USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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STRENGTHENING MILITARY PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 85 (signed to press 19 Feb 85) pp 56-61

[Article by Colonel V. Trushin, chief, department of party organizational activities, political directorate, Baltic military district: "The Obligation a Trust Imposes"]

[Text] The editors of this journal have received a letter from the secretary of the party organization of a battalion of a unit in the Red Banner Baltic Military District, Captain Aleksandr Borisovich Balakhnin. "I was elected secretary last fall," he writes. "I can't say I didn't already have some experience. I had already been serving as an organizational secretary. But now, what with the preparations under way for the 27th CPSU Congress, I feel like I could and should be doing more, performing better and mobilizing the efforts of all our communists toward the objective of getting at least our own little living party cell to perform more actively, more aggressively.

"How are we to accomplish this objective? What are the best means and methods to employ? What is the best way to integrate the military and party responsibilities? What is the proper way to structure the interrelationship between commander and his senior people?"

Colonel Trushin had a talk with the man who wrote this letter. In our view, a great deal of what they talked about should be of interest to many of our party activists.

It is commonly known that the overwhelming majority of party organization secretaries are unreleased personnel [neosvozhdennyye rabotniki]. The 6th Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries recommended that political organizations, party committees and party bureaus provide them with more focused training, expand their theoretical and ideological horizons, develop their understanding of questions concerning party structure and organization, increase their knowledge of new thinking and practices, new ways and means of discharging their organizational responsibilities and in general do everything they can to enhance the authority of the party organization secretary.
The political administration and political organizations of our district are devoting their unflagging attention to the needs of the party aktiv and to efforts to improve their training and education. They give particular attention in this respect to the unreleased secretaries—they hear their reports on the activities under way and provide them with concrete assistance on the spot.

It was not too long ago that the district political administration heard a report from officer P. Boyko, secretary of the primary party organization bureau of one of the administrations in our military district. Discussion centered around, among other things, the steps which needed to be taken to enhance the party's influence on efforts to improve the style and methods of work of communists in the administration. It was pointed out that the party bureau is focusing on the question of the competence of party members and the effort to instill in them a heightened sense of responsibility for the tasks with which they have been charged. The party bureau is currently doing a great deal to increase the organizational role of the communists of the administration and to instill in them the desire to perform more efficiently, be more exacting and to be more insistent in eliminating the impact of anything negatively affecting the level of combat readiness of our units and subunits. The party organization has developed a system of reporting by CPSU members, which brings in an individual accounting of what they have accomplished in the way of meeting the demands imposed on them by the CPSU by-laws. Last year, for example, the party bureau heard reports from one out of every three members of the CPSU covering what that member had done in the way of discharging both his party and his official responsibilities.

This organization has a system in which the established, more experienced communists help out their newly arriving comrades. Officers A. Larin, V. Maksimov, V. Dudnik and P. Pospelov speak words of gratitude for the help they received from the good CPSU members A. Brazdzhyus, Ye. Komarnitskii, A. Svirepov and V. Poladin. Their advice and suggestions have been of good help to great many communists. The party organization involves all party members in social life. Each one of them is assigned a responsibility involving the propagandizing of new ideas or new practices or some ideological activity. It has also given the meetings a greater role in the life of the party collective.

Earnest concern, interest and exactingness in its approach to administration workers, well-planned, well-organized ideological and theoretical education for communists and a program of indoctrination for them in the spirit flowing from party decisions—these form the basis of the work of the party bureau and the secretary. The administration's performance is improving, and it is coming to play and increasingly important role within the military organization and the life of the troops. And the result of this has been that last year saw them conclude the training year with higher performance ratings. The training program is proceeding in a well-organized fashion during the winter training period as well. Officer Boyko received his most rigorously reviewed performance rating at the reporting and election meeting. The communists reelected him party bureau secretary.

Success in providing leadership and direction for the masses as V. I. Lenin saw it is determined "not through the exercise of power, but rather by the force of authority, by focusing energies, by virtue of greater experience, being more versatile and by being able to draw on a greater reserve of talent." These words
perhaps have special application to our unreleased party organization secretaries, whose success depends on close ties with the communists, thorough knowledge of their people and an ability to find capable of assistants.

It is no easy thing for an unreleased secretary to combine his official duties with his social obligations. Experience shows, however, that those who are entrusted with the task of leading a party organization will in the vast majority of instances justify that trust.

Captain Yu. Parshikov, a combat pilot lst class, has been able to accomplish a great deal as secretary of his squadron's party bureau because of his good organizational skills, self-discipline and ability to rely on his aktiv. With one CPSU member he will take a minute to have a word or two, see how things are going and pass on a little useful suggestion or two. With another he will inquire about the success he's having in accomplishing one task or another. In the case of a third he might, if necessary, give a reprimand. When he completes his flying duties for the day, Parshikov doesn't race straight home, but rather will take some time to tend to party business. Both communists and nonparty personnel will come to the secretary: pilots, technicians and mechanics. Each one will have some kind of problem. The secretary doesn't make any attempt to sidestep the most difficult ones. For the fact is that he knows that the frame of mind of the personnel of the organization and the morale of the entire unit is going to depend on the appropriateness of the solutions he finds to these problems.

The way the unreleased party organization secretary budgets his time is clearly something that warrants special attention. This is an important matter, one which is frequently asked by a great many of our activists. "We don't always get a chance to get with the people," they'll say, "and we have to do our paperwork at night." Time is at a premium for Captain Parshikov, too. But he will still be able to find enough to interest himself in the program of ideological and theoretical education for the communists, meet with his agitators and political information specialists, acquaint himself with the activities the Komsomol bureau has planned and express his own wishes concerning them and to chat with communists who have been elected to positions in the Komsomol organization.

His ability to stoke the fire under efforts the party organizations have under way in the combat aviation organizations helps Parshikov get the most out of each precious minute toward the accomplishment of his objectives and to make the best possible use of both his own time and that of others. Parshikov meets with the secretaries of these organizations on a regular basis. Activists are informed of tasks assigned by the commander and of decisions announced by higher party authorities. Members of the squadron party bureau attend meetings of communists of the various flying organizations and help the secretaries plan their activities, organize socialist competition and conduct the indoctrination programs they run for the flight personnel. When the party bureau meets it will regularly hear reports by the flight party organization secretaries. Then together with the secretaries, with their help, it becomes possible to solve the greatest variety of problems associated with efforts to improve the service, the training program and personnel indoctrination and education programs.
On one particular occasion, the subunit in which Major Yu. Igushev served as party organization secretary, began to fall behind schedule in the effort to implement the full flight training plan. This subunit, moreover, had just recently recorded a flight incident. Igushev was invited to a meeting of the party bureau. Together they undertook a thoroughgoing analysis of the causes of the problems this organization was presenting. Most important, it turned out, was the fact that the party organization had not been placing the proper demands on the personnel of the organization. The secretary himself, for example, had not been taking the hard look he should have at the departures within the organization from the requirements of military regulations. Igushev was given a stern warning and reminded that combat training is always to be the paramount concern of the party collective and of each and every communist as individuals. Both the secretary and the members of the party organization were able to draw the proper conclusions from this discussion.

Today this squadron is one of the best there is. It is rightly referred to in the regiment as a forge for combat aviation personnel. And much of the credit for the fact that the squadron has not lost its good name goes to the party bureau and its secretary Parshikov, a restless man, a crack combat pilot and a principled communist.

It has come to be said that one out of every four primary party organizations in the district will have only a very few members. Nor are there many communists in the company-level organizations. This, of course, is something that they have to take into account in planning their activities. We have abandoned the practice by which political organizations would concern themselves primarily with the released party organization secretaries alone, and it was these people who would then deal with those at the lower echelons. When they are making their rounds the political administration representatives will now meet with each and every one of the unreleased secretaries as well. And we are placing the same requirement on all political organizations. It must be said that as this requirement is complied with it has beneficial impact on the performance of the lower-echelon party organizations. I will show you only one example here.

The party organization headed by Major N. Komaruk has nine communists. It is the party secretary who has been primarily responsible for simply assigning them their individual responsibilities—decisions based on both capacity and spiritual and emotional makeup. He has also made it a practice to meet regularly with members of his organization for conversations with each one individually. These discussions will center around such questions as how things are on the job in general? are you working to improve your political knowledge? what kind of influence are you able to exert on your colleagues? which ones have you helped with their training, provided with a piece of helpful advice or been able to steer away from trouble? At their meetings the communists will regularly report on what they are accomplishing in the way of discharging their regulation-imposed responsibilities and carrying out party decisions and assignments. Most interesting are the meetings at which the discussion focuses on the problems involved in efforts to improve the combat training program, organize competition, and intensifying interest in social activities and then relates these problems to the need to enhance the leading role the communists play, to give them more responsibility. His own practical experience has shown the secretary that if you want the people around you to develop an enthusiasm for efficiency and service then you yourself are going to have to show some spark of enthusiasm in
your own work and set an example in both duty performance and training for everybody. So Komaruk was one of the first in his subunit to become a master of combat skills. And once you start the ball rolling, as the saying goes, there will always be other people who will keep it going. So now almost all the communists here have won "outstanding" ratings in training and are highly rated specialists. The subunit as a whole has won an "outstanding" rating for three years running now.

This, however, is not the situation you will find in all our small party organizations. For the fact is that a number of them are far from putting forth their best efforts. These organizations will sometimes be found leading an unhappy, disorganized life as far as the general tenor of intraparty affairs are concerned and giving insufficient attention to the problem of insuring that its communists set the examples in both training and duty performance and in the practice of criticism and self-criticism. Take, for example, the division party organization for which Senior Lieutenant A. Alekseyev serves as secretary. Not all the communists here are participating in the organization's meetings. And it will frequently be the same people who speak time after time. They will get up and speak distractedly in abstractions without ever referring specifically to the guilty parties responsible for a situation. And of course the result of this is that whatever decisions are taken will be only general ones which don't obligate anybody to do anything. So in the end the steps required by the demands of the time and the situation involved will not be taken. All this goes a long way toward explaining why the division failed during the past training year to reach the objectives which had been set for it. And at the same time, the communists have yet to make this situation a subject of detailed, critical analysis and discussion.

In speaking of these small party organization, we must say that we cannot agree with the practice of those secretaries and party group organizers who always try to rely essentially on only their own efforts or, at most, on those of only a narrow group of party activists. The following example will illustrate what this can lead to. The tank battalion in which Major V. Sakharov serves as party organization secretary began to be a drag, as they say, on the unit as a whole because of deficiencies in the technical training it was providing its personnel, and this included the communists as well. When people from the political administration came to have a look at this organization they found that the secretary was trying to handle all party business himself. And so the communists, without responsibilities, without any specific tasks to perform, were able gradually to escape any social involvements altogether. Their contributions to the overall success were not growing; on the contrary, they were gradually declining. And this had its impact on the performance ratings of the subunit.

It would be appropriate at this point to recall the advice we get from V. I. Lenin, who warns: "... Don't try to do 'everything' all by 'yourself.' Don't knock yourself out and then find yourself in a situation in which you have nothing to show for your efforts. Don't start 20 projects and then discover you can't finish one of them. Rather, give directions, and learn from people who have knowledge ... and experience ...."

So here's the conclusion we can draw: what is demanded of the party organization secretary is that he be able to identify the basic, critical factors in a given
situation and then focus the efforts of all communists on those tasks which will determine the success of the larger effort.

To find a general recipe, a universal rule valid for all situations in which the unreleased secretary may find himself is virtually impossible. The most important thing, I think, is for the lower-echelon aktiv to be striving consistently to learn how to resolve all problems in the life of their party organizations independently and to develop a lasting sense of responsibility for its activities and for its successful performance. I recall in this connection one place in the novel Verkhniy etash [The Upper Story] published in Moskva magazine where the hero, an unreleased party organization secretary, says: "What happens when you're elected secretary of a party organization? What changes, what difference does it make in you...? Something external? Nothing in the slightest. Something on the inside, something about your inner qualities? You can't see the slightest unusual thing about yourself, nothing changed.... Your responsibilities? Nothing different there either.... Do they raise your pay? Same pay.... So does that mean things remain as they always were? No, there are now new limits to your area of responsibility. People have voted for you, but they haven't given you anything—no new position, no new titles, no more material benefits. Only trust. But this, the trust that other people have placed in you, while it has neither added anything or taken away anything, has in fact worked a change in you. While before you may have had to concern yourself with your planning department, your family and so forth, you are now obliged to shoulder the responsibility for a 2000-man organization...."

In these words, I think, we have the best description we would ever find of the nature of the work of the unreleased secretary and the limits of his responsibilities. And it is an awareness of these responsibilities that we must every day strive to instill in our party aktiv.

Instructive at this point would be a discussion which took place at a seminar for party organization secretaries of the Guards Proletarian Moskovsko-Minskaya Motorized Rifle Division. It was being pointed out that as we prepare for the 27th Congress of the CPSU, it is going to be even more important that we place greater responsibility on the party aktiv for general situation prevailing within the party organizations and among communists and for a greater personal contribution on the part of each and every one of them for the overall success of their unit and subunit. Also worthy of attention, however, is the following reminder which was heard during the course of the seminar: responsibility is not an abstraction. For what it in fact means is that the secretary is under obligation each and every day to know which of his communists is actually performing his tasks as required and how, which are the leaders, which are falling off the pace, which need what kind of help and which should have more rigorous demands placed upon them. And this, let us reiterate, is possible only when the secretary has developed a thorough knowledge not only of how the training program is going overall, but also of the kind of work he is getting from each and every member and candidate member of the party. They will then be able to notice the lack of success on the part of one comrade or another in a timely way and to help that man get back on track. They will then achieve their successes and be able to show their people to what these successes are to be attributed. Discussions of these things should be conducted with each communist with due regard for his personal qualities, character traits and the level of his professional training. In the case of one man it will be enough give him a
few pieces of good advice, while another can do with some constructive criticism and yet another is going to require some concrete assistance and a detailed explanation of the importance of one thing or another. Much here is going to depend on the secretary's tact and his ability to approach a man and lead him to a willingness to engage in confidential conversation.

The seminar referred to above also touched on the question of the proper relationship to be established between the unreleased secretary of the party organization and the senior personnel. It should be pointed out here that the political administration has made a special study of this question in the formation [soyedimeniye] in which officer V. Isakov is a member of the staff of the political department. More than 90 per cent of the secretaries here are unreleased. And they have not all, unfortunately, been able to establish the right kind of relationship with senior personnel. These disagreements are most frequently the products of situations in which neither the secretary nor the senior man has clear idea of their proper roles and responsibilities and they are trying to divide the work to be done into purely party and official, professional spheres, to set one role against the other.

This is what happened in the case, for example, of Major Yu. Pilipenko, the regimental chief of staff, and Major V. Zatvornitskiy, secretary of the staff party organization. We undertook a thoroughgoing analysis of the problems involved in this relationship. Now, what usually happens when a senior communist officer and a party organization secretary are for some reason unable to find a common language is that the regimental party committee and the formation political department will step in to help straighten things out. There will always be the possibility of undertaking a thorough objective analysis of the underlying causes of the misunderstandings in this situation, expressing an opinion and then, if necessary, inquiring pointedly: "Why is it that you, comrade secretary, and you, comrade officer, are conducting yourselves in such an unpatriotic manner?" If you take this principled approach, the nature of the disagreements involved will not, and indeed cannot, pose any problem for which a solution cannot be found. When analyzed from a party point of view, this relationship can always be reestablished on the proper footing and restored to health.

To be able to provide proper leadership for an organization of communists requires solid political and moral qualities, thorough knowledge of military affairs and good understanding of the methods and forms of party work. The true authority of the party leader, of course, will be based upon his efficiency, competence, ability to get close to people and his capacity for working with them. He must combine political maturity with a knowledge of the specific conditions prevailing within his military organization, breadth of vision and thought with an intolerance of shortcomings and exactingness with sensitivity and responsiveness to the needs of service personnel.

The political administration and political organizations within the military district are striving continuously to improve efforts directed toward giving the unreleased party organization secretary a greater role and more responsibility. They are giving more attention to, among other things, the need to provide them with some practical instruction in the best methods to employ in discharging their responsibilities. Training programs are being organized at the district level for secretaries of the different branches of the service.
Seminars have recently been held for secretaries of party organizations in the missile subunits and in the aviation units and subunits of the air defense forces. The district political administration holds a seminar each year for secretaries of staff party organizations. A number of seminars, meetings and courses of instruction have been conducted for activists in the leading units.

It is no secret that the level of activity demonstrated by an organization at any echelon of the party will depend to a great extent on the person at the head of that organization. In the course of our reporting and balloting we would at one time make frequent changes in our unreleased party organization and party group secretaries. And it should be pointed out that this practice by no means contributed to any intensification of activity or increase in the aggressiveness of our lower-level party organizations. One activist would not be able master his responsibilities and get some experience under his belt before he would be replaced by another. Things have now taken a turn for the better in this regard. More than 70 per cent of the secretaries of our primary and 65 per cent of the secretaries of company-level party organizations are now being reelected.

It can with justification be pointed out that we are still not doing everything we should be for our unreleased party organization secretaries. There are still instances in which a secretary and his difficult tasks and absorbing concerns seem simply to escape the attention of our unit political organizations, party committees and party bureaus. Practical experience would now suggest the need to create within our political organizations a reliable system by which they could undertake a thoroughgoing study of the efforts of our unreleased party organization secretaries and their political and professional qualities. It is high time for our more expert and experienced party personnel to begin establishing more frequent direct contact with the people at this echelon and in both word and deed help them master the difficult art of exercising the party's direct and continuous influence on the life and training of service personnel.

During this period of preparation for the 27th Congress of the CPSU, a period which finds the party engaged in an exacting review of its own performance, the political organizations of the district see their task to lie in improving the performance of all our lower-echelon party organizations and each individual unreleased party secretary and in increasing their aggressiveness, initiative and adherence to principle in the effort to improve military discipline and achieve combat training objectives.

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OFFICERS' FAILINGS IN DISCIPLINE, UPBRINGING WORK

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 85 (signed to press 19 Feb 85) pp 3-8

[Editorial: "The Officer—An Example of Discipline"]

[Text] Over the course of many years now this antiaircraft missile regiment has distinguished itself by its tight discipline and good performance in combat and political training. Officers from other units will frequently visit the regiment to see what can be learned from the experience here. On one particular occasion the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel N. Bochkovskiy, was asked what in general he would say it was which constituted the most important ingredient of such consistently high performance on the part of his unit, and, in particular, what the secret was of being able to maintain good military discipline. He did not hesitate to reply that the key factor was "the personal example our officers set and the responsibility they assume for the tasks with which they are charged." In his unequivocal response, of course, he went on to mention the enormous role played by the party organization, the Komsomol aktiv, the cohesiveness of the unit as a whole and the mobilizing and educational impact of socialist competition.

The commander was right when he pointed to the special role the officer plays in maintaining good discipline and organization. For the experience of this particular regiment along with that of many other units and ships and the entire heroic history of the Soviet Armed Forces demonstrate indisputably that the victories and successes a military organization achieves, its unit cohesion and its ability to maintain good organization and discipline will all be a function in the final analysis of the competence and strength of will of the organization's officers and the dedication with which they discharge their official obligations and measure up to the demands of their high calling. It was not solely by the power they exercised that commanders and political officers inspired their troops and led them into battle during the Great Patriotic War, but also by their indisputable personal prestige and authority and the example of their personal discipline, steadfastness, bravery and courage. Of all members awarded the honored title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the war, more than half, 6437, were officers. Practical experience has confirmed the far-sighted prediction of V. I. Lenin, who declared that "it will be the Red officer alone who is able to carry authority among our soldiers and to consolidate and strengthen the foundations of socialism in our army. This army will be invincible."
With the continuous concern and support demonstrated by our Leninist party, the officer corps constitutes the hard core, the supporting framework of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the torchbearer of communist ideals, revolutionary spirit, our glorious military traditions, high morale and political and moral values. The Soviet officer will be seen as a zealous and consistent implementer of party and government policies and decisions in all services of the armed forces and devoting his full effort and knowledge to the maintenance of high vigilance, continuous combat readiness, tight discipline and good organization in his unit and on board his ship. He will be found in the vanguard of the patriotic movement of armed forces personnel mobilizing to render a worthy salute to the 27th Congress of the CPSU and the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascist Germany.

The push for tighter discipline and better organization and order in all spheres of life in developed socialist society, which has been initiated and consistently maintained by the CPSU Central Committee and has won the support of the entire country, has also become one of the primary concerns of our officer corps. The peculiar nature of military service, which is a function of the requirement to perform tasks of critical national importance, to maintain conditions of the highest operational readiness and to remain continuously ready to break up any attack, instantly to repulse any possible aggressor, requires discipline of the highest order. Without the maintenance of strict military organization and order, the highest level of efficiency in the performance of military duties and absolute obedience to the will of the commander we cannot even begin to speak of any truly high level of combat readiness, not to mention victory on the battlefield.

The existence of the real military danger posed by imperialism, the present-day levels of development in the field of military affairs and the new weapons, equipment and methods of conducting military operations are all combining to pose more sharply than ever before the problem of improving the effectiveness of all forms and methods employed in the effort to strengthen conscious military discipline. Success in this effort today requires the development of a creative new approach, a balanced, well-organized, objective-oriented system of ideological, political, military, moral and legal education and indoctrination for personnel and good coordination between commanders, political organizations, staff personnel, party and Komsomol organizations, personnel of the military justice system, rear services organizations and all officers.

"Particularly important in the training and preparation of our officer corps is the development of such qualities as strength of will, good organizational abilities and steadfastness in pursuit of an objective," points out Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov, USSR minister of defense. "Faint-heartedness, slowness in response, indecisiveness—these characteristics must remain alien to the officer. He is summoned to let his life be guided by the rule: if I am given an order, I must strive to carry it out whatever the cost or effort required."

In the effort to strengthen discipline just as in the case of all other tasks, the key factor, a most important and constant condition for the achievement of the objective set forth will rightly be seen to be the personal example of the officer. It is not without reason that people say that the word summons, but the example leads. The commander, the political officer, the staff officer, for
whom self-discipline, organization and efficiency are at one and the same time
natural, integral traits of character, dictates of conscience and inner, spiri-
tual necessities, who adhere unfailingly to both letter and the spirit of the
provisions of the USSR constitution, Soviet laws and regulations as well as to
the imperatives of communist morality, these officers will inspire in their men
as well the desire to maintain good discipline and discharge their military ob-
ligations conscientiously.

The educational role of the personal example set by the commander is particu-
larly important. He personally has been invested with full authority over the men
under his command; he can issue the orders and instructions, send his men on the
most difficult and challenging missions and, if necessary, lead them into battle.
At the same time, he will bear full responsibility for the state of their train-
ing, their morale, discipline and the mobilization and combat readiness of the
subunits, units or ships with which he has been entrusted. The commander will
always find himself in the eye of his troops and so will be influencing them
not only by the official authority he exercises, but also by exemplary conduct,
by irreproachable discharge of his manifold duties, personal moral purity, by
his each and every deed and decision.

Everyday military life will provide us with any number of convincing examples of
the truth of this. Lieutenant Colonel S. Kondrat'yev, for example, takes over a
motorized rifle regiment whose disciplinary record is leaving something to be de-
sired, and in time the organization finds its way into the ranks of the best
regiments in the entire military district. How do you explain such an impres-
sive turnabout? First and foremost by the fact that by expertly combining mea-
sures of persuasion and coercion, the commander himself stood out as a model of
efficiency; he involved himself on a daily basis with the education of his men
in the spirit of unfailing compliance with the requirements of military disci-
pline, with the organization of his daily unit routine and with the effort to
insure adherence to regulation practices and procedures. He combined rigorous,
consistent exactingness in an integral way with a basic respect for people, at-
tentiveness to the needs and requests of his men and with demonstrated concern
for their health, attitudes, welfare and leisure time enjoyment. While he never
failed to correct any misconduct on the part of a subordinate, he would also be
quick to give due recognition for enthusiastic duty performance, conscientious-
ness and displays of initiative. By the force of his own personal example, this
communist leader was able to teach all the other officers in his unit and the
commanders of all his subunits the same kind of focused, objective-oriented ap-
proach to the organizational, educational and indoctrinational tasks they faced.
Together with his deputy commanders and party and Komsomol organizations, the
commander was able to bring his organization together into a more cohesive body,
inspire his men with challenging objectives, create an atmosphere of comradely
mutual assistance which at the same time was one which permitted no breaches of
regulation discipline and in the end brought his organization into the very top
ranks.

It is difficult to overvalue the force of the personal example of the political
officer, particularly at regiment and ship levels. His high calling is to condi-
tion the troops ideologically and instill in them a profound love of the mother-
land. Both the official and moral authority of the commander’s deputy for polit-
ical affairs is based upon his own deep communist convictions, his devotion to
the party, the breadth of his ideological and theoretical knowledge, his close-
ness to the people and his accessibility and sensitivity. These qualities make
it possible for him to carry the ideas and requirements of the party to the mas-
ses in a passionate, persuasive and comprehensible manner and so to exercise an
influence on the consciousness and conduct of each member of the armed forces
and, accordingly, on the overall state of military discipline.

Most of our political officers have proven themselves to be expert educators
and organizers of party political activities. Together with their commanders
and our party and Komsomol organizations, they work to mobilize personnel to
the end of implementing the policies outlined by the 26th Party Congress and
the subsequent CPSU central committee plenums in the sphere of national defense
and meeting requirements imposed by the USSR minister of defense and the chief
of the main political administration of the Soviet Armed Forces. An object of
their particular concern is the effort to improve the quality and effectiveness
of our ideological and mass political activities and the development of high
political, professional and moral qualities in our officers. Major A. Khutbeyev
and Captain 3d Rank B. Sidoryuk, for example, are making major contributions in
these respects.

That the overwhelming majority of our officers do honorably live up to the de-
mands of their high calling and set examples worthy of emulation in the daily
performance of their military duties, in their training, in discipline and in
their participation in public activities is the return we would expect on the
concern demonstrated by the party, which is now focusing even more attention on
the training provided our officers and the education and indoctrination of our
military councils, political administrations and party organizations. It would
not be correct, however, behind all the positive not to see the less attractive
side of things. It is certainly no secret that some of our officers have been
negligent in their attitude toward what is required of them in the way of ful-
fillment of official obligations; they will not impose demands of the required
exactness on subordinates and in other cases will resort to crude adminis-
trative methods; they shun personal involvement in activities with other people,
and some of them of taken the first steps down the slippery slope of abuse of
official position and breach of discipline.

Only recently, for example, Captain Yu. Lanovoy was removed from his position
and demoted. Upon completion of his work at the military academy, he was placed
in command of a subunit which was among the best in all categories of evaluation.
Now you would think that an officer with such a solid background of training and
education in command of such an exemplary, cohesive organization would be able
to lead that organization along the path to greater and greater success. But
excessive ambition, exactness which fell victim to pride and an unwillingness
to lean on his party and Komsomol organizations did not allow him to establish
his contacts with people and gain authority in their eyes. Particularly in not
bothering himself with involvement in organizational and educational activities
and in frequently conducting himself in a manner contrary to provisions of all-
service regulations, Captain Lanovoy had a detrimental impact on his fellow of-
ficers as well. His superior officers tried repeatedly to help him and get him
back on track, but to advice and suggestions he paid no heed whatsoever. So in
the interest of the profession, it ultimately became necessary to resort to the
extreme measure.
An officer's discipline and sense of responsibility, his ability to establish the right kind of mutual relationship with his men, to combine exactingness with respect for people, to rely on his party and Komsomol organizations, to play the roles of both organizer and educator, sensitive, responsive pedagogue and tactful, insightful psychologist—all the qualities do not evolve in the man spontaneously. The foundations must be laid in the future commander, political officer and staff and administrative specialists in the military schools and academies and then continuously, purposefully built upon in our units and on board our ships.

Recent years have seen us make considerable progress in the effort to improve the quality of the training we provide our officers in the VUZ training programs. But have all graduates of the VUZ programs developed that conscious discipline which becomes, as they say, as flesh and blood, second nature? During their period of training in the VUZ program do all the students develop that respect for rules and regulations as immutable laws of both daily life and service and the desire to adhere to both the letter and the spirit of the provisions they contain? Have all VUZ graduates developed that spiritual need to involve themselves in social and political activities, in study and in the training and education of our troops? In the case of graduates of many military schools, we can still not give an affirmative answer to these questions.

We need, therefore, to select our students more carefully, intensify efforts to upgrade our program of training and education and, most importantly, to improve the temper we give our future officers ideologically, politically and morally along with the programs of military indoctrination and individualized work. This will require the combined efforts of political officers and instructional personnel along with our party and Komsomol organizations, a resolute effort to eliminate the purely formal, superficial approach, an end to the boring aspects of classroom instruction and, finally, that we never lose sight of the fact that it is the example of older friends and colleagues that exercises the greatest educational influence on younger people. However infrequently they occur, we cannot consider normal those instances in which among those instructing our future officers we find officers who have basically made a botch of things so far in their military careers, who have already sullied their own reputations with unbecoming conduct and who possess neither the learning nor the teaching skills required. Political and party organizations of our higher educational institutions and the communists in the personnel divisions must begin to speak out forcefully against these negative developments and move aggressively to help commanders and their senior officers remedy these situations.

The finishing touches, of course, are put on the new officer's professional development in the course of his service in his unit and on board his ship. His involvement in the practical aspects of the daily routine helps him develop his volitional and organizational capacities and the methodological and pedagogical skills required for successful educational work with people and at the same time provides the environment in which he will evolve his own moral character and basic attitudes toward life. Thoughtful, tolerant work with young officers—this, of course, is one of the direct obligations of their immediate superiors and of the organizational staff and political personnel and an indication of their own maturity. For as our practical military experience has shown, the young new lieutenant will always have to be taught a great deal. How to organize
political instruction, exercises, training and drill and competition, how to tighten discipline, the ability to identify and master the fine points in educational work with personnel, not to confuse exactingness with harshness or comradely relations with overfamiliarity.... And it is very important here to instruct without becoming a guardian, to help without doing the job yourself, so that each new commander and political officer can develop the ability to function independently and a sense of personal responsibility for the mission with which he has been charged and not fall into the habit of working with one eye back on his superiors.

No less important are the tact, self-control and pedagogical wisdom and experience of the elder colleagues, which reduce the temptation to draw conclusions overly hastily. For it does, after all, happen every now and then that because of his inexperience a young officer will slip up, make a mistake, fail to get something done on schedule or fail to get it done in accordance with instructions. The impatient, hot-headed superior is then ready to accuse him on the spot of inefficiency, failure to carry out orders and indiscipline and deliver himself of a lecture. The harm this does lies not only in the fact that the young lieutenant will then lose faith in himself and throw up his hands in despair, but in the fact as well that some new officers will then begin to imitate this kind of behavior in their own relations with other people; they, too, will begin to bellow and rudely berate their subordinates, permit themselves to administer discipline in the heat of the moment and, ultimately, alienate themselves from their own men.

Work with the officer will yield the desired results when it is conducted systematically and purposefully, taking account of the characteristics of the different categories of officers. At its core it has always rested, and continues to rest, on a concern for raising the ideological-theoretical level of the officer. For the fact is that ideological conviction and a communist world view constitute the ultimate basis of conscientious service and conscious discipline. The politically mature individual develops a thorough understanding of his obligations and responsibility and a solid, class-based point of view, does not allow himself any departures from the principles and norms of communist morality and will not remain on the sidelines when the time comes to come out boldly and forcefully against deficiencies, indiscipline and outmoded thinking. Taking the proper approach are those commanders, political organs and party organizations which are striving consistently to improve the Marxist-Leninist education they provide their officers and involve them in ideological and mass-scale political activities for organizational personnel.

Moral education is a proven method of insuring that organizational officers provide the personal example in duty performance and discipline expected of them. Within the individual units and on board the ships, among the individual officers, during officers meetings, at meetings of the party and Komsomol aktiv, in the course of the individualized activities, wherever the questions of the moral character, the honor, the dignity, the integrity, the honesty of the military officer are raised in the most pointed manner we will, as a rule, also see no instances of unbecoming conduct. It will, on the other hand, be in those organizations which fail to give these questions the attention they deserve that we will occasionally find evidence of these negative phenomena. Only recently, for example, we saw Lieutenant Colonel P. Markov expelled from the party and
discharged from the ranks of the Armed Forces. And now his superior officers, his colleagues and the party organizations are trying to find out how it was that an officer who had received positive evaluations in the past ultimately came to lose those good qualities and evolve into an avaricious money-grubber, a sly fox who became expert at throwing the dust in people's eyes. Regardless of how exceptional this case is, it can nevertheless not fail to cause some serious concern, what with the fact that it is evidence of some serious shortcomings in moral education and in our individualized activities.

More than 90 per cent of our officers are members of either the Communist Party or the Komso mol. The party organizations of ships and units, in which the prevailing atmosphere is one of devotion to principle, criticism, self-criticism and rigorous comradely inquiry and analysis of shortcomings, insist on unflagging adherence to party discipline, with members and candidate members of the CPSU also taking a responsible attitude toward the discharge of military duties and the performance of other official obligations.

We have recently begun to see the communists in a great many staff party organizations exercising an increasing influence on the administrative management style of these organizations. Here we will find the most experienced officers, members of the party who have been called upon for their contribution to the effort to improve military discipline and to insure fuller adherence to regulation procedures and increase the effectiveness of the training and education programs. And the facts are clear: the more aggressive these staff and administrative party organizations are, the more of an impact this contribution will have.

Following the army conference of Komso mol organization secretaries we saw an upsurge in the spirit of initiative and aggressiveness of the armed forces Komso mol organizations. In implementation of directives enunciated by Comrade K. U. Chernenko and of the CPSU Central Committee decree outlining steps to be taken to improve party leadership of the Komso mol, commanders, political organs and party organizations have begun to focus Komso mol organizational activities more sharply on the most urgent objectives. Komso mol committees and bureaus are involving themselves more actively in the ideological and political indoctrination of our young people, to include our young officers, to insure that they present themselves as models for emulation in both training performance and discipline. This does not describe the situation everywhere we look, however. Some Komso mol activists are proving themselves very slow to change their ways of doing things; they have yet to break out of their empty armchair routine and abandon their paper-shuffling ways; they are not doing all they can to help accustom young officers to participation in the social life of their units and ships and, to all appearances, have forgotten the path to the officers quarters.

Nor are we always seeing our organizations fully exploit the rich educational potential of socialist competition for helping the young officer develop his sense of responsibility, the essential unity of word and deed and his creative initiative. There is no arguing with the fact that the established practice of evaluating the performance of a commander, political officer or staff specialist on the basis of the state of things prevailing in the units they command or the sections for which they are responsible has proven itself. But as a participant in competition, they will each have their own personal socialist obligations to measure up to. How will he in fact measure up? Is he expanding his
own ideological, theoretical and cultural horizons? Is he progressing and developing in his knowledge of military weapons, equipment and tactics? Or is he simply marking time? These questions are not always subjected to thoroughgoing analysis when we figure up the final performance ratings for competitions, which, like it or not, is going to reduce its overall educational benefit, what with the fact that seldom if ever will they be raised for discussion at an officers meeting.

In the entire arsenal of the variety of methods and means of educating and developing the young officer, the most effective has always been, and remains, the individualized activities. For the fact is that you can help mold and develop a man only after you have studied him thoroughly and you know his strengths and weaknesses. People, after all, differ, for example, in character, abilities, level of political and moral maturity and professional training and preparation. So each individual officer is going to require an individualized approach. For one man it might be enough simply to point out a mistake, another might require nothing more than some good suggestions, while still another you will have to patiently help do this and that. Unfortunately, however, there are some commanders, political officers and party and Komsomol activists who lack the desire, and occasionally even the ability, to work with a young officer on an individual basis. It is this which will most frequently account for those "unexpected" deviations in behavior and the deficiencies in the development of a particular officer.

The officer's duty is not easy. And his performance in discharging this duty will be affected to no small degree by the way in which his garrison tackles the problems of living conditions and the quality of the cultural, medical and material support it provides. Good living conditions for the officer and his family, comfortable, well-maintained officers quarters and an officers club offering a hospitable environment and an interesting program of recreation and entertainment will all have an impact on the officer's frame of mind and his attitude toward his work. These problems have not been handled in the most exemplary fashion, for example, in a number of units in the Transbaykal Military District, with the result that we have seen no small number of disciplinary problems involving officers there. Concern for the individual should be one of the primary concerns of the commander, the political officer, staff personnel and our party and Komsomol organizations. It should always be kept in mind that the concern they demonstrate for the officer will be reflected in the concern he in turn will demonstrate for his subordinates.

The Soviet officer is a member of a heroic profession. The party, the government, the entire Soviet people place a high value on the difficult role the officer plays. His name, the name of a steadfast defender of the motherland and the achievements of socialism, an ardent patriot and internationalist, is the object of honor and esteem. But at the same time this high esteem and deep trust also impose an enormous responsibility on the officer. Each and every one of them must stand as an exemplar of devoted service to the party, the country and the people, of zealous discharge of military duties, irreproachable discipline and moral purity and insure that the organization for which he is responsible adheres rigorously to regulation requirements and procedures and maintains itself in the highest state of combat readiness.

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WOMEN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO WAR EFFORT Praised

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[Article by Prof. V. Murmantzeva, doctor of historical sciences: "The Soviet Women and Her Contribution to the War Effort in Military Service and Civilian Labor," "Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory"]

[Excerpts] Soviet women have accounted for no small number of dramatic pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. These years saw a truly extraordinary demonstration of the strength of spirit and unyielding will of the daughters of the fatherland, their infinite steadfastness in the workplace and their heroism at the front.

The war was a phase in the development of the profound realization on the part of Soviet women that they were in fact involved in all aspects of the national effort to bring the day of final victory closer, a phase in the evolution of mass-scale involvement in active social-political and military-patriotic work.

The last war provided convincing confirmation of words which V. I. Lenin spoke in a speech to the 4th Moscow City Conference of Women Workers: "Women can make a contribution in wartime, too, when it comes to helping the army and undertaking agitation among members of the armed forces. Women must get actively involved in all these activities so the Red Army can see that they are concerned about it, that they want to help provide for its needs." Vladimir Il'ich went on to point out that women could demonstrate this concern for the welfare of the army in a variety of ways both in the army itself and for the army as a member of the labor force in the rear.

From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party gave a great deal of attention to the effort to establish a solid organizational base for the women's patriotic movement and provide it with clear, purposeful direction and orientation.

Before 1941 was out the country had seen thousands of women and girls join the ranks of the defenders of the motherland. But it was the spring of 1942 that ultimately saw the beginning of mass-scale mobilization of women into the armed forces. This was in implementation of a decision by the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] central committee and the State Defense Committee.
The Komsomol, which played an important role in selecting young women for military service, was responsible for a large contribution to this military mobilization effort.

In implementation of a decision by the State Defense Committee, the first mass mobilization of women for service in the air defense force was announced in March 1942. Over 100,000 young female volunteers joined the ranks of the air defense forces under Komsomol sponsorship alone. At the end of 1942 the State Defense Committee decided to conduct a second mobilization of women for the air defense forces. The stream of female replenishments for the air defense forces continued throughout the entire war. In Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, the Northern Caucasus and other areas where air defense troops were being organized, a great many antiaircraft machine gun, searchlight and balloon subunits were formed entirely of women, who proved able to extricate themselves from any of the most difficult of combat situations.

The year 1942 also saw a mass-scale mobilization of women for the communication troops. In April 1942 alone, for example, in implementation of another State Defense Committee decision over 40,000 women were assigned both to the training centers to learn their new military specialties and directly to their new units. In May 1942, 25,000 young women began their service in coastal and rear units of the navy. Women and girls also developed into expert snipers, communications observers, pilots and tankers.

Our combat medical personnel, a substantial number of whom were women, have also accounted for a dramatic chapter in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Physicians, medical assistants, nurses, medical instructors and medical aids, they all performed their humanitarian services with honor and dignity. In the spring of 1943, Matrena Nechipurkova, a 19-year-old rayon hospital nurse, put on the soldier's coat and became a medical instructor for a Guards regiment. She underwent her first baptism of fire at Izum and Lozova. Then came the Dnieper, the Vistula, the Oder, the assault on the Seelow Heights and the battle for Berlin. Matrena saved the lives of many dozens of soldiers. In Berlin Sergeant Nechipurkova was put in for another decoration. Army commander V. I. Chuykov wrote the following words on the citation accompanying the award: "Order of Glory, 1st degree for participation in the assault on the Seelow Heights and in the street fighting in the vicinity of the Reichstag and Imperial Chancellery."

Women were particularly enthusiastic about aviation. During the tension-filled days of the battle for Moscow, an effort was launched at the initiative of the famous pilot M. Raskova to form a women's air regiment, which subsequently won the Guards designation. All members of this 46th Guards Taman Night Light Bomber Regiment, from the commander down to the last technician and weapons specialist, were women. Girls who had been enrolled in flying club courses, yesterday's students and industrial workers, all women who had responded to the Komsomol central committee's call to help defend the motherland, were now taking to the night skies in their agile little PO-2 "flying machines" and carrying out accurate bombing attacks on enemy targets.

Their social activities, political maturity, relatively high levels of education and the organizational skills acquired before the war from their involvement in social and political activities enabled a great many women and girls not only to
develop a knowledge of military affairs and master the use of military weapons and equipment quickly and thoroughly, but also to grasp the "secrets" of educational work. This was very important in view of the fact that, considering the special nature of political indoctrination among women military personnel, the party was trying to engage as many women as possible in it. They were the ones who could best understand the unique features of the character of their comrades-in-arms, their unique psychology.

With the objective of helping these young women who had been called to military service accustom themselves to the severe conditions of military service more quickly and to find their place in the country's military effort, the VKP(b) Central Committee took a special decision in March 1942, in accordance with which a number of male political officers in the air defense forces were replaced by female political officers. It was decided in connection with this decision to call up an initial 440 female communists between the ages of 25 and 35. By the end of 1942 the political sections of our air defense units were comprised mostly of women, who were to be found among subunit political officers as well.

Many women found their places in party and Komsomol work. In March 1943, that is, a year after the mass mobilization of women into the air defense forces, more than 1600 women and girls were being assigned to party and Komsomol work in the Moscow air defense zone. Thousands of air defense force women served as agitators and editors of wall newspapers and combat bulletins. In both word and personal example they provided inspiration to their friends to perform their military duties in the most conscientious manner possible.

The effectiveness of the party's political effort among female service personnel can also be seen in the example of other military organizations. The Central Women's Sharpshooter Training School, for example, an organization formed on the initiative of the Komsomol central committee and which was staffed by female political officers, turned out 1061 sharpshooter girls and 407 sharpshooter instructors within two years. By the time the war was over, graduates of the school had killed more than 12,000 soldiers and officers of Hitler's army.

In addition to their heroic military service, the years of the Great Patriotic War also saw our Soviet women do truly valiant service on the labor front as well. From the very first days of the war they were taking the places of their husbands, fathers and brothers at the machines, mastering these specialties and raising productivity from one day to the next. In their appeal "To our husbands, brothers and fathers who have gone to the front" the women of Moscow's brake works wrote: "All our efforts, all our energies we are devoting to the end of taking your place on the production line and of providing you with everything you need."

The labor exploits of O. Kosheleva, a worker in the capital's Kompressor works, provide a dramatic example of this devotion to patriotic duty. On July 6, 1941 the plant newspaper printed her appeal to the women of the plant, in which she summoned her friends to be bolder in their efforts to master the jobs in the plant which had formerly been performed by the men. Kosheleva herself was a strong women physically, who had taken the place of a foundry hammer operator who had gone to the front and was working right up to the standards of the men, filling and overfulfilling her quotas.
The country saw a universal upsurge in the enthusiasm among women to find their place in the national workforce. In August 1941, more than 1000 women in Magnitogorsk completed a short course and went to work in the combine. While women accounted for 41 per cent of the industrial workforce on the eve of the war, 1942 saw this figure rise to 51.6 per cent, 1944 to 52.9 per cent. By 1943 our women were providing more than one-third of the country's coal miners. By the end of 1942, between 30 and 60 per cent of the workers and employees in our defense plants were women. They provided no small number of examples of highly productive labor and self-sacrifice. "Everything for the front, everything for victory!"—this slogan governed the life and work of all Soviet people.

Workers in the agricultural sector contributed their heroic efforts to victory in the war as well. The reader will be aware of the fact that during 1941 and 1942 many kolkhozes and sovkhozes were reestablished farther to the east, thousands of tractors transported, millions of quintals of grain and other agricultural products shipped and over 14 million head of cattle evacuated. The war years saw major expansions of the area sown to crops along the Volga, in the Urals and in Western Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and other parts of the country. Local party and economic administrative authorities directed efforts to insure that planting patterns represented to most effective use of the land available, to develop the subsidiary farms and, among other things, to insure that each oblast was able to supply itself with the agricultural products it needed. The general situation was complicated by the fact that the number of farm managers and rural communists, most of whom had been sent to the front, was dropping considerably.

Women and teenagers inevitably came to constitute the core of the rural workforce. Women became tractor drivers and combine operators and managed kolkhozes, and they did all this with a spirit of self-sacrifice and with a devotion of every ounce of effort. From the very beginning of the war one patriotic initiative after another was launched in the effort to spur agricultural production. The third day of the war, for example, saw female tractor operators of the Ramenskaya machine-tractor station in Moscow Oblast summon all female kolkhoz workers throughout the Soviet Union to an effort to master the operation of tractors, combines and automatic machinery so as to be able to replace the men who had gone to the front. This appeal found a widespread response. Thousands of women and girls became machinery operators.

It is difficult to measure the magnitude of the heroic contribution Soviet women made to the overall war effort. It would have to take account of more than simply the figures on enemy manpower and equipment losses and the shells, mines and tons of grain produced. The warmth of a mother's words and the loyalty of the wife warmed the hearts of the fighting man and spurred him on to truly heroic deeds in the name of victory and independence for the fatherland. It is symbolic that these days it was a Woman with eyes full of fear who looked down at the Soviet soldier from the "The motherland calls!" posters. She was summoning him to the battlefields, to rout the enemy and to win victory for the motherland.

The deep patriotism of Soviet women also manifested itself in their participation in the creation and maintenance of the defense fund. In September 1942, the women of Kyzyl-Koshun Kolkhoz of Takhtabazarskiy Rayon in the Turkmen SSR appealed to all women of the republic to contribute their jewelry and other valuables to
in support of the defense program and the production of military weapons and equipment. "We don't need finery when the motherland is in danger"—this was their slogan as they went about the task of collecting what ultimately amounted to 82 kilograms of silver and gold articles. This appeal sparked an enthusiastic response. By November 20, some 2980 kilograms of gold and silver items had come in and by December 1942—460 poods.

The same year saw the valuables collected by the women of Kalinin Oblast finance the formation of the Liza Chaykina Squadron, which was then added to the forces of the 630th Fighter Regiment. Money collected by the women of Novosibirsk Oblast funded the creation of three Krasnodon Heroes Squadrons, that by the women of Moldavia the Mariya Raskova Squadron, funds contributed by the women of Kirghiziya a "Boyevaya podruga" [Fighting Friend] aircraft etc.

The primary focus of the efforts of Soviet women of the postwar generations, as indeed of the efforts of the entire Soviet people, has been the economy. Our outstanding women are laboring selflessly and steadfastly with the objective in view of meeting the five-year-plan targets, improving production efficiency, increasing savings and economies and tightening production discipline. They are making an important contribution to the effort to implement the food program and to the development of Soviet science. Hundreds of thousands of our women occupy leading positions in a number of branches of our national economy. The women who have decided to devote their lives to a career in the Armed Forces are respected figures in our society. As officers, warrant officers and rank-and-file soldiers they are serving in a number of military occupational specialties, discharging their military obligations in an exemplary manner and continuing the traditions of the front-line veterans, while at the same time adding their own worthy contributions.

Wherever you find the Soviet women at work, you will find her demonstrating her enthusiasm for her work, her self-discipline and her capacity for organization. The motherland holds her heroic deeds in the highest esteem.

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SOKOLOV–OLAH TALKS

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[Unattributed report: "On an Official Friendly Visit"]

[Text] A Hungarian military delegation headed by Colonel General I. Olah, member of the NSZMP Central Committee and Hungarian minister of defense, arrived in the Soviet Union 11 June on an official friendly visit at the invitation of the Soviet government.

The Hungarian military delegation was met at the capital's Sheremetyevo Airport by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the armed forces and USSR first deputy defense minister; Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, USSR first deputy defense minister and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces; Army General V.L. Govorov, USSR deputy defense minister; Admiral A.I. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; Army General P.G. Lushev, commander of the Moscow Military District, and generals, admirals, and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Hungarian military delegation comprises Lieutenant General J. Pacsek, chief of the General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army and deputy defense minister; Lieutenant General F. Karpati, director of the Hungarian People's Army Main Political Directorate and deputy defense minister; Major General I. Narai, chief inspector of combat training of the Hungarian People's Army and deputy defense minister; Major General E. Kovacs, and other officials.

S. Rajnai, Hungarian ambassador to the USSR; and Major General L. Varga, military and air attaché at the Hungarian Embassy in the Soviet Union, were also in the welcoming party.

The state flags of Hungary and the USSR were flying at the airport. An honor guard was lined up on the tarmac, and the Hungarian and USSR state anthems were played.

Hungarian Defense Minister Colonel General I. Olah received the report from the commander of the honor guard and inspected the lineup of Soviet servicemen.
On the same day a meeting was held between Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, and Colonel General I. Olah, member of the MSZMP Central Committee and Hungarian defense minister. During a warm and friendly conversation questions of mutual interest were discussed.

Taking part in the conversation on the Soviet side were Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev; Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov; Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov; Army General V.L. Govorov; Admiral A.I. Sorokin, and other officials; and on the Hungarian side: Lieutenant General J. Pacsek; Lieutenant General F. Karpati; Major General I. Narai; Major General E. Kovacs; other members of the delegation, and S. Rajnai, Hungarian ambassador to the USSR.

On the same day, members of the Hungarian military delegation headed by Colonel General I. Olah laid wreaths at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin Wall.

Award Presentation

In the afternoon a presentation of Hungarian orders to a group of Soviet Military leaders took place at the Hungarian Embassy in the Soviet Union. On instructions of the Hungarian Presidential Council, the awards were presented by Colonel General I. Olah.

The award presentation ceremony was attended by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov; Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev; Army General Ye.F. Ivanovskiy; Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov; Army General V.L. Govorov; and Army General P.G. Lushev. S. Rajnai, Hungarian ambassador to the USSR, was also present.

The award recipients included Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, USSR first deputy defense minister and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces; Chief Marshal of Artillery V.F. Tolubko, USSR deputy defense minister; Army General A.I. Gribkov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces; Admiral A.I. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; Colonel General A.S. Zheltov, chairman of the Soviet War Veterans Committee, and others.

Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov delivered a speech on behalf of the award recipients.

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JUBILEE MEDAL ON 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF 'GREAT VICTORY'

USSR Supreme Soviet Decree

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 13 Apr 85 p 3

[Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Institution of the Jubilee Medal "40th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945"]

[Text] The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. In commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, the jubilee medal "40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" is instituted.

2. The Statute on the jubilee medal "40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" is ratified.

3. The description of the jubilee medal "40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" is ratified.

4. In connection with Article 1 of the present Ukase:

Article 17 of the General Statute on Orders, Medals, and Honorary Titles of the USSR, ratified by the 3 July 1979 Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1979, No 28, Article 479; 1982, No 28, Article 537) is supplemented after the words "Jubilee medal '30th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945'", with the words "Jubilee medal '40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.'"

Part Two of Point 4 and Part One of Point 7 of the Rules for Wearing Orders and Medals of the USSR, order ribbons and medal ribbons on boards, and other honorary decorations, ratified by the 28 March 1980 Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1980, No 14, Article 261; 1982, No 28, Article 537) is supplemented after the words "Jubilee medal '30th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945'", with the words "Jubilee medal '40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.'"

[signed] V. Kuznetsov, first deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
T. Menteshashvili, secretary of the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
Kremlin, Moscow, 12 April 1985

USSR Statute

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 13 Apr 85 p 3

[Statute on the Jubilee Medal "40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic
War of 1941-1945"]

[Text] 1. The jubilee medal "40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic
War of 1941-1945" is awarded to:

Military servicemen and civilian employees who took part in the combat actions
of the Great Patriotic War in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces, partisans of
the Great Patriotic War, participants in the underground, and other persons
awarded the medals "For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-
1945" or "For Victory over Japan";

Persons who worked in the rear and for their heroic labor during the Great Pat-
riotic War received orders of the USSR and the medals "For Valiant Labor in the
Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" and other USSR medals or were awarded the
medals "For the Defense of Leningrad," "For the Defense of Moscow," "For the
Defense of Odessa," "For the Defense of Sevastopol," "For the Defense of Staling-
grad," "For the Defense of Kiev," "For the Defense of the Caucasus," and "For
the Defense of the Soviet Polar Region";

Persons mentioned in the second part of this article are given the jubilee medal
with the inscription "Veteran of the War," while persons mentioned in the third
part have the inscription "Participant on the Labor Front."

2. The jubilee medal "40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of
1941-1945" is given in the name of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to:

Persons who have left the USSR Armed Forces -- by the military commissariats of
Union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, autonomous oblasts and okrugs,
rayons, and cities;

Military servicemen and civilian employees of the Soviet Army and Navy, troops
and organs of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR State Committee
for Security, and rank-and-file and leadership personnel of internal affairs
organs -- by the commanding officers of military units and large units and by
the chiefs of institutions;

Persons who worked in the rear and former partisans and underground members --
by the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of Union and autonomous republics and
the executive committees of kray, oblast, autonomous oblast and okrug, rayon, city,
and urban rayon Soviets of Peoples Deputies.
3. The jubilee medal "40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" is worn on the left side of the chest and placed after the jubilee medal "30th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."

[signed] T. Menteshashvili, secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet

Description of Medal

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 13 Apr 85 p 3

[Description of the jubilee medal "40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945"]

[Text] The jubilee medal "40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" is made of brass in the shape of a circle with a diameter of 32 millimeters.

On the front of the medal against a background of a five-pointed star, laurel wreaths, and commemorative flames in honor of Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War there is depicted a sculptural group composed of a soldier, a worker, and a woman kolkhoz member plus the Spasskaya Tower of the Moscow Kremlin. The dates "1945" and "1985" are in the upper part.

On the back of the medal are the following: in the upper part around the edge -- the inscription "Veteran of the War" or "Participant on the Labor Front"; in the middle -- the inscription "40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945"; in the lower part -- a depiction of the hammer and sickle and a ribbon. All the inscriptions and images are inset. There is a border around the edge of the medal.

The medal is connected by an eyelet and ring to a pentagonal ribbon bar holder covered with a silk moire ribbon 24 millimeters wide with three narrow longitudinal black stripes alternating with four narrow orange stripes and one red stripe 100 millimeters wide. The edges of the ribbon are finished with narrow green stripes.

[signed] T. Menteshashvili, secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet

11176
CSO: 1801/200
RIGIDITY OF INTERCEPT TRAINING METHODS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Vasin, deputy commander of the N Air Regiment, Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District, under the rubric "School of Air Training": "Forestall on the Attack"]

[Text] The fighter plane and the check target were traveling on a collision course. To intercept the target at maximum distance deputy squadron commander Major V. Balabanov had to solve a problem with numerous unknowns: precisely determine and carry out his maneuver to reach the line of attack; get the target onto automatic tracking by his onboard radar before the "enemy" detected him; and select the optimal distance for launching his missiles. Because of the enormous approach speed there was minimal time to adopt a plan. The pilot had to react instantly and carry out intelligent, calculated actions from the start of the intercept to the end.

To avoid revealing himself Major Balabanov delayed in switching the onboard radar to active mode. And he maneuvered so that he was on the "enemy's" sun side. All this enabled Balabanov to forestall the pilot playing the role of target in opening fire. His attack was accurate, as the data from the monitoring-recording equipment confirmed.

Combat pilot 1st class Major Balabanov tirelessly hones his skills at actions in different weather conditions and strives to make full use of the potential of the fighter-interceptor. He does not like rigid and stereotyped actions in performing the complex missions of contemporary battle, and he does everything possible to forestall the "enemy" in the maneuver and the attack.

But unfortunately, we must say that there are still some pilots who do not try to operate with this kind of determination and creativity. I recall the following instance...

A flight tactical exercise was underway. The next fighter took off. Soon it entered the concluding phase of the intercept. All that was left was, as they say, a question of technique: get the target onto automatic tracking and carry out the hypothetical missile launch. But the "enemy" made a skillful maneuver to escape the attack and himself took a tactically advantageous position for the attack...
But why was Captain V. Petrov, a first-class aerial fighter, unable to destroy the maneuvering target, especially when the man playing the role of "enemy" for him was a pilot rated one class lower? Here is why. The target and the fighter were traveling on perpendicular courses to one another. The "enemy" determined exactly when the interceptor, traveling at enormous speed, reached the optimal launch distance, and abruptly cuts its speed at this point. The interceptor did not anticipate this and, leaping past the target at great speed, found itself under attack. Thus the "enemy" was able to forestall the fighter pilot in the decisive maneuver for a devastating attack.

The officers from higher headquarters who were present at the exercise also pointed out a deeper reason for the failure: some pilots, including highly rated ones, had become accustomed to operating by definite patterns and stereotypes in the air. In fact, some people at that time even tried to find ways to justify this: we have a certain "set" of exercises, they would say, that we use to practice intercept methods and learn how to operate in particular situations. But in all honesty, I do not like these excuses. When analyzing our mistakes and failures, we must not forget miscalculations in methods of training pilots. We must always remember during combat training that a real enemy will not operate according to a definite, set pattern. He will try to use the whole range of possibilities open to him to escape the fighter plane's attack and achieve his objective. This means that readiness for a real intercept does not result from mechanically running up exercises, but above all involves the ability to think with tactical intelligence, anticipate the course of aerial battle, avoid confusion in a fast-changing situation, and make creative use of skills acquired during combat training.

How can we fail to remember here the words of three-times Hero of the Soviet Union A. I. Pokryshkin, who writes in his book "Kryly istrebiteley" [The Wings of the Fighter]: "The real value of the fighter pilot lies precisely in the fact that when the necessary moment comes he will not use those 100 or 200 learned battle methods that are good in definite situations, but will suddenly carry out a new one, the 101st or 201st, which originated at the critical moment of clash with the enemy."

We often say that experience from the front is our priceless possession. We read the books and memoirs of veterans of the front, see movies about the front, and never cease to be delighted by the daring of our fearless falcons and their vigorous, coordinated, and unexpected (by the enemy) actions. Surprise in the strike was their second weapon. And certainly its value is not less today!

It certainly is not. There is no need to demonstrate that to forestall the enemy in the maneuver for the attack and in the use of weapons is the primary mission of the group leader, of command post officers, and of every pilot. After all, the very first missile launches from maximum range can lead to the destruction of the enemy even before he detects the interceptors. And on the other hand, delay and lack of initiative in action will probably cause the battle to be lost.

The case of the unsuccessful intercept discussed above forced us to think over a number of things. Specifically, we had to look for ways to avoid stereotypes
in combat training and develop initiative, creativity, and tactical resourcefulness in trainees during planned flights and flight tactical exercises. On the initiative of the regimental commander the unit methods council studied this question. The recommendations they developed began to be used in all squadrons.

The main emphasis was put on the fundamental principle of teaching that which is necessary in war. Special exercises on training equipment were structured with this in mind. Considerable attention was given to theoretical training periods. During them the most diverse tactical situations were simulated, based on the tactics of the probable enemy. And during flights, especially during exercises, a situation was created which forced the pilots to exert all their mental and physical strength; unexpected tactical problems were given. All these things helped the airmen acquire skills in quick orientation in complex situations and intercepting under any conditions. And here is the result: the regiment came back from its next mission at the training range with a score of "five." It is noteworthy that not only the experienced aerial fighters, but also young pilots had outstanding results in destroying targets.

Nonetheless, the problem of training pilots with initiative who are capable of operating under any conditions of the air situation, including the most complex, is not as simple as it sometimes seems to some airmen. Some people still say that with supersonic aircraft equipped with the latest devices a pilot is able to perform highly complex missions. I agree that he is able to do this, but only on the condition that he has solid theoretical knowledge, strong flying skills, and the ability to evaluate a situation creatively and at the necessary moment carry out a maneuver that the enemy does not expect. These qualities have to be constantly instilled in the aerial fighter.

The experienced flight and squadron commanders of our regiment take this into account. Along with teaching flying skills, tactics, and combat application, they deliberately strive to see that their subordinates are able to orient themselves rapidly in complex air situations and make correct decisions where time and information are short. For example, during tactical skull sessions and group exercises military pilot 1st class Lt Col Yu. Yegorov gives tactical problems that demand quick decisions from the trainees. He often gives them incomplete information about the situation. Thus, the pilots have to recreate the whole picture from scattered information, which develops their ability to operate actively and with initiative when the situation in the air becomes more complex.

Working through combat training missions during flights offers the commander great opportunities to instill these qualities in pilots. When teaching airmen tactics and combat application, it is important to show the pilot graphically how to operate with greatest effect in different situations. Thus, Majors V. Miloserdov and M. Avramenko, experienced instructors and methodologists in our unit, often take the role of the plane under attack during the process of combat maneuvering. Then, carrying out an unexpected countermaneuver, they try to gain a tactical advantage, which shows their subordinates how vigorously the enemy will act in a real situation. Try, they say, to intercept him!

Experienced methodologist Lt Col V. Kostenko operates with intelligence and initiative in every aerial battle. He is able to demonstrate in the air, at the
correct time, the best tactical method to use in the particular situation to forestall the enemy on the attack. Once, for example, he took off in a pair with Capt Ye. Veselov to intercept an aerial target. The "enemy" proved resourceful. First he laid down interference, so that instrument guidance equipment had to be used to rendezvous with the target. Then, when the pair with Lt Col Kostenko as wingman closed with the "enemy," the latter employed an effective antifighter maneuver. But this did not take Lt Col Kostenko by surprise. He ordered Veselov to pursue the "enemy," while he swiftly carried out a vertical maneuver to gain altitude and with a half-roll brought the fighter plane to missile launching range. His strike was deadly accurate, and in the aerial battle his subordinate received good air training.

Veterans of the front would say: I forestalled the enemy, and defeated him. And, imposing their will on the enemy, they delivered strikes against him boldly and determinedly. This is exactly why the effort of aerial fighters to operate actively and with tactical intelligence should always be reinforced with identification of new reserves and the search for ways to take the initiative in battle. As experience shows, painstaking work, creativity, and resourcefulness during combat training and productive drills based on progressive methodology are what bring success. And we must always remember this when training and indoctrinating those to whom the defense of our Fatherland's air frontiers is entrusted.
REVIEW: VOLUME ON ZARNITSA MILITARY-SPORT GAMES

Moscow POLITICHESKOE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 3, 1985 (signed to press 25 Feb 85) pp 131-133

[Review by V. Kazarinova of the book "Vernost' geroicheskim traditsiyam. Partiynoye rukovodstvo voyenno-patrioticheskim i internatsionalnym vospitaniyem" (Loyalty to Heroic Traditions. Party Management of Military-Patriotic and International Indoctrination) by I. Kh. Yunak, first secretary of the Tula Oblast CPSU Committee, Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, 142 pages]

[Text] More than once the young people of the Land of Soviets have proven that they are ready and able to carry out their patriotic and international duty. The ideological work of the Communist Party deserves enormous credit for this. Preparation for celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory is playing a large party in further improvement of this work.

The book "Loyalty to Heroic Traditions" by first secretary of the Tula Oblast CPSU Committee I. Kh. Yunak thoroughly reviews the forms, methods, and experience of indoctrinating young people and the entire population of the oblast in the feelings of love for the socialist Homeland and class solidarity with the working people of all countries. Success in shaping and reinforcing these qualities is secured above all by management of party organs.

While revealing the essence of patriotic indoctrination, the author observes that young men and women know of the people's struggle for the freedom and independence of the Homeland and to stop oppression by the exploiters from their childhood years. The images and immortal deeds of the great sons of the Russian soil and the unprecedented courage of the Bolsheviks and defenders of the Fatherland during our years of trial become a priceless possession in the hearts and minds of young people and with time become woven into firm ideological convictions. The patriotic feelings of Soviet people are also shaped by the entire Soviet way of life and in the process of labor, moral, and ethical indoctrination. But a special role is played by military-patriotic propaganda and mass defense work, which are carried on in such fundamental areas as explaining and spreading Lenin's doctrine of defense of the socialist Fatherland and party and state decisions to carry it out; indoctrinating people with the example of the life and activities of V. I. Lenin and his brothers-in-arms and the heroic traditions of the Communist Party, the Soviet people, and the Armed Forces; dissemination of military knowledge among the population, especially young people;
and psychological, technical, and physical preparation of pre-draft-age young men for military service.

Needless to say, such a breakdown is quite arbitrary. The author stresses that military-patriotic indoctrination, like all ideological and political indoctrination work, is carried on in comprehensive fashion. And he shows how this is achieved. The party obkom assigns an important role, in particular, to coordinating the activities of party, state, and public organizations. Combined plenary sessions of the Komsomol and DOSAAF obkoms and the oblast organization of the Znaniye Society are held, with participation by the oblast department of public education, the oblast military commissariat, and the garrison Officers Club. The work of these organizations and institutions is carried on according to a plan of joint measures including, for example, annual science-practice conferences, regular seminars for secretaries of city and rayon party committees on questions of military-patriotic indoctrination and mass defense work, methodological meetings and demonstration training periods at the oblast House of Military-Technical Training of DOSAAF, and so on.

On the recommendation of the party obkom the rayons too have worked out such plans. Based on them party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations and lecturers of the Znaniye Society and DOSAAF committees, together with divisions of public education, military commissariats, and cultural education institutions, are propagandizing Lenin's theoretical heritage on the questions of defending the socialist Fatherland and the heroic traditions of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces.

The managers of various organizations take part in this work. For example, at one of the science-practice conferences devoted to preparing young people for service in the Armed Forces, the propaganda activists heard reports from the secretary of the CPSU obkom, the oblast military commissar, the secretary of the Komsomol obkom, the deputy chairman of the DOSAAF obkom, and the deputy chief of civil defense headquarters. Other science-practice conferences that were unquestionably useful to ideological workers were on topics such as "Ways and methods of improving the moral-political and psychological preparation of students in oblast DOSAAF training organizations" and "The role of technical and military-applied types of sports in instilling an activist life posture in Soviet young people and preparing them to defend the Homeland." In addition to such conferences the unified coordinated plan also envisions heroic-patriotic readings, excursions and hikes for young people to sites of revolutionary, combat, and labor glory, improving the work of clubs and universities of the future fighting man, activating the Timurov movement, and other measures.

The experience of work with lecturers engaged in military-patriotic propaganda which the book covers is also enlightening. Most of these lecturers are veterans of the party, Komsomol, and the Great Patriotic War and career officers who participate actively in mass political work and whose mobilizing words carry great indoctrinating impact. The Tula section of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, which is headed by Hero of the Soviet Union A. A. Rogozhin, has a methods council on military-patriotic indoctrination of young people and the DOSAAF committees have special departments for work with draft-age youth. They give the lecturers energetic help in preparing for and organizing appearances
at meetings with young people from Tula Oblast and at lessons in courage; in addition they analyze and disseminate progressive experience in military-patriotic work. The scope of this work can be judged from figures given in the book: the propaganda aktiv of the Tula section of the war veterans committees, which has 300 members, gave about 19,000 lectures on military-patriotic subjects in 1982. To improve the quality of the lectures, they hold seminars for lecturers regularly and develop topical aids and reading lists. To help propagandists and political information workers the methods councils of party committees prepare informational and methodological materials, practical assignments, and lists of graphic aids and technical means of party propaganda.

Military-patriotic propaganda is also carried on at peoples universities. There are 22 specialized peoples universities of military knowledge and military-patriotic indoctrination in the oblast. In addition, 39 faculties at other peoples universities study these problems. The total number of students is more than 7,000. The program of training periods includes lectures, topical subject evenings, oral magazines, meetings with fighting men, and excursions to battle sites and to museums of combat glory.

Taking into account the age characteristics of young people, oblast organizations, as the book shows, make broad use of emotionally saturated forms of mass political work: topical music evenings, movie programs, lecture-concerts, contests, and performances by amateur artistic collectives. As an example, in the oblast review of amateur artistic activities dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the defeat of the Nazis at Moscow and the heroic defense of Tula, 40 choreographic compositions with patriotic content were performed. Concerts under the slogan "Songs in Military Uniform" and band music holidays which draw thousands of listeners and viewers have become traditional in many houses of culture, clubs, and culture parks.

One of the most effective means of indoctrinating patriots, the book stresses, is the printed word. The author describes articles on military-patriotic subjects in the oblast newspaper KOMMUNAR, in particular, as distinguished by a variety of contents and forms and by their linkage of the heroic past with the present day. The newspaper regularly publishes material that shows the essence of Lenin's doctrine of war and defense of the socialist Fatherland and illuminates the guiding role of the Communist Party in realization of this doctrine and the significance of the combat cooperation of the Warsaw Pact states.

And it is especially valuable that the oblast mass information media give attention to the life and work of Tula people in the Armed Forces and show the ties between working people in the oblast and fighting men of the army and navy. Material under rubrics such as "Oblast natives serving the Homeland," "Officer is a heroic profession," "Everyday garrison life," "DOSAAF -- school of courage," and others appear regular in the newspapers KOMMUNAR and MOLODOY KOMMUNAR and in radio and television broadcasts. The editors enlist journalists from newspapers in the Transcaucasian, Moscow, Belorussian, and other military districts, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and the Black Sea, Northern, and other fleets in preparation of these publications. Motocross and bicycle races dedicated to Victory Day and volleyball tournaments for the teams of hero cities, which the oblast newspapers organize, are very popular. In recent years teams from
the Central Slovakian Oblast of Czechoslovakia, with whom Tula Oblast has fraternal friendship ties, have participated in the volleyball competition.

The party obkom, the author writes, is constantly analyzing and disseminating know-how in printed military-patriotic propaganda. Each year just before Press Day and Victory Day they summarize and publicize the results of competition for the best treatment of a heroic-patriotic subject by the mass information media. The winners are given certificates and awards.

The book treats many other forms of patriotic indoctrination and mass defense work. It is noted, in particular, that the curricula at the Tula Model Combined DOSAAF Technical School, the Young Artilleryman School attached to the Tula Artillery School, the Shchekino Club for Young Pilots and Cosmonauts, and the summer military sports camps devote considerable attention to political education and instilling lofty moral-political qualities in pre-draft and draft-age young people.

The author sees the result and effectiveness of all the ideological indoctrination and mass defense activity of oblast organizations in the fact that a large majority of the working people and draftees of the oblast are devoting all their efforts to strengthening the economic and defense might of their native state and perform their military duty conscientiously.

We have spoken above mainly of military-patriotic indoctrination. That is not accidental, for that is exactly what the book devotes its primary attention to. Experience with international indoctrination of the working people of Tula Oblast, unfortunately, receives less detailed treatment. And the work also has certain other shortcomings. We will note, for example, that the author, seemingly swamped by excessive factual material, sometimes repeats similar examples for different occasions, whereas the supporting material for some points related to the forms and methods of propagandizing Lenin's theoretical heritage is not carried through fully and remains limited to general statements. Publications on such a subject also offer an opportunity to treat the quite important question of indoctrination with examples of heroism in unselfish, everyday labor. Otherwise some young people will think that heroic deeds are only for heroes in special conditions and they will not be ready to overcome the difficulties of everyday military life.

Party and ideological cadres and the propaganda aktiv will find much that is useful in the book for improving their activities in the area of indoctrinating people in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism.

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11176
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MSU KULIKOV ON ARMED FORCES' WWII 'LIBERATION MISSION'

Moscow POLITICHESKOY SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 3, 1985 (signed to press 25 Feb 85) pp 40-48

[Article by MSU V. Kulikov, first deputy USSR minister of defense, commander of the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries: "The Liberation Mission of Soviet Armed Forces in World War II"]

[Text] Victory Day, 9 May 1945, occupies a special place in the pages of world history. The victory of the freedom-loving peoples over fascism, achieved at the cost of uncountable sacrifice and deprivation and washed with the tears of mothers and widows, was one of the portentous mileposts of human history and will remain such forever. There is no country on earth which was not affected by the consequences of the victory over the forces of fascism and militarism in World War II. And how vivid and majestic, in the grateful memory of people and in the flashes of the Eternal Flame on the graves of the immortal heroes, is the feat of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who defended the freedom and independence of their socialist Fatherland in battle against the Nazis and their satellites and carried out their great mission of liberation, which showed vividly the internationalism of the Soviet social and state order.

It was the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, as the CPSU Central Committee decree on the 40th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 emphasizes, who "made the decisive contribution to victory over fascist Germany and its allies, to liberation of the peoples of Europe from fascist enslavement, and to saving world civilization; they performed their patriotic and international duty with honor. This is their greatest service to humanity."

The victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism once again reaffirmed the profound truth of Lenin's conclusions on the invincibility of the new social order born of Great October, on the impossibility of conquering a people who are defending their socialist Fatherland, and on the superiority of the socialist state which is capable, under the leadership of the Communist Party, of making the most effective use of material and spiritual potential to achieve victory.

In our day too the Soviet State and the CPSU are in the vanguard of the struggle for peace and social progress and are doing everything they can to normalize the political climate on the planet, bridle the forces of militarism and aggression, and avert the threat of nuclear war which hangs over all the peoples of the earth.
The Soviet people spare neither effort nor means to strengthen the defense capability of their country. "We cannot help seeing," Comrade K. U. Chernenko emphasized in his talk at the 15 November 1984 session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, "the growing aggressiveness of imperialism, its attempts to achieve military superiority over the socialist community. Our country does not intend to attack anyone. This is clear to every reasonable person. But we will strengthen our defense capability, protecting the peaceful labor of Soviet people and defending the cause of peace throughout the world."

Fascist Germany's aggression against the Soviet Union in June 1941 radically changed the sociopolitical meaning, scale, and nature of World War II. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War there began an armed class struggle between two opposed social systems -- the socialist state and the shock forces of world reaction, who yearned to destroy the freedom and independence of the USSR peoples and threatened their social gains. The struggle of the Land of Soviets against the fascist aggressors was a just war, in defense of the socialist Fatherland and our achievements in building a new society which embodied the hopes and desires of working people of the whole world. In no other war has a people defended such lofty ideals and material blessings. All these factors predetermined a unity and solidarity in the peoples of the USSR such as had never before been seen in the history of wars, their unbending spirit and enormous will to victory.

Almost all of continental Europe was under the yoke of fascist Germany and the threat of invasion hung over England at the moment that the USSR was invaded. The Nazi leadership had developed strategic plans to thrust its troops into the Near and Middle East and conquer the countries of Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The entire world faced a real danger of fascist enslavement. Therefore, the Soviet-German front decided not only the destiny of history's first socialist state, the bulwark of the working people of all the world, but also the fate of progress and democracy, of all world civilization. From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War our country became the center of gravity for all freedom-loving forces, the nucleus around which all the peoples who had fallen under the yoke of fascism or were threatened with enslavement united.

A huge responsibility lay on the shoulders of our fighting men and all Soviet people -- to smash and drive the fascist aggressors out of our land and assist the peoples of the occupied countries in their struggle for freedom and independence. The international ideas of the struggle against fascism were defined in directives and decrees of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)], the USSR Council of People's Commissars, and the State Committee for Defense.

The Communist Party and the Soviet State undertook at the same time measures to solidify all the countries who were opposing German aggression and to form an anti-Hitler coalition. Ways were found to set up and consolidate a broad anti-fascist coalition of freedom-loving peoples and this coalition played a major part in achieving victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism.

The Soviet Union and its Armed Forces bore the brunt of the struggle against Hitler's Germany. The majesty of the Soviet people's achievement lies above all
in the fact that they stopped the fascist aggressor, destroyed his main military forces, and defended the world's first socialist state. In this way the Soviet people performed their great international mission to the working people of other countries.

The liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces is inseparably linked with the international essence of the Soviet State. This mission was a natural and predictable continuation of Soviet foreign policy, which is based on the principles of proletarian internationalism. Consistent implementation of this policy was a clear expression of the loyalty of our people to Lenin's teaching that true internationalists "must not think only of their own nation; they must place the interests of all, the general liberty and equality of all, above their own nation" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], Vol 30, pp 44-45).

The liberation mission of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in World War II took a number of specific forms, military, political, ideological, and economic.

The most important and decisive condition for fulfillment by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces of their international duty -- freeing millions of citizens of various European countries from fascist enslavement and physical destruction -- was crushing the military might of fascist Germany and its allies and smashing their armed forces.

The Soviet Union and its Armed Forces exercised a decisive influence on the course and outcome of all World War II. From June 1941 to May 1945 the Soviet-German front was the main front of World War II. It was there that the fate of the military-political goals set by the warring coalitions was decided. This was the main center of armed battle. It was on this front that the largest battles, those which fundamentally changed the course of World War II, took place.

In the Battle of Moscow (September 1941-April 1942) the plan of "blitzkreig" against the USSR was thwarted. The German fascist troops suffered their first major defeat in World War II. The victory at Moscow was the beginning of the turning point in the armed struggle against the fascist aggressors. In the great battles of Stalingrad (July 1942-February 1943), Kursk (July-August 1943), and the Dnepr (August-December 1943) the Soviet Armed Forces achieved a fundamental turning point in the Great Patriotic War and World War II as a whole. The results of the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front in 1943 completely dispelled the doubts of foreign skeptics as to the ability of the Soviet Army on its own to smash the Wehrmacht and had a significant influence on the policies and strategy of the USSR's Western allies. They marked the beginning of the process of disintegration of the aggressive fascist bloc.

No other fronts of World War II can compare with the Soviet-German front in terms of losses suffered by German fascist forces there. For example, the loss of personnel inflicted on the Nazi armies on the Soviet-German front was four times greater than in the Western European and Mediterranean theaters taken together, and six times greater in terms of killed and wounded. It was in fighting against the Soviet Army that the Nazis lost up to 75 percent of all tanks and assault guns they lost during the war, plus more than 75 percent of their aviation losses and 74 percent of the artillery pieces lost. Thus, the Soviet Armed Forces, in
bitter fighting, knocked out the bulk of enemy troops and military equipment; in other words, they performed a mission that no bourgeois army could.

The victories of the Soviet Armed Forces created favorable conditions to step up the antifascist liberation struggle of the peoples of occupied countries and countries dependent on Germany. Communists, loyal sons of their peoples, were in the front ranks of this struggle. Under their direction and with them in a leading role, national fronts were formed, all progressive forces stood together, and the liberation movement began to rise. The fighting men of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, partisan detachments in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and participants in the Resistance movement in Greece, Albania, France, Italy, and other European countries intensified their strikes against the fascist aggressors. The patriots of Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary waged the antifascist struggle under difficult conditions. Inspired by the victories of the Soviet Army the peoples of China and the Southeast Asian countries stepped up their struggle against the Japanese aggressors.

1944 was the year of the decisive victories on the Soviet-German front. Our Armed Forces developed offensives in all strategic axes. As a result of these operations the State Border of the USSR was restored along almost its entire length, and combat operations moved beyond the bounds of our country. A qualitatively new phase of the liberation mission began -- direct liberation of countries and peoples from fascist enslavement, by the Soviet Army.

About 7 million Soviet fighting men fought stubbornly against the Nazis in the countries of Europe for more than a year, and 1.5 million fought the Japanese militarists in August-September 1945. Participants in combat operations to liberate the countries of Europe and Asia, which ended in the utter defeat of the enemy, were 11 front formations, 2 air defense fronts, 4 fleets, 50 combined arms armies, 6 tank armies, 13 air armies, 3 air defense armies, and 3 flotillas. In performing its liberation mission the USSR Armed Forces conducted a series of front operations and operations by groups of fronts in foreign territory. This included such vast operations in terms of scale and results as the Belorussian (second phase), Jassy-Kishinev, Lvov-Sandomierz, Budapest, Vienna, Belgrade, Wisla-Oder, Berlin, Prague, Manchurian, and other operations. Soviet fighting men demonstrated mass heroism in the concluding battles of the Great Patriotic War. Millions of soldiers and officers were selected for lofty government awards -- orders and medals of the USSR, and tens of thousands of members of the Soviet Army and Navy were given foreign state awards.

During 1944 and 1945 peoples liberation armies, partisans, and foreign units formed in the USSR during the war years fought side by side with our fighting men in a number of European and Asian countries.

The Peoples Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, the Polish Army and Polish partisans, the Czechoslovak Army Corps, and Czech and Slovak partisans waged combat operations in close cooperation with Soviet troops. After the fall of the fascist monarchies and the victory of antifascist uprisings in Romania and Bulgaria, the armies of these countries took part in the armed struggle against Hitler's Germany.
Members of the Polish Army fought together with Soviet fighting men in the Lublin-Brest, Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian, and Berlin operations. The Belgrade operation was carried out by the joint efforts of the Soviet Army, the Peoples Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, and units of the Bulgarian Army. Cooperation by Soviet, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav troops in the Balaton defensive operation and by Soviet, Romanian, and Bulgarian forces in the Budapest offensive operation was successful. Subunits of Hungarian volunteers took part in the fighting for Budapest. Large units of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian armies participated in the Vienna offensive operation conducted by Soviet troops. Two Romanian armies, one Polish army, and a Czechoslovak army corps fought in the Prague operation together with Soviet troops.

In August-September 1945 the Mongolian Peoples Army, the Peoples Liberation Army of China, and Korean partisans participated actively in the combat operations of Soviet troops to liberate Northeastern China and North Korea from the Japanese militarists.

The Armed Forces of the USSR operated on the basis of the principles of proletarian solidarity and the norms of international law; they entered the territory of foreign countries in conformity with intergovernmental or international agreements. Soviet troops defended the lofty ideals of liberty and democracy, did not interfere in the domestic affairs of the countries being liberated, and respected their national customs and traditions. By this our fighting men won recognition by the broad masses of people in these countries.

An inseparable part of the liberation mission of the Soviet Union during World War II was comprehensive moral-political, diplomatic, material, and other aid to the fighting peoples.

This aid was given throughout the entire war and grew with each year. The USSR became the bulwark of the united front of peoples, the center around which all progressive forces united. Foreign bureaus of a number of communist parties and antifascist committees operated in the USSR; their activity was an important factor in activating the liberation struggle of peoples in the countries enslaved by fascism.

The Soviet Union helped the peoples of a number of foreign countries to establish national military formations. Large units of two Polish armies, a Czechoslovak army corps, two Romanian volunteer divisions, and two Yugoslav brigades (tank and infantry) plus other units and large units of all arms of troops were formed, trained, and armed in Soviet territory. The total number of personnel of foreign formations formed with USSR help exceeded 550,000 by the end of the war.

The comprehensive fraternal aid given by the Soviet Union to the peoples of Central and Southeast European countries in the concluding phase of the war played an important part in the establishment and strengthening of people armies. The USSR gave these countries significant quantities of small arms, artillery, tanks, and aircraft. Large amounts of money, means of transportation, gear, and food were allocated for the fraternal armies.

At the request of the governments of the liberated countries, the Soviet Union helped them train cadres and organize and conduct combat training for the peoples
armies. For this purpose the Government of the USSR sent Soviet generals and officers to the Polish Army for temporary duty and to Czechoslovak \, Yugoslav, and Romanian troops as advisors and instructors. In addition, hundreds of commanding officers of the Polish, Czechoslovak \, Yugoslav, and Romanian armies went through training in our military schools.

In November 1944 the Soviet Union turned over an air group consisting of two air divisions to operational subordination of the supreme command of the Yugoslav Peoples Liberation Army, and this group carried on combat operations until the end of World War II.

The significant help given by the USSR in building up the new peoples armies was a vivid manifestation of performance of international duty and an important contribution to solidifying the antifascist combat cooperation of peoples. But this was not all the aid and support that the Soviet Union gave to the liberation struggle of the peoples of the countries enslaved by fascism.

In performing its international duty to the freedom-loving peoples, the Soviet Union did everything necessary to strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition. Throughout the war its political-diplomatic activity was an example of fulfillment of the obligations it assumed and consistent implementation of the strategic foreign policy line according to the liberation goals of the war proclaimed in documents of the Communist Party and Soviet State. These obligations were formulated in the declaration of the Government of the USSR at the Allied conference in London in September 1941. The declaration set the goal of securing the earliest possible defeat of the aggressors and defending the right of each people to national state independence, the right to establish the social order and select the form of government that they would deem wise and necessary and to strive for a postwar world order that would correspond to the ideals of the liberated peoples and the establishment of international cooperation and friendship.

The Soviet Government used all available political and diplomatic means to achieve the assigned goals, including political announcements and declarations, plus allied conferences, meetings, negotiations, and the like. But the consistent Soviet foreign policy line aimed at defending the independence and sovereign rights of peoples met constant resistance from the ruling circles of the United States and England, who were striving to use the war to achieve their own imperialist goals. They tried in every possible way to obstruct the progressive changes taking place in a number of countries during the antifascist, liberation struggle of peoples and to prevent democratic governments from coming to power.

By contrast, the Soviet Union did everything possible to give political support to progressive, democratic forces. USSR help played a large part in the formation and consolidation of the people's order in a number of foreign states.

For example, the Soviet Union supported the resolutions adopted in November 1943 by the second session of the Antifascist Veche of Peoples Liberation of Yugoslavia on formation of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia as a provisional government and on depriving the king and his government of their authority. In February 1944 a Soviet military mission attached to the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia began work, and on 12 April a military mission from the Committee arrived in Moscow.
When the Polish National Liberation Committee was formed as the central organ of executive power during the antifascist liberation struggle of the Polish people, on 26 June 1944 the Soviet Government signed the Agreement on Relations between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and the Polish administration, acknowledging the power of the Liberation Committee in all of liberated Poland. A representative of the Soviet Government to the Polish National Liberation Committee was accredited in the liberated city of Lublin, and a representative of the Committee to the Soviet Government was accredited in Moscow.

The Soviet Government firmly defended the interests and sovereignty of the peoples of the liberated countries in the meetings of the heads of government of the three great powers -- the USSR, the United States, and England -- in Teheran (28 November - 1 December 1943), Yalta (4-11 February 1945), and Potsdam (17 July - 2 August 1945) conferences. The Soviet delegation, defending the interests of the Polish people, got an agreement signed at the Potsdam conference which established a new Polish border on the Oder-Western Neisse line.

The policy of the USSR, which was directed to restoring the national sovereignty of peoples, found vivid expression in relations with Czechoslovakia. As early as 12 December 1943 the Soviet Government signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar Cooperation with Czechoslovakia. This treaty created a guarantee that the country's independence would be restored. Under an agreement with Czechoslovakia on 8 May 1944, territory liberated by Soviet forces was transferred wholly to sovereign control by Czech organs of power.

History knows no other examples of such great humanism as were shown by the Soviet Union in aiding the peoples of foreign countries to eliminate the economic consequences of fascist domination and restore normal conditions for the population of the liberated countries and rebuild their war-ravaged economies. Everywhere our liberation army went it gave help in supplying food to the population. Soviet fighting men risked their lives to disarm mines in buildings and restore industrial enterprises. The Soviet command attached great importance to organizing normal, peaceful life.

The working people of the liberated countries acquired a dependable supporter in the person of the world's first socialist state. The comprehensive aid of the Soviet Union helped bolster the position of progressive, democratic forces and of people's power in a number of European and Asian countries and marked the birth of a new type of relations among peoples who had adopted the socialist way.

The Soviet Union gave its unselfish aid and support not only to the peoples of countries occupied by the fascists, but also to the peoples of those countries which had been allies of Nazi Germany.

Our country and its people, who endured enormous sacrifices in the war, never operated from a desire for revenge. The Soviet Government pursued one goal -- complete elimination of fascist regimes, restoration of democratic liberties, and the rebirth of democratic, peace-loving states.

After Romania and Bulgaria declared war on Germany in 1944, the Soviet Union recognized them as its allies. Later Hungary and Finland declared war on Germany, which was a result of the successful actions of Soviet troops combined with the Soviet Union's policy of defending the national interests of these peoples.
Thanks to the political activity of the USSR, the humane conditions of the armistice agreements signed with Bulgaria, Finland, and Hungary in September 1944 - January 1945 opened a new page in the history of diplomacy, secured the national interests of these countries, and prevented their subjugation by the imperialists.

The Soviet Government consistently advocated resolving the German problem by demilitarization and democratization of the German state on the mandatory condition that Nazism be eradicated and the fascist military machine destroyed. Soviet diplomacy held firmly to this line at the conferences of heads of the governments of the USSR, United States, and Great Britain in Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, striving to completely preclude the possibility of repeated aggression by Germany and to establish conditions for the development of a unified, democratic, peace-loving German state.

The Soviet Union, as everyone knows, opposed the economic subjugation of Germany. Specifically, at the Yalta conference on 5 February 1945 our delegation announced that in working out its own reparation plan the Soviet Government had in mind creating conditions under which the German people would be able to live in the postwar years at the average European living standard (see "Krymskaya konferentsiya rukovoditeley trekh soyuznikh derzhav -- SSSR, SSHA i Velikobritanii (4-11 fevralya 1945 g.). Sb. dokum." [The Crimean Conference of Leaders of the Three Allied Powers -- the USSR, United States, and Great Britain (4-11 February 1945). Collection of Documents], Moscow, 1984, p 75).

The Soviet Government and the command of Soviet forces could not be unconcerned at the grave economic position to which fascist domination had led the German people. As a result of measures taken by them, in a very short period of time normal life was re-established in Berlin and other cities of East Germany that had been liberated by Soviet troops. After the end of the war the USSR rejected most of the reparations belonging to it, even though our country itself had lost about 30 percent of its national wealth in the war years and the direct material loss of the Soviet Union caused by Germany and its allies in the territory they occupied was 679 billion rubles. Such an unselfish policy toward a defeated country was in full accord with the class nature of the Land of Soviets and with the ideology and policy of the Communist Party.

The victory of the peoples of the anti-Hitler coalition in World War II, won with the world's first socialist state playing a decisive role, had a profound impact on the entire subsequent course of world development and led to a fundamental change in the ratio of forces in favor of democracy and socialism. People's democratic and socialist revolutions were victorious in a number of European and Asian countries as a result of the crushing of German fascism and Japanese militarism. Socialism moved beyond the bounds of a single country and became a world system. A crushing blow was delivered to the imperialist colonial system and the position of all progressive, democratic, peace-loving forces was strengthened.

"The peoples of the world," General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and President of the CzSSR G. Husak observed at the ceremonial meeting in Moscow in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation
of the USSR, "will never forget what the Soviet Union did to save human civilization in the implacable struggle against fascism" (PRAVDA 23 December 1982).

The ruling circles of imperialism and the mass information and propaganda media which are in their hands try to distort the causes, nature, course, and outcome of World War II and the significance of the liberation mission of the USSR Armed Forces.

The essential features of all the fabrications by the falsifiers of history are attempts to defame socialism, play down the decisive role of the USSR in crushing fascism, make peoples forget their feelings of appreciation and gratitude toward the Soviet Union, and finally leave undisclosed, conceal the real meaning of the war, its antifascist, liberation meaning from the standpoint of the peoples of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition. For this purpose bourgeois ideologists distort the foreign policy of the Communist Party and Soviet State during World War II, especially in its concluding stage and ascribe to the USSR aggressive goals and a desire to subdue other peoples which are not consistent with the nature of the Soviet State, and to impose unsuitable social orders on them by force. The falsifiers try vainly to show by this that the great liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces was nothing more than "exporting revolution."

Reactionary historians make great efforts to defame the noble moral character of Soviet liberation troops, who gave their lives to rid humanity of the threat of enslavement by fascism.

The purpose of such allegations is to undermine the international reputation of the USSR, arouse distrust of its present-day foreign policy actions, sow hostility among the countries of the socialist community, and most importantly, justify the aggressive policy of imperialism and the arms race. But the plans of the imperialists and their henchmen are doomed to fail. Progressive humanity will never forget the heroic deeds of our soldiers and officers who carried out their great liberation mission during World War II and rate the achievements of Soviet people in the name of the triumph of peace and progress very highly.

The combat cooperation of the fraternal peoples and armies, which was born and grew strong in the common struggle against fascism, became in the postwar years the basis for the establishment and consolidation of the community of socialist states. Under these conditions the international mission of the USSR Armed Forces took on new meaning. Now we and the armies of the countries allied with us faced the mission of securing the defense of the gains of socialism. In other words, with the formation of the world socialist system the question of armed defense of the cause of socialism and communism went beyond the boundaries of a single country, acquired an international character, and became a part of the problem of strengthening the unity and cooperation of the socialist countries.

In conformity with this objective necessity, during the first postwar decade an organizational restructuring was carried out in all the armies of the countries of people's democracy, with active assistance from Soviet officers, generals, and admirals, and a more up-to-date training base was established for training troops and staffs. The Soviet Union continued to deliver military machinery, weapons,
and military gear. Many officers and generals from the armies of the socialist countries go through training in Soviet military schools. This guarantees that their armed forces will be replenished with highly qualified military specialists.

The Warsaw Pact Organization has become a dependable shield to defend the socialist gains of the peoples. This organization embodies Lenin's lofty ideas of proletarian internationalism and fraternal solidarity among working people. For three decades already this voluntary defensive alliance of sovereign states has reliably served the cause of international security.

The Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community are waging a historic battle for peace on earth. This is in the interests of all peoples on our planet. A large majority of the human race supports the line of avoiding the threat of war and peaceful co-existence. The peace-loving forces are capable of presenting a mighty barrier against aggressive imperialist circles.

Having come into conflict with the will of the peoples who oppose war, the U.S. imperialists have recently been donning peacemaker clothing. But this is only words, camouflage. In reality they persistently follow a militaristic course in international affairs. The most dangerous of their unprincipled, risky moves is to threaten the established military-strategic equilibrium, to aim for military superiority. In the international situation that has developed through the fault of the imperialists, above all the U.S. administration, the Soviet Union and its allies are forced to take appropriate responding steps to insure their own security, raise the level of combat readiness of their armies, improve control of them, and provide them with technical equipment.

The Soviet Armed Forces, in a single combat formation with the fighting men of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries, are showing great vigilance and are always ready to perform their patriotic and international duty, avert the threat of war, and preserve the peace for the present and future generations. Soviet fighting men wholly and completely support the foreign and domestic policy of the Communist Party and are filled with determination to mark the 40th anniversary of the world-historic Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the upcoming 27th CPSU Congress with new successes in combat and political training. These patriotic aspirations have been embodied in the socialist competition that has developed among fighting men of the army and navy under the slogan "Dedicate our selfless military labor to the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress!"

The Soviet people have given the armed defenders of the Homeland first-class weapons and the most modern combat equipment. Mastering these weapons is the decisive condition of the constant readiness of the fighting men to carry out any order to defend the socialist Fatherland and the gains of socialism.

The most important task of all the forces of peace and progress is to bridle the forces of imperialism and aggression. The results and lessons of World War II teach us this. And people turn to the history of the war to learn how to avoid an even more terrible tragedy for humanity.

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EDITORIAL ON 1941 INVASION ANNIVERSARY

PM241539 Moscow KRASNAYA AVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 85 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "History Teaches Vigilance"]

[Text] There are dates written in letters of gold in the pages of man's historical annals. One such date is 9 May 1945—the glorious day of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, whose 40th anniversary we celebrated so widely and solemnly together with all progressive mankind. The years of the war were long and grim and the path to victory was a hard one. It began 44 years ago—22 June 1941. On that day began the grimmest ordeal ever to befall the Soviet people and their armed forces.

The war left a legacy such that its results and lessons are still continuing and will continue for a long time to influence the entire course and nature of world development and people's consciousness. And today there is a special reason to remember these lessons in order to prevent a repetition of the past, to protect the peoples of the Soviet Union and the other states of the great socialist community and all mankind from a repetition of the past, from the threat of nuclear missile war.

The sinister shadow of World War II loomed over the peoples long before its first battles were launched. It arose when some people could not and others would not prevent the establishment of Hitlerism in power, when leading groupings of monopoly capital began to manipulate the expansion of German fascism, directing it Eastward, and persistently pushed Hitler to attack the Soviet Union. The Western powers' policy and their connivance with Hitler's aggression and refusal to create a system of collective security, for which the USSR was fighting, or to act in a single front with the Soviet Union against the Nazi adventurers resulted in a grave tragedy for the peoples of Europe and the whole world and brought very grave disasters and uncounted victims.

War could have been prevented by collective efforts. But the eyes of the Western leaders of the time were dimmed by hatred of socialism. The occupation of almost all of West Europe, bombing raids on London, and the attack on Pearl Harbor were needed for their cynical calculations to collapse and their unfounded hopes to crumble. The brilliant victories of the Soviet Army were needed for the agreements on cooperation with the Soviet Union in the struggle against fascism to acquire material force.
One of the main lessons of World War II is in fact that states of opposite social natures can pool their efforts in the struggle against a common enemy, find mutually acceptable solutions, and act effectively to achieve a joint aim. The cooperation between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and the real understanding of the new situation which took shape in the world after the defeat of fascism were also reflected in the postwar settlement which accorded with the interests of the long-awaited peace and in the decisions of the allied conferences in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

This must be recalled, because today all peoples of the world have a single common enemy—the threat of nuclear war—and a single most important task—eliminating that threat. The ceremonial meeting in Moscow to mark the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War noted: "Unfortunately, history is repeating itself. And today, more than ever, it is a case of vigilance with regard to the intrigues of those who are pushing the world toward the abyss—a nuclear abyss this time."

Vigilance is what is taught by the history of the Great Patriotic War, which began with the perfidious attack by Hitler's Germany on the Soviet Union 44 years ago. Vigilance is what is required by the complex and dangerous situation in the international arena that has taken shape in our day.

The imperialist reaction is totally reluctant to agree with the social and international political results of World War II. It is seeking to achieve a kind of historical revenge, to crowd out socialism and the other democratic forces, spearheading its strategy primarily against the USSR. U.S. imperialism is on the frontlines of the threat of war. U.S. policy has become a constant negative factor of international relations.

The aggressive aspirations of the U.S. ruling elite are manifested in attempts to undermine the military-strategy equilibrium—that foundation of international security—and in the harking of the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, and in dangerous plans to militarize space. The United States is trying to foist on the world community its claims to some kind of exclusiveness and special destiny in history and to dominion over the entire planet. It has drawn many other capitalist countries, above all those belonging to NATO and Japan, into the orbit of its aggressive and hegemonistic policy. The reliance on strength, on state terrorism, on impudent interference in the affairs of independent states and peoples—that is the credo of the Washington administration's policy, which is causing mounting alarm throughout the world.

As in the prewar years, the Soviet Union is warning again and again of the looming peril and is pointing out where the threat to all mankind comes from. Clearly aware of the dimensions of this threat, conscious of their responsibility for the destiny of peace, and always mindful of the grim lessons of the war, our country and the other Warsaw Pact countries are doing everything necessary to protect themselves against any encroachments. They will not allow the disruption of the military-strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO. That is the immutable policy of the Soviet Union and all states of the socialist community. "We will continue to adhere to this policy because we have firmly understood once and for all what the past has taught us," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev has pointed out.
Early on that June morning in 1941 the grandfathers and fathers of the present Soviet Armed Forces servicemen faced the Hitlerite hordes' sudden attack. In fierce fighting they fulfilled their patriotic and international duty to the end and did everything for the spring of victory to come. The present generation of Soviet servicemen, loyal to their immortal behests, is sacrely preserving and augmenting their unfading traditions. Educated by Lenin's party, to whose ideals they are boundlessly devoted, and supplied with the powerful weapons presented to them by the Soviet people, they are vigilantly standing guard over the security of their beloved fatherland and peace and security throughout the world. Advancing to greet the 27th Congress of the Party of Communists, the Soviet Army and Navy servicemen are seeking ever new successes in improving their combat skill.

The sacred duty of the Soviet servicemen to the motherland and people consists in unremitting vigilance and in the need to enhance their combat readiness. That is what history teaches them.

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DOCUMENTS ON 'LIBERATING MISSION' OF ARMED FORCES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 85 (signed to press 19 Feb 85) pp 29-31


[Text] At this time 40 years ago, in bitter fighting in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany, the Soviet Armed Forces were on the verge of finally destroying the enemy and achieving the ultimate objective of their great liberating mission, that is, helping the peoples of Europe still under the yoke of fascism to bring down this bloody regime and win their freedom and independence. The documents we publish in this little collection dramatically illuminate the noble moral character of the liberating Soviet fighting men, who spared not even their lives in the effort to free mankind from the menace of enslaving fascism.

Declaration of the Government of the USSR on Austria

Moscow

April 9, 1945

Smashing up and pursuing the German fascist armies, the Red Army has penetrated Austrian territory and invested the Austrian capital, Vienna.

Unlike the Germans in Germany, the people of Austria are resisting the evacuation which the Germans are attempting, remaining in place and joyously greeting the Red Army as the liberator of Austria from the yoke of the Hitlerites.

The Soviet Government does not pursue the objective of acquiring any portion of Austrian territory or of altering the social structure of Austria. The Soviet Government stands on the principles of the Moscow declaration of the allied powers on the independence of Austria. It will implement this declaration. It will assist in the liquidation of the regime established by the German fascist occupiers and in the restoration in Austria of a democratic order and democratic institutions.
The Supreme High Command of the Red Army has ordered Soviet forces to assist the Austrian people in the achievement of these objectives.

Declaration of the Military Council of the 3d Ukrainian Front on the Provision Provisioning of Vienna

From the Army in the Field

April 21, 1945

In view of the critical shortage of food and the great delays being encountered in the effort to provision the people of Vienna and of the fact that at the present time it is impossible to bring in food from the outlying areas, the front military council decrees:

That provisions in the following quantities be transferred to the Vienna city administration:

1. Grain ................................................................. 7000 t
2. Corn ................................................................. 500 t
3. Groats (coarse grain and flour) .................................. 2000 t
4. Beans ................................................................. 1000 t
5. Peas ................................................................. 1000 t
6. Meat ................................................................. 300 t
7. Sugar ................................................................. 200 t
8. Salt ................................................................. 200 t
9. Vegetable oil (unprocessed) ..................................... 200 t
10. Oil-bearing crops ................................................. 1000 t

The chief of front rear services will complete this transfer by April 25, 1945.

F. Tolbukhin, Marshal of the Soviet Union
Commander, 3d Ukrainian Front

V. Layok, Lieutenant General
Member of military council,
3d Ukrainian Front

A. Zheltov, Colonel General
Member of military council,
3d Ukrainian Front

Excerpt of report of member of military council of 5th Shock Army to Commander of 1st Belorussian Front on political attitude of residents of Berlin toward measures introduced by Soviet command

Berlin

May 15, 1945

The end of the war and a number of steps taken by the Soviet command to begin to restore the situation in Berlin, particularly to provide the residents of the city with food, have had a dramatic impact on their political attitude and morale. Many Berliners will emphasize in private conversation that of the events of the past year, only those of the last few weeks have given them anything to feel good about, and as paradoxical as it may seem, these have been associated with the Red Army's entry into Berlin... With the arrival of the Red Army, living conditions began to improve: the light reappeared, it began to be easier to get
water and lodging and, most importantly, good progress is being made toward resolution of the problem of provisions.

An electrician by the name of Truemberg said in a conversation that "the nightmare weeks are now behind us. The Nazis had us scared that the Russians would send all the Germans into perpetual slavery in cold Siberia. We now see that this was nothing but a lie. The steps the Soviet command has taken show that the Russians are not getting ready to insult and then destroy us. I've now got my perspective on life back."

G. Banacke, the burgermeister of the Lichtenberg area, said: "I would like to express my thoughts and feelings to you completely openly. I will say to you in all sincerity that I never thought the Russian government and its command here would take such an effective step to insure a supply of food. I would underline once again the fact that before the Red Army arrived I, my colleagues and the entire population of this area, all of us had our suspicions of the policies the Soviet Government and its military command here would pursue. But we're all breathing a lot easier now. We're all hoping for a return to a normal life and a good job. I've talked to a lot of workers, both blue-collar and white-collar, and a good many representatives of the intelligentsia about this. They all say they've been surprised by how high the norms are. The generous bread ration in particular. Everybody knows, of course, that we can't claim to be entitled to what we've been provided by the Russian command. So when the Red Army arrived we were expecting a hungry death and that anybody remaining alive would be shipped off to Siberia.

"This is a truly magnanimous gesture.... I should also tell you that I myself have had a chance personally to meet Marshal Zhukov, a member of the government, and Colonel General Berzarin. I was struck by their simplicity and sincerity. Everybody who's had anything to do with Zhukov and Berzarin speak very highly of them. I am struck by the fact that people in positions of such great authority are able to talk to the people and officials of the burgermeister's office so simply and straightforwardly. So from what I've seen I've concluded that the Russians are going to be able to restore some normalcy to the life of the city of Berlin because they are showing such energy and aggressiveness in tackling all the city's problems. The main thing the Russians care about is that everybody has a job and that the people be able to live normally...."

Bokov, Lieutenant General
Member of military council,
5th Shock Army

Excerpt from directive of chief of Red Army rear services to the military council of the 2d Ukrainian Front on shipment of seed and feed for planting to Czechoslovakia

Moscow May 18, 1945

In accordance with your telegram of May 13, 1945, I am requesting by order of the chief of front rear services that seed and feed of the following crops be shipped from current front reserves to the Chop station in Czechoslovakia and that this shipped be moved immediately:
barley - 500 tons, oats - 430 tons, corn - 1070 tons, vetch - 70 tons, legumes - 30 tons, bran - 500 tons and mustard - 1 ton.

Procedures to followed in effecting this shipment should be arranged with Comrade Zorin, USSR ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

Khruulev

Excerpt from decree of military council of 1st Ukrainian Front on differentiated ration categories for residents of Prague

From the army in the field May 30, 1945

Pursuant to State Defense Committee Decree of May 26, 1945, the military council of the 1st Ukrainian Front decrees:

1. Based upon the average per capita food norms established for the residents of Prague by the State Defense Committee of 400–450 g of bread and 30 g of groats per day and 400 g of salt per month and taking account of the wishes of the Czechoslovak government, the establishment, effective June 4, 1945, of the following differentiated food norms for the residents of Prague with respect to these food items (in grams per person):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Bread/day</th>
<th>Groats/day</th>
<th>Salt/month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers performing heavy labor and in hazardous occupations...</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers (other than those in the previous category) ..........</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees [white-collar] .........................</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children, independents and all others .................</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Honored individuals in science, engineering, culture and the arts, physicians, the higher clergy as well as senior officials of the organs of local and regional self-government and managerial personnel in heavy industry and transport will be entitled to these foodstuffs on the basis of the norms established for workers performing heavy labor in accordance with lists approved by the local mayors.

Other industrial and institutional engineering and technical personnel as well as teachers and clergy will receive the same rations as workers in the second category.

Hospital patients will be provided the rations established for workers, individuals requiring special treatment the rations established by the local public health department.

2. Approve the attached text of the declaration to the city of Prague concerning the establishment of food ration norms for bread, groats and salt for the residents of the city.
Have comrade Kal'chenko recommend to the government of Czechoslovakia that it communicate the text of this message to the people of Prague.

3. The chief of the front motor transport administration, Major General Sobolev, place 100 trucks at the temporary disposal of the Czechoslovak government for the transportation of foodstuffs to the various regions and stores of the city; the chief of the front fuel supply section will make available the necessary fuel.

Konev

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8963
CSO: 1801/211
FRENCH, BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES IN NATO STRATEGY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNTKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 85 (signed to press 19 Feb 85) pp 82-86


[Text] A column of several heavy trucks accompanied by buses with security guards and motorcyclists departs a facility in southern England each month and makes its way to the main road and heads for Holy Loch Bay. This is the way the English publication NEW STATESMAN describes the picture of the secret delivery of nuclear warheads....

Let us now recall that American atomic-powered submarines are based in the vicinity of Holy Loch. According to the above-mentioned NEW STATESMAN, the Pentagon has more than 100 bases and other military facilities of various types, including nuclear facilities, located throughout the British Isles. At Bentwaters, Woodbridge, Alconbury and other American bases on British soil bombers of the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC) with nuclear weapons on board remain in constant readiness. With the deployment of American first-strike missiles they are also making their appearance at the base at Greenham Common and, according to press reports, will soon arrive at Mulsworth.

After the passage of 30 years, London has recently made public some official British government documents from the year 1954. From these documents we learn that even back then, the sober-minded members of the cabinet were extremely alarmed by the aggressive, adventurist course being taken by London's senior NATO partner, Washington, which was trying to push the planet to the brink of war. People on the shores of the Thames were already speaking of the serious danger that "the Americans will push things to a confrontation with the Soviet Union and that because of what they are doing we could see the start of a nuclear war."

Even W. Churchill, an unbridled anticomunist and one of the troubadors and organizers of the anti-Soviet "crusade" against the young Soviet government, and then a herald of the "cold war" in the postwar period, was alarmed by the possible consequences of the nuclear course being steered by the American ship of state and by Washington's persistent efforts to draw London along in its wake. "England has doomed herself to a position as a target," Churchill declared with the appearance of American nuclear bases on British soil.
It is doubtful, however, whether at that time even such a patriarch of British politics as Churchill, who had already stood at the helm for many years at that point, could have imagined that three decades later the British government would not only be giving its unconditional support to the nuclear strategy of the U.S. and NATO, but also that it itself would be engaged, heedless of the costs involved, in an intensive buildup of its own lethal potential. Every month the column of trucks referred to at the beginning of this article delivers nuclear warheads to Holy Loch not for American, but for British submarines. And these deadly charges are not being made overseas, but rather in Britain's own death merchants in factories in southern England....

One of the postulates of NATO doctrine has it that the "security" of the countries of the bloc can be guaranteed only by the superiority of their combined nuclear strength and the decisive contribution of the nuclear forces of the U.S., as well as by their readiness to use nuclear weapons first. England joined the nuclear club in 1952. And then in 1960, when France first got its hands on nuclear weapons, a "triple alliance" of sorts took shape within the framework of NATO.

In recent years the policy of the ruling circles of both the U.S. and the North Atlantic bloc as a whole has increasingly revealed a desire at any price to destroy the existing military balance between the USSR and the US and the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Washington and its partners want to be able to act from a position of strength in each and every situation and to dictate their will to others, and this, as has been the case many times, includes at the negotiating table. Current US military doctrine calls directly for the United States to establish itself as the No. 1 military power. The concept of military superiority determines the content of all actions the American government takes and the demands it places on its allies. And it is precisely with the objective of achieving military superiority that programs have been outlined which provide for increases in strategic offensive forces, both nuclear and conventional, as well as for additions to the military capabilities of both the US and NATO overall.

In order to justify these unprecedented preparations in the eyes of their own people, the governments of the West will frequently resort to camouflage and a number of cunning expedients. Among other things, they will always try to milk the myth of the "Soviet threat" and the military superiority of the USSR for everything they can. Comrade K. U. Chernenko stressed in a recent appeal to French readers on the occasion of the publication by Plon of the book Narod i partiya ediny [People and Party United] that it is precisely those whose policy does represent a threat to the entire world who are trying to lead their people down the wrong path. They are suggesting that it is USSR which represents the military danger. But to say this is to forget history and overlook the real facts of life as we face them today.

The fact is that between the USSR and the US, between NATO and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty, there is today a rough strategic military parity. And this, incidentally, has been and remains the view of prominent political figures in the West and is confirmed by the analyses of foreign military experts.

But apologists for the nonsensical notion of Western military superiority entrenched on both sides of the Atlantic are not inclined to proceed on the basis of the principle of parity and equal security. The Atlanticists have their own
system of computing troop and weapon strengths—computing by elimination, a
militarist, NATO-weighted system of computation. One of the propaganda tricks
which NATO politicians and strategists as well as the mass media resort to most
frequently consists in the following. In their effort to employ all possible
devices to frighten their people with the menace of Soviet medium-range missiles
and the military strength of the USSR overall, U.S. and NATO leaders and Western
propagandists will always leave the English and French nuclear weapons out of
their calculations and pretend that they simply don't exist.

What NATO is trying to do here is to insinuate into the minds of the millions of
West Europeans the idea that it is both "legitimate" and "essential" to begin to
deploy the new American missiles. It cannot be forgotten that Washington's stub-
born refusal to take account of the English and French nuclear forces was one of
the reasons the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe broke down.

Another one of the West's propaganda tricks is to insist on the "independent," "national" character of the English and French nuclear forces. But the state-
ments of NATO political and military officials themselves, as well as those ap-
ppearing in respected Western publications paint a different picture. In a large-
scale war, the NEW YORK TIMES points out, the British nuclear forces "would be
immediately integrated into NATO." Moreover, we can hear direct threats ring
from the pages of an official English document—a government "White Paper." Here
in black and white we see written that Britain's nuclear forces, an "integral component of NATO's nuclear potential," are capable of "inflicting such
damage on the Soviet Union that the Soviet leadership has to take them into ac-
count."

Now as far as the French nuclear forces are concerned, we see from top secret
American intelligence documents cited by the WASHINGTON POST that French mis-
siles are targeted on our country. France's signature, too, is to be found on
the NATO treaty, and in accordance with the provisions of this document, in
case of the outbreak of an armed conflict it is to act jointly with the other
states of the North Atlantic bloc. And in this case, observers point out, it
is not going to be important whether Paris becomes part of the organization of
the bloc or not. General B. Rogers, supreme commander of the combined armed
forces of NATO in Europe, has stated unequivocally that in case of war, France
will join forces with NATO "very quickly." So there's your "independent" "na-
tional" nuclear forces!

So, to go on about how the English and French missiles cannot be included in
the overall European nuclear balance is demagoguery of the purest sort. For
while American weapons do constitute the basis of the Atlanticists' nuclear
strength, the atomic arsenal of England and France is certainly substantial as
well. The nuclear weapons which these two countries possess are a reality which
simply cannot be ignored. They exist, they are targeted on the Soviet Union and
the other socialist countries and, as the Americans themselves say, their role
is to supplement U.S. forward-based nuclear weapons. This is a threat which
has to be taken into account and which must be responded to. The missiles of
England and France are kept in readiness to deliver hundreds of nuclear warheads
to their targets. Let us now go into this in a little more detail.
The nuclear forces of Great Britain and France are based upon military formations capable of employing strategic nuclear weapons. These weapons comprise part of the arsenals of the strategic nuclear forces of both countries. We are referring specifically here to 162 English and French ballistic missiles. They are to be employed primarily in the conduct of a general nuclear war, more specifically, for the purpose of delivering strategic nuclear strikes. It is precisely these weapons which, in the view of military experts, are held to comprise the most important component of the armed forces of England and France and which are given the greatest amount of attention. Expenditures for improving existing and the development of new strategic weapon systems are always increasing. In the event of a general nuclear war, the strategic nuclear forces will operate in combination with the general-purpose forces.

Great Britain has built and organized its strategic nuclear forces, as well as its armed forces as a whole, in accordance with the military and political policies London is pursuing as well as with NATO's aggressive nuclear strategy. Characteristic of these policies is the reliance on nuclear weapons and a willingness to be the first to use them.

Precisely of what, now, are the strategic nuclear forces of Great Britain comprised? They include units and formations of the Vulcan medium strategic bomber (56 aircraft) and atomic-powered missile-carrying submarines. These four vessels, the Resolution, Repulse, Renown and Revenge, also constitute part of the combined armed forces of NATO and alternately conduct combat patrols. Each submarine is armed with 16 Polaris-AZ ballistic missiles, which have a range of up to 4600 kilometers. Each missile carries three warheads. According to the press, there are 192 nuclear warheads in missiles carried by English submarines aimed at targets in the USSR.

Speaking of Britain's nuclear navy, it should be pointed out that, while it is inferior to the U.S. Navy, it nevertheless has no equal among the navies of the other capitalist states. In the view of military experts, the British navy is capable of performing a substantial range of military missions both in a general nuclear missile war and in limited wars, that is, missions which do and missions which do not involve the employment of weapons of mass destruction. Confirmation of this can be found in press reports that during the Anglo-Argentine conflict in the South Atlantic, the destroyer Sheffield and other British combat ships were carrying nuclear weapons.

These weapons, moreover, could have been detonated at any moment. It was only by a fortunate stroke of luck that the nuclear weapons on board the Sheffield did not explode when the ship was struck by a missile. Another ship tried to remove at least a part of these weapons from the Sheffield but was unsuccessful. The English destroyer went to the bottom with its entire arsenal of nuclear weapons.

The ruling circles of Great Britain have devoted and continue to devote particular attention to the upgrading and building up of their offensive nuclear forces. The modernized Polaris ballistic missile, which now carries no longer three, but six warheads, is being added to their submarine arsenals. It is the view of English military officials that this will add substantially to the strength of their strategic naval nuclear forces. Then plans for the 1990's call for the
deployment of the Trident-2 missile on nuclear submarines; this is a missile which will carry eight warheads with greater range and accuracy. The British press has reported plans to build a new base for these Trident missile-carrying submarines on the River Clyde in Fasline (Scotland).

The decision to modernize the atomic submarine fleet was made in 1979. At that time it was estimated that to buy the missiles from the U.S. and build four atomic-powered submarines would cost 5 billion pounds sterling. The SUNDAY TELEGRAPH now points that inflation and the decision to buy an improved version of the missile have now doubled the original estimate. The introduction of a submarine fleet armed with the Trident will increase the nuclear strength of the British forces many times virtually overnight. All this is clear evidence of the aggressive nature of British military doctrine, which has already revealed its true nature in London's military adventure in the Falkland Islands. The British government takes the position that the country must have its own "modern" independent nuclear "deterrent."

But we have just seen the price it is going to pay for this "independence." As journalists have accurately pointed out, this is the independence of the American boot on English soil. For the fact is that a guidance system is required to launch a Trident, and as the press emphasizes, the English cannot provide this guidance without the support of American satellites.

It comes as no coincidence that the program for modernizing Britain's nuclear forces with American Tridents has drawn the criticism of some in London from whom it would never have been expected. Lord Carver, former chief of the general staff of the British army, for example, has referred to these billions in expenditures on an American missile system as "a mistaken selection of priorities." "As far as Great Britain is concerned," J. Silkin, minister of defense in the Labor "shadow" cabinet, writes, "no matter which way we look at the problem, there is no sense in which we can say that she has an 'independent' nuclear force. We can pretend we enjoy this independence, but, of course, we don't really have it."

But the Tory government pays no heed to the voices of sanity. Like the senile old British lion, unable to give up age-old ambitions of empire, always ready to jump east when Uncle Sam waves his militarist whip in that direction, its threatening roars will be heard more and more often.

Prime Minister Thatcher has declared openly that she "would not hesitate to push the nuclear button to launch Polaris missiles in the case of a military conflict in Europe, even if that would lead to the destruction of Britain." So judging by all this, it looks as though nuclear ambitions and anti-Sovietism have become ingrained so deeply in the ruling circles of England that with all the heedlessness of a card player, they are prepared to stake the fate of their very own country on a single card.

The English man in the street, however, has different ideas. Despite the intensity of efforts to whip up a poisonous fog of militarist, anti-Soviet hysteria over an already foggy Britain, many have been disturbed by the prime minister's remarks. For example, John Brown, a Royal Air Force veteran who participated in the landing of Allied assault troops in France in June 1944,
sent a letter to the editors of MOSCOW NEWS, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow, in which he sharply condemned the highly aggressive nuclear ambitions of official London.

Here is part of what Brown wrote:

"In the first place, Mrs. Thatcher is forgetting that she can speak for roughly only a third of the country. Secondly, those on our small island who recall the battles for Stalingrad, Kursk, Moscow and Berlin have not forgotten that it was thanks to these victories that we ourselves were not trampled under the SS boot and that there were no Auschwitzes and Buchenwalds at London, Liverpool and Glasgow. These Britons, or at least most of them, know that the Soviet people are our friends, friends who saved us at the cost of the lives of 20 million of their fellow citizens.

"Most Britons also understand that if Mrs. Thatcher does push that god-awful button there will be instant retaliation, and within only a few minutes the British Isles will cease to exist."

Among Englishmen who think like World War II veteran John Brown there is also widespread sympathetic understanding for the point of view of the USSR, as has been put forth by Comrade K. U. Chernenko at a meeting in the Kremlin with N. Kinnock, the leader of the Labor Party of Great Britain. The Soviet Union wants to see Europe completely rid of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons, on the basis, of course, of the principle of equality and equal security for the countries of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The Soviet Union would be prepared to reduce and then physically eliminate the same number of medium-range missiles it has in the European part of the USSR that would correspond to the number of nuclear missiles destroyed by the English side.

If Britain would implement a policy of complete nuclear disarmament and eliminate the corresponding foreign bases, it would be creating conditions under which the USSR would guarantee that it would target none of its nuclear weapons on British territory. If Great Britain decides to commit itself officially to a policy of nuclear disarmament, the entire range of questions which would arise in this connection concerning Soviet-British relations in the military sphere could then become the subject of discussions and a corresponding agreement between the USSR and Great Britain.

This is a clear-cut, constructive position. How will London respond to it?

The Albion Plateau. This green, hilly area in southern France is very picturesque and literally breathes tranquillity. But below this green blanket stand steel-reinforced launch silos which have been hardened against a nuclear blast. Each one of these silos contains a nuclear missile with enough firepower to wipe a fairly good-sized city off the face of the Earth.

According to foreign press reports, this is the main base for France's nuclear forces. During the late 1970's and early 1980's, France was developing its basic plans in the area of nuclear missile systems and its armed forces modernization program overall in accordance with a six-year "military program for development of the armed forces for the period 1977-1982." France's strategic nuclear forces, which have the third most powerful nuclear arsenal in the world, now include
strategic weapon systems. The nuclear forces comprise 44 Mirage medium bombers, 18 medium-range, surface-to-surface ballistic missile launchers and 5 atomic-powered submarines with 16 launchers each. These vessels have the following specifications: displacement (surface) - 7500 tons, underwater displacement - 9000 tons, surface speed - 20 knots, submerged speed - 25 knots, effective weapon range - up to 3200 kilometers.

At the end of June 1982 France launched its sixth nuclear missile submarine, the Inflexible. It will take its place in the operational inventory in April 1985. According to official reports, this vessel is "more powerful, quieter and more effective." This new submarine will carry 16 3-stage missiles with a range of 4000 kilometers. It is currently undergoing trials. According to the new defense program for the period 1984-1988, France's strategic nuclear forces will have 7 nuclear missile submarines by 1990. The total number of missiles will rise to 130, while the number of nuclear warheads will increase seven-fold to 690. These figures do not include the aircraft designed to carry nuclear weapons.

In remarks on the occasion of the launching of the Inflexible, the French prime minister declared in connection with the Soviet-American nuclear arms limitation talks then under way in Geneva that Europe was seeing a "growing imbalance in the areas of both conventional and nuclear weapons in favor of one of the superpowers." The country he had in mind? The Soviet Union, which, he said, was "threatening both Europe and China." This statement obviously has absolutely no relationship to reality whatsoever. Has not this been used to justify the policy imperialist circles have followed in increasing the level of nuclear tension in Europe, in attempting to achieve military superiority, in building up their own nuclear potential? And what are we supposed to make of the statement made at the very same ceremony that "there can be no negotiations" involving the French nuclear forces?

On the banks of the Seine you will hear people discourse at length about the "special" nature of the national nuclear forces. At the end of January 1985, Ch. Hernu, minister of national defense once again spoke of their "independence." At the same time he pointed out that "the security of France is based on cooperation with the other countries of Western Europe" (i.e., NATO—V. R.). In making this declaration, Ch. Hernu reiterated the position of Paris, namely, a refusal to include the French nuclear forces in the coming Soviet-American negotiations.

Is it possible that the people on the banks of the Seine have forgotten that as long as 10 years ago, back in 1974, at a session of the North Atlantic Alliance council in Ottawa, the nuclear forces of France were referred to in documentary black and white as a coequal component of the NATO nuclear force?

France's missiles, as is attested by her military experts, enable her to pursue a "strategy of strikes against urban areas." And which urban areas? No big secret is ever made of this, of course. Soviet urban areas. As the noted political scientist R. Aron acknowledges, when people in Paris talk about "determining the Soviet Union," what they are talking about is the "ability to drop a few bombs on Moscow or Leningrad." And these, it turns out, are the objectives targeted by the missiles on the Albion Plateau and aboard the French submarines, whose patrol areas are agreed upon with the American military command!
In February 1985 the American press cast some light on how France was modernizing and building up its strategic forces. It wasn't able to get along without its Uncle Sam. NEWSDAY referred directly to the fact that France's nuclear arsenal is growing with the direct support of the United States. This ominous cooperation is based on a secret agreement concluded between Washington and Paris in 1978. In 1982 the Reagan administration and the Mitterand government reached agreement on the practical details involved in implementing the agreement. The United States has supplied the French with eight of the most advanced Cray-1 computer systems. And it is precisely these computers, as NEWSDAY emphasizes, which have played a most important role in France's nuclear multiple warhead-missile development program.

And as for Paris? Foreign nuclear debts have to be repaid, first and foremost in the military-political sphere. As the press has reported, in return for U.S. help in building up its strategic strength, the French government has agreed to increase its cooperation with the NATO military organization. It has also taken "a number of steps in support of Reagan's policy toward the USSR." The country's advocates of the much-celebrated "Atlantic solidarity" have become much more vociferous now. To the accompaniment of the anti-Soviet propaganda orchestra, they are coming out for the installation of new American missiles in Western Europe, a military modernization program for the NATO countries, production of neutron weapons and stepped up military preparations generally.

But the fact is that Western Europe is already larded with nuclear weapons. For every 50 American soldiers stationed there there is one warhead equivalent in power to the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. So why, one would ask, the need for any more?

The method the Atlanticists use to compute NATO's nuclear weapons—write one, carry two—is simply not in line, because it gives a distorted picture of the balance of forces on the continent of Europe and, in the final analysis, worldwide as well. This question has now become a particularly urgent one in view of the Soviet-American nuclear and space weapons talks beginning on March 12 in Geneva.

A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR minister of foreign affairs, responded recently to questions put to him by political observers by emphasizing once again that the English and French nuclear weapons must be included in the calculations. England and France are part of the North Atlantic Alliance. It would be in the highest degree unjustifiable for the North Atlantic Alliance to get this kind of a break, this little extra, a prize, if you could call it that, in the form of the English and French nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is taking a firm position based on principle in this question, a position based upon the principle of equality and equal security for the parties.

Discharging their patriotic and international duties to stand in defense of the security of our country and our friends and allies, the fighting men of the Soviet armed forces and their comrades-in-arms in the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Treaty countries continuous remind themselves of the growing military threat posed by the aggressive circles of NATO. The Atlanticists are giving pride of place in their menacing preparations, in addition to the nuclear forces of Eng-
England and France, to the new American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles. To maintain a state of high vigilance and continuous combat readiness and to be able to divine the treacherous schemes of our enemies—these are the missions with which the Communist Party has charged the Soviet armed forces. This is a duty to the generations bygone, which in the bitterest of wars defeated the most dangerous of all mankind—Hitlerite fascism. The Soviet fighting man has no higher duty than to stand in defense of the fatherland which in the fiercest of battles our fathers once defended.

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8963
CSO: 1801/211
MOSCOW TV DESCRIBES ATTACK ON KABUL

LD232138 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 23 Jun 85

[From the Vremya newscast]

[Excerpts] A special revolutionary court of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has examined in open session the case of members of bandit units accused of subversive terrorist activity: [Report by M. Leshchinskiy, identified by screen caption; video shows court room with the case in progress] criminals who shelled Kabul and districts adjoining it at the end of last year now find themselves confronting the law. Bandits specially trained in Pakistan, indeed under the direction of Pakistani instructors, made their way along mountain paths to the Musai-e Logal gorge, some 10 km from Kabul. [Camera zooms to table bearing gun and bullets and with large shell on the floor standing about 3 feet high] Here they set up a portable rocket launcher of Chinese manufacture, type BM-12, and fired 96 rounds at the city. The shooting was directly supervised by those same Pakistani instructors who did not tell the bandits their names. After the armed forces of the DRA had opened fire on the position, all 80 bandits dropped their weapons and documents and tried to hide but not many succeeded in this. This is the most densely populated district of Kabul. [Video shows part of town with no people in sight] Here live simple people—craftsmen, smiths, small traders. But it was upon the roofs of their homes, upon their homes, that the rocket strike was made from that hill.

[Video shows busy street with mosque and a man in Afghan civilian clothing carrying a rifle]. In this district there are no longer any traces of those tragic events. The homes have been all restored but the world must know that so far the overall damage done to the Afghan people by the widespread undeclared war is already estimated at 35 billion Afghani. The time will come when this bill is presented to international imperialism and regional reaction.

CSO: 1801/252
YOUTH PAPER ANSWERS READERS ON DRA

PMO21944 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jun 85 p 2

[Answers to readers' questions by V. Snegirev and R. Aushev under the "Serving in Afghanistan" rubric: "Under Fire"—first and last graf are editorial comment]

[Text] Participants in a live session held by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's "Dialogue" discussion page at Moscow's Order of Labor Red Banner Automobile Plant named for the Lenin Komsomol showed great interest in events in Afghanistan, the present situation in the country, and the prospects for the young democratic republic's development. Our readers' questions are answered by Vladimir Snegirev, a post-graduate student at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences who worked as KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's correspondent in Afghanistan, and Hero of the Soviet Union Ruslan Aushev.

V. Snegirev: The following note came from the hall: "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA rarely publishes reportage on our servicemen's service in Afghanistan. And we should like to know as much about it as possible." The note is correct. And although reportage from the DRA about our internationalist servicemen and their letters have begun appearing in the newspaper more frequently of late, I think that I express a general opinion when I say that, of course, there should be more items of this sort. Our young men in Afghanistan are carrying out a very responsible internationalist mission and have to face very serious tests, and it it a good thing if we all remember this every day.

Quite young guys, aged 19-20, are assisting the fraternal Afghan people to repulse foreign aggression. Soviet people have always been responsive to others' distress, and when the lawful government of Afghanistan requested our help and a real threat to the gains of the April Revolution and a threat of direct intervention arose, then the Soviet Union went to the aid of its neighbor. This was done in strict compliance with the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation previously concluded between the USSR and the DRA.

In taking this responsible step the Land of the Soviets also proceeded from a desire to ensure the security of our southern borders.

Why do you think that the United States is backing the Dushmans so strongly and is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on training and arming them?
The answer is that Washington still hopes to reverse the course of history: in gambling on the counterrevolutionaries Washington is trying to make up for the loss to the United States of Iran, which was such an important strategically for many years. Prior to 1979, when the Shah's regime collapsed in the face of pressure from the broad popular masses in Iran, there were 70,000 (!) American servicemen there. Radioelectronic spy stations were heavily concentrated along the Soviet-Iranian border by the United States. And a CIA regional center was located in Tehran. The anti-Shah revolution ousted the Yankees from Iran, and it was then that Washington began to play the "Afghan card" in a big way. The Pentagon and the CIA headed the outright aggression being waged by world reaction against the DRA.

The destiny of the April Revolution has thus proven to be inextricably bound up with the security of our homeland, with the security of you and me. This is understood and appreciated by everyone. That is why our limited contingent of servicemen—people the same age as we—are still in Afghanistan. They are there beating back Dushman attacks and risking their necks. They are doing so in order that we may live in peace. Many internationalist servicemen have won orders and medals, and heroes of the Soviet Union number among their ranks. I will now let one of those heroes speak, Major Ruslan Sultanovich Aushev, longtime friend of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and student at the Frunze Military Academy.

R. Aushev: One sometimes hears the complaint that young people today are not what they should be. They don't dance properly and the way they dress.... Some people ask with disquiet: But can we rely on these young people not to let us down when the going gets tough? Allow me to assure you that you can rely on them not to let us down! I can state this firmly because I spent more than 2 years alongside soldiers carrying out their internationalist duty in the DRA. I saw the 19-year-old boys in every situation—both under fire and when racked by terrible thirst for many days....

In Afghanistan all superficiality and falseness is stripped away. Only the core remains, that which forms the basis of a person's character and motivates his thoughts and actions. And I have to say that the Soviet strength of character is second to none in the world.

It was quite young people who went to the Afghan people's aid. But how deeply they felt the others' pain. For them fulfilling their internationalist duty means putting their own interests last. There have been many exploits there! Such qualities possessed by our people such as epic valor and readiness to sacrifice themselves for others have been displayed with particular force in Afghanistan.

I remember the heroic feat of Sergey Shashev, a soldier of our battalion. He volunteered to cover the withdrawal of comrades who had fallen into a bandit ambush. Otherwise they would all inevitably have been killed. Sergey took as many grenades as he could and mounted the defense. He waged single combat against a whole gang of bandits until he had no further means of defending himself. With his last grenade he blew both himself and the Dushmans up.

My brother Adam (he and another brother, Bogautdin, are both officers and both volunteered to serve in Afghanistan) told me about a feat accomplished by
a Dagestani called Magomedov, who shielded his battalion commander from shell fragments with his own body. Adam was the battalion commander.... A similar event occurred in front of my own eyes. Platoon commander Lieutenant Mozgovoy failed to see that a Dushman had him in his sights. A soldier, Mizikhir Minibayev, did see, however, and leapt forward to shield his commander. Mizikhir received bullet wounds. He survived and now works in Kuybyshev.

Believe me, I could tell stories which I witnessed myself and others which I heard from comrades for hours on end. I do not remember anyone showing cowardice or weakness.

The "dialogue" page informs its readers that R. Aushev graduated from the Frunze Military Academy the other day and asked to be sent to continue his service in his homeland. His request has been granted.

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PROBLEMS OF HELICOPTER PILOTS OUTLINED

PM2411450 Moscow KRAKAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jun 85 Second Edition p 1

[Article by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Skrzhalin: "Routine Flights; on Afghan Soil"]

[Text] It was time to take off. Approaching the helicopter pad, we looked anxiously at the pass through which the two helicopters had brought us here in the morning and at the remote garrison hemmed in by the mountains in the narrow valley. "Will we take off?" everybody was thinking, looking at the clouds covering the mountain tops in a dense mantle.

Now the last work belonged to the pilots. Here in Afghanistan they are invested with particular independence in making decisions. And indeed it cannot be otherwise. It is virtually impossible to foresee in detail all the situations which aircraft and helicopter crews encounter here every day. Things are more obvious to the pilots on the spot: Whether it is possible to take off or it is necessary to wait for the bad weather to pass; where to fly, how to fly... experience, flying skill, knowledge of the region, ability to predict changes in atmospheric phenomena—that is what gives the pilot the right to the last word here.

Independence in decisionmaking is based primarily on high responsibility for the fulfillment of missions and the favorable outcome of flights and on the crew's skill in making maximum use of the potential of the combat machine. Flight Commander Captain A. Kratov, leader of the helicopter pair, weighed up the situation and decided: we will take off.

The pass was closed but another route still remained open (according to the weather report): the river valley which would lead us out of there. It is true that the river runs near the Afghan-Pakistan border and is sometimes only a matter of kilometers away from it. The proximity of Pakistan, which has been transformed into a base region for the Afghan counterrevolution, has made it possible for Dushmans armed to the teeth to infiltrate this valley....

In deciding to fly above the river, Captain A. Kratov assumed a considerable burden of responsibility. And then the helicopters were in the air. During the whole flight neither our crew, comprising Captain A. Kratov and Senior Lieutenants N. Gordyushin and S. Fedotov, nor the crew of the following
helicopter, in which the commander was Captain P. Kudashkin, performed counter air defense maneuvers nor did they fly within meters of the cliffs, as sometimes happens. The machines flew as though on an ordinary passenger flight.

However, on the approach to the airfield the helicopters descended very steeply --for safety reasons.

...At a small mountain air garrison I made the acquaintance of Flight Commander Captain M. Yemelyanov, who has served for a long time in the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The top-class pilot has great experience of flying work in very inaccessible mountains.

Today the crew commanded by Yemelyanov was flying into the "interior"--to one of the province's remote district centers. The helicopter took around 90 minutes to cover the distance between the provincial and district centers.

The Afghan passengers, each with a load, got into the helicopter, which rose into the air and flew off into the mountains. There is no specially prepared helicopter pad in the district. From the riverside sandbank where the helicopters sometimes land, it is quite a way--about 4 km--for the passengers to reach the village with their loads. And Captain Yemelyanov chose the cut rice fields right next to the walls of the houses for the landing.

The dust raised by the rotors made the helicopters invisible. They landed blind, as the saying goes, both Yemelyanov, with Senior Lieutenants G. Mukhin and V. Koltsov, and the crew of the following helicopter--Senior Lieutenants V. Borobyev, A. Sheshinin, and Ye. Dreal. Experience, skill, and boldness helped to land the machines right in the center of the tiny rectangles surrounded by irrigation canals.

Captain Yu. Grigoryev, secretary of the Squadron Party Organization, escorting me, pointed some 3-4 km beyond the mountain.

"Once we had to remove a casualty from there. Yemelyanov picked him up while we kept him covered. The only thing to cling onto there--with just one wheel--was a knife-edge ridge. If Yemelyanov touched the ridge with the front wheel, the door was about 3 meters from the ground. He tried to approach sideways, with no success--there was a precipice. Then he noticed a row of rocks and came in close to it from the side. It was also difficult to take on board the victim who could not walk. But the flight technician, Senior Lieutenant Koltsov, proved--like the commander--equal to it...."

This is what they are like, helicopter flights over Afghanistan. Flights which here are considered to be routine.

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CONFERENCE OF ARMY DOCTORS IN DRA

PM241213 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 85 Second Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Skrizhalin: "Conference of Military Doctors"]

[Text] A scientific-practical conference of military doctors fulfilling their international duty in the DRA has been held. The speeches delivered by Medical Service Colonel I. Kosachev, Medical Service Lieutenant Colonels Yu. Lyashenko, A. Verkhovskiy, V. Zakudrayev, and others were devoted to questions of rendering medical aid under the conditions of mountain and desert terrain and the hot climate. Specialists from the S.M. Kirov Military Medical Academy took part in the work of the conference.

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END