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Tightening Standards for Military Party Membership

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[Article, published under the heading “Urgent Problems of Party Construction” by Col Gen A. Shirinkin: “The Authority of the Communist Is the Authority of the Party”]

[Text] [Introduction—Biographic Sketch of Author] Ivan Akeksyey Ivanovich Shirinkin was a participant of the Great Patriotic War. He completed the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin. He has gone through all levels from company political worker to military council member and chief of the political directorate of a military district. Since 1987 he has been the secretary-in-charge of the party commission under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. [End of Introduction]

The evermore widely developing work of restoring the authority and role of the Communist Party as the political vanguard of society entails the reestablishing of the Leninist understanding of membership in it. For the truth that the effectiveness and authority of the party depends completely upon its membership does not require proof. As was pointed out at the conference held in June in the CPSU Central Committee, the role of our party in society, its influence, the authority and ability to hold the initiative in its hands are most directly determined by the activity, initiative and authority of all the almost 20 million communists. And when we present this fact publically the lack of confidence in the CPSU and the decline in its authority in the eyes of a portion of the Soviet people, then we are recognizing that to a large degree this is a consequence of a definite “weediness” of its ranks with politically immature elements, all sorts of renegades, spineless opportunists and careerists. And hence the struggle which has begun in the course of perestroika for a self-purification and strengthening of the party ranks, for the pure and honest appearance of a communist is also a struggle for establishing the authority of the party. Naturally, along with the party organizations and party bodies, the party commissions functioning under the latter must also make a major contribution to this.

Membership in the CPSU has been and remains one of the fundamental questions of party construction. Its fundamental conditions and principles were formulated and theoretically established by V.I. Lenin. Vladimir Illich was against the excessive growth of the party ranks and for a reasonable control over admission to the party. Widely known is his view that “it is better that 10 workers did not call themselves party members...so that one chattering had the right and opportunity to be a party member.” Lenin’s views and provisions concerning party membership have been transformed into specific requirements of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

The political bodies, their party commissions and the party organizations of the Army and Navy, in carrying out these demands, have emphasized an improvement in the recruitment of new party members drawing on the most active participants in perestroika. The principle being more strictly observed of admitting to the CPSU only the person who has shown in deed that he is joining it, in using Lenin’s words, not for the sake of obtaining some advantages but for the sake of unstinting work for the benefit of our society. It is perfectly clear that we must not allow drift in the admission policy to the CPSU any more than forcing this.

It is a question of a substantial qualitative improvement in the fresh forces coming into the party and a thoughtful control of admission to the party which meets the given moment. Some at present are against this control in incorrectly interpreting the provisions in the party documents. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the Tashkent party oblast organization and the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, as we recall, condemned the practice of a rigid, mechanical control of selection for the party, the “test assignments and the schedules which were prescribed for the party bodies and primary organizations for how many were to be admitted and whom. But at the same time, they condemned a lessening of exactingness and unprincipledness which opened the doors to the CPSU for any sort of bystanders, careerists and at the same time the task was set of improving in every possible way the recruitment practices for the party and being concerned primarily with the qualitative strengthening of its ranks.

In carrying out this task, a majority of the party organizations and commissions began to study more profoundly those who had voiced a desire to be admitted to the CPSU and from these selected the men who possessed high political, professional and moral qualities. In working in the units and subunits, they do not merely disclose but also shape the base for the growth of the party ranks, considering the real demand for strengthening the party influence among the leading categories of servicemen and in the crucial areas of the struggle to raise the quality parameters of combat readiness.

Recently one can clearly note an increased exactingness on those submitting recommendations, including on the Komsomol committees, for objectivity of the recommendations for those being admitted to the party as well as work with them during the candidate stage. Thus, in the primary party organizations of the Kiev Military District, last year they heard over 400 communists who submitted recommendations for admission to the party on how they were working with those whom they had put up. In the Ryazan Higher Motor Vehicle Engineer School the CPSU members, Comrades I. Sachin and S. Andryukhin, were held responsible under party rules for a formal attitude toward submitting recommendations.
Almost everywhere the process of broadening democracy and glasnost in admission to the CPSU is picking up strength. Admission, as a rule, is now being carried out in open party meetings. It is becoming a system to have the preliminary discussion in the military or labor collective of the political, professional and moral qualities of the person joining and the opinion of fellow servicemen is then considered in reviewing the application at the party meetings in the group, the shop and primary organizations. The members of the party commissions in their majority participate in selecting worthy servicemen in all these stages for recruitment into the CPSU.

However, it would be wrong to be complacent with the first achieved advances and not see the real mistakes and omissions behind the positive facts. In the interests of the matter, it would be beneficial systematically and profoundly to analyze the work of the party organizations and commissions in the area of admission to the CPSU and periodically discuss this at the party meetings, the sessions of the elective bodies as well as at meetings and seminars of the party aktiv.

Then, undoubtedly, the pluses and minuses of this work will be clearer in the party elements of the military district, troop group, fleet, formation and unit. For example, an analysis made by our party commission of the statistical reports has shown that there has been a rise in the number of rejecting of candidate members when moving to full party member. Along with the CPSU candidate members expelled last years, 6.8 percent of the candidate members did not become full party members, while in 1986, the figure was 4.7 percent. During the first 6 months of the current year, the figure was already 8.4 percent. This increase in the number of rejections can scarcely be explained solely by increased exactingness on those being admitted. Here, undoubtedly, mistakes are being discovered in admitting candidate members as well as poor work in indoctrinating the young communists.

Let me give the following eloquent fact as confirmation of this. The party organization of a helicopter squadron in March 1988 accepted as a CPSU candidate member, reenlisted Jr Sgt A. Chistyak who was studying by correspondence in an institute but had a bad attitude toward service. He did not master the duties of an aviation mechanic. He did not pay his membership dues. The party organization expelled Comrade Chistyak from the party candidate members, having recognized their error. Unfortunately, such examples are not isolated.

One cannot help but be concerned by the circumstance that in certain districts, troop groups and fleets, less attention is being paid by many party bodies, party commissions under them and elective party bodies to the questions of recruitment and admission to the CPSU. As a consequence, there has been a steady trend for a decline in admission to the party in the Army and Navy party organizations: by 18 percent in 1986, by 19 percent in 1987 and by 21 percent in 1988. Over the 6 months of this year, 23.3 percent fewer were admitted than over the same period of the previous year. Here the reduced admission for candidate members has occurred in all serviceman categories. This decline has been the greatest in the following districts: the Volga by 34.6 percent, the Baltic by 33.3 percent, the Transcaucasia by 28.8 percent, the Transbaykal by 36.7 percent and in the Pacific Fleet by 41 percent. Of course, here a role has been played not only by the increased exactingness for those being admitted, as a number of the designated districts has endeavored to depict things, but also by the fact that many party organizations and commissions in their work do not consider the new ideological situation and the altered attitude of people to party membership.

Certainly, no one would deny that the publicizing of the negative phenomena which occurred in the CPSU during the cult of personality and stagnation did not leave a trace and has not been eliminated in the minds of people. And the fact that the tasks of perestroika are now being carried out not so rapidly as was initially assumed is perceived by people in very different manners. Not everyone is clearly aware that our party, having raised the banner of revolutionary renewal of society and having given a mercilessly just analysis of the real state of affairs, has not only given rise to great hopes and put the powerful forces of the people to work, but has also assumed enormous responsibility for the fate of perestroika. This misconception has basically determined the designated shortage of trust for the party and the relative decline in the number of persons wishing to join its ranks. We must not fear such a decline. Let the CPSU now receive precisely those who firmly believe in its ideals and goals and who heart and soul have taken up perestroika as their vital concern. And it is important not to repel these persons by our lack of attention, by a formal bureaucratic attitude toward a person's desire to link his destiny with the party. It is equally important to instill in each communist a feeling of his own involvement in the authority of the CPSU and responsibility for its strengthening.

Careful recruitment and a more demanding approach to admission to the party, greater concern for the ideological tempering of the young communists, the development of their social activity and education in practical work and party assignments—these are the elements of a biune task. On the one hand, a thoughtful carrying out of it will contribute to the ideological and organizational strengthening of the party organizations, to their increased role and authority in perestroika and, on the other, to a strengthening of party authority.

Incidentally, all communists without exception need constant ideological and political tempering, a deeper understanding of party duty and the obligatory observance of the standards of party morality and ethics. We have gained convincing lessons of what happens when these axioms are forgotten. We might recall what a sharp jump occurred in the first perestroika years in increasing the number of communists held to party responsibility and expelled from the CPSU ranks. This was a forced but vitally necessary measure.
Last year the wave of punishments began to decline with the party organizations and commissions of the Army and Navy holding liable under party procedures some 21 percent fewer CPSU members and candidate members than in the previous year of 1987. It would be a good thing if this process developed further and was turned into a steady trend. For now, one can point out that the increased exactingness and the strengthening of educational work with the communists combined with democratic life and the development of grassroot in the work of the party organizations, the political bodies and party commissions as a whole have brought about positive results in the strengthening of party discipline.

Practice shows that in raising the responsibility of the communists for the conscientious execution of their party and official duties, a substantial role is played by principledness and unswerving observance of Paragraph 9 of the CPSU Bylaws concerning the inevitability of party action against any party member who is guilty of nonfulfillment of prescribed duties and other misdeeds. But party action in no way should be identified with an obligatory punishment. Often it is enough to apply to a communist a preventive measure of party education such as a conversation, criticism, warning or reprimand.

At present, it has been recommended by the Main Political Directorate that cases involving misdeeds of all communists without exception, whatever posts they might hold, be examined in the primary party organizations where the party members are registered. In working to see that democracy and objectivity are ensured everywhere in examining such cases, the members of many party commissions participate in conducting party investigations and examining infractions at party meetings.

Unfortunately, the instilling of order in our party house is not going on as rapidly as we would like and as yet has not been successful everywhere. Regardless of the reduced number of communists held liable under party procedures last year, the number of them still remains high. Here around two-thirds were punished under party procedures for a personal lack of discipline, for violating moral standards and for various service abuses including almost one out of every two for drunkenness.

Particularly intolerable are the instances when certain communists commit boorishness, impoliteness towards subordinates, the distorting of disciplinary practices and even the physical assaulting of fellow servicemen. In particular, the former commander of one of the regiments in the Transcaucasus Military District, Lt Col P. Stoletov, was expelled from the CPSU for boorishness and coarseness. Col V. Gubarenko from the Belorussian Military District was given a strict reprimand for employing an improper type of group punishment for the personnel. The chief of the political section of a road construction unit, Col A. Bursanov, for coarseness and the physical abuse of a subordinate was given a strict reprimand with the entry of this into the record card and discharged into the reserves. There can be no concessions to anyone when it is a question of the undermined authority and honor of a communist and the party commissions proceed from this requirement in placing such strict demands on the party members.

How can one explain that individual communists are not concerned with their authority and do not value the title of CPSU member? I feel that one of the main reasons for this negative factor is the underdevelopment of criticism and self-criticism, reciprocal exactingness, connivance, liberalism and condescension which reign in certain party organizations. Without burdening themselves with daily, painstaking, preventive educational work, some party committees and bureos and party commissions by employing extreme measures of punishment endeavor to compensate for the delay of their action and consider these a panacea for strengthening party discipline.

One other factor can be seen in the fact that communists who have party reprimands are not always in the field of vision of the party organizations and commissions. In some places constant individual educational work is not conducted with them and at times the reprimands are hurriedly lifted without justification.

The CPSU Bylaws demand that no later than after a year of handing down a reprimand the communist should be heard on how he has rectified the committed shortcomings. But this does not mean that the reprimand should be lifted without fail. If there are claims against the communist, then the party organization has the right to delay with this. We disagree particularly with the attempts to accelerate the lifting of a reprimand from a communist due to the necessity of submitting him for his next military rank, transfer in service, dispatch on a foreign mission, dismissal into the reserves from active military service and so forth.

Of course, the times for lifting a party reprimand are not set by any documents. In each specific instance this question is resolved by a party organization on a strictly individual basis, considering all the circumstances of the case. But the demand of the CPSU Bylaws of hearing a punished communist no later than within a year in the practice of party work has developed as the optimum time giving a communist the opportunity to mend his ways after a party reprimand has been given to him.

Analysis of party disciplinary practices in the primary party organizations shows that in an absolute majority of the instances the holding of the communists liable, including expulsion from the CPSU, is valid. But even individual errors and hurried expulsions are inadmissible as a person stands behind each such decision. For taking a final decision the party commission must possess the necessary information on all the circumstances of the case, and consider here the depth of understanding by the communist of his responsibility for the infraction. In no instance must it be considered that the stricter the punishment the more effective it is. In a word, in this important undertaking, there must be no room for
invalid accusations. The recommendation of V.I. Lenin to the control workers applies also to all members of the party commissions that not a single word must be taken on faith and not a word must be said against one's conscience.

But, unfortunately, as yet not everyone follows this as can be seen from the appeals from communists of excessive strictness and invalidity of punishments. Out of the total number of expulsions from the CPSU, approximately 10 percent appeal for a decision of the party commissions under the primary party bodies. Around 100 persons expelled by the Army and Navy party commissions appealed to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. In reviewing the appeals, 23 persons were returned to the party. Here the decisions to return to the party were taken in their majority in those instances when in additional checks a number of accusations was lifted from the person expelled due to their unsoundness as well as due to positive changes in the behavior of the person and the petitions on this grounds of the party organizations and political bodies to return him to the party.

In particular, our party commission satisfied the request of Sr Lt A. Dubchinskii on being readmitted to the CPSU as he had been expelled from it for negligence toward service, coarseness to superiors and subordinates. Understandably, this was preceded by a very careful study of the case. After expulsion the officer drew serious conclusions, at his new post he was conscientious in carrying out his duties, he showed his best at Chernobyl and in carrying out his international duty in Afghanistan, and was awarded two orders of the Red Star and the Medal "For Valor." The party commission, in view of the decision to readmit Comrade Dubchinsky to the party considered not only the fact that he was profoundly aware of the gravity of the misdeed committed by him and had subsequently fundamentally changed, but also the discovered, previously unknown circumstances which mitigated his guilt.

The party activists and former communists frequently turned to us with the questions of after how much time is it possible to readmit or return a person to the party. No time has been set for this. A period of 2 months from the day of expulsion by the party commission is given only for the right of submitting an appeal. At this time, the expelled person can petition for his return. In the event of the refusal to return by the next superior party commission, within the same time the appealing person can turn to the next level above, right up to the Party Control Committee Under the CPSU Central Committee.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the Tashkent Oblast Party Organization stipulates that persons expelled from the party for bribery, theft and padding of figures are not to be restored or readmitted to the party. In speaking about the readmission to the party of persons who were previously members but for various reasons had dropped out or were expelled, it must be said that in our view hurry must not be permitted on this question. I propose that we must agree that although the Bylaws do not permit the readmission to the CPSU, instances of this must be isolated and exceptional.

Recently, both in the party as a whole and among the Army and Navy party members, there has begun to spread a phenomenon which while not new was in any event rather rare in previous years. I have in mind the quitting of the party upon the initiative of the communists themselves, the turning in of their party cards. Naturally, the question arises as to what causes and what incentives lay at the basis of such action?

Clearly in individual instances, one can feel the insufficiently high authority and activeness of the communists in the primary party organizations, the negative qualities which exist among a number of the leadership-level party members such as coarseness, inattentiveness to the needs of subordinates and the abuse of official positions. All of this causes in some a protest expressed in the turning in of party cards. But here excessive emotional-ness and hurry often get the upper hand.

In January of last year, the former electrician in the Khabarovsk Military Sanatorium, L. Kuteykin, signed a request for a so-called "organizational withdrawal from the party." The main reason was a protest, in his words, "against the persecution campaign against him for criticism and carried out by the administration at his previous job in the Khabarovsk Laboratory of the NPO [Scientific Production Association]." Our explanations and persuasion as to the speed of the decision taken did not stop him. His request had to be granted.

Serious flaws in the ideological tempering of the communists and a lack of attention to them lead to a situation where at times, encountering difficulties or having fallen into some conflict situation, they do not see the ways to resolve it except for turning in their party card.

In a number of instances the reasons for the voluntary withdrawal from the party are to be found in moral dishonesty and careerist incentives and this is a culture medium for ideological and political instability of a person. A party organization in one of the missile units accepted as a candidate and then as a member of the CPSU Capt O. Sokolov who had completed a civilian VUZ and, as he stated, out of material considerations voiced a desire to serve in the ranks of the army. Having become a party member, he did not participate in the work of the party organization and was not present at party meetings. The party organization paid little attention to him. Becoming disappointed with service, in June 1988 he submitted a request to withdraw from the CPSU.

Over the 7 months of the current year, the CPSU Central Committee has received 57 party cards sent in by army communists, including 30 officers. Basically, the party cards have been turned in by former communists of the
Navy, Air Defense, Air Forces and most from the Baltic and Transbaykal Military Districts.

The periodic press is now debating the questions of the freedom to withdraw from the party and the attitude toward those who decide on such a step. At the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the writer V. Rasputin viewed the independent withdrawal from the CPSU in the current complex and very difficult times for us as dishonorableness. But other viewpoints were also voiced. Since the party is a voluntary organization, it is not correct to resort to persecution, to political and administrative sanctions or the voluntary breaking off of party membership and a person should not be accused of unliability for this. Possibly, the various viewpoints are not devoid of reason. Possibly it makes sense to allow the party organizations and commissions to have the right to decide whether a communist is to be expelled from the party or he should be granted an opportunity to freely retire from it if he has in no way compromised himself. The party only benefits from such self-purification. But in any event, such an act should be given an appropriate political assessment. For a CPSU member should not be a volunteer in the party organizational discipline.

One thing is perfectly clear: the party does not merely need members but rather it needs real political fighters, active supporters of perestroika and who by their socio-political work, their moral impeccability strengthen its authority.

Considering this it would be advisable for the party commissions to focus their efforts not only on creating an atmosphere of exactingness and principledness in the party organizations but also real concern and attention for the communists. There is also an obvious need for the party organizations and committees to strengthen explanatory work among the nonparty persons. Of course, supervision over the fulfillment of the CPSU Bylaws, by the communists, exactness and educational work by the party commissions need to acquire a new quality. Many party commissions are endeavoring to achieve this in following the path of raising the effectiveness of party control as an important instrument for an educational effect on the communist.

This is being done, for instance, by the party commissions under the political bodies of the Strategic Rocket Troops. Last year, they conducted an inspection on how the communist leaders were aware of an embodied in practice the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference on combating bureaucracy, for social justice and what example they set in observing these demands.

However, it must be recognized that the mechanism of preventive, precautionary work in a number of the party commissions has not yet been organized. The inspections often are of a general nature and do not reach specific individuals responsible for the shortcomings and omissions in the combat training of the units and formations, the state of military discipline and the moral situation in the collectives. Such shortcomings in the previous and current year were characteristic of the activities of certain party commissions under the political bodies of the Air Defense Troops, the Northern Group of Forces, the Transbaykal Military District and the road construction units.

In the opinion of the communists of the units and formations, many party commission secretaries lack initiative, there is a certain timidity and they do not fully utilize the opportunities for strengthening modern preventive party control. Here, of course, we must not overlook the fact that two-thirds of them is carrying out difficult and responsible duties as a second job. As yet not all the members of the party commissions have realized that a party inspection is not an audit, although absolute accuracy of the facts is required and that the object of the inspection for them is not the collective, not the activities of the party organization as a whole but rather the observance of the specific requirements of the CPSU Bylaws by one or another party member in the area assigned to him.

If preventive control and demands on the communists had not been so organized, then it would not have been necessary to expel from the party Lt Col G. Tyutynnikov who embezzled the equipment of the unit and abused his official position. Nor would it have been necessary to expel from the party Maj Gen A. Chmykalov for similar infractions and amoral conduct; hold for strict party liability Maj Gen A. Svechnikov for unscrupulousness in everyday life or the workers of the political bodies Col D. Bukin for violating the standards of party morality or Lt Col I. Kuritsyn for abusing official positions.

It is the primary obligation of a party committee to hold under supervision everything that can damage the honor and dignity of a communist. The attitude of a CPSU member or candidate member to labor, the example he sets in observing military discipline, the educating of subordinates by him, his involvement in instilling firm prescribed order and ensuring high combat readiness—all of this is a sphere of party control. There must be particular intolerance for any manifestations of the embellishing of things, the concealing of infractions and crimes by the communists, their drunkenness and, no matter how strange this might seem under army conditions, their bribe-taking.

We feel that the party commissions must not merely wait for alerts and information from the procurator's office concerning infractions committed by communists but more actively and more frequently must check the observance of the CPSU Bylaws where state order and party discipline must be observed with particular vigilance. The main reserve for improving the activities of the party commissions is seen in strengthening the demands placed on each communist for the assigned job, establishing in the party organizations a situation of mutual exactingness and implacability for shortcomings as at present one of the most important areas of restructuring.
the style, forms and methods of party work is closely linked to this. On this matter an indispensable guide for us is the ideas of the 27th CPSU Congress that in the party there are not and should not be any organizations outside of control, closed off to criticism, and there are not and should not be any leaders protected from party responsibility.


Two Opinions on Domestic Functions of Armed Forces

General Stresses External Functions

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[Text] [Introduction] “Even 5-10 years ago we firmly believed that the domestic function of an army in a state of all the people had been eliminated. However, recently in line with the events in a number of the Union republics, both in verbal statements and in the press, often the notion has been voiced that our army as before is to be used for carrying out the domestic tasks of the state. Disputes have constantly broken out over this problem. Frequently we, the political workers, feel ourselves in a difficult situation, without knowing how to explain what is going on. It would be interesting to know the viewpoint of those who are directly involved with the questions of the activities of the army as a state organism.

Lt Col S. Voytenko, Unit Party Committee Secretary”

The editors have received a number of letters where the authors have voiced the same requests. In meeting our readers' requests, we have turned to military leaders and military scientists with a request to voice their opinion on the question. We are publishing the first materials which have come in reply to our proposal. [End of Introduction]

The profound changes in all spheres of life of Soviet society have brought about in the Soviet people a need to more profoundly analyze the numerous, seemingly already resolved questions relating to the genesis and development of socialism in our country. There is heightened interest in our defense development and in particular over the question of the purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Until recently this problem was considered completely resolved. The USSR Constitution and the CPSU Program clearly and uniformly state that the Armed Forces are designed to defend the interests of our state against outside aggression. From the viewpoint of internal conditions, our society does not need an army. Why then has this question recently come up again and again?

In our view, there are two reasons. One of them is that real life is much more complicated and diverse than the theory and doctrinal concepts. The other is in the incorrect interpretation of the very notion of the “function of the Armed Forces” on the part of certain authors. Let us immediately stipulate that “function” means a duty, purpose or role. Precisely such an interpretation of this concept makes it possible to understand the purpose and social role of the army as an element of the political superstructure, an instrument of the state and a tool of its policy.

Let us turn to F. Engels. Here is his definition: the army is “an organized association of armed people kept by the state for the purposes of offensive or defensive war.” Hence, the function of an army is to wage war. But wars can be against an external enemy but they can also be against an internal one. Correspondingly, the army can have internal and external functions.

In a society where antagonistic class contradictions exist, the army, as an instrument in the policy of the exploiting class, is designed not only to wage wars against external enemies but also acts, as was pointed out by V.I. Lenin “...as a weapon used in the hands of the ruling classes to suppress any sort (economic and political) of movements of the proletariat...” This is also the internal function of the army.

As for the sociopolitical system where the internal antagonistic contradictions are absent or are withering away in keeping with the system's development, in it, respectively, the very need for the domestic function of the army also is eliminated.

For the Soviet Armed Forces, the internal function was a necessary attribute during the period when they had to wage an armed struggle not only against the intervention after the Great October Socialist Revolution, but also against organized armed resistance from the internal counterrevolution.

It is important to point out that an essential feature in the presence of an internal function for our Armed Forces was the class principle of their manning. And as soon as the necessity for the internal function of our army disappeared, the class restrictions in military service were also lifted. This occurred on 1 September 1939, with the adopting of the Law Governing Universal Military Service at the Extraordinary 4th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

But if it is true that the Soviet Armed Forces do not have an internal function, why then are they used for resolving a number of the internal problems of the state, including
national economic tasks, carrying out rescue work, eliminating the consequences of natural disasters and other emergencies, building vast projects and in a number of instances have also been employed to carry out the tasks of maintaining social order?

The carrying out of these tasks is not a direct purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces and consequently does not act as their internal function. Here the issue is something quite different. Being the flesh and blood of its people, our army cannot remain and does not remain on the sidelines of their concerns, away from their problems and misfortunes. At the same time, in a number of instances the army has been the only organized means available to national leadership and capable of immediately going into action in the most complex and dangerous situation. As an inseparable part of its people, our army cannot oppose and does not oppose its people. It acts not to the detriment but only in the interests of the people and for their defense.

In carrying out all of these certainly important but not inherent tasks, the men of the Armed Forces—the soldiers and sergeants, warrant officers "praporshchik", officers and generals—in their predominant majority show inherent aware military discipline and organization, a high sense of responsibility and loyalty to their duty, mastery and initiative, courage and tenacity and a readiness for a reasonable risk and self-sacrifice. This was the case on the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline], at Chernobyl, in Armenia, Tajikistan and in the Ufa area, this has been the case in providing aid in harvesting and now in building roads in the Nonchernozem Zone. But still it must be said that the Armed Forces are not designed to carry out such tasks. If one agrees that these tasks are the internal function of the Armed Forces then one must revise many principles in their organizational development, arming and training.

Now directly about the internal function of the Soviet Armed Forces. Sufficient arguments have been given to reach the conclusion that our army has only one function, an external one, and its only direct purpose is to prepare to repel external aggression. But here clearly we must introduce certain clarity on a number of concerns.

In the first place, on the reduced or increased importance of the internal function of the Soviet Armed Forces. Actually, in recent years, the Soviet state has succeeded by political means to put off a direct threat of war. But it has still not disappeared completely. Moreover, at present there is still a danger of a surprise initiation of a war by the aggressor by launching powerful nuclear and conventional weapons strikes and by the invading of large groups of constantly alert troops. For this reason at present one must speak about the increased role of the quality parameters in the development, arming and training of our Armed Forces on the increased importance of their high combat and mobilizational readiness for the dependable security of our motherland.

Secondly, about the relationship of the policy of the Soviet state, its military doctrine and the internal function of the Armed Forces. From the political and socio-class viewpoint, aggressive aims are alien to a socialist state. Its ideal is a lasting and just peace. This was stated in the very first decree of Soviet power, the Peace Decree. We are loyal to this ideal even now as has been reflected in the content of Soviet military doctrine.

In turn, the strictly defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine determines the method by which the USSR Armed Forces carry out their external function of repelling possible aggression by conducting defensive actions as well as the related structural and organizational changes. Hence, the adjustment in the focus of the operational, combat, mobilizational and political training for the troops.

Thirdly, the external function of the Soviet Armed Forces for the first time has gained a new focus of preventing war as a whole. The carrying out of this vitally important task for mankind—the preservation of peace—at present determines the social significance of the Soviet Armed Forces and military service. This also determines the complete congruity of interests between army and people as well as the necessity of national concern and a respectful attitude toward the Soviet military who under peacetime conditions stand difficult, often dangerous but also necessary and honorable service for the sake of the interests of their people.

Finally, and fourthly, the reality of the present-day international situation is that two military-political groupings oppose one another in the world—the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance. For this reason, the Soviet Armed Forces carry out their external function in close interaction with the fraternal armies of the socialist countries which are members of the Warsaw Pact. This above all shows the international nature of the external function of our army.

In conclusion I would like to reemphasize that the Soviet Armed Forces have been established to defend socialism and peace. Their direct purpose is to securely protect the interests of their people. And army service, while the necessity for this remains, continues to be an honorable obligation and sacred duty for each Soviet person.
together with the other fraternal armies ensures the security of all world socialism. The united military might of the socialist states served as a guarantee for peace between peoples, for the presence of this might restrains the aggressive political circles in imperialism from unleashing a military adventure as they can receive a devastating retaliatory strike.

Until recently, we called one of the areas of the external function of our army the military opposition to the dissemination of imperialist counterrevolution into nations the peoples of which had risen up in a revolutionary-liberation struggle. Actually, Soviet volunteer servicemen participated in this (Spain, China and North Korea) and also regular troops (Afghanistan) while weapons and military equipment were provided to many peoples. Such a measure by a socialist state was historically justified. And this was initiated exclusively upon the request of the legitimate governments in these countries or the recognized leaders of the liberation movements which were actually threatened by the counterrevolution being exported by imperialism.

At present, when any confrontation involving the employment of armed forces or an individual regional conflict can grow into a global conflict, the CPSU and the Soviet government are focusing all their foreign political activities on preventing the use of military force on the international scene and at settling all questions in the national liberation struggle exclusively by political means, by agreements, compromises and so forth. This line over the long run will clearly be continued as our military might cannot be employed as a means for thwarting imperialist intervention into the affairs of other countries. Other means will be sought out.

These are the changes in the content of our army's external function as brought about by foreign political circumstances. Now about the internal function. At present, here the situation is significantly more complex and, I would say, more delicate. This function was carried out in the process of socialist construction within the USSR as long as the social base remained for organized armed resistance to the new order (the Kronstadt Revolt, counterrevolutionary actions in Moscow, Yaroslavl and other cities, the Basmack in Central Asia, nationalistic actions in the Western regions of the Ukraine and in the Baltic immediately after the end of the Great Patriotic War and so forth).

With the elimination of the vestiges of the organized antisocialist, anti-Soviet forces as the object against which the internal function of our army was directed, this function itself fell away. The CPSU Program adopted at the 22d Party Congress stated that from the viewpoint of internal conditions, our society does not require an army. This notion was also incorporated in the new wording of the Party Program. Theoretically this does not cause any doubt. In actuality, at present our nation does not have class forces which would fight against the socialist system and seek its elimination. And the internal function of an army is its activities precisely against the class enemies acting to overthrow the existing social system.

Everything seemed fine, the situation in the nation as a whole kept within the concept of the functions of the socialist army. This kept this way... until recently. And suddenly we were confronted with facts which forced us to reflect on the theoretical provisions concerning the role of the army within our society. It is a question of the well-known organized nationalistic actions in a number of the nation's regions and the employment of army subunits to thwart these actions and maintain public order. What is this, the carrying out of the internal function by our army or something else?

We would like to think very much that this is "something else." First of all, it must be said that the employment of the army against a mass of people (regardless of the fact that many participate in the demonstrations being deceived and misled by extremist elements on the true aims of the given action) is an extremely undesirable measure. It does colossal harm to the prestige of the army, its unity with the people and which ultimately is the basis of the army's combat capability. It is no accident that all the military, in profoundly understanding this, have always been against using the troop units for combating any mass actions.

In analyzing the events in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989, the Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, A.E. Shevardnadze, said at the Plenum of the Georgian CP Central Committee: "I also want to mention the army and the attitude toward it. The army came out on the streets of Tbilisi not out of its own will. It came out and took up the places indicated for it and obeyed the decisions which were taken by the republic leadership. These were political decisions. Here, in this auditorium, before the plenum participants, I cannot help but say that, as comrades told me, the Commander of the Transcaucasia Military District, Col Gen I.N. Rodionov, was against this decision. He said that this function is not inherent to the army and that he, his colleagues and his subordinates are charged with carrying out completely different tasks."

The words of the commander are profoundly correct. The thwarting of antisocial actions is the function not of the army but rather the interior troops and the police. They exist for this. They do not have an external function as does the army and they carry out only an internal function. If in individual emergency conditions these bodies cannot handle their tasks, then possible they must be strengthened and numerically reinforced but an effort must be made not to resort to army help.

All the same, since facts of involving army units to "disperse" nationalistic demonstrations have occurred recently, the question naturally is: How should one qualify these activities by the army? I would answer this question thus. In a socialist society there are no objective (class) conditions for the army to carry out an internal
function. But the deformation permitted in our nation of the most important principles of socialism has led to the build-up of problems in the system of social relations and these problems have caused legitimate dissatisfaction among the workers. The people express this dissatisfaction at times violently and in certain instances even in the form of strikes and demonstrations. The anti-Soviet elements employ this in their own selfish, political aims. At times, they succeed by demagogic slogans to win over trusting people and organize mass actions against the local leadership and central authorities.

Recently, the actions have occurred, as a rule, on a nationalistic basis. The actions of the army units called in for these instances to "restore order," can clearly be qualified as an element of the internal function of an army, its recidivism under the existing present-day situation. Moreover, these facts are the consequence, certainly, of not always thought-out actions and decisions by the local political leadership which forces the troops to carry out a function not inherent to them, not endemic to the army of a socialist state.

This, in my view, is the present state as concerns the theory of the internal function of a socialist army and the practice of involving army units in thwarting anti-Soviet mass actions. What about the future? It is hard to say. Time will show. One thing is clear: the use of the army for "restoring domestic order" in a city or rayon is extremely undesirable.


Reevaluating Domestic Functions of Armed Forces

Keep the Military in Traditional Role

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[Text] Times indicate that the question concerning the functions of the army is a problem which presently concerns many. With good reason this was raised at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The army should do its job. This is the principled position of the Soviet leadership as set out by M.S. Gorbachev from the rostrum of this congress. Its practical implementation presupposes clear and firm notions of precisely what is the job of the army. As is known, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies instructed the Supreme Soviet to work out an assessment of the decision taken at one time to commit Soviet troops to Afghanistan and set up a special commission on examining the circumstances related to events in the city of Tbilisi on 9 April 1989. It is a question of ascertaining how necessary and valid were the political decisions to bring in the army in either instance.

On the theoretical level, it is a question of whether or not there are limits for the use of the army and what these are. In this context one can understand the sense and significance of the debate over the question concerning the army's functions. Without claiming a complete elucidation of this broad and difficult problem or an infallibility of the judgments voiced, we would like within the limits of the limited exchange of opinions in a journal to draw attention to several facets of this.

At the Congress of People's Deputies and at the First Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet some speakers spoke with pride about the army's participation in carrying out economic tasks and gave impressive examples of victories on the labor front. Others were indignant wondering if this was a matter for the army? If each year for an extended time many thousands of truck drivers are diverted into harvesting jobs or if the men called upon to defend the motherland are not participating in combat training, can one not help but wonder whether this would be felt in providing motor transport for the needs of the troops or on the combat skills of the units sent for combat duty? Are the activities of reservists called up for "assemblies" to participate in agricultural work service in the Armed Forces and the carrying out of an honorable civilian duty?

I personally favor the second viewpoint. The state and the people need the army to ensure their security. Ultimately there should be other institutions for carrying out the national economic problems of society. The Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Questions of Defense and State Security must work out and carefully estimate how justified and necessary it is to employ soldiers as manpower. Even now, as they say, even the naked eye can see, on the one hand, that the involvement of the Army in carrying out plan quotas for the economic departments (military constructions workers, for example, carry out tasks in the interests of over a score Union ministries) is being turned for them into a permanent source of unskilled and cheap manpower and they will work steadily to see that this source does not dry up. At one time with the aid of additional paramilitary formations, construction was developed on heavy industry projects and later the Baykal-Amur Mainline was laid and now roads are being built in the Northern. Is this not the reason, as was pointed out at the Congress of People's Deputies, that we continue with a shortage of a high-quality induction group to call up into the construction troops a large portion of young persons with physical and moral defects and with criminal records.

Are these persons armed defenders of the motherland? Certainly they do not undergo military training and do not have weapons. The conclusion arises: if the army is freed from "rescuing" the plans of the economic departments then there would be a noticeable reduction in the
size of the Armed Forces and the military budget would decline. This meets the interests of a complete conversion to economic management methods within the nation and the strengthening of confidence in our country as well as a further lessening of tension on the international scene.

On the other hand, due to well-known causes and numerous economic failings, society has shifted a portion of the concerns about the army to the army's own shoulders. Yes, we still cannot abandon the troop ancillary farms as together with the military svakhozes they supply all the personnel with meat, vegetables and other foodstuffs. We are forced to build housing, schools and preschool institutions for serviceman families, to run the utilities system of the military camps and so forth. But all of this even with the richest imagination cannot be viewed as carrying out the intrinsic task of the army, that is, to learn what is needed in a war.

At present, more and more insistently the question is being discussed of the army's professionalism. The arguments are nothing more than naive by those who favor an army which "can be completely professional only simultaneously being a productive force working just as professionally in the peacetime area. But what sort of military specialist is this who is professionally involved, for instance, in raising cabbages or is a house painter? If it is a matter of using the ideas and principles of military organizational development for creating a labor army, then, it seems to me, such ideas are something from the past. We "went through" this during the period of war communism and the dominance of a command-administrative system which endeavored to turn the entire society into a barracks. An army which produces more than the expenditures on its upkeep under present-day conditions is both impossible and ill-advised. And an army as a military organization in which a nonmilitary function prevails in its activities can only be a speculative formation which in its essence is alogical.

In this context, I would like to raise the so-called educational function of the army. The ability and readiness of a person to carry out his civil duty in defending the motherland requires definite knowledge, abilities and skill. A notice of induction is not a free trip to a sanatorium and military service does not mean a release from the difficulties of life. Linked to the highest sense of responsibility for the fate of the motherland, it is becoming evermore intense in intellectual, psychological and physical terms.

The Armed Forces are carrying out extensive and effective work to develop the appropriate personality qualities. These are of individual and social significance and represent a value outside of the army structures. Military service broadens and enriches the vital experience of young people, it, as a rule, has a beneficial effect on developing their moral views and values and honing character. However, all of this is not an end in itself but rather a necessary and obligatory result of the vital activities of the military organism. The attempts at absolutizing this expressed in assertions about the educational function of the army cause serious doubts. For example, take such a widely known aphorism as "the army is a school of indoctrination." There is a real content for this and this was expressed in the thesis of the 27th CPSU Congress to make certain that our army is a school for indoctrinating civil responsibility, courage and patriotism. However, the given thesis is a figurative assessment and not an essential characteristic of the Armed Forces and makes no claim to completeness or thoroughness.

In the first place, this does not name the object at which the educational effect of the army is aimed and namely the personnel, the men in uniform. And although they are replaced every 6 months, a broadened interpretation is not correct. Long ago the notion was formulated which is still truthful today: it is not the army that is the school of society but rather society is the school of the army. Moreover, the army is not an educational and indoctrination institution, it is not a school in the strict sense of the word. The development of a soldier is related primarily to the shaping of definite ideological-political, moral-combat and psychological qualities and precisely those which are needed chiefly for combat.

Secondly, army education (army schooling) is not either an obligatory condition for the development of a citizen or an obligatory prerequisite for the normal functioning of society. Far from all the young men undergo military service and this in no way prevents them from becoming proper citizens of the nation.

The theoretical "justification" for the educational function of the army has given rise to completely inadmissible proposals. Some, for example, complain that the army does not make sufficient use of its enormous potential for preparing young men for future work under civilian conditions. Here they emaciate the intrinsic content of military service which is viewed solely as a prelude for "real life." Others propose "changing the priorities in political education with the servicemen in the interests of demilitarizing mass awareness and indoctrination in a spirit of peace." But such appeals of a pacifist stripe are aimed objectively at turning the army into an organization incapable of employing military force, when circumstances might require this. Still others purely deny the educational effect of the army. Thus, recently there have been more frequent attacks on military patriotic education. But why has patriotism been so closely linked to the word military? Is it because the army has been an unique generator of patriotism? Or, on the contrary, have the military and the army endeavored to monopolize patriotism and completely subordinate it to the interests of their department? In no way. This has been the result of a lack of attention by other social institutions to instilling patriotic feelings in people and a reticence and inability of the conservative forces who brought the nation to stagnation to rely on the patriotism of the masses.
The creating and maintaining of a state's definite military force on a proper level is an objective necessity. As long as a nonviolent world has not become the norm, the rule continues to operate which V.I. Lenin formulated thus: a regular army is inherent to the strengthening power of any class. Consequently, the question is not whether or not there should be an army but rather when and how it can be employed and for the sake of what?

Here theoretically there are two motives: when the enemies of the existing order are the first to raise their weapons or when its supporters intend to impose their order on those who absolutely do not accept this. In both instances it is a question of coercion and the object of this can be the social strata and the political forces inside the nation and outside of it. Correspondingly, one speaks of the internal and external functions of an army. Their specific content is not a given state that is set once and for all. It reflects changes occurring in the economy and social structure of a society, the dynamics of the objectively arising military political situation in the world and in individual regions and the development of military affairs.

The question of the internal function of the army in the literal sense of this word is extremely complex. This is the question of the possibility of the development of a situation where it becomes justified, proper and necessary to employ the army for defending the existing system against its enemies among its own citizens. The obvious contradiction is that our ideology and morality repudiate armed violence against the people. At the same time, the events in Nagorny Karabakh, in the Fergana, Novyy Uzen and certain other regions of the nation show the necessity of special and decisive measures to prevent mass social disorders and ensure the security of the society and the personal rights of the citizens. A one-sided assessment of this contradiction has led individual authors to biased conclusions distorting the role of the army in society and undermining the authority of the Armed Forces, the prestige of military service and the link between the army and the people. A number of articles have stressed the notion of the isolation of the army, its supposed covert nature and corporative spirit which impede the possibility of a dialogue with society.

What can be said on this question? It is impossible not to point out what is. Science should provide an explanation of reality. However, science cannot in the interests of playing up "establish" the necessity of what should not be. The elevating of any political phenomenon to the rank of a political norm is fraught with very serious consequences. This is precisely the case with the pseudoscientific establishing of the internal function of a socialist army.

In reality there is no such function. The Soviet people can be confident that in the army no one will move against our people. Democratization and glasnost, the growing openness and the elimination of the excessive secrecy in the activities of the Armed Forces will strengthen this certainty.

In speaking about "on whose side the army may be," it is essential first to determine who could act against perestroika, from where this would come and what force they would have for this. Moreover, one must not overlook the fact that the army is a weapon of the state. The forms and limits of its use are determined by state power in the form of its legislative and executive bodies. They, precisely they, and only they are empowered to take the decision on the employment of the army. In a state of law, the army should be subordinate to the democratically elected government.

In practice it is possible to have a triple violation of this principle.

1. The army is turned into a self-contained force, it escapes from under subordination to the government and carries out a state coup. But world experience indicates that such an action by the army is possible only under the corresponding social conditions, when the civilian structures of power are lacking or are completely impotent.

2. The leadership of the nation in becoming isolated from the masses discredits itself. Having lost the moral right to lead, it endeavors to protect itself and "discipline" the people with the aid of the army. The army, in being established to protect the people, is turned into their jailer. This is the obvious hypertrophying of its function. In order to prevent such a metamorphosis, it is essential to have legal mechanisms which exclude the arbitrary, voluntaristic use of the army.

3. The army is employed to stop mass social disorders, that is, it carries out the functions of protecting public order. Incidentally, the former legislated merging of the army and the interior troops as components of the Armed Forces had negative consequences. This required from the interior troops a definite readiness for action to defend the socialist fatherland and to a certain degree impeded their specific development as forces of public order. At the same time, such an identification in the eyes of the political leadership eliminated the real boundaries and made it possible to use the army for carrying out the tasks of the interior troops.

Thus, if the army "leaves the barracks" in peacetime, even if this is for the most humanitarian purposes, it is not doing its job. Our army has only one external function. This has always been viewed as the defense of the socialist fatherland and the victories of socialism against the encroachments of world reaction. There was a time when this defense was conceived of as waging a rapid war "with little blood on foreign territory." Then the task was set of dealing a crushing blow to any aggressor and force the potential enemies to reckon with us. At precisely that time the political weight and influence of the nation on the international scene was to be maintained by relying on military force and the unchecked development of this undermined the other components of state security. The affirming of the new political thinking has fundamentally altered the previous
views and this has been reinforced in the new, strictly
defensive military doctrine of the USSR and the Warsaw
Pact countries. Correspondingly, the view of the external
function of the army has changed. The Armed Forces,
without losing their direct purpose, act at the same time
as a restraining factor. They are charged, as was empha-
sized at the Congress of USSR People’s Deputies, with
ensuring strategic stability in the world and guaranteeing
the security of the Soviet state and its allies.

In recent years, we have adopted and have begun to put
into effect the principle of reasonable sufficiency for
defense, the Armed Forces are being cut back, we have
begun to withdraw our troops from friendly countries
and their organizational structure has been brought into
conformity with the strategic concept of a defensive
document.

All the measures being carried out in this direction must
be strictly balanced. As long as there are no guarantees
for the reversibility of the positive changes in the world,
we must not unilaterally give up our concern for the
proper defense of the nation. Certainly precisely the
fear of the aggressors of the inevitable retaliation which
our army has inspired and does inspire is one of the most
important factors of Soviet security and in preventing
aggression. Until a political mechanism which makes
war impossible has been established, we are forced to
maintain and support the USSR Armed Forces on the
proper level.

Internal Role of Army Examined

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VOORUZHENNYKH VIET in Russian No 19, Oct 89
(signed to press 26 Sep 89) pp 19-20

[Article by Col (Ret) P. Skorodenko, doctor of historical
sciences, professor: “In the Aims of Protecting Social-
ism”]

[Text] The question of the internal function of a socialist
state’s army, particularly in recent years, has become a
question of rather sharp debate both within the socialist
countries and outside. The content of the internal func-
tion of the army as the armed organization of a socialist
society must be viewed in close relation to the stages of
socialist construction, to the balance of class, political
forces in one or another country as well as with the
political situation on the international scene as a whole.

Generally recognized in theory and confirmed by prac-
tice is the fact that the army of a socialist state carries out
the function of suppressing the armed resistance of the
antisocialist forces during the transitional stage from
capitalism to socialism.

The internal function can be manifested in various forms
from such acute ones as a civil war, the suppression of
armed revolts up to the “passive” effect on counterrev-
olutionary forces by the very fact of the army’s existence.
Vivid examples of this are the Civil War during the first
post-October years in our country, the struggle against
the armed opposition in People’s Poland in the second
half of the 1940s and in China at the end of the 1940s
and the beginning of the 1950s. To one degree or
another, it was necessary to resort to armed force for
suppressing the remnants of the exploiting classes who
put up violent resistance to the new social system in a
number of other countries during the initial period of
socialist construction.

As the socialist society developed, the internal function
of the army has gradually withered away. Here the degree
of the reduction of the scope of its tasks within the nation
has depended both upon the degree of the maturity of
socialism (the depth of the political, socioeconomic and
spiritual changes) as well as upon the potential of the
internal forces opposing socialism. Examples are known
when in individual periods of history, under the condi-
tions of an exacerbation of the domestic political and
international situation, the armies of the socialist coun-
tries have been called in for carrying out domestic
political tasks.

The most characteristic in this regard was the activities
of the Polish Army during the crisis in Poland at the
beginning of the 1980s, when martial law was declared
throughout the entire nation, and the Military Council of
National Salvation was established. Even before the
adoption of these measures, the Fourth Plenum of the
PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] Central Com-
mittee (October 1981) pointed out: “The Armed Forces,
in carrying out the internal function of protecting the
constitutional people’s power, are the guarantee of sta-
bilization in the nation.”

During the period of martial law, the commissars who
were the representatives of the Military Council of
National Salvation and pointed to the wojewodstwo
[administrative unit], ministries and departments,
 supervised and coordinated the activities of the local
authorities, without replacing the existing state appa-
ratus with their own structures. The appeal to the army
for help was of a temporary and extraordinary nature
and was not aimed at replacing the existing mechanism
of socialist democracy by the army.

We feel that it is an invalid thesis of the antisocialist
forces that the introduction of martial law in Poland was
an action against the people. This was revolutionary
violence against a rather narrow stratum of the popula-
tion and primarily the counterrevolutionary upper
clique. Activities were halted only in those organizations
which were involved in preparing for a state coup.

The public opinion poll conducted at the beginning of
February 1989 showed the workers’ understanding of the
role of the army during the crisis period in Poland. Some
75 percent of those polled voiced their confidence in the
army. None of the nation’s political institutions
including the PZPR, the Sejm and the government had
such authority. The Report of the PZPR Central Com-
mittee to the 10th Party Congress commented: “An
invaluable possession for the soldier is the trust of the
people. This has found proper confirmation in the very responsible carrying out of tasks during the period of martial law and in performing the historic duty of saving the nation.”

A different role was played by the Czechoslovak People's Army in the autumn of 1968. The rightist portion of the party and government leadership actually did not take measures against the counterrevolutionary coup and the approaching civil war while the supporters of the decisive defense of socialism did not possess within the nation a military force capable of resisting the pressure of reaction. The Document of the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] Central Committee “Lessons of Crisis Development in the CPCZ and in Society After the 13th CPCZ Congress” states that during this period the combat capability and moral-political state of the Czechoslovak People's Army declined. “This is a historical fact,” commented the Minister of National Defense M. Dzur later, “that in 1968 a counterrevolution occurred in Czechoslovakia and we were unable to oppose it with our own forces.”

Experience indicates that in crucial stages in the development of socialism, the army should be ready to perform the internal function against forces acting with weapons in arms against the socialist system. Whatever the actions will be by the army in each specific instance depends upon the degree of acuteness of confrontation between the opposing sides and upon the degree of the threat to the victories of socialism.


Civilian Negative Press Treatment of Armed Forces
90UM0094B Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 89 (signed to press 26 Sep 89) pp 29-34

[Article by Maj A. Krokhmalyuk and Capt N. Kartashov: “Why Pens ‘Fire’ Farther Than Cannons”]

[Text] Recently many mass information media have frequently turned to army problems. Just as often the comments by the press, radio and television cause hostility among the professional military who feel, and not without grounds, that the life of the Armed Forces is treated in a prejudiced and one-sided manner. In holding onto their positions stubbornly, both sides often resort to reciprocal attacks instead of solving many acute problems in common.

In attempting to reach a constructive dialogue and to find points of contact for mutual efforts the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy organized a meeting between the leaders of a number of political bodies and military journalists with representatives of the youth press. Correspondence from our journal also participated in the roundtable discussion. Below we offer their comments to our readers.

We must say from the outset that, in our view, no serious, sincere dialogue developed. Although the start was very promising. In any event, the introductory speech by the Deputy Chief of the Directorate of Ideological Work Under the Main Political Directorate, Maj Gen N. Grebenkin, predisposed one to a thoughtful, confiding conversation. Nikolay Aleksandrovich [Grebenkin] spoke with concern about the reduced prestige of military service and frankly admitted that a number of problems and primarily those related to “hazing,” and relations between servicemen of different nationalities as before were acute in many army collectives. And he proposed to reflect together on how to unite the efforts of the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol activists, the military and civilian journalists in resolving the touchy questions. However, the hopes were not justified.

Let us introduce our fellow roundtable members: Konstantin Yevgeshin from the magazine YUNOST, Olga Volkova from the Field Mail of YUNOST, Mikhail Pasternak from MOSKOVSKIKIY KOMSOMOLETS and Aleksandr Chudakov from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. They all are not novices in journalism. As professionals, they cannot help but value in our work such qualities as the ability to seize the essence of a phenomenon, to see a problem from outside and to touch upon the sore spots. For this reason, it seemed that a meeting with persons who had devoted over a score of years to military service would provide an impetus to make maximum use for better understanding army life, gaining new information and checking out one’s views. Alas, some of our colleagues had a different goal.

Konstantin Yevgeshin, for example, was most concerned by two questions: Were not the interests of anarchists encroached on in the army and why did the army youth need such an organization as the Komsomol which had supposedly completely outlived itself. Equally original was Mikhail Pasternak who has won dubious renown for his tendentious articles on the modern army. He, in particular, proposed discussing how believers serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces would be given an opportunity to perform their religious rites.

In a number of other comments by the civilian journalists one did not feel a sincere concern for solving truly vital army problems. Their arguments, very often with hints of intentional gloating, differed little from those articles on military questions which so abound in the youth press.

It would not be difficult for a careful reader to note that many publications aim fire and brimstone directly at the army. Just the titles alone show this! “Would I Serve Happily,” “Hold Out, Gobs,” “Let Us Overthrow the ‘Military,’” “Does a General Need a Violin?” “At Ease!,” “Will Vilnius Bid Farewell to Arms?” “Aircrafts Over the City,” “A Law or a Fist?” “Soldiers Flee...” and scores of other similar ones. Set in large type, they shout from the newspaper and magazine pages
sending shivers through mothers and causing despondency in the coming army relief. Repeatedly we have read materials which are generously sprinkled with phrases such as "the army anesthetizes," "the barracks breaks down the individual" and "a person is degraded in army life." ... Such caricaturing and mockery even in many civilians cause indignation as is seen from the extensive mail received by many central newspapers and magazines. But clearly certain of our colleagues have developed such a taste for this that they do not see where criticism ends and nitpicking begins.

Such a massed assault by a number of the press organs against the Armed Forces, in our view, is somehow reminiscent of the noisy strident campaigns in the newspaper columns during the not-distant years of stagnation. In truth, at that time our fellow journalist boldly wielded his pen to glorify the Army and Navy. At present, the flogging of shortcomings has gained a broad field and unfortunately many shortcomings have built up in army life.

Certainly, a view from outside at times can be both more acute and more objective. But, honestly speaking, in leafing through selections of many youth publications, you will rarely find in the materials dealing with the army any precise observation, thoughtful analysis or unbiased conclusion.

In one of the first issues this year of the popular weekly SOBESEDNIK, there was the attention-getting article "Preinduction Quadrille" on the refusal by a certain portion of draft-age youth to carry out their constitutional duty. Recently this problem has become noticeably more acute. Sufficient to say that from January of the current year upon notification just in the rayon commissariats of the city of Moscow, 1,527 draftees have failed to report, while around 300 stubbornly reject induction and have been sought for a long time. The figures are alarming. And we must give proper due to the journalist of the respected publication who set out to investigate such an alarming phenomenon. But who is to blame that the young men do not want to serve as the defenders of the motherland?

The author of the article with envious ease gives a final diagnosis that the army is to blame for everything and no one else. It turns out that the problem of "desertion" rests on the "purely psychological dislike for the barracks orders." Is it possible, the author wonders, to command the mind of a young person using the methods of the prescribed requirements if he has already been able "in civil life" to enjoy the therapeutic "air of democracy"? No, he replies, it is not possible and one must adapt. And here he offers a variation of a solution to all problems. It is essential, it turns out, you must hang up your warming clothes next to the uniform, put running shoes to the boots and, if you please, the soldier will serve his shift on alert duty and then go off, now a "completely civilian person." Then there will be neither the "desertion" nor the ill-famed "hazing." Everything is seemingly simple. The only thing is what will be the state of constant combat readiness, training and everything that makes the army the army. The author for some reason has little to say about this. The reason for such delicacy, in our view, is that the journalist (no matter how insulting this may sound for a fellow writer) does not have a sufficiently profound understanding of that area about which he is writing.

Unfortunately, many other publications also suffer from similar, equally light-weight articles. But thousands of readers, predominantly young ones, could read them and take them as the honest truth. Because at present there is a special attitude toward the press. It is in the attack lines of perestroika and people believe in it. Try, for example, to persuade the young readers of the newspaper KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA that the instances of improper relations are not massively widespread in the army after they have carefully read the material of "Hold Out, Gobs." The author has stated, no more or no less, about the existence of an entire system of this monstrous phenomenon. It would be interesting to know what data he relied on in making such a hasty conclusion?

It would be equally difficult to explain that the mirror is not a trick one for the readers of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, the organ of the Lithuanian Komzomol Central Committee. In one of the issues the editors published the material "Komzomol Radicals in Uniform." Let us quote from it just two excerpts: "Improper relations are problems of the entire army. The commanders look at this through their fingers..." and "Perestroika is being felt in the army. And it was not the soldiers and officers that began it..." (From the article we do not learn who after all did begin it.—Author's Note.) The entire article is packed with such judgments. And how can one help but understand the state of those young persons who read it? Without any superfluous words it is clear that it aroused nothing but negative feelings for the army and a watchful attitude toward the officers.

Or one other addition to how our civilian colleagues treat the army theme. At the end of July of the current year on the pages of the Lithuanian KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, an article was published with a striking title "Will Vilnius Bid Farewell to Arms?" Its authors, for attracting reader attention, have given the article a large-type preamble in which, in being dazzled by their own boldness, propose discussing "such an urgent problem as moving the Northern Military Compound out of Vilnius."

Then the journalists talk with the Chairman of the Vilnius Gorispolkom A. Vileikis and the Member of the Vilnius Gorispolkom and Buro of the Party Gorkom, Col V. Kutrovskiy, who have nothing against moving the troop unit out of the city. In the conversation they point out that the moving of the military camp will require removing a major amount from the republic budget. In particular, Col Kutrovskiy mentions an approximate figure of 15 million rubles. This can be found if they cut back on the construction of housing, nurseries and
hospitals. But must this be done with the current acuteness of social problems? The authors of the article assert that it must. This is what they write: "...We have begun disarmament, we are pulling entire divisions out of Eastern Europe, we are reducing the army by a half-million men, and here just one camp...." In actuality, everything is so simple and easy. Is it really impossible to find the 15 million rubles to move out the military?! It is just a detail....

In becoming acquainted with the youth publications, one cannot help but notice that affirmative articles on army life have virtually disappeared from the pages of a number of newspapers. Inevitably the question arises: Does nothing at all remain of the defender of the fatherland? It seems that certain of our colleagues feel precisely that way. And they do not spare the gloomy hues. But it does not require much daring to defame the army in taking satisfaction with the shortcomings in so doing. But it is quite a different thing to criticize but to put one's pain and concern into each line, to seek ways out of the situation, to suggest, recommend and propose. Certainly the army is nothing alien but it is our own, Soviet. And the fellows serving in it are not from overseas but also our own Soviet. They are from Ryazan and Tashkent, Tbilisi and Minsk, Tallinn and Yerevan.... They are our sons, brothers, grandchildren and husbands.... And precisely now, when the prestige of military service has been shaken, what we need is not nitpicking "staters of fact" and angry "unmaskers" but rather fellow champions, persons who are profoundly interested in resolving army problems.

Alas, as of now there are shamefully few such champions among the journalists of the youth publications. This was reaffirmed by the roundtable meeting. From the statements of some of its participants, one saw how they related to the military and to the army as a whole. In particular, the correspondent from the journal YUNOST, in speaking about Hero of the Soviet Union, Col A. Ruts, called him... a murderer. Was this a word used accidentally in the heat of polemics? No it was not, but the issue was much more serious. This Konstantin Yevgeshin himself hurried to assure the audience, having stated that at YUNOST not only he alone feels this way.

For now, let us leave to Yevgeshin's conscience the direct insulting of an officer who honorably carried out his military duty and in his figure also all Afghan veterans. At least there remains no doubt over the views of the person in charge of army matters at YUNOST.

In the course of the roundtable debate, the political workers repeatedly emphasized that criticism is a strong weapon in fighting against shortcomings. But is this weapon always fired accurately at the target? We would like to ask our civilian colleagues: Are we not hitting our own positions when we generously provide newspaper and magazine pages for often unfounded criticism of the army, its "orders" and the officer corps but cannot find sufficient room to show the difficult military service of the Soviet military, the truly unstinting labor of a majority of the commanders and political workers who have taken perestroika to heart and have already done a great deal to renew the Armed Forces?

Why, for instance, does the newspaper MOLODEZH ESTONII, in remaining silent about the difficult situation of the families of officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"], not come to their defense? Because they are not ours? They are "occupiers!" Certainly their life is not to be envied. But all of a sudden the Tallinn Gorispolkom at one of the sessions adopted a decision not to assign apartments to servicemen. As they say, any comment is superfluous.

Some in Georgia want to depict the military as "aliens." The newspaper MOLODEZH GRUZII and certain other periodicals have labeled them "butchers" and "murderers." One of the Georgian magazines on the cover published a cartoon showing a soldier with a combat shovel threatening... a sculpture of the motherland. Although the tragic events of that April night must still be investigated.

When subjectivism gains the upper hand and truth is distorted, this merely harms things. There will be no positive results. On the contrary, new painful questions begin to arise.

For the sake of justice, it must be said that we, the military, must also learn to discuss, to rise above our emotions and be able to listen to and hear criticism. Some thought was given to this at the end of the roundtable discussion, when it became ultimately clear that its participants virtually to an equal degree suffered from subjectivism, a one-sidedness of judgments and reciprocal prejudice. For example, we could have stopped on one of the problems proposed for discussion by the same Mikhail Pasternak, doted, as they say, all the "its" and then move on. But the representatives of the political bodies behaved precisely as the civilian journalists after the comments by Maj Gen N. Grebenkin. In response to a long statement by Maj. Pasternak, there came the quip: "But what does your heading "The Oath" in MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS teach?" Naturally, all its weak points were listed. There then followed a hint that we were on different sides of the barricades. Who needed this at that moment? We feel that neither side did. But ambitions prevailed over common sense and the conversation strayed away from urgent problems common to all of us. Again the question of "hazing" was raised. In our view, the correspondent of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Aleksandr Chudakov, spoke very constructively on the given problem. He voiced the opinion that the root of many of our misfortunes, including the improper relations, lies in the low professional level of the NCO personnel and in the fact that the NCOs do not have sufficiently broad rights and powers. This idea was supported only by Maj Gen N. Grebenkin. The other political workers saw in this the
unacceptable and supposedly completely alien thesis for us of a professional army. The discussion of the question was again crushed.

Nor was there any support for the proposal to the political workers by the editor of the "Field Mail of YUNOST," Olga Volkova, to participate in analyzing the letters received by the editors. And certainly she was speaking about a specific matter, about hundreds of those questionnaires of the "Field Mail of YUNOST" which shed light on the vital problems of modern Army and Navy life but remain a dead weight in various institutions.

After the meeting at the Central Club of the Soviet Army, many participants of the roundtable were left with a feeling of dissatisfaction. But still, we feel, it is not worth making a tragedy of this. Certainly such meetings are just beginning to become a practice of working together. Of course, it is a pity that it was impossible to determine certain joint approaches and that both sides lacked in the skills of conducting a debate. But for some reason we feel that the participants of the meeting took at least a step closer to understanding the simple truth that behind each such discussion there should be the interests of the matter and not personal ambitions. For at present, in the age of glasnost, when each word in a newspaper reverberates in the hearts of millions of people (and the rear will forgive us for the pathetic), the pens "fire" farther than cannons. This is all the more apparent when the cannons stand silent.

Here we could put a period. But one question concerns us yet: How has it happened that the youth press at present does not so much help as it does hinder the work with the young people and with that portion of the youth in uniform? Are we not partially to blame here?

For a long time the army remained a zone outside of criticism for the civilian press. And it is a natural pattern that when the gates of glasnost were thrown open, many journalists in a desire to shine in originality took to sketching in its shadowy aspects. At that time had we been more restrained, had we not given way to emotions and tried to analyze the situation calmly, then possibly the differences would not have assumed their present acuteness. But we just as zealously rushed to defend the honor of the uniform, and we endeavored to cover over and underplay our own shortcomings. As a result, the critical shelling of the army by the mass information media intensified and we abandoned one position after another. Suffice it to recall the sensation over the story of Yuriy Polyakov "One Hundred Days to the Order." Some political workers did everything they could to place a "taboo" on it, thereby fanning the interest of the reading public.

Fortunately, the wave of prohibition has abated sharply. The gates of the checkpoints of the military units have been thrown open more and more often. Now we already have every right to count on the objectivity of the journalists from the youth publications. It is time to put an end to the "cold war." It leads nowhere except into a blind alley and this is clear to anyone with common sense. Let us recall with what concern many USSR people's deputies spoke at the congress about the sore spots of our Armed Forces. Let us properly view, for example, the action of the Soviet Culture Fund which has worked out and begun to implement an extensive program to humanize the Armed Forces and entitled "The Army and Culture." Let us give proper due to our colleagues from PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA and MOSKVSKAYA PRAVDA in the articles of whom one feels evermore strongly a real concern to make our army home brighter. And the most popular youth publications seemingly are beginning to approach army problems in a more thoughtful manner. For example, one was pleased by the comments at the roundtable of A. Chudakov from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. He spoke about the finest traditions of the Russian Army which now have been largely forgotten, about love for the fatherland with its history which could and should be used to educate the defenders of the motherland. He said that this was one of the noble subjects on which the commanders, political workers, the local party, Komsomol and soviet bodies, the military and civilian journalists could unite their efforts in the military patriotic education of the youth.

And we must unite. It is essential to us, the military, without assuming the stance of the insulted, to take a step forward ourselves, to seek out and strengthen contacts. For instance, invite civilian journalists to the troop collectives and acquaint them with the organization of training, service and the everyday life of the personnel. With such an approach in articles dealing with the army there certainly would be no tendentiousness, flippancy, prejudice and there would be more truth.

Incidentally, regular meetings between the representatives of the mass information media and the military have already been given the go-ahead in certain districts. For example, in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District and the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District. In the Red Banner Northern Caucasus Military District they invited to such a meeting the workers of the newspapers, journals, radio and television from the Don, the Northern Caucasus and the Lower Volga Region. Over a period of several days, the journalists became familiar with service and routine of the servicemen and were present at tactical exercises, in the barracks and even...at the guardhouse. The results could be seen on the newspaper pages. New interesting headlines appeared in the local press and an exchange was organized for regular columns between the district newspaper and the print organs of the republic, krais and oblasts on the territories of which the district troops are stationed.

It is not difficult to realize that the army suffers from the same ailments as society as a whole. And any patient must be cured without insulting him and without humiliating his dignity. All the more by the printed word which runs into millions of copies. Can one dispute this truth any more?

Unauthorized Groups Meet At Azerbaijani Conscription Centers
18310042B Baku KOMMUNITY in Azeri 29 Oct 89 p 2

[Text] "At The Azerbaijan SSR Military Commissariat"

Recently frequent unauthorized meetings at the conscription centers of rayon and city military commissions have been held by the leadership of informal organizations and groups. These organizations and groups, which are using the democratization process for their own nefarious goals, are obstructing the regular conscription of youth into military service and spreading all kinds of rumors and fabrications which lack any basis in fact. As is known, leaders of these informal groups are urging the parents of soldiers serving outside the republic's borders to write their children and invite them to go AWOL (absent without leave) from their unit. They are also assured that such criminal steps will remain unpunished.

Individuals evading regular conscription into true military service or preventing the timely arrival of citizens at the assembly points will be considered to be criminally responsible. Materials on illegal actions have been sent to the law enforcement organs.

The military commissariat asks all republic workers and youth to definitively repudiate all illegal acts aimed at preventing the conscription of youth into true military service and stopping them from the performance of their constitutional duty.

The Azerbaijani SSR Military Commissariat draws the attention of draftees and their parents to the fact that according to the law in force the armed forces are staffed on a non-territorial basis and that 25 percent of the entire conscripted contingent will serve in the republic.

Representatives of a number of union republics are working in the earthquake zone. I believe that the issue of restoration work in Armenia should have been reflected in the report by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. In view of the fact that representatives of a number of union republics are working there, I propose to set up a permanently operating group of people's deputies which would stay in touch with people working in the earthquake zone, be aware of their opinion, and influence the state of affairs. I would also ask Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov to receive deputies from the earthquake zone.

It seems to me that on the whole the report by the Soviet government contains many sound and specific proposals; I approve of it. I am convinced that plan fulfillment will depend to a great degree on the political situation in our country. I believe that we cannot expect to be successful if in the future as well we are not certain that labor discipline is stable.

I will take the liberty of giving just one example. At the 1st Congress, we resolved to reduce defense expenditures by 10 billion rubles. According to my data, by now the strike movement alone has brought about billions of rubles being spent to make up the losses. Who has benefited by virtue of that? Where has the money gone which neither the defense nor the people have received? We, the military, are prepared for the further reduction of defense expenditures if this is what is necessary for the people. However, we very much want to believe that this money will go to the people in order to improve their life and existence rather than to cover losses and debts which appear on heavens know whose initiative.

At present, we have in our society a large number of public and informal organizations. Many of them are officially recognized, and actually aid perestroika. However, I am profoundly convinced that it is time for us to create the law on informal organizations. Why does the responsibility for everything—the death of people and great financial losses—devolve on the state alone and nobody else? We are talking about creating a law-governed state; in such a state, the individual, the social organization, and the state itself should be equal before the law.
The next problem, I would like to bring up some of the issues of the life of the armed forces. It is not easy for us, military deputies. We represent the interests of both military and civilian voters. However, here is the first point. For some reason, the conviction is constantly voiced in this auditorium that we do not have our problems.

I must tell you that at present the pay of officers is extremely low. To be sure, a decision to increase it by 50 rubles has been made.

Housing is the most acute problem. Our wives have virtually nowhere to work because in all union republics the knowledge of their native language is required. They have no work tenure. It is very difficult for children because instruction in schools is also offered in the national languages. These problems also need to be solved.

The army personnel is prepared to serve and to do its duty. We would only ask that they take the necessary care of us rather than just criticize us through the mass media.

I will take the liberty to dwell on one more point. It is embarrassing to speak about this, but for some reason the word "general" at this congress has come to sound as something of an insult. There are "murderer-generals," and "wedding-party generals," you see?

Who are we, the generals? Where did we come from?

I am a peasant from the vicinity of Kaluga, I can give you the address to verify that. All of the generals present here whom I know have worker and peasant backgrounds. Each one of us has served a minimum of 25 to 30 years in the Soviet Army. Prior to this, all of us worked at plants and construction sites. So, who do we represent here at present?

Not one general has said anything about who makes what money. Meanwhile, the speakers frequently say "general-like earnings," "general-class pay," "generals' dachas." I am stating for you officially—my pay of a general does not exceed the earnings of a cooperative member in 1 week. All that we, the generals represented here, have is state-owned—apartments, cars, and so on.

As of today, I have moved 11 times with my family. My daughter went to nine schools, and is now in her second college. Besides, all of us are deputies the same as you are. If we are deputies then let us respect each other. Why should we be rebuked all the time for our position in the service? We like and respect the people. We are on the side of the people. We have no other orientation.

Here is one more problem. The armed forces are being reduced, and many hundreds of thousands of servicemen are being retired. We would like the government to have a more precise program for their settlement and job placement.

Finally, I cannot but refer to the level of competence. For example, our respected deputies step up and say that the army needs to be reduced by so much, and there should be so many generals. I cannot discuss, say, the issues of health care in detail at present; all I know is where to stick the thermometer. I would like to see a similar professional treatment of the army when we are going to discuss it.

We are not strangers to each other, and let us not oppose each other. Otherwise, it gets to be ridiculous: During the proceedings of the 1st Congress, a TV correspondent went out into the street and interviewed the first passer-by he saw: "Is 70 billion enough for our defense?", and the passer-by said: "We can even take some more away." Is this a statesmanlike approach to the matter?

I would ask, comrades, for us deputies not to be split into the civilians and the military. Let us unite in order to switch from words to specific deeds, so that we will not be ashamed to look our voters in the eye.

Thank you for your attention.
New Deputy Chief of Supreme Court Military Collegium on ‘Dedovshchina’
90UM01574 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sep 89
(signed to press 7 Sep 89) pp 61-66

[Article by Maj Gen Justice A. Ukolov: “A Sentence on the ‘Dedovshchina’”]

[Text] They say that professionals get used to everything. But I especially recall this sitting of the military tribunal. Not only from the figures. In the dock at the same time were eight military construction workers, and in the hall were 25 victims who testified. I also recall that the matter that the military tribunal was looking into very clearly reflected the essence of an urgent problem, that of the “Dedovshchina.”

For more than half a year I. Magomedov, M. Guseynov, and six of their fellow soldiers, having united on the basis of ethnic interests, mocked their fellow soldiers. They found fault under any pretext, forced them to carry out housekeeping chores for them, wash floors, make up their beds, etc. They threatened those who refused, and even beat the more “obstinate.”

But military construction workers were found who went to the company commander, officer A. Chirkov and asked him to handle the situation, to take measures. It is true that they did this in a unique way. They wrote him a letter, without signatures, to be on the safe side. The company commander, without thinking about it long, began to find out at a meeting of the men who had written it and who was mistreating whom. Naturally, the authors of the letter kept silent, fearing the presence of the hooligans. With this the matter ended.

The victims made no further attempts to appeal to the command. And Magomedov and his group continued to mock their fellows for several more months. And the mocking became even more malicious. Only the intervention of the military procuracy put an end to this.

Both anger and a feeling of pity gripped my heart when I looked at the accused and listened to their testimonies. They confessed and asked for mercy. Were they sincere? It is hard to say. But, judging by the accounts of witnesses, none of these lads was known to have done anything bad before the army. Then where did such aggressiveness and such a cadish attitude toward their comrades in service come from?

The end of the story is a sad one. The military tribunal passed a strict sentence. I heard it and thought: Isn’t this sentence a serious reproach to the commanders, the political workers, all the unit activists, and to us military lawyers, for the fact that they “overlooked” those who were in the dock, the first manifestations of “dedovshchina” in the collective?

Such shameful phenomena in army collectives, which the law calls violations of regulations covering relationships among military personnel, engender in people indignation and justified alarm. Numerous statements by the mass media, letters of citizens to party and state organs, subunit and unit commands, newspaper and journal editors, and law enforcement organs, complaints by military personnel, and the materials of military procuracies and tribunals, bear witness that the “dedovshchina” is a phenomenon alien to our morality, and incompatible with the very spirit of Soviet society, which is on the paths of restructuring and renewal of life on truly socialist footings.

Undoubtedly, the problem cannot help but cause concern. We have begun today to speak about it at the top of our voices. Most of all military people are attempting to deal with it. More and more often articles are appearing on the pages of the military press about the underlying causes of non-regulatory relations and ways of preventing them. I note, apropos of this, that some of the civilian mass media do not always write objectively about the “dedovshchina” problem. Such thoughts, for example, were expressed in conversation with me by political workers from one of the military units in the Turkestan Military District, who believe that some authors, who do not have a true impression about service in the army, strive for sensationalism and draw superficial conclusions. And this has a negative effect on the forming of public opinion.

I believe that there is reason here. After all, there are many military units where there are either no manifestations of “dedovshchina”, or they are observed extremely rarely. Just the same, it must be acknowledged that this phenomenon exists, despite the fact that recently the struggle against non-regulation relationships in the army has stepped up markedly. This year questions associated with it were examined at sessions of military Soviets in a number of military districts, groups of forces, and fleets (Western Group of Forces, Odessa Military District, Baltic Military District, Black Sea Fleet).

A positive process of changing the moral climate in military collectives is underway. The number convicted for crimes based on non-regulation relationships has declined since 1985 by more than 50 percent, and by almost one-third in 1988 compared with 1987. Nevertheless, the problem of overcoming instances of mocking and humiliation in the army continues to remain acute. Crimes associated with non-regulation relationships are the most widespread. It is enough to say that the number convicted for them constitutes one quarter of the total number of military personnel convicted of all crimes. The most unfavorable situation took shape in military construction detachments and units.

Violations of regulations concerning relationships, in the broad plane, consist of any deviations from the requirements of regulations, including violations of observance of subordination (insubordination, resistance or acts of force against superiors), so called distortions of disciplinary practice (corporal punishment and other unlawful actions by superiors toward their subordinates)
and, finally, violations of regulations governing relationships among military personnel in the absence of superior-subordinate relations among them.

The greatest alarm is caused by the considerable spread of the latter; i.e., the “dedomshchina,” “strikovshchina,” “veteranstvo” [all referring to unlawful relationships of older soldiers toward junior soldiers], and “zemly-achestvo” [unlawful relations based on ethnic differences]. I would like to speak in more detail namely about them.

What are the sources and what is the essence of this phenomenon?

The reasons for the “dedomshchina” are multi-faceted, and go back into history and the dynamic of social processes. In the 1970s and early 1980s negative tendencies began to be manifested particularly acutely in the development of our society. Many anomalous phenomena arose in the social and the spiritual-moral sphere, which distorted and deformed the principles of socialist justice, undermined the faith of the people in it, and engendered social alienation and immoral conduct in various forms.

The influence of these negative phenomena, and the weakening of moral supports, also had their effect, undoubtedly, on the younger generation. A significant portion of the young people devalued considerably such moral values as honesty, fairness, kindness, and compassion. At the same time negative traits were formed: egotism, coarseness, cynicism, cruelty, disdain for their surroundings, moral and spiritual callousness, and a lack of elementary discipline, on the one hand, and on the other hand an undeveloped sense of personal worth, passivity, and resignation. Some young people began to unite into various informal groups, which frequently cultivated the right of the strong.

A cult of crude physical force, at times cruelty, abasement and oppression of the weak, the formation in some young people of an orientation based on force—all these negative phenomena were practiced in many children’s homes, boarding schools, vocational and technical schools, technical schools and general education schools, and became firmly rooted in places of confinement. I believe that the fact that in the last 20 years criminality among juveniles increased 150 percent says a lot.

Such anomalies, unfortunately, also remain in our day. For example, 30 percent of the soldiers questioned in one of the military units answered that they were first confronted with the “dedomshchina” in vocational-technical schools and technical schools. It is no accident, evidently, that former vocational-technical school students comprise one-third of the military personnel convicted for violations of regulations pertaining to relationships.

Also alarming are the, of late, increasingly frequent manifestations of aggressiveness by young people, associated with the formation of young groups in some cities, between which take place clashes, fierce fights based on “clarification of relations,” turf battles, etc. All of this, of course, also permeates into the army environment.

But, it would be incorrect to see only “external” reasons for the spread of non-regulation relationships. I am convinced that no matter how serious the shortcomings are in the bringing up of the younger generation, in and of themselves they do not have a fatal effect. Objective conditions, the situation, atmosphere, and psychological climate in which the further formation of the individual in the military collective takes place, are definitive in the person’s behavior in the army.

Today it is obvious that phenomena of stagnation in the life of the Armed Forces (weakness of political educational work, the separation of officers from soldiers and sergeants, existing facts of a lack of social protection for military personnel, the absence of required regulatory order in some units, connivance toward violators of law, an environment of indifference, lack of glannost, pretense, lack of desire to air dirty linen, and many other deformations of army life) contributed to the fact that negative purposes in the behavior of some military personnel were not uncovered completely enough. The danger was seen, but it was obviously underestimated. There were many calls to “root out” and “get rid of.” However, thorough investigations of the phenomenon, and sufficiently effective, purposeful work to overcome it, were not carried out. The illness became deeply embedded.

And what happened? Military personnel from earlier callups, as a rule joining into groups, attempt, through the use of non-regulation methods, to impact on the younger replacements and create for themselves a privileged position. Frequently they lay on the shoulders of the young soldiers physical work, service in the daily detail, and other burdens and troubles. Moreover, often they try to take by force the best food and clothing, and sometimes personal things and money, from the victims. Here actual criminal intentions are at times veiled as non-regulation “traditions,” and physical and psychic force is used as a means of suppressing the victims’ will to resist.

Data from sociological studies show that physical force, which is easier to establish, began more frequently to lose its place to moral humiliation, crudeness, insults, and coercion of the young soldiers to provide various kinds of services in making beds, washing clothes, cleaning shoes, etc. Cases are noted of coercion to accomplish humiliating exercises and various jobs at night, and other things.

I will cite some data from criminal proceedings. In 60 percent of the cases the motive prompting non-regulation manifestations by those convicted was the desire by a soldier called up earlier to subordinate the young soldiers to his influence; in 20 percent of the cases
the infringements were caused by hooliganistic motives; and in 8 percent by erroneously conceived interests of the service.

Of late a substantial portion of non-regulation relationships is more and more closely affiliated with “zemly-achestvo” phenomena. It is no secret that the change in the demographic situation in the country, the population growth in the republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, is leaving its imprint on the personnel structure of the Armed Forces. The share of compulsory service military personnel from these regions increased to 37 percent by 1988. An increasing number of conflicts between soldiers of different nationalities are also being observed. For example, according to the results of one sociological study, carried out in the “N” unit, almost one in four compulsory service personnel acknowledged that instances of clashes between soldiers of different nationalities take place in the subunits. This is manifested in the desire of some of them to subordinate to themselves soldiers of other nationalities, insulting representatives of another nation, etc.

Undoubtedly, such a statistic is troubling. We military lawyers also “prick up our ears” at the fact that some commanders and political workers reason that the problem of the “dovoshchina” is clear, and does not require further serious study. But is everything here utterly clear? It seems to me that studies are necessary, and not only under army conditions, but in society as a whole, since the illness has infected many young people’s collectives outside the army.

The dynamic of processes taking place in society, including the army, in the period of perestroika has grown substantially, which makes necessary their thorough analysis, and the expansion of sociological research. The army is a large and complex organism, which is characterized by diverse features of personnel manning, carrying out service in different regions, branches of arms, military construction detachments and units, military districts and fleets, and by many other factors. Non-regulation relationships, for example, have different coloration, taking into account the length of the term of service in the navy and in the ground forces, etc.

In our view, a single authoritative center for sociological and criminological studies is needed in the Armed Forces, which could thoroughly study the problem being discussed. It must contain specialists of various profiles: political workers, sociologists, psychologists, military doctors, lawyers, etc. Specific studies by this center would make it possible to arm commanders and political workers with knowledge of the causes of negative phenomena, and help them determine ways of preventing conflicts and uniting the military collectives.

It seems that in the complex of measures against the “dovoshchina,” most important is perestroika of the consciousness of young people, many of whom before the army were confronted with manifestations of the cult of the strong, and consider such a phenomenon inevitable in the army environment. Overcoming such psychological tendencies is one of the tasks of pre-callup training, as well as of the family, school, labor collectives, and Komsomol.

Experience shows that first of all it is necessary to study the younger generation thoroughly. The moral-psychological preparation of young people for army service is not uniform. Unfortunately, there are still many socially neglected people among them. For example, of those convicted for violation of regulations governing relationships, before callup into the army one in four was either subjected to administrative measures (often including being brought to the militia), or was brought to criminal accountability. Therefore, it is extremely important from the very outset to ensure a correct understanding by each soldier of the requirements of laws and regulations on mutual relations in the military collectives, and the consequences and responsibility for their violation, and to teach them the ability to withstand the influence of violators of order, and the ability to defend themselves.

This can be achieved if in the unit or on the ship a system for preventing non-regulation relationships is functioning. That is, what is needed is a totality of efforts by commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations, and a precise thrust for all means of education. And, understandably, the nucleus of this system and its cementing foundation must be the commander or supervisor, on whom military regulations place responsibility for discipline and education of the personnel. Life indicates convincingly that maintaining regulatory relations in the collective depends decisively namely on him.

Subunit commanders A. Yerokhin and A. Simonov from one of the military units displayed themselves to be authoritative and able leaders. Inherent to them are high professionalism, personal example, and closeness to their subordinates. They carry out the work of preventing non-regulation manifestations purposefully, in a differentiated manner, taking into account the periods of service of the soldiers, on the basis of thorough study of their subordinates and an individual approach to education and training. It is no accident that in the subunits commanded by these officers, and in the unit as a whole, for the last two years there has not been a single crime stemming from non-regulation relationships. The positive experience of the work of the unit command and political workers has been generalized by the Ground Forces Political Administration, and disseminated by the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Materials from criminal cases and investigations that have been conducted indicate that non-regulation actions are more frequent where commanders have not yet realized thoroughly the need for an uncompromising struggle to root them out, and where no principled assessment is given to them. In this regard I note that a
substantial number of military personnel questioned (up to 50 percent) note in the questionnaires the lack of namely a principled assessment by the officers of instances of humiliation of young soldiers.

Moreover, noting the existence of non-regulation relationships in the subunits, 32 percent of the soldiers questioned stated that the officers and warrant officers themselves do not set an example in the observance of the requirements of laws, regulations, orders, and moral norms, and display crudeness, foul language, and deprecation of human worth in their interaction with subordinates. Analysis of the matters of criminal cases shows that, to one degree or another, incorrect actions or inaction by officers contributed to violation of regulations pertaining to relationships by one in three of those convicted. I will cite, in particular, this example.

Pvt V. Skorokhod cruelly beat a fellow soldier. Sr Lt V. Zhuravskiy, the company commander, saw that the victim had received a serious head wound. But he was not sent for medical observation and treatment. What did he do? For 10 days he did let the soldier out of the company area, hoping that he would feel better. At the same time, he inclined the victim, as well as the other soldiers, to conceal the circumstances of what had taken place. But, they are right in saying that one cannot keep the cat in the bag. The soldier became worse, and the regiment learned about the incident. The military procuracy initiated a criminal case against Skorokhod. The barracks hooligan, as a result, received what he deserved. But here I cannot avoid speaking about one other result. The attempt by the officer to conceal what had taken place, undoubtedly, did considerable harm to the education of the soldiers, and undermined his subordinates' trust in him.

Such attempts, without any doubt, are depraved and warrant the strictest condemnation. But, the psychology of concealing negative phenomena and facts, unfortunately, is frequently engendered by conditions which make it disadvantageous for a commander to show the true situation. It happens thus because higher superiors even today often continue to assess the activity of their subordinates according to the principle: the more violations uncovered, the worse the work of the officer.

The falseness of such practice has been talked about for many years already, but, alas, even today there is still a lot of it. Besides that indicated, here there of course exist numerous other, including objective, factors that cause its tenacity. But, this is already the topic of another article. Here it remains only to add that, in my opinion, we will not advance far the solution of the problem of non-regulation relations, or of many other army and navy problems, until we ensure the true interests of the officers in the quality of their service, by appropriate socio-legal and material measures.

Returning to the reasons for the tenacity of the "dedovshchina," I would also like to name the following: low activeness by non-commissioned officers in the struggle against it. In particular, 67 percent of those compulsory service personnel questioned indicated precisely this aspect of the matter. Truly, many young commanders today, unfortunately, have an insufficient general educational level and poor professional training, as a result of which they do not enjoy the required authority among their subordinates. Attempting to compensate for the lack of authority, they frequently embark upon the path of crudeness toward their subordinates and non-regulation relations, including physical force. At times sergeants even find "common language" with those soldiers called up with them, and support the unlawful claims of some of them for some "exceptional" status, and become participants in general mocking and humiliations against the younger fellow soldiers. Characteristically, some 20 percent of those convicted of such crimes were former junior commanders.

Is there a way out of this situation? Undoubtedly. It seems to me that it is necessary to train junior commanders in regimental schools, as before. Further, we should increase their material interests, and possibly even conclude appropriate contracts with them after they complete compulsory service, contracts of the type found in production, for a year or two, with payment of a decent wage. Moreover, it goes without saying that it is advisable to expand the disciplinary authority of sergeants. I see one of the real ways of overcoming non-regulation relations to be improving the training of junior commanders, raising their authority and the influence on the lives and activities of their military collectives, and their role and importance in the training and education of their subordinates.

As is known, maintaining strict regulatory order in the unit (on the ship) and subunit, is a most important condition for unifying the collectives and instilling in them firm military discipline and law and order. Unfortunately, for some reason it is necessary to repeat this axiom again and again. Some evidently have forgotten that correct relations among military personnel are formed primarily by the tenor of military service, life and everyday living conditions. And, to the contrary, in places where there is a lack of precise organization of service activity and the training and education process as a whole, and strict monitoring of the personnel, especially in the evening, and on days off and holidays, and where soldiers and sailors are frequently left to their own devices, fertile soil is also created for non-regulation relations.

Here is a statistic that confirms this. More than 80 percent of the crimes associated with violation of regulations on relations are committed in those collectives where the training and service of the personnel are not precisely set up, where the living conditions of the soldiers are not properly arranged, and where there is a lack of concern about organizing their free time and rest.

And take public opinion, which is a most important regulator of people's behavior. In those subunits where, through the efforts of commanders, political workers,
and party and komsomol activists, a healthy public opinion has been created with respect to any manifestations of lack of discipline, including anti-regulation actions, and there is an atmosphere of openness and glasnost, the soldiers themselves display principles in assessing both their own deeds and those of their comrades.

And, to the contrary, unhealthy manifestations in relations among soldiers usually occur where the collective consciousness has not been tuned to firmly rebuffing violators, where apathy and passivity reign, and where indifference has firmly nestled in the hearts of the soldiers and sergeants. In confirmation, I want to say that, according to materials from criminal cases, two thirds of the crimes associated with non-regulation manifestations were carried out in the presence of other military personnel, with their connivance and non-interference. This is why perestroika of the consciousness of soldiers and sergeants, developing in them social activeness and intolerance toward any anti-social deed, is a task of exceptional importance.

The “dedovshchina” is a complex problem. Understandably, it cannot be solved in one swoop. Society has, figuratively speaking, given it a harsh sentence. And it is necessary to get rid of this freakish phenomenon; i.e., to put the sentence into effect, through the joint efforts of commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations, and representatives of health organs.

About the author: Anatoliy Timofeyevich Ukolov finished the Kemerovo Military Communications School in 1959. He served as chief of a radio station, and platoon commander. After completing the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin in 1967, he worked as a member of and deputy chairman of military tribunals of a military district and a group of forces, and chairman of the Pacific Fleet military tribunal. Since 1985 he has been deputy chief of the Administration of Military Tribunals. In June 1989 he was elected a member of the USSR Supreme Court by the USSR Supreme Soviet. He is also a deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium.


Uzbek Komsomol Compensates Invalid Veterans

[Appeal by the Uzbek Komsomol CC and the Republic Office of the Uzbek SSR State Insurance Committee]

[Text] As an act of humaneness, human duty and mercy, the Uzbek Komsomol CC and the Republic Office of the Uzbek SSR State Insurance Committee appeal to you to support an initiative on the establishment of general life insurance policies for the amount of 1,000 rubles for soldier/internationalists with disabilities in categories I or II resulting from combat operations. That amount will be paid to them when the policy matures, and while the policy is in effect it will cover them for negative developments resulting from injuries and so forth.

The policies are set up by Komsomol brigades or establishments, organizations, enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes using their own funds.

The insurance premiums may be paid monthly or in a lump sum for the entire policy term (3 or 5 years) at special rates.

Interview with Lt Gen Gromov of Kiev Military District

90UM0131A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 5 Nov 89 p 4

[Interview with Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, commander, Kiev Military District, USSR people’s deputy, by PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent Reserve Colonel G. Chernomorskiy; date, place, and occasion not given]

[Text]

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] In the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a deputy, speaking on early discharge of students, exclaimed with delight that the first victory had been won. At the same time, the mass information media have been presenting a large amount of responses that may be summarized as: “Considering the difficulties faced by the Army, former students are willing to continue their service.” Boris Vsevolodovich, what are your feelings on the situation that has come about?

[Gromov] First about the students. Unfortunately, all of them were discharged into the reserves, in spite of their stated desire to continue in the service and prepare for worthy replacements. Law is law, and it must be carried out. As far as the deputy’s speech is concerned, in my view there is nothing to become excited about. Of course, bearing in mind the interests of the national economy, we made the proper decision: Let students first study, then serve. That makes sense. What is disturbing is something else: It was not necessary to take away from the Army 176,000 specialists all of a sudden, without looking at the problem realistically and without first doing the preliminary work. The consequences will be felt for a long time.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] How could something like that happen?

[Gromov] Far be it for me to think that all this was due to popular sentiments on the part of some members of the Supreme Soviet. Some deputies were overcome by a desire to resolve the problem as soon as possible. It is also possible that there were those who did not want to acquire the reputation of being retrograde—anti-perestroikoviks—so they also raised their mandate in the air.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] In the present session it is not necessary to raise the mandate in the air. All one has to
do is press the button of an electronic device to have a screen display all voting information. The technology may be new, but the problems are still there, as pressing as ever. For example, the draft law on granting amnesty to servicemen who committed crimes while serving in Afghanistan was hotly debated. That has to do with prisoners of war. It is a fact that Soviet public opinion is highly divided on this issue. You were in Afghanistan 5 years; you most likely have a definite opinion relative to this problem.

[Gromov] War is war. Command authorities do not always make the proper decisions, and the enemy attains overwhelming superiority. In a word, situations do differ; being taken prisoner of and by itself cannot be considered to be a crime. That is for sure. According to our information, 312 men were being held as prisoners of war. Many of them perished, as did the 12 heroes who on 26 April 1985 revolted and took over Badabar Fortress, which is located 35 kilometers south of the Pakistani town of Peshawar. Of course, it is not given to everyone to exhibit such courage and tenacity. That goes without saying. However, why do we consider as prisoners of war all former Soviet servicemen travelling with mujahedeen bands or those who have emigrated to foreign countries?

Ozhegov's Explanatory Dictionary provides a rather precise definition of the word "captivity": "A state of enslavement of a person who is taken prisoner and deprived of freedom." Note the term "taken prisoner," I do not want to be pedantic, but let's be fair. Would you consider a soldier to be a prisoner of war if he throws a grenade at his comrades, fires an automatic weapon at them, and runs over to the enemy's side? Before another day passes, he then uses his automatic weapon once more, this time firing from trenches belonging to the mujahedeen. That is not being a prisoner; it is being a traitor.

Even proponents of a general amnesty, in their incessant desire to portray themselves as archhumanitarians, know that it is difficult to establish legal grounds for this kind of decision. They appeal for mercy. I have seen blood and death. I saw people die before my very eyes. I had to sign death certificates more than once, and I understand too well that by forgiving known murderers today, we are giving free rein to future traitors who, if heaven forbid war does break out, will once more shoot at their own people. Before they make their decision, it would be good if the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet would do some thinking about the mothers of the children that lost their lives in Afghanistan, not only to mujahedeen bullets.

[Gromov] I would like to see the deputies control themselves and learn to communicate and listen to each other, so that their decisions are not only topical but competent.

Of course, also important are the kinds of laws that the congress will approve and the kind that will be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet for reworking. However, even more important is the carrying out of the laws that already are on the books. I am against the use of pressure and dictating in any form, but attempts made by certain circles to commit illegal acts under the guise of pluralism should be stopped immediately and unequivocally. Although barracks discipline is unacceptable in society, we are all obligated to observe the law.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] Comrade Commander, in our news media—both the printed and the electronic—there is often a tendency to portray the Armed Forces in a way that forms a negative opinion in the Soviet person. Attempts are made to blame the Army for all the troubles common to all of society. On top of that, it is sometimes accused of transgressions with which it has nothing to do. You may have read Ivan Andreyev's article "Time to Play Peaceful Games," which was published in SOBESEDNIK No 37. What are your feelings on the article? Do you share the writer's opinions?

[Gromov] Only one. I believe that peaceful games are always better than war games, but on the condition that a "game" has firm rules that are not violated. As far as definite statements made in the article are concerned, the author, being a diplomat, not military man, proceeds from false premises.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] Can you be more specific about that?

[Gromov] Yes, I can. In speaking of length of service, I. Andreyev willingly or unwillingly suggests to the reader the need for making additional strength reductions in our Army. It is quite clear that with the term of service in our Army being 24 months, not 15 months as in the Bundeswehr, our Army in proportion to the size of the population is larger than the armed forces of the FRG.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] Is that really so?

[Gromov] That is true, but the basis of his figuring is faulty. Following his logic, one can go a step further and say that we can unhinkingly disarm even more, since we possess considerable superiority over Norway's Air Force or because our nuclear submarine fleet is more powerful than that of the USA. The point is that the level of defensive sufficiency is determined not by the might of a particular branch of service, but by the level of development of all the Armed Forces as a whole. So, in the opinion of authoritative experts of the USA, England, and the FRG, there was approximate parity between the Warsaw Pact armies and NATO even before the announcement by the Soviet government, then by
the governments of the other Warsaw Pact member nations, relative to unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces.

[PRAVDA UKRAYINA] There are those among the populace that believe that the parity has been disrupted. Is that the case?

[Gromov] It is possible. NATO does possess definite superiority in certain types of armaments, but the power of our Armed Forces is generally equal to the missions called for by the new defensive doctrine. There can be no doubt that if NATO responds by taking measures of its own, then we can think about taking further steps toward disarmament.

[PRAVDA UKRAYINA] Andreyev obviously desires to emphasize the illegality of introducing Soviet troops into Afghanistan by writing: "Few people know that the creators of the FRG's fundamental law drew on lessons learned from history when they included in their constitution the provision that the armed forces of the FRG cannot be employed in regions of the globe lying beyond the sphere of action of NATO." Would you like to comment on that?

[Gromov] Indeed, few people know of this provision in the FRG's constitution. But that really does not say much, for the "sphere of action of NATO" includes the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Near East, the North Pole. The list is quite long. Note that the constitution says "regions of the globe," not of the continent.

The article contains other questionable statements. Andreyev writes that the West German sees danger in the fact that our Army is capable of waging large-scale offensive operations at any time, while the FRG's Army cannot do this. His argument is extremely simple: "The Bundeswehr's barracks are more than half empty on days off, since all servicemen other than the company on duty are offered the opportunity to go home." It is hard to say whether this is a case of naivete or simply a lack of knowledge of armed forces. It is a fact that all armies—with the exception of one in a musical comedy—have their operational and strategic plans defining the actions they will take in particular situations. I can let you in on a "little secret": The Bundeswehr also has this kind of plan.

Now about something that relates to geography, not the military. Our servicemen also are issued passes and they too go on leave. The Navy even allows a third of a ship's personnel complement to go ashore when a ship is riding at anchor. As far as going home is concerned, that indeed does not happen very often. The tiresome talk of our supposed aggressiveness has nothing to do with this. Just take a look at a map of the FRG. All a Bundeswehr soldier has to do is jump onto a bus or electric train and he is home within two hours at most. In our country, it is a different story.

[PRAVDA UKRAYINA] I served in the Armed Forces for more than a quarter century. I was issued an apartment in my twelfth year of officer service. I spent some time in various military posts, those located in capital cities and those in the "boondocks." I saw how difficult it can be for officers. I am not talking about the burdens of military service—they are inevitable. I am speaking of social vulnerability. So here we have Andreyev saying that the Army in our society is never refused anything. I have the impression that he never served in the Army and that he is discussing subjects with which he has nothing to do. It is possible that I am mistaken, since much water has flowed under the bridge since I was discharged.

[Gromov] Definite changes have come about. It may be dialectics on my part, but there is much that has not changed. Take the housing problem. To provide officers and warrant officers with a place to live, we must build twice as much as now. But where are we to obtain the money, the resources? Where to find contractors? Something else that needs mentioning is the situation of the officer who completes his training on some post located in a forest, rents a standard-issue apartment, and then with his family must live many years in inadequate quarters until he is issued an apartment, which, according to the law, is supposed to be made available to him within three months. Note that this kind of situation is not peculiar to the Kiev Military District. Clearly, the problem is not one that can be resolved by the Ministry of Defense alone.

[PRAVDA UKRAYINA] The picture is not encouraging, of course. It is a fact that the problem of housing, rather the lack thereof, is shared by everyone. Also suffering are miners and railway workers. What can you say about availability of other material benefits? Everyone knows that an officer is paid according to his rank and the position he occupies, with additional pay based on length of service.

[Gromov] I do not believe that professional military men enjoy a privileged situation. Forget the lieutenant. Take a senior officer. At first glance, his pay seems to be quite decent. But how does he live? His wife does not work, as a rule. Not because she does not want to work, but because there are no jobs available. If the officer has a roof over his head, fine; if not, he rents a place to live in the private sector. This costs him 40 to 50 rubles even in a rayon center. Not for an apartment—for a room. Concerning the conveniences: They are located outside. And how long is the work week of the officer or warrant officer?

[PRAVDA UKRAYINA] So, you think that the time has come to put in a word for the poor major?

[Gromov] I do. If inflation continues at the same rates, the material situation of military cadres in the next few years will drop to the poverty level.

[PRAVDA UKRAYINA] Getting back to Andreyev, I keep having the feeling that the author is deliberately attempting to put the Armed Forces in an unfavorable light.
Garrison Construction in Novorossiysk Area

90UM0131B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Letter to the editors: "A Command Post Immediately Below"]

[Text] Dear Editors!

I am happy to see that you have started the rubric "The Army and the Ecology." Maybe now the military will listen to our complaint. Let me explain.

A military unit has taken up quarters, occupying an entire microrayon, in the very center of Novorossiysk. The KPP [regimental command post] was set up directly under the windows of our five-story building. Trucks, passenger cars and other vehicles rush back and forth day and night, announcing their presence with a roar of engines and loud horns; not to mention the fouling of the air. Is this something we must tolerate day in and day out?

It used to be that heavy vehicles would drive through another KPP—one located far from residential buildings. That was better for us. We appealed to the headquarters to arrange matters at least as they were previously, but we were told in a sarcastic manner to seek help to calm our nerves. Later it was explained to us that there was no one available to man a second KPP as a result of the personnel shortage following the reduction in the Army. That is how perestrojka has touched our lives.

It seems that city officials also could not reach an agreement with the unit's command authorities and simply gave up. Is there no way we can have peace and quiet once more?

G. Ryleyeva
(artist)

Social Problems Created by Reduction, Abolition of Central Asian MD

90UM0131C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col O. Falichev in the column: "Armed Forces Reductions—Aspects of the Problem"; "A District Is Abolished"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] It is generally known that one of the important measures taken in the course of the Armed Forces reductions currently in progress was the abolition of two military districts—the Central Asian and the Urals. Is there any need to discuss the wide scope and the complexity of these measures, the number of people whose lives are touched?

What does the future hold in store for officers and warrant officers subject to the reduction? What uses are there for the equipment that is being released from service? How much thought and organization are there in all this? These questions and others are disturbing by their very nature. Our correspondent visited command authorities in the area occupied by the former Central Asian Military District in an attempt to obtain answers to some of these questions.

Thorough preparations for the abolition of the district were being made in the personnel directorates of the SAVO [Central Asian Military District] and the Ground Forces, and in the Main Personnel Directorate. A program was developed to abolish the district. Service personnel that were discharged into the reserves as a result of the Armed Forces reductions were informed of their benefits and rights. This generally was conducive to maintaining morale and created favorable conditions for personnel organs to do their work. However, circumstances appeared on the scene, as the present saying goes. There were instances of more rapid reporting to "upstairs" of measures taken. On the whole, resolution of the large number of personnel problems was no easy matter.

Consider the facts. The district was abolished as of 1 June. Many servicemen subject to reduction were transferred to new duty stations. Approximately 20 percent are being discharged into the reserves. They are mostly officers and generals who have attained maximum age. However, almost 4 months after the district was officially abolished, about 180 officers are still awaiting a decision on the future. Many have been assigned to the district commander. This means that quite a few of them—including their families—are in a state of limbo. Considering that an officer can be kept "off the official list" up to one year, such a prospect hardly brings joy to anyone. Some officers become despondent and telephone the personnel directorate themselves or make a trip to Moscow.
Indeed, finding employment for hundreds of persons is difficult. However, we cannot ignore the question: Are some personnel organs not abusing the opportunity of taking an entire year to decide someone’s future? Do we sometimes lose sight of how much this costs the state? Not to mention the state of mind of a person who is torn apart by uncertainty for months on end?

“We consider it essential to render assistance to the officer placement activities being carried out by the Personnel Directorate of the Ground Forces and the Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, but decisions are unfortunately slow in coming,” said Major General B. Gusev, Personnel Directorate chief in the Turkestan Military District. “It is embarrassing for a conscientious person to receive a salary if he is ‘off the official list.’”

Officers whose future is being decided are offered various jobs, of course, but we can see that the problem of the time wasted is serious. Nonetheless, it would be solved much more easily if it were not associated with another problem that is just as important. Which one is that?

“The fact is, in many cases the district control organs were the first to be dismantled, and only later were the remaining structures eliminated,” explained Major General Gusev.

Well, perhaps circumstances dictated the application of this particular procedure to resolve the tasks at hand. However, if one is to speak of people’s futures, one must know that certain chiefs and commanders were transferred to new assignments before they could complete their work of placing their subordinates. This meant that the officers’ futures were turned over to persons who were unfamiliar with their professional and moral characteristics.

“The captain is the last to abandon ship,” said political worker Colonel B. Babakhin, giving his opinion on this issue. “In our case, the first to leave for new assignments were the commander, military council member, and personnel directorate chief.”

“I do not want to impose my way of thinking, but I believe that in a situation where a unit, combined unit, or district is being dissolved, a commander’s authority can only increase if he exhibits concern over the future of his subordinates and does not leave them to someone else’s care at such a time. Some officers in the Central Asian Military District felt that they were simply abandoned and no longer deserving of attention.”

“I must admit that the reduction has caused problems,” agreed Major General A. Ryabtsev. “You can see this in the officers’ morale. But we do have to live with the new tasks.”

The tasks are quite difficult as far as maintaining combat readiness is concerned. They are about the same as those that faced the district. There are other problems. For example, relations with local party and soviet organs are less than ideal. City officials had claims on the headquarters building; it was necessary to find a document proving that it had been purchased for several million rubles. Also, one of the party leaders at the oblast level asked the question point-blank: What do we get from the district reduction?

Does this decidedly consumeristic approach serve the common cause? Of course the reduction will produce fallout for the economy. The figures speak for themselves. In a period of three and a half months, there were sold to the economy in the Turkestan Military District more than 2,000 vehicles of various types and about 300 motorcycles. In addition, applications were received for the purchase of 1,969 other vehicles. Thus, the process of transferring equipment to the economy is operative. And it will increase throughout the Armed Forces.

That is only one aspect showing that the reduction is not an internal affair as far as the Army is concerned. However, there is another aspect: The Army—especially the units and combined units taking the reductions and undergoing reorganization—needs support from local authorities. It seems that a realization of this is starting to come through. N. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, has received the installation commander. Problems relating to making the necessary housing available and offering employment to officers discharged into the reserves are on their way to resolution. In addition, I was told that an operations group for placing reserve soldiers has been organized in response to the abolition of the district. It is headed by the first deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Gosstroy. The group seeks to find employment for officers, warrant officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel. The service personnel are enrolled in retraining courses if they so desire. N. Makiyevsky, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Gosstroy, said: “We must render assistance to men entering the reserves so that they can join labor collectives.” Agreement was expressed by Colonel General I. Fuzhenko, commander of the Turkestan Military District: “Relocating units is much more than moving little flags around on a map. Also, we must not forget the families of officers and warrant officers, their children....”

I remember well how often it was said at meetings, aktivs, and conferences that the Central Asian Military District was located on the territory of three union republics—Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Tajikistan. What was meant was that it possessed a special status and solved extraordinary problems commensurate with its territorial expanse. All of a sudden, all the problems are inherited by the Turkestan District. There has been no relaxation in combat readiness requirements levied on the remaining units. Indeed, it has become more difficult to fulfill them.

“There has been an increase in problems of troop control,” said Major General A. Agafonov, “but we are attempting to resolve them.”
Improvements have been made in communication with units and subunits; signal and interaction procedures are undergoing refinement. Storage of combat vehicles and weapons belonging to disbanded units has been rendered more difficult.

"Just imagine: approximately one or two electricians to 1,000 storage batteries," commented Colonel B. Zhitnik. "It is unrealistic to expect the men to perform regular quality servicing."

That may appear to be a mere detail, but without this "detail"—the storage battery—no combat vehicle will start. This also holds true for servicing wheeled vehicles and other vehicles. You must realize that the men, in addition to maintaining thousands of units of combat materiel in combat-ready condition, must also perform corrosion prevention work, security, and numerous other tasks. There is already an insufficiency of personnel at times to man two guard shifts. How can there be talk of quality work when specialists cannot shake themselves loose from guard duty? The point is that personnel are not the only item in short supply: There is a shortage of thermoelectric materials, battery charging equipment, alarm systems... How is it that we set out to build a house without making provision for walls?

"These problems were not thought out well enough," opined Major General V. Yashkin, staff directorate chief in the Turkestani Military District. "The reduction in progress is an extraordinary event for the Armed Forces, of course."

The point here is that all the measures should have had a "run-in" period and only then applied to troops. I was told that the existing impression is such that the order was issued to dismantle the district, but it is up to the "underlings" to worry about the details.

"This is reminiscent of the slogan method of the stagnation period," offered Major General V. Sychev. "We are supposed to foresee the consequences of any innovation that may be introduced."

It must be stressed that no one doubts the necessity of carrying out these organizational measures. Everyone knows full well why the district was dissolved, and the decision is supported. At issue here is the fact that a good and proper decision should not be carried out in such a wasteful manner. It would appear that plans were made to suffer a certain percentage loss of goods slated for storage, as if we were dealing with frozen potatoes rather than modern vehicles. Judge for yourself: A large amount of equipment will lie out in the rain and snow for years. What will happen to it?

Many things are being discussed after the fact, of course. But they must be discussed, if for no other reason but to learn a lesson for the future. After the lapse of some time, there may be tens and even hundreds of thousands of units of combat materiel in this kind of situation in the country. How to preserve it? What is the optimum composition of service personnel? Is it possible that we will lose millions of rubles by trying to save a few rubles today? These are not idle questions; they cannot be resolved all at once. Before submitting this article for publication, I visited the interested General Staff directorate of the USSR Armed Forces. I was told that yes, these are important problems; they will be resolved in due course. And concerning the difficulties being encountered, well, what great affair is not associated with them.

Abolishment of the Central Asian Military District has given rise to a number of problems and generates much thought and comparisons. The conclusion suggests itself: In the course of a reduction in the Armed Forces and structural and mission changes in units and military districts, any haste or failure to make preparations is reflected firstly in the man wearing the uniform and his morale, then in combat readiness. This must not be permitted.

Obituary: Lt Gen (Ret) P.A. Malyakshin
90UM0200A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[Obituary: "P.A. Malyakshin"]

[Text] After a grave illness Lieutenant General, retired, Petr Artemyevich Malyakshin, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, passed away. He dedicated his entire conscious life to selfless service to the Motherland and the cause of the Communist Party of which he was a member since 1943.

P.A. Malyakshin was born 5 October 1923 in the village of Malye Karmaly in the Chuvaskaya ASSR. From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War he saw duty in the regular army. His combat career took him from being a scout with the rank of private to commander of a rifle company having demonstrated personal courage and heroism. He was wounded three times.

In the years following the war, having graduated from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, he commanded a battalion, a regiment, a division, was first deputy commander of an army and deputy commander of a military district. From 1981 to 1987 as a department head at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, he made a significant contribution in the training of highly qualified officers.

In all areas of service with which he was entrusted P.A. Malyakshin demonstrated a high level of competence, organizational ability, exceptional diligence, an adherence to principles and consideration in his dealings with people.

The Communist Party and the Soviet State highly valued the accomplishments of P.A. Malyakshin. He was
awarded the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Great Patriotic War Class I, the Order of the Great Patriotic War Class II, three Orders of the Red Star, the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces Third Class and the Order of Merit as well as numerous medals.

A fond memory of Petr Artemyevich Malyakshin will remain in our hearts forever.

Effects of Reduction on Two Tank Battalions
90UM0125A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Nov 89 First Edition p 1-2

[Article by O. Bedula, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Volga-Ural Military District: “Autumnal Rush Jobs”]

[Text] Many people are now calling tank battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Sh. Khannanov a prophet. He had foreseen that his battalion would have to receive an unsatisfactory grade on its inspection. Other people consider him to be a temporary failure. An inspection determines one’s fortune and fortune turned her back on you this time, Shamil Gabdulakhovitch. But there are also those who “sentenced” him in interviews, behind his back, for, they say, it is not this mess that will cause Khannanov to stumble and have all his service decline...

As for the battalion commander himself, few people were interested in his explanation as to why his personnel were poorly trained. And that is why neither his own command nor the inspectors from Moscow took that into consideration. Yes, Khannanov himself now understands that he had generally attempted to explain well-known truths to everyone. For example, pulling people away from planned training would eliminate any hopes of increasing the professional skills of the tankers. True, he had still had a glimmer of hope that the “everything is as it was” that was told to the inspectors would ease the severe inspection, they would understand the situation and add at least half a point to the regiment’s score for accomplishing the collateral missions that in one way or another impacts on the regiment’s combat readiness...

They heard him out, but were not officially sympathetic, although they were in unofficial conversation. But what is the use of all his arguments once the grade was written down? What is the use of looking from autumn back to summer and spring if you do not return to that golden time, do not teach people and do not get the leadership to change its mind? All that remains is that which you now await—they relieve you from your duty position or they do not.

People had often told me that Khannanov was an energetic, active, cheerful officer. Sitting before me at our meeting was a tired, confused man who seemed very guilty of something. Shamil Gabdulakhovitch smoked constantly and talked very, very fast, as if he was afraid that I would leave without listening to his whole story and without finding out about the bitter, ugly truth with which he had lived in private for many month.

The battalion commander stated, “As far back as summer I received the order to disassemble 22 tanks and send them in to be melted down. At the same time I had to accept other combat equipment, service it and sent it in for long-term storage. We certainly had to manage this before cold weather arrived. But since the people in the battalion could be counted on one hand and it took 340 man-hours to prepare just one tank for storage I immediately asked the regimental commander what I should do about planned military training. And I later asked this same question at our major unit headquarters. Everyone everywhere answered to the effect that I had to be able to ‘win the war on two fronts.’ But there were many more ‘fronts.’ A day later there was guard duty. We had to repair the barracks and re-stock the warehouses. We had to put up fencing in the wheeled-vehicle motor pool and build a daily vehicle technical servicing point. We had to repair the tank firing training area. There were extended temporary detached duty trips...”

In September the battalion commander was hospitalized for nervous over-exertion. And a month before the inspection he was given a new mission. He was to focus all his efforts on combat training. But the tankers did not have the knowledge and skills even after this desperate flurry. In speaking soon afterward at a party gathering Khannanov said, “Comrade Communists, I am going to the guillotine.” To this the regimental commander hesitantly answered. “Perhaps we will make it through this.”

They did not. The battalion was awarded a “two” in marksmanship, driving and physical training. It is certainly possible to complain that organizational blunders turned the battalion’s inspection into an exhausting, interrupted marathon without sleep and valuable rest, something that had to have an effect on the evaluations. But obviously there was also something else—the level of the personnel’s professional training was rather poor.

How could that training level be high when the battalion was involved in everything else but combat training for the entire training year. Regimental Party Committee Secretary Lieutenant Colonel P. Tkachenko indignantly said, “The annual training plan for the training area and the schedule of exercises... these documents were never even a guide for anyone. We live by the principle ‘We go wherever they send us.’ Everyone puts the blame on Moscow, Moscow, they say, sends endless hypothetical exercise situations and this is certainly not the first year for this practice. Lieutenant Colonel K. Bolshakov was ‘trampled’ in this job before Khannanov got it. Company and platoon commanders soon lose interest in the service.”

To be objective, I have to say that it is not just this regiment that is constantly in trouble with time and nervous tension. It is the same in other units that have been deployed into garrisons. This is due to the fact that units have made the transition to a new organic structure. As a result, the number of personnel has been drastically reduced and, they tell me, the number of sites that they occupy, the volume of construction jobs and the number of field guard patrols and other such missions have drastically increased.

Any man can lose his head under such extreme conditions. While on guard duty one man teaches a course in marksmanship and putting equipment into operational
configuration. During their tours of duty others prepare for exercises and write summaries. Yet others do as Lieutenant Colonel P. Tkachenko did last year (he was then chief of the regiment’s chemical service) as he worked along with his son to maintain the equipment.

I was given the names of soldiers who were assigned as orderlies for up to twenty days in a row. This was just the soldiers. And the officers were in no better shape. Recent academy graduate Lieutenant A. Polovodov stood 18 details in a row because there was no one to replace him—all the officers were on temporary detached duty.

But let us return to Khannanov. The situation in which he, a recent academy graduate, found himself could certainly have provided stimulating motivation for a serious analysis of the real capabilities of people and the volume of the missions that they resolve. However, judging by everything that we have, this did not happen. The fact is that Major I. Kukhareenko’s tank battalion in another regiment passed the inspection with a “four.” Instead of providing satisfaction, this news strengthened the opinion among many in the major unit headquarters that, they say, it turned out that it was possible to get good marks in our unforeseen situation. They feel that the neighboring unit’s evaluation resulted in Khannanov’s sentence. In conversation with me Lieutenant Colonel S. Martyushev, a major unit staff officer, said, “Obviously Comrade Khannanov is not in the right job.”

True, he then added, “This is my personal opinion.”

And here is what the inspector, a chief of one of the Main Ground Force Combat Training Directorate’s sections, Colonel V. Koshak, thinks about the two battalion commanders: “To be frank, Kukhareenko got his evaluation under inhumanly tense conditions. He spared neither himself nor his people and Khannanov was not able to do this... During the inspection itself Kukhareenko was in the hospital with two bleeding ulcers. As you know, this problem results from nervous over-exertion. True, many people were not so interested in Kukhareenko’s illness as they were in the fact that he temporarily abandoned the hospital bed, took a position at the tank driver’s seat, aimed the main gun and put several ‘fives’ into the battalion’s evaluation scoresheet.”

Thus there is nothing surprising in the fact that people in Khannanov’s battalion will soon begin studying the “latest experience” of Kukhareenko’s battalion. But it should be just the opposite—people should be concerned because this garrison is in such a state and few positive evaluations are being won at any price. Another inspector, Colonel N. Sukhov, a senior officer from the Main Ground Force Combat Training Directorate, shares my opinion in this matter.

“I feel that we have to free this major unit from its planned combat training and also not hold inspections such as this one. In the future inspections will focus only on issues of mobility preparedness, the professional training of the staff and officers and also on the condition of the weapons, equipment and materials in storage.”

I have to say that we are putting a lot of hope on inspectors in the forces. On this plane, we have to put an end to officers having an unregulated work day, endless pulling people from combat training, and having missions that are beyond their capabilities and times for their completion that are unrealistic.

Khannanov says, “We also had a Ground Force inspection last year. We told the inspectors about all our problems. They also sympathized with us and promised that they would report that. But in my opinion there never was such a report. There are certainly many people who simply do not want to tell the whole truth and are afraid of losing the leadership’s understanding and favor. You know, all the battalion officers and I are prepared to sleep two hours a day and spend the rest of the time in our subunits, but this does not help. We have to break the system...”

By system the regiment’s officers mean the organic structure of the unit with all of its enormous numerical strength. At the decision of the organization’s communists, a group of people with a lot of initiative was recently convened. This group developed recommendations to change the structure of subunits and the regiment as a whole and have the volume of their tasks sensibly conform to their capabilities. These recommendations were resolutely sent to three agencies: the Ministry of Defense, the Supreme Soviet and the CPSU Central Committee.

Lieutenant Colonel P. Tkachenko says, “We will no longer rely on others. What is finally more important to us is defending truth, regardless of organizational conclusions or constantly feeling humble because no one has problems as bad as ours.”

And as far as I can see, this appeal to these high levels is also the last hope for Lieutenant Colonel Sh. Khannanov. In part he said, “If everything stays as it was, I will write a report about being transferred to headquarters or to an instructor position. My predecessor, Lieutenant Colonel Bolshakov, is now in a military academy. When we met recently he said that he was literally reborn when he left the battalion...”
Air-Sea Rescue Methods: Black Sea Fleet Experiment
90UM0089A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Nov 89 pp 1-2

[Article by correspondent V. Pasyakin, Capt. 2nd Rank:
"Black Sea Experiment: Search for New Forms of Organizing Rescue of Shipwreck Victims"]

[Text] The tragedy on the Sea of Norway which occurred April 7, 1989 and the death of seamen of the submarine "Komsomolets" highlighted the urgent need to improve the Navy's rescue services and means. An experimental unit, the Airborne Rescue Team (ART), has been set up at the Black Sea Fleet's Emergency Rescue Party (ERP). Its main mission is to rescue people at sea at a great distance from the shore. The team will be carried to the site of emergency by airplane. Of more than 50 military and civilian specialists comprising the ERP, only soldiers with special parachute training were allowed to join the ART. They were Warrant Officer V. Rusanov, Senior Seaman R. Shavyldayev, Seamen O. Lazur and 1. Kondratyuk, each with 45 parachute jumps, Petty Officer Second Class A. Chernyshenko and Seaman V. Kozhushkov, both with 20 jumps, and others. In total, there were 27 men commanded by Lieutenant Colonel G. Novokreshchenov and Lieutenant Colonel N. Borisov, who were responsible for personnel training.

The rescue team spent three and a half months preparing for their baptism by fire. A mock rescue operation was part of the curriculum. It was conducted under the command of the search and rescue service chief Captain First Rank V. Yurmanov.

After receiving the distress signal, the AN-26 plane carrying the ART hastened to the area of emergency. Upon locating dummies floating in water, the team dropped a "Strizh" inflatable craft (IC) with a cargo chute from the height of 200 meters. This was an important point, for this part of the operation had never been practiced at sea without some form of simulation. The question was how the "Strizh", a boat equipped with a 250 horsepower motor, three air tanks for rapid inflation and a three-sectioned bottom, would land and how systems designed to deploy the large 600-kilo capacity craft would function. Everything worked well. The method for deploying the "Strizh", which was developed by the rescue team, proved successful.

After this the rescue team landed. In addition to Warrant Officer V. Rusanov and Seamen O. Lazur and 1. Kondratyuk, the ART included Masters of Parachute Sports from the Navy's Air Force Captain I. Zhuravlev, Warrant Officer Yu. Polulekh and Junior Sergeant Extended Service S. Zuyev. These three men jumped with PO-9 chutes and landed between 1 meter and 1.5 meters to the "Strizh"; having disconnected its parachute, they deployed the boat.

Warrant Officer Rusanov started the motor. Soon, all four dummies floating nearby were lifted into the boat. Another 18 minutes later, the "Strizh" linked up with the search and rescue ship "Donbass" and transferred the "victims" aboard.

And now let me mention the lessons learned during the exercise and some problems which have not been resolved.

It was no accident that three masters of sky diving were included in the group. They landed near the "Strizh" and began working immediately. The three members of the ERP, using the PTL-72 chutes, landed at a distance of 10, 60 and 150 meters from the boat, respectively.

It is significant that even in favorable weather, the rescue team had trouble spotting the "Strizh" in the water. Had the sailors found it earlier, they would have landed nearer to it. This means that the "Strizh" must be visible in the water. For instance, it could be marked by a smokepot. It would then be easily located from an altitude of several hundred meters. At night, a lighting device would be needed, something like a small warning light. In poor meteorological conditions, the rescue team may become dispersed over a considerable area; for this reason, every team member should have a light-weight miniature aviator's life boat MLAS-1, a small portable radio transmitter to communicate with the aircraft and flares.

The "Strizh" itself should also be improved: it must have a transmitter to contact the aircraft and the craft which is being rescued, medical supplies, an emergency food supply, a canopy, a searchlight and lights to enable it to function at night. The inflation device and the outboard motor should be perfected.

These are not minor or idle questions. Difficulties arose during an exercise, in daytime and in good weather; they could well become insurmountable at night or in difficult weather conditions.

And another problem. At this point, the ART is part of the regular ERP, whose future is rather clouded.

"It is not staffed by special personnel but by whoever is left after boats and ships have been staffed," said the commander of the ERP Captain-Lieutenant F. Vinogradov.

The rescuers' work is difficult, especially when real-life action is involved, requiring courage, self-control and intense physical and mental concentration. Few people are eager to tempt fate and risk their lives without adequate benefits. This is why the ERP is understaffed and suffers from defections.

This primarily refers to the warrant officer cadres, which is the core of the ERP. And if there is no solid foundation, how can we expect professionalism of the team as a whole?

It is clear what would happen if the ERP's sills spread to the ART, given its more complex mission. To prevent this, we must solve a number of problems.
First, personnel should be specially selected. This means strong, enduring and well-trained individuals, preferably athletes: sky divers or at least those who have some experience. Second, they should get appropriate training. The specifications I have seen list the following types of training: parachute training and, in order to help the craft in distress, special, medical and physical training. It is clear that neither good training nor success in carrying out rescue missions is possible without the appropriate material base, necessary equipment and reliable and convenient emergency rescue supplies. ERP personnel is still supplied based on ordinary ship regulations. They do not even have special clothing to work in emergencies. With ARTs becoming regular units, the need for special equipment will increase. In addition to floating equipment, they will need airborne and emergency rescue equipment. Moreover, equipment currently in use will have to be replaced, improved or redesigned. For instance, the motor on the “Strizh” should be better protected against the elements at sea, more hermetically sealed and shielded from waves.

The rescue team invented a better way to deploy the IC “Strizh” by dropping it from the aircraft on a platform. However, it is still at the good idea stage, even though it has been tried in practice. There is no doubt that it could be improved with the help of both engineers and designers before being finally adopted.

There are things that need no inventing; they enjoy a good reputation and are used successfully, but not by the rescue team. These include oxygen masks KIP-8 used by firefighters or convenient lamps used by rescuers in mines: they are mounted on helmets and are strong enough to penetrate smoke-filled spaces.

“The list of supplies for the ERP should be revised, or at least we should have the right to purchase necessary equipment from other agencies and ministries,” said Captain-Lieutenant F.Vinogradov. “We should be especially careful and thoughtful when we decide what to equip the ART with.”

The issue of retaining personnel also requires attention. Rescuers’ work involves potentially deadly situations. However, warrant officers of the ERP get only the sixth grade. In other words, their pay is not adequate given the complexity of their labor. This is why the parties are short of warrant officers, who are the professional core of the ERP. The discrepancy will widen when ARTs become permanent, if wages remain unchanged and no new benefits are introduced. We also need to devise a new organizational and staff structure for ARTs to meet the challenges they face. Seamen from the Black Sea Fleet have proposals how to address all of these issues.

There is another organizational problem.

“At one time, there were discussions about transferring the emergency rescue service to the fleet’s General Staff from rear services,” said Captain-Lieutenant F.Vinogradov. “However, only the name was changed. The service was renamed search and rescue. Maybe now, taking the special characteristics of our work into account, its urgency, extreme conditions and combat-like qualities, as well as the impending structural changes, it makes sense to transfer the search and rescue service to the combat training department, for instance. The main mission of rear services is to ensure military preparedness and provide vital services for the fleet. As to the mission of the search and rescue service, it differs greatly in form and content from the missions of food, material, deck gear and other rear services with whom we share the roof. It is a paradox that watch duty in rescue services is not considered combat duty, even though the work of rescue teams is very much like combat, even in peacetime.”

I think that this idea deserves attention and should be closely examined. Incidentally, it fits well with the restructuring of rescue forces underway all over the country, such as the establishment of a government coordinating center for rescue at sea. Life and experience offer proof of the need to concentrate all rescue forces and means in a single center. But what happens in reality?

Even in a single fleet, there are rescue services that are either related or overlapping one way or another: the fleet and its Air Force both have regular and special units. Taken separately, they are much less productive than alone. If they were united and had a joint command at a sufficiently high level (and hence, the ability to make decisions quickly, without needing additional clearance, and pressing additional forces into service to carry out rescue operations), their quickness, effectiveness and capabilities would increase immeasurably. Together with other rescue forces and resources of other agencies, the search and rescue service would be able to carry out not only individual missions but also missions of state significance, on the scale of an entire sea or a large area. If need be, it could assist foreign boats, ships, submarines and aircraft.

Let us recall the lessons of large-scale disasters, such as the sinking of “Admiral Nakhimov”. In that case, the efforts of the Ministry of the Sea Navigation, the Navy, aviation and border troops were coordinated. Evidently, it would be useful if such coordination were practiced in advance and had a certain organizational structure.

The creation of a mobile airborne group capable of working at a great distance from the shore and to operate over a large area was approved by the Navy. However, it remains but a successful experiment of the Black Sea Fleet; it must be followed by a next step. New shoots should not be allowed to fade.

**Book Review:** ‘Submarine Front’ by N.I. Vinogradov

90UM0202A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Vice Admiral (ret) A. Gontayev, under the rubric “New Books”: “Submarine Front”]

[Text] When certain books are published, there is a requirement not merely to inform the readers about them, but to congratulate them as well. In my opinion,
the book, which was published literally the other day at the Ministry of Defense Military Publishing House,—the book of Admiral Nikolay Ignatyevich Vinogradov's memoirs (Vinogradov N. I., Submarine Front—Ministry of Defense Military Publishing House, 1989), is this kind of book. This name is well-known in the Navy. N. I. Vinogradov was one of our most prestigious submariners. As early as 1933, he began his service in the Pacific Ocean as the commander of the lead ship of the Malayutka class submarines. During the war, he commanded a submarine brigade in the North, held the position of chief of submarine operations for the Northern Fleet, and after that chief of submarine operations for the Soviet Navy. During the final stage of the war, he was Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Naval Defense Area...

The book's title—"Submarine Front" aptly conveys the subject matter. A detailed chronicle of epic events and tense combat operations, in which the submarine forces of three warring fleets participated—the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets...

The book is a vivid and captivating work. In contrast to many memoirs, it is not overloaded with specialized military terms nor excessively detailed descriptions. Its principal merit is as a gallery of vivid and authentic portraits of naval personnel—from sailors in the Red Navy to people's commissars, with whom the author became acquainted through fate. In particular, the author writes with great warmth about the acknowledged master of submarine attacks, Ivan Aleksandrovich Kolyshkin and about Magomet Imadutinovich Gadzhiev, in N. I. Vinogradov's estimation, one of the Great Patriotic War's most talented submariners...

Quite a few pages of "Submarine Front" are devoted to Arseniy Grigoryevich Golovko, who commanded the Northern Fleet throughout the war. The commander of the fleet is described memorably as a man, who loved animated discussions with subordinates and was able to arouse creative thought in them. And what is particularly impressive,—as a man capable of assuming the burden of heavy responsibility. The account of a dramatic episode involving the submarine Shch-421 [Shchuka (class of diesel submarine)], which occurred in April 1942, is very instructive on this score. After suffering damage from an exploding mine, the submarine found itself in a difficult position near the enemy's coast. All attempts to tow the Shchuka class submarine were unsuccessful. And then the commander of the fleet, supported by the fleet's military council and guided by the conviction that nothing was more important than human lives, issued an unprecedented order—remove the crew from the submarine and scuttle the ship itself. In addition, the gravity of this decision was intensified even more by the fact that there was a critical shortage of warships in the fleet at that time. But A. G. Golovko stuck to his decision and people's lives were saved.

One automatically begins to think, why today, during peacetime, are we sometimes incapable of rescuing submariners in distress?

Many pages of "Submarine Front" are relevant to the present time. By way of illustration, is it possible to be indifferent to the author's sincere declaration of a sense of personal blame, rarely encountered in memoirs, for the loss of one of his submarines. Nikolay Ignatyevich was unable to forgive himself for the fact that he did not catch the request to return the submarine to base, which, in his opinion, was contained between the lines of the message from the commander of Shch-421, A. Moiseyev. The author writes, "I, especially I, should have understood that something was amiss on the submarine"—and enormous conscientiousness, integrity, and responsibility are read in this line.

Many other pages are also worthy of attention, for example, those dealing with the author's meetings with the prominent naval leaders, V. M. Orlov, I. K. Kozhanov, and K. I. Dushenov, whose lives abruptly came to an end in the avalanche of brutal repressions during the 80's.

The book includes a moving "Word about the Author" by Hero of the Soviet Union, Fleet Admiral G. M. Yegorov. It expresses the hope that N. I. Vinogradov's memoirs, which are written in an intelligent, vivid, and captivating style, will be received with great interest by the readers. It appears that this is indeed the case. It is only a pity that the edition of the book is relatively small—50 thousand copies.
Lt Gen Dolgin on Extent of Civil Defense Response to Azot Disaster

90UM0199A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 89 pp 32-33, 44

[Article by Lt Gen N. Dolgin, deputy chief of USSR Civil Defense: "In the Face of Improbability Theory"]

[Text] The accident which happened on 20 March 1989 at the Azot Production Association in the city of Ionava, Lithuanian SSR essentially was unequalled in scale and in the amount of virulent toxic substances discharged into the environment. Strange as it may seem, however, it did not generate special passions either here or abroad.

What was the matter? The fact is that the discharge even of several tons of such substances into the atmosphere is considered a major accident by Civil Defense personnel, but here 7,000 tons of liquefied ammonia were instantaneously in the environment. At the same time, a finished-products warehouse with 20,000 tons of nitrophosphoric mineral fertilizers also caught fire. A kind of "chemical Chernobyl" formed.

Judge for yourselves. The toxic cloud, which also was being fed by combustion products of nitrophoska (nitrogen oxides, chlorine, ammonia and so on), spread to a depth of up to 30 km, forming a contaminated area of up to 400 km². Specialists estimated that up to 1,000 tons of virulent toxic substances appeared in the first 24 hours and 700 tons of ammonia and 50-70 tons of nitrogen oxides appeared on the following two days.

That picture, which frankly speaking is exceptional, took shape near the city of Ionava. Were a thousand specialists to have been surveyed about its possibility one day before the accident, I am sure everyone would have said that it was improbable.

Hence it would appear an important conclusion follows—in the course of preparing, planning and simulating situations, one must always start with the most unfavorable conditions. I have had occasion to conduct many exercises or participate in them in line of duty, and at times the trainees complained that the exercise situation was farfetched, unrealistic, and something that simply never could be.

How often we use the words "this cannot be" to postpone or brush aside difficult questions and problems. By the way, that was also the case on the eve of the accident at Chernobyl, when a group of scientists from the USSR Academy of Sciences persistently tried to prove to Chief of USSR Civil Defense Army Gen A. Altunin and Civil Defense specialists (including myself) accompanying him that a major radiation accident at the AES [Atomic Electric Power Station] could not be because it simply could not be. But Chernobyl refuted this assertion three weeks later.

We cannot rest hopes, not in any way, only on lucky chance, only on favorable coincidence, although this was what helped avoid major unpleasantness at Ionava.

Because of wind direction, the toxic cloud bypassed major populated points. Lucky? Unquestionably. But that is on the one hand.

The enormous work performed in the days of the accident by local party and soviet entities and Civil Defense staff of Lithuanian SSR and the cities of Kaunas and Ionava showed up in the fact that there were no more serious consequences. Firefighters acted exceptionally selflessly and military personnel actively assisted them. The USSR Ministry of Fertilizers Operations Group headed by Minister N. Ozhanskiy and personnel of the Azot PO [Production Association] played the main role in properly organizing necessary measures to mop up the center of chemical danger.

The absence of loud repercussions and passions over the accident obviously is explained by the fact that consequences of the accident were mopped up in a short time and did not lead to victims among the populace or to contamination of the environment. But of course, Civil Defense entities should learn serious lessons and draw serious conclusions from this incident.

Two main tasks arose in the course of mopping it up as they obviously do in any other such accident. The first was to ensure maximum safety of nearby residents and protection of the environment, especially water sources. The second was to localize and mop up the contaminated area in a minimum time period and carry out a set of complex engineering-technical measures directly at the enterprise.

The Emergency Commission headed by LiSSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Yu. Sheris, local party and soviet entities, and republic Civil Defense staffs carried out a large set of measures for protecting the population. Control and distribution of personnel and assets were organized precisely.

Many bitter lessons of Chernobyl also were taken into account. Above all we should single out the prompt, competent actions of the plant dispatcher service and leadership in the initial period of the accident, which helped save the lives of many workers and employees.

The accident occurred at 1115 hours. As a result, an isothermal tank 12 m in diameter and 26 m high containing liquefied ammonia was ripped from its bottom and thrown 25 m to one side. The base, an enclosing reinforced concrete shell, was demolished in the process. As a result the liquefied ammonia poured out freely, forming a unique lake 0.3-0.4 m deep in an area of up to 10,000 m². Evaporating ammonia mixed with natural gas leaking from a broken line. An intense fire broke out, with flames rising several tens of meters. The nitrophoska warehouse caught fire and PO grounds were enveloped in smoke and ammonia vapors. Azot PO dispatcher F. Kazakavichene promptly gave the "Ammonia Gases’ accident signal throughout the enterprise and she ordered shutdown of the plant and evacuation of workers. This was good. Of course, but the signal had to be passed to the city of Ionava 5 km away via
Vilnius. Residents would have been warned immediately had there been a local population notification system at Azot.

The organization of constant chemical reconnaissance of possible areas of contamination also should be singled out. Despite certain difficulties involving a shortage of chemical reconnaissance instruments and appropriate specialists, it can be said that the director's staff had a clear picture of the chemical situation. Chemical patrols and RKfN [radiation and chemical observation] posts equipped with UG-2 general-purpose gas analyzers functioned efficiently on the main routes and in populated points.

A patrol from the Ionava SES [not further identified; possibly medical and epidemiological station] immediately began work. On 22 March there were already five patrols reconnoitering to a depth up to 50 km. Aerial reconnaissance also was conducted simultaneously. Situation information was transmitted over radio channels four times a day. In parallel with this, observation and laboratory monitoring services of the State Agroindustrial Committee, State Committee for Hydrometeorology, and State Committee for the Protection of Nature were determining the extent of water and fodder contamination. Some 200 samples were taken. An analysis was performed for nitrate content.

In accordance with reconnaissance data and the weather forecast, the republic commission decided to evacuate the population promptly without looking to higher-ups and after consulting with specialists. This was done already with ammonia concentrations of 20 mg/m³ in the air, although ammonia's injurious effects can appear at concentrations of from 100 mg/m³ and higher. This completely precluded the possibility of people being injured.

Up to 40,000 persons had to be evacuated. Both farm transportation and personal vehicles were used, and city buses were taken off routes. Seventeen ambulances and five buses evacuated patients and medical personnel. OOP [protection of public order] service personnel; the duty communications shift; duty shifts of installations; soviet and party entities; and the rayon Civil Defense staff remained in Ionava. The patrol service checked who remained on farmsteads and in settlements and took steps to evacuate them.

Questions of accommodating and feeding evacuees, providing transportation, and assembling people were decided in a calm, businesslike atmosphere, and I admit that it was pleasing for me to see the disciplined, organized behavior of the populace. It would appear that television and radio played a deciding role here. They informed people about the course of events promptly and, most important, truthfully and intelligibly. A lesson learned from Chernobyl also is seen here.

Rumors of course arose and as a rule came from abroad that decisions made by representatives of the center to mop up the accident allegedly were incompetent and the situation was catastrophic. Some rumors unfortunately took root. Central press representatives who arrived from Moscow also saw this. It stands to reason that it is necessary to see problems and deficiencies acutely, but one cannot look only at one side, otherwise the people who bear the brunt of rescue and emergency work on their shoulders will escape notice.

Alas, the press did not notice how selflessly and furiously firefighting subunits headed by Col V. Maksimchuk fought the fire. This was not a simple fire, but a chemical fire. Toxic smoke, limited visibility, and the absence of good approaches to centers of fire extremely hampered firefighters' actions, but together with mine rescue workers, gas rescue workers, and Civil Defense soldiers, they quickly coped with the task and largely prevented more serious consequences. Unfortunately, Vilnius firefighter Genrikh Narkevich died from nitrogen oxide poisoning because of damage to his protective mask eye assembly during a fall. Many firefighters had to be hospitalized at the end of the work.

There also were other victims in the first minutes of the accident. Six persons died and sixty-four were injured. Gas rescue workers, CD medical aid team women, and workers gave first aid. A group of medical personnel of the Azot PO medical unit consisting of two mobile medical first aid teams appeared at the accident site in just seven minutes. Four first aid teams arrived from Ionava at 11:35, two from Kaunas at 12:00 and four from Vilnius at 13:00 hours. Based on indications, they anesthetized victims, applied bandages, washed out eye and mouth mucous membranes with water, and gave oxygen. In my view, the actions of medical personnel deserve a positive evaluation.

It was very important to quickly and accurately determine how to put out the fire. It was essentially not a question of fire, but of a thermochemical reaction. Specialists of the USSR Ministry of Fertilizers and Minister N. Olishanskiy personally had the main say here. After a careful analysis in which a group of scientists from Moscow took part it was decided to neutralize the center of fire with a large amount of water.

I will note, by the way, that ministry heads decided all technical and organizational questions that arose promptly and precisely, and I believe emergency work would have been greatly complicated without their active assistance. I say this for the fact that many proposals about eliminating the ministries now are being heard. I do not know how it is under ordinary conditions, but under emergency circumstances and with major accidents we obviously cannot get by without the technical, financial and, finally, the scientific help of central departments.

I also cannot help but mention the participation of military personnel in the emergency work. USSR Minister of Defense Army Gen D. Yazov regularly looked into the course of events. On his instructions special
units and subunits—obstacle clearance, pipeline, communications, helicopter—were brought in to mop up in the aftermath. Personnel of the Airborne Troops took an active part in the work. As has happened more than once, the Army came to the help of the populace in difficult minutes. Those who sometimes are not beyond heating up passions over our Army and military service could see with their own eyes that officers and soldiers always are ready to lend a helping hand.

Just what lessons and conclusions should be learned and drawn from what occurred?

First, that we are not insured against this kind of accident. This means we have to prepare for them seriously and in advance. For now, such preparation bears more of a theoretical nature. Suffice it to take a look at installation Civil Defense plans that have been drawn up for peacetime. Everything seemingly has been done in accordance with instructions of higher staffs, but the events in Ionava showed that it is extremely difficult to be guided by this document when an accident happens. Obviously a plan of actions by heads and Civil Defense forces in emergency situations that would specifically specify the steps of each responsible person would be more appropriate.

The poor state of supply of equipment for quality detection of virulent toxic substance vapors that exists in the reconnaissance group and the radiation and chemical reconnaissance group also indicates that preparation at Azot was insufficient. Special formations were not outfitted with self-contained breathing equipment for protecting respiratory organs or with means of skin protection; this limited their employment in the presence of high concentrations of virulent toxic substance vapors.

Second, we must also take a more serious approach to improving the mobility and technical outfitting of special Civil Defense forces. I fully share the opinion of VOYENNYE ZNANIYA readers about establishing T/O&E paramilitary units. Obviously there must be those CD subunits which would perform around-the-clock duty and which could arrive in an accident area in a matter of minutes and perform rescue operations professionally. Together with firefighting subunits and first aid teams, their actions would largely help reduce losses and avoid sacrifices.

Of course, time heals wounds. But the problems and lessons revealed cannot be allowed to become more insoluble, the further these troubling March days fade into the past. Many businesslike suggestions and ideas were expressed hot on the heels of the event as a group of specialists was flying back to Moscow. My thought was: I hope that this pain is not forgotten under the press of routine affairs, so that no accident catches us unawares.


Effects of, Measures Against Phosgene
90UMO1998 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 89 p 37

[Article by V. Voznesenskiy under rubric "For Those Who Teach"; "Phosgene"]

[Text] Phosgene or carbonyl chloride, COCl₂, is a prevalent virulent toxic substance. It is a colorless, highly toxic gas with the characteristic sweetish odor of rotten fruit, decay, rotten leaves or damp hay. Under ordinary pressure it solidifies at -128°C and liquefies at +8°C. In a gaseous state it is approximately 3.5 times heavier than air and in liquid state it is 1.4 times heavier than water. Because of high vapor pressure it has a high volatility even at low temperatures. Vapor pressure at 20°C is 1,173 mm of mercury. Maximum concentration at 20°C is 6.4 g/l. The volatility of phosgene at -20°C is 1.4 g/l. Persistence at -20°C is around 3 hours, and in summer no more than 30 minutes. It is stored in cylinders and other containers in liquid form. Pressure within casings does not exceed 1.5-2 atmospheres under ordinary conditions.

It dissolves poorly in water—two volumes of phosgene gas in one volume of water—but is easily soluble in organic solvents such as benzene, toluene, xylene and acetic acid.

Phosgene dissolved in water hydrolyzes rapidly even at low temperature. Phosgene gas hardly hydrolyzes at all, and it takes a long time for a noticeable change of its concentration in air. With relatively high air humidity the phosgene cloud can take on a whitish color from partial hydrolysis.

It readily interacts with caustic alkalies, ammonia, and solutions of sodium carbonate and sodium sulfide. Essentially safe substances are products of the chemical reaction in all these cases.

COCl₂ is obtained from the interaction of carbon monoxide and chlorine in the presence of a catalyst—activated carbon. Because of its great reactivity phosgene is widely used in organic syntheses to obtain solvents, dyes, medicines, polycarbonates and other substances.

Germany employed phosgene as a choking chemical agent against French troops in 1915, and subsequently the British and French also used it. Eighty percent of those who died from chemical weapons were poisoned by phosgene.

The most pronounced feature of an injury from the vapors is pulmonary edema (leakage of blood plasma into alveoli), as a result of which gas exchange is disrupted—the blood's carbon dioxide content increases and its oxygen content drops. It manifests itself only after a latent period of from 4 to 8 hours (periods of 15 hours even have been noticed). During this time the victim feels well and as a rule does not lose work fitness. The appearance of a sweet, often repugnant aftertaste in the mouth, and sometimes nausea and vomiting must be
singed out as the first symptoms in susceptible people. In the majority of cases a slight urge to cough, a tickling and burning in the nasopharynx, and slight disturbances of respiration and pulse rhythm appear.

Features of the next period are rapid, shallow breathing and an ever stronger cough with abundant discharge of frothy liquid sputum (sometimes with blood). Pulse and heartbeat accelerate; temperature rises; headache, dizziness, pain in the chest and throat, asthenia and dyspnea appear; and the face, ears and hands become blue.

The threshold limit value [TLV] in an industrial enterprise’s work spaces is 0.5 mg/m³. Phosgene can be smelled at a concentration of 4.4 mg/m³, and an air vapor content of 5 mg/m³ with a 10 minute exposure is considered the minimum dangerous for inhalation. Death ensues in half of the cases with inhalation of 100 mg/m³ for 30-60 minutes, 1 g/m³ for 5 minutes, and 5 g/m³ in 2-3 seconds.

Respiratory organs are protected by industrial mark V respirators (yellow canister) as well as by civilian masks (GP-5, GP-7), children’s masks and protective self-contained breathing masks.

See the table for the approximate time of protective effect of large-size industrial protective masks (in hours) for work spaces with various concentrations of phosgene.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protective Gear</th>
<th>Concentration (TLV)</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>1,000</th>
<th>44,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V with filter, Vg</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V without filter</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The TLV when using industrial respirators is 22,000 mg/m³ (44,000 TLV), above which only protective self-contained breathing masks should be used. When mapping up accidents at chemically dangerous installations where the concentration of phosgene is unknown, work is done only in protective self-contained breathing masks.

Rubberized protective suits and rubber boots and gloves should be used to keep from getting liquid phosgene on a person’s skin.

First aid measures for phosgene poisoning are to put a protective mask on the victim, carry him from the danger zone and give him complete rest and warmth. Loosen his collar, belt, and all fastenings; if possible remove outer clothing, which may be contaminated by phosgene vapors. Give hot beverages and oxygen. Do not give artificial respiration. The victim should be delivered to the hospital quickly and in a comfortable position.

Determine the presence of phosgene vapors in the air using the multilayer detector tube marked by three green rings which is included in the VPKhR, PKhR-MV and MFKhR chemical detection devices. To do this, open the tube, break the ampoule, insert the tube in the pump and pump it 15-20 times. Then compare the coloring of the upper layer of filler (from the marking) with the color on the cassette label. The filler’s white color changes to green or blue-green under the effect of COCl₂. The presence of phosgene also can be determined using a detector tube marked by one yellow ring. In this case the filler’s lemon-yellow color turns green.

Phosgene can contaminate air in injurious concentrations from a production accident at a chemically dangerous installation or from a leak during storage or transportation. In these cases it is necessary to cordon off the danger zone, move people away and not admit anyone without protective gear. Stay upwind of the zone.

With a liquid phosgene spill, block the liquid with an earth embankment and pour aqueous solutions of ammonia, sodium hydroxide or sodium sulfide on it or cover it abundantly with dirt and water. Contaminated air in enclosed and semiclosed spaces is decontaminated by spraying an aqueous solution of ammonia (when it is impossible to air spaces out).

Defense Conversion for Agro-Industry 'Not So Successful'

9UM0176A Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 46, Nov 89 p 10

[Article by N. Dudorov: "Conversion for the Agro-Industry"]

[Text] Although a certain growth has been achieved in recent years in the production of agricultural products in kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]; nonetheless, no noticeable increase has occurred in food commodities or their variety on store counters. And in many ways this is explained by the fact that a lot of what is obtained from the fields and farms is lost, not only during transport and storage, but also because of a low level of organization of raw material processing.

The processing industry has turned out to be the weakest link in the agro-industrial complex of the country, inasmuch as appropriate attention was not given to this sector of the economy for a long time. It is no accident, for example, that of the gathered harvest of potatoes, vegetables, and fruit, according to the calculations of specialists, up to 30 percent and more is lost. Animal produce is also not fully utilized by far.

That is why 2 years ago a state-wide program was adopted to provide enterprises of the processing industry with modern equipment. Not much time has passed, but this program is already gathering strength. As is known, enterprises of the ministries of the military-industrial complex have been engaged for the first time for its fulfillment. And this is quite understandable. Because it is precisely here that there is a concentration of the most powerful scientific-technical capability, and it is here that the more prominent designers of collectives work who are capable of resolving any tasks in the development of modern machines and equipment.

The country has been developing a defense capability for many years, not taking costs into account and allocating resources to it at the expense of cutting back on the most critical needs of society. And the Soviet people, in this period of approaching conversion, have a right now to count on the assistance of the indicated branches in resolving the most important socio-economic tasks of perestroika. Unfortunately, the work of the ministries of the defense industries to supply the processing branches of the APK [agro-industrial complex] with the necessary machines, lines and aggregates, and shops for the economy is not moving as successfully as one would like.

I had occasion to be present at a regular meeting of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission on Military-Industrial Questions where discussions were held on the results of the activity of enterprises of the defense industry in this direction. In the tables and graphs that were widely displayed there, all indices moved steadily upward. Reporting on the progress of program fulfillment, the managers of branches who spoke cited what appeared to be comforting data on the amount and quality of new types of equipment for milk plants, refrigerators, vegetable storage facilities, and grain mills. But the high rate of growth is associated with the fact that, actually, it goes from a zero level. If you proceed from the real needs in such means of production for the APK processing enterprises, then it is necessary to increase their supply by several times.

The Ministry of General Machine Building, for example, has been instructed to create a large series system of equipment for the output of dry potato puree. Everyone knows what enormous losses of potatoes occur in storage. But only a meager percentage is processed, while in the United States 50 percent of the tubers are processed. Six plants that have promised to initiate enterprises of the aforesaid ministry next year should immediately increase the proportion of potato processing by a factor of six. Then we will finally see food products from this crop on store counters.

Unquestionably, our space industry can sharply improve the counter situation. It has the wherewithal to equip milk plants with first class equipment, to create series production of mini-plants, and to set up a mass conveyor for the production of Russian meat dumplings. But to do this, as the discussion showed at the state committee meeting, in which managers of enterprises, chief designers, and secretaries of party committees participated, will require a closer link with the science and practice of the processing branches.

I.S. Belousov, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission on Military-Industrial Questions, emphasized that the defense complex is in a position fully and in a timely way to ensure a sharp change for the better in the agricultural product processing industry. All that has to be done is to take extraordinary measures today that would respond to that tense situation that has developed in the country with respect to food. Special responsibility is placed on party committees, ministries, enterprises, NII’s [scientific research institute] and KB’s [design bureau] of the defense industry. The front line in the struggle for the better supply of the population with foodstuffs does not pass through agricultural fields and farms only, but here as well.

When something does not succeed in increasing the production of equipment for processing agricultural raw materials, the managers of a number of ministries of the defense complex most often refer to parts-producing factories, suppliers, and interdepartmental partitioning. This was noticeable at the last meeting of the state committee. But if we put the blame on each other, success will not be achieved. It is necessary for the workers of the defense complex themselves to increase the demands on themselves and to take a more active part in the resolution of tasks for the fulfillment of planned programs.

Of course, it is not possible not to note the progress in this important matter. Dozens of NII’s and KB’s of the
industrial complex have been involved in the creation of equipment for the reconstruction and construction of new APK processing enterprises. Plants of this system fulfill an increasingly greater proportion of orders for equipment for the processing branches, and this year it already constitutes about 30 percent, and it will reach 45 percent next year.

However, for the time being there has not been any radical improvement in the supply of equipment for the APK. Many design organizations are still standing on the sideline and are not participating in the development of these machines and aggregates. Moreover, of the equipment that has been developed and is being supplied no more than 15 percent corresponds to the world level, and an overwhelming part of the equipment is based on obsolete principles, does not guarantee high productivity, and is not distinguished by reliability and the quality of products it produces.

The cost of the newly developed machines and aggregates by collectives of the defense complex frequently exceeds the cost of similar equipment systems produced previously by several times. This places a heavy burden on processing industries, sharply increases the costs of production, and affects their financial results negatively.

When the program for furnishing the processing industry with equipment was being worked on, by far not all parameters were clearly defined as to what and how much had to be supplied. Now the tasks and terms have to be refined, closer contacts have to be established among all branches and departments that are participating in the execution of programs, and relationships have to be arranged with suppliers of components in order to put an end to lack of coordination in this work. It is also important to more fully utilize ties with foreign firms that are engaged in the development and production of similar equipment.

The APK system also has quite a few of its own enterprises for the production of machines for the processing branches. It is also necessary to arrange close contacts with them and to provide every possible assistance in increasing the technical level of their articles. In many industrial centers, various plants are included in the output of machines for the processing branches. This is a sizable reserve for increasing the indicated equipment.

A joining of the efforts of all of the ministries and departments will facilitate the creation of a strong base in the APK processing industry in a very short time, it will sharply increase output, and it will broaden the variety of foodstuffs in the country.
Obstacles to Computerization at Lenin
Military-Political Academy
90UM0139A Moscow KRAVSKAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Nov 89 First Edition p 2


[Text] The process of computerizing the military VUZs, about the importance of which many government words have been said and written, actually continues to be like a tightly fettered race horse glancing enviously at his more loosely fettered comrades from the civilian VUZs, who, albeit not so very rapidly, are still covering the long stretch.

The fetters on our race horse are nothing other than all sorts of instructions, barriers and regulations which have outlived their usefulness but continue to thrive. They are not the only ones. At the civilian VUZs the concept "whatever is not forbidden is allowed" is forging ahead. At the military school the well-known concept, familiar to more than a single generation of officers, "only that which is [officially] permitted is allowed," remains unshakable. Perhaps it is justified in certain areas of the work, but certainly not in the development of computerization, since the officially defined paths of development simply cannot surmount the endless problems of all kinds.

What is needed most of all for computerization? The answer is basic and simple: more computers. But computer equipment is expensive, very expensive. Furthermore, with the exception of some home computers as the BK-0010, Agat and Mikrosha, they cannot even be bought in the stores. These bear the name "computer" only through a misunderstanding or egotism on the part of their developers and producers. These Soviet "masterpieces of computer technology differ from programmed minicalculators only in their incredibly high price and their weights and sizes. So there is no point in even considering them.

Serious work requires real computers such as the general-purpose YeS-1060 computer, the SM-1420 minicomputer, the YeS-1840 personal computer.... And in adequate quantities. But what is our reality?

Such computers can be acquired only by requisitioning them through the supply system. Since the requisition system is rigidly centralized, however, and since industry does not always produce what is needed—and far from always in the full quantity—a requisition has to be prepared according to a pattern worked out by someone: not what is needed but what is authorized. Then one has to wait a long time, a year and a half at best, for the requisition to be filled. When the promised date arrives, one frequently hears: You can obtain the computers, but not the model indicated in the requisition and not the number requested.

With respect to supplying military VUZs, they always get what is left. Points count when there is a shortage, and only crumbs are left for the needy. The military-political VUZs are at the end of the waiting line for computers. They are hopelessly caught up in a situation not just of shortages, but also of the old, stereotypical views on the political worker's occupation, which hold that the political worker has absolutely no need for a computer.

Our academy, one of the largest, which engages in fairly extensive scientific work in many fields, for example, managed with difficulty to scrape together for all of its departments around 10 modern personal computers and several dozen Agata and Mikrosha "consumer" computers. For the jobs performed by the academy's computer laboratory, we need at least four small computers and one mainframe. We have managed to obtain only three small computers, and a mainframe is out of the question for now. Furthermore, the laboratory's T/O in no way meets our real needs for specialists essential for operating even the available equipment. This is the reality.

If the computer situation is bad, things are even worse with respect to software. No one provides the VUZs with finished programs. They have to be created at each academy and school by a small group consisting mainly of aficionados. The manning tables for the computer laboratories, we repeat, are very rigidly set. What is more, not all of them can be filled. It is difficult to find a qualified specialist to fill the vacancy of an engineer-programmer (a Soviet Army employee), since both the wages and the working conditions in the "civilian" organizations are better than in the military. Particularly today, when many civilian VUZs and establishments are converting to self-financing.

Attempts by the academies and schools to cooperate in the preparation of programs have not been very productive. The situation is caused by departmental segmentation and by the technical and program incompatibility of the computers with which the military educational institutions are equipped. As a result, when the VUZ receives the long-awaited computer, it cannot always be brought up to full operating capacity. There are organizational, economic, technical, personnel and other barriers. Computerization at the military school today is reminiscent of a game in which each participant plays by his own rules. And this goes on for years.

We obviously need large-scale research in the field of computerization and well-conceived organizational and technical measures. It is time to give this matter broad scientific and economic support.

Nor can we ignore the fact that today, in addition to material problems, there are also problems of a psychological nature. The computer literacy of many military instructors is extremely poor. And the situation...
threatens to remain that way for a long time to come. A sociological survey of social science instructors, for example, showed that only one out of six had some slight understanding of the capabilities of electronic computers and only every tenth instructor had the desire and the ability to participate in computerization of the training. Can the instructors be blamed, however, when the publicizing of computerization has not yet been organized, when a system of incentives for mastering electronic computers has not been set up, when teaching experiments to study the effectiveness of computerization in various fields of training, including the teaching of the social sciences, are essentially only beginning? And when, we repeat, there are not enough computers? Today, students at the academy have “hands-on” experience with electronic computers only around 25 hours per training course, which is one fourth the number needed to acquire solid skills. And the instructors themselves do not have much more than that. It is not surprising that many people regard computerization of the training as nothing more than an alluring but remote prospect.

We have a paradox: Even that limited experience acquired by the military VUZs in computerizing the training demonstrates has demonstrated more and more possibilities for it, but the distance separating us from the extensive realization of these possibilities is being reduced practically not at all. The best and what would appear to be the most promising ideas on this matter ultimately run into some sort of barrier, most frequently a shortage of funds.

Just how are the civilian VUZs resolving the problem? How are they building up their training facilities and enlarging their computer pool? Unlike the military VUZs, they have possibilities for earning money and purchasing the necessary equipment with it. Considerable possibilities: the formation of cooperatives, contracted jobs, the adoption of self-financing.... Computer programs are a good source of income. A software market is currently developing in the nation, in which good training programs are sold at prices of up to 15,000 rubles or more. There is no shortage of buyers, since a good program ultimately pays for itself. Universities and institutes, which ordinarily have greater material and technological, human and financial resources for computerization, earn considerable sums of additional money in this way.

The military VUZs, however, kept on starvation technical and personnel rations, do not have the right either to sell their own programs or to purchase those of others. “Not authorized”! Perhaps they simply have nothing to offer the program market? Not entirely true. Our academy alone has produced several training programs, which the specialists would snatch up, so to speak, and pay for even without going through the trade system. We distribute them gratis, however, receiving nothing in return.

Perhaps it is time to abandon the bans, borrow from the experience of the civilian VUZs and take the route of adopting elements of economic accountability and self-financing in the area of information science at the military academies and schools. Just the opportunity to sell training programs would make it possible to resolve many problems: to enlarge the electronic computer pool, improve the supply of computers and software, resolve certain social problems, reward the originators of valuable developments, enlist the best specialists from outside for special-purpose projects, and so forth.

We would only need to build the economic and legal foundation for this kind of activity.

The changes in the life of the nation and in the army demand that the military cadres perform their missions by the most effective means and methods. And economic mechanisms and the ability to engage in entrepreneurship and strive to use the resources and means most advantageously occupy an important place in this work. The field of computerization provides extensive possibilities for this kind of performance.
Bolshakov Recalls Cuban Missile Crisis
90UM0195A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 20, Oct 89 pp 70-75

[Article by G. Bolshakov under the rubric "Time, Events, People": "The Kennedy-Khrushchev 'Secret Channel'"

[Text] The "blank spots" of history, and first and foremost such formerly "inviolable" realms as the strategic military sphere of the foreign policy of our nation, are gradually disappearing during the period of restructuring and glasnost. The actions of some Soviet leaders after the Great Patriotic War, without the "advice and consent," as it is expressed in international practice, of either the Soviet people or the supreme bodies of state power, led to two major confrontations—the Cuban missile crisis and the participation of our country in the bloody war in Afghanistan.

I believe that the time will come when the "blank spots" of the Afghan epic will also be made known. As the time has come today to relate the events of the fall of 1962 that pushed the world to the brink of the nuclear abyss.

Soviet diplomat G. Bolshakov was at the political epicenter of the events of that alarming fall of nineteen sixty-two. We publish here his documentary essay prepared especially for KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL.

"His Own Russian in Washington"

My friend Frank Holumen, who worked for the NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, called me at about four o'clock in the afternoon on that May day of 1961. The trusting relations that had gradually formed between us allowed us to discuss Soviet-American problems candidly in an informal atmosphere. And the worse they became, the more often we talked. It was namely the candidness of our relationship that allowed Frank Holumen to acknowledge to me that he relayed the most interesting fragments of our discussions to his close friend Ed Gutmman. And Gutmman was the press secretary for Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the brother of the president...

Frank dropped by, and we left for the Georgetown area of Washington, found a small and unremarkable restaurant and, seating ourselves at the table, began a discussion.

After some time Frank looked at his watch as he smiled mysteriously. It was twenty minutes past five.

"Time to go home?" I asked.

"No, it's time for you. Bobby Kennedy is waiting for you at six o'clock."

"What the hell!" I exclaimed. "Why are you only telling me this now?"

I had known R. Kennedy since 1954, when he was was an adviser to the ill-reputed McCarthy Commission. We would meet during those difficult "witch-hunt" times for breakfast in the Congressional cafeteria in an extremely friendly atmosphere. Even then he was attractively energetic and strove for an objective evaluation of Soviet-American relations, which was a rarity for the times...

And now a new meeting, after almost seven years. He had not changed at all: he looked just as youthful, cheerful and energetic, although he seemed to me somewhat tired. And that was understandable: after all, the concerns of organizing his brother's election campaign were on his shoulders.

"So, let's go for a walk."

The smell of fresh-cut grass from the lawn was in the air. I followed the example of Robert and took off my jacket as well. Clouds gathered in the distance, a storm was approaching.

Bobby suggested we sit right on the lawn.

"Listen, Georgie," he said. "You see that we are agreed in principle to a summit meeting, but blast it, the discussions on an agenda have reached a dead end, and that is quite important. If we do not agree on this issue now and the meeting falls through, we know what will happen. You'll blame us, we'll blame you, and we won't have any way of getting closer together. I know your position very well, your familiarity with the guys from Khrushchev's circle. I know you're close to A. Zhubez, close to Kharlamov, close to Yury Zhukov. It would be good if they got true information firsthand, from you. I assume they will find the opportunity to transmit it to Khrushchev."

Thunder sounded at that moment, and Bobby remarked with a grin, "That's all we need. Now we'll get struck by lighting, and the newspapers will write that a Russian agent killed the president's brother, and he could push the nuclear button in a fit of temper. And the irreparable could happen. Let's get out of here."

And we left. The rain came down harder and harder, we broke into a run, and we went into the Justice building. Bobby tossed out the sentence "This is my guest" on the run to the guard, and I saw for the first time the small elevator of the attorney general, which I later took many times.

The elevator took us directly to his office. He invited me into a tiny room with two armchairs, a magazine table, a refrigerator and a small library.

We were soaked to the skin, as they say, and we removed our jackets and shirts and were left in our T-shirts.

"My brother," Robert continued the conversation begun on the lawn, "feels that the tension in the relations between our two countries arises chiefly from a failure to understand each other and an incorrect interpretation of
the intentions and actions of the other party. The president took power from the hands of General Eisenhower, who was a major military leader. He inherited such people in key positions as CIA Director Allen Dulles, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Lemnitzer and others. And my brother's mistake was that he did not replace them right away."

"These people," continued Robert, "advanced outdated recommendations and proposals that do not correspond to the president's new direction. And my brother was forced to make decisions based on their incorrect evaluations of the situation. The events in the Bay of Pigs have altered all of our notions of the traditional concepts of American foreign policy and the unacceptability of the thinking of the leaders of Eisenhower's time. The events in the Bay of Cochininos were not a disaster for us, but rather the best lesson we've gotten. Thus we do not intend to repeat our prior mistakes now. We understand that neither you nor we want to be the first to push the nuclear button. If we are resolved to blow up the world, then there is one way—get Khrushchev to agree with my brother to push these buttons of annihilation simultaneously. But we are sure that neither of them wants that."

R. Kennedy, as well as other Americans, told me many times that the collapse of the anti-Cuban adventure could not be considered a manifestation of weakness, that the Americans would fight and defend their interests by any means, including armed, in the future as well.

But J. Kennedy did not want these actions to be perceived as a challenge to the Soviets. He was trying to expand the information channels to the Soviet leadership on his "New Frontiers policy," that required that each of his aides have "his own Russian in Washington."

"I Ask You to Relay to Premier Khrushchev..."

At the same time both Robert Kennedy and White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger were concerned for the fate of the president, who was being threatened by the "hawks." "They could chuck him out at any moment. Therefore on certain issues he has to act very precisely and cautiously, and not proceed in a straight line"—I often heard these words from the attorney general and other presidential aides.

A channel of communications was created in this climate in the spring of 1961 in which—as it turned out—I was to play no small role. The Pentagon, the State Department and the CIA could not exert influence on that channel.

"At the present time," continued Robert Kennedy, "we are troubled most of all by the situation in Berlin. Many still do not realize the importance of the problem. The president feels that a failure of us or you to understand our position on Berlin could lead to war. The Berlin problem, like the problem of the two Germanies, was created by Premier Khrushchev and not by my brother. This is a very difficult problem, and we should thus scarcely begin solving it at the summit meeting in Vienna. We should, in my opinion, study the Berlin problem attentively and take not major diplomatic actions on Berlin as yet before we discuss it in detail at the summit meeting. This problem, in my brother's opinion, should still be put on ice."

"The main thing that we would like—and evidently, you too—is that the meeting in Vienna help the president and the premier understand each other better, establish better contacts, outline the shape of the future development of our relations. We thus feel that it is very important that the meeting conclude with the achievement of definite agreements and be the start of the development of businesslike contacts between our leaders."

"My brother," continued Robert, "is going to Vienna with great doubts. The impression is being created here that Premier Khrushchev feels that he is dealing with a quite weak political figure, a young man still without experience in conducting affairs of state, who does not possess a strong nature or confidence in himself. There has been a certain pressure on him from that direction for the whole first five months of the Kennedy presidency. I often asked him how he likes being president. Which he answered, as a rule, "This would be the best job in the world if it were not for the Russians!"

Our conversation concluded at eleven o'clock at night. Robert drove me home. I couldn't sleep all night. A report of this discussion went off to Moscow the next morning.

Five days later I received a reply from Moscow. It clearly set forth our position on the Berlin question and expressed a readiness for an exchange of opinions on all issues of the impending summit meeting via the use of this unofficial channel of communication.

I met with Robert Kennedy again on Sunday, after church services. I sat in his car and relayed the message of N.S. Khrushchev. He heard me out in silence and noted that its language and style differed noticeably from the usual notes and official statements, and that was good in and of itself.

"We should, in using this channel of communication, speak directly and candidly, and not resort to the usual propaganda tricks of politicians. Our mutual understanding can only gain from that."

In conclusion, he asked that I report to Moscow that this message would be relayed to his brother today, and he was sure that he would answer N.S. Khrushchev in the shortest possible time.

The final weeks before Vienna were filled with meetings. Both sides made effective use of the new channel of communications, and it must be said that the Kennedy-Khrushchev dialogue took on a more candid and direct nature with each message. The parties were already not bashful in expressing themselves, and the personal "1" of
the leaders was felt in each message. Sometimes, when I was relaying Khrushchev's messages, Robert Kennedy interrupted me: "Georgie, skip that. Gromyko's people wrote that, not Khrushchev. It's all clear. Better to tell me right away the places that were written by Khrushchev. It is important that we know his opinion, his thoughts, the same way that he clearly wants to know the thoughts of my brother."

Right before the departure of John Kennedy for Paris, where he intended to meet with President de Gaulle on the eve of Vienna, Robert Kennedy asked me to come to his office immediately. He told me that the president wished that the majority of the meetings between him and Premier Khrushchev be conducted tête-à-tète, with the participation of just a single interpreter. I reported Khrushchev's consent to him a few hours later. Robert Kennedy smiled with satisfaction upon receiving this news: "So then, a good beginning. We are flying to Vienna with one point already agreed upon. Would that it be that way to the end!"

But it did not go that way to the end. True, we did reach agreement on Laos, but the mutual understanding and constructive start that Kennedy was counting on did not end up happening. We did not agree to postpone discussion of the Berlin question, but on the contrary Khrushchev, without mincing his words, threatened to conclude a treaty with the GDR in the shortest possible time. That would signify that we would consider all of the prior agreements with the Western countries on Berlin no longer in effect.

The Americans regretfully concluded that we were continuing to employ power-confrontation pressure. John Kennedy, concluding his meeting with Khrushchev, said, "I expect we will have a very cold winter."

Some time in the fall of 1961, after the Vienna summit meeting, I had occasion to visit the White House with a Soviet delegation. And the president suddenly approached me right there and, taking me by the elbow, led me into the government room.

"Georgie," he said, "I am grateful for the services you have rendered for me, as well as for Premier Khrushchev. I think that in the future, if there are no objections on your part, we will continue to get in touch with Premier Khrushchev through you."

"That depends on you, Mr. President," I answered, and thanked him for the compliment. He patted me on the shoulder and smiled: "Well then, till we meet again!"

The president followed the life of our country very attentively, and especially the speeches of Khrushchev, not letting a single one pass, as a rule. One day Nikita Sergeyevich made this comparison: in the 1980s we will be at a railway halt and see two trains: one, shining in the rays of the sun, on which is written "Soviet Union," and the other, a decrepit and barely used freight train with the inscription "United States."

J. Kennedy said to me regarding this, "I welcome this statement of Mr. Khrushchev. This says that the Soviet Union and Premier Khrushchev see our future rivalry in the civilian rather than military field. That is already gladdening. But I want to object to the time period when you will overtake us."

He took two sheets of paper from his desk. The calculations of our economists, he said, show that the Soviet Union will reach our present level of production output per capita in approximately the years 2020-2050. You can believe my economists.

This was said at the beginning of the 1960s.

John Kennedy always chose his words very carefully when speaking of relations between the USSR and America. He did not like the word "co-existence," and he preferred "competition." "A man and woman can co-exist," he joked. "The word 'competition' more accurately reflects the principles of our relations."

A fresh wind blew in, as it were, with the coming of Kennedy to the White House in Washington. Kennedy was the first to note the possibility of rapprochement with our country, and it was under him that the first shoots of common sense in relations with the USSR began to appear in American political thought. And today, a quarter of a century later, it can be said that it was Kennedy who laid down good foundations on the part of the United States in Soviet-American relations. And even then the forces that now stand between us and the United States tried to destroy those shoots. NEW YORK TIMES columnist James Reston said in the first hours after the assassination of Kennedy that the president had been killed because he had been born a hundred years earlier than his own America. That is, he was killed by America itself, which did not understand him.

But life takes its own course. Today the shoots of realism are pushing toward the light once more. This could have happened before as well, but then there was no awareness of the fact that all of mankind is in the same boat and could perish together. There was hope for the survival of one side, and the world was thus considered from the point of view of one's own egotistical interests. And one instructive example of that was the Cuban missile crisis that arose in the fall of 1962.

I was to leave for Moscow on vacation on September 1. On the morning of August 31 Robert Kennedy called me at home and asked me to come for a "farewell discussion" that evening. I had scarcely appeared when he reported to me straight off that the president was waiting for me: "He knows you are leaving for Moscow and would like you to relay his message to Premier Khrushchev as soon as you get there."

The president's invitation was highly unexpected for me. I thought nervously, what message and why?
Robert Kennedy and I got into an official black Lincoln and we headed off for the White House. I must say that this was the first time I had ridden with him and he had not been driving.

Flashing down a Pennsylvania Avenue empty of daytime traffic, we entered the green driveway of the White House several minutes later and stopped at the canvassing entrance for unofficial visitors to the president. A secret-service agent opened the door. The corridor was empty, and only the personal guards of the president a few steps from each other testified to the presence of the master at home. Passing through this “honor-guard” formation, we entered the small office of the secretary of Mrs. Lincoln. There we were met by an aide to the chief of the protective staff, who said that the president would be there in a few minutes.

“We’ll wait for him here,” said Robert Kennedy, opening the doors to the Oval Office. It was clear that he felt himself to be at home here.

Several minutes later the side door opened noiselessly and the president, a little stooped as if conscious of his height, came into the room. He was in a dark gray striped suit with a light blue shirt, which especially set off his chestnut hair, lightly touched with gray. He seemed tired to me and a little anxious.

“Hello, Georgie,” said the president, extending his hand, and offered me a seat.

“So, then,” he said. “I know you’re going to Moscow to relax. That’s good. I will ask you to perform a service for me and relay to Premier Khrushchev the following: our ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, has informed me that Khrushchev is worried about the overflights of Soviet vessels heading for Cuba by our aircraft. Tell him that today I have issued a directive to halt those flights.

“The prospects,” continued the president after somewhat of a pause in which he fell into thought and looked out the window, “seem to me to be clearly favorable for improvements in Soviet-American relations, and I am profoundly convinced of the reality of those prospects. The next accomplishment on that path, in my opinion, could be the conclusion of an agreement to ban nuclear testing. The achievement of such an agreement could be the initial stage of the disarmament of our countries, and we would thereby rid our children and grandchildren of the threat of war. Tell Khrushchev also that I hope to meet with him again in the near future,” concluded Kennedy, smiling broadly.

We left the cool Oval Office for the driveway. The silence was broken by Robert Kennedy, who had not uttered a word during the meeting with the president.

“Damn it, Georgie!” he suddenly burst out. “Does Khrushchev really not understand the president’s situation? Does the premier really not know that the president has not only many friends, but no fewer enemies as well? Believe me, my brother truly wants to achieve what he is talking about. But every step toward Premier Khrushchev costs him great effort. N.S. Khrushchev has complete power in his country. It’s easier for him. My brother has no such power. The premier must put himself in the president’s situation for at least an instant, then he would understand it. After all, ‘they’ could go for anything in a fit of blind fury…”

I had never seen Robert so open and candid. I had to think that he had said what the president had left unsaid.

I left for Moscow the next day.

“We in Moscow Must Know Everything…”

Arriving home from the airport, I got in touch with Khrushchev aide Vladimir Semenovich Lebedev and arranged a meeting. Lebedev said that Khrushchev would receive me in Pitsunda between September 10 and 15.

I went to Gagra. Lebedev sent a car for me, and soon I was at the dacha where N.S. Khrushchev was relaxing with A.I. Mikoyan. The next day, at about six o’clock in the evening, walking through the famous eucalyptus grove, Lebedev and I walked up to a sparkling azure pool, onto the marble steps of which stepped a sunburnt and smiling Nikita Sergeyevich. He was dressed in a Ukrainian shirt unbuttoned at the collar. One of those accompanying him handed him a straw hat…

“Hello, Georgiy Nikitovich! How did it go?”

I thanked him.

“We in Moscow are attentively following your contacts with Robert Kennedy, through whom contact is maintained with the president. So now, tell me everything you think about President Kennedy, his brother, those around him, without holding back, candidly,” continued Nikita Sergeyevich, looking fixedly at me from under the brim of the hat pulled down almost to his nose.

I shared my impressions and observations about Kennedy himself, his program and the “New Frontiers” people, as the people around Kennedy were called, for more than an hour. Nikita Sergeyevich listened attentively, asking elaborating questions from time to time.

Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan appeared in the third hour of conversation. Khrushchev introduced me. They were bothered by Cuba. I answered Khrushchev’s question of whether the United States would resolve to enter into an armed confrontation with Cuba in the affirmative. I addressed the fact that Kennedy was under great pressure on the part of reactionary forces, and first and foremost the military and the ultra-rightists, who were thirsting for revenge after the disastrous CIA adventure in the Bay of Pigs. They were only waiting for a suitable moment to destroy the Republic of Cuba.

“He wouldn’t be averse to taking revenge himself either,” inserted Nikita Sergeyevich, looking searchingly
at me from under his hat. "Just let him try it. Cuba's not the one. They'll give him a tickle."

"However," I added, "Kennedy will clearly seek some more cautious solution, a reasonable compromise proceeding from the principle of 'don't drive each other into a corner and leave no way out.'"

I told Nikita Sergeyevich about Robert Kennedy's apprehensions for his brother, emphasizing that one could not fail to reckon with that circumstance.

"They're crying poor," remarked Khrushchev. "Is he president or isn't he? If he is a strong president, then no one scares him. All the power is in his hands, and his brother is even attorney general. Everything you have told me is interesting and useful. When you return to Washington, tell the president that we have a positive regard for his steps aimed at reducing tensions and normalizing relations between our countries..."

And he set forth in clear-cut fashion everything I was to relay orally to the president of the United States.

"You should be attentive to everything—tone, gestures, conversations. We in Moscow must know everything, especially now," Khrushchev counseled me at parting. The word "missiles" was never mentioned over the course of the whole discussion with N.S. Khrushchev.

The next morning I was in Moscow. And I flew off to the States a few days later.

The Approaching Storm...

Washington seemed high-strung and bustling to me compared with peaceful and businesslike Moscow. That could be explained by the heat of the intermediate elections that gripped the country. The Republicans were trying to get revenge for their defeat in the 1960 elections and, together with right-wing Democrats, they were criticizing President Kennedy for spinelessness in relation to Cuba. The Cuban question had essentially become the dominant problem of the whole election campaign.

I called Robert Kennedy in the morning. I told him I wanted to see him. Usually reacting quickly and willingly to my calls, he was silent for a long while this time. After a pause, he proposed meeting the next day after lunch. I was extremely surprised: why such haste before my departure for Moscow and such indifference now?

I was at Robert Kennedy's office at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He was cordial as always. The sleeve of his snow-white shirt was offhandedly rolled up, his tie had been let down, but that unruly and boisterously tousled shock of hair had grayed noticeably and hung down over his weary and bloodshot eyes. It seemed to me that he was restraining himself and just trying to appear calm. I cast a fleeting glance around his office. Some more pictures of his children had been added to the walls over the month of my absence. One attracted my attention. It showed people shooting a rifle out of the window of a house at a man who looked like R. Kennedy walking along the street wearing a helmet. Fragments flew from the helmet to the side. My gaze shifted involuntarily to a new "souvenir" of the attorney general that was sitting on his desk: a riot helmet with a bullet dent. This was his helmet, which he wore during a trip to Alabama, where the major Negro disturbances had occurred.

"And here's the gift from Alabama itself," said R. Kennedy, catching my gaze and extending to me in his broad tennis-calloused hand the flattened lead bullet.

"Any news from home?" he asked, and he said the word "home" in Russian.

"Premier Khrushchev," I said, "has entrusted me with an answering oral message for the president."

"Good, I'll tell my brother about it," said Robert with somewhat feigned indifference, as if it were just our usual meeting. And he warned, "Not a word to any of our boys about the message, understand? I'll call you."

I left Robert lost in riddles. I went to work, where they told me that presidential press secretary Pierre Salinger was looking for me. Calling him back, I received an invitation to cocktails at the White House.

"Hi, Georgie!" said Pierre, extending his hand to me. He was in excellent spirits.

"The President knows you have come back to the capital," he whispered conspiratorially, taking me aside. "Isn't there any news for him?"

"None. Only greetings and best wishes from the Soviet leaders. Your correspondent friends and the editors-in-chief of our newspapers send you greetings as well," I joked in reply.

"Well then, give them my greetings," said the press secretary with disappointment. "Take it easy, then. We'll meet at the White House, and no one will bother us there."

Having completed his unsuccessful soundings, Pierre left, and I mingled among the guests for another hour. Here, a few paces from the White House, no one was saying anything about the approaching political storm and none of the guests uttered the word "Cuba."

Two days later Robert Kennedy invited me in to talk.

(Conclusion to follow).

Footnotes

1. The discussion concerns the events in the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, where in April of 1961 a landing of American mercenaries was attempted for the purpose of overthrowing the Castro regime. The mercenaries were routed.

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Origins of 'Finnish' War
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[Part One of article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Special Correspondent A. Chudakov from Helsinki and Moscow under rubric "History Lessons: "Requiem of the Karelian Marshes"]

[Text] "The pen restores what the sword has destroyed"—Urho Kaleva Kekkonen. Today we begin a story about events of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940 and the reasons for it.

1. The difficult path to Maynila

We do not like to recall this war. But still, is it possible to remember, knowing little from the very beginning? We knew almost nothing about it and for a long time perceived these events as a secondary episode of our history. So should one be surprised that even basic scientific works often do not honor it with the status of war, inarticulately calling it the "Soviet-Finnish armed conflict of 1939-1940"? In Russia this war is called the "Finnish" war and in Finland the "Winter" war. Probably both names are correct: "Finnish" because it was waged against Finland and "Winter" because it fit almost precisely within the framework of the calendar winter on the threshold of the 1940's.

It is also called "unsung." This quiet word apparently also is apropos, for it is no secret that this war added little to the glory and prestige either of a great power or of its weapons.

The "Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Great Soviet Encyclopedia] devotes only one little page to events on the Karelian Isthmus. The first five lines of the article define the essence of the war briefly and categorically: "The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940 arose as a result of the policy of Finland's reactionary government, which turned the country's territory into a springboard for possible attack on the USSR by aggressive powers." The 24th volume was published in 1976.

People often say that the Finnish War permitted learning many lessons in preparing the country and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army for the Great Patriotic War. It is impossible to disagree with this to a certain extent. The people's commissar of defense was replaced, cadres were reshuffled in the Army, and troop combat training was improved. But...

What happened in general, in the main, and as a whole? We did not have time or we did not want to understand, to see and to have time?

"Just how could such a thing happen? Where did we not think things out? What did we not take into consideration?" This was the chief and most tormenting question of that terrible summer of 1941, that summer when everything we believed in as being eternal and immutable crumbled. It was as if the flame of a fallen Vyborg being abandoned by the last half-disabled Finnish companies, the flame of the final day of that war, carried across the 15-month gap in time into the first day of this war.

And here is one other thing I would like to say. While working on this article I would catch myself thinking that phenomena deeply antagonistic in nature often stood side by side in the events of that far-off winter: cowardice and courage, talent and mediocrity, victory and defeat. The inevitable dialectic of war—an extreme, unnatural form of human survival and self-assertion—obviously consists of this.

Karelia is a land of forests, lakes and marshes. People say that the trees begin to give off a whole gamut of surprising sounds when these impassable thickets are paralyzed by the hard Christmas freezes. Fancifully interweaving and blending, these sounds sometimes form some kind of unearthly, solemn and at the same time oppressive melody. It is the Requiem. The Requiem of the Karelian forests and marshes, the final funeral mass which sounds at the moment a person crosses the unsteady boundary of life and death. The Requiem to Soviet and Finnish soldiers killed in the remote lake defiles, in the frozen mire of the Karelian marshes, in the biting snows of the Arctic. A common Requiem for soldiers of two armies on whose obelisks epitaphs are inscribed that are in different languages but are the same: "Died in action for the Motherland."

The striving for a sober and composed, albeit at times belated, analysis obviously is inherent in human nature itself. "What would have happened had it not been for...?" is the question people always ask.

Frequently the hot gun barrels have not yet been encased and the embers in the last sites of fires have not yet finished smoldering, but the generals already have passed on a war that has just ended to the historians and politicians. And now it is they, arming themselves with patience, who prepare a long sequence of events and facts scrupulously, month after month, with the end of the sequence being the transformation of the state border into a front line. It was as a result of these sacraments of higher politics that the "Finnish," "Winter," "unsung" war in time acquired one other name: "the war which did not have to be."

Having chosen state independence, Finland also made a choice in the question of the state system and became a bourgeois republic. Despite active Soviet support, the revolution in Finland suffered defeat in May of 1918.

On the one hand the Yuryev Peace Treaty concluded in October 1920 of course stabilized relations between the two countries, but on the other hand...

Taking advantage of the extreme exhaustion of its suzerain of yesterday, the Finnish side resorted to stiff pressure in the talks. Basically this concerned demarcation of the border on the Karelian Isthmus. The final document declared the border to run along the old
border line between Russia and the Great Principality of Finland 32 km from Petrograd, which demolished the defense system of the northern capital that had taken shape through history and made the country's second city theoretically within range even of artillery fire from the contiguous side.

"Tough, tougher, and tougher yet—that is the only way to talk with the Soviets!" was the triumphant comment by Helsinki newspapers on the "major success of Finnish diplomacy." But playing on the temporary weakness of a powerful neighbor does not at all mean securing a firm status quo for what has been achieved for the future. It was there in Yuryev that one of the delayed-action mines was laid that almost two decades later would explode the peace on the Karelian Isthmus. In his time Juho Kusti Paasikivi, one of the patriarchs of the famous Finnish realism, would call this "success" in Yuryev "fatal for my country."

Prominent Finnish historian and diplomat Max Jakobson once told me that the main thing a small country could learn was the art of surviving. Surviving by skilfully finding very delicate life-giving rivulets of one's own interests in the flow of political ambitions of powerful and influential neighbors, and acting without setting great hopes on the favors of the strong of this world, i.e., surviving not "because of," but "despite."

Objectively Europe's political climate was determined at that time by three main forces: the renewed Anglo-French alliance; a Germany swiftly gathering might and thirsting to wash away the "disgrace of Versailles"; and a multimillion-strong giant Russia of yesterday heading down an unfamiliar and therefore frightening path. It became clear very quickly that Finland would not succeed in dropping anchor in a quiet harbor—it occupied too favorable a strategic position and the question of for whom the shores of the Gulf of Finland would become hostile was far from a matter of indifference to European capitals. The main question of the Finnish concept of survival was transformed from "how to survive" to "with whom to survive."

With whom? Finnish sympathies traditionally were on the side of Germany—sentiments of the country's middle- and high-level officers seemed to leave no possibility for another choice. But nearby were Sweden and Norway, countries with a British leaning. A love affair with Germany was potentially fraught with an undermining of the harmony of Scandinavian good-neighbor relations. Moreover, Great Britain was rich and influential. Her Majesty's Fleet had no equal on the seas.

Who would prove to be more powerful at "X" hour and how much time remained until that hour?

And finally the third card, the Soviet Union, fell away on its own: a political bloc with the "Reds" was too frightening, the prospects were too foggy and vague. And as before, things were not completely clear with respect to the border. Meanwhile the notorious "tough course" toward the USSR seemed to have begun to have side effects. The greatly increased activeness of rightist movements in the country and calls "to move the border back to the Urals" and to declare the "third millennium a millennium of peoples of the Arctic seas" all forced even worldly-wise parliamentarians to vacillate cautiously. The escalation of ultra-rightist sentiments clearly were jarring London and Paris.

What was to be done? What if they tried to find a German-British "common denominator"? They didn't have to look for it—there it was on the surface! Proclaiming Finland to be an "outpost of the struggle against Bolshevism" paid a whole heap of dividends! This would clothe the Finnish soldier in the cloak of a brave Viking—shaker of the barbarians, and would ensure joint support of powerful neighbors in the common European home.

And so is this tough, tougher and tougher yet? Yes, but with a top secret proviso: a limit to the toughness nevertheless existed. What balancing with torches on the verge of a foul. But in no event beyond that verge! There was still no wish to fight the Red Army, even though the British and German divisions were sensed to be nearby.

Soviet attempts to arrange a dialogue with Finland were breaking up like a wave against the fjord's rocky shore. Nevertheless it seemed a light appeared at the end of the tunnel in the early 1930's: Finland and the USSR concluded a treaty on nonaggression and peaceful settlement of conflicts, which in 1934 was extended until December 1945. Nevertheless, mutual mistrust continued to grow.

Despite the fact that Finland officially declared its neutrality in 1935, its turn into the wake of German politics was taking on more and more alarming forms. A phrase once flung by Svinhuvud that "patriotism has two sides: love for one's motherland and hatred for Russia" was backed up by specific matters: the Finno-German "brotherhood in arms" was growing stronger and fortified areas on the Soviet border were being constructed at accelerated rates.

Finland also had grounds for serious concern: the song could not be rid of the words. A great deal of what was occurring in the USSR could not help but be understood let alone accepted either by the West in general or by Finland in particular. This included Stalin's collectivization of the village, the NKVD repressions and finally the promises "to destroy capitalism throughout the world" (which were not very pleasant for the West, to put it mildly), in combination with a call on the workers of all countries to unite to carry out these concepts.

August of 1939 literally placed Helsinki in a state of shock with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

Finland felt itself thrown one on one against Stalin, abandoned by its closest partner. The country's hasty rapprochement with new "friends," the Anglo-French bloc, occurred against the background of a growth in military preparations. In the final account Hitler ended up the winner in this whole story; he received absolutely
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free at the expense of his northern ally an opportunity to organize grandiose bloody "maneuvers" with the participation of the future chief enemy, the Red Army. May the reader forgive me this pun—the theater of military operations between the USSR and Finland became a real theater for Hitler and his generals, who observed the development of the plot from the best seats in the front row.

Meanwhile, the days were racing one after the other toward a head.

The demands on Finland put forth by Stalin were really impressive: concede essentially the entire Karelian Isthmus, thereby moving the border back 100 km westward, transfer a portion of the Rybachiy Peninsula to the USSR, and lease the Hango Peninsula for constructing Soviet air and naval bases with 5,000 military personnel. In return Finland was offered territory twice the area in Soviet Karelia.

Opinions in the country's parliament were divided. For example, Finnish Army CIC Marshal Mannheim declared that he even found such an exchange advantageous; in addition, he "also did not think that Finland's prestige would suffer if we agreed to such an exchange." Paasikivi was inclined to this same thing, but in the final account the viewpoint of adherents of a "tough course"—Kajander, Erkko, Tanner—gained the upper hand. The result was that Helsinki responded with a refusal.

Finally the talks in Moscow entered a total impasse. The Finnish delegation broke them off not "simply," but with an emphatic challenge, declaring that it "had more important affairs in Helsinki."

Were the Soviet Union's claims on Finland substantiated? That is a difficult question. On the one hand they were unquestionably explainable from the standpoint of ensuring Leningrad's security, and on the other hand Finland as a sovereign state was free to accept or not accept proposals affecting its territorial integrity. From an international law standpoint this is also indisputable. It was just that Väinö Tanner's diplomacy lacked flexibility, more flexibility, and sober calculation.

"While wishing for peace, prepare for war." The first part of this wisdom of the ancients was thoroughly forgotten on both sides of the border. Today we just do not know on which side of the border the guns were secretly uncased; on what side the first round, greasily glistening with lubricant, went into the breech; on what side the first guns recoiled with a booming gas. We do not know whose soldiers were in the crews of those mysterious guns that went down in history as the "guns of Maynila."

As followed from a TASS announcement, on 26 November 1939 Finnish artillery from the Finnish side bombarded Red Army subunits stationed in the border village of Maynila. Several Red Army men were killed and wounded as a result of the bombardment. A Soviet government note to the Finnish government which followed on that same day declared a categorical protest and a demand to immediately cease armed provocations and withdraw troops 25 km back from the state border. The Finns responded with lightning speed. A Finnish government note categorically denied the involvement of Finnish troops in the tragedy which occurred and expressed the supposition that what happened was an accident, the result of a tragic error during Soviet artillery combat training practice. The note also directed the Soviet government's attention to the fact that Finnish troops did not have artillery in that area which by its performance characteristics would have been capable of bombarding Maynila. In conclusion the proposal was made for immediate establishment of a mixed Soviet-Finnish commission for detailed study of the incident in accordance with the 1928 Convention on Border Commissioners.

Stalin's response was stunning for Helsinki. On 28 November the Soviet Union unilaterally denounced the nonaggression pact and on the following day announced the recall of Soviet diplomatic and trade representatives from Helsinki.

There is a version that on the 26th soldiers of the NKVD troops stood to the guns at rear Soviet artillery positions and that they fired the ill-fated rounds. According to another version, eyewitnesses assert that rounds whistled overhead specifically from the Finnish side and that drunken Home Guard personnel conducted fire.

Either way, it still seems to me erroneous to interpret what occurred as "grounds for war." The border literally was racked by skirmishes and clashes. Had explosions not sounded in Maynila, they would have sounded somewhere in another place. The political situation itself that had taken shape left no opportunity for other arguments except "the last arguments of kings."

By the way, many years later, somewhere in the mid-1970's, a shipboard missile lost control and flew into Finland as a result of equipment malfunction during practice firing by the Soviet Northern Fleet.

Fortunately it was a practice missile and did not do any harm as it plumped into a remote marsh somewhere in the Finnish Arctic. There was discomfiture of course. Helsinki was presented with official apologies with detailed explanations of the reasons for the accident, and they were accepted with understanding. The incident was settled with this, as the saying goes.

But then, on 30 November 1939, Leningrad Military District troops crossed the Soviet-Finnish border at 0800 hours.
2. Timoshenko Against Mannerheim

And so history was made. The choice was made and the "one who draws the sword will not be deterred."

By the way, no one was especially afraid: neither the battalion commanders condescendingly viewing through stereoscopic telescopes the very scanty chains of Finnish earth-and-timber emplacements receding into the pine forests on the other bank of the Sestra, nor the people with gold-stitched shoulderboard stars in the still of Kremlin offices. Neither Finland nor its almost entirely infantry army was taken as a worthy enemy.

If we are to believe the recollections of eyewitnesses, Stalin was in an angry and at the same time derisive mood. Elaboration of the campaign plan was transferred wholly to the Leningrad Military District headquarters. The "great leader" figured that at that time the General Staff had concerns much more important than to distract it for such a trivial matter. It was also prohibited by directive to use divisions of interior districts for the operation, and it was planned to inflict overall defeat on the Finnish Army in 9-12 days. The really high morale of troops deployed at the Finnish border, filled with resolve "to teach a lesson to the presumptuous White Finn bandits" and defend the cradle of the revolution, also inspired confidence.

The Sestra River. For 22 years this quiet river bore the title of state border which previously it had not known. On 30 November it gave that up, becoming simply one of the hundreds of small Karelian streams. It was not destined to become a front line.

Our 7th Army, the strongest and most combat-effective large strategic formation of the Leningrad Military District, successfully launched the offensive here on the Karelian Isthmus. Finnish infantry withdrew, avoiding major battles. The sparse little network of country roads receding into the interior of the country to the northwest from now on began to be called the axis of main attack in operational-level situational reports.

It must be noted that the Leningrad Military District staff did not put much thought into the plan of the Finnish campaign, apparently for the reasons already given. It was simple and uncomplicated like the bayonet of a 7.62-mm Mosin-Nagant service rifle.

Obviously the circumstance that the shortest path on the map from the state border to Helsinki lay specifically here along the coast of the Gulf of Finland was regarded as of paramount importance in elaborating the plan, but that was on the map. And in fact?

One can ask a logical question: Why was no account taken of the very vast system of powerful Finnish fortified areas hidden between lakes and in impassable marshy quagmires and echeloned in depth for many tens of kilometers, solidly covering the path to the country's underbelly? Better known as the "Mannerheim Line," specialists estimated that it conceded nothing to existing world analogues, particularly the German Siegfried Line and the French Maginot Line. Then why was this direction, wretched in all respects, chosen for the main attack?

I will risk expressing several observations.

First of all, in Stalin's understanding, if they were to fight it was necessary to fight with great fame so that a demonstration of the Red Army's crushing might would force the European capitals to quiet down a bit in deference. But you would not get such fame by encirclements and envelopments of troops of the Finnish Army, which was far from the most powerful or largest in Europe. In short, you would not get it by wise, skillful tactics. But if Suomi's reinforced concrete coat of armor were breached by an intrepid battering ram and this were done at a time when the Germans and the British and French were indescissively marking time opposite each other in Europe, yes, this would impress those in London and Paris and Berlin and force them to involuntarily "take off their caps."

Secondly, neither then People's Comissar of Defense Marshal Voroshilov nor Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko, CIC of the Leningrad Military District force grouping, had any military leadership talents, to put it mildly. Often the decisive argument for both in making a particular military decision was an ordinary ruler which turned a straight line on the map from point A to point B into the axis of main attack. By the way, immediately at the end of the Finnish campaign, while answering questions from graduates of military academies concerning new strategic decisions, Timoshenko condescendingly brushed them aside: "What more strategy do you need here? Go forward, gnaw through the defense—that is all the strategy!" But by the way, we will discuss this "strategy" of Timoshenko's a bit later.

And finally, it is simply senseless to speak about the influence of the third factor, the "human" factor, as it is sometimes called. "By little blood and a powerful attack" turned out in fact to be nothing more than the opening line of a gallant song, which did not correspond in any way to the real state of things. Soldiers' blood remained in almost the last place in the long sequence of pros and cons. This was confirmed by numerous episodes both of the Finnish and Great Patriotic wars, when the infantry would be buried as entire companies and battalions to the last man near an "unknown settlement on a nameless hill." How could the life of a village man in a Red Army overcoat be worth much at that time when marshals and army commanders were being executed on the spot?

Did an alternative campaign plan exist in principle? Yes. It was drawn up under the direction of Marshal Tukhachevsky back at the beginning of the 1930's as a possible option for combat operations against a potential enemy, which Finland at that time was swiftly becoming. The plan provided for swiftly cutting off Finland at the narrowest place, in Northern Karelia, with a subsequent vigorous blow to the south and a move to the rear of
Finnish fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. But history ordained otherwise. By the time the potential enemy had become the real enemy, the remains of the publicly dishonored marshal already were lying in the ground and this plan of his, as by the way all other works, became the plan of an "enemy of the people."

The troops had to operate under another scheme already known to us, which later became a sorry textbook example.

(To be concluded.)

Causes, Course of Soviet-Finnish War
90UM0153A Moscow TRUD in Russian 30 Nov 89 p 4

[Interview with A. Dorgarov, senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and A. Noskov, professor and doctor of historical sciences, by V. Badurkin under the rubric "Looking Across the Years": "The War That Did Not Have To Happen"

[Text] Today marks the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the war between Finland and the Soviet Union, but until now we have done little to study the war. The long silence of Soviet historians has also permitted a certain onedimensionality in interpretations of the war abroad. Now perestroika and glasnost have opened many archive documents to researchers, shedding light on this page of the USSR's history too. V. Badurkin, TRUD's military correspondent, talks with A. Dorgarov, senior official at the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], and A. Noskov, professor and doctor of historical sciences, about recent evaluations of the half-century-old events. Of course this article does not lay claim to absolute authority, but the facts presented in it will help "fill in" one more "blank spot" in our history.

[Badurkin] The Soviet-Finnish War broke out in that uneasy year when the German Wehrmacht, after its "Polish campaign," was gathering forces for its next assault, and when there was more and more uncertainty and mutual suspicion in international relations. In Moscow they worried, "Can we trust the West after the Munich settlement with Hitler?" In the West they asked "Can we trust Moscow after they concluded a pact with Hitler?" Under these conditions were the Soviet proposals to Finland to transfer the borders justified?

[Noskov] The defense of our northern borders would have been seriously compromised without these minimum territorial changes which the Soviet Union requested from Helsinki. Finland, because of its geographic position, always had great military and strategic significance for Russia. It was situated at Russia's naval outlets to Western Europe, and its land borders to the east stretched almost 1400 kilometers and served as the shortest route for a potential enemy into heart of Russia...

[Dorgarov] Of course that does not mean that Finland was "doomed" to a conflict with our country. We only needed to find a compromise which would reconcile the indisputable right of the Finns to independence and territorial integrity with the right of their eastern neighbor to seek to guarantee the security of its northeastern region. The Soviet government offered another territory, far greater in size, to Finland in exchange. (By the way, the great grandfather of Karl Mannheim, president and marshal of Finland at that time, believed the border passed too close to the capital of Russia. And in 1939 the marshal himself considered the exchange of territory not only possible but profitable for Finland.)

In connection with the escalation of military tension in the world engendered by Hitler's expansionist plans and by a definite increase in pro-Fascist sentiment in Finland itself, the Soviet government believed that the Soviet-Finnish nonaggression pact concluded in 1932 was no longer a sufficient guarantee of the security of the USSR.

Chronicle: On 5 March 1939 M. Pitvinov, the people's commissar of foreign affairs, submitted a proposal through the Finnish envoy in Moscow that four islands in the Gulf of Finland be leased to the Soviet Union for 30 years for use as surveillance posts. The Finns were quick to refuse (on 8 March), and the suggestion was then made that the Finns exchange the islands for any of the Soviet Union's border territory to the north of Lake Ladoga.

On 14 October the Soviet Union proposed that Finland lease the port of Hango to the USSR for 30 years for the construction there of military bases, and that it turn over to the USSR several islands in the eastern portion of the Gulf of Finland and parts of the Karelian Isthmus and the Rybachy Peninsula—in all, 2,761 square kilometers in exchange for 5,529 square kilometers of Soviet territory in Karelia. In the course of negotiations the Soviet Union proposed reducing the lease of the port to the end of the war in Europe and the number of personnel at the base from 5,000 to 4,000 men. When the idea of stationing Soviet troops on the Finnish mainland was rejected, the USSR expressed its willingness to make use of three and then one of the islands closest to Hango.

However after the Finnish side felt it necessary to break off negotiations, Stalin concluded, "We will have to go to war with Finland." This took place in the middle of November.

[Noskov] The decision led to an incredible rush to concentrate and deploy men and equipment for the "operation against Finland." The troops were not effectively prepared to conduct combat operations in that extremely difficult terrain or under conditions of an unusually severe winter.

[Badurkin] Concerning Stalin's determination to go to war. Foreign historians maintain that the 26 November incident, when Soviet troops in the frontier town of Maynil were shelled, was organized by the Soviet side itself in order to have a reason to begin the war. Do you believe they may be right in this instance?
[Dongarov] The opinion really is widespread in the West that this incident was provoked by Stalin, Molotov, and Beria even though the historians so far have no documentation to confirm (or disprove either) this version. The only thing certain is that, in connection with a mass movement of troops to the Soviet-Finnish border, an extremely dangerous tension arose. Under these conditions border incidents became commonplace occurrences.

[Noskov] If you consider that the bombardments were carried out at Moscow’s orders in order to begin the war, then why did they not begin it immediately? How do you explain the 3-day interval after the Maynil incident?...

Chronicle: On 26 November the Soviet government sent the Finns a note of protest requiring them to pull their troops back 20-25 kilometers from the border.

In its response the government of Finland denied that its troops had participated in the shelling of Maynil and proposed that a joint commission be created to investigate the incident and “to begin negotiations on the issue of a mutual pull-back of troops”...

On 28 November the Soviet government declared that a mutual pull-back of troops was unacceptable, hardly addressed the proposal of a joint investigation of the incident, and announced that “we consider ourselves free of the obligations we took upon ourselves as a result of the nonaggression pact.”

On the evening of 29 November the Finnish envoy in Moscow was summoned to the NKID [People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs] where V. Potemkin, the deputy people’s commissar, handed him a new note. It said that “in view of the present circumstances, for which the government of Finland bears sole responsibility, the government of the USSR can no longer maintain normal relations with Finland and must recall Soviet political and economic representatives from Finland.” In this manner the penultimate step in the transition from peace to war was taken.

[Dongarov] Nonetheless, I expect that the Maynil bombardment was most likely a “final warning” to Helsinki. The 17 November report to Molotov from V. Derevyansky, USSR plenipotentiary in Helsinki, provides evidence in favor of this interpretation. In it the plenipotentiary recommends that a series of measures be undertaken to exert pressure on the Finns with the goal of persuading them to make concessions; create strained conditions at the Soviet-Finnish border, begin an anti-Finland campaign in the Soviet press, and organize meetings and demonstrations of Soviet workers under the appropriate slogans. And as a last step—denounce the nonaggression pact of 1932.

And in fact on 26 November artillery shells exploded in the town of Maynil, and the Soviet Union immediately unleashed a storm of criticism against the Finnish leaders, demonstrations and meetings took place around the country, and the pact was denounced. Did not everything happen just as in Derevyansky’s “musical score”? But we should remember the goal of this intermezzo: To exert pressure on the Finnish leadership and to persuade it to come to an agreement.

[Budurkin] As we know, however, this was unsuccessful and on 30 November extreme measures were taken—armed forces. What sort of mission did they have? To subjugate Finland?

[Noskov] I believe that in this instance only the means of achieving the goal had changed while the goal itself had remained, in essence, the same: To compel Helsinki to compromise... And limited measure were used—only troops from the Leningrad military district were involved. The mission was also a limited one: To advance 120-150 kilometers into Finnish territory over a period of 2-3 weeks, which would be enough, according to Moscow’s calculations, to defeat the main forces of the Finnish Army and force Helsinki to negotiate.

Chronicle: Soviet troops occupied the small town of Terijona and, on 1 December 1939, a government was created which declared Finland a democratic republic. Otto Kuusinen, a Finnish emigre revolutionary and secretary of the Comintern, became its head. On that same day it was recognized by the Soviet Union. On 2 December a treaty of mutual assistance and friendship was signed between them. At the same time the Central Committee of Finland’s Communist Party called upon the people to overthrow the government in Helsinki.

In the Soviet Union a corps under the command of A. Anttila, a Finn by birth, was activated and handed over to the “government of the Democratic Republic of Finland.” However, the corps never took part in combat operations.

After a peace treaty was signed in 1940, the “Kuusinen government” dissolved itself with the consent of Stalin and Molotov.

[Budurkin] You maintain that the goals and measures were “limited.” But how does that fit in with the creation of the “Kuusinen government” and the formation of a corps of a “Finnish National Army”? Do we not see here the intention to change the governmental system of Finland after its defeat?

[Noskov] Political measures have for a long time been part of any war, limited or not. Nonetheless, it seems to me that this was a major miscalculation and that the evaluation of Finland’s internal situation was mistaken as well. As often happened under Stalin, desire passed for reality. For instance, our diplomats in Helsinki reported to Moscow that “the working masses and the poorest sections of the peasantry express a secret dissatisfaction with the government’s policy... and threaten violence against those who pursue policies hostile to the Soviet Union...” The opinion was quite widespread that the working class and the peasantry “will not take up
arms” against the homeland of socialism, that they would overthrow the administration that was so disagreeable to them, etc.

It is necessary to recognize that the very fact of creating the “Kuusinen government” was in every respect untenable on a general political level because it awakened the negative reaction of world public opinion. It turned out to be mistaken on another level as well: The news of the creation of the “government” excited in the Finnish people the strongest apprehensions for the independence of the country. The resistance of the Finnish Army increased dramatically...

[Badurkin] And does this explain the initial failures of the Red Army on the Finnish front?

[Noskov] In part, but the main reason lies elsewhere. The Soviet command had not considered Finland a target for attack and had not made serious preparations. The Finnish leadership at that time, however, considered the USSR its sole potential enemy and had been intensively constructing defensive installations since 1927. In this fashion a thoroughly prepared Finnish defense met the unprepared attack of the Red Army.

Our intelligence and troops had hardly studied and barely knew the enemy at all. As a result the plan of attack developed by the staff of the Leningrad Military District barely took into account either a real enemy or a real theater of military operations. As it turned out, the troops of the LVO [Leningrad Military District] attacked where the strongest defensive structures were located. There was not the slightest hint of surprise or originality of concept. The general headquarters of Army Commander 2d Rank K. Meretskov, commander of the district’s troops, committed itself to a massive assault of heavy forces and equipment: Against the 280 Finnish guns that had been “uncovered,” 1,500 of ours were put into action; against 10-15 tanks, 900 of our machines; against 150 aircraft, 1,600 of ours; against 62 Finnish battalions, 141 of ours. It was believed that victory would be inevitable in the course of 2-3 weeks.

The Finns stuck to a strategy of wearing down the cumbersome and unwieldy combined units with small, highly maneuverable detachments. The enormous masses of our tanks, vehicles, and guns frequently turned out to be a liability. The soldiers and officers hastily called up from the reserves or transferred from the Ukraine did not know how to ski, and in fact many did not have skis. Dressed in summer uniforms, they often froze in the snow.

The mass repressions against the most qualified military cadres also had their effect. The Army was as though decapitated, and the remaining commanders performed with caution. Many of them had little knowledge and experience. They had to learn their lessons on the battlefield, sustaining huge losses in the process: By my calculations our forces lost more than 90,000 men killed and missing in action, and about 200,000 men were wounded and severely frostbitten.

The ineffectiveness demonstrated by the Red Army was a great surprise to both the Soviet leadership and the whole world. “Stalin grew angry,” recalls Meretskov: “Why are we not advancing? The fact that we are being held up for so long by such a weak opponent will promote the anti-Soviet efforts of imperialist circles...”

Berlin no longer had to fear its eastern border and could devote the entire might of the Wehrmacht to the British-French coalition. And right after the Finland sensation there was a bigger one yet: The catastrophically speedy defeat of the Western allies. They rejoiced in Berlin and Hitler suggested that they take immediate advantage of the weakness of the Soviet Union and attack it in the fall of 1940. However the Wehrmacht was not prepared and winter was close.

[Badurkin] The past cannot be changed. As a result, many historians maintain that there is no sense in guessing what might have happened if only... Nonetheless I believe that hypothetical questions merit the attention of researchers. Otherwise you cannot draw any conclusions or learn any lessons from history. In this context a question suggests itself: Was this war unavoidable?

[Dongarov] This war has many names. The Soviets usually call it the Finnish War, the Finns call it the Winter War. Aleksandr Tvardovskiy has christened it more comprehensively, sadly, and accurately: “the Infamous War.” In my opinion it would be appropriate to call it the war that did not have to happen.

It did not have to happen because its true causes lie outside the framework of the relations between two countries. Taken by themselves, even in those far from ideal times, Soviet-Finnish relations did not display the final inevitability of armed conflict. With all their complexity in the period between the wars, sufficient cause was lacking for one or the other country to deem it necessary to break the peace. However, in Europe everything had changed abruptly when the threat of world war became a reality and when Fascist aggression reached catastrophic levels. In circumstances of growing nervousness and mutual suspicion, it turned out that the reserve of Soviet-Finnish goodwill was insufficient.

Of course, acknowledgement of this fact does not absolve either the Soviet Union or Finland of responsibility for the tragic turn of events on 30 November 1939. In my opinion, the Finnish leadership at that time had also maintained a false tone in its relations with its eastern neighbor right from the beginning. Intransigence and provocative hostility were perceived by many in Finland as an indicator of its independence.

And of course the Soviet leadership of that time must bear its share of the responsibility for the tragic events of 30 November. This consists primarily in the fact that it did not make full use of peaceful means of solving the problems which arose between the USSR and Finland. Many Finnish historians maintain that the government of that country was surprised by the decision of the
USSR to resort to “the last argument of kings” to manage its points of contention. V. Tanner, for instance, says that in Helsinki they expected some sort of final ultimatum, after which the government would be able to make concessions, insisting that circumstances of force majeur left them no alternative...

The Soviet side probably should have taken greater account of the political situation inside Finland and communicated more distinctly its interest in providing for the security of the USSR. And most importantly, once hostilities had already begun Moscow ignored many of the Finns’ proposals for a long time.

Chronicle: On 5 March 1940 Assarson, Sweden’s envoy to the USSR, informed Molotov that the government of Finland had agreed to begin negotiations on Soviet conditions “in principle.” On 6 March he was given a Soviet government memorandum with an affirming response. On 9 March a delegation from Finland arrived in Moscow headed by Prime Minister R. Ryuti. On 12 March a treaty was signed. Under its conditions Finland leased the peninsula of Hango to the Soviet Union for 30 years and turned over the entire Karelial Islthmus to the USSR (including the city of Vyborg), the Gulf of Vyborg with its islands, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, part of the Rybachiy and Sredniy Peninsulas, and several other small pieces of territory. The distance from the new border to Leningrad was 150 kilometers.

And thus ended the “infamous” war.

[Badurkin] The Russian and Finnish people have a saying which means roughly that it is easy to lose that which has been won easily. Our peoples and countries have had to pay very dearly for today’s relations of trust and cooperation. And so we must treat them all the more carefully. Above all, this is the meaning for us of the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the war that did not have to happen...

Col Gen Kleymenov on 1939 ‘Introduction’ of Troops into Baltics

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[Text] Col Gen A. Kleymenov, deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, is interviewed by a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

[Correspondent] Events of the fall of 1939 are one of the subjects most debated in the Baltics. This is borne out, among other things, by numerous letters to the editors. The readers ask on what basis certain public movements classify the introduction of Red Army units into Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in the fall of 1939 as an occupation. What can you tell us about this, Anatoly Nikolayevich?

[Kleymenov] What is an occupation? It is the seizure of enemy territory by armed forces and the assumption of control of that territory. Soviet troops did not seize the territories of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and did not assume control over them. They were introduced under an agreement with the governments in the face of fascist Germany’s aggressive aspirations.

The parties to the agreement committed themselves to provide one another with every kind of assistance, including military. It was specified that military bases would be built on the territories of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and that a small number of Soviet military units would be located there.

These and other agreements did not encroach upon the sovereign rights of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian states and did not affect their public and state structures. They secured the national independence of those nations and were designed to prevent their territories from being turned into staging areas for an attack on the USSR.

[Correspondent] What documents are there which specifically refute the accusations of forced “Sovietization” of the Baltic states?

[Kleymenov] Political, diplomatic and military documents at our disposal provide the basis for stating that the actions taken by the Soviet side adhered precisely to the agreements.

I would cite just a telegram sent by V. Molotov to N. Pozdnjakov, plenipotentiary in Lithuania, on 21 October 1939: “I absolutely forbid you and all the workers with our delegation, including the military attaché, to interfere in intraparty affairs in Lithuania, to support any kind of opposition movements, and so forth. The slightest attempt by any of you to interfere in the internal affairs of Lithuania will bring the most severe punishment for the guilty party. Bear in mind that our party is going to fulfill the agreement with Lithuania honorably and precisely.” Similar instructions were issued also to diplomats representing the USSR in Latvia and Estonia.

The same is indicated in war department documents....

[Correspondent] Would it be possible to acquaint our readers with at least a few of them?

[Kleymenov] Why not? Many of them have now been declassified. Orders issued by the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR on 25 October 1939 are extremely typical of relations between the “occupiers” and the “occupied.”

Among other things, Order No. 0162 stated: “In order to ensure that the mutual assistance pact between the USSR and the Estonian Republic is precisely followed, I order:

1. Division Commander Comrade Tyurin, commander of the 35th Special Rifle Corps, and Brigade Commissar Comrade Zhmakin, commissar of that corps, to take all
necessary steps to see that all the personnel of our units located in Estonia, from the Red Army private to the highest commanders, observe each point in the mutual assistance pact precisely and conscientiously and not interfere in the internal affairs of the Estonian Republic under any circumstances;

2. that the Soviet Government’s friendly policy toward Estonia be explained to all the personnel of our units. The mutual assistance pact with Estonia is intended to secure peace in the Baltics and ensure the security of Estonia and the Soviet Union. All of the personnel of our units must clearly understand that under the mutual assistance pact our units are billeted and will live on the territory of a sovereign state in the political affairs and the social system of which they do not have a right to interfere.

Orders No. 0163 and No. 0164 absolutely forbade personnel of the 2nd Special Rifle Corps and the 16th Special Rifle Corps to interfere in the internal affairs of the Latvian and Lithuanian republics.

[Correspondent] Would it not be a good thing for those who talk about an occupation of the Baltic nations by Red Army units to learn how questions pertaining to the stationing of Soviet troops there were decided? We know the indications of real occupiers in such cases: plunder, murder, lawlessness,....

[Kleymenov] There was no such thing is this case, of course. The sites and the procedure for stationing Soviet military units, the status of our armed forces and the kind of relations maintained with local authorities were decided through talks. I have before me a directive issued by the People’s Commissar of Defense to the military council of the 7th Army: “A commission chaired by Corps Commander Comrade Boldin, 7th Army commander, has been set up to implement that part of the agreement concluded between the USSR and the Latvian Republic pertaining to the introduction of Red Army units onto the territory of the Latvian Republic.

“The commission’s missions are to coordinate with representatives of the Latvian Republic the basic sites and the distribution of Red Army units to be stationed on the territory of the Latvian Republic.”

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Nikolayevich, it would be of interest to learn the procedure by which Soviet units were introduced.

[Kleymenov] I can cite excerpts from a report from Army Commander 2nd Rank Meretskov, commander of the Leningrad Military District, to the People’s Commissar of Defense: “The last columns of our units moving into Estonia crossed the state border at 10:50 on 19 October 1939....

“This is how the crossing of the border took place. Representatives of the Red Army command element gathered at the troop crossing sites on the Soviet-Estonian border by 08:00 on 18 October 1939: Brigade Commander Lyubovtsev, commander of the 16th Rifle Division, on the Narva Highway; Division Commander Khabarov, commander of the 8th Army, and Brigade Commander Dershin, chief of Armored and Motor Vehiele Troops, on the Riga Highway, and on the Estonian side: Maj Gen Pulk, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, with an escort of officers, on the Narva Highway; Maj Gen Kruus, commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, and Col Strig, commander of the Pechora Military District, with an escort of officers, on the Riga Highway. Following reciprocal greetings, bands played the International on our side and the Estonian national anthem on the Estonian side, with a simultaneous 21-gun salute on both sides. The troops, positioned in a state of readiness at the border, were then given the order to advance.”

[Correspondent] But there were also opponents to the introduction of Red Army units....

[Kleymenov] There were, including members of the government of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. They did everything possible to sabotage the fulfillment of the treaties, on the one hand, and organized acts of provocation and united the reactionary forces against the Soviet Union, on the other.

Acts of provocation against our representatives and Red Army fightingmen had been stepped up by the summer of 1940, obviously influenced by those victories which fascist Germany had won in the West.

In view of this, the Soviet Government proposed in June 1940 that the governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia strictly observe the treaty. In order to prevent new acts of provocation and to ensure the security of our few garrisons in the Baltics, the government considered it essential to move additional military contingents to the bases previously made available.

It should be stated that the demand was in fact made in the form of an ultimatum. This can hardly be recognized as acceptable in relations between sovereign states.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Nikolayevich, how did relations develop between Red Army units and the people’s armies of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs after those republics joined the USSR?

[Kleymenov] The Baltic Special Military District was formed on their territories after the Baltic Soviet republics became a part of the USSR.

Since the regular armies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia consisted of representatives of the workers, they were not disbanded but were reorganized. Each army was transformed into a territorial rifle corps.

The corps were given the following names: the Estonian corps, the 22nd Rifle Corps; the Latvian corps, the 24th
Rifle Corps; the Lithuanian corps, the 29th Rifle Corps. The new corps became a part of the Red Army and were subordinate to the commander of the Baltic Military District.

It is my profound conviction that if agreement had not been reached on the introduction of Red Army units into the Baltic nations in the fall of 1939, the fascist boot would have crushed that territory long before 22 June 1941.
U.S. Hummer-Mounted ‘Avenger’ Anti-Aircraft System
90UM0122A Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 22 Nov 89 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article from “In the Inventories and on the Firing Ranges” section: “Anti-Aircraft System”]

[Text] As reported in ARMY MAGAZINE, Boeing has delivered initial serial production models of the new missile-and-machine gun Avenger Anti-Aircraft System to U.S. Ground Forces. This system is designed to protect troops from low-flying airplanes and helicopters.

A turret that has two-dimensional stability and 360-degree rotation has been mounted on the highly mobile Army M998 Hummer platform. The turret is equipped with two four-missile transport-and-launch containers for Stinger guided anti-aircraft missiles. In addition, the complex’s armament calls for a 12.7 mm machine gun. In the future this will be replaced by the M242 25-mm automatic cannon. The loader’s instruments include an optical and thermal sight that allows the complex to fire at night and under poor weather conditions. There is also a laser range-finder, a computer and a “friend-or-foe” recognition system.

The basic tactical and technical characteristics for the anti-aircraft system are as follows: combat weight—4.3 tons; vertical firing angle—10 to +70 degrees; missile rearming time—4 minutes; maximum range—5.5 kilometers; maximum firing altitude—3.5 kilometers.

The magazine also noted that in addition to the contract calling for delivery of 20 new complexes at a cost of 16 million dollars, the U.S. Defense Department has also given Boeing an additional 29 million dollars for 39 complexes. These have to be produced by June 1990. According to the 189 million dollar contract, Boeing must deliver 273 Avenger systems by mid-1993.

New French Carrier ‘Charles De Gaulle’
90UM0122B Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 22 Nov 89 First Edition p 3

[From “In the Inventories and on the Firing Ranges” section: “Nuclear Aircraft Carrier”]

[Text] According to INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW magazine France is building its first nuclear aircraft carrier, the Charles De Gaulle. The official keel-laying ceremony is to be in April of next year.

According to plans the aircraft carrier is to have the following tactical and technical data: water displacement—36 thousand tons; length—261 meters; width—32 meters; draught—8.2 meters; speed—28 knots (approximately 52 kilometers/hour); crew—1700.

The flight deck (195 meters long with an area of 12,000 square meters) is equipped with two catapults and the hanger is designed for 40 airplanes and helicopters.

To protect the aircraft carrier from aircraft and anti-ship missiles it is armed with two eight-round Naval Krotal anti-aircraft guided missile launchers and two Sadral six-round anti-aircraft missile complexes.

The aircraft carrier’s sea trials are planned for 1997 and it is to enter the French Navy’s inventory in 1998 (two years later than was originally planned). There are also plans to construct a second nuclear aircraft carrier. These will replace the non-nuclear aircraft carriers Clempto and Foch that have been in the inventory since the early 60’s.

French-West German Reconnaissance RPV
90UM0122C Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 22 Nov 89 First Edition p 3

[From “In the Inventories and on the Firing Ranges” section: “Remotely Piloted Reconnaissance Aircraft”]

[Text] MILITARY TECHNOLOGY is reporting that the French company Matra is forming a special consortium, Burodrouin, with West Germany’s MBB to produce the Brevel remotely-piloted reconnaissance aircraft beginning in 1995. The West German firm has experience in developing such remotely-piloted aircraft.

According to tactical and technical requirements that were coordinated by the FRG and French Ministries of Defense the Brevel must have a launch weight of up to 155 kilograms, a maximum speed of 150-250 kilometers per hour and a maximum time of flight in excess of three hours. It must also be able to reconnoiter to a depth of at least 50 kilometers.

The reconnaissance airplane will have an automatic pilot with instrumentation to input the flight route, a thermal or television camera and equipment to allow for real-time transmission of reconnaissance information.

Amounts, Changes to U. S. Defense Budget Noted
90UM0206A Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 30 Dec 89 First Edition p 5

[Article by Col N. Gavrilov: “The Pentagon Budget: Why Differences Arise”]

[Text] Recently a report flashed by in the newspaper that the U.S. military budget for 1990 had been approved in the amount of $286 billion. But other figures are also encountered—$305 billion, for example. What explains this discordance? Maj V. Shevtsov

A month ago U.S. President George Bush signed the law on military appropriations to the U.S. Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 1990 (1 October 1989 through 30 September 1990), that had been approved by the Congress, in the amount of $286 billion. Thus concluded the process of examination and approval of the official U.S. military budget, which includes the budget of the Department of Defense, the military program of the Department of Energy (development and production of
nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, atomic reactors, etc.), and a number of small programs of other departments—the Federal Emergency Management Agency (civil defense), the General Services Administration (creation of strategic reserves), etc.

In its final form, appropriations under the official military budget total $305.5 billion. This figure is made up of the Department of Defense budget of $295.3 billion; the military programs of the Department of Energy of $9.7 billion; and the programs of other departments, totalling $500 million. However, in reality substantially greater funds are allocated to military purposes. Here are not counted appropriations for U. S. military assistance to other countries (credit sales and gratis deliveries of weapons and equipment) and for NASA, although the results of projects in the field of aeronautics and space are used directly by the Department of Defense, and some, for example the program for creation of the Shuttle spacecraft, are financed jointly. Significant funds for maintaining the Coast Guard, paying pensions to war veterans, etc., also pass outside of the official military budget.

But these are not the only reasons for the variances. Various financial categories are used in U. S. budgetary practice, the main ones of which are appropriations and expenditures. In connection with this, various figures appear in the press. For example, in Fiscal Year 1990 appropriations amount to $305.5 billion and expenditures $299 billion. What is this all about?

Appropriations are an index characterizing the amount of monetary resources that, after approval by Congress, the Department of Defense is authorized to obtain from the Treasury to support the financial obligations of paying the salaries of military personnel and wages of civilian employees, placing orders for development and production of weapons and military equipment, as well as construction of military facilities. The funds intended for maintaining personnel are almost entirely expended in the given fiscal year. At the same time, appropriations for development and production of weapons and military equipment, and for military construction, are used, on average, over the course of three to seven years, since payment for orders placed takes place not in advance, but according to the amount of works actually fulfilled. Unspent appropriations are not put into the budget revenues, and are transferred to the following years.

Expenditures are monetary resources directly transferred from the accounts of the Department of Defense in payment for military products and services obtained. Usually about 60 percent of the expenditures are secured by appropriations of the given fiscal year, and the remaining 40 percent by unused appropriations of past years.

The request for military appropriations is presented by the president to Congress, in the form of the overall budget request, within the framework of the official military budget. It is developed in three parts, which differ in the time periods and order of passage in Congress.

The main part consists of the direct request for appropriations (to the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, etc.). It is approved by Congress in six separate laws at different times. The largest sums are passed in the law on military appropriations, which encompasses all of the funds allocated to the Department of Defense, except for the funds for military construction and housing support for military personnel, which are approved in the law on appropriations for military construction.

Another part consists of appropriations for "unforeseen circumstances." As a rule, requests for these are sent to Congress a year after presentation of the given draft budget, and concern primarily funds for an increase in the salaries of military personnel in connection with inflation. However, their amount is entered into the totals of the Department of Defense draft budget, and is taken into account in assessing the overall size of the military budget.

The third part consists of compensatory revenues (internal assets of the Department of Defense).

Different figures appear as a result of this practice of presenting the budget requests. Most often they have in mind the figures according to the law on military appropriations to the Department of Defense, which are sometimes taken to be the entire U. S. military budget.
Conference On MIAS In Afghanistan
90UM0205A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[Article by A. Oliyink: "Hearts Sustained By Hope"]

[Text] The All-Union Congress of Mothers and Relatives of Soviet Servicemen Missing in Action in Afghanistan was held a few days ago in the press center of the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. Our correspondent, Lt. Colonel A. Oliyink, briefly interviewed I. Andronov, a publicist who was elected chairman of the All-Union Society of Families of Soviet Servicemen Captured as Prisoners of War in Afghanistan.

[Oliyink] "Iona Andronovich, tell us briefly about the results of this unusual congress."

[Andronov] "Two hundred forty-seven mothers and relatives of our boys, who up till now have been languishing in the torture chambers of Afghanistan’s armed opposition, took part in the work of the congress. Our humanitarian and civic duty is to do everything possible, and maybe even the impossible, to obtain their immediate release. The USSR MID, USSR Ministry of Defense, Union of the Red Cross and Red Half-Moon Society and the Soviet Peace Fund are exerting great efforts toward this, something which was talked about in detail at the congress. Appearing before the congress were N. Kozyrev, USSR ambassador for special assignments who read a letter to the congress participants from E. Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs; Lieutenant General N. Ter-Grigoryants, deputy chief of staff of ground forces, as well as other representatives of government and public organizations.

“The participants of the congress appealed to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev for support in the creation of a temporary Soviet mission in Pakistan for negotiations regarding the release of our boys. Also approved was an appeal to President Najibullah of the Republic of Afghanistan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan B. Bhutto and leaders of the Afghan opposition located in Peshawar."

[Oliyink] "What are your plans for the near future?"

[Andronov] "To increase the pace of the difficult work already begun. However, we don’t have any illusions. The process towards release is hard and long. But we believe in the humanity and the ever increasing power of people’s diplomacy. With this faith we soon will travel again to the Republic of Afghanistan and probably to Pakistan..."

Union Of Afghan Veterans Publishes Monthly
90UM0211A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Dec 89 Second Edition p 3

[Article by V. Sinenko: "POBRATIM"]

[Text] The Union of Afghan Veterans has begun to publish a newspaper under this laconic title, POBRATIM...This word has been heard since ancient times in old Russia and better than any other describes the brotherhood of soldiers forged in combat. A brotherhood strengthened by blood spilled in battle. Blood brotherhood. It is especially dear to those who carried out their military duty far from the Motherland with rifle in hand. These emotional words are from a message to the reader.

The first issue came out on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the introduction of our forces into Afghanistan. The “afghan soldiers” were not the only ones who received it. Those who fought in the ranks of the anti-fascist forces in Spain, who aided the patriots in China and Mongolia, who took part in the battles in the Middle East, in Korea, in Vietnam, who served in Egypt, Cuba and other countries during difficult times also received a copy.

“Let’s join efforts,” exhorts Aleksandr Kotenov, chairman of the Union of Afghan Veterans, from the pages of the newspaper. Hero of the Soviet Union A. Rutskoy, writer Yulian Semenov, Metropolitan Volokolamskiy and Yuriyevskiy Pitirim forwarded their best wishes to the newspaper. It is reported that fourteen agencies and organizations are among the founders of the Union of Afghan Veterans including the USSR Ministry of Defense, VTSPPS [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], KGB [Committee for State Security] and the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans and the Moscow Patriarchy.

The newspaper will be published monthly. One half of the proceeds received will be donated to charity.

Good luck, POBRATIM.
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