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USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS

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YEPI SHEV ON IMPROVING IDEOLOGICAL WORK

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 84 (signed to press 3 Jan 84) pp 16-24

[Article by Army Gen A. Yepishev, chief of Main Political Directorate of Soviet Army and Navy: "Bring Ideological Work Up to the Level of Party Demands"]

[Text] An improvement in developed socialism in our country and strengthening of our country's defense might assumes a steady rise in Soviet citizens' political awareness and social activeness. Comrade Yu. V. Andropov remarked at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum: "Already today we have a good sense of how much the rates of progress grow when ideological work becomes more effective and when the masses have a better understanding of party policy, perceiving it as their own policy which meets the nation's vital interests."

By faithfully reflecting and scientifically explaining the real social processes, the CPSU's ideological work allows the toiling masses to have a clearer picture of ways of building a new society and to participate consciously in accomplishing tasks advanced by the party and defending our revolutionary achievements. In all its content, forms and methods this work contributes to turning Marxist-Leninist ideas into the Soviet citizen's steadfast personal convictions and it determines his affairs and actions. The party's ideological activity thus becomes a permanent factor in the struggle for communism and for strengthening the socialist Motherland's defense might.

Resolutions of the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum provided a powerful impetus for a further improvement in ideological work in the Army and Navy as well as everywhere in our country. Based on fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and in elaboration of propositions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November 1982 Central Committee Plenum, the party advanced a comprehensive concept of ideological work of long-term significance at the June plenum. Our ideological arsenal was enriched with new, profound ideas connected with the reality of today and illuminating paths of further progress.

In conformity with guidelines of the June Central Committee Plenum, the attention in propaganda and indoctrination work is focused on a study of fundamental
theoretical and political problems of modern times. All aspects of the concept of developed socialism now are being revealed more fully and thoroughly in this work. The focus of attention now for military councils, commanders, political entities and party organizations is an explanation of resolutions of the December 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the text of the speech by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, and materials of the 9th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation.

The connection of propaganda and agitation with tasks of further strengthening national defense and improving our Armed Forces has become more perceptible and integral. The Armed Forces' increased responsibility for defending socialism's achievements places ideological work in the Army and Navy at the same level as the accomplishment of key combat readiness missions and preparation of the personnel for successfully repulsing possible aggression by imperialism's reactionary forces.

Ideological work now gives fuller consideration to the features of the present-day international situation and its sharp aggravation in connection with the beginning of deployment of American medium range missiles in Europe. The detailed explanation to personnel of the statements by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov on 28 September and 24 November 1983 and of the appraisals in the statements of the aggressive foreign policy course of the present U.S. administration is having a beneficial effect on shaping the Army and Navy's fighting spirit. Military personnel fervently approve and support CPSU policy aimed at averting the threat of war and approve the Soviet leadership's retaliatory measures designed to strengthen the security of our Motherland and the entire socialist community. They see their patriotic and international duty is to increase the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces and the combat readiness of units [sotvedineniye and chast'] and ships.

Improving the level of ideological work means giving servicemen a convincing explanation of all the danger in development of the present military-political situation, demonstrating the character and direction of aggressive preparations by the United States and NATO countries, and emphasizing that they noticeably increase the danger of war for our Motherland. Army and Navy personnel are obliged now as never before to display supreme vigilance, efficiency and discipline.

There is a growing importance for skillful propaganda of the Leninist party's heroic history and the Soviet people's grand revolutionary, combat and labor traditions in indoctrinating ideologically persuaded defenders of the socialist Motherland. The CPSU's historic path is a victorious experience in struggle and creation; it is the path of a pathfinding party which was called upon by history itself to solve problems never before solved by anyone and with only its own experience capable of being a teacher. Throughout all the years of its existence, from the first days of its origin to today, when the party is at the helm of a powerful socialist country, it has directed all its thoughts and actions at defending working class interests and at achieving a better future for the people of labor. It thus won the people's supreme respect and boundless trust.
A knowledge of party history and the history of one's socialist homeland is a necessary condition for strengthening the patriotic and international awareness of Soviet citizens and of Army and Navy personnel. As it was noted at a meeting of USSR ministry of defense leaders with Soviet Armed Forces veterans, broad opportunities open up for strengthening military-patriotic work in connection with the celebration of the 40th anniversary of prominent victories by Soviet troops in the most important Patriotic War operations and in connection with preparations for the 40th anniversary of our great victory over fascist Germany. While celebrating these grand jubilees nationwide as banner dates in the heroic history of the Soviet land and the Armed Forces, we must show the unparalleled exploit of the people and Army intelligibly, in a lively manner, and with specific facts and events; we must propagandize the courage and mass heroism of Soviet citizens at the front and rear; we must explain the fundamental values of socialism and sources of the socialist state's strength and indestructibility; and we must expose the bourgeois falsifiers of World War II history.

Spiritual forces of the Soviet Army and Navy are the concentrated expression of the mobilizing role of communist ideas and of Soviet military personnel's patriotism and internationalism. The detailed assimilation of Leninist ideas about defense of the socialist homeland and of CPSU policy, and an understanding of the need for constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces act as very important motivations for improving the personnel's combat schooling and strengthening their discipline, efficiency and readiness to fulfill a patriotic and international duty with honor and dignity.

All this presumes a continuous build-up of efforts by commanders, political entities, and the party and Komsomol organizations to improve the personnel's political awareness and to develop their ideological conviction and moral maturity. With the increased danger of war stemming from imperialism, ideological work must be conducted on the broadest possible scale and be aimed at achieving real results. It is impossible to picture today a single area of military endeavor outside the sphere of its influence.

Many party organizations and party committees have begun to work more thoughtfully and with imaginative vim in the ideological sphere, which also was noted at the report-election party meetings and conferences that concluded recently. Recognizing positive points on their merits, the party members at the same time spoke sharply and exactingly about omissions existing in the arrangement of the personnel's ideological upbringing and about slow elimination of deficiencies as pointed out by the June Central Committee Plenum. We must continue to support and develop in every way the party members' desire for a serious, self-critical analysis of the effectiveness of political indoctrination work by viewing it as a matter for the entire party and for every party member.

The effectiveness of ideological-political influence on workers and Army and Navy personnel is directly related to how the fundamental principles of ideological work--scientific nature, party spirit, diligence, offensive spirit and a link with life--are implemented in practice. As Comrade Yu. V. Andropov pointed out at a meeting with party veterans, fulfilling the resolutions of
the June Central Committee Plenum means overcoming the gap which unfortunately still exists between words and deeds. This means learning to speak seriously and frankly with people without cutting corners. It means systematically improving the workers' political culture in order to make every citizen an aware participant of public life. What was said relates fully to ideological work in the Army and Navy as well.

The immutable basis of servicemen's communist indoctrination is their development of a scientific, Marxist-Leninist outlook. The entire history of our party, state and Armed Forces persuades us that it is ideological maturity that makes Soviet citizens and Armed Forces personnel conscious, steadfast fighters for the party cause and permits them to assess events and phenomena from a position of party and class positions, see the connection of current problems with end goals, and conduct well-reasoned polemics against any ideological enemy.

Political studies regularly conducted in the Army and Navy, and which vary in form, hold a special place in the development of a scientific outlook and ideological maturity of our military cadres and all service personnel. The meaning of such studies is for students to gain a deeper understanding of party policy, to be able to apply in practice the knowledge they obtain, and to gain a clearer picture of and fulfill in practice their military duty and responsible tasks of raising the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships. Political studies on the whole proceed in an organized manner and are making a substantial contribution to an improvement in the Army and Navy's combat potential.

The personnel's political studies in 1984 are being conducted under new thematic plans which have broadened the study of problems of developed socialism, the party's policy and practical activities, and the tasks of strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces' combat might. As a rule, all these issues rivet the soldiers' interest, but this occurs only if the classes are well organized and are conducted at a high ideological and methods level. The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany can be given as an example, where the political directorate did a great deal to improve the quality of political studies and strengthen their influence on the accomplishment of specific missions.

Unfortunately, that is not how matters stand everywhere. There is still a great deal of an empty "flow of words" and open boredom in classes. An atmosphere of frank discussion or an analysis of urgent problems is not always created, and a logical tie between the lessons being studied and the life of military collectives is not always achieved. The mobilizing aspect of political studies must be reinforced above all by improving the class methodology, reinforcing the ties between the classes and practical experience, and seeking the most active forms for studying the material.

An improvement in the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist training, the political studies for warrant officers (praporshchiki and michmany), and political classes with privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers presumes a decisive improvement in the preparation of political study instructors and
propagandists. Time set aside for seminars and other scheduled classes must be used better and with greater return, and we must strive for a continuous build-up in the group instructors' theoretical knowledge and methods proficiency and an improvement in their self-education, as well as for the propagandists to set a personal example in studies and service.

An improvement in mass political work presumes a further rise in the theoretical level and practical direction of propaganda lectures. It is a matter of decisively ridding such propaganda of stereotypes, boredom, excessive exhortation and elements of formalism. As inspections of Army and Navy forces show, it is a positive fact that mass political work, and verbal agitation above all, has come closer to the people and to the life of military collectives. In the Carpathian Military District, for example, a majority of generals and officers have public assignments connected with propaganda work and they regularly speak to the personnel on problems involving a reinforcement of military discipline and regulation order, which is of benefit.

Major reserves still exist in the matter of improving the effectiveness of political agitation, and this relates both to content and form of verbal presentations, many of which lack clarity, intelligibility, and mobilizing force. A significant amount of visual agitation does not provide the desired return. Some posters, panels and displays often contain obsolete data and their artistic arrangement leaves much to be desired. It would appear that in implementing resolutions of the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum we have to develop and enrich mass political work in every way and concentrate efforts and resources on the most important and pressing problems being advanced by the development of military affairs, by the personnel training and indoctrination practice, and by the contemporary international situation.

The means of mass information and propaganda occupy an increasingly important place in the fighting arsenal of ideological work. Many editorial staffs of our district, group and fleet newspapers and of military journals have improved the quality of their publications of late. Many articles and reports are distinguished by profound content, a well-argued presentation, and lively, intelligible language. At the same time, the military press must take a more attentive and responsible approach to elaborating current issues of Soviet military organizational development and to covering problems of the struggle for constant combat readiness, it must increase the depth of generalizations and the substantiation of recommendations in the area of training and indoctrination, and it must reveal current problems of ideological practice.

Technical means of propaganda, which are coming into the Army and Navy in an ever-increasing flow, serve to improve the effectiveness of the personnel's ideological indoctrination. More than 4,000 radio receivers have been sent to units located in areas of unstable radio reception over the last three years. Work is under way to supply remote posts with Central Television broadcasts, much has been done to increase the number of motor vehicle clubs and radio and television centers and terminals, and training of officer cadres for providing television to groups of forces has begun. The task is to effectively place all this at the service of combat readiness and of the personnel's indoctrination in high political vigilance, discipline and efficiency.
The activity of Army and Navy cultural establishments is gaining more and more importance in the ideological-political, military, moral, legal and esthetic indoctrination of personnel. It is gratifying to see servicemen's growing interest in culture and the arts, the high demand for books, and the desire to attend good concerts or view an interesting movie. All this is a graphic display of the heightened intellect of the Motherland's defenders and evidence that the Army and Navy's spiritual life is becoming richer and more diverse.

The growth in young people's spiritual needs also poses its own problems. Do our Army and Navy cultural establishments always manage to satisfy the soldiers' many-sided interests and give the necessary ideological direction to young people's entertainment? Experience shows that this is not always the case and some officers' and enlisted men's clubs continue to place emphasis on the number of activities held without showing particular concern for their quality. This leads to a situation where the role of cultural establishments in indoctrinating servicemen and members of their families is degraded. Some officers' and enlisted men's clubs are losing their position in developing the serviceman's overall culture, in instilling the necessary ethics of mutual relationships in military personnel, and in developing their concepts of honor and dignity. Political entities must manage the activity of cultural enlightenment establishments more objectively and orient them on productive work to implement guidelines of the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

When we speak of a build-up in efforts to indoctrinate ideologically persuaded soldiers, the problem of controlling the individual's spiritual development is very important. Its essence lies in coordinating the influence of all factors which go into shaping the servicemen's political awareness and high morality. It is very important in this regard to enrich the content of free time for officers and members of their families and diversify their leisure.

The Armed Forces primarily consist of young people, a majority of whom are Komsomol members, and a significant part of the officer corps also consists of young people. If we add to this that companies, batteries and equivalent sub-units consist almost wholly of Komsomol members, it is not difficult to see what an important role the Army and Navy Komsomol plays in troop life. Komsomol members successfully perform their military duty on the whole, but at the same time the negative processes occurring in the youth environment, the belated civic development and political naivete, the parasitism and state of being unaccustomed to labor all can be observed in certain military collectives as well. That is why it is so insistently necessary to devote more attention to managing the Komsomol organizations.

Improving the level of ideological work and of the young people's ideological and moral indoctrination means improving the level of party management of the Komsomol. The All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries is to be held in May of this year. It unquestionably will serve to increase the spirit of Komsomol organizations and reinforce their influence on young people.
The ideological work of commanders, political entities and party organizations is called upon to bring a more active influence to bear on the indoctrination of young officers, a majority of whom work selflessly and conscientiously perform their responsible duty. There are those in their midst, however, who are slow to acquire social maturity and who display negligence or even political naiveté. Some lieutenants are extremely slow in feeling at home with their command and indoctrinational duties and are not able to become genuinely close with subordinates or arrange proper, regulation relationships among service-men. All this requires that military councils, commanders and political entities work more thoroughly with young cadres, persistently develop their high moral-political and psychological qualities, and arm them with legal knowledge and a knowledge of pedagogics and ethics.

All our efforts in the personnel's ideological, military, moral and legal indoctrination are intended to improve servicemen's political and job activeness and channel their energy in military labor toward increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces, maintaining constant vigilance and high combat readiness, and strengthening military discipline, efficiency and order. There is no more responsible task for propagandists than ideological support to combat readiness and the soldiers' combat schooling and discipline. Many examples can be given of a comprehensive ideological support to the tasks of maintaining combat readiness in the Strategic Missile Forces, Ground Forces, Air Forces, and a number of large units [soyedineniye] of the Air Defense Forces and Navy.

At the same time, it cannot be forgotten that the sharply aggravated international situation demands a higher measure of responsibility on the part of commanders, political entities and party organizations for giving the entire system of combat readiness the necessary flexibility and capability to react effectively to any changes in the military-political situation and to the enemy's aggressive actions. It is difficult to overestimate the role of ideological work here, for well-trained, courageous, bold people with an unprecedented store of strength—combat, ideological and moral—are needed for victory in modern combat.

We know from history that the aggressor always has relied on a surprise attack, and our probable enemy is also counting on this. This is why it is so important to use all means of ideological influence to act resolutely against any displays of indifference, negligence, a dulling of vigilance, or an underestimation of the danger of war.

The substantial change in tactics of conducting combat actions using modern weapons and combat equipment introduces its specific features into personnel training practice. Mastering these tactics to perfection and employing them expertly on the battlefield means finding the key to victory over the enemy. Fulfillment of demands of the USSR minister of defense that personnel master weapons and military equipment in abbreviated time periods and with high quality raises the combat readiness of units [soyedineniye and chast'] and ships to a new level. The development of soldiers' firm conviction in the social importance of military labor and a desire to master weapons and a combat
specialty expertly are matters to which the attention of all ideological workers must be riveted. Under present-day conditions there is an increase in the importance of military-technical propaganda and the development in personnel of love for equipment, confidence in its high combat capabilities, and the need to operate and safeguard it carefully.

The problems of improving the quality of combat training and of the personnel's field, air and naval schooling are connected integrally with people's awareness, emotional mood, and attitude toward training and the mastery of weapons. Far from all problems have been resolved here. In places one does not see the daily, specific, spirited and purposeful agitation aimed at improving the personnel's enthusiasm and activeness on the job. We also must be bolder in taking ideological work out of the barracks, enlisted men's clubs and officers' clubs into the field, where tactical proficiency is improved daily.

The results of combat training are more substantial and stable in those military collectives where socialist competition is well organized. Its skilled organization is determined largely by the level of mass agitation work, which is intended to mobilize personnel for the struggle for foremost units, for pledge fulfillment, for disseminating foremost experience and for popularizing outstanding personnel and rated specialists. Broad opportunities open up in this regard by implementation of the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "Improving the Organization and Practice of Summarizing Results of Socialist Competition and Rewarding Its Winners."

The end results of competition by military collectives are not equal. Some did not make full use of the capabilities of competition and did not organize it in the best manner. We have to take up the work in the new training year so that socialist competition occurring under the motto "Be on guard and in constant readiness to defend socialism's achievements!" serves as an important factor for further improving the quality of combat training and military proficiency.

Meaningful and purposeful ideological work is an important means for strengthening military discipline. The vivid and convincing explanation of demands of the USSR Constitution, the military oath and regulations, and propaganda of models of selfless performance of military duty make propaganda and agitation lively, convincing and genuinely effective. A better orientation on the struggle against violations of regulation demands and against other negative manifestations in the conduct of some servicemen is required of political entities and all ideological workers. Political indoctrination work acquires an especially spirited nature when it is conducted directly in the subunits, when it comes close to a specific person, and when it is combined with concern for every soldier and for providing him with all kinds of authorized allowances and medical services. Resolution of these matters has a very beneficial effect on development of a healthy moral climate in military collectives and on the establishment of an atmosphere of comradeship, friendship and mutual help in subunits.
There is one other sphere of ideological activity of which special mention should be made. We cannot forget for a moment the "psychological warfare" unprecedented in intensity, scale and unruiness which has been unfolded against us by world imperialism headed by the United States. The West is conducting it on the highest and most hysterical antisoviet note, and problems of waging counterpropaganda merit special attention in this regard. As Comrade Yu. V. Andropov stressed at the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, we need a well-conceived system of counterpropaganda which is dynamic and effective.

A study of the arrangement of counterpropaganda in a number of districts, groups of forces and fleets showed that attention to it has increased of late, but on the whole counterpropaganda work still lacks a comprehensive, system-oriented nature, a clear-cut structure of its conduct, a well-arranged feedback mechanism, and a detailed knowledge of public opinion and the real state of affairs in military collectives. Some presentations suffer by poor knowledge of the subject and the absence of persuasive arguments. A convincing demonstration of the great advantages of socialism, the vivid facets of the Soviet way of life and the historical purpose of the Armed Forces of the Land of Soviets contributes to an increase in the offensive nature of our propaganda and its influence on people's awareness and feelings.

The sharply aggravated world military-political situation and imperialism's development of "psychological warfare" against socialism makes it necessary to orient the commanders, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations on building up efforts in developing servicemen's political awareness, irreconcilability toward bourgeois views and customs, and an ability to withstand ideological subversion by the class enemy and the opportunistic and revisionist forays against real socialism.

The level of counterpropaganda depends largely on skilled use of daily programs of Central Television and All-Union Radio, and on the activation of work by cultural enlightenment establishments in this direction. Stricter control is needed here over the repertoire of movies shown on the Army screen, over the content of musical broadcasts and over the make-up of fictional holdings.

It appears necessary to work out more precisely at all levels of troop organization a system for studying public opinion: the collection and analysis of questions and the preparation of answers to them. Questions of interest to soldiers must be explained in our press and in verbal presentations by commanders, political workers and propagandists.

The preparation for elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet is the focus of attention for political entities and party organizations. This is a major event in the sociopolitical life of the Soviet state and it is important to use all means of ideological work to assure that the personnel are given a detailed explanation of the CPSU's managing and guiding work to strengthen national economic and defense might and improve the Soviet people's welfare, and an explanation of the historical achievements of developed socialism fixed in the USSR Constitution. More attention should be given to explaining the CPSU's Leninist policy of nationalities, steps taken by the party to further strengthen the friendship and fraternal unity of all nations and nationalities of our Motherland, and the importance of making military collectives cohesive.
An improvement in the effectiveness of ideological work in the Army and Navy is linked with the preparation of propaganda cadres. The make-up of T/O&E ideological workers has improved of late and there has been a determination of the procedure and sequence of their training and advanced training at courses for political personnel. On the whole, problems of the professional training of ideological cadres are being resolved successfully in the Army and Navy. The connection between their theoretical training and the specific missions facing units and ships is being reinforced. Fuller consideration should be given in this work to guidelines of the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum about bringing professional training closer to the current tasks of ideological practice and orienting the work of propaganda cadres at attaining high end results.

The leader's style is determining amidst all the diversity of various factors affecting servicemen's indoctrination. It is apropos to recall Lenin's statement about the importance of the Soviet leader's personal example: "If we conscientiously teach workers and peasants discipline, we are obliged to begin with ourselves."

Today the party is sharply posing the question of the leader's role in indoctrinating the masses and strengthening discipline. It requires that cadres execute their duty conscientiously and set a moral example for nonparty personnel, and it requires that party organizations perform a fundamental assessment of displays of conceit, haughtiness, crudity, and irreconcilability toward instances of an abuse of official position and violation of our moral standards.

The CPSU's demands for improving the level of party management and the party members' vanguard role directly in the collective obligate us to perform a steadfast search for more effective forms and methods of party work. We must achieve a further growth in initiative in the work of every primary party organization.

Unshakably true to Leninist tradition, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is reinforcing active, offensive ideological and political indoctrination work. It is the primary task of Army and Navy officer cadres to make their contribution to this work, to strengthen high political awareness among Soviet military personnel and develop their dedication to communism's great cause. The focus of their attention must be servicemen's indoctrination in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism and utter devotion to the socialist Motherland, an improvement in the quality of the personnel's combat and political training, and assurance of high discipline and military order. Military councils, commanders, political entities, party organizations and all Army and Navy party members are called upon to implement CPSU policy vigorously and persistently and to work steadily to fulfill guidelines of the 26th party congress for improving the Armed Forces' combat potential, reinforcing their indoctrinational role, and rallying and mobilizing the personnel for exemplary performance of missions in defense of our Motherland's state interests and socialism's historic achievements.
The Leninist party shows steadfast concern for the security of the Soviet land as it accomplishes the tasks of improving developed socialism. The ideological work it performs multiplies the spiritual forces of Soviet citizens and Army and Navy personnel and elevates their activeness in accomplishing creative tasks and strengthening national defense. These matters are constantly at the focus of attention of our party and its Central Committee. It is emphasized in the text of Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's speech at the December 1983 Central Committee Plenum that the 1984 plan envisages everything necessary for keeping national defense at the proper level.

In today's international situation the chief efforts of commanders, political entities, staffs and party organizations of our Armed Forces must be directed at steadfast fulfillment of resolutions of the 26th party congress and CPSU Central Committee Plenum and of directions by CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Comrade Yu. V. Andropov concerning defense matters; at a further strengthening of combat might; and at a comprehensive improvement in vigilance and readiness to repulse aggression and inflict damage on the aggressor under any condition where he unleashes a war.

The Armed Forces have everything necessary to attain new levels in the improvement of combat readiness. It is a matter of honor of commanders, political entities and party organizations to elevate the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination work in the Army and Navy to the level of our Leninist party's high demands.


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BOOK ON AMERICAN PROPAGANDA REVIEWED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 84 (signed to press 3 Jan 84) pp 90-92


[Text] Having provided a detailed analysis of the present situation, the 26th CPSU Congress and the June 1983 Party Central Committee Plenum stressed that ideological struggle in the world arena has become noticeably aggravated. For the sake of attaining their selfish goals, bourgeois ideologists are striving to use all means, from crude slander of socialism to the most refined falsification of Marxism-Leninism. "A struggle is going on for the hearts and minds of billions of people on the planet," remarked Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. "And mankind's future depends to no small extent on the outcome of this ideological struggle. Hence it is understandabe how exceptionally important it is to be able to present the truth about socialist society, its advantages and its peace policy in an intelligible and persuasive form to the broadest masses throughout the world. It is no less important to skillfully expose the false, subversive imperialist propaganda."

The collection of articles entitled "Pravda protiv demagogii i lzhi" published by Politizdat meets these requirements to a sufficient extent. Using specific facts, the collection's authors expose the aggressive essence of imperialism headed by the United States and the goals and methods of widespread ideological subversion which imperialist propaganda centers are carrying out against countries of socialism and all forces of social progress.

The collection opens with an article about aggravation of ideological struggle in the world arena and the importance of workers' political indoctrination. On the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology it comprehensively examines the deep-seated reasons which prompted the U.S. ruling class to place the Reagan government, the most conservative in the postwar period, at the state helm,
where on coming to power it undertook new, massive ideological attacks against socialism. These reasons include a further sharp aggravation of the capitalist economic crisis, a series of U.S. foreign policy defeats, growing contradictions in the imperialist camp, the aggravation of economic competition and the appearance of new centers of power. The article notes that under these conditions U.S. ruling circles advanced the task of shoring up the shaky American leadership in the capitalist world by pursuing a dual goal: to satisfy their own selfish interests and to consolidate the imperialist front for a struggle against socialism and the national liberation movement.

The collection shows the essential differences between ideological struggle and "psychological warfare"; the objectives, content, methods and basic directions of present-day anticomunist and antisoviet propaganda; and the tasks of our ideological work under today's international conditions, which largely pose in a new way problems of workers' political indoctrination and give this special significance.

Against a broad background of contemporary events, the authors thoroughly examine in the book the material, political and ideological support to the new "crusade" against communism announced by U.S. President Reagan, the chief direction of which, as emphasized by CPSU CC Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense Gen SU D. F. Ustinov in his briefing at the unified political day of the USSR Ministry of Defense central apparatus on 11 November 1983, to use all measures to ensure readiness to "destroy socialism." This essentially is ideological aggression, which is in flagrant contradiction with international law, the UN Charter and the Helsinki Accord, signed, as we know, by the U.S. president as well.

In declaring the "crusade," R. Reagan declaimed not at all for competition against real socialism in the sphere of ideas and social practice, but for a confrontation with it, for the West's "right" to intervene openly in the internal affairs of countries of the socialist community for the purpose of changing the system existing there. "Let's stop vacillating," demanded the present White House proprietor before the British Parliament in June 1982, "Let's take advantage of our might to see that "Marxism-Leninism is left on the ash-heap of history." As we can see, there is an appeal to brute force in place of ideas and arguments.

Being in no position to justify, by any intelligent argument, the course aimed at breaking American-Soviet relations, the unwinding of a new spiral in the arms race, and U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, U.S. ruling circles are whipping up world tensions and accompanying this with crude anticomunism and anticomunism.

In intentionally avoiding an honest, constructive discussion of thorny problems, U.S. ruling circles have begun "psychological warfare" against the Soviet Union and are trying to achieve satisfaction of their imperial ambitions through force.

The present round in this warfare is characterized by an attempt of the imperialist special services for a deeper and more many-sided penetration into the
social structures of socialist countries. Active searches are under way for "vulnerable" spots in their economy, politics and ideology for concentrated actions with the aim of a direct destabilization of the political situation. This specific feature is seen clearly today, for example, in attempts to tie nuclear blackmail closely with political and economic acts against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which is thoroughly covered in this collection.

The book analyzes the goals, forms and methods of "psychological warfare," its ideological arsenal and, most important, its influence on White House military-political decisions. The collection's authors convincingly show that the "psychological warfare" which Washington has unleashed today is not only a means for propaganda support to imperialism's foreign-policy strategy, but also an independent factor in undermining detente and whipping up tensions. Having its point directed against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, this warfare presents a danger to the entire world and is capable of damaging mutual relationships of the nations of all continents.

The system of propaganda measures which U.S. imperialism is carrying out today represents nothing more than psychological preparation for nuclear warfare. Proclamation of a new strategy aimed at conducting "limited" nuclear war, development of plans to reinforce all components of the so-called "triad" of strategic arms (ground-based missiles, missiles aboard submarines, and heavy bombers), NATO's decision on stationing American medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of West European countries, the beginning of neutron weapon production, attempts to shift the arms race into space, and the decision about mass production of new kinds of chemical weapons as well as other actions of a military-strategic nature are receiving corresponding political-psychological and propaganda support.

Military blackmail, saber-rattling, and the fanning of war hysteria have become the alpha and omega of U.S. official documents and speeches by American leaders. The world public has heard from them that there are things "more important than peace" in the world; that nuclear war is not so terrible, and it can be waged and won; that the Soviet Union has a choice: either change its system or be doomed to a devastating war; that the United States will carry out a "demonstrative" nuclear explosion in case anything happens in order to deter enemies, and so on.

And so a militaristic, anticommuist course above all is inherent to today's foreign policy propaganda of imperialism.

In analyzing the class roots of Reagan's militaristic course, the collection's authors draw a substantiated conclusion that psychological preparations for nuclear war which the United States has unfolded across the planet and attempts to accustom people to the thought of its possibility and admissibility do not at all bear a situational character, and that the whipping up of war hysteria will continue as American military programs are carried out. At the same time, it is also obvious that along with long-term goals, American imperialist propaganda, actively supported by circles of the monopolistic
bourgeoisie of Western Europe closely connected with the United States, is setting for itself the task of justifying and substantiating Washington's irreconcilable position regarding a dialogue with the Soviet Union. This also is attested by numerous facts contained in the Statement by CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov dated 24 November 1983. This Statement, which is imbued with deep concern over world destiny, gives a fundamental assessment of the course being taken in international affairs by the present U.S. administration as a militaristic course representing a serious threat for mankind. It was stressed once more very forcefully in the Statement that the Soviet Union's foreign policy is aimed at preserving and strengthening the peace, at relaxing tensions, at curbing the arms race and at widening and deepening cooperation among states.

The imperialists headed by the United States are conducting a different policy in international affairs. They are imposing on mankind not only a new spiral in the arms race, but a new spiral of "psychological warfare." Imperialist powers have formed a powerful foreign propaganda apparatus to spread various kinds of myths which cloud the true meaning of imperialist intentions and which lull nations' vigilance. The chief place in the "ideological crusade" against real socialism and the role of director of the anticommunist, anti-soviet band rests with the United States. The collection's authors use specific facts and examples to thoroughly expose the structure, forms and methods in the work of the foreign propaganda mechanism of the United States and other leading NATO countries. In analyzing the systems of these "institutions," the authors clearly define their purpose as playing the role of an ideological battering-ram on the fields of "psychological warfare."

The book provides a comprehensive description of all elements of the notorious U.S. "intelligence community," coordinated and directed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the book reveals the meaning of this organization's formation and existence, which is intended to remake the world in the American image. It maintains a secret body of associates in all countries who arrange political and economic subversion and the murder of figures unsuitable to the White House, and who supply arms to reactionary regimes.

Using persuasive facts little known to the broad circle of readers, the authors reveal ominous plans and subversive work of imperialist states against the USSR, Poland, Cuba, Afghanistan, Angola, Lebanon, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Namibia, Zimbabwe and other countries. These facts show in detail how the CIA uses for its dirty purposes so-called "prisoners of conscience" allegedly persecuted in the USSR.

All this cannot help but generate a feeling of anger in honest people, but particular indignation arises over the fact that aggressive forces and warmongers act as petitioners for fascist criminals who have the blood of millions of people on their hands. In showing disrespect for general human morality and violating international laws and pledges they have assumed, aggressive circles (in the United States above all) are hypocritically trying to prove that the problems of war criminals no longer exist. Genuine light is shed on the position of protectors of the Nazi "fat-cats" by numerous
evidences of their active use for the purpose of anticommunist hysteria and for "psychological warfare" against the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist countries.

The collection of articles abounds in many other examples and facts of subversive work by propaganda departments of the leading imperialist states and their mass media.

It should be emphasized that the entire book is written from a position of Leninist party spirit, in an offensive spirit, in a spirit of irreconcilability toward imperialist ideology of diktat and war. The arguments, facts, historical analogs and, finally, the journalistic style give this publication special persuasiveness and topicality.

Filled with abundant factual material, the collection also is not devoid of some shortcomings. The fact that one and the same problem at times is covered in several articles (although in various aspects) presents a certain inconvenience for the reader. Perhaps the question of the arrangement of material under a different, problem-oriented principle should be thought out in further work on such publications. This would help eliminate a shortcoming so difficult to remove with the existing structure of the book such as repetitions of analogous thoughts.

On the whole, however, this collection merits a high appraisal. It draws one by the vastness and diversity of accurate information, by a class and party approach to the evaluation of phenomena, and by the depth and persuasiveness of arguments. The publication unquestionably will help commanders, political workers and propagandists in the work of exposing imperialism's ideological subversion and developing in soldiers a high political vigilance.


6904
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EFFECT OF MILITARY THEORY ON COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 84 (signed to press 3 Jan 84) pp 25-32

[Article by Col G. Lukava, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "Soviet Military Science and Combat Readiness"]

[Text] We live in a troubled time, and the reason for this is the openly aggressive course by imperialism's forces headed by the United States, which have unfolded an arms race unprecedented in tempo and scope and which are conducting direct preparations for a nuclear war. The goal of the build-up in these military preparations by imperialism is to attain military superiority over the USSR and other Warsaw Pact nations and then, by threatening them with military force, to provide oneself with undivided world domination.

But no one has the power to turn the course of history backward. The Soviet Union and its true friends and allies—countries of the socialist community—are living and will live according to their own laws, laws of the most advanced socialist system. The military might of socialism and high combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, which stand vigilantly on guard over the historical achievements of nations and peace on earth together with other armies of Warsaw Pact nations, serve as a reliable guarantor of this.

A further development of military theory is one of the basic factors for strengthening Army and Navy combat readiness. Lenin's statement that it is impossible to build a modern army without science now acquires special significance in the era of rapid scientific-technical progress. In the elaboration of complicated issues of military affairs, military-theoretical thinking is a reliable reference point in the practical work of our military cadres and arms them with foremost views on organizational development and training of the Armed Forces.

USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov emphasizes that for all Armed Forces personnel the chief issue among those of primary importance is the "issue of improving combat readiness of units [soyedineniye and chast']. This
is our chief task and our purpose. It is written in the Soviet state's Constitution and all our duty and all our thoughts and actions must be subordinated to accomplishing it. Combat training, the performance of interior and guard duties, the state of military discipline, soldiers' conduct in and out of formation, and party-political work—in short, all our activity—must be evaluated through the prism of this task."

Combat readiness is that status of the Army and Navy which assures their immediate entry into military actions at any moment and in any situation and successful performance of assigned missions to repulse and resolutely defeat aggressor forces.

The category of "combat readiness" is closely connected with such categories of military science as "combat capabilities" ("combat potential"), "combat effectiveness," "survivability" and "combat actions of troops (naval forces)." At the same time it is also important to see the distinction among these categories, which allows fuller identification of reserves for improving combat readiness, and above all by reducing the time periods for placing troops on a wartime footing and by increasing the reliability of their prompt performance of combat missions.

The category of "combat capabilities" and "combat potential" reveals the capability of the Armed Forces to conduct successful offensive and defensive actions. The combat capabilities of Army and Navy forces are realized by means of combat effectiveness, combat readiness and the conduct of combat actions.

Combat effectiveness is a qualitative and quantitative descriptor of the troops which reflects the extent to which their combat capabilities are realized. Combat effectiveness is determined by the extent to which Army and Navy forces are up to strength, their technical outfitting, level of training, the personnel's moral—combat qualities, state of supply, the art of control, and knowledge of the enemy. Consequently, combat effectiveness is the foundation and basis of combat readiness. Survivability is in turn the heart of combat effectiveness. This is the troops' ability to withstand the effects of enemy weapons, to maintain their combat effectiveness at a certain level, and restore it quickly in case it drops.

The second element in realizing the combat capabilities of Army and Navy forces is their combat readiness. And finally, the third and highest element in realizing the Armed Forces' combat capabilities is the conduct of combat actions (the combat factor).

Combat readiness thus is a connecting link between potential combat might (combat potential) and actual combat might (the combat factor). There is a perceptible trend in military affairs today for bringing the elements of combat potential as close as possible to elements of the combat factor thanks to high combat readiness. USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov points out that "the capability of the Army and Navy to realize this potential quickly and to the fullest extent for repulsing possible aggression is
reflected in their constant, high combat readiness, which is determined above all by the quality of the personnel's field, naval and air schooling, the extent of their mastery of weapons and combat equipment, the level of moral-political conditioning, discipline and efficiency of Army and Navy forces, and the art of command and control."

The effect of military theory on combat readiness has two aspects, the first of which is connected with the troops' combat might (forecasting the strategic nature and content of wars, studying the changes occurring in armed forces of aggressive powers and in methods of their combat actions, determining the composition of the Soviet Armed Forces for repulsing aggression and defeating its instigators, and improving the organizational structure, logistical support, methods of waging warfare, command and control, and the training of military cadres). The second aspect concerns the very process of maintaining constant combat readiness. In studying these interrelated aspects of improving combat readiness, military science arms officer cadres with fundamentals of the foremost theory of military art, its principles, and specific strategic and operational-tactical recommendations.

Let us examine some directions of the effect of military-theoretical thought on the Armed Forces' combat readiness. The most important direction is the forecasting of the strategic nature and content of wars which may be unleashed by imperialism's aggressive forces. The growing complexity of processes occurring both in social development as a whole and in military affairs demands that Soviet military science delve more deeply into the character, outlines and features of modern war and identification of the mechanism by which the laws of war are manifested, and that it constantly and comprehensively interpret the patterns and development trends of arms and methods of conducting military actions.

Proper foresight into the nature of modern war and methods by which it is unleashed by aggressors make up the basis for long-range organizational development of the Armed Forces and their preparation for reliable defense of socialism's achievements.

A detailed study of changes occurring in armed forces of aggressive states and in their practice of preparing and conducting military actions is no less important a direction of military science which has a noticeable effect on troop combat readiness. Lenin provided the logic for approaching a solution of this problem in the work entitled "The Children's Disease of 'Leftism' in Communism": "Anyone will agree that the conduct of an army which is not ready to master all kinds of weapons and all means and tactics of warfare which the enemy has or may have is unwise or even criminal" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XLI, 81).

A prominent place among measures assuring knowledge of probable enemies lies with a study of experience in their conduct of wars, including local wars. It was F. Engels who noted in the work "Algeria" the importance of combat experience for servicemen. In particular, he pointed out that "Algeria was made only a military school for French generals and soldiers, in which all French
officers who won laurels in the Crimean War underwent military training and acquired their experience" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], XIV, 104).

In the monograph entitled "European Civilizers and Morocco," written in 1925 on the heels of the heroic struggle by this country's people against French imperialism, M. V. Frunze sets forth propositions which retain their importance even today: "In addition to the general political importance, the war in Morocco also presents much purely military interest. Here, for the first time after the World War, we have the experience of military operations conducted on a rather broad scale and with the use of all the latest equipment. With all its narrowness, one-sidedness and limitation, this experience can provide much useful material for judging the nature of future mass military operations of modern armies. The role of a 'living force' and 'equipment,' the relative importance of individual combat arms, questions of a maneuverable or static nature, war and politics, and so on, receive a large amount of new, specific data in light of this experience which facilitate their elaboration. It is clear from what has been said as to the vast and diverse material which a study of the experience of the Moroccan war can provide for our military thinking."

It is noteworthy that the imperialists employ almost all combat arms and all kinds of weapons in contemporary local wars. Areas of combat operations are turned into ranges for testing the latest models of military equipment, and in these wars the aggressors use cruel and inhuman methods and means of warfare. A study of military operations reveals a trend toward an expansion in the scope of local wars and aggravation of the struggle in them, which leads to the increased danger that local wars will develop into a world war.

Certain new points are observed in the methods of conducting combat actions. The experience of local wars of the 1970's shows the promise of troop maneuver by air. Where it is very difficult and at times impossible to go over the ground, the maneuver of troops by air provided an opportunity to shift them rapidly to the necessary area for subsequent attacks on the enemy. Great importance is attached to tactical amphibious landings, the mission of which can be the capture and holding of areas and beachheads on shore, water crossings and road junctions in the depth of enemy defenses until the arrival of the main body of friendly forces advancing by land.

Of great importance for analyzing changes occurring in imperialist armies is the study of the experience of their conduct of military exercises. For example, from year to year the NATO command continues to build up the scope and number of major troop and naval maneuvers and command and staff exercises held annually in various bloc countries. A particularly large number of these exercises take place in Central Europe, and on FRG territory above all. As a rule, a large number of troops (over 30,000) and a large amount of combat equipment of all branches of armed forces participate in them, and variants for preparing, unleashing and waging an aggressive war in Europe against Warsaw Pact states are practiced. This takes place near the borders of countries of the socialist community (10-15 km from the GDR and Czechoslovakia),
it bears a clearly provocative nature, and it is aimed at increasing interna-
tional tension. An analysis of these exercises permits drawing the conclusion
that NATO bloc armed forces are capable of beginning widescale aggression
against countries of the socialist community without an operational pause.

Having begun the deployment of American medium range missiles in Western
Europe, the United States and NATO now have sharply aggravated the interna-
tional situation. Drawing conclusions from the situation at hand, military
science places higher demands on the level of combat readiness of the Soviet
Armed Forces and develops recommendations for improving their command and con-
trol and their technical outfitting.

The substantial influence of military theory on combat readiness of Army and
Navy forces is manifested in the long-term determination of the quantitative
and qualitative composition of the Armed Forces, in an elaboration of ques-
tions of their optimal, flexible and mobile organizational structure, and in
assuring the harmonious development of all branches and combat arms and their
advisable combination in the overall Army and Navy system. The forms for
optimum coordination of structural elements of the Armed Forces and for pre-
serving at the same time their relative independence in the interests of
effective performance of general strategic missions are important here.

Military science also influences combat readiness of the Armed Forces through
a determination of the directions for outfitting the Army and Navy with per-
spective weapons and combat equipment. It is important to consider here that
along with the determining trend—the improvement in mass destruction
weapons—there also exists another trend—the improvement in conventional
weapons. In setting as their goal the attainment of military supremacy over
the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, U.S. ruling circles
above all are speeding up the build-up in strategic offensive forces. These
include the new Ohio Class strategic nuclear submarines, the MX and Midgetman
intercontinental ballistic missiles, the B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers,
the Shuttle multipurpose space system, long-range air-, sea- and ground-based
cruise missiles and other weapons. At the same time the United States is
unfolding the process of improving conventional weapons, which relates to the
creation of aircraft carriers, the development of antitank guided missiles
(PTUR), surface to air missile systems (ZRK), tanks with stabilizers and laser
weapon guidance devices, supersonic aircraft, and other modern types of weap-
ons and combat equipment.

Considering the increased aggressiveness of imperialism, Soviet military
science is doing everything necessary not to give it an opportunity to achieve
military-technical superiority over socialism. Soviet military science is
taking a comprehensive approach to the improvement of arms and equipment and
to the forecasting of their potential capabilities.

The theory of military art exerts great influence on combat readiness of the
Armed Forces by developing forms and methods of warfare. F. Engels' thesis is
the basis for a correct understanding of this problem: "The entire organiza-
tion of armies and their method of conducting combat, and victories and
defeats along with this, are dependent on material, i.e., economic, conditions: on human material and on weapons, and consequently on the quality and numbers of the population and on equipment" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya," XX, 175).

Man has a deciding role to play in war. This truth has been, is and will remain immutable for military science. It always has been and is the basis of its recommendations for building our Army and Navy and improving their combat readiness. In elaborating the theory of training and indoctrination of Soviet military personnel, our military thinking stresses that under present-day conditions soldiers are required not only to have great knowledge and proficiency, but also high spiritual qualities, firm ideological conditioning, staunchness, political awareness, a detailed understanding of their missions, and the ability to withstand unprecedented moral-psychological and physical stresses and preserve the will to fight and win under all conditions.

In emphasizing the determining influence of personnel and military equipment on methods of warfare, Soviet military thinking also examines the relative independence of the development of forms of military actions, and it improves them actively. For example, at the present time forms and methods of modern strategic military actions have seen further development. Operations by a group of fronts, which originated during the Great Patriotic War, have been developed further of late. The command element of fronts may have at their disposal those weapons (missiles, missile-armed aircraft, aircraft with a large radius of action, and others) with combat capabilities which already have considerably exceeded the bounds of front operations. Troop mobility and maneuverability has increased sharply, time periods for the concentration of attack groupings have been reduced, and there have been changes in the conditions and methods of accomplishing operational and strategic missions by large units [soyedineniye] and formations [ob"yedineniye] of branches of the armed forces. With the establishment of strategic nuclear forces, the supreme military leadership receives the opportunity of substantially affecting the attainment of strategic and military-political goals of war. In connection with this it is obviously no longer the front operation which should be viewed as the basic operation of modern war, but a form of military actions on a larger scale—the strategic operation in a theater of military operations. During such an operation every front or fleet may conduct two or more front operations consecutively, with or even without brief pauses.

For example, in elaborating problems of the encounter battle and meeting engagement, military-theoretical thinking shows the conditions for their appearance and conduct, the typical features, sequence of development, and troop missions. A decisive defeat may be inflicted on the encounter grouping not during their direct clash, but back in the period of approach. In this situation military science stresses the importance of commanders at all levels displaying initiative, persistence and resolve in implementing the decisions which have been made.

Studies conducted by military theory have introduced much that is new to the process of employing naval forces as well. Forms and methods of their strategic and operational employment and the tactical methods and tactics of
employing submarines with missile and torpedo weaponry, naval aviation, surface combatants of various types, naval infantry units and other forces in combat operations have been developed.

A special role belongs to military doctrine and to normative-legal control documents (combined-arms and combat regulations, manuals, instructions, orders and directives) in the mechanism by which military science influences combat readiness of Army and Navy forces. For example, field manuals are a concentration of military thought, the integration of its fundamental provisions, and a form of concentration and concretization of military knowledge. Being a juridical fixation of fundamental provisions of military science, they assure a scientific level and purposefulness in management of troop combat activity. Both the combat experience gained in armed struggle against enemies and the experience of Army and Navy life and work in the postwar period are collected and scientifically grounded in them. They provide scientifically grounded recommendations on ways and methods of accomplishing combat missions, effective organization of combat and political training, reinforcement of military discipline and maintenance of high combat readiness.

An in-depth elaboration of problems of command and control of the Armed Forces, formations, large units, units and ships is an extremely important direction in military science's influence on troop combat readiness. For example, studies connected with the effect of combat readiness on the transformation of combat potential into a combat factor as well as elaborations devoted to continuity, survivability, effectiveness, concealment of command and control in warfare, a combination of centralism and decentralism in command and control, and automation of control over troop combat actions, and the development of strategic and operational-tactical thinking of our military cadres are of a current nature.

A substantial influence is exerted on combat readiness of the Armed Forces by military science, including the history of wars and military art, by its elaboration of problems of troop combat readiness and studies of its inner logic, relative independence, interrelationships and component elements. These issues include in particular the methodology of planning combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces, a substantiation of methods for continuously maintaining constant troop readiness to perform combat missions, methods for advisable troop disposition, and ways of reliably screening state borders, which today are examined by combat readiness theory.

A feature of this theory is the fact that on the one hand it is included in the theory of national military readiness and, on the other hand, it is a part of the theory of military art (in a certain sense, this is its summary section).

The theory of Armed Forces combat readiness is a system of categories, laws, principles and propositions revealing the optimal status of the Army and Navy in which the disruption and defeat of any aggression is assured. It includes, for example, a category such as "operational readiness duty" and takes account of the effect of laws of the dependence of the course and outcome of armed
struggle on the level of troop combat readiness, and the relationship of the level of troop readiness to perform combat missions to the level of development of the philosophy of military art. We will also emphasize the significance of such principles of Armed Forces combat readiness theory as, for example, the preeminence of the political approach in resolving tasks of maintaining combat readiness; the comprehensive approach to the structure of combat readiness; continuity in maintaining troop readiness for immediate accomplishment of combat missions; the advisable troop disposition; reliable screening of state borders; and practical troop training to work out actions in response to a combat alert.

Combat readiness in turn exerts an active reverse influence on the development of military thinking. A careful analysis of the process of maintaining high combat readiness of the Armed Forces and of the forms for checking it provides an opportunity to identify new trends in the development of military art and to see, for example, the growing dependency of the course and outcome of war on preparatory measures preceding the beginning of combat actions.

An improvement in the role and a change in the content of combat readiness have made substantial adjustments to the conceptual matter of the leading component of military science—the theory of military art—and to the system of categories which it uses to explain the process of preparation and conduct of armed struggle. For example, the content of the categories "army offensive operation" and "front offensive operation" recreates new objective points of the preparation, course and outcome of operations of these scales. In contrast to the past, the level of combat readiness of troops participating in army and front operations provides not only for the successive defeat of the enemy, but also his simultaneous defeat.

High troop combat readiness expands the possibilities of an operational redeployment—the movement of formations (large units) from certain areas to others to form a new grouping and to shift operational efforts to another axis. Under present-day conditions an operational redeployment may be carried out before the beginning of an offensive or defensive operation as well as while it is being conducted or at the end of the operation in shorter time periods than in the past. All these new points have enriched the content of the category of "operational grouping."

In generalizing phenomena connected with maintaining high combat readiness, military science recommends that primary attention be given during combat training to developing the troops' offensive spirit, high activeness, persistence, and the ability to function skillfully under the most difficult conditions and in the presence of exposed flanks and zones of contamination and devastation. This will allow achieving surprise and swiftness of attack, a skillful combination of fire and movement, creation of superiority over the enemy, the execution of a flexible maneuver of forces and means, and preempting the enemy in opening fire and delivering attacks, and it will provide an opportunity to function successfully in any situation day or night, summer or winter, with the employment of various weapons.
The work of military scientists alone is insufficient for effective resolution of the many-sided tasks of Soviet military science. The inclusion in this process of representatives of all elements of the system for maintaining combat readiness is acquiring more and more importance. The enrichment of military thinking with new propositions and the embodiment of theoretical developments into practice are accomplished during the work of military leaders, staffs, political entities, military scientific research and educational institutions, and all Army and Navy personnel. Officers at practically all levels of the Army and Navy organism are showing a growing interest in military-theoretical knowledge and scientific research methods, and they are carrying on a creative search for the most effective forms and methods of mastering modern weapons and making maximum use of their capabilities, and of the best methods for conducting combat actions.

A growth in the level of military-theoretical and professional-technical training of officer cadres and all personnel contributes to a further improvement in the results of this work. In an integral combination with a constant perfection of Army and Navy technical outfitting, this growth facilitates a steady improvement in combat readiness of the Armed Forces and a strengthening of national defense.

Development of the personnel's confidence in the superiority of Soviet military science over bourgeois military theory and an awareness of the need for precise, mandatory fulfillment of propositions of the science of winning fixed in military manuals is a most important duty and a pivotal direction in the work of commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations and all Armed Forces personnel.

Broad opportunities to do this are presented by the Marxist-Leninist training of officers, generals and admirals; the political studies of warrant officers; political classes with privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers; theoretical and practical science conferences; briefings and talks; personnel meetings; and individual work with soldiers.

Commanders and chiefs at all levels play a deciding role in implementing the provisions of Soviet military science in everyday life and in the process of maintaining high combat readiness. In organizing combat and political training and the personnel's duty on the basis of the demands of military science and military regulations, these commanders and chiefs see to it that servicemen not only thoroughly assimilate these demands, but also are guided strictly by them in life and practical work.

Party and Komsomol organizations are a reliable support to commanders in the struggle to implement the provisions of military science and regulation demands, contributing to this by having party and Komsomol members set the example in fulfilling provisions of military regulations and commanders' orders and instructions, as well as by many-sided indoctrinational work. An area of special attention of the party and Komsomol organizations is their concern for broadening the military-theoretical and operational-tactical outlook of officers and improving their level of applied military training.

Soviet military science is an important factor in strengthening the country's defensive might and maintaining high combat readiness of the Armed Forces. A detailed study of the provisions of military science and their extensive implementation serve as a guarantee for new successes in further increasing the combat readiness of Army and Navy forces.


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MILITARY SCIENCE

ARMY PAPER EXAMINES ELECTROMAGNETIC GUN RESEARCH

PM011249 [Editorial Report]  Moscow, KRASTAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 February 1984 second edition publishes on page 3, under the headline "Electromagnetic, Guns; We Describe at Readers' Request," a 1,000-word article by doctor of technical sciences, Prof Colonel Engineer (Reserve) V. Malikov, in reply to a reader's letter requesting information about U.S. research into electromagnetic guns. Malikov says that "in the opinion of official Pentagon spokesmen, such guns can be used not just as tank, antiaircraft and antitank weapons, but also as means of delivering material and technical supplies to troops on the battlefield and also for launching missiles," and that they are "destined to replace conventional artillery systems in the future" because electromagnetic systems ensure greater initial velocity than conventional systems. However, Malikov concludes, foreign observers note that their are "still problems" in the development of electromagnetic systems, such as the "need for large power sources" and "new materials...able to withstand great mechanical and electrical loads."

CSO: 1801/262
PLANNED MILITARY-PATRIOTIC EDUCATIONAL REFORMS EXAMINED

Medical Releases From Physical Exercises Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 84   p 2

[Article by Col (Reserve) O. Volkov in the column 'We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms': "Excuses Instead of Knowledge"]

[Text] The editors are receiving responses to the CPSU Central Committee's "Main Directions for Reforming the General Education and Trade Schools." They show that this important party document is being discussed with interest in the teacher collectives, in the family and by the general public. It has drawn the attention of commanders, political workers, professors and instructors at military educational institutions—all those who carry the baton of training and indoctrination in our school.

The following is one of the reactions to the plan.

Since being discharged into the reserve I have taught military training and physical education at one of Kharkov's secondary schools. Naturally, in the CPSU Central Committee's plan for reforming the schools I was especially interested in the statements to the effect that our youth must grow up not only literate, but also physically developed, healthy, happy and prepared to work and to defend the homeland.

Is everything in order in this matter? Unfortunately, not everything. Our school children include outstanding athletes, European and world champions. We are proud of this. At the other pole, so to speak, however, we find graduates of both rural and urban secondary schools who cannot perform the simplest exercises on the gymnastic equipment and cannot run the cross-country distance or toss a grenade the required distance. The school unreservedly accepts responsibility for the fact that some of its graduates have not mastered Archimedes' Law, but it is still little troubled by the fact that some of the students—future soldiers and sailors—cannot stay up in the water.

In connection with this I must point out the trend whereby the percentage of students exempted by doctors from performing the exercises in physical culture
and initial military training is increasing by the year at our school (my colleagues tell me that the situation is the same in other schools). I would mention the fact that excuses are issued at the parents' first request. But some fathers and mothers simply want to create hothouse conditions for their heirs not just at home but at school as well, to relieve them of the need to spend time on what they consider to be secondary subjects.

I have before me the last such excuse, dated December of last year. The doctors were exempting a young person who had injured his head in 1968, from the exercises in physical education and initial military training. But the injury, of which not a trace remains, is not preventing the student from advancing in mathematics. Another student, excused from the "extra exertion," finds the strength and the time to study music intensively.

Naturally, the teachers are required to work hand in hand with the doctors to protect the children with poor health from too great a load. Even in medical treatment facilities, however, physical culture is prescribed within the limits of their capabilities for recovering patients. Why, then, can a teacher, professionally trained and competent in his work, not select appropriate exercises and a workload with the doctor's help for those who require individual treatment? How could we fail to mention what Comrade Yu.V. Andropov had to say at the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "The individual should know his body from an early age and be able to maintain it properly."

When they attempt to have a son or daughter exempted from certain exercises, the parent are unfortunately not thinking about the fact that they are thereby isolating the son or daughter from the group and frequently creating an inferiority complex in the adolescents.

The classes in initial military training are important for all the students—and I underscore: for all the students. I would even say that they are doubly important for those who for reasons of health will not be performing the honored duty of the fightingmen. They will have some sort of military knowledge, even if only within the limits of the school program. It is the sacred, constitutional duty of every citizen to protect our socialist homeland.

In short, in the process of effecting the school reforms, we should specify that the years of youth are to be used to the maximum possible degree to strengthen health, physical conditioning and all-round readiness for labor and defense of the homeland.

**Military Career Orientation Wanting**

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Lt Col (Reserve) K. Bykov in the column "We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "Orient Correctly"]

[Text] The class instructor attended one of my talks with the upper-classmen on the officer's heroic profession. I wanted to learn the opinion of the veteran teacher and methods expert about whether the talk had been successful, whether I had been able to make the students think.
"Don't be offended," the class instructor said, "but in my opinion it was not entirely successful. You discussed well and convincingly the fact that the officer's profession is one of the most interesting and romantic. But did you have to remind them that this profession also involves certain hardships and deprivations? This might create doubts as to whether they are choosing the right path in life."

According to that, one may only speak of the attractive aspects of this or that career when talking with the young men and women setting out in life. The discussion of the difficulties involved should be postponed. Is this right? I am convinced that it is not.

A young person sometimes goes to a large construction project, having heard accounts of the beauty of the area, of the "fragrance of the taiga." He returns 2 or 3 weeks later. It turns out that he did not know about such a "detail" as life in railcars. And doesn't the military school deal with similar situations? Yes, the youth still likes the attractive cadet uniform, but as for the daily schedule, discipline, regulation relationships, field exercises.... He was not prepared for this.

Some people might find my reasoning oversimplified. It is derived from life, however. The military schools have the opportunity to select candidates for training at the distant approaches—with the help of the military commissariats. Nonetheless, we are still not managing to avoid failures among the cadets (especially in the first year). These are most frequently people who knew only about the romantic side of the military service and the officer's career but had no idea of the demands made of the individual.

It is the task of the teacher, I believe, to correctly orient the youth, not to be afraid to tell them about the difficulties without which life is inconceivable, to generate in the minds and hearts of the young people a desire to struggle, a desire to be at the forward edge, there where not merely knowledge is needed, but strong character as well.

This is precisely the way it is put in the CPSU Central Committee's plan: "Main Directions for Reforming the General Education and Trade Schools." More than once I have read with great interest the section on labor indoctrination, training and career orientation. All of the teachers at our school support the points in the plan about stepping up the work of the interdepartmental councils and the city and rayon commissions on career orientation for the youth, and about the creation of experimental career orientation centers in a number of cities and rural rayons. I believe that the system for orienting the youth toward a military career also needs to be improved.

The Suvorov Military Schools and the Nakhimov Naval Schools are producing excellent replenishments for the higher military school. But this is just a drop in bucket, as they say. When we define the labor orientation of the secondary, general education schools, why not also provide for schools with a military career orientation. Specifically, this could be done with the schools serving large military posts and certain boarding schools with the students specially selected. Everything which the CPSU Central Committee's plan says about organizing the labor preparation and indoctrination of the students could be realized
in schools of this type. Each of them would have close ties with a principal military unit. Experienced methods experts from among the commanders, political workers and service specialists would take part in the training and indoctrination process along with the teachers. All of the elective work would be designed to prepare the students for military service or for training at military schools.

Along with this, we need to show greater concern for creating a good physical plant for the initial military training at all general education and trade schools. This does not depend entirely upon the military instructor or the teaching staff. This is the 4th year I have taught military affairs at Secondary School 141 in Minsk. It is a newly constructed school, and all of my efforts to obtain the authorized equipment, without which it is impossible to cover the initial military training program well, were fruitless. The school has no practice hand grenades, practice cartridges or magazines for the sub-machine guns, and it lacks the supplies necessary for teaching the subjects in civil defense and medical training. It seems to me that the following should be added to Point 17, Section III, of the CPSU Central Committee's plan: "Universally create the materials and equipment base essential for a good mastery of the fundamentals of military affairs."

We are not managing to establish good ties with the military unit designated as sponsor for the school. It turns out that the unit was already sponsoring some schools. In short, there is not enough clarity and definiteness in this matter either. The sponsorship ties between the military collectives and the schools need to be further developed and perfected.

The CPSU Central Committee's plan for school reforms call for extensive changes in the process of educating and indoctrinating the upcoming generation. Increasing the personal responsibility to society, active participation in the national, creative work, a high level of discipline, collectivism, mutual demandingsness and comradely support.... All of this will undoubtedly help to better prepare the youth for military service, prepare them to fulfill their sacred constitutional duty to defend the socialist homeland. As a veteran of the Armed Forces, I say this with profound satisfaction.

Training for Common Occupations Deficient

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Dmitriyev, deputy Sretenskiy Rayon military commissar, Chita Oblast, in the column "We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "Without Simplifications"]

[Text] I have noticed that a considerable portion of the youth in school associate the term "general occupations" with the concept of simple, easy-to-acquire jobs which require no special ability and can be mastered without effort. But this is certainly not so. General occupations mean prevalent occupations, very necessary to the national economy. As a military man, I would add: in many cases, also to the Armed Forces. I recall a rejoinder I heard from a regular worker at one of the plants. He said approximately the following: You have to study hard at an institute 5 years in order to receive an engineer's diploma. It takes just as much to become a lathe operator, who receives personal assignments from the
shop chief and whom the plant director addresses with his first name and patronymic. I believe that this reasoning is valid.

I needed this introduction in order to express my opinion on the nature of the labor preparation of students at general education schools and their job orientation. We cannot permit students who have not mastered practical skills and abilities in a specific specialty to receive a labor skills certification despite this fact. We must protect the prestige of the general occupations and real work skills. Only that individual who can pass a rigid exam and can perform well all of the duties involved in the chosen specialty is entitled to receive a certificate stating that he possesses the proper job training. This approach requires that the schools, the base enterprises, the ispkoms of city and rayon soviets and finally, the students themselves, handle the job training without simplifications. After all, the effectiveness of the national economy, the quality of the industrial products, the return from the fields and farms and possibilities in the service area depend upon the competence of the regular workers and upon their job skills. The amount of time required to master the military specialties, the combat equipment and weapons, and the combat readiness of the units and ships depend upon the preparation of the youth, especially those in the technical fields.

As a worker with a military commissariat, it would seem that I would be happy that the students are even now working with motor vehicles in a number of secondary schools. In many cases, however, we have only a simplified approach to an important general occupation and the training of diletantases and not real specialists. The young people know nothing more than the traffic rules and can drive the vehicle along a city street and correctly cross an intersection near the school. But what about servicing the vehicle, driving it in a column, operating it in difficult terrain and correcting problems? No one seriously tests the young person in these matters at the general education school.

I do not rule out the possibility of training drivers at the secondary school, of course, but this requires a solid materials and equipment base, a staff of experienced instructors and time.

When we determine the fields of labor training for the students at the schools, we should take into account the needs of the economy in the given region for specific specialists, as well as the existing system of short courses for training them. These include DOSAAF training organizations, among others. Our military commissariat has difficulty obtaining the necessary number of students for the defense society's motor vehicle schools. This is primarily due to the fact that the secondary school graduates have already received a driver's license (or a certificate entitling them to one upon reaching the age of 18 years). And although we know the real value of such a document, we cannot ignore it.

We must organize the system so that the students do not simply receive initial skills in a certain general occupation but become adequately trained specialists. And wherever the young person receives his labor skills rating—at a general education school, a vocational and technical school, a tekhnikum or in the system of short courses (which, I believe, has not outlived its usefulness)—he must be a knowledgeable and trained worker.
Consideration of Secondary School Grades for VUZ Admission

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jan 84 p 2


[Text] The CPSU Central Committee's plan calls for developing new rules for acceptance at higher educational institutions. The expediency of retaining the existing statute on consideration of the average certificate grade for the competition acceptance of secondary school graduates at VUZs is to be considered.

This matter has long been discussed in the press. Many people say that it is not necessary to consider the average grade on the certificate for admission to VUZs. They cite what they believe to be important reasons. We have made a very simple study, however, comparing the final grades of the higher school graduates with the average grades on the school certificates. We found that those who studied best in the secondary school also achieved more at the higher military educational institution. I believe that it would be useful to perform studies at the institutes and universities as well.

In my view, the results achieved in the secondary school should still be considered in some way. The prestige of the secondary school certificate should be protected.

Education in Social, Economic Concepts Stressed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Babakov, senior instructor in the political section of the Alma-Ata Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, in the column "We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "Develop Thrifty Individuals"]

[Text] Point 23 of the "Main Directions for Reforming the General Education and Trade Schools" seems especially important to me. It is truly important for the students to become practically involved in production relations, to acquire a vital understanding of socialist ownership, the plan, labor and production discipline, and wages, to learn to value the ruble earned by working. Is every worker with a secondary education, every practical worker, so to speak, capable of freely using such terms as economic accountability, basic production cost, labor productivity, counter-plan, and many others, however? Unfortunately, not every worker is. They also need certain theoretical training.

In my opinion, the social science textbook, which is standard for all types of secondary educational institutions, should include a section on the principles of the socialist economy, which would define economic terms in understandable language. And if the time designated for the study of social sciences is increased, this section should be studied in depth, with economists from local enterprises, sovkhozes and kolkhozes, and outstanding production workers drawn upon for presenting lectures and participating in seminars.
Initial Military Training Deficiencies Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by Col S. Konobeyev, deputy section chief in the civilian military training organization of the USSR Ministry of Defense, in the column "We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "On the Threshold of Military Service"]

[Text] When the plan for the reforms was being discussed I had the opportunity to meet with many military instructors of schools and vocational and technical schools, and to share opinions with the directors of educational institutions and the secretaries of their party organizations. They fervently approve of the main directions for the reforms and are actively seeking ways to implement what is outlined therein.

There is growing conviction that the system for controlling the youth's preparation for the homeland's defense and for the military service needs to be improved, beginning with the school and the vocational and technical school and ending with the ministry. It would be expedient to establish the position of deputy director of the educational institution for military-patriotic indoctrination, charging that individual with supervision of the entire process of preparing the students to serve in the Armed Forces. We need to build up the group of inspectors and methods experts for initial military training. This will make the inspections of the state of affairs at the sites more effective and will make it possible to reveal still unutilized possibilities for the military training of the youth. These inspections are not very effective, and the military instructors receive no practical assistance.

The question of increasing the amount of time designated for initial military training during the 2 final years of study at general education and trade schools by approximately 50 percent is also being considered. We must enlarge the group of subjects pertaining to the homeland's defense in the programs of the incomplete secondary schools as well.

Comprehensive field exercises in initial military training, conducted in the concluding phase of the training, are also justifying themselves. They immediately precede the induction of the youth for military service. It is the overall opinion of the school military instructors that these exercises do not last long enough, that a full work week of six training days should be allocated for them. Summer labor and defense sports camps, at which adolescents from the age of 15 years can rest and condition themselves, should be more actively employed along with these.

How well the youth are prepared to serve in the army or navy depends to a crucial degree upon the teaching staffs at the schools and vocational and technical schools. And especially upon the military instructors. Unfortunately, not all of the schools are yet completely staffed with instructors for initial military training. There is a fairly large shortage of military instructors in the nation as a whole. This is due, among other things, to the fact that the military instructors earn less than the wages paid in other sectors of the national economy. The suggestion that the existing salaries for military instructors at rural
schools be increased by up to 30 percent is therefore extremely valid. I believe that it would be possible to pay the full pensions, regardless of earnings, and to pay half the cost of the military uniforms for officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers in the reserve or retired, who are directly involved in preparing the youth for military service in the public and the vocational and technical education agencies. It would be a good thing to extend the increments for length of service established for teachers to the military instructors.

All of this would help staff the schools with experienced military instructors and improve the training of the youth for military service and a job. This especially applies to the military-patriotic indoctrination, physical conditioning and the thorough study of the individual characteristics of the draftees.

The school training plants necessary for the complete and quality fulfillment of the initial military training program, needs to be further developed and improved. Every school should have a military office, a room for storing the training weapons, a rifle range, an area outfitted for drilling, a sports ground and other training facilities. All of these facilities are included in the standard plans for schools. In reality, however, many of the new schools do not have them. The corresponding training plant at the old schools is being developed too slowly. The schools in two rayons of Irkutsk Oblast do not have rifle ranges, for example, and eight rayons have only one range each. Hundreds of young people do not fire small-caliber weapons once before being drafted for military service.

The problem of creating a complete complex for initial military and physical training in the schools can be resolved, however. Experience in student construction of training facilities—in labor classes and during periods when classes are not scheduled—has been accumulated at schools in Stavropol Kray and Brest, Novosibirsk and a number of other oblasts. They have prepared multiple-complex gymnastic facilities and devices (so-called nonstandard equipment), making it possible to develop strength and stamina, with the help of sponsors there.

It has now become necessary to develop scientifically based standards of an applied military nature for the physical training of draft-age youth to be included in the school physical education programs. The process of selecting youth to serve in a specific service of the Armed Forces should begin in the school and the vocational and technical school.

The military instructor's duties are multifaceted. He has no more important job than that of working directly with the future soldiers and sailors, training and indoctrinating them. Studies show, however, that the military instructors are presently given up to ten different public assignments.

It is the concern of the general education and vocational schools to see that their graduates are thoroughly prepared to perform their military duty. In the final analysis, this is the job of strengthening the nation's defense capability.
Greater Emphasis on Physical Education Recommended

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by Private (Reserve) N. Machnev, physical education instructor, in the column "We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "On the Same Line With Mathematics"]

[Text] After serving in the army I graduated from a physical culture institute and have now been providing physical education for the students for a quarter of a century. For the past 18 years I have taught at the Novotroitsk Construction Institute in Orenburg Oblast. Like all the teachers I am carefully studying the CPSU Central Committee's plan for reforming the general education and vocational schools. The points about further developing physical culture are especially important to me.

M.I. Kalinin once said that physical culture should be placed on the same line with the Russian language and mathematics. I cannot convince myself that we have done so. Physical culture enjoys no esteem in the school.

At first I wanted to make a number of additions to the CPSU Central Committee's plan for school reforms, additions having to do with the physical education of the students. I stopped, however, when I remembered that all of this is stated—and extremely convincingly—in the decree of the party and the government: "On the Further Improvement of Mass Physical Culture and Sports." Specifically, it sets forth the task of intensifying the physical training of the pre-draft and draft-age youth, eliminating formalism in the matter of certifying that people have met the standards for the GTO (Ready for Work and Defense) complex, and giving greater attention to the technical and applied military types of sports, especially the motor vehicle, motorcycle, parachute and rifle sports.

Unfortunately, we are still not being adequately consistent in the accomplishment of the tasks arising from this important document. I support Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) O. Volkov, whose article I read in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: We need to Increase the responsibility of the schools, vocational and technical schools and tekhnikums for the physical training of the students.

I also have some purely practical wishes. I feel that we should study the matter of increasing the number of scheduled, mandatory physical culture classes, especially in the primary school, where an interest in sports is developed in the children.

I have one other suggestion, which goes beyond the scope of the problem we are discussing. Chapter VIII of the plan talks about creating interdepartmental commissions at the center and locally for the effective coordination of the work of various elements of the education system. It seems to me that it would be easier to achieve this coordination by creating a single ministry of general secondary and vocational education. The expediency of merging the two departments is based on the fact that the objectives and the tasks of general secondary and vocational education are increasingly drawing together and combining.
Greater Role for Military Instructor Advocated

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union R. Tokatayev, head of the training section at the Issyk Secondary Boarding School, in the column "We are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "The Duty of the Veterans"]

[Text] I fervently support the thesis in the CPSU Central Committee's plan pertaining to the need to extensively involve party workers, the best propagandists, Znaniye Society lecturers and party veterans in the social and political indoctrination of the students. I would add to that: and also veterans of labor and of the Armed Forces.

We sometimes find young people who are not looking forward to their forthcoming service in the army or navy. They are even afraid of it: strict discipline, great physical and mental loads. I believe that this is a result of failings in the indoctrinal work. The youth should be prepared for the service not just in the upper grades, just prior to being drafted. A love for the army and an intense desire to serve in its ranks should be developed throughout the period of study in the school. And who can tell about the army as a school of life better, more warmly or intelligibly than the veteran of the Armed Forces?

I share the opinion which has been expressed in the newspaper that the military instructor should officially be the deputy school director for military-patriotic indoctrination. The best military instructors are even now performing these duties. Unfortunately, I cannot consider our school's military instructor to be among the best. Senior Lieutenant (Retired) G. Litvin does not want to hear about anything other than the four weekly, scheduled classes. This means that some of our military instructors are going to have to vigorously readjust themselves in the work.

Improvements, Additions Suggested

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by Col N. Babich in the column "We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "Develop Industrious Individuals"]

[Text] Students in the teachers' school at the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin discussed the CPSU Central Committee's plan, "Main Directions for Reforming the General Education and Vocational Schools," at a meeting. The section which discusses the development of a need to work in the youth met with especially fervent support in the future military teachers.

Captain V. Kladov suggested setting up labor and vacation camps for the summer vacation period, where the school children could engage in militarized games along with productive labor and relaxation.

It was Major A. Mitichev's opinion that the following should be added after the words "Enhance the level and the effectiveness of initial military training in the general education and vocational schools" in Point 17 of the plan: "Make fuller use of sponsorship of the schools by military units and military educational institutions for this purpose."
A number of suggestions were made for Point 31 of the plan. The legally more accurate "servicemen released into the reserve" should be substituted for the words "demobilized servicemen." It was suggested that the concluding proposal be submitted in the following form: "Accept candidates for the teacher training institutions at the recommendation of the teachers' councils of schools and secondary vocational and technical schools, labor collectives, public education bodies and the command elements of military units."

Student Role, Sponsorship, Labor Training Stressed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by N. Seliverstov, secondary school director, Southern Group of Forces, in the column "We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "On a Solid Practical Foundation"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee's plan, "Main Directions for Reforming the General Education and Vocational Schools," is another clear demonstration of the party's concern for the Soviet school and for the upcoming generation. In my opinion, it would be especially worthwhile to consider the matter of improving the organization of labor training and indoctrination and job orientation for the students. It is a known fact that young people frequently receive their secondary education certificate but do not know what they are going to do with their lives.

Relations between the enterprises and the schools are still complicated, still undefined, I would say. I feel that we should legally establish the duties of the base enterprises with respect to the school, specifying who does what and who is responsible for what.

All of the teachers at our school greeted with satisfaction the point about increasing the amount of time designated for studying social science and about producing a permanent and unified textbook. In my view, the matter of improving the work of the youth organizations and student government and increasing their authority is also correctly stated. It is important for the development of an active stance in life in our charges to increase the responsibility and the solidarity of the student bodies, and for them to receive all-round support from their superiors for their useful undertakings, initiative and independence.

Use of Pensioners as Group Leaders

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by K. Nikul'shin, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, in the column "We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "Who Is to Direct the Groups"]

[Text] Those points in the plan about improving indoctrination work after class in the school and at the place of residence seem important to me. In my opinion, every school should have the largest possible number of various groups, which consider the needs, the interests and abilities of the students. It would
be difficult for the teachers to direct these groups by themselves, of course. I am confident that at the first appeal the school could get pensioners who are unable to continue working in production for reasons of health. They include designers, modellers, musicians, artists and athletes and trainers well known in the past. They have something to share with the adolescents. I believe that the following could be added to the CPSU Central Committee's plan: "Make more active use of assistance from pensioners with extensive experience in life and with special expertise when organizing elective activities at the schools."

Lower Age Limits, Medical Certification Needed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by Col Bondarev, senior instructor in the School of Marxism-Leninism at the Kazan Higher Tank Command School imeni Presidium of the Tatar ASSR Supreme Soviet, in the column "We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "Medicine Has the Say"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee's plan raises the issue of possibly lowering the age limits for a number of occupations. I am among the proponents of this proposal. At the military schools, for example, the first-year cadets master extremely complex equipment at the age of 17. The future military pilots fly jet aircraft and independently perform complex piloting missions in their first year. The cadets participate in night exercises, perform guard duty and serve on 24-hour duty details. Experience has demonstrated that they can handle this.

Nonetheless, the words "study the matter" seem to be proper and necessary in the plan. The desires of the youth, the parent community and the labor collectives is not enough. The important and substantiated medical conclusion is also necessary. What could be more important to us than the health of the upcoming generation?

Equalizing School Finals, VUZ Entrance Exams

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by N. Sedova, meteorologist, in the column "We are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "According to Unified Programs"]

[Text] Section II of the plan stresses the fact that additional possibilities are opened up for further improving the work of preparing specialists with a higher education by improving the performance of the general education and trade schools and by creating equal VUZ admission requirements for their graduates. This strikes me as a very important idea.

Continuity has broken down between the general education school and the higher school. The final exams at the secondary school and the VUZ entrance exams are not the same by far. A "four" or "five" from the school sometimes becomes a "two" at the institute or military school. The problem pertains equally to the secondary and the higher school. Tutoring—a sort of schooling at home—has come
into being for a reason, But not everyone is in a position to use the services of tutors. As a result, a secondary school graduate coached (I cannot think of a different word) by tutors makes a better showing on the entrance exams than the student relying on knowledge acquired during years of honest study at the school. Not the person who is most gifted and industrious, but the individual who at the specific moment is capable of answering the exam questions more accurately, frequently ends up at the VUZ.

I suggest adding the following to the eighth point in the plan: "Assure total continuity between the general education and trade schools and the VUZ's. Conduct the final exams at the secondary schools and the entrance exams at the higher schools in accordance with unified programs."

Deputy Minister on Military-Patriotic Work

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Feb 84 p 4

[TASS article in the column "We Are Discussing the CPSU Central Committee's Plan for School Reforms": "Develop Patriots of the Homeland"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee's plan for school reforms stresses the importance and the necessity of military-patriotic indoctrination for the students, of preparing the youth to serve in the ranks of the Armed Forces, of instilling in them a love for the Soviet Army, and of developing in them a sense pride in their homeland and constant readiness to come to its defense.

At the request of a TASS correspondent, F.Ye. Shtykalo, deputy USSR minister of education, tells about what is being done in this area in the nation's schools and what will have to be done:

"Matters pertaining to the patriotic indoctrination of the youth have always been at the center of attention of our party. And they occupy an important place in the reform plan. Many schools have accumulated extensive experience in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the students and their initial military training. We must study what we have achieved and on this basis, create a smoothly functioning and consistent system of information about the homeland and about the heroic daily work and the feats of the Soviet Armed Forces. Almost every school subject could include coordinated elements of this knowledge for the students. This work is already underway.

"The second element of a unified system of military-patriotic indoctrination for the school children consists of the further development of extracurricular work, which includes a broad spectrum of various areas of independent work for the students.

"The third component of this system is the development and improvement of the work performed with the students outside the school, increasing the children's participation in groups and sections of extra-mural facilities of the educational system, trade unions, other departments and housing management organizations"
at the place of residence. It also includes tourist and area-study trips, field trips and militarized games, and the functioning of exploring (poiskovyy) clubs and Pioneer camps during vacations.

"We also judge the effectiveness of the military-patriotic indoctrination and the initial military training from feedback received from the commander-elements of units of the Soviet Army and Navy in which the graduates are serving. Most of this feedback is positive. Nonetheless, we must improve the physical conditioning of the youth and develop them into psychologically stable individuals capable of overcoming difficulties.

"Those in charge of the initial military training at the schools have an important role in the accomplishment of many of the tasks mentioned. Today, most of them are reserve officers with extensive experience in life and service in the forces. Beginning last year, their ranks are being replenished with diploma-holding instructors of initial military training and physical education. They are being trained by the military schools established at many teachers' VUZ's.

"When they complete their regular service term fightingmen of the army and navy can enroll at institutes and become military instructors for the schools. The selection of candidates for this training is made in the military units and by the military commissariats with the participation of local public education bodies. We want the commanders and political organs to consider it their important duty to select the best of the fightingmen released into the reserve and send them to institutes for training."

11499
CSO: 1801/228
INDIVIDUALS TO ANSWER FOR SHORTCOMINGS IN PERFORMANCE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 84 p 2

[Guards Major A. Yershov, tank battalion commander, Northern Group Forces: "Better the Bitter Truth"]

[Text] It was during a two-way regimental tactical exercises which brought the training year to a close. Our battalion got its mission: As part of the regiment complete a long march and at the designated time and place mass and attack the "enemy".

At the designated time and place the majority of the battalion's subunits emerged and were ready to begin the battle directly from the march. The majority, but not all. The tank platoon commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant N. Mazanov moved to the departure point very late. Besides that, two tanks generally lagged behind during the march because of minor problems.

We were nonetheless successful in this battle. But facts are facts. The battalion was not at full strength when it started the attack.

"How did this happen?" This question has given me have no peace. The fact is that not long before the exercise, the platoon's combat vehicles were in for servicing. Mazanov had enough time to check his vehicles' condition. Having reported that his vehicles were totally ready to complete the mission, the officer, putting it mildly, lowered his principles. He did not follow up on the technical servicing and did not check how each vehicle was.

Mazanov was disciplined. However we did not stop there. The party buro proposed discussing the conduct of communist officer Mazanov at a battalion party meeting. And then some of the activists began to question if it was worth washing dirty laundry in public. They say that victors are not judged and the battalion did totally complete the assigned mission in the exercise. Besides, remembering any failures is now out of our hands. "Now out of our hands" -- this reminded me that I had sent in a report with a request to enroll him as a candidate in military school and he had not yet signed up...

The majority of activists were of a different opinion. Being silent about this one event could become morally detrimental not only to the one man but to the whole collective. And, it seems, we acted correctly. Strictly speaking the party meeting which was soon convened in the battalion also confirmed
this. A sincere party discussion about the authority of an officer—communist and his contribution to strengthening combat readiness took place. Communist Mazanov was reprimanded for a careless attitude toward fulfilling his service responsibilities and for falsifying a report. I hope that this lesson will benefit the young officer.

"Better the bitter truth than a sweet lie". Who does not know this popular wisdom. But some officers, and especially the young ones, don't immediately understand the obvious truth that you must own up. Even I did not understand this once.

This happened when I was a young officer. I was taking my first steps as a company commander. My predecessor had left me a good legacy, as the subunit was one of the regimental leaders. I naturally did everything in my power to consolidate the success and not mar the good name of the subunit. It was during this time that life first seriously tested my honesty and principles.

Guards Lieutenant V. Orel served in our company. He knew his business well but it turned out that he had a weakness. He was abusing alcohol. We lived in the same house and shared a porch. And it happened that one evening when I returned home, his wife embarrassingly asked, "Is Viktor again on duty?"

I answered evasively. I knew that Lieutenant Orel had actually again gone to a comrade's in the barracks for "a shot". I reasoned that how he used his after-duty time was personal. And another thought emerged. Is it a mark on the foremost company and my own reputation to stake the issue of an officer's conduct on principle? In a word, I was silent. It ended up that Orel began to be late for duty and began to work with subordinates less. Then unexpectedly, because of intoxication, he received and injury and was hospitalized. After he recovered, he found the strength to rid himself of the embarrassing weakness and he began systematically to work on himself. He was soon assigned as a company commander.

But one day while in a sincere conversation he confessed that a severe, strict word would have helped him very much in this difficult time of development. But no one told him the truth.

For me and for the other company officers this was a lesson to last a lifetime. This event helped me to become firmly convinced that the road to success is in the objective evaluation of the results of one's own labor and the labor of subordinates.

We often stress the need for being objective in evaluating accomplishments and for truthfully reporting to seniors the state of affairs in subunits. We call for this at service meetings, party and Komsomol meetings. But it appears that there is little of this. Honesty, exactingness and the ability to look the truth in the eyes must be taught daily. However, it is impossible not to recognize that we do not always do this the way it should be done. Could it be because individual officers have an incorrect, narrowed impression about the quality of being honest? They think that there is nothing reprehensible
if they overlook, let's say, some detail in a report to a senior chief or somewhat embellish the true state of affairs.

I want to stress that in our battalion the overwhelming majority of officers selflessly complete their duties and set a moral example for subordinates in all respects. But there are unfortunately those who at times give in to the temptation to color reality.

Here is an example. Company Commander Guards Captain A. Borisovets one day omitted the fact in a report that during a general muster Guards Sergeant I. Starchenko was absent from the ranks. I found out about this when Starchenko went on a short leave. The company commander later explained that it was primarily because of this leave that he did not report the sergeant's absence. He revealed the "kindness". How could they not call off the encouragement.

It turned out that Guards Sergeant Starchenko during the muster was in a neighboring unit where he had gone to see a fellow townsman. And after he returned from leave he again willfully went to the neighboring unit to treat his fellow townsman to what he had brought from home. It came to light that this was a "repayment of a debt". During the first unauthorized absence a "treating" also took place. Guards Captain Borisovets was disciplined for covering up the misdemeanor of a subordinate. But the moral damage as a result of the dishonesty allowed by him was certainly borne by more than just him. Such a lack of principles cannot but damage the indoctrination of personnel. And Starchenko didn't get off freely. He was demoted in rank. But the story didn't stop here.

I don't know how, but it turns out that Starchenko's father, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, found out about what had happened from one of the townsman who was discharged into the reserves and he wrote us a letter. This was in the letter. "At the front there was nothing more disgraceful than deceiving and abusing the trust of commanders...I hoped that my son will serve even better after his leave, but to my shame, he disgraced our family and his battalion. He can atone for his guilt only by honest service..."

I am sure that this letter played its own educational role and forced Starchenko, yes, and other servicemen inclined to break regulation, to view their acts in a different light.

Certainly there is not justification for those who show the smallest dishonesty. They deserve the most principles and strict party rating.

But, while reflecting on the reasons for non-objective reports, it is useful to ask yourself if we, the senior commanders, are always on top of the affair? Has this not happened? Some commander, having heard about a subordinate officer's report on a disciplinary violation in a subunit or about some other deficiencies, without trying to understand the essence of the affair, as they say, heatedly jumps on him with reproaches which are at times unwarranted. People are very sensitive to such facts.
It goes without saying that objectivity and principles in large and small matters and the strict evaluation of peoples' acts, when it is necessary to as they say tell the bitter truth openly about someones' faults or omissions, requires certain courage. And the certain conviction that you understand the essence of the issue completely. But only this stance serves the interests of our common affair, the interests of increasing combat readiness. Primarily such a stance is dictated by the requirements of the party. The December 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum again stressed the necessity of inseparably linking word and deed, and of increasing personal responsibility of cadres for ir-proachable fulfillment of their responsibilities, including the most important of them -- to be honest and truthful.

12511
CSO: 1801/217
LIVING CONDITIONS IMPORTANT FACTOR IN COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 84 (signed to press 3 Jan 84) pp 59-63

[Article by Lt Col G. Bogatyrenko, deputy chief of political department: "Concern for Everyday Life is Concern for Combat Readiness"]

[Text] The party and Soviet state show constant concern for seeing that our Armed Forces have everything necessary for reliable defense of the socialist Motherland. We have the most up-to-date combat equipment and arms, we have well-built military posts, the soldiers' uniform is being perfected and their messing and medical and cultural services are improving. It is no secret that where problems of everyday life and the organization of public services and amenities for people are successfully resolved, military achievements are apparent there and a good emotional climate favoring the personnel's indoctrination reigns. To the contrary, an absence of genuine concern for human needs undermines trust in the word of the indoctrinator and propagandist and reduces to naught the efforts of many organizers of the indoctrinal process.

Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized at a meeting with party veterans in the Kremlin in August 1983: "We rightly speak about the ideological support of economic work, but the economic or, to put it more broadly, social support of ideological work has no lesser if not a greater importance. The fact is that any kind of disorder, mismanagement, infraction of the laws, money-grubbing or bribery depreciates the work of thousands of agitators and propagandists."

I have occasion to be in the units and subunits constantly, give lectures and briefings to the personnel or have a heart-to-heart talk with them in an unconstrained atmosphere. Each time the old truth is confirmed that where soldiers are provided with all authorized allowances they appear more cheerful, they are distinguished by a more dashing bearing, and they prove themselves more vigorously in everything concerning service and fulfillment of duty to the Motherland.

At times one discovers with bitterness that not all the leaders understand the importance of constant concern for servicemen's needs, with some considering this a secondary matter which can be put off "until later."
I recall that our political department workers conducted a unified political day in one of the units, and I had occasion to give a lecture to personnel of the company commanded by Sr Lt Yu. Kurasov. The men listened to the talk carefully and began to ask questions toward the end. An unconstrained, frank conversation gradually ensued, and then Pvt V. Nosov complained:

"You could help us, Comrade Lieutenant Colonel, for we have turned to our commander more than once, but he always has no time..."

After carefully writing down all the soldiers' complaints, I decided to have a talk with the subunit commander. In response to my account of what happened, Sr Lt Kurasov reacted peculiarly:

"Nosov complained? But he's a person who goes AWOL and is a malicious violator of discipline..."

As a matter of fact, matters were rather poor with the discipline of some soldiers in this subunit. There had been instances of AWOL and other serious infractions, but the company commander, a young officer, was not able to see and did not want to see the interrelationship of the unsettled state of his subordinates' everyday lives with shortcomings in matters of strengthening discipline and regulation order. Sr Lt Kurasov invariably would put off "until tomorrow" the resolution of everyday living problems while engaging in what appeared to him to be more important matters.

If the company commander's erroneous position still could be explained somehow by his inexperience, the behavior of senior comrades—Lt Col A. Ocheret and Maj V. Zakhlebin—caused alarm. Many serious deficiencies in the personnel's combat and political training were revealed during the inspection the political department held in the company. Discipline and internal order here also left much to be desired and everyday living conditions were wretched. It also was learned that the subunit first sergeant gave Sr Lt Kurasov practically no help. Moreover, the subunit suffered material loss because of WO [Pkaporshchik] A. Surovtsev's negligent attitude toward his official duties.

What is surprising is that all this occurred literally before the eyes of the unit commander and political officer. The political department's intervention was required to have the existing deficiencies finally remedied and the soldiers' everyday life put in order.

There was a serious and impartial discussion at a session of the party commission of the unit [soyedineniye] political department to which the commander and his political deputy were invited. A strict accounting was demanded of them for the deficiencies which had been uncovered and for the lack of concern for subordinates. The party activists also reminded these officers that concern for servicemen's everyday life is one of their most important duties. Here is where it was decided to give Sr Lt Kurasov specific assistance.

I am deeply convinced that the most substantial successes in combat training, in service and in the strengthening of discipline are achieved where commanders
and political officers, supported by party and Komsomol organizations, engage
in administrative work knowledgeably and where they delve attentively and
thoroughly into people's needs and wants, seeing in this one of the sources
for improving combat readiness and an important condition for the personnel's
harmonious emotional and physical development.

The units [chast'] in our large unit take an active part in competition which
has unfolded for an exemplary military post. Much is being done to organize
the grounds on which the units are located and to maintain cleanliness and
order on post.

Upkeep and maintenance of the housing is a subject of special concern for the
command element and political department. We periodically go around to serv-
icemen's housing and decide together with the residents where repairs must be
made and where gas stoves and bathroom facilities must be replaced... Such
visits to servicemen's apartments help us not only to satisfy people's com-
plaints and requests promptly, but also to preserve our housing.

I will note that the housing of subordinates with concerned commanders also is
kept in order. Take for example the unit in which Lt Col V. Vinogradov
serves. As many times as political department workers and rear services offi-
cers have visited houses where this unit's servicemen are living, each time
they have been pleased: doors and window panes in entrances are intact, the
walls have not been ill-treated and they are always carefully painted. The
water line functions excellently and there are no cracks in the ceilings in
the apartments. Preventive and major repairs to the apartments are performed
promptly here.

But it is quite a different picture in the unit where Lt Col V. Belov serves.
Here the commander, political officers and rear services officers seem to have
forgotten that they have housing. This unit simply waves off requests to per-
form repairs or help replace facilities.

It stands to reason that this state of affairs is inadmissible, but there is
one important point here. No matter how much the command element is concerned
with preservation of housing, all efforts will be to no avail if the residents
themselves do not observe order in their stairwells and apartments. The answer
is to perform explanatory and indoctrination work with the people at their
place of residence, instil in them a respect for the builders' labor, and
remind them of the responsibility for maintenance and upkeep of housing.

There are specific, living people with their moods, experiences and problems
behind every complaint and every request for help in arranging everyday living
conditions. These are the people who go to make up our military collective.
And the mood with which they arrive for duty and the energy and desire with
which they take up their assigned tasks depends to no small extent on how well
adjusted their everyday life is and on the conditions under which they live.
It is therefore easy to understand that our concerns for arranging living con-
ditions also are explained by concern for maintaining the high combat readiness
of units and subunits and for the quality of combat training.
Of course, for a number of servicemen's families the housing question still is acute, but young people are under more favorable conditions. An excellent dormitory was built on post in which bachelor officers and warrant officers live. Everything would be superb but, as we know, everyday life is shaped not just by the material blessings they receive, but also by the culture of their conduct, personal contact and observance of the standards of the socialist society. At times one observes trouble here.

The deputy unit [soyedineniye] commander for rear services came to the political department after one visit to the officers' dormitory and began to relate what the inspection showed.

"There are good rooms and new furniture," said the officer, sharing his impressions, "but there is dirt and cigarette butts on the floor and garbage in the corners. What is most disappointing is that the young people seem not to notice this. Have they become accustomed to living this way?"

That is when we decided to hold a meeting for young officers living in this dormitory. Comrades in charge, chiefs of services and political department workers spoke. It seems we succeeded in "getting to" the young people and reminding the lieutenants that a person can create many conveniences and comforts for himself; it can't all be introduced in the form of orders. The words had an effect and since then order in the dormitory has become better, but this of course is not enough. The fact is that officer dormitories are called upon to become models of the high culture of everyday living conditions.

Frankly speaking, officer dormitories come less often under the scrutiny of some responsible persons than enlisted men's barracks. The fact is that very strict accounts usually are demanded for support to privates and NCO's and the company locations are always in view, while the everyday life of officers often is something "invisible" and not always subject to a direct accounting. But both require concern, attention and worry to an equal extent and this hardly has to be proved.

There is no question that soldiers' living conditions have undergone great changes, but the demands on such conditions are constantly rising. In the utilitarian sense the barracks are a place for servicemen's accommodation and night rest and the messhall is a place for eating. We try to ensure, however, that both the barracks and the messhall not only satisfy their basic purpose, but also serve to bring up privates and NCO's in the spirit of our morality, improve them and accustom them to culture.

Unfortunately, this is not always achieved. What is at fault in this is not at all the lack of certain technical innovations, but the elementary absence of supervision over the observance of regulation order and absence of exactingness on the part of the appropriate appointed persons and persons on the daily detail.

Take for example the enlisted men's mess which now is managed by WO P. Tomilin. It is rather well organized, but complaints would come periodically from those who eat here over the poor quality of food preparation and lack of good
conditions in the kitchen and the dining room. The situation began to change for the better when people took what is called a "serious look" at the mess-hall.

The efforts just of commanders, political officers and rear services officers are insufficient to resolve problems of improving living conditions. The daily routine and living conditions of soldiers are a party matter. During the report-election party meetings which we held in the unit [soyedineyiye] the party members also touched on this important problem and said that servicemen's living arrangements must be within the constant view of party organizations.

For example, at the report-election meeting in the party organization headed by Sr Lt Yu. Sadikov, the party members gave much attention to questions of daily life both in the briefing and during its discussion, and they discussed fundamentally and in a businesslike manner what they had to do in this direction and how shortcomings could be remedied. During the year this party organization regularly brought up questions of the personnel's everyday living conditions for discussion by buros and meetings, and the party members achieved a great deal. Exemplary order is constantly maintained in the sub-unit, appropriate comfort has been created and the enlisted men are provided with everything necessary for cultural leisure. Party members keep a very strict eye on this.

The report-election campaign helped us see more clearly our tasks of improving everyday living conditions and helped us uncover a number of serious deficiencies. Take the following problem for example. The specific duties of many of our specialists are such that they have to operate combat equipment in the open air for several hours at a time in any weather. The officers, warrant officers and privates who are subordinate to solicitous commanders are surrounded with special attention. They always have hot tea at hand, special rooms have been set up for people to warm themselves, and supplementary meals have been arranged. That is the case, for example, in the unit where Maj A. Tarabanov serves. The party members here have become reliable assistants to the commanders in resolving all questions of everyday living. In the unit where the aforementioned Lt Col V. Belov serves, however, extremely little attention is given to the soldiers' daily life. One can hear a particular party member-manager declare rather often: "Even without this I am over my head in concerns. I'm sorry, but I don't get around to living conditions..."

Honestly speaking, it is disappointing to hear this. It is a fact that concern for people and for providing them with everything necessary generates a response in them without fail. When a person senses a friendly attitude toward himself he will do even more than he is capable of doing. By the way, front-linessmen have pointed this out more than once in their memoirs.

Twice HSU Army Gen A. P. Beloborodov recalls how one day in the initial period of the war Lt Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy, who at that time was the army commander, arrived at Beloborodov's division CP. For a long while he inspected through binoculars the miniscule base of operations on which our soldiers had consolidated. Later he decided to visit there himself. The division commander
explained that there was no concealed approach to the base of operations. It was entirely exposed and the Hitlerites had registered every hillock. But the army commander insisted and he visited the base of operations. He paternally questioned the soldiers on how they understood their mission, whether or not they had been provided with proper food and ammunitions and what requests they had. The army commander's arrival in the combat formations and his concern for the fighting men inspired them with new energy, they began to fight the enemy more selflessly and they executed the order they had received with honor.

It would not hurt those appointed persons who consider concern for the soldier's everyday life to be a secondary matter which can be put off to know about such examples.

While such a state of affairs is intolerable, the other extreme is no less dangerous, where some party-member-managers use various dodges and turn into such "procurers" under the pretext of concern for improving living conditions. For example, Maj M. Kovalev was held accountable by the party. In order to obtain costly materials for decorating barracks spaces he sent soldiers to various enterprises while separating them from scheduled training and used equipment for other than its intended purpose. All this happened with the party organization's knowledge and tacit consent. It was only when such "activity" by Kovalev was stopped by the senior chief that party members finally found it possible to give their colleague's conduct a fundamental appraisal. No one needs such "concern" for the personnel's living conditions, for essentially it is illegal and it costs the entire collective too dearly. In any case, a kilogram of paint is not worth the classes missed because of it, classes called upon to improve the servicemen's combat proficiency and the military collective's combat readiness.

A party approach to further improvement of the personnel's living conditions presumes a planned nature, high efficiency, and persistence in finishing a job which has been begun. It is important to use every meeting with the soldiers, not to mention ideological measures (lectures, briefings, talks) for clarifying how living conditions are arranged in the subunits, what is troubling the soldiers and what are their questions, complaints and wishes. That is just the procedure followed, for example, by officers N. Bozhko, V. Sotnikov, V. Rybakov and others who are members of the agitprop group of Unit "X."

Experience indicates that we have to rely on the women's council in the work of improving living conditions and include women more widely in the resolution of matters involving the organization of public services and amenities in posts and barracks and the arrangement of various intraregimental holidays. The women's council headed by Tat'yana Dmitriyevna Teterina does a great deal in this direction. We are trying to see that this experience is taken up in other units as well.

Concern for improving the living conditions of the Motherland's defenders is a matter of great state importance. In his speech at the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum Comrade Yu. V. Andropov noted: "Improvement of people's living conditions is the ultimate goal of our efforts in the economic sphere." To accomplish this task with party principle under Army conditions means showing genuine concern for further strengthening the combat readiness of units and subunits and creating favorable conditions for soldiers to fulfill their high patriotic and international duty.

SHOULD MILITARY INSTRUCTOR STATUS BE UPGRADED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 21 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel G. Ivanov, Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent: "Measures of Responsibility"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee draft "Basic Orientation of Reforms for General Education and Professional Schools" states that "the basics of military-patriotic indoctrination for pupils must include training them for service in the ranks of the USSR's Armed Forces, indoctrinating in them love for the Soviet Army, developing a high feeling of pride in belonging to the socialist Motherland and constant readiness to defend it." I read these words and I remember a military instructor with whom I made an acquaintance not long ago. He is a man of concern and endless energy and loves to work with young people.

People regarded reserve Engr-Maj L. Lakhtin's idea of starting a parachute club in school in various ways. Some rejected it with the approach that it had no place. There is, they say, an initial military training program; carry it out. Others were not so categorical. Parachute jumping is tempting, romantic and, it goes without saying, of some use for indoctrinating. But what a responsibility! Do you need this, Leonid Pavlovich?

"I am not accustomed to responsibility" answered the reserve Major and it went to a higher level. Thus he went to the representative of the Central Committee DOSAAF for the Kazakh SSR Major General B. Baytasov who supported the military instructor.

I am certain that this is worth doing. You will have your parachutists....

This was one of the happiest minutes in the life of Leonid Pavlovich. Most of all he wanted to transfer to the youths his own love for aviation. He knew that aviation schools need good replacements.

In the words of the lads, real parachutes appeared in the Issyk Secondary School imeni N. K. Krupskaya. Senior classmen began to study ways of packing them and trained for jumping. It is hardly necessary to say that the military instructor had to have excited talks with parents. He found the necessary words.
People in the school still remember who was the first student to jump from an AN-2. And they recall the words he said after landing. "Now I know what I will be--a military pilot."

And he actually enrolled in pilot training school.

After their jumps the eyes of Vladimir Shepelev, Aleksandr Shevchenko, Vladimir Ognev, Valeriy Polyakov, Sharif Turynbekov, Aleksandr Smurygin, Yuriy Yung, Serik Sharikbayev, Arkadiy Krivonosov, Aleksandr Krasnobyev, Yuriy Ashinberg and others burned excitedly. Yes, you really got to all of them. The young people, after verifying their character in a serious test, selected the officer profession.

Time passed and now it isn't Leonid Pavlovich convincing fathers and especially mothers not to keep their sons and daughters from joining the parachute club. Instead it is the parents asking the military instructor to take the juveniles under his tutelage.

There was one time when Lakhtin was unable to satisfy such a request for a long time. Doctors would not allow a young man to parachute jump because of poor health. The military instructor and the doctors had to develop a set of strengthening exercises, a schedule of supplemental activities, and even a dietary regime for this youth. A few months elapsed and the schoolboy passed the GTO [Ready for Work and Defense] norms and was allowed to jump.

Did the activities in the club come easily for the military instructor? They were far from easy. The DOSAAF airport where his students made their parachute jumps during spring vacation was located far from Issyk. And it took more than a day to get there. And Leonid Pavlovich began to have transportation difficulties. He requested help from the chiefs of the local PMK and the komsomol and party raykoms. Once he made several trips with the lads in his own Zhiguli. But the jumpers were never late for the exercises.

There were many other concerns. Guiding a parachute in the air and landing it require strong physical and psychological tempering. There are few systematic physical exercises to develop these qualities. Together with the physical education instructor Dmitriy Anastas'evich Seferidi Lakhtin planned supplementary exercises on the horizontal bar, parallel bars, the circular wheel, running and downhill skiing. A schedule was made up for off days and it was strictly followed. Now, in winter, skiing down the steep slope of the hills near the town is especially satisfying for the young men and women. The young parachutists choose difficult and long runs where their speed approaches 60 kilometers per hour and they are learning to slalom. The school has never before had so many fearless and skilled skiers. And the parachute club was everyone's motivation.

Other readers ask how meeting the required program of initial military training is going on in the school? According to the voyenkomat [military registration and enlistment office] and national education agencies it is excellent. Information from the forces about service of the school's graduates says the same thing. At the military instructor's first call the club members came together to develop the material training base necessary for the planned
activities. The school's military study was equipped with modern technical study equipment. There is even an oversized screen in it. The juveniles worked enthusiastically, making a firing range, a radiation shelter, a guard duty cantonment, and a square for drill training.

The fact that he found followers made reserve Engr-Maj Lakhtin happy. In his own time he included several pupils from neighboring professional technical schools. Then a master from an industrial training PTU [professional technical institute], reserve Senior Lieutenant Tursun Manasbayev came to him with a request.

We have decided to form our own parachute club. Yury Gromakov who worked with you, Leonid Pavlovich, has returned from the army a reserve sergeant and a parachute instructor. He offers your help. Will you help us?

Lakhtin clearly helped with all his spirit. He took about 20 pupils from the neighboring school into his own club. Six of them are already in military schools.

The military instructor of the school imeni N. K. Krupskaya is a very authoritarian instructor. He is respected and loved by the students and parents. Not long ago he sat in the place of honor next to the father of the betrothed at the wedding of Lieutenant Vladimir Shilling. Vladimir was one of his club members. Leonid Lakhtin was a valued guest at the Dedin family. His student Sergey Dedin returned home after service with the medal "For Military Service". Olya Zaytseva's mother came to school especially to thank the military instructor. She reported that her daughter and her daughter's girlfriend Galya Sidorenko were now in the army, had become parachutists and are continuing sports jumping.

"I remember the warning about responsibility," said Leonid Pavlovich Lakhtin with a smile. He is an outstanding educator of the Kazakh SSR. "Yes, and everyone who works with young people has a great responsibility. Responsible that our students grow up literate, strong and ready to work and defend the Motherland. Certainly you cannot have a parachute club in any school. And they are not necessary in all schools. Perhaps a club for snipers or young communicators excites the young people less. Would there be enthusiasts...."

The school imeni N. K. Krupskaya is warmly and excitedly discussing the CPSU Central Committee draft on school reform. Instructors are especially active, and not without reason, in supporting the resolution on developing and improving extra-curricular work and activating student social-political clubs, museums, societies, and lecturing bureaus. The teachers' collective has come up with the opinion that perhaps it is time to elevate the rank of the military instructor in general education and professional schools. Shouldn't he be made deputy director of military-political indoctrination? I think that this deserves attention.
OUTSTANDING BATTALION COMMANDER PROFILED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 24 Jan 84 p 1

[Captain I. Sokolovskiy, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "Radio Battalion Commander"]

[Text] Comrades-in-arms speak of Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Vladimirovich Borisuyk with deep respect. He is an able, innate commander. And not without reason. Borisuyk commanded a radar company for several years and it was the foremost company for all those years. The Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3rd Degree crowned the officer's successful work in that post.

He was assigned to a new, higher post -- commander of a radio battalion. And this unit attained no small successes. For three years running it has led the socialist competition in the unit and has retained the rank of outstanding. Lieutenant Colonel Borisuyk received a second order, the Red Star.

It is said that if you want to know what kind of commander a person is, ask his opinion about his subordinates. During our meeting I didn't ask Borisuyk about his subordinates. He began talking about them himself.

"Any situation depends primarily on people. In this regard, I consider myself simply lucky. The people in the battalion are all choice, one and all. This is where success begins.

This is so. Conscientious people with initiative serve in the battalion.

Lieutenants A. Nedoruba and S. Bortnovskiy are recent military school graduates but they are already highly rated specialists. Such a high tempo of professional growth is one of the characteristic features of battalion life. Clear organization of the training process and competition in combination with a modern material training base, effective control of the training of each specialist and the operational introduction of the latest knowledge and methodological innovations are all ways of promoting success.

Even during the first exposure to the battalion it was apparent that each radar operator tries to become a highly rated specialist. And, as I understood from the battalion commander himself, this works. He is an example of professional perfection.
Lieutenant Colonel Borisyuk holds a master rating. He can fill in at any workplace, from a junior specialist to the highest rating. Once during training at a very tense moment an operator, Private M. Edeyev lost his head because of the large amount of information coming in. And then the battalion commander himself was at the screen of the radar indicator. All target information was sent to the KP [Command Point] on time and with no loss.

During the review of the training results Edeyev stood, head lowered. He was shamed before his commander and comrades. He awaited a reproach and was ready for any punishment. And what he heard was totally unexpected.

"Comrade Edeyev, you acted correctly and tactically competently. Lack of experience simply let you down. Train some more and in about two months you will feel confident in any situation."

The ability to look ahead, into tomorrow, to reveal before a soldier, sergeant, warrant officer or officer perspectives of growth, to create the conditions for full realization of peoples capabilities is a noteworthy feature in a battalion commander's work style. He aims the party and Komsomol organizations at this and teaches it to company commanders and other officers.

It is not easy to serve in this battalion, but it is interesting. The demand on each person is great. They orient only on high results and on the maximum. Here, let us say, is one of the reference points. Each officer, warrant officer and sergeant is to master his position at the level of his senior. Is this difficult? Certainly. But service here is unthinkable in any other way. Primarily because this is how the commander, Communist Borisyuk, himself serves. And also because for air defense soldiers service must be only in this way, maximally effective. Defending the skies of the Motherland demands this.

12511
CSO: 1801/217
SURVIVORS BENEFITS FOR VETERANS' FAMILIES DETAILED

Moscow SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN' in Russian 16 Oct 83 p 4

[Interview with Col of Justice V. F. Vandyshnev, by V. Fedayev, correspondent: "Benefits for Servicemen's Families"]

[Text] The editor is receiving letters requesting that we discuss benefits for family members of servicemen killed in the Great Patriotic War defending this Motherland.

At the request of our correspondent V. Fedayev, Col of Justice V. F. Vandyshnev responds to numerous reader inquiries.

[Question] Tell us about housing benefits for such families.

[Answer] Families of servicemen killed defending the USSR or while fulfilling other military duties have a number of important benefits. They are outlined in the "Regulations on Benefits for Invalids of the Patriotic War and Families of Deceased Servicemen" which was approved by a resolution by the USSR Soviet of Ministers on 23 February 1981 and by several other legal acts.

In accordance with Article 20 of the Basic Housing Laws of the USSR and the union republics and with Point 15 of the aforementioned regulation, families of killed servicemen, requiring better living conditions are guaranteed living space first and foremost (both by place of work and by domicile), including at the expense of living space transferred by the ministers and departments to the disposal of ispolkoms of local Councils of People's Deputies.

Living space within the limits of the existing norms occupied by families receiving a pension because of a serviceman killed is paid on the scale of 50 percent of the rent calculated at the rate for workers and employees, but superfluous living space (up to 15 square meters) is paid at a single rate. These families also receive a rebate of 50 percent of what they pay for heat, water, and electricity.

The Council of Ministers of the union and autonomous republics, ministries and departments, and ispolkoms of local Councils of People's Deputies must give every possible assistance to families of killed servicemen in constructing
individual houses. These families have first priority for local construction material designated for individual housing construction and major repairs. They have the same priority for fuel.

Families of servicemen who were killed while defending the USSR may not be evicted from their living accommodations by judicial action without being granted other living space.

[Question] How are pensions set for members of families of killed servicemen.

[Answer] Disabled members of families of servicemen who were killed or of deceased Heroes of the Soviet Union and holders of all three degrees of the Order of Glory have the right to a personal pension.

Disabled parents whose children perished on the front have as of 1 May 1975 the right to a pension because of the loss of a bread-winner, regardless of whether the parents were dependent on the killed serviceman.

A pension for the loss of the bread-winner-serviceman was set for disabled wives of servicemen who perished at the front regardless of when they reached old age or when they became invalided and also regardless of whether they were dependent on the serviceman killed. Those living in rural areas receive a pension for the death of the bread-winner-serviceman for the full amount, without the 15 percent reduction stipulated for pensioners permanently living in rural areas and linked to agriculture.

Pensions for members of deceased servicemen of private and sergeant ranks is set by agencies of social maintenance and for family members of deceased officers, army and navy warrant officers and servicemen who re-enlisted, the pension is set by the military commissariats.

[Question] What other benefits are there for families of servicemen living in rural areas?

[Answer] The USSR "Agricultural Tax" law and corresponding instructions from the USSR Ministry of Finances state that households of families of service-

men killed at the front in the Great Patriotic War are granted the following benefits in regards to agricultural taxes:

--households having 1 able-bodied person and from 1 to 3 children up to the age of 16 have a 25 percent tax rebate;

--households with 1 able-bodied person and more than 3 children under the age of 16 receive a 50 percent tax rebate;

Benefits on agricultural taxes are granted to those households which have a serviceman who perished.

Persons who are receiving a pension for the loss of a bread-winner serviceman are exempt from paying income tax on the first 300 rubles per year. This benefit does not apply to salaries from enterprises, institutions, and organizations.
Men and women who lost children on the front are exempt from paying the taxes on bachelors, single females, and those having small families.

[Question] Who are considered eligible for the benefits established for families of deceased servicemen?

[Answer] The benefits listed are granted (in shares that concern them) to families of servicemen, partisans, command and enlisted personal in the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and KGB [Committee for State Security], the soldiers and commands of fighter battalions, platoons and detachments of peoples' defense who were killed or who died as a result of wounds, shell-shock, or mutilation while defending the USSR or while fulfilling other military duties (service responsibilities) and also as a result of illnesses resulting from being on the front; to families of people who perished in the Great Patriotic War while members of self-defense groups for installation and repair of local air defense commands; and to families of deceased hospital workers in Leningrad (during its defense). Families of servicemen missing during military action have the same rights as families of those who were killed on the front.

The following are recognized as members of families of servicemen, partisans and other designated categories who perished (or died): dependants of those who perished or were missing and who receive a pension because of this; parents; a husband who does not remarry, regardless of the set pension; children not having their own family or those who have one but who become invalided before reaching their majority; children who lost both parents as either killed or missing.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

TRAINING FOR IN-FLIGHT MISSILE FIRING

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 20 Dec 83 p 1

[Article by Major M. Lauren, Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "Long Range Attack"]

[Text] Dense clouds covered the sky. All-weather bombers are soaring up to the clouds.

Senior Lieutenant of Technical Service B. Shkalenov is preparing the airplanes for the next flight. Having checked that the air service specialists have completed the required work and annotated the control sheet, the technician again made the rounds of the bombers--Was anything omitted? In a few minutes the crew commanded by military pilot lst class Captain V. Myski will take the military vehicle beyond the clouds. The bomber technician must be certain that the specialists did everything for a successful flight. This is the way it is in aviation: The technician is on the ground but his thoughts are on the flight. He never mixes up the "voice" of his own plane coming in for a landing. And there is no greater reward for him then the pilot, after landing, saying, "Everything is normal, thanks."

The bomber crew got its mission: Go out to the firing range at the designated time, make a bombing run, then after a long flight, launch a missile. The military skills of aviators is polished in such flights and their weapons and aerial training increases.

Having gotten into the required formation, the crew set course for the firing range. Not wasting a second, the aviators began preparing for the bombing run. It is not easy in complicated meteorological conditions to determine the bomb release point so as to hit the target exactly. But the electronics and automatic military machinery are reliable aids for the aviators.

The crew's actions through training have been developed to the point of being automatic. Everyone worked without fussiness and did not fill the air with unnecessary radio traffic. Secrecy is one of the integral parts of success.

Having completed the maneuver called for by the mission, Captain Mysik set the plane on the combat course. Now primary responsibility falls on the crew navigator Senior Lieutenant A. Radionov. A few seconds more and the airplane will pass over the target. It is time. Bombs released from the plane fall towards the target.
"Excellent, navigator!" Radionov heard the voice of the crew commander say through the intercom.

Captain Mysik was not in error in rating the navigator's work highly. A few minutes later the guidance officer from the range confirmed:

"The target is destroyed!"

Senior Lieutenant Radionov is a military navigator 1st class. He is a master of sudden raids and heir to the military glory of front-line soldiers. Radionov knows that during the Great Patriotic War the skill of Baltic pilots and navigators guaranteed their difficult victory over the fascist invaders. In the battles during the lifting of the Leningrad siege bombers piloted by M. Kurochkin, P. Streletskiy and N. Kolesnikov made powerful attacks on the heavily fortified enemy strong points.

The aviators of today's generation are following the example of the front-liners. They try to act daringly and come out of the most difficult situation as winners.

The flight continues. The horizon darkens noticeably. The long flight is made along the route. The navigator has to have great skills to lead the plane to a given point at a strictly set time.

Senior Lieutenant Radionov, having marked the flight map, reports to the commander, "We will be at the launch point on time."

From this point on, the second navigator takes care of navigational control and Radionov together and the plane commander begins to check the missile guidance systems.

The moment of greatest tension arrives as just seconds remain before the missile attack. Crew members report on readiness. The commander again sets the combat course. Launch!

With an orange flame behind it, the missile rushes to the target.

As earlier, the crew has gathered and is attentive. An "enemy" air defense battery opens fire on the airplane. The bomber maneuvers and sets course for its own airport.

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EXERCISE IN NIGHT HELICOPTER LANDINGS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 84 p 1

[Lieutenant N. Zelenskiy, military pilot 3rd class, Northern Group Forces: "In The Screening Group"]

[Text] Group commander Captain M. Kovalev and the crew commanders of the helicopters were bent over the map. They were members of a covering force to secure a landing in the "enemy" rear.

"This is not one of the easy missions." The group commander deduced this from the tactical situation.

"Behind the 'front lines' there are a lot of 'enemy' air defense weapons concentrated. Besides that, they can attack us from the air. This means that a lot of attention must be put on secrecy."

The aviators together with the landing subunit commander selected the best flight path through the "front line". Alternatives were also selected.

And as night fell, the helicopters with the troops on board lifted into the air one after another. The covering force followed them into the dark sky. Having received detailed instructions, the crews of Captains M. Kovalev, A. Akimenko and A. Kolechkov, maintaining military order exactly, flew to the point where the landing was to take place. The terrain over which they flew was unfamiliar to the aviators. But the thorough pre-flight preparation foreordained the helicopter pilots' successful actions. Using the terrain contours, they successfully overcame the conditional front line.

During the approach to the landing area they were attacked by "enemy" helicopters. But the covering force did not give them a chance to disrupt the military order of the assault helicopters. Having completed the maneuver the covering force itself gained the advantage for an attack. Fire from the mounted weapons of Akimenko's and Kolechkov's crews was accurate. The "enemy" aerial attack was repulsed.

Soon the troops commanded by Captain N. Osipov were on the ground at the designated area. Having completed the daring raid on the "enemy" rear area, the "winged infantry" destroyed rocket launchers. The aviation group commanded by Captain Kovalev received an excellent mark for skillfully securing the landing.

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