Soviet Union
Military Affairs

CONTENTS

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

‘New Doctrine—Old Problems?’
[A. Demidov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 16, Aug 89] .................................................. 1
Commander vs. Party Bureau Chiefs
[I. Vakhnov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 16, Aug 89] ................................................. 5
Reader Calls for ‘Radical’ Changes in Ideological Work
[Yu. Shishkin; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 16, Aug 89] .................................................. 7
Temporary Statute on Officers’ Conferences
[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 16, Aug 89] ................................................................. 10
Belorussian MD Calls For Civilian Support of Fall Draft  [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIIA, 4 Nov 89] .... 15
Lt Gen Zichenko: ‘Nationality Aspects of Military Service’
[O. Zichenko; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 11 Nov 89] ................................................................. 16
Letters to Editor on Military—Nationality Relations [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Nov 89] ................. 19
‘Informal’ Groups: Role of Komsomol in Military  [F. Ishchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Nov 89] .... 21
Volga-Ural MD: Flow of Military Weapons to Civilians
[G. Shmidt; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Nov 89] .............................................................................. 22

ARMEF FORCES

Round Table: Social, Legal Problems of Military Life
[O. Kosheleva; SOVETSKII VOIN No 17, Sep 89] ................................................................. 25
Land, Housing Provisions Added to Retirement Benefits  [V. Vandyshhev; AGITATOR No 21, Nov 89] .... 27
Debate on Utility of Reserve Officer Training Programs
[S. Svetlov; KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA, 3 Nov 89] .......................................................... 30
Maj Gen Semenov on Multi-Ethnic Service in Mountain-Rifle Division
[B. Semenov; BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 11 Nov 89] .................................................................... 31
Proposed Revisions to Draft Regulations  [O. Vladykin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Nov 89] ......... 33
Drug Use in Armed Forces  [V. Serov; SOVETSKII PATRIOT, 19 Nov 89] .............................. 35
Interview with Commander, Belorussian Military District
[A. I. Kostenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Nov 89] ................................................................. 38
Group Formed to Address Military International Legal Problems
[I. Kolyarov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Nov 89] ......................................................................... 41
AWOL, Discipline Problems in Naval Construction Unit
[P. Ishchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Nov 89] ........................................................................ 42

AIR FORCE, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Impact of Departmentalism on Flight Safety Investigation
[V. Zhukov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Nov 89] ............................................................................. 45

NAVAL FORCES

Frequent Breakdown of Fire-Control Radar Noted
[A. Kozhevnikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Nov 89] .................................................................. 47
Industry Response on Delivery of Low Quality Equipment  [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Nov 89] .... 47

STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

Col Gen Kochemasov on Missile, Artillery Troops Day, 1989
[S. G. Kochemasov; VILNYUS SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 19 Nov 89] ............................................. 50
SPECIAL TROOPS

Problems of Military Construction Workers on Civilian Projects
[L. Nechayuk; Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 Nov 89] ................................................................. 52

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Service Chiefs on Military Contributions to Economy
Belousov on Conversion Politics, Economics
[I.S. Belousov; Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil No 17, Sep 89] ................................. 61
Decision To End Production of Weapon-Grade Uranium Noted
[Vladimir Chernyshev; Agitator No 21, Nov 89] ......................................................... 64
Universal Rail Truck Tested [V. Startsev; Moskovskaya Pravda, 6 Jan 90] .................. 67
Ryzhkov, Presidium on Abortive T-72 Sale [Rabochaya Tribuna, 1 Feb 90] .............. 67

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

Gagarin Academy Exchange Visit to Royal Staff College
[V. Goryainov; Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 Dec 89] ............................................................... 70

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Various Aspects of Ongoing SDI Research Noted
[B. Yegorov, B. Petrovich; Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 Nov 89] ........................................... 72

AFGHANISTAN

Defense Archival Material on Decision to Invade [A. Oliynik; Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 Nov 89] ****** 74
Survey On Afghan Service, Treatment Of Veterans
[M. Magomedeminov; Komsomolskaya Pravda, 24 Nov 89] .................................... 79
NEW DOCTRINE—OLD PROBLEMS?

Interview with Colonel General Aleksey Arsenteyevich Demidov, Chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate and Major General N. Domashev, Chief Inspector of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, by Colonel A. Nekrylov: "NEW DOCTRINE—OLD PROBLEMS?"

[Text] DEMIDOV, Aleksey Arsenteyevich. Born in 1936. CPSU member since 1957. Graduated from Yaroslav Military School, the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K.Ye. Voroshilov. For 7 years he was a platoon leader and commanded a company. Subsequently he held high command and staff positions. He was First Deputy Commander of the Southern Group of Forces and then commander. He has been in his present position since 1988.

DOMASHEV, Nikolay Stepanovich. Born in 1935. CPSU member since 1958. Graduated from Ulyanov school of communications, pedagogical institute, and Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin. Served as platoon leader, deputy company commander, and was involved in Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Young Communist League] work. Subsequently he went through positions from deputy regiment commander for political work to first deputy chief of the political administration of the Odessa Military District. He has been in the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy since 1987.

[Nekrylov] A certain amount of time has passed since, in keeping with the new doctrine, a course was taken toward maintaining our defense capability mainly through qualitative parameters. A good deal was done in this area in the troop units during the winter training period and the first months of summer. What, precisely? What results can we speak of today?

[Demidov] It is not merely difficult but impossible to give a simple answer. First let us define the concept itself, its qualitative parameters, at least in a simple way. In my opinion this is the achievement of a level of combat readiness and combat capability of our units and subdivisions whereby our army becomes more flexible, organized, and mobile, and has a stable unity of views, will, and actions as a combat organism which equipped with the latest in science and technology. Briefly, this means a replacement of the extensive path of growth of defense capability with the intensive one. We must learn to solve the problems that are set for us not with numbers but with ability. But how—this is the broad question that encompasses combat and political training and the daily activity of command political cadres.

Here, in my opinion, one must take into account the fact that each kind of troop unit has its own qualitative parameters. Take, for example, tank personnel. What is the main thing for them? To fire accurately, to drive their combat machines masterfully, and to interact with the crew skillfully on the battlefield. For aviators, missilemen, and communications personnel, naturally, special training is in first place. Motorized infantrymen and landing parties cannot get along without excellent weapons training and physical fitness. Incidentally, I am deeply convinced that everyone needs physical fitness. Especially today when the army is receiving young people who are very short on physical endurance. This sometimes gives rise to a weakness of the spirit, which frequently explains why some young people do not wish to serve. Unfortunately, far from everything is in order in the education system.

As for a concrete answer, I would say the following. The army's composition, technical equipment, and combat potential lead to a rational and reliable sufficiency for defense and the kinds of armed forces and the kinds of troop units, formations, and large units are being restructured. And the operational and combat training of the personnel is being organized strictly in keeping with the principles of our defense doctrine.

I am focusing special attention on this in order to make clear that in the past we have had to restructure in the most direct sense of the word. The troops perfected the art of defense, and I can tell you that this is very, very difficult. Organization and control of fire on the offense is one thing, and it is something quite different on the defense. So it one is to speak about qualitative parameters, there has been no sharp improvement yet.

[Domashev] On the whole one cannot but agree with Aleksey Arsenteyevich. I shall speak about the fact that the political organs and party organizations have managed to a significant degree to mobilize people to carry out the tasks that have been set and direct communists and Komsomol members to the struggle for achieving high final results. Our numerous meetings and conversations with various categories of commanders and political workers and personal communication with the men have shown that a good moral and psychological situation has developed in the majority of troop collectives. The people have a correct understanding of the tasks facing the troops today and their role and responsibility for their fulfillment.

Do we need examples. Take the political section of the motorized rifle division (Western Group of Forces) where Lt Col V. Pavlov works. The political organ is constantly studying the state of affairs in the troop collective, it promptly discovers the sore spots, reacts quickly to shortcomings, and works on particular matters in the local party organizations. Because of this in the formation there are more and more party organizations for which it is typical to have self-critical evaluation of the state of affairs, departure from formalism and routine in work with communists, and a search for new, nonstandard solutions to problems of combat training and political preparation. Or take the communications
regiment in which Lt Col V. Dzyuban (Central Group of Forces) serves. Here through the efforts of commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol activists they have established stable order and the training and educational process is well organized. Not a single soldier leaves his training unless there is a crucial need to. And, which is very important, the officers, mainly communists, have high professional qualities. And another thing. In the regiment they strictly observe the daily schedule, people have time for recreation and self-education, and good living conditions have been created. Because of all this the communications personnel do an excellent job of their difficult work as soldiers.

And in general I must say that today there are more and more political organizations where typical features of their work are objective and self-critical assessment of the state of affairs, departure from formalism and routine procedures, and a search for new, nonstandard ways of solving the problems facing them. The party organization of the motorized rifle regiment headed by Maj A. Gonchar, who was elected USSR People's Deputy, and the communists of the unit where Lt Col F. Mel' nichuk is Secretary of the Party Committee operate in precisely this spirit. The party organizations which include the communists V. Komar, V. Rodionov, and V. Khmel also keep abreast of the times. The spirit of perestroika in these units has motivated party members to seek out new forms and methods of increasing the political influence on combat readiness and has influenced the increase in the effectiveness of military labor to a considerable degree. So one can say that there is a movement in the direction of qualitative parameters.

[Nekrylov] Of course, one cannot but rejoice in the successes. But still one cannot but see the fact that in certain military collectives indifference and complacency reign as much as ever and there is a good deal of empty showiness and formalism. And there is no need even to mention the bureaucratism. It has assumed so many forms that it is difficult to recognize. Just take the quantity of paper. It has not only not decreased as compared to the past but, on the contrary, it has increased, and much of the paper contains instructions to declare a battle against paperwork. Is this not a paradox? This means that the mechanism of retardation, in spite of the discussions and measures that have been taken against it, is working as well as ever.

[Demidov] Unfortunately, the influence of the mechanism for slowing down perestroika in the army is still strong. A battle has been declared against it in words, but in reality in many cases everything is the same as it was before. Take, for example, the practice of numerous coordination sessions which cannot stand up under any criticism. No, the coordination sessions are undoubtedly necessary, but not for shifting the responsibility from oneself to somebody else. And some many reproaches have been elicited recently and are being elicited to the present day concerning the planning of combat and political training. The plans sent down “from above” have been severed from reality and have not taken into account the capabilities of the military collectives. And, of course, this kind of formalism has simply motivated people to put on a good show, which is inevitably followed by indifference and complacency. These phenomena are always related.

This is why the main ground forces command is continuously improving planning today. It should be better and more flexible and take into account the real state of affairs in the unit. It is also necessary to objectively evaluate what has been achieved. And my many years of service have convinced me that to do this communists must speak the language of truth and eliminate any attempts to make the state of affairs look better than it is.

And the volume of correspondence in the troop units? It is steadily increasing, and unnecessary information sometimes comprises a significant share of it. The quantity of documents and the volume of all kinds of reporting in the subdivisions and units are increasing. I do not know how to fight against this. It is like a grave disease. There are many prescriptions but nothing seems to work. Probably what we need here is not appeals and promises but strict accountability. I say this because I am convinced that we do not take seriously enough either the paperwork or the people who adhere to this pernicious style. A stereotype of thinking is at work here, is it not?

[Domashev] Yes, one must admit that the retardation mechanism is not losing steam yet. How many times has it been said, for example, that the political organs must get rid of the habit of not taking initiative, waiting for instructions “from above,” but there have been no decisive changes for the better. As before, many political organs and party organizations in their work overlook questions related to meeting the requirements of the new military doctrine. For some reason they seem to be talking more about this but actually doing less that is concrete. Although common sense tells us that it should be the other way around. And is this not why the approaches to training and education and the organization of classes have not changed? The requirements for troop training have increased but the approaches have remained the same. Thus in a number of units even today one can find cramming and oversimplification. Just one example.

The formation in which Officer V. Litvinchuk is a political worker did not have good results on firing and tactical training in an inspection. And it was mainly the artillerymen who let them down. This is the more surprising since they have always had better training than the other specialists. When they began to figure it out it became clear that during the winter training period the artillerymen rarely went out to the file and they fired their weapons even less frequently. And it is especially alarming that neither the political organ nor the party organizations sounded the alarm about the oversimplification of the training. Did this actually suit them? Or did the communists simply reconcile themselves to the idea that “everything is clearer” to the leader above. I do
not want to be a pessimist but here is one figure that leads to sad reflections. of the 100 companies and batteries that were inspected only one received an excellent rating, that is, in terms of the level of training it meets the requirements of the present day.

So I am far from the idea that we have everything “on schedule.” Many plans for improving quality have failed.

[Nekrylov] Incidentally, about oversimplification. Recently central television on the program “I serve the Soviet Union” showed a film about troop training of the Moscow Military District in which it said that despite the reduction of the size of the army, its combat readiness is not decreasing since the quality of training and the mastery of military equipment are improving. To confirm this they showed the cadres: A tank was firing on the march (into nothing) and a soldier was digging in on the battlefield. What does this tell us? Are we not oversimplifying the very concept of “qualitative parameters”? I ask this because in their letters many readers express concern about the fact that now it is very important not to allow a devaluation of the new concepts, so that they become essentially ineffectual and we have a situation where we have new words but the same old deeds.

[Demidov] Unfortunately, so far not all communist leaders are aware of what qualitative parameters are or how they can be increased. And hence the formalism, oversimplification, and external showiness—in a word, all the things we have brought along with us from the times of stagnation. How can we get rid of this?

It is necessary to teach the leaders. Teach them to think on a large scale and arrange the training and educational process scientifically. One must admit that we ask a good deal of our commanders and other leaders but we do not teach them enough about how they are to work. I myself know how important this is, especially in the first year, when you are just beginning to learn a new job. In the army we have now entered upon this course. Thus recently there were meetings of large unit commanders. The USSR Minister of Defense, General of the Army D. Yazov himself to over the training of this category of military leaders in keeping with the new training program. This is the first time this has been done in our practice and we hope that the result will be good. The formation commanders will teach methods of fighting for qualitative parameters to the regimental commanders; the, in turn, will teach the battalion commanders, and so forth. In a word, the people will know what to do and how to do it. And this is the main thing.

And I think that today we should pay special attention to the regimental commander. It is in this unit that the training and educational process is mainly arranged, and this being the case, its organization and, if you will, all of our restructuring in the army depend on the level of competence, erudition, and human feeling of the commander. And we have plenty of problems here. But the main things are selection, placement, and training.

I recall in my days as Commander of the Southern Group of Forces I had to work a good deal with Lt Col Rudenko. He himself was an efficient, conscientious officer and he handled his duties fairly well when he was in charge of a collective with a small number of tasks. But when a broader range of thinking was required of him he could not get organized. Both the personnel organs and the senior commander were to blame here. And yet such things are encountered even now. And this is especially alarming. Unlike in past years, now the commander has been given extensive rights. Show initiative, a creative approach; organize classes in a way that is suggested by your experience and knowledge. The fact is that many commanders are in no hurry to show initiative.

[Nekrylov] Yes, one can understand that today we need a commander who has mastered not only the new level of thinking but also a high level of military culture, and one who has good human qualities. Therefore, the question arises: Why not take advantage of the experience of other armies in which the officers have to pass certain examinations when appointed to high positions? Incidentally, we also have this kind of experience. In the large unit where the communist O. Smirnov serves, when an officer is appointed to the position of regimental commander he undergoes testing for his knowledge of the duties of chiefs of various services and for his ability to act in the most diverse situations. They say that this helps him to avoid mistakes when he is appointed.

[Demidov] I have heard about this practice. But this is still a unique phenomenon, as it were. Now the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces has decided to put all regimental commanders through the Vystrel Higher Officers’ courses, and then the battalion commanders, and this will do a lot for preparing the basic group of officer cadres. As concerns the experience you mentioned, much here depends on the large unit commanders and the local political organs. What is keeping them from introducing it? The whole problem is that many leaders have a strong habit of displaying initiative on command “from above.”

[Domashnev] And who is to blame for that? Themselves least of all. Let us look the truth straight in the eye: We have an entire generation of military cadres who have been taught to follow orders and in no case to display initiative or independence. And there is nothing surprising in the fact that all the inspections have shown the same thing: The main shortcoming in the training and education of officer cadres is the weak development of creativity and initiative and a penchant for routine and schematism. And on the whole the new period has not been a turning point in the improvement of the quality of command training. And here, in my opinion, it is not a matter of a new doctrine, but the inertia of our thinking. Well, and then... Have you ever thought about how many
problems, large and small, sometimes secondary, come down to the regimental commander personally? It has been calculated: If he worked 24 hours a day without sleep or rest, he would still not manage to get half of his work done. It is necessary to lighten the load of the regimental commander and give him time to think and collect his thoughts. Then one can speak about initiative on his part.

And another thing. I should like to return to the preceding question. In the units why have they not been able to take full advantage of the capabilities of the party organizations to raise the organizational and methodological level and educational role of combat training as is required by the corresponding document? Because many commanders, staffs, and political organs perceived the requirement for reorientation of military construction mainly toward qualitative parameters basically as an appeal, a slogan which is necessary in the propaganda of lectures and visual agitation. Therefore, it is certainly no accident that in many units of the Western Group of Forces, the Southern Group of Forces, and the Carpathian Military District the plans for party-political worker and the measures that are being conducted to provide for combat readiness this year are practically no different from last year's either in direction or in content. And the same old approaches are being used by the political organs and party organizations to try to increase activity on the job.

[Nekrylov] As we found out, the simplistic approach to training and education is largely explained by the fact that some of the communist leaders have not gotten rid of their old approaches. Some of them try to cover up the fact that personnel are taking away from combat training for construction and economic work and conceal their own disorganization by a lot of spit and polish. And all this is frequently done with the tacit agreement of members of the party committee. Is this unprincipled behavior not partially explained by the force of inertia that has accumulated over the years whereby some secretaries have structured their relationships with the leaders according to the principle: "What can I do for you?"

[Domashov] Practice shows that the reason for this "agreeable" position of the political organs and party organizations lies in the lack of real democracy, glasnost, and adherence to principles. At party meetings are there many communists who frequently criticize their leaders, even if there is something for which to criticize them. This is very rare. This is the way it has been in the past and it is the way it frequently is now. People are still under the burden of the inertia of old approaches. Some people before saying what they think first weigh well what this will ultimately cost them. Because—let us be frank—the boss has many opportunities to recall an unfriendly speech against him from one of his subordinates and accuse that person of being against perestroika. This has already happened and more than one commission has had to straighten things out and put everything in its place.

Incidentally, we should probably also take into account the fact that far from everything is normal with the commissions either, and sometimes a lot of inspections do more harm than good. Practice shows that certain senior staff officers frequently are "simply present" among the men without showing the proper concern for improving things, making an exacting analysis of what has been accomplished by the personnel, or transferring their rich experience to young commanders and political workers.

[Nekrylov] Why does this happen? Perhaps it would be better not to have so many inspections? One every half year or maybe one a quarter? But not weekly. For inspections (frequent) encourage dependency and excessive caution which verges on cowardice. And this ultimately indicates a lack of confidence in the commander, political worker, or party organization which, as life shows, does not motivate them to be more active.

[Demandov] I do not agree with the idea that when a senior officer comes to a unit under his command along with a couple of other officers this is necessarily an inspection. What should we do: Have the division commander communicate with the regimental commanders only on the telephone? His coming to the regiment is ordinary working contact. Although, of course, there are also many inspections. The attitude toward this is changing now. First of all we are taking the path of a sharp reduction. Thus this year in the various units there were 60 percent fewer inspections than last year and, as I have already said, the results of the training are no worse. And on the whole a decision has been made that the Ministry of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces will inspect the troops only once a year, in the autumn, when they will be held accountable for the preceding year.

And then again the comrades who visit the troops have somewhat different tasks now. It is important not only to reveal shortcomings but also to help the people eliminate them. I shall give this example. Maj Gen V. Vlasuk has worked in the Volga and Ural military districts. And here is what he encountered there. A new program had already been introduced for the troops but the training process had been planned in the old way. And he did not leave until he had done everything in his power to restructure the training process. When he returned he reported to me what he had managed to do and what he had not and he expressed his considerations about what kind of assistance the troops need from us, the officers of the main combat training administration. Subsequently there was a frank discussion about this at one of the party meetings. This is the kind of work we welcome and encourage in all ways.

[Domashov] I hold the opinion that no inspection will rectify things unless the communists in the units and subdivisions feel their responsibility for everything that takes place. These 4 years of perestroika have shown quite definitely: If a party organization is principled and cares about the state of affairs in the collective it will be
able to do a very great deal: help impose order, organize the training and educational process on the proper level, and, incidentally, hold responsible those communist leaders who have stepped too far out of line. So it seems that the most important practical task of the present day is to increase the role and responsibility of the local party organizations for a businesslike climate and ideologically moral atmosphere in the collectives. Communists must understand one truth: nobody will do for them what they should do for themselves. The times are such they that cannot sit on the sidelines.

[Nekrylov] The last question. But far from the last in terms of significance since there are many problems here. The social sphere. Many of the officers' misdeeds are committed because of poor living conditions, the lack of free time, and social injustice. Because of these factors many of them do not give their all to the service and some of them do not want to serve at all. But ultimately combat training suffers because of this. Everyone understands this, but this is changing slowly. This is inertia which feeds the mechanism of retardation.

[Demidov] The Defense Minister has now made a decision to allot significant funds for the construction of housing for officers and warrant officers. And this is quite fair. We have sometimes constructed palatial barracks for the enlisted men and have not wanted to help the officers. And some of them have gone without housing for several years (and there are quite a few of them even among us) looking for an apartment which they rent and pay half of their salaries. But, as they say, they have to do what they have to do, especially with the current prices charged by cooperators. But how else can they live? With this kind of social injustice how can they take on and bear the immense burden of responsibility for our safety? I understand that the things I am talking about are too prosaic. But we must not develop our attitude toward the daily life of officers on the basis of their self-sacrifice and long suffering, if one may put it that way. Today this would be very unreliable. Evidence of this is that so many intelligent officers and good specialists want to leave the army. Where do you think they will go? Into the cooperatives.

[Domashov] I must frankly admit that during the years of stagnation the person in the army was pushed into the background. In the foreground was the aspect of appearances: The percentages of what had been achieved in combat training. And how the officers and warrant officers lived, what they living conditions were, and whether or not they had a roof over their head at all—concern did not reach this far. Now people are saying that the social sphere is the concern of all military personnel. In principle one cannot but agree with this. But, in my opinion, the political organs and party organizations deserve most of the blame for the lack of attention to people. Who if not they should be concerned about the people? After all, it is no accident that party political work is called human science. Today there can be only one attitude toward this: Negligence in the organization of the daily life of military servicemen is unforgivable. We have already spoken about the need to introduce testing for those who are being promoted to the position of regimental commander. But perhaps there would be some point in introducing something similar for chiefs of political organs and secretaries of party committees. I think it would be useful. At least I am sure that there would be fewer random, indifferent people in these positions.

[Nekrylov] Today is the time to renew our work. It is a time of change which rejects empty words and demands that we rely on quality and on constant contact with life. We need concrete actions. The return from the new methods and approaches, new views and assessments, increased responsibility and discipline, and extensive glasnost should be manifested in the results of combat training and the solutions to the problems that are keeping us from moving forward.

Copyright: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1989

Commander vs. Party Buro Chief
90UM0059C Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 89 (signed to press 7 Aug 89) pp 37-40

[Article by Major I. Vakhnov: "Unsuitable Secretary"]

[Text] There was what one might call an extraordinary occurrence in one of the battalions. The commander, Lieutenant Colonel A. Kobelev, complained to the political department... about the secretary of the party bureau: "The political leader is off the mark." This happened before April 1985. But more and more cases like this have been revealed during the years of perestroika. And it is precisely that the party secretaries, under the conditions of the democracy which has been gathering force, have begun to resist more boldly the pressure from the leaders and their leaders have been less willing to take the opinion of the party organization into account. And here it would seem they have reached the other extreme.

Jumping ahead, I shall say that the commander's complaint was unfounded. Moreover, it was a kind of institutional maneuver to make himself look better.

Lt Col Kobelev was in charge of a separate material supply battalion recently—last summer. In the collective they immediately sensed that he was a willful and stubborn person. Indeed, it gradually became clear that for him the concepts to command and to "apply pressure" were the same. The new battalion commander decided to put those who did not agree with him or who had been spoiled by the preceding "command-democrat" who allowed himself to be criticized at party meetings in their place by a tried and true method—yelling and then threats.

True, not everyone would be put in their place. Anatoly Ivanovich was quite taken aback when Warrant Officer A. Kurochkin responded to him, a Lieutenant Colonel:
"You do not have to yell at me, I am not deaf."

The Secretary of the Party Buro S. Fedyanin could not but note such incidents. But he did not attach any special significance to them. Before the report and election meeting he suggested to the activists that they elect the battalion commander as a member of the bureau. There were no particular objections to this although a number of communists doubted the expediency of such a hasty move: We should observe some more, they said.

Captain O. Pikkevich at the meeting expressed an opinion that reflected this viewpoint.

"Communist Kobelev is a new person and we have not yet gotten to know him properly," he said. "But still the party bureau will always give him help and support..."

In keeping with the will of majority of the communists, Kobelev was not included on the list of candidates for election.

It would seem that this would be a serious warning and a lesson for the communist leader. But in indignation he attacked his comrades in the party organization. For democracy. After all, just 4 years ago in the Transbaykal military district he had all of his subordinates towing the line. They were afraid to say a word back to him. But here?

The further development of events confirmed the way the battalion commander perceived his failure to be elected to the party bureau.

Pikkevich ended up among his "list." And the secretary at the same time: He had not provided "unanimity" and support. Moreover, in Anatoliy Ivanovich's opinion, he interfered too often in official business and could not understand the demands he made on his subordinates. True, demandingness was understood in a fairly unique way—as the right to act according to the principle: My way is the only way.

One time a subdivision he had ordered to unload some trucks full of potatoes refused. The outraged battalion commander called all the officers into formation and... ordered them to move the sacks. Many of them kept their indignation to themselves. But the secretary told Kobelev in plain terms that this was no way to develop efficiency. But Anatoliy Ivanovich did not want to listen to him.

Fedyanin tried repeatedly to speak frankly with the battalion commander about fundamental truths, about the fact that the commander's demandingness was incompatible with exceeding the rights granted to him and had nothing to do with rudeness. These attempts only irritated Kobelev. True, he began to raise his voice less frequently when the secretary was present. But when he was not... Examples? The battalion commander allowed himself to "shake" the private A. Khoma by the collar for educational purposes. The enlisted women N. Pogrebnyak, L. Volkovaya, and L. Shteyngaur began to send complaints about the communist leader to the party bureau and the higher levels. Sometimes because he used foul language in front of them, sometimes because of unjust punishment. There was also this case: He made them do dismounted drill on the parade ground along with the draftees.

The people also did not understand and were dissatisfied with the fact that Anatoliy Ivanovich got his wife, Warrant Officer L. Kobeleva, a job in the unit. Incidentally, in spite of the policy established by law, she was under his jurisdiction in a materially responsible position.

Of course the secretary could not put up with such arbitrary behavior on the part of the commander just as he could not understand his positions in strengthening military discipline in the battalion, which left something to be desired: The lieutenant colonel was too strict with some and was unjustifiably liberal and all-forgiving with others.

One time when Lt A. Molgachev was on duty in the unit a vehicle left the motor pool without permission. On instructions from the battalion commander the young officer was brought before a comrade's court of honor. And the lieutenant has never before had any disciplinary measures taken against him in the collective. Was there any need to be so hasty with such a severe measure?

And yet the battalion commander simply turned his back when Sr Lt A. Kasymov and Sr Warrant Office V. Priym tried to use gasoline for their own purposes. He neither conducted an investigation nor punished them. "It was enough that they were expelled from the party," was how Kobelev put an end to this case. And yet this was not simply a violation of discipline, it was gross misconduct verging on violation of the law.

Why such different approaches? Anatoliy Ivanovich does not like "gross violations" which have to be reported "above." It is his deep conviction that this is cutting your own throat.

Fedyanin could not agree with this position. Nor could he remain silent about it. In his speech at one of the party meetings he said outright:

"Communist Kobelev is not meeting the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Ministry of Defense for strengthening discipline and is not demanding that his deputies do this. We have no analysis of misconduct and violations and we are not working to prevent violations of regulations. We have forgotten all about meetings of officers and warrant officers. Moreover communist Kobelev has started to cover up cases of misconduct requiring discipline...

At that time Anatoliy Ivanovich understood that he could not keep Fedyanin under his thumb. But still he decided to show that his opinion carried more weight in the collective and his position was more correct.
A couple of days later he called the officers together for a conference:

"We have among us people who like to wash their dirty linen in public. But just remember that this makes things worse for all of us. And above all for company commanders! I promise you that," the battalion commander stated and then put it point blank: "So are we going to send information about gross violations of military discipline to the higher staff or not?"

This was said in a tone which allowed no response, with pressure that you did not use at a party meeting. Unfortunately, there were officers there who strictly follow the commander's orders: No, they said, there is no need to be in a hurry—we shall straighten them out ourselves. And Kobelev looked at Fedyanin triumphantly—this is the true opinion of the collective!

"So, what have we here, Comrades," the party secretary could not restrain himself. "Are we casting doubts on the requirements of the party and the defense ministry concerning strengthening military discipline. For they plainly make it incumbent on us communists to put an end to window dressing and concealing misconduct."

Sr Lt S. Lysenkov supported Capt Fedyanin. The rest remained silent. They some of them came to the party secretary and said: "You understand, Sergey Leonidovich, it is difficult to retrain the battalion commander. He will make things hard for us. But you as secretary have strong support—the political section..."

Kobelev also thought about the political section at that time: I would not put it past Fedyanin to go and complain. Anatoliy Ivanovich decided: I should warn them. And this is what he did.

Shortly the chief of the political section and the secretary of the party commission appeared in Fedyanin's office. The battalion commander had obviously called his deputies for support.

"What complaints do you have against the secretary of the party organization, Anatoliy Ivanovich?" asked the chief of the political section.

"He does not understand the essence of one-man management and undermines authority. He criticizes me at party meetings."

"For what, specifically?"

There is no denying that Kobelev is straightforward.

"Because I do not wish to send information about certain violations of military discipline higher up."

?! It is not difficult to guess the amazement this statement evoked from the workers of the political section.

But Anatoliy Ivanovich apparently drew no conclusions from the conversation that took place with them.

I was convinced of this upon meeting with him. The battalion commander was just as convinced as ever that he was right. Here are a couple of his conclusions: "Maybe I bend in some things, but it is in the interests of the service... The secretary is still washing his dirty laundry in public... I and not the secretary will determine what is a gross violation and what is not. I have the right to decide whether to report it or not... How are the regulations applied? Its requirements must be used in a differentiated way..." Behind these words lies communist Kobelev's same confidence in his infallibility, the same line of the battalion commander: It is for him to pardon or punish, to determine on whom to unload...

I thought: How far removed the communist leader is from an understanding of the changes perestroika is making in army life. From all appearances he is not even trying to understand the need to rely on the party organization or for an open resolution of problems. He does not want to part from the times of stagnation or, rather, the leadership methods of the times of stagnation. Administrative aplomb (there is nothing else to call it) will not allow the battalion commander to accept the party secretary's viewpoint on the shortcomings in his style of leading people, the suppression of criticism, window dressing, and making the state of affairs with discipline look better than it is. Hence the policy of confrontation and the formation of the opinion of the party leaders as a person who is against the collective.

So who is against whom? In order to answer this question it seems that one more conversation with the workers of the political section will be needed. And not in the office but in the party collective.

Copyright: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1989

Reader Calls for 'Radical' Changes in Ideological Work

90UM0059D Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 89 (signed to press 7 Aug 89) pp 41-44

[Letter from reader, Major Yu. Shishkin: "Why Embellish Formalism?"]

[Text] I was motivated to take up my pen by a conversation published in No. 6 of the journal between a correspondent and the Deputy Chief of the Directorate for Ideological Work of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. It touches upon one of the key issues in the organization of mass agitation work—the question of radical renewal. But it seems to me that in the article they should have made a more critical assessment of the current condition of political agitation, propaganda, and all ideological work in general. And indeed there are some crucial problems here which cannot be solved by "cosmetic" means. In my opinion, we need radical changes. That is, measures of an organizational, economic, and legal nature and fundamentally different approaches in all spheres of ideological work. We also need people who are capable of thinking in the
new way instead of the standard one and working with modern methods. There is a need to increase the independence of political organs in conducting ideological work, to improve the structure of the institute of nonorganizational propagandists, to increase (redistribute) financial allocations, and to improve material and technical supply.

In my opinion, one of the factors that is holding up the implementation of the decisions of the 27th Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference in questions of ideological work is that the system of ideological and political education is cumbersome and rigidly regulated and it hampers the initiative of political organs and the ideological aktiv. If you look you will see that the is a mass of documents (just the names of them will make your head spin) regulating literally all the “nooks and crannies” of ideological work. And if one delves into the content of these documents? In the first place, they are very similar to one another, there is repetition, and, in the second place, the “reign” of such documents has so “canonized” the ideological process that any new phenomenon in the life of the troops automatically requires writing another document. This was recognized by one of the workers of the Main Political Administration.

But directives cannot create world views. I do not understand why I, a party member and a propagandist, have to be reminded in each document: a) it is necessary to regularly inform personnel of the domestic and foreign policy;

b) it is necessary to make a change in the direction of individual work with subordinates and so forth and so on.

Frequently general concepts prevail in the documents—“to strengthen,” “to improve,” “to increase.” And so it turns out that the documents that determine the tasks after the regular party forums are practically no different from any others...

I am convinced that the propagandist does not need general phrases and instructions to use certain forms of work that are repeated time after time. Numerous directives only wind up the “paperwork carousel” more tightly and generate new plans, reports, and guidelines. Would it not be better to abolish all such documents and create one like, say, the “Provisions for political organs for organizing ideological work”? By defining the tasks, functions, and directions of ideological work in light of party and government requirements it would give the political organs the opportunity to manifest independence, creativity, and initiative. People could object: Time flies and such a document would be outdated before very long. I think corrections could be made to it. The main thing is for them to be done promptly. And now the number of “work plans for...” fluctuates, as I know from my own work, in the range of 20. As they say, the bureaucracy is good at making work for itself.

Today the nature of the propagandist’s activity has changed: The people have changed and the means of influencing their consciousness have changed as well. The press, radio, and films are being restructured and television is more actively “invading” the life of army collectives. This means that the activity of the propagandist needs to be restructured in this direction as well. But we are continuing to restrict ourselves to old forms and methods. Take, for example, the work of the agitation groups. First of all it seems to me to be inexpedient to “legitimize” individuals from the leadership in the agitation and propaganda groups. This reduces the number of communists, whose duty it is to participate in ideological work as well. This question is also important: How should a member of an agitation group present his information? As a rule it is a lecture-monologue. This form of “communication” between the leader and his subordinates is ineffective today. The educational level of the men is different from what it was before and they receive a lot more information. The people want to exchange opinions and debate.

I recall how an officer from the District Political Directorate talked to me, a unit propagandist. He was interested in the work of the agitation group. Precisely, he wanted to see its work plans. I got hold of these plans and placed before the officer the files filled with texts of “speeches” of nonorganizational propagandists and notes about the lectures they gave. It turned out that this...was enough. Moreover, the inspector praised us, saying that he had not seen anything like this anywhere else...

What am I trying to say? It would be expedient to change both the work of these groups and the criteria by which it is evaluated. And I support the idea expressed in the article: We must refrain from letting the members of the agitation groups have cumbersome plans and written texts of lectures. Indeed, the duties of nonorganizational propagandists should include, if necessary, explaining various events, conducting conversations, and participating in disputes and debates.

In this connection I should like to refer to the example of a unit where Majors V. Telikin and V. Degtyarev are the propagandists and where I recently had occasion to visit. In mass agitation work here they actively use such forms as roundtables and operational information. The local television center also plays a large role. It has been possible to solve a number of crucial problems with the help of its programs. They pay a lot of attention to radio programs in the garrison, the people take questions and suggestions to the leaders and they give explanations on regular programs.

In this unit they actively use non-organizational movie studios. They found people who like this work and obtained the movie equipment. They have already made several films about the military affairs of aviators. And how this influenced people and inspired them!

As we know, the renewal of ideological work depends largely on the level of training of the propaganda cadres.
And here is perhaps one of the "sorest" spots. Unfortunately, the requirements of the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee to the effect that the party ideological corps must be augmented with people who are very knowledgeable about theoretical and practical issues and active fighters for perestroika are being met slowly, in my view. Take, for example, the selection of staff propagandists. So far the people who end up in these positions are usually officers who are almost at pension age who wish to finish out their service peacefully, or very young officers who do not have sufficient work experience.

And this is no accident. A considerable proportion of the unit propaganda officers who are approaching pension age are former political officers of subdivisions. Among them are many people who could not really work with people. But it turns out that they were able to be propagandists.

Among the propagandists there are also officers who have rapidly "skipped over" the position of company political officer (frequently using pull) or their previously held Komsomol positions. In my memory there has not been a single case when they have become good staff propagandists.

It seems to me that there is a need to change over to competitive selection of unit propagandists. Let several people apply for a vacant position and the one who is best according to the results of theoretical and practical examinations would be determined by a commission that includes representatives of the higher political organ and the command of the unit to which the propagandist will be assigned. It seems that competitive selection would contribute to increasing both the prestige of the ideological workers and the authority of the political organ. And on the whole it would contribute to the improvement of ideological work.

It seems to me that it is also time to solve this problem. Up to this point the duties of the propagandist have not been defined in the regulations of the domestic service. Until we have these definitions they will not have the opportunity to do their immediate work and not be at someone's beck and call—compiling ordinary references, preparing reports, and writing "cribs" for their bosses' speeches. All propagandists are bothered by this. The determination of the specific rights and responsibilities of the propagandist, on the one hand, will make it possible to clearly determine the range of problems in ideological work and the ways of solving them and, on the other, will guarantee social protection from the arbitrariness of certain leaders. Again I wish to refer to my own experience. I recall that almost every commission that came to the unit blamed me, the propagandist, for all the shortcomings in ideological work. I was also blamed for the poorly kept records and for the poor minutes from all kinds of meetings. With difficulty I managed to all this written work, but the main thing was that my live work with people suffered. And some people still reproached me: They said the propagandist does nothing since he has no personnel under his jurisdiction.

Once when I was upset after a regular inspection I asked the officer from the higher political organ: "So what am I to be responsible for, why do they blame me for things that are clearly not my job?" The answer was simple: "You are young and there is much that you do not know, but never mind—calmly do what they tell you to." In search of the truth at the regular assemblies I asked my more experienced colleagues this question. They slapped me on the shoulder in an understanding way. So I think it is necessary to determine the rights and responsibilities of the propagandist.

I should like to mention the training of staff propagandists. Changes in the content of the assemblies and seminars are also needed here. One must admit that frequently the assemblies are conducted in the old way—"successful" reports and dull lectures. This kind of training does not awaken creative thought but, on the contrary, stifles it and makes it dogmatic. It is my firm conviction that most of the time at assemblies should be devoted to training in conducting discussions, debates, and other active forms and teaching propagandists the skills of public speaking. It would also be possible to have tests of knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and party and government documents.

Changes in the activity of staff propagandists entail inevitable changes in the work of the entire ideological aktiv as well, particularly nonorganizational personnel. Practice shows that far from all activists have a good idea of how the conduct ideological work most effectively. Many simply do not have the knowledge and skills. And their training in universities of Marxism-Leninism and schools of party aktiv are not very different from the Marxist-Leninist training or political education of warrant officers.

It is time to stop the drive for gross output and transform the universities into places where commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol activists will actually study ideological work with personnel. It is here that they should discuss the pressing problems related to the study and formation of public opinion and acquire the skills of conducting dialogues with subordinates and the ability to persuade them during the process of discussions. I think it is appropriate to focus on the organization of general ideological training based at the universities of Marxism-Leninism, especially their propaganda departments. The organizers of this general training should be the political organs and the staff propagandists. It is important for all command and political personnel to understand that only in close interaction is the mechanism of ideological influence capable of producing a maximum effect.

As concerns political training, it would be expedient to envision the study not of concrete themes but of one or two problems a month. The work of party and Komsomol organizations, the club, the library, and the
councils of Lenin halls should be directed toward this. That is, the efforts of agitation-propaganda and cultural-educational units would mesh. There would be more interest in political training since the "repeated" subjects would be excluded from the plans. And the role of the center would be switched over to the use of the mass media in this area: the press, radio, and television. For example once a month a television program on the problem being studied would be broadcast at a time that is most convenient for the troops (taking into account repeat showings on other days). This would also include speeches from military scientists, military leaders, leading military servicemen, and participants in the Great Patriotic War and combat activities in afghan-stan, and also the showing of training and documentary films. There would be efficiency in the study of party and government documents and the events in domestic and international life.

And, finally, the last thing is the financial issue. Does it not seem absurd that up to this point we are oriented toward norms of monetary outlays for political and educational expenditures introduced even before the war? Is it not time to bring order into this work? After all, the needs have increased sharply in recent years, and the prices—even more. Moreover, it is known that item 43, according to which monetary funds are annually allotted for party political work in the units, is must less than the other items. And if one also takes into account how limited the possibilities are for using the funds earmarked in this item?

In 1976 when I graduated from school I came to the Far East. At one of the first instructional meetings the division political officer said that it would not hurt if I were to buy materials for updating the visual aids with my own money each month since there was no money from item 43 but we still had to do the work and for a bachelor expenditures of 2-3 rubles were nothing. But the years passed and even after I had become a family man I was forced to continue to do the same thing. And so did my colleagues. And when it came around to re-equipping the Lenin Hall the Chief of the unit political section clearly gave me to understand how things were: “Make a deal and get the materials from civilian organizations.” And we made deals and got hold of them in spite of all the orders prohibiting this and the separation of the soldiers and sergeants from combat training—it was all the easier since there were a great many timber industry enterprises right there.

Then I served in one of the groups of forces. There the state of affairs with material and technical supply for party and political work was somewhat better but this was because of centralized deliveries. Unfortunately, these deliveries were not reliable either. This pertained especially to technical means for propaganda. Their quality was poor. I recall that in 5 years they replaced all the television equipment in the center twice. But not of it worked properly—it was necessary to take first one thing to the plant for repair and then another.

I understand that what I am discussing involves many organizational and financial problems. But they are the ones that should be given attention first. Then all the issues touched upon in the magazine article which I mentioned at the beginning of my letter can be successfully resolved.

Copyright: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1989

Temporary Statute on Officers’ Conferences

90UM0059E Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 89
(signed to press 7 Aug 89) pp 76-82

[Temporary statute on Officers' Conferences in the USSR Armed Forces, effective 1 August 1989: "The Officer Conference"]

[Text] In response to numerous requests from our readers (see No. 14 of our Journal for this year) we are publishing the Temporary statute on the Officers' Conference in the USSR Armed Forces, put into effect on 1 August of this year.

The Officer Conference is a permanent social organization of officer personnel in the USSR Armed Forces. The Officer Conference arranges its activity strictly and precisely in keeping with the requirements of the USSR Constitution and legislation that is in effect relating to social organizations. It is intended to contribute in all ways to the developing in the officers of a sense of the officer's honor and dignity, satisfaction of the officers' needs,1 fraternal communication, solidarity of officer collectives, the endurance of mutual demandingness, respect in interrelations among officers in keeping with military traditions and the norms and rules of the Soviet way of life, and their increased activity in performing their military duty.

The Officers' Conference is created in the military units, institutions, military training institutions, and in enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense (henceforth called 'military units') in keeping with the present temporary statute. If the military units of the garrison have a significant number of officers, by an order of the chief of the garrison a combined Officers' Conference can be created in the garrison.

The temporary statute determines that the Chairman of the Officers' Conference is the Commander of the military unit and the Chairman of the Combined Officers' Conference for the garrison is the Chief of the garrison.

All officers of the military unit or garrison are members of the Officers' Conference. The officers of individual subdivisions that are not included in military units can be members of Officers' Conferences located near their military units, regardless of the branch of the USSR Armed Forces to which they belong.

The Officers' Conferences of military units can include personally selected officers in the reserve or retirement
who are veterans of the given military unit. Officers assigned to prolonged temporary duty can, by a decision of the Officers' Conference, be granted the right to participate in all measures conducted by the Officers' Conference. In this case all the duties of a member of the Officers' Conference apply to them.

By a decision of the Officers' Conference, guests can be invited to participate in measures conducted by the Officers' Conference—warrant officers, military servicemen who have extended their tour of duty in the unit, members of officers' families, workers and employees of the Soviet Army and Navy, representatives of the party and Soviet organs, social organizations, other military units, industrial and agricultural enterprises, scientific institutions, and training institutions, veterans of the USSR Armed Forces, and also officers of national armies from the socialist and developing countries training in military training institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense and their families.

The highest organ of the Officers' Conference is the General Conference of the Officer Personnel, which is held no less frequently than once a quarter or as necessary or at the request of one-third of the members of the Officers' Conference, and it is authorized under the condition that no less than half of the members are present. The course of the Conferences that are conducted and the decisions that are adopted are recorded in the minutes. Additionally, in the Officers' Conference if necessary there can be celebrations not he occasions of state holidays, anniversaries, and the conferring of honors to leading officers. If the military unit is located in several remote garrisons, delegate Conferences are conducted. The number of delegates is determined by the council of the Officers' Conference.

Expenditures on the delegates' travel to the Conferences are made from money placed at the disposal of the commanders of the military units to pay for official business trips.

A council of the Officers' Conference consisting of a number of people determined by a decision of the General Conference is elected by a secret vote (the Conference can decide to have the voting open) to conduct current work at the General Conference of Officer Personnel.

The Chairman of the Council of the Officers' Conference, his deputy, and a secretary are elected at the council's organizational Conference by open voting. In the event that any member of the council is transferred to a new location or leaves the unit for other reasons, elections to fill the vacancies are held at the next Officers' Conference. Conferences of the council of the Officers' Conference are held as necessary but no less frequently than once a month. The issues discussed and the decisions made at the Conference are recorded in the minutes.

When elections to the council of the Officers' Conference are conducted several candidates can be nominated for one position. The officer who is elected is the one who has received in the elections the largest number but no less than half of the votes of individuals participating in the General Conference. If necessary the General Conference can replace any member of the council of the Officers' Conference before his term has expired. The results of the elections are reflected in the minutes of the General Conference of the officer personnel.

The General Conference of officer personnel or the council of the Officers' Conference can make suggestions concerning candidates from the officers of the commissions and other organs created in the military units or garrisons.

All measures of the Officers' Conference are organized and conducted, as a rule, on the base of Houses of Officers and officer clubs, and in garrisons and military units were these do not exist—in premises especially assigned by the command which are provided with the necessary property and means of communication. If necessary, under the established policy, it is possible to borrow or rent premises, means of transportation, and other material things.

The work of the Officers' Conference is conducted on a democratic basis, in surroundings of extensive glasnost, and friendliness which contributes to open exchange of opinions and free, comradely communication, and the assurance of mutual responsibility and respect for relations among officers, regardless of their military knowledge or position.

The Officers' Conference conducts its work in close contact with political organs, party and Komsomol organizations, the women's soviet, and other social organizations. The study, generalization, and dissemination of the work experience of the Officers' Conference are carried out by the higher commanders (chiefs) and political and personnel organs.

WHAT TASKS AND AUTHORITY DOES THE OFFICERS' CONFERENCE HAVE?—educating the officers in the spirit of selfless devotion to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government, high responsibility to the Soviet people for constant readiness to defend the socialist homeland, and the development in them of high ideological and political, professional, job-performance, and moral qualities;—maintenance in the officer collective of comradely relations based on unwavering observance of the officer's honor, patriotism and internationalism, and faithfulness to the profession of the defender of the homeland;—protection of officers from rude and arbitrary behavior, degradation of personal dignity, social injustice when solving service problems, and improvement of the conditions for the life, daily existence, and recreation of the officer personnel and their families.

The Officers' Conference educates officers in the military traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces and their military unit, conducts measures in museums and rooms of military glory, organizes excursions through historical
places of combat and revolutionary glory of the Soviet people and the USSR Armed Forces, and contributes to restoring and maintaining order at monuments to fallen soldiers near the location of the military unit.

Provides for the participation of members of the Officers' Conference in military-patriotic education of youth, including students in general educational schools, vocational and technical schools, and VUZ's [higher educational institutions], and publicizing among them the significance of the profession of the Soviet officer and the martial feats of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in defending the USSR and performing their international duty, and renders assistance to youth in preparing for entering military training institutions.

The Officers' Conference holds celebrations to honor officers who have achieved success in their work, been granted state awards, had honorary or military titles conferred on them, or been promoted, and on the occasions of celebrations in the family life of the officers and festive farewells to officers, generals, and admirals when they are transferred to a new duty station or go into the reserve or retirement.

The Officers' Conference discusses proposals for nominations for state awards and honorary and military titles and presents its opinion for consideration to the unit certification commission so that the commander can make a decision.

The Officers' Conference mobilizes the officers to maintain military settlements and residential buildings of officer personnel in exemplary condition, develops in them the art of organizing their lives, promotes a sober way of life, combats harmful habits, in conjunction with the women's council studies questions of material-domestic, medical, and trade support for officers and their families. Renders assistance to officers who have just arrived at the unit in settling into their jobs, entering the collective, getting set up, providing housing for them and their families, and finding jobs for officers' wives and other members of their families.

By a decision of the Officers' Conference, in order to render material assistance to needy officers and to conduct measures for other reasons, it is possible to create a voluntary monetary fund from contributions of members of the Officers' Conference, which is expended by a decision of the council of the Officers' Conference. The amounts and procedure for making the contributions are decided at a general Conference of the officer personnel.

The Officers' Conference conducts measures for instilling in officers and their families a love for nature and protection of the environment. In conjunction with the command it organizes leisure and cultural and educational measures for the officers and their families, mass sports work with them, and other kinds of collective recreation.

On the occasion of the anniversary of the military unit, holidays, and other celebrations, with the agreement of the command and the political organs, they can hold comradely dinners, recreational evenings, and Conferences with the participation of the officers' families and guests.

Members of the Officers' Conference participate in the creation and improvement of the base for cultural and educational institutions, sports facilities, and other places for organized recreation of officers and their families. Under a voluntary policy they may submit to the cultural fund of the Officers' Conference works of literature and art, personal creative works, and collections.

In order to solve organizational problems related to conducting mass cultural measures and the leisure of officers and their families, the corresponding work groups are also created under the Council of the Officers' Conference.

In military units that are temporarily stationed abroad the Officers' Conference, with the agreement of the command, can conduct measures in conjunction with representatives of organizations, military units, and institutions of the fraternal and friendly armies of the socialist countries directed toward developing internationalism and strengthening friendship and military cooperation.

The Officers' Conference at the General Conference of officer personnel or the Conference of the council at the suggestion of the commanders (chiefs) and on their initiative and also on the initiative of individual members have the right to consider: —situations of conflict among officers; —cases of insults and tactless behavior; —negative acts of officers (conceit, arrogance, haughtiness, rudeness, toadying, boot licking, and so forth); —abuses of position; —violation of military discipline and officers ethics; —cases of manifestation of social injustice concerning officers; —unworthy behavior on the part of minor children of officers; —cases of unworthy behavior of officers at work, at home, in public places, and other questions.

The Officers' Conference can take measures of social influence against officers for crimes they have committed: —comradely criticism; —comradely warning; —a decision to require a public apology from an officer who has committed one crime or another to the Officers' Conference or to the individual who has been offended; —the initiation of petitions to the command to turn junior officers over to the officers' court of honor for violation of moral-ethical norms and acts not related to the performance of official duties.

WHAT ISSUES ARE RESOLVED BY THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF OFFICER PERSONNEL?

The General Conference of Officer Personnel: —considers and discusses questions related to ensuring exemplary behavior on the part of officers in ideological-political and professional training, and improving the leisure, cultural, material-domestic, medical, and other
kinds for service for officers and their families; — considers questions directed toward developing in officers such qualities as honor and dignity, friendship and comradeship, staying in touch with people, modesty, faithfulness to the word of an officer, initiative and responsibility, mutual demandingness and exactingness, and love for the profession of a Soviet officer; — considers statements from members of the Officers' Conference concerning questions of social protection and justice in military service and personnel problems; — considers cases of unworthy behavior on the part of the officers involving the honor and dignity of the Soviet officer and the officer collective and makes decisions concerning them; — considers cases of insulting and degrading officers; — petitions the command to exclude officers from the list for promotion; — considers questions related to sending officers for training and their early release into the reserve with a discussion of the accompanying documents; — considers and decides the sequence for officers' receipt of housing or improvement of living conditions, places in children's preschool institutions, and so forth.

The discussion of questions raised at the General Conference of Officer personnel is conducted under conditions of openness, comradely criticism, and self-criticism. Each officer has the right to speak regarding the essence of the questions that are raised. No actions directed toward suppressing criticism or restricting the freedom of speech or discussion and criticism of orders of commanders and chiefs are allowed.

The decisions of the General Conference of the officer personnel are made by open voting and are considered to be adopted if more than half of those present at the Conference have voted in favor of them. At the request of the majority of the members of the Officers' Conference, these decisions can be made by secret vote as well.

Suggestions and recommendations of the Officers' Conference are subject to consideration within 1 month by the command and the social organizations of the military unit.

The decisions of the General Conference of Officer personnel on questions within the competence of the Officers' Conference are mandatory for all officers and the entire officer community is informed of them, and in the unit that is affected all personnel are informed of them. The commanders of the military units must take the decision of the Officers' Conference into account and take measures to implement the decrees it has adopted. In the event that the commander of a military unit does not agree with a decision of the Officers' Conference the question is considered by the senior commander.

WHAT ISSUES ARE RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE OFFICERS' CONFERENCE?

In its practically activity the council proceeds from the decisions of the Officers' Conference, the tasks facing the officer personnel and party and Komsomol organizations of the military unit, and also the initiatives of the officers.

The council of the Officers' Conference: — prepares and considers questions subject to discussion at the General Conference of the officer personnel and implements and monitors the fulfillment of decisions made by the Conference; — listens to members of the Officers' Conference concerning their performance of their duties in the area assigned to them; — in daily life conducted individual work with members of the Officers' Conference, invites officers to the Conference of the council where they are hearing opinions and suggestions about respecting the honor and dignity of the Soviet officer, and points out places where they have failed on the job; — contributes to eradicating cases of bureaucratism, encroachment on the legitimate rights of officers, and unjustified accusations of them for job failures, and works to prevent accidents with private vehicles and other legal violations on the part of officers; — at its Conference the council considers letters, statements, and proposals sent to the Officers' Conferences and receives officers to discuss personal issues at the established times; — studies and nominates candidates from the Officers' Conference for social control commissions and work groups of the Officers' Conference; — participates in monitoring the work of military trade institutions, dining rooms, and other consumer service facilities serving the given military unit in order to improve the conditions for serving the officers and their families; — participates in solving problems related to granting officers and their families passes for treatment in sanatoriums, leisure in preventive medical facilities, houses of recreation, pensions, tourist bases, and excursion trips through our country; — in conjunction with the women's council considers questions of the condition of the moral atmosphere in the officers' families and earmarks and discusses measures related to improving work with the children of officers, renders assistance in the work of parents' committees and pedagogical collectives of general educational schools in educating the children of military servicemen, visits officer living quarters and the families of officers, and takes an interest in their lives; — enlists officers for keeping up the residential buildings, the territory of the military settlement, and the sports and children's areas; — in conjunction with the administration of the cultural and educational institutions of the military unit (garrison) determines and discusses measures for improving the cultural service and the aesthetic and ethical education of officers and their families, and organizes discussion of innovations in artistic literature and radio and television programs; — supports the traditions of military rituals related to important events in the lives of officers (arrival in the unit, achievement of a military rank, awards, conferment of honorary titles, farewells when they leave the unit, and so forth).
The council of the Officers' Conference makes all decisions by open voting. A decision is considered adopted if no less than two-thirds of those present at the Conference vote for it.

Upon expiration of its term of office the Council of the Officers' Conference reports on the work it has done to the General Conference of officer personnel. At each regular Conference the Council informs the General Conference of its work, the measures for implementing decisions of the preceding Conference, the realization of proposals, critical remarks made by officers at it, the implementation of its decisions, and also the reaction of the officers in relation to whom measures of social influence have been taken.


The Chairman of the Officers' Conference must: —direct the activity of the Officers' Conference toward solidarity of officer collectives, the development of their friendship and military comradeship, and the solution to other problems related to the life and performance of official duties by officer personnel of the military unit; —participate in all measures conducted in the Officers' Conference and the implementation of the earmarked plans and decisions, and provide material and other means within the limits of the possibilities granted to them; —constantly study and know the demands, needs, and attitudes of the officer community; —take concrete measures against people who suppress criticism expressed at the General Conference or persecute others for this and inform the Officers' Conference of measures that have been taken; —make decisions and render assistance to the Council of the Officers' Conference in conducting measures to honor leading officers who have earned state awards or received honorary titles or regular military titles ahead of schedule, and also officers who have been released into the reserve or retirement who have given irreplaceable service on active military duty.

The Chairman of the Officers' Conference has the right: —to determine and establish the procedure for the work of the Officers' Conference and conduct correspondence on behalf of the Conference; —with the agreement of the Council of the Officers' Conference, to refine plans for the work of the Officers' Conference taking into account tasks that arise suddenly and the conditions for the daily activity of the military unit and also, if necessary, to convene general Conferences of the officer personnel and appoint inspection commissions for checking on the material and financial means of the Officers' Conference.

The chairman of the Council of the Officers' Conference works under the leadership of the Chairman of the Officers' Conference in keeping with the decisions adopted at the General Conference of Officer Personnel and the Conference of the Council of the Officers' Conference.

The chairman of the Council of the Officers' Conference must: —develop plans for the work of the Officers' Conference, discuss them in the Council, and submit them for the approval of the General Conference; —organize the preparation for and conduct of Conferences of the Council of the Officers' Conference in order to discuss current problems pertaining to the activity of the Officers' Conference; in conjunction with members of the council, conduct purposeful work for implementing the decision adopted at General Conferences of the officer personnel and Conference of the Council, and provide for their unconditional fulfillment by all members of the Officers' Conference; —provide for conducting measures in the Officers' Conference; —receive visitors who are members of the Officers' Conference and their families; —hold individual conversations with members of the Officers' Conference, especially young officers, concerning their behavior in the performance of their military duty and their private behavior, and take an interest in their needs, demands, and wishes concerning improvement of the work of the Officers' Conference. They must be concerned about the professional development of graduates of military training institutions and actively participate in their mentor movement; —establish and constantly maintain interaction with political organs and party, Komsomol, and trade union organizations, permanent certification commissions, and local party and soviet organs; —conduct supervision taking into account the expenditure of the monetary fund of the Officers' Conference. Constantly delve into problems of the material, medical, and trade and consumer support and cultural service for officers and their families; —no less frequently than twice a year, report to the Officers' Conference on work done by the Council of the Officers' Conference; —each month inform the Chairman of the Officers' Conference of the work that has been done.

The Chairman of the Council of the Officers' Conference has the right: —to participate in the work of the Permanent Certification Commission, to address the command regarding questions of social protection and justice in military service and solutions to personnel problems involving members of the Officers' Conference; —to conduct, if necessary, unplanned Conferences of the Council of the Officers' Conference; —to give instructions to members of the Council and members of the Officers' Conference concerning the implementation of decisions adopted at the General Conference or Conference of the Council and concerning the organization of measures conducted in the Officers' Conference.

A member of the Officers' Conference must: —value his membership in the Officers' Conference and be concerned about and in all ways support its authority; —participate in all measures conducted in the Officers' Conference and unconditionally fulfill the decisions and instructions of the Chairman of the Officers' Conference.
and the Chairman of the Council of the Officers' Conference; —provide an example of observance of military discipline and the established rules of behavior on the job and in public places; —in all ways contribute to the creation in the officer collective of a situation of mutual respect, comradeship, an attentive attitude toward the authority of each officer, and to the development of a feeling of respect for seniors and closeness to one's subordinates as well as general concern for them; —maintain a close connection with the personnel of the subunits and personally work to maintain a healthy moral atmosphere in the military collectives and prevent nonregulation relations among servicemen; —render assistance to the command and the Council of the Officers' Conference in strengthening collectivism, comradeship, and mutual advantage among officers and their families and eradicating negative phenomena in the officer environment; —participate personally in the work for propagandizing the military traditions of the USSR Armed Forces and the military unit and conducting military-patriotic work among the population, especially youth; —constantly work on improving their political, professional, and legal knowledge and expanding their general theoretical and cultural worldview; —be constantly concerning about the creation of a strong and healthy family and the education of children; render assistance to pedagogical collectives and parent committees of general educational schools in training and educating school children.

A member of the General Officers' Conference has the right: —to freely express his opinion when considering any question in the Officers' Conference. At General Conferences of Officer Personnel he can express his opinion and criticize any member of the Officers' Conference for shortcomings and omissions on duty and in his personal behavior. In the event of suppression of criticism or persecution for it he can submit a written statement to the council of the Officers' Conference; —to appeal to the Officers' Conference with oral or written statements regarding personal problems. Appeal to the Chairman of the Officers' Conference in the event that the member disagrees with a decision adopted concerning him by the Council of the Officers' Conference; —to request that the Officers' Conference or its Council check on the substantiation for his being held materially responsible by the unit command; —in the event of insult or degradation of his honor and dignity, in addition to the Officers' Conference, the officer can appeal to the Comrade's Court of Honor of officers for protection; —to be present at General Conferences of officer personnel and Conferences of the Council of the Officers' Conference when they discuss the applications, complaints, requests submitted by him or the misdeed committed by him; —with the permission of the Council of the Officers' Conference, to invite his relatives, loved ones, friends, and associates to cultural and educational measures that are conducted.

Taking into account the specific nature of the activity of the military unit, if necessary, the Officers' Conference can develop and approve at a general Conference of the officer personnel individual documents regulating the activity of the Officers' Conference of the military unit which correspond to the goals and principles contained in the present temporary statute.

FROM THE EDITORS: These temporary statutes concerning the Officers' Conference are intended to be in effect for roughly 2 years. During this time the Officers' Conferences will undoubtedly gain experience. The editors hope to receive materials regarding this experience from our readers and also suggestions and requests for the preparation of the permanent statute.

In the next issue of the magazine we shall publish a clarification for those who have been released into the reserve.

Copyright: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1989

Belorussian MD Calls For Civilian Support of Fall Draft
90UM0123B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 4 Nov 89 p 6


[Text] Dear Comrades!
The next draft of citizens for active military service has begun. Soon they will become full-fledged soldiers of our glorious Armed Forces in which an active process of perestroika and renewal is occurring as it is in all of Soviet society.
The Soviet Army is the offspring of its own people and it needs the people's constant attention, concern, and support.
The Military Soviet appeals to local party and government agencies, society, and to all workers of the republic. Offer encouragement and assistance to military commissariats in organizing the draft of citizens for active military service and solemnly lead them to the Armed Forces.
The drafted soldiers from the heroic Belorussian land upon which their ancestors profusely shed their blood have themselves always been an example of selfless service to the Fatherland, have performed and continue to perform difficult service in every corner of our immense Fatherland, and continue the glorious military and working traditions of their people.
The Military Soviet appeals to all worker and student collectives from which the Armed Forces are reinforced. Organize solemn send-offs for the conscripts, order them to conscientiously perform their military duties, do not forget to maintain contact with them, and express constant interest in their service. The entry of young people
into Army ranks and their moods and attitudes toward their military duties, the atmosphere in military collectives and, finally, the combat capability of the Armed Forces in many ways depends on this. The prestige of your collective is linked to the outstanding service of your conscripts.

The Military Soviet appeals to conscripts' parents, relatives, and dear ones. During their service in the ranks of the Armed Forces, your sons, brothers, relatives, and friends will pass through the school of courage, combat proficiency, patriotism, and internationalism and they need kind parting words, constant support, and consideration. Establish close contacts with command and political workers, respond to their letters and requests, and visit their military units! When necessary, you can state your own requests, desires, and questions to the district commander at telephone number 39-26-20.

We invite you to the military units where your sons are serving during open house days, to swearing-in ceremonies, and on unit anniversaries. The soldiers will greet you as their dearest and most welcome guests.

The Military Soviet appeals to Komsomol organizations, soldier-internationalists, and to all the young people of the republic. Conscripts into the Armed Forces are leaving your ranks today. Show them your consideration and concern! Lead them to their military service sincerely with a feeling of fellowship and friendship! Do not forget that they were educated in your youth collectives and that they will bring your traditions to the Armed Forces of the USSR.

The Military Soviet appeals to conscripts. Fulfillment of military service to defend the Socialist Fatherland by you begins from the moment your notification is presented [to you]. Be disciplined and observe order at the conscription points and while traveling to military units. From your first days of service, strive to be highly disciplined, active, and mature defenders of the Fatherland, persistently acquire military proficiency, and strengthen friendship and military fellowship. Let the fact that you are entering the service from the heroic Belorussian land cause a feeling of legitimate pride among you. Be true to its traditions.

I wish you success in fulfilling your sacred duty and honorable obligation to our beloved multinational Fatherland!

Lt Gen Zinchenko: ‘Nationality Aspects of Military Service’

90UM0123A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 11 Nov 89 p 3


[Text] Conscription into the Army is, for many young people, the first separation from home and entry into an adult, independent life. Therefore it is entirely understandable that not only the conscript but also his parents and primarily his mother will be anxious and nervous. How can a mother's heart not be in pain and not be alarmed! And a subconscious reflex is also added to all this: How to protect and shield her offspring from possible dangers and adversity? Such is the maternal psychology and the maternal instinct. They are set by nature itself and by the entire female essence.

Dear parents, we military men, future commanders, and leaders of your sons under whose command and guardianship the recruits will end up are also not indifferent to how their Army life takes shape. Your interests and our interests completely coincide here. Therefore, we also need to think and act in concert so that young men, having become soldiers, honorably fulfill their civic duty and return home healthy, stronger, and more mature. Thus it is better for us to join forces and not oppose [one another].

Economic and political reforms are occurring in the nation. Laws are being improved. Respect for and unconditional observance of the law are rightfully thought to be the core of the population's civic and legal education. And insofar as the Law on Universal Military Obligation is in force in its former scope and content at the present time, we need to carry it out. Amendments will be made to it or it will be adopted in a new version—we will have to carry it out in the form in which it is approved. But until that occurs, we must carry out what we have as is customary in any civilized, democratic state.

But how do we prepare our young men for military service? In what atmosphere does this occur and how does it affect the recruit's psychological make-up? And finally, his state of mind? And what, exactly, can his state [of mind] be when various types of well-wishers suggest he is going to serve in an occupation army where harassment and derision await him, where his national self-consciousness will be suppressed, and where his nationalist consciousness will be violated.

How will all of this impact on a young man's still inadequately developed psyche? I think everyone understands after such upbringing and such “parting words” that a young man will cross the barracks threshold in not nearly a happy frame of mind.

I foresee my opponents' objection: And is it really not true? Is there really no “dedovshchina” in the Army, can we really be silent about the truth or embellish it to please the Army leadership? Thank God, these are not such times.

Of course, we do not need to conceal the truth. Let us talk, to what extent are these accusations grounded, do they correspond to truth and logic, verbal attacks and labels. At the same time, I will divide them into three elements—“the occupation syndrome” (this is what we
call charges of occupation), mutual relations at variance with regulations, and the alleged suppression of national self-consciousness which exists in the Army. And thus, in sequence.

Let us imagine this picture. A man has arbitrarily formed a statute or its article and, later, having placed some facts or deeds beneath it, he renders his own verdict. Nonsense, you say? Undoubtedly. But is this not how it occurs with “occupation” and “occupation army” based on the “right” to refuse to serve in it?

In the Baltic Republics—at train stations, at bus stations, and in squares, we managed to see appeals of various extremist organizations (in particular, the so-called League of Freedom of Latvia) to young men to refuse to serve in the Soviet Army on the basis... of the Geneva Convention that forbids occupation authorities from conscripting the population of occupied territories into its army. And a logical (?) deduction is made on this “basis”: To the extent that the Baltic Republics are occupied territories, consequently, in accordance with international law (?), young men of draft age may refuse military conscription. Deft, indeed. They themselves announce the occupation and they themselves refer to this “statute” as the legal basis.

Let us delve into the concept of “occupation.”

It is interpreted as the forcible (using armed forces) seizure of foreign territory. We will emphasize territory. Are troops of the [military] district really deployed on the territory of the Soviet Baltic Republics? Or only on territory set aside (however through an agreement with republic authorities) for garrisons and individual military posts? And there really is a difference and a very great one. Let us proceed further. Not one order (already not speaking about any laws) can be given on occupied territory without the approval of military authorities for they and only they completely control everything on occupied territory. All economic and political activity, jurisprudence, etc. are under their strict control.

Rather than say a lot here, it is sufficient to recall the Fascist occupation. And what do we have right now in the Baltic Republics? What interference does the military bring to bear in civilian life?

Let us proceed further. The invaders themselves select where they live and what benefits they enjoy, in short, they do what they want. Do the invaders not conduct themselves quite strangely in the Baltic Republics: They live, wherever they can, right up to in attics and office buildings. Each case of damage to crops in the field is calculated to the kopek for the slightest damage. And they also build homes and roads. The former are rushed to the aid of the population in the event of misfortune befalls them. Is it not interesting in accordance with which “conventions” and for which “actions” they are considered to be occupation troops?

Maybe the presence of troops in and of itself is occupation? But let us say there is a mighty British Army of the Rhine in the FRG. And there are a total of 1,500 U.S. military facilities and bases on foreign territories. For some reason this does not cause objections or protests but we are—“invaders.”

And, nevertheless, we hear and see this insulting, blasphemous word “invader” on picketers’ banners. It is drummed into the heads of civicly immature young men. And some of them swallow the bait. This is only one example.

Private K. Yasulyavichus, under the influence of the “occupation syndrome” (and more accurately, as a result of having it systematically drummed into his head) refused to take the military oath, left his unit, started to look for sponsorship from the leaders of informal movements, and later appealed to “Sajudis” activists. Only on the ninth day did the lads suggest (luckily) that he appeal to the Republic Presidium of the Supreme Soviet where the situation he found himself in was explained to him. On that very day, he was brought back to his unit by relatives. But it turned out that he was already beyond the limits of the law and he had to answer for it. But the court considered all mitigating circumstances of guilt and did not incarcerate him (Yasulyavichus received one year with a two year reprieve). Now the soldier is serving normally. The court treated him humanely. And what about these instigators, these “soul hunters”? Alas, they have not put their nets away for now and they continue to crow about the “occupation” and sow strife in young undeveloped minds.

And what honest Latvian youth, having put on a soldier’s overcoat, wants to hear the insulting word “invader”? He is outraged and indignant: How can I be an invader in my own country? Just what kind of oppression are Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians enduring from people in military uniform? None whatsoever! Moreover, the “oppressors” are living under much more crowded conditions than many local residents. Thus do we need to poison our own sons’ consciousness with the “occupation” virus that is cultivated in extremist elements’ test tubes and laboratories? Would it not really be better for all of us if young men come to the Army with clear minds and happy feelings?

Sometimes parental guardianship is excessive. This tragicomic incident which occurred in one of the units located abroad is evidence of this. Private Aigars Krievs, working at a pig farm, severely bruised his leg while unloading feed and ended up in the hospital. In a letter from there to home, he mentioned in passing that he had argued with fellow serviceman K. Belekov and that Belekov had punched him. This really started something! The League of Women of Latvia rose to Krievs’ defense. USSR People’s Deputy Yu. Boyars became involved. A demand was sent to the commander to immediately transfer Krievs to Latvia or an appeal would be sent to the UN. The incident at the pig farm threatened to develop into an international scandal. If Private Krievs himself had not begun to assert that he did not need to be transferred anywhere, that he wants to
serve here, that besides the altercation with Private K.
Belekov (of which Kriyev himself was guilty, since he
fell asleep while on duty and his fellow serviceman,
having found him sleeping, did not treat him too well),
nothing else of this sort had occurred at the unit, no one
is threatening anyone and, on the contrary, this is a very
good and friendly collective.

I can list even more similar cases of “false alarms.”

Now about non-regulation relations. Yes, it has still not
been eliminated and it has not been eradicated every-
where. Although its position has been greatly constricted
and it is no longer conducted on a massive scale. More
likely the contrary: The results of the analysis are evi-
dence that this disgraceful phenomenon does not exist in
90 percent of companies, batteries, or equivalent sub-
units. But no one is planning to surrender to it. Preven-
tive work is being conducted. We need to involve all
healthy forces in the struggle with “dedovshchina.” In
concert, without accusing each other and without cov-
ering up these disgraceful facts of life that are alien to the
Army system but also without stirring unhealthy pas-
sions around them. Those who follow the military press
can be convinced: We do not have “secret” zones in this
regard, the honor of the “uniform” is not predominating
during trials of the cases discovered, but on the contrary,
the forces of glasnost, legal and social protection of
servicemen are being involved and the principle of inevitability of
punishment for what has been done is being put into action.

But in this struggle, it would appear that we are having to
clash with an unexpected phenomenon. Some young
men are literally programmed for servile patience: They
say, I will endure this “prescribed” period of time for a
new person, and later I will win back on others. And it
turns out that this “complex” is imbued in them while
they are still in school, PTU [Vocational and Technical
School], technicum, at boarding school, or at a children’s
home. And it is very difficult to overcome. Frequently
even military lawyers run into an inexplicable wall of
contradiction... the victim (“fell,” “bruised himself,” or
“slipped”) during investigation of cases of dedovsh-
china. It turns out that many young men have a sup-
pressed, deformed sense of their own dignity and their
moral criteria and concepts of friendship and comrade-
ship are distorted. It would hardly be legitimate to look
for the roots of this damage only in the Army.

I must also say something else. Why distort the truth and
incite fear about the draft among young people? What do
I have in mind? Unfortunate instances and cases of
servicemen’s deaths. No one, as we all know, can be
insured from them. Unfortunately, such cases happen
(we very carefully look into each one of them). We do
everything possible to prevent them. But they do occur.
And speculation, disinformation, and distortions begin.
Is this not a shameful phenomenon—to play on grief and
misfortune? Why is an unfortunate instance transformed
into murder? The mass media is also not innocent in this
matter. Here is an example.

In October, the newspaper ATMODA printed pictures of
deceased servicemen. The captions under them also ring
out like shots: “Shot,” “murdered.” Or “suicide,” but
with a knowing question mark. In particular, one can also
read such captions under the pictures of Yuri
Yusupov and Martin Svilans. At the same time, (the
investigation documents talk about this) the first of them
died as a result of negligent handling of a weapon
(inadvertently squeezed the trigger of an assault rifle
which violated the most elementary safety procedures
and personal weapons handling regulations) and the
other committed suicide (and this was not the first
attempt, they managed to prevent a previous attempt).

Unfortunately, this also happens. Impassive statistics
also record this alarming trend—the number of young
people with unstable psyches, who are emotionally ill,
weak-willed, or do not know how to control themselves is
growing. In civilian life, cases of suicide do not occur so
noticeably but in the Army they acquire conjecture,
generalization, and their own context. But really society
and the Army are communicating vessels. Any “dis-
eases,” “viruses,” and even general trends immediately
transfer from one to the other.

All of this does not nearly signify that the Army has
resigned itself to these types of “ChP” [emergency situ-
ation] fatalities. We extract lessons from each one and
specific individuals take personal responsibility for each
of them. But it is really more worthless and dishonorable
to introduce such, putting it mildly, temporary correct-
tions and to even circulate falsehoods in the mournful
lines of a tragic end. To immorally and blasphemously
manipulate the causes of death through wording. Such
papers do not bring dividends to anyone.

And in conclusion on “suppression of national self-
consciousness” and “forcible Russification” through
military service.

One can hardly think up a more untenable “theory.” But
since the theory exists, it is impossible not to say
anything about it.

We must regret that a number of incidental negative
phenomena managed to get by along with such positive
processes as the growth of peoples’ national self-
consciousness and the development and adoption of
laws on languages and others. One of them is the increase
in the contingent of soldiers who speak the Russian
language poorly. This is all the more incomprehensible
and strange since throughout the world a trend is being
observed toward destruction of language barriers and
study of as great a number of languages as possible that,
incidentally, was always inherent to the people of the
Baltic Republics. Now it seems that the very status of a
state language was interpreted by many as a trend toward
self-limitation and isolation. The Russian language as a
means of international intercourse is perceived by some
as a concealed attempt at Russification. But this appears
to be absurd and it contradicts common sense.
It is also permissible to ask: Just who is it in the Army that suppresses national self-consciousness? Who prohibits young men of the Baltic Republics from getting publications in their native languages? (Many unit sub-units have subscriptions to such newspapers). Of course, the processes occurring in the sphere of internationalist relations, once again according to that same principle of communicating vessels, are also being transmitted into military collectives. But no one has ever encouraged national discord or the confrontation of one nation by another. On the contrary, (and everyone may be convinced of this since there is now open access to all units), internationalist education and unifying of military collectives on this basis occupy a leading position in educational activities of commanders, political agencies, Party and Komsomol organizations. The microbes of nationalism and chauvinism, if they end up in Army ranks, will not find a culture medium here.

The soldiers themselves say that there is still no better school of internationalism than the Army. Of course, a soldier’s development is not a simple [process].

The main thing will depend on the soldier himself. But much also depends on us—commanders, chiefs, fellow servicemen, and you, the young soldier’s parents, relatives, and dear ones and on your send-off, support, and spiritual warmth. So let us combine our efforts for the sake of our common cause and benefit—the education of a generation worthy of the life that is being created right now during the process of our revolutionary perestrojka.

Letters to Editor on Military—Nationality Relations

90UM0119A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Nov 89 First Edition p 1

[Letters to the Editor by Various Authors: “We Need To Live in the Common Home”]

[Text] As before, there is an abundant flow of readers’ letters to the editor in which the authors raise various aspects of internationalist [mezhnatsionalny] relations. But if we analyze them and compare them with those that arrived just two months ago, we can see an essential difference. Our readers judge many important problems that trouble them from the principled positions developed by the September CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the “Party National Policy in Contemporary Conditions” platform adopted by it.

Many critical issues are being raised in letters arriving at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. But one thing unites our readers: The striving to find the true path out of the complex labyrinth of inter-ethnic problems and to strengthen our Soviet federation and our harmony and friendship.

Who is Calming Mother?

Until recently, I was a fervent supporter of the Popular Front of Latvia (NFL), but now my attitude has changed. And this is why, I am a veteran, I fought here at the end of the war, and I liberated this land from the Fascists. I can remember very well how the population greeted us. What we saw at that time in Riga, Yelga, and other cities, heaps of debris and a death factory at Salaspils. I have to say that they greeted us as liberators and as good friends. And now we hear insults directed at us and even threats here and there. And how do they treat officers and soldiers now? May one ask what these young men are guilty of? Are they guilty of being assigned to this land as a duty location and not to Kursk or Orlovskiy, Amur or Chita [Oblast]?

Officers of the local garrison recently told me how a mother of a young soldier from Leningrad arrived to visit. They could not provide her with quarters at the unit so she and her son went to a hotel in the city. She returned the next day in tears because she heard a woman say quite a few insults that were directed at her. A motorcyclist ran into her and her son at a bus stop, ripping her overcoat and bruising her arm. They barely managed to calm the mother and she is so terribly concerned about her son who ended up serving in Latvia.

I know that clean and tidy city very well and I know quite a few marvelous people who live here. It is precisely for that reason that I must say: Remember, stop, and think about what can happen next and about what the soldier’s mother will tell other mothers.

I am sharing my thoughts with my comrades, including representatives of the People’s Front. They argue that the NFL had no part in it and that they condemn such activities. But where are the facts? I personally did not hear or see the People’s Front come to the defense of veterans of war, of Soviet Army officers, or of young men in Army overcoats. Are there not grounds to think that all of these outrages are occurring with the silent consent and approval of the NFL?

N. Ivanov Latvian SSR

Let Us Not Lose What We Have Attained

Sumgait, Karabakh, Fergana, Novyy Uven, the social storms in the Baltic States, Abkhaiya, and here in Moldavia... The “hot spots” and the centrifugal onrush of other “informalists” who are attempting to push through their ambitious plans by covering them with the clothing of nationalist aspirations trouble, alarm, and frighten people and they cause our hearts to sink. It is too bad that we are weakly resisting this today and that we are listlessly and indecisively objecting to and opposing all of these manifestations and trends. Although we must and are obliged to think about the fate of our Fatherland—the only one for our people that was brought together during our common ordeals through the blood of sons of different races. Time demands this.

Hitler, not without the help of the Stalinists, succeeded in decapitating our Army and undermining our strength in the 1930’s. But even then, in spite of the repression and violence, resentment and bitterness, we did not lose
the main thing—our friendship and our unity. The Fascists’ stake on a nationalist split in the Soviet Union was shattered.

Internationalism was our weapon and shield both during the Civil War and during the Great Patriotic War. But right now during this critical period when so many problems and concerns have accumulated in the common Soviet home, has this weapon been rendered obsolete and made unnecessary? Are we really capable of moving perestroika ahead, having isolated ourselves from each other with nationalist blinders? We need to improve internationalist relations and fill them with new content, only we must do this thoughtfully and responsibly. Let us look at history, it can teach us a lot.

Internationalism and patriotism cannot be transmitted through inheritance. These noble qualities of the spirit must be painstakingly cultivated in people from childhood.

We all need to think about this. And primarily writers, journalists, and artists. Many of them have become people’s deputies and quite a few of them are those who joined and even led new social movements. Let us not forget that the main tasks are creative ones. It is impossible to move forward without looking around or [we will] lose what has been acquired and tested by time and fire.

Yu. Golyshiev, Lieutenant Colonel, retired, Kishinev

Many Problems Have Accumulated

Today we can read candid appeals for separation from Moscow and a return to the past in some of the Ukrainian “informalists” slogans. But what past are we talking about? We, the Ukrainians, remember all too well the deeds of the Kurkulsyki bands of the 1930’s and the Banderovyki bands of the 1940’s and 1950’s. There should not be a return to such a past.

OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] members in the West know very well that, having morally degenerated our young people, they can thus deprive us of our future. And young people are people who are easily carried away and they often follow those who know how to speak eloquently and who can paint enticing pictures of the future. And the “ennobling” of the anti-popular banditry is going on under the slogans of the struggle for national self-determination. And I am sure that he who stands for all of this is only seeking personal power and not good for the Ukrainian people.

What do we need to counterbalance the unleashing of nationalist sentiments? First of all, immediate elimination of those errors in nationalities policy that have accumulated in our country over the decades. For example, there are forty schools in my home town and they are all Russian language schools. This is clearly abnormal.

In short, if we want our young people to follow us, we need to prove by our everyday business that they can trust the perestroika which the Party heads.

N. Serdyukova, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

We Appeal: Do Not Knuckle Under

We, constant readers of your newspaper and servicemen of one Western Group of Forces unit, are writing to you. The current draft is occurring and we are worried that instances of conscripts refusing military service are more frequently taking place and a “boycott” campaign of conscription has begun “thanks” to the acts of a number of informal movements and incompetent current events articles in periodicals on life in the Armed Forces.

Unquestionably, the Army cannot get by without perestroika. But the single large Army organism cannot be cured by dismembering it into a multitude of small national ones like the people’s fronts and movements of the Ukraine, Moldavia, the Baltic Republics, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia are calling for. Only people who are totally removed from the problems of the nation’s defense and the structure of its Armed Forces can think this. How and at the expense of what people will large formations and units be manned which make up the groups of forces and crews of submarines and surface ships located far from the shores of the Baltic Republics and the Caucasus? Soldiers of what nationalities will sit at the control panels of launch complexes and at radar screens? How will headquarters and commanders coordinate if they speak dozens of “state republic languages”? No one has answered these questions thus far.

The history of a people is always the history of its labor and military glory. Men’s skill at cultivating and defending it has been valued on any land since time immemorial. It is no accident that the appropriate symbols are being repeated in nationalist symbolism. Like the Georgians’ grapevine and sword, for example.

But of course, the Army is not only about training to master weaponry. In an Army collective, people frequently acquire peaceful professions, learn to better understand one another, make friends, distinguish truth from lies, and nobility from baseness. Here a consciousness of the sense of Fatherland, patriotism, and internationalism arrives. Is this really not therefore the primary reason why people always and everywhere respond to the military uniform. That is how it was at Chernobyl, in Armenia, and that is how it will be henceforth.

We, servicemen and representatives of the various peoples of the nation who are performing service beyond its borders, call upon our contemporaries to not follow those who play on national feelings, use youthful maximalism, and attempt to amass political capital for themselves. We must defend the Fatherland.

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

‘Informal’ Groups: Role of Komsomol in Military
90UM01119B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko: “And The Applause Subsided... Then the Question Arose About the Results of an Unofficial Meeting of Komsomol Workers in Arkhangelsk”]

[Text] Today no one is surprised by informal groups and organizations. But “informalists” in military uniform and the majority of them officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers... All of this is somehow unusual... And now a group of Northern Fleet and Leningrad Military District Komsomol workers are advocating a proposal to conduct informal meetings of Army and Navy Komsomol activists to discuss problems which have accumulated in their work. The idea, as they say, has been set in motion. The “Arkhangelsk Meeting”—this is the name it has acquired—has taken place.

Fourteen people participated in it, although the organizers thought that it would be more representative. But we will neither be ironic nor will we discuss the failure. We agree that the very fact that such a meeting occurred says that youthful initiative is being given a range in Army and Navy Komsomol organizations, each is able to express his opinion on some problem, and each can participate in these perestroyka processes with which the Armed Forces Komsomol lives today. It is another matter if this is always of a constructive nature. And it is from that point of view that we will also look at the work of the “Arkhangelsk Meeting” participants.

It is time to present the “rabble-rousers of Komsomol tranquility”—the members of the initiative group. They are Komsomol activists and staff Komsomol workers of lower and “slightly higher” elements: Chief Petty Officer J. Zernov, Senior Naval Warrant Officer V. Shamshin, Senior Lieutenant V. Mostovenko, and Captains M. Oleynik, A. Shemyanin, and S. Semenov.

Let us turn to the meeting’s agenda. It’s main points are: Assessment of the situation that has taken shape within Armed Forces Komsomol organizations, the attitude toward the meeting of Army and Navy Komsomol activists that recently occurred in Moscow, on the advisability of establishing an independent union of young people of the Armed Forces with its own program and charter, and on cooperation of Komsomol organizations with commanders, political organs, and party organizations.

Members of the initiative group stated that Army and Navy Komsomol members are entirely capable of not only being a “VLKSM [All-Union Komsomol] combat detachment” as they are often called, but can also have an independent organization with its own program and charter, and with its specific nature that a “civilian Komsomol” does not have.

And really is the idea so Utopian of the establishment of an independent (in the organizational sense) “Komsomol in shoulder boards”? It cannot be denied that it sounds attractive.

And there seems to be a basis for it. A Komsomol organization has essentially already been formed in the Army and Navy that exists not only in accordance with the laws of the VLKSM but also in accordance with principles that are only customary in the Armed Forces. It is already one thing that practical work here is being based on instructions to the Soviet Army and Navy VLKSM organizations, on directives from the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate, and in a certain sense places the Army and Naval Komsomol in a special position within the framework of the VLKSM. And the initiative group of the “Arkhangelsk Meeting” proposed “bringing form in line with content.”

How? The meeting’s participants had no single opinion.

A heated discussion broke out. It is only too bad that common sense often vanished during the course of it. And the experience that they already have. It is true that the meeting’s participants nevertheless need to more deeply and more attentively study the decisions of the Army and Navy Komsomol activists’ conference at which, in my opinion, a comprehensive, constructive concept was developed for structural perestroyka of the Armed Forces Komsomol organization.

But the impression was created that certain of the meeting participants simply had the goal of absolutely refuting it and of finding a “worthy alternative” to it at any costs.

This is not an altogether creative approach.

Captain 2nd Rank A. Pyatygin, senior instructor of the Komsomol Affairs Department of the Main Political Directorate, Lieutenant Colonel A. Kasyanov, Professor of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, Captain-Lieutenant I. Shulgin, USSR People’s Deputy, and G. Shvetov, a VLKSM Central Committee worker asked to say a few words.

It was hard to refute their observation that the meeting’s participants, who were opposed to formalism in the life of Komsomol organizations, were they themselves at the same time attracted to the formal side of the issue. The opinions and arguments are interesting, they are outwardly attractive, but they do not have sufficient depth or basis. Well good, the Armed Forces Komsomol will become a completely independent unit. In that case what can we do about a Border Guards Komsomol? Internal Forces? Do they create their own unions of young people, too? According to this logic, why not? But the process of delimitation can go even further. Voices are ringing out to create Komsomol organizations within the Armed Forces on a nationality basis...

What will we arrive at? What do we want?
These questions are far from trite.

And they need to be answered.

Views and positions have begun to come together. This process was not easy. And nevertheless in the end voting was unanimous for the resolution "On Paths Toward Democratization of the USSR Armed Forces Komsomol." It it true that those gathered nevertheless stipulated that they had "made concessions" on some point or other. These were concessions to common sense:

"We support the decision of the meeting of the Army and Navy Komsomol activists which occurred during September of this year in Moscow on establishment of a Komsomol organ election system from below to above in the form of soviet of Komsomol organizations... However, we consider this only the first step on the path toward democratization of Army and Navy Komsomol... While participating in the deepening of democratization of social life in the Armed Forces of the USSR, Komsomol organizations promote the consolidation of yedinonachaliye [sole responsibility of the commander for both political and military matters]. Political organs run Komsomol organizations by political methods while excluding administrative bureaucracy and petty stewardship. Party organizations carry out their influence through communists working in Komsomol organizations and consider the opinion of the Komsomol while arriving at their own decisions and cooperate with it in practical work. We arrived at the conclusion on the need for including the chapter on "The Commander (Head) and Social Organizations" in the Internal Service Charter of the USSR Supreme Soviet. "These are priority tasks for the Komsomol of the Armed Forces: 1) providing VLKSM leadership in a youthful environment; 2) increasing the specific contribution of VLKSM members to insure qualitative parameters of combat readiness; and, 3) establishing an effective mechanism for expressing the interests and defending the rights of young people."

Besides the resolution, they also adopted two documents on a model of the Armed Forces Komsomol organization.

Why two? All of the meetings participants' views are still different. Some have adhered to the opinion that the Army needs a Union that is independent in everything... Others—that [it needs] an Armed Forces' VLKSM organization that nevertheless has equal rights with republic unions of young people. Let us point out that the meeting of Army and Navy Komsomol activists made just such a decision. But something else is important: The meeting's participants stated that on this issue we should let the Komsomol members themselves discuss it and let them make the final selection.

"We consider the main result of the "Arkhangelsk Meeting" to be the very fact that it was conducted," stated members of the initiative group. "The stereotype that everything interesting and valuable must only come from above will be overcome."

Incidentally, that very "above," the Komsomol Affairs Department of the Main Political Directorate did not interfere in "overcoming" that "stereotype" either.

Yes, the stereotype was overcome. One more time. But in another way if you look deeper. The stereotype in public opinion about Army and Navy Komsomol is as an organization that is completely closed to living young people's business, bursts [of emotion], and transformations. Organizations in which any "democratic license" is impermissible, that do not dare to have their own opinions," and that only wait for the next orders and the next directives from the political organs and commander.

I think that it was clear to people that it was not so.

The "Arkhangelsk Meeting" is yet one more confirmation.

But it also confirmed something else. Good bursts [of emotion] and projects in and of themselves still will have not produced real results if deep knowledge of some problem does not stand behind them, if all of its complications are not considered, or if there is no grounded development of ways to solve the problem.

Volga-Ural MD: Flow of Military Weapons to Civilians

90UM0129A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 89 First Edition p4

[Article by Lt-Col G. Shmidt, Chief, Missile and Artillery Armament Service, Volga-Ural Military District: "Souvenirs out of Projectiles: How to Stop the Flow of Weapons and Ammunition from Military Units?"

[Text] We have been reading with increasing frequency newspaper accounts of thefts of weapons from military supply depots and arsenals and of ammunition from firing ranges and training grounds.

I tell you frankly that I—a specialist in missile and artillery armaments—find it difficult to read such accounts. I find it even more difficult to answer the question: what is going on with you military people? You feel especially that people are justified in their alarm when you see the link between stolen weapons and the notification of a murder, gunfire or the explosion of a mine or grenade.

As reported in the press, the search is on for 8,945 firearms. Of this number 1,952 belong to the USSR Ministry of Defense. This amounts to about 22 percent of the number of weapons which the criminal world has "in service". Such figures make a person do some serious thinking.

Yes, the theft of weapons and ammunition is an acute and burning question that has not bypassed our district.

A fourteen-year-old, Roman M., lost all the fingers of his right hand as a result of explosion of a large-caliber
round. Who is the most to blame? The juvenile himself? His father—an officer—who did not beat into his son's head what can happen if he plays with ammunition? The training center chief, who did not prevent intrusion of an unauthorized person into the range, where the boy found the round? The chief of the unit missile and artillery armaments, who does not keep a count of returned cartridge cases? Questions, questions.

Also, even after the guilty parties are found and measures are taken after the fact, is there a guarantee that tomorrow another boy will not get his hands on a battle noise simulator, signal flare, or grenade? Do you realize that the training ground and the firing range are located near the unit? Are we to set up a double or a triple range guard? Or encircle the area with several rows of barbed wire? Would it not be better to determine why a dull, brassy round suddenly shows up in the training ground grass or a mortar round tail is protruding from the sand?

It is an inescapable fact that any large field exercise leaves behind something—perhaps an extremely small piece—from an unexploded mortar round, rocket, projectile, or artillery round. Their collection and destruction is the duty of the range detail—something which ordinarily is done. However, if the area is used intensively and the detail numbers only a few men, it is virtually impossible to collect all ammunition down to the last piece.

But field exercises are not the only events to consider. Even routine firing can "sow" ammunition over an area. The following is the typical situation on the training ground of the unit in which the father of Roman M. serves. A motorized rifle company in training arrived there to perform train-firing. It arrived behind schedule—a not uncommon occurrence. This meant that the commander was faced at the outset with making a choice: were he to proceed as required by instructions, some of the cadets would not even get to "smell" gunpowder. But if he were to deviate only slightly from the instructions, all his personnel would spend some time on the firing line. The commander also realized that battalion headquarters wanted him to produce a completed evaluation report, not an explanation as to why he did not complete the exercise.

Thus, he made his choice and committed the first errors: hastily organizing the ammunition supply point and placing a poorly trained man—an enlisted man or NCO—in charge of this task. The latter proceeded to hurriedly issue ammunition from a shelter half spread out on the ground. It should be understood that he was keeping only an approximate count. Since spent cartridge cases were returned to the depot "in bulk", not by the piece, there was no way to determine how many rounds were fired and how many were lost. There likewise was no "one-by-one" count made by the battle simulation team, which can also be provided with battle noise simulators, signal flares, and smoke pots, in addition to artillery rounds.

An accurate count is burdensome for all concerned: the commander of a subunit, which can expend thousands of rounds in the course of a field exercise, and the Chief of the artillery supply depot, who will make a rough guess, not count thousands of empty cartridge cases. However, the major cause here is not the "out and in" process; it is the firing rating received that determines the company's success.

Small boys who live on post do not care that the requirement for setting evaluations for firing accuracy degrades the training process of the units in which their fathers serve. What they want to do is slip through the thin range guard and pick up the artillery rounds, spent cases, and, perhaps, a grenade that may be lying in the grass. Then they can go home and brag to their friends.

I would be remiss if I did not mention that "X" unit does now have a procedure for maintaining a record of storage and use of all types of ammunition and weapons. At the same time, to satisfy the normal curiosity of small boys, military instructors have been provided with simulation ammunition and training weapons for use in grade schools. Social organizations have also been enlisted in this effort.

However, let us not dwell exclusively on juveniles. In the absence of suitable controls, ammunition does more than become lost in a training ground's grass. It also can "walk" into barracks and repair shops. I remember an instance when soldiers used a hacksaw to cut open an live mine so that a clever warrant officer could make an ash tray for the commander. In another unit, I saw soldiers with their emblems of valor mounted on brass bases. They were fashioned out of empty large-caliber cartridge cases. "Combat" metal is also used to fabricate miniature tanks, aircraft, candles, and other souvenirs.

However, the above is nothing more than pranks that are usually harmless.

On the other hand, real harm is done—and a crime committed—in cases where weapons are channeled to unauthorized persons by officials of missile and artillery armaments. I shall never forget a much-discussed incident whereby 41 pieces of firearms and ammunition were stolen by Warrant Officer Kovalov.

How can something like this and other cases be explained? Is this a breakdown of personality? Moral turpitude? It is a little bit of both. When you look into the "anatomy" of such a crime, you see that something like this is also made possible by the normative codes of our service.

Can you tell me how a warrant officer possessing high moral qualities can be selected to fill the position of an artillery supply depot chief if people do not want to serve in low-paying jobs? You must realize that the chief of an artillery supply depot is paid the same as the chief of a clothing or rations depot. I do not wish to offend the representatives of other services, but our service is
definitely special. As it now stands, maintaining responsibility for the safekeeping of machineguns is held at the same level of esteem as that of meat products.

Once they realize the above, young warrant officers leave to take assignments as company first sergeants or platoon leaders so that they can earn the additional 40 to 50 rubles.

Clearly, the problem cannot be resolved at the district level. In my view, the time has come to review the pay scales from the standpoint of amount of responsibility and scope of tasks performed by the particular specialist.

Something else is disturbing. It is becoming increasingly difficult to protect storage facilities and depots with alarm systems. More often than not, those that are available are obsolete or quite primitive.

We entertained high hopes of receiving deliveries from a central source; instead, what we did receive was the Baryer system, with only the control panel and sensors provided as standard. As for the connecting cable, we must obtain it wherever we can.

Or take the area alarm system. To set it up, you must have special reinforced concrete posts, special barbed wire, and special cable. Installation can cost as much as 50,000 rubles. Since appropriations for our service are authorized by the “Capital Construction” and “Capital Repair of Buildings” articles of the District Billeting Directorate and the post billeting unit, much red tape and lost motion are involved.

Even after I were to overcome all difficulties and complete endless coordination of countless papers, sooner or later the problem of servicing and repair will crop up. Who will do this? No one in the ranks possesses this kind of training. This means that once more I must turn to civilian organizations; once more I must beg; once more I must try to think of a way to pay for the work. Is it even wise to show strangers around and let them see the alarm system?

All this most likely could be avoided by charging the chief of the district missile and artillery service—who is responsible for the safekeeping of weapons and ammunition—with the additional tasks of providing finances, training of repair specialists, and furnishing of materials and supplies.

Deserving of a separate discussion is the subject of the so-called major materiel supply depots, which provide arms and ammunition; we would be better off without them.

There is an aspect of the weapons safekeeping problem that is definitely ethical. At the very least, it becomes so when it is a matter of responsibility on the part of officials guilty of stealing weapons and ammunition. Judging from what I see, and in spite of orders issued by the minister of defense, the detestable practice of punishing both the innocent and the guilty after an occurrence of an extraordinary incident continues to exist. The problem would appear to be resolved by the threat of punishment of a large number of people. What is the result of such a practice? A direct result is how it affects the missile and artillery armaments chief of the unit or combined unit, who, after discovering a loss of ammunition or small arms, may delay in reporting “upstairs”, instead attempting to conduct his own investigation, at times going so far as to cover up the shortage.

Is this abnormal? Unethical? Undoubtedly. Be that as it may, mere complaints and expressions of indignation are insufficient. The time has come to do some thinking about creating conditions under which persons responsible for weapons storage would acquire a real feeling of this high responsibility, so that they would reliably block all possible ways in which weapons and ammunition flow from military units.
Round Table: Social, Legal Problems of Military Life

90UM0115B Moscow SOVETSKY VOIN in Russian No. 17, Sep 89 (Signed to press 23 Aug 89) pp 6-7

[Round Table Discussion Conducted by O. Kosheleva, under the rubric "SOVETSKY VOIN Round Table": "Are We Really So Unprotected?"]

[Text] L.G. Mymrikov: "The law is frequently only a formality, not in effect, existing only on paper...."

V.A. Dzyuba: "We need to establish truly effective incentives which correspond to the importance and the significance of what the serviceman does."

Yu.Yu. Sokolova: "Boldness and experimentation are needed everywhere.... But I believe that initiative should come from below...."

"Lack of social and legal protection for the families of servicemen? Just what are you talking about?! I know, of course, that you like 'sensational' facts. Believe me, though, you won't find them here. The families of servicemen have more benefits, statutes and decrees protecting their interests than a simple mortal could dream of! Our officers and warrant officers have less to complain about than anyone else. Everyone should have the life they and their families live."

I recently heard this monologue from an official with a respectable position in the Ministry of Justice.

I beg to differ with him. I myself lived for several years at military posts and quite frequently encountered difficult problems.

"We discussed what these problems are and how to solve them in our discussion with Col Justice Vladimir Antonovich Dzyuba, deputy chief of the Directorate of Affairs of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Col Justice Leonid Georgiyevich Mymrikov, deputy chief of the Legal Department of the Directorate of Affairs of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and Yuliya Yuryevna Sokolova, senior instructor working with members of the families of servicemen for the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, people's deputy of the USSR and member of the Presidium of the Soviet Women's Committee."

[Correspondent] The most acute and pressing matter is that of providing servicemen with housing. In your opinion, is any sort of improvement evident in this matter?

[Mymrikov] A housing construction program has been worked out in the USSR Ministry of Defense, the same as for the entire nation, for providing apartments for servicemen without them by the year 2000. With respect to providing housing for servicemen discharged from active duty, this is handled by the ispolcoms of local soviets of people's deputies by a procedure established by the USSR Council of Ministers.

[Correspondent] It seems to me that the law is defective in that a person can serve a quarter of a century, be discharged into the reserve and end up without an apartment. He has to go somewhere, has to settle somewhere, which means waiting in line several years. After giving a third of his life, sometimes more, to the army and tramping from one unit to another, he is essentially forced to begin all over again in his declining years....

[Mymrikov] Precisely so, even though the Statute on Benefits for Servicemen, Reservists, Individuals Discharged from Military Service into Retirement and their Families approved in Decree No. 193 of the USSR Council of Ministers on 17 February 1981, states that they are provided by the ispolcoms of local soviets of people's deputies with housing on a priority basis, but no later than 3 months from the day they arrive at a place of residence selected under the current registration procedure. Unfortunately, however, it is frequently not observed.

[Correspondent] Nor does it make sense, you will agree, that an individual discharged from the army does not have the right to return to his native city, from where he was inducted, if that area has registration restrictions.

[Mymrikov] Naturally, the registration restrictions for servicemen released into the reserve or retirement which exist in a number of cities and communities in the nation are a violation of the principle of social justice. The USSR Ministry of Defense has therefore recommended the abolition of all these restrictions for all of the nation's cities and communities without exception.

[Correspondent] There are probably many families of servicemen not provided with housing today, are there not?

[Dzyuba] Tens of thousands, including servicemen discharged from the military. This is the sad picture. It is one indication of the inadequate social and legal protection of servicemen in our real, everyday life.

[Correspondent] Servicemen frequently continue to live at the military post after being discharged into the reserve. Do they have the right to do so?

[Dzyuba] Officially, they are supposed to be moved. This is difficult, however. The individual frequently simply has nowhere to go. He is therefore forced to remain at the post, even though this does not always coincide with his interests.

[Correspondent] And what about the interests of the unit command element? A new officer comes to replace the one discharged into the reserve, after all, and he also has nowhere to live....

[Dzyuba] That is frequently the case. This situation results also from the fact that a serviceman released into the reserve or retirement is placed on a list for an apartment at his chosen place of residence only after he submits a document proving that he has signed out and surrendered his housing at the post.
ARMED FORCES

[Correspondent] In plain language, one has to become homeless before being place onto a list. Is that so?

[Dzyuba] Absolutely correct. Release your housing, sign out and only then get your name on the list.

[Correspondent] Is there any way out of this situation?

[Dzyuba] The USSR Ministry of Defense has proposed that personnel discharged from the military service be placed on a list before turning over the housing they occupy at the time. The serviceman discharged into the reserve or retirement could submit proof that he has turned over his housing at his former place of residence when he receives housing, after all. Those who have served at restricted military posts and in the north have the right to join a housing cooperative or a housing construction cooperative 3 years prior to discharge. We have proposed extending this right to all those who have completed their military service, without exception.

[Correspondent] There is not enough housing. When a serviceman arrives at his station alone, he is attached to the unit. But what if he brings his family? A woman without a residence permit is deprived of everything: a job, the right to medical service and the right to enroll a child in a kindergarten. What is she to do? She becomes a person without any rights.

[Dzyuba] We have found a solution: a temporary permit at the address of the military unit. Complications have still arisen recently in this area, however. The local soviets have begun demanding that specific housing be available in the unit, but the unit does not always have it....

[Correspondent] When she married, she had some sort of rosy picture of life in the military. After bouncing around from post to post, however, and traveling from one place to another, she learns how much we wives of servicemen are deprived of. How are women to find work at restricted military posts, for example?

[Sokolova] We suggested to the General Staff that it designate those garrisons where there is no work for women and that the years spent without work at the husband's station, or at least part of them, be added to the total length of employment. I want to get back to this matter in my work as a deputy. Particularly since it was not taken out of thin air. There is a precedent: The wives of diplomats do not lose their length of service while abroad with their husbands.

[Correspondent] For the wife of a serviceman a diploma frequently becomes a superfluous document, a bitter reminder of a lost career. What happens when the husband is transferred to a city and it becomes possible for her to work in her field but she has lost her skills?

[Sokolova] That is a specific feature, a bitter feature, of our life. At the present time it is not realistic to expect everything to be taken into account in the stationing of the officer corps. There might be one medical slot at a garrison, but 10 women-doctors. The wives of many servicemen are doctors or teachers, after all. Today their numbers include many women with musical training. They have graduated from a conservatory but can apply their training only in a small group at best. The principles of self-financing are now going into force, and the field of activity can be expanded.

[Correspondent] At a number of military posts the women themselves are starting cooperatives. One of my acquaintances, a graduate of a foreign language institute, set up a group for teaching English to children. Other women followed her example. Circles for the study of music, drawing, knitting, pattern-making and sewing... have been formed. The training is paid for on a cooperative basis. It would be perfectly possible to open cooperative kindergartens.

[Sokolova] A cooperative kindergarten has been operating on Kamchatka since August of last year. Incidentally, it has been described in SOVETSKIY VOIN. The group consists of 30 members. The command element did its part for the women's initiative, finding space for them. The workers were selected on a competitive basis. The kindergarten costs 100 rubles per month. That is a lot, of course, but this is on Kamchatka, where there is a pay increment. We were told that the cost would be reduced after a certain time. The project has just been started, after all, and they need to acquire many things. This experiment confirms once again the fact that boldness is needed in all things. Unfortunately, not all of us are yet especially able to think independently. We wait for instructions "from above" and are always looking over our shoulder: "If only we don't get into trouble for it." And I believe initiative must come from below.

[Correspondent] The wives of servicemen could be employed at home. Many of them know how to sew and knit. Why not sell their products through the military trade organization?

[Sokolova] Yes, the women could perfectly well work at home. What is more, we have courses in the general occupations, upon graduating from which the women are real masters. Everything depends upon the market. We are trying to get something done, but there are still powerful impediments locally.

[Correspondent] There is also a great deal of dissatisfaction with the organization of leisure time activities for the families of servicemen. During the year you see your husband only in breaks between temporary duty assignments, alert duty and daily duty details. And so you live for a leave. There is practically no such thing as passes for families to tourist facilities. I do not say this without foundation. I saw a lot of tears at the Sukhumi tourist facility, for example.

[Sokolova] I must say that a turn for the better has been made in this area. And a family can count on vacationing together. The fact that we still do not have enough vacation centers and tourist facilities is another matter. Many of these problems could be resolved in the districts themselves, however, if they gave some serious thought.
to what they themselves could build. We have a gradation like this: sanitation, vacation center, tourist facility. But there are practically no boarding houses in which a serviceman's family can spend its vacation near a stream or the sea or in the woods.

[Correspondent] It frequently happens that a woman's vacation does not coincide with her husband's leave. This can be worked out when the command element tries to correct it. But what if it does not?

[Sokolova] It seems to me that the women's council could help by petitioning the enterprise management and its trade union committee to grant the wife of a serviceman a vacation at the time she needs it. We must all work together to resolve these matters. I have a letter with a suggestion that we pass a law requiring the management of enterprises and establishment to release a woman for vacation when her husband receives his leave. This cannot be done, however. We must not demand privileges for ourselves. It is important to achieve a level with women in the civilian sector with respect to our social and legal protection, however. Even that protection is still inadequate, and we lag behind in this area.

[Correspondent] And so, we have determined that problems of lack of legal protection for servicemen and their families do exist. We can also see ways to resolve them, however. If we think about it together, a way out of many situations can be found in each unit, in each women's council and family without waiting for the law to provide protection.


Land, Housing Provisions Added to Retirement Benefits
90UM0143C Moscow AGITATOR in Russian
No 21, Nov 89 (Signed to press 12 Oct 89) pp 35-37

[Article by military lawyer V. Vandyshnev: "For Soldiers Discharged into the Reserves"]

[Text] Many officers, warrant officers, draftees and extended-service military personnel are being discharged from active duty in connection with the reduction of the USSR Armed Forces. The Soviet state has always shown concern for discharged servicemen and it continues to do so. Significant benefits and advantages have been established for all categories of servicemen discharged into the reserves and for retired servicemen by previously adopted legislation—the USSR Law "On Universal Compulsory Military Service," the statute on benefits for servicemen, reservists, persons retired from military service and their families (approved by Decree No. 193 of the USSR Council of Ministers dated 17 February 1981), and others. These benefits and advantages also apply to servicemen presently being discharged in connection with the reduction of the armed forces. The principal ones are as follows:

**Housing space, registration.** Servicemen serving their compulsory term of active duty and officers called up for military service out of the reserves for a period of 2-3 years retain the housing space which they had occupied prior to being called up, and they may not be stricken from housing waiting lists. Warrant officers and extended-service military personnel retain the right to housing occupied prior to entering military service for the first 5 years of active duty.

Officers, warrant officers and extended-service military personnel who were provided housing space according to the established procedure while in military service are entitled to live in such housing after discharge into the reserves or retirement. At the same time it is foreseen that if they are discharged into the reserves or retired for reasons of health, age or reduction in forces, they are provided housing space by the executive committee of local Soviets of People's Deputies on a priority basis, but not later than 3 months from the day of arrival at the place of residence selected with regard for the existing registration procedures. In this case they are provided housing space on the condition that they had been on active duty for not less than 20 calendar years.

In accordance with Decree No. 678 of the USSR Council of Ministers, dated 28 August 1974: "On Some Rules of Citizen Registration" (as amended and supplemented subsequently), officers, warrant officers and extended-service military personnel (and their families) discharged into the reserves and retired for reason of health, age or reduction in forces are registered at their chosen place of residence prior to the receipt of housing space according to the established procedure, irrespective of the amount of housing space found for temporary residence. They are registered in this case if they had been on active duty for not less than 20 calendar years.

**Work.** Executive Committees of local Soviets of People's Deputies and Directors of enterprises, institutions, organizations, kolkhozes and educational institutions are obligated to provide work to compulsory and extended-service military personnel, warrant officers and officers discharged into the reserves and retired, with regard for their specialties, not later than a month's time from the day of their application. Those among them who worked in enterprises, institutions and organizations prior to military service retain the right to jobs at the same enterprise, institution or organization. In this case officers called up from the reserves for a term of 2 or 3 years are offered a position no lower than that occupied prior to being called up for active military service.

Time on active duty is figured into the total time of service. It is included in continuous time of service if a person discharged into the reserves or a retired person gains employment or begins studies not later than 3 months after the day of discharge, not counting the time necessary for travel to the place of residence. In regard to young specialists with higher and secondary special education who are called up into the armed forces, their
time on active duty is additionally factored into the time of mandatory work assigned following graduation from an educational institution.

In the case of officers, warrant officers, and compulsory and extended-service military personnel discharged into the reserves (retired) from military units located in regions of the Far North and in locales equivalent to them, and those who gain employment in these same regions and locales within 3 months of discharge, the time of continuous service in the indicated regions and locales is included in the time of continuous service upon which benefits established for regions of the Far North are based. Servicemen discharged from active military service and signing work contracts with enterprises, construction projects and organizations, and servicemen sent to work as a result of an organized recruiting effort are granted additional benefits in accordance with existing legislation.

Education. Upon being discharged into the reserves, persons called up for active military service while undergoing training in educational institutions maintain the right to continue their studies in the same educational institution and in the same class in which they studied prior to being called up for military service; a scholarship is granted from the day of reinstatement in the educational institution until publication of the results of the next examination session.

Servicemen discharged from active military service enjoy advantages in admission to higher and secondary special educational institutions, to VUZ preparatory divisions, to vocational-technical schools and to courses providing training in corresponding occupations. Thus officers discharged from active military service for reason of health, age or reductions in forces and having a completed or incomplete higher military education are admitted to VUZes (to the corresponding class) without having to take entrance examinations. Those who graduated from secondary military educational institutions or have at least an eighth-grade education are admitted to secondary special educational institutions without having to take entrance examinations.

Servicemen discharged into the reserves who possess the "Right to Benefits Certificate" (soldier-internationalists) are admitted to higher and secondary special educational institutions on a noncompetitive basis on the condition that they receive positive scores in entrance examinations. Servicemen discharged into the reserves and recommended for training by military unit commands are also enrolled on a noncompetitive basis in secondary special educational institutions (for all forms of study).

Public health. Senior officers who are discharged into the reserves and retired for reason of age or illness and who have served 25 years or more (calculated for benefit purposes) retain the right of medical care for themselves and family members, while those needing it retain the right to sanatorium and health resort treatment in polyclinics, sanatoriums and vacation homes of the Ministry of Defense. The same right is also retained by officers of the rank of colonel and of equal rank who are discharged into the reserves for reason of impaired health or reduction in forces, who have served 25 years or more, and who have reached an age of 45 years by the day of discharge, and by members of their families. This right is retained by general and flag officers discharged into the reserves or retired for reason of age, illness, reduction in forces or impaired health, and by their families, irrespective of years of service and age.

Passes to health centers of the USSR Ministry of Defense are paid for by these categories of soldiers at reduced prices. When traveling to sanatoriums and vacation homes on the basis of passes issued by military medical institutions, they are also granted the right of round-trip travel at USSR Ministry of Defense expense.

Servicemen who were participants of the Great Patriotic War and who are granted a pension from the Ministry of Defense upon being discharged from military service, retain the right to use garrison polyclinics at their place of residence.

Retired servicemen and their families are provided all forms of medical and prosthetic care in civilian public health institutions and in institutions of the ministries of social welfare of the union republics under identical terms with retired blue and white collar workers and their families.

Other benefits. Extended-service military personnel, warrant officers and officers discharged from active military service and their families have the right to travel and to move their possessions at state expense when traveling to their selected place of residence. Compulsory-service military personnel discharged into the reserves are also conveyed to their place of residence at state expense.

The time of service of servicemen in the active army and in the Republic of Afghanistan (after 1 December 1979) and the time of their continuous presence there for reason of wounds, contusions and illnesses acquired there are included in the number of years served toward a pension from the Ministry of Defense (USSR KGB, USSR MVD) at an advantageous rate: One month of service (treatment) counts as 3. Those who are certified as disabled may receive a pension due to age from social security organs 5 years earlier and 15 rubles more a month than usual.

In addition to the benefits and advantages listed, the 1989 decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers foresee a number of guarantees specifically for servicemen discharged into the reserves and retired in connection with reduction of the USSR Armed Forces.

In connection with a reduction in armed forces, officers assigned to special duty [rasporyazheniya] (relied from normal work) may be paid the base pay and allowances
to which they were entitled in their last principal position for the time that they remain on special duty, but for not more than 1 year. Warrant officers discharged from military service without the right to receive a pension receive pay on the basis of their rank for the course of 1 year. Cadets and students of military educational institutions not possessing officer ranks who have served the established time of active military duty and who are discharged into the reserves are now entitled to one-time monetary assistance in an amount of 100 rubles, while those who have been awarded the rank of a reserve officer are entitled to assistance in an amount of 250 rubles.

In compliance with the 31 March 1989 decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, all officers, warrant officers and extended-service military personnel discharged into the reserves or retired in connection with the reduction of the armed forces for reason of age, illness, a reduction in manning, impaired health and completion of the established term of service, or because of the impossibility of utilizing them in connection with organizational measures, are entitled to a pension for serving 20 or more years, irrespective of their age on the day of discharge. Previously, only persons who had attained 40 years of age were entitled to such a pension.

Officers discharged into the reserves or retired with less than 20 years of service and having attained 50 years of age as of the day of discharge are provided an increase in pension of 30 to 40 percent of base pay and allowances when their total time of service is not less than 25 calendar years, of which not less than 12.5 years were served in active military duty, and of 40 to 45 percent for those with a total time of service of not less than 30 years, of which military service is not less than 15 years.

This decree applies to officers receiving discharge, reserve or retirement orders signed after 20 March 1989.

The USSR Gosplan and the USSR Ministry of Defense submitted a draft decree to the USSR government on strict observance of the deadlines for providing housing space to servicemen discharged into the reserves and on registering them with the executive committees of local soviet of people's deputies. The USSR Ministry of Defense also adopted a decision to build 7,500 apartments in the next 2 years specially for persons discharged in connection with the reduction of the army and navy.

The plan of measures to provide employment and solve other problems concerned with the social security of servicemen discharged from the armed forces (drawn up by the USSR Ministry of Defense jointly with the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems) foresees rendering assistance in the work of special commissions under the executive committees of soviet of people's deputies responsible for providing employment, housing and personal services to servicemen discharged into the reserves.

From the Editor

The editor received new materials on benefits for servicemen discharged into the reserves at the time that this article was being prepared for publication. These materials are published below.

Lots of the following dimensions are reserved for private housing construction for senior-grade, general and flag officers having served not less than 25 calendar years of military duty and officers having served not less than 25 years and discharged into the reserves or retired for reason of health, age or reduction in forces: in urban settlements and resort areas—up to 0.12 hectares; in all other places: generals and admirals—up to 0.25 hectares, senior-grade and junior officers—up to 0.15 hectares. The dimensions of these lots are halved in regions of irrigated farming. Lots for private housing construction are reserved in cities with dimensions foreseen by existing legislation.

In accordance with Decree No. 197 of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers dated 11 February 1988, servicemen discharged into the reserves may be provided home construction loans irrespective of the number of years served: for persons residing in rural areas—up to 20,000 rubles, to be paid back in 50 years, beginning with the third year after receiving the loan; for persons residing in cities and urban settlements—up to 20,000 rubles, to be paid back in 25 years, beginning with the third year after receipt. Loans for the purchase of private homes from civilians in cities, urban settlements and rural areas are provided equal to the balance cost of structures, but not more than 20,000 rubles, for a term of 25 years, to be paid back beginning in the year following receipt of the loan.

It is established by Decree No. 406 of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers dated 31 March 1988 that extended-service military personnel, warrant officers and officers discharged from active military service for reason of age and health have a preferential right to join housing construction and housing cooperatives. When necessary, savings banks may provide credit to such cooperatives in amounts up to 5,000 rubles to be paid back in 10 years; interest is to be 3 percent per annum for persons residing in cities and urban settlements, and 2 percent per annum for persons residing in rural areas.

Prior to discharge from the armed forces, officers, warrant officers, and extended-service military personnel who served more than 15 calendar years with a good record and who joined housing construction and housing cooperatives may take advantage of a benefit under which military units, institutions and organizations for which they work may provide uncompensated financial assistance in an amount of up to 50 percent of indebtedness resulting from acquisition of cooperative housing space.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS “Pravda”. “Agitator”, 1989
 Debate on Utility of Reserve Officer Training Programs
90UM0143B Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 3 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by Sergey Svetlov: “The People and the Army Are One!”]

[Text] The chronology of events is, briefly, as follows. On 23 September we published Yevgeniy Lamikhovoy’s article “Students—Forward!”, in which the author gave his arguments why it was unsuitable for students to study the officer’s craft in military departments. Out of the mass of responses to this article, we selected a letter from Colonel (Reserve) A. Podushko, and next to it we published Ye. Lamikhovoy’s response. The debate began. In the next issue of “The Office” Semen Novoprudskiy, a student of Tashkent State University, shared his thoughts; his was but one letter out of dozens supporting Ye. Lamikhovoy’s opinion.

Numerous letters have come in since that time. It must be said that no one is willing to compromise: Students, their parents and younger people argue that military departments are unneeded, while officers and war veterans hotly argue the reverse. These two categories of readers have become locked in sharp debate. Whose arguments are the more persuasive? Life will tell.

“You are confusing the main thing,” believes G. P. Tkachenko, a participant of the Great Patriotic War. “Military schools train officers only for the regular forces in an amount necessary for peace-time, with regard for defensive doctrine. In the meantime, school military departments are intended to prepare a reserve of officers for the event that our country finds itself in extraordinary conditions, at which time they would serve as commanders of platoons, companies and the like. These VUZ [Higher Educational Institution] graduates are the ones who must take charge of platoons and companies of privates and NCOs in a time of trial for our people. As a participant of the Great Patriotic War, let me say with all responsibility that if the training of reserve officers is curtailed at someone’s desire in our state, 1941 will repeat itself, only in a variant that would be terrible to even suppose.”

I don’t think that what happened in the first days and months of the war, when the Red Army was unprepared, and left without a command by Stalinist terror, could happen again. Nor do I think that the officers that are being trained today in the military departments can save the fatherland in a time of trial. I also question G. P. Tkachenko’s assertion that in the event of war, reserve officers must take charge of platoons and companies. What would regular military personnel do then?

Anyway, let a reader answer the reader.

“The joint, simultaneous existence of the term ‘new political thinking’ and the conservatism of the military leadership appears unnatural to me,” writes Aleksey Danilov, a student from Alma-Ata. “The army is undergoing reduction, and that’s the right thing to do. The country can’t afford maintaining an army superior in numerical strength to the armies of the USA, the FRG and China combined. Students were demobilized, and this was correct. It would hardly be pertinent to talk about a shortage of officers when there is an obvious shortage of qualified specialists in the national economy. But they demobilized the students one day, and on the next they introduced military training. Where is the common sense? Once again our half-measures! Why don’t the instructors in military departments admit outright that what they are doing there is meaningless? Because it is warm and cozy for them there, their home is not far away, there is hot running water at home, the pay is good, and promotions abound. My brother is a regular officer. He has served in a number of garrisons over several years, and I have heard from him on several occasions what real military people feel about officers serving in military school departments. Mildly speaking, they are less than sympathetic. This summer I’m scheduled to defend my diploma project. I will also exchange my draft card for a military I.D. card. I will be an officer. But what sort?? I don’t know anything, after all, I wasn’t taught to do anything! Not because I was a poor student, but because none of this interests me. Does anyone really seriously think that you could learn military art simply by putting on a green shirt and shaving your head?”

It is hard not to agree. One can learn to be a real turner only on a lathe, a journalist in an editor’s office, and military affairs in the army. Studying military science once or twice a week will not work. I myself was a student, but I never did become an officer.

“There is perhaps no other society in the world, neither in the West nor in the East, where the attitude toward the army has recently been so negative,” were the words with which Colonel (Retired) B. P. Zaytsev, Director of the Training Department of the Tashkent Polytechnical Institute, began his letter. “And everyone is trying to make his ‘contribution’ to this incomprehensible clamor concerning the Soviet Army—writers, actors, cooks, academics, people’s deputies and parents. Why do we really need defective officers who are unable to command military subunits? But do we need bad physicists, geologists, translators and mathematicians either? What we’re doing here is confusing the cause with the consequence. As with any occupation, people must be taught military affairs. And our higher school is presently not teaching. It must be restructured. We feel ourselves to be unserving workers in behalf of perestroika in both spirit and body. But were we to dig within ourselves, we would probably find that we would very much prefer to receive perestroika ready-made from someone else’s hands, without any special effort and stress. Where are the brakes being applied, where is the breakdown happening? The answer which we are afraid to give is this: ‘Within us.’ That is why all appeals coming from above find no response in the direct executors, and so we get poor scientists, poor officers, poor specialists. But is it
right to make a generalization on the basis of an isolated case? In many of the military departments, the levels of organizational and instructor training and of the material and equipment base are significantly higher than in civilian school departments of various specialties. No one has ever freed students of army service. This is a duty and a sacred obligation of every citizen of the USSR. What students have received is a deferment from service in the ranks of the armed forces, and they must—I emphasize the importance of that term—utilize this time in order to become physicists, chemists, philologists. Fifty percent of the Soviet Union’s VUZes do not possess military departments. There is a right of choice, there is the freedom to define oneself as a citizen and a patriot. To be a reserve officer, or to become a rank-and-file reservist after graduating from the institute. But no one has ever been freed of obligations as defender of the fatherland. Our military doctrine predetermines the presence of a strong army capable of defending the country. The military programs of capitalist states imply that a military danger continues to exist for our country. From this follows the need for maintaining the combat readiness of the armed forces at the required level. And until a certain point in time, training of reserve officers in VUZ military departments will be necessary. The conclusion is this: We need to decisively upgrade the quality of military training on the basis of restructuring of the higher school. ‘The people and the army are one’—this slogan must be retained, since the army is the primary shield of us all in times of despair, and people go into the army not to earn a living or by choice, as some informal groups suggest, but out of civic duty and responsibility."

I have cited that which seemed to me to be the most important out of B. P. Zaytsev’s far-ranging letter. The position of our reader, I think, is clear. But here is another opinion—that of process engineer V. Karpin:

“What scares me is that when they fill out their school applications, most young boys guide themselves in their choice of their future occupation not by their vocation and interests, but by the presence of a military department in the VUZ. I am certain that as a result we lose large multitudes of fabulous actors, artists, textile workers and educators—specialists produced by those educational institutions which do not possess military departments from which students are selected for compulsory service. This is both unjust and dangerous. The Ministry of Defense should concern itself with training regular personnel in military schools, rather than uprooting people out of the national economy to the detriment of the latter. It is, after all, the country’s national economy that is in extremely deep crisis, which is something you can’t say about the army—it is precisely military needs that the bulk of the budget supports, it is in the military that the best equipment and the most highly qualified specialists are found. I can hear the objections now: Defending the motherland is an obligation of every citizen of the USSR. But it is obvious from common sense that there is no need to defend the motherland at the given moment. What is advantageous to the country now is disarmament, reduction of the army: These things are in keeping with both domestic interests and the interests of foreign policy. I solidly support Academician Sakharov, who defends the conviction that the country’s security depends directly on the level of trust which capitalist countries experience in us. And trust is based on our internal stability, on continuation of perestroyka and on reduction of the army, the size of which is inordinately large. Army officials appearing in the mass media complain more and more frequently about the drain of the best specialists in connection with demobilization of students. But let me ask you this: what is such an army worth if its combat capability depends so significantly on ‘civilian’ forces? As is true everywhere else, the army should employ professionals, and its size should not exceed the limits of defensive sufficiency. I get the impression that some part of the military subunits are maintained only as a free work force; otherwise what need would we have for the construction battalions that go around painting fences, or companies that pick carrots. I feel that military departments are needed, but not just to stamp out good-for-nothing officers. They are needed as a way to acquaint students with the fundamentals of weapon handling and providing medical assistance—a couple of hours a week in the course of one school year. And there is no reason here for the green shirts, the short haircuts and the marching in patent leather shoes.”

We could go on with this duel between readers’ pens, but I feel that the truth is best expressed by the statement that “The army should employ professionals.” This point of view is supported by the majority: both by officers and by people not in the military. This is not a rejection of patriotism. It is time we understood that the new way of political thinking imparts new meaning to the slogan “The people and the army are one.” Reinforcing the might of the fatherland with weapons in hand, on the basis of the requirements of military manuals, is but half the battle. The more difficult problem is to raise the country out of its poverty, to feed and clothe the people. This, if you like, is what our strategic, defensive objective should be.

Maj Gen Semenov on Multi-Ethnic Service in Mountain-Rifle Division

90UM0143D Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 11 Nov 89 p 2

[Interview with Major General V. V. Semenov by Azerbaijan special correspondent M. Aliyev: “It’s Not Easy Being a Soldier”]

[Text] Soldiers of this famous Red Banner formation known in the past as the 1st Azerbaijan Mountain-Rifle Division are serving in the Ural Military District. Formed in fall 1920 in Baku out of workers of Red Guard detachments and the 1st Iron Regiment imen/26 Bakinskiye Komissary, it enwreathed itself with unfading glory in past engagements. The Colors of the
unit, which has been awarded the orders of the Red Banner and Suvorov 2d Degree, still bear the memories of the defense of Novorossisk, the assault of Mount Sapun, and the liberation of the Ukraine and the Baltic states. Today's generation of soldiers, among whom there are many young Azerbaijanis, hold sacred the combat traditions of their fathers, and honorably fulfill their filial duty.

An Azerinform correspondent met with the commander of the renowned formation, Major General V. V. Semenov.

[Aliyev] Valeriy Vasilyevich, it's not an easy thing to manage a military collective, while it is doubly hard to manage a multi-ethnic one. Do cases of ethnic conflict occur between soldiers in your formation. What is the result of educational work?

[Semenov] We are keeping an attentive eye on the complex processes occurring in our country. We in the military are of course troubled primarily by the ethnic issue, which has assumed unprecedented acuity in a number of regions. There is good reason for this, since representatives of 62 nationalities serve by side in our formation. Multi-ethnic collectives require commanders to know the customs and traditions of the peoples, and their national character. This is all the more necessary because, to be frank, certain irresponsible groups sometimes attempt to carry the fire of nationalism into the army milieu, and to pit soldiers of one ethnic group against those of another. But such attempts have not caught commanders and political workers unawares. They have started devoting more attention to individual work with the soldiers. Officers do not avoid discussion of the nationalities issue. Moreover they even encourage soldiers to engage in dialogue. They analyze the situation together, and find common ground.

We are helped a very great deal by meetings of soldiers with their compatriots who work in the city's industrial enterprises. Incidentally, many Azerbaijanis live and work in Sverdlovsk. We are happy with the delegations we receive from the union republics, and we are now awaiting such a delegation from Azerbaijan.

[Aliyev] Nonetheless, doesn't friction arise among servicemen, no matter what you do?

[Semenov] Today on the training ground I came across one soldier treating another roughly. That soldier's way of speaking to his comrade irked me. I had to talk with them. "How could you do such a thing?" I asked them. "You are serving together, after all, and you eat bread from the same table." They replied, "It's habit...."

Roughness develops in the youngsters back before they join the army. Things do not come together in school, and in society they encounter misunderstanding, and sometimes even indifference. Hence arises a unique form of protest—open roughness and tactlessness. Many adult comrades lay their hopes on the army: "The army will reeducate him," "The army will make a man of him." But the army is first of all a school of military proficiency, courage, and of morally and physically healthy people. And if anyone thinks that the army is something like a colony for corrective education, he is deeply mistaken. At the same time I don't want to relieve certain officers and warrant officers of their responsibility. The culture of their communication with common soldiers requires strict reexamination.

[Aliyev] Many parents are concerned that their children are unable to handle the difficulties of a soldier's life.

[Semenov] You can't run away from the difficulties. I myself was up to my knees in mud today on the training ground. But what else would you expect? You have to know how to drive equipment, to shoot, and to fulfill many missions in all kinds of conditions. We'll soon be hit by the cold weather. Then it will be really difficult. But the work still has to be done. If we, the men, can't do it, then who else would?

We try to do many things in order to make the work of the soldiers easier. We create favorable conditions: drying rooms in which they can dry their footwear and clothing after exercises; we try to make the Lenin rooms not only agitation rooms but also a place where soldiers can rest and spend their time usefully. I myself often visit the company under my sponsorship, as well as other subunits.

I would like to take this occasion to say the following.

Dear fathers and mothers of Azerbaijani soldiers!

It is with great attention and tremendous concentration that we are following the events occurring in the Transcaucasian Soviet republics.

Our twice-decorated order-bearing Red Banner formation is a strong, friendly family which shares joys and difficulties equally. There is no soil for manifestations of national enmity in our military collectives, and equally so, notorious dedovshchina is absent. There are no reasons for soldiers of any nationality to maintain a poor attitude toward their military duty, and all the more so among Azerbaijanis, who have always been known as good soldiers. Gunners Oktay Apkerov, Rafiz Ibragimov and Elshan Yusufdzhanov, driver-mechanic Aydyn Talybov and many others deserve words of gratefulness. A commander's big thank-you to you, the fathers and mothers who raised these soldiers.

Azerbaijan is living through difficult times today. The processes occurring in the republic have affected the hearts of all peoples of our country. Nothing is simple, but we are firmly convinced that the ethnic problems that have accumulated need to be solved peacefully, on a constitutional basis, in the spirit of perestroyka and the new way of political thinking.

I am certain that the mothers of Azerbaijan, public organizations and the republic's military commissariat will send the best sons of Azerbaijan to our military
Proposed Revisions to Draft Regulations
90UM01154 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col O. Vladychin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Going Back to a Previous Item", "Too Early to Consider it Final"]

[Text] The Main Military Procuracy is amending the draft regulations—How is an "explanation" found for every extraordinary occurrence?; Alternative opinions on "alternative responsibility"; Will demanding commanders be protected?

Today we all have such expectations of good changes in our lives. Both overall and in specific areas. But we start to have mixed feelings when they actually begin to take shape somewhere. It could be a time to be happy, it would seem, but we are tortured by doubts that it might all end suddenly, might turn out not the way we anticipated....

Something of the sort happened to me when I was reading the numerous proposals and comments on the draft Combined-Arms Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR (the list was compiled by the working group of a special commission in the Ministry of Defense). I can say frankly that one revision proposed by the Main Military Procuracy for Article 42 of the draft Disciplinary Code evoked conflicting feelings and thoughts. The legal experts believe that it should contain the following points:

"Liability for an infraction is borne by the serviceman who committed it. It should be specified that the commander (superior) does not bear liability for crimes, incidents or infractions committed by subordinates unless they are not a direct consequence of his performance. It should be specified that superiors guilty of persecuting commanders for infractions committed by their subordinates will be held accountable."

The opinion of the commission's working group was indicated with "Approved." in a separate column next to the proposal.

And how could one not be pleased by the fact that one of the most acute army problems will soon be resolved and a procedure will be established for assigning liability for infractions of the law in the forces, one which the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers vote for almost every day in their letters to the editor and for which the authors of many of our articles have appealed more than once.

But let us not get carried away. The state of euphoria passes when one remembers that a draft is not yet a law. Another thing. If the above amendment to Article 42 becomes an actual provision in the new regulations, it will of course help to strengthen law and order in the forces. However... will it give commanders a full guarantee that no one will indiscriminately punish them for the crimes and infractions of subordinates as sometimes occurs today? This question has to be raised because it inevitably arises when one looks at the debate conducted in our newspaper over a period of several months.

It was initiated following publication of the article "Dignity" on 3 December of last year. The account of young soldiers able to stand up for themselves in spite of everything and to finally achieve lawful punishment for an unrestrained "old-timer" (dcd) evoked a lively response and sympathy from many, many readers. While expressing their support for the courage and persistence of the fightingmen, however, the authors of the letters differed markedly in their opinion about the problem brought up in the article with respect to holding commanders responsible for nonregulation relations in the subunits, which frequently motivates officers to cover up infractions of the law by subordinates. I shall verbatim that passage which drew the particular attention of the readers:

"All crimes and incidents detected are reviewed by the military procuracy, the data are summarized by garrison and then for the district. And when the level of discipline in the units is assessed—when the yearly results are summed up, for example—a comparative analysis of the number of extraordinary occurrences is just about the crucial factor. Where there are fewer of these, the situation must be better. Accordingly, also the demandingness applied to commanders, political workers and people in charge at various ranks, to all those who have subordinates and to whom the regulations assign responsibility for the state of discipline in the military collectives."

Forgive me for quoting myself, but I was forced to do so in order to make the subject of the subsequent discussion absolutely clear. After all, even before the article was published, but particularly after its publication, hundreds of officers in the forces asked the same question in letters to the editor as that raised by Lt Col V. Kozorov, battalion commander:

"Just why is it that the regulations shift liability from those who ignore the law onto those who bring them to order?" ("Let the Guilty Party Bear Responsibility," 7 Apr 89)

In the first response from military legal experts, however, the matter, an urgent one, was for some reason moved to the back burner. Maj Gen Justice B. Chizhov, Senior Assistant of the Main Military Procurator, and Col
Justice V. Bobrenev, Senior Military Procurator, focused their attention on something else entirely:

"The authors regard deficiencies in the rules for recording crimes in agencies of the military procuracy as one of the main causes of the tolerance of lawbreakers. One cannot agree with this.

"The assessment of the state of military discipline must take into account, in addition to the general data on crimes, incidents and gross disciplinary infractions, the entire body of factors reflecting various aspects of the life and activities of the troops." ("The Grounds Are Not Taken Into Account," 6 Apr 89)

It should be noted that the acceptance of the established procedure for recording crimes in agencies of the military procuracy was not subjected to doubt in general. Moreover, the article frankly stated it should continue to be done in the previous manner. Use of the report data for pressuring officers was criticized, however. Unfortunately, the "body of factors" is not always used in evaluating the state of discipline. The discussion therefore turned to the existing "mechanism" for taking administrative steps, which is activated far more rapidly than the "mechanism" for determining a commander's liability for what has happened. Mention was also made of a directive which actually encourages this practice.

It is not surprising that this significant focus in the article was immediately detected in the directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR which worked out the document. Col Yu. Kudinov, deputy chief of the directorate, expressed doubt that the author was justified in raising the question, underscoring the fact that the center demands a comprehensive approach for evaluating the state of military discipline, and used the "classic" argumentation for explaining discrepancies between actual practices and the directives:

"...Out of negligence or inability certain commanders and OICs do not thoroughly delve into the state of affairs in the military units but take the more simple and easy path, studying only the quantitative data for violations of the law and disciplinary infractions by servicemen and deriving corresponding conclusions from this." ("All of the Problems Are Caused by the Negligent," 7 Apr 89)

In general, there would appear to be no cause to be defensive. There are no problems! One is struck by the fact, however, that the statements in the newspaper by workers of the Main Military Procuracy and the directorate of the General Staff evoked sharp criticism on the part of many readers. A letter from one of them, Col F. Golovchenko, was also published:

"...Personally I am puzzled by the stand taken by representatives of the central directorates. One has the impression that the existing system for recording and evaluating the state of military discipline suits them despite the fact that probably everyone in the forces can see the futility and harmfulness of the methods used, which encourage officers deliberately to cover up violations of the law." ("Let the Procurator Take it Into Account," 16 May 89)

One can endlessly demand that indiscriminate punishment of commanders for the infractions of subordinates not be allowed and write this demand into dozens of orders and even include it in the new regulations, but there will still be no change if the firmly established "mechanism" of administrative response to incidents and crimes continues in effect. Col Yu. Kudinov inadvertently revealed the secret of its "reliability" in the letter previously cited:

"...Disciplinary penalties are ordinarily imposed upon officers for omissions in the performance of their duty and not for crimes and incidents committed by subordinates."

There you have it, the universal formula for instantaneously finding the explanation for any extraordinary occurrence, "determining" who is to blame for what has happened on the spot, without any investigation, and holding them accountable without fear that someone will consider the punishment to be premature and indiscriminate. It is extensively used at the present time, enabling certain OICs to get out of a sticky situation "in good shape," without ignoring directions "from above" to thoroughly investigate the causes of each infraction of the law, to make a comprehensive evaluation of the state of discipline and at the same time rapidly take some sort of steps in response to what has happened. And this will continue until we have rigid legal guidelines ruling out arbitrariness in determining the responsibility of officers in such situations and along with that, incentives to reduce infractions of the law.

Holding superiors strictly accountable for persecuting commanders for the infractions of subordinates, I believe, will only partially help the situation (remember the "universal formula"). We therefore need to eliminate the conditions which encourage such actions. How? Col Justice (res) V. Luneyev, Professor and leading scientific associate at the State and Law Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, who made some problematic comments in the discussion, suggested that we take a large number of steps to achieve this: —eliminate the departmental recording of crimes in the forces, which duplicate state records kept by military judicial agencies, primarily for their own purposes, and work (incidentally, Maj Gen Justice B. Chizhov and Col Justice V. Bobrenev mentioned the latter in their letter); —alter the procedure whereby a serviceman who has committed a crime can be brought to criminal accountability only with the agreement of the superior military chief; —eliminate in the law alternative (criminal or disciplinary) liability for many kinds of military crimes and precisely differentiate them according to degree of public danger, classifying those without great significance as disciplinary infractions and making it mandatory to settle the more serious ones through criminal legal proceedings. ("The Costs of Dual Statistics," 26 Apr 89)
In short, considering these proposals as a whole shows a common trend: to relieve the command element at all levels of the need (the duty) independently to assess criminal acts in the forces, concentrating all of these functions in the agencies of military justice capable of truly performing them in a competent manner. And the possibility of resolving the problem this way was greeted with understanding by workers with the Main Military Procuracy. Col Just L. Smerzin, Department Chief in the Main Military Procuracy, responded to Professor V. Luneyev's comments in an entirely different vein than his colleagues had done several months previously:

"...An evaluation of the commander's performance with respect to strengthening military discipline after any sort of crime has been committed by subordinates must take into account—and when possible, be based on—the findings of an investigation and the court." ("The Statistics Are Not to Blame," 25 Aug 89)

The military legal expert went even further with his proposals. He focused attention on the paradoxical nature of the inquest system used in the Armed Forces. As a supernumerary agency of inquiry, after all, the unit commander is forced to perform incompatible duties: combat crimes and simultaneously... bear responsibility for the state of military discipline and law and order. He must reveal infractions, report them "upstairs" and then be penalized for them! Col Justice L. Smerzin sees the solution to this abnormal, to put it mildly, situation in the establishment of organic agencies of inquest made up of officers with legal training. He also points out the following:

"...the institution of coordination, which V. Luneyev spoke out against, was recently abolished and it seems simply illogical to retain the alternative liability (for crimes—O.V.)."

Among other things, this comment demonstrates that the position taken by those who accuse workers in the central agencies of fearing drastic changes is just too sweeping. We can see that the need for them is understood. And is this not indicated also by that revision proposed by the Main Military Procuracy in the draft regulations and the fact that the commission's working group agrees with it? And still, getting back to the concepts expressed during the discussion, it has to be said that far from everything efficient coming out of experience rapidly finds its way to application.

We recently asked Col Just M. Matakin, Chief of the Legal Service of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to explain just what specific steps are being taken in this area. It turns out that for foreseeable future commanders will have to continue dealing with that same dilemma of whether to punish subordinates who violate the law by administrative or criminal procedure. Furthermore, it is even planned to increase the number of kinds of military crimes with alternative liability in the new legislation. And the establishment of organic agencies of inquest, the need for which is apparent to many people today, is postponed for an indefinite period. There are not enough military legal experts. Most important, however, is the fact that no one plans to rewrite a document whose incongruities produce distortions in the system of administrative accountability for officers for the crimes of subordinates.

One would like to know how Article 42 of the draft Disciplinary Code, one which is indubitably needed, will be backed up. Good intentions are not a firm guarantee that if an extraordinary occurrence takes place in the subunit no one will impose a penalty upon the commander before grounds for this are presented by the procurator, let us say. Yes, statistics themselves are not to blame for anything, as Col Justice L. Smerzin correctly states. The situation in which the data are used as an instrument of arbitrary action, however, and in which each recorded crime or incident serves as an excuse for unrestrained punishment of commanders still exists. Just how long is this going to continue?!

Drug Use in Armed Forces
90UM0143A Moscow SOVETSKY PATRIOT in Russian 19 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with RSFSR Honored Lawyer V. Serov, Associate of the Military Tribunals Directorate, by correspondent Anatoly Sharapov: "The Needle of Death"]

[Text] The soldier and drug addiction. Are these two concepts compatible? Unfortunately, they sometimes come together. As in a mirror, all of the ills and problems of our society are reflected in the armed forces.

Nor has a negative phenomenon such as drug use by servicemen avoided the army. An analysis of this disease's spread in the army shows that most soldiers discovered to be drug addicts had a passion for hashish while still civilians.

[Sharapov] The infamous practice of covering up vigilantly protected the society from the topic of our interview—information on drug addiction in the armed forces.

[Serov] But even in the society, the preference has been not to talk aloud about drug addiction. The topic was prohibited there as well, and assertions that the country lacks the social preconditions for such an abnormal phenomenon are refuted by glaring figures: There are now 60,000 drug addicts registered in the Soviet Union.

[Sharapov] Does this figure reflect the real situation?

[Serov] In my opinion, no, since revealing persons hooked on drugs is a complex problem. They carefully conceal their habits, they fear exposure, and when crises come, they rarely seek medical help. Specialists feel that there are approximately six times more drug addicts than are registered in the statistics.
[Sharapov] Army statistics are not included here, and you of course can’t say how many drug addicts there are in the armed forces.

[Serov] I can’t. The Military Tribunals Directorate does not possess this information, but I think that the corresponding military medical organs are maintaining such records. Our competency, meanwhile, is limited to generalizing statistics on the number of servicemen who commit drug-related crimes.

[Sharapov] Can you say on the basis of the materials of your directorate that stubborn negation of this phenomenon in the armed forces played the role of a unique catalyst of the disease?

[Serov] At the moment there are no grounds for saying that this stupefying plague has seriously infected the ranks of the soldiers. This is also confirmed by data on conviction of servicemen for drug use. In the last 3 years the quantity of such persons decreased by a factor of three, and it is now 0.7 percent of the total number of persons convicted by tribunals for all crimes.

[Sharapov] Does this mean that there is no cause for alarm?

[Serov] A drug problem does exist in the armed forces—no one denies this, but it cannot be asserted that a syringe filled with poison can be found in every soldier’s bedside table or combat field pack. Yes, particular cases of use of drugs by soldiers do exist, and these are doubtlessly bitter facts. But their sporadic nature does not relieve the acuity of the issue, inasmuch as the actions of a drug-influenced person are unpredictable and socially dangerous.

[Sharapov] And isn’t a drug addict wearing shoulder boards doubly dangerous?

[Serov] Of course. He has weapons and combat equipment within his control. This can lead to tragic consequences.

[Sharapov] It may seem prejudicial to say this, but it appeared to me that being a representative of such an important military department, you are not allowed to cite specific figures concerning drug addiction which your directorate has in its possession.

[Serov] As with many journalists, you are hampered by stereotypic thinking. By prejudice: Whenever you are dealing with an army department, you’ll never get any unfavorable information (and all the more so compromising information!). They’ll smooth out all the rough spots, you think, and call any negative things “atypical.” I agree that this prejudice did not come into being in a vacuum—the military did of course aid in its creation. But the situation is changing, and much of what was forbidden yesterday is now becoming declassified. This pertains to our directorate as well, which is not making any secrets of the statistics on drug addiction.

[Sharapov] What drug-related crimes are most typical of the army?

[Serov] The same as in civilian life: making, possessing and selling drugs. Taking drugs takes money, and a lot. This forces drug addicts to stealing, robbery and embezzlement. A “high” degrades the personality, and mental disturbance and the loss of self-control encourage these people to act aggressively—to commit murder and do severe bodily harm to surrounding individuals.

Forty-nine percent of all servicemen convicted for drug-related crimes stole drugs (primarily medicinal preparations) from pharmacies, storehouses and medical units, while 51 percent wound up on the dock for making, acquiring, possessing, transporting or selling drugs.

The tribunal of the Volga Military District examined what was perhaps the most sensational criminal case. Servicemen of the Internal Troops, Yagmurzhi, Matsnev, Fedorkin and Konoval, organized production of hashish out of hemp and poppies growing near the unit. They made regular use of these greens, and they encouraged the participation of fellow servicemen. However, during one of their “drug sessions” a terrible plan entered the minds of the group’s members in a time of ultimate stupefaction: seizing an airplane with hostages and fleeing abroad.

Taking weapons, Yagmurzhi, Matsnev and Konoval left the unit, stopped a taxi and ordered the driver to take them to Ufa’s airport. They were met by a police patrol car en route. The criminals opened fire on the police and killed two MVD associates. Frightened by what happened, Konoval fled, while Yagmurzhi and Matsnev made their way to the airport and broke into the cabin of a TU-134 filled with 74 passengers. Shouting “Lie down, the airplane has been taken!”, they attempted to force the crew commander to fly outside the country. One of the passengers rushed Yagmurzhi. Shots rang out once again, and another two persons lost their lives in the hands of the criminals. Then during the operation against the bandits the SWAT team killed Matsnev and wounded Yagmurzhi.

The tribunal sentenced Yagmurzhi to death. For their crimes, the rest of the members of the group were sentenced to imprisonment coupled with mandatory drug treatment.

[Sharapov] Vasily Arsenyevich, how do drugs make their way into the barracks?

[Serov] Several channels can be distinguished: the selling of drugs by civilians, their acquisition by mail, their misappropriation from medical institutions, over 60 percent of convicted servicemen obtained drugs during short leaves, while on pass, and while absent without leave. Cases of soldiers harvesting narcotic plants growing near military units have been recorded.

Sometimes new recruits bring drugs in from the “economy.” For example, before joining the army Private
Zvonov was convicted for manufacturing hashish, and he underwent drug treatment, but it was ineffective: In the army he did not abandon his desire to get high, and he continued to roll joints out of hemp buds. When the raw materials ran out, Zvonov stole narcotic drugs from the unit’s medical aid station, for which he ended up on the dock.

[Sharapov] Drug trade is a profitable enterprise. According to data of the USSR MVD, the demand of the black market for such goods is estimated at 300 to 400 million rubles. Organized groups of drug dealers are operating in the country—thieves, manufacturers, drug dealers and drug den operators. Do similar underground clans exist in the army?

[Serov] There is no organized drug business in the armed forces. Most soldiers convicted for misappropriating drugs stole them for personal use, while marketing was the objective in only 20 percent of the cases. Of course, the tribunals also had to examine criminal cases involving servicemen who were establishing ties with the drug mafia.

For example three cadets of a certain military school came into contact with drug dealers (in order to earn money for a Zhiguli, as they later explained the reason for their criminal actions). The trio spent their leave in Kazakhstan’s Chuyyskaya Valley, where they harvested a large quantity of pollen from hemp buds. They brought the raw material to Saratov, where it was processed and then released for sale.

[Sharapov] And what did this “business” end with?

[Serov] The tribunal.

[Sharapov] The dock is a bitter finale, and the inevitability of punishment restrains the zeal of those who like to get high. But certainly the tribunal is not the sole means of fighting the spread of drug addiction in the armed forces?

[Serov] Most soldiers convicted for using or distributing drugs had tried them for the first time before joining the army. This is why the young complement is studied carefully in the military subunits. Commanders try to obtain as much information as possible on the mental features of the recruit, and on his way of life in the civilian world. The region from which the youngster was called up and how widespread drug addiction is among juveniles there are also considered.

For example analysis showed that before joining the army, most servicemen convicted of drug-related crimes lived in regions in which hemp grows (the Far East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Ukraine), 34 percent of them studied in vocational-technical schools, 15 percent have a record, and 10 percent were required to appear before the police for use of narcotic substances.

[Sharapov] Let’s assume that a soldier has smoked a hashish cigarette for the first time, and is caught. Would he be turned over to the tribunal as well?

[Serov] No. On the condition, of course, that he did not commit a crime while under the influence of the drug.

[Sharapov] But how will they deal with him?

[Serov] He will be put on record, and sent to a psychiatrist for consultation in order to reveal the degree of drug addiction. In the absence of illness, he will be placed under dispensary observation. But if this same soldier is discovered to make repeated use of drugs, he would then be faced with hospital treatment.

[Sharapov] In other words compulsory treatment would await him?

[Serov] There are no exclusions in the law barring compulsory treatment of servicemen for drug addiction (if, I repeat, they have not committed unlawful actions). However, considering the particular features of army service, for practical purposes tribunals do not interfere in this matter, and they do not send soldiers who have been found to be drug users to the appropriate military medical institutions. This decision is made by the command.

In the late 1970s the World Health Organization recognized that compulsory treatment of alcoholics and drug addicts is humane. When a person can no longer relieve himself of a destructive predilection (and, I add, one which is dangerous to surrounding individuals), the society is compelled to return him to normal life by force.

[Sharapov] Vasily Arsenievich, if a soldier wishes to apply for help in a civilian drug treatment center, would he be permitted to do so?

[Serov] Of course.

[Sharapov] Were there cases in which soldiers were deemed to be unfit for military service due to drug addiction?

[Serov] Persons suffering from drug addiction are determined to be unfit for military service when pathological alterations of the personality and serious disorders of internal organs are present, and when repeat hospital treatment is unsuccessful.

[Sharapov] Emotional stresses are greater in the army due to various prohibitions and constraints; could this be why a soldier seeks escape in drugs?

[Serov] Without a doubt, the army is nothing like civilian life, and the youngster is faced by many difficulties here associated with the peculiarities of military service. All of this, as well as improper mutual relations, and the arbitrariness still encountered among commanders, may lead to nervous breakdown and thoughtless acts. But to say that some sort of specific conditions exist in the armed forces which compel soldiers to use needles or smoke hashish is, to be blunt, stupid, and it smells of a desire to blacken the name of the military.
The danger to the army, I repeat, comes from youngsters who acquired this destructive habit at home. In the barracks they seek others like themselves, they quickly form groups, they introduce fellow servicemen to drugs, and they propagate among them the "special" influence of drugs, which supposedly provide an "escape" from service and help to "remove nervous tension." And the advertising does have an impact. According to the materials of criminal cases involving crimes associated with this problem, in one year convicts made drug users out of over 200 soldiers.

[Sharapov] It seems to me that law enforcement organs (both civilian and military) look at drug addiction only as a social evil, forgetting that this is also a disease, one which cannot be cured by punitive sanctions alone. A person who uses drugs simply fears applying for medical assistance in a critical situation, knowing that exposure would mean going to court. And all of our righteous words about confirming a healthy way of life, about timely prevention, about creation of an "antidrug wave" in society transform into empty sounds before a patient's fear of prison.

[Serov] Yes, criminal liability is foreseen for illegal acquisition, possession or consumption of narcotic substances without a doctor's prescription. However, we cannot forget one important provision of the law. Persons who voluntarily give up drugs are released from administrative and criminal responsibility for their acquisition, as well as their possession, transport and mailing. This also pertains to drug addicts deciding to apply for medical assistance.

[Sharapov] Vasilyi Arsenyevich, if it is established that a juvenile is ill, and that he is on record with a drug treatment center, why is he called up into the army? There doesn't seem to be any logic in this from my point of view: The person needs to be treated, and instead he is handed an assault rifle.

[Serov] The problem rests with the military commissariats, which are obligated to study the young complement thoroughly. Unfortunately these "filters" do not always operate reliably. It is hard to reveal drug addiction, and medical commissions at induction stations do not possess effective means of diagnosing this disease. Moreover there are cases where the health of a future soldier was examined superficially, and where documents were not requested from drug treatment institutions and law enforcement organs. As a result persons who use drugs and were not even on record as drug abusers were deemed to be fit for service, and sent to the army. This practice should of course be curtailed.

Interview with Commander, Belorussian Military District
90UM0128B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 89 First Edition pp I-2

[Interview with Col-Gen A.I. Kostenko, Commander, Belorussian Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt-Col I. Yesyutin; date and place not given]

[Text]
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Anatoliy Ivanovich, I would like to start our discussion with your self-portrait, as it were. You are relatively young to command a military district, and I think that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers are very much interested in who Colonel General Kostenko is.

[Kostenko] My self-portrait? Well, why not. At one time I was walking down a street in Kiev—this was in the 1950s—and who do I see but a general. Well, like a true Suvorov cadet, I started to do the goose step and rendered the salute. The general was snappy in returning the salute, too. But you know how a Suvorov cadet thinks? I ran around the block very fast so that I could greet the general once more. I must smile now as I recall that, of course. The point is, military service was a cherished dream for me. I applied twice for admission to a Suvorov school. I even wrote a letter to the minister of war of that time. I wore the Suvorov uniform 7 years. Some of that feeling has stayed with me to this day.

My officer's service was uneventful: after graduating from officer school, there were the platoon, the company; after the academy, a separate battalion, a regiment. Perhaps I was just lucky, but I always served with a feeling of inspiration. While serving as division chief of staff, I was assigned to study at the General Staff Academy. After that there were line duty and various command positions. In 1987 I was appointed First Deputy Commander of the Belorussian Military District; in the very beginning of this year, I was moved up to commander.

To be honest, this assignment aroused mixed feelings in me. This was the office of such celebrated military leaders as S.K. Timoshenko, V.N. Komarov, V.A. Penkovskiy, S.S. Maryakhin, I.M. Tretyak, Ye.F. Ivanovskiy. The district was always known for its combat proficiency. I—the new commander—wanted to live up to that tradition. I fought inner struggles, but I tried not to show it. Now I imagine that I can say that the district troops generally have done well in operational and combat training. The scores attained at the end of the year are somewhat higher than those of the winter training period. We carried out two divisional exercises in the summer. Both formations performed satisfactorily. The Main Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense inspected the missile and artillery troops in the fall. We were satisfied with the results. Good scores were also registered in 95 percent of battalion exercises carried out on the eve of the present end-of-training period evaluation.

Were there any shortcomings? We are in the middle of the district troop inspection, and it is too early to make general statements, but I can tell you my personal observations. The performance of our company grade officers is wanting. You must realize that the company is the fundamental training level. We must introduce corrections. In the near future we intend to hold training
conferences for young officers and commanders who are to take new assignments. With this as a basis, we will draw up plans to train command cadres in the preparation period.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It seems to me that the present approach to assuring the country's defensive capability via the application of quality factors relative to equipment, armaments, military science, and personnel of the Armed Forces definitely requires fundamental restructuring of the existing system of professional military education.

[Kostenko] It is sometimes useful to simplify complex things. On the one hand, quality factors represent a search effort; on the other hand, there is a limit. Once you understand this, you do not go ahead and "invent the bicycle." Whenever the necessary level of training is attainable by using tried-and-true methods, there is no need to fight the problem. However, when the old approaches no longer work, we must abandon old forms to seek and introduce new and more effective procedures. That is why I would say that the entire training process of the district amounts to dialectical unity of stability and changes. We believe that this kind of approach produces good results. This can be seen in the final scores of the training year, and also by the fact that the district representatives performing at the Army-Wide Officers' Professional Training Competition demonstrated a high level of proficiency by winning second place for the district in this large-scale competition.

I am sure that this is not a chance result. It is a reflection of the care bestowed upon upgrading commanders' professional knowledge and skills. In the winter training period, we held contests at the various levels—regiment, large unit, and, finally, district—for first place in combat proficiency. In the summer period we worked for first place for companies. These competitions are difficult but prestigious. For example, the exercise involving live firing at several targets that represent the opposing side exceeds the usual exercise by a factor of two or three. Success here depends upon boldness and originality of commanders' decisions, and on initiative and willingness to abandon the usual procedures.

I believe that we are still not deriving maximum benefit from the still low quality of tactical exercises and other training. The present system of planning does not permit us to properly prepare for them, work through problems, analyze the results, or learn a lesson for the future. One exercise takes place right after another. I understand the man in the company who gets lost in the mass of pointless requirements of platoon live firings, the company, the battalion tactical exercise. The exercise should be an event for the officer and the soldier! What we need is a system whereby the focus would indeed be on quality factors, not on merely completing the program to get released from the schedule.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The current training year presented the troops with well-known organizational and structural changes associated with the new military doctrine. It was necessary to incorporate them in the course of the combat training. You must have had your problems in this regard in conducting the professional training.

[Kostenko] There were problems here and there. In the course of the spring inspection, the district staff uncovered a number of shortcomings in the way combat training was organized in the formation under the command of Major-General V. Leushev. Other units also suffered the threat of falling out of step, deviating from the plan, and giving in to the task of the moment, so to speak. I believe that this was noted in time by the district military council, which called the command and political personnel's attention to the importance of planning and quality of combat training. We directed a group of officers from the Combat Training Directorate to visit the division of which I spoke above. They assisted units belonging to the large unit to get into the swing of combat training. Today the formation is performing tasks at the level of advanced units of the district.

We found it necessary to restructure the capital equipment training base as we went along as a result of the new structure of subunits and units, and in some cases units had to become familiar with new equipment. However, this work was an integral part of mastering new tasks that lead to the future.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In the last few years—and that includes this year—foreign observers have been invited to large-scale exercises carried out by the troops. Does this not impose a burden on the district, considering that the exercises take on a partial aspect of demonstration or show?

[Kostenko] Exercises watched by foreign observers do impose a high responsibility. Our eyes are not closed to the fact that judgments are made relative to the Army's state of preparedness on the basis of the degree of training displayed by the participating units and subunits. We try to do all we can to satisfy the guests' interests in quality of combat proficiency on the part of units and subunits and in the changes that are coming about as a result of our implementing the new military doctrine. This does at times introduce elements of show into the activities. There obviously is a down side to this kind of approach. There are times when we do not have an instructive display of mock combat operations that reflects the nature of a true contest; the exercise falls into the rut of a preconceived tactic. You should know that the exercise area and demonstration point are prepared in a particular way in advance. For this reason, from the purely military point of view, I am of the opinion that there are disadvantages attached to holding this kind of training exercises every year in the same district. The structure of formations makes it possible for us to conduct two-sided exercises without the large troop involvement called for by the Stockholm agreement relative to invited guests. However, there are in this act
of good will other reasons; they are of a diplomatic and political nature. They simply cannot be ignored.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] I understand that one of the troubles the Army is experiencing is noncompletion of the training plan on the part of personnel.

[Kostenko] There are major occurrences and there are minor occurrences when it comes to this problem. As far as minor occurrences are concerned, when people take up another activity instead of following the training plan, we can do something about it. As for major occurrences—if I may be so bold as to say it—at the district level, we cannot do anything about it. High-level decisions must be made. In my view, the problem can be resolved by following two approaches: on the one hand, by effecting a change in attitude toward the Army as a free work force and emergency team that takes care of someone else’s blunders and omissions; on the other hand, by creating a social infrastructure in military posts and setting the quarters and utilities service on a better footing so that it can independently engage in construction activity, make repairs, and lay pipelines; and by organizing within units subunits that would pursue the special mission of supporting the training process.

Under the present conditions, we are interested in keeping enlisted and NCO personnel possessing combat specialties from being pulled from regular duty to perform odd jobs.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It is common knowledge that the republic housing the district is slated to make the change to total economic accountability and self-financing in the coming year. Is the district in a position to independently provide itself with all necessities so that it can function normally, without the support of local enterprises and organizations?

[Kostenko] I believe that the relations between the district and the republic can become a model of businesslike ties between local organizations and troops under the conditions of economic independence of the republic and localities.

It has been two years since we bypassed the center to sign an agreement with the Belorussian SSR Goskomneprodukt (State Committee for Petroleum Products), whereby district units receive direct deliveries of certain fuel and lubricant items. Republic enterprises supply the District Clothing Service with a considerable amount of clothing. We satisfy all our requirements for potatoes and vegetables on the basis of job authorizations from union ministries. Enterprises that manufacture construction materials supply the district with 75,000 square meters of large-panel elements for housing construction, more than 85 million bricks, and more than 30,000 tons of cement. I must admit that it has become noticeably more difficult to enter into contractual agreements with our suppliers. They are more interested in more useful consumers who are in a position to provide their products in exchange. For this reason, it is of extreme importance to us—in this time of the republic’s transition to total economic independence—to include the district’s needs in the state order category. Those services of ours that are involved are presently working on this problem in collaboration with the Belorussian SSR government.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What affect are the present socio-political processes that are taking place in society—particularly the reductions in the Armed Forces—having on the work of military cadres?

[Kostenko] Let me answer that this way: The sentiments existing in society are reflected to a definite extent in the military collective. Although we officially point to and diligently follow up our promise of guaranteed housing and pension benefits for those discharged into the reserves, our fellow servicemen continue to suffer anxiety over this. What will be available to them in a year or two? What will their future be like?

What officer cadres need is legally-assured confidence for the future. Young persons should have no fears about the security of their service; those further along in age should not worry about housing, permission to establish residence, or employment after discharge.

On the subject of the very specific sentiments military cadres possess relative to combat readiness, I can say with certainty that they have not had any affect at the district level.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How do you think combat training will be organized next year?

[Kostenko] To respond to that with a brief and conceptual reply, I see it as a training that will prepare each serviceman—and this holds true for the subunit and unit—for successful accomplishment of the mission assigned to his combat role. What does this involve? Primarily selfless labor, of course. However, the organization of military labor also calls for an approach that is in tune with the times. It is necessary to enhance the position of the man in uniform as a social being. He must be given the opportunity to do what he is supposed to do. Incentives must be provided to reward labor of high professional standing. The man should be given a reason to be interested in the end result of his labor and improvement of his qualifications.

The present training year has offered commanders the opportunity of exercising a great amount of independence in resolving many problems. Have they all taken advantage of this? It seems that it is necessary to do more than offer independence; it must be inculcated, cultivated, and instilled. Independence is linked directly to responsibility. I, as the commander, would like my subordinates to display it more often.
Group Formed to Address Military International Legal Problems
90UM0128A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Text] The International Law Group has been formed in the Administrative Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. It is headed by Colonel of Justice I. Kotlyarov, Candidate of Juridical Sciences, and Docent. By request of the editors, he answers questions on the purpose and nature of work performed by the group.

[Kotlyarov] We had something to go on when we started our work. Before our group was organized, military problems of international law had been worked on by various departments of the USSR Ministry of Defense. This work has been turned over to us.

One of our major tasks is drawing up recommendations for submission to military control organs relative to the application and strict observance of the principles and rules of international law in the routine activities of troops and naval forces; and incorporating their requirements into national legislation. The need and importance of this work was discussed in a recent conference held by the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The International Law Group is taking its first steps. We started off by setting up a card index; compiling a list of international legislative acts dealing with various aspects of international law; and systematizing international agreements pertaining to military activities of countries.

In the most recent past our group participated in drafting suggestions for submission to the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense on the subject of carrying out the USSR Supreme Soviet decree of 4 August 1989 entitled “On the Ratification of the Protocol Addendum to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relative to Protecting Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and the Protocol Addendum to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relative to Protecting Victims of Armed Conflicts of a Non-International Nature (Protocol II).”

[Kotlyarov] The group also will be held responsible for developing suggestions for submission to military command organs dealing with: the monitoring of possible violations of rules of international law by military and naval forces and individual servicemen; review, from the international legal standpoint, of actions taken by Soviet troops and fleets in unusual situations that involve the interests of other countries; activities of armed forces belonging to foreign countries violating the security and territorial integrity of the USSR, or activities that are not sanctioned by the government; and the study, from the international law standpoint, of procedures for effecting resolution of incidents.
ARMED FORCES

“Non-regulation relations causing personnel, including Sarkisov, to go AWOL?” Lieutenant Colonel A. Tsvetkov, Detachment Commander, answered with a question and then stated categorically: “That is not so and cannot be so. It is simply unconscientious military construction workers with a desire to evade their duty.”

“I ran away because they were constantly beating me. I couldn’t take it any longer,” Private V. Sarkisov stated. “Why didn’t I go to superiors? That would just have made things worse. I will not even tell you the names of those who beat me. Things would become unbearable for me if I did. If not physically, they will destroy me emotionally. Nothing will happen to those who beat me in any case....”

The facts too contradict Lieutenant Colonel Tsvetkov’s complacency.

“This detachment is the worse in the Northern Fleet Military Construction Directorate with respect to discipline,” we were told by Lieutenant Colonel V. Doroshchenko, chief of the Political Section of the Northern Fleet Military Construction Directorate. And the worsening statistics bear this out. While there were five cases of non-regulation relations—to put it more plainly, beatings of the young personnel by abusive old-timers during the first 5 months of last year, there have already been 22 during the same period this year. The number of absences without leave grew from 8 to 23 during that period of time. Three absences without leave by groups, involving seven people, have occurred this year. Six of them were young military construction workers who could no longer bear the beatings and humiliations.

“I refused to clean up the area for senior servicemen.” Private N. Romanenko told me. “So they took me to the latrine and held me by the arms and legs, at which point I yelled: ‘I’ll clean it for you.’ Two days later I went AWOL because they were making life miserable for me. When they caught me, they beat me again. I couldn’t stand it. I went to the commander and told him who was beating me. Almost nothing changed after that, though....”

Lieutenant of Medical Services A. Smolyaninov, Chief of the Detachment Medical Service, said that of 65 military construction workers injured this year, 35 of them were injured as a result of non-regulation relations. A total of 171 workdays were lost.

The figures are shocking and make any normal person angry. Lieutenant Colonel Tsvetkov remains unperturbed, however. Perhaps because he himself is far from pure when it comes to observing the rules governing relations among servicemen. In one case he struck Private B. Murzagildin while they were in his office. Other examples were presented in the political section to show that Lieutenant Colonel Tsvetkov did not much rest on ceremony in “teaching” subordinates.

In short, this is the background against which one needs to view the absences without leave of Private Sarkisov

AWOL, Discipline Problems in Naval Construction Unit

90UM0137A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Nov 89 First Edition pp 1-2


[Text] Respected Editors: I am the mother of Private Vladimir Sarkisov, a military construction worker. I visited Northern Fleet unit in which my son serves. When I met him at the hotel I could see bruises around his rib cage and one on his chin, and one of his teeth had been knocked out.... I submitted a statement to this effect but retracted it under pressure. Ten days after I returned home I received a telegram from the unit commander stating that Vladimir was AWOL from the unit. I ask the editors to ascertain why our son left the unit. Please help us old people (my husband is a war and labor veteran, and we have been living on a pension for a long time) get to the bottom of it all.—Z. Sarkisova, Komi ASSR

The runaway had already been found by the time I arrived in the military construction detachment. The military procuracy had refused to file criminal charges against Private V. Sarkisov for going AWOL (he was absent less than 3 days).

It turned out that this was the second time he had gone AWOL. The first had ended with Sarkisov and Private N. Romanenko, his companion in the unauthorized absence, appearing before a Comrade’s Court of military construction workers, where they received public penalties.
and other young military construction workers. While in no way justifying Sarkisov's act, one can say with certainty that he would not have run off at all if not for the blatant abuse by old-timers in the detachment. All the more since Sarkisov's superiors, with the exception perhaps of Lieutenant Colonel Tsvetkov, had positive things to say about his decency and his conscientiousness and diligence on the job.

It is a known fact that the disease of abuse by old-timers has been fairly well neglected. I shall cite one fact as confirmation: A large percentage of the absences without leave in the Northern Fleet Military Construction Directorate involve non-regulation relations in one way or another. It would be very simple to explain all of the actions of individual hooligans by saying that the virus of abuse by old-timers was brought into civilian life. This has occurred, of course, and cannot now be avoided. One cannot fail to see the blame of commanders and political workers, however. The situation in the detachment we are discussing is graphic illustration of this.

"My service duties have frequently taken me to this detachment," said Lt Justice I. Burdanov, investigator for the garrison military procuracy. "And I can say that the service of the internal duty details has been poorly organized wherever proper regulation order has been absent. And there is a direct linkage between violations of discipline and non-regulation relations.

Strange as it seems, the flourishing of abuse by old-timers in the detachment has been furthered to a considerable degree by those who are its targets. A sense of false comradery solidly seals their lips even when the signs of beatings appear right on their faces. I spoke for several hours, until late in the night, with Privates B. Altybayev, D. Kuzovlev, K. Karyandzhiev and other young military construction workers, who, according to unofficial information, feel the brunt of the "interests" of superiors more than anyone else, but not one of them would name his tormentors. We agreed to give them a night to think it over. The next morning no one came to me, however.

"We come up against situations in which the victims of non-regulation relations refuse to appeal for the protection of their rights," Lieutenant Colonel Justice V. Afanasyev, first deputy military procurator of the Northern Fleet, had to say about this behavior. "And when they do, sooner or later, nine out of ten of them will deny his previous testimony in the court. The main cause of this is their fear of public condemnation."

There is no denying the fact that public opinion carries great force. Even when it is negative, as in this case. And there is no doubting its negative impact, since the collective protection covers those older servicemen who "educate" the youth with their fists, protected by the reliable armor of an acutely negative attitude toward the "squealers." It would not be an exaggeration to say that the abuse by old-timers literally parasitized the sacred sense of comradeship, makes the latter serve it—and fairly skillfully.

Many young military construction workers are restrained from reporting to headquarters or the political section by a sense of self-preservation, if you like. They have no faith in their own safety or that they can be protected from retaliation by the old-timers. "Can you guarantee us that no one will touch us after we tell you the whole truth, that all of the guilty parties will receive their just punishment?" I was bluntly asked by one young fellow in the group of military construction workers with whom I met until late at night. Perhaps it was precisely because of this absence of a guarantee, which a correspondent cannot give, that none of them dared tell "the whole truth."

I could not give such a guarantee because I was already acquainted with some statistics which amazed me. In only 2 out of 25 cases of non-regulation relations brought out in the unit this year the criminal case was not dropped. And not one of the old-timers was held criminally accountable. This means that not one of the barracks hooligans bore any significant accountability for beatings and humiliation inflicted upon junior comrades. They cannot even be put into the guardroom, because it has been closed. One cannot accept as serious punishment the stern reprimand received by Private N. Frolenkov from the company commander for striking Private S. (who asked not to be named) so hard he broke the latter's nose.

"The difficulty lies in the defectiveness of criminal law," was Lieutenant Colonel Justice Afanasyev's opinion. "Articles 243 and 244 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, which specify criminal liability for an offense to one serviceman by another, are applicable only when at least one of them is on duty at the time. Otherwise a criminal case can be instigated only if the victim files a personal complaint. You already know how unwilling the victims are to do this. As a result we frequently find ourselves unarmed against non-regulation relations."

They were forced to admit in the Northern Fleet Military Construction Directorate that it was a mistake to appoint Lieutenant Colonel Tsvetkov as a detachment commander. And Maj G. Gross, the new detachment commander, an energetic and conscientious officer, has set about decisively establishing order and improving the personal conditions of the personnel. ("We sensed this immediately just from the fact that the daily schedule finally began to be carried out in its entirety," Private Sarkisov said. Incidentally, he has been discharged into the reserve for reasons of health). Certain officers who were unable to handle their duties have been relieved of their assignments. One would like to think that the steps being taken and those planned will produce results. It will not be an easy job, of course. And how important it is for the law to serve as an active incentive in this
matter, for it to reliably protect the serviceman and inescapably punish those who encroach upon their honor, dignity and health.

Commentary by Col of Justice B. Bobrenev, Department Chief in the Main Military Procuracy:

“One cannot say that the law on this matter is defective. Back in 1984 the concept of being on duty as a prerequisite for bringing one to criminal accountability was eliminated from Article 244 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, mentioned by Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Afanasyev. A criminal case is instigated whenever there are non-regulation relations in the form of beatings or other violence. Furthermore, a statement by the victim is not required at all. Letters from family members or acquaintances, reports from party or Komsomol organizations, the detection of signs of a crime, information provided in the press and other sources can provide the grounds.

The unit commander is required to instigate a criminal case as soon as he learns of an instance of non-regulation relations. Furthermore, if he permits the matter to be covered up two or more times, this is grounds for the procuracy to instigate a criminal case against the commander himself under Article 260 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (for systematically neglecting to apply his authority). While this previously required the consent of the higher command element, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has passed an ukase this year whereby the procuracy enjoys total independence in this matter with respect to an official of any rank.

According to the above article the abuse by old-timers in the unit flourished because of the former commander’s inaction and the unprincipled legal stance of the procuracy. The main military procurator has demanded that the military procurator of the Northern Fleet get to the bottom of all these cases and inform the readers of Krasnaya Zvezda on steps taken to restore lawfulness.
Impact of Departmentalism on Flight Safety Investigation

90UM0120A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Maj Gen of Aviation V. Zhukov: “Those Who Don’t Need a ‘Black Box’”]

[Text] In the report on the flight accident, the description of this incident fit on a few lines: “when executing a landing during a training flight, Lt. D. Zhukov did not maintain his glidepath and landed on the right edge of the runway. The fighter rolled off onto the ground, where it struck the supports of wind vanes that had been set up to frighten away birds. As a result, the plane crashed.”

Only Lt. Zhukov was named as a culprit in the accident—a pilot who had served in the unit for less than a year following his graduation from flight school. And there was not a word about the other causes that had led to the occurrence of the crash situation. Thus no mention was made of the deficiencies in the organization of flights, although the lieutenant’s program of conversion-training in the regiment had been unjustifiably delayed. The commission also failed to note the errors in flight control, although neither the flight operations officer nor his subordinates had noticed the deviation of the fighter from the assigned descent trajectory during the landing. Nor did the commission remark on flight support, even though the legs of the wind vanes at the airfield had been set up in violation of requirements of the governing documents.

In short, they found the “usual suspect”, and that was the end of it. Whence this bouquet of unprincipled behavior? Could it be that the commission was not interested in an objective investigation of the accident?

I will venture to voice the opinion that not every commission is interested in an objective, unprejudiced examination of a particular accident. Everything depends on its so-called departmental affiliation. For example, the incident with Lt. Zhukov occurred in a regiment which is subordinate to the Moscow Air Defense District. However, no specialists not belonging to air defense aviation (including from the Flight Safety Service of the USSR Defense Ministry) were included in the commission. This predetermined the nature of the investigation.

In each stage of development of Soviet military aviation, great attention has been devoted to raising flight safety. In the mid-60s, the formation of the Flight Safety Service in the aviation of the Armed Forces branches—the Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, and Navy—made it possible successfully to resolve the practical questions of combating accidents. They began to clarify the regularities in the repetition of the most characteristic air accidents, methods were improved for their investigation in various situations, a group of cause-and-effect relationships that led to the onset of the accident situations was drawn up. Combining the monitoring functions with the provision of assistance to the command and personnel in preventing air accidents, the officers of the safety services made a contribution to the reduction of accidents in the late 60s and early 70s.

However, over time deficiencies began to crop up and then progress in the work of these services. Because they had separate headquarters (actually, departments) these services did not provide the necessary coordination, which reduced the effectiveness of accident prevention on an Armed-Forces-wide scale. The absence of a uniform supra-departmental body did not allow efficient tracking of the status of safety in military aviation as a whole, centralized reaction to the greatest and most complex problems, or avoidance of vagueness and redundancy in scientific research work.

But even this was not all. The impossibility of fully and fairly performing functions of duty, especially in the investigation of accidents and mishaps occurring in units of branches of the Armed Forces, was the most serious deficiency in the work of the departmental safety services. You see, each such service not only was directly subordinate to the corresponding commander, whose responsibility included flight safety status, but also was virtually dependent on the positions and decisions of the leaders of a number of directorates and departments of the apparatus, whose activity directly influenced the safeguarding of flight safety (combat training, staff, political organ, flight-engineer service, equipment purchasers, headquarters, rear, and cadres). After all, flight accidents generally do not happen for a single reason, or through the fault of a single violator, whom they most often strive to see as the pilot himself. A group of errors and omissions not only by the flight personnel but also by a number of officials belonging to the enumerated (and of course other) services also contribute to accidents and mishaps. Here errors and omissions may directly precede the specific accident situation. For instance, an error of the flight operations officer, commanding a crew to descend to a level lower than the established safe one. They may be long-existing deficiencies that have never before manifested themselves. These include faulty training methods, failure to test certain flight characteristics of a plane (helicopter), poor ergonomics of the pilot’s workplace, and absence of certain variants of special situations in the flight operations manuals.

Finding all the factors that led to the unfortunate finale of the flight means that one can rule out a repetition of analogous incidents, and at the same time ensures reliability in the “pilot-aircraft-environment” system. But precisely this is frequently not present in the work of the involved officials, who draw up the investigation report of the specific accident. “Finding” remains a bird in the aircraft wreckage, writing off the accident to unforeseen complication of the flight or combat loss, finally, to a lack of discipline or error on the part of the pilot (especially if he can no longer provide explanations)—this is the behavior model of those commission members
who strive first of all to smooth over and blunt the impact of the incident. Such "investigators" do not conceal their satisfaction when the "black box" (flight recorder) is not found or has burned up—it will be simpler to perform such unpleasant work. They do not think about past accidents, let alone possible future ones.

The truth is even more distorted in the absence of representatives of the central apparatus, when the investigation is done only by local forces. There have been cases when accidental destruction of aviation equipment has been classed as breakage or simply damage, and the plane (helicopter), which will never fly again, is counted as part of the flight inventory and kept for a long time in a remote section of the airfield until it is written off in accordance with some "less exciting" clause.

Due to the worsening of the state of affairs in aviation accidents in the mid-70s, the decision was made to form the Central Flight Safety Inspectorate of the USSR Armed Forces, subordinate to the Defense Ministry. It was formed from the most well-trained officers of all aviation arms. The inspectorate began its work with a profound study of the actual state of affairs with respect to accidents and the complex of all causes leading to them—from the manning of flight schools to the procedure for finding and eliminating design and production defects in experimental and serial aviation equipment. As was noted in 1978 in a report by the inspectorate to the leadership of the Defense Ministry, the higher command for the first time received a complete and objective picture of the status of flight safety of military aviation. At this time they reported not only the most rational, but also the actually feasible measures to ensure flight safety. As a result they managed first to stabilize and then to achieve a stable downward trend in flight accidents. The number of accidents and collisions of aircraft diminished, and there were practically no more incidents of concealment of flight accidents.

Unfortunately, the work of the inspectorate to find defects in ensuring flight safety began to encounter ever-increasing resistance. Its manning was periodically cut. In 1987, it had been transformed into the Flight Safety Service, and made part of the Air Forces. This eliminated its non-departmental status and legalized influence on its work by those authorities whose defects in ensuring flight safety had previously come under scrutiny.

Under the slogan of reducing and reorganizing the administrative apparatus they now continue to "melt away" the manning of the Flight Safety Service. The service no longer has the pilots, navigators, and engineers in the basic arms of aviation, especially for trips to accident sites and for preventive classes in the units. What will happen next?

Is it possible that the officers of the Flight Safety Service are those arm-chair administrative bureaucrats who can and should be reduced? These are workers who spend more than half the year on field trips and temporary duty assignments, detailed to any point in the country. They are involved in very hard work (both emotionally and physically) to investigate tragic situations, oversights, and sometimes unconscious behavior by the most diverse officials.

Now when the cost of even a single accident has become especially high, it is hard to understand this attitude toward the professionals who stand guard over flight safety. In its tasks, our service is similar to the GAI [State Automobile Inspectorate] and other inspection and accident prevention organs for the equipment in many departments. In a certain sense, it is also analogous to law-and-order organs. But they are being strengthened today. In particular, the organization analogous to ours in civilian aviation has gained the status of a State Commission.

Indisputably the matter is not one of the name of the service, which works in the interests of raising both the combat readiness and prestige of the Armed Forces. It is important to stabilize its manning at a strength which ensures quality accomplishment of its assigned tasks, and to guarantee the possibility of objective work. You see, the cost of only one aircraft saved from an air accident pays for the annual cost of this service. We must count and compare everywhere, both today and for the future. It is important that the state cause of ensuring flight safety be resolved at the state level.
Frequent Breakdown of Fire-Control Radar Noted

90UM0100A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Nov 89 First Edition p 1

[Report by Captain 2nd Rank A. Kozhevnikov, Senior Officer in the Northern Fleet Radiotechnical Directorate: “Guaranteed Reliability”]

[Text] A malfunction occurred recently aboard a destroyer during combat training exercises at sea. The antenna of the fire-control radar jammed on its pawl. Fearing that in time the pitching would rip it loose, the commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank V. Fomin, decided to return to base ahead of schedule.

The following circumstances drew attention to itself. The malfunction in the operation of equipment occurred during the period of the factory warranty. And the situation was made even more complicated by the fact that it happened at sea when, according to the training plan, the ship was to use gunnery fire. It is not difficult to imagine what that “warranty” would be worth under the conditions of a real combat situation.

It must be said that the occurrence of a malfunction in some guaranteed fire-control radar system is not such a rarity. Perhaps it is precisely with these radars that our directorate and the ship’s specialists servicing them have to deal most. On the one hand, the cause is the growing complexity of fire-control radars in recent times and the increasing probability of some kind of malfunction. On the other hand, it is a question not of everyday radio-technical equipment, where, incidentally, a high degree of reliability is also essential, but combat equipment in which personnel and the ship’s commander must have 100-percent confidence. The real state of affairs gives us grounds for talking about the inadequate reliability of radars manufactured by the enterprise where the general director is G. Ivanov, and about the not always high quality of execution. Virtually from the very start of production of these radars the fleet has been having trouble with them. Another of their features is that there are many more industrial brigades that service the radars than brigades that service other types of radar. Let me quote you the opinion of ship’s officers on this score:

Captain 2nd Rank I. Zhelzhnyakov, commander of a combat unit in the large antisubmarine ship:

Our ship is relatively new. The radar that is installed on it is very unreliable. If a combat group made up of several ships is at sea, one or two of their radars will certainly malfunction. I can remember numerous instances of work being interrupted because of malfunctions in these radars.

Senior Lieutenant I. Ponomarev, commander of a BPK [large antisubmarine ship] air and surface target-illumination group:

The radar is right there in my subunit. I can say with a proper sense of responsibility that its qualities and reliability are very poor. For example, our ship has had to return to base three times for repairs because of malfunctions in this radar. It is reckoned that the radar will operate continuously for a certain number of hours, but in fact on our ship it is much less. We have calculated that time to malfunction is on average only half the guaranteed time. One serious defect is that the thermal insulation on the radar has not been well designed. It is impossible even to change a regular rubber gasket ourselves; the entire antenna must be sent back to the plant.

On 16 July this year the BPK commander signed an official complaint. This is what happened: The operating system could not be switched on. On one missile cruiser in less than 10 months of the warranty period 28 instances of radar malfunction were logged (eight of them while at sea). A total of 18 malfunctions were logged on an antisubmarine cruiser during the period March 1987 through December 1988. And the list could be continued.

The following question arises: How long will the enterprise managed by G. Ivanov be sending these rejects to the fleet?

Industry Response on Delivery of Low Quality Equipment

90UM0106A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: “A Hostile Reception for Criticism: Defense Enterprise Delivers Low Quality Products”; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] On 30 June of this year, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published the correspondence entitled “A Departmental Dictate,” written by Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko. It discusses low quality of equipment produced for ships by the production association headed by General Director G. Ivanov and some causes of this situation.

The Production Association sent us an official reply, in which the Association rejects the criticism completely and goes so far as to accuse the writer of lack of conscience and prejudice. It is not possible to quote the entire letter on account of its length. We will restrict ourselves to the main issues.

The Association in its reply rejects the accusation that it delivers obsolete equipment to the Navy and that the management is engaged in the practice of supplying poor products. Let us look at the documents. The following are excerpts from the report written by the superior institution’s quality control division: “It does not satisfy the requirements stipulated by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers... by virtue of technical obsolescence of its products... There is no pilot production or test base... Realignment schedules have been abandoned... Efficiency is poor... 100 percent of items in a particular category were returned to be reworked under the supervision of the military representatives... The Production Association has not set up
technical service bases in the fleets... Commissions have discovered the same shortcomings year after year..."

Let us also consider the following excerpts from an official document written upon completion of an inspection of the enterprise carried out by the TsFU [Central Finance Directorate] of the Ministry of Defense: "The low product quality is associated with system price increases... There is a complete absence of price discipline; production cost escalation is typical..."

The reply further states that the Production Association has no arrangement for accepting complaints, which means that it cannot process any claims. Indeed, the writer of the correspondence was shown no complaints at the enterprise. However, he directed inquiries to the fleet. The editorial staff did not receive a single positive response relative to the Association's products. The following was written by Captain 2nd Rank A. Kozhevinikov, senior directorate officer in the Northern Fleet: "In 1989 alone, we transmitted to the enterprise five unsuitable equipment reports: three from the destroyer "Okrylenny," one from the destroyer "Gremyashchii," and one from the large antisubmarine ship "Simferopol." All the stations are within the warranty period! Six or seven reports such as these are sent by our fleet every year."

Much effort is devoted in the official reply to prove that worker V. Korotkov and Captain 1st Rank E. Ryazin—the former chief of the military representative's office at the plant—who are defended in the correspondence, are, to say the least, "unreliable comrades." Let us not clutter up this article with unsubstantiated accusations of numerous transgressions "submitted" in the reply. We will stick to the main questions. In the official reply to the editors, it is stated that in 1979 Section Chief V. Korotkov had charges brought against him, allegedly as a result of a collective action, with the charge being "official malfeasance," after which he was released from his position. The facts tell us something else. Section Chief V. Korotkov was released from his position by Order No 321/k dated 22 April 1981 (not 1979) "in connection with reorganization of production" and demoted to ordinary worker by his own request. The facts and documents indicate that it was General Director G. Ivanov that took action to "get rid of" V. Korotkov (since he knew of many outrageous incidents about which he wrote to all offices).

On 24 November 1986, G. Ivanov sent a letter (No 52-578), dealing with alleged theft committed by Korotkov. This resulted in a criminal investigation, prompting G. Ivanov to write a circular letter (No 2-497, page 198 in the rayon people's court file) to the office to which Korotkov had sent letters describing the transgressions. He stated in his letter that Korotkov was under investigation, and, as a result, could not be considered reliable. However, in February of 1989 the RSFSR Procurator's Office terminated the investigation of Korotkov due to lack of evidence, after which it raised the question of filing charges against officials for initiating an unjustified criminal investigation. This fact must have been known in the Association at the time the official reply to the editorial staff was in preparation. Nevertheless, the reply continues to levy at Korotkov accusations that have long since been rejected by the RSFSR Procurator's Office.

With regard to Reserve Captain 1st Rank E. Ryazin, it is difficult to accept the idea expressed in the official reply to the editorial staff that he is "dragging the plant through the mud" as a result of suffering personal affronts (in 1987 he was not selected to fill the position of deputy general director). The fact is that Ryazin was discharged into the reserves in 1987, and he started to write the letters and official reports of troubles at the plant in 1983 (copies are on file in the enterprise's military representative's office).

Now the main issue. The official reply to the editorial staff casts doubts on the writer of the correspondence relative to his competence to comprehend the problems existing in the Association. Nevertheless, our article drew responses—56 of them. They were written by designers, engineers, officers in Directorates of the Ministry of Defense and military representative's offices, and ship specialists whose work is associated with the products manufactured by the production Association in question. They all support the article, citing numerous facts pointing to troubles in this defense enterprise. (Not a single letter states the opposite.) Below are some excerpts:

"The correspondence entitled "Departamental Dictate" concerns us directly, since for some years we have been using the equipment supplied by the Association in question."

"Quality of the equipment is indeed extremely poor. We know worker V. Korotkov, who for a number of years rendered technical assistance to ships' crews and alone carried on an amount of repair and maintenance work that was sufficient for three specialists. Numerous letters of appreciation citing Korotkov for his work were addressed to General Director G. Ivanov, but they went unanswered."

"We find it inconceivable that in this day and age the General Director can proceed with impunity in his ruthless mistreatment of a worker who undertook perestonka on his own, i.e., raised questions of improving equipment quality and uncovered serious abuses." [Signed] Captain 3rd Rank I. Tseyrifman, Laboratory Chief; Captain-Lieutenant V. Flag Specialist, RTS; Warrant Officer Ya. Dubovoy; Instructor, RTS, BALTIC FLEET.

"I am in complete agreement with the correspondence 'Departamental Dictate.' I am prepared to offer the editorial staff documents proving that the Production
Association headed by G. Ivanov does harm to inventions that relate to systems that are very necessary for the fleet..." [Signed] Ye. Lipatov, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Leningrad.

"The Navy is suffering as a result of equipment supplied by the Production Association headed by G. Ivanov. Breakdowns are common. Reliability is poor..." Captain 1st Rank V. Drigola, Deputy Directorate Chief, Northern Fleet.

On the basis of the information provided in the correspondence "Departmental Dictate," the Military Procurator's Office of the Moscow Garrison, working jointly with the District Procurator's Office of the city of Moscow and specialists from the Navy, conducted an inspection of the Association. The results also confirmed the information provided in the correspondence. The following was received from Colonel of Justice V. Knokhinov, Acting First Deputy Military Procurator of the Moscow Military District:

"An inspection has revealed that the Association has indeed committed infractions...of the requirements as stated in the USSR Law on State Enterprise (Association) and the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers...dealing with the struggle against the manufacture of poor quality products..."

"Specialists have concluded that...the shortcomings...are such that design solutions are given final modification during series production and use of equipment instead of employing mockups and pilot models. This practice results in the creation of new equipment models offering poor reliability."

"...It has been established that the management...does not take effective measures to assure timely and quality preparation of the production process for the purpose of manufacturing products of suitable quality...Insufficient importance is attached to quality control...to assure observance of technological discipline. The latter conclusion is especially supported by the fact that acceptance testing carried out by the quality control division and the military representative's office in the first half of 1989 resulted in the discovery of nearly 300 defects in each manufactured product..."

Acting on the basis of the inspection, the Military Procurator's Office of the Moscow Garrison, operating jointly with the Procurator of the Moscow City District Procurator, has served the Association head with a notice of elimination of legal infractions, demanding cessation of manufacture of poor quality products. The notice also raises the question of filing charges against officials, as provided for by law, for negligence in the performance of their official duties.

The inspection also discovered that the article contains some inaccuracies...In particular, we point out that the incident involving the BPK [large antisubmarine ship] "Admiral Tributs" is not related to products manufactured by the Association. (The correspondence mentions that "At that particular time, workers of an associated enterprise were aboard the BPK," i.e., the enterprise was not being held accountable in this case.—Ed.)

"...Relative to the "obsolete equipment base (representative of the 1950s and 1960s)," it should be understood that the equipment base is selected in strict conformity to the pertinent guidelines..."

"...The inspection discovered that allegations of failure to provide consumer organizations with spare equipment had no basis in fact...References to 'failure to provide the fleet with training devices' were inaccurate. In 1986 the Association delivered one training device to a higher naval school" (but the fleet has no training devices!—Ed.).

"In general, the article is topical. The questions it raises demand careful consideration and action on the part of all interested ministries and departments."

As we can see, it is too early to bring the matter to a close. Witness the production Association management's hostility to the criticism and lack of acknowledgement. And the fact that worker V. Korotkov is still being punished. (He was recently reprimanded on the same grounds that were rejected a number of times by people's courts.) And the fact that N. Treyyev—or a board member in the ministry associated with the Association—wrote the editors a reply to the correspondence in which he totally commits himself to defending the defense enterprise producing the defective products. With all this as a basis, the editorial staff transmitted the materials it had available on the work of the production Association to the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet for Questions of Defense and State Security. Naval Combat Readiness Department
Col Gen Kochemasov on Missile, Artillery Troops Day, 1989

90UM0207A VIINUS SOYETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 19 Nov 89 p 1

[Interview with Col Gen S. G. Kochemasov, the Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Main Staff, conducted by an unnamed TASS correspondent, under the rubric "19 November—Missile and Artillery Troops Day": "The Missile Shield of the Homeland."]

[Text] 19 November is Missile and Artillery Troops Day. The Soviet people honor missile launch crews, artillerymen, and the inventors of formidable combat weapons. In connection with this holiday, a TASS correspondent asked Colonel General S. G. Kochemasov, the Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Main Staff, to answer some questions.

[Correspondent] Stanislav Grigoryevich, I would like (you) to remind our readers about the history of the vocational holiday for Soviet artillerymen and missileers and about those heroic pages which they have added to the combat annals of the USSR Armed Forces.

[Kochemasov] I will begin with the fact that this holiday was established in commemoration of the Soviet artillery's special combat services during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Namely, in October 1942, the salvoes of 15 thousand guns, mortars, and rocket launchers announced the beginning of the Red Army's counteroffensive near Stalingrad.

During the years of the war, Soviet artillery destroyed more than 70 thousand enemy tanks, 167 thousand guns and mortars, and tens of thousands of his soldiers. During this time, Soviet industry produced 482 thousand guns of all calibres and 352 thousand mortars. More than 2,100 artillery regiments and brigades were awarded decorations, approximately 1,200 received honorary name designations, and more than 500 received the title of guard units. 1.6 million artillerymen were awarded combat decorations and medals and 1,883 of them became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Of course, one can also cite other impressive statistics, but, in my opinion, the significance of the artillerymen's contribution to the achievement of our common victory is obvious without them.

During the postwar years, in response to the growing military threat from the aggressive forces of imperialism to unleash nuclear missile warfare, the Communist Party, the Soviet government, and our whole nation secured through incredible efforts the development of nuclear missile weapons in our country. And since 1964, (by USSR Supreme Soviet decree dated 17 November) our holiday began to be observed as the Missile and Artillery Troops Day.

[Correspondent] It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this event for our country and for the fortunes of the whole world. Therefore, please, go into more detail on the fact of the development of our nuclear missile shield.

[Kochemasov] They say, do not discard the lyrics of the song. Moreover, we, having learned through bitter experience, must not rework nor retouch our history. And our history attests that during the summer of 1945 at the Potsdam Conference, Truman, with insidious intent, informed Stalin: the United States had developed the atomic bomb. Stalin, when the occasion required, knew perfectly well how to control himself. Not until that same evening (and this is also a historical fact), did he contact Kurchatov by telephone, hurrying the scientist to finish the development of the atomic bomb.

Regarding that historical period we can ask ourselves the question: was everything done correctly at that time? And we can honestly answer: on the whole—yes. There was no alternative to the development of the nuclear missile shield. But we would not be completely honest, if we did not address the fact that during the postwar period, good use was not made of all the opportunities to limit the scale and the acuteness of confrontation and to prevent the spectre of an "iron curtain", which subsequently cost us a pretty penny. The deviation from Leninist norms, the aftereffects of which we are still overcoming, also played a part in this. As a matter of fact, this is why we need perestroika.

[Correspondent] Be that as it may, Stanislav Grigoryevich, it is symbolic that our country was the initiator of a radical reduction in nuclear missiles. Along these lines, an opinion exists among a certain portion of the Soviet people that many military men, primarily missileers of course, opposed the peaceable initiative of the highest Soviet leaders. What can you say regarding this?

[Kochemasov] In common terms this is called a discourse to the extent of one's own expertise. But if one is speaking seriously, one must note that hundreds and thousands of people, primarily our military experts, worked on the preparation of the Soviet-American INF Treaty. No one can or does know better than military experts, how to eliminate the most complex weapons of our age. Furthermore, we even had to train hundreds of missileers for this purpose. And in order to put an end to this once and for all, I will add that among our soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers, it is unlikely that people, who doubt the correctness of the Party's and government's decisions, could be found. Although by everyday standards, many of them have experienced the type of problems, which do not fall within the usual bounds of military service.

[Correspondent] Stanislav Grigoryevich, please dwell at greater length on this circumstance.

[Kochemasov] It is no secret that in the not too distant past during such large reductions in the strength of the Armed Forces, people sometimes seemed to recede into the background. The military bureaucracy did not trouble itself an awful lot about them, especially in the
provinces. Today, we are solving the problems of discharging officers with particular care, bearing in mind that consideration and concern for the people, who are performing the honorable duty of defending the homeland, was and still is a main factor determining the morale of the Army.

Seizing the opportunity, I would like to address the representatives of the local Party and Soviet bodies, who,—and I would very much like to believe this,—will provide an appropriate welcome to our missleers in the cities and villages, at the factories and plants, at educational institutions, at transportation facilities, at the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, in short, in every aspect of the national economy. I really think that these people, who have devoted so much strength and energy to the homeland, are worthy of every consideration and encouragement from the local Party and Soviet bodies.

[Correspondent] What is the state of the modern Missile and Artillery Forces? Have not our unilateral and rather large scale reductions affected their combat readiness?

[Kochemasov] First of all, I must state that our artillery has made a qualitative leap during its period of development. In connection with the development of battlefield missiles and operational-tactical missiles, a new combat arm has appeared—the Missile Forces and Artillery of the Ground Forces. Cannon artillery has not lost its great importance in accomplishing offensive and defensive objectives. Today, high-powered gun artillery, howitzer artillery, tank-destroyer artillery, and rocket artillery are actively used in all field training exercises.

Modern missile systems and their automated guidance and control systems ensure the highest degree of readiness for delivering a retaliatory strike.

I do not say this at all for the purpose of once again rattling the saber. In my opinion, the whole world is convinced that none of the Soviet people, including the military, desire war, but are fighting for peace. The revolutionary character of our new thought lies in the fact that it is directed toward a denuclearized future. However, defense is the main priority of the state. Safeguarding the life and peaceful labor of the Soviet people is a matter of supreme responsibility. And so, proceeding from present-day realities, we cannot under any circumstances allow military superiority over ourselves.

Therefore, special responsibility lies with the strategic missile launch crews. This responsibility is conditioned by the combat role of this branch of service and the special nature of the missions entrusted to it. Our soldiers' basis for serving is the performance of combat alert duty in peacetime. The entire system of personnel training and education is subordinated to the unconditional and efficient execution of this special responsibility.

[Correspondent] As a rule, it is natural that they should celebrate their vocational holiday with significant achievements in combat and political training.

[Kochemasov] And such is the case. You know, in the long run, the mood of the missleers is mainly determined by their sacred duty to the homeland and to their nation.

In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize that the realities of the modern world do not give us grounds for complacency. And this means that we cannot, we do not have the right to lower our constant vigilance and combat readiness. For today, this is the most effective way of preventing war. For the present, the implementation of the principles of our new political thought is just beginning to develop other measures for preventing war.
Problems of Military Construction Workers on Civilian Projects
90UM01264 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col L. Nechayuk: “In a Disenfranchised State”]

[Text] Before me is a pack of readers’ letters. Each has its own story and its own concerns, but essentially they speak of one thing: the appalling lack of rights of military construction workers sent to civilian construction sites. The people complain, they come to the editors for protection. What do we do when we receive these bitter letters and hear their complaints? In most cases we pass them on to the leaders of the relevant ministries and departments, we call them on the phone, we ask them to look into it, to take steps. More than once KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has raised these questions on our own pages as well.

Usually the answers are not slow in coming: they easily admit that there are deficiencies, as they put it, which have been pointed out to the culprits. They intend to eliminate them; plans have been made. And then comes reader’s letter—it was all deceit, nothing changed, or things became even worse. Where to turn now? This would appear to be obvious—to the military procurator—he won’t make deals and he might use his authority.

I am at a session of the board of the Main Military Procurecy. It is chaired by the recently appointed Chief Military Procuretor, Deputy General procurator of the USSR, Lt Gen of Justice A. Katushev. Among those invited—the leaders of ministries and departments who use the labor of military construction workers, and people’s deputies of the USSR. They are here for the first time. In a report, Maj Gen of Justice V. Kaunik speaks of these very sorrows and troubles.

At present more than 300 thousand military construction workers have been assigned to enterprises and construction sites of twenty Union and Republic ministries and departments that have nothing to do with providing national defense. All the is by special decision of the government.

The speakers cite examples of how easy it is generally for the ministries and departments to have a workforce in military uniform at their disposal, and the staggering irresponsibility with which they use it, at times simply casting the people to the whims of fate, depriving them of work, pay, and normal living conditions. In the territorial construction association “Sredneuralstroy” [Central Urals Construction] last year they were able to provide work to only half of the construction workers assigned to them. And in the “Altaykoksakhimstroy” [Altai Coal-Tar Chemical Industry Construction] trust, this has continued for two years now.

There are frightfully many such cases incidents of mismanagement and indifference to people in all twenty ministries and departments, but matters are worst in the RSFSR Minvostokstroy [Eastern Construction Ministry]. A representative of the ministry, L. Chuyko, was even invited to the Main Military Procurecy to explain. Of course, things did not become better for the military construction workers under him, alas.

The complete neglect of elementary personal needs and indifference to them have led to a growth in crime. As a result, more than 40 percent of all offenses that occurred in the year in the Army, Navy, and other military formations were due to the military construction units sent to the domestic economy. This is 2.5 times as many as among the military construction workers of the Defense Ministry, and 10 times more than among the railroad troops. A reasonable question must be asked: where exactly is the prosecutor looking?

It turns out, in all the time that the military construction units have existed since 1955, around 70 representations for various incidents of quite evident despotism were initiated. But they brought no results, only noncommittal replies.

“And indeed, they could not bring results,” argued a speaker. “To this point due attention has not been paid to these matters, or the sharpness of the prosecutor’s response, when it was a question of protecting the rights of people.”

Practically since childhood we have memorized it: public interests are always higher than personal rights. For decades we have assured one another that we must advance production by any means, never counting the costs and expenses, and all else is “trivial”. And we did not notice how the interests of the state and society were supplanted by departmental interests. The price of all this was backwardness, deficits, years of stagnation. Because when each individual person is robbed, all of society is robbed. It would seem that in turning to the individual, to his interests, rights, and freedoms, we are beginning to understand this.

But then, the situation has still not changed very much. Even today many military prosecutors find themselves helpless before the abuse of leading officials, often they close their eyes to their despotism and illegality. Judge for yourself.

The prosecutor of the Leningrad Military Procurecy, Maj Gen of Justice O. Gavrilyuk, takes the floor.

“The military formations assigned to the RSFSR Minsevapstroy [Ministry of Northern and Western Construction] were transformed into ownerless, disenfranchised collectives and are used in work that is miserably hard, the men are garrisoned in quarantined zones hazardous to health, and crime grows constantly.

Maj Gen of Justice V. Gurinovich, Procurator of the Far-Eastern Military District:

“The main thing today is to see the individual, but in the RSFSR Minvostokstroy, they treat military construction
workers as inanimate objects; they are not only outside the law, but even beyond the threshold of normal life. I do not exaggerate: the military construction workers are absolutely unprotected, both legally and socially. They are not trained, they are not paid a wage, they are forced to suffer all sorts of deprivations."

According to the procurator of the North Caucasian Military District, Col of Justice V. Godin:

"In the USSR Minenergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification], USSR Minvodstroy [Ministry of Waterways Construction] and RSFSR Minyugstroy [Ministry of Southern Construction], an average of only 77 percent of the military construction workers have been provided with work, at times their pay is below the minimum level established by the USSR constitution, and nearly a third do not have special clothing. All attempts to influence the leaders of the ministries to eliminate countless violations in the organization of labor and living conditions of the men have led to nothing. Minyugstroy simply remains silent in response to demands to immediately remove people from zones that are hazardous to health."

"But why not institute criminal proceedings?" the Chief Military Procurator asked.

"We lacked the resolve," came the response. "To our shame, only this year have we seriously looked into the matter."

Nevertheless, it is not only a matter of outmoded stereotypes or lack of resolve of the prosecutors. The undeveloped judicial base has also hampered appropriate monitoring of compliance with laws, protection of the rights of military construction workers, and support of social justice through legal means. To put it more simply, they lack the necessary laws to protect the specific rights of the military construction worker from zealous administrators.

Professor and Dr. of Jurisprudence Col of Justice H. Artamonov explained how this situation of almost complete disenfranchisement arose for people who have been formally drafted into military service. He recalled that from the legal standpoint, military construction workers are not service members, but only are equated with them, and indeed, only in certain respects. In the general military regulations, for example, one cannot even find mention of them. However the force of these regulations has been applied to military construction workers on the pretext that they are meeting their military obligation in an unusual way.

On this basis it is still somehow possible to legitimize the existence of military construction units for the needs of the Ministry of Defense and for providing for the defense of the country. In any case, such precedents exist in the practice of other states, and do not contradict the Geneva convention compelling the abolition of use of forced labor. But as for military formations transferred to the civilian sector, they were created essentially with no basis in law.

How can we be reconciled to this situation if we want to become a state of laws. The time has come to put an end unconditionally to the departmental, parochial approach to legality. I am certain that we must abandon the use of military construction workers in enterprises and construction sites of the domestic economy, and transfer them to the Defense Ministry. Or "lift" their shoulder boards from them and organize a kind of alternative to military service, of course on a sound legal basis. And here we cannot manage without the intervention of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Incidently, this viewpoint was supported by the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, General of the Army K. Kochetov, department chief of the Committee of People's Control of the USSR S. Teteryatnikov, representative of the USSR GOSPLAN I. Novoselov, and others who spoke at the board meeting.

General of the Army K. Kochetov, speaking of the distressing results of the inspection of 76 military construction detachments transferred to 11 ministries and departments, summed it up:

"We have been convinced that it is economically unjustified and completely unacceptable from the moral standpoint to conscript people to military service and send them to an ordinary construction project. By making military construction workers the equals of soldiers only when it comes to uniform, we do harm to the prestige of the Armed Forces that is hard to repair. Of course, the problem cannot be solved overnight, but we cannot be reconciled to the previous situation. Therefore we should: first of all, immediately modify the military construction subunits and strengthen regulation- and law-governed order in them; second, go to the USSR Council of Ministers with a request to halve the numerical strength of the military construction subunits in civilian departments. And subsequently, within one or two years, do away with them altogether."

In short, the leadership of the Defense Ministry intends to take decisive steps to free hundreds of thousands of individuals of a disenfranchised status that is demeaning to their dignity. And how could one not agree with people's deputy of the USSR V. Minin, who stated that the establishment of order in the military construction units is a task not only of the law-enforcement organs, but of all society.

Alas, the leaders of Minugleprom [Ministry of the Coal Industry], Minvodstroy, Minvostokstroy RSFSR, and other ministries and departments thought quite differently.

Typical in this respect was the speech by L. Chuyko. "I have been working with this contingent for more than 30 years," he said. "I believe that on the basis of the national interests, we cannot get along without it. I concur with the criticism voiced, but the matter can be corrected."
I listened to the deputy minister and I thought about how the masters of the forced-labor force had gotten used to the disenfranchisement and social vulnerability of their men. Even today, in a time of perestroika, they cannot shed their indifference to their needs and requirements; again they pass off departmental self-interest as national interests.

"If our economy is still not strong enough to dispense with the services of military construction workers, we should reinforce this by law, ensuring unconditional protection of individual rights provided by the USSR constitution." Thus did Lt Gen of Justice A. Katusev end the board meeting.

Thus the most diverse approaches to the problem were found: from traditional promises to improve matters, to the most radical solutions. But one thing is clear: the existence of military-construction detachments in civilian departments is an abnormal phenomenon; there should be no place for it. And we must give the Main Military Procuracy its due: on the basis of glasnost and openness in its actions, it has sharply and honestly raised a question that for long years had been simply hushed up.

Let us hope that this time the lessons of past years will not be in vain.
Service Chiefs on Military Contributions to Economy
90UM0057A Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 89
(Signed to press 07 Aug 89) pp 3-12

[Articles by Col Gen N. Kovalenko, Col Gen M. Makartsev, Maj Gen Avn L. Chervyakov, Col Gen I. Balabay, Col Gen V. Novikov, and Col A. Marchenko: "Always Together with the People; the Contribution of Soldiers to the Resolution of Economic Tasks"]

[Text] "The main function of the armed forces is the defense of the socialist Motherland. At the same time, military subunits are taking an active part in the fulfillment of national economic tasks. Unfortunately, almost no material can be found in the press on this subject. But to me as a political worker, and to many of my comrades, such information is extremely necessary."—Senior Lieutenant S. Sergeyev.

Quite a few letters like this come to the editorial office. We are asked to write often about the participation of the army in matters that are truly national—the mastery of Nechernozyemye [non-black earth region], resolution of the food problem, the housing problem, and others. Responding to the wishes of our readers, the editorial staff asked a number of military leaders about the kind of contribution soldiers are making to the socio-economic development of the country.

The Construction of Housing Is a Priority Task
(Article by Colonel General Nikolay Stepanovich Kovalenko, Chief of the Political Directorate of Construction Units of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Born in 1928, Belorussian. Member of the CPSU since 1948. In the Soviet Army since 1947. Was deputy commander for political affairs of a battery, secretary of a unit VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], assistant to the chief of a political department of a formation for komsomol work, and deputy commander of a regiment for political affairs. Subsequently held higher leadership posts. Since 1985—chief of the Political Directorate of Construction Units of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Decorated with many orders and medals.)

Perhaps one of the most critical problems troubling society today is the housing problem. The party has put forth the specific but very complicated task of providing each Soviet family with a separate apartment or a house by the year 2000. The forces of a thousand construction organizations and many enterprises and departments have been enlisted to accomplish this. Military builders are also taking a direct part in the fulfillment of the housing program.

OUR INFORMATION. More than 30 percent of the total volume of capital investments of the USSR Ministry of Defense is allocated to the construction of housing and facilities in the social sphere. On 6 February 1989, the Minister of Defense approved a housing construction program to the year 2000 that envisions the provision of each family with an individual apartment. To accomplish this task, it will be necessary to increase the aggregate of the dwelling house area operations, compared with the level of the 12th 5-year plan, by 16 percent in the 13th 5-year plan, and by 28.9 percent in the 14th 5-year plan.

Unfortunately, I must note that according to the USSR Ministry of Defense the number of families without apartments is not being reduced. The most alarming situation has developed in the Moscow, Carpathian, Odessa, Belorussian, and Baltic military districts. Serious difficulties with housing are being experienced by the families of servicemen in other regions of the country as well. It is obvious that the present situation did not come about all of a sudden. Life long ago placed the problem of providing housing first and foremost. It is true that the problem was not always noted, and frequently attempts were made to justify this by more important tasks, and at times with the readiness and even the duty of servicemen "to steadfastly endure all burdens and deprivations." The problem was also aggravated by a number of shortcomings in the system of capital construction itself. However, substantial corrections were made in it after the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The erection of housing and facilities in the social sphere became one of the priority directions in the activity of military construction units.

At the same time, I would especially like to emphasize that the resolution of the housing problem is a common task of our units and civilian construction organizations. And it can be resolved only under conditions of close cooperation. We are counting in this plan on the help of the soviets and the USSR people's deputies. In uniting our efforts, we will be able to fulfill the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers about providing housing space for servicemen discharged from the Soviet Army and the Navy for years of service or for sickness. Today, the liability of the local soviets for housing for these and other categories of citizens associated with the USSR Ministry of Defense, just in the RSFSR is 200,000 square meters, in the Kazakh SSR—30,000, in the Kirghiz SSR—about 19,000, and in the Tadzhik SSR—9,000 square meters.

The question of broadening the cooperation of apartment construction organs of the Ministry of Defense with civilian house construction organizations on shareholding principles deserves our attention.

At the present time we are aggressively building 100 apartment houses in various regions of the country for families of officers and warrant officers without apartments who are serving in the groups of forces in the Far North and in other remote regions and who will be discharged in connection with armed forces reductions.
The effort will also be helped by the strictest measures for bringing proper order in the registration and distribution of housing, and also by a careful regard for the housing fund of the Ministry of Defense.

I will also note that military builders will have to resolve a whole series of other no less responsible tasks as well. Thus, our organizations have been operating from the first days after the earthquake in Armenia. To eliminate the aftereffects of the natural disaster, the forces and means of the construction directorates of the Transcaucasus and Transbaykal, Belorusssian and Far East, Leningrad and Volga military districts, and the Northern and Pacific fleets have been brought into the stricken areas. The efficiency and scope of the adopted measures, the purposeful concentration of resources, and also the courage and selfless labor of the military builders made it possible to master the situation and perform restoration work at a rapid pace. A 2-year plan has been drawn up which contemplates the construction of almost 2,000 apartments in the city of Leninakan, Kirovakan, Stepnakert, Pushkino, and Koltakchi. In addition to housing, we are erecting dining halls, clubs, schools, medical stations, kindergartens, department stores, cafes, warehouses, and hangars, and we are also creating our own production base.

The best qualities of the military builders surface under these complex conditions—honesty, industry, and undying dedication to their duty. Among those who achieved the highest results is a construction organization collective headed by Colonel V. Zhurbenko. There they are fulfilling planned tasks by 120-130 percent. The directorate collective of the chief of operations, Major V. Nikolayev, is successfully building a school and 10 apartment houses. Selfless work is being performed by personnel of subunits where officers A. Kropachev, M. Logvinov, N. Shmachkov, M. Khachaturyan, V. Kollar, S. Potapov, and many others. Military builders, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers of the Turkestan Military District who were brought in to help those residents of Tadzhistan who are suffering from the earthquake are working conscientiously.

Other tasks are also at the center of attention of our directorate: Constructing large national economic and social facilities, developing networks of automobile roads, etc.

On Lines of Steel*


It was not until the middle of the 1970's, when construction started on the Baykal-Amur main rail line, that the active participation of military railroad workers in the life of the country became widely known. The line's entire eastern sector was built by military railroad workers (and this is 1,470 kilometers that were laid through the dense thickets, bogs, and rocks of the taiga. We have already put 1,314 kilometers of the BAM line into operation. We are getting ready to turn over the last 156-kilometer stretch from Zeysk to Tungala.

OUR INFORMATION. At the present time, military railroad workers are working on many railroads of the country. More than every fourth kilometer of the steel main lines in our country are built by railroad troops. Troops are working on the construction and electrification of railroads in the Baltics and the Transcaucasus, in Central Asia and in the Far East, and in Siberia and the Ukraine. In 3 years of the current 5-year plan, about 21 percent of the newly constructed rail lines and more than 25 percent of the secondary lines can be credited to the troops. Each year military railroad workers put from 600 to 800 kilometers of railways of various designations into operation.

When trouble occurs, the troops of the lines of steel are among the first to come to the aid of those who are stricken. They demonstrated resolution and courage and high professional skill in Chernobyl and Arzamas, in Sverdlovsk, Bologoye, and Yaroslavl, and in Armenia.

On the second day after the earthquake in Armenia, battalions of railroad troops arrived and immediately undertook the restoration of damaged lines. The elements damaged 11 railroad stations, destroyed 40 kilometers of roadbed, damaged 70 kilometers of overhead lines of communications, and destroyed and damaged many passenger and freight facilities and service technical and housing buildings. Jointly with transport builders and workers of the USSR Ministry of Railways and the Transcaucasus Railroad, by 15 December, sooner than the date stipulated by the governmental commission, soldier-railroad workers started the movement of trains on the Leninakan-Kirovakan line. Trains with freight, equipment, and people moved along the railroad to Armenia.

The feat of labor of many of our servicemen is highly valued by the Motherland. Major General G. Kogatko, Colonels V. Kupriyanov and S. Palchuk, and Major A. Shantsev were awarded the high title of Hero of Socialist Labor, many of the railroad troops were decorated with orders and medals, and thousands with the medal "For Construction of the Baykal-Amur Main Rail Line," and "For Cultivating the Resources and Developing the Oil-Gas System of Western Siberia." More than 20 young officers of the troops became laureates of the
Lenin komsomol prize in the area of production. We also have laureates of the USSR State Prize, and officers have been awarded medals and certificates of the USSR VDNKh [USSR Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy]. There are many people among our troops who have drive and energy and who put their heart and soul into a common cause. And this is a pledge that we will resolve assigned tasks.

*Until recently, the Railroad Troops were part of the USSR Armed Forces. They were removed from the armed forces by a Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 21 March 1989.

The Second Profession of Military Aviation

(Article by Major General of Aviation Leonid Mikhailovitch Cheryakov. Born in 1927. Russian. CPSU member since 1951. Graduate of the Chelyabinsk Higher Military Aviation School for Navigators imeni 50 Years of the VLKSM and the Air Academy imeni Yu. Gagarin. Performed service in the posts of aircraft navigator, navigator of an air detachment, squadron, regiment, and division. He subsequently held high managerial posts. Decorated with many orders and medals.)

Our Military Transport Aviation is more and more actively engaged in the resolution of national economic tasks. M.S. Gorbachev spoke in his speech to the London City Council about the transfer of a significant part of this aviation to service the national economy. The broadening of the scale of employment of aircraft of the USSR Ministry of Defense for the purposes indicated is an important trend in the conversion of military capability to resolve socio-economic tasks.

Military Transport Aviation is a component part of the Air Force. It possesses modern aircraft with various lift capacities, including such powerful airliners as the AN-124 "Ruslan" and the AN-22 "Antey."

Pilots, navigators, engineers, technicians, and ground crew specialists of the VTA [Military Transport Aviation] more than once demonstrated the better qualities of Soviet soldiers—courage, steadfastness, and dedication to patriotic and international duty. Many of them, who have been given high state awards for valor and skill that was demonstrated in the fulfillment of duty on Afghan soil, where it was necessary frequently to carry out flights under fire.

As is well known, military transport aviation was employed widely in the tragic days after the earthquake in Armenia. To provide support to the victims, more than 350 aircraft were assigned. In just a little more than 20 days in December of last year 32,400 tons of cargo were transported to the stricken areas, including 377 lift cranes, 98 excavators, and 1,320 tons of food. Such superheavy cargos as a 74-ton truck crane were delivered to Yerevan on an AN-124. This unique operation was performed by crews commanded by Majors V. Kozlov and Ye. Danilov.

The volume of cargoes transported for the needs of the population by aircraft of the USSR Ministry of Defense is continuously growing. Last year it amounted to several tens of thousands of tons. Today there is talk about raising all of the work in the use of VTA in the interests of the national economy to a qualitatively new level. The main task—together with the management of the civil air fleet—is to coordinate the activity of all of our national aviation. We are ready to make our contribution to this effort.

OUR INFORMATION. The total volume of transport of national economic cargoes by Air Force aircraft this year will amount to approximately 50,000 tons. Their cost is more than R45 million. The number of aircraft assigned will reach 60. This includes AN-124's, AN-22's, and AN-12's.

First of all, our aviation will take an active part in furnishing the population food. The military "cargo post" will be loaded with fresh vegetables, fruit, and other agricultural products. These flights, one can call them food flights, will lay a course essentially to areas of the Far North, Siberia, and the Far East.

The transport of passengers is another important task. Beginning this year we started jointly with the Ministry of Civil Aviation to take part in the transport of servicemen on leave, especially in the busy spring and summer period, which made it possible to free part of the passenger aircraft of Aeroflot and to save on aviation fuel.

Soldiers' Kilometers


Motor vehicle drivers are not talked about or written about very frequently. But it is no secret that a substantial part of the motor vehicle park of the armed forces is actively involved in the resolution of national economic tasks. Annually, during harvesting time, trucks with army numbers can be seen in many grain areas of the country. Together with agricultural workers, soldiers of the Soviet Army take part in the harvest battle. In addition, they build vehicular roads, construct bridges, and repair farm equipment. And if you consider that not one large construction project can do without motor vehicle transportation, it becomes clear what a significant contribution is being made by military motorists in the resolution of many tasks of the 12th 5-year plan.
They also had a part in the construction of BAM [Baykal-Amur Main Rail Line]. Since the beginning of construction on this rail line, army drivers transported more than 600 million tons of various kinds of cargoes. The volume of completed transport work in this was about 4.5 billion kilometer-tons.

Together with soldiers of other specialities, the motor vehicle drivers took an active part in eliminating the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station]. In the initial period of operations in the zone, more than 4,000 military vehicles were employed. A large number of repair subunits and items of equipment were assigned.

As soon as the news about the earthquake in Armenia spread throughout the country, military motor vehicle convoys were dispatched immediately to the area of the natural disaster. As early as the second 24 hours, 650 army motor vehicles were working in the stricken area, on the fourth day, there were 1,400, and on 16 December, their number reached 2,300 units. About 3,000 officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and soldiers of the motor vehicle service were working in the earthquake area.

Military drivers evacuated more than 6,000 persons and took out more than 7,000 tons of reinforced concrete scrap and soil, and they conveyed 5,000 tons of personal property items, 2,500 tons of foodstuffs, 700 collapsible living units, and many other cargoes.

During the evacuation of victims, bus drivers Warrant Officer V. Marchuk and Junior Sergeant Yu. Shirvanyan especially distinguished themselves. During the course of 4 days, almost not taking time to sleep, they transported the injured to the airport. Senior Sergeant S. Gladelnikov transported more than 300 persons and a large amount of critical cargo with his vehicle. Privates Yu. Abdurashidov and I. Nurdinov, fuel truck drivers, practically uninterruptedly supplied vehicles in the work areas with fuel over the course of several days.

The list of outstanding military drivers could be continued. They worked just as selflessly in the elimination of the aftereffects of the railroad catastrophe in Arzamas, Sverdlovsk and Bashkiriya, and in the natural disasters in the Transbaykal, and in the Far East, Kamchatka, and Sakhalin. The residents of Kamchatka speak with deep gratitude about the soldiers. Snow cyclones that paralyzed transport, communications, and supplies could not crack the courage and persistence of the soldiers and officers that went into battle with the elements. For almost 2 days, Junior Sergeant V. Kutsenko and Warrant Officer V. Popkov, who were assigned to the Petrapavlovsk-Kamchatka first aid station, did not leave their tracked vehicle. Examples of selfless execution of military duty were set by Captain I. Makin, Warrant Officer T. Shishenin, and many others.

No less resolute qualities are required at times from soldiers in what at first glance appears to be routine work on the grain routes of the country. In accordance with a decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government, starting in 1956 the armed forces assigned motor vehicle transport to crop harvesting regularly.

OUR INFORMATION. In 1988, personnel of motor vehicle battalions of the USSR Ministry of Defense, fulfilling the tasks of the party and the government, transported more than 22 million tons of agricultural goods, including 8 million tons of grain.

In the course of the harvest battle in 1988, especially high results were achieved by subordinate officers P. Simonov, A. Dolgopolov, P. Palubis, A. Tkachenko, and A. Tazagulov. Heroes of the grain harvest period were military drivers Private V. Sprynchan, who conveyed 12,000 tons of agricultural loads, Private T. Gabdul—and 10,000 tons, and Warrant Officer A. Blinov—9,000 tons, and other soldiers.

For the successful fulfillment and overfulfillment of planned tasks, many motor vehicle subunits were awarded challenge Red Banners.

 Soldiers are working just as selflessly in crop harvesting this year.

An important sector of the activity of the army is the construction and reconstruction of roads in Nechozemye. By a resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government, the strongest of our construction organizations, including road builders of the USSR Ministry of Defense, have been brought in to resolve this urgent task. Twenty-two brigades have been formed.

OUR INFORMATION. The state program for the construction and reconstruction of motor vehicle roads in the Nechozemye zone of the RSFSR "Roads of Nechozemye" is planned for the years 1988-1995. In this time, our road building units must lay more than 20,000 kilometers of roads.

Today, road-building units are working in the Udmurt SSR, and in the Archangel, Vologda, Kirov, Kostroma, Perm, Gorkiy, Ryazan, Orlov, and Sverdlovsk oblasts. They have modern motor vehicle and road construction equipment and repair means. Organizing the fulfillment of the tasks of the party and the government, the command of the road construction and motor vehicle units pay particular attention to the protection of the environment. For the Nechozemye is a special region. There are very many untouched places in this kray and a fragile nature. In assimilating this kray, we must preserve its primordial beauty.

We also are not standing aside from such an important problem as expanding the production of consumer goods and the services area. Since 1988, the Main Motor Vehicle Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense linked up all of its motor vehicle repair enterprises to this work. In the 10 months of 1988 alone, they produced consumer goods and provided services to the population in a sum higher than R200,000. In 1989, this figure will
increase to R5 million, and by 1995 the volume of produced commodities and provided services will reach up to R10 million.

Today, the motor vehicle repair enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Defense produce and supply spare parts and accessories that are in short supply to the trade network for the “Moskvich,” “Zhiguli,” “Volga,” and UAZ-469 motor vehicle models. Everyday household commodities and plumbing fixtures, garden and summer cottage commodities, and trailers for passenger cars that are manufactured at military enterprises enjoy a great demand among the population. Our motor vehicle repair plants and shops perform quality repair for several thousand motor vehicles, engines, and units that belong to civilian organizations.

If Misfortune Strikes


We are living for the fifth decade without war, and we do not hear the bursts of bombs and shells and the whistle of bullets, and we are not exposed to the effects of combat toxic agents. It would seem that nothing threatens us. But every so often reports appear in the newspapers about earthquakes and avalanches, and explosions and catastrophes. Unfortunately, humanity is not immune to such misfortunes.

On 4 July 1988 at the Arzamas station, 91 persons perished and 700 families were left homeless as the result of an explosion of three rail cars with explosives.

On 16 August in the same year in the area of Bologoye station of the October Railroad, 12 cars of an express train went off the rails, and 29 persons perished and 104 were injured.

On 20 April 1989 at the production association “Azot” in the city of Ionava of the Lithuanian SSR, the destruction of an isothermic tank occurred, as a result of which about 7,000 tons of ammonia spilled out and the finished products plant caught fire. Seven persons died, and 57 were injured. About 40,000 persons had to be evacuated.

All told, more than 400 different disasters occurred in 1988. Dozens of people died, and the state suffered tremendous material and moral damage.

Soldiers of USSR Civil Defense are called on to help the population and to lower the economic and human losses resulting from accidents, natural disasters, and catastrophes to the maximum extent.

Chernobyl became the criterion for high political consciousness, courage, heroism, and selflessness for the Soviet people. Here such human qualities as self-control, cohesiveness, and readiness for immediate assistance to those in trouble underwent a severe test. Civil defense specialists, chemical and engineer troops, helicopter crews, and doctors marched side by side in the offensive against an invisible enemy.

Now the name of the commander of an outstanding mechanized company, Captain Pavel Zborovskiy, is widely known. While realizing the mortal danger, he was the first to reconnoiter the underground area of the reactor that had broken down. Contrary to expectations, the level of radiation here turned out to be surprisingly low, whereas powerful radiation raged on the outside. Sergeant P. Avdeyev and Corporal Yu. Korshunov worked shoulder to shoulder with the company commander. For 2 days the soldiers, sergeants, and officers of Zborovskiy's company pumped contaminated water out of the pool with the help of pumps. And the danger receded. The chairman of the state commission expressed his gratitude to the personnel of the subunit. Among those who especially distinguished themselves were officers O. Akimov, V. Kotenev, and V. Zlobin, sergeants A. Oleynik and B. Nanava, Corporal M. Gariirullin, and Privates A. Akhmetov and V. Molodtsov. Many of the soldiers were subsequently presented state awards.

High resolve qualities were also displayed by subordinates of Colonel N. Masyuk. Under conditions when the radiation exceeded the permissible limit by several times, they removed radioactive fragments from the roof of the third power unit.

A lot of work was required in the first days after the accident to cover the destroyed reactor. To do this, it was necessary to install a special rigging in the shortest possible time. Execution of this task was entrusted to a civil defense subunit headed by Captain P. Nikita. The situation demanded bold, decisive action and high professionalism from each soldier and officer. The soldiers worked in individual protective clothing in 30-degree heat [Celsius]. They performed the assigned task steadfastly and capably without a rest or relief for a whole day. They performed the task, and they kept their word. Communist Captain P. Nikita was with his subordinates from the first to the last minute.

Similar other examples can be cited. A person in military uniform was the first to come to the aid of victims in Armenia and Tadzhikistan, and Arzamas abd Sverdlovsk. During the course of several days after the earthquake in Armenia, civil defense soldiers, led by Colonel Grabar, pulled 436 persons out of the debris and wreckage, they removed thousands of cubic meters of destroyed structures, and they cleared tens of kilometers of roads.

Another important part of our work was to reduce to a minimum the risk of possible accidents and catastrophes.
for people working or living near potentially dangerous enterprises and industries. Analysis of the events at the Chernobyl AES, in the Armenian SSR, Arzamas, Sverdlovsk, and in Bashkiria and other places that were marked for catastrophe compels one to give serious thought to the question: But was it possible to prevent the tragedy? It is obvious that we could have avoided many of the serious consequences. But in order to achieve even the slightest tangible results in preventive work, it is necessary to put an end to lack of discipline and slapshod work and irresponsibility and incompetence in any questions which even partially concern matters of people's safety. Concerns for the protection of the lives and health of our fellow citizen and protection of the environment require that order and firm discipline are maintained everywhere and that the responsibility of all managers and each worker is raised.

OUR INFORMATION. All told, for the first several months of eliminating the after-effects of the earthquake in Armenia, civil defense soldiers removed about 40,000 persons from under the debris of destroyed buildings and structures, including 15,254 who were alive. A large volume of work was performed to restore the vital activity of the stricken areas. Through the efforts of military subunits, 60 mobile food stations and 6 separate bakeries were deployed, 70,000 dry rations were issued to the population, 146 tons of bread were served, and 300 tons of foodstuffs for cooking hot food were used up.

We still quite often encounter narrow-minded attitudes toward the conduct of civil defense measures. And this is disturbing. Because without close contact with local management organs, we simply are not in a position to successfully resolve tasks for the prevention of accidents and catastrophes and the elimination of their aftereffects. Quite a lot in those situations depends on how prepared the personnel of nonmilitary organizations are. That is why we display firm insistence on the organization of civil defense measures in enterprises and organizations.

Relying on close cooperation with local party, soviet, and administrative organs, we will do everything within our power in the future to make the life of the Soviet people secure to the maximum possible extent.

At the Regimental Truck-Farm

(Article by Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Petrovich Marchenko, Deputy Commander of Rear Services in "N" unit. Born in 1935, Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1962. In the Soviet Army since 1954. Was master sergeant of a company, chief of clothing service. Graduated in 1968 as an external student from the Volsk Higher Military School of Rear Services imeni Lenin Komsomol. Since 1978—regimental deputy commander for rear services.)

The problem of providing foodstuffs to the population remains the number one problem in our country today. And the soldiers of our unit are taking part in its resolution to the extent of their strength and capabilities. In what way? For the fifth year in a row we do not take meat from the state in our food allowances. We use the products of our own farm. Moreover, we sell the surplus to the families of officers and warrant officers, and we provide assistance in supplying other units. There are fresh vegetables and cold snacks on the soldiers' table year round. During exercises, field training drills, and combat alert duty, soldiers receive an additional ration owing to the unit kitchen farm. We expend 35-40 rubles on additional nourishment for each soldier annually.

OUR INFORMATION. Lt Col Alexey Petrovich Marchenko has a modern livestock-raising complex that contains about 500 pigs, 30 bulls, 4 cows, and 5 horses; and two hothouses and equipped auxiliary accommodations. The construction of a fish farm is under way.

I could also further cite figures and calculations that graphically demonstrate the advantages and benefits of a "soldiers' farm," but this is not the main thing. But another matter is of concern: What can be done so that others would fall in line with our farming also? Take, for example, our neighbors. They are not even thinking of vying with us, although if they wanted to they could fully supply themselves with meat. They could, if not by a hundred percent, then at least by half that. Not to speak of those 20 kilograms a year per person that we must produce.

Back in 1987 the newspaper KRNAYA ZVEZDA published my letter in which, on behalf of the collective of our unit, I challenged any military unit to a competition for best farming performance. It is saddening to say this, but no one has accepted my challenge to this day. Not, of course, that they were afraid to be defeated. Apparently, people simply do not have the desire to compete on enthusiasm alone. It seems to me that today we lack the appropriate moral and material incentives for a more successful development of military unit kitchen farms. Let's face it, anyone of my colleagues—a unit commander for rear services—who does not trouble himself with running a kitchen farm is in far more favorable circumstances. To put it simply, he does not have to worry about how to feed animals, where to get fodder, and how it is best to process and use the acquired products. Our rates of pay are the same, but the work demand is different. And it seems to me that until we resolve this question, the "soldiers' farm" will not be developed sufficiently. But it should be developed. Let the state expend less money on us, let more foodstuffs go to store counters, hospitals, boarding schools, and kindergartens.

FROM THE EDITORIAL OFFICE: In expressing our gratitude to all of those who responded to our request to take part in this discussion, we want to emphasize that the material submitted threw light only on certain aspects of the indissoluble ties of the army and the people. The responses of the military leaders clearly showed dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs and the desire to find new ways and forms of joint
activity in resolving the most important national economic problems. This is not a pretended concern and not a contrived one. All Soviet soldiers—generals and officers, warrant officers and sergeants, and soldiers and sailors live with the same hopes and concerns for their country. And therefore their desires to take as active a part as possible in the affairs of state are completely understandable. There is no doubt that this participation will expand more and more, affecting new spheres of political, economic, and social life.

Copyright: “Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil”, 1989

Belousov on Conversion Politics, Economics

90UM00924 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 89
(Signed to press 27 Aug 89) pp 28-33

[Report on interview with I.S. Belousov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by Colonel A. Trifonov, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL correspondent: “Conversion: Politics and Economics”; date and place not specified]

[Text] By conducting a consistent policy on the demilitarization of international relations, the Soviet state is setting an example for a logical transition from an economy of armaments to an economy of disarmament. Evidence of this is the declaration by our country of a cut of 14.2 percent in the military budget and 19.5 percent in the production of weapons and military equipment. This also shapes the process of conversion—the switch of a part of defense industry capacity onto a peaceful track. It is being executed within the scope of the economic reform being carried out in the country, and it has been given approval at the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies.

In an interview with our correspondent, I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, talks about conversion’s main directions, the first try, and the outlook for conversion.

[Trifonov] Igor Sergeyevich, what is the overriding aim of the program for reprofiling part of the defense industry?

[Belousov] Projects for reprofiling, on which work is now being done, are aimed at a resolution of the most pressing national economic tasks, and, first and foremost, at increasing the production of modern technological equipment for processing agricultural products, for light industry, for trade, and for public catering. Part of the productive capacity will be used for the output of medical equipment, whose shortage can be felt very tangibly in our country now, and for the development of computer equipment and electronics. And, of course, considerable attention will be given to the production of consumer goods.

Plans for the utilization of military equipment that is being cut are directed at achieving the maximum benefit for the national economy. Thus, of the 10,000 tanks our country is cutting back in Europe, only 5,000 will be “physically” eliminated and the remainder will be altered into tractors for the national economy and into bulldozers for the construction of roads in localities that are difficult to access. The Air Force has taken on part of the civil aviation cargo transport. In this year alone, military transport aviation will carry 50,000 tons of cargo of the national economy. The running gear of the SS-20 missile launcher will be utilized as a mobile platform for heavy lift cranes.

[Trifonov] What methodological approaches underlie the conversion program?

[Belousov] We proceed from the proposition of carrying out a conversion of the defense industry with a maximum preservation of enterprise production area. Under these conditions, a reduction in the production of weapons and military equipment should be compensated by an increase in the production of needed civilian products and consumer goods.

The draft plan of conversion envisions the necessity for its implementation without a stop in production, although, of course, this creates difficulties. Provision has also been made for the transition of scientific-research and design organizations to the development and creation of new types of civilian products and consumer commodities that correspond to the latest achievements of scientific and technical progress in the world, and this work is already going on.

[Trifonov] It is not a secret to anyone that the defense industry did not shun civilian orders even before. Apparently the complexity of the current reprofiling resides in its scale?

[Belousov] This is true. Defense enterprises have produced and are producing large tractors, equipment for irrigation of fields, gondola cars, diesel engines, installations for drilling on land and at sea, equipment for light industry, and many other things.

But the scales of participation of defense branches of industry in the resolution of national economic tasks are increasing significantly. Thus, taking into account the conversion to production for light industry, the food industry, and trade, more than 300 defense enterprises have already been involved, and this year they will manufacture almost one-fifth of this equipment that is produced in the country. And by 1995, the defense branches should increase the volume of production of equipment for light industry by 2.3 times in comparison with 1987; that is, they will manufacture such equipment almost by half as much again as was manufactured in our country in the last 20 years. For this period, it is planned to create and mass produce more than 1,400 types of new equipment and practically to renew completely the nomenclature of those machine tools and machines that are being produced now and which our light industry needs.
The share of civilian production of our defense enterprises, which now constitutes about 40 percent, will increase to 60 percent by 1995.

[Trifonov] The powerful scientific and production potential acquired in the defense industry will apparently help increase the quality of products produced both by industrial and agricultural enterprises?

[Belousov] Yes, the main aim of the "defense industrialists" is not only to increase the output of machines and equipment, but also to raise their technical level and their quality. Today these parameters are low in a majority of cases. Of the entire range of articles for the food industry that was transferred to the defense industry last year, only one-fourth meets the current standard.

The program for increasing production and raising the technical level of equipment for the processing branches of the agroindustrial complex envisions the creation and series assimilation by 1995 of more than 3,000 designations of new equipment for a total of R7 billion. The production of equipment and spare parts will increase by a factor of 1.8 by 1990, and by a factor of 3.5 by 1995; the "defense industrialists" took upon themselves almost a half of the total volume of deliveries to the branches we are talking about. In order to conduct this program, more than 200 leading scientific research institutes and defense branch design bureaus, besides military plants, were drawn into it.

The projects that are now being worked on aim at the resolution of the most urgent national economic tasks. Many of them are called on to accelerate the resolution of such painful production problems in the country as the creation of equipment for small capacity processing enterprises, mobile slaughter facilities, cheese-making plants, plants for vegetable processing, etc. Their special feature is the capability of facilities that are directly in kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]; that is, where there are raw material sources and where the producers of products live and work. This will significantly reduce and, here and there, will also eliminate tangible losses that "traditionally" are generated during shipment, and even the quality of equipment promises to be sufficiently high, inasmuch as the technology for its manufacture is more advanced.

There are other examples as well. The Central Scientific Research Institute of Heavy Machinebuilding, which had an active part in the creation of the "Energiya" rocket system, possesses the most modern technology of welding production. This is beam, diffusion, and pulse welding of seams with high accuracy and with the most advanced automation. The casting here is thin-walled from nonferrous metals using a smelting cast model with directed crystallization. All of this can be utilized in the manufacture of particularly precise parts for complex machines.

But, about our daily bread. The specialists know that a majority of our bread-baking plants use aluminum mixers with welded seams for mixing dough. Pieces of dough stick to these seams, and in time they deteriorate and lower the quality of the bread. The new mixer, manufactured at a defense plant, is very different. Here, it is made with the help of a rotational roller from a flat steel sheet. This technology makes it possible to reduce the labor-intensiveness of manufacturing mixers by a factor of 4-6, and the material requirements by not less than a third.

As you see, the opportunity for increasing the quality of articles of national economic significance is quite substantial and diverse, and it just requires their rational use.

[Trifonov] Are we not squandering the high technology and professionalism of the specialists of the "defense sector" on the production generally of ordinary items, like the mixing bowl? Is this not even more so since the conversion process itself requires significant expenditures?

[Belousov] First of all, I will note that the basic production of the defense enterprises under conditions of conversion does not lower quality. But the increase in the technological level of the civilian sector of the economy today has not only a social significance, but a political significance as well. We have had enough of being ashamed of our domestic equipment, our machines, and our consumer goods. We have to attain a world standard in all aspects, and conversion is a good help in this. As for the expenditure on enterprise reprofiling itself, then it unquestionably is very substantial. However, we must look into the root of the problem: Conversion is being implemented partly at the expense of a reduction in defense expenditures; however, in giving a powerful push to scientific and technical progress on a scale of the entire national economy, it actively increases the strength of these branches. Thus, the expenditures on conversion will pay for themselves.

[Trifonov] A critical situation has developed in the country in the provision of consumer goods to the population. How can conversion overcome this, let us be frank, intolerable lag?

[Belousov] In recent years, the defense enterprises have been joining more and more aggressively in the production of commodities for the people. At the present time, plants of the defense industry manufacture more than 2,000 types of cultural and household items and utensils. In 1988 alone, these plants manufactured almost 10 million television sets, 95 percent of all domestically produced refrigerators, 62 percent of the washing machines, and 69 percent of the vacuum cleaners, and they produce passenger cars, motorcycles, washing machines, cameras, and many other types of articles. It is planned to produce consumer goods this year in the sum of R28.9 billion. And still, as we know, there are not enough commodities.

This means that we have to increase our capacity and simultaneously increase the quality of commodities. The
defense branches are working in this direction. The production program and the creation in the defense industry complex of new consumer products for 1985-1995 provide for the development and production of more than 140 types of complex equipment. The list includes television sets with stereophonic sound accompaniment, and the latest models of general purpose kitchen devices, refrigerators, electric vacuum cleaners with electronic power regulators, and various models of meat grinders, dryers, irons, and washing machines, and many other things. The list contains a number of items that were not produced in the country previously: compact disc players, video cassette recorders, video cameras, pocket watches with voice synthesizers, household computers, etc. I will note: This year commodities should be produced in the sum of R1.5 billion more than that called for in the 5-year plan, and the task has been set to increase this over the 5-year plan by several times.

What will be produced specifically and by whom? Of course, we cannot talk about all of the defense branches. But the Ministry of Defense Industry, for example, during the conversion, is significantly expanding the production of consumer items for the market. Among these are washable wallpaper, toys, and toothpaste. This is in addition to the fact that enterprises of this ministry also produce its traditional consumer goods, and this is more than a thousand types of items, including refrigerators, bicycles, washing machines, household electronic equipment, manual gas-powered saws, and electric hot plates. In 1990 the production of nonfood commodities in branch enterprises should increase almost by one and one-half times, essentially owing to the introduction of new articles.

[Trifonov] It is obvious that the population wins from the reprofiling of the defense industry. But will not the "defense industrialists" themselves be shortchanged? Is it not more advantageous for them to produce tanks and aircraft than television sets and refrigerators? Of course, I have in mind only the purely economic aspect...

[Belousov] The complications that inevitably will be encountered during conversion should not be oversimplified. Among these complications are economic questions, including those connected with not infringing on the social interests of labor collectives.

However, as initial experience indicates, defense enterprises that are able to restructure themselves while operating, or in short periods, into peaceful production with available floor space, equipment, and raw materials will also be able to provide for the material interest of the workers and specialists in the output of products for the national economy. It should be taken into account that the application of highly efficient technology in the production of consumer commodities reduces their prime cost. As a result, this will be reflected in the growth of enterprise profits, a significant part of which, under conditions of economic accountability, goes to the development of the social sphere and to the material incentives fund.

"Quick thinking" will be required of those who are responsible for the skillful replanning of production areas, for important changes in technological processes and technological reequipping, and for the development of the economic policy of enterprises under the new conditions.

Of course, there will be complications. We have to be able to overcome them, and to find solutions that are aimed at the stable work of enterprises and the economic interest of the labor collectives.

Also urgent is the question about the retraining of part of the workers and specialists, and their mastery of new methods and modes of work. We still do not have a lot of experience in this. Therefore, this year experimental conversion plans are being prepared for two or three defense enterprises which should become the model on which reprofiling methods "will run."

[Trifonov] One of the former chief designers of a defense plant, writing in the press, called the conversion "the last trump card" of our economy. What do you say about this?

[Belousov] This, of course, is an obvious exaggeration. One of the main directions in our economic policy is the ubiquitous and in-depth inculcation of full economic accountability and the elimination of "wage-leveling." But no matter what happens, the investment of our "defense establishment" in the civilian branches is significant, and it will become even more profound. This is the way it should be because everything is done in the name of the people and for their welfare. We are obliged to take charge of available resources and productive forces in a sensible way and wisely, using everything in the interests of the people that the new political thinking and relaxation of world tensions provides.

The help of conversion to the national economy will, of course, be substantial. But, on the whole, our economy, experiencing certain difficulties and interruptions, and restructuring itself while in motion, is getting its "second wind" owing to the introduction of a new economic mechanism, and using the creatively vital force of the human factor. And the significant connection of the defense complex with the resolution of a wide range of national economic tasks, unquestionably, will speed up overcoming the delay in the resolution of a number of the most important social problems of our society.

The military industry of other countries, including the United States, is also utilizing the results achieved in technology and in the creation of new construction materials for the output of products of nonmilitary importance. We also have a need to utilize the results of work on military orders for peaceful purposes. Because discoveries and inventions made in the fulfillment of military orders, after moving over into civilian production, frequently produce a technological revolution there. Thereby, there is an increase in the competitive ability of commodities on the world market. As a result, the tremendous sums that are invested annually in
military research and design work are compensated, even if only partially. According to NASA, just the space programs alone made a contribution to the American economy of $35 billion through "technology transfer."

It is not accidental, as the press reports, that the U.S. Congress intends to discuss the question of a national plan on the conversion of military production. Moreover, a number of American scientists in this connection are coming out for Soviet-American cooperation in the exchange of experience in the sphere under discussion.

Well, despite the existing differences in approaches to the problem, we are ready to exchange ideas and even experience with the United States. And not only with the United States. Our country is for the idea that all states, first and foremost the major military powers, should present their plans on this score to the United Nations. It is for the formation of a group of scientists which would take on itself an in-depth analysis of problems of conversion on the whole and as applied to individual countries and regions. Conversion, it can be said with complete certainty, is one of the effective ways of disarmament, satisfying the interests of all states and of all peoples of the world.

[Trifonov] Readers of our journal naturally cannot help but be troubled by the question: Are we not fascinated by the process of conversion at the expense of the security of our country and the entire socialist community? Because the equipment and weapons of our potential adversaries are being improved continuously, and, despite certain progress in the area of disarmament, qualitative improvements are being made in specific types of armed forces. Will our "defense" not lag in its main job, while being fascinated by "side issues"?

[Belousov] Not going into detail, I can say that those who work in branches of the defense industry sense profoundly the measure of responsibility for the work entrusted to them, and they understand the tasks that they must resolve to ensure the safety of our country, taking into account the new defensive doctrine. Much also has to be changed with respect to the restructuring of the Armed Forces. Much has to be done to improve the qualitative characteristics of equipment and weapons. This is being worked on by scientists, designers, engineers, specialists, and workers of enterprises and associations of the defense branches of industry.

Taking this into account, M.S. Gorbachev announced from the rostrum of the United Nations: "We will support the defensive capability of the country at a level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency, so that no one will be tempted to encroach on the security of the USSR and its allies. This idea was also asserted at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. I do not doubt that the soldiers of the Army and the Navy will correctly understand the policy of our party and the Soviet state in the area of the country's socioeconomic development and that they also henceforth will vigilantly and reliably guard the security of the motherland and the gains of socialism.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1989

Decision To End Production of Weapon-Grade Uranium Noted
90UM0144A Moscow AGITATOR in Russian
No 21, Nov 89 (Signed to press 12 Oct 89) pp 42-44

[Article by TASS military issues commentator Vladimir Chernyshev: "Dismantling the Economy of War"]

[Text] At the UN General Assembly Session in December, 1988, M.S. Gorbachev directed the attention of the world community to the extremely urgent theme of our time—the transition from the economy of armament to the economy of disarmament. The fact is that a major military sector has become an integral part of the economic system of capitalist, socialist, and developing states and it is increasingly being transformed into a burden that is constraining economic development and is substantially burdening the economies of all nations. The Soviet Union has also not avoided this. The "gross-numbers approach" to defense construction, symmetrical reaction to the actions of the U.S. and NATO, and cost mechanisms of major military production—all of this fell like a heavy load on our national economy.

What does the economy of disarmament consist of? What are the directions of the state's practical activity in this area? What specific steps are being conducted by the Soviet Union?

First, the economy of disarmament consists of a reduction of military budgets. N.I. Bykhov in a report to the 1st Congress of People's Deputies explained that during formation of the national economic plan for 1986-1990 due to the international situation that was taking shape at the time and due to Soviet military doctrine, the USSR was compelled to view the increase of expenditures for defense in a traditional manner in rates of growth that were higher than the growth of national income. However, the Soviet State's peaceful initiatives, the conclusion of a number of agreements on reduction and limitation of individual types of armaments, and the principles of the new defensive military doctrine have permitted us to accomplish a truly revolutionary maneuver.

During 1987-1988, the Soviet Union's military expenditures were frozen. This provided savings of 10 billion rubles in the budget in comparison with what was envisioned by the five-year plan. In 1989, our military expenditures total 77.3 billion rubles. In 1990-1991, we are planning to reduce our military expenditures by another 10 billion rubles, that is, by 14 percent. As a whole, progress toward the limits of reasonable and reliable sufficiency for defense will result in savings of nearly 30 billion rubles with regard to the five-year plan approved earlier which totals almost 40 percent of the
annual defense budget of our nation. And this is not a limit. Persistently following the path of disarmament, by 1995 we plan to reduce the ratio of expenditures on defense to national income by a factor of 1.5 to 2.

Second, the economy of disarmament envisions the reduction of armed forces and weapons that accompany the release of a significant quantity of combat equipment, communications gear, electrical and other equipment, and also clothing which after certain finishing processes will be transferred to the national economy and can be used at enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and by cooperators, lease holders, and Soviet “individual farmers.”

It is widely known that during the course of 1989-1990 the Soviet Union is reducing the size of its Armed Forces by 500,000 men on a unilateral basis. At the same time, in the European portion of the USSR and on the territory of its European allies alone, Soviet Armed Forces will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft. Substantial changes will also occur in the Asian portion of the nation.

What benefit will these reductions have on the national economy? As planned, they will be quite substantial. For example, of the 10,000 tanks being reduced by the USSR in Europe, only 5,000 will be physically eliminated and the remainder will be reconfigured into prime movers for civilian needs, fire trucks for extinguishing fires under particularly complicated conditions, and bulldozers for road construction in rugged terrain. The Ministry of Defense envisions selling half a billion rubles worth of combat vehicles and combat equipment which will be transferred from the military category to assets designated for civilian use. By August 1989, consumers had already received several tens of millions of rubles worth of equipment. In the near future, they are proposing to sell up to 50 million rubles worth of equipment. Altogether the Ministry of Defense will transfer or sell 1,900 nomenclatures of various equipment to the national economy. They are vehicles, communications gear, welding equipment, various instruments, parts, and spare parts, mechanical equipment, fuel and POL refueling equipment, low power meat cutting equipment, meat processing equipment, ovens, field kitchens, shoes, clothing, and other equipment.

Third, the economy of disarmament includes, as its own essential component, conversion of military production, that is, transfer of part of military economic potential to solution of peaceful tasks. Really if the nation is advocating disarmament and bringing arms and the armed forces to the mark of exclusively defensive significance, in other words, if the nation is for strengthening real security—and this is vitally necessary—then we need to think about reduction of military production and about reconfiguring military plants to production of peaceful products.

Our country is unilaterally undertaking major steps in this area. During 1989-1990, arms production will be reduced by almost 20 percent. The defense complex production structure is radically changing under the impact of conversion. If today the ratio of civilian production to total output in sectors is 40 percent, then in 1991 it will total 46 percent and, by 1995, it will exceed 60 percent.

Other measures are being undertaken besides conversion measures: Certain military enterprises which cannot be utilized for civilian production are being completely closed. In particular, the Soviet Union has already decided this year to cease production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes—weapon-grade uranium. In 1987 a production reactor for processing weapon-grade plutonium was closed in our country. Next year we plan to close two more such reactors and to not introduce new capacity.

While implementing the conversion of military production, the Soviet Union is directing released capacity and resources toward the resolution of social and economic tasks. Such activities are creating the opportunity to substantially increase (by a factor of 1.5 to 2) the output of equipment for the agroindustrial complex, light industry, trade, and public catering.

Guided by the decision on reorientation of the national economy to satisfaction of social needs, the defense sectors are tasked with insuring the accelerated establishment of new scientifically intense forms of civilian production and complex service goods. This primarily affects medical equipment. In 1989, defense sector enterprise production of these goods will reach nearly 240 million rubles and in the future annual output will reach not less than one billion rubles.

The defense complex must make a much larger contribution toward satisfying the population’s demand for cultural and domestic goods. Today the defense industry produces these goods at a sum of about 30 billion rubles per year or 22 percent of the nation’s gross output. In 1990, the increase will total 33 percent. It is proposed that, during the 13th Five-Year Plan, the complex will produce 250-270 billion rubles worth of these goods and will exceed the task of the current five-year plan by a factor of two.

The defense industry will conduct an enormous volume of work in the area of light and food industry equipment production. At the present time, 345 defense sector plants and also more than 200 design bureaus that are engaged in designing military equipment and weapons have already been enlisted to fulfill this task. Certain military plants that are being constructed or that are already at the design stage are being reconfigured for peaceful purposes.

In accordance with the plan developed in the USSR for the next eight years—1988-1995—3,000 nomenclatures of new equipment for the agricultural product processing sectors will be manufactured using defense sector industries. Of a total volume of deliveries worth 37 billion rubles, defense sectors will deliver 17.5 billion rubles.
worth of modern equipment to the agricultural processing sectors and will increase the volume of equipment production for light industry by a factor of 2.3 which is 1.5 times more than was produced in the nation during the last 20 years.

We have defined subject specialization for defense sectors while producing peaceful products. For example, the Ministry of the Aviation Industry already in 1989 plans to produce at its own main plants 43 percent of the total volume of equipment for processing agricultural raw materials and will increase its share to 65 percent in the future. The Ministry of the Defense Industry has been made responsible for systems and assembly lines for processing cattle and poultry, and production of metal containers; the Ministry of General Machine Building plans to supply the bread baking, sugar, candy, yeast, and oil-fat industries. The Ministry of Medium Machine Building will specialize on the design and production of milk processing equipment.

The numbers listed undoubtedly make an imposing impression. But they are all related to activities directed at supplementing military production and development of production for peaceful purposes. The complete conversion of individual enterprises causes substantially greater interest. What are we undertaking here in our nation for this purpose?

A specific plan of action in this direction was set forth at the General Assembly session where the appeal rang out to transition from an economy of armament to an economy of disarmament: The USSR expressed its readiness to develop and present its own domestic national conversion plan to the UN and is also producing conversion plans for two to three defense enterprises as an experiment and to publish its experience in job placement of specialists from military industry, and use of equipment, buildings, and facilities for civilian production. As M.S. Gorbachev stated to the USSR People's Deputies, all of this work is currently occurring in our country.

Just what should be included in the national conversion plan? First of all, it must determine types of alternative production, sources of financing and sales prospects, production capacity and raw materials requirements. It must also contain recommendations on structural perestroyka of military enterprises and on required technological equipment for production of new products. And, finally, the issues of retraining and providing work to individuals who are released from the military sector of the economy must be developed in detail.

In contrast with Western countries, the USSR's economy is planned and with all the shortcomings of our planning, we are better prepared to develop major national programs like the conversion program must be. All the more so since centralized planning of structural advances in the economy are already being implemented in the USSR and many Soviet defense plants have experience in producing civilian products.

And nevertheless in spite of these factors that facilitate conversion, all of this does not nearly signify that economic, technical, and social problems will not arise while running a planned economy. Thus, let us say that many modern military enterprises are narrowly specialized and use specific military technology, special raw materials, and semifinished products that impede their direct transition to production of civilian output.

Personnel matters of military enterprises are also not proceeding simply. During the transition to civilian production, they lose advantages in wage levels and also an unconditional priority in obtaining financial and material resources. During the reorientation to the civilian market, personnel of defense enterprises also must renounce the principle of "end result at any price" that is natural for a number of military plants. And this requires serious restructuring of not only technology but also management of production and sales.

Although we have a work force shortage, it must decrease to a certain degree since the capacity of the national economy in this plan will not be "unlimited" under the new management conditions which envision cost-accounting and self-financing. Thus the problem of job placement for workers of the former defense enterprises will also arise during a broad conversion. Consequently, it is impossible to simplify the conversion problem: It has serious social aspects.

As a whole, one can say that conversion must meet the following requirements: Output at defense enterprises of such civilian products that maximally correspond to their pre-conversion nomenclature in order not to erode high technology islands in the boundless sea of mediocrity; insurance of the production of products that enjoy demand at the market; support of a sufficient level of profitability and, consequently, a social level of employment; and, preservation of existing production and technical ties.

All of this once again talks about the need for detailed study of national target programs of activity in the area of the economy of disarmament. Really the process of disarmament which has begun is related to far-reaching economic reform and can only be implemented using, in the words of V.I. Lenin, "a single economic plan."

In the opinion of Soviet experts, establishment of socioeconomic guarantees, along with military and political guarantees, of support of peace and security can become an important element in the economy of disarmament. Among them are social orientation of state budgets, increasing civilian production at former defense enterprises, increasing East-West economic cooperation, beginning a constructive North-South dialog, etc. Destruction of the material base of the policy of wars and confrontation is really one of the most reliable guarantees of international security.

Copyright: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Agitator", 1989
Universal Rail Truck Tested
904H0124A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by V. Startsev: “On the Narrow Gauge”]

[Text] Express trains connect our country with 27 states. Those who have been abroad know that a customs inspection is definitely accompanied by the tiresome and time-consuming transfer of cars to other rail trucks. After all, the gauge is 100 mm narrower abroad. Specialists from the imeni Dimitrov Plant in Sofia and the VNIIZhT [All-Union Institute of Railway Transportation] in Moscow have offered an original technique: a rail truck which will fit any gauge.

The principle on which the new design operates is simple: an engine pushes the cars from the rear, and they move from the broad onto the narrower gauge. The rails themselves shift the wheels along the axle to the necessary width. Subsequently, a locking device clicks retaining the wheels in the desired position. The pushing engine moves away while another engine on the narrow gauge is coupled to the first car, and the train is ready for departure.

This entire operation is performed at low speeds; it takes very little time. Incidentally, it is performed in an automatic mode. The safety of traffic is guaranteed, and the passengers themselves do not even notice the moment when their car enters “the narrow gauge.”

The honored Bulgarian inventor, Nikola Gaydarov, developed the concept of this technique. It was implemented in metal by the Lyublinovo Foundry and Metal-Working Plant. Our scientists are the authors of technical specifications for the entire design. To be sure, this unique rail truck has one “drawback”: It is 1.5 times more expensive than a conventional one. Still, its application is very promising and profitable. The specialists have calculated that the economic effect due to the use of the new design at one border crossing alone will amount to about R4 million a year.

Cars equipped with universal rail trucks have been tested at the VNIIZhT experimental track ring in Sherherbinka, in the vicinity of Moscow, and have traveled 250 kilometers without any accidents. The first runs of refrigerator cars with universal rail trucks through the Varinllichesk ferry complex have been scheduled. International passenger cars will also be equipped with new devices. It is planned to embark on the mass production of universal rail trucks this year.

Ryzhkov, Presidium on Abortive T-72 Sale
90UM0274A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 1 Feb 90 p 2

[TASS report: “In the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers”]

[Text] As has been reported in the press, law-enforcement agencies stopped an attempt to illegally export 12 T-72 tanks with their regular complement of weapons. The main character in the unsuccessful operation was the now former interdepartmental state-cooperative concern “ANT.”

The circumstances associated with the participation in this affair by a number of officials were examined at a meeting of the USSR Council of Ministers, which was held on 29 January under the chairmanship of N.I. Ryzhkov.

The “ANT” concern was established for purposes which, at the current stage of development of our society, are given unquestionable priority. With its participation, it was intended to energize efforts and to expand capabilities for saturating the consumer market with commodities in high demand, including taking advantage of certain privileges and conducting barter operations; to develop scientific research, and to introduce its own developments in ecology, chemistry, aviation, and electronics. Of course, the activities of the concern were to be conducted strictly within the scope of the law.

However, as practice showed, the concern took the path of illegal actions and deception of the government. The aforementioned deal in the tank sale is evidence of this.

How indeed did the situation arise that tanks, for the first time in the history of our defense industry, were transported outside the gates of the military plant to an unknown destination? The first and decisive step in assuring concealment of this illegal operation was taken by V.K. Dovyann, General Director of the Scientific Production Association [NPO] of the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry [Minradioimport], who gave direct assistance in the acquisition of tanks by the concern, expecting to receive part of the profits from the transaction for the NPO. V.S. Seryakov, General Director of the defense plant, approached the question on the tank sale absolutely irresponsibly. Appropriate measures were also not taken by senior officials of the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry.

Officials of the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry displayed an intolerable lack of principles. Even before the establishment of the concern, whose founders were the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry [Minaviaprom] and the industrial state cooperative association “ANT,” the Ministry granted “ANT” the right to conduct export-import operations in its behalf, thereby replacing this Ministry's foreign economic association “Aviaexport.”

Intolerable negligence was also displayed by some officials of the USSR Ministry of Defense [Minoboron], which did not prevent the transport of the tanks out of the plant and their shipment by rail to Novorossiysk.

All of this makes it possible to come to the conclusion that a lowering in state and executive discipline and
irresponsibility and laxity had an effect on a number of organizations and enterprises of the country's defense complex.

It was observed at the meeting that unscrupulous persons from the "ANT" concern, in violating existing procedures, took advantage of instructions for commercial transactions in military equipment that grant the concern a number of privileges in buying products cheap and selling dear. These instructions, according to representatives by senior officials of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers, were signed by V.K. Gusev, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. In addition, under the guise of production rejects and secondary raw materials; sheet metal, bronze, lead, stainless steel, fertilizers, and nonferrous metal articles, all of which are in short supply, and other commodities, were accumulated for sale abroad.

The Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers recognized that the illegal activity of the "ANT" concern, which grossly violated the procedures established in the country for acquiring military property and raw materials in short supply for the purpose of export sales, became possible as a result of the fact that a number of officials of the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry, USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry, and USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry [Minoboronprom] performed their direct official duties irresponsibly, and that some of them abused their rights. Individual workers of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers did not ensure control over the activity of the "ANT" concern, and in doing this displayed political shortsightedness, which made it possible for the concern to take the path of illegal actions.

The Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers assessed this incident as unprecedented and in direct contradiction to the fundamental principles of the foreign economic policy of the USSR, and it noted that the persons guilty of this, regardless of their official positions, must be held strictly answerable.

For gross violations of existing legislation concerning the export of arms and military equipment and the approval of the illegal charter of the "ANT," which was the basis for the illegal operations of the concern, A.G. Bratukhin, First Deputy Minister of Aviation Industry, is discharged from the post he occupies.

For permitting illegal actions in questions concerning the sale of military equipment and arms, the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers considered it impossible in the future to employ V.K. Dovgan, General Director of the NPO "Vzlet," in managerial work, and it discharged him from the post he was occupying.

It was noted that, for serious violations of the established procedure for the sale of tanks dispatched from the defense plant, V.S. Seryakov, General Director of the industrial association "Uralvagonzavod" of the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry, deserves discharge from the post he holds. However, owing to the fact that after being appointed to the position of general director he only worked several months, he was given a severe reprimand.

For lack of the necessary control in the area of foreign economic activity of the branch, which led to an illegal approval by the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry of the "ANT" concern charter, and which created the conditions for the illegal operations of this concern, USSR Minister of the Aviation Industry A.S. Systsov was given a severe reprimand.

For relaxing control over the foreign economic activity of subordinate enterprises and organizations, USSR Minister of the Defense Industry B.M. Belousov and USSR Minister of the Radio Industry V.I. Shimko were reprimanded. M.A. Zakharov, deputy minister of the defense industry, was severely reprimanded for not taking steps to prevent the illegal dispatch of tanks from the plant.

For displayed negligence and nonfulfillment of instructions of the Government of the USSR on exercising control over the activity of the concern "ANT," Yu.A. Peshkev, deputy chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers, was severely reprimanded, and V.S. Grinev, the first deputy supervisor of a department of this commission, who was directly responsible for this control, was discharged from the position he held.

Punishment was also imposed on other officials who to one or another extent participated in the illegal activity of the "ANT" concern.

Speaking during a summary of the findings on the question, N.I. Ryzhkov said that the illegal actions of the concern "ANT," and also of officials who transgressed state discipline and legality, inflicted not only economic damage, but also moral-political damage on the country, the national economy, and a number of labor collectives. This should serve as a serious lesson for everyone, especially for organs of state administration. It was noted that the examination at the meeting of the facts of serious violations of existing rules of foreign economic activity also makes it possible to come to a general conclusion on the necessity for all-around strengthening of state discipline in this sphere and the proper utilization of instruments of regulation and control, including licensing, quantitative regulations, and permissible procedures for barter transactions, etc.

As for the sale of arms and military equipment abroad, even nonsecret, this can be accomplished only with the permission of the government. This procedure, as it is now, is obligatory for all enterprises and organizations without exception.
The pertinent state organs are instructed to implement a system of measures to preclude ways of taking advantage of foreign economic ties to the detriment of general state interests, improvement in the national economy, and normalization of the consumer market.

The Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers took into consideration the information of USSR Procurator General A.Ya. Sukharev that the office of the USSR Procurator General is conducting a thorough on-site investigation into the facts of the illegal activity of the concern "ANT" and its organizations.
Gagarin Academy Exchange Visit to Royal Staff College

90UM2024A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Dec 89 First Edition p 5

[Article by Col V. Goryainov: "The Address of the College is Kranvell"]

[Text] Recently a delegation from the Air Force Academy imen Yu. A. Gagarin, headed by academy chief Col Gen Avn B. Korolkov, visited Great Britain. This was a reciprocal visit for the trip to the Soviet Union by representatives of the Royal Air Force Staff College, headed by its chief, Air Vice Marshal S. Hunter, in July of this year. Col V. Goryainov, whose remarks we are publishing, was a member of the delegation.

From the trip notes

Can there be 45 year old students? In England—yes. We saw this when we visited the Royal Air Force College in Kranvell [transliteration]. This fact greatly surprised us all. As, by the way, did some others, our impressions of which were as vague as can be.

What was the main goal of our trip? We were to become familiar with how the training of officers in the British Air Force takes place, that of the leadership, flying, and engineer-technical components. I cannot say that we knew nothing about the system and organization of this training. However, the visit enabled us to expand our knowledge of this matter significantly.

I will say right off that our hosts demonstrated hospitality, openness and good-will, placing at our disposal much printed material of all kinds, and supplementing it with oral reports. They willingly answered our numerous questions. We were present at several briefings, including one with Air Marshal M. Greydon, commander of the Royal Air Force Support Command, who is responsible, among other things, for the training of officer cadres.

Summarizing everything we saw and heard, I can say that the system of training officer cadres, including the leadership element, in Great Britain's Air Force differs substantially from Soviet military schooling. In our country we, for example, already in the first stage of training, that is in the secondary and higher aviation schools, train students both as officers and specialists. Then in the academies the officers perfect their professional knowledge and receive higher military training.

In the air forces of Great Britain, in the first stage of training in the college, which is located in Kranvell, the focus is primarily on training the student as an officer. This course, which is called "Primary Officer Training," lasts a total of 18 weeks. Both men and women graduates of schools and universities, as well as former military personnel, are accepted into this school. In connection with this, the age of the students varies widely, from 17 years for school graduates, to 45 years for a former sergeant or warrant officer.

Upon the completion of schooling, and having obtained the initial officer rank, the graduates immediately must take specialist training. For engineers, for example, this will be a course in general engineering training, lasting 20 weeks. Upon its completion the graduates go to serve in aviation units in duty positions roughly corresponding to those of an aircraft technician in the Soviet Air Forces. Having served approximately 2 years with the troops, the officer may go to courses in specialized engineer training, which last 17 to 20 weeks, depending on profile. Here an officer receives engineering education in one of three specialties: mechanical systems, electronic systems, or communications systems. With this level of training the officer can rise up the service hierarchy to the rank corresponding to "major" in the Soviet Air Forces. The highest duty to which he can aspire is comparable to our position of air squadron engineer. Subsequently, officers in the engineer service can take an advanced training course lasting 13 weeks, which enables them to occupy any engineer positions in aviation.

Training of officers for command and staff positions takes place in another educational institution, the Royal Air Force Staff College, which is located in Bracknell.

The members of our delegation were interested in the fact that a substantial portion of the training time in the officer training system at all levels is allotted to the, so-called, command and control course. This course pursues the objective of developing the ability to analyze situations, make well-founded decisions, determine the order of their fulfillment, issue tasks to subordinates, and organize work. Much attention is paid to public speaking practice and methods of preparing oral reports and written articles. In short, the course is to train officers as the leaders of military collectives.

Instructive in this regard was one of the practical exercises at which we were present. It took place at a training site in a woods, and was aimed at developing in the students the skills of organizing the work of a group of six persons to build a shed to store property. The instructor, Capt Sheila Hawkey, assigned the task to one of the students, whom she designated group leader. She showed him the materials that he could have for the construction, and also determined the time allotted for these purposes. It was interesting to observe how the group leader thought through his decision aloud, then assigned the mission to his subordinates, and finally organized their work. As the task was being carried out the instructor created complicated situations, observing how the group leader acted. This training element was also used: The instructor at the beginning of the class picked out one student from the group and gave him the task of evaluating the actions of the group leader and subsequently conducting a lesson critique.
In general we noted that group exercises at which one of the students carries out the role of leader are considered the main form of training in the colleges. Stress is also placed on independent work. Skills in using specialized literature, and searching for and systemizing various information, are imparted to the students. Apropos of this, the college library operates every day, around the clock.

At one of the training sites we read the ancient Chinese proverb: "If you give a man a fish you will feed him for one day. If you teach him to catch fish you will feed him for his whole life." This proverb contains, evidently, the main rule in the system of training future officers in Britain.

The visit was brief, only a few days. Nevertheless, we were not limited to purely professional problems. The English were interested in prospects for development of the situation in Eastern Europe, and our vision of the future of socialism. A frank exchange of opinions and discussion began everywhere that our delegation went.

On the last day of the visit, in a solemn ceremony at the flagstaff of the Staff College in Bracknell, the flag of the Soviet Union was lowered. We parted in the hope that contacts will continue between air force military educational institutions, as well as between the armed forces of the USSR and Great Britain as a whole.
Various Aspects of Ongoing SDI Research Noted
90UM01104 Moscow KRASTAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Nov 89 First Edition p 4

[Article by Maj Gen B. Yegorov, doctor of technical
sciences, and Lt Col B. Petrovich, candidate of technical
sciences, in the column: "Military-Technical Review":
"SDI Without Sensation"]

[Text] More than 6 years have passed since that March
day in 1983 when R. Reagan, the former President of the
U.S., announced the establishment of the SDI pro-
gram—the "Strategic Defense Initiative." Billions in
appropriations; unprecedented military tasks; the wide
scope of associated research and development; all this
generated far-reaching discussions. Today, the consensus
among most foreign experts is that Reagan's statement of
the time—"to render nuclear weapons impotent and
obsolete"—amounted to a slogan, not the purpose of the
program.

The purpose of the program is more realistic: with
large-scale research as a basis, to create a large fund of
scientific and technical knowledge to make an informed
decision relative to the feasibility of establishing an
ABM defense system; and to devise alternate defense
structures and determine the kinds of components that
will make up the system.

The American military and political leadership charged
at the same time that the first phase of the program was
completed. That was the reason for the intensification of
congressional discussions: It was necessary to choose a
strategy to provide additional financing for the program.
The opinions held by the president and the Congress
differed to such an extent that a final decision was not
made by 1 October - the official day marking the
beginning of the new fiscal year. This fact is referred to in
many publications as the "crash of SDI." Readers are led
to believe that there are no problems with the SDI; and
that, since the activity continues to be pure "research,"
the program is safe. Is that really the case?

We probably run the risk of appearing banal, but we
remind the reader that in all countries of the world today
(the same as yesterday, incidentally), military technology
reaps the primary benefit of the most important attain-
ments made in basic research, and of "supermodern
technologies."

Western experts are already maintaining that the SDI
program has so far produced definite results that can and
will be applied to the improvement of military tech-
nology. In addition, the press points out that the scient-
ific and technical base that is being formed will endow
future developments with flexibility, thus making it
possible to modernize concepts of definite systems and
weapons in an ongoing manner.

Structurally speaking, the SDI program consists of five
subprograms, each of which includes a considerable
number of projects: means for detecting, lock-on,
tracking, and kill evaluation of targets; directed-energy
and kinetic-kill weapons; systems for performing anal-
ysis, communications, and control. The foreign press
reports that the SDI has so far cost more than 14 billion
dollars. Presently at the "demonstration testing and
evaluation" level are: projects for ground and orbiting
missile systems; and systems for observing ballistic tar-
gets in space in the boost phase and in the atmosphere
during the terminal phase. However, observers maintain
that the question of their fate remains open. The new
BSTS satellite is the only project that has garnered
general support in Congress, since it presently affords a
significant advantage outside the context of the large-
scale ABM defense system: modernization of the existing
early warning system, by virtue of enhancing the features
of response time and accuracy of determining the coor-
dinates of a launch location.

Of the pure research programs, the creation of directed
energy weapons is deemed to be of paramount impor-
tance. These include space-based chemical lasers; free-
electron lasers; ground-based excimer lasers; and
orbiting X-ray lasers and accelerators.

Chemical lasers have undergone the most development
to date. The most powerful is the MIRACL (2.2 MW).
The press has reported that this laser was used in testing
carried out in 1986 to destroy a stage of the Titan
missile; and in February of 1989, it was successfully
employed in an experimental intercept of an air-to-air
missile. Nevertheless, military experts are of the opinion
that chemical laser technology is not sufficiently
advanced for incorporation into ABM complexes at the
present time.

Work is continuing, however. A search is on for new
active media for lasers. Feasibility studies are in progress
to employ nonlinear optical processes to solve the
problem of propagation of powerful optical beams and of
converging several beams into a single beam. This is still
in the research stage. But it should lead to something. It
would be unwise to ignore this development.

Incidentally, it follows from statements made in the
press that the serious difficulties encountered in devel-
oping directed energy weapons have given rise to the
increasing importance attached to the development of
layered ABM defense systems that could be built on the
basis of existing technologies. One of the proposed
versions is a two-layer ABM system.

The authorities in charge of the SDI program have until
quite recently attempted to refrain from giving prefer-
ence to any one version of ABM defense, instead opting
for maximum progress in all areas of attendant technolo-
gies. The Office of Technology Assessment, which was
formed as early as the time the SDI program was
initiated, is destined to keep its finger on the pulse of all
these matters. It is no accident that its sphere of interests
compasses more than 40 different aspects of research
(based on program requirements).
James Johnson, former head of the department, formulated its tasks as follows: "Our mission is not confined to basic research; it does not consist merely of incorporating completed research elements. We must endeavour to fill the needs of definite developments with the results of basic research."

The above describes the situation as it exists. For example, the requirement for increasing the operating speed of computers, which is dictated by special needs of the tactical control system, has given rise to heightened interest in optical computers (both analog and digital), prospective architectures offering parallel data processing, and mathematical algorithms written for these computers.

Relative to target detection and recognition, the office's interests are focused on aspects which at another level can solve the unique problems of early detection of missiles (at distances of several thousand kilometers), precise indication to active interception in the space phase, and target tracking.

The list could be continued. The area of interest of the office also includes nontraditional concepts of power sources, both nuclear and non-nuclear: promising materials and designs for space; high-temperature superconductors; materials offering metastable properties; new semiconductor-based structures; new types of rocket fuels; fundamentally new concepts of engines...

Now for the financial side of the matter. The Office of Technology Assessment receives an annual appropriation of up to 100 million dollars, which amounts to approximately 3 percent of the entire program budget. Is that much or little? It is entirely sufficient, considering that the office is limited to performing an exploratory and intermediary function, with the costs of the projects proper paid by the Pentagon out of a special programs budget.

Clearly, successes attained in the creation of fundamentally new technologies are conducive to the appearance of new projects within the framework of the SDI program. It is sufficient to recall the work related to the creation of space-based interceptors, which in 1987 evolved to the "demonstration testing" phase. Plans of that time called for conducting two cycles of flight testing by 1992. A group of independent experts has estimated the cost of the ABM defense system component projects that are in the "demonstration testing" phase.

It has been determined that development of the necessary 300 space vehicles with their 3,000 interceptors will incur a cost of about 45 percent of 115.4 billion dollars (the total outlay for the system). Such impressive figures gave rise to a review of the concept. This resulted in a proposal to dispense with the complex system of target tracking fitted directly to the interceptor in favor of large-diameter optical devices that would permit extending the homing system's lock-on range. Estimates indicate that this would reduce expenditures for developing and purchasing materiel from 52 to 18 billion dollars, with about another 11 billion dollars saved by diminishing the number of satellites employed in the data-gathering system.

The above describes how the highly-touted "Brilliant Pebbles" concept was born. Its core consists of such components as a wide-angle telescope that is collocated with a multispectrum high-resolution sensor developed by the Livermore National Laboratory; a multiunit antenna designed for communicating with ground control stations; special missile nozzle units; etc. These represent attainments made in supermodern technologies which at first glance seem to be products of basic research.

Also in existence are plans to channel, for a two-year period, some of the funds previously earmarked for "demonstration and testing" of space interceptors to reworking the "Brilliant Pebbles" concept, temporarily halting the other efforts. This will make it possible, when the time comes to make the subsequent decision, to shift to full-scale work on all space interceptor versions, which should all be at the same level of development. There is no need to comment here.
Defense Archival Material on Decision to Invade
90UM0116A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Nov 89 First Edition pp 3-4

[Article by Lt Col A. Oliynik, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Sending of Troops to Afghanistan: Participants in the Events Tell and Documents Attest to How the Decision Was Made"]

[Text] A decade separates us from December 1979, when the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (OKSV) was sent into Afghanistan. We know that all our forces were totally removed from the Republic of Afghanistan on 15 February 1989 in accordance with the Geneva accords. The echo of the Afghan war disturbs the hearts and minds of the Soviet people with questions which have still not been answered clearly and convincingly, however, and will continue to disturb them for a long time to come. One of the main questions has to do with the circumstances surrounding the introduction of the limited contingent of Soviet forces into Afghanistan.

Articles containing different versions have recently been printed in various publications. Far from all the assessments and conclusions have been substantiated with documentary facts. A number of documents from the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense have been placed at the disposal of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, which shed some light on certain details pertaining to the adoption of the decision to send troops into Afghanistan. In addition, we have succeeded in obtaining a number of statements from actual participants in those events, which we believe will be of interest to the readers.

Naturally, this article cannot to any degree clear up all of the questions and certainly does not purport to offer any overall assessments of the commitment of the troops or of the Afghan war in general. This is the prerogative of the commission set up in the USSR Supreme Soviet at the instructions of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, whose findings are awaited by all the Soviet people.

The Cost of the Mistakes and Miscalculations

They say that the Afghans could not recall a spring as erratic as that of 1979. Now the sun would send down its burning heat, now a swift "Afghan" would sweep down from the mountains, filling the sky with leaden clouds, and Kabul would be enshrouded in rain. The military-political situation at that difficult time for the nation was equally unsettled and extremely discordant.

Only a year had passed since the military coup in Kabul on 27 April 1978, which was led by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Socialism was proclaimed as the goal of the April revolution in Afghanistan. Sociopolitical and economic reforms began to be carried out. The Afghan capital and almost all of the provincial centers were flecked with crimson. Numerous slogans, posters and banners quoting Noor Mohammad Taraki, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and chairman of the nation's Revolutionary Council, were displayed everywhere: "Socialism is the goal of the Saur Revolution!" "Land and water to the peasants"... These slogans were established in a dramatic struggle, however. Automatic-rifle rounds frequently rattled the villages, where the peasants were given free plots of lands and the first cooperatives were born. Those who offered resistance, who did not agree with the reforms being implemented—landowners and the clergy—were being executed in front of the population, in front of the believers.... The government of the Republic of Afghanistan now reports that around 11,000 political prisoners were executed at that time.

The situation in the nation was exacerbated also by the intensifying discord between Taraki and Amin, minister of foreign affairs, who was striving to gain power and force out his enemies. Nor was there a lull in the factional struggle within the party itself between its two wings: The Khalqi (people) and Parcham (banner). Soviet representatives in the nation, including party advisors headed by S. Veselov, attempted to help settle these disagreements in the PDPA, but all their attempts were unsuccessful.

These excesses and errors, obviously a part of many revolutions, produced disappointment and resistance in a considerable part of the population. Masses of refugees rushed out of Afghanistan. Entire tent cities of Afghan refugees sprang up in the neighboring nations of Pakistan and Iran. The formation of armed detachments was begun, many of which openly opposed the revolution. Centers of resistance began to be formed in many provinces, which gradually developed into a civil war.

It is up to the Afghans themselves to evaluate specific internal Afghan problems. We are presently concerned with how the situation in Afghanistan was regarded in our nation back in 1979. It was viewed with ever increasing alarm. The unseemly actions of the USA and Pakistan were becoming increasingly apparent. While verbally recognizing the DRA, during the very first days after the PDPA came to power Washington began working out plans to eliminate the democratic government headed by N. Taraki. The emphasis was on undermining the system from within, using secret links between the CIA and the pro-monarchy, feudal and other reactionary forces.

"Certain changes have recently occurred in the activities of American official and private organizations in the DRA," said Col A. Baranayev, our military attache in Kabul, in one report in 1979. "There has been a significant transformation of the activities of the American cultural center in Kabul, which has substantially increased the number of students in language courses and regularly shows films and presents lectures. The activities of the joint Afghan-American Ariana Airline have been stepped up to an unusual degree. At the initiative of the Americans a large group of specialists
have arrived from the Douglas aircraft company [sic] in the USA, who know Dari and Pashtu and are familiar with eastern customs...."

One more report published in the Pakistani newspaper *Millat* on 4 July 1979: "As a result of the Iranian revolution," it stated, "the CIA has moved its headquarters to Pakistan. Its job is to monitor the development of events in Afghanistan and Iran from there."

What lay behind the benign words "CIA monitoring" is well known today. It was not just weapons which flowed clandestinely from Pakistan to Afghanistan but also guerrillas from among the Afghan immigrants, the latter to conduct subversive activities against the nation's legal government and their own people. A base for training terrorists near Aravali "started up" in January 1979, followed by bases at Mirhan in June, at Bagh in September and at Badabar, Varsak, Miranshah and Landi Kotal in December.... According to military intelligence around 40,000 rebels with a command element mainly transferred from Pakistan were operating on the territory of Afghanistan by the end of 1979. The emergence of bases and weapons depots and the movement of armed detachments from Pakistani territory to the DRA all attested to direct interference in the affairs of sovereign Afghanistan, a full member of the UN.

**Revolts in the Army**

A wave of armed actions, as well as revolts, swept over all of Afghanistan throughout 1979. This was well known not just to the government of the DRA; the leadership also kept our nation regularly informed. Specific information on armed actions against the Afghan government arrived through many channels: intelligence, diplomatic and military. I shall cite what I consider to be the most important of the information received by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR from March to November 1979 through the main military advisor in Afghanistan and the military attaché.

15-20 March: A counterrevolutionary rebellion by the population of Herat erupted, with active participation by subunits at the military garrison. The revolt was put down with the help of troops loyal to the government. Two Soviet citizens died during that revolt.

21 March: A conspiracy was uncovered at the Jalalabad garrison. Around 230 military conspirators were arrested.

9 May: Massive antigovernment armed actions flared up in the provinces of Paktika, Ghazni, Paktia, Nangarhar, Kunar, Balkh and Kabul. The uprisings were put down by the troops in all areas.

20 July: An uprising by rebels seeking to capture Gardez, the provincial center of Paktia, was put down. Two Soviet military advisors were killed during the fighting.

5 August: A mutiny broke out at Kabul, at the base of the 26th Airborne Regiment and a battalion of "commandos." Decisive steps put down the revolt. Troops at the capital's garrison were placed on Readiness 1 status.

11 August: Rebels in subunits of the 12th Infantry Division suffered large losses in heavy fighting with superior forces in the province of Paktika (in the area of Zurmat) (some of the personnel surrendered and were imprisoned; others deserted).

14 September: By order of H. Amin Readiness 1 was declared in units of the Kabul garrison at 09:30 today as a result of discord among the leadership of the PDPA. Troops entered the city's interior at 16:20 at the order of Yaqub, chief of the General Air Force Staff of the DRA and occupied their areas of responsibility by 18:00. At 17:50 Kabul radio announced changes in the government of the DRA. According to this report N. Taraki was removed from the posts he held. Also removed from their posts were members of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee Watanjar, minister of the interior; Gulyozoi, minister of communications; Mazdoviyar, minister of border affairs; and Sarvari, chief of the security service, who were accused of forming a conspiracy "of four" which enjoyed the protection of Taraki. (Theses changes were officially confirmed at an extraordinary plenum of the PDPA Central Committee and a session of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA on 16 September, at which H. Amin was elected general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA—author's note).

N. Taraki's residence was sealed off by troops and all lines of communication with it were cut off. The commanders of the 8th Infantry Division, an artillery regiment and a separate tank battalion of the 8th Infantry Division and the chiefs of staff of the 4th and 15th tank brigades were removed from their posts and placed under arrest. Flights by all types of aircraft were banned. It is essentially a military coup....

10 October: According to a report by the Afghan Information Agency broadcast this morning by radio and television, N.M. Taraki died on 9 October following a short but serious illness. The deceased was buried in the family burial vault.

(N. Taraki was actually killed at Amin's personal order by officers of the guard at 23:30 on 8 October—author's note).

16 October: A revolt in the 2nd Infantry Division was put down with combat action by units of the Kabul garrison (the 8th Infantry Division, the 37th "Commando" Regiment and a training regiment) with the support of aircraft, tanks and infantry combat vehicles at 11:00 on 15 October. The objective of the revolt was the physical removal of H. Amin from power. The officers who organized the revolt arc in hiding. Chief of General Staff Yaqub directed the forces putting down the revolt.
in the 7th Infantry Division. "The situation in the army and in the party continues to be extremely complex...."

Even a cursory study of these reports shows that the military-political situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated so catastrophically not just because of armed actions by tribes organized by the Afghan counterrevolution with the assistance of the USA and Pakistan, about which a great deal has been written in our press. We can see that revolts within the army, its low morale and poor combat readiness were also important causes of the instability in the nation. And this was not surprising. Following the April revolution was completed the Afghan army in fact continued to be a royal, Daoud army in spirit. Add to this the struggle between the two factions—the Parcham (banner) and Khalqi (people) underway within the PDPA and the mass arrests and executions of officers and enlisted men. Those military cadres for whom the concepts of the April revolution were dear melted away before the eyes not just on the battlefield....

This is what Lt Gen (ret) Lev Nikolayevich Gorelov, in charge of Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan from 1975 to November 1979, had to say:

"According to the agreement signed between the USSR and the DRA in May 1978 a considerable number of our military advisors and specialists were located on Afghan soil. They worked at all army levels, including the regiments, fulfilling their professional military duty honorably and courageously, frequently at a high cost—the cost of their lives. But what could two or three advisors do in an infantry regiment, for example, when there was no unity among the officers and many of them openly spoke out against popular power, against the PDPA. Regimental schools had to be opened at once for training specialists and junior commanders coming out of the people, and an additional two or three infantry divisions had to be deployed. This was repeatedly reported to the center, and the opinion was supported at a meeting of the Commission on Afghanistan of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, to which I was summoned along with Lt Gen B.S. Ivanov. It was held in Moscow in mid-August 1979. It was attended by members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee Gromyko, Andropov and Ustinov, as well as Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff at that time, and Korniienko, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR. Numerous questions followed my brief but candid report on the situation in the nation and in the army. They came mainly from Gromyko and Andropov. The actual subject of committing our troops was not raised at that time. I expressed my firm opinion that, despite numerous requests from the Afghan leadership, specifically Amin, who was promoting military matters in the government of the PDPA, it would not be expedient to increase our military presence in Afghanistan, which was experiencing a revolutionary crisis at that time, and particularly to commit our troops there. I cited a number of grounds for this opinion and stressed the fact that, despite the demoralizing processes, the Afghan army would be capable of defending the gains of the April revolution on its own after it was reorganized (this was discussed in detail). Lt Gen Ivanov, who spoke in the commission following me, had a different, contrasting opinion both with respect to assessing the combat capability of the Afghan army and on other complex processes underway in the PDPA.... Unfortunately, Ivanov's opinion and that of his colleagues seemed more convincing to our political leadership at that time...."

Reports from Kabul

The revolts in the army had a sobering effect upon the leaders of the PDPA. Following the Herat revolt in March of 1979 the Afghan leadership began insistently requesting that Soviet troops be brought into the nation.

These reports with requests from Taraki himself and from Amin are kept in the historical archives department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The requests were transmitted through our representative in Kabul: Ambassador A. Puzanov, Lt Gen Ivanov, KGB representative, and Lt Gen L. Gorelov, chief military advisor. They were also voiced to Soviet state and military officials who visited Kabul. N. Taraki raised the matter twice in talks with B.N. Ponomarev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and H. Amin raised them with Army Gen I.G. Pavlovskiy.

I cite here a part of these reports:

"...was invited to see Comrade Amin, who, at N.M. Taraki's instructions, requested that 15-20 combat helicopters with ammunition and Soviet crews be sent to Kabul to be used against rebels and terrorists sent in from Pakistan should the situation worsen in the northern and central regions of the nation. Assurances were given that the arrival of Soviet crews in Kabul and their use would be kept secret.—Gorelov, 14 Apr 79"

(Response to report by MSU N.V. Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR at that time: "This should not be done."—author's note).

"Taraki as well as Amin repeatedly returned to the matter of enlarging the Soviet military presence in the nation. They brought up the matter of bringing approximately two divisions into the DRA in an emergency 'at the request of the legal government of Afghanistan.' In response to this statement it was announced to the Afghan leadership that the Soviet Union could not agree to that....—B. Ponomarev, 19 Jul 79"

"...in talks with us on 10 and 11 August H. Amin noted that it would be possible to use troops stationed in Kabul against the rebels if the Soviet leadership agreed to the request by the government of the DRA and by N.M. Taraki personally for the deployment of three Soviet special battalions in the Afghan capital. On 12 August, at the instructions of H. Amin, security service chief Sawari asked us to accelerate the fulfillment of the request by the DRA's leadership for Soviet special battalions and
transport helicopters with Soviet crews.—Puzaov, Ivanov, Gorelov, 12 Aug 79"

"A talk was held with H. Amin on 11 August at his request. During the discussion particular attention was given to the matter of sending Soviet subunits to the DRA. H. Amin earnestly requested that the Soviet leadership be informed of the need for the earliest possible dispatch of Soviet subunits to Kabul. He repeated several times that 'the arrival of Soviet troops will considerably raise our morale and give us greater confidence and peace of mind.' He went on to say: 'The Soviet leaders are possibly concerned that enemies in the world will assess this as intervention in the internal affairs of the DRA. I assure you, however, that we are a sovereign and independent state and decide all issues on our own. ...Your troops will not take part in military operations. They would be used only in a crisis for us. I feel that we will need the Soviet subunits before spring.—Gorelov, 12 Aug 79"

"I was invited to see Amin on 20 August. During the conversation Comrade Amin brought up the fact that a large number of troops, including troops with heavy weapons (tank, artillery and other units) were concentrated in the area of Kabul, which could be used in other areas to combat the counterrevolution if the USSR would allocate formations of 1,500-2,000 "commandos" (airborne troops) which could be quartered at Bala-Hisar Fortress.... Comrade Amin then raised the matter of replacing with Soviet crews the crews of antiaircraft batteries of the 77th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion covering Kabul and adjacent dominant heights around the city, of whose loyalty he was not certain.—Pavlovsky, 21 Aug 79"

"A meeting with H. Amin was held on 3 December. During the discussion H. Amin said: 'We plan to transfer part of the personnel and weapons of the 18th and 20th divisions (from Mazar-i-Sharif and Baghlan) for the formation of people's militia formations. In this case, instead of bringing regular Soviet troops into the DRA, it would be better to send subunits of Soviet militia, which, together with our people's militia, could provide security and restore order in the northern regions of the DRA.—Magometov, 4 Dec 79"

(Col Gen S. Magometov replaced Gen Gorelov in mid-November 1979 as chief military advisor in the DRA—author's note).

How the Center Reacted

One can see from the reports that the request by the Afghan leaders with respect to moving Soviet troops into Afghanistan involved various military contingents: helicopter and antiaircraft gun crews, subunits for guarding the government, airborne troops and even... subunits of Soviet militia.

It should also be stated that Soviet representatives in Kabul also sent several memoranda to the center stating the need to move certain subunits into the DRA "under the appropriate pretext." They were concerned about providing security during a possible evacuation of Soviet citizens in case the situation deteriorated. Moscow partially satisfied their request.

On 7 July 1979, for example, one airborne battalion commanded by Lt Col A. Lomakin (minus equipment) was clandestinely transferred to the airfield at Bagham in the guise of specialists. The airborne troops reinforced airfield security. They were subordinate to the chief military advisor and did not interfere in the affairs of the Afghans....

The Afghan government asked us for military assistance in the form of troops a total of 18 times during 1979. The Soviet government responded to all the requests with a restrained and well-based refusal. So just why was the political decision still made to commit our troops in Afghanistan?

This is what Army Gen I. Pavlovsky, former commander in chief of the Ground Forces, had to say:

"Sometime in mid-August of 1979," Army Gen Pavlovsky said, "Marshal Sokolov phoned me and reported that the Ministry of Defense had placed me in charge of a group of officers to go to Afghanistan. "President Taraki," he stressed, "earnestly asks us to provide assistance for stepping up combat operations to destroy the rebel movement in the nation. At the site you will help coordinate the operations of our military advisors and the general staff of the Afghan army. Our group of 20 men, which consisted mainly of officers from the General Staff of the Ground Forces, was soon ready for the dangerous detached-duty assignment. On the eve of our departure I made a call on a high-frequency channel to Marshal Ustinov in Sochi, where he was vacationing. I recall that at the end of the brief conversation I asked the minister of defense point-blank, so to speak: 'Are we going to send troops to Afghanistan?' he responded abruptly: 'In no case. And if the leadership of the DRA asks you about this, answer them in the same vein....'"

One sometimes reads in the press today, in Literaturnaya Gazeta (the 20 September issue for this year), that the 14 September coup in Kabul and the vile murder of President Taraki at the order of Amin, who was warmly received by L.I. Brezhnev in September of 1979 during his trip from Havana to Moscow, were the crucial factors. This seems more like only an effect rather than a cause to me.

The alarming chronology of revolts in the army cited here attests to the fact that a dramatic military-political situation had developed in Afghanistan by the end of October 1979. The social base of the April revolution had shrunk like shagreen leather. The flower of the PDPA was being destroyed, the party was immersed in bloody infighting and the nation was on the brink of civil war.... All of the steps taken by us were unproductive. What was to be done? How could the situation in neighboring Afghanistan in revolutionary turmoil be stabilized?
The motives behind the "Afghan decision" were very complex and multifaceted. They involved more than just Soviet-Afghan relations. They had to do with the general situation which had developed in the world at the end of the '70s. And we know that it was extremely complex and filled with conflicts. Power pressure, distrust and suspicion dominated in the foreign policy between the USSR and the USA. It actually involved the refusal of the U.S. government to ratify the SALT II Treaty, NATO's decision for its members to increase their military budgets each year to the end of the twentieth century and the Pentagon's creation of "rapid deployment forces," a tool for conducting a policy of military intervention.... We should add to this the beginning of a "compact," as our newspapers called it at that time, between Washington and Beijing. Nor can we discount preparations by the Americans to invade Iran as a result of the fall of the shah's regime. This is acknowledged unequivocally in the memoirs of Z. Brzezinski, chief ideologist of U.S. anti-Soviet strategy at that time....

All of this, or at least the way we saw the world and the situation at that time, directly or indirectly influenced the decision to commit Soviet troops in Afghanistan. No matter how many important arguments were cited by way of explaining that political action, there was absolutely no justification for it. E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, correctly noted in his address to members of the USSR Supreme Soviet that the decision violated standards of behavior in the international arena and involved gross violations of our own laws and intraparty and civic ethical standards.

Few people know even today that the final political decision to commit our forces in Afghanistan was made on 12 December 1979 in the Kremlin office of L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It was made in secrecy not just from the people but also from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, members of the party Central Committee and even the Politburo.

Those few military chiefs whose jobs involved the Afghan events and who had thoroughly analyzed the entire set of circumstances of the Afghan reality and expressed their doubts about the commitment of our troops in the DRA were informed after the fact.

The following is taken from a statement by Army Gen I. Pavlovskyi:

"I returned to Moscow from Afghanistan in November 1979. I returned with difficulty, since Marshal Ustinov had personally dragged out the date of my return, the reason for which I later understood.... On the day of my arrival I was immediately sent to the Ministry of Defense to report to Marshal Ustinov. He greeted me coolly, inquiring in passing about whether I knew about the struggle within the PDPA and about the Khalqi and Parcham wings. When I completed my report on the situation in the nation I expressed my opinion that there was no need for us to commit our forces in Afghanistan. I cited several considerations to support my opinion. I suggested, among other things, that Amin, who had evoked distrust in many people, be received in Moscow by some member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and told about his personal message to Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, which he had transmitted through the chief military advisor in the DRA. The minister did not want to listen...."

"I was not heard not just by Army Gen I. Pavlovskyi, member of the CPSU Central Committee, commander and chief of the Ground Forces and deputy minister of defense. Nor were the conclusions and valid arguments of the General Staff, which was against the commitment of our troops in Afghanistan, taken into account by either the political leadership at that time or the minister of defense. Until the idea became a political decision, of course. According to Army Gen V. Varennikov, deputy chief of the General Staff at that time, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, then chief of the General Staff, Army Gen S.F. Akhromeyev, his first deputy, and he all three specially requested to be allowed to report to the minister of defense on the Afghan matter. The opinion of the General Staff was presented by Marshal Ogarkov, with calculations and computations in hand, so to speak. It was that it would be infeasible to commit the proposed 75,000 men to "stabilize the situation in Afghanistan," since these forces could not accomplish the mission. Furthermore, the General Staff predicted that a Soviet military presence would immediately result in a step-up in the rebel movement in the nation, which would be directed primarily against the Soviet troops. And since the mission could not be accomplished by military means, one had to ask: Why commit troops at all? If the political leadership still considered it essential to commit troops in the DRA, the General Staff proposed that the units be stationed in separate garrisons, not become involved in combat operations under any pretext...."

History arranged things in its own way.... We now know how many thousands of people paid for this "Afghan decision" with their lives.

H-Hour on 25 December

Strange as it seems today, the fact is that Army Gen V. Bogdanov and I could not find any state documents in the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense setting forth the mission of preparing troops to go to Afghanistan. There is every indication that Marshal Ustinov issued all instructions from the political leadership to the General Staff verbally.

The following is from a statement by Lt Gen V. Bogdanov, deputy chief of the Military-Scientific Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces:

During the first days of December 1979 Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov informed a narrow circle of officials in the Ministry of Defense of a possible decision by the political leadership to employ our troops in Afghanistan. On
10 December he issued the order to the General Staff, in which I was dealing with Afghan matters at that time, to prepare an airborne division and the necessary units of the military transport aviation for an airlift, to raise the readiness status of two motorized rifle divisions in the Turkestan Military District and bring an engineer unit up to full T/O. Thus began the formation of the future 40th Army, of which Lt Gen Yu.V. Tukharinov was placed in command.

The documents show that the General Staff issued more than 30 various directives during December at the oral instructions of Marshal Ustinov. Tens of thousands of officers and enlisted men, mainly from the republics of Central Asia, were called up to complete the manning of the forces. Around 8,000 motor vehicles and other equipment were transferred to the forces from the civilian sector. At the sites where the combat units and formations were being deployed everyone thought this to be an ordinary test of the combat readiness of the troops, albeit a large-scale one, and many things were therefore done hastily, as a formality. Many people at the General Headquarters, including myself, honestly did not believe until the last day that the troops would enter Afghanistan and did not even have a thorough understanding of what their mission would be."

The clock was ticking, however. The "Afghan decision" adopted by the nation's political leadership was strictly implemented. On 24 December 1979 Marshal Ustinov held a conference of top personnel of the USSR Ministry of Defense. It was attended by the deputy ministers of defense, the commander in chief of the Ground Forces, the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces, the commander of the Airborne Troops and certain chiefs of main and central directorates of the General Staff. At the meeting the minister of defense announced the decision adopted by the Soviet leadership to move troops into Afghanistan. A summary of D.F. Ustinov's speech was retained in the archives, with his notation in red: "Special importance and secrecy!"

Marshals D. Ustinov and N. Ogarkov signed the order for moving troops into Afghanistan that same day. About the purposes for committing troops the preamble to the order states: "A decision has been made to move certain contingents of Soviet forces stationed in the southern regions of the nation onto the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for purposes of providing international assistance to the friendly Afghan people and for creating conditions conducive to the prevention of possible anti-Afghan actions on the part of bordering states."

H-Hour, the time set for crossing the State Border of the USSR, was 15:00, Moscow time, on 25 December.

...The commanders and staffs had only days in which to brief troops of the 40th Army, which had been deployed within a matter of weeks, on the missions set for them in the directive. Officers and enlisted men of the future limited contingent slept peacefully on native soil that last night. And probably none of them knew what dangerous and bitter fate awaited them in war-torn Afghanistan or what an enormous burden had been dumped onto the shoulders of our people for years to come....

Survey On Afghan Service, Treatment Of Veterans
90UM0132A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Nov 89 pp 1-2

[Article by M. Magomedeminov, Candidate of Psychology and Director of the Psychological Service of the Afghanistan Veterans Union: "Duty: No One Is Forgotten"]

[Text] The survey whose questions we and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA ask you to answer is the first nationwide attempt in our country to study the psychological and social characteristics of the lives of those who served in Afghanistan.

Why has the need for such a study arisen? Above all, because we are concerned for the fate of veterans of the Afghanistan—undeclared—war, who number nearly 1 million, according to rough estimates. It is important that we obtain a full picture of how they live, what they think about, and what they feel.

Psychologists have a concept known as "delayed stress syndrome" (DSD). It is the natural reaction of a healthy person to the stresses that are inevitable in war. DSD, as well as stresses that occur after one's return home, creates internal psychological obstacles to adaptation to civilian life and impedes the resolution of tasks in various areas of life, professional self-determination, and the establishment of family relationships. In acute form, DSD reactions can manifest themselves in constant irritability, chronic depression, difficulties in establishing intimate relationships with other people, persistent recollections of the past, and a feeling of alienation from other people. Sleep disorders, nightmares, alcohol and drug abuse—these too are the effects of Afghanistan.

War is an inhuman, abnormal situation that severely traumatizes a person, as a rule. But regardless of our attitude toward the war, we must be humane in our attitude toward the soldiers who fought in it.

We think the problems to be discussed will be of interest to not only those who served in Afghanistan themselves. And so other readers, too, will answer the first few questions. First and foremost, tell us this: Did you serve in Afghanistan?

—001
—yes
—002
—no, but this applies to my comrades, my family
—003
—no, I "fulfilled my internationalist duty in other countries"
—004
—no, but these problems can only concern a person
In your opinion, is sufficient concern shown for those who returned from Afghanistan by:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sufficient</th>
<th>insufficient</th>
<th>scandalously little</th>
<th>hard to say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Society as a whole:</td>
<td>005</td>
<td>006</td>
<td>007</td>
<td>008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government:</td>
<td>009</td>
<td>010</td>
<td>011</td>
<td>012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Party:</td>
<td>013</td>
<td>014</td>
<td>015</td>
<td>016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet agencies:</td>
<td>017</td>
<td>018</td>
<td>019</td>
<td>020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Komso-</td>
<td>021</td>
<td>022</td>
<td>023</td>
<td>024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mol:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;people around you in</td>
<td>025</td>
<td>026</td>
<td>027</td>
<td>028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>general&quot;:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the older generation:</td>
<td>029</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>031</td>
<td>032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>young people:</td>
<td>033</td>
<td>034</td>
<td>035</td>
<td>036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the press:</td>
<td>037</td>
<td>038</td>
<td>039</td>
<td>040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you personally:</td>
<td>041</td>
<td>042</td>
<td>043</td>
<td>044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How do you view the involvement of our soldiers in events in Afghanistan?

—045
—046
—047
—048
—049
—050
—051
—052
—053
—054
—055
—056
—057
—058
—059
—060
—061
—062
—063
—064
—065
—066
—070
—071
—072

Can you agree with the following assessments that have appeared in the press?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan veterans are some</td>
<td>058</td>
<td>059</td>
<td>060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the few people the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country can count on in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>times of difficulty:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan veterans are a</td>
<td>061</td>
<td>062</td>
<td>063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>force on which opponents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of restructuring will rely:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan veterans are a</td>
<td>064</td>
<td>065</td>
<td>066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lost generation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan was the best</td>
<td>070</td>
<td>071</td>
<td>072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>true-life school:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUESTIONS FOR THOSE WHO SERVED IN AFGHANISTAN THEMSELVES:

What problems are the most urgent for you?

—073
—074
—075
—076
—077
—078
—079
—080
—......(other)

What concerns or alarms you about your situation most of all? ........

What period was the most difficult for you following your return from Afghanistan?

—081
—082
—083
—084
—085
—086
—087
—088
—089
—090

seventh, eighth, ninth
Do you have your own family?

—088
—yes
—089
—no

Are you satisfied with your family situation?

—090
—yes
—091
—no
—092
—don’t know

Do you often think about events connected with your service in Afghanistan?

—093
—often (very often)
—094
—rarely
—095
—I’ve forced myself to forget everything

What do you see as a means of relief from troubling thoughts?

—096
—lose myself in work
—097
—try to be with other people
—098
—solitude
—099
—alcohol
—100
—narcotics
—101
—...........(other)

How would you assess your relationships:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>satisfactory</th>
<th>hard to say</th>
<th>unsatisfactory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>with friends</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in the family</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with the opposite sex</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at work</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with other veterans</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Did you go to Afghanistan in:

—119
—1979
—120
—1980
—121
—1981
—122
—1982

In what capacity were you in Afghanistan?

—130
—officer, noncommissioned officer
—131
—soldier, sergeant
—132
—medical worker
—133
—...........(other)

Do you have wounds or contusions?

—134
—yes
—135
—no

Did you take part in combat operations?

—136
—yes
—137-no

Are you a member of any association of Afghanistan veterans?

—138
—yes
—139
—no

This association...

—140
—was set up with the participation of the Communist Youth League
—141
—of a military commissariat or the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy
—142
—on an exclusively independent basis
—143
—...........(other)

This association has...

—144
AFGHANISTAN

Your sex?
—170
—female
—171
—male

Is Russian your native language?
—172
—yes
—173
—no

Would you say that you are:
—174
—an ordinary, “rank and file” Communist Youth League member
—175
—the type of person known as an “aktiv” member
—176
—“I’m fed up to here”
—177
—a “radical”
—178
—a “conservative”
—179
—an “optimist”
—180
—a “pessimist”

What republic do you live in?
—181
—Azerbaijan SSR
—182
—Armenian SSR
—183
—Belorussian SSR
—184
—Georgian SSR
—185
—Kazakh SSR
—186
—Kirghiz SSR
—187
—Latvian SSR
—188
—Lithuanian SSR
—189
—Moldavian SSR
—190
—Russian SFSR
—191
—Uzbek SSR
—192
—Ukrainian SSR
—193
—Tajik SSR
—194

—less than 10 members
—145
—10 to 50 members
—146
—50 to 100 members
—147
—more than 100 members

In what area, in your opinion, should those who served in Afghanistan apply themselves first and foremost?
—148
—participation in political struggle
—149
—Communist Youth League life
—150
—educating the rising generation
—151
—helping each other
—152
—combating lawbreaking
—153
—establishing law and order generally
—154
—.........(other)

A few questions for all who have responded to the survey:

Your age?
—155
—16 and under
—156
—17 to 18
—157
—19 to 25
—158
—26 to 30
—159
—31 to 50
—160
—over 50

Occupation:
—161
—worker
—162
—farm laborer
—163
—student
—164
—school pupil
—165
—office employee
—166
—paid [shtatny] Communist Youth League worker
—167
—soldier
—168
—cooperative employee
—169
—other answer
—Turkmen SSR
—195
—Estonian SSR

If you care to, write your return address: .......... 

P.S. When this article was already prepared, the editors were contacted by representatives of the Soviet Charity and Health Foundation's All-Union Youth Center. They reported that the center is prepared to provide assistance in processing the survey and in solving all the problems indicated in it. In particular, they asked all internationalist soldiers who are having difficulties with artificial limbs to write about this in greater detail and to indicate the nature of their injuries.
SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.


The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.