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Arms Control
SHIJIE ZISHI Says Arms Reduction ‘Slow’
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[Article by Xia Yishan (1115 5030 0810): “Why the Progress of Strategic Arms Reduction Is Slow” —written on 26 May]

[Text] After Reagan and Gorbachev concluded an agreement in Washington on the destruction of intermediate-range missiles in December last year, they decided to sign a treaty on the 50 percent reduction of strategic arms at the Moscow conference this year. Subsequently, both sides instructed their disarmament representatives to speed up their negotiations on drafting the treaty, giving the impression that they were full of confidence. Despite repeated negotiations, however, these representatives have not been able to formulate the text of the treaty for the two state leaders to sign at the Moscow conference. Why is it that the United States and the Soviet Union have not made great progress in this respect? Involving the security and military interests of both sides, this issue covers a wider scope and is more complicated than that concerning intermediate-range missiles. Apart from this, their strategic nuclear arsenals also constitute an important factor causing the slow progress.

The offensive strategic nuclear arms of the United States and the Soviet Union are composed of ground-based ICBM, sea-based missiles (including those launched from submarines and naval vessels), and air-based missiles (carried by large bombers). Now the United States has about 2,100 strategic nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union 2,400. Each of them has almost 10,000 nuclear warheads. At a glance there is not a large gap between them, but a detailed comparison between their ground-based, sea-based, and air-based nuclear warheads will show a striking contrast. The United States has 2,100 ground-based nuclear warheads, and the Soviet Union 6,420; the United States has 1,700 air-based cruise missile nuclear warheads, and the Soviet Union 400; the United States has 5,760 sea-based nuclear warheads, and the Soviet Union 2,700; the United States has 2,140 aircraft-carried nuclear bombs and short-range missiles, and the Soviet Union 360. In addition, the United States has several hundred submarine-launched cruise missiles whereas the Soviet Union is just making preparations for the deployment of such missiles. The above figures clearly indicate that the Soviet Union’s ground-based nuclear warheads account for almost 70 percent of its total nuclear warheads but its sea-based and air-based nuclear warheads account for only a little over 30 percent of the total. The United States’ situation is just the other way round: its sea-based and air-based nuclear warheads account for 80 percent of its total nuclear warheads but its ground-based nuclear warheads account for only 20 percent. The Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear power rests on its ground-based missiles whereas the United States has the upper hand in sea-based and air-based missiles. During their negotiations the United States has tried to restrict the Soviet Union’s ground-based missiles, and the latter wants to restrict the former’s sea-based and air-based missiles, both attempting to restrict their opponent’s strong points to make up for their own weak points. Over the last 3 years, through 9 rounds of negotiations, 26 rounds of discussions at the foreign-ministerial level, and 3 rounds of summit meetings, the United States and the Soviet Union have made progress with regard to reducing strategic arms. The frames of the relevant treaty and agreement have basically taken shape and both sides have reached unanimity of opinion on the principles concerning the number to be reduced and the supervisory measures (based on the supervisory measures for intermediate-range missiles). But on other details, their negotiations have run aground. Their main divergence is on sea-based cruise missiles, air-based cruise missiles, mobile ICBM, and space weapons.

1. On the question of sea-based cruise missiles. As mentioned above, the Soviet Union is superior to the United States in this respect. Therefore as soon as their negotiations started, the Soviet Union made up its mind to get rid of U.S. superiority and its plan for the large-scale development of such weapons. In the beginning the Soviet Union proposed allowing the United States to retain the number of its sea-based cruise missiles within the permitted 6,000 nuclear warheads, but the United States strongly objected. The United States made a concession to the Soviet Union at their summit meeting in December last year, and both sides agreed to keep a certain number of sea-based cruise missiles outside the limit of 6,000 nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union suggested dividing such missiles into two categories, one carrying nuclear warheads and the other carrying nonnuclear warheads, the former being limited at 400 and the latter 600. It also proposed all-round supervisory measures. The United States refused this proposal because it would restrict U.S. naval activities. The United States suggested that both sides issue a statement clarifying that they would promise to keep the number of their sea-based cruise missiles within the limits set even without any supervision. However, the Soviet Union deemed this suggestion meaningless.

2. On the question of air-based cruise missiles. In this connection, the United States is 4:1 superior to the Soviet Union. Air-based cruise missiles are different from other missiles. They are carried by bombers and their number can be easily changed. Therefore it is difficult to calculate and check. The United States proposed dividing all large bombers into three categories. Large bombers equipped with nuclear cruise missiles fall into the first category, and each bomber counts as one carrier instrument and 10 warheads. The second category covers large bombers carrying nuclear bombs and short-range missiles, each bomber counting as one carrier instrument and one warhead. Bombers in these two categories are included in the limits of 1,600 carrier instruments and 6,000 warheads. Large bombers carrying nonnuclear arms fall into the third category, and
these bombers are not included in the above limits. This proposal was aimed at excluding many of U.S. large bombers from the limits so as to maintain U.S. superiority in this respect. The Soviet Union did not agree to this proposal and pointed out that all large bombers should be included in the limit of 1,600 carrier instruments. It also suggested that missiles should be counted according to the actual number a bomber can carry, with the aim of reducing U.S. superiority in large bombers and air-based cruise missiles.

3. On the question of mobile ICBM. The Soviet Union has such missiles whereas the United States does not. In the beginning the United States demanded the prohibition of such missiles but relaxed its demand subsequently, admitting that such missiles were conducive to strategic stability. The United States pointed out recently that it would agree on a negotiation with the Soviet Union about limiting the number of such missiles, if supervisory measures acceptable to both sides could be formulated; otherwise it would still insist on the prohibition of such missiles. However, the Soviet Union adopted an opposing stand.

4. On the question of abiding by the treaty on the relationship between antimissile missiles and the reduction of strategic weapons. In essence this question involves whether the United States is allowed to carry out the Strategic Defense Initiative. This old issue caused an unhappy ending of the Reykjavik summit. At the end of last year U.S. and Soviet leaders made concessions and agreed on formulating a treaty on the 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons under the prerequisite that both sides observe the ABM treaty. But they had differences of opinion on how to “observe.” The Soviet Union stood for strict adherence to the 1972 treaty whereas the United States emphasized that the treaty allows the necessary research, development, and experiment of a strategic defense system. The crux is how to explain the treaty. Should the treaty be explained in a broad or narrow sense? (Please refer to an article in the No 7 issue of this magazine entitled an “Argument About the Explanations of the ABM Treaty”.) Apart from this, both sides also held different views on the validity of the treaty on the reduction of strategic arms: the Soviet Union suggested 10 years whereas the United States 7 years.

In short, reducing strategic arms by 50 percent is a knotty and complex problem. Apart from the above factors, the political situation and other aspects in the two countries can also produce certain impacts on the issue of strategic arms. However, the signing of the treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms is only a matter of time because the United States and the Soviet Union consider it necessary to do so. Reagan has expressed the hope time and again that the treaty can be signed before the end of his office by the end of this year. Whether his hope will come true depends on the development of the domestic situations in the United States and the Soviet Union and on the decisiveness of the two leaders.
Europe’s security requires speedy disarmament, not “deterrence.” This is an aggressive doctrine. It means clinging to nuclear weapons and the readiness to use them. It leads to the continuation of the nuclear arms race. It impedes and finally prevents any kind of disarmament. The only thing it maintains is the danger of a nuclear inferno.

Is it not high time to dispose of the lie of a threat and, with it, of “deterrence”? For the house of Europe, which is now frequently also spoken about in the West, is to be a house for the living, not a house for the dead....

NATO Retreat From Arms Cuts in Europe Viewed
LD1307180688 Moscow TASS in English
1741 GMT 13 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 13 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

By all indications, the NATO leadership continues viewing conventional armaments as an inalienable component of its power politics and categorically objects to a balanced lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe.

A communique issued by the headquarters of the North Atlantic bloc in Brussels says, specifically, that the Soviet Union’s proposal for the withdrawal of Soviet aircraft from the areas of forward-basing in East Europe, if the United States does not deploy 72 F-16 fighter-bombers in Italy, does not suit NATO’s fundamental demands for asymmetrical reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces.

So it follows from the communique that it is only unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty member countries that would suit the leaders of the NATO bloc. It is stated in the communique that asymmetrical reduction, above all in tanks and artillery, that is the armaments in which “the East has considerable numerical advantage”, is the main priority of the alliance.

In their communique, the NATO leaders deemed it best not to go into essential details of the Soviet proposals on the reduction of conventional forces and armaments advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev in Warsaw, apparently for the reason that unlike NATO concepts of unilateral arms reductions, by countries of the socialist community only, the Soviet initiatives envisage the elimination of all imbalances and asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

Even before the opening of the talks Moscow proposes to exchange the initial data on the numerical strength of troops and quantity of armaments of the two military alliances, to check this data thoroughly with the use of on-site inspections, to eliminate imbalances, that is
reduce troops and armaments to the level of the side which has less armaments and troops, and then make reductions of forces from the equal level of both sides by 500 thousand.

Over the past years NATO has been constantly using the invented thesis about the “overwhelming superiority” of the Warsaw Treaty for the numerical strength of troops and conventional armaments in order to oppose any initiatives on disarmament. Let us first achieve parity in conventional armaments and forces, NATO officials were saying.

Now that the Soviet Union proposes to start the process of deep cuts in troops and armaments in Europe from the levelling out of the military might of the two alliances in every area, the NATO strategists brazenly beat a retreat.

Apparently, too many self-seeking interests are involved in the arms business, and, apparently, the stereotypes of the pre-nuclear age are too ingrained in the minds of NATO military and politicians.

NATO Reaction to Soviet Proposals Viewed
LD1507190188 Moscow TASS in English
1808 GMT 15 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 15 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

The NATO leadership has not yet evolved any clear-cut concept on security in Europe that it could offer without coming to be seen in the world as an opponent of balanced disarmament taking into account the interests of all sides.

This has been demonstrated strikingly by the alliance’s reaction to Soviet initiatives for scaling down military confrontation in Europe.

These proposals, formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev in Warsaw, are based on the principle of causing no harm to the security of any side.

The Warsaw Treaty suggests exchanging even before the commencement of talks initial data on the number of troops and armaments of the two blocs, carefully verifying this information through such means as on-site inspections, evening out imbalances and asymmetries, that is reducing armed forces and weaponry to the lower levels, and then slashing troop strength from the achieved equal level on each side by 500,000 men.

The impression is that balanced cuts in the military power of the two alliances down to equal levels do not suit NATO leaders since their goal is to break out of the fetters of parity and gain a military advantage.

In response to the Soviet initiatives they have demanded “asymmetrical cuts”, meaning a unilateral reduction of troops and conventional armaments by the Warsaw Treaty.

The “Atlanticists” are pretending that all the existing imbalances in Europe are due to Soviet military superiority.

NATO, in the meantime, has obvious advantages over the Warsaw Treaty in a number of aspects of military strength in Europe. This includes tactical aircraft, combat helicopters, anti-tank systems and aircraft carriers cruising off European shores.

The North Atlantic bloc has an advantage in the aggregate military power of all the services on the southern flank in Europe.

In the NATO headquarters they hold an extremely negative view of the Soviet proposal for swapping data about the military power of the two alliances since such exchanges with subsequent on-site inspections will dispel the myth of an “overwhelming military superiority” of socialist nations.

U.S. State Department spokesman Charles Redman said they were uncertain whether the USSR was really going to mend the imbalance in conventional arms.

Why doesn’t the United States and NATO as a whole test the sincerity of the Warsaw Treaty’s intentions by exchanging data about the military power of the two alliances and verifying it through on-site inspections as a starter?

Pact Proposals for Disarmament Observed
LD1707193788 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 17 Jul 88

[Text] You know, comrades, that the documents of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states held in Warsaw were published today. Among the priority tasks in the field of disarmament, the Warsaw Treaty member states single out reaching a treaty on a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive arms, a total, comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing, the conclusion of a convention completely banning chemical arms, and cutting armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. A separate declaration was made on that question. Over to commentator Vladimir Pasko:

[Pasko] The joint program for cutting armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural was proposed by the Political Consultative Committee as far back as 1986. A year later, at the session in Berlin, the program was supplemented and has now been made still more specific. It consists of a proposal to start the relevant talks and list of the topics which could be discussed in the first stage.
But why is so much significance attached by the allied states to cutting conventional forces whereas we stress the problem of cutting and eliminating nuclear arms? The fact is that the problem of eliminating nuclear arms is closely connected with cutting conventional ones. For example, let us recall that our development of intercontinental strategic missiles—which the United States is aiming so hard to cut at the moment—was in reaction to the U.S. forward-based weapons, including conventional ones. There is a second reason forcing us to grapple in earnest with this problem—in European conditions, very little distinguishes conventional weapons from nuclear ones. No one can guarantee that in case of a conflict, strikes will avoid nuclear power stations or chemical enterprises, and the consequences of that are obvious.

We have long been warning about the danger of conventional arms. The West seems to agree with this in words but in fact nothing changes. The arsenals are growing. Plans are being adopted to modernize conventional weapons. The concept of deterrence with regard to the East is being confirmed without change—that is to say, adherence to a policy of force. Work on a mandate for talks on cutting conventional forces and weapons is marking time. And this is accompanied by propaganda assertions that the Warsaw Treaty has more such forces; and therefore, they say we must cut them.

We propose getting out of the impasse in the following way: to exchange official data on the presence of forces, with verification [proverka] of this data, and on the basis of this data to eliminate the imbalances and asymmetry; then to cut the troops by 500,000 on each side; and in the third stage to continue cutting until the military formations of the two alliances have an exclusively defensive nature. As for the topics of the first stage of the talks, they are set out in the recent declaration and deal with three questions: reaching lower, equal levels; preventing sudden attacks; and exchanging information and verification. But it is essential to begin the talks themselves. We propose embarking on them immediately, this very year.

We must suppose that the West is already studying the documents of the Warsaw session of the Political Consultative Committee. Long ago they began guessing at their contents. Western leaders will be waiting with interest for an answer to the question as to whether the documents published after the session will speak in concrete terms about conventional arms control, Britain's THE INDEPENDENT wrote, for example. As we see, they do speak about this, clearly, logically, and in detail too. Now it's over to the other side; and we are waiting for their response with just the same impatience.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Fischer Address on INF Inspection, Disarmament
AU0707182688 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 1 Jul 88 p 9

[Speech by GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer at the Sixth People's Chamber Session on 30 June in East Berlin: "For a Comprehensive Security System and for a Nuclear-Free World"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade President, esteemed deputies: Immediately after the exchange in Moscow of the instruments of ratification on the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, the SED Central Committee general secretary and State Council chairman said: "This brings the historic treaty into force and inaugurates nuclear disarmament... The prospects for developments in Europe and the world... are further proof that a world with fewer weapons, a world without nuclear weapons is possible."

Esteemed deputies, part of this first disarmament treaty comprises:

—The trilateral agreement of 11 December 1987 between the GDR, the USSR, and the CSSR on inspections in connection with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles;

—The agreement between the GDR and the United States on inspections of the former Soviet missile bases on GDR territory. It was concluded on 23 December 1987 by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes.

These two documents form the basis in international law for the implementation of verification measures on our territory.

At the same time, they govern the advance notice and carrying out of inspections by the United States, in order to help guarantee the overall verification of the implementation of the Washington treaty. They set in detail the rights, obligations, privileges, and immunities of the U.S. inspectors and members of the aircraft crews. The agreements naturally safeguard the sovereign rights and interests of our state.

The Densest Network of Control Measures Ever Agreed in a Disarmament Treaty

We on the dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, have a vital interest in the speedy elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles; we commit ourselves to supporting the United States in carrying out inspections of the former Soviet Army missile bases on our territory.

For their part, the U.S. inspectors and members of their aircraft crews must strictly obey GDR laws and regulations, and not interfere in internal affairs. The conditions under which inspectors or members of aircraft crews can be denied entry into the country have also been defined.

Our state is ready to receive these inspectors and to guarantee them the agreed-upon support; this will be legally possible as of tomorrow.
These are new tasks, in the reliable mastery of which the good experience in the implementation of military observation and inspection measures in fulfilling the Stockholm document on confidence-building and disarmament will be useful. The Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles contains the densest network of control and verification measures ever agreed in a disarmament treaty. They cover a period of 13 years and apply to all former missile deployment sites cited in the treaty. This is unprecedented; and many of the solutions found could undoubtedly be used as models for future disarmament treaties. It is a case of the principle that control and verification measures are necessary because they strengthen trust.

Verification Must Become the Basis of Increasing Trust

Their scope must always be determined by the content of the agreed-upon disarmament, because verification is not an end in itself, it must in no way be the source of new distrust, but—I repeat—it must become the basis of increasing trust. It is clear that the conscientious fulfillment of all obligations resulting from the agreed inspections by all parties to the treaty leads to a further increase in trust on our continent.

Intentions or even efforts to replace nuclear systems, which are subject to reduction and destruction, by "modernization" or rearming in other fields will not only devalue the Washington treaty, they will be a direct blow to disarmament. For this reason, the GDR calls for decisive steps to be taken to prevent this.

You, esteemed deputies, know very well that, even before the just-mentioned treaty came into force, the GDR and the USSR decided—in the interest of the ratification of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles—to withdraw the missiles stationed in response to the arming of West European states with the most modern U.S. nuclear missiles. This, as well as similar steps by the CSSR, met with the greatest respect internationally. The former military site at Waren into a holiday center for the FDGB became a comprehensive symbol of the advantages which disarmament can bring for mankind.

Of course, it corresponds to the essence of socialist politics, and additionally, it is cheaper not to have to build holiday homes via the circuitous route of missile positions.

You also all know what our state has done to effectively support the process of working out and starting to implement the agreement of 8 December 1987.

Even when countermeasures to the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe had to be taken on our territory, we declared our support for the aim of a drastic reduction in missiles on both sides. I recall the slogan coined by Comrade Erich Honecker at the seventh SED Central Commission session in November 1983, which rapidly gained popularity: The devil's tools must go—now, more than ever! By the way, in the meantime this slogan has lost nothing, absolutely nothing of its topicality. Many people were surprised at the naming of Leipzig airport as the arrival airport for the U.S. inspectors who are due to supervise the keeping of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the dismantling of the missiles.

Even at the hour of the signing of this very important document, someone in Washington objected to Schoenefeld Airport. Why? It has remained inexplicable ever since. But our immediate decision to change to Leipzig showed: The GDR follows a predictable—because logical—policy, and this is oriented toward the comprehensive questions of mankind.

As of 1 August the Soviet Union Will Begin the Destruction of the Missiles That Have Been Withdrawn

The GDR has intensified the policy of dialogue and balance. This was one of the main topics during the talks and negotiations held in many West European states—including those in countries where U.S. intermediate-range missiles are deployed—by our highest representative. This is also shown in the statement of the joint communiqué on his official visit to the FRG from 7 to 11 September 1987, in which—I quote—"both sides" stressed "...the particular importance of an agreement on intermediate-range systems..." and expressed the conviction "...that the conclusion of a corresponding agreement will have positive effects both on other fields of arms control and disarmament, and also on East-West relations as a whole. The chance inherent in this must be used."

This, esteemed deputies, is the attitude to be expected from a German state which takes seriously its duty to see that war will never again emanate from German soil.

Looking back we can say that this policy was and remains correct; the efforts have been worthwhile, and they will continue to be so.

Negotiation, signing, ratification, and the incipient implementation of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles have been and are observed by the world public with extraordinarily great interest and almost unanimous agreement.

Thus, it became impossible for the opponents of any disarmament, be it in the area of missiles of intermediate- and shorter-range or strategic importance, be it nuclear or conventional, to prevent the ratification. As of 1 August, the Soviet Union will begin the destruction of the missiles which have been withdrawn.
All this proves that the weight of the Soviet-U.S. treaty of December 1987 and of the other advances achieved in recent times in the struggle for disarmament and arms control far exceeds the respective subject of the negotiations.

The Berlin Meeting Is of Outstanding Importance in the Struggle for Nuclear Disarmament

Esteemed deputies, the lively movement, which has entered all efforts toward disarmament and arms control, may be assessed as the first consequence of the insight that, in the nuclear age, more weapons do not mean more security.

The worldwide cooperation of the forces of realism and reason is being extended on the basis of this knowledge. This was shown in a most impressive way only a few days ago at the International Meeting on Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, held in our capital city. This, the most comprehensive world forum on peace issues in history, is unprecedented. It is of outstanding importance in the struggle for nuclear disarmament, particularly for Europe, where the most modern weapons of mass destruction of all kinds are concentrated. The establishment of nuclear-free zones and areas would—as Comrade Erich Honecker, the initiator of this meeting, stressed—strengthen the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and would free increasingly larger territories from the nuclear devil's tools. Last but not least, it confirmed the view that tactical nuclear weapons have to be included in the disarmament process, which is particularly in the interest of the peace and security of the citizens of the two German states.

Our representatives who spoke at the meeting left no doubt that disarmament in the field of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles should be followed by the next zero-option—the removal of so-called nuclear tactical systems. And one of the encouraging, future-oriented experiences of the meeting is that the Soviet-U.S. treaty of last December was considered by all participants not as an individual nuclear disarmament activity that will not be repeated for a long time, but as an important first step, which is to be speedily followed by others.

A nuclear-free world in the year 2000 is not a utopia—it can be achieved.

Thus, we stick to the view, expressed in the Politburo report to the sixth SED Central Committee session, that there are the beginnings of a change for the better in international relations.

Significant developments are taking place, in spite of existing complications and the most stubborn resistance by forces inimical to detente.

For the first time, the most up-to-date weapons systems are not only being limited, but destroyed. Here it is shown that enormous intellectual, material, and financial means are required to bring this about without any dangers to mankind. Should this not be a reason to come to an agreement not to produce such weapons in the first place?

To the west of our state border there are still people who advocate the retention of "nuclear deterrence" in Europe. This is aimed directly against the process of disarmament and the improvement in international relations which has just begun. One has to know this. And it is mere supposition and speculation that nuclear deterrence has prevented a third world war for 40 years. No one can guarantee that this is the case.

Who would or should prove the contrary if worse came to worse? Do we not see daily, in our highly technological world, accidents and disasters because, for example, an insignificant component or a human being failed? I am thinking of Chernobyl; of the poisoning of the Rhine; of the catastrophes in Bhopal in India and in Seveso in Italy, at the launch of the Challenger spacecraft; of the cloud of poison gas in Springfield in the United States; and many other things.

Can we in Europe or elsewhere risk a nuclear war "by chance"? That a war "by chance" has become conceivable is shown by the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have taken measures to reduce the risk of a nuclear conflict. This concern was also the stimulus for Erich Honecker’s proposal at last week’s international meeting in our capital city for the creation of mechanisms for peaceful crisis-management and the prevention of military incidents in central Europe, which immediately received a worldwide response.

Its implementation, which is easily possible within a short period, would help reduce the danger of surprise attacks. Solutions for "all of Europe" would thus not only not be prevented, but would be promoted! Those who are in favor of more confidence-building, predictability, and effective crisis-management should proceed from this. Saying yes to this proposal is a test for whether such assurances are meant seriously.

Esteemed deputies, we are in favor of a balance without nuclear weapons and with a minimum of weapons on either side, just enough for defense.

Doctrine of "Deterrence" Prevents Any Disarmament

"Nuclear deterrence," that is, the readiness to use nuclear weapons in case of conflict, is in direct contradiction to what Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan agreed on—and what has not been contradicted by anyone in the world, as far as I know—that is, that there cannot be any victors in a nuclear war and that such a war must simply not be waged.
Furthermore, such weapons are unnecessary in Europe; the already existing conventional weapons—with a concentration about 20 times as high as that in other continents and regions—would certainly be completely sufficient to first turn this continent into a desert. History, from the past to the very recent present, gives innumerable examples that it is easy to begin a war, but it is very difficult to stop it. Armed conflicts have always developed in line with their own regularities, since every side wants to win at any price. We are also against "nuclear deterrence" for the reason that it logically entails the fact that these weapons are renewed and "modernized" from time to time. That means that "nuclear deterrence" is continuing the nuclear arms race. And more: In the end, "nuclear deterrence" hinders and thwarts any sort of disarmament.

Already now, 40 countries are said to be able to produce nuclear weapons.

If NATO adheres to its doctrine of nuclear deterrence, then all over the world the temptation to base one's own security on nuclear deterrence would surely grow. Hence, what we must do is to find solutions which make nuclear weapons dispensable for all, without harming anyone's security.

Further Proof of the Realistic Nature of the Proposals

Esteemed deputies:

The GDR, esteemed deputies, judges the speedy realization of the Soviet-U.S. treaty of last December as further proof of the realistic nature of the Warsaw Pact's joint program on the establishment of a comprehensive system of security and the creation of a nuclear-free world. At the third special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament questions in New York, the GDR and its allies again advocated this with great emphasis.

There at the United Nations, here at the Berlin International Meeting—everywhere one can see that people are becoming increasingly aware of the dangers resulting from the continuing arms race. More and more people become sensitive to this; become so, and are prepared to commit themselves to a life in peace.

Perceptible influences on further developments in the world will emanate from the implementation of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-and Shorter-Range Missiles, for which all the political and legal prerequisites now exist. The expectations tied to this can only be fulfilled if no break in the policy of disarmament is allowed.

President Reagan and other Western politicians, too, said that the agreement of last December can only be the beginning of the process of nuclear disarmament. Well, such statements meet with our agreement, and we are waiting for further actions.

Even if differences of opinion exist on the scope and objective of disarmament, we can still note, esteemed deputies, that a growing consensus is forming for the further disarmament process. This applies to the negotiations between the USSR and the United States on a 50-percent reduction of their strategic-offensive weapons, which have actually made quite a lot of progress. We demand that the questions that are still open, such as, for instance, the strict observance of the ABM Treaty and the inclusion of sea-based cruise missiles in the reduction process, be solved by the end of this year.

This applies to nuclear-weapons tests. By agreeing on a corresponding joint experiment with regard to the verification of the 1974 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, the last preconditions for putting this treaty into force are being established. A further limitation of the number and intensity of nuclear tests can be the preliminary stage for a total ban.

This also applies to the conclusion of a convention on a ban of all chemical weapons. The GDR thinks that, for this purpose, it is necessary to intensify the respective negotiations in the Geneva disarmament committee.

It Is Necessary to Push Ahead the Process of Disarmament

And, finally, this also applies to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

In all these questions it is now necessary to push ahead the process of disarmament—this was the conclusion drawn at the sixth SED Central Committee session. At the two summit meetings in Berlin in 1987, at the foreign ministers meetings in Sofia and Berlin in 1988, the Warsaw Pact states repeatedly reacted with proposals to changed conditions and took up the ideas of the other side.

Furthermore, as is known, we support
—The three-stage plan of Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on conventional disarmament in Europe;
—The plan proposed by Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski on arms limitation and the strengthening of trust in central Europe, including the further details spelled out a few days ago;
—The plan established by Comrade Milos Jakes on establishing a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the dividing line between the states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO;
—The initiatives of the Finnish and the Hungarian sides; we welcome the first-time conference of the foreign ministers of the Balkan states, and finally I refer to
—The International Meeting on Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones held last week here in Berlin, and to its mobilizing effect.
We Continue the Efforts to Establish Nuclear-Free Zones and Corridors in Europe

As a state on this dividing line, we continue our persistent efforts to establish nuclear-free zones and corridors in Europe. The corresponding proposals of the SED, the CPCZ, and the SPD demand a constructive response. Even if NATO should not consider direct disarmament of tactical nuclear weapons possible at present, the separating of dangerous offensive weapons that has been offered would be an important contribution to strengthening mutual trust and to reducing military confrontation. It limits the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and certainly helps to arouse the world's conscience. And—this should also be remembered—a policy of "all or nothing" has never solved any problem in a lasting way and in the interests of all sides. This can be done only step by step. In our view and in that of our allies, it should only prove difficult to rid Europe of chemical weapons, and thus at the same time promote a worldwide ban on them.

In line with this, there is our negotiating offer on the establishment of a chemical weapons-free zone in central Europe where, for instance, parts of the convention on a ban on chemical weapons, which have already been agreed on in Geneva, could be tested.

Sometimes one hears the objection that a worldwide ban would be better than a regional one. This is correct, and the GDR is in favor of a global ban without any reservations. But it is equally true that there is nothing to confirm the view that regional solutions would contradict a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. On the contrary: On a limited scope, things that are to be valid all over the world can be tested effectively and quickly. And is it not better to accomplish one thing—a chemical weapons-free zone in central Europe—without renouncing another one, namely, continuing the work on the global ban on chemical weapons?

As for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, the GDR feels that the high concentration of weapons and civilian targets, the destruction of which would have unforeseeable consequences for our entire continent, means that today—and I repeat what I have just said—a war can no longer be waged in Europe, neither by conventional means nor by nuclear means. Just think of how many nuclear power plants have meanwhile been built in Europe. Their destruction by conventional means, for instance by so-called intelligent ammunition, would—as in the case of a nuclear strike—quickly cover not only our continent with nuclear contamination.

Hence, at the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, we are trying to ensure that talks between the 23 states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on conventional disarmament can start before the end of this year. An early mandate for these negotiations would at the same time be an outstanding contribution to guaranteeing human rights, as only living people can exercise such rights.

And the common European house, which is being passionately discussed and patiently worked for in Vienna and elsewhere, can and must be only a house of the living—and must never be a mortuary.

The comprehensive exchange of data and information on armed forces and armaments of both alliance systems in Europe, which has been proposed by the Warsaw Pact states, could contribute much to the realistic presentation of the relations of military power on our continent and could make the planned negotiations easier. We regret the delaying attitude of the NATO states to this proposal, which actually corresponds to their own demands. Delays obviously only benefit those forces that want to postpone conventional disarmament to 31 February.

Therefore, the Warsaw Pact states are in favor of acting as soon as possible to get a clear picture of the existing asymmetries in armed forces and armaments on both sides. As is known, the armies of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO are not equipped equally. Thus, for instance, NATO has more attack air forces, combat helicopters, or antitank-missile complexes. The Warsaw Pact states, on the other hand, have more tanks and artillery.

In order to prevent this problem from continuing to be the subject of unproductive speculation or accusations which make negotiations more difficult, we are in favor of reliably verifying the exchanged data, if necessary on the spot. Then there would be nothing in the way of removing the imbalances between the armed forces and armaments of the two opposing military alliances which have built up over the years, with due regard for mutual concerns—and I stress the regard for mutual concerns.

Achieving Joint Solutions by Means of Negotiations

The Warsaw Pact states also feel that drastic reductions in armed forces and armaments must directly follow the process of overcoming existing imbalances. The final aim is to remove the capacity of the forces of both blocs to, first, launch a surprise attack and then, finally, any attack at all. In this connection, I point out the comparison of the military doctrines proposed by the Warsaw Pact in Berlin.

On all these issues I mentioned that our state and the Warsaw Pact members will continue to work to reach joint solutions by means of negotiation, solutions which lead us forward on the path of disarmament, detente, and cooperation, and which, of course, are of benefit for bilateral relations.

Esteemed deputies, the declaration of the People's Chamber groups on the trilateral agreement on inspections, which I recommend you to approve, pays tribute
to the historic significance of the intermediate-range missile treaty. The declaration corresponds to the principles and goals of our republic's foreign policy.

NVA Has Met 'All Obligations' of CSCE Pact
LD0607110788 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0721 GMT 6 Jul 88

[Text] Berlin, 6 Jul (ADN)—The GDR and the National People’s Army (NVA) have fulfilled all obligations contained in the document of the Stockholm conference on confidence-building and security measures, says Colonel General Fritz Streletz, deputy defense minister and chief of the Main Staff of the NVA, in a press article. Thus, in close collaboration with the fraternal states and armies, it has made an important contribution to security on the continent. “The proper application of the stipulations met with unqualified recognition and in this way helped to increase the international authority of the socialist German state.”

Up to the present time, for example, the GDR has announced six exercises of the NVA and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany on its territory with more than 13,000 participants and has invited exercise observers to four of them, involving over 17,000 men. In addition, it has complied with the request by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in September 1987 and of the United States in April 1988 to carry out an inspection on its territory, and it has made provisions for this.

Moreover, the GDR has so far sent to 21 exercises—including 10 NATO and 1 of a neutral state—2 officers as observers, and in November 1987 carried out an inspection on the territory of the FRG.

“With the prospects for further disarmament measures new and further-reaching confidence-building steps in the military-political area become increasingly indispensable,” stressed Col Gen Streletz. It was in this spirit that the efforts of the socialist military coalition to hold consultations on the military doctrines and concepts of both sides and for the exchange of relevant details for the comparison of data on armed forces and arms should be seen. This continues to include the efforts of the socialist states to arrive at confidence-building measures on the activity of air and naval forces and a limitation on all kinds of military activities (maneuvers).

He stressed that further concrete efforts for confidence-building between East and West have increasing importance. They form a component of the security policy of the Warsaw Pact states. On the basis of the defensive nature of the joint military doctrine, the GDR, together with its alliance partners, supports the achieving of further disarmament measures in an integrated context.

SED, SDP Present ‘Zone of Confidence’ Plan
LD0707142588 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1010 GMT 7 Jul 88

[Text] Bonn, 7 Jul (ADN)—The SED and the SPD are jointly, in Bonn at this moment, putting forward to the public new and topical proposals for confidence-building and increasing European security. At a greatly acclaimed press conference, Hermann Axen and Egon Bahr, members of the leading bodies of the two parties, are setting out the proposal for a “zone of trust and security in central Europe,” which was worked out by a joint working group and which has been approved by the SED Central Committee Politburo and the SPD Presidium.

It is proposed that all the CSCE states further reduce the participation of troops in maneuvers, that they also give advance notice of sea-based and air forces participation, that they no longer hold maneuvers in an area of, for example, 50 km either side of the border between the two military alliances, and that they invite observers to all maneuvers. Centers of confidence-building and permanent joint observation posts at strategically important points in all central European states are to be created.

It is also proposed that there should be exchanges of military attaches between these states, and that a joint European satellite observation station as a possible instrument for all CSCE countries, and “hotlines,” should be created.

Foreign Ministry Comments
LD0807102688 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0930 GMT 8 Jul 88

[Text] Berlin, 8 Jul (ADN)—The GDR Government is prepared, in the spirit of the SED and SPD joint proposal, for a “zone of trust and security in central Europe,” and to immediately begin negotiations with the governments and states of this region for its realization. This was stated in Berlin today to representatives of the press, by GDR Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ambassador Wolfgang Meyer. After the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and nuclear disarmament commenced, this initiative was dictated by an effort to prohibit any pauses or even a slowing down of the disarmament process, he said.

The spokesman referred to Erich Honecker's statement at the Berlin International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, that the sensitive dividing line between the two strongest military coalitions of our time runs down central Europe and that a terrible potential in weapons of mass destruction is stockpiled there. The initiative is to a great extent confidence-building and thus an important link with other disarmament measures.
A central European zone of trust and security endangers or disadvantages no one; on the contrary, it is in line with everyone's legitimate security interests, the spokesman stated.

The proposal is a possible interim step toward a corridor free of nuclear weapons in central Europe. It also supports and promotes important disarmament initiatives, such as the Jaruzelski Plan, for the reduction of armaments and raising trust in central Europe, and the Jakes plan for creating a zone of trust along the dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

Bahr, Axen Remarks

LD0707170588 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1134 GMT 7 Jul 88

[Text] Bonn, 7 Jul (ADN)—The SED and the SPD have put before the public their most recent joint proposal for a "zone of confidence and security in central Europe" at an international news conference in Bonn today.

The heads of the joint working group of the SED Central Committee and the SPD Bundestag group—Hermann Axen, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee, and Egon Bahr, chairman of the subcommittee for disarmament and arms control in the FRG Bundestag and member of the SPD Presidium—presented the document.

In his introductory remarks, Egon Bahr said that the new proposal differs on one point from the previous working results on a chemical weapons-free zone and a nuclear weapons-free corridor in central Europe. It does not concern weapons, but concentrates on building confidence and thus moves in the tradition of Stockholm. The confidence-building measures agreed on there are already effective, although there is still no conventional disarmament in Europe.

The SPD disarmament expert emphasized that the measures proposed today do not conflict with any NATO resolution. They are to be fully included in the negotiations, for which a mandate can be agreed on in Vienna this month, which the Federal Government hopes for. Thus, the proposals' timing is right, they conform to alliance interests, and they are intended for the CSCE follow-up negotiations. One can assume that the GDR Government will adopt these proposals, which means that the Federal Government will have to count on being confronted by them in Vienna, said Egon Bahr.

Therefore, the question is whether the Federal Government wants to leave such an initiative solely to the GDR Government. Nothing can prevent both German governments from recalling the community of responsibility agreed to by both sides during the visit of the chairman of the GDR Council of State on developing joint initiatives which would lead to greater security in Europe. They would only be doing what is expressly provided for in the Basic Treaty.

With regard to the new proposal, Egon Bahr emphasized that both sides in Europe should have the same level of information at their disposal, so that mistakes and misunderstandings can be excluded. Since there are already monitoring centers in every capital city, these could be connected to one another, which would prevent crises developing from mistakes.

In his remarks, the SPD politician described the double zero option as a triumph of the idea of joint security over the policy of strength. All sides are proud of the agreed-on reciprocal controls which previously were considered implausible.

Bahr said that the present proposal shows that confidence can emanate not only from the two superpowers or the neutral and nonaligned states, but also from the smaller states in central Europe.

In his announcement to the domestic and foreign journalists, Hermann Axen said that this proposal is the first interim result of the work of the SED/SPD joint working group. It is the expression of the result-oriented dialogue between the two parties for safeguarding peace, increasing security and building confidence in Europe.

A few weeks after the implementation of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, it was convincingly expressed at the International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones held in Berlin how strong the striving for a nuclear weapons-free world is.

Hermann Axen referred to the positive response of the GDR population to the participation of 100 figures from the Federal Republic—including well-known politicians from three Bundestag parties—in the Berlin meeting. The politician recalled the words of Erich Honecker at this world forum: "Not much time remains for negotiating a nuclear weapons-free world. We must use every initiative that brings us in this direction." Hermann Axen continued that the GDR believes that the main direction of further nuclear disarmament agreed to between the USSR and the United States should be actively supported and not hindered by all European states. As the owner-occupier of a small but beautiful socialist apartment in the common European house, it supports the idea that growth in confidence and increased security determine a peaceful life for all the inhabitants of this house. Part of this is that the house must have a reliable alarm system, explosive material must be handled as little as possible in this house, and sources of danger must be reduced through inspections. This is the essence of the new proposal.

Then Hermann Axen went into the details of the proposals aimed at the governments of the CSCE states and expressed the recommendation of the working group that the governments of the two German states to take
corresponding initiatives. There is a recommendation that, in order to bring about a zone of confidence and security in central Europe, the agreements made at the Stockholm conference should be expanded by the further reduction of the minimum limits for notifiable maneuvers, by the inclusion of independent maneuvers by air and sea-based forces, and the limitation of large-scale maneuvers. Finally, permanent centers for confidence-building are to be created.

The setting up of a central European zone of confidence and security will be an important link in a system of European and international security. The proposal worked out by the SED and the SPD is based on the joint political initiative for the creation of a nuclear-free corridor and a nuclear-free zone. Hermann Axen thanked his Social Democratic partner, particularly Egon Bahr, for their fruitful cooperation.

Afterward, Hermann Axen and Egon Bahr answered journalists' questions. On the ranking of the new proposal within the security policy dialogue between East and West, Hermann Axen emphasized that the proposals made so far have been related to how to remove weapons of mass destruction in the area on both sides of the dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. By contrast, the new proposal is aimed at confidence-building measures that can be tackled immediately and do not need a long time for agreement. Also, the proposals will not touch on the interests and commitments of both sides within their alliances, but will create more security and trust. What matters is to apply confidence-building measures now being practiced by the two great powers to the sensitive zone in Europe. Egon Bahr then expanded on this by referring to the efforts of the Stockholm conference to extend the resolutions on confidence-building, which have been functioning for 1 and ½ years. This is precisely where the proposals of the working group fit in. The process can not go in any other direction.

Speaking of the inclusion of independent maneuvers by air- and sea-based forces in the obligation to notify, Egon Bahr emphasized that this component of the joint proposal, which goes beyond Stockholm, is very difficult to implement, but is indispensable. The complexity involves a definition of the size and regionalization of the maneuvers. The working group pointed this out, but neither wanted to nor could anticipate the government negotiations which would be dealing with this problem.

Asked about the international efficacy of the proposals, Hermann Axen said that the subject of nuclear-free zones is more topical than ever today. This has been shown not least by the Berlin International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones. Leading statesmen, prominent politicians, and representatives of large international organizations have welcomed the proposals of the SED, CPCZ, and SPD and have described them as important initiatives. Efforts toward peace and disarmament demand not only energy but also, above all, patience.

In reply to further questions, Egon Bahr said that the FRG Government has been informed of all proposals made so far. Indeed there are also consultations taking place between the GDR, the CSSR, and the FRG in Geneva on the removal of chemical weapons, but unfortunately they have remained unfruitful up to now because the FRG Government remains exclusively bent on a global solution. The SED and the SPD are also for a worldwide agreement, Egon Bahr said, but why should not the period before such an agreement is reached be used for independent concrete initiatives for Europe, where the greatest concentration of weapons of mass destruction is to be found.

In reply to a question about possible meetings, for example, between the defense ministers of the two German states, Hermann Axen said that there is no law saying that such meetings must be confined to the Soviet Union and the United States. With appropriate preparation this would certainly be useful and fruitful.

Review of Joint Security Talks

LD0707165888 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1406 GMT 7 Jul 88

[Text] Bonn, 7 Jul (ADN)—The joint working group of the SPD Bundestag group and the SED Central Committee on security questions in Europe, formed on 15 May 1987 following an agreement between Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, and Dr Hans Jochen Vogel, chairman of the SPD and of the SPD Bundestag group, has met six times so far.

At its meetings it has examined additional possibilities for confidence-building security measures in Europe and is presenting an interim report on this topic. The extensive and far-reaching discussions on questions of incapacity for attack and the achieving of the lowest possible level of armaments whilst mutually eliminating asymmetries will be continued in the autumn of 1988.

As an interim report, the working group presented a proposal for a "zone of confidence and security in central Europe". It was approved by the SED Central Committee Politburo on the recommendation of Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee, and by the SPD Presidium on the recommendation of Party Chairman Dr Hans Jochen Vogel.

In the creation of this proposal both sides have been directed by the conviction that international security in the nuclear age is indivisible and demands confidence through cooperation, globally and regionally. The CSCE process has already created an important basis for that.
The Moscow meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan also strengthens our view that the European states, and especially the two German states, should make their own contributions to disarmament and detente. The implementation of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

There is no alternative to joint security and peaceful coexistence. The measures put forward today can be implemented in a relatively short time. They are in the interests of all European states, as for the first time, at the center of our continent on the sensitive dividing line between the great military alliances, opportunities for communication in crises and further limitation of military exercises are being proposed. They are in line with our conviction that stability and peace must emanate from central Europe.

Both sides have agreed to pass the results of their work to the governments of their states and to make them available to interested governments, parliaments, and parties.

The working group included:

For the SED: Hermann Axen, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee; Dr Manfred Uschner, deputy department chief of the SED Central Committee and secretary of the SED Central Committee Foreign Policy Committee; Prof Manfred Mueller, head of the Basic Issues Department at the Potsdam-Babelsberg Institute of International Relations; Dr Guenter Hillmann, section head at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Karl-Heinz Wagner, who works for the SED Central Committee.

For the SPD: Egon Bahr, chairman of the FRG Bundestag Subcommittee on Disarmament and Arms Control and member of the SPD Presidium; Erwin Horn, chairman of the SPD Bundestag group in the Defense Committee; Dr Hermann Scherer, chairman of the disarmament and arms control working group of the SPD Bundestag group and member of the SPD Party Council; Dr Uwe Stehr, consultant to the SPD Bundestag group (until February 1988); and Wolfgang Wiemer, consultant to the SPD Bundestag group.

SED-SPD Proposal for Zone of Confidence Plan
LD0707142988 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1034 GMT 7 Jul 88

["Proposal for a 'Zone of Confidence and Security in Central Europe'"—ADN headline]

[Text] Bonn, 7 Jul (ADN)—The text of the proposal for a zone of confidence and security in Europe is as follows:

1. The Changes of Further Disarmament Measures in Europe.

1.1 After the coming into force of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, the historic opportunity must be used to overcome the old thinking in categories of military confrontation and deterrence and to create an international order of peace which gives all states equal security. The agreement must not be circumvented by new armament measures: We reject the concept of compensation. The process of disarmament and detente must be made lasting and irreversible.

1.2. Only the removal of military confrontation opens up the real possibility for developing a European system of joint security and all-around cooperation. The SED and the SPD share the views of those political forces which want to continue the process of disarmament and give it dynamism.

This applies particularly to Europe and its central region, which has the greatest concentration of forces and weapons. In this connection both parties renew their demand that a mandate should be agreed upon for negotiations in Vienna before the end of this year on the reduction of troops and conventional forces in Europe.

The aim of these negotiations should be to achieve stability at a significantly lower level from the Atlantic to the Urals by means of substantial reductions of forces and the removal of conventional superiorities.

1.3. At the same time further efforts should be made for the removal of weapons of mass destruction in Europe, particularly tactical nuclear weapons. The creation of a stable situation of secure peace in central Europe, in which no nuclear or chemical weapons are left in the region and neither side—with the maintenance of an adequate defense potential—has the conventional means for a surprise attack, for aggressive operations, or actions aimed at conquering or temporary occupation of territories, is the subject of discussions by the joint SED/SPD working group on security policy issues.

1.4. Negotiations at government level do not relieve political parties in the East or the West of the responsibility to promote the disarmament process through their own proposals and ideas. The joint SED/SPD working group will, in this respect, work from its proposals on a chemical weapons-free zone and a nuclear-free corridor. Their further development into a zone of stability and of structural incapacity to attack is in the interests of the European states and of the two alliances.

1.5. The separation of military potentials capable of attack from the line of contact of the two military alliances would be a step toward reducing the danger of surprise attacks and of the offensive capacity of forces. The reduction of forces in cohesive units with their structural conventional weaponry, and the reduction and
final removal of tactical nuclear weapons mean more security for all the states in the alliance, above all if this zone of less concentrated weaponry is to be embedded within agreements on stability for central Europe and for the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The joint working group is continuing its discussions on principles and criteria of European stability on the basis of a structural incapacity to attack. In doing so, the joint working group takes account of the CSSR's proposal for a zone of confidence and cooperation and the joint declaration of the SPD and the PZPR on confidence-building security services in Europe, which go beyond the aim of structural incapacity for attack only within the corridor.

2. For More Confidence and Security in Europe

2.1 Experience with the Stockholm document shows that confidence-building measures can be implemented in the short term, and that their politically stabilizing effect comes into play even before the conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of forces.

2.2 The CSCE states want confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of an outbreak of war, among other things as a result of a mistake or a misunderstanding, through the mutual exchange of information, openness, and predictability. They are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable from the Atlantic to the Urals.

2.3 As permanent arrangements for mutual communication on maneuvers and other events which could lead to misunderstandings, there have existed up to now direct links between Washington and Moscow and between Paris and Moscow ("hotlines"), and also the "centers for the reduction of nuclear risk" in Washington and Moscow, which came into operation 22 March 1988.

2.4 The European states, particularly in the danger zone along the dividing line between the alliances, have a direct responsibility to their citizens to do what they can within the framework of their sovereignty and alliance commitments to secure peace and stability. There also arises from this their interest in avoiding crises through their own cooperative measures and in directly removing errors or misunderstandings themselves, before they become an international crisis.

This end could be served by European institutions and measures such as those proposed by various parties at the Stockholm conference. Their aim of creating confidence through transparency, shared information, and verification is appropriate to accompany and promote disarmament and stability.

3. Our Proposal

3.1 We put before the governments of the CSCE states the following proposals for a zone of confidence and security in central Europe and recommend the Governments of the FRG and the GDR take corresponding initiatives.

3.2 In order to create this zone of confidence and security, measures are necessary which convince both sides that irrespective of the still existing capacities there is no intention to launch a surprise attack.

These could include:

A) Expansion of the agreements reached in Stockholm:
   — Through the further reduction of the lower limit in the number of soldiers and tanks for notifiable maneuvers with a notification deadline of 60 days;
   — By the inclusion of issues (discussed without any result in Stockholm) of the notification of independent maneuvers of air and sea-based forces for further confidence building, with regard to size and regionalization;
   — Maneuvers with more than 40,000 soldiers will no longer take place. This also applies to series of maneuvers and emergency practices;
   — Observers are invited to all notified maneuvers.

B) Over and above this:
   — The number of maneuvers which take place outside troop training grounds and create burdens for the civilian population are to be limited;
   — Notifiable maneuvers under the terms of this proposal will no longer take place within an area of, for example, 50km on both sides of the border between the two alliances.

These confidence-building measures are proposals which must be discussed and voted on with all the states involved.

C) The central European states are to set up permanent "Centers for Confidence-Building." Their task would be to exchange militarily relevant information and observation data, in order to enable the governments involved to prevent crises in central Europe or to settle them by political means. The centers would all have the same technical equipment and would be in direct contact. They would be staffed by representatives and experts from all the countries involved.

D) Military experts of the relevant states will be given the task of agreeing on details for permanent, mixed observation posts at strategically important points; their results would be communicated to the "Centers for Confidence-Building."

All these states would exchange military attaches.
E) The aim is to create a joint European satellite observation post, the data from which would be communicated to all 'Centres for Confidence-Building' simultaneously. It would also conceivably be an instrument for all the CSCE states. Thus, its results would be available to all the European states, the United States, and Canada.

F) Additionally, direct bilateral links ("hotlines") will be created between the central European states. In the event of worries or incidents they permit swift communications between governments.

The SED and the SPD regard the proposal for a "zone of confidence and security in central Europe" as a supra-alliance political initiative, open to expansion and more precise formulation, and open to all CSCE states. It is in line with their conviction that this is the way to demonstrate possibilities for ensuring additional stability and peace on the long path to creating a zone of confidence in Europe which embraces not only security but also confidence through comprehensive cooperation.

**Bonn Demands 'All or Nothing' From Disarmament**

AU0807150088 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 7 Jul 88 p 2

["He." commentary: "Intentional Gibberish"]

[Text] FRG Defense Minister Scholz finds himself in an awkward situation. He made his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Claus, make the following statement: The "decline of the feeling of threat" among the population has assumed "dramatic forms." The hostile image is "fading." And in addition to that, the FRG media have long reported that the strategy of "deterrence" mainly deters the FRG population. What the people really want is disarmament.

And what is Scholz doing? The minister, a dyed-in-the-wool advocate of nuclear "deterrence" founded on the lie about the threat, proceeds tactically. Of course he is in favor of disarmament. He is only against "too narrow approaches" in specific areas during future disarmament negotiations. For him it is a matter of observing the "compatibility of options." If one interprets this intentional gibberish, Scholz demands the simultaneousness of all relevant decisions. To put it simply, he is "in favor" of disarmament—in accordance with the demagogical slogan: All or nothing.

What can be heard from Bonn points in a similar direction. Specific disarmament measures cannot be adopted before NATO has an overall concept. However, as FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE reported, such a concept "will not exist in the near future." This amounts to the following: Scholz and other NATO states want to delay, if not altogether prevent, further disarmament steps following the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

But a policy aimed at all or nothing does not resolve any problems whatsoever. Those who oppose steps do not want to proceed on a path and arrive at a goal. Given these circumstances, it is not a coincidence, after all, that NATO has no overall concept....

Our concept is well known: Permit no pause after the introduction of disarmament! Reduce strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent. Halt nuclear tests. Ban chemical weapons—a chemical weapons-free zone would be a step in this direction. Reduce and ultimately remove tactical nuclear weapons—nuclear-free zones are steps in this direction. And the reduce armed forces and conventional arms, also gradually.

Those who object to such "initiatives in specific areas" knowingly neglect the fact that what is to obtain validity worldwide could be tested efficiently and quietly within a limited area, as in the case of tactical nuclear weapons. The only thing that can be proven by delaying tactics in the name of compatibility: Disarmament continues to require struggles. The resistance of those must be broken who want to stick to their arsenals and who continue to threaten mankind with a nuclear inferno.

**Bahr, Axen Hold Press Conference in Bonn**

AU1207164588 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 8 Jul 88 pp 5, 6

[Dispatch from Bonn by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND correspondents Rolf Guenther and Werner Otto: "An Expression of the Result-Oriented Dialogue for a Secure Peace"]

[Text] Bonn—At the beginning of the international press conference in Bonn on Thursday [7 July], the heads of the joint working groups of the SED Central Committee and the SPD Bundestag group, Hermann Axen and Egon Bahr, took the floor to explain the document.

In his introductory remarks, Egon Bahr said that the new proposal differs in one basic point from the working results achieved so far concerning a chemical weapons-free zone and a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe. It does not concern weapons, but concentrates solely on building confidence, and is thus completely within the tradition of Stockholm. The confidence-building measures agreed on there are already effective, although there is still no conventional disarmament in Europe.

**Proposals Conform to the Time and to Alliance Interests**

The measures proposed today do not conflict with any NATO resolution. They are to be fully included in the negotiations, for which a mandate can be agreed on in
Vienna this month, which the FRG Government also hopes for. Thus, the proposals’ timing is right, they conform to alliance interests, and they are intended for the CSCE follow-up negotiations. One can assume that the GDR Government will adopt these proposals, which means that the FRG Government will have to expect to be confronted by them in Vienna, Egon Bahr said. Therefore, the question is whether the FRG Government wants to leave such an initiative solely to the GDR Government. Nothing can prevent both German governments from recalling the community of responsibility affirmed by both sides during the visit by the chairman of the GDR State Council and from developing joint initiatives which would lead to greater security in Europe. They would only be doing what is expressly provided for in the Basic Agreement.

Equal Information at All Times for Both Sides of Europe

With regard to the new proposal, Egon Bahr emphasized the qualitatively new element that both sides in Europe should have the same level of information at their disposal, so that mistakes and misunderstandings can be excluded. Since there are already monitoring centers in every capital city, these could be connected to one another, which would prevent crises developing through mistakes. In his remarks, the SPD politician described the double-zero option as a triumph of the idea of joint security over the policy of strength. All sides are proud of the agreed reciprocal controls, which were previously considered implausible.

Bahr said that the present proposal shows that confidence can emanate not only from the two superpowers or the neutral and nonaligned states, but also from the smaller states in central Europe.

There Must Be No Stagnation in the Process of Disarmament

In his speech, Hermann Axen stressed that again it is representatives of the SPD and the SED who take the initiative to present to the international public new, up-to-date proposals for confidence-building and for increasing European security. He recalled that in implementing the agreements of 17 May 1987 between Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, and Hans-Jochen Vogel, chairman of the SPD and of the SPD Bundestag group, a working group was established with the aim of drawing up proposals for the establishment of confidence-building security structures in Europe.

The proposal presented to the public today on a “zone of trust and security in central Europe” is the first interim result of our work, and an expression of the results-oriented dialogue of both parties to safeguard peace, increase security, and build confidence in Europe, Hermann Axen stressed.

Only a few weeks have passed since, at their Moscow summit, Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan exchanged instruments of ratification concerning the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, and thus put this historic treaty into force. The elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons is a first, forward-reaching step on the path toward a nuclear-free world that is desired by all peoples. The Berlin International Meeting on Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones convincingly demonstrated how strong these efforts are. The GDR politician stressed that this meeting became the most comprehensive international forum on peace issues in history so far. The GDR’s people considered it positive that 100 renowned persons from the FRG participated in this meeting, representing a very broad political spectrum and including well-known politicians from three Bundestag parties.

The coming into force of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles has initiated nuclear disarmament. There must be no break, no stagnation in the process of disarmament. First, the danger that results for all the world from the enormous accumulation of weapons along the sensitive dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is not banished in any way. Second, neglecting the historic chances of dynamically continuing nuclear, chemical, and conventional disarmament in Europe, circles that are interested in armament are developing, testing, and deploying new, dangerous arms systems with intensified assiduity.

Averting Damage From the Common European House

One realizes that such a policy is madness, the speaker said, when one thinks that a military incident—regardless of whether it is started deliberately or through human or technical error—would have disastrous consequences for Europe and the whole world. Erich Honecker said at the Berlin International Meeting: “Not much time remains for negotiating a nuclear-free world. We must use every initiative that lets us make progress in this direction.” Proceeding from this, Hermann Axen continued: We think that the main direction of further nuclear disarmament agreed on between the USSR and the United States should be actively supported and not hindered by all European states. The responsibility of the states at the dividing line between the two alliance systems therefore requires the presentation of new, independent proposals to raise security and confidence on the European continent. As the occupant of a small but beautiful socialist condominium in the common European house, it supports the idea that growth in confidence and increased security determine a peaceful life for all the inhabitants of this house. With our proposal today we want to install—if we stick to this picture—a reliable alarm system in order to avert damage from the very beginning from those inhabitants of the European house who are most endangered. At the same time, we
want all those living in the common European house to handle less explosive material in their apartments, and, finally, we are in favor of the inhabitants reducing existing sources of danger by means of mutual inspections and joint protective measures.

Preventive Measures Would Be Taken With Regard to Crises

What are the essential aspects of the new SED-SPD proposal for a "zone of trust and security in central Europe?"

1. We present to the governments of the CSCE states the following proposals for a zone of trust and security in central Europe, and recommend that the FRG and GDR Governments take corresponding initiatives.

2. In order to establish this zone, the SED and SPD recommend measures, such as the expansion of the agreements concluded in Stockholm by means of further reducing the lower limits for notifiable maneuvers and by including independent maneuvers of air forces and navies, and the limitation of large-scale maneuvers. According to our proposal, notifiable maneuvers in an area of, for instance, 50 km on both sides of the border between the two alliances, should no longer take place.

3. The most important item of our agreement is the establishment of permanent centers for confidence-building, which increase security through the timely exchange of information, which prevent critical situations in central Europe, or help solve them by political means. They would be based on the joint evaluation of national and international information. Permanent, joint observer stations should be established in strategically important sites. In addition to direct links—such as "hot lines"—between Berlin, Prague, and Bonn, for instance, we are striving for joint European satellite reconnaissance. This could be an instrument of the CSCE states.

All information or reports collected on risky situations should be evaluated multilaterally. In addition to the European states, they would also be available to the United States and Canada.

These confidence-building measures, the Politburo member continued, are proposals which would have to be discussed and coordinated with all states affected.

A Zone of Trust Is No Disadvantage to Anyone

The preamble of our proposal demonstrates how SED-SPD cooperation in security policy fits into the all-European disarmament process. A zone of trust and security in central Europe is no danger or disadvantage to anyone. It corresponds to the legitimate security interests of all sides. A central European zone of trust and security would consolidate the joint responsibility of the European peoples and states for peace on their continent, and would contribute to the reduction of military activities and tensions and to the elimination of mutual fears of threats and of distrust at the dividing line between NATO and Warsaw Pact in Europe. The establishment of a central European zone of trust and security would be an important link in a system of European and international security, Hermann Axen stressed.

The proposal worked out by the SED and the SPD is based on the joint political initiative to establish a nuclear-free corridor or a nuclear-free zone in central Europe. It promotes and supports important disarmament initiatives, such as the Jaruzelski Plan for the elimination of armaments and the increasing of trust in central Europe, and the Jakes plan for the establishment of a zone of trust along the dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The speaker recalled Mikhail Gorbachev's words during the exchange of the instruments of ratification for the elimination of the Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range missiles, to the effect that the first lines have already been written in the book of a world without war and nuclear weapons, and that already now no one will be able to shut this book any more, and to lay it aside. The speaker said that we proceed from the expectation that our proposal today will be used by the states and peoples in Europe to continue this book.

With their joint initiatives for the establishment of a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe, for a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe, and for a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, the SED and the SPD have already made an important contribution to pushing ahead the process of disarmament and confidence-building on our continent. In this spirit, we will continue the dialogue on questions of arms limitation and disarmament, in particular on conventional disarmament and inability to attack, which has just started, Hermann Axen said.

Measures Could Be Tackled Immediately

Afterward, Hermann Axen and Egon Bahr answered journalists' questions. With regard to the ranking of the new proposal within the security policy dialogue between East and West, Hermann Axen emphasized that the proposals made so far have been related to how to remove weapons of mass destruction in the area on both sides of the dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. By contrast, the new proposal is aimed at confidence-building measures that can be tackled immediately and do not need a long time for the attainment of an agreement. The proposals will also not touch on the interests and commitments of both sides within their alliances, but will create more security and trust. What matters is to apply to the sensitive zone in Europe the confidence-building measures now being practiced by the two big powers. Egon Bahr then expanded on this by referring to the efforts of the Stockholm conference to extend the resolutions on confidence building which
have been in force for 1 and ½ years. This is precisely where the proposals of the working group fit in. The process cannot go in any other direction.

Speaking of the inclusion of independent maneuvers by air forces and navies in the obligation to give notification, Egon Bahr emphasized that this component of the joint proposal, which goes beyond Stockholm, is very difficult to implement, but is indispensable. The complexity involves definition regarding the size and regionalization of the maneuvers. The working group pointed this out, but neither wanted to nor could anticipate the government negotiations which would be dealing with this problem.

Asked about the international effectiveness of the proposals, Hermann Axen said that today the subject of nuclear-free zones is more topical than ever. This has been shown not least by the Berlin International Meeting on Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones. Leading statesmen, prominent politicians, and representatives of large international organizations welcomed the proposals of the SED, CFCZ, and SPD and described them as important initiatives. Efforts toward peace and disarmament demand not only energy but also, above all, patience.

In reply to further questions, Egon Bahr said that the FRG Government has been informed of all the proposals made so far. Indeed, there are also consultations taking place between the GDR, the CSSR, and the FRG in Geneva on the removal of chemical weapons, but unfortunately they have remained unfruitful up to now, because the FRG Government remains exclusively bent on a global solution. The SED and the SPD are also for a worldwide agreement, Egon Bahr said, but why should not the period before then be used for independent concrete initiatives for Europe, where the greatest concentration of weapons of mass destruction is to be found.

In reply to a question about possible meetings, for example, also between the defense ministers of the two German states, Hermann Axen said that there is no law saying that such meetings must be confined to the Soviet Union and the United States. With appropriate preparation, this would certainly be useful and fruitful.

**Honecker Welcomes Gorbachev Disarmament Proposals**

LD1207175488 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1614 GMT 12 Jul 88

[Text] Berlin, 12 Jul (ADN) - Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and GDR State Council chairman, made the following statement today:

The GDR welcomes as being extremely in line with the times Mikhail Gorbachev's new proposals on the reduction of confrontation made in the Sejm of the PPR. This is an important initiative for confidence building, for strengthening security in Europe and for continuing the process of disarmament. The GDR, as a country directly on the dividing line between the two military blocs, has great interest in a European center for reducing the threat of war, which includes the possibility of continuous cooperation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This initiative is very closely linked to the ideas expressed by the GDR as well as to the proposals of the PPR and the CSSR.

The GDR supports the project for calling a European summit. It is in favor of W. Jaruzelski's proposal to hold this summit in Warsaw. The GDR is prepared to take part in the preparations for and execution of such a meeting. Meetings at the highest level, we know from experience, can only foster multilateral understanding on disarmament and support effective negotiations in other committees.

With particular attention and agreement, the GDR has also noted the USSR's proposal to withdraw air forces from advanced positions in East Europe, if NATO does not transfer its 72 F-16 fighter-bombers to Italy as planned. It also supports the initiative on agreements on the priority reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, tactical offensive air forces, and tanks, made within the framework of the three-stage plan to reduce conventional armed forces in Europe, in the plan's first stage, and not in its third. This plan is also significant because it provides for reducing NATO and Warsaw Pact troops to 500,000 on each side after eliminating imbalances and asymmetries.

**ROMANIA**

**SCINTEIA Comments on UN Disarmament Session**

AU0107184688 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1742 GMT 1 Jul 88

["At the End of the UN Special Session on Disarmament"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 1/07/1988—The concerns manifested on a world plane at the continuous armings, the peoples' will to free themselves from the nightmare of a nuclear catastrophe have been eloquently expressed during the recent UN General Assembly special session on disarmament, writes "SCINTEIA" in a commentary which stresses that among the numerous initiatives, ideas, proposals advanced during the session standing out were the measures synthesised in the document titled "The Considerations and Proposals of Romania, of President Nicolae Ceausescu on Disarmament Questions and the Directions of Action of Countries to Solve Them." This extensive programme approaches the disarmament question in a global and comprehensive manner, dwells upon, in its complexity, setting phased-out objectives, and the means to achieve them. Giving top priority to stepping up negotiations on nuclear disarmament, liquidating strategic nuclear weapons, the nuclear threat in general, the Romanian programme also stipulates a number of tangible measures to
halt space militarization, concomitantly with the implementation of conventional disarmament measures, of freezing and reducing armaments, troops and military spending. Romania’s outlook on the way of attaining the historic desideratum of eliminating the danger of a world war and build a world of peace and confidence has been tellingly expressed in Romania’s synthetically drafted proposal that the UN call for “disarmament through facts.”

The highly realistic character of the Romanian proposals, the great extent to which they meet people’s fundamental requirements, the newspaper stresses, show in the fact that they are to be found, in one form or another, in the measures stipulated by numerous other states, more particularly by small and medium-sized countries, non-aligned and developing countries—which make up the great majority of the states of the world—that declared for a real disarmament process.

The Romanian daily expresses the regret that despite the persevering efforts made a number of states, a consensus failed to be reached and a final document adopted which should have set the ways and directions of action to the end of halting the arms race and passing on to disarmament. The newspaper quotes President Nicolae Ceausescu who has recently stated: The fact that the session has not ended the way it should have is due to a few countries, the U.S.A. in the first place, that opposed to the adoption of a comprehensive document on disarmament. Certainly by obstructing such an important international meeting the respective states assume a high responsibility before their own peoples as well as the whole mankind.

This is one more proof that—as Romania stressed in the aforementioned documents—the steps made towards disarmament have not altered the balance of forces, have not removed the danger the nuclear armament poses to life on our planet, that, no matter how important, the accord on the liquidation of intermediate- and short-range missiles is only a modest beginning. That is why, Romania’s stands call to action and vigilance, to stepped-up efforts by states and peoples to bring about a change in the course of events, disarmament, “SCIINTEIA” highlights writing in conclusion: This is a fundamental question which concerns all states, all peoples, with no exception, and that is why it cannot be solved by a few states, no matter how big. That is why, all countries, the broadest social forces should assume the responsibility and work for achieving disarmament, for ensuring peace.

**YUGOSLAVIA**

**Hungarian Defense Minister Interviewed in Zagreb**

LD1207161288 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1429 GMT 12 Jul 88

[Text] Zagreb, July 11 (TANJUG)—Within the context and process of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on limiting military potentials in Europe, it is realistic to imagine a limitation of Soviet units in our country, Hungarian Defence Minister Col-Gen. Ferenc Karpfai said in an interview to the Zagreb weekly DANAS.

In the first interview to a foreign journal, Karpfai gave an assessment of the Army’s role in Hungary’s political life, and spoke of Hungary’s stand on the Warsaw Treaty, its stand on questions of disarmament and relations with neighbouring Romania and Yugoslavia.

Karpfai, 62, was formerly secretary of the Hungarian People’s Army party commission and head of its political administration. He was appointed defence minister in 1986.

Gen. Karpfai stressed that the Hungarian Army supports the reforms which are being implemented and said that his country has understood the mistakes made in the past when it automatically copied the models of other countries. He also said the serious mistakes resulted in the events of 1956 and the Soviet military intervention. Hungary’s perestroyka began over that decade.

Explaining Hungary’s military doctrine, he said that Hungary has its own national doctrine which reflects the goals Hungary wishes to attain within the Warsaw Treaty. The doctrine is based on the elements of preventing aggression and avoiding war.

Karpfai assessed the Soviet-U.S. accord on Euro-missiles as important and said that Hungary believes that attention should now be devoted to limiting conventional arms.

He said there is a tendency in NATO circles to modernize conventional forces, but said his country was opposed to this. Hungary plans to take no such steps as they are contrary to Hungary’s concept of security.

He further said that Hungary has no MiG-29 aircraft or T-84 tanks and said it had no plans to change to smaller-calibre infantry weapons.

Speaking of Hungary’s relations with its neighbours, Karpfai said cooperation with Romania on the military level was good, but that problems existed in other areas. We do not wish to aggravate our relations with Romania and hope they will in future be resolved in a civilized manner, he said.

Asked what steps Hungary would take if Yugoslavia was attacked by NATO forces, he said that any aggression against Yugoslavia, Hungary’s non-aligned neighbour, would also pose a threat to Hungary. This means that Hungary would take joint military steps with its allies which would ensure the defence of Hungary’s borders and Yugoslavia’s self-defence.” [quotatation mark as received]
Karpáti said that Hungarian aid would depend on the political leadership of the brotherly socialist Yugoslavia, on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Government, and on the type and amount of aid sought. The country's military potential (the Hungarian National Army) is adjusted to the defence of Hungarian territory, and military assistance would be implemented from this aspect.

However, the Yugoslav Army is strong and its units are capable of independently and successfully stopping any aggression on its territory, Karpáti said.
It is precisely these ideas, born of the new political thinking, that comprise the meaning of the military policy of the states in the socialist community today. More and more people are coming under the banner of the new political thinking in other countries as well.

But with all difficulty, what squeaking of the wheel of official policy turns in the Western countries. The new trends have just been noted there, but there are no radical changes as yet. This was demonstrated by the extraordinary session of the NATO Council that was held in Brussels in the beginning of March. Yes, voices sounded at the session calling for more stable relations with the USSR. But in its documents, the Soviet Union was once again called a “potential aggressor,” and there was again discussion of the “Soviet threat.”

The text of the statement adopted in Brussels says that the leadership of the North Atlantic bloc would like to foist unilateral disarmament on the socialist countries, break up the existing general structure of the Soviet armed forces and ultimately achieve military superiority.

Some of the speeches of official figures in the United States are evoking surprise at the least, such speeches as the one of the president at the Council on International Affairs in Springfield or some of the utterances of Vice President G. Bush. The spirit of the worst times of the cold war wafts from them. Some influential circles in Washington do not want to reject the conventional stereotypes, and the desire of monopolistic circles in the United States to establish a world order that meets their interests alone is still very strong.

This question is appropriate: is universal security possible in such a climate and is it worth talking of such security today, if the recidivists of anticommunism and militarism are constantly making themselves known in international relations and poisoning them?

Different answers are given. Some people, for example, feel that despite the presence of militaristic inclinations in the Western countries, no one wants to quarrel with them. I think that what is desirable here is being passed off as what is real, since the positions of those circles that have never ceased to put their trust in armed violence in relations with other countries and feel that it is fully legal and justified are still strong.

But if the source of the military threat is so powerful, is there any sense in the peaceful initiatives being advanced by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries? Can it be that only toughness, unyieldingness and uncompromisingness will force back the forces of evil? No, such judgments are also incorrect. To slam the door to negotiations in our infinite wisdom is not needed. We behaved that way at one time, but the anticipated impact was not achieved. Today wisdom in
The task of concluding and observing bilateral and multilateral treaties aimed at legal consolidation of the principles of international security remains as important as before. It should be taken into account herein that parity and equality, thanks to their very high levels, in and of themselves cannot save the world from catastrophic cataclysms. The problem of material guarantees for security—reducing the levels of arms to such a level that the very possibility of aggressive offensive operations becomes impossible—thus arises in all its magnitude.

A reliance on military technical means, on a desire to achieve superiority over other countries via increasing the quantity of arms, cannot lead to a strengthening of security in our times. On the contrary, this path inevitably leads to the opposition of one's own security against that of others and against international security.

The logic of the development of contemporary military policy is directly reduced to the theory and practice connected with the complete rejection of "nuclear deterrence." The concept of the "triple zero," assuming the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, arises from this in particular. This step can proceed after or in conjunction with a reduction in conventional weaponry. The states that take part in the Warsaw Pact have officially declared their readiness to hold consultations with the NATO countries regarding the size of the armed forces and arms of the two opposing blocs for the most rapid possible elimination of existing imbalances. As M.S. Gorbachev has said, we are offering to put our cards on the table, to exchange all data, evaluate it, uncover asymmetries in arms and troops and set about solving the problems.

But this process should be suitable. It is difficult to understand the logic of the FRG government, which has advanced the "New Concept for Reducing Conventional Weapons in Europe," according to which the countries of the Warsaw Pact are supposed to reduce their forces by 80 military formations equivalent to divisions, while the NATO states need only remove two such formations. And after all, the number of combat-ready formations (divisions and brigades) that NATO has is 1.5 times greater than the Warsaw Pact anyway. Such a position is an echo of the old thinking.

Our times persistently require other approaches. Every state, large and small, should comprehend its responsibility for ensuring the survival of humanity and make any contribution it can to creating a system of stable and universal security. After all, today security for all is security for each.

12821

FRG-GDR Group Discusses European Security
LD0707203288 Moscow TASS in English
1800 GMT 7 Jul 88

[Text] Bonn July 7 TASS—A joint working group of the Social Democratic Party of Germany group in Bundestag and the political leadership of the Socialist Unity
Party of Germany have appealed to countries members of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe to create a zone of trust and security in central Europe. Concrete measures in this direction were submitted today at a press conference held by the leaders of the working group Egon Bahr, member of the Presidium of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and Hermann Axen, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.

In the period of drafting, the communique points out, the sides were guided by the understanding that international security can be only mutual in the nuclear age. The process which was started by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe laid down an important foundation for this. The Moscow meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, the document stresses, strengthened the belief that the European states, especially the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, must make their own contribution to the cause of disarmament and detente.

After the entry into force of the INF Treaty it is necessary to take advantage of the historic chance to create an international order which will ensure security to all states without exception. We reject any idea of compensation for the nuclear missiles to be destroyed under the treaty. The process of disarmament and detente must become long-term and irreversible, the final document stresses.

To create the zone of trust and security in central Europe, it runs, it is necessary to take and elaborate measures which would convince both sides that no one has intentions to stage a surprise attack. In particular, it is proposed that the lower ceiling on the personnel and tanks taking part in the exercises with a 60-day notice should be reduced further, while exercises involving more than 20,000 people should be announced two years ahead. The working group also suggested that exercises with more than 40,000 men be banned.

In elaborating the proposal, the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany proceeded from the premise, which increasingly becomes valid, that at the nuclear age international security can be only mutual, and the balance of force should be replaced by the balance of interests.

It is noteworthy that the initiative comes from the leading political parties of the states which are on the junction of military confrontation in Europe between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. The meaning of the plan, put forward by the two parties, is that to establish a zone of confidence and security in the centre of the European Continent it is necessary to take steps that would convince both sides that there is no intention for a sudden attack.

Further development of the course, launched by the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, could be mentioned among such steps. The joint working group proposed that exercises involving over 40,000 servicemen be totally given up, and that notification about exercises involving over 20,000 men be given for sure two years in advance. It is also proposed to further reduce the lower level of the strength of the personnel and tanks involved in the exercises announced 60 days in advance.

The conclusion made by the two parties that, with the entry into force of the INF Treaty, the historic change appeared for eliminating from international politics such categories as confrontation and intimidation, seems to be exclusively important and topical. The sides turned down any idea of compensation for the missiles to be liquidated in accordance with the treaty, and underlines that the process of disarmament and detente should become irreversible.

In Soviet diplomatic circles it is noted that the proposal of the joint working group of the two parties accords with the USSR's efforts aimed at further improvement of the political climate in Europe and the whole world. The initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany reaffirms the rightfulness of the thesis in Mikhail Gorbachev's report to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, saying that at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries the ensuring of security of the states will increasingly shift from the sphere of correlation of military potentials to the sphere of political interaction.

**German Parties' Peace Initiative Praised**

*LD0807214388 Moscow TASS in English*

2108 GMT 8 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 8 TASS—TASS commentator Sergey Staroselskiy writes:

The introduction of new political thinking into international politics is bringing tangible positive results. Bilateral and multilateral initiatives are acquiring ever growing significance. The latest example of that is the proposal of the joint working group of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany for establishing a zone of confidence and security in central Europe, which was put forward on Thursday.
is probably only new practical deeds which will provide the answer to this question. Years will pass before the Pershings and cruise missiles finally disappear from the FRG territory, and by then, possibly, our military inspectors' trips will have become an everyday matter. But the first visit is, of course, an extraordinary, historic event.

[V. Kondratyev] Our IL-62 brought 19 experts to Frankfurt. In accordance with the provisions of the Washington accord, they informed their hosts the following morning of where they intended to go for the purpose of their inspection. The choice fell on Wueschheim, where cruise missiles are sited, and Mutlangen, a Pershing-2 base. They were to carry out verification of the information which the United States had provided to the Soviet Union—most recently on 13 June—on the number and types of the nuclear weapons subject to destruction. A relaxed and business-like atmosphere was established right from the start of the inspectors' stay in the Federal Republic, according to representatives of both sides.

Everything has been prepared at the bases for those carrying out the verification. The inspectors have the right to examine any of the areas and any container capable, by virtue of their dimensions, of being a shelter for missiles. What is now happening in the FRG, other European countries, the Soviet Union, and the United States still seemed unthinkable not so long ago. And so, the day is not far away when weapons of mass destruction which are in full combat readiness will go under the press, be cut into parts, and exploded.

After the conclusion of the inspection, the group of Soviet experts left the FRG. Their first visit has ended, and new ones are due.

Delegation Arrives in Geneva for Nuclear, Space Talks
LD10071152588 Moscow TASS in English
1449 GMT 10 Jul 88

[Quotation marks as received]


Aleksay Obukhov, the head of the Soviet delegation, made a statement at the airport.

He said: "The USSR delegation has arrived at Geneva to begin the next round of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

This resumed round has a special dimension to it. The two delegations have been instructed to go on preparing the draft treaty on 50-per cent reductions in Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive arms while observing the ABM Treaty, taking account of the additional understanding reached at the Moscow summit on such issues as mobile ICBM's and long-range ALCM's [air-launched cruise missiles].

It should be stressed that progress at the negotiations now depends primarily on resolution of problems related to the observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, as well as the problem of limitations on the deployment of long-range SLCM's [submarine-launched cruise missiles].

The Soviet side has tabled clear-cut proposals on both of these questions. We stand for recording in a legally binding document the language on the observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in its full and integral form as agreed upon at the Soviet-U.S. summit in December 1987 and reiterated in Moscow in May and June this year.

The Soviet side has put forward well-defined and far reaching proposals with regard to long-range SLCM's. This is imperative for guaranteeing the effectiveness and stability of the future treaty and precluding its circumvention. The Soviet side favors the strictest possible verification, also as regards long-range SLCM's, up to inspection of any naval ship. We shall try to convince the United States to accept also this form of verification.

In general, we attach particular importance to strict and reliable verification of compliance with the limits to be established. Mikhail S. Gorbachev recently reaffirmed this position of principle in his report to the 19th all-union party conference. The Soviet delegation will as consistently as before implement this approach in its practical work at the talks.

A long way has been already covered toward the treaty on 50-per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms. The outstanding questions can and should be resolved. Following the instructions issued to the delegations by the top leaders during their meeting in Moscow, the Soviet side is prepared for active and meaningful deliberations in both the space and the strategic offensive arms negotiating groups. We do not want to lose momentum and would like to work toward the earliest possible completion of joint draft texts of the relevant documents. We expect an equally constructive approach from the U.S. side since the future treaty can only be a product of combined efforts by both sides.

All nations and peoples are looking forward to the conclusion of a treaty on 50-per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms while observing the ABM Treaty. This is essential for global security and for averting the threat of war. People's hopes must not be dashed.

Let me conclude by expressing our gratitude to the authorities and the people of the canton of Geneva for their warm hospitality".
Ninth Round of Soviet-U.S. CW Talks Opens
LD1107214588 Moscow TASS in English
2054 GMT 11 Jul 88


In line with instructions received by the delegations of the two countries during the Moscow summit, the sides will discuss the main outstanding issues of drafting a convention, as well as various aspects of building confidence and openness, including those on a bilateral basis. At the Moscow summit the Soviet and U.S. leaders both confirmed the aim of all-embracing and global prohibitions of chemical weapons and pointed to permanent urgency of the task of concluding a relevant effective convention.

The Soviet delegation at the consultations is led by Ambassador Yury Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation at the disarmament conference, and the U.S. delegation—by Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, head of the U.S. delegation at the disarmament conference.

SPD-SED Security Plan
LD1207140088 Moscow TASS in English
1324 GMT 12 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 12 TASS—“The Soviet Union welcomes the latest initiative of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD, Federal Republic of Germany) and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] (SUPG, German Democratic Republic) directed at strengthening security and enhancing confidence in Europe, an area of direct contact between two military-political alliances having the biggest armed forces and highly destructive weapons,” a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told a briefing in Moscow today.

Vadim Perfiliev, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry’s Information Directorate, commented on the SPD and SUPG statement calling for establishing a “zone of confidence and security in central Europe.”

He drew the journalists’ attention to the fact that the two parties suggested establishing permanent “confidence centres” in central Europe to exchange information to prevent critical situations in the region, setting up standing joint observation posts in strategic areas and a system of joint satellite monitoring and organising direct bilateral communication to prevent crises.

Perfiliev stated that “the available experience of the functioning of the nuclear risk reduction centres of the USSR and the United States confirms the usefulness of this form of deepening trust and defusing military tension.”

Perfiliev Comments on SLBMs, Military Incidents
LD1207163788 Moscow TASS in English
1545 GMT 12 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 12 TASS—Progress at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, resuming in Geneva today, will depend on the American side, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

Vadim Perfiliev, deputy head of the ministry’s Information Directorate, told a briefing that “this applies primarily to the solution of issues connected with observance of the ABM Treaty and limitation of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles.”

The Soviet Union proceeded from the premise that the SLCM [submarine-launched cruise missiles] issue should be resolved within the framework of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, now being drafted, Perfiliev said.

This was required in order to ensure the effectiveness of the would-be treaty. Without limiting the SLCM’s, it was impossible to achieve deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons. Otherwise, there would remain a possibility of circumventing the future treaty and retaining a channel for the strategic offensive arms race.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman described Marshall Sergey Akhromeyev’s visit to the United States as a part of the process of the further development of contacts between the two countries at various level.

“Contacts in the military field,” he stated, “facilitate broader mutual understanding and trust, positively influence the present state of relations between our countries and help overcome the existing stereotypes.”

Perfiliev observed that during the visit, accompanied by frank and useful exchanges of views, the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and first deputy defence minister of the USSR made a statement together with William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, about the sides’ intention to avoid dangerous military activity.

They came out in favour of setting up a Soviet-American working group with a view to elaborating corresponding recommendations to reduce the risk of the outbreak of military incidents.

The ministry spokesman gave attention to the situation in Central America, noting that the cessation of talks between the Sandinist government and the Nicaraguan armed opposition “added elements of tension not only to Nicaragua, but also to the entire Central American region.”

The latest round of talks between the Nicaraguan Government and the contra rebel leaders failed to bring about any final agreement due to the advancement by
the contras of new conditions that were totally unacceptable for the Sandinists and contradicted the Sapoa agreement and the Guatemala accords.

The conclusion of an agreement on truce and on participation of armed opposition forces in the country's political life, half completed, "is hanging in the air," he noted.

Relations should be based on the sensible balance of the sides' interests—at international, regional or national level, Perfiliev said. "There is only one path that leads to that—talks between the sides concerned with strict non-interference of external forces and respect of the principles of sovereign equality and the right to self-determination of all peoples."

Gorbachev Proposals on European Forces Noted
LD1207161888 Moscow TASS in English
1603 GMT 12 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 12 TASS—By a TASS diplomatic correspondent:

Speaking in the Polish Sejm (parliament) Monday, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev suggested setting up a war risk reduction center in Europe.

Offering a venue for cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, such a center could provide a useful structure strengthening European peace.

The constructive proposal has evoked immediate response. Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski said his country is prepared to host the center if the other interested countries agree.

The Soviet leader's words that time has come for deeper troops and arms cuts in Europe have also been welcomed in Warsaw, just like in many other European capitals.

A continent which has been the hardest hit by wars should become a home offering calm and peace for all. This requires breaking the deadlock at Vienna talks as soon as possible.

Gorbachev called for the deep reductions to be effected in three phases. First of all, it is essential to identify and iron out the existing imbalances and asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty in troop strength and principal weaponry.

The resulting troop levels should then be further lowered by 500,000 men on each side. The subsequent cuts are to be carried out in such a way as to lend the armed forces of both alliances a purely defensive nature.

Claims about Soviet and Warsaw Treaty superiority in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe are popular in NATO countries, but they are based on tendentious estimates of the correlation of military strength between the two alliances.

So as to clear up the issue and expedite negotiating progress, the USSR and its Warsaw Treaty allies propose early exchanges of relevant data. This proposal, however, has not yet been accepted by NATO members.

This gives special significance to the following remarks made by Gorbachev in Warsaw:

"Dialogue rather than mutual accusations, a desire to understand the interests and arguments of the other side rather than ascribing evil intentions to it—this is how we understand civilized relations between states and this is what has guided us in offering the concept of a common European home for discussion by all."

Draft Protocol Submitted
LD1207193188 Moscow TASS in English
1912 GMT 12 Jul 88

[Text] Geneva July 12 TASS—A regular, tenth round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms opened here today with a plenary meeting of the delegations of the USSR and the USA.

In its statement at the meeting, the USSR delegation emphasized that it had arrived in Geneva with the instructions to press for the conclusion within the shortest period of time of the drafting of a treaty on 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive arms in conditions of strict observance of the ABM Treaty.

At the very first meeting in this round of talks, the Soviet side has taken a new constructive step aimed at the achievement of arrangement. It has tabled a draft protocol to the future treaty on strategic offensive arms about the summary throwweight of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Soviet proposal takes into account the considerations expressed by the delegation of the USA and creates the necessary basis for reaching agreement on this matter.

It was noted that the Soviet side expects reciprocal constructive actions on the part of the U.S. delegation at the talks.

U.S. Move on Strategic Arms Curb Urged
PM1307160588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jul 88 First Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel V. Nazarenko: "On the Way to an Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons"]

[Text] The latest round of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons opens in Geneva today. The aim of the talks is to prepare for signing a draft agreement on a
50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons. How realistic are the prospects of such an agreement being concluded before the end of the incumbent U.S. Administration's term in office? Is Washington ready to make this political decision? What problems have to be resolved on the way to reaching an agreement between the USSR and the United States to make radical cuts in strategic offensive weapons?

The first problem is to ensure the implementation of the Washington accord on observing the ABM Treaty. Deliberately ignoring the linkage between strategic offensive weapons and the ABM Treaty, SDI supporters in the United States are working toward a situation whereby the ABM Treaty is formally preserved, while a free hand is retained in preparations to deploy [razvertyvanije] a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements and to transfer offensive weapons into space. Their calculations are simple: When the opportunity appears to put the first phase of SDI into practice, the treaty can be discarded and abandoned.

A report by the Federation of American Scientists names three planned experiments as part of the SDI program which, in its opinion, will represent a flagrant violation of the traditional (strict) interpretation of the ABM Treaty. They are the testing of a special optical aviation system, the space-based "Zenith Star" chemical laser, and a system for detecting and tracking missiles in the boost stage of the flight trajectory. In addition to this, another violation of the ABM Treaty will be the testing of a so-called space-based interceptor—a space platform armed with banks of 5-10 nonnuclear interceptor missiles and devices for tracking enemy targets. The first test is planned for the early nineties.

This is why the Soviet Union is in favor of strictly observing the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972 and not withdrawing from it for an agreed term. Our stand is not some whim or tactical subterfuge. The ABM Treaty is a basis for strategic offensive arms limitation and reduction without which the development [razvitie] of antimissile defense would lead to a buildup of strategic offensive weapons.

Another serious impediment to an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons is long-range air-launched and, particularly, sea-launched cruise missiles.

What is the crux of the problem with air-launched cruise missiles [ALCM]? Our position is this: First, every heavy bomber, regardless of whether it is equipped with nuclear or nonnuclear weapons, must be included in the 1,600 strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to be permitted to the Soviet Union and the United States under the treaty; second, if a heavy bomber is equipped with long-range nuclear cruise missiles, each missile must be included in the 6,000 nuclear weapons each side will be permitted to have; third, if a heavy bomber is equipped with shorter-range missiles (cruise or ballistic) (with a range of up to 600 km) or with free-fall bombs, it must be included as a unit in the 1,600 delivery vehicles and as a unit in the 6,000 warheads. It is hard not to agree as they say, with the logic of these arguments (regarding the procedure for reckoning the number of warheads and their delivery vehicles). Our partners in the talks have voiced no objections on this score. But they would still like to place long-range nonnuclear cruise missiles outside these limitations.

The United States would thereby have a reserve of 200-300 heavy bombers, each of which could accommodate 10-20 cruise missiles. These figures are based on some expert assessments and on the information which the United States has officially conveyed to the Soviet Union. The replacement of nonnuclear with nuclear weapons when necessary is not in principle a problem from a technological standpoint. Consequently, there is no point in reckoning the number of heavy bombers and long-range cruise missiles in their nonnuclear configuration—this would mean giving the United States the opportunity to deploy a few thousand nuclear weapons on its strategic delivery vehicles at any point in time, in addition to the agreed 6,000 nuclear weapons. Can we agree to this kind of accounting? Certainly not. As is well known, the ceilings on delivery vehicles and warheads for the two sides have been agreed. Consequently, any attempt to exceed these limits in any way must be regarded as an outflanking maneuver calculated at the very least, to prolong the talks on strategic offensive weapons. During the Moscow summit meeting, we succeeded in considerably broadening the area of accord on the ALCM issue. Nevertheless, the Geneva talks delegations evidently still have to overcome considerable difficulties in the process of evolving a method for calculating the number of these missiles.

Now the question of long-range nuclear submarine-launched cruise missiles [SLCM]. These are extremely dangerous weapons whose proliferation [raspolzhanie] throughout the waters of the world's oceans will clearly destabilize the strategic situation as a whole and increase the risk of armed conflict. The U.S. Navy command plans to have in service by the middle of the nineties some 4,000 Tomahawk SLCM's of various modifications: approximately 800 nuclear missiles (with a yield of 200-250 kilotons and a range of up to 2,600 km), almost 2,600 missiles with conventional warheads (single or multiple, with a range of up to 1,500 km), and 600 antiship missiles (with conventional warheads and a range of up to 600 km). It is planned to install these SLCM's on up to 200 multirole nuclear submarines and surface ships, a considerable number of which could be deployed off the shores of Western Europe, in the Atlantic, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the Mediterranean. Long-range SLCM's—in their nuclear configuration above all—launched from the said regions would render the territory of the Soviet Union accessible from all directions.

In principle, the United States does not deny the need to limit SLCM numbers, but in practice it has offered no
proposals to solve the problem, citing the absence of an effective verification system in this sphere as the main problem. "We can see no possibility of distinguishing between nuclear and nonnuclear SLCM's," U.S. Defense Secretary F. Carlucci said in an interview in Moscow, "or distinguishing them from nuclear devices on ships or any other nuclear weapons they may be carrying."

The Soviet Union holds a different view on this matter. The SLCM can be verified if the sides monitor every point on the route taken by the missile from leaving the manufacturing plant through to its sitting aboard ship, including the point where it is fitted with a particular warhead. If the American side were to agree to carry out mutual inspections on first demand at any point on the SLCM's route the verification problem too could be successfully resolved. But the Pentagon has made it quite clear that "U.S. seamen will never allow Russian inspectors to wander around their ships."

The American side also considers unacceptable the Soviet proposal to conduct a joint experiment in remote [distansionnyy] verification which envisages determining the presence of nuclear SLCM on warships with the aid of technical means. They say that their scientists have already studied this question and concluded that at present no joint experiment in this field would lead to sophisticated verification measures. The United States is opposed to the Soviet proposal to establish a ceiling of 1,000 long-range cruise missiles—either nuclear or conventional—to be deployed on an earlier defined number of agreed types of surface ships and submarines. It is not only trying to exempt its SLCM from strategic offensive weapons limitations—it also does not agree to limitations on nonnuclear missiles. What is more, it does not consider the SLCM a strategic weapon.

As we can see, the reluctance of the American side to seek solutions to the problem is obvious. It is also obvious that the long-range nuclear SLCM which the United States clearly wishes to exempt from limitations and verification measures represent a barrier which, if not overcome, will make it impossible to achieve a radical reduction in strategic offensive weapons. Can we really leave open another area of the arms race which offers a potential opportunity to circumvent a future treaty?

In our view, a political decision is needed at this stage. And the sooner Washington makes this decision, the sooner the delegations at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons resuming today will be able to draw up a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons.

As far as the Soviet delegation is concerned, it has studied the real possibilities for bringing the two sides' positions closer together and come to Geneva with clear instructions to complete the drawing up of a treaty as soon as possible.

U.S. Seismic Station 'Ready' in Tajikistan
LD1307211788 Moscow TASS in English
1234 GMT 13 Jul 88

[Text] Dushanbe July 13 TASS—The American seismic station set up in the outskirts of Garm, a settlement in the mountains of the Soviet Central Asian Republic of Tajikistan, is in full readiness for operation. The equipment was installed by Larry May, an engineer from the University of California, and other specialists from this educational centre.

“Our station will take part in the new Soviet-American experiment to verify nuclear explosions,” Larry May told a TASS correspondent. “The designation of the station is to record all nuclear tests at the Soviet nuclear range in Semipalatinsk and also to determine the yield of the explosions. For this we have installed a set of seismographs in a shaft and lowered sensors into a hole to a depth of 110 metres. The signals that they will receive will be relayed to a computing complex.”

The American specialist has no doubts about the success of the experiment despite the big distance from Semipalatinsk (1,400 kilometres) and the small yield of the nuclear charges that will be used. In his opinion the frequent earthquakes in Tajikistan (on the average about ten a day) will not affect the reception of seismic waves generated by nuclear explosions.

Larry May bases his optimism on the results of the first joint experiment in Karkaralinsk (Soviet Kazakhstan) in which he had taken part as project engineer. During that experiment American equipment recorded only explosions at the range in Nevada because the Soviet range in Semipalatinsk was silent as the Soviet Union was observing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear blasts.

In the course of the current, bigger experiment another four American seismic stations will be set up in various parts of the USSR in addition to the one that is already ready for action in Tajikistan. Meanimte five Soviet seismic stations are being set up on the territory of the United States. All these stations are to make their first recordings late in August and early in September this year when two mighty calibrating blasts will be set off in different parts of the globe and signal the commencement of the experiment.

GDR's Honecker Supports Gorbachev Initiative
LD1307205288 Moscow TASS in English
0824 GMT 13 Jul 88

[Text] Berlin July 13 TASS—The German Democratic Republic welcomes as extremely timely the new proposals made at the Polish Sejm by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to reduce military confrontation. They represent an especially important initiative aimed at building trust, strengthening security in Europe and continuing the disarmament process. This is said in a statement by
Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, published in the newspaper NEUES DEUTSCHLAND today.

The GDR, which is situated on the division line between the two military blocs, takes a keen interest in creating a military risk reduction centre in Europe which could provide for gradual cooperation between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, the statement runs. This initiative is closely linked to the GDR concept and the Polish and Czechoslovak proposals.

The document expresses support for the Soviet initiative to convene a pan-European summit meeting and readiness to take constructive part in its preparation and holding. Summit meetings, as experience shows, can only facilitate multilateral understanding in the field of disarmament and provide a further boost to talks at other levels.

The GDR received with special attention the Soviet proposals on the withdrawal of its forward-based air force if NATO agrees not to redeploy its 72 F-16 fighter bombers in Italy after Spain ordered them out. Honecker said. It also supports the initiative to reach an agreement on the priority reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, strike tactical aviation and tanks already at the beginning of the implementation of the plan of three-stage troops and arms reductions in Europe, and not at the third stage. This plan is also important because it provides for eliminating disbalances and asymmetries in the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Treaty troops by 500,000 from each side.

INF Inspector Views Visit to U.S. Facilities
PM1507145988 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Jul 88 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Itskov interview with Colonel V. S. Lebedev, leader of group of Soviet INF inspectors which visited the United States, under the rubric “We Report the Details”: “Inspections Have Begun”; date and place of interview not given—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles signed between the USSR and the United States began to be implemented 1 July 1988. This began with mutual trips of Soviet and U.S. inspection groups.

Colonel V. S. Lebedev, leader of the group of Soviet inspectors, told journalists about his trip to the United States.

"By the second week of mutual inspections we had already inspected the operational-tactical missile bases, plants manufacturing launchers, storage dumps, and other facilities that were once considered strictly secret," V.S. Lebedev said.

[Itskov] What is the monitoring system like?

“... The same for the Soviet and U.S. sides,” V. S. Lebedev replied. “On arriving at the point of entry and after a short rest, we announced the inspection sites and the host side had to take us to the facilities within 10 hours. The facilities that our group inspected were as follows: the Army arsenal at Pueblo (Colorado); the USAF base at Fort Washakie and Davis-Monathan (Arizona); Military Plant No 19 at San Diego (California); and the Dugway testing ground (Utah).

“The Americans took Soviet inspectors to the monitoring sites at the appointed time, in a strictly businesslike fashion, in a gentlemanly fashion, showing courtesy and obligingness. We had 24 hours at our disposal to carry out the inspection.

“You can familiarize yourselves in detail with the facility, go where you want, ask any questions, and conduct technical inspections,” the U.S. representatives told us. ‘If you don’t have enough time, then the inspection can be extended by another 8 hours by prior agreement, plus 4 hours for compiling and signing the joint report on the inspection.’

“While fulfilling our mission on U.S. territory,” Colonel V. S. Lebedev stated, “the Soviet inspectors were guided strictly by the provisions of the treaty. We hope that the incipient exchange of inspection groups will be a new form of Soviet-U.S. cooperation and will promote peace and international security.

“The Americans,” V. S. Lebedev continued, “allotted us two comfortable two-story blocks, not forgetting, however, to put orange warning cones, which hinted unambiguously that further access was forbidden. The Americans organized safe care and protection for us. Of course, they also thought about our leisure, although, to be honest, we had virtually no time for leisure.

“The work of U.S. and Soviet inspectors,” V. S. Lebedev said, “has begun at a good pace and for the first 2 months will be carried out particularly intensively. Soviet inspectors will monitor approximately 30 facilities on U.S. territory and West European countries’ territory. In the future each side will devote the main attention to verification of the destruction of missiles and launchers and will carry out other strictly agreed upon kinds of inspection, for the process of eliminating intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles must be completed within a 3-year period.”

Belgium Ratifies INF Inspection Agreement
LDI407215888 Moscow TASS in English
2041 GMT 14 Jul 88

[Text] Brussels July 14 TASS—By TASS correspondent A. Balebanov:

The upper chamber of the Belgian Parliament, the Senate, unanimously endorsed today agreements signed by
Belgium with the United States and the Soviet Union on holding inspections by Soviet specialists at the American units armed with cruise missiles on Belgian territory. The inspections are envisaged by the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-and Shorter-Range Missiles.

All members of the chamber, 167 senators, who were present at the plenary meeting voted for the agreement. There were neither "no" votes nor abstentions.

Earlier these agreements were unanimously endorsed by the lower chamber, the House of Representatives. Thus, the procedure of ratification of these international acts has been completed. The agreements will now be submitted for signing by head of the Belgian state, King of the Belgians Baudouin.

Ratification of the agreements was expected to pose no difficulties because no party in the country opposed the INF Treaty. Taking into account such unanimous support for the treaty from the public of the country, the Belgian Government, without waiting for the ratification of the agreements, gave the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union official obligations to observe their provisions, in particular, those concerning on-site inspections.

On the basis of the above mentioned agreements Soviet inspectors received the right to monitor in Belgium compliance with the INF Treaty. Inspections will be held at the military base in Florennes and at the European centre for servicing cruise missiles in the city of Gosselies.

Soviet INF Inspectors Arrive in U.S. 14 July LD1507052588 Moscow TASS in English 0521 GMT 15 Jul 88

[Text] Washington July 15 TASS—A group of 40 Soviet experts arrived in American military facilities to verify compliance with the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty.

Early in July, the first group of Soviet inspectors visited five military facilities in the west of the United States, where missiles and their components, to be destroyed under the treaty, were or had been deployed.

Soviet experts carried out two more inspections in West Germany.

Over the same period, American inspectors checked 33 military facilities in Soviet territory.

During the current visit to the U.S., the Soviet inspectors will visit sites in Alabama, Maryland, Oklahoma and Florida.

Karpov Assesses Arms Limitation, Reduction LD1707183988 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1300 GMT 16 Jul 88

[The "International program" presented by Melor Sturua, international affairs journalist, identified by screen caption, with Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, head of the Arms Limitation Administration of the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry]

[Text] [Sturua] Hello, dear television viewers. The topic of our conversation today is the problem of reducing strategic offensive weapons. I don't think there's any point in expanding the theme of how significant solving this problem is. With me in the studio is Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, the head of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Administration of the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry and thus one of the most competent people in this sphere. It is natural that we shall be talking about those problems of greatest interest to us as television viewers, Soviet citizens, and residents on earth.

At the end of May and the beginning of June, the fourth summit meeting between the state leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States of America took place in Moscow. From my point of view there were two emotional points at that meeting: The first was the exchange of ratification documents which open the way to an agreement, or rather a treaty, to eliminate intermediate-and shorter-range missiles. The second emotional point was the recognition by President Reagan that the Soviet Union is no longer the evil empire. It stands to reason that it is hard to overestimate the significance of these two points, but, nonetheless, at the Moscow summit work was under way on a potentially still more important problem, that of a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive weapons. In the joint statement resulting from the Moscow meeting, the following is said on this: The leaders of both states noted that a joint draft text of a treaty to reduce and limit strategic offensive weapons has been worked out.

Viktor Pavlovich, to start with, explain this part of the joint statement. On the one hand it sounds very optimistic and on the other hand we know that there was no decisive, as the English say, breakthrough, at that summit meeting.

[Karpov] True, there was no breakthrough that would provide an opportunity of signing a treaty already. A whole series of problems remained unsolved but there is the draft, the joint draft treaty, a fairly voluminous one—a volume of almost 200 pages—which consists not only of the agreed text but also of a text that demonstrates the sides' positions; that is, what coincides is expressed as already agreed and what does not coincide, reflects the positions of each side. There are four such documents on strategic offensive weapons. These are the draft treaty itself, a draft of two protocols: one on the elimination or conversion of the strategic weapons subject to reduction and a second protocol on procedures for
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[Sturua] Incidentally, why are these latter put forward separately? Even in the joint statement it is said that an ABM agreement will be separate from the treaty on strategic offensive weapons itself.

[Karpov] This is a long story and one which has its origin in previous debates in both Geneva in 1985 and Reykjavik in 1986. Initially, our proposals proceeded from the issue being dealt with as a whole: Both observance of the ABM Treaty and 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive weapons. However, because of the peculiarity of the U.S. position and President Reagan's love of the Strategic Defense Initiative program, the U.S. side was constantly putting to us a proposal to have, as it were, two documents: One on observance of the ABM Treaty, separately, and the treaty on 50-percent cuts. Ultimately, what matters is content rather than form and so we did deem it possible to accede to such a division, while maintaining, however, the internal logic of the combination of these components of the overall problem. It is not possible to cut strategic weapons without observing the ABM Treaty, and this internal correction is recorded in the document.

[Sturua] I see. What then, in which spheres were advances achieved at the summit? I can tell you sincerely that we journalists are not very keen on the word advances [podvizhki] in the literal sense, but since advances have great significance for diplomacy, I will use that word as well [laughter].

[Karpov] However, in a word, perhaps it does not express very precisely what really does happen when this word is used to describe movement at talks, but the point lies in the fact that during the summit it was possible to advance in agreeing two very serious sections which will be part of the draft treaty itself. To be precise, the first is the issue of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's]. For a long time, this problem was a stumbling block at the talks. The Soviet Union does have such missiles, the United States does not. Hence, the divergence of views. The United States proposed banning these missiles and we proposed permitting these missiles, but with the introduction of strict limitations and verification of their siting and use.

Why are we insisting on this? Because mobile ICBM's are the guarantee and surety of the survivability of counterstrike weapons. The United States acknowledges this fact and even the Scowcroft presidential commission, under that famous strategic arms specialist, acknowledged 2 years ago that mobility is a method of ensuring survivability and of strengthening strategic stability. We understood this a long time ago, which is why we are making such missiles. The United States has now gone so far as to acknowledge the legitimacy, as it were, of mobile ICBM's, but the question has arisen of how to monitor [kontrolirovat] them, since strict monitoring will be required to prevent either of the sides increasing the established limits as reductions proceed. It was here that a fairly serious start toward a future treaty was made at the Moscow summit.

In theory, an accord was reached whereby mobile ICBM's will be limited to specific regions. These regions will be known to the other side, and the other side will be provided with information as to how many mobile ICBM's are deployed in each of the regions and there will be strict limitations on moving these ICBM's out of the limited regions. In this way, it will not be possible to deceive the other side by manipulating and moving ICBM's from one area to another. These provisions were agreed upon. They made up a fairly bulky document that the delegations in Geneva, which began talks again on the 12th after the Moscow meeting, are to embody in the concrete formulae of the treaty.

The second section relates to air-launched cruise missiles. We have long had disagreements with the United States here as to how to count cruise missiles and which ones to count—all of them together or just certain specific categories. Long ago, as a result of SALT I and II, it was established that air-launched cruise missiles with a range of 600 km were to be regarded as strategic. Anything with a range of less than 600 km is not regarded as strategic, and anything that travels further than 600 is seen as a strategic weapon and taken into the count. The United States has now proposed setting, in contrast to the earlier established range, a range of 1,500 km. This will considerably increase the number of non-monitored [nekontroliruyemykh] weapons. Previously, all cruise weapons in place, meaning that are sited on bombers, with a range of more than 600 km, which were taken into account make for 6,000 nuclear warheads, the established ceiling that should be taken into account at the moment. The United States would like to take a considerable proportion of these out of the framework of the talks and to have more than 6,000. Thus far we have no agreement on this, but for the moment we have put it on one side.

[Sturua] Viktor Pavlovich, all you are now saying seems to call for some kind of exchange of strategic data and this is, incidentally, included in the joint statement.

[Karpov] Definitely, because it is necessary to know, as was the case, for example, in the INF Treaty, and to know specifically how many, which and what type of weapon each side has. Such an exchange has begun.
[Sturuja] Now about where we have made no headway following the Moscow meeting: Where do the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States obviously diverge?

[Karpov] If we're talking....

[Sturuja, interrupting] Yes, I want, in this instance, to put the SDI issue, which we will discuss in more detail later, outside the framework.

[Karpov] Okay. If we have in mind only strategic offensive weapons, then the main issue is that of sea-based cruise missiles. This issue has been a stumbling block for a long time and thus far no mutually acceptable solution has been found. Right at the beginning of the talks in March 1985, we raised the issue of making all types of strategic offensive weapons the subject of an accord so that it would not be possible to proceed according to a solution in which, for example, ground-based ICBM's, submarine-based ballistic missiles, heavy bomber weapons are reduced, while at sea cruise missiles could be deployed absolutely anywhere—on board ships or submarines. An obvious lack of proportion emerges, an imbalance.

[Sturuja] A certain circumvention.

[Karpov] It turns out that you can deploy cruise missiles of any range in any numbers, and thus in essence nullify the significance of the reductions that will be undertaken in other spheres. That is why without limitations on long-range sea-based cruise missiles, we cannot see the possibility of a real solution really signifying a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

[Sturuja] It would be the Achilles' heel of the whole agreement! And now let's go back to the Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI, the so-called "Star Wars" program. The program has become a kind of Carthage which must one way or another be destroyed in order that a treaty on the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons may become a reality. Certain readers [as heard] are bewildered. They believe—and the main thing is that many Americans believe thus—that SDI is effectively unrealizable. Financially speaking, it is pretty well unattainable. But even if it proves possible to buy and create the SDI, it will prove to be untenable strategically. That is, we can find a cheaper and fully effective response to it.

[Karpov] This, you know, is how I'd put it: We have probably created too large a propaganda image of the evil of this SDI. And we have no doubt fallen somewhat under the spell of the danger.

[Sturuja] A sort of empire of evil in space!

[Karpov] Something like that, yes, something like that. But then, when we started to understand more clearly what can be done and how, on the basis of what the Americans have already published, both our experts and the U.S. experts started to reach the conclusion that things aren't all that simple. For a start, to send into space the systems that would have to be sited there under the full SDI program, thousands of carrier-rockets would be needed to carry cargoes of not just several tonnes, but weighing dozens and even hundreds of tonnes. The United States does not at the moment have such carrier-rockets, and the Challenger disaster, as you well know, has set back the U.S. space program by a long period of time. The development of carrier-rockets of this sort will require enormous resources and a very lengthy period of time. There are also a great many other factors which are not for the moment being resolved, and cannot be resolved.

So why, in spite of this, are we so resolutely opposed to allowing the United States to carry out work that goes outside the ABM Treaty? Here is the reason. The ABM Treaty was conceived as the cornerstone of the whole process of the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. The interdependence between strategic defense and strategic offensive weapons is organically inherent in these two components of the strategic potential. If a strategic defense is being created, whether it be on earth or in space, or by some other means—it inevitably entails the development of more sophisticated systems of strategic attack. This is because the balance has to be maintained. The potential for a possible retaliatory strike must be maintained as far as we are concerned: We must maintain a potential which would not afford the United States the possibility of effecting a first strike against us and covering itself by some sort of shield to neutralize a retaliatory strike. This action and counteraction, the struggle between shield and sword, which has been a feature of the military art from time immemorial, is present here too. So the ABM Treaty was conceived at the end of the 1960's—and realized in 1972—as a method of preventing the competition between shield and sword, thus ensuring a situation of strategic stability and predictability in relations between the USSR and United States and allowing a switch to the limitation, first, and then the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. This principle must be observed. If we breach it, if we destroy this connection, we shall not be guaranteed at any given moment that reductions in strategic offensive weapons will lead to a strengthening of strategic stability, rather than shattering this stability. In this sense, it is not so much opposition to the SDI program that is important, as compliance with the ABM Treaty. That is what we are now specifically advocating—full, undeviating, and as far as possible, open-ended compliance with the ABM Treaty. But here the United States is doing everything it can to resist this. It is setting itself the task—at least now, in our talks with them—of shattering the ABM Treaty, of trying to give it a wider interpretation that would enable the United States not only to conduct research work in the laboratory, but also to take certain tests into space—tests which in terms of the spirit and the letter of the treaty would mean going beyond the limitations that it sets.
We should like this not to happen. That is why we are proposing the following to the United States. Okay, if you are afraid of perpetuating the treaty for many years to come, let’s at least agree to a 10-year period. Let us pledge not to go beyond the framework of the treaty in all work associated with antimissile defense. Then a state of strategic stability would be ensured. We think that the simple fact of a 50-percent reduction in the USSR’s and U.S.’ strategic armaments would fundamentally change the general atmosphere and people’s general frame of mind, it would reshape their viewpoint regarding strategic weapons themselves and their necessity for ensuring their defense. I think that such a breakthrough in the reduction of strategic armaments will enable us to go further along this road. And then the question of SDI, the question of wide-scale strategic defensive systems, it seems to me, will look quite different.

[Sturua] Beyond the Atlantic, another objection is advanced against concluding a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons. They say that you cannot opt for this treaty until we have drawn up the strategy and structure of our armed forces, otherwise, the theory goes, we may find ourselves in a vulnerable position.

[Karpov] The structure of the strategic forces that will remain after they are reduced by 50 percent must, of course, be in strict accordance with the task that they will continue to face—maintaining the possibility of a retaliatory strike. This task will remain even when they are reduced by half. That is why their survivability and effectiveness in a retaliatory strike must be ensured. This task will of course require a more optimum correlation to be defined between land-based forces, submarine forces, naval ballistic missiles, and strategic aircraft.

[Sturua] That is clear, but is there not some element of sabotage here?

[Karpov] I think that when artificial questions are raised, it always occurs when someone does not want something to happen. In this case, an issue which really exists becomes hypertrophied and is given some kind of absolute significance, instead of the subsidiary significance that it really has as part of the overall problem of the reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

[Sturua] Here is another question. As you follow developments in Washington, you cannot fail to note a certain disagreement, a certain dissonance on the prospects for a treaty on strategic offensive weapons. I have here a statement by Colin Powell, the U.S. President’s assistant for National Security Affairs. He declared that the President “has not given us any instructions to bring the treaty to completion.” His boss has been saying something a little different. What can you say about this dissonance, this polyphony which is not very intelligible to us, if I can put it that way?

[Karpov] I could add to the polyphony the statements of other representatives of the administration—Kampel-
have been established under this administration. Much has been done, and the continuity is ensured by the fact that both Vice President Bush, the Republican Party’s presidential candidate, who took a direct part in the formulation of decisions on medium range missiles and the position on a 50-percent reduction, will be continuing this line if he is elected, and Dukakis, as the Democratic candidate....

[Sturua, interrupting] That is, there won’t be the traditional hiatus that has always occurred with a change of guard at the White House.

[Karpov] Yes. And I think, at any rate, that next year—if not this year of 1988, then 1989—could well become the year when it will prove possible to conclude an agreement on a 50-percent reduction.

[Sturua] Let us hope that, like Oracle of Delphi, you....

[Karpov, interrupting] Ha, ha! You probably shouldn’t compare me with the Oracle of Delphi.

[Sturua] Yes, it was difficult to grasp what the Oracle of Delphi was saying. The Oracle’s predictions were very evasive. You, on the other hand, are more optimistic!

[Karpov] I am making assumptions based on our assessment of trends.

[Sturua] The trend is positive. Thank you very much, Viktor Pavlovich, for your interesting talk, for your replies. Thank you very much for your attention. Until we meet again.

U.S. Scientists Leave for Semipalatinsk
LD1707083488 Moscow TASS in Russian 0826 GMT 17 Jul 88

[Text] San Francisco July 17 TASS—TASS correspondent Andrey Sidorin reports:

A C-5 military transportation plane with a group of American scientists and Corrnx equipment to determine the yield of nuclear detonations has left the Indian Springs Air Force Base, Nevada, taking course towards the Soviet Union. In two days’ time, American officials said, the plane will arrive at the area of Semipalatinsk where a regular joint Soviet-American experiment is to be held in September this year.

The Corrnx equipment which American scientists have been using for more than ten years to determine the yield of nuclear explosions will be located at a certain distance from the epicentre of the planned underground explosion at the Soviet test site. By means of the instruments the U.S. experts will determine its parameters and compare them with control data.

A similar experiment will be conducted a month earlier, in mid-August, in Nevada desert where a group of Soviet specialists has already arrived. In both cases the yield of the explosions will not exceed 150 kilotons.

The experiments, the importance of which was emphasized at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow, are to promote intergovernmental talks between the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva on the nuclear test ban issue. On the strength of the results of seismic observations, scientists must prove that by means of the existing equipment it is possible to reliably monitor underground nuclear tests.

The United Press International (UPI) news agency notes out that the forthcoming joint experiments are expected to promote ratification of the 1974 Soviet-U.S. Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosive Treaty.

This hope is given by preliminary data obtained in Kazakhstan last year and in Nevada in spring this year. They confirmed the original estimates made by the specialists of the two countries and showed that it does not seem possible already now to conceal an underground nuclear explosion of even the smallest yield.

U.S. Specialists Inspect Works at Sverdlovsk
LD1707114688 Moscow TASS in Russian 0958 GMT 17 Jul 88

[Text] Sverdlovsk, 17 Jul (TASS)—A group of U.S. specialists today completed their first inspection to verify INF observance at the Sverdlovsk experimental works of the "M.I. Kalinin Engineering Works" production association.

Observing the conditions of the treaty, this enterprise in the Urals has ceased the production of launchers for ground-based cruise missiles (RK-55). The special technological and testing machinery has been dismantled and destroyed.

"This is the first Soviet industrial enterprise we have verified; our previous trips were to missiles bases, a TASS correspondent was told by U.S. Armed Forces Lieutenant Colonel Paul Nelson, the leader of the group of inspectors. Under the treaty, I do not have the right to comment on the results of the inspection, but I am satisfied with the cooperation with the Soviet side. All those we worked with are good professionals. I am glad that I have been given the opportunity to establish such contacts. It would be a good thing for such cooperation to continue in the future."

Inspectors Check U.S. Missile Facilities
LD1707113788 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 17 Jul 88

[Text] A group of Soviet inspectors have started spot checks at missile-producing enterprises and missile bases in a number eastern and southeastern states of the United States. This is envisaged in the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.