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The American Soldier after the Cold War: Towards a Post-Modern Military?

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Introduction

The armed forces of the United States and those of other Western developed democracies are moving from what can be termed modern to postmodern forms of military organization. This is the core argument presented here. Events since the end of the Cold War augur that some meaningful, even momentous, not illusionary, change is occurring within armed forces in Western societies. Clarification of this change is the purpose of this Technical Report. The modern military that fully emerged in the nineteenth century was inextricably associated with the rise of the nation-state.[1] Though the modern military organization was, of course, never a pure type, its basic format was a combination of conscripted lower ranks or militia and a professional officer corps, war oriented in mission, masculine in makeup and ethos, and sharply differentiated in structure and culture from civilian society. The postmodern military, by contrast, undergoes a loosening of the ties with the nation-state. The basic format shifts toward a volunteer force, more multipurpose in mission, increasingly androgynous in makeup and ethos, and more permeability with civilian society.

The term "postmodern" as applied to the armed forces must imply some significant departure from "modern" forms of military organization. Otherwise "postmodern" is just another misapplication of an overworked adjective. Drawing heavily on the historical experience of the United States and Western European nations, we present a threefold typology of the military and society. The first is the modern type, which we can date from the nineteenth century to end of World War II.[2] The second is the late modern type that prevailed from the mid-twentieth century into the early 1990s and is essentially coterminous with the Cold War. The postmodern type is ascendant in the present and is postulated to continue so into the indefinite future. Although antecedents predate the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of communism in Eastern

Europe provided the major thrust to move the military toward the postmodern model.

Why these three periods and not others? Primarily, they make sense of the direction of societal-military relations at the conclusion of a watershed period, one in which the fear of total annihilation was present. Nuclear weaponry imposed an ultimate reality that forced both sides to accommodate -- whether at the building of the Berlin wall in 1961, during the Cuban missile crises of 1962, or in surrogate wars in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan. The power to destroy civilizations was the defining quality of the Cold War. Though the nuclear threat has not vanished, it has receded greatly as a possible instrument of war between major states. The core thesis of this Technical Report is that the end of the Cold War has ushered in a period of transition in which the conventional modern forms of military organization are giving way to new postmodern forms.

The postmodern military is characterized by four major organizational changes. One is the increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both structurally and culturally. The second is the diminution of differences within the armed services based on branch of service, rank, and combat versus support roles. The third is the change in the military purpose from fighting wars to missions that would not be considered military in the traditional sense. A final change is that the military are used more in multinational forces and authorized (or at least legitimated) by entities beyond the nation state.

Debate over the state of armed forces and society at the end of the twentieth century pits a kind of naive optimism against a deep pessimism. Among the optimists, the end of large-scale war was captured in visions such as a "new world order" proclaimed by President George Bush following the Gulf War, or in Frances Fukuyama's seminal phrase "the end of history."[3] The notion of a future without major war was, in a manner of speaking, a reincarnation of the beliefs of

the founders of modern social thought. Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, among many others, held in common (about the only thing such a diverse group did hold in common) the notion that industrial societies were evolving toward greater pacification, even toward a warless world.

Taking a darker view of the post-Cold War era are those who see post-Cold War anarchy. In this perspective, the very tools of war are slipping out of control of central states as the employment of organized violence become more and more the characteristic of armed bands, terrorists and gangsters. Martin Van Creveld moves away from the Clausewitzian assumption that war is rational in the sense it reflects national interests to posit the blurring of existing distinctions between civilian and soldier, between individual crime and organized violence.[4] Robert Kaplan evokes this mood in the title of his influential essay, "The Coming Anarchy and the Nation State Under Siege."[5] In a more muted, but still essentially pessimistic tone, is the influential thesis of the ultimately insoluble "clash of civilizations" advanced by Samuel Huntington.[6]

But whether or not one takes the more pessimistic or optimistic viewpoint, the missions of the armed forces will be structured in ways fundamentally different from the relative certainties of the Cold War. A distinguishing feature of the contemporary period is the decline of wars between states and the rise of war within states, sometimes resulting in state collapse. Separating belligerents, resettlement of refugees, delivery of food and medical supplies, providing security for humanitarian organizations, and so forth, create demands that, if not entirely new, are certainly of a larger scale, than those with which the military traditionally contends. Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions have come to occupy a more central position in military doctrine than ever before. Indeed, the term "military humanitarianism" enters the new vocabulary and strikes few as an oxymoron.[7]

Although many of these changes can be traced back prior to the end of the Cold War, they have become more prominent since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union two years later. It is incontestable that the demise of the Soviet Union has ushered in a new era in international relations and with it concomitant changes in the structure and culture of the armed forces. Very important, the very missions of the military shift from primarily war-fighting or war deterrence to military deployments for peace and humanitarian purposes. Table 1 lists over fifty military operations by Western nations since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, and is by no means a complete accounting. In virtually all of these missions, the main purpose was of a peace or humanitarian nature.

[Table 1 About Here]

The changes taking place, of course, are not simply confined to the military or to the realm of war. On the contrary, we are dealing with a general reorganization of post-industrial societies. There are several indicators that sweeping change is taking place. Of special relevance for us is the relative weakening of central forms of social organization that have been the hallmarks of the modern age: the nation-state and national markets. The substantial growth of global social organizations has altered the conditions under which modern nation-states can expect to exercise their power, maintain the loyalty of their citizens, or raise and deploy their military might.

Social commentators who conceptualized the shift away from the paradigm of the old industrial state to something new are as diverse as David Reisman, Marshall McLuhan, Alvin Toffler, and Robert Reich.[8] Respectively, these observers pointed to the shift from inner-directed to other-directed societies, from

print to electronic media, from industrial to information based economies, and from producers of goods to symbolic analysts as the dominant occupation. These macro-organizational shifts also correspond with the demographic transition from high to low fertility societies.

The postmodern movement began as a whimsical architectural style around 1960 in reaction to the dominant "international" style. In the 1970's postmodernism became a fashionable form of literary criticism in which all "texts" (pronouncements, novels, historical events, etc.) are indeterminate, subject to endless interpretation and reinterpretation. Postmodernism began to infiltrate social theory by the early 1980's and to subvert absolute values and metaphysical foundations. This is not the place to render a full treatment of postmodernism. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that postmodernism subverts absolute values and introduces a profound relativism into discourse. The operative terms are pluralism, fragmentation, heterogeneity, deconstruction, permeability, and ambiguity.

The advent of information technologies and their impact on armed forces has been described as the Revolution in Military Affairs, or RMA for short. Proponents of the RMA point to the accelerated integration of computer-age technologies into weapon system and military command and control networks. The RMA carries the promise of greater military agility, precision, and potency, but it also requires large force reductions to finance the new technology. A corollary of the RMA is the lessening of the distinctions between warrior and non-warrior, between officers and other ranks, and between the branches of the military. Congruent with the concept of the postmodern military, the RMA vision does point to a qualitative break with the patterns of warfare characteristic of the modern eras.[9]

Yet another contemporary sign of the interpenatrability between armed forces and civilian spheres is the closer cooperation between armed forces and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in humanitarian operations. Though we are accustomed to thinking of the military and the NGOs as contrasting types of organizations, even contrasting character types -- the tough-minded and the high-minded -- this is becoming increasingly wrong. At the very time the military becomes more nuanced in its dealing with local populaces in peace and humanitarian missions, the NGOs become more reliant and even more supportive of the military. The secretary general of Doctors Without Borders argues for an international force to break the grip of Hutu gangs in refugee camps in Zaire.[10] Similarly, the humanitarian agency Oxfam states U.N. troops should secure refugee areas in Rwanda.[11]

The United States Armed Forces After the Cold War

Changes in military organization reflect, as they sometimes affect, large-scale social changes in the broader society. Comprehensive analysis of these reciprocal relations require a clear specification of the dimensions along which change is expected to occur. As a practical matter, we rely on typologies of military organization to accomplish this task, even though we are fully aware that any typology does an injustice to reality.

Drawing heavily on the experience of the United States, it is possible to describe and contrast modern, late modern, and postmodern military organizations, and to speculate about the factors facilitating movement from one type to the other. These trends within the three basic types are summarized in Table 2.

[Table 2 About Here]

Our concern is to grasp the whole, to place the salient facts within a framework that will enable us to study the main trends of institutional development in military organization. The typology, in other words, is offered as a guide to systematize current research findings. We must avoid using it mechanically to bring artificial closure to our thinking about these matters. Its use, rather, is to help bring focus to ongoing research and, if need be, to set the stage for revising the analytic framework we are about to present. The discussion in this section depends mainly on the American experience.

Perceived Threat

We begin with the simple idea that the probability of war and the perception of threats shape the basic relations between armed forces and society. One key difference between modern and postmodern societies lies in the character of the threats they face and the ways they perceive them. For modern states, the threat of enemy invasion of the homeland, or of close allies, is always a real possibility that has to be defended against. Over the last two centuries, an important factor accounting for a state's survival has been its ability to mobilize and deploy a mass armed force, relying typically on a system of military conscription to prepare its population for war. In the modern era, the threat of war, and so the justification for armed forces engaged in border defense was close at hand. Mobilization to meet this threat, at least since the end of the eighteenth century, was one of the main sources of nationalist fervor.

What are the threats against which the military is suppose to defend society? These change in time and character, as well as in specifics. In the pre-Cold War period the primary concern was invasion either of a nation or its allies. Although the source of an invasion might change and the technology of an attack certainly would change, the primary concern still remained that of invasion.

Once both sides in the Cold War acquired nuclear weapons, the older threat of invasion was supplanted by nuclear war as the primary fear. For the West, this began with the 1949 acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and reached full force by the mid-1950s, when the Soviets demonstrated both thermonuclear weapons and methods of delivering them.

The 1991 Gulf War, although not a Cold War product, nevertheless was a war involving states against state and in that sense was a throwback to the early modern period, albeit at unprecedented levels of high technology on the winning side. The threat, however, was not one of invasion to the West (although Kuwait was invaded), but to oil interests that were deemed vital to national security.

As we enter the post-Cold War era, most states are not concerned with invasion or of nuclear war initiated by enemy states (though the fear of nuclear terrorism grows). The greatest tension and violence are occurring within states, such as the former Yugoslavia with its ethnic conflicts, or African states, such as Somalia, Zaire, and Rwanda, with starvation and ethnic struggles.

The American military rapidly created new training exercises and manuals to incorporate lessons learned from deployments since the end of the Cold War. New buzzwords entered the Pentagon lexicon: "operations other than war," "other military operations," or "sustainment and stability operations." Likewise, the predictable acronyms are OOTW, OMO, and SASO. Whatever these kinds of missions are called, they reflect a fundamental shift in the emphasis of armed forces from defense of the homeland to multinational peace and humanitarian missions. Indeed, one of the growing internal debates within military circles is the degree to which "operations other than war" detract from the "warrior" capabilities of the armed forces.[12]

In addition to intra-state violence, other matters come to occupy the attention of armed forces in Western states and many of these tend to be non-military in

any traditional sense. Threats to national security increasingly have transnational dimensions, such as the drug trade, uncontrolled immigration, and environmental degradation. A few examples suffice to make the point. In 1991 the Army constructed 10-foot high steel-panel fence on the Mexican border to close off a popular route for smugglers who were bringing drugs and illegal aliens into the United States. In 1992 and 1993, the American Navy and Coast Guard picked up thousands of Haitians at sea seeking to enter the United States and placed them in refugee camps at the American naval base in Cuba. In fact, the American invasion of Haiti in 1994 was in motivated in part by the desire to stop illegal Haitian immigration to the United States.

Force Structure

As the perceived threat changes, so also does the force structure to deal with it.[13] From the early modern era to well into the Cold War, countries relied on mass armies, typically of conscripted able-bodied men. These mass armies were based on conscripts with a cadre of professional military officers, non-commissioned officers, and certain technical specialists. From the rearmament of the Korean War, the United States, at least, relied on large standing army of conscripts until 1973, when the draft ended and the all-volunteer force came into being From that time until the end of the Cold War, the military was increasingly professional, although still large.

At the end of the Cold War threat, all continental European states relied on conscription (Britain having done away with the draft in 1963). But during the late modern period, volunteer components in technical specialties had become the rule. Still, the move toward a volunteer force came more quickly than expected once the Cold War was over. In 1995, France, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands announced plans to phase out conscription. The overriding fact

of ending conscription is the shrinking of the military forces. In the American case, the active duty force of 2.6 million in the peacetime draft years of the Cold War was down to 1.4 million by 1998. The projections were for further "drawdown" by the end of the century. With a diminishing active duty force, reserve components began to play an increasingly important role in the AVF. From being rather moribund during the Cold War period and virtually excluded from the Vietnam War, reserve forces became integral components of force deployment. Reserve forces were particularly well integrated with regular forces in combat support roles after Vietnam. This was evident in the United States military of the Persian Gulf War and in the humanitarian missions to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Still, the realities of a smaller military force and the increasing deployment of military personnel in peace and humanitarian operations dramatically heightens a personnel problem for the military. The operation tempo or "OPTEMPO" becomes heightened, with command concern that it was causing a deterioration in morale.

Dominant Military Professional

The military's genetic self image is that of a specialist in violence, ready for combat. Certainly in pre-Cold War times, the primary military need was for the leader skilled in the arts of war and leadership. For situations involving direct combat, such leaders are still needed. Increasingly, however, technological sophistication replaces brute force as the key to victory. Probably the most well known finding in military sociology tells how the dominant type of military professional shifts from the combat leader in the early modern period to the managerial technician in the late modern period. This shift was most clearly argued for in the American case by Morris Janowitz.[14]

In the postmodern period, more than a residue of the warrior spirit will continue within the officer corps, but we can also expect to see the ascendancy of alternative professional types: the soldier-scholar, including the attainment of advanced civilian degrees; and the soldier-statesman, the officer skilled in handling the media and adept in the intricacies of international diplomacy. This is not to suggest that soldier-scholars were absent in earlier eras, but the relevant empirical question is which kind of officer will most likely be promoted into the military elite. Of some note is that when General Wesley K. Clark was selected as supreme commander of NATO and all American forces in Europe in 1997, he was described as "scholarly" and possessing the "diplomatic skill" that made him right for the job.[15] Likewise, in the same year, when General H. Hugh Shelton was selected to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was announced, a key factor was "how he transformed from a warrior to a diplomat" during the 1994 American intervention in Haiti.[16]

Media Relations

In the modern period, the civilian media are typically an integral part of the military system. Through World War II, the American media were basically incorporated into the armed forces. Not only were journalists subject to censorship, but they also had formal status in the armed forces including the wearing of military uniforms. In essence, both the media and the military were "on the same team."

In the late modern period, the media, while no longer incorporated into the armed forces, are nevertheless subject to a high degree of control as occurred during the American operations in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War. The defense establishment effectively controlled the media through the use of press "pools" in which only a small and select number of journalists was given access

to the troops. The media saw itself as being manipulated by the military, even though there was no formal censorship.

The post-Cold War era, as represented by the operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, presents an entirely different situation.[17] The media are frequently "in country" before the arrival of the military and take care of their own logistical needs. More important, the media are essentially autonomous entities as technological advances allow for direct transmission of news to the outside world. Whereas the media are manipulated by the armed forces in the late modern period, they are courted by the military in the postmodern era. The ultimate in postmodernism may well be the "CNN factor," in which commanders watch commercial television to see what is happening in their areas of operation.

Civilian Employees

The civilian component of the defense establishment undergoes significant change as well.[18] In modern military systems, civilians are a minor component of the operational side of the defense establishment. But, in the late modern period, an increasing number of civilian employees work in the defense establishment in operational roles. In part this is due to turning over many menial jobs to civilian workers on the grounds of cost effectiveness and releasing soldiers from non-training tasks. More important, the shift toward civilians is due to the military's greater reliance on technically complex weapons systems, with the corresponding need for technical experts, both contract and direct-hires, to work in the field and at sea. At least since the 1950's, the capabilities of American warships would be severely handicapped without the civilian technicians -- "tech reps" -- who maintain their weapon systems.

In the buildup leading to the Gulf War, some 10,000 "Emergency Essential Civilians" working for the U.S. military were sent to Saudi Arabia to help operate

logistics systems. Interestingly enough, these civilian personnel had a lower rate of being returned back to the United States for physical and disciplinary reasons than regular military personnel.[19]

In the postmodern period, civilians become even more intimately involved in military functions. Without the contractors who were responsible for much of the logistics and housekeeping duties, it would be hard to conceive the American missions to Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia taking place. It is more than a historical footnote that the first American casualty in Operation Provide Comfort in Somalia was an Army civilian employee who died when the vehicle in which he was traveling hit a mine.[20] When the 1994 military relief mission to Rwanda ended in 1994, the task was turned over to civilian contractors.

Women's Role

A particularly revealing way to understand the trend toward postmodernism in the armed force is to look at the role of women in the military.[21] In the mass army of the modern period, women were typically excluded from service. In those cases where women did serve, they did so in separate corps. In the United States the Women's Army Corps (WAC) and the Navy's Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES) of World War II typified this form of utilization.

In the late modern period, separate corps were generally abolished in Western armies, though the numbers of women remained small. In the United States, women were formally integrated into many support roles starting in the 1970s. Women were allowed to join the officer commissioning programs on civilian campuses in 1972. Four years later, a major threshold was crossed with the admission of women to the military academies in 1976. Through the Cold

War period, however, American policy remained one of exclusion of military women from combat roles or even being assigned to areas of high risk.

In the postmodern military, pressures grow to incorporate women into all assignments, including combat roles. Although the United States was not in the forefront of the movement, by the 1990s steps in that direction were clearly evident. Starting in 1995, Navy women were allowed to serve aboard warships (excluding submarines) and as combat pilots aboard aircraft carriers. Similarly, women pilots (albeit a small number) were assigned to bombers and fighter planes in the Air Force. Though still excluded from the ground combat assignments at the time of this writing, the role of women in the American military had increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Starting in the early 1990s, basic training was gender integrated in all of the armed forces, except in the Marine Corps and in the ground combat arms of the Army.

Spouse and Military Community

In the not so distant past -- the 1950s -- a junior enlisted man informing a superior of his wish to marry would be admonished: "If the Army wanted you have a wife, it would have issued you one." And, in fact, about nine out of ten draftees and first-term soldiers were single men. With the advent of the all-volunteer force, there is a striking increase in the proportion of married soldiers. Thus, for example at the pay grade level of a corporal, only one in ten were married in the years of conscription compared to three in ten in the AVF. In a striking reversal of the draft pattern, soldiers in the AVF are more likely to be married than their civilian counterparts. The presence of large numbers of married junior enlisted personnel becomes an accepted reality. Indeed, the commandant of the Marine Corps was publicly rebuked in 1993 when he proposed that recruits be limited to single persons only.

For the career soldier, especially commissioned officers, military membership in a manner extended to his wife and family. [22] The military wife was expected to take part in numerous social functions and "volunteer" activities. Indeed, promotion to higher ranks might depend to some degree on how well one's wife performed in this role. These formal and informal requirements for officer wives seemed more pronounced in the American than in European militaries.

In the late modern period, a discernible trend was the increasing reluctance of wives of military personnel at both the noncommissioned and officer levels to take part in customary military social functions. This trend became more pronounced in the postmodern military as military spouses became much more likely to have employment outside of the home. Fewer and fewer of them -- and we are still speaking mainly of wives rather than of husbands -- have either the time or the inclination to engage in the social life of military installations. Curiously enough, it appears that as demands on military spouses decrease, there is more resentment of those demands that remain.

Homosexuals in the Military

The status of homosexuals in the military remains contentious, but the general movement is toward increased toleration and acceptance.[23] During the modern period of the mass army, military personnel who were discovered to be homosexuals were frequently incarcerated during times of war, or dishonorably discharged during times of peace. Such punishment did not prevent homosexuals from performing military service or having covert forms of informal associations. In the late modern military of the Cold War, homosexuals were still not welcome, though the severity of punishment diminished. Gays and lesbians were typically given medical discharges, though even these could be coded in

ways by which civilian employers could know the cause of discharge. The trend, however, was toward less stigmatizing discharges.

A key characteristic of postmodernism is lack of consensus on absolute standards to inform moral judgments. As the status of homosexuals becomes increasingly accepted in society at large, similar pressures arise to allow open homosexuals to serve in the armed forces. The United States occupies somewhat of a midposition on the issue of homosexuals in the military. It is more lenient than the United Kingdom or certain Mediterranean countries, but much more restrictive than the policies found in Scandinavia, the Netherlands or Canada.

The controversy surrounding President Bill Clinton's effort to lift the gay ban in 1993 dominated much of the news coverage of the new Administration. After much negotiation between service chiefs, the Congress, and the Administration, the new policy announced in 1994 forbade the military to inquiry as to a service member's sexual orientation, but if the service member declared his or her homosexuality, than that person was to be discharged. In other words, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy meant in effect that a discrete homosexual could remain in the service.

Only time will tell whether "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" would hold firm or was only a way station to the full integration of open homosexuals into the American armed forces. In point of fact, the number of male homosexuals discharged declined slightly in the first four years after the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was introduced. The number of lesbians discharged, however, increased during the same period -- a reflection, most likely, of the increasing number of women in the military. For both sexes, homosexual discharges were much more likely to be due to "telling" than by authorities "asking." For fiscal year 1997 in the Army, 171 homosexuals were discharged for "admissions" compared to four for "acts."

Although the lifting of the full ban seemed unlikely, the United States has clearly moved toward greater acceptance of homosexuality than would have been imagined a decade or so earlier.

Conscientious Objection

In most modern Western societies, the state formally recognized conscientious objection, but limited such recognition to traditional "peace churches," such as the Mennonites, Brethren, Quakers, Seventh Day Adventists, and, with less consistency, the Jehovah's Witnesses. Screening is fairly severe. Conscientious objectors, if not outright allowed, were often given the option of going to prison or serving in a noncombatant role in the military. This was basically the case in the United States up to World War II. By the late modern period, the state accepts broad religiously based objection as a criterion; thus objector status is granted to COs from mainline Protestant denominations, Roman Catholicism, and other religious bodies. This stage saw the appearance of alternative civilian service as occurred in America during World War II.

In postmodern Western societies, the definition of conscientious objection vastly expands to include secular and humanitarian motives.[24] In effect, religion is no longer a defining factor. This secularization of conscience is accompanied by a definite movement toward regarding civilian service as the functional, and even civic, equivalent of military service. With the advent of all-volunteer forces, conscientious objection appears even among serving military members. During the Gulf War several hundred American servicemen claimed CO status. Almost surely the first female CO appeared at that time, though her name, up to now at least, has been lost to history.

The Postmodern Paradigm

The three-stage paradigm can be applied to other phenomena. For example. The first Muslim chaplain entered the America armed forces in 1993, thus ending the monopoly of the chaplaincy by Christians and Jews. In another symbol of growing religious diversity, starting in 1997, soldiers of Native American Indian descent were allowed to use the hallucinogenic plant peyote in religious services. Congress significantly boosted military involvement in domestic projects when it passed the Civil-Military Cooperative Action Program in 1992 to meet "domestic needs" by improving "environment and economic and social conditions."[25] Congress in 1993 directed the Secretary of Defense to start a pilot community outreach to combat drug abuse among young people.

The anti-adultery regulations of the military justice system came under heavy attack from the establishment press owing to highly publicized cases. Thus, the New York Times castigated the "antiquated adultery rules" of the armed forces.[26] The salient point was that the very idea that the moral codes of the military and those of civilian society should be different was now coming under postmodern criticism. In August, 1998, the Department of Defense issued new guidelines on the prosecution of adultery. Significantly, there was no major departure from the status quo.

The postmodern military also finds itself working more closely with various governmental entities. Western military forces have collaborated with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Africa and supported the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in monitoring elections in the former Yugoslavia. The United States military has worked closely with American governmental inter-agency personnel in training and setting up local police forces in Haiti. The head of the National Defense Panel set up by the Department of Defense in 1996 to assess the future of the armed forces reported

to Congress that future military forces would "require different forces and more cooperation with other agencies of government and private agencies.[27]

Comparative Analyses

The American case presents itself as a good reference point not only for the intrinsic interest that inheres in the world's foremost military power, but also because its military occupies somewhat of a midposition on the spectrum of postmodern developments. The essential observable features of the postmodern military described above from the American case are phrased in terms suitable for cross-national research in Western advanced democracies

For this project a distinguished group of military sociologists were asked to discuss the relationship between the military and their society along a series of postmodern dimensions discussed above in the American armed forces. The organizing principle was to capture the commonalty as well as uniqueness of each nation's civil-military changes in the post-Cold War era.

We use the comparative case study method, choosing the richness of detail provided by expert observers of the armed forces in their own societies. Our approach is case-based, rather than variable based. This decision differs from the dominant methodology of empirical social science based on the language of hypothesis testing, in which researchers develop theories that specify relationships among variables and then collect data to determine the extent to which the relationships hold. The corresponding methodology deals largely with measurement questions, determining the reliability of the data and with statistical manipulation.

Comparative analyses have no logical affinity with the variable-based approach, and is often best perused with case studies. Statistical analyses tend to break cases into parts and require many simplifying assumptions, while

qualitative comparisons allow examination of constellations and configurations. Variable-based analysis generally starts simply with one independent variable, then adds more independent variables, usually one by one, to deduce the variance in explaining a dependent variable. Case-based analysis starts out complicated and then begins to discard extraneous independent variables that do not affect the dependent variable, while remaining sensitive to organizational complexity and historical specificity. Variables are discarded rather than added as the analysis proceeds. This kind of analysis assumes that causal relations are complex, and allows the judgment of knowledgeable observers to be taken more fully into account.

The full presentation of the comparative analysis is presented in the forthcoming volume, The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War. [28] A summary version is given below.

Great Britain

Many of the traditions of the military forces of English-speaking nations have been adopted from the armed forces of the United Kingdom which has probably been a more enthusiastic keeper of these traditions than her former colonies or fellow members of the Commonwealth. Christopher Dandeker points out that as the British armed forces move into the post-Cold War world, they bring with them elements of earlier periods as well. Thus, while new missions are being faced with smaller, more flexible forces, more dependent on civilian personnel and contractor support, and the forces are moving toward full integration of women, preparations for traditional military missions has not been excluded. The roles of soldier-statesman and soldier-scholar have not supplanted the role of warrior and homosexuality continues to be regarded as incompatible with military service.

France

If the long-term cross-national trend is in the direction of a new postmodern form of military organization, this development has nowhere been as dramatically illustrated in the mid-1990s as it has been in France. As Bernard Boene and Michel Martin demonstrate, as recently as 1994, although colonial wars and deterrence of Warsaw Pact aggression had faded into the past, nuclear deterrence was still central of the French military mission. Most significantly, the birthplace of the mass armed forces still clung to a conscription-based army. By contrast, during the late 1990s, the decay of the public service tradition was evident, conscientious objection had increased, France was moving rapidly toward a smaller, more professional, volunteer military, focused on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The roles of soldier-scholar, soldier-diplomat, and soldier-communicator were on the ascent.

Germany

The armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany are deeply rooted in alliances, initially NATO and now the European Union as well. As Bernhard Fleckenstein suggests, the Bundeswehr may be forerunner of a post-national military in advanced democratic societies. Germany is also a forerunner toward a postmodern military in another way. During the 1990s, conscientious objection had reached such levels that about one in three draftable men chose civilian service over military service. These conscientious objectors enjoy good standing in German society has they deliver needed human services in medical and institutional facilities for the disabled and delivery of services to elderly or handicapped people. Ironically enough, with the end of the Cold War and the possible end of conscription, Germans seem more concerned over losing the conscientious objectors who perform alternative service than over the loss of

draftees who would fight in the eventuality of war. In one key feature, however, the German military does not accord with the postmodern paradigm. Nowhere else in the West do women play such a minuscule role in the armed forces.

Netherlands

The Netherlands is crossing a historic threshold. Its centuries old conscription system for the active force is coming to an end. This development along with military unionization, acceptance of homosexuals, women in combat assignments, and a strong commitment to peackeeping missions would seem to have launched the Dutch armed forces well into postmodernity. Yet, as Jan S. van der Meulen points out, the military may be becoming more marginalized rather than postmodern; marginalized in the sense that it is no longer a major institution in Dutch society. Also the move toward professionalization may see some backtracking on liberal social policies within the rank and file. Most significantly, there is deep soul-searching on the utility of the military in the wake of the Dutch contingent's lamentable failure to stop the killing of 7,000 Moslems in the Srebrenica area of Bosnia, in its role as part of the United Nations Protection Force.

Denmark

In overall terms, the Danish armed forces fit the postmodern paradigm remarkably well. Security policies are influenced more by national desire than by actual threats to the nation. Or as Henning Sorensen phrases it, the armed forces have gone from national defense to collective to selective defense. The downsizing of the Danish armed forces reduces the significance of conscription as rite of passage for adult males. Data gathers from Danish surveys show a marked tendency toward individualization rather than broader identities. The

major departure from the postmodern model is that there has been no decline in the positive attitude the Danish public holds of its military. This may be because the Danish military have yet to undergo a serious scrutiny or investigation by the media or other groups.

Italy

The Italian military, as with most other Western armed forces, is in the throes of a massive drawdown and a shrinking military budget. Indeed, the Army Chief of Staff in protesting the budgetary cuts was quoted as saying: "It would be better to abolish the Army." As described by Marina Nuciari, however, the Italian armed forces remain relatively traditional with regard to restrictions on homosexuals, limits on the role of women, and an almost invisible conscientious objectors program. A strong postmodern element does appear in the dramatic transformation of the military purpose, however. The traditional concerns of territorial defense have given to the new perceived threats of terrorism and uncontrolled immigration. This has led to a fundamental questioning in Italy of what is the purpose of military service.

Canada

Among the Anglo-American nations (with due acknowledgment of the centrality of Quebec in the Canadian fabric), Canada has probably moved earliest and farthest from a traditional military model. Canada's military posture is increasingly driven by internal rather than external considerations, and both value integration with the host society and transparency of the civil-military interface are paramount. As Franklin Pinch notes, while there is continued involvement in global activities such as peacekeeping, public support for the military is ambivalent. Defense spending is at its lowest point since the 1930s

and the active Canadian Forces have less support from a reserve structure than is the case in most other Western countries. The armed forces themselves have been increasingly democratized, liberalized, and civilianized. The dominant professional roles in the Canadian military are becoming the soldier-diplomat and the corporate manager. As elements of a more general societal concern with human rights, both gender integration and sexual orientation integration have progressed further in the Canadian forces than in other Anglo-American nations.

Australia and New Zealand

As Cathy Downes notes, although Australia and New Zealand were on the periphery of the Cold War, they were clearly influenced by it. Like England, and Canada, they have used conscription only rarely. In the post-Cold War era, they have experienced an accumulation of new missions, with alliance arrangements, as they have reoriented themselves toward the Asia-Pacific region and as information-age dynamics weave them more tightly into the global community. Australia and New Zealand have maintained a high ratio of officers to enlisted personnel, reflecting the recognition that for mobilization purposes it takes more time to "grow" officers. As the enlisted ranks have been reduced, their armed forces have become more dependent on defense civilians and contractors. At the officer level, the role of combat leader, which dominated until recently, is now being accompanied by the role of military entrepreneur, as corporate culture spreads through the military and it becomes more concordant with civilian society, and that of military diplomat, as the force structure becomes shaped by contemporary contingencies.

Switzerland

Switzerland defines itself as a special and unique case: no war for a century and a half, neutrality and non-alliance as national policy, and a militia conscription system whose universality for males is not approached by any other European country. Karl Haltiner describes how the age-old Swiss system is now being increasingly undermined. Advanced military technology cannot be maintained by a part-time militia. Military service for young men is becoming more likely to be regarded as a nuisance to be avoided than entry into an important reference group. It is unlikely that Switzerland will abandon its militia system entirely, but it will find itself increasingly relying on more volunteers and long-term professionals.

Israel

Israel confronts genuine threats to its national survival. This is the overriding reality that shapes the format of the Israeli Defense Force and civil-military relations. Since the inception of the nation in 1948, the Israeli military has also been the great melting pot for Jews coming from the various diasporas. Israel is the only country that conscripts women, although the role of female soldiers is circumscribed. Reuven Gal and Stuart A. Cohen see some signs of postmodern trends in the Israeli Defense Force, notably in suggestions to widen the definition of service to include civilian service, perhaps even incorporating non-Jewish Israelis. But the authors argue basically that Israel does not fit a postmodern paradigm. Yet, they do not note that new strategic concerns with missile attacks rather than direct invasions may erode the concept of conscription even in Israel in favor of a more smaller, more technically advanced force.

Conclusion

The hallmark of the modern military was that of an institution legitimated in terms of values and norms based on a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. Members of the American military were often seen as following a calling captured in words like "duty, honor, and country." With the end of conscription and the advent of an all-volunteer force, supply and demand factors of the marketplace enter the late modern military. Distinctive military values still predominate, but occupational incentives of the marketplace came to compete with normative considerations of an institution. [29]

The postmodern model, however, implies much more. The structure, makeup, and purpose of the armed forces changes as well as the values. The basic point is that a postmodern military ultimately derives from the decline in the level of threat to the nation and, in the American case certainly, the rise in identity politics based on ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation.

The social sciences can come to grips with constantly changing realities only by recasting conceptual frameworks. Of course, experience teaches us that it would be unwise to claim an indefinite life expectancy for any new paradigm. But when reality makes the postmodern framework obsolete, so be it. For the foreseeable future, however, it appears to be a good guidepost to armed forces after the Cold War.

We finish with a caveat, a speculation, and a conclusion. The caveat is not to take for granted that the movement toward a postmodern military will continue into the future. The speculation is that we may be moving into an era in which a future conflict might occur between a military system anchored in traditional social forms (with relatively low technology) and one more postmodern with high technology. The form of social organization might become more important than the level of technology.

Footnotes

[1] The literature on how the military and war laid the basis for the modern state is quite extensive. See, especially Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954); Brian M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1990), Charles Tilly, ed., Coercion, Capital, and European States (Cambridge, Mass: Basil Blackwood, 1990); Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State (N.Y.: Free Press, 1994).

[2] Of course, the "modern" era can be traced as far back as the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) which ended the Thirty Years War, and certainly to the levee en masse of the French Revolution in 1793 when the concept of the citizen soldiers enters the European continent.

[3] Frances Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (NY: Free Press, 1992). See also Martin Shaw, Post-Military Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); and Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War (N.Y.: Guilford Press, 1997).

[4] Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (NY: Free Press, 1991).

[5] See, notably, Robert Kaplan. "The Coming Anarchy and the Nation State Under Siege," Sources of Conflict (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1995), pp. 7-11.

[6] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

[7] Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 5, Sept./Oct. 1991, pp. 451-465.

[8] David Reisman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952); Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1964); Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (NY :William Morrow, 1980); and Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations (NY: A.A. Knopf, 1991).

[9] The literature of the Revolution in Military Affairs is quite extensive. For a concise guide, see James R. Blaker and Robert A. Mannin, eds., Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America's 21st Century Defense (Washington, D.C.: Progressive Policy Institute, 1997).

[10] Alain Destxhe, "We Can't be a Party to Slaughter in Rwanda," New York Times, Feb. 9, 1995, p. A15. See also, Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 5 (Sept./Oct. 1991), pp. 451-465; and Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995).

[11] Reuters, April 24, 1995.

[12] An early empirical study on the potential contradictions been the warrior and the peacekeeping roles, based on the U.N. contingent in Cyprus, is Charles Moskos, Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. My conclusion was that: "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it." For more recent empirical studies of military attitudes in peacekeeping missions, see David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, Peacekeepers and Their Wives (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993); Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, "Humanitarians or Warriors? Race, Gender and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Summer, 1995), pp. 615-637; David R. Segal and Dana P. Eyre, The U.S. Army in Peace Operations at the Dawning of the Twentieth Century (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1996).

[13] For discussion of changes in the recruitment and force structure of U.S. forces, see, David R. Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989); and Sam Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr., America's Armed Forces (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996).

[14] Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960). Where Janowitz saw the need for the professional officer corps to have greater civilian interaction, Samuel P. Huntington saw an inevitable, and not necessarily bad, disjuncture between the conservative ethos of the officer corps and the liberal society. See Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957). A recent analysis of the contemporary officer corps is Edward C. Meyer and R. Manning Ancell with Jane Mahaffey, Who Will Lead? Senior Leadership in the United States Army (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995). See also, David R. Segal, Organizational Designs for the Future Army (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1993).

[15] "Clinton Picks Army General for NATO Post," New York Times, April 1, 1997, p. A3.

[16] "Cohen Gets One Right," Time, July 28, 1997, p. 52.

[17] See Peter R. Young, ed., Defence and the Media in Time of Limited War (London: Frank Cass, 1992)); Larry Minear, Colin Scott, and Thomas G. Weiss, The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); and Charles Moskos with Thomas E. Ricks, Reporting War When There Is No War: The Media and the Military in Peace and Humanitarian Operations (Chicago, IL: McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1996).

[18] There is little research on the subject of civilians who work for the military. For one of the few analytical treatments, see Martin Binkin, Shaping the Defense Civilian Work Force (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978).

[19] Of the 2,297 Department of Army civilians assigned to Desert Shield/Storm, five would not go and four were sent back after arrival in Saudi Arabia. Personal communication (1994) to author by a Department of Army official.

[20] New York Times, Dec., 24, 1992, p. 1.

[21] The literature on women in the armed forces is vast and growing. See, especially, Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution (Novato, CA; Presidio, 1992); Sandra Carson Stanley, Women in the Military (NY: Julian Messner, 1993); Laura L. Miller, "Feminism and the Exclusion of Army Women from Combat," Working Paper No. 2, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, December, 1995; Judith Hicks Stiehm, ed., It's Our Military, Too (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1996); and Linda Bird Francke, Ground Zero: The Gender Wars in the Military (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1997). A useful comparative examination is Mady Wechsler Segal, "Women's Military Roles Cross-Nationally: Past Present, and Future," Gender and Society Vol. 9, No. 6 (Dec., 1995), pp. 757-775.

[22] For a summary of the literature, see Mady Wechsler Segal and Jesse J. Harris, What We Know About Army Families, (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Science, 1993).

[23] A compendium on homosexuals in the armed forces is Wilbur J. Scott and Sandra Carson Stanley, eds., Gays and Lesbians in the Military (NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1994).

[24] A full discussion of conscientious objection across Western democracies is found in Charles C. Moskos and John W. Chambers, eds., The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance (NY.: Oxford University Press, 1993).

[25] Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "The Last American Warrior: Non-Traditional Missions and the Decline of the U.S. Armed Forces," Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 1994), pp. 65-82.

[26] The Discharge of Kelly Flinn," New York Times, May 23, 1997, p. A18.

[27] Remarks of Philip A. Odeen, AUSA News, June, 1997, p. 9.

[28] Charles Moskos, John A. Williams, and David R. Segal, eds., The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[29] For a full discussion of institutional versus occupation norms in the armed forces, see Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood eds. , The Military: More Than Just a Job? (McLean, Va.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988.

Table 1. POST-GULF WAR MILITARY ROLES OF WESTERN NATIONS

(partial listing) through 1998

Location	Date	Mission	Participants
1. USA borders "Joint Task Six"	1990--	Assist in drug interdiction	100-1,500 military; plus law enforcement agencies
2. Turkey " Operation Provide Comfort"	1991	Kurdish refugee relief & enforce no-fly zone	US forces and coalition partners (23,000 peak)
3. Bangladesh "Operation Sea Angel"	1991	Flood relief	8,000 US Marines & Navy
4. Philippines "Operation Fiery Vigil"	July 1991	Mt. Inatubo volcano rescue	5,000 US Navy & Marine Corps
5. Cuba " Operation Safe Passage"	Nov. 1991-May 1992	Haitian refugee relief	US Military and Coast Guard (2,000 peak)
6. Italy "Operation Volcano Buster"	Dec. 1991	Mt. Etna volcano rescue	Small US Marines/Navy force
7. California "Joint Task Force Los Angeles"	May 1992	Restore domestic order	8,000 US Army & Marine Corps, 12,000 National Guard
8. Florida	Aug.-Set. 1992	Disaster relief following Hurricane Andrew	21,000 US Air force, Marines, 6,000 National Guard
8. Iraq "Operation Southern Watch"	Aug. 1992--	Surveillance	US Air Force, Navy
10. Hawaii	Sept. 1992	Disaster relief following eruption of Iniki	National Guard, small US Marines/Air Force
11. Somalia "Operation Restore Hope"	Dec. 1992 – May 1993	Famine relief and restore order	Large US & UN force (peak 35,000)
12.Former Yugoslavia and Macedonia "Able Sentry"	Dec. 1992-	Monitor border	1,000 UN force: Nordic contingent, USA Bn
13. Kuwait "Operation Iris Gold"	Jan. 1993-	Kuwait defense coalition forces	4,000 US Army
14. Somalia (UNOSOM II)	May 1993-Dec. 1994	Establish order & humanitarian aid	15,000 UN force (peak): esp. USA, Belgium, Italy,

			France, Nigeria
15. Iraq	Jun. 1993	Baghdad Bombing	US air forces
16. Puerto Rico	Jul. 1993	Anti-drug law enforcement police	300 National Guard troops with local
17. Rwanda	Jun. 1993-May 1994	Oversee cease-fire & elections	2,200 UN force : esp. Bangladesh, Ghana, Belgium
18. Colombia	Jan.-Feb. 1994	Civic works engineers	150 US Army
19. Bosnia	Feb. 1994	Downing of Serb fighter planes	US (first NATO military action)
20. Rwanda	April 1994	Rescue foreign nationals	Belgium & France: also US Marines in Burundi
21. Bosnia	April 1994	Bombing of Serb Positions	US planes under NATO
22. Washington state	July 1994	Forest fire fighting	600 active-duty, 7,000 reservists
23. Bosnia	Aug.-Sept. 1994	Air strikes against Bosnian Serbs	US & British planes under NATO
24. Dominican Republic	Sept. 1994	Monitor Haiti embargo	Small force; USA, Canada, Argentina
25. Haiti "Operation Uphold Democracy"	Sept. 1994 – March 1995	Secure change of government	20,000 USA at peak, token forces from 24 other nations
26. Kuwait "Operation Vigilant Warrior"	Oct.-Dec. 1994	Protect Kuwait from Iraq	13,000 force at peak, mainly USA
27. Bosnia	Nov. 1994	Air strikes against Serbs in Croatia	US, British & French planes (largest NATO military action)
28. Kazakstan "Operation Sapphire"	Nov. 1994	Removal of uranium	US civilian-military team
29. Panama "Operation Safe Haven"	Sept. 1994 – March !995	Guarding Cuban refugees	3,000 US military at peak (240 hurt Dec. 7-8)
30. Somalia "Operation United Shield"	Dec. 1994 – March 1995	Aid evacuation of UN troops	1,800 US Marines, 400 Italians
31. Haiti United Nations Mission in Haiti	March 1995 – Dec. 1997	Oversee transition to elected government	6,000 peak (major contingents from Bangladesh, Pakistan, USA)
32. Iraq	Aug. 1995-	Enforcement of no-fly zone	USA and coalition partners

33. Bosnia IFOR Implementation Unit "Operation Joint Endeavor"	Dec. 1995 – Dec-1996	Enforce peace agreement	60,000 NATO force (20,000 US including in Hungary)
34. Liberia "Operation Quick Response"	May – Aug. 1996	Evacuate American nationals	US Marines and Special Forces
35. Atlanta, GA Joint Task Force Olympics	July – Aug 1996	Security and transportation	8,000 US Army (mainly reserve components)
36. Iraq	Sept. 1996	Air attack on missile sites	US Air Force and Navy
37. Bosnia SFOR Stabilization Force	Dec. 1996 -	Enforce peace agreement	20,00 NATO force (6,000 US)
38. Zaire	April 1997	Evacuate foreign nationals	1,200 troops from USA, Belgium, France, Britain
39. Sierra Leone	June 1997	Evacuate foreign nationals	US Marines
40. Haiti "Operation New Horizon"	Dec. 1997 -	Civil works	500 US military
41. Persian Gulf "Operation Desert Thunder"	Feb. 1998	Bombing of Iraq	Large US military force with some allies

Table 2. ARMED FORCES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Armed Forces Variable	Modern Pre-Cold War (1900-1945)	Late Modern Cold War (1945 – 1990)	Postmodern Post-Cold War (since 1990)
Perceived Threat	Enemy invasion	Nuclear war	Subnational and nonmilitary
Force Structure	Mass army, conscription	Large professional military	Small professional military
Major Mission Definition	Defense of homeland	Support of alliance	New missions, e.g. peacekeeping, humanitarian
Dominant Military Professional	Combat leader	Manager or technician	Soldier-statesman, soldier-scholar
Media Relations	Incorporated	Manipulated	Courted
Civilian Employees	Minor component	Medium component	Major component
Women's Role	Separate corps or excluded	Partial integration	Full integration
Spouse and Military	Integral part	Partial involvement	Removed
Homosexuals in Military	Punished	Discharged	Accepted
Conscientious Objection	Limited or prohibited	Routinely permitted	Subsumed under civilian service