NATIONALISM IN SPAIN: IS IT A DANGER TO NATIONAL INTEGRITY?

THESIS

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AFIT/GLM/LAL/98M-1

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Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Logistics and Acquisition Management of the Air Force Institute of Technology Air University Air Education and Training Command in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Logistics Management

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Fernando Pastor Villar
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Abstract

In recent years there has been a worldwide resurgence of ethnic nationalism as ethnic minorities have seen in this ethnic differentiation a better way to increase their political power within the states where they reside. Spain is a complex country divided into a number of contrasting regions with widely varying economic and social structures as well as different historical, political, and cultural traditions, that includes different languages. This extreme complexity is related to its national diversity and also to the political and social articulation of nationalist claims within the state.

This study arrives at five conclusions. First, Basque and Catalan nationalism is an example to follow by other regions in order to get a higher level of self-government. Second, the possession of a different language is the most important factor of distinctiveness. Third, the economic situation is closely related to the resurgence of peripheral nationalism. Fourth, the present political configuration, although supported by the majority of population, could be easily transformed into a federal state. Finally, peripheral nationalism does not affect the national security because of the lack of internal and external support to the nationalist movements that employ violence as the means to reach their political goals.
NATIONALISM IN SPAIN: IS IT A DANGER TO
NATIONAL INTEGRITY?

I. Introduction

General Background of the Problem

After the Second World War many people thought that the right of self-
determination was something that applied only to the world outside Europe, but today it
is once again applicable in Europe itself. The new political order established in Europe
after the Second World War disappeared completely as a consequence of the
disintegration of the Soviet Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the following
reunification of Germany, the partition of the Czechoslovakian Republic between Czechs
and Slovaks, the independence of the Baltic Republics, and the disintegration of the
former Yugoslavia are some examples of the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet
Union.

The end of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe gave rise to a centrifugal
current in all Europe. People thought that once the division of blocs disappeared and the
Cold War had been overcome a period of prosperity would arrive for the old continent,
but, to the contrary, in the last decade ethnic nationalism within existing European states
has spread powerfully bringing new threats to European stability.

Differences have emerged between the Flemings and the Walloons in Belgium.
In Italy, *La Liga Norte* (The North League) of Umberto Bossi requests the independence
of the Padania region from the rest of the country. Corsicans represent a problem for the French government, and the Irish are still trying to solve their old conflict. These nationalist demands represent a significant political problem for stable governments such as those of the United Kingdom and Belgium, whereas the effects of these nationalist demands in less stable governments such as those of some republics of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are much more disruptive.

As Balcells says, at the end of the twentieth century the history of the stateless nations of Europe, far from being a mere peculiarity, is an issue of great contemporary significance (Balcells, 1996: 1).

In the case of Spain, it belongs to the group of states with a comparatively high level of national disturbance, due to the presence of strong peripheral nationalist movements in some parts of its territory (Nuñez, 1992: 1).

Spain is a complex country divided into a number of contrasting regions with widely varying economic and social structures as well as different historical, political, and cultural traditions, that includes different languages. In this sense, it is appropriate to say that this extreme complexity is related to its national diversity and also to the political and social articulation of the nationalist claims within the state.

One of the clearest indicators of Spain’s cultural diversity is the coexistence of several languages within the limits of the state. The boundaries of the different ethnic groups coincide broadly with the three major peripheral ethnic groups: Basque, Catalan, and Galician.
Spain has a long tradition of strong centralized government dating back to the beginning of the nineteenth century when the foundations of the modern system of administration was configured.

Any discussion in the context of Spanish political culture must include the different meanings attached to the words “regionalism” and “nationalism.” From the point of view of centralists, areas like the Basque or Catalan provinces are regions of the Spanish nation, or to the maximum they are nationalities within the larger Spanish nation. The points of view of Basque and Catalan nationalists are quite different. For them the Spanish nation does not exist, only a Spanish state formed of a number of ethnic nations, of which the Basque country and Catalonia are two (Lancaster and Prevost, 1985: 67). These two excluding alternative models, one centralized with a unitary concept of state, and the other a decentralized conception based on the right of regional autonomy and self-government, have actively contributed to the definition of the contemporaneous Spanish history.

Since the death of Franco, on 20 November 1975, and the restoration of the Spanish monarchy in the person of King Juan Carlos I, a remarkable transformation has taken place in Spain. Today, the ethnic diversity and variety of the Spanish territories is a fact recognized by the 1978 Constitution that has proved the basis for the establishment of new democratic institutions based on the two principles of modernization and decentralization.

The political and administrative map of Spain is now radically different from what it was 20 years ago. Instead of a unitary state divided into 50 provinces (see Figure
1), the country has now a decentralized structure in which the powers of the state are shared with 17 newly created autonomous communities (see Figure 2). The devolution of power to the Basque country, Catalonia, and 15 more other autonomous communities has made Spain one of the most decentralized states in Europe. Each of the 17 autonomous communities has its own parliament, government, and, inevitably, its desire for status symbols and bureaucracy.

The political map of Spain is nowadays divided into two groups, one formed by the autonomous communities, such as Catalonia and the Basque country, where nationalist parties have control of local governments, and the other one is characterized by the hegemony of Spanish national-level parties where nationalist parties have no more than 25 percent of the total amount of votes in their respective communities.

Today, the political situation, although much more stable than that of the period of the democratic transition, is still a subject of concern for the Spanish population. As Linz has stated in different occasions, in order to prevent the disintegration of the existing structure of the state a peaceful and acceptable accommodation between nationalist groups and the central government must be made (Linz, 1973: 47).

Problem Statement

This study will investigate those issues of ethnicity, economics, and politics that have produced differences between the peripheral nationalism in general and Catalan and Basque in particular and the Spanish central government. Also, this study will analyze the effect of peripheral nationalism in the Spanish national security.
Research Objectives

The purpose of this study is to determine if the presence of strong peripheral nationalist movements can affect the consolidation of Spain as a unitary state. Also, this research will try to find out if these peripheral nationalist movements can cause the transformation of the Spanish Kingdom in a federal state or even be the source of its disintegration.

Research Questions

The study will try to answer the following questions:

1. Can Basque and Catalan nationalism be examples for other autonomous communities to follow in order to get more political and economical advantages?

2. Is language the only reason that Basques and Catalans feel that they are different nations and do not belong to the Spanish Kingdom?

3. Is the economic situation responsible for the periodic reappearance of the peripheral nationalism?

4. Could the changes produced in Spain in the last twenty years lead the country towards a federal state, or be the source for its disintegration?

5. Does peripheral nationalism affect the Spanish national security?

Methodology

The methodology employed in this study is historical or archival research. This methodology requires acquiring sources that document the different aspects of the study, checking the sources for accuracy, and synthesizing the various sources to form a
coherent and correct document. Methodology is addressed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Scope and Delimitation of the Study

The scope of this study about nationalism is limited to Western Europe, and in the Spanish case, it is limited to the peripheral nationalism represented by Catalans and Basques. Although some historical data will be addressed that is external to this framework, these data have been evaluated for relevance and contribution to the understanding of the historical elements involved.

Summary

This research will analyze the resurgence and evolution of peripheral nationalist movements in Spain and the consequences that this phenomenon may have in the future of the Spanish state. Chapter II discusses the methodology used to collect and analyze research data. The literature review in chapter III provides the reader with a brief insight into the political history of Spain. The chapter examines concepts closely related to the different theories of nationalism, and presents a historical overview of the nation-building processes of Spain and the Basque country and Catalonia. Chapter IV looks at facts of today in light on the data previously gathered, and it discusses the existing situation and presents possible outcomes for the future of Spain. Finally, chapter V answers the research questions, presents conclusions drawn from the information in the preceding chapters, and includes recommendations for further areas of research.
Figure 1. Provinces of Spain
Figure 2. Autonomous Communities of Spain
II. Methodology

Introduction

This chapter presents the research objectives that must be fulfilled in order to conclude this study. Also, this chapter describes the methodology used to collect and analyze the information needed to answer all the research questions. The basis of this study is historical or archival research forms.

Research Objectives

This research will try to clarify how the presence of strong peripheral nationalist movements in Spain can affect its consolidation as a unitary state. Also, this research will try to find out if these peripheral nationalist movements can cause the transformation of the Spanish Kingdom in a federal state or even be the source of its disintegration.

For a better understanding of this research and the Spanish political situation it is essential to understand the meaning of concepts like state, nation, and nationalism. Also it is important to know the roots and history of Basque and Catalan nationalism to be able to answer questions such as: Can the peripheral nationalism be an example to follow for other autonomous communities? Will these nationalisms be responsible for the disintegration of Spain, as it is known today? Is the language the only reason that Basque and Catalans feel that they are a different nation and do not belong to the Spanish Kingdom? Is the economic situation responsible for the periodic reappearance of the Basque and Catalan nationalism? Could the changes produced in the last twenty years in Spain lead the country toward a federal state? Finally, this study will attempt to
determine how can the national security be affected by the different nationalism that today coexist in Spain.

Method

To achieve the objectives of this specific study it is imperative to use the historical or archival research methodology. Historical research depends upon narratives, documents and written remains all left behind by someone other than the investigator, and the procedure is the testing of evidence of human beings and things (Vincent, 1969: 17).

It is not necessary in the twentieth century to repeat that no conclusions are of any value either in natural science or in history unless these are based on actual factors or reliable reports. The use of historical evidence is not a mysterious operation. It is only the constructive application of common sense to the data which the investigator has accumulated.

Historical research involves the process of collecting relevant historical data and examining their interrelationships. Interrelationships are appraised and, through the process of synthesis, key elements of data are combined into a coherent document that clearly describe past events to meet research objectives (Social Science Research Council, 1954: 157-159).

In all science the purpose of research is knowledge, the understanding of relationships. In historical research such understanding involves a great deal more than the mere arrangement of events in the order in which they occurred (Social Science
Research Council, 1954: 24-25). The most important problem of historical study is the analysis of change over the time. That is why every historical event, however similar to others, is in some aspects unique.

Data collection is an important step in the research process. The historical method involves searching public records, literature, documents, reports, and other media that contribute relevant information (Dane, 1990: 169).

The search for documentary evidence must be done in a way that suggests answers to the questions raised (Social Science Research Council, 1954: 128-131). Definition of the problem and formulation of questions or hypotheses are crucial because these determine the direction of the investigation.

The collected data are analyzed for accuracy, importance and meaning. When all this is done, the process is complete. Analysis of data involves the process of verification (Social Science Research Council, 1954: 132). This analysis is known as internal and external criticism. Internal criticism determines the amount of truth in historical materials and tries to provide reliability to the subjects and events described by the author (Vincent, 1969: 21). On the other hand, for Shafer, internal criticism determines the meaning and value, or credibility, of evidence (Shafer, 1980: 128-129).

External criticism is the procedure by which a given resource is determined to be genuine and admissible as evidence. In other words, external criticism determines the authenticity of evidence (Vincent, 1969: 20). In the case of documents, external criticism essentially authenticates evidence and establishes texts as accurately as possible (Shafer, 1980: 128-129).
The aim of external criticism is to get evidence ready for the use in the examination of human affairs. External criticism deals with the document, and internal criticism with the statement or meaning of the document.

The most fundamental part of historical investigation is the test of genuineness of the materials obtained. The value must be estimated according to the personality of the author, the circumstances under which it was written, and other factors of internal evidence.

Analysis and synthesis involve such mental processes as comparison, combination, and selection. When sufficient evidence is available, the hypotheses are tested against the evidence collected and against the views of other scholars. The information needs to be considered all together, in a final effort of analysis, interpretation, generalization, and synthesis. This is when the researcher engages in the always perilous process of inference (Shafer, 1980: 171-174).

There are three preliminary observations to make about synthesis (Shafer, 1980: 187):

- Adequate synthesis of evidence at any level will not be attained without sufficient attention and manipulation of the evidence.
- Successful synthesis involves the capacity to judge the quality of work of other scholars and synthesize your research with that of others.
- You have to think about synthesis as finding sufficient evidence for the specific issue in question.
Archival research is that in which the investigator analyses existing documents (Bryman, 1989: 188). Archival research also can be seen as any research in which a public record is the unit of analysis (Dane, 1990: 169). In such research, new data are not created, though a great deal of detective work may be required to generate the necessary information.

Data have been collected from various sources in the areas of nationalism, language, education, history, economics, national security, and any other that may clarify the results of this study.

For a better understanding of expressions as nation, nation-state, nationalism, nationalist movements, ethnicity, and related terms, the information gathered goes back to the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, when many of these words appeared in Europe, and the first theories where presented by philosophers, idealists, and writers of that time: Rousseau, Renan, Bagehot, Mazzini, Hegel, and Herder. Their ideas are the basis for the revolutionary changes produced in Europe in the last two hundred years, and they affected all the continent.

After World War II, publications about nationalism had certainly a period of relative decadence because the idea of nationalism was identified with fascism and totalitarianism, and it was seen as the real cause of the conflict.

It was not until the 1960’s that real academic works of scientific importance appeared in the academic world. Kohn, Gellner, Kedouri, Hayes, Kelley, Minogue, Snyder are like pioneers in this field; followed by others in the 1970’s and 1980’s: Smith, Connor, Hobsbawn, Linz, Foster, Petrella; and more recently, Greenfeld and Smith in
1992, and Keating, Pickett, and Balcells in 1996. The study of their work will be essential to understand which is the situation in Spain at the present moment and how it can evolve in the future.

In Spain, the history of nationalism has had two main approaches. Initially, the history of the nationalist movements was carried out only by the peripheral nationalists, in order to justify their claims to the central government. On the other hand, since the history of the nationalisms in Spain was intended to be only a matter of importance for peripheral historiographies, it is not strange that this subject was not treated from the Spanish point of view. Its immediate consequence was that even today the information about ideological Spanish nationalism or the Spanish nation-building during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is still very restricted. In this research, both approaches will be analyzed and completed with information raised by other historians from abroad, in books and specialized journals as *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *Contemporary History*, *American Sociological Review*, and others.

The backwardness of Spanish social history and especially the lack of good research on economic history makes it difficult to investigate the field in which nationalisms and regionalisms emerged, although this point is important to determine if there is a correlation between the aggravation of the economic situation and the reappearance of the nationalisms in some parts of the periphery.

A good knowledge of Spanish history, in general, and Basque and Catalan history, in particular, is necessary to understand the roots of the historical problem between the central government and the peripheral regions.
A detailed analysis of the Constitution of 1978 and general and regional elections celebrated in Spain since that date will be useful to present some possible outcomes to the present situation.

Summary

This study will use historical methodology to document how the peripheral nationalist movements can affect the consolidation of Spain. The historical method follows a logical process to create a document that details the events and processes that complete research objectives. Data collection, analysis, and documentation are steps that guide the historical process. Completion of research objectives provides a coherent, objective, reliable, and valid description of the situation.
III. Literature Review

Introduction

After the death of General Franco, and during the democratic transition that led to the 1978 Constitution, many books and articles appeared, in Spain, dealing with the history of the nationalist movements and the Spanish situation. But the major problem of these works is that they were made without scientific rigor, and much of the research performed about the Spanish situation frequently appeared before research on social and economic history were made.

Beramendi analyzed in 1984 the overall Spanish historical production on the national question between 1974-1984, and concluded that less than 3% of the bibliography met abstract and theoretical aspects. There were no real Spanish, or Catalan, or Basque theories of nation and nationalism, and the few attempts made had been rather deceiving (Beramendi, 1984: 49-76).

According to the working paper Historical Research on Regionalism and Peripheral Nationalism in Spain: a Reappraisal, in Spain, there is a lack of organization of the archives. It is difficult to find information such as statistics, population censuses, and comparatives studies, and even the ecclesiastical archives administered by the Catholic Church, that might be of great importance in order to determine the social penetration of nationalism, are very restricted (Núñez, 1992: 17-18).

The literature review of this study is divided in three parts. First, it is important to know and understand the root and meaning of words as nation, nation-state, nationalism, different kinds of nacionalisms, nationalist movements, and other terms that are related to
each other, but there is no general agreement among historians, political scientists, sociologists, or psychologists, when they try to define them.

Second, it is necessary to review the literature on the formation of Spain, the steps it took to arrive at the present political configuration, the process by which some distinct kingdoms became part of Spain, and how those kingdoms, with different languages, customs, and rules, in different periods of time, present national claims against the central government. Comparing the nation-building of Spain with that of the peripheral regions may help to clarify the relationship among these territories during the last centuries.

Finally, if the review of history is vital to understand the past and to avoid the repetition of the same mistakes in the future, the analysis of the present situation, based on the information obtained in the media and other sources, will be the framework to present and support the idea of what is Spain today, where it is going, what is its future, and what implications can appear as a consequence of a new situation.

**General Look at Theories of Nationalism**

In studying modern nationalist movements, there is little consensus even on the vocabulary used. Terms as nation, nationality, ethnic group, nation-state, state, national character, national consciousness, national will, and national self-determination are often confused and many times used for different purposes depending on the source consulted. The concept of a nation, for example, has no clearly accepted definition, and it is difficult to assure when the word “nation” took on its present meaning. Historically, the creation
of states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has been referred to as the process of
nation-building, and the term “nation” has been commonly applied to states.

**Nation.** The word “nation” is ambiguous and it has had a variety of different
connotations before arriving at its present meaning, but all of them refer to a group of
human beings. Derived from the Latin natio, the basic term seems to indicate people
related by birth or race and forming social groups based on real or fancied community of
blood and unity of language. Yet, in the formation of modern nations, the exigencies of
historical development caused people to be thrown together by factors other than ethnic
relationships.

According to Snyder, the term is so controversial that some scholars consider the
meaning of nation to be so complex that they assume or explicitly state that is not capable
of scientific definition (Snyder, 1990: 230).

Some writers maintain that the impulse to form into groups is inherent in
mankind, as Bagehot who considers nations as old as history (Bagehot, 1900: 83). Others
hold that nations only came into existence at the end of the Middle Ages, and the
majority think that the modern sense of the word is not older than the eighteenth century,
and it is with the French Revolution that we arrive at explicit and conscious use of the
terms “nation” and “nationalism.”

At that time the nation was considered a body of associates living under common
laws and represented by the same legislative assembly where the nation is prior to
everything. The French Revolution presents the nation as a single and indivisible entity
where the body of citizens under a centralized government constitutes a state. The terms, "nation," "state," and "people," meaning the same thing, and especially sovereign people, undoubtedly linked nation to territory. Another important innovation of that period was the French insistence on linguistic uniformity, quite exceptional at that time.

Since the seventeenth century the word "nation" has been employed by jurists to describe the population of a sovereign political state, regardless of any racial or linguistic unity, and this description still enjoys general sanction. It is notable the absence, until quite late in the nineteenth century, of influential theories or pseudo-theories identifying nation with genetic descent.

Historians generally see the nation as the population of a sovereign state, living within a definite territory, and possessing a common stock of thoughts and feelings that are transmitted during the course of a common history by a common will.

Hobsbawn pointed out that the last two centuries of the human history are incomprehensible without some understanding of the term "nation" and the vocabulary derived from it (Hobsbawn, 1990: 1). Hobsbawn sees that the criteria for nationhood, or for explaining why certain groups have become nations and others not, have often been made based on single criterion such as language, common territory, common history, cultural traits, or whatever else, but he thinks those criteria are themselves fuzzy and ambiguous (Hobsbawn, 1990: 5). He says that a nation "is a social entity only insofar as it related to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the nation state, and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it" (Hobsbawn, 1990: 9). For Hobsbawn the concept of nation has different meaning in different countries.
depending on the moment and the situation. In some parts the evolution could tend to stress the place or territory of origin, while others stress rather the common descent group, and thus move into the direction of ethnicity (Hobsbawn, 1990: 14-28).

French historian Ernest Renan in *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?* (What is a nation?) defined nation as:

A grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices which one has made and those that one is disposed to make again. It supposes a past, it renews itself especially in the present by a tangible deed: the approval, the desire, clearly expressed, to continue the communal life. The existence of a nation is an everyday plebiscite. (Renan, 1882)

Renan attempted to show how nations are constructed of subjective factors that have nothing to do with shared history or common race, and concluded that the will of the individual must ultimately indicate whether or not a nation exists. This point of view is supported by Gellner that says two men are of the same nation only if they share the same culture, where culture, for him, means a system of ideas and ways of behaving and communicating. “Two men are of the same nation only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation” (Gellner, 1988: 20).

Stalin’s definition is probably the best known among the ones who thought that nationalism has in common a language, a territory, and a history. “A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture” (Stalin, 1982: 8).

In the *Dictionary of the Spanish Academy* the final version of the nation is not found until 1925 when it is described as “the collectivity of persons who have the same ethnic origin and, in general, speak the same language and possess a common tradition.”
Pérez-Argote remarks that a dominant ethnic group among the ones that live in the same territory does not form a nation. For him, a nation is a community of superior order over the different ethnic groups. What it is really important is a common project accepted by everyone (Pérez-Argote, 1994: 41). “A nation only exists when the national awareness and the appeals in the name of the nation can obtain a mass response” (Pérez-Argote, 1994: 27).

Louis Snyder sees the nation as the formal organization of one people, which is a group able to communicate with each other by means of a similar language, folkways, and institutions (Snyder, 1968: 32). He makes clear that in understanding the meaning of the word nation, we must immediately exclude the identification of nation with race. Such identification is highly fallacious and it has no basis in fact (Snyder, 1990: 231).

Carlton Hayes sees the nation as a group of persons who speak a common language, have the same historical traditions, and constitute or think they constitute a distinct cultural society (Hayes, 1966: 21). He says that culture is important in the formation of a nation, and the factor of zoology is not applicable to it. Hayes sees the nation more or less coincident with that of the modern state. He does not reject the possibility of more than one nation existing within the boundaries of a state but he refers to them as sub-nationalities. In particular, Hayes comments:

Catalans once formed a nationality with a distinctive language and literature, with distinctive historic traditions, and with a belief that they possessed a distinctive culture, but during centuries of Spanish sway in Catalonia they have been so permeated by the language and traditions of other and dominant nationalities that the Catalans have been reduced to the position of a sub-nationality within the Spanish nationality. (Hayes, 1966: 22)
For Kelley, a nation is a group of people subject to one government, who reside in one territory, and have a distinctive history and environment. What it is innovative in Kelley's concept of nation is that the nation is required to be of a certain size with a certain closeness of contact throughout the group. For him, the absence of effective government from a single center and of closeness of contact over a wide area at any date before the end of the Middle Ages explains why the term nation is not normally applied to any group prior to that time (Kelley, 1966: 251-259).

For Smith, nations are not static targets and that is the reason why the process of building a nation is never concluded and subject to redefinition in each generation. Smith considers that there are two quite distinct conception of the nation, the civic-territorial, better known as civic, and the ethnic-genealogical (Smith, 1986a: 15).

The first type, as the name suggests, defines the nation as a territorial entity where the citizens are ruled by the same laws and share a common culture with common myths and symbols. In the practice, the nation can be based on a pre-existent ethnie, but the goal goes beyond the ethnic ties, and it is to form a community with the same laws and only one public culture. The second type, nations were or are formed on the basis of pre-existing ethnie and ethnic ties, so that the building of a nation becomes a question of transforming ethnic ties into national ties through the process of mobilization, territorialization, and politicization. In general, both types produce a rather different concept of nation, the civic-territorial model has an easily identifiable territory, and a single political authority, able to level and homogenize the population, but weak ethnic bases and social support. Population does not share a cult of common origins and history
or other cultural differences like language. In the case of the ethnic-genealogical model the opposite applies (Smith, 1986a: 134-138).

For Smith, the civic conception of the nation comes from the French Revolution and appeared also in other European countries like Holland, Sweden, and Switzerland. In those countries the ethnic differences and the minority communities were more or less integrated. But in other countries, especially in Great Britain and Spain, the dominant ethnic community did not have enough success in integrating the ethnic minorities (Smith, 1994: 7-10).

Smith presents the federal states as a special case in which ethnic and civic-territorial nations are mixed, and he says that today many individuals belong simultaneously to two nations, and presents Spain as an example. For him, even though Spain is not a federal state, the Catalans are a nation but at the same time, Catalans, like other nations or ethnie in Spain, are Spaniards. They have Spanish legal citizenship and share certain common feelings with other Spaniards and a wider political culture (Smith, 1986a: 165-167).

For Kelley, in Spain, the development of nationhood on English and French lines never was fully achieved. The wealth of the New World went direct to the Church and the feudal nobility, and trade remained undeveloped. That situation avoided that a powerful tradesman class could arise, and the national impulse decreased in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. “The feudal structure of society has never been thoroughly broken down in Spain, the centrifugal forces have never been overcome, and national unity has never been fully achieved” (Kelley, 1966: 22).
To understand the present resurgence of ethnic movements in Western Europe, see Appendix, Kelley's point of view of the effect of language on the process of nation-building is essential. He declares that a nation which possesses over any period of time a distinctive language is likely to develop a culture of its own, which will become one of its proudest possessions and will contribute to the growth of its national feeling (Kelley, 1966: 254-255).

Gellner proclaims that language is a vital medium for relating education and citizenship, which are central to nationalistic purposes and essential for the existence and operation of modern nations (Gellner, 1988: 70-71).

Petrella also supports the idea that language is one of the most important expressions of the specific identity of a human group because it immediately and physically differentiates 'us' from 'them' (Petrella, 1980: 13).

Kedourie declares that language is the means through which a person becomes conscious of his personality, and it is like the legacy of a distinctive tradition. It is the most important measure by which a nation is recognized by others, and the main support for having the right to form a state (Kedourie, 1961: 62-64).

Snyder proclaims that in all nations, language is a special symbol of their national life, and people regard their languages as a major expression of their independence, personality, and culture (Snyder, 1990: 184). That is the reason why nationalists demand the precedence of their own language in their territory and the replacement of foreign elements from the language (Snyder, 1968: 21).
In societies with more than one linguistic group, the process of nation-building meets particular problems, and that is the idea of Tejerina who says that the presence of more than one language in the same territory, and in the same community is always conflicting (Tejerina, 1992: 111). In this case, the dominant group may impose compulsory monolingualism, in order to assimilate the smaller groups. This is the French model. Or they may adopt bilingualism or multilingualism, in which all citizens are exposed to common national values while being allowed to maintain other languages, the Swiss model. However, we cannot say that all ethnic groups are extremely concerned with maintenance of their own language. In Scotland and Wales, for example, the use of their native language is not an important factor in defining their ethnicity. For them the land and historic institutions are much more important in defining their own characteristics.

Smith does not agree with the majority of authors about the importance of the language in the process on nation-building. He says that language by itself is unable to sustain a collective identity; to do so, “it requires the support of the historic core of ethnicity, a cult of common origins and common development” (Smith, 1977: 19). Smith thinks that identifying nations with language groups is a fallacy, and gives the example of the United States and United Kingdom where even talking the same language they are two different nations. So, for him, the possession of a common language by people in different states does not give them a common nationality, and those who speak the same language within the same state can belong to different nations (Smith, 1977: 182-184).
**Ethnic Group.** Another important concept, while talking about nationalism, is that of ethnicity or ethnic group. Although many writers make little distinction between ethnic groups and nations, in general, there is greater agreement on the definition of ethnicity than there is on that of a nation. In the nineteenth century, it was common to refer to ethnicity as something closely related to race, but lately the use of race in this context has largely been abandoned due to scientific and moral objections. Instead, ethnicity is presented as a community based on ascription rather than achievement or choice. For Foster, an ethnic group is a set of people that possesses common ancestry, language, and cultural traditions and that is in a process of self-categorization. He thinks that the revival of ethnic identity in the unitary states of Great Britain, France, Spain, or Belgium is the greatest challenge to the European nation-states (Foster, 1980: 1-2).

Among the cultural characteristics of an ethnic group, language is, and always has been, pre-eminent. The formation of most modern nationalities has been historically dependent upon the development of particular languages. The rise and decline of nationalities have always been closely paralleled by the rise and decline of their respective languages, and both processes still go on together.

Hayes promotes language as the preeminent cultural characteristic of an ethnic group, since it provides the medium by which the shared culture is consolidated (Hayes, 1966: 6). He also remarks, “within a given nationality differences of dialect may become in time so pronounced that, in conjunction with other separatist factors, they may exalt
what have been mere sub-nationalities into true and distinct nationalities" (Hayes, 1966: 15).

Benton disagrees about the importance of language to determine if a group constitutes itself an ethnic group. For him, what it is really important is that the group itself must consider, and be considered by others, as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics. It must have a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which it keeps alive. Such a group must also have a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners. Certain other characteristics, of geographical origin or descent, language, literature, religion, and size, though not essential, may be relevant (Banton, 1994: 9-10).

Some ethnic theories of nation-building holds that nations are constituted by ethnic groups (Smith, 1986a; Kellas, 1991), and others as Connor and Pi-Sunyer see a close resemblance between ethnic group and nation. For Connor, the nation is a self-differentiating ethnic group. The prerequisite of nationhood is the “popularly held awareness of belief that one’s group is unique in a most vital sense” (Connor, 1972: 337). And Pi-Sunyer, when he writes about the Catalans, matches the concept of ethnic groups with nationalities. He shares with the Catalans the belief that Catalonia constitutes a nation (Pi-Sunyer, 1971: 111).

**Nationality.** Nationality also has wide-ranging meanings, from basic membership in a nation to the legal concept of citizenship. In general, nationality is far
less ambiguous than nation, while nation is used mainly to denote the citizens of a
sovereign political state, nationality is more exactly used in reference to a group of
person speaking the same language and observing the same customs.

For Hayes, nationality is an attribute of human culture and civilization and for that
reason nationality does not depend on racial heredity or physical environment. He points
out that the formation of most modern nationalities has been historically dependent upon
the development of particular languages (Hayes, 1966: 12-15).

Keating believes the claims of some minorities or peripheral nationalist
movements represent only the substitution of one exclusive national identity by another,
leading them into a separatist position. Others do not want an exclusive nationality but
dual or multiple loyalties and identities, and the capacity to act in different areas.
Keating presents the example of Catalonia. “Catalans have historically recognized their
membership of the Iberian community, of the Mediterranean world, at times of the
Spanish or Habsburg empires and of Europe, as well as their own nationality” (Keating,
1996: 19).

Other authors do not necessarily relate nation to nationality. Talking about Spain,
Anselmo Carretero accepts that this country has many nationalities, understanding for
nationality groups of people who share the same race, religion, and especially language
like Basques or Catalans. But the nation is a superior entity where the most important
aspect is the common history (Carretero, 1977: 1-23).
State. With the meaning of state it happens the same as with nation, since so many books have been written on those concepts, it is impossible to expect a precise definition on what people understand by state. Quoting Max Weber, state can be defined as: “a compulsory political organization with continuous operations where its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber, 1978: 54).

Hayes connects the words nation, nationality, and state. He thinks that a nationality, by acquiring political unity and sovereign independence becomes a nation, and in this case establishes a national state. For him, a national state is always based on nationality, but a nationality may exist without a national state. His conclusion is that a state is essentially political and a nationality is primarily cultural and only accidentally political (Hayes, 1966: 3-6).

In 1906, Evangelista de Ibero, a Capucine monk, wrote in a Basque nationalist catechism, Ami Vasco, a series of ideological definitions that contrast nation and state (Sarrailh, 1962: 547):

Nation is the ensemble of men or peoples who have a same origin, a same language, a same character, the same customs, the same fundamental laws, the same tendencies and aspirations, and the same destinies. Of all of those properties what constitute essentially a nationality is in the first place, the blood, race, or origin; in the second place, the language. The other qualities are nothing but the consequences of the other two, most specifically of the first.

State is the ensemble of peoples or individuals who live subject to the same sovereign authority. The nation is not the same as the state. The nation is something natural, that is, something created by nature itself; the state is something artificial, dependent on human will. The nation is indestructible, as long as the race subsists; the state are formed and broken by the whims of kings
and conquerors. The nation binds its elements with bonds of blood and language; the state, only with the tie of the authority that governs them.

For Rousseau, what gives moral significance to an association of individuals is the pursuit of a common aim, and the common aim of the association, known as the state, is the common welfare of all its members. It is in the general will of a free community that its moral unity must be found. In such a community, men are bound to each other not by fear but by common loyalty. In Rousseau’s community, there must be two conditions: first, there must be sufficient interest in common between its members, and second, the law by which the community is governed has to emanate from the will of the people themselves. This conception of the moral relation between the individual and the community, based on self-determination and common interest, is the dominant idea of Rousseau’s book *On the Social Contract*.

Rousseau rejects the embodiment of the nation in the personal sovereign or the ruling class and identifies nation and people. Freedom consists in obedience to the law of the state, and those laws are the product of the general will.

The French Revolution, following Rousseau’s ideas, introduced in Europe and then to the world the theory of national democracy. It declared the right of individuals not only to determine their form of government but also choose the state to which they wanted to belong. In other words, it enunciated both the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the doctrine of national self-determination.

We must be conscious of the important role of economic factors and the economic revolution at the end of the Middle Ages played in the origin of the national-state. The
whole structure of the medieval life was based on the subsistence economy of a great number of small areas. At that time, the economical and physical contacts among the different areas were difficult.

In Germany, like in Italy, the division of the country into small absolutely governed states was becoming, by the end of the eighteenth century, a great obstacle to economic progress. In both cases, the national unity had become a prerequisite of economic prosperity, so that the commercial classes became enthusiastic supporters of the national political unity. Kelly wrote: “the ultimate flowering of national feeling was chiefly due to the realization that a united German state would be strong and influential” (Kelley, 1966: 40). Smith presents another example about the importance of the economy in the relation between different ethnic groups when he says: “Catalonia like Scotland opt to remain within wider states, because the quest for national sovereignty would bring unacceptable costs politically or economically” (Smith, 1986a: 154).

For Keating, the compound word “nation-state” implies an identity of nation, in the sense of a community that may claim the right to self-government, and the state, as a system of political action. The nation-state represents a consolidation of authority within territorial limits and the imposition of common values to the people who live in that territory. “Its essence is the claim of authority within the territory” (Keating, 1996: 23). For Pickett, the nation-state is “an entity seeking sovereignty (autonomy) and emancipation from constraint that will enable it to achieve an adequate expression of its will and desire” (Pickett, 1996: 10).
For Minogue, the concept of nation-state in modern Europe is almost a fiction (Minogue, 1967). Today, only a few states comprise one and only one homogeneous nationality, as Portugal or Poland. The rest, and most important the first states that appeared in Europe as the United Kingdom and France, contains more than one nationality. The United Kingdom comprises four obvious nationalities, the English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish; and France that was, until quite recent, seen as a union between the Germanic Franks and the Latin Gauls has also absorbed Basques, Italians, and the Germanic peoples of Alsace-Lorraine, and Celtic Bretons.

State formation in Europe has, extensively, taken one of two forms. In Western Europe it involved the consolidation of different territories into states. France, Spain, and Britain were created gradually over centuries by dynastic and military expansion. In Eastern Europe, states appeared as a consequence of the disintegration of empires in the late nineteenth century, culminating in the Treaty of Versailles, and at the present moment the disintegration of the former Soviet Union has generated new states. If the new states do not integrate all the ethnic groups, it is easy to understand the ideas of Kedourie when he affirms that the states which are formed of more than one nation have their existence perpetually challenged (Kedourie, 1961: 79).

For Pérez-Argote, the national state bases its existence on a central power that controls a very defined physical territory, and a legitimization of that center to belong to a community of which it feels part. The history of western countries tells us that the state is formed before the nation and that the educational system is essential because the idea and sentiments of a nation to be effective must not be exclusive of an elite group but to
form part of everybody. This idea is reinforced by Louis Snyder, Hans Roos and Ludwig Jahn, the first talking about state, primarily refers to it as the legal authority or government, and concludes: “A state needs to be a nation. A nation must be a state” (Snyder, 1968: 32). Roos clearly recognizes that it is not the nation that creates the state, but the state that creates the nation (Roos, 1966: 48), and Jahn declares that the state is the fundamental framework of the nation (Jahn, 1991: 33). This is true in the case of Great Britain and France where the state preceded the nation and created it, but in the German case the nation preceded, and helped to create the modern German state.

Pérez-Argote says that the construction of a nation-state over a specific territory, where different ethnic groups live, could be a successful if certain social groups, belonging to the dominant ethnic group, present the idea of a nation as a community which covers all the existing ethnic groups in that territory. If this idea is accepted we will have a national community on this territory. This nation will be a pluriethnic nation that would cover the preexisting ethnic groups. This is a social process that occurs along the years and consists in the broadcast of an idea and a sentiment in every area of the territory. In this case the state is pluriethnic but national. If the central power controlled by specific social groups fails in the broadcast of the idea of a national feeling, what happens is that it can produce the opposite effect, emerging nationalist movements in the peripheral culture whose components consider themselves nations without a state, and that their final objective would be to have their own state. In this case we have a plurinational state. This difference is important because Spain is a clear example where under the same territory you can have present a pluriethnic and national or plurinational
state, depending on the objectives desired. The Spanish nationalism considers Spain as a pluriethnical and national state, while the peripheral nationalism like the Catalan and Basque consider the Spanish state as a plurinational one (Pérez-Argote, 1994: 23-44).

Michael Banton reinforces the idea of Pérez-Argote when he presents the idea of multinational states and multi-state nations. Examples of multinational states are the former Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom. The Arab nation is an example where its members are citizens of different states (Banton, 1994: 9).

Medrano defines multinational state as the state in which a significant group of people does not identify with the national community the state claims to represent and aspires instead to create a political community whose boundaries coincide with the boundaries of the group. In this sense, Spain, Canada, and Great Britain can be viewed as multinational states (Medrano, 1994: 873).

Keating believes that, at the present moment, people are searching for some new ways to express their national identity. Each minority group wants its own nation-state, or it wants some form of home rule within it. Before the age of nation-states, there was ambiguity about identity and authority, now it is difficult to find a formula that is able to satisfy the desires of an ethnic group which seeks an ambiguous status, partly within and partly without the state in which territory is settle down (Keating, 1996: 1-2). The problem is that almost every claim for territorial autonomy based on ethnic characteristics produces a counter-claim by other groups within the state who affirm that they are, too, ethnic groups with the same rights to self-determination.
The results of so many states and ethnic groups is that today only a few nations have succeeded in making the ethnie similar and comparable with the state. Greece, Poland, and Portugal are mono-ethnic states or unquestionable nation-states. Usually, what happens is that states that share the territory with different ethnic groups, called multi-ethnic states, are dominated by a single strategic ethnie which tries to incorporate or influence the other, smaller or weaker, ethnies (Smith, 1986a: 150).

Nationalism. One of the more open-minded ways of explaining nationalism is in terms of its history. But the difficulty is that nationalism, as such, does not have a single history. It is a phenomenon closely tied with local circumstances and it is inexplicable without falling back on historical understanding. “It most perplexing feature is that it may differ in its forms according to specific historical conditions and the special social structure of any given country” (Snyder, 1990: 245).

For Keating, nationalism is a doctrine of self-determination that appears as a response to modernization, identifying modernization with the collapse of traditional social order based on ascriptive status, the decomposition of affective communities, and the erosion of traditional authority structures, generally associated with an industrialized world (Keating, 1996: 1-3).

When talking about nationalism, there is a close association, even identification, among three ideas: ethnicity, nation, and state. “Nationalism is seen as the effort to align ethnicity, nation, and state” (Keating, 1996: 3). “Nationalism is an attempt to make the boundaries of the state and those of the nation coincide” (Minogue, 1967: 11-12). “The
essence of nationalism is to link the state to the ethnie, or more exactly, to identify and
equate the two” (Smith, 1986b: 47-49).

Smith says that today is impossible to disconnect ethnie, or ethnic communities,
from nationalism and its desires for collective identity, unity and autonomy. The reason
why ethnic communities and nationalism are linked is because nationalism and the
revival of ethnic self-awareness appeared in the context of a great movement of
emancipation, which has been the social and political movement of the modern world. In
the late eighteenth century, Europe was a group of states and ethnic communities. There
were states as France, England, Spain, Sweden, Holland, and Russia, while some ethnic
groups just began to experience a cultural revival: the Irish, Welsh, Corsicans, Catalans,
Swiss, Scots, and soon after were followed by Basques, Flemish, Bretons, and
Norwegians. In this situation, it is important to know if the citizens belong to the state or
to the ethnic community. For Smith, the state belongs to the domain of politics, and the
ethnie resides in the domain of culture and society, and as long as these two areas are
separated, as they used to be in the Middle Ages, the expectations for nationalism are
narrow (Smith, 1986a: 138-140).

What it is clear and almost everyone accepts is that nationalism is always,
whatever other objective it may have, a question of possession of land. “A precondition
of the nation is the acquisition of a homeland” (Smith, 1986a: 163). So, those who have,
or can obtain, a homeland, are in a situation to exploit ethnic rivalry at any moment. The
potential is there, and the impulse may later be regenerated, as has happened in Catalonia
and the Basque Country.
The literature on nationalism shows that some authors such as Kellas, 1991; Greenfeld, 1992; and Keating, 1996, agree with Smith’s ideas about the division of nationalisms in two types, the civic and ethnic. For Keating, civic nationalism is a different mode of nation-building; anyone can join the nation irrespective of birth or ethnic. It is a collective project of its members but it is based in individual assent rather than ascriptive identity. The reason why civic nationalism has potentially a broader appeal is because it does not exclude anyone within the society (Keating, 1996: 5-7). In particular, Keating comments: “It is not the existence of language and culture policies which determine whether a nationalism is ethnic or civic, but the uses made of language and culture, whether to build a civic nation or to practice ethnic exclusion” (Keating, 1996: 10).

Just as definitions of the term “nation” are open to debate, to establish when the nationalism appeared is not an easy task either, but one moderately precise way of knowing this is considering when writers came to discuss the moment when nationalism came into the world.

If we take the opinion of certain writers (Runciman, Hroch, Toynbee, Kohn, Smith, Kedouri, and others) literally, they contradict each other; but if we look to the context, we will find that most of their opinions can be justified, but only if we recognize that in most of the cases they are referring to a different thing.

While we find Steven Runciman talking of Bulgar nationalism in the Middle Ages (Runciman, 1960: 98), Hroch contemplates the nation as a phenomenon of the modern history: “the nation emerged as a result of a long formation process, from the Middle
Ages and it is tied to older forms of communities” (Hroch, 1994: 45), and Arnold Toynbee writes that it was in 1775 that the principle of nationality first asserted itself in the modern world as a dynamic political force (Toynbee, 1939: 316). Hans Kohn writes that modern nationalism originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in North-West Europe and its American settlements, and it became a general European movement in the nineteenth century (Kohn, 1961: 12-13). For Smith, though nationalism as theory and ideology is quite modern, dating from the late eighteenth century in Europe, the identities on which it feeds and builds are ancient and persistent (Smith, 1984: 289). Smith notes nationalism is a manifestation of a fixed and immutable tradition where the central concept is identity. For Kelley, although the nation itself and national feeling can be traced back to a much earlier date, nationalism as a conscious political force was a product of the French Revolution and its sequel (Kelley, 1966: 31). And Kedourie begins his account of nationalism saying that nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Kedourie, 1961: 9).

I consider Jean Jacques Rousseau provides the theoretical foundations upon which the nationalism on the nineteenth century was built, and a proper understanding of the nature of modern nationalism, demands knowledge of Rousseau’s political thoughts. His influence is immediate on the French Revolution, but also and probably even more important is its effect upon the whole development of nineteenth century political thought, above all in Germany.

Walker Connor assumes that since the French Revolution there has existed the belief that the right to govern rests on the people, and thus ethnic groups have a basic
right to self-determination. This belief has become the argument in recent years to justify ethnonationalism. Connor summarizes various justifications of the rise of ethnic nationalism since World War II. The theory of relative deprivation assumes that the ethnic groups are in a lower situation in the field of economy, culture, or politics, with respect to other groups in the state. An ethnic group might feel isolated as a result of the depersonalized bureaucracy of modern mass society and will therefore seek new national strength and institutions as a remedy. Another theory presents a center-periphery relationship, with the state occupying the favored center and the ethnic minority the periphery; this periphery might be geographical or referred as detached from the political power. Finally, the loss of prestige suffered by some countries is felt by the minority as a failure of the state rather than the ethnic group. For example, the loss of the British Empire is a question for the United Kingdom rather than the Scottish (Connor, 1977: 25-27).

Michael Hechter also presents the idea of ethnonationalism as a response to economic, political, and cultural marginalization. Hechter notes,

The spatially uneven wave of modernization over state territory creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups. As a consequence of this initial fortuitous advantage, there is crystallization of the unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups. The super-ordinate group, or core, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalization of the existing stratification system. It attempts to regulate the allocation of such roles such that those roles commonly defined as having high prestige are reserved for its members. Conversely, individuals from the less advanced group are denied access to these roles. This stratification system, which may be termed a cultural division of labor, contributes to the development of distinctive ethnic identification in the two groups. (Hechter, 1975: 9)
Hechter's explication could provide a possible explanation for the resurgence and recrudescence of ethnonationalist claims and movements on the European continent. His theory has some supporters, but the attempts to apply it on the continent have been equally controversial. Indeed the Catalan and Basque cases have proven to be particularly spiny, since it may be argued that in both instances the ethnonationalist movements constitute a defense of economic and political privilege compared to other regions of Spain.

Ernest Gellner is another theorist who views ethnonationalism as a response to the inexorable pressures of modernization. Gellner is typical in that he sees nationalism as a crucial element in a process of change leading from traditional society to modern society. "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 1988: 13). However, rather than viewing the problem in terms of a dominant core and a subordinate periphery, he examines the importance of the culture in the new social structure. For Gellner the need for a shared cultural frame of reference among the citizens of an industrial state demands that the state and national culture become synonymous.

Gellner thinks that the potential for a division based on ethnic characters may be reduced by decreasing the internal cultural differences through mass education, and predicts that ethnonationalism is a transitory phase that is eventually destined to disappear (Gellner, 1988: 117-132).

Linz after studying some cases of ethnic nationalism, particularly in highly industrialized regions, where internal migrations since the late nineteenth century have
produced a heterogeneous population, and immigrants constitute a large proportion, concludes that ethnic peripheral nationalism is moving from an emphasis on primordial elements to a definition based on territoriality. Linz defines primordial characteristics as "the relations based on a common language, culture, distinctive religion, or kinship" (Linz, 1985: 204).

According to Linz's ideas, peripheral nationalism is giving more importance to the idea of 'living and working' in the same area, or the willingness to identify themselves with the community where they live. The ideas of common descent, race, language, distinctive culture, tradition, and in some cases religion are less important. This is a consequence of these internal migrations, because to build a national consciousness and ultimately a nation-state, based on primordial characteristics it is a task almost impossible in such environment. It is important to remember the phrase coined by the Catalan leader Jordi Pujol (1976) of 'living and working' in Catalonia as the main characteristic to be considered Catalan as a reinforcement of Linz's theory.

Definition of Terms

Before talking about the historical aspects of Spain, it is important to define the terms, nation, ethnicity, state, and nationalism, in the sense that they will be used in this thesis.

Nation. Nation is a group of person who share a common ideology, common institutions and customs, and has a sense of homogeneity; the most important factor is that they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. A nation may comprise
part of a state, be contained within the same boundaries of a state, or extend beyond the borders of a single state.

**Ethnicity.** Ethnicity is the feeling of group cohesiveness based on factors of common biological descent, social, cultural, and historical experience. At the heart of ethnicity is the feeling of being special.

**State.** State is a legal concept describing a social group that occupies a defined territory and is organized under common political institutions and an effective government. In many cases, this state is call the country, the nation, or the nation-state.

**Nationalism.** Nationalism is a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment of a group of people living in a well-defined geographical area, who are linked by a common heritage of culture and history. Nationalism is always a question of possession of land; its essence is to link state, nation, and ethnie. It implies the right of self-government without interference in its internal affairs.

**Historical Look at Spain**

One of the characteristic features of the early history of Spain is the successive waves of different peoples who extend all over the Iberian Peninsula. In the Middle Ages, feudal lords and kings of different territories, by conquests and marriages, created a number of political units, among them, the more important were the crowns of Aragon, Castile, Portugal, Navarre, and the last Moorish territory, the kingdom of Granada.

In 1469, the marriage of the Catholic Monarchs, Isabel of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon, was the starting point of the reunification of all the territories that constitute
Spain today. During their reign, Granada, the last redoubt of the Arabs in Spain, was conquered (1492), Christopher Columbus discovered America (1492), the Canary Islands became part of the Spanish territory (1495), and Navarre was incorporated into Spain (1512) (Madariaga, 1958: 24-27). But, even with the personal union of the Castilian and the Aragonese crowns, Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia remained constitutionally distinct political entities, and they retained separate councils of state and parliaments.

When Ferdinand died in 1516, the Spanish Crown went to his grandson Charles I of Spain and V of Germany, who unified under a single person the Spanish kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, plus the Italian and European territories of the Habsburgs. The next two centuries, the sixteenth and seventeenth, were the apogee of the Spanish Empire under the rule of the Habsburgs (Flores et al., 1989: 184-189).

In 1524, the Council of the Indies (Consejo de Indias) was formed and acted as an advisory board to the crown on colonial affairs that regulated trade with the colonies (Library of Congress, 1990: 17). This is important for the future of the Spanish consolidation because the new colonies were considered a property of Castile, and the Aragonese and Catalans were prohibited from trading or settling there (Madariaga, 1958: 206-208).

Spain’s apparent prosperity in the sixteenth century was not based on actual economic growth but on the American gold and silver, and this was aggravated by military expenditures. The result was that when the gold and silver supplied from America, during the seventeenth century, ceased, Spain could not afford its military
commitments and stimulate its domestic production, the consequences were a political, economic, and social decline (Library of Congress, 1990: 19-20).

During the regency of Philip IV (1621-1665), his prime minister, Count-Duke of Olivares, tried and failed to establish a centralized administration similar to that of France, and tried to extend the use of Castilian beyond official dealings to general use throughout the country. In reaction to Count-Duke of Olivares’ bureaucratic absolutism, Catalonia revolted (1640), Portugal, with English aid, obtained its independence in 1640, and two attempts were made to separate Andalucia (1641) and Aragon (1648) from Spain (Flores et al., 1989: 224).

With the death of Charles II in 1700, without descendants, the dynasty of the Habsburgs came to an end and the War of the Spanish Succession broke out, involving Spain, France, England, and Austria. Habsburg partisans, supported by England and Austria, argued for allocating succession to the Austrian branch of the Habsburg dynasty, but Charles II, before dying, left Spain to his nephew Philip d’Anjou, later king Philip V, a Bourbon and the grandson of Louis XIV, king of France.

Castile enthusiastically admitted the Bourbon dynasty, but the Catalans opposed it, not for loyalty to the Habsburg but trying to maintain their fueros (special legislation) against the feared imposition of French-style centralization by a Castilian regime. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) brought the end of the war and recognized the Bourbon succession in Spain, although Catalans continued their resistance until September 1714 when Barcelona, the most important Catalan city, surrounded. For the first time in its
history Catalonia was fully integrated into the broader affairs of Spain (Flores et al., 1989: 260).

Philip V emphasized the absolutist regime, institutionalized a centralized government, abolished regional parliaments, and canceled local fueros, leaving only those of the small province of Navarre, and the fueros of the Basque country, especially because these provinces did not oppose to the new dynasty. The decree of Nueva Planta signed by Philip V in 1716 marked a new situation:

*Considerando haber perdido los reinos de Valencia, Aragón, Mallorca, y Cataluña, y todos sus habitantes por la rebelión que cometieron, faltando enteramente al juramento de fidelidad que me hicieron como su legítimo Rey y Señor, todos sus fueros, privilegios, exenciones y libertades que gozaban, he juzgado conveniente reducir todos mis reinos de España a la uniformidad de una mismas leyes, usos, costumbres y tribunales, gobernándose igualmente todos por las leyes de Castilla.* (Flores et al., 1989: 263)

Linz finds paradoxical that the conflict between the Catalans and the Bourbons led to the most successful period of Spanish state-building ever known. With the dissolution of the Catalan Constitution in the decree of Nueva Planta came the “disappearance of a legal and ideologico-historical basis for resistance to the state in Catalonia” (Linz, 1973: 49). In contrast, the Bourbons delayed the process of state penetration in the Basque country and when they tried to do this in the nineteenth century, under unfavorable circumstances, it was more difficult.

Spain entered the nineteenth century with an economic, social, and educational underdeveloped system, and this situation was aggravated by the Napoleonic invasion of 1808, and the lost of almost all the American colonies. The French invasion was a key factor in the crystallization of Spanish nationality and in the promulgation of the first
Spanish constitutional text on March 12th 1812. During the rest of the century Spain was a country divided by civil wars between the liberals, generally supported by the elite, influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution, and the traditionalists or conservatives, especially the clergy with the support of important sector of the people in the defense of king, religion, and old laws (Linz, 1967: 198).

King Ferdinand VII died in 1833, leaving his wife, Maria Cristina, as regent for their daughter Isabel II, but Ferdinand's brother Don Carlos contested his niece's succession, and he received the support of the traditionalists of Aragon, Navarre, Catalonia, and Basque country. The Carlists, supporters of Don Carlos, held that legitimate succession was possible only through the male line. Even though the war finished in 1839, sentiment for Don Carlos and for his successor remained strong in Navarre, and the Carlists continued as a serious political force, and uprisings occurred in 1847 and again from 1872 to 1876 (Flores et al., 1989: 318).

Smith supports the idea that at the time of the first Carlist War (1833-1839) rural Catalonia, along with the Basque country, were the most important support of the reactionary Carlist cause, because these regions wanted to regain or preserve old local rights (Smith, 1977: 112-113). After the Carlist Wars the Basque fueros were abolished in 1876, but they were replaced by a special regime, called the concierto económico, in Navarre and the three Basque provinces that allowed them autonomous taxation (Payne, 1971: 35). Only during the Second Republic, 1931-1936, could Catalonia and the Basque country establish autonomous governments again.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, military uprisings, called *pronunciamientos*, were not unusual. If any government wanted to survive, it needed the support of the army. In 1868, one of these *pronunciamientos* led by General Prim caused Isabel’s abdication, and Spain passed in a short period of time through a liberal monarchy, a federal republic, and finally a military dictatorship, until the restoration of the Bourbon in the name of Alfonso XII, Isabel’s son on December 29th 1874.

General Prim, as prime minister, brought to Spain and crowned Amadeo of Savoy, son of the Italian king Victor Emmanuel II, but the assassination of Prim left the new king without any support and Amadeo of Savoy abdicated and left Spain on February 11th 1873. The parliament proclaimed Spain a federal republic, and the constitution of the First Republic (1873-1874) provided that the provinces would be self-governed and tied to the federal government by voluntary agreement. In its eight-month life, none of the four presidents of the federal republic could form a stable cabinet, the central government lost the control of the country and again another *pronunciamiento* proclaimed the restoration of the Bourbons in the person of Isabel’s son, Alfonso XII. This restoration gave Spain a generation of relative calm (Flores et al., 1989: 328-330).

The traumatic events of 1898, when Spain gave up Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, brought a new period on instability. By 1915 it was practically impossible to form a coalition government that could rule the country. Regionalist movements appeared with the goal of releasing, in a progressive way, Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia from the Castilian leadership (Library of Congress, 1990: 30-31).
In the 1931 municipal elections anti-monarchist parties won a substantial vote and King Alfonso XIII, interpreting the outcome of the elections and the disorders that followed as an indication of an imminent civil war, left the country and abdicated. The Second Republic was established, and during its five year of lifetime, political, economic, and social conflicts, separated Spanish people into two irreconcilable sides. During that time, Catalonia, Basque country, and Galicia, were granted with Statutes of Autonomy and regional governments were created (Flores et al., 1989: 374).

That situation of violence culminated on July 1936 with a tragic civil war which lasted until 1939. After the war, Franco’s policies toward cultural, ethnic, and linguistic minorities were directed towards the unification, integration, and homogenization of the country (Library of Congress, 1990: 87). General Franco’s death, in 1975, opened the way to a new restoration of the Bourbon monarchy with the rise to the throne of Juan Carlos I, who promoted the Spain’s transformation from a rigid, authoritarian, highly centralized regime into a pluralistic, liberal parliamentary democracy with considerable regional autonomy. The consequence of this change was that on July 15th 1977 the first democratic elections in 41 years were celebrated, and it concluded with the adoption of a new constitution, ratified by universal suffrage, on December 6th 1978.

**Nation-building of Spain**

Spain represents an interesting case that includes large geographical areas, but with diverse social structure, historical traditions, and languages. It is a middle-sized
country whose modern history is characterized by a development unevenly distributed between regions and intense internal conflicts.

Spain's diverse ethnic and linguistic groups have existed for centuries, and they have presented Spanish governments with severe challenges since the nineteenth century. At the present time, about one citizen in four speaks a mother tongue other than Castilian Spanish: Spanish 74 percent, Catalan 17 percent, Galician 7 percent, and Basque 2 percent (Coplin and O'Leary, 1996: FS-2).

Simmel cites medieval Spain as an example of an ethnic kingdom that owes its national unity to its war with the Moors. For him, prolonged and total warfare generally accentuate national or ethnic self-consciousness, because conflicts pull the members so tightly together that force to unite them (Simmel, 1964: 88-101).

Simmel's idea is reinforced by Seton-Watson in *Nations and States*, chapter 2, when he writes that in an long-term perspective, many of the European states like, England, France, Russia, Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, and Spain, among others, have reached their national shape by the effect of continuous wars (Seton-Watson, 1977: 15-22).

The union in the Middle Ages of different kingdoms with different political institutions, reflecting different social structures, did not immediately build a Spanish state, because at that time the king was not king of Spain, but king of Castile, of Aragon, lord of Vizcaya, and so on (Linz, 1973: 97).

Later, during the reigns of Charles I and Philip II, when Spain reached its most glorious period of cultural splendor and world prestige they were unable to create a
Spanish state, and this frustrated state-building allowed some regions in the periphery to feel apart from the Castilian core (Linz, 1973: 48).

One of the leading Spanish historians, Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, formulated the situation in these terms:

Neither in their own mind nor in that of their collaborators emerged the idea to articulate all Spaniards into a state unity, of whatever form. Charles and Philip organized, it is true, the modern Castilian state, but in doing so they accentuated the obstacles that arose in the task of Spain. They placed Castile, converted central political axis of the monarchy and fiscal basis of it, and the other peninsular kingdoms on different levels, and they transformed them into mere satellites of similar significance to the other European states inserted into the general framework of their large empire. (Sánchez-Albornoz, 1956: 479-480)

For Ortega y Gasset the Catholic Monarchs and later Philip II were the only monarchs that offered an interesting common project about a unified Spain (Ortega y Gasset, 1969: 48).

This delay in building the Spanish state in the period of maximum splendor, prestige of its kings, and influx of wealth from America, made the task more difficult later, in a period of decadence.

At first, the Spanish Habsburgs tried to maintain the traditional institutions under a monopolial confederation, and when Philip IV and his Prime Minister, Count-Duke of Olivares, tried a higher level of integration they failed. Some peripheral regions saw in it a conspiracy to destroy the freedom of the other kingdoms, and Catalonia and Portugal revolted.

Spain continued being little more than a confederation of regions until Philip V brought the centralization of the Bourbon monarchy to the country in the eighteenth
century. However, the Spanish state never achieved the creation of a fully unified state and a nation-state with its linguistic, cultural, and emotional integration as France did. For Linz, “Spain is the case of early state-building where the political, social, and cultural integration of its territorial components, nation-building, was not fully accomplished” (Linz, 1973: 33). He believes that Spain succeeded in building a state but failed in building a nation, although it was close to it at the turn of the eighteenth century when the Bourbon’s dynasty was established, and in the first decades of the nineteenth century thanks to the reaction in all parts of the country to the French invasion (Linz, 1973: 103).

After the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty, Philip V introduced important changes in the monarchy, eliminating much of the traditional limits to the royal authority and centralizing the government of the entire territory. A considerable economic progress took place, regional demands disappeared, and the state-building process went successfully. Catalonia with its new access to the overseas market experienced an economic revival, and at the time of the war with France, led by Napoleon, a strong Spanish nationalism appeared (Linz, 1973: 48). In contrast, in the Basque country the crown delayed the process of centralization until the nineteenth century.

Many authors have studied the process of Spanish formation and they generally agree in pointing out that this process never was completely achieved. Silver considers that the Spanish consolidation never succeeded because the Crown only tied the different kingdoms under the control of the central government without taking into consideration the will of the people (Silver, 1988: 55-56). Silver says that the present Spanish
configuration is due to the peripheral pressure that the Catalan and Basque nationalisms have been putting on the central government since the end of the last century. "Catalonia during the Second Republic, and the Basque country in the democratic transition have promoted the present configuration of Spain as a decentralized state divided in autonomous communities" (Silver, 1988: 9).

For Smith, absolutist authority and Castilian dominance over the rest of Spanish territory has been a characteristic of Spain in the last centuries. "The myths of Iberia and Hispania never succeeded in integrating the several identities of the other communities outside the core ethnic of Castile" (Smith, 1986b: 57).

Gunther believes that linguistic diversity and competing national loyalties, between the culturally and linguistically distinct minorities and the Castilian majority, are the foundations of nationalist challenges to the Spanish state (Gunther et al., 1986: 242).

For Kelley, in Spain the development of nationhood, on English and French lines, never was fully achieved. "The association of the Habsburg dynasty with the Spanish throne, and Spanish ambitions in Italy and in the New World impeded the consolidation of Spain" (Kelley, 1966: 11). Castile was more concerned about its overseas territories than in the internal cohesion of its different kingdoms. The wealth of the New World brought prosperity to the Church and the feudal nobility, but trade continued undeveloped and no powerful merchant class arose. "The feudal structure of society has never been thoroughly broken down in Spain, the centrifugal forces have never been overcome, and national unity has never been fully achieved" (Kelley, 1966: 22).
Heiberg thinks Spanish nationalism has not triumphed because it was unable to override local and regional loyalties. The main reasons for this breakdown were the economic and political failures of the nineteenth century reforms, "an economically stagnant and politically corrupt and unstable center was unable either to inspire or control Spain's more vigorous peripheries" (Heiberg, 1989: 45).

Keating coincides with Heiberg in pointing out the economic and political issues as the basic reasons for the instability between center and periphery. "The concentration of economic power in the Spanish periphery, while political control remained at the center, was a permanent source of problems" (Keating, 1996: 117).

Of course, there are some other historians that have another perspective about the building-nation process of Spain, especially those close to the Franco regime. For García Venero, Spain was a modern nation already in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the nation-building process was achieved "through the royalist institution, which was represented by the King's person, and by his military victory over the invading peoples."

In the introduction of his Historia del nacionalismo catalán (1944), García Venero says that the claims of national minorities emerged as a result of the decadence of the Spanish nation (Núñez, 1992: 28).

After Franco's death Spanish nationalism and the Spanish nation-building process were almost completely ignored, and no specific research on the matter has been done. Núñez believes the main reason for this lack of research was the bad reputation of Spanish nationalism at the end of Francoism (Núñez, 1992: 92), and Payne, in the same
line of thought as Núñez, wrote: “Spanish nationalism, discredited by Francoism, is weaker than ever and has for all practical purposes disappeared” (Payne, 1991: 487).

The concept of a Spanish nation has been forgotten in the Spanish educational system in every level. Students nowadays learn at school the history of their regions and autonomous communities, but nothing of the history of Spain as a nation. Students never study Spain as a unified whole. On the other hand, peripheral nationalisms have an elaborated educational system that includes their own community history, language, culture, and concepts such as nation, motherland, anthem, and flag. This exclusion of the history of Spain as something that belongs to all Spaniards enlarges the differences between the autonomous communities, and even in some cases Spain is considered as the focal point of their problems.

As it has been noted, despite the fact that the borders of the Spanish state have been the same since 1512, the unity of the peoples and the lands of Spain has been questioned more than once, especially since the end of the last century when peripheral nationalisms questioned the existence of a Spanish nation and even a Spanish state. Although Spain is for many Spaniards a nation-state there are important minorities to whom Spain is only a state and not their nation, for them Spain is not a nation-state but a multinational state. Linz believes those feelings are the best demonstration that Spain and part of its people failed in the process of building a nation though they succeeded in building a state (Linz, 1973: 36).

Although there are different point of views about what provoked the appearance of peripheral nationalism in Spain, most of them coincide in presenting the different
languages and cultures, centralized government, and economic factors, as the main reasons for the rise of peripheral nationalism. For Clark, the conflict between centralism and peripheral nationalism in Spain began with the adoption of the liberal centralizing Constitution of 1812 and continued even after the Constitution of 1978, which allows the establishment of regional autonomous communities (Clark, 1980: 80).

Payne relates the failure of the nation-building process in Spain with the emergence by 1900 of peripheral nationalism, emphasizing the slowing and frustrated modernization of Spain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Payne’s theory of modernization leads him to assert: “Peripheral nationalism was a centrifugal protest against the manifold frustrations attending the process of modernization, and in part was a reaction against the relative failure of nineteenth-century liberalism in Spain” (Payne, 1991: 482).

Núñez considers centralization and oppression processes imposed by the Spanish/Castilian state as the main reasons for the appearance of the peripheral nationalism. The central government imposed Spanish as the official language of the state and abolished the previously existing regional freedoms (Núñez, 1992: 23).

In the latter part of the nineteenth century the weakness of the Spanish state placed serious barriers to the integration process. The center-periphery tensions increased during that period and the system entered in crisis under the joint pressure of Catalan and Basque nationalism as a consequence of the financial and economic crisis of 1898 when Spain lost the last remains of its empire: Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.
The reaction to the so-called *Disaster of 1898* contrasted deeply with the loss during the 1820’s of most of the overseas territories. At that time, the independence of the majority of the colonies, as Blinkhorn says: “were seen as civil wars among Spaniards, a kind of family quarrel” (Blinkhorn, 1980: 6). But the defeat of 1898 was different because at that time the remains of the Spanish empire were seen as a national question instead of a royal patrimony.

The trauma of 1898 did not precipitate the downfall of the monarchy but produced some economic and social consequences. The loss of overseas trade and customs revenues delayed the industrialization process and brought the emergence of peripheral nationalism, especially in Catalonia and to a lesser extent in the Basque country. Blinkhorn suggests that the possession of such a vast empire acted as a brake on industrialization and in the modernization of rural society (Blinkhorn, 1980: 7), and for Linz, the loss of Cuba, and the economic consequences particularly in Catalonia, awakened nationalist feelings (Linz, 1973: 61).

During the first quarter of the present century, Spanish affairs were strongly affected by a political movement called Regenerationism, which emerged in response to the military and political defeat of 1898 and the slow rate of modernization and economical progress. Regenerationalists were convinced that Spain was inefficient and decadent with an old-fashioned administration. They tried to reform the state from below, through the achievement of local and regional autonomies. In those years, Spanish nationalism was reduced to the military range, although they rarely received support from the dominant political forces (Payne, 1991: 481-482).
Contemporary to the Regenerationism movement, a regional nationalism was emerging in Catalonia and part of the Basque country. In Catalonia, the main nationalist party, Lliga de Catalunya, never claimed separatism but self-government for Catalonia within a more prosperous and progressive Spain. A good example that shows Catalan’s feelings about its integration in Spain is found in the slogan of the Lliga’s leaders during the 1916 electoral campaign: “For a Great Spain” (Payne, 1991: 482).

The European economic crisis after the First World War affected Spanish markets and a explosion of violent manifestations of working class widespread all over the country between 1919 and 1923. To stop the increasing wave of disorders, General Primo de Rivera revolted and created the first nationalist government in Spanish history although he failed in establishing democratic institutions.

The Republic, that followed Primo de Rivera dictatorship in 1931, knew that it was impossible to build a democratic regime without giving satisfaction to Catalan demands for autonomy. The government rejected a federal state, but it allowed the Catalans a certain degree of autonomy in their internal affairs.

The establishment of the Republic and the success of Catalonia encouraged autonomist movements in other areas of Spain. Basque country, Galicia, and Valencia were not the only regions that requested autonomy, even regions so closely tied to the idea of a Spanish nation, like Andalucia, Castile, and Extremadura, started the process leading to autonomy (Payne, 1971: 42).

Núñez considers the emergence of autonomist demands in Andalucia, Castile, and Extremadura “rather as a kind of protective chain-reaction than as a popular claim”
(Núñez, 1992: 81). Ortega y Gasset is more pessimistic. He thinks if some of the Spanish regions acquire a different status, the rest of the regions will follow the example, and the consequences would be the disintegration of Spain (Ortega y Gasset, 1969: 373).

The Civil War brought the complete defeat of all the Spanish regional nationalist movements. The only part of Spain that retained its special taxation and tariff privileges during the Francoist regime was the province of Navarre thanks to its traditionalist Catholic population and hostility to Basque nationalism.

Gunther believes that tensions between the centralizing tendencies of the government in Madrid and the periphery were the cause of four civil wars before the establishment of the Second Republic (1640, Catalonia and Portugal revolts; 1700-1715, Succession War; 1835-1839 and 1876, Carlist Wars), and to some extent, the Civil War of 1936-1939 should be considered another demonstration of the struggle between center and periphery: “Catalan and Basque nationalists opposed the rising by the Spanish army mainly because they wanted to defend or reestablish semi-autonomous regional governments” (Gunther et al., 1986: 17).

Franco’s regime, based on absolutely opposite premises than the Republic, tried to develop and unify Spanish society, but regional differences during his mandate were only reduced, never eliminated. As soon as the government relaxed the repression, they appeared again with renewed vigor (Ben-Ami, 1991: 502). Franco’s idea of Spain as *Una, Grande, y Libre* (One, Great, and Free) did not triumph, and after his long ruling years the question of integrating the periphery with the center remained unsolved.
Payne considers that in the long run, Franco’s policy towards peripheral nationalism had the counterproductive effect of reawakening intense nationalist feeling in most of the distinctive regions of the country (Payne, 1991: 487).

During the democratic transition, after Franco’s death in 1975, there were considerable differences of opinion at the mass level concerning even the general question of whether to maintain a centralized state or to grant autonomy. Even though the 1978 Constitution established the general principle of decentralization; the precise nature and extent of the regional autonomy were still unsolved and conflictive questions (Gunther et al., 1986: 246).

Finally, Spain became a democratic parliamentary monarchy where an *Estado de las Autonomías* (State of self-governing communities) replaced the centralized structure of the state. This process led to the redistribution of the fifty provinces of Spain into seventeen autonomous communities.

The 1978 Constitution and the democratic elections of 1977 and 1979 that showed the willingness of the majority of Spanish people to accept a new organization of the Spanish state could not avoid the attempt of a military coup on 23 February 1981. The army’s dissatisfaction with the government’s inability to defeat terrorism and the belief that Spanish integrity was in danger were some of the motives for the failed coup. The central government tried to appease the army’s dissatisfaction concerning to the devolution of power to regional government, by cutting these down through the *Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico*, LOAPA, (Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process).
This new controversial law was in essence a post-coup pact. The fact it had been agreed on by the ruling UCD party and the opposition PSOE strengthened peripheral nationalism suspicions that all the ‘Spanish’ parties maintained their traditional commitment to centralist rule (Newton, 1997: 122-123).

The LOAPA was challenged in the constitutional court by Catalans and Basques and several of its main provisions were not approved (Keating, 1996: 123).

The results of a survey made in 1979 about the desirable structure of the Spanish state, ranging from centralism, to the granting of either limited or extensive autonomy, to total independence for regional minorities, expressed a preference for either a limited or extensive autonomy, including the linguistically distinct regions: Catalonia, Basque country, and Galicia. Also, it is important to mention the appearance of an emergent autonomist sentiment in Andalucia. The number of Andaluces who preferred a centralized country decreased from more than fifty percent to less than one-third from 1977 to 1979, while in the rest of the country this decreased was from 42 to 33 percent (Gunther et al., 1986: 241-251).

According to a more recent survey by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Center for Sociological Research) made in December 1996 about the Conciencia nacional y regional (regional and national consciousness), the total percentage of people who prefer an unique central government has decreased to 16.3, and the number of Spaniards who consider the Autonomous Communities as something positive for the country has increased to 59.3 percent, while 17.4 think the opposite (Garrido, 1997a: 1-3).
Table 1. Proportion of regional population favoring varying degrees of autonomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomous Communities</th>
<th>Centralism</th>
<th>Limited Autonomy</th>
<th>Extensive Autonomy</th>
<th>Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andalucia</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Balearic Islands</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gunther et al., 1986: 248

**Federalism in Spain**

As I have expressed formerly, Spain was little more than a confederation of regions until the eighteenth century when Philip V centralized the government in Madrid. This centralization never was fully accepted by some of the peripheral regions that tried to change it every time they could.

The failure of the monarchy of Amadeo of Savoy (1873) after the abdication of Isabel II, led to a Republic in which two main currents emerged: a unitary and a federalist one (Linz, 1973: 57). The federalists led by Pi Margall, a Catalan living in Madrid, created a nationwide movement with a program for the whole country, and the parliament
proclaimed Spain a federal republic where the different regions would be tied to the federal government by voluntary agreement. In its eight-month life, none of the four presidents of the federal republic could form a stable cabinet, and again another military uprising brought the monarchy and a new centralized government (Flores et al., 1989: 328-330).

Linz believes that Pi Margall’s federalism was impractical in Spain, because of its economic, social, and cultural differences, increased by centuries of centralist governments in large part of the country (Linz, 1973: 64). As Rennie Warburton said “Federal nation-states by their very nature are prone to tension. These tensions are more acute in those multilingual contexts where wealth, property, living standards and political rights are unevenly distributed among the component groups” (Smith, 1977: 109).

The following attempt in establishing a federal state in Spain, again in a period of social unrest and political decline after the collapse of the monarchy in 1931, was led by the Catalan Frances Macia who supported by left Catalanist and left Republican took control of local government in Catalonia and proclaimed the Republic of Catalonia within the Democratic Federal Republic of Spain (Payne, 1971: 40). Although this proclamation was not really effective, it resulted in a Statute of Catalan autonomy. In 1934, the continuous conflicts between the centralist right in Madrid and the extreme Catalan nationalists brought the rebellion of the Catalan government of Companys and a new proclamation of a Catalan republic within the Federal Republic of Spain (Linz, 1973: 69). This situation only lasted a few hours, but it shows the federalist sentiments of Catalan people in the first half of this century.
After the Catalan attempts to obtain a federal state in the 1930’s, the results were the same as after the failure to set up a federal republic in the 1870’s, a powerful centralized state emerged and prohibited any kind of regional autonomy (Solé, 1985: 29).

The 1978 Constitution opened the way towards a decentralized state, and albeit the first point of the Article 145 forbids expressly a federal state, "In no case shall the federation of autonomous Communities be allowed," many jurists and politicians believe that the present legal configuration of Spain is up to certain degree federalist (Alzaga, 1978: 26).

Núñez thinks that nowadays the decentralized system of Spain can be considered as an intermediate step between the federalism of the Federal Republic of German and Italy’s regional system (Núñez, 1992: 1-2), and Payne believes that Catalonia and Basque country have had a powerful demonstration effect on the rest of the country, and in reality Spain has been a federal state since 1982 (Payne, 1991: 487-488).

**Basque Country**

What constitutes the Basque country is a matter of dispute. While ethnic militants hold that it comprises four Spanish provinces, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Alava, and Navarre, and three provinces located in Iparralde (French territory), Labourd, Basse Navarre, and Soule, the present Spanish territorial distribution of the Basque country only recognizes three provinces, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Alava (see Figure 3).

Although Basques regard themselves as forming a simple cultural unit based on a distinctive race and language, called *Euskera*, Heiberg considers Basque people as a
complex society formed by various primitive ethnic groups of the Western Pyrenees with an ample variety of language dialects which in some cases were mutually incomprehensible (Heiberg, 1989: 13).

Figure 3. Basque country

For Clark, geography of the Basque territory has determined the shape of Basque social, economic, and political life. In the North, topography and climate played and important role in directing the people toward the sea; its population is more ethnically Basque and less interested in contacts with Spain. In the South, its inhabitants are more closely tied to the people and economy of the rest of Spain (Clark, 1980: 76).
Heiberg in her introduction to *The Making of the Basque Nation* says that inside the Basque country, since the Middle Ages, two opposed but overlapping social orders exist: one urban, Hispanicized, complex, successful, and strong and the other, enclosing the immense majority of rural population, Basque-speaking and relatively impoverished.

Ben-Ami agree with Heiberg and instead of a Basque country he sees various Basque countries with a remarkable degree of political pluralism that goes from “*españolista* socialism through Carlism and integrist to an incoherent nationalism divided between a possibilist and a radical wing” (Ben-Ami, 1991: 495).

Juan Linz states that, at the present moment, in spite of the unquestionable hegemony of nationalism, Basque politics and society continue to be essentially pluralistic (Linz, 1985: 232-234).

**Basque History.** The geographical situation of the Basque country has made it a country of passage for people coming from north and south. Until the thirteenth century, when the three Basque provinces were finally incorporated into the kingdom of Castile, they alternated between the kingdoms of Navarre, Asturias, or Castile.

To understand Basque history, an understanding of the concept of collective nobility is essential, since collective nobility was the moral core of the Basque sense of ethnic uniqueness. “Any Basque able to prove birth of Basque parents in Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, or in certain valleys of Navarre and Alava was automatically recognized as noble by virtue of purity of blood” (Greenwood, 1977: 86). Collective nobility was frequently mentioned by Basques to support their claims for different treatment within
the Spanish state, or to maintain certain privileges as freedom for taxation and conscription.

Concession of collective nobility was a matter of military policy. The grant of this privilege had two main reasons: the Arabs never entered the Basque country, and as a reward for the defense of the Spanish borders from foreign attacks since the fifteenth century (Greenwood, 1977: 90-91).

The Basque territory enjoyed certain independence from Castile, thanks to the *fueros*, traditional laws and customs, to which the kings had to swear before they were crowned. As a result of the conflict arising from the succession to the Spanish throne in 1700, the Basque provinces were the only ones which, together with Navarre, preserved their privileges and institutions.

At that time there was no conflict between being Basque and being Spanish. Zaldibia, a compiler of Basque customary law, in the sixteenth century, saw a perfect compatibility between being Basque and being Spanish. "Zaldibia's feeling was that the Basques were not only Spaniards but were the best Spaniard of all" (Greenwood, 1977: 93). Later, that relationship became unthinkable and collective nobility was used to differentiate Basques from the rest of Spaniards.

The special juridical situation, added to the possession of a language of their own, prompted the spread among the people of the territory of a consciousness of mutual affinity and special identity. Basques began the process of revising Basque history to emphasize their differences. An example of this is viewed in Larramendi's ideas written at the end of the eighteenth century. As cited in Greenwood, Larramendi developed a

66
extreme virulent ethnic confrontation against the Castilians, considering them as the worst of all Spaniards. For him, Spanishness and Basque-ness were mutually exclusive and conflicting (Greenwood, 1977: 98).

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the system of provincial government, called diputaciones forales, was a source of conflicts between the crown and the Basque provinces. Other provinces of Spain, which did not have freedom from taxation and conscription, pressed the crown to give them similar rights or to abolish the Basque rights. If each monarch maintained its support to the ancient rights of Basques was because the military importance and shipbuilding industry of Basques still remained a fundamental element in the Spanish European and colonial policies (Greenwood, 1977: 94-97).

As result of the centralizing ideas that arrived from France, and the declining military importance of the Basque territory, due to the crown’s establishment of permanent garrison in the area, Basques began to lose weight and adopted a more defensive position with relation to their rights. Tension was greater and the Basques began to consider themselves an oppressed ethnic minority.

In 1793, during a Spanish-French war as a consequence of the French Revolution, the Diputación of Guipúzcoa proposed to France its neutrality and independence of the province under the condition that the Catholic religion and the fueros would be respected. French rejected the proposal and only accepted the incorporation into France. The end of the war in 1795 concluded the danger of secession, but the events raised the issue of
eliminating the traditional institutions for a more centralized government, although the political situation prevented this (Linz, 1973: 74-75).

The progressive Constitution of 1812 aggravated the differences and endangered the continued existence of the *fueros*, but the reinstatement of the monarchy with Ferdinand VII brought the reintegration of the *fueros* in 1814. On his death in 1833, the candidature of his brother Don Carlos against Isabel II caused the first Carlist War, in which the country people sided with the pretender, representing tradition, while the citizens opted for the liberal faction of the queen. Two further Carlist wars between 1847 and 1875 resulted in the definite abolition of the Basque *fueros* in 1876, and their replacement by the *concierto económico*, economic agreements between the regional councils and the state (Flores et al., 1989: 318).

After the suppression of Basque rights in 1876, the system of provincial government and taxation was definitely reorganized to match the national model. The crown finally managed to have taxes and conscription shared equally among all Spaniards, and it refused to recognize different provincial rights on the basis of historical privileges. For Villota the suppression of provincial rights set the stage for contemporary ethnic conflict (Villota, 1994: 250).

The next stage in the history of the Basque country was the emergence of a nationalist movement which goal was the reinstatement of the *fueros*. The movement owns its character to the personality of Arana, a strongly religious man, educated in a Carlist family by the Jesuits, and opposed to the immigrants from other parts of Spain that were attracted to the region for its industrial development (Linz, 1973: 78).
With the fall of the Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship and the proclamation of the Second Republic, the Basque nationalist demands materialized in the proposal of an autonomy statute for the country. The autonomy statute bill of 1934 proposed a “Basque state ... autonomous within the totality of the Spanish state” (Ben-Ami, 1991: 500). The Spanish state would be in charge of foreign relations, armed forces, currency, penal and mercantile law, and suffrage in national elections. On the other hand the four provinces, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Alava, and Navarre, would be autonomous within the Basque state and would be permitted to leave it at will. An important issue was that the relationship between church and state would be within the competence of the local government.

The withdrawal of the religious matters from the autonomy statute, by pressure of the central government, was the reason why Navarrese representatives refused to support that autonomy statute in June 1932 (Blinkhorn, 1974: 601-604). The next year, a new autonomy project for Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Alava was submitted to a popular referendum, but this time it was the rural Alava, which opposed to autonomy. Payne believes this rejection “reflected not so much opposition to autonomy, but fear of domination by wealthier, industrial, urban, and increasingly more assertive Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa” (Payne, 1971: 43). Finally, the alliance of Basque nationalists with republicans and socialists in Madrid after the outbreak of Civil War in 1936 meant that the autonomy statute could be approved, but only in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa while the conservatives provinces of Alava and Navarre joined the nationalist cause (Ben-Ami, 1991: 501).
The defeat of the Spanish Republic in the Civil War in 1939, and the installation of the new regime led by Franco, weakened Basque nationalism and threatened to reduce it to a nostalgic movement. For Sullivan, what saved Basque nationalism from decline was the recovery of the Spanish economy in the 1950’s, which brought another wave of immigrants from other parts of Spain looking for a job (Sullivan, 1988: 332).

**Ethnic Characteristics and Language.** One of the reasons why much attention has been focused on Basque ethnic uniqueness is that the Basque population has some different characteristics that make them quite unusual among surrounding peoples. They have the highest incidence of the Rh negative blood factor and the lowest frequency of blood type B of any European population, and the Basque language is unrelated to any of the Indo-European languages (Kern, 1995: 101).

Genetic studies on the Basque population began in 1937, and at the present moment still many studies are financially supported by the Educational Council of the Basque government. Manzano’s studies show the genetic peculiarity of the Basque population with regard to Rh system and other blood characteristics (Manzano, 1996: 249). The results in the studies of Arrieta and others scientifics present statistically significant differences between Basques and other Spanish populations. Blood group studies show that the frequency of group B is the lowest in Europe and the rhesus gene d is the highest of any analyzed population (Arrieta et al., 1987: 97), and Calafell and Bertranpetit’s studies show that besides the Rh system, many other systems are different.
in the Basque in relation to surrounding populations (Calafell and Bertranpetit, 1994: 213).

With regard to the origin of the Basque language, Euskera, it does not have a clear origin. Some scholars argue that Euskera has Afro-Asiatic roots, while others claim that it comes from the Caucasus; nonetheless the reality is that modern linguists failed to demonstrate a link between the Basque language and any other human tongue (Kern, 1995: 101). The topographic features of the Basque country have contributed to maintain its linguistic diversity where you can find different dialects from village to village (Heiberg, 1989: 13).

The Basques found many more difficulties in selecting an element to carry the symbolic weight of national identity than Catalonia did. For Sabino Arana, founder of modern Basque nationalism, race was the first and most important national characteristic, followed by language which should be used to avoid the contact with immigrants from other parts of Spain (Villota, 1994: 259). The priest Evangelista de Ibero (1906), another figure of early Basque nationalism, also gave a secondary role to the language. He wrote:

... of all those properties, which one constitutes essentially a nationality? In the first place, the blood, race or origin; in the second place, the language. The other qualities are nothing but the consequences of the first two, most specifically of the first. (Linz, 1973: 37)

Later, since genetically transmitted characteristics that identify Basques from non-Basques, such as blood type or Rh negative factor in the blood, were so vague and diffuse, and emphasis on racism was unacceptable, language became one of the most important distinguishing features of Basque ethnicity (Clark, 1980: 81).
Today, language is still an important issue in the Basque country but it is seen less as a core value. This change can be explained by recent changes in Basque society, especially the inadmissible idea of race as a core value after the massive arrival of southern Spanish immigrants (Conversi, 1990: 50-51). In 1985 a survey about the characteristics defining who is Basque concluded that the majority of the population, 67.3 percent residing in the Basque country, regardless of geographic origin and ethnic identification, believed that the main criterion that should be used for differentiating Basque individuals from non-Basque is whether or not someone lives and works in the Basque country, while the rest, 30.7 percent, thought that the main characteristic was speaking Euskera (Linz, 1985: 216).

For Urla, the links between Basque identity and language is due in great part to Franco’s repressive policies on this issue, which forbade the use of Basque in public and initiated a strong campaign to eliminate its use (Urla, 1993: 822). As Conversi wrote: “periods of oppression or foreign domination are often those in which core values are consolidated” (Conversi, 1990: 52). So, after years of political and cultural repression, an open insistence on speaking and learning Euskera became a political act of challenge against the state and its government. It is in this context that Urla explains that for the radical Basque separatist organization known as ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom), language was the sine qua non of the nationalist struggle (Urla, 1993: 822).

For Gunther, in the Basque country the national self-identity is clearly related to the ability to speak Euskera. Even among native Basques, there is a great correlation
between people who speak *Euskera* and those who only feel Basque (Gunther et al., 1986: 316).

Table 2. Subjective national identification by language usage (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sense of group identification</th>
<th>Native speakers</th>
<th>Native non-speakers</th>
<th>Immigrant non-speakers</th>
<th>1984 All respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish only</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Spanish than Basque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Spanish as Basque</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Basque than Spanish</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque only</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gunther et al., 1986: 317

The 1978 Constitution recognizes the right of the autonomous communities to use their own languages. In 1979, instruction in *Euskera* was made obligatory in those areas, primarily Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, where the language was the prevalent medium of communication. In other areas, such as Alava and Navarre and some larger cities, language instruction was optional and introduced gradually. In the small towns of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, it is not unusual to find 95 percent of the population speaking *Euskera*, while in the industrial surroundings of Bilbao the situation is inverted and hardly anyone speaks Basque, even at home. The large-scale migration of non-Basque into the region since the Civil War aggravated this tendency (Clark, 1980: 82).

The use of the Basque language has also been in steady decline, especially since the 1950’s with the rise of the immigration.

Table 3. Basque-speakers in 1868 and 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Basque-speaker</th>
<th>% of Basque-speaker population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>391,000</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>519,078</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Heiberg, 1989: 101
In 1984, of the 2.1 million people in the Basque country, 23 percent could understand *Euskera*, 21 percent could speak it, but only 13 percent could read the language and only 10 percent could write it. (Library of Congress, 1990: 96-97).

For Tejerina, the historic reasons why the Basque language has never had social prestige is because of its oral transmission and the absence of a cultural, scientific, and literary production. For him, the main motivation to learn *Euskera* is to increase one’s possibilities to find a job especially if the employer is the Basque government (Tejerina, 1992: 230-243).

Today, the recuperation of *Euskera* constitutes an enormous challenge for the nationalist parties. Officials in the Basque country have started a number of important programs, especially in television and education, to restore the language to a level of parity with Castilian Spanish, but the success of these efforts will not be confirmed for at least a generation. Leopoldo Barrera, speaker of the Popular Party (PP) in the Basque parliament, estimates in one billion pesetas the money invested in the Basque country since 1980 to spread the Basque language in the region (Garrido, 1997b: 1).

**Basque Nationalism.** To understand Basque people a wide range of information must be viewed. Banton sees the Basques as “a group, whose members are dissatisfied with the recognition accorded their distinctiveness by the state in which they find themselves” (Banton, 1994: 15). For Medrano, the Basque country is an overdeveloped region within a multinational state. For him, “Basque nationalism since its emergence in the late nineteenth century has been divided into two groups: those who hold separatist
and anti-capitalist views, and those who emphasize political autonomy but not separatism
and who hold pro-capitalist views” (Medrano, 1994: 877).

The question of determining whether the abolition of *fueros*, Carlist wars, and
resurgence of Basque culture constituted elements of pre-nationalist meaning is still a
question of historical controversy. While some authors, especially the Basque nationalist
historians have tended to see the Carlist wars and the abolition of *fueros* as the previous
pre-nationalist stage, some others support the opposite assumption: neither abolition of
*fueros* nor the Carlist wars are precedents of pre-nationalism (Núñez, 1992: 65-66).
Payne says that after the defeat of Carlists, even Basque liberals remained foralists, that
is, concerned about the protection of certain separate rights and exemptions, but Payne
considers this cannot be viewed as a manifestation of Basque nationalism in any sense

Extramiana on his paper, *Regionalismo y prenacionalismo en el País Vasco del
siglo XIX* (Regionalism and prenationalism in the Basque country in the XIX century),
presents the evolution of the *fueristas* towards pre-nationalism, as well as the negative
reaction against Spanish immigration (Extramiana, 1985: 387-400). For Clark, the
expansion of Basque nationalist movement in the last third of the nineteenth century was
a consequence of the abolition of the ancient *foral* laws and the incorporation of the
Basque region into the Spanish economic system (Clark, 1980: 80). Ben-Ami writes that
those Basques who under the *fueros* system did not found any contradiction between
being Spanish and Basque, later developed a sentiment of shared distinctiveness (Ben-
The cultural origins of Basque nationalism are also a matter of discussion, although it is generally accepted that its influence in the formation and modeling of the first Basque nationalism was relatively weak (Núñez, 1992: 65-66). Corcuera’s essay on the social and political origins of Basque nationalism tracks back the remote intellectual origins of Basque nationalism to the Carlist wars, where he finds some elements of ideological pre-nationalism, such as the defense of a Basque traditional peasant culture against the laical and liberal Spanish state (Corcuera, 1991: 357). The fuerista tradition, defender of the ancient privileges which the Basque country maintained until their abolition in 1876, represents another pre-nationalist factor, which provided some ideological elements to the modeling of Basque nationalist doctrines. At the end of the third Carlist War and as a consequence of the abolition of the fueros, a diffused nostalgic and conservative ideology survived among many intellectual groups. Some of them created cultural associations to promote the defense and recovery of the ancient Basque language, but they never elaborated a definite ideology (Corcuera, 1991: 358-376).

It is clear that there has been a Basque culture and language for many centuries, but the concept of the Basque nation did not appear until the end of the nineteenth century.

The political history of the Basque region was a history of clans, tribes, lineages, seigniorial domains, and eventually of partially self-governing individual provinces owing allegiance to the crown of Castile/Spain, but never at any time prior to the twentieth century did it concern a joint and distinct political unit. (Payne, 1991: 484)

Some other authors consider that the roots of Basque nationalism can only be understood in an economic context. Petrella remarks that in situations of deteriorating
economic conditions, the central government and the dominant social groups inevitably become the target of the complaints of the social forces that are facing serious economic problems. "The flagging economy was the reason why the Basque country, at the beginning of this century, originated the first Basque nationalism" (Petrella, 1980: 17).

According to Jordi Solé Tura, with different nuances, writers as Elorza, Solozábal, Jáuregui, Corcuera, Fusi, or Recalde that have studied the origins of Basque nationalism agree in tying it to the conflicts produced as a consequence of its quick process of industrialization (Solé, 1985: 37).

For Sullivan, Basque nationalism was a response to the rapid transformation of Basque society by the rapid industrialization of the region, which brought an enormous immigration of workers from other parts of Spain (Sullivan, 1988: 11).

Before industrialization arrived in the region, the unity of Basque and Castilian interests was so intense that there was never any Basque revolt against the Spanish crown. Protected by the Spanish tariff and regional tax privileges, Basques did not have any complaint about the Spanish system (Payne, 1971: 33-35), but capitalism began to divide the Basque bourgeoisie in two parts: the upper middle class and aristocracy, who cooperate with Spanish politics and foreign capital for their own benefit and who did not have any interest in their Basque ethnicity, and the lower middle class and professionals, who felt oppressed by industrial growth and who turned to their ethnic heritage to improve their welfare and political power (Clark, 1980: 87).

Recently, modern Basque nationalism has been explained as a reaction by traditional Basque society to the challenge of socialism and to the collapse of the old
social and cultural order (Ben-Ami, 1991: 494), and as a consequence of the change from tradition to modernity (Heiberg, 1989: 38-44).

The first symptoms of the Basque nationalist movement appeared in the growing industrial city of Bilbao; its support came mainly from the rural population often led by the lower clergy, and the native skilled working class, partly as a reaction against immigrants workers from other parts of Spain and the secular socialist labor movement (Linz, 1973: 79).

Basque industry reached a high rate of development favoring the demand for manpower that attracted many immigrants. A good example is that from 1857 to 1900 Vizcaya’s population increase by 93.9 percent. The consequence of this heavy immigration was that proportion of population ethnically Basque decreased considerably and in many urban areas the majority was clearly non-Basque in both language and identity (Library of Congress, 1990: 96-97).

In this context Sabino Arana, founder of Basque nationalism and the first regional party, Partido Nacionalista Vasco PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) formulated in the 1890’s the first elements of Basque nationalist consciousness. Arana protested against the denationalization of his homeland by the immigration, the growing identification with Spain, and the carelessness of local language and history (Linz, 1973: 79). He wrote the book Biscaya por su independencia (Biscaya for its independence), where he presented his idea of Euskadi, as he called the Basque country, formed by an independent republic confederation of Basque states which would include the three Spanish-Basque provinces, Navarre, and the three French-Basque provinces each of which would enjoy full internal
autonomy. Arana emphasized that Spanish immigration should be restricted to preserve the Basque purity of blood and avoid degeneration and possible extinction of the Basque race by the increase of the Spanish immigration (Ben-Ami, 1991: 497).

Sabino Arana’s ideology contains a synthesizing mixture of elements taken from previous ideologies like, Basque fuerismo, traditionalism, and Catholicism, and it expresses the rejection of Basque traditional society of capitalism and social conflicts, both consequences of the industrialization process. The result was a xenophobic and racist theory where Basque nationality was defined by race, religion and language, expressed in the formula “God and Ancient Laws” (Núñez, 1992: 56-58). For Arana, Euskadi had to be independent, because depending on Spain, the nation could not address to God, and it could never be truly Catholic (Villota, 1994: 255-256). It was thanks to Arana’s religious integrism that the Catholicism became a constant element of Basque nationalism (Núñez, 1992: 62).

Sabino Arana presents race as the first and most important national characteristic, followed by the language which should be used to avoid the contact with immigrants (Villota, 1994: 259). Arana’s ideas about language were clearly segregationist.

The Vizcayans are as much bound to speak their national language, as not to speak it to the maketos or Spaniards. It is not to speak this or the other language, but rather the difference between languages which is the great means of preserving ourselves from the contagion of Spaniards and avoiding the mixing of the two races. If our invaders were to learn Euskera, we would have to abandon it, carefully archiving its grammar and dictionary, and dedicate ourselves to speaking Russian, Norwegian or any other language, as long as we are subject to their domination. For the Catalans it would be a great glory if the Spanish government appointed Catalan as the official language of all Spain; on the contrary, if it were to do the same with Euskera, it would be for us the final blow of unavoidable death dealt from the most refined diplomacy. (Conversi, 1990: 59)
According to Minogue's theory that there is a tendency, almost a law of human behavior, such that the greater the hostility for foreigners, the greater the cohesion of the group itself (Minogue, 1967: 146), it seems that Arana was looking for that cohesion when he tries to differentiate Basques from the rest of Spaniards.

Arana publicly exposed what he called the Catalanist error of pursuing autonomy and cooperation within the Spanish framework, insisting that the Basque movement claimed total independence (Payne, 1991: 485-486).

Racial purity, in a modern society, was not a good component for a quick expansion of Arana's ideas although he attracted a great number of people who wanted to counteract the threats of liberalism, socialism, and the moral degeneration brought by industrialization and immigrants. The expansion of Basque nationalism at the beginning of this century is attributed to the incorporation of Social-Catholic sectors into the Basque movement and the support of the non-monopolist bourgeoisie, and even to a part of the shipbuilding contractors, which joined nationalism because their interests were opposed to the economic regulations imposed by the central government in Madrid. On the other hand, these new groups disagreed with the radical separatism proclaimed by Arana's ideology, so their entry in the Basque movement implied a revision of the separatist doctrine of the PNV (Núñez, 1992: 56-57). In fact, Arana's philosophy about racism and radical independence from Spain moderated, and, in 1902, he advanced the idea of autonomy as being more realistic than that of independence (Ben-Ami, 1991: 498).
Since the beginning of Basque movement, opinions and loyalties have been divided. The new industrial upper bourgeoisie, financiers and great industrialists in Bilbao did not identify with Basque nationalism. One basic factor was the crown’s policy, after the Restoration in 1874, of granting nobility titles to financiers and industrialists. This created a set of ties between the Vizcayan big business and Madrid that has continued until the present moment, where the Bilbao financial capitalism is essentially national (Linz, 1973: 81). In fact, the Basque bourgeoisie has made major contributions to Spanish nationalism in the twentieth century in five distinct historic situations:

- The Liga de Acción Monárquica, the political organization of the Basque new right, played an important role in the attempt to create an all-Spanish new right in the years immediately after the first world war.

- The Basque bourgeoisie collaborated fairly closely with the nationalistic new dictatorship of Primo de Rivera during the rest of the 1920s.

- Representatives of the Bilbao bourgeoisie contributed more than any other single group in the first efforts to stimulate a fascist movement in Spain between 1931 and 1933.

- They played an important role in the attempt to form a nationalistic all-Spanish radical right around José Calvo Sotelo between 1934 and 1936.

- The Basque right enjoyed disproportionate representation under the Franco regime. For example, in 1960, when the Basque provinces and Navarre contained 5.8 percent of the population of Spain they had 9.5 percent of the Cortes seats, 8 percent of all the military ministers of Franco, 12.9 percent of the titles of nobility granted by the Generalissimo, and approximately 15 percent of all the cabinet ministers in the regime to that point. (Payne, 1991: 490-491)

Basque nationalism has been characterized by the forced relationship between liberal sectors, more moderate in their pretensions about autonomy or independence, and
the Arana's followers, strong nationalists, who come from rural sectors, young Basque white-collar workers and petty bourgeoisie. So, the internal tensions and splits within the Basque nationalist movement must be understood in terms of class and ideological opposition. In this way, Núñez explains the 1921 split within Basque nationalism, between the Comunión Nacionalista Vasca, Catholic-conservative and moderate in the social question, and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, clearly separatist and ambiguously populist-oriented (Núñez, 1992: 58).

The PNV during the Second Republic was still a populist Catholic party, and although it was different from the one created by Arana it maintained xenophobic and even racist remains, but it had to move toward the liberals, in spite of its anticlericalism, because in a democratic and pluralistic regime it was the only way of reaching an autonomous government, after the defeats of 1932 and 1933 (Ben-Ami, 1991: 500).

The division of Basque country as result of its economic, ethnic, or social disparity determines a complicated situation of difficult evaluation. Dispersion of Basque nationalism presents a clear relationship between cultural and political factors. Basque-speaking areas of the region are more inclined to nationalism, and this is the reason why Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and the northern municipalities of Alava were the first attracted by nationalism. In Navarre, the case is different, Basque nationalism is more autonomist and moderate in order to compete for the support of the traditional Carlist vote (Núñez, 1992: 60-61).

Leaving aside historically inherited cleavages, Basque nationalism maintained, until recent years, the unity of the nationalist movement at the cost of leaving outside of
the movement most of the big business entrepreneurs and the immigrant working class identified with the socialist party. Basque nationalism initially saw in the socialists a threat to the ethnic community and perceived the immigrant workers as a national and as a class threat (Linz, 1973: 69), and socialists rejected Basque nationalism for its ultra-religious and traditionalist convictions, and for its xenophobic attitude towards the immigrant (Ben-Ami, 1991: 495).

It was the refusal of the Spanish right, during the Second Republic, to concede autonomy to the Basques that forced the conservative PNV to ally with socialists and republicans, and opened a new path for some Basque nationalists that in the 1950’s would feel a more deeply sympathy with leftist and revolutionary ideas (Ben-Ami, 1991: 515).

According to J. L. de la Granja, Basque nationalism until the 1960’s was considered to be only a patrimony of the population of Basque origin; immigrants from other regions of Spain were systematically rejected in the PNV or in the Basque nationalist labor union. This is the main reason why during the Second Republic, the reunified PNV could not obtained more than 50 percent of the votes in Vizcaya, around 30 percent in Guipuzcoa, and less than 25 percent in Alava and Navarre (Douglass, 1985: 155-173).

Today, the racially oriented ideas of Sabino Arana are rejected by all Basque nationalist parties. The stress on race is impossible to maintain in Euskadi, especially after the large Spanish immigrations at the end of the last century and after the late 1950’s (Conversi, 1990: 61).
Basque nationalism after the Civil War almost disappeared and Basque nationalist opposition to Franco’s regime did not receive much attention, at least until the period prior to ETA’s foundation. The peculiarities of that time, clandestinity, lack of free press, and refusal of the PNV to open its archives, make analysis of that period of time difficult. On the contrary, the period following the establishment of ETA has received much attention from historiographers, probably by the effect of its terrorist actions (Núñez, 1992: 67).

What recovered Basque nationalism after the Civil War and saved it from oblivion was the spectacular recovery of the Spanish economy after the late 1950’s and the following invasion of Basque country by new waves of immigrants. Just as the industrialization of 1890’s brought Arana’s idea about Basque nationalism, the second wave of modernization brought ETA, a Basque nationalist revolutionary organization which in 1959 split from the PNV in protest against its excessive conservatism (Ben-Ami, 1991: 515), and whose goal is outright independence for Euskadi, with violence as the only way to get it (The Economist, 1992: 16).

During the late 1950’s and 1960’s, Spanish economy increased tremendously, and this economic progress, just like the industrialization of the Basque region in the 1890’s, had a direct effect on the expansion of Basque nationalism. This rapid economic progress emphasized the difference between the center and the periphery. Basques complained that their profits were sent to other areas of the state according to central government priorities (Ben-Ami, 1991: 501-502). Since the industrial boom in Vizcaya following 1876, the Basque country has regularly been among the richest regions of
Spain. In 1969, the provinces of Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, and Alava ranked first, second, and third respectively in terms of per capita income, and Navarre ranked seventh, out of 50 provinces (Clark, 1980: 83).

For Jáuregui, ETA is the result of the interaction of two factors closely tied. Arana’s nationalism based on the consideration of Euskadi as a military occupied country, and Francoism that made this occupation effective and real (Jáuregui, 1996: 63).

Petrella believes that Basque nationalism owes its success to a unique situation, difficult to find in any other areas, the existence of two agents of political mobilization, one the Partido Nationalista Vasco representing historical continuity and moderation and the other, Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) a revolutionary organization against ‘Spanish’ oppression which looks for a new future (Petrella, 1980: 24).

This radical movement of Basque separatists was organized in 1959 when they separated from the much larger Partido Nacionalista Vasco Nationalist Party. During the great economic expansion of the 1960’s some young nationalist militants moved directly from Catholic youth organizations to nationalist cells, and transferred the traditional fervor of Basque Catholicism to a new political cause. This brought to the Basque country the most intense repression during the final decade of Franco’s regime, creating an oppression complex which awakened nationalist feelings in thousands of formerly skeptical or indifferent citizens (Payne, 1991: 488-489). At its first General Assembly in May 1962, in Southern France, ETA began to define its principles.

Its Declaration of Principles called for the independence of the French and Spanish Basque countries and their reunification in a democratic state that would
guarantee religious freedom. *Euskera* would be the official language, and it was promised the immigrants would not be discriminated. (Ben-Ami, 1991: 503)

Today, ETA, and its political branch *Herri Batasuna*, only contemplate the end of the struggle against the Spanish state if the central government accepts, as a political solution, what the nationalists call the *Alternativa Kas (Koordinadora Abertzale Socialista)*, which ultimate objective is complete independence from Spain (Library of Congress, 1990: 335). *Kas’* demands can be summarized as:

- recognition of Basque self-determination, compulsory teaching of the Basque language, incorporation of Navarre into the independent Basque state, the complete legalization of all political parties, a withdrawal of the Spanish police and the Civil Guard from the Basque country, and a variety of social benefits to be granted to the Basque working class. (Ben-Ami, 1991: 512)

The gradual acceptance by ETA of the immigrants from other regions of Spain as Basques, and its gradual solidarity with their social aspirations reinforced the socialist character of the radical organization, although a strong religious sentiment, reminiscence of Arana’s Catholicism, is present in ETA.

The election of a democratic national parliament in 1977 and a Basque parliament in 1980 did not bring any decrease of violence from ETA in contrast to the general Spanish opinion. Although ETA considers themselves socialist in orientation, the organization continued justifying its terrorist actions after the socialist government reached the power in 1982, because for them the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) was only an instrument of the capitalist and clerical forces that dominated Spain, and because PSOE did not offer any real autonomy to the Basque people (Library of Congress, 1990: 334).
As a consequence of the terrorist activities of ETA, investments in the region decreased considerably and paralyzed production. In the 1980’s Basque country lost 150,000 jobs and real income decreased by nine percent, according to Banco Bilbao-Vizcaya. In 1975, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa were among the country’s five richest provinces; in 1985, none was (The Economist, 1989: 61-62).

The economic situation has always been an important point in Basque nationalism. For Douglass, there will always be a potential for future ETAs as long as the historical and structural issues that led to creation of the movement remain unsolved (Douglass, 1988: 205). So long as unemployment stays high, ETA’s combination of nationalism and socialism is likely to retain popular support.

In the 1980’s the Basque nationalist would not have hesitated in saying that their aim was outright independence. Today they prefer to be vague. They cannot just drop the dream of independence, for fear of losing support of the extremist, but the integration in Europe would allow them to sidestep this issue (Economist, 1992: 17).

After the democratization of the Spanish political system in 1975, Basque nationalists as a whole, including the PNV, were willing to operate within a constitutional framework that could give them the widest possible degree of self-government, but at the same time, in order to achieve more political advantages, they did not clearly accept the legitimacy of the new system. Nationalist policy was that of maintaining contact with central government only in as far as it advanced the interest of the Basque nation. There has always been a kind of calculated ambiguity in the political strategy of PNV, defending Basque sovereignty and nationhood (Ben-Ami, 1991: 498-511).
Arzallus, President of the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, predicts that in 20-30 years Europe will have the same currency, foreign policy and army, and in this context Basques do not need a state; what they need is to win the maximum amount of autonomy, so they can find their way to Europe not through Spain, but as Basques. He recognizes that the bigger challenge for Basques is the economic isolation (The *Economist*, 1992: 17). Arzallus has publicly manifested, more than once, his aversion to Spain: “I am not and I do not feel Spanish” (Alonso de los Ríos, 1994: 62).

When the new constitution came to a vote in 1978, the moderate Basque nationalists urged their electorate to abstain on the constitutional referendum because the Basque *foral* privileges abolished in 1937 had to be restored before cooperation with the constitutional monarchy could begin (Newton, 1997: 119). For many Basques the results of the referendum meant a rejection of the new constitution because they consider the abstention as a refusal of the proposal. Javier Arzallus, President of the PNV has said: “we do not accept the constitution, but we observe it because we cannot accept war not because we are in agreement” (S.N, 1996: 1).

Table 4. Constitutional Referendum, December 1978 (as percentage of Basque census)

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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Void</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstention</td>
<td>50</td>
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Source: Heiberg, 1989: 125

The next step was the promulgation of a Basque Autonomous Statute which included the creation of their own parliament and government. Negotiations for
autonomy were hard, and they coincided with a notable recession in the Basque industrial economy. It was generally believed that taxes paid by the Basque economy did not generate an equivalent investment in regional services by the Spanish government. These circumstances created an atmosphere of rising resentment based in feelings of discrimination and even oppression (Payne, 1991: 488-489).

On October 25, 1979, people in the Basque country voted for the Basque Autonomous Statute, and more than 832,000 voted in favor of the statute, 47,000 against it, and about 620,000 abstained (40% of the eligible electorate), thus making the election an ambiguous expression of Basque nationalism (Clark, 1980: 75). The degree of autonomy obtained by Basques over their own affairs is considered by some sources at least as much as a German Land enjoys (The Economist, 1992: 17).

For the Basque government, the Autonomous Statute is a step in the process of creating a new Basque nation-state. Insausti, President of the Bizkai Buru Batzar (Vizcayan Parliament) in 1984 said: “The goal of the PNV is watch the day that the seven historical provinces of Euskadi become an independent state” (La Voz de Euskadi, 1984: 3).

In the first years in democracy, consciousness of Basque identity became stronger than ever before. This expansion of Basque identity was reflected in the creation of their own parliament and government, local police, own taxes, education system, and two television channels, one of them in their native language. In the first democratic elections of June 1977, nationalist parties obtained 35 percent of votes, in the election of June 1987, the proportion was 67.8 percent (Ben-Ami, 1991: 508).
Basque nationalism was confused by the attempt of a military coup in February 1981. A successful coup could have been, perhaps, advantageous for ETA as it would have removed what was seen as the façade of parliamentary democracy and revealed the unchanged nature of Spanish oppression of the Basque people. On the other hand, the PNV was shaken by the situation and, from this point on, it adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards the central government. The PNV remained dissatisfied with the pace of transfer of powers to the Basque government, but fear of military reactions was a powerful factor in inhibiting the demands for bigger regional autonomy (Sullivan, 1988: 298-299).

In the Basque context, there are two electoral choices among the nationalists. The radical, represented by Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity) that denies the legitimacy of the entire juridical and statutory framework within which Basque autonomy has emerged since 1979, including the 1978 Spanish Constitution and the 1979 Basque Autonomy Statute, and the more moderate approach, represented by the PNV, Euzkadiko Ezkerra (Basque left) now forming coalition with socialists, and Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque solidarity) that accept, in a certain way, the juridical and statutory framework, but at the same time reject Madrid’s domination over the legislative and political implementation of these laws, and the centralist interpretation of these statutes and subsequent legislation (Clark, 1987: 429-430).

Spanish national-level parties in the Basque country (Table 5) have remained strong because the region is the residence of a large numbers of non-Basques that came from other regions of Spain. Many of these workers have been gathered in the lower
classes of Basque society, and Medrano’s studies in this area show that the probability that immigrants will vote for Spanish parties increases as the concentration of immigrants in lower jobs goes up in the municipalities (Medrano, 1994: 886-877).

Table 5. Comparative autonomous election results in the Basque country

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNV</td>
<td>37.95</td>
<td>41.81</td>
<td>19.60</td>
<td>28.49</td>
<td>29.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>9.78</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>15.77</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB</td>
<td>16.48</td>
<td>14.59</td>
<td>17.40</td>
<td>18.33</td>
<td>16.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15.77</td>
<td>11.38</td>
<td>10.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP/PP</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>14.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCD/CDS</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE/PSE</td>
<td>14.16</td>
<td>22.96</td>
<td>21.95</td>
<td>19.94</td>
<td>17.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE/IU</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>9.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(1) EE joined PSOE in 1993
Source: Ministerio de la Gobernación, Dirección General de la Política Interior

Regional
PNV
EE
HB
EA
UA

National
AP/PP
UCD/CDS
PSOE/PSE
PCE/IU

Partido Nacionalista Vasco
Euskadiko Esquerra
Herri Batasuna
Eusko Alkartasuna
Unidad Alavesa
Alianza Popular/Partido Popular
Unión de Centro Democrático/Centro Democrático y Social
Partido Socialista Obrero Español/Partido Socialista de Euskadi
Partido Comunista de España/ Izquierda Unida

At the present moment, one hopeful sign is that support for Herri Batasuna is decreasing. In 1994 it lost its one seat in the European Parliament (Newton, 1997: 308), and in the Basque country majority of inhabitants oppose clearly against the violence showed by ETA and Herri Batasuna, with huge public manifestations after terrorist outrages. Unfortunately some 140,000 Basques still vote for ETA’s political wing and it
is very difficult to find any solution to the Basque problem in this context. What seems to be truth is that the more successful the moderate Basques are in winning concessions from Madrid, the weaker ETA becomes, and the bigger possibility of an ending terrorism in Spain (The *Economist*, 1996: 41-42).

**Catalonia**

Catalonia located in the northeast part of the Iberian Peninsula is a country of varied geographical characteristics. The Pyrenees Mountains and the valley of the Ebro River isolate Catalonia from the central Castilian tableland; its history has been heavily influenced by the Mediterranean Sea which it faces.

Modern Catalonia includes the provinces of Barcelona, Tarragona, Lérida, and Gerona, but the language is spoken in a wider area that covers the French Roussillon, the little state of Andorra, Valencia, the Balearic Island, the east boundaries of Aragon, and the town of Alghero in Sardinia (see Figure 4) (Balcells, 1996: 1).

The origin of Catalonia’s national identity is a matter of discussion among historians. Keating goes back to the Middle Ages, and says that Catalonia emerged as a defined territory and administration with its own language and culture at that time (Keating, 1996: 115). For Seton-Watson, Catalans possessed their own state in the past, have their own language and literature, and have shown repeatedly that they feel themselves a nation since immemorial times (Seton-Watson, 1971: 6). On the contrary, Salvador de Madariaga, writer and diplomat voluntarily exiled after Franco’s victory, denies a separate Catalan history because Catalonia is an integral part of Spain. “The
Basque and Catalan peoples are interwoven in the history of Spain in such an intimate fashion that their separation would tear apart a living being and leave it weakened” (Madariaga, 1967: 173).

Figure 4. Catalonia and language boundary

Nowadays, the Catalan nation within Spain is recognized by the 1978 Constitution, and Catalan leaders do not regard the nation as a mere historical fact, rather, they are engaged in a process of nation-building. This involves strengthening Catalan identity and culture while developing self-governing institutions (Balcells, 1996: 127-134).
For Catalanists, Catalan identity is not confined to Catalonia proper since the
Catalan language is spoken in a much larger area (Madariaga, 1958: 179).

**Catalan History.** It is impossible to deal with the history of Catalonia without
continual reference to that of other Spanish kingdoms as Aragon or Castile. Catalonia,
like Portugal and other kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula, cannot be traced before the

At the beginning of the ninth century, the Franks led by Charlemagne began an
offensive in the South Pyrenees, in what today it is Catalonia, to liberate the area from the
Moors. Under Frankish tutelage a number of small independent counties appeared, called
the *Marca Hispánica* or Spanish Marches, the most important being Cerdagne, Urgell,
Girona, Besalu, and Barcelona. The county of Barcelona soon became the most
significant, and after yielding the other counties under its control the County of Barcelona
was emancipated from the Carolingian Empire by the end of the ninth century. For
Peers, at this point begins the history of Catalonia (Peers, 1970: 4-5).

By the middle of the eleventh century, the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer
I, promulgated the *Usatges de Barcelona*, a codification of the laws and customs which
prescribed the duties of the Count to nobles, clergy, and bourgeoisie, obligations for
Army and Navy, and other civil and penal issues (Peers, 1970: 8).

In an attempt to protect Catalonia from the emerging kingdom of Castile, in 1137,
Aragon and Catalonia united under the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer IV
forming the Catalan-Aragonese confederacy, for Linz, often misleadingly referred to as

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the Kingdom of Aragon (Linz, 1973: 38). Ramon Berenguer IV assumed the title of king of Aragon, but he continued to rule as count in Catalonia. In reality there were two kingdoms, each one with its own government, laws, currency, and political orientation (Library of Congress, 1990: 11).

Catalonia and Aragon maintained their complete autonomy, but Catalonia was the pivot of the constitutional federation of the Crown of Aragon and developed one of the most advanced constitutional systems in Europe (Payne, 1971: 15). For Aragon the union with Catalonia was advantageous because of the economic profits, but for Catalonia the union was a constant fight against the Aragonese opposition to any expansion towards the Mediterranean sea (Madariaga, 1958: 199).

In 1469 Aragon was united in a dynastic confederation with Castile following the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabel of Castile, and in 1516 the crowns were merged under the Habsburg dynasty. Within these complex confederal structures, Catalonia retained its own institutions and laws; it raised its own taxes and it was not forced to participate in the monarch’s defense effort, except where Catalonia was directly threatened (Keating, 1996: 115).

At the height of Spanish history during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Catalonia did not play any important role in the general context of Spain; it was absorbed in its local affairs and in the Mediterranean area. Catalan economic enterprise was largely excluded from Spanish-American trade, but at the same time Catalans were not required to pay the big expenses of the imperial Habsburg government (Payne, 1971: 15).
For Keating, the exclusion of Catalans until late eighteenth century from trading with America was one important factor to explain Catalan’s economic decline in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Keating, 1996: 115-116).

As I have mentioned before in the Spanish history section, during the regency of Philip IV, his prime minister, Count-Duke of Olivares, tried to establish a centralized administration similar to that of France, but the result was that Catalonia, among other Spanish regions, revolted in 1640 (Flores et al., 1989: 224).

The root of the Catalan rebellion was not sentimental or purely political, but economic and financial. Spain, after long military campaigns in Europe and America, needed men and money and Catalonia had both, but Catalan laws only allowed conscription to defend its own territory; Catalan law provided that money could not be collected for foreign wars (Peers, 1970: 77).

Catalonia was supported by France, but in January 1653, twelve years later, Catalonia surrendered. Philip IV, as he had promised, maintained Catalan laws and once again Catalonia restored some kind of independence in its region. Although Catalonia surrendered, war against France continued until 1659 when the Treaty of the Pyrenees gave to France the complete Roussillon and part of Cerdagne that were part of Catalonia (Peers, 1970: 84).

After the death of Charles II in 1700, Spain faced a new war between the supporters of Philip V and the Habsburg pretender, Archduke Charles. Catalonia fearing a strong centralized government joint the Britain and Austrian alliance but it could not avoid its defeat in 1714. Catalan self-government and special laws were abolished. The
intention of the Bourbon monarchy was to submerge the identity of Catalonia in Spain (Flores et al., 1989: 260).

For the first time in its history Catalonia was fully integrated into the broader affairs of Spain. This was a period of remarkable expansion in Catalan economy that allowed the region to be the most economically active region of Spain. Catalans were fully aware of the advantages offered by the Spanish system and felt completely loyal to the crown. For Payne, the Catalan upper middle class backed the centralization model for reasons of social and economic interest (Payne, 1971: 16-17).

During the early years of the nineteenth century the expansion of Catalan industry in contrast with that of other parts of Spain caused Catalan businessmen to demand new economic policies of the central government. A pattern repeated periodically until the Civil War in 1936 is that of Barcelona resisting the central government, often arguing for its particular interests and issues, but alleging to act in the name of Spain and its broader national interests (Linz, 1973: 53).

The failure of the monarchy of Amadeo of Savoy, after the abdication of Isabel II, had important effects on the following rise of political Catalanism. In the first elections with universal male suffrage held in Spain in 1869, a new political force, Federal Republicanism, obtained a majority of votes in Catalonia, contrasting with the rest of Spain. “Federal Republicanism presented an alternative project for a Spanish state into which Catalonia could fit without either being disloyal to Spain or giving up its distinctive features or aspirations of self-government” (Balcells, 1996: 28).
In February 1873 the then King of Spain, Amadeo of Savoy, abdicated and the First Republic, opposed to federalism, was proclaimed. In Barcelona, Federalists and the International anarchists tried to proclaim the existence of a Catalan state as a first step towards federalization, but Madrid, with the help of Pi Margall and Almirall, succeeded in persuading Catalans to abandon the attempt (Balcells, 1996: 31).

However, the Catalan upper bourgeoisie and later the middle classes felt frustrated with the power obtained in Madrid, and they thought that a better solution for the Catalan interests could be found within a regional framework with administrative and political self-government or even within a Catalan state (Linz, 1973: 57).

These feelings increased with the loss of protected colonial markets after the war of 1898, which brought serious problems for the Catalan economy (Keating, 1996: 151). In 1899, for the first time, Catalan economic leaders began to support the demands for greater regional autonomy and more responsibility in the control and administration of their internal affairs (Payne, 1971: 23).

The crisis in the Spanish parliamentary system at the beginning of the 1920's, as a consequence of the military operations in North Africa, internal divisions, terrorism, and class conflicts, brought the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera. At first, middle and upper class Catalanists supported the coup as the only solution to maintain the social order, but later the decrees prohibiting the public use of the Catalan language, exhibition of the Catalan flag in public corporations, and dissolution of municipal councils, were seen as a centralist reaction against Catalonia (Payne, 1971: 23).
Primo de Rivera's administration was replaced in 1930 and regional and municipal councils were immediately reinstated in Catalonia, but the attempt to return to 1923 as though nothing had happened was impossible. One year later, municipal elections showed that the Republicans had won in all the provincial capitals throughout Spain. Luis Campanys proclaimed the Spanish Republic, and Macia proclaimed the Catalan Republic as a member of an Iberian Federation. After some talks with the provisional government in Madrid, Macia replaced the Catalan Republic for a regional government which adopted the historic name of the Generalitat. According to Balcells, Macia's declaration intended to speed up the federalization process, but at any moment had the idea of a separatist revolt or a general insurrection in Spain (Balcells, 1996: 88-94).

The coming of the Second Republic brought the recognition of the Generalitat which rapidly prepared a draft for Catalan autonomy. The final version of the statute of self-government was modified by the Spanish Parliament in the area of finance and education, but it guaranteed the Catalan language the same status as the Spanish language and gave the Generalitat exclusive jurisdiction over legislation concerning Catalan civil laws and local and internal administration (Balcells, 1996: 96-97).

In October, 1934, a revolutionary strike by the socialist miners in Asturias encouraged the president of the Generalitat, Luis Companys, to declare a separate Catalan state. The central government immediately suppressed the provisions of the Statute of Autonomy and it changed the Generalitat by a returning right-wing government (Balcells, 1996: 119-120).  

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After the outbreak of the Civil War, Catalonia functioned almost as an independent state until April 1938, when the entry of General Franco’s troops into Catalonia put an end to the Catalan Statute (Keating, 1996: 120). During the first years of Franco’s regime, public use of Catalan language was forbidden, but the nationalistic sentiments of its people were never eliminated.

On the death of Franco, a process of political transition began which led to the creation of a state coherent with the modernization which had taken place within society itself. The ironical outcome of repression reinforced Catalan identity, since it united opponents of the regime, and it ensured that a return to democracy would be identified with a return to self-government (Keating, 1996: 120).

**Ethnic Characteristics and Language.** Based on a general definition of ethnicity, Catalonia is an area of ethnic distinction because her history and language differ from those of Spain.

For Salvador de Madariaga, the claim of Catalonia to be considered as something more than a mere region arises from the fact that its people speak a language of its own. For him, a language is like a signal to show that there is a people there (Madariaga, 1958: 178). It is not a coincidence that the centrifugal movements observed in Spain occur in Catalonia, Basque country, and Galicia where the peoples have their own languages. This was the vision of Prat de la Riba who identified Spain’s nationalities with the distribution of its linguistic communities (1990: 54).
In general, the Catalan people reject ethnic exclusiveness and are open to assimilate immigrants. They emphasize history, language, and culture, with little concern for race or descent. Keating considers that Catalans use the language to secure and enhance their national identity and to integrate people from other parts of Spain, what gives the Catalan people a strong civic character that opposes to ethnic segregation (Keating, 1996: 133-135).

Ramon Pi declares that Catalans are different from their neighbors only because of the language they use, and they cannot be differentiated by race because Catalonia has been a country of passage and continuous migrations. He believes that this is the reason why Catalans give so much importance to their language (Pi, 1996: 39-40). Pi’s feelings are reinforced by the constant statements of Jordi Pujol, President of the Generalitat since 1980, about Catalan identity which he considers to be cultural and linguistic, but never ethnic or religious (Pi, 1996: 176-177).

Some studies have been performed, but not so many as for the Basque country, about the racial characteristics of Catalan people. Moreno and Matsumoto in their research, in 1991, following the general trend could not find any evidence to establish any differentiation between Catalans and other Spanish or northern and southern European populations in Finland, Norway, Scotland, Great Britain, and France (Moreno and Matsumoto, 1991: 337).

In contrast, for Almirall the Iberian Peninsula has been occupied since the remote past by different peoples where as result of history two basic races, peoples or groups were formed, the Castilian and the Basque-Aragonese or Pyrenean (Llobera, 1983: 343).
Catalan is a Romance language whose earliest literary text dates from the middle of the twelfth century and has flourished until the installation of the Habsburgs in the Spanish crown in the sixteenth century. Although Catalan was the official language of Catalonia until 1716, the political hegemony of Castile within the Spanish state implied that Catalan ceased to be the language of culture much earlier. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries it underwent a period of decline for Catalan language and literature that was aggravated with the entronement of the Bourbon dynasty at the beginning of the eighteenth century. At this time, Spain began a policy of open repression against the Catalan language that finished with the integration of Catalonia into Spain and Catalan ceased to be an official language (Llobera, 1983: 335-339).

Salvador de Madariaga remarks that at the beginning of the nineteenth century the Catalan language was spoken only by illiterate peasants (Madariaga, 1958: 214). The resurgence of the vernacular language for literary purposes dates from the 1830’s with the publication of Carles Aribau’s Oda a la Patria which called to patriotic feelings, and opened the way to other prestigious writers of the epoch. This awakening was part of a general romantic movement that spread broadly in many parts of Europe (Chaytor, 1978: 279).

This literary movement known as Renaissance was intimately connected with the political movement of the period. Celebration of the Jocs Florals, ancient poetry contests, which were restored in 1857, became the occasion for the expression of regionalist sentiments, and from this moment on, Catalan literature began to excel. It was in the forefront of Spanish culture at the turn of the century (Conversi, 1990: 53).
Language became the most important element of the Catalan identity, and as Almirall said "language represents the main manifestation and means of expression of a people's personality" (Conversi, 1990: 54).

The period between 1886 and 1906 was rich in nationalist literature with a large literary output ranging from poetry to journalism (Seton-Watson, 1977: 56). Enric Prat de la Riba, one of the most vehement supporters of the movement (Chaytor, 1978: 280), declared "one's own language is the most powerful instrument for nationalization and therefore for the maintenance of the life of a nationality" (Conversi, 1990: 54). In his book, *La nacionalitat catalana*, Prat de la Riba presents language as an organic whole, and he adds that the language of a nation is its soul, and so a revival of a language means also the revival of its people (Llobera, 1983: 345).

In 1907, Prat de la Riba created the *Institut d'Estudis Catalans*, whose principal pursuit was to encourage higher scientific research of all the elements of the Catalan culture, and it was responsible for the modern linguistic normalization of Catalan language. In the *Institut d'Estudis Catalans*, Pompeu Fabra fully developed the first regulation and grammatical systematization of Catalan for its standardization (Conversi, 1990: 55).

Every ethnic group through history has placed a specific weight on a particular element of its own culture. In the contemporary world the most universal core value is language, and this is the case in Catalonia where language has always been its main core value, and where its political importance has been strengthened as a consequence of repression during a great part of its history. For Conversi, "language is both a symbol
and an essential instrument for the diffusion and the expressiveness of their own culture” (Conversi, 1990: 53).

For Colomer, one’s own language is the most eloquent manifestation of the personality of a people, and those who do not share the same language cannot share the same nation. He sees language as the deepest unifier (Colomer, 1984: 33), and Solozábal goes farther and says that if a people loses its language it is because it has become slave of another one (Solozábal, 1975: 357).

In the first years of Franco’s regime public use of Catalan was forbidden and Catalonia faced years of repression directed towards language, culture, and at every form and type of political expression, but in spite of language prohibition by the state, its social condition remained quite strong. “Fear of culture loss, a very real anxiety at that time among many Catalans of all classes, also stimulated a tremendous amount of effort designated to maintain cultural viability and the survival of the Catalan language as the key cultural symbol” (Pi-Sunyer, 1987: 168).

Although language, as I have already written, was always a core value in Catalonia, the presence of considerable immigrant communities in the region forced Catalan nationalists to formulate their appeals more on the basis of a voluntaristic identification with the nation and less on the basis of primordial liking to language and place of birth (Gunther et al., 1986: 315).

There are difficulties and inconsistencies with the data on language at the time of the democratic transition, but since 1981 there have been census data, which are more
reliable. In the 1970's around 40 percent of Catalan population had been born outside the region (Keating, 1996: 120).

Significant advancement has been made in the past 15 years towards the return of Catalan language to normal usage in all areas. In 1975, 74.3 percent of Catalan population understood Catalan, in 1986 the percentage had increased to 90.3 (Balcells, 1996: 189).

In 1983, the Generalitat promulgated a law, Llei de Normalitzacio Llinguistica a Catalunya, declaring that Catalan was the official language of Catalonia, as also was Castilian. The linguistic normalization law intends to make Catalan the normal language of communication in Catalonia and to integrate immigrants into the national community (Keating, 1996: 136).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistic Ability</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understand</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Keating, 1996: 140

Following the aspiration of nation-building, after the Llei de Normalitzacio Llinguistica a Catalunya, the emphasis was placed mainly on the introduction of Catalan into education and public administration, although language was also promoted through social and cultural activities which included radio and television broadcasts (Keating, 1996: 139). By 1990, 58 percent of students were receiving education entirely or almost
entirely in Catalan, and just 8 percent entirely in Castilian, though in each case the other language remained a required subject (Keating, 1996: 138).

Since the transition to democracy, Catalan identity has grown considerably and this Catalan identity is strongly related to language use. There are marked differences in subjective national identity between those who claim to speak the regional language and those who does not. The ability of the middle class to speak Catalan is higher than working class, and stronger among natives than immigrants (Gunther et al., 1986: 316).

Table 7. Subjective national identification by language use (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sense of group identification</th>
<th>Native speakers</th>
<th>Immigrant speakers</th>
<th>Immigrant non-speakers</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish only</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Spanish than Catalan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Spanish as Catalan</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Catalan than Spanish</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalan only</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gunther et al., 1986: 317; and Mercade, 1994: 283

For Gunther, differences in national self-identity between Catalan and non-Catalan-speaking immigrants suggest that the learning and usage of the regional language may serve to encourage new attachments and to eliminate old ones (Gunther et al., 1986: 316).

For Keating, exclusive Catalan identity is found most among the older generation, with experiences lived before Franco reached the state presidency, and among the young, while Spanish identifiers tend to be less educated, though this probability indicates the presence of unskilled immigrants (Keating, 1996: 130).
This relationship between language and identity has continued until the present moment. On 1 March 1989, Jordi Pujol, President of the Generalitat and leader of the most voted Catalan nationalist party, Convergencia i Unio, in a political speech emphasized:

The language issue will indicate whether the relations with the central government are progressing or not, because if some issue is absolutely important to Catalonia is the language and culture, because they are the core elements of our identity as a people. Catalonia did not want autonomy for political or administrative reason, but for reasons of identity. (Conversi, 1990: 56)

**Catalan Nationalism.** Catalonia has retained a marked sense of national identity since its beginning in the Middle Ages; it was lethargic only during the eighteenth century when the Bourbon dynasty fully attached Catalonia into the broader affairs of Spain. It is a good example of a country with a strong civic nationalism, which focuses on territorial self-government. Its citizens have abandoned exclusive notions of identity and can sustain multiple identities at the same time (Keating, 1996: 50-53).

The pillars of Catalan nationality are language, institutions (Corts and Generalitat), and history instead of any myth of common ancestry. That is what gives a strong civic dimension to the Catalan nationalism. The majority of Catalans accept that history cannot be denied or rolled back. Separatist feelings are weak, and not all Catalan separatists seek total independence from Spain. Many Catalans have a dual identity; they have a strong commitment towards the promotion of Catalonia as a particular national society within Spain and Europe. They wish to be allowed to run their own affairs within and not outside a Spain that forms part of the European Union (Keating, 1996: 160-161).
The last two decades of the nineteenth century correspond with the gestation of modern Catalan nationalism. For Payne, what really influenced this revival was the expansion of the language for literary purposes, the concern for promoting and protecting Catalan industry, the influence of federalist ideas among the middle classes, and the remains of Catalan Carlism. He considers Valenti Almirall the father of Catalan nationalism who until 1875 proposed federalism in Spain with all the territories of the former Crown of Aragon joined in a politico-administrative entity, and after the restoration of the monarchy he changed national federalism for administrative autonomy of the four Catalan provinces, something more realistic according to the general political situation in Spain at that time (Payne, 1971: 19-20).

Vicens Vives in *Industrials i politics del segle XIX* considers the rejection of the Catalan people towards the administrative corruption of the liberal Spanish state, together with the perception of the ineffectiveness of the modernizing role of Spain, the main reasons for the appearance of Catalan nationalism by the end of the nineteenth century (Núñez, 1992: 31).

In Solé Tura’s view, Catalanism was a historical product of the influence of the bourgeoisie because the Spanish state did not accomplish its claims and class interests. Catalanism emerged by the end of the nineteenth century as an ideology of social union and state reformation, which allowed the bourgeoisie to form a dominant group through which it pretended to reform the state in order to better defend its interests. By 1868, the majority of the Catalan bourgeoisie only had a Spanish national project, by the turn of the
century the situation had changed in accordance with the economic recession (Solé, 1974: 3-14).

For Keating, Catalonia industrialized and modernized earlier than other parts of Spain, except the Basque country, under the leadership of local industrial and commercial bourgeoisie that were the basis for an early Catalan movement that cemented a sense of Catalan identity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Catalans knew their industry, although more advanced than elsewhere in Spain, still was non-competitive at the European level, and they felt comfortable in a protected market with special tariffs for their products. Ties with Madrid weakened after the Spanish defeat by the United States in 1898 and the loss of overseas colonies which caused an economic crisis in Catalonia, whose textile industry was tied to the Cuban market (Keating, 1996: 117-118).

For Núñez, although much emphasis has been put on figures such as Valentí Almirall who tried to integrate popular federalism and bourgeoisie, and the nationalist assembly of Manresa (1892) which presented the Bases de Manresa as the first consistent political program of Catalan nationalism, the father of the Catalan nationality is Enric Prat de la Riba through his book La nacionalitat catalana (1906) (Núñez, 1992: 23).

The publication in 1895 of Enric Prat de la Riba’s Compendio de la Doctrina Catalana contributed to the diffusion of the idea of Catalonia as a nation. From this point on, nation and state were not longer considered the same thing. Prat de la Riba defined Spain as the political state and Catalonia as the true fatherland of Catalans, who constitutes a distinct and fully developed nationality. Catalanism did not sustain independence but demanded a regional parliament and government with a fully
autonomous regional administrative system, which would develop the economy, society, and culture of Catalonia while preserving its traditions (Balcells, 1996: 41).

Shortly before 1901, Prat de la Riba, Cambó, and others formed the Lliga Regionalista de Catalunya. It is significant that the name of the new political party did not include the words national or nationalist. For Balcells, the reason was to avoid the apprehension of the central government and the Catalan conservative electorate (Balcells, 1996: 44).

Prat de la Riba and Frances Cambó synthesized the aspirations of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, emphasizing the need to unify Catalonia under the leadership of the middle classes but at the same time seeking influence within Spain (Keating, 1996: 123). The Lliga Regionalista maintained the hegemony over the Catalanist forces until 1923. However, the mass appeal of the Lliga never properly reached the Catalan working classes.

A limit for Catalanist bourgeoisie was the fact that, although it always demanded State modernization, in the end the Lliga always came to terms with the oligarchic state, whose support was needed for keeping its class interests in the social conflicts of Catalonia. (Núñez, 1992: 33)

While the Lliga Regionalista looked for some kind of autonomy within Spain, the working classes were more prone to do away with the state. This confrontation gradually deteriorated the situation in Catalonia and ended with a general strike in July 1909. The Catalan bourgeoisie allied with the central government to preserve its economic interests at that time much more important than any autonomist ideals (Brandt, 1981: 36-37).
As a consequence of the better relations between Madrid and the Catalanists an independent administration, called the Mancomunitat, was granted to Catalonia in 1912. In reality, the Mancomunitat was a weak form of self-government, but the four Catalan provinces were able to pool their powers and act as a whole, which most nationalists see as the first step towards a more extensive Catalan autonomy (Brandt, 1981: 36-37).

At the end of the First World War Catalan nationalists believed that the allied victory would have a positive effect on Catalonia’s demands for broader autonomy since the allies had taken into consideration the rights of diverse oppressed nationalities in Europe. But, France with its centralist ideas and fearing a revival of Bretons and northern Basques national feelings was totally indifferent to Catalan self-government requests. At this time, inspired by the Irish revolt against the British, a separatist form of Catalan nationalism arose and the first Catalan separatist organization, Frances Macia’s Nationalist Democratic Federation, was formed in January 1919 (Balcells, 1996: 74-77).

Successive demands for autonomy were repeatedly denied by the central government. On 20 November 1919, Frances Cambó one more time assured the Congress that the form of self-government requested had nothing to do with separatism, and he confirmed his opposition to complete independence for Catalonia. For Balcells, “the intransigence of the Monachists obliged the Lliga to join forces with the Republicans and Socialists and move towards a break with the regime, a position that was repugnant to the bourgeois base of the Regionalist party” (Balcells, 1996: 76).

During Cambó’s second term as Minister in Madrid a widespread of separatism in Catalonia led to a split in the Lliga Regionalista in 1922. Unlike Basque country where
nationalists have been primarily represented by one fairly continuous organization since the end of the last century, Catalan nationalists have split in many occasions with the appearance and disappearance of different political parties (Payne, 1971: 36).

Harrison in *El mon de la gran industria i el fracas del nacionalisme catala de dreta (1901-1923)* reaches to the conclusion that the policy of the *Lliga Regionalista* failed in fulfilling the function of representative of the Catalan interests, because it could not integrate Catalan economy and politics into the Spanish system. “Catalan industry needed the Spanish market, but at the same time the former proved to be unable to renew the archaic structures of the Spanish Restoration system” (Núñez, 1992: 41).

In the summer of 1923, a symbolic agreement called Triple Alliance among factions of Catalan, Basque, and Galician nationalists caused a considerable alarm in the Spanish government since it was the first attempt of coordination in nationalistic matters among different regions of Spain. This agreement was a precedent for the pact signed ten years later in Santiago de Compostela called GALEUZCA (Galicia, Euzkadi, and Catalonia) (Balcells, 1996: 82).

General Primo de Rivera, after a military uprising in September 1923, in order to force national unity dissolved the *Mancomunitat* in 1924, and contrary to his will the new situation caused an increase in the Catalan desires for a republican government (Brandt, 1981: 39-40).

After the abdication of King Alfonso XIII in 1931, the Second Spanish Republic was declared, and the first elections to the Catalan parliament of modern times revealed
the weakness of communism and the impotence of separatism in Catalonia while showed
the strength of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya ERC (Balcells, 1996: 101).

Table 8. Results of legislative elections in Catalonia under the Second Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unio Socialista de Catalunya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accio Catalana Republicana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partit Nacionalista Republica</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d’Esquerra</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accion Republicana</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Republicano Radical Socialista</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izquierda Republicana</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrema Izquierda Federal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partit Catala Proletari</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partit Comunista de Catalunya</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unio de Rabassaires</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Republicano Radical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lliga Regionalista/Lliga Catalana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unio Democratica de Catalunya</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradicionalistes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Balcells, 1996: 100

The next step was the creation of a statute of autonomy. Unlike Basques, who
encountered great problems to approve such a statute, Catalans quickly submitted the
statute to a referendum. In August 1931, 75 percent of Catalan voters took part in the
referendum and 99 percent of them ratified the draft statute (Balcells, 1996: 95).

Although Catalan Statute of Autonomy granted in September 1932 gave Catalans
much more power than the previous Mancomunitat, Catalonia still faced problems with
labor unrest and unemployment. The Generalitat was unable to integrate the different
political options.
While the idea of autonomy was in the forefront of the government agenda, the transformation of the petition for autonomy into a perceived demand for separation gave rise to radicalism on the part of the right. Regionalism goaded the conservatives into a call for the defense of the historical tradition of national unity. (Brandt, 1981: 43)

In 1934, radical Catalanists were determined to force the Spanish government to grant Catalonia absolute sovereignty over all its affairs without exception, and the Catalan government of Companys declared a separate Catalan state. This revolt was immediately suppressed and the central government suspended the provision of the Statute of Autonomy. One more time Catalonia was placed under a central administration (Payne, 1971: 41-42).

The Civil War represented the end of the Catalan institutions and a new attempt to centralize the state, but not the end of the national Catalan consciousness. In the late 1950’s a new Catalanism was born. A group of young activists headed by Jordi Pujol promoted the idea of rebuilding Catalan identity around culture and economic progress in order to provide the basis for political actions when this could be permitted (Keating, 1996: 151-152). This new Catalan movement was strongly influenced by Catholicism and rejected the Catalanism of the Republic for its responsibility in the outset of the Civil War, and it also rejected the Catalanism of the Lliga Catalana because of its conservative position on social issues (Balcells, 1996: 140).

At the end of the 1950’s Jordi Pujol said that he understood the separatist ideas of some Catalans, but for him the best options were federalism or a broad autonomy. He emphasized “Catalonia needs its own organization, sovereignty, and political power, and federalism or autonomy give satisfaction to its demands” (Pi, 1996: 220). Pujol declared
that the main goal of Catalan nationalism was not to decentralize the Spanish state, but to maintain its own identity inside the Spanish state. For him, since the fifteenth century the history is full of mistrust, confrontations, fights, and revolts between the central government and the Catalans as a consequence of a deficient insertion of Catalonia in Spain. But also, there are at least from the second half of the seventeenth century a lot of examples of the Catalan will for being and acting as part of Spain (Pi, 1996: 241-243).

After Franco’s death, the basic principles to decentralize the country were developed by a new democratic constitution, which was voted in a popular referendum in December 1978. Catalonia clearly accepted the new constitution, and its percentage of abstention, 31.9, was lower than in the rest of Spain.

Table 9. Constitutional Referendum, December 1978 (as percentage of Catalan census)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>90.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Balccells, 1996: 187

For Brandt, the high percentage of acceptance in Catalonia, which exceeded the national average, presents a clear evidence that the nationalists consider the new constitution an acceptable framework in which they could proceed towards autonomy (Brandt, 1981: 125).

On 25 October 1979, a new statute of self-government similar to that of 1932 was ratified by 88.1 percent of Catalan people. However, the turnout was a disappointing 59.6 percent if compared with 74 and 68.1 percent in the referenda about political reform (1976) and constitution (1978) respectively (Balccells, 1996: 187).
The process of political and economic transfers began soon after the elections of 1980 to the Catalan parliament. This process has not always been smooth, partly because of lack of clarity in the Spanish Constitution and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, and partly due to underlying political problems (Newton, 1997: 138).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CiU</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSUC/IC</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.7 (1)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC/PSOE</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCD</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP/PP</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>13.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Since 1986 the PSUC formed an alliance with left-wing nationalists

Source: Balcells, 1996:184

Regional

CiU Convergencia I Unio
ERC Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
PSUC/IC Partit Socialiste Unificat de Catalunya/ Iniciativa per Catalunya

National

PSC/PSOE Partit del Socialistes de Catalunya/Partido Socialista Obrero Español
UCD Unión de Centro Democrático
CDS Centro Democrático y Social
AP/PP Alianza Popular/Partido Popular

Convergencia I Unio, an alliance between Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya and the Christian Democrat Unio Democratica de Catalunya led by Jordi Pujol, has ruled Catalonia since 1980. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, the dominant force under the Second Republic, now the most nationalistic of the parties with parliamentary representation is the second nationalist force. The Partit Socialiste
Unificat de Catalunya/ Iniciativa per Catalunya which includes the Catalan communists is linked to the national party Izquierda Unida that has centralist tendencies.

The proposal in favor of complete independence for Catalonia by peaceful means presented by ERC in the last two elections appears to have influenced the improvement of its position in the regional elections doubling the number of votes and increasing from six deputies in 1988 to 13 in 1995 (Newton, 1997: 211).

Table 11. Opinion on constitutional options, Catalonia, 1992 (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catalonia</th>
<th>Barcelona</th>
<th>Tarragona</th>
<th>Lérida</th>
<th>Gerona</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More autonomy</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Present autonomy</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less autonomy</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Abolish autonomous system</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Balcells, 1996: 132

Convergencia I Unio is represented in the Spanish parliament, and it is the only regional party that has a decisive role in politics on the national level. Keating says “CiU has resumed the historic mission of seeking more autonomy while also seeking to Catalanize Spain” (Keating, 1996: 123). Since 1993, following the loss of the socialists' overall majority in the Spanish parliament, and in 1996 with the new center-right government of the Popular Party, which could not reach overall majority, the Catalan nationalist party, CiU, has a great influence in the government policy since both governments found themselves obliged to come to an accommodation with the Catalan nationalist party in order to be able to continue in government (Keating, 1996: 123).
Jordi Pujol, the leader of CiU, astutely exploits this peculiar status to squeeze favors from the government in Madrid, first with the socialists and now with the center-right PP. The central government depending on the support of Convergencia i Unio has been transferring more autonomy to Catalonia. In particular, the Generalitat wants to collect their own taxes and then pass on to the central government a share based on the services it provides, something that Basques already have (The Economist, 1993: 60).

Pujol declared in Canada that Catalonia contributes to Spain 20 percent more than the mean of the other communities, but receives 17 percent less than the mean (Pastor, 1996: 6).

Table 12. Results of General elections in Spain, 1977-1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td></td>
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<td>% votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>168</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>29.27</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9.38</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>AP</td>
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<td>8.33</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
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</table>

Source: Newton, 1997: 217
Table 13. Results of General elections in Spain, 1989-1996

<table>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.88</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Newton, 1997: 217

National
UCD Unión de Centro Democrático
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español
PCE/IU Partido Comunista de España/Izquierda Unida
AP/PP Alianza Popular/Partido Popular
CDS Centro Democrático y Social

Regional
CiU Convergencia I Unio
ERC Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco
PSUC/IC Partit Socialiste Unificat de Catalunya/Iniciativa per Catalunya
EA Eusko Alkartasuna
HB Herri Batasuna
EE Euskadiko Esquerra
PSA/PA Partido Socialista Andaluz/Partido Andalucista
AIC/CC Agrupación de Independientes de Canaria/Coalición Canaria
BNG Bloque Nacionalista Gallego
In Spain, people disagree with the dual game played by Catalan leaders of pressing for autonomy while seeking to maximize their influence in Spanish national politics. The pact between CiU first with the PSOE and later with the PP central governments after the 1993 elections has risen a great deal of anti-Catalan sentiment (Keating, 1996: 161-162). A recent survey by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) made in December 1996 about the Conciencia nacional y regional (regional and national consciousness) shows that 87.1 percent of Spaniards believe that Catalonia receives more benefits than any other autonomous community. The survey also remarks that the bigger aversion is towards Catalan and Basque people (Garrido, 1997d: 1-2).

For Keating, the profound Catalan’s ambiguity with respect to its position within the Spanish state comes from its strategy of seeking leadership within it or, when this is not possible demanding autonomy. Catalans want self-government for Catalonia, but at the same time they want to have more influence in Madrid (Keating, 1996: 118-119). Pi, following the same line of thought as Keating, suggests that Catalans feel pessimistic when Spain faces political or economic crisis and then they turn separatists. For Pi, this is what happened at the time of the crisis of 1898 when Spain lost its last overseas territories (Pi, 1996: 230).

Independence for Catalonia is advocated by only a very small proportion of the population, the majority of nationalists are more prone to an advanced stage of autonomy
(Linz, 1985: 217). Catalonia does not have a separatist party that is able to win votes in elections like Herri Batasuna in the Basque country, and terrorism has never succeeded in Catalonia. On the contrary Catalan society unanimously rejects it (Balcells, 1996: 192).

An important fact that helps the integration of Catalonia into Spain is that Catalan trade unions are integrated into their Spanish counterparts, in contrast to Galicia or the Basque country where local trade unions are independent from the rest of labor unions. This circumstance serves the purpose of social integration within the working class in Catalonia by avoiding ethnic segregation of the labor movements. Balcells says “this is critical important given that about half the labor force comprises immigrants from other parts of Spain” (Balcells, 1996: 148).

Today, Catalan nationalists still have problems finding the best way to place Catalonia within the framework of the Spanish state. In Aquisgran, in 1985, Jordi Pujol said that Catalonia is a nation without a state that is part of Spain. He declared that Catalonia does not have secessionist ideas, but the will to participate actively in the economic, politic, and social Spanish policies as part of the Spanish state (Pi, 1996: 255). In 1991, in an interview in France (Le Monde, 4 October 1991) Pujol emphasized: “the Catalan national option must exist within the unity of Spain” (Keating, 1996: 128).

For Antoni Duran Lleida, president of the Unio Democratica de Catalunya, the other party that forms the CiU coalition, the best way to integrate Catalans and Basques in the Spanish state is through a confederation in language and cultural issues, federal in economic matters, and autonomy for the rest of issues (Casqueiro, 1996: 4).
Although Jordi Pujol considers Catalonia as part of the Spanish state, he believes that Catalonia is different from the rest of the country and this distinctiveness must be expressly recognized and accepted by the rest of Spaniards (Newton, 1997:144). Another point of conflict in Pujol’s view is that Catalonia has to find its place between Europe and Spain, because Catalans still do not know how to answer clearly to the question about if they are or not Spaniards (Pi, 1996: 153).

Since 1978 the Catalan Socialist Party, PSC, like Convergencia i Unio, CiU, and the communist Catalan Unified Socialist Party (PSUC) have abandoned the principle of national self-determination for Catalonia, and from 1983 on the PSC not only gave up Catalan nationalism which it had previously claimed as its own, but began to give it negative connotations (Balcells, 1996: 185). In 1994, socialists explicitly rejected Catalan independence and Spanish uniformity, and presented the idea of a federal Spain within a federal Europe. This idea is shared by the former communists now called Iniciativa per Catalunya that pretend greater autonomy for Catalonia within a federal Spain (Keating, 1996: 125).

The idea of federalism is not unanimously accepted by Catalan nationalists because they believe that the historic nationalities, Basque country, Catalonia, and Galicia, might have greater problems in a more uniform federal state than in a state like the present one comprising different levels of self-government (Balcells, 1996: 194).

Federalism, while supported by the Catalan left, is regarded with suspicion within CiU as another way of reducing Catalonia to the status of the other regions. The debate centres, instead, on types of confederal arrangement or asymmetrical federalism which recognize the hecho diferencial. CiU is constantly pressing for more autonomy, without defining the end point clearly. It slogan for the 1992
autonomous elections, *Ara, mes* (now for more) evoked both a continuation of Pujolist government and a gradual extension of autonomy. There is fierce opposition to efforts to homogenize the system of regional autonomy, by allowing other regions to catch up to the historic nationalities. (Keating, 1996: 128-129)

On the other side of the political spectrum, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* wants outright independence. The separatists say that Catalonia is now more closely linked to the rest of Europe than to the rest of Spain. They ask why Catalonia, one of Spain’s most prosperous regions, should subsidize the others (The *Economist*, 1992: 54).

At the present moment, Catalan nationalists have achieved most of their initial objectives in their fight for autonomy, and they are engaged in the process of nation-building that involves strengthening Catalan identity and culture. The most vivid problem is how to handle the distinctiveness of Catalonia inside Spain without breaking the cohesion among the Spanish regions.

**The Spanish Constitutional Process**

The principal characteristic of Spanish constitutional history has been its extreme instability. From the nineteenth century until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936, Spain has known several constitutions and a number of projects and partial reforms. This instability has its roots in the convulsive political history of contemporary Spain (Flores et al., 1989: 398-400). Newton wrote: “It is sometimes forgotten that, in spite of her propensity for authoritarian regimes, Spain has a long, albeit turbulent, democratic history stretching back to 1812, when the first constitution was drawn up” (Newton, 1997: 1).
Juan Pablo Fusi states that the appearance of the peripheral nationalism has become a problem for the Spanish policy since 1900, and it is the main reason that forced the change in the territorial structure of the state, first with the *Mancomunidad* of Catalonia in 1914, and later with the autonomous statutes included in the 1931 and 1978 Constitutions (Fusi, 1996: 1).

For Pérez-Argote, the main goal of the political forces during the political transition, after Franco’s death, was the double reconciliation between right and left, in political terms, and between center and periphery. A state formed of *Comunidades Autónomas* (autonomous communities) was the political response to find the reconciliation among the people of Spain. In this situation, some old and new terms appeared in the political scene such as decentralization and autonomy, federal state, nation and nationalities, nation and regions, and the most significant *nación de naciones* (nation of nations). With the term “nation of nations,” people pretended to emphasize the concept of Spain as a nation formed by different nations that are located within its territory. Pérez-Argote says the better way to obtain this double reconciliation is through the 1978 Constitution that establishes the rules to reach the necessary consensus among all Spanish people (Pérez-Argote, 1987: 81-82). The idea of Pérez-Argote about the Constitution is shared by Solé Tura, who considers the Constitution to overcome the historical rivalry between the two conceptions of Spain, the centralist and the autonomist (Solé, 1985: 87).

In July 1977, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs was formed, made up of thirty-six deputies from the newly elected *Cortes* (Congress and Senate). These deputies
in turn appointed a seven-member subcommittee that included members of the major national parties and one representative of the regional parties: three from Unión de Centro Democrático, one from Partido Socialista Obrero Español, one from Partido Comunista de España/Partido Socialista Unificado de Calatuña, one from Alianza Popular, and one from the Basque-Catalan group. Jordi Solé Tura one of the committee members believes that the committee should have included members of all the parties represented in the Parliament, and especially one from the Partido Nacionalista Vasco. For Solé Tura, this absence was a negative factor particularly in the discussion of the Title VIII of the Constitution, which refers to the state territorial organization (Solé, 1985: 92).

The framers of the 1978 Constitution had to deal with many controversial issues during the 16-month constitutional debate, but especially with the historically sensitive question of regional autonomy. The transformation of Spain from a unitary state into a decentralized structure was a difficult task. “Reactionary elements objected to any reference to regional autonomy in the Constitution as a threat to national unity, while, at the other extreme, militant Basques demanded the right of self-determination for the regions” (Library of Congress, 1990: 222).

Finally, after prolonged and embittered debates that involved extensive negotiations and concessions, the committee presented a draft document that after many amendments was presented on October 31, 1978, to the Congress and Senate which overwhelmingly approved the text of the new constitution and it was voted in a referendum on December 6, 1978 (Solé, 1985: 83).
Table 14. Approval of constitution in Parliament, October 1978

<table>
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<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Houses</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Newton, 1997: 16

Table 15. Approval of constitution in national referendum, December 1978

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<td>636,095</td>
<td>135,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7.90</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total electorate</td>
<td>59.40</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Newton, 1997: 16

Although according with the percentage of people who approved the new Constitution, 87.79 percent, it can be said that it was a constitution for all the people in Spain, the percentage of abstentions, 32 percent in Spain as a whole and 56 percent in parts of the Basque country, produced some kind of concern in the government and in the major political parties. In the referendum campaign, only the Partido Nacionalista Vasco and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, with some extremist parties like the extreme right Fuerza Nueva, recommended rejection (Newton, 1997: 15-16).

The 1978 Constitution in articles 2 and 3 explicitly acknowledged the multinational and multilingual character of Spanish society and established the principle of administrative decentralization. The right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of Spain implied a 180 degree change with respect to the previous regime, which was based on traditional centralist arrangements. Some negative features of the process were the facts that certain issues like the role of the monarchy, and the armed forces were not
opened to serious negotiation and they simply had to be accepted by the left parties, because the government could not afford to make concessions to radical nationalists and at the same time to maintain the support of the military to the democratic process (Ben-Ami, 1991: 510).

Article 2 refers to the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation and recognizes and guarantees the right of the nationalities and regions of Spain to autonomy.

The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible motherland of all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among all of them. (Alzaga, 1978)

Article 3 does not recognize a Spanish language, but a Castilian language as the official language of the state, and it also gives to the Gallego, Catalan, and Basque languages a co-official status in their respective regions.

(1) Castilian is the official Spanish language of the state. All Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to use it.

(2) The other languages of Spain will also be official in the respective autonomous communities, in accordance with their statutes.

(3) The richness of the linguistic modalities of Spain is a cultural patrimony which will be the object of special respect and protection. (Alzaga, 1978)

The constitution that the Spaniards ratified in 1978 is long and complicated. It is divided into twelve Títulos (sections), including the introductory section or Título Preliminar (preliminary section), and two sections at the end, Disposiciones Adicionales (additional provisions) and Disposiciones Transitorias (transitional provisions), which lay down the guiding principles which regulate the functioning of the new Spanish state and Spanish society.
In an effort to avoid dogmatism and to gain widespread support, the committee
produced a document acceptable for the majority, but at the same time its ambiguous
language and contradictory provisions that allow a variety of interpretations have
produced since the first moment problems in its implementation, and in the relationship
between the more powerful autonomous regions and the central government (Solé, 1985:
66-67). Arzallus, leader of the PNV, has repeated in several occasions that the Spanish
Constitution is an unfinished and ambiguous document (Souto, 1997: 1).

For Silver, the major innovation of the 1978 Constitution was the acceptance for
the first time in the Spanish constitutional history that the Spanish state is not
synonymous with national homogeneity, but compatible with the existence of different
nationalities within Spain (Silver, 1988: 165). Although the word “nationalities” only
appears once in the constitutional document the conservative parties presented serious
objections to this term because according to them it was an invitation to a secession, but
finally was accepted for the strong defense that the diverse nationalist groups made on
this point.

The timid acceptance of the multinational nature of Spain by recognizing the
existence of various nationalities and regions led to the redistribution of the fifty
provinces of Spain into seventeen autonomous communities with their own set of
cultural, economic, and political characteristics, and a new Spain based in a State of the
Autonomies, as it is called, appeared. The basic principles of the State of the Autonomies
were developed in Title VIII of the Constitution named Territorial Organization of the
State. Article 143.1 presents the territorial basis for the establishment of self-governing communities.

Exercising the right to autonomy recognized in Article 2, bordering provinces with common historical, cultural, and economic characteristics, the island territories, and the provinces with a historical regional identity will be able to accede to self-government and form autonomous communities in accordance with the provisions of this Title and the respective statutes. (Alzaga, 1978)

Although the Constitution authorizes the formation of autonomous communities the Article 145 expressly prohibits the right of federation among them.

(1) In no case shall the federation of Autonomous Communities be allowed.

(2) The statutes may specify the conditions, requirements, and terms under which the Autonomous Communities may establish agreements among themselves for the administration and rendering of services pertaining to them, as well as the nature and purposes of the corresponding communication of them to the Parliament. Under other conditions, cooperation agreements between Autonomous communities shall require the authorization of the Parliament. (Alzaga, 1978)

The Constitution established procedures for the creation of autonomous communities but did not precisely delimit the scope of the powers between the central and the autonomous governments avoiding the rigid normalization of a federal state, but at the same time it is difficult to be certain about which powers belong exclusively to the autonomous communities and which to the state (Newton, 1997: 137-138).

Specifically, Article 148 lists an extensive array of governmental functions that may be transferred to regional governments. These include among others the organization of their own institutions of self-government, regulation of the territory, urbanism, and housing, promotion of culture, research, and, when applicable, the teaching of the language of the autonomous community, tourism, sport, leisure, and
social welfare, health and hygiene. Article 149 lists what are called the exclusive powers of the state, which include such areas of competencies as foreign affairs, defense, customs and international affairs, areas which even under a federal system would never be devolved to a regional authority (Alzaga, 1978).

The Constitution by means of its Article 150 allows the central government to intervene if an autonomous community fails to carry out its constitutional obligations or acts against the general interests of the nation. In such a case, the state must encourage to the president of the autonomous community to correct the matter; if this fails the government with majority approval from the Congress and Senate, may adopt measures necessary to enforce the community’s compliance (Library of Congress, 1990: 225). This provision has never been invoked, and it remains unclear what such a measures might entail.

(1) The parliament, in matters within the competence of the State, may grant to all or one of the Autonomous Communities the authority to dictate for itself legislative norms within the framework of the principles, bases, and directives established by a state law. Without prejudice to the competence of the Courts, within the framework of every law shall be established the method of control by the Parliament over these legislative norms of the Autonomous Communities.

(2) The State may transfer or delegate to the Autonomous Communities by an organic law those faculties on matters within the competence of the State, which because of their own nature are susceptible to transference or delegation. The law shall in each case contain the pertinent transfer of financial means as well as the forms of control the State reserves for itself.

(3) The State my dictate laws which establish the principles necessary to harmonize the normative, provisions of the Autonomous Communities even in the case of matters attributed to their competence when the general interest so demands. It is up to the Parliament, by the absolute majority in each Chamber, to evaluate this necessity. (Alzaga, 1978)
Another strange situation derived from the Constitution and still unsolved that disturbs the relationship between Navarrese and Basques is the aspiration of the Basque nationalists to merge both autonomous communities. Article 4 of the Transitional Provisions conceives the possibility of an eventual incorporation of Navarre into the Basque autonomous regime to which the Navarrese reject (Souto and Saldaña, 1997: 1-4).

In the case of Navarre, and for the purposes of its incorporation into the General Basque Council or the Basque autonomous regime replacing it, instead of the provisions established by Article 143, the initiative shall lie with the competent Foral organ, which shall adopt its decision by a majority of the members comprising it. In order for this initiative to be valid, the decision of the competent Foral organ must also be ratified by a referendum expressly held for this purpose and passed by a majority of the valid votes cast.

If the initiative does not succeed, it may only be repeated during a different term of office of the competent Foral organ and, in any case, only when the minimum period laid down in Article 143 has elapsed.

After seeing the present and potential problems than can emerge in Spain due to the ambiguous redaction of the Constitution, Solé Tura states that the whole constitutional system only can be efficient if it is based on the reciprocal cooperation between the central and the autonomous governments (Solé, 1985: 128).

National Security

"National security means preserving the country’s independence and territorial integrity, its constitutional and democratic form of government, and providing safety for its inhabitants in times of emergency" ( Trapans, 1997: 27). Pedro Morenés, Spanish Secretary of State for Defense, considers national security an unquestionable
responsibility of the highest institutions that rule nations. “National security is one of the principal objectives of the State, which entails identifying national interests, as well as possible risks and threats” (Morenés, 1997: 16).

The Spanish Constitution in Article 8 assigns to the armed forces the role of safeguarding the sovereignty and independence of Spain and of defending its territorial integrity and constitutional order. But, it also emphasizes that ultimate responsibility for Spain’s defense rests with its popularly elected government, not with the armed forces.

National security can be threatened internally and externally. At the present time, in Spain there are two main concerns in the area of national security related to nationalism: the terrorist organization ETA and the complete professionalization of the armed forces. In both cases it is essential to take into consideration the possible evolution of the current situation.

ETA, supported by the Basque radical nationalist movement, is totally indifferent to the nature of the Spanish state or to the kind of regime that prevails in it, and this is the reason that ETA continues to fight the Spanish democratic state. According to Shlomo Ben-Ami “ETA was not created to fight the Franco dictatorship and restore democracy in Spain, as some European observers think, but to bring about an independent and socialist Basque state” (Ben-Ami, 1991: 508).

Full professionalization of the armed forces in a state with strong peripheral nationalist movements could lead to a lack of integration between the different regions. General Suances, Director of Defense Policy, in February 1997 speaking to a joint Congress-Senate commission, voiced his concern about a new model of armed forces
fully professionalized. He pointed out the possibility of having a high percentage of personnel from certain regions while many other regions might not have any representation in the armed forces. This uneven distribution would cause the agglutinative role that the armed forces have in the Spanish state to disappear (González, 1997: 2-3).

During Franco’s regime, a number of resisting groups opposed governmental policy and, in some cases, developed terrorist activities. After Franco’s death, most of the dissident activities diminished with the proclamation of a democratic system that recognized the different political options, including the Communist Party of Spain. This recognition together with the grant of regional autonomy, which included local governments with powers of taxation, policing, and education, helped to decentralize the state and at the same time to accept the legitimacy of separatist political parties, but accepting the democratic rules. As a consequence of these policies, political opposition groups did not present any threat to the Spanish stability during the politic transition towards a parliamentary democratic monarchy (Library of Congress, 1990: 334).

The proliferation of terrorist organizations was different. During these years, besides ETA, other regional terrorist groups appeared and threatened the stability of the state. In the Canary Islands, Movimiento Para la Independencia del Archipiélago Canario (Movement for the Independence of the Canary Archipelago), Galicia, Exército Guerrileiro o Pobo Galego (Free Galician Guerrilla People’s Army), and Catalonia, Terra Lliure (Free Land) affected national security (Library of Congress, 1990: 335).
These groups never represented a threat to internal security forces that was comparable to ETA. In the Canary Islands and Catalonia, both groups gave up violence for lack of popular support and integrated into democratic political options. In Galicia, although there has not been an explicit renunciation of terrorist actions to achieve the independence, the moderate sector of the organization has imposed a turn towards more moderate positions (Garrido, 1997c: 1-2).

Today, the Basque terrorist movement does not enjoy the active support of the majority of the Basque population, and it appears to be in decline as a result of increasingly effective political and police campaigns. Nonetheless, the end of the conflict is something unpredictable at least in the short range.

Full professionalization of the armed forces, the other big concern, is probably one of the most important tasks that have been undertaken in this century in the military area. Adolfo Menéndez, Under Secretary of the Department of Defense, believes society demands a new model of armed forces in accordance with current times and the own evolution of the Spanish society. He understands that, in this era of specialization, responsibilities for defense should be placed in professional hands (Menéndez, 1997: 20).

People must be fully aware that the best army in the world is condemned to disaster if it does not have the firm social support of the nation. It is important to emphasize that the armed forces must be a representation of the entire society to which they serve and from which they are nourished.
The policy of the Government with respect to defense was defined in December 1996 when President Aznar approved the National Defense Guidelines which moves from a conscription system to a strictly professional one (Serra, 1997: 7).

In the reform legislation of 1984 and later the *Ley del Servicio Militar* (Military Service Law) published in December 1991 a number of important changes affected recruitment and conscription. Government instituted a new regionalization policy and to the extent permitted by national defense needs, servicemen could choose the geographical place and military branch where they preferred to carry out their military duties (Boletín Oficial de Defensa, 1991: 252). This regulation represented a great innovation with respect to the previous policy when the principal mission of the armed forces was internal security and soldiers were sent to regions where they had no personal ties (Library of Congress, 1990: 310).

At the present time, when the old model of conscription is going to disappear, a thorough analysis of the attitude of the different regions towards this new model is needed to clarify the effect of the diverse nationalisms in the composition of the future Spanish Armed Forces.

**Summary**

This chapter begins with a general look at theories of nationalism to help in the understanding of some concepts that are difficult to define and there is no general agreement among writers. It follows with the nation-building process of Spain and the appearance of peripheral nationalism in different periods and places of the Spanish
territory with the historical information needed to understand why they appeared and how they have evolved with time. The significant changes recently produced in the political structure of the state as a consequence of a new democratic constitution as well as the effects of the different nationalisms in the national security are also presented in this literature review.
IV. Analysis

Introduction

This chapter contains an analysis of historical data that attempts to answer the research questions concerning the effect of peripheral nationalism on the consolidation of the Spanish state. The goal of this analysis is to determine the influence of the economy, language, and politics in the different processes of nation-building within the Spanish territory, without forgetting the effect of these processes in the Spanish national security as a whole.

Influence of the Economy in the Emergence of Nationalist Movements

Throughout the history of the nation-state a close connection has existed between the appearance of nationalist movements and the economic situation at that time. In fact, dissatisfaction and rejection between center and periphery are frequently attributed to economic factors. It is often claimed that peripheral regions are dominated by the core region whose members control the state institutions.

Often, as a result of different situations, such as wars and revolutions, among others, there are included in modern states people of different histories, languages, and cultures. These peoples usually form minorities in the state where they live. In some cases, essentially because of economic advantages, they may accept their status without any problem. In other cases, they may struggle for autonomy or independence, and in other conditions they may change from acceptance to rejection depending on the circumstances of the moment (Snyder, 1990: 236).
There are different opinions about the effects of the economy in the emergence of peripheral nationalism. A number of authorities have noted that economic considerations represent the determining force in human affairs. For Kelly, the transformation in Western Europe of the economic and social order, marked by the emergence of the middle class, was the most powerful force that favored the rise of the nation-state and the first awakening of national consciousness. The force which causes men of the same language, culture, or religion, to pursue closer union is a practical desire to improve their status, or to prevent a deterioration of it in relation to some other groups of men who do not share these characteristics (Kelley, 1966: 239-251). Banton goes beyond Kelley’s idea, and he thinks that people in some circumstances will be more influenced by considerations of money or status than by ethnic ties (Banton, 1994: 1-3).

Ethnic communities are seen by more and more people as a useful means to obtain the privileges, prestige, and power, that other groups enjoy. Ethnicity seems to be the best way to satisfy the aspirations of smaller groups (Smith, 1986b: 45-46).

On the other hand, there are other authors with different ideas. Douglass disagrees that there is a correlation between the strength of a particular nationalist movement and its perceived economic deprivation. Douglass says if this correlation were true, the strongest ethnic nationalist movements would coincide with the most rejected ethnic groups, but recent attempts to demonstrate such correlation among contemporary European ethnic nationalisms are not encouraging (Douglass, 1988: 196). There are deprived regions like Southern Italy that, nevertheless, never manifested any collective movement or even a significant nationalism, and over-developed regions that in any case
cannot be regarded as economically deprived that have developed a vigorous ethnic nationalism (Smith, 1986b: 45).

Walker Connor argues that there is no a correlation between an increase in welfare and a decrease in ethnic consciousness. To the contrary, there is a large proportion of states within the technologically and economically advanced region of Western Europe that have problems because of their ethnic conflicts. In many cases, economic development increases social mobilization and communication, which result in an increase in ethnic tensions and separatist demands (Connor, 1972: 327-332).

Economic consideration may be a component that reinforces ethnic consciousness but Connor believes that economic factors are in a secondary place when competing with the sentiment of ethnic nationalism. "Separatists are not apt to be dissuaded by assertion that the nation is too small to comprise an economically viable unit" (Connor, 1972: 343).

With respect to Spain, Robert Clark and Oriol Pi-Sunyer respectively in Nations without a State coincide in saying that the Basque and Catalan regions arose politically in response to the ruthless centralization of the political and economic control by the Spanish state. Clark considers that the key element in both cases is the role that Basque and Catalans played in Spanish economic development. Both wealthy regions felt deceived by the unfairly distributed tax burden and revenues as well as by the discriminatory economic policies pursued by an over-centralized Spanish bureaucracy (Clark, 1980: 75-99) (Pi-Sunyer, 1980: 101-115).
When in 1524, the Council of the Indies ruled that in trade with the overseas colonies, the Aragonese and Catalans were prohibited from trading or settling there, Castile was preventing the full integration of Catalonia within Spain. This regulation explains the Catalan’s economic decline in the next two centuries, and the lack of good relationships between both regions.

Later, in the eighteenth century, the Bourbon dynasty introduced important changes in the Spanish policy eliminating much of the traditional restriction and centralizing the government of the entire territory. Considerable economic progress took place in Spain, and regional demands disappeared. Catalonia with its new access to the overseas market experienced an economic revival. Catalans were fully aware of the advantages offered by the Spanish system and felt completely loyal to the crown. Basques, at that time, did not represent any obstacle for the Spanish stability. The successive monarchs maintained the country’s support to the Basque *fueros* because the Basque shipbuilding industry represented an important element in the Spanish economy.

The main reasons for the failure of Spain to complete the nation-building process initiated under the Bourbons were the economic and political failures of the nineteenth century reforms for economic modernization. Spain entered the nineteenth century with an economic, social, and educational underdeveloped system aggravated by the French invasion of 1808, and the lost of almost all the American colonies.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century, Spain was still mostly rural, and modern industry only existed in the textile mills of Catalonia and in the metallurgical plants of the Basque country. The weakness of the
Spanish economy placed serious barriers to the integration process. The Spanish political system entered a crisis under the joint pressure of Catalans and Basques as a consequence of the loss of overseas trade and customs revenues after 1898 when Spain lost the remains of its empire. Catalan economic leaders began to support the demands for greater regional autonomy and more responsibility in the control and administration of their internal affairs because they place the blame for the political and economical disaster on the central government. By 1868, the majority of the Catalan bourgeoisie only had a Spanish national project, by the turn of the century the situation had changed in accordance with the economic recession (Solé, 1974: 3-14).

In the Basque case, the situation is different because the Basque country was and continues to be a pluralistic society where a variety of political options compete for hegemony. The degree of economical and social modernization and the Basque commitment to nationalism have never been homogeneous. The rejection of Basque nationalism by the largest industrial and banking interests, which rely on the Spanish market, is one of the greatest weaknesses of Basque nationalism.

Payne, Clark, Petrella, and Ben-Ami relate the failure of the nation-building process in Spain with the emergence by 1900 of peripheral nationalism. They believe that the deteriorated economy in Spain, except in Catalonia and the Basque country, was the main reason why in these two regions appeared the first genuine modern peripheral nationalism at the end of the nineteenth century.

This opinion, according to Solé Tura, is supported by many Spanish writers such as Elorza, Solozábal, Jáuregui, Corcuera, Fusi, and Recalde. They have studied the
origins of peripheral nationalism and they agree in tying it to the conflicts produced by quick process of industrialization and the loss of protected market and regional tax privileges (Solé, 1985: 37).

The economical differences between the center and periphery persisted during the first quarter of the present century. By 1915 it was practically impossible to form a coalition government that could rule the country. This instability was utilized by Catalans and Basques who tried to reform the state from below, through the achievement of local and regional autonomies.

The European economic crisis after the First World War and later the political, economical, and social conflicts during the Second Republic affected the Spanish economy, and an explosion of violent manifestations of working class widespread all over the country. The results of this situation was the granting to the peripheral regions of Catalonia, Galicia, and Basque country of statutes of autonomy, and in 1934 the declaration of a separate Catalan state.

At that time, in the Basque country, only the industrial Vizcaya and Guipozcoa ratified the statute of self-government, while the conservatives and less developed provinces of Alava and Navarre felt much more tied to the rest of Spain.

After the tragic Civil War, which lasted until 1939, the Spanish economy was ruined, and no nationalist demands came out until the late 1950’s. There is again a coincidence between the spectacular recovery of the Spanish economy, more remarkable in Catalonia and the Basque country, during the late 1950’s and 1960’s and the reappearance of some weak nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque country.
Just as the industrialization of the Basque region in the 1890's had a direct effect on the expansion of Basque nationalism, the new economic growth in Catalonia and the Basque country accentuated the differences between the center and the periphery, and it helped in the resurgence of nationalist movements. Basques and Catalans complained, and still do, that their profits go to other areas of the state according to central government priorities. This policy creates an atmosphere of rising resentment in both regions based in feelings of discrimination and even oppression.

In the Basque case, the second wave of modernization besides the reappearance of a moderate Basque nationalism represented by the PNV, it brought the revolutionary organization ETA, whose goal is outright independence from Spain.

In Catalonia, a group of young activists headed by Jordi Pujol promoted the idea of rebuilding Catalan identity around culture and economic progress in order to provide the basis for political actions when this could be permitted.

As I showed in chapter three, the relationship between the economic development and nationalist demands in Spain has been emphasized in different ways according to the sources consulted. For authors, such as Keating and Ramón Pí, Catalan's ambiguity with respect to its position within the Spanish state comes from its strategy of seeking leadership within it, or, when this is not possible, demanding autonomy. They agree that Catalans feel pessimistic when Spain faces political or economical crisis and then they turn separatists (Keating, 1996: 118-119) (Pí, 1996: 230).
Smith says that Catalonia prefers to remain within Spain, because the quest for national sovereignty would bring unacceptable costs politically and economically (Smith, 1986a: 154).

Alonso de los Ríos remarks that peripheral nationalism always exploits the weakest periods of the central government. First after the disaster of 1898, then during the Second Republic, and lately they exploit the significance of the nationalist votes in the Spanish Parliament without which the central government is unable to rule (Alonso, 1994: 10).

At the present moment, the majority of Catalan nationalists support the central government, but it is important to say that the Spanish economy is now one of the strongest in Europe; in 1997 its deficit was lower than the German one. Theo Waigel, German Economy Minister, expressed in Munich that Spain, France, and Germany are the fundamental pillars for the construction of the European Union of the next century (ABC, 1998: 1).

In the Basque case, politicians today prefer to be vague. Arzallus, President of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, predicts that in 20-30 years Europe will be totally integrated. In that context, he recognizes that the bigger challenge for Basques is the economic expansion, and so, only with economic independence can Basques join Europe without depending on Spain (The Economist, 1992: 17).

For Alonso de los Ríos, the only reason why Catalan and Basque nationalist leaders maintain their ties with the Spanish state is because of the benefits that those autonomous communities obtain by belonging to Spain (Alonso de los Ríos, 1994: 80).
He considers the proposal for self-determination in the Basque country will be postponed until the economical situation is the more adequate (Alonso de los Ríos, 1994: 158).

As Linz says, economic development is not a premise for the appearance of nationalist movements, but they are normally closely related in one way or another. For him, Basques, Catalans, and the rest of Spanish people are obliged to work together because in case of secession, the economic cost would be too high for everyone (Linz, 1973: 107).

**Language as a Factor of Integration/Differentiation**

For many historians, the most universal core value in the contemporary world is language, and its importance comes from the fact that the whole social and political system of the group is organized around the language. For Conversi, language rather than other values such as race or religion offers better possibilities for pacific and successful mobilization in democratic states if the language is spoken, or at least understood, by a considerable proportion of the population (Conversi, 1990: 50).

Sometimes it is argued that since in many cases nationalism seeks to preserve a particular national language and culture within the state where they live, nationalist demands may be satisfied by conceding autonomy in cultural matters to the different groups under the control of the state. For Kedourie, such attempts are seldom successful, since nationalists consider that political and cultural matters are inseparable (Kedourie, 1961: 116-117).
In the case of Spain, the importance of the language as a factor that has a great influence on the national cohesion becomes from the fact that 41.3 percent of the Spanish population lives in more or less extended bilinguals autonomous communities (García et al., 1994: 36). For Gunther, this linguistic diversity is the main reason of nationalist challenges to the Spanish state (Gunther et al., 1986: 242).

According to Linz, in the Basque country and Catalonia, migrations from other parts of Spain since the late nineteenth century have produced a heterogeneous population in which the descendants of immigrants and immigrants of recent decades constitute a large proportion. These migrations together with the deliberate action of the state trying to extend the use of Castilian to the peripheral regions brought a decrease in the use of traditional languages, a cultural assimilation, and an identification with the larger nation-state (Linz, 1985: 204).

Catalan nationalism has given paramount importance to language since its origin. Catalan has been and is the normal way of communication among its inhabitants since the Middle Ages. As Keating says, Catalans use the language to secure and enhance their national identity and to integrate people from other parts of Spain, thus giving Catalan people a strong civic character that opposes to ethnic segregation (Keating, 1996: 133-135). Catalan people center their nationalism on the language, which ultimately is something that can be acquired. The possibility of assimilation of immigrant has never been excluded. For Catalan nationalists spread of the language, both in its daily use and in its literary production, is the biggest integrating factor which at the same time differentiates them from the rest of Spanish people.
In the Basque country, the situation is different. Basque nationalism is characterized by an overall ambiguity and fluctuating attitude over the core values to be promoted. This ambiguity is reflected in the profound changes that Basque nationalism has experience from its beginning to the present time. As I have already mentioned in chapter three, at the first stages of Basque nationalism language was seen as a way to separate the indigenous population from the immigrants. Also, it is important to mention the attitude of the Basque upper class towards the Basque language. They never felt absolutely identified with the local language because they never considered it suitable for administration or commerce.

Basque nationalism changed its strong ethnical dimension because of the changes in its social structure due to the industrialization and consequent immigration process, but even at the present time the integration of immigrants is difficult especially in the rural areas.

Table 16. Characteristics defining who is Basque and Catalan (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics to be considered Basque/Catalan</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living and working in <em>Euskadi</em></td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking <em>Euskera</em></td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be born in <em>Euskadi</em> or to descend from a Basque family</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living and working in Catalonia</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking Catalan</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be born in Catalonia or to descend from a Catalan family</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Responses of 'do not know' and 'no answer' are not shown.
Source: Linz, 1985: 216.
Table 16 shows that the main criterion to differentiate who is Basque or Catalan is based on whether or not they live and work in the country. This change is due to the presence of sizable immigrant communities in their territories. Another important fact presented in the table is the decreasing importance of a primordial element as the ability to speak the local language.

Comparing Catalonia and Basque country with respect to linguistic issues the more important aspects are:

- Language is at the present moment an important value for both movements.

- While the diffusion and vigorousness of Catalan have made it a core element around which the nationalist movement could grow and develop, the poor diffusion of Basque language incited Basque nationalist intellectuals to overlook the language, particularly in the earliest phase of the movement.

- While Basque nationalism has historically been characterized by an overall pattern of indefiniteness and lack of continuity in the choice of its core values, Catalan nationalists have been stable in promoting language as a key element of their struggle (Conversi, 1990: 51).

- Catalonia has been spectacularly more successful in assimilating the mainly working-class immigrants than the Basque movement. While in 1977 the percentage of inhabitants in Catalonia born outside the country that could speak Catalan was 54. Only 8 percent of those living in the Basque country but born outside spoke Basque, though it should be considered the considerably greater difficulty of that language (Hobsbawn, 1990: 139-141).
The linguistic situation in Spain has changed considerably with respect to that of 1976. At the beginning of the democratic transition the efforts were directed to end a period of 'linguistic unity' where the Castilian-Spanish was the only official language. At the present time, the situation is completely different, and the Spanish Constitution defines Spain as a multilingual state.

In the last two decades, the discussions about linguistics issues have been a constant in the political arena, but fortunately the intransigence of the first moments have disappeared and now the majority of the Spanish people accept the fact that Spain is a multilingual state. The doubt that still persists is whether this duality of languages in some of the autonomous communities may represent a factor of national cohesion, or by the contrary this duality is something transient that will disappeared in the future. Some people fear that in the future only the local languages will subsist in the Basque country and Catalonia provoking a feeling of distinctiveness from the rest of the state, while at the same time will increase the internal cohesion of these autonomous communities.

Significant advancement has been made in the past years towards the return of Catalan and Basque languages to normal usage in all areas, and especially in schools. Whereas the three ikastolas (Basque schools) which opened in 1960 had together only 60 students, this population increased in 1979 to almost 50,000 representing one-tenth of the entire school-age population (Heiberg, 1989: 101). In Catalonia by 1990, 58 percent of students were receiving education entirely or almost entirely in Catalan, and just 8 percent entirely in Castilian (Keating, 1996: 138).
Table 17. Preferences concerning the obligatory language of instruction by partisan preference in the Basque country and Catalonia (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basque country</th>
<th>HB</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>PNV</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>PSE/PSOE</th>
<th>UCD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basque only</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingualism</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilian only</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catalonia</th>
<th>BEAN</th>
<th>ERC</th>
<th>CiU</th>
<th>PSUC</th>
<th>PSC/PSOE</th>
<th>UCD</th>
<th>AP/CD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catalan only</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingualism</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilian only</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gunther et al., 1986: 365

The former table presents clearly that bilingualism is the choice of the vast majority of Catalans and Basques. It also shows that the option for the exclusive use of the local language is only supported in the Basque case by part of the nationalist parties *Herri Batsuna* (HH), *Euskadido Esquerra* (EE), and *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV).

In Catalonia, except for the independentist BEAN, the bilingual option is shared among all the political parties. In both cases, the parties with representation in all the state such as the socialists, and center-right parties *Unión de Centro Democrático* (UCD) and *Alianza Popular* (AP) still prefer the Spanish as the language of instruction in a high percentage.

An analysis of tables 2 and 7, presented in chapter three about the subjective national identification by language usage denotes that in the Basque country the national self-identity is clearly related with the ability to speak Basque. Among native speakers, 72 percent of them identify as only Basque. Basque-speaking areas of the region are
more inclined towards nationalist ideas, and this is the reason why Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and northern municipalities of Alava where the use of Euskera is much more extended nationalist ideas are more vigorous (Nuñez, 1992: 60-61). In Catalonia, even among native speakers the higher percentage represent those who feel as Spanish as Catalan. But also there are marked differences in subjective national identity between those who claim to speak the local language and those who do not.

Also, in Catalonia and the Basque country there is a clear relationship between the knowledge of the local language and the attitude towards the right for self-determination, although in the Basque case is much more evident (García et al., 1994: 174).

Table 18. Percentage of Basques and Catalans that agree to questions relates to self-government by level of knowledge of local languages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Level of knowledge of local language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain must be organized as a state where the autonomous communities have</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the right of self-determination to become independent states.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Catalonia and the Basque country should exist the possibility of being</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independent states.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalans and Basques should be allowed to freely decide their political,</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economical, and social future.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Low (only understand), Medium (understand, read, and talk), High (write).
Source: García et al., 1994: 175

The relative knowledge of their local language differs with the Catalans showing a much higher level of understanding than the Basques. According to García Ferrando in
Catalonia only 3.3 percent of adults recognize that they do not understand Catalan at all, while in the Basque country this percentage increases to 63.5 percent of the population. This is the reason why the authors divide Basques among those who do not speak the language at all, and those who know something (García et al., 1994: 174).

Today, the recuperation of Basque and Catalan constitutes an enormous challenge for nationalist parties. In both regions a number of important programs, especially in television and education, to restore the language to a level of parity with Castilian-Spanish are in progress. In Catalonia the success is much more visible, in 1975, 74.3 percent of the Catalan population understood Catalan; in 1986 the percentage had increased to 90.3 percent (Balcells, 1996: 189). In the Basque case, the results are more pessimistic, in 1979 only 36 percent of the population could understand the local language, and in 1986 the percentage increased to 42 percent (García et al., 1994: 37-39).

As I have presented, the knowledge and use of local languages represent an important point in the process of national self-identification, but it does not always exist a correlation between the possession of a particular language and the existence of strong nationalist political parties. In Galicia, in spite of its rich historical tradition and ideological developments, nationalist parties have never overcome so far the barrier of 25 percent of the number of votes at any general, local or regional election. Hence, its political force appears to be less important than that of its Basque and Catalan counterparts, although its cultural strength, based on an own language spoken by more than 80 percent of the population, is more important than in the Basque case (Núñez, 1992: 69-70).
Political Structure of the Spanish State

Despite the fact that the borders of Spain have been the same since 1512, Spain has not succeeded in building a nation that includes all the territories of the state. The Spanish monarchy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was little more than a confederation of regions, and Spain did not create centralized institutions until after the victory or the new Spanish Bourbon dynasty in the Succession War of the early eighteenth century.

By 1716 the new monarchy had abolished the separate constitutional systems of Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands, leaving only those of the small kingdom of Hispanic Navarre, in fact by that time only a semiautonomous province, and the foral rights of the Basque country.

A good example of the lack of success in developing a stable political structure is provided by the many changes in the political system of the Spanish state in the last two centuries. The country, during this time, has lived under an absolutist monarchic period, followed by two federal structures, a dictatorship, and now a democratic parliamentary monarchy.

Spain has made great efforts to find the best way to politically integrate the different regions of the country, but it has been difficult to find one suitable way accepted by all the regions. The main obstacle is provided by Catalonia and the Basque country which consider they are different nations within the Spanish state.
At the present time, the future form of the political structure of Spain is not clear. In some aspects the country functions like a federal state and in others it depends on the pressure that the different regions place on the central government. The Spanish Constitution recognizes the multinational character of Spain and the necessity of an administrative decentralization, but at the same time the first point of the Article 145 forbids expressly a federal state. The different autonomous communities enjoy their status by grant of the Spanish government, and such status can be amended or even withdrawn by Madrid if the Spanish government determines such a step to be in the general interest.

One important aspect that differentiates Spain from a classical federal state is the power granted to the autonomous communities. In a federal state, the regions tend from the beginning to assume control over a clearly defined area and inherit clearly structured institutions. In Spain, each region is free to decide whether or not to request autonomous status, and they are able to some extend to decide on the level of autonomy required (Newton, 1997: 136).

Another aspect that differentiates Spain from a federal state is the percentage of the revenues that Madrid transfers to the different autonomous communities. Although the percentage is increasing, in 1984 for instance, only 5 percent of the revenue of the state were transferred to the autonomous communities, whereas in federal states the percentage is usually around 50 percent (Balcells, 1996: 173).

This unclear political structure was aggravated by a recent ruling by the Constitutional Court, which revoked the majority of the rules passed by the state
concerning the control over the territory. Now this control depends on each autonomous
community, and many jurists consider that this decree may be another step towards the
transformation of the State of the Autonomous Communities into a federal state. Article
148 of the Spanish Constitution establishes that the regulation of the territory, urbanism
and housing is responsibility of each autonomous community. After this ruling, some
common rights for all the country, which were approved by the General Courts,
disappeared and new norms passed by each autonomous community will be established
without any communication between them (S.N., 1997: 1-4).

The establishment of a Federal Spanish Republic has occurred twice, and in both
cases the promoters and main supporters of the idea were the Catalan parties. Both
attempts had a short life and the results in both cases were the same: the difficulty of
ruling the country under this form of government and the subsequent appearance of a
powerful centralized government that prohibited any kind of regional autonomy.

The proclamation of the First Republic in 1873 stimulated autonomist movements
in three other areas: the Basque country, Galicia, and Valencia, and regionalist
proclamations were made in Andalucia, Extremadura, and Castile.

The following attempt to establish a federal state was in 1931, and again the
success of Catalonia encouraged autonomist movements in other areas of Spain. This
emergence of autonomist demands in regions that have strongly shared the belief that
Spain is a nation for all the Spanish people it is not a new sentiment. During the regency
of Philip IV, in the middle of the seventeenth century, Portugal obtained its independence
and Catalonia revolted looking for the same results. Andalucia and Aragon that until
then had never made any separatist demands were also affected by secessionist aspirations. Also, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, special regulations in some regions about taxation and conscription were a source of conflict. Regions without those privileges pressed the government to give them similar rights or to abolish them. The real situation is that the different Spanish regions do not accept political or economical discrimination based on historical facts. The issue of grievance towards different levels of regional autonomy is still present in Spain.

In the Spanish hinterland, especially in Castile, people will not accept special privileges for other regions (Balcells, 1996: 77). On the other extreme, Jordi Pujol believes that Catalonia is not one more autonomous community. He says Catalonia is different and there will be tensions between Catalonia and the rest of Spain until this distinctiveness is expressly recognized and accepted by the rest of the country (Pastor, 1997: 1). In the Basque case, confrontation between moderate and radical nationalists could lead the moderate PNV to increase the level of its autonomy demands in order to avoid the lost of votes towards more radical political options (Newton, 1997: 136).

In this situation it is difficult to foresee what will be the political evolution in Spain. The majority of political parties do not find the transformation of Spain in a federal state an unsolved problem. According to them, only a few changes should be required in the current constitution. The Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) has officially favored a federal government since 1918 (Newton, 1997: 190), and Catalan socialists (PSC), which in 1977 affiliated to PSOE, explicitly reject independence of Catalonia and
Spanish uniformity and have supported a federal Spain within a federal Europe since 1994 (Keating, 1996: 125).

The Catalan communists, *Iniciativa per Catalunya*, pretend greater autonomy for Catalonia within a federal Spain (Keating, 1996: 125), and Antonio Romero, General Secretary of Izquierda Unida (communists) in Andalucia, emphasized in 1996 the necessity to revise the constitution toward a federal state with each autonomous community having the same privileges and level of self-government (Romero, 1996: 1).

Even the founder of the PP, Manuel Fraga, believes that federalism per se is not a bad thing (Acuña, 1993: 381), and Carlos Garaicoechea, former Prime Minister of the Basque government, believes that a federal relationship with the Spanish state could be achieved without violence (The *Economist*, 1986: 54).

Jordi Pujol, and his party CiU, should approve an asymmetric federal state in which the historic nationalities, Catalonia, Basque country, and Galicia, could have a relationship with the central state different from that of other regions (Keating, 1996: 225).

With these precedents the establishment of some kind of federal state in Spain should no longer be regarded as a remote possibility. Gregorio Peces-Barba, one of the writers of the current constitution, considers that the State of the Autonomous Communities functionally is a federal state that requires for its consolidation the acceptance of the constitution on behalf of the peripheral nationalism (Peces-Barba, 1996: 1-2).
The analysis of a survey done by the Center for Sociological Research (table 19) shows that the opinion of the main political leaders is different from that of the population in general. From 1979 to 1990 the percentage of people who support federalism remains stable and below 10 percent. The reality is that support for centralism has decreased and a spectacular increase in the desire for autonomy has occurred in regions with a long tradition of centralism such as Andalucia, Castile, and Extremadura.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andalucia</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>77</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castile-Leon</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>81</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>65</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>Cantabria</td>
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<td>Valencia</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPANISH AVERAGE</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: García et al., 1994: 182
In the former table, readers must have in mind that the option that includes independence also includes self-determination, and these two concepts are different. Self-determination means the possibility to vote whether the people of the different regions want to remain as part of Spain or to be independent. There are people who support this idea even though they would prefer to be part of Spain, but they consider this option should depend on their desires and not on the will of the rest of the country.

Basques and Catalans consider they have their own nation on the basis of their language and culture, but neither population has been asked to vote on whether or not to remain in Spain. It is also important to say that the majority of the population in both regions has not pressed for such a vote. For *The Economist*, there are two main reasons. First, it is the fear of a military intervention, a possibility contemplated in the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which assigns to the armed forces the responsibility for safeguarding the territorial integrity. Second, moderate nationalists believe self-determination will arrive from the redrawing of the internal boundaries of a united Europe, and this position until now prevails over radicals (*The Economist*, 1991: 54).

Catalan nationalism is strong and support for separatism that was normally weak is lately gaining supporters, not only on the political fringes. Nonetheless, the majority of Catalans want autonomy but also want the protection of the existing state. They know that, as small nations on the edge of large states, their politics will continue to be influenced by these large states and that is the reason why, in many instances, nationalists want to maintain political links, allowing them a continued presence within the politics of the host state (Keating, 1996: 223).
In the Basque country, the option of independence and self-determination has decreased substantially from 1979 to 1990, but in this region there is a considerable internal division over the desired political solution, and the steps that must be followed to reach this desired political solution.

According to Greenwood, there are at least five distinct views among the Basques. The first view consists of a desire for a high degree of regional autonomy that could include some kind of federalism. The second calls for the elimination of the current European nation-states and the creation of a European Community made up of true ethnic groups. A third position is separatism. Supporters of this approach demand the unification of the Spanish Basque provinces and the French Basque department in a single independent nation. This is the desired political solution of ETA and its political organization, Herri Batasuna. A fourth view is characterized by agnosticism and cynicism about the possibility of any solution to their problem. And finally, there is a fifth segment of the population that still favors a highly centralize regime (Greenwood, 1997: 85-86).

A negative aspect that affects the solidarity and cohesion between the different regions of Spain and its political stabilization is the extended feeling among the different regions that nationalism with or without historical or cultural roots is profitable for the interest of the different autonomous communities. After 1975, the first democratic governments could form stable governments because the parties that supported them had overall majority. But this situation changed and the last two governments led by the two biggest national parties the socialist PSOE and center-right PP have needed the support of
Catalan and Basque nationalists in order to be able to govern. This nationalist support has forced the central government to increase the level of self-government in these autonomous communities, but at the same time has produced a rejection on behalf of the rest of Spanish as noted in a survey done by the Center for Sociological Research (ABC, 1997: 1).

The results of the autonomous elections in Catalonia and the Basque country previously showed in tables 5 and 10 indicate that the nationalist forces receive around 50 percent of the total number of votes. These two regions are the only ones with such a high percentage of nationalist votes, but this situation could change in the future.

In Galicia the number of votes supporting the Galician Nationalist Party, Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG), has increased constantly since the first democratic elections when it received 11.3 percent of total votes. In 1993 the number was 18.4 percent, and in 1997 this proportion increased to 25.5 percent, reaching the second place in number of votes, after the Popular Party, passing for the first time the Socialist PSOE (El Mundo, 1997: 1).

People and politicians are aware of the increased competencies in self-government that Basques and especially Catalans have received for their support of the central government, and it might happen that every region supports its own nationalist groups with the expectation of getting profit from this situation (San Sebastián, 1997: 1). The problem is that the example of the BNG in Galicia can spread to other autonomous communities. In this situation the national parties would diminish their weight in the political arena, and it should be very difficult to form coalition governments among the
different parties. The results could be a permanent political crisis that would impede the
correct operation of the state.

In the present circumstances a national pact between the main political forces is
necessary where the limits of the state and those of the autonomous communities are
established. If this consensus is not reached consolidatings the Spanish political structure
will be difficult. There are some pessimistic segments of the population that believe that
this situation might end with the disintegration of Spain. Alonso de los Ríos says that
some regions could finish adopting positions never seen before, and he says that serious
movements have already begun towards extreme positions (Alonso de los Ríos, 1994:
115-116). Ossenberg's idea when he says that Canadians are very much aware that
separation on Quebec's part could mean the beginning of total national disintegration
(Ossenberg, 1974: 433-435) is transportable to the Spanish case depending on the
evolution of the present situation.

Influence of Peripheral Nationalism in National Security

In the analysis of peripheral nationalism in the Spanish national security I will
consider two different influences. The first is the separatist nationalist movements
sometimes connected to terrorist activities, and the other is the degree of volunteer
participation in the armed forces by autonomous communities. In the first case, the most
vivid example is ETA, a Basque terrorist organization, whose goal is to achieve
independence of the region from Spain. In the second case, the situation is more diffuse
and dangerous. There is a possibility that population in certain regions of the country do
not feel engaged with the defense of the state and do not contribute with personnel to the armed forces. It is important to emphasize that the armed forces must be a representation of the entire society which they represent. An uneven participation of the different autonomous communities in the supply of personnel would be a sign of a weak integration of the different parts of the state in a common project.

In contrast to other similar movements around the world, neither Catalan nor Basque nationalism have their goal in seceding from Spain and joining another state, particularly since France probably has a history more centralistic than Spain. France is not interested, in any way, in encouraging any secession from Spain, since an independent Basque country could aspire to incorporate to its territory the historical and relatively underdeveloped part of the Basque region now under French control. And an independent Catalonia might affect the stability of some Catalan-speaking areas in the southeast of France that could feel some kind of attraction to the idea of a Great Catalonia as the one known until the seventeenth century.

At the present time, when the Spanish political system contemplates the possibility of any kind of political demands, it is hard for violent nationalist movements to find support in European institutions. As Ben-Ami says, the most probable, although hardly promising, perspective for the Basque country is that a limited degree of armed struggle will persist and will continue feeding the dreams of an independent state (Ben-Ami, 1991: 517). A delicate relationship between the aspirations of part of the Basque people and the unbreakable unity of Spain manifested in the Constitution will have to be maintained for lack of any other viable solution. According to Robert Graham, the
strongest opposition to any form of relaxation on the national unity will come from the armed forces. They were a central pillar of the Franco regime, and now the constitution assigns them the role of defending the territorial integrity and constitutional order of Spain (Graham, 1984: 188).

Today, when a totally professionalized armed forces will be a reality by the year 2003 (Serra, 1999: 8), experts consider that the armed forces will not have any problem selecting soldiers if the unemployment index continues as now the highest in the European Union, with almost 40 percent unemployment among people between 15 and 19 years old (González, 1997: 1-4). People in general support this professionalization. A survey conducted in 1994 by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) (Center of Sociological Research) showed that 49 percent of participants supported completely professionalized armed forces, one year later the percentage increased to 64 percent, and in 1997 the favorable percentage reached almost 75 percent. The choice of the professional model increases according to the level of education. The main support for compulsory military service comes from people of limited education, and those who live in country areas and vote to the far right (Muñoz-Alonso, 1997: 56).

The problem is not to have enough people demanding to join the armed forces, the real problem is to have armed forces that represent all the nation. Whereas entry in the military is only a temporary solution to unemployment, the results will be a momentary increase in the number of applicants but neither quality nor homogeneity nor continuity will be assured. Politicians must be aware that since the nineteenth century all
the attempts to professionalize the armed forces failed because of the short number of applicants (González, 1997: 1-4).

A survey carried out in more than forty countries worldwide under the direction of Ronald Inglehart in 1990 revealed that of the countries studied, Spain is one of the most pacifist. Only two thirds of Spaniards aged 18 or more declared themselves willing to fight for their country in a war. This compares with 70 percent in the United States and more than 80 percent in countries such as Poland and the Scandinavian states (Muñoz-Alonso, 1997: 55).

The legislation of conscientious objection is frequently used as a subterfuge to avoid a compulsory military service. In 1996, the number of conscientious objectors reached 93,000 and for the following year the expectation was around 130,000 (Lobo, 1997: 1). This means that one third of conscripts refuse to join the military, and with these numbers the maintenance of the conscription model is impossible. The lack of data and research about the relationship between conscientious objectors and region of origin does not allow reaching any conclusion about the correlation between those regions where the presence of nationalist movements is considerable and rejection to participate in the armed forces for matters of conscience.

One important point to determine whether the future armed forces are going to represent the whole Spanish population is the study of the origin of their memberships. Nowadays, conscripts arrive from everywhere so all the regions are represented proportionally depending on their population. This proportion is not the same when talking about officers and non-commissioned-officers. In this case the number of
personnel from different regions varies greatly. Rates of intermarriage within the armed services community have always been high, as has been the ratio of sons of military personnel choosing military careers. In 1979, about 67 percent of those entering the army academy were following their fathers’ steps. The corresponding proportion for the navy was 81 percent, and for the air force it was 54 percent. These percentages are decreasing lately because of noncompetitive salaries and greater career opportunities in the modern civilian economy (Library of Congress, 1990: 289-290).

Table 20. Percentage of applicants to join the professional armed forces by autonomous communities, 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicants origin</th>
<th>Percentage of total applicants</th>
<th>Percentage of total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalucia</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castile-La Mancha</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castile-Leon</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Islands</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque country</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Island</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Data on new candidates to the armed forces as professional soldiers in the first half of the year 1997 is very significant; 28.5 percent of the applicants are from

166
Andalucía which has only 18.2 percent of the Spanish population. On the contrary, only 3.2 percent of the applicants are from Catalonia with 15.4 percent of the Spanish population, and the Basque country with 1.4 percent of applicants with the 5.3 percent of Spanish population (Gonzalez, 1997: 3).

With these numbers, the future armed forces are not going to reflect Spanish society, and not only geographically but educationally, economically, and politically. A survey by the CIS for the Defense Ministry shows that the highest predisposition to be a professional soldier is found among the extreme right wing with 27.2 percent while they only represent the 2.9 percent of the Spanish population (Gonzalez, 1997: 3).

Table 21. Percentage of intentions to join the professional armed forces by political ideology, 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extreme Left</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Extreme Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: González, 1997: 4

In Catalonia and the Basque country the number of applicants to join the armed forces differs considerably with respect to the number of applicants to the regional police forces. Article 149 of the Spanish Constitution allows the autonomous communities to create their own regional police forces, but only two of the historical nationalities: Catalonia and the Basque country together with Navarre created their own police forces in the 1980’s (Newton, 1997: 138). This differentiation between number of applicants between the armed forces and regional police forces could be influenced by the fact that
the armed forces are seen as something related to Spain, while the regional police forces are related to their regions and are fully integrated and accepted by the native population.

Table 22. Regional per capita income as percentage of national per capita incomes, and percentage of total applicants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomous Communities</th>
<th>Percentage of national per capita income</th>
<th>Percentage of total applicants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalucia</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castile-La Mancha</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Castile-Leon</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Islands</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque country</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Island</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Economic development among Spanish regions varies widely and a relationship appears between the degree of economical development and degree of participation in the armed forces. The three poorest regions, Extremadura, Andalucia, and Galicia, with a gross domestic product (GDP) below 76 percent of the Spanish average, provides 41.1 percent of military applicants. On the other extreme, Navarre, the wealthiest region only provides the 0.2 of the applicants, the lowest value of all the regions (Maxwell and Spiegel, 1994: 78-79). A significant exception is provided by the autonomous
community of Madrid, and this could be because Madrid has a great number of military installations and 64.8% of the total national military industry is located in this region (AFARMADE, 1997).

The situation at the present time is a little confused. The new proposal for a totally professional model of armed forces is still in the first phase of development and more data and research will be needed to reach valid conclusions.

Summary

This chapter presents an analysis of the factors that have had more influence in the appearance and consolidation of peripheral nationalism, and the role that this peripheral nationalism has played and still plays in the configuration of the political structure and national security of the Spanish state.
V. Conclusions

Introduction

This chapter will present the results of this study and will attempt to answer the research questions, presented in Chapter I, about the influence of peripheral nationalism on the consolidation of the Spanish state. The five research questions will be examined individually, followed by a section of final conclusions.

Research Questions

Research Question 1. Can Basque and Catalan nationalism be examples for other autonomous communities to follow in order to get more political and economical advantages?

The influence of autonomist and separatist movements on the rest of the country has been evident throughout the history of Spain. The first manifestations were in the middle of the seventeenth century when the Catalan desires for independence where followed by other regions. The same happened during the Second Republic, and more recently with the appearance of the autonomous communities.

The present political configuration of the Spanish state is greatly due to the influence of peripheral nationalism during the redaction of the 1978 Constitution. The support for a decentralized state has increased considerably in the last years even in regions such as Andalucia with a long tradition in centralism.

In reality Catalonia and the Basque country have contributed in great measure to the changes produced in Spain in the last two decades. Basques and Catalans have a
strong influence in the national policy and their statutes of autonomies have a higher level of self-government. This is a consequence of the influence of the Basque and Catalans nationalist parties in the government of the country. Since 1993, the central government needs the votes of these nationalist parties to rule the state, and they take advantage of this situation by acquiring more concessions in the political and economic area.

The belief that the presence of strong nationalist parties in the different autonomous communities will be a useful means to obtain the same privileges that Catalans and Basques enjoy has been gaining supporters recently. This situation is leading to the resurgence of nationalist movements, as it is the case in Galicia or the appearance of nationalist movements in places where they never before existed. The immediate consequence of this explosion of nationalist feelings could be the loss of national cohesion and the difficulty of ruling the state.

**Research Question 2.** Is language the only reason that Basques and Catalans feel that they are different nations and do not belong to the Spanish Kingdom?

Language is not the only reason why Basques and Catalans feel they are different nations inserted into the Spanish state, but in both cases language is the main factor of differentiation with the rest of the Spanish people. It is significant that the 1978 Constitution recognizes as nationalities the three Spanish regions that have their own language: Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque country.

Language is considered the most extended core value in the contemporary world, and this is the case in Catalonia and the Basque country. But there is a considerable
difference between the two regions. In Catalonia the language has always been the main
cfactor around which the Catalan nation built its national feelings. For Catalans, language,
culture, and history are the three pillars of their own distinctiveness. On the contrary, in
the Basque country people never had a clear idea which should be their core values.
They have changed from race to language, depending on the situation. In Catalonia
language is a way of assimilating the newcomers while in the Basque Country until
recent times language was a way of differentiating Basques from immigrants from other
parts of Spain.

At the present time the presence of considerable immigrant communities in both
regions has forced nationalists to formulate the idea of belonging to the nation on the
basis of a voluntaristic identification with the nation and less on the basis of the ability to
speak the local language. It means that in both regions the idea of a civic nationalism is
surpassing the ethnic nationalism.

**Research Question 3.** Is the economic situation responsible for the periodic
reappearance of the peripheral nationalism?

Although the effects of economy in the emergence of nationalist movements has
supporters and detractors and everyone presents arguments to support their decisions, in
the Spanish case the peripheral nationalism is closely connected to the economic situation
of the moment.

In Catalonia, the relationship with the central government has been greatly
influenced by the economic situation of the country in general and Catalonia in particular.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the maximum military and economic apogee of Spain, Catalonia did not feel part of Spain partially because the governmental policy of excluding Catalonia from trading with the overseas colonies negatively affected the economic development of the region. Later, in the eighteenth century when Catalonia was fully integrated into state policy and considerable economic progress took place throughout the country, Catalan nationalist demands disappeared completely. Catalonia with its new access to the overseas market experienced an economic revival, and Catalans fully aware of the advantages offered by the Spanish system felt completely loyal to the crown.

This situation has changed periodically depending on the economic situation. There are many examples where the weakness of the Spanish economy placed serious barriers to the integration process. After 1898 when Spain lost her last colonies in America and the Philippines, Catalan leaders began to demand greater autonomy and more responsibility in the control and administration of their internal affairs because they placed the blame for the political and economical disaster on the central government. At this time a strong nationalist movement appeared in Catalonia. The same happened during the economic crises after the War World I and during the Second Republic.

After the Civil War, the Spanish economy was ruined, and no Catalan nationalist demands came out until the late 1950’s coinciding with a remarkable recovery of the Spanish economy, especially in Catalan and in the Basque country.

In the Basque case the situation is different. The roots of Basque nationalism are more recent, and although the industrialization of the Basque region in the 1890’s had a
direct effect on the expansion of Basque nationalism, and the second wave of modernization in the late 1950’s saved it from oblivion the relationship between the economic development and the Basque commitment to nationalism have never been homogeneous. The rejection of Basque nationalism by the largest industrial and banking interests, which rely on the Spanish market, is one of the greatest weaknesses of Basque nationalism.

In general, one of the most interesting characteristics of peripheral nationalist movements is the manner and degree to which they undergo critically important changes in response to alterations in the economic and political environments within which they are positioned. In Spain, the economic factor contributes to the awakening of peripheral nationalist movements and increases the resentment arising from economics inequalities that are easily transformable into generic nationalist sentiments.

**Research Question 4.** Could the changes produced in Spain in the last twenty years lead the country towards a federal state, or be the source for its disintegration?

Spain has a long tradition as a monarchical confederate state. Since the marriage of the Catholic Monarchs in the fifteenth century until the arrival of the Bourbon Dynasty in the eighteenth century, Spain was a confederate state where the different kingdoms remained constitutionally distinct political entities with separate councils of state and parliaments. And more recently, Spain was proclaimed a federal republic in 1873 and 1931, even though in both cases the establishment of such political structure lasted only a short period of time. The failure in both cases was because a federal state in a
multilingual context with considerable economic, social, and cultural differences is difficult to maintain.

Recently, the 1978 Constitution opened the way towards a decentralized state, and for the first time in the Spanish constitutional history was accepted the existence of different nationalities within Spain. This acceptance together with the creation of a new political structure based on a state of autonomous communities, where each community has its own parliament and local government, changed completely the Spanish political map.

With these precedents the creation of a federal state should no longer be regarded as a remote possibility, and in reality inside and outside the country many sources share the idea that Spain is already, in some way, a federal state.

Even though the Constitution expressly forbids the creation of a federal state, the increased transference of powers between the central and local governments, and the way the Constitutional Court is regulating the relationship between the state and the different autonomous communities might lead the country towards the creation of a federal state with minimum constitutional changes. One important factor that enforces this opinion is the fact that the left (socialists and communists) and some regionalist/nationalist parties support the creation of a federal state and the conservative parties at least do not see negative connotations in the creation of a federal state.

It is significant that the public opinion does not support the idea of creating a federal state, but experience shows that politicians can change public opinion with an adequate informative campaign that eliminates possible mistrust. The real problem is not
the creation of a federal state but which kind of federal state. Catalonia would only accept a federal state based on the different nationalities recognized by the Constitution: Catalonia, Basque country, Galicia, and the rest of Spain, while the majority of autonomous communities would only accept a federal state with the same level of self-government for every one of the future states. The basic point is that the different Spanish autonomous communities do not accept political or economical discrimination based on special historical conditions.

As I have said, the political evolution of the last two decades could lead the country to the creation of a federal state without great changes in the Spanish political structure, but, if the socio-economical situation of Spain does not change, the country goes toward the consolidation of the State of the Autonomous Communities, and there is no risk of violent degradation caused by nationalist ideas.

The majority of Catalans and Basques agree with the type of autonomy they enjoy, and rejection of violence by Basques population is more notorious every day. They are conscious that the independence of their countries would lead them to apply for admission to the European Union, which would once again limit their sovereign rights.

Research Question 5. Does peripheral nationalism affect the Spanish national security?

The influence of peripheral nationalism in the Spanish national security throughout the existence of independentist nationalist movements even though is a delicate issue in the Spanish policy does not represent a danger for its integrity. The
main reason to uphold this decision is the lack of internal and external support to these nationalist movements.

The political situation has changed drastically in the last two decades. Nowadays, in Spain any political idea is accepted as long as their supporters follow the democratic rules. Under the present circumstances people inside and outside the country see violence as an unacceptable means to force a change in the policy of central government with respect to the political structure of the Spanish state.

In Spain, the majority of population in the different autonomous communities agrees with the present configuration of the Spanish state. Even in the Basque country, where the terrorist organization ETA has the support of part of the Basque population, this support is decreasing in the last years and the native population is adopting a position much more strong against the use of force to reach political results. In Europe, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the complete acceptance of Spain in the different European institutions any kind of political and economical support to the nationalist movements has disappeared.

The other area where peripheral nationalism could affect the national security, the degree of implication of some autonomous communities in the national defense, is unclear. In this case, there are not enough data available and research performed to reach valid conclusions. It is true that an uneven distribution of population in a totally professional army could destroy the agglutinative role that the armed forces have had in Spain, but this is the case in the majority of armed forces in the western countries.
More research is needed to determine if the differences in the number of applicants to join the armed forces is motivated by a lack of identification of some autonomous communities with a common project of Spanish state, or the reasons are because of the uneven economy growth, localization of the military industry, and distribution of military installations. Also, with the data available, it is difficult to determine if the increase in the number of conscientious objectors is a consequence of the imminent professionalization of the armed forces or because the peripheral nationalist movements lack involvement in national security.

Final Conclusions

The importance of nationalism is so great in the contemporary world that much more scholarly research is indicated to help explain the ramifications of such a complex historical phenomenon. Because nationalism is a sentiment, nationalism has powerful psychological nuances and so psychological investigation is necessary to explain the inconsistencies, paradoxes, and mysteries of nationalism.

In Spain, although there are different point of views about what provoked the appearance of peripheral nationalism, most of them coincide in presenting the different languages and cultures, centralized government, and economic factors, as the main reasons for the rise of peripheral nationalism. The tension inside multilingual states cannot be resolved if the unifying instruments, that is the political institutions, do not grant a self-respecting, secure, economic, and political position for self-conscious linguistic minorities.
Nowadays the Spanish democracy has been consolidated. Since the late 1970's the government and administration of the Spanish state has undergone a profound transformation that, even at the present time, continues. The impetus for such changes came from the new constitution, which reflected a widespread desire for a new legal framework and a completely new set of principles to guide the country.

Spain has to develop fully a political concept large enough to enclose all the factors and stimulating enough to command the fidelity of widely differing communities. Even after the principle of autonomy had been agreed on and incorporated in the new constitution, center-periphery relations remain a source of partial conflict. This is partly due to the fact that, in the constitutional and developing processes, the final shape of the Spanish state was left an open question. As Linz says: “Spain today is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities” (Linz, 1973: 99). But, a view of how far Spain has traveled along the democratic road since 1975 and the positive profits achieved during these years makes possible to view the future in optimistic terms. The present State of the Autonomous Communities will be able to survive if solidarity and cohesion between the different regions remain stable.
Appendix

Minorities in Western Europe

Austria

The Slovenes of Carinthia
The Magyars in Burgenland
The Croats in Burgenland

Belgium

Flemings in Flanders
Walloons in Wallonie
The Germans in the province of Liege

Britain

The Gaels of Scotland
The Lowland Scots
The Gaels of the Isle of Man
The Gaels of Northern Ireland
The Welsh
The Norman French on the island of Jersey and Guernsey

Denmark

The Germans of North Schleswig
The Faroe Islanders
The Greenlanders

Finland

The Swedish Lapps
The Lapps

France

The Occitans
The Catalans of Roussillon
The northern Basques
The Corsicans
The Alsatians
The Flemings of Westhoek
The Bretons

Germany

The Danes of North Schleswig
The north Frisians

Ireland

The Gaels

Italy

The Piedmontese
The Occitans of Piedmont
The Romagnolis from Emilia-Rogmana
The Friulians
The Sauris of Friuli
The Ladins of the Dolomites
The Aostans in the Aosta Valley
The south Tyroleans
The Slovenes of Trieste
The Sards
The Greek Croats and Albanians of the Mezzogiorno

Luxembourg

The Letzeburgers

The Netherlands

The West Frisians

Norway

Nynorsk
The Lapps
The Finns of northern Norway
Spain

The Catalans
The Basques
The Galicians

Sweden

The Lapps
The Finns in the Torne Valley

Switzerland

The Ticinese
The Jurassians
The Rhaetians

Source: Foster, 1980: 211-213
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Vita

Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Pastor Villar was born on 4 June 1954 in Seville, Spain. He graduated from the Spanish Air Force Academy, San Javier. After graduation in 1978 he was selected for a Cargo Pilot Course.

His first tour of duty was at Torrejón Air Force Base. Later he served as a flight instructor at the Spanish Air Force Academy. He was promoted to Major in 1990 and commanded the Primary Flight School and later the Squadron Cadets. In 1994 he was selected to attend the Air Staff course. After graduation one year later he was assigned to the Logistics Division in the Air Staff Headquarter, Madrid.

In May of 1996, Lieutenant Colonel Pastor entered the School of Logistics and Acquisition Management, Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

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**Title and Subtitle**

NATIONALISM IN SPAIN: IS IT A DANGER TO NATIONAL INTEGRITY?

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**Abstract (Maximum 200 Words)**

In recent years there has been a worldwide resurgence of ethnic nationalism as ethnic minorities have seen in this ethnic differentiation a better way to increase their political power within the states where they reside. Spain is a complex country divided into a number of contrasting regions with widely varying economic and social structures as well as different historical, political, and cultural traditions, that includes different languages. This extreme complexity is related to its national diversity and also to the political and social articulation of nationalist claims within the state.

This study arrives at five conclusions. First, Basque and Catalan nationalism is an example to follow by other regions in order to get a higher level of self-government. Second, the possession of a different language is the most important factor of distinctiveness. Third, the economic situation is closely related to the resurgence of peripheral nationalism. Fourth, the present political configuration, although supported by the majority of population, could be easily transformed into a federal state. Finally, peripheral nationalism does not affect the national security because of the lack of internal and external support to the nationalist movements that employ violence as the means to reach their political goals.

**Subject Terms**

Spain, National Security, Nationalism, Basque Country, Catalonia

**Security Classification of Report**

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