working invalids.

Provision is made for expansion of shops, sections, and
departments at enterprises and in cooperatives intended
for the use of labor of invalids, including home labor. It has
been proposed to Gosplan BSSR that jointly with the
BSSR Ministry of Welfare and societies of invalids it study
the question of purchasing devices for locomotion and
minor mechanization, and accessories for invalids, from
foreign companies.

The decree provides for measures to improve the
training of invalid children, including in general educa-
tional schools, and the manning of pre-school institu-
tions and special institutions with qualified cadres and
special teaching equipment.

The Belorussian society of invalids has been give signifi-
cant financial assistance to introduce new conditions for
compensation of labor of regular workers of the society,
and for financing the social and cultural activity of the
society.

The Council of Ministers of the BSSR has obliged the
executive committees of local Councils of People’s Depu-
ties to provide every sort of support and assistance to local
organizations of the societies of invalids in improving the
conditions of their work, and particularly in the allocation
of accommodations and telephone service equipment.

The resolution in question has entered into force.

A. Maksimov Reported Chief Of ‘Space Forces’
90F50042A

[Editorial Report] Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in
Russian No 28, 14-20 July 1990 publishes on page 4 an
article by V. Lapshin entitled “Who Rules Over the Ball
in Space”? The article notes that eight years ago Colonel-
General A. Maksimov was chief of the “space forces”
kosmicheskiye voyska).
Designers, Test Pilots Recall Details of Mi-G-25 Program
90UM0441A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 2, 1990 pp 24-25

[Unattributed article: "A Sensation a Quarter of a Century Later"]

[Text] At the end of last year our journal briefly reminded readers: The Artem Ivanovich Mikoyan Experimental Design Bureau was fifty years old. At the same time, the world famous firm celebrated another anniversary. The MiG-25, one of the most remarkable aircraft ever created, surpassed the quarter century mark of continuous service in the sky. This aircraft is well-known abroad—it has set records (some of them still stand), it has participated in airshows, and it has been exported. And once, in 1976, a huge landing force of leading American experts disembarked on the Japanese islands—as a result of the traitorous actions of the pilot Belenko, a MiG-25 stolen by him landed there. Nevertheless, this aircraft is practically unknown to our fellow citizens.

Today, the readers of this journal are being given a rare opportunity—to receive the sensation firsthand a quarter of a century later. Thus, the whole truth about the MiG-25 is told by its creators.

The following are present at the meeting in the editorial office: Vasilii Anatolyevich Arkhipov, the assistant chief designer and chief engineer for the tests of the first experimental aircraft Ye-155R-1; Lev Georgiyevich Shengelaya and Valentin Aleksandrovich Stepanov, assistant chief engineers and assistant chief designers; Fedor Vladimirovich Shukhov, the chief designer of the R-15B-300 engine; and Boris Antonovich Orlov and Vladimir Gavrilovich Gordienko, Honored Test Pilots and Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Lev Berne and Yevgeni Pavlov, KRYLYA RODINY correspondents, are conducting the meeting.

[Pavlov] Let us return to 1964. I remember what kind of impression President Lyndon Johnson’s report that the USA had built the A-11 aircraft, capable of flying at speeds up to 3,000 kilometers per hour, made on us students of the aviation institute. Everyone remembered the recent havoc inflicted upon our air forces by N. S. Khrushchev at the end of the 1950’s. True, the grandiose 1961 Tushinskiy airshow was held afterwards and subsequently test pilots flying MiGs set a whole slew of records. But now the uneasiness appeared once again—wouldn’t our designers fall behind because of the mandatory downtime...

[Arkhipov] Yes, you are absolutely correct—that was a difficult time for us. The approaching “missile era” threatened to cancel all of the cumulative work already done on prospective projects. At least such a frame of mind existed. But we knew that the upper altitude of the atmosphere, higher than 20 kilometers, in our skies remained vulnerable to penetration by the enemy. We did not fly this high, but the Americans and the British could. Valentin Aleksandrovich was the chief engineer on the MiG-19 variants—the SM-50 and SM-12PMU experimental aircraft, which could, with a very small degree of probability, intercept the Canberra. Supplementary liquid propellant boosters were installed on them for this purpose.

[Stepanov] In addition, we certainly “suspected” that the A-11 program, including the development of the UF-12 interceptor and the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft, was being developed amidst strict secrecy in the USA. And our MiG-25 was, to some extent, a response to their actions. It always was, is, and for the present, one cannot contend that it will not always be this way. After the US president’s announcement, the first photographs of the A-11 appeared in the press and from its tail number it became clear that the money for its construction was allocated in fiscal year 1961. The General Designer’s order to begin designing the Ye-155 aircraft was dated 10 March 1961. I do not think this is a mere coincidence.

[Shengelaya] The preliminary work was done in 1958-1959. In 1960—a principled decision was made. While all firms came to a standstill and waited hesitantly for what would happen with aviation, we were working hard.

[Stepanov] A group of 12 people was set up in the design department. The General Designer selected engineers with the most progressive views and original thought and who were inclined towards unexpected solutions. He created a state of siege around this group and they completed the project within six months. In 1962, the prototype committee for the reconnaissance aircraft sat in conference and in December 1963, the first aircraft was rolled out of the shop onto the airfield. On 6 March 1964, Aleksandr Vasilyevich Fedotov conducted the first test flight of the aircraft.

[Shukhov] I began working on this aircraft with the first axial line on the engine and finished yesterday, as the saying goes. However, I would like to talk about something else right now. I do not think the main thing about this aircraft is just its outstanding performance characteristics in speed and altitude. The fact that during the development of the MiG-25, Artem Ivanovich succeeded in rallying stars of the highest magnitude from our aviation industry around his group is also very important. With the assistance of Pyotr Vasilyevich Dementyev, the minister of that time, during those years when they were attempting to drive aviation into the background, he managed to literally push through the idea of this aircraft, which was unlike anything else on earth, and to carry the idea to material realization and send it into the sky.

[Berne] Indeed, during those years, the MiG-25 was not like any other aircraft in the world. It was not until much later that its design became an object for imitation. And nevertheless, as it appears to me now, at that time this aircraft could have only turned out the way it did...
[Arkhipov] You are absolutely right, Lev Pavlovich. Remember, we had a very limited selection of high-altitude engines. From the existing experimental engine variants, which were developed at your experimental design office, we decided in favor of the 15K—a low-pressure gas dynamics engine similar to a ramjet engine. This engine was previously intended for a high-speed, high-altitude drone. It was precisely at this point that we climbed into that trap—the speed of our aircraft should be three time the speed of sound—only in this regime would the advantages of the engine begin to become apparent. And hence the conclusion—the aircraft would be unlike anything on earth. It was necessary to do everything all over again, on different design principles, while solving a multitude of problems and tasks.

[Stepanov] Now, everything could be worked out differently—there are high-pressure bypass engines for high-altitude flight. But at that time designing such an engine from scratch would have put off the development of the aircraft for an indefinite period of time. Furthermore, the long teamwork with the experimental design office of Aleksandr Alekseyevich Mikulin, the patriarch of our engine manufacturing, and afterwards of his successor, Sergey Konstantinovich Tumanskiy, allowed us to rely on a successful revision of the 15K engine to our requirements. Gleb Yevgeneyevich Lozino-Lozinskiy, the current chief designer of the “Buran” space shuttle, chose the engine for the MiG-25. His ideas and proposals for using a low-pressure engine on the fighter were the basis for the development of the R-15B-300 engine.

Actually, only the shroud remained from the old engine. The compressor was changed—the margins of stability were increased. The combustor was reworked for high altitudes. The turbine temperature was increased by 50 degrees. We got rid of the vibratory combustion in the afterburner, which, in this sense, is doing very well up to the present. Finally, a nozzle with three modes of operation was made.

[Stepanov] The MiG-25 was conceived straight away as a multirole aircraft. Somewhat earlier, we were convinced that the Ye-150 and Ye-152 aircraft, which had R-15-300 engines with ejector nozzles, would have an advantage in a strictly defined role. An adjustable ejector, with adjustable boundary layers was required and this is very difficult to make. When the engine designers suggested a three-position nozzle to us, we abandoned the ejector. This saved us from many difficulties later on. In order to have minimum power loss in the paired engines, the nozzles were separated by a distance less than the diameter, i.e. they intersected. But again, in modern high-pressure engines of smaller diameter the solution could have been different. But at that time a gap was made in the nozzles of the engines and a special deflector, which ensured equivalent conditions for both engines during their different modes of operation, was placed in it. Yuriy Pavlovich Rotmistrov, Fedor Vladimirivich’s assistant, developed and substantiated this original solution. Furthermore, on going into MiG series production, we became seriously concerned with the margins of stability in the engine.

[Arkhipov] We jointly undertook this enormous job with the S. K. Tumanskiy Experimental Design Bureau. In 1963-1964, the control system for the R-15B-300 engine was perfected aboard a Tu-16 flying laboratory. L. P. Berne, who is present here, participated in these flights.

[Berne] Botskovskiy was the chief engineer from the aeronautics research institute and the tests were conducted on the Starik and Gruzdev aircraft. In the past, we already had to work on the Ye-150 and Ye-152 aircraft, the Mikoyan Experimental Design Bureau's interceptors, in which the R-15-300 engines were installed. The engines were controlled by a traditional hydraulics system. And at this point, we all of a sudden brought an identical engine in external appearance, but which was equipped with a totally new electronic control system, aboard the flying laboratory. The majority of the subcontractor's experts were at least astonished: "Watch out, the spark will exit into the tail skid!"

[Shukov] During steep climbs, we had already encountered appreciable inertia in the hydraulic system on those interceptors. Under the requirement for a rapid change in fuel consumption from 150 kilograms per hour at minimum throttle to 15,000 kilograms per hour at full throttle, the system did not provide the necessary amount of fuel to the engine. The engine found itself on starvation rations and did not maintain revolutions per minute with the required precision. And for the MiG-25 this was 2 percent—much higher than for any other aircraft, and no hydraulics could handle that. And the range of changes in fuel consumption on the MiG-25 was even greater. In addition, this was a multirole aircraft and for the first time we were required to tie the operation of the engine to flight conditions, even to include the automation of the air intake control. A control system, which included a main electronic unit—an engine conditions regulator and a back-up hydraulics system with a limited number of functions with respect to the main system, proved to be more suitable. The complex multifunctional RRD-15B system was developed at the experimental design office of Chekunov, the chief designer. Internal control of six parameters was installed in the system, which made it very reliable. Solenoids, instead of boosters, became the primary actuating mechanisms in the main fuel lines.

[Pavlov] If the engine designers were troubled by so many problems out of hand, what was going on at this time with the aircraft designers, who conceived a machine that had not been manufactured by anyone before them?

[Arkhipov] The aircraft was manufactured not only with a new engine and capable of high-altitude, high-speed flight, but because of the enormous heat loads, it was made out of a completely new material. I will explain—the deceleration temperature at maximum speed is 303 degrees Celsius. Duralumin will withstand 140 degrees.
This precluded any thought of using Duralum. The solution was found in a steel aircraft. Technological questions arose immediately—a rejection of the usual riveting and the length of the welded joints, which on this aircraft is measured in kilometers. There were warnings: “What are you doing! After the very first landing, your aircraft will begin to leak! You will be constantly tormented by this flawed design!” Many people believed that it was impossible to realize this new conception. Ultimately, even such a brilliant designer as Anatoliy Grigoryevich Brunov gave up. This aircraft was entrusted to him and before my very eyes, he studied the diagrams for a long time and in the end, on his own initiative, refused to become involved with the project. M. I. Gurevich led the project for some time and afterwards, still before the first flight, N. Z. Matyuk took over the project and has been improving it for a quarter of a century already.

[Pavlov] The problems of ensuring the durability of the design are solved in different ways depending upon the choice of the main construction material...

[Arkhipov] That is absolutely correct. It would seem, what difference does it make—steel is three time heavier than Duralumin, but it is both three times more durable and three times more resilient. But one must bear in mind that the rigidity of the aircraft's skin depends not only on the module of resilience, but also on its thickness. Make a 1-millimeter skin three times thinner and what do you get? Christmas tree decorations. In order to compensate for the increase in weight due to using skin of an acceptable thickness, the aircraft was completed using a plan of internal fuel tank construction, which is divided into compartments, reinforced from within by stringers, hermetically welded, and completely filled with fuel. This aircraft has no changeable, external fuel tanks. It can be stated that the general designer also received objections over this principled and revolutionary position: “It is impractical, it won't work. External fuel tanks have been replaced by stans. And what is this here?” It must be said that Artem Ivanovich made all of the fundamental decisions about the aircraft. And the group needed all of his fortitude and courage in order to defend their progress ideas from every quarter.

[Shengelaya] Unfortunately, everything that fell to Artem Ivanovich's lot during the development of the MiG-25 took a toll on his health. After the death of the experimental design bureau's founder, Rostislav Apolosovich Belyakov received the baton from Mikoyan. He replaced Artem Ivanovich during his illness and both versions of the MiG-25—the interceptor and the reconnaissance aircraft—were added to the inventory of the Soviet Air Forces now under the new General Designer. The lion's share of the credit in the struggle for the aircraft belongs to Belyakov.

(To be continued)

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Air Force Preparatory Schools to Be Established
90UM066604 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jun 90 First Edition p 2

[Letter to editor and follow-up by Col S. Levitskiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: “Special Air Force Schools... on Paper: Why Has the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers Fallen Through?”]

[Text] Dear Editors:

On November 1988 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported that a decision had been adopted to open special Air Force schools in eight cities of the Soviet Union in 1990. The time is approaching for them to begin admitting students, but the military commissariat in our city of Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast, knows nothing about this. Are students going to be accepted for the special Air Force schools? This is not an idle question for me. My son is completing the 8th grade this year, and I would like to recommend this for him. I myself completed a special Air Force school in Sverdlovsk. That school gave us boys, deprived by the war, warmth and affection, fed and trained us and prepared us for life. To the end of my days I shall never forget those years at the school. Because of it I devoted my life to defending the homeland, serving 30 calendar years in the Air Forces.—Lt Col (Res) I. Panov

We received similar letters from Col (Ret) N. Kuznetsov of Bryansk, T. Molotukhina of Yaroslavl, A. Merzlakov of Bashkiriia and other readers. The editors decided to return to this subject.

The need to improve the system for training military pilots has been discussed for a long time. Indeed, can one prepare a professional in four years at a military school under the present system?

The Main Staff of the Air Forces worked out and submitted related recommendations for resolving the problem. One of the measures proposed was to establish special boarding schools to provide basic flight training. The USSR Council of Ministers passed a decree on the matter in 1988. It was decided to establish the special schools in eight cities. They were to be staffed and equipped by November 1989, and classes were to begin as they were readied, starting on 1 September 1990.

Just who will be admitted at these special boarding schools? When? Where? These and many other questions are posed in letters from the readers every day. We took them to Col Gen Avn A. Goryainov, deputy commander in chief of the Air Forces for military educational institutions and chief of military educational institutions of the Air Forces.

“It is planned for the special schools to accept 15- and 16-year-old boys who have completed nine grades of an 11-year school and are physically strong,” he explained. “Applications for admission to a special boarding school are submitted by the applicant's parents (or persons replacing them) through the rayon (or city) education departments.
"It is proposed that the students receive full state support. A uniform like the Suvorov uniform has been designed for them.

"The training period is two years. There will be practical flight training from 1 June to 28 August during the first year of training, in February and March the second year. After all of the special boarding schools begin turning out graduates, everyone wanting to enter a fighter or fighter-bomber aviation school will have to undergo this basic flight training...."

In short, as we can see, the terms and rules for admission to the special schools and the notification agencies have been worked out. Things should get moving, it would seem. But why is there no information on the special schools locally? Because no one wants to get to work seriously on this.

This is what Anatoliy Fomich Vyrostrochenko, first secretary of the Bryansk Oblast Committee of the CPSU, had to say on the matter:

"Just how can we do this when the government's decision to establish special schools did not provide material resources"?

He himself supports the educational aspect unconditionally. Thousands of kids will leave our sometimes deprived homes and set out for their dream of flying. This is why Bryansk is prepared to "sacrifice" Special Vocational and Technical School No. 7 with all its equipment for a special school, and the Bryansk Air Sports Club of the USSR DOSAAF is prepared to provide for the training at an airfield.

This promise was made by Anatoliy Fomich at a meeting of representatives of the air sportsmen, the Air Forces and Air Defense Forces. Time went by, however, and the city education committee replied to those who inquired: The special school will not be opened by 1 September 1990....

And what is the situation in other cities? In Krasnoyarsk, for example? Col I. Belolapatkin, chairman of the kray DOSAAF committee, frankly stated:

"It is a very complex problem! Representatives of the CPSU CC, the DOSAAF CC and the Main Staff of the Air Forces visited us in connection with the matter, but all we have for now are promises."

M. Pegov, chief of the Krasnoyarsk Air Sports Club, also throws up his hands and says that the situation with respect to flight training facilities is a sorry one.

The fact is that more than 15 years ago the kray authorities became concerned about an airfield within the city limits—more precisely, about its flight field. The aircraft fly almost at head-level, they said, and make a lot of noise. They decided to build a new airport. They could find no better place to locate it than the flight field which belonged to the air sports club, however. It became clear very soon that the joint basing of aircraft of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and DOSAAF posed a threat to flight safety. There are instructions from the USSR Council of Ministers on the matter, which state: If you want to build something at the site of “someone else’s” airfield, then build them another, similar one with the same facilities.

No one had any intention of doing this, however. The Ministry of Civil Aviation passed the buck to Soviet authorities, the latter to the Ministry of Civil Aviation. The bureaucratic circle was closed.

Officials of the Air Forces should have intervened and gone to bat for their young replenishments. Unfortunately, however....

Following an abundance of correspondence, almost 10 years later, construction of a sports airfield was finally begun dozens of kilometers from the city. It has still not been completed, however. Now SMU-10, a construction organization of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, absolutely refuses to do anything for the airfield....

It was stated with absolute specificity at a conference at the rayon ispolkom of the USSR Soviet of People's Deputies, in which all interested parties took part: It will not be possible to open a special boarding school even in 1991, because it has been decided to close a vocational and technical school of the same kind, and it is impossible to evacuate the dormitory for a special school. Krasnoyarsk families live there, and not students. The piles for an apartment building were driven long ago on the possible sports grounds....

We could travel to other cities where it is planned to open special schools. It was frankly stated at the Main Staff of the Air Forces, however: "The decision of the USSR Council of Ministers has "fallen through" practically everywhere. Is it not time to sound the alarm?"
Local Soviet Demands Removal of Nuclear Submarines From Bay

90UM06844 Moscow VODNYY TRANSPORT in Russian 14 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by I. Zolotarev and N. Semchenko: "False Alarm"]

[Text] Residents of Vanino and Sovetskaya Gavan demand that nuclear submarines be removed from the bay.

The plan of the sailors was a simple one: to put their worn out nuclear submarines in one of the Pacific Fleet bases and calmly repair them. The chairman of the local rural soviet was told that orders of commanders were not discussed, and that reassuring the people, in the light of glasnost, was his responsibility. But the people figured out what unloading the fuel cores of the nuclear reactors under unprepared conditions could mean, and began to grow agitated.

The rumor spread along the coast of the Tatarsk strait with the speed of a torpedo. A ball of fable and rumor began to grow around the alarming fact. In mid May people went to meetings. Their demand—remove the submarines from the bay! They formed an initiative group to be the liaison between the populace, the organs of Soviet authority, and the command of the Pacific Fleet.

There were no disagreements with the local authorities. At a joint session the Sovgavan Municipal and Vanino Rayon Councils of Peoples Deputies decided not to permit the work planned by naval personnel, not to allow new nuclear submarines into the bay, and to organize monitoring of the environment and public health. The deputies issued a demand to the Pacific Fleet command that it make a constructive decision within a week's time. This deadline is long past...

So how are events developing now?

"Essentially the demands of the populace boil down to two points," said the chairman of the Vanino Rayon Council of People's Deputies A. Klimov. First, not to allow operations to remove the fuel elements from the submarines, and second, to withdraw them from our shores. Military specialists claim that the submarines can no longer leave their moorings under their own power. The military is also trying to explain that the nuclear reactors are mothballed and pose no danger. Incidentally, I can confirm this: I myself was on the submarines and measured the radioactive background. It is within normal limits.

We are demanding of the Pacific Fleet Command that it present a plan for measures to restore the ecological situation. However we are not getting any clearcut cooperation from the military. A group of sailors came to see us, but they could not convince the people of the complete safety of the work. Meanwhile, in the Vanino commercial port and other areas, calls are being heard for strikes, and there are proposals for changing the name of the initiative group to strike committee, and picketing the bay.

Now every day a group of ten men is allowed to take measurements of the radiation background. The populace is informed of the results via local radio and newspapers.

We also asked the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet, Admiral G. Khvatov, to comment on the situation. Here is what he said.

"As you understand, the Fleet Command cannot independently make a decision to relocate. I believe that unrest about this is out of place. Such work can be done anywhere, and it does no harm, since it will leave no radioactive waste. I personally am ready to be present during the unloading of the fuel elements, and even of the reactor itself. We plan to disassemble and remove the nuclear "guts" of the submarines from the bay and leave the empty hulls for subsequent disassembly.

Now the populace gives us this ultimatum that we remove the submarines. Technically this is not easy to do quickly. The reactors are shut down, and the diesel engines are not designed for long voyages. The transport dock is presently under repair. We could remove no more than one submarine a year from the bay. The costs for this would be around 1.5 million rubles. We intend to meet with the populace of Vanino and Sovetskaya Gavan and other populated areas, and will explain the true state of affairs to the people."

To what was said by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the chairman of the Vanino Rayon council we can only add that for the present they are exchanging letters and telegrams, and the heat of emotions and passions is rising. They did not die down even after the fleet commander-in-chief rescinded the order to unload the reactors. We believe the main reason for this is that for a month and a half now the people have been almost completely ignorant of the Navy's further plans. The local press covers the events, but even it has only one-sided information. The "secret" stamp may be lifted, but not everyone can penetrate the dense fog of unspoken words.
Transbaykal Plant Converts To Consumer Microelectronics

90UM0352A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by I. Tsurik, "Shop in a Former Barracks"]

[Text] The first industrial lot of electronic desk clocks has been turned out at the Transbaykal Mining and Chemical Combine [GKhK] in a village of the First of May Chitinskaya oblast. Until now such items were not produced in the region.

Even a year ago few in the oblast knew about the existence of this enterprise—it was a defense plant and was classified. The beginning conversion "declassified" the combine. A year ago, consumer wares, plastic dishes, buckets, and basins, produced in the shops of the GKhK, appeared on store shelves in Transbaykal. Then production of more serious goods was organized—equipment for milk processing. And now they have taken another step: the combine has begun to produce electronic clocks.

The new plant was set up...in a former barracks. Military construction troops and security guards use to live here. After refitting and repair, new residents appeared in the spacious four-store building—microelectronics workers.

“Our shop is still in the developmental stage,” says the deputy chief of the plant, V. Gazaryan. “We have managed to set up, organize, and test only a part of the equipment, the rest is still coming. Our manning is still not complete either. Three groups of specialists are being retrained in Novosibirsk. However the job is started, and the shop is already operating. We assemble clocks from parts provided on a contract basis by the "Adron" production association in Novosibirsk. Soon however, we will begin producing the microcircuits and casting the housings ourselves. Besides clocks, we plan to make parts for computer equipment. If everything goes as planned, we hope to produce goods worth at least four million rubles a year within a few years.”

Reader’s Response on Defense Housing Program

90UM0355A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Col (Ret) V. Chumichev, honored construction worker of the RSFSR: “How to Solve the Housing Problem”]

[Text] The article “The Housing Program: Plans and Reality” was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 26 January. It told about steps being taken in the USSR Ministry of Defense to provide every family with convenient housing by the year 2000.

The editors are receiving responses to that article. The authors express their opinions on the problems discussed and suggest specific ways to solve them. We are publishing one of them.

I personally have great doubts that it will be possible to provide an apartment for everyone needing one within the Ministry of Defense in the next 10 years. The program which was approved was not realistic. And not just because it was compiled without taking into account the full extent of the reduction of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the withdrawal of units and subunits from the groups of forces and other aspects of military organizational development.

What is even worse is the fact that the plan for providing housing was worked out like any other regular document, in haste, and contains actual miscalculations. In the military construction organization headed by Lt Gen V. Zakimov, for example, “they forgot” to count 4,500 of those needing apartments. In general, one senses a desire not to solve the problem but merely somehow to make ends meet. Suffice it to say that the plan calls for an average total apartment area of 52-55 square meters, whereas the figure for the nation was 58 square meters in 1988 and has been increasing. How are servicemen any worse than other Soviet citizens?

I believe that the Ministry of Defense should begin perfecting the housing program by assessing how realistic it is. Officers and warrant officers discharged into the reserve need to be included in the number of those requiring apartments. And their housing should be built by the ministry itself, including construction within housing construction cooperatives. This would lengthen the “apartment line” to approximately 30,000 people. In a few years, however, housing construction will no longer be necessary at many closed and isolated garrisons.

One way or another the Ministry of Defense needs to develop its own production base and additional housing construction capacities. Right now it is amazing to see how strict those in charge are with respect to failures to fulfill housing construction plans and how mild the demandingness for failure to meet targets for developing the construction industry.

It seems perfectly apparent to me that the housing problem can be solved only by means of industrialization. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has repeatedly brought up these problems, specifically writing about the need for more extensive application in construction of three-dimensional components given a high degree of finish at the plant. Available experience permits us to state that box-unit construction reduces construction costs by 3-5%, consumption of materials by 25-30% and labor-intensity by 20-25% (1- to 3-fold at the construction site itself) compared with traditional construction methods. Furthermore, the time required to perform the work is reduced 1.5- to 2-fold. Is this not the solution, given our shortage of time and resources?

Following the publication of the first articles on this matter in 1987, Mar Eng Trps N. Shestopalov, deputy USSR minister of defense for construction and billeting of troops at that time, approved the special, comprehensive Blok program. This program called for the output of
three-dimensional components to reach 375,000 square meters of total area this year. In fact it is one tenth of that. If not for the failure of this and the previous program, we could be completing an additional 10,000 apartments annually right now, which is more than the increase it is planned to achieve by 1995. Such is the result of irresponsibility.

The military construction workers have pioneered in the use of three-dimensional components in the construction industry. The job was accomplished in record time, only a year and a half. Multistoried industrial buildings have been built of so-called three-dimensional frame modules (OKM) for several years, bettering the standard time by a factor of two-three.

The planning foundation was not established at that time, however, and an economically unjustified decision was made under the pretext of preserving production capacities: to build barracks and other general military buildings with three-dimensional frame modules. Extensive funds adequate for building 10 100-apartment buildings were wasted as a result.

Another ill-conceived decision has been made today under the specious pretext of expanding housing construction: to convert the nation's only shop producing three-dimensional components for industry to the production of box units. Not only will this cost two-three million rubles, but it will also take around two years. To acquire capacities for the construction of 70,000 square meters of general housing area annually, we shall lose future plants for the production of reinforced concrete items which could turn out seven-eight times as many components for housing construction. What is more, light, three-dimensional frame components have now been developed which are competitive with the box units, and we already have the building designs. We could begin turning out components for dormitories and barracks literally within a few months.

It is clear to everyone, I believe, that the housing program will not be accomplished without giving priority to the development of our own construction base. And this involves not just the construction of new enterprises and the modernization of old ones. We need centers for assembly and for setting up production, for the servicing and repair of motor vehicles and other equipment and the storage of materials. The three-dimensional frame modules making it possible rapidly to accomplish this are indispensable for accomplishing all these tasks. And the capacities for their production are being destroyed. Honestly, all of this simply does not make sense.

I propose that a plan for using box units in the construction of housing and social facilities be compiled as part of the housing program. Developing production capacities for their output to five million square meters of general area by the year 2000 would make it possible to cover almost half of our present needs and to release approximately 50,000 people annually from construction. The production base for box-unit housing construction could be developed with new construction or the modernization of existing enterprises as the equipment wears out and the products become obsolete.

**Votkinsk Producing Equipment for Dairy Industry**

90UM0550A Moscow ZEMLYA I LYUDI in Russian No 13, 23 Mar 90 p 6


[Text] The collective of the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, which has formerly manufactured medium-range missiles, has organized production of high-quality equipment for dairy industry.

Anyone who visits Izhevsk will invariably turn attention to the diversity of dairy products in the stores and public food service enterprises. Kefir, thin sour cream, sour cream, bottled milk, acidophilin, packaged cottage cheese and dietetic cheeses are always available here. Even milk-based beverages such as Snezhok, Yubileynyi and Kolomenskiy, which are rather scarce today, hardly ever disappear from the shelves.

The supply of dairy products to the population is organized reasonably well in other cities of the Udmurt ASSR as well. On the backdrop of the present food shortage, such an abundance elicits a natural amazement and a desire to learn how workers of the autonomous republic’s agroindustrial complex have managed to solve this problem.

V. Timashov, chief engineer of the Izhevsk Dairy Combine: Following the Course of Full Mechanization

The fact that dairy products are practically always sufficiently available on the store shelves of Izhevsk and other cities of the Udmurt ASSR is directly associated with improvements in equipment availability at the republic’s dairies. I am referring primarily to our combine, which provides a large proportion of bulk milk, kefir, sour cream, cottage cheese, butter, ice cream and other dairy products to the trade network. Each year we process a sum total of more than 240,000 tons of milk worth over 56 million rubles.

Wasteful production has been organized at our combine owing to full mechanization. As a result we now put buttermilk to work normalizing milk, skim milk is used to make cottage cheese, while part of it we return to the farms as cattle feed, and we send whey to bakeries. In short, the most up-to-date equipment has been put into operation in all of our labor-intensive processes, including in the collective of the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant.

I would like to make special mention of the pasteurizing-cooling installation, which is already in its third year of
trouble-free operation at the combine. Before, there were five low-output machine units of an old design here, not only occupying a considerable amount of room in the shop (which itself significantly complicated the collective's work) but also barely managing to process the milk coming from the farms.

The Votkinsk installation replaced all five of the old machine units, and for practical purposes it is able to carry out all of the work of pasteurizing and cooling the milk on its own. In summer, when the volume of products coming from the farms rises dramatically, we will attach another two such installations, purchased by us recently. Each of them has a productivity of 25 tons of milk per hour—significantly greater than that of the old machines.

It must be emphasized that the pasteurizing-cooling installation plays the leading role in full mechanization of milk processing. It would be impossible for any dairy plant or combine to work without it.

With its assistance, raw milk coming from the farms becomes completely suitable for making various products, including dietetic ones. This process is rather complex, which is why the required equipment is also complex. Not every industrial collective is capable of running it. But our machine unit has been awarded the State Emblem of Quality, and this says a great deal.

Cooled pasteurized milk does not spoil for a long time, which is very convenient and economically advantageous to dairy combines and plants. It can be stored in containers up to 16 hours (such is the standard). Owing to this our collective has been able to organize production of diverse high-nutrition and dietetic products.

Yu. Chertkov, chief engineer, Votkinsky Zavod Production Association: At the Level of the Best Models

To begin with, a few figures which would be of assistance in gaining a clearer impression of what kind of partner processing sectors of the agroindustrial complex have acquired for themselves. Only two years have passed since the collective of the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant organized large-scale production of equipment for dairy industry, but around 350 complex, large-sized milk processing installations have already reached the processing enterprises. Just last year 75 pasteurizing-cooling machines, 132 automatic bottling and capping machines with an output of 3,000 bottles per hour, 93 with an output of 6,000 bottles, 50 clogged milk dispensing devices and 16 baby food dispensing devices came off this association's conveyers.

To say that it was easy for us to assimilate large-scale output of products new to us in a rather short time would be wrong. Its assimilation necessitated a thoughtful approach both to scientific and technical development and to large-scale production itself on the part of the specialists and workers.

It stands to reason that we did not reinvent the wheel here. In general, all of these machines and automatic systems were already being produced at the Melitopol Prodarnash Plant, which was transferred to our department following liquidation of the Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry. But the quality of its products was not very high. We had to assume the complete responsibility for this form of milk processing equipment, and organize its large-scale production in short time, after first modernizing it and improving its design.

We had to begin from the very bottom—with studying the biological and physical properties of milk. This was extremely unusual work for our specialists. However, the collective's traditions carried the day. The department created specially for this work successfully completed its assignment. The equipment for dairy industry which we now produce is not inferior to the best foreign models.

The milk processing installations bearing the brand of the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant are being supplied primarily to new facilities of the agroindustrial complex. But some of them are also replacing obsolete equipment at operating milk processing enterprises. Today these machine units can be seen in operation at dairy combines of Ryazan, Stavropol, Yaroslavl, Dzhankoy, Donetsk, Mariupol, Izhevsk, Moscow, Sverdlovsk and other cities of the country. According to responses from specialists, they have all shown their best side.

A. Parkhomenko, deputy chief, Department for Production of Equipment for Food and Processing Industry, Votkinsk Machine Building Plant: Progressive Procedures at the Basis of Production

We employ a tested method of ours when designing equipment for food industry. It is based on the stage-by-stage principle, which reduces time on both developing the design and its assimilation. We focus the attention of specialists and workers on the experimental model, and we try to fulfill the client's requirements precisely and efficiently.

In this stage we are completely unconcerned about the procedures for manufacturing the article on a large scale, since we know that once the experimental model is available, the procedures will be developed quickly. Everything is often done differently in most machine building enterprises. Designers are compelled to tailor old production operations to new procedures, which is what slows down the efforts to create new equipment.

We work on our experimental model until such time that we arrive at a perfect design. Next we subject the model to a complete testing program, until we achieve prescribed results.

Only after this do we begin drawing the plans for large-scale production. On receiving them, shop process engineers do not have the right to make any changes in deference to production conditions already in existence.
Their task is to organize the work in such a way that products of the highest quality would roll off the conveyor.

Take for example the design of the automatic milk bottling and capping system, which we were tasked to develop production of in 1988. The plan was to begin large-scale production of these machines the very next year. Moreover the design had to be improved, and it had to be modified so that it could dispense kefir and baby food as well. What was difficult about the task was that in view of its viscosity, kefir flows more slowly than whole milk. Naturally the automatic system had to be capable of "reacting" to the difference in flow rates. Our designers had to wrack their brains to solve this problem, but they were successful in the end. But this is not all. Foil 63 microns thick is used to cap bottles on the old dispensing machines, while we use foil 13 microns thinner, which is economically much more advantageous. This innovation also required the corresponding design changes.

The design itself of the bottling and capping machine, which is similar to that of the machine produced earlier at the Melitopol Prodsmash Plant, was cumbersome and awkward. Its installation at any dairy plant elicited great complications. Its dimensions had to be reduced and its metal content had to be decreased, while simultaneously raising its reliability and simplifying the principle itself of dispensing the dairy products. This task was also within the means of our specialists.

Using a new design for the lifting table on which the glass bottles are positioned, we did away with the complex, heavy manipulator and installed our own very simple feeder attachment. Having completely rebuilt the bottle capping carousel, we achieved greater productivity for the automatic system and a reduction of the metal-intensiveness of its units. All of this allowed us to decrease metal consumption in the production of automatic bottling and capping systems by 60 tons on an annual basis.

If we consider that dairy equipment is made out of high quality stainless steel, of which our country is experiencing a shortage by the way, this fact acquires especially important significance. Moreover by organizing large-scale production with the modernized installation, we have been able to free the equivalent of up to 30 workers. Given a shortage of qualified personnel, this also has major significance. Further improvement of design, which is something our department is involved in today, will make it possible to reduce the labor-intensiveness of manufacturing milk processing equipment even more, reduce metal-intensiveness and improve design.

Of course, we could hardly have intensified all of these efforts without creating a special department at our plant. It was staffed by 85 qualified, experienced workers. A design office of 25 persons was created under the department just to develop dairy equipment.

Commentary by S. Royev, assistant department director, Izhevsk Oblast CPSU Committee

The collectives of the autonomous republic's machine building enterprises have actively joined the effort to produce consumer goods as well as the equipment for their production. Enterprises of the defense complex occupy a leading place in this effort. Conversion has achieved a good pace in the Votkinskiy Zavod Production Association. Creation of milk processing machines at its enterprises was described above. In addition, it has organized manufacture of numerically controlled milling machines and other complex machinery.

The Chepetskiy Mekhanicheskii Zavod Production Association organized production of cheesemaking vats, also needed by milk processing industry. Wristwatches, shut-off fittings and medical equipment are being placed into production here as well. The Izhmas Production Association organized manufacture of automatic cottage cheese packaging systems and eskimogeneratory [translation unknown].

The Izhevskiy Mekhanicheskii Zavod Production Association accepted the responsibility for manufacturing articles for these generators, as well as automatic cookie and bagel packaging units. This year it also pledged to initiate production of laser video players, general-purpose kitchen appliances and home computer game systems.

The contribution of scientists and specialists of the Progress Scientific Research and Technical Institute to developing domestic equipment for light, food and processing industry will now increase to 30 percent. With their assistance, production of new automatic butter, margarine and cottage cheese packaging systems will begin this year. The Izhevskiy Radiozavod and Izhevskiy Motozavod production associations and the Sarapul Electric Generator Association are also committing part of their output capacities to producing consumer goods and machinery and equipment for light and food industry.

I think that active participation of all of these collectives in reequipment of the dairy industry will make it possible to significantly increase food production and to make one more step forward in implementing the country's Food Program.

Update on Factories' Conversion Efforts

Rocket 'Engine-Construction' Association

90UM0525A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 15, 9 Apr 90 p 9

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Stepan Troyanov under the rubric "The Consumers' Society," Gulyaypole: "Worthy of Attention: An Unpromising Plant Was Given a Second Chance Under the Wing of the Aviation Industry"]
REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

[Text] We did not choose to begin our discussion of the conversion precisely in "The Consumers' Society" by accident. Today conversion is perhaps the main reserve for rapidly—we want to stress that!—saturating the market with many types of goods in demand. It is a known fact, after all, that the best equipment, modern technology and highly skilled cadres accustomed to working with the highest standards ended up in the hands of the defense branches. In short, those who made the decision to begin the conversion had every basis for hoping that the "defense people" would help the nation put an end to the shortage primarily of complex, durable goods. And so, how are the "demobilized" enterprises performing? Are they justifying our expectations? What problems are they encountering? We consumers are not indifferent to their situation.

It is a good thing the conversion has for now involved only one wing of the Motorostroitel association—this was precisely the idea which V. Boguslayev, association director, emphasized several times during our discussion. Why? Why because the process of converting an enterprise from one type of production to another is complicated. Torturous, if you like.

I have recently been visiting more and more plants which were not mentioned in our press until quite recently. And I could not help noticing that the conversion from the "narrow-gauge" defense rails to the peacetime "wide gauge" has created confusion. And just how could one maintain Olympian calmness? The operating assembly lines cannot be shut down at once, because production of the traditional goods, let us put it that way, is ordinarily not halted but only reduced, and the production of new products for the empty consumer market has to be rapidly mastered. How does one escape what appears at first glance to be a closed ring.

The enterprise name alone tells one what kind of product it was built to produce. They include unique engines for such aircraft as the Ruslan, the Mriya (Mecha), IL airbuses and, of course, military aircraft. As soon as the demand from the military-industrial complex fell off, the question arose: How do we continue to exist? Drop aircraft engines, set up production of some new products and push them into the market? No, the enterprise decided, this was not the way. The "way" was to increase the output of engines and spare parts for the civil aviation fleet. It is a known fact that the Soviet pool of passenger and cargo planes is meager and is operating at its limits. One can only try to keep up with the need for engines. But what about consumer goods? Those for which there are all-devouring lines?

I believe that the Zaporozhye people have groped their way to a solution. But you be the judge.

Slightly more than 100 kilometers from the oblast center, in the city of Gulyaypole, a plant producing household goods was barely eking out an existence. Its manager, although called the Ministry of Light Industry, also counts not just the rubles but also the kopecks. Baby carriages were produced at the plant. Three years ago, however, because far larger competitors set up production of this "transport," the customers stopped buying the Gulyaypole product. Earnings dropped catastrophically, and blue-collar workers and engineers began leaving the plant.

Management scrambled about in search of orders, grasping at any possibility for obtaining work. And the more primitive the work, the more willingly they accepted it. It was impossible to assemble computers in the squat, warped, one-story buildings.

In the meantime the conversion and the attendant need to significantly increase output forced the engine-builders to seek a solution beyond the home grounds. There is not much opportunity to spread out in a city with a population of almost a million. The idea came to the aircraft builders: What if we were to take this little plant under our wing? And the Zaporozhye people began sending it machine-tool assemblies, the likes of which the rayon industrial combine could not even have dreamed before.

Master craftsman S. Chernov, who has devoted almost four decades to the plant, had this to say:

"We acquired real prospects," Stepan Ignatyevich said, pointing to a building under construction for a future galvanizing shop. "The tool-making section is being converted into a shop. Purification facilities are planned. It is all going to cost at least 700,000 rubles. Motorostroitel has not been stingy with its money. Our plant has increased the output of products needed by the population from 3.2 to 4.5 million rubles worth. We have renewed production of baby carriages, but we now use the developments of Motorostroitel. This is how fast we are moving!"

Chief engineer N. Kachan and I. Makarchuk, the very young production chief, added this to what the veteran had said: Average wages for the workers rose from 120 to 200 rubles in a year. Those who "fled" are now returning, and even bringing comrades with them. The collective is clearly younger. While the plant workers received three apartments in three decades, we are now looking at an entire street on which to build bungalow-type houses.

A modular building is in the works, where it is planned by the end of the year to begin turning out the scarce Sich engine-blocks and the even more scarce gas-fuel parts for all makes of passenger cars. The most important thing, however, is not that a completely unpromising enterprise has suddenly acquired a future. The remote site will acquire a high caliber of production, modern technology, bold engineering and normal production discipline: precisely what the "rayon people" in the local industry subdivisions lack. This is how it will look. The Motorostroitel specialists will build the modern automated lines at their head enterprise, perfect the finished item and set up the training of "provincial cadres" there, and
all of it will go to the rayon. Rapid development of production and good product quality are clearly ensured under this system.

At the end of last year the UkSSR turned the Gulyaypole Home Appliances Plant (renamed the Zarya) completely over to Motorostroitel. But yesterday’s parents want to “give away” the bride without a dowry: without electric power quotas, without funds for raw and processed materials. This could mean that the Zarya will be unable to harvest the crop planned for this year....

I suggest that the “knots” tied by the conversion at enterprises can most easily be untied by taking the Motorostroitel route.

There are hundreds of unpromising enterprises such as the former Gulyaypole Home Appliances Plant. The conversion could take them out of their doldrums.

A Specialist’s Opinion

A.Ye. Shestakov, deputy USSR minister of general machine-building:

Our branch has always been oriented toward the production of very small lots of products and is therefore unable to set up with our previous equipment the large-scale production demanded of us today. The conversion requires large financial investments. We must also have a “retraining” program for the workers, engineers, designers, managers....

Kirow Oblast’s ‘Mayak’ Plant

90UM0525B Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 15, 9 Apr 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Izvestiya correspondent Anatoliy Yershov, Kirow Oblast, under the rubric “The Consumers’ Society”: “We Are Sounding the Alarm! Waiting to Be Told”]

[Text] The conversion did not catch the Mayak unprepared. Kirow residents were familiar with its civilian products: home appliances, children’s toys and other popular items. Thinking ahead, however, it began producing control devices for machine-tools with numerically programmed control. And so, it seems that the plant was ready for peacetime action.

“But the situation changed with unexpected speed for us last year,” says plant director B. Drozhdin. “We lost several very large defense orders at once and were forced drastically to reorient production toward the output of civilian goods. This is why we decided to begin producing complex home appliances....”

The choice went to a sewing machine with electronic control. A contract for the sale of a license from the American Singer company—or rather, its Italian affiliate in Monza—is being readied for signing. The government has allocated almost 48 million exchange rubles for purchasing the production equipment. A new building with an area of 10,000 square meters has been built for producing the home appliances. If the negotiations are successful, it is planned to turn out the first 10,000 units by the end of the year. The total production capacity is estimated at a half-million of the sewing machines annually.

In a word, things are going well, but this is more the exception than the rule. In order to fill our market with “conversion” goods, it is not enough just to free the enterprises of the “special orders.” An enterprise might build submarines today but be producing refrigerators, let us say, tomorrow. We need investments of both personnel and funds.

Otherwise, the enterprise will find itself in a critical situation, such as that of the Selmash Plant, which, despite its name, belongs to the Ministry of the Defense Industry. Its output of defense items was cut by almost a fourth, which was not made up in good time with anything else. Production volumes fell. Profits dropped by 6.7 million rubles last year, and wages were cut. Several hundred people have recently been laid off.

“We tried to retrain the people who operated special machine-tools. We paid them a decent stipend, but we still lost skilled cadres,” said Selmash director G. Shin, not without a touch of bitterness. “Conversion has turned out not to be as easy as we assumed....”

The conversion to new products has created confusion in the “defense people,” primarily in the upper echelons of management. The ministry “recommended” that the plant begin producing a product whose name even is super-specific: a device for removing cops from looms. The customer bought 15 of them and then refused further deliveries. No more were needed. But the ministry continued insisting that they be produced.

Plant personnel tried to find their own customer. They even began negotiating with an Italian company on the beginning of joint production of locks, the latter’s traditional product. In their dreams they saw the international market, currency earnings, the technical reequipment of production.... The deal was not concluded, however. Know-how in international cooperation is also worth a lot. The talks were conducted sluggishly and incompetently.

The defense enterprises are waiting to be told from the top, from the bottom, from the side, from anywhere at all. The Ministry of Defense knows very well the technical capabilities of its producers but has no real information on the nation’s needs for products. And the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Supply and Demand of Consumer Goods has no idea of the technical potential of the “defense people.” This is why, I believe, the conversion needs a middleman with a good understanding both of the defense industry’s capability and of demand in the market.

I would like to direct attention to this economic and psychological difference. Our defense enterprises have
always operated under hothouse conditions. Today no one gives them detailed and financially backed programs. They have to find the orders, establish contacts and think about selling the product themselves. The "defense people" will someday develop initiative, enterprise....

I am afraid that the conversion could end up in losses for us, afraid that the most highly skilled cadres, accustomed to performing well, will leave the plants and that the caliber and the level of production will drop. In short, there is a danger of losing the enormous technical capability of the "defense people," who truly have every possibility for providing the nation with complex and scarce products.

The question is how to do it.

'Energiya' Scientific-Production Association
90UM0525C Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 15, 9 Apr 90 pp 8-9

[Article under the rubric "The Consumers' Society": "The Plant Is Eliminating the Overcoat—What Then?: What 'Outer Space' Can Do"]

[Text] To produce truly modern and high-quality consumer goods we need the latest equipment, materials and technology. Do we have them? We do, but for now mainly for "special" use. In the photograph [photograph not reproduced] you see the general-purpose Energiya rocket-transport system and the Buran orbiter. V.I. Pylnikov, chief of the Energiya Scientific Production Association, tells us what kinds of products can be produced using "space" technology.

The missile flies off into space, but the technology and the materials we have developed remain, of course. And we could use them in civilian production. We use high-strength steel in the engines, for example (1). It is also suitable for producing medical instruments. A light, strong titanium alloy is used in the pressure accumulators (2). This material could be used in the field of medicine, as prosthetic parts and synthetic tissue which "engraft" into the body.

Arrow 3 points to where the missile's power components are located. The high-strength aluminum alloy used in them is suitable for the production of wheelchairs and prostheses, and in the future, for high-speed transport equipment.

Imagine how many fires could be prevented in hotels, homes and transport facilities if "civilian" industry had fireproof plastics. We have them (4, 8). We use high-strength carbon plastics in the fairing parts (5). Athletic equipment made of these materials would not be as heavy or unattractive as that we now have.

We use a static-resistant covering to prevent electric voltage from building up in the spacecraft (6). It is used in the civil aviation. Here is a more down-to-earth example. We use cryogenic thermal insulation for insulating fuel tanks and lines. This method could be used for stopping up window and door openings and sealing seams between panels.

We have not yet found a use for the cryogenic heat protection (9), but it is perfectly clear that this is a matter of the not too distant future.

We use a high-strength aluminum alloy in the engines and tank components (10, 13). It could also be used for producing ecologically clean transport facilities operating on hydrogen.

We cover the plating edges, which heat up in flight, with carbon-carbon composite materials. They could not only take the place of asbestos but could also be used for the production of self-lubricating bearings, brake discs for sports cars and the aforementioned implants, which would artificially "engraft" into the body organs.

You know that the engine assemblies operate at enormous temperatures (14). Some of them are therefore made of heatproof nickel alloys. They could be used for the production of filters, particularly catalysts, in the form of foamed materials with a large specific surface. We need to continue looking for ways to use our developments in "peaceful" products. I believe that a use will be found also for the heatproof copper alloy (15).

Naturally, I have mentioned only a small part of what "outer space" is capable of today. We need to seek "peaceful" areas of application for our efforts. We simply do know about many of them. We all need an exchange of information very, very much.

The USSR Ministry of Trade has a pavilion in which are assembled thousands of foreign consumer goods. Those which we do not have. Our economic situation today is such, however, that clearly only the military-industrial complex would be capable of producing them.

Unfortunately, we were told, representatives of the defense enterprises rarely visit the pavilion. Perhaps this is the reason why certain "addresses" still do not know what they should undertake to produce.... Our photographer saw compact equipment for small kitchens (a stove, refrigerator and sink all in one cabinet).

Thousands of other products were left out of the picture. If the "defense people" do not come here, however, if they continue to lack information on the real demands of the market and on the best products, the Soviet consumer will continue to be unaware of the products.

Complaint About 'Energiya' Products
90UM0525D Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 15, 9 Apr 90 p 9

[Article by Oleg Tkachuk under the rubric "The Society of Consumers": "Come Now! Who Is Directing the Parade?: They Want to Know in the Energiya Scientific-Production Association"]
They say that a certain tank plant recently began producing kitchen knives out of armor steel. And it is alleged that this peaceable chopper costs somewhere around 90 rubles. The quantity of goods on the shelves is so incommensurate with the number of shelves, of course, that one can make money with anything today. Even with a kitchen knife which costs more than a cavalry sword.

Most customers still do not have a clear idea of who is in charge of the parade for the disarming industry, of whom to write a complaint if one is dissatisfied. In one issue of NEDELYA we published a letter from a reader in which she voiced complaints about a milk boiler produced by the Energia Scientific-Production Association. The issue had barely reached the readers, however, when there was a call from the association:

“What do you mean, comrades, printing such things?” they asked, shaming us. “It is absolutely wrong. Our milk boiler is a good one, and there are almost no complaints about it. Furthermore, it has nothing to do with disarmament. It is going on for four years old. But you should be interested in what we missile-builders are doing under the conversion. Come and have a look....”

We did not have far to go: just to the Moscow suburb of Podlipki.

Let us begin with the list: a compressor for blowing flour onto a conveyor, surgical instruments, prostheses, a pressure chamber, a candy-stretching machine, a candy-wrapping machine, a cabbage planting system (KVK) and a dough kneader. All of this is being produced today by an enterprise which, in the same shops where these items are produced, assembles the Soyuz, Buran and Progress spacecraft.

Was the list of “down-to-earth” products a random selection? Why should the Energia invest its energy in precisely this and not some other equipment?

One example of the agricultural slant, so to speak, is the cabbage planting system. It consists of a system of conveyors designed for raising the seedlings. The KVK prepares the growing mixture, plants each little seed in a separate pot, then transplants the small plants in the field, and so forth. The Mosobispolkom was directed to produce 11 of the systems under an agreement with the USSR Ministry of General Machine-Building.

“The workers are grumbling, of course,” said Boris Matveyevich Bocharov, deputy plant director. “And how could they not grumble? It would not occur to anyone to drive a nail with a Japanese tape recorder, but we force highly skilled specialists to screw nuts on bolts. Our technology, our extensive know-how and our brains are not needed to assemble this system. We are disciplined people, though, and we understand that if it has to be, it has to be....

I wondered just who decided that none other than the scientific-production association should produce the system. After all, more than just a single airport in Moscow Oblast had tried to gain access to Energia as a supplier. There were other solicitors as well. And the victor was not the one whose order was more profitable and interesting for the association or conformed more to its line of production, but the one with weight and connections.

Saltykov-Shchedrin wrote the following about this sort of thing: “It would not occur to anyone to check on whether or not arbitrariness has acted correctly, because everyone knows it is arbitrariness because it operates without rules, however it sees fit at the moment.”

But let us move on from the classics to the following example. Possessing unique know-how in producing life-support systems, a group of plant designers (at their own initiative) took on the very difficult task of producing a multiple-patient, multipurpose pressure chamber for our medical system. No one in the world has it, but we soon will. I have only seen a full-scale mock-up. The work has only been underway going on three months, after all (the first lot will go to the medical workers in a year). It is very similar to both a bathyscaphe and a space station. “Our geometry,” I was told. Inside the pressure chamber oxygen or air enriched with oxygen to the required concentration will be fed to six patients simultaneously. It can also contain a doctor. Suffice it to say, the scientists believe, that in critical situations during births the use of the chamber assures a successful outcome in 99 out of a hundred cases.

Both the workers and the managers at the plant said with a single voice that they could and should be working full force. Two months ago they began working on prostheses which are completely new to the industry. With their help Tatyana Kuznetsova has already participated in the 15-kilometer race for the handicapped in the USA. The shop chief told me: “Believe me, our prostheses will be the best in the world.”

The Energia has a unique oxygen equipment shop. But, at the instructions of the USSR Ministry of General Machine-Building, the shop is engaged in the production of... a candy-stretching machine. And one of the newspapers recently reported on the death of a person which might have been prevented had the clinic had an oxygen system.

This is how my look at Energia’s non-space affairs went: now admiration for the level and the capabilities of the equipment and the people working there, now experiencing doubt as to how these capabilities would be used...

A Specialist’s Opinion

Yu.M. Sinitsyn, deputy USSR minister of the defense industry:

“The main difficulty at this time is the fact that there is still no Law on Conversion. The current programs for re-specializing defense enterprises are on the branch and not the state level. The law should stipulate the conditions...
under which plants and entire branches are to convert to "peaceful" production. We must provide advantageous currency conditions for obtaining credit, currency for retooling production, a quota for contract work for the reconstruction, the repair of facilities, and so forth..."

Conversion Value of Weapons Exports

90UM0713A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 16, 29 Apr-6 May 90 p 10


[Text]

A Scandal With the ANT Deal

It erupted over sales of a batch of tanks abroad and has had, at least, one favourable result—forcing many people to rethink the export possibilities of our defence industry.

Today everyone agrees that "military goods" are among the very few branches of our economy still competitive in the international market. But how are the export possibilities of military goods affected by conversion? Will conversion mean an increased hard currency income?

There were two points of view up until recently. The first—since our defence industry has the necessary manpower and equipment we must at once convert a part of this and organize a new form of production for export as quickly as possible. The second view—since our arms sell well abroad, the best we can do is to step up their export production, and keep conversion for later.

Alas, the facts rule out both these recommendations. Neither conversion nor the stepping up of military exports promise us a flood of convertible currencies in the near future.

Let's start with the sale of arms. It is true that the USSR is a major arms seller. In 1988, for example, we sold 12.8 billion dollars' worth of arms—over a third of the world total. The figures seem impressive, but the problem is that nearly all the countries with a stable currency are economically tied to the NATO bloc and don't buy arms from us. Most of our buyers are poor, developing states unable to pay in hard currency. As a result our actual profits from military exports are quite low. Many specialists think that the trade is not profitable because USSR clients are often not capable of paying for our deliveries and receive arms on credit (this can be proved by the recently published list of our international debtors). This situation is quite natural—after all, the sale of Soviet arms was never trade as such; above all it was a foreign policy tool.

Will this situation change in the future? Apparently yes, but most probably for the worse. Firstly, world arms markets are obviously declining because of the growing detente and expiration of a number of armed conflicts (Iran-Iraq, Central America, Africa, etc.) (In 1988 the general volume of arms trade fell from 39.5 to 33.9 billion dollars, or 14 per cent.) Secondly, the competitiveness of our military hardware is going down: in the 60-70s it was on a par with Western arms but today it is increasingly losing out due to outmoded electronic equipment, and this sends its value down too. True, we're still capable of producing examples of excellent technology (such as combat planes SU-27 and MiG-29, shown last year at Farnborough and Le Bourget), but we can hardly hope that NATO countries would prefer them to their own models.

It is therefore unreasonable to count on a sharp expansion of military exports (to say nothing about the morals of it). But will conversion produce currency?

Our best specialists and latest equipment are actually in the field of military production. These are important factors, but absolutely insufficient for competition in the world market. In the two years of conversion we can count examples of a happy use of military capability for export on the fingers of one hand. The contribution of military engineers towards conversion export capability has not been particularly impressive either. Very soon an exhibition entitled "Conversion" is to be held in Munich. Defence ministries will show their designs for civil products. But will many of these products be any good for commercial use?

The low competitiveness of civil output by the defence industry is conditioned by technological lagging (according to NATO experts, in the late 80s the USSR reached the USA level in only 5 out of 20 fields of military research), extremely high cost (the result of the old idea of achieving results at any expense) and the continuing disdain shown by military enterprises towards civil output, which is regarded as second-rate production. As long as all these brakes are in operation, we can hardly hope that TV sets or washing machines produced by defence enterprises will be able to compete with Japanese or South Korean ones.

All that doesn't of course mean that the defence sector in our economy is hopeless from the point of view of export, or that conversion is impractical for export purposes. There are already various possibilities in the offing.

This is true first of all for the utilization of military hardware and components which have become surplus or obsolete. The navy have done best till now in this field. In the last two years they sold a number of obsolescent warships for scrap iron, including 17 submarines at a price of 150-240,000 dollars a ship and a cruiser for 1.5 million dollars (on average a ton of metal was sold for 180 dollars). It is planned to raise and sell for scrap iron in the near future some 500 more ships which were sunk around our coastline at different times.

Tanks and armoured cars form a huge reserve. If there is agreement over the reduction of arms in Europe, we'll do away with several tens of thousands of them. Since the country lacks enough equipment for re-equipping or
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re-making them, the best thing to do is sell them (after the necessary "disarmament") for currency. True, the sad example of ANT and of Tocarla (the company which tried to sell faulty parts for Soviet tanks and armourd troop carriers abroad) shows that this is not entirely straightforward.

In the field of high technology we can count on the launch of commercial sputniks and research in space on orders from foreign partners. The demand for such services is today ahead of supply, and the USSR is as yet one of the few sellers in this market.

Such parts of the defence industry as helicopter and ship-building are in a position to make a good start (sports yachts, launches, etc.). It is possible to make a sizeable currency income from this quite soon with only moderate input. Military aviation could also contribute to the development of the country's exports. World demands for aviation transport are quite high today.

In short, if we seek we can find quite a few aspects of military economy where we can compete in the world market even now.

Most of the defence enterprises being converted now cannot aim very high however. The majority of them can offer Western partners only their production premises (without equipment) and well-disciplined, cheap manpower. The directors of such enterprises should not reject proposals for the production of basic items for export, even bolts and nuts. These proposals are not humiliating at all. You cannot charge onto the world market in a dizzy cavalry attack. But you must start somehow.

Medical Instruments from Ministry of General Machine-Building

90UM06464 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by S. Tutorskaya, special correspondent for IZVESTIYA: "Syringes and Scalpels Instead of Missiles"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Protecting the Health of the People has met to discuss how the USSR Ministry of General Machine-Building is meeting its responsibilities for re-equipping the medical profession.

Quite recently the Ministry of General Machine-Building, which has incorporated the former USSR Ministry of the Means of Automation and Instrument Making, has become a prime producer of equipment and instruments for the medical profession. It is understood that it is not easy to switch to a completely new product line, which often requires painstaking manual finishing work; and this is particularly true for medical instruments. However, as the Committee Chairman, Yu. Bordin, pointed out, the time for organizational "shake-downs" has already elapsed. It is time to provide medical workers with products. But for now, according to many important economic indicators, the output of needed medical equipment amounts to only 20 to 30 percent of the requirement.

For several consecutive years they have been telling us that at any time now our hospitals will receive the new "RUM" x-ray device. And so what has happened? They still do not have the "RUM;" and the Deputy Minister of General Machine-Building, V. Sokolov, admits that the remaining x-ray equipment lags behind foreign-made equipment by 20 years. And one cannot open a single hospital or polyclinic without an x-ray machine. And now here is, so to speak, the channel we have set up: we are offering our ships to foreign firms for transporting cargoes. In turn these firms will pay us in medical equipment, including x-ray equipment.

It is the final result that is important to us, the patients, so that when needed we and our children can be quickly examined.

As concerns the mass production of instruments things are very sad. If the peoples' deputies who are doctors are saying: there is one phonendoscope for every six doctors; the trauma specialists have neither special wood screws and nails for setting broken bones nor other needed equipment; that the production of even multiple-use syringes, in spite of all efforts to increase their production, is falling; if these and other such things are being heard within the walls of the Supreme Soviet, then something must be changed immediately to stop the decline in production.

The situation with syringes is critical. Deputy Minister V. Sokolov reported that the West German automated machinery that makes multiple-use needles is worn out and barely functioning. Thus, perhaps it is necessary to purchase new equipment right away and to give it to the small enterprises. It was no accident that the conversation about small enterprises was initiated. Experience throughout the world tells us that small enterprises put out more product; they have a healthy competition.

Those who spoke at the meeting said that many of our plants fear parting with the situation of the monopolists more than death. And how: they dictate both the amounts of production and the prices. And we sit around for a year or so without mustard plasters (one plant in Volgograd), without the equipment to measure mercury vapors in the air (one plant in Sverdlovsk), and without a lot of other things that are greatly needed.

It was strange to hear the admission of the Ministry of General Machine-Building that it does not have the money for very important product lines and that it is requesting funds from the USSR Ministry of Health. How can this be the case, commented V. Pokrovskiy, the president of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, if the Ministry of General Machine-Building has cut back on the production of missiles, then funds should have been freed up. Give these funds to us, the doctors, and
we will order what we need ourselves, rather than that which many enterprises are thrusting on us.

The President of the East Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences in Irkutsk, S. Kolesnikov, emphasized that for the moment there is no precise legal definition of conversion. And it is difficult to plan everything that finds its way to the medical world from “big” industry; and these plans will not be supported by funds.

It is time to learn how to count money and to know how to earn it. This is also true for doctors and medical scientists. The flow of funds, and it is a considerable amount, can be provided by medical insurance. In any event we can no longer tolerate the present situation, wherein we have not less than a seven-fold lag behind any developed nation in the amount of medical equipment that is produced. And the gap is even greater in terms of the money that is invested through the budget and other means. The committee participants in the meeting devoted especially serious attention to the following issue. Throughout the world, industry that works for the medical profession pays fewer taxes because the work is very labor intensive. And it goes without saying, that this industry receives only the best raw materials. Here things are quite the opposite. The residual principle of financing, poor materials, and outrageous taxes—all of this would suffocate even the Kruppe steel mills. The peoples’ deputies, the committee, the USSR Ministry of Health, and the USSR Ministry of General Machine-Building have decided to petition the USSR State Planning Committee and the USSR Ministry of Finance immediately to change their investment and tax policies. If we want our capability to produce instruments for the medical profession, this puny little child, at last to increase, for a start it is necessary to give it at least a swallow of fresh air.

Leasing Poses Problems for Defense Industry Producer

90404067A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian No 27, Jul 90 p 7

[Article by A. Rodionov, general director of the Penza “Zavod Imeni Frunze” Production Association: “Leasing In The Departments”]

[Text] This is the second year that we are operating under leasing conditions. And for the second year we are encountering a number of problems which, unfortunately, are still not being reflected in any of the laws that have been adopted.

The first of these problems is associated with the existing goszakaz [state order] system. Certainly, this question affects all enterprises throughout the country and yet it is having an especially painful effect upon leasing collectives.

As defense workers, we always have considered the fulfillment of the goszakaz as our priority task. But how is it possible to cope with the goszakaz, and our commitment to it is 100 percent, if there is no guarantee for the marketing of the product or that production operations will be supplied with the needed materials, technology or equipment. There is no stability in the planning for this work, nor a guarantee that it will not be corrected at the end of the year. We never know what the goszakaz will be like in the future—a year or two later. Under such conditions, how is it possible to carry out timely production preparations or to conclude contracts for raw materials, other materials and equipment.

And indeed all of this is of special importance if the conditions of leasing contracts are to be carried out in an effective and successful manner.

The subject of leasing in our defense branch is worthy of discussion. It is our belief that this form of management is suitable for any branch and yet a need exists for clearly designating the peculiarities of its use and, on this basis, regulating the interrelationships between the leaseholders and the lessors. And such peculiarities are few in number.

For example, it is stated in the Legislative Principles Governing Leasing that the output of a leasing collective is its own property. Output of defense significance can scarcely be considered the property of the collective. Therefore, it is our opinion that defense enterprises must lease property with certain limitations being imposed. What are these limitations? For example, an enterprise is granted the right of ownership of its output, but the goszakaz stipulates that the sale of this output is to be carried out only to those addresses indicated by the lessor, that is, distribution will be carried out in accordance with the conditions established for state enterprises.

If defense enterprises are excluded from the system of leasing relationships, then they will not enjoy the same economic conditions as do civil enterprises. And indeed, so far as we are aware, the enterprises in our branches have always been distinguished by a higher level of organization for production, labor and personnel skills. Why must these collectives suffer?

I would like to mention the unsolved problems characteristic of all leasing enterprises regardless of their branch affiliation.

When converting over to a single taxation system commencing 1 January 1991, collectives which operate on a lease basis will encounter more complicated conditions compared to other collectives. In addition to a tax on their profits, they will also have to deduct a lease payment from their profit. Moreover, it is still not clear to us exactly what this payment will include. If during 1989 and 1990 the amount of the lease payment was based upon payments into the ministry’s centralized fund and was nominal in nature, then under the conditions which will prevail in 1991, when there will be no centralized fund, it is not clear exactly what we must transfer over to the lessor. If we are guided by the
Principles of Leasing Legislation, then a lease payment includes amortization withholdings from the cost of leased property and a portion of the profit and if we follow the Law Governing Enterprises in the USSR, then it would appear that all amortization must remain at the disposal of the enterprises. What are we to believe? It is obvious that changes must be introduced into one of the laws (possible the Law on Leasing).

Under the conditions imposed by the Law On Taxation, it is our opinion that a lease payment must represent an amount for the partial purchasing of property. This applies first of all to new enterprises which have been in existence for not more than 20 years and which have not fully amortized their value. Thus they must be purchased. And such enterprises as ours (in May of this year, it will have been in operation for 75 years), where the fixed capital depreciation exceeds 60 percent, must obviously be turned over to the labor collective free of charge.

The conversion of enterprises over to leasing forces the collectives into intensifying and improving their intra-production cost accounting. And again we are confronted by the fact that, owing to the absence of normative documents, each element must devise and develop statutes governing the conversion of subunits over to collective contracts, leases, the second cost accounting model, and so forth. A tremendous need exists for information and for summarizing leading experience. But the amount of such information that is available is negligible. Thus we must move forward using the method of trial and error.

We employed this method. We began with the introduction of a collective contract in the velo-galvanic department. The collective of this department concluded a contract with the association's administration in which the mutual responsibilities, rights and obligations of the parties involved were reflected. And soon thereafter, another department—for the assembly of velo-wheels—was converted over to lease operations. A statute on organizing a lease contract was approved for it, the prices for products produced were computed and a personal account was opened for it. During the second half of 1989, leases were registered for three more machine tool production departments.

Taking into account the specific nature of these production operations and the absence of methodological preparations, the association had to attract specialists from a leading scientific-research institute of the ministry for carrying out joint work aimed at creating a new model for the formation of prices and income. The collectives of lease departments have now been given complete independence in the distribution of cost accounting income. It is noted that our experience in converting departments over to leasing has been approved by the ministry and by the Penza Oblast CPSU Committee.

Experience has shown that the process of introducing internal leasing must not be accelerated artificially and that the labor collectives themselves must understand the advantages of leasing and proceed with a clear understanding of the future prospects.

At the present time, the next stage in the development of intra-organizational relationships has commenced within the association—the conversion over to cost accounting operations of the association's auxiliary departments: power engineering, repair-mechanical and repair-construction departments. Traditionally, this group of departments has lagged behind in its cost accounting development and the need for improving its economic mechanism is both obvious and urgent. It is precisely in this sector of operations that the efforts of the association's plant economists and specialists are being concentrated at the present time. Our task would indeed be facilitated by the material recommended for improving intra-production cost accounting! I believe that this must become one of the tasks of the recently organized USSR Union of Leaseholders and Employers.
Interview on Functions of 'Red Banner Military Institute'

90UM0383A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 1990
(signed to press 2 Feb 90) pp 68-72

[Interview with Lieutenant General G.M. Pershakov, chief of the Red Banner Institute's Political Department, by Correspondent Major I. Plugatarev: “The Institute Reveals [its] Secrets...”]

[Text] After publication in KVS [KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] No. 21 of brief information about admission and learning conditions at the Military Red Banner Institute, the editors received letters whose authors ask us to discuss this military educational institution in detail. While carrying out the wishes of our readers, our Correspondent Major I. Plugatarev met with Lieutenant General G. Pershakov, chief of the [Red Banner] the Institute’s Political Department, and asked him to answer several questions.

[Plugatarev] Gennadiy Mikhaylovich! Judging by the letters arriving at the editor's office and also by conversations during the temporary duty assignment, the troops are poorly informed about the Military Institute. Several years ago, while discussing the activities of the Institute’s graduating class party organization on the magazine’s pages, our magazine’s correspondents precisely called it “one of the military educational institutions.” Graduates of this VUZ were never, so to speak, close coworkers of very many military officers. In general, a quite marked aura of secrecy exists around the institution to this day, during the sixth year of perestroika. How can you explain all of this?

[Pershakov] I think that right now this “secrecy” is caused by the fact that the Institute actually continues to remain an institution that is the only one of its kind and also is the only one in the country. And competition among applicants remains great. Until recently, it really was impossible to find information about the institute’s activities in the press. Except that KRASNYA ZVEZDA annually published several lines about application requirements for the Institute. Of course, all of this caused a complicated reaction among people and promoted dissemination of various rumors many of which were groundless. Now the situation has changed. Various publications, including KRASNYA ZVEZDA, SOBESEDKI, and CHELOVEK 1 ZAKON, have already written about graduates of the Institute.

The Pervogovo Fervalya [First of February] Military Institute has marked its 50th Anniversary. Today, as previously, it is training officers and specialists for our Armed Forces: Military interpreters, military lawyers, and political workers with knowledge of foreign languages. Institute graduates are serving in all areas of our Fatherland, in the Groups of Soviet Forces that are deployed abroad, and live with the same problems and concerns as each of our Army’s officers. They do not have any privileges.

[Plugatarev] Anyway, let us attempt to raise the plank of glasnost a little higher over the Institute. We can probably presume or guess that some of the VUZ’s graduates are familiar with the Afghan heat. they know what the whistle of a bullet over their head is, and they have a definite connection with our diplomatic missions abroad.

[Pershakov] Let us dwell on this for the time being. Of course, many of our students fulfilled their international duty in Afghanistan and manifested bravery and heroism. We sacredly preserve the memory of those who died there. More than 200 graduates have been decorated with orders and medals. I will briefly tell you about one of them, Andrey Sokolov. He entered the Institute in 1985 for a one year course. By that time, he already had compulsory service behind him. He attained the rank of junior lieutenant and was sent to Afghanistan as an interpreter to a special purpose battalion near Jalalabad. He repeatedly participated in combat operations. Once, the detachment to which he was assigned destroyed a DSHK [machinegun] crew. Andrey Sokolov was awarded the Order of the Red Star for courage and heroism manifested in battle. And in February 1988, Junior Lieutenant Sokolov participated in an assault on a Dushman weapons caravan.

The detachment then seized a Stinger PZRK [Anti-aircraft missile] system. Many participants of this operation, including Sokolov, were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Later Andrey participated in supporting the withdrawal of the first column of the limited contingent of Soviet Forces in May 1988. Now Lieutenant Sokolov is 25 years old and he is a second year student in the Western languages department and he is doing well in his studies. Furthermore, he is a member of the Assembly of Officers Council and he became a communist in December 1989.

As for the participation of our graduates in diplomatic missions abroad, there are some [graduates] there. It is already not a secret for anyone that Soviet international contacts on military policy have increased and that regular trips abroad by USSR Ministry of Defense delegations, including to capitalist countries, are evidence of this. Therefore, there is a great demand for our graduates and interpreters and they work, as they say, by the sweat of their brow. Exactiveness toward their training has also increased at the Institute itself.

[Plugatarev] At one time after graduation from Suvorovskiy Institute, I almost attempted to enter your Institute. I had pretty good English language skills. But they “brought me to my senses.” They said your father is far from a general, not an eminent scientist, and not first secretary of an Obkom, and there they said parents first of all compete and only later.... Gennadiy Mikhaylovich, without being a hypocrite, answer me, what were my chances for success?

[Pershakov] As I understand it, this question is also from the area of secret rumors about the Institute. I will not
presume to judge if it is possible that there were some reasons for this earlier. However, I will say that now the selection of candidates and the exams they take here are conducted on legitimate grounds. Both the leadership of the Institute, the political department, and the party organization stand guard over justice when entering the Institute.

By the way, here are the facts. Among students of the last two enrollments are representatives of 34 nationalities and about 30 percent came from the forces. There are a total of only 15 percent Moscow residents and the rest are from other cities. During entry, priority is given to members of worker and peasant families and to university applicants who have worked in industry.

[Plugatarev] And is it true that for some time the institute "has not been making a lot of" the fair sex? That the Army no longer needs female interpreters?

[Pershakov] Yes, a decision has been made to close the female student department. This is tied to today's Armed Forces reduction trends. We think it is proper for the fair sex to be engaged with its own, purely peaceful, female duties, and the profession of female interpreter of the military department, although it is romantic, is not as carefree as it appears.

[Plugatarev] As we all know, in ancient times practically every officer in the Russian officer corps mastered some foreign language or even two to three [foreign languages] and it was considered to be more than unacceptable to not know a [foreign] language. Now it has become a privilege essentially of only those who study at the Military Institute. What do you think, is there already no longer a need for a company or large unit commander or for political workers of various ranks to master a foreign [language]?

[Pershakov] It is my opinion that it would be good for all categories of officers to master foreign languages—it is quite useful both for their general education and for their professional activities. But this question goes beyond the limits of our VUZ's authority: We train foreign language professionals.

[Plugatarev] And have you yourself, if it is not a secret, mastered a foreign language?

[Pershakov] I have not quite mastered but I think I adequately comprehend German.

[Plugatarev] Are there polyglots among your students (or professors)? Or let us put it this way: It is certainly no secret that only young men who are particularly capable in languages enter your Institute since, upon graduation, each of your students perfectly masters a language that he studies during his five year course of studies?

But what are his opportunities to study two or three, four, or even more languages, or is there generally a need to do so?

[Pershakov] The opportunities to learn a language, both native and also foreign, are truly unlimited. But it is obviously impossible to speak about perfection in the mastery of a language upon graduation from our VUZ. And this is also obvious. Really there are approximately one million words in any (developed) language. Lev Tolstoy used 22,000 words in Russian, Pushkin—17,000 words, and V.I. Lenin—almost 37,000. Furthermore, they had an outstanding mastery of several other languages.

And there is the possibility to study several languages at the Institute but each interpreter is rated on the quality of mastery of the so-called working language. Poor mastery of the working language cannot be compensated for by poor mastery of yet a dozen more languages.

[Plugatarev] Gennadiy Mikhaylovich, recently the forces have run into the need to increase the legal education of officers. I do not think I need to explain what caused this. We all know that a special subdivision was also created at your Institute that will train legal consultants—aides to unit commanders on legal affairs. Tell me, how do you see the prospects of such cooperation? What new businesslike qualities does this require from your graduates?

[Pershakov] It requires graduates of this subdivision to know how to rapidly and skillfully solve various legal problems that arise in the everyday activities of troops. A specialist of this level must have an understanding of every branch of law. A legal consultant must know how to properly provide comprehensive assistance to the commander from a legal point of view to successfully carry out the mission. The commander is the person invested with sole command. And the legal consultant must also consider this in his practice. Furthermore, I think that he must maintain close contact with political organs and with unit party organizations and here there must be mutual support and good mutual understanding among them.

[Plugatarev] But unfortunately Gennadiy Mikhaylovich, military lawyers do not always have the qualities you have listed. Letters frequently come to the editorial office in which men also complain about illegal activities of those who work in garrison procurator offices who themselves should be guarding legality, about their inattentive and disdainful attitude toward people at times. As a rule, many of these workers are your graduates. How would you comment on these cases?

[Pershakov] Well, even individual instances of such conduct by our former students annoys me. And it is more so since I also know something else: The absolute majority of law department graduates are conscientiously fulfilling their duties while at the same time manifesting concern and sensitivity toward people. According to comments of 1987-1988 graduates, only four percent of officers have observations concerning their basic professional training. We understand that this is also a flaw in our work and simultaneously an impetus
to improve the quality of the training and educational process. In connection with all of the expanding processes of democratization and glasnost and with the growth of political activities of people, including in the Army and the Navy, we are also appropriately increasing the demands on our students—future military lawyers. For democracy is not only the celebration of freedom it is also a great responsibility to society. And to stand on guard of the Law in our days means to promote the development of democracy in society. This means not only to improve knowledge of provisions, articles, and paragraphs of the Law, to use them while resolving conflict situations and in the procedural conduct of cases, but also to have high standards of [personal] intercourse, the ability to convince, to conduct a dialogue, to not forget that before you is a man with his problems who is asking not simply for your help but frequently for—protection, for protection in accordance with the Law. And to respond to his expectations—not the whim of a legal person since this is his duty, his sacred obligation. The Institute’s military professors and the efforts of the political department, commander, and the VUZ’s party organization are also working in this direction right now.

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Roundtable on Baltics in 1939-1940
90UM0382A Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 1990 (Signed to press 2 Feb 90) pp 59-67

[Roundtable discussion conducted by Colonel N.N. Belyakov, candidate of philosophical sciences and deputy editor-in-chief of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Magazine; “The Baltic States: 1939-1940—Materials from a 'Roundtable' of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Magazine Editors”]

[Text] This year marks half a century since the time when an event occurred in the lives of the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia that radically changed their fate: The three Baltic States became a part of the USSR and tied their historic fates with all of the peoples of the Soviet State and with socialism.

Numerous requests to describe the events of fifty years ago are being expressed at readers conferences and in letters arriving at the editorial offices. A political hullabaloo is also being diligently stirred up in the Baltic Republics around the so-called “blank spots” [surrounding these events]. The editors of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Magazine have prepared a series of materials on these problems. An attempt is made in them to provide a broad picture of the military-political situation in Europe and in the Baltic Region in 1939-1940 and to analyze the factors that had a substantial impact on the entry of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union, especially in light of the Soviet-German Treaty of 1939. Documents from that time will be published including those just recently declassified.

We are beginning publication of the roundtable materials on events that occurred 50 years ago. The following individuals participated in the roundtable discussion: Colonel A.S. Akhteryakov, candidate of historical sciences; D.L. Belskiy, an APN [Novosti Press Agency] military and political observer; Lieutenant Colonel N.I. Dorokhov, candidate of historical sciences; Colonel N.P. Karpichenko, candidate of historical sciences; Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Kopylov, candidate of philosophical sciences (VPA [Military Political Academy] imeni V.I. Lenin); Plenipotentiary Ambassador A.N. Nikolayev, doctor of legal sciences; Colonel V.T. Roschupkin, editor of the International Life Department of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL; Professor V.A. Sekistov, doctor of historical sciences; Professor M.I. Semiryaga, doctor of historical sciences (Institute of the International Workers Movement); Colonel A.A. Sytczhev, candidate of historical sciences and assistant professor; G.A. Takhnenko, advisor 1st class and first secretary of the historical and diplomatic administration of USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs].

Colonel N.N. Belyakov, candidate of philosophical sciences and deputy editor-in-chief of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Magazine, conducted the roundtable.

[Belyakov] Today the problem that has been submitted for our discussion has become more aggravated than ever before. Right now a distorted picture is being presented of much of it. Really, it is a fact that monuments to the S.S. and to the “forest brothers” who are called “heroic partisans” etc., are currently being erected in the Baltic. And some people are depicting our soldiers as occupiers. The crimes of the true occupiers and the genocide they committed are not even mentioned.

I would like our roundtable and other publications to find the truth.

[Sytczhev] The increased interest in the events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 has acquired the nature of a fierce political struggle. And not only in our country but abroad as well. We are seeing a wide scattering of opinions of historians, the mass media, and the fever pitch of society’s passions.

An objective analysis of the military-political situation in the prewar years requires first of all knowledge of the entire gamut of facts, documents, literature, and various sources of an open and closed nature and a comprehensive assessment of the events examined in their interrelation with other phenomena.

Let us take the complicated issue of how to assess the military-political situation on the eve of the war. For the world as a whole and also including for the Soviet Union and the states adjacent to it, be they in the West, East, South, or North, the situation that we will graphically describe today developed in an extremely contradictory manner.

The Soviet leadership found itself in a very complicated and extremely difficult situation. Hitler's Germany was literally not stopping at anything in its moves to seize foreign territories and states. And a threat existed for us not only from the West but from the East as well. We sometimes forget that a formidable danger threatened not only from Fascist Germany but also from Japan in the Far East. The class egotistical positions of the leading imperialists powers during the period when M. Litvinov headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs disrupted all attempts to create a system of collective security in Europe. And Soviet-English-French negotiations demonstrated that first of all England and France, I emphasize, first of all they and not Stalin and his entourage did not want to conclude an alliance directed at countering Hitler's aggressive plans.

[Sekistov] At the end of July and the beginning of August 1939, negotiations with Germany occurred in an environment of deepest secrecy at the initiative of the British Government. The negotiations in Moscow were used as a means of political pressure against Hitler. The governments of England and France did not want, writes
French historian J. Vilars, to conclude any type of agreement with the Soviet Union, "that would exclude any hope of a German-Soviet clash."

This is confirmed, for example, by the content of a conversation of N. Chamberlain and his closet friend, Minister of Aviation Kingsley Boyd at the beginning of July 1939 (in the presentation of Ambassador to London I.M. Mayskiy):

"What is new with the negotiations on a pact?" asked Kingsley Boyd.

Chamberlain irritably waved his hand and said: "I have still not yet lost hope that I will succeed in avoiding this unfortunate pact."

Naturally under such an approach, the talks in Moscow, begun at the initiative of the USSR, did not conclude and could not conclude in any results whatsoever. In August 1939, [Admiral The Honorable Reginald Plunkett-Erle-Drax, head of the British mission, was forced to state that "he is only authorized to conduct talks but not to sign a pact (convention)."

[Belyakov] And how can we assess Stalin's reaction to this statement?

[Sytezhiev] In the situation that had developed, a harsh choice was placed before Stalin: Either the USSR would find itself facing the developing Anti-Soviet Front alone or it could create more acceptable conditions to insure security and prevent aggression. But, of course, we can now also talk about how, they say, the probability of an alliance existed if we had delved deeply into the essence of the Soviet-Anglo-French talks. But what was the degree of probability of their success? We can say that Stalin did not have enough patience or endurance, and maybe not enough wisdom to attempt to understand the English and French anyway. They had to have a very serious understanding with the Soviet Union on restraining Fascist Germany's future appetites. But, alas, all of this is from the sphere of the theory of probability.

I think that renunciation of the forced, I emphasize, forced 23 August Treaty with Germany could hardly have prevented the German-Polish War in accordance with the Weiss [White] Plan (This plan was signed on 11 April, 1939). Events developed in such a way that Hitler's appetites would have resulted in his seizure of the Baltic Region and establishment of control over Finland and Romania, and the Wehrmacht's further advance to the East.

Therefore, I do not agree with those who assert that the Non-Aggression Pact (I have not yet touched upon the secret protocols to it) was absolutely not needed by us and who demand that we admit it was ineffective and illegal from the very beginning. This particularly concerns the Lithuanian representatives of Memorial and Sajudis.

I think that the Soviet leadership did not harbor any illusions at all regarding Hitler's true plans and understood that the treaty was only a delay of the war and only a definite pause. The calculation was also based upon increasing our defense capability, especially after extermination of the flower of the Army before the war. The guilt lies not only with Stalin but with all those who signed these documents: Beria, Voroshilov, and others.

[Belyakov] Today there are many conversations concerning secret protocols to the 23 August treaty....

[Sekistov] As for the secret protocol to the 23 August 1939 treaty, I recall that the original of the protocol has not been found in Soviet or other archives. Photocopies of the secret protocols are circulating in the West. Xerox copies from them have been printed, for example, in the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY weekly (1989, No. 23). The day of the signing draws attention to itself—not 23 August, but 28 September, 1939 when the border treaty was signed which stopped the further advance of German Fascist troops to the East. The xerox copy of the map on which the extent of the border is corroborated by the signatures of Stalin and Ribbentrop is marked with this same date (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, July 5, 1989).

The West is attempting to distort the cause and result relationships. For example, University of Maryland (U.S.) Professor George Kent is attempting to convince [people] that the copy "confirms the authenticity of the protocol with greater persuasiveness than even the original itself...." Elementary logic is cast aside only to prove the treaty's illegality for the purpose of abolishing it!

Furthermore, I think that it is impossible to categorically refute the probability of the drafting of the secret protocol to the 23 August 1939 treaty that could only be the consequence but not the cause of the treaty itself.

Let us turn to "Supernumerary on the Diplomatic Scene." [Translator's note: English tile is "Hitler's Interpreter." 1951] the book of memoirs by P. Schmidt, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs senior interpreter during Hitler's time, that was published in the FRG. He frequently fulfilled the duties as the Fuhrer's personal interpreter. "I saw this secret protocol signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop that night (on 24 August, 1939)," writes P. Schmidt.

[Roshchupkin] In the 21st issue of our magazine in 1988, roundtable materials were published on the theme "Soviet-German Treaty of 1939: The View Across Fifty years" where these problems are also partially examined. During the work on collecting documents and materials, I managed to meet and talk in detail with the famous Soviet Diplomat and Historian Doctor of Historical Sciences V.M. Berezhkov. He is the author of several books on USSR foreign policy during the prewar period and during the years of the Second World War.

On the eve of Fascist Germany's attack against the Soviet Union, Valentin Mikhailovich first secretary of
our embassy in Berlin. Before and during the war, he participated in many important international negotiations of the Soviet leadership as Stalin's and Molotov's interpreter. He is without a doubt an informed man.

According to Valentin Mikhaylovich, the authenticity of the copies of the secret protocol (he also has access to them) does not cause any doubt today. There is also the explanation of why the originals in the Russian and German languages have not been found to this day. Berezhkov thinks that Stalin decided to destroy the original after the "Soviet-Nazi Relations of 1939-1941" anthology was published in the U.S. in 1947. Then Stalin directed these materials be refuted. Vyshenskiy and a number of historians who were close to the "leader" were engaged in this.

In the Sovinformbyuro [Soviet Information Bureau (press agency)] materials "Falsifiers of History" published at the time, nothing is said about the secret protocols but they talk about the "warmongers' forgers" that were disseminated for the purpose of discrediting the USSR.

And what about in Germany? It is obvious that the originals there were destroyed while Hitler was still in power. But, according to some information, the appropriate documents were recorded on microfilm during the final stage of the war, including the secret protocol to the Soviet-German Treaty. Ribbentrop sent one of his associates and they were microfilmed in his presence in the repository in the Alps. At the end of April 1945, the chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered this man to destroy the film. But he surrendered to the English and they gave the film to the Americans.

And one more fact mentioned by V.M. Berezhkov. If we judge by the American Ambassador's telegram to Moscow dated 24 August 1939 that has been preserved, the U.S. administration already had access to materials of the talks between the USSR and Germany the next day. From where? It is now no secret that an American agent was operating in the German Embassy in Moscow at that time. In the morning, he transmitted the text of the documents signed the [previous] night. Thus, having received the German microfilm in 1945, the Americans were convinced of the reliability of the information (about the secret protocol) that they had already obtained in 1939.

In conclusion, I will provide the opinion of A.N. Yakovlev, Politburo member, CPSU Central Committee secretary, and chairman of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies Commission on the Political and Legal Assessment of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty of 1939. Although, Comrade Yakovlev emphasizes, the original of the secret treaty has not been found, its presence in the world in documents discovered, including in very recent months, does not cause any doubt.

[Sekistov] In the words of the previously mentioned P. Schmidt, the protocol talked about the division of Germany's and Russia's spheres of interest in Eastern Europe. However, the demarcation line that crossed Poland appeared later.

In May 1989, the USSR and PPR [Polish Peoples Republic] Commission of Scientists arrived at the conclusion that in August 1939 there was some form of an agreed guarantee of a line of preservation that German troops were not supposed to cross "that was necessary for the security of the USSR." Actually, until 17 September 1939, the Soviet government did not intervene in the events that were taking place. The Red Army crossed the border with Poland only when the German Fascist troops approached Brest and Lvov.

Thus, harsh reality forced the Soviet government to conclude a treaty with Fascist Germany on 23 August 1939. The situation that was developing was similar to the Brest Peace of 1918 when the issue was resolved: Will our country be free and independent or not. Therefore it appears to me that under those conditions any action that helped to create conditions for the greatest advantage for defense were justified.

[Sytsheev] I would also like to say that the line for repelling possible aggression was in sum already moved back several hundred kilometers in September 1939. And Japan's aggressive plans in the Far East during joint operations with Germany against us were also ruined. Furthermore, after signing the pact, the lack of coordination that occurred between Japan and Germany resulted in the rapid resignation of the cabinet of the Japanese Government and to a serious reorientation of Japan with regard to the Soviet Union and Germany.

[Nikolayev] After conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 that had not only an anticomunist but also an anti-Soviet orientation, Japanese leaders attempted to establish a close military alliance with Hitler's Germany and with Fascist Italy for the primary purpose of a joint attack against the Soviet Union.

On May 4, 1939, Prime Minister Hiranuma sent Hitler a "declaration" in which he expressed his admiration for the "wisdom and iron will" of the German Chancellor who is fulfilling "the noble task of restoring his country and establishing international peace...." Hiranuma called for the conclusion of a treaty to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and cooperation between Japan, Germany, and Italy.

Representatives of Japan, Germany, and Italy were conducting negotiations on concluding a tripartite military alliance directed against the USSR. And at this time, 23 August 1939, Hitler, unexpectedly for Japan, concluded a Non-Aggression Treaty with the Soviet Union!

News of this caused a storm of indignation in Tokyo. The Japanese Government assessed Germany's conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union as
"a betrayal" of the principles of the Anti-Comintern Pact and as a renunciation of the military alliance with Japan.

Prime Minister Hiranuma said in despair: "This is incomprehensible!" Instructions were sent to Ambassador Osima in Berlin: 1. Inform the German Government that the Japanese Government has understood the conclusion of a non-aggression pact in such a manner that it definitively annuls current negotiations on the three power pact between Japan and Germany on one hand, and Italy on the other.

2. The Japanese Government states that conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia is a serious violation of the secret treaty linked with the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. Therefore, it expresses a strict protest to the German Government.

On 28 August, 1939, Hiranuma and members of his cabinet submitted their resignations.

The Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome—Osima and Siratori, having aggressively pursued conclusion of a military alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy—pointedly left their posts.

The conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between Hitler and the Soviet Union seriously undermined the trust Japan's leaders had in Germany.

On 13 April, 1941, a neutrality pact was concluded by the Soviet Union and Japan. Although Japan violated this pact, it nevertheless was a serious restraining factor for Tokyo in its relations with the Soviet Union. The war on two fronts against the Soviet Union previously conceived by German and Japanese militarists—from the West and from the east—did not take place. And the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty facilitated this to a considerable degree.

[Sytzehev] In discussions that have taken place about the events of 1939, statements ring out that the non-aggression treaty and the secret protocol to it also predetermined the fates of the Baltic Republics. But really these documents did not define the political and legal status of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia! Their status changed as a due to other circumstances. And the occupation of a large portion of Poland during the course of three weeks demonstrated that Fascist aggression farther east would hardly be stopped in the future. What decisions could the governments of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have made to avoid enslavement by Germany?

In my view, there were five versions of the Baltic states foreign policy vectors.

First, a policy orientation toward England and France. There were such opinions but this policy turned out to be unrealistic since these countries pushed aside the small states through the Munich conspiracy. They doubted the sincerity of London's and Paris's promises to defend them from aggression.

The second version—was an attempt to create a Baltic Entente (Agreement). This idea was constantly spread with the participation of England, Sweden, Turkey, and the Baltic countries. But it turned out to be unsuccessful. It is true that they succeeded in creating a military alliance of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. However, it was extremely contradictory and did not resolve all of the problems, although the Baltic comrades are now refuting the existence of this alliance.

The third version—was an orientation toward an alliance with Fascist Germany. But soberly thinking statesmen and a large portion of the populations of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia sharply came out against this.

The fourth [version]—was neutrality. In my view, no one could remain on the sidelines of a war that assumed a world character. And each state (only Sweden and Switzerland were "lucky") was searching for potential allies. What kind of neutrality could there be for the small Baltic Republics!

And well (the fifth) most realistic path to prevent a German occupation was precisely cooperation with the southern neighbor, with the Soviet Union and good neighbor relations with us! In the interests of both the Baltic Republics and the Soviet Union!

[Belyakov] In this connection, I would like to hear about Germany's plans with regard to the Baltic Region.

[Kopylev] Prior to unleashing the war, Germany was hatching secret plans to colonize the Baltic. These plans were based on the "race theory" and on the concept of "a lack of living space." In accordance with them, the other peoples of Europe were declared to be lower races who had seized massive, fertile lands and were awaiting the arrival of the German "superman." From these positions, programs were developed to "Germanize" one portion of the Baltic Republic population and to eliminate the other.

In March 1939, Germany annexed the Klaipeda region to its territory. This actually was the beginning of Fascist aggression in the Baltic that very clearly demonstrated the true intentions of the Nazi leadership in this region.

As for the Soviet Union, it had formed economic, political, ethnic, and cultural ties with the peoples of the Baltic Republics that had ancient historical roots. During the years of the Civil War and the foreign military intervention, the forces of internal counter-revolution supported by international imperialism forcibly tore the Baltic Region away from the young, still growing Republic of the Soviets. The Baltic Republics occupied an important strategic position and, facing an approaching world war, the Soviet State had to be alarmed by the regimes that were in power in these countries and by the policies they were conducting.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were in a difficult position at this time. They found themselves between Germany and the USSR under conditions when the redistribution of Europe had begun. Who should they go with? This is what the governments of these countries had to decide [to do]. And when it became clear that the Baltic lands could end up in Hitler's hands, a choice was made in favor of the USSR.

[Takhnenko] There should be no “white spots” in the history of the Soviet Union. How bitter it is that it sometimes turns out that we make these “white spots” black. In any case, I think it is necessary to have complete information about all of the episodes of our country’s history and our relationships with other countries. “We need complete and true information,” V.I. Lenin wrote in 1921. “And truth must not depend on whom it must serve” (Complete Collected Works, Volume 54, page 446).

Of course, the Soviet leadership undertook all possible measures to strengthen the country’s security in the face of the Fascist threat. But at times violations of Leninist foreign policy principles were also permitted. You should never depart from them.

However, the impression is taking shape that many people in the Baltic Region do not have a desire to objectively approach the assessment of events. They persistently seek the negative and slander the Russian people. At the same time, they forget that both they and other peoples also suffered hardships and that a massive deportation of the Russian population also occurred!

There is confirmation in our diplomatic documents that the Baltic Republics themselves welcomed the conclusion of the 23 August pact. If, as our [ambassador] plenipotentiaries reported, at first they guardedly accepted this, literally on the second day, 25 August, Semenov, entrusted with USSR affairs in Lithuania, reported to the Foreign Affairs Narkomat [People's Commissariat]: In this Republic, they have come to the conclusion that the situation in Estonia and Latvia has become stronger (take into account this is 25 August!) since the threat of a German-Soviet clash that could have crushed them has receded. The Lithuanians were afraid that the USSR would finally cease being interested in Lithuania.

The Lithuanian Embassy’s advisor in Latvia (Zotov, our [ambassador] plenipotentiary in Riga, reported this fact to us) wrote: The treaty brought calm to the small countries of the Baltic. That is, representatives of the Baltic Republics assessed the conclusion of our treaty with Germany in a positive manner! And [they] even welcomed it because it strengthened the situation of the Baltic Republics!

Here I have one more document before me. You and the readers reading it in the magazine are the first to hear about it. Concerning the movement of Red Army units toward the Lithuanian border, on 20 September, Pozdniyakov, the USSR [Ambassador] Plenipotentiary to Kaunas informed [us] that General Rashikis, commander of the Lithuanian Army, issued the order to meet Red Army units in a friendly spirit and to help them to establish the border.

As you can see, I am attempting to refute certain theses with precisely the facts (with materials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives). They very often curse us and say that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not allow it and no one shows us anything. But, we are seeking the truth with an open mind. I came to you myself!

Now our administration, and I am included in that number, is preparing a very large collection on the Baltic. On USSR relations with the Baltic [Region] in 1939-1940. Almost 80 percent of the documents selected for this collection are new. We have sent a request to the Soviet Army Archives and to the Main Administration of Archives: Enrich our collection so that there are not only foreign policy documents but also documents from the Soviet Army Archives in it.

When the Second World War began and England and France declared war on Germany on 3 September, the Baltic Countries relations worsened precisely with England and France. Already on September 3rd representatives of the Baltic Countries began appealing to our embassies for us to broaden our trade ties with them.

On 2 September 1939, Plenipotentiary Nikitin met with Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Selter during which the latter stated: They would like to transfer all British trade to the USSR if the Soviet Government agreed. Thus, a trade agreement was signed. They were forced to appeal to us and to seek cooperation with us. And all of these trade talks occurred prior to conclusion of our pacts with Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn. On 12 September, Selter summoned the Soviet Plenipotentiary to Estonia and handed him a memorandum on his country's desire to conclude a trade agreement with the USSR for the period until 1 January 1941. The same thing occurred in Latvia. On 3 September, Plenipotentiary to Riga Zotov transmitted the Latvian Government’s desire to expand trade relations with the Soviet Union.

On 6 September 1939, Zotov reported that Latvian public opinion positively assessed the pact with Germany and our foreign policy. And on that same date, 6 September (I am particularly noting the dates), Zotov reported that the Latvian Government had requested that the USSR assist in supplying raw materials, [food] products, and oil.

And it seems to me that after Moscow concluded the pact with Germany on 23 August, fear appeared in the Baltic Countries. This fear remained face to face with Hitler's Germany.

On 6 September, Zotov sent the following to Moscow: If enemies of the USSR and peace are spreading false rumors about the division of the Baltic [Region], the
workers are expressing the desire for Latvia to be Soviet, annexed to the USSR as the 12th Republic.

[Belskiy] Permit me to ask, Galina Aleksandrovnna, what is the degree of confidence in these reports? Did these Zotovs, Petrovs, and Sidorovs send reports in order to please Joseph Stalin?

[Takhnenko] So we can cast doubt on any document. I am submitting various documents: Nikitin—from Estonia, Zotov—from Latvia, and Pozdnyakov—from Lithuania. Here is Pozdnyakov’s 13 September telegram from Lithuania: “Sober politicians immediately understood that the pact strengthens the Baltic countries’ position since it has eliminated the threat of a Soviet-German clash during which the small countries between them would have unavoidably suffered.”

[Belskiy] But he knew that there were secret protocols where two men—Stalin and Hitler—were deciding the fates of these small states behind their backs?

[Takhnenko] I will speak based only on the facts. And it is a matter for scholars to interpret them considering the totality of all currently known information and the principles of international law.

[Belskiy] But you yourself are also a scholar!

[Takhnenko] I am a diplomat-researcher who wants to find the truth based on historical documents. Documents talk to us unambiguously: They positively assessed the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact during those years in the Baltic Region.

[Sytezhov] Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov also casts doubt on reports that the diplomats and Army representatives sent when we had already entered there. He said that much was done to please Stalin. It is possible. But, for example, would it please someone to organize a large rally, demonstration, and a parade in which 80,000 people participated in Vilnius on 7 June? All of this really happened! And therefore I do not totally agree with those who say there is no truth in those reports.

[Belskiy] Obviously, we need to consider that the population of the Baltic Region was stratified. And it was not difficult to organize a rally at that time.

It is impossible to separate individual facts and to base conclusions on them. And without reference to the time and without reference to the methods of the policy that Stalin, Molotov, and others were conducting.

It has already been said here and correctly, in my opinion, that we need to start with the question: Why are some people speculating on history? Really speculation arises due to a lack of information. And this deficit existed in our country for a long time. For example, I do not see anything bad in someone demanding a clear assessment of the Soviet-German Treaty, the protocols to it, or on the Friendship and Border Treaty that proceeded from it. And while we are not forming all of this, it seems to me that there is a basis for such speculation.

When the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was concluded, how could the Baltic States not face questions about their fates: Who could they go with, where could they go? Furthermore, rumors were circulating in the Baltic Region about secret protocols. And these rumors were not daydreams—we know much about this now. The Protocol about the division of the USSR’s and Germany’s spheres of interest were actually signed in secret. And here we must admit: The methods of implementing the policy came into sharp contrast with its goals!

The Friendship and Border Treaty was concluded in Germany on 28 September. And on this same day the Mutual Assistance Treaty with Estonia was concluded! After that, the signing of mutual assistance treaties followed on 5 October with Lithuania and on the 10th with Latvia. Our troops were introduced after this. And their introduction was actually justified both in Estonia, in Latvia, and in Lithuania. Here is how General Laydoner, commander-in-chief of the Estonian Army, assessed it on January 1, 1940: “We must consider the Soviet Russia’s geographical position. The USSR needs access to the Baltic Sea. Therefore, it had to exert pressure to strengthen its positions.

“We selected the path of a mutual assistance and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union and I am convinced that we acted very wisely. What did we achieve? We were not attacked by a great power (Germany—Editor’s Comment) as it occurred in Poland.”

I recall that we were fighting with Finland at that time. Thus, the Estonian military leadership at that time proposed the use of military airfields against Finland, that is, the situation was such that we cannot to this day provide a complete military-political assessment.

Here, historians must still speak their word and provide the correlation of forces in the East, the correlation of forces after conclusion of the treaty with Germany and after the defeat of Poland.

Until the beginning of the Second World War, we were not threatened by a direct attack because Poland separated us. Hitler could not get to the Soviet Union without defeating Poland. And he did this.

And how did the correlation of forces take shape in the East, between the Soviet Union and Japan? Both Germany and the USSR, Japan’s position with regard to us, and its military cooperation with Berlin affected the Baltic problem.

[Semiryaga] I think the thesis about the threat of two wars—from the West and from the East is somewhat stereotypical. Richard Sorge’s reports in 1939-1940 said that there was no such threat. These documents are also being introduced into academic circulation right now.
But Stalin's political leadership demanded this version—war on two fronts! Moreover, while working in the archives, I found a very interesting document: Voroshilov's report at a military council meeting in 1935. Thus, Kliment Yefremovich reported that today, that is in 1935, we cannot establish the threat of war on the Far Eastern Front. The threat of a conflict and there is danger of a threat but we cannot establish the threat of war.

[Sytzevich] But there really are [these] facts: Japan had seized northeastern China, having proclaimed the state of Manchukuo. And afterward, did Japan really stop at that? After that, it had already occupied Southeast Asia.

[Takhnenko] Let us return to the political situation prior to 23 August 1939. In July 1935, the Estonian Magazine KOMMUNIST wrote: "Germany's military mission is to seize the Baltic Region. This must serve as the bridgehead for an attack on the Soviet Union."

[Dorokhov] There were two sides in the epicenter of confrontation in the Baltic Region toward the end of the 1930's: The USSR and Germany. And taking the Baltic countries into account, we can talk about a "triangle:" Germany, the Baltic Republics, and the Soviet Union. Each side of this "triangle" had its own plans, goals, and interests.

GERMANY. A very important role was assigned to the Baltic Region in its strategic plans. It was viewed as a bridgehead. And here Galina Aleksandrovna very successfully listed a very specific historical fact. Already since Autumn 1937, Hitler was persistently instilling the idea about expansion "in the Baltic and in Russian space." Already since March 1939, that is, since the seizure of Klaipeda, we can say that German aggression in the Baltic had begun. The colonization of this region had begun.

The second side of the "triangle"—is the SOVIET UNION. In the confrontation with Germany, in my opinion, we also had considered the important strategic position of the Baltic Region in the Soviet Union's security system. We could anticipate the threat of German aggression from there. I studied the materials of 225 command exercises, Headquarters [war] games, and military-strategic maneuvers on the theme of the initial period of war that were conducted by our leadership and by our forces during the 1930's. And approximately one third of these maneuvers and exercises was directed by content to the Baltic Region.

In 1939, the Soviet Union undoubtedly activated its policy in the Baltic Region while attempting to counter Fascist Germany's aggressive schemes. This fact in particular is evidence of that. On 28 March 1939, representatives of Estonia and Latvia were handed Narkom of Foreign Affairs Litvinov's infamous note that expressed the Soviet Union's resolve to defend its state interests in the Baltic Region.

The third side—are the BALTIC COUNTRIES. In my opinion, under conditions when far from progressive regimes were in power there, we could have expected that in a confrontation between the USSR and Germany, the Baltic Countries would side with the latter. Thus, the threat to our northwestern borders would significantly increase.

And here it is important to point out that, according to the assessments we have, only from 10 to 20 percent of the population supported the foreign policy activities of the governments of the Baltic Republics in 1939. One could assume that worsening social problems—and in 1939 some exacerbations in social problems did occur in the Baltic Region—to a certain degree prepared the ground in the entire region for a major social class conflict.

[Belsky] The matter is not in assumptions but in plans. We should discuss practical activities. And thus—this is all reading tea leaves. I think that Germany would not have attacked Poland at that time if there had not been a treaty with Moscow. That is why Hitler hastened to conclude it in August.

[Karpichenko] Now we all know that on the eve, when the issue was being resolved about whether or not there was going to be a non-aggression pact, Goebbels' aircraft was at readiness one for a flight to London.

[Semiryaga] Once again this frightened the Anti-Soviet Front! But understand that German propaganda issued this bluff that Goebbels' aircraft was ready to fly to London. This was done to intimidate us a bit to accelerate conclusion of the pact.

The Franco-German and Anglo-German Declarations of 1939 are often referred to. These were common sentences and there was nothing specific there! But the fact that it was a declaration! But the treaty was already a reality. This is why: No danger of an English and French plot with Germany existed at that time. Of course, the Munich Agreement is a shameful page in the history of England and France. But right now we are talking about 1939.

After March 1939, even such reactionaries and conservatives as Chamberlain and Daladier said that Hitler had cheated them and that it was impossible to deal with him. The evolution of England and France's foreign policies begins at that time! And I consider this a very important stage that provided us with the basis for good relations with these two countries in the future.

Thus, once again with regard to how the Anti-Soviet Bloc was frightened. You recall that England and France were age old foes of Germany. Read Hitler's statements about France! And with regard to England! How he hated them and how he dreamt of destroying them! The sharpest and most irreconcilable inter-imperialistic contradictions. And that is why England and France were more frightened of Hitler than of Stalin.
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What could Stalin have taken at that time? What could he have used to frighten England and France? Not military force. He frightened them with ideas! The ideas of Communism and the Comintern. But not with armed aggression. And to threaten with ideas is still not to threaten them with war.

(Continued in the next issue)


Roundtable on Baltic in 1939-1940: Conclusion
90UM0406A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 4, Feb 1990
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[Part Two of a roundtable discussion conducted by
Colonel Roschupkin, editor of the International Life
Department of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL: "The Baltic: 1939-1940: KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Editors' Roundtable Materi-
als"]

[Text]

[Belyakov] Was there a threat of an anti-Soviet collective
conspiracy in the West?

[Semiragya] The real military threat for England and
France originated from Germany. And this allowed us to
hope that no bloc in the West would be against the
USSR. From the beginning of the Second World War,
England and France objectively gravitated toward an
alliance with us against the common real but not condi-
tional enemy. An enemy that threatened both them, us,
and the Baltic States.

We should continue the conversation about this because
at that time the fate of the Baltic Republics substantially
depended on the disposition of forces in Europe and the
position of the USSR.

[Belyakov] Now about the Baltic....

[Semiragya] I do not agree with those who say that our
August Treaty with the Germans has a direct relation-
ship to the fate of the Baltic Countries. I think that the
Soviet-German Treaty itself, in contrast to the secret
protocols, did not have a direct or immediate relation-
ship to the fate of the Baltic Region. But there was an
intermediate impact in the form of favorable external
conditions.

The fate of the Baltic Region was defined in the secret
protocol to the Soviet-German Treaty! Without
obtaining a clear idea about this, we cannot understand
why the inclusion of the three Baltic Republics into the
USSR became possible. Only two men in our country
knew about the secret protocol and it was the same in
Germany.

[Kopylev] The decision to sign it was an act of Stalin's
personal power and did not in any way reflect the will
of the Soviet people who do not bear any responsibility
for this conspiracy. The secret protocol to the 23 August
Treaty and other secret treaties with Germany that were
signed from 1939 through 1941, are a flagrant departure
from Leninist principles of Soviet foreign policy.

[Semiragya] Some are puzzled because German troops in
Poland practically came right up to our border. But they
simply did not know that they were supposed to stop at
a definite line in accordance with the secret protocol.

I am certain that our actions in the Baltic Region would
have been impossible if Stalin had assumed that this
would confront Germany. Stalin acted confidently
because the secret agreement with Germany existed.

From the USSR Congress of People's Deputies Resolution
on the Political and Legal Assessment of the 1939
Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty that was adopted
on December 24, 1989:

"The Congress thinks that the content of this treaty (of
nonaggression—the editor) did not depart from the
standards of international law and treaty practices of
states that are customary for this type of settlement.
However, both while concluding the treaty and during
the process of its ratification, they hid the fact that an
"additional secret protocol" was signed simultaneously
with the treaty that delimited the "spheres of interests"
of the contracting parties from the Baltic to the Black
Seas and from Finland to Bessarabia....

“The protocols did not create a new legal basis for the
Soviet Union's mutual relations with third countries but
were used by Stalin and his entourage to present an
ultimatum and forceful pressure on other states in viola-
tion of the legal obligations they undertook.”

Recognition of spheres of interests does not nearly entail
the need to introduce troops. And all the more so
introduction into the USSR! If it is a sphere of influence,
it is political influence but under total independence! Let
us assume that the USSR had a priority and paramount
right to exert pressure on these countries. But with total
preservation of their sovereignty! See how one can
interpret the concept of "spheres of interests" in dif-
ferent ways.

[Sytzezhev] And right now where are the USSR's interests
when the new political thinking is developing? In the
entire world. We are all interdependent.

[Semiragya] The treaties of September and October 1939
(the USSR with the Baltic States) were something dif-
ferent than the treaties of the summer of 1940. I think
that in the situation that existed in 1939 the treaties were
advantageous for both us and the Baltic Region. But
when I talk about the fact that the fate of the Baltic
Region was entrusted into the hands of Stalin's leaders-
ship, I primarily have in mind the treaties of the summer
of 1940.
[Akhtereyakov] Our interests coincided when the threat of Fascist aggression arose, including in this region. Therefore, it is incorrect to present the treaty signings as the result of Soviet foreign policy alone. Did they meet the basic interests of the working masses of the Baltic Republics? In that situation—yes. Could the ruling circles of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have ignored this? No. They were forced to consider these interests. When the representatives of the Baltic Republics now raise the issue of the treaties, they “forget” precisely these important details.

And one more situation: There were also treaties about mutual provision of security in the event of aggression. The USSR did not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Baltic Countries. The commanding officers of Soviet forces that were introduced into Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia received very strict orders on this score. They accurately carried them out! And it is incorrect to characterize the treaties as forced on the Baltic Republics because this does not meet the historical truth.

Poland was defeated and war was being waged. At that time, the USSR was also concluding mutual assistance treaties with the small Baltic countries. The parties also assumed the obligation to provide military assistance to each other in the event of attack. Not to form alliances and not to enter coalitions. And documents provide evidence that Soviet contingents that were isolated and did not enter into any political activities were deployed on the territories of the Baltic States in accordance with the treaties. This occurred during 1939-1940.

It is not surprising that under conditions of the war that was raging in Europe, a large portion of the population of the Baltic Region legitimately tied conclusion of the treaties with their own fates, with the provision of security, and with the hope that the Baltic Region would find protection from Fascism. At the same time in the Baltic States, there were forces in the bourgeois governments that came out against the mutual assistance treaties with the USSR and that counted on an alliance with Germany.

I recall that during February 1940, Povilaytis, director of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs State Security Department, was sent to Berlin to obtain Fascist Germany’s consent to establish a protectorate over the Baltic States. This very fact is evidence that a fierce struggle, both political and diplomatic, was occurring around and in the Baltic Region.

[Belskiy] One can view the treaties that were concluded in September-October 1939 as desirable for the Soviet Union and as forced for the Baltic Region. The situation that had taken shape shoved it toward the USSR. The Baltic Republics also sounded out the Germans for the purpose of concluding a treaty. But Germany remained indifferent because it and Moscow had signed the secret protocols.

[Belyakov] And how did the ruling circles of the Baltic Region assess the treaties with the USSR?

[Takhnenko] I.A. Chichayev, interim USSR charges d'affaires in Latvia, wrote V.M. Molotov in October 1939 that a significant portion of the country’s influential circles perceived the mutual assistance pact with Moscow as the “lesser evil.” They say it is better to be under the influence of the Russians than the Germans since under the Russians the Latvians will maintain their nationality but the Germans will destroy not only the national culture but also the Latvians themselves.

[Belskiy] Even Laydoner, commander-in-chief of the Estonian Army, considered the activities of the Soviet Union to be correct. Laydoner thought that the USSR wanted to use the favorable situation that was developing for it. The Estonians thought that Moscow would not do this if the Russians were working against their own interests.

Look, this is what General Laydoner said, having in the past loyally and truthfully served the Tsar in the old Army and later the Bourgeois Regime in Estonia! Afterward he went to the Soviet Union where he was repressed. It is too bad that we turned quite a few people away from us in this manner. Tragedy was the fate of many of them....

Unfortunately, we do not have an adequate number of arguments to conduct discussions on this subject in Baltic auditoriums. Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov said that he had discussions there and he, having documents, could speak argumentatively. But this is not published anywhere. Or most likely there is this taboo and we cannot properly use what has already been discovered in the archives. And it is very important to conduct this discussion.

At first, a large portion of the Baltic population advocated the introduction of Soviet troops. When they began talking about introducing additional contingents and when they began to present ultimatums to the bourgeois governments, these foreign policy methods of ours hurt us quite a bit and our enemies appeared.

[Belyakov] How did the Baltic peoples perceive the mutual assistance treaties with our country and also the proclamation of Soviet power on their territory and the decision about entry into the USSR that was made in July 1940?

[Kopylev] The reaction of various classes and social groups was different. Just like right now when perestroika is perceived differently by various categories of the population in our country. On one hand, representatives of the bourgeoisie understood that the population of the Baltic Region did not feel sorry for the Germans who had long oppressed the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Livonians. On the other hand, the ruling circles understood the kind of revolutionary influence that increasing ties with the USSR and the presence of Soviet servicemen could exert on the workers of the Baltic Republics. Workers and peasants of the three
Baltic Republics liked the Soviet people and felt quite sorry for the Soviet power that was stifled on their soil two decades earlier.

Yes, it was very difficult for the ruling circles of the Baltic Republics to become closer to the USSR. It really created a threat to their class interests and to their material and political well-being. But they were compelled to do this for domestic political reasons and due to the international situation that had developed.

[Takhtenko] In 1939-1940, the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia themselves made a simple choice. Masses of people welcomed Red Army units with flowers along their entire travel route and in any city or populated area.

On June 26, 1940, K.I. Nikitin, the USSR ambassador plenipotentiary to Estonia, reported to the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] that, despite the Estonian Army Commander-in-Chief General Laydoner's order that banned gatherings, demonstrations, and rallies, "Workers at plants and factories had begun to gather, demanding that they be provided the opportunity to discuss the Soviet Union's representation... the people, having sensed the Soviet Union's support, started out toward freedom en masse."

In my hands, I have a copy of the 28 September 1939 Treaty with Estonia (It has just recently been declassified). Molotov signed it. It states that the treaty (as it was also the same with Latvia and Lithuania) was concluded for the purpose of preventing attempts to involve the contracting parties into the war that was ongoing in Europe.

The treaties stipulated that the USSR had the right to maintain a total of 20,000 men in Lithuania, up to 23,000 in Estonia, and up to 20,000 in Latvia to carry out defense of joint borders.

[Sytezhev] Article 1 differentiates the Treaty with Lithuania from the treaties with Latvia and Estonia. It states that, to strengthen friendship with Lithuania, the Soviet Union will transfer the city of Vilno and Vilnyussky Oblast that were part of Poland at that time to Lithuania.

We participated in a major discussion on this theme with Nikolay Innokentyevich Dorokhov. The Lithuanian Comrades consider this treaty signed on October 10 1939 to be invalid. But we told them at that time: Once you consider it invalid, why do you not protest the fact that Lithuanian Vilnus and Vilnyusskiy Oblast are illegally part of the Republic as a result of the treaty? After all as a result, historical justice triumphed in favor of Lithuania! Our opponents suddenly fall silent.

When we analyze those documents from the international law point of view, we come to the conclusion that they completely maintain their legal force. No one has even complained about them in the final analysis. The main thing in the content of the 1939 treaties with the Baltic Countries was that we defined specific conditions for providing mutual security. The treaties were advantageous for Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania as well as for the USSR! But the main thing is that they stipulated respect for each party's state, social, and economic structures and strengthened the foundations of peaceful, good-neighbor cooperation.

That is, the Soviet side never intended to use force to immediately resolve the issue of changing the political reorganization of the three Baltic States! This is very important.

[Belyakov] How were the treaty articles implemented?

[Sytezhev] We leased land, barracks, houses, and commercial buildings to house the troops: For 248,000 rubles in Estonia, 198,000 in Latvia, and 159,000 in Lithuania. We completely settled accounts with them and there were no complaints against us.

Incidentally, in accordance with these treaties and the secret agreements (just recently declassified!), we promised to strengthen the Armies of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The Soviet Union sold them a large quantity of arms at the most favorable terms.

In particular, the Lithuanian Government requested deliveries of fighter aircraft, artillery, mortars, heavy machineguns, and artillery projectiles. We sold a total of 30,915,613 lit worth of equipment, weapons, and ammunition to them—at a discount. Hardly any other country would have rendered such substantial aid to the Lithuanian Army on favorable terms during that difficult time.

A similar request for deliveries of weapons and military materials for the needs of its Army came in from the Latvian Government. We also satisfied that request. It was a different situation with Estonia. This country's government continued to purchase German weapons. But I do not have precise data on this.

The Soviet Union strictly complied with the treaties. We recently asked our Lithuanian colleagues what number of the population supported this entire process. They could not answer precisely. According to the information of our plenipotentiaries and military and also according to intelligence data of those years, more than half of the local population approved of our activities. The commanding officers of the Soviet forces did not interfere in the internal affairs of these countries. There were very strict instructions: Do not interfere under any circumstances!

Furthermore, we need to frankly state that violent resistance of hostile pro-Fascist elements took place. Afterward, their number increased significantly (after July 1940). Pro-Fascist elements attempted to create difficulties from the very beginning of the Soviet troop deployments.

Nikolay Innokentyevich Dorokhov has studied the documents that witness that our troops were fired upon in Estonia. These activities were gross violations of the
Estonian Government’s instructions and of the treaties with the Soviet Union. The Estonian authorities forbade local residents to associate with the officers and men of the Red Army. Various provocations occurred and our sentries were fired upon. An ideological campaign was widely conducted that was directed at the prevention of contact with us, reading Soviet newspapers, or listening to Radio Moscow. And even not to ride in the same rail cars with Soviet representatives and servicemen.

[Dorokhov] I became specially involved with the problem of deploying our garrisons on the territory of the Baltic Countries and the conditions for entry of our forces. Actually, the conclusion of mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union did not violate the political integrity, sovereignty, or independence of the Baltic States.

Special commissions were created in accordance with Narkom [People’s Commissar] of Defense Voroshilov’s representation. Stalin personally approved their composition. Here is one of the documents: “To Comrade Stalin. Request approval of the commission being sent to Latvia to determine deployment locations for our troops and the approximate areas of these installations. October 11, 1939. Voroshilov.”

The document goes on to state: “A commission has been formed to implement the portion of the mutual assistance treaty between the USSR and Latvia that concerns introduction of Red Army units onto the territory of the Latvian Republic under the chairmanship of Seventh Army Commander Corps Commander Comrade Boldin and members: 14th Army Political Directorate Chief Brigade Commissar Comrade Mareyev, RKKA [Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army] Motorized Armored Tank Directorate Commander Corps Commander Comrade Pavlov, Aide to the Commander of the Air Force Division Commander Comrade Alekseyev and, 21st Rifle Corps Commander Division Commander Morozov.

The Commission’s mission is: “To jointly with (I direct attention to this) the representative of the Latvian Republic ascertain deployment locations and discuss arrangements for Red Army units subject to deployment on the territory of the Latvian Republic.”

Appropriate commissions were also established during negotiations between the Soviet military delegation and the Estonian and Lithuanian Republics. In particular, Meretskov headed our commission at negotiations with Estonia.

The Commissions worked from October 13 through 20 1939. Billeting officers from the units drove out from the 20th through the 24th of October in accordance with the People’s Commissar of Defense’s order. Composition was two men from each unit and two men from corps or division headquarters. The documents stress that the best commanders and political officers were among the billeting officers. The RKKA Chief of Staff approved their passes.

The advance of Red Army units began simultaneously with the beginning of work by the billeting officers. But entry into Lithuania was somewhat later—November 3, 1939. The border crossing was conducted on several axes. The “Internationale” and the national anthems of the Baltic States were played and a 21-gun salute was conducted while crossing it.

State border crossings, introduction of Soviet troops, and their deployment on the territories of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia occurred on the whole without any particular incidents with the exception of isolated cases of our troops being fired upon. I have a document—Meretskov’s report to Voroshilov. October 26, 1939, Commander, 65th Rifle Corps deployed on the territory of the Estonian Republic, Division Commander Tyurin reported that 4th Company of 415th Vehicle Battalion (consisting of 33 motorized vehicles) was fired on while transporting cargo. Several weapons fired from a forest. This incident was presented to the Estonian Commander for analysis and appropriate action.

The Governments of the Baltic Republics carried out security of roads, bridges, and crossings while the troops moved to deployment locations. Local authorities were also responsible for construction of bases, airfields, and barracks. Treaties were concluded in accordance with the results of the deployment of USSR military units on the territories of the Baltic States. Soviet troop strength and their deployment locations were determined in final form.

[Karpichenko] Here is the consolidated strength report for our men and equipment at the end of November 1939.

In Estonia: Personnel—21,347 men; guns—78; tanks—283; armored vehicles—54; aircraft—255; and, transport vehicles 1,930 of which 316 were returned to the Soviet Union.

In Latvia: Personnel—25,011 men; guns—91; tanks—197; armored vehicles—78; aircraft—278; and, transport vehicles 2,016.

And in Lithuania: Personnel—20,000 men; guns—86; tanks—189; armored vehicles—62; aircraft—211; and, transport vehicles 1,892.

[Akhteryakov] The Soviet Union strictly complied with the conditions of the treaties from the first days that they were signed with the Baltic States. The commanding officers of Soviet troops did not interfere in the internal affairs of these countries. Furthermore, the Red Army met violent resistance of pro-Fascist elements who attempted to create every possible difficulty during deployment of Soviet troops and in their lives and activities. Local residents were persecuted for association with the officers and men of the Red Army and various provocations were committed against them. There were cases of attacks on military facilities, firing at them, and abduction and murder of individual servicemen.
[Belyakov] How did the governments of the three republics react to anti-Soviet activities?

[Akhteryakov] Provocations were conducted with the knowledge of the ruling circles in some cases.

President and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ulmanis and the Chief of Staff of the Latvian Army General Rozentsheyn continued an aggressive policy directed against the USSR. They attempted to conclude a treaty with Estonia and Lithuania on the creation of the so-called Baltic Entente. In December 1939 and later in March 1940, conferences of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania occurred in conditions of total secrecy at which they actually formed this alliance. These steps did not meet the conditions of the treaties signed. How could you characterize this activity of the ruling circles of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia?

Some political figures secretly sounded out officials in Fascist Germany and attempted to obtain Germany’s support to implement their anti-Soviet plans. We have already pointed out that in February 1940 Lithuanian President Smetona sent Director of State Security Povilaitis on a secret mission to Berlin to obtain the agreement of Hitler’s Germany to establish a German protectorate over Lithuania.

But information exists that the German Government only intended to establish a protectorate over Lithuania in the Autumn of 1940.

Despite signing a treaty with the USSR, the ruling circles of Estonia also continued to orient themselves toward Hitler’s Germany. Estonian President Pyats and other of the country’s highest leaders advocated the “Germanization” of Estonia. A meeting even occurred between Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Selter and Goering at the beginning of 1940.

The military aspect of the problem poses a great deal of interest for us military people. Soviet troops in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were billeted in barracks that belonged to the armed forces of these countries. The barracks were vacated by personnel of the national armies and transferred to Red Army units.

But Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian troops were not withdrawn to the western borders of their states from where they could wait for the attack of the German armies but, on the contrary, to the eastern borders. The impression was formed that Soviet troops were already encircled from the west and from the east during peacetime. At the same time, the governments of the Baltic Republics began construction of fortifications on the eastern borders.

These and other facts are evidence that the ruling circles of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were inconsistently and contradictorily carrying out the conditions of the treaties and even permitting direct violations of them.

[Semiryaga] All of these facts have been well known even since 1940. But they do not completely work, they are old approaches. Modern historians categorically refute the formation of the Baltic Entente or its anti-Soviet direction.

This organization had already been established in the 1920’s. And we did not protest. Because a sovereign state has the complete right to create alliances and to conclude treaties for the defense of its interests. And it is incorrect to ascribe to the three republics that they only began to form an anti-Soviet Entente after the entry of our troops. It has not been proved that it was anti-Soviet in nature!

[Takhnenko] Mikhail Ivanovich, there is a proposal to render a verdict on this matter. I will cite a very interesting document that has never before been published anywhere—Molotov’s June 14 1940 telegram on the Baltic Entente to the plenipotentiaries in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland.

Look at what is written here: I am setting forth the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the current activities of the Baltic Entente. After Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania signed mutual assistance pacts with the USSR, the Baltic Entente (two members of which—Estonia and Latvia—were already earlier associated with a military alliance against the USSR) not only did not eliminate but it also intensified hostile activity with regard to the USSR, having also included Lithuania in the military alliance and also began to prepare to include Finland in it. The Baltic Entente did not resort to pacts (with the USSR) for almost a year. After signing the pacts, it had two conferences just within the span of three months: December 1939 and March 1940.

Methods to combat the Soviet Union’s growing influence in the Baltic Region and against the mutual assistance pacts in particular were secretly planned at these conferences that were actually conducted behind the USSR’s back. The latter circumstances confirm the coordinated approach of all three states with the delayed signing of separate treaties and with attempts to reduce the armed contingent of troops, etc.

In general beginning in 1939, the Entente developed exclusive never previously observed aggressiveness in all possible directions: Military, political, economic, cultural, the press, tourism, and so forth. All of these activities both in major and in secondary areas in fact were and are anti-Soviet in nature.

[Belskiiy] I would like you to completely express your attitude toward the Entente.

[Takhnenko] Of course, for Stalin, it was important to prove that the Entente was anti-Soviet in nature and that it carried out provocations. I also understand Molotov: He was psychologically and politically compelled to prepare the appropriate actions. I do not take everything written there at face value. There were ordinary contacts.
As for Germany, the correspondence of the ambassadors of all three republics with Ribbentrop provide the basis to suggest: Berlin did not interfere with the Soviet Union's policy in the Baltic Countries at that time. The Germans thought that at that stage it would be better to conduct a neutral policy and not confront the Soviet Union in the Baltic Region. Therefore, it is unlikely that Germany was conducting any active operations against the Baltic Region at least until the summer of 1940. At that time, Hitler had more important tasks in other regions of Europe.

[Belskiy] Well that is true and I agree with that. But the truth has only been told until July 1940 when Hitler had already begun to seriously think about the Barbarossa Plan, the plan to attack the Soviet Union. And that in time coincided with the inclusion Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the USSR. That is when Hitler, it is true quite surreptitiously, actually began to interfere in the affairs of the Baltic Republics and to plant his secret agents there. But, they valued the 23 August Treaty in Berlin until the middle of 1940 and they did not want to quarrel with the USSR over the Baltic Region.

[Takhenko] I request that when we are talking about some actions or other that we tie them to a time. Then we will have a specific conversation. This was a very complicated time—1939-1940. And policy frequently changed. If we do not know specific events in relation to time, our discussions with our Baltic Region colleagues will not be very convincing.

I have with me a copy of Molotov's instructions to our plenipotentiaries. He invariably stressed: Pass this to the military comrades, too. Thus, Molotov wrote to Plenipotentiary Nikitin in Estonia: Remember that the USSR will honestly and punctually carry out the mutual assistance pact and will demand the same from Estonia. We need to immediately give a firm rebuff to dubious and provocative elements who provoke rumors regarding the Sovietization of Estonia through their activities and regarding violation of the concluded Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact while explaining the validity of the concluded treaty.

Molotov wrote the same thing to Lithuania: I categorically prohibit all embassy employees, also including the military attaché, to interfere in international affairs in Lithuania or to support any opposition trends. The most insignificant attempt of any of you to interfere in the internal affairs of Lithuania will entail a most severe punishment. On our part, we will honestly and punctually carry out the Treaty with Lithuania. You must reject the nonsense about the Sovietization of Lithuania as provocatively harmful.

Later, Molotov telegraphed Nikitin in Estonia for a second time: "You are obliged to understand once and for all that any encouragement of the mood with regard to Sovietization of Estonia and even simple non-resistance to this mood plays into the hands of our enemies and anti-Soviet provocateurs. I make it incumbent upon you to suppress any conversations about the Sovietization of Estonia that are advantageous and welcome at the present time to provocateurs and enemies of the USSR."

I want to stress Molotov's sentence from one telegram of that period: growing Soviet influence. Did it not turn out at that time that, having concluded mutual assistance pacts with the Baltic States, we began to broadly interpret them? And we began to act like a bull in a china shop. We could have caused a negative reaction among a definite portion of the population through our actions despite the fact that our troops did not interfere.

Hence, evidently this persistence of Molotov's. Obviously some of our representatives had too zealously set out to struggle for "Soviet power." The cry from Moscow followed for both military and diplomats to moderate their ardor with regard to Sovietization.

Thus, at first (1939), I think that we attempted to precisely and punctually carry out all of our obligations. As for 1940, we need to actually consider the situation here. When we presented the ultimatums to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the international situation in general was also being taken into account. A world war was occurring. Hitler was becoming increasingly aggressive. If at first it was a "strange" war, by the Spring and Summer of 1940 both Denmark and Norway had already been captured and Hitler's troops had invaded Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.

Paris was captured on June 14. And Molotov presented the first ultimatum to the Lithuanian Government on July 14 and to the Governments of Latvia and Estonia on July 16. Later, Molotov summoned their Ministers of Foreign Affairs to Moscow. I think the facts about the Baltic Entente and about the murders of our Red Army soldiers were formal reasons. The matter is more complicated. The threat from Germany was weighing heavily on us and Molotov rushed to untie the Baltic knot.

I have notes from Molotov's conversation with the Ministers: How he summoned them to his office, how he spoke very brusquely with them and accused them and the ministers tried to prove their innocence....

In any case, throughout all of these conversations Molotov had, maybe it is purely my woman's intuition or emotion, the alarm about the security of our borders could be heard everywhere. The methods we used at the time are another matter. It is easy for us to judge right now if it was right or wrong but at that time you needed to get the feel of your matter and to sense what was occurring.

Acts of deportation of, as it was said at the time, anti-Soviet elements were begun. Furthermore, even those citizens of the Baltic Republics who advocated the policy of cooperation and mutual understanding with the Soviet Union were deported. We do not need to rule this out because it is a counter-argument against us.
Yes, our troops conducted themselves impeccably during those months of September and October. And we still do not entirely know to this very day what the Beriya people were doing at that time.

[Dorokhov] I want to draw attention to the following. The conduct of a dual policy certainly took place in the traditions of the Stalinist leadership: Official and unofficial and dark. And Beriya and his staff did all of the dark and dirty deeds.

[Takhnenko] I can somehow understand the deportation of “anti-Soviet elements” in 1941: War was already at our doorstep. But....

Molotov’s telegram to the plenipotentiaries that was listed above is evidence that the right hand of Soviet policy did not know what the left hand was doing. That is, Molotov could also not know that at the same time that he was sending dispatches, Stalin’s extraordinary representatives in the Baltic Republics—Dekanazov, Vyshinskiy, and Zhdanov—were acting in accordance with directives signed by Stalin himself and operated precisely in the direction of Sovietization! But Molotov was worried that this was premature.

[Belyakov] Let us move on to the question: Why were representations made by Moscow to the Baltic States about removing enemies of the treaty-ultimatum from the government as Galina Aleksandrovna stated. Why did Moscow demand the formation of a government capable of ensuring the honest and consistent implementation of the treaties?

[Sytzehev] In June 1940, the Fascists had already captured Paris. In turn, either England, or.... The Fuhrer’s gaze had already turned to the East. And furthermore accents were set precisely on the Baltic Region.

From a USSR Congress of People’s Deputies Commission on the Political and Legal Assessment of the 23 August 1939 Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact:

Operation Weiss—is the attack plan against Poland that was approved on April 11, 1939 and assumed the capture of Lithuania whose inviolability England and France could in no way guarantee. However, Lithuania did not assuage the Reich’s appetite. On March 16, 1939, the Latvian envoy to Berlin was told that his country must follow Germany and then “the Germans will not use force to compel it to come under the Fuhrer’s wing.” Speaking to the generals in May 1939, Hitler also gave instructions to resolve the “Baltic Problem.”

[Belyakov] As we all know, during this period the Reich’s military intelligence services had to be activated in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Can you tell me in greater detail about the activities of Hitler’s intelligence services in the Baltic Region during those years?

[Roshchupkin] While hatching secret plots of aggression against the USSR, the Nazis increased the scale of espionage and other forms of subversive activities in the Baltic Region. The intrigues of the German intelligence services increased in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Leading German intelligence figures visited there.

In 1936, at that time Captain 1st Rank (subsequently Admiral) V. Kanaris, commander of the Abwehr [German Military Intelligence Service], visited Bourgeois Estonia. There, he conducted negotiations with the chief of the general staff and the head of the 2nd (secret) department. An agreement was reached on the exchange of espionage information about the Soviet Union. In 1938, Kanaris visited Estonia for the second time (along with another military intelligence figure—G. Pickenbroek). The goal of the trip was to speed up joint activities of the secret services of both countries against the USSR.

In August-September 1940, the general staff foreign department issued the order to all Wehrmacht Army formation intelligence organs to sharply increase activities against the USSR. Nazi agents on the territory of the Baltic Republics that had become a part of the USSR were also activated. Seventy five German espionage groups that were operating in preparation for the attack against the USSR were rendered harmless in the Lithuanian SSR alone by May 1941.

All of these and other cases undoubtedly led the Soviet side to definite conclusions....

Already after the beginning of Hitler’s aggression against the USSR, the Abwehr developed an operation under the code name “Erna.” It consisted of a parachute drop of 15 Estonian officers into the Red Army rear area to create combat groups. Sonderfuhrer Schwartz was entrusted with command of the group. Other similar operations were also developed.

Special detachments and groups were also trained to conduct subversive activities in Latvia and Lithuania. German agents in Lithuania were tasked in particular to seize the tunnel and bridges near Vilnius. In Latvia, Hitler’s “fifth column” had the task of seizing the bridge across the Daugava. It was proposed that strategically important facilities had to be held by raiding and reconnaissance detachments until the arrival of German regular units.

[Sytzehev] Moscow made representations: To the Lithuanian Government on June 14 1940 and to the Governments of Latvia and Estonia on June 16 1940. I need to frankly state that the demands were relatively harsh and categorical in tone.

Thus, the Stalinist leadership raised the question about removal of individuals [from the governments] who were opponents of the treaty with the USSR. And about the formation of governments that were capable of insuring that the treaties were honestly implemented.

At the same time, the Stalinist leadership stated the requirement to deploy an additional number of Soviet military units on the territory of the Baltic States in order to insure the capability to more precisely and more
reliably implement the mutual assistance pacts between the USSR and each of these countries.

I recall that a treaty was signed with Finland on March 2, 1940 that was not advantageous for it where a new border was established along Peter I's line and Soviet Union's new acquisitions were made official in the north of Europe. And Stalin, inspired by these successful activities, once again sent Zhdanov, Vyshinsky, and Dekanozov at that time to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively.

On June 17, 1940, the issue of the additional introduction of troops was very harshly discussed in Moscow with the Ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. But the entry of additional contingents was undoubtedly carried out based on the treaties signed between the USSR and the Baltic Countries.

The protocols on the procedure for introducing troops had already been signed by the military commanders. General of the Army Meretkov and on the part of the Estonian Army by General Laydoner. There were three Red Army commanding officers' appeals to the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian peoples. And they stated that we did not intend to deprive them of their national sovereignty. We were introducing additional troops there without disturbing the normal life of the Baltic peoples.

But the most interesting thing is that the population of the Baltic Region at that time once again supported the additional commitment of troops in 1940! This is obvious from the documents preserved in the USSR Foreign Policy Archives and TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army].

Our military presence undoubtedly impacted both Sovietization, the change of the political climate, and the attitude toward the USSR. And the activities of the local communist parties undoubtedly significantly increased. The revolutionization process went on and we should not refute that.

In one of his articles, D.A. Volkogonov, for example, frankly stated that dialectical unity of domestic and external causes was present. Both the external causes, our presence, and our activity also exerted a substantial influence. At the same time, the legitimacy of the new governments which were created by parliaments was recognized by the overwhelming majority of the population.

Today in the Baltic Region they are saying that the elections were falsified, that allegedly the ballots were not the same, and there were no ballot boxes. That they placed stamps in the passport: Arrived and departed like on a vacation ticket. Without a stamp, they considered that a person had not voted. Who has data that it was falsified?

[Takhnenko] The people positively perceived the introduction of our troops! Professor Vlism Yanovich Sipols, doctor of historical sciences, who speaks a lot in connection with these events right now, said that he lived in Riga at that time (he is Latvian) and he himself saw how the people rejoiced. He said that the people themselves went to the demonstration. I am not referring to the leadership right now but to the people. Incidentally, Dekanozov also wrote in his reports that the people received them well.

[Semiryaga] We can only objectively judge after we have read not only Dekanozov's and Pozdnyakov's reports but also the reports of the Germans, Swedes, and the other 20 plenipotentiaries who were there.

[Takhnenko] One thing is clear: It really was a complicated situation for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. But the international situation was also complicated for the Soviet Union. However, this does not justify the fact that we expressed our demands in the form of an ultimatum.

[Belskiy] We have also used the complexity of the international situation to justify our actions in the recent past. But right now it is as if everything has been turned around. And already there are no references to "complexity!"

We are revealing some things in doses and this is going to discredit us later. At one time it was asserted even at the highest levels that there were no secret protocols to the Soviet-German Treaty at all. Later they began to say that an agreement existed in some form. Later it turned out that there are secret protocols. But they are not secret protocols at all but copies of them and can we verify these copies? Twisting and turning....

Right now we have simply come to the conclusion that there were also originals. Furthermore that maps have also appeared where there is the signature of the "leader of the people" and where the borders of sovereign states have been "corrected."

We need to once and for all admit the immorality of Stalin's policy in many cases. We need to completely admit it and not in doses. They hoped that we would not find out anything about it and somehow everything would go away. It is not going away! The people are stirred up and emotions are conquering through the kray and are pouring into nationalism. We are silent and they mercilessly smear the "white spots" of silence with black.

From the speech of A.N. Yakovlev—CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, Chairman of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies Commission on the Political and Legal Assessment of the August 23 1939 Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty:

"Actually, the originals of the protocols have not been found in either Soviet or foreign archives. Nevertheless, the commission considers it possible to admit that the August 23 1939 additional secret protocol did exist...

"First. There is an official memorandum in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs that records the transfer of the
originals of the secret protocols by one of Molotov's aides to another, by Smirnov to Podtsreob in April 1946. Thus, we had the originals and afterward they disappeared....

"The next fact. Certified typed copies of the protocols have been found in the Russian language. As a panel of experts has demonstrated, these copies date to Molotov's time in the operation of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"Third. Criminologists have conducted an examination of Molotov's signature on the original of the nonaggression treaty whose authentic signature you yourself understand we also have on the photocopy of the secret protocol. Experts have concluded that these signatures are identical.

"Fourth. It turned out that the protocols from which the West German photo copies were made were typed on the same typewriter as the treaty original that is preserved in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. As you can understand, such coincidences do not occur.

"And finally, fifth. A demarcation map exists. Stalin stamped it and made an entry on it. The map delimits the territories exactly according to the protocol. Furthermore, two of Stalin's signatures are on it. In one case, together with Ribbentrop's and in the second case Stalin makes a correction in our favor in red pencil and once again signs on that correction.

"...Graphological, photo-technical, and lexical inspections of the copies, maps, and other documents, and the conformity of the protocol's contents to subsequent events confirms the fact that it was signed and did exist."

[Belyakov] Naturally, the problem of deportation and massive repressions are being poorly reported in our press and in scientific research. Some people even think that, they say, there is no reason to focus attention on the tragic sides of past events and to arouse the people. Is this position justified?

Let us recall the words of N.M. Karamzin, the prominent Russian scholar: "The historian must rejoice and mourn with his people. While being guided by passions, he should not distort facts, exaggerate good fortune or diminish catastrophe in his presentation; he must first of all be truthful; but may, even must relay everything unpleasant and everything shameful for his people with sadness but he should speak with joy and enthusiasm about what yields honor, about victories and about a flourishing condition."

Do we need to say that the way out of these acute problems in publicizing the Baltic theme causes varied speculation, idle gossip, is being passed off as "Moscow's attempt to hide the truth from the people," and creates grounds for nationalistic passions.

Thus, the roundtable has been completed. There were fierce arguments at it. At times polarized points of view were stated. Although the last word has still not been spoken, the diversity of opinions and views permitted us to model major fragments of the extremely complicated and in many ways contradictory historical panorama of 1939-40.

We will not dot the "i" with this article. We hope that the conversation on this subject will continue.


Col Gen Tsarkov Recalls 1978 Downing of Korean Airliner
90UM06824 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jun 90 p 3-4

[Interview of Col Gen Tsarkov by A. Krayniy: "I Was the One Who Downed That Boeing"] txt
[Text] We still recall the South Korean plane downed over Sakhalin. But five years earlier, an incident
occurred in the region of Murmansk. Col Gen of Aviation Vladimir Tsarkov tells about this for the first time.

[Krayniy] Vladimir Georgiyevich, how did it happen that you, a combat pilot, changed to a desk command position?

[Tsarkov] After the academy I was retrained for the MiG-25. At the time those aircraft had just started to reach the units, and our regiment was the first in the Armed Forces to be retrained. Then there was a change of duty for the deputy formation commander for aviation, and quite unexpectedly I was appointed to the new post. This decision was made by the then commander-in-chief Marshal of the Soviet Union P. F. Batitskiy. I had great doubts—wasn’t that a little high? But Batitskiy, knowing that the PVO Troops were preparing to adopt the MiG-25 in their armament, and that by then I already had experience in that, decided that I could handle it.

So in 1970 I arrived in the regiment, and I had made one takeoff in a two-seater with the deputy commander of the regiment for political affairs, Lt Col Kiyian. Successfully. Before the second takeoff I said to him: “You take off yourself, and I’ll monitor.” We began our takeoff roll, the aircraft was just about to lift off from the concrete when suddenly all hell broke loose, an awful shaking, the aircraft rolled and dropped its nose, and I realized Kiyian had retracted the landing gear while we were still on the runway, and that now we were running on the fuselage. How could an experienced pilot, an instructor, make such a mistake? That is still a puzzle to me to this day.

To tell the truth, at the time I was thinking about how not to be burned alive. I did not want to eject. Pilots in general can’t stand ejecting, except in the most extreme situation, of course. But I had to prepare for evacuation, and I began to open the canopy so that it did not twist or get stuck. I had just finished the emergency ejection of the canopy when the ejection system was activated.

I believe it was a record ejection for the time: from the ground, at a speed of 89 kilometers per hour. I flew out of the cockpit and saw that I was heading for the ground. In my head a single thought: if I crashed into the asphalt, they’d have to bury me in a closed coffin. I stuck my hands out to protect my face and suddenly there was a thump: the parachute had worked. “Well, well,” I thought, “I’m alive.”

I landed and shouted, how was Kiyian? Normal, they said. I gave the aircraft the once-over and went off to call the commander-in-chief, Lt Gen of Aviation Vladimir Sergeyevich Dmitriyev.

In the heat of the moment I did not notice, did not feel the pains, and then I was overcome. I was flown to the hospital. The doctors made their diagnosis: compression fracture of the spine.

In the evening the commanding general and the chief of staff flew in to see me, we drank a shot of cognac on the sly, they supported me, reassured me, but I still felt sick at heart. It was like this in our unit—a culprit had to be found. After this emergency I was one of the culprits for about a year, only then did they understand it upstairs, and even told me that I had done the right thing—saved the pilot and not entirely ruined the plane. But this was said a year later, while initially they had wanted to discharge me from the Army for reasons of health, and there was no question at all of flying.

I was in the hospital for two months, and had time to think a lot including, as we say now, about my social protection. Well, they would be discharging a fairly young and almost healthy man. My time in service at that point was not very great, so my pension would be small. My daughter was studying at an institute, you know yourself what a student stipend is like, my son was in military school and I wanted to help him too. My wife did not work, she had moved from garrison to garrison with me for one and a half decades and raised the children. How would we live?

Today when defense legislation is discussed in the USSR Supreme Soviet, I hope that the people’s deputies will solve the problem of protecting both the military and their families. Service in the Army even in peacetime is service with risk. Risking himself in the name of the state, a man should know that the state will not abandon him when things get rough, like a wrung-out rag. But today, very often, an officer who has served thirty years doesn’t have a roof over his head—what’s the point of that?

[Krayniy] Vladimir Georgiyevich, doesn’t it seem to you that with the reduction in the Army, and the withdrawal of divisions from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and subsequently Germany and Poland, we are just multiplying this problem?

[Tsarkov] I believe that the unilateral reduction and withdrawal of troops has not been thought out thoroughly. Even if we have not been able to predict the development of the situation in the world, and in particular in Eastern Europe, in my view should at least clearly determine our position with respect to troop withdrawal. Divisions arrive, there are military camps and barracks for the soldiers, and parks for the combat equipment, but the officers, warrant officers, and their families have no place to live. And the men, tired of the continued need for heroics in their lives, write their requests and try to get discharged from the Army. Here it is the younger level which is getting discharged, from lieutenants to captains—but you know, this is the future of the Army. In my view, we need a state program to resolve this problem. After all, the withdrawal has just barely started, tomorrow or the day after this problem will assume its full proportions, and the Ministry of Defense alone cannot handle it.

[Krayniy] But let us return to the hospital. Two months passed...
[Tsarkov] I went on leave, and then received an assignment to a desk job, now not related to all at aviation, the position of formation commander. Fate was again awaiting me. In April 1978 a South Korean Boeing 707 entered the zone of responsibility of my formation, and violated the air space of the USSR.

That day, 20 April 1978, I remember very well. It was a normal, routine day. I had come home a little early, but in my years of service I had already developed the habit of not going very far from the telephone. Incidentally, when I commanded the Moscow PVO district, from time to time I would break away to go to the theater, which I like very much. Then the district staff duty officer, the operations duty officer, and my aide not only knew what theater I was in, but also the row and seat. As you understand, that is not my distinguishing feature; all commanders do it, from the commander-in-chief to the regimental commander. There is no other way, it is not a whim but a law of service in the PVO Troops.

So now I had just removed my overcoat when the operations officer called and reported that our radar troopers had detected an airship. It was flying at an altitude of ten thousand meters on a bearing of 180 degrees, right towards Murmansk. At this moment the aircraft was still beyond the border, so I told the duty officer that the “Ensha” (chief of staff) who was at the CP should look into it and make a decision himself, and I myself summoned a car. I was somewhat uneasy in my mind, I had a presentiment, although in my years of service in the Arctic I had gotten used to NATO planes taking off from bases in Norway, say, and keeping us constantly in a state of tension. An “SR-71” would come (they really loved to do this during our holidays) almost along the “strip,” along the border I mean, which is called a “borderline foul,” but it is not a foul, it is a violation of a national border by a kilometer or three. We scramble fighters to intercept, and the NATO plane withdraws. In short, there had been time to get used to the tricks, but here, I sensed, was something different.

I went to the CP and the chief of staff reported that the Central Command Post [CCP] of the PVO Troops had forbidden the rocket troopers to open fire. Meanwhile the plane had entered our air space.

“A Boeing 707 travelling the Paris-Tokyo route, with a landing to refuel in Alaska, has disappeared.

At 1951 hours the plane was over the North Pole and in communications with Bude. There were 96 passengers and 16 crew members on board.” (Associated Press 0105, 21 April.)

We scrambled two interceptors. The weather was good, but at the moment the Navy was conducting exercises, so we even assumed initially that this was their plane. I decided to ground all aircraft not participating in the intercept, the command for that was “kover.”

We began to force it. There are special international signals for this. The pilot rocks his wings and turns in the direction of the airfield, and the intruder pilot is obliged to follow him. I had already established direct communications with the pilot, and the pilot reported that there was no reaction to his command. I said to him: “408, what is it, did you rock your wings two kilometers away from him?” And he yelled—we were all a little tense—“I stuck the tail and star in his window, and he turned his mug away!”

Events were now unfolding in the region of Kandalakshi, the Finnish border was right next door, and the plane began to change course, began to withdraw. Six minutes remained to make a decision and execute it. Imagine my condition: the crew did not obey our commands, although they could see very well. What was inside the intruder aircraft we didn’t know, but we did know that it was a Boeing 707, and we knew how sophisticated the navigational system was on a Boeing 707, i.e. that the pilot could not get lost... I reported to the commanding general that I had decided to destroy the aircraft. Dmitriyev approved the decision. The interceptor executed his attack and missile launch, and the Boeing dropped from our screens.

“Soviet fighters opened fire on a South Korean liner that intruded onto USSR territory. On board the plane were 110 persons, two of them are dead and two wounded, nationality not reported.

South Korean experts stated that they do not rule out the possibility of hijacking of the aircraft, and the Japanese assume a faulty navigational system.” (Radio “Liberty”, 0538, 22 April).

I ordered the pilot to make a circle over the site of the possible crash of the plane. It was already dark and a fire would be visible a long way off. But the pilot detected nothing. We scrambled helicopters, and soon we learned that the Boeing had managed to land on the ice of Korpisjoki lake. Well naturally I put units on alert. We prepared alcohol and wood at the nearest airfield, and the passengers were accommodated at the officers’ club and given warm clothing. Fortunately most of the people survived, two died.

I still did not know all the details when the then commander-in-chief of the PVO called from Moscow: “By how much did the plane violate the Soviet border?” I answered: “By one hundred and fifty kilometers, comrade Marshal.” “You will be discharged, General,” and he hung up the phone. Then my radio operators brought me a radio intercept: the search was on for a South Korean “Boeing.” On board were a hundred passengers flying from Paris to Tokyo. Again the commander-in-chief called. I reported the radio intercept and heard his response: “You will be judged by a people’s tribunal, General.” Of course I understood the nervousness of the commander-in-chief at this moment, after all he bore responsibility to the country’s leadership, but both then and now, I do not doubt that I acted correctly.
In response Tsarkov laughed unkindly:

They would have torn off my shoulder boards along with some skin, and they would have been right.

"The Russians are very 'sensitive' in the matter of security in the region of Murmansk, which is near the Finnish and Norwegian border. Murmansk is the base for the largest of the four Soviet fleets.

The mystery remains: what was the South Korean liner doing 1,000 miles to the east of its allotted route?" (Reuters correspondent, 1400 22 April).

[Krayniy] So what happened further?

[Tsarkov] They began to investigate. The pilot turned out to be a most experienced pilot, a military pilot who fought in South Korea. He landed the plane masterfully, for his left outboard wing section had been knocked off to the first engine. He could not have gotten lost. Considering his experience and the weather, the terrain relief, the navigational equipment, and the fact the he clearly saw the red-starred fighters forcing him to land. It is like walking toward a siren and pretending you didn't hear his “halt!” This was a provocation, one timed to coincide with the visit of the U.S. president to the USSR and with our major troops exercises. The plan was simple! The Boeing would violate the border, force us to put the troops on combat readiness, and then they would conduct reconnaissance from a spy satellite or. say, an RS-135.

[Krayniy] Vladimir Georgiyevich, I understand that you don't want to relive the past, but nevertheless: what happened with Rust?

[Tsarkov] To tell the truth, I would prefer not to talk about this subject. It would seem that time enough has passed, but when I think about that day, my heart begins to sink. I do not want make excuses, but I have been appointed to the district in mid May, that is, by that time I had been in command for ten days, no more. And I was travelling, acquainting myself with the units. When word was sent to me that a light plane from the FRG had landed on Red Square, I could not believe it. And to this day I cannot believe it. The worst thing was that, to tell the truth, the intruder aircraft could and should have been brought down. Major General G. Kromin, in whose zone of responsibility the Cessna was, reported the plane. But he was internally not prepared to make the decision. Kromin tried to convince himself, and indeed our Moscow District, that it was a weather phenomenon or birds. Of course, it also played a role that we are not permitted to open fire on transport or passenger aircraft, and the Cessna was not a combat aircraft, and the fact that attempts to violate the border occur constantly; when the border is violated for a minute, three, five, this teaches you, or rather means you away from making decisions. Kromin was obliged to report the intruder to the commanding general, and he did not do so. It is clear, the commander would have made the decision to force down the Cessna. Instead of this Kromin tried to convince himself that it was not an intruder. And he did convince himself, reporting to the Central PVO Command Post that an aircraft was violating the flight regime. That is, he reported a Soviet plane flying without a preliminary flight plan.

Incidently, a record was kept of the conversation between Kromin and the pilot scrambled to identify the intruder aircraft. Here is how it is cited by historian of the PVO Troops Col. Ye. Klimchuk.

"Pilot: I see a light plane, white. Waiting orders.

Kromin: Can it be one of our planes. From DOSAAF? Clarify.

Pilot: No. It is a European plane. What are my orders.

Kromin: Look closely. Clarify. There can be no mistake.

Pilot: Too late. I left the plane far back. I will make another circle."

And Col. Ye. Klimchuk continues: "The operations officer of the Central Command Post, Maj Gen S. Melnikov, after receiving the report from Leningrad, wanted to immediately report it to the commander-in-chief, but he dawdled. Then he forgot, although Koldunov had been twice in the Central Command Post that day and dealt with the air situation. Melnikov hoped that the Moscow PVO District would handle the intruder itself, and gave the order to remove this target from the notification board in the Central Command Post."

[Krayniy] Vladimir Georgiyevich, is Klimchuk's story true?

[Tsarkov] Yes, except perhaps for some of the details. Without removing blame from the district and the CCP duty officer, I would again like to say that it was Kromin's lack of resolve and his unreadiness to make a decision that dealt such a morale blow to the troops and to the prestige of our country.

[Krayniy] But if we discard the emotions, clearly Rust's flight also revealed some deficiencies in the system of structuring of our air defense?

[Tsarkov] The PVO is a very expensive item. I believe that specialists will agree that it is not constructed to fight light planes. Remember in Paris when a hooligan flew over the city for several days. The French government at the time made the decision not to activate the air defense; it was a matter for the police. But this was a preamble to my response. Indeed deficiencies were uncovered. And I am glad that at a session of the Politburo on the flight of the Cessna, most of the Politburo members did not succumb to emotions, listened to our arguments, and provided assistance. But
problems still remain. Agricultural and DOSAAF aviation are of special concern. We continue to have no communications with their airfields, and they fly at low altitudes, without a friend or foe identification system. For fighter aviation such aircraft are not a hindrance, but for the PVO... In short, there are still problems.

[Krayniy] Could you not name the most urgent problem. What most concerns the PVO leadership?

[Tsarkov] That's easy. The main problem is morale and living conditions. The PVO troops suffer more than other services from the disease called lack of amenities. It is understandable why. For many years they experimented with the troops: first they were distributed to the combined-arms districts, then brought together again. The voluntarism with which they ran our Army was especially vivid in the PVO. And then, after all, the radar companies, posts, and remote SAM battalions are far from large cities, in the wilds. As they say, the convenience is outside. The soldiers live like that for two years. The officers, wives, and children, for many years. I am closely following the debates in the USSR Supreme Soviet and I see that the deputies are quietly beginning to acknowledge the urgency of the problems that have accumulated in the Army, and the fact that the Defense Ministry alone cannot resolve them.

[Krayniy] Vladimir Georgiyevich, what do you think of the creation of a professional Army?

[Tsarkov] I am sure that we will arrive at such an Army. One example, a primitive one: We perhaps lose twice as much on repair of equipment that is out of order through the fault of soldiers and sergeants as we save through the draft. But we must calculate everything.

Somehow I am not convinced either by the calculations of those who are against a professional Army, or of those who are "for." The impression is that only the figures that are favorable in the argument are cited. But approaching the solution of a task of state importance in this way is at the least unserious. And one other thing I would like to say. There was always a professional Army in old Russia. Beginning with the druzhina of the Kiev princes up to the regiments of Peter. The people's militia assembled only when trouble was at the doorstep. In peacetime Russia was defended by professionals.
Use of Diving Teams in Western Armed Forces
90UM0338A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank A. Biryusov in the column:
"Military Technical Review": "Underwater Commandos"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] This is the kind of thing portrayed in an adventure film: a submarine reduces her speed and settles to the ocean floor. "Fin-footed creatures" emerge from within one after the other, quickly but quietly pulling containers carrying various pieces of equipment through the torpedo tubes. The calm reigning at the ocean bottom serves to intensify the mystery of what is going on. Some time later underwater tow craft take the "fin-footed creatures" away from the submarine.

The above is one of the ways of delivering combat swimmers of the FRG Naval Forces to an area earmarked for action in an enemy's rear. The West German periodical WEHRTECHNIK calls them "triphians," since they feel at home on dry land, in water, and in the air.

This is how the journal describes the usual working day of the combat swimmers from Eckernförde:

"It is unusually quiet in the corridors of the headquarters building and various other offices. Only about 12 men of the subunit are on duty. The remaining personnel were disposed as follows: One of the three platoons was carrying out diving exercises in the Baltic Sea; a second was involved in joint parachute training with Danish "human frogs"; the third had been issued passes to go home after accomplishing training exercises in an exemplary manner."

The missions of the combat swimmer subunits (which are organic to naval forces of virtually all NATO countries) consist of reconnaissance and raids on naval stations and ship bases, ports, roadsteads, and anchorages. The foreign press stresses that the combat swimmers can destroy enemy surface ships and submarines; neutralize shore missile complexes, pipelines, and communication land lines; blow up docks, dams, bridges, depots, and other military and industrial installations. The foreign press makes them out to be some kind of supermen for whom nothing is impossible.

Although there are differences in the "human frog" subunit training programs of the various NATO countries, they share much in common. At the top of the list are the physical practice orientation; and mastery of diving procedures, close combat techniques, and individual and group employment as reconnaissance scouts and commandos. The training plans include remaining in or under the water for up to eight hours regardless of water temperature; mining of objectives; exiting a submarine while under way or stationary on the ocean floor; transporting equipment; maintaining underwater orientation; and much more. The combat swimmers periodically participate in dives during the day and at night, covering distances up to 20 km.

Special exercises carried out in summer as well as winter are designed to test them for endurance in short-distance double-time forced marches; survivability under conditions of complete absence of life support means; ability to carry out the assigned missions in various critical situations.

A major interest is maintaining interaction with other forces for the purpose of accomplishing a common mission. The joint exercises are perfected not only within the framework of a national effort, but also in combination with armed forces of the bloc. In addition, competitions are arranged between teams of combat swimmers of the various countries. This promotes effective exchange of combat training experience.

As pointed out in the foreign press, the combat swimmers can be delivered to the action area by air, surface craft, or submarine. All these means of transportation are specially tasked to do so. The method of delivering the combat swimmers described in the beginning of this article provides the maximum concealment. It is employed in cases where the targeted area is heavily fortified or protected by an air defense system or a well organized and effective system of defense against a surface enemy.

Depending on the particulars of the situation, distance to area to be assaulted, weather conditions, and depths in the shore area, combat swimmers can be delivered to the shore area by nuclear-powered submarines or diesel-powered small and miniature submarines. The latter type (miniature submarines) can be carried aboard large submarines an initial distance in the case of a long cruise.

Surface craft that may be employed for delivery, in addition to combat displacement types, include air cushion craft, high-speed boats, inflatable craft, canoes and tow craft.

Combat swimmers are also delivered to the operational area by air. It goes without saying, as noted by WEHRTECHNIK, that in this kind of situation there is little probability of landing fixed-wing or helicopter craft. Therefore, the principal method of landing is by parachute drop onto water or land from altitudes dictated by the particular circumstances. In the event an enemy possesses a strong air defense system, the combat swimmers can employ gliding-type parachutes that make it possible for them to travel considerable distances—up to 15 kilometers and more.

Now a few words about equipment. This includes breathing apparatus, diving suit, mask, fins, depth gauge, watch, and underwater sound and radio communication equipment. Armament includes small arms, antitank, and rocket weapons. Demolition charges and mines may also be employed.

Breathing apparatus may be of the open, intermediate, or closed type. The first type (the lightest in weight) employs compressed air that is exhausted into the water. This is a disadvantage, since air bubbles rise to the
surface of the water to reveal the diver's position. In addition, this kind of apparatus is suitable for short-term diving to depths no greater than 40 meters. The intermediate and closed types permit remaining at depths of several hundred meters for several days. They employ breathing mixtures consisting either of an inert gas with a low oxygen content, or an inert gas in combination with pure oxygen made up for the particular application.

Diving suits come in two varieties: the wet and the dry. The first is made of porous rubber; a thin layer of water between the diver's body and a rubber sheath serves as a heat insulator. The second variety, which is worn over warm clothing, is impervious to water; it can be fitted with an electric heating system.

One more detail. For use at night, diving masks are provided with night vision goggles.

The arsenal of reconnaissance and commando subunits includes air pistols and hand-held weapons that fire needles under and on the surface of water, and daggers made of nonmagnetic steel. In addition, they are armed with conventional automatic weapons fitted with silencers and laser sights, automatic rifles, special designs of machineguns, and grenade launchers with a complement of fragmentation, high-explosive, and incendiary grenades. The divers can also be armed with antitank and antiaircraft weapons, and with sabotage devices.

In the estimation of NATO authorities, the use of reconnaissance and commando diving subunits in peacetime and in a period of threat preceding outbreak of war paves the way for conducting successful operations of friendly armed forces in coastal sectors. In wartime they can play an important role in disrupting command and control activities of an enemy navy; and destroy his surface craft, submarines, and important military and industrial sites in a coastal area. That is why these subunits are the object of special attention.

Experimental Bradley With Armor of New Composites

90UM0498B Moscow KRASTAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: “Unusual Armor”]

[Text] According to a report in the journal DEFENSE AND ARMAMENT the USA has designed an experimental model of the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle with a hull consisting of composites in place of the aluminum alloy hull used in series-produced models.

Despite the fact that the front part of the composite turret is 4.5 mm thick and the sides are only 2.4 mm thick, dependable armor protection to the vehicle's personnel is ensured. The hull made from the new material is 1.365 kg lighter, it reduces the noise level within the vehicle by 5-10 decibels, and it decreases the fighting vehicle's thermal signature on the terrain background, owing to which the probability of its being hit by ammunition equipped with infrared homing heads decreases.

British 'Super Light-Weight' Towed 155-mm Howitzer

90UM0498C Moscow KRASTAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: “Super Light-Weight Howitzer”]

[Text] According to a report in the journal INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, because there is a demand in the troops for a high-power gun of low weight England's VSEL is developing a super-light-weight towed 155-mm howitzer. According to the design its fighting capabilities should be no worse than those of the 155-mm caliber towed and self-propelled guns presently in the forces (it should fire conventional projectiles up to 24 km and rocket projectiles up to 30 km).

However, the combat weight of series-produced models of the new howitzer should be around just 3.65 tons, which is almost twice lighter than the American M198 155-mm howitzer. English specialists have achieved such a significant weight decrease by making wide use of parts stamped out of titanium and its alloys, and by implementing a number of new design concepts.

As of the beginning of this year VSEL already manufactured two prototypes of the new gun; it has a deployed length of almost 10 m, a width of 4.1 m, a height (in traveling configuration) of 2.2 m and a weight of around 4.1 tons.
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